Wordtrade Reviews: Hiding Time

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Editorial Appraisals:
Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise most of our content represents the authors’-editors’ own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>
When I read the Introduction to this bestseller I cried with a sickening sense of sorrow, anger, and bone-deep sadness. The America I love is more seriously imperiled than I am by covid-19. Until I read this brief but empowering paean to self-knowledge and freedom of conscience. Do not be bullied into apathy. Remember your own strength and ability to love what is right and true.

New York Times bestselling author Sarah Kendzior documents the truth about the calculated rise to power of Donald Trump since the 1980s and how the erosion of our liberties made an American demagogue possible. The story of Donald Trump’s rise to power is the story of a buried American history – buried because people in power liked it that way. It was visible without being seen, influential without being named, ubiquitous without being overt.

Sarah Kendzior’s *Hiding in Plain Sight* pulls back the veil on a history spanning decades, a history of an American autocrat in the making. In doing so, she reveals the inherent fragility of American democracy – how our continual loss of freedom, the rise of consolidated corruption, and the secrets behind a burgeoning autocratic United States have been hiding in plain sight for decades.

In Kendzior’s signature and celebrated style, she expertly outlines Trump’s meteoric rise from the 1980s until today, interlinking key moments of his life with the degradation of the American political system and the continual erosion of our civil liberties by foreign powers. Kendzior also offers a never-before-seen look at her lifelong tendency to be in the wrong place at the wrong time – living in New York through 9/11 and in St. Louis during the Ferguson uprising, and researching media and authoritarianism when Trump emerged using the same tactics as the post-Soviet dictatorships she had long studied.

It is a terrible feeling to sense a threat coming, but it is worse when we let apathy, doubt, and fear prevent us from preparing ourselves. *Hiding in Plain Sight* confronts the injustice we have too long ignored because the truth is the only way forward.
Excerpt from Introduction:

...I have been studying authoritarian states for over a decade, and I would never exaggerate the severity of this threat. Others who study or have lived in authoritarian states have come to the same conclusion as me.

And the plight is beyond party politics: it is not a matter of having a president-elect whom many dislike but having a president-elect whose explicit goal is to destroy the nation.

I am writing this not for those who oppose him, but for those who support him, because Trump and his backers are going to hurt you too ...

You can look to the president-elect himself for a vision of what is to come. He has told you his plans all along, though most chose to downplay or deny them. You can even look back to before his candidacy, when in February 2014, he went on Fox News to defend Russia. Why a reality TV host was on Fox News defending Russia is its own story, but here is what he said about his desired outcome for the United States: "You know what solves it? When the economy crashes, when the country goes to total hell and everything is a disaster. Then you'll have a [chuckles], you know, you'll have riots to go back to where we used to be when we were great."

This is what "Make America Great Again" means to Donald Trump. It is how he has operated his businesses, taking advantage of economic disasters like the housing market crash for personal gain. It is why, during a long and painful recession, he made "You're fired" a national catchphrase, because he understands that sometimes it feels good to know that the person getting fired, for once, is not you. He said he could shoot someone on 5th Avenue and people would still vote for him, and he said he could grab women "by the pussy" because "When you're a star, they let you do it. You can do anything."

He is right about that last part. No one holds Trump accountable, because he is exactly what he claimed to be railing against: an elite billionaire with no concern for the average person, a kleptocrat who enjoys taunting people less powerful than him with threats. When you have that kind of money, which Trump was given at birth and further gained through fraud, there are few limitations to the ways you can hurt people.

He is right that the system is rigged: it is rigged in his favor. And now it is rigged against you, unless we find a way to stop it ...

I will rearrange my life so I can fight this fight, because I am fighting for my country, and I never give up on my country or on my countrymen.

But I need you to fight too, in the way that matters most, which is inside. Authoritarianism is not merely a matter of state control, it is something that eats away at who you are. It makes you afraid, and fear can make you cruel. It compels you to conform and to comply and accept things that you would never accept, to do things you never thought you would do.

You do it because everyone else is doing it, because the institutions you trust are doing it and telling you to do it, because you are afraid of what will happen if you do not do it, and because the voice in your head crying out that something is wrong grows fainter and fainter until it dies.

That voice is your conscience, your morals, your individuality. No one can take that from you unless you let them.

They can take everything from you in material terms—your house, your job, your ability to speak and move freely. They cannot take away who you truly are. They can never truly know you, and that is your power.
But to protect and wield this power, you need to know yourself—right now, before their methods permeate, before you accept the obscene and unthinkable as normal.

My heart breaks for the United States of America. It breaks for those who think they are my enemies as much as it does for my friends. You still have your freedom, so use it. There are many groups organizing for both resistance and subsistence, but we are heading into dark times, and you need to be your own light. Do not accept brutality and cruelty as normal even if it is sanctioned. Protect the vulnerable and encourage the afraid. If you are brave, stand up for others. If you cannot be brave—and it is often hard to be brave—be kind.

But most of all, never lose sight of who you are and what you value. If you find yourself doing something that feels questionable or wrong a few months or years from now, find that essay you wrote on who you are and read it. Ask if that version of yourself would have done the same thing. And if the answer is no? Don’t do it.

I have followed my own advice in terms of staying true to what I value and how I treat people. But despite my best efforts, this administration changed me. I had spent my professional life studying authoritarian regimes with the luxury of being able to leave them. My studies had been voluntary; I could stop at any time. When I went abroad to authoritarian states, I faced certain risks, but I took them knowing I could always return to the relative security of American life. Now the horror had come home.

The knowledge that the political transition is not yet complete, that we are still in the process of protections being stripped, speech being suppressed, and rule of law being annihilated shakes me, because I know how much worse it can get. I don’t have longing for the past. I have nostalgia for the future, because I am a mother, and whatever system wins will be the one my children inherit. When I allow myself to picture the world in ten years or twenty years, I have to force myself to stop because the pain is too much. I remind myself that the future is not set in stone, that I still have some ability to shape it. I cling to what cannot be predicted or controlled: love, imagination, originality. I try to live in a way that would break an algorithm. I pray to the unexpected.

We have lost a lot over the last few years, but one of the most disorienting losses is our sense of time. This is a common experience for people living in a democratic country that is transitioning into an autocracy. The last three years have been as much about deciphering the truth of the past as they are about debunking the lies of the present or fighting for the freedom of the future.

When I was a child, my baby boomer relatives would tell me the story of where they were when JFK was shot—the day their illusion of safety ended. That moment was crystalized: the location, the shock, the grief, the demarcation between one era and the next. In Trump’s America of nonstop crises, every day brings a soul-crushing development or an earth-shattering revelation. But I can rarely pinpoint where I was for any of them without a struggle, the way the details of a nightmare fade when you awaken but your body stays tense with fright. Everyone I know who follows the news closely experiences the same exhausting disorientation. We are trapped in a reality TV autocrat’s funhouse mirror, a blurred continuum of shock and sorrow that exhausts our capacity for clarity of thought.

There is a difference between expecting autocracy and accepting autocracy. It is necessary to expect it so that you can plan how you will fight. But the battle lines change, and you often end up changing with them, no matter how hard you try to resist. It is impossible not to change inside when children are snatched from their parents and held in concentration camps at the Texas border; when there is a sociopathic commander in chief with a nuke fetish threatening the world at whim; when the American government operates against the American people in collaboration with hostile states; and when you learn that men carried out horrific acts for decades without repercussions. It is impossible not to be shaken when you realize how many
people knew of these crimes for so long and did nothing to help the victims. You feel haunted by the alternative America that could have existed had people told the truth.

For certain twenty-first-century elites, criminal impunity has turned into criminal immunity. Public leverage is disappearing along with the concept of the public good as a priority of the powerful. You live knowing that if you aren’t a propagandist or protector of the perpetrators, you are the prey. You watch as victims of decades-old atrocities stand up and speak out, hoping for resolution in our era of reevaluation, only to be reduced to a fleeting headline or a cautionary tale. You watch as crimes become “solved” by not being called “crimes” at all. You listen to the administration lay out the road map for future horrors—an acceleration of the existential threat of climate change, an entrenchment of autocratic measures—and to pundits proclaiming that these are mere fantasies. Everyone says it can’t happen here, until it does.

When I was pregnant with my second child, I remember wondering how it could be possible to love my second as much as my firstborn. A friend told me that love for your children is infinite; your heart expands to hold it, and she was right. What I did not realize until the last few years was that the same is true of grief. Whatever well exists inside us to capture the magnitude of loss—of lives, of expectations, of freedom—is vaster than I knew or wanted to know.

There’s a kind of horror that shakes you to your core, when you start believing in the devil because of what you witness and in hell because you want comfort. Sometimes all you are left with is anguish, and the desire for others to find the strength to survive and fight. People say that history will be on your side, but these days history is an endangered commodity. In autocracies this is always the case: history can be erased, history can be rewritten. But our era is different: the present cannot become history unless there is still a future, and a future is no longer guaranteed.

People ask me how I find hope. I answer that I don’t believe in hope, and I don’t believe in hopelessness. I believe in compassion and pragmatism, in doing what is right for its own sake. Hope can be lethal when you are fighting an autocracy because hope is inextricable from time. An enduring strategy of autocrats is to simply run out the clock.

THE END OF OCTOBER: A NOVEL by Lawrence Wright

[Knopf, 9780525658658]

“An eerily prescient novel about a devastating virus that begins in Asia before going global . . . A page-turner that has the earmarks of an instant bestseller.” —New York Post

“Featuring accounts of past plagues and pandemics, descriptions of pathogens and how they work, and dark notes about global warming, the book produces deep shudders . . . A disturbing, eerily timed novel.” —Kirkus Reviews

“A compelling read up to the last sentence. Wright has come up with a story worthy of Michael Crichton. In an eerily calm, matter-of-fact way, and backed by meticulous research, he imagines what the world would actually be like in the grip of a devastating new virus.” —Richard Preston, author of The Hot Zone

“This timely literary page-turner shows Wright is on a par with the best writers in the genre.” —Publishers Weekly (starred review)

In this riveting medical thriller—from the Pulitzer Prize winner and best-selling author—Dr. Henry Parsons, an unlikely but appealing hero, races to find the origins and cure of a mysterious new killer virus as it brings the world to its knees.
At an internment camp in Indonesia, forty-seven people are pronounced dead with acute hemorrhagic fever. When Henry Parsons--microbiologist, epidemiologist--travels there on behalf of the World Health Organization to investigate, what he finds will soon have staggering repercussions across the globe: an infected man is on his way to join the millions of worshippers in the annual Hajj to Mecca. Now, Henry joins forces with a Saudi prince and doctor in an attempt to quarantine the entire host of pilgrims in the holy city . . . A Russian émigré, a woman who has risen to deputy director of U.S. Homeland Security, scrambles to mount a response to what may be an act of biowarfare . . . Already-fraying global relations begin to snap, one by one, in the face of a pandemic . . . Henry's wife, Jill, and their children face diminishing odds of survival in Atlanta . . . And the disease slashes across the United States, dismantling institutions--scientific, religious, governmental--and decimating the population. As packed with suspense as it is with the fascinating history of viral diseases, Lawrence Wright has given us a full-tilt, electrifying, one-of-a-kind thriller.

The contagion despised all medicine; death raged in every corner; and had it gone on as it did then, a few weeks more would have cleared the town of all, and everything that had a soul. Men everywhere began to despair; every heart failed them for fear; people were made desperate through the anguish of their souls, and the terrors of death sat in the very faces and countenances of the people. — DANIEL DEFOE, A Journal of the Plague Year

“But what does it mean, the plague? It’s life, that’s all.” — ALBERT CAMUS, The Plague

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Geneva
In a large auditorium in Geneva, a parliament of health officials gathered for the final afternoon session on emergency infectious diseases. The audience was restless, worn out by the day-long meetings and worried about catching their flights. The terrorist attack in Rome had everyone on edge.

“An unusual cluster of adolescent fatalities in a refugee camp in Indonesia,” the next-to-last speaker of the conference was saying. Hans Somebody. Dutch. Tall, arrogant, well fed. An untrimmed fringe of gray-blonde hair spilled over his collar, the lint on his shoulders sparkling in the projected light of the PowerPoint.

A map of Indonesia flashed on the screen. “Forty-seven death certificates were issued in the first week of March at the Kongoli Number Two Camp in West Java.” Hans indicated the spot with his laser pointer, followed by slides of destitute refugees in horrible squalor. The world was awash in displaced people, millions pressed into hastily assembled camps and fenced off like prisoners, with inadequate rations and scarce medical facilities. Nothing surprising about an epidemic spilling out of such places. Cholera, diphtheria, dengue—the tropics were always cooking up something.
“High fever, bloody discharges, rapid transmission, extreme lethality. But what really distinguishes this cluster,” Hans said, as he posted a graph, “is the median age of the victims. Usually, infections randomly span the generations, but here the fatalities spike in the age group expected to be the most vigorous portion of the population.”

In the large auditorium in Geneva, the parliament of health officials leaned forward to study the curious slide. Most mortal diseases kill off the very young and the very old, but instead of the usual U-shaped graph, this one resembled a crude W, with an average age of death of twenty-nine. “Based on sketchy reports from the initial outbreak, we estimate the overall lethality at 70 percent,” Hans said.

“Pediatric or natal . . . ?” Maria Savona, director of epidemiology at the World Health Organization, interrupted the puzzled silence.

“Largely accounted for in the reported cohort,” Hans replied. “Possible sexual transmission?” a Japanese doctor asked.

“Unlikely,” said Hans. He was enjoying himself. Now his face drifted into the projection, casting a bulky shadow over the next slide. “Reportable deaths stay consistent for the following weeks, but the overall total drops significantly.”

“A one-time event, in that case,” the Japanese woman concluded. “With forty-seven bodies?” Hans said. “Quite an orgy!”

The Japanese doctor blushed and covered her mouth as she giggled.

“Okay, Hans, you’ve kept us guessing long enough,” Maria said impatiently.

Hans looked around the room triumphantly. “Shigella,” he said, to groans of disbelief. “You would have got it but for the inverted mortality vector. That puzzled us as well. This is a common bacteria in poorer countries, the cause of innumerable cases of food poisoning. We queried the health authorities in Jakarta, and they concluded that, in a starving environment, the only people robust enough to seize the limited food resources are the young. In this case, strength proved to be their undoing. Our team deduced that the probable source of the pathogen was raw milk. We offer this as a cautionary tale about how demographic stereotypes can blind us to facts that would otherwise be obvious.”

Hans stepped down to perfunctory applause as Maria called the last presenter to the podium.

“Campylobacter in Wisconsin——” the man began.

Suddenly, a commanding voice interrupted. “A raging hemorrhagic fever kills forty-seven people in a week and disappears without a trace?”

Two hundred heads turned to locate the source of that booming baritone. From the voice, you would have thought Henry Parsons was a big man. No. He was short and slight, bent by a childhood case of rickets that left him slightly deformed. His facial features and professorial voice seemed peculiarly outsized in such a modest figure, but he carried himself with the weight of a man who understood his value, despite his diminished appearance. Those who knew his legend spoke of him with a kind of amused awe, calling him Herr Doktor behind his back, or “the little martinet.” He was capable of reducing interns to tears if they failed to prepare a sample correctly or missed a symptom that was, in fact, meaningful only to him, but it was Henry Parsons who led an international team in the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa in 2014. He tracked down the first documented patient of the disease—the so-called index case—an eighteen-month-old boy from Guinea who had been infected
by fruit bats. There were many such stories about him, and many more that could have been told, had he sought the credit. In the neverending war on emerging diseases, Henry Parsons was not a small man; he was a giant.

Hans Somebody squinted and located Henry in the gloom of the upper tiers. “Not so unusual, Dr. Parsons, if you consider the environmental causation.”

“You used the word ‘transmission.’ ”

Hans smiled, happy to resume the game. “The Indonesian authorities at first suspected a viral agent.”

“What changed their minds?” Henry asked.

Maria had become intrigued. “You are thinking Ebola?”

“In which case we’d see likely migration to urban centers,” Hans said. “Not shown. All it took was to eliminate the source of contamination and the infection disappeared.”

“Did you actually go to the camp yourself?” Henry asked. “Take samples?”

“The Indonesian authorities have been fully cooperative,” Hans said dismissively. “There is a team from Médecins Sans Frontières in place now, and we will receive confirmation shortly. Don’t expect surprises.”

Hans waited a moment, but Henry sat back, thoughtfully tapping a finger on his lips. The next presenter resumed. “A slaughterhouse in Milwaukee,” he said, as a few conferees with an eye on the time ducked toward the exits. There was bound to be increased security at the airport.

“I hate when you do that,” Maria said, when they got to her office. It was glassy and stylish, with a fine view of Mont Blanc. A flock of storks, having hurdled the alpine barrier, circled for a landing beside Lake Geneva, their first stop on the spring migration from the Nile Valley.

“Do what?”

Maria leaned back and tapped her finger on her lips, imitating Henry’s gesture.

“Is that a habit of mine?” he asked, leaning his cane against her desk.

“When I see you do it, I know I should be worried. What makes you doubt Hans’s study?”

“Acute hemorrhagic fever. Very likely viral. Weird mortality distribution, totally inappropriate for shigella. And why did it suddenly—”

“Just stop! I don’t know, Henry, you tell me. Indonesia again?” “They hid the ball before.”

“It doesn’t look like another meningitis outbreak.”

“Certainly not.” Despite himself, Henry involuntarily began tapping his lips again. Maria waited. “I shouldn’t tell you what to do,” he finally said. “Maybe Hans is right.”

“But . . . ?”

“The lethality. Stunning. The downside if he’s wrong.”
Maria went to the window. Clouds were settling in, masking the majestic peak. She was about to speak when Henry interrupted her thought. “I’ve got to go.”

“That’s exactly what I was thinking.”

“I mean home.”

Maria nodded in that way that meant she had heard him, but the worried expression in her Italian eyes sent a different message. “Give me two days. I know how much I’m asking. I should send a whole team, but I don’t have anybody I can trust. Hans says MSF is there, so they can help. Just get slides and samples. In and out and on your way back to Atlanta.”

“Maria . . .”

“Please, Henry.”

In the manner of friends who have known each other a long time, Henry saw a flash of the worried young epidemiologist studying the African swine fever outbreak in Haiti. Maria had been part of the team that advocated the eradication of the indigenous pig that carried the disease. Nearly every family in Haiti kept pigs; in addition to being a major source of food, they functioned as currency, a bank for the peasantry. Within a year, thanks to the efforts of the international community and the dictator “Baby Doc” Duvalier, the entire population of Creole pigs was extinct, a great success, almost unprecedented. The eradication stopped an incurable disease. But the peasants, already poor, were reduced to famine. The corrupt elite appropriated most of the replacement pigs the Americans provided, which were in any case too delicate for the environment and too expensive to feed. With no other resources, people turned to making charcoal, which denuded the forests. Haiti never recovered. It’s debatable whether the hogs should have been slaughtered in the first place. We were such confident idealists back then, Henry thought.

“Two days, maximum,” he said. “I promised Jill I’d be home for Teddy’s birthday.”

“I’ll have Rinaldo book you on the red-eye to Jakarta.” Maria assured him that she would call the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in Atlanta, where Henry was deputy director for infectious diseases, and beg forgiveness; it was an emergency request on her part.

“By the way,” he said as he was leaving, “any word from Rome? Your family is safe?”

“We don’t know,” Maria said despairingly.

The Rome attack had been planned for Carnevale, the eight- day festival that takes place all over Italy before Lent. The Piazza del Popolo was packed for the costume parade and the famous dancing horses. The news that morning was filled with images of the torn carcasses of the beautiful animals, strewn among the dead celebrants and the rubble of the twin churches. “Hundreds dead in Rome, the counting still going on,” the Fox host was saying. “What’s Italy’s response going to be?”

The youthful prime minister was a nationalist, with his hair closely trimmed on the sides and long on top, the fashion for the neofascists taking over Europe. Predictably, he proposed mass expulsions of Muslims.
Jill Parsons switched off the TV when she heard the kids thundering downstairs, an argument already under way. They were bickering over whether Helen would be allowed to go to Legoland with Teddy and his friends. Helen wasn’t even interested in Legos.

“Who wants waffles?” Jill asked cheerily. Neither child responded; they were still captivated by their pointless argument. Peepers, a rescue dog of mixed heritage, with black patches around his eyes like a panda, stirred from his corner and shambled over to referee the quarrel.

“It’s my birthday,” Teddy said indignantly.

“I let you come to Six Flags on mine,” Helen replied.

“Mom, she stole my waffle!” Teddy wailed.

“I just took a bite.”

“You touched it!”

“Helen, eat your cereal,” Jill said mechanically.

“It’s soggy.”

Helen coolly took another bite of Teddy’s waffle. He shouted in outrage. Peepers barked in support. Jill sighed. The household always took a turn toward chaos when Henry was out of town. But just as she was rebuking him in her mind, her iPad buzzed, and there was Henry, calling on FaceTime.

“Did you read my mind?” she asked. “I was telepathically summoning you.”

“I can’t imagine why,” Henry said, hearing the argument and the barking in the background.

“I was going to cuss you out for not being here.”

“Let me talk to them.”

Immediately Teddy and Helen subsided into adorableness. It was a kind of magic trick, Jill thought, a spell that Henry cast over them. Peepers wagged his tail in adoration.

“Daddy, when are you coming home?” Teddy demanded. “Tuesday night, very late,” Henry said. “Mom said you’d be here tomorrow.”

“I thought I would, but my plans suddenly changed. But don’t worry. I’ll be back in time for your birthday.”

Teddy cheered, and Helen clapped her hands. It was impressive. Jill could never calm the waters like Henry. Maybe I’m too ironic, she thought. It must be Henry’s total sincerity when he speaks to the children that subdues them. Somehow, they know they are safe. Jill felt that way, too.

“I made a robot,” Teddy reported, holding up the iPad to display the conglomeration of plastic parts, electrical circuitry, and an old cell phone that he had put together for the science fair. The skeletal face had a pair of camera lenses for eyes. Jill thought it looked like a Day of the Dead doll.

“You did this by yourself?” said Henry.

Teddy nodded, his face radiant with pride.
“What do you call him?”

Teddy turned to the robot. “Robot, what is your name?”

The robot’s head tilted slightly. “Master, my name is Albert,” he said. “I belong to Teddy.”

“Holy smoke! That’s amazing!” Henry said. “He calls you ‘Master’?”

Teddy giggled and tucked his chin the way he did when he was really happy.

“My turn!” Helen said, grabbing the iPad.

“Hello, my beautiful girl,” said Henry. “You must have a game today.”

Helen was on the sixth-grade girls’ soccer team. “They want me to play goalie,” she said.

“That’s great, right?”

“It’s boring. You just stand there. They only want me to do it because I’m tall.”

“But you get to be the hero every time you save a goal.”

“They all hate me if I don’t.”

This was typical Helen, Jill thought. Where Teddy was sunny, Helen was dark. Pessimism oozed out of her, giving her an odd kind of power. Jill had observed that her classmates were a little fearful of her judgment. That quality, along with her fine features, made her an object of adoration among the girls and a troubling beacon to the pubescent boys.

“I heard the part about not coming home,” Jill said, when she had the chance to talk again. Henry looked tired. In the chiaroscuro of the iPad, he resembled a portrait of a nineteenth-century Austrian nobleman, with his penetrating gaze behind round spectacles. In the background she could hear flights being called.

“It’s probably nothing, but it’s one of those things,” Henry said. “Where this time?”

“Indonesia.”

“Oh, Lord,” Jill said, letting the worry get ahead of her. “Kids, finish up, the bus is coming.” Then to Henry: “You haven’t been sleeping, have you? I wish you would take some Ambien and just conk out properly for a night. Have you got some? You should take it as soon as you get on the plane.” She was annoyed that, for a doctor, Henry was so resistant to taking medications.

“I will sleep again when I feel you next to me,” he said, in one of those maddening endearments that would ring in her ears until he came home.

“Don’t take chances,” Jill said pointlessly.

“I never do.” <>

BREAKING THROUGH SCHIZOPHRENIA builds on the ideas of Jacques Lacan who argued that schizophrenia is a deficient relationship to language, in particular the difficulty to master the metaphoric dimension of language, which children acquire by the Oedipal restructuring of the psyche. This book is thus a countercultural move to present a less damaging view and a more efficient treatment method for schizophrenic persons.

Through a collection of published and unpublished articles, Ver Eecke traces the path of Lacanian thought. He discusses the importance of language for the development of human beings and examines the effectiveness of talk therapy through case studies with schizophrenic persons.

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About the Author
BREAKING THROUGH SCHIZOPHRENIA: LACAN AND HEGEL FOR TALK THERAPY is intended for anyone who comes in contact with people afflicted with schizophrenia or other psychotic disorders, whether those people are family members or medical professionals. By reading the last section of the book, in which I discuss successful talk therapies with those afflicted with schizophrenia, they will be able to borrow methods to communicate and thus stay in touch with their mentally ill family member. Also, in reading chapter 9 family members will learn to understand better their afflicted parent, child, brother, or sister. Professionals will be able to improve their understanding of their patients. Furthermore, medical professionals will be challenged to learn that severe mental illness is not a hopeless situation. It can, in certain circumstances, be cured. The "Open Dialogue" method in Sweden (Seikkula et al. 2003, 2006) and the Giffric method in Montreal (Apollon 1990; Apollon et al. 1990) report that more than 80% of patients diagnosed with schizophrenia can be cured to such a degree that they can return to their work or studies. Karon is willing to say to the patients who suffered from schizophrenia and who he treated that they will, in normal circumstances, not experience another psychotic episode (Karon 2018, 231). This hopeful view of severe mental illness will require that mental health professionals change their philosophy of mental illness. Mental illness will have to be seen and understood as a developmental challenge, not a biological condemnation.

This radically new view of severe mental illness will require from the medical profession that they view medication of mentally ill patients in a totally different way. Medication must be seen as secondary to talk therapy. It must be minimalized. I am happy to report that I am in contact with psychiatrists who are willing to diminish the medication of patients I see doubled between the 1980s and the 2000s. The proportion of young people aged 15 to 16 with a conduct disorder more than doubled between 1974 and 1999.

CAUSES OF MENTAL ILLNESS
There is no agreement about the causes of mental illness. Some authors stress genetic and thus biological causality. As recently as DSM-IV, it has been claimed that having a first-degree family relative with schizophrenia increases the risk of developing the condition by about 10 times (APA 2000, 309). This claim is contradicted in DSM-V, where it is stated, "Most individuals who have been diagnosed with schizophrenia have no family history of psychosis" (APA 2013, 103). Still, DSM-V maintains, "There is a strong contribution for genetic factors in determining risk for schizophrenia" (APA 2013, 103).

Other authors stress environmental factors. Harry Stack Sullivan writes, As a result of some years' study of male patients suffering from schizophrenic mental disorders, I am inclined to the opinion that the occurrence of these illnesses is to be explained on the basis of experiential factors rather than by reference to an hereditary, or to a primarily organic, disorder.

Bertram Karon uses the example of Nazi Germany to refute the thesis of the genetic origin of severe mental illness. He writes,

For several years all schizophrenics in Nazi Germany were sterilized. Then, the annihilation gas chambers were designed by psychiatrists, originally not for Jews, but for mental patients. Hundreds of thousands of schizophrenics were annihilated. But a generation later, the rate of schizophrenia was not affected.

Donald Winnicott says it as follows: "Psychoanalysis tends to show that the basis of mental health is not hereditary ... ; the basis for mental health is being actively laid down in the course of every infancy when the mother is good enough at her job, and in the span of every childhood that is being lived in a functioning family".

This book argues that Winnicott's "functioning family" includes the mother showing respect for the word of the father, which Lacan technically calls respect for the "Name-of-the-Father." I therefore consider as environmental factors the psychosocial conditions created by early family life, which optimally create...
certain relationships between mother and child, father and child, and mother and father. This network of relationships is the Oedipus complex and optimally guides the child to incorporate metaphors into its language, as the early Lacan teaches us.

In thinking about the causes of mental illness, one is faced with profound philosophical questions. Some people argue that the body dominates the mind and that thoughts are merely brain waves. In their view, delusions and hallucinations are indications of a malfunctioning brain. They support the use of medication to treat the malfunctioning brain. Other people argue that the mind dominates the body. They gain support from the curious phenomenon that cancer patients who are optimistic about the outcome of their treatment have a greater chance of survival. Given that cancer is a bodily condition and optimism is a condition of the mind, these studies present evidence that, at least in some cases, the mind dominates the body. Since Husserl, Continental philosophy has argued that we are embodied minds. The mind makes use of the body and is thus to some degree dependent upon the body. Still, the mind is an active agent and uses the body as a means to express its thoughts and concerns. This idea of the mind—body connection is illustrated clearly in the case of a patient of Lacan. The patient was a French Muslim whose father had been falsely accused of stealing and could face the punishment of having his hand cut off. In this case, the mind of the child dominated his body to such an extent that he expressed, unconsciously, his deep empathy with his father’s potential punishment by creating a paralysis of his own hand.

This book concentrates on the environmental factors of mental illness and argues that these factors reveal a possible important role for the mind in their treatment. In the most advanced treatments of cancer, the importance of the mind is already recognized. Hospitals create a pleasant environment for the children with cancer in their care. Hospitals do so despite the fact that it is not fully understood, precisely, how such environmental factors as a friendly environment contribute to the fight against cancer. Similarly, to provide the optimal environmental factors in the treatment of seriously mentally ill people, we wish to defend the use of psychosocial and linguistic approaches. The justification of the role of the mind in the treatment of mentally ill people can be increased if we can demonstrate the great importance of environmental factors in the development of schizophrenic symptoms. Giving a psychological and social rather than a biological interpretation of mental illness has the advantage of decreasing stigma. It also has the advantage of giving hope to the mentally ill. On the contrary, the idea that mental illness is attributable to biology tends to make patients feel condemned for life because they possess a defective brain. In addition, psychological treatment can avoid the side effects of long-term medication, which in the case of antipsychotic medication, can lead to tardive dyskinesia and irreversible sexual difficulties.

To decide whether schizophrenia is a biological disease or a psychosocial and linguistic maladaptation, it is worthwhile to look at empirical research. We find that in the Finnish research by Pekka Tienari.

The Finnish study by Tienari, which lasted 20 years, rejects the thesis, still presented in DSM-V, that biology or genetics is the determining factor in schizophrenia. Tienari looked up the women who had been hospitalized for schizophrenia or paranoid psychosis. Tienari then looked for any of these women who had children given up for adoption to nonfamily members in Finland. Tienari ended up with 179 children of 164 schizophrenic mothers. During the rest of the study, the number of adoptee children from schizophrenic mothers that could be followed diminished to 155. Tienari then categorized the adopting families, dividing them between those judged to be healthy, to be neurotic, and to have personality disorders, and those who were judged to have functional psychoses.

Tienari reports that zero children of psychotic mothers developed a "functional psychosis" if the adoptive family was classified as "healthy". This research indicates that a nurturing family environment can overcome a genetic predisposition. In other words, genetics by itself cannot cause the outbreak of psychosis. On the other hand, if a child of a schizophrenic mother was adopted by a disturbed family, he or she was more likely to be seriously disturbed than the biological children of that disturbed family (61.7% of adoptee
children grew up to become seriously disturbed as compared to 34% of biological children from such families). Tienari's study clearly demonstrates that the environment in which one grows up mediates the process by which a genetic predisposition to schizophrenia becomes a reality.

If, for children of psychotic mothers, schizophrenia or other psychotic disorders are illnesses that only develop when those children are raised in disturbed families, then schizophrenia must be considered a psychological illness. Hence, we cannot hope that medication will heal people afflicted with schizophrenia. Medication will only be able to suppress the schizophrenic symptoms. We can argue that, in crises, suppression of symptoms is desirable. Bertram Karon, a psychoterapist who practiced psychotherapy with schizophrenic people, advised his patients that they should keep medication on them. Having medication, when the patient is fearing a sudden crisis, is very helpful. He continued by saying that the psychological reassurance is probably more effective to combat the crisis than the chemical compounds of the medication. Irwin Kirsch defends the same idea, in particular for people diagnosed with severe depression, by stating that the healing effect of medications is almost completely the result of the placebo effect (Kirsch 2010). Antoine Vergote, a psychoanalyst, provides an additional argument for the use of medication. He writes that a patient who cannot sleep does not have the energy or concentration to do talk therapy. Vergote continues by stating that he works together with a psychiatrist who prescribes medication for his patients who are severely ill.

Medication is, therefore, useful in the treatment of mentally ill people; however, the use of medication, as described by Karon, Kirsch, and Vergote, is auxiliary. It is considered a helpful tool for coping, although the real work to improve the patient is achieved through talk therapy. We can ask the question as to how we can understand how talk therapy is such a helpful tool to deal with mentally ill people. To begin with, we have statistical evidence that talk therapy, as used in Finland's "Open Dialogue," is efficient, even very efficient.

One way to explain why talk therapy is a helpful tool for mentally ill people is to understand that human development from child to mature person is a complicated process, which I like to compare to climbing a ladder. Going from one step of the ladder to the next requires a task that a person may fail to do well. Such failures lead to maladaptation, creating mental stress, which can become a contributing cause for possible mental illness.

Human development has an additional challenge discovered by psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis emphasizes that as a baby, a human being must develop certain strategies that are only helpful at that stage in life. If continued into adulthood, these strategies would be maladaptive. These strategies cope with the fact that human infants are very dependent upon a supportive maternal figure. Still, a human baby has a developing consciousness, which makes total dependence upon another frightening or even unacceptable. Realistically, however, the child cannot escape this unacceptable situation. When one is faced with an unacceptable situation and can do nothing, one can fall back upon a typical human strategy: One can start fantasizing. Most children make use of two fantasies to deal with the psychologically unacceptable fact of total dependency. First, the child imagines that the mother (or the mother figure) is omnipotent; total dependence would not feel safe with a mother who is anything less than omnipotent and perfect. Second, the child imagines that he or she is everything the mother could want. This second fantasy assures the child that the omnipotent mother will take care of the child as the child fulfills all of the mother’s wants and desires. Children who can create these two fantasies flourish.

However, these two fantasies are not always useful, since the feeling that one is the center of the world is not the best psychic attitude to succeed as an adult; therefore, to acquire a successful, mature psychic structure, human beings must undergo a radical change, which is unavoidably painful. This happens because of the introduction of a third person in the emotional life of a child. Psychoanalysis refers to this moment as the Oedipal phase. Normally, the person who is introduced as the third figure is the father. But
this introduction does not always facilitate the change when, for example, some references by mothers to
the father are, at best, ambivalent. Another reason why the change might not happen is that single mothers
may have a need for affection, which they satisfy by making the child a substitute for the missing partner.
Finally, a father may be too narcissistic and grandiose to present a model with whom the child can identify
(Lacan 2006, 482-83). Any of these shaky beginnings for the child can lead to maladaptive strategies,
which make the child, as an adult, more vulnerable to mental illness.

Strategies for Treating Seriously Mentally Ill People
This book presents strategies for understanding and treating people that suffer from schizophrenia and
psychosis. My proposed strategies depend upon the thesis that schizophrenia and psychosis result from
failed psychological adaptation to the challenge of growing up. The psychosocial—linguistic theory of the
cause of schizophrenia is preferable to the biological theory because it accommodates treatments that can
cure the condition. The authors of the PORT report, who subscribe to the biological theory of schizophrenia,
admit that for such patients, the prescribed medication will be needed for life. Bertram Karon, who
defends the thesis that failures in the psychosocial and linguistic development of the person are the cause
of schizophrenia—a thesis I also defend—wrote, "The vast majority of hospitalized schizophrenic patients
will be able to function as outpatients with two months of the five-time-per-week treatment". Karon was
also able to say to a patient he had treated that, in normal circumstances, the patient would not have a
recurrence of a schizophrenic episode.

Organization of The Book
In the introduction, I present a picture of the many symptoms afflicting Daniel Paul Schreber, the famous
case I use as the main clinical case for developing a theory of schizophrenia and psychosis. In the
introduction, I also present the two theories of Lacan, which will be the basis for my psychological
understanding of schizophrenia: i.e., the mirror stage and the idea of foreclosure of the "Name-of-the-
Father."

Part I defends the idea that human growth is a complex phenomenon and that failure to master all the
steps in the growth process can lead to a kind of psychic structure in a person that makes the person
vulnerable to mental illness. Thus, I locate a principle cause of mental illness in the psychosocial—linguistic
challenges that a person might not have mastered when growing up.

Chapter 1 argues that a child needs a radical psychological restructuring between 3 and 6 years of age,
which invites the child to choose its own identity instead of allowing its identity to be determined by the
desire of the mother.

Chapter 2 makes use of studies by Louis Sass, who interprets the alogia of schizophrenics not as a
deficiency, but as a paralyzing hyperactivity connected with a deficient relation to their own body.

Chapter 3 elaborates on the ideas of the previous chapter by using Lacan's linguistic theory of psychosis,
and I explain the meaning of Lacan's concept of "Paternal Metaphor."

Chapter 4 asks the question as to what happens to people who have not benefitted from a paternal
function. I make use of ideas by A. Vergote and J. A. Miller's concept of "ordinary psychosis" to clarify that
question.

Chapter 5 presents the later Lacan's claim that the "Paternal Metaphor" is only one possible way of
avoiding schizophrenia. Based on his study of James Joyce, Lacan argues that the function of the father is
to allow the child to have a name. If the paternal function does not work properly, the child has the
challenge of creating a name for him or herself—a challenge Joyce pursued.
Chapter 6 uses the writings of De Waelhens to show that Lacan's approach to psychosis allows philosophy to overcome the mind-body dualism, which was first introduced by Descartes. Lacan shows that human beings must occupy and take ownership of their bodies by means of a triangular relationship with their parents. Many things can go wrong in taking up this challenge.

Part II points to the similarity between the theory of well-known philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Jacques Lacan. Chapter 7 shows that Lacan is in need of a respectable framework for theorizing about his own psychoanalytic experience. I show that Lacan finds in Hegel's passage of the "Master/Slave" the desired framework for his theory of the mirror stage and in the passage of the "Law of the Heart" the desired framework for his theory of paranoia and aggression. Chapter 8 outlines the great similarity between Hegel and Lacan's theories on paranoia. I then continue by showing how Lacan points toward a developmental explanation of paranoia. Indeed, Lacan points out that children who later become paranoid were able to identify with and idealize their siblings but unable to fight them. Thus, they did not accept the challenge of becoming a separate self, separate from the idealized sibling.

Part III develops further the thesis that psychosis and schizophrenia are illnesses characterized by a defective relationship to language. Psychotic and schizophrenic people have great difficulty grasping the meaning of metaphors. Thus, when told that they are handicapped, they might feel that they do not have hands. They translate a metaphor into a literal reality. Chapter 9 uses Robert Sokolowski's idea that linguistic intentionality, for example, naming, superimposed on perception, not only represses the richness of sense data, but also provides a guide for action. Hence, naming objects for the very mentally ill can help them orient themselves in a world where they are overwhelmed by sense-impressions. Chapter 10 draws attention to the fact that the voices heard by Schreber have similar characteristics to the "social referencing" that is typical for young children. Hence, the hearing of voices is an indication of lack of psychic development and thus not a proof that the patient has a defective brain.

Part IV uses Lacan's theory of the "Paternal Metaphor" to clarify the famous case of Judge Schreber, which is much discussed in American psychoanalytic literature. Chapter 11 compares Morton Schatzman and Jacques Lacan's interpretation of the case of Schreber's mental illness. Whereas Schatzman emphasizes the role of the father's sadism, Lacan stresses the fact that Schreber's mother did not seem to show respect for the word of Schreber's father. He cites the mother's destruction, at the death of her husband, of his unpublished manuscripts, as evidence. According to Lacan, Schreber's mother's lack of respect for the word of the father obliterated the possibility for Schreber to create a "Paternal Metaphor." Chapter 12 addresses the problem of the breakdown of a schizophrenic or psychotic person. Lacan locates the cause of psychosis and schizophrenia in the absence of a "Paternal Metaphor." Lacan explains the breakdown of such a person by the presence of a protective maternal figure, who exercises paternal characteristics. Schiller seems to have played such a dual role in the emotional life of Hölderlin.

Lastly, part V analyzes, from a Lacanian point of view, three successful therapy approaches to cure the condition of schizophrenia. All three therapists stress that talk therapy for people afflicted with schizophrenia or other psychotic disorders must be of a very different kind than talk therapy for neurotic people.

Chapter 13 uses the Lacanian concepts of the imaginary and the symbolic to analyze Bertram Karon's treatment of people afflicted with schizophrenia. Karon, a non-Lacanian therapist, first confirms the patient's imaginary needs by making statements like, "Who says it's wrong to want to kill a bitch like that (patient's stepmother)? The old bitch deserves to die, for what she did to you" or "Any time anyone hurts you, you hate them, you want to kill them. And that is healthy". This allows the patient to reveal the suffering he experienced at the hands of his stepmother. Karon then introduces a prohibition by telling the patient, "The only reason for not killing her is that you'll get caught. If you're willing to die in order to kill her, she must be more important than you are. That sounds stupid to me". That prohibition is based on a
linguistic or symbolic connection presented by Karon and imaginarily understood and accepted by the patient.

Chapter 14 analyzes Palle Villemoes’s method for treating schizophrenic people. Villemoes is impressed by the fact that schizophrenic people cannot properly use pronouns. Thus, when asked if his parents liked him, a schizophrenic person answered, "No, I did not like them." Hence, Villemoes concludes that the therapist cannot treat schizophrenic patients as dialogue partners. One way of doing so is to make the physical arrangement in the therapy room different from most other therapy methods. Instead of putting himself in front of the patient, Villemoes recommends that the therapist sits next to them. Villemoes also interprets the autistic symptoms demonstrated by schizophrenic people as a fear of human dialogue. People afflicted by schizophrenia fear communication because of their tendency to psychologically fuse with other people. This prevents them from maintaining a stable self-conception during the dialogue, which then culminates in self-alienation.

Hence, Villemoes is not asking questions from the schizophrenic person. Instead, Villemoes believes that a therapist must work indirectly with schizophrenic patients.

Villemoes’s method consists of strengthening the relation of a schizophrenic patient with language. In a first phase, Villemoes describes objects in the consulting room, thereby inviting the patient to change her passive attitude of allowing herself to be bombarded by a multitude of sense impressions into a more active and aggressive attitude of cutting the continuous domain of sense impressions into pieces that are named and thus made into objects. When Villemoes then describes objects in the patient's own room, he elevates the patient to the guarantor of truth. This process normally leads to the patient starting to idolize the therapist.

The idolization by the patient is the sign, used by Villemoes, to start the second phase of the treatment, where Villemoes encourages the patient to describe objects in her memory, starting with the earliest ones and continuing up to the present. Villemoes observes that patients slowly introduce, in their description of past memories, references to their interactions with other people. This allows the patients to construct a story of who they have become. When that story is complete, Villemoes starts the third phase of the therapy, where he asks the patient to choose a date between the present and two months later. That date will be the last therapy session. The purpose of the third phase is for the therapist to give back to the patient the transferential power invested by the patient in the therapist so that the patient can finish the treatment without a feeling of loss. The patient is then ready to take her life back into her own hands.

Chapter 15 describes Gary Prouty’s method of treating schizophrenic patients. Prouty emphasizes the patient’s deficient relationship to the body. He uses five methods to improve the creation of a psychic body. One method is called bodily reflection. According to this technique, the therapist sits in front of the patient and either imitates the posture and bodily gestures of the patient (e.g., arm movements), or the therapist describes the bodily expressions of the patient (saying, "I see tears in your eyes"). In imitating the bodily gestures of his patient, Prouty is strengthening the imaginary relation of the patient to his or her body. In naming the bodily expressions of the patient, Prouty is strengthening the patient’s relationship to language.

The chapters can be read on their own, but, of course, prior chapters might elucidate ideas in later chapters. <>
KRISHNAMURTI IN AMERICA: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE MAN AND HIS MESSAGE by David Edmund Moody [David E Moody, 9781734227819]

For more than fifty years, J. Krishnamurti gave public talks to audiences around the world in which he expressed a revolutionary new understanding of consciousness, daily life, and the human condition. KRISHNAMURTI IN AMERICA is the first biography to tell the complete story of his life in the United States, and it presents a new perspective on his life and his teaching. It is a story of love and betrayal, lawsuits and enlightenment, passion and transcendence.

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Krishnamurti’s life was conducted on three continents. India was the land of his birth and the country to which he returned many times, but he established residences with deep roots in England and the United States as well. The frequency and extent of his travels were among the defining characteristics of his career.

One of the challenges facing Krishnamurti’s biographers is the necessity to bring into balance the geographical components of his life. The first and only authorized biography was composed by his lifelong friend, the English novelist Mary Lutyens. Her work appeared in three volumes, published in 1975, 1983, and 1988. She provided the factual foundation for all subsequent research, but the center of gravity of her perspective was located in England. Pupul Jayakar composed a biography published in 1986 that supplements the record provided by Lutyens with respect to people and events in India. Neither author was well acquainted with his life in the United States.

During the years subsequent to the appearance of the work of Lutyens and Jayakar, vast quantities of new information about Krishnamurti have appeared in the form of numerous memoirs and other forms of
documentary evidence. Much of this information illuminates his life in America, including the people and organizations responsible for arranging his talks and publishing his books. Prolonged lawsuits and Krishnamurti’s private relationships were also subjects of much of this new material. The present volume incorporates these findings and corrects the geographic imbalance in the existing record.

The lack of geographic proportionality has been matched by a certain degree of distortion in how Krishnamurti’s philosophy is characterized. Lutyens was raised in a theosophical environment that she never entirely relinquished, and her work expresses traces and remnants of that background. Jayakar’s perspective is steeped in her familiarity with the philosophical and religious traditions of India, and she casts Krishnamurti in the role of the ancient seer and sage. Neither author examines his teaching entirely on its own terms, without regard for any background or traditional point of view.

Due in part to the orientation of the existing biographies, Krishnamurti’s philosophy continues to be viewed through a haze of inaccurate images and associations. A front-page article in the New York Times (December 9, 2017) exemplified these false impressions. There he was described as a "renowned Indian guru" and as the "anointed messiah" of a spiritual organization, one who transformed the valley in which he lived into "a mecca for New Age pilgrims."

This way of characterizing Krishnamurti’s work is based on his life before the age of thirty-four, whereas for more than half a century thereafter, he followed another course entirely. One objective of this book is to convey his life and work in a more accurate and revealing manner, one in which the thrust of his philosophy is recognized, not as a mystical, religious, or Eastern point of view, but rather as a revolutionary new understanding of ordinary consciousness and daily life.

The large body of public statements that represents Krishnamurti’s teaching speaks for itself and needs no assistance to enable an understanding of it. But the public reception of his work remains limited or shaped by inaccurate images, and much time may be required before the actuality of his message breaks through and dispels the false associations. This book is written in an effort to advance that day by a few years and to move the compass needle toward true north by a few degrees. If it succeeds, the primary beneficiary will be the individual human being throughout the world for whom his message was intended.

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In the spring of 2019, the KFA celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of its founding, some thirty-three years after the death of its founder. Krishnamurti would have had reason to appreciate what had transpired in his absence. The east end residence now functions as an educational center for adults, with various activities in several venues. Arya Vihara serves as the Pepper Tree Retreat, with accommodations for visitors to stay overnight or for weeks at a time. An archive building houses an environmentally secure and professionally managed vault that contains the many thousands of documents, manuscripts, photographs, and audio and video recordings that constitute the physical record of the teachings. The large living room in Pine Cottage is a library and conference room for visitors throughout the year. Krishnamurti’s personal living room and bedroom are preserved as they were when he lived there, affording guests the opportunity to partake of the atmosphere he generated.

Each year a weekend "Gathering" is held in early May, corresponding with the time when Krishnamurti gave public talks in the Oak Grove. Talks and discussions exploring the teachings are scheduled throughout the weekend. The foundation sponsors many additional conferences and seminars during the year, including selected speakers whose professions indirectly bear upon Krishnamurti’s philosophy. An active and robust online presence makes the teachings available in every format, and search engines enable access according to topics, locations, time periods, audiences, and discussion participants. As a result of all
these activities, the teachings remain alive and healthy, and a resource available to individuals throughout the world.

One of the reasons—perhaps the main reason—why Erna nurtured a negative attitude toward the school was that it represented a steady drain on the financial condition of the KFA. She had the mentality of a bookkeeper, which made her an effective opponent of Rajagopal, but ambivalent at best about the school. In a delicious irony—one that even she might appreciate—it is now the school that subsidizes the activities of the foundation, rather than the other way around. After running annual deficits for three decades, the school now operates in the black and generates a surplus that helps the foundation make ends meet. The relationship between the school and the foundation has been a chronic source of tension, but now the partnership is more stable and mutually beneficial.

Oak Grove School has always been blessed with a beautiful campus, dedicated teachers, and students from families deeply committed to the welfare of their children. Now it also has full enrollment (216 students), with waiting lists at each level from K through twelve, and a more coherent educational program. Whether the school fulfills the deep intention of its founder is not easy to assess; there is no metric for matriculation at that level. What can be said is that graduates of the school tend to embody or exemplify the principle of self-actualization: they seem to be fully themselves, in a sense, as if they have flourished in a place that allowed them to discover their own talents and identity and begin to develop them. They are highly qualified academically, as confirmed by access to the best and most selective colleges and universities.

The seed that Krishnamurti planted in America is well and firmly established. There can be little doubt that it will survive and grow for another hundred years at least. His message is imprinted indelibly in the fabric of civilization; the question that remains is whether the world will ever pay it the attention it warrants and humanity so desperately needs. He has opened the door into another way of living. Only we can enter it.


C. G. JUNG AND THE DEAD: VISIONS, ACTIVE IMAGINATION AND THE UNCONSCIOUS TERRAIN offers an in-depth look at Jung’s encounters with the dead, moving beyond a symbolic understanding to consider these figures a literal presence in the psyche. Stephani L. Stephens explores Jung’s personal experiences, demonstrating his skill at visioning in all its forms as well as detailing the nature of the dead.

This unique study is the first to follow the narrative thread of the dead from Memories, Dreams, Reflections into The Red Book, assessing Jung’s thoughts on their presence, his obligations to them, and their role in his psychological model. It offers the opportunity to examine this previously neglected theme unfolding during Jung’s period of intense confrontation with the unconscious, and to understand active imagination as Jung’s principle method of managing that unconscious content. As well as detailed analysis of Jung’s own work, the book includes a timeline of key events and case material.

C. G. JUNG AND THE DEAD will offer academics and students of Jungian and post-Jungian studies, the history of psychology, Western esoteric history and gnostic and visionary traditions a new perspective on Jung’s work. It will also be of great interest to Jungian analysts and psychotherapists, analytical psychologists and practitioners of other psychological disciplines interested in Jungian ideas.

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The unconscious terrain: setting the stage for the dead

Seeing the dead is as old as death itself. Whether in a dream, a vision, in the corner of the room or the corner of one’s eye, the dead return. The encounters are often significant, moving and life altering, and they demand something from both parties, what that is exactly is the mystery of their appearance in the first instance. Jung knew and understood as much.

When I first read Memories, Dreams, Reflections, it became clear the extent to which Jung grappled with his visionary experiences and how he struggled to understand the dead from a psychological perspective. His direct encounters with figures of the unconscious, some of whom he specifically identified as the dead, proved seminal to his experiences of the unconscious as a whole and appear to have assisted him in conceptualising both the unconscious and the figures who occupied the same psychic space as the dead.

This book arises from my fascination with Jung’s descriptions of the dead in Memories, Dreams, Reflections and The Red Book and is intended to guide the reader through the content of Jung’s visionary experiences as well as the methods by which he discovered the unconscious terrain. Active imagination assisted Jung in dealing with his own emotional and psychological imbalance. This process permitted him to mine visionary content that lay under the surface of consciousness and prompted him to refine and define a method that would include the interplay between the two. Yet, Jung also visioned in several other specific ways. In one sense, active imagination sits as the cornerstone of Jung’s entire psychological model. The work here speaks to Jung’s ability to visualise material, describe these experiences and do something unique; determine a model of how consciousness and the unconscious exist as a dynamic in the personality. I argue that specifically Jung’s encounters with the dead assisted with his project. The premise here looks beyond
the symbolic nature of the dead’s appearance, which signifies a departure from the traditional Jungian approach, and examines the implications of Jung’s psychological model as a result of considering the dead as a literal presence in the psyche. Offering an alternative to the symbolic approach allows the dead to point to themselves as psychic material and thus enhances the timing and psychological effect of their appearance. By formulating a picture of what Jung’s relationship with his dead actually entailed, this book argues the central yet neglected role the dead played in pointing Jung toward themselves and toward the formulation of the unconscious dynamic.

This work does not attempt to build an argument that the dead exist in se, parapsychologists have been at that for a while now. But rather to raise a question that if we understand the dead to exist literally, as I propose Jung did, what do we learn about the dead, the unconscious and how we live with both? What do Jung’s accounts of the dead teach us?

Where my focus in the article ‘Active Imagination and the Dead’ was to suggest and then attempt to support that Jung was experiencing a different type of unconscious material when he labelled the experience as being with the dead, my project here is different. Here, I wish to illustrate the variety and scope of Jung’s visual encounters with (and as a result of) the dead. These would later inform and expand episodes that he recounted in Memories, Dreams, Reflections. The assumption here is that Jung is speaking with the dead when he says as much, and thus the focus can now be on the skills he develops as a result of such encounters. This raises the fundamental question as to how the dead informed his understanding of the visioning process. I wish this question to stand apart from examining if Jung was a visionary because I feel this is a different question and one handled by previous authors.’ Rather, Jung’s experiences reveal he was skilled at visioning and in turn became even more so as he used it.

I have adopted the term ‘visioning’ because the word communicates both active engagement and interactivity. Jung did not simply ‘have visions’, as this would imply that he became distracted by flashes of visionary material. Rather, Jung engaged in a process of entering the space of the unconscious perceiving, seeing and then seeing more and further. This layered journeying entailed a type of sustained visioning/seeing/sight in which what he saw informed him further, not only in understanding but in process. When Jung came to understand what he witnessed, his ability to sustain visioning assisted him further. Thus, ‘The focus is not on what Jung sees or on his attempts to formulate what he sees, but rather on his manner of seeing, that is his approach and method.’ Visioning therefore refers not only to Jung’s capacity to see, but also his ability to manage his unconscious content for further exploration.’

The theme of the dead began in Jung’s childhood, and manifested in provocative form in 1896 with the dream of his deceased father six weeks after his death and to brief resolution with the dead’s appearance when writing Septem Sermones ad Mortuos (Seven Sermons to the Dead) in 1916. During this time it was the dead who showed Jung the nature of ‘figures of the unconscious’ in a series of death dreams and visions. He made this distinction in his chapter ‘On Life After Death’, when he speaks about both figures of the unconscious and ‘that other group ... often indistinguishable from them, the ”spirits of the departed”’. In their role, they not only pointed Jung toward the unconscious as a venue of exploration, but they also pointed to themselves as separate and distinct entities. They guided him to discover layers of the unconscious both personal and collective, and to the lively countenance of the unconscious itself. The dead remained a consistent presence in his discoveries and facilitated for him the ability to explore and define its workings.

The approach
The book’s approach is principally chronological and draws conclusions about the experiences of the dead themselves. The discussions treated here examine Jung’s personal material in visions and dreams in both Memories, Dreams, Reflections and The Red Book and includes the seminal dream of Paul Jung six weeks
after his death in 1896 and continues to examine the death dreams occurring between 1911 to 1912, which served as a preparatory phase before Jung’s full confrontation with the unconscious between 1913 and 1914. This discussion sets the background for the emergence of The Red Book material. Much of the content here includes encounters with the dead as well as pointing to instances in which death is a prominent theme. As Jung recounted his dreams and visions with graphic descriptions of terrain, climate and even time, he reveals the unconscious as a process in which dynamic transformations occur and in which he became a more active participant.

It has been a challenge for the Jungian community to approach The Red Book as a text, its form seems to have dictated the way it has been discussed, argued, advocated and in some cases (perhaps few) dismissed. As such, previous scholarly approaches have attempted to tackle the work as a whole and in terms of a narrative, which have lent the work a broad appeal in an attempt to make it more accessible and understood. Attempts to determine what The Red Book is have fallen short in acknowledging specific details, which prove it masterly in terms of what Jung learns about himself and the unconscious as he describes it. Where Memories, Dreams, Reflections reveals the recurrent appearance of the dead in Jung’s personal material, The Red Book confirmed and in some instances elaborated these accounts.

**Spirits and the dead**

During Jung’s lifetime he vacillated as to whether spirits could be defined as split-off parts of a subjective psyche or whether they actually existed unto themselves, in se. This is best demonstrated when he asks if ‘the ghost or the voice is identical with the dead person or is a psychic projection’ and if what we attribute as information coming from the dead might be content that already exists in the unconscious. That is whether emerging knowledge is derived from a discarnate as such or if details remain in an unconscious readily accessible by some.

But, Jung’s professional position on after-death survival was indecisive not because personally he was unsure if there existed life after death, but rather because of the challenges the dead posed to his psychological model. Did they fit into a psychological framework and if so how? What kind of unconscious accommodates for the dead? One can see Jung’s intentional ambiguity in affirming the topic of ‘spirits’ in relation to his established psychological ideas when in a letter about spiritualism, he states:

> I am inclined to assume that she is more probably a spirit than an archetype, although she presumably represents both at the same time. Altogether, it seems to me that spirits tend increasingly to coalesce with archetypes. For archetypes can behave exactly like real spirits, so that communications like Betty’s could just as well come from an indubitably genuine archetype.

Here Jung is attempting to bring his psychological concept of the archetype in alignment with the querant’s understanding of a spirit. The significance of this detail rests with Jung’s consideration of spirits alongside his concept of archetypes and therefore confirms that he, at the very least, considered the existence of spirits or the dead as a separate category of experience. By attempting to link the two ideas, Jung falls short in an attempt to clarify. He was aiming not to dismiss the experience of a spirit, but rather to highlight that the symbolic appearance of a ghostly form can be archetypal and this consideration is meant to accommodate the concepts of both. Does this clarify? Not really, but it allowed him to justify each occasion and to frame Betty’s ghostly appearance into a psychological context. What appears certain is Jung’s position on how ‘real spirits’ behave.

**Defining the dead**

For Jung, the dead proved themselves to be souls without bodies (discarnates) and this is revealed in a scene from the Sermones when the dead leave for Jerusalem. Jung has an exchange with the figure Ezechiel and asks where they are going and might he join them. Ezechiel responds, ‘You cannot join us, you have a body. But we are dead.’ It is this exchange that makes clear the speculation as to what Jung meant when he designated experiences to be with ‘the dead’. At the heart of not only this encounter but all
his exchanges with the dead is the notion that the human being is both soul and body and that the soul possesses immortal qualities. I suggest this seminal moment informed Jung’s future encounters with the dead. Although the distinction was pointed out by Ezechiel, this pivotal revelation shows that Jung experienced the dead as souls divorced from their physical bodies, who appear in the same psychic space as all other figures of the unconscious.

The Dead and The Transcendent Function

As a part of defining the dead, I have previously suggested them to be a separate experience to figures of the unconscious who also emerge visually and are projections or split-off parts of the psyche. For figures, the visioning process is about objectification so as to manage them as contents of the unconscious that will, as the process occurs, be reintegrated into the personality as a result. Their appearance in the first instance emerges from Jung’s psyche and therefore is supported by somewhat of an energetic extension of Jung himself. Jung identified this dynamic as the transcendent function or the process of reintegrating split-off parts of the psyche back into the personality. I have argued that this process, although appearing the same for the dead, does not include the final part of the function, which would have the dead absorbed back into the personality. This cannot occur if the dead appear in the psyche in se and presumably have their own energetic and psychological integrity that has no interest in absorbing or reintegrating into the personality of another.

Although Memories, Dreams, Reflections points to substantial discussions about the nature of life and death and highlights Jung’s personal material on the question, this exchange is by far the clearest in terms of how Jung discovers and defines the dead. Therefore, when evaluating Jung’s experiences, I suggest abandoning a metaphorical understanding for a literal one. That is, it is necessary to leave aside the idea that the dead appear solely as symbolic of the unconscious itself and move toward the notion of the dead as disembodied souls, yet, no less psychological. When I emphasise the psychological relationship to the dead, this does not allocate them to a projection. Rather, primarily and most intimately this psychological approach poses the questions: ‘How do we live with the dead?’ and ‘What do the dead teach us about them, ourselves and the unconscious?’ Or, most critically, ‘What do the dead teach Jung about the unconscious through his visioning process?’

Jungians on the dead

Jungian scholarship traditionally has framed the discussion of the dead in relation to the bereavement process. Analysts have suggested that the return of the dead is manifested by a mourning psyche adjusting to a lost object. One approach has been to view the history of spiritualism and its influence on the genesis of Jungian psychology.” A recent theme has treated spirit possession as a psychological dynamic. Yet, little research has focused the discussion on the dead themselves and their specific role in Jung’s personal material. By focusing attention on Jung’s interactions and experiences, a novel perspective emerges; the dead illuminated the possibility that this relationship was anything but pathological. The dead extended beyond the problematic issue of after-death survival to become a profound psychological agency whose main purpose was to assist Jung with his understanding of the dynamic of the unconscious itself. Jung attempted to address a similar issue in his dissertation when he suggested, ‘It is, in fact, exceedingly difficult, and sometimes impossible, to distinguish these states from the various types of neurosis, but on the other hand certain features point beyond pathological inferiority’.

The appearance of the dead raises some seminal questions, ‘Who are [they] and what does it mean to answer them?’ and ‘What do the dead want?’ Analyst Paul Kugler asks, ‘What is the significance of this realm between the living and the dead and why are the dead so intent upon getting our attention?’ Analyst Susan Olson asks, Do [the dead] grieve as we do? Does the process of individuation continue after death?’ And analyst Greg Mogenson suggests the possibility of what he calls the ‘life of the dead’. Most recently Peter Moore considers that we have not done justice to the obvious question of how the dead
might survive by limiting the possibility to either incarnate or discarnate options. Rather, he proposes the possibility of a post-mortem form of survival of consciousness, which maintains a type of form, simply not a physical one.

These types of speculations reflect the possibility that the consideration of the dead apart from previously held assumptions of being personal projections or splitoff parts of a mourning psyche might yield some surprising directions of inquiry. By considering the dead as Jung experienced them, as discarnates or souls without bodies inhabiting the very same psychic space as other figures of the unconscious, the full extent of their influence on Jung can be understood.

Scholars have charted some of these difficulties and inconsistencies regarding spirits in Jung’s professional writings, but lacking until recently, has been a concentrated focus on the presence of the dead in Jung’s personal accounts. Jung’s vacillation is apparent in the Zofingia lectures, which contain an, ‘impassioned and informed appeal for the serious scientific study of spiritualistic [i.e. paranormal] phenomena' to his ‘cautious position’ regarding ‘the objective existence of spirits’ in 1919. This back and forth would continue throughout his career until his out-of-body experience in 1944, when Jung stated, ‘I am absolutely convinced of personal survival, but I do not know how long it persists.’ Some think that Jung expressed his conviction in after-death survival later in his life, yet Shamdasani suggests it is more likely that after his mother’s death in 1923, he began writing professionally about it and became most certain. With the publication of The Red Book not only can the dead be positioned centrally in the discussion of Jung’s model of the unconscious, but it also appears that their role challenges the previously held assumption that the dead are simply projections of the personal unconscious. Charet charts how Jung himself analysed the issue of the dead in terms of his personal unconscious thinking the problem rested with his past and then considers: ‘Though the dead, as Jung claimed, pressed upon him from within, he still felt he could credibly interpret this psychologically and identify the dead with contents of the unconscious’, that is as projections. What The Red Book shows is that the dead are experienced as contents of the unconscious, as discarnates or disembodied souls and they have a psychological relationship. <>

THE REALITY GAME: HOW THE NEXT WAVE OF TECHNOLOGY WILL BREAK THE TRUTH by Samuel Woolley [PublicAffairs, 9781541768253]

Fake news posts and Twitter trolls were just the beginning. What will happen when misinformation moves from our social media feeds into our everyday lives? Online disinformation stormed our political process in 2016 and has only worsened since. Yet as Samuel Woolley shows in this urgent book, it may pale in comparison to what’s to come: humanlike automated voice systems, machine learning, "deepfake” AI-edited videos and images, interactive memes, virtual reality, and more. These technologies have the power not just to manipulate our politics, but to make us doubt our eyes and ears and even feelings.

Deeply researched and compellingly written, THE REALITY GAME describes the profound impact these technologies will have on our lives. Each new invention built without regard for its consequences edges us further into this digital dystopia.

Yet Woolley does not despair. Instead, he argues pointedly for a new culture of innovation, one built around accountability and especially transparency. With social media dragging us into a never-ending culture war, we must learn to stop fighting and instead prevent future manipulation. This book shows how we can use our new tools not to control people but to empower them.
The Concept of Fake News Burst onto The Global scene in 2016 following the rise of blatantly false news stories and the flow of digital garbage during the presidential election in the United States. The specter of "fake news" was further fanned by suspicious rumors of smear campaigns against Russian athletes that arose during the summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro and by misinformation about the Zika virus, which continued to spread in Brazil and elsewhere. The term "fake news" was quickly co-opted, though, by the powers that be. The very people who produced the junk content known by this moniker reclaimed the phrase as a means of undermining legitimate journalism, as a crutch to attack inconvenient scientific findings, or as a means to refute factual stories about their own misdeeds. The term "fake news" itself became a tool for spreading fake news.

With this in mind, I need to explain how I use a couple of terms and definitions that are important to the coming chapters and the arguments I make here. First, I try not to use the phrase "fake news." Instead, I use the term "misinformation," by which I mean the accidental spread of false content or "disinformation," by which I mean the purposeful spread of false content. I sometimes refer to "false news" or "junk news," and when I do I mean articles constructed to look like news that are not actually true, because they lack facts or verifiability. These types of articles, like the infamous pieces that came from the bogus Denver Guardian during the 2016 US election, are created with an intent to mislead, confuse, or, at times, make money. I do not use "fake news" because the phrase has been repurposed as a tool to target articles and reports by actual journalists who write things with which thin-skinned politicians, litigious business executives, or incensed regular folks do not agree.

I refer to "computational propaganda" often. My colleagues and I originally came up with the term to refer to the use of automated tools (like Twitter bots) and algorithms over social media in attempts to manipulate public opinion. In this book I use the term more broadly to refer to the use of digital tools—from Facebook to augmented reality (AR) devices—to spread politically motivated information. Computational propaganda includes using social media to anonymously attack journalists in order to stop them from reporting. It includes leveraging digital voice systems designed to sound like humans to call voters over the phone and tell them lies about the opposition. It also includes using artificial intelligence (AI) and social bots—automated programs built to mimic people online—to fake human communication in order to trick the online algorithms that curate and prioritize our news.

Finally, I often talk about democracy and human rights. When I talk about "democracy," I am talking about democratic values: liberty, equality, justice, and so forth. I am not advocating for US-style democratic governance or for any other hybrid democratic-republican-parliamentary-presidential system. When I talk about "human rights," I have in mind the definition by the United Nations, which defines "human rights" as:
the rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or any other status. Human rights include the right to life and liberty, freedom from slavery and torture, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to work and education, and many more. Everyone is entitled to these rights, without discrimination.

I argue that we should bake the values of democracy and human rights into our technology. We must prioritize equality and freedom in the tools we build so that the next wave of devices will not be used to further damage the truth.

She can also get bullied and harassed on the platform, as she can at school or on social media, but here it happens in an unfettered virtual environment. As a soon-to-be voter, she can be targeted with false news reports and bogus information on elections and major political events. Now that she and her peers aren’t simply reading stories and watching videos of events, now that they are immersed in an environment that enchants multiple senses, they can become unwitting victims of virtual disinformation. White supremacists, political extremists, and all manner of other predators can construct worlds within worlds in this social VR system where they can indoctrinate this young girl and others like her. They constantly barrage these kids, and even their parents and grandparents, with subtle political advertisements of dubious provenance and fake stories, such as the ones about how vaccines cause autism and other ailments.

This particular world and these circumstances do not exist yet, though several new and emergent social VR platforms are now available. With VR and other novel media tools, the issues of an unregulated and unconsidered digital sphere become all the more potent. These tools are coming. If we do not take action, we could very well end up with scenarios just like this. Digital propaganda is not just biased information, enhanced by automation and bots, that can be read on Facebook group pages or in YouTube comment sections. It is technologically enhanced propaganda that people can see, hear, and feel. In the not so distant future, it could be politically motivated information that is also tasted and smelled. This new way of spreading disinformation moves well beyond fake accounts on Twitter.

"Deepfakes”—videos so convincingly doctored that the eye cannot tell they’re fake—are already being made to show politicians and public figures doing and saying things they haven’t. And lying politicians can use the rise of these altered videos to claim that they were framed. They can deny the wrongdoing recorded in an actual video, insisting that they never made that gaffe or took that bribe. The video is a deepfake, they will argue. Automated voice calling systems, which sound just like a real person—with pauses, tics, and everything—have already been launched by Google, which bills its Duplex tool as an M personal assistant. What happens when that system is used to call your grandmother to talk politics, or to threaten journalists over the phone? Imagine the possibilities for using such a system for political robocalls, or for push-polling—a technique sometimes used by campaigns to manipulate voters over the phone under the guise of an opinion poll. Virtual reality and augmented reality are immersive technologies that obscure the border between the physical and digital worlds and are useful for more than just entertainment and education. What happens when groups begin using VR as a means to manipulate?

More sophisticated chatbots are likely to supplant their more rudimentary social bot cousins. Whereas the bots used in the 2016 US election and the 2018 Mexican election were blunt instruments used to inflate likes, shares, and follows, AI-enabled chatbots will be able to convince real users through conversation. Passively using a bot to share a biased news article on vaccination with a group of people is a fairly unsophisticated way of changing minds. Deploying AI chatbots that are indistinguishable from people, can engage in real arguments, and can more effectively mimic emotion is likely to be far more effective. Beyond this, what will VR social bots look like? Will politicians and other groups be able to build groups of "smart" avatars to do their bidding—spreading their messages and attacking their enemies—in the virtual world?
To understand where technologically enhanced disinformation is heading, we have to look to the past. The next chapter details a short history of how social media websites and applications have been used for manipulation. Although for many people the 2016 US election was the first time that they experienced the impact of false news, it was not the first time that social media was gamed for political purposes. Between the founding of Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and other major web 2.0 sites—the internet of social media—and 2016, these media tools were harnessed for coercion and control in lots of ways in many countries around the world. And the social media companies were aware of these events. They simply failed to act to curb computational propaganda before it got out of hand.

One of the main reasons I wanted to write this book was to empower people. I believe that the more people there are who understand the problem, the better. If we are educated about the history of dialogue around how the latest gadgets often go from tools for saving the world to implements for breaking democracy, then we can contextualize the current wave of propaganda within the larger history. The more we learn about computational propaganda and its elements, from false news to political trolling, the more we can do to stop it from taking hold. Today’s propagandists, criminals, and con artists rely on people not understanding how technology and propaganda campaigns work in order to deceive them. The more we know about these tactics, the less effective they are. And the more people there are who advocate for sensible solutions to stop the spread of junk news and unfair data-gathering practices, the better off we all will be.


A courageous and damning look at the destruction wrought by the arrogance, incompetence, and duplicity prevalent in the U.S. military—from the inside perspective of a West Point professor of law.

Veneration for the military is a deeply embedded but fatal flaw in America’s collective identity. In twenty years at West Point, whistleblower Tim Bakken has come to understand how unquestioned faith isolates the U.S. armed forces from civil society and leads to catastrophe. Pervaded by chronic deceit, the military’s insular culture elevates blind loyalty above all other values. The consequences are undeniably grim: failure in every war since World War II, millions of lives lost around the globe, and trillions of dollars wasted.

Bakken makes the case that the culture he has observed at West Point influences whether America starts wars and how it prosecutes them. Despite fabricated admissions data, rampant cheating, epidemics of sexual assault, archaic curriculums, and shoddy teaching, the military academies produce officers who maintain their privileges at any cost to the nation. Any dissenter is crushed. Bakken revisits all the major wars the United States has fought, from Korea to the current debacles in the Middle East, to show how the military culture produces one failure after another.

THE COST OF LOYALTY: DISHONESTY, HUBRIS, AND FAILURE IN THE US. MILITARY is a powerful, multifaceted revelation about the United States and its singular source of pride. One of the few federal employees ever to win a whistleblowing case against the U.S. military, Bakken, in this brave, timely, and urgently necessary book, and at great personal risk, helps us understand why America loses wars.

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The Collapse
On the final evening of the academic year at West Point, the computer system collapsed. This incident, in May 2019—the third such breakdown in just over two months—came hours before the last day of classes at what the U.S. Army calls the "preeminent leadership institution in the world," and was accompanied by a complete loss of internet connections. The army colonel responsible for the system admitted at the time that the shutdown "had a crippling impact on cadets," though he managed to skirt all responsibility. It was a failure on his watch, and entirely not his fault.

In some ways, he was correct. The failure of that system was not his doing inasmuch as the failure of the entire system was not. His denial of responsibility was a sign of the large creeping problem inside America's military and the schools that feed it. Breakdowns and malfunctions with far greater ramifications had been rampant long before the colonel became the chief information officer, and even before he was a student in the same place, decades earlier.

The colonel attributed the system "outages" to "management, process, and technology failures [and] clumsy maintenance" by the Pentagon's Defense Research and Engineering Network (the DREN), the greater computer system that supports research and development for the entire U.S. military. After shifting and dispersing blame instead of accepting it, the colonel repeated another dubious and grandiose army mantra, reminding some in the West Point community, "We are and will remain the #1 public university in the United States."

This kind of hubris in the face of inarguable failure is neither rare here nor mysterious. It is central to military officers' bearing, as they try to project an image of competence, surety, and expertise, optimism over logic. The bragging, however, is not a harmless "hooah," the guttural cheer uttered by soldiers to express their camaraderie and enthusiasm. Inside the U.S. military, such mantras and public relations adages can metastasize into falsity that may be used to justify interventions and wars, including those in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

The geopolitical consequences of those wars could not be more significant. Communist, totalitarian North Korea possesses atomic weapons. Communist China fought the Americans on behalf of the North Koreans and supported the North Vietnamese, and China is now the second most influential nation in the world. Vietnam is completely Communist. Afghanistan's sovereignty is threatened daily by the Taliban. Iraqi society, heavily influenced by Iran, which is another potential atomic threat, is in turmoil. Arising from the war in Iraq, ISIS is an international threat, including in Afghanistan. The Middle East is more dangerous than when the United States invaded Iraq under false pretenses in 2003. No one knows for sure, but probably three to six million people were killed in these wars, including over one hundred thousand U.S. soldiers. Inside America, the last seventy-five years of military intervention have unleashed a flood of incompetence, hubris, and denial.

I have been living at the headwaters.
West Point has graduated just about every top general in every war since 1861. It has been and remains one of the most critical institutions in America. Now completing my twentieth year teaching there, I’ve had a front-row seat to a culture that has led to great losses. I’ve observed how the thinking and behavior taught at West Point, mirrored in the other academies, overwhelmingly influences military culture at large and contributes to or creates catastrophes thousands of miles away.

The variables that lead to the military’s failure are numerous and complex, but lack of support is surely not one of them. Public polling regularly shows that the military is overwhelmingly the most popular institution in America. It is the most well resourced, technologically advanced, and highly weaponized force in world history. These immense advantages are a product of America’s democracy, economy, and system of taxation. What America creates, builds, and achieves becomes what its military should be able to create, build, and achieve. Why does it lose?

Along the way, the military, of its own volition, has separated from the civilian society that was supposed to be overseeing it and caused the nation irreparable damage. This separation has occurred slowly, but unabated, since the end of World War II, which, not coincidentally, was the military’s last clear-cut victory. The public’s deference toward America’s perceived military prowess solidified in 1945 and, despite seventy-five years of losses, has hardened into place. Under the watch of an executive branch that has ceded more and more authority to military generals—who now on their own often decide whom to attack around the world—and a Congress united by little except the fear of challenging war, the U.S. military has become an island. It has completely severed its culture, mores, and legal system from the basic tenets of civilian society and constitutional government.

After winning several critical Supreme Court cases in the 1970s and 1980s, the military successfully codified this separation into law. The highest court in the land deferred to the generals’ contention that they needed more leeway to create "good order and discipline." As a result, legal and moral authority was delegated to the military chain of command, essentially depriving soldiers of constitutional liberties enjoyed by all U.S. citizens. The institution tasked with defending our freedoms was no longer required to offer these liberties. Within this insular world, unaccountable to outside authority, the U.S. military developed one value that eats away at all others: loyalty.

The military’s disassociation from civilian society has led to an institution that is larger and more independent than some nations, a sovereign entity within America, opaque and secretive. It is led by self-protective officers who can go decades without ever having to reckon with a contrary opinion. Conformity is not only valued but also treated as an end in itself. As in an authoritarian state, free speech, independent thought, and creativity are stifled and smothered. The individual gains nothing and risks everything by engaging in dissent. Compliance equals survival.

In this closed system, the generals do not develop the ingenuity necessary to win modern wars or the capacity to understand whether a war is even winnable in the first place. This leads to a consideration that is almost too disturbing to acknowledge: some generals may indeed understand but remain silent because there is no mechanism in the military for them to express their individual ideas or opinions. Men and women die because other men and women do not have the reasoning, or the ability, or the courage to speak truthfully.

Of course, a computer meltdown at a military academy is not a failed foreign intervention, but it does illustrate a military institution more focused on large machinery than on computer hardware and software, which are the modern tools that will determine success or failure in war. Along with an absence of adequate ingenuity, the conditions for individual and organizational failure are pervasive inside the military: loyalty over truth; isolation; censorship; control over everyone; manipulation of the media; narcissism; retaliation; and callousness. The military’s separation reinforces its worst instincts, especially its
penchant for violence. This is a grave matter, and it is present every day at the three military academies. Statistics from studies by the Pentagon and Department of Justice show that women students attending the academies are five times more likely to be sexually assaulted than women students attending other colleges in the United States. The moderating influences and voices of reason that are inescapable in civilian society don’t make their way inside the academies.

In a place where loyalty is the top value, change is almost scientifically impossible. In any number of instances over the past two decades, I experienced the futility of relying on the most well educated officers in the military when urging basic modern practices. Civilian professors and I proposed that West Point should permit all faculty members, rather than exclusively army officers, to apply for academic leadership positions at West Point. This was rejected. Another time, I argued against what I believed was favoritism, a prohibited practice under federal law. This was met by immediate retaliation, a common response inside the military. I notified the top two officials in the U.S. Army, the civilian secretary of the army and the chief of staff, a four-star general, about conditions at West Point.

According to the federal agency where I litigated and won a case against the army, it was the head of the Department of Law, a colonel and military lawyer, who was responsible for the retaliation. From this case, I became a legally recognized whistleblower working under a corrective order issued by a federal administrative judge to West Point. When the army promoted the colonel to brigadier general, it was only the latest example of what I’ve come to expect from the “world’s preeminent leadership institution.” It is a malfunctioning system, and the consequences are the most dire imaginable.

"The cost of loyalty is far too high, and we, for the safety of our nation, have to pay the bill that has come due. <>"
“any air pollutant” that could reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health. But could something as ordinary as carbon dioxide really be considered a harmful pollutant? And even if the EPA had the authority to regulate emissions, could it be forced to do so?

Environmentalists urged Mendelson to stand down. Thinking of his young daughters and determined to fight climate change, he pressed on—and brought Sierra Club, Greenpeace, NRDC, and twelve state attorneys general led by Massachusetts to his side. This unlikely group—they called themselves the Carbon Dioxide Warriors—challenged the Bush administration and took the EPA to court.

The Rule of Five tells the story of their unexpected triumph. We see how accidents, infighting, luck, superb lawyering, and the arcane practices of the Supreme Court collided to produce a legal miracle. An acclaimed advocate, Richard Lazarus reveals the personal dynamics of the justices and dramatizes the workings of the Court. The final ruling, by a razor-thin 5–4 margin, made possible important environmental safeguards which the Trump administration now seeks to unravel.

On the morning of April 2, 2007, the United States Supreme Court announced its decision in Massachusetts v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, the most important environmental law case ever decided by the Court. The stakes were enormous. At issue was the legal authority and responsibility of the United States government to address the most pressing global environmental problem of our time—climate change.

One person, Joe Mendelson, acting very much alone, had triggered the events that had led to this moment. Fed up with the lack of action during the presidency of Bill Clinton to address the climate issue, he had decided to do something about it, even when other environmentalists had urged him to stand down. By the
time the case reached the Supreme Court, George W. Bush was president and Mendelson had been joined by dozens of lawyers; together, they made up a team that called themselves "The Carbon Dioxide Warriors." They sought to do something no environmentalist had ever done before: take a case to the Supreme Court and defeat the president of the United States. Now it was up to the nine Justices of the Supreme Court to decide.

A ruling in favor of a coalition of states, local governments, and environmental groups led by Massachusetts could mean that after years of inaction, the United States would finally take action to address a global threat with potentially catastrophic consequences for which the United States, more than any other nation, was largely responsible. A loss, by contrast, could set back or even destroy efforts across the country to bring lawsuits to force the federal government to act on the climate issue. The latter prospect was why many thoughtful environmentalists had tried to prevent the Massachusetts case from ever going before the Justices. They were justifiably worried they might not only lose, but lose big.

This book tells the story of Massachusetts v. EPA. It is an unlikely yet nonetheless hopeful and inspiring story that reveals the best of Supreme Court litigation today, while acknowledging why it is hard to make law to address climate change. The Massachusetts story underscores the serendipitous pathways and fascinating personalities that can lead to a historic ruling. It also opens a window into the Court itself, and the many ways in which environmental cases present particular challenges both for the Justices and for the advocates who appear before them.

Joe Mendelson had planned to stay up late on election night November 2016 to celebrate the returns. Much had been accomplished during the Obama administration to realize the potential created by Massachusetts to use the Clean Air Act to address climate change, but there was clearly much critically important work left to be done by an administration that would be led by President Hillary Clinton. The Paris Agreement was a spectacular turning point, yet only an important first step. Years, indeed, decades more work would be needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and stabilize atmospheric concentrations of those gases at a safe level. To that end, climate activists who had been tapped to be part of the transition team for what Mendelson (and most of the nation) assumed would be the new Clinton administration already had their flights booked to Washington, D.C., and their apartments rented across the nation’s capital, so they could be ready to start their work on day one after the election. There was also a Supreme Court seat to be filled, left vacant by Justice Scalia’s death in February, which would solidify a majority on the Court ready to reject industry challenges to the EPA’s greenhouse gas regulations, including those pending against the Clean Power Plan.

There was good reason for Mendelson’s excitement and optimism at 8 p.m., just before the election returns started to come in. But, not long after, he instead went to bed early on election night once he saw the crumbling of the Democratic Party's "impenetrable" electoral college firewall in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin, which political pundits had for months declared would ensure Hillary Clinton’s victory. "Why watch a disaster unfold?" he thought to himself. He awoke the next morning to an unusual silence that confirmed his worst fears. Donald Trump was the president-elect.

The threat to environmental protection law presented by a Trump administration was without modern historical parallel. George W. Bush had reneged on his campaign pledge to regulate greenhouse gases, but, unlike Trump, he had not campaigned on the preposterous proposition that climate change was a "hoax" "created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive." Nor had Bush embraced a national political party platform that promised a wholesale unraveling of the nation’s air and water pollution control laws and the agencies in charge of their administration. And, while not embracing greenhouse gas regulation, the Bush administration had funded important climate research that
later provided the scientific basis for much of what the Obama administration had accomplished by regulation.

November 2016 was no mere reprise of the election of Ronald Reagan thirty-six years earlier. Notwithstanding his exaggerated political rhetoric, Reagan had challenged existing environmental law mostly at the margins. And despite his personal popularity, his ability to fulfill any broader reform agenda was persistently curtailed by both Democrats and Republicans in the House and Senate, who supported tough air and water pollution control laws. By contrast, the 2016 election produced Republican majorities in the House and Senate that shared Trump’s desire to cut back on federal environmental protection, including restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions.

Trump wasted little time in taking steps to fulfill his deregulatory agenda. He named to head the EPA Oklahoma attorney general Scott Pruitt, who had spent the previous six years launching lawsuits against the Obama EPA, including challenging the lawfulness of the Clean Power Plan. (When Pruitt was forced to resign under a cloud of scandal, Trump replaced him with a former coal lobbyist with the same policy agenda.) Trump also named former Texas governor Rick Perry—who had previously called for the elimination of the Department of Energy—to be his secretary of energy.

Trump himself took an axe to environmental regulation shortly after his inauguration. In March 2017, only two months into his presidency, he signed an executive order designed to unwind every one of Obama’s climate policies. He revoked several executive orders that Obama had issued to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the operations of federal government buildings and the military, and instructed the EPA to consider curtailing and outright repealing the agency’s restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles and power plants.

On August 4, 2017, just over six months into his presidency, Trump formally notified the UN secretary-general of the United States’ intent to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Under the agreement’s terms, any such withdrawal would not be effective until November 4, 2020, the day after the next presidential election. Trump also canceled the payment of $2 billion previously promised by the United States to the Green Climate Fund to help developing nations address climate change.

Trump-appointed agency officials were instructed to roll back environmental protection regulations, especially those aimed at addressing climate change. Trump’s EPA wasted no time in announcing proposals to cut back on regulations governing greenhouse gas emissions established by the agency under Obama. The proposed rules governing new motor vehicles would freeze fuel efficiency standards at 37 miles per gallon in 2020 and eliminate the prior requirement that vehicles subsequently achieve 50 miles per gallon by 2030. The EPA also announced the elimination of California’s long-standing right to impose pollution emissions limitations that are more stringent than the national standards. Twelve other states and the District of Columbia have adopted the tougher California standards, and if the federal government were to succeed in eliminating California’s authority to adopt more stringent standards, all those states and the nation’s capital would have to follow the more relaxed EPA emissions limitations.

To similar policy ends, the EPA announced its repeal of the Clean Power Plan—the Obama administration’s plan to curtail greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power plants—and to replace it with a plan that several academic studies concluded would lead to an increase in coal combustion emissions. According to an early estimate by the EPA of its own initial proposed repeal-and-substitute plan, the increase in power plant emissions would result in more than fourteen hundred more premature deaths and fifteen thousand more upper respiratory illnesses each year by 2030.8 The president’s budget request for 2020 further sought to radically reduce the money available to basic scientific climate research, by eliminating the EPA’s Global Change Research Office, presumably because such government sponsored research was undercutting the rationale for the president’s deregulatory agenda.
Government scientists in November 2018 had announced sobering news about climate change, underscoring the urgency of the very controls Trump sought to eliminate. The report concluded that annual average temperatures across the country had already increased by 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit since the beginning of the twentieth century, and would increase at least another 2.3 degrees by the middle of the century and by 5.4 to 11 degrees by the end of the century if historical trends continued unabated. The federal government report stated that the evidence was "significant, clear; and compelling ... that global average temperature is much higher, and is rising more rapidly, than anything modern civilization has experienced, with widespread and growing impacts."

The government report noted that the "earth’s climate is now changing faster than at any other point in the history of modern civilization" and laid out in stark detail what the consequences of such temperature increases would be. In dispassionate economic terms, the report described how climate change would result in hundreds of billions of dollars in annual losses to the U.S. economy, including almost two billion lost labor hours each year.

The report described how rising sea levels would threaten $1 trillion in public infrastructure, private industry, and private property along the U.S. coast. Devastating droughts would increase in some parts of the nation while no less devastating downpours and floods would cripple other parts of the country. Agricultural productivity would plummet, power plant efficiency would plunge with rising temperatures (leading to more air pollution), and supplies of safe drinking water would seriously decline.

The many proposed and announced Trump rollbacks were far from being faits accomplis. The most significant of these were immediately subject to legal challenge in the courts. Like past efforts to curtail environmental protections, they were no more immune to being struck down than was the EPA’s 2003 fateful decision to deny Mendelson’s petition. And just as the Massachusetts petitioners had chosen to challenge the EPA, many states and the nation’s leading environmental organizations quickly joined forces to mount challenges to the Trump administration’s actions, including Doniger at the NRDC, Fox at Earthjustice, and attorneys from the Environmental Defense Fund and the attorneys general offices of Massachusetts, New York, and California, all of whom had worked on the Massachusetts litigation.

The challengers had far more reason to be optimistic about their likelihood of success than the Massachusetts petitioners did back in 2003. The strong scientific and economic bases for greenhouse gas regulation that the EPA developed during the Obama and Bush administrations cannot easily be explained away. As a result, any effort by the EPA to revoke Obama-era regulations is susceptible to being struck down by the courts as arbitrary and capricious, and therefore unlawful. As Massachusetts made clear, even presidents have to follow the commands of the law. Early on, the Trump administration lost several major environmental cases in the courts, including a case challenging its efforts to immediately suspend regulations designed to curtail greenhouse gas emissions from cars and trucks and from the production of oil and natural gas. According to NRDC, the administration lost fifty-four of the fifty-nine decided cases the environmental organization brought against Trump’s environmental rollbacks in the administration’s first three years.

The Obama administration greenhouse gas reduction programs also have a life that is wholly independent of the success or failure of any effort by the Trump administration to undo them. The EPA estimated that the benefits of the Clean Power Plan exceeded its costs by tens of billions of dollars. The emissions reductions envisioned by the Clean Power Plan, even if repealed by the Trump administration, will at some point happen simply because they make good economic sense.

For that same reason, many state and local governments have pledged to follow the blueprint set forth in the Clean Power Plan for how electricity may be generated within their jurisdictions with far lower emissions. They have taken their own steps to increase the use of renewable energy in the production of
electricity and to promote energy conservation measures that reduce the need for electricity produced by
coal-fired power plants. States discovered that they could simultaneously reduce greenhouse gas emissions
and lower pollution that threatens public health without a substantial increase, if any, in the cost of
electricity. In 2019 the State of New York enacted a law requiring zero emissions electricity by 2040 and
an 85 percent reduction from 1990 levels for emissions from all sources by 2050.

Nor has the rest of the world followed the Trump administration’s lead. Just the opposite. Other nations
have almost uniformly made clear their intent to honor their Paris commitments, and many pledged to
increase their efforts in response to the Trump administration’s backtracking. China, in particular, has
exploited the void left by the United States by assuming a global leadership role—reducing the growth
rate of its own emissions and developing and marketing products that can be sold to businesses and
individual consumers in other nations who wish to do the same.

Unlike politicians, business leaders must make decisions based on actual climate science. Executives of
publicly owned companies, who face fierce competition from other businesses and have fiduciary
obligations to their shareholders, cannot imagine away the scientific consensus that temperature increases,
rising sea levels, and extreme weather events will threaten their physical facilities and operations. Nor can
they ignore the business opportunities to sell products and services to consumers both in the United States
and abroad seeking to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions or otherwise limit the harmful impacts of
climate change. Rather than support Trump’s efforts to roll back greenhouse gas emission limitations on
cars, industry leaders have repeatedly made it clear that they favor tougher controls. Shortly before the
White House announced that it would seek to end California’s ability to adopt more stringent car emissions
standards, four of the nation’s largest auto manufacturers declared they would voluntarily meet
California’s more demanding standards. When the EPA similarly announced its proposals to relax
restrictions on the emissions of methane, a highly potent greenhouse gas, many of the biggest oil and gas
producers subject to those emissions controls made clear their opposition to any such relaxation.

It is too soon to measure the full legacy of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Massachusetts, which has become
required reading in law schools throughout the country. But as the 2016 election soberly reminded those
who a year earlier had been uncorking champagne bottles in Paris, the kind of transformative change that
Massachusetts sought to trigger can begin in a courthouse, but it never ends there.

A major Supreme Court ruling can play a critical role in jumpstarting a too-long-stalled lawmaking process.
But transformative change depends on more than winning lawsuits. As environmental public interest lawyers
understand, every litigation victory is necessarily provisional. The political and economic interests defeated
by environmentalists in court do not merely surrender and disappear. They regroup and file their own
lawsuits. And they do not shy away from breaking free of the courtroom by supporting the election of new
lawmakers who promote their interests and the passage of new laws to overturn court rulings they
disfavor.

That is why environmental progress, over the longer term, requires votes too. Not just the votes of five
Justices in one courtroom, but of individual voters across the country and the world. These votes must be in
sufficient numbers to elect forward-thinking leaders ready to embrace demanding environmental
protection measures, and inspirational enough to mobilize people in favor of the necessary social change.

The climate issue can still be effectively addressed. There is time, despite the drumbeat of increasingly dire
predictions and the unnecessary setbacks threatened by shifting U.S. political leadership. The worst
consequences can still be avoided. The necessary technology and institutional design changes to reduce
future greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to now-unavoidable climate change either already exist or
are within reach. Nor are there insurmountable economic obstacles that prevent those new technologies
from being adopted. The greatest economic threat by far to public health and welfare will come not from addressing climate change, but from failing to do so.

But a future that effectively addresses the problem of climate change cannot be merely assumed by simple claims that those who oppose such efforts are "on the wrong side of history." As recent political events in the United States make clear, the ability to make history must be won. It is time for the United States, and the rest of the world, to take the bold, far-reaching steps necessary to curtail global greenhouse gas emissions in order to avert climate change's worst consequences. America has both the opportunity and the responsibility to embrace a leadership role in addressing a problem our own nation played an outsized role in creating. But for that to happen, we will need a fully engaged and politically active citizenry committed to addressing the issue with their votes.

It takes five votes at the Supreme Court to make a majority. But as the Massachusetts story makes clear, sometimes one committed person can make all the difference. <>

THE POWER WORSHIPPERS: INSIDE THE DANGEROUS RISE OF RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM by Katherine Stewart [Bloomsbury Publishing, 9781635573435]

For readers of Democracy in Chains and Dark Money, a revelatory investigation of the Religious Right’s rise to political power.

For too long the Religious Right has masqueraded as a social movement preoccupied with a number of cultural issues, such as abortion and same-sex marriage. In her deeply reported investigation, Katherine Stewart reveals a disturbing truth: this is a political movement that seeks to gain power and to impose its vision on all of society. America’s religious nationalists aren’t just fighting a culture war, they are waging a political war on the norms and institutions of American democracy.

Stewart pulls back the curtain on the inner workings and leading personalities of a movement that has turned religion into a tool for domination. She exposes a dense network of think tanks, advocacy groups, and pastoral organizations embedded in a rapidly expanding community of international alliances and united not by any central command but by a shared, anti-democratic vision and a common will to power. She follows the money that fuels this movement, tracing much of it to a cadre of super-wealthy, ultraconservative donors and family foundations. She shows that today’s Christian nationalism is the fruit of a longstanding antidemocratic, reactionary strain of American thought that draws on some of the most troubling episodes in America’s past. It forms common cause with a globe-spanning movement that seeks to destroy liberal democracy and replace it with nationalist, theocratic and autocratic forms of government around the world. Religious nationalism is far more organized and better funded than most people realize. It seeks to control all aspects of government and society. Its successes have been stunning, and its influence now extends to every aspect of American life, from the White House to state capitols, from our schools to our hospitals.

THE POWER WORSHIPPERS is a brilliantly reported book of warning and a wake-up call. Stewart’s probing examination demands that Christian nationalism be taken seriously as a significant threat to the American republic and our democratic freedoms.

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Introduction
Church and Party in Unionville
Ministering to Power
Excerpt: This is not a book I could have imagined writing a dozen years ago. When an older couple from another town attempted to set up and lead a Bible club at my daughter’s public elementary school in Southern California in 2009, they might as well have been alien visitors showing up at a beach party. The purpose of the club was to convince children as young as five that they would burn for an eternity if they failed to conform to a strict interpretation of the Christian faith. The club’s organizers were offered free and better space in the evangelical church next door to our school, but they refused it; they insisted on holding the club in the public school because they knew the kids would think the message was coming from the school. They referred to our public school as their “mission field” and our children as “the harvest.” I thought their plan was outrageously inappropriate in our religiously diverse public school. I also thought it was a freak occurrence. They seemed completely out of place in the sunny land of standup paddle boarders and open-air wine tastings. In my eyes they came out of the American past, not the future. I was quite wrong about that.

Sometimes it takes a while to realize what is happening in your own backyard. As I researched the group behind these kindergarten missionaries, I saw that they were part of a national network of clubs. I soon discovered that this network was itself just one of many initiatives to insert reactionary religion into public schools across the country. Then I realized that these initiatives were the fruit of a nationally coordinated effort not merely to convert other people’s children in the classroom but to undermine public education altogether. Belatedly, I understood that the conflict they provoked in our local community—I was hardly the only parent who found their presence in the public school alarming—was not an unintended consequence of their activity. It was of a piece with their plan to destroy confidence in our system of education and make way for a system of religious education more to their liking.

In 2012, I published what I had learned about the topic in my book The Good News Club. As I was completing that project, I realized I had latched onto only one aspect of a much larger, more important phenomenon in American political culture. The drive to end public education as we know it is just part of a political movement that seeks to transform the defining institutions of democracy in America. This movement pretends to represent the past and stand for old traditions. But in reality it is a creature of present circumstances and is organized around a vision for the future that most Americans would find abhorrent.

For the past ten years I have been attending conferences, gatherings, and strategy meetings of the activists powering this movement. I have sat down for coffee with “ex-gay” pastors determined to mobilize the “pro-family” vote. I have exchanged emails late into the night with men and women who have dedicated their lives to the goal of refounding the United States according to “biblical law.” I have walked alongside young women as they marched for “life” and followed them into seminar rooms where they receive training in political messaging and strategy. Along the way, I have made some friends and learned
something like a new language. I no longer see members of this movement as alien visitors under the California sun. I know them to be very much a part of modern America. And that alarms me all the more.

Now and then I wish I could go back to those happy afternoons on the California coast, where none of this would have seemed worthy of placing before the public. But I can’t so easily forget what I have learned. Anyone who cares about what is happening in American politics today needs to know about this movement and its people. Their issues—the overwhelming preoccupation with sexual order, the determination to unite the nation around a single religious identity, the conviction that they are fighting for salvation against forces of darkness—have come to define the effort that has transformed the political landscape and shaken the foundations upon which lay our democratic norms and institutions. This is the movement responsible for the election of the forty-fifth president of the United States, and it now determines the future of the Republican Party. It is the change that we have been watching—some with joy, others in disbelief, others in denial. And it isn’t going away anytime soon.

I don’t doubt that many of the people I have met on my journey mean well. I have seen them showing kindness to friends and strangers with equal conviction, and I know that among them are many generous spirits. But I am convinced that they are dead wrong about the effect of their work on the future of the American republic. They may believe sincerely in the righteousness of their cause and want as much as anyone to build a secure and prosperous America. But that just makes their story—the subject of this book—an American tragedy.

For too long now America’s Christian nationalist movement has been misunderstood and underestimated. Most Americans continue to see it as a cultural movement centered on a set of social issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage, preoccupied with symbolic conflicts over monuments and prayers. But the religious right has become more focused and powerful even as it is arguably less representative. It is not a social or cultural movement. It is a political movement, and its ultimate goal is power. It does not seek to add another voice to America’s pluralistic democracy but to replace our foundational democratic principles and institutions with a state grounded on a particular version of Christianity, answering to what some adherents call a “biblical worldview” that also happens to serve the interests of its plutocratic funders and allied political leaders. The movement is unlikely to realize its most extreme visions, but it has already succeeded in degrading our politics and dividing the nation with religious animus. This is not a “culture war.” It is a political war over the future of democracy.

Political movements are by their nature complex creatures, and this one is more complex than most. It is not organized around any single, central institution. It consists rather of a dense ecosystem of nonprofit, for-profit, religious, and nonreligious media and legal advocacy groups, some relatively permanent, others fleeting. Its leadership cadre includes a number of personally interconnected activists and politicians who often jump from one organization to the next. It derives much of its power and direction from an informal club of funders, a number of them belonging to extended hyperwealthy families. It took me some time to navigate the sea of acronyms, funding schemes, denominations, and policy and kinship networks, and I will lay out much of this ecosystem in this book. Yet the important thing to understand about the collective effort is not its evident variety but the profound source of its unity. This is a movement that has come together around what its leaders see as absolute truth—and what the rest of us may see as partisan agitation. My aim is to describe the common, often startling political vision that has united this movement.

Names matter, so I will take a moment here to lay out some of the terms of my investigation. Christian nationalism is not a religious creed but, in my view, a political ideology. It promotes the myth that the American republic was founded as a Christian nation. It asserts that legitimate government rests not on the consent of the governed but on adherence to the doctrines of a specific religious, ethnic, and cultural heritage. It demands that our laws be based not on the reasoned deliberation of our democratic institutions but on particular, idiosyncratic interpretations of the Bible. Its defining fear is that the nation has strayed
from the truths that once made it great. Christian nationalism looks backward on a fictionalized history of America’s allegedly Christian founding. It looks forward to a future in which its versions of the Christian religion and its adherents, along with their political allies, enjoy positions of exceptional privilege and power in government and in law.

Christian nationalism is also a device for mobilizing (and often manipulating) large segments of the population and concentrating power in the hands of a new elite. It does not merely reflect the religious identity it pretends to defend but actively works to construct and promote new varieties of religion for the sake of accumulating power. It actively generates or exploits cultural conflict in order to improve its grip on its target population.

Other observers may reasonably use terms like "theocracy," "dominionism," "fundamentalism," or "Christian right." I use those terms where appropriate, but often prefer "Christian nationalism" in referring to the whole, because it both reflects the political character of the movement and because it makes clear its parallels between the American version and comparable political movements around the world and throughout history.

'This is not a book about "evangelicals." The movement I am describing includes many people who identify as evangelical, but it excludes many evangelicals, too, and it includes conservative representatives of other varieties of Protestant and non-Protestant religion. This movement is a form of nationalism because it purports to derive its legitimacy from its claim to represent a specific identity unique to and representative of the American nation. And I join with others who study the field in calling it "Christian nationalism" in deference to the movement’s own understanding of this national identity, which it sees as inextricably bound up with a particular religion. However, I do not mean to suggest that Christian nationalism is representative of American Christianity as a whole. Indeed, a great many people who identify as Christians oppose the movement, and quite a few even question whether it is authentically Christian in the first place.

I have been following this movement for over a decade as an investigative reporter and journalist. I remain as impressed with the organization and determination of its leaders as I am alarmed by the widespread lack of awareness of its influence among the general public. The aims of the movement’s leaders have been clear for some time, often openly stated in the forums that they share. Their recent achievements have exceeded reasonable expectations. Yet much of the public continues to believe that little has changed.

Perhaps the most salient impediment to our understanding of the movement is the notion that Christian nationalism is a "conservative" ideology. The correct word is "radical." A genuinely conservative movement would seek to preserve institutions of value that have been crafted over centuries of American history. It would prize the integrity of electoral politics, the legitimacy of the judiciary, the importance of public education, and the values of tolerance and mutual respect that have sustained our pluralistic society even as others have been torn apart by sectarian conflict. Christian nationalism pretends to work toward the revival of "traditional values" yet its values contradict the long-established principles and norms of our democracy. It has no interest in securing the legitimacy of the Supreme Court; it will happily steal seats and pack the Court as long as it gets the rulings it wants. It cheers along voter suppression and gerrymandering schemes that allow Republicans to maintain disproportionate legislative control. It collaborates with international leaders who seek to undermine the United States’ traditional alliances and the postwar world order built up over the past seven decades. And it claims to defend "the family," but treats so many American families with contempt.

The widespread misunderstanding of Christian nationalism stems in large part from the failure to distinguish between the leaders of the movement and its followers. The foot soldiers of the movement—the many
millions of churchgoers who dutifully cast their votes for the movement’s favored politicians, who populate its marches and flood its coffers with small-dollar donations—are the root source of its political strength. But they are not the source of its ideas.

The rank and file come to the movement with a variety of concerns, including questions about life’s deeper meaning, a love and appreciation of God and Scripture, ethnic and family solidarity, the hope of community and friendship, and a desire to mark life’s most significant passages or express feelings of joy and sorrow. They also come with a longing for certainty in an uncertain world. Against a backdrop of escalating economic inequality, deindustrialization, rapid technological change, and climate instability, many people, on all points of the economic spectrum, feel that the world has entered a state of disorder. The movement gives them confidence, an identity, and the feeling that their position in the world is safe.

Yet the price of certainty is often the surrendering of one’s political will to those who claim to offer refuge from the tempest of modern life. The leaders of the movement have demonstrated real savvy in satisfying some of the emotional concerns of their followers, but they have little intention of giving them a voice in where the movement is going. I can still hear the words of one activist I met along the way. When I asked her if the antidemocratic aspects of the movement ever bothered her, she replied, "The Bible tells us that we don’t need to worry about anything."

The Christian nationalist movement is not a grassroots movement. Understanding its appeal to a broad mass of American voters is necessary in explaining its strength but is not sufficient in explaining the movement’s direction. It is a means through which a small number of people—quite a few of them residing in the Washington, D.C., area—harness the passions, resentments, and insecurities of a large and diverse population in their own quest for power. The leaders of the movement have quite consciously reframed the Christian religion itself to suit their political objectives and then promoted this new reactionary religion as widely as possible, thus turning citizens into congregants and congregants into voters.

From the perspective of the movement’s leadership, vast numbers of America’s conservative churches have been converted into the loyal cells of a shadow political party. Here, too, there is a widespread misunderstanding of the way Christian nationalism works. Its greatest asset is its national infrastructure, and that infrastructure consists not only of organizations uniting and coordinating its leadership, and a burgeoning far-right media, but also in large part the nation’s conservative houses of worship. The churches may be fragmented in a variety of denominations and theologies, but Christian nationalist leaders have had considerable success in uniting them around their political vision and mobilizing them to get out the vote for their chosen candidates. Movement leaders understand very well that this access to conservative Christians through their churches is a key source of their power, and for this reason they are committed to overturning regulatory, legal, or constitutional restrictions on the political activity of churches.

A related source of misunderstanding is the comforting yet unfounded presumption that America’s two-party system has survived intact the rise of the religious right as a political force. The conventional wisdom holds that the differences between America’s two parties, now as before, amount to differences over questions of domestic and foreign policy, and that politics is just the art of give-and-take between the two collections of interests and perspectives they represent. Yet the fundamental difference today is that one party is now beholden to a movement that does not appear to have much respect for representative democracy. Forty years ago, when both sides of certain cultural issues could be found in either party, it made sense to speak of the religious right as a social movement that cut across the partisan divide. Today it makes more sense to regard the Republican party as a host vehicle for a radical movement that denies that the other party has any legitimate claim to political power.

True, there are some Republicans concerned primarily with a conservative economic agenda and willing to practice the traditional politics of compromise and sharing of power. But few Republican politicians can
achieve influence without effectively acting as agents for Christian nationalism, and almost no Democratic leaders can realistically cede enough ground to earn the movement’s support.

Many critics of the Republican party today trace its present corruption to the influence of big money. This explanation is true enough yet incomplete. In the age of Trump, the party’s resolute rejection of the democratic and constitutional norms that it once at least pretended to champion would not have been possible without the prior success of Christian nationalism in training millions of supporters to embrace identity-based, authoritarian rule over pluralistic, democratic processes. The roots of the present crisis in the American political party system lie at the juncture of money and religion.

In recent years the movement has come to depend critically on the wealth of a growing subset of America’s plutocratic class. Without the DeVos/Prince clan, the Bradley Foundation, Howard Ahmanson Jr., the foundations of the late Richard Scaife, the John M. Olin Foundation, the Lynn and Foster Friess Family Foundation, the Macallan Foundation, Dan and Farris Wilks, the Green family, and a number of other major funders I will discuss in this book—to say nothing of the donor-advised funds such as the National Christian Foundation, which channel hundreds of millions of dollars in annual donations anonymously, and the massive flow of right-wing dark money targeting the courts—the movement would not be what it is today. At the same time, the movement has developed a large-scale apparatus for raising funds from millions of small donors. Indeed, the Christian right rose to prominence through aggressive direct-marketing operations, and much of its daily activity can be understood as part of an effort to milk its base of supporters.

Just as important as the pursuit of private money to Christian nationalism is the effort to secure public sources of funding. The movement has learned to siphon public money through subsidies, tax deductions, grants, and other schemes. This flow of funds has in turn shaped the ambitions and tactics of the movement. The calls for "religious freedom" that characterize much of its activism today, though undoubtedly bound up in a sincerely held belief that conservative Christians should be permitted to discriminate against LGBT people and members of religious minority groups, are as loud and passionate as they are because they are grounded in the fear among movement leaders that their discriminatory inclinations might cost them their lucrative tax deductions and subsidies.

Christian nationalists have put particular emphasis on the intersection of money and education. The Christian right has been hostile to public education at least since Jerry Falwell of the Moral Majority called for an end to public schools in 1979. This hostility has its roots in a combination of racial animus and fears of secularism, as I will explain. But Christian nationalists now see in school vouchers—and even charter programs—a potentially vast source of public funding, too. Furthermore, by planting churches in public school buildings for nominal fees rather than purchasing and funding their own buildings or renting private facilities at market rates, they are exploiting the public schools on a widespread scale to subsidize their religion.

In their pursuit of money, just as in their efforts to mobilize voters, Christian nationalists have displayed a high degree of sophistication and technological capability. There is a tendency on the part of those outside it to view the movement as a premodern phenomenon clinging to ancient doctrines that have long been destined for the archives of history. In fact, this is a modern movement in every respect. It is modern in its methods, which include high-tech data-mining operations and slick marketing campaigns. It is also modern in its doctrines, which notwithstanding their purported origins in ancient texts have been carefully shaped to serve the emotional needs of its adherents, the organizational needs of its clerical leaders, and the political needs and ambitions of its funders.

At every step in its rise, popular commentators have declared that the movement is in terminal decline. Secularization and modernization, we have been told, are the immutable laws of history, and demography
will put the nail in the coffin. When journalists do draw attention to the authoritarian and theocratic ambitions of the movement, some have been quick to minimize concern and complain of alarmism. It is "a movement that could fit in a phone booth," wrote former George W. Bush speech-writer Michael Gerson in the Washington Post. Now that the "phone booth" has been installed in the White House and in the Capitol, the time has come to set aside these premature dismissals.

I wish to underscore, because the question always comes up, that my concern here is not with religious belief systems, either in general or in particular. I do not for a moment imagine that Christian nationalists represent all Christians. I leave it for theologians to decide whether their views are consistent with Christian teachings. I am not interested in judging other people's religious beliefs. But I think we all have a stake in understanding their political actions.

I believe that some of the most powerful resistance to Christian nationalism may ultimately come from those who identify as Christians themselves. As of this writing, many individuals and groups who identify as religious moderates or who call themselves part of a "religious left" are organizing to meet the challenge. They have many good arguments and can draw on a long tradition in the American past to support their cause, and they may have the future on their side. But they are not in the saddle of history today, and they are not the subject of this book.

In The Power Worshippers I will introduce you to the movement's power players and the foot soldiers. I will tell their stories, in their words, though my real subject is the political vision that ties them together. I will take you to gatherings in Northern California, where agribusiness men team up with pastors who have direct access to the Trump White House; to North Carolina, where Christian nationalist leaders recruit clergy to their partisan activism; to Arizona, where charter school operators with sectarian agendas are indoctrinating schoolchildren on the taxpayer's dime; and to Verona, Italy, where American representatives of what they call a "global conservative movement" gather with international far-right leaders to declare war on global liberalism. We will revisit the strategy meetings of the late 1970s in which it was decreed, several years after Roe v. Wade, that abortion would be packaged and sold as the unifying issue of the movement. We'll go back further in time to historical antecedents of Christian nationalism in some of the most fraught chapters of America's theological past—most importantly, the chapter in which the theological ancestors of today's religious authoritarians wielded the Bible in support of slavery and segregation. And we will examine the movement's affiliations and connections with religious nationalist movements in other countries. I will trace the flow of funds from America's most pious plutocrats to the organizations that are packing the courts and upending electoral politics. We will sit in on gatherings organized by national activists to motivate pastors to get out the vote for Republican candidates. And we will spend time with some of the movement's most intriguing personalities as they cast aside their "unbiblical" longings, make war against their "demonic" enemies, and stride confidently on the path to power. <>
Broken Faith: Inside the Word of Faith Fellowship, One of America's Most Dangerous Cults by Mitch Weiss and Holbrook Mohr [Hanover Square Press, 9781335145239]

A PopSugar Best True Crime Book of 2020

“I can’t imagine a more important book.”—Jeff Guinn, New York Times bestselling author

An explosive investigation into Word of Faith Fellowship, a secretive evangelical cult whose charismatic female leader is a master of manipulation

In 1979, a fiery preacher named Jane Whaley attracted a small group of followers with a promise that she could turn their lives around.

In the years since, Whaley's following has expanded to include thousands of congregants across three continents. In their eyes she's a prophet. And to disobey her means eternal damnation.

The control Whaley exerts is absolute: she decides what her followers study, where they work, whom they can marry—even when they can have sex.

Based on hundreds of interviews, secretly recorded conversations, and thousands of pages of documents, Pulitzer Prize winner Mitch Weiss and Holbrook Mohr's Broken Faith is a terrifying portrait of life inside the Word of Faith Fellowship, and the harrowing account of one family who escaped after two decades.

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Reviews:

"**Broken Faith** is a gripping, meticulously reported account of a cult leader’s grip on a small southern community. It is also a prescient story of systemic abuse where the victims seek—and fail to find—justice from the very institutions that were meant to protect them." —**Ethan Brown**, New York Times bestselling author of *Murder in The Bayou: Who Killed the Women Known as the Jeff Davis 8?*

“A tour de force of investigative journalism and storytelling. This is the kind of book that inspires the next generation of journalists and reminds working reporters why they do the job.” —**Kevin Maurer**, #1 New York Times bestselling co-author of *No Easy Day*

"In light of current events, I can’t imagine a more important book than **Broken Faith** by outstanding investigative journalists Mitch Weiss and Holbrook Mohr. Their chilling description of North Carolina’s Word of Faith Fellowship and professed Christianity gone horribly awry is unsettlingly parallel to events involving Peoples Temple and its demagogic leader Jim Jones. Much credit is due to the courageous former Word of Faith members who share their shattering stories in *Broken Faith*. If you care at all about religious abuse and the destructive means by which charismatic leaders exert despotic control of their well-meaning followers’ lives, read this book." —**Jeff Guinn**, New York Times bestselling author of *Manson* and *The Road To Jonestown*

“…Fascinating and deeply researched… Compelling in its evidence, this shocking narrative examines the bonds of family, the limits of endurance, and how far people will go to save their souls.” —**Booklist** STARRED review

“A compelling examination of a Christianist cabal whose crimes are evident but whose power seems, for the moment, unbreakable.” —**Kirkus Reviews**

“A fast-paced, harrowing exposé…transfixing.” —**Publishers Weekly**

A page-turner for any fans of the *Wild Wild Country* Netflix series… will leave a lasting impression on readers for years to come.” —**PopSugar**

“Those interested in cults and true crime will be enthralled by this account.” —**Library Journal**
“A harrowing picture of faith gone horribly astray… Broken Faith makes for compelling drama, with a vision of healing and renewal at the end.” —StarNews

“An important and carefully sourced rendering of how founders of religious sects can become tyrants, ruling by fear and threats of eternal hellfire for those who disobey… reads like a thriller.” —Associated Press

This is the troubling story of the Word of Faith Fellowship and the lives destroyed by the secretive church in the foothills of North Carolina’s Blue Ridge Mountains. The events depicted in this book come from extensive interviews with more than one hundred former members of the sect, their relatives, advocates, current and retired law enforcement officials, and others. We spent years researching and reporting this story, reviewing thousands of pages of documents ranging from child custody cases to police reports. We reviewed more than one hundred hours of video and audio recordings, many of which were secretly recorded by former congregants. We listened to dozens of tape-recorded sermons by Jane Whaley and other key church leaders from the mid-1990s.

Much of the documentation chronicling the earliest allegations of abuse in the church is based on a damning, 315-page report prepared by the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation in 1995. Never publicly released, most of the information in the report is being revealed for the first time.

Information on Word of Faith Fellowship leader Jane Whaley and other ministers is based on dozens of interviews, legal documents, bankruptcy filings, court cases, published material, and a 208-page sworn deposition of Whaley on April 27, 2017. Part of a contentious child custody case, Whaley’s deposition has never been released to the public.

Biographical information on many of the current members and church leaders is based on their own words. Shortly after the Associated Press published its first in a series of articles about the Word of Faith Fellowship in February 2017, some congregants posted videos online to challenge what the church called "media lies."

And beginning in December 2017, the Word of Faith Fellowship purchased airtime on WCAB, a Rutherfordton, North Carolina—based radio station, every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. Nearly two hundred members of the Word of Faith Fellowship have used the broadcast to deny allegations made against their church, criticize former members and their advocates, or give glowing "testimonies" about their experiences in the congregation. Videos of the radio programs have been posted on YouTube.com under a channel titled "WFF Speaks Out" as well as on the church’s website.

Church leaders categorically deny that any abuse takes place at the Word of Faith Fellowship. The survivors stand by their stories. <>

**Daniel Johnston: A Portrait of the Artist as a Potter in North Carolina** by Henry Glassie, Photography and Drawings by the Author [Indiana University Press, 9780253048431]

Daniel Johnston, raised on a farm in Randolph County, returned from Thailand with a new way to make monumental pots. Back home in North Carolina, he built a log shop and a whale of a kiln for wood-firing. Then he set out to create beautiful pots, grand in scale, graceful in form, and burned bright in a blend of
ash and salt. With mastery achieved and apprentices to teach, Daniel Johnston turned his brain to massive installations.

First, he made a hundred large jars and lined them along the rough road that runs past his shop and kiln. Next, he arranged curving clusters of big pots inside pine frames, slatted like corn cribs, to separate them from the slick interiors of four fine galleries in succession. Then, in concluding the second phase of his professional career, Daniel Johnston built an open-air installation on the grounds around the North Carolina Museum of Art, where 178 handmade, wood-fired columns march across a slope in a straight line, 350 feet in length, that dips and lifts with the heave while the tops of the pots maintain a level horizon.

In 2000, when he was still Mark Hewitt’s apprentice, Daniel Johnston met Henry Glassie, who has done fieldwork on ceramic traditions in the United States, Brazil, Italy, Turkey, Bangladesh, China, and Japan. Over the years, during a steady stream of intimate interviews, Glassie gathered the understanding that enabled him to compose this portrait of Daniel Johnston, a young artist who makes great pots in the eastern Piedmont of North Carolina.

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2 Apprenticeship
3 East and West
4 Building a Shop and Making a Pot
5 Firing
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Excerpt: Earning is a pleasure for me, as it is for Daniel, and I learn the most in the field. Though I have made my living in the university, I get away and into the field as often as I can. In the nineteen-sixties, I measured old buildings by day and recorded the singers of old songs at night in North Carolina, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and upstate New York. The seventies were for Ireland, for close ethnographic work in a borderland community during the time of the Troubles. In the eighties, big field projects in Turkey then Bangladesh turned my attention to ceramics and I began visiting potteries in the South, drawn by the fine books published in the eighties by my close friends and fellow folklorists Ralph Rinzler, John Burrison, and Terry Zug. The southern pottery tradition was in good hands. There was no need for me to write about it too; a little learning was enough. In the nineties, while my work in Turkey and Bangladesh continued, I also visited potters in New Mexico, Sweden, India, and Japan, Japan especially, and I was pulled southward by deepening friendships with Mark Hewitt in North Carolina and Chester and Matthew Hewell in Georgia.
At the end of the decade, when I published a small book, The Potter’s Art, my main aim was to provide compact, updated summaries of the information on pottery from two big books published earlier in the nineties, Turkish Traditional Art Today and Art and Life in Bangladesh. I added reports of recent fieldwork from New Mexico, Sweden, and Japan, included a brief piece on Georgia, featuring the Hewells, and closed with a rhetorical flourish centered on Mark Hewitt.

During the new century, work went on in Turkey, Bangladesh, and Japan, and I began doing fieldwork in Italy, excited by the parallels in history and production between Italian maiolica and Turkish fini. In this century’s first year, I got a chance to visit potteries in northern China, and in that year, when he was still Mark’s apprentice, I met Daniel Johnston. Trips to the South increased, taking me frequently to Daniel’s place, and in 2012, knowing that I had written a couple of brief bits about Mark, Daniel asked me to write about him.

Immediately we started a series of recorded interviews. I watched Daniel at the wheel, and I could have quickly concocted some prose of praise. But I was in the midst of a big field project, in collaboration with my wife Pravina, on the working-class artists of northeastern Brazil, potters and sculptors, painters and smiths. Writing about Daniel would have to wait, and the delay was beneficial. I kept visiting North Carolina, usually with Pravina beside me, watching what was happening, interviewing Daniel and other potters as well (check out the list of oral sources that precedes the bibliography). My understanding deepened and broadened.

When in the fall of 2017 our Brazilian book was finished, I leafed through the seven thick notebooks I had filled, read over the hundreds of pages I had transcribed from recordings, reviewed the two thousand or so photos I had taken, and, though my initial intention was more modest, I thought I had enough to write a book worthy of Daniel. Coincidentally, Daniel’s life had completed an arc with his installations. One phase had ended, he said, another had begun. Daniel had arrived at a point where a book could end, and I had a story to tell.

I was ready. When Daniel asked me to write about him, I had most recently published a book on the life and art of the Nigerian painter Prince Twins Seven-Seven. Twins got his book, then died in 2011, and I miss him. Twins was my pal, as Daniel is now. I recorded many long interviews, observed him at work, and traveled with him through Nigeria, meeting up with the babas in the bush and visiting the places — Ijara, Ogidi, Ibadan, Abuja, and Osogbo — that figured in his story.
My book about Twins, which prepared me to write about Daniel, belongs to a folkloristic tradition of writing that generally involves fieldwork and brings specific biographical facts into conjunction with general concerns about creative processes and products.

Taking inspiration from anthropological life histories that bring individuals into connection with cultural patterning, and from biographical writings by and about artists that bring individuals into connection with aesthetic principles, we folklorists have written about narrators, singers, and makers. The resulting works are not properly ethnographies or biographies, but integrations of the ethnographic and the biographical designed to yield understanding at once of individuals, their cultures, and their arts. To give this variety of writing a name I’ll borrow Joyce’s word “portrait.”

I am not being tricky — Daniel would say cute — when I twist Joyce’s title into a subtitle for Daniel’s book, A Portrait of the Artist as a Potter in North Carolina. Read the long fragment of the first draft — titled Stephen Hero after the old English ballad “Turpin Hero” — and you will find that in writing A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, James Joyce jettisoned digressive biographical details to shift from the merely personal toward the place where the personal,
cultural, and artistic meet — closer, that is, to the center located in folkloristic portraits like my book about Twins or this one about Daniel.

Dylan Thomas arodied Joyce’s title for his own story, Portrait of the Artist as a Young Dog. In it, ten artfully contrived and chronologically ordered memories bring the poet to the point where artistic orientations are set but the great work lies ahead. That’s the point Stephen reaches in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. We’re waiting for Ulysses. Daniel has gone farther, his second phase began with the installations, parallel, say, with Dubliners, but he is done with the columns, he says, and greater things are promised. In the far future, some biographer might do for Daniel what Ellmann did for Joyce. Meanwhile, we have this tale of the beginning and the portrait of a fully developed young artist who makes pots in the eastern Piedmont of North Carolina.

To get it done required recording and transcribing many lengthy interviews (maybe ten percent of that transcribed material appears as quotations in this book), making detailed notes during every visit and phone call, taking more than enough informational photographs (more valuable as documents than as illustrations), reading many books I’d long wanted to read, and enjoying the tasks of writing and design while crafting a book that implicitly demonstrates how I think fieldwork should be done. <>

**Recollections of My Nonexistence: A Memoir** by Rebecca Solnit [Viking, 9780593083338]

“At the same time that [Solnit] describes her forays into her past, she invites us to connect pieces of her story to our own, as a measure of how far we’ve come and how far we have left to go.” —Jenny Odell, *The New York Times Book Review*

An electric portrait of the artist as a young woman that asks how a writer finds her voice in a society that prefers women to be silent

In *Recollections of My Nonexistence*, Rebecca Solnit describes her formation as a writer and as a feminist in 1980s San Francisco, in an atmosphere of gender violence on the street and throughout society and the exclusion of women from cultural arenas. She tells of being poor, hopeful, and adrift in the city that became her great teacher, and of the small apartment that, when she was nineteen, became the home in which she transformed herself. She explores the forces that liberated her as a person and as a writer—books themselves; the gay community that presented a new model of what else gender, family, and joy could mean; and her eventual arrival in the spacious landscapes and overlooked conflicts of the American West.
Beyond being a memoir, Solnit's book is also a passionate argument: that women are not just impacted by personal experience, but by membership in a society where violence against women pervades. Looking back, she describes how she came to recognize that her own experiences of harassment and menace were inseparable from the systemic problem of who has a voice, or rather who is heard and respected and who is silenced--and how she was galvanized to use her own voice for change.

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Excerpt: One day in New Orleans in late 2013 I was sitting behind a table in a narrow room signing books for a long line of people, along with my coeditor, native New Orleanian Rebecca Snedeker, when a woman took my hand in hers and began to read my palm. The book was our atlas of that city, my fifteenth or sixteenth or seventeenth book, depending on how you count them. I'd come to New Orleans six months after Hurricane Katrina, on Easter weekend of 2006, and been drawn into the untold stories of the storm and its aftermath, gotten involved in trying to expose some of the racial crimes, which I prodded investigative journalists to look at and wrote about myself in my 2009 book about disasters and the remarkable societies that arise in the wreckage, A Paradise Built in Hell.

I'd shown up in New Orleans to look at what was ugliest about the city: poverty and racism and how more than 1,500 people had died of those things in the flooded city as they were first abandoned and then attacked and prevented from evacuating and from receiving relief, died of stories that demonized and dehumanized them. And I'd fallen in love with what was most beautiful about New Orleans, including the way that its inhabitants were good at being in the here and now, at being out in public and knowing where they were and celebrating in the streets and connecting with the people around them and at remembering the past that shaped this present. They had a talent for valuing other things more than productivity and efficiency, the miserable virtues that hustle people past each other and everyday attentiveness and pleasure.

That unhurriedness might be why a woman was confident she could hold up the long line to read my palm; I knew New Orleanians could take the delay in stride, and I let her take charge of my hand and override my own sense of obligation to keep things moving. I don't believe in palmistry or any other form of divination, but I believe in stories that come by any means, and in capacities strangers have to be messengers and mirrors in which you see new possibilities. Her parting words as she released my hand were, "Despite everything, you are who you were meant to be," and I kept them like a talisman.

Despite everything, she said, which I heard as the obstacles and injuries ordinary in billions of lives. I know how profoundly things have changed for the better, and how many people are nevertheless not who they were meant to be because the distorting mirror of gender gives them damaged senses of self, or because their rights and capacities or even conditions of survival are undermined. I cannot imagine a wholly undamaged human being or that that's a useful thing to imagine, though I can readily imagine that some of the kinds of damage inflicted on my gender can be reduced and delegitimized. I also think the process is under way, and that even being told that you deserve to be safe and free and equal can fortify you. If
I’m both feminist and hopeful it’s because I know how profoundly women’s rights and status have changed, in many ways, in many places, since my birth.

Sylvia Plath at nineteen had mourned that ”I want to talk to everybody I can as deeply as I can. I want to be able to sleep in an open field, to travel west, to walk freely at night” but she felt unable to because of her gender. I was born thirty years later and I and we have been more fortunate. I had roamed the West, slept in mountain meadows, in deserts, at the bottoms of canyons, on the banks of great rivers in the Southwest and the Arctic, driven vast distances alone, wandered many cities and some rural places at night, had organized with rebels, had blockaded streets, met heroes, written books, encouraged activists, had the friendships and conversations I yearned for when I was younger, had occasionally stood up for what I believed in, had stuck around long enough to see the arc of change across time in ways that were terrifying when it came to climate change and sometimes exhilarating when it came to cultural politics. Also it seems safe to say I’m damaged and a member of a society that damages us all and damages women in particular ways.

There are so many stories that can be told about damage. I ran across one in an essay on photographs of environmental destruction recently. The photographs showed the Carlin Trend, the belt of microscopic gold that runs through the Western Shoshone lands, including Carrie and Mary Dann’s ranchlands, and that would have made Nevada, had it been an independent nation, the fourth or fifth biggest gold-producing country on earth. I’d visited the mines myself, enormous pits that could swallow cities, wounds out of which the water was pumped so that the gigantic equipment could keep going deeper, as whole mountains were pulverized and other heavy metals released, and cyanide-laced water poured through the dust to leach out the gold so that foreign corporations could reap a profit and people far away could ornament their bodies. The precious water of the desert was squandered, poisoned, then dumped into man-made lakes that killed the birds who landed in them. Knowing those mines made me hate gold.

The photographs came with an essay quoting another writer who’d worked for eight seasons in Antarctica. Jason C. Anthony wrote about the nutritional deficiencies common among sailors and polar explorers in the past and of their cause: ”Without vitamin C, we cannot produce collagen, an essential component of bones, cartilage, tendons and other connective tissues. Collagen binds our wounds, but that binding is replaced continuously throughout our lives. Thus in advanced scurvy, old wounds long thought healed will magically, painfully reappear.”

You can read that as an insistence that we never get over anything, though it might make more sense as a reminder that though damage is not necessarily permanent, neither is repair. What is won or changed or fixed has to be maintained and protected or it can be lost. What goes forward can go backward. Efficiency says that grief should follow a road map and things should be gotten over and that then there should be that word that applies to wounds and minds both: closure. But time and pain are a more fluid, unpredictable business, expanding and contracting, closing and opening and changing.

You move toward or away from or around something that harmed you, or something or someone brings you back; that slippage in time, as though the stairs you exit on have become a waterfall, is the disorderliness of trauma and of trauma’s sense of time. But sometimes you revisit the past, as I have in this book, to map the distance covered. There is closure and reopening and sometimes something reopens because you can bring something new to it, repair it in a new way, by understanding it a new way. Sometimes the meaning of the beginning of the story has changed as new chapters are added.

Damage begets a different destiny than one you might have had otherwise, but it does not preclude having a life or making things that matter. Sometimes it’s not despite but because of something terrible that you become who you are meant to be and set to the work you’re meant to do. I heard ”meant to be” not as though there was no damage but that it had not prevented me from doing what I was here to do. And
some of my work was about that damage as it applied to so many of us. I’ve often wondered what people whose work is for justice and rights would’ve been in a world without the injustices, the lack of rights. Who would Martin Luther King Jr. have been in a nonracist society, Rachel Carson in an unpoisoned America? Unless you imagine them in a world without pain and harm, they might have found other wounds to try to heal. Paradise is often described as a place with nothing to do, nothing required of its inhabitants. I don’t desire a paradise that demands nothing of us, and I see paradise as not a destination to arrive in, but a pole star by which to navigate.

The fortune-teller was a woman, and perhaps as women often do, as I often do, she only wanted to give me something to make me feel good, to make that microscopic utopia that is a moment of kindness, though even that a stranger wanted to give me a gift signifies. A few years ago, a man ran after me at the farmers’ market and handed me a little octagonal jar of honey from his stand; he had recognized me, though I’d never seen him before. To become a person that, occasionally, strangers want to reward because they felt I’ve given them something is an amazement. Once a young woman passing by an outdoor booth where I was signing books burst into a spontaneous jig at the sight of me, and that might be the pinnacle of my career, to be somehow an occasion for someone else’s exuberance. We’d never set eyes on each other before, but that’s the work that books do, reaching out further than their writers.

There’s another story about wounds and repair that has captured a lot of imaginations in recent years. It’s about the Japanese art of kintsugi, which literally means golden repair. It’s a method of mending broken ceramic vessels with a bond made of powdered gold mixed with lacquer. The result turns the breaks into veins and channels of gold, emphasizing rather than hiding that the vessel has been broken and making it precious in another way than it was before. It’s a way to accept that things will never be what they were but that they can become something else with a different kind of beauty and value. They are exquisite objects, these cups and bowls with their channels of gold like magical scars, like oracular patterns, road maps, hieroglyphs. They make me love gold.

My friend Roshi Joan Halifax, a feminist Buddhist leader, an anthropologist, and a constant traveler, has on several visits to Japan held these repaired vessels in her hands, and a few years ago, she explored them as a metaphor: "I am not suggesting that we should seek brokenness as a way of gaining strength, although some cultures do pursue crisis in their rites of passage as a way to strengthen character and open the heart," she wrote. "Rather, I am proposing that the wounds and harms that arise from falling over the edge into moral suffering can ... be the means for the ‘golden repair,’ for developing a greater capacity to stand firm in our integrity without being swayed by the wind." And then my friend who had given me the desk sent me a letter to approve what I’d written about her that ended with a line from William Stafford: "I have woven a parachute out of everything broken."

People aren’t really meant to be anything, because we’re not made; we’re born, with some innate tendencies, and thereafter molded, thwarted, scalded, encouraged by events and encounters. Despite everything suggests the forces that try to stop a person or change her nature and purpose, and who you were meant to be suggests that those forces did not altogether succeed. It was a lovely fortune to be handed by a stranger, and I took it, and with it the sense that who I was meant to be was a breaker of some stories and a maker of others, a tracer of the cracks and sometimes a repairwoman, and sometimes a porter or even a vessel for the most precious cargo you can carry, the stories waiting to be told, and the stories that set us free. <>
SURREALISM, OCCULTISM AND POLITICS IN SEARCH OF THE MARVELLOUS edited by Tessei M. Bauduin, Victoria Ferentinou, and Daniel Zamani [Studies in Surrealism, Routledge, 9781138054332]

This volume examines the relationship between occultism and Surrealism, specifically exploring the reception and appropriation of occult thought, motifs, tropes and techniques by Surrealist artists and writers in Europe and the Americas, from the 1920s through the 1960s. Its central focus is the specific use of occultism as a site of political and social resistance, ideological contestation, subversion and revolution. Additional focus is placed on the ways occultism was implicated in Surrealist discourses on identity, gender, sexuality, utopianism and radicalism.

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Revisiting the `Occultation of Surrealism’: The Marvellous and the Occult as Political Tools

As already noted, this volume has been primarily motivated by the editors’ conviction that this revisionist tendency needed to be advanced further, and that expanding scholarship in the field of Surrealism and the occult should be reflected in an anthology that duly considers diverse positions within this field. While significant attention has been paid to the esoteric and occult ramifications of French Surrealism in general,
and the work and thought of André Breton in particular, there are no monographs or anthologies on this topic that embrace a more expansive view of Surrealism, both in terms of its transnational politics and with regard to its long history, from the turbulent beginnings in Paris Dada right through to the post-war period. To this end, the book brings together contributions on both iconic artists and writers and lesser known players in the intellectual and artistic orbit of the movement, all of whom drew on occultism and magic for their very own, avant-gardist ends.

Certainly, Breton's call for the 'occultation of Surrealism' may have been a welcome incentive for many artists and writers, who already harboured an interest in this field. Conversely, there can be no doubt that Breton's appropriation of the occult was similarly nourished by a critical dialogue with many of his contemporaries, whose own engagement was in some ways determined by questions of gender, nation and culture as well as their specific location within the long history of the surrealist movement. In this framing, through a collective and pluralistic lens, we follow an appreciation of Surrealism, not as an authoritarian, dogmatic group, but as a dynamic, constantly shifting enterprise that was characterised by internal dialogue and exchange — a movement that was "always a place of encounter open to all possibilities" as well as "an elective community established by a shared sense of mystic vocation," as Michael Richardson and Krzysztof Fijalkowski have noted.

Throughout this volume, we acknowledge that a dialogue with the occult was central to the surrealists' overarching search for the marvellous or merveilleux — a key concept of surrealist theory that may best be understood as the destabilizing incursion of the surreal within the fabric of everyday life, and which Hal Foster identified as essential to the "medievalist aspect of surrealism, its fascination with magic and alchemy, with mad love and analogical thought." Etymologically, the origins of the term merveilleux can be traced back to the Latin verb mirare, meaning both "to be astonished" and "to look with bewilderment." Its appropriation into French common vocabulary during the eleventh century was accompanied by the emergence of the closely related noun merveille (lat. mirabilia), denoting any object or circumstance likely to produce feelings of admiration, wonder and astonishment. In the Grand Robert de la langue française (1985), the concept is therefore defined with particular emphasis on its disturbing effects: "Whatever is marvellous (...) effects an impression of bewonderment and estrangement, generally due to unlikely events (...) which indicate the existence of a world that escapes the laws of nature." Key aspects of the surrealist marvellous, notably its uncanny potential and feelings of estrangement, are therefore rooted in the concept's complex connotations.

In pre-surrealist literature, the marvellous remained typically linked to themes of occultism and enchantment, with a number of commonplace tropes functioning as more or less clichéd motifs in an anti-realist tradition of fiction. Significantly, however, nineteenth-century debates about the marvellous expanded its original, more literary connotations, and instead placed its theoretical impact within the contested terrain of neo-occultist as well as psychological discourses. For example, in his 1860 study Histoire du merveilleux dans les temps modernes, Louis Figuier described the marvellous in anthropological terms as an innate human search for spiritualist powers. Tracing the existence of the concept from ancient rites of divination through to neo-occult practices and parapsychological experimentation, Figuier maintained that its main function was to provide a psychological arena of comfort, which permitted the mentally fragile to find a place of shelter from the rational demands of everyday experience.

Ultimately, the surrealist recourse to the marvellous benefitted from the term's vague definition, exploiting its associations with occultism, superstition and a sense of estrangement from the real. As a gap in signification, whose causes usually remain unexplained, the Bretonian marvellous aims, like its medieval progenitor, to produce a break in discursive thinking. Significantly, however, this sense of a dépaysement is not an end in itself, but functions as a shock that aims to catapult the mind into a higher sphere of receptivity. In his occult account Nadja, 1928, Breton foregrounded this notion of the marvellous, as he
presented a vision of contemporary Parisian experience that remained tinged with allusions to magic and alchemy, consistently concentrating on "petrifying coincidences," "sudden parallels" and "peculiar reflexes" that scientific rationalism could never fully account for. In an embrace of the esoteric theory of correspondences, Breton ultimately abandons himself to the "fury of symbols" and the "demon of analogy," and eventually realizes that human existence is best understood as a hieroglyphic space in constant need of decipherment:

Perhaps life need to be deciphered like a cryptogram. Secret staircases, frames from which the paintings quickly slip aside ..., button which must be indirectly pressed to make an entire room move sideways ort vertically, or immediately change all of its furnishings; we may imagine the mind's great adventure as a journey of this sort to the paradise of pitfalls.

Duly considering occultism's relation to other aspects of the `marvellous,' including tropes of mythology, enchantment and the irrational, this volume brings together research by well-established scholars in the field and early career researchers, offering a rich and variegated cross section of contemporary scholarly engagement with Surrealism and the occult. In terms of chronology, these discussions range from the beginnings of the movement in 1920s France through to its legacies in post-World War II Europe and the Americas, always considering the varying cultural and historical contexts within which the occult was mobilised. Throughout, the volume's primary focus is the specific use-value of the occult as a site of political and social resistance, ideological contestation, subversion and revolution; in other words, the many ways in which the occult became utilised as a powerful weapon within the surrealists' counter-cultural politics, and was reconceptualised as a key tool in their aspiration to transform the world, both poetically and socially. To this end, our understanding of the word `politics' follows the historical understanding of the revolutionary avant-gardes themselves, for whom wider social and cultural change needed to be effectuated beyond the confines of party politics, and for whom any project of truly radical change demanded a concept of `total' revolution as opposed to the focus on exclusively political and economic factors as espoused by orthodox strands of Marxist thought.

Indeed, as Raymond Spiteri has emphasised, "surrealism existed in the contested space between culture and politics," and it is the way surrealistic artistic practice "registers each impasse" that "a new configuration of the political in surrealism" is brought forth.59 In this volume, we accept `politics' as a broader concept in line with its reconceptualization within Surrealism. Thus, for our purposes in this anthology, `politics' and `political action' encompass not only strategies to affect material change within society, but any artistic tropes and strategies deployed to negotiate, question, deconstruct or rewrite discourses pertinent to issues of identity and individual transformation. In other words, one should not lose sight of the fact that the surrealist reconfiguration of politics pertains to the prospect of social revolution as much as to the revolution of the mind by means of a poetic and artistic engagement conceptualised as a social practice of emancipatory potential.

That the occult became an integral part of this politically radical, avant-gardist vision is certainly no coincidence; historically, it often offered a platform for individuals or groups who pursued a countercultural programme of personal change and self-fulfilment, or who envisaged a thorough transformation of society and the political realm. Weaving together the idea of psychical and political revolution as filtered through Marxist theory, Surrealism strategically revalorised cultural forms drawn from the occult that were subversive to mainstream culture, its Enlightenment, progressivism ideals and capitalist substructure. This anti-modernist strategy entailed what could be described as `occult politics': the surrealist politicising of occult tropes for socially subversive or revolutionary purposes. Thus the extent to which artists operating within or in the orbit of the surrealist movement responded to the confluence of politics and the occult in text, image and film, exploring in particular the critical dialogue enacted either in the form of expansions to, or of deviations and departures from Bretonian Surrealism, is investigated in this volume.
The objective is to meaningfully expand the on-going debate about the 'occultation of Surrealism' by proposing that the movement turned to the occult as a potentially potent site of revolution, subversion, radicalism and utopian politics, and we thereby challenge the view that recourse to occultism was a nihilistic and escapist return to primitivism and religion.

Discussion of the Contributions

The first part of this anthology, titled "Alternative Modes of Knowledge," foregrounds the surrealists' appreciation of the occult as an alternative discourse to science and religion, and one that aimed to facilitate an exploration of man and the universe above and beyond what Breton famously rejected as the "sentinels of common sense." Claudie Massicotte opens this section with a discussion of surrealist automatism and its debt to spiritualist séance practices. Throughout, she argues that we need to appreciate the surrealists' exploration of the 'creative unconscious' beyond the limitations of Freudian psychoanalysis and acknowledge how Breton and his colleagues also owed a considerable debt to the psychical research of writers such as Théodore Flournoy (1854-1920), Frederic W. H. Myers (1843-1901) and William James (1842-1910). Massicotte's specific focus lies in the role of spiritualist mediums as powerful role models for surrealist investigations of automatic procedures. Central to this was Breton's fascination with the Swiss medium Hélène Smith (1861-1929), whose trance states and poetic utterances were famously explored in Flournoy's 1900 study From India to the Planet Mars and whom the surrealists hailed as the "muse of automatic writing." As Massicotte insists, the surrealists rejected the idea of an external spirit world associated with spiritualist mediumship, but it was notably through an engagement with mediumistic powers that the surrealists were able to explore highly complex modalities of the unconscious, which extended far beyond the production of symptoms and their controversial framing within psychoanalytic discourses.

The poetic engagement with a violent and potentially dangerous creative power also underpins Donna Roberts's discussion of the Parisian avant-garde group Le Grand Jeu in Chapter 2. Similar to their surrealist contemporaries, members of the Grand Jeu such as René Daumal (1908-1944), Roger Gilbert-Lecomte (1907-1943) and Roger Vailland (1907-1965) developed a marked interest in magic and the occult, soon embarking on a form of initiatory journey that saw them engaged in experiments with automatic creations, somnambulism, extrasensory perception and collective dreaming. Like the surrealists, the Grand Jeu was concerned with enlarging the parameters of reality and exploring the apparent contradictions between the experiential certainty of what William James termed 'ineffable' experiences and the methodological restrictions of empirical science. Roberts's specific focus is the group's methodical and wide-ranging exploration of tropes of mysticism, revolt and self-dissolution. Revisiting the movement's interest in mystical philosophy, she analyses the group's approach to the sacred in relation to questions of selfhood, negation and transgression, and convincingly argues for a marked continuity with Dada and Surrealism through a shared focus on the issue of revolt. More specifically, she demonstrates how the Grand Jeu developed the notion of adolescent revolt into a complex philosophical system, which opposed the economic, individualistic and social constraints of the adult world with an anthropologically-influenced view based on a permanent state of collective liminality that is best understood within its wider preoccupation for a reactivation of sacred forces in contemporary individual as well as collective consciousness.

In Chapter 3, M. E. Warlick continues the exploration of Surrealism and parapsychology through a discussion of the life and work of Dr. Charlotte Wolff (1897-1986) — a German-born physician and writer whose fortuitous encounter with the surrealists in 1930s Paris played a significant role in the development of her career.

As Warlick demonstrates, Wolff's article "Psychic Revelations of the Hand," published in the surrealist periodical Minotaure in 1935, provides an opportunity to explore palmistry as another esoteric field that intersected with the surrealists' investigations of alternative paths to unlocking the unconscious. Sketching in
her early studies of philosophy and medicine, Warlick considers the eclectic influences on Wolff’s system of hand reading, drawing on a broad range of contemporary sources as well as Wolff’s later writings. Although Wolff herself insisted on the scientific foundations of her analyses, and developed her system based on empirical experimentation as well as medical and psychiatric studies, her work also dialogued with the prominent role of palmistry within neo-occult discourses, and there can be no doubt that the surrealists appreciated her work within the context of their own broad explorations of diverse esoteric fields as well as much more poetic understanding of psychoanalysis. Warlick proposes to introduce the hand reading system Wolff presented within the wider contexts of this volume, and to place it within the broader context of historical palmistry. Much like Massicotte’s analysis of the époque des sommeils and its eclectic mixing of occult, parapsychological and psychoanalytic elements, Warlick’s discussion testifies the often deeply ambivalent relationship between esotericism and rational science, as well as the surrealists’ daring exploration of esotericism and psychoanalysis as twin paths of unlocking the depths of the unconscious self.

In Chapter 4, Vivienne Brough-Evans shifts the focus of attention from the core group around Breton to the so-called ‘dissident’ Surrealism around Georges Bataille, a writer and intellectual who famously described himself as Surrealism’s “enemy from within.” Crucially for our aims in this anthology, Bataille was central to an increasingly political interest in a reactivation of tropes of occultism, mythology and the sacred, a key preoccupation that found outward expression in ventures such as the journal and concomitant secret society Acéphale, as well as the Collège de Sociologie, founded by Bataille and Roger Caillois (1913-1978) in 1937. In her discussion, Brough-Evans focusses on the perceived emancipatory potential of Bataillean theories of the sacred, foregrounding his notoriously complex notion of ‘occulted un-knowing’ and its relationship to a negation of authority. However, rather than simply reiterating this conflation of occultism, myth and politics within Bataille’s work of the 1940s, she draws on these theoretical tools as a screen through which to revisit the occult politics of two later surrealist texts that show close affinities with Bataillean ideals: the 1968 drama Ceasornicăria Taus, written by Gellu Naum (1915-2001) in Communist-era Romania; and El Siglo de las Luces (1962), a historical novel conceived of in Cuba by Alejo Carpentier (1904-1980). Weaving in both of these writers’ appropriation of surrealist textual and political strategies, Brough-Evans demonstrates that their texts parallel Bataillean forms of occulted unknowing, not least by drawing upon traditional occult symbolism and alchemical metaphors, respectively deployed as a powerful critique of a repressive communist present and a colonial past of violence and exploitation.

The second part of the anthology continues this exploration of the occult as political discourse through a specific focus on the increasingly prominent role of mythology and magic to the surrealist project of the 1940s. In Chapter 5, Daniel Zamani offers a close reading of Breton’s Arcane 17. Written during the most brutal year of the Second World War, the book is titled after the tarot game’s so-called Star card, expressing faith in youth and hope in renewal. Eschewing any form of linear narrative, the work mixes the genres of a love poem, travel journal and political pamphlet, interwoven with alchemical metaphors and discursive references to a range of mythological narratives. In his analysis of the novel, Zamani’s focus lies on Breton’s turn to an emphatically feminised mythology, notably his championing of the medieval water-sprite Melusina as a powerful redeemer after the war. While a number of feminist critics have attacked the work’s essentialist framing of woman as related to the realms of myth, desire and natural renewal, Zamani contextualises Breton’s twin turn to tropes of myth and femininity within the contemporary abuse of mythology in Fascist discourses, and their gendered, emphatically masculinist ramifications. Accordingly, Zamani locates Arcane 17’s mythic politics within the broader context of both the surrealist search for a new myth aimed at social cohesion and transnational dialogue, and the contemporary context of Fascism’s violently nationalist cult of the male warrior-hero. Sketching in Breton’s admiration of Bataille’s Collège de Sociologie and reiterating his increasingly political interest in myth making from the late 1930s onwards, Zamani argues that we need to appreciate Arcane 17 as much on political as on poetic grounds, and
demonstrates that the novel may best be considered as Breton’s most ambitious attempt to create an anti-Fascist mythopoiesis of the modern, geared towards peace, liberty and the redeeming potential of metamorphosis.

The combined threads of revolutionary politics, the redeeming power of a new myth and their relation to surrealist art underpins Kristoffer Noheden’s discussion of Wilhelm Freddie (1909-1995), a Danish artist and filmmaker who gravitated towards Surrealism from the end of the 1920s onwards. Indeed, as Noheden emphasises, it was as a direct consequence of his participation at the occultism-focused 1947 International Surrealist Exhibition in Paris that Freddie entered what he described as his ‘esoteric period’, replete with explicit references to alchemy, myth and the esoteric tradition. Such preoccupations prominently come to the fore in two experimental short films, which Freddie directed in 1949 and 1950, respectively titled The Definite Rejection of a Request for a Kiss (Det definitive afslag paanmodningen am et kys) and Eaten Horizons (Spiste horisonter), realised with the aid of the filmmaker Jorgen Roos. As Noheden argues, both works evidence that Freddie embraced Surrealism’s change in direction towards the experiential creation of a new mythology, as evidenced by the artist’s other ventures of the time such as his co-organisation of the hitherto much neglected 1949 exhibition Surrealistisk manifestation: Expo Aleby in Stockholm, and his 1950 radio talk, “Why Do I Paint?” Squarely contextualizing Freddie’s post-war works within the broader development of the movement’s project of artistic and spiritual renewal after the war, Noheden proposes a reading of these works, which convincingly foregrounds their presumed function of a new myth as a harbinger of utopian plenitude, channelled as a force of renewal against the repression of the time.

In Chapter 7, Gavin Parkinson problematizes some of the tensions and contradictions that the surrealist turn to a mythology of the modern entailed, predicated on a discussion of Antonin Artaud (1896-1908) — the French writer, film maker and theatre director who was loosely aligned with Breton and the surrealists from the beginning of the 1920s onwards. In 1947, Artaud published Van Gogh, the Man Suicided by Society, in which he glowingly discussed Van Gogh’s life and work in esoteric terms. In his exploration of this book and Artaud’s writing of it, Parkinson exposes the long and ambivalent shadow cast by the long-awaited ‘occultation’ of Surrealism. Reviewing the history of Artaud’s relation to Surrealism in his troubled life as well as in his writing, Parkinson brings to light an esoteric, self-confessedly occultist Artaud — one that is markedly at odds with the Artaud formulated in French theory from 1950s critics such as Maurice Blanchot, Michel Foucault and others. In his analysis, Parkinson highlights the role of Artaud’s essay “Shit to the Spirit” (1947), which was spurred by the abovementioned exhibition Le Surréalisme en 1947 and in which Artaud was vociferous in his denouncement of magic as an alternative means of understanding the world, thereby creating a new breach between himself and the increasingly esoteric Surrealism of Breton and others. Disenchanted by both magic and Surrealism but not able to fully disengage himself from either, Artaud’s Van Gogh monograph provided an occultist reading of his art, and its transformative intent that was markedly different from Breton’s, offering a materialist theory of enchantment in a rhetoric tilted towards scepticism, and thus positing a rich and meaningful counterpoint to his colleague’s much more idealist take on enchantment.

In Chapter 8, Grazina Subelytė rounds off the section’s focus on mythology and magic with a discussion of the Swiss-born surrealist Kurt Seligmann (1900-1962), who played a key role in the movement’s increasing ‘occultation’ during the 1940s period in exile. Seligmann’s interest in magic and ritualism can be traced back to his childhood memories of his native town’s carnival, a pageant based on pagan and seasonal rites with fantastically spectral figures that would populate his later visual output well into the post-war period. Seligmann joined the surrealist movement in 1934, participating, among other manifestations, at the 1938 landmark show Exposition Internationale du Surréalisme at the Wildenstein Gallery. At the
outbreak of World War II, he arrived in the United States, where he became a highly respected authority on the history of magic. In New York, Seligmann took part in all central surrealist activities, contributing numerous essays to journals associated with the movement such as View and VVV, and participated in the 1942 exhibitions Artists in Exile and First Papers of Surrealism. As Subelyté demonstrates, Seligmann was central to the ever-closer rapprochement between Surrealism and magic during the critical period in exile, while ventures such as his 1948 account The History of Magic went hand in hand with a more emphatically occult iconography pervading his own artistic output. Ostracised by Breton over a rather trivial argument in 1943, Seligmann was virtually cut off from any official surrealist manifestations of the post-war period. His vital influence on the movement’s esoteric proclivities has long been neglected in dominant histories of the movement. Purveying his life and work through the dual lens of Surrealism and the occult, Subelyté’s essay aims to revisit his central impact on the ‘occultation’ of the movement, foregrounding his creative appropriation of the occult.

This anthology’s third part deals with female artists who moved in the orbit of Surrealism, and examines their appropriation of occult tropes, themes and motifs in text, image and film from a gendered perspective. In Chapter 9, Victoria Ferentinou problematizes the complex questions surrounding the gender politics concerning the mythical construct of the ‘Goddess’ and the theory of matriarchy, concentrating on British surrealists Ithell Colquhoun (1906-1988) and Leonora Carrington (1917-2011). Focussing on selected works from the 1940s and early 1950s, Ferentinou explores the different ways in which Colquhoun and Carrington reconstructed, or fabricated, a matrifocal history to counter masculinist models of creativity and subjectivity. Both artists were familiar with nineteenth- and twentieth-century theories, anthropological and otherwise, concerning matriarchy as an early stage in humankind’s development in which women prevailed socially and politically, all of which fed into the discursive construct of an all-powerful Goddess. They were also familiar with various occult and (neo-)pagan sources in which women were deemed powerful, creative and spiritual beings. Ferentinou locates their oeuvre within contemporary esoteric and surrealist discourses on woman as a transformative agent and traces occult sources, themes and topoi in Colquhoun’s The Goose of Hermogenes (1961), among other works, as well as in several of Carrington’s paintings and writings, including The Hearing Trumpet (1976). The close analysis of these examples shows how the two artists developed Goddess iconographies in the post-war period within cultural environments that promoted the efficacy of occult and related discourses for feminist and political ends. Ferentinou argues that Colquhoun and Carrington identified a liberating potential in Goddess imagery, thus developing a holistic and integrative vision that recognises the social use-value of the myth of matriarchy, not only for the empowerment of women, but also for the healing of the planet and its inhabitants. As Ferentinou concludes, both Colquhoun and Carrington can be seen as important precursors of the revisionist tendencies of the feminist spirituality and eco-spiritual movements of the late 1960s and the 1970s.

Carrington and Colquhoun’s omnivorous fascination with occult, (neo-)pagan, and anthropological sources is matched by the interests of Remedios Varo (1908-1963), a close friend of Carrington. In Chapter 10, María José González Madrid sets out to explore a previously understudied dimension of Varo’s practice: her interest in, knowledge of and integration of witchcraft into her iconography. The starting point of Gonzalez’s discussion is a letter Varo wrote to Gerald Gardner, the founder of Wicca, as a response to his Witchcraft Today (1954). This chapter ties together earlier topics touched upon in this volume: the key position of magic — of which witchcraft was often perceived as the ‘feminine’, uncultured pendant — as specific worldview and practice in Surrealism, the surrealist conflation of the woman-muse with the witch and the perception of witchcraft as feminine, as well as the empowering potential of the image of the witch for artists, female and otherwise. Closely analysing the iconography of several of Varo’s paintings, Gonzalez provides an alternative reading of several of its enigmatic figures — often identified as alchemists or mages — as a counterpart to the (male) surrealist magician. This feminine model, Gonzalez
shows, acknowledged the artist’s own creative and transformative capacities, even as it subverted the long tradition distinguishing between magic and witchcraft as paths of knowledge based upon class and gender.

A similar appropriation of magic to inform a specifically gendered and idiosyncratic art practice is discussed by Judith Noble in her chapter on the artist and film-maker Maya Deren (1917-1961). Deren always rejected the label ‘surrealist’; at the same time, Surrealism’s fomenting role to her artistic development is undeniable. Examining Deren’s relationship with Surrealism as well as the role that magic and occultism played in her work, Noble shows that Deren’s exposure to the work of the surrealist émigré artists in New York, and her simultaneous personal commitment to esoteric ideas and practice fuelled a unique personal form of filmmaking. As with Carrington and Colquhoun, Deren can be considered a forerunner for later feminist developments, in this case feminist film practice of the 1970s and 1980s. Examining a trilogy of films from the early 1940s as well as the unfinished Witch’s Cradle (1943), Noble traces the artist’s deep exploration and cinematographic deployment of the occult and the magical. It becomes clear that Surrealism, in which at that time myth, magic and the occult generally had become central to its poetic-political agenda, functioned as a means of liberation for this artist, enabling her to create works investigating magic as a transformative and emancipatory trope in her exploration of subjectivity.

The volume closes with Chapter 12, in which Susan Aberth explores five relatively little-known American female artists who were more or less influenced by Surrealism and whose work prefigures the New Age movement: Sylvia Fein (*1919), Gertrude Abercrombie (1909-1977), Gerrie Guttman (1921-1969), Juanita Guccione (1904-1999) and Marjorie Cameron (1922-1995), all of them absent from broader histories of the surrealist movement. Aberth situates these artists’ twin turn to occult and gendered tropes between the legacy of earlier surrealist women artists, such as Leonor Fini (1907-1996), Carrington and Varo, and the eventual dawn of New Age spirituality. As she argues, following Ilene Forth, key words such as ‘liberation’, ‘empowerment’, ‘self-discovery’ and ‘self-healing’ were central to the artwork produced by these women who interwove feminism, spirituality and Surrealism in their imagery. Despite the divergences among the artists discussed, Aberth identifies certain commonalities, the most significant being "their shared portrayal of women in possession of mysterious powers; ranging from playful send-ups of tarot cards, to somnambulant journeying through nocturnal landscapes, to disguised and not-so disguised self-portrayals as seer and sorceress." Much like the other contributors to this section, Aberth highlights the proto-feminist spirit underpinning the language of occultism utilised by the aforementioned artists who wished to set themselves apart from the mainstream art world, and extended strategies that were unorthodox and rebellious as "meaningful heralds of the New Age in all its unorthodox and subversive power."

As all chapters of this volume demonstrate, the occult contributed to the formulation of the surrealist discourses on the social revolution and the emancipation of the mind in diverse ways, spanning the period from the 1920s to the 1960s and beyond. Yet, there are still many aspects of this interface that remain largely unexplored, obscuring our knowledge of this still marginalised dimension of Surrealism. Rather than being the definitive word on ‘the occultation of Surrealism’ and the part it played in shaping artists’ lives as much as their works, we hope that this volume will take the discussion to the next level, opening it up for even further fruitful explorations of the topic. The aim of the volume is to highlight the significance of an interdisciplinary and transnational perspective to the complex relationship between Surrealism, occultism and politics that would afford us new insights into the creative possibilities the occult offered to poets, artists and intellectuals who moved in the orbit of Surrealism, always in dialogue with its revolutionary tropes and liberating strategies. <>
THE DEATH OF SITTING BEAR: NEW AND SELECTED POEMS by N. Scott Momaday [Harper, 9780062961150]

Pulitzer Prize winner and celebrated American master N. Scott Momaday returns with a radiant collection of more than 200 new and selected poems rooted in Native American tradition.

"The poems in this book reflect my deep respect for and appreciation of words. . . . I believe that poetry is the highest form of verbal expression. Although I have written in other forms, I find that poems are what I want and need most to read and write. They give life to my mind."

One of the most important and unique voices in American letters, distinguished poet, novelist, artist, teacher, and storyteller N. Scott Momaday was born into the Kiowa tribe and grew up on Indian reservations in the Southwest. The customs and traditions that influenced his upbringing—most notably the Native American oral tradition—are the centerpiece of his work.

This luminous collection demonstrates Momaday’s mastery and love of language and the matters closest to his heart. To Momaday, words are sacred; language is power. Spanning nearly fifty years, the poems gathered here illuminate the human condition, Momaday’s connection to his Kiowa roots, and his spiritual relationship to the American landscape.

The title poem, “The Death of Sitting Bear” is a celebration of heritage and a memorial to the great Kiowa warrior and chief. “I feel his presence close by in my blood and imagination,” Momaday writes, “and I sing him an honor song.” Here, too, are meditations on mortality, love, and loss, as well as reflections on the incomparable and holy landscape of the Southwest.

THE DEATH OF SITTING BEAR evokes the essence of human experience and speaks to us all.

Excerpt: The poems in this book reflect my deep respect for and appreciation of words. I consider myself especially fortunate to have been given a rich sampling of storytelling as a child. My mother was well versed in English literature, and she taught me how to discover the wealth within books. My father, who was a Native American of the Kiowa tribe and whose first language was unwritten, told me stories from the Kiowa oral tradition.

I became a poet. I believe poetry is the highest form of verbal expression. Although I have written in other forms, I find that poems are what I want and need most to read and write. They give life to my mind.

I have a recurrent dream. In it there is a child who lives hundreds of years ago in a village in Anglo-Saxon England. Early one morning the child is awakened by its parents, who whisk the child away into the forest. There, around a clearing, are gathered the people of the village. They chatter with excitement, and the child does not know what is happening. Then a little old man, dressed in a ragged robe and hood, steps into the clearing, and a hush falls on the scene. The old man begins to speak, "Hwaet we Gar-Dena in geardagum ..." And he recites Beowulf, the oldest poem in the English (Old English) language. It is a long recitation, of some 3,182 metrical lines, but no one turns away. It is a singular, mesmerizing occasion. It is a great story told. The child, especially, is transported. Here is indeed the discovery of wonder and delight in words. For the child it is an epiphany, a first fulfillment of the imagination. At once and forever nothing will be as it was.

It seems to me that I am that child. I too have had the profound experience of discovering the power of language and literature, first in the oral tradition, then in writing. My father would begin a story with the Kiowa word Akeah-de, "They were camping," an ancient verbal formula that reflects the nomadism of the culture and is likely thousands of years old. I was fascinated by the Kiowa stories, and I begged my father...
to tell them to me over and over again until they were fixed in my mind. I have lived with them for many
years and they remain a foundation of my creative expression.

Story is the marrow of literature. The story does not end with the last word. It goes on in the silence of the
mind, in that region in which exists the unknown, the mysterious, and that origin of the word in which all
words are contained. I profess the conviction that there is only one story, but there are many stories in the
one. Literature can be likened to a rolling wheel of language. It reinvents itself with every telling of the story, and in its timeless procession it has neither beginning nor end.

A poem is a moral statement concerning the human condition, composed in verse. It is a moral statement in
that it involves judgment and choice. The poet judges the validity of his subject and chooses what he
considers the appropriate vehicle of its expression. The judgment is an ethical procedure, as is the reader's
(listener's) obligation to judge the poet's judgment. In a real sense the human condition is the universal
subject of literature; arguably there is no other. Verse is measure. The basic difference between poetry
and prose is that poetry is composed of predetermined measures, iambic pentameter, for example.

The poem, as such, does not exist in Native American oral tradition, for the verbal equivalent is not
composed in English poetic measure. Rather, there is song and such verbal variants as oratory, spells,
chants, prayers, etc., all informed with poetic or lyrical undercurrents.

In my early career as a poet I wrote out of the oral tradition, making use of the character of Native
American expression that I acquired as a birthright and by way of having grown up on Indian reservations
in the Southwest, specifically the Navajo, Apache, and Pueblo.

In 1959 I was awarded a Stegner Creative Writing Fellowship at Stanford University, where I studied
under the direction of the distinguished poet and critic Yvor Winters, who instructed me in the history of the
lyric poem in English. Winters was my true friend, and he influenced my life as a writer in ways that I
continue to discover. I am profoundly in his debt.

In my time I have seen many things, and I have traveled widely over the earth. My writing is supported by
considerable experience. In Arizona I have seen the Navajo Yeibichai and heard the haunting chants of the
mountain gods. In Moscow I have seen numerous commuters reading books of poetry on the Metro, and I
have attended poetry readings to standing-room-only crowds in large arenas. In Siberia I have heard the
Khanty songs of the bear ceremony. And in London I have heard the words of Shakespeare and Ben
Johnson. I can only hope that there are soft echoes of these voices in my work. It would be a grateful
satisfaction.

At Stanford I experimented with different forms of poetic composition. During my tenure there I received a
Guggenheim Fellowship and spent a year on leave in Amherst, Massachusetts, where I read Emily Dickinson
in manuscript. She wrote in intricate patterns and rhyme schemes, and she described brilliantly the
landscape in which lived her whole life. I learned from her something about the spirit of place.

My friend and predecessor at Stanford, Thom Gunn, tried his hand with syllabic poems, poems measured
solely by the number of syllables in each line; I too wrote in syllabics. The 5-7-5 syllabic form basic to
haiku is one that informs the section of this collection entitled "A Century of Impressions."

The title poem, "The Death of Sitting Bear," is the memorial to a Kiowa kinsman of extraordinary stature as
a warrior and a chief. He inspired fear, wonder, and admiration in large measure, and his death was a
self-orchestrated act of extreme bravery, loyalty, and the determination to be free. I feel his presence
close by in my blood and imagination, and I sing him an honor song.
Under the title of my poem "Prairie Hymn," the final poem in this collection, is a concise formula from the Chippewa oral tradition:

As my eyes search the prairie
I feel the summer in the spring.

These few words, in the precision, perception, and beauty they express, seem to me to embody the essence of poetry. When I was a boy, waking to the pristine sunrise and seeing the bright land rolling away to the horizon, the seed of poetry was invested in me. I felt the summer in the spring.

FOR WALLACE STEVENS

Yes, I know that time.
Evening is the afternoon,
Snow is incessant.
And blackbirds sit in the limbs.

Do you know this time? Magpies range in the meadows, And antelope graze
In foothills of the mountains.

When the blackbird flies
There is a deep emptiness
In which presence was,
In which nameless nothing is.

When the magpie flies
There is a bright arrogance
Of four colors, a
Flag for holy clowns, God's own.

THE WOMAN LOOKING IN

Near the Taganka Theatre she stands
At a window, shaping talk with her hands,
Wearing a fur-trimmed coat, a white fur hat
And boots. The photograph is bare and flat:
The woman, window, wall and winter fixed
In time, in drab where cold and soot are mixed.
And yet there is a luster on the plane,
As specters of the Northern Lights remain.
I imagine the woman is resolved
To tell a fate in which I am involved.
I've seen the tragedy performed next door
And seen the ghost that wanders Elsinore.
Perhaps the woman sees beyond the glass
A spirit schooled in semblance and morass.
Or is she poor Ophelia gone insane
And peering through the frosted windowpane?
The lens has opened on the dismal air,
And nothing that the woman sees is there.

THIS MORNING THE WHIRLING WIND

It was full of angry sound,
It was not, but its fury was visible.
I watched the tumult among the leaves
And thought of needles of the sun,
How they stitched a stillness
Beneath the green blur of havoc. <>


Homeland, Exile, Imagined Homelands are features of the modern experience and relate to the cultural and historical dilemmas of loss, nostalgia, utopia, travel, longing, and are central for Jews and others.

This book is an exploration into a world of boundary crossings and of desired places and alternate identities, into a world of adopted kin and invented allegiances.

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This volume of essays began by happenstance. An interdisciplinary center of excellence in Israel, Daat Hamakom, Center for the Study of Cultures of Place in Jewish Modernity, supported by the Israel Science...
Foundation, began its activities in 2012 with the goal to further academic cooperation and intellectual pursuit with colleagues and centers in Israel and abroad. By chance, as things often happen in the academic world, colleagues at the University of Virginia, and in particular Professor Asher Biemann, were in the throes of thinking of expanding their scholarly interests and horizons in issues of Homeland, Exile, Imagined Homelands and the like, and were involved in discussions on creating a conference on these themes. Our interests coincided and thus we embarked on a joint venture that began with an international conference in Charlottesville, Virginia in 2015 and a sequel workshop with some of the original participants in Yad Hashmona, Israel in 2017. Fortunately, Dr. Sarah Wobick-Segev, a historian of modern Jewish history, who joined us on the eve of the workshop in Israel and has been a wonderful collaborator from that point on, has taken on many responsibilities for the editorial process, not the least of which was her active participation in the composition of this introduction.

Colleagues from both centers and participants have been acutely aware that these themes relating to place touch dramatically on contemporary society in which hundreds of thousands of refugees are leaving their homes for a host of reasons and seek a new homeland, often at high risk to their lives. Interestingly, the papers collected here make no allusions to the plight of these people, but their analyses of literary and historical phenomena offer insight to the burden of our times. This volume brings together mutual contemplations of both venues.

"Place" and the multiple expressions Jews developed for a particular place was an overriding theme of Daat Hamakom. The term makom, in Hebrew nipn, carries innumerable meanings and associations - geographic, theological (for example, God is referred to as Makom), philosophical, and existential. Indeed, the presence of "place" has permeated Jewish life and consciousness from time immemorial but has taken dramatic turns in modern times. Place in this context is a feature of modern cultural adaptation that relates to the cultural dilemmas of loss, nostalgia, utopia, travel, longing, but also in terms of boundaries, languages, and space, and the cultural dilemmas associated with being "misplaced" and "displaced" as well as "re-placed."

The geography of culture can be viewed as a means of "mapping" where and how certain modes of creativity and their traditions became rooted, or - in many cases - when and how they became uprooted and were then transported to new contexts and transformed. The turn to spatial and geographic concerns in the study of the humanities can be fruitfully and imaginatively applied to the Jewish case and that, in turn, can enrich scholarly discourse from this particular angle of vision. The idea of "place" anchors this volume in a field of research related to the overall question: how do realia of particular places influence behavior, consciousness, beliefs, and creativity?

Spiritual Homelands poses these questions anew from a variety of disciplinary approaches, including history, literary criticism, ethnography, and cultural studies. It is an exploration into a world of boundary crossings and of desired places and alternate identities, into a world of adopted kin and invented allegiances. What makes this theme relevant is that the election of a homeland is no mere fantasy and projection of the mind and but a transformative and mutually constitutive process. Scholars such as Arjun Appadurai and Homi Bhabha have recently created theoretical frameworks for communities of sentiment and narrative identities co-existing with larger transnational realities. Others, such as Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, have reconsidered the fixity of locations as "accidents of proximity" and the old dichotomies of here and there, home and exile, as "spaces of dispersal!" The intention of the present volume is to discuss the role of choosing alternate places and of identifying with cultures not necessarily one's own, a process, which can neither be subsumed under "rootless" cosmopolitanism nor merely be labeled romantic exoticism. Nor, for that matter, does the language of "assimilation" or, in more recent scholarship, "co-constitution" suffice to describe the agency of choosing and the awareness of self-fashioning. It is not the imitative impulse that defines this volume's theme, not the erosion of selfhood, but
the creative imagination of an expanded self beyond the facts of natural kinship and given place. Spiritual homelands, however naïve and imaginary they may be, are works of self-formation and "self-othering" that question existing geographies and cultural-political orders. They are places of elective affinity and imagined familiarity. But this does not render them less real, or "authentic." Choosing a homeland is an act of election that simultaneously implies a process of un-election and conscious dissociation. If the modern condition, as Erich Auerbach wrote from his own place of exile, involved "the task of making oneself at home in existence without fixed points of support," then the election of place is both an act of self-orientation and one of defiant rootedness in a "boundless and incomprehensible" world. Spiritual homelands are fixed points in a fluctuating, accidental geography. But their elective topography is also an acknowledgment of the transience of human space and the uncertainty of belonging. Spiritual homelands at once seek places and betray a sense of placelessness. They are, paradoxically, homecomings into an elsewhere. And as such, they frequently function as forms of cultural critique and statements of dissent and protestation, though they can also become sites of disguise and hiding.

Not all election of place, of course, is one of free agency and conscious choice. More often than not, spiritual homelands emerge from conditions imposed by power and force. They belong to complex stories of migration and exile, which, in one form or another, have always been part of human history — despite claims to the contrary made by waves of nativist movements throughout the modern era.

Though the various terms to explain the loss of home change from language to language and over time, there appears to be a fundamental commonality to the visceral nature of this experience. Moreover, most if not all cases of expulsion and exile during the early modern and modern eras have been essentially, as Joseph Carens suggests, "by-products" of the way we organize the world politically. The last century’s massive political readjustments and human displacements exemplify this. As Peter Gatrell has averred, "the collapse of multinational empires, the emergence of the modern state with a bounded citizenship, the spread of totalizing ideologies that hounded internal enemies, and the internationalization of responses to refugee crises" resulted in unprecedented waves of exile.

By the early twentieth century, as old homelands disintegrated and were replaced with new states, many people lost their footing, along with their previous political affiliation. Looking for mooring, some tried to find solace in new conceptualizations of cosmopolitanism, which they saw as the antithesis of the rabid nationalism that surrounded them. The famous Austrian-Jewish author Stefan Zweig, for example, would write a number of biographies on historical figures whom he understood as serving as guiding lights in dark times. Zweig’s work on Erasmus pitted the humanist against Luther and was, as such, a parable on the dangers of nationalism and fanaticism. Erasmus, in Zweig’s reading, was not only "the first conscious European, [but also] the first to fight on behalf of peace." Other thinkers of Zweig’s time, including Paul Kristeller, Ernst Cassirer, Hans Baron, and Ernst Kantorowicz, sought in Renaissance humanists role models for a humane and enlightened engagement with the Other. The Renaissance became their own virtual "dreamland."

The refugee crises of the twentieth century in general and the Holocaust in particular have become paradigmatic case studies for philosophers and political ethicists. Carens has argued that the Holocaust is the watershed moment that proves the state’s responsibility to welcome those in critical need. To be sure, this perspective also has roots in Kantian cosmopolitanism. The latter is not the facile and oft derided belief that each person can and should see herself as a citizen of the world, supposedly at home everywhere, but according to critics, truly at home nowhere. Rather, Kant contended that states had the moral duty to provide hospitality to the stranger. Kant’s notion of openness arose from his belief that as humans we all share the earth. However, by this he did not mean to suggest that humans could or were supposed to shed their need for a concrete home or homeland, rather that everyone has the right to (at least temporarily) security and shelter.
More recently Jacques Derrida has returned to Kant’s concept of cosmopolitanism and advocated with others for "cities of refuge." Yet much of this Kantian-inflected discussion of the ethics of cosmopolitanism is top-down, focused on the responsibilities of the state (or city) toward those who seek its hospitality. What of the exiles themselves? For as much as cosmopolitanism seemed to offer a way out for some in the face of exile or nationalism or religious particularism, the need for belonging and a concrete place to call home has remained pressing, even for the most committed humanists and cosmopolitans.

Additionally, there is an important distinction between a guest’s right to hospitality and shelter in times of need and the right to a home beyond the place of one’s birth. Does such a right even exist? And assuming that the exile is allowed in, will she ever feel truly at home? Here the answers remain more complicated. And here is where our volume seeks to make important interventions.

The challenges of exile are well known. Edward Said’s assessment of exile, for instance, is absolute in its pessimism. For him, exile is a "condition of terminal loss," and "the achievements of exile are permanently undermined by the loss of something left behind forever." Siegfried Kracauer, less absolute but not particularly more optimistic, has suggested that the exile "will never fully belong to the community to which he now in a way belongs" but instead lives, "[i]n the near-vacuum of extra-territoriality, the very no-man’s-land ... The exile’s true mode of existence is that of a stranger." Certainly, many of his fellow German-Jewish refugees lost hope and never found comfort in the lands in which they would find temporary shelter. It was far from easy to build a new future in foreign lands. Finding secure, long-term employment was notoriously complicated for many. Working and communicating in new languages and in new cultures was often frustrating and left individuals feeling alienated. Loneliness and a sense of loss overwhelmed others. Indeed, the despair and psychological toil provoked a number of exiles of Kracauer’s generation to take their own lives — including Stefan Zweig, Walter Benjamin, and Ernst Toiler, though each of them experienced flight and exile in ways that cannot be necessarily compared. Others like Joseph Roth would self-destruct, dying from complications of alcoholism.

For those in exile, the most profound challenge has been to create a home without, at least initially, the support networks and emotional rootedness we assume, at least ideally, come with the very word home. Yet there were some who were (more) successful, and the experience of remaking a home in a chosen homeland could be socially and culturally productive acts. Even Kracauer was willing to admit that there were advantages to exile. Namely, that the experience promoted a sharp sense of cultural criticism. Historian Peter Burke’s recent book on the intellectual contributions of exiles and expatriates offers countless examples of how this condition of distance and displacement has fostered deep scholarly insights. The sheer length of the list of exile/scholars compels the reader to consider where modern scholarship would be today were it not for these trying but ultimately productive experiences.

Yet, the process of building a home in a new land - not just the distance from one homeland to a new one - is not merely a catalyst for critical thought, it constitutes new identities. Martin Heidegger has argued in his post-war essay on building and dwelling that "we attain to dwelling, so it seems, only by means of building." Yet to build is not merely a physical task; it is intrinsically connected, Heidegger continues, by acts of cultivating, caring for, protecting, and ultimately of being at peace. To be at home is thus to care and be cared for deeply charged emotional acts of mutual concern and protection. Home is thus not only a place - "the home is also a site of cultural meaning, social relations and emotional attachments. Home is a key space in which our identities are (re)produced." The emotional need for a home (and a homeland) is linked directly to a sense of belonging, which is in turn created through our affective attachments. Similarly, Michel Foucault has asserted that space can be described through a network of relations; and in fact the importance of relations, of relatedness is key to the meaning of place and to home, in particular. Home is an obvious embodiment of the emotional connections we attribute to it. These connections can, of course, also be negative ones. As gendered critiques of the home remind us, the home is formative just as much, if
not more, for the conflicts that take place within its walls, with ethnic, gender and class differences enacted against dominant norms. The conflicts that emerge at home do not, nonetheless, take away from the need for a space of familiarity and comfort, even if tensions and conflict - both domestic and national - lead the individual to leave and build a new home, and homeland, in another space. Spiritual homelands are homes built elsewhere, homes built with multiple and often contradictory affiliations and affinities. Homecoming itself is a paradoxical term, for the homecomer, as Alfred Schutz wrote in 1944, “is not the same man who left. He is neither the same to himself nor for those who await his return.” The homecomer has always already tasted the “magic fruit of strangeness,” and every return, in this respect, is a strangely intimate encounter of unfamiliar faces. Homecoming renders every homeland an unfamiliar place; to the homecomer, every home is an imaginary one, a spiritual homeland yet to be built and truly inhabited.

The stories in our volume are stories of building, of creating homelands in strange places, of choosing belonging; they are stories of election and defiance; and most of all, stories of self-fashioning. The majority of our voices focus on Jewish biographies. But this should not obscure the fact that exile, migration, and the search for homelands are universal human experiences, demanding our urgent attention and engagement. Rather, the modern Jewish experience has become symbolic of a plight shared by many groups displaced and labeled as “other,” and it can offer us a common thread that will allow the reader a perspective, a historical point of reference, whose contemporary significance is painfully apparent.

Indeed, generations of Jews in the modern period struggled and yearned for a place that would offer them a home. Many developed a profound attachment to their native or acquired land in the diaspora or in the Land of Israel (Eretz Israel). They acquired the language of the country, the habits of its people, the tunes and rhythms of its culture, yet often maintained elements of their own tradition, albeit with nuances and influences of the native spirit. Manifesting their inner desire to belong and feel part of that culture/place, their diverse forms of creativity emphasized the multiple layers of their existence. Music, theater, poetry, synagogues, liturgy, and language drew from many sources, but the dialogue with the geography, the place in which they lived took a privileged role. Languages and traditions became intertwined and confused. The ways in which Jews in Istanbul and Paris, Jerusalem and Berlin, bridged these worlds, left a mark on their form of belonging and attachment to that particular place, can be seen in the diverse essays in this volume. Yet, at times, either as a result of voluntary action or forced displacement, Jews sought new homes, surroundings, and traditions. Displaced but not totally acculturated to the novel situation, the power and attraction of the former place, its sensitivities and formal structures loomed large. Thus the Jews from Italy, for example, found a new home in different countries but often continued to pray in the rite of Italian Jewry, or of a specific community in Italy, nostalgically and/or consciously, remaining in contact with the former place. The sounds of the past place continued to reverberate in the new one. Exploring the ways in which Jews shaped the culture they cultivated in one place and how they translated it into another requires the attention to many voices and sights.

The diverse group of scholars in this volume have in their research sought out the ways in which individuals created, remembered, dreamt of a place, physical or imaginary, revealing some of the major intricacies of Jewish life in modern times. The sense of being of a place, and being out of place, has been part of the Jewish experience in the diaspora and Eretz Israel; how this was translated into the minds and imaginations of authors and thinkers, is at the center of our attention. Viewing this concern within a comparative context (by concentrating on a range of authors who developed forms of attachment and belonging to different places) and theoretical underpinnings of cultural studies, the volume enables us to further understand some basic notions of identity, traditions, and forms of attachment and belonging in the modern era. The lessons of the past remind us of the very palpable need for homes and homelands for all. <>

by Andrew Pessin

[Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 9781538110980]

Concise winnowing to the gist style of a broad swath of Jewish thinkers from Philo to Lebens

THE JEWISH GOD QUESTION explores what a diverse array of Jewish thinkers have said about the interrelated questions of God, the Book, the Jewish people, and the Land of Israel. Exploring topics such as the existence of God, God’s relationship to the world and to history, how to read the Bible, Jewish mysticism, the evolution of Judaism, and more, Andrew Pessin makes key insights from the Jewish philosophical tradition accessible and engaging. Short chapters share fascinating insights from ancient times to today, from Philo to Judith Plaskow. The book emphasizes the more unusual or intriguing ideas and arguments, as well as the most influential. THE JEWISH GOD QUESTION is an exciting and useful book for readers wrestling with some very big questions.

Review

This impressive summation of a huge wealth of material will be of interest to anyone interested in the history of Jewish thought., Publishers Weekly

[Pessin] offers an overview of the diverse, serious thought Jewish thinkers have given over the centuries to broad questions about God, religion, and Judaism. . . . each chapter distills highly complex ideas and, much more importantly, got me involved with the subject. The presentations help the reader understand what motivated the position under discussion and to think along for oneself. . . . Pessin has written an outstanding overview of Jewish thought which I found moving and informative., Midwest Book Review

Quite an accomplishment given the profundity of the subjects. . . . a fine introduction to Jewish philosophy., Association of Jewish Libraries Reviews

In eighty-seven brief chapters, Pessin offers an informative and highly readable survey of what Jewish thinkers, from antiquity through the twenty-first century, have had to say about God and related topics. Pessin is a learned guide, and he has written an accessible introduction to the varieties of Jewish philosophy by way of one of its central themes. -- Steven Nadler, University of Wisconsin-Madison

I highly recommend this book for anyone interested in Jewish theology or Jewish philosophy. Reading this book is both a joy and an education: Pessin’s combination of knowledge, wit, readability, and insight is a rarity, and his survey touches on all the best-known Jewish thinkers and many more besides. -- Sanford Goldberg, Northwestern University

This book is amazingly comprehensive and written in a lively and attractive style. It will attract a broad range of readers, all of whom will profit from reading this thought-provoking work. -- Menachem Kellner, professor emeritus, Shalem College and University of Haifa

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It starts as the name of a person. The biblical patriarch Jacob is given this new name after a night spent wrestling with an angel sent from God (Genesis 32:29). Jacob’s sons and daughter subsequently become the "children of Israel," then multiply into the "tribes of Israel," who, collectively, as a people, are often simply called ‘Israel.’ The land (1) in which they first arose as a people, (2) which the Bible apportions between the tribes, (3) where they first obtained political sovereignty three millennia ago, and (4) where they primarily dwelled for the next millennium is called the "Land of Israel”—that is, the land of the people Israel, or simply "Israel." And of course the modern state founded in 1948 took as its official name the "State of Israel”—again, the state of the people Israel, or simply "Israel" for short.

And what does the word "Israel" mean in the first place? The Hebrew Bible tells us, "Your name shall no longer be Jacob, but Israel, for you have striven with beings divine" (Genesis 32:29). In Hebrew, in other words, the name essentially means "one who struggles with, contends with, prevails over the divine."

So, "Israel" refers to a person, a people, a land, and a state—and to struggling with (and maybe even prevailing over?) God, the way that Judaism, the religion of Israel, long has.
Welcome to the Jewish God Question.
Or, more accurately, the Jewish God Questions, for there are many that fall under this heading.

As long as there have been Jews, there have been Jewish thinkers—and they have been thinking about the many things referred to as "Israel" and all their connections. Who are the biblical patriarchs and matriarchs, and what is the precise nature of the people, the land? Who or what is God, and can His existence be proven? What is His relationship to the progenitors, the people, the land? What does God demand of the people, the Jews, and why? Why were they expelled from the land with the destruction of the Second Temple (70 CE)? Why have they been kept in exile, in dispersion, for so many long centuries? How should they relate to the broader communities in which they live? Does God still demand of them today what He demanded of them back on Mount Sinai, even in their condition of exile? And why them, of all people?

Starting in the seventeenth century, as the modern era arrives, the Jewish God Question, with all its many components, takes on new and sharper forms reflecting the surrounding Western cultures. What role should religion play in public life in general, if any? Should religion be discarded in favor of a life of reason, of enlightenment? Is it feasible to believe in God in the modern world? Can a Jew even fit into the broader society in which he or she has lived, and remain a Jew? Can (or should) one separate the Jewish person from the Jewish religion? Can (or should) one separate the Jewish people from the Land of Israel? Should Jews simply disappear as a collective body—convert, intermarry, assimilate, vanish? Or should they return to their ancient homeland and reestablish their long-lost political sovereignty? What does the Jewish religion say about all this? Or should we not even pay attention to it?

If one thing is clear, as suggested by all these questions, it is this: Jews have been continuously struggling with God, and everything that that struggle entails, ever since that fateful encounter between Jacob and the angel.

This book will introduce you to some of the things Jewish thinkers have said about these matters, and more. The goal is not to be comprehensive, because that is not possible. It is, rather, to sample some of the more interesting, counterintuitive, provocative things famous thinkers have had to say, as well as to introduce you to some thinkers you probably haven’t heard of. You’ll also notice that there is plenty of disagreement among the thinkers here. There’s the famous expression, “Ask two Jews, get three opinions.” This phenomenon is perhaps grounded in the great tradition of disagreement and debate represented by the ancient Talmud, which remains a central object of study for Orthodox (and many non-Orthodox) Jews to this day. This vast document records for posterity disputes on matters large and small, recognizing that where truth is the goal, "These and those are [both] the words of the living God" (Talmud Tractate Eruvin 13b). Truth can be difficult to discern, in other words, and all sides sincerely seeking it have something to contribute. No one ever said that “struggling with God” should be easy or straightforward.

The phenomenon is also grounded in another fact: The Jews are often divided among and against themselves. Jacob’s sons did not always get along very well—they sold Joseph into slavery, remember—and the tribes that descended from them followed suit. The pattern continued through their long millennium dwelling in the Land of Israel, and then through the centuries of dispersion and exile. It only grew more intense in the modern era, when the possibility of seriously transforming, and even leaving, the Jewish religion became a live one; and all the more so with the rise of political Zionism, which really forced on many Jews the problem of deciding just who or what they and their Jewishness were and should be. The divisiveness remains in full force today, both inside and outside the State of Israel, as Jews within and without struggle not only with God, but also among themselves with respect to who or what they, and their collective, is and should be.
Ask two Jews any question and you'll get at least three opinions. In this book we ask seventy-two Jewish thinkers about the Jewish God Question and we get more opinions than we can easily count.

**LEO STRAUSS AND THE THEOPOLITICS OF CULTURE** by Philipp von Wussow [SUNY in the Thought and Legacy of Leo Strauss, SUNY, 9781438478395]

This archive-based study of the philosophy of Leo Strauss provides in-depth interpretations of key texts and their larger theoretical contexts.

In this book, Philipp von Wussow argues that the philosophical project of Leo Strauss must be located in the intersection of culture, religion, and the political. Based on archival research on the philosophy of Strauss, von Wussow provides in-depth interpretations of key texts and their larger theoretical contexts. Presenting the necessary background in German-Jewish philosophy of the interwar period, von Wussow then offers detailed accounts and comprehensive interpretations of Strauss’s early masterwork, *Philosophy and Law*, his wartime lecture “German Nihilism,” the sources and the scope of Strauss’s critique of modern “relativism,” and a close commentary on the late text “Jerusalem and Athens.” With its rare blend of close reading and larger perspectives, this book is valuable for students of political philosophy, continental thought, and twentieth-century Jewish philosophy alike. It is indispensable as a guide to Strauss’s philosophical project, as well as to some of the most intricate details of his writings.

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Leo Strauss and the Theopolitics of Culture

For the time being, Leo Strauss remains the unlikely case of a first-rate philosopher who has yet to be discovered, despite the enormous amount of scholarship invested in his legacy. Strauss has been studied widely in the fields of political science, intellectual history, and modern Jewish thought, but his philosophical project remains difficult to grasp. This is in part due to the fact that his works do not seem to have a central idea or thesis. Instead, they are exceedingly multilayered, stretching across a variety of fields, epochs, and thematic concerns. Strauss is not only a major reference for the renewal of political philosophy in the twentieth century, he has also had a major impact on the historiography of medieval Jewish philosophy and he has made a partly unexplored contribution to the logic of modern social science. Furthermore, he advocated a largely atypical notion of philosophy, according to which the problem of belief and unbelief is the central issue of philosophical investigation. Last but not least, he sought a way out of the impasse of modernity by consciously "returning" to Platonic philosophizing.

It is difficult to find a single master thesis or a common thematic thread behind these heterogeneous aspects of Strauss's work. But perhaps there is a recurring conceptual pattern or a critical purpose—or at least a "direction" of philosophical investigation—despite the great variety of concerns? To understand the philosophical project of Leo Strauss, I suggest reading his works with regard to a specific constellation of culture, religion, and the political. In particular, this study carves out Strauss's largely unknown critique of "culture," his occupation with a latent culturalism that allegedly holds its grip on modern philosophical thought.

This focus may not be self-evident. His objections to the notion of "culture" initially appear to be rather vague. Moreover, "culture" is not the central theme of Leo Strauss's writings. It is, however, a theme that leads to and accompanies the central themes. As this study argues, Strauss's conception of political philosophy was formed in the polemics against the notion of "culture." The problem had an extraordinary importance for the inner workings of his philosophical endeavor. As he understood the notion, "culture" signified a void in the discourse of twentieth-century philosophy, which has come to be seen in the problematic conjunction of "culture" with religion and the political.

The place where the new philosophical concern came to be most visible is Strauss's unrecognized masterwork Philosophy and Law (1935), where he introduced the topic into the historiography of Jewish philosophy. In the first chapter—masked as a review essay of Julius Guttmann's seminal book Philosophies of Judaism (1933)—Strauss sought to demonstrate that Guttmann could not understand the original problem of religion because he was trapped in the assumptions of the philosophy of culture; but as he argued, "religion cannot be rightly understood in the framework of the concept of `culture.'" First, culture is to be understood as the spontaneous product of the human spirit, while religion is given to man. Second, culture is to be understood as a set of "domains of validity," each constituting "partial domains of truth," whereas religion makes a claim to universality. In a next step Strauss rephrased these two incompatibilities as a contradiction between two oppositional claims to universality: "The claim to universality on the part of culture," which in its own view rests in spontaneous production, seems to be opposed by the claim to universality on the part of religion, which in its own view is not produced by man but given to him." With their respective claim to be universal, culture and religion do not coexist peacefully side by side. Instead, they clash with each another and seek to submit each another to their respective semantic structure. In Guttmann's Philosophies of Judaism, religion wins the fight against culture. As Strauss described the outcome of the quarrel, Guttmann "finds himself driven to a remarkable distancing from philosophy of culture by the fact of religion as such, which thereby proves to be one crux of philosophy of culture."
Now that Strauss had described the conflict between religion and culture, he added an inconspicuous third element. In his footnote to the passage quoted above on religion as the "crux" of philosophy of culture, he continued: "The other crux of philosophy of culture is the fact of the political," referring to his review of Carl Schmitt's The Concept of the Political. With this addition, the conceptual framework of culture, religion, and the political was completed.

This study follows the conceptual triad of culture, religion, and the political through different aspects of Strauss’s work stretching across a variety of spatial and temporal contexts. Each of the five parts can be read on its own to a large extent, but the triad also provides a recurrent theme or leitmotif throughout the book. Such an interpretation of Strauss’s philosophy inevitably finds itself in an uneasy position between "systematic" and "historical" philosophizing. The present study, with its emphasis on close reading of Strauss texts, seeks to situate them in their proper context of discussion while exploring a thoroughgoing systematic concern. It is therefore compelled to combine the "systematic" and the "historical" pursuit of philosophical scholarship in a way that is open to attack from all sides.

Most notably, perhaps, the argument of the book cannot be properly laid out in terms of "contextualism" as it is widely understood. Only to a small extent does it situate a text or teaching in the immediate historical context of its creation. Rather, it traces how a major theme was imported from a prior discourse that belonged to an entirely different temporal and spatial context, and how it was adapted to a new situation. In each case, the connection is still visible in the voids and ruptures of arguments and conceptual strategies. I show in each chapter of my study how a prior discourse—often from a remote context—provides the conceptual template for the new discourse. The larger consideration is that philosophical discourses are not essentially a direct response to an immediate context. The recourse to earlier conceptual patterns is philosophically far more relevant than the immediate responses. However, the inevitable modifications of these patterns are being made in accordance with the historical situation.

Strauss may have been up to something when he emphasized—and maybe overemphasized—the essential difference between philosophers and intellectuals, who respond to their political and cultural situation. One need not evoke the dreadful image of timeless and spaceless philosophizing to see the difference: philosophers respond to their immediate contexts, too, but they do so in a different way. When they reflect upon "their time," they resort to conceptual patterns and genealogical lines that reach much farther down both in history and in the structure of their argument. Such patterns and lines are also to be found throughout the writings of Leo Strauss. He had a knack for running the same conceptual patterns through the most divergent texts and contexts, and he even ran them through the same texts again and again without ever coming to the same conclusion twice. There must be some systematic thread that keeps his philosophizing together.

My attempt to introduce a "systematic" concern into Strauss scholarship may seem odd, for Strauss is not known as a systematic thinker, and he did not present his ideas in a systematic fashion. Phrased in terms from the philosophical discourse of his time, he appears to be a Problemdenker, not a Systemdenker. He clearly belonged to the post-idealist world in which philosophers no longer wrote the huge and comprehensive philosophical systems of previous generations but expressed their philosophical ideas in a series of commentaries to previous philosophical works. Some of the main ideas are scattered across all of his work, and the only way to get hold of these ideas is to analyze them in a variety of concrete situations.

Strauss himself described the prevalence of systematic thinking without a system, and even without the slightest attempt to explicate one's ideas in a systematic fashion, in his dissertation Das Erkenntnisproblem in der philosophischen Lehre Fr. H. Jacobis (1921). A major methodological question of this study was whether a "systematic difference" can also be claimed for an "anti-systematic thinker" such as Jacobi. As Strauss maintained, Jacobi was unwilling to bring his ideas into a systematic form, but the "objective
Strauss wrote the study in a moment when the old philosophical systems were no longer viable, whereas the anti-systematic fervor of the day seemed to lead straight into relativism. The crucial issue was "that there are several types of reason," and it was far from clear how the "multiplicity of standpoints" would allow for a unified philosophical perspective. In this situation Strauss proposed "that a philosophy which understands itself, and which does not wish to be exposed to a degrading relativism, must think of the truth as an independent, coherent existence [Bestand], which it does not create but seek, find, and recognize."

Subverting the distinction between Problemdenker and Systemdenker, Strauss pointed to a connection between systematic thinking and "a strictly definable complex of problems in its own lawfulness." This early outline reverberated in his introductions to Moses Mendelssohn, where he pointed to Mendelssohn's distinction between systematic (philosophical) and poetic form, as well as to the problem posed by the plurality of systems. How did these ideas morph into the foundational writings of Strauss's political philosophy from the early 1930s onward?

The place in Strauss scholarship that is located most closely to the matter is the question of whether there are "technical" discussions in his work. Most prominently, Stanley Rosen ventured that there are no such technical discussions in Strauss's writings. Whether he had a very specific kind of technical discussions in mind (after all, the claim is based on a comparison between Strauss and Aristotle) or whether he looked only in some of the writings (those "middle works" upon which Strauss's fame and notoriety is based) we do not know. But the rhetorical question "whether or not [Strauss] was capable of this sort of technical work" must be reposed with regard to his writings of the 1930s. These works are replete with many technical discussions, and from there we also find some technical work in his later writings. Strauss himself contributed to the fact that this layer was disregarded by his readership, for he often spoke out against "technical terms" in philosophy and held that political philosophy was to be written in nontechnical language that stems "from the marketplace." He also alluded to "technical terms" as an indicator of exoteric writing.

The technical layer in Strauss's works, however, is to be found not in the terminology but in the discussions of the systematic division of philosophy. These discussions may not arouse the suspicion of most Strauss readers. But they indicate the place where we should look if we seek to understand the inner workings of his philosophy. Furthermore, these technical discussions are replete with historical references that situate Strauss within the overall discourse of early-twentieth-century German and Jewish philosophy. I argue in Part I that this occupation with the division of philosophy stems from his early intimate acquaintance with Marburg neo-Kantianism, especially with the works of Hermann Cohen. He discussed the problem of political philosophy within the framework of the prior discussion on the place of religion in the system of philosophy. Paradoxically, Strauss preserved this systematic preoccupation of neo-Kantianism in his lifelong polemics against neo-Kantian philosophy of culture.

Strauss's controversial interpretation of Carl Schmitt's The Concept of the Political is a follow-up to the Cohenian question, as we can trace from the discussion on the systematic place of the political in his "Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political" (1932). The argument with Schmitt extends his occupation with neo-Kantianism up to the point at which Schmitt himself appears as a covert neo-Kantian. As I shall argue, the "horizon beyond liberalism" opened up at the beginning of the "Notes on Carl Schmitt" was in the first place a horizon beyond the polemical antagonism between the principal task is to outline how the book works as a book, despite its heterogeneous parts and its multiple philosophical contexts. Needless to say, this commentary is not meant to provide a comprehensive interpretation; it merely serves to outline a path through the extremely difficult text in order to prepare for such an interpretation. If this meticulous work is helpful, it is a first step toward the future recognition of Philosophy and Law as one of the greatest
philosophical works of the twentieth century, along with the **TRACTATUS, BEING AND TIME, and DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT.**

The systematic question also serves as a guide through Strauss’s work on medieval philosophy, most notably through his evolving views on Maimonides after Philosophy and Law. A typical proposition in the article "Some Remarks on the Political Science of Maimonides and Farabi" (1936) goes as follows: "It is difficult to understand the exact meaning of Maimonides' prophetology if one does not know first the philosophical place of this doctrine." Strauss first recited the Maimonidean division of philosophy into speculative philosophy and practical philosophy—the latter being divided into ethics, economics, and politics—and argued that this disposition is well founded in the Aristotelian tradition. Second, he examined some seemingly minor deviations from that division: Maimonides mentions happiness when speaking of politics, not of ethics; he divides practical philosophy into four parts but later drops one of them; and he attributes to politics the treatment of "divine matters." Third, Strauss suggested that the difficulties pertaining to these deviations can be solved only by acknowledging that Maimonides is strongly influenced by Farabi—namely, a philosopher who fought for philosophy against religious dogma. The systematic disposition was so important for Strauss here because it seemed to decide about the philosophical character of medieval Jewish thought: it would provide the only reliable clue to the question whether a work of Maimonides was actually a philosophical or a Jewish book. This, in turn, would also give access to the precise way in which political things are intertwined with divine things.

Strauss discussed the same division in "The Literary Character of the Guide of the Perplexed" (1941) and stretched the matter much further. The preeminent characteristic was the exclusion of any philosophic subject from the Guide, and Strauss concluded that it was not a philosophical book. The discovery of "exotericism" in Maimonides and his predecessors led to a turnaround in the hermeneutics of medieval thought. As the 1963 introductory essay on Maimonides shows, Strauss was still occupied with the structure of the **GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED**, but the way he described this structure had changed. To give a typical example:

The Guide consists then of seven sections or of thirty-eight subsections. Wherever feasible, each section is divided into seven subsections; the only section that does not permit of being divided into subsections is divided into seven chapters. The simple statement of the plan of the Guide suffices to show that the book is sealed with many seals.

At this point the systematic question had moved into the background. Instead of the underlying division of philosophy, Strauss paid greater attention to the outer division of a text, or to its surface. As in the quote above, there was a new word that indicated this new approach: the plan. In "How to Begin to Study The Guide of the Perplexed," Strauss simply started from a description of the sections, subsections, parts, and chapters as the indicators of its "plan." Such meticulous descriptions of textual surfaces became the epitome of Straussian hermeneutics in the wider public perception.

Despite the dramatic shift in his philosophic and hermeneutic approach from 1937 onward, there is also a fundamental continuity. The original hermeneutic innovation of Straussian political philosophy preceded the discovery of exotericism and the shift of attention from the systematic division to the literary character of a text. It is to be found in his attention toward what he later called "the argument and the action" of a text. Strauss paid great attention to the tension between argument and action, and in particular to the argument of the action. As Seth Benardete explained the title of Strauss’s late work **THE ARGUMENT AND THE ACTION OF PLATO’S LAWS**: "The 'and' in the title is misleading; it does not mean that some sort of action is represented while the argument is being developed; it means that the action has an argument, and that that argument is the true argument of the Laws."

To better understand the notion of the argument of the action—and its continuity in Strauss’s thought—we must seek to trace how it applies to the composition of his own writings. For lack of a better term, I suggest...
that a major aspect of the Straussian art of writing is the predominance of directional arguments. These arguments indicate a movement from one understanding to another, and they contain instructions on how to get from one to another. Strauss’s directional arguments suggest that the propositional content of a text must be discerned from its dramatic movement. This feature also explains why Strauss was immensely occupied with the questions of how to begin, and how to proceed from there.

Strauss must not be read in the same manner he read, but his advice that the philosophical argument is contained in the dramatic action is certainly useful for reading Strauss. As he explained in a landmark article on Plato: "For presenting his teaching Plato uses not merely the ‘content’ of his works (the speeches of his various characters) but also their ‘form’ (the dialogic form in general, the particular form of each dialogue and of each section of it, the action, characters, names, places, times, situations and the like); an adequate understanding of the dialogues understands the ‘content’ in the light of the ‘form.’" Strauss imitated these features of Platonic dialogues in his philosophical prose. His own texts, to be sure, do not have the type of dramatic elements—characters, places, or situations—mentioned in the quote. But he often seemed to transpose the philosophical concepts and their systematic interrelationships into a dramatic situation, in which they all of a sudden and unexpectedly gain a new life of their own. To quote Benardete on Strauss’s Plato again: "Strauss was not the first to ... suggest that the drama altered the apparent meaning of the argument; but what is peculiar his discovery was that once argument and action are properly put together an entirely new argument emerges that could never have been expected from the argument on the written page. Something happens in a Platonic dialogue that in its revolutionary unexpectedness is the equivalent to the periagōgē, as Socrates calls it, of philosophy itself." It is not difficult to trace these features in Strauss’s own writing, for his texts often appear to have a peculiar spatial dimension. Strauss was a master of translating a philosophical subject into a dramatic situation, in which a new argument emerges from the interplay between the concepts—the "characters" in philosophical prose—over the course of a text.

These peculiarities notwithstanding, we shall be cautious not to imitate Straussian hermeneutics for reading Strauss. In particular, we shall not presuppose that Strauss himself practiced exoteric writing, or that he wrote "between the lines." In most cases, it is more precise to understand the respective text "as it stands." Reading Leo Strauss, one must make a shift toward the argument: To see the dramatic action of a Strauss text, one must read it closely and follow the argument. This can be a difficult task. As a rule of thumb, readers invoke exotericism where the plain argument is either too simple or too difficult to understand. One common challenge to reading comprehension is to identify whether the position stated in the text is Strauss’s own. As Steven B. Smith explained: "One of the great challenges in reading Strauss is the question of voice. When is Strauss speaking in his own voice and when is he reconstructing, often in his own distinctive idiom, the words of someone else? He no doubt deliberately and provocatively ran these together. Strauss often restated the views of dangerous writers like Nietzsche and Heidegger with a power and clarity greater than those writers had expressed themselves." Beyond "dangerous writers," Strauss applied this ability also to thinkers who were not easily accessible to readers. As he explained with regard to Cohen’s Religion of Reason, his remarks were an attempt at "reproducing or imitating difficulties" that the author had not resolved.

This mimetic reproduction of philosophical positions and their internal difficulties adds to the directional character of Strauss’s texts, or to the fact that their propositional content must be discerned from the dramatic action. "Exoteric" readings often occur where the reader has lost track of the argument and action. But these directional arguments are not in any meaningful sense written "between the lines." In principle they are accessible to careful readers. Their rhetorical elements—and the continuous interplay between philosophy and rhetoric—pertain to the educational function of philosophy as Strauss came to see it.
Part III of the present study will follow up on this theme in an interpretation of Strauss's "German Nihilism" (1941), which is an extraordinarily "rhetorical" text. The rhetorical elements, however, serve a clear philosophical purpose. I argue that the text is a parable on liberal education toward philosophy, placed within the context of the debates around 1940-41 on the intellectual origins of National Socialism. As I seek to show, the text responds to a forgotten genre at the border of philosophy and politics, in which scholars sought to locate the origins of National Socialism in the history of German philosophy, particularly in German Idealism, Romanticism, or Nietzsche. The genre had been established during World War I and was resurrected for a brief and intense period during World War II. It also retained a strange afterlife in postwar debates on the alleged political complicity of philosophy. The principal fallacy of the genealogies of National Socialism was due to a confusion in the relationship between politics and culture. As they sought to trace the peculiarities of German politics in German Kultur, they paradoxically repeated what—they thought—was the fallacy of German philosophy: a characteristic overemphasis on culture, to the detriment of politics with its corresponding notion of civilization. A major key to Strauss's counterinterpretation of National Socialism in his "German Nihilism" text is the critical reversal of the distinction between culture and civilization. Located particularly within the heated debates of 1940-41, the text served to clarify the relationship between philosophy and politics.

As to the inner development of Strauss's thought, it has often been argued that "German Nihilism" marks the transition of a German-Jewish scholar of the Weimar era to the American research context. I propose to move this debate to another playing field, namely, Strauss's discourse on American social science and his scathing critique of modern relativism. Part IV of the present study argues that Strauss's transition to American social science is to be located in a shift from "culture" to "cultures." There is a quote in Liberalism Ancient and Modern that captures this shift better than any other:

It is not easy to say what culture susceptible of being used in the plural means. As a consequence of this obscurity people have suggested, explicitly or implicitly, that culture is any pattern of conduct common to any human group. Hence we do not hesitate to speak of the culture of suburbia or of the cultures of juvenile gangs, both nondelinquent and delinquent. In other words, every human being outside of lunatic asylums is a cultured human being, for he participates in culture. At the frontiers of research there arises the question as to whether there are not cultures also of inmates of lunatic asylums. If we contrast the present-day usage of "culture" with the original meaning, it is as if someone would say that the cultivation of a garden may consist of the garden's being littered with empty tin cans and whisky bottles and used papers of various descriptions thrown around in the garden at random. Having arrived at this point, we realize that we have lost our way somehow.

Quotes such as this are likely to be noticed for their irony and wit, but there has been little effort to understand them in their theoretical and historical context. As I show from numerous traces—often to be found in remote articles and unpublished lecture manuscripts—the actual target of this critique of "cultures" was the new science of cultural anthropology, with Ruth Benedict as its principal spokesperson in the wider public discourse. According to this viewpoint, all values are relative to a social or cultural group. The absurd notion that juvenile gangs or inmates of lunatic asylums constitute "cultures" provided the extreme case for the thesis that all values are "relative" to any group. The ostensibly more open-minded and flexible notion of "cultures"—or of a culture as opposed to culture—thereby came to be regarded as a problem. In the words of Geoffrey Hartman, "[I]t is 'a culture' that tends toward hegemony, while 'culture,' understood as the development of a public sphere, a 'republic of letters' in which ideas are freely exchanged, is what is fragile."

Strauss occupies a special place in the wider discourse on relativism, although he is practically nonexistent in the more technical philosophical debate. For some, he is a bulwark against the tide of Western relativism, while for others, he is the high definition of an "absolutist" invoking the threat of relativism for demagogic purposes. To the extent that the so-called Strauss wars have any specific philosophical and
moral content (beyond the more obvious political content), they revolve for the most part around the relativity or permanence of ideas, values, and philosophical problems. But Strauss was by no means the staunch antirelativist he has come to be regarded as in the wider public perception. To revaluate his contribution to the understanding of modern relativism, it seems useful to keep a certain distance from both sides. In other words, we shall neither presuppose nor merely debunk Strauss's antirelativism. His critique of modern social science can neither be taken to be true nor understood as untrue in its entirety, as if social science were still the same as it was for him in the 1950s. The debates on "relativism" in the 1950s and '60s are for the most part a matter of recollection at best. Hence, one must first recontextualize the Straussian discourse on relativism to revaluate his understanding of social science. This procedure will help to see the strengths and weaknesses of the actual arguments against "modern relativism."

For the thesis of a fundamental plurality of cultures, the theoretical project of cultural anthropology provided some extreme cases such as cannibalism, the killing of parents, and female genital mutilation. Initially Strauss's sometimes enigmatic contributions to this discourse seem to be rather unspecific. He generalized the matter to the point at which he concluded that modern social and political science as such has become relativistic and that it is therefore methodologically incapable of addressing the fact of the political. But his arguments are often highly idiosyncratic interventions into specific theoretical situations. In the first place, one must rehearse the arguments and rhetorical strategies pertaining to the theoretical matrix of "relativism" and "absolutism." One must analyze them in their respective textual situation. Second, Strauss's discourse is not a unified theory but a loose set of strategies and arguments in a complex matrix of relativism and absolutism. Third, Strauss was occupied with relativism only in a comparably short span of his philosophical career. And fourth, he did not reframe his arguments as a contribution to an ongoing debate. Their precise function is to disrupt a debate. As he sought to demonstrate, the debate had lost track of its subject matter and purpose. He therefore designed his arguments as a disruption that would prepare for a change of perspective.

For the most part, then, Strauss's arguments do work, even as their function is limited. There are basically three types of arguments: commonsense arguments, historical arguments, and arguments that combine a commonsense understanding with a historical perspective. Commonsense arguments often come in colloquial phrases—"forgetting the wood for the trees" is the most common phrase. The purpose is to remind the reader of a triviality, "if a necessary triviality." Historical arguments usually seek to put a modern problem into a larger historical perspective. Their main purpose is critical, and for the most part they come in brief and fairly dry statements that seek to strip a contemporary teaching of its normative claim: "this conclusion ... is known to every reader of Plato's Republic or of Aristotle's Politics."

Both these types of argument are not yet very spectacular. Strauss's specialty was to combine a commonsense argument with a historical argument. Even these combinations seem trivial at first, but they are well thought out and surprisingly strong. When Strauss sought to remind his contemporaries of "a necessary triviality" he typically followed a concept or debate to its ultimate relativistic consequences to state that "we have lost our way somehow." The inconspicuous claim functions as a brief allusion to a larger change of perspective: The debate had been on the right way, but at some point it strayed off course. It is therefore necessary to make a fresh start.

Another characteristic element of this change of perspective is the understanding that this new start must involve some kind of return to an earlier position, which had been refuted in the debate that eventually strayed off course. Each time, Strauss proposed an untimely "return" to Platonic political philosophy (supplemented by Aristotle's Politics). He did not merely speak as a Plato scholar here, but as the principal spokesman for a full-fledged return to Platonic philosophizing. But how is it possible for a twentieth-century philosopher and/or Jewish philosopher—a modern—to return to premodernity, and why did he insist? As we shall see in various textual situations, Strauss often evoked the return to Plato to facilitate a change of
perspective on modernity. The contrast between modernity and premodernity creates a tension within the modern world, and this contrast is primarily a critical difference introduced by Strauss into twentieth-century philosophy. Whereas some of his contemporaries sought to judge modernity by its socioeconomic flipside, for Strauss it was to be tried in a "pre-modern court."

But Strauss was also radically modern. As he explained in 1935, "[T]he return to pre-modern thought ... led ... to a much more radical form of modernity." There is no better context to study this paradox in action than his life-long occupation with the theme of Jerusalem and Athens. Strauss was a major proponent of a view that understood philosophy from its opposition to revealed religion, and one of his principal contributions was to renew the conflict between reason and revelation in the middle of the twentieth century. He took reason and revelation as representatives of two types of wisdom, and he associated these types of wisdom with the names of two cities, Jerusalem and Athens.

Part V provides a fresh commentary on the seminal article "Jerusalem and Athens" (1967) in its basis and its genesis. As to the basis, Strauss outlined an understanding of religion after the critique of religion: he described a notion of religion that is no longer exposed to the critique of religion proposed by Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud. Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud offered three—maybe the three—comprehensive post-traditional interpretations of Judaism in modernity. They represent the three options for a radical critique of religion to argue where religion stems from: class struggle, the will to power, or neurosis. Religion, then, is a sign either of injustice, mediocrity, or immaturity. Despite their internal differences, their respective views on religion have a lot in common. Marx called it "the opium of the masses," Nietzsche spoke of "alcohol and Christianity" as "the two great European narcotics," and Freud compared religion to "intoxicating substances." They all expected a future without the drug of religion to be blissful and bright. But Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud did not account for the possibility that one could be thoroughly religious without falling back behind their critique. They presupposed that the religious interpretation of reality had been discredited, and that the common man only held on to it for narcotic purposes. A new interpretation would successfully replace the religious interpretation. The one thing necessary for humanity was a new purpose—the classless society, the overman, or the man of unprejudiced science. These purposes were the core elements of a new, secular "belief," which was based on the idea of the perfectibility of man.

Strauss was not the first to detect the fundamental weakness of this critique of religion, but he took the matter to another level. Following his reevaluation of the critique of religion and its premises, we may describe the epistemic situation of religious belief as follows: it is possible to refute religion, of course, but it is just as possible to refute the refutation, and both refutations take place on the very same grounds. Religious and non-religious or antireligious beliefs and attitudes are a matter of choice, an act of the will. Religious and antireligious discourses are a matter of rhetorical persuasion. A philosophical critique of the critique of religion is therefore not needed to rehabilitate or reestablish religion, it is justified by the purpose of philosophy itself. The veracity of philosophy depends upon its relationship to religion and theology, for this relationship illuminates the epistemic precondition of philosophy.

Strauss was also somewhat ahead of the discourse on belief and unbelief when it came to the proper conceptual strategies. With a strong sense for the structural asymmetries in the conflict, he was careful not to prematurely resolve the case in favor of one side. As Pierre Manent put it, Strauss's account was "so impartial that it seems impossible to say where he stands." The relatively high symmetry of Jerusalem and Athens developed over a long span of time, evolving out of his passionate—perhaps even preposterous—resistance to mediation through "culture." Strauss had started from a highly asymmetrical understanding of the conflict between Jerusalem and Athens and only successively came to an understanding of the conflict as one that cannot be resolved in either direction. And while he became less and less convinced that the
mere decision for the philosophical life could settle the matter, he came to emphasize that the possibility and necessity of philosophizing depended upon its clear delineation from the life of obedience to God.

I start from an outline of the emergence of the topic and the conceptual strategies in Strauss’s work. "Jerusalem and Athens" in particular, with its unique outline of a philosophical interpretation of the Bible and a theological interpretation of Greek philosophy, is an extremely well-crafted-text, displaying certain hypermodern arguments and rhetorical means that deserve close attention. Another aspect of "Jerusalem and Athens" is how it brings together Strauss’s two critiques of culture—the critique of German philosophy of culture (represented in text by Hermann Cohen and his understanding of Jerusalem and Athens) and the critique of cultural anthropology (represented by some unnamed scientific observers of Jerusalem and Athens).

Strauss did not fully develop the intricate connection, but in the void between the two concepts of culture the text announces a third type of culturalism, which had come up in the 1950s and ’60s. This new type of culturalism was closely linked to the emergence of postcolonialism—a multiplicity of "cultures" becoming nations and eventually founding nation-states. Both the political events and their repercussions in the academic discourse brought about a first wave of reaffirming the roots of "Western civilization," for which Strauss became a spokesman. As Judith Shklar contended in 1964:

The conspicuous concentration on "the West" today is clearly a response to the Cold War and to the political organization of ex-colonial, non-European societies which now challenge the European world. These events have made us all culturally self-conscious.... The question is whether it is valid to extract a quintessence of "the West" by subtracting from its history all that it shares in various degrees with the rest of mankind. The result inevitably gives Europeans an unwarranted appearance of consistency and uniformity. The aim of this exercise, moreover, is not difficult to guess: as always it is a matter of defending the "essential" West against other ideological forces, revolutionary, national, and violent. The difficulty is that these too are Western.

Shklar summed up the argument against the resurgence of "the West" well. It is based on the plurality of what constitutes the West, generalizing the claim that the idealizing view of the West excludes some of its many aspects while highlighting others. We must not diminish the scope of this criticism to see that at least the more intelligent proponents of "the West," such as Strauss, have little to fear from it. They had known about this plurality all along. When Strauss recast Jerusalem and Athens as the "two roots of Western civilization," he was well aware that he had not described all its branches and fruits. It was the ongoing conflict between the two roots or "pillars" of the West that safeguarded its vitality, with all its heterogeneous elements.

A second wave of reaffirming the roots of "the West" began as a response to the conflicts at the border of culture, religion, and the political in the twenty-first century. This wave has ignored many of the lessons of the first wave, including those of Strauss. The current return to "the West" also witnesses the renewal of an older quarrel between two highly politicized notions of culture: the largely conservative notion of culture as a reaffirmation of the roots of Western civilization has again entered into a principal argument with the liberal notion of culture as an agent of social change. This principal argument can now be seen again after a time when the argument in favor of "the West" was virtually absent from the discourse on culture. As Susan Hegeman noted about the conservative appropriation of the term culture: "A classic rhetorical tool of liberal discourse is now being appropriated by the Right." Her response reflects the shock caused by the loss of a monopoly:

What does it mean that "culture," undeniably a central term of a left-leaning academic discourse in previous decades, has now become accessible to this kind of manipulation? ... I believe we are in danger of ceding the domain of culture to those who we already know have a deliberately limited understanding of it.
We shall be glad that the debate is open once again. But we shall also welcome any serious contribution that would lead the way out of this highly politicized situation. And we shall remind ourselves that neither the reaffirmation of the West nor the hope for social change exhausts the meaning of culture.

There are three ways in which the relationships between culture, religion, and the political are being played out here: as a conflict between the religious and the philosophical life, as the conflict between philosophy and politics, and as the resistance to mediation by way of "culture." It is important to notice these different concerns. But it is also crucial to see that they are all part of an inconspicuous larger concern, namely, to secure the possibility of philosophy. The possibility of philosophy had to be negotiated in the force-field of culture, religion, and the political. We may seek to pose the pertinent conflicts differently than Strauss did, but it seems useful to further acquaint oneself with the contexts, problems, and strategies of his philosophical project to see the scope and magnitude of the issues at hand.


In this important new book, Richard Polt takes a fresh approach to Heidegger’s thought during his most politicized period, and works toward a philosophical appropriation of his most valuable ideas. Polt shows how central themes of the 1930s—such as inception, emergency, and the question “Who are we?”—grow from seeds planted in Being and Time and are woven into Heidegger’s political thought. Working with recently published texts, including Heidegger’s BLACK NOTEBOOKS, Polt traces the thinker’s engagement and disengagement from the Nazi movement. He critiques Heidegger for his failure to understand the political realm, but also draws on his ideas to propose a “traumatic ontology” that understands individual and collective existence as identities that are always in question, and always remain exposed to disruptive events. Time and Trauma is a bold attempt to gain philosophical insight from the most problematic and controversial phase of Heidegger’s thought.

Reviews:

Richard Polt’s book is so much more than another academic interpretation of Heidegger; it is an original work of thinking through the disintegrating fabric of our world. A masterful achievement by one of the leading Continental philosophers in the United States! — Michael Marder, Research Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of the Basque Country, Spain

Polt’s reading of Heidegger is a meticulous, original, and admirably nuanced reconstruction and critique of Heidegger’s ill-fated engagement with the political. The question ‘who are we?’ leads Polt to a judicious recovery of the political and toward a ‘traumatic ontology’ that promises to transform the question of being from one of understanding to one of the ‘emergency of being’. — Reginald Lilly, Professor of Philosophy, Skidmore College

In this ambitious and thought-provoking study, Polt undertakes a reassessment of the ethical and political dimensions of Heidegger’s thought, with particular focus on the work of the 1930s. He not only presents a comprehensive and judicious account of Heidegger’s problematic complicity with National Socialism, but seeks to retrieve an Arendtian-inspired understanding of action that would avoid the most problematic excesses of Heidegger’s later thought, an understanding grounded in what he calls a “traumatic ontology”. This book will be essential reading not only for those interested in Heidegger and the political, but for anyone attempting to understand what is at
stake in the turn from his early fundamental ontology to the work of the 1930s and beyond. — William McNeill, Professor of Philosophy, DePaul University

"Polt once defined philosophy as "asking questions beyond the point where questioning usually stops."

This volume lives up to that ideal and then takes it a step further. Like Heidegger himself, Polt intentionally raises more questions than he answers -- which makes the book an invitation to question yet further and to think outside the parameters of received Heideggerian wisdom, including the impressive and laudable wisdom of this volume.

Some readers will feel strongly drawn to the second and third chapters, which provide (1) a devastating critique of Heidegger’s politics under Nazism, including brilliant summaries of six of his courses during the 1930s as well as an astute reading of his "Black Notebooks," and (2) a constructive Arendtian reading of the political, both in light of and against Heidegger. —Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

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How do we become the ones we are? —Martin Heidegger, Martin Buber

For Martin Heidegger, becoming who he was going to be meant undergoing a tumultuous transition after the publication of what he had envisioned as the first half of Being and Time in 1927. That project was never completed. Instead, a series of questions drew the restless Heidegger into a dark new philosophical and political landscape. He experienced a crisis, an emergency, and emerged from it with a new approach to these very themes: emergency, self-transformation, and the question of who one is. This book tries to understand the problems that brought Heidegger into a new phase of his thought, and to think through the concerns that drove him during that period.

To "think through" a thought can mean to analyze it; to get over it and come out on the other side; or to think with its help. I aim to achieve all three: to work out some interpretive issues, to work through certain problems and deficiencies in Heidegger’s thought, and to work on my own philosophical ideas while drawing on the more promising aspects of his thought.

My focus is the period that begins with the so-called turn after Being and Time and includes his much discussed and lamented entanglement with National Socialism. For convenience, we can refer to this phase as "the thirties." But how should we delimit it philosophically?

This distinctive and troubled period in Heidegger’s philosophical career is marked by a shift "from the understanding of being to the happening of being". Instead of describing the temporal structures that allow us to understand being, as he intended to do in Being and Time, he now looks to the happening in which we come into our own as those who stand in the truth of being. The emphasis is no longer on our
constitution—human nature, in traditional terms—but on a transformative event that seizes us and thrusts us into the condition of "being-there" (Dasein).

Such an event could involve the founding of a new political order—and the thirties are notoriously the decade of Heidegger’s overt political engagement, including his 1933-1934 tenure as Nazi rector of the University of Freiburg. For several years, he is intensely concerned with action, decision, and the awakening of the German Volk. By the end of the decade, however, his view of politics is considerably jaundiced; in the forties he will develop a philosophy of Gelassenheit or "releasement" that lays aside power and will in order to await the gift of being. The thirties, then, are marked by his attempt to leap into a singular, transformative event that would bring Germany into its own.

By late 1929, Heidegger is ready for a metamorphosis: "Now I am finally at the decisive inception, and am ready to turn the deconstruction against myself." We can say, not completely facetiously, that his "thirties" began on a weekday evening in that December. We can pinpoint the moment when he allows himself a fateful step into the political: halfway through his lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, he asks about "our Dasein," "the Dasein in contemporary man." He claims that we are sunk in profound boredom, insulated from distress. This moment is the beginning of a theme that often recurs in the thirties----the idea that his times suffer from "the emergency of the lack of emergency." He has leapt into the divination of a shared situation and into a cultural critique.

This juncture in Heidegger’s lectures is the start of what soon becomes a political-philosophical worldview that gets woven into a metanarrative about Western history. This story becomes increasingly difficult to disentangle from the question of being itself, which Heidegger now approaches "ontohistorically," in terms of the history of beyng (seynsgeschichtlich). "Dasein" is also historicized: it is no longer the human condition in general, but a possible transformation of the human—a new way of relating to all that there is.

It was in 1930, by Heidegger’s own account, that he began to believe that National Socialism could generate a new inception for the West. Before this, he may very well have had political predilections, but they stayed out of his philosophy, which focused on describing what seemed to be universal human conditions.

What provoked this change in Heidegger’s thought and attitudes? One could speculate about his new professional circumstances after the publication of Being and Time: he gained a chair in philosophy and no longer needed to obey academic conventions. One could also point out the panic that so many in Germany and elsewhere were feeling as they beheld what looked like a failed experiment in liberalism and capitalism. (The American stock market began to crash on October 24, 1929.)

But to judge from his journals, known as the BLACK NOTEBOOKS, Heidegger himself might prefer to think of the change in his thought in terms of the requirements of philosophy itself as a risky adventure. He writes, at the outset of the thirties, "Only if we actually err go into errancy—can we run up against `truth'. Thinkers must learn "long useless straying"; "the history of philosophy is in itself an erring".

In trying to understand Heidegger’s transition into the thirties, we should not wipe out this element of experimentation and risk. The transition should not be smoothed over in retrospect and turned into a logical extension of his earlier thought. However, we can identify some crucial spurs that urged him to think differently. One is the question of the origin of our temporality. Others include the themes of emergency and shared selfhood, which were present in Being and Time but become more urgent.

As for the end of the "thirties," it is more gradual. Heidegger draws back from his political or quasi-political discourse of leaping, deciding, and founding. His enthusiasm for struggle and power cools. During the Second World War, he moves toward a nonwillful letting-be.
Although the transition to Heidegger's "late" thought was incremental, it eventually led to a stark personal and philosophical collapse. After the defeat of Germany and his removal from teaching, he experienced a depressive crisis from which he had to recover in a sanitarium. He had to build a new, humbled way of thinking on the ruins of his former thought, trying to describe "things" in a deliberately simple, unpresumptuous way, as if he were seeing the world anew. Philosophically, the collapse of the "thirties" could be highlighted in two dramatic reversals. In a lecture from 1945, "Poverty," he defines Not (urgent need or emergency) as being forced to focus on what we require for survival, and claims that freedom lies in Not-wendigkeit, turning away from such compulsion. Emergency is no longer a requirement for appropriate existence. The other reversal is a postwar passage in the BLACK NOTEBOOKS that says the "talk of the history of beyng is an embarrassment and a euphemism". With such statements, one can say that the "thirties" have been left behind.

To be sure, Heidegger still understands the West as suffering from a certain crisis that must be understood in terms of its entire history. And short of certain extreme breaks, one does not simply become a new person—or a new philosopher. Several themes and concerns run throughout sixty years of Heidegger's thinking, and a case can be made for a unified interpretation of his trajectory.

Why, then, focus on the thirties?

Although the path from Being and Time to the thirties is tangled and far from obvious, the thirties radicalize certain tendencies in that book. To remain within Heidegger's thought-world of the twenties would be to neglect these more radical implications. In particular, Being and Time's concepts of the moment, ecstasy, existence, and history imply an embrace of the thinker's own historicity that is not fully explicit there. Being and Time claims we must find possibilities to retrieve from our heritage, but it remains at the general level of "existential" ontology, avoiding the particular, "existentiell" question of which possibilities to retrieve. At the same time, any response to this question seems arbitrary in the face of anxiety, which confronts us with the ultimate insignificance of all things and roles, reminding us of our exposure to death. Thus, as Heidegger's students quipped, "I am resolved, only towards what I don't know." In the thirties, however, he makes choices, leaving behind the detached viewpoint of Being and Time and acting as a member of a community at a particular historical juncture. This choice of who to be is, in his view, intrinsically linked to the philosophical act of asking the question of being. Heidegger acts—and in the ensuing turmoil, develops a wealth of intriguing ideas.

Heidegger's choices were, in my view, first deeply wrong (joining the Nazi movement) and then unsatisfactory (withdrawing from all politics). But his failed attempt to act politically at least gives us an occasion for thinking about the political realm as such and reflecting on concrete decisions, which was not possible within the ambit of Being and Time. The thirties represent his attempt to participate in history, radicalizing the thought of historicity and engaging in his times. Maybe, then, this period could be a fertile source for our own practical thought. It is during the few years when he has faith in action that his concepts are potentially most illuminating for our attempts to think and act today. Potentially—but with the constant danger that we will be seduced by the phantoms that tempted him into evil. This is one reason why the thirties must be thought through.

Of course, we should be cautious if we appropriate any ideas from a philosopher who sympathized with Hitler. Just how much of a Nazi and an antisemite was Martin Heidegger? Interpreters differ widely, and often acrimoniously, on whether his Nazism was a passing aberration or a long-term commitment, and whether it was due to a character defect or a philosophical error. As a biographical and psychological question, the issue of his Nazism has legitimate but limited interest. It is easy to find numerous vices in him that he shared with millions who have lent their support to tyrannies, scapegoated minorities, and lied both to others and themselves. But as a question of philosophical interpretation, the issue is more important, as it helps us see the implications and limitations of his ideas.
It was never wholly accurate to describe Heidegger as a convinced Nazi, since from the start he hoped for a questioning more radical than any party slogan. As early as 1934, he begins to view mainstream Nazi ideology as an instance of the domineering and reductive metaphysics of modernity. However, this metaphysical critique is not accompanied by a moral or political one, and he even explicitly dismisses such points of view. In texts such as the Black Notebooks he portrays all modern movements and forces, including the phantasmagoric power of “world Jewry,” as instances of one and the same machinational metaphysics. Modernity’s forgetting of its roots is associated in his discourse with the traditional prejudice against Jews as supposedly nomadic cosmopolitans. Despite his critique of Nazism on the theoretical level, he does not resist it, but submits to it. As we will see, he seems to view Nazism as the ultimate modern destiny, an extremity of willfulness that must be played out to its catastrophic conclusion before a new inception can become possible.

Clearly, then, there is good reason for concern. Heidegger’s ambiguous but close relationship to Nazism is not just a personal failing, but a disturbing knot in his thoughts of the thirties. As we think through those thoughts, can we be certain that our own thought is not being “infected” with Nazism? We cannot. Philosophers never understand themselves completely. However, if Heidegger’s thought in the thirties offers significant questions and insights, we need to think through them—maybe even especially because they are entangled in error and evil. Instead of avoiding a problematic philosopher—and how many great philosophers are unproblematic?—we should take the problems as occasions for better thinking.

What of Heidegger’s late work? As valuable as it often is, I find it politically inadequate. After he is disappointed by his intervention in politics, he retreats from the sphere of the political altogether. He turns ever farther away from concrete struggles, power relations, and emergencies, in order to focus on the remote and epochal happening of being itself, which lies beyond both power and powerlessness. He deemphasizes founding, and patiently awaits a new dispensation that can come only from being. His postwar writings seem to abandon praxis altogether in favor of a pastoral “dwelling” that claims to be the true “ethics” but is essentially contemplative.

In the Contributions to Philosophy (1936-1938) he could endorse a “will to ground and build” and a “will to the event of appropriation”, but in the forties he identifies the “will to will” as the essence of a modern subjectivism that must be set aside. The Country Path Conversations, composed in the final phase of the war, suggest that will itself may be evil. Willfulness springs from a malignancy in being—a blockage and concealment within the very process of presentation. Heidegger can only recommend “pure waiting,” a releasement to the event that releases us into the open. We have already almost reached the famous statement from the Der Spiegel interview of 1966: “Only a god can still save us”. Calculation and action cannot rescue humanity, because the illusion of self-sufficiency is just an effect of the very devastation from which we need to be rescued.

There are various difficulties in this project of setting aside the will. First, Heidegger has to assume that a certain free will is crucial to the human condition: even if oblivion has come upon us, we have some freedom either to resist it or to let ourselves fall all too far into it. (As Plato puts it, we all have to drink from the river of Carelessness on the plain of Lethe, but some of us drink a little deeper than we have to: Republic 621a.) Secondly, Heidegger’s attempt to understand evil is unsatisfactory. He holds that evil will is essentially the manipulative approach to beings that is typical of modern technology; this approach embodies a “devastation” that has been “sent” to us as our destiny and that stems from the self-occlusion of being.” But as Bret Davis points out, the deepest evil is not the technological “faceless defacing” that perceives everything as an object and ignores the face of the other; profound evil is “face-to-face defacement.” The sadist knows that the other is there, and willingly treats her as if she were an object in order to enjoy her horror at her own objectification. Sadism is not a misunderstanding, but deliberate and knowing abuse. This fact is the downfall of all theorists who identify evil with ignorance or oblivion. This line
of thought also suggests that will, including the possibility of evil will, is not just a phase in Western history; it is an essential dimension of the human condition.

If we want to think about ethics and politics, then, Heidegger's late period is likely to leave us dissatisfied—not to mention that his evasive way of dealing with his own past and the Nazis' crimes leaves a great deal to be desired. He may escape from Plato's cave, but he never comes back down to develop appropriate judgments about particular human relations. Retrieving ethics and politics after Heidegger means resisting the detachment that characterizes his later thought and drawing selectively on his thoughts of the thirties to develop better concepts of decision, will, and initiative. Action must be recovered as a central topic of post-Heideggerian philosophy.

Despite Heidegger's misguided choices and his failure to appreciate particular situations, his writings offer many opportunities to reflect on the deeper ground of ethics and action. After Heidegger, it is harder to place our confidence in conceptions of action as pure self-determination, or will as autonomous choice. One lesson to be learned from his late thought is that we always remain indebted to a disclosure that we did not make, that we cannot harness, and that calls for our response but cannot be exhausted by this response. The most responsible action will always involve a certain responsiveness to what Heidegger in the thirties calls das Ereignis, "the appropriating event."

As I have argued in my study of the Contributions, the greatest promise of the thought of Ereignis lies in its possible application to concrete phenomena: we must each discover the appropriating events of emergency in our own lives and communities.” Here I pursue this idea. Although Heidegger focuses on the rare emergency that would found a world and an era, we can apply some of his thoughts to the smaller shocks and reversals that are frequent elements of our individual and collective lives—developing a "traumatic ontology" of human beings and their understanding of being. I also attempt to retrieve politics with the help of Hannah Arendt's concept of action as an event that both discloses and develops the actor, initiating unpredictable relationships. The political realm can be a seedbed for such events—for the emergence of selves in emergencies large and small.

The challenge is not just to interpret Heidegger, but to think and act today. The twenty-first century is witnessing a disturbing resurgence of neofascist movements, complete with an intelligentsia that draws on right-wing theorists of the past, including Heidegger. To denounce these developments in the name of morality and liberal democracy is correct and necessary, in my view, but this is no answer to the ideas of those who reject these standpoints. A more adequate and philosophical response goes through Heidegger to grasp the theoretical inadequacies of his stances toward politics, and to show that his best insights of the thirties can be appropriated in support of a pluralistic and free society.

Chapters 1 and 2 of this book are primarily interpretive, chapter 3 is critical, and chapter 4 is constructive.

Chapter 1 sheds light on some motivations for Heidegger's shift after Being and Time. No longer content with describing human temporality as the horizon for our understanding of being, he pursues the possibility that our temporality itself originates in a crucial moment. This time when time arises is bound up with the experience of emergency and the question of who we are.

Chapter 2 examines seminars, lecture courses, journals, and other manuscripts in which Heidegger attempts to work out fundamental political questions in light of his new philosophical orientation. These texts reflect both his initial support for Nazism and his later critiques of it, as the decade of the thirties sees him leap into the event of revolution and then pass through the political into the mysterious "event" of being itself. I consider his conceptions of political founding, the role of silence in his political thought, and his analysis of the metaphysics of struggle and power that is reflected in Nazi ideology.
The chapter ends with a close look at the Black Notebooks, which illustrate his ambiguous relationship to Nazism and other contemporary phenomena.

Chapter 3 unfolds a philosophical critique of Heidegger’s political thought, drawing on Arendt’s views on action and plurality. At stake here are not only his temporary enthusiasm for National Socialism and his antisemitic tendencies, but his permanent antiliberalism and his failure to appreciate political realities. Again, his attitudes richly deserve moral condemnation, but I focus on theoretically retrieving politics as a sphere of action.

Chapter 4 draws on Heidegger’s thought of the thirties to sketch a temporal ontology along the lines of what might have been included in Being and Time, Part One, Division III, and then to supplement it with a traumatic ontology—an attempt to understand human beings and our relation to being itself that hinges on transformative encounters with what exceeds established sense.

The appendix, "Propositions on Emergency," lays out the fundamentals of traumatic ontology in the style of Spinoza’s Ethics. This text is an experiment in thinking deductively about the issues at stake and testing the consistency of a possible system of traumatic ontology. Such an "axiomatics of being-there" is very un-Heideggerian, and deliberately so: it is meant to draw us out of Heidegger’s ambit and explore whether ideas with Heideggerian roots can survive in a different philosophical atmosphere. But since the very spirit of traumatic ontology resists systematization and conceptual fixation, the text is written with tongue partly in cheek; it ends (with a nod to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus) by demonstrating the inadequacy of all systems of propositions. <>

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Bibliography

**Hiding in Plain Sight: The Invention of Donald Trump and the Erosion of America** by Sarah Kendzior [Flatiron Books, 9781250210715]

**Editorial Appraisal:**
When I read the Introduction to this this bestseller I cried with a sickening sense of sorrow, anger, and bone-deep sadness. The America I love is more seriously imperiled than I am by covid-19. Until I read this brief but empowering paean to self-knowledge and freedom of conscience. Do not be bullied into apathy. Remember your own strength and ability to love what is right and true.

*New York Times* bestselling author Sarah Kendzior documents the truth about the calculated rise to power of Donald Trump since the 1980s and how the erosion of our liberties made an American demagogue possible.

The story of Donald Trump’s rise to power is the story of a buried American history – buried because people in power liked it that way. It was visible without being seen, influential without being named, ubiquitous without being overt. <>

**The End of October: A Novel** by Lawrence Wright [Knopf, 9780525658658]
“An eerily prescient novel about a devastating virus that begins in Asia before going global . . . A page-turner that has the earmarks of an instant bestseller.” —New York Post

“Featuring accounts of past plagues and pandemics, descriptions of pathogens and how they work, and dark notes about global warming, the book produces deep shudders . . . A disturbing, eerily timed novel.” —Kirkus Reviews

“A compelling read up to the last sentence. Wright has come up with a story worthy of Michael Crichton. In an eerily calm, matter-of-fact way, and backed by meticulous research, he imagines what the world would actually be like in the grip of a devastating new virus.” —Richard Preston, author of The Hot Zone

“This timely literary page-turner shows Wright is on a par with the best writers in the genre.” —Publishers Weekly (starred review)

In this riveting medical thriller—from the Pulitzer Prize winner and best-selling author—Dr. Henry Parsons, an unlikely but appealing hero, races to find the origins and cure of a mysterious new killer virus as it brings the world to its knees.

At an internment camp in Indonesia, forty-seven people are pronounced dead with acute hemorrhagic fever. When Henry Parsons—microbiologist, epidemiologist—travels there on behalf of the World Health Organization to investigate, what he finds will soon have staggering repercussions across the globe: an infected man is on his way to join the millions of worshippers in the annual Hajj to Mecca. Now, Henry joins forces with a Saudi prince and doctor in an attempt to quarantine the entire host of pilgrims in the holy city . . . A Russian émigré, a woman who has risen to deputy director of U.S. Homeland Security, scrambles to mount a response to what may be an act of biowarfare . . . Already-fraying global relations begin to snap, one by one, in the face of a pandemic . . . Henry’s wife, Jill, and their children face diminishing odds of survival in Atlanta . . . And the disease slashes across the United States, dismantling institutions—scientific, religious, governmental—and decimating the population. As packed with suspense as it is with the fascinating history of viral diseases, Lawrence Wright has given us a full-tilt, electrifying, one-of-a-kind thriller.


Breaking through Schizophrenia builds on the ideas of Jacques Lacan who argued that schizophrenia is a deficient relationship to language, in particular the difficulty to master the metaphoric dimension of language, which children acquire by the Oedipal restructuring of the psyche. This book is thus a countercultural move to present a less damaging view and a more efficient treatment method for schizophrenic persons. Through a collection of published and unpublished articles, Ver Eecke traces the path of Lacanian thought. He discusses the importance of language for the development of human beings and examines the effectiveness of talk therapy through case studies with schizophrenic persons.

Krishnamurti in America: New Perspectives on the Man and his Message by David Edmund Moody [David E Moody, 9781734227819]

For more than fifty years, J. Krishnamurti gave public talks to audiences around the world in which he expressed a revolutionary new understanding of consciousness, daily life, and the human condition. Krishnamurti in America is the first biography to tell the complete story of his life in the United States, and it presents a new perspective on his life and his teaching. It is a story of love and betrayal, lawsuits and enlightenment, passion and transcendence. <>

C. G. Jung and the Dead: Visions, Active Imagination and the Unconscious Terrain by Stephani L. Stephens [Routledge, 9780815366126]

C. G. Jung and the Dead: Visions, Active Imagination and the Unconscious Terrain offers an in-depth look at Jung’s encounters with the dead, moving beyond a symbolic understanding to consider these figures a literal presence
in the psyche. Stephani L. Stephens explores Jung’s personal experiences, demonstrating his skill at visioning in all its forms as well as detailing the nature of the dead.

This unique study is the first to follow the narrative thread of the dead from Memories, Dreams, Reflections into The Red Book, assessing Jung’s thoughts on their presence, his obligations to them, and their role in his psychological model. It offers the opportunity to examine this previously neglected theme unfolding during Jung’s period of intense confrontation with the unconscious, and to understand active imagination as Jung’s principle method of managing that unconscious content. As well as detailed analysis of Jung’s own work, the book includes a timeline of key events and case material. <>

**The Reality Game: How the Next Wave of Technology Will Break the Truth** by Samuel Woolley [PublicAffairs, 9781541768253]

Fake news posts and Twitter trolls were just the beginning. What will happen when misinformation moves from our social media feeds into our everyday lives?

Online disinformation stormed our political process in 2016 and has only worsened since. Yet as Samuel Woolley shows in this urgent book, it may pale in comparison to what’s to come: humanlike automated voice systems, machine learning, “deepfake” AI-edited videos and images, interactive memes, virtual reality, and more. These technologies have the power not just to manipulate our politics, but to make us doubt our eyes and ears and even feelings.

Deeply researched and compellingly written, **The Reality Game** describes the profound impact these technologies will have on our lives. Each new invention built without regard for its consequences edges us further into this digital dystopia. <>

**The Cost of Loyalty: Dishonesty, Hubris, and Failure in the US. Military** by Tim Bakken [Bloomsbury Publishing, 9781632868985]

A courageous and damning look at the destruction wrought by the arrogance, incompetence, and duplicity prevalent in the U.S. military—from the inside perspective of a West Point professor of law.

Veneration for the military is a deeply embedded but fatal flaw in America’s collective identity. In twenty years at West Point, whistleblower Tim Bakken has come to understand how unquestioned faith isolates the U.S. armed forces from civil society and leads to catastrophe. Pervaded by chronic deceit, the military’s insular culture elevates blind loyalty above all other values. The consequences are undeniably grim: failure in every war since World War II, millions of lives lost around the globe, and trillions of dollars wasted.

Bakken makes the case that the culture he has observed at West Point influences whether America starts wars and how it prosecutes them. Despite fabricated admissions data, rampant cheating, epidemics of sexual assault, archaic curriculums, and shoddy teaching, the military academies produce officers who maintain their privileges at any cost to the nation. Any dissenter is crushed. Bakken revisits all the major wars the United States has fought, from Korea to the current debacles in the Middle East, to show how the military culture produces one failure after another. <>

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Deeply researched and compellingly written, *The Reality Game* describes the profound impact these technologies will have on our lives. Each new invention built without regard for its consequences edges us further into this digital dystopia. <>


“The gripping story of the most important environmental law case ever decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. Richard Lazarus’s compelling narrative is enlivened by colorful characters, a canny dissection of courtroom strategy, and a case where the stakes are, literally, as big as the world.”
—Scott Turow, author of *Presumed Innocent*

“There’s no better book if you want to understand the past, present, and future of environmental litigation.”
—Elizabeth Kolbert, author of *The Sixth Extinction*

The gripping inside story of how an unlikely team of lawyers and climate activists overcame conservative opposition—and their own divisions—to win the most important environmental case ever brought before the Supreme Court.

When the Supreme Court announced its ruling in *Massachusetts v. EPA*, the decision was immediately hailed as a landmark. But this was the farthest thing from anyone’s mind when Joe Mendelson, an idealistic lawyer working on a shoestring budget for an environmental organization no one had heard of, decided to press his quixotic case.

In October 1999, Mendelson hand-delivered a petition to the Environmental Protection Agency asking it to restrict greenhouse gas emissions from new cars. The Clean Air Act had authorized the EPA to regulate “any air pollutant” that could reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health. But could something as ordinary as carbon dioxide really be considered a harmful pollutant? And even if the EPA had the authority to regulate emissions, could it be forced to do so? <>


For readers of *Democracy in Chains* and *Dark Money*, a revelatory investigation of the Religious Right’s rise to political power.

For too long the Religious Right has masqueraded as a social movement preoccupied with a number of cultural issues, such as abortion and same-sex marriage. In her deeply reported investigation, Katherine Stewart reveals a disturbing truth: this is a political movement that seeks to gain power and to impose its vision on all of society. America’s religious nationalists aren’t just fighting a culture war, they are waging a political war on the norms and institutions of American democracy.

Stewart pulls back the curtain on the inner workings and leading personalities of a movement that has turned religion into a tool for domination. She exposes a dense network of think tanks, advocacy groups, and pastoral organizations embedded in a rapidly expanding community of international alliances and united not by any central command but by a shared, anti-democratic vision and a common will to power. She follows the money that fuels this movement, tracing much of it to a cadre of super-wealthy, ultraconservative donors and family foundations. She shows that today’s Christian nationalism is the fruit of a longstanding antidemocratic, reactionary strain of American thought that draws on some of the most troubling episodes in America’s past. It forms common cause with a globe-spanning movement that seeks to destroy liberal democracy and replace it with nationalist, theocratic and autocratic forms of government around the world. Religious nationalism is far more organized and better funded than most people realize. It seeks to control all aspects of government and society. Its successes have been stunning, and its influence now extends to every aspect of American life, from the White House to state capitols, from our schools to our hospitals. <>
Broken Faith: Inside the Word of Faith Fellowship, One of America’s Most Dangerous Cults by Mitch Weiss and Holbrook Mohr [Hanover Square Press, 9781335145239]

A PopSugar Best True Crime Book of 2020

“I can’t imagine a more important book.”—Jeff Guinn, New York Times bestselling author

An explosive investigation into Word of Faith Fellowship, a secretive evangelical cult whose charismatic female leader is a master of manipulation

In 1979, a fiery preacher named Jane Whaley attracted a small group of followers with a promise that she could turn their lives around.

In the years since, Whaley’s following has expanded to include thousands of congregants across three continents. In their eyes she’s a prophet. And to disobey her means eternal damnation.

The control Whaley exerts is absolute: she decides what her followers study, where they work, whom they can marry—even when they can have sex.

Based on hundreds of interviews, secretly recorded conversations, and thousands of pages of documents, Pulitzer Prize winner Mitch Weiss and Holbrook Mohr’s Broken Faith is a terrifying portrait of life inside the Word of Faith Fellowship, and the harrowing account of one family who escaped after two decades.

Daniel Johnston: A Portrait of the Artist as a Potter in North Carolina by Henry Glassie, Photography and Drawings by the Author [Indiana University Press, 9780253048431]

Daniel Johnston, raised on a farm in Randolph County, returned from Thailand with a new way to make monumental pots. Back home in North Carolina, he built a log shop and a whale of a kiln for wood-firing. Then he set out to create beautiful pots, grand in scale, graceful in form, and burned bright in a blend of ash and salt. With mastery achieved and apprentices to teach, Daniel Johnston turned his brain to massive installations.

Recollections of My Nonexistence: A Memoir by Rebecca Solnit [Viking, 9780593083338]

“At the same time that [Solnit] describes her forays into her past, she invites us to connect pieces of her story to our own, as a measure of how far we’ve come and how far we have left to go.” —Jenny Odell, The New York Times Book Review

An electric portrait of the artist as a young woman that asks how a writer finds her voice in a society that prefers women to be silent

In Recollections of My Nonexistence, Rebecca Solnit describes her formation as a writer and as a feminist in 1980s San Francisco, in an atmosphere of gender violence on the street and throughout society and the exclusion of women from cultural arenas. She tells of being poor, hopeful, and adrift in the city that became her great teacher, and of the small apartment that, when she was nineteen, became the home in which she transformed herself. She explores the forces that liberated her as a person and as a writer--books themselves; the gay community that presented a new model of what else gender, family, and joy could mean; and her eventual arrival in the spacious landscapes and overlooked conflicts of the American West.

Surrealism, Occultism and Politics: In Search of the Marvellous edited by Tessei M. Bauduin, Victoria Ferentinou, and Daniel Zamani [Studies in Surrealism, Routledge, 9781138054332]

This volume examines the relationship between occultism and Surrealism, specifically exploring the reception and appropriation of occult thought, motifs, tropes and techniques by Surrealist artists and writers in Europe and the Americas, from the 1920s through the 1960s. Its central focus is the specific use of occultism as a site of political and social resistance, ideological contestation, subversion and revolution. Additional focus is placed on the ways occultism was implicated in Surrealist discourses on identity, gender, sexuality, utopianism and radicalism.
The Death of Sitting Bear: New and Selected Poems by N. Scott Momaday [Harper, 9780062961150]

Pulitzer Prize winner and celebrated American master N. Scott Momaday returns with a radiant collection of more than 200 new and selected poems rooted in Native American tradition.

“The poems in this book reflect my deep respect for and appreciation of words. . . . I believe that poetry is the highest form of verbal expression. Although I have written in other forms, I find that poems are what I want and need most to read and write. They give life to my mind.”

One of the most important and unique voices in American letters, distinguished poet, novelist, artist, teacher, and storyteller N. Scott Momaday was born into the Kiowa tribe and grew up on Indian reservations in the Southwest. The customs and traditions that influenced his upbringing—most notably the Native American oral tradition—are the centerpiece of his work.


Homeland, Exile, Imagined Homelands are features of the modern experience and relate to the cultural and historical dilemmas of loss, nostalgia, utopia, travel, longing, and are central for Jews and others.

This book is an exploration into a world of boundary crossings and of desired places and alternate identities, into a world of adopted kin and invented allegiances.

The Jewish God Question: What Jewish Thinkers Have Said about God, the Book, the People, and the Land by Andrew Pessin [Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 9781538110980]

Concise winnowing to the gist style of a broad swath of Jewish thinkers from Philo to Lebens

The Jewish God Question explores what a diverse array of Jewish thinkers have said about the interrelated questions of God, the Book, the Jewish people, and the Land of Israel. Exploring topics such as the existence of God, God’s relationship to the world and to history, how to read the Bible, Jewish mysticism, the evolution of Judaism, and more, Andrew Pessin makes key insights from the Jewish philosophical tradition accessible and engaging. Short chapters share fascinating insights from ancient times to today, from Philo to Judith Plaskow. The book emphasizes the more unusual or intriguing ideas and arguments, as well as the most influential. The Jewish God Question is an exciting and useful book for readers wrestling with some very big questions.

Leo Strauss and the Theopolitics of Culture by Philipp von Wussow [SUNY in the Thought and Legacy of Leo Strauss, SUNY, 9781438478395]

This archive-based study of the philosophy of Leo Strauss provides in-depth interpretations of key texts and their larger theoretical contexts.

In this book, Philipp von Wussow argues that the philosophical project of Leo Strauss must be located in the intersection of culture, religion, and the political. Based on archival research on the philosophy of Strauss, von Wussow provides in-depth interpretations of key texts and their larger theoretical contexts. Presenting the necessary background in German-Jewish philosophy of the interwar period, von Wussow then offers detailed accounts and comprehensive interpretations of Strauss’s early masterwork, Philosophy and Law, his wartime lecture “German Nihilism,” the sources and the scope of Strauss’s critique of modern “relativism,” and a close commentary on the late text “Jerusalem and Athens.” With its rare blend of close reading and larger perspectives, this book is valuable for students of political philosophy, continental thought, and twentieth-century Jewish philosophy alike. It is indispensable as a guide to Strauss’s philosophical project, as well as to some of the most intricate details of his writings.

In this important new book, Richard Polt takes a fresh approach to Heidegger’s thought during his most politicized period, and works toward a philosophical appropriation of his most valuable ideas. Polt shows how central themes of the 1930s—such as inception, emergency, and the question “Who are we?”—grow from seeds planted in Being and Time and are woven into Heidegger’s political thought. Working with recently published texts, including Heidegger’s Black Notebooks, Polt traces the thinker’s engagement and disengagement from the Nazi movement. He critiques Heidegger for his failure to understand the political realm, but also draws on his ideas to propose a “traumatic ontology” that understands individual and collective existence as identities that are always in question, and always remain exposed to disruptive events. Time and Trauma is a bold attempt to gain philosophical insight from the most problematic and controversial phase of Heidegger’s thought. <>