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Wordtrade Reviews: Re-Making the Heart of Empire

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Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

REDISCOVERING THE ISLAMIC CLASSICS: HOW EDITORS AND PRINT CULTURE TRANSFORMED AN INTELLECTUAL TRADITION by Ahmed El Shamsy [Princeton University Press, 9780691174563]

The story of how Arab editors of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries revolutionized Islamic literature

Islamic book culture dates back to late antiquity, when Muslim scholars began to write down their doctrines on parchment, papyrus, and paper and then to compose increasingly elaborate analyses of, and commentaries on, these ideas. Movable type was adopted in the Middle East only in the early nineteenth century, and it wasn't until the second half of the century that the first works of classical Islamic religious scholarship were printed there. But from that moment on, Ahmed El Shamsy reveals, the technology of print transformed Islamic scholarship and Arabic literature.

In the first wide-ranging account of the effects of print and the publishing industry on Islamic scholarship, El Shamsy tells the fascinating story of how a small group of editors and intellectuals brought forgotten works of Islamic literature into print and defined what became the classical canon of Islamic thought. Through the lens of the literary culture of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Arab cities—especially Cairo, a hot spot of the nascent publishing business—he explores the contributions of these individuals, who included some of the most important thinkers of the time. Through their efforts to find and publish classical literature, El Shamsy shows, many nearly lost works were recovered, disseminated, and harnessed for agendas of linguistic, ethical, and religious reform.

Bringing to light the agents and events of the Islamic print revolution, **REDISCOVERING THE ISLAMIC CLASSICS** is an absorbing examination of the central role printing and its advocates played in the intellectual history of the modern Arab world.

It was the late summer of my second year in graduate school, and my train was speeding away from the urban moloch of Cairo toward Alexandria on the Mediterranean coast, cutting through the Nile delta, whose lush greenery was sprinkled with the white of the first cotton buds of the season. I was taking

some time off from the neatly printed books of Harvard's Widener Library to explore Arabic manuscripts at the Egyptian National Library in Cairo. After it had closed for the day, I had spent a few hours book shopping around the Azhar mosque, one of the oldest still functioning institutions of learning in the world, and was now on my way back to my temporary home.

I was exhausted and had clearly gotten too much sun, but I was making an effort to review the notes I had taken that day. My haphazard stabs at the National Library's large manuscript collection, at the time housed in a dingy concrete block in Cairo's Bulaq district, had yielded a surprising find: a work on Islamic law, written 1,200 years earlier by an Egyptian named Abu Ya`qūb al-Buwaytī, which recent academic publications had declared extinct. Sitting at the microfilm reader that morning (the library did not allow access to the manuscript itself) and realizing what I was looking at, I had scrolled frantically through the text, scribbling notes as I went. The work appeared to be a complete treatment of the principal areas of Islamic law, and it included a methodological discussion on how to read and interpret scripture—one of the oldest such discussions to be found. I had immediately requested a copy of the manuscript, but this would not be ready until the following week, so for now all I had were my hastily jotted notes. The last thing I had written in my notebook was the name of the copyist—a certain 'Abd al-Ra'ūf from Kazan, the Tartar Muslim city on the Volga River—and the year in which the manuscript had been copied: 1325. That year fell in the Mamluk period, when Egypt and Syria were the intellectual centers of the Muslim world. But revisiting my notes, I frowned: why had I written only 1325, without its Hijri counterpart? The Islamic Hijri calendar is more than six centuries behind the Gregorian calendar, though the gap shrinks by about eleven days each year, as the Hijri calendar tracks lunar rather than solar years.' When I wrote down the date, I reasoned, I must have automatically converted it into its Gregorian equivalent, but why had I not made a note of the original Hijri date also? I was too worn out to ruminate on the matter further that day, but when I awoke the following day with my headache gone, the answer struck me: 1325 was not the Common Era date; it was the Hijri date. This meant that the manuscript of al-Buwayti's book had been copied as recently as in 1907 CE. No wonder I had, in my groggy exhaustion after a long day of work, misread my own notes. Why would a hugely important work have been copied by hand in the twentieth century, even as it remained unknown in the published literature?

Puzzling though the manuscript's provenance was, I had to push it to the back of my mind. My dissertation research focused on the early period of Islam, and it was the content of al-Buwaytī's book, not the textual history of this particular manuscript, that was immediately relevant to my investigation of the genesis of Islamic law. But the twentieth century reasserted itself a year later, when I found a second manuscript copy of the same book in Istanbul's magnificent Süleymaniye Library. This copy had been written in 1228 CE (AH 625), but a short note had later been added to the otherwise empty last page: "I, the poor servant of God `Abd al-Ra'ūf from Kazan, have made a copy of this work on the seventh day of [the month of] Jumada al-Ãkhira, 1325 [July 18, 1907]."2 The Cairo manuscript thus turned out to be a copy of the Istanbul one. Why had a work originally composed in Egypt ended up in Istanbul, and how had its copy found its way back to Cairo? Examining the two manuscripts for further clues, I noticed an ownership seal on the margin of the Cairo copy, carrying the name Ahmad Bey al-Husayni. Some digging revealed that al-Husayni was an Egyptian lawyer who died in 1914; he possessed quite a collection of manuscripts and had evidently traveled to Istanbul in order to procure the text I had stumbled on in Cairo.

I was intrigued by this individual I had never heard of whose hunt for written treasure had yielded such a find in my own quest. Once I returned to Egypt for further archival work connected to my dissertation project, I looked for more information about al-Husayni and unexpectedly came across his name in the card catalog of the Egyptian National Library as the author of a twenty-four-volume manuscript book with the cryptic title Murshid al-anām li-birr umm al-imam, "The people's guide to respecting the imam's mother." Curious, I asked to see the work's first volume. I spent the rest of the day reading al-Husaynī's extensive introduction, and by the evening I knew that I would one day write the book that you are holding now.

When we think of the classics of Islamic thought today, we think in the first instance of works written by the founders of the various schools of theology, philosophy, linguistics, Sufism, and historiography and by subsequent scholars who shaped these fields through their seminal contributions. The 'sles of the bookshops around al-Azhar that I browsed for hours during my visits to Cairo could be relied on to contain, for example, Sibawayh's eighth-century grammar, al-Ash`arī's tenth-century survey of Islamic theology, al-Tabarī's voluminous ninth-century exegesis of the ran, al-Makkī's tenth-century Sufi manual, al-Shāfi`ī's ninth-century legal treatise, and Ibn Khaldūn's fourteenth-century sociology of history, usually in multiple editions and copies. These same classics formed the basis of the foundational works of Orientalist scholarship that I pored over in preparation for my qualifying exams at Harvard, and they are the same works I now teach in my classes as the "great books" of the Muslim world.

But this landscape of relatively established classics was not what al-Husayni faced at the turn of the twentieth century. Far from ubiquitous, these works were scarce and difficult if not impossible to find; not only had most not yet been edited and printed, but there were few manuscript copies of them, and the whereabouts of those few that existed were often unknown. Instead, the literature that was available and abundant consisted of a very different pool of writings: dense, technical commentaries on earlier works, typically written centuries after the original works' composition. It was this state of affairs that drove al-Husayni to embark on the grand quest that he describes in the introduction to his massive book. Deeply dissatisfied with what he saw as the narrow horizons of Islamic scholarship in his time, he had set out to gather the largely forgotten foundational early works of the Shāfi`ī school of law, to which he adhered, laboriously hunting down manuscript fragments across the Middle East, and then sought to reintroduce them to his contemporaries in the form of an exhaustive synthetic commentary on al-Shāfi`ī's magnum opus, al-Umm (The mother[book]). In addition to producing this commentary, which brought together and summarized countless key works of earlier Shāfi`ī scholarship, al-Husayni arranged and financed the publication of the Umm itself; the seven-volume book appeared in print between 1903 and 1908, much earlier, thanks to al-Husayni, than the foundational legal works of most other schools.' Given its rich information on contemporary juristic trends and debates, the Umm subsequently became the lens through which Western scholars of Islamic law, such as Joseph Schacht, perceived the early history of their subject.

Al-Husaynī's account changed the way in which I viewed the "classics" on which my work—like that of other scholars of premodern Islam—was largely based. I realized that I had been wrong to assume that the printed classical literature, whose many known gaps were gradually being filled as new editions were completed and published, naturally reflected the essence of the Islamic intellectual tradition. To me as to Schacht, familiarity with al-Shāfi`ī's Umm had seemed indispensable to any serious study of Islamic law; but al-Husaynī's description of scholarship in his time made it clear that just a century or two ago, even

Shāfi`ī jurists saw absolutely no need to have read al-Shāfi`ī's own words in order to be considered leading experts in their field. The fact that books that had been so thoroughly marginalized and ignored had, in such a short time, attained the status of classics clearly owed much to their availability in printed form, but as al-Husayni's travails demonstrated, their printing was by no means inevitable: in the case of many of these long-forgotten works, the publication of a reasonably complete and accurate text constituted a major achievement that had required the marshaling of an array of philological, organizational, and financial resources, all underpinned by considerable time and commitment. But commitment by whom, and for what purpose?

These are the questions that this book seeks to answer. My aim is to sketch the transformation of the Arabo-Islamic intellectual tradition that accompanied the adoption of printing in the Middle East, and to bring to light the stories of the hitherto mostly invisible individuals who effected this transformation. They collected books, resurrecting forgotten works, ideas, and aesthetics that they felt could contribute to the revival of Islamic and Arabic culture; they inaugurated institutions dedicated to the preservation and dissemination of their discoveries; and they developed practices and systems of editing and publication that led to a wave of printed editions of classical works from the late nineteenth century onward. Their motivations, goals, and approaches were diverse. Some sought to reinvigorate the established scholarly tradition, others to undermine it. Some emphasized the socially relevant messages conveyed in rediscovered older works, while others focused on their aesthetically superior form. Some consciously adapted the Orientalist tradition of editing and scholarship, whereas others sought to excavate an indigenous Arabic philology to counterbalance Orientalism and its claims to privileged expertise. All had to contend with the formidable challenges posed by centuries of cultural neglect of the classical literature: locating and obtaining manuscripts in the absence of catalogs, piecing together complete works out of scattered fragments, deciphering texts in spite of errors and damage, and understanding their meaning without recourse to adequate reference material. Their painstaking, frequently solitary, and often innovative efforts opened up the narrow postclassical manuscript tradition into a broad literature of printed, primarily classical works—the literature that we today consider the essential canon of Islamic texts.

This renaissance of classical literature by means of print was part of a broader constellation of sociocultural changes that has often been referred to as the nanda, "awakening." Although there is no agreed-on definition of this phenomenon, developments that are typically placed under its umbrella include the large-scale translation of European works into Arabic, the adoption of European genres of literature, and engagement with the modern natural and social sciences.' An interest in the classical past appears less often among the features of the nanda, although Western observers contemporaneous to it pointed out the connection. But as this book shows, the resurrection of the classical heritage, particularly in the form of published editions of classical texts, was an integral facet of the activities of many key nanda figures? They were not, as is often assumed, rejecting the ArabоIslamic intellectual tradition wholesale in favor of an imported modernity. Instead, they drew on the classical tradition in order to undermine the post-classical one, which they decried as restrictive and ossified, and in order to reconstruct a classical literature that could serve as the foundation of an indigeneous modernity.

My focus on the individual agents of this cultural transformation reflects my conviction that the technology of print was not a cause of the transformation as much as it was a site and a means of it. Influential studies of the history of print in the West, published between the 1960s and the 1980s,

portrayed an inherent logic that connected the adoption of printing to subsequent sociocultural changes. It is undeniably true that a manuscript culture differs in many respects from a written culture perpetuated through mechanical reproduction. But I reject the deterministic hypothesis that grants technology the power to override individual agency and to move societies along a fixed, inevitable trajectory—especially when the hypothesis rests on the blanket generalization of a particular (in this case Western) historical experience. Instead, this book tells the stories of the people who harnessed the multidirectional potential of print to further their diverse agendas, and it describes how the printing of rediscovered classical works, together with a host of related phenomena, such as the reassertion of classical Arabic and the foundation of modern libraries, permanently transformed the landscape of Islamic thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

* * *

The narrative of this book opens in the early nineteenth century, when Arabo-Islamic book culture was still carried overwhelmingly in manuscript form, its practices of teaching, copying, and transmission perpetuating a continuous written discourse that was, by then, well more than a millennium old. But the literature that was taught, transmitted, and circulated at this time represented only a fraction of the extant Arabic literary corpus: early and classical works had been marginalized and often forgotten, and many clung to existence in rare, dispersed copies or fragments. In chapter 1, I outline the key factors that constrained the availability of such books—namely, the dramatic decline of traditional libraries and the voracious appetites and deep pockets of European collectors of Arabic books. Meanwhile, chapter 2 examines the reasons for the dearth of indigenous interest in these works: the dominant scholasticism of postclassical academic discourse preferred late commentary works over their classical predecessors, and the growing influence of Sufi esotericism undermined the authority of book-based learning altogether.

The adoption of printing to reproduce Arabic and Islamic literature changed the literary landscape. Not only could copies of books now be made available in much larger quantities than when each had to be copied by hand; more importantly, access to the presses was open to anyone who wished to publish a particular text and could come up with the money to have it printed. Chapter 3 describes the birth of the Arabic printing industry and the new opportunities that it created for the propagation of established as well as novel ideas and works, and chapter 4 uncovers the emerging constituency of elite bibliophiles such as `Abd al-Hamīd Nāfi` and Ahmad Taymūr whose enthusiasm for classical literature, supported by social capital and access to financial resources, drove the rediscovery of long-lost classical works. As the movement to publish classical texts gained momentum, the challenges of reconstituting fragmentary and corrupted texts gave rise to the new cultural function of the editor, inaugurated by Ahmad Zaki and described in chapter 5.

The technology of printing appealed to reformers of various stripes, who recognized its potential for promoting social and religious change. Chapter 6 discusses the editing and publishing activities of Tāhir al Jazã'irī and Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom believed in the power of eloquent language and the importance of ethical literature in the project of public edification. In chapter 7, I introduce other, less well-known reformist scholars, such as Jamal al-Din al-Qāsimi and Mahmūd Shukri al-Alusi, who formed a transnational network of like-minded individuals dedicated to rescuing classical texts from oblivion. Their choice of works to publish reflected their goal of challenging the postclassical scholarly orthodoxy

on both methodological and substantive grounds. Their emphasis on the objective representation and evaluation of positions on their own merits found an echo in the developing discourse of textual criticism, discussed in chapter 8, within which philologists such as Muhammad Shakir and Ahmad Shākir grappled with issues of truth and authenticity and confronted the complex legacy of Orientalist scholarship in the shadow of European political and economic dominance.

Finally, a word on terminology and the limitations of the book's scope. I have striven to minimize the use of labels, and the few labels that I do use should be considered descriptive rather than evaluative. Accordingly, a "reformist" is simply someone who seeks to reform something, not necessarily along progressive lines; "scholasticism" is not intended (as it is sometimes used) as a term of abuse but simply as a descriptor of a specific mode of scholarship; and "postclassical" thought is so called because its central feature was its sidelining of the classical textual corpus. Geographically, my investigation of the Arabo-Islamic scholarly tradition and the printing movement has dictated a focus on the heartlands of this tradition where, for many decades, the movement was concentrated—especially Egypt, the Levant, and Iraq—with only marginal attention to regions less influential in the early stages of this movement and almost total disregard for editions and writings in languages other than Arabic. I do not discuss lithography, a technique of reproducing manuscripts mechanically that dominated the Indian, Iranian, and North African printing industries in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, because it represented a continuation of the preprint scribal tradition and lacked the features of moveable-type printing—such as clear script, distinct editors, and substantial print runs—that made the latter so pregnant with possibility. Lastly, the aim of this book is to trace the evolution of the discourses of Islamic scholarship, and I therefore consider nonscholarly religious practices and ideas only insofar they are reflected in the arena of scholarship. <>

ESOTERIC IMAGES: DECODING THE LATE HERAT SCHOOL OF PAINTING by Tawfiq Daʿadli [Jerusalem Studies in Religion and Culture, Brill, Hardback: 9789004398009; E-Book: 9789004398412]

In **ESOTERIC IMAGES: DECODING THE LATE HERAT SCHOOL OF PAINTING** Tawfiq Daʿadli decodes the pictorial language which flourished in the city of Herat, modern Afghanistan, under the rule of the last Timurid ruler, Sultan Husayn Bayqara (r.1469-1506). This study focuses on one illustrated manuscript of a poem entitled Khamsa by the Persian poet Nizami Ganjavi, kept in the British Library under code Or.6810. Tawfiq Daʿadli decodes the paintings, reveals the syntax behind them and thus deciphers the message of the whole manuscript. The book combines scholarly efforts to interpret theological-political lessons embedded in one of the foremost Persian schools of art against the background of the court dynamic of an influential medieval power in its final years.

Excerpt: During the rule of the sultan Ḥusayn Bāyqarā (r. 1469–1506), the elite of the court at Herat (modern Afghanistan) were patrons of the arts of the book, from paper manufacturing and calligraphy to illumination, illustration, and bookbinding.[1] This Late Herat school of painting marks one of the highest moments in Persian painting. Based on previous schools of art, especially the Early Herat school of painting, the artists of the Late School created new compositions and encoded several levels of meaning into their paintings. However, the illustrations contain a paradoxical relation between form and content. Those paintings bear relationship to mystical Persian poetry which is composed of sophisticated verse and includes ambiguous metaphor. The fundamental objective of this book is to analyze the visual language of these illustrated manuscripts in relation to the circumstances in which they were produced.

One of the most celebrated illustrated manuscripts of the *Khamsa* (Quintet) of the Persian poet Niẓāmī Ganjāvī (1135 or 41–1202 or 9) serves as a case study for the whole school. Currently kept in the British Library under code Or.6810, the manuscript reveals the extraordinary quality and revolutionary approach of this school. It was originally created for Amīr ʿAlī Fārsi Barlās, ruler of Samarkand. The history of the manuscript is documented with more than 70 inscriptions and seal impressions dating from 1564/65 to 1782 testifying to its transition from the Timurid to the Mughal. Among its owners in the Mughal court were Akbar, Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Awrangzeb. The manuscript was restored in the Mughal court and some paintings were retouched. The manuscript was acquired by Richard Johnson on 17 December 1782 and purchased by the British Museum on 27 February 1908.[2] The page size of this manuscript is 17 × 24 cm and the poem is written in four columns of 25 lines per page. Interlaced within the text of the poem are one double and 20 single miniatures in the Herat style. The attributions to various artists beneath the lower margins of the miniatures were added later, but the miniatures folios 37v, 135v, 190r, 214r, 225v, and 273r are considered to be the work of Bihzād. One of the paintings (f 284a) is clearly dated 900 AH (1494/95).

The paintings illustrate scenes from the five poems of the *Khamsa*; the *Makhzan al-asrār*, that consists of twenty discourses, each exemplified by a representative story; *Khusrau and Shīrīn*, based on the love story of the Sasanian King Khusrau II Parviz (590–628) and Princess Shīrīn, who seek to be together in the face of significant obstacles; *Laylī and Majnūn*, a rendering of an Arabic legend about two star-crossed lovers—the poet, known as Majnūn, and his uncle's daughter, Laylī; *Haft Paykar*, where the Sasanian King Bahrām Gūr (420–438) becomes a prototype of the ideal king; and the *Iskandar-nāma* in two parts. In this poem, Alexander/Iskandar is the ideal king and reaches prophet status, his physical integrity reflected in royalty, his spiritual integrity in prophecy.

In some cases, the poem presents the story of one protagonist, as in the *Iskandar-nāma*, where the artist chose to illustrate Iskandar's different natures. In other cases, poems depict different episodes,

sometimes unrelated to each other, as in the case of the *Makhzan al-asrār*, where the painter illustrates episodes that tackle moral issues along didactic lines.

While a few of the paintings were based on earlier versions of compositions, the majority were newly created by the Late Herat painters. Those painters, it seems, did not only illustrate the text, but created their own pictorial texts and embedded in them clues to deeper layers of meaning. Some of the clues are only visible in the original paintings. In later retouches, they were brushed over, leaving the illustrations without important symbols and metaphors.

Some research, including a short monograph by Martin and Arnold, and an article by Stchoukine, has been conducted into the illustrations of Or.6810. Paintings from this manuscript are reproduced in books on Islamic art in general, and in those on Persian painting in particular. However, the discussions tend to be about the identity of the painters, rather than about the paintings' meanings. For example, while some of the miniatures have been attributed to the famous painter of the Late Herat school, Kamāl al-dīn Bihzād, only few studies engage with the question of the meaning of illustrations affiliated with this school. For me, the question of attribution or the identity of the painters is secondary to the discussion of the art itself and its significance.

In the early stage of research, the illustrations from the manuscript were examined separately in order to get an understanding of the iconography behind each. During this stage it became obvious that illustrations in *Khamsa* Or.6810 contain details redundant to a straightforward illustration of episodes described in the text of Niẓāmī. My premise is that these additional details point to a parallel narrative with didactic intent.

After dividing the manuscript into individual illustrations, I found that the paintings covered common ground and consequently regrouped them according to theme. The reconstruction of the manuscript unmasked what I see as a general theme and dictated the further choice of scenes. That is to say, most of the scenes illustrated in this manuscript were selected to demonstrate one particular idea—the revelation of Sufi mystical beliefs and concepts. Moreover, the idea of just rule, where the ruler seeks the truth and is humble before the Sufi dervish who encapsulates this truth, is discussed in various chapters and is intrinsic to the idea behind the illustrated manuscript.

As the book focuses on the Herat school of painting under Ḥusayn Bāyqarā, and especially on one illustrated *Khamsa* from this school, an introductory chapter is provided with background material. The introduction first presents a (brief) history of the Timurid dynasty, especially the days of Sultan Ḥusayn Bāyqarā and the cultural conditions that prevailed in Herat under his rule. The second part discusses the poet Niẓāmī Ganjāvī, author of the *Khamsa*.

The meaning of the paintings cannot be understood without decoding the pictorial language of the Late Herat school. The second chapter attempts to decode and reinterpret some paintings from Late Timurid Herat by pointing to a character, here called a focalizor, whose function it is to point out a specific event. By situating focalizors in a central place in the composition, whence eye contact is established between them and the observer or another feature in the painting, the painter attracts the observer to the focalizor himself or to the object of his gaze. The focalizor in the painting becomes the lens through which the observer can "read" the illustration. This reading can, I suggest, be mystical in nature which would be in keeping with the cultural context of Herat under Sultan Ḥusayn Bāyqarā.

Chapters 3 and 4 look at the didactic aspect of several scenes. In several illustrations the Sultan is depicted as the main protagonist who practices justice and helps his subjects, while in other paintings he is depicted as a mystic seeking to reveal the truth. In some of these illustrations, one of the Sultan's sons, perhaps the crown prince, is illustrated as well as the Sultan. Where acts of justice are depicted, the son is seen beside his father; in the mystical illustrations, the son is separated from his father and relegated a lower spiritual status.

Beside the didactic scenes in the Or.6810 *Khamsa*, the painter also illustrates scenes in chapter 5 that emphasize the fleeting nature of the material world. Man should avoid false representation and seek the path to his true destiny, attainable only through divine love. Illustrations of the deaths of mystical lovers combine two aspects—earthly death and the path to salvation. This is not far removed from the moral aspect of the other scenes, as the Sultan who seeks the truth is aware of the transient nature of the material world and the need to escape its temptations.

The sixth chapter offers conclusions regarding the formal building of compositions and the creation of a pictorial language. The discussion in this chapter is largely based on conclusions that emerged after deciphering the narratives of the paintings studied. By this I mean the elements or tools used by painters of the Late Herat school to build the meaning of their compositions. This chapter is followed by a concluding section in which I attempt to bring together the connecting themes in this illustrated manuscript.

While I have arranged the scenes to support my argument, the scenes can of course be regrouped to reflect other lines of enquiry. For example, the two chapters discussing the ancestral line of Sultan Ḥusayn can be merged into one group: scenes depicting the Sultan alone and those where the Sultan and his son are together; or illustrations that depict the Sultan seeking the truth as distinct from those that also depict his acts of justice.

And finally a word about the texts used to support the arguments. Nizami's text was the first source examined to unravel the illustrations' meanings; later came the poems of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Jāmī, the influential poet of late fifteenth-century Herat. Other sources derived from various poems that were popular in Herat in that period.

Since the cultural life of late fifteenth-century Herat was so rich, the proposed reading of its pictorial language—admittedly only a section of it—is but a step in widening the crack in the shutters that might afford us a glimpse into what was once a vibrant civilization. <>

Sainthood and Authority in Early Islam: Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī's Theory of wilāya and the Reenvisioning of the Sunnī Caliphate by Aiyub Palmer [Studies on Sufism, Brill, Hardback: 9789004408302; E-Book: 9789004416550]

In **Sainthood and Authority in Early Islam** Aiyub Palmer recasts wilāya in terms of Islamic authority and traces its development in both political and religious spheres up through the 3rd

and 4th Islamic centuries. This book pivots around the ideas of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, the first Muslim theologian and mystic to write on the topic of wilāya.

By looking at its structural roots in Arab and Islamic social organization, Aiyub Palmer has reframed the discussion about sainthood in early Islam to show how it relates more broadly to other forms of authority in Islam. This book not only looks anew at the influential ideas of al-Tirmidhī but also challenges current modes of thought around the nature of authority in Islamicate societies.

Excerpt: Through this work I have sought to reimagine the way we think about *wilāya* in the early Islamic period, by bringing a new methodological approach, new textual sources to bear, as well as a close reading of al-Tirmidhī's major works. The results have provided significant explanatory potential for numerous social, political and religious movements in early Islam. I did not want to simply write a book about al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī and his ideas. That has already been done by previous authors. My purpose was to reframe the discourse around al-Tirmidhī and his ideas and provide a new and hopefully beneficial approach to the study of Islamic Mysticism that other scholars may be able to reproduce and explore in further detail. After several attempts to apply Weber's paradigm to early Islamic *wilāya*, it became clear that there was a lack of congruence between the theory and the subject matter. Early on, I had tried to apply Foucault's concept of the episteme, and that too produced mediocre results. It was not until I looked for a structure within early Arab/Islamic social and political history that I began to notice the transactional and socially dynamic manner that authority conveyed within Islamicate society. This approach has the possibility of allowing us to rethink not only certain aspects of Islamic Mysticism but also the way Islamic history is understood generally. I have pointed out some of these insights throughout the book.

Instead of looking at al-Tirmidhī's gnoseology through the prism of sainthood, I looked at *wilāya* as it was playing out socially and politically in the two centuries prior to al-Tirmidhī. This required tracing the historical roots of *wilāya* as it grew out of the early Arab/Islamic conquests and the rule of the Rāshidūn caliphs up to and including the first couple of centuries of the ʿAbbāsids. When looking across numerous Islamic movements during the first three centuries of Islam, it is clear that *wilāya* occupied a very different social-semantic universe than sainthood, while overlapping in only a few distinct areas.

If *wilāya* was not the same as sainthood then, based on its various meanings and usages, it must be related to authority or some discourse around the negotiation of power. In fact, we find that *wilāya* speaks to a range of power relations in pre-Islamic and early Arab/Islamic society that coalesce around the solidarity group. It is the solidarity group that is primary in this model rather than the individual. We find social structures connected to the way solidarity groups form and interact at both the political and social levels. The city-based mercantile classes had developed strong ties of dependence with the nomadic Bedouin ethos that surrounded the urban oases.
This *Weltanschauung* proved to imbue early Arab/Islamic social structures with durable patterns that gave precedence to transactional and diffuse types of authority that varied significantly from the more hierarchical agrarianate models often used in Islamic Studies.

This approach to early Islamic history helps us look at the development of Sufism in a different way. It brings into question Melchert's thesis that Sufism developed out of a transition from asceticism to mysticism in the 3rd/9th century. His thesis does not resolve a number of outstanding anomalies that have plagued the study of Islamic Mysticism for decades. For example, why are 'wearers of wool' always characterized differently in the literature than Ṣūfīs? The problem partly lies in the persistence of certain assumptions about Ṣūfīs, such as their being primarily mystics, and their vaulted mystical doctrines being the centerpiece of their efforts. Rather, Chapter 1 shows us that the Ṣūfīs were more concerned with correcting what they saw as negligence and abuse by the caliphal establishment. When the state persecuted them, the Ṣūfīs transformed from being a diffuse subversive movement to following a more stable contractual model founded on the doctrine of al-Junayd. One of the significant points about the Ṣūfīs is that, in doing so, they developed a solidarity group that could absorb other solidarity groups and thus become a type of meta-solidarity group. Al-Tirmidhī developed out of the same Baṣran-based milieu that gave rise to the Ṣūfiyya. Al-Tirmidhī focused on the *wilāya* model of the early *zuhhād* such as Ibrāhīm b. Adham and Fuḍayl b. ʿIyāḍ, who were Traditionists representing a contractual authority structure outside of the nascent *madhāhib*. It is these two types of authority that eventually merge to then be reconstituted in Nīshāpūr in the 11th-century ce.

Chapter 2 explains how al-Tirmidhī thought about *wilāya* through the prism of clientage (*walāʾ*). Through a close reading of al-Tirmidhī's works, it is clear how he is not as interested in promoting *virtuosi* as he is concerned with working out the relationship of the *ʿulamāʾ* to the common Muslims and the political rulers. He is focused on reforming the scholarly class and preserving its position of authority in a time of political instability and rapid social change. Clientage (*walāʾ*) could schematize both the path towards freedom (in a spiritual sense) and a new basis for social dependence and authority that prioritized Islamic norms rather than Arab descent. The beneficiaries of al-Tirmidhī's model are the *ʿulamāʾ*, who become the class from which the *awliyāʾ* arise. These are the *awliyāʾ* who are worthy to be followed; however, their precise characterization always remains amorphous.

In Chapter 3, we looked at al-Tirmidhī's notion of *ḥikma*. The debate has swung back and forth about whether or not al-Tirmidhī was influenced directly by Hellenistic thought. I position myself somewhere in between Radtke and those who say that al-Tirmidhī incorporated Greek learning directly in its Aristotelian and Neoplatonic forms. What is significant, however, about my presentation is that it shows how al-Tirmidhī attempts to encompass and synthesize a foreign knowledge-paradigm within his traditional Islamic scholarly framework. What is more important than the content of this imported

knowledge is the way in which al-Tirmidhī interacts with that knowledge. *Ḥikma* and the purveyors of *ḥikma*, i.e. the *ḥukamāʾ*, are not adopted by the later Ṣūfī tradition as authority figures. This is not necessarily because they saw *ḥikma* as a foreign implant, but more probably because the authority of the *ḥukamāʾ* was ultimately subversive to the authority of the *ʿulamāʾ*.

Chapter 4 serves to demonstrate al-Tirmidhī's connection to the normative scholarly tradition as exemplified in the works of early Murjiʾī/Ḥanafī creedal texts. Al-Tirmidhī's discourse on the *awliyāʾ* was part of a much wider discourse among the *ʿulamāʾ* that sought to place the *awliyāʾ* as the true inheritors of the *anbiyāʾ*. By the end of the 3rd/9th century, the *awliyāʾ* figure prominently in these creedal texts, and it is assumed among large numbers of Muslims in the Eastern lands of Islamdom that the *awliyāʾ* not only exist, but that their miracles (*karamāt*) are recognized by the normative tradition. Again, this provides a correction to the view that al-Tirmidhī was an outlier or that his views were incompatible with the normative tradition. While al-Tirmdhī's notion of *ḥikma* was not adopted by the later Ṣūfī tradition, it does seem to have influenced the Māturīdī theologians of Transoxania as a theoretical basis for their theological discourse. In this sense, the theoretical approach we can call *ḥikma*-based was disassociated from its connection to the *ḥukamāʾ* and so also its potential to generate authority. However, *ḥikma* for the Māturīdīs seems to function in a similar way to Aristotelian philosophy for the Ashʾarīs after al-Ghazālī.

In Chapter 5, we looked at how al-Tirmidhī develops a schematization of *wilāya* that reflects the primary binary structure of diffuse versus contractual modes of authority. He does this through a tripartite approach to authority types focusing on the *ʿulamāʾ*, *ḥukamāʾ* and *awliyāʾ*(*khulafāʾ*). The *ʿulamāʾ* and the *awliyāʾ* represent the two primary modes of both contractual and diffuse structures, while the *ḥukamāʾ* represent a subversive authority that frames *wilāya*. Chapter 5 also addresses a number of aspects of al-Tirmidhī's concepts of *wilāya* and *ḥikma* that are important for his overall gnoseology. Examples of these are the light-based nature of al-Tirmidhī's notion of *wilāya* as well as the potential ramifications of *wilāya* and *ḥikma* for Islamicate social and political history. While *ḥikma* does not become important for Islamicate authority, it does become important as a conduit for foreign knowledge elements to enter into the Islamic scholarly discourse.

In Chapter 6, I complete the book by showing how the discourse on authority and al-Tirmidhī's notions of *wilāya* were important building blocks for the Great Mystical Synthesis of the 11th-century ce in Nīshāpūr. Again, I show how al-Tirmidhī was not necessarily the outlier that many characterize him to be, even for the discourse stream of Islamic Mysticism. One of the important lessons of this work is that the solidarity group should be understood as the primary basis of negotiating authority in Islamicate societies. Al-Tirmidhī's ideas and his contributions to Ṣūfī discourse are more important than the figure of al-Tirmidhī himself for Islamicate society. What is clear is that al-Tirmidhī was actively working through central issues at the center of Islamic social, political and religious thought. For that reason, we should not view al-Tirmidhī as only an Islamic mystic but as one of the important early ideologues of Islamic social, religious and political thought. His approach to new knowledge paradigms is still very relevant today as we see Islamicate societies grappling with the challenges of modernity while attempting to ground their claims to authority through Islam. Al-Tirmidhī exemplifies the process of Islamic renewal and a path that leads forward in a time of political and social change. <>

RE-MAKING THE WORLD: CHRISTIANITY AND CATEGORIES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF KAREN L. KING edited by Taylor G. Petrey, Carly Daniel-Hughes, Benjamin H. Dunning, Anne-Marie Luijendijk, Laura S. Nasrallah [Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament, Mohr Siebrek, 9783161565816]

This edited volume brings together important scholars of religion in the ancient world to honor the impact of Karen L. King's scholarship in this field. Her work shows that Christianity was diverse from its first moments - even before the word "Christian" was coined - and insists that scholars must engage both in deep historical work and in ethical reflection. These essays honor King's intellectual impact by further investigating the categories that scholars have used in their reconstructions of religion, by reflecting on the place of women and gender in the analysis of ancient texts, and by providing historiographical interventions that illuminate both the ancient world and the modern scholarship that has shaped our field. Contributors:Carlin Barton, Giovanni B. Bazzana, Daniel Boyarin, Bernadette Brooten, Margaret Butterfield, Carly Daniel-Hughes, Benjamin H. Dunning, Judith Hartenstein, T. Christopher Hoklotubbe, Ronit Irshai, Denise Kimber Buell, Marcie Lenk, AnneMarie Luijendijk, Laura S. Nasrallah, Elaine Pagels, Silke Petersen, Taylor G. Petrey, Adele Reinhartz, Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, Sarah Sentilles, Angela Standhartinger, Stanley Stowers.

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Telling Karen King's story of New Testament and Early Christianity Studies

Telling the story of Karen King's many contributions to the study of New Testament and early Christianity is a difficult task. One distillation of her decades of work in the field is found in an important 2008 chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies, "Which Early Christianity?" The very title gives us a glimpse into King's contributions, which provide data and analytical tools for investigating the varieties of early Christianity. In this chapter, she offers a succinct formulation of one of the most pressing historiographical issues in early Christian studies:

> Throughout the history of Christianity, diverse beliefs and practices would ebb and flow on the tides of historical change and conflict, navigating and sometimes floundering with ever-shifting geographical, social-political, and cultural contexts as Christianity expanded from a tiny movement to a global religion. The issues, actors, and contexts would vary, but diversity would continue to characterize Christianity, even in the face of powerful claims to unity and uniformity. The question is how to represent this ever-shifting diversity adequately.

The drive to present (true) Christian belief and practice as singular runs deep in the tradition, inflecting many of its earliest narratives and theological claims and even cutting across specific positions that conflict with one another. We can see the template for what King calls "the master narrative of Christian origins" emerging at least as early as the conclusion to the Gospel of Luke: "And [Jesus] said to them, 'Thus it is written, that the Messiah is to suffer and to rise from the dead on the third day, and that repentance and forgiveness of sins is to be proclaimed in his name to all nations, beginning from Jerusalem. You are witnesses of these things— (24:46-48 NRSV). Here Jesus reveals a supposedly pure, original gospel to his disciples and charges them as witnesses to carry this deposit to the rest of the world. The book of Acts further clarifies that this initial deposit is entrusted first and foremost to twelve male followers and that their charge entails both pneumatic empowerment and a specific geographical mandate, which subsequently shapes the text's narrative arc: "But you will receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you; and you will be my witnesses in Jerusalem, in all Judea and Samaria, and to the ends of the earth" (1:8 NRSV). Diversity of opinion and dissension within the movement are therefore presented either as temporary and eventually resolved (Acts 15) or as the seeds of heresy, threatening the otherwise unbroken chain of truth - as in the case of Simon, a believing and baptized follower of Christ (8:13) who, by virtue of his conflict with Peter, comes to be figured by numerous sources in the later tradition as diabolically inspired and the father of all heresies (see, e. g., Justin, 1 Apol. 26, Irenaeus, Haer. 1.23; 3, preface).

King's "Which Early Christianity" and her larger corpus ask that we pay attention to nascent templates for making sense of difference in Christianized terms, such as the one found in Eusebius of Caesarea's enormously influential Ecclesiastical History in the early fourth century:

> It is my purpose to record: the successions from the holy apostles and the periods extending from our Savior's time to our own; the many important events that occurred in tbe history of the church; those who were distinguished in its leadership at the most famous locations; those who in each generation proclaimed the Word of God by speech or pen; the names, numbers, and ages of those who, driven by love of novelty to the extremity of error, have announced themselves as sources of knowledge (falsely so-called) while ravaging Christ's flock mercilessly, like ferocious wolves; the fate that overtook the whole Jewish race after their plot against our Savior; the occasions and times of the hostilities waged by heathen against the divine Word and the heroism of those who fought to defend it, sometimes through torture and blood; the martyrdoms of our own time and the gracious deliverance provided by our Savior and Lord, Jesus the Christ of God, who is my starting point. (1.1.1-2; trans. Maier)

Here we see more fully articulated a trajectory that has served, more or less, as the basic hegemonic narrative of Christian origins for the greater part of two millennia. There is rhetorical power to this plot, a story of twists and turns whereby God managed to preserve Christian truth, embodied in Jesus Christ, through all sorts of external attacks, until finally bringing about deliverance through the Emperor Constantine. And yet, while this may be a compelling plot, it is also a selective one. It is an account of certain locales, communities, and events but not others. It is an account that erases legitimate debates whose outcomes were genuinely not known in advance, whitewashes competing visions of Jesus' teaching and why it matters, and positions diversity that could not be easily assimilated or coopted as irredeemably beyond the pale.

Unsurprisingly, alternative evidence abounds, and King's career has been steeped in detailing and explaining such evidence. Eusebius's rhetorical alignment of a fixed origin ("my starting point" - that is, Jesus Christ as singular and singularly understood) with essence and truth works to obscure the otherwise seemingly obvious historiographical insight that whatever point we fix as the beginning is always, historically speaking, already a point in the flow. In this particular case, the tradition itself problematizes any notion of a singular point of origin, insofar as the New Testament preserves four conflicting accounts of Jesus' life, death, and ongoing significance (the last not necessarily always aligned with bodily resurrection in a straightforward way). Many more possibilities and stories exist or did exist at some early point, even if now lost.

For example, the Gospel of Mary - with its theological promise of a Jesus who dialogues with a woman, on the one hand, and whose words allow for a questioning of the very idea of sin, on the other - is only one voice, but a key one that King has made accessible through her translation and contextualization of the text. Yet evidence for debate and contrary opinions at Christianity's very start is not limited to this one early (perhaps second-century) extracanonical text. Diversity characterized Christ-following communities from the very beginning. In his first letter to the Corinthians, the apostle Paul buttresses his appeal for unity with the acknowledgment that "it has been reported to me by Chloe's people that there are quarrels among you, my brothers and sisters. What I mean is that each of you says, `I belong to Paul,' or `I belong to Apollos,' or `I belong to Cephas,' or `I belong to Christ' (1:11-12 NRSV). Citing this passage, King notes, "It would seem that the questions `Which Christianity? Whose Christianity?' were posed very early, even before the gospels and most of the New Testament literature had been

composed, and at a time when the number of believers must have been very small indeed." Yet the drive to answer definitively the question of "which early Christianity" in the singular by way of domesticating or demonizing difference appears to be equally early - and to extend through the tradition in ways not limited to the New Testament or other texts that later came to be classified as "orthodox" (see, e. g., Apoc. Pet. 76-79; Testim. Truth; Ptolemy, Flor. 33.3.2-3).

Karen King's work shows that Christianity was diverse from its first moments - even before the word "Christian" was coined - and insists that scholars must engage both in deep historical work and in ethical reflection. Whatever one's goal in reconstructing early Christianity, she argues, "such work should be based in an adequate comprehension of the multifarious practices of early Christians, including their constructions of identity and difference."6 To this end, a class that King has long taught, titled "Orthodoxy and Heresy," deconstructs the history of those terms. In this course, as in her publications, King demonstrates how ancient Christians accused each other of heresy - a term originally emerging from the Greek haeresis, meaning "choice" or "sect" or "school" – and made claims of orthodoxy for themselves. In the introduction to her translation of the Apocryphon of John, she explains that "[early Christians] developed distinct ways of contesting orthodoxy and heresy, and in so doing they created discourses of identity and difference that would pervade the West for millennia to come." King has long argued that the texts discovered at Nag Hammadi in the mid-twentieth century should not be read as "Gnostic," but instead as part of the diversity of early Christianity. Her expertise in the Coptic language has allowed her to bring these texts into the orbit of mainstream scholarly conversations within early Christian studies. One important aspect of King's work has been to break down the barriers that ecclesial and scholarly traditions have constructed between various forms of Christianity in antiquity. Thus, in her work, a text from the so-called gnostic author Valentinus can sit alongside one from Origen, and Irenaeus can join the conversation even as the Apocryphon of John does.

King does this sort of work by precise attention to the details of ancient literature. Her first book, Revelation of the Unknowable God, is a text, translation, and explanation of Allogenes, a challenging text within the Nag Hammadi codices. Her Gospel of Mary of Magdala makes that fascinating dialogue between Mary and the Savior accessible to popular audiences. The Secret Revelation of John provides in lucid translations the extant versions of the Apocryphon of John; she contextualizes the text within Jewish and Christian interpretive trends in antiquity and shows the way in which its imagination of a utopian Divine Realm still draws from the "central values that underlie the power arrangements current in the Mediterranean world under Roman domination." Her co-publication with Elaine Pagels of Reading Judas provides an accessible translation and discussion of the fragmentary Gospel of Judas, a text that indicates, according to King's interpretation, that the very idea of and meaning of a martyr was contested among early Christians.

King's careful work in translation and the production of accessible editions needs to be situated within her larger undertaking of reconsidering the historiography of early Christianity. Her What is Gnosticism? exposes the way in which a scholarly category, once invented, was then naturalized as a historical phenomenon. She demonstrates that what is at stake in the scholarly work of defining Gnosticism is a theological and ideological struggle not unlike those that we find in early Christian texts, which worked to include and to exclude various proximate others. She also illuminates how much is at stake for scholars as they approach the project of telling the story of Christian origins. Scholarly interpretations of how similar Christianity was to Judaism, or how many affinities Christianity had with

so-called Hellenistic philosophy or with celebrations of knowledge found among those then labelled "Gnostics," reveal something about ancient texts and communities. But they reveal just as much about the scholars' own times and commitments: how they define Christianity, how they define Judaism, what assumptions they make about how a pure and sui generis religion can emerge.

King's work emerges from the traditions of historical criticism, which produced such narratives of the origins of Christianity and its distinctiveness from - and/or similarities to - "Judaism" and "Gnosticism." But her work also breaks from historical criticism in important ways. The advent of historical criticism within modern New Testament scholarship opened up new possibilities for interpreting ancient evidence, not only providing methodological tools to render early Christian diversity more easily visible, but also situating it within new historical narratives. Walter Bauer's landmark thesis that the earliest forms of Christianity were regionally specific - that is, originally characterized by a highly localized diversity of belief and practice - is well known. While critiquing many facets of Bauer's analysis, scholars have built on and amplified his larger thesis, integrating newly discovered textual evidence (e. g., Nag Hammadi, Oxyrhynchus) along with familiar sources in order to reconstruct distinct and bounded (hypothetical) communities of early Christians. Here particular locales, noteworthy theological positions or interpretive techniques, and the authority of individual apostles have all functioned in various combinations to demarcate putative social formations. As King summarizes, "Texts were read as reflections of the historical situations of communities that produced them. Theological differences in the texts frequently (and problematically) came to be read as ciphers for communities in conflict."'

These historiographical techniques rely on questionable methodological assumptions; accordingly, more recent scholarship has done much both to clarify the theoretical issues and to question the historical conclusions that such assumptions yield. A rich tradition of feminist biblical interpretation has emphasized that early Christian texts are tendentious and rhetorical. These texts do not reflect a preexistent social reality in a simple or straightforward way, but rather work to persuade readers, inducting them into and/or confirming their place within particular systems of truth and meaning. As Elizabeth Clark reminds us from the standpoint of the so-called linguistic turn, the evidence we have from the ancient world does not necessarily lend itself to techniques of analysis drawn from the social sciences: "social-scientific appropriations obscured the fact that scholars of late ancient Christianity deal not with native informants, nor with masses of data amenable to statistical analysis, but with texts - and texts of a highly literary, rhetorical, and ideological nature." Frederik Wisse puts a finer point on one of the key historiographical difficulties that afflicts the project of reconstructing Christian origins: "It is as difficult to disprove that specific communities were the real referents of early Christian literary texts as it is to prove it ... [T]here are simply too many contingencies that bear on the composition of literary texts to allow inferring indirect evidence from them about the historical situation in which they were written." But if this point is granted, what then? How might we sift, organize, and evaluate the evidence differently in order to tell the history of early Christianity otherwise?

To tell a different history of early Christianity, we must question not what analytical categories we ought to use, but the very nature of categorization itself: what it is, how it works, whom it serves in any given context, and to what ends. Jonathan Z. Smith rightly notes that "`otherness' is not a descriptive category, an artifact of the perception of difference or commonality ... Something is `other' only with respect to something `else: Whether understood politically or linguistically, `otherness' is a situational category. Despite its apparent taxonomic exclusivity, `otherness' is a transactional matter, an affair of

the 'in between.'" King has been at the forefront of thinking through the challenges and the opportunities that these insights pose to the task of narrating the history of early Christianity. The formulation of a way forward that she has offered to the field remains characteristically her own:

> Given that there are many ways to map difference, and given that any categorization of early Christian diversity will both illumine some things and distort or hide otbers, depending upon its aims ..., any resulting typologies would necessarily be positional and provisional; that is, they would be understood as scholarly constructs intended to do limited kinds of carefully specified intellectual work in order to serve some particular end.

Elsewhere, she specifies, "I have suggested that to think hard and speak differently require revising our notions of tradition and history, reshaping discourse, categories, and methods, and above all, rethinking the ethically informed goals of historical analysis.

One way to revise our notions of tradition and history, King suggests, is to move away from a static model of strictly delineated "communities in conflict" to one that attends to the variegated and ever evolving work of ancient identity formation. Such an approach eschews the essentializing assumption that early Christian difference was simply there - and is thus now available to the contemporary historian as a kind of fully formed "found object" to be situated uncritically within a historical narrative. Rather, this approach "aims to understand the discursive strategies and processes by which early Christians developed notions of themselves as distinct from others within the Mediterranean world (and were recognized as such by others), including the multiple ways in which Christians produced various constructions of what it meant to be Christian." It includes being attentive to both the ways in which Christians sought to carve up the world into "us" and various forms of "them" (Jews, Greeks, Romans, etc.) and also the rhetorical strategies they used to conjure internal plurality into being by way of marking certain differences among Christ-followers as those that made a difference (the discourse of orthodoxy and heresy).

King also analyzes what early Christians said and wrote as a mode of practice, following the insight, expressed well by Foucault, that "to speak is to do something - something other than to express what one thinks .... [A] change in the order of discourse does not presuppose new ideas, a little invention and creativity, a different mentality, but transformations in a practice, perhaps also in neighbouring practices, and in their common articulation." Here King has been one of the key scholars to introduce to the field of early Christian studies the work of the sociologist and practice theorist Pierre Bourdieu. Drawing on Bourdieu's notions of habitus, field, and doxa, among others, she has unpacked with clarity and precision the complex logics whereby early Christian discursive formations impose regularity while allowing for some modicum of improvisation, spontaneity, and change. "The results of this historiographical method," she contends, "[is] to demonstrate where and how the `textual' resources, cultural codes, literary themes, hermeneutical strategies, and social-political interests of various rhetorical acts of Christian literary production, theological reflection, ritual and ethical practices, and social construction simultaneously form multiple overlapping continuities, disjunctures, contradictions, and discontinuities, both locally and trans-locally." King's emphasis on practice works to decenter the primacy of high literary or theological texts in the project of historical reconstruction. Yet, as noted above, her work does not neglect close textual analysis (and indeed, many of her signature contributions have been in the interpretation of specific early Christian texts), but rather resituates these texts as one kind of evidence among many, always in dynamic relation to alternative genres of textual evidence, material culture, institutions, and other social structures.

This work of resituating, redescribing, and recategorizing entails ethics. For as her former and current students can attest (ourselves included), in both her research and her teaching, King not only poses questions of practice - i. e., what work does the historical data under analysis do within a given cultural field? - but also relentlessly asks: what is at stake for the ancient world, the contemporary world (with an eye to the plurality of worlds and selves - scholarly, religious, etc. - that we all inhabit), and the complex interplay between the two in how we both formulate and answer such questions? Questions King regularly poses in the classroom insist on historical precision. Her oft repeated question "What is the evidence evidence of?" makes colleagues and students alike turn to situate a piece of evidence in a broader social and political context of power; the simple question requires the difficult two-step path of describing the evidence and contextualizing it adequately, not allowing oneself to be swayed by the rhetorical context of an ancient text or the assertions of modern scholars about the nature of the evidence. Her frequent phrase "good to think with" (bonnes à penser),

borrowed from Lévi-Strauss, pushes students and colleagues alike to notice tropes in early Christianity and to consider the varied use of an idea - suffering, for example, or a paradigmatic female figure such as Mary Magdalene - toward ethical ends in antiquity and today.

For example, in her "Christianity and Torture," King explicitly confronts the issue of the lack of a condemnation of torture in New Testament texts, and the ethical problems this raises:

> Some might wonder why I, as a Christian who opposes torture, go to such lengths to expose the possibilities within Christian tradition for supporting torture .... Opposition to torture on religious grounds will not be effective without acknowledging and addressing the fact that enculturated ways of thinking and structures of feeling cultivated in Christian stories, images, and theological discourses are implicated in a wide variety of attitudes and behaviors, both for and against torture .... How do religious communities, human rights advocates, or other voices effectively engage this tradition without enabling its potential for violence? This is a dilemma not only for believers but for all whose heritage includes these and similar cultural "logics" of feeling and thought.

Elsewhere, King argues, "The task at hand is to enable an ethics of critical-reflexive practice in historiography and theology ... we must explore critically [religious traditions] past and potential implications in violence as well as liberation, in injustice as well as justice. Critical practice necessarily involves accountability." Such critical self-reflexivity need not lead to the disavowal or dismantling of the tradition. Rather, King avers, "For myself and others, the ethical point that follows from diversity is not relativism, but the need to take responsibility for how scripture and tradition are read and appropriated."

Karen King's publications and teaching upend facile uses of New Testament texts and simple narratives of early Christian history. Her work has demonstrated, with philological, historical, and historiographical precision, the effervescence of what we call early Christianity but might well call early Christianities: the leadership of women; the complexities of theological debates over the worth of the body, sin, and martyrdom; the possibilities for transformative modes of thought; and, indeed, the scholarly and ideological stakes of how we define the ancient religious formations we study. The scholars in this volume engage her signature contributions to the field in three parts or acts. The first act treats the topic of categories, celebrating the sort of work that King did in What is Gnosticism?, which fundamentally pushed us to throw away a scholarly construction of people called Gnostics that we had

naturalized as existing in early Christianity or even before. The second act treats the topic of women and gender. Since her first edited volume, Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism, and her contributions to feminist projects such as Searching the Scriptures, King's work has long helped to open our eyes to evidence for the agency, significance, and power of women in earliest Christianities, the variety of ways in which gender could be performed in antiquity, and the engagement of early Christian texts in ethical debates that demonstrate how sexual practices and theology go hand in hand. The third act focuses on historiography, asking how we can write different histories of the earliest Christianities that King has helped us to see, or different stories of women and gender in the study of religion.

Categories

One of the major contributions of Karen King's work has been to question what used to look like stable categories in the history of early Christianity: Gnosticism, orthodoxy, heresy; her work exposes the ways in which theological and scholarly communities either have invented or have continued to trade in labels that limit our understanding of the diversity and choices available among earliest Christian communities. Several chapters engage the question of category criticism.

In "Mark 7:1-23, Finally," Daniel Boyarin begins by acknowledging the significance of King's work and conversations with her for his own developing sense of how the categories of "Jews" and "Christians" can obscure our understanding of ancient interactions in antiquity. He then offers a detailed analysis of Mark 7, reading the words of Jesus regarding food and cleanliness within halakhic debates of the time. He argues that Mark 7:1-12 not only presents an attack on Pharisaic deviations from Leviticus, but also demonstrates that Jesus kept kosher - or that the Gospel of Mark thought he did.

Elaine Pagels's "How John of Patmos' Readers Made Him into a Christian" questions whether the category of "Christian" can be applied to the visions of the Apocalypse of John. She offers a resounding no, joining those who have pointed out John's Jewishness. Her chapter shows that John's engagement with Isaiah's prophecy fits within the logic of Jewish prophetic material and offers a vision of the entry of Israel, and then repentant Gentiles, into a new Jerusalem.

T. Christopher Hoklotubbe's chapter, "What is Docetism?," suggests that we set aside our modern category (and subcategories) of docetism. We should instead look for "more productive classifications and more dynamic questions about the representation of Jesus' body in early Christian literature." Treating a span of literature and figures such as the epistles of John, the corpus associated with Ignatius of Antioch, Basilides, Marcion, Valentinus, the Gospel of Peter, Julius Cassian, Saturninus and Cerdo as we know them from Irenaeus and (Pseudo) Tertullian, and the Acts of John, Hoklotubbe shows a variety of Christian responses to the idea of Jesus' body. He writes, "Following the exemplary critical insights and pedagogy of King, I strive to (re)enchant students with the ambiguity, creativity, scriptural interpretation, the pastoral and polemical motivations, and existential stakes involved in early Christian questions about the nature of Jesus' human experience that were by no means simply apparent - Christianity was still 'in the making!"

Giovanni Bazzana s "Beyond Gnosticism: Pneumatology and Ecclesiology in 2 Clem 14" focuses on the theology and conversation partners of this difficult passage. Bazzana argues that the image of a pre-existent church makes sense in relation to other first- and second-century literature, especially the Shepherd of Hermas and aspects of Paul's 1 Corinthians. Christ, understood as pneuma, as well as an experience of spirit possession, were "foundational for membership in the Christ movement." Yet 2

Clement offers a surprising twist. Christ-followers are possessed not by pneuma but by ekklesia, a pneumatic entity, in that text.

Judith Hartenstein's "The Designation `Gnostic' for the Gospel of Mary and Its Implications: A Critical Evaluation" takes up the Book of Allogenes and the Gospel of Mary. New fragments of the former from the Tchacos Codex allow for clearer parallels to be drawn between Allogenes and the Gospel of Mary. Hartenstein shows that the Gospel of Mary has access to and understands what she terms a "mythologically founded alienation toward the world," but that it contains its own unique theology. Moreover, the text makes an unusual move in that it "depicts how esoteric knowledge is made public."

Marcie Lenk and Sarah Sentilles bring us to present-day categories. Lenk's "Parted Ways Meet Again: Messianic Judaism in Israel" alludes in its title to a long debate between scholars of antiquity: when did the ways between Christianity and Judaism part, if ever? She focuses on the Messianic Jewish community in Israel and the challenges that this community poses to a stable understanding of Judaism and Christianity and to legal status within Israel. After defining the term "Messianic Jew" and historically contextualizing Messianic Jewish traditions from the Hebrew Christians of the nineteenth century to the present, Lenk offers a survey that shows a range of Jewish messianic claims over time, within which "faith in Jesus as the Messiah has long been viewed differently." Lenk uses a variety of theoretical tools, from the postcolonial theories of Homi Bhabha to the performance theory of Judith Butler, to make sense of the complex identity of Messianic Jews as a possible act of resistance to claims of stability that undergird the categories of "Jew" and "Christian."

Women and Gender

Carly Daniel-Hughes's contribution moves us from the "categories" subsection of the volume to "women and gender" by working on both. Her "Mary Magdalene and the Fantasy Echo: Reflections on the Feminist Historiography of Early Christianity" traces aspects of anglophone feminist historiography "to consider how the attachment to the category `women operated in the feminist historiography of early Christianity." Daniel-Hughes considers the particular historical and social-psychological forces that shaped fantasies of "women's solidarity" within this scholarship, as well as those that ultimately lead some feminists to challenge these. Weaving analysis together with the personal, she ultimately seeks to describe the affective landscape sustained by this critical feminist work and to reflect constructively on some of its negative effects, both for feminist historians and for those captivated by their work.

In her analysis of "Wise Women in the Gospel of John," Adele Reinhartz argues that the fourth evangelist is hardly proto-feminist. Yet her close analysis of five women in the gospel - Mary the mother of Jesus, the Samaritan woman, Martha and Mary of Bethany, and Mary Magdalene - shows ways in which "the Gospel of John - perhaps inadvertently - does allow us to consider the behavior and qualities of these women separate from their re-domestication." Focusing on the narratives of these women "allows us to consider their wisdom, as exemplified by their behavior towards Jesus." For instance, analyzing Jesus' mother, Reinhartz argues that "we may quietly appreciate the wisdom of a mother who can see beyond her son's rude behavior and is able to prompt him to act when and where he does not yet understand he should."

The women of Philo's De vita contemplativa and the Testament of Job are the focus of Angela Standhartinger's "Performing Salvation: The Therapeutrides and Job's Daughters in Context." Yet her contribution is nearly encyclopedic in the evidence it provides of representations of women's leadership

in the Septuagint, New Testament texts, and the writings of the likes of Plutarch and Pausanias. These regular representations of women's ritual work and competence allow Standhartinger to argue that "While Philo's Therapeutrides and Job's Daughters remain literary figures, their cultic roles are by no means exceptional or historically implausible. To the contrary, female singers and dancers who act out parts of the central myth of a given religion are broadly attested also among their Greek, Roman, and later Christian sisters." The work allows us to see the cultic leadership of women in antiquity as represented in the literature of the time and even as performed in the retelling of such literature in ritual settings.

Margaret Butterfield's "The Widow, the Wife, and the Priestess: Tertullian's Life Plans for Widows in Ad uxorem" also takes up Standhartinger's theme of women's participation and leadership in cult. Tertullian, she notes, details "gentile" women's involvement in religious roles, including the Vestal virgins and the prophetesses at Delphi, and "provides chaste Christian widows with an identity parallel to that of the gentile priesthoods - the identity not of wife, but of altar of God." Tertullian focuses on the widow as wife - even as God's wife - precisely to avoid the danger of her role as sacerdotally powerful; yet the very image of woman as altar, as well as his detailing of the roles of religious leadership among non-Christian women, hints at the irrepressibility of some Christian women's religious authority.

Silke Petersen sets aside the category of Gnosticism as unhelpful in her analysis, titled "Marriages, Unions, and Bridal Chambers in the Gospel of Philip." She notes how "disruptions" in the text - points where the reader or hearer might be confused - are a deliberate technique to slow down the reading process and to note that different levels of meaning are being deployed. Images like bread and the marriage chamber have multiple meanings. Petersen concludes that the Gospel of Philip's "bridal and marriage imagery is used to speak about community and ritual in terms of union and separation, thus interpreting something else rather than denoting a discrete ritual." Such language points to the close union of marriage in order "to speak about ritual, community, baptism, or incarnation."

A Valentinian Exposition, Tripartite Tractate, and sections of Irenaeus's Against the Heresies are closely attended to in Taylor Petrey's "Cosmic Gender: Valentinianism and Contested Accounts of Sexual Difference." He demonstrates that "so-called Valentinian texts do not offer a single perspective on gender, reproductive capacity, gender roles, bodies, hierarchy, or moral tendencies, and in fact provide numerous models that challenge a heterogendered interpretation." After providing a history of scholarship on Nag Hammadi texts and gender analysis, Petrey demonstrates that we cannot easily reconstruct a singular cosmological schema from these texts nor the sexual practices of the communities that read and valued them. They instead provide "conversations ... about gender and sexual difference," even suggesting that "disruptions to male-female complementarity" are a solution as well as a problem; Valentinian texts provide "queer alternatives to male-female complementarity."

Ronit Irshai's "Feminist Research in Jewish Studies: What's in a Name?" tries to put some order into what is called "feminist scholarship in Judaic Studies" by proposing to distinguish four categories within it. Those categories are not merely conceptual. They also serve as an analytical tool that can produce new research. The chapter presents several opinions on male homosexuality in order to consider how feminist scholarship that takes gender as an analytic category can produce new knowledge about the ways in which male and female identities are constituted in recent halakhah. Feminist critique, she concludes, can help in such analysis as it lays bare the mechanisms by which "`natural sex' is created."

Historiography

Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza's chapter, titled "Revisioning `Christian' Beginnings," engages with the question of Christian origins, in order to underscore the contribution of the work of Karen King to early Christian historiography in a feminist key. She argues for the importance of feminist historiography in the revisioning of Christian beginnings. Karen King's feminist work on Gnosticism as well as on critical category formation and framework-analysis continues to be pathbreaking in this work of a feminist re-description of early "Christian" history.

In "Locating the Religion of Associations," Stanley Stowers participates in and nuances historians' attempts to understand "synagogues" and Christian groups in light of associations. He creates a clear taxonomy of four modes of religiosity, and demonstrates that the bias of our data - which comes from literate and entrepreneurial experts - means that we can overlook how these groups participated in the religion of everyday social exchange.

Carlin Barton's contribution, titled "A Roman Historian Looking at Early Christian religiones: the coniuratio and the sacramentum in Second and Early Third-century North Africa," argues that Latin-speaking African Christians of antiquity sought to sacralize themselves as individual persons and as groups. Barton unravels with philological precision the terms that Latin-speaking Christians used for themselves. Focusing primarily on Tertullian, she avoids our modern conceptions of religion, our mistranslations of religio, and our inattention to the significance of binding, framing, setting apart, which, she demonstrates, were fundamental acts in the process of sacralizing. In this way, her work asks questions at the intersection of historiography and philology How do we translate words from our historical distance, and how do our misperceptions or even our desires drive such translation? By bringing attention to the details of ancient texts and to the investments of modern readers, Barton enlivens the complexities of late second- and early third-century Carthage and the Latin of its day.

Related historiographical questions drive Denise Kimber Buell's "This Changes Everything: Spiritualists, Theosophists, and Rethinking Early Christian Historiography." The chapter explores the nineteenth-century to mid-twentieth-century context of spiritualism and theosophy, showing how these practitioners and theorists were adjacent to and sometimes participants in academic conversations about biblical studies, classics, and early Christian history. Their understandings of spirit and flesh, of the enduring nature of what they thought was gnostic thought, of "a non-linear temporality - futures and pasts commingle in the present," and of ideas of mysteries and initiation were part of a larger discourse on early Christian origins and the nature of so-called Gnosticism. Buell shows that tracing the impact of theosophists and spiritualists is essential to understanding the historiography of early Christianity.

Bernadette Brooten's chapter re-examines the depiction of enslaved persons in the Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons, which depicts a woman named Blandina as subverting the Roman slaveholding assumption that enslaved persons are weak in character. Blandina, who shares her mistress's religion and stands by it until the very end, is an owner's best possible enslaved laborer. In contrast to Blandina, "certain of our gentile slaves" enter the stage of the bloody drama as "also arrested." The Christians apparently expect these enslaved gentiles to suffer torture silently, which aligns with what other slaveholders expected. The Roman officials believe them, even though they speak freely and not under torture, which constitutes a breach of Roman criminal procedure. Brooten invites us to

think about how these texts project ideals for enslaved persons rather than simply Christian heroism in the face of martyrdom.

With "The Gospel of Mary at Oxyrhynchus (P. Oxy. L 3525 and P. Ryl. III 463). Rethinking the History of Early Christianity Through Literary Papyri from Oxyrhynchus," AnneMarie Luijendijk returns to a text that Karen King has published and made widely known. Some might argue that the Gospel of Mary was a marginal source to the majority of Christians in antiquity, and the story of a woman who followed Jesus and understood his teachings better than did the male disciples was a strange tale. By looking closely at one fragment of the Gospel of Mary from Oxyrhynchus, Luijendijk shows by the form and the hand of this papyrus that "Such texts, like the Gospel of Mary, which disappeared in the course of history, were not just random and aberrant sources. They were not merely the fodder of heresiologists, examples of disregarded sources. Rather, these sources circulated and were widely read, appearing in different forms and hands."

In an epilogue Sarah Sentilles draws the lens out, challenging us both to consider how we see and to investigate the visual as well as structural elements of racism. She argues, in "As If the Way We Think about the World is the Way the World Is," that "mis-seeing" others' bodies has violent results. Exploring language of eye-balling, the visible suspect, and the mug shot's origins in eugenics, as well as educating the "untrained eye" to see drone warfare, the deaths of Black men and women in the U. S., and casual racism, Sentilles challenges the reader to see differently pointing to analogous interventions made by Karen King.

In Sum

King's scholarship has long worked to create a welcoming and capacious new world of possibilities for her fellow scholars, including those whom she has taught. In a quiet voice and with an intense value for loyalty, she has changed the face of early Christian studies, setting a large table with hospitality. She has helped to bring her beloved Coptic texts, which used to be considered marginal to the story of earliest Christianity, into conversation with the canonical and authoritative texts with which the field was already familiar. She has helped us to see how the voices and authority of women may be suppressed in a text, but the traces of such authority nonetheless remain, opening up possibilities for writing different kinds of history. She has consistently insisted that scholars consider their own ethics and the ethics of the texts that we study. In doing so, she has not only contributed to the intellectual diversity of the field, bringing in voices from feminist studies and anthropological theory in particular, and bringing marginalized texts into the full reconstruction of early Christian history, but also helped to create a diverse, international community of scholarly friends, whose words can be found in the pages ahead. <>

The Spiritual Transformation of Jews Who Become Orthodox by Roberta G. Sands [State University of New York Press, SUNY, 9781438474281]

A psychological study, based on extensive interview data, of Jewish adults who take on a devout lifestyle.

Spiritual transformation is the process of changing one's beliefs, values, attitudes, and everyday behaviors related to a transcendent experience or higher power. Jewish adults who adopt Orthodoxy provide a

clear example of spiritual transformation within a religious context. With little prior exposure to traditional practice, these baalei teshuvah (literally, "masters of return" in Hebrew) turn away from their former way of life, take on strict religious obligations, and intensify their spiritual commitment. This book examines the process of adopting Orthodox Judaism and the extensive life changes that are required. Based on forty-eight individual interviews as well as focus groups and interviews with community outreach leaders, it uses psychological developmental theory and the concept of socialization to understand this journey. Roberta G. Sands examines the study participants' family backgrounds, initial explorations, decisions to make a commitment, spiritual struggles, and psychological and social integration. The process is at first exciting, as baalei teshuvah make new discoveries and learn new practices. Yet after commitment and immersion in an Orthodox community, they face challenges furthering their education, gaining cultural knowledge, and raising a family without parental role models. By showing how baalei teshuvah integrate their new understandings of Judaism into their identities, Sands provides fresh insight into a significant aspect of contemporary Orthodoxy.

Contents

The Social Context of this Study

The period in which the participants in this study moved into adulthood (late 1960s to early 1990s) and became Orthodox was a time when traditional norms were becoming more relaxed and society was becoming more open. The country was developing increased acceptance of different religious, ethnic, and cultural groups, and the groups themselves were celebrating their differences. Evangelical Christianity became a conspicuous political force, making it customary for politicians to bring God into public discourse. Universities faced challenges about curricula that focused on knowledge about and created by white men, resulting in the addition of women's studies and revised multicultural curricula. This atmosphere made it possible for a Jewish man to run for vice president in 2000 and an African American man to be elected president in 2008 and reelected in 2012.

While the country was becoming more tolerant of cultural differences, similar developments were occurring within the Jewish community. The Reform, Conservative, and Reconstructionist movements were becoming increasingly open, ordaining women as rabbis and cantors; accepting lesbian, gay, and bisexual members; and, in the case of some Reform rabbis, conducting marriages of interfaith couples. Women in all three of these religious movements were able to wear religious garments traditionally worn by men, read from the Torah, and lead prayer services, and they were counted in the quorum, or minyan, required for religious services (traditionally ten men).

In the face of liberalizing trends in Jewish communities, sectors of Orthodox Judaism became wary. Traditional Jewish communities in Europe have a history of resisting reform movements (Wurzburger, 1997). Following the Haskalah, the Jewish Enlightenment, and the emancipation of Jews from European ghettoes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the opening of the secular world to Jews became problematic to religious Jews. Some Jews, such as those in the Reform movement, modified their religious practices as a way of accommodating to their host European societies. Other Jews tried to maintain their traditional religious practices while partaking of secular knowledge (Torah im derekh erez; Torah with secular education); still others had a separatist ideology. Those traditional Jews who saw accommodation as a gateway to assimilation and assimilation as perilous opposed adapting to the secular culture. Today's Haredi communities continue to resist assimilation, accommodation, and secularization and convey this to potential baalei teshuvah when they are exploring Judaism in educational programs.

The Question of Gender

Since the women's movement of the last few decades of the twentieth century, much discussion has been had about the unequal position of women within Orthodox Judaism. Among the concerns are the separate men's and women's roles, limits on women's participation in religious services, restrictions on women's singing in the presence of men (due to the doctrine of kol ishah), and the requirement that married women go to the ritual bath (mikveh) after several clean days following menstruation. Although some writers have tried to clarify the basis for discrete gender roles in Jewish law, feminist Jewish scholars view such distinctions as inequitable. Two sociologists who studied baalot teshuvah have tried to understand women choosing a way of life that appears to run counter to feminist sensibilities. Davidman conducted an ethnographic study of the newly observant in two communities, one Modern Orthodox, the other Lubavitch; and Kaufman interviewed baalot teshuvah living in a variety of Orthodox Jewish communities around the country. Davidman found differences between the Modern Orthodox and Lubavitch BTs, the latter younger and less educated in secular universities. Both authors observed

that the baalot teshuvah were attracted to the family orientation of Orthodox Judaism. Other social scientists that made Hasidic women the focus of their research have highlighted the complexity of women's adaptations to feminism conducted studies of baalot teshuvah and their mothers in Israel, South Africa, Argentina, and the United States; and Mock-Degan did a similar study in Holland. In all these, the mothers voiced a feminist perspective in response to their daughters.

Although this book is about the process of spiritual-religious transformation without specific focus on gender, the gender-balanced sample of interviewees made it possible to examine gender issues as they relate to changes the BTs made. Gender issues are discussed where evident in the interview data. The book draws attention to women's separate roles, the struggles of some women over feminist issues, and the adaptations of women and men as they moved into and became part of gendered communities.

Themes and Format of the Book

This book emphasizes the extensive life changes that are made after one makes a commitment to Orthodox Judaism. In reading this book, one will become aware of several prominent themes, some of which have been already touched on:

- Spiritual transformation is a lifelong process.
- Social connections draw baalei teshuvah into Orthodoxy and help them adapt to life in Orthodox communities.
- One is most receptive to examining and moving into another spiritual-religious orientation during late adolescence and early adulthood, and during times of transition, such as new parenthood, marriage, divorce, and the death of a significant other.
- Because of gaps in their Jewish religious education and the need to participate in religious life with others, baalei teshuvah engage in an extensive learning activities before and after they become Orthodox.
- Spiritual struggles occur before one makes a commitment and continue while living an Orthodox Jewish life.
- Baalei teshuvah make psychological and social changes that lead to (but do not necessarily ensure arriving at) psychological and social integration.
- Baalei teshuvah gain a framework with which to view adverse events positively, to heal from past wounds, and to appreciate the nonmaterial aspects of life.
- The transformation changes them thoroughly, changing their identity, family life, living situation, career, and daily life.

This book is organized around findings of the research study that pertain to the process of considering, deciding upon, and taking on the responsibilities of an Orthodox Jew. Chapter 1 portrays the backgrounds and early experiences of the men and women who later become Orthodox. It captures their constructions of their family lives, their early memories of thoughts about God, spirituality, and religion, and the experiences that were conducive to or impeded their spiritual development. Chapter 2 is about their search process and the journey toward commitment. It identifies and describes different phases of the process, including conflicts and ambivalence, leading toward a decision. In keeping with the developmental perspective used in this book, Chapter 3 examines differences among participants who became from at different ages and life stages. It also looks at the developmental issues of participants who were at different ages or stages at the time of their interviews. This chapter should be of special interest to readers who are acquainted with the developmental literature, but it can be skipped if this is

not a focal concern. Starting with chapter 4, the emphasis is on the open-ended socialization and reeducation process, which involves help from mentors and role models as well as personal efforts to learn. As novices, the BTs learn from teachers and others whom they view as knowledgeable about Orthodox Judaism and community norms. In chapter 5, the focus is on challenges related to marriage, the family of procreation, and relations with the family of origin, which also involves reeducation. In chapter 6, the struggles the BTs experience in maintaining belief in the light of untoward life events, gender role expectations, and other issues are addressed. Chapter 7 pertains to the psychological integration of the new identity as an Orthodox person and to social integration into an existing Orthodox community. The eighth chapter describes how baalei teshuvah attempt to live out their spiritual-religious orientation in their daily life. In the final chapter, I discuss and integrate these issues further and propose components of a theory on the process of spiritual-religious transformation in Judaism and potentially other religions.

Throughout this book, the reader will find quotations from participants in this study.' In all cases, pseudonyms are used. The pseudonyms selected reflect the range of names the participants used, which are Hebrew, Yiddish, and Anglo-American. The reader may also notice slight differences between the spelling of Hebrew and Yiddish words in quotations and in the text. The analysis represents a composite of individual narratives, comprising what Richardson called a `collective story:' Accordingly, the narratives of "similarly situated individuals who may or may not be aware of their life affinities" are amalgamated so that the experience of the group and the social, cultural, and historical contexts of their experiences can be recognized. Here the narratives represent baalei teshuvah as a community. In a few cases, details are presented about individual narratives, but for the most part the focus is on the collective narrative.

Summary

This book is about the spiritual-religious transformation of Jewish men and women living on the East Coast of the United States during the early years of the twenty-first century. It is based on a qualitative research study of the spiritual journeys of baalei teshuvah from diverse Jewish backgrounds. It explores participants' perceptions of the families in which they were raised and examines their accounts of the experiences that led them to radically change their beliefs, behaviors, and values so that these are consistent with the way of life of Orthodox Jews in the religious communities they joined. The findings of the study are based on in-depth interviews with baalei and baalot teshuvah, focus-group meetings with health and mental health professionals who are also baalei teshuvah, and interviews with Orthodox community leaders who work with this population. Theories of psychosocial development and socialization are used to interpret the findings.

The aims of this book are to examine the processes involved in spiritual-religious transformation; the relationship between spiritual changes and psychosocial development; the reeducation and resocialization that occurred along the way; the significance of spirituality and spiritual struggles; and the extent to which baalei teshuvah integrate these changes psychologically and socially and make changes in their identities. <>

RELIGIOUS DISSENT IN LATE ANTIQUITY, 350-450 by Maijastina Kahlos [Oxford Studies in Late Antiquity, Oxford University Press, 9780190067250]

RELIGIOUS DISSENT IN LATE ANTIQUITY reconsiders the religious history of the late Roman Empire, focusing on the shifting position of dissenting religious groups - conventionally called 'pagans' and 'heretics'. The period from the mid-fourth century until the mid-fifth century CE witnessed a significant transformation of late Roman society and a gradual shift from the world of polytheistic religions into the Christian Empire.

This book challenges the many straightforward melodramatic narratives of the Christianisation of the Roman Empire, still prevalent both in academic research and in popular non-fiction works. Religious Dissent in Late Antiquity demonstrates that the narrative is much more nuanced than the simple Christian triumph over the classical world. It looks at everyday life, economic aspects, day-to-day practices, and conflicts of interest in the relations of religious groups.

RELIGIOUS DISSENT IN LATE ANTIQUITY addresses two aspects: rhetoric and realities, and consequently, delves into the interplay between the manifest ideologies and daily life found in late antique sources. It is a detailed analysis of selected themes and a close reading of selected texts, tracing key elements and developments in the treatment of dissident religious groups. The book focuses on specific themes, such as the limits of imperial legislation and ecclesiastical control, the end of sacrifices, and the label of magic. Religious Dissent in Late Antiquity examines the ways in which dissident religious groups were construed as religious outsiders, but also explores local rituals and beliefs in late Roman society as creative applications and expressions of the infinite range of human inventiveness.

Laxity or tolerance?
Authority and aggression
The narrative of Christian triumphalism
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Initiating aggression
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Naming, listing, and labelling
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Making Donatists
Making Pelagians
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Non-violent resistance: Silence and self-segregation
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People in rhetoric and realities: Some conclusions
SECTION III Time, place, practices
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In search of local religion
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The realities of pollution?
Disappearances, continuities, and adaptations

Rhetoric and realities

In her recently published **THE DARKENING AGE: THE CHRISTIAN DESTRUCTION OF THE CLASSICAL WORLD**, Catherine Nixey shares a story of the all-embracing, ancient world that triumphant Christianity destroyed.' Nixey's book is, of course, a non-fiction book aimed at a wider readership, not the academic work of a specialist written for other specialists. Such a straightforward narrative is probably sexier for the media and promises to get more online clicks than a research report filled with unresolved questions and reservations.

In the research of the religious history of the late Roman world, however, we must exercise extreme caution in the construction of such ostentatious narratives. For this reason, Religious Dissent in Late Antiquity is not meant as a grand narrative. Instead, the book challenges those biased accounts that build on simplistic assessments of the categories of `paganism' and `Christianity.

The focus of this book is on the religious dissident groups in the late Roman Empire in the period from the mid-fourth century until the mid-fifth century CE. I am not claiming that this is a pleasant story. By analysing religious dissent in Late Antiquity, I wish to demonstrate that the narrative is much more nuanced than the simple Christian triumph over the classical world. My interpretation is not sexy and sensational. Instead, it looks at everyday life, economic aspects, day-to-day practices, and conflicts of interest.

There are, and there have been, many straightforward melodramatic narratives over the centuries, both in academic research and in popular non-fiction works. One of these has been the long-standing debate on the last phases of Roman paganism. According to the traditional view, explicated especially by Andreas Alföldi and Herbert Bloch after World War II, pagan aristocrats were united as a heroic and cultured resistance against the advance of Christianity, and they even rose up in the final battle near the Frigidus in 394. The notion of the last pagan stand was promoted by Alföldi, Bloch, and others especially during and after the war, in a Zeitgeist in which it was perhaps characteristic to construe Christian-pagan relations in terms of dichotomy and conflict.

Later generations have outlined the world of Late Antiquity in more nuanced ways than the interpretations put forward immediately during and after World War II. The traditional interpretation of conflict has been challenged since the 1960s by Alan Cameron, among others.' The 'new radical' view refutes the idea of the last pagan resistance as a romantic myth and contends that there was neither a pagan reaction in a military sense nor a pagan revival in a cultural sense. The fact that there are now more abundant and multifarious sources available for late antique studies than ever before has also led to further reinterpretations of the religious changes of Late Antiquity (the so-called Christianization) of the late Roman world.

However, the traditional view of conflict tends to live on in modern scholarship. It pops up in different forms, especially in non-specialist books, such as Nixey's The Darkening Age. Why does the dichotomous and conflictual image of the pagan reaction continue to attract scholars (not to mention the general audience)? It seems that the melodrama of a last resistance with discernible heroes is both dramatic and simple enough to captivate more attention than the mundane, everyday nuances of economic and social issues.' In Christian literary sources, the more committed or rigorist writers made a lot of noise, and it is this noise that has influenced the tendency to see the religious history of Late Antiquity primarily in antagonistic terms. The problems with these melodramatic grand narratives—either Christian triumphalism (often, but not always, connected with the Christian confessional agenda) or a gloomy decline of classical civilization (often, but not always, connected with a secularist worldview)—is that, in both cases, interpreters fall into the trap of taking the late antique, highly rhetorical sources at face value.

This is why in **RELIGIOUS DISSENT IN LATE ANTIQUITY** I address two aspects: rhetoric and realities. Both are necessary for understanding the religious history of the late Roman Empire, particularly the shifting position of dissenting religious groups. In terms of the first, the research focuses on the analysis of discourse used in late antique sources, moving principally in the textual world of the writers. The second aspect involves social and historical research, which surveys the practical circumstances of religious minorities in late Roman society. This approach does not entail an epistemologically naïve distinction between the 'text world' and `historical reality. These are not

separable. Thus, this research delves into the interplay between the manifest ideologies and daily life found in our sources.

The hundred years under scrutiny, from c. 350 to c. 450 CE, stretch approximately from Constantius II's reign until the end of Theodosius II's reign. The time span covers the most crucial years of Christianization after the Constantinian turn and, consequently, the shifts in relative power between religious majorities and minorities. This period witnessed a significant transformation of late Roman society and a gradual shift from the world of polytheistic religions into the Christian Empire.' However, this shift should not be plotted teleologically. Rather, in the fourth century, a wide variety of religions, cults, sects, beliefs, and practices coexisted and evolved in the Mediterranean world. The coexistence of religious groups led sometimes to violence, but these outbreaks seem to have been relatively infrequent and usually localized.

My purpose in this book is to explore what impact these changes had on the position and life of different religious groups. In the late Roman Empire, constant flux between moderation and coercion marked the relations of religious groups, both majorities and minorities, as well as the imperial government and religious communities. The area under examination is the late Roman Empire, in both the East and West. In my analysis of the status and everyday life of different religious groups, I am not aiming at an exhaustive or systematic treatise on what is clearly a wide-ranging topic. What I propose to provide is a detailed analysis of selected themes and a close reading of selected texts, tracing key elements and developments in the treatment of dissident religious groups. I have concentrated on specific themes, such as the limits of legislation, the end of sacrifices, the label of magic, and the categorization of dissidents into groups.

Religious Dissenters

The religious groups under consideration are pagans and heretics. These terms are only shorthand: `pagans' for non-Christians or polytheists; `heretics' for Christians marked as deviants. Furthermore, these terms are relational. Pagans were a creation of Christian writers, of course; there would have been no pagans without the viewpoint of Christians. Likewise, the question of who is a heretic naturally depends on the perceiver.6 I am inclined to call the religious groups under scrutiny religious dissenters or dissidents, as well as deviant groups or religious deviants.

In late Roman society, relations between the religious majorities and minorities fluctuated. Over the course of the fourth century, Christianity shifted from a minority position to the majority one, or at least a strong minority, while the Graeco-Roman religions gradually fell to a minority position, or a silent and weakened majority.' It is impossible to precisely define the relative proportions I look at Christianization as part of a wider process of religious transformations in the Mediterranean world, which embraced what we distinguish and call by the separate names of Graeco-Roman, Christian, Jewish, and Manichaean religions?'

The Themes of this Book

My discussion starts with Section I: Imperial and ecclesiastical authority, which first focuses on imperial and ecclesiastical rhetoric of power and then observes both the interaction and the power struggle between the imperial and ecclesiastical authorities. The rhetoric of alienation and aggression is counterbalanced by a discussion of the limits of power, such as the realities of making laws. I analyse these dynamics of power on the macro level of the state and church. The chapters explore the

development of the legal status of religious dissidents, the attempts to enhance religious unity by both the emperors and bishops' authorities, and the rhetoric of public welfare. As we will see, the imperial and ecclesiastical discourses in legislation and the canons of church councils were offset by the limits of power—in making and enforcing laws, negotiating power in ecclesiastical disputes, and taking local circumstances, such as the patronage of local landowners, and local diversity into account.

In Section I, the categories `pagans' and `heretics' are treated as a given because imperial and ecclesiastical discourses build and maintain these categories. However, we need to move beyond these categories. Therefore, in Section II: People in rhetoric and realities, I analyse the construction of `pagans' and 'heretics; In due course, these categories are questioned and finally deconstructed. Section II surveys both the rhetoric of separation against dissident groups and the relations between religious groups. Social, religious, and cultural encounters were complex moments in which the identities of groups or individuals were never fixed but always multivariable, fluid, and negotiated. The realities and pragmatic solutions of everyday life included accommodation and flexibility in interfaith relations as well as aggression and resistance.

After questioning and deconstructing the ancient and modern use of these categories, we move on to Section III: Time, place, practices, which offers an alternative way of looking at the late antique religious world: through local religion. This is an attempt to get beyond categorization, labelling, and the listing of groups in the imperial and ecclesiastical writings—thus restoring agency to the individuals. The purpose of this section is to show how late antique people were not passive recipients of change, but instead actively took part in creative interaction. Therefore, I explore how the dissident religious groups coped with day-to-day social life in urban and rural communities, and I analyse social, economic, and cultural structures. Rhetoric by emperors and ecclesiastical writers against practices, feasting, and places was balanced by the realities of everyday life. Many traditional rituals and local communal practices went through a series of metamorphoses in the fourth and fifth centuries, and this section explores the transformations of such practices as sacrificial rituals, as well as their economics and the competition over and sharing of holy places and sacred times. Section III ends with a discussion of how the label of `magic' functioned as a boundary marker between what was understood as the proper religion and the deviant one. <>

Catechism of the Catholic Church: Full Text and Theological Commentary, Direction and Coordination of the Theological Commentary by Rino Fisichella [Our Sunday Visitor, 9781681922744]

While the Catechism of the Catholic Church is considered "useful reading" for all the faithful, it is often necessary to turn to bishops, pastors, catechists, and scholars for assistance in understanding its meaning and purpose in our lives.

Perfect for priests, deacons, catechetical leaders, teachers, seminarians, and anyone who wants to dive deeply into the truth and beauty of the Catholic Faith.

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The CCC and the Renewal of Catechesis

Pope Benedict XVI, in the 2012 Motu proprio PF, wanted to create a connection among the Second Vatican Council, the Year of Faith, the Synod for the New Evangelization, and the CCC, to create a better understanding of the CCC and bring it into the catechetical activity of the Church. The CCC, therefore, is not a document that can be isolated from the life of the Church, nor is it a static expression of her doctrine. It came in order to reaffirm that Vatican II, in the name of Tradition, is the true theological expression of today, as Pope Paul VI already said.

So it isn't possible to understand and accept the CCC for catechetical activity without caring for the organic link that joins it to the Second Vatican Council, integrating the principles of the CCC with the faith which the Church lives and teaches; and finally interpreting it as an instrument of service to the new evangelization.

The CCC's enthusiastic reception into catechesis, particularly in Europe and in America, and the diffidence in other countries, came to exist because of a distorted image of the catechism which was propagated in Europe in the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries. We cannot develop the

historical argumentation here (cf. the works of the great historian Sr. Elisabeth Germain) but we hold that the notion of catechism had changed its meaning in the Church between the Council of Trent (1545-1563) and Vatican I (1870). The Roman Catechism, called the "Catechism of Trent," intended to be an instrument to foster the desire to know Jesus Christ, assigning to pastors the task of adapting the pedagogy to various types of believers, in the spirit of the Renaissance humanists, and in view of building up individual believers. That is what St. Charles Borromeo expressed in the oft-cited introduction to the Catechism of the Council of Trent. The catechisms of the 19th century, for their part, insisted on a text to be learned out of obedience, thought of as a guarantee for salvation and eternal life. In effect, the catechisms of that era were on the defensive and had become rigid about three areas of controversy: against Protestants above all, which caused a considerable retreat in the role of sacred Scripture and a conception of faith as a collection of truths to believe; then against the Jansenists, which led to a strong tendency toward moralism, with the development of catechisms around three "musts": one"must believe," one "must observe the commandments," one "must receive the sacraments"; and finally argument against ideas of the Enlightenment, which led to a spiritual impoverishment and an intellectualism constrained by responding to the 18th-century philosophers who asserted that faith is irrational (cf. J. Molinario, Le catéchisme, une invention moderne. De Luther ti Benoit XVI, Bayard, Paris 2013).

It was during the 1985 Synod that Pope John Paul II and Cardinal Ratzinger relaunched the idea of writing a Catechism for the Catholic Church. At the time, two constant references appeared: the Catechism of the Council of Trent, with the preface by St. Charles Borromeo, and the Second Vatican Council, which Paul VI called the "Catechism of the 20th century." The magisterium rightly avoided reference to catechisms of the 19th and early 20th centuries, to write a catechism that would be the fruit of Vatican II.

This wish to write the CCC as a fruit of Vatican II was not something obvious to carry out, since the Council Fathers had not desired to promulgate a universal catechism, out of fear of "freezing doctrine," according to Cardinal Ciriaci. In effect the Council Fathers had in mind the majority conception of catechisms whose reference model came from the 19th century. Because of that, they hesitated about rewriting a catechism at a time when a new concept of the relation of the Church with the world was taking shape, and especially when new and great figures of theology (we can think of de Lubac, Congar' Geseilmann, Balthasar, Rahner...) and of the catechetical renewal (J Jungmann, J. Colomb) were taking up the question of the supernatural and revelation in a new way. While the question of a catechism had been posed at the beginning of the Council, that interest was transformed bit by bit in the course of four sessions, in the direction of catechesis and the catechumenate (SC 64; AG 14; CD 14; LG 19).

The CCC's organic link with Vatican II was underscored pastorally by Pope John Paul II. In FD, the Apostolic Constitution for the publication of the CCC which serves as an introduction to it, John Paul II returns insistently to Vatican II and the anniversary of its opening, to the happy memory of John XXIII and to the joy he had in participating "in that session of the Church" that nourished the present CCC.

The organic link to Vatican II is emphasized in a more theological way in the two introductory chapters of the CCC, which had the aim of clearing away any theological misunderstanding about the principles and doctrine espoused in it. "Faith," says the CCC, "is a personal adherence of the whole man to God who reveals himself" (n. 176).

The text deals with the theology of Vatican II, following the long Tradition of the Church. After affirming just that, the first chapter takes up GS again to underscore that man is capable of God (nn. 27-30) and is restless until he rests in him. The second chapter then takes up the doctrine of revelation from DV to express how the revelation of God in Jesus Christ is met as human desire; and that the fullness of this revelation makes human beings partakers of the divine nature, thanks especially to the mediation of the holy Scriptures (nn. 51-53). In this beginning of the CCC we find confirmed the great theological advances that Vatican II realized. GS and DV renewed the very nature of our understanding of a catechism: this is what the first two chapters of the CCC convey.

The CCC and Faith

Benedict XVI wrote in PF that "there exists a profound unity between the act by which we believe and the content to which we give our assent" (PF 10). Faith is an opening of the heart to the gift of God and an attachment to the word of God with the confession of our lips. Knowledge of the teachings is therefore insufficient, Benedict XVI points out, without the opening of the heart Which converts the person (PF 10).

This interpretive key for the Year of Faith turns up a few lines later when the CCC is the topic: "In order to arrive at a systematic knowledge of the content of the faith, all can find in the Catechism of the Catholic Church a precious and indispensable tool" (PF 11). Benedict XVI continues: "In its very structure, the Catechism of the Catholic Church follows the development of the faith right up to the great themes of daily life. On page after page, we find that what is presented here is no theory, but an encounter with a Person (PF 11). So this interpretive key opens the way to a good use of the CCC in catechesis. The CCC fulfills its task as an "instrument to support faith" when the understanding of the words leads to the opening of the heart; and also conversely, when the grace of opening the heart leads to the desire to know him in whom the believer has placed his trust. The knowledge dealt with in the CCC is therefore not abstract; there is a structure that harmonize the faith professed, celebrated, lived, and prayed: the four parts of the CCC that enable us to meet Christ. So the faith contents in the CCC are at tilt same time words of understanding the faith and human experiences of faith Catechesis, then, consists of uniting understanding and experience of the mystery of God, although no one can grasp him totally.

Saint Augustine left us a formula with a surprising clarity to understand this. Commenting on the Apostles' Creed (the first part of the CCC), he writes: "If you believe 'in' him, also believe him; yet he who believes Goc (credere Deo) does not necessarily believe in him. The demons believe him, but they don't believe in him." (In Evangelium Ioannis Tractatus, 29, 6). And the bishop of Hippo explains that we become Christians from the moment in which we believe in God (credere in Deum; `Hoc est etiam credere in Deum quod utique est quam credere Deo": Enarrationes in Psalmos, 77, 8). Without the grace of a relation with Christ, proclamation remains arid and dogma does not achieve its purpose of designating the mystery of the living God for every man. According to the beautiful expression of Fr. de Lubac, it is a doctrine of life that catechesis must promote, with the help of the CCC. In this regard, the great innovators of catechesis of the mid-20th century and the great theologians who inspired Vatican II agree perfectly.

Pope Francis—with Benedict XVI—takes up this fundamental key in LI and adds this further explanation: "Faith, in fact, needs a setting in which it can be witnessed to and communicated, a means which is

suitable and proportionate to what is communicated. For transmitting a purely doctrinal content, an idea might suffice, or perhaps a book, or the repetition of a spoken message. But what is communicated in the Church, what is handed down in her living Tradition, is the new light born of an encounter with the true God, a light which touches us at the core of our being and engages our minds, wills and emotions, opening us to relationships lived in communion" (LF 40).

The CCC, the New Evangelization, and Christian Initiation

Once any misunderstanding about the foundations of the CCC is clarified' thanks to Vatican II and the Year of Faith, we can better understand its place in the new evangelization. Let us take up an element cited as evidence at the time, the catechumenate, mentioned in Proposition 38 of the Synod on the New Evangelization and in LF, texts that help us catch sight of the link among the three elements of the catechism text. On one hand, the faith is transmitted first of all with baptism, which is not an isolated past event, because it involves the whole life of the Christian. Pope Francis writes:

> This dynamic of transformation "which takes place in baptism helps us to appreciate the singular importance of the catechumenate [...] for the new evangelization" (LF 42). On the other hand, the search for God is presented in the encyclical as the road which the Magi followed: "For them God's light appeared as a journey to be undertaken, a star which led them on a path of discovery" (LF 35). This image relates naturally to the experience of the catechumen.

How does this matter for the CCC? We need to return to the theological structure of the catechism in four parts organically connected among themselves (cf. the conferences of Cdl. Ratzinger at Lyon and Paris on "Transmission of faith and wellsprings of faith'): the faith proclaimed ("The profession of faith", nn. 144-1065), the faith celebrated ("The celebration of the Christian mystery," nn. 1066-1690), the faith lived ("Life in Christ," nn. 1691-2557) and the faith prayed ("Christian prayer," nn. 2558-2865); this is the theological structure used by the Council of Trent, common to Luther's catechisms (Little and Great Catechism, 1529) and whose origin traces back explicitly to the catechumenate which the Church developed between the third and fifth centuries and to the apostolic life as it is presented to us in the Acts of the Apostles: "They devoted themselves to the teaching of the apostles and to the communal life, to the breaking of the bread and to the prayers" (Acts 2:42). In effect, for the Christian initiation of adults, a participation in the liturgical life of the Christian community is necessary, the call to conversion and to live a Christian life with reference to the biblical commandments is permanent; finally, when the traditio-redditio of the Apostles' Creed and of the Our Father is accompanied by appropriate catechesis, they articulate the final preparation for the sacraments that will be received at the Paschal vigil (RICA 175-178). And the Second Vatican Council wanted the restoration of the catechumenate for the current era and invited the bishops to organize a baptismal itinerary for adults articulated in various stages (SC 64, cf. CCC 1232). The DGC sees them as the reference point and inspiration for all catechesis (nn. 59 and 88-90). This means that there is a theological structure common to the Christian initiation of adults OICA 53 and 55), the catechetical practice of every era, the CCC, and the apostolic life.

The four parts of the CCC do not thereby correspond to a program be followed word for word like a manual. They are, compariable to lighthouses and signal buoys that guide sailors in the essential passages of their crossing. Hence the varied usage of this theological structure in catechesis: if in the baptismal catechumenate there is the ritual character that guides the order and articulation of the four elements, then in the CCC the catechesis of children needs to be considered as a post-baptismal catechumenate (n. 1231).

This means that children or adolescents already baptized also need to live the essence of the journey of Christian initiation. This is based on a theological understanding of baptism that does not limit it to its isolated liturgical celebration, because the sacramental grace extends for the whole length of the itinerary of becoming a Christian, before and after the sacrament. In this, the catechumenate's "dynamic of transformation" can be considered a reference for the new evangelization. Here too the CCC furnishes the needed guidance. Even if, unlike what happens with adults, where the traditio of the Our Father is only foreseen at the end of the catechumenal process (OICA 188-192), the Christian initiation of baptized children often begins with the Our Father. Is it not normal to introduce children immediately to a filial relation with God? (CCC 2765-2766). Equally, conversion of the heart and change of life in the name of the Gospel are at the center of becoming mature in faith. Now, one cannot ask children to change their life when they are in a time of building their personality; therefore the lighthouses and signal buoys proposed by the CCC remain the same, but the encounter with the four parts of the CCC and their articulation are made in differing order and manner, according to common sense and the age of those being catechized. The essential and combined contribution of the catechumenate and the CCC to catechesis and the new evangelization is in understanding that every catechetical itinerary is sacramentally structured, and that baptismal grace is not isolated, but extends before and after having received the sacrament. So the CCC plays the role of a concrete means in the form of a theological structure of the Church's faith, and, as such, is suited to inspire and nourish every itinerary of faith for the life of every person. In this way, the exposition of the faith contained in the CCC refers to the lived experience of faith and points forward to its continuation. (Fr. Moog and J. Molinario, eds., La cathéchès et le contenu de la foi, Paris: DDB, 2011).

The CCC and the Living Faith of Believers

The CCC fulfills its role completely when its theological expression succeeds in describing the human experience of believing in God, when its language is able to let us sense the Gospel that shapes a life, when its dogmatic expression defines the believing experience. In short, therefore' the often-asserted opposition between dogmatic language and the language of experience is empty, while their mutual articulation proves vital. Our clan era has separated what was originally united in apostolic life. The part of the CCC are only the re-appropriation of the life of the Church, four parts which comes first of all. It is the life of faith of the apostles that raises this theological structure of the CCC. So in the CCC the life of the Church and the catechists are not applying an abstract dogma given by the Magisterium of the Church, but rather the Magisterium sets itself to listen to the apostolic life, to discern elements that structure every Christian life. In this way we can better understand the idea that the contents of faith expounded in the CCC refer to how the Church lives her faith, to such an extent that the two are not separable. This is why, in reading every chapter of the CCC, it is right to ask oneself about the experience of faith that it describes (M.-L. Rochette and J.-L. Souletie, La resurrection de la chair, Paris: Le Sénevé-ISPC, 2011,7-15). Without this work, we risk confusing the CCC with an abstract theory that would not take account of the experience of the believer's encounter with Jesus Christ (EG 7-8).

Another aspect of the CCC is suggested by Charles Borromeo, who explained that the catechism is an instrument at the service of catechists ("Doctors of the Church") because it "is applied [will be applied] first of all to make the sincere desire to know Jesus Christ be born in the soul of the believer," Thus the purpose of the CCC is not only to nourish and clarify the believing experience, but also to arouse a desire. This desire has two dimensions: a theological one, the desire to see God, of which St. Thomas Aquinas spoke so well, the other pastoral and pedagogical. There is indeed a catechetical pedagogy of

desire in absolute consonance with what a French writer said about great works: "One of the great and marvelous characteristics of beautiful books [...] is that what the author could call conclusions" can be called "the outset" by the reader" (Marcel Proust, Days of Reading). He went on to explain that great works are great, above all, by giving desire. Setting the desire for Jesus as the purpose of the Catechism, Charles Borromeo has anticipated our initiative for a new evangelization. In effect, without the desire for God, the Gospel will always appear old, because it is desire that opens us to a renewal of faith and of our relationship with Christ. Hence the CCC will evangelize all the better, the more it will make the believer become aware that God also desires the salvation of man. <>

READY OR NOT: PREPARING OUR KIDS TO THRIVE IN AN UNCERTAIN AND RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD by Madeline Levine, PhD [Harper, 9780062657756]

The New York Times bestselling author of **THE PRICE OF PRIVILEGE** and **TEACH YOUR CHILDREN WELL** explores how today's parenting techniques and our myopic educational system are failing to prepare children for their certain-to-be-uncertain future—and how we can reverse course to ensure their lasting adaptability, resilience, health and happiness.

In **THE PRICE OF PRIVILEGE**, respected clinician, Madeline Levine was the first to correctly identify the deficits created by parents giving kids of privilege too much of the wrong things and not enough of the right things. Continuing to address the mistaken notions about what children need to thrive in **TEACH YOUR CHILDREN WELL**, Levine tore down the myth that good grades, high test scores, and college acceptances should define the parenting endgame. In **READY OR NOT**, she continues the discussion, showing how these same parenting practices, combined with a desperate need to shelter children from discomfort and anxiety, are setting future generations up to fail spectacularly.

Increasingly, the world we know has become disturbing, unfamiliar, and even threatening. In the wake of uncertainty and rapid change, adults are doubling-down on the pressure-filled parenting style that pushes children to excel. Yet these daunting expectations, combined with the stress parents feel and unwittingly project onto their children, are leading to a generation of young people who are overwhelmed, exhausted, distressed—and unprepared for the future that awaits them. While these damaging effects are known, the world into which these children are coming of age is not. And continuing to focus primarily on grades and performance are leaving kids more ill-prepared than ever to navigate the challenges to come.

But there is hope. Using the latest developments in neuroscience and epigenetics (the intersection of genetics and environment), as well as extensive research gleaned from captains of industry, entrepreneurs, military leaders, scientists, academics, and futurists, Levine identifies the skills that children need to succeed in a tumultuous future: adaptability, mental agility, curiosity, collaboration, tolerance for failure, resilience, and optimism. Most important, Levine offers day-to-day solutions parents can use to raise kids who are prepared, enthusiastic, and ready to face an unknown future with confidence and optimism.

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Excerpt: In between changing diapers, wiping noses, folding laundry, dialing for takeout, rushing to work, going to parent-teacher conferences, driving carpool, and obsessing over whether your parenting skills are in line with the latest findings on child development, you've undoubtedly noticed that the world appears to be unraveling. Not literally, of course, but what with previously unimaginable political friction at home, increasing tension abroad, deteriorating climate conditions, and the ever-advancing tech revolution, the world, as most of us have known it, is becoming ever more uncertain, unfamiliar, and disturbing.

Most of us have been busy trying to keep our families functioning reasonably well while we juggle home life, work life, and something resembling our own lives. This leaves us little time to process the daily onslaught of calamitous headlines the twenty-four-hour news cycle depends on. Cybersecurity may or may not protect our identities. Our kids won't have jobs. The robot apocalypse is on the way. We weep at the worst of it: another mass shooting at a school, a church, or a synagogue. We cringe at the debasement of dialogue that has become the new normal in politics. We fight feelings of distrust, anger, and helplessness about a future that too often feels dystopian. Increasingly, we turn our attention to our children out of love, fear, and the consolation of being able to exert some control when so much feels out of control.

Amid this drumbeat of disruption, when we take a deep breath, we can see that the changing world actually offers tremendous opportunities for innovation, growth, health, and greater equality. Babies with birth defects can be cured while still in the womb. Paper microscopes that are cheap and easily transportable can help revolutionize health care in developing countries. Headsets that read brainwaves can allow paralyzed patients to control their wheelchairs by simply thinking about movement. CRISPR allows the editing of genes and may soon be eliminating some of our most lethal diseases. We are at an extraordinary moment in time that offers equal evidence for concern, caution, and optimism. Great for scientists and researchers. Not so great for parents and grandparents.

The surreptitiously curated information most of us get is piecemeal, anecdotal, and designed to further addict us to our particular worldview. While it plays to our biases, it does little to actually inform us. We are aware that the world is changing, but experts seem to be short on consensus and it is the velocity of change that we find truly head-spinning. Change has always been with us humans, measured in millennia, centuries, or decades, not in years or even weeks. How do we move ourselves and our children forward when our impulse and our anxiety make us look to the past for solutions that are now outdated? We have always been concerned with the forward trajectory of our children's lives. Anxiety is nothing new. Historically, it has hummed along in the background. But our anxiety is no longer background noise. Not for us. Not for our kids. Anxiety is now the number-one mental health disorder for both adults and children.'

Ready or Not is about addressing that anxiety. It is about the damage unchecked anxiety does to parents' decision-making at the very moment we need greater, not lesser, clarity about everything from which preschool will best nourish our toddler to which university will be the best fit for our high-school senior. Will coding camp or soccer camp or adventure camp help set up our kids for future success? Oh, and what will that success look like? Will it come from the metrics we've always used—well-respected universities leading to in-demand professional jobs with high pay and status? Or will it depend on our child's ability to adapt to ever-changing work requirements, perhaps even the requirement to find purpose while lacking any sort of work in the traditional sense? This book is also about how anxiety (theirs and ours) impacts our kids' well-being and hinders their ability to develop the muscular mental health they'll need in a world that is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, or VUCA, as the military calls it. Anxiety does not have to stifle our judgment or our children's development. By understanding and taking charge of uncertainty and anxiety we can turn our increased awareness into an advantage.

Parents are faced with many challenges over the course of raising children. But at the moment, we face the usual challenges of parenthood compounded by the uncomfortable feeling that we're not really sure which childrearing rules apply and which have passed their expiration date. It's tough to make plans when we aren't sure what we're planning for. I've spent the last three years speaking to a wide range of experts around the country—captains of industry, military leaders, scientists, academics, and futurists—and their projections of our near future, say ten or twenty years down the road, range from life pretty much the way we know it, perhaps with tweaks in self-driving cars and package-delivering drones, to what is called the singularity, in which human intelligence and artificial intelligence combine in some sort of cyborg mash-up. I can't change this lack of consensus on what the future will bring. But I can help you to understand the price uncertainty exacts from us—from our ability to make good decisions, exercise our optimal parenting skills, and nurture our children's healthy development.

The more we know about how vulnerable our thinking can be under uncertain conditions, the more capable we'll be of making decisions that are clearheaded and in the best interest of our children. That's not to say that there is a single solution for all kids and all families. Every child is different, just as every family is different. However, child development is one of the more mature fields in psychology. We're not at a complete loss here, and the evidence suggests that we'll need to adjust some of our traditional assumptions about good parenting. We can look at the data, consider the science, and decide whether we want to shift our attention and intentions or not. As it stands, we are not preparing our children (or ourselves) very well for confronting an unpredictable, rapidly changing future. Just the opposite: in our efforts to protect our children from experiencing distress, we are unintentionally setting up the circumstances that nurture distress today and will surely exacerbate it tomorrow.

Fortunately, while there is little consensus about what the future will look like, there is far greater consensus about the kinds of skills our kids will need to flourish in the coming decades. As Darwin discovered more than 150 years ago, adaptability is the sustaining feature of those who not only survive but who thrive. If you have more than one child, you know that kids seem to come into this world with different degrees of adaptability. One child will only eat grilled cheese or spaghetti for a year or two and another seems to go from baby food to tacos and sushi with great enthusiasm. So can we cultivate adaptability? And what about those other attributes that are likely to give kids an advantage in our uncertain future—things like creativity, flexibility, curiosity, and optimism? As we learn about the science

of epigenetics—the intersection of genetics and environment—we will see that we can, to greater and lesser degrees, cultivate these protective traits in our children. We'll learn how to inoculate our kids against the most disconcerting aspects of an uncertain future and maximize their ability to find fun, challenge, and fulfillment in exactly this kind of environment.

We will need to develop in ourselves a shift in attitude about how, in fact, most people become successful. I've spoken at hundreds of venues to a number north of 250,000 people about trajectories of success. I'm using "success" in a broad sense here. There are folks with large amounts of money and little self-worth. Others are "just getting by" but have fulfilling, happy lives they feel good about. Ultimately, success is an achievement that can only be defined by the person who feels successful. It's not about grades, colleges, salaries, or employment. It certainly can be, but not necessarily. And the vast majority of adults who consider themselves successful have had winding (what I call "squiggly") life paths. So we'll look at the benefits of a squiggly path going forward, the pressing need for moral clarity, as well as how to incorporate a more robust sense of community for all of us who too often feel isolated and alone.

In a popular quip, the scientist Alan Kay said, "The best way to predict the future is to invent it." If I remember right, when I had three children, a private practice, an ailing mother, a husband on too many on-call nights, and an ever-expanding list of responsibilities I never seemed able to meet, "inventing the future" was about the last thing on my mind. Since most of us find the demands of the present crowding out our ability to fully invest in the future, let's at a minimum commit ourselves to preparing our children for that future. Every generation adds to the repertoire of previous generations in fresh and unexpected ways. That is how we adapt, how we innovate, how we continue to move forward. In a time of great uncertainty, if we can raise children who know how to optimize that climate and who greet it with anticipation, optimism, and enthusiasm, we will have done our best to prepare them for a hopeful future they will gladly inherit and invent. <>

START HERE: A PARENT'S GUIDE TO HELPING CHILDREN AND TEENS THROUGH MENTAL HEALTH CHALLENGES by Pier Bryden, MD, and Peter Szatmari, MD [Simon & Schuster, 9781982144586]

From two of the top child and adolescent psychiatrists at The Hospital for Sick Children comes an accessible guide to common mental health struggles, such as anxiety and depression, for any parent wondering how to help their child.

Is my child okay? Is she eating and sleeping enough? Is he hanging out with the right people? Should I be worried that she spends all her time in her room? Is this just a phase? Or a sign of something serious?

As parents, we worry about our children—about their physical health, performance at school, the types of friends they have, and, of course, their mental health. Every day seems to bring new and expanding issues and disorders and troubling statistics about the rise of mental illness in children and teens. It's usually obvious what to do for physical injuries like broken bones, but when it comes to our children's mental health, the answers are much less clear, and sometimes even contradictory.

Pier Bryden and Peter Szatmari, top child and adolescent psychiatrists, are here to help. Using their combined six decades working with families and kids—and their own experiences as parents—they break down the stigma of mental health illness and walk parents through the warning signs, risk factors, prevention strategies, and the process of diagnosis and treatment for mental health challenges arising from:

- Eating disorders
- Anxiety
- Psychosis
- Sleep Disorders
- Substance Use Disorders
- ADHD
- Autism
- Depression
- Trauma
- Suicidal thoughts and behaviors

The most important thing to remember as a parent is that you and your child are not alone. Wellness is a continuum, and there is a lot parents can do to bring their child back to a place of safety. The road ahead isn't always easy or straightforward, but this guidebook offers essential advice that every parent needs to advocate for their child.

As parents ourselves, we know in every fiber of our beings that becoming a mother or father is a transformative experience, and one that almost always brings with it multiple red-letter days of unprecedented joy. However, we also know in every fiber of our beings that becoming a mother or father is to commit to a life of worry about your child—about his or her health, friends, behavior, and grades—and, of course, about your own parenting. We've been there too. We have five children between us, and, yes, even child psychiatrists question their parenting techniques. The constant stream of worries can be exhausting: How serious is this drop in marks in grade nine? Should I be concerned that she goes to her room as soon as she gets home? Is he hanging out with the right friends? Am I doing the right thing?

'While physical ailments such as broken bones and fevers can be frightening in the short term, it's usually quite clear what to do. In contrast, how to handle your child's mental health is often much less clear, and even contradictory. If a child is skipping school, not eating or sleeping well, or isolating themselves from friends and family, some parents are advised to write it off as "just a phase." Others may be concerned that these behaviors indicate a serious issue that requires early treatment to prevent long-term problems. It's not surprising that today's parents feel uncertain if their child is "normal" or if their mental state is something to worry about.

And the truth is that child and adolescent mental illnesses (also known as psychiatric disorders) are common, with somewhere between 10 percent and 20 percent of children and teenagers globally suffering from a mental health disorder. Half of all mental illnesses in adulthood begin by age fourteen, and three-quarters by the midtwenties. Despite the progress we've made as a society to destigmatize mental illness, many children and teens continue to hide their distress from their families and peers because of the shame associated with psychiatric disorders, and parents are left to wonder how they will know if their child is a part of these sobering statistics.

Now more than ever before, parents need help. We suggest you start here. This book is our attempt to address the confusion, helplessness, and isolation that parents too often experience when a child exhibits signs of mental health challenges or illness. We wrote it to provide you with the information and help you need to support your children. After a collective six decades working in children's mental health, we feel uniquely equipped to share the wisdom and practical strategies we have learned from our patients (and their families), colleagues, and scientific research, as well as our own experiences as parents.

If you are concerned about a change in your child's development or behavior, this book will help you ascertain whether he or she is simply "going through a phase" or is in real trouble. (When referencing children, we've alternated the use of male and female pronouns throughout, but we recognize that some children identify as gender neutral and prefer "they/them" and we support this use.) Each chapter focuses on a different mental health issue and opens with a vignette about a parent whose child is in distress, then describes the family's path to understanding what led to the moment of crisis, and how they learned to help their child. As you read, you will accompany these parents and children to meetings with mental health professionals and learn not only about various psychiatric disorders, risk factors, and warning signs, but also what you can do to intervene early to ensure that your child gets the treatment he needs should he develop such a disorder. You will get an inside look into the mental health system, see how a psychiatric diagnosis is reached, what the treatments for different types of psychiatric disorders entail, and what parents of children with mental health challenges can expect for their children's future well-being.

As the title suggests, this book is meant to be a starting point. It would be impossible to provide an exhaustive guide to each and every mental health disorder experienced by children and adolescents, though we have included a detailed list of resources for you at the end of the book so that you can find out more about specific psychiatric illnesses, and, of course, your child's physician or mental health provider is an invaluable resource for any questions we haven't touched on here. Our goal is to help you figure out if your child is struggling with a mental health disorder and provide you with a road map to help her get the treatment she needs.

The most important piece of advice we can give you is this: don't look away. We know that the fear that your child has a mental disorder can be paralyzing. Parents tell us that merely considering the possibility that their child may be undergoing mental challenges evokes self-recrimination, fear of isolation, and the worry that other people—family, friends, neighbors, teachers—won't understand. But if your instinct is telling you that something is not right, trust yourself. There is more harm done by ignoring the signs than by looking deeper.

Some parents have told us that, looking back, they believe they avoided what was in front of them because of an unacknowledged fear that they were somehow responsible for their child's distress. Don't waste your time and energy on misdirected guilt and self-doubt. Focus on your own well-being and nurturing supportive relationships. Doing so will allow you to better sustain your child and family during what is likely to be a challenging time for everybody.

Lastly, whether you are a parent of a child with a diagnosed mental illness or are concerned that your child is at risk, we want to reassure you that you are not alone. The road ahead isn't always easy or straightforward, and relief may be a ways off, but help is there for you. There is a lot you can do to help your child back to a place of safety.

We hope this book will empower you to do so.

Some parents have told us that accepting the natural and legal boundaries that exist for adults in our health care system has actually been the hardest aspect of dealing with their child's illness. However, it can also be an opportunity—to renegotiate your support for your child and to demonstrate confidence in your ability to work together collaboratively while respecting his or her privacy.

We understand that the isolation experienced by parents coping with a child's mental illness can be as great or even more of a disability than the illness itself. We hope that by shedding light on the frequency and nature of children's mental illness—and the many treatment options available—we have helped destigmatize mental illness and made you feel less alone. Yes, you may sense judgment from others and feel exhausted and powerless at times. Your own mental health may suffer as you try to help your child. But remember, you are not alone. There is help for you, too. Before we close, we want to remind you who can help you.

We urge you to resist the shame that many parents still associate with having a child with a mental health disorder that may be holding you back from reaching out to those close to home: your coparent (if relevant), your family, your friends, your own doctor or other health professionals, and, perhaps as we have just discussed, your child's school. In all these cases, with the possible exception of your coparent and health care providers, it is important to negotiate and be honest with your child about what can be shared and what will remain private. Remember that your coparent—whether you are together or apart—has a shared responsibility for your child's well-being, and can be a primary support to both your child and to you (unless in the rare instance they themselves are unstable or a source of significant stress). Your own and your child's health care providers all have a legal responsibility to maintain both your privacy and while the latter cannot disclose your child's private health care information to you except in the case of emergency, they are able to take information from you. If they recommend you seek support for yourself from a mental health professional, anything you share with that individual remains confidential, unless you or someone else is at immediate risk. Consider joining a

parents' support group, even if you feel too tired to go initially. Parent after parent has told us that knowing that other moms and dads are facing similar challenges has been a life saver for them. Find out about community programs—after-school programs, summer camps, mentoring initiatives—designed for children with mental health challenges and their families. By sharing your experiences and concerns, you are not only helping yourself and your child, you are helping other parents who are struggling with their internalized stigma and self-blame.

It is an impossible burden for parents to shoulder sole responsibility for the mental health of their children. We all share it. To borrow a familiar phrase, "It takes a village." On the following page we've listed some essential community resources that help parents support their children's mental health. Unfortunately, they do not exist everywhere and can be at risk in times of public financial constraint, but we urge all parents and health care professionals to advocate for these supports. For parents who are in the midst of crisis, your first job is to look after your child, yourselves, and your families, but once your child has reached a safer place, we encourage you to spread the word about programs that either helped you or that you wish had been available to you.

- Early intervention and education programs for vulnerable children and families;
- Free breakfast and lunch programs for children coming from impoverished homes;
- Safe outdoor environments that promote children's physical activity;
- A mental health system that provides timely affordable access to proven therapies, not just medication;
- Universal child care;
- After-school programs, particularly for vulnerable youth;
- Mental health resources in schools;
- Mental health professionals embedded in family health teams;
- Policies and legislation aimed at preventing or mitigating adverse childhood experiences (ACES) such as abuse and neglect;
- A well-resourced, culturally safe, expert child protection system that can maintain safety for a child while supporting a relationship with parents who require their own mental health treatment for addiction, illness, or their own experience of trauma;
- Legislation and economic support for parents who need to take time away from their work to care for a mentally ill child;
- Advocacy for Indigenous communities—both rural and urban—through policies and funding opportunities that have been associated with improved health and mental health outcomes for children and youth.

Finally, we want to remind you of our book's most important message: Don't look away from your child's distress. Don't try and comfort him too quickly. Insist on spending time with your child even if he resists, but meet him halfway by offering to do something he is interested in. Be proactive. Risk overreacting. Ask difficult, awkward questions. Learn about the behaviors she is exhibiting that worry you and make sure you rely on good sources that refer to science and well-researched evidence. Talk to your own support network and to health professionals whom you trust about your concerns and get their advice and help.

While we understand every parent's fear of facing the possibility that something is truly wrong with your child's mental health, we also know that the consequences of looking away can be tragic. Deep down, your child wants and needs your help. He's counting on you to obtain for him the care he needs. We hope this book reassures you that you are indeed capable of making a positive impact on your child's mental health. We have provided the information, resources, and supports; we know that you will bring the love, courage, persistence, and honesty required to help you, your child, and your family find your way forward to a better place. <>

THE ECOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD: HOW OUR CHANGING WORLD THREATENS CHILDREN'S RIGHTS by Barbara Bennett Woodhouse [Families, Law, and Society, NYU Press, 9780814794845]

How globalization is undermining sustainable social environments for children

This book uses the ecological model of child development together with ethnographic and comparative studies of two small villages, in Italy and the United States, as its framework for examining the well-being of children in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Global forces, far from being distant and abstract, are revealed as wreaking havoc in children's environments even in economically advanced countries. Falling birth rates, deteriorating labor conditions, fraying safety nets, rising rates of child poverty, and a surge in racism and populism in Europe and the United States are explored in the petri dish of the village. Globalization's discontents—unrestrained capitalism and technological change, rising inequality, mass migration, and the juggernaut of climate change—are rapidly destabilizing and degrading the social and physical environments necessary to our collective survival and well-being. This crisis demands a radical restructuring of our macrosystemic value systems. Woodhouse proposes an ecogenerist theory that asks whether our policies and politics foster environments in which children and families can flourish. It proposes, as a benchmark, the family-supportive human-rights principles of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The book closes by highlighting ways in which individuals can engage at the local and regional levels in creating more just and sustainable worlds that are truly fit for children.

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Excerpt: This book project occupied more than a decade, from 2007 to 2019. It unfolded on two continents and utilized a wide range of methods, from legal research and comparative law to site visits and ethnographic fieldwork, and it introduces narratives and case studies from the author's work as examples. The purpose of this preface is to assist readers in navigating the book by providing a brief overview and roadmap. This is especially useful for navigating a complex, multidisciplinary, and multiyear project such as this one.

This book began as a relatively simple comparative study of childhood in two developed countries, using the ecological model of childhood as its framework. An unanticipated event—the Great Recession—reshaped the project almost as soon as it was started. The devastating effects on children and families of global economic crisis left no doubt that global forces, instead of being distant and abstract from the ecology of childhood, could threaten the welfare of children even in economically advanced countries. In response, I expanded the project to consider these potentially toxic forces, gathered under the umbrella of globalization. These global phenomena include unrestrained capitalism, technological change, rising inequality, mass migration, racial conflict, and, most global of all, the human-made juggernaut of climate change. These forces are already at work, destabilizing and degrading the social and physical environments necessary to the survival and well-being of the young. Not only this generation of children but succeeding generations are at risk.

In these pages, I argue for a radical change in value systems. If human society is to survive, we must place the well-being of future generations at the top and not the bottom of our social agenda. A society's

welfare is not captured by measures such as a rising GDP or a higher competitiveness index. As I have argued in my prior writings, which introduced the theory of "ecogenerism," the true measure of a just and sustainable society is whether it meets the basic needs of its children and whether its policies foster environments in which children, young people, and families can flourish. Without these preconditions for sustainable communities, a society's human capital dwindles and, eventually, disappears. A far better benchmark than GDP is found in evidence-based research into child well-being and a far better value system than short-term efficiency is found in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which identifies children's most important needs and assigns responsibility for their nurture and protection not only to parents but to the larger community. The book ends by proposing ways in which each reader, wherever and however situated, can contribute to the goal of building a better world for children on the theory that a world fit for children will be a world fit for everyone.

The analysis in this book is grounded in the ecological model utilized by many disciplines in studying childhood. Pioneered by social scientists studying children's development, this model is designed to place children's lives in social context. It imagines children at the center of a constellation of social institutions and social structures that include and surround them, as represented schematically in the ecology of childhood diagram. The systems in which children are embedded are the "microsystems" where they spend their days, such as the family, peer group, faith community, neighborhood, and school. Where these microsystems intersect and overlap, they create social spaces that are called "mesosystems." Conditions in the microsystems are influenced by spaces where children may rarely or never go. These are the encircling "exosystems" of institutions and structures such as the parents' workplace, economic markets, and health care, as well as social welfare and judicial systems. Permeating every part of this universe is the "macrosystem;' the ever-present climate of ideas, values, prejudices, and powers that create hierarchies that are often damaging to children. In addition to providing insights into fostering the development of children, both as individuals and in groups, the ecological model can provide insights into larger environments for rearing children as well. The ecological model recognizes that childhood is dynamic, not static, and thus events unfolding in any of the systems affecting childhood will have spillover effects into the others. It also recognizes that macrosystemic values, like H^2O in a natural ecological system, are not static but flow up from the microsystems as well as down from on high. Unlike laws of gravity or physics, macrosystemic laws, both written and unwritten, are generated by human societies. In sum, the cultural macrosystem is created by us and can be reformed and reshaped by us.

Roadmap

The ideas presented above recur throughout the book, but what follows is a basic roadmap to aid readers in understanding the book's structure and to assist teachers who might want to assign selected chapters. Using the ecological model as a framework, I have divided the book into four parts, with a total of thirteen chapters. The sequence of parts and chapters is structured to take the reader from the center of the ecology diagram to its outer reaches and back.

Part 1, "Comparative Ecologies," is intended to introduce the project and to orient the reader to the tools and methodologies utilized in the project.

Chapter i, "How a Comparative Study of Childhood Became a Story of Global Crisis," explains the genesis of the project as a comparison of childhoods and child-welfare policies in Italy and the United States that was transformed by unforeseen events, leading to the project's expansion. In addition to the

economic turmoil of the 2008 financial crisis and its fallout, these events included advances in the science of brain development and new research into DNA that shed new light on the roles of nature, nurture, and environmental stressors in the cognitive and emotional growth of infants and children.

Chapter 2, "Tools for Studying Childhood," introduces the reader to the methodological tools and analytical theories I have employed. In addition to exploring ecological and other models of inquiry into children's development, I discuss the central theory animating my approach: the child-centered and environmentally informed perspective of "ecogenerism" introduced in my prior writings. I also explain how and why I selected Scanno, in the Abruzzo Region of Italy, and Cedar Key, in the US state of Florida, as petri dishes for a longitudinal ethnographic comparative study.

Part 2, "Microsystems and Mesosystems;' focuses on the most intimate levels of children's worlds—the places where children actually go. It examines the various microsystems where childhood unfolds and the social dynamics children experience in the mesosystems, those zones where microsystems intersect and overlap. It, too, utilizes the two villages as a petri dish for examining these intimate systems.

Chapter 3, "A Tale of Two Villages," provides detailed portraits of the two villages under study and explores their similarities and differences from a child-centered perspective. It utilizes demographic data and historical materials as well as ethnographic field observations, and it employs the comparative method developed by comparative law scholars to compare similarities, differences, and overarching values within the microsystems of family, school, faith community, neighborhood, and peer group.

Chapter 4, "The Magic of Mesosystems: Seedbeds of Solidarity;' examines how the social institutions that constitute children's microsystems overlap and intersect. It uses examples from both villages to illustrate how these zones of interaction generate personal and group identity and values of solidarity that can transform "other people's children" into "our" children.

Part 3, "Exosystems and Macrosystems;' moves outward from the intimate zones of family and community to examine the larger institutions, such as employment markets, health care, and child-welfare policies, that encircle these microsystems and indirectly, or sometimes quite directly, impact children's lives. It highlights how these exosystems, when they fail to meet children's and families' needs, can threaten the ecology of childhood. It also shows how macrosystemic forces—those ideas, values, prejudices, and powers that permeate the ecosystem—distort our policies and our politics to the detriment of children and of humankind.

Chapter 5, "Falling Birth Rates and Rural Depopulation," looks at two current crises that are largely attributable to exosystemic factors: the sharp decline in birth rates in developed countries, and the migration of young people from rural to urban areas, rupturing their social and family bonds. Young men and women in rich countries want babies, but they are not having them. They want to put down roots but they cannot afford to. The chapter examines the reasons behind this decline, and the consequences of this "baby bust" for young people and for society.

Chapter 6, "The Role of Family-Supportive Policies in the Decision to Have Children," explores how government policies such as day care, affordable health care, parenting leave, and income supports can influence the decision whether to have children. Such policies can make the climate for child-rearing warmer and more child-friendly, or colder, more hostile, and more stressful. Comparisons indicate that the United States lags behind peer nations in providing support to working parents. This phenomenon is

part of an American culture of rugged individualism that treats child-rearing as a private matter and sees supports as a slippery slope to socialism.

Chapter 7, "Children of the Great American Recession," considers the role of market systems in shaping the ecology of childhood and determining whether a nation's children are lucky or unlucky. The chapter begins with an overview of benchmarks commonly used to measure a nation's success. It then traces the impact of the Wall Street meltdown on child poverty, food security, housing stability, child health, and child maltreatment. In each of these areas, children of the US recession were harmed as a result of parental loss of employment, cuts in family-supportive government programs, and fiscal policies that hurt the most vulnerable and further damaged an already frayed safety net.

Chapter 8, "The Great Recession Crosses the Atlantic," shows how a crisis made in America metastasized to Europe, with dramatic consequences for families and children in Italy. As a member of the Eurozone, Italy lacked the power to use monetary policy to fight the recession, and children's lives were even more deeply affected in Italy than in the United States. Utilizing sources such as UNICEF Report cards and OECD studies, this chapter documents the disproportionate effects of austerity policies on children in Southern European countries such as Italy. It closes with an account of the backlash that the fiscal crisis generated in both the United States and Italy, resulting in sharp increases in racism and hostility toward immigrants and refugees, as well as in the alarming rise of radical populist parties and autocratic strongmen.

Chapter 9, "Globalization: The Elephant in the Playroom," presents a critique of the dominant macrosystem. It argues that a set of macrosystemic forces, which I group under the umbrella of globalization, have been the elephants in the room of contemporary social policy. These forces include unrestrained capitalism guided only by short-term profit, the destabilizing forces of technological change, rising inequality even in developed nations, mass migration, the rise of racial and ethnic discrimination, and paralysis in the face of climate change. When examined through the lens of the ecology of childhood, these seemingly separate issues are revealed as collectively apocalyptic. I argue that these ills are produced or exacerbated by a set of misguided beliefs, prejudices, myths, and individualistic values that have come to dominate global policies and have eroded social solidarity. The climate they create is unsustainable and threatens both the small worlds of children and the larger ecology of human societies.

Part 4, "Transforming the Ecology of Childhood," moves from explorations of the ecological model to proposals for macrosystemic transformation and reform. It proposes a child-centered value system as the measure of how well a given society or community is functioning. Grounded in the theory of "ecogenerism" introduced in chapter 2, its guiding philosophy regards a commitment to the welfare of future generations as the mark of a mature, just, and sustainable society This final part considers how to flesh out and implement these ideals.

Chapter 10, "The Role of Children's Rights," asks the metrics question, "How do we decide what is good for children?" I offer the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as an example of a scientifically sound and highly developed scheme of children's essential needs and inalienable human rights. Known internationally as the CRC (Children's Rights Convention), it is the most rapidly and universally accepted charter of human rights in history. This chapter explains the basic concepts of the CRC, in both child-friendly and legalistic terms, and describes its spreading influence in the world beyond the United States.

Chapter 11, "How the CRC Affects Actual Children's Lives," rebuts a criticism often aimed at this charter and at human rights charters in general. The charge is that lofty human-rights principles are simply powerless to affect real world change. This chapter provides concrete examples from the Italian and EU contexts of how implementation of the CRC has improved the lives of real children, giving them voice and furthering recognition of their rights to family, play, education, participation, protection from discrimination, and inclusion. It introduces children's own voices to tell their stories.

Chapter 12, "Building Small Worlds in Urban Spaces," is inspired by E. F. Schumacher's classic 1973 book Small Is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered. Schumacher was prescient in proposing a humanist alternative to the school of economics that has dominated recent policy. In this chapter, I draw upon insights gleaned from studying the ecology of childhood at the village level to advocate focusing on the small and local levels and learning to bring the strengths of smallness to bear on larger problems. The chapter concludes with evidence of how the virtues of smallness are not limited to rural communities but can be introduced into challenging urban settings. It describes and compares two projects, La Sanità in Naples and the Harlem Children's Zone in New York, aimed at improving the lives of at-risk children and youth by building supportive small-scale communities.

Chapter 13, the book's closing chapter, "Charting the Way To a World Fit for Children," begins by highlighting some of the "big ideas" that inform the "small is beautiful" approach. Clearly, action is needed at a global level. But in this book, instead of offering a grand solution for altering the dominant macrosystem from the top down, I close by challenging readers to take action at the grassroots level, reminding them that macrosystems are built from the bottom up. I propose a very accessible menu of strategies for action at the local, municipal, and regional levels, aimed at advancing child-friendly institutions and communities, combatting the myths and prejudices that undermine solidarity in microsystems like schools and faith communities before they take root, and embedding the values of the CRC at every level of the ecology of childhood. Through active engagement, I argue, each one of us can contribute to building a world fit for children. <>

White Kids: Growing Up with Privilege in a Racially Divided America by Margaret A. Hagerman [Critical Perspectives on Youth, NYU Press, 9781479803682]

Winner, 2019 William J. Goode Book Award, given by the Family Section of the American Sociological Association

Finalist, 2019 C. Wright Mills Award, given by the Society for the Study of Social Problems

Riveting stories of how affluent, white children learn about race

American kids are living in a world of ongoing public debates about race, daily displays of racial injustice, and for some, an increased awareness surrounding diversity and inclusion. In this heated context, sociologist Margaret A. Hagerman zeroes in on affluent, white kids to observe how they make sense of privilege, unequal educational opportunities, and police violence. In fascinating detail, Hagerman

considers the role that they and their families play in the reproduction of racism and racial inequality in America.

White Kids, based on two years of research involving in-depth interviews with white kids and their families, is a clear-eyed and sometimes shocking account of how white kids learn about race. In doing so, this book explores questions such as, "How do white kids learn about race when they grow up in families that do not talk openly about race or acknowledge its impact?" and "What about children growing up in families with parents who consider themselves to be 'anti-racist'?"

Featuring the actual voices of young, affluent white kids and what they think about race, racism, inequality, and privilege, **WHITE KIDS** illuminates how white racial socialization is much more dynamic, complex, and varied than previously recognized. It is a process that stretches beyond white parents' explicit conversations with their white children and includes not only the choices parents make about neighborhoods, schools, peer groups, extracurricular activities, and media, but also the choices made by the kids themselves. By interviewing kids who are growing up in different racial contexts—from racially segregated to meaningfully integrated and from politically progressive to conservative—this important book documents key differences in the outcomes of white racial socialization across families. And by observing families in their everyday lives, this book explores the extent to which white families, even those with anti-racist intentions, reproduce and reinforce the forms of inequality they say they reject.

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About the Author

Excerpt:

> Racism is not a problem anymore.... Racism was a problem when all those slaves were around and that, like, bus thing and the water fountain. I mean, everything was crazy back in the olden days.... But now, I mean, since Martin Luther King and, like, Eleanor Roosevelt, and how she went on the bus. And she was African American and sat on the white part.... After the 1920s and all that, things changed. —Natalie (11, Sheridan)
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> I think [racism] is a way bigger problem than people realize. It's nowhere near what it used to be.... It's just different, and white people don't realize it.... I think it's still there. It's just not as present, and people want to hide it. Because they are scared to talk about it. —Conor (11, Evergreen)
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> I think that the white kids, since they have more power in general in society, ... disciplinary actions aren't brought down as hard upon them. But when it's, you know, a black kid getting in trouble with the police, ... I think people are going to be tougher with them, because, you know, [black kids] can't really fight back as well.—Chris (11, Wheaton Hills)

Natalie, Conor, and Chris are all growing up in the same midwestern metropolitan area. They are 11-years-old and in middle school. They all participate in a variety of sports and extracurricular activities, and they have busy social lives with their friends. These kids often travel with their families across the country, sometimes even across the globe. All three attend expensive summer camps and enrichment programs, most play instruments and take private music lessons, and many of them have attended private school or have received private tutoring, at least once in their lives. Like most kids, they are interested in popular culture, though their favorite celebrities vary, especially with respect to Justin Bieber. Every single one loves animals.

Overall, the children in this book are growing up with upper-middle-class privilege in a society where private wealth shapes the experiences, opportunities, and outcomes that follow such childhoods of privilege. These kids have parents with some of the highest levels of educational attainment possible, being alumni of world-class law schools, medical schools, graduate schools, and business schools. These children's parents work in highly prestigious and influential professions and earn lucrative incomes. These parents also all experience heterosexual privilege. While a small number of the mothers in this study do not work outside the home, these women are heavily involved in their children's schools, their local churches and synagogues, and charitable and volunteer organizations. They all have college educations, the majority holding advanced degrees. The fathers all work outside the home, and some are highly involved in the daily lives of their children and coach sports teams or lead clubs. These children are growing up in valuable, well-maintained single-family homes that their parents own, and some families even have vacation homes in different parts of the country.

But these children are not only privileged in that they benefit from the wealth of their parents: these kids are also growing up white and with racial privilege—or as founding figure of American sociology W. E. B. Du Bois wrote, with a "public and psychological wage": the wages of whiteness.' Although many Americans may not believe that race shapes experiences, opportunities, and outcomes in the United States, social science research indicates otherwise. The United States is a racialized society, or a society that "allocates differential economic, political, social, and even psychological rewards to groups along

racial lines; lines that are socially constructed.'" This means that though the racial categories that we have today are meaningful to us, at their core, they are categories crafted by human beings.'

Evidence that we live in a society in which race shapes the lived experiences, opportunities, and outcomes of people can be seen across a range of institutions.' When it comes to children specifically, race structures the education they receive and experiences they have both inside and between schools,' race structures youth exposure to and treatment with law enforcement and within the juvenile (in)justice system,' and race structures the bonds children have (or do not have) with family members as a result of racialized mass incarceration and the War on Drugs.' Race structures kids' experiences in foster care and the child welfare system.' Race structures children's access to health care and even pain medication," and race structures the knowledge children receive through sex education about their own body and sexuality. Race structures where kids live and play, the availability of welfare benefits, and, as mentioned, family private wealth holdings that offer children profoundly different lived experiences and opportunities. The list goes on and on. To put it in simple terms, then, all children growing up in the United States have lives that are structured by race—and this includes the affluent, white kids in this book.

As the epigraphs to this chapter make clear, however, not all white kids think about race in the same way. Despite the similarities in structural privileges that these children have, despite the fact that sociologists often tend to assume these kids think alike, despite these kids' shared interests, and despite the fact that they all live within one metropolitan area, these white, affluent kids have different understandings of race and racism in America today.

I spent two years studying these white children and their families and can show that these kids talk about and interpret race differently. Their subtle behaviors reflect that they think about race and class inequality differently, and the experiences they have with their families and in their day-to-day interactions are substantively different from one another. For example, while some of the 36 children in this study believe racism is present in today's society, some do not. While some of these children believe that the police racially profile and abuse black and Latinx youth, some believe that black and Latinx youth are "bad kids" because their parents "do not care about them:" Some of these children are close friends with children of color, and some of these children rarely even see a person of color. Similarly, while some think that all schools in the United States provide kids with the same education, others speak passionately about how unequal schools in the United States are "a big problem:' Some children believe that the impact of slavery on the black community with regard to wealth holdings can still be seen today, yet other children believe that slavery and the civil rights movement era were one and the same. Some of these kids believe that talking about race "makes you racist," while other children think white people need to talk and think carefully about race much more often. Some children think that black people have "extra muscles" that make them jump higher, while other children think this is absurd. While some of these children believe people get rich because they work hard, some have other ideas about the causes of social stratification. And while some of the children in this study thought the shooting of Trayvon Martin was a grave violation of human rights and evidence of continued racial violence and racism in the United States, other children did not even know Trayvon's name.

How can this be? How can these white, affluent children have so much in common yet think about race in the United States in such different ways? And how do these kids form these different ideas in the first place? How do white kids learn race? What role do parents play in shaping children's racial views? How

do kids growing up in families that do not talk openly about race or acknowledge its impact learn about race? And what about children growing up in families with parents who consider themselves to be "antiracist"? What lessons are these children learning about race, and what is the outcome? Finally, how can children's agency and their own participation in their production of ideas be accounted for within this broader process of racial socialization or racial learning? Do kids simply parrot the ideas of their parents, or is there a more complex process under way? In what ways do kids challenge their parents' perspectives on race, perhaps even influencing parents' views in the process? Answering these questions will allow us to understand the role white kids and their families play in the reproduction, reworking, or maybe challenging of existing forms of racism.

Before providing answers to these questions, I think it is important to address a few key considerations about both what I have written and what I have not. First, this book is not about centering whiteness in a way that detracts from the critical scholarship on race as did much family-based ethnographic research of the past. Traditionally, family research and early developmental psychology assumed white families and children to be "the norm" to which families and children of color were compared and often found to be inferior. Rather than putting white families back at the center of family research, this book seeks to examine white families with the intention of addressing critically the role that white families play in the production and reproduction of white racial power.

Second, I have not written a book about middle-class or workingclass white families. I believe that class plays a role in the process of racial learning—that what is at stake for working-class families when it comes to interpretations of race in the United States may be very different than it is for those with both race and class privilege. For families where economic struggles are not a concern, where power and privilege and security are well-rooted features of everyday life, and where parents and children do not feel any sort of real threat to their status and well-being, the messages about race sent to children may not be the same as those messages received by children growing up in families that are struggling to get by. Research shows that some working-class whites exhibit resentment toward people of color because of a perceived threat to their whiteness, white privilege, and economic interests." As the sociologist Maria Kefalas writes, "While the true victims of race in America were, of course, African Americans, working-class whites could legitimately claim that upper-class whites could more easily avoid the costs of racial change." Other studies challenge this view and find evidence that working-class whites, particularly young white women, are more likely to be racially progressive. While this debate continues, it is certainly the case that very little research critically examines racial socialization processes in affluent white families. As such, I chose to study comprehensive racial learning in these kinds of families deliberately. The parents in this book have access to nearly unlimited resources that allow them to make almost any decision they desire for their children—choices that are accessible only to those with economic privilege, such as tuition costs for private schools or vacations to China or Mozambique or the capability to remove a child from a situation (e.g., switching to a new school) at a moment's notice if deemed necessary. As such, I can show how ideas about race inform the decisions parents make since their choices are less about availability of resources, or what they can afford, and more about what parents truly think is important or "best" for their child. As I will demonstrate, these views about what is important or "best" are shaped in part by racial ideologies and, in turn, send powerful messages to kids about race, privilege, and power. This is true whether parents realize this is the case or not and regardless of what parents actually say out loud to their children about race.

A second reason to study these kids is because through the intergenerational transfer of wealth and as a consequence of the wages of whiteness, these children will likely grow up to hold powerful positions within US society themselves. As such, this work can enhance our understanding of the future of race relations in the United States and how the ideas of future powerful people take hold during childhood.

The third and perhaps more pressing reason to study this particular group of young people has to do with race and class in the United States right now, in the present moment, in an applied sense. American children are growing up in a world with ongoing public debates about race—a world that has seen two completed terms of the first black president of the United States, fervid political and racialized arguments about immigration and criminal justice system reform, recent acts of overt white nationalism and violence such as that in Charlottesville, Virginia, unprecedented youth access to other people through social media, and growing youth activism and protest, such as the emergence of #Black-LivesMatter and many other groups working for racial justice across the country (many with youth leaders and participants). These are children growing up in a world that has seen white peers chanting "Trump" and "Build the Wall!" at basketball games against predominantly Latinx schools, kids who attend schools that have teachers reporting increased bullying along racial lines in classrooms, increased media coverage of the racial disproportionality in who is subjected to violence and torture at the hands of the police, and seemingly heightened discourse about inequality in the United States at large.

In addition to the current events that are marking this contemporary moment as significant in the long history of racism in the United States, social science research shows that white children receive the wages of whiteness from very early ages and well into young adulthood. For instance, one of the driving forces behind increased residential segregation involves patterned decisions made by parents concerning where their white kids will go to school. Research also finds that white kids are more likely to be considered "innocent" in comparison to black and brown peers in the juvenile injustice context or in the context of school discipline. When white young adults commit crimes—as in 2015, when a 21-year-old white man murdered nine black parishioners in the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, or when in 2014 when a 22-year-old white man shot a BB gun at police officers in Concord, New Hampshire—their lives remained intact. Young black people are murdered in seconds by the police even when they are simply suspected of criminal behavior, such as 12-year-old Tamir Rice playing with a toy gun in a public park or 14-year-old Cameron Tillman, who entered an abandoned house with a BB gun. Research shows that even though white youth are more likely to use illegal drugs, arrest rates do not reflect this reality.26 Studies also show that teachers are more likely to designate white children as "gifted and talented" and perceive them as smarter and more capable than peers of color. When doctors think black children need less pain medication, they demonstrate their belief that white children need more, suggesting white children are more fragile, more innocent, and more important to protect from physical pain. These are the privileges of whiteness.

I believe that it is important to examine empirically how white children, such as those in this book, not only are going to have power in their futures as white adults but also already have power and influ¬ence in the present moment, as young white people, in their families and communities. Pushing back against the notion that children lack agency or free will or power to shape adults around them, this book explores the power of white kids in their families, their schools, their peer groups, their extracurricular spaces, and public discourse about who is "innocent" and who is not, who is "special" and who is not, and who is "deserving" and who is not. White childhood is a place where power and privilege take on

not only ideological significance but also material significance for white youth, which is why it ought to be studied.

Of course, the children in this book are not at personal fault for their unearned advantages—certainly, their power is tied directly to the social structure of the society into which they are born and to their position within the structural hierarchies that they neither asked for nor can control. I am not interested in demonizing these kids or their parents, and I am not suggesting that they are individually at fault for racial inequality in the United States. However, I am interested in confronting honestly what is going on beneath the surface within affluent, white families and communities that serves to perpetuate racism and racial inequality in the United States. <>

Becoming a Man: The Story of a Transition by P. Carl [Simon & Schuster, 9781982105099]

"A memoir that is jolting, honest, passionate, and beautifully written" (Claudia Rankine), Becoming a Man explores one man's gender transition amid a pivotal political moment in America.

Becoming a Man is the striking memoir of P. Carl's journey to become the man he always knew himself to be. For fifty years, he lived as a girl and a queer woman, building a career, a life, and a loving marriage, yet still waiting to realize himself in full. As Carl embarks on his gender transition, he takes us inside the complex shifts and questions that arise throughout—the alternating moments of arrival and estrangement. He writes intimately about how transitioning reconfigures both his own inner experience and his closest bonds—his twenty-year relationship with his wife, Lynette; his already tumultuous relationships with his parents; and seemingly solid friendships that are subtly altered, often painfully and wordlessly.

Carl blends the remarkable story of his own personal journey with incisive cultural commentary, writing brilliantly about gender, power, and inequality in America. His transition occurs amid the rise of the Trump administration and the #MeToo movement—a transition point in America's own story, when transphobia and toxic masculinity are under fire even as they thrive in the highest halls of power. Carl's quest to become himself and to reckon with his masculinity mirrors, in many ways, the challenge before the country as a whole, to imagine a society where every member can have a vibrant, livable life. Here, through this brave and deeply personal work, Carl brings an unparalleled new voice to this conversation.

Finally Me! New York, New York

When bodies gather as they do to express their indignation and to enact their plural existence in public space, they are also making broader demands; they are demanding to be recognized, to be valued, they are exercising a right to appear, to exercise freedom, and they are demanding a livable life.—Judith Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly

I have been living as a white, Midwestern woman for fifty years and ten months, until one weekend in March, I cross a line. It comes unexpectedly on this particular day, but I've been thinking and expecting it for as long as I can remember. The Hotel Chandler in Midtown Manhattan: seven months on testosterone, I check in at about 6 PM. "Good evening, sir, how are you?" This isn't my first "sir"—they have come and gone my entire life, and more often in recent weeks. But it's the start of something that from this "sir" forward will be my new life. On March 16, 2017, I become a man.

What changed from yesterday and the day before yesterday? What is this fine line of gender that makes me a woman one day and a man the next? Did my jawline get just square enough, my voice deep enough? Did my hairline recede enough? All I know is that from March 16 forward, I am finally me. I take a selfie and send it to my wife, with a text message: "I'm me now." I can't fucking believe it. I am finally me. I am visible for the first time, just two months shy of my fifty-first birthday. This rite of passage, this moment of being welcomed into the world as embodied is something most people experience at the moment of birth, or even earlier, at the moment of those ultrasound pictures of unborn babies that all my friends with children have, already sexed by their obstetrician and their parents. Some of us are never announced into the world and some of us wait fifty years.

I am finally announced into being in this moment in a random hotel in Manhattan unraveling my past, present, and possible future. There are so many political ramifications of this new body—ramifications I both know and can't know until I begin to live them.

The next morning, I will go down to the hotel restaurant for breakfast. "Good morning, sir, what can I get you? Coffee, sir?" I will read the news on my phone: a white supremacist is being asked to resign from the White House; it's the lead story. Second up, another judge has granted a temporary restraining order on the president's newly revised travel ban, from seven countries to six. This judge also thinks it is discriminatory, even with Iran dropped from the list. My waiter is from India I learn after he brings me my oatmeal; he tells me he and his wife recently immigrated here. Just in time, I think to myself. They both work at the restaurant. He forgets to bring me my orange juice. I will get free breakfast for the rest of the week, with many apologies to this newly minted white man. When I ask for more coffee, he calls me "boss," a term I will hear often from now on from men of color in service positions: valets, waiters, taxi drivers. I am stunned and embarrassed by the term, the sudden privilege and power that emanates from my white male skin. I don't feel it in my body yet. But the world can see it.

I come into being as a white man in 2017. White male supremacists occupy the White House. Immigrants are deported and denied entry to the United States. Black lives don't matter to the

politicians controlling Congress. I am announced to the world as a man eight months before #MeToo will fill our social media and news feeds—women will unsilence themselves and begin the arduous process of dismantling the lives of individual men, one by one by one, for unspeakable acts of discrimination, harassment, assault, and abuse. No part of this two-year stretch has been more divisive than the Republican Party's insistence on appointing Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court. No moment has been more despairing than listening to Susan Collins, a woman, a senator, say that Christine Blasey Ford was likely assaulted but that it wasn't by Kavanaugh—to hear one woman say to another woman that she doesn't believe her, among a chorus of white men who decry what has been done to Kavanaugh, that he is the victim, not Blasey Ford. Depending on who sees me and in what context, my body is grouped with these men and Collins in this moment in history—a threat not just to women but also to a fragile democracy on the brink of collapse, in part over a gender divide that has never been more volatile.

This book is a layperson's anthropological exploration of living a double life, Double consciousness, to borrow a term from W.E.B. Dubois, is a permanent condition of a trans person who has lived a life in one body and then another. The nuances of doubling require an untangling of two bodies, two distinct perspectives, two lives lived. I seek to do justice to the complexity of this emotional travel as I write this book in a number of different cities and through an evolving bodily transubstantiation where in one moment I am material subject matter to be consumed and in another I feel like a holy essence, my body and blood both sacrificed and blessed into being.

For most of my life, this process of becoming feels lethal, the disparate parts always at war with one another. I am born to the name Polly, but I never feel like her. I spend decades trying to know her, shape her into something that I can bear to live with. I medicate her, I dress her like I imagine Carl would look if he were allowed to live. On two occasions, I try to kill her off. The moment at the Hotel Chandler when I am lifting my hands over my head and jumping up and down and taking photos and posting them everywhere is the beginning of revelations, the ones I will try to convey to you in these pages. I become solid enough to share with you how my becoming is filled with contradictions and questions, and sometimes I have the courage to look back and tell you about what Polly went through and other times I want to convince you I was always only Carl.

I purposely choose a name to reflect my past and present. I don't know all the ways this name will matter to the life that will unfold when I choose it. I do know that I am fifty-one when I change my name. I can't imagine suddenly being summoned as Paul, or my favorite Italian name, Giacomo, Jack in English. I know that if I heard these names at this stage in my life, I wouldn't recognize them as me. Polly Kathleen Carl. What parts of her can I keep? My father and brothers have often mistakenly been called Carl, as if their last name might be their first. P. Carl is continuity. I hold on to a piece of her and acknowledge that he has always been with me. I had no idea the trouble this name would cause the world. It crashes the computer systems at the pharmacy and the airport. It makes my passport look like it's missing a first name and at every border crossing I must convince the customs agent that this is me. Each exchange requires a shift in vantage point for what can constitute a name. "Yes, this is really my legal name," I say over and over. "I go by Carl." Though the first time we meet, people insist on calling me "P," as if what is first in the order of a name must always come first.

This is also a book about changing a name, a life, and a gender—crossing a seemingly indistinguishable line and all the implications of that crossing—for me, my family, my friends—in an American political

landscape that misunderstands transgender bodies even as some progress is being made toward accepting that we exist, we are human, and we deserve a livable life. I lived half a century first as a girl and then as a queer woman, and now for almost two years as a man. What does it mean for a body to transform? Do those changes transform an inner life, a person, and his personality? Am I fifty-two years old? Or have I just been born? What do you see? What do I feel? What do I know about America's fraught relationship with gender having inhabited these two bodies? Is there a revolution lurking in my double consciousness, in transgender bodies, that might reinvent discussions of gender? Can I, can other white trans men, bring something new to the conversation about white masculinity? In the words of Christine Blasey Ford, an American hero, my purpose in coming forward is to be "helpful."

If you had asked me five years ago, before I started taking testosterone, "Are you a man?" I would have said no. I would have said, as I wrote in an essay at the time, "A Boy in a Man's Theatre," that I was a boy—that I had missed the rites of passage to adulthood because I was never a girl and never a woman, and I didn't want the baggage that comes with being a man. I desired to live in perpetual boyhood because boys are infinitely more likable than men.

Everyone around me was comfortable with this. They liked the image of me as a boy. I looked the part—youthful, short-haired, and short in stature, dressed in little tailored suits. My wife joked, "You dress like a businessman, a tiny toy businessman." The last lines of my wedding vows to Lynette from 2012 were, "And I own these words now and say them with all the conviction a boy can muster: I love you, Mary Lynette D'Amico, and vow to do so forever and always." As long as I stayed in the container of my female body, I could call myself a boy and still be a heroic woman, happily married to Lynette, challenging men and their dominance in my profession and inside my family.

It's an important distinction, and one I didn't understand until I crossed over from boy to man. In the queer community, boy is an affectionate term; the slang boi is used as another way to refer to younger or perhaps "less butch" butches. Butches and boys aren't men, they are queer women. Lesbians, my wife for example, have expressly defined their desire in opposition to men but not to butches and to boys (that is, tomboys). When women marry butches and boys, they are still marrying women on the legal certificates.

Boys also have less accountability than men. I keep thinking of the family of the president. His two older sons are men and get called out for hunting endangered species, for lying, for being sexist. But the youngest son is only twelve. I don't know what he does, but there is a consensus that he's off-limits to a certain degree because he's a boy. There is an accountability that comes with white adult masculinity, and if you've spent your life minimizing your contact with it and its power over you, suddenly being confronted by a white man in a marriage or friendship can be an unforgivable transgression. Being a boy kept me in a body that presented as androgynous, quirky, tomboy, singular. It was a queer body that created discomfort for the world, but my family, friends, and most of the people in my profession embraced it as the true me; they had accepted and counted on my queerness. The opposite happened when I became a man. The world scooped me up and gave me a warm welcome in places I could never before have entered comfortably, and many of the people closest to me turned away, betrayed by a transition they took personally.

My father soured me to the idea of manhood from the get-go. My wife of twenty years wasn't encouraging about the subject. She has identified as a lesbian for forty years, and though she loves boys,

especially our nephews, men haven't been of particular interest to her. She never had any intention of living with one. And as much as I had done every single thing to look like a man and live like one, I denied wanting to become one because I didn't want to become my father or lose my lesbian lover or be a failed feminist and intellectual.

As a feminist for my entire adult life, and as someone who completed a PhD in cultural studies, my transition creates ripples of complications for my brain, a brain that lived with certainty about the elasticity of gender and its capacity to flex and expand with the culture. I desperately wanted to inhabit my ambiguity as a political position, as a way to say that I would not perpetuate a binary that almost killed me, but when I heard the definitive nature of that "sir" inside the Hotel Chandler, my body never wanted to look back. I imagined myself packing a single bag, a change of clothes, my passport, and some cash, and boarding a plane to another country to live the life I had missed for whatever time I had left on this earth.

My head and my body were at odds. I had been scrutinizing masculinity my whole life, trying to perfectly replicate it in my gestures and clothes and physique. I stayed very trim, wore only men's clothes, studied the latest short-hair styles, tried to keep the tenor of my voice low, and always played the roles that I thought men played. I earned. I mowed the lawn. I kept track of the finances. I filed the taxes. I shoveled the snow. I lugged the air conditioners from the basement to the bedroom windows every summer. I always drove. I was grossly deficient at housecleaning. I owned only one bathroom towel when my wife, Lynette, first moved into my bachelor pad. But I insisted that I was not a man, until at age fifty, the knowledge that I had only ever felt like a man and a boy poured out of me with a certainty that I would never deny again. I learned quickly that it's okay to theorize about bodies, but altering a body's sex is perhaps the greatest disruption to the social order that makes up friendship, work, and love.

My body's biological need is to live as a man. It presents a gender theory problem. My PhD had trained me to put all of my emphasis on the cultural manifestations of gender as a construct. I see queer and trans people wearing T-shirts now that read "Gender Is a Social Construct." I think the oversimplification of that is as dangerous as is the reinforcing of genitalia defining sex as God's will. A construct is something we make; it is a materiality that is drawn from the offerings of culture and reinscribed so seamlessly that it feels natural. For me, living as a woman was a construct. I am not a philosopher and this book is not a treatise on the ontological nature of being. What I know is that this transition wasn't something I knew I wanted, it wasn't something I chose. It was a longing and a desire so deeply embedded in my body that I could barely access it because every part of my life, all that culture had to offer, told me I couldn't have it. I believe my maleness is the truest and most stable thing about me, and has been so since my earliest memories. I experience myself as a man; not as a construct, but how I construct that man knowing what I know as a woman is my work now.

There is a photo of me at age four with my older brother and some of my cousins. I'm wearing my brother Tim's purple paisley shirt, an article of clothing I adored; it's unbuttoned and my naked chest is sticking out proudly and I have a huge smile on my face. That boy knew who he was. How the culture of my childhood and most of my adulthood made living and exploring that truth both impossible and deadly is the trauma that formed my emotional core, separated my soul from my living, breathing existence. My body could feel alive and my heart could feel warm only when testosterone reunited me with that boy at age four who, I so clearly remember, dreamed of being a man.

"That's what she wanted. White picket fences. Happy hubby, romantic, man and woman. And yet, she had the body she had, and she was who she was."

These are the words of the best friend of the first transgender person killed in the United States in 2018. Christa Leigh Steele-Knudslien was bludgeoned with a hammer by her husband and then stabbed in the back and through the heart. "She had the body she had." These six words play over and over again in my head. The inescapable doubling of the transgender body, expressed as if doubling means a life can never be complete, as if a certain combination of body parts is necessary to achieve "happiness," even for a best friend who knows which pronouns to use.

How to tell you what it feels like? How to bring you inside this experience with me, so that you can be not just openhearted, but so you can know me, so that when I die, you can say the right words? Please don't say "he had the body he had." Please don't ask me if I feel incomplete because the top half doesn't match the bottom, as one good friend did. I love this body and all its contradictions. Please know that many things are true about my history that can never add up. I was conscripted to the girls' locker room and the women's restroom, but when I was speaking to you I was always speaking to you as the boy I was and the man I am. I knew I had to check the F box on my passport application to go to college in London, but when I saw the photos of me standing next to Windsor Castle, I didn't recognize her and turned away. I will always feel the rage of being a woman who was told on too many occasions that I was aggressive and ambitious and angry. I feel those feelings as her, even though she's me and not me. An inner self can learn to walk parallel with a constructed self and know and not know it simultaneously.

I am transgender to my past, to all the people who knew me as Polly. Friends will say, when I am not around, "You know, he was she before he was he." I will enter rooms where my past is present and watch people search for the woman in me. I am an object of curiosity in one setting and the embodiment of privilege as I flaunt my whiteness and masculinity in another. I am a spy. I watch men and how they behave: I am at the pool. A man dismisses a young woman's kind request. She has reserved the lane he is in for the lesson she will teach, the schedule posted on the door to the entry to the pool. "This is my lane." He sneers at her and swims on. The next time he pops his head out of the water I shout at him, "Move the fuck over, buddy," and he does. My body is at risk as trans and it has incredible mobility as white and male. I represent a threat to the lone woman walking in the park with her dog, and I am perhaps the greatest hope for the young trans students at the college where I teach, the only transgender professor as of this writing.

I have never felt so much. I am like a newborn who is expected to drive sixty-five miles per hour down the highway, but I can't see above the steering wheel. I crane my neck upward to get a glimpse of wholeness in the rearview mirror and weep with relief at that gorgeous gray-haired man. I want to believe that my past is behind me, that I will look at him forever, that we are undivided. There is an episode in the Amazon television series Transparent in which the trans women on the show have their childhood photos altered to reinvent their history, to imagine their pasts different from what they were, to see themselves as the young girls they wish they had been. I want this, too, at the beginning. But I am a married man, and this transition isn't singular. I was a lesbian lover once and now I am a husband. What to do with my history of loving the same woman for twenty years when both bodies worship the ground she walks on?

Old relationships formed under a dead name flounder, dead-ending, ending. "You changed," they say—all the ways of coming into being as a transgender person threaten the chronology of history and memories for others. "Be prepared to lose everything," my healthcare provider tells me when I start testosterone. This hardly feels like a warning because I think I can't lose everything fast enough. I want her to stop talking and just give me that testosterone shot. But she was right, and over the course of these two years I have to face the loss. It's taboo in the trans community to use someone's "dead name." Do not, for example, put a dead name in an obituary, or refer to the time when she was her if he is now him. I break that taboo in this book. You must know Polly, as much as I will begrudge telling you, because Polly knows so much about Carl and vice versa.

Polly knows what it is to be treated as a woman and to live inside the confines of the female gender. Carl knows the freedom of being a man and what happens in spaces where only men are allowed to go. Polly felt intensely the discrimination of being a successful woman, a leader in American theater. Carl witnesses the discrimination against women everywhere now in a way that Polly's body couldn't take in. I am a work in progress, always doubling as different selves in different spaces, still learning how to navigate the multiple truths this body inhabits. When I shout at that man in the pool, it's Polly's memories and Carl's body.

I am slowly being surrounded by many young people who define themselves as nonbinary, friends who refuse to pick a side and use the pronoun "they." And this possibility, one that feels very recent, may change the gender landscape for the better. It is a different experience of being trans and one that I am eager to continue to learn from. At the same time, white masculinity is more defined and powerful than ever—in the workplace, in the government, in the gym where I work out every day, in my little apartment in Berlin where I watch Kavanaugh testify, shout in anger, cry out over the indignation of being held accountable, lie repeatedly, and then get sworn into a lifetime appointment to the Supreme Court.

I walk in the world as a man. I am experiencing that privilege for the very first time and I love it unapologetically. This side of the binary suits me. But I can't walk freely and act like I don't know what women face in a culture of men who dismiss a women's terror and traumas and history as unworthy of consideration. I will not recover from what I am seeing, a woman recounting her deepest pain in front of a group of disinterested and disbelieving men who run our country. The part of the assault most etched in Blasey Ford's memory, of two boys/men laughing, not at her, but with each other over their power to destroy her life. I know she did not forget who was in that room. As my visible queerness has dissipated, and the fog of being disassociated from my body has lifted, I see with crystalline clearness the power that operates in men's bodies—power that threatens the very integrity of our nationstate.

I see all the flaws of men, all the ways their fragility makes them dangerous and powerful and dismissive and sure that they know it all, and I love being a man. I love masculinity and I love hanging out with men. My body is a contradiction. I feel a fiery rage toward men for treating me like a woman, for making women seem crazy and emotional and inferior, for what men did to me. I feel so much joy living in a man's body, my natural physicality, and I am trying to find a path toward becoming a good man.

If we are to survive America's current war over who gets to have a livable life, we must confront and understand masculinity and we must all seek some version of double consciousness, to be inside and outside of identities that are not our own. Transgender people have something important to offer this

conversation, and perhaps if we are allowed to speak, if we're heard, we too will have a chance at more livable lives. <>

INVISIBLE AMERICANS: THE TRAGIC COST OF CHILD POVERTY by Jeff Madrick [Knopf, 9780451494184]

"A clarion call to address this most unjust blight upon the American landscape. Madrick has provided a valuable service in presenting a highly readable and cogent argument for change."--Mark R. Rank, *The Washington Post*

By official count, more than one out of every six American children live beneath the poverty line. But statistics alone tell little of the story. In *Invisible Americans,* Jeff Madrick brings to light the often-invisible reality and irreparable damage of child poverty in America. Keeping his focus on the children, he examines the roots of the problem, including the toothless remnants of our social welfare system, entrenched racism, and a government unmotivated to help the most voiceless citizens. Backed by new and unambiguous research, he makes clear the devastating consequences of growing up poor: living in poverty, even temporarily, is detrimental to cognitive abilities, emotional control, and the overall health of children. The cost to society is incalculable. The inaction of politicians is unacceptable. Still, Madrick argues, there may be more reason to hope now than ever before. Rather than attempting to treat the symptoms of poverty, we might be able to ameliorate its worst effects through a single, simple, and politically feasible policy that he lays out in this impassioned and urgent call to arms

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In 1962, Michael Harrington published The Other America, which awakened America to the extent of poverty in a nation that at the time thought the postwar affluence had solved such problems. Harrington presented persuasive evidence that at least 25 percent of Americans were poor, and it shocked a nation that thought of itself as newly affluent. A middle class was flourishing by the 1960s. Harrington's book and the buoyant economy combined to raise the American people's sense of obligation and commitment to decency. Under President Lyndon Johnson, the country adopted a range of generous programs for the poor, including children, and people of color. This "War on Poverty," though hardly as bold as it could have been, succeeded far more than its later deriders claimed.

But the child poverty rate in America today is 20 to 25 percent as I measure it, and arguably higher, and it has produced no wave of response vaguely similar to Johnson's more than fifty years ago. My purposes here are to document the scourge of child poverty, the many ways it damages children and limits their possibilities, to make clear the immense irresponsibility of the world's richest nation to tolerate basically the highest child poverty rates in the developed world, and to recommend what should be done about it.

'There are roughly 13 million officially poor children in America, nearly one in five. If properly measured it would be closer to one in four, and with more honest assumptions more than one in three. In France and Germany only around one in ten children are poor, and by a more stringent test. In the Nordic nations, only one in thirty children are poor. Child poverty is lower in these nations not because the economy produces fewer poor people but because social policies are directed at supporting the poor more generously and efficiently than in the United States.

Our struggling children lack material goods and services, including minimally decent shelter and healthcare. The level of material deprivation, or hardship, as analysts call it, is much higher than the government-reported poverty rate. Some analysts argue that child poverty is lower because parents don't remember and don't fully report income from government programs on government surveys. Others note that many people underreport earned income. Even with underreporting, poverty rates would be higher than in almost any other rich nation. Moreover, according to the latest studies, well over one in three American children live in a household with a significant deprivation: inadequate food, lack of access to medical care due to its cost, seriously overcrowded housing, and so on.

These children are well aware of their poverty, and they live not merely in deprivation but also in shame. 'They see themselves as irredeemable outsiders. They watch television and observe how others live; they see movie ads even if they can't afford to go to the movies. They flip through sophisticated comic books, which they cannot buy. Debilitating pessimism is thrust upon them at a young age. When middle-class Americans scoff at poor kids because parents buy them the latest expensive sneakers and iPhones, they are unaware that these kids demand these things not to show off but mostly to belong, a deep need of which they are mostly deprived.

I will argue that poor children have many requirements, but above all they need money.

The distress and consequences of child poverty are too often ignored. Reducing child poverty is more consequential than reducing poverty among other groups due to its longer term effects. Overwhelming evidence makes clear that poverty results in lasting damage to poor children compared to middle-income children. Their cognitive abilities are seriously reduced, their emotions are destabilized, and their health is compromised over a wide range of debilities. They often live in physical and emotional pain. Infant mortality is higher in the United States than in other rich nations. Such studies are adjusted for race, ethnicity, and parental education to isolate the effects of low income itself.

Child poverty was hardly mentioned in the 2016 presidential primary battles by Democrats or Republicans, nor in the general election campaign. Some Democratic presidential candidates are only now beginning to formulate policies aimed at incomes below the median—below the halfway point of workers' wages. But these policies, given stagnating incomes for more than a generation, typically don't go far enough.

Such damage has measurable longer-term consequences for the productivy of poor children when they become adults, their health costs, and the costs of crime. A stunning recent analysis finds that GDP is up to $1 trillion lower as a result of child poverty, or more than 5 percent. Many analysts agree this is a reasonable, if as I say shocking, number. It is mostly due to reduced labor productivity of workers, higher health costs, and the costs of crime, including incarceration. Child poverty affects all of us.

The American social policy system of the last forty years emphasizes work for parents through income tax credits, which are not the best way to reduce poverty. Instead, I will advance a position embraced by a burgeoning number of academics: America should be distributing substantial cash grants to all families with children without conditions. Better-off families will have much of the income taxed away.

Why not childhood benefits only to poor families? America's most successful social programs, including Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment insurance, are all universal. The deduction of interest on home mortgages is similarly available to all homeowners. And primary and secondary education is free for all children in America. Such universal programs have persistent and widespread political support. These are what made America great. A universal program will also cover those children considered merely "near-poor" by the current official poverty measures—I will argue that these children are in fact truly poor.

In tracing the causes of America's neglect of poverty through its historical ideology, its longstanding skepticism of the poor, its continuing deep-seated racism and anti-immigrant attitudes, and a superficial scholarship of dependency, I will bring attention to the deliberate official understating of the numbers of the poor. The official poverty measure in America is one of the most irresponsible statistics produced by the government. I will closely examine the damage done to poor children, and describe how these children actually live.

Money Matters

Poor children and their parents have so many needs, but cash should be the highest priority. Several strands of research over the past twenty years have helped form a consensus among leading academics that cash income spent by parents can reduce disadvantages for children significantly. The research has partly been based on experiments when some poor groups have suddenly had access to more money than others, due, for example, to increases in the generosity of federal social programs. The studies show that those poor children do better in school, are more likely to graduate from high school, are often more stable emotionally, are healthier, make higher wages as adults, avoid incarceration, and live longer. Provocative historical sociology studies on cash relief programs begun more than a hundred years ago have convincingly found longer life spans resulting from greater incomes, as they follow recipients to their death. Enabling families to use cash as they choose without conditions has been a constructive solution in Europe and Canada. Parents spend the money by and large on their kids' needs, and unconditional cash distributions minimize the stigma of poverty, reducing the patronizing attitudes of government officials and soci¬ety at large.

That America does not provide adequate housing for the poor, decent institutions for childcare, adequate levels of food subsidy, or public education of equal quality is no secret. These needs absorb significant analytical time, institutional attention, and government money, but corrective actions are woefully slow in formulation and fall short of satisfying the need.

Child poverty is too punishing and harmful to wait years for results—especially when cash distributions can help today. A family with two children being provided $300 to $400 for each child when typical decent housing costs roughly $boo or $700a month can improve their standard of living immediately. The additional income significantly raises the family food and clothing budgets. It may help buy decent childcare for working mothers. Some scholars believe poverty can be cut in half almost immediately for roughly $90 to $110 billion of federal funding a year.

Why Social Policies are Inadequate

Since the 1990s, America's new and substantial social programs, including welfare reform and the expanded Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), have been mostly designed to get poor parents to work. Their benefits are determined by how much they make. This attitude toward poverty policy reflects a centuries-old battle in America about who the deserving poor are. American leaders have largely concluded that only those who work deserve government aid. Even food stamps have a work requirement. Welfare has changed, but poverty rates have remained high.

Tax credits, which as implied reduce taxes owed, are inefficient and favor the better-off among low-income people rather than very poor Americans. Poverty rates have fallen as a result since the 1990s, but not as much as even some progressive advocates claim, an issue we will address late in the book. Tax credits do not in themselves create either the jobs or the opportunities America badly needs. Studies have found that tax credits also "pushed down somewhat wages in low-skilled labor markets in general. This wage reduction decreases the earnings and employment of others." Direct cash aid is denigrated by both the left and the right as a waste and inducement to laziness and abuse. But the social policies of today are failing. The poorest of the poor are wantonly neglected, including poor children, under the new American social regime. The sheer number of poor children is a moral tragedy and an appalling waste of precious resources.

The Ubiquitous Poor

If you're an American, relentless family poverty is nearby. It's growing in formerly rich suburbs like Nassau and Suffolk Counties in New York. It's now near the national average in newly rich areas like Santa Clara County in Silicon Valley (12.3 percent). It remains in the Deep South and the agricultural Southwest, where there are the greatest number of poor counties in the country. It is in the Inland Empire of California and persists in Appalachia and in Washington, D.C. People in the citadels of old money, in the elite neighborhoods of Chicago and New York, know it is only a few blocks or at most a couple of miles away—if they think about it at all. Poverty is even more concentrated in recent years than it was in the 199os. "There are now more census tracts of concentrated poverty than have ever been recorded before," writes the policy scholar Paul Jargowsky.

A higher proportion of children are poor than adults. To stick for the moment with the official poverty measure, the child poverty rate is 17.5 percent versus 12.3 percent for adults. An updated alternative poverty measure developed by the federal government, but also with flaws, is called the Supplemental Poverty Measure. I believe it, too, understates child poverty. It places child poverty at 15.6 percent, but adults' poverty is more than 2 percentage points lower.

Put another way, children comprise roughly onequarter of the population but one-third of the official poor. More than one out of three American children live in official poverty for at least one year. By European poverty measures, the rate could approach one in two. More white children are officially poor

than white adults, more black children than black adults, and more Hispanic children than Hispanic adults. One reason there are more poor children than adults is the high number of single-parent households, often headed by women, whose poverty levels are particularly high, in part because there is only one income. The proportion of single-mother households in Europe is almost as high as it is in America, yet their child poverty rates are far lower as a result of adequate social programs.

While tax credits can help, as have improvements in access to health insurance for children, far more attention is paid to the elderly in America than to children. Aid for the elderly, including Social Security, a cash program, and Medicare, is commendable and necessary. But American social programs raise twice as many elderly out of official poverty than they do poor children. The Agriculture Department's measure of food insecurity is more than twice as high for children as for the elderly, strongly suggesting that children's poverty rates are understated. To put it simply, children do not have enough food to eat.

In an age where better-off parents spend so much more to enrich their children's lives than they once did—one estimate is an additional $10,000 a year in developmental expenses for their children—poor children are falling even further behind. To the extent they don't or can't develop their full potential, the economy is significantly undermined. When poor children do not receive adequate aid, collateral damage is done to their mothers, who often don't have access to jobs, are subject to racial and gender pay gaps, and have inadequate help in a society that now virtually demands that women work and incarcerates poor men, particularly men of color.

Measuring Poverty

The irresponsible and cavalier way America calculates how many people are poor reflects its long-standing skepticism about who is poor and its historical lack of sensitivity to poverty. Even well-meaning analysts oversimplify the child poverty problem because they are content to use official measures as true estimates of poverty. Those estimates are inaccurate and biased.

There was no official poverty line in America until 1969, though there were many estimates of the number of poor since the 1800s. The line finally adopted, the Official Poverty Measure (OPM), is among the least sensible and misleading statistics the U.S. government produces. The basis for the OPM has not been updated in more than fifty years. It is a low rate that has not kept up with changing standards of living, a measure that few other nations use. When first adopted, the poverty line was about 5o percent of typical household income (the median). Today, adjusted for inflation, the line is 30 percent of median household income. There is no scientific or rational basis for that discrepancy.

Alternative poverty measures have been devised, notably the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM), which has been endorsed by the Census Bureau, the agency that calculates the OPM. The SPM is a more complex, up-to-date, and comprehensive measure, which includes government programs. The OPM includes only cash income. Yet it, too, is inadequate to the problem. As of early 2019, the SPM raised the poverty line only slightly above the OPM, from $24,800 for a family of two adults and two children to roughly $27,000.

The pressure for four to live within an SPM budget of $27,000 is intense. The rent for a very modest two-bedroom apartment in many locations is roughly $800. That leaves about $350 a week, including government programs, for an officially poor family of four for food, childcare (which can be very expensive), clothing, entertainment, schoolbooks, taxes, and the rest. Add a reasonable estimate to run

a car at $1,000 a month, but not likely less than $500, and money for absolute necessities cited above is down to less than a couple of hundred dollars a week. Doing without a car in most of America is a serious handicap. Public transportation for two workers could easily run $300 a month. The United Way Alice Project finds that 43 percent of American households, nearly 51 million, can't afford to meet the costs cited above plus a smartphone. A national survey done by Gallup every few years finds that people think a family of four must earn roughly $50,000 a year just to "get along." If the poverty line were moderately realistic, official poverty rates would be significantly higher, and the nation, even its legislators, would be more aware and perhaps more sensitive to the tragedy unfolding. Many believe that an informal definition of low income in America is twice the official poverty line, or about that same $50,000 a year for a family of four. At twice the current poverty line, more than 40 percent of children live in low-income families in America, or more than 30 million children.

The OPM should conservatively be $37,000 dollars a year for a family of four, about 5o percent higher than it currently is. This would leave it close to the 50 percent level of median household income it was in 1969. Such a level would add another 8 or so million to the number of poor children in America.

My own ideal definition of a useful poverty measure would be this: the level below which we know that short- and long-term damage is being done to children. There are examples of such poverty lines drawn before World War II and even in the 1800s. Such an idea is not now a formal consideration in academic circles, partly because choosing such a threshold for damage would be difficult given the state of the research. Future research into damage done, however, may make it easier to do. Measuring it this way would reinforce the reasonableness of a poverty line at 1.5 times the current OPM or higher.

So far, I have been referring to families who live near the poverty line. But nearly 6 million children live in families that earn half or less of the official poverty line, which policy experts call deep poverty. Nearly 20 million of all Americans live in deep poverty today. For a family of four, this is roughly $12,500 a year, or a little more than $1,000 a month, not nearly enough for both minimal nutrition and housing. This is squalor. These especially low-income children suffer measurably worse harm. There are 3 million children who live, before counting food stamps, on $2 a day in cash, the poverty rate devised by the World Bank for poor and developing nations. This is informally known as extreme poverty, though the terms deep and extreme are sometimes used inter-changeably. Counting food stamps would reduce this estimate, but food stamps are not the equivalent of cash.

For those in the bottom half of the poverty population, welfare is profoundly inadequate, in good part a result of the reforms of the 1990s under Bill Clinton. If a family earns no or little income, which has been increasingly likely in the last thirty years of declining pay and few good jobs, America is severely punishing them. The only major cash or quasi-cash welfare programs are food stamps, now known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), the Clinton welfare reform program of 1996, which is far less generous than the welfare system it replaced. If a family with children is lucky enough to receive both programs (many states resist allowing families onto TANF), the income from these programs will on average amount to only 55 percent of the already low official poverty measure. In seventeen states the total is under 50 percent of the OPM; in one state, Mississippi, less than 40 percent of the official poverty line.

Deservingness

America has long been resistant to adequate poverty policies because of its strong strain of thinking that the poor are responsible for their own situation, no matter their suffering. On balance, economists have not helped enough, and many have made matters far worse. The inherent bias among even the best of them is usually that economic growth will "cure" poverty, but that has never been the case. Economic growth has reduced extreme poverty, notably in some of today's developing nations with improved social policies, but nowhere has it nearly eliminated it. In America, inadequate opportunities, belief in small government, institutional prejudices among banks and real estate developers, racial bias in education and labor markets, underfunded schools, and a desire by many powerful businesses for poor workers who won't demand higher wages all contribute to the persistence of large numbers of poor who suffer and lead minimized lives. History has shown unambiguously that government assistance is necessary to alleviate this suffering.

There are many factors that can worsen the damaging consequences of poverty, including a dearth of affordable housing, crime-ridden neighborhoods, poor schools, and inadequate child services. Many experts insist we should fix most of them. A study just released in 2019 under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences proposed four different plans to reduce child poverty, for example. The authors included tax credits and work requirements in each of their plans, along with other proposals, including cash allowances. Their mandate was to propose policies that reduce child poverty. Advocates of such a full-court press against child poverty, however, may distract from getting the job done.

For policymakers, there is a more optimistic and more direct answer. The finding that money alone can make a large difference amounts to a major breakthrough. "One of the odd aspects of the history of writing about poverty," writes the historian Michael Katz, "is the avoidance of the simple view that people are poor because they lack money. Again, a cynical historian could see much of the writing on poverty as an elaborate dance choreographed to stay away from the point."

Reforms

In Europe, poverty is considered a "relative" condition compared to the rest of society, usually 50 to 60 percent of the median family's income—the family whose income is in the middle of the pack. As society gets richer overall, the poverty measure will rise. Adopting that measure in America would provide a metric, if an imperfect one, of social inclusion—giving the poor the opportunity to live a full civic and economic life as economies prosper and material needs change.

We should abide by two principles in fashioning an income support program: universality—a cash program for all children, not just the poor—and non-paternalism, meaning that recipients decide how to use their cash distribution as they see fit. My direct proposal is to establish an unconditional monthly cash allowance for all children in America of $4,000 to $5,000 a year. As I said, it will be taxable, so wealthy families will have the benefits largely taxed away.

The Neoliberal Conversion

The neoliberal conversion of America that began in the 1970s and hardened in the 198os became more extreme under President Donald Trump. A government of more tax reductions and promises of deep cuts in social spending cannot easily be withstood by a nation that has already lived with a generation of inadequate policies. Child poverty is bound to worsen. Under similar policies in England, during the

regime of Margaret Thatcher, child poverty soared. After reforms under the Labour government, which reduced poverty, it rose again in recent years when Conservatives cut social spending. The Trump administration has scandalously claimed based on duplicitous use of data that general poverty is only 3 percent in America, rather than the official estimates of 12 to 13 percent (and realistic estimates that it is much higher). Child poverty was minimal in their calculations as they shamelessly manipulated the data. The conservative economists whose research the claims were based on themselves conceded they were not seeking a specific poverty rate. The rate of 3 percent was arbitrary. It could also have been as high as 12.7 percent under slightly different assumptions.

In a time when we avidly discuss and worry about the future of the nation's productivity and prospects for growth, it is hard to believe that we are willing to discard 20 to 25 percent or more of the population by not providing them an adequate standard of living early in their lives, depriving them of the foundation necessary to become productive workers. As noted a reasonable cost to us all is $1 trillion in lost national income—reduced GDP.

Poverty is one of the main battlefields of American ideology Warring camps have been fighting over it for a couple of centuries. At one end of the spectrum are the individualists, who believe poverty is mostly the result of individual failings, and at the other end are those who see the cause in structural social and economic elements including prejudice, scarce jobs, and low wages.

The individualists have usually won out in America, prevailing again since the 1980s and 1990s. Poverty, Michael Katz has written, has been a third rail to policymakers, including Democrats, for more than a generation. This misguided course can be righted.

Faith in the Poor

There is much else to be done beyond child allowances, but as I've stressed the danger is to let a not-yet-politically practicable comprehensive agenda become an obstacle to a practical and beneficial one. Nevertheless, we must imagine a better world if we are to make one.

SNAP should be expanded, and include more generous programs for individuals without children as well.

High on any list of additional needs is a jobs creation program. Basing policies on a nostalgic view of past job growth, and an unawareness of true economic conditions today, is apt to go wrong.

We must also recognize that we now live in an era of almost universal female employment, partly created by poverty policies that demand work. But women and men do not have adequate paid leave for raising their children, or programs to care for them.

Truly universal public childcare remains elusive even where these programs have advanced furthest, as Ajay Chaudry has documented in New York City. More work must be done on equalizing pay with men and reducing evident prejudice against all women.

A major market failure in America is the lack of construction of low-income housing for poor Americans. The private market won't solve this problem, so government must. The two federally assisted housing programs, public housing construction and Section 8 4 subsidies to rent in the private market, have proven valuable. But they reach too few people. Expanding such programs would help poor children perhaps the most. As noted, inadequate housing has a profound effect on children's lives.

Congressional attention is at last being directed at helping poor children. A bill was proposed by Senators Michael Bennett and Sherrod Brown in 2017 to establish a $3,000 allowance for all children six to eighteen and $3,600 for children under six, based on the Child Tax Credit. It would be refundable. This is close to a pure cash allowance: all children, even if their parents make no income, would be allocated $3,000, paid in monthly installments of $250 a month for older children and $300 a month for toddlers and pre-K-age kids. Its annual cost after eliminating the current CTC would be around $100 billion. Congresswoman Rosa De Lauro has proposed a similar bill.

Many Democrats have made proposals that involve forms of cash allowances. Let's begin to reduce the pain and disadvantage of poor children with an income program that will have immediate and extremely beneficial effects. Some will always complain that such cash welfare will create dependency. But we know such consequences are exaggerated and the immense gains for poor children are well worth this relatively negligible social cost.

There is no need to wait for the passage of other, more politically difficult to realize programs to help the young. The nation is held back by the deep prejudice against cash welfare that continues to be reinforced by some scholars and right-wing think tanks. As the University of Michigan policy scholar Luke Shaefer says, "If you were going to choose one program, nothing is more effective than child allowances."

The Potential of The Poor

We must develop an appreciation of the potential of poor Americans. That the United States refuses to raise those in poverty to a decent life reflects a mean-spirited and destructive prejudice against the poor, underlined by racism and a sense of class superiority. It's time to reeducate ourselves. As one of Amartya Sen's acolytes has put it, Sen believes "poverty is unfreedom."

The purpose of accurate poverty measures is to help the nation make decisions about where to invest in its citizenry, how to reduce pain and suffering, how to produce access to the opportunity so often promised by America, and what its moral obligation is—an obligation to equal opportunity, freedom of choice, and healthy lives. It is also necessary to understand what is needed to maintain a productive workforce and a prosperous economy—time to recognize the toll child poverty takes on the finances of all Americans in lost income due to reduced productivity across the economy and higher costs of social programs. This penalty can be sharply reduced, as, more important, can the pain of the lives that poor children inevitably face.

Mollie Orshansky said in the 1960s that her poverty line was not the line above which people will escape from hardship—rather, it is a line below which one should not have to live. America has dedicated itself to measuring poverty as a matter of mere subsistence. It is a cruel collective decision.

Tens of millions of Americans live below the minimal poverty line today. Measured by a fairer and updated line, the true number of deprived is around 60 million. The number of truly poor children is arguably more than 20 million. It is a cruel irony that we can't agree on how many poor Americans there are, no less cut the number. Let's change the national attitude—and recognize the reality of childhood poverty in this country. Cutting child poverty in half with a universal child allowance would be one of America's great moral victories. <>

EU TRADE LAW by Rafael Leal-Arcas [Elgar European Law, Edward Elgar Publishers, 9781788977401]

This comprehensive book provides a thorough analytical overview of the European Union's existing law and policy in the field of international trade. Considering the history and context of the law's evolution, it offers an adept examination of its common commercial policy competence through the years, starting with the Treaty of Rome up until the Treaty of Lisbon, as a background for understanding the EU's present role in the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework.

Accessible and thought-provoking, chapters offer a legal analysis of EU trade policy after the Treaty of Rome, after the conclusion of the WTO Agreement, at the Treaty of Amsterdam, at the Treaty of Nice, and at the Treaty of Lisbon, taking into account the most recent constitutional developments by the Lisbon Treaty on division of competences between the EU and its Member States. Additional thought is given to the role of major EU institutions and their balance within EU trade law and policy, and the tension between efficiency and accountability in decision-making processes in EU trade policy is further considered.

Students and scholars working in the field of European and international trade law and policy, and international economic law and policy more generally, will find this a clear and useful resource. Practitioners seeking a clear and up-to-date insight into the area will also appreciate this important work.

Excerpt: This book is an attempt to provide a thorough chronological analysis of the European Union's (EU)' existing law and policy in the field of international trade. This book analyses the evolution of the EU's external trade relations, as well as its common commercial policy competence' through the years, starting understanding the EU's present role in the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework.' Thus, a legal analysis of EU trade policy after the Treaty of Rome, after the conclusion of the WTO Agreement, at the Treaty of Amsterdam, at the Treaty of Nice, and at the Treaty of Lisbon is provided,

taking into account the most recent constitutional developments by the Lisbon Treaty on division of competences between the EU and its Member States.

The EU has become an important actor on the international scene, and since the 1970s its external relations have been growing both in the number of agreements signed and in domains of participation. The EU has participated in an important number of multilateral conventions within the framework of international or regional organizations, and is increasingly present in world affairs. In legal terms, however, the EU has a growing role. The EU's progression has not been steady, but was achieved in small steps, as we will see in the analysis of this book.

Structure of Study

After this short introduction in Chapter 1, Part I of this book (Chapters 2-5) deals with the substantive aspects of EU trade law and policy. Part I analyses the history and evolution of EU trade law and policy since its early days up to the Treaty of Lisbon. It begins with Chapter 2, by providing a legal clarification of Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (formerly Article 133 EC). It continues with an analysis of the emergence of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as a pioneer (1952-1958), as well as the European Economic Community (EEC) (1958-1967). Next is a discussion of the period of the merger of the three European Communities in 1965 and the end of the transitional period after the formation of the EEC (1967-1977).

Chapter 3 analyses the EEC/EU' s position within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO. Opinion 1/94 of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and its consequences for EU trade policy are explored. Chapter 3 also provides an analysis of the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations in the international trade field.

Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the changes made to the EU's common commercial policy by the Nice Treaty and the confusion resulting from those changes, whereas Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the trade policy provisions after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It then provides an analysis of the United Kingdom's (UK) decision to leave the EU, i.e., Brexit, from a trade policy perspective.

Part II (Chapters 6-11) deals with the procedural aspects of EU trade law and policy. An analysis of mixed agreements as well as the EU institutions and their interaction with EU Member States' institutions and trade policy form the core of Part II of this book. The problems that the enlarged EU will face in its internal decision-making process (such as transparency, efficiency, accountability) can be paralleled to the WTO's decision-making process. Although the new challenges of democratic legitimacy and accountability, ¬demanded by European citizens, as well as efficiency, traditionally imposed on the EU supranational institutions, will be considered in Part II of this book, the focus of Part II is not about a thorough analysis of major parameters such as efficiency, accountability and transparency in the external relations powers of the EU and the implications thereof, all of which go well beyond its scope.

The thesis of Part II of this book, therefore, is that EU Member States wish to retain their right to participate and veto in international trade negotiations since they do not fully trust the supranational level (namely the EU) to defend their national interests in all areas of trade policy.' Furthermore, EU citizens do not trust the supranational level either, since identity in the EU remains national (with the few exceptions of citizens that transcend it). An example is the failure of the EU Constitutional Treaty, which was rejected by popular will.

Hence, the name of the game is democracy: EU citizens do not want an EU federation run by Eurocrats in Brussels. To explore these arguments, Part II of this book is divided into three main sections:

An analysis of mixed agreements (Chapter 6); a phase-by-phase analysis of international trade agreements (Chapters 7-10), by looking at the main EU institutions dealing with EU trade policy; and an analysis of efficiency versus accountability in the decision-making process with respect to EU trade policy (Chapter 11).

The major actors dealing with the external relations of the EU will also be analysed as well as the role they play in the European commercial policy-making. Agreements are negotiated by the Commission and concluded by the Council, normally after consultation with the European Parliament (EP). Part II of this book, therefore, intends to go phase by phase in the analysis of an international trade agreement and see how it affects the EU trade policy-making process. We shall see that, as far as actors are concerned, third States may face [in mixed agreements] one or more of the Communities, one or more of the Communities together with one or more of the (by now 15) [as of 2007, there are 27] Member States, the Member States acting jointly, for instance, under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) spelled out in Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and the Member States acting in a more individual capacity."

To this can be added that, while Community treaties should normally be concluded by the Council, the Commission, too, has certain powers to enter into international agreements (albeit on behalf of the Communities), and a general right to represent the Union in its external relations." Even some quasi-independent Community agencies have been given certain external functions.

The aim of Chapter 6 is to portray the legal problems raised by issues of shared competence between the EU and its Member States. Some of these legal problems, which do not exist within the context of exclusive EU competence, are related to the functioning of the EU. Chapter 6 also intends to show the implications of the so-called legal phenomenon of mixed agreements for third parties.

Chapters 7-10 deal with the institutional balance in EU trade law and policy. They analyse the role of major EU institutions in trade law and policy, following the various phases of an international trade agreement. Chapter 7 explores the negotiation of EU trade agreements. It analyses the negotiating phase of international trade agreements. Although there are bilateral" and WTO multilateral (services) trade negotiations in which the EU participates, I will only focus on the multilateral approach. In this regard, the role of national ministers in the EU's external trade relations, as well as the so-called Trade Policy Committee and civil society, is taken into consideration. We shall see, inter alia, how the Commission, the negotiator of international agreements, is limited by the Council in its initiatives and in its negotiation autonomy. Many of these issues deal with the division of roles between the Commission and the Presidency of the EU in the field of international trade." The role of civil society is also tackled by analysing the new challenges of trade diplomacy, such as the integration of non-economic aspects of trade into the EU's trade policy, how to have a greater involvement of civil society in trade policy, as well as how to include trade policies in the democratic debate.

Chapter 8 examines the conclusion and ratification of EU trade agreements. In Chapter 8, the Council, i.e., the EU's intergovernmental body and adviser.

Conclusion

Much of Part II of this book has been an institutional analysis of the EU's decision-making process in trade policy. By institutional analysis, I mean the creation of a conceptual framework in which to assess the trade-offs among the various mechanisms of public policy to ensure oversight of EU trade policy. All proposed mechanisms should be understood and assessed in terms of how well they permit the actors to participate in the decision-making process that affects them in an unbiased manner, compared to other realistic, non-idealized institutional alternatives) I have focused on a binomial variable, i.e., efficiency versus accountability (technocratic versus democratic trade policy) at the national and supranational levels.

Trade is no longer just about negotiations on tariffs on goods between industrialized economies. Trade policy has become complicated on both sides of the matrix — new actors and new issues. Trade policy, as well as WTO rules and policies, need to change to become more efficient and more accountable. At the same time, it is important to address the issue of the lack of transparency and legitimacy in the current system of governance, denounced by the Laeken European Council, including trade policy matters handled in the WTO, in order to be closer to the citizens' needs. Thus, more leadership is needed. 'The European Union has long suffered from a sense that the sum is far less democratic than its parts. Though they have benefited from their union, many Europeans feel alienated from the Brussels-based entity that mysteriously wrests more power from their nations each year.' However, Weiler argues that the EU institutions are more transparent than EU Member States.' Tbus, the new forms of governance on the European level continue to limit the sovereignty of the nation-state, and the ongoing transfer of competences from the national to the supranational levels, which has the symptoms of a federation in the case of trade policy, may lead to an accountability deficit.

With regard to transparency, it means ensuring that a given organization is more internally accountable to its members. The well-known formula that 'more transparency implies less efficiency' is rather simplistic and, thus, does not suffice to answer these questions.

As for efficiency and accountability, the world has moved on, and so must the Treaty of Rome. It is necessary to ensure that negotiations on trade in services, intellectual property rights, and investment are handled in the same way as negotiations on trade in goods by QMV in the framework of the EU Council of Ministers. Unanimity, especially in an enlarged EU of over 30 Member States, makes no sense, and is unrealistic in policy-making. In sum, the EU can no longer afford the luxury of finding a common position in trade matters by consensus or QMV in such a politically diverse EU. Political compromises and social sacrifices must be met and found in the name of efficiency and Realpolitik if the EU wants to move forward its position in the world trading system.

That said, the Commission's compromise proposal allows for an EU Member State to call for unanimity on a point of real national sensitivity. It also calls for the EP to be fully involved in EU trade policy-making. Also, there needs to be a change in the EU's negotiating methods. On the other hand, having the Commission as the trade negotiator on behalf of the EU Member States implies a more efficient but less democratic system of EU trade policy-making. This democratic deficit is further corroborated by the fact that the Lisbon Treaty does not establish full parliamentary accountability of the Commission. So with the Lisbon Treaty, trade policy is more efficient — since it becomes more federal — but not yet fully

accountable or democratic. Despite that, one can argue that the overall balance is positive, even taking into account the price Europeans pay for loss of sovereignty.

The legal recognition by the CJEU in its Opinion I/944 of shared competences departs from the founding principle that the EU has a single voice in international trade negotiations and from previous case law on external relations. The Court's encouragement of a return to intergovernmentalism in the field of external trade is clearly setting the stage for future disputes over transatlantic parallelism is that, although the EU is composed of 28 sovereign Member States, it is in their national interest to give up their national sovereignty to the European level in order to have a stronger negotiating position, provided that the EU common position defends that national interest. This would only be legally possible by amending the treaties.

After analysing the treaties of the EU, the case law of the CJEU, and the scholarly literature with regard to the EU's external trade relations law and policy, I conclude that, despite the fact that EU citizens do not want an EU federation, in EU trade policy the tendency is toward a federal, top-down approacb to the decision-making process, leaving Member States with less room for manoeuvre. The reasons for this tendency are: it is a necessity in today's world trading system; and the EU's internal decision-making process is complex.

In fact, in my opinion, the EU behaves already as, or nearly as, a federation of states in the case of trade. The EU faces problems similar to those of federal states. In Germany, to take an example of a prominent European federation, the Länder strongly protested against the silent transfer of their powers to the federal government.

Another finding of my research is that, as a result of the federal approach in trade policy, EU Member States insist on keeping an important control power over the Commission since they will have less power and play a less important role in the world trading system as individual states. This is a direct consequence of the evolution of the decision-making process in the EU: from unanimity (where individual EU Member States were in a strong position, given their veto power) to QMV (where EU Member States can be overruled).

Reflecting on the Future: Recommendations and Prognosis

The Lisbon Treaty confirms the existence of mixed agreements and finds a compromise between its reforming spirit and the two-level system of division of competences in the EU. Mixed agreements will continue to be used in the near future between the EU institutions and Member States when dealing with specific issues of the EU external trade relations. However, mixity often makes life more difficult for everybody involved in any given international agreement. Although mixity may function as an invitation to pursue parochial national interests, the unitary tendency, which is equally important, is controversial in normative terms. It is, therefore, desirable that the EU is able to tackle the following issues in the near future:

Respect for the duty of cooperation in areas of shared competence between the EU and its Member States. As long as Member States insist on obligatory mixity, they must also accept the duty to accede themselves to the mixed agreement in question without undue delay. Furthermore, throughout this book we have seen that both the EU and the Member States have understood that it is to the benefit of all to have a coordinated EU action vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Hence, the duty of cooperation

between the national and supranational levels seems to be the way forward, given the nature of the EU in international trade. However, a question arises: how much freedom do EU Member States have to follow their own national interest, if it conflicts with the duty of cooperation proposed by the CJEU? This duty is perhaps not taken seriously because the CJEU refers to it only in its Opinions, wbich are not legally binding on the EU Member States, and not in its decisions; Pure EU agreements rather than mixed agreements in areas of concurrent competences. This does not mean that there will only be exclusive EU competence or that shared competence is incompatible with pure Union agreements. In fact, oftentimes there are pure Union agreements (the majority of the EU's international agreements) with shared competence; and A combination of pragmatism and considerations of the common good, rather than battles of prestige between the national and supranational levels, as well as among EU Member States, should be the focus of attention. Collaboration among the EU institutions is also very necessary to solve inevitable problems so long as the EU retains its complex structure.

The EU is the victim of its own system: the accusations of inefficiency, inconsistency, and democratic deficit are the result of the intra-EC inability to find a mecbanism to terminate these deficiencies. My analysis shows that the EU needs to become more democratic. This requires that elections to the EP become more meaningful. At present, European elections bave little effect, neither upon the policy of the EU nor its leadership. It is no wonder that turnout is so low. I believe that the composition of the European Commission should be determined by the outcome of the European elections, and that the Commission should become accountable to the EP. Moreover, the members of the Commission should also become individually accountable to the EP.

As for the EU's prognosis, with the Lisbon Treaty, efficiency in EU trade policy has improved. A few questions arise: How can the trend of a lesser role for EU Member States in the international trading system (after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty) be reconciled with the fact that they are sovereign states according to public international law? Is it correct to interpret that

EU Member States will no longer participate in the WTO forum because the Lisbon Treaty explicitly gives exclusive competence to the Union in all areas of trade policy? There was a similar situation when the WTO Agreements were signed in April 1994. During the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the EC faced the issue of the scope of its authority under the EC Treaty in the field of international economic relations, particularly with respect to trade in services and intellectual property rights. Negotiations were conducted according to the normal procedures for GATT negotiations, albeit that the European Commission negotiated on behalf of both the EC and its Member States!' The assumption throughout was that EU Member States would continue to be members of the world trading system (and therefore WTO Members), and would not be completely replaced by the European Community.

Moreover, the tendency of exclusive EU competence in trade policy during the pre-Lisbon Treaty era is evident in the TFEU, which explicitly acknowledges the exclusive competence of the Union in the common commercial policy.16 As a result, this will create a more integrated and efficient common commercial policy. However, will this translate into more accountability in trade policy-making?

Trade is, more than ever, in the domestic domain. So national leaders wish to know what is going on when it comes to issues such as food, the environment, or immigration. It is therefore quite ironic that the main purpose of the Convention on the Future of Europe (and therefore of the EU Constitutional

Treaty, i.e., the predecessor of the Treaty of Lisbon) was to make policies more democratic and closer to EU citizens, and yet national parliaments were not supposed to ratify trade agreements under the proposals of the Convention on the Future of Europe. In an era where international trade has a great incidence in domestic politics, this proposition seemed inappropriate. As a result, it would not seem plausible to exclude EU Member States from ratifying future trade agreements. The proposal made by the Convention on the Future of Europe eventually never saw the light under the Lisbon Treaty.

Hence, I conclude that the EU is not yet ready to bypass its Member States in all areas of trade regulation (notably trade issues related to immigration policy) and consequently EU Member States continue to be present in the WTO after the Lisbon Treaty. <>

RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU ECONOMIC LAW edited by Federico Fabbrini and Marco Ventoruzzo [Research Handbooks in European Law, Edward Elgar Pubishers, 9781788972338]

The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) constitutes a key pillar of the project of European integration, and the law serves as the infrastructure of the EU's system of economic governance. This comprehensive Research Handbook analyses and explains this complex architecture from a legal point of view and looks ahead to the challenges it faces and how these can be resolved.

Bringing together contributions from leading academics from across Europe and top lawyers from several EU institutions, this Research Handbook is the first to cover all aspects of the Eurozone's legal ecosystem, including the fiscal, monetary, banking, and capital markets unions. In doing so, it offers an up-to-date and in depth assessment of the norms and procedures that underpin EMU, exploring the latest developments, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the existing framework, and making suggestions for necessary reform through policy and law.

Scholars and advanced students with an interest in EU economic law will find this Research Handbook to be an indispensable guide. It will also prove valuable to policy-makers and legal advisors working in EU institutions, as well as practitioners in the field and officials in both EU and national administrations.

Excerpt: Economic law constitutes a key component of the project of European integration. Pursuant to the current Article 3 TEU, the European Union (EU) `shall establish an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro.' In fact, since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 the EU has been endowed with a framework to coordinate the member states economic policy, and since 2002, when the euro started circulating as legal tender, the majority of EU member states has had a single currency, with monetary policy centralized at EU level. Nevertheless, the EU Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has developed significantly in recent years. Following the financial crisis — which hit Europe a decade ago, and threatened the survival of the Eurozone itself — major legal and institutional developments have occurred in the field of EU economic law. While economic governance has been overhauled to strengthen budgetary rules and financial stability, and monetary policy expanded into new terrains, a Banking Union has been created from scratch, and steps have been taken to set up a more integrated Capital Markets Union with new supra-national supervisory authorities.

While in the past EMU tended to be a marginal topic, reserved for a few specialists, the euro-crisis and the responses to it have increased attention to European economic law among scholars, policy-makers and the general public alike. If academic analyses of European economic governance have mushroomed, debates on the EMU including about the potential costs and benefits of using t euro —have become part of the day to day political conversation in a number of European countries. If anything, therefore, the euro-crisis contributed to raising attention to the EMU, and its deficiencies, prompting further action by the policymakers. After all, the EMU remains an incomplete union. For example, while the first two pillars of banking union — centralized supervision of banks, and a mechanism to resolve failing institutions — have now been established, the third pillar — a European deposit insurance scheme — is still missing; and while fiscal rules abound, the EU still lacks fiscal capacity to undertake counter-cyclical policies in case of asymmetric economic shocks. Yet, although the EMU remains a work in progress, there is growing need for academics, practitioners and the informed public to understand what are the legal mechanisms and institutional principles that underpin the functioning of the Eurozone.

The purpose of this edited volume is to offer a comprehensive analysis of European economic law, spanning from fiscal and monetary issues to banking and capital market questions. Needless to say, the focus on the book is on the legal, as opposed to the economic issues — but, in the EU, the law is the backbone of all policies, so a proper appreciation of its content is crucial. Moreover, this book seeks to overcome a silos analysis of the various components of EMU, showing instead how the economic, monetary, banking and capital markets unions are actually deeply interconnected elements of the

European economic architecture. Whereas public lawyers (especially scholars of EU and national constitutional law) have mostly dedicated their attention to the fiscal and monetary aspects of the EMU, while private lawyers (and notably corporate and financial markets law scholars) have predominantly focused on the banking and capital markets dimensions of the EMU, the book suggests that all these components are actually part and parcel of a single ecosystem of European economic law. Hence, fiscal, monetary, banking and capital markets law should be appraised together to acquire a complete understanding of how the EMU works.

To this end, this edited volume brings together a distinguished set of contributors, which include some among the leading experts of the various elements of European economic law, including specialists in, inter alia, fiscal rules, macro-economic governance, monetary policy, judicial review, banking and financial supervision, clearing and settlement and financial services and investment funds. Furthermore, on the understanding that European economic law is very much still a work in progress, the book blends contributions from both academics and policymakers, including the top lawyers of institutions such as the Council, Commission, European Central Bank (ECB) and European Securities Market Authority (ESMA) Legal Services, bringing in the experience of actors who operate daily within this legal environment. Finally, the book endeavours to offer a pluralist and balanced perspective on the foundations and development of European economic law, by combining contributions by authors of different generations, gender and geographical origin — the latter point, in particular, offering a valuable snapshot of how the different regions of Europe may have various views on EMU and its future.

The book is structured in four parts, each focusing on one of the four pillars of European economic law:

- Part I examines the Economic Union;
- Part II the Monetary Union;
- Part III the Banking Union; and
- Part IV the Capital Markets Union.

Economic Union

In Chapter 2, Alberto de Gregorio Merino offers an overview of the institutional architecture for macro-economic governance in the EMU, analysing the role of the EU supranational and intergovernmental institutions and explaining their reciprocal interactions. Specifically, de Gregorio analyses the tasks of the Council, the Commission, the Eurogroup — including when this acts as the board of governors of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) — as well as the European Council and the Euro Summit, reflecting the complexity of coordination of economic affairs in the EU. Moreover he details the limited powers of the European Parliament in EMU, and underlines the narrow justiciability of acts adopted by the intergovernmental institutions — as reflected in the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on crisis-response measures. As de Gregorio emphasizes, the intergovernmental response to the euro-crisis significantly affected the EU interinstitutional balance in economic governance, but this created challenges, including on the relation between the European Council and the Council, which will need to be addressed in due course.

In Chapter 3, Jean-Paul Keppenne focuses instead on the fiscal rules of economic governance, mapping the procedures in place to ensure that member states conform to sound budgetary policy. In particular Keppenne distinguishes between mechanisms of control which operate externally, outside the member states: that is, at the level of the EU, from those entrenched internally, within the member states

themselves. With regard to the external controls, he analyses in depth the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and its recent revisions through the so-called `Six-Pack' and 'Two-Pack' and details the functioning of both its preventive and the corrective arms. Moreover, he discusses the sanction's mechanisms applicable in the excessive deficit procedure, as well as the growing role of the European Commission in policing states' budgets in the framework of the European Semester. With regard to the internal controls, then, Keppenne emphasizes the importance of the obligation to constitutionalize a balanced budget amendment in national law resulting from the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU and refers to the possible future developments in this area, including the commitment to domesticate the Fiscal Compact in EU law.

In Chapter 4 Tomi Tuominen zooms into the mechanisms of financial assistance that were established in response to the euro-crisis and the threat of sovereign default in a number of Eurozone member states. While Tuominen considers both the European Financial Stability Mechanism — a temporary support tool established through a Council regulation — and the European Financial Stability Facility — a private vehicle incorporated under Luxembourg law — he mostly focuses on the ESM an international institution set up by the Eurozone member states through an intergovernmental treaty in 2012. Tuominen, in particular, explains the main administrative features of the ESM and discusses in detail the Pringle judgment of the ECJ, which confirmed its compatibility with the EU legal framework. As Tuominen explains, the establishment of the ESM modifies the original understanding of the `no-bailout' provision enshrined in the EU treaties, but reflects the growing awareness for financial stability as a common concern in the Eurozone. Nevertheless, Tuominen identifies challenges in the ESM and cautions against the pressure to re-incorporate it within the EU legal framework without major amendments.

In Chapter 5 Federico Fabbrini analyses the proposals in favour of establishing a fiscal capacity — that is a budget of the euro area that can be used as a counter-cyclical tool for stabilization purposes in cases of asymmetric shocks. As Fabbrini explains, the fiscal capacity remains a missing link in the constitutional structure of EMU: the Maastricht Treaty did not foresee any supranational mechanism to handle asymmetric busts, and the responses to the crisis so far have not led to the creation of such an instrument. Yet, Fabbrini underlines that growing awareness exists on the need for such a fiscal capacity and he reviews the proposals advanced, among others, by the European Parliament, the European Commission and jointly by the French and German governments for a euro area budget, suggesting that a consensus may be slowly building in this direction. In fact, Fabbrini claims that there are adequate legal bases in the current EU treaties to set up such an instrument, but he emphasizes from a constitutional point of view that a successful fiscal capacity must be based on own resources — rather than state transfers — and subject to adequate governance and accountability mechanisms to ensure executive effectiveness and democratic legitimacy.

Monetary Union

In Chapter 6 Phoebus Athanassiou presents the institutional role of the ECB, as well as the new functions it has acquired since the beginning of the euro-crisis. Athanassiou explains the organization and independence of the ECB and the national central banks comprising the Eurosystem, and details the ECB powers in conducting the single monetary policy of the Eurozone. Moreover, Athanassiou underlines the new tasks that were assigned to the ECB in response to the euro-crisis — notably the functions of micro- and macro-prudential supervision in the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism — and

discusses the impact on its mandate and independence. At the same time, Athanassiou reviews the role that the ECB played in managing financial support programmes as part of the so-called Troika. As Athanassiou points out, the ECB emerged as one of the most powerful institutions of the EMU in the aftermath of the crisis, acting as the stopgap to remedy the design flaws of the EMU, but with great power comes greater responsibility, and it is therefore unsurprising that its actions are increasingly subject to judicial scrutiny.

In Chapter 7, Katerina Pantazatou and Ioannis Asimakopoulos overview the conventional and unconventional monetary policies that the ECB has deployed to pursue its mandate as the central bank of the Eurozone. Pantazatou and Asimakopoulos underline how the EU treaties assign to the ECB the primary task of maintaining price stability, and explain the traditional toolkit to achieve this goal, including interest rate changes, open market operations, standing facilities, i.e., the deposit and marginal lending facilities, and minimum reserve requirements for credit institutions. At the same time, they underline how conventional monetary policy came under pressure in the context of the euro-crisis, when interest rate policy reached its lower bound and the transmission of monetary policy came under pressure, forcing the ECB to develop new instruments, such as targeted long-term refinancing operations, a securities market programme, outright monetary transactions (OMT) and — finally — public assets purchase programmes, otherwise known as quantitative easing (QE). As Pantazatou and Asimakopoulos explain, the deployment of unconventional monetary policy confirms that the ECB enjoys powers analogous to other central banks, but also raises legal challenges to the ECB actions.

In fact, the legality of ECB action is at the heart of Chapter 8, by Stefania Baroncelli, which examines judicial review of ECB measures. Baroncelli refers to older ECJ cases on ECB independence, and more recent national challenges to ECB monetary policy, but her analysis mostly focuses on two major rulings delivered by the ECJ — on preliminary references made by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (the Constitutional Court of Germany) — on the legality of the OMT and QE programmes: the Gauweiler and Weiss judgments. As Baroncelli explains, the fact that the ECB has been subject to so many legal actions is unusual in comparative perspectives, since in most other constitutional democracies action by central banks tends to be shielded from judicial review on standing grounds. Nevertheless, she stresses that the ECJ has fully validated the action of the ECB, effectively adopting a deferential standard of review, which is consonant with the greater technical expertise that the ECB has compared to the other EU institutions.

In Chapter 9, Roderic O'Gorman examines instead the adjustment programmes devised to support EU member states facing fiscal challenges, discussing also the role of the ECB in designing and monitoring such programmes. As O'Gorman explains, after losing access to the bond markets, five Eurozone countries — Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus and (partially) Spain — received financial assistance from the ESM and its predecessors. Nevertheless, pursuant to the principle of conditionality, financial support was subject to the national implementation of structural reforms, including in the pension, labour market and tax sectors. O'Gorman, in particular, considers the case of Ireland as an example to assess the efficacy of the adjustment programmes; and even though the Irish case is often taken as a success story, he emphasizes how a number of the requirements originally set by the international creditors were actually lost in translations due to national political opposition. O'Gorman then reflects on the impact of adjustment programmes on the protection of social rights and reviews the growing case law by national and European courts in this field, making the conclusive case that financial support programmes should

give greater attention to the disparate social impact resulting from economic adjustment at the domestic level.

Banking Union

Establishing a Banking Union is one of the most important goals of European economic integration, also in light of the Monetary Union. The project is based on three pillars: Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), and European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). While the first two pillars have been accomplished, although they are far from perfect and there is still room for improvement, the EDIS still appears more uncertain and subject to political controversy. Chapter 10, by Valia Babis, starts with a discussion of the so-called Single Rulebook and the European Banking Authority (EBA), summing up the state of the art and critically examining the most recent developments. As Babis shows, the Single Rulebook is not truly an example of maximum harmonization, and neither is it really a `single' document, but rather a `multi-tiered' structure. Several of the Directives composing the Single Rulebook leave, in fact, wiggle room to member states, and in any case local rules might create different regulatory environments in which the shared EU rules apply, with sometimes relevant effects on substantive harmonization. The chapter also analyses how the role of the EBA should be strengthened to facilitate a more effective and harmonized rule-making activity.

The SSM is examined in Chapter 11 by Tobias H. Tröger, who considers the role of the ECB and its relationships with the central banks and supervisory authorities of the member states participating in the banking union. As Träger explains, in response to the euro-crisis and with the aim of breaking the doom loop between sovereign defaults and bank defaults, supervision of significant financial lending institutions was shifted from the national to the supranational level, and vested in a new branch of the ECB: the SSM. Nevertheless, as he points out, national competent authorities have preserved an important responsibility in supervision, and they have a major voice within the SSM decisionmaking system, as they outweigh the ECB representatives in the Supervisory Board. Moreover, as Träger claims, the institutional solution found for supranational supervision of banks creates challenges, notably due to the separation between the SSM and the SRM: while this choice was ultimately made to shield the ECB from the fiscal consequences of bank failures, it raises difficulties of coordination — a situation which is further complicated by the continuing role of the EBA as a standard setter for banking rules for the whole EU. Nevertheless, as Träger concludes, the SSM is very much a project of the EMU, and there are limited incentives for non-Eurozone countries to join, which suggests that adjustments may occur in the near future.

In Chapter 12, Christos Gortsos leads us through the intricacies of the SRM, and specifically the role of the different institutions involved in the resolution, with a focus on bail-in and its effectiveness. In particular, Gortsos analyses the role of the Single Resolution Board — the agency in charge of resolving credit institutions — and reflects on the so-called bail-in mechanism, discussing its uneven application in the first concrete cases of resolutions of small regional banks in Spain and Italy. Yet, the Banking Union cannot fully be realized without a single deposit insur¬ance scheme — that is a uniform guarantee for bank depositors across the EMU — which is the object of Chapter 13, also written by Christos Gortsos. As he explains, however, EDIS has not yet been accomplished as the matter remains complex and politically charged. The controversy is clear: countries with (possibly) more financially stable banks do not want to mutualize risk before banks in other countries have strengthened their solidity; conversely a currency union requires credible and similarly effective deposit insurance in the entire area. A single and

well-designed insurance scheme would also increase competition as depositors might shop across borders more freely and would contribute to decoupling the correlation between sovereign and bank risks.

Capital Markets Union

Integrated, efficient and effective capital markets are equally essential for the EU and, especially after Brexit, uncertainties concerning this area abound. For sure, the integration of capital markets started before the development of a true Banking Union, and is now relatively advanced, even if national barriers are far from having been entirely abolished. Part IV of the book starts with a discussion in Chapter 14 of the European architecture of financial supervision and the role of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), written by Sophie Vuarlot-Dignac and Eugenia Siracusa. Vuarlot-Dignac and Siracusa summarize in historical perspectives the reasons leading to the creation of the ESAs in the aftermath of the euro-crisis and examine specifically the role of the European Secur¬ities Market Authority (ESMA), detailing its organization and institutional mandate. As they point out, the ESAs have contributed to establishing a common supervisory culture across Europe. However, a number of challenges remain, including divergences in data collection, and it remains questionable whether the ESMA specifically has all the powers it will need: from this point of view, therefore, further legislative developments may be necessary.

In Chapter 15, Danny Busch examines the ambitious but also fragmented and partially idealistic group of initiatives commonly known under the expression Capital Markets Union. Two major areas of this emerging landscape are then the subject of detailed analysis in Filippo Annunziata's Chapter 16, dedicated to financial services and investment funds; and Nadia Linciano's Chapter 17, on clearing and settlement. The picture emerging from these chapters is one of a significant and growing harmonization, but a process which is still incomplete and, in any case, uneven. While some areas enjoy significant uniformity (e.g., financial services or prospectus), in other important areas national differences are still significant (e.g., with respect to civil liability for false, incomplete or misleading prospectuses). The institutional framework is itself only partially satisfactory. The very limited direct supervisory powers granted to the ESAs, for example, due to constitutional constraints, determine a baroque and possibly ineffective pan-European supervision. In this context, additional efforts seem needed to complete the Capital Markets Union, and there are questions as to whether the political will to do so will be strong enough following the United Kingdom (UK) withdrawal from the EU.

Conclusion

The book is ended by the concluding remarks of Andreas Heinzmann and Valerio Scollo, who bring a practitioners' perspective to European economic law. As they point out, developments at EU level increasingly have a bearing on the work of professional lawyers, particularly in the field of securitization, investment funds and financial services. Moreover, they emphasize how traditionally English law used to be the main operational tool but how the decision of the UK to withdraw from the EU is likely to change that. As Scollo and Heinzmann argue, steps taken at EU level in response to the crisis, notably the creation of a Capital Markets Union, are very welcome from a market perspective. Nevertheless, the work in progress in completing the EMU creates a number of challenges, and they express a hope that the system may settle for good, offering a more stable rule of law framework for European economic law and lawyers.

In fact, the ambition of this .book is to provide a benchmark for professorial and professional lawyers to understand European economic law de jure condito, but also to offer suggestions for policy-makers for further reforms to be introduced in EMU de jure condendo. In our view, this is essential to win back the support of the European people, at a time when Euroscepticism is on the rise and the UK is seeking, not without difficulty, to leave the EU. As this book was going to press in June 2019, efforts to deepen the EMU remain ongoing at the highest institutional level, so we hope this volume will contribute with innovative ideas and independent input to the continuing project of completing the economic, monetary, banking and capital markets unions. At a minimum, we hope that the explanations and descriptions of the different issues will help more and less expert readers in orienting themselves in the maze of rules and institutions, and that a clear understanding of the points of strength and weakness of the existing framework will contribute to address and solve the major problems that remain within the EMU.

Concluding remarks

For those of us who were born in the 1970s and the 1980s, a geographic Europe without a European Economic Area is inconceivable. Our generation has been studying the acquis communautaire together with the constitutional law of the Member State where they attended university. Those who were born in the 1990s, who are entering the legal profession now, have received their pocket money and their first pay cheque in euros. Yet, the Brexit referendum in 2016 has shaken our common beliefs. Is the European Union (EU) a project European citizens need? Is it possible to maintain political stability, peace and prosperity without it?

Brexit seemed to represent, at the time, the potential follow-up to Grexit and the forerunner to Italexit. After three years of self-destructive actions by the British government, the firm and united reaction of the rest of Europe has shown the world that the EU is here to stay.'

Until Brexit, the UK and the English practitioners were at the forefront in interpreting and making the EU financial regulations familiar to market participants. They were the point of reference. Today we still read the EU policies and laws on financial services through the lenses of English law and practice. Yet Brexit has started a process that will likely change the status quo. Brexit pushed and will push more and more practitioners in a post-Brexit EU to challenge themselves, and to find new paradigms. The European lawyers will have to develop and shape by themselves the legal infrastructure that will promote growth and prosperity for the generations of the 2000s and the 2010s.

A good example is the project of the Capital Markets Union, whose development was illustrated in Chapter 15 of this book. It started with European Commission President Juncker launching the idea, after the investment plan for Europe (channelled through the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund) had become operative, but it required an English commissioner, Jonathan Hill, to develop a plan for the Capital Markets Union. A plan that came with a marketing campaign to revaluate finance. More securitisation to complement bank lending.

More investment funds and fewer bank deposits to make savings more productive. Risk averse European investors and a naïve adversity to finance caused Europe to lose competitiveness in the financial sector compared to other global players, like the US. The EU was still fine because it had the leading financial centre within its boundaries, London. Less finance means devaluation of assets, less funding of entrepreneurship and less capacity for European small and medium enterprises to scale up. Europe needed more finance. Jean-Claude Juncker and Jonathan Hill, among others, saw that. With Brexit,

Europe lost the English leadership half way through. However, France and Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland,3 and Luxembourg,4 among others, were keen to continue the path started with the Capital Markets Union. Yet, according to some, not all expectations have been met. The Prospectus Regulations is following the path started with the 2010 reform of the Prospectus Directive,6 which contributed to a substantial decrease in prospectuses approved by national competent authorities.' The Market Abuse Regulation has increased the cost of compliance, which affects in particular small and medium enterprises, and has driven issuers outside European stock exchanges. The long-awaited legal framework for simple transparent standardised securitisation did not go well either. A financial sector without strong capital markets limits the pool of investors available to finance small and medium enterprises and increases the overall cost of funding, in contrast with the initial scope of these pieces of legislation.

The Commission seems receptive to the market needs. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), whose increased functions were illustrated in Chapter 14 of this book, and the Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA), in charge of producing the first drafts of directives and regulations on financial services, are formed by very competent people. The Commissioners have also been supportive of the financial sector and of a regulation that should strengthen the Union's regulatory framework for financial services." But the European financial sector also needs citizens, academics and public representatives who understand and appreciate the importance of having sound and reasonable financial regulation. The combination of a lack of market friendly capital markets regulation, low interest rates and increased capital requirements lead to a credit crunch during the financial crisis, a financial gap which could only partially be filled by the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund. In our view, Europe needs more clarity, a more market friendly approach, more systemic understanding and cost/benefit analysis of new regulation. This becomes all the more important following the decision of the UK to leave the EU.

If capital markets affect a segment of society, the European institutional infrastructure affects the whole society. Still, this infrastructure is not clear to most citizens. Democracy is not just about voting, it is most of all about understanding the dynamics of power that affect our lives. One cannot have democracy without transparency. The conference held in Luxembourg on 29 and 30 November 2018, which led to the publication of this book, can represent a step towards the enlightenment of the dynamics of economic power. The development and growth in role and power of the European Central Bank and the European Stability Mechanism, institutions that have been ensuring financial stability in the Eurozone since the years of the financial crisis, should be of comfort to the European citizens. The European Central Bank and the European Stability Mechanism were instrumental in avoiding (hopefully not just postponing) the default of European sovereign debt, which felt so imminent in 2011.12 Still, despite having saved the European economy, the European Central Bank is often challenged in court, when not at the centre of absurd conspiracy theories fuelled by social media and tabloids.

Another important challenge for the European economy will be with respect to the capacity of the EU to develop a fiscal union in order to deepen the Economic and Monetary Union, as illustrated in Chapter 5 of this book. We are Luxembourg lawyers, qualified also in Germany and Italy. Luxembourg is one of the leading financial places in the world, but it still carries the stigma of its tax haven past. The Luxembourg economy was mainly agricultural in the 19th century, it then grew with steel and mining, it developed a strong private banking system, it became the second largest fund centre in the world and it is now developing a fascinating space industry. The Luxembourg government has been promoting

transparency and openness in fiscal matters. In his address to the European Parliament on 30 May 2018, Luxembourg's Prime Minister declared the country's support for a closer union: `It is in the interest of European states to strengthen the community and speed up the process towards a European Union, exactly in those areas where citizens are calling for it.'

The European economy has a lot of challenges ahead and it needs strong institutions and a clear legal framework. We hope that this publication will encourage more and more academics and students to focus on European economic law and more and more practitioners to understand and promote the study and development of these matters. <>

SHAKESPEARE, OBJECTS AND PHENOMENOLOGY: DAGGERS OF THE MIND by Susan Sachon [Palgrave Shakespeare Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, 9783030052065]

This book explores ways in which Shakespeare's writing strategies shape our embodied perception of objects – both real and imaginary – in four of his plays. Taking the reader on a series of perceptual journeys, it engages in an exciting dialogue between the disciplines of phenomenology, cognitive studies, historicist research and modern acting techniques, in order to probe our sentient and intuitive responses to Shakespeare's language. What happens when we encounter objects on page and stage; and how we can imagine that impact in performance? What influences might have shaped the language that created them; and what do they reveal about our response to what we see and hear? By placing objects under the phenomenological lens, and scrutinising them as vital conduits between lived experience and language, this book illuminates Shakespeare's writing as a rich source for investigation into the way we think, feel and communicate as embodied beings.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: In Ihde's **EXPERIMENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY: MULTISTABILITIES,** he gives a step-by-step clarification of method that—since it is sympathetic to my approach—I will adopt here as a useful framework. Ihde also takes his reader through a series of experimental exercises, using a series of line drawings. These offer an insight into training the mind to 'see' multiple perspectives of the same drawing. My own attempts at this experiment prompted a number of observations on the process of embodied perception that are relevant to my study and make a useful introduction to method.

At first glance, Ihde's line drawings seemed to present just one obvious `version' of each shape. However, by intense focus on particular aspects of each drawing, and by the strange device of

imaginatively `gripping' the object with the gaze and `moving' it upwards, the shape immediately morphed into a new perspective that seemed to sit higher on the page than the original—although in reality, of course, the line drawing stayed in the same position. Repeating the exercise takes time and patience, but by focussing on different aspects of the drawing, gradually three or four different versions of the same drawing sprang into my view. The sense of movement I felt during the exercise seemed linked directly to my innate grasp of spatiality. My gaze `gripped' and `dragged' or `pushed' the drawing, and as the shape morphed from one form into another, I experienced a distinct sense of anticipated 'lift' in the body. If I wished to return to the original perception, I simply focussed on a bottom corner of the 'box' and imaginatively `dragged' it lower with my gaze. It then obediently returned to its default shape. Guided by Ihde's instructions, I found that if I wished to prompt a more 3-dimensional perspective of the box image, I could give the original perception depth by focussing on a point in the middle of it and imagining my gaze `pushing downwards' into the centre of the box. Again, a strong sense of movement was key to the success of my efforts. Finally, Ihde used a 'story-telling' technique to focus the perceptual gaze. This speeded up the process of perceiving alternative shapes, so that an encouragement to think of one particular drawing as a `gem', and another as a 'six-legged insect' quickly prompted these new perspectives to emerge.

These instances of phenomenology working at a primarily visual level (or helped by story-telling) encapsulate the complexity of perceptual experience and illustrate a number of key points that underpin my exploration of objects in Shakespeare. My initial struggle to see beyond my original perception of the first drawing underlines the need to focus beyond what Husserl termed the `natural attitude'. We often find it difficult to mentally move away from embedded assumptions to new perspectives; in this case, movement provided a useful key to advancing beyond that first perception. For me, the fact that the perceived shape apparently refused to reveal its `hidden' alternatives without an active intention on my part, clarified Husserl's description of perception as a `seizing upon' and a `singling out' of an object from its `experiential background' (The Essential Husserl 1999b, 68). When he penned this comment, Husserl was writing about his perception of a white sheet of paper, among a background of `books, pencils, an inkstand'. I was singling out the drawing from a line of others, all set out on the page of Ihde's book. This directed concentration is an important step in the phenomenological process, as part of an `active', intentional approach to perception. As the above exercise infers, it involves a sense of engaging and preparing the body for action. This `inner energy' focus is something I have successfully employed when directing particular scenes of Shakespeare's plays containing an important object—such as the vial given to Juliet by Friar Lawrence in Romeo and Juliet—and is a topic I return to when I discuss the application of method in rehearsal. A similar sense of energy is present when we focus on an object with the idea of using it or watch someone with that same intention: a phenomenon described by Merleau-Ponty as `motor intentionality'. 'The object which presents itself to the gaze or the touch arouses a certain motor intention which aims not at the movements of one's own body, but at the thing itself', he writes, 'from which they are, as it were, suspended'.

One of the ideas I wish to explore in this book is that Shakespeare uses an active, intentional approach to shaping our perception of objects, and thus to bringing his plays alive in the embodied mind. In the same way that Ihde's 'story-telling' technique prompted new perspectives of his line drawings, Shakespeare uses poetic language to arrest, centre and focus our attention. He thus not only prompts new images; his words engender a sense of immediacy through inferred movement, and help to destabilise embedded expectations—so that we can glimpse beyond them to new perspectives.

Imagination is the key to `working' his audiences' thoughts—a point his Chorus openly canvasses in Henry V. For it is in the structure, texture, sound, rhythms and semantic loading of words that Shakespeare makes his language work for us, in a way that breaks through the ease of assumptions and challenges us to engage our perception in a fully embodied sense. This particular intentionality is a major focus of my exploration, on which I bring to bear my close-reading method, set out below.

The first step in a phenomenological enquiry is to specify the field and set aside embedded assumptions concerning the example (Husserl's `bracketing'). This is done by defining: (1) 'an it, an object of study'; (2) the observer (or `experiencing subject'); and (3) the situation (the room, conditions and perspective). In my own case, my object of study is a textual one concerning an object: Macbeth's dagger, for example, or Yorick's skull from Hamlet. Analysis takes place in my study at home, where I can be alone, comfortable and undistracted. The perspective is my own as a reader of the text, allowing for imaginative shifts to that of audience member, director or actor. I am already familiar with the play text, but my particular focus is on the objects it creates in consciousness. Whether these are destined for use as stage properties, or to remain in the realm of the imagination, they are all initially woven from words. My examples also include `objectified' bodies, where subject and object boundaries clearly merge in the text. Objects of study—intentional objects—are framed by their context in the play, and in terms of my intentional mode of perception, which is imaginative. Framing can take various forms: Smith also sees textual framing as a way of positioning himself as the reading subject and of defining the perspective from which analysis is taken. Within his historicist-based study, an object may be framed by social, political or cultural considerations, and contextualised through other historical documents. For Merleau-Ponty, framing in visual mode can be a literal device, as he frames his vision by scrutinising phenomena through a match-box lid. His three-step approach is a step-by-step recording of experiential immediacy, out of which questioning naturally arises. The first confirms the importance of the body in the perceptual process: taking the whole horizon in which the object is situated, he fixes his gaze on the object and then `feels' the perception in his body. Smith grounds his close-reading (of a Shakespeare sonnet) by posing a number of questions, such as `[dio you only see when you read? Do you hear? How do you coordinate seeing with hearing? How do you coordinate seeing and hearing with reading? Reading with remembering?' (Smith 2010, 33). This type of questioning is also something I use later in the enquiry, in order to explore various strands of experience. As my textual examples may be taken from any point in a scene, I read up to that point and allow the text to 'set the scene' in my mind. The idea of this initial reading is to become immersed in the story, rather than adopting a conscious examination of the text. The text becomes part of my `natural' gaze, whereas my intentional focus is on the imagined object I perceive in the embodied mind, through the act of reading. As I read, the text becomes `invisible'. Merleau-Ponty aptly describes this complex experience of reading:

> [t]he wonderful tbing about language is that it promotes its own oblivion: my eyes follow the lines on the paper, and from the moment I am caught up in their meaning, I lose sight of them. The paper, the letters on it, my eyes and body are there only as the minimum setting of some invisible operation. Expression fades out before what is expressed.

Reading in this way is, as Merleau-Ponty realises, an intersubjective experience: a `direct communication with a universe of truth in which we are at one with others' (467). This sense of intersubjectivity is important in terms of the multiple perspectives I adopt during the close-reading process. Although my principal perspective is initially as a reader, absorbing the story and imagining the action, I find that my point of view can unconsciously shift to that of director, performer or audience as I envisage the

example in performance. This is perhaps a phenomenon generated by past experience of watching, acting in and directing productions. As Merleau-Ponty recognises, in reading we are almost constantly perceptually ahead of the game. We `grasp' what we read in a complex way: one that `exceeds language and thought as already constituted' (467). In this first reading, then, I note these shifts as part of my experience without questioning them, but in subsequent readings each perspective is used as an intentional focus. What I have noticed from these different viewpoints is that in the `directing' mode, there seems to be a stronger focus on motility and manipulation of the object, of sensation, touch and texture, since part of my intentionality in this mode is to imagine the object being used in performance. In `audience' mode, perspective, mood and atmosphere become intensely important as part of the perceptual experience. This concentration on the separate modes of experience, brought together, produces a mass of readings that can be cross-checked against each other, then reflected on in terms of performance possibilities—a point at which `director' mode becomes my prominent perspective.

In terms of `bracketing' prior assumptions—removing oneself from what Husserl termed 'the natural attitude'—in my own case, this takes the form of deep focus, to clear or `quiet' my mind so that I am able to attend totally to the immediate experience of textual reading. A relaxed approach and quiet, undisturbed environment are therefore essential and help to open the mind to new ideas. Past experience or expertise is used as it becomes a natural element of the experience, for it is part of our perceptual dialogue with the world, and this is something that theatre relies on to create new experiences for its audiences. I therefore follow Merleau-Ponty's existential view, rather than Husserl's transcendental approach. Like Merleau-Ponty:

> `I may well close my eyes, and stop up my ears, I shall nevertheless not cease to see, if it is only the blackness before my eyes, or to hear, if only silence, and in the same way I can "bracket" my opinions or the beliefs I have acquired, but, whatever I think or decide, it is always against the background of what I have previously believed or done'.

What an intentional focus on the example allows, however, is a gradual loosening of entrenched perspectives, so that new ideas and impressions may emerge. In the next step, therefore, following Ihde's summary, I `attend to phenomena as and how they show themselves'—a process that for me involves focussing on the example and allowing myself to freely experience images, sounds, rhythms and textures of words. With the Hamlet excerpt, for example, I was immediately struck by the sharpness of the image as Yorick's skull appeared in my mind, and by the anticipation of smell and the strange morphing of skull and flesh—both dead and alive—that I perceived at this stage of absorption.

I describe the experience in detailed written note form—recording each strand of experience as it occurs, without explanation or interpretation, thus simply `capturing' the experience, rather than attempt-ing to justify it. It is this flow of experiential immediacy that is most valuable as the enquiry proceeds. An important step of this initial stage is to 'horizontalize all phenomena'—which means, as Ihde notes, that 'all phenomena must be thought of as "equally real" within the limits of their givenness'.

The idea of this important step is to prevent rejection of any experiential strands or ideas springing from them that might initially be assumed false or misleading, but that might later lead to new and unexpected understanding. As 'each seer sees what he already believes is "out there', and his first perspective, therefore, merely confirms his beliefs, `[p]henomenology holds that reality belief must be suspended in order to allow the full range of appearances to show themselves. This is the function of horizontalization'. Training the mind to accept all experiences as equally important, rather than to judge

and select, can initially prove difficult, but it is part of the discipline of phenomenological enquiry that every strand of experience is recorded as it occurs, without reflection. Throughout my enquiry, I note all sense-responses as they occur. In this, my approach is similar to Merleau-Ponty's, who understood sense-responses as important aspects of phenomenological experience. Husserl, however, saw sense-responses in a somewhat different way, as Gallagher notes, for in Husserl's transcendental form of phenomenology, 'the body is suspended within the epoché and remains transcendentally an obscure problem' whereas for Merleau-Ponty, perceptual experience is not `ranged over by a constituting consciousness'. The world is grasped `through the agency of my body', and sense-perception is part of that primary experience. Merleau-Ponty believed that touch is part of a 'transaction between the subject of sensation and the sensible'; such experiences may be `qualities' that `radiate around' objects 'a certain mode of existence', and the subject `enters into a sympathetic relation with them'. His comment that the hand `subtends' the hard and soft qualities of an object (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 248) encapsulates the `anticipation' of experience that informs my own investigations and may be understood as a form of enactive perception that recognises the importance of our objective environment in shaping our perception. As Gallagher writes, 'how I perceive things is qualified by what I can do, which is itself qualified not only by the physical state of my body, but by what it is like to be in the particular state that I'm in'.

The second stage of my enquiry is the more `active' process, where the aim is to `delve into essential features (essences) of phenomena'. In general terms, Ihde explains, essence can sometimes mean 'that which a number of things have in common', or `universal, in the sense that a certain number of things belong to it, while others do not'. He then defines it more closely in phenomenological terms, through the process by which it is uncovered: the seeking out of `structural or invariant features', which requires 'that phenomena be looked at with a particular interest', or focus. To illustrate this point, I will use Yorick's skull as a working example. As my intentional mode is imaginative, my aim is to 'look through' the text to the object created within it: my conscious experience of the skull becomes the focus of my enquiry. Having recorded my immediate stream of impressions from the first reading, this stage involves looking for structures that make the example essentially what it is. This, in fact, is where my enquiry becomes somewhat complex, since my objects of study are created through language. The image and the percept are not the same, as Merleau-Ponty points out: '[t]he imaginary has no depth', he notes; and therefore, in a bodily sense, he feels, `[w]e never have a hold upon it'. However, he also notes the powerful role of the imagination in varying and enhancing perception. When he perceives a pebble, for example, he observes: `I can imagine possible fissures in the solid mass of the thing if I take it into my head to close one eye or to think of the perspective'. This sounds similar to Husserl's imaginative variation. But for Merleau-Ponty the perception of a real object is constituted through his bodily relationship with it, through its and his presence in the living moment; a real thing is 'a form of being with depth'. He therefore sees perception as 'my concrete hold on time in a living present'.

And yet, he notes, although the image lacks the reality of the percept, 'the notion of essence' can be borrowed 'from the world of perception'; that is, the intentional threads of past experience with real objects enable us to reconstitute those perceptions within the embodied consciousness. What I am suggesting in the case of the skull example, and elsewhere throughout Shakespeare's work, is that he uses description not just to prompt an image; he engages us in an act of embodied reconstitution that fills out the image with a bodily `anticipation' of essential qualities. He uses language to evoke intentional threads that link us to our own experience, thereby creating a sense of lived immediacy. Merleau-Ponty

notes that individual words can be charged with experiential intentionality. In language experiments, he observes, if a subject is shown a word for a short time—`the word "warm", for example'—the

word itself `induces a kind of experience of warmth' (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 273); this is 'not an actual warmth', but `simply my body which prepares itself for heat and which, so to speak, roughs out its outline'. It is this form of structure that we need to test if we are to understand how Shakespeare's writing strategies shape our perception in such a visceral sense. If we were testing a real skull in terms of establishing its `essence', we would seek out its essential features. It would not be a human skull without its bony frame, its basic shape with eye and mouth sockets. We can certainly scrutinise Shakespeare's text to find description that suggests certain structural aspects, yet very little is needed to prompt a strong image of such an iconic object, and there is far more to our perceptual experience of the skull than its casing. A phenomenological exploration probes the subject's active role in perception. What prompts the affective reactions and complex sense-responses we experience when we encounter Yorick's skull in the imaginative perception? If the first stage is recording those, then the second is about discovering how they are evoked—uncovering the structures within Shakespeare's writing that prompt them. The reason that phenomenology is so useful for examining Shakespeare's textual examples, I suggest—and that objects are a particularly useful focus for study—is our phenomenal ability to `rough out' embodied experience from description. And the more finely crafted the language engaging our perception, the more vivid and complex the imaginative experience in the present moment.

My intending object—the imaginary skull—is perceived within a horizon of experience that shapes it—such as a general backdrop of mood and atmosphere in the play, its characters and their actions and intentions, and the wider story within which my example is placed. I may make notes on these aspects of experience as they come to me, but they are not the central focus of my gaze at this point. However, I will return to analyse these details later in the enquiry, as they are vital structures of my perception: they influence the 'how' and 'why' of my experience. My deepest concentration at this point is on my experience of the object itself. This total focus allows the object to emerge fully from its background, and certain facets of it `leap' to the fore with more impact than others (in the case of the skull, the hanging lips; the macabre `smile'; the image of Hamlet holding and exploring the skull; and of the child Hamlet being carried on his older friend's back). These facets are the structures of my experience that validate its sense of `reality'.

Movement is strongly felt and also mood; the morphing image elicits an overwhelming aura of horror and waste. I perceive no defined facial image of Yorick, but his sense of fun and laughter is marked. This is quickly subsumed by the darker mood pervading the text at this point.

As my focus on the object deepens, I find that the text `melts' even more into an invisible medium, and I perceive the object itself—the skull—more vividly in the imagination. It exists perceptually as an imagined object, through associations with touch, texture, smell and sound that memory draws upon, elicited by language. The experience comes as a `stream', that at this stage is not separable into strands; teasing out those strands is an activity I will return to in later reflection, when individual elements can be traced back to their source of stimulus. The fact that the experience is of primary and immediate importance at this point, rather than my reflections or judgements on or concerning it, is key to phenomenological method. Although, as Ihde explains, the subject is 'most thoroughly involved' in 'the project in hand', it is 'in such a way that [...] self-consciousness is reduced to a minimum'. This aspect of Husserl's phenomenology differentiates it from pure introspection, as the subject thus becomes

immersed in the `things themselves'. As Ihde explains, phenomenological analysis is thus the `inverse of introspective analysis. The "I" is arrived at not directly, but by way of reflexivity'. By contrast, `[a]n introspective ego or "I" claims direct, immediate and full-blown self-awareness as an initial and given certain'.

As my intentional focus is bent on the example of Yorick's skull, the object's sense of `presence' stands out more vividly, as a shape stands out from its background. My perceptual experience is strongly tactile. But as with my experience of Ihde's drawings, it is action, or the inference of action, that cues this anticipation of contact in the embodied mind; therefore, it is Hamlet's step-by-step exploration of the skull that enhances our tactile perception. The words 'here hung those lips', for example, direct more than our imaginative gaze to a specific spot. They also direct our sense of touch. The specific focus also heightens our experience. We know that fixing our gaze on a real object, with the intention of touching it, cues our anticipation of touch. In the case of the imaginary object, Shakespeare achieves a similar effect through the word `here', and the precise sense of action in `hung'. It is this intentionality, I suggest that is key to our vivid perceptual experience of Shakespeare's language. If we are asked to simply `imagine' a dagger or a skull, an image irresistibly forms in the mind. But when language intentionally directs our focus, our perception is heightened, and the object seems to come within our perceptual grasp. The more the intentional focus is narrowed to individual aspects of the perception, the greater the possible yield of noted experience, for later reflection.

Narrowing focus in this way is the first stage of what Husserl termed eidetic reduction. The second stage involves probing all possible eidetic variations of the phenomenon. For my investigation, this means carefully listing strands of experience and orientating my enquiry with questions, such as: Which images are most vividly experienced? Am I conscious of imagined sound? A particular fluctuation in metre? Do I see colour? Sense temperature? Am I anticipating movement, touch or texture, experiencing atmosphere, mood or emotion? Is my perspective constant or fluctuating? Am I `inside' the scene, or watching, as an audience member? (As mentioned earlier, shifts in perspective can happen unconsciously during reading.) Having noted as many facets of the experience as possible, the next step in Eidetic Reduction is Imaginative Variation, which focusses on moving from the apparent to the possible.

This process entails taking the example and imagining different possible versions or uses of it. As Ihde points out, 'free variations employed in a systematic way are a central methodological feature of all phenomenological investigation'. Imaginative variation can be used to test the structures of experience. In very simple terms, for example, one way of testing a knife's basic affordance is to try cutting something with it, in order to verify its function. Imaginative variation is also one way of checking how much of one's own response may be broadly intersubjective. To give an example, the following is an exercise that I have found useful in acting workshops as well as scholarly study, when exploring the impact of language in shaping perception. Imaginative variation in this case takes the form of possible word substitutions. What happens if a keyword is swapped for another, or moved to a different place in the sentence? For example, in Romeo and Juliet, the Friar describes the sleeping potion he gives Juliet as `distilling liquor' that will bring about a `borrowed likeness of shrunk death' (Romeo and Juliet, 4.1.94, 104)a To substitute `shrunk' with another word or expression—for example, `little', `small' or `reduced', changes the way we grasp this particular meaning. For one thing, `shrunk' immediately evokes its action in the embodied mind: the word is already in the past, and therefore the action has to `catch up'. The word compresses time by the using the past tense, and thus, it seems that the action of

shrinking rushes to achieve its aim, even as we `watch'. The word choice here also compresses the impact of death on the body: the gradual dwindling of flesh is achieved almost instantly—but not quite. This is an inferred action, a very specific one that makes the image so vividly visceral. The `body' shrinks into itself, as the liquid is reduced into the tiny vial in the Friar's hand.

The sounds involved in `shrunk' and `death' are equally light and soft, and in uttering them, the breath is stopped briefly after each one—'shrunk' by the middle of the tongue meeting the hard palette; `death' by the tip of the tongue on the teeth. They are not easy words for an actor to say quickly and clearly; they need to be firmly separated to be effective. This factor draws attention to their importance. The 'k' in `likeness' also chimes with that in `shrunk', so that to substitute it with `resemblance', for example, would not be nearly as effective. The metre, too, equally stresses the two end words, and with a missing iambic foot at the end of the line, there is breathing space to slow them down and accentuate them. To change the word order, or exchange `borrowed' for `temporary', say, would not only give the line a more modern `feel', it would also affect its hypnotic smoothness and alter the impact of sound and metre on the mind and senses. `Borrowed' also infers the presence of another person or state waiting to take back that which they or it have loaned: in this case, death—making the word a far more intimate choice. Thus, imaginative variation, in my own enquiry, involves studying writing strategies that produce particular effects in terms of embodied perception. Some of the most vivid examples involve the same kind of perceptual shift that Ihde engages through his storytelling technique that aids perception of the line drawings, through precise word choices that seem to compress time itself and morph the body into essences of `other'. I found Henry V and Titus Andronicus _particularly valuable sources of examples in this respect. This practical method of ascertaining the invariant structures of an example, by imagining possible alternatives, has proved useful in workshop situations, since it develops further understanding of a particular speech in context with the rest of the play, and encourages experimentation in the way Shakespeare's language can be used to create mood and shape audience perception. Having now completed this stage of the phenomenological enquiry, the final step of my enquiry is the Reflexive Mode.

In this mode, I reflect on individual strands of my experience and trace them back to the writing strategies that evoked them. I also consider them in the broader context of the play. I focus this step of the enquiry by asking such questions as: if the object was intended for use as a stage property, how was it introduced to the scene? Was my perception of the object shaped before it `appeared' onstage? If so, how? How do I think this might affect a watching and listening audience? Did my perception of an `onstage' object change throughout the reading? If it did, in what way—and what exactly triggered the changes? If the example was a body, objectified through language, exactly how did language change my perception of that body? How did I experience the image? Was it immediately `delivered' to the mind—or did it appear to move into place (like the `shrunk' likeness of death in the vial)? If so, did I anticipate this movement in an embodied sense? I examine the excerpt from different perspectives—as reader, director, audience member—and consider how my findings could be used to heighten an audience's experience of the same scene. At this point, I also reflect on the process of perception itself, and the ways in which this particular example may have shaped my understanding of it; I also consider the impact my findings have had on my earlier reading of the play.

Throughout the discussions above, I have looked at ways in which general principles of phenomenology provide a useful underpinning for close-reading that explores the presentation of objects in Shakespeare.

I also considered phenomenological methodology in terms of its limitations and suggested the benefits of validating and utilising its findings within Shakespeare scholarship through collaborations with other disciplines. One of the ways in which we can achieve this is, I believe, is within an ongoing dialogue with historicist studies. Recent critical discussions on early modern attitudes towards imaginative literature and play texts have stressed the impact of descriptive language on audiences of the time. In the texts explored in Shakespearean Sensations, for example, Katharine A. Craik and Tanya Pollard point out that early modern 'men and women respond to plays and poems not only with their minds and souls but also with their hearts, hands, viscera, hair and skin'. For modern readers, as Smith so aptly observes, Shakespeare's plays are also 'rife with fantasies of touch' (Smith 2010, 145). It is this visceral quality in Shakespeare's work with which my study is most concerned: primarily with its potential effects on modern audiences—but within a basic understanding of its potential impact on audiences in his own time. This is an idea that I go on to consider in the case studies that follow. I have already briefly touched upon the idea of cognitive studies as a way of informing and expanding my enquiry. To this end, I propose to extend my discussion by looking at a number of recent collaborative works that use cognitive studies to illuminate research in theatre and performance, and by engaging with the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in Metaphors We Live By (1980), and Gilles Fauconnier's and Mark Turner's study in Conceptual Blending: The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities (2003). Like Amy Cook, I am interested in the question, `[h]ow does the complexity of [Shakespeare's] language enrich our experience?'. The breadth of topics in this book precludes a detailed foray into cognitive or historicist studies, as its main focus is on phenomenological close-reading. Therefore, this interdisciplinary aspect of my study is undertaken in a spirit of exploratory `play' that shows how drawing together a phenomenological enquiry with aspects of cognitive studies in particular has some distinct advantages. For example, one advantage of using conceptual blending to open up my close-reading is its concern with the relationships between language, thought and embodied experience. Blending theory studies ways in which we conceptually integrate two or more `mental input spaces' to generate a further `blended' space containing aspects of the original inputs. The example of Yorick's skull from Hamlet is a combination of a visual input space—and all that is connected with the actual skull, present onstage— and a verbal input space that contains Hamlet's description of Yorick and the skull. When the two input spaces are blended, our visual perception is imaginatively re-shaped by the words as the blend is `run'. Conceptual blending theory is particularly useful when looking at a text written for performance; for as Cook notes, while reading the text, "running the blend" generates a mental simulation', and can give us an appreciation of how the blend might inform performance. We can `'blend' and 'unblend' in different ways, creating multiple possibilities and perspectives; therefore, the discipline offers a distinct flexibility that sits well with phenomenological exploration. The process of unpacking blends can give specific clarity to aspects of the experience that might previously have been overlooked. It thus helps to reveal, as Cook points out, 'the often hidden input spaces that help construct the blend', and throws light on its dramatic power. This is something I illustrate in the following chapter—once more using the example of Yorick's skull from Hamlet— and pursue further in the case studies.

Another way of understanding the complex ways in which Shakespeare's language shapes how we think, feel and sense is in the light of recent neuroscientific research. With the availability of fMRI scans and MEG machines, we can witness activity in a subject's brain as he/she responds to linguistic or visual stimuli, and this has helped us to begin to understand the extent to which the mind is embodied. As with the study of objects, visual evidence of brain activity has a comfortingly tangible feel. And yet, what can

a `cluster of color on a picture of the brain', to use Cook's expression, really tell us? (2010, 26). Without a clear record of the subject's experience as he/she responds to a given stimulus, and without an attempt at understanding the ways in which that particular experience was shaped and influenced, neural mapping is only part of the story. Phenomenology provides an excellent tool for capturing experiential immediacy in a carefully structured way. Its descriptive, narrative form means that it offers an easily accessible ground-base for exploration into the way we think, and it has thus in recent years found itself in a shared research arena with the developing discipline of neuroscience. Nicola Shaughnessy explains that 'in the twenty-first century new terminologies and paradigms have moved beyond cognitive science's black box to conjoin thinking and feeling, body and brain as dynamic, complex and interconnected' . The neurosciences are, themselves—as Anna Furse points out—'in fact a relatively new and comprehensive branch of science — emerging in the 1970s — transcending previous disciplinary boundaries, e.g. neurobiology, biochemistry and physiology'. The increasing dialogue between phenomenology and certain strands of cognitive science developed through an understanding of 'the mind-body as an interconnected system', inspiring phenomenologists, cognitive scientists and philosophers to come together in a common working arena.

A number of Shakespeare scholars are now working in dialogue or collaboration with other disciplines, in order to open up new ways of understanding their own. Shakespeare scholar Evelyn B. Tribble and Cognitive Philosopher John Sutton, for example, are discovering 'new complexity in [their] own fields as a result of thinking through old problems with the different perspectives of each other's discipline'. And going back over old ground in new ways can illuminate our understanding of what we thought we knew. To this end, my study scrutinises four of Shakespeare's plays, bringing objects—both real and imaginary—under the phenomenological lens, and reconsidering its findings in the light of other disciplines that share an interest in embodied perception. Although time and space preclude a detailed survey of the excellent research currently being done in these fields, the observations I have used here should, I hope, reveal a fascinatingly organic subject/object relationship in the chosen plays that throws an interesting light on Shakespeare's writing strategies, and our response to them. It is at this point, therefore, that I wish to turn to what Gallagher describes as the `rebirth' or indeed `re-incarnation' of phenomenology, with a `renewed emphasis on embodied cognition' (Gallagher 2012, 15) and to consider the value of bringing cognitive studies to `play' on the results of phenomenological enquiry.

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The advantage of a phenomenological reading is that it encourages us to `look' differently, with all our senses alive and open to discovery. The immediate disadvantage is that the findings are limited to one individual's experience. So how can we test that experience in a broader sense? And how can a phenomenological reading become a useful part of a larger dialogue that seeks to understand and unravel our embodied thinking? One way of verifying the strength and usefulness of such a reading is to use other methods to analyse its findings in different ways: to test whether they offer a broader or different understanding of the example. To this end, my multi-modal enquiry has brought phenomenological close-reading into dialogue with several other disciplines: historicist research, cognitive neuroscience and conceptual metaphor and blending theories, within a spirit of exploratory play. A desire to understand what might have informed the marked fluidity of subject/object boundaries in the examples, for instance, or to what extent the examples reflect their original audiences' own embedded and embodied beliefs and socially/culturally shaped experience, led me to current historicist

research that might illuminate my own findings. Among the many differences in beliefs and attitudes between moderns and early moderns, there remain many unexpected connections. A growing interest in embodiment theories among modern neuroscientists and cognitive linguists and a burgeoning number of cross-disciplinary collaborative projects between scientists, psychologists, philosophers, theatre practitioners and performers—although expressed in different terms—seems rooted in early modern ideas. I therefore decided to explore what links there may be between early modern and modern perspectives, including ways in which actors use physical exercises to connect to emotions through the body.

I then set out to verify some of my readings in a different way—through conceptual blending analysis and conceptual metaphor theory.

Through this detailed method, I could separate and clarify my own immediate responses to the examples within a framework that would highlight their viability in a broader, intersubjective sense. Conceptual metaphor theory, applied to selected examples, revealed which strands of experience might be seen as prompted by attitudes and beliefs already embedded in modern language structures—and highlighted those that we appear to have in common with our early modern counterparts, such as `argument is war' and 'war as heroic' in Henry V and Macbeth. The exercise also helped to clarify ways in which Shakespeare uses embedded assumptions to destabilise audience expectations, and to potentially warp visual perception—as in Macbeth and King Lear, when heightened audience expectation creates a sense of illusion, which is then dissipated by `real' events. This strategy is also evident in the clash between poetry and visual horror in Titus, and in the Chorus's glorification of war juxtaposed with Williams's disturbing vision of dismembered limbs in Henry V. Conceptual blending theory illuminated instances where language appeals to our intuitive senses, and elicits our anticipation of action or `protension'—as in Henry's speech before Harfleur, when his soldiers' faces are conceptually blended with the weapons they fire, and in the example of Yorick's skull, from Hamlet, discussed in the opening chapter. In the final analysis, then, how far did these multi-modal strands of enquiry help to clarify my phenomenological readings of objects in Shakespeare's writing? And how might such findings be used to inform Shakespeare in production?

Firstly, historicist research illuminated the fluidity of that writing as part of a deeply embodied attitude towards language and theatre—one that also ties in with our growing understanding of how the embodied mind works. Although four hundred years is an impossible gulf to cross in terms of trying to understand early modern experience, my findings suggested a rich vein of intentionality that runs through Shakespeare's work, based on his own lived experience and his approach to his audiences. It is one that we may not be able to tap into in the same way that our early modern counterparts did, but it lends us useful insights into the body it serves, and as part of a collaboration with phenomenological close-reading and conceptual blending analysis, can usefully inform both critical readings and Shakespeare in performance. Although there is limited space in which to explore the many excellent works exploring the important field of historicist research, the observations below give a flavour of the way early moderns saw themselves and their world in an `embodied' sense. They suggest an intriguing fluidity of subject/object boundaries that characterises Shakespeare's writing—particularly in Titus Andronicus, Henry V and Macbeth.

Paster notes, for example, that Francis Bacon `describes a tension in all things between their desire for union with other things and their desire for self-continuance'. While hard materials such as `iron, stone,

or wood have a "strong" appetite to resist change', Paster explains, for Bacon, `sticky things, such as pitch, glue, or birdlime, will "partly follow the touch of another body; and partly stick and continue to themselves".1 Rather than the materials having a consistency that is pliable, as we would see it, the materials themselves show a will of their own to join others. Paster goes on to describe a relationship between subject-object-and-world that is reflected in Shakespeare's writing: 'the relationship of self to world is less one of resemblance and correspondence than it is of reciprocity or even mutual permeation'. This results in `swords being tempered (like people, liquors, or musical instruments) and thus easily made to participate in humoral discourse' (39). This idea is evident in Romeo and Juliet, when the Friar asks, 'What mean these masterless and gory swords I To lie discoloured by this place of peace?': the swords appear to have an intentionality of their own. Furthermore, as Paster points out, for the early moderns, 'the substantial self is constructed [...] from the same materials as the natural world; this is a chief reason that its appetites are analogous to the appetites animating nature.' In addition, the `self' could be `imagined as a physical substance', which could become `other — through its associations with a value-laden object world and with elemental interactions with the environment'. This idea is borne out in Henry V's words to his soldiers at the siege of Harfleur, and in Titus's roar of grief: `I am the sea'; it is also evident in the examples of Macbeth's objectified bloody hand, and Williams's vision of disembodied, personified limbs in Henry V Carla Mazzio indicates that the idea of body parts or functions personified is also illustrated in Thomas Tomkis's play of 1607, Lingua, or the Combat of the Tongue and the Five Senses for Superiority, an allegorical play where the senses, personified, vie for supremacy. Carla Mazzio explains that the play 'is part of a tradition of academic dramas of the period, where students would inhabit theatrical parts that were also systematic parts'. In drama, it appears, parts of the body, even its very lifeblood, could be given a tongue, as are the dismembered limbs in Williams's speech in Henry V.

To us, this treatment of body parts as vital individuals might seem bizarre, and we would find it very strange to attend a play in which our senses parade before us. We have (somewhat characteristically) dismembered the brain on occasions, however (as in The Man with Two Brains, in 1983, directed by Carl Reiner); a concept that reflects the long-standing empirical attitude that brain and body function separately.

Indeed, the functionalist-philosophy image of a disembodied 'brain-in-a-vat' that `seems perfectly capable of experience and cognition as long as the correct neurons are stimulated', is `surprisingly influential even for opponents of functionalism', as Gallagher observes. For followers of this theory, the body and its environment do not seem to have a part in shaping consciousness: it is therefore the polar opposite of early modern ideas on embodiment. As I discussed earlier, however, attitudes are changing in this respect. In The Phenomenological Mind, for example, Gallagher and Zahavi point out that for roboticists, trying to create a functioning body from an artificial brain has proved problematic; scientists have been unable to build a successful 'top down' robot—i.e. `starting with a disembodied syntax and trying to add a functional artificial body that would heed the commands from a central intelligence computer'. `[T]heir more recent initiatives', they note, 'are attempts to design robots from the bottom up, building simple, pragmatically ordered, biologically inspired, sensorimotor machines that can move around environments by using information gathered in real time from the environments themselves'. These robots are "physically grounded"' , a fact that underlines the importance of the body and the environment in effectively shaping experience and functionality.

Where such ideas leave the emotions, however, is difficult to fathom. McConachie points out that in modern scientific terms:

> 'The primary human emotions, facilitated by the limbic part of the brain, include fear, panic, joy, rage, care, disgust and curiosity. Each of these emotions is sparked by specific stimuli, which trigger a chemical response and the activation of dedicated neuronal networks in the brain. These changes lead, in turn, to changes in muscle tone, blood flow, and hormonal response'.

We may be able to regard emotions as the result of chemical reactions in IV the brain, but scientists still have difficulty in explaining them adequately. Gerald Edelman, for example, in noting the distinction between feelings and emotions, touches on the complex nature of the latter: `feelings are a part of the conscious state and are the processes that we associate with the notions of qualia as they relate to the self'. They are not, therefore, to be confused with emotions, which have strong cognitive components that mix feelings with willing and with judgements in an extraordinarily complicated way. Emotions may be considered the most complex of mental states or processes insofar as they mix with all other processes (usually in a very specific way, depending on the emotion). They are not made simpler by the fact that they also have historical and social bases.

In some ways, however, there seems an odd connection between emotions described as chemical reactions in the brain and early modern beliefs in the four bodily humours that (in cases of imbalance) could dangerously affect mood. But for early moderns, body, world, senses and emotions were inextricably and fluidly intertwined, connected by a life force of spirits that flowed through world and body alike. As Paster explains:

> 'the spirit realm worked analogically to explain the psychophysiological constitution of the embodied self, since the pneumatic spirits that organized the universe replenished the life forces of the human body too, being inhaled into the lungs or absorbed in food and drink'.

Thus the air, full of expectancy, that early modern audiences inhaled when they listened to the Chorus in Henry V, would have signified far more than a psychological lifting of spirits, as we understand it; for them it would have been a bodily absorption of vitality. But bodily fluids could also affect the spirits; as Paster observes, spirits could be clouded if they were invaded by bodily fluids, affecting the passions. These affects were transported around the body via the spirits, for as they believed, `[i]n the great activity of spirits moving between heart, brain, and body lie the effects and the expression of all passions'. Emotions were bound up with bodily function, rather than remaining purely a problem of the mind; therefore `emotional change resides in internal bodily alteration'. To some extent, we also recognise the interdependent relationship between bodily function and emotion; if not in terms of spirits that carry mood-changing fluids, as emotional triggers that can activate physical responses—such as the sudden rush of adrenalin when we feel excitement or fear, or sense danger. In a way, the fluid adrenalin also `invades' or floods the body, but in response to a stimulus that triggers a reaction in the brain. The difference seems to be that for early moderns, the imbalance of bodily fluids could itself act as a cause of—among a number of evils—depression or ungovernable emotions. Having said that, we also know that chemical imbalances in the brain can cause what we categorise as psychological illnesses and disorders. What we hear, think and remember can also fuel an adrenalin-filled panic attack: listening to a horror story, for example; hearing a particular song, or catching a certain scent can reconstitute the fear associated with a traumatic event in the past.

For early moderns, maintaining health in both body and mind meant keeping the four bodily humours in balance. In a sense, some societies still approach health in this holistic way, and interest in their treatments is growing in Western Society. As we begin to understand more about the way our minds work in relation to our bodies through experiments in neuroscience—particularly when allied with the work of other disciplines such as psychology, phenomenology and performance/theatre studies—early modern ideas seem a little less removed from our own than we once perceived them to be. There seems, for example, a marked similarity between modern views on `enactive embodiment' and early modern ideas on the fluidity of exchange between the passions and the world. Paster notes that early modern thinking `recognizes the influence of environment on the passions and the effect of human passions on the objective world outside self. On the other hand, differences in thinking

between the two eras are still many and complex. Although we might glimpse the essence of enactive embodiment theories within early modern beliefs, we would perhaps find it more difficult to identify with the idea, for example, that the elements can literally invade the consciousness. In terms of air, for instance, Paster observes that early modern thinking derived from `premodern beliefs that the body was filled with moving currents of air in the bloodstream, that the air taken within the body became part of the stuff of consciousness'. And as she explains, `quotations from Descartes and others suggest' that these beliefs lasted 'well into the early modern period'. This is borne out by the fact that `[m]etaphors of winds as passions are commonplace' in the period: thus Shakespeare's wonderfully physical image of audience members drawing ships across the seas to Harfleur, in Henry V, for example—with bodily spirits infused in wind and breath; or the inhalation of spirits as air, embodying the Chorus's uplifting mood of `expectation'. Lear's cries to the wind and thunder on the heath reflect the rage coursing fluidly through his body, as much as the external storm. In one sense our modern, scientific thinking shares a similarity with our early modern counterparts—we are also made up of the same stuff as the world around us. What our modern thinking omits, however, is the physiological and emotional sense with which early moderns connected themselves to objects and environment: the link between passions and elements, where excessive grief could be more literally understood as a tempest within and without. However, it is through the remnants of our physiological connection, perhaps, that we respond to metaphors such as Shakespeare's that at times stir us in ways that we barely understand—somewhere below the level of consciousness.

Whereas the early moderns saw `passions' as bodily states, it is difficult for us not to separate mind and body in the way we see ourselves and our world. As Noga Arikha points out, however, fMRI scans and `other imaging techniques have in fact been helping us revise Cartesian preconceptions about how we think and feel, showing, notably, the extent to which our emotions are conjoined with our thoughts.' But as she also observes, it seems that emotions still cannot be adequately explained. We are, however, becoming more aware of ways in which our bodies are interconnected with mind, mood and emotion through chemical responses in the brain, and the fact that our environment plays a vital part in shaping proprioception. Perhaps the main difference between us and our early modern counterparts is not only their commitment to this innate, fluctuating exchange between mind, body and world that—according to recent research findings—they clearly experienced; it is also their physiological investment in language. For them, words quite literally had the potential power to kill or cure.

Our own advancements in medical science mean that we can now cure many diseases and illnesses that would have proved fatal in early modern times. But for our forebears, fear of illness was all-consuming

and easily became bound up with the seemingly magical power of words, influencing the way early modern audiences responded to theatre. Initially, it is easy to dismiss early modern beliefs that words are able to permeate the body and cause physical damage. At least in one sense, this threat still very much alive, however. We only have to look at the devastating effect of online teenage bullying, to realise how powerful language still is in shaping self-perception. We may believe that language can only permeate consciousness, rather than the body, but its effects may be just as damaging, both physically and mentally. We might ask ourselves why it is that young people who 'self-harm' inflict damage on their bodies, when the `harm' is done through the mind. And although as far as treatments for bodily illnesses go, we now rely far more on mainstream medicine based on scientific evidence than we do on `alternative' cures, they are still present in our society, just as `[tlhe humoural underpinning of our emotional life was always there' from early modern times, as Arikha notes. We can still be 'bad humoured', or `choleric'. Despite these connections, however, there is a myriad of potential differences: political, social, cultural and historical, meaning that we can only generalise about how early modern audiences would really have felt, thought, sensed and reacted when watching a play. And as Escolme points out, 'we have a paucity of accounts of what audience members actually felt about the theatre they visited.' Despite a growing body of writing on the subject of early modern audiences and how they might have responded, then, a great deal of speculation is still involved. The study of texts such as Shakespeare's, however, can help us to understand how early moderns perceived themselves as part of an objective and natural world, through which they expressed experiences and deep emotions, such as grief and despair. Uncovering intricate writing strategies, such as those explored here, that set out to engineer audience perception may help us to draw a clearer picture of how early modern audiences were affected by language. Such detailed analysis as phenomenological reading and conceptual blending analysis afford can give a microscopic view of intentions within and behind the language used, that may in turn be valuably informed by historicist research. What we also discover, by careful analysis of Shakespeare's language through such a `sympathetic' lens, is a thread that allows us to reconnect with our environment through an understanding of embodiment, and the complex embeddedness of language within our thinking, feeling and sensory relationship with our world. This thread is a useful tool, I suggest, that can be used to inform modern productions of Shakespeare's plays.

In addition, performance studies can also provide a useful and fascinating conduit between those whose work is very much based on `instinct', and scientists who seek to define clear causes and reasons for our responses. From such experiments as Melissa Trimingham's—studying the `Haptic Effect' in autistic children, for example, we can begin to appreciate the value of Lakoff and Johnson's conceptual metaphor theory in helping us to understand the difficulties such children have in learning to interact in a socially complex world. Within a stimulating environment full of tactile objects for children to explore, and puppeteers who encourage the children to imagine moving as a character, Trimingham realises that 'the mind is formed literally by being "in touch" with the world'. Understanding is a process of tactile contact; of `using the body/brain memory of feeling, touching, literally rubbing against the World.' As Lakoff and Johnson have clearly shown, from such physical experience of the world, we learn to think and communicate in terms of metaphors that encapsulate that experience in an easily graspable sense. It is the objects' very tangibility—and our contact with them—that fuels the basis of our understanding and helps us to articulate it. `Understanding is felt through "primary metaphors"',

notes Trimingham; `warmth is affection, big is important', for example. 'Big' we learn from encountering large objects in relation to our own bodies, and `warmth' from tactile experience, that is then linked to

comfort and security—and thus to affection. The hot-water bottle or warm soup a mother gives a sick child, for example, becomes bound up with her care and affection. Trimingham therefore feels that Lakoff and Johnson's theory 'is deeply relevant to autistic children' who have `difficulties in learning to think, and hence to embody the world' in the way non-autistic people do. Understanding objects in an embodied sense leads to the `development of meaningful speech, empathy, abstract thinking and imagination'. As a result of the experiments on the immersive activity `pod', children became, she writes, `aware of the shared cultural and social embeddedness of [...] objects, in a mutual flow, however brief, where individual consciousness and the extended mind become impossible to distinguish'. Trimingham's article highlights the importance of objects in the formation of understanding—an idea that lies at the core of this book, and one that highlights the importance of cross-disciplinary work in Shakespeare studies. For from such simple connections as warmth is affection, or the concept of 'big' in terms of bodily relationships to objects, we can begin to understand how Shakespeare's Dover Cliff scene can so successfully create a dizzying sense of height, or an immense feeling of mass; or how Lady Macbeth's `blanket of the dark' might suggest a sinister antithesis of warmth and affection with callous ambition, in the context of her speech.

The idea of improvised but directed `play' that the children took part in during Trimingham's experiment is a familiar one to those engaged in theatre training. In another fascinating cross-disciplinary experiment described by Gabriele Sofia, and carried out by two neurologists (Nicola Modugno and Giovanni Mirabelli), a group of patients with Parkinson's disease were asked to attend theatre workshops rather than undergo traditional medical treatment. Sofia reports that, in contrast to a second group who only underwent traditional treatment, the theatre workshop patients `showed a constant improvement on all clinical scales. As well as improvisation work to encourage socialisation and co-operation, these patients also took part in exercises `linked to rhythmic skills and body coordination, others to vocal elasticity, breathing and the singing skills', and in `posture control and facial mimicry'; in addition, Sofia notes, 'a specific section of the workshop was dedicated to the storytelling, and the construction of theatre scenes starting from the tales of the participants'. The theatre training patients showed a higher level of improvement in social skills `because of the interpersonal co-operation that every theatre activity required'. This in turn appeared to help 'the feeling of isolation' such patients `frequently reported'. The final data—which showed results but could give no explanation of precise reasons for them—encouraged a `shared project aimed at understanding how theatre training affects cognitive functions'. Sofia notes, however, that `little neuroscientific research on performers' since the 1980s that 'has taken into consideration the importance of the live co-presence of actor and spectator during the performance. An empirical and systematic research focusing on the efficacy of theatre's relational potentialities is consequently yet to be carried out', he writes. He questions, however, whether it is `possible to study the neurobiological level of this particular intersubjective relation?' (174), and suggests that `[r]esearch into the mirror neurons mechanism' could provide answers, as the `activation of the mirror mechanism [...] alters the biochemical balance of the body-mind system and provides some important information about the observed action. Sofia terms `mirroring' a "resonance" of actions', that `assumes different forms and dynamics depending on the observer's body-mind system, on his own experiences, his motor vocabulary, his attention mechanisms and his current emotional state, etc.' Therefore, `[p]erceiving an action implies the activation of all the individual's abilities, both the imaginative and associative as well as the motor abilities'. This is a phenomenon I have explored in some detail in Shakespeare's work—which I believe is an ideal ground-base for examining implied mirroring in

terms of writing, reading and performance. Further study of his work in this respect could, I believe, reveal a great deal about the way we understand, think, feel and communicate as embodied beings. Again, the experiment Sofia describes shows the value of collaboration between disciplines in a very practical sense. We might realise the efficacy of theatre training exercises on such patients, but as yet are only just beginning to unravel the source of its beneficial impact. Shakespeare's texts, written by an actor to appeal to his audience in a deeply embodied sense, provide endless opportunities to examine how language shapes our thinking and uses our experience to fuel the imagination. As a `mirror to nature', it not only shows us ourselves in action, it also engages our anticipation of others' actions.

Collaborations between neuroscientists and acting practitioners can also highlight what appears to be an interesting link that draws together early modern and modern thinking, historicist and scientific research, Shakespeare's writing and the performance process—in terms of embodied thinking and its connection to emotion. McConachie, commenting on the changing views of science towards emotion, writes that 'all cognitive scientists now recognize that emotion cannot be divided from even the most abstract of thoughts', and in a way, he feels that `science has caught up with the theatre' in this respect. For the actor: emotion, body language, posture, gesture, fluidity, senses, memory and physical energy are all part of the vocabulary of acting as an embodiment of character. Various approaches to acting demonstrate as much or more emphasis on physicality as conceptualisation. For Jacques Lecoq, `[a] piece of writing is a structure in motion'; like Merleau-Ponty, he believes that `[p]eople discover themselves in relation to their grasp of the external world', and what is important is to `observe how beings and objects move, and how they find a reflection in us'. His comment that `[p]robing the depths of one strand leads to the discovery that everything is contained within it' also has a distinctly phenomenological ring. Stanislayski, although known for his character-driven approach to acting, also recognised the importance of physicality. McConachie explains this idea in terms of how the body schema operates in relation to motivation. When an actor moves awkwardly onstage, `[t]his is because the body schema, though generally unconscious in operation, is linked to intentional action. Actors who do not know their intentions [...] will tend to falter in their movements'. He also notes that Chekhov's approach to exploring character through improvisation helps `conceptual integration', for 'the actor blends self and role together', leading the actor to `embody an actor/character blend'. Character needs to be `grounded in the body', McConachie observes, for `[i]f the actor attempts to physically imitate an imagined moving figure, she will spark low-level empathy, because the mirror neurons of the actor will mentally mirror the movements of the figure'.

To this end, I have placed objects in Shakespeare—as shaped in our perception—under the phenomenological lens, and interfaced the findings of that enquiry with considerations taken from a number of discourses in order to interrogate ways in which Shakespeare shapes what we see, feel and sense when we encounter them on page and stage; how we can imagine that impact in performance; what influences might have shaped the language that created them; and what they reveal about our response to what we see and what we hear. What has emerged from this study is the extent to which we understand our world and our bodies through our experience of objects; they are part of the deeply embedded story of our survival: one that we have learned to express through language—that in turn connects us back to our experience by triggering intuitive responses that lie below the level of consciousness. Fauconnier and Turner explain that `[n]early all important thinking takes place outside of consciousness and is not available on introspection; the mental feats we think of as the most impressive are trivial compared to everyday capacities'. By this, they mean that so much of what we take for

granted in our daily actions, observations, interactions, anticipations, etc. is incredibly complex and yet seems outwardly straightforward or `given', because it is unconscious. As they go on to note, 'the imagination is always at work in ways that consciousness does not apprehend; consciousness can glimpse only a few vestiges of what the mind is doing'.

This is the reason why acting training is centred so much around developing what we call 'instinct'—using our unconscious responses—and why actors spend time discovering and developing `triggers' that enable them to connect, through these instincts, with emotions, in order to `inhabit' their characters and project themselves imaginatively into different scenarios. The most immediate source of such triggers is the performance text, or script. To recognise within those texts the writing strategies that tap into embedded processes beneath our immediately conscious appreciation of the language is, I suggest, to begin to apprehend our response to language in a deeply intuitive sense. It is, as Booth so aptly phrases it, ill to look at Shakespeare 'as a writer manifesting key capacities that animate us all' (Booth 2017, 230). His comment illuminates the common ground that Shakespeare's work offers cross-disciplinary research; for those working in neuroscience, cognitive linguistics, performance studies and literary criticism, Shakespeare's writing is a rich source for investigation into the way we think, feel and communicate in an embodied sense.

Phenomenological close-reading offers an initial way of accessing this rich vein of perceptual experience: of reaching beyond or beneath the Cartesian mind/body dualism that shapes so many of our assumptions, so that we still tend to separate language from objects, visual from verbal. Through such close-reading, I have sought to trace the inten¬tional threads that connect my own experience to Shakespeare's language, exploring ways in which embodied experience is appealed to, reconstituted and blended with new imaginings. For as Husserl realised, perception is as much about the experience of perceiving as it is about its object; it is concerned with the intentionality of the phenomenological gaze—with its imaginative potentiality, and the affordances that unique fusion of subject/object experience brings to light. As Merleau-Ponty so aptly observed, 'Husserl's essences are destined to bring back all the living relationships of experience, as the fisherman's net draws up from the depths of the ocean quivering fish and seaweed' (Merleau-Ponty 2002, xvii). In engaging and directing our intentionality, Shakespeare illuminates those essential qualities of objects before the gaze, encapsulating them with an intensity that shimmers—even for the fraction of a moment—through the barriers of the unconscious mind. <>

THE MORAL ARGUMENT: A HISTORY by David Baggett and Jerry Walls [Oxford University Press, 9780190246365]

The history of the moral argument for the existence of God is a fascinating tale. Like any good story, it is full of twists and unexpected turns, compelling conflicts, memorable and idiosyncratic characters, both central and ancillary players. The narrative is as labyrinthine and circuitous as it is linear, its point yet to be fully seen, and its ending yet to be written. What remains certain is the importance of telling it. The resources of history offer a refresher course, a teachable moment, a cautionary tale about the need to avoid making sacrosanct the trends of the times, and an often sobering lesson in why reigning assumptions may need to be rejected. This book lets the argument's advocates, many long dead, come alive again and speak for themselves. A historical study of the moral argument is a reminder that classical

philosophers were unafraid to ask and explore the big questions of faith, hope, and love; of truth, goodness, and beauty; of God, freedom, and immortality. It gives students and scholars alike the chance to drill down into their ideas, contexts, and arguments. Only by a careful study of its history can we come to see its richness and the range of resources it offers.

> Like so many Americans, she was trying to construct a life that made sense from things she found in gift shops.—Kurt Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse-Five

As I (Dave) sit here in the anterior alcove of the Forest Public Library in central Virginia, through the decorative recessed windows before me I take in a beautiful scene. Foregrounded by a thoroughfare that extends in a few miles to the cemetery where my mother is buried, in the distance is a sprawling mountain range that dominates my whole vision. Punctuating the panoramic range are distant peaks and valleys that have inspired painters and poets alike for centuries. Just a half hour away, in Appomattox, Virginia, the Civil War officially drew to a close. Mere minutes from here can be found Thomas Jefferson's Poplar Forest home, a smaller replica of Monticello. Off to my far left I can see Sharp Top, a particular peak that is famous, among other reasons, for bequeathing some of its sacred stones to the Washington Monument. As I reflected on all this enchanting history on a crisp autumn day, I was reminded afresh that these mountains have stood tall throughout the centuries and represented an excellent vantage point to witness all these events with their many vagaries and vicissitudes. And they will persist long after our own stories, and those of our contemporaries, have come to an end.

Ours is but a brief chapter in the history of the world. The point is not meant as morbid, but rather a sober but telling reminder that quite a lot has come before us. It behooves us all to take that seriously and to cultivate a teachable spirit, a measure of humility, and a rapacious curiosity. We have much to learn from cultivating an ear to hear echoes from the past. None of us need start from scratch in

figuring out life's mysteries. We can and should enter into animated conversation with the greatest minds and most generous hearts from the past, and stand on their shoulders as we strive to see farther and further.

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This book intends to do just that with the so-called moral arguments for God (primarily) and the afterlife (secondarily). The moral argument for the existence of God presents us with a curious and somewhat puzzling irony.

On the one hand, the moral argument has had enormous appeal in popular literature. It was the starting point and a pivotal argument in the most widely read and influential work of Christian apologetics in the twentieth century, C. S. Lewis's Mere Christianity, a book that continues to enjoy remarkable sales and staying power as we move well into the twenty-first century. In the same vein, the prominent Christian philosopher and apologist William Lane Craig reports that the moral argument has been the most effective one for reaching his audiences when he lectures on college and university campuses.

On the other hand, however, in recent times it has suffered neglect in academic philosophical circles compared to the other classic theistic arguments. For a salient example of this, consider how the argument has fared in the seminal work of two of the leading philosophers of religion of the twentieth century—namely, Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne. In his groundbreaking work God and Other Minds: A Study in the Rational Justification of Belief in God, published in 1967, Alvin Plantinga did not even discuss the moral argument, limiting his attention to the cosmological, the ontological, and the teleological arguments. Richard Swinburne advanced a larger set of arguments for God in his landmark volume The Existence of God, published in 1979, but still the moral argument received scant attention and support compared to most of the other arguments. Adding to the irony is the fact that the first major proponent of the argument—namely, Immanuel Kant—famously declared that there were only three possible arguments for the exist¬ence of God, the very three that Plantinga considered in his 1967 volume, and that all three were fallacious. Despite his famous argument that the existence of God is a necessary postulate of practical reason that we require to make full rational sense out of morality, Kant insistently maintained that his argument was in no way a speculative argument in support of a theoretical claim.

We believe there are good reasons why the moral argument has enjoyed acclaim in popular apologetics, but also that it deserves as much respect and attention in academic discussion as the other theistic arguments. Indeed, we believe the moral argument possesses a unique appeal that may well make it the most powerful of all theistic arguments—at least for many. To fully appreciate this argument, however, we need to have a grasp of its historical devel¬opment and elaboration, which often goes neglected. The moral argument, to be sure, does not enjoy the same sort of heritage that can be traced back to the medieval period with towering progenitors such as Thomas Aquinas and Anselm of Canterbury. However, it has its own rich history, one that can illumine its own illustrious pedigree that may be missed in the deceptive simplicity of Lewis's famous formulation. Appreciating this story, moreover, is vital for contemporary philosophers who want to advance the argument and articulate it as forcefully as possible. To that end, this is an extended essay in historical recovery, an archaeological dig for ideas that can shed some badly needed light on a number of the most important questions human beings can ask.

These perennially pressing questions are arguably more critical than ever in our morally ambivalent times.

The history of the moral argument in the English-speaking world after Kant is a fascinating tale to tell.' Like any good story, it's full of twists and unexpected turns, compelling conflicts, rich and idiosyncratic characters, both central and ancillary players. The narrative is as labyrinthine and circuitous as it is linear, its point remains to be fully seen, and its ending has yet to be written. What remains certain, however, is the importance of telling it. Why this is so, and why readers will find it worth their while, requires a bit of explanation, including an elaboration of a central and recurring conflict at the heart of the story—another nonnegotiable requirement for any good yarn.

After accepting his new post at Cambridge, Lewis—on his fifty-sixth birthday, in 1954—gave his inaugural address, titled "De Descriptione Temporum," a description of the times, in which he aimed to identify the central turning point in Western civilization: "Somewhere between us and the Waverley Novels, somewhere between us and Persuasion, the chasm runs." To make the case for his proposal, Lewis adduced germane examples from the realms of politics, the arts, religion, and technology. With respect to religion, what Lewis primarily had in mind was the un-christening of cul¬ture. Exceptions abound, but the "presumption has changed:

A critical aspect of his strategy here was simply to face head-on the reality that the tide had turned against many of his deepest convictions. Since he believed that the new direction was mistaken, he would often point backward. To the charge that this was retrograde, he famously said, "We all want progress, but if you're on the wrong road, progress means doing an about-turn and walking back to the right road; in that case, the man who turns back soonest is the most progressive:

> One of the telltale indicators of modernity (that Lewis subverted) is the relegation of morality to a second-class status—among not just philosophers but many writers of fiction and poetry as well. A prominent American poet of the twentieth century, Wallace Stevens, once said that ethics are no more a part of poetry than they are of painting. In philosophy, too, business as usual in metaphysics is to construct an interpretation of reality that draws exclusively on nonmoral considerations, such as the deliverances of the sciences. Only then does one go on to draw out various ethical consequences of the resultant view, even if that means domesticating morality or even emaciating it to fit an otherwise morally indifferent system.

In 1935 the Cambridge philosopher William Sorley, another luminary in moral apologetics, expressed misgivings about this demotion of morality, which is bound to result in an artificially truncated worldview in which moral ideas are paid short shrift. "If we take experience as a whole," Sorley wrote, "and do not arbitrarily restrict ourselves to that portion of it with which the physical and natural sciences have to do, then our interpretation of it must have ethical data at its basis and ethical laws in its structure."

At the heart of moral arguments, as this book will chronicle, is the abiding conviction that morality provides an indispensable and vitally hopeful window of insight into ultimate reality. Hermann Lotze, a nineteenth-century German philosopher, went as far as to say that the true beginning of metaphysics lies in ethics, a sentiment with which both Sorley and Lewis, among others, resonated. Indeed, those who intend to sideline ethics may actually end up inadvertently displaying their moral commitments, and we should be alert to their presence as Friedrich Nietzsche suggested: "Whenever explaining how a

philosopher's most far-fetched metaphysical propositions have come about, in fact, one always does well (and wisely) to ask first: 'What morality is it (is he) aiming at?'

Those best able to speak to a cultural moment aren't always the ones simply swept up in it, but rather may be those who recognize it as only the latest chapter in an ongoing story. Ideas don't arise in a vacuum, ex nihilo, out of whole cloth, but have their antecedents, precursors, and influences. History is a vital reminder to neither fall prey to the tyranny of the urgent and forget what's truly important, nor yield to the dogmatism of the present. As C. S. Lewis reminded us, "Every age has its own outlook. It is specially good at seeing certain truths and specially liable to make certain mistakes. We all, therefore, need the books that will correct the characteristic mistakes of our own period. And that means the old books." The resources of history offer a refresher course, a teachable moment, a cautionary tale about the need to avoid making sacrosanct the trends of the times, and an often sobering lesson in why reigning plausibility structures may need to be rejected. It takes us out of the present, not for good, but for a season, so that we can return to contemporary discussions and pressing matters of the day with a new lens and fresh perspective.

The persuasive power of the moral argument rises or falls on this central question of the role morality is to play in shaping our understanding of reality. Feeling the force of the moral argument requires permitting the deliverances of morality to inform metaphysics. In an age of reductionism, skepticism, and deconstruction, however, morality is often less explained than explained away, relegated to the distinct periphery when it comes to the serious business of figuring out life's meaning and purpose (or lack of it).

In such a context, preoccupation with the minutiae of technical details can supplant the traditional concern of philosophy to pursue wisdom and virtue. Mindful of this recurring trend, Roger Scruton, while discussing the present state of British philosophy, laments the narrowness of much of the analytic tradition. As an illustration, he makes the following point: "That Derek Parfit is referred to as the greatest moral philosopher of our time is a sign of how isolated analytic philosophy has become. His utilitarian arguments are clever, but there are no human beings in them! In answer to the question, 'how should I live?' he has nothing to say, or nothing that a grown person would not laugh at." Scruton thinks there's plenty of smart philosophy generated nowadays, but he admits he finds depressing how, too often, the "analytical narrowness has driven away the human questions."

Some readers, of course, might be convinced that the moral argument is hardly worth their time. Even if they're right, though, there seems little harm in hearing what its historical representatives have had to say. If their assumptions were so mistaken, if the challenges they would pose to contemporary understandings are in fact ineffectual, it is worthwhile to see why this is so. But if their insights prove penetrating, their challenges formidable, and their case powerful, then an intentional effort to recapture the richness and fertility of the history of the moral argument will likely prove to be profoundly illuminating. In this book we propose to let the argument's advocates, many long dead, come alive again and speak for themselves. Perhaps the exercise, rather than proving to be an adventure in archaeology, will be just what's needed to imbue an old argument with new vitality, and provide invaluable insight for contemporary culture.

In short then, a historical study of the moral argument is important for several reasons. It's a reminder of how classical philosophers were unafraid to ask and explore the big questions of faith, hope, and love; of truth, goodness, and beauty; of God, freedom, and immortality. It gives students and scholars alike the

chance to drill down into their ideas and arguments, rather than settling for cursory summaries of their rich analysis. It invites us all to learn to live with the moral argument, rather than reducing it to a tactical weapon in one's apologetic arsenal, or something merely to acknowledge before quickly dismissing its contemporary relevance. Only by a careful analysis and assessment of the history can we come to see its richness and the fertile range of resources it offers.

As we embark on this journey, we encourage readers to keep an eye out for certain recurring themes that add richness and coherence to the unfolding story and that can serve as hooks on which to hang important ideas. First, guiding epistemological assumptions are important to notice, since many of the central understandings are at variance with what's assumed today. Second, consider the relative expansiveness of the germane theories of rationality among those whose work we examine. Is it a narrow empiricism, for example, or something much wider? Are aesthetic or relational or affective elements allowed in such theories, or excluded? How do such operative assumptions compare to what goes on today?

Third, take note as we go along of the various forms of argument that make an appearance. Are they all deductive? Or are some inductive or abductive? How often are cumulative cases to be found, either within the moral argument or in the larger natural theological case to be made of which the moral argument is just a part? Fourth, assess our claim that an exposure to these historical thinkers sheds light on contemporary discussions. If that's where the evidence leads, what is its significance? If not, why were we wrong to suggest as much?

Fifth, pay special heed to an argument's interlocutors at the time. Was it Nietzsche, or G. W F. Hegel, or David Hume? Idealists, rationalists, or empiricists? By turns, be forewarned, it's each of these and more. Milieu matters; context counts. Scholars, like words, are best understood in their native habitat. Sixth, and finally, be inspired by the sheer range of learning and meticulous, patient rigor of so many of these eminent thinkers, leading scholars, and brilliant philosophers. Oxford dons, Cambridge philosophers, Gifford lecturers, and leading churchmen grace these pages, and even a British prime minister. Readers may not finally be persuaded by their collective case, but so impressive a group cannot be responsibly ignored.

The modern moment may not be quite as bleak as the picture Vonnegut paints in the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter, with Billy Pilgrim's mother cobbling together meaning from vestiges of kitsch gathered from gift shops. Still there's something distinctly recognizable in Vonnegut's insight: the misguided nature of asking the wrong questions and not asking the right ones; looking for meaning in the wrong places; ignoring the rich resources we have at our ready disposal to find meaningful and substantive answers to life's most important and existentially central questions.

We hope that telling the story of the moral argument can serve as a partial corrective to this lamentable trend. More positively, we trust it will serve as inspiration for a new generation to recapture some of the vision and passion shared by these luminaries in the field who had learned to live long and well with these arguments, making them part of the air they breathed, and in so doing breathing new life back into them.'

At the end of each chapter is a concise, aerial synopsis of the chapter's content. It's intentionally broad in scope for the sake of not losing the proverbial forest for the trees. <>

THE LONGING FOR LESS LIVING WITH MINIMALISM by Kyle Chayka [Bloomsbury Publishing, 97816355721OO]

"More than just a story of an abiding cultural preoccupation, **THE LONGING FOR LESS** peels back the commodified husk of minimalism to reveal something surprising and thoroughly alive." -Jenny Odell, author of *How to Do Nothing*

"Thoughtful and absorbing . . . A superb outing from a gifted young critic that will spark joy in many readers." -*Kirkus Reviews,* starred review

"Less is more": Everywhere we hear the mantra. Marie Kondo and other decluttering gurus promise that shedding our stuff will solve our problems. We commit to cleanse diets and strive for inbox zero. Amid the frantic pace and distraction of everyday life, we covet silence-and airy, Instagrammable spaces in which to enjoy it. The popular term for this brand of upscale austerity, "minimalism," has mostly come to stand for things to buy and consume. But minimalism has richer, deeper, and altogether more valuable gifts to offer.

Kyle Chayka is one of our sharpest cultural observers. After spending years covering minimalist trends for leading publications, he now delves beneath this lifestyle's glossy surface, seeking better ways to claim the time and space we crave. He shows that our longing for less goes back further than we realize. His search leads him to the philosophical and spiritual origins of minimalism, and to the stories of artists such as Agnes Martin and Donald Judd; composers such as John Cage and Julius Eastman; architects and designers; visionaries and misfits. As Chayka looks anew at their extraordinary lives and explores the places where they worked-from Manhattan lofts to the Texas high desert and the back alleys of Kyoto-he reminds us that what we most require is presence, not absence. The result is an elegant new synthesis of our minimalist desires and our profound emotional needs.

To Whom
No subject
No image
No taste
No object
No beauty
No message
No talent
No technique (no why)
No idea
No intention
No art
No feeling
No black
No white (no and)
—John Cage, "To Whom" (1953)

Excerpt: It makes sense that millennials embrace minimalism. My generation has never had a healthy relationship with material stability. There are always too few resources at hand or too much competition for what's left, a scenario that's engulfing not just one age group but a wider swath of people every year. Even as the traditional economy falls apart, we're awash in social media noise and new platforms competing for our attention, labor, and cash. Stability is no longer the default.

My purpose in writing this book was to figure out the origins of the thought that less could be better than more—in possessions, in aesthetics, in sensory perception, and in the philosophy with which we approach our lives. Dissatisfaction with materialism and the usual rewards of society is not new, and by looking at how that dissatisfaction has cycled through previous centuries, how artists and writers and philosophers have already contended with it, I could find what was truly worth keeping. Swerving between austerity and extravagance is stressful; finding the source of our material anxiety might make it more manageable. I wanted to uncover a minimalism of ideas rather than things, not obsess over possessions or the lack thereof but challenge our day-to-day experience of being in the world.

Chronological history is too causal an approach for minimalism. Its ideas don't have one linear path or evolution; it's more of a feeling that repeats in different times and places around the world. It's defined by the sense that the surrounding civilization is excessive—physically or psychologically too much—and has thus lost some kind of original authenticity that must be regained. The material world holds less meaning in these moments, and so accumulating more loses its appeal in favor of giving things up and isolating yourself, whether literally—becoming a hermit or nomad—or through art. No single English language word quite captures this persistent feeling of being overwhelmed and yet alienated, which is maybe why "minimalism" has become so widespread.

I began thinking of this universal feeling as the longing for less. It's an abstract, almost nostalgic desire, a pull toward a different, simpler world. Not past nor future, neither utopian nor dystopian, this more authentic world is always just beyond our current existence in a place we can never quite reach. Maybe the longing for less is the constant shadow of humanity's self-doubt: What if we were better off without everything we've gained in modern society? If the trappings of civilization leave us so dissatisfied, then maybe their absence is preferable, and we should abandon them in order to seek some deeper truth.

The longing for less is neither an illness nor a cure. Minimalism is just one way of thinking about what makes a good life, though it's a strategy that's particularly relevant when confronting the superhuman scale and pace of our time.

Minimalism's lack of a coherent history is in part due to its nature—it instinctively tends to erase its own background, as if starting anew in each iteration. If its practitioners admitted to being referential or reviving a past tradition, they wouldn't seem so radically minimal after all. Yet no matter where or when you find minimalism emerging, it has certain consistent qualities. Each of this book's four chapters takes on one of these qualities and explores how it manifests. The longing for less is best captured in the texture of the lives of those who pursued it, and what they created that was inspired by it. Each person in this book seeks their own version of the idea, succeeding in some ways and failing in others. By observing the differences and similarities we can chart our own paths through the idea of minimalism.

The first of these common qualities is reduction, the pursuit of simplicity through throwing things out and moving apart, favored by figures from the Stoic philosophers to today's decluttering advocates. The

second is emptiness, the austere visual style of Philip Johnson's American modernist architecture and Minimalist art like Donald Judd's, which inspired the current minimalist decorating fads but also have more powerful ideas about the control of space. The third is silence, the desire to buffer our senses from the chaotic world but also the radical possibilities of sound that can be found in the works of composers like Erik Satie, John Cage, and the lesser-known Julius Eastman. The final chapter is about what I call "shadow," the acceptance of ambiguity and the randomness of life or fate that emerges from Buddhist philosophy and Japanese aesthetics, which Westerners have increasingly adopted over the past two centuries and which form the deepest root of the minimalist trend. The lessons these four aspects of minimalism have to teach us are not the ones we might, at first, expect.

Each of the four chapters is composed of eight smaller sections that take on particular people, ideas, or artifacts, from paintings to symphonies, essays, and buildings. The book's structure is like a grid or a space to wander through, encompassing a range of experiences. Through my research I experimented with sensory deprivation, traveled to see Judd's industrial-scale homes in the Texas desert, plumbed the depths of boredom at the Guggenheim Museum, and visited rock gardens in Kyoto. The way these examples relate to each other comes not only from their similarities but also from the blank spaces between them—the differences in practice or thought that can be seen in each object, artist, or thinker. You can hold on to whichever spark joy.

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The minimalist blogger Joshua Becker, an evangelical Christian and author of The More of Less, published in 2016, proposes Jesus as the original minimalist. When he instructed a rich man to "sell everything you own and give it away to the poor," the commandment wasn't about self-sacrifice, according to Becker. It meant that the rich man would be happier without the possessions, so giving them away was a net gain—a kind of minimalist prosperity gospel.

Yet the discipline goes back even further. Contemporary minimalism often gets mentioned alongside the ancient Greek philosophy of Stoicism. The school's founder was something of a minimalist himself, a wealthy Athenian merchant named Zeno of Citium who in the third century B.C.E. decided to forsake his worldly goods for the study of philosophy. (He gave his teachings from a porch, or stoa, hence the name.) His philosophy was about "a good flow of life," as Zeno put it, and "living in agreement," an ambivalence to worldly concerns and the vicissitudes of fate. Millennials have their own Stoic commandment: "lol nothing matters."

Most of Zeno's original writings haven't survived, but Stoicism is refracted through his followers. Cicero considered the dissatisfaction of materialism in his Stoic Paradoxes of 46 B.C.E. Even for those in possession of mansions, treasure, and power, "the thirst of desire is never either filled or sated; not only are they tortured by the desire for increasing what they have, but also by fear of losing it." True authority comes from overcoming that thirst. A leader must "first curb his desires, scorn his pleasures, hold his anger, restrain his greed, and avert other spiritual faults; then let him command others." Not that Cicero gave up everything himself. He admitted that he, too, was "influenced somewhat by the error of the age." With this spirit in mind, perhaps, in 2019 a lobbying firm that advocates for Silicon Valley entrepreneurs adopted the philosopher's name and became the Cicero Institute.

Stoicism is especially popular on the internet, where podcasts, blogs, and forums pop up specifically to adapt the practice to more modern problems, like what to do when a romantic interest doesn't text you back. The Stoicism Reddit forum, which has some 149,000 members, debates what constitutes proper modern Stoicism. There's a discussion of how to stop the internet from making you unhappy, a Stoic argument for masturbation as the healthy satisfaction of human urges, and the resolution that tattoos are okay as long as you're getting them for yourself and not to gain social approval. ("Is Keanu Reeves a Stoic?" someone asks. Stoic Keanu probably would have stayed inside the Matrix and made the best of it)

The Stoic can accept that society has flaws and expectations as long as she can avoid contaminating herself unduly with them. "Our life should observe a happy medium between the ways of a sage and the ways of the world at large," wrote Seneca, who lived until 65 C.E., when he was ordered to kill himself by Emperor Nero. Stoicism has no doctrine but a process of active judgment and self-awareness: It must be chosen moment to moment. You can't just convert in an instant. Even back then Seneca argued for not mistaking the appearance of austerity for commitment to its ideals: "We should not believe the lack of silver and gold to be proof of the simple life." However, you might need some riches to attain elegant simplicity—as tutor and adviser to Nero, Seneca had plenty of material wealth. "Why this beautiful furniture, this wine older than yourself, these trees that yield nothing but shade?" he asked himself, looking for hypocrisy. Simple answer: He was doing as well as he could, given the circumstances and human fallibility. "Philosophy calls for plain living, but not for penance."

Simplicity didn't mean a lack of pleasure. In fact, the second-century C.E. emperor Marcus Aurelius offered a perfect manifesto for minimalist hedonism in his Meditations, a lifelong diary of Stoic aphorisms: "That which is really beautiful has no need of anything."

Despite his slight materialist hypocrisy, Seneca was taken up by early Christians and posthumously converted from Paganism. He would not have been extreme enough for later saints, however. For Saint Francis of Assisi, who established the Franciscan order of friars in the thirteenth century, there was no such thing as too much austerity. He had his followers vow poverty and wear rough gray robes. His hagiographer Thomas of Celano recalled that Francis "detested those in the Order who dressed in three layers of clothing or who wore soft clothes without necessity." Self-abnegation was next to godliness and materialism literally Satanic. "We ought not to have more use and esteem of money and coin than of stones," he wrote in the Franciscan Order's rules. "And the devil seeks to blind those who desire or value it more than stones."

Francis made self-sacrifice into performance art. He had a mania for giving clothing away to the poor and going naked. A monastery built a special cell for him to stay in during a visit but it was too well-constructed, so he requested that it be smudged with dirt and leavesbefore he slept there—only then could he be comfortably uncomfortable. Rocks and pieces of wood were his pillows. To prove their piety his followers kept starving themselves to the point that Francis had to eat with them so that they didn't die. Pursuing material satisfaction was a sign that a person had already fallen from grace, according to Francis: "When the soul finds no delight, what is left except for the flesh to look for some?"

The United States has its own secular saint of asceticism in Henry David Thoreau, who famously retreated into the woods from 1845 to 1847 in order to find the joy of simplicity. More accurately, he moved to land owned by his friend Ralph Waldo Emerson on Walden Pond, a small body of water

walkable of an evening from the town center of Concord, Massachusetts, where he grew up and where his mother's cooking was still freely available whenever he felt like going back. As far as an escape from society, it seems more like a child running away from home and making it to the nearest street corner.

In the rustic-chic cabin he built for himself Thoreau sought "to front only the essential facts of life," as he wrote in Walden, "to live deep and suck out all the marrow of life, to live so sturdily and Spartan-like as to put to rout all that was not life." Here, again, the good life lies in the purified remainder, not the excess that had to be thrown out. Only there could the truth be found: "Most of the luxuries, and many of the so-called comforts of life, are not only not indispensable, but positive hindrances to the elevation of mankind."

Thoreau pushes the point that anyone could carry out his experiment, though few people had the benefit of being a Harvard graduate and published writer who could turn his rusticating hobbies into profitable texts. As Kathryn Schulz wrote in a scathing New Yorker takedown, Thoreau was "narcissistic, fanatical about self-control, adamant that he required nothing beyond himself to understand and thrive in the world."

Thoreau also sowed the seeds of another repeated misunderstanding, the belief that this enlightened simplicity had already been found in places and times that were exotic to him. "With respect to luxuries and comforts, the wisest have ever lived a more simple and meagre life than the poor," Thoreau wrote. "The ancient philosophers, Chinese, Hindoo, Persian, and Greek, were a class than which none has been poorer in outward riches, none so rich in inward." Never mind Seneca's wine cellar; most of Thoreau's "ancient philosophers" likely kept servants or slaves, a practice he detested in his own time. Still, there remains this sense that true austerity has to be imported from somewhere else.

What the Stoics, Francis, and Thoreau have in common is a strategy of avoidance, especially in moments when society feels chaotic or catastrophic. It's a coping mechanism for those who want to fix or improve the status quo instead of overturning it. Its orientation is toward survival. The minimalist is committed to the protective cultivation of the self in difficult situations—recall Sonrisa Andersen cleaning her room. Yet the withdrawal is paradoxical. The minimalist is ultimately a pragmatist who has to reconcile the desire for a better, cleaner world with the limits of what one person can influence. It's often an internal, individualized process rather than an external one: Your bedroom might be cleaner, but the world stays bad.

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In 1968, while living in another loft on Nineteenth Street, Judd found an entire five-story SoHo factory building for sale for $68,000 on the corner at 101 Spring Street. He could just about afford it, with the help of a recent grant. It didn't look like much at first—the interior was so piled with junk that Judd likened it to an installation by the artist Arman, who filled gallery windows with detritus—but the bones were good. Built in 1870 by the architect Nicholas Whyte, the facade was made of painted cast-iron, with thin metal ligaments stretching between expansive windows so that the building seemed to float. It boasted neoclassical flourishes, like pediments on some of the stories, setting it apart from more workaday industrial buildings. In it Judd saw a precursor to the glass-and-steel structures of modernism, which Philip Johnson and Mies van der Rohe were bringing to New York with buildings like the glamorously glass-walled Seagram Building, completed in 1958.

Inside, 101 Spring Street was ruined. Originally a department store, it ended its industrial life as a hardware store with small-scale manuiifacturers above. The machines had leaked oil and left imprints on the dark wood. After the cleanout Judd noticed that in the building's original state there was no evidence of it having internal walls, so he decided to leave each level open and devote it to a single function: a gallery and meeting place in the ground-floor storefront, where Judd would sometimes host groups of younger artists (including the later neo-expressionist Julian Schnabel) or stack material samples of metal or wood; a kitchen and entertaining area on the next floor; a studio and gallery; a domestic space like a living room; and then bedrooms on the top floor.

Judd's family was growing with his art career. He married the dancer and choreographer Julie Finch and they had a son, Flavin (named after might suggest. There are signs of life everywhere, particularly in the open kitchen, from small wicker chairs for the young Rainer and Flavin to a stovetop espresso maker, Chemex, and mammoth teakettle on the counter, along with Wüsth of knives and a sinister deli-meat slicer. Judd's shelves are stacked with wine, whiskey bottles, and wooden psake cups, the ingredients of an instantaneous party. The floorboards aren't pristine but spotted with green paint, ground deep into the wood from a century and a half of wear. They squeak in spots, the sound a reminder of the building's age and character, which Judd worked hard to preserve. He presaged ideas of adaptive reuse—turning industrial buildings into livable architecture—and reclaiming urban space that have only recently become mainstream.

Nothing in the loft matches, but everything goes together. Judd mixed angular chairs by the Dutch designer Gerrit Rietveld with tables of his own design, long and wide enough to seat a dozen. Interspersed in the living quarters is a museum-quality collection of artwork from the '60s and '70s, including a wall-sized pastel-colored shaped canvas by Frank Stella and a Claes Oldenburg "soft sculpture," a three-dimensional model of theater lights made of plain canvas flopping from the wall—another "specific object" that doesn't look Minimalist at all. The creaking staircase running all the way up the interior side of the building is decorated with tribal masks from the Americas right next to drawings by Dan Flavin. There's an eclecticism that isn't apparent in more recent "minimalist" condos.

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Though Donald Judd thought the art world was already too crowded in the '70s and '80s, it is far larger and more influential today. Art galleries are now behemoth shopping malls, the commercial white cubes bigger than museum spaces, proliferating across entire neighborhoods. Auction house sales net a billion dollars in a night as collectors compete over artists, though Judd's prices have never reached the heights of Warhol, Jeff Koons, or Damien Hirst, in part because they are so replicable. Art has been commodified at a scale that Judd may have never imagined, and its most successful figures have become mainstream celebrities who collaborate with clothing brands and pop stars.

Judd couldn't get far enough away. Over time he got sick of the bustle and gossip of tiny downtown Marfa and focused his efforts on rebuilding small ranch houses hours into the desert. He participated in local politics, advocating against any borders that infringed on the region's open land. The sense of freedom in his art was reflected in a kind of libertarian socialism, against authority and for cooperation: "If

you don't act, someone will decide everything." Judd's vision never stopped expanding. He died at the age of sixty-five in 1994 from a

sudden diagnosis of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma in the midst of working on projects around the world, including renovating an old hotel in a Swiss village and planning a series of barnlike galleries in Marfa, bigger than ever. His architecture became just as important as the art he made. "It is my hope that such of my works of art which I own at the time of my death will be preserved where they are installed," Judd's will read—the two forms, spaces and objects, were inextricable.

When estate lawyers proved themselves ignorant of the art world as well as Judd's wishes, Rainer and Flavin Judd, who were in their twenties at the time, took over the artist's estate and made a controversial decision. They sold a portion of his work that he had kept for himself at auction in order to fund the preservation of what they thought was most important: the loft at 101 Spring Street and Marfa spaces like the Block. Selling a chunk of an artist's work at once risks depressing the market and lowering prices by flooding it with supply. When I met Flavin, a sandy-haired filmmaker who spends most of his time managing the Judd Foundation, in the modernized office in the basement of 101 Spring Street, he explained the logic of the sale. It was an anti-commercialization move, in a way: Only the pieces that were installed in the spaces Judd designed truly represented his vision.

"If we install it, it's kind of a warping of what Don did," Flavin said. "There are plenty of places that are institutionalized, where the original artist's touch or intention is not there, and you can feel it. It just feels different; it feels more corporate or something. That's to be avoided. You're degrading it no matter what you're doing." Without the full context, the light, space, and architecture that the loft or the desert provided, the works weren't as meaningful. I had to agree; Judd's work never looks as good as when it's in his own spaces and part of a total work of art.

Over the decades art itself has become a commercializing force in the wider economy. Richard Florida's Creative Class theory, circa 2002, made it common knowledge that artists are on the front lines sound," as the scientific definition runs—and we have more of it than ever before. Noise pollution is rising everywhere, a result of cars, trucks, factories, and airplanes overhead. So much noise exposure causes elevated blood pressure, loss of sleep, increased heart rate, cardiovascular constriction, labored breathing, and changes in brain chemistry, according to a government report. Noise has been shown to directly impact children's ability to learn; one study found that students in a classroom closer to railroad tracks made slower progress than those on the opposite side of the building. To escape we have to create our own silences.

"Silence" was originally a verb describing a persistent state of being. It came from the Latin silere, the action of being quiet or still, and has roots in the Gothic Anasilan, to remain calm or cease motion, used in the context of the wind or still water. It's tempting to draw a line between this meaning and its modern pronunciation, the sibilance of the initial s and the soft ending c creating its own susurration that starts and stops with the word, like a breeze that passes through and leaves a contrasting stillness behind, noticeable only after the fact.

Once, silence was a symbol of everything that transcended the scale of mere humanity. Its presence marked things we subjugated ourselves to. There were the vast silences of nature, where no man-made sound could be heard; the silence of prayer or meditation in the quiet of a sacred space; the silence of

night, where dangers lurked; and the hushed silence of authority. Silence was inspired by the divine, while royalty demanded it: By 300 C.E. the Byzantine court appointed a class of silentiarii, courtiers whose job it was to ensure the appropriate noise levels for the emperor or empress—they were shushers of the imperial classroom. The title survived for centuries as an honorific given to the worthy or those wealthy enough to purchase it, linking silence and power.

Silence offered a retreat into transcendence, into unknowability, since noise or speech always ties you closer to the mundane world, the way that words on a page pin down the object they describe. In Jewish mysticism, the doctrine of tsimtsum proposes that god had to withdraw into silence, in a great inhalation, in order for humanity to flourish into sound and language. "Everyone who knows how to remain silent becomes a divine child, for in silence lies the recollection of his divine origin," the Danish existentialist philosopher Soren Kierkegaard wrote in his journals. The Quakers believe that there is a spark of the divine in everyone, and so they host silent meetings in unadorned rooms, where they face each other in a circle or square. God speaks in a "still, small voice," and so silence makes the voice easier to hear. During the meeting, any Quaker may speak whenever so moved, and then the silence reigns again.

Maybe we manufacture safe silences because we want to avoid confrontation with whatever is beyond us. We're not accustomed to the awe that it can inspire anymore. The new form of silence is devoted to commercial productivity, not transcendent contemplation. You don't meditate in Amtrak's Quiet Car; you fill out spreadsheets. "The fear, even dread, caused by silence has intensified," the French historian Alain Corbin wrote in his 2016 book, A History of Silence. "We have almost forgotten what it is."

In 1967, during the emergence of Minimalism, the New York critic Susan Sontag wrote an essay arguing that silence had indeed been turned into a cultural coping mechanism. "In an overpopulated world being connected by global electronic communication and jet travel at a pace too rapid and violent for an organically sound person to assimilate without shock, people are also suffering from a revulsion at any further proliferation of speech and images," Sontag wrote in "The Aesthetics of Silence." This flood of sensory input, which has only accelerated in the fifty years since the essay was published, prompts the longing for its opposite: "As the prestige of language falls, that of silence rises."

Sontag's evocation of silence isn't about sound specifically. The essay is a deconstruction of artwork—literary, visual, and musical—that tries to move beyond language. Before the modern era, she argued, art was directed outward toward the world. Through art, human consciousness affirmed its own existence with stirring symphonies and grand history paintings depicting social and political accomplishments. But we eventually realized that these material attempts at transcendence had failed. Art had done nothing to halt the violence of the industrial revolution, the rise of exploitative capitalism, and the wars of the twentieth century.

Instead, artists directed themselves inward, confronting this failure by embracing the nonnarrative and inexpressive. Some artists pursued the "ever-receding horizon of silence," as Sontag put it, to the point that they gave up making work altogether, including Marcel Duchamp, the poet Arthur Rimbaud, and the abstruse Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, who in the 1920s took ajob as an incredibly overqualified elementary school teacher.

In a flood of relatively meaningless sensation, anything that embraces silence stands out. For the listener, viewer, or reader, the newly austere art that Sontag noticed could actually become hedonistic, because it forces its consumer to focus ever more intently in pursuit of the elusive effects of Minimalism. "There is no talented and rigorous asceticism that... doesn't produce a gain (rather than a loss)…

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History keeps moving, driven by conflict: "One wave throughout the world, one wave since Troy rolls its haunch towards us," wrote the French diplomat and poet Alexis Leger, who spent five years in China in the 1910s. (The line has stuck with me thanks to another existential artist, the German Anselm Kiefer, who referenced it in the name of a sculpture.) Japan's ultranationalist government plowed into World War II using the ideas of philosophers like Shúzõ Kuki and Kitarõ Nishida as a justification for violence on a massive scale. The Kyoto School's work to taxonomize the uniqueness of Japanese identity gave cover to the militaristic doctrine that Japan must become the central power of Asia and defend its "idealistic and unrealistic culture," as Kuki put it, by force.

Existential minimalism was a way of reacting to the anxiety of Western influence and Japan's vulnerability. Attempts at philosophical unification like Kuki's meant little in the face of World War II and its aftermath. In 1942 some of Nishida's pupils participated in a seminal symposium called the "Conference for the Reintegration of Culture: Overcoming Modernity." The aggressive title encompassed its goal: The philosophers sought an alternative to the West's imperialist, industrialized ideology. But in its sense of manifest destiny, Japan became imperialist itself, invading neighboring nations and imposing its will over the Asian geopolitical sphere. Nishida didn't participate in the wave of nationalism directly, yet some of his statements are unmistakably supportive: "[Japan's] Imperial House is the beginning and the end of the world, as the absolute present that embraces the past and the future." Zen's universal nothingness was warped into an apocalyptic cult. In August of 1945, four years after Kuki's death, the United States dropped two nuclear bombs, and in September Japan surrendered (Kyoto escaped the devastation because Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who had visited the city, argued for its cultural importance). As part of the nation's reconstruction, the United States military worked to dismantle the spirit of exceptionalism. On January 1, 1946, came the Humanity Declaration, when Emperor Hirohito disavowed his divinity and became just another person.

Death is what makes art meaningful, according to the Kyoto School philosopher Keiji Nishitani. Nishitani was a younger disciple of Nishida and fell on the side of hypernationalism. Like Kuki he had traveled abroad to study, working under Martin Heidegger in the 1930s, and in the "Overcoming Modernity" symposium he praised Japan's "moral energy" (a euphemism for military violence). After the war, Nishitani was banned from taking public office and he eventually retreated from ground-level politics, confining his work to the abstractions of religion and art, which he felt had more potential to be truly universal.

In 1953 Nishitani wrote an essay on ikebana, the Japanese art of flower arranging. The arranger selects a very few seasonal blooms or branches, cuts them, and places them in a handmade ceramic vase or bowl so that the plants extend upward and outward like energetic strokes of calligraphy, framed within the blank space of the tokonoma, like the one in my inn room. Intentionally austere and reticent, ikebana is the opposite of the effusive Western bouquet's profusion of cont-lasting colors.

In his essay Nishitani linked ikebana to Europe's postwar wave of popular existentialism, championed by Jean-Paul Sartre, Kuki's French teacher. Existentialism put existence before essence, championing the individual's ability to create herself through action and experience instead of slotting in to predetermined social roles. "Man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines himself afterwards," Sartre wrote. To do is to be. Nishitani thought this also aligned with ikebana's ephemerality: "The essential beauty lies precisely in its being transitory and timely."

In the midst of existence, most living things deny time. They grow and reproduce in order to fight the inevitable. Life strives to be permanent, though it cannot be. Even the slow natural decay of a flower in the ground is a consequence of this struggle to survive as long as possible. When the ikebana practitioner cuts the flower at its stem, she stops this process, freezing it in a moment in which there is "no arising or perishing," Nishitani wrote, at least for three or four days within the vase. The flower is "poised in death ...It becomes a temporary manifestation of eternity that has emerged in time." The philosopher argued that this ephemeral timelessness amounts to a kind of transcendence. Only by cutting can the plant be transformed into art: "The flowers are simply there, in their correctness"—defining themselves alone, moment to moment.

There are two forms of art, according to Nishitani. The Western form strives toward permanence, as in the stone cathedral built to last thousands of years or the royal portrait commissioned to communicate ostentatious wealth and power to future generations. Yet in trying to deny its inherent temporariness, this form ends up becoming artificial or inauthentic. The cathedral crumbles into ruins and the portrait tatters; in the end, Nishitani claimed, these monuments can only prove the impossibility of achieving permanence. The Japanese form of art accesses eternity by embracing time. "Instead of trying to deny time while in the midst of it, ikebana moves along in time without the slightest gap," Nishitani wrote. In 2017 there was a wave of interest in ikebana from magazines like T and New York. The flower arrangements popped up in hotels and Blue Bottle coffee shops, becoming an element of the overall minimalist decorating scheme, perhaps pursuing this brief sense of timelessness.

Instead of assigning the value of temporariness only to the Japanese, as Kuki did with iki, Nishitani observed how it is shared across cultures, particularly after industrialization. "This idea which had lain dormant for so long is gradually grasping the hearts and minds of Europeans," he wrote. He found ikebana's aesthetic of ephemerality in the essays of Montaigne and Nietzsche and the poems of Rainer Maria Rilke, as well as in the existentialists. He would have found it later in Minimalist visual art and music, too. In the 1950s, after the cataclysm of the war, maybe the concepts of permanence and accumulation had been finally bankrupted. The bombing campaigns on all sides demonstrated that humanity would willingly destroy anything it built. There was an international turn toward Japan's negative aesthetic, an appreciation of absence and disappearance because absence was so prevalent in the ruined buildings and shattered lives.

Nishitani wrote that each flower in ikebana appears as if it emerged from nothingness. Nothingness undergirded everything—humans, animals, objects all brought together by one long shadow that rests "in the depths of existence." The shadow of nothingness combines being and nonbeing, collapsing the binary between them. It is space in which all possibilities are simultaneous and "points directly to a most intimate encounter with everything that exists," Nishitani wrote in 1961. "A most intimate encounter with everything that exists" is also a good way to describe Minimalism circa 1964, with its aim for

objects that are complete within themselves. Donald Judd's Marfa boxes are like so many ikebana flowers, timeless and yet experienced within time.

The desire to find the essence of things, to confront existence unmediated, made sense for the postwar desolation. The wreckage was beyond morality, beyond winning or losing sides. Western writers sought out the nonbinary space of absence, too. Shadow was a convenient metaphor—as Tanizaki noticed in In Praise of Shadows, it represented everything that Western progress plowed over or ignored. "Speaks true, who speaks shadows," wrote the Romanian poet Paul Celan, whose poems took on the impossibility of expression in the wake of the Holocaust. Within the futility of existence one still had to find a way forward, as in Samuel Beckett's existentialist 1953 novel Watt, which he wrote while on the run during the war: "For what is this shadow of the going in which we come, this shadow of the coming in which we go, this shadow of the coming and the going in which we wait, if not the shadow of purpose?"

"I thought the most beautiful thing in the world must be shadow," Sylvia Plath wrote in her 1963 novel The Bell Jar. The narrator gives a litany of "the million moving shapes and cul-de-sacs of shadow" that creep under everything, like Nishitani's nothingness. "There was shadow in bureau drawers and closets and suitcases, and shadow. under houses and trees and stones, and shadow at the back of people's eyes and smiles, and shadow, miles and miles and miles of it, on the night side of the earth."

There's a darkness and danger to the idea of absence in this list and for these writers, as well as for figures like Shūzō Kuki or Julius Eastman, that's totally missing from the bland facade of popular minimalism today. It's not about consuming the right things or throwing out the wrong; it's about challenging your deepest beliefs in an attempt to engage with things as they are, to not shy away from reality or its lack of answers. To believe or commit too strongly to one particular way of seeing or being is to miss out on all the other possibilities and to allow yourself to be defined too much by one thing. I thought back to Sonrisa Andersen, who had used minimalist self-help to solve her own consumerist identity crisis, but then left that behind, too, when she found she no longer needed it. It seemed like the most minimalist response possible.

After the war a new wave of foreign artists began visiting Japan. Among them were members of the Beat movement, who were already exposed to Japanese culture from living in San Francisco. Kenneth Rexroth, one of the predecessors of the Beats, set about translating Chinese and Japanese poetry. In the '70s he rented an ancient Kyoto farmhouse with a tea room—"Kyoto was unbombed & full of temples etc and old houses," as he described in a letter to the poet Morgan Gibson. Gary Snyder, known as the Thoreau of the Beats, made an intense study of Zen and in 1956 traveled to Kyoto to join a temple. A 1958 volume of the Chicago Review (covered with an ink-wash painting of a single tree branch) focused solely on Zen, with essays from Snyder, Jack Kerouac, and Alan Watts. Allen Ginsberg had a life-changing epiphany on the high-speed train between Tokyo and Kyoto in 1963 so strong that it made him abstain from drugs in favor of meditation.

Zen provided an alternative to America's postwar drive into suburbanization, consumerism, and the nuclear family—the seemingly solid pillars that identity and success were supposed to be built on, which also feel less dependable than ever today. By 1979 Rexroth described the U.S. as a "bankrupt police state" and wrote that he couldn't imagine anyone going back there who had moved to Japan. (Though in other letters he also complained about Japanese conservatism.) Was the adoption of Zen cultural

appropriation—the theft of a heritage that didn't belong to Americans? If so, minimalism could fall under the same critique. The answer is more complicated. Though its roots were in ancient history, the Japanese aesthetic of absence grew over the course of the twentieth century not in a vacuum but as a response to Western imperialism and the expansionary, globalizing pressures of capitalism and industrialization. In reaction to the general alienation and the extreme changes that were happening, it showed an alternative, the possibility of a life built on the careful appreciation of life's minor details and ephemerality over permanence.

No wonder that in the twenty-first century, when so many feel modernity has failed the West—that our civilization has come close to destroying itself and our lifestyles appear gaudy and pointless—absence is appealing once more. Embracing it reflects the need for a new way of thinking as well as consuming, one that makes a virtue of incompleteness and irresolution.

Minimalism is a communal invention and the blank slate that it offers an illusion, especially given its history. It is popular around the world, I think, because it reacts against a condition that is now everywhere: a state of social crisis mixed with a terminal dissatisfaction with the material culture around us that seems to have delivered us to this point, though the fault is our own. When I see the austere kitchens and bare shelves and elegant cement walls, the dim vague colors and the skeletal furniture, the monochrome devices, the white t-shirts, the empty walls, the wide-open windows looking out onto nothing in particular—when I see minimalism as a meme on Instagram, as a self-help book commandment, and as an encouragement to get rid of as much as possible in the name of imminently buying more—I see both an anxiety of nothingness and a desire to capitulate to it, like the French phrase for the subconscious flash of desire to jump off a ledge, l'appel du vide, the call of the void.

The popular minimalist aesthetic is more a symptom of that anxiety, having less as a way of feeling a little more stable in precarious times, than a solution to it. The art, music, architecture, and philosophy that I've described, however, isn't concerned with perfect cleanliness or a specific style. It's about seeking unmediated experiences, giving up control instead of imposing it, paying attention to what's around you without barricading yourself, and accepting ambiguity, understanding that opposites can be part of the same whole. This deeper form of minimalism can't be reduced to a hashtag or sold on a t-shirt. It offers no answers, let alone step-by-step guides, and it comes with risks. But it suggests another way of living that we can carry on into the future beyond the length of a trend. <>

Nothingness in the Heart of Empire: The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Kyoto School in Imperial Japan by Harumi Osaki [SUNY Press, 9781438473093]

Reveals the complicity between the Kyoto School's moral and political philosophy, based on the school's founder Nishida Kitarō's metaphysics of nothingness, and Japanese imperialism.

In the field of philosophy, the common view of philosophy as an essentially Western discipline persists even today, while non-Western philosophy tends to be undervalued and not investigated seriously. In

the field of Japanese studies, in turn, research on Japanese philosophy tends to be reduced to a matter of projecting existing stereotypes of alleged Japanese cultural uniqueness through the reading of texts. In **NOTHINGNESS IN THE HEART OF EMPIRE**, Harumi Osaki resists both these tendencies. She closely interprets the wartime discourses of the Kyoto School, a group of modern Japanese philosophers who drew upon East Asian traditions as well as Western philosophy. Her book lucidly delves into the non-Western forms of rationality articulated in such discourses, and reveals the problems inherent in them as the result of these philosophers' engagements in Japan's wartime situation, without cloaking these problems under the pretense of "Japanese cultural uniqueness." In addition, in a manner reminiscent of the controversy surrounding Martin Heidegger's involvement with Nazi Germany, the book elucidates the political implications of the morality upheld by the Kyoto School and its underlying metaphysics. As such, this book urges dialogue beyond the divide between Western and non-Western philosophies, and beyond the separation between "lofty" philosophy and "common" politics.

Excerpt: This book is a critical examination of the Kyoto School philosophers' prewar and wartime political discourses, with specific reference to the philosophical and metaphysical theories that worked to reinforce them. Prior critical works on the Kyoto School have tended to focus on the philosophers' alignment with Japan's war effort. However, as such critiques do not address the philosophy in depth, they have tended to leave open the possibility that the problem lies not in the Kyoto School thinkers' philosophical endeavors, but in their historical circumstances. By the same token, even when critiques seem to bit the mark, advocates of the Kyoto School have tended to blame the critics for not understanding the philosophy, and have ignored these assessments peremptorily. With a goal of moving the dialogue beyond this rupture, this book argues that the Kyoto School's moral and political philosophy tends to align itself with nationalist and imperial formations, conceptually and logically. By undertaking a philosophical investigation of the problems found in the Kyoto School thinkers' political discourses, this book shows that there is no strict separation between "lofty" philosophy and "vulgar" politics. Instead, it argues that seemingly genuine philosophy can be a source of political problems.

In this examination, despite the Kyoto School philosophers' frequent emphasis on the uniqueness of Japan, the East, or the Orient, I do not adopt such particularism. Rather, I elucidate how the particularistic assumptions of these philosophers constitute an essential part of the problems their political discourses gave rise to. There is a persistent tendency for Western thinkers to read into the texts of non-Western philosophers something particular to their own cultural tradition. Although I do not completely disagree with such an approach, the arbitrary insertion of idealized images of "Japan," "the East," or "the Orient" often obscures what is written in these texts and covers up the difficulties that exist there. Reading philosophers' texts in this way makes an intellectual dialogue with them almost impossible. For, when people idealize others, they treat them simply as the representatives of cultural stereotypes and refuse to face them as status-equal interlocutors. Moving against such a tendency, I read the Kyoto School philosophers' discourses without reducing their meanings to cultural particularities, and present the problems in these discourses in a way sharable with anybody, in principle, regardless of whether they are of the West or the East. In doing so, I hope to pave the way for future dialogues and exchanges that can traverse such dichotomous divisions.

The founder of the Kyoto School, Nishida Kitarõ, once dreamed of a philosophy in which the particularity of the national culture of his own country could contribute to the universality of humanity. However, he seemed to be swayed by the ambition of identifying this particularity with true universality. His followers, even in the present, do not seem to be free from a similar desire to celebrate "Japaneseness" over and above the particularities of other cultures. Still, in his philosophy, there is a line of thought that gestures toward another universality that can enable all such particularities to coexist and interact, without being superior or inferior to one another. Although Nishida conceived place or nothingness to be such a universality, the sense of cultural superiority he retained in the name of the dignity of particularity prevented him from fully developing the potential of this line of thought. Thus, to locate a point from which we can start this pursuit differently than Nishida did—that is, to open a "place" where dialogues and exchanges of Particularities actually can occur—is also a key objective of this book.

The first aim of this book is to read the philosophy of Japan's Kyoto School as philosophy. As I shall explain in greater detail below, such a project is not without precedents. However, those who have read Kyoto School work as philosophy have tended to introduce a divide between philosophy as such and politics, often to avoid being critical of the Kyoto School or to redeem its philosophers. In contrast, in reading Kyoto School philosophy as philosophy, I hope to provide a more detailed account of the political implications of its intellectual project, neither to dismiss nor to redeem it, but to open up questions about the project of modern philosophy more generally. As such, the second aim of this book is to explore the politics of Kyoto School philosophy as philosophy.

The Kyoto School was a group of Japanese philosophers who were under the tutelage or influence of Nishida Kitarõ, the school's founder. Nishida is often regarded as the first Japanese philosopher who tried to express religious insights from Zen Buddhism through the medium of Western philosophy in order to establish a mode of philosophy unique to East Asian cultural traditions. Although some Japanese scholars still identify themselves as members of the Kyoto School, or descendants of Nishida's philosophy, the school was at its zenith before and during the Second World War, when Nishida was still alive. In postwar Japan, the Kyoto School philosophers' involvement with Japan's wartime situation as famous intellectuals aroused much controversy: in the prewar and wartime periods, some of Nishida's disciples frequently made statements supporting wartime policies, and even had meetings with military authorities. While not as active as his followers, Nishida published works in line with the ideology of the wartime regime, and also offered his work to military authorities who asked for his advice.

In contrast, when the Kyoto School's philosophers first became known in Europe and North America, their involvement with Japan's wartime situation was not brought to the public's attention. The ways in which the Kyoto School's thinking was received went through gradual changes until issues surrounding their wartime involvement started to draw notice. In the preface to Rude Awakenings, a 1995 anthology that was intended to "examin[e] the relationship between Japanese nationalism and intellectuals in the Kyoto school" (vii), James W Heisig and John C. Maraldo give a short overview of these changes. According to these two scholars, the Kyoto School philosophers' ideas began to spread through translated texts in Western countries in the 1980s. At the time, they were warmly welcomed as Zen thought, which, as specific to Oriental culture, had gained some popularity in the West. However, since Heidegger's association with the Nazis had drawn substantial attention within academia in the late 1980s, people also started to scrutinize the Kyoto School's commitment to the wartime politics.

In 2011, Bret W Davis, Brian Schroeder, and Jason M. Wirth published Japanese and Continental Philosophy: Conversations with the Kyoto School, which addressed intellectual dialogues between the Kyoto School and continental philosophers. In the introduction to this collection, they review the reception of the Kyoto School's philosophies and emphasize the fact that "the members of the Kyoto School thought of themselves first and foremost as philosophers, rather than as religious, cultural, or political theorists" (Japanese and Continental Philosophy 2). From this standpoint, the three editors intended their volume to be "the first anthology to be fully committed to developing philosophical exchanges between the Kyoto School and modern and contemporary Western philosophers in the Continental tradition" (Japanese and Continental Philosophy). What is expressed here is concern about the Kyoto School thinkers' inquiry into philosophy as such that goes beyond mere introduction to or interpretation of their thought, which formerly tended to be understood in the context of politics or Eastern religions.

Even before this, the increasing interest in philosophical approaches to the Kyoto School had manifested itself in its study. In the introduction to Re-Politicising the Kyoto School as Philosophy in 2008, Christopher Goto-Jones describes this anthology as "the search for the politics of the Kyoto School qua philosophy" and explains its goal as "shifting scholarly priorities away from `historical evaluation and assessment of socio-political implications' at a specific point in history and towards the quest to `apprehend philosophical architectonic and conceptual coherence' in philosophical texts" (11). While addressing the Kyoto School's political thought by following the general trend of scholarship since 1990s, Goto-Jones emphasizes the importance of philosophical inquiries, rather than socio-politico-historical investigations that have previously been carried out. For example, seven years before the publication of this anthology, Heisig, who wrote the forward of Re-Politicising the Kyoto School as Philosophy, published his book, Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School. Heisig's 2001 work is an extensive study of three major philosophers of the school, namely Nishida, Tanabe Hajime, and Nishitani Keiji. Other similar examples, such as Goto-Jones's 2005 Political Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and Co-Prosperity and Robert Wilkinson's 2009 Nishida and Western Philosophy point to a kind of "philosophical turn" that has been going on in Kyoto School scholarship, so to speak.

However, this philosophical turn cannot be celebrated without reserve, since it seems to include some problematic tendencies, depending on how "philosophy" is understood. If one assumes, even if tacitly, that only Western philosophy is philosophy in the exact sense, from this standpoint, the Kyoto School's philosophy, which was created outside the region called "the West," could be judged as not properly philosophical. In Nishida and Western Philosophy, Wilkinson seems to take this stance. What matters is not that Nishida's philosophy is compared with Western philosophy, but rather how this comparison is conducted.

For example, annexing the proviso that, "It is a mistake, of course, to regard either East or West as monolithic; Wilkinson insists "there are general tendencies of the kind" between them (158). Then he discusses what he believes to be a main difference between them with regard to rationality, which in his view consists of "working out rigorously the consequences of one's foundational beliefs, the beliefs in turn being dependent on equally foundational experiences":

> Rationality manifests itself in the same way both in the East and in the West. The chief difference (if one may simplify so complex a matter) lies in the centrality given to non-dual or mystical experience in the East by comparison to its relative non-centrality in the West. (Wilkinson 159)

Although Wilkinson may seem to simply present his idea of a general differ¬ence between the East and the West here, his further statements on Nishida suggest, although avoiding explicit mention, he reduces this difference to a matter of degree to which thought is worth being called philosophy. For example, Wilkinson states:

> The fact that Nishida's philosophy rests on experiences of the kind described is not in itself a problem. From the philosophical point of view there is a greater problem in the fact that he does not try to argue that the insights which he tries to conceptualize are veridical. (159)

"Overcoming Modernity" was the title and theme of a symposium organized soon after the beginning of the Asia-Pacific War. Its goal was to discuss the war's significance, which the symposium's title was supposed to represent. Famous intellectuals, including a few members of the Kyoto School, were invited to contribute essays and exchange their opinions. Before and after this symposium, a series of three

other symposia also took place. Only four prominent members of the Kyoto School participated, including the two who attended the "Overcoming Modernity" symposium. Since all four thinkers shared a particular conception of world history, their philosophy was a consistent topic across these symposia. In pursuit of the symposium's goal, these thinkers discussed the importance of a Japanese national subjectivity that could lead to the overcoming of modernity, and also bring world history into perspective. Thus, for these four philosophers, the themes of overcoming modernity and Japanese national subjectivity were inseparably connected, reflecting their thoughts about not only what the Second World War was, but also what it should be. Although their mentor, Nishida, distanced himself from his four disciples' project during these symposia, this does not necessarily mean the former's philosophy was completely removed or resolutely opposed to that of the latter. As I will discuss, the ideas of similar subjectivity and the lines of thought that constituted another attempt to overcome modernity can be discerned in Nishida's philosophy in the same period. Nishida's thinking thus conceptually buttressed the ideas his disciples expressed during these symposia.

The Kyoto School philosophers' pursuit of universality and their concern for overcoming modernity have an inherent connection. Modernity, as we usually understand it today, originated in the West and then spread globally. As such, it appeared as something universal, but only as an effect of historical processes of universalizing. The nation-state, as a polity that is characteristic of modernity, is also the universal in a similar sense. Indeed, it is an amalgam of the universal and the particular, a combination of the state as a universalized form of a political body and the nation as a particular (or particularized) human group. In Japan's case, Japanese people largely equated modernization with Westernization at that time. It, along with the importation of Western philosophy, began almost concomitantly with the establishment of the nation-state in the Meiji period. Following this time of importation and adaptation, "Japanese" modern philosophy developed and culminated in the emergence of the Kyoto School. The Kyoto philosophers' bid for universality only took place under specific conditions, in which the Japanese nation-state had already been established and universalized. More precisely, in the prewar and wartime periods when these philosophers were most active, Japan struggled to expand its power beyond itself as a particular nation-state. Considering this situation, it is not a coincidence that the Kyoto School's bid for universality, in line with Japan's policies and war efforts, sought the universality beyond that of modernity and the West. Reflecting the amalgam of the universal and the particular in the Japanese nation-state, these philosophers' pursuit of this "higher" universality was permeated by their allegiance to the values of the particularity of their nation. Therefore, it is not surprising that these philosophers viewed the task of overcoming modernity and the West as connected to the realization of this "higher" universality to Japanese national subjectivity in particular.

Doubt has been cast on the success of the Kyoto School's attempts to overcome modernity. As the title of his 2002 book, Overcome by Modernity, suggests, Harry Harootunian evaluates the philosophers' attempts as failures, claiming the Kyoto School was overcome by the modernity they tried to surmount. This claim might be criticised as a sweeping generalization that does not inquire deeply into the philosophy at issue. Still, his formulation on the general historical context concerning the theme of "overcoming modernity" is helpful to situate the Kyoto School's philosophy within a broader scope, and explore it in line with "the structural complicity between the West and Japan; which Sakai emphasized.

Harootunian's statement may be misunderstood as a Western-centric claim that non-Western countries must follow the same path of modernization as the West, and therefore are fated to be overwhelmed

by the West forever. However, this is not what he means. When he qualifies Japanese modernity as "co-eval" in the sense that it "shared the same historical temporality of modernity (as a form of historical totalizing) found elsewhere in Europe and the United States", he does not propose that European or American modernities are/were at more advanced stages than Japanese modernity in a single, linear course of progress. As history shows, Japan was urged to modernize through its encounters with Western modernity, and it achieved modernization through its confrontation with the West. To this extent, Japanese modernity was born from the same historical process as Western modernity. This coevality does not necessarily imply that the latecomer is doomed to be overwhelmed by the predecessor. The point is that, as the result of this coevality, Japanese modernity, in spite of or precisely because of its rivalry with Western modernity, ran the risk of internalizing its structural oppression against the non-West. This is the same oppression which Japanese modernity is supposed to counter to achieve a non-Western form of modernity for itself. More concretely, Harootunian raises the question of whether it can be said that a Japanese modernity overcame Western modernity when the former appropriated the latter's modes of imperialism and colonialism that have historically tormented the non-West. It is from this perspective that Harootunian claims the Kyoto School was overcome by the modernity they tried to surmount. What he means is not that the West defeated, and will continue to defeat Japan, but that Japanese modernity has been, and will be challenged by its own self-contradiction, just as Western modernity has been, and will continue to be. Another question raised is whether the Kyoto School philosophers, in their discourses on overcoming modernity, could develop ideas that aimed to break such complicity between Japanese and Western modernity.

Along this line of thinking, this book asks: Could the Kyoto School philosophers' thoughts about overcoming modernity offer a valid prospect for the Japanese people to overcome modernity, rather than being overcome by it? Could their ideas about a Japanese national subjectivity, as the agent for this overcoming, offer visions of a mode of existence that differs from Western-centric subjectivities? Attending to these questions by focusing on the two themes of overcoming modernity and Japanese national subjectivity, and by thoroughly examining these philosophers' discourses, are the tasks this book sets out to achieve. The criteria for evaluating these philosophers' attempts will be taken from their own criticisms of Western modernity and the subjectivity that is characteristic of it. Thus, evaluating their attempts entails examining whether their moral and political philosophies were true to the ideals they themselves professed to uphold and, relatedly, elucidating how these philosophers particularized their own country and people by using universalistic philosophical terms against their own ideals. It will be shown that this particularization of the universal, in terms of how it was expressed, will take the shape of the universalization of the particular in terms of the content of expression in the discourses at issue.

In part I of this book, I will examine the discourses of four prominent members of the second generation of the Kyoto School: Kõsaka Masaaki, Kõyama Iwao, Suzuki Shigetaka, and Nishitani Keiji. While only Suzuki and Nishitani participated in the "Overcoming Modernity" symposium, all four thinkers participated in the three subsequent symposia, during which they discussed their philosophies of world history. I will explicate these thinkers' philosophy, as expressed in these symposia, on Japanese national subjectivity and the philosophy of world history, based on which they asserted the significance of this subjectivity and the necessity to create it. By looking into its three salient characteristics, I will inquire whether this subjectivity could become the agent for overcoming modernity, as these thinkers envisioned. I will also question whether this subjectivity could become the agent for ethicitly

transforming the Japanese wartime state or its military government, as recently claimed by some scholars.

In part 2, I will turn to these thinkers' mentor, Nishida, and examine his discourses, published almost contemporaneously with these symposia. My analysis will turn an eye to the overlaps and continuity between his lines of thought and that of his disciples. In reference to the above three characteristics of Japanese national subjectivity, I will argue that Nishida not only promoted ideas of a similar subjectivity, but also elaborated a theory of the structure of the Japanese state that could condition the possibility of this subjectivity. By unpacking the visions of the state and the world that Nishida believed this subjectivity would create, I will inquire whether such views could offer alternatives to the forms of the state and world that are characteristic of modernity, thus constituting a successful project to overcome modernity. <>

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