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Spotlight 070

Wordtrade Reviews: Excessive Saints on the Nightside of Runes

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Editorial Appraisals:

Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

TRADITIONAL CHINESE MEDICINES: MOLECULAR STRUCTURES, NATURAL SOURCES AND APPLICATIONS: MOLECULAR STRUCTURES, NATURAL SOURCES AND APPLICATIONS 1ST EDITION compiled by Xinjian Yan, Guirong Xie, Jiaju Zhou, G. edited by W. A. Milne [Routledge, 9781138722729]

This title is a major research reference in the chemistry and molecular structure in the compounds found in traditional Chinese herbal medicines. It was first published in 2003. In laboratories around the world the active principles in traditional herbal medicines are being isolated and characterized. A systematic effort at the Chinese Academy of Sciences is underway to identify the structure-activity relationships that result from the link between chemistry and medicine that is permitted by this data. This book, which provides the only systematic English-language description of the chemical structures and pharmacological effects of compounds active in traditional Chinese medicines (TCMs), is now in its second edition. The new edition provides English-language monographs on over 9000 chemicals isolated from nearly 4000 natural sources used in Chinese medicine and features the addition of in-depth bioactivity data for many of the compounds. Effects and indications of the medicines are included. Extensive indexing permits cross-referencing among English, Chinese and Latin names for natural medicinal sources, effects and indications, and the chemical components of the medicines.

TRADITIONAL CHINESE MEDICINES: MOLECULAR STRUCTURES, NATURAL SOURCES AND APPLICATIONS 2ND EDITION edited by Xinjian Yan, Guirong Xie, Jiaju Zhou, G. W. A. Milne [Wiley, 9780566084270]

The second edition of **TRADITIONAL CHINESE MEDICINES** includes 2300 new compounds, 2400 additional plant sources, more CAS Registry Numbers, and more pharmacological data. The structure of the book has been extensively reorganised to make cross referencing the data much simpler. This new edition is therefore a substantial improvement on the first edition of this important reference on the structural chemistry of traditional Chinese medicines.

Jiaju Zhou, Professor, Institute of Process Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, graduated from the Department of Chemistry (a six-year program), Peking University in 1963. He is an organic and computational chemist who has spent many years studying the chemical composition of plants used medicinally in China. He has worked for extended periods at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, USA, where he became expert in chemical data systems. He has worked as a visiting scholar at the University of British Columbia, Canada and Marseilles University, France.

Guirong Xie graduated from the chemistry department of Shandong University, Jinan, China in 1965. Since then she has worked as a physical chemist in the Institute of Process Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences. As a visiting scholar, she worked for one year in the USA at the National Institute of Standards and Technology

where she developed several metallurgic samples that were awarded certification as standard reference materials. Since 1990 she has focused on computer-aided molecular design and databases relating to the structure and activity of compounds.

Xinjian Yan, graduated from the Department of Chemistry, Peking University in 1978, and received a PhD from the Institute of Process Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences in 1991. He conducted molecular modeling as postdoctoral fellow at the Institute of Cancer, National Institutes of Health from 1992 to 1995 and the Department of Chemistry and Biochemistry, University of Texas at Austin from 1995 to 1996. He studied traditional Chinese medicine at the Laboratory of Computer Chemistry, Chinese Academy of Sciences from 1996 to 1999. Since 1999, he has been working at Texas University at College Station.

The Editor
G W A Milne served 36 years as a research chemist at the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, MD, USA. Here he worked on the use of spectroscopy for structure determination of organic compounds, and on molecular modeling in the design of drugs for the treatment of cancer and AIDS. He has been active for many years in the fields of chemical information and chemical computation, and is the Editor of the American Chemical Society's *Journal of Chemical Information and Computer Sciences* and Gardner's *Chemical Synonyms and Trade Names*, Eleventh Edition (Ashgate). In 1999, jointly with Stephen Heller, Dr Milne was awarded the Skolnik Award of the Chemical Information Division of the American Chemical Society.

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Excerpt:

The part played in Western medicine by naturally occurring organic compounds is complex and substantial. The chemistry of natural products has long been an important part of the organic chemistry syllabus used in chemistry schools, and a familiarity with the chemistry of plant-derived compounds is common in research laboratories in the US and Europe. Partly because of this, the proportion in modern pharmacopeial of natural products and their derivatives is variously estimated to be somewhere between 25 and 50%.

Scientists in China, on the other hand, have spent centuries producing exhaustive and detailed compilations of the plants that are found in that country's various Materia Medica, and these compilations, which go far beyond mere familiarity, have long proved to be important resources for pharmaceutical chemists in the West. Chinese publications have generally focused on the botanical and medical aspects of medicinal plants, and the research

chemist has required expertise in at least one of these disciplines in order to make use of the information presented.

In Traditional Chinese Medicines, a second edition of the work first published in 1999, the primary focus is on the chemical compounds found in plants of the Materia Medica of China. This is a significant step forward because chemistry is the bridge between botany and medicine. With this book, the reader can learn which chemicals are in a given plant, what the biological activities of these chemicals are and how this relates to the use of the plant in traditional Chinese medicine. A huge amount of knowledge has been distilled by the authors—Jiaju Zhou, Xinjian Yan and Guirong Xie—to prepare this book which, it is hoped, will be of value to anyone working in drug discovery. —G.W.A. Milne

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The medicinal use by humans of natural materials—plants, minerals, animal extracts, fungi—predates recorded history and has been undertaken in all parts of the world. Ancient Egyptian, Roman, Greek and Indian civilizations all studied the medicinal uses of herbs, which were used to treat a variety of diseases. These treatments, however, were generally empirical, and it is only in the last century that an effort has been made to isolate and identify specific active chemicals from natural sources. Currently as many as half the drugs in the modern pharmacopeia are derived more or less directly from plants. Traditional Chinese medicines, which are largely based on plants or plant extracts, are still used widely in China.

A Valuable Medical Information Resource

TRADITIONAL CHINESE MEDICINE (TCM) is based upon a huge accumulation of knowledge developed over a period of several thousand years of observation, investigation and clinical practice in China—a large country with a population that is currently close to 1.3 billion. TCM is the home of much theoretical knowledge of life, health, longevity and disease, and it transcends medicine by focusing on the relationship between humans and the natural condition, local and global aspects of disease and the principles of yin and yang.

In the fight against disease, plants were a natural resource and were exploited heavily by ancient civilizations. More recently, research in the West and in China has established as common ground the conclusion that all medicinally active materials operate at the molecular level—that active drugs, irrespective of origin, all contain specific molecules that are the source of the activity. Further, in most cases the active molecules are often related to receptors in the body. Progress of a disease may depend upon the functioning of numerous receptors, and blockage of a receptor by a foreign molecule can alter the course of the disease. If multiple receptors can be blocked, the likelihood of a medical effect will be enhanced. Traditional herb-derived medications such as those that form the basis of TCM contain numerous distinct chemical compounds and this, coupled with the simultaneous use of different medicines, a common practice in TCM, ensures that numerous chemicals will be present in any treatment, a condition that is unusual in Western medical practice. Different chemicals may be synergistic, or one may ameliorate the toxicity of another. A primary objective of the physician is to identify the combination of herbal medicines that is most effective in treating the disease.

TCM then, is highly empirical, and, as in any empirical activity, history is of great importance. Many centuries of human use of TCMs, coupled with unusually thorough documentation, has produced a valuable body of knowledge, which is the basis of this compilation.

Beginning in the twentieth century, modern analytical techniques have been applied to the study of the materials used in TCM. The active principles have been isolated from thousands of TCMs, these molecules have been completely characterized and their behaviors in biological systems have been determined. As an example, the Japanese Honeysuckle (JIN YIN HUA, Lonicera japonica, TCM T1555 in this book) has been used extensively in Chinese medicine as an antipyretic in treatment of upper respiratory tract infections, tonsillitis, laryngitis, skin lesions, viral conjunctivitis, welling abscesses, influenza, pneumonia, mastitis, appendicitis and heat-toxin blood dysentery. Analysis of the extract from this plant reveals chlorogenic acid (compound 1360 in

this book) as a major component. This compound is known from pharmacological studies to have antibacterial, antineoplastic, antimutagenic, antioxidant, antiviral and choleretic activities. It affects blood coagulation, stimulates intestinal motion and is a CNS stimulant. These "Western" properties are thus quite consistent with the use in TCM of the Japanese Honeysuckle. A related compound, ferulic acid (compound 3070), isolated from over 40 plants used in TCM, including Chinese Angelica (DANG GUI, Angelica sinensis, TCM T642) is known to possess antibacterial, antineoplastic, antiestrogenic, antifungal, antihepatotoxic, antimitotic, antioxidant and platelet aggregation inhibitory activity. These properties underlie its role in TCM as a tonic useful in the treatment of anemia and asthenia.

The purpose of this book is to serve as an integrated information resource for TCM. The book is based upon chemicals known to be present in TCMs and includes the chemistry, medicinal chemistry, pharmacology, toxicology, effects and indications of TCMs. This reference should serve as a useful collection of medicinal data related to TCM and also as a tool useful for the understanding of TCM. The data presented here should prove to be a rich source of lead compounds and useful for the development of new theories in health and medical treatment. It is hoped that this compilation will be helpful in building bridges between Chinese and Western medicine.

History of TCM

Hieroglyphic records pertaining to Chinese medicine created during the Shang dynasty, which ended in the eleventh century BC, are among the oldest medical records known. One of the earliest works mentioning disease and medicine, Shi Jing, was written before the seventh century BC and a second, Shan Hai Jing, in the third century BC. Other important sources include Wu Shi Er Bing Fang, which appeared between 770 and 221 BC, Huang Di Nei Jing (220 BC), Shan Han Za Bing Lun (150-219 AD) and Shang Han Lun (220 AD). These sources, collectively, identify a few hundred herbal preparations useful in the treatment of medical disorders. This book describes the important chemicals in some of these herbal preparations. The full history of traditional Chinese medicine is the subject of a number of publications, and the interested reader is referred to a recent summary by Nigel Wiseman, who also has published authoritative dictionaries of Chinese medicine. Other useful dictionaries include one by Yuan et al. and one published by the Chinese government in 1997. A Chinese—English dictionary of the names of seed plants appeared" in 1983 and two other dictionaries of plant names were published in 1996.

Chinese Materia Medica

The development of documentation concerning the materials used in Chinese medicine has been continuing since ancient times. There are a number of well-known books dealing with the subject. These include the following:

Ben Jing (Shen Nong Ben Cao Jing, written in the Qin and Han Dynasties, not earlier than 104 BC), the oldest herbal book, contains detailed descriptions of 365 herbal medicines (including 67 animal-derived drugs, 252 herbal drugs and 46 mineral drugs).

After Ben Jing, important Materia Medica books include Wu Pu Ben Cao, Ben Cao Jing Ji Zhu and Ming Yi Bie Lu. Wu Pu (a student of the well-known TCM practitioner Hua Tuo) in 208-239 AD compiled Wu Pu Ben Cao, which describes 441 TCMs in detail. Tao Hong-jing (456-536 AD) wrote Ben Cao Jing Ji Zhu, which describes 730 TCMs. A more important book by Tao Hong-jing is Ming Yi Bie Lu, which describes 680 TCMs. Modern TCM experts regard Ben Jing and Ming Yi Bie Lu as having laid the foundation for the development of a Materia Medica of China.

The first national pharmacopoeia, Tang Materia Medica (Newly Revised Materia Medica) was sponsored by the Tang government and compiled by Su Jing, et al. (659 AD). It covers 850 medicinal herbs. Another national pharmacopoeia is Kai Bao Materia Medica, published in the Song Dynasty, which includes 983 medicinal herbs.

In the 16th century, the Compendium of Materia Medica (Ben Cao Gang Mu) was compiled by Li Shi-zhen (1596 AD). This very important book is a comprehensive herbal encyclopedia that includes descriptions of 1,892 herbal, animal or mineral medicines, 1,160 pictures, and 11,000 compound prescriptions. The Compendium of Materia Medica has been used not only as a medicinal pharmacopoeia, but also as a valuable reference on botany, zoology, mineralogy and metallurgy. It has been intensively studied in Japan and Korea, and highly evaluated by Western scientists. Darwin called it "the encyclopedia of China published in 1596," and cited this book in reference to chicken species. An important supplement to this book is Ben Cao Gang Mu Shi Yi (1765 AD) compiled by Zhao Xue-min (Qing Dynasty, circa 1719-1805 AD). Ben Cao Gang Mu Shi Yi contains 921 TCMs, 716 of which are not included or have no detailed information in Compendium of Materia Medica. Dian Nan Ben Cao (circa 1476 AD) is a book on Yunnan herbal medicines, covering 458 local TCM herbs. An Illustrated Book of Plants (1848 AD) written by Wu Qi-Jun (1789-1847 AD) includes 1714 plants.

The most important TCM books published recently include Chinese Medicine Dictionary (ZhongYao Da Ci Dian, 1979) covering 5,767 TCM herbs, Chinese Materia Medica (Zhong Hua Ben Cao, 1999), describing 8,980 TCM herbs with 8534 pictures, and China Resources Brief Flora of Chinese Medicine (1994).

Formulary and Pharmacology of Traditional Chinese Medicines

In TCM, single-formula medicine is always an option, but the use of compound prescriptions, involving multiple TCMs, plays an important role. This aspect of TCM has been addressed by many authors, and some of the important formulation resources are described below.

Oian lin Yao Fang and Oian lin Yi Fang. In the Tang dynasty (618-907 AD), Sun Si Miao (581-682 AD) compiled Bai Ji Qian fin Yao Fang (652 AD), generally called Qian lin Yao Fang (Thousand Golden Essential Formulas). This book consists of 30 volumes, 232 classes, 5,300 prescriptions, discusses many different diseases and treatment methods, and summarizes the medical achievements attained before the Tang Dynasty. Based on 30 years' clinical experience and on the publication of Qian Jin Yao Fang, in 682 AD Sun Si Miao completed another 30-volume work, Qian fin Yi Fang, which primarily discusses treatment in internal medicine, surgery and acute infectious diseases.

Wai Tai Mi Yao. Another book from the Tang dynasty is Wai Tai Mi Yao written in 752 AD by Wang Xi. This book has 40 volumes and 6,000 prescriptions.

Tai Ping Sheng Hui Fang. Progress in economics, culture, science and technology—printing technology in particular—greatly promoted the development of medicine, and in 992 AD the Song Dynasty government published Tai Ping Sheng Hui Fang (Great Harmony Sagely Benefit Formulae), which contains 100 volumes and 16,834 prescriptions. This was the first book of TCM formulations compiled by the government of China. There are also many other publications, including He Ji Ju Fang, containing 10 volumes, and Sheng Ji Zhong Lu, describing 20,000 prescriptions. In the Ming Dynasty, Zhu Tun et al. published Pu Ji Fang (Prescriptions for Healing the Masses), which contains 61,739 formulas (1406 AD).

Two modern texts on the pharmacology of TCMs are by Qi Chen and Kee Chang Huang. <>

THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO MUSIC, MIND AND WELL-BEING edited by Penelope Gouk, James Kennaway, Jacomien Prins and Wiebke Thormählen [Routledge, 9781138057760]

In recent decades, the relationship between music, emotions, health and well-being has become a hot topic. Scientific research and new neuro-imaging technologies have provided extraordinary new insights into how music affects our brains and bodies, and researchers in fields ranging from psychology and music therapy to history and sociology have turned their attention to the question of how music relates to mind, body, feelings and health, generating a wealth of insights as well as new challenges. Yet this work is often divided by discipline and methodology, resulting in parallel, yet separate discourses.

In this context, **THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO MUSIC, MIND AND WELL-BEING** seeks to foster truly interdisciplinary approaches to key questions about the nature of musical experience and to demonstrate the importance of the conceptual and ideological frameworks underlying research in this field. Incorporating perspectives from musicology, history, psychology, neuroscience, music education, philosophy, sociology, linguistics and music therapy, this volume opens the way for a generative dialogue across both scientific and humanistic scholarship.

The Companion is divided into two sections. The chapters in the first, historical section consider the varied ways in which music, the emotions, well-being and their interactions have been understood in the past, from Antiquity to the twentieth century, shedding light on the intellectual origins of debates that continue today. The chapters in the second, contemporary section offer a variety of current scientific perspectives on these topics and engage wider philosophical problems. The Companion ends with chapters that explore the practical application of music in healthcare, education and welfare, drawing on work on music as a social and ecological phenomenon.

Contextualising contemporary scientific research on music within the history of ideas, this volume provides a unique overview of what it means to study music in relation to the mind and well-being.

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19. Musical Engagement and Well-being in the Early Years of Life (Beatriz Ilari)
20. Music, Emotion and Learning (Jennie Henley)
21. Music, Cognition and Well-being in the Ageing (Susan Hallam)
22. The Goodness of Small Things: Why We Need Longitudinal and Ethnographic Studies of Music in Dementia Care (Mariko Hara and Tia DeNora)

Excerpt: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Music, Mind and Well-being by Penelope Gouk, James Kennaway, Jacomien Prins and Wiebke Thormählen

The last 30 years have seen a resurgence of interest in the connections between music, mind and well-being. This is hardly surprising as life has become inundated with music facilitated by its ever-increasing dissemination through digital technology. We no longer need to find a radio or CD player, let alone a live band. Each of us has a vast choice of music readily available through our preferred electronic medium and our choices are determined as often by loose emotional concepts such as music that is "sad," "happy," "relaxing" or "romantic" as they are by artist or genre. Social media abound with testimony to the use of music in daily life: to calm us, to inspire us, to distract us, to help us remember, to help us forget; to express ourselves or to avoid finding our own words; to bond with others or to shut ourselves off from the world; to intensify or overcome a particular feeling. At the heart of all this lies the general assumption that music is somehow a "language of the emotions" with an almost magical link to our state of mind. Musical emotions are perceived to have an impact on the subjective sense of well-being and thus on psychological and physical health. In our everyday lives, the music-emotions-health nexus constitutes "common sense" on the subject, but doubts about its universal validity and questions around how it might function remain, at a time when research into the application of music's "powers" is mushrooming across a variety of fields.

A key reason for the boom in recent scientific interest in music, emotions and well-being relates to the remarkable advances in imaging technology in the neurosciences over the past few decades, which have led to the formation of a highly productive sub-discipline that has brought exciting insights into how the brain reacts to music. The neuroscience of music has also inspired scholarship in other fields such as cognitive psychology, psychotherapy and psychoneuroimmunology, as well as in applied studies such as rehabilitation and non-pharmacological pain management and is the basis of work on neurologic music therapy. At the same time, it has also created significant and intriguing intellectual challenges for future approaches to the subject. What is the relationship between the lived experience of music and the measurable biological markers that are the stock-in-trade of neuroscience? What are the limits of what brain science can tell us about music and emotion? What is the relationship between reward circuits in the brain and the social and historical construction of musical concepts and cultures? And for that matter, is music really all about emotion at all?

The idea itself that psychological processes can be mapped directly onto biological processes, with the apparent implication that mental states and emotions can be read from biological markers, has come under fierce attack. Some critics have accused the neuro-disciplines of ignoring the political and social context, and have argued that the field - in a way that is almost neo-phrenological - makes the mistake of thinking that locating brain activity using brain scans is the same as explaining the meaning of its function. While scientific popularisers and the media have sometimes clearly been guilty of a hubristic approach to what brain research can tell us about music, serious researchers in the field have stoutly defended the epistemological basis of their work and acknowledged its limits. In order to create empirically based models of how music affects the brain, neuroscientific approaches necessarily have to reduce complex human behaviour, but that is not a barrier to producing important and informative results.

Much excellent work has been presented in the related fields of music and health and music and emotions, most recently **MUSIC, HEALTH AND WELLBEING** by Raymond MacDonald, Gunter Kreutz and Laura Mitchell (2012), the **HANDBOOK OF MUSIC AND EMOTIONS** (2010) and its predecessor, **MUSIC AND EMOTION: THEORY AND RESEARCH** (2001) by Patrik Juslin and John Sloboda, which together demonstrate the rapid development in the field of the affective sciences over the first 10 years of the twenty-first century, as well as Tom Cochrane, Bernardino

Fantini and Klaus Scherer's **THE EMOTIONAL POWER OF MUSIC** (2013) and, on a rather different note, there is also Oliver Sacks's **MUSICOPHILIA** (2007), which gives a literary-clinical description of neurological cases related to music.

Our Companion differs in two respects from these books. Firstly, it explicitly problematises the relationship between past and current scientific thinking on music, emotions and well-being, using historical perspectives to illuminate the ideological and cultural roots of contemporary musical and scientific concepts. It places contemporary understandings into a continuum of approaches instead of setting out a vision of a teleological march of progress, revealing the role of culturally determined concepts. It goes beyond traditional narratives of music and emotion, with many chapters using ideas of the embodied mind, and includes contributions that deal with scepticism not simply about music's "emotional power," but with the ideology itself that music has an inherent special relationship to the mind. As such, the Companion identifies a variety of theories on music's affective relationship to man, presenting a variety of conceptions of the temporal and dynamic nature of both music and the mind as an encapsulation of the self, that have been discussed and reinvented to suit changing socio-cultural contexts since Antiquity. Indeed, a Pythagorean-Platonic model of the soul (mind) in which music was considered to have an inherent relationship to the human self, forms the underlying assumption in many of the chapters presented here, while others point to the Aristotelian model that denied an a priori relationship between the soul and music. Finally, the book seeks to create a dialogue between theoretical and experimental approaches, with the hope of inspiring new research questions and methodological approaches that can further the investigation into the nature of music's impact on body and mind. We hope to inspire research that involves integration at the level of formulating research questions, research that is fully aware of its own ideological premises with respect to key concepts such as music, mind, emotions, human nature and well-being, and that is fully aware of the ideological pillars that hold its own disciplinary stakes and methods.

This Companion brings together case studies and state of research summaries from a wide variety of perspectives – neurology, psychology, sociology, education studies, history and musicology – to probe not only how music relates to the mind and emotions and how it has been or could be used in the process of maintaining or gaining well-being but also to push beyond this to the question whether the subject-object relational model traditionally used to investigate the "power of music" – in which music as a "thing" or even a "practice" acts on the individual who possesses mind, emotions and a sense of well-being — is a useful model in the investigation of a more inclusive conception of well-being that is based around individuals' accounts and perceptions. By placing case studies and theoretical studies side by side, the book raises issues of voice, individuality and community as aspects of music that could be considered alongside biological markers. In other words, this Companion seeks to encourage a greater awareness of agency and the social dimension of music through self-reflexive research approaches, as well as of the role of historical and cultural contexts.

In this light, a central issue addressed in the book is the problem of the obvious lack of dialogue between the various disciplines involved and their lack of agreement on the conceptual framework used to explain the impact of music on the mind, emotions and well-being. The conceptual and philosophical challenges posed by the different disciplinary approaches to the impact of music give us the opportunity for further fruitful research based on an exchange of ideas between disciplines to create a multidisciplinary picture of the music, mind, well-being nexus. Our Companion therefore aims to demonstrate the value of and need for musicologists, historians, neuroscientists, psychologists and others to examine these theoretical issues together in order to move towards an understanding of musical experience that incorporates a sense of both the cultural and historical construction and the scientific materialist basis of musical experience.

The chapters in this book thus critically consider the basis of thinking on the topic, while also investigating the different models of the interaction of body, mind and emotions, revealing ideologies that have a significant impact on the questions that scientific and psychological research asks today. The historical chapters allow an evaluation of the social and cultural contexts within which these models were conceived as true, universal and scientific, drawing on the so-called method of reflexivity (common in ethnographic studies and in medical

humanities) in which the subject of study is investigated alongside its practical and ideological contexts and frameworks which include the investigator and the common assumptions of the "normal" setting for the investigation. Stepping beyond these boundaries will be essential in order to formulate approaches that help us to develop our understanding of the musical experience as a vital human phenomenon that manifests itself both as subjective experience in everyday life and as a scientific object of study.

The Basic Concepts: Music, Mind and Well-being

The concept of music itself as it surfaces throughout the chapters in this book requires some consideration. Interestingly, many a-historical studies appear to reveal a reliance on what musicologists have long since defined as a strong work concept. The underlying assumptions prevalent here follow a subject-object model in which music as an entity in itself impacts on the human mind and the aim is to quantify this impact. Yet, this very notion of music as possessing an objective character – and one that can be described both technically and aesthetically independent of an individual's reception and perception – has come under considerable scrutiny over the past 30 years, as musicology has tried to free itself from an ideological construct that determined its rise as a discipline in the first place. The long-held idea that music operates as a series of fixed art works was critiqued comprehensively in the 1990s and the construct has come to be seen as a restrictive cultural premise, albeit one with continuing influence among composers, performers, theorists and educators. Ideas of music as practice ("musicking") as something one does rather than a collection of works has become increasingly influential in musicology, but some other fields seem more beholden to older conceptions of music as an object.

This older concept of a musical "work" itself developed from the re-definition of music as an art in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries or even as early as the Italian Renaissance and from the subsequent desire to define and control music's powerful physical and mental stimulation. One Baroque source that strongly contributed towards this view of music as discrete works created by composers with a view to move the passions was Athanasius Kircher's highly influential treatise Musurgia Universalis (Rome 1650) (Universal Music-making). As well as classifying music and musical instruments Kircher's encyclopaedic work also contained a section on anatomy that included illustrations designed to show how the ear actually hears and responds to music. For Enlightenment music theorists such as Johann Georg Sulzer, music's non-conceptual nature and its perceived physical and mental effects made it difficult to define it as a true art. Art's role was the moral education of man, a tall task for an un-texted piece of music, the meaning of which appeared potentially different to each listener. Two features of music became significant in defining music's inherent powers and its usefulness in the process of education: the manner of experiencing music – i.e. music as a practice – and a contemplation of music as abstract form. While both were part of the formulation of music's powers during the eighteenth century, the latter rose to prominence towards century's end, with a Kantian separation of experience and perception from the object per se. Around 1800 an Idealist conception of music came to dominate, suggesting that music as practice and its physiological impact were mere tools towards the true aim of music — metaphysical truth communicated through musical form. Aesthetic judgement, therefore, was divorced from musical practice and the idea of music as aesthetic objects or works came to be tied to educational ideals in which art could further man's moral sense and be part of a moral education through its truth and beauty, the physical effect of music was in part marginalised as a medical problem.

With this Idealist shift, abstract form not physical impact became the manifestation of music's vital powers. As a result, both music's formal parameters and its constituent parts – sound and vibration – took centre stage in treatises that were no longer instructive (as eighteenth-century composition treatises had been) but analytical. They displayed the desire to put understandings of music's impact onto a proper scientific basis. The novelist Stendhal reflected on this scene when he wrote in his 1824 Life of Rossini that, "Music is still awaiting the coming of its Lavoisier, the genius who will eventually submit the whole system of the aural nerves and indeed the human heart itself, to a series of accurate scientific tests and experiments." This person would need a "remarkably sensitive nervous system" to understand the kinds of "emotional reaction" provoked by music, leading in the end to "the establishment of a scientific theory of music based upon the observed data of

emotional psychology (European sub-species) and upon an analysis of the habitual reactions of the aural nerves".

On the other hand, a generation later the music critic Eduard Hanslick postulated a view of music that was entirely divorced from such emotional psychology. In Vom musikalisch Schönen (1854) he denied music any expression beyond the expression of itself. As such, he distanced music from the expression of emotion to conclude that music's effects stemmed from the fact that its dynamism mimicked the shape of emotion rather than any act of expression. Hanslick claimed that form itself and the beauty arising from form was the only true essence of art. Here, aesthetic judgment was strictly separated from emotion, effect, perception and stimulation. At the same time, Hermann Helmholtz would attempt to provide a scientific rationale for music's effects on human physiology (1863). His definition of science and physiology necessarily required him to explain music's effects as entirely independent of any subjective perception. The development of his theory, however, was driven by his own strong emotional reactions – caused in turn by moral beliefs and national sentiment – against the virtuosic musical display which became increasingly popular during the nineteenth century.

Both Helmholtz and Hanslick would prove hugely influential on an understanding of music that isolated objects from practice. For both, musical practice and any effect arising from the application or experience of music were pale shadows of music's true nature. One result of this was the prioritisation of the act of serious listening over any other ways of engaging with music. Echoing Greek thought, Sulzer had already suggested that the ear and the eye were the primary senses with which man gained knowledge and honed his inner sense of the beautiful and the good and he also conceded that while "in these two noble senses lie the mainsprings of rational and moral behaviour," that "of the two, hearing has by far the greater power". Listening itself came to be formulated in such a way that only proper listening would yield the higher truth that the new metaphysics of music promised. The resulting prominence of listening over other modes of engaging with music is reflected in the familiar image of a modern concert culture which was established in the mid-nineteenth century. True art music must be revered in silence so as to unfold its powers.

The idea of the work concept remains latent in much recent research into music's emotional and health effects. The reasons for this may be rooted in the fact that the move towards a music conceived of existing in and of itself and venerated through listening foreshadowed the interest in and the scientific means to record music and that recorded music has become by far the most pervasive mode of engaging with music in Western society today. The one exception is perhaps singing, yet, everyday practices such as singing or humming to oneself have rarely been taken into consideration as musical acts in music-emotion-health studies. Many studies continue to rely on investigative approaches that prioritise listening over other modes of engagement and on a conception of music as a series of works with parameters that can be analysed and defined in rhythmic, melodic, harmonic and timbral features.

Music as practice is more commonly discussed in studies that deal with either therapy or community music making than in the "hard sciences". While Christopher Small introduced the concept of "musicking" as musical acts that cut across different modes of engaging with music, the boundaries between theory and practice and between music as works and music as application are at times still upheld in scientific studies into music's effects today. Still, in the modern era music therapy, for instance, has often been – and remains – an "other" to high art music and its effects.

The application of music in therapy and in education is often treated as entirely different to contemplation of music at a concert (for a breakdown of this dichotomy through education theory see Henley in this Companion). In short, music's therapeutic and its moral/educational values have been severed. The separation between aesthetic object and application can also be seen in the social psychology of music, with a split between studies that foreground agency and those that see the individual as a passive recipient. Here, the effects of musical activities on individuals in both clinical and non-clinical settings are now being studied on a large scale. These approaches place emphasis on variables including historical, cultural, psychological, physiological and

behavioural effects which may have implications for health and well-being, but they view music as a tool and music-making essentially in terms of application studies. Indeed, these studies often function as validation for further scientific research into music, emotions and well-being. Only in recent work has this division begun to be resolved, significantly, perhaps, in approaches in education that draw on Small's work.

The concept of emotions, which forms a pillar of contemporary research into music and the brain, has also been shown to be highly historically contingent by scholarship in the booming field of the history of emotions over the past 20 years, notably in Thomas Dixon's important work on the development of the modern language of emotions as bodily, non-cognitive and involuntary, and on what was lost with the decline of the terminology of passions, appetites, affections and sentiments. A sophisticated understanding of our concepts of emotions as in part historically contingent can enrich contemporary studies. Adding the issue of music to the consideration of the history of emotions raises further innumerable historical and philosophical questions about the nature of emotions themselves, the concept of "musical emotions," its influence on health and well-being and its uses in investigating human nature across history.

In music psychology, the concept of Basic Emotion Theory (BET) has recently been critically reviewed. BET was adopted from psychology generally fairly recently into music and emotion research and has yielded significant work, but the need to account for both aesthetic categories of emotions such as astonishment and awe, the demand for emotional categories that can answer to the contextual situatedness of musical emotions and the fact that they do not correspond necessarily to emotions created by other stimuli has led to a variety of other models of emotion. Some have abandoned the basic emotion model altogether and have described music as "complex information processing components" thereby shifting the onus firmly onto the cognitive faculties; others have been critical of the stimulus model due to its focus on the act of subjective listening to objective environmental influences by which it uphold the subject-object divide, arguing instead that this does not account for the embodied experience of music. More recently, BET has been challenged by Dynamical System Theory so as to account for the experience of musical emotions as they unfold across body and mind in different contexts. Here, agency is given to the emotion itself.

Another crucial concept implicit in many discussions of the topic is that of "human nature." In the first section of the Companion, contributors deal with a wide variety of implied models for conceiving of mankind since Antiquity, reflecting the fact that human nature is not a universal beyond history but something that is in part determined by social and cultural factors and by hegemonic systems of knowledge. As many of the chapters here reflect, discussions of music, both in the past and today, are often revealing about how human nature and its relationship to well-being are conceptualised. In the early modern period, new ideals of humanity were often expressed in terms of music and its relationship to sociability and natural law. With the development of sciences such as psychology from the nineteenth century, human nature was increasingly subject to systematic and experimental approaches (see Quinones in this Companion).

The focus of our Companion on the relationship between music and the mind inevitably raises issues of embodiment and the "hard problem" of consciousness. Many of the chapters here set out views of the experience of music that assumes not only that listeners are "human animals" responding to stimuli, but also beings with will and agency, embedded in a specific culture. Different conceptions of the "self" involved in music are set out in our volume. So for instance, we see a neuroscientific embodied self, an interpersonal self, a self-defined by narratives and personal memories and a spiritual self as "soul" in some of the historical chapters.

Finally, the modern concept of well-being is, of course, also a socio-historical construct. In the context of theories of happiness and human flourishing that have been profoundly influential since Antiquity, this concept still informs some contemporary approaches to music and the field of the "philosophy of life" in general. In other ways it is a rather recent concept, a response to a number of issues, such as the problem of how to define the concept of "health" beyond the narrow sense of freedom from diagnosed pathologies. Since the World Health Organisation defined health as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the

absence of disease or infirmity" (WHO, 1946), well-being has encompassed a wide variety of social, personal and economic aspects. It is an attempt to create a measuring tool for individual perceptions of a state of contentment that is not directly dependent on actual physical health defined by the workings of the mechanical body. The result is a culturally determined concept of psychological well-being dependent on emotional states, which requires a search for measurable biological markers to serve as proxies for those emotions. Current pressures on health systems have led to a rise in the attention given to research into mental health, while the perceived pressures of an increasingly technologised and monitored lifestyle have given rise to a whole industry of alternative paths to "well-being," many of which relate to or use music in some form.

Structure of this Study

Historical Scientific Perspectives

The first section of the Companion presents historical chapters that investigate different moments of conceptualising music's relationship to emotion, mind and well-being. However, they don't constitute a neat teleology culminating in present-day conceptions of music's relationship to emotions and its usefulness as a tool for achieving well-being. Instead, they present paradigmatic moments of what theorists in the medical humanities have recently termed "entanglements" (Barad, 2007; Callard, 2016). They reveal that contemporaneous scientific perspectives and socio-cultural perceptions interacted in complex ways that do not allow a simple cause-effect understanding of their relationship in which one is merely handmaiden to the other.

This part of the Companion begins with Francesco Pelosi's chapter, which considers the range of ideas on the subject in ancient Greek sources. It demonstrates important ways in which Greek concepts of music and soul have informed subsequent thinking until today while outlining ways in which they differed crucially from twenty-first-century understandings. Pelosi gives a systematic overview of the major Greek schools of thought on the impact of music on the mind, health and well-being, including the Pythagoreans, the ethos school represented in particular by Plato and those who rejected the whole idea of music having a significant impact on body or soul. Furthermore, this chapter draws a distinction between implicit ideas about the long- and short-term impact of music to elucidate the relationship between medical, magical, religious and ethical conceptions of music, the body and the soul, thereby opening a debate that is still current today.

The following chapter, by Andrew Hicks, considers what happened to these Greek ideas as they were developed in parallel discourses in the Latin West, the Arabic and the Persian-speaking worlds during the Middle Ages. In particular, Neoplatonic theories of music in terms of the relationship between macrocosm and microcosm had a longstanding impact, notably among medieval Latin commentators such as William of Conches and Bernardus Silvestris, who drew strongly on Boethius's sixth-century AD De institutione musica. His version of theories linking music (musica instrumentalis) to the balance in man (musica humana) provided a context for understanding the physical, medical and ethical power of music with respect to bringing the soul into a state of harmony. In investigating the Arabic tradition, Hicks looks at texts such as the tenth-century Epistles of the Brethren of Purity, which considered the spiritual substance of music and its effects on its human souls in terms of the macrocosm. Similarly, writers in the Persian Sufi tradition also drew on Pythagorean ideas, but with more focus on the "ear of the soul" and the "ear of the heart" than on mathematical ratio. All the case studies here demonstrate that music's moral, emotional and physiological effects continued to fascinate medieval writers on music, but also that they all remained rather inconcrete with respect to specific ways in which music yielded such powers.

Jacomien Prins' chapter describes a move towards the conception of music as an art, displayed here through the examination of Girolamo Cardano's 1561 De utilitate ex adversis capienda (On gaining advantage from misfortunes) and the secular model of psychology which he sets out. Here, the Platonic idea that music can shape and condition the human soul experienced a revival, as Cardano argued for music therapy as an alternative to traditional religious ideas of the care of the soul, re-conceptualising musical practices of healing and education.

At the centre of Renaissance theories of auditory perception and sensory cognition lies the concept of mental representation, because most operations of the mind were understood as a process of creating visual and aural images. The process of creating mental images of musical sounds was also associated with the arousal and control of the "passions of the soul." The chapter demonstrates how a new view of the pursuit of happiness came into being, focused on the manipulation of mental images using certain kinds of music. Cardano and his detractors set out the Idealist and naturalistic positions on the alleged power of music that have recurred in the debate ever since.

The focus shifts to England in Penelope Gouk's chapter, which considers the debate on music's effects in the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century, with particular reference to the composer and lutenist John Dowland. Despite the crisis in musical life brought on by the Reformation, books such as the anonymous 1586 The praise of musick, Mulcaster's 1581 Positions and Case's 1588 Apologia musices stoutly defended the art and explored how it was experienced. Gouk examines the language of passions and affections that framed understandings of music's effects, looking in particular at how these theories of music as a means of both relieving sorrow and intensifying enjoyable sadness related to the contemporary culture of melancholy expressed through music. Melancholy while being a "passion" also had a cognitive dimension, since spirits connected the body to the mind and soul. In this regard, Dowland continued a learned tradition that provided a vocabulary to articulate musical experience and offered an understanding of how music contributes to well-being. His singling out of a particular emotional state in the individual finds a counterpart in recent research into the perception of particular music as characteristic of a particular emotional state.

Eighteenth-century thinking on musical emotions in the context of new instruments such as Benjamin Franklin's glass armonica and Peter Joseph Schneider's aeolodicon is the subject of Carmel Raz and Stanley Finger's chapter. Franklin himself had tried to cure the Polish aristocrat Isabela Czartoryska of melancholy using his armonica. Similarly, Peter Joseph Schneider, author of System einer medizinischen Musik (1835), used music to try to cure a melancholy woman using an aeolodicon, an instrument with a keyboard and metal wind pipes. The debate on the medical impact of such instruments illuminates many of the major themes of this book, throwing into relief both the rationalisation of music via particular man-made instruments and via specific fixed parameters such as melody, harmony and rhythm. Significant here is the fact that timbre was crucial in music's effect, a musical parameter that is far less frequently considered in music-psychology in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The chapter also deals with the significant separation between music as social act and as aesthetic experience that arose from the recasting of music as part of a discourse on the arts in the second half of the eighteenth century, a dichotomy that we still grapple with today.

In Chapter seven Wiebke Thormählen explores how the aesthetic paradigm of music in early nineteenth-century England led to a division of the musical experience. Listening to music and making music were systematically framed as relating to separate types of experiences: the one aesthetic, the other social and educational. Physical and emotional effects of music, therefore, depended on these changing social functions. Large-scale amateur choral singing – a (semi-)secularised version of Christian church singing, with its ideologies of respectability, education and moral self-improvement – was born of the desire for a collective achievement that could aid the establishment of one's identity as an individual and as a member of a group. The emotions inspired through collective singing became drivers for the desire to affirm agency and establish a voice. Singing was incorporated into discussions of health, yet resisted the increasingly dominant German Idealist aesthetics of music and social stratification. This historical framework reveals striking similarities with the results of recent scientific research into the impact of choral singing; here, the desire for collectivity and community emerges as the central theme that defines a perception of well-being.

Andrea Korenjak moves the historical focus onto nineteenth-century Austria in her chapter on music therapy, emotions and the mind in lunatic asylums. She looks at the work of Bruno Goergen (1777–1842), who in 1819 founded the first private "lunatic sanatorium" in Vienna, in which the famous poet Nicolaus Lenau was a patient. Goergen set up a large salon for musical performances, arguing that music was "one of the best psychic

remedies." Yet, the chapter argues, music as a therapeutic aid was mainly considered a means for distraction, engagement and amusement. Theories of music's powers focusing on its beneficial distracting effects were drawn from clinical practice and reflected in the first Viennese medical dissertations on music. This chapter demonstrates that the evidence that music can distract the listener and performer possibly through inducing a state of "flow" – and in doing so can provide health benefits – is partly historical in character.

James Kennaway uses the famous late nineteenth-century clinical case of "Anna O." as a frame for an examination of shifts in thinking on music, the body and the emotions. Anna O. was a Viennese woman whose neuroses were discussed by Freud and his colleague Josef Breuer in one of the most famous studies in psychoanalysis. Although her neurotic symptoms were in part triggered by dance music, very little attention has been paid to this angle. In a vital shift, Freud and Breuer challenged the model that suggested that physical over-stimulation by music could lead to psychological symptoms, arguing instead that psychological causes could lead to physical symptoms. In the last 30 years, however, the pendulum has swung decisively back towards a neuroscientific model of music's effects. A clear understanding of this previous moment in the history of the topic should perhaps also lead us to question some of the technological determinism and whiggish assumptions about scientific progress that abound in our current neurological turn.

Marta García Quiñones' chapter follows this by investigating the development of music psychology in America in the first half of the twentieth century. Drawing on the earlier German experimental psychology of figures such as Wilhelm Wundt, the Americans Carl Seashore, Max Schoen and Walter Van Dyke Bingham built up the psychology of music as a sub-discipline to main-stream psychology yet one that enjoyed strong institutional support. Although introspection was one of the methods used, they showed little interest in the Freudian ideas examined by Kennaway. And while a neurological angle can be seen in the contemporary work of Wever and Bray on the auditory nerves, the principal methods of the period involved technological advances and new statistical techniques. The chapter takes as a starting point the collection The effects of music, which illustrates some of the experimental procedures that were developed at the time and the key role of the phonograph in them. The latter is significant in two ways here: first, Quiñones identifies a crucial shift at this time from a focus on active engagement with music (bourgeois models of playing or Hanslickian "structural listening") to a consumption of music (facilitated by the phonograph) for health benefits, in line with stimulation models of music's effects. Second, the role of technological means strengthened the stimulation model of music in both aesthetic theories and in therapeutic and educational music practices: based in contemporary medical practices, music here was seen to affect mood (in a return to ideas of nervous stimulation), rather than to express it.

Juliane Brauer's chapter takes up Thormählen's narrative of music as a social praxis. Looking at music in Germany in the first weeks of the First World War, in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp and in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany after the Second World War, it defines music-making as an emotional praxis that offers an explanation for the close relationship of music and emotion via action and agency. Brauer uses the Scheer model to conceptualise listening as a bodily practice that allows for "doing" rather than feeling emotions, re-conceptualising musical emotions not merely as perceived emotions from which one can choose to step back if they become unpleasant but as tools that can be used as torture. Far beyond the chain of music–mind–emotion–biological marker, this chapter frames the power of context that puts a significant rift between the perceived emotion and the resulting biological reactions.

Contemporary Scientific Perspectives

The second section of the Companion looks at a wide variety of contemporary scientific perspectives on issues related to music, emotions, the brain and well-being. Together, these chapters reveal the wide-ranging concern in many different disciplines with music's powers today. In her introduction to the current debate on the relationship between music and emotion, Elvira di Bona provides a consideration of the theoretical and epistemological problems that lie behind the debate around music, mind and well-being. She offers an introduction into the role of emotion as a distinctive aspect of musical experience. Drawing on her background in

philosophy and cognitive science, she provides a view of the most important explanations for music's power to arouse, resemble or express emotions. She sets out the "quarrel" between musical "cognitivists" and "emotivists" whether the emotional content of the music resides somehow in the music itself or in the listener and the views of formalists in the tradition of Hanslick who reject the focus on emotions in music altogether (Zangwill, 2004). These continuing philosophical debates about fundamental questions in the relationship between music and feelings still pose an implicit challenge to many researchers in disciplines based on more direct conceptions of the music-mind-emotion-well-being nexus.

The next chapter, by Daisy Fancourt, examines the biological mechanisms at work below the level of our psychological responses to music. In an environment where the prestige of neuroscience has led to a widespread belief that "you are your brain," she expands the focus to other parts of the body that also have the ability to affect the function of the mind. Her chapter considers not only how musical emotions can trigger physical changes in terms of factors such as hormones and neurotransmitters, but also how those changes in turn feed back to the brain. The long and short-term effects on mood that these changes can cause has implications for inflammatory immune responses as well as for affective phenomena such as stress and depression. The chapter goes on to examine recent thinking on the evolutionary roots of emotional reactions to music in terms of the immune system and the hormonal basis of social cohesion, and it concludes with a look ahead to future understandings of the relationship between music, subjective emotion, limbic activity and health. As such, the chapter forms the counterpart to Di Bona's philosophical chapter by arguing that analysis of the wider biological foundations of the music-mind-body-emotions complex can provide us with a better understanding of the relationship between music, emotions and well-being.

Alexandra Lamont's chapter sets out the current state of the debate in her field of psychology and the legacy of Positivist experimental approaches since the 1950s. She outlines the various conceptual models that dominate the discussion of music's impact. Lamont goes on to discuss such models in the light of critical social psychology and up-to-date empirical findings to illuminate how and why music creates emotions, taking into account social context as well as the experience of individual musical "stimulation." Her chapter also considers psychological insights into the question of happiness and well-being with reference to Seligman's PERMA model (2002), which has strong echoes in thinking since Antiquity, as the historical chapters in this Companion show. The model is often applied to help people develop new cognitive and emotional tools and its scientific underpinnings remain the subject of current debate, especially with respect to the reconciliation of its philosophical and biological foundations. Lamont also examines the specific nature of playing as opposed to just listening to music, and explores questions of social identity tied up with different modes of engagement, echoing Thormählen's work on the nineteenth century. She concludes with some thoughts on the kinds of views of music and emotion that we would have if music's meaning as well as its stimulating **MUSICOPHILIA**, if Musicophilia's power were taken into account.

For a contrasting view, we turn directly to the neuroscience of music and current thinking on what it can tell us about musical emotions. Ole Heggli, Peter Vuust and Morten Kringelbach's chapter takes one of the central concerns of contemporary research on music, emotion and the brain – the role of pleasure. They discuss the links between subjective feeling and objective measurable reactions in the brain, revealed by modern neuroimaging techniques, showing the ways that musical experience fits into broader patterns of pleasure in the brain. They argue that music is a ubiquitous source of what is perhaps a pleasure only available to humans. Like any other reward, music can lead to subjective feelings and objective hedonic reactions as part of complex emotional responses. Finally, the chapter examines a particular phenomenon, "chills," and the role of anticipation as well as the relationship between pleasure and broader conceptions of well-being, suggesting that music's pleasure relies on predictive mechanisms which the neuroscientific method can reveal. As a hypothetical application study, the authors consider the potential of music in the treatment of anhedonia (a lack of pleasure) in certain affective disorders.

To address the challenges presented by the stimulation/pleasure model of music and the brain, the next two chapters consider the apparently paradoxical issue of sad music, albeit in two very different ways. Tuomas Eerola sets out the main controversies in explaining why people enjoy melancholy music, considering its effects along conceptually different yet interconnected domains: physiology, psychology and phenomenology. Considering the idea of sad music, apparently non-utilitarian in two senses, both ostensibly negative and "merely" aesthetic, allows Eerola to question the paradoxes of aesthetic emotions. The solution presented to the paradox of sad music is a subtle view of the "trajectories of emotional experiences" in listening to music that work at a number of conceptual levels each with its own mechanism.

The second chapter to examine the issue of sad emotions in music from a neuroscience angle is written by Liila Taruffi and Stefan Koelsch. It begins by looking at historical explanations for the appeal of sad music, from Aristotle's notion of catharsis to the work of Levinson and what they can bring to current debates, which often lack this broader approach. The chapter continues with a cross-disciplinary approach combining philosophical and psychological perspectives with neuroimaging to make sense of the observation that although sadness is typically described as a negative emotion, in aesthetic contexts it is paradoxically associated with pleasurable experiences. To conclude, the authors consider the strengths and weakness of the whole neuroscientific approach to music in a way that goes beyond the reward-circuit model.

These chapters combine the so-called "cognitive turn" in research into the relationship between music, cognition and emotion and the more recent "affective turn," in which the focus shifted from musical cognition to affective musical phenomena. The cognitive approach sought answers to the question of why many people attach importance to their musical experiences in terms of cognitive functions such as perception and memory as well as attention and listener expectation. Moreover, the way in which the listener plays an active role in the creation of a musical experience that can be exhilarating, soothing and inspiring had become a focal point of studies in the field of music cognition. Underlying this approach is the idea that listening does not happen in the outer world of audible sound, but in the inner world of our minds and brains.

The challenges of the "affective turn" and the related new avenues of music research are discussed in Ariadne Loutrari and Marjorie Lorch's chapter. Their work looks at what we can learn from the parallels between the role of features such as pitch, loudness, duration and phrasing in the expression and perception of emotion in speech and music. Parallels between music and language (especially rhetoric) have been a recurring aspect of conceptions of music and emotion since Antiquity, as the historical chapters in this Companion reflect and in the past 20 years they have been a significant theme in neuroscience. Loutrari and Lorch argue for a focus on prosodic features of music ("expressiveness") in neuroscientific research into music and emotion, and for their position in discussions of various forms of cognitive impairment. In line with several other chapters, they also draw attention to the challenge of the tension between the attempt to construct empirically testable universals to explain music's emotional impact and the role of cultural context.

Beatriz Ilari's chapter engages with the debate on music, emotions and well-being by looking at musical engagement and well-being in the first 8 years of life. She argues that all young children need experiences of individual and collective well-being to establish a healthy self-image, and she examines the role that music can play in this. Her discussion uses the model set out by Roberts (2010) to assess the value of "musicking" in early years for four vital stages of identity formation: physical development, communication, identity and boundaries (i.e. social grouping) and agency (related to will and emotion), before outlining a number of studies to show how "musicking" affects these developments at different levels of social interaction (micro, meso, exo and macro). While the studies predominantly show that musicking is a useful tool for developing and maintaining a sense of well-being, she points to the problem that social conditioning has not been taken into account in the studies insofar as all of them mainly deal with people with WEIRD backgrounds (i.e. white, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic).

Jennie Henley's chapter investigates the claims made for music's power to achieve well-being by focusing on the relationship between music, emotion and learning. She challenges the view that the links between musical development and emotional development lie solely in the content of music learning. Her chapter critiques the notion that emotional development occurs as a result of engagement with emotional content embedded within music and suggests that it is not the type of music or musical activity that is learned; rather it is the manner in which music is learned that gives rise to emotional development. She examines the relationship between music and emotion in the context of music education. As she points out, the rationales for teaching music, from art-for-art's sake to ones based on its extra-musical benefits, often assume a powerful emotional impact, but this is rarely consciously acknowledged in music policy in education. Drawing on her work with the Good Vibrations music programme for hard-to-reach audiences, including people in prison, Henley considers the potential role of music in reflection and conflict resolution.

The final two chapters present questions related to the role of music and emotions among older people. Susan Hallam's chapter looks at the scientific research into the impact of music in the lives of the elderly, both those with full cognitive function and those with diminished powers. It argues that music can be equally important in maintaining and realising a sense of well-being in the ageing. Like several other chapters, notably Thormählen's, it looks specifically at the effect of acquiring skills in playing music, not just listening to it. In particular, it draws on studies relating to the British Music for Life project, looking at ways in which learning music was linked to well-being as it enhances the perception of autonomy and control, positive social relationships, competence and a feeling of accomplishment.

Mariko Hara and Tia De Nora's chapter also looks at older people's relationship to music. It offers an examination of the long-term benefits of music for Alzheimer's patients, not as a technology or a temporal stimulus "dose," but as something "ecological," embedded into social practice. Drawing on ethnographic techniques, they look at music as an activity, not a reified concept, opening up new methodological angles that could prove highly productive for the debate on music, emotions and well-being more broadly. They observe that although dementia is a long-term process, current literature on music in dementia care tends to focus on the immediate effects of music, in contrast to the authors' longitudinal ethnographic case study. By presenting this material the authors aim at making a case for ecological perspectives in order to highlight the ways in which music offers more sustained benefits.

Concluding Remarks

The beginning of the twenty-first century is an exciting time for research on music, mind and well-being. While human experiences are necessarily interdisciplinary and require multi-faceted and at times perhaps contradicting approaches, we are hopefully moving forward towards a more comprehensive dialogue between disciplines about music's relationship to the mind. However, rather than positing unified new knowledge or universal truths about the relationship of music, mind, emotion and well-being, we hope that this Companion inspires further historical and scientific investigation into music or musicking as everyday experiences, its ideological models, its ecologies and its modes of engagement and communication.

Placing historical, sociological, psychological and neurological approaches into a continuum, the chapters reveal many common strands: investigations into aesthetic experience, aesthetic attitude and their relationship to the mind, emotions and to ways of listening, questions of the relationship of mind and body and the concept of embodiment; questions around happiness, well-being and pleasure circuits; and questions of the way in which we have and continue to construct the relationship between music, mental states and healing on one hand and morality, education and self-improvement on the other. These intersections reveal that concepts of music and understandings of the self, of body, mind, emotion, perception and experience influence each other to form questions and approaches to the topic in which these ideas are inextricably linked and in which each one can be turned into the justification for the other. As such, philosophical and aesthetic approaches are not simply "useful" to medical or scientific explanations; rather, "humanist" and scientific models have to a large extent determined

each other. Historical hindsight, perhaps, can reveal this entanglement more clearly than contemporary studies can, by showing for instance both the impact of medical and scientific thinking on musical aesthetics since Antiquity, as well as highlighting the role of culturally and historically determined concepts and frameworks in scientific understandings of music.

Together, the chapters also demonstrate that while the interest in music in terms of feeling and mental states appears to be universal throughout Western history, music's power is far from universally applicable. While recent scientific approaches account for the cultural conditioning of music's effects in individual experiments, generalised notions of "music" and its parameters as internal attributes that make music stand in opposition to the individual and act upon her/him from the outside are still widespread. The stimulation model of music as object in psychological and neurological discussions remains strong. The emerging field of musical neuroaesthetics is particularly liable to this problem, sometimes seeming to portray music as acting on the individual in an automatic fashion, without much consideration of the role of the active listener. The idea of music as a practice is only slowly gaining momentum in the way that current research asks its questions and is methodologically conducted. The separation of studies that foreground agency and those that see the individual as a passive recipient is strong; the separation of subject and object is upheld and the ideology of the work concept, of moral education and the primary place of listening are latent in many studies into music's effects. This has allowed researchers and practitioners to reformulate music therapy and music-making as modes of intervention that mimic commonly accepted and practiced models of "clinical intervention" thereby upholding the concept of the medical intervention as the primary path towards healing.

Ultimately, this Companion was produced with the aim of revealing and questioning some of these ideologies in the belief that the development of approaches to mind and well-being can be furthered by continued cross-fertilisation between disciplines. We hope to encourage future researchers to consider the ideological frameworks that exist particularly around the question what music is and what a musical experience is. <>

EXCESSIVE SAINTS: GENDER, NARRATIVE, AND THEOLOGICAL INVENTION IN THOMAS OF CANTIMPRÉ'S MYSTICAL HAGIOGRAPHIES

by Rachel J. D. Smith [Gender, Theory, and Religion, Columbia University Press, 9780231188609]

For thirteenth-century preacher, exorcist, and hagiographer Thomas of Cantimpré, the Southern Low Countries were a harbinger of the New Jerusalem. The Holy Spirit, he believed, was manifesting itself in the lives of lay and religious people alike. Thomas avidly sought out these new kinds of saints, writing accounts of their lives so that these models of sanctity might astound, teach, and trouble the convictions of his day.
In **EXCESSIVE SAINTS**, Rachel J. D. Smith combines historical, literary, and theological approaches to offer a new interpretation of Thomas's hagiographies, showing how they employ vivid narrative portrayals of typically female bodies to perform theological work in a rhetorically specific way. Written in an era of great religious experimentation, Thomas's texts think with and through the bodies of particular figures: the narrative of the holy person's life becomes a site of theological invention in a variety of registers, particularly the devotional, the mystical, and the dogmatic. Smith examines how these texts represent the lives and bodies of holy women to render them desirable objects of devotion for readers and how Thomas passionately narrates these lives even as he works through his uncertainties about the opportunities and dangers that these emerging forms of holiness present. **EXCESSIVE SAINTS** is the first book to consider Thomas's narrative craft in relation to his theological projects, offering new visions for the study of theology, medieval Christianity, and medieval women's history.

CONTENTS

Hagiographical Theology—Making Holy Bodies from the Word

Sometime in 1250 or 1251, two Dominican friars, twenty-five years apart in age, sat together in a classroom at the new Dominican studium generale in Cologne under the tutelage of Albert the Great.' One, Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225-1274), became the representative of medieval theology in the popular imagination. The other, Thomas of Cantimpré (ca. 1200-1270), disappeared into comparable obscurity. Thomas Aquinas was a young man, just beginning his career. Thomas of Cantimpré was already passing middle age and was returning for further education after what had already been a long and busy life, which included a first profession as an Augustinian canon and a subsequent transition to the Dominican order in 1232. Thomas Aquinas emerged from these studies with an academic vocation that involved preaching and traveling but remained closely tied to the university, and he created his famous introductory textbook for budding theologians, the Summa Theologiae, which is composed of systematic treatises even as he was a writer of devotional hymns. Thomas of Cantimpré, after completing this course of study, returned to his homeland in the Southern Low Countries, and from the priory in Louvain, he traveled as the preacher general for Teutonia, moving primarily among aristocrats and town dwellers, visiting monasteries, acting as confessor and exorcist to the laity, and collecting stories of the holy and the possessed as well as relics—vials of undecomposed blood or a saintly finger—that provided proof of the divine presence he saw being poured out on the region in eschatological abundance. These stories, collected and treasured, like marvelous particulars gathered and displayed in cabinets of curiosities, were placed within an encyclopedia, an exempla collection, and five saints' Lives.

Both Thomases attempted to discover and articulate the relationship between divinity and humanity in order to understand the ways in which embodied human subjects receive and should interpret divine revelation through a careful negotiation between faith and reason. Both, in other words, undertook a theological project. Both were likewise university trained in the most cutting-edge Aristotelian philosophy of their day.

Their modes of discovery, ways of proceeding, and sources were, however, different. Thomas Aquinas's work is primarily—though not entirely—systematic and scholastic. He approached revelation using the categories of Aristotelian philosophy in order to formulate and answer questions of scripture and church authorities, using the protocols of validity to move through arguments in a linear progression. "Sacred teaching" (sacra doctrina), Thomas Aquinas determines in the first question of the first part of the Summa Theologiae, is scientia. As such, it is an organized body of knowledge that is teachable precisely because of its order. Its organizational structure is possible because of the internal consistency of the teaching, in which knowledge (scientia) is generated through syllogistic demonstration based on valid first principles: as the "most effective way to teach (docere) is to present doctrine as conclusions from first principles, sacra doctrina presents theological doctrine as true and certain, derived from articles of faith as first principles." Scientia, then, is that knowledge in which conclusions

flow necessarily from premises. Unlike opinion, scientia generates a knowledge of which one can be certain because it is founded on first principles; unlike faith, scientia is that to which reason assents following understanding.

As a pedagogical text teaching scientia, the Summa is a finely articulated body composed of distinctions that seek coherence, that aim to leave no element extraneously hanging. It does not meander or digress but, as John O'Malley argues, "churns along," impelled by the inexhaustible force of its quest for truth.' Thomas Aquinas's authoritative sources were scripture, the theological giants of the Christian past, and Aristotle.

Thomas of Cantimpré's work, in contrast, is hagiographical and documentary. It proceeds through the narration of contemporary lives. Thomas was a pastor who saw the people with whom he worked as primary theological sources. His authorities were not only scripture and the important figures of Christian theology or pagan philosophy but also the saintly people he encountered in his travels; revelation was found in these saintly lives, which, he believed, embodied and communicated Christ through their perfection. Thomas of Cantimpré begins, then, in the concrete particularity of certain persons who are brought to life by narrative. The uni¬versal claims he makes are tied back to these bodies and the stories that produce them. Whereas Scholastic discourse aims at an objectivity in which the speaker disappears "behind the subject," Thomas's hagiographical discourse foregrounds speakers and the bonds of love and desire, trust and doubt, that form their lives and, in turn, inform the ways in which others convey these to Thomas. What we see in him, then, is an academically trained Dominican who nevertheless foregoes systematicity in order to address some of the pressing theological issues of his day, crafting a devotional theology that addresses questions of faith and reason, the imitation of Christ, and theological representation through the figuration of beloved individuals who are offered to readers so that they might form relationships with them.

Thomas's work is profoundly formed by and embedded in the varieties of women's spiritual expression, which flourished in his context. He was a defender, documentarian, shaper, confessor, and devotee of many holy women. Of the five saints' Lives he wrote, four depicted women who lived their religious vocations in different modes (Marie d'Oignies as a Beguine, Margaret of Ypres as a Dominican tertiary, Lutgard of Aywières as a Cistercian nun, and Christina "the Astonishing," who was not affiliated with any institutional formation), and a fifth was based on a man (an Augustinian canon, Abbot John of Cantimpré). Thomas also wrote the Bonum universale de apibus (The common good as taught by bees), a lengthy exempla collection of short, extremely dramatic narratives depicting virtue and vice, which he gathered in the course of his travels throughout the Low Countries, and an encyclopedia, De natura rerum, which derives moral lessons from the natural world.

The primary assertion of this book is that Thomas of Cantimpré's hagiographical writings are sophisticated theological and literary documents. They represent a mode of medieval theology that is typically overlooked as such by theologians and medievalists. This is, then, in some ways, the story of a road not taken. As Barbara Newman notes, if you were to ask someone on the street today what they think of when they hear "medieval theology," the immediate response would probably be a caricature of Scholasticism: "How many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" The complexity and texture of medieval theological discourse, which contains distinct but overlapping forms, including monastic, mystical, Scholastic, pastoral, imaginative, and vernacular theologies, has been eclipsed in the contemporary imagination by a dominant model of systematicity and disembodied academic speculation in which complex arguments are made to answer seemingly inane questions about angelology. As Pierre Hadot and, more recently, Jean-Yves Lacoste argue, however, throughout antiquity and much of the Middle Ages, both philosophy and theology were as much ways of life as they were modes of knowledge and discursive formations. These "ways of life" were, in turn, bound to particular organizational structures that formed and made possible different modes of living and thinking. There is, in other words, no speculative project in this context that can be absolutely detached from the embodied lives of the persons who practiced it, a fact that hagiography makes clear both in its very form, as the stories of particular persons, and in its pursuit of its readers' devotional responses. These hagiographies both represent and seek to reproduce ways of life and modes of thought.

If the theological import of hagiography is considered, it is typically placed under the rubric of pastoral theology, understood as that which attempts to teach the most basic principles of Christian life to a broad audience; in other words, it is seen as a subsidiary application of theology to practical circumstances. Such an understanding of hagiography owes much to Gregory of Tours's (ca. 538-593) famous assertion regarding the purpose of saints' Lives in the preface to his Liber vitae Patrum. There he argues that despite differences of merit and virtue, the Lives of the saints should properly be understood as the "Life of the saint," for they all partake of the singular illuminative power of Christ. Vitae are meant to "build up the church" (aedificare), stirring listeners to emulate (profectum) the lives that are there represented. A saint's life is an exemplary manifestation of the singular light of Christ among humans, and this manifestation is represented textually in order to edify readers—citizens of the church—and offer up the figures of the saints for imitation. Gregory's definition was repeated by the Bollandist Hippolyte Delehaye, who, in a work that became highly influential for modern studies of saints' Lives, defined hagiography as works that seek to "edify" through "exemplarity."

Although Delehaye's definition can be usefully applied to many vitae, thereby suitably situating them in a pastoral context, it is not as simple a proposition as it might seem to edify or offer a figure for imitation. Thomas's hagiographical corpus reveals notions of edification and imitation being tested and made strange within the works of a single author. Furthermore, Thomas's corpus elevates varied, often-incompatible forms of exemplary life. It is thus not possible to reduce hagiography and its theological content to the singular aim of presenting exemplary figures for imitation without attending to the tensions, difficulties, and sheer variety that are found within particular vitae and between them. Nor is it possible to ignore the ways in which, in particular Lives, we sometimes find that the text undermines its own solicitation of a reader's devotion to a figure in order to edify or inspire imitation. These works thus show that edification and imitation are as much the work of the reader, who is required to interpret the meaning and discern the status of a Life. Thomas understood exemplarity to be a function of devotion—of right relation to the saint—and that relationship occurs through the complex mediations of the text, the Life that makes present the life of the holy person, and if read correctly, that life will become present again in the reader's own.

Delehaye notes the imbrication of narrative and theology in the interpretation of saints' Lives when he contends that because of their writers' attempts to conform the saint to the Christic archetype, hagiographies tend to be repetitive, reproducing paradigmatic actions and lifting whole passages from one Life into another, thereby enacting Gregory's theological claim that vitae should be understood not in the plural but in the singular. The textual form of saints' Lives, according to Delehaye, relies upon the repetition of types in an attempt to manifest a transcendent reality that seeks to escape from the particularities of history. In this view, vitae are not regarded as documents of discovery or invention (indeed, discovery or invention would undermine their very import as hagiography according to this view) and thus are not sites that require arduous interpretation, for they do not produce new knowledge. Such a lack of theological and literary creativity renders hagiography, in Delehaye's assessment, "monochromatic."

This book argues, in contrast, that Thomas of Cantimpré's hagiographies are not monochromatic but rather sites of theological work that are filled with debate and experimentation. It considers how they seek to edify and offer figures for emulation; it argues that these works are theological documents that perform their theologizing in a rhetorically specific way, namely through the narration of contemporary—and, most often, female—lives. Moreover, they explicitly represent themselves as works of interpretation and call for the interpretive engagement of the reader. To paraphrase Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, who argues that in medieval texts of various genres, the body is a site of "unraveling and invention," this book argues that Thomas's hagiographical texts think with and through the bodies and deeds of particular figures, which are placed within their historical contexts and written for historically contextualized audiences. The narrative of the holy person's life becomes, in these works, a site of theological invention and unraveling. The form of this theological discourse, in other words, is inseparable from its content.

HENRI DE LUBAC AND THE SHIFTING APPROACH TOWARD THE SIGN IN MEDIEVAL THEOLOGY

In his now-classic study of the Eucharist in the Middle Ages, Corpus Mysticum (which de Certeau considered his essay "A New Science" in The Mystic Fable vol. I to be the sequel to), Henri de Lubac lays out a narrative of the shifting approach toward signs and the understanding of what constitutes faith. He argues that by the thirteenth century, Scholasticism had advanced an epistemology that was fundamentally different from that which dominated theology before the eleventh century. He tracks the dissolution of the "incurably ambiguous" Augustinian notion of the relationship between faith and understanding and the way that changing theories of the sign reflected this dissolution.

In the Augustinian model, de Lubac notes, revealed truths of faith are mysteries, but their mysterious nature incites a twofold response. On the one hand, revealed signs are marked by an obscurity that confounds the understanding of knowledge attained through the senses. On the other hand, this obscurity is a lure that prompts questions and arouses the desire of the intellect to understand, to seek beneath and beyond the obscurity of the sign. Thus, the more mysterious a sign, the more reason is elicited and engaged. There is an interplay of seen and unseen, opacity and clarity.

De Lubac argues that at the end of the eleventh century, this Augustinian view broke down. For de Lubac, Anselm was the pivot, for he was inspired by an Augustinian impulse, viewing reason as led by divine light. However, de Lubac argues, Anselm advanced new "emphases" in theology, and these emphases ultimately led to a new notion of understanding, for with Anselm, it "takes the form of a demonstration"; providing objective proofs of and for mysteries becomes necessary to theological knowledge. The "mystical" and intellectual interplay of Augustine's illuminationism here begins to polarize, resulting, on the one hand, in a notion of understanding based on rational demonstration and, on the other hand, a faith that stands in contradistinction to reason, a "simple" faith that does not attempt to probe obscure mysteries or undertake suspect speculation. The anagogic tension of contemplative understanding, in which faith moves into comprehension by virtue of its engagement with "mystery" that eludes it and draws it after itself, is eventually replaced with a belief in propositional content. Such understanding through demonstration was placed in the service of apologetics, and "the end being pursued was no longer dogmatic or contemplative, but purely apologetic.... The giving of reasons had taken the place of the discerning with the mind."

De Lubac's distinction between the contemplative and demonstrative approaches to signs is helpful for teasing out tensions within Thomas's work. However, attention to Thomas's hagiographical corpus also troubles de Lubac's historical narrative, for it shows that the antipodes of what de Lubac describes as an epistemic polarity could coexist, as it does in Thomas in the later thirteenth century. Thomas's hagiographical theologizing should be situated at a moment of increasing rationalization in which the urge to demonstrate and prove the claims of faith was ascendant. He wrote his stories during the course of his profound formation in Scholastic modes of thought and argument, the natural science of his day, and his engagement with the ecclesiastical, social, and theological questions of his time. His mode of demonstration was the bodily proof of saintly signs. However, at the same time that Thomas appeals to the vivid display of the body and deeds of his figures, he offers a profoundly Augustinian model of reading, interpretation, and signification as an alternative. His work is perched between contemplative and demonstrative approaches to theological questions. The hagiographical mode of Thomas's theology thus enables him to wrestle with the profound and, in his time, unresolved theological issue of the status of signs and the correct mode of reading them.

DEMONSTRATION, THE UNIVERSITY, AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF THEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE

Thus, despite the shift in theological discourse toward demonstration and apologetics and away from earlier contemplative models, as de Lubac describes, it is important to note that medieval theology remained complex, and it is this complexity that someone like Thomas of Cantimpré demonstrates well. The contemplative and

literary form of monastic theology, whose approach to the page was the meditative and allusive reading of lectio divina, continued; vernacular theology among women and men, laity and clerics, flourished in the thirteenth century; and Scholastic theology, even as it continued to develop from its Anselmian roots into a discourse marked by highly technical Aristotelian vocabulary and the combative techniques of dialectic and disputation, cannot be caricatured as the sport of bloodless syllogists. Mark Jordan argues that in the tertia pars of the Summa, Thomas Aquinas retells Christ's life as exemplary—the highest hagiography. The moral teaching of the Summa is completed as Christ's life is manifest in the sacraments. Each Eucharistic celebration becomes a "scene of moral instruction" that the Summa's teaching reflects. The Summa, like Thomas of Cantimpré's vitae, is a pedagogy of the incarnation, leading readers ultimately to the Eucharistic table, not only to the realms of metaphysical abstraction. Like Anselm, Thomas Aquinas wrote devotional poetry and understood the life of prayer to be intimately bound up with his work of uniting reason and revelation. In other words, the classroom was not as distant from the pulpit or the cloister, and Scholastic, pastoral, and devotional theology were not as separate, nor were they understood to be antagonists, as has been sometimes argued. As Bernard McGinn notes, "All forms of medieval theology tried to be true to two goals—deepening the understanding of faith (intellectus fidei) and enkindling charity (experientia caritatis)."

However, Scholastic theology, written in the privileged language of Latin, which was reserved for clerical men who acquired a technical vocabulary through extensive university training, was set apart, and theology became increasingly professionalized. The ultimate result of this trajectory was the defining of theology in profoundly limited terms, a definition that was retrospectively applied to medieval sources by later figures. By the early modern period, the sense that theology had been taken over by specialized language and techniques can be seen in polemics against Scholasticism by Erasmus and Martin Luther. For Luther, Aristotelian assumptions were incompatible with Christian doctrine. For Erasmus, they were were affectively powerless, caught up in a world of jargon and debates that were disconnected from real, everyday life and the concerns that human beings have about how to live. For both Luther and Erasmus, Aristotelianism was a colonizing force in theological discourse, requiring readers to approach scripture inappropriately, disputing and covering over holy writ with philosophical categories rather than listening to and meditating upon its words.

De Certeau notes that theologians had long considered the multiplicity of theological modes according to a hierarchical gradation that, although it predicated distinction and rank, saw the modes as fundamentally united in a continuum. Theological discourses in this view are "diverse modal forms" that "remain accidental and quasi-`adjectival' in relation to the One Principle that innerves them, correlates them, and manifests itself in them."52 However, with the specialization of society in the late Middle Ages, knowledge, too, was transformed. The "distinct spaces" of society lead to a conception of the distinct regions of knowledge, and "knowledge ... henceforth consist[s] of regions whose differences are insurmountable and whose methods are specific to each region." No longer a hierarchized continuum with overlapping elements, the new geography of knowledge is that of discrete islands.

THOMAS OF CANTIMPRÉ'S HAGIOGRAPHICAL THEOLOGY

In arguing that Thomas's hagiographies are a mode of medieval theology, I am not advancing a claim that would be at all surprising to medieval persons. However, hagiography as a theological genre was obscured because of the identification of medieval theological discourse with Scholasticism, first in the early modern period and then in the nineteenth century when Pope Leo declared Thomistic "philosophy," and Scholasticism more generally, the best remedy for rescuing Christian thought from secular influence in the encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879). The argument of this book, then, is part of the emerging convergence of conversations that attempt to complicate what we mean when we use the word theology in terms of its methods, aims, addressees, and content.

When hagiography is treated theologically, as I have noted, it is usually located within the framework of pastoral theology. However, when we ask how someone like Thomas teaches—when we consider the unique

features of theologizing in a hagiographical mode—the notion of pastoral theology becomes too thin a construct. We need to either expand our notion of the pastoral beyond the teaching of basic doctrine and practice or supplement it with other theological forms. There are epistemological and methodological questions that arise when teaching occurs by means of narrating the stories of particular lives that need to be addressed. Thomas's hagiographical corpus is a powerful witness to the ways in which theological modes overlap and require each other. Unpacking the implications of theologizing through the vivid depiction of contemporary, often-female bodies and deeds, particularly the implications such an approach has for the reader who seeks to "take up" the saint as a model for life or as a source of doctrinal claims, is the work of the chapters.

The primary attention in these chapters is given to those vitae that are marked by what Roisin termed "mystical" features—the Lives of Lutgard and Christina—but there is extensive comparison with the Lives of Marie, Margaret, and John in the body of the text. The reason for this focus is that in the Lives of Lutgard and Christina, the tension and relationship between the devotional and the demonstrative use of signs is most finely knit. The important exception to this treatment of the hagiographical corpus is chapter 6, which is a study of what Henri Platelle terms Thomas's "Jewish dossier," a section from his final work, the exempla collection Bonum universale de apibus. This departure is important, however, for it demonstrates the way in which the theology of the sign developed by Thomas is not only gendered but is also a development in a long-standing anti-Jewish discourse by Christian theologians.

After contextualizing Thomas's life and works within the political and social forces of his day, chapter 2 will turn to the second of Thomas's Lives, the Life of Christina the Astonishing, which demonstrates the imbrication of Thomas's interrogation of the limits and possibilities of saintly signs and devotional theology. A key problem Thomas faces when soliciting the reader's belief and love is the astonishing and, in Christina's case, horrifying nature of the saint. Christina's Life exemplifies the vicissitudes of appealing to the vivid figure as the undeniable foundation of belief. Thomas portrays the saint performing such incredible feats of bodily mortification that, in her imitation of Christ, she becomes indistinguishable from a demoniac to those around her. On the one hand, the terrifying aspect of the saintly figure is meant to convince readers of the terrors of purgatory, which Christina's deeds embody. However, by attempting to inspire horror (or a horrified devotion) in readers by writing a Life that deforms hagiographical conventions, Thomas risks the rejection of his saintly exemplar, flight from her and her message rather than assent to it. In addition to the possible failure to teach lessons about purgatory, the representation of the saint as the imitator of Christ is also called into question. Christina is represented as inimitable, her sanctity pointing to divinity in its ineffable aspect. The vita thus portrays a break in the mimetic chain of Christian sanctity, raising the question of what it is to imitate the singular witness of Christ's incarnate example, of how the saint is saved by, participates in, and repeats the divine witness. Inimitability probes the possibilities and limits of exemplary repetition; this is, then, one way that Thomas renders a vita apophatic.

Chapter 3 compares the representation of saintly exemplarity in Thomas's earliest vitae, those of Christina and John of Cantimpré. These representations are profoundly gendered. In the case of John, exemplarity is figured as a type of successful repetition, for the exemplar disappears within his vita, absorbed into figures who displace him despite being inspired by him. This effacement is the mark of his successful imitation of Christ's humility and contrasts with Christina's imitation, which is represented as singular and monstrous. Exemplary imitability and inimitability is thus shown to be a gendered difference, for the inimitability of the female saint functions as a fence to limit the reach of her transgressive life. Moreover, the divergent representations of the two saints carry different implications for the devotional lives of readers.

Chapter 4 continues the question raised in chapter 3, asking how Thomas, in Stephen Justice's words, "bares the devices of faith," but here it is considered in relation to the Life of Lutgard of Aywières and the Supplement to the Life of Marie d'Oignies. It demonstrates the ways in which Thomas draws on multiple discourses—including the contemplative, juridical, scriptural, and autobiographical—to persuade readers to believe his stories. The chapter argues that the most telling distinction between and within these two Lives is that of a corrosive

hermeneutic—in which the reader seeks proof in a juridical sense, weighing evidence and placing the text on trial, so to speak—and an Augustinian hermeneutic in which the reader contemplates the text, treating it as an object of devotion through which the reader is affectively transformed. These hermeneutics and the epistemologies on which they rest are both suggested by Thomas as possible, though potentially incompatible, approaches within single works.

Chapter 5 considers more deeply the devotional theology of Lutgard's Life. It shows how Thomas thematizes the interchangeability of the saint's beloved body and vita in the Life. Thomas explains that he wrote Lutgard's Life in exchange for possession of her finger after her death. The text—a careful depiction of her body, deeds, ecstasies, visions, and words—and the relic become figures for each other; both are remains of the saintly body, sites and sources of love, and an encounter with the saint as well as a locus for her holy power. The reader, in turn, believes the story there narrated and is morally transformed, not solely through an act of cognition, but by "putting on" the saint's body through practices of devotional reading. Thomas offers a complex treatment of Lutgard's reading of scripture as one that conforms her to the bride from the Song of Songs, making Lutgard an exemplar of how to read hagiography devotionally. Belief and understanding are possible, in this model, only through assimilation to the text. As the saint imitates scriptural models, so the reader of hagiography is to imitate the saint.

Chapter 6 examines the ways in which it is not only the reading but the writing of hagiography that is, for Thomas, a devotional act. Hagiographical writing here does not merely describe an object or articulate a theological position but is a means of undertaking a spiritual practice that incites and consummates Thomas's desire for a holy person and thereby performs his theology of sanctity and sanctification. This chapter shows how Thomas's devotional practice as a writer proceeds not only by way of the vivid figuration of a particular beloved but through its apophatic effacement. Following Roisin, I show that Thomas deploys rhetorical strategies drawn from mystical theology in order to describe those person whose primary vocation is the attainment of union with a God who defies the delimitations of language, thereby becoming unnameable herself. The writing of such a saint's vita must defeat the descriptive and taxonomic capacity of the hagiographer's language. This failure in Lutgard's Life does not, however, only mark the weakness of language; rather, it is a purposeful failure that implicates Thomas, the writer, in the text, becoming a central strategy for his own act of imitation of and relation to Lutgard. It is, in other words, a feature of the devotional performativity of Thomas's rhetoric, for Thomas's linguistic humiliation enables his own experience of ecstatic rapture by observing and composing Lutgard's ecstasy in his writing. Lutgard has a vision of God while the hagiographer has a vision of Lutgard. This devotional context is, then, inescapably gendered.

Chapter 7 looks beyond Thomas's vitae proper to his use of exempla in his final work, the Bonum universale de apibus. The chapter examines the theorization of the inventional power of the exemplary sign to find and persuade theological themes and so inspire devout faith, even as it demonstrates the limits of such a strategy in some key exempla. The semiotics of exemplary proof in the De apibus is, for the most part, simple: the outer, material reality signifies and manifests the abstract, inner, or immaterial reality, proving, through corporealization, the existence of an immaterial reality, and the belief that follows in the wake of such proof unites the devout with God.

However, there is a fundamental problematization of persuasion by means of external proofs, and therefore a question arises of the power of lsuch bodily proof to inspire devotion when Thomas addresses Mary's virginity, in which the pregnant body speaks of one thing but signifies another. Thomas addresses the question of Mary's virginity in that part of the text that has been called his "Jewish dossier," thereby linking the problematics of proof and doubt, the inner and the outer, the visible sign and the invisible divine truth, with his notorious representation of the Jews and Jewish unbelief. It becomes clear here that the understanding of signs as external, corporeal evidence for internal, spiritual claims is one that has been crucial to the articulation of Christian difference from Judaism since its inception and remains operative in Thomas's understanding of saintly signs. The chapter argues that Thomas understands the externality of exemplary signs to be licit and useful if

these signs are capable of spiritualization, able to transcend their carnal particularity. This convertability is represented by his portrayal of a Jewess, Sarah, in one exemplum, while her husband represents the danger of visible signs to remain recalcitrantly carnal and unconverted.

Thomas's hagiographical signs function as evidence for propositions of faith (not least the proposition that the person depicted is, in fact, holy) and serve an apologetic purpose. However, this probative use is in no way exhaustive of the purpose, meaning, or effect of such signs, nor are the beliefs that are taught in Thomas's vitae solely "simple" ones, assented to under pressure of clerical fiat. Rather, they are represented as contemplative engagements with others whose motive force is devotion.

The theological foundation of such devotion is the assumption underlying all Thomas's vitae that the persons he represents are founded on Christ's incarnate example, which was rendered as word in scripture. The vitae and exempla are, in turn, textualizations of saintly figures. These hagiographies are, then, an imitation of the scriptural text and so require a hermeneutics proper to reading them. The saintly body of hagiography becomes, Thomas hopes, through writing and a certain kind of contemplative reading, a sacrament enabling the reader to participate in the divine life. <>

THE VARIETIES OF NONRELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: ATHEISM IN AMERICAN CULTURE by Jerome P. Baggett [Secular Studies, NYU Press, 9781479874200]

A fascinating exploration of the breadth of social, emotional, and spiritual experiences of atheists in America

Self-identified atheists make up roughly 5 percent of the American religious landscape, comprising a larger population than Jehovah's Witnesses, Orthodox Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus combined. In spite of their relatively significant presence in society, atheists are one of the most stigmatized groups in the United States, frequently portrayed as immoral, unhappy, or even outright angry. Yet we know very little about what their lives are actually like as they live among their largely religious, and sometimes hostile, fellow citizens.

In this book, Jerome P. Baggett listens to what atheists have to say about their own lives and viewpoints. Drawing on questionnaires and interviews with more than five hundred American atheists scattered across the country, **THE VARIETIES OF NONRELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE** uncovers what they think about morality, what gives meaning to their lives, how they feel about religious people, and what they think and know about religion itself.

Though the wider public routinely understands atheists in negative terms, as people who do not believe in God, Baggett pushes readers to view them in a different light. Rather than simply rejecting God and religion, atheists actually embrace something much more substantive—lives marked by greater integrity, open-mindedness, and progress.

Beyond just talking about or to American atheists, the time is overdue to let them speak for themselves. This book is a must-read for anyone interested in joining the conversation.

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Excerpt: Several years ago I designed and then taught for the very first time a new graduate-level course titled "The 'New Atheism' in American Culture." At the risk of seeming immodest, I must say that it was a terrific course. We read material on secularization and religious change, historical accounts of irreligious notables and movements, and a number of more polemical works by both forthrightly atheist authors and their unimpressed critics. Who could ask for more? The students, I am happy to report (again, with apt modesty), also appreciated the course, and, all things considered, it turned out to be quite the academic success that semester.

But there was this one sticking point. Especially upon discussing some of the recently published books by best-selling atheist polemicists, many of my students divulged that they did not see their own experience reflected in these works. I had expected to hear this from the majority of these students who considered themselves to be religious, some of whom were actually preparing for careers in ministry of one sort or another. And sure enough, at times many of them did get pretty flummoxed by what they took to be wildly off-the-mark depictions. They were not scriptural literalists, they pointed out. Indeed many were, or were in the process of becoming, very sophisticated in the critical interpretation of religious (and other) texts. They also insisted that they were not irrational or in any way anti-science, a response made most vociferously by one of my master of divinity students who also happened to have previously earned a doctorate in molecular biology. Nor, they seemed to guffaw in unison, did they think their religious beliefs should be imposed upon other citizens or that the crucial "wall of separation" between church and state should be allowed to falter in any way. Nor did they condone any form of religiously inspired violence. Nor were they blind to the multitude of perfectly legitimate religions other than their own. Nor could they somehow not tell the difference between what people generally consider to be knowledge and, alternatively, what believers hold to as matters of faith. Nor could ... well, you get the idea. Let's just say that this admittedly small sample of well-educated, self-consciously religious graduate students did not recognize themselves within the pages of these anti-religion best sellers.

Far less expected, though, was that the two self-described atheists in the class also did not recognize themselves with respect to the attitudes and overall tone displayed by their fellow-atheist authors of these books. They sometimes grimaced when, rather than accurately writing about people of faith, these authors seemed content to smugly write them off for being, as suggested above, uniformly fundamentalist, anti-science, theocratic, violent, and judgmental people of dogmatic proclivities. In contrast, neither of these two students was particularly exercised about religion as a phenomenon, nor did they care much about what religious, or secular, people believed, just as long as they behaved in ways that did not harm others. Given their own perduring uncertainties related to befuddling questions about human existence and meaning, they were also not quick to reproach religious people for arriving at whatever answers seemed most credible to them. In short, they felt that these authors represented a more religion-fixated and religion-bashing, tip-of-the-iceberg subset of atheists instead of the less visible, significantly larger mass of American atheists among whom they included themselves. One of these students, Steven (whose name, like the names of all respondents introduced in this book, is a pseudonym) was especially irritated by the cocksure militancy of one of these writers. He learned a good deal and, he took pains to mention, considered this author's voice to be an important one to hear within a

class on atheism in the United States. Yet, Steven asked, referencing his own as well as certain friends' and family members' decidedly less polemical experience of leading lives that just happened not to include believing in God, "Where the hell's everybody else?"

That was a good question. Since, as I could tell from the look on Steven's face, it was also a nonrhetorical one, I explained to him that the atheist "everybody else" would get heard from later in the course when we addressed sociological studies of nonreligious Americans. As it turned out, while valuable, these studies were mostly survey based and thus did not give everyday atheists the full hearing that Steven and other students wanted. More in-depth, qualitative works would be published after that first year I taught this class—and incorporated into the course syllabus thereafter—but they are only a start. The truth is that, from about the very moment he posed it, Steven's question gnawed at me.

Eventually deciding to address it head on, I began to do what any good sociologist does: I went to where I thought "everybody else" was. I started showing up at various atheist "meet-ups"—especially those of the pub-based, "Beer Not God" variety—sponsored by atheist organizations throughout the San Francisco Bay Area, where I live. I also went to more than a few atheism-related lectures, usually sponsored by these same organizations or packaged together for such special events as the SkeptiCal conference I attended in Berkeley or the annual Freethought Day I checked out in Sacramento. I listened, I took notes, I chatted with people, I drank beer. It was all very interesting, and I discovered much about a subculture that had been largely unknown to me. Yet, a particularly important insight came to me during a long day at the Atheist Film Festival held in San Francisco's iconic Roxie Theater. I watched six of the seven films shown that day (missing only the one about the life and work of Charles Darwin) and, between screenings, mingled among the approximately 120 people in attendance. Then it occurred to me: even after just a few months of doing this firsthand research, I knew by name, by reputation, or just by face nearly half of them. This "it's a small world, after all" feeling was only reinforced later on when I realized that several of the people who appeared in the festival's showing of Hug an Atheist, a documentary film aimed at dispelling myths about nonbelievers, were also in attendance. That's when Steven's question truly became my question. I definitely enjoyed exploring this milieu of dyed-in-the-wool atheists for whom disbelief in God and often the denigrating of religion are core to their identities. Nevertheless, I found myself asking, a bit more intently this time, "Where the hell's everybody else?"

So, at that juncture, I did what all somewhat pigheaded sociologists do: I expanded the scope of my study. I spent a day visiting the Center for Inquiry in Los Angeles and, later that evening, was allowed to sit in on a secular AA meeting held on the premises. I attended the three-day, fiftieth-anniversary conference of American Atheists in Austin, Texas. I even hung out for a couple of days at the Northern California chapter of Camp Quest, a secular summer camp for kids. From all this, my next real insight came not from doing participant observation at these institutions and events, all of which I considered to be fascinating. Instead, it emerged from casual conversations with some of my atheist friends who, on those occasions when I happened to recount some of what I saw and heard, seemed much less enthralled than I was expecting. What's going on? I asked myself. Were they distracted? Was I not the relentlessly intriguing raconteur I had always imagined myself to be?

The answer came one evening when I was about to drive to San Jose to experience my very first Sunday Assembly gathering. Sometimes known as the "atheist church," on its website it prefers to call itself a "secular congregation that celebrates life" and aims to help people, as stated in its mission, to "live better, help often and wonder more" I was all in. Anyone would be into checking this out, I thought—until I asked Daniel, a longtime friend (and neighbor) and appreciably longer-time atheist, if he would like to join me. "No thanks, man," he shot back before I finished inviting him and informing him that I would even pay for dinner. "I moved past all that a long time ago" I proceeded to tell him how Sunday Assembly was initially organized by two British comedians, that it was supposedly very intellectual and fun, and that it would be a good place to hang out for a while with like-minded people. Nothing. He was having none of it. Finally, just as I was about to play the free dinner card again, he interrupted me. "Nope," he said, and then repeated with a distinct emphasis, "I moved past all that a long time ago."

That's when I got it. Daniel was actually where "everybody else" is. Beyond simply belief in God, he also moved past whatever desire he may have once had to associate with fellow nonbelievers. Past the need to participate in any organized retort to religious ritual. Past the urge to consolidate and label his worldview. Past thinking of atheism as the defining feature of his identity or as some kind of lifelong job description. Now past all of this, Daniel was coming from a place that, while densely occupied by American atheists, is very seldom heard from within both public conversations and the pages of books written by and pertaining to nonbelievers.

But I wanted, as they say, to "go there," to listen to what people like Daniel—who months later actually became my very first interviewee for this project—had to say, and then share what I would hear with readers. So, consider this book a majority report, not a minority report. It pays attention to lots of voices from the rank-and-file center, not just from the film-festival-attendee margins. Rather than recapitulating arguments first articulated by best-selling "somebodies" of the atheist firmament, it attempts to capture the workaday cacophony of commonly drownedout viewpoints that could well be described by the phrase, which James Joyce waggishly used in Finnegans Wake to describe Catholicism, "here comes everybody."

As readers will see in the final section of chapter 1, I operationalize "everybody" as the 518 respondents for this study. That's a lot. It includes people who have been sometimes profoundly influenced by such atheism-related books as the ones we read in my class years ago. It also includes people who, to varying extents, are likely to attend events like the Atheist Film Festival, participate in such initiatives as Skeptical and Freethought Day, and count themselves among the members of local atheist organizations or communities like Sunday Assembly. Important to emphasize, it also includes the majority of American atheists, people like Steven and Daniel, who rarely or, more likely, never attend, participate in, or consider themselves members of any manifestation of public atheism.

With so many people taking part in this study, presenting what I have discovered obviously requires some organization and selectivity. Hence, in part I, "Getting the Lay of the Land," I begin in the first chapter by clearing away six commonplace presuppositions about atheism and American atheists, and then introduce the sociological methods used for this study. Next, I present in chapter 2 the ways in which respondents describe what it felt like for them to first identify as atheists and then, in chapter 3, how they do the ongoing work of maintaining their atheist identities by situating themselves within an "imagined community" of fellow nonbelievers.

In part 2, I start "Digging a Bit Deeper" by showing that four distinctive roots of atheist thinking (introduced in chapter 1), even though they reach back two and a half millennia to ancient Athens, continue to inflect atheist discourse presently. Not different types of atheism, these roots instead represent styles of atheist thinking that have long histories and also go a long way toward assuring atheists today that their identities, though often deprecated within the broader society, are actually legitimate and worthwhile. As we will see in chapter 4, atheists rely upon the empirical root in framing religion as the antithesis of science and, at the same time, using the language of personal meaning and sometimes even of spirituality to stand clear of scientism. The epitome of this root is the so-called science versus religion "conflict myth," which functions to naturalize three sets of oppositional categories that respondents deploy in order to highlight and hone key dispositions they claim to be features of their identities as atheists. For instance, especially when they specifically address the topic of religion, they rely upon the critical root to accentuate their rejection of religion's comforts in preference to what they experience as their own lives of greater integrity. I focus on this topic in chapter 5. Then, in the following chapter, I show how respondents draw upon the agnostic root when attending to certain "big questions" and perennial matters of faith and, in doing so, privilege their own openness over the purported closed-mindedness of believers. Finally, in chapter 7, I explain how, when the issue of morality is raised in conversation, atheists typically display the discursive style of the immanent root in demonstrating that, compared to the regressive nature of religion-based moralities, their more this-worldly ethical sensibilities are both superior and far more precipitous of societal progress.

In the process of my getting the lay of the land and then digging deeper, I happened upon some intriguing nuggets scattered about, some key themes I consider well worth the trouble of excavating. The first has to do with variety. In their important book American Secularism: Cultural Contours of Nonreligious Belief Systems, sociologists Joseph Baker and Buster Smith situate atheists among a broader swath of secular Americans, which also includes agnostics, nonaffiliated believers, and the nonpracticing "culturally" religious. My work contributes to this conversation by complementing Baker and Smith's wider gaze with one that explores the variations within that subset of secular Americans who identify as atheists. Second, while only a minority of the 518 people I spoke with are members of atheism-related organizations or small groups, in one way or another, nearly all of them draw symbolic boundaries between themselves and religious believers, and thus participate in an "imagined community" of the putatively like-minded. A third nugget is the salience of nonbelief's affective dimension. Whereas atheists are generally known for their critical thinking and intellectualism—leaving many observers to focus on the cognitive dimension—I argue that feelings are essential to many atheists insofar as they provide a kind of affective confirmation that they are living authentic, meaningful lives and are indeed part of the aforementioned imagined community of others endeavoring to the same. Fourth, as Steven, my former student, already knew, nonbelievers often voraciously read about, learn from, and find support for their own perspectives within the works of popular atheist authors. But that does not mean they parrot them. In fact, as we will see, their views are significantly less prone toward scientism and, in some ways, far more nuanced in their assessment of religion than what appears within the pages of best-selling books. The final and perhaps most important nugget concerns the revalorization of atheism itself. Here I mean something more than moving from a stigmatizing perception of atheists—which, after all, is based upon erroneous stereotypes—to a more accurate one. This, too, is essential. Yet, beyond even that, I also mean moving from envisioning atheism in terms of a rejection (abandoning religion) or a negation (not believing) or an absence (without faith) to seeing it in more positive terms—as an active and affirmative embrace of convictions and dispositions that are, to use sociologist Lois Lee's preferred term, quite "substantial" in their own right.' As much as the arcs of their lives have taken them from belief, as we will see in the chapters ahead, they have also directed these 518 respondents toward new, wholly desirable ways of being in the world that deserve to be approached in an equally new, interpretively capacious manner.

People often say lots of uninformed, untrue, and oftentimes quite unsavory things about atheists. And it has only been recently that the voices of atheist writers, bloggers, organizers, celebrities, and other public figures have added important rejoinders that have been heard by more and more of their fellow citizens. Now, lest those voices come to be thought of as expressing the totality of what is on nonbelievers' minds, it is time for "everybody else" to also chime in and be heard. This book is intended to facilitate that process.

While working on it, I was sometimes struck by the irony of a sociologist writing about nonbelief being so thoroughly inspired by a nonsociologist's expressed belief. But so be it. In his own preface to the now classic **THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE** (1902), the great American psychologist and philosopher William James informs his readers of his guiding "belief that a large acquaintance with particulars often makes us wiser than the possession of abstract formulas."' I could not agree more. So, in the pages ahead, I aim to introduce readers not to some abstract, formulaic thing called "atheism" but instead to as many particular, fleshand-blood people as possible—in all their varieties—in order to provide a granular sense of what they think and how they go about living both without God and very much with a purposefulness of their own design. If, in making their acquaintance, readers consider themselves the wiser for it, then I will consider this work, while perhaps not destined to be a classic, to at least have been worth the effort to write.

THE VARIETIES OF NONRELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE Interview Schedule (E-mail Version)

Thanks for taking time to respond to these questions. Note that there are no "correct" answers we are looking for and your responses to this questionnaire will be kept strictly confidential. Also, please feel free to provide as much information as you would like. In other words, we encourage you to provide specific examples in your responses, recount stories from your past, and go into as much detail as necessary to give us a thorough

understanding of your experience. We are more than happy to read all of this because we want to provide the most detailed and most balanced snapshot of American atheists that we possibly can. Thanks again for helping us to do this.

BACKGROUND QUESTIONS:

1. Were you raised atheist or did you have a religious upbringing of some sort? In other words, to what degree (if any) was religion or atheism part of your family life while growing up?
2. If raised religious—When and why did you become an atheist? What was this transition from religion like for you, for your family, for your friends, etc.? Was this a quick transition or a slow one? Was it easy for you or difficult?
3. If raised nonreligious—Have you ever been drawn to religion at any point in your life? Why or why not?

THINKING ABOUT ATHEISM:

1. Do you identify yourself as an atheist? If so, what does being an atheist mean to you? And, if so, how is your life now different from before you began identifying as an atheist?
2. Why do you think most people in the United States say they believe in God, practice some form of religion, and do not identify themselves as atheists?
3. Do most people who know you—family, friends, co-workers, etc.—also know that you're an atheist? Why or why not?
4. Do you have family members who are also atheists?
5. Are most of your friends atheists? Why or why not?
6. Have you ever been treated differently by people because you're an atheist? If so, in what way(s) precisely?

THINKING ABOUT RELIGION:

1. Overall, would you say that other people's belief in God is a good thing, a bad thing, or something you're indifferent about? Why?
2. Overall, would you say that organized religion is a good thing, a bad thing, or something you're indifferent about? Why?
3. If not a religious person, do you consider yourself to be a spiritual person? Why or why not?

LIVING AS AN ATHEIST:

1. Many religious people say that belief in God provides a founda-tion for their morality. What do you think about this idea? As an atheist, on what do you base your morality? How do you decide what things are good or bad, whether you (or others) are behaving rightly or wrongly, etc.?
2. Many religious people consider belief in God and religious practice to be essential for raising well-rounded children with a connection to a tradition that helps them to see meaning in the world. What is your opinion about this viewpoint?
3. For many religious people, belief in God purportedly provides an explanation of how the world came into existence and why we are here. As an atheist, do you need or have answers or insights pertaining to these topics? If so, what are they?
4. For many religious people, belief in God is said to provide hope or comfort with respect to suffering in the world and to the inevitability of death. As an atheist, how, if at all, do you think through or come to terms with these things?
5. Conclusion: No questionnaire could possibly cover all dimensions of a topic as complex as this one. So, do you have any additional information or any further reflections that could help us to understand your experience as an atheist better? If so, please feel free to add this now. <>

THE PLIGHT OF WESTERN RELIGION: THE ECLIPSE OF THE OTHER-WORLDLY by Paul Gifford [C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 9781787381339]

'Religion' can be used to mean all kinds of things, but a substantive definition—based on the premise of superhuman powers—can clarify much. It allows us to attempt to differentiate religion from culture, ethnicity, morality and politics. This definition of religion necessarily implies a perception of reality. Until recent centuries in the West, and in most cultures still, the ordinary, natural and immediate way of understanding and experiencing reality was in terms of otherworldly or spiritual forces. However, a cognitive shift has taken place through the rise of science and its subsequent technological application. This new consciousness has not disproved the existence of spiritual forces, but has led to the marginalisation of the other-worldly, which even Western churches seem to accept. They persist, but increasingly as pressure groups promoting humanist values. Claims of 'American exceptionalism' in this regard are misleading. Obama's religion, Evangelical support for Trump, and the mega-church message of success in the capitalist system can all be cultural and political phenomena. This eclipsing of the other-worldly constitutes a watershed in human history, with profound consequences not just for religious institutions but for our entire world order.

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Excerpt: The origins of this book are largely personal. Since the early 1980s I have been studying religion in Africa (at the beginning Christianity exclusively, but in recent years also Islam). My wife has had various positions across Africa, mainly with the United Nations, and we have been lucky enough to be based for years at a time in countries as diverse as Zimbabwe, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and Ethiopia. I have also spent shorter periods in other places. At the same time, I have kept one foot in Europe—since 1992 in the Department for the Study of Religions at SOAS, a constituent college of the University of London. Since the early 1980s, I have spent almost equal time in Africa and Europe.

These years have witnessed the transformation of Christianity in Africa. The mainline or mission churches remain powerful (sometimes the most salient institutions of civil society), the traditional independent churches have lost ground, and newer churches have mushroomed. In 2007, when we lived in Kenya where it is required that churches be registered before operating, the Attorney General announced that the country had 8,520 registered churches, had 6,740 applications pending, and that 60 new applications were filed every month. The procedure for vetting new bodies was overwhelmed and systems had totally broken down.' Other African countries have seen similar proliferation.

My method of study has been empirical. I simply attend as many churches as I can. In Liberia in 1988-89, beginning at about 6 am and finishing about 9 pm, I managed to average five churches a Sunday, mainline, independent and new. (I have not even attempted to keep that up.) I have supplemented Sunday services by attending Bible studies, crusades and conventions. Media productions have provided supplementary material.

All this has taught me the complexity of Christianity in Africa, and the many roles the various forms of Christianity play. Just as importantly, it has disclosed the pervasive `enchanted religious imagination', or the worldview which seeks causality in spiritual forces.

Not every aspect of Africa's booming Christianity has been uncontroversial. Thus in early 2018 the admittedly hyper-authoritarian President Kagame of Rwanda simply closed 6,000 (yes, six thousand) churches in the country, because if he is to make Rwanda the Singapore of Africa, there are certain kinds of religion that in his opinion Rwanda does not need. The complexity and the controversial nature of some forms of African Christianity have perhaps not received the attention they deserve.

At the same time, teaching in London, I have tried to keep abreast of the situation in the West. I have observed first-hand the declining church attendance, and tried to keep up with literature on the subject. Moreover, I have learnt much from teaching at SOAS. For example, the Religion Department offered introductory courses in many religions, and even when relatively senior I held out to teach the introductory course in Christianity. In that way I could experience secularisation advancing year by year. The students, from many different countries, were intelligent, articulate, extremely knowledgeable about all kinds of things and committed to all sorts of causes, but increasingly less grounded in and drawn to any recognisably Christian heritage.

However, it was not just the declining significance of Christianity that struck me. It was the form of Christianity found in Western churches generally and which characterised even the committed Christians among the students. This was, in most cases, and in striking contrast to the situation in Africa, a completely `disenchanted' Christianity—one thoroughly in keeping with the surrounding milieu. This increased my reluctance to talk easily of Christianity's shift from the North to the South, for that often implied that what was becoming less significant in the North was the very same animal that was exploding in the South. It wasn't.

I have written elsewhere of what I have learnt of African Christianity. This is my attempt to address what I have observed—often by contrast—of Western Christianity, and to suggest, not least to myself, an explanation not only for Western Christianity's decline, but for the particular disenchanted form in which it has come to be found.

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John Peel has remarked, in reference to conversion in Africa:

> The only workable definition of conversion is the process by which people come to regard themselves, and be regarded by others, as Christians. This social identification is what being a Christian most immediately and unarguably is, rather than holding certain beliefs or behaving in certain ways specified a priori ... By taking social identification as the real thing to be explained we avoid the analytical problems which arise if as often occurs in practice Christians maintain or later adopt "non-Christian" beliefs and practices but still insist on regarding themselves as Christians and are so regarded by others.

So, for Peel, social identification is what being a Christian is; digging deeper or pushing further leads to 'unworkable' analytical problems. Certainly, there is much that can be discussed under the heading of social identification, as Peel ably shows in his justly acclaimed study. However, in this book I want go beyond labelling to address some of the analytical problems he sidesteps or leaves aside, especially the 'certain beliefs ... specified a priori'.

I attempt this through an analysis of Western Christianity over recent centuries. For this exercise I adopt a substantive definition of religion (activity premised on the existence of superhuman powers) because it enables me to attempt to differentiate religion from culture, ethnicity, politics and morality. I argue that religion, understood substantively, necessarily implies a perception of reality, and in the West until recent centuries (as in so many cultures still) the ordinary, natural and immediate way of experiencing and understanding reality has been in terms of otherworldly or spiritual forces. However, a cognitive shift has taken place through the rise of

science and its subsequent technological application. This new consciousness has not disproved the existence of spiritual forces, but it has led to the peripheralisation of the otherworldly, which mainline Western churches seem to accept; they persist, often as significant players in society, but increasingly as pressure groups promoting `humanist' values and as agencies effecting them. Claims of `American exceptionalism'—that Americans' constant invocation of Christianity shows that, in contrast to Europeans, Americans have retained an awareness of the supernatural—are misleading; phenomena like Evangelical support for President Trump, and the mega-church message of success in the capitalist system, can be understood as political and cultural rather than religious. This peripheralising of the otherworldly constitutes a watershed in human history, with profound consequences not just for religious institutions but for our entire world order.

I make my argument in five chapters. Chapter 1 identifies many of the issues under discussion. I try to bring some clarity into contemporary debate on religion, particularly by differentiating issues of culture, identity and tradition in any such discussion. I also defend my focus on `belief' or the cognitive element in religion. Chapter 2 attempts to trace the cognitive shift that has taken place in the West in recent cen¬turies, and to illustrate this shift through a comparison with an example of non-Western religion. Chapter 3 addresses some counterclaims, for example that the 'New Age' or counterculture shows that religion is alive and well in the West, just `mutating' or becoming personalised. I illustrate the decline of Christianity in Victorian times and in the 1960s, and show how `internally secularised' or hollowed out many contemporary forms of Western Christianity have become. Chapter 4 illustrates the hollowness of claims of `American exceptionalism' . Chapter 5 pulls the argument together, arguing that a rationality of functional instrumentality (explained below) has become the dominant cognitive style in all modern societies, a cognitive style which strongly militates against a substantively religious understanding of reality.

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Religion: clarifying the idea

In debates about religion, it is helpful to be clear about exactly what is under discussion. Berger has claimed: `I once asked Luckmann who would not be religious by his definition. He replied, "A dog."" But if everything or anything or anyone is by definition religious, it is hard to use the term analytically. It is impossible to compare and contrast with anything else (because there is nothing else). It is impossible to differentiate religion from something like culture or ethnicity, which is precisely what I attempt here. So in what follows, I will adopt a substantive definition like Reisebrodt's: `Religion is a complex of practices based on the premise of the existence of superhuman powers'. There is nothing remarkable in this it is a definition of fine pedigree, adopted by prominent scholars of religion like Taylor, Bruce, Martin and Berger.'

I am aware of the debates about substantive versus functional definitions (religion in a functional sense is anything addressing deeper questions or needs or values). I have no need to consider those here. I adopt a substantive definition because it enables me to draw attention to some changes in Western societies about which confusion often reigns, and because it enables me to pinpoint significant differences between the West and many other cultures. I adopt a substantive definition because it serves my present purpose.'

The great ditch

It seems safe to say that the shift traced here, the rise of a new cognitive style, constitutes a watershed; many would say the watershed in the history of humankind.' This shift has changed the conditions of human life. Up till about 1800, the standard of living on all continents was roughly the same; very low indeed by today's measure. Before then, economic growth based on technological change barely existed. But the intellectual environment that gave rise to natural science, the application of science and technology to production and its accompanying refinements, have produced continuous innovation and increase. This shift has been so powerful that it has swept all before it—so much so that it could enable Britain (in Seeley's expression) to acquire an empire 'in a fit of absence of mind'.

The idea of a `great ditch' seems far more convincing than an approach like Fried's, according to which everything we have now is clearly built on what was already there in the Middle Ages.Yes, demarcation of periods can be forced, and one thing does lead on to another, and it is helpful to point out the glimmerings of things that later came to fruition; but granting all that, it is still possible that someone today looking at the differences between, say, the 1300s and the 2000s would be struck not by the similarities but by the dissimilarities. Yes, Marco Polo did (perhaps) get to China, and if you want to call that the beginnings of globalisation, fine; but in our world of multinationals, transnational political bodies, mass migrations, unregulated and instantaneous flow of capital, surely globalisation means something rather different. Fried's comments on social contracts in Carolingian times capture his approach: 'The deep-seated roots of Western notions of constitutional rule, power sharing, codetermination, and democracy that would come to shape European history in the modern period all derive ultimately from this tradition.' Ultimately perhaps; but what strikes most observers is the great ditch of the seventeenth century and later.

The claim to a watershed is not made in arrogance. There is ample room for both apprehension and humility. The reasons for the shift may be in large measure fortuitous, even if momentous in consequences. Mokyr, in comparing the scientific revolution in Europe with the situation in China in the same period, puts it well: `It seems wrong to dub the Chinese experience a "failure". What is exceptional, indeed unique, is what happened in eighteenth-century Europe."

It is undeniable that in recent centuries in Europe the radically different worldview formulated by the sciences, spearheaded by astronomy, became disconnected from a religious understanding of reality. The religious was `shifting from the realm of information to a realm more like that of mythology. In this way the old mind could live on alongside the new, in a less central way and in a different key.'

This `different key' idea has given rise to the notion of NOMA or 'non-overlapping magisteriums'. In this view, science and religion operate on totally different planes, which by definition never intersect. Scientific propositions deal with the world out there; religious statements are something else, addressing ultimate questions and expressing moral values. Richard Dawkins objects violently to what he considers this subterfuge; religion, along with its values and morality, always attempted to explain reality (what I have called the inevitable cognitive element of religion), and this explaining was done in terms of otherworldly forces. My argument has been that such explanations, though not discredited, have been marginalised by a far more powerful form of explanation; a new mind has displaced the old mind.

`Those who still fully lived the old mind, however, whatever their numbers, were now in the margins of things: the new mind was developing the technologies and social structure that were transforming the world.' 15 It is this new worldview 'that drives almost everything of significance that happens in our world, from technologies to economies, with the resulting impact on the social and political organization of almost all societies, even the ones where the majority of people still hold to a version of the pre-seventeenth-century mind-set'.

Multiple modernities

This persistence of the marginalised worldview in the modern world raises its own issues. `Modern' certainly means more than just existing in the twenty-first century. Modernisation means something like that combination of changes in the mode of production and government, in the social and institutional order, in the corpus of knowledge, and in attitudes and values that makes it possible for a society to hold its own in the twenty-first century; that is, to compete on even terms in the generation of material and cultural wealth, to sustain its independence, and to promote and accommodate to further change."

Modernity is obviously not a simple notion; components of modernity seem to include power-driven machinery, integrated transport systems, science, technology and research and development, financial services, standardisation of weights, measures and currencies, systems of public health, attention to the status of women, universal education, leisure, consumerism, state-run welfare, political parties, trades unions, civil service and

bureaucracy, social legislation, organised sport, conscript military forces, and (increasingly, in all its ramifications) electronic communication. Of course, many elements are far from positive: other characteristics are organised crime, inequality, an underclass, and weaponry with destructive power beyond the comprehension of previous ages. Above all, though, our cognitive shift must be part of it indeed, most of these things are made possible only through this shift. <>

WHAT'S SO FUNNY ABOUT GOD?: A THEOLOGICAL LOOK AT HUMOR by Steve Wilkens [IVP Academic, 9780830852673]

If you don't believe God has a sense of humor, just look in the mirror.

Humor is a truly human phenomenon—crossing history, culture, and every stage of life. Jokes often touch on the biggest topics of our existence. And although it may seem simple on the surface, humor depends on the use of our highest faculties: language, intelligence, sympathy, sociability. To the philosopher Steve Wilkens, these facts about humor are evidence that God just has to be in there somewhere. Yet many Christians, scholars and laypeople alike, haven't taken humor seriously. In **WHAT'S SO FUNNY ABOUT GOD?** Wilkens launches an exploration of the connections between humor and many of the central topics of Christian theology. He argues that viewing Scripture and theology through the lens of humor brings fresh insight to our understanding of the gospel, helps us avoid the pitfalls of both naturalism and gnosticism, and facilitates a humble, honest, and appealing approach to faith. Wilkens turns this lens on the paradoxes of human nature, the Christian calendar, church life, and new readings of well-known biblical texts, including the book of Esther, the nativity narratives, and Jesus' own teachings. Taking into account the problems of suffering and the need for timely lament, he portrays the Christian story as one that ultimately ends in cosmic comedy. Full of wit and thoughtful jokes throughout, it's enough fun that you may not realize you're reading theology.

PROFESSIONAL COURTESY

Why don't sharks attack lawyers?
Professional courtesy.

Of course, we can also turn this joke around and get a different result:

Why do sharks attack lawyers?
They don't like the competition.

Theology usually doesn't grant much professional courtesy to humor. Don't get me wrong. Christians, surprisingly, are almost like normal people; most of us seem to like humor. It's sprinkled throughout our everyday conversation, and we watch TV sitcoms as much as other groups. If you're looking for church jokes, a quick Internet search reveals that we have found plenty to laugh about in this niche of our lives. When it comes to

finding thoughtful Christian reflection on the topic of humor, though (to modify the late Rodney Dangerfield's signature line): "Humor doesn't get no respect." It's rare to find a reflective discussion on the relationship between Christianity and humor.' So why do Christian thinkers have so little interest in a topic that plays a central role in people's lives? After all, theologians stick their noses into just about every other subject and take each of them pretty seriously. But when it comes to humor, we often listen for their take on the matter and hear only crickets, punctuated occasionally by negative comments before they again revert to silence.

FUNNY ISN'T THE OPPOSITE OF SERIOUS

Mr. McCabe thinks that I am not serious but only funny, because Mr. McCabe thinks that funny is the opposite of serious. Funny is the opposite of not funny and nothing else.

Perhaps the main reason Christian scholars haven't taken humor seriously is that they don't think that humor is serious, a view confirmed for many by the plethora of poop jokes available. Thus, they may see humor as "the competition;' just another thing that vies for our attention and distracts from thinking earnestly about God. But I'm with Chesterton here. Funny and serious are not opposites. To joke about something requires that we deem it sufficiently important to search for the humor in it, and I will argue later in the book that even poop jokes may be more profound than we recognize. Moreover, we should also acknowledge that humor frequently draws us into the big questions of our existence. Think of all the jokes you know (but possibly can't tell some people) about love, death, God, sex, children, good and evil, and politics—"meaning of life" sorts of topics. In this way, humor certainly pays attention to questions of deep concern to theology, so why hasn't the attention (not to mention the affection) been mutual? The attitude that humor negates seriousness also lacks consistency. Other parts of our lives that we take seriously—family, friendships, work relationships, leisure, and church life—have room for laughter and are enriched by it. It seems that theology's lack of professional courtesy to humor relies on a deficient definition of seriousness.

Another obstacle that humor faces from Christians comes from a lopsided understanding of spirituality Humor centers on our bodies, and often on its lowest features and functions. Spirituality, on the other hand, seems to be concerned with souls and spirits. Laughter is shortterm and ephemeral, but the spiritual is about eternal life. Jokes and quips are usually specific to a situation, but our life with God transcends any single moment or event. Moreover, funny is enjoyable, and some Christians don't appear to find this compatible with being spiritual. Indeed, it may be that many Christians see humor as competition to their spiritual quests and don't appreciate it, somehow failing to note that joy is the root of enjoyment and is a word liberally spread throughout Scripture. Once again, I will argue that opposing humor and spirituality involves a flawed definition of spiritual development.

...WALK INTO A BAR

An airline pilot, a one-eyed Greek redhead, a giant, and an alligator walk into a bar.

The bartender says, "What is this? Some kind of joke?"

I don't want to shoot off too much of my ammo before we even get through the book's introduction, but let me lay a foundation for why Christians should view humor as a vehicle for taking faith seriously and pursuing spiritual growth and understanding. In normal circumstances, we anticipate that certain people will walk into a bar together. When these expectations are shaken up and worlds collide, good jokes are the result. Humor is about incongruity, surprise, misdirection, reversal, and other elements that shatter expectation. That's why we can find humor all around us. Whether it arises as a clash of generations, body and soul, good and evil, wife and husband, or in imagining what might happen if a one-eyed Greek redhead pulls up a barstool next to an alligator, funny occurs when worlds collide.

These sorts of juxtapositions occur on every page of the Bible. Heaven invades earth, humanity encounters God, and the future overlaps with the present. Our expectations are dashed when Saul the Super-Jew who

persecutes the new Christian community becomes Paul the Apostle to the Gentiles (Gal 2:7) or an obscure shepherd kid, the youngest of Jesse's rather large brood of sons, becomes King of Israel (1 Sam 16:11¬13). In our own lives, we feel the dialectic of being both saved and sinner, or heirs of the God of Heaven who also get stuck in freeway traffic. Perhaps there is no bigger cosmic collision than God becoming flesh. And if I started that story by saying that a poor unmarried couple, a group of shepherds, and some foreign astrologers walked into a stable together, it might remind you of a joke. It is precisely that: a glorious, beautiful joke that no one expected, and it brought salvation.

HUMOROUSLY

"I learned today that it is a bad idea to pet a tiger," she said offhandedly. (My apologies, but good adverb jokes are hard to come by.)

The point of this book is not that we should scour Scripture looking for humor on every page, although there is a lot more there than we usually recognize. Instead, the suggestion is that we should employ the structures and mechanisms of humor to gain insight into the Christian faith. Stated otherwise, the idea is that we think of Christianity, and ourselves, humorously. This is an "adverbial" approach to faith and humor. Adverbs, if I remember my junior high grammar correctly, describe actions and modify verbs; they talk about how something is done (and frequently end in -ly). The primary theme in this book, then, it to meditate on what we might see in Scripture and in our faith when we look at them humorously.

It is hard to define humor itself. A dictionary definition such as "something that is or is designed to be comical or amusing" hardly seems to capture the richness and variety of humor. Instead of attempting to define humor, it seems more helpful to focus on how it works. Humor builds on punch-line surprises, disruption of the conventional, reversal of expectation, juxtaposition of seeming incommensurate things, challenging boundaries, misinterpretation, redefinition of the familiar, satire, paradox, irony, and other related devices. If these elements are also part of the very fabric of the Christian story—and I'm convinced they are—then reading Scripture humorously holds the possibility of opening dimensions of the faith in new ways, seeing things from a fresh vantage point, and recognizing some spiritual blind spots. God defeats Israel's enemies with a woefully undermanned military force armed with band instruments (Judges 7), elevates Jacob the gimpy swindler to the role of Patriarch of the Chosen People, and adopts us as heirs of eternal life "while we were yet sinners" (Rom 5:8). Doesn't it seem possible that these incongruities and surprises share common ground with humor, and isn't the delight we should feel at the oddity of these stories akin to the delight we experience in a good joke?

The flip side of this adverbial methodology will provide a secondary motif within the book, in that I will raise the question of what it might mean to think about humor theologically. Jimmy Fallon's cue line to signal the beginning of his Tonight Show monologue is "Here's what people are talking about" If we listen carefully, we discover what those around us are talking about through their humor. Jokes about death, sex, gates of heaven judgment, money, politics, and marriage cue us in to the fact that ultimate issues are top of mind for people. Gallows humor and quips about aging and nonfunctional body parts expose human fears and provide glimmers of hope. Insecurities and a sense of impotence are often the undertones in sarcasm directed at the wealthy and powerful. Self-deprecating humor is often the only form of confession that we will hear from friends and neighbors. This list will grow as we move through the book, but suffice it to say here that humor is often the conduit by which we express our frustrations, anxiety, joys, loves, and opinions about life's biggest issues. Since these are obviously matters of theological concern, we ought to be theologically attuned to humor.

If the only tool you have is a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail.

The aim of these musings about humor's relationship to Christianity is not to create a happy-face church that is more fun than our usual offerings, an alternative to the comedy club without the two-drink minimum. Not to say that some congregations couldn't make things a tad more interesting. Some churches feel like a hostage situation in which they hope the captives will hang around long enough that Stockholm syndrome will kick in and they'll

eventually join the cause. Instead, I view interpreting faith humorously as a way, one way, of thinking about who we are and who God is. I'm working hard to be sensitive to the tunnel vision that often accompanies the zeal of a new convert. Reading Christianity humorously has brought a freshness to my faith, and I'm excited about this. But it leads to the temptation to overstate the case and see humor even where it isn't.

The Christian faith has a broad array of valid forms of expression. Sermons, heartfelt conversation, devotional thoughts, and a range of other forms all have their place and are useful. Still, I'm also convinced that one of the most potent ways of expressing, understanding, and deepening faith is woefully underutilized. Too often, humor has been sidelined, even discouraged, as a means of exploring, learning about, or growing in faith. However, Ecclesiastes tells us there is "a time to weep, and a time to laugh" (Eccles 3:4). It seems that many Christians are overdue on finding a time to laugh, and I am convinced that our life in God's presence warrants a lot more laughter than we've imagined.

DISSECTING FROGS

Humor can be dissected, as a frog can, but the thing dies in the process and the innards are discouraging to any but the purely scientific mind.

For most of its history, philosophy, like theology, has refused to give humor much professional courtesy. In recent years, however, a flurry of philosophy-of-humor books has emerged. Some of that research lies beneath the surface of this book, but a lot of this material has the tendency to kill all that is good about humor. Unfortunately, this isn't uncommon when philosophers get hold of an interesting topic—and this should stand as a warning about reading anything on the philosophy of sex.

Given the dangers of death by over-analysis, this book has rather modest goals. The intent is to raise an overlooked and underappreciated topic, but not in a way comes close to what you might call a robust "theology of humor." It will deal with some traditional theological topics—theological anthropology, incarnation, death and resurrection, ecclesiology, general revelation, and eschatology—but I don't pretend to give any of these subjects a thorough treatment and will stay away from most of the tricky and nuanced questions that arise in each area. I have enough on my hands just trying to make the case for the value of humor and laughter in our theological inquiries. This is nothing more than a series of meditations on thinking humorously about theology, thinking theologically about humor, and attempting to encourage a conversation that I believe will be valuable to faith.

If any book cries out for a unity between medium and message, it is this one. A book about theology and humor ought to include humor, and perhaps a little theology. Thus, I have endeavored to incorporate laughter into the process and to keep the tone light and, hopefully, entertaining enough that you don't even realize that you are reading theology.

A couple of things to be said about that. First, some will find the tone and format disrespectful and unserious precisely because it incorporates humor. There is nothing further from my intent; my deepest desire is to honor God and help others think clearly and differently about faith. But I also happen to think that one of the best ways to do that is to include joy and laughter, as I would if I were in a serious theological discussion with good friends. More importantly, I believe that good theological reasons exist for making laughter part of our considerations of Christianity. As Karl Barth states: "If you have heard the Easter message, you can no longer run around with a tragic face and lead the humorless existence of a man who has no hope. One thing still holds, and only this thing is really serious, that Jesus is the Victor." We are resurrection people, and if elated laughter is not part of our faithful repertoire, I'm not sure we really get Easter.

Second, I need to acknowledge that although humans of every era enjoy humor, the forms differ over time, across culture, according to gender, and in relation to our moral and religious commitments. Humor is a matter of taste. What one person will find incredibly funny will elicit yawns or bring offense to others. I have a high tolerance for humor that some find objectionable (and a low tolerance for those in perpetual search of anything

that could be perceived as objectionable). Out of consideration for others (and a desire to have the book published), most of the time I have stayed on the safe side, but it has been painful. When the humor and subject matter does move toward the earthy and guy-humor side, it does so to make a theological point.

A final disclaimer is that I am neither a theologian nor a comedian. As far as theology goes, I am an amateur both in the professional sense and in the sense that an amateur is "one who does something for the love (amour) of it." I am a philosopher by trade, and philosophers are often quite hilarious, though rarely on purpose. Apparently, I was much funnier when my kids were young, but according to them, that ability faded long ago. The jokes and quips within the book have several sources. When I knowingly use material from a professional comedian, I give credit. Those who devote their skills to bring levity to our lives deserve no less. However, jokes often enter the public domain by retelling without attribution, and since joke details and vocabulary vary with repetition, it is quite possible that some have originated from professionals and do not receive due credit. My apologies if that has happened. The remaining materials are my own invention or have been drawn from my decades-long memory bank of humor, stories, and jokes shared by family and friends, and, of course, the Internet.

LAUGHING WITH GOD DURING EARTHQUAKES

I like Jesus, but he loves me. It's awkward.

This book began with the observation that humor is one of the primary ways we communicate love. Used well, it signals openness toward the other and a willingness to build relationships. Humor is a way of saying that we have good intentions. I've argued throughout the book that, since Christian theology often uses the same tools that are essential to comedy, humor is one of the ways God communicates love to us. When we encounter Scripture's use of paradox, political satire, reversal, irony, and incongruity, we should hear it as a love language through which God invites us to laugh along with him, even when we are the targets of divine laughter.

When I started this project, I expected that a theological investigation would deepen my love and gratitude toward God. Making a conscious effort to reflect on God's faithfulness and forgiveness should do that. Greater love for God is, after all, the primary aim of good theology. Moreover, since humor is a conduit through which we experience love, I anticipated that examining the work of a gracious God through humor's filter would make God's love even more clearly visible. With gratitude, I can say that investigating the links between humor and theology has been spiritually enriching. What I didn't anticipate, however, was that this journey would confront me with an idea I had never considered. As I read theology through the lens of humor, I discovered that I don't just love God. I like God.

The idea of liking God initially struck me as so odd that I began to explore whether others had thought about this. You can find almost anything on the Internet, but if you Google "Can we like God?" you get a lot of "Can we be like God?" or "Can we, like God, ... ?" but you won't find much discussion of the original inquiry. As I have wrestled with this question, I've concluded that we should like God, even though it still feels a bit uncomfortable for me to say it. I think I've figured out a couple of reasons for this uneasiness.

First, liking God seems incompatible with the respect and awe that should be our proper response toward the transcendent one. It is certainly not my intention to downplay the vision of a God so holy that his people refused to speak the divine name for fear of displaying a lack of respect. There is a worship of God that demands that we fall on our face in holy fear and awe. As right and necessary as this reverent posture is, we also know a God who is called by the name of "Abba, Father" (Mk 14:36; Rom 8:15; Gal 4:6), a label that denotes intimacy and trust. Our understanding of God becomes unbalanced if we do not quake before the God of the burning bush, but is it any less unbalanced if we fail to see God as the smiling parent? So here is our final apparent incongruity: maybe the sovereign and exalted YHWH is also a likable daddy.

A second factor that makes us uncomfortable with the idea of liking God is that it may imply, as in the silly quip to begin this epilogue, that liking is a step down from loving. Certainly, no Christian wants to create the impression that they're demoting God from the "love" to the "like" category. Seen from a different angle, though, liking adds something to love. There are people that I love, but I don't want to be around them too long because, to be quite honest, I just don't like them that much. I've never stopped loving my wife, but situations have arisen when I couldn't truthfully say that I liked her at the moment. But when amends were made and I could both love and like her again, it was better. Liking augments loving. That seems obvious when you think about how difficult it is to love unlikable folks. It's not much of a challenge to love the people you like.

One thing that makes me believe it's proper to like God is that Jesus informed his disciples that they were no longer servants. Instead, "I have called you friends, because I have made known to you everything that I have heard from my Father" (Jn 15:15). I'm assuming that this promotion from servant to friend also applies to disciples of every age. We do, after all, sing "What a Friend We Have in Jesus." My friends are not my friends because I love them, although I do. Instead, they are friends because I like them and take pleasure in being with them. So if I'm friends with Jesus, and with God through Jesus, it makes sense that I should like God.

I love God for what he has done for us, but I also like God for the way God does it. When God makes the crown of his creation out of dirt, continually uses the least likely for his most important jobs, draws us near through bread and wine, and sneaks into the world as an infant, it is the sort of good-natured fun that makes me want to spend time with this God. I can't help but like a God who brings a mighty nation into being through an elderly, barren couple and preserves that people with an assist from a beauty-pageant winner. When God extends forgiveness and grace to those who don't deserve it, stands up for the powerless, and brings victory through sacrifice, I detect a winsomeness that enhances my enjoyment of the time I spend with God. I don't always understand God, but when I look at the way he does things through the filter of humor, I can't help but think of God as likable. I love this God, but I also like him so much that I want to be with him.

One final difference between loving and liking is worth consideration. Some of my friendships are what Aristotle called friendships of amusement.' These are relationships in which I enjoy being in a person's company simply because they are fun to be with. However, I may not share the same values and goals of these friends. They make me smile, but I don't want to emulate them. My deeper friendships, however, are what Aristotle called friendships of virtue. These friends possess traits and dispositions that I find admirable, and I desire to spend time with them in the hope that I can absorb some of these virtues. These are friendships formed for the sake of becoming a better and more complete person. In addition to this, friendships of virtue are a two-for-one deal. They also, like the first form of friendship, provide amusement because as we grow in the virtues that allow us to flourish, these dispositions become pleasurable to us. Since the character qualities displayed by virtuous friends originate in God's goodness, I like God by liking these friends.

In sum, when I see God acting in ways that appeal to my sense of humor, I like this God. And it's not the quick click-of-the-mouse Facebook kind of like. It's a form of liking that allows me to enjoy spending time with God and creates a hunger to be more like God. As with my human friends, God doesn't intend to evoke laughter every time I'm with him. However, I want to be with God because he has at times spoken to me through his love language of humor, and he has made me laugh.

We had just returned from China with Zoe, the beautiful ten-month-old girl we had adopted. This was my first go-around at parenthood, and all the typical new-parent anxieties were augmented by the fact that we were all jet-lagged and wide awake at 2 a.m. Zoe was lying on our bed, and, not knowing what parents are supposed do in this situation, I started bouncing the mattress playfully. She started grinning. So I rocked it harder, and she started laughing. At full crescendo, I was on all fours, bouncing the bed and yelling "earthquake!" Her face was beet-red with laughter—the type of laughter I call "angel music"—and I knew that, regardless of what might happen in the future, we would be okay as long as we could laugh together.

The world for children is mysterious and frightening. So much is beyond their understanding and, in their powerlessness, they feel vulnerable and crave to be with someone they trust in moments of uncertainty. When vulnerability overwhelms them, they cling to you and cry. In other moments, something beautiful happens. A situation that could easily be interpreted as dangerous, such as a wildly undulating mattress and semi-maniacal vocalizations from a person completely unknown to you just days earlier, is defused by trust. Zoe's faith in my good intentions was the only difference between horror and laughter.

As God's children, we too often experience the world as frightening and horrible, and we understand enough to know that much is indeed dark and destructive. In these moments, we cling to God and shed our tears. This is appropriate. It is just as appropriate, though, to laugh with God. Our heartiest laughs are not a form of escape, amusement, or diversion. Instead, they are profound theological statements in which we confess our faith in a God who is faithful to us. In our laughter, we proclaim that the sovereign I AM will rout the principalities and powers because he is also the loving Abba who has the best of intentions for his children. In our paradoxical existence as saved sinners who straddle disease and eternal life in a world filled with earthquakes of all kinds, we can laugh because the I AM Abba wants to laugh with us. That is, after all, the purpose for which he has created us. <>

JAINS IN INDIA: HISTORICAL ESSAYS by Surendra Gopal [Routledge, 9780367204648]

The Jain community in India, though small in number, is very important in the economic and social life of the country. Jain history becomes more important when we find that the community anticipated new commercial practices adopted by European trading countries from the sixteenth century onwards. Two Jain names stand out in history; they are Veerji Vora, in the seventeenth century and Jagat Seth of Bengal in the eighteenth century. A succession of Jagat Seths interacted with high government officials and were very influential in their time as this volume brings out. This volume contributes significantly to the study of merchant communities and colonial history in South Asia.

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Jainism has continuously flourished in India like Hinduism since ancient times. Buddhism flourished, when the twenty-fourth Jain Tirthankara, Mahavir was born. From then onwards Jainism has had a continuous history.

Jains have preserved their languages and memorialized their contribution to Philosophy, Ethics, Mathematics, etc., through the centuries. The Jain community has been basically literate and mostly engaged in trade activities. They deserve more attention by students of history.

In course of my study of medieval India, I came across repeated references to them in both European and Indian languages, Hindi, Gujarati, Marathi, etc. They are also mentioned in English, Dutch and other European accounts repeatedly.

Over the years I wrote quite a few essays on the Jain Community in various research journals and anthologies. These are collected here. Readers will find that in the seventeenth century Virji Vora was the greatest Indian merchant. In the eighteenth century a Jain family based in Bihar became the biggest merchant. The English East India Company agreed with the Mughal Emperor who conferred the title of `Jagat Seth' (world merchant) on the chief on head of this family. The title in course of time became hereditary.

Economic power soon placed them in the local political field. The English East India Company used them to their advantage. They became the de facto rulers of Bihar, Orissa and Bengal. This resource enabled the English Company to create an army which enabled them to establish their sway over India. I hope my essays on the community will attract scholars to write about them in detail.

It is my pleasure to remember friends who motivated me to write about the Jain community. The first place among them goes to Shri Ramesh Jain who persuaded me to collect these essays

The Social Life of the Jain Community in Medieval Times

After the Hindus, the Jains are the oldest surviving religious community in India. Their identity is confirmed by their distinct theology, philosophy, religio-socio rituals, literary traditions, among others. Certain other features of the community also deserve to be remembered.

The basic profession of Jains in the historical period has been trade, both local and long-distance. As a result the community has been economically well-off.' The relationship of the community with commerce compelled its members to acquire some elements of literacy. It is not an exaggeration to say that the community by and large has always been literate. Literacy enabled them to keep alive the Prākrt and Apabhrarnsa languages which contain a large number of Jain theological, literary and philosophical texts. This is no mean achievement if we remember that over two millennia many languages appeared in north India and were forgotten.

The strong element of literacy and economic affluence has enabled the community to contribute to the corpus of Indian art, painting and sculpture as well as architecture. They all have their distinctiveness and enrich the diverse strands of Indian culture. It may also be noted that the history of the Jains like that of the Hindus can be traced almost without a break since ancient times. <>

CONSTRUCTING THE DIVINE: RELIGION AND WORLD VIEW OF A NAGA TRIBE IN NORTH-EAST INDIA by G. Kanato Chophy [Routledge, 9780367204648]

From being characterized as ‘primitive tribe’ in the colonial imagination to become predominantly practitioners of the American Baptist faith, the Sumi Naga – formerly known as the Sema Naga – in the North-East Indian state of Nagaland have come a long way ever since this Naga tribe encountered the white man toward the latter half of the nineteenth century.

This book in a way chronicles the transition of Sumi society from the period of colonial contact up to the present-day context. A critical understanding of Sumi society and culture is at the heart of the narrative, and the analysis of Sumi religion and world view remains the main thrust of this book. It is argued that the Sumi, who are

overwhelmingly Baptists, are faced with new religious issues which has brought about not only schismatic divisions but also rendering ebullience to religious life, and that a new discourse has emerged in Sumi religion. The author positions himself as an 'insider', and in doing so has given a reflexive account of Sumi religious life, meanwhile substantiating the arguments and findings in the light of contemporary theoretical developments. The volume brings out compelling evidence that religion significantly shapes the daily life of the Sumi. It offers a detailed ethnographic study of Sumi religion and world view, as the Sumi Naga was seldom studied in-depth in the post-Independence period.

Reading through Kanato Chophy's exemplary work on the religious beliefs and practices of the Sumi Naga, a community of people predominantly distributed in the districts of Zunheboto and Dimapur of Nagaland, I was instantly reminded of a lecture I heard while attending the Baptist Centenary Celebrations in the town of Kohima in November 1985. The speaker, a pastor, in his imposing exhortation in English, told the audience representing different Naga communities, who had come in their traditional attires to the capital of Nagaland from different districts, and also from the state of Manipur, that before the advent of Christianity, they were all pagan, reposing faith in a myriad of punitive, diabolical, unkind, and demanding spirits. The hill-dwellers, as the people were called, were afraid of these `supernatural beings, grounded in the belief that if they fell short of complying with the impositions of the spirits, they would be doomed in reality.

Their religion, the speaker continued, was based on `fear', and thus, they were overwhelmed with mirth, when they found them under the patronage of the `religion of love', in which God was compassionate, nurturant, merciful, and benevolent. It was not just the `persona of God' that suffused people with joy, but also, the material changes that indiscriminately flowed from the `institutions of God', namely the church, the school, and the hospital, which transformed the lives of people, ensuring their decent and dignified existence, free from misery, scarcity, isolation and suffering. Conversion to a `world religion' that Christianity is, made people, who hitherto were cut off from the wider world, a part of the vast Christian congregation. Just to add to what the pastor said, this facilitated the `modernisation' of the local `tribal' communities - they learnt English, which soon was going to acquire the status of an international language, got their children admitted to mission schools, obtained scientific cures of their illnesses, and imbibed the values of equality, liberty, open-mindedness, and the modern outlook.

Chophy's incisive analysis of Christianity among the Sumi Naga also reaches a similar conclusion. The Christian God was benign, tender-hearted, an apotheosis of love. This quality bestowed upon Him the power of the `moral order. He was complete, perfect, and free from infirmity. His kindness, however, did not mean that He would compromise with deviant manners - such as domestic violence, homicide, bribery, theft - on which their

`pre-Christian pantheon' might have observed silence. Not only would He lay down the charter of moral prescriptions, but also robustly denounce the stances of the nefarious and evil powers, which even after being ousted would persist troubling righteous people, therefore, they needed to be ostracized by the power of morality, the power of God and His institutions.

Christianity, hence, Chophy argues, did not `negate the existence of these spirits, but reified them within the tradition as lowly, capricious, and hateful, that deserved stringent punishment. In this skein of thought, even the guardian and ancestral spirits that tried to vouchsafe the welfare of their descendants, and were placed far above the malicious forces, received a setback of downward mobility. They assumed a `subservient role to powerful Christian God.

With conversion to Christianity occurred many changes in the cultural models of the people. For instance, Chophy shows that the Sumi, like some other Naga communities, believed in the duality of the body and the soul - an idea central to Edward Tylor's concept of `animism' (`belief in the existence of soul'). The soul might depart temporarily, or have a permanent exit. When the latter occurred, the soul sought abode in the `world of the dead, where it led a `normal life, a life similar to that of the `living: Unsurprisingly, those communities that subscribed to the bodysoul dichotomy came to be termed `animists, and were expected to resist those beliefs that ran contrary to their thoughts. Like the Sumi eschatology, Christianity also believed in the existence of the soul, but unlike their belief, the soul perished away forever after death. Against this backdrop, the Sumi had to adjust their world view to the repertoire of Christian concepts of life and death.

Looking at the Sumi life as an `insider' as well as an `insider-outsider, for Chophy was born and brought up as a native, he perceptively documents the dynamics of the interaction between the `recipient culture' and the `donor culture: Neither is assimilation an operational concept to understand this situation, since the elements of the traditional Sumi culture continue to thrive in contemporary times, notwithstanding the fact that the process of conversion to Christianity began in the Sumi land in the mid-1930s. Nor is integration a satisfactory idea, because it is not a situation where some elements of the Sumi culture are `integrated' (or `woven') with another set of the Christian concepts. In fact, it is a situation of `negotiation, `interpretation, and 're-interpretation', where the cultural elements of both the systems - the Sumi and the Christian - are constantly being dialectically opposed, understood, given a new meaning, which is further critically examined. The ensuing system is `constantly in flux', to use a time-worn anthropological expression. Further, both the concepts of assimilation and integration presuppose a static system, which certainly is not the reality.

Chophy is in the midst of a perpetually evolving system. And, that is the essence of life. Thus, Chophy's ethnography is a sensitive account of the Sumi's relentless struggle to negotiate the `inside' with the `outside' worlds. The 'outside world' is not just of Christianity, but in present times includes all those forces and institutions that come in the wake of globalization. In this unceasing process of negotiation, nothing is in a pristine state. Both are in the process of transformation; and ethnography grasps its glimpse. It is important to note that ethnography is not a `final' or `sacrosanct' statement, as we over years have thought of the accounts that the colonial anthropologists had written. Our skepticism of calling these accounts 'ethnographies' is not unjustified.

In his work, Chophy makes another seminal contribution. He renders a non-positivistic, interpretive account of his people and their religious life. For him, the constellation of beliefs - the idea of the supernatural - is worthy of study, independently of an array of ritual performances. An implication of positivism - and later, the structural-functional approach - in the study of religion had been that rituals were given a primary place, since they were observable, whilst the beliefs were not. Furthermore, beliefs showed a great deal of variability and a perplexing mass of individual interpretations. Therefore, their study would not add to our understanding of social structure. Chophy convincingly reverses this paradigm, showing that beliefs are intellectual products. They define the spheres of action, whether they are of rituals, ceremonies, or of the usual quotidian nature. Their study guides us, as Claude Lévi-Strauss had said for the myths, to understand the working of human mind.

Chophy's monograph has a lot to share with those undertaking a study of their own societies, for he has truly succeeded in employing the technique of de-familiarization, thus studying his own people as a `far-off object' and as a `proximate entity' To oscillate from one end to the other, without losing one's balance, is a frame of mind, which Chophy has already grasped.

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Restudy is gaining popularity in fieldwork-based disciplines like anthropology and sociology. The trend at least in India is synonymous with `village study,' a post-Independence phenomenon carried out by researchers to garner new insights into the fast-transforming social, cultural and economic life of caste-based villages functioning as whole societies. This approach has extended even to the social formation called tribes (most of whom were studied during the colonial period), albeit not in the strict sense of a restudy like the one Oscar Lewis carried out in a Mexican village - Teportlán - formerly studied by Robert Redfield. For one thing, tribal identities, social relationships and economic interdependence, in the present situation, cut across villages, regions, and even states as the assertion of tribal identity is getting stronger and ever expanding. This situation renders the earlier conception of a small-scale tribal community as a closed and self-sufficient system redundant, if not preposterous. Thus revisiting ethnographic subjects like the Naga tribes need not be seen only as a critique of colonial representation, but even the indigenously developed methodology and approaches need to be tested against a wide range of communities showing prodigious diversity.

Keeping in perspective the methodological issues involved in restudying former anthropological subjects, I have carried out the ethnographic study of the Sumi Naga of Nagaland. The Sumi, who were popularly known as the Sema Naga in the colonial period, remain a proverbial example of what a `tribe' should look like and be like in the anthropological imagination. Interestingly, the Sumi were added to a long list of tribes (both documented and undocumented) portrayed as unruly, primitive, and to be dreaded—the imageries, which the community to some extent is still allaying in the eyes of the world. However, this is the least of my concerns because prejudices and ill-informed portrayals of others are integral to the social world. Also, the Sumi, who are fast modernizing and becoming politically conscious, are empowered enough to handle the issue without academics and political activists slaying dragons for them. My concern is with the fallacious conceptual baggage that entails the identification and description of a tribe like the Sumi that still persists not only in the public space but even within the larger academic fraternity: the biggest problem being the conception of a tribe like the Sumi as closed, isolated, cohesive and a well-knit social system.

Implicit in Prof. J.H. Hutton's widely read monograph The Sema Nagas is also the classification and identification of regional variations and instances of cultural contact. But today, the regional variations and cultural interactions have increased manifold aggravating the perfunctory comparisons and generalizations—the two important aspects of any ethnographic description. This does not imply that the Sumi reckoning of a common identity and past tradition is getting erased; in fact, the ethnic identity and boundaries are getting sharper with newly constructed discourses and narratives, but these efforts are not without pitfalls, since the maintenance of what can be called as `Sumihood' is not without conflict and contention amid the unprecedented flow of cultural ideas and images. This is where the significance of this study comes to the forefront. I have described the characteristic view of the Sumi, which maintains community identity and rationalizes self-identification, although this essentialist view of the society is socially constructed and precariously maintained, as my thesis suggests.

In this context religion as a cultural system plays a pivotal role because religion aids the social group in negotiating the exigencies of daily social life and the inevitability of social and cultural change, which often threatens the very existence and perpetuity of the ethnic identity. This is an important point of departure because I argue that shift in religious affiliation and world view need not be seen purely in terms of conflict, because the Sumi have ingeniously appropriated the beliefs and themes of the religious system to (1) reinforce their common identity amid the interaction of different belief systems; and (2) the new belief system has opened up more avenues and possibilities for the Sumi to exercise their individuality within the confines of religious

traditions. Social conflicts can be an engine of change whether they are religiously motivated or not; but the study, for the most part, is not on a congeries of ideologies grappling the Sumi society but on a larger discourse under which different ideologies and conflicts meet and clash keeping the Sumi society in perpetual flux. Thus I have described the concept of world view as a characteristic outlook of a particular society but at the same time providing ample space for different views, discourses and narratives to flourish and coexist. Here world view is significantly understood as a social construction perpetuated, understood and internalized by the Sumi in the form of narratives. Also, the religious life of the Sumi is described in detail, but with the objective to delineate the characteristic outlook of the community; in other words, I have attempted to study the Sumi religion not as a world view in itself but like a world view, amid multiplicities of world views, shaping and guiding social behaviour.

This book is a restudy of some sort because one of the main intents (also motivation) is revisiting the Sumi Naga (the community to which I belong) as an insider almost a hundred years later after the British administrator-ethnographer J.H. Hutton studied the community during the heyday of the Raj in the early decades of the twentieth century. But this book is neither a reflection on Hutton's monograph nor a critique of his work (some may even see it as a futile exercise), although implicit in my argument one may find sensible critique of colonial writings on the Naga tribes in general and the Sumi in particular. This is because the contemporary Sumi society is far-removed from the colonial description and portrayals. The Sumi organizational structure and social institutions are undergoing rapid change, and despite the reckoning of a common Sumi identity, the historical, social and cultural variations cut across clans, khels, villages, regions, and even among those Sumi settled outside the state. As such I have adopted an inductive approach of studying a particular village and moving to larger geographic and sociocultural spaces as an ethnographic endeavour. Here I have chosen Ighanumi in southern Sumi area as the focus village and taking the investigations further to the level of the larger Sumi society. Thus my arguments and findings traverse villages, towns and regions describing the particularity and interrelatedness of the Sumi society to understand the religion and world view of the Sumi Naga. <>

CONSIDERING COMPARISON: A METHOD FOR RELIGIOUS STUDIES by Oliver Freiberger [Oxford University Press, 9780199965007]

The comparative method is an integral part of religious studies. All the technical terms that scholars of religion use on a daily basis, such as ritual, hagiography, shrine, authority, fundamentalism, hybridity, and, of course, religion, are comparative terms.

Yet comparison has been subject to criticism, including postcolonialist and postmodernist critiques. Older approaches are said to have used comparison primarily to confirm preconceptions about religion. More recently, comparison has been criticized as an act of abstraction that does injustice to the particular, neglects differences, and establishes a mostly Western power of definition over the rest of the world.

In this book, Oliver Freiberger takes a closer look at how comparison works. Revisiting critical debates and examining reflections in other disciplines, including comparative history, sociology, comparative theology, and anthropology, Freiberger proposes a model of comparison that is based on a thorough epistemological analysis and that takes both the scholar's situatedness and his or her agency seriously. Examining numerous examples of comparative studies, **CONSIDERING COMPARISON** develops a methodological framework for conducting and evaluating such studies. Freiberger suggests a comparative approach - which he calls *discourse comparison* - that confronts the omnipresent risks of decontextualization, essentialization, and universalization.

This book makes a case for comparison, arguing that it is indispensable for a deeper analytical understanding of what we call religion. The book is intended to enrich the practice of both aspiring and seasoned

comparativists, stimulate much-needed further discussions about comparative methodology, and encourage more scholars to produce responsible comparative studies.

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Selection, Mode, Scale, and Scope
Description and Analysis
Juxtaposition
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5.3. Conclusion

Excerpt: This book is about the comparative method in the study of religion. I realize that some think that cross-cultural comparison was once important but has rightly fallen out of fashion and that others suggest such comparison cannot really be done in a responsible way. I will claim in this book that comparison is not only inevitable in everyday thinking and scholarship at large but also constitutive for religious studies as a discipline. It is indispensable for a deeper understanding of what we call religion. Despite its omnipresence, few scholars have reflected more deeply upon how comparison works in practice, but such a reflection can prove useful both for producing comparative studies and for evaluating them. I will propose a methodological framework that is, I hope, relevant both for theoretical reflections and for the pragmatics of actually doing comparison. And I will suggest a comparative approach—discourse comparison—that helps to confront the omnipresent risks of decontextualization, essentialization, and universalization. My hope is that the book will enrich the considerations of both aspiring and seasoned comparativists, stimulate much-needed further discussions about comparison, and encourage more scholars to produce responsible comparative studies.

This book is, in some ways, a follow-up to my comparative study on ascetic discourses in Brahmanical and early Christian texts. As explained in greater detail in Chapter 5, that study was heavy on analyzing primary sources and comparative work but included rather short and generic reflections on the comparative method as such.

To be sure, this is by no means unusual. Most comparative studies of religion relegate methodological discussions—insofar as they pertain to comparison—to a short section in the introduction, never to be returned to again. That is exactly what I did in my book too, and while I was confident that the study was methodologically sound, I felt an unease about this lack of reflection. When I subsequently explored the scholarly literature about comparison more deeply and systematically, I was both relieved and disturbed by how little work has been done on how comparison operates as a method. On the one hand, there were works like mine, which conducted a comparative study but did not reflect much on the method of comparison; on the other, there were many contributions, mostly article-length, that tackled more abstract questions, often about fundamental problems or the general value of comparison, but very few of those translated their reflections into methodical guidelines. When, for example, authors note that comparison is a political act and that Western comparativists have used comparison to classify phenomena in other cultures in their own terms in order to execute power over them, what exactly does that mean for conducting a concrete comparative study today? If we do not want to reject comparison entirely—an option that, at times, seems to be suggested implicitly but rarely explicitly (for good reason)—how can we compare responsibly? Most such contributions stop at criticizing comparison—or, in the other camp, at justifying it—and rarely speak about implications for actual comparative practice.

The disconnect between theoretical discussions about comparison and actual comparative studies tends to yield different responses from scholars of religion. Discouraged by the theoretical criticism, many refrain from undertaking comparative projects altogether. Others include an inconsequential nod to those discussions (or sweepingly dismiss the criticism) in a short introductory section and then move on to do their comparative study anyway in their own, idiosyncratic ways. This book attempts to address the gap between theoretical debates and comparative practice by exploring how comparison works and by proposing an analytical methodological framework that relates comparative practice to theoretical reflections. Aside from revisiting discussions within religious studies, it also draws on methodological insights from other disciplines such as comparative history, sociology, anthropology, comparative theology, political science, and others.

The book begins with an orientation about the academic location of comparison. Chapter I breaks down the common phrase "comparative method in the study of religion" and seeks to clarify the scholarly contexts in which comparativists of religion operate. It argues that religious studies ought to be recognized as an academic discipline—and as one that is grounded in comparison. Speaking of disciplinarity helps to acknowledge the scholarly discourses and goals of other comparative disciplines and to engage in productive interdisciplinary conversations. The chapter also describes three different ways in which comparison is used in religious studies and argues that it makes sense to speak of "the comparative method." Finally, it proposes two primary goals of comparison in religious studies and argues that with its particular configuration of goals, comparative method, and disciplinarity, religious studies makes a unique contribution to scholarship.

Chapter 2 addresses theoretical criticism that has been raised and challenges with which comparison is confronted. It discusses the most common objections—namely, that comparative studies decontextualize and essentialize religious phenomena—and it engages with postcolonialist and postmodernist critiques and their insistence on acknowledging difference. Turning to the opposite side of the academic spectrum, the chapter then reviews the relation of naturalistic approaches (such as the cognitive science of religion) to comparison and their focus on universals and sameness.

Noting the problems and incorporating the benefits of those critiques and approaches, Chapter 3 explores the epistemology of comparison by taking a close look at the origin and genesis of the comparands (the items that are to be compared) and the tertium comparationis (the aspect with regard to which they are compared) as well as their mutual relationship. It proposes a scholar-centered approach to comparative methodology that takes the situatedness of the scholar seriously but also acknowledges her or his agency in conducting a comparative study.

Chapter 4 seeks to connect the insights gained in Chapter 3 with comparative practice. It outlines a methodological framework that identifies two sets of elements of the comparative enterprise. First it describes the general configuration of a comparative study by distinguishing modes, scales, and scopes of comparison. Each of these categories comprises several options, out of which the researcher selects those that are most appropriate for the study. Second, the chapter breaks the comparative process down into the five operations of selection, description and analysis, juxtaposition, redescription, and rectification/theory formation. This methodological framework provides a vocabulary that enables us to talk about the elements of the comparative method and is meant to serve two purposes. A comparativist may use it as a template or foil against which to devise a comparative study. It provides the researcher with tools for questioning, reconsidering, and defending the decisions made in the course of the study. Second, the framework may be used to analyze and evaluate existing comparative studies. Being able to pinpoint, with this terminology, specific strengths or weaknesses enables us to provide more precise and constructive criticism (or praise).

Finally, Chapter 5 introduces a comparative approach that I call discourse comparison. The approach focuses on the discursive context of the comparands and highlights the plurality of voices, the tensions, the conflicts, and simply the heterogeneity of opinions that are expressed in the sources about the studied phenomenon. To exemplify this approach the chapter presents, as a case study, my earlier work on ascetic discourses in early Brahmanical and early Christian texts. At the same time, it analyzes that work along the lines of the methodological framework proposed in Chapter 4 in order to demonstrate the ways in which the terminology of the framework can be applied to a concrete comparative study.

This book makes a case for comparison. It seeks to rehabilitate the comparative method in the study of religion by highlighting its fundamental role for the academic mission of religious studies and by proposing both a responsible theoretical approach and an analytical vocabulary for comparative practice. If it can encourage some readers to pursue new and interesting comparative projects, it has accomplished its main goal. Rather than claiming to conclude a debate, however, I view this book as the beginning of a discussion about comparative methodology in the study of religion, a discussion that is almost nonexistent so far. I expect that some readers

will object to certain proposals and conclusions (or all of them), and I look forward to studying counterproposals of methodological schemes, to being persuaded, to revising mine, or to defending it. It is time that we engage in questions that have rarely been addressed but are so crucial: How does comparison work? What does it do for the study of religion? And how can we conduct comparative studies in a productive and responsible way? This book offers some answers to these questions. <>

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE RECONSIDERED: A BUILDING-BLOCK APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF RELIGION AND OTHER SPECIAL THINGS by Ann Taves [Princeton University Press, 9780691140872]

The essence of religion was once widely thought to be a unique form of experience that could not be explained in neurological, psychological, or sociological terms. In recent decades scholars have questioned the privileging of the idea of religious experience in the study of religion, an approach that effectively isolated the study of religion from the social and natural sciences. **RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE RECONSIDERED** lays out a framework for research into religious phenomena that reclaims experience as a central concept while bridging the divide between religious studies and the sciences.

Ann Taves shifts the focus from "religious experience," conceived as a fixed and stable thing, to an examination of the processes by which people attribute meaning to their experiences. She proposes a new approach that unites the study of religion with fields as diverse as neuroscience, anthropology, sociology, and psychology to better understand how these processes are incorporated into the broader cultural formations we think of as religious or spiritual. Taves addresses a series of key questions: how can we set up studies without obscuring contestations over meaning and value? What is the relationship between experience and consciousness? How can research into consciousness help us access and interpret the experiences of others? Why do people individually or collectively explain their experiences in religious terms? How can we set up studies that allow us to compare experiences across times and cultures?

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE RECONSIDERED demonstrates how methods from the sciences can be combined with those from the humanities to advance a naturalistic understanding of the experiences that people deem religious.

Excerpt: For reasons of temperament and training, I find it natural and exciting to make forays across what many scholars see as an unbridgeable divide between the humanities and the natural sciences. I must admit to a certain impatience with those of my fellow humanists who police these boundaries and caution against serious engagement with the natural sciences. In my view, it is better to construct rough and ready bridges than to wait for the construction of a perfect bridge that will stand for all time. This book is devoted to building some usable, albeit imperfect, bridges linking the study of experience in religious studies, the social-psychological study of the mind, and neuroscientific study of the brain.

I have written this book primarily for humanists and humanistically oriented social scientists who study religion using historical and ethnographic methods. My hope is that the conceptual tools provided here will embolden these readers to make greater use of scientific research that is illuminating the complex ways in which the brain-mind is both shaped by and shapes socio-cultural processes. I also hope that this book will be useful to experimentalists who study religion—to help them consider ways in which the resources of the humanities might enhance their experimental research designs or provide new contexts for testing hypotheses.

The focus of the book is on experiences deemed religious (and, by extension, other things considered special) rather than "religious experience." This shift in terminology signals my interest in exploring the processes whereby experiences come to be understood as religious at multiple levels, from the intrapersonal to intergroup. To understand these processes, I argue that we need to work comparatively, but that we cannot limit our comparisons to "religious things," as if "religious things" or "religious experiences" comprised a fixed and stable set. Rather, much as scientists compare experimental and control groups, we need to compare things that people consider religious with similar things that they do not. The phrase "experiences deemed religious" is contentious, as is each of the individual words "experience," "deemed," and "religious." A chapter is devoted to

each word, starting with "religion," and followed by "experience" and then "explanation," which takes up "deeming." The fourth chapter—devoted to comparison—discusses how we might best set up comparisons between experiences that are sometimes considered religious and sometimes not.

Scholars of religion regularly raise certain objections to the approach I am advocating. First, they suggest that the subject matter is passé in an era that has abandoned experience for discourse about experience. Second, they worry that an approach that compares religious and nonreligious things will wind up being reductionistic—that is, it will "reduce" religion to something else. And, third, they offer critiques of scientific methods and claims drawn from science studies. While I do not deny the many legitimate concerns, humanists have raised relative to scientific methods and claims, I do not think these concerns should stop us from engaging with research on the other side of the academic divide.

The book addresses the subject of religious experience directly and the problems of reductionism and humanistic fears of the sciences indirectly and by example. The orientation of the book is practical more than philosophical. In the process of identifying methods that will allow us to cross back and forth across this humanistic/scientific divide easier and responsibly, I draw from work in religious studies, anthropology, history, philosophy of science, psychology, and neuroscience. In doing so, I sidestep contentious issues where possible, privileging method over theory and philosophy in the interests of actually crossing the divide, while alerting readers to the unresolved philosophical and theoretical issues in the notes.' The book is not intended to address all the thorny issues surrounding "religious experience" but is designed to alert researchers to some of the most hotly contested issues and to provide suggestions for dealing with those that directly affect the way we set up and conduct our research.

The book presupposes that we humans are reflexively conscious biological animals, that is, animals who are not only consciously aware,—but aware of being aware. This means that our experience can be studied both as a biological phenomenon from the science side of the divide and as a subjective phenomenon from the humanistic side. The book is written for those interested in taking both perspectives into account to develop a naturalistic understanding of experiences deemed religious. Such a pursuit does not rule out religious understandings of experience that are compatible with a naturalistic approach, but it does not develop them., My own view is that the cultivation of some forms of experience that we might want to deem religious or spiritual can enhance our well-being and our ability to function in the world, individually and collectively. Identifying those forms, however, is not the purpose of this book.

My eagerness to get on with the task is fueled by a long-standing set of interdisciplinary interests. Although trained as a historian of religion with a particular focus on Christianity in the modern era, I was originally drawn into the field through discussions of theory and method, an interest I have maintained throughout my career. I was able to integrate those interests, or at least bring them into conversation with one another, in my book **FITS, TRANCES, AND VISIONS,** which traced the history of the interaction between experiencing religion and medical and psychological explanations of experience over time.

Though this was not its overt focus, **FITS, TRANCES, AND VISIONS** was inspired by the realization that there are commonalities between multiple personality, possession trance, and religious inspiration that are rooted in capacities and that new insights could be generated by comparing the similarities and differences between them. This comparison, which has continued to fascinate me, led to further work across the disciplines of psychiatry, anthropology, psychology, and religious studies over the past decade and in the process generated the methodological reflections that make up the present book.

My particular interest in and preoccupation with unusual sorts of experiences has influenced the choice of examples presented in this book. There is no reason, however, why this bias should preclude using the approaches recommended here to study more ordinary types of experience. So, too, the traditions engaged reflect my own range of expertise. As the metaphor of rough and ready bridges is intended to suggest, I do not intend this book to be the last word on anything, including matters of method. I do hope, however, that it will

foster a collaborative spirit among those interested in working across the humanities/sciences divide and an interest in testing and refining methods and the0ries in an effort to enhance our collective understanding of things deemed religious.

The Problem of "Religious Experience"

The idea of "religious experience" is deeply embedded in the study of religion and religions as it (religion) and they (religions) have come to be understood in the modern West. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many modernizers in the West and elsewhere advanced the idea that a certain kind of experience, whether characterized as religious, mystical, or spiritual, constituted the essence of "religion" and the common core of the world's "religions." This understanding of religion and the religions dominated the academic study of religion during the last century. Key twentieth century thinkers, such as Rudolf Otto, Gerardus van der Leeuw, Joachim Wach, Mircea Eliade, and Ninian Smart, located the essence of religion in a unique form of experience that they associated with distinctively religious concepts such as the sacred, the numinous, or divine power.

This approach has been heavily criticized over the last thirty-five years on two major grounds. First, it Sets religious experience up as the epitome of something unique or sui generis,' which must be studied using the special methods of the humanities. As a unique sort of experience, they argued that scholars should privilege the views of believers (the first person or subjective point of view) and should not try to explain their experiences in biological, psychological, or sociological terms for fear of "reducing" it to something else. Second, it constituted religion and the religions as a special aspect of human life and culture set apart from other aspects. Critics claimed that this approach isolated the study of religion from other disciplines, masked a tacitly theological agenda of a liberal ecumenical sort, and embodied covert Western presuppositions about religion and religions.

The critics are basically right about this. Around 1900, that is, at the height of the modern era, Western intellectuals in a range of disciplines were preoccupied with the idea of experience. This spilled over into theology and the emerging academic study of religion where thinkers with a liberal or modernist bent, mostly Protestant and a few Catholic, turned to the concept of religious experience as a source of theological authority at a time when claims based on other sources of authority—ecclesiastical, doctrinal, and biblical—were increasingly subject to historical critique.-For modernist theologians who followed in the steps of the liberal Protestant theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher, the self-authenticating experience of the individual seemed like a promising source of religious renewal, less vulnerable to the acids of historical critical methods.

Early twentieth-century liberal Christian theologians, such as Rudolf Otto, Nathan Söderblom, and Friedrich Heiler, placed the experience of the numinous, sacred, or holy at the center of Christianity and, by extension, at the center of all other religions as well.' Hindu and Buddhist modernizers, such as Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, made similar moves relative to their own traditions, using the idea of experience to undercut traditional sources of authority and interpret traditional concepts in new ways amidst the cross-currents of colonialism, westernization, and nationalist self-assertion. While maintaining the centrality of their own traditions, each used the notion of experience to underscore what they viewed as the essence of all religions.

It was in this context that the Harvard psychologist William James gave the Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh in 1902. These lectures, which were immediately published as The Varieties of Religious Experience, not only defined religion in terms of religious experience—that is, as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider divine"—but popularized what had been a predominantly Protestant concept as a core feature of religion in general. While James was responsible in many ways for initiating the turn to religious experience in the psychology of religion and religious studies, he did not—like so many who followed him—claim that religious experience was sui generis and refuse to explain it in psychological or sociological terms Indeed, his aim as a psychologist was to explain religious experience in psychological terms, while at the same time leaving open the possibility that it pointed to something more.

Although James should not be grouped with those who argued for a sui generis understanding of religion, his definition privileged experience of a particular sort over religious doctrine, practice, or institutions. In privileging sudden, discrete authenticating moments of individual experience (such as revelations, visions, and dramatic conversion experiences) over ordinary, everyday experience or the experience of groups, he introduced a bias toward sudden, individual experience that not only shaped the contemporary Western idea of religious experience but also related concepts such as mysticism and spirituality as well.

The prominent twentieth-century scholars of religion already mentioned—Gerardus van der Leeuw, Joachim Wach, Mircea Eliade, and Ninian Smart—built on this turn-of-the-century emphasis on experience to formulate their understanding of religion and the distinctive phenomenological methods they thought should be used to study it. In the wake of the general linguistic turn within the humanities, however, this entire approach was called into question. Many scholars of religion, eager to deconstruct an essentialist understanding of religion and religious experience, abandoned the focus on religious experience and recast the study of religion in light of critical theories that emphasize the role of language in constituting social reality in the context of relationships of power and inequality. Scholars have now traced the history of these concepts in Western thought, their appropriation by turn-of-the-century intellectuals with modernist inclinations in other parts of the world such as India and Japan, and their use by missionaries in colonial contexts. These Studies, although well integrated with efforts at deconstruction across the humanities, are usually isolated from efforts to understand religion in the natural sciences. Indeed, those who embrace critical theory within the humanities and social sciences have typically been more interested in deconstructing scientific efforts than in bridging between science and critical theory.

Scholars in anthropology, sociology, and psychology—disciplines that we might expect to serve as bridges between the humanities and natural sciences—have faced various difficulties in that regard. Within mainstream anthropology of religion, the primary focus has been on shamanism and spirit-possession with far less attention paid to so-called world religions, particularly Christianity. In reciprocal fashion, religious studies has focused for the most part on "high religions" with "gods" and relegated the study of shamanism and spirits—that is, "folk religion"—to anthropology. Although William James and his collaborators in the Society for Psychical Research thought of spirit-possession and mediumship as intimately related to the broader realms of religion and religious experience, they downplayed those connections in their published work and were not able to overcome the emerging division of labor between religious and theological studies, on the one hand, and the anthropology of religion, on the other. Given this twentieth-century division of labor, scholars have tended to use terms such as "religious experience," "mysticism," and "spirituality" with reference to so-called "high" religions but not as commonly in relation to "folk" or "primitive" religion.

In terms of its orientation to the humanities and natural sciences, anthropology has been divided right down the middle. More than any other discipline, anthropology has been a battleground in the methodological wars between critical theorists oriented toward the humanities and social scientists oriented toward the natural sciences. While race and gender have been the most hotly contested issues, any attempt to bring science into the humanities and critical theory into science can raise suspicions among anthropologists. There are pockets, however, within anthropology—psychological anthropology and medical anthropology in particular—that do bridge the humanistic and the natural sciences, and there is some exciting new work being done on religion in these subfields. Generally speaking, mainstream anthropological research on shamanism and spirit-possession has exemplified the tension between reductionistic, naturalistic, or medical models, on the one hand, and phenomenological, contextualizing cultural-studies approaches, on the other, although here, too, a few anthropologists have made innovative efforts to bridge the gap between the natural sciences and the humanities.

Although some sociologists, especially those following in the tradition of Emile Durkheim, have attended to collective and in some cases even individual experience, they have focused on the social causes and effects of experience apart from the psychological and biological. In general, psychologists and sociologists of religion

have distinguished between the private religious experience of individuals and the public religiosity of organized groups, with psychologists of religion focusing on the former and sociologists of religion on the latter. Although there is some newer work that runs counter to these trends, psychologists of religion have devoted far more attention to religious experience than sociologists.

Due to their focus on religious experience, including spirituality and mysticism, the relationship between the psychology of religion and the general field of psychology is parallel in some respects to the relationship between religious studies and other disciplines. Although research in the psychology of religion is conducted across the whole array of subfields within psychology running the gamut from the natural to the social sciences, psychologists. of religion, like scholars of religion, have wrestled with the question of whether religion is unique among human behaviors or can be accounted for using the research methods and/or explanatory principles that are applied to human behavior more generally. Those who claimed that religion is in some sense unique (sui generis) have resisted "reductionistic" approaches to the psychology of religion and maintained the need for distinct approaches that set it apart from the rest of psychology.

While the psychology of religion, like religious studies, has been through a long period of critical self-reflection, some within the field now advocate a "multilevel interdisciplinary paradigm" that would allow the psychology of religion to "reach out to evolutionary biology, neuroscience, anthropology, cognitive science, and ... philosophy in a generalized cross-disciplinary approach to critiquing and sharpening the assumptions of science". The multilevel interdisciplinary paradigm would thus link "subfields within psychology as the gore discipline in a broader effort." This new paradigm undercuts the old binary distinction between reductionism and uniqueness, reframing it in relation to theories of emergence in which emergent properties, such as consciousness and group leadership, are understood to emerge at different levels of analysis (ibid). Experience—whether religious, spiritual, or mystical—is definitely a phenomenon for study within this new paradigm, but the implications of the paradigm for setting up experientially related objects of study that can be examined across disciplines have not been adequately worked out. Without further refinement at the design stage, it will be difficult to connect different lines of research.

Finally, in the last decade and a half (since 1990), there has been a. dramatic increase in studies examining the neurological, cognitive, and evolutionary underpinnings of religion in light of the rapid advances in the study of the brain and consciousness. Scholars who identify with the growing subfield of the cognitive science of religion are drawn from disparate disciplines including psychology, anthropology, religious studies, and philosophy. Though most of them are well versed in the study of religion, they have focused on belief and practice (ritual) and with a few exceptions, such as Azari and Livingston have ignored experience. In addition, scholars and researchers, including a number of self-identified neurotheologians, most of whom lack training in theology or religious studies, have enthusiastically embraced the challenges of identifying the neural correlates of religious experience without engaging the critiques of the concept that led many scholars of religion to abandon it.

After decades of critical discussion of the concept, we can neither simply invoke the idea of "religious experience" as if it were a self-evidently unique sort of experience nor leave experience out of any sensible account of religion. How, then, should we understand "religious experience"? Given the critiques of the last several decades, is there any way the concept can be studied by those interested in understanding such experiences naturalistically?

EXPERIENCES DEEMED RELIGIOUS

Rather than abandon the study of experience, we should disaggregate the concept of "religious experience" and study the wide range of experiences to which religious significance has been attributed. If we want to understand how anything at all, including experience, becomes religious, we need to turn our attention to the processes whereby people sometimes ascribe the special characteristics to things that we (as scholars) associate with terms such as "religious," "magical," "mystical," "spiritual," et cetera. Disaggregating "religious experience" in this way will allow us to focus on the interaction between, psychobiological, social, and cultural-linguistic

processes in relation to carefully specified types of experiences sometimes considered religious and to build methodological bridges across the divide between the humanities and the sciences.

A focus on things deemed religious in turn allows us to make a distinction between simple ascriptions, in which an individual thing is set apart as special, and composite ascriptions, in which simple ascriptions are incorporated into more complex formations, such as those that scholars and others designate as "spiritualities" or "religions." This distinction provides a basis for examining the various roles that experience in general and unusual experiences in particular play in both simple ascriptive formations (in which, e.g., a single event is set apart as special) and composite ascriptive formations (in which, e.g., an event is viewed as originary and people seek to recreate it in the present). The distinction between simple and composite formations, thus, allows us to envision a way of studying "religion" that allows us to understand how humans have used things deemed religious (simple ascriptions) as building blocks to create the more complex formations (composite ascriptions) we typically refer to as "religions" or "spiritualities."

PREVIOUS WORK

The distinction between simple and composite ascriptions builds on a particular reading of the French sociologist Emile Durkheim and has been' anticipated to varying degrees in more recent work. James Dewey (1934) anticipated a similar distinction when he stressed the difference between "religion, a religion, and the religious" (3) and referred to "religious elements of experience" rather than "religious experience" in order to avoid setting up religious experience as "something sui generis" (10, 13). More recently, Hent de Vries makes an analytical distinction between a general or generic concept of religion and the "things" (words, gestures, powers, et cetera) that constitute the "elementary forms" in which religion, abstractly conceived, is instantiated. De Vries's approach in Religion: Beyond a Concept, like Dewey's in A Common Faith, is constructive as well as analytical. Where Dewey sought to articulate a scientifically grounded "common faith," de Vries and collaborators seek to move beyond the abstract concept of religion to develop what he calls a "negative metaphysics" or "minimal theology" designed to sketch the "emerging features" of an "abstract and virtual “global religion."

Nina Azari, one of the few neuroscientists with dual doctorates in both psychology and religious studies, appropriates attribution theory critically in her recent religious-studies dissertation. The dissertation, which builds on her pioneering use of brain-imaging techniques to identify neural correlates of religious experience provides the most sophisticated attempt so far to come to terms with the issues surrounding the neuroscientific study of religious experience. While our conclusions are compatible, they are intended for different audiences and thus are expressed in somewhat different terms and framed at different levels of generality. Azari's work is directed primarily toward neuroscientists studying contemporary Western subjects, philosophers of religion, and theologians interested in reflecting on their findings, She critiques both attribution theory and the relatively unsophisticated theoretical underpinnings of neuroscientific studies of religious experience in light of recent research on emotion. This research allows her to undercut the inadequate conceptualization of emotion that informed earlier neuroscientific studies of religious experience as well as overly narrow conceptions of causality in some versions of attribution theory. In contrast, this book aims to rehabilitate a more broadly defined concept of experience and to suggest an approach to studying experiences deemed religious that can be used by researchers who do not focus on contemporary Western subjects.

Azari's approach has specific limitations that need to be overcome in order to advance this larger agenda. First, although defining religious experience from the perspective of the subject works well when studying modern Western subjects for whom the concept of religious experience is meaningful, this work aims to support research on singular experiences across cultures and historical time periods. Second, although experience can usually be construed as having an emotional valence, it is not always its most salient feature. Defining experience in terms of emotion deflects attention from a range of unusual experiences that are granted special significance, such as lucid dreams, auditory and visual hallucinations, sensed presences, possession trance, and out-of-body experiences, which this book seeks to include. Third, a focus on individual, decontextualized.

The strictly analytical focus of the distinction made here, however, more closely parallels that of sociologist Danièle Hervieu-Léger and psychologists such as Kenneth Pargament and Annette Mahoney. Hervieu-Léger distinguishes between the sacred character that can be conferred on things and religion as a way of organizing meaning through chains of belief. Pargament and Mahoney distinguish between the sanctification of various objects or aspects of life and religion as "a search for significance in ways related to the sacred." In making these distinctions, these scholars redefine the first-order terms "sacred" and "religion" as second-order terms for the purposes of their research.

Although I adopted this course as well in earlier drafts, doing so makes it harder to distinguish between our aims as scholars and those of the people we are studying and thus risks obscuring the contestations over and transformations of experience that we want to study on the ground. Since there is no way to specify an inherently contested phenomenon precisely, I will propose that we situate what people variously refer to emically (on the ground) as "religious," "spiritual," "mystical," "magical," and so forth in the context of larger processes of meaning making and valuation, and specifically in relation to the process of singularization (Kopytoff 1986), by means of which people deem some things special and set them apart from others. In my revisions, I have tried to be clear rather than relentlessly consistent in my use of terms, so the reader will find references to both "experiences deemed religious" and "things considered special" as seems appropriate in any given context.

The distinction between simple and composite ascriptions relies heavily on attribution theory, which seeks to explain how people explain events. Long a staple of social psychology, attribution theory was applied to religious experience in the 1970s and to religion in general in the 1980s. Although attribution theory has been widely presupposed by psychologists of religion, Some religious-studies scholars have rejected it because they think it overrides the subjective sense of those who claim their experiences are inherently religious rather than culturally constructed. In order to respond to this criticism, we will need to distinguish between attributions (commonsense causal explanations) that people often supply consciously and ascriptions (the assignment of a quality or characteristic to something) that may be supplied implicitly below the threshold of awareness.' The distinction between attribution and ascription will allow us in turn to connect attribution theory more fully with research on implicit, nonconscious mental processing experiences tends to reproduce the relatively narrow understanding of "religious experience" that has been of particular interest to modern Western philosophers of religion and theologians. By extending attribution theory to processes at the group level and to composite as well as simple ascriptions, we can plate the study of experiences that people consider special within a broader interdisciplinary field of inquiry and open new possibilities for understanding the way that religions are constructed.

THE ARGUMENT

The argument unfolds in chapters devoted to religion, experience, explanation, and comparison. Chapter 1 (Religion) addresses the question of how scholars can specify what it is they want to study without obscuring the contestations over meaning taking place on the ground. Since there is no way to specify an inherently contested phenomenon precisely, I argue that scholars can situate what people characterize as religious, spiritual, mystical, magical, superstitious, and so forth in relation to larger processes of meaning making and valuation, in which people deem some things special and set them apart from others. We can then identify marks of specialness (that set things apart in various ways), things that are often considered special (ideal things and anomalous things, including anomalous beings), and the ways in which simple ascriptions of specialness can be taken up into more complex formations. These various distinctions provide numerous options for setting up more precisely designed research projects to probe competing schemes of valuation and singularization in different social contexts.

Chapter 2 (Experience) reconsiders views of experience and representation that have colored humanistic discussions of religious experience in light of recent discussions of experience and consciousness among philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists. Distinctions between types of consciousness (transitive and

intransitive), levels of consciousness (lower and higher), and levels of mental processing (conscious and unconscious) allow us to consider the relationship between experience and representation in an evolutionary and developmental perspective relative to the experience of animals and prelinguistic humans. Viewing experience in this way allows us to consider how we gain access to experience (our own and that of others) and how it acquires meaning as it arises in the body and through interaction with others. A more dynamic model of how we articulate our own experience and that of others illuminates a range of data that we can gather about experience and allows us to reconsider the relationship between experience and representation in some specific cases (dreams, possession trance, and meditation) in light of the data available for studying them.

The dynamic model of how we come to know our experience and the experiences of others developed in chapter 2 is based on research on embodiment and theory of mind. Theory of mind is a key aspect of what researchers refer to as "folk psychology," the set of very basic, cross culturally stable assumptions that we use to predict, explain, or understand the everyday actions of others in terms of the mental states we presume lie behind them. Folk psychology, which also informs the latest work in attribution theory, lays the foundation for the development of a more interactive understanding of how and why people explain their own and other's actions in chapter 3 (Explanation). Drawing on the multilevel attributional framework proposed by Hewstone (1989), I show how Malle's interactive approach can be extended to various levels of analysis—intrapersonal, interpersonal, intragroup, and intergroup—some of which fall under the traditional purview of historians and ethnographers. Though the attributional process takes a somewhat different form at each level, an interactive approach allows us to conceptualize everyday explanations as an interpretive process involving negotiation and contestation at every level.

In arguing against the sui generis approach to religious experience, I am arguing that the comparison between religious and nonreligious subjects taken for granted in experimental design can and should be extended to historical and ethnographic research. In chapter 4 (Comparison), I sketch some of the ways that researchers can construct similar sorts of comparisons using historical and ethnographic data. Returning to the distinctions between simple and composite formations set out in chapter 1, I set up comparisons that illustrate what we can learn from comparisons between simple formations, between composite formations, and between simple and composite formations.

The distinctions between ascription arid attribution and simple and composite formations have implications not only for the study of experiences that people consider special but also for the study of 'religion more generally. The distinction between ascription and attribution allows us to distinguish between the creation of special things through a process of singularization, in which people consciously or unconsciously ascribe special characteristics to things, and the attribution of causality to the thing 'or to behaviors associated with it. The distinction between simple ascriptions, in which an individual thing is set apart as special, and composite ascriptions, in which simple ascriptions are incorporated into the more complex formations characteristic of religions or spiritualities, in turn allows us to envision a building-block approach to the study of religion. The implications of these distinctions for the study of religion are drawn out in the conclusion.

WHY AN ATTRIBUTIONAL APPROACH IS BETTER

Reframing the concept of "religious experience" initially as "experiences deemed religious" and then more broadly as a subset of things people consider special allows us to do three things. First, it forces us to sort out who is deeming things religious or characterizing them as special and on what grounds, both at the level of scholarship and that of general human behavior. Analysis of the different ways that things can be set apart as special and protected by taboos will suggest that the sui generis approach to the study of religion, which defines religion in terms of religious experience, sets the study of religion apart and protects it with taboos against comparing it with nonreligious things. If instead we sitúate the processes whereby people characterize things as religious, mystical, magical, and so forth within larger processes of meaning making and valuation (singularization), we are better able to analyze the contestations over the meaning and value of particular

things and the way that those things are incorporated into and perpetuated by larger socio-cultural formations, such as religious traditions and spiritual disciplines.

Second, it allows us to position experience, traditionally understood as a central concept 'within the study of religion, not as something that sets the study of religion apart from all other forms of knowledge but rather locates it in relation to them. By locating how we come to know our own and others' experience through processes that are simultaneously embodied and interactive, we can make a concept familiar to scholars of religion usable across disciplines and further a process of conceptual integration that is presupposed in the natural sciences but less well advanced elsewhere.' In drawing from different disciplines to examine processes of ascription and attribution at and between various levels (intrapersonal, interpersonal, intragroup, and intergroup), we can escape the simple binaries in which the reductionism debate has been framed in, religious studies and explore the distinctive features of different levels of analysis in more sophisticated ways.

Third, an attributional approach allows us to view experiences—and especially unusual experiences—as a subset of the many special things that may be incorporated into the more complex formations we think of as "religions." The twentieth-century focus on "religious experience" rather than experiences deemed religious deflected attention from the various components that taken together constitute a "religion." Refocusing our attention on the component parts and the disparate ways in which they can be assembled provides a method for assessing the role of unusual experiences in the emergence and development of religions. Although conceived to solve the problems surrounding "religious experience," the method provides a more promising way forward for the study of religion generally. <>

FITS, TRANCES, AND VISIONS: EXPERIENCING RELIGION AND EXPLAINING EXPERIENCE FROM WESLEY TO JAMES by Ann Taves [Princeton University Pres, 9780691028767]

Fits, trances, visions, speaking in tongues, clairvoyance, out-of-body experiences, possession. Believers have long viewed these and similar involuntary experiences as religious--as manifestations of God, the spirits, or the Christ within. Skeptics, on the other hand, have understood them as symptoms of physical disease, mental disorder, group dynamics, or other natural causes. In this sweeping work of religious and psychological history, Ann Taves explores the myriad ways in which believers and detractors interpreted these complex experiences in Anglo-American culture between the mid-eighteenth and early-twentieth centuries.

Taves divides the book into three sections. In the first, ranging from 1740 to 1820, she examines the debate over trances, visions, and other involuntary experiences against the politically charged backdrop of Anglo-American evangelicalism, established churches, Enlightenment thought, and a legacy of religious warfare. In the second part, covering 1820 to 1890, she highlights the interplay between popular psychology--particularly the ideas of "animal magnetism" and mesmerism--and movements in popular religion: the disestablishment of churches, the decline of Calvinist orthodoxy, the expansion of Methodism, and the birth of new religious movements. In the third section, Taves traces the emergence of professional psychology between 1890 and 1910 and explores the implications of new ideas about the subconscious mind, hypnosis, hysteria, and dissociation for the understanding of religious experience.

Throughout, Taves follows evolving debates about whether fits, trances, and visions are natural (and therefore not religious) or supernatural (and therefore religious). She pays particular attention to a third interpretation, proposed by such "mediators" as William James, according to which these experiences are natural *and* religious. Taves shows that ordinary people as well as educated elites debated the meaning of these experiences and reveals the importance of interactions between popular and elite culture in accounting for how people experienced religion and explained experience.

Combining rich detail with clear and rigorous argument, this is a major contribution to our understanding of Protestant revivalism and the historical interplay between religion and psychology.

Excerpt: This book is about the interplay between experiencing religion and explaining experience. It is mostly about Anglo-American Protestants and those who left the Protestant fold beginning with the transatlantic awakening in the early eighteenth century and ending with the rise of the psychology of religion and the birth of Pentecostalism in the early twentieth. It focuses on a class of seemingly involuntary acts alternately explained in religious and secular terms. These involuntar) experiences include uncontrolled bodily movements (fits, bodily exercises, falling as dead, catalepsy, convulsions); spontaneous vocalizations (crying out, shouting speaking in tongues); unusual sensory experiences (trances, visions, voices, clairvoyance, out-of-body experiences); and alterations of consciousness and/or memory (dreams, somnium, somnambulism, mesmeric trance, mediumistic trance hypnotism, possession, alternating personality).

Those who experienced religion, not surprisingly, explained their experience in religious terms. Those who appear in this narrative typically did so in terms of the "power" or "presence" or "indwelling" of God, or Christ, or the Spirit, 01 spirits. Typical expressions include "the indwelling of the Spirit" (Jonathan Edwards), "the witness of the Spirit" (John Wesley), "the power of God" (early American Methodists), being "filled with the Spirit of the Lord" (early Adventists), "communing with spirits" (Spiritualists), "the Christ within" (New Thought), "streams of holy fire and power" (Methodist Holiness), "a religion of the Spirit and Power' (the Emmanuel Movement), and "the baptism of the Holy Spirit" (early Pentecostals). Biblical imagery figured prominently in the explanations of Protestants anc ex-Protestants. Pentecost, in which the disciples received the Holy Spirit, runs as a leitmotif throughout. Some early-nineteenth-century Methodists believed the disciples shouted at Pentecost. Some mid-nineteenth-century Spiritualists held that the disciples were inspired by spirits. Some late-nineteenth-century Methodists insisted that the disciples were sanctified at Pentecost, while early-twentiethcentury Pentecostals argued that the crucial event was speaking in tongues.

Those who challenged such claims typically characterized their opponents as "enthusiasts" or "fanatics" and offered naturalistic or secularizing explanations of their experiences. Depending on the era, critics framed their explanations in terms of the imagination, animal spirits, animal magnetism, mesmerism, hysteria, hypnosis, subconscious automatisms, and suggestion. Those who explained such experiences in this way were not necessarily outsiders to the traditions in question, nor were they necessarily opposed to all claims of religious experience. Regardless of where they positioned themselves, however, they explained claims they regarded as

false in naturalistic or secularizing terms. Some who experienced religion, such as the Spiritualists, challenged the dominant tendency to dichotomize religious experience and naturalistic explanation. Committed to reconciling science and religion, they insisted on explaining their experience in religious and naturalistic terms.

Much of the writing on this topic has either taken the critics' charges of enthusiasm or fanaticism at face value or has focused exclusively on those who claimed to have experienced religion. These histories generally dichotomize explanation and experience, on the one hand, and intellectual abstraction and cultural embeddedness, on the other, and then ascribe these characteristics to different strata within society. The result is that educated elites are typically depicted as explaining (away) religious experience in abstract terms, while ordinary people, embedded in traditions of faith and practice, are depicted as having them. In an attempt to undercut the stereotyped narrative in which educated secularizing elites combat the superstitions of ordinary people, I have placed those experiencing religion and those explaining experience, ordinary people and elites, in the same narrative and made the interaction between them the focus.'

In doing so, I have not assumed that ordinary people were the only ones experiencing religion and elites the only ones explaining experience. As I hope this book will amply demonstrate, claims about religious experience were consistently contested at a grassroots level and significant theoretical explanations of experience were generated by the self-educated as well as by intellectual elites. Conversely, while the experience of religion was integrally bound up with traditions of discourse and practice, those who explained such experiences by abstracting and comparing them to other things were also bound up in other, often competing, communities of discourse and practice. By recontextualizing explanations of experience in their own traditions of discourse and practice, we can see something of what was at stake for both those experiencing religion and those explaining experience in the period from Wesley to James.

The book is divided into three parts. Each reflects significant changes in discourse, practice, and social location of the experiences in question. Part I , "Formalism, Enthusiasm, and True Religion, 1740-1820" highlights the politically charged interpretations of Anglo-American evangelicalism promulgated during the eighteenth century against a backdrop of established churches, Enlightenment thought, and a legacy of religious warfare. The focus of debate was dreams, trances, visions, and various involuntary vocalizations and bodily movements, referred to as fits, falling as if dead, bodily exercises, crying out, and shouting. The discourse of formalism, enthusiasm, and true religion extended into the early nineteenth century and informed the development of American Methodism in the decades immediately after the Revolutionary War.

Part II, "Popular Psychology and Popular Religion, 1820-1890," highlights the widespread interpretive creativity unleashed in the United States during the middle decades of the nineteenth century with the disestablishment of the churches, the decline of Calvinist orthodoxy, the continued expansion of Methodism, and the birth of new religious movements. Wheras in the previous period, fits, bodily exercises, trances, and visions seemed to occur spontaneously, the new psychology of animal magnetism provided people with a means of inducing what seemed like similar experiences in themselves and others. During the nineteenth century, many began thinking of these experiences as evidence of special mental states. The range of experiences associated with these mental states expanded to include clairvoyance, healing, automatic writing, and mediumship as well as fits, trances, and visions. By the end of the period covered by Part II, trance was the umbrella term most commonly used to designate these experiences collectively, and debate correspondingly focused on whether or not trance should be interpreted in religious or secular terms.

Part III, "Religious Experience and the Subconscious, 1886-1910" highlights the professionally charged character of the interpretive field at the turn-of-the-century as psychology emerged as an academic discipline and psychotherapy as a formal clinical practice. At the end of the nineteenth century, elites—clinicians, psychologists, and psychical researchers—transformed the popular psychology of animal magnetism into the new experimental psychology of the subconscious, granting it a new respectability. The pre-Freudian concept of the subconscious mind replaced that of mental states, while the language of hypnosis, hysteria, dissociation,

automatisms, and suggestion replaced that of fluids, electromagnetism, and sympathy. The range of experiences associated with the subconscious expanded beyond fits, visions, clairvoyance, healing, automatic writing, and mediumship to include conversion, mysticism, and speaking in tongues. During this period, debate focused on the subconscious and its implications for the understanding of religious experience. By 1910, the concept of the subconscious was largely discredited in academic circles.

Three figures—the enthusiast, the clairvoyant somnambule, and the multiple—provide the foils in relation to which religious experience was constructed in each of these three periods. The enthusiast, understood as falsely inspired; the clairvoyant somnambule, thought to enter a special mental state in which the mind passed beyond the external senses; and the multiple, believed to manifest co-conscious secondary personalities, provided the chief means of explaining religion and the chief challenge to those who claimed to have experienced it. The emergence of the enthusiast is discussed in the Introduction to Part I; the clairvoyant somnambule in the Introduction to Part II; and the co-conscious multiple in the Introduction to Part III.

From chapter to chapter, my goal is to construct an interconnected narrative that tracks the unfolding and interaction of particular "chains of interpretation."

Although the primary focus of the book is on the United States, the narrative moves back and forth across the Atlantic in order to locate these claims in relation to chains of interpretation that showed no particular respect for national boundaries. Within the Protestant tradition, Methodists provide the central narrative thread, since they and their heirs in the Adventist, Holiness, and Pentecostal movements embraced religious experience in greater numbers and with greater enthusiasm than most other Protestants. As Protestants embrace new religious movements—Spiritualism, Christian Science, New Thought, and Theosophy—that wrestle directly with matters of experience and explanation, they in turn are woven into the narrative. The naturalistic or secularizing explanations of experience in Part I are drawn from medicine or philosophy (although they are often recognizably psychological in retrospect) and from psychology, psychopathology, and neurology in Parts II and III. But again when the narrative thread demands it, sociology and anthropology also make appearances.

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This book is constructed around three chains of interpretation. The first two stand in opposition to one another and run the whole length of the book. The first, running from the seventeenth-century polemic against enthusiasm through the rise of mesmerism and hypnosis to the twentieth-century Protestant modernists, constituted these experiences in natural terms, usually in relation to secularizing theories of mind. The second, running from John Wesley and the transatlantic awakening of the early eighteenth century to the independent Holiness and Pentecostal churches of the early twentieth century, constituted the experiences in question in supernatural terms. The third line of interpretation, which appears midway through the book, attempted to mediate between the other two lines of interpretation. Running from German romanticism through the Spiritualist movement to the flowering of the subconscious, the mediating tradition interpreted these phenomena as both natural and religious.

Readers may rightly wonder why a book mostly about Protestants and ex-Protestants would play with the ideas of "religion" and "religious experience" in its subtitle, as if the experiences of Protestants could be equated with religious experience in general. The short answer is that "religion" and "religious experience" were the terms used by the subjects of this book. By sticking to their terms we can see how explanations of the experiences of Protestants and former Protestants informed explanations of religion in general.' Eighteenth-century thinkers commonly used "false religion" to refer to particular forms of Protestantism. But the desire to discredit "false" forms of Protestantism by comparing them to non-Protestant phenomena led to the expansion of the idea of "false religion" and the development of more-comprehensive explanatory theories. Midway through the book, mediators emerge to claim that what had been deemed "false religion" was in fact "true religion." For the mediators, "true religion" was "religion-in-general" and authentic religious experience and naturalistic theories of religion were not incompatible. By tracking how the concepts of religion and religious experience developed

in a particular historical context, we can gain a fresh perspective on the way in which Protestant and anti-Protestant modes of thought have informed the academic study of religion.

While the subtitle "Experiencing Religion and Explaining Experience" reflects the subjects' usage in this book, the phrases are also meant to conjure up contemporary debates within the academic study of religion. Contemporary theorists of religion tend to view experiencing religion and explaining experience as antithetical. Many prominent theorists of religion argue that the primary task of scholars of religion is to explain religion as opposed to "defending" their own or others' experience of it. Whether these theorists depict the "wrong-headed" scholar of religion as a "religionist" or a closet "theologian," they tend to depict the situation in dualistic terms.' In the conclusion, I argue that a threefold typology, based on the three chains of interpretation outlined in the book, does more justice to the cultural legacy that has informed and in many ways continues to inform such quarrels within academic study of religion than does a dualistic formulation.

This third or mediating tradition relied upon and contended for a distinction between the "natural" and the "secular," which will be honored throughout the book. For them, "natural" designated the opposite of "supernatural," while "secular" designated the opposite of "religious." Given this distinction, a "natural" explanation could be either religious or secular and religious naturalism was not a contradiction in terms. Their religious naturalism targeted supernaturalism for attack, not religion in general. Their stance presupposed the availability of definitions of religion that were not based on supernaturalism.

Methodologically, the book posed two significant challenges. The first was to describe the subject of the book without doing violence to my sources and their categories. The second was to figure out my place in the narrative, particularly in relation to William James and the other early psychologists of religion. Solving these methodological problems backed me, through sheer necessity, into thinking explicitly about problems of comparison in the study of religion, historical or otherwise. In retrospect it is clear, not only that these methodological challenges were linked, but that my interest in James and the early psychologists of religion was rooted in a shared fascination with theories of mental dissociation and their implications for understanding religious experience. Such theories, first developed in the 1880s, were repopularized in the 1980s in conjunction with a proliferation of cases of "multiple personality disorder."

This book had its origins in my readings in the psychiatric literature on multiple personality disorder during the late 1980s. Those readings led me to the anthropological literature on shamanism and trance and to the conversations between psychiatrists and anthropologists about dissociative disorders that antedated the 4th edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV). At some point in the process, I realized that this literature might make some sense of the early Methodists about whom I had been teaching for so many years. Initially, I thought I was going to write a book about "dissociation" or "trance" among Protestants. As it became clear that these terms were used by my sources, usually to explain and often to discredit the experiences of others, I began to say that the book was about "religious experience." In doing so, I switched to the language of those experiencing religion, but implied that the subject matter under discussion was always viewed as religious, which obviously was not the case. Then for a while, to get everyone in the picture, I said the book was about "contested experience." Although overly vague, this way of viewing what I was writing about both focused my difficulties and forced me to think explicitly about problems of comparison.

Over time, I became aware that specifying the kind of experiences I wanted to discuss posed challenges precisely because of their contested character. Various academic disciplines have developed distinctive discourses to designate the general sort of experience in question. Psychiatrists most commonly refer to dissociation (or more distantly hysteria); anthropologists to trance, spirit possession, and altered states of consciousness; and religionists to visions, inspiration, mysticism, and ecstasy. These discourses are not simply descriptive, but rather reflect the various historical and explanatory commitments of the disciplines themselves.

Use of any one of these terms thus tacitly positions us both in relation to disciplinary subject matters (e.g., religion, culture, or psychopathology) and explanatory commitments and in doing so theoretically constitutes the experience about which we are speaking in particular ways.

Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen makes this point quite forcefully. When asked to speak on the topic of "hypnosis," he pointed out that calling "this phenomenon 'hypnosis' immediately exposes us to many methodological difficulties, for `hypnosis' is only one name among many that designate the elusive 'X' we are trying to grasp." After considering the terms used by psychiatrists, anthropologists, and theologians, he concluded that "each of these ways of naming brings with it not only a different theory but also a different phenomenon, as if the most remarkable property of our 'X' was not to have any property and to vary in accordance with the discourse brought to bear upon it."

Not only does this naming position us in relation to contemporary disciplines, it also positions us as scholars in relation to our historical subjects. Each of these terms carries with it presuppositions and associations that may be at odds with, and thus distort, the experience of our historical subjects. In seeking to identify what the experiences that form the subject matter of this book hold in common, I am not looking f0r universal or objective categories or essences, but rather a tentative and particularistic starting point for comparative work. Comparison by definition "lifts out and strongly marks certain features within difference as being of possible intellectual significance, expressed," as Jonathan Smith says, "in the rhetoric of their being `like' in some stipulated fashion." Smith emphasizes the scholar's agency in this process. "Comparison," he stresses, "provides the means by much we `re-vision' phenomena as our data in order to solve our theoretical problems." My concerns in re-visioning this diverse set of phenomena are both pragmatic and theoretically driven. Pragmatically, I want to identify a specific feature that these experiences have in common as a means of saying what the book is "about" and, at least as crucially, as a means of identifying such experiences in the context of historical research. Since I am interested in the contestations that arose around such experiences, I want to define this comparative field so as to mark what the experiences share without obscuring their differences.

Once we begin to think in terms of delineating a comparative field and identifying relevant instances in the context of historical research, the difficulties attached to the various terms currently in use become even more apparent. While scholars working with non-English-speaking subjects must figure out how to translate (and in the process operationalize) concepts such as trance, ecstasy, or dissociation, scholars working with English-speaking subjects face the fact that our subjects also use these terms, but not necessarily in the same way. The solution, I believe, is to move away from single terms to more extended descriptive statements that identify common features in a way that is simultaneously intelligible across disciplines—religious, anthropological, and psychotherapeutic—and workable in terms of designating comparable subject matters at the level of lived historical experience. By workable, I mean language that, while perhaps striking those within these various interpretive traditions as awkward and overly general,

> It allows us to engage phenomena across traditions of interpretation without unduly violating the lived experience of those within them." Here I aim to avoid, as much as I can, what Wayne Proudfoot has termed "descriptive reduction" by specifying the experiences in question "under a description that can plausibly be ascribed to the person to whom we attribute the experience."

As anthropologist Michelle Stephen points out, many of the terms we use to refer to these contested experiences are problematic precisely because they obscure the subjective experience of the native actor, that is the lived experience of persons within traditions of interpretation. The crucial element of the experience for the "native actor," according to Stephen, is its "self-alien" or, in the terms used here, its involuntary aspect, that is, the sense that "I" am not the agent or cause of "my" experience. To put it more precisely, the historical sources I discuss in this book depict subjects whose usual sense of themselves as embodied agents is altered or discontinuous. Their experiences includes include the loss of voluntary motor control, unusual sensory perceptions (kinesthetic, visual, auditory, and tactile), and/or discontinuities of consciousness, memory, and identity. If we equate our "usual"

sense of ourselves with our ordinary waking consciousness, the most common human experience of a discontinuity in consciousness is the discontinuity between waking and dreaming."

We can find classic illustrations of such modifications and disruptions of a person's usual sense of embodied selfhood in the New Testament. Thus, for example, when the Apostle Paul said "it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me" (Gal. 2:20), he described an experience in which his usual identity was disrupted (it is no longer I, but Christ). When he said "whether [I was] in the body or out of the body I do not know" (2 Cor. 12:2), he described a modification of his usual kinesthetic or bodily sense of himself. When he said he saw "a great light from heaven" or "heard a voice saying ... `Saul, why do you persecute me?" he was describing unusual visual or auditory experiences (Acts 22:6-9). If, when he "fell to the ground" after seeing the great light, he did so involuntarily, it would provide an example the loss of voluntary muscular control. If he had fallen to the ground in a trance, it would illustrate both the loss of voluntary muscular control and a modification of consciousness.

In reopening the comparison between religious and psychological or psychopathological phenomena, I am picking up the questions that fascinated William James and, to a lesser extent, the other early psychologists of religion. In making such comparisons, how we think about the relationship between experience and explanations of experience becomes particularly crucial. The usual course, as I have indicated, has been to divorce explanation and experience, on the one hand, and intellectual abstraction (theory) and cultural embeddedness (practice), on the other. Upon close scrutiny, these dichotomies break down. Narratives of experience cannot avoid implicit theoretical and explanatory commitments." Theories of experience, while abstracted from the practices they are objectifying, are not abstracted from practice in general. It is more accurate, in other words, to assume that narratives of experience contain theoretical and explanatory commitments, however rudimentary, and that theories of experience, however abstract, are nonetheless constituted within their own (e.g., academic or intellectual) traditions of discourse and practice.

A distinction between narratives of experience and theories of experience is more useful. The important thing about narratives of experience is that they retain the marks, bodily and social, of the contexts in which they were constituted and within which they normally are reproduced, whereas theories of experience usually do not. Narratives, cast in the first person, are usually concrete and particular and provide clues to the bodily knowledges that inform particular traditions of experience. Bodily knowledge, what Pierre Bourdieu refers to as habitus and Paul Connerton as habit, manifests itself in the ability to do something, that is, in the practical mastery (Bourdieu) or skilled performance (Connerton) of the socialized human agent. While this bodily knowledge is acquired, acquisition does not necessarily occur consciously. As long as the work of education is not institutionalized with specialized agents and occasions, "practical mastery is transmitted in practice, in its practical state, without attaining the level of discourse." Every society, according to Bourdieu, provides "structural exercises tending to transmit this or that form of practical mastery." These exercises range from "apprenticeship through simple familiarization ... [to] explicit and express transmission by precept and prescription." The narratives of involuntary experience presuppose bodily knowledges that people acquire in part "insensibly and unconsciously," in the way that an apprentice acquires "the principles of the 'art' and the art of living—including those which are not known to the producer of the practices or works imitated."

If narratives of experience presuppose certain bodily knowledges that are acquired and assumed in practice, the marks of this knowledge are lost when experiences are abstracted from practice and constituted as "theory." Narrating and theorizing, thus, represent two different genres, typically reliant on very different sorts of practices. Both may, indeed often do, take place within a particular tradition, although some traditions may emphasize one over the other. Some individuals easily switch from one genre to the other. Jonathan Edwards and John Wesley are two good examples of persons who theorized about experience (as Christian theologians), narrated their own experiences, and passed on the narratives of others. In this book, Chapters One and Seven focus on theories about experience (experience-in-theory) and tease out their authors' practical

commitments. Chapters Three, Five, and Eight focus on narratives of experience (experience-in-practice) and tease out their implicit theory and explanation. Chapters Two, Four, and Six include sections on both.

While, for the sake of clarity, I emphasize narrative or theory at any given point, my overall aim is to highlight the complex interplay between experiencing religion and explaining experience over time. In doing so, I assume that the process whereby theorists abstract experiences from narratives is only one example of a larger process whereby experience is extracted from one context and reconstituted in another. Narrators of experience may switch from one narrative to another (e.g., through conversion). Theorists may abstract from their own experience or from the experience of others (e.g., as theologians or secular theorists). Narrators may recount their narratives and theorists disseminate their theories in service of a variety of ends, including the promotion, transformation, or eradication of particular forms of experience. Oftentimes, critics attempt to discredit one form of experience as a means of advancing another. To understand how experience has been variably constituted in a particular swath of history, we must be willing to follow the process whereby interpreters make and remake specific experiences by extracting them from one community of discourse and practice and reconstituting them in another.

Although I find the comparative universe constructed by the early psychologists of religion fascinating and have constructed a comparative field very similar to theirs, I do not think they have been read with enough attention to this process. As theorists, they abstracted the experiences in question from the contexts in which they were originally constituted for their own reasons and in doing so constituted something new. I, of course, cannot claim to stand outside such processes myself. In tracing these processes of making and remaking, I too am involved in extracting these experiences from their initial communities of discourse and practice and reconstituting them within the pages of this book. In the process, the experiences inevitably become something other than what they originally were. Nonetheless, by creating historical representations of traditions in which experience was constituted and from which experiences were abstracted and remade, I hope to level the playing field somewhat between those who experienced religion, those who explained it in secular terms, and those who mediated between them.

The underlying approach to my subject matter involves an intellectual movement in and out of competing communities of discourse and practice. Although an ability to sympathetically enter into diverse points of view is generally valued by historians, religious and secular perspectives on these sorts of experiences are rarely juxtaposed in an even-handed way. My own adoption of such an approach reflects both my commitments as a historian and my own experience of moving between communities, both secular and religious. This movement, which is not unlike a movement between cultures, is increasingly common in religiously and culturally pluralistic societies. I expect this methodology will appeal most to those accustomed to that sort of movement.

There is a vast literature on religious experience within the field of religious studies, much of it theological and/or philosophical. There also are numerous historical studies of particular forms of religious experience in specific historical contexts. Although some attention has been given to the relationship between psychological theories and religious experience, relations between psychologists of religion, on the one hand, and theologians and phenomenologists of religion, on the other, have been rather strained, to say the least. Even as the history of dynamic psychology prior to Freud has attracted much recent interest, the range of significant interactions between psychology and religion in this era have only begun to be mapped. Those who have ventured into this historical territory have done so under a variety of rubrics, including the cure of souls, consciousness, and miracles. While there is some overlap between our studies, this study is distinguished by its focus on the category of "experience," scrutinized historically.

Within an overarching narrative that runs from the more radical Puritans to Pentecostals, on the one hand, and the early psychologists of religion, on the other, the Methodist tradition, known for its emphasis on religious experience, stands out. Although it was the largest nineteenth-century Protestant denomination in the United States, Methodism was until very recently one of the least studied by historians outside the denomination. Not

only were Methodists numerous, they were also diverse in terms of race and class. A focus on Methodism and its offshoots and competitors in the realm of religious experience allows us to examine claims about religious experience from a variety of perspectives at a grassroots as well as a more elite level.

I hope this study of the interplay between experiencing religion and explaining experience will contribute to our understanding of what anthropologists refer to as "trance" and psychiatrists as "dissociation." Anthropologists have long been fascinated by the role of trance in so-called "primitive" cultures. Since the early 1970s, there has been a resurgence of popular and academic interest in dissociation and trance states in the Anglo-American context. This interest has led to studies of spiritualism, psychical research, and multiple personality in the Victorian era and studies of the role of hypnosis in the emergence of dynamic psychiatry. Although Christianity is often given credit for the apparent aversion to "trance" or "dissociation" in the West, little effort has been paid to how or why mainstream Protestants marginalized the more extravagant forms of religious experience. By focusing on historical explanations of involuntary phenomena among American Protestants, I hope this book will contribute to a broader understanding of the role of involuntary experience in human culture.

Finally, I hope to enhance our methodological sophistication in the comparative study of religious experience and our critical self-awareness as scholars of religion. Although most scholars view the academic study of religion as a child of the Enlightenment, only a few studies have attempted to root the discipline historically. Significant advances have been made in our understanding of the relationship between the emergence of the discipline and the "discovery" of the non-Western world. In this quest for disciplinary self-understanding, the relationship between the rise of the study of religion and elite engagement with the Protestant `other" within Anglo-American culture—those whose religious experiences were variously disparaged as enthusiastic, fanatical, hysterical, or popular—has been largely ignored. By turning our attention inward, I hope to enhance our awareness of the political dimensions of explanation within a Western cultural context and also enrich our understanding of the history of difference. Contemporary historians of difference are preoccupied with matters of race, gender, and sexual orientation, but they rarely attend to the parallel processes by means of which religious difference or identity was (and is) constructed. As I hope this study will make clear, competing claims about the authenticity of religious experiences were also claims about identity. <>

DREAM SYMBOLS OF THE INDIVIDUATION PROCESS: NOTES OF C. G. JUNG'S SEMINARS ON WOLFGANG PAULI'S DREAMS by C. G. Jung, edited by Suzanne Gieser [Philemon Foundation Series, Princeton University Press, 9780691183619]

Jung's legendary American lectures on dream interpretation

In 1936 and 1937, C. G. Jung delivered two legendary seminars on dream interpretation, the first on Bailey Island, Maine, the second in New York City. **DREAM SYMBOLS OF THE INDIVIDUATION PROCESS: NOTES OF C. G. JUNG'S SEMINARS ON WOLFGANG PAULI'S DREAMS** makes these lectures widely available for the first time, offering a compelling look at Jung as he presents his ideas candidly and in English before a rapt American audience.

The dreams presented here are those of Nobel Prize–winning physicist Wolfgang Pauli, who turned to Jung for therapeutic help because of troubling personal events, emotional turmoil, and depression. Linking Pauli's dreams to the healing wisdom found in many ages and cultures, Jung shows how the mandala—a universal archetype of wholeness—spontaneously emerges in the psyche of a modern man, and how this imagery reflects the healing process. He touches on a broad range of themes, including psychological types, mental illness, the individuation process, the principles of psychotherapeutic treatment, and the importance of the anima, shadow, and persona in masculine psychology. He also reflects on modern physics, the nature of reality, and the political currents of

his time. Jung draws on examples from the Mithraic mysteries, Buddhism, Hinduism, Chinese philosophy, Kundalini yoga, and ancient Egyptian concepts of body and soul. He also discusses the symbolism of the Catholic Mass, the Trinity, and Gnostic ideas in the noncanonical Gospels.

With an incisive introduction and annotations, **DREAM SYMBOLS OF THE INDIVIDUATION PROCESS: NOTES OF C. G. JUNG'S SEMINARS ON WOLFGANG PAULI'S DREAMS** provides a rare window into Jung's interpretation of dreams and the development of his psychology of religion.

Excerpt: In 1936 and 1937, Jung delivered consecutive seminars in Bailey Island, Maine (see figure 1), and in New York City. The seminars ran for a total of eleven days, six days on Bailey Island and five days in New York. Jung's lecture series was titled "Dream Symbols of the Individuation Process." The dreams presented were those of physicist and Nobel Prize laureate Wolfgang Pauli (1900-1958). Jung went into far greater detail concerning the personal aspects of Pauli's dreams than anywhere else in his published work.

Central to these seminars was showing how the mandala as an expression of the archetype of wholeness spontaneously emerged in the psyche of a modern man, and how this imagery reflects the healing process. Jung defines archetypes as innate to man, having an invariable core of meaning that is "filled out" with experiential material conditioned by culture and environment. Therefore it was important to him to provide evidence for this hypothesis by holding up examples from different cultures and epochs, especially from the sphere of religious symbolism.

The themes that Jung chooses to pick up in these seminars are all related to his quest to develop and expound his theories of the psyche. In the lectures, Jung touches on a wide range of themes. He presents his theory of dreams; mental illness; the individuation process; regression; the principles of psychotherapeutic treatment; masculine psychology and the importance of the anima, shadow, and persona; psychological types; and psychic energy. He comments on the political currents of the time such as Nazism, communism, fascism, and mass psychology. He reflects on modern physics, causality, and the nature of reality. From the religious sphere, he chooses to illustrate his theories with examples from the Mithraic mysteries, Buddhism, Hinduism, Chinese philosophy, The I Ching, Kundalini Yoga, and ancient Egyptian concepts of body and soul. From the Christian heritage, he focuses primarily on Catholicism and the symbolism of the Mass and the Trinity and also on the content of the newly discovered noncanonical gospels and Gnostic ideas. He also mentions the Dreamtime concept of Aboriginal Australians and their beliefs in healing objects, the Apollonian and Dionysian cults of ancient Greece, Nordic mythology, Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism, and the Khidr in the Koran. From the world of literature, he refers to Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Goethe's Faust, and Meyrink's The Golem. He also discusses the Exercitia of Ignatius Loyola and the visions of Zosimos. The connections to Jung's further work on these topics is provided in the notes.

In summary, we see here many of the budding themes that germinated during the years 1937—S7 in the ongoing development of Jung's psychology of religion. From his initial studies in mythology and religion from 1912 onward, in the early 1930s, Jung drew his comparison principally from Eastern esoteric practices, such as Kundalini Yoga and Daoism. After this, his focus shifted to the Western tradition, principally medieval alchemy and Christian symbolism. These themes were then deepened and further explored in the 1940s and 1950s.

WHAT IS UNIQUE ABOUT THESE SEMINARS?

Most of Jung's preserved texts and seminars in English have been either translated from German, or, when they were given in English, professionally transcribed and thereafter edited.' Moreover the translations of Jung's

written works into English have gone through many revisions and "rewritings."' As a result, today's reader has been deprived of a valuable heritage, the fascinating evidence of the author's creative process.

These seminars comprise Jung's most extensive oral presentations in spoken English in front of an American audience. They were only very lightly edited, in order to, as stated in the introduction to the seminars by the Notes Committee, "keep the talks as nearly as possible as Dr. Jung delivered them." The Notes Committee consisted of three pioneering women doctors and Jungian analysts who lived in the United States: Kristine Mann, Eleanor Bertine, and Esther Harding. Here in this almost verbatim transcript is a chance to "listen in" to the way in which Jung spoke in English. Here also is textual evidence of Jung's intuitive, associative way of thinking, a style that would lead him to meander in many different directions, so much so that he was unable to keep to his original plan of covering the complete dream material—the eighty-one unconscious visions and dreams that he had selected to illustrate Pauli's individuation process—during his six days at Bailey Island. Of these eighty-one, he managed to cover only thirty-four. Just as important, here is a spontaneous survey of topics that were uppermost in Jung's mind during September 1936 and October 1937.

As the audience was composed of benevolent followers, Jung could allow himself to be informal. It was the explicit wish of the organizers that the seminars should be "as strictly private and informal as the [preceding]

Harvard event had been prestigious and formal. No newsmen were allowed. The lectures contain spur-of-the-moment responses to questions from the audience. They were given in front of a limited audience of especially invited people, usually Jung's followers, analysts, students, and analysands. The seminars were turned into simple transcripts from shorthand notes made by a few selected seminar members, then copied, bound, and distributed before Jung had the chance to comment, change, or edit them.' Jung actually wrote to ask for a copy of the Bailey Island notes to review and edit in connection with a request from the publishing house Harcourt Brace and Company to publish the seminars. Jung requested that a note should be added to the introduction of the seminars that read: "Dr. Jung has consented to let these notes be distributed to those present at the talks without his final suggestions or corrections. Any errors or shortcomings that have occurred are the responsibility of the Notes Committee."

The second part of the seminars, those held in New York in 1937, were originally not planned for, so that, in a sense, the seminars given at Bailey Island were at the time considered "completed." But even as Jung sent his request for a copy to review, there were budding plans for another trip to America for the autumn of 1937. These plans may have played a role in holding back the publication of the Bailey Island Seminars. In the end, these publication plans were never realized, but then, considering how much Jung disclosed in the seminars about Wolfgang Pauli's personality and family, what would have remained in a publishable version. of the seminars?

Instead, the seminars were (as was the case with many other seminar notes transcribed from Jung's lectures and speeches) printed and circulated privately to a restricted list of subscribers. For many years they were kept in Jungian libraries, accessible only to readers on approval, for instance, if the reader had completed a certain number of hours of Jungian analysis.'

THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE SEMINARS AT BAILEY ISLAND

In 1935 Jung celebrated his sixtieth birthday and was appointed titular professor of psychology at the ETH, the Swiss Federal Institute for Technology in Zurich. Two years before, in 1933, he had started to give lectures at the ETH that were open to the public, lectures that became so popular that it was difficult to find a seat.' In August 1935 Jung decided to give a lecture at the Eranos conference on a selection of Wolfgang Pauli's dreams, called "Dream Symbols of the Individuation Process," without disclosing the identity of the dreamer. The lecture on Pauli's dreams was held less than a year after Pauli had ended analytical contact with Jung in October 1934."

This was Jung's third lecture at the Eranos conferences, a yearly event held in Ascona, Switzerland, on the shores of Lago Maggiore. The Eranos meetings were initiated by Mrs. Olga Fröbe-Kapteyn, a Dutch woman with a strong interest in Jung's psychology, symbolism, art, and religion, especially the encounter between Eastern and Western religions and philosophies.

sinologist Richard Wilhelm there.) Others who participated and lectured at the school—Leo Baeck, Gerardus van der Leeuw, and Erwin Rousselle—all later appeared at the Eranos meetings. Fröbe-Kapteyn invited Jung to lecture at her summer school in 1931, but he declined. Hakl claims that Jung was displeased with her close connection to Alice Bailey and Assagioli and that he pressured her to turn away from them. In 1932 the two women went separate ways, and Bailey left Ascona. At the same time, Hermann Keyserling's School of Wisdom, which had been offering events since 1920, formally stopped meeting.

It was in this context that Jung's first lecture at Eranos in 1933 took place, in which he chose to present Kristine Mann's visions under the title "A Study in the Process of Individuation." The conference was titled "Yoga and Meditation in East and West." Approximately two hundred people attended. Two years later, in 1935, Jung lectured on Pauli's dreams. It was perhaps then that Jung encouraged Fröbe-Kapteyn to obtain photographs of paintings and other works of art from diverse public libraries, at her own expense. Jung even gave her a letter of recommendation for this research. As she lacked expertise in art history, she used an ancient divinatory method to compensate: she simply poked a long needle into the card index of the archives and then demanded the book catalogued on the card that the needle had indicated. After her financial situation became strained, in 1937 Paul and Mary Mellon agreed to pay for her expenses, so that she could travel to Italy and Greece to collect pictures with archetypal motifs for the forthcoming conference "The Great Mother." (A story recounts how, in 1941, Fröbe-Kapteyn fell under the scrutiny of the FBI on a return flight via Stuttgart for carrying "cryptic" pictures in her luggage.) It is perhaps safe to assume, then, that the mandalas shown at the Bailey Island seminars were given to Jung by Fröbe-Kapteyn. Also the illustrations to the 1936 lecture "The Idea of Redemption in Alchemy" must have stemmed from her researches. All these and many more were then included in Jung's Psychology and Alchemy. In the foreword to that volume, Jung thanks Olga Fröbe-Kapteyn for obtaining the photographic copies of alchemical pictures and Jolande Jacobi for choosing and arranging the illustrations for publication.

Immediately after giving the Ascona lecture in August 1936 titled "The Idea of Redemption in Alchemy," Jung traveled to the United States to attend the Harvard University tercentenary celebrations, giving a lecture titled "Psychological Factors Determining Human Behavior," and to deliver his seminars at Bailey Island. There are traces in the seminars of new alchemical motifs employed as amplifications to Pauli's dreams that are not in the Eranos lecture from 1935. For instance, in the seminar Jung expands on the anima mundi as a round, perfect globe and refers to the round substance of the alchemists, a motif that is present neither in the 1935 Eranos lecture nor in the English translation from 1939. In Psychology and Alchemy Jung developed this theme further with a reference to Theatrum chemicum. In the same way, Jung's description of the croquet ball as a symbol of wholeness makes reference to Paracelsus. In addition, the seminars refer to the circulatory work of alchemy (opus circulatorum or rotundum), that is, to distill the quintessence through a circular movement or circumrotation, and to the ouroboros as the basic mandala in alchemy, a detail he will expand on in Psychology and Alchemy.

During the winter of 1936, Jung cancelled ordinary activities such as his ETH lectures and his English seminar and reduced his analytical hours to a minimum. According to Hannah, he did so in order to immerse himself in alchemical texts.

THE NEW YORK SEMINARS

There were originally no plans for Jung to give a second lecture series on Pauli's dreams. He returned to America because of an invitation to lecture on psychology and religion at Yale (the Terry Lectures). The Jungs traveled on the Hansa of the Hamburg America line, most probably from the port of Hamburg around October 8. They had just attended the ninth conference of the International General Medical Society for Psychotherapy,

held between October 2 and 4 in Copenhagen, where they had Stayed at the Hotel d'Angleterre. It is probable that they went directly to Hamburg after their stay in Copenhagen. Their arrival in New York was noted in the newspapers.

The seminars in New York were given before and after the event of the Terry Lectures. While at Yale, Jung was a guest fellow at Jonathan Edwards College. He dined in the hall, and the master of the college, Robert Dudley French, arranged that two or three undergraduates should lunch with him. Among others Jim Whitney and Robert Grinnell were chosen, and Grinnell remembers animated discussions and tea at the Elizabethan Club. Both young men would become involved with analytical psychology.

Having the onrush of attendees to the Bailey Island seminars in fresh memory, Harding planned the New York event on a much larger scale from the beginning. She took it on herself to look for a suitable lecture hall and recommended to Jung the MacDowell Club at 166 East Seventy-Third Street in Manhattan, for its considerable capacity. Of course, these New York seminars were much more formal; indeed, they were "as huge and formal as Bailey had been the opposite." And again, Jung also planned to give private sessions. The seminars were held from 8:00 p.m.

pulses of Pauli's World Clock with number mysticism in the Kabbalah. This is the last addition to a text that started out as a lecture on the emergence of one symbolic product in the individuation process, the mandala, and transformed over the years into the text "Individual Dream Symbols in Relation to Alchemy."

This process of transformation is even more apparent in the third part of Psychology and Alchemy, in the revision of the text "The Idea of Redemption in Alchemy" into "Religious Ideas in Alchemy." Here the additions are so comprehensive as to render the original text unrecognizable. For example, on the subject of Aurora Consurgens there is an approximately fifteen-page addition. Jung had apparently already in 1942 planned for the publication of the full text of Aurora Consurgens translated by Marie-Louise von Franz, as he states in a footnote to the first edition of Psychology and Alchemy. But when von Franz asked Jung to contribute a preface, he became so fascinated with the material that he asked whether she would mind if he wrote a whole book on it. His preface swelled into an eight-hundred-page book, Mysterium Coniunctionis, to which Aurora Consurgens became a supplementary volume more than ten years later. This work started before he suffered his myocardial attack in February 1944, and he is reported to have told von Franz that his illness, near-death experience, and visions had been necessary for him to fully "know" the reality of the mysterium coniunctionis.

Jung obviously decided to include Pauli's dreams in Psychology and Alchemy, although in the beginning they were presented as an example of emerging mandala symbolism. Nothing in the Pauli correspondence indicates that Pauli found it in any way strange to publish his dream material in the context of alchemy. The first time Pauli mentions alchemy in his correspondence is on May 24, 1937, after Jung sends him his Eranos essay "Redemption Motifs in Alchemy." Pauli states that the essay is of great interest to him both as a scientist and in the light of his own personal dream experiences. He also confirms the relevance of the link between concepts describing physical processes and psychological processes, saying that "even the most modern physics also lends itself to the symbolic representation of psychic processes, even down to the last detail," and after 1935 he refers to the role played by the "the radioactive nucleus" in his dreams after 1935 as a parallel to the philosopher's stone.

Jung gradually amplified Pauli's dreams more and more in the light of alchemy. Jung's thorough reading of Paracelsus and his discovery (or rediscovery) of Paracelsus's concept of the lumen naturae—the light of nature, the divine spark buried in the darkness of matter, in the innate intelligence in animals and plants, and also in man—contributed to the decision to include the physicist's dreams in Psychology and Alchemy. Perhaps Jung considered it symbolically appropriate to include the dreams of Pauli as quantum physicist and modern alchemist, a man combining a deep knowledge of the mysteries of matter with a devout observation of his unconscious psyche. Pauli embraced a similar idea in his historical work The Influence of Archetypal Ideas on the Scientific Theories of Kepler. Starting in 1946 after a compelling dream, Pauli studied the debate between the

astronomer Johannes Kepler and the alchemist Robert Fludd, focusing on that point in history when the shift occurred from the older hermeneutic worldview to an emerging newer one characterized by a Strict demarcation between subject and object, between soul and matter. The older hermeneutic view included a feminine element in the form of the anima mundi (world soul) who stands in direct relation to the human soul, macrocosm to microcosm, connected. What intrigued Pauli was not only quantum physics' renewed interest in the problem of the demarcation between subject and object, but also his own differentiated identification with both parties in the historical debate: "I myself am not only Kepler but also Fludd." <>

CHRISTUS VINCIT: CHRIST'S TRIUMPH OVER THE DARKNESS OF THE AGE by Bishop Athanasius Schneider in conversation with Diane Montagna [Angelico Press, 9781621384908]

--"We cannot but be grateful to Bishop Schneider for his clear and courageous analysis of the state of the Church."--Robert Cardinal Sarah

In this absorbing interview, Bishop Athanasius Schneider offers a candid, incisive examination of controversies raging in the Church and the most pressing issues of our times, providing clarity and hope for beleaguered Catholics. He addresses such topics as widespread doctrinal confusion, the limits of papal authority, the documents of Vatican II, the Society of St. Pius X, anti-Christian ideologies and political threats, the third secret of Fatima, the traditional Roman rite, and the Amazon Synod, among many others. Like his fourth-century patron, St. Athanasius the Great, Bishop Schneider says things that others won't, fearlessly following St. Paul's advice: "Preach the word, be urgent in season and out of season, convince, rebuke, and exhort, be unfailing in patience and in teaching" (2 Tim 4:2). His insights into the challenges facing Christ's flock today are essential reading for those who are, or wish to be, alert to the signs of the times. Reminiscent of **THE RATZINGER REPORT** of 1985, **CHRISTUS VINCIT: CHRIST'S TRIUMPH OVER THE DARKNESS OF THE AGE** will be a key point of reference for years to come.

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For a number of years now, the interventions of Bishop Athanasius Schneider on the controversies raging in the Church have provided clarity and hope f0r beleaguered adherents 0f traditi0nal Catholic teaching. Never before, however, has Bishop Schneider stepped back from the occasional intervention to unfold at length his own witness to "that faith given once and for all to the saints" (Jude 3) and c0nveyed to him by the martyrs 0f the Communist persecuti0n. This book is offered as a vade mecum for the perplexed in these difficult times.

Christus Vincit ("Christ conquers") is the first book-length interview with Athanasius Schneider, auxiliary bishop of St. Mary in Astana, Kazakhstan. Born Antonius Schneider on April 7, 1961, in Tokmok, Kyrgyzstan (USSR), Bishop Schneider's early years were spent in the Soviet underground church, before emigrating with his family t0 Germany. In 1982, he entered in Austria the Canons Regular of the Holy Cross, originally founded in C0imbra. He was 0rdained to the priesthood on March 25, 1990. Appointed to the episcopate by Pope Benedict XVI, in June 2006, at the age of 45, he was consecrated a bishop in St. Peter's Basilica. Bishop Schneider speaks German, Russian, Portuguese, Spanish, English, Italian, and French, and reads Latin and Greek.

The bishop's ancestors were Germans who migrated from Alsace to Odessa on the Black Sea Coast of the Ukraine. At the close of the Second World War, the victorious Stalin deported the Schneider family to the Krasnokamsk gulag in the Ural Mountains. Maria Schneider, the bishop's mother, played a key role in the underground church and sheltered Blessed Oleksiy Zarytskyj, a Ukrainian priest who was martyred by the Soviet regime in 1963.

Like his fourth-century patron, St. Athanasius the Great, Bishop Schneider says things that others won't, fearlessly following St. Paul's advice: "Preach the word, be urgent in season and out of season, convince, rebuke, and exhort, be unfailing in patience and in teaching" (Tim 4:2). Many have been impressed by his conviction, zeal, and clarity, and his total dedication to his vocation as a Successor of the Apostles.

The aim of this volume is to allow the reader to get to know Bishop Schneider better, and to convey how he views the world, the Church, and the perennial tension between the two.

The text is established on the basis of three main interviews. The first took place over the course of several days in January 2018 in Munich, where Bishop Schneider was visiting his mother, who is in the care of a community of religious sisters. The second conversation took place in May 2018 in Rome. The third took place in March 2019, also in Rome, after the ad limina visit of the bishops of Central Asia.' Bishop Schneider then carefully reviewed the manuscript and refined and amended his reflections.

It is hard not to be struck by the bishop's love for the Eucharistic Lord, his confidence in Christ's triumph through those he calls the "little ones," and his own willingness to imitate the Good Shepherd in laying down his own life, whether by daily sacrifice 0r the final extremity, for the flock of Christ.

The title Christus Vincit was Bishop Schneider's own choice. He was drawn to this Latin phrase especially because of the hope and encouragement it gives to the faithful. It also emerged during our conversation that, for him, it captures Christ's use of "the foolish things of this world to confound the wise" (1 Cor I:27). The subtitle, Christ's Triumph over the Darkness of the Age, was inspired by the verse in the Prologue of St. John's Gospel: "The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not overcome it" Un i:5). As will become clear, this verse captures the arc of the narrative and the spirit of hope that imbues the text.

The book is divided into four parts, each with a title taken from chapter 24, verse 29 of St. Matthew's Gospel. In his inaugural encyclical E Supremi, St. Pius X remarked that so serious was the gathering storm of error at the

beginning of the twentieth century that he would not be surprised to hear that the Antichrist was already on this earth. The same pope would go on to describe Modernism as the synthesis of all heresies and the herald of the end time. The Church Fathers do not fail to give us a spiritual interpretation of the famous words of Our Lord: "Immediately after the tribulation of those days the sun will be darkened, and the moon will not give its light, and the stars will fall from heaven, and the powers of the heavens will be shaken" (Mt 24:29). The tribulation, St. Augustine tells us, will precede the great falling away. "These things shall be `after the tribulation of those days,' not because they shall happen when the whole persecution is overpast, but because the tribulation shall be first, that the falling away may come after" (Ep. 19, 39).

The "Sun," Christ, will be obscured in the hearts of men, and the "Moon," the Church, will no longer win men's hearts by her beauty. "In that ungoverned fury of wicked persecutors, the Church shall not be seen." The "stars," members of the Church who seemed reliable touchstones of orthodoxy, will fall from the true faith and the moral life. "Many, who seemed to be shining in God's grace, shall give way to their persecutors, and shall fall, and even the stoutest believers shall be shaken," St. Augustine tells us. And yet, like the fall of the rebel angels from heaven, it is a sign of the coming triumph of Christ (Lk 10:i8).

Whether Our Lord's words do refer to our days or not, their resonances in the experience of Bishop Athanasius Schneider and so many others are undeniable, and his insights into the apocalyptic challenges facing Christ's flock in these days count as essential reading for those truly alive to the signs of the times.

Finally, I wish to offer my heartfelt thanks to all those who in any way helped with this book. God knows who they are and, in His love, will surely reward them. Over the course of this work, I have repeatedly been reminded of God the Father's words to St. Catherine of Siena in the spiritual classic, The Dialogue of Divine Providence: "Daughter, I could easily have created men possessed of all that they should need both for body and soul, but I wish that one should have need of the other, and that they should be My ministers to administer the graces and the gifts that they have received from Me."

Secularism and the New Dictatorship

Your Excellency, secularism seems to be on the rise throughout the world and, as you say, a new dictatorship is emerging. What are the underlying causes of secularism in your view, and why is it that moral relativism seems to be spreading so fast in the West?

The deepest root of this movement of secularism in Europe — which began to construct a world without God, and to live as if God did not exist—is anthropocentrism. Secularism seeks to ban Jesus Christ from public life. Secularism is connected with relativism because when man says, "I determine what is true," then it can be true in this generation, and when the next generation comes, there can be another truth. Thus, it is always changing. This is relativism. Relativism is intimately connected with secularism and anthropocentrism. Relativism is a flight from reality.

What is behind this movement?

Ultimately Satan is behind it. There was a tendency in this direction before the so-called century of the Enlightenment. I believe it began in the fifteenth century with Humanism. This was also called the Renaissance. Its aim was to put man at the center, that man should be the measure of truth. It was not yet well articulated in the fifteenth century, but this tendency had already begun — the unhealthy autonomy of man towards God, towards the supernatural world.

Why the Renaissance?

Renaissance means rebirth. Rebirth of what? Of a pagan society. At first, they meant only a rebirth in art, but it happened in their mentality too. To praise pure naturalism — paganism is naturalism, not supernaturalism —

and so to put pure nature at the center and thus weaken the supernatural bonds with God, with the Incarnate God Jesus Christ, who is supernatural. All of this was reflected in art.

In some ways, the art of this time was very carnal, not spiritual. Sensual art is for me not worthy of man. We are more than an animal. To paint the human person almost exclusively in his naturalistic, anatomic perspective is unworthy of him. Man is more than this. We must also portray man as a spiritual being, with a supernatural dimension.

Secularism started with anthropocentrism, and the catalyst that helped this movement to grow and spread was the Protestant so-called Reformation (begun by Luther in 1517). In the religious sphere, man declared himself the center, and this is subjectivism. It was, in some way, a tendency to pride that was expressed very clearly in Luther and then in the Enlightenment. Then came the movement of Deism, which began in the seventeenth century in England. It was not yet formally Freemasonry, but it was born in the Protestant environment.

Could you say more about the connection you see between secularism and Protestantism?

Secularism, in my view, is the necessary consequence of Protestantism. It is the subjectivism in virtue of which man decides what is true, and the subject, or the private man, is the authority who determines the true meaning of revelation. This led to faith — objective faith — being weakened. For Luther, faith was subjective. Sola fide: for him, faith is a subjective conviction without submission to the objective content of divine revelation as transmitted by the constant tradition of the Church. Today, even in the Catholic Church, we are in danger of neglecting the objective content of Truth and Revelation, under the pretext that one is expressing one's subjective conviction that "I believe in Christ; Christ is my Savior," or under the pretext of "the development of doctrine." To proclaim Christ without stressing the objective content of the immutable truths of divine revelation and the divine commandments ultimately signifies a new subjective religion of emotionalism, similar to many Protestant denominations. In this attitude we find, in my opinion, one of the deepest roots of the crisis in the Catholic Church in our days.

You mentioned Deism. Can you explain the foundations of this movement?

Deism was a cultural and philosophical phenomenon, especially in England, which held the theory that God is inaccessible, that we can know only that God exists and nothing more. For the Deist, it is impossible to know anything about God—completely impossible.

There is no communication, then, between God and His creatures.

According to this view, God created man and the whole universe and gave creation — man and the universe — complete and absolute independence in everything, and just let it run by itself without any direct influence, without any divine and supernatural action. Any direct divine revelation is therefore excluded in this view. There is no possibility of revelation. This opened the door to Freemasonry, the main dogma of which is Deism: that there is complete and absolute independence and freedom of human beings toward God, or the Creator, or whatever you name this god. Since God is totally unknowable, you can name him whatever you want. You can name him Allah, or Christ — even though Freemasons do not accept Christ — you can call him Creator, Buddha, you can even call him Satan, or the Great Architect of the World. This movement goes back to secularism and anthropocentrism.

And where are we today?

Now we have reached a peak of secularism, of this complete independence of man, 0f this enormous anthropocentrism where everyone decides for himself what is true and what is good or evil. Such secularism brings us a horrible and cruel society. We are witnessing this — it is cruel. And what is the result? Egoism. Secularism leads to egoism. We have now reached a peak of egoism — and egoism is cruel: only I and no one else.

It is Hell.

It is Hell. "Only I." Ultimately this means, "When someone else is impeding or hindering what I want to do, I will kill him, I will destroy him." And so, they began to kill the innocents in their mother's womb because these babies are hindering them from achieving what they believe is their self-realization through pleasures, a false freedom, and worldly success. Then they eliminate sick people; then the handicapped, for instance those with Down syndrome, and so on. This is the path of the new dictatorship, patterned after the Nazi dictatorship in Germany and the Communist dictatorship in the Soviet Union. This is a process which leads ultimately to an exasperated egoism, to a cruel and inhuman society.

From its roots to the point where we are now, this trajectory has led to gender ideology, in which man decides what nature is, instead of God the Word "through whom all things were made" (cf. Jn 1:3). <>

AND STILL WE WAIT: HANS URS VON BALTHASAR'S THEOLOGY OF HOLY SATURDAY AND CHRISTIAN DISCIPLESHIP by Riyako Cecilia Hikota [Princeton Theological Monograph, Wipf and Stock, 9781532605611]

In response to the recent critiques made against Balthasar's interpretation of Christ's descent into hell on Holy Saturday, this book argues that Balthasar does not intend to present a radical reinterpretation of the doctrine in contrast to the traditional teachings but rather intends to fully appreciate the in-betweenness of Holy Saturday as the day of transition from the cross to the resurrection, from the old aeon to the new. The book further argues that this awareness of the ""in-betweenness"" can be detected throughout Balthasar's theological corpus and provides a clue to interpret his thoughts on Christian discipleship and suffering. After all, the Christian existence is also characterized by the transition from the old aeon to the new, from suffering to victory. The Christian believes that their victory is already here and not here yet. In this sense, the Christian still lives in Holy Saturday. Eventually, we can deepen our understanding of Christian discipleship and suffering in the light of Holy Saturday. In short, we could patiently endure our Holy Saturday because of Christ's Holy Saturday in hell."

Hans Urs von Balthasar is acknowledged as one of the greatest modern Christian theologians . . . Hikota's openness to the mystical sources that influenced Balthasar, specially his friend and profound spiritual writer, Adrienne von Speyr, makes Hikota's interpretation one of the most valuable studies of Balthasar. This engaging book marks a new beginning of Balthasar scholarship and a sincere recovery of the mystery of the Son of God who pursues us even into the depths." --Matthew Lewis Sutton, Associate Professor, St. John's University, New York City "

Avoiding recent polemics, Riya Hikota offers a patient exploration of Balthasar's theology of Holy Saturday, noting in particular the influence of Adrienne von Speyr. Through providing a balanced scholarly appraisal of Balthasar's work, Hikota seeks to develop a consensus approach to the liturgical and pastoral significance of Easter Saturday. Her treatment of the subject deserves broad ecumenical consideration." --David Fergusson, Professor, University of Edinburgh

Riyako Cecilia Hikota is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institut Catholique de Paris. She has received a PhD in systematic theology at the University of Edinburgh.

The Context: The Debate Concerning Christ's Descent into Hell

In recent years, Holy Saturday and Christ's descent into hell have been quietly gaining more and more scholarly attention,' but there is still more to be said about their significance. The most influential modern theologian who has seriously engaged with this doctrine is the Swiss Catholic theologian, Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905-1988). Inspired by the mystical visions of his collaborator and friend, Adrienne von Speyr, he has presented an innovative, but also controversial, interpretation that on Holy Saturday Jesus Christ suffered in utter solidarity with the dead in hell and took to himself our self-damnation. For Balthasar, this "act" of Christ reveals the full depth of our redemption. One of the most distinctive characteristics of Balthasar's interpretation is that he reads this doctrine as a Trinitarian event and emphasizes the passivity of the Son, who, in sheer "obedience of a corpse," underwent the godforsakenness in solidarity with the sinful humanity as the final point of his salvific mission received from the Father.

However, Balthasar's innovative interpretation has caused controversies, leading critics such as Alyssa Lyra Pitstick to argue that Balthasar's theology is even heretical.' On the surface, Balthasar's interpretation seems to be quite far from the mainstream Catholic teaching of the doctrine (known as the harrowing of hell), which obviously presents Jesus Christ in hell as being already crowned with the glory of Easter and emphasizes the salvation of the patriarchs from Sheol (or Hades, the realm of the dead, which contains both the righteous and the wicked). For example, the current Catholic Catechism, which was promulgated by Pope John Paul II in 1992, summarizes this doctrine as follows:

> By the expression "He descended into hell; the Apostles' Creed confesses that Jesus did really die and through his death for us conquered death and the devil "who has the power of death" (Heb 2:14). In his human soul united to his divine person, the dead Christ went down to the realm of the dead. He opened heaven's gates for the just who had gone before him.

The Catechism also explains that Jesus "descended there as Savior, proclaiming the Good News to the spirits imprisoned there" and also "Jesus did not descend into hell to deliver the damned, nor to destroy the hell of damnation, but to free the just who had gone before him."' This statement of the current Catechism of the Catholic Church basically reflects the teaching of the Catechism of the Council of Trent (1566; the so-called "Roman Catechism"), which had a dominant influence for more than four centuries. The Roman Catechism provides two reasons why Christ descended into hell: to liberate the just6 and to proclaim his power.

Turning to such authorities as these, Pitstick has summarized the traditional teaching by focusing on the following four points:

> First, Christ descended in His soul united to His divine Person only to the limbo of the Fathers. Second, His power and authority were made known throughout all of hell, taken generically. Third, He thereby accomplished the two purposes for the descent, which were "to liberate the just" by conferring on them the glory of heaven and "to proclaim His power:' Finally, His descent was a glorious one, and Christ did not suffer the pain proper to any of the abodes of hell.'

In short, Pitstick has argued that there does exist a "traditional" Catholic doctrine of the descent and that the creeds, the magisterial teaching, the Scripture, the liturgy, the consensus of the saints, and the sensus fidelium expressed in sacred art all unanimously show that the descent is "glorious in the first and proper sense of the word" in other words, "glorious" in the sense of Easter, while Balthasar seems to interpret it in the sense of Good Friday.'

In response to Pitstick, Edward T. Oakes has taken the position to defend Balthasar, and the series of their debates on this topic has been published. While admitting that "Balthasar is a disturbing theologian. Even among some of his most vocal enthusiasts, he seems 'not quite right;" Oakes has attempted to defend Balthasar against Pitstick's harsh critiques by mainly focusing on the following three points: Protestantism, papacy, and purgatory. As it is well known, Balthasar is hugely influenced by the Reformed theologian, Karl Barth, in many areas of his theology, including his famous "hope" for universal salvation. Oakes criticizes Pitstick's curt dismissal of Reformed theologians in general. This point is worth noting because, as Oakes reminds us, it is nothing less than St. Paul's doctrine of atonement that Balthasar has tried to bring back into the center of Catholic theology through his engagement with Barth. Therefore, Oakes argues that it is actually St. Paul's teachings that Pitstick is denying by dismissing Barth's influence on Balthasar. Further, Oakes turns to the authority of the two popes, namely, St. John Paul II and Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI, who are known to have greatly commended Balthasar's contributions to the Catholic Church. (The former is the one who insisted that Balthasar be a cardinal, and the latter's own interpretation of Christ's descent into hell sounds similar to Balthasar's.) Finally, as to Pitstick's treatment of purgatory, Oakes points out that Pitstick's argument admits a pre-Christian purgatory, which does not make sense, as not only Balthasar but also the traditional teaching states that the "hell" Christ descended into was Sheol. In short, through a series of articles and responses on this topic, Oakes has tried to present Balthasar's interpretation as an authentic development of the doctrine which can stand the norms set by Blessed John Henry Newman."

Another scholar whose response to Pitstick is worth noting here is Paul J. Griffiths. His focus is not on Balthasar's interpretation itself but on the scope and doctrinal weight of what Pitstick has called the "traditional" teaching. Regarding her four-point summary of the "traditional" teaching, Griffiths has argued that Pitstick "drastically overestimates the extent to which there is settled doctrine on this topic, and therefore also misconstrues the nature of her own enterprise" Pitstick herself clearly appeals to the consensus fidelium to support her argument. However, as Griffiths says, "Appeal to the consensus fidelium to support or rule out some doctrinal is, therefore, while quite legitimate, always difficult and never prima facie probative." Specifically, Griffiths has pointed out that the technical language she uses in her summary (such as the phrase "limbo of the Fathers") "has never been the subject of definition by any council, that appears in no creed, and that, so far as I can tell, is almost entirely absent from ordinary magisterial teaching" Further, concerning the meaning of "glory" in the sense of Easter which Pitstick emphasizes, Griffiths criticizes the way she uses the notion "to close thought down" rather than "to break open and suggestively expand the meaning of the descent in ways whose limits cannot be specified in advance.'" As a conclusion he writes, "the church doesn't teach very much about that matter, which means that the scope for such discussion is wide." In short, Griffiths has shown that the "traditional" teaching presented by Pitstick is "nothing that requires assent from Catholics."

However, Griffiths's article is far from being the final word on this debate concerning Balthasar's innovative interpretation of Holy Saturday. While it has certainly helped us to see that Pitstick's accusation of Balthasar of heresy may not be as solidly grounded as she claims, some of the serious concerns raised by Pitstick against Balthasar have been shared by others (mostly concerning his treatment of the Trinity, Christology, and universal salvation)."

Going back to the statement of the current Catechism on this doctrine, while it is true that it sounds far from Balthasar's interpretation on the surface, we should also note that when this Catechism was presented to the public at first some scholars actually said it should have left some room for interpretations like Balthasar's. For example, a Rahnerian scholar Peter C. Phan has written,

> There are, however, elements in the CCC's exposition of the Creed that are "old" in the pejorative sense of outmoded. For example, in its interpretation of the formula "he descended to the dead," the Catechism seems to take it literally to mean that Jesus descended into the realm of the dead ...While such an interpretation is not to be ruled out of course, it would have helped matters immeasurably to

> state unambiguously that such a phrase need not be taken literally and that other interpretations (such as Hans Urs von Balthasar's or Karl Rahner's) are theologically plausible.

It is further worth noting that Cardinal Christoph Schönborn, the editor of the Catechism, has specifically mentioned Balthasar in his introduction to the Catechism's teaching of this doctrine in quite a subtle way. He has said,

> The fifth article ... concerns an equally central good of the Christian patrimony of faith. The brief paragraph on Jesus' descent into hell keeps to what is the common property of the Church's exegetical tradition. Newer interpretations, such as that of a Hans Urs von Balthasar (the contemplation of Holy Saturday), however profound and helpful they may be, have not yet experienced that reception which would justify their inclusion in the Catechism.

We should not read too much into this "not yet; but the subtle way that Balthasar is mentioned here is worth noting. His interpretation has been neither received as orthodox nor rejected as heterodox. In other words, there is still room and even a need to evaluate Balthasar's theology of Holy Saturday critically.'

The Contributions of **AND STILL WE WAIT: HANS URS VON BALTHASAR'S THEOLOGY OF HOLY SATURDAY AND CHRISTIAN DISCIPLESHIP** in Terms of Its Approach, Scope, and Questions

Now let us clarify the position of this book and the contributions we aim to make in terms of critical evaluation of Balthasar's theology of Holy Saturday. Despite its polemical tone, there is no doubt that Pitstick's work has been a great achievement for it has certainly stirred much scholarly interest in this topic. As we have noted above, she has also raised some serious concerns about Balthasar's theology, which have been shared by other critics. First of all, does Balthasar's theology not bring some kind of a rupture into the Trinity? Secondly, does he not depart from the Chalecedonian Christology by confusing the divinity and humanity of Jesus Christ? Finally, does his theology not inevitably lead to admitting universal salvation in a systematic sense despite his insistence that it is merely a "hope"? We will discuss these questions as we expound his theology of Holy Saturday.

On the other hand, we find three significant problems with Pitstick's approach to Balthasar, which are directly related to the contributions this book aims to make. First of all, we have to note the huge genre difference between Balthasar and Pitstick. While Balthasar is known for his utter distaste for neo-scholasticism, Pitstick's entire work is precisely written in a neo-scholastic style. This genre difference should not be ignored, as it seems to be one of the causes which lead her to miss the exploratory nature of his treatment of Holy Saturday and to misread him as if he attempted to reshape the Catholic dogma in a radical way. Throughout this book, our position is that Balthasar does not try to present a radical reinterpretation of the doctrine of the descent into hell in contrast to the traditional teachings but rather tries to appreciate the "in-between" state of Christ in Sheol on Holy Saturday more seriously than any other theologian has ever done. We will argue for it while paying full respect to the genre he is working within, which we understand to be a contemplative combination of theology and spirituality.

This point leads us to the second point: the problem concerning the sources. First of all, in order to evaluate Balthasar's theology of Holy Saturday fully, we believe that it is important to see Adrienne von Speyr's mystical visions and to examine how he has developed his own theology by using them as an inspirational source while also turning to various sources for support. In contrast to Pitstick, who almost entirely ignores her writings, throughout this book we will refer to Speyr's mystical visions when it is relevant. We will also emphasize the importance of the spiritual writings of saints in history for him: St. John of the Cross and St. Thérèse of Lisieux in particular.

Finally, the entire scope and angle of this book differs from Pitstick's work and the other previous studies on Balthasar's theology of Holy Saturday. In the last analysis, our focus is on Holy Saturday itself, the day between the cross and the resurrection, which includes Mary's Holy Saturday and the Christian's Holy Saturday experience today as well as Christ in hell. We believe that this angle is significant in order to do full justice to Balthasar's treatment of this subject. After all, he himself has preferred this liturgical term "Holy Saturday" to the more doctrinal term "Christ's descent into hell" His preference for this liturgical term also implies the wide

scope his theology potentially has. It is not only about what Christ did or where he was on this particular day in what condition, but it also has in its scope the whole "Holy Saturday experience," which can be characterized by silent waiting. For example, the Roman Missal clearly states, "On Holy Saturday the Church waits at the Lord's tomb in prayer and fasting, meditating on his Passion and Death and on his Descent into Hell, and awaiting his Resurrection." We also believe that this element of waiting is important to understand the way Balthasar remains faithful to the Catholic tradition. In his own words, We could, simply put, distinguish the two great movements of the tradition: that of the East and that of the West. For the East, the icon of Christ's descent makes the main representation of our salvation. Christ strides over the gates of hell which lie across under his feet, as victor over death, and extends His saving hand to those waiting in the darkness of Sheol ...In the West, theology and liturgy mainly honor the silence of death, so the church watches quietly and prayerfully with Mary at the grave. However, both traditions have an inner limit. The Eastern tradition shows us not the dead but the one who is fully alive, namely the Christ of Easter ...The Western tradition with their pure silence remains somehow eventless, and nothing seems to happen between Good Friday and Easter. Is there a possibility to reconcile both theologies by criticizing their weak points?

This passage helps us to see why Pitstick's main question (whether the descent was glorious in the sense of Easter or Good Friday) can be actually misleading for evaluation of Balthasar's theology of Holy Saturday. His own concern does not lie so much in clarifying the meaning of the glory as in fully appreciating this strange pause between death and life, or between suffering and victory. This point can be further justified by noting that Pitstick's argument does not really answer the question why the church actually waits a whole day before the celebration of the Easter Vigil mass on Holy Saturday night. To underline this point, we will conclude this book by exploring the profound relation between the mystery of Holy Saturday and the mystery of the Eucharist, which is "the source and summit of the Christian life."

Once we note Balthasar's emphasis on the "in-betweenness" of Holy Saturday, we start to see the possibility to widen its scope and explore its implications for Christian life. In addition to his innovative treatment of Holy Saturday, Balthasar is also regarded as a pioneer in the area of theological engagement with tragedy, but the profound connection between these two areas has not yet been fully examined. Balthasar fundamentally sees something "tragic" in an in-between state. We will present a close connection between his theology of Holy Saturday and his tragic view of the paradoxical existence of the Christian by focusing on the element of waiting.

With this approach and within this scope, we will explore the following questions in particular: what kind of implications Balthasar's theology of Holy Saturday can provide for Christian discipleship? In relation to this, we will also explore the implications for the question of Christian suffering as well: how does Balthasar's theology of Holy Saturday help Christians to find meaning and hope in their suffering while avoiding the pitfall of systematized theodicy, that is, avoiding presumptuously theorizing or explaining away the reality of suffering? In fact, Christian discipleship and suffering are closely interlinked in Balthasar's theology, so in the last analysis these questions become virtually inseparable. This point will be made clear as we expound his theology.

We will try to explore the implications for Christian suffering and discipleship by connecting the in-between state of Christ in Sheol and the in-between existence of the Christian in this world. Such an exploration is quite relevant when we critically evaluate Balthasar's theology of Holy Saturday while doing full justice to the genre within which he is working. After all, Balthasar's own concern does not lie so much in how to clarify the dogmatic aspects of the mystery of Holy Saturday as how to enrich Christian discipleship by contemplating on its profound mystery. This point is clear from the following passage which appears at the end of his article on Christ's descent into hell:

> What follows from all this for us? Let us leave it to the theologians to discuss the dogmatic aspects. We, however, like Mary and most Christians, cannot follow Christ on this last way. We remain awake at the grave with the other holy women: What can we do? Many things. In our lives, revive the spirit of

> solidarity, this power to share the burden of another, to pray with fervor—and such prayer is unfailing—so that our brothers and sisters would not be lost in the end ...We simply attempt to put into action the small things that are possible for us.

The Outline of the Chapters of **AND STILL WE WAIT: HANS URS VON BALTHASAR'S THEOLOGY OF HOLY SATURDAY AND CHRISTIAN DISCIPLESHIP**

Finally, let us explain the structure of this whole book and specify the contents and issues we will discuss in each of the chapters:

In chapter i, we will prepare the setting for the subsequent chapters. Based on Balthasar's Trinitarian theology and Christology, we will narrate Christ's descent into hell on Holy Saturday as the event in which Christ the Savior went through the transition from the old to the new aeon in hell, while emphasizing the aspect of "waiting" as well as how it does not necessarily contradict the traditional teachings.

In chapter 2, we will explore the descent into hell as "the dark night of the soul," which is a crucial concept for Balthasar's theology of Holy Saturday. For Balthasar, hell is first and foremost a christological concept. As the main influences on Balthasar on this topic, we will examine Adrienne von Speyr's mystical vision of hell, "the dark night of the soul" of St. John of the Cross, and "the night of nothingness" of St. Thérèse of Lisieux. We will also make reference to St. Mother Teresa as one contemporary example of the descent into hell persevered for the sake of brethren.

In chapter 3, the focus is on Mary, for Balthasar presents Mary as the perfect role model of Christian discipleship. We will discuss how Mary obediently participated in her son's suffering of the sinner's godforsakenness. We will also criticize Balthasar's view of the feminine, which is revealed in his Mariology. In relation to this point we will discuss his critics' concern that Balthasar's theology does not really serve the cause of social justice.

In chapter 4, we will try to locate Balthasar's theology of Holy Saturday within his "tragic" view of Christianity. We will argue that the element of waiting which characterizes Holy Saturday between the cross and the resurrection represents the fundamentally "tragic" state of Christian existence (understood as "tragedy under grace"). In the last analysis, if we locate Christian suffering in the in-between existence represented by Holy Saturday, we could somehow interpret the meaning of suffering into "tragic waiting." This could help us to avoid simply explaining away the reality of suffering while also leaving the hope to find meaning in suffering. The "tragic" waiting in our lives, which is represented by the in-betweenness of Holy Saturday, now can be seen in a christological light.

In chapter 5, we will try to put together the discussions of all these chapters by exploring the mystery of the Eucharist, which constitutes the central part of the life of the church, in light of the mystery of Holy Saturday. Liturgically speaking, Holy Saturday is the day on which we do not celebrate the Eucharist, but without the empty and silent pause of Holy Saturday, we cannot truly appreciate the mystery of the Eucharist. <>

THE WISCONSIN ONEIDAS AND THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH: A CHAIN LINKING TWO TRADITIONS edited by L. Gordon McLester III, Laurence M. Hauptman, Judy Cornelius-Hawk, and Kenneth Hoyan House [Indiana University Press, 9780253041388]

This unique collaboration by academic historians, Oneida elders, and Episcopal clergy tells the fascinating story of how the oldest Protestant mission and house of worship in the upper Midwest took root in the Oneida community. Personal bonds that developed between the Episcopal clergy and the Wisconsin Oneidas proved more important than theology in allowing the community to accept the Christian message brought by outsiders.

Episcopal bishops and missionaries in Wisconsin were at times defenders of the Oneidas against outside whites attempting to get at their lands and resources. At other times, these clergy initiated projects that the Oneidas saw as beneficial—a school, a hospital, or a lace-making program for Oneida women that provided a source of income and national recognition for their artistry. The clergy incorporated the Episcopal faith into an Iroquoian cultural and religious framework—the Condolence Council ritual—that had a longstanding history among the Six Nations. In turn, the Oneidas modified the very form of the Episcopal faith by using their own language in the *Gloria in Excelsis* and the *Te Deum* as well as by employing Oneida in their singing of Christian hymns.

Christianity continues to have real meaning for many American Indians. **THE WISCONSIN ONEIDAS AND THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH: A CHAIN LINKING TWO TRADITIONS** testifies to the power and legacy of that relationship.

The title of the book was carefully chosen to capture the essence of the Wisconsin Oneidas' relationship with the Episcopal Church, although on numerous occasions there have been severe breaks in the chain linking these Native Americans with the clergy. Since Jackson Kemper's bishopric began in the mid-183os, the relationship has not been a total one-way street with the clergy completely dominating and imposing their will on the Indians, as was too often the case in missionary history. It is no accident that contemporary Wisconsin Oneidas use the metaphor of the Covenant Chain to describe their historic relationship with the Episcopal Church. The original Covenant Chain was first established in the seventeenth century and was composed of a complex series of alliances between the Iroquois League, then composed of the Five Nations—Oneidas as well as Mohawks, Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas—and the Anglo-American colonies, and was fashioned diplomatically in belts of wampum. These agreements were supposed to be mutually beneficial and respectful to both parties and were later symbolized by an iron chain that tended to rust. Subsequently, the metaphor became a silver chain, one that had to be periodically polished/renewed to once again bind the parties in efforts at cooperation and alliance.'

The Oneida mission, founded in 1816 with roots going back more than a century, was the very first "foreign" mission of the Episcopal Church, predating others by a decade. The Wisconsin Oneidas have had four Episcopal churches to meet the spiritual needs of their growing population in Wisconsin since the beginning of their migration out of New York. It is important to note that when the Oneidas first came to Wisconsin in the 1820s and 183os, they brought with them two already established Christian traditions: the Protestant Episcopal and the Methodist religions. At that time, although they were heavily influenced by Hodinöhsö:ni' beliefs, no Iroquois longhouse, whether inspired by the Good Message of Handsome Lake that arose in 1799-1800 or the earlier Great (Binding) Law, was brought with the Oneidas to Wisconsin. Although traditional revivalist movements came to the fore in the 1920s and today play a significant role in community life, the Oneidas' longhouse that exists in Wisconsin was formally established in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

In 1825, after arriving from central New York, the Oneidas built their "Log Church" about ten miles southwest of Green Bay in the vicinity of Duck Creek. This church structure was the first Protestant church in the Old Northwest Territory. In 1838, their second church, a Gothic-styled wooden structure, the first non-Roman Catholic church consecrated in the Old Northwest Territory, held its first religious services. As late as 1847, the Oneida mission was only one of three parishes of the Episcopal Church in Wisconsin Territory. Volunteering their labor to quarry stone and secure funding over a two-decade period, the Oneidas built their third church, the "Hobart" or "Stone Church," one with a steep roof, heavy buttresses, and low massive walls designed by priest and architect Charles Babcock and opened in 1886; this house of worship was consecrated by Bishop Charles Chapman

Grafton in 1897. When this church was struck by lightning and its interior destroyed by fire in the summer of 192o, the Oneidas rebuilt the interior around the surviving stone wall frame and opened the new structure. In June 1922, the church was reconsecrated by Bishop R. H. Weller and renamed the Church of the Holy Apostles. Today, the church is one of thirty-seven parishes in northeastern Wisconsin under the spiritual leadership of the bishop of Fond du Lac, whose diocese office is headquartered at Appleton, Wisconsin. Its importance in the state and nation was best recognized by one Native American, not an Oneida, who described the church, with its majestic gray tower, as "the cathedral for all Episcopal Indians."

The Wisconsin Oneidas and the Episcopal Church: A Chain That Links Two Traditions begins with an introductory essay by an Oneida local historian and a diocesan archivist who reflect on the nature of the historical links between this Native community and the Episcopal Church. Then the book is divided into four parts. Part I contains three essays, one focusing on the Oneida world before the arrival of missionaries; one on Jesuit, Anglican, and Presbyterian proselytizing efforts; and, finally, one on the controversial Eleazer Williams, who Bishop John Henry Hobart chose to serve the spiritual needs of the Oneidas at the Episcopal Church's first Indian mission. The authors in Parts II of the book describe the Episcopal Church involvement in Oneida community life from the mid-1830s into the first decade of the twentieth century. It includes articles on the Episcopal clergy; on the special bond between Kemper and Oneida leadership as well as the bishop's influence on Susan Fenimore Cooper; on Oneida connections to the Nashotah House Seminary; on two Oneidas—Chief and Priest Cornelius Hill and John Archiquette—and their roles as both tribal and church leaders; on Christmastime at the mission; on church-sponsored health care delivery; and on a successful Episcopal-sponsored lace-making project. Part III is composed of accounts by seventeen Oneidas reflecting on the Episcopal Church's influence on the community over the past one hundred years. These reminiscences clearly show that what Wisconsin Oneidas valued most were the good works by individual Episcopal clergy, including Oneida priests and nuns themselves, who often engendered respect and approval for their actions while preaching Christ's path to salvation. In Part IV, Christopher Vecsey puts the previous sections into a larger perspective, comparing the Wisconsin Oneida experience with the scholarly literature on other Native American communities. Vecsey's article is followed by the editors' concluding words about the history of this lengthy and extraordinary link between the Wisconsin Oneidas and the Episcopal Church.

The editors are quite aware of the criticisms, both in the scholarly literature and in the media, of the Episcopal/Anglican Church over the past half a century. In 1974, the late Vine Deloria Jr., the noted scholar and activist and himself a former seminarian who was brought up in the Episcopal religious tradition among the Standing Rock Lakota, pointed out that major cultural, economic, political, and social problems in Native American communities resulted from the severing of traditional religious life.' In 1999, Edmond Browning, presiding bishop of the Episcopal Church in the United States, and Native American leaders, including the chief of the Mattaponi Nation of Virginia, acknowledged this and issued the Jamestown Covenant, one of faith and reconciliation, where the church asked for forgiveness in some of its past policies and treatment of indigenous peoples. In July 2009, the General Convention of the National Episcopal Church meeting in Anaheim, California, passed Resolution 2009-D035, which repudiated and renounced the Doctrine of Discovery that was applied by Henry VIII and the Anglican Church in the early years of colonization of the Americas; in the same resolution, members called on US officials to endorse the United Nations Declaration of Indigenous Rights. Moreover, the editors are also aware of revelations since the late 1980s of rampant abuse of Native American children at residential schools administered by the Anglican Church of Canada. After this scandal was widely reported, Primate Archbishop Michael Peers made a formal apology in 1993. In 2005, the Canadian government and indigenous communities established a mechanism for students to seek financial compensation. The Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission was created in 2008, and its final report was issued in 2015.

While presenting the positive side of the church's relations with the Oneidas, **THE WISCONSIN ONEIDAS AND THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH: A CHAIN LINKING TWO TRADITIONS** does not attempt to cover up the failings of the Episcopal clergy. The authors make it clear that both sides of the chain from the first used each other for their own

purposes, be they economic, political, or religious. Jack Campisi, the foremost ethnohistorian on the Oneidas, has said that Episcopal clergy "advised the council, and, in turn accepted direction and advice from it." These same missionaries and bishops were the Oneidas' representatives to the national church, raised funds for Indian needs, brought medical care, taught at the mission school, developed self-help projects that benefited the tribal economy, and periodically served as cultural brokers between the Oneidas and local, state, and federal officials to defend the Oneidas against outside threats. On the other hand, Campisi has also brought out that the Episcopal mission weakened the Oneida clan system and discouraged certain aspects of Iroquoian culture, including membership in medicine societies. He has pointed out that the Oneida mission school had an assimilationist focus and that its teachers insisted on the use of English and not the Oneida language, a policy that was strictly enforced at times. <>

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SPIRITUAL LIVING by Paul Brunton, edited by Jeff Cox [Inner Traditions, 9781620558041]

Answers to the questions that arise on the spiritual path

- Includes specially selected writings from the huge literary archive of Paul Brunton
- Explains the different stages of meditation and the obstacles likely to arise for each, offering guidance for achieving advanced states of meditation to deepen one's inner life
- Challenges the need for spiritual dependency on any particular guru, teaching, or practice, showing that following your intuition can bring the best spiritual success
- Explores the process of self-examination and emotional purification, revealing how to break free from the ego and tap into the inspiration flowing from within

No matter where we are in our spiritual development, we all have questions about our practice and what we are experiencing--both the challenges and opportunities. How can I overcome my struggles to meditate more deeply? Is there a need for a guru or can I rely on myself? Can I trust my intuition? Is it possible to hear the "Inner Word," the voice of the soul, and how can I be sure that's what I'm hearing? Is the Higher Self in the heart?

Offering trustworthy answers to these and many more questions, renowned spiritual teacher Paul Brunton provides instructions to guide one's development in three fundamental areas of the spiritual path: meditation, self-examination, and the unfolding of awakening. Guiding you with insight and care through each stage of meditation, including advanced states that deepen one's inner life, he explains how meditation is the art and practice of introverting attention, of freeing oneself for a period of time from thoughts, sensations, and feelings and allowing the soul to reveal itself out of the quiet that one has created. He explains the goal of each meditative stage and the obstacles you are likely to face and examines the need for spiritual dependency on any particular guru, teaching, or practice, showing that following your intuition can bring spiritual success.

Exploring the process of self-examination and emotional purification, Brunton shows how life's challenges are moments by which we can make real progress in our surrender to a higher life. He reveals how to break free from the ego, follow your intuition to align with your ideals, and tap into the inspiration flowing from within. He also examines the development of transcendental insight, the cornerstone of compassionate wisdom in action, which allows us to become a source of inspiration to all we encounter.

Including writings received by the Paul Brunton Philosophic Foundation after his death, this guide offers transformative wisdom to aid our understanding of what the spiritual journey entails, help point the way when the way is uncertain, and learn and grow from the challenges that arise as you develop spiritually.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SPIRITUAL LIVING examines both foundational and advanced topics central to most spiritual paths. Whether we have a teacher or not, spiritual development is fraught with complexities and challenges. Paul Brunton offers transformative wisdom that aids our understanding of what the spiritual journey entails and helps point the way when the way is uncertain.

"PB," as he preferred to be called, was a gentle man from whom an aura of peace and kindness emanated. His deep understanding of the spiritual life was forged in the crucible of experience, and his spiritual depth shines through his writings.

PB provides instructions to guide one's development in three fundamental areas: in a full course of the stages of meditation to deepen one's inner life; in a process of self-examination that roots obstacles out of one's character; and in the unfolding of full awakening that includes wisdom in action. As he makes clear, the living expression of realization is a life of service both to the inner wellspring of wisdom as well as to others.

Beginning with "The Adventure of Meditation," the first chapters open the door to the inner landscape. Meditation is the art and practice of introverting attention, of freeing oneself for a period of time from the thoughts, sensations, and feelings that are usually at the center of our attention, and allowing the Soul to reveal itself out of the quiet that one has created. PB guides us with insight and care through the stages of concentration, meditation, and contemplation. He explains the goal of each stage and the obstacles that are likely to arise in the process of achieving each. Invaluable are the pointers and encouragement he gives us to continue with patience as we strive to deepen our practice. The chapters: "Is the Soul in the Heart" and "The Interior Word" are marvelous supplements to our understanding and experience of the inner life.

Undoubtedly, there is great need for instruction in the spiritual pursuit. However, PB examines, questions, and challenges the need for dependency on any particular person, organization, teaching, or practice in his chapter "Self-Reliance or Discipleship?" After all is said and done, we are striving to realize our essence and inner wisdom—our lives are individual expressions of that essential wisdom, and because of this often-overlooked fact, PB explains and emphasizes the necessity and value of the independent path.

In the next few chapters, PB lays out the ethical qualifications and emotional purifications that are integral to our progress toward self-realization. It is our attachments that bar the door to our Soul and block our search for truth, and a steady dose of self-examination is critical for our success in spiritual life. Striving to understand our nature, and the aspiration that makes this process an enlivening one, awakens our intuition. Following intuition aligns us with our ideals, and thereby prevents us from succumbing to emotional disturbances and temptations. Realization requires the surrender of egoistic fixations so that we may attend to the inspiration flowing from

within, which PB refers to as "grace." In "The Probations and Tests of the Aspirant," he proffers an eye-opening explanation of how life's challenges are moments by which we can make real progress in our surrender to a higher life.

While a primary goal of mystical meditation is the realization of our inner reality in a sense-free and thought-free contemplation, it is the development of transcendental insight that enables the realization of this reality whether we are awake, a dream, or asleep. In the chapter on "Insight," PB refers to a person who has achieved this realization as a "philosopher" (by elevating its meaning to "lover of Truth/Reality"). He explains:

> Mystics find their inner self. They discover that personality is rooted in a deeper, wider being—the Overself. But they do not discover the significance of the not-self. They do not enter into comprehension of the All. Once a philosophic illumination has been gained, it shines steadily and enduringly. It is never clouded even for a moment. In other words, the philosopher walks in perpetual light and not in intermittent flashes of light as does the mystic. The philosophic knowledge is a well-established one, whereas the mystic knowledge is an occasional one. Philosophic truth is a constant and unclouded power of the one, whereas fleeting intuition or temporary ecstasy at best is the attainment of the other.

Insight is the cornerstone of compassionate wisdom in action and, once achieved, enables us to become a source of inspiration to all whom we encounter. In the final chapters, he elaborates how the philosopher's orientation to life is one of altruistic service, a constant call to enlighten others.

In an appendix, we have included PB's candid account of his Spiritual unfoldment, which he wrote for the purpose of providing a living example of the transformational operation and power of these teachings and especially to inspire and encourage anyone who is drawn to study and practice them.

Instructions for Spiritual Living has been created from essays that were unpublished during PB's lifetime. The Paul Brunton Philosophic Foundation selected them from the large archive of PB's writings and arranged them to form this manual for spiritual practice and realization.

Please note that Paul Brunton wrote in the mid-twentieth century when the literary convention was to use "he" rather than "he or she," but PB intended that these teachings applied to everyone interested in them. The editors have updated PB's language to reflect this fact and have made some other minor editorial changes to the original text.

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The Paul Brunton Philosophic Foundation (PBPF) was formed in the mid-1980s after the death of Paul Brunton. PB's son Kenneth Hurst, his literary heir, helped form the PBPF for the purpose of archiving, publishing, and making available the teachings of PB in a variety of media and languages. From PB's archive, a sixteen-volume collection of his previously unpublished writings, The Notebooks of Paul Brunton, was created; these volumes have been recognized as a major contribution to spiritual literature, as have his earlier works, which continue to serve as key spiritual resources for generations of seekers. The foundation is based in the Finger Lakes Region of New York and has a twelve-member working board of volunteers who manage its many tasks. For more information about the foundation and PB's work please visit www.paulbrunton.org. <>

A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BOOK OF MORMON by Larry E. Morris [Oxford University Press, 9780190699093]

The story of the creation of the Book of Mormon has been told many times, and often ridiculed. **A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BOOK OF MORMON** presents and examines the primary sources surrounding the origin of the foundational text of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the most successful new religion of modern times.

The scores of documents transcribed and annotated in this book include family histories, journal entries, letters, affidavits, reminiscences, interviews, newspaper articles, and book extracts, as well as revelations dictated in the name of God. From these texts emerges the captivating story of what happened (and what was believed or rumored to have happened) between September 1823-when the seventeen-year-old farm boy Joseph Smith announced that an angel of God had directed him to an ancient book inscribed on gold plates-and March 1830, when the Book of Mormon was first published. By compiling for the first time a substantial collection of both first- and secondhand accounts relevant to the inception of the divine revelation-or clever fraud-that launched a new world religion, **A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY** makes a significant contribution to the rapidly growing field of Mormon Studies.

On Friday, June 26, 1829, the Palmyra, New York, newspaper Wayne Sentinel announced that Tucker and Lothrap's store had received a new shipment of dry goods, groceries, glassware, hardware, cutlery, and hollowware. Not only that, but two drug shops were now open for business—one operated by doctors Robinson

and Loomis and the other by Dr. Eggleston—with each offering a full and general assortment of drugs, medicine, paints, dyewoods, and dyestuffs.

Another article noted that a citizen in Rutland, Vermont, had complained of General Jackson: "He has been in office a little more than three months, during which time nearly four thousand post-masters have had their walking papers, merely because they were friendly to the reelection of J. Q Adams!"

Another story apprised readers of a bit of local news:

Just about in this particular region, for some time past, much speculation has existed, concerning a pretended discovery, through superhuman means, of an ancient record, of a religious and a divine nature and origin, written in ancient characters, impossible to be interpreted by any to whom the special gift has not been imparted by inspiration. It is generally known and spoken of as the "Golden Bible."

Most people, continued the article, believe the whole matter "a gross imposition, and a grosser superstition." Rather than ridiculing the unidentified person who had supposedly discovered the ancient record, however, the Sentinel let the golden Bible speak for itself and published, "as a curiosity; the title page of the book, which proclaimed its purpose in exalted terms: "to shew unto the remnant of the House of Israel how great things the Lord hath done for their fathers ... and also to the convincing of the Jew and Gentile that Jesus is the Christ, the Eternal God, manifesting himself unto all nations."

Less than two months later, the Palmyra Freeman sounded quite a different note: "The greatest piece of superstition that has ever come within our knowledge, now occupies the attention of a few individuals of this quarter. It is generally known and spoken of as the `Golden Bible:... An account of this discovery ['plates of gold' and 'a huge pair of spectacles!'] was soon circulated. The subject was almost invariably treated as it should have been—with contempt."

In 2003, Book magazine included the Book of Mormon in its list of "a0 Books That Changed America" (July/August 2003). Jerome Kramer, editor of Book, explained that the staff had set out to select the books "that have had the greatest impact on the history of the country: the ones that led to concrete, definable changes in the way Americans live their lives." In addition, only books published at least a quarter of a century earlier (by 1978) and also published during or after the founding of the United States could qualify. The Book of Mormon deserved inclusion, wrote Kramer, because it "provides the theological underpinning for one of the world's most vibrant religions.'"

In 2011, Ben Brantley, the chief theater critic for the New York Times, praised a Broadway musical he described as "blasphemous, scurrilous and more foulmouthed than David Mamet on a blue streak [but] ... as pure as that of a Rodgers and Hammerstein show." The name of the production? "The Book of Mormon"—even though the musical had little to do with the text of the book itself. Brantley added: "Church founders like Joseph Smith and Brigham Young appear in illustrative sequences, as does Jesus and an angel named Moroni. When delivered in musical comedy style, these vignettes float into the high altitudes of absurdity." Brantley particularly enjoyed "a spirited, innocently obscenity-laden" song about Joseph.

Such alternating reactions to the Book of Mormon—friendly/hostile, serious/ sarcastic—have happened from the start and will no doubt continue. Parley P. Pratt could not put the book down once he started reading it, preferring reading to eating or sleeping; Mark Twain called it "chloroform in print." The young school teacher Oliver Cowdery dedicated his life to the Book of Mormon before hearing any of the text or even meeting Joseph; the printing office apprentice John H. Gilbert, who frequently saw Cowdery during the printing process, called the book "a very big humbug." Respected Palmyra farmer Martin Harris returned from a meeting with Columbia professor of Greek and Latin Charles Anthon convinced that Joseph was indeed a prophet; Anthon, who examined characters reportedly copied from the gold plates, reported years later "that it was all a trick, perhaps a hoax."

And so it goes.

"True or not, the Book of Mormon is a powerful epic written on a grand scale with a host of characters, a narrative of human struggle and conflict, of divine intervention, heroic good and atrocious evil, of prophecy, morality, and law," argues Daniel Walker Howe, who adds that the book "should rank among the great achievements of American literature, but it has never been accorded the status it deserves, since Mormons deny Joseph Smith's authorship, and non-Mormons, dismissing the work as a fraud, have been more likely to ridicule than read it."

Likewise, Jan Shipps contends that whether the Book of Mormon was translated from engravings on metal plates or dictated from "Joseph Smith's extraordinary mind—this book functions as a powerful and provocative synthesis of biblical experience and the American dream, and it occupies a position of importance in both the religious and intellectual history of the United States."

Certainly, understanding the origin of the Book of Mormon is essential to understanding its significance in American history. Furthermore, as Ann Taves points out, "to reconstruct the process through which [Joseph Smith's] new church [organized within weeks of the publication of the Book of Mormon] emerged, we need to peel back layers of later interpretation to reconstruct how those involved in the process viewed events and understood their experiences as they unfolded." This means taking "the earliest sources as our starting point."'

There are no substitutes for the primary documents, but in the case of the Book of Mormon, the "earliest sources" are not nearly as early as one would hope. As shown by a glance at the table of contents of this volume, a host of crucial Book-of-Mormon events took place between September of 1823 and the end of 1827, but not a single document—no letter, diary entry, legal record, newspaper article, or anything else—mentioning the Book of Mormon has survived. Even for the crucial year of 1828, only two documents, neither the original, are extant. It is not until 1829 that contemporaneous documents are plentiful, with the June 26 Wayne Sentinel article having the distinction of sending out the first public notice of the Book of Mormon.'

Even so, the bulk of key documents in this volume are first-hand accounts from the likes of Joseph Smith, Martin Harris, Lucy Mack Smith, Emma Smith, Isaac Hale, Charles Anthon, and John H. Gilbert, and virtually all of these are reminiscences, some recorded as early as the 1830s and some as late as the 1890s.9 Reminiscences can be quite valuable, but they are also inherently problematic: How accurate is the writer or teller's memory? How much has his or her retelling of the event in question been molded by happenings in the interim? Not only that, but the important affidavits collected by Philastus Hurlbut and published by E. D. Howe in **MORMONISM UNVEILED** (as well as a host of statements subsequently collected by others over the next half-century) are also remembrances. The upshot is that both defenders and critics of Joseph offered their public assessments of him after the fact—after he had published the Book of Mormon, organized the Church of Christ, proclaimed himself a prophet, made converts and enemies, and become a controversial figure (especially after scores of newspaper articles—most of them negative—had been published about him). As a result, one looks in vain for "unbiased" accounts of Joseph's Book-of-Mormon activities between September of 1823, when he first told of the gold plates, and March of 1830, when the Book of Mormon was published. Documents recorded on the spot by Joseph and by relatives, neighbors, and acquaintances later to become both friendly and hostile—these are the kind of early sources one hopes for but rarely finds.

We therefore proceed with caution and do the best we can in investigating the origins of the "very big humbug" that has been reprinted approximately one hundred and eighty million times. The first standard of this compilation is that everyone—from Oliver Cowdery to Lucy Harris to Joseph Knight to Willard Chase to John Whitmer—is allowed to speak for themselves. (For that reason, when practical, such accounts are reprinted in their entirety, even when only part of the statement relates specifically to the Book of Mormon.) A "layer of interpretation" will not do when such participants have already spoken on their own behalf. In determining what person x said, no statement by person y or z trumps the narrative of x (which seems self-evident, but needs reiterating). The accuracy or reasonableness of x's statement is, of course, open to debate. Similarly, accounts

written or dictated by the persons themselves take priority over descriptions of what they said as recorded by others (unless the subject approved such a second-hand account). Documents closest in time, distance, and person to the events always get top priority. True, a given witness may be simply mistaken or lying about a given event. For that reason, all sources are subject to comparison with other sources to check for consistent details and general patterns. Again, a second-hand account from an impartial observer may turn out to be more valuable than a polemical first-hand assertion, but such examples will be revealed after careful analysis, not by way of presumption.

Whether a certain informant is friendly or hostile to Joseph is not a factor in questioning or accepting his or her testimony. In addition, candid expressions such as diary entries and personal letters will generally be valued over memoirs and memoirs over official histories. (As mentioned, however, the sticking point here is the lack of diaries and letters on both the friendly and critical sides.) Statements given by a person who implicates him- or herself in a mistake or wrongdoing are also particularly valuable but understandably rare.

I echo these sentiments of Terryl Givens: "In a history of a religiously controversial subject, ... the disputability of the facts is too obvious to bear repeating on every page. I have therefore avoided constructions like `Joseph Smith's alleged vision, or `the purported visit of Moroni; as they would become tiresome and pedantic.... My focus in any case has not been on whether the Book of Mormon or the account of it given by Joseph Smith is true."

Finally, I endorse what Philip Barlow calls "a method that embraces such values as balance, fairness, openness, integrity, the willingness to be self-critical, honesty in the attempt to present and follow even difficult or painful evidence, a modesty which respects opposing competent views, an absence of dogmatism, and the ability to produce history which will seem responsible to diverse but intelligent and informed people of good will." <>

FINDING GOD THROUGH YOGA: PARAMAHANSA YOGANANDA AND MODERN AMERICAN RELIGION IN A GLOBAL AGE by David J. Neumann [The University of North Carolina Press, 9781469648637]

Paramahansa Yogananda (1893–1952), a Hindu missionary to the United States, wrote one of the world's most highly acclaimed spiritual classics, **AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A YOGI,** which was first published in 1946 and continues to be one of the best-selling spiritual philosophy titles of all time. In this critical biography, David Neumann tells the story of Yogananda's fascinating life while interpreting his position in religious history, transnational modernity, and American culture. Beginning with Yogananda's spiritual investigations in his native India, Neumann tells how this early "global guru" emigrated to the United States in 1920 and established his headquarters, the Self-Realization Fellowship, in Los Angeles, where it continues today.
Preaching his message of Hindu yogic philosophy in a land that routinely sent its own evangelists to India, Yogananda was fueled by a religious nationalism that led him to conclude that Hinduism could uniquely fill a spiritual void in America and Europe. At the same time, he embraced a growing belief that Hinduism's success outside South Asia hinged on a sincere understanding of Christian belief and practice. By "universalizing" Hinduism, Neumann argues, Yogananda helped create the novel vocation of Hindu yogi evangelist, generating fresh connections between religion and commercial culture in a deepening American religious pluralism.

Recapturing Yogananda's Importance

Yogananda's importance as a twentieth-century American religious figure makes his virtual neglect in the scholarly literature paradoxical. A few years ago, anthropologist Sarah Strauss observed that while dozens of yoga teachers and their organizations from the last century deserve their own "book-length treatments," one of the two figures "most conspicuous in their absence" was Yogananda and the Self-Realization Fellowship. Mark Singleton, author of **YOGA BODY**, acknowledges that Yogananda "inspire [d] several generations of Western spiritual seekers." Professor of comparative religion David Gordon White argues that, along with a handful of other gurus, it is "the life and teachings of Yogananda that have had the greatest impact on modern-day conceptions of yoga as a marriage between the physical and the spiritual, the human and the superhuman." Yet, despite this importance, few scholars — including Singleton and White — have studied Yogananda at length. In her influential **HISTORY OF MODERN YOGA**, Elizabeth De Michelis reduces him to part of one sentence. And in his discussion of "the most important modern gurus" in his book on **HINDUISM AND MODERNITY**, David Smith ignores Yogananda altogether.

Yogananda has appeared in some trade press books. Most recently, popular yoga author Philip Goldberg has offered a full-length biography in **THE LIFE OF YOGANANDA**. Goldberg provides a detailed chronology of Yogananda's life and tackles a number of controversies in his ministry, though the tone remains the same as his earlier American Veda, where he devotes a largely respectful chapter to Yogananda. In that earlier work, he highlights Yogananda's engaging personality and speaking style, the adaptations he made to appeal to an American audience, most notably his "enthusiastic embrace of Jesus," and devotees' attraction to being "in the presence of a genuine holy man." Yogananda has typically made only cameo appearances in other trade press books. In Transcendent in America, an investigation of "Hindu-Inspired Meditation Movements," Lola Williamson gives due attention to SRF. But because her interest is more contemporary than historical, she deals with Yogananda himself fairly briefly and offers little in the way of broader context. In a remarkable oversight, Stefanie Syman, who claims to tell "the story of yoga in America" in her Subtle Body, devotes only a few terse, somewhat flippant pages to Yogananda and his movement.

Until recently, the only sustained scholarly attention Yogananda received in the past two decades was through a handful of dissertations in which he figured merely as one of several figures. Polly Trout's 1998 "Hindu Gurus, American Disciples, and the Search for Modern Religion, 1900-1950," places Yogananda in the spotlight, but he has to share it with two other twentieth century Hindu figures, Theosophical "World Teacher" Jiddhu Krishnamurti and Vedanta leader Swami Paramananda 'Theodore Anderson's 2008 "Reimagining Religion: The Grounding of Spiritual Politics and Practice in Modern America, 1890-1940," likewise places Yogananda in the company of other figures, viewing him as one of five individuals who reinvented spirituality in early twentieth-century America.

Anya Foxen's **BIOGRAPHY OF A YOGI: PARAMAHANSA YOGANANDA AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN YOGA** is the major exception to this pattern. As her title suggests, Foxen is interested in the emergence of contemporary yoga, particularly in the image of yogis in the West as purveyors of extraordinary powers, and Yogananda functions as a detailed case study. Foxen emphasizes from the outset that her book is "not actually a biography" but a study of his persona, largely as portrayed in the Autobiography. Biography of a Yogi shares a few common themes with the present work: the Indian roots of Yogananda's teaching, his largely ignored contribution to the development of Western yoga, the centrality of the Autobiography to his reputation, and attention to the crafting of his persona in a culture that was often suspicious of yogis.

Despite some complementary perspectives, the two books differ significantly in emphasis. In Finding God through Yoga, I explore Yogananda's biography in substantial detail, in part because it seems to me that the best way to understand his persona creation is by teasing out the ways his life story diverged from the public image he so carefully cultivated. More importantly, although I portray Yogananda as a Kriya Yoga instructor, I see that as but one role he played. I emphasize his broader identity as a Hindu religious teacher who sought to connect disciples to God in various ways. The Autobiography is undoubtedly his most famous work, but Yogananda was a prolific author and poet, an entrepreneur who sold yoga lessons by correspondence, and a magazine editor. His labor on behalf of East-West magazine indicates both his leadership in the global interfaith movement and the deep and abiding interest in Jesus and Christianity that was a central feature of his identity. His commentary on the New Testament, more than a decade of work, easily rivals the Autobiography in scale and ambition. Given Yogananda's deep interest in Jesus, I place him in the broad context of American Christian culture. Yogananda was also the founder of a significant religious organization. And because that global organization continues to serve as custodian of his legacy, which includes maintaining his persona, any discussion of his significance should include investigation of this organization and its rivals.

Though recent scholarly work has begun to rectify the situation, Yogananda has long suffered neglect relative to his significance. There are two chief reasons for this state of affairs, one evidentiary and the other historiographical, both necessary to understand before proceeding. First, access to sources offers a genuine challenge to Yogananda scholars. Like many organizations, Self-Realization Fellowship takes great care to guard the reputation and legacy of its founder. It does occasionally cooperate in limited ways with those who request the use of archival materials?' More typical is the situation Polly Trout experienced a generation ago, when she noted that SRF 's "historical archives are not open to the public." My requests for access were declined due to SRF's lack of a research library and, after further inquiry, to the organization's many spiritual and humanitarian priorities, which make it impossible to help the scholars who request research assistance and archival access.

Still, abundant Yogananda materials are available, and in more recent years, thanks in part to the Internet, the accessibility of some sources has increased significantly. **FINDING GOD THROUGH YOGA** makes use of the extensive sources now available. Though few copies of early issues of Yogananda's magazine have made their way into libraries, I had access to the vast majority of issues from 1925 through 1960 for this project, which proved invaluable for understanding his views. Not only was he responsible for overall content and tone of the nearly two hundred issues that ran during his lifetime, but he also contributed more than eight hundred articles. Yogananda's yoga course was the instructional heart of his ministry. Early editions of the lessons are now available and provide essential insight into his teachings. Though SRF's editions remain private and secret, copies can be accessed in various ways and reveal changes that have been made over the years. And apart from the Autobiography, Yogananda wrote a number of other works that provide valuable understanding. Nearly one thousand newspaper advertisements and articles about Yogananda are extant. More than twenty books, memoirs, and reminiscences by friends and disciples—published both by SRF and independently, some quite recently—provide glimpses of the private Yogananda. Several of these texts reprint letters from the Master, and more than two hundred are extant. Scouring various online sources yielded additional letters, legal

documents, videos, and other materials. Together, this substantial and varied evidence allows for a robust portrait of this important religious figure.

The other reason for Yogananda's scholarly neglect is historiographical. He has fallen between two scholarly stools, not really resting comfortably on either. As a teacher and practitioner of yoga, he would seem to belong in the burgeoning scholarship on yoga. But, as indicated above, few yoga scholars except for Foxen have seated him there. His affection for Jesus and the New Testament makes him an awkward fit for many yoga scholars, though this need not be the case, since his interest in Jesus and Christianity puts him in good company with many other contemporary yoga teachers and Hindu intellectuals.

Also, he downplayed the āsanas, or postures, that have become a central feature — indeed, often the defining element — of most forms of contemporary yoga. But his dislike for āsanas has sometimes been exaggerated. In **THE SUBTLE BODY**, for example, Syman overstates the case when she claims that Yogananda "publicly disdained" hatha yoga and cites as evidence a footnote from the **AUTOBIOGRAPHY**. In fact, issues of his magazine near the end of his life include long articles by SRF 's Reverend C. Bernard that provided detailed instruction on how to perform difficult āsanas (with accompanying photos) and discussed the health benefits of each position. In the footnote Syman cites, Yogananda actually explained that hatha yoga, "a specialized branch of bodily postures and techniques for health and longevity," was "useful and provides spectacular physical results." His only critique was that it was "little used by yogis bent on spiritual liberation." Though, as I will demonstrate, Yogananda never ignored health and well-being, he did think that the yoga practices that deserved most attention were those that led to God-realization.

Most importantly, the teleological interest within most yoga scholarship on the emergence of contemporary secular yoga, which focuses on postures, health, and mental well-being, has led to the neglect of individuals who do not fit that pattern. David Gordon White acknowledges that any element of yoga that falls outside the "modern-day sensus communis" of yoga scholarship, such as a focus on the supernatural, tends to be ignored. Though Elizabeth De Michelin's influential taxonomy of yoga provides a place for "denominational movements," most scholars of modern yoga—including De Michelis herself— largely ignore yoga's religious dimensions. The influential work of De Michelis, Singleton, sociocultural anthropologist Joseph S. Alter, and others has concentrated on modern postural yoga, charting a transformation that another scholar, Sarah Strauss, describes in her own monograph as moving from "a regional, male-oriented religious activity to a globalized and largely secular phenomenon." Yoga historian Andrea Jain offers a nuanced definition, acknowledging that yoga has always embraced varied practices and divergent aims, both physical and spiritual. Rather than treating postural yoga as the culmination of a secularizing trajectory, she views it as a "body of religious practice" with sacred behaviors, an ontology, and a set of values, all of which are maintained by ritual and story. But many of the postural yoga practitioners engaged in the kinds of practices Jain has defined as religious would be quite uncomfortable with Yogananda's highly normative instruction on ontology, cosmology, supernatural achievements, and communion with the divine. If Yogananda does not fit easily into Jain's capacious definition of religious yoga, he is all the more out of place in the secular framework offered by most postural yoga scholars. But although Yogananda's emphasis on religious themes runs counter to the dominant scholarly trajectory, he was indisputably a teacher of yoga—and one of the most popular in the United States before the 1960s.

There is a second scholarly stool where Yogananda has failed to find the seat he deserves. Although many scholars have explored Hindu gurus as religious figures, both in India and in the United States, the homegrown gurus they profile typically postdate Yogananda. With the notable exception of Vivekananda, scholars tend to concentrate on individuals who established their own American ministries only in the past few decades. This focus on the recent past stems in part from scholarly interest in baby boomers' attraction to Asian traditions and in the formation of diaspora Indian communities who transported their own traditions to the United States. With a few exceptions, the placement of Hindu leaders in the very recent past conforms to the dominant narrative arc of American religious history in which a pluralism broad enough to encompass Asian traditions is seen as largely a

post-1965 phenomenon. But the 1965 Hart-Celler Act's immigration liberalization did not yield a critical demographic mass of religious diversity, as some scholars assume. The law did contribute modestly to the growth of non-Christian religions, but its primary effect was to diversify the Christian population, as the percentage of Asian and Latino Christians increased relative to Christians of European descent. The Hart-Celler Act really functions as a symbolic watershed of Americans' growing awareness of other faiths, rather than as a marker of religious diversity per se.

Of course, many scholars recognize that Hindu traditions — and the interest of some white Americans in those traditions — have a much longer trajectory. In the wake of the counterculture era, scholars like Harold French and Carl Jackson explored the influence of Hindu religion and philosophy on early twentieth-century America. More recently, Catherine Albanese's masterly Republic of Mind and Spirit has provided a comprehensive survey of American metaphysical traditions, including influences from India and elsewhere in Asia.

These authors, however, tend to consider Hindu organizations either as independent stand-alone movements, like French and Jackson, or in the context of New Thought, like Albanese. Like the yoga scholars discussed above, Albanese frames her brief treatment of Yogananda by largely ignoring the role of Christianity, in effect walling off Hinduism and yoga from the nation's dominant religion. Yogananda, whose deep knowledge of Jesus and the New Testament is typical of many educated Indians of his generation, illustrates why the growth of modern Hinduism can be properly understood only in the context of Christianity.

The Plan of This Study

Finding God through Yoga explores the life and ministry of Paramahansa Yogananda in five chapters that follow the chronology of his life, addressing key themes as they emerge. Chapter 1, "The Making of a Modern Religious Seeker: From Mukunda Lal Ghosh to Swami Yogananda, 1893-1920," places Yogananda's spiritual development in the context of Indian modernity, with rapid travel, exposure to diverse traditions, and awareness of the outside world — particularly the United States and the larger West. The chapter examines his childhood, adolescence, and young adulthood, focusing on the spiritual journey that culminated in his decision to become a swami under the leadership of a guru. His connection to modernity deepened with his college education and adoption of modern Hinduism, a framework that severed religious belief from its historic embeddedness in land, caste, life stage, and gender. This universalizing of Hinduism paved the way for Yogananda's American ministry as a Hindu missionary.

Chapter 2, "The Founding of a Home for Scientific Religion: Swami Yogananda and Southern California's Spiritual Frontier, 1920-1925," traces Yo-gananda's early years in the United States. The chapter begins by examining the conference that brought him to the United States and the presentation he gave there on "the Science of Religion." It places both in the context of an intramural Protestant debate that offered competing answers to the epistemological challenges modernity raised for the universalistic claims of Christianity. For the first few years after the conference, Yogananda struggled to establish a successful ministry. A cross-country road trip in 1924 took him to Los Angeles, which quickly became his national headquarters. This chapter explores the role Southern California played in fostering Yogananda's ministry at a time when many Americans were suspicious of so-called Orientals, their cultures, and their religions. The nation's new spiritual frontier, the Los Angeles region was an ideal space for a new religious movement, a relatively tolerant center that had already fostered Hindu movements by the time Yogananda arrived.

The third chapter, "The Creation of a Yogi Guru Persona: Marketing Swami Yogananda and His Yoga Instruction, 1925-1935," "evaluates Yogananda's ministry through the lens of modern consumer religion, mass marketing, and religious branding. The early portion investigates the religious products he touted, most centrally his systematic, practical method for God-realization through yoga—in the innovative form of a correspondence course. Yogananda's instruction inculcated a larger Hindu worldview, not just a set of meditative techniques. His East-West magazine was a promotional tool designed to highlight his brand's distinctiveness. The chapter also explores the way the yogi, like evangelical preachers of the time, promoted his message to a modern American

audience saturated with savvy advertising and modern products. The final section considers the hazards of the religious market, including negative press attention and several lawsuits that threatened his brand image as well as his solvency just as the Depression arrived.

"The Apotheosis of a Global Guru: Paramahansa Yogananda and His Autobiography, 1933-1946," the fourth chapter, explores Yogananda's growing status as a global spiritual authority and a divine figure. The chapter begins by placing Yogananda in the context of religious internationalism, a subset of interwar cultural internationalism driven by concerns for world peace.

It details his use of East-West as a vehicle for a cosmopolitan spiritual vision. An extravagant worldwide journey in 1935-36 from California to England, the Continent, the Middle East, and ultimately to his home city of Calcutta solidified his reputation as a "global guru." The chapter also explores his lengthy exegesis of two sacred texts. He provided extensive exegesis of the Bhagavad Gita in the pages of East-West, presenting it as an allegory for personal struggle against evil temptations. In another long-running series in his magazine, he interpreted the New Testament gospel narratives, transforming the story of Jesus and his teachings into a revelation of yogic truth that hinted at Yogananda's own divine identity. But it was the 1946 Autobiography of a Yogi that firmly established Yogananda's reputation as a guru to the world. An analysis of this text's structural features reveals it to be a new scripture, designed to inculcate belief in the spiritual world Yogananda evoked and in the divine status of the yogi who wrote it.

Chapter 5, "The Death of an Immortal Guru: Charisma, Succession, and Paramahansa Yogananda's Legacy, 1946-1952," explores discipleship and conversion in Self-Realization Fellowship, Yogananda's dramatic death, and the transfer of authority that transpired afterward. The chapter profiles twenty Yogananda disciples, employing a model of conversion to offer insight into common patterns among those who chose to followYogananda and the challenges of spiritual apprenticeship they faced as Americans raised in an individualistic cultural ethos. The circumstances surrounding Yogananda's death and his followers' efforts to cope with the tragedy are considered next. Yogananda's death produced a crisis in leadership. Max Weber's model of the routinization of charisma, modified by subsequent scholars, offers insight into the common challenge faced by organizations led by charismatic individuals, particularly after their death. Yogananda spiritualized his own leadership by indicating that his writings were to become the "guru" after his departure, but this did not fully solve the problem of human leadership. After the short tenure of one leader, long-term female disciple Faye Wright was appointed president. Her half-century tenure at SRF stabilized the organization and routinized its publications by and about Yogananda.

A century after Yogananda came to the United States with the message of Kriya Yoga and three quarters of a century after Autobiography of a Yogi was released, yoga has become ubiquitous and Hindu beliefs have become an integral part of the spiritual landscape. Yogananda played a key role in this transformation. During his lifetime, he converted thousands of Americans. Since his death in 1952, he has influenced countless others around the world through SRF and independent organizations that trace their lineage to him, as well through Autobiography of a Yogi and his other teachings. The Father of Yoga in the West nurtured numerous religious offspring. Not simply a wise teacher, he came to be revered and worshipped — overwhelmingly by non-Indian Americans — as the very incarnation of deity. Yogananda's story is thus indispensable to understanding the emergence of contemporary yoga, modern American Hinduism, and modern global religion. <>

AFRICAN SCIENCE: WITCHCRAFT, VODUN, AND HEALING IN SOUTHERN BENIN by Douglas J. Falen [University of Wisconsin Press, 9780299318901]

In this sensitive and personal investigation into Benin's occult world, Douglas J. Falen wrestles with the challenges of encountering a reality in which magic, science, and the Vodun religion converge into a single universal force. He takes seriously his Beninese interlocutors' insistence that the indigenous phenomenon known as àze ("witchcraft") is an African science, credited with fantastic and productive deeds, such as teleportation and supernatural healing.

Although the Beninese understanding of àze reflects positive scientific properties in its use of specialized knowledge to harness nature's energy and realize economic success, its boundless power is inherently ambivalent because it can corrupt its users, who dispense death and destruction. Witches and healers are equivalent to supervillains and superheroes, locked in epic battles over malevolent and benevolent human desires. Beninese people's discourse about such mystical confrontations expresses a philosophy of moral duality and cosmic balance. Falen demonstrates how a deep engagement with another lived reality opens our minds and contributes to understanding across cultural difference.

African Science

Blurring the lines between religion, science, and magic could make some fervent rationalists and theologians uncomfortable. Indeed, the majority academic opinion holds that witchcraft is imaginary; therefore, the belief in such supernatural forces is irrational. As philosophers Barry Hallen and J. Olubi Sodipo point out, Western scholars express embarrassment about the history of witches] in the West; witches are a mark of shame on an otherwise rational culture. Hallen and Sodipo note that clinical psychologists and other scholars interpret witchcraft confession as a psychological product of frustration among subordinate groups or, worse, of mental illness. Current anthropological scholarship often depicts witchcraft as a metaphor for social turmoil, finding a language that makes Sense to our scientific sensibilities but that does not automatically demonstrate an acceptance of native belief as true. In an earlier anthropology, and still in Western folk ideology, magic was portrayed as a crutch for an inferior mind, or at least as an impoverished explanation in the absence of a "true" scientific understanding. In a word, witchcraft and magic became "superstition?' By contrast, Christianity and other religions of the developed world receive little of this critical attention. But as my informants' testimony shows, the boundary between magic and religion is exceedingly porous, a position advanced by other writers. Randall Styers, for example, notes that, despite repeated attempts, the literature on religion and magic betrays a long history of failed efforts to define these terms and their separate domains. The conundrum is so vexing

that Claude Levi-Strauss concluded, "There is no religion without magic any more than there is magic without at least a trace of religion". Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah tracks the origins of the distinction between magic and religion in Christian theological debates. He notes that when Protestants were distancing themselves from what they saw as the magical rituals of Catholicism, they introduced a distinction between prayer and spell, the former characterizing religion, and the latter being a feature of magic. Tambiah notes that these concepts were later adopted by Edward Burnett Tylor and James George Frazer and incorporated into the anthropological canon.

To the question of why academics continue to use the term "magic," Randall Styers argues, "One of the primary functions of magic in this scholarly literature has been to serve as a foil for religion.... Magic is 'the bastard sister of religion—. Styers states that modernity itself has been defined by the creation of discursive boundaries between "primitive" magic on one side and "modern" science and religion on the other. Magical thought is usually attributed to colonized peoples, the former "primitives" and "savages" of an earlier anthropology. The presumed illegitimacy of magic is marshaled in the effort to define the West as "modern" and therefore superior to "traditional" societies. And anthropologists themselves are not immune to these othering tendencies. Byron Good, citing Wilfred Cantwell Smith's linguistic history of the word "belief," holds that anthropology's language of "belief" implies doubt or falsehood, often in contrast to Western "knowledge" or "truth:' This is ironic, given anthropologists' usual mission of withholding judgment of other cultures. But it is also emblematic of our instinct to defend our ontological turf, giving us the satisfaction of presenting our own position as the correct one.

As for magic and science, there is a similar tendency to take the distinction for granted. Academics brought up in a Western scientific paradigm are socialized to regard science as the ultimate source of truth, in contrast to the superstition of magical systems of thought. But philosophers have criticized this tendency. Though controversial, Robin Horton's position is that traditional African religious thought holds many similarities to scientific thinking. Addressing African spiritual beliefs, Horton writes:

> How could primitives believe that a visible, tangible object was at once its solid self and the manifestation of an immaterial being? How could a man literally see a spirit in a stone? These puzzles, raised so vividly by Lévy-Bruhl, have never been satisfactorily solved by anthropologists. "Mystical thinking" has remained uncomfortably, indigestibly sui generis. And yet these questions of Lévy-Bruhl's have a very familiar ring in the context of European philosophy. Indeed, if we substitute atoms and molecules for gods and spirits, these turn out to be the very questions ... posed by modern scientific theory in the minds of Berkeley, Locke, Quine, and a whole host of European philosophers from Newton's time onwards.

Horton goes on to suggest that both scientists and African diviners display similar thought processes and the use of theory in order to explain events. Indeed, my own data tend to confirm Horton's assessment of the resemblance between scientific and magical thought, in that Beninese people are not merely slaves to tradition; instead, they constantly doubt what they see and hear, and they test different ingredients, procedures, and ritual specialists and then evaluate the results. Horton's philosophical approach to science and spirituality is entirely consistent with Beninese people's own theory as evidenced in the super-category àzè, which combines science, magic, and religion. Following this model, in the way that Karin Barber contends that African gods are invented by humans in search of concrete results, people are free to abandon any diviner or healer who is unable to satisfy their needs. Thus, even in the supernatural realms, African thought demonstrates a practical, materialistic, and critical approach to life.

Despite these lessons on the similarities between different knowledge systems, Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah contends that science exhibits greater emphasis on systematic experimentation, information dissemination, repeatability, and the development of alternative theories. While he acknowledges that scientists are far from totally neutral, he suggests that religious thought is more concerned with meaning and values than is science. He identifies some of the possible factors for these differences in industrial societies' development of

social mobility, individualism, and literacy, all of which promote debates over contrasting ideas. Horton himself draws a distinction between the "open" scientific outlook and the "closed" outlook of traditional African thought. Although part 1 of Horton's article argues for the similarities between scientific and spiritual thought, part 2 hedged on these claims by declaring that African thought does not allow for self-critique or the abandonment of a failed theory in the way that science does. But like Andrew Apter, I argue that African ritual and spiritual thought do allow for self-reflection, critique, and even the abandonment of theory. Within African systems of thought lies the potential for dramatic change and transformation, and this transformative potential is at the heart of àzé. Aze is constantly reworking the political and religious landscape while also being reworked itself through the articulation with Vodun and other religions and through invention and the borrowing of foreign traditions. What remain more fixed are larger paradigms—and this is true for both African and scientific systemS of thought. Accordingly, we can recognize that in Africa, whatever experiences people have are unlikely to cause them to forsake their resolve that spiritual and supernatural forces exist.

Scientists are likewise resistant to the abandonment of science and rationality in the face of failed experiments. Thomas Kuhn was one of the first to introduce the idea that scientists are themselves embedded in a social and psychological mindset that makes them resistant to new paradigms that are inconsistent with their standpoint. Although Kuhn's theories allow for scientific shifts, they remind us that science, like religion, is supported by a degree of faith. Regarding contemporary Western faith in science, Tambiah writes: "A commitment to the notion of nature as the ground of causality can function as a belief system without its guaranteeing a verified `objective truth' as modern science may define it." Too little attention is paid to the magical thinking and faith associated with Western science. Many researchers talk about the "occult imaginary," but few interrogate the "scientific imaginary:' However, following Kuhn, some scholars in the field of science studies (e.g., Bruno Latour) have questioned science's privileged claim to a single reality. These debates, popularly dubbed the "science wars," reflected the tension between science's positing of an independent natural world and the postmodern argument that science is itself rooted in culture and therefore a social construction. There is much about the world and the human body of which doctors and scientists are ignorant. We know little about how drugs operate, how the brain works, or the creation of the universe. And even what we think we know from science is constructed via particular instruments, language, and cultural learning. So while I agree with Horton and Appiah that science and magic may not be identical, there may be more resemblance than people are comfortable with or accustomed to admitting. Those who subscribe to Horton's general message make the case that the boundaries between religion, magic, and science are a product of mythmaking, and the myth is founded on particular social and political agendas related to an enduring discomfort among Westerners with seeing the Self and Other as one.

Horton makes another important point, claiming that academics often overlook examples of overtly magico-spiritual thinking in their own societies. While professional scientists may scoff at magical thinking, they ignore just how much folk culture embraces and celebrates it. Indeed, magical thought was never vanquished in the West, and scholars have observed that societies the world over are experiencing a reenchantment. New Age religion and Wicca are some recent examples of the ways that Westerners have embraced the possibility of mystical powers, demonstrating the difficulty in separating magic from religion. Furthermore, popular culture is filled with a fascination with mystical and fantastic powers, from Harry Potter, to Voodoo dolls, to films and television shows about vampires, superheroes, psychics, and time travelers. Science fiction has always skirted the fringe between magical fiction and scientific reality. For example, the 1960s TV series Star Trek anticipated many innovations like cell phones, teleconferencing, voice-activated computers, and noninvasive medical devices. One could argue that inventions that seem purely imaginary today may actually be possible in the future. In fact, Frances Yates proposes that magical thought was actually the inspiration and catalyst for the development of the scientific movement during the Enlightenment. Thus, alchemy and other practices that we now consider pseudoscience were very much part of the rich and productive intellectual climate of the Enlightenment. Today, Star Wars and other films depict Jedi knights and superheroes with godlike powers, and these characters come closest to Beninese conceptions of àzètc (witches). Although the figure of the "witch" is a much regretted chapter

in the history of Western civilization, one way we might view the witchcraft phenomenon is through reference to images that are pervasive in our society. Just as Darth Vader was seduced by the dark side in Star Wars, Beninese worry that religious leaders and others believed to possess àzè will turn to evil. The moral messages conveyed by our superhero stories, about the battle between good and evil and the corrupting influence of ultimate power, are the same as those found in accounts of àzètó. But although such characters are generally relegated to a fictional existence in the West, I must stress that my Beninese friends see them as terribly real. Thus, comparison to Western fictional characters may provide an opening to understanding other belief systems, but they cannot take us all the way. This is why I maintain that to understand witchcraft among Beninese, we must also take seriously their claims that science and witchcraft occupy similar domains and that they represent similar modes of knowledge.

Goals of the Book

When one understands the simultaneous juxtaposition and merging of science and witchcraft in Africa, it becomes evident that anthropological studies have missed something in their characterization of occult forces. I believe a key objective of anthropological study is the rapprochement of peoples and cultures, but the divide between Africa and the West remains vast when it comes to witchcraft. In addition to the widespread disbelief in witchcraft expressed in academic discourse, Western news headlines sensationalize the stories of child witches in Africa, and human rights groups argue against the mistreatment of accused witches. Yet in a number of African nations, the acceptance of witchcraft's reality is so pervasive that courts regularly hear witchcraft cases and sentence accused witches. To the average European or American, such events are unimaginable, or perhaps it is more accurate to say they are only imaginable, because witchcraft appears so far from reality.

My intent is not to try to convince readers of the existence of witchcraft, nor is my position a claim of authority to define reality. Instead, I hope the contribution of this book is to destabilize common perceptions of witchcraft and shed light on how Beninese people see and experience occult forces. Doing this might help remove some of the stigma and the exotic perception of African people's mystical worlds. Readers might understandably want to know whether I actually "believe" in witchcraft. In fact, some Beninese informants interpreted my research as a quest for proof of witchcraft, as if I were a messenger who could show Americans that witchcraft is real. In some ways, this was Gaston's desire, which will have to remain unfulfilled for now, since I did not witness many demonstrations (and I never sought them). Moreover, those informants trying to protect esoteric knowledge might have seen my inquiries as a quest to appropriate their knowledge and power, leading them to distrust me. In any event, I usually explained that I was neither trying to prove witchcraft's reality nor trying to make off with their secrets. In fact, many of my Beninese friends and informants have never seen explicit proof; instead, they have interpreted misfortune, sudden death, incredible coincidence, and confession as sufficient proof of the existence of invisible forces. As for me, after listening to their accounts and testimonials, I am more receptive to these ideas than before. Over a twenty-year span of working in Benin, with the longest stay of two years, I have come to see many Beninese as close friends and even family. And when these rational, trustworthy friends and family declare the existence of something, I am naturally more inclined to take it seriously than if it came from strangers. As to what I believe, I confess that this remains a struggle for me. In my life in the United States, witches are not real; but, as I describe in chapter 3, while in Benin I found myself occasionally fearful of witchcraft as I was drawn into the perspective of my friends. This has made me sympathetic to the notion of alternate realities, but realities that nevertheless can be bridged through human connection, such as that created through ethnographic fieldwork. After a number of years of close contact with a people and their culture, I have not only begun to appreciate the social conditions that permit people to believe something but have also become sensitive to how they believe it on a personal, emotional, and embodied level. Yet, like many of my informants, I cannot blindly accept all claims of supernatural power, so I continue to ask questions and wonder what elements of witchcraft, religion, and science are real, false, hidden, or overt. Because ethnography is inherently about storytelling, I attempt to convey these epistemological and ontological struggles through my own and my informants' accounts of our experiences. I acknowledge that reading ethnography is a far cry from

doing ethnography, and so I cannot expect my audience to feel the same transformative effects that I have felt over the course of long-term fieldwork. At the same time, I contend that even receiving a glimpse of Beninese life provided in this book might be enough to provoke thought and raise questions that can unsettle some of what readers take for granted.

However, ethnography is also a social science, so my stories are not meant to inspire exotic or voyeuristic reactions; instead, I hope that a reader can view these phenomena through various theoretical lenses and consider the ramifications of the different perspectives for foreigners' ability to respect and empathize with African people. This book employs a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches coming out of the sociological and anthropological traditions. As a social scientist, I cannot deny some of the social functions (or rather the social effects) of occult behaviors and beliefs. For example, the occult may serve as a leveling mechanism when the fears of envy-inspired witchcraft cause more fortunate individuals to downplay their successes (Rosenthal 1998) or to share their wealth with less fortunate family members. Witchcraft may also serve to promote social conformity and to reduce the expression of hostility. It is clear that jealousy, envy, and inequality are key components of the fears and suspicions of witchcraft in Africa, and this observation is made readily by ordinary Beninese people. Following the modernity school in witchcraft studies, I acknowledge the idea that witchcraft and occult fears accompany (or symbolize) the spread of capitalism and the resulting inequality and social upheaval. Furthermore, given witchcraft's gender imagery and the fact that accusations are unequally directed at women, feminist perspectives suggest that witchcraft may reflect both male fears of a threatened status quo and the patriarchal power to scapegoat women as witches. I also explore the possibility that the occult expresses Africans' frustration with Western-inspired "development" and a postcolonial desire to offer an African alternative to Western ways of knowing. Despite the value in these theoretical interpretations, we must use our scientific perspectives cautiously. Bruce Kapferer argues that occult beliefs are too often "boxed away into familiar sociological and rational categories: witchcraft as resistance, witchcraft as the folk explanation of misfortune, or witchcraft and sorcery as types of `social diagnosis'. The practices are domesticated to the analysts' own sensibilities. There is a tendency towards a too easy glossing of the phenomena in question, a brushing aside of dynamics that are not immediately and externally self-evident." Therefore, although I acknowledge the utility of our theoretical tools for Understanding some aspects of witchcraft, this book also takes inspiration from the phenomenological method pioneered by Jeanne Favret-Saada and Paul Stoller and Cheryl Olkes and partially adopted by Harry West and Adam Ashforth. In anthropology the phenomenological approach typically involves privileging experience and the lived worlds of others, as opposed to abstract theorizing in the anthropologist's intellectual tradition. Phenomenological anthropology often includes a narrative ethnographic writing style that employs engaging first-person accounts to emphasize bodily or emotional experiences within the fieldwork process. While this book is not strictly a phenomenological ethnography, I follow these authors in employing some narrative techniques to demonstrate my perceptions and experiences living in a world inhabited by witches. In other words, I take seriously my Beninese friends' expressions of fear or pride and their testimonies about mystical powers because I believe in the necessity of anchoring my analysis in the beliefs of my Beninese friends and informants and in "taking [my] intellectual cues from their concerns". Apter writes: "Whatever the methodological concern—functionalism with authority, Marxism with contradiction and change, structuralism with binary contrast and equivalence, phenomenology with the conStruction of experience—the interpretation of cultural forms must begin with the people, not the ethnographer". Therefore, I have determined that, whatever methodological techniques or theoretical interpretations I employ, I should also write this book in a manner such that my Beninese friends would recognize their views and beliefs in my words. As a result, much of my analysis is inspired by Beninese people's claims that witchcraft is a science with important links to religion, philosophy, and global spiritual movements.

In addition to investigating philosophical questions about science and the occult, this book is about the articulation between the occult and organized religions in Benin, including Christianity and the indigenous polytheistic religion of Vodun, found among the Fon- and Ewe-peaking peoples and related ethnic groups of

southern Togo and Benin. In some ways, by highlighting the connections between witchcraft and Vodun, I am in danger of feeding exoticism and popular stereotypes about Vodun and its New World cousin, Voodoo. American popular culture in the form of film, TV, music, and video games depicts these African-based religious traditions as equivalent to black magic and witchcraft. A great deal of scholarship has gone into dispelling this unfortunate conflation, particularly with respect to Haitian Vodou. Caribbeanist authors have endeavored to distinguish between serving the legitimate spirits, on the one hand, and seeking to manipulate illegitimate supernatural forces, on the other. I must state early on and emphatically that this same distinction exists in Benin, so it would be a fallacy to claim that practicing the Vodun religion is tantamount to casting evil spells. Ordinary adherents of Vodun (known as Voduisants) do not equate their religion with magic, and even less with nefarious actions. Nevertheless, scholars of Afro-Caribbean religion have acknowledged the blurred lines between the Haitian `good" priest (hungan) and "evil" priest (bocor), and there are also important links between the legitimate and illegitimate spiritual domains in Benin. This book outlines both distinctions and connections between Vodun and the occult, bringing to light the similarities shared by the Vodun religious tradition and New World Vodou. Perhaps because indigenous religions are in retreat in many African countries, other recent works on African occult forces do not delve deeply into the role of indigenous religions in the occult or into the connections between witchcraft and the organized worship of divinities. Vodun is alive and flourishing in southern Benin, opposing and interacting with other religions and supernatural forces.

One thing this book does not offer is a historical examination of witchcraft and the processes through which Benin developed its own unique characteristics (see Ranger 2007). While that would be a worthy task for a historian, my interest lies more in the ethnographic endeavor and the ways witchcraft ideas are currently marshaled in the quest to respond to life's challenges and opportunities. When possible, I refer to older ethnographic accounts of Benin, but their treatment of witchcraft and the occult is often superficial or nonexistent. Although there appear to be recent and dramatic changes in Beninese understandings of witchcraft, I do not mean to imply that witchcraft is something new. Linguistic cognates of àzé exist in neighboring languages (adze in Ewe and aje in Yoruba), demonstrating that the term and the category have old roots in the region. Based on reports from elsewhere in Africa, it is clear that Benin is part of a broader pattern whereby witchcraft articulates with morality, kinship, health, development, and the state. While these features allow witchcraft to transcend the local and engage with globalizing trends and spiritual influences, this is an ethnography of a particular place that should not be considered identical to other parts of Africa.

In many ways, the study of witchcraft is really the study of the whole of a culture, since it touches on many other social fields in southern Benin, including notions of science and causality, family, religion, sexuality, wealth, jealousy, envy, political power, morality, health, and identity. Though I cannot hope to cover each of these issues with equal or comprehensive attention, this book will provide a sense of the important, even seminal, role of witchcraft and the occult in contemporary southern Beninese society. My goal is to weave together a number of threads, namely: (1) witchcraft is perceived as a science, a typically "African" science that inspires pride among residents of this postcolonial nation; (2) like technology, the occult can be applied to both destructive and productive ends, informing Beninese racial comparisons between Africans and foreign others; (3) discourses of witchcraft's good and evil sides reflect an abiding philosophical outlook about duality and cosmic balance; (4) Beninese people's belief in the convergence of science, witchcraft, and religion calls into question Western disciplinary distinctions and creates fertile ground for thinking about alternate realities; and (5) Beninese occult beliefs involve a universal notion of power in the world that includes science, technology, religion, and healing, opening the door for the appropriation of foreign religions and esoteric traditions. <>

NIGHTSIDE OF THE RUNES: UTHARK, ADULRUNA, AND THE GOTHIC CABBALA by Thomas Karlsson [Inner Traditions, 9781620557747]

This book is an introduction to runosophy, the wisdom of the runes, and to practical rune magic. The runes are dynamic symbols that characterise hidden forces. The outer shapes of the runes have changed through history, but the principles that they symbolise are today almost the same as during old Norse times. This book does not claim to include a historical description of runes or rune magic. The book offers an introduction to a rune magic that is constructed around practical work with the runes in the contemporary world. The ambition, however, has been that the runosophy in this book shall be deeply rooted in historical Nordic magic.

Reveals the occult wisdom and multidimensional layers of meaning hidden in the Nordic Rune stones

- Explores the practice of the Uthark divination system encoded within the traditional exoteric Futhark system of reading the runes
- Traces the relationship between the rune stones and numerology, the Cabbala, alchemy, Gothicism, and sigil magic
- Examines the history of the runes and the ancient spiritual mysticism of Odin

Uncovering the dark side of the Nordic rune stones hidden beneath their traditional interpretation, Swedish scholar and runologist Thomas Karlsson examines the rune work of Swedish mystic and runologist Johannes Bureus (1568-1652) and professor Sigurd Agrell (1881-1937), both of whom devoted their lives to uncovering the secret uses of rune stones concealed from all but the highest initiates.
Karlsson begins by examining the Uthark system of divination--the Left Hand Path of the runes--that lies hidden under the traditional Futhark system. According to the lore of Uthark, a cryptographic ruse was used to make it impossible for the uninitiated to know the true order of the runes. Exploring Agrell's decryption of the Uthark system, Karlsson reveals similarities between the numerology of ancient mystery cults and the Runic tradition. He explains the multidimensional meaning of each rune from the Uthark perspective, their relationships with the nine worlds of Norse cosmogony, and the magical powers of rune-rows and the three aettir rune groupings. He details how to create your own magically-charged runes, direct and activate the force of the runes, and use them for rune meditation, divination, sigil magic, galders (power songs), and rune yoga.

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Excerpt: The Northern Light of Original Genius

Sweden has a relatively small population, yet over the centurieS it has produced more than its share of innovative thinkers with groundbreaking ideas, from Carl Linnaeus to Alfred Nobel. This innovative spirit is especially evident in the field of runology. Nightside of the Runes brings together two works of original genius concerning the runes. Both are written by Thomas Karlsson, an ingenious master of the mysterious ways of the North. Each of the two is in turn rooted in the ideas of two Swedish geniuses in the field of runology: Sigurd Agrell and Johannes Bureus.

Part 1, "Uthark: Nightside of the Runes," follows the pioneering work of Sigurd Agrell (1885-1937) on runes, magic, and mysticism; it highlights the Uthark's symbolic connections with Norse spirituality and provides an experiential guide allowing readers to apply these hidden aspects of rune wisdom in their lives. Part 2, "The Adulruna and the Gothic Cabbala," investigates in detail the world of Johannes Bureus (1568-1652) and his profound insights regarding the spiritual dimensions of the fifteen "noble" runes, the adulrunes, and their connections to the Cabbala.

Sigurd Agrell came of age in a world in which the scientific study of the runes was in full swing. Scholars from Scandinavia, Germany, and Britain were all contributing to a lively debate on the origin of the runes and the use of these mysterious characters in the culture of the North. Agrell's interest in runes was multidimensional. He took note of the subculture in which he saw this writing system being used as well as the crosscurrents with other cultures, such as the Greeks and even the Lapps. His controversial Uthark theory is the contribution for which he remains best known, and in "Uthark: Nightside of the Runes" Karlsson describes how this theory can be applied today.

Johannes Bureus is not only considered the father of modern, scientific runology but also an early leader of the international Rosicrucian movement of the sixteenth century. He was innovative on two fronts: first, he scientifically learned to read and record many of the runic inscriptions that he found in his native country, and second, he brought the spiritual insights of the Paracelsian revolution to the lore of the runes in an unexpected way. Bureus was both a scholar and mystic. In "The Adulruna and the Gothic Cabbala," Karlsson offers the first book-length study of Bureus to be published in English. (It should be noted that Karlsson also wrote his doctoral dissertation on the subject of Bureus.)

To both of these innovators Karlsson brings his own pioneering spirit to provide readers with new intellectual and magical experiences as they follow his journey though the mysteries of the northern lights.

Sigurd Agrell and the Uthark

Thomas Karlsson's intriguing text Uthark explores the mysteries of the runic tradition that was discovered and brought to the light of day by the Swedish philologist Sigurd Agrell (1885-1937). Agrell's theories gained widespread authority in esoteric circles in Sweden during the late twentieth century because his ideas opened the doorway between runic and Germanic magic and the more familiar magical ideas rooted in the Mediterranean. This was an important insight on his part, that these worlds of the North and the South were not as separate or distant from one another as people might think. I offer the reader this short survey about Agrell and his contributions.

During Agrell's relatively brief lifetime he contributed intellectually and artistically in diverse ways. He was obviously a talented linguist who translated poetry into Esperanto at the age of sixteen. As a young university student, he belonged to a circle of symbolist poets at Uppsala who called themselves Les quatre diables (The four devils). His early academic career was spent in Slavic philology, in which he earned his doctorate in 1908 from Lund University. He taught and wrote scholarly articles in that field and also undertook the translation of works of Russian literature—for example, Tolstoy's Anna Karenina (1925)—as well as various folktales and short stories by the Nobel Prize laureate Ivan Bunin.

In the late 1920s Agrell began to publish scholarly works on the subject of runes and runology. His interest was especially within the context of Late Antiquity European culture as regards magic and mysticism. Works by him on these topics appeared in both Swedish and German. Agrell's major works in the field of runology included Runornas talmystik och dess antika förebild (Number mysticism of the runes and its ancient model) (1927); Rökstenens chiffergätor och andra runologiska problem (The cypher puzzles of the RA-stone and other runological problems) (1930); Senantik mysteriereligion och nordisk runmagi: En inledning i den nutida runologiens grundproblem (Late Antiquity mystery religion and Nordic rune magic: An introduction into the basic problem of current runology) (1931); Die spätantike Alphabet-Mystik and die Runenreihe (Late Antiquity alphabetic mysticism and the rune row) (1932); Lapptrummor och runmagi: Tvenne kapitel ur trolldomsväsendets historia (Lappish drums and rune magic: Two chapters from the history of the essentials of sorcery) (1934); Die pergamenische Zauberscheibe and das Tarockspiel (The magic disk of Pergamon and the game of Tarock) (1936); and Die Herkunft der Runenschrift (The origin of runic writing) (1938).

In addition to his philological studies, Agrell continued his interest in poetry, and he published several volumes of verse.

The Uthark

Runes are a well-known subject to the average Swede of any time period, since the Swedish landscape is covered with thousands of runestones, which give the land a mysterious pedigree. The runes were used by the ancient Germanic peoples to write their language before they adopted the Roman script after the various tribes were Christianized. But even after Christianization, runes continued to be used for several centuries, especially for inscriptions on memorial stones.

This form of writing was first used in the last century or so BCE. But the oldest actual surviving inscription comes from about 45 CE. Runes were used for relatively short inscriptions, most of which could have some kind of magical meaning or function. Over the first several centuries of runic history, the runes and rune carvings underwent several historical phases.

Much to Agrell's credit, he did not just look at the runes and runic inscriptions as lines on paper in books and as something separate from the actual culture and lives of the people from the times when the inscriptions were made. Agrell had a lively interest in the actual culture and psychologies of the people who made these monuments.

As the rune carvers came into ever-increasing contact with the peoples of southern Europe—the Italic and Hellenic peoples especially—they also came into contact with the theories and ideas about writing that would have been of great interest to their craft. Many Germanic men joined the Roman army. In this context many of them were initiated into the Mithraic mysteries. Mithrasim was an initiatory cult for men of all social and economic classes in the Roman Empire. It had its origins among the ancient Iranians, but in the exact form as practiced by the Romans the cult was highly Latinized with mythic elements from the Iranian and Hellenic cultures of the ancient Near East.

Closely related in some respects to the Mithraic system were the practices reflected in the Greek magical papyri, mostly originating from Egypt. These documents show a use of language for magical purposes that often mirrors the practices that seem to be in use by the rune magicians of the same time period (between 200

and 500 CE). In both styles we see inscriptions or written formulas that begin in natural language but at some point break off into what historians of magic call ephesia grammata, or voces magicae—strings of letters/sounds that make no linguistic sense but rather are thought to be the voices of the gods or some secret encoding of sound in a "divine language" understood by the gods or directly by the universe itself. Additionally, such strings of runes or letters could, in Agrell's theory, be numerological codes believed to have the power to alter reality.

The Uthark theory is rooted in the study of the numerical values of the runes. Since the early twentieth century runologists had been speculating about the role of number symbolism in runic inscriptions. Agrell was among the first to apply the theory of gematria (that is, the idea that a letter has a numerical value and that words and texts can be analyzed on an esoteric level according to the sums of these values). He did so with the following twist: he shifted the numerical values by one place so that the first rune was taken to the end of the row, and the second rune (uruz) in the row received the numerical value of 1. This created a new order of the runes called the Uthark. One of the main things that made this theory plausible to Agrell was the fact that when he made this numerical alteration the resulting sums of runic inscriptions seemed to be more in line with the numerical symbolism found in the Mediterranean world.

The controversy about the role of the Uthark in the origin and history of the runic tradition is, I think, solved when we look at it as an alternate number code used to help synthesize the systems of the runes and the Greco-Roman magic of Late Antiquity. If we view the rune row as a ring of runes and numbers, and all we do is shift the runes one numerical place, we have a new set of numerical values such that the whole system can be seen as a decoder ring. With this decoding, or re-encoding, a new set of correspondences is produced that links runic, Roman, Hellenic, and Hebraic signs. With this encoding too, the runes can be brought into the so-called mainstream of Western esotericism. For nine days, the Nordic god Odin hangs in the world tree, Yggdrasil. He hangs there sacrificed by himself, to himself. Without food or water, deeply wounded by his own spear, he endures the long nights in the tree. Odin's sacrifice in the tree is not an attempt to save humankind from its sins. He is not sacrificing himself to redeem a sinful world. Odin hangs in the tree by his own free will. The Nordic world picture does not include belief in an original sin from which humanity and its world must be saved. The Nordic tradition does not emphasize any messiah. There are other reasons behind Odin's sacrifice. He hangs there for his own sake. He hangs there to gain wisdom and power. Odin hangs in the world tree in his quest for the utmost secrets of the universe, the secrets that he picks up from the depths in a scream of ecstasy.

Odin is not a messiah. He is in many ways a dark and demonic god, feared by most. But he is a role model. Through his uncompromising search for knowledge and power we can learn the secrets known only by him. Odin can become our teacher and initiator. He will not save us from any sins. But the path of Odin will reveal a magical initiation of knowledge and power. He can teach us to save ourselves from weakness and uncertainty. Odin can teach us the secrets of the runes.

This book is an introduction to runosophy, the wisdom of the runes, and to practical rune magic. The runes are dynamical symbols that characterize hidden forces. The outer shapes of the runes have changed through history, but the principles that they symbolize are as similar today as during the ancient Norse times. This book does not claim to include a historical description of runes or rune magic. It is an introduction to a rune magic that is constructed around practical work with the runes in modern time. The ambition, however, has been that the runosophy in this book shall be deeply rooted in historical Nordic magic. Even if some of the runosophical knowledge in this book cannot be recognized from archaeological findings, the aim has been to describe keys to the same hidden reality that unites modern humans with our ancestors in the past. Time has passed, but we are the same now as then; just as with the hidden reality.

To many people the spiritual quest is associated with heavenly spheres and a striving up toward the light. This reflects the great influence from religions like Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. In these religions the divine world exists somewhere in a distant heaven, and God is a masculine sky god of light. In the older pagan traditions the

divine could also be found on earth and inside it, in the underworld. There were not only a male god but also equally powerful goddesses. Humans sought not only the light: the wise also entered the dark in their spiritual quest. The night sky with all its stars was as important as the daylight sky. The underworld was as important to visit as the heavenly spheres. This is reflected in the ancient Norse tradition. In the Nordic tradition the darkness is a prerequisite for illumination. When Odin hangs in the world tree he gazes into the depth to find the runes. The secrets of existence are hidden in the underworld.

The runes consist of a light outer form and a dark inner dimension. Rune magicians during all times have sought the inner secrets of the runes, striving with an iron will like Odin to discover the hidden meanings of the runes. The runosophy of this book is based on a disputed thought that the rune row is written in a cipher to hide its secret mean ing from the uninitiated. The hidden and dark side of the rune row has been called the Uthark. This has been viewed as the inner esoteric rune row that is hidden behind the more common rune row, called the Futhark. When discussing this type of occult thought there is no actual right or wrong, true or false. Many have doubted the historical anchorage of the Uthark, and many deep and advanced magical books based on the Futhark have been written. But the Uthark has revealed itself as a very powerful tool for entering the secrets of the runes and for exploring their nightside.

Johannes Bureus, Man of The Northern Renaissance

For centuries, the life, work, and image of Johannes Bureus remained largely forgotten. Even over the past century he remained mysterious and often misunderstood. Such is often the fate of historical magi. Scholars such as Hans Hildebrand and Sten Lindroth, and more recently Susanna Akerman and Thomas Karlsson, have begun to lift the veil on the contributions of this scientist and magician. To understand Johannes Bureus more clearly we must comprehend the historical and cultural milieu that preceded him and in which he lived—the Renaissance and the Reformation. Bureus was shaped by these cultural paradigms, but he also shaped them in turn. He was an active agent in history, and as such he can be counted as a true magus—one who through his personal effort and work, even if only subtly, to some extent transforms the world around him. As such Bureus was a consummate Renaissance man in Sweden who bridged the gap between objective science and subjective magic. That he accomplished this before the gap grew so wide between these two impulses that it seemed it could never be bridged speaks directly to his genuine and enduring value as an intellectual and spiritual fountainhead.

The present sweeping study by Thomas Karlsson was originally written in Swedish for a Swedish readership—a readership presumably well aware of the historical background relevant to the study. As a general introduction to this work, it might be useful to review some of the historical context relating both to Swedish history and the history of ideas during the Renaissance and Reformation in Europe.

Historical Context for Runes

The country now known as Sweden takes up the bulk of the eastern part of the Scandinavian peninsula. This region had a rich Bronze Age (1700-500 BCE) culture that left behind many mysterious rock carvings that were precursors to later Germanic myth and legend. When the Germanic peoples articulated themselves linguistically and culturally from the rest of the northern Indo-European world around 700 BCE, at least the southern part of what is now Sweden was included in the original Germanic homeland. At that time the Germanic peoples were defined by one commonly intelligible dialect referred to by linguists as Proto-Germanic. The peoples of the region presumably shared most major cultural features with the other Germanic peoples to the south in what is now northern Germany. They all spoke more or less the same language, worshiped the same major gods and goddesses and shared a common system of values. However, theirs was a tribal, and not a nationalistic society. These small organically conditioned groups were fiercely independent and bore a tremendous sense of internal authenticity and solidarity.

Tacitus (56-115 CE), a Roman historian, wrote a remarkable ethnography of the Germanic peoples in 98 CE commonly titled Germania. In this work he mentions both the Gothones (Goths) and Suiones (Swedes). It is not unreasonable to conclude that the Goths emerged from the southern part of Scandinavia before settling first on the Baltic coast around the mouth of the Vistula River and that the Swedes were somewhat to the north of them. During the socalled Migration Age, when many Germanic tribes migrated across the European continent, the Goths wandered widely through what is now Russia and throughout the Mediterranean lands and even into North Africa. The Swedes, on the other hand, consolidated their position in Scandinavia during this period. However, many presume that the migrating Goths merely represented part of the whole Gothic world and that many of them remained behind, lending their name to regions in what is now southern Sweden (Östergötland and Västergötland) as well as to the island of Gotland.

This period of tribal migrations on the continent was well concluded by about 800 CE, by which time the still-pagan Scandinavians entered into a dynamic historical phase of raiding and trading with Christian countries to the south and west. This period is called the Viking Age by most scholars. Much of this activity for the Swedes was centered on the countries across the Baltic to the east, reaching as far as the Islamic world. It was a time of great power and wealth for all the Scandinavian countries—Denmark, Norway, and Sweden—all of which had developed their own individual identities by this period. As this age drew to a close the individual Scandinavian lands were at least nominally Christianized. Sweden was the last to fall in about 1100 CE.

It was at the very end of the Viking Age and at the very beginning of the Christian Middle Ages in Sweden when the bulk of the great runestones, which were to occupy so much of Bureus's scientific life, were carved. These are for the most part memorial stones that commemorate dead ancestors. The stones were usually commissioned by the survivors of the deceased. By the early modern period, when Bureus lived, these stones were between four and five hundred years old, and the runes with which they had been inscribed were largely forgotten, as was the original significance of the stones.

Christianity, and with it medieval European culture, was established relatively late in Sweden. In fact it was not firmly established until about 1200, and even then, pockets of the old traditional culture remained in the remoter areas of the countryside. The center of pagan culture had been Gamla Uppsala, just a few miles north of the medieval town of Uppsala. After the destruction of the pagan temple at Gamla Uppsala in 1100, the political and spiritual center of the country moved to the new town of Uppsala and the cathedral there.

The period following Christianization was characterized by civil wars in Sweden. Power began to be consolidated under the great Jarl Birger Magnusson, who ruled as regent after 1250. This was accomplished by organizing the ancient local legal assemblies (thing) into a network throughout the country. Centralized authority over the minor nobility and farmers developed only slowly and partially in medieval Sweden. Until the final consolidation of power by Gustav Vasa in the early sixteenth century, Swedish history was marked by prolonged times of internal strife and intermittent periods when the country was at least partially controlled by Denmark. In 1521 Vasa was elected king of Sweden by some two hundred farmers at Tuna near the ancient coronation stone of Mora, where the pagan and early Christian kings of medieval Sweden were invested with royal power. Vasa drove out the Danes with the help of the German Hanseatic League—a commercial cartel that dominated business interests in the Baltic and North Seas from the early eleventh to the sixteenth centuries.

The early 1500s saw another influence coming from Germany—Protestantism. The new king and national hero, Gustav Vasa, embraced the idea of Lutheran reform but moved slowly and wisely in its implementation. But a hundred years later all of Europe would find itself in an international war pitting Protestant against Catholic. This became known as the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). Gustav Vasa's grandson, known as Gustavus Adolphus, ruled as king from 1611, when he was only seventeen years old, to 1632, when he was killed in battle at Lützen in Germany. Gustavus Adolphus was a student of Johannes Bureus, and Bureus was later well supported by the king. The young king was a capable ruler and a brilliant military strategist. The tide of the

Thirty Years War was turned by his numerous victories on the continent between 1630 and 1632. Northern Europe would remain Protestant and independent of Rome.

S. M. Toyne, writing in The Scandinavians in History, describes the death of Gustavus Adolphus as follows:

> On November 6th, 1632, the battle of Lützen brought the last victory in death to the Swedish hero. Cut off by a thick mist, he was shot by some Croats in the middle of the battle. As his riderless white horse brought the news down the ranks, the Swedes were blinded with fury, and surged forward to revenge the death of their beloved leader. For once, discipline went, and the old "berserk" spirit took its place. Panic seized the Imperialists, who fled in disorder.

History of Cabbalism Hermeticism in the North

The world of Johannes Bureus was one of ideas. The time period in which he lived was one of revolutionary change and a tremendous forward-looking spirit. However, Bureus himself, like so many of his fellow Europeans of the age, looked back to tradition, often secret tradition, as fuel for these changes. Beginning in the Florentine Renaissance of the fifteenth century new ideas began to emerge to challenge the intellectual hegemony of the Christian Middle Ages. But whereas the Renaissance in Florence was mainly characterized by the expansion of awareness to encompass previously rejected or unknown sources of knowledge, for example, the Cabbala, Hermeticism, and other non-Christian philosophies, north of the Alps a new wind was blowing.

Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim (1493-1541), better known by his academic moniker, Paracelsus, introduced a revolutionary way of thinking and established it as a mode of intellectual operation. He would experiment and expose the results of his experiments to rational analysis. Although Paracelsus is considered a magician on the one hand, he is also known as the father of modern medicine and pharmacology on the other. His methods of operation called the authority of ancient and "received" knowledge into question. He wanted to prove the validity of theories and ideas based on experimental work. In this he was followed by the Welsh English magus John Dee (1527-1608).

This Paracelsian method quickly gained an international following and was applied to matters both exoteric and esoteric. The ideas of Paracelsus were especially well received north of the Alps in Germany, England, and Scandinavia. Esoteric topics such as Hermeticism, Cabbala, astrology, magic, and alchemy were fundamentally reshaped by Paracelsian ideas that called for a good deal less medieval faith in authority and a good deal more modern reason to be applied to the contents of these arcane traditions.

At the same time when Bureus was maturing intellectually there emerged from central Europe a movement known as Rosicrucianism. This movement was itself largely the spawn of Paracelsian ideas, especially as received by such men as John Dee and Francis Bacon in England. Early Rosicrucianism is principally known from the contents of three texts: the Fama Fraternitatis (1614), The Confessio Fraternitatis (1615), and the Chymische Hochzeit (1616). The Rosicrucian movement early on appears to have been a secret secular brotherhood of mainly Protestants who were keen to bring perfection to mankind and the sciences through the application of a system of previously hidden knowledge.

The central myth of Rosicrucianism, recounted in the Fama, tells of the travels of a German, "brother C(hristian) R(osencreutz)," to the East to seek true illumination. He sojourns in Damascus and Fez absorbing what the Arabic philosophers have to teach. Afterward he returned to Germany and gathered three students, thus founding the "Fraternity of the Rose Cross." Eventually brother C.R. died, at the age of 106, and was buried in a secret vault. After 120 years this mysterious tomb was discovered and opened—and thus the door was opened to a general reformation throughout the world. On the one hand Rosicrucianism was an exponent of the Protestant Reformation of Martin Luther and others, but on the other hand it was a continuation and expansion of earlier trends in esotericism north of the Alps.

The Renaissance and Reformation both in their own ways ushered in the Modern Age. The Modern is imbued with an optimism for the future not based on the faith of the Middle Ages that the return of Christ was imminent

but rather on the reason of the ancients coupled with the burgeoning scientific method pioneered by Paracelsus and others. The young Johannes Bureus found himself in the midst of these volatile and exciting times.

Johannes Bureus was an esotericist and magician. His esoteric ideology is well outlined in the present book. His magical legacy is less well known owing to a lack of documentation. However, it must be said that his methods were intended to have an effect on the world around him and that they indeed had such an effect. Bureus was also a groundbreaking secular humanistic Paracelsian. He used the Paracelsian method of gathering data based on experiential observation and the subjecting of the results of this observation to rational analysis. Whereas many Paracelsians used this revolutionary technique in the field of "natural philosophy" (as the natural sciences were called then), Bureus applied it to what we would call the humanities. Of course, it must also be said that in the time around 1600 the distinction between Naturwissenschaft and the Geisteswissenschaft was not as great as it is today. This original close association is at the root of why Bureus could slip so easily between exoteric and esoteric approaches to runology, for example. That the distinction between these categories does in fact exist for Bureus is also emphasized by the tendency on his part to write studies that were either exoteric or esoteric in their tenor.

Johannes Bureus was interested in magic and Hermeticism at least from his early twenties. He studied the De magia veterum or Arbatel, which was originally published in Basel in 1575. It is very likely that Bureus read a version of the Fama that circulated in manuscript form in 1613 and that it affected him deeply; it was to this experience that he refers when he said that in that year he "received knowledge concerning the hidden truth." Although the identities of most early Rosicrucians are unknown, and that even the authorship of the early RC documents has been called into question, Johannes Bureus is one of the few men who actually signed his name to a Rosicrucian treatise—a Latin poem printed in 1616. It is clear that the underlying motives and temperament of Bureus were esoteric ones, although he focused almost exclusively on the idea of the communication of secret knowledge from an unseen, divine realm to the world of humanity. This spirit animated his runology, both exoteric and esoteric.

Bureus is sometimes compared to the Welsh English magician and philosopher John Dee. These comparisons are apt and quite profound. Dee created a system of symbolic magical communication ("Enochian tablets"), had a symbol that summarized his magical philosophy (the Monas Hieroglyphica), and helped guide his country in a time when it stepped upon the stage of world history as a great power. Dee is even said to have coined the term "the British Empire."

As Sweden assumed its place as a world power for a short time during the first half of the seventeenth century, especially during the illustrious reign of Gustavus Adolphus, Bureus assumed a leading ideological role. As John Dee sometimes used the myth of King Arthur to bolster his idea of a British empire, so too did Bureus utilize the preexisting myth of Gothicism to support Swedish national interests.

The historical Goths were tribes that probably migrated from what is now southern Sweden into eastern Europe around the second or first century BCE. During the third to fifth centuries CE, they continued to migrate through southeastern Europe and into the Mediterranean, where they did battle with the eastern and western Roman Empire, sacked the city of Rome itself in 410, and established powerful Gothic kingdoms in what is now Italy, Spain, and southern France. All the while they kept up relations with Scandinavia. But by the eighth century they had all but disappeared from history as a visible people; however, owing to their great achievements, they endured in Germanic and European myth, legend, and tradition. The mythic tradition surrounding the Goths, something known to the historians of ideas as "Gothicism," was especially strong in Scandinavia. It also remained important in Spain and England.

Gothicism is most usually seen as an interpretation of history and a model for political action or nationalistic identity on the part of the country in question, be it Sweden, Denmark, Spain, or England. However, as Thomas Karlsson points out, the Gothicism of Johannes Bureus was more profound. With him, Gothicism became a system for the esoteric education of the individual and for esoteric communication between the divine and human

worlds. Ironically, yet fittingly, this approach had perhaps the greatest effect on history owing to the role it may have played in the education of Gustavus Adolphus, Sweden's most illustrious king, at the time when Sweden was a great world power.

Although this book deals with Bureus's work in the esoteric field, he was also a pioneer of scientific or academic runology—the study and interpretation of actual runic artifacts. Previously, the thousands of runestones scattered across the Scandinavian landscape, and especially in Bureus's own native Uppland, were seen as artifacts from before the Deluge recorded in Genesis and were created by "giants." Only isolated words were interpreted by humanists such as Olaus Petri (1493-1552) and Johannes Magnus (1488-1544). It was Johannes Bureus who first Studied the runic artifacts in a syStematic way. He was enabled in this endeavor by his "fieldwork" in the district of Dalarna, where runes were still being used by farmers for practical purposes. Bureus's method of decoding runic texts can be seen as an example of the Paracelsian method in the humanities. Bureus's first runological document,

Runakänlones lärospa'n (1599), was a basic phonetic key to runic inscriptions. Eventually Bureus would record and interpret hundreds of actual runic texts. A short time later, similar, even more systematic work in runology was developed by the Dane and chief rival of Bureus, Ole Worm (Olaus Wormius). In this rivalry the roots of the two current approaches to runology can perhaps be seen. Bureus was a humanist and a spiritual man with interests in esoteric matters, while Wormius was a physician with a more empirical sensibility. Despite the fact that Bureus produced a number of works of scholarly value in the field of runology, it appears that his motivation for these studies remained something deeper and more radical. As such Bureus is the father of radical runology.

The works of Bureus bring the ancient gods and goddesses of the North once more into esoteric religious consideration as entities to be venerated and honored. Although his runology places the ancient Germanic gods in the forefront, Bureus does not, however, see the esoteric meaning of these gods as being anything essentially different from the esoteric meaning of Christianity. For him, Christ and Odin are one. As such he shows himself that he is an adherent of the perennial tradition, one of the true magi who, although outside the conventional understandings of the exoteric church, nevertheless honors Christ without abandoning the hidden truth. This secret knowledge is used to interpret Norse myth as well as the Bible and harmonizes their meanings. Unfortunately, during Bureus's lifetime relatively little was known of the deep and rich mythic lore of the ancient North. If he had had time to synthesize the contents of the Poetic Edda into his work it would have been far richer in Norse content. But the chief manuscript of this work was only discovered toward the end of Bureus's life. As his work stands, it can be seen as reflective of an initiated HermeticRosicrucian understanding of the perennial tradition underlying a spectrum of mythic models typical of the best thinkers of his day.

Johannes Bureus is the father of modern esoteric runology and the first "high priest" of a renewed spiritual tradition that places the old gods of the North back in their natural and rightful place at the center of the spiritual life of the Germanic peoples. As such, he is worthy of our respect, and his work is deserving of our further attention. The present offering by Thomas Karlsson provides us with many tools to help us understand and honor this valiant pioneer.

Gothicism

Gothicism is associated by many people mainly with the Swedish fantasies of great power expressed in Olof Rudbeck's Atlantica, where it is maintained that Atlantis was situated in Sweden, or with the Götiska Förbund (Gothic League) and the bombastic nationalistic and Romantic poetry of the 1800s. Gothicism is a cultural movement that projects its origin back to the Goths, whose legendary great deeds the movement's followers wanted to ascribe to their own history. In Sweden the Goths were connected with the Geats, or in exceptional cases to the inhabitants of the island of Gotland, while in Denmark it was thought that the Goths and Jutes were related. Gothicism was characterized by grand fantasies and speculations and came to be meaningful in both cultural life and propaganda. Gothicism in general, and Swedish Gothicism in particular, lived in a close

relationship with the esoteric currents that thrived throughout Europe. Ideas of Paracelsus and later the Rosicrucian awakening would influence Gothicism as much as anything. From this quarter came along apocalyptic predictions and prophecies that were useful in Gothic propaganda, but with this intellectual material also came Hermetic speculations of a significantly more individualistic character that emphasized humanity's gradual ascent toward a higher state of being. The foremost representative for the meeting between Gothicism and esotericism was the antiquarian Johannes Bureus, who was the teacher of King Gustavus Adolphus. Bureus was a pioneer in runology and Swedish linguistics and is acknowledged as the father of Swedish grammar, but Bureus himself thought that it was within the sphere of mysticism that he made his most important contribution.

Bureus repreSents what we would call an esoteric Gothicism. In him the motif of Gothicism coalesces with the esotericism of his age, with such things as alchemy, Cabbala, Hermeticism, astrology, and magic. Bureus himself called his esoteric system for Nordic Cabbala a notaricon suethia or a Cabala Upsalica. Bureus also applied the methods of the Cabbala to his runological research.' In speaking of an esoteric Gothicism we can differentiate this tendency in Gothicism from the nationalistic chauvinism that we normally associate with it. With Bureus the Gothic themes with runes and ancient Nordic themes appear in an equally imaginative way as with Rudbeck, but what is particular to Bureus is that he utilizes these themes to describe a highly individualistic initiatory path that leads to an alchemical and cabbalistic coalescence with God. Usually Gothicism, both the older and younger, is restricted to using the theme of the mystical Goths to support the kingdom or nation in a mythologized version of history. Esoteric Gothicism utilizes Gothic themes for individual initiatory purposes. In speaking of an exoteric Gothicism we can also include persons and groups that, in a way partially independent of Bureus's "Gothic Cabbala," incorporate elements in their Gothicism (or Gothic elements in their esotericism). That this is not merely to be thought of as esotericism in the most general sense is due to the importance placed on the myth of the Goths in the esoteric speculations. The Goths were thought to be the mystical exponents of the forgotten truth that mankind stood on the verge of reviving again.

This part is concerned with the esoteric elements in Gothicism as they are expressed in the writings of Johannes Bureus. The focus is on a description of Bureus's most important esoteric work: Adulruna rediviva.

As I approached the ideas of Bureus, I tried in the main to proceed from the source material that I read in Stockholm, Uppsala, and Linköping.* The most important source materials were the six manuscripts of Bureus's esoteric work titled Adulruna rediviva. Four of these are found in the National Library of Sweden in Stockholm, and two are found in the Carolina Rediviva in Uppsala. Bureus drew up seven versions of Adulruna rediviva, one of which disappeared from the National Library of Sweden in 1812. There is also a manuscript in the National Library of Sweden titled Antiquitates Scanziana that in part has contents similar to that of Adulruna rediviva. Antiquitates Scanziana is more comprehensive, and one finds in it a significant amount of valuable information about Bureus's esoteric thought. Bureus's runic account mostly describes the linguistic implications of the runes but reflects certain esoteric trains of thought as well. Printed texts such as Runa ABC-boken, Runa redux, and apocalyptic writings such as Nordlandalejonsens rytande (Roar of the Nordic lion) give an insight into Bureus's intellectual values. In Linköping's diocesan library I studied Bureus's highly interesting, but muddled, notebook titled Cabbalistica, which reveals much of his own references and those esoteric thoughts that characterize his works. In Linköping is also found the linguistic Om sprákens uppkomst (On the origin of language), which describes his mystical view of language. Two aids that were indispensable as I studied Bureus were a sketchbook and a pocket calculator. Only by drawing Bureus's Hermetic symbols and calculating his cabbalistic numerical values did his ideas become fairly intelligible. <>

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