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Collecting Futures in America

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Editorial Appraisals:
Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

AMERICAN SCIENCE FICTION EIGHT CLASSIC NOVELS OF THE 1960S BOX SET: THE HIGH CRUSADE / WAY STATION / FLOWERS FOR ALGERNON / ... AND CALL ME CONRAD ... MASTER / PICNIC ON PARADISE / NOVA / EMPHYRIO edited by Gary K. Wolfe [Library of America, 9781598536355] In a deluxe two-volume collector's edition boxed set, eight mind-bending novels from science fiction's most transformative decade, including the landmark classic Flowers for Algernon

The tumultuous 1960s was a watershed decade for American science fiction. As the nation raced to the moon, acknowledged masters from the genre's "golden age" reached the height of their powers. As it confronted calls for civil rights and countercultural revolution, a "new wave" of brilliant young voices emerged, upending the genre's "pulp" conventions with newfound literary sophistication; female, queer, and nonwhite authors broke into the ranks of SF writers, introducing provocative new protagonists and themes. Here, in a deluxe, two-volume collector's set, editor Gary K. Wolfe gathers eight wildly inventive novels, the decade's best: Daniel Keyes' beloved Flowers for Algernon and Poul Anderson's madcap The High Crusade; Clifford D. Simak's Hugo Award-winning Way Station; Roger Zelazny's post-apocalyptic . . . And Call Me Conrad (previously published as This Immortal); Joanna Russ' Picnic on Paradise, a pioneering work of feminist SF, and Samuel R. Delany's proto-cyberpunk space opera Nova; R.A. Lafferty's quirky, neglected, utterly original Past Master; and Jack Vance's haunting Emphyrio.

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Here we offer a brief look at the plotlines of each novel:

THE HIGH CRUSADE by Poul Anderson

14th century English Baron Sir Roger de Tourneville is about to make war on France, when an interstellar scout ship lands amidst his army encampment. From the craft emerge a small group of star-faring, alien conquerors. Having evolved beyond the need for hand to hand combat, the aliens are overrun by Sir Roger and his fighting Englishmen, some of whom are incinerated by laser handgun fire. The victorious English baron keeps one of the aliens alive, to learn how to operate the spacecraft. Sir Roger wants to use it to fly to war against France. But upon launching, he is tricked by the captive alien, who sets the craft on autopilot back to its home planet, sealing the Englishmen's fates…

THE HIGH CRUSADE is a science fiction adventure novel cast through the lens of a medieval cleric's diary, one Brother Parvus, Sir Roger's trusted translator, diplomat, advisor, and holy man. It is an engaging novel written in a slightly tongue in cheek, but affectionate, idiom of high Arthurian fantasy, right down to the Lancelot-esque love triangle involving charismatic Sir Owain and the Baroness, Lady Catherine.

Initially, the story hinges on Sir Roger's thwarted attempt to return to Earth. Sundered from his home planet, the noble baron makes war on the alien race which delivered him and his folk into their predicament. Anderson's story periodically goes further than he was

leading you to expect. The story becomes truly engrossing when Sir Roger and his rough and tumble English army start winning. It is a unique, imaginative tale, like crossing Star Trek: The Next Generation, with A Canticle for Leibowitz. I still have not given away the biggest zingers of the book, but here's another hint: "sociotechnician."

Monty Python meets Hitchhiker's Guide? Why not? While the marrying of medieval romps and galactic pioneering sounds as fun today as it did over fifty years ago, the execution is sparse for modern SFers whose mash-up expectations require hundreds of pages, years of research, valid science, and ironic nihilism. But when the first tenth of a novel is dedicated to its most famous fans' love letters, you know you've stumbled on to an important piece of SF history.

The humor is the axle of this tale, not necessarily in punchline form (although that is sometimes the case), but always present in the sheer zaniness of such a premise. Medieval knights in space? Horses, cattle, and wenches striding down the ramp of a rocket? Christian-converted blue aliens? A medieval siege against a high-tech alien fortress? It's ludicrous, implausible, and downright farcical, but that's the charm of the novel. The knights themselves are oh, so serious about their duty to the Crusade. When communication fails with the captive blue alien, the Baron shouts at his mousy cleric, "Nonsense! All demons know Latin, at least. He's just being stubborn."

Although the silliness nullifies any high, historic-fantasy potential (and renders impotent social commentary), some character-driven drama exists, primarily in a Lancelot-inspired love triangle, and certain ethical gray areas arise: Should Sir Roger risk the unknown stars to return his people home, or continue this interstellar Crusade for England, God, and glory? But those dramatic moments are mere

glimpses that surface between the crests of this zany premise. This is no Once and Future King or Mists of Avalon, the interpersonal conflicts serve as equal fodder for the lampoon, although this novel did inspire Anderson's friends to start the medieval faires that still attract today's chivalry-seeking crowds.

Hugo Award-winning WAY STATION by Clifford D. Simak

Clifford D Simak: sci-fi in the countryside

The Wisconsin-born writer is now largely only remembered by serious Scifi officios. **WAY STATION** pioneered 'pastoral science-fiction' — so what happens when aliens land in the woods?

In this case, this bucolic is set in the early 1960s in backwoods Wisconsin, where Enoch Wallace, a Union-side veteran of the 1863 battle of Gettysburg in the American Civil War, is thriving as an apparent 30-year-old for the last century. Living quietly off the grid in a remote farmhouse when his hoary age catches the attention of the intelligence services.

Enoch's farmhouse is a way station for intergalactic travelers, and Enoch's youth is byproduct of the alien technology that conceals the building from the world. It has made its outer surface "so slick and smooth that dust could not cling upon its surface, nor weather stain it".

Simak tenderly portrays the rural backdrop that shows an abrupt radiance of the everyday in contrast to mash-ups government agents intrigue with intergalactic diplomatic machinations in quest to protect the future of human life on planet Earth because we are about to blow ourselves up and destroy our planet. In a city mouse, country mouse scenario of moonshine-drinking humans contrasted to witty, sophisticated aliens the Earth's fate is left in the hands of an idiot savant girl from the backwoods who has the ability to mend

butterfly wings and to save the universe with a long-lost object called The Talisman.

FLOWERS FOR ALGERNON by Daniel Keyes

Charlie Gordon, a mentally retarded thirty-two-year-old man, is chosen by a team of scientists to undergo an experimental surgery designed to boost his intelligence. Alice Kinnian, Charlie's teacher at the Beekman College Center for Retarded Adults, has recommended Charlie for the experiment because of his exceptional eagerness to learn. The directors of the experiment, Dr. Strauss and Professor Nemur, ask Charlie to keep a journal. The entire narrative of **FLOWERS FOR ALGERNON** is composed of the "progress reports" that Charlie writes.

Charlie works at Donner's Bakery in New York City as a janitor and delivery boy. The other employees often taunt him and pick on him, but Charlie is unable to understand that he is the subject of mockery. He believes that his coworkers are good friends. After a battery of tests—including a maze-solving competition with a mouse named Algernon, who has already had the experimental surgery performed on him—Charlie undergoes the operation. He is initially disappointed that there is no immediate change in his intellect, but with work and help from Alice, he gradually improves his spelling and grammar. Charlie begins to read adult books, slowly at first, then voraciously, filling his brain with knowledge from many academic fields. He shocks the workers at the bakery by inventing a process designed to improve productivity. Charlie also begins to recover lost memories of his childhood, most of which involve his mother, Rose, who resented and often brutally punished Charlie for not being normal like other children.

As Charlie becomes more intelligent, he realizes that he is deeply attracted to Alice.

She insists on keeping their relationship professional, but it is obvious that she shares Charlie's attraction. When Charlie discovers that one of the bakery employees is stealing from Mr. Donner, he is uncertain what to do until Alice tells him to trust his heart. Delighted by the realization that he is capable of solving moral dilemmas on his own, Charlie confronts the worker and forces him to stop cheating Donner. Not long afterward, Charlie is let go from the bakery because the other workers are disturbed by the sudden change in him, and because Donner can see that Charlie no longer needs his charity. Charlie grows closer to Alice, though whenever the mood becomes too intimate, he experiences a sensation of panic and feels as if his old disabled self is watching him. Charlie recovers memories of his mother beating him for the slightest sexual impulses, and he realizes that this past trauma is likely responsible for his inability to make love to Alice.

Dr. Strauss and Professor Nemur take Charlie and Algernon to a scientific convention in Chicago, where they are the star exhibits. Charlie has become frustrated by Nemur's refusal to recognize his humanity. He feels that Nemur treats him like just another lab animal, even though it is disturbingly clear that Charlie's scientific knowledge has advanced beyond Nemur's. Charlie wreaks havoc at the convention by freeing Algernon from his cage while they are onstage. Charlie flees back to New York with Algernon and gets his own apartment, where the scientists cannot find him. He realizes that Nemur's hypothesis contains an error and that there is a possibility that his intelligence gain will only be temporary.

Charlie meets his neighbor, an attractive, free-spirited artist named Fay Lillman. Charlie does not tell Fay about his past, and he is able to consummate a sexual relationship

with her. The foundation that has funded the experiment gives Charlie dispensation to do his own research, so he returns to the lab. However, his commitment to his work begins to consume him, and he drifts away from Fay.

Algernon's intelligence begins to slip, and his behavior becomes erratic. Charlie worries that whatever happens to Algernon will soon happen to him as well. Algernon eventually dies. Fearing a regression to his previous level of intelligence, Charlie visits his mother and sister in order to try to come to terms with his past. He finds the experience moving, thrilling, and devastating. Charlie's mother, now a demented old woman, expresses pride in his accomplishments, and his sister is overjoyed to see him. However, Rose suddenly slips into a delusional flashback and attacks Charlie with a butcher knife. He leaves sobbing, but he feels that he has finally overcome his painful background and become a fully developed individual.

Charlie succeeds in finding the error in Nemur's hypothesis, scientifically proving that a flaw in the operation will cause his intelligence to vanish as quickly as it has come. Charlie calls this phenomenon the "Algernon-Gordon Effect." As he passes through a stage of average intelligence on his way back to retardation, Charlie enjoys a brief, passionate relationship with Alice, but he sends her away as he senses the return of his old self. When Charlie's regression is complete, he briefly returns to his old job at the bakery, where his coworkers welcome him back with kindness.

Charlie forgets that he is no longer enrolled in Alice's night-school class for retarded adults, and he upsets her by showing up. In fact, Charlie has forgotten their entire romantic relationship. Having decided to remove himself from the people who have known him and now feel sorry for him, he

checks himself into a home for disabled adults. His last request is for the reader of his manuscript to leave fresh flowers on Algernon's grave.

Mistreatment of the Mentally Disabled

The fictional idea of artificially augmenting or diminishing intelligence enables Keyes to offer a telling portrayal of society's mistreatment of the mentally disabled. As Charlie grows more intelligent after his operation, effectively transforming from a mentally retarded man to a genius, he realizes that people have always based their attitudes toward him on feelings of superiority. For the most part, other people have treated Charlie not only as an intellectual inferior but also as less of a human being than they are. While some, like his coworkers at the bakery, have treated him with outright cruelty, others have tried to be kind but ultimately have been condescending in their charity.

After his operation, Charlie himself drifts into a condescending and disrespectful attitude toward the disabled to a certain extent. Charlie consciously wants to treat his new intellectual inferiors as he wishes others had treated him. When he sees patrons at a diner laughing at a mentally retarded busboy, he demands that the patrons recognize the boy's humanity. However, when Charlie visits the Warren State Home, he is horrified by the dim faces of the disabled people he meets, and he is unable to muster any warmth toward them. Charlie fears the patients at Warren State because he does not want to accept that he was once like them and may soon be like them again. We may even interpret Charlie's reaction as his own embodiment of the same fear of abnormality that has driven his mother to madness.

The Tension between Intellect and Emotion

The fact that Charlie's mental retardation affects both his intellectual and emotional development illustrates the difficulty—but not the impossibility—of developing both aspects simultaneously and without conflict. Charlie is initially warmhearted and trusting, but as his intelligence increases he grows cold, arrogant, and disagreeable. The more he understands about the world, the more he recoils from human contact. At his loneliest point, in Progress Report 12, Charlie shockingly decides that his genius has effectively erased his love for Alice.

Professor Nemur and Fay indicate the incompatibility of intellect and emotion. Nemur is brilliant but humorless and friendless. Conversely, Fay acts foolishly and illogically because she is ruled entirely by her feelings. It is only with Alice's encouragement that Charlie finally realizes he does not have to choose between his brain and his heart, the extremes represented by Nemur and Fay. Charlie learns to integrate intellect and emotion, finding emotional pleasure in both his intellectual work and his relationships. It is in this phase that he finds true fulfillment with Alice.

The Persistence of the Past in the Present

Charlie's recovery of his childhood memories after his operation illustrates how significantly his past is embedded in his understanding of the present. Charlie's past resurfaces at key points in his present experience, taking the form of the old Charlie, whom the new Charlie perceives as a separate entity that exists outside of himself. In a sense, the past, as represented by the old Charlie, literally keeps watch over the present. When Charlie longs to make love to Alice, the old Charlie panics and distracts him—a sign that the shame Rose

instilled in Charlie is still powerful, even if he cannot remember the origin of this shame.

Charlie cannot move forward with his emotional life until he understands and deals with the traumas of childhood. Similar ties to the past control Charlie's mother. When Charlie returns to see Rose, she still harbors her old resentment over Charlie's lack of normalcy—even after his intelligence levels have increased dramatically. Rose's attempt to attack Charlie with a knife illustrates that for her, just as for Charlie, the past interferes with her actions and concerns in the present. Rose cannot separate her memories of the retarded Charlie from the genius Charlie who comes to visit her in the flesh. The harrowing turn of events at this meeting is a tragic reminder of the past's pervasive influence on the present.

…And Call Me Conrad (aka This Immortal) by Roger Zelazny

In 1966 (or so I've been told), Roger Zelazny seemed like the future of science fiction. He was one of a progressive breed of SF writers who came to be known as "the new wave" in homage to the French film directors who were said to have influenced them. These authors were generally characterised by a determination to move the genre away from its pulpy origins, to tackle difficult political issues and use sophisticated literary devices to do so.

Typical to SF sub-genres, there are all kinds of complexities, arguments and disqualifying criteria relating to the new wave, but the point, as far as this blog is concerned, is that after publishing a series of pioneering short stories, Zelazny was generally regarded as hot, hip and bang up to date. So, with the irony that history doles out to all those who deal in modernism, he now seems horribly passé. Certainly, his first novel This Immortal (first published in slightly shortened form under the title … And Call Me Conrad) has not stood the test of time. While

Dune, its 1966 co-Hugo winner, is still widely read (and worth reading), This Immortal seems more like a quaint period piece.

The story, for instance, boils down to a standard cold-war mix of nuclear paranoia and alien invasion fear, even if it initially seems completely out there. It's set on a future earth, some years after a near-apocalyptic nuclear war. Most of the mainland has been destroyed, but life still continues on islands – albeit complicated by the presence of various mutants (mainly based on mythological creatures) who have grown up around radiation hotspots, and by a race of blue aliens – the Vegans – who seem intent on buying up the Earth as real estate. The narrator is a superhuman of considerable (but unspecified) age who likes to be called Conrad, but seems to have many other names. He was once a revolutionary determined to blow up everything to do with the Vegans and Earth-folk who live "off-planet", but who now acts as a kind of caretaker of Earth's remaining historical sites and ends up fighting to protect a Vegan called Myshtigo from a superhuman assassin in the pay of a group inspired by his own revolutionary past …

It's all as breathless and convoluted as that last paragraph. Characters appear and disappear with alarming rapidity; often dozens of them at a time at exotic cocktail parties that could have come straight out of a 1960s article about jet-set living (but for the aliens). The scenes chop and change with the manic rapidity of Godard at his most relentless. New types of monsters and mutations are introduced with barely a line apiece and vast chunks of history essential to the story are dealt with in seconds.

Zelazny has enough skill to keep things on just the right side of bewildering, but the rocky ride is rarely entirely pleasurable, thanks to the other major dating factor on the novel: Conrad's no-longer-achingly-hip narrative voice.

Consider:

> "I drank a pint of rum in an effort to catch up, but I couldn't. Myshtigo kept taking sips of Coke from a bottle he had brought along with him. No one noticed that he was blue, but then we had gotten there rather late and things were pretty well along the way to wherever they were going."

Or:

> "'Who are you?'
> 'Ozymandias. Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair.'
> 'I'm not mighty.'
> 'I wonder ...' I said, and left the part of her face that I could see wearing a rather funny expression as we walked along."

I'm sure you can imagine how irritating it gets after a while, and how easy it is to lose patience with This Immortal. This is a shame, because it does have plenty to offer. Although none of the characters have anything approaching a rounded personality, Zelazny cleverly builds intrigue around them using determinedly vague allusions to their long histories, odd powers, and convoluted love lives. I didn't believe in Conrad, or like him, but I did start to find him fascinating. There is also plenty of strange and beautiful writing about the Vegans and their different perceptions that allow them, say, to see different aspects of a "white" flower since their eyes can process more light wavelengths and so look "deeper" into ultraviolet.

Zelazny's future world, where mutant humans, blue aliens, mythological creatures and supermen collide, also allows him to build some joyously over-the-top scenarios. The climactic showdown has to be one of the most absurd in literature. Think One Million Years BC, crossed with Dracula, Heart of Darkness (complete with learned Kurtz references), Gladiator and the Texas Chainsaw Massacre and you're on the way to encompassing its lurid weirdness. Or at least, you are if you also factor in the arrival of a gigantic millennia-old dog with skin harder than

armour who leaps into the fray at the last minute …

It's just a shame that it's such a slog to get to that gleeful stage, and it's hard to imagine anyone reading the book now except out of historical curiosity.

This Immortal, or "And Call Me Conrad" was Roger Zelazny's first novel, and it showcases a lot of the things that he typically did. It's unquestionably science fiction, but it uses mythic resonance in a way more familiar in fantasy. It has a first person smartass hero, wisecracking his way across the adventure. It's fast moving and builds the world up as a neat piece of juggling—and of course, it's poetic and beautifully written. I can see some people hating Zelazny for the very things I love about him— the style, the prose, the offhand worldbuilding. It doesn't always work for me. But when it does, as here, it's lovely.

In This Immortal it's Greek mythology, and Greek folktales too. In the first line, Conrad is accused by his wife Cassandra (who is, naturally, always right and never believed) of being a kallikanzaros—one of the demons who try to destroy the world and are scared away by the Easter bells. He's tall and hairy with one leg shorter than the other and he somehow just doesn't seem to age. This is because there was a nuclear war on Earth, the "Three Days" and there are a whole lot of mutants around, especially near the "hot places" that are still radioactive. There are also a whole lot of alien tourists, and Conrad's job involves taking one of them on a tour of beautiful but devastated Earth, while other people, human, mutant, and alien, seem desperate to kill him.

Reboot

There's a complicated backstory—after the nuclear war, the colonies on Mars and Titan had to manage on their own. They were rescued by blue-skinned humanoid aliens from Vega, who

took them to their planets, even though the presence of humans detracts from the value of real estate, cheap sentient labour and entertainment makes it worth it. Meanwhile, Earth has a lot of mutants, a civilization based on the less-damaged islands, and the only thing that's thriving is the tourist trade as bored Vegans visit to be entertained. Conrad's been trying to save the world, or possibly destroy it, for a long time now. The exiled human population are a problem, having their own agenda, and the Vegans want resorts and seem to see all humans as whores.

What we have here is a picaresque in the traditional old fashioned sense—the characters go from place to place and encounter and overcome dangers while we learn about them and about the world. Zelazny gives us enough of all three things—the encounters, the characters and the world—to keep us fascinated and tantalised. There could always be more. The end is something of a deus ex machina, but in a way that fits very well with everything that has gone before. There are moments in this book that are as good as anything Zelazny ever wrote—getting a telepathic flash of being in the alien's mind and seeing ultra-violet colours in a white flower, fighting a boadile and wondering how many legs it has, Hasan saying the devil has forgiven him.

PICNIC ON PARADISE by Joanna Russ, a pioneering work of feminist SF

Nominated for the 1969 Nebula Award for Best Novel
Joanna Russ' first published novel **PICNIC ON PARADISE** (1968) delightfully subverts traditional SF pulp adventure tropes. Although not as finely wrought as **THE FEMALE MAN** (1975), **AND CHAOS DIED** (1970), or her masterpiece **WE WHO ARE ABOUT TO...** (1976), Picnic is worthwhile for all fans of

feminist SF and the more radical visions of the 60s.

Unfortunately, the metafictional implications/literary possibilities of the Alyx sequence of short stories and novels—of which **PICNIC ON PARADISE** is part of—are not realized until the publication of the short story "The Second Inquisition" (1970).

Brief Plot Summary/Analysis
Hardened female soldier stuck in a semi-utopian civilization, **PICNIC IN PARADISE** is the story of Alyx. Displaced in time, she is pressed into acting as guide for a group of spoiled humans—all upgraded bigger, stronger, and more beautiful than herself—across uninhabited, scenic terrain. Despite the commercial war going on in the background, Alyx expects the trip to be an easy one, and thinks they can make it in a matter of days. Events quickly escalate, however, and what was supposed to be a week-and-a-half becomes weeks. But the journey is not the only thing that stretches. Alyx's personality caught in a variety of conflicts with her past and the vices of the travelers, she is forced to confront, and in some cases conquer, personal demons as their journey becomes ever more harrowing in the wild beyond.

PICNIC IN PARADISE has a lot of things on its chest—the most burning thing certainly Alyx. But where Leigh Brackett tiptoed away from the standard pulp presentation of women, giving many of her female characters agency in what remained male science & sorcery stories, Russ takes leaps away in Picnic, making her female lead as gritty and emotionally unresolved as they come, and in turn creating female science & sorcery.

"…and when he tried to rise she slashed him through the belly and then—lest the others intrude —pulled back his head by the pale hair and cut his throat from ear to ear. She did not spring back from the blood but stood in it, her

face strained in the same involuntary grimace as before, the cords standing out on her neck...”

Not your average damsel in distress (to say the least), Alyx has obviously led a life that toughened her to the core. Repressing a lot of personal issues, she moves through Picnic in Paradise like a lion in a cage—hungry, snapping, eyes smoldering, only occasionally social, and always-always pacing. Life eating a hole inside her, the strength of her character is borne in action and deed, and her humanity in mistakes and chances lost. I will not go so far as to say Alyx is a fully realized character, but for the full-on subversion of standard genre female characterization, she succeeds where Conan remains a fairy tale.

Character is not the only mold Russ is interested in breaking. Writing style is (apparently) the other. But where Alyx makes her mark, the prose/Russ attempts to erase it. The writing of Picnic in Paradise is all elbows and knees. The following passage, taken just after Alyx has bore her naked body to the group, moves from profound to dramatic to humorous to confusing (why the tears?) to a paragraph of exposition that. just. won't. die, all in the matter of a page. And the speech tags, punctuation, asides, and backwards paragraph structure only further cloud matters:

> "None of you has anything on," said Alyx. "You have on your history," said the artist, "and we're not used to that, believe me. Not to history. Not to old she-wolves with livid marks running up their ribs and arms, and not to the idea of fights in which people are neither painlessly killed nor painlessly fixed up but linger on and die—slowly—or heal—slowly.
> "Well!" he added, in a very curious tone of voice, "after all, we may all look like that before this is over."
> "Buddha, no!" gasped a nun.
> Alyx put her clothes on, tying the black belt around the black dress. "You may not

look as bad," she said a bit sourly. "But you will certainly smell worse.
> "And I," she added conversationally, "don't like pieces of plastic in people's teeth. I think it disgusting."
> "Refined sugar," said the officer. "One of our minor vices," and then, with an amazed expression, he burst into tears.
> "Well, well," muttered the young girl, "we'd better get on with it."
> "Yes," said the middle-aged man, laughing nervously, 'People for Every Need,'you know," and before he could be thoroughly rebuked for quoting the blazon of the Trans-Temporal Military Authority (Alyx heard the older woman begin lecturing him on the nastiness of calling anyone even by insinuation a thing, an agency, a means or an instrument, anything but a People, or as she said "a People People") he began to lead the file toward the door, with the girl coming next, a green tube in the middle of her mouth, the two nuns clinging together in shock, the bald-headed boy swaying a little as he walked, as if to unheard music, the lieutenant and the artist—who lingered.

Erratic with limited coherency, such a style is much better suited to satire, stream of consciousness, post-modern experimentation, humor—anything but planetary adventure/drama. Everything jammed together, its edges rough, the narrative tone is choppier than fluid, and as a result more distracting than thought-provoking or engaging. Why, for example, are two characters' dialogue placed in the same paragraph, when a few lines later the character who is speaking is given a new paragraph for a second line of dialogue—and then twisted by the speech tag which follows. Such a style causes the reader to perpetually spend that fraction of a moment keeping up with who's speaking, sidetracking a reading experience that easily could have been inherent. Alyx's character would have been more sharply defined in relation to the group's, thus benefiting theme.

The anti-Conan, **Picnic in Paradise** examines a savage woman amongst civilized people in a savage land. The examination largely successful, the reader gains a better picture of the woman's dealing with the trials and tribulations of a mountainous journey alongside humans pampered by vices of the future and unaccustomed to such Spartan conditions. Not doing itself any favors, however, the text sways and pitches to the beat of its own drum—a writer trying to do more than just produce 'a novel' as their first, when in fact the story type would have benefited from a more traditional approach; the personal and emotional content would have had more impact, and the transition of story, smoother. The seeds sown, however, the ambition would later reveal itself in more cohesive form in **The Female Man** and **And Chaos Died**.

R.A. Lafferty's quirky, neglected, utterly original **Past Master**

The golden planet of Astrobe, made in the image of Utopia, now faced a crisis which could destroy it forever; & yet, no one could understand it:

> In a world where wealth & comfort were free to everyone, why did so many desert the golden cities for the slums of Cathead & the Barrio? Why did they turn away from the Astrobe dream & seek lives of bone-crushing work, squalor & disease?

The rulers of Astrobe didn't know, so they sought in humankind's past for a leader who could give them the answers. They brought to life the one man out of history who would most want to destroy Astrobe!

Of his novel-length works, the most cohesive is probably Past Master (1968), the fifth of Terry Carr's Science Fiction Specials and Lafferty's first novel. Something of an scifi roman à clef, it features the historical Sir Thomas More transported to the planet Astrobe a thousand years after the year of his death… Astrobe,

once a utopia, is declining so irrevocably that it may mean the end of the human race. Not a good thing, they realize — hence the use of a time machine to bring in the Boss.

In a recent essay, Thomas Molnar writes about the culture wars and points out that the old sacred is always challenged by a new profane, until at last the profane triumphs and becomes a sacred tradition in its own right. Today: We are in a state of astonishment, as the last Greco-Roman pagans must have been when their temples were closed in favor of Christian churches, and the administration of provinces slipped out of the hands of imperial officials into the hands of a new authority--the bishops. Taking the long view, we can view the succession of cultures and civilizations with equanimity, knowing that the future will in certain essential ways be like the past, and the old patterns will continue. Yet, there is always a fear (or a hope, to some) that someday this will not be so, that some New Thing will cause a breach with all previous history, transforming human nature incomprehensibly. Some technological marvel, we presume today, although who knows what it might be? Molnar sees this also, pointing out that there may come a time when there is no sacred at all, but only the profane: As long as human beings and institutions were initiators of historical and social change, it was legitimate to expect transformations, for good or evil, in laws, manners, values, collective aspirations. Each was escorted to the stage of history by an ensemble of ritual legitimization that raised the mere acts of change to the level of spiritual, moral significance. The new factor in our modern times seems to be the mechanical character of change, its independence of human initiative, of human interest, of human comprehension. [...] It is just possible--hence our "age of anxiety"--that this civilization closes the door on anything

beyond itself and proclaims its functional self-sufficiency. _That_ would be the true Dark Age. [...] In a technological world-society, the limitless framework and the cosmopolitan perspective discard the transcendental objects and the code they impose. They turn into immanent objects because technology adores only its own drive, its own accomplishments; it worships action with its visible products and suppresses the space and time for ritual. The profane alone remains. I was provoked by these reflections to dig out an old science-fiction novel: _Past Master_, by R.A. Lafferty, 1968. The prolific Raphael Aloysius is not well-known outside the genre, but I hope that someday he will be more widely read. His strength is his short stories; they are dizzying little tales by someone I have always imagined to be part lunatic. I read one collection on an exhausting plane trip once and swear that it gave me a sort of brain-fever. Lafferty lives (lived?) in Oklahoma, describes himself as a "correspondence-school electrical engineer", and is probably a wily old coot. His novels have always seemed to charge around a bit too long for me, but this one works well. It reminds me of the fables of G.K. Chesterton and C.S. Lewis, as well as of what little I have been able to glean from the very dense philosophy of Eric Voegelin. In the year 2535 (exactly 1000 years after a certain execution), a utopian civilization has achieved the earthly paradise, immanentized the eschaton, and is now in inexplicable crisis, facing extinction. Saint Thomas More is fetched out of the past to solve their problems and be martyred again. He has been selected because of his ability to distinguish and choose correctly between alternatives when the labels have become confused, as, for example, between "Heaven" and "Hell", or between "Everything" and "Nothing". He takes it all pretty calmly. It seems that time travelers often stop and chat with him. On

Astrobe, the world of the future, he finds allies and enemies, Adam and Eve, the last Pope, a friendly alien called an "ansel" [angel?] and a race of artificial beings (the "Programmed Persons" with their "Programmed Killers") who have no souls or even real consciousness, but who are supplanting human beings. These synthetic beings worship Ouden, the "Great Nothingness". They are More's real enemies, and plan to exterminate humanity and then themselves. We could say they are the problem, if it did not seem more likely that they are manifestations of the corrupted souls of real humans. At one point they admit to More that they are old-fashioned Demons. (There is a Christian tradition of calling evil the "void" or "nothingness". When soulless machines start ordering one about, there is a natural suspicion of those satanic mills, and Luddism sometimes has its attractions). This is all very fast-moving, violent, witty, and more than a little metaphysically creepy. Lafferty claims that More's _Utopia_ was a satire.

Destruction and Renewal proto-cyberpunk space opera: NOVA by Samuel R. Delany

There are authors who work with the stuff of legends and make it new and fresh and all their own. There are authors who make their prose sing like it was poetry, and authors whose work explores the cosmos in spaceships, dealing with physics and astronomy. And in a few rare cases, there are authors who bring all those elements together into something magical. One of those authors is Samuel R. Delany, whose book NOVA is a classic of the genre.

Delany received vital support early in his career from editor Fred Pohl, and was quickly and widely acclaimed from the start of his career as a gifted and skillful author Delany, still in his 20s, burst onto the science fiction scene of the

1960s like a nova himself. He has been nominated for many awards, won the Hugo Award twice and the Nebula award four times, collecting many more nominations for those awards over the years. His two Nebulas back to back in 1966 and 1967. This in a field dominated by white men Delany as gay African-American showed that SF is something of a meritocracy.

NOVA works on many levels, including myth and legend, unfolding against a solidly-researched science fiction background. There are other authors who would happily build an entire book around merely a tenth of the ideas that Delany packs into **NOVA**.

.. In addition to **NOVA**, his novels include **BABEL-17** (Nebula Award winner in 1966), **THE EINSTEIN INTERSECTION** (Nebula Award winner in 1967), **THE FALL OF THE TOWERS**, **THE JEWELS OF APTOR**, and **DHALGREN**.

The World of **NOVA**
It happens in the 32nd Century CE, human civilization is split between the Earth-led worlds of Draco and the worlds of the Pleiades star cluster, where shorter travel distances have allowed a younger confederation to blossom. These powers compete in the non-aligned Outer Colonies. The economy of these worlds is controlled by a few families, whose power exceeds that of the robber barons of the United States at the end of the 19th Century. The Pleiades worlds are dominated by the Von Ray family, while the Draco worlds are dominated by the Reds of Red Shift Ltd. The Von Ray family has played a large role in keeping the Pleiades free from domination by the corporations of Draco—something that is seen as patriotism among the Pleiades, but as piracy by the people of Draco.

This future civilization is fueled by the fictional element Illyrion, a power source like none ever seen before. There is not much of this element

available, but even the smallest amounts can generate huge amounts of energy. The discovery of even modest amounts of Illyrion could completely upset the balance of power among human worlds. From a scientific standpoint, while Transuranium elements tend toward faster and faster radioactive decay rates as they get heavier, scientists have long speculated that there might be "islands of stability," where super-heavy elements such as the fictional Illyrion exist. No trace of these elements has ever been found in nature, but they remain an intriguing possibility.

Novas have long captured the imagination of those who watch the sky. The very idea of a star becoming unstable and exploding into cosmic fury—one that could destroy every world that orbits—it is both frightening and fascinating. Scientists now separate the phenomena into two types of events: classical novas, which are caused by two binary stars interacting, and supernovas, which involve a massive star exploding toward the end of its lifespan. Supernovas can reshape the elements of the star itself in a process known as nucleosynthesis.

Interstellar travel in Delany's 32nd Century, which involves journeys at speeds faster than light, is made possible by manipulating the flow of forces unknown to us today in a process akin to sailing. These forces of the space-time continuum are accessed by energy vanes, each of which is controlled by a computer operated by the "cyborg studs" who make up the crew of a starship.

Most humans have been outfitted with cybernetic control sockets in their wrists and at base of their spines. This allows them to control a range of devices and power tools, from vacuum cleaners to mining machines and right up to starships. It also allows people to be much more flexible in moving from career to career. Some reviewers have drawn a parallel between

these sockets and the jacks that would later appear as a popular element in the cyberpunk genre. But unlike those jacks, which connect people with a virtual world that stands apart from the physical world, the sockets in this novel connect people to devices in the physical world, and allow the physical world to be sensed in different ways.

Haunting EMPHYRIO by Jack Vance

Halma, a world where humans were ruled by a race of effete and arrogant lords; where a neo-feudal system banned all work by machines; where a mock welfare state rewarded painful hand labor with a pitiful dole. Young Ghyl Tarvok was a rebel. In a pirated spaceship, he began his search through the civilizations of the galaxy, hunting the elusive key to the time-shrouded secret that could free his people. Inexorably he moved toward his last desperate hope: the place his ancestors had left many thousands of years before, the mysterious and terrifying planet called Earth.

When is the last time you saw Richard Matheson, Fritz Leiber, Robert Heinlein, Jack Vance, A.E. van Vogt, Theodore Sturgeon, Harlan Ellison, Poul Anderson or Frank Herbert mentioned in any list of significant West Coast authors? Even science fiction writers who 'crossed over' into respectability, such as Philip K. Dick, Ursula K. Le Guin and Ray Bradbury rarely get included in reading lists of dream coast fiction. Yet here was an area in which the West not only matched the East in impact and acclaim, but legitimately surpassed it. During the glory days of science fiction and fantasy, the trends were set out West; meanwhile Manhattan, Boston and all of Europe needed to play catch-up as best they could.

Of these authors, Jack Vance had the deepest California roots. His grandfather arrived in California a decade before the Gold Rush, at a time when San Francisco's population amounted to only a few hundred pioneers. After his childhood in San Francisco, Vance moved with his mother to a ranch near the confluence of the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers, and he later matriculated at UC Berkeley. Here he wrote his first science fiction story for an English class—and was derided for doing so by the professor. Under slightly different circumstances, he might have flourished as one of the bohemian literary figures of beatnik San Francisco, but he had populist tastes which led him to pursue opportunities as a scriptwriter for the entertainment industry—his first big break came via a job at Twentieth Century Fox—and as an author of genre fiction for pulp magazines.

Vance may have made his name with the pulps, but his writing style and knack for close observation of nuanced human dramas were more aligned with the fiction of the slick, coated weeklies that published 'serious' authors. He is one of the great anthropologists of science fiction, able to create entire alternative worlds so plausible and persuasive that readers hardly need futuristic concepts or advanced technologies to hold their interest. Even the most mundane matters of everyday life, as presented in his fiction, captivate us with their resonance and evocative detail. The master of this style of science fiction was Frank Herbert, whose Dune universe set the standard for meticulous outer space ethnographies, and I am hardly surprised to learn that Vance and Herbert were very close friends, took joint family vacations and even shared a houseboat, built with the help of fellow author Poul Anderson.

These virtues of discernment are demonstrated again and again in Vance's masterful 1969 novel EMPHYRIO. Most genre writers introduce heinous crimes or outlandish technologies in their opening chapters, but Vance takes a different approach. He lovingly sketches scenes of family life in an artisan-driven community where the economy is supported by elaborate

handwork—the production of furniture, jewelry and other everyday items of use and apparel. The story is set on a distant planet, and in time we are introduced to spaceships and peculiar alien creatures, but Vance has drawn us deeply into his narrative long before these take center stage. Much like the characters who populate **EMPHYRIO**, Vance takes pride in the craftsmanship and well-wrought details of his trade. This is the "kernel of Vance's genius," sci-fi historian Adam Roberts rightly explains: "his carefully mannered prose slips effortlessly from familiar to alien, treating both with the same disinterested precision."

In Ambroy on the planet Halma, a youngster named Ghyl Tarvoke watches on helplessly while his father Amiante gets into trouble with his guild and the local political authorities. Amiante is hardly a rabble-rouser, but even his small gestures of support for a more open, democratic society meet with harsh reprisals from the entrenched oligarchies that control the community's wealth and power. Ghyl gets caught up in this same battle, inspired both by his father's courage and ancient legend about a young man named Emphyrio who, hundreds of years earlier, had led a rebellion against enemies of the people.

This basic plot, as outlined here, will not be unfamiliar to readers of science fiction. A hardy libertarian streak is now embedded in sci-fi literature, and seems to crop up irrespective of the authors' own political leanings —when was the last time you read a science fiction story that championed the government against the rights of the individual? Do such genre stories actually exist? Readers of these tales apparently don't want to hear about the beneficent visions of the central planning agencies; instead they get jazzed about brave individuals who take on the system, the renegades who refuse to play by the rules and fight for freedom at all costs.

EMPHYRIO is the story of Ghyl Tarvoke. Son of a master artisan, Ghyl grows up on the planet Halma learning to carve elaborate wooden screens from his father, Amiante. Investing long hours in their work, the father and son duo reap little reward, however. With business and production on Halma highly regulated, the two receive only a stipend for their skilled creations, while the lords of the city, aristocrats who live in towers, rake in the profits from outlying planets for the handiwork. Worse yet, no manner of duplication—mechanical or otherwise—is allowed on Halma. Each wooden screen, silk blouse, item of metalwork, book, etc. is hand crafted, and if methods of duplication are discovered, punishment, up to and including death, are implemented. Amiante a quiet, phlegmatic man, what he is found doing after hours one evening shocks young Ghyl. But is it enough to shake him from the doldrums of Halma?

Part bildungsroman, a significant portion of **EMPHYRIO** describes a coming of age. Vance handling matters with a surprisingly delicate touch, not all is rainbows and butterflies in Ghyl's youth. With a father seemingly indifferent to the injustices occurring on Halma, friends that constantly get into trouble with the law, dreams of traveling in space limited by poverty, and eating the most base of food on the pittance provided by the government, Ghyl's reserve as an adult has roots the reader can relate to.

Seemingly unique, **EMPHYRIO** has something which I have yet to encounter in another Vance work. The title of the novel taken from a legend Ghyl reads as a youth, there is a touch of intra-textual play. Ghyl possessing only the first half of the story of Emphyrio, the rest is hearsay. He spends a fair portion of the book seeking out the truths, and for that matter, the untruths of the second half. What results may be one of Vance's weakest denouements, but it certainly distinguishes itself by being one of the

most ideological. The typical elements of planetary adventure, mystery, and revenge still have a place in the narrative, just this time around a place is allowed for the subjectivity/objectivity of legend—both in the story and in its underlying concepts. This contrived sub-layer complementing surface plot is something I've yet to encounter in Vance's other works.

Regarding style, **EMPHYRIO** is likewise rather unique in Vance's oeuvre. Missing almost the entirety of the baroque dialogue that books like Cugel the Clever and The Tchai had recently made famous and would go on to color nearly all of the author's books thereafter, Emphyrio does not display a subtlety of humor in character interaction—arguably the author's trademark, but remains accomplished. The singular cultures, the proficient plotting, the worldbuilding—all of the other aspects which make Vance unique, are present. Typical dialogue, however, is not. And it is obviously something intentional. I'm only guessing, but it would seem Vance was trying to emphasize the severity of Halma's strict work practices. A bleak mood permeates their society as a result, and in turn Ghyl's life.

In the end, **EMPHYRIO** is standard, quality Vance that should be read by any of his fans. Whether it should be a starting point for the author, however, is another question. Given the aforementioned singularities, it is not as representative as many of his other works. The sublimely humorous dialogue is toned down to the point of being almost non-existent, and the ending—with it's ideological aims—is not developed in a fashion complementing the story at hand: one is sacrificed for the other. The intentions are good, I'm just not convinced the results match earlier scenes. That being said, it's still well-worth it. Vance is Vance, and you either love him or hate him. (For those curious, Emphyrio most closely resembles

MASKE: THAERY and **NIGHT LAMP** in Vance's oeuvre.) <>

CAPTURING IMAGINATION: A PROPOSAL FOR AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF THOUGHT by Carlo Severi, translated by Catherine V. Howard, Matthew Carey, Eric Bye, Ramon Fonkoue, and Joyce Suechun Cheng [HAU, 780999157008]

We have all found ourselves involuntarily addressing inanimate objects as though they were human. For a fleeting instant, we act as though our cars and computers can hear us. In situations like ritual or play, objects acquire a range of human characteristics, such as perception, thought, action, or speech. Puppets, dolls, and ritual statuettes cease to be merely addressees and begin to address us—we see life in them.

How might we describe the kind of thought that gives life to the artifact, making it memorable as well as effective, in daily life, play, or ritual action? Following The Chimera Principle, in this collection of essays Carlo Severi explores the kind of shared imagination where inanimate artifacts, from non-Western masks and ritual statuettes to paintings and sculptures in our own tradition, can be perceived as living beings. This nuanced inquiry into the works of memory and shared imagination is a proposal for a new anthropology of thought.

 Carlo Severi's new book is a masterpiece for its rare combination of erudition, attention to ethnographic detail, and its vast conceptual imagination. It is a unique book from a unique author who invites us to join him on a intellectual journey along a path, following the threads that guide us to new discoveries every step of the way. Using data from different parts of the world and different historical periods, Severi keeps the reader so enthralled that the title, Capturing Imagination, ends up sounding

like an augur. Let yourself be captured. — Carlos Fausto, author of Warfare and Shamanism in Amazonia

The relation between person and object is a topic that has been central to theory in anthropology and to the method of ethnography since its inception. With this excellent English translation of L'Objet-personne, Carlo Severi invites us to revisit the legacy of assumptions and resulting models that have influenced how we conduct ourselves around objects, how we approach them in research and analysis, and how we account for the difference they make to culture and society. A tour de force on the topic of person and object and its manifold offshoots, the book is a must-read for anyone acquainted with earlier classics and their unanswered questions, which are exposed and debated here in the most nuanced, sophisticated, and hugely accessible and readable manner. This book indeed is a joy to read and a gift for anyone interested in the fundamental paradox of being human. — Susanne Kuechler, author of Malanggan: Art, Memory and Sacrifice

Mellifluous Elucidations of Hallucinations

Excerpt:

One of the invaluable features of Severi's work is that he draws on an astonishing breadth of sources, published in various languages and in various countries, enabling readers to encounter numerous works and authors for the first time. To assist scholars in tracking down references, the citations and bibliographic data for foreign works have been converted to English publications if they exist. Since Severi's analyses are sensitive to the historical context in which the sources first appeared, the original publication date, if known, has been added to each citation. Similarly, direct quotations are drawn from published English versions that exist; otherwise, they have been translated by one of the translators who contributed to this book. It is our hope that this translation will open up new perspectives on anthropological questions to a wider audience and thus enrich the debates that surround them.

On Living Objects and the Anthropology of Thought

When we were living in Berlin, Kafka often went for a walk in Stieglitz Park. I sometimes accompanied him. One day, we came upon a little girl who was crying and seemed to have lost all hope. As we spoke with her, Franz asked the reason for her grief. We learned that she had lost her doll. On the spot, he invented an entirely plausible story to explain the disappearance. " Your doll is just taking a little trip. I know because she sent me a letter." The little girl looked at him suspiciously. "Do you have it with you?" she asked him. "No, I left it at home, but I'll bring

it tomorrow." Suddenly curious, the little girl almost forgot her grief. Franz went home immediately to write the letter.
He set to work with as much seriousness as if it were a matter of writing an actual literary work. He entered the same state of nervous tension that would overcome him whenever he sat down at his desk, even if only to write a letter or postcard. . . .
This make-believe lasted at least three weeks. Franz dreaded the moment when he would have to bring it all to a conclusion. Such a conclusion would have to be an authentic one, creating a new order to take the place of the disorder triggered by the loss of the toy. He pondered long and hard before finally deciding to have the doll get married. He first described the young man, the engagement party, the wedding preparations, and then, in great detail, the newlyweds' house. The doll concluded her letter by telling the little girl, "I have traveled a great deal. I now have a house and a husband. You, too, will realize that we have to give up ever seeing each other again."

This story, related by Kafka's partner, Dora Diamant, exemplifies a certain type of presence an object can have, one that is perhaps universal, when an artifact is transformed into a person. Once lost, the doll ceases to be inanimate and becomes a girl. She comes to life. She speaks. She cries. She consoles. She writes letters. The fascination with what Diamant calls Kafka's "instinctive impulse" to attribute life to the doll is immediate. In this series of letters (unfortunately, probably lost), he undoubtedly used literature—or, rather, the act of writing in itself—as a sort of magic. According to Diamant, Kafka's intention was to enter the inner universe of the little girl to help her move forward and thus create an order to replace the disorder caused by the doll's disappearance. Beyond this, however, we need more to understand the magical effect of Kafka's letters. What reality, what exercise of thought is involved in claiming that this doll met a young prince in Stieglitz Park, took a long trip with

him, became engaged, and had a happy marriage? Under what conditions is an object, clearly inanimate in the eyes of all the protagonists of this story (the storyteller, the witness, and even the little girl), capable of thinking, imagining, or speaking?

To understand the nature of this remarkable form of thought, the first step should be to reflect on the effects of narration on space and time. Thanks to the story that Kafka's letters gradually reveal, a shared space of thought emerges. Within this space, a complex relationship is established between the writer, the little girl, the doll, and the witness, Diamant. The first effect is clear: because of this new relationship, the lost doll does not disappear. More precisely, her disappearance from sight no longer means she vanished for no reason. Through the letters Kafka reads to the little girl every day, the doll remains present. She stays with the child for as long as the story lasts. Through Kafka's voice, the doll gives advice to the little girl, recounts her travels, expresses desires, shares thoughts, and promises to write more letters. Through such means, the little girl is able to reach an agreement with the doll and gradually separate from her with less pain. Over a certain period of time and within a certain space, the object has thus become a person. How should this space and this time be described? How shall we conceive of the self of the one who narrates, the self of the child (so bound up with the object), and the self of the absent doll that returns to narrate its own story through Kafka?

In innumerable social contexts of different cultures, people attribute the status of living beings to inanimate objects. In situations like play or ritual, objects may be endowed with a range of human characteristics, such as perception, thought, action, or speech. Puppets, dolls, and ritual statuettes cease to be merely addressees and begin to address us. We see life in them. What type of thought animates the object in these situations, making it both alive and memorable? The aim of this book is to formulate some answers, albeit partial and provisional, to this question, through the study of a number of ethnographical cases, from non-Western masks and ritual statuettes to paintings and sculptures in the Western tradition. This task, however, needs to be founded, as any anthropological enterprise, on more than empirical analyses; it also requires a new approach to the question of the anthropological study of thought. My exploration of the kind of life that might be mentally attributed to inanimate beings is intended to be an initial experiment in this domain. In this chapter, then, I will outline the argument of the book and, in more general terms, the theoretical strategy I have adopted to construct it. But let me first pay a well-deserved tribute to the work of Alfred Gell.

In **ART AND AGENCY** (1998), Gell made the point that the museum artifacts that we label "art" are not merely instances of a universal instinct underlying artistic creativity. Besides being the products of the particular aesthetic of the societies in which they were conceived, many of these objects were also originally treated as living beings, notably within sequences of ritual actions. Through the process that Gell calls an "abduction of subjectivity," these artifacts are endowed with their own "agency." As such, they become the means of expressing specific networks of relationships among members of society. Whether it is a question of performing a sacrifice, marking out a symbolic space, or correctly accomplishing a rite of passage, "living" artifacts play a crucial role.

Gell's approach has been highly influential, and his work is still invaluable for the anthropology of art. However, twenty years after the publication of his book, we can look at his argument with fresh eyes and pose some new questions. Here, I will raise two points in

particular. The first concerns the relationship between agency and aesthetics. On this topic, Gell famously wrote that "the anthropology of art cannot be the study of aesthetic principles of this or that culture, but of the mobilization of aesthetic principles (or something like them) in the course of social interaction" (1998, 5). According to him, "a purely cultural, aesthetic, 'appreciative' approach to art objects is an anthropological dead end.". If the anthropology of art can be pursued, it has to develop an "imitative strategy" of the other branches of social anthropology by becoming a "theory about social relationships, and not anything else."

Gell's proposal has proven successful and productive. Yet we can argue that the question of aesthetics is not entirely resolved by the proposal of simply neglecting it. Even if we admit that a merely aesthetic appreciation would be unhelpful to understand the life of ritual objects in Melanesian or Amerindian cultures, the influence that Western conceptions of art, and of modern primitivism in particular, still holds on our way of looking at them is left unexplored in Gell's book. In the ensuing chapters, I will try to show that a critical examination of modern primitivism is necessary in order to free our gaze from Western conceptions and to approach the analysis of artifacts in a new light, looking at both their social effectiveness and the kind of aesthetics they mobilize.

My second point concerns the context and the network of social relationships in which agency may be attributed to an artifact. Gell refers to a kind of "spontaneous anthropomorphism" that we constantly experience in everyday life. His favorite example is his old Toyota, a "reliable and considerate" object that "does not just reflect the owner's personhood; it has a personhood as a car". He notes how common it is for us to speak to objects as if they were human, at some level almost expecting them to

respond, even though logically we know better. This kind of everyday experience led Gell to elaborate a theory of how agency and subjectivity are attributed to things. His claim is that artifacts become part of our social existence precisely because we so easily treat them as human. "Because anthropomorphism is a form of 'animism' which I actually and habitually practice," writes Gell, "there is every reason to make mention of it as a template for imagining forms of animism that I do not happen to share, such as the worship of idols.". As a consequence, his theory tends to conceptualize the presence of an "animated being" as the result of a direct replacement: a certain object corresponds to a certain person and vice versa. Through this perspective, for instance, the celebrant of a ritual and the object that takes on the celebrant's functions maintain a relationship of absolute equivalence. One has exactly the same value and meaning as the other. In ritual action (and in the universe of truth that it generates), the object seems to act like a shadow or a mirror image of the human being who replaces it.

Admittedly, this kind of anthropomorphism is very common in everyday life. But it is also highly unstable. It is a fragile state of mind, as it is constantly subjected to critical examination. Moreover, anthropomorphism does not invariably take the diffuse, everyday, and relatively superficial form discussed by Gell. In other situations, our relationship to artifacts assumes more stable forms. This is notably the case in ritual action: the progressive construction of a truth regime different from the one we follow in our day-to-day existence creates a context in which our anthropomorphic thinking crystallizes and gives rise to enduring beliefs. Does the concept of anthropomorphism used by Gell enable us to account for the complex, stable, and counterintuitive identities embodied by inanimate objects in contexts such as ritual

action or play? To understand these cases—and the kind of "suspension of disbelief" they imply—we need to look closer at the mental operations underlying this kind of elaborated anthropomorphism. My hypothesis is that in such situations, the object ceases to entertain a dual relationship with the person or "supernatural being" it represents. Within a ritual context, it becomes more complex than a mirror image or a "double." It resembles more a crystal, where a plural identity, constituted by fragments of different identities, is gradually constructed. The investigations presented in this book will show that this complex relational structure may account for the attachment of a stable belief to the living artifact. I will try to show that if we decipher the complexity of the bond of belief created between objects and persons, the very idea of a "living object" appears in a completely different light.

The story of Kafka and the doll offers a luminous example of this complexity. What does the doll represent? Whose image is it? By following Kafka's game, we gradually realize that it assumes a changing identity, at once plural and provisional. In one letter after another, the doll is a girl, a close friend, then a fiancée and the future wife of a young prince. But there is more involved in the make-believe: the doll's presence is imagined in the universe described by the narration: long journeys to wondrous, far-off countries, fabulous palaces, and so on. Moreover, the narration is not just a story; it is also an act. It translates the presence of a narrator, not simply the characters Kafka talks about. Beyond appearances, the doll is thus equally close to the image and the voice of this thin, inspired young man who reads his letters aloud—or even to the silent presence of Diamant, who captured the memory of this curious episode.

Through the tools of comparative anthropology, I will offer an analysis of this type of complexity, which concerns the presence as well as the

image of an object, while seeking to identify the space of thought that engenders it. Although this will involve constructing an anthropological theory of anthropomorphism, I wish to do more in the pages that follow. In fact, the existence of anthropomorphic thought is not at all surprising. The traces of the exercise of this mode of thought are evident throughout our daily experience, even if we may not notice them because of their very banality.

In other places, times, or situations, anthropomorphic thought undergoes a profound change. On certain occasions, it intensifies, becoming more serious, sometimes solemn and indisputable. The attitude that attributes life to an artifact in such cases is no longer revocable or provisional. Anthropomorphism thus appears to be a "serious game" with rules that people may follow or transgress. Such occasions call to mind the domain of religion, yet they can also occur without any religious belief being involved, such as when the picture of a recently deceased husband comes "alive" for a while and becomes a conversation partner with a widow.

These situations, which I will discuss mainly in ritual contexts, are also illustrated in Ernst Gombrich's memorable example in his **MEDITATIONS ON A HOBBY HORSE** (1971). The broomstick that a child can "ride" (an action that, as we will see later, Gombrich rightly links to the artistic act) is a horse—in fact, it is the horse that makes the child a knight, just as it makes his friend a princess of the Middle Ages—precisely because anthropomorphic thought makes this rudimentary object the final term in a chain of associations. Like Kafka's doll, the broomstick points to a complex exercise of thought, which the image can only partially translate.

Here, I will focus my analyses on situations in which the establishment of a belief links an object and a person in a persistent, complex,

and to a certain extent, orderly manner. These situations are not always "rituals" in the strict sense of the term. Other situations exist where games of substitution and partial identification may be established between humans and objects, or even between humans and humans. I thus propose to describe such situations as quasi-rituals. Without corresponding to the usual conditions prevailing when ritual action is exercised, these situations can nonetheless be described through the relational theory that Michael Houseman and I formulated for ritual action twenty years ago. In this work, we argued that a rite is determined more by its relational form than by its meaning or function. By "form," we meant a particular relational configuration that confers a distinctive ontological dimension on ritual interaction. This dimension, which we viewed as a "serious fiction," to borrow Gregory Bateson's phrase, implies more than the traditional anthropological principle that the world evoked within a ritual must be interpreted according to a symbolic register. It implies further that the identity of the subjects of ritual action is defined through the condensation of what would be seen in ordinary life as contradictory modes of relationship.

As an example of this kind of quasi-ritual situation, which likewise involves the condensation of different modes of relationships, I will propose an analysis in an ensuing chapter of the Homeric funerary games based on a reading of the Iliad. Later in the book, I will go a step further by considering instances of Western art as generating specific relational situations in which artifacts may reveal agency and even a certain kind of life. This approach to what we call "art" experimentally reverses the perspective of modern primitivism. Instead of seeing "works of art" in artifacts endowed with agency outside the West, I will analyze certain Western works of art according to their own logic as object-

persons. My final claim will be that studying situations where an object is thought to come alive enables us to deepen and extend the scope of our understanding not only of ritual action and the act of play but also of art, both Western and non-Western.

Let me now briefly define the strategy I have chosen to develop my argument. To do so, I will first examine in what ways my approach differs from the two main currents in contemporary anthropology that aim to deal with thought and mental operations: the ontological and cognitive approaches. I will next outline the approach I develop in the analyses presented in this book. Let us start with an experiment in ontological thought.

Kūkai's Vision
At the turn of the ninth century, a young Japanese scholar named Kūkai (Kōbō Daishi, 774–835) met an ascetic Buddhist monk, who introduced him to an esoteric text of the tantric tradition. This text stated that by reciting the mantra it contained one million times in the proper way, "the meanings of everything that had been heard will be thoroughly understood, retained in the mind, and never lost or forgotten." Kūkai believed that any word attributed to the Buddha was (or had to be) literally true. From that day forward, he devoted himself without rest to the practice of reciting the mantra. "Wandering in deep mountains and secluded valleys," he never stopped chanting the mantra. One day, he had a vision. In the valley where he was reciting, he suddenly realized that trees, rocks, and birds loudly resounded with the sound of his whispered mantra. Everything he perceived was speaking his own words.

This experience was not due simply to the attainment of heightened powers of memory and vision (also promised by the mantra). What Kūkai understood from the message conveyed to him by his "sudden awakening" was that

nature itself is vibration, sound, and language. Every phenomenon, in all nature, is . . . a manifestation of a primordial language carved into the fabric of space. . . . Long before human language ever evolved, the entire universe was . . . a text written in this primordial language.

Later, in his treatise devoted to The Meaning of Sound, Letter, and Reality, Kūkai commented on the meaning of his vision in more speculative terms:

> The moment that the inner breath and the outer air began to move, vibration inevitably arises. This is called sound. . . . Sound arises and is never meaningless; it is always the name of a thing. This is called letter. Names evoke the essence. This is called reality. Distinguishing the three—sound, letter, and reality—is called meaning.

According to Kūkai, then, language and reality coincide. In order to understand a meaningful statement, one has to understand that words actually work as an acoustic image of the world. They do not represent it; they are the world.

How are we to understand this statement? One possibility is to reconstruct its historical context. Buddhism often presents the practice of experiencing visions as an "undetermined, spontaneous, absolute" (Faure, 1993, 158). Many scholars have shown that this kind of vision was linked to a specific discursive practice, an "art of speaking" that required a long initiation. Moreover, we know that Kūkai had studied Daoism in China, and it has been noted that his vision of the "speaking valley" reflects a passage of one of the great books of Daoism, the Zhuangzi:

> A colorless and soundless wind blows through the infinite reaches of the cosmos. . . . When this wind blows in the deep forests of the Earth, the trees immedi¬ately begin to rustle, and sounds arise everywhere. In that ancient forest, there are huge trees measuring a hundred

arms lengths around. In their trunks and branches are infinite holes of different shapes. When the wind strikes those holes they each produce different sounds: some roar like torrents dashing against the rocks, some murmur like the shallows, some rumble like thunder in the sky, some hiss like flying arrows, and others sound of wailing, anger, sadness, or happiness.

Kūkai is thus not alone in assimilating language with reality. What appears at first sight to be a spontaneous vision of an enchanted valley is actually an image deeply rooted in a particular conception of the world, one that originated in the Chinese philosophy of the fifth century. From this point of view (sometimes called a "lateral" comparison, in this case, between China and Japan), we can say that Kūkai's vision reflects a scholarly tradition and a specific school of thought.

Another way to evaluate a cosmology of this kind is to "frontally" compare it to Western cosmology. European or American authors of all sorts have traditionally stated that, in the Western perspective, signs are opposed to objects, not confused with them. Signs are arbitrary, conventional, and in some measure abstract. They do not "resemble" objects nor do they convey their acoustic image. Furthermore, in contrast to what Kūkai writes, Western cultures hold that sounds can be perfectly meaningless. The distinction between inanimate matter and language is paralleled by another crucial one, that between subject and object. Western thought is, we are often told, "dualistic." Eastern doctrines, on the contrary, tend to posit a kind of synthesis of the subject and the object, incarnated, in Kūkai's case, by the idea of a "speaking landscape." Such a vision is associated with a "religious" or metaphysical vision of the world, whereby language (and the mind behind it) are not opposed to each other but, rather, are part of a single being.

Recently, it has become usual to oppose Eastern Monistic spiritualism to Western Cartesian dualism. Is this opposition really well founded? We will have to look more closely to Kūkai's vision and its connections with Buddhism to fully answer this question. Before doing so, however, we may also wonder whether the image of ourselves that this kind of comparison implies is correct, whether from a theoretical or a historical point of view. Among the philosophers of Western antiquity, we find a number of nondualist thinkers. Epicurus, for instance, taught that both reality and the human mind are materially composed of the same atoms. His theories do not fit comfortably into the pattern in Western society that Philippe Descola describes as "naturalism," which implies the existence of, on the one hand, a continuity between human and nonhumans in terms of the physical matter they are composed of, and on the other, a discontinuity between physical matter and the mental faculties that are exclusively human. Epicurus saw continuity and a common nature in the structures of both matter and human mental activities. In Lucretius's De Rerum Natura, one of the richest sources for understanding Epicurism, all phenomena belonging to nature are said to be composed of an infinite but fixed and immortal set of "atoms." Thought processes, including inference and imagination, are not fundamentally different from other "natural" phenomena; they are simply generated by different combinations of atoms. Furthermore, human bodies and minds are not different from animal bodies and minds. Death is not the end of a "soul" or its travel to another world; it is just a transformation of atoms guided by the laws of a Mind, which is common to all creatures. Lucretius describes, for instance, how horses feel, think, and dream like human beings. And, for him, since atoms combine in the same way the letters of an alphabet combine to generate words, the organization of human language is the best model for

understanding the material structure of the universe.

This vision of a fundamental continuity between the "object" (matter) and the "subject" (mind) was far from being confined to Greek materialism. Since Lucretius's De Rerum Natura and other ancient texts were rediscovered, the materialism of antiquity has indeed permeated an entire tradition of Western materialistic thought, from Giordano Bruno (who remarkably wrote that "if God is not the same as nature, it is to be conceived of as the nature of nature"), to Baruch Spinoza, to Denis Diderot, and down to contemporary debates in the cognitive sciences. Although the competing paradigm of naturalism has always had advocates such as René Descartes, who distinguished the res extensa (the Matter) from the res cogitans (the Subject), the long tradition of materialism, which considers these two domains to be coinciding, has had equally vigorous proponents.

Where is the supposedly monolithic "Western dualism" that is so often opposed to an equally monolithic "Eastern monism"? This kind of comparison, no matter how it is framed, whether sophisticated or simplistic, inevitably leads down the wrong path, for both theoretical and ethnographical reasons. As for theory, I have argued elsewhere that anthropologists usually do not adequately understand the concept of ontology. Many of our colleagues tend to call any discourse about the origins and nature of the world an "ontology." However, ever since Parmenides, the term ontology has not referred to the various material constituents of the universe (fire, water, air, etc.) and their different ways to combine. Parmenides's ontological argument is about "being itself." It aims to construct an ontology as a science of abstract principles—founded on the analysis of predicates of being (such as necessity versus contingence, possibility versus impossibility, subsistence versus potentially, and

the like)—not as a discourse about the origins of what physically exists. Nor does Parmenides seek to classify the different beings inhabiting the universe. He intends, on the contrary, to identify an abstract relationship between nous and physis and to discover the conditions under which the world is thinkable. This is why a classification of different beings into categories based on, for example, the distinctions of animate/inanimate, human/animal, male/female (which are often considered "ontological" by anthropologists) technically does not make for an "ontology." It is better defined instead as a "natural philosophy without ontology."

From a technical point of view, the negative (or indeterminate) results of this kind of comparison appear as an effect of the way "ontology" is usually constructed as an ethnographic object. The first problem is the exclusive focus on the content of "cosmology" as a notion, accompanied by a lack of analysis about the ways it comes to be shared and by whom. If the "stuff a cosmology is made of" is shared knowledge, how is this knowledge shared or transmitted? We may hope to understand this process only if we adopt a perspective in which the analysis of the forms of knowledge transmission is given priority over the analysis of content. In this respect, Kūkai's vision no longer appears as the inverted analogon of an abstract notion of "Western naturalism." Rather, it is the result of ritual action implying a certain form of thought-enactment ("contemplation"), a certain form of language use, typically nonpropositional ("the repetition thousands of times of a certain sequence of words"), and an exercise in techniques of memory aimed at defining an exceptional form of subjectivity. From this perspective, the relationship of these practices to the other ritual tradition Kūkai also followed (the meditation technique aimed at transforming him in a way to "become the Bodhisattva immediately in his body") is clearly relevant to

understanding his vision. Notably, the only other treatise that we have by Kūkai is precisely about meditation. In other words, the kind of variation in the realm of thought that I am attempting to define here is not only characterized by a symbolic content; it also implies forms of enacting thought, which emerge through specific forms of language use and ritual action. It is only through the study of these conditions that we may comprehend the many ways in which "cosmological knowledge" is shared, transmitted, and transformed.

My third objection to the ontological approach concerns the use of the verb to be. From a philosophical point of view, since at least Alfred Ayer, the ambiguity of this verb has been criticized. As Ayer writes,

> If we were guided merely by the form of the sign, we should assume that the "is," which occurs in the sentence "He is the author of that book," was the same symbol as the symbol "is," which appears in the statement, "The cat is a mammal." But when we come to translate l the sentences, we find that the first is equivalent to "He, and no one else, wrote that book," and the second to "The class of the mammals contains the class of cats." And this shows that each "is" is an ambiguous symbol, which must not be confused with the other, nor with the ambiguous symbols of existence, a class membership, and identity, and entailments, which are also constituted by signs of the form "is."

This way of generating ambiguity has heavy consequences in the analysis of ethnography. If we want to avoid them, we should recognize that things do not "exist" in human societies in an undifferentiated way. To understand how an "ontology" applies to a specific society, we have to reconstruct the grammar of the verb "to be" on a case-by-case basis.

In the anthropological literature, an eloquent illustration of this point can be found in the

discussion E. E. Evans-Pritchard devotes to the grammar of the verb "to be" among the Nuer. He starts by arguing that a specific form of the use of the verb "to be" is crucial for understanding sacrifice:

When a cucumber is used as a sacrificial victim, Nuer speak of it as an ox. In doing so, they are asserting something rather more than that it takes the place of an ox. They do not say, of course, that cucumbers are oxen, and in speaking of a particular cucumber as an ox in a sacrificial situation, they are only indicating that it may thought of as an ox in that particular situation; and they act accordingly by performing the sacrificial rite as closely as possible to what happens when the victim is an ox. The resemblance is conceptual, not perceptual.

Once he establishes this point concerning the existence of conceptual analogies, Evans-Pritchard takes a more general approach to this question by distinguishing among several forms of existence revealed by the use of the verb "to be." First, he remarks that the Nuer use the verb in one sense, such as "the crocodile is an animal, not a spirit," which only means that such a reptile exists as a beast. The Nuer are not immersed in the mystical, nonlogical, "primitive mentality" described by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, nor do they see spirits or essences everywhere. The proof given here by Evans-Pritchard is simple: even when the Nuer say that "a crocodile is Spirit," they would constantly and firmly deny that "a spirit is a crocodile." Evans-Pritchard next introduces a subtle distinction between "being Spirit" and "being a spirit." "Being Spirit" can sometimes function just as the name of a natural phenomenon, such as lightning or any natural sprite, which involves a sort of "refraction of Spirit.". The "is" appearing in this statement, however, "is not one of identity", since Spirit is, for the Nuer, quite independent of any natural phenomenon. However, the use of "is" designating a stable and general identity

is not found in the statement "X is a spirit" either: this expression simply refers to an individual being that, in certain cases, might assume the "symbolic" role of representing a specific spirit. In other cases, this statement refers to a different kind of situation, the totemic relationship between an "animal spirit" with the members of the clan it designates. In this specific relationship, where a single animal might assume the role of "spirit" only for members of a particular clan, the indication "to be a snake or a crocodile" comes closer to the description of a personality. In none of these cases, however, is the verb "to be" a tool for indicating stable or unconditional identities. From the point of view we might call "ontological," this means that these variations in the grammar of the verb "to be" reflect the fact that the Nuer do not consider Spirit as something that exists in a general and undifferentiated way. Evans-Pritchard explains this in the following way:

There are gradations of the conceptions of Spirit from pure unattached Spirit to Spirit associated with human; animal and lifeless objects are more and more closely bound to what it is associated with the farther down the scale one goes. So when Nuer say of something that it is Spirit, we have to consider not only what "is" means, but also what "Spirit" means.

We could add that this "graduated" character is also typical of what we might call "matter" or "reality." Spirit and matter do not constitute the terms of an opposition; both of them exist only in degrees. One obvious consequence of this point is that "patterns of existence" are not the same for all beings in the Nuer universe. Nonhumans do not "exist" in the same way humans do; the same goes for cucumbers, oxen, and other sacrificial victims.

These analyses of Evans-Pritchard, relevant to Nuer ontology, are followed by his famous discussion of the relationships between twins

and birds. the focus of the argument is on the logic of relationships underlying the use of the verb "to be." Here, as we have already seen, the form subject X "is" predicate Y (e.g., twins are birds, or twins are the same person) hides the fact that the relationship is not dual; it presupposes a third term, "God," to whom both are related. In this case, writes Evans-Pritchard, "the formula does not express a dyadic relationship between twins and birds, but a triadic relationship of twins, birds, and God. In respect to God, twins and birds have a similar character."

For the Nuer, constructing a progressive series of predicates in these forms of existence is a way of establishing an ordered set of relationships among graduated instances of beings, be they "material" or "spiritual." It is clear that adopting this relational approach (in which, as in sacrificial actions, relations take priority over the description of the empirical appearance of beings) is a way to identify a rich, detailed sequence of intermediary steps between "true" (material) and "untrue" (spiritual) things. In other words, the concepts of truth and falsity do not disappear in this context, since both of them are present: a crocodile is a beast, not Spirit; a vulture is not Spirit is the sense that rain or an earthquake is; a twin is not a bird in terms of their appearance; and a cucumber is not an ox, unless it becomes an ox by convention. But they play different roles according to the different linguistic forms in the grammar of the verb "to be" and the different contexts of enunciation in which they are expressed. this is the reason why, instead of trying to establish whether they obey some sort of general rationality, we must use the utmost exactitude to grasp the limits and scope of the conceptual universe they express.

this carefully graduated and contextual interpretation of reality need not be deciphered as a proposition or an ensemble of propositions forming a "conception" of the world. Nor does

Evans-Pritchard's proposal to consider this way of thinking as the product of the Nuer's poetic sense or verbal art seem much more useful. Elsewhere, Hanks and I have argued that, instead of looking for a category where this kind of discourse would belong, it is far more valuable to follow the process of translation to which this "experience on an imaginative level of thought" (Evans-Pritchard 1956) is constantly subjected in the culture where it is used. In Claude Lévi-Strauss's language, we could say that this kind of conceptualization constantly mobilizes sensory data in terms of other sensory data, without invoking the question of rationality (in the sense this term has in linguistics). Furthermore, in this case, instead of seeing the possibility of translation as a theoretical difficulty for defining thought (as it has traditionally been viewed), we could, on the contrary, consider the ethnography of translation as an opportunity to observe the dynamics of thought processes and to study how they operate by adapting to constraints and by exploiting possibilities of the means of expression they use in different contexts.

Finally, let us consider the case of negation from this point of view. As noted earlier, when anthropologists use the concept of ontology, they often describe various "forms of existence." However, the concept of "existence," which is the foundation of the idea of "ontology," cannot be formulated without referring to its contrary, the concept of "nonexistence." It is unimaginable that a culture, while mentioning the "existence" of something, could spare itself the distinc¬tion between "existent" and "nonexistent" instances of reality. For Aristotle, the properties pertaining to all existent beings are only four: the existence of a being can be necessary or contingent, possible or impossible. However, it should be noted that these four "ontological properties" represent four possible mediations between being and nonbeing. In fact, it is quite

possible to reformulate the terms used to qualify the existence of a being in terms of nonbeing. If something exists necessarily, it cannot be nonexistent; if something exists in a contingent way, it can become nonexistent by accident. If an object has only a possible existence, it can equally (to the same extent) become nonexistent. To say that the existence of an object is impossible is to state that it could never exist. What is crucial for social anthropology is that these classic relationships between being and nonbeing do not rule out a further possibility: situations in which the relationship between being and nonbeing assume a paradoxical form where "Being" implies "Nonbeing." Anthropologists know these paradoxical definitions well, since they often characterize the relationship societies establish with the dead, the spirits, or entities like the "speaking trees" or the "rocks expressing fear or sadness" that appear in Kūkai's vision. To designate these imaginary situations, in which the relationship with reality assumes the form of a paradoxical ontology ("existent only if nonexistent" or "existing by negating the feature of existent things"), human societies have invented an array of special forms of communication, verbal and nonverbal alike. The study of these forms of "serious fiction" (which bear relationships with other, more ordinary forms of reality) is essential for understanding the coexistence of different "forms of thought" in a single society.

In conclusion, let me point out that the "ontological" perspective generates two blind spots. On one side, there is a naïve (nonanalytical) conception of the concept of "existence" and on the other, a refusal to admit the existence of a specific logic governing serious fiction as a parallel form of reality. In both cases, there is a refusal to recognize that social life is composed of different layers of reality governed by different logics.

Levels of Cognition

The refusal to apprehend plural perspectives of analysis also characterizes the field of cognitive anthropology. In this case, however, the problem concerns the rigidity of the conceptual model, not a mistaken conception of the ontological background. Cognitive anthropologists explicitly aim to study, as do I, the ways that mental processes propagate in a society (e.g., Sperber 1985; Sperber and Wilson 1986; Boyer 1988, 1992, 1993, 2002; Whitehouse 2004; Bloch 2012; Morin 2011). It seems natural, therefore, to ask how their approach might be compared with the one I am defending here. I will therefore first define the kind of cognition I am focusing on and then formulate a number of critiques to the main line of research in cognitive anthropology.

We can start by acknowledging that, in social life, not all individual fantasies become shared knowledge. Dreams, for instance, which might be seen as extremely "counterintuitive" and thus memorable, usually last only a brief period of time in individual memory. Furthermore, their representational content is famously difficult to share with others. Anthropology has not much to say about individual experiences of this kind. Its primary scope is the exploration of the many ways knowledge is shared. Furthermore, we know that a large amount of human shared cognition is basic and indifferent to cultural variation, simply because it is independent of any process of communication. A good example is what psychologists call "naïve physics". At a certain age, all human children acquire the right expectations concerning a ball thrown upward. They instinctively "think" that the ball will come down. Usually, their daily experience confirms this rule. It is remarkable, however, that, from a logical point of view, this does not mean that this kind of knowledge is independent of truth: it still has to be confirmed to become fully true. As far as we know, knowledge belonging to this

kind of cognition does not vary from one culture to another. It is a mistake to think that this level is irrelevant for the study of social cognition, but it is also irrefutable that this kind of cognition only describes a form of competence that belongs to the individual. The performances of social interactions, as well as their propagation in a society, only indirectly depend on this kind of basic cognition, which might be part of a general endowment of the human species but is not technically definable as a social phenomenon. From the point of view of a general psychology of human beings, then, the exploration of this kind of cognition might be quite interesting, but from the point of view of the forms of propagation of knowledge in a given society, it simply never strikes deeply enough. I would therefore argue that it is a mistake to conflate this kind of cognition with other kinds of cultural representations, which are also basic and shared but heavily dependent on the modalities of cultural communication, thus varying from one culture to another.

In my view, cognitive anthropology constantly mistakes one level for the other. This is one of the reasons for the rigidity of the method and the poverty of results that characterize this field of anthropology today. It is obviously impossible in such a short introduction to examine this question in detail, but let me briefly examine analyses proposed by Dan Sperber, since they are shared by many other cognitive anthropologists and still reflect the mainstream perspective in this field. Sperber has often claimed to be the author of two influential and controversial theories: one concerns the identification of relevance (that is, intentional meaning) within an expanded and revised Gricean model of conversation; the second concerns the definition of culture as a process of an "epidemic" propagation of representations. The natural development of this approach to social cognition—which one might consider the task of his followers—would

be to go one step further, leading to the identification of a logical link between the two theories. This link would enable the unified theory to predict where and when a certain way of producing relevance in communication would generate a specific sort of social propagation of representations. However, this seems to be an impossible task for contemporary cognitive anthropology. Two reasons may account for this theoretical failure. The first is that Paul Grice's work offers an abstract model for understanding the role of intentions and a speaker's implicit meanings in situations of idealized conversation. However (or therefore), it is, quite intuitively, a poor tool for understanding other contexts of cultural communication where, as in Kūkai's vision, language is used in a nonpropositional way, or where, as in ancient Greek funerary rituals, the faculty of speaking is attributed to an inanimate artifact (Chapter Five), or where, yet again, as in many rituals, knowledge is expressed through action. In many cases, the use of this model simply leads to inaccurate or inappropriate descriptions of ethnography. To understand the ever-changing and usually unexpected forms of propagating representations that we find in ethnography, we obviously need a far wider conception of language use and communication. The second reason for cognitive anthropology's failure lies in the rather outdated concept of epidemics that Sperber uses in his famous paper on "cultural epidemiology." In that essay, he describes the propagation of representations in a society as a process analogous to the propagation of a viral illness, when an ill body "infects" a previously healthy one. Contemporary epidemiology, however, long ago ceased to define epidemics in these terms. Epidemics are no longer defined as the physical contact of viruses of an illness that pass from a body to another body. The field of epidemiology has increasingly become the study of the reproduction of the conditions generating illnesses rather than their

propagation. Today, epidemiologists currently speak of the epidemiology of obesity, asthma, or lung cancer—all illnesses where no contact between viruses or other microorganisms generate any symptoms. The same conceptual revision should be applied for the epidemiology of ideas. The cultural study of cognition should be based, thus, not on a typology of representations (such as intuitive, counterintuitive, apparently irrational, etc.) but, rather, on the conditions influencing the generation of specific forms of communicative interactions. If so, this inquiry should no longer be based on the content of cultural representations, which supposedly makes them "successful or unsuccessful," but instead on the analysis of the pragmatic forms of their propagation. The research that I have conducted on the propagation of the Native American messianic movement known as the "Ghost Dance" (between approximately 1880 and 1920) in the United States shows, for instance, that the propagation of this new "religion" was not based on the content of the representations themselves (whether categorized as counterintuitive, intense, salient, etc.) but on the form of communicative interaction that characterized the new rituals, which combined, in a paradoxical way, Christian prayers with traditional dances celebrating the ancestors.

In short, the knowledge of human social cognition need not avoid, as is unfortunately often the case, the intricacies of ethnography. It should, to the contrary, be rooted in a detailed study of the forms of the transmission of knowledge. A crucial point that I share with cognitive anthropology, however, is that the focus of analysis shifts from reconstructing "conceptions of the world" to the study of the conditions of enunciation of shared knowledge in different contexts. In this perspective, to "study culture" becomes a way to explore the pragmatic conditions of cultural communication,

verbal or otherwise, ritualized or ordinary. It is certainly from this perspective that, in this book, I analyze the communicative agency and forms of interaction that we find attributed to artifacts.

Anthropology and Pragmatics

On the links between anthropology and pragmatics, the contribution of linguistic anthropology has been crucial. Thanks to the work of authors such as Dell Hymes, Michael Silverstein, Denis Tedlock, Keith Basso, Alan Rumsey, William Hanks, Francesca Merlan and Alan Rumsey, Alessandro Duranti, and Webb Keane, anthropology has firmly integrated the study of the pragmatic conditions of speech acts, through which the identities of speakers are constructed, into its conceptual toolkit. These authors have demonstrated that studying the conditions of interlocution can enrich our understanding of the meaning of traditional discourse and help us situate myths and other narrative forms in specific oral genres and, more generally, shed new light on the uses of traditional knowledge. This pragmatic approach enables anthropologists to move beyond the mere deciphering of indigenous speech acts and endeavor, instead, to distinguish various forms of social communication and the modalities through which tradition functions.

However, as mentioned earlier, research in the field of pragmatics has forked into two distinct branches. On the cognitive side, the analysis of extremely simple (or fictitious) communicative acts leads to sophisticated but hardly applicable theoretical models (Grice 1989; Sperber and Wilson 1986). On the linguistic side, the detailed identification of complex sociolinguistic phenomena, using contextually specific explanatory tools, has prevailed in more theoretical concerns. To this day, specialists in pragmatics tend to focus either on the wider criteria of generalized pragmatics, applicable to all communicative acts, or on the localized, specific variations that affect particular instances

of linguistic performance. The unfortunate effects of this bifurcation in research strategies are clear: the degree of abstraction that Grice and his followers opt for makes their models unsuitable for analyzing data from the field, while the study of specific cases raised by other authors has rarely led to wider, more generalizable conclusions from an anthropological perspective. In its relationship with social anthropology, linguistic pragmatics has seemed either too abstract and based on fictitious examples, or else empirically grounded but too circumstantial and heterogeneous. This divergence is particularly striking in the study of ritual communication, a context where the "agency" attributed to artifacts is very frequently involved. Whereas a series of solid anthropological works has sought to identify the constitutive traits of ritual action and to distinguish it from everyday action, linguists (even though they have produced precise descriptions of many different situations of social communication) have thus far not attempted to explore the special pragmatics of ritual speech. Were this to become a topic of research, their studies could converge in an approach illuminating the range of phenomena involved in this type of communication.

Anthropologists, for their part, have been slow to grasp and incorporate descriptive categories from pragmatics, such as situation, setting, context, indexicality, and implicature, into their analyses. They have made little attempt to delve deeper into the study of the ritual use of language, limiting themselves to highlighting a few superficial aspects of ritual language (repetition, semantic poverty, use of fixed formulas, etc.) without linking them to other aspects of ritual behavior. Some of them have indeed applied John Austin's classic work on speech acts to the disparate elements of ritual speech and action, but as Donald Gardner points out, these approaches are either

rigorous but empirically useless or else approximative and theoretically negligible.

For linguists, pragmatics is still defined as the study of everything that is explicitly formulated through linguistic means under the conditions of a given speech context. Although they recognize the existence and efficacy of other contextual indicators that are not expressed in linguistic terms, they almost invariably treat them as either residual or negligible. This linguistic definition of the field of analysis, which only takes into account the "grammaticalized" elements, ignores a whole range of other phenomena that we need to take into account for understanding communication in ritual contexts.

This point is analyzed in detail in several chapters of this book. Here I wish to raise only two points. The first concerns the way in which a ritual identity is established in contrast with ordinary life. Many pragmatists have highlighted the fact that, in ordinary speech, the identity of the speaker is an important element of social indexicality and thus helps determine the meaning of utterances. By contrast, in a ritual context, many of the usual conditions of ordinary communication are suspended, such as the ones identified by Erving Goffman—"shared experience, the occupation of the same space at the same time, and a form of reciprocity through mutual perception"—and those later added by Hanks, namely, "mutual understanding among parties, and a framework of relevance.". The meaning of the utterance can only be grasped if we understand how the speaker is defined in a preformatted, often counterintuitive communicational game. As in a game of chess, we must first know the rules governing the game and the uses of all the pieces in order to understand why one piece made a certain move. Likewise, in ritual communication, we must first know what the components of a speaker's complex identity are in order to understand the framework and thus

the context of speech acts. In logical terms, this means that the rules governing a speaker's identity cease to be normative (as in everyday speech) and become constitutive when they are applied to an entirely new game of interaction.

My second point concerns the role of images and actions in ritual communication. In many cases, the images and actions are no more to be seen as a heterogeneous or residual element in relation to the speech act. On the contrary, speech and image reciprocally entail one another in the definition of the speaker and thus of the indexical field. Speech acts that occur in ritual contexts possess a specific form of complexity that is defined less by their semantic content than by the definition of the specific "conditions of utterance," including where and when the act occurs and the nature of the speaker. To be anthropologically relevant, this context must be defined not only in linguistic terms but also with regard to other forms of communication, notably visual or gestural. To bridge the two approaches of pragmatics and anthropology, a model is needed that can account for this complexity.

Ethnography and Thought

Let us turn to the issue of thought. From Lévy-Bruhl's considerations of "prelogical mentality" up to Sperber's arguments on apparently irrational beliefs, a large part of the anthropological literature devoted to thought does not really concern the study of thought as a general human activity but, rather, the opposition between rationality and irrationality. In this perspective, anthropologists usually compare an abstract definition of "rationality" with an empirical counterpart, mostly founded on the analysis of some forms of categorization and theories of causality. It is obvious, however, that there is much more to human thought than categorization or propositional rationality. Ideas about perception and space, language, and communication, right or wrong moral values, for instance, are constantly present in

ethnography. It would be hard to qualify them as "rational" or "nonrational" (or even "symbolic"); following at least Austin, concepts of this kind would be better qualified as "appropriate" or "inappropriate," or as "felicitous" or "infelicitous," within a certain context, rather than as rational or nonrational.

In sum, when approaching the idea of an anthropology of thought, there is a preliminary choice to make. Either one chooses what we may call a Piagetian model of thought-as-rationality, seen in its various manifestations but defined only through the opposition between rational or nonrational; or one refers to a more extensive, and more realistic, definition of thought. One of the classic authors who have worked in this direction (and whom we could, in this respect, oppose to Piaget) is Lev Vygotsky, the great Russian psychologist. Not unaware of the problems posed by cultural differences, Vygotsky elaborated a multifaceted conception of the exercise of thought, which includes not only rational inference but also metalinguistic, meta-communicational, aesthetic, and narrative thought. In this book, I have chosen this Vygotskian option, and I try to develop it in a new direction. From a methodological point of view, the approach to thought I am taking here is resolutely ethnographic. Instead of predefining a kind of thought and looking for it in social life, I consider specific interactions and forms of communication and then try to understand the kind of thought they mobilize. This perspective may allow us to take further steps toward the definition of a new approach in the anthropology of thought. Roman Jakobson remarked once that when we pass from one language (or, more precisely, one grammar) to another, the variation between the two concerns what speakers must say in order to express a meaning rather than what they may say. I have argued that this kind of variation might become useful in the study of linguistic

variation, but also in the domain of thought. I would claim first that variation in a necessary but far from sufficient level is not merely an empirical fact (as Jakobson probably thought), with no meaning in itself. To illustrate this point, I referred to the distinction currently used in logic between the power of symbolic systems (the possibility of identifying a limited number of features that are valid for a large number of cases) and their expressivity (the possibility of identifying a large number of features belonging to a limited number of cases). Any case-centered inquiry (such as fieldwork-based ethnography) needs to be in some measure expressive, while any comparative or statistical analysis needs to be reasonably powerful. With this distinction in mind, I have noted that a consequence of Jakobson's perspective on linguistic variation is that all human natural languages potentially have the same logical power, but they always differ in degrees of expressivity. This means that the grammatical differences between languages can be considered as specific forms of a general logical property of all symbolic systems ("degrees of expressivity"), not simply as "episodic" or contingent phenomena. Second, I have proposed that if this form of variation is considered as the variation of an abstract property, we may then extend this observation from language to the domain of thought. In short, we might state that language-games generate thought-games. Accordingly, I formulated the hypothesis that different "forms of thought" only concern what people must conceptualize in a certain context. Through this perspective, variation in the realm of thought might not indicate "kinds of thought" typical of different kind of societies; rather, the representations and operations that a specific kind of context might require people to think, without limiting what it may allow them to think. I have argued that this kind of variation is not limited to grammar rules. It also concerns practices linked to many forms of translation, in particular, to intersemiotic translation, which involves the passage from verbal to nonverbal ways for expressing meaning. The main intent of the investigations gathered in this book is to make a further step in this direction and to show that not only language-games but also interactions with images generate thought-games.

In my recent research, I have been looking at the type of thought (and context of social action) that is related to the social use and interpretation of images in the process of transmitting knowledge. As a first step, I analyzed iconographies used in techniques of memorization. In studying these techniques, I sought to identify their universe, a concept I defined as the family of mental operations (classifying, inferring, and imagining) involved in these techniques. In this book, I now look at the attribution of subjectivity and agency to artifacts with the same perspective. I wish to demonstrate that endowing an artifact or image with "life" is another way of establishing a universe of thought, one that mobilizes a multiplex form of shared imagination.

These thought-games define the universe where certain inanimate objects are given life. The task of this book, as an initial experiment in the anthropology of thought, is to explore some of their many ways of capturing our imagination. <>

Carlos Slim: The Power, Money, and Morality of One of the World's Richest Men by Diego Enrique Osorno [Verso, 9781786634375]

Can one of the richest men in the world be a good person?
The rich are not like us. Great wealth brings both power and immunity, a pairing that opens a yawning moral abyss at the feet of the world's billionaires.
Carlos Slim is one of eight people whose

combined wealth equals that of the 3.6 billion people who make up the poorest half of humanity. A businessman who dominates telecoms and global real estate, and a major shareholder of the *New York Times*, Slim exerts a degree of power in Mexico unmatched by any politician.

The biography of Carlos Slim, one of the richest people of all time, is a case study in the ethical and psychological effects of extraordinary wealth. Not just the tale of the first man from a developing country ever to reach the top of the Forbes list of billionaires, it presents a living embodiment of the financial mentality of our time, a man who mistrusts politicians and believes the market to be the answer to everything—even corruption. In short, Slim's story is that of Latin America's last half century and indeed the wider world.

After years of thorough investigation, Diego Osorno has produced an extraordinary portrait detailing the effects of great wealth. His time with Slim forces Osorno to pose an age-old question: What does it profit a man if he gains the world and loses his own soul?

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How can we Understand Wealth?

Since the beginning of his reporting career, Diego Enrique Osorno has dedicated himself to some of Mexico's thorniest issues, covering everything from the Zapatista insurgency and narcotrafficking to the migrant traumas along the northern border with the United States. For the past fifteen years, his books, articles and documentaries have positioned him at the forefront of his generation and earned him wide public recognition and the respect of his peers. That's because Diego always delves deeply into the issues he tackles, and he reports them firsthand. He is brave. If you are a Mexican journalist, it's dangerous to write about drug cartels and police corruption, and Diego's investigations into the Sinaloa and Los Zetas cartels, among other stories, are evidence of his determination to push the boundaries.

Diego Enrique Osorno was born in the northern Mexican city of Monterrey in 1980. When I first met him, more than a dozen years ago, he was still in his mid-twenties, and had just come out of a dramatic experience in Oaxaca, in southern Mexico, where months of protests by teachers had turned bloody as the authorities had responded with a brutal crackdown. Diego said that he felt as if he had been living in a war zone, and when he told me what he had lived through and witnessed, I agreed with him. More than twenty activists had been killed during the time he was there; others had been detained, tortured and some of them forcibly disappeared. Diego had also been an eyewitness to the shooting deaths of several men, including a Mexican mechanic named Jose Jimenez Colmenares and an American cameraman named Brad Will, and he had been left shaken and indignant from the experience.

What came next was a profound learning experience for Diego. As he followed up on the abuses he had discovered in Oaxaca, seeking justice, Diego did not find it. Instead, as is so often the case for those seeking redress for

political crimes in Mexico, he encountered official obfuscation and impunity. Diego did not let go, however, but dug in deeper and eventually wrote his first book, Oaxaca Besieged, about the episode. Over the years since then, Diego has reported on a wide range of other issues, with the topic of injustice foremost in his concerns. In one of his most wrench¬ing inquiries into a case of impunity, Diego probed the suspicious lack of official intervention during a horrific month-long massacre carried out in 2011 by Los Zetas sicarios in the town of Allende in the state of Coahuila, just across the border with Texas, that had killed over three hundred people.

Diego Enrique Osorno is a norteño of a casual and friendly appearance. Tall, bearded, usually clad in jeans, cowboy boots and checked shirts, the only thing missing to complete his wrangler look is a Stetson, and maybe a pistol.

A couple of years ago, during a visit I made to Monterrey, Diego showed me around. The way a Parisian might show off the Moulin Rouge and the Eiffel Tower, Diego showed me how his hometown had become a city governed by criminals. One day, he introduced me to a local soldier for Los Zetas, who spent three hours explaining the ins and outs of his organization. He told us how and why Los Zetas killed certain people and how, in their terrifying "kitchens," they disposed of the bodies by dismembering them and incinerating them with diesel fuel in oil drums. At the time, his organization was the dominant power in much of northern Mexico, and by talking to this man it became apparent that, to him, the bosses of Los Zetas and those of rival cartels were authorities of equal importance as any state governor, police commander, or army general. Intriguingly, he made no moral distinctions between such figures. Instead, he spoke of them as sharing something in common. That something, to him, was power, pure and simple, and it was clear that from his perspective,

power was a force that needed neither definition nor justification, but existed in a realm all its own, far beyond equations of good or evil.

The power dynamic between Mexico's citizens and those who exercise control over their destinies—whether Los Zetas killers or elected officials—has become a matter of increasing importance to Diego in his ongoing quest to unravel, and to expose, some of the chronic injustices of his homeland. If Los Zetas understood power as an absolute, a thing that transcended moral considerations, it was also true that most Mexicans could point to one man, and one man alone, as their country's king of kings. That man was not the Mexican president, who holds the office for a single six-year term, called a sexenio, but Carlos Slim. Impelled by what he has called "a sense of indignation" at the fact that the world's richest man could have accumulated his fortune in a nation where fifty two million citizens lived in dire poverty, Diego proposed to write a political biography of the Mexican magnate. (On the lists of the world's wealthiest people, Slim was number one when Diego began his research a decade ago; over the years since, others have replaced him. As of early 2019, Jeff Bezos was the world's richest man, and Slim was the fifth, with an estimated worth of sixty-four billion dollars.)

In this book, which was originally published in Spanish in 2015, Diego examines this modern-day pasha, a symbol at once of twenty-first-century capitalism and of Mexico, a giant among Lilliputians in a country with a long tradition of caciques, or strongmen. The surreal dimensions of Slim's economic power lead Diego to openly ask—indeed, it is the guiding question of this book—whether a man as rich as Slim can also be a good person. In Carlos Slim, Diego, sets out to find the answer to this question.

What Diego proposes, of course, is a major challenge. As someone who has also written portraits of powerful men, including of the late Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet and the former King Juan Carlos of Spain, I know that one of the most essential steps in the process is to establish an intuitive understanding of the characters, as well as to gain access to information that sheds new light on their lives. It is always a very difficult thing to approach powerful figures, who tend to avoid journalists and who often retain advisors whose very purpose is to either keep such people at bay or else to ensure that their bosses are portrayed in a positive light.

In a testament to his journalistic mettle, as well as his amiable personality, Diego managed to circumvent the roadblocks around Slim, and to secure several meetings with him. In their meetings, Diego was able to ask him some of the questions he had been seeking answers for, and to converse on a range of different topics. Coming on top of his research that had taken place over several years, including archival documentation and numerous interviews with Slim's friends and foes, his encounters with the man have given his book a human touch and helped make it an invaluable contribution to modern history. In a memorable meeting they had in Slim's personal library, for instance, Slim reveals himself to be an avid and eclectic reader, of everything from poetry by Khalil Gibran to the diaries of Ernesto "Che" Guevara in Bolivia—although books about wealth, business and power dominated. As they walked around, inspecting his books, Slim confessed to Diego that business titans like Baruch, Rockefeller and Getty had been role models. He showed him a good sense of humor, telling Diego he was willing to answer all his questions, and the only thing he asked in return was that he not put "too many lies" in his book. He also gave him his copy of Malcolm Gladwell's

Outliers, and told him to take it, that he simply had to read it.

The library scene is just a teaser. There is, of course, much more to Carlos Slim. Diego set out to tell the life story of one of the world's greatest capitalists at a time of great inequality in their shared birthplace of Mexico, and he has certainly done that and more in this highly original, fascinating account of the life of Carlos Slim. —Jon Lee Anderson

The Role of Neoliberalism in the Creation of Wealth

The biography of Carlos Slim, one of the richest people of all time, is not just the tale of the first man from a developing country to ever reach the top of the Forbes list of billionaires. It's also the story of a businessman who, at crucial moments, supported the PRI—the Institutional Revolutionary Party that governed Mexico for seventy-two uninterrupted years, until 2000—and capitalized on the country's mass privatization of national services and banks, promoted since the 1980s by the United States and other world powers through the Washington Consensus, which consolidated neoliberalism in Latin America.

Slim has been immersed in the world of business since early childhood, thanks to his father, Julián Slim Haddad, a Lebanese émigré who made his fortune as a merchant in Mexico and whose political ideas were aligned with those of Al Kataeb—the Lebanese Phalange Party, an organization created by the Gemayel family, taking inspiration from Primo de Rivera, founder of the fascist Spanish Phalanx.

After studying civil engineering at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM)—and standing as a personable student who, as well as being a math lecturer and catcher on the college baseball team, championed the use of the then-cutting-edge electronic calculator—Slim married Soumaya Domit Gemayel. She was

a niece of Bachir Gemayel, the Lebanese president who ordered the Sabra and Shatila massacres, in which the Phalangists killed over 2,000 people, many of them Palestinian refugees from the war with Israel. The priest who celebrated their wedding was Marcial Maciel, founder of the Legion of Christ, a conservative Catholic order whose scandals surrounding child abuse and corruption led the Vatican to intervene. On his wedding day, Slim was accompanied to the altar by his mother, Linda, and his elder brother, Julián, an active commander of the Federal Security Directorate (DFS), the political police of the PRI regime, which, in the context of the Cold War, killed, tortured and forcibly disappeared those in opposition.

After the wedding, Slim combined letters from his own and his wife's name to found Carso, the group whose operations have resulted in a net worth of over $80 billion, which has on occasion surpassed the fortunes of Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, Amancio Ortega, George Soros, Mark Zuckerberg and other famous billionaires. His wife Soumaya did not live to see the family empire consolidated at a global level, as she died of chronic kidney disease in 1999. Two years earlier, Slim had also been at death's door after he underwent heart surgery in Houston, Texas—an event that caused his companies' shares to plummet in the New York Stock Exchange and elicited rumors of his possible retirement from the world of business.

But by 2015, Slim had recovered from these difficulties—and from some of his most controversial relationships. He is no longer suspected of being a front man for ex-president Carlos Salinas de Gortari, currently considered one of his adversaries in Mexico, along with Televisa, the most important Spanish-speaking television network in the world. Now, Slim's name is associated more closely with those of other former presidents around the world, such as the democrat Bill Clinton, the socialist Felipe

González and even Fidel Castro. During Mexico's electoral crisis in 2006, according to associates of ex-president Felipe Calderón, Slim quietly intervened to support left-wing presidential candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador in his mission to annul the questioned elections.

In terms of philanthropy, Slim says he does not like playing Santa Claus, and although he has donated money to altruistic causes through his foundations, his efforts may appear pretty miserly compared to other members of the global ultrarich elite. Instead, his presence as a benefactor has focused on strategically exerting power in politics and further afield.

Drawing from interviews with his friends and enemies, as well as extensive research into historical and confidential archives obtained from intelligence agencies, and from Slim's own testimony through a series of interviews conceded especially for this book, this biography builds a profile of the richest Mexican in the world, going beyond the cold, hard numbers and clichéd business success stories. With the advantages and disadvantages this entails, he is seen from the distance of a journalistic catwalk, such as the one in Washington, DC, in 2010, where a Getty agency photograph shows Slim striding across a hall, dressed in a tuxedo and wearing the lanyard of a White House special guest, with a painting of ex-president Grover Cleveland in the background.

This book is not financial reportage or an economic view on his empire; rather, it is a portrait of Slim's social influence and the way in which he builds political relationships, and how his actions or omissions affect public life in Mexico and the eighteen countries of Latin America where he has investments. At the same time, I hope it is a journey through key moments in Mexican history, such as the years after the Revolution, the Tlatelolco student

massacre in '68, the dirty war, the financial crises of the '8os, the wave of privatization under Salinas, the government turnover of the year woo, the post-electoral conflict of 2006, the so-called War on Drugs and the return of the PRI to power with the government of Enrique Pena Nieto.

Journalism in Latin America tends to come from the top and address those at the bottom. It represents a way in which power tells its truth to the people, not necessarily one in which the people tell the truth to power. In 2.00 7, when I first started to do journalistic research on Slim, the idea was to provide a portrait of my country from a different angle. At the time I had just covered the teachers' uprising in Oaxaca, one of Mexico's poorest states, and the stories I wrote about elsewhere in the country were always linked to marginalized communities. How, then, to report on power? What would I find if I started to look into the richest man in the world with the same passion with which I followed a popular uprising or visited a hunger-stricken community? What would that point of view reveal about Mexico?

When I started writing this book, my political mindset was very agitated. In addition to the Oaxacan revolt, where I witnessed the extrajudicial execution of several protesters, I had been involved in the Other Campaign, launched by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), the initiative led by Subcomandante Marcos under the guidelines of an anticapitalist manifesto known as the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, which I signed as an adherent. But writing a book like this one with that particular polit¬ical mindset would prove impossible. As a journalist, I needed other traits, which I had to learn over the years the way we learn the most important things in life: by doing them. Aiming to improve the way in which we view the lives of the powerful and famous within their own environments, I followed and wrote extensive

profiles on Mexican actor Gabriel Garcia Bernal, Puerto Rican reggaeton duo Calle 13, Cuban blogger Yoani Sánchez and writer Juan Villoro. In addition, I codirected a documentary about Mauricio Fernández Garza, one of the most extravagant businessmen in Mexico, and another entitled El poder de la silla (The Power of the Saddle), about the ex-governor of the northern state of Nuevo León. Although these figures differ greatly from Slim, each one of these portraits trained me to develop the patience required for Slim's project, and to look deeply into the contradictions that we all tend to live by.

In 2008, a year after Forbes' announcement that a Mexican had topped their list of the ultrarich, I learned that Slim's brother, Julián, had been subdirector of the Federal Security Directorate during its most infamous era, and that he had been a PGR (Office of the Attorney General) commander during the 1980s. For several weeks I thought Slim's brother was an apocryphal character, that his life represented an unfortunate coincidence for the owner of Telmex. However, as I researched more I confirmed that the brothers were extremely close, as I detail in one of the chapters of this book. This was the first surprising fact that I encountered in my research, and in a way it was what stoked my interest in exploring the figure of Carlos Slim. It was not easy to officially prove the trajectory of Julián Slim as first commander of the PGR. His former colleagues were reluctant to talk about him due to his brother's notoriety. I had to turn to the Federal Institute for Access to Public Information and make several appeals against the federal authorities who refused to provide me with their files, but in the end I succeeded. Someone who also helped me fundamentally in this kind of work was Maria de los Angeles Magdaleno C., who carried out historical research in different sections of the National Archives, the historical archive of Mexico City, and the archives at El

Colegio Nacional and the national newspaper archive.

Although my main project for eight years was to research and write about Slim, I was committed to many other stories: that's why I also researched and wrote about the fire that killed forty-nine children in a nursery in Sonora and the intricate web of corruption behind it; about the political manipulation behind the War on Drugs launched by president Calderon; and about the social collapse caused by the drug cartel Los Zetas in the northern states of Tamaulipas, Nuevo León and Coahuila.

Over the years I was working on this book, I was warned by many of my interviewees that it would not be easy to publish it, and that all the publishing houses would be fearful of the effect it might have on their commercial relationship with Sanborns, the biggest chain of bookshops in Mexico—owned, of course, by Slim himself. These kinds of comments did not shake my determination as much as other warnings around the book being potentially ignored by the media (owned, again, by Slim) or even the risk of being legally annihilated by his lawyers. One of the people who warned me of that possibility was the editor of one of Mexico's most influential magazines, which Slim sued through five different agencies of the public ministry simultaneously on the same morning, over a mild criticism. His case, as that of other activists and critics who have condemned Slim, never became public knowledge.

I traveled to New York, Beirut, Rio de Janeiro and several other cities to research Slim; I was near him during some of his public appearances and private functions, such as the inauguration party of Saks in Mexico. As the ribbon was being cut on the first Mexican branch of the New York store, I ended up standing two meters away from him, which later led some of the guests at the exclusive drinks reception to believe that I was someone close to the richest man in the world, and to treat me extremely kindly, though they soon turned the other way when they found out that, although I knew many things about Slim, at that time the man and I had never exchanged words.

With the aim of providing a view of Slim from several different angles, I formally interviewed over a hundred people, from mere associates to the magnate's most senior business friends or foes, such as Bernardo Gómez and Alfonso de Angoitia, two of the three executives who steer Televisa along with Emilio Azcárraga. In Mexico, the prevailing perception is that this company, the most important Spanish-speaking television broadcaster in the world, aggressively intervenes in public power by grossly manipulating information. Other important members of the political and economic class also gave interviews but have refused to be cited explicitly. That was not the case for Jacques Rogozinski, the official operator of the privatization of Telmex and other state-run companies, who gave me an extensive interview with permission to quote him.

Before having the first of three long conversations with the magnate, in which I heard his version of his story for this unofficial biography, I looked at many of the interviews that Slim had given in the past. Perhaps some of the most revealing ones were those with the American journalist Larry King, who became his business partner and who, some speculate, will author Slim's official biography, although the tycoon assured me he would write it himself. They have both been part of interesting conversations at business congresses in the United States. At the 2013 Milken Institute Global Conference, in a session available on YouTube, King introduces Slim this way:

> About two and a half years ago, Carlos Slim has this big conference in Mexico City in which he gives out scholarships, and they called and asked me to be the keynote speaker. And I went down and

they said I was limited to twenty minutes, which to me is like phoning it in. So they extended my time and we became friends, he came to my house, we had dinner, we did my show, and then finally we formed Ora TV which is now on the Internet, we're distributed by Hulu, we started in July, we've done over 170 interviews already, increasing every week; so, he is my partner. He was poor, he needed help [smiling]. He is an incredible man.

***

Slim already has a short official biography published on his website. This book gleans some information from there, but crucially it adds political angles that have been scarcely explored. It also contradicts or contextualizes, based on testimonies and documents, other aspects of Slim's (auto)biographic narrative. As is necessary in the kind of journalism I value, there is never an intention to lynch him, nor is the aim to glorify him.

Other journalist colleagues have already written about Slim's life. The most extensive piece was by José Martinez, the generous author of a text added to this book, but my purpose was to create something that did not exist: a biography that also examined the influences and political relationships around the richest Mexican in the world. In this sense, this book is not financial reportage or an economic analysis of his empire, but a portrait of Slim's social influence, as well as his political relationships, and his actions or omissions and the way these affect public life. At the same time, I hope it is an overview of key moments in the history of Mexico, such as the years after the Revolution, the Tlatelolco massacre in '68, the "dirty war," the economic crises of the 1980s, Salinas' privatizations, the change of power in woo, the postelection conflict of 2006, the so-called War on Drugs and the return of the PRI to power with the government of Enrique Pena Nieto.

After I carried out the research, I tried out several ways of writing this biography: using the literary device of a letter to the richest Mexican in the world, or the polyphonic techniques masterfully demonstrated by Ryszard Kapušciñski in Imperium and Hans Magnus Enzensberger in Anarchy's Brief Summer. In the end, looking at my subject's character traits and the information gathered, I opted for a more streamlined register as the best way to tell Slim's story. So my research about him is interwoven with his own point of view.

I should mention that despite my difficult questions in my interviews, Slim always maintained an attitude of respect. If anything, when asked about controversial issues he chose to respond only briefly. I should thank him for the more than seven hours he conceded me for this book, which, as I mentioned, I started working on eight years ago. During our meetings, he showed me photographs of his visits to the dentist, we listened to songs by Chamín Correa, we chatted while he got his hair cut before an event with the president, he gave me the autobiography of his friend Sophia Loren and a biographical essay about Genghis Khan, and he shared with me his process of preparing for a conference that was held in September 2015 with the interns at Fundación Telmex about the evolution of societies over the history of humanity. At some point the tycoon, half reprimanding and half joking, said to me: "You made me say a lot of things I've never said before."

Although this biography may have special force because it includes the direct voice, rarely heard, of its main character, I hope above all that it posits the challenge of getting to know and understand one of the most important figures in the world today, based on information and questions. Questions such as whether he has truly helped combat poverty and whether one can live for money alone, with the belief that the economy is not connected to social and

political issues. Whether the richest man in the world can be a good person was one of the guiding questions during the immersive research for this book, although in the end I decided not to openly address it in the text, to give the readers the freedom to consider for themselves this or any other question during their reading. An intelligent friend reminded me of what Javier Cercas says in The Impostor: in order to tell someone's story, we first need to understand it, and that understanding tends to bring us closer to them. Therefore, the exercise of narrating in a way reduces any distances that may exist—in this case, imposed by money—and provides readers with a more accurate perspective.

It's not easy to analyze a millionaire beyond the good or bad stereotypes that exist about them. The French psychoanalyst Jacques-Alain Miller, a disciple of Lacan, even believes it's an impossible task when it comes to the ultrarich. In an interview for the weekly magazine Marianne, he said that in 2008 he saw a millionaire patient who told him how in those days he earned or lost a million dollars speculating until he was ruined by the financial crisis that year. "If you are truly rich, you are unanalyzable, because you are not in a position to pay—that is, to give up anything meaningful: analysis slides like water off a duck's back," explains Miller, who believes "money is a signifier without the signified, that kills all meaning. When one is devoted to money, truth stops making sense."

This specialist, who studied alongside Jean-Paul Sartre, believes that there are usually three motivations for the great accumulators of capital. The first has to do directly with death and is reflected in the fear of illness and the desire to perpetuate in their offspring. The second is linked to pleasure and is reflected in immediate consumption and extravagant spending. Neither of these two seemed to fit with Slim's motivations. Perhaps Miller's third classification would apply: that of having money for money's sake, for the pure pleasure of

owning in itself and the drive to keep earning more.

But this book may say other things about Slim, depending on each reader. It may be the story of a Lebanese immigrant who added his mathematical abilities to his entrepreneurial vision to create a global empire; or it could be the record of economic inequality that is present throughout the world, especially in Mexico, where the wealth of millionaires—with Slim at the top—grew 32 percent between 2007 and 2012, despite the rest of the world's falling by 0.3 percent according to the Global Wealth Report 2014.

Others may find here instead the story of a character who represents the neoliberal mentality of our times, which mistrusts politicians, believes that the market is the most efficient mechanism for everything, even to combat corruption, and sees philanthropy as a social investment and businesses as an aspect of collective wealth. What is clear to me is that domination and resistance are two concepts that have marked me, sometimes unconsciously, when reporting and writing this and all my other books. My most important journalistic questions reside in that dispute between any kind of established power and the opposition that organizes to combat it. I agree with Bolivian philosopher Raúl Prada in that Marx's theory of social struggle is not akin to a catalogue of plant species, as many dogmatic Marxists seem to believe. Instead, there is an aspect of performativity to it, "through the drama of conflict between two historical protagonists: the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. It is not just a critical but also a dynamic theory of class struggle."

It has fallen to me to witness and tell the story, from different perspectives, of the existence of that class struggle. My first book, Oaxaca sitiada (Oaxaca Under Siege), tells of the first insurrection in Mexico in the twenty-first

century, in a state that had long been poor and subjugated. It tells of the conflict from the barricades, although I also interviewed the questioned the governor and members of the political class in power at the time, including the police chiefs who lead the repression.

In contrast, what I tried to do in this book was to tell the life of one of capitalism's greatest figures; class struggle propels my stories and those of many other narrators living through this dynamic era riddled with inequality.

To refuse to see the class struggle behind an insurrection of the people or behind the life of the richest man in the world would be delusional. It is around that drama that history revolves. <>

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Elgar Introductions to Management and Organization Theory

THEORIES OF SOCIAL INNOVATION by Danielle Logue [Elgar Introductions to Management and Organization Theory Series, Edward Elgar, 9781786436887]

As we grapple with how to respond to some of the world's most pressing problems, such as inequality, poverty and climate change, there is growing global interest in 'social innovation' as a potential solution. But what exactly is 'social innovation'?

Danielle Logue theorises social innovation as a contemporary manifestation of the historical tensions and relationship between 'economy' and 'society', of markets and morality, and the simultaneous pursuit of economic and social progress. Going back to the historical work of Adam Smith the author presents three theoretical lenses from different ontological positions on how to navigate and understand organizational theory and management approaches to 'doing good' and 'being good'. These lenses include theorizing social innovation as social value creation, capture and distribution; social innovation as polysemous; and social innovation as institutional change.

This generative and approachable introduction is targeted at graduate and doctoral students, as well as non-specialist academics who seek a

comprehensive understanding of social innovation and a choice of frameworks when examining complex and wicked problems and the organization and management of efforts to solve them.

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This book has emerged from a portfolio of work seeking to theorize and make sense of new ways to solve intractable, social problems, and new ways to finance their solutions. Yet who decides what is socially valuable and `good', and what is in the public interest after all? This book is driven by a desire to improve the generation, management and organization of public good, and with it our understandings of social value that are embedded in existing institutions, organizations and management practices. It is driven by a desire to see generative and genuine collaborations across public, private and community sectors, and efforts to understand the values and logics of other domains. It is driven by a desire to see us reconceive and recover the role of the state in directing and protecting the public good. It is about developing new meta-narratives on the possible varieties of capitalism, boundaries of markets for producing social value, and alternative ways of organizing to address entrenched inequality. And mainly, writing this book is part of my own thinking and phronetic questioning: where are we going? Is this desirable? Can we do better? Surely we can.

The Aim and Structure of this Discourse on Social Innovation

Social innovation is a contemporary manifestation of historical tensions of the relationship between `economy' and `society'. As a concept, it is representative of long-standing debates raised in the works of Adam Smith (1759, 1776) regarding the embeddedness of markets in society, or alternatively the subjugation of society into market-based forms of organizing and the development of civil society. Ultimately, social innovation is concerned with the process and pursuit of both economic and social progress and is underpinned by a fundamental relationship to values and morality, that is, understandings of `doing good' and `being good'. As a term, it combines two words that have their own bodies of literature and debates: this makes it a rich multi-disciplinary concept to theorize, and notably prevents (or makes futile) the production of any single theory to capture its manifold effects and possible positions.

So what does this rather obtuse and liberally diffused term mean? Some have attempted to unpack this term by investigating what 'innovation' means, and what `social' denotes in this usage. Innovation can be both process and outcome, and is both novel and an improvement on a current context or application, or new for a user. As a topic of long-standing interest to a range of disciplines, it is closely linked to entrepreneurship, and is described by Drucker (1985) as being at the very heart of entrepreneurship in creating focused, purposeful change. What the `social' in social innovation denotes also varies amongst communities and applications. This ranges from social denoting intentionality and motivation (to be socially `good'), or participation (for example, of stakeholders in innovation processes), to the social nature of the outcome of the innovation process (addressing a social problem), and distributing the benefits of

innovation beyond a single individual or entity (shared value and social impact). According to Nicholls and Murdock (2012), while many innovations may create benefits for society, through providing employment, productivity, economic growth and technological advancement, and some even generate value beyond their initial economic impact, social innovations intentionally seek to address social problems, producing shared value that would otherwise not have been created. This corresponds to a widening rationale and application of innovation beyond that of economic performance and efficiency, to social and environmental performance, increasingly considering `societal consequences' and impact.

Definitions of the term `social innovation' abound. For example, social innovation is a `novel solution to a social problem that is more effective, efficient, sustainable or just than existing solutions and for which the value created accrues primarily to society as a whole rather than to private individuals'. It's a term often associated with responses to large-scale social and wicked problems, and transformation or systems change; `Social innovation is creating capacity to respond to grand challenges'. Others suggest social innovation describes 'the agentic, relational, situated, and multilevel process to develop, promote, and implement novel solutions to social problems in ways that are directed toward producing profound change in institutional contexts'. Regardless of whether you think social innovation is going to get us to a `better' version of capitalism or believe that it's more hype than substance, social innovation 'is focused on a set of issues that matter to a shared future'.

This wide-ranging understanding of the term, and its potential wideranging applicability, has attracted the attention of many disciplines (discussed further in Chapter 1). Indeed, it has also attracted the attention of many practitioners and policy makers, globally. Much

of the early public sense-making of social innovation is in `grey' literature, published by think tanks, government bodies and other private entities, outside of the academy. This book is developed explicitly for organizational and management scholars, and I would argue that these framings offer a richer and more rigorous approach to social innovation than has occurred in other disciplines so far. Nonetheless, the multiple theoretical lenses suggested are applicable across multiple disciplines and empirical settings.

This book provides a succinct but broad introduction to theories of social innovation. It does not attempt to offer a complete 'map of the jungle', but rather to offer a set of theoretical lenses (and references) that can help to understand the diverse but interconnected nature of this theoretical and empirical ecosystem. The ontological starting positions of these different lenses do differ, ranging from more positivist stances on social value creation and capture to more constructivist positions on the mutual constitution of structure and agency and understandings of social change.

The structure of this book is as follows. I first outline the contemporary evolution of the term `social innovation', with its emergence often traced to work of management theorist Drucker, and now subject to many multi-disciplinary reviews (Chapter 1). In recent years there has been a proliferation of theorizing across disciplines. This meta-summary identifies key issues that many scholars are grappling with, which I go on to examine in the following chapters. I then take a more positivist stance in considering social innovation as social value creation, capture and distribution (Chapter 2). I draw on strategy literature of value creation and capture, adding a new dimension of `value distribution' as an important, distinct and necessary mechanism of social innovation. I propose several abstract models for theorizing social value distribution. I then take a different

ontological stance, far more social constructivist, in considering social innovation as polysemic (Chapter 3). Social innovation is a concept that means different things to different stakeholders, simultaneously connecting diverse interpretations into a network of meaning. I describe how polysemic concepts are considered in organizational and management studies, and discuss the three main societal domains related to social innovation — private sector, public sector, and the not-for-profit (NFP) sector — and their differing understandings and mobilization of the concept. I argue that it is the polysemic nature of social innovation that provides its grist and capacity for social change. I consequently examine social innovation as social change, specifically institutional change (Chapter 4). As well as being a dominant theoretical approach in organizational and management theory, institutional theory enables theorizing of change across levels: individual, organization, field, and crossfield. Its attention to the mutually constitutive nature of structure and agency, across these levels, is theoretically and empirically valuable, as demonstrated by many existing studies of social innovation using institutional theory. I conclude the book by returning to my original anchoring of social innovation in classical tensions and theorizations of the relationship between the realms of `economy' and `society' (Chapter 5). I discuss this in terms of the social construction of markets and their moral legitimacy, and implications for future theories of impact. As social innovation is inherently about morality and values, it also raises the question of how to investigate morality in management by learning more about social innovation, and the value of a phronetic approach for future research. I then detail possible sites for such future empirical investigations by describing core tensions in practice, that of managing hybrids, measuring impact and governing cross-sector collaborations (Chapter 6). <>

ANTISOCIAL: ONLINE EXTREMISTS, TECHNO-UTOPIANS, AND THE HIJACKING OF THE AMERICAN CONVERSATION by Andrew Marantz [Viking, 9780525522263]

From a rising star at The New Yorker, a deeply immersive chronicle of how the optimistic entrepreneurs of Silicon Valley set out to create a free and democratic internet--and how the cynical propagandists of the alt-right exploited that freedom to propel the extreme into the mainstream.

For several years, Andrew Marantz, a New Yorker staff writer, has been embedded in two worlds. The first is the world of social-media entrepreneurs, who, acting out of naïvete and reckless ambition, upended all traditional means of receiving and transmitting information. The second is the world of the people he calls "the gate crashers"--the conspiracists, white supremacists, and nihilist trolls who have become experts at using social media to advance their corrosive agenda. ANTISOCIAL ranges broadly--from the first mass-printed books to the trending hashtags of the present; from secret gatherings of neo-Fascists to the White House press briefing room--and traces how the unthinkable becomes thinkable, and then how it becomes reality. Combining the keen narrative detail of Bill Buford's AMONG THE THUGS and the sweep of George Packer's THE UNWINDING, ANTISOCIAL reveals how the boundaries between technology, media, and politics have been erased, resulting in a deeply broken informational landscape--the landscape in which we all now live. Marantz shows how alienated young people are led down the rabbit hole of online radicalization, and how fringe ideas spread--from anonymous corners of social media to cable TV to the President's Twitter feed. Marantz also sits with the creators of social media as they start to reckon with the forces they've unleashed. Will they be able to solve the communication crisis they helped

bring about, or are their interventions too little too late?

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Prologue

Populist Punk

I landed at the Bob Hope Airport in Burbank, rented a Ford sedan, and asked Google to send me southward on a semiefficient route, scenic but without too much traffic. As I drove, I listened to a nationalist motivational speaker delivering far-right talking points via livestream. I was deprived of the full effect, being unable to see his facial expressions and the comments floating up the left side of my phone's screen, but I figured that the full effect was not worth dying for. "Are you gonna be a passive observer in these extraordinary times, as we fight to save Western civilization, or are you gonna step up?" he asked. "I've decided that I'm stepping up." The 2016 presidential election was approaching, and the institutional gatekeepers in government, business, and media all agreed that the result was inevitable. The nationalist was urging his listeners to question the prevailing narrative, to think the unthinkable, to bend the arc of history. Through my windshield I could see a sliver of the Pacific, picturesque but not all that pacific.

On the Hermosa Beach boardwalk there were longboards and mirrored sunglasses and poke bowls and matcha smoothies. A small film crew from Women.com was shooting a series of woman-on-the-street interviews about sex positivity. On the beach, a crowd had gathered around a drum circle. "Can you feel the Earth's rhythm?" one of the drummers asked, passing around a bucket for donations.

I spotted about a dozen beefy white men, dressed in T-shirts and shorts, milling around near an outdoor bar. In the middle of the scrum was the nationalist motivational speaker. Most people on the boardwalk didn't recognize him, but to his followers, both in person and on the Internet, he was something of a hero, or maybe an antihero—an expert at injecting fringe ideas into mainstream discourse. A few months earlier, he had decided, based on no real evidence, that Hillary Clinton was suffering from

a grave neurological condition and that the traditional media was covering it up. He turned this conjecture into a meme, which gathered momentum on Twitter, then leaped to the Drudge Report, then to Fox News, and then into Donald Trump's mouth. The nationalist had told me, "All the people at each step may or may not know my name, but I'm influencing world history whether they know where their ideas are coming from or not."

He was hosting what he called a free-speech happy hour—a meetup for local masculinists, neomonarchists, nihilist Twitter trolls, and other self-taught culture warriors. About sixty people showed up over the course of the afternoon. Some refused to call themselves alt-right, which had become, in their words, "a toxic brand"; others were happy to own the label. Most were white, most were nationalists, and some were white nationalists—not the old skinhead type but the more polished, just-asking-the-question variety. For years, they'd been able to promote their agenda through social networks like Twitter and Facebook, with almost no restrictions. Now those networks were starting to crack down, banning a few of the most egregious trolls and bigots. "It's straight-up thought policing," one person at the meetup said. "It's 1984."

A pudgy guy with oversized sunglasses sat at a table by himself. On his T-shirt was a drawing of Harambe, a gorilla who'd recently been shot to death at the Cincinnati Zoo. The incident had resulted in real internet outrage, followed by satirical internet outrage, followed by absurdist metacommentaries on the phenomenon of internet outrage. All afternoon, I saw people pointing at the guy's T-shirt and laughing as they passed by. "Fuck yeah, Harambe," they'd say, or "Dicks out for Harambe." The guy wearing the T-shirt would nod knowingly, as if in solidarity. That was the extent of the interaction.

I sat down next to the guy and asked him to explain the joke. "It's a funny thing people say, or post, or whatever," he said. "It's, like—it's just a thing on the internet." Harambe, of course, was a real animal before he became a meme. Still, I knew what it was like to experience much of life through the mediating effects of a screen. It wasn't hard for me to imagine how anything—a dead gorilla, a gas chamber, a presidential election, a moral principle—could start to seem like just another thing on the internet.

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For as long as the United States has been a country, there have been Americans handing out pamphlets declaring taxation unconstitutional, or standing on soapboxes railing against papist sabotage, or calling C-SPAN to demand that every member of Congress be investigated for treason. (C-SPAN's screeners, if they were doing their jobs, did not put those callers on air.) The First Amendment protected this minority's right to speak, and for a long time it seemed as if the majority were not inclined to listen. "There have always been those on the fringes of our society who have sought to escape their own responsibility by finding a simple solution, an appealing slogan, or a convenient scapegoat," President John F. Kennedy said in 1961. "But in time the basic good sense and stability of the great American consensus has always prevailed."

In 2004 and 2005, a few young men wrote the computer code that would grow into a vast industry called social media—"social" because people could receive information horizontally, from their friends, rather than waiting for gatekeepers to impart it from on high; "media" because information was information, whether it came from a stilted broadcaster, a kid procrastinating during study hall, or a nationalist on a boardwalk. The social media

entrepreneurs called themselves disrupters, but they rarely described in much detail what a postdisruption world would look like. When pressed, their visions tended toward hazy utopianism: they expected to connect people, to bring us all closer together, to make the world a better place.

Their optimism wasn't entirely misguided, of course. Millions of people—whistleblowers, citizen journalists, women resisting abuse, dissidents under despotic regimes—did use social media to organize, to reveal abuses of power, to advance the aims of justice. And yet, when the same tools were used to sow disinformation or incite hatred, the disrupters usually responded by saying something vague about free speech and then changing the subject.

The disrupters aimed to topple gatekeepers in dozens of industries, including advertising, publishing, political consulting, and journalism. Within a decade, they had succeeded beyond anyone's expectations. Their social networks had become the most powerful information-spreading instruments in world history. Many traditional media outlets were being dismantled, and no one seemed to have any idea what might replace them. Instead of taking over where the old gatekeepers had left off, the disrupters—the new gatekeepers—refused to acknowledge the expanding scope of their influence and responsibility. They left their gates unguarded, for the most part, trusting passersby not to mess with the padlocks.

Right away, the national vocabulary started to shift, becoming both more liberated and more unhinged. The silent majority was no longer silent. Longstanding fissures furrowed into deep rifts. The disrupters weren't solely responsible for all of this, of course. Like every epochal shift, this one had many preconditions. Political movements mattered; economic structures mattered; geography and demography mattered;

foreign wars mattered. Still, only a few years into the unprecedented experiment that was social media, it suddenly seemed quaint to recall that there had ever been such a thing as a great American consensus.

This much was shocking but not quite unthinkable. Then, swiftly, came the unthinkable: smart, well-meaning people unable to distinguish simple truth from viral misinformation; a pop-culture punch line ascending to the presidency; neo-Nazis marching, unmasked, through several American cities. This wasn't the kind of disruption anyone had envisioned. There had been a serious miscalculation.

We like to assume that the arc of history will bend inexorably toward justice, but this is wishful thinking. Nobody, not even Martin Luther King Jr., believed that social progress was automatic; if he did, he wouldn't have bothered marching across any bridges. The arc of history bends the way people bend it. In the early years of the twenty-first century, the internet was full of nihilists and masculinists and ironic neo-Nazis and nonironic neo-Nazis, all working to bend the arc of history in some extremely disturbing directions. Social media feeds were algorithmically personalized, which meant that many people didn't have to see the lurid ugliness online if they didn't want to. But it was there, more and more of it every minute, whether they chose to look at it or not.

***

In 2012, a small group of former Ron Paul supporters started a blog called The Right Stuff They soon began calling themselves "post-libertarians," although they weren't yet sure what would come next. By 2014, they'd started to self-identify as alt-right. They developed a countercultural tone—arch, antic, floridly offensive—that appealed to a growing cohort of disaffected young men, searching for mean¬ing

and addicted to the internet. These young men often referred to The Right Stuff, approvingly, as a key part of a "libertarian-to-far-right pipeline," a path by which "normies" could advance, through a series of epiphanies, toward "full radicalization." As with everything the alt-right said, it was hard to tell whether they were joking, half joking, or not joking at all.

The Right Stuff's founders came up with talking points—narratives, they called them—that their followers then disseminated through various social networks. The memes were tailored to the medium. On Facebook, they posted Photoshopped images, or parody songs, or "countersignal memes"—sardonic line "drawings" designed to spark just enough cognitive dissonance to shock normies out of their complacency.* On Twitter, the alt-right trolled and harassed mainstream journalists, hoping to work the referees of the national discourse while capturing the attention of the wider public. On Reddit and 4chan and 8chan, where the content moderation was so lax as to be almost nonexistent, the memes were more overtly vile. Many alt-right trolls started calling themselves "fashy," or "fash-ist." They referred to all liberals and traditional conservatives as Communists, or "degenerates"; they posted pro-Pinochet propaganda; they baited normies into arguments by insisting that "Hitler did nothing wrong."

When I first saw luridly ugly memes like this, in 2014 and 2015, I wasn't sure how seriously to take them. Everyone knows the most basic rule of the internet: Don't feed the trolls, and don't take tricksters at their word. The trolls of the altright called themselves provocateurs, or shitposters, or edgelords. And what could be edgier than joking about Hitler? For a little while, I was able to avoid reaching the conclusion that would soon become obvious: maybe they meant what they said.*

In October 2018, a white terrorist carried three Glock handguns and an AR-15 into a synagogue in Pittsburgh and started shooting. He had been active on a small social network called Gab, a hermetic bubble of toxicity that billed itself as "the home of free speech online." Two weeks before the shooting, he'd reposted a countersignal meme featuring two stick figures. The first was labeled "Me one year ago" and the second was labeled "Me today." The first stick figure, in a speech bubble, said, "I believe everyone has the right to live how they want and do what makes them happy." The second one said, "We need to overthrow the government, implement a clerical fascist regime, and begin mass executing these Marxist degenerates." The caption above the drawing: "The libertarian-to-far-right pipeline is a real thing."

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This is not a book arguing that the fascists have won, or that they will win. This is a book about how the unthinkable becomes thinkable. I don't assume that America is destined to live up to its founding ideals of liberty and equality. Nor do I assume that it is doomed to repeat its founding reality of brutal oppression. I can't know which way the arc will bend. What I can offer is the story of how a few disruptive entrepreneurs, motivated by naïveté and reckless techno-utopianism, built powerful new systems full of unforeseen vulnerabilities, and how a motley cadre of edgelords, motivated by bigotry and bad faith and nihilism, exploited those vulnerabilities to hijack the American conversation.

I spent about three years immersing myself in two worlds: the world of the gate-crashers, such as the nationalist on the boardwalk, and the world of the new gatekeepers of Silicon Valley, who, whether intentionally or not, afforded the gatecrashers their unprecedented power. (At the same time, simply by working as

a writer at The New Yorker, I was immersed in a third world: that of the old gatekeepers, who are increasingly at risk of being disrupted into extinction.) I had breakfast at the Trump Soho with a self-proclaimed "internet supervillain," toured a rural Illinois junkyard with a freelance Twitter propagandist, drank in a German beer hall with a not-quite-Nazi. In Washington, D.C., I shadowed a histrionic far-right troll during his first week as a White House press correspondent. In San Francisco, I sat at a conference table while a group of new gatekeepers, having allowed their huge social network to become overrun with hate speech, opened their laptops and tried to rein in the chaos. I also spent hundreds of hours talking to people who were ensnared in the cult of web-savvy white supremacy, and to a few who managed to get out.

At no point did I start to find Nazi propaganda cute or funny. I did not succumb to the misconception that a journalist must present both sides of every story, or that all interview subjects are owed equal sympathy. I am not of the opinion that we owe Nazis anything. I do believe, however, that if we want to understand what is happening to our country, we can't rely on wishful thinking. We have to look at the problem—at how our national vocabulary, and thus our national character, are in the process of being shattered.

"The left won by seizing control of media and academia," a blogger on The Right Stuff, using the pseudonym Meow Blitz, wrote in 2015. "With the Internet, they lost control of the narrative." By "the left," he meant the whole standard range of American culture and politics—everyone who preferred democracy to autocracy, everyone who resisted the alt-right's vision of a white American ethnostate. For decades, Meow Blitz argued, this pluralistic worldview—the mainstream worldview—had gone effectively unchallenged; but now, by promoting their agenda on social media, he and

his fellow propagandists could push America in a more fascist-friendly direction. "ISIS became the most powerful terrorist group in the world because of flashy Internet videos," he wrote. "If you're alive in the year 2015 and you don't understand the power of the interwebz you're an idiot."

To the post's intended audience, this was supposed to be invigorating. To me, it was more like a faint whiff of sulfur that may or may not turn out to be a gas leak. The post was called "Right Wing Trolls Can Win." Would the neofascists win? I had a hard time imagining it. Could they win? That was a different question. "The culture war is being fought daily from your smartphone," the post continued. On this one point, at least, I had to agree with Meow Blitz. To change how we talk is to change who we are.

It has become a tradition for big tech companies to release elaborate, self-referential jokes every April Fools' Day. The point is to generate some free publicity, to make the company seem quirky and relatable; but it can also have the opposite effect, especially when the premise of the joke is Silicon Valley's unprecedented power. A few years ago, Twitter announced that it would start charging for vowels. More recently, Amazon revealed voice-recognition software that could take commands from pets, and Google shared a mock-up of its new data-storage center on Mars. The companies hadn't actually commissioned any of these proj¬ects, but they probably could, one day, if they wanted to. Get it?

In 2017, instead of a parody announcement, Reddit unveiled a genuine social experiment. It was called r/Place, and it was a blank square, a thousand pixels by a thousand pixels. In the beginning, all million pixels were white. Once it started, any Reddit user could change a single pixel, anywhere on the grid, to one of sixteen colors. The only restriction was speed: the

algorithm allowed each redditor to alter just one pixel every five minutes. "That way, no one person can take over—it's too slow," Josh Wardle, the Reddit product manager in charge of r/Place, explained. "In order to do anything at scale, they're gonna have to cooperate."

The experiment had been live for about twenty minutes when I found Wardle in the common area, huddled over his laptop, frantically refreshing dozens of tabs. So far, the square was mostly blank, with a few stray dots blinking in and out of existence. But redditors were making plans and, in true Reddit fashion, clinging to those plans with cultish intensity. A new subreddit, r/TheBlueCorner, was conspiring to turn the whole square blue; r/RedCorner was vowing to make it red; already, they were on a war footing. Other groups planned elaborate messages, fractal patterns, and references to various memes. A broad coalition—leftists, Trump supporters, patriotic libertarians, prepolitical teenagers—decided to draw an American flag in the center of the square. They congregated at r/American FlaginPlace, where they hashed out the exact dimensions of the stars and stripes, and shared strategies for repelling potential invaders. Meanwhile, a group of nihilists at r/TheBlackVoid prepared to blot out whatever the other groups created. Some people just want to watch the world burn.

Wardle went to great lengths to show me that Place was a pure democracy—the algorithm was designed so that, once it went live, all he could do was watch, along with everyone else. Now, toggling compulsively from tab to tab, he seemed nervous. "The idea was `Let's put up a very simple microcosm of the Internet and just see what happens,'" he said. "Reddit itself is not the most complex idea. It's sort of a blank canvas. The community takes that and does all sorts of creative things with it."

"And some terrible things," I said.

"I'm pretty confident," he said. He paused. "I'd be lying if I said I was a hun-dred percent confident." Already, one of the top comments on Place read, "I give this an hour until swastikas." One of Wardle's colleagues told me, "That was what kept Josh up at night. Before this went live, he was literally calculating, 'OK, it takes a minimum of seventeen pixels to make a swastika—what if we open this up to the world, and the headline the next day is "Reddit: A Place to Draw Swastikas on the Internet"?'"

The upper-left corner turned a choppy, flickering purple as the "Blue Empire" and the "Red Empire" battled for dominance. A graffiti artist, or artists, wrote "9/11 was an inside job"; a few minutes later, the "was" turned into "wasn't," and the "an" became "anime." Elsewhere, "Dick butt" became "Dick butter," then "Dick buffet"; "Kill me" became "Kill men," then the words disappeared entirely. And then the swastikas arrived—just a few of them, but enough to make Wardle raise the hood of his sweatshirt, retreat into an empty conference room, and shut the door, looking pallid.

In his office, Huffman met with Chris Slowe, Reddit's first employee, who is now the chief technical officer.

"How is Place going?" Huffman asked.

"Pretty much as expected," Slowe said. "A lot of memes, some Pokémon, and a barrage of dicks."

"If there's ever a Reddit musical, that wouldn't be a bad title," Huffman said. "I have faith in our people," Slowe replied.

People stood in the common area, eating from paper plates, watching a live feed of Place on a wall-mounted TV. One employee, reading the comments, brightened. "A bunch of people are finding swastikas and then telling everyone else where they are, so that people can go get rid of them," she announced.

"I just saw it!" another employee said. He pointed to a section of the screen. As we watched, one swastika was erased, and another was modified to become a Windows '95 logo. After a while, the swastika makers got bored and moved on.

At one point, the American flag was set on fire, its red, white, and blue pixels replaced with orange flames and black smoke. The defenders of the flag, still coor-dinating the efforts at r/AmericanFlaginPlace, rallied to stamp the fire out, and the Reddit employees cheered.

"Feels like watching a football game in extreme slow motion," one said.

"Or like watching the election results."

"Oh God, don't say that."

Toward the end, the square became a dense, colorful tapestry, chaotic and strangely captivating. It was a collage of hundreds of incongruous images: logos of colleges, sports teams, bands, and video-game companies; a transcribed mono¬logue from Star Wars; likenesses of He-Man, David Bowie, the Mona Lisa, and a former prime minister of Finland. In the final hours, shortly before the experiment ended and the image was frozen for posterity, r/TheBlackVoid launched a surprise attack on the American flag. A dark fissure tore at the bottom of the flag, then overtook the whole thing. For a few minutes, the center was enveloped in darkness. Then a coalition of thousands of redditors joined up to beat back the Void; the stars and stripes regained their form, and, in the end, the flag was still there.

The final image contained no visible hate symbols, no violent threats—not even much nudity. Late in the day, Wardle emerged from hiding, poured himself a drink, and pushed back his hood. "It's possible that I will be able to sleep to¬night," he said.

I wrote an article about Reddit, ending with the saga of r/Place. Everyone I knew interpreted the final scene differently. My most optimistic friends read it as an affirmation, another reason to keep faith in the basic good sense of the American people. My more pessimistic friends wondered whether I'd gone soft—where was my skepticism, my vigilance, my attunement to humanity's deep deficiencies? I told both camps: the scene doesn't imply that We Are Good or that We Are Bad. All I knew was that, on this particular day, on this particular part of the internet, the hordes had joined together to beat back the darkness. Even better, they'd done it on their own, without the guidance of gatekeepers, relying only on the wisdom of the crowd.

Then I got a direct message on Twitter. "For r/place, Reddit employees had mass white-out tools where they could quickly and easily remove swastikas," the message read. "Those swastikas weren't all replaced by other users." The message came from a Twitter account with a female avatar photo, but the person behind it wouldn't tell me her name. She claimed to be a former Reddit employee. "Heard about the white-out tools from an engineer who still works at Reddit," she continued. "They're probably feeding you quite a bit of propaganda tbh."

I tried to report out the rumor, asking a few former employees who'd recently left the company.

"Totally sounds like something they would do," one former employee said. "Why leave it to chance?"

"Doesn't sound like them," another former employee said. "I think they're too old-school techno-libertarian to try playing tricks like that."

I messaged the woman on Twitter, asking for more information, or for proof of her identity.

She didn't respond.

A few weeks later, I tried again: "Maybe we could talk on the phone?" No response.

A few weeks after that: "So was this just a troll?"

I never heard from her again. <>

AMERICAN BREAKDOWN: THE TRUMP YEARS AND HOW THEY BEFELL US by David Bromwich [Verso, 9781788737265]

How Trump got to the Oval Office—and how both parties and the mainstream media are keeping him there

Donald Trump's residency in the White House is not an accident of American history, and it can't be blamed on a single cause. In American Breakdown, David Bromwich provides an essential analysis of the forces in play beneath the surface of our political system. His portraits of political leaders and overarching narrative bring to life the events and machinations that have led America to a collective breakdown.

The political conditions of the present crisis were put in place over fifty years ago, with the expansion of the Vietnam War and the lies and coverups that brought down Nixon. Since then, every presidency has further centralized and strengthened executive power. The truly catastrophic event in American life was the invention by George W. Bush and Dick Cheney of the War on Terror, designed to last for generations. Barack Obama's practice of "reconciliation without truth"—sparing CIA torturers and Wall Street bankers—deepened the distrust and anger of an electorate that has rallied around Trump.

An unsparing account of the degradation of US democracy, American Breakdown is essential to our evaluation of its prospects. Arguing that Trump's re-election seems just as likely as impeachment, Bromwich turns his attention to

the new struggles within the Democratic Party on immigration, foreign policy, and the Green New Deal.

AMERICAN BREAKDOWN will be a crucial reference point in the political debate around the upcoming presidential election—a contest in which the forces that created Donald Trump show no sign of letting up.

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Third Rate Huckster Buoyed by Billions Social Media Naïveté

Trump acts from motives that are intelligible at a glance. He cares for money and publicity, each for the sake of the other. Loyalty matters to him more than laws. For loyalty can be counted on to protect corruption, and without corruption there will be less money. In Trump's first two years in office, the United States became more entangled in the Middle East than it had been under Obama; the fighting continued in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Syria, in Libya; ties were strengthened with Saudi Arabia and Israel, but this could only mean new trip wires for another war in the region. American respect for alliances that had held steady since 1945 he shrugged off with an unseemly scorn; Trump appeared to think such organizations a useless remnant of the Cold War: they could safely be allowed to atrophy. And yet, in many ways he was a domestic president, too, and the largest political result of his election was the passage of the tax bill that drove up his approval

ratings in the early months of 2018—a time when that encouragement was badly needed. It was a bill that any other Republican president, attuned to the morale of the party in 2017, would have had to support; and in the nature of its scheduled changes, in a few years it will benefit only the rich. The other accomplishment Trump is fond of citing, a significant decrease in the numbers of the unemployed, is not for the most part his doing; his promise of a large-scale return of American manufacturing is still unrealized; and his baffling appointment of the militarists John Bolton and Mike Pompeo as national security adviser and secretary of state calls into question the meaning of his resolution to stay out of unnecessary wars.

All along, his pledge to withdraw from our wars in the Greater Middle East had been accompanied by a demagogic readiness for conflict of other sorts: a trade war with China, for example, and regime change in Iran (the latter no different from what Bush and Cheney hoped to realize in 2007, and what Benjamin Netanyahu wanted Obama to support in 2010-2011). But if the essence of Trump is chaos, his spasmodic exertions of command and control have never slackened since he announced his candidacy in 2015. His tweets (an average of five per day) of course receive mixed responses, but they keep him at center stage from day to day and almost from hour to hour. From his commercial perspective, all business is good business: at no moment is Trump not a leading topic of news or public commentary; the mainstream media have profited financially by this diet of all-day Trump; the networks and papers know it, and the public does, too. It is something like the hold of the repulsive charlatan over the captive crowd in Thomas Mann's Italian allegory of the thirties, Mario and the Magician, or years, the latter a "birther" propagandist against Obama—have signified their loyalty to Trump, and Trump has reminded them of his power to pardon, but

they are vulnerable for their apparent advance information on the release of hacked materials from the Democratic National Committee. By January 25, Stone had been indicted and arrested.

This is only a partial list. What carries conviction is the pattern of interested cooperation. In all the extended train of characters and meetings, careful and careless hints and confidences, which make up the myriad relationships between the Trump campaign and Russians of one description or another (lawyers, diplomats, media impresarios, oligarchs, agents), not a single knock on a door by Russia was greeted with anything but an eager "Come in." It is inconceivable that none of these contacts was cleared with the man at the head of the campaign—the candidate, Donald Trump—and inconceivable that a refusal by Trump would have been overridden by persons lower down the ladder to pursue the risky business on their own. The largest single category of evidence, however, remains the sacking by Trump of federal prosecutors he knew to be involved in investigations that might lead to his being charged with a crime. On transparently ad-lib pretexts or for contradictory reasons or for no admitted cause, Trump fired the deputy attorney general Sally Yates (January 30, 2017); the US attorney for the southern district of New York, Preet Bharara (March 11, 2017); the director of the FBI, James Comey (May 9, 2017); and his own attorney general, Jeff Sessions (November 7, 2018). All circumstances taken together, it adds up to a practice of obstruction of justice as consistent and penetrable as the actions that triggered the charge of obstruction in the articles of impeachment drawn up against Richard Nixon.

One may recognize Trump's complicity with Russian financial and state interests without pretending to be shocked by each new revelation, or accepting a re-militarized policy

as an appropriate response to the Russian attempt to influence American voters. Such intrusions in the form of surveillance, subsidy, or infiltration are hardly foreign to the habits of the US government—targeting elections in Russia, Georgia, or Ukraine, for example—and Americans have been on the wrong end of it before. (Consider the less successful but far bolder machinations of the Israel lobby in arranging Netanyahu's speech to Congress and Romney's trip to Jerusalem to influence the 2012 election.) Trump has driven some of his most resolute opponents to think it is policy enough to place a minus sign beside whatever he does. Might it be desirable for the United States to reach a long-term understanding with North Korea? To withdraw troops from Syria once ISIS is defeated? To renew a limited collaboration with Russia in order to avoid nuclear war and control the proliferation of nuclear materials and technology? Even in matters of such importance, Russian-American cooperation had lapsed in 2014 under pressure of the US reaction to hostilities in Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea—actions the United States was bound to condemn but which were predictable, so long as one grants that there is such a thing as a Russian sphere of influence. In the eyes of most of the world, everything the United States has done in the Middle East since 2001 and much of what it did in Central America in the 1980s is a great deal harder to defend.

The war party of 2003-2006 has resurrected itself in the United States, as a kind of shadow state department, and is now propounding a version of imperial internationalism to counter the isolationism of Trump. The tendency has two wings, one neoconservative, the other neoliberal, both promoting a return to US leadership by force of democracy and arms. The neoconservative advocacy group, called the Alliance for Securing Democracy, has on its board Michael Chertoff, Mike Rogers, and Bill

Kristol; the neoliberal version, National Security Action, includes the Obama speechwriter Ben Rhodes, the Obama national security adviser Tom Donilon, Susan Rice, and Anne-Marie Slaughter; while Jake Sullivan, who was in line to be Hillary Clinton's national security advisor, is on the advisory council of the first group and serves as co-chair of the second. What all these people desiderate is a larger and more constant US presence in the world. The neoconservatives may look for armies and special ops and regimes to change; the neoliberals may prefer trade deals; but there will be plenty of conferences where academics, think-tank pundits, and generals can safely mingle. "We have," as William Arkin observed, "a single war party in the United States and it's the only party that's given voice."

Where does this leave us? There is an outlaw presidency, the first in American history to say so almost on its face. Every day brings fresh evidence of an administration conceived and executed as a money-making scheme; and it betrays its character when it reverts to the argot of the gangster world—the world that created Trump through his contacts in the New York real estate milieu. One of Roy Cohn's associates memorably said, "I double-cross myself twice a day just to keep in practice." Trump's habit of saying X and Not X, close together, displays obedience to this precept by a financial athlete who must never break training. When the Saudi murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi could no longer be doubted, Trump said: "They had a very bad original concept, it was carried out poorly, and the cover-up was one of the worst cover-ups in the history of cover-ups"—the verdict of a contest judge demoting a failed performance in a delicate genre. Trump assimilates all politics to the dispatching of flunkies and payoffs to protect corruption. Two recent books on the first year of his presidency—Bob Woodward's

Fear and Michael Wolff's Fire and Fury—are replete with examples.

To dwell on the criminal habits, however, is to leave out of account the debased form of celebrity to which Trump has accustomed his political audience, and by which he retains his hold on the media and the nation. He is a president who gets on all fours with citizens, to praise flatterers and accomplices, to denounce or deprecate enemies, and to wheedle with persons who stand somewhere between. From his position as chief magistrate, he addresses promises and threats to individual citizens. All this he does in public, and does with an incurable shamelessness. A personality of his temper as president could not have seemed a distant possibility to the constitutional framers. Trump differs in kind from even the most undistinguished of his predecessors, since his overt message is that we can choose to be ignorant—ignorant of science, ignorant of the law, ignorant of the logic of non-contradiction. When President Reagan said that the most dreaded words in the language came from the government official who wanted to help, he was pandering, no doubt, but it was a joke well suited to an ideology in which he actually believed. The same cannot be said of Trump. He has no interest in government, large or small, and no commitment to ideals of any description.

The Constitution seems the best native resource for a political recovery, and the hardest to traduce. Its prohibition of external emoluments given to an official of the government; the explanation of causes that could justify impeachment, and the procedures to be followed; above all (abandoned but not gone) the explicit framing of the role of the Senate in approving and, where necessary, overruling a president's decisions in foreign policy—all these things bear looking into. But though impeachment is the constitutional solution, it may be that only a rejection of

Trump by a strong majority in 2020 could begin to reverse the degeneration that he personified as a symptom even before he hastened the process by his official acts. The loyal Tea Party remnant have been so thoroughly imposed on that they would take impeachment as proof of a conspiracy against Trump. They have been coached to believe that every finding of the Mueller inquiry is part of an organized attempt to nullify the election of 2016.

Occasionally, in the chapters that follow, I bring up the fact that foreign policy limits what can be done in domestic policy. This is most the case for a nation immersed in multiple wars of choice. Whether we speak of them or not, they are a drain on civic imagination and public energy, to say nothing of the loss of lives. Nationalism, of the sort Trump seemed to represent in his campaign, might at least have led to a greater concentration on the repair and reform of American society, and the improvement of justice at home. But as Michael Lewis showed in The Fifth Risk, the most dire hazard of the corporate plunder of the Trump administration can be seen in defunding and staff reductions in places like the National Weather Service (located in the Department of Commerce), food and drug regulation (the Department of Agriculture), and control of nuclear waste (the Department of Energy). The greatest war we face for many generations to come will be defensive in nature. Climate disruption stands as the overwhelming collective danger that the distraction of the Trump years has tempted us to ignore; and those who concentrate all their passions on Trump are captive to his denial as much as those who are genuinely ignorant. Global climate disruption is already a cause of effects we still speak of as if they belonged to separate categories—immigration, inequality, war. There will be wars as a consequence of climate disruption, there will be mass migrations, and there will be increased inequality. Meeting the

change that is on us will require a form of international control we haven't begun to imagine. Trump did more than anyone else to create a national distemper that has postponed for a few years longer a reckoning with the future of life on earth. More than cheating in an election or insulting traditional allies or degrading the norms of public speech in unheard-of ways, his denial of the existence of this more-than-national predicament should be counted the largest of his crimes.

Where Goes the Nation?

How do we get it back? Many people asking that question are thinking about more than Donald Trump's offenses against the dignity of high office. They are wondering how, with so much broken already, one man fumbling at the controls could find still more to destroy. In 2016, Trump was cast as the voice of rebellion against a power whose dimensions few understood; and in a campaign that started as a promotional gimmick, he ran a hard race and surprised the country. Russian meddling is unlikely to have swayed the result in a single state, yet the Democrats and their media allies jumped at the idea of the stolen election. The premature fantasy of a quick removal of President Trump—and the comparative slowness with which the real extent of his corruption was brought to light—have enabled the president's backers to play the conspiracy story in reverse: an election Trump legitimately won is about to be retroactively reclaimed by the deep state. The Mueller report when it comes will satisfy neither side. It will lay out illicit connections between Trump and financial and state actors, some American, some Russian, possibly some from other countries. It will hand lawmakers a map from which they can induce a logical path to impeachment, on charges of obstruction and emoluments, and perhaps on other grounds as well; but the report will not overtly recommend impeachment, and its legal upshot will be left to prosecutors in New York

and elsewhere who are handling Trump-related indictments. The crowd that continues to support him, united by animosity more than by positive belief, is too formless to become a movement, but it has sufficient size and energy to tear the country apart. So the question returns. Can we recover a rational skepticism regarding the state and corporate institutions that for so long have governed unaccountably, and at the same time acknowledge the value of a representative government with three functioning branches? For constitutional democracy to survive, this doubt and this fidelity must be made to coexist again. <>

IDEOLOGICAL POSSESSION AND THE RISE OF THE NEW RIGHT: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF CARL JUNG by Laurie M. Johnson [Routledge, 9781138082113]

Political theorist Laurie M. Johnson deals with Jung's analysis of the effects of modern scientific rationalism on the development of communism, fascism and Nazism in the 20th century and applies this analysis to the rise of the New Right in the 21st century.

Jung's thought provides much needed insight into contemporary ideologies such as neoliberalism, Identitarianism and the Alt-Right. Johnson explains Jungian analytical psychology as it relates to these topics, with a chapter devoted to Jung's views of Friedrich Nietzsche, who exemplifies the modern problem with his proclamation that God is dead, and an in-depth discussion of Jung's views on truth and the psychological function of religion as a safeguard against deadly mass movements. She then turns to Jung's treatment of anti-Semitism and the Nazi movement, and his views on race and racism.

Johnson applies these historical insights to the current manifestations of mass psychological disruption in the clash between neoliberals and the right-wing populist and Identitarian movements on the rise in North America and

Europe. She concludes by discussing the search for an authentic and meaningful life in a West that rejects extremism and is open to authentic spiritual experiences as a counterbalance to mass mindedness.

IDEOLOGICAL POSSESSION AND THE RISE OF THE NEW RIGHT will appeal to both undergraduate and graduate students of psychology and intellectual history. The book will also be of interest to those wishing to understand the new nationalist, nativist and Identarian movements.

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Jung's Political Thought

This book is ultimately about dangerous ideological movements, what causes them and what might be done to prevent future outbreaks of extremism and violence. Carl Jung's analysis of the destructive ideological movements of the 20th century is worth contemplating to see if it can bear on the rising ideologies of our own times, particularly (for purposes of this book) the rise of ethnonationalist/New Right movements in Europe and the United States. To that end, in this chapter I will lay out the basics of Jung's thought as it relates to the creation of mass ideologies. Other chapters in this book will provide the building blocks for a more nuanced picture of Jung's views. I will spend time on what Jung thought of Friedrich Nietzsche and his proclamation that "God is dead," Jung's analysis of the psychological value of religion in his work Answer to Job, as well as his views on

the Nazis and on race and racism. In the latter two chapters, I will not only explore what Jung thought of fascism and racism but the possibility that his own views were tainted by these pernicious views. After these steps, I will turn to a Jungian reading of the current signs of mass psychosis in the Western world in the rise of Identitarian/ethno-nationalist movements.

Here, I hope to explain the building blocks of the psychological theory Jung used to analyze totalitarian communism, fascism and Nazism. According to Jung, each individual psyche contains a personal consciousness or ego and a personal unconscious containing repressed and forgotten memories. But our psyches also contain the "collective unconscious." As we will see, Jung's "cure" for various personal as well as political ills is a healthy awareness and expression of this common, ancient and unchanged part of ourselves. The collective unconscious can either help people become whole individuals who can resist the lure of ideological extremism or drive them to become little more than drones in some tyrannical political framework. The problem is, most people in the Western world were, in his view, alienated from the collective unconscious because of modernity's rejection of authentic spiritual experience. But, to understand why this is so, we must first learn what Jung meant by the collective unconscious.

The Collective Unconscious

Jung claims that the collective unconscious is a stratum of the unconscious that is shared by everyone, regardless of their different civilizations and cultures. As Progoff points out, "collective" means that its contents are prior to the appearance of genuine individuality. Its origins are therefore very ancient and primitive. Beyond these observations, Jung concludes that it is impossible to answer the metaphysical question of how or exactly when the collective unconscious was first expressed—all we have are symbolic expressions that came, no doubt,

long after they had already bubbled up in action and non-written communication.' The visible symbols by which the collective unconscious expresses itself will differ according to civilization, culture and time, even though the archaic ground from which these symbols arise is "identical in all individuals."' In "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious," he states that the archetypes "owe their existence exclusively to heredity."' However, the exact mode of transmission remains unclear.

Suffice it to say that Jung theorized something like a layered memory bank in the human psyche. Most of the time, only the most recent layers were accessible to our consciousness. But the symbols used in the past, even the very distant past, to express the archetypes of the collective unconscious in that age and place, were still stored in the lower levels of our unconscious along with the archetypes themselves. For instance, Progoff writes that ancient Druid or Etruscan symbols can be found buried in the modern Irish and Italian psyche. Today, ancient symbolism is still found in dreams, myths and even religions. If Jung's theory is correct, then the individual is a repository of ancient history.'

Why do symbols change over time within cultures even as the archetypes they express remain the same? Sometimes the change is forced by conflict, as it was during the Roman conquest of pagan Europe. Jung believed, for instance, that Europe and United States were still dealing with the consequences of the imposition of Christianity on the pagans. Christian symbols had largely usurped the pagans' symbols, but there was intermingling, and paganism lay beneath the surface, coming out in dreams. Also, symbols sometimes changed due to the slow erosion of the psychic power or life of a civilization. Such was the case with Rome in the days before the Christian conversion.

Philosopher Charles Taylor's argument in A SECULAR AGE resonates with Jung's analysis of the collective unconscious. Taylor's book is perhaps the best chronicle to date of how not only the modern scientific mentality, but certain developments within Christianity itself, produced a disproportionate rationalism in man. This rationalism and subsequent diminishment of spiritual openness in turn destroyed the "porous self" which could have direct spiritual experiences. It created growing "disenchantment" or disbelief in the possibility of the supernatural or numinous experience, producing the "buffered self." Along with disenchantment, Taylor writes, came a great "disembedding," in which human beings lost their sense of oneness with their society and became autonomous, isolated and atomistic. According to both Jung and Taylor, along with disenchantment and disembedding, doubt crept in as to the validity and meaning of Western society's religious rituals and symbols. They began to lose their life and force. Individuals were cut loose into a sort of painful isolation in search of new meaning and new symbols which could recapture the power of the old.

We now see the aftermath of the great spiritual and psychological challenges of modernity. The collective unconscious is a powerful force that needs proper expression, and contemporary individuals still attempt to break through the modern "buffered self" to new experiences of identity, unity and spirituality. Attempts in our time are often mediated by technology. Disconnected individuals seek a feeling of wholeness. For instance, some people in the West follow counter-culture icons past and present, figures such as Terence McKenna, Duncan Trussell, Joe Rogan and Jordan Peterson, into a syncretistic spirituality, and even the use of psychedelics as a spiritual vehicle. At the level of psychological function, these esoteric pursuits might not be that dissimilar to other attempts to connect to

something larger than the individual. For instance, some Americans have followed Alt-Right leader Richard Spencer into the white identity movement.' From a Jungian perspective, each attempt is aimed at finding some lost unity and some missing transcendent meaning.

The symbolic contents of the collective unconscious are the archetypes. Archetypes are ideas or forms imprinted on the human mind by innumerable and ancient experiences. Jung sometimes links the archetypes to the Platonic forms, though it is likely that he feels he has a more concrete handle on what these `Ideas' are than did Plato:

> In former times, despite some dissenting opinion and the influence of Aristotle, it was not too difficult to understand Plato's conception of the Idea as supraordinate and pre-existent to all phenomena. "Archetype," far from being a modern term, was already in use before the time of St. Augustine, and was synonymous with "Idea" in the Platonic usage.

These archetypes within the collective unconscious can produce numinous or transcendent experiences. That is, they can affect us as if they are not a part of us, but some outside, superior force. This is what Taylor would call the experience of the porous self, a self which is open to perceiving and experiencing

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Jung once wrote the following about what he had learned from one of his patients:

> We are moved by the laudable and useful ambition to extirpate the chaos of the irrational both within and without to the best of our ability. Apparently the process has gone pretty far. As a mental patient once told me: "Doctor, last night I disinfected the whole heavens with bichloride of mercury, but I found no God." Something of the sort has happened to us also.

This scouring of the heavens is the cause of the catastrophic nature of our age, according to Jung. In the age of scientific enlightenment which continues to unfold, mankind has rejected the belief that the gods dwell above and has become convinced that they are nothing more than projections of human psychological needs and wishes. But the gods, as it were, have returned with a vengeance in the disastrous politics of the 20th and 21st centuries. They have returned in the form of mass movements of the Right and Left, in the destruction of total war caused by total enmity, in the slide into ever-increasing identification with and dependence on liberal big government, in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and subsequent endless war on terror, and, most recently, a marked upswing in Western ethno-nationalism.

Jung is doing nothing less than trying to diagnose the continuing crisis of our time. He does this by pointing out what any student of political philosophy should know, that the modern political thought that eventually gave rise to the totalitarian political structures of the 20th century was born in a rebellious denial of the religious instinct in man, and that this is not mere coincidence. This connection between religion and ideology, and the implication that religion is superior to ideology, and with the further implication that we might be able to learn from religion, is jarring to our modern ears. This is especially true for today's scientists who have consigned such "value" issues to theologians and philosophy departments. Indeed, it is very difficult for many of us to accept the idea of a religious instinct that will not go away. Our resistance to this idea is a product of modernity, which sees all aspects of religion as "irrational" and therefore outside the purview of what to take seriously. Yet, in ignoring religion, we are ignoring the fact that, outside intellectual circles, the majority around the world is still clinging perilously to some sort of religious faith. Surely, as Jung points out,

ignoring or downplaying the importance of religion is not the position of a truly objective social scientist but, instead, the position of someone who fears what he does not understand. At the same time, for at least one of the foremost "enemies" that the West should try better to understand, religion seems to be everything. If nothing else, understanding Jung should allow us to get back in touch with the importance of these still largely misunderstood phenomena in the human psyche and to explore their impact on individuals and on society.

Lessons From Nietzsche

Carl Jung spent many years developing a psychological interpretation of the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche and his works, especially Thus Spake Zarathustra) Nietzsche fascinated Jung, not only because of his highly eccentric personality and his momentous creativity, but because Jung saw in Nietzsche a living example of the crisis of modernity: a great psychological upheaval in modern man, a change from religiosity to deep skepticism and thus from confidence to profound uncertainty over the place of humankind in the universe.

Jung had read many of Nietzsche's works and acknowledged Nietzsche's influence on his own thinking.' For instance, in a letter to Rev. Arthur Rudolph, he remarked:

> It would be too ambitious a task to give you a detailed account of the influence of Nietzsche's thoughts on my own development. As a matter of fact, living in the same town where Nietzsche spent his life as a professor of philosophy [Basel], I grew up in an atmosphere still vibrating from the impact of his teachings, although it was chiefly resistance that met his onslaught. I could not help being deeply impressed by his indubitable inspiration....'

Jung was impressed by what he saw as Nietzsche's zealous quest for the truth about modern man, contrasted with most academicians who were more interested in "career and vanity." Perhaps Jung felt some

kinship with Nietzsche because of how close Jung himself came at times to making the same types of sacrifice of self-control in pursuit of psychological knowledge.'

Nietzsche's **THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA** appeared to Jung to be full of religious spirit despite its rejection of the Judeo-Christian religion and religion generally. It was a work of philosophy which fully engaged and explored the realm of psychology and hence dealt honestly, if in a flawed manner, with the spiritual unknown. Jung was less impressed with the absence of proof for some of Nietzsche's theories, such as the origin of morals in Genealogy of Morals or the famous Nietzschean theory of eternal return.' Nietzsche's philosophy was important to Jung because it "gave some adequate answers to certain urgent questions which then were more felt than thought."' It was important not so much in its particulars as in its overall message, not so much because of whether it could or should be implemented as for what it said about the psychological condition of modern man.

Jung was aware that Nietzsche's philosophy was very attractive to certain susceptible people, especially at his time in the right wing, whom he referred to as "all the cranks of Europe."' He believed that one could not truly understand Nietzsche's works, especially THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA, without the aid of psychology. Nietzsche the man, Nietzsche's philosophy, and that philosophy's importance for understanding contemporary social and political events, were all subjected to Jung's psychological perspective. I will now deal with each of these in turn.

Nietzsche the Man: A Microcosm of the Modern Psyche

Jung was fascinated by Nietzsche as a human being and not just as a philosopher. He speculated that Nietzsche suffered for a long time from psychological problems, first mild and

finally severe. As much as Nietzsche urged a "yeah-saying" attitude to the life of this world and a renunciation of a next life, Jung claims that Nietzsche lived a surprisingly nay-saying life, denying the demands of his body and passions and loathing the actual mundane existence of most human beings. Nietzsche's life therefore did not reflect the worldly component of his teaching; it did not pay heed to the animalistic part of his experience. Nietzsche was perpetually sick, slept poorly, and had to move from place to place in search of a healthy climate. He was so cerebral that his nerves tied his body in knots. His body was little more than a nuisance to him. For these reasons and more, Jung called Nietzsche a "pathological personality."

Jung observed that Nietzsche had an artistic or creative character, and this character held many benefits, but also severe negative consequences. Nietzsche once claimed that he "owed to his malady" much of his creativity, and Jung agreed.' But Nietzsche's malady also led to what Jung called psychological "inflation." The process of inflation began when Nietzsche became hyperaware of his own creative genius and began to think of himself as the sole source of his creative powers. This transformation was, for Jung, as we will see, a microcosm of a similar phenomenon in modern societies generally.

Jung's Psycho-Theological History

It may seem strange to explore Jung's political thought by an examination of one of Jung's most seemingly non-political books, Answer to Job. However, it is through this work that we can understand more deeply the intimate connection Jung saw between religious belief and modern politics. Answer to Job is a work that exposes the historical importance of the Judeo-Christian religion, or more precisely, the Christian break from Judaism and the psychological meaning and consequences of that break not only for individuals but for society as well. Because of the way Jung deals with the

topic, the book is far from non-political. Instead, it contains major political and social implications. Some have tried to trivialize the contribution in Answer to Job by writing it off as Jung unconsciously working through his own psychological issues, an approach which, in addition to simply being too easy, speaks to a narrowness of vision which precludes much useful and indeed necessary speculation about the relationship between religious and political motivations and movements.' As David Sedgwick writes of a reissue of Answer to Job in 2002:

> This latest reissue is timely: it comes at a time when many Americans, previously aware of but relatively insulated from violence on a collective level, find themselves confronting the deeper questions about the reality of Good and Evil, inhumanity and insanity in a personal way. The horror and extent of the World Trade Center and Pentagon hijack-bombings, the subsequent war against Islamic extremists in Afghanistan, and ongoing anti-terrorism initiatives have brought fundamental moral issues home to the U.S. for the first time in a generation. Against the backdrop of world events, this republication of Jung's controversial musings in Answer to Job seems almost synchronistic.

As Sedgwick explains, when Jung was writing Answer to Job, he was dealing with the aftermath of World War II, particularly the Holocaust, and the whole question as to how Germany could have committed such atrocities and how Europe could engage, again, in such catastrophic violence. With the current War on Terror and the upswing in racist and neo-fascist movements, we are once again living in a time of great political and ideological evil and mass violence. "So it is relevant now to ponder what he had to say then about the dark side of human, and God's nature."

In this chapter, I will see how Jung's insights into history brought to light in Answer to Job culminate in a theory which, while scattered in

various places throughout his works, is still a complete and not altogether unfamiliar account of psychological history. This theory is based on the theme discussed in the first chapter, of psychological balance. Jung posits that, on the level of society, psychological imbalances can arise which can greatly influence politics. He paints a picture of the human psyche which, on the aggregate level, has been swinging between two extremes, between reason and spirit, throughout history. In painting such a picture, Jung also gives hope for a balance which could encourage political realism, peace and stability.

Finally, we will see how Jung's theory of history is applied in his analysis of the events of his time, in not only the world wars he witnessed but also in the rise of the bureaucratic state and the "statistical man" (what Hans Morgenthau referred to as "scientific man")," a phenomenon that can be said to still plague us today. Jung believed that the world psychological imbalance had reached its height in the 20th century, and that the crisis could either lead towards our ultimate destruction or our salvation, depending on whether we could come to recognize what has been driving human history from the earliest times and come to grips with its power.

Conclusions for Democracies

Hence it is modernity more generally, the aspect of the scientific spirit in social engineering of any kind, the quest for institutions which can control and reshape human nature through force or base incentives, which is the manifestation and to a certain extent the cause of the crisis of spirit which faces the West. In the West, religious people go through the motions, but no longer have the numinous experience characteristic of being gripped by forces inside and yet beyond themselves. Without true religious experience they have no point of reference apart from the world around them, and it becomes difficult for them to hold onto their perspectives as individuals.

Jung juxtaposes the tendency of modem capitalistic mass democracy with "true democracy." Such a democracy is "a conditional fight among ourselves, either collective or individual." True democracy comes closest to adequately expressing the internal conflicts of individuals and society because it turns these conflicts inward; in other words, the conflict is at least not projected onto other nations.

For Jung, numbers are a matter of great importance. Once a democracy, or any other type of government, encompasses too many people, it can hardly help but produce a herd mentality. Then it is not really a democracy. Also, it seems, the nation's attitude towards commerce is important. It is not that Jung is anticapitalist, for he knows all too well the power that economic centralization gives to the totalitarian state. But Jung does credit capitalism at the stage it is now, in which markets move beyond any individual's control, with what we might call "alienation," and he would loath the lowering of culture and values caused by commercialism or consumerism. As we have seen, Jung is wary of the effects of the welfare state which has grown up alongside advancing capitalism. Perhaps Jung would agree with Habermas that "late capitalism" has become an alliance between government and big business with the necessary welfare safety net causing a greater and greater growth of state power and diminution of individual initiative, freedom and moral responsibility.

At the time, Jung could hold up his native Switzerland as a relatively good example of the type of small democracy he preferred, where the strife was internalized (no wars in 400 years) and the government had not become too big. The small, legally-restricted civil war called democracy, however, is only the best practicable political solution to the human problem. "Our order would be perfect if only everybody could direct his aggressiveness inward, into his own psyche," and if they could

thus "fight the overwhelming power-drive of the [personal] shadow." If this became widely possible, Jung believes that even the worst civil strife of democracy would cease. Then human beings would really be in control of themselves and their fate. Jung is an optimist, for though it may take the experience of long periods of various forms of state-slavery to drive people to it, he apparently believes that the time will come when people will be ready to begin the confrontation with the evil within on a conscious basis. If any intent can be discerned from his various writings, it is that he wishes to be a herald for that time.

Jung's answer to the crisis of our time is self-knowledge. But self-knowledge does not simply entail knowing one's conscious self, or ego, or what other people see in us. Theories of human nature do not help much either, for all of them consider the average, "statistical" man, and not any individual. The individual is consummately unique and can gain self-knowledge only if he does not rely on anyone else's theory in determining who he is. Therefore, under-standing mankind in general is quite a different task from the one which Jung regards as the only safeguard at this point from mass psychosis—self-knowledge.

It is the goal of self-knowledge that prompted Jung to still define himself as a scientist. As Lachman puts it, "Till the end of his life and throughout a long and often turbulent career, an exasperated Jung argued that he was first and foremost a scientist and empiricist, and not a theorist, metaphysician, philosopher, or, most emphatically, a mystic." If Jung could give his recommendations the authority of a science, (that book that deals with how he wanted to be scientific) Western man might be inclined to be open to them. In this light, science, strangely, would breed openness to mystery. Jung hoped that the psychological truths which he had discovered could breech the relativistic rift in modem faith for people who were well

acquainted with other people's beliefs as well as the arguments against the validity of any belief.' Psychology could be, in this sense, the ultimate science. Self-knowledge would then be scientific knowledge.

It is also true that, nearer the end of his life, Jung began to acknowledge more what he no doubt knew all along—he was a scientist, but he was also a visionary. As Colin Wilson explains, after Jung's heart attack and near-death experience when he was 68 years old, Jung was less concerned about his scientific reputation:

> Jung was to live on for another seventeen years. But the near-death experience had caused a profound change in his outlook. Throughout his working life, Jung had felt obliged to protect himself by presenting himself to the world as a scientist. Not long after his recovery, he was writing to a correspondent who was trying to convert him to Catholicism: "My dear Sir! My pursuit is science, not apologetics and not philosophy. My interest is scientific, and yours evangelical." Yet anyone who is familiar with Jung's work knows that this is a half-truth; Jung was both a philosopher and an evangelist. But the near-death experience seems to have made him less defensive about presenting his deepest convictions, less concerned about being accused of stepping beyond the limits of science.

Answer to Job was published in 1952, nine years before Jung's death, and after much experience including his near-death experience. We can see the mixing of Jung the scientist and Jung the visionary in this work. We can also see his abiding interest in the future of humanity in the wake of the incredible events of the two world wars, the coming of the atomic age and the Cold War:

> Since the Apocalypse we now know again that God is not only to be loved, but also feared. He fills us with evil as well as good, otherwise he would not need to be feared; and because he

wants to become man, the uniting of his antinomy must take place in man. This involves man in a new responsibility. He can no longer wriggle out of it on the plea of his littleness and nothingness, for the dark God has slipped the atom bomb and chemical weapons into his hands and given him the power to empty out the apocalyptic vials of wrath on his fellow creatures.

Clearly Jung as both scientist and visionary, while far from orthodox, believed that modem man ignored God at his peril, and that rather than sweeping Him under the rug in favor of the materialist bent of modem science, people had better sit up and pay attention to the mysterious things they cannot see but which continue to have the greatest impact on their lives.

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The Jungian perspective has given us two concepts that are particularly useful at this moment: secular religions and ideological possession. If we understand that the extremism and totalitarianism of the 20th and 21st centuries is rooted in changes that emerged as early as the Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution, we can move beyond the predominant superficial and polarized thinking that keeps us running in circles. This longer vantage point helps us to see the ways in which technological and economic advances have come along with spiritual disenchantment and social disembedding. Our advances have led to more material production and technological capability than ever before, but they have at the same time produced more spiritual alienation and fragmentation of community.

In 1992, Francis Fukuyama published **THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN**. In that now-iconic book he asked if liberal democracy and capitalism had triumphed in their battle against

competing ideologies, and, if so, was that a good thing? His answer was "yes" to the first question and "maybe" to the second, because he worried that people might be fundamentally dissatisfied with satisfaction. But, despite his qualms, Fukuyama's way of thinking caught on because it is deeply entrenched in the Western mind. What Aleksandr Dugin calls the first political theory, liberalism, appears to most people in the West to be reality itself, because it defeated its communist and fascist competitors. From their perspective, liberal politics and economics reflects our true nature, and, now that both have triumphed, we can start to build a better world in which age-old problems will finally be solved. Liberalism is, as David Foster Wallace said in his famous commencement speech, like the "water" we cannot see because we are all swimming in it. This blindness to context and position is, ironically, the very definition of ideological possession.

Fukuyama's thesis, without its nuances, appealed to neoconservatives who embraced liberalism as a faith. They promoted the idea that democracy and capitalism were, in a sense, viral, and that we might see a day when the United States could reign over a peaceful, prosperous and free world. From the neoconservative perspective, the benefits of spreading democracy and capitalism were so great that they were not to be left on their own to develop but needed to be pushed, while illiberal ideologies and regimes needed to be fought. We had, then, the psychologically needed crusade against evil to replace the Cold War. But the neoconservative ideology characteristic of Francis Fukuyama's outlook in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and adopted with minor modifications here and there by Republicans and Democrats alike, did not bear the fruits of peace and prosperity that were expected.

We can see now that, while liberalism seemed to be triumphant in the late 20th century, it was quickly involved in another epic ideological

battle, this time with a rebellious and fanatical Islamic fundamentalism that did not want to join "McWorld." And, as if the Muslim rejection of the Western faith in economics was not enough, the election of Donald Trump in the United States and the surge of populist right-wing leaders around the world showed that there was more than a passing dissatisfaction with liberalism's outcomes for Western citizens as well. With the threat from Islamic extremism ongoing, and the New Right rising in the United States and Europe, it is now not at all clear that the liberal faith will win.

There are no doubt many reasons for it, but Donald Trump's unexpectedelection to the American presidency must be understood in the context of a global phenomenon of resurgent ethno-nationalism. As such, it can be seen as an instinctual attempt by some Americans to take back what they feel they have lost—their cultural bearings and their popular power. Trump supporters tend to be white Americans who are used to being (as a class) politically active and relevant, and feel as though they are being left behind by recent trends in politics, economics and culture. They see Trump as a source of disruption against whatever it is that is threatening their way of life. But I have argued here that they are mistaken about the sources of their discontent. Their economic and cultural precarity is less the fault of non-whites, foreigners and immigrant interlopers than it is the result of the large managerial state and a globalized corporate economy that does not care about them as human beings and continues to disrupt families, communities, local economies and cultures. The globalized economy forms the context for the mass migrations they fear, as people try to escape countries where economic and political chaos mean they can no longer adequately feed and shelter themselves and feel threatened by Western-driven cultural, economic and military interventions.

It is a lot to expect those attracted to the New Right to see the overarching technological, political and economic forces at work in creating peoples' anxieties and resentments. There will always be plenty of opportunistic leaders who can redirect their fears onto ethnic and religious groups that can be blamed for invading, taking opportunities and disrespecting their native traditions and values. But an overarching perspective that exposes how political and thought leaders time and again aim at the wrong targets is precisely what Jungian theory contributes to our understanding of competing ideologies.

Jung's psychological insights can be enriched by an engagement with later thinkers who focus more squarely on the liberal system through the fields of political philosophy and economics. The existing system in Western countries is now closer to what Sheldon Wolin called "inverted totalitarianism" and Wendy Brown and others call "neoliberalism" than to the type of government and economic system the American founders created. The economies of Western countries favor global corporate economic power and continue to disadvantage local and regional enterprises and public commons. This process has been facilitated by Western governments in the name of the general welfare or of "rights" and the elusive "free market."

As Wendell Berry is fond of pointing out, people who live in the pockets of abundance the complex globalized economy creates are not as free as they think. Most cannot individually or even collectively guarantee their access to fresh air and potable water, let alone the nutrition they need to survive.' But Western citizens are encouraged to equate freedom with economic opportunities and choices. They are told that, if they continue to consume, their economies will continue to expand and their access to everything they need and want will be assured. Another part of the

narrative is that the rest of the world can also enjoy this freedom if it is open to the same economic transformations the West has passed through. The power of this narrative is still such that many forget the lessons of market crashes and disregard the cost to the environment we all depend upon for life. People continue to put their faith in governments and commercial enterprises that are, more than ever, beyond their control.

But as powerful as the freedom narrative is, the challenges from the New Right to liberalism discussed in this book are proof that the liberal faith is weakening. Will it be replaced by various Identitarian faiths that claim to be superior because they have rejected the universalist "end of history" story? As we know, Jung's view would be that these new attempts at faith, while claiming to break away from Enlightenment universalism, are still flawed because they point to a this-worldly solution that will finally end our quest for political and social truth. That is, they propose a fourth secular religion to believe in, and inevitably they involve various levels of ideological possession and political extremism.

Would Jung agree with the extension of his theory regarding ideological possession to our new ideological battles? I think he would. Jung popularizer Jordan Peterson gives the impression that Jung strongly condemned the communist east and all things socialist while approving of Western liberalism because it safeguards the autonomy and liberty of the individual. But Jung's actual teachings regarding the state of the Western soul are far from reassuring, and not between people who still lived relatively independently in rural communities, capable of feeding and providing for themselves without constant dependence on the government or the larger economy, and the mentality of those who no longer lived close to the land. Those who live in metropolitan areas can be anonymous and are simultaneously freer from reliance on other people but less free of

government and market influences. What would Jung say about the life of the average "consumer" in the United States now bombarded constantly by advertising, working extra hours to purchase things that are not only unnecessary but actually harmful to his health and happiness, spending hours and hours watching television, playing video games and interacting with people largely through social media? From his vantage point, would this way of life be the opposite of the spirit-stultifying socialism that was thought to be the largest threat to the West in his times, or would it be a less obviously violent and physically lethal product of the same "statistical" worldview?

We know that Jung thought that mass men were vulnerable to worshipping the state in the absence of God. If we can set aside for a moment the ideological divide between Left and Right, the arguments over which party is the enemy of liberty and which one is its friend, we can catch just a glimpse of how much real freedom, over time, neoliberal citizens have relinquished to both government and economy, and how political and economic power have become increasingly interdependent. In this regard, Jung simply updated the observations of Alexis de Tocqueville about the vulnerability of the Western (and particularly the American) mind to what he called conformism, leading to what Tocqueville referred to as "soft despotism."

It was, in Jung's view, a spiritual problem that caused the German disaster as well as the Soviet one, and the aftermath of those disasters did not address that spiritual problem. For this reason, Jung warned that we had not seen the end of such upheavals: "What happened not so long ago to a civilized European nation? We accuse the Germans of having forgotten it all again already, but the truth is that we don't know for certain whether something similar might not happen elsewhere." To make the point perfectly clear, Jung turned to the case of

the United States, which "forms the real political backbone of Western Europe," and is perhaps even more vulnerable than Europe, since her educational system is the most influenced by the scientific Weltanschauung with its statistical truths, and her mixed population finds it difficult to strike roots in a soil that is practically without history.

Notice that Jung is not saying here that the threat to the West is from external communist intervention or propaganda, or even internal communist subversives, or even creeping socialism or fascism. The threat is deeper—scientific rationalism and the mentality and ways of life it brings forth—mentalities that are materialistic and inhospitable to spiritual life and true individuality, ways of life that are more and more tied up with technology and dependent upon an impersonal state and an increasingly complex and impersonal economy. From this perspective, he wrote, the goals of the West are "practically indistinguishable from the Marxist ideal."

While Jung would agree with Counter-Enlightenment philosophers about the evil of treating man as an interchangeable statistic, he did not head towards ideas of racial and ethnic tribalism as they did. His ideas do not, therefore, lend themselves to today's ethno-nationalist movements. In fact, it's safe to say that in a world where no ideological choice was perfect, Jung was a liberal by default. But while liberalism and capitalism or even neoliberalism might be more satisfactory than fascism, communism or "Islamo-fascism," the very impetus that drives liberalism/neoliberalism, endless scientific and technological advancement and the expansion of "technique," is in Jung's view dangerously godless. It produces the spiritual poverty that leads to ideological rebellions like fascism, Nazism, communism, Islamic extremism and ethno-nationalism. In his view, therefore, Enlightenment liberalism caused as many problems as it solved. Without

countervailing spiritual strength on the part of people in liberal countries, the risk of future crises was great. This is why, rather than defending liber¬alism and capitalism as antidotes to extremism, he turned away from all ideologies and towards an appraisal of the health of Western Christianity. In his view, Christianity had largely failed to serve as a source of spiritual strength, and Christians were therefore more than a little to blame for the modern tendency towards ideological possession.

The Failure of Christians
Jung's teachings help us to answer the question of why Western Christianity failed and continues to fail at providing a source of inner strength and resistance to ideological contagion. Christianity faced a daunting challenge in modernity, especially in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. In a statement that resonated with Jacques Ellul's indictment of "technique," Jung wrote that "[T]he accumulation of urban, industrialized masses," felt as though their fates were in the control, not of God, but of impersonal economic and technological forces. This alienation from God was at the root of 20th century ideological mass movements.

In addition to his resonance with Ellul's concerns, there is more than a passing resemblance between Jung's critique of Christianity and Tocqueville's critique of the American Church. Tocqueville argued that American Christianity was enmeshed with and even dominated by the economy and politics of the country. The pilgrims' puritanism, for instance, was "not only a religious doctrine; it also blended at several points with the most absolute democratic and republican theories." As time went by, American Christianity, particularly Protestantism, became entirely conformed to the commercial spirit. American pastors refrained from sermons about self-sacrifice and about the sacred character of the

poor as embodiments of Christ. Instead, they promoted "bourgeois virtues" such as honesty, industry and the type of charity that benefits both parties. Moreover, Tocqueville argued that while many Americans saw the utility in Christianity for helping maintain an orderly and industrious society, their hearts were rather dispassionate toward their dominant religion beyond its social utility.

I have elsewhere written that, for Tocqueville, American Christianity:

> makes itself compatible enough with the democratic mindset to survive, but it cannot remain the strongest influence in people's lives. In the democratic environment, not religion purely, but public opinion becomes the "greatest influence," and public opinion puts its stamp on religion.... So people don't look to other individuals with knowledge (such as pastors or priests) to guide their views, but to the all-powerful judgment of the collective, whose ideas "penetrate souls." ... The general will imposes its view on all things, including religion, so that Americans will not hear anything discordant while sitting in their pews.

Since the mid-19th century, American Christianity has continued to conform to the prevailing political and economic scene. It is beyond the scope of this book to chronicle its trajectory but suffice it to say that there is plenty of evidence of conformity. Wendy Brown speaks of neoliberalism "remaking the soul," and while she mainly discusses the commercialization of education in this regard, her analysis of how "neoliberal rationality disseminates the model of the market to all domains and activities" explains why today's pastors and priests often resemble managers or even CEOs more than curers of souls. Today, churches often measure success in terms of number of members and amount of contributions. They create programming to increase membership and attendance that resembles marketing campaigns because they

are marketing campaigns. Software is sold by firms to give the church what is essentially management, brand recognition and engagement. The flavor of this approach to religion can be found on the United Methodist Church Communications website, where we find the following topics: "Marketing Magnets That Bring New People to You," "How to Rethink Your Church's Direct Mail Strategy," "How Much Should Your Church Spend on Marketing?" and "Making the Most of Your Advertising Dollars." And, business majors can find quite a few positions like this: "Director of Communications/Marketing," First Presbyterian Church, Amarillo, TX, whose job description from 2012 reads:

> Responsible for the internal and external communication activities of First Presbyterian Church. In charge of the marketing of the church through advertising, public relations and traditional, electronic, and emerging media. Oversees and is "hands-on" with both internal and external communications activities aggressively seeking to foster the church's mission and improve the "brand" while enabling cross-communications between the staff, session, ministries, committees and the congregation.

Tocqueville's criticism of American Christianity was more than a little prophetic. His chief observation was that American pastors had conformed their teachings in the pulpit too much with American individualism and commercial values. It is also not uncommon today for churches to take strong political and economic positions. Fundamentalist and many mainline churches equate Christianity with the free market, having come to associate socialism with godlessness. They focus on a few matters of law like outlawing abortion or bringing back prayer in schools. Other Christians take a left-leaning social justice position and advocate for progressive taxation and the expansion of the welfare state, along with cultural goals like LGBTQ rights. When the church becomes little

more than a proxy for worldly values and practices, political positions and economic and social policies, where is its unique function? While churches may justify their market mentality and politicization as a necessity in a world in which they must compete for relevance, it seems unlikely that an approach that conforms this much to the world can adequately distinguish itself as a pathway to the transcendent. Ellul noted the phenomenon even in the 1940s, remarking that the Christians of his day, confronted by challenges like fascism and communism, "called men to arms and fought with material weapons. We have conquered on the material level, but we have been spiritually defeated."

What would Jung want from religion as opposed to what we often have? In "After the Catastrophe," he used the language of responsibility alongside the language of possession in a discussion that called out German Christians. He wrote that they had "allowed themselves to be driven to the slaughterhouse." He also said that "they showed the least resistance to the mental contagion." Germans had the opportunity to reflect upon their own national weaknesses, especially in the philosophy of Nietzsche, but they did not reflect. They "allowed themselves to be deluded by these disastrous fantasies and succumbed to the age-old temptations of Satan, instead of turning to their abundant spiritual potentialities.... " Jung insisted that the Germans had a deep heritage of both philosophy and religion at their disposal, and yet they ignored all the elements in both which did not confirm their current illusions. He wrote, "[T]heir Christianity forgotten, they sold their souls to technology, exchanged morality for cynicism, and dedicated their highest aspirations to the forces of destruction."

We can gather from his language of responsibility that Jung thought that, while most Germans conformed to the Nazi agenda, they

should have been able to resist. They made a choice, and they chose wrongly. If the Germans, whom he argues were under great economic duress prior to the rise of Nazism, still had a choice to make, it is likely that Jung would consider today's Christians and other religious believers free to choose as well, especially because they have the advantage of hindsight and Jung's own analysis of events.

Jung hoped that Western civilization would not repeat the catastrophic mistakes of the 20th century, namely replacing authentic Christianity with secular religions. He hoped that they would do the hard work to arrive at a faith that could encourage individual and collective moral responsibility. But, while the Christian faith survived, in Jung's view it was hamstrung and could not fulfill its purpose. It was hampered not only by its tendency to conform to liberal economics and politics but, more fundamentally, by the cloud of doubt surrounding it, generated by an accumulation of events, from the Scientific Revolution to the Enlightenment to the Industrial Revolution, that made its beliefs seem untenable. Organized religion could still serve its purpose using "ritual, initiation rites and ascetic practices," but this would only be true if people encountered a faith that was believable in the modern context.

Finding Authentic Faith
According to Jung, individuation, the alliance of the conscious will with the contents in the unconscious psyche, is needed to keep human evil at bay. People need to understand that they have great good and great evil in them, and they need a means to encourage the former to emerge and to keep the latter in check. To bring this about, he called for a religious experience which brought the individual into an "immediate relation to God" and which could keep him or her from "dissolving in the crowd:

> It is not ethical principles, however lofty, or creeds, however orthodox, that lay the

foundations for the freedom and autonomy of the individual, but simply and solely the empirical awareness, the incontrovertible experience of an intensely personal, reciprocal relationship between man and an extramundane authority which acts as a counterpoise to the "world" and its "reason".

This type of immediate religious experience is hard to come by in the modern world. Jung observed that the number of neuroses in the general population increased in direct proportion to the decline in religious convictions. He also claimed that his patients 35 years and older almost always experienced problems stemming from deep spiritual doubt and a desperate search for authentic religion. None of his patients experiencing these problems were fully healed without finding a way to reconcile their religious yearnings with their doubts. But what would give people the "incontrovertible experience of an intensely personal relationship" with an "extramundane authority?"

Jung explored which religious institutions and practices were most likely to yield psychological health and which produced more neuroses. In these explorations he tended to conclude that Catholicism was an active religion that was still capable of facilitating individuation, whereas Protestantism was relatively spiritually dead. In a survey he conducted, Jung found that of those who had needed help, 57 percent of Protestants and only 25 percent of Catholics sought out psychiatry. On the other hand, 58 percent of Catholics had at some point in their lives sought the counsel of clergy, while only 8 percent of Protestants had. Even if we disagree with his judgment in favor of Catholicism, or we argue that Catholicism has changed since Jung wrote and so his points about it are no longer valid, we can find in his comparisons what Jung thought were the most psychologically/spiritually harmful and beneficial elements in modern faith and practice.

Jung concluded that Catholics had less need for psychiatry because of the Church's symbolic and ritual apparatus. -This most notably included the Mass, with its demand that people believe in a priestly agency that brings about the transubstantiation of the Eucharist, and individual confession with its direct assurance of absolution. Protestant worship was by contrast lacking in mystery; it was non-liturgical and had therefore moved away from the store of rich symbolism present in the Mass. Protestants considered such Catholic articles of faith as transubstantiation to be, at best, magical thinking and, at worst, idolatry. Protestant worship, though, had the tendency to feel man-made, a product of democratic or at least group decision-making, and it therefore lacked the feeling of awe and authority evoked by liturgical worship.

In Answer to Job, Jung claimed that Protestants were in danger of "a species of rationalistic historicism" which could not deal with the spiritual dimensions—the evil—of the apocalyptic happenings of the 20th century. Though some "dogmatic symbols" and hermeneutical allegories remained in the Protestant service and hymnology, Protestants had lost touch with these symbols' true meaning. When it came to sin and forgiveness, they emphasized the abiding presence of evil within the soul but had inadequate means to deal with it. They taught that man was a depraved sinner whose hope was in God's unwarranted mercy, but their forgiveness was intangible, invisible and therefore uncertain (corporate and abstract, rather than personal and direct). At the same time, the constant emphasis on man's sinful and unworthy nature was a recipe for repression, not for individuation.

Because of the need for the recovery and expansion of symbolic knowledge, Jung thought that an alliance between Protestant clergy and psychiatry was "entirely legitimate." He saw

nothing wrong with Christian theologians and ministers venturing into psychology because psychologists had been encroaching on their realm for a long time, with theories such as Freud's which tended to psychologize religion out of existence. While faithful Protestants and Catholics alike might be uncomfortable with Jung's analysis, this entire line of reasoning and his open attitude toward the clergy cast in doubt any suggestion that Jung wished to reduce or explain away religious faith. In his view, an alliance between religion and psychology, rightly understood on both sides, had to be part of the solution. This is why he sought to reach the clergy who would be open to the insights of analytical psychology and might thereby nudge mankind into spiritual progress.

Jung thought that a disastrous tension had developed between our "increasingly rationalistic" convictions and our religious beliefs and practices, most of which were rooted in a medieval worldview. This tension could create a crisis but could also carry the potential for positive change.

Only when conditions have altered so drastically that there is an unendurable rift between the outer situation and our ideas, now become antiquated, does the general problem of our Weltanschauung, or philosophy of life, arise, and with it the question of how the primordial images that maintain the flow of instinctive energy are to be reoriented or readapted.

The modern resolution to this crisis of rationalism was a rejection of faith, but the disastrous consequences of that rejection were proof to Jung that faith was not as useless as its detractors thought. Instead of rejecting it as antiquated. faith needed to be changed so that it could function in a healthy way within the modern context. This change needed to be guided by a more advanced and conscious

appreciation for symbolism because, even when, as rationalists, we feel impelled to criticize contemporary religion as literalistic, narrow-minded and obsolescent, we should never forget that creeds proclaim a doctrine whose symbols, although their interpretation may be disputed, nevertheless possess a life of their own on account of their archetypal character.

Theologians who attempted to demythologize faith and make it all about, for instance, left-wing or right-wing social and political priorities, were going in precisely the wrong direction to correct this problem. Instead, understanding the importance and role of dynamic mythology within religious faith was necessary to heal the "rupture between faith and knowledge" which was a symptom of the "split consciousness" that led to the ideological possession he blamed for the horrors of Nazism and communism.

To save Christianity, its sacred scriptures must become alive and potent again by being interpreted symbolically, Jung reasoned. Symbolic interpretation of sacred stories is exactly what Jordan Peterson is doing in his series of biblical lectures on YouTube. These lectures, which he also gives to packed auditoriums all over the world, have drawn in younger audiences who might never sit through a traditional exegetical sermon. Before Peterson, we had George Frazier (The Golden Bough), Joseph Campbell (The Power of Myth) and Jung himself' who likewise caught on in their own generations. Their popular appeal and the fact that Peterson has become almost a household name for people under 30 in the United States today is evidence that there is a deep yearning for a new approach to old articles of faith. But, with Peterson, as with any person who brings a much-needed perspective to a new generation, there is the danger of people transferring their awe upon him rather than on the spiritual world that Jung hoped to illuminate for future generations.

So, beyond bringing the Jungian perspective back into public consciousness, what needs to be done? Jung warned that "[T]he danger that a mythology understood too literally, as taught by the Church, will suddenly be repudiated lock, stock and barrel is today greater than ever." He criticized the narrowly scientific attitude, but in a thoroughly scientific age, he argued that we need a more expansive view of science as well as religion. An expanded science, one that included real psychological knowledge, might breed a certain evolved reenchantment. The psychological truths we discover might breech the profound doubts of modern people, who suffer from the dilemma of relativism because they are well acquainted with cultures and beliefs other than their own. Jung formed a picture of a typical conversation with an inquiring patient. The patient asked what made Christ's teachings superior to the Buddha's? How could we choose which belief was correct? Jung answered:

> ... I must admit to the patient that his feelings are justified. "Yes, I agree, Buddha may be right as well as Jesus. Sin is only relative, and it is difficult to see how we can feel ourselves in any way redeemed by the death of Christ." As a doctor I can easily admit these doubts, while it is hard for the clergyman to do so. The patient feels my attitude to be one of understanding, while the pastor's hesitation strikes him as traditional prejudice, which estranges them from one another.

What Jung is saying is that his ability to remain open to his patients' doubts, and his ability to acknowledge the fact that he knows nothing with absolute certainty, make him a more sympathetic ear for post-modern souls than most clergy. Acknowledging and accepting uncertainty is a key, in his view, to modern faith.

Jung writes that the problem with every modern Weltanschauung so far, including liberalism, is that it has claimed universal significance. Yet all claims to universality seem to be contradicted by history. What looks like incontrovertible evidence of relativism—the fact that people at different times and places have believed in very different gods—shatters modern man's confidence in his own Weltanschauung, a dilemma which Nietzsche put forth most clearly in "On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life". Today's New Right thinkers are trying to solve this dilemma through nationalism and neopaganism. Jung, claiming a different way around the Nietzschean dilemma, tells us that all other Weltanschauungs have erred in believing themselves to be the truth in themselves, instead of expressions— prone to perspectives and error—of the truly ineffable. They are our names for archetypes, not the archetypes themselves which, not surprisingly, we can never grasp in their totality. The names may vary, but the things they describe remain the same.

Jung's position on the solution to cultural relativism bears some resemblance to that of Dugin, who claims there is a deep tradition underlying particular faiths that allows them to share in a more universal truth. While Jung's theory may not be wholly satisfying, for the same reasons we may not like Dugin's position (for instance, is this level of sophistication in religious experience plausible for most people?), it is Jung's attempt to prove a type of underlying universalism in what he views as a relativistic, nihilistic world. If we understand that there is underlying order in cultural and historical variation, and we admit our inability to have absolute knowledge of the absolute, he argues, we are at least half way to a healthier position.

Advice to the Church
To really make an impact on faith, the Jungian approach to religion would need to be more than just a passing trend. It would need to be evaluated, informed by theological perspective, and applied by theologians and members of the clergy. One of Jung's most important insights for theologians and pastors was that, too often,

churches promoted belief (creeds, dogmas) but provided no route for experience (numinous, direct feeling). He pointed out that "unreflecting belief, which is notoriously apt to disappear as soon as one begins thinking about it," is no match for modern rationalism. "People call faith the true religious experience, but they do not stop to think that actually it is a secondary phenomenon arising from the fact that something happened to us in the first place" that instilled the faith. The problem with Christianity is not that it is an untenable faith but that it has largely ceased to be experienced. So how could those who claim to be shepherds of people's spirituality study creeds and marketing strategies less and engage their flocks more in the mystery and the development of a true inner life?

This is a large question, but a few points can be taken away from what has already been said above. Churches should not encourage social conformity. They should not treat their members as customers, consumers or subjects for statistical analysis or scientific management. They need to argue with the tendency of people to look to government first as the solution to all social problems and to use the consumer economy as the solution to their personal problems, and they need to supply an alternative in the form of real, active community. They need to stop equating their religious convictions with political convictions. Their focus should be foremost on the development of the individual soul in its inner dimensions so that people are strong enough to resist enslavement to systems that block real human communion. Perhaps most importantly, religious institutions and the people who lead them need to acknowledge the difficulty of faith in the modem context and be ready to discuss and share the fears and doubts of the people they lead, rather than demanding an artificial acquiescence to doctrinal formulas.

In addition to these points, I will offer below a brief and necessarily impressionistic overview of what Jung wanted from a living religion, all of them drawn from The Undiscovered Self:

1. It is not a "creed," which can be a social matter, but is "simply and solely the empirical awareness, the incontrovertible experience of an intensely personal, reciprocal relationship between man and an extramundane authority which acts as a counterpoise to the `world' and its `reason.'

2. It is not of this world, so it does not mimic worldly practices or dwell on worldly concerns. Working to make the world better is to be done in the context of spiritual truths and not mistaken for the ultimate point of religious faith.

3. It fosters a strong inner life that allows the person to withstand the pressures of the "outer world." It increases the individual's ability to think for himself and not succumb to social, political and economic pressures.

4. It does not insist that the individual submit to rigid formulas, which would be to surrender to a "collective category." It affirms individual judgment instead of condemning it as "heresy and spiritual pride."

5. It is not merely intellectual, moral or ethical in content and does not dwell negatively on resistance to the world but instead attracts people with a positive "inner, transcendent experience.... "

6. It recognizes that the state and the economy are in opposition to this inner experience and therefore, in a real sense, to God, and so it lives in uneasy tension with the priorities of the state and economy. This tension provides the

individual freedom relative to these depersonalizing forces.

7. It takes seriously the performance of rites and rituals. Impugning such things as superstition shows a lack of psychological insight because they are gateways to direct experience.

8. It is not primarily communal (i.e., its purpose is not primarily social) but individual in nature, stressing the person's unique inner relationship with God. This then benefits the community because "the value of a community depends on the spiritual and moral stature of the individuals composing it."

9. It encourages spiritual regeneration and recognizes that people are afraid of the direct and life-changing consequences that flow from it. It therefore strengthens people against the fear of direct experience, as well as the inevitable social disapproval that follows from engaging in such experience. Regeneration entails an internal personal change and not the mere adherence to a creed, set of beliefs or membership in a corporate body.

10. It puts itself forward as a source of protection from people's "inner demonism." It allows people to acknowledge and deal with the evil in their natures which, if denied, gets re-located on an external enemy.

11. It recognizes the permanent instinctual character of the person's shadow and does not promote the idea that people can become completely "innocuous, reasonable and humane" by any amount of faith or practice. It teaches people to distrust their motives instead of proclaiming themselves and their actions wholly pure.

Who was Jung to give this kind of advice to religious authorities? He was someone who was very open about the fact that he did not have answers to people's metaphysical questions. That is, he acknowledged that he did not know, or was not certain about, the metaphysical reality of God or the literal truth of Biblical accounts. He was not a promoter of a dogma or doctrine. At the same time, he had deep respect for religions and those who practiced them. He had the humility to admit that his studies were problematic to religious faith and that he was not able to pronounce on the factuality of any faith. This attitude, while it may seem threatening to those already deeply committed to their faith, is apparently quite refreshing and intriguing to people who have never been so committed but find that life without some faith feels hollow.

One of the greatest obstacles to religious authority that has not been mentioned already is its tendency toward worldliness on an even more disturbing level than marketing ploys and politicization, both of which are usually undertaken in relative innocence as mistaken means of faithfulness. From its cooperation with Roman authorities and adoption of imperial institutions at its inception, to the corruption and cruelty of the medieval Church, to the scandal of religious wars in the wake of the Protestant Reformation and the failure of Christians to stop the Holocaust, to the charlatanism of "TV preachers" and the Catholic Church's pedophilia scandal, the Christian Church has given people so many reasons to question its authority that it is surprising and telling that many are still walking through its doors at least occasionally. Although I am picking on Christianity here, one could just as well say something similar of many other religious institutions. The greatest challenge to these institutions may be the necessity of acknowledging these grave and continual failures in the spirit of humility, and then dealing with those who still need and want spiritual guidance and community as equals—equally human,

equally fallible, equally uncertain and equally in need of a stronger self. <>

THE DAY IT FINALLY HAPPENS: ALIEN CONTACT, DINOSAUR PARKS, IMMORTAL HUMANS AND OTHER POSSIBLE PHENOMENA by Mike Pearl [Scribner, 9781501194139]

From a Vice magazine columnist whose beat is "the future," here is entertaining speculation featuring both authoritative research and a bit of mischief: a look at how humanity is likely to weather such happenings as the day nuclear war occurs, the day the global internet goes down, the day we run out of effective antibiotics, and the day immortality is achieved.

If you live on planet Earth you're probably scared of the future. How could you not be? Some of the world's most stable democracies are looking pretty shaky. Technology is invading personal relationships and taking over jobs. Relations among the three superpowers—the US, China, and Russia—are growing more complicated and dangerous. A person watching the news has to wonder: is it safe to go out there or not?

Taking inspiration from his virally popular Vice column "How Scared Should I Be?," Mike Pearl in The Day It Finally Happens games out many of the "could it really happen?" scenarios we've all speculated about, assigning a probability rating, and taking us through how it would unfold. He explores what would likely occur in dozens of possible scenarios—among them the final failure of antibiotics, the loss of the world's marine life, a complete ban on guns in the US, and even the arrival of aliens—and reports back from the future, providing a clear picture of how the world would look, feel, and even smell in each of these instances.

For fans of such bestsellers as What If? and The Worst Case Scenario Survival Handbook, The Day It Finally Happens is about taking future events that we don't really understand and

getting to know them in close detail. Pearl makes science accessible and is a unique form of existential therapy, offering practical answers to some of our most worrisome questions. Thankfully, the odds of humanity's pulling through look pretty good.

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What happens if...?
If you consider yourself an informed reader who cares about the future in our supposedly post-truth world, you've probably learned the dark truth about expert forecasters. They supposedly don't know anything.

There's data to back up this cynicism. For the book **SUPERFORECASTING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PREDICTION**, which psychologist Philip E. Tetlock wrote with journalist Dan

Gardner, Tetlock gathered mountains of data about predictions, only to conclude that statistically speaking, "the average expert [is] roughly as accurate as a dart-throwing chimpanzee." But still, people who predict things aren't all idiots. Tetlock and Gardner discovered that some people have a knack for prediction, and they profiled them in their book. Here's what the two authors found:

Apparently, if you want to make a prediction about the future, you should base it on hard data, and that data should be completely divorced from any hunches or biases. You should deal in probabilities—never certainties—and offer an unambiguous time frame.

For instance, if you're like legendary physicist Enrico Fermi, you can make seemingly psychic deductions about information you don't have by determining what data you can easily access, and then extrapolating. In his famous "How many piano tuners are there in Chicago?" thought experiment, Fermi asked his students to guess the number of tuners (people, not forks) to a reasonable degree of certainty with simple number crunching. We know the population of Chicago, and we know how piano tuning works. We can also calculate with some accuracy how many pianos Chicago has. So if we crunch the data, and show our work, we can come up with an estimate with a better chance of being accurate, rather than a guesstimate. It's a cool trick, but it only works when the thing you're studying is already pretty well studied.

I'm not a statistician or a physicist. In fact, I'm terrible at math, but I do like to predict the future, and I've made a job of it. I just approach it a little differently because my main qualification is a paralyzing fear of things that are going to happen.

My fear comes from an anxiety disorder—a very common mental illness. It's a mixed

blessing for someone who works as an explanatory journalist: it fills my head with ideas, but I hate the ideas. This might sound like a fun personality quirk, but if you've ever experienced a weeklong string of panic attacks, or been afraid of closing your eyes because sleep brings extreme, graphic nightmares, you know anxiety can be a whole lot more serious than just stand-up comedian—esque neurosis. I'm hypervigilant. I'm very easy to startle (that cat-in-the-window gag is in seemingly every horror film, but it gets me every time). I'm fidgety. I constantly scan my surroundings for exits.

As part of what I guess you could call a "coping strategy," I started writing my Vice column "How Scared Should I Be?" in which I tried to assess the rationality of my own fears. Writing about what scared me—things like terrorism, pit bulls, choking, and getting punched in the face—was a revelation. That experience led to my series of climate change predictions called "Year 2050," and my hypothetical war series, "Hours and Minutes." These articles weren't just therapy; through them, I learned that millions of people share my fears. And for a time, I felt a twinge of guilt: Is it okay to exploit people's fear for clicks? I wondered. But then my girlfriend (my most loyal reader) pointed out that understanding the details of a terrifying topic is weirdly empowering, even comforting.

Of course, occasionally, after a thorough excavation of the facts, I've been forced to break the news—to myself and the readers of Vice—that we're not scared enough. For example: I assigned my highest fear rating ever to "never retiring" because, after researching the topic, I decided that my peers should be much more afraid of it than they already are. So yes: by definition, I'm fearmongering.

But I see that as a net positive, too. After all, we evolved to experience fear because it saves us from harm. Evolution may not have taught us

inhabitants of the modern world to allocate our fears judiciously, but with a little research, we can make some necessary adjustments. I find it reassuring to know that some of the stuff that's ostensibly scary is also actually scary. It makes me feel sane.

But let me be clear: this isn't a self-help book, and I'm not going to make any claims about how I can rescue you, too, from anxiety if you follow my step-by-step plan. I still believe, however, that envisioning future possibilities in a sensible, fact-based way is a helpful habit that leads to clearer thinking. Since writing about speculative scenarios became my job, I've trained myself, whenever my knee-jerk response to something is fear, to stop and look at likely outcomes and real-world implications rather than imagine the apocalypse. Or, if I have to concede the possibility of the apocalypse, I ask myself, would it really be so bad?

The most therapeutic article I've ever written wasn't about the future at all. It was called "How Scared Should I Be of Pit Bulls?" I've dealt with a fear of dogs for most of my adult life, ever since 2006, when a dog I swear was the size of a lion lunged at me on a sidewalk in Budapest. It wasn't a life-threatening incident (the owner pulled the dog off me a second later, and the bite didn't even require a Band-Aid), but the shock has stayed with me. One moment that dog was someone's well-groomed pet—a good boy or girl, if you will—and the next it wanted me dead.

Even so, I brought an open mind to my investigation, and it turned out that, yes, dogs described as "pit bulls" are involved in far more fatal attacks than any other type of dog, but science can't really nail down what a "pit bull" is, which complicates the whole matter of the breed's inherent scariness. But I also learned that dogs—pit bull or otherwise—simply aren't dangerous enough to be a threat to most humans, There are only about twenty-six dog-

related fatalities a year in the US, which is less than the number of fatalities from falling tree limbs. And the vast majority of human victims have either been babies or the very elderly. What's more, that's 26 out of the approximately 4.5 million annual dog bites— including nips on the hand.

Uncovering these facts has been good therapy; I now pet pit bulls all the time—but only if they seem receptive. So with that in mind let's turn our attention to the next few decades, shall we?

 Reports on what the future may hold for humanity aren't exactly full of optimism. For instance, a multidisciplinary panel of Australians at the University of Adelaide authored a report in 1999 called The Bankruptcy of Economics: Ecology, Economics and the Sustainability of the Earth that seems to spell certain doom. The Adelaide experts note that the demands of our expansionist economic models are putting too much strain on natural resources, and they predict "massive environmental damage, social chaos and megadeath."

To make matters worse, society's collapse might be irreversible, at least according to Fred Hoyle, the British mathematician and astronomer who coined the term "big bang theory." According to Hoyle's classic book Of Men and Galaxies, with "oil gone, high-grade metallic ores gone, no species, however competent, can make the long climb from primitive conditions to high-level technology. This is a one-shot affair. If we fail, this planetary system fails, so far as intelligence is concerned."

Then again, there are academics out there, like Harvard cognitive psychologist and linguist Steven Pinker, who would have us believe that humans' pursuit of knowledge will ensure our pulling together, dodging the apocalypse, and making the best of it. As Pinker wrote in his 2018 bestseller, **ENLIGHTENMENT NOW: THE CASE FOR REASON, SCIENCE, HUMANISM, AND PROGRESS**, "Despite a half-century of panic,

humanity is not on an irrevocable path to ecological suicide. The fear of resource shortages is misconceived. So is the misanthropic environmentalism that sees modern humans as vile despoilers of a pristine planet."

Starting in 2011, with the release of Pinker's **THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED**, I began to really like Pinker-ism, because I found it enormously comforting to read passages like that one about humans not being "despoilers"—not just because they assure me humanity isn't on a path toward oblivion, but because they make me feel less guilty for being human. Still, when I read the news, my gut tells me that, yes, we're "despoilers," at least unwitting ones.

With **BETTER ANGELS**, Pinker brought to the surface a very important fact: human-on-human violence isn't on the rise; it's been dropping off precipitously over the last few millennia. But with an eye toward the future, his books contain a few too many hedges to quiet my anxieties.

They're punctuated with passages like "No form of progress is inevitable," and "Progress can be reversed by bad ideas."

Journalist Gregg Easterbrook is an optimist in the Pinker mold. In his book **IT'S BETTER THAN IT LOOKS: REASONS FOR OPTIMISM IN AN AGE OF FEAR**, he writes about watching a formerly endangered bald eagle soar through a smogless sky, a moment that "did not make me feel complacent regarding the natural world, [but] rather, made me feel that greenhouse gases can be brought to heel, just as other environmental problems have been." But Easterbrook also hedges, noting that just because "past predictions of widespread human-caused species loss did not come true does not mean the peril to other living things has concluded."

When it comes to prophesying the future it really is hard to bathe everything in sunlight when there are so many uncomfortable facts casting shadows.

One of the most famous predictive documents in my lifetime, the "World Scientists' Warning to Humanity," written in 1992 by the Union of Concerned Scientists, was pretty solid. It contained dire warnings about the atmosphere, water resources, oceans, soil, forests, and living species. When in 2017, for the organization's twenty-fifth anniversary, fifteen thousand signatories thoroughly evaluated that earlier report's predictions, they found that it had been partially wrong about the atmosphere—happily, the ozone layer has been stabilized, thanks to increased global awareness of the issue—but as for the rest, the Union noted, "humanity has failed to make sufficient progress in generally solving these foreseen environmental challenges, and alarmingly, most of them are getting far worse."

I'm sure you know the broad strokes of humanity's Big Problems before I even go into detail. Thanks to the greenhouse gases we can't seem to stop emitting, we've heated our planet around 0.8 degrees Celsius since the Industrial Revolution, and after a brief pause, we have—as of 2018—begun increasing our emissions once again. Never mind the famous 1.5-degree-high watermark; according to some estimates, we're on track to warm the planet by an average of 4 degrees Celsius by 2084 or earlier. That will, in turn, lead to longer and more severe droughts, subsequent famines, and a watery future for major coastal cities like Miami, Shanghai, Rio de Janeiro, Osaka, Alexandria, and Dhaka.

And in the midst of the crises engendered by climate change, we could lose the ability to treat bacterial diseases, as germs become more and more resistant to antibiotics. Adding to the gloominess, humanity's richest 1 percent pocketed 27 percent of all income from 1980 to

2016, while the entire lower 50 percent pulled in just about 12 percent.

And then, of course, there's the messiness of technology. I was born in 1984, placing me in the small cohort of people who experienced "an analog childhood and a digital teenhood." I created my identity in the Internet Age, but I can remember life before the internet, and like many people, I sense something bizarre is going on. Over 40 percent of Americans get their news from Facebook, and only 5 percent have "a lot" of trust in said news. Everything is being automated—and I mean everything—and while 33 percent of my countrymen are enthusiastic about that, 72 percent are worried. Those last figures are from Pew Research, which found that people are ambivalent about many aspects of technology. For example, 70 percent of us are excited about robots easing the burden of caring for our elders, but 64 percent think mechanized caregivers will probably make Grandpa and Grandma feel lonely, so, um, why are we excited again?

Summing it all up, it seems to me that if you're not both excited by and terrified of the future, you don't have a pulse.

But something's missing from all these conversations: specificity. A global mass extinction sounds grave, but shouting about a mass extinction just makes you sound like a scold or a street preacher. On the other hand, if I get specific and tell you we're going to lose Arabica coffee and the adorable aquatic mammal known as the vaquita (google it), you'll more likely feel the reality of a dawning ecological disaster at the gut level. Similarly, "political instability" sounds hazardous in a vague sort of way, but people tend to be more interested in where the civil wars are going to be and who will die. If the robots really take all of our jobs, doesn't that mean there'll be famous robots doing better, more exciting

work than the others? They sound pretty cool to me. What will they be up to?

Maybe some of these things won't happen the way we think they will. But why waste time predicting when we can imagine? When I spoke to Dan Gardner, the **SUPERFORECASTING** author, he concurred. "The range of possible futures is absolutely immense and people don't appreciate that fact," he said, which echoed my own feelings on the matter, and made me feel better about not being a mathematician or a physicist.

So with apologies to Wall Street speculators and Vegas bookmakers, I'm afraid this isn't going to be the kind of book about the future that you can use to make a clever stock trade or start a business. Predicting outcomes is, in some cases, an exact science—but mostly for boring bean counters and engineers. "When you build an airplane, you're building a new airplane, but they've got some kind of a checklist, which is immensely long," mathematician and physicist James A. Yorke, coiner of the term "chaos theory," told me. If the checklist looks good, the plane will fly. On the other hand, he pointed out, "You don't have a checklist on items which are completely new."

Even though we're about to talk in this book about the real-world implications of some pretty outlandish things, I should warn you: there won't be anything here about time travel, dragons, or everyone on Earth jumping up and down at the same time. Myths, fantasies, and goofball what-ifs have their place, but I'm trying to bring you information you can actually use. So, yes, that means there won't be a chapter on zombies.

My specific brand of future-vision was pioneered, as far as I can tell, by a guy you may or may not have heard of—Matthew Ridgway, who served as chief of staff for the US Army. Before Ridgway was a high-ranking general, his

military career got on track in the days just before US involvement in World War II when he cooked up a crazy hypothetical: What if the whole American fleet in the Pacific got wiped out? Ridgway says top brass considered his fictional scenario "fantastic and improbable," so, to work through the implications, they only agreed to schedule a single "command post exercise"—a "what-if" run-through carried out over the communications lines at headquarters rather than on simulated battlefields.

Then along came the attack on Pearl Harbor, which eerily echoed Ridgway's command post exercise. His fictional version of a Pacific fleet wipeout turned out to be somewhat inaccurate—for example, at Pearl Harbor the whole fleet wasn't completely destroyed, and the US aircraft carriers survived, which sped up the navy's recovery. But the real event at least vindicated Ridgway conceptually, and his superiors took notice. He'd been promoted by then, but he was quickly shuffled further up the ranks, and became the US general best known for taking over command of the Korean War after Harry Truman fired Douglas MacArthur.

According to Gardner, the **SUPERFORECASTING** author, the lesson we can learn from Ridgway isn't that people who speculate about future events are geniuses with ideas that are consistently amazing. Rather, the lesson is that "it doesn't matter how probable or improbable you think [an] outcome is, let's start from that point and work it through, because in the working through there is value."

To that end, let's jump ahead in this book to some earth-shattering, horrifying, ridiculous, and wonderful days in the future. The scenarios I'll be describing won't all be Pearl Harbor—level nightmares. In fact, some will be downright pleasant. But all will be of the type that we don't usually contemplate in much detail, because on some level they're unsettling. As you'll see,

most are the logical extensions of social, technological, or natural trends.

The hope is that, by indulging in what some might dismiss as crystal ball—gazing, we can actually avoid being caught flat-footed by events that are either outlandish or dangerously momentous. Also, that by looking ahead we'll develop a better understanding of the present.

There's comfort in that. Trust me. <>

A QUARTER CENTURY OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE: ELEVEN CONVERSATIONS: A SPECIAL ISSUE OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE (VOLUME 25 AND ISSUE 1-3), edited by Jeffrey M. Perl [Duke University Press, 9781478004905]

This special anniversary issue celebrates the past twenty-five years of Common Knowledge, with eleven "conversations" that cover ambivalence, commensurability, intellectual philanthropy, punitive scholarship, and more. Read together, these pieces map a quarter century in the life of a journal that Susan Sontag has dubbed her "favorite" and that Stephen Greenblatt has praised as demonstrating "what it means boldly to choose compromise over contention, reconciliation over rejection, civility over strife."

From The Editor Jeffrey M. Perl

The special issue of Common Knowledge that you are reading commences the journal's twenty-fifth volume. At least some readers, I hope, may remember that, a quarter century ago, we began with calls for papers issued by individual editors and members of the editorial board. The journal's name, after all, was not meant to imply that consensus prevailed among the founders and participants but, instead, to suggest our intention to build toward agreement over time. As a colleague and I observed in 2002, the name was also meant to express unease with the term or slogan "local knowledge," made famous by [Clifford] Geertz, a member of CK's founding editorial board. "Local knowledge" had been a shorthand for the contextualist premise of [Thomas] Kuhn and the many scholars in the many fields he influenced, that truth and meaning are goods obtainable solely inside a language game, a paradigm, an episteme, a coherent circle closed on the outside—that truth and meaning are, in other words, local, untranslatable, and incommensurable with any knowledge obtainable across frontiers, whether those be spatial, cultural, or temporal. The "local knowledge" argument arose to oppose the universalism of positivist and structuralist theories, but also to defend both living cultures against imperialism and long-ago cultures against condescension. The moral impetus of the argument, however, was belied by unethical applications.

The conversations that resulted in the founding of CK took place as the Cold War was winding down and the Balkan crisis heating up. It was a time when various champions of "local knowledge" contextualism were seeking to map commonalities among discrete communities, or at least—in the East bloc vernacular adapted by Richard Rorty—to achieve solidarity among them. Common Knowledge enmagazined that project)

The "conversations that resulted in the founding of CK" have continued here since 1992, as a call for papers that Rorty issued in that year foretold:

The word conversation is a useful, relatively bland substitute for terms like argument and dialectic and philosophy. Many of our best conversations are with people whose books we have pondered but have never met, or met only in passing. Indeed, much of our inner lives consist of conversations with such people. I've been asked to call for papers, so: I call for papers from people who would like to write up fragments of their inner lives—fragments which consist of conversations with people from whom they have learned but who inspired in them interesting and important disagreement. I wonder, what have Feyerabend and Popper learned from one another? Fang Lizhi from Mao or Kolakowski from Marx? What would Geertz say he'd learned from Lévi-Strauss, Alasdair MacIntyre from Foucault, Kenner from Ellmann, Irigaray from Mailer, Quentin Skinner from Raymond Williams, or Derrida from Gadamer? The editors of CK have agreed to hoard responses to this call and publish them together in an issue devoted to conversation(s).

We never did publish a single "issue devoted to conversation(s)." Instead, the entire quarter century became a conversation, or a set of conversations, of the sort that Rorty had called for. Perhaps the best example is the memorial tribute to Rorty himself by Alasdair MacIntyre. The cultural politics of those two could hardly have differed more. Still, MacIntyre, a Thomist moral philosopher and a radical critic of liberalism and secularism, wrote of the liberals' champion that "I learned more [from Rorty] in a shorter period, during lunchtime walks by the lake at Princeton, than I have ever done before or since."

In our first series, of seven volumes, when the publisher of Common Knowledge was Oxford University Press, symposia consumed one issue each or were spread seriatim, one article at a time, across several issues—and in some numbers of the first series there were no symposia at all. In its second series, with Duke University Press, Common Knowledge has become a venue exclusively for symposia, and indeed of multipart symposia that, as I like to think, are of unprecedented thoroughness. The symposium on xenophilia that this anniversary issue interrupts has taken four installments so far (23.2-24.2) and is likely to require three or four more to complete. Other multipart symposia in series 2 have been:

> "In the Humanities Classroom" (23.1, 24.3);
> "Peace by Other Means: Symposium on the Role of Ethnography and the Humanities in the Understanding, Prevention, and Resolution of Enmity" (20.3-22.2);
> "Experimental Scholarship, Revisited" (20.1, 2);
> "Fuzzy Studies: A Symposium on the Consequence of Blur" (17.3, 18.2-19.3);
> "Apology for Quietism: A Sotto Voce Symposium" (15.1-16.3);
> "Devalued Currency: Elegiac Symposium on Paradigm Shifts" (14.1-3);
> "A `Dictatorship of Relativism'?: Symposium in Response to Cardinal Ratzinger's Last Homily" (13.2-3);
> "Unsocial Thought, Uncommon Lives" (12.2-13.1);
> "Imperial Trauma: The Powerlessness of the Powerful" (11.2-12.1);
> "Talking Peace with Gods: Symposium on the Conciliation of Worldviews" (10.3, 11.1);
> And "Peace and Mind: Symposium on Dispute, Conflict, and Enmity" (8.1-9.3).
> Our single-issue and seriatim discussions have included:
> "Anthropological Philosophy: Symposium on an Unanticipated Conceptual Practice" (22.3);
> "The Warburg Institute: A Special Issue on the Library and Its Readers" (18.1);
> "Between Text and Performance: Symposium on Improvisation and Originalism" (17.2);
> "Comparative Relativism: Symposium on an Impossibility" (17.1);
> "Neo-Stoic Alternatives, c. 1400-2004: Essays on Folly and Detachment" (10.2);
> "The Disregardable `Second World': Essays on the Inconstancy of the West" (10.1);

"Outside the Academy: Papers from the Papal Symposia at Castelgandolfo and Vienna, 1983-1996" (73);
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"Beyond Post-: A Revaluation of the Revaluation of All Values" (1.3);
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To commemorate the journal's quarter century, this issue consists of pieces from in- and outside those symposia, arranged, to fulfill our obligation to Rorty, in conversational groupings. Readers are invited to shift, from knot to knot, around a common room filled to bursting with lively colleagues, young and old, but also ghosts, whose words mean more and other, now, than when originally written. The dead and quick alike drift from one conversation to another, then some go off, like MacIntyre with Rorty, to walk by some lake in odd couples. The dramatis personae, as I say, are representative but only as far as carnivorous agents have allowed. Hence the absence of writers (Kertész, Carver, Sebald, Bolano, Nádas, Quignard, Calasso, and Hadot among them) whose work a reader of Common Knowledge might expect to find reprinted on this occasion. Still, with ventures of this kind, celebrations are best held on the fly and called for in accordance with their peculiar criteria of attainment. On one occasion, marking no milestone of survival, I prefaced the introduction to a symposium ("on the

conciliation of worldviews") by calling for self-congratulation:

> The introduction to this symposium consists in its first two contributions: a cosmopolitan proposal by Ulrich Beck for negotiating between worldviews, then a warning from Bruno Latour against presuming we know what a conflict of worldviews entails. I would like to point out, as a preface to that introduction, that whereas versions of this discussion used to center on questions of commensurability—are worldviews comparable, let alone reconcilable?—the discussion here centers on problems of commensuration. How is it to be done and who might accomplish it? From commensurability to commensuration is a long trek, and we should feel self-congratulatory at this juncture. Historic events have turned the Linguistic Turn guild from theory toward—if not practice, then at least talk of practice. The contributors to this first installment of our symposium would have been, let me hazard, Left Kuhnians back when that term meant anything. During the time of dispute over Thomas Kuhn and incommensurability, the Right Kuhnian position was that commensuration between discrete contexts does not occur. Whereas our contributors imply or state that commensuration is the most difficult of all things not impossible (emphasis on both "most" and "not").... It is vital to our moment of self-congratulation to acknowledge that this symposium involves neither, on the one hand, idealist universalism nor, on the other hand, contextualism of the absolute kind.... The question, in other words, is [no longer] whether worldviews are commensurable. The question is whether we should do what it takes—all that it takes—to communicate and reconcile with those we fear.... But whoever—let us admit it—takes on the task is going to end up with dirty hands. This job is not one for contextualists in white gloves.... There is no clean methodology for reconciling worldviews at odds.

By this time, fifteen years later, our hands are filthy, and our shoes unwearable indoors. We are now closer, as a group, to "revanchist

optimism," because Trump, Putin, and other masters of the noble arts of casuistry and sophistry have turned them to the dark side. It has gone unnoticed, perhaps, by most readers (but not, I assure you, by any authors) that this journal, as a policy, avoids the word fact and the phrase in fact, except where demonstrable facts are involved, since fact and in fact are devices of rhetoric for bullying readers and listeners. Our authors regularly object to this policy, because composition is made more difficult when "the fact that" is ruled out as a tool for writing easy sentences. Few objected to our hygienic rule, in the old days, on epistemological grounds. These days, however, I hear, even from founding members of the editorial board, that our diffidence about facts feels like capitulation to Trump, who issues "alternative facts" for the credulous on a daily basis. The god-awful state of world affairs presently (things did appear hopeful in our first years of publication) has made the tasks that Common Knowledge set for itself a bit less difficult to achieve. Conciliation between parties not malicious seems less impossible to arrange. On the other hand, as I have recently discovered, the world's most powerful institution committed to friendship between former adversaries—I mean the Roman Catholic Church—stands not only against relativism, which one knew (we dedicated a special issue to the problem in 2007), but stands also, even under the present pope, against "eirenism" or irenicism. Let us talk, by all means; let us break bread together, the bishops say to Protestants, Muslims, and Jews with warmth and sincerity. But by no means let us worry whether, on questions that divide us, both you and we may be wrong. Let us, in other words, rethink nothing. Thus the white gloves of the episcopate are kept pristine.

Meanwhile, recalling a remark of Rorty's to Gianni Vattimo ("once Christianity is reduced to the claim that love is the only law, the ideal of purity loses its importance"), I have taken as my editorial mantra the following arrhythmic, unrhyming couplet:

> The world was never cleaner
> than on the day Noah left the ark.

The difference between cleansing and obliteration is not trivial, but perfect purity is, in itself, nonexistence. When told that my buoyancy about Muslim worship in Christian churches was inappropriate—given that, I was informed, both the Muslims and the Christians involved were indifferent—I replied that exopraxis and xenophilia are only our latest excuses to broach the topic of affects and attitudes that, although widely spurned, tend to have irenic outcomes. Over the past quarter century, in these pages, ambivalence, "antipolitics," quietism, stoicism, sophistry, casuistry, pharisaism, apathy, cosmopolitanism, "gnostic diplomacy," ecumenism, syncretism, "comparative relativism," anarchism, skepticism, perspectivism, constructivism, de-differentiation, "fuzzy logic," pensiero debole and Verwindung, "unsocial thought," detachment, humility, cowardice, caritas, and well-motivated obnubilation have all come in for cordial scrutiny.... If we conceive of indifference as in-difference—that is, a state or sensibility in which differences go unnoticed or, if noticed, are not cared about—then it is fair to say that indifference should rank higher than xenophilia in a hierarchy of irenic affects. No one ever has died a martyr for indifference. And I would like to think that, in some cases at least, a believer has come down from the scaffold, alive, in awareness that to die for Islam, Christianity, or Judaism, in its conflict with one of the other two, is to bear witness in blood to no more than a nest of ambiguities. Never mind the social and historical overlaps, links, yokes, and vector-overlays among the three traditions. There is also a theological knot so undisentangleable that Allah, the Christian Trinity, and the God of Israel are indifferentiable scholastically. However much the feel of belief in each differs from the feel of

belief in the others, I cannot imagine an honest (as opposed to a parochial) formulation that could distinguish among them without undermining the bases of all three religions.

On the same topic, in an earlier issue, "I volunteered that I knew a man in New York, a Catholic convert, originally Jewish, who used to read Sufi hymns to himself during mass. He wanted to be Jewish, Christian, and Muslim simultaneously. My students laughed, so I added that the man in question was renowned in the art world for being ahead of his time." The man was Lincoln Kirstein, who brought modernism and George Balanchine to America, cofounded the New York City Ballet, and issued caveats that felt like blessings when I asked him how to make Common Knowledge happen. On its silver anniversary, it occurs to me that reading Sufi prayers, in a Catholic church, as an ethnic Jew, was a feat of modernist choreography, one from which we may learn a good deal about what are thought to be opposed beliefs. An essay on resistance to harmony makes the point on which this introduction concludes:

David and Goliath may appear to be dueling, when observed from the bird's-eye perspective of theory. Viewed from up close, however, it may turn out that they are dancing, shifting positions over rocky ground, as each does what he feels he must to keep the only dance he knows from ending. <>

THE FUTURE OF CATHOLICISM IN AMERICA edited by Mark Silk and Patricia O'Connell Killen [The Future of Religion in America, Columbia University Press, 9780231191487]

Catholics constitute the largest religious community in the United States. Yet most American Catholics have never known a time when their church was not embroiled in controversies over liturgy, religious authority, cultural change, and gender and sexuality. Today, these arguments are taking place against

the backdrop of Pope Francis's progressive agenda and the resurgence of the clergy sexual abuse crisis. What is the future of Catholicism in America?

This volume considers the prospects at a pivotal moment. Contributors—scholars from sociology, theology, religious studies, and history—look at the church's evolving institutional structure, its increasing ethnic diversity, and its changing public presence. They explore the tensions among members of the hierarchy, between clergy and laity, and along lines of ethnicity, immigration status, class, generation, political affiliation, and degree of religious commitment. They conclude that American Catholicism's future will be pluriform—reflecting the variety of cultural, political, ideological, and spiritual points of view that typify the multicultural, democratic society of which Catholics constitute so large a part.

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The Future of Religion In America by Mark Silk and Andrew H. Walsh

What is the future of religion in America? Not too good, to judge by recent survey data. Between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of adults who said they had no religion—the so-called Nones—increased from the middle single-digits to over 20 percent, a startling rise and one that was disproportionately found among the rising "Millennial" generation. If the Millennials remain as they are, and the generation after them follows their lead, one-third of Americans will be Nones before long. To be sure, there are no guarantees that this will happen; it has long been the case that Americans tend to disconnect from organized religion in their twenties, then reaffiliate when they marry and have children. It is also important to recognize that those who say they have no religion are not saying that they have no religious beliefs or engage in no religious behavior. Most Nones in fact claim to believe in God, and many engage in a variety of religious practices, including prayer and worship attendance. Meanwhile, nearly four in five Americans continue to identify with a religious body or tradition—Christian for the most part but also Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Baha'i, Wiccan, New Age, and more. How have these various traditions changed? Which have grown and which declined? What sorts of beliefs and practices have Americans gravitated toward and which have they moved away from? How have religious impulses and movements affected public policy and the culture at large? If we are to project the future of religion in America, we need to know where it is today and the trajectory it took to get there.

Unfortunately, that knowledge is not easy to come by. For nearly half a century, the historians who are supposed to tell the story of religion in America have shied away from bringing it past the 1960s. One reason for this

has been their desire to distance themselves from a scholarly heritage they believe to have been excessively devoted to Protestant identities, perspectives, and agendas. Placing Protestantism at the center of the story has seemed like an act of illegitimate cultural hegemony in a society as religiously diverse as the United States has become over the past half-century. "Textbook narratives that attempt to tell the `whole story' of U.S. religious history have focused disproportionately on male, northeastern, Anglo-Saxon, mainline Protestants and their beliefs, institutions, and power," Thomas A. Tweed wrote in 1997, in a characteristic dismissal. Indeed, any attempt to construct a "master narrative" of the whole story has been deemed an inherently misleading form of historical discourse.

In recent decades, much of the best historical writing about religion in America has steered clear of summary accounts altogether, offering instead tightly focused ethnographies, studies based on gender and race analysis, meditations on consumer culture, and monographs on immigrants and outsiders and their distinctive perspectives on the larger society. Multiplicity has been its watchword. But as valuable as the multiplicity approach has been in shining a light on hitherto overlooked parts of the American religious landscape, it can be just as misleading as triumphalist Protestant ism. To take one prominent example, in 2001 Diana Eck's A New Religious America: How a "Christian Country" Has Become the World's Most Religiously Diverse Nation called for an end to conceptualizing the United States as in some sense Christian. Because of the 1965 immigration law, members of world religions were now here in strength, Eck (correctly) claimed. What she avoided discussing, however, was the relative weight of the world religions in society as a whole. As it turns out, although twenty-first-century America counts millions of

Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, Taoists, and adherents of other world religions in its population, they total less than 5 percent of the population. Moreover, Eck omitted to note that the large majority of post-1965 immigrants have been Christian—for the most part Roman Catholics. Overall, close to three-quarters of Americans still identify as Christians of one sort or another.

While there is no doubt that the story of religion in America must account for the growth of religious diversity, since the 1970s substantial changes have taken place that have nothing to do with it. There is, we believe, no substitute for comprehensive narratives that describe and assess how religious identity has changed and what the developments in the major religious institutions and traditions have been—and where they are headed. That is what the Future of Religion in America series seeks to provide. For the series, teams of experts have been asked to place the tradition they study in the contemporary American context, understood in quantitative as well as qualitative terms.

The appropriate place to begin remapping the religious landscape is with demographic data on changing religious identity. Advances in survey research now provide scholars with ample information about both the total national population and its constituent parts (by religious tradition, gender, age, region, race and ethnicity, education, and so on). As a resource for the series, the Lilly Endowment funded the 2008 American Religious Identification Survey, the third in a series of comparable, very large random surveys of religious identity in the United States. With data points in 1990, 2001, and 2008, the ARIS series provided robust and reliable data on American religious change over time down to the state level that is capable of capturing the demography of the twenty largest American religious groups. Based on interviews

with 54,000 subjects, the 2008 Trinity ARI S has equipped our project to assess in detail the dramatic changes that have occurred over the past several decades in American religious life and to suggest major trends that organized religion faces in the coming decades. It has also allowed us to equip specialists in particular traditions to consider the broader connections and national contexts in which their subjects "do religion."

The ARIS series suggests that a major reconfiguration of American religious life has taken place over the past quarter-century. Although signs of this reconfiguration were evident as early as the 1960s, not until the 1990 did they consolidate into a new pattern—one characterized by three salient phenomena. First, the large-scale and continuing immigration inaugurated by the 1965 immigration law not only introduced significant populations of adherents of world religions hitherto little represented in the United States but also, and more significantly, changed the face of American Christianity Perhaps the most striking impact has been on the ethnic and geographical rearrangement of American Catholicism. There have been steep declines in Catholic affiliation in the Northeast and rapid growth in the South and West, thanks in large part to an increase in the population of Latinos, who currently constitute roughly one-third of the American Catholic population. California now has a higher proportion of Catholics than New England, which, since the middle of the nineteenth century, had been by far the most Catholic region of the country.

A second major phenomenon is the realignment of non- Catholic Christians. As recently as 1960, half of all Americans identified with mainline Protestant denominations— Congregationalist, Disciples of Christ, Episcopalian, Lutheran, Methodist, and Northern Baptist. Since then, and especially

since 1980, such identification has undergone a steep decline, and by 2015 was approaching io percent of the population. The weakening of the mainline is further revealed by the shrinkage of those simply identifying as "Protestant" from 17.2 million in 1990 to 5.2 million in 2008, reflecting the movement of loosely tied mainline Protestants away from any institutional religious identification. By contrast, over the same period those who identify as just "Christian" or "non-denominational Christian" more than doubled their share of the population, from 5 to 10.7 percent. Based on current demographic trends, these people, who tend to be associated with megachurches and other nondenominational Evangelical bodies, will soon equal the number of mainliners. In most parts of the country, adherents of Evangelicalism now outnumber mainliners by at least two to one, making it the normative form of non-Catholic American Christianity. Simply put, American Protestantism is no longer the "two-party system" that historian Martin Marty identified a generation ago.

The third phenomenon is the rise of the Nones. Their prevalence varies from region to geographic region, with the Pacific Northwest and New England at the high end and the South and Midwest at the low. Americans of Asian, Jewish, and Irish background are particularly likely to identify as Nones. Likewise, Nones are disproportionately male and younger than those who claim a religious identity But there is no region, no racial or ethnic group, no age or gender cohort that has not experienced a substantial increase in the proportion of those who say they have no religion. It is a truly national phenomenon, and one that is at the same time more significant and less significant than it appears. It is less significant because it implies that religious belief and behavior in America have declined to the same extent as religious identification, and that is simply not the

case. But that very fact makes it more significant, because it indicates that the rise of the Nones has at least as much to do with a change in the way Americans understand religious identity as it does with a disengagement from religion. In a word, there has been a shift from understanding one's religious identity as inherited or "ascribed" toward seeing it as something that individuals choose for themselves. This shift has huge implications for all religious groups in the country, as well as for American civil society as a whole. In order to make sense of it, some historical context is necessary. During the colonial period, the state church model dominated American religious life. There were growing pressures to accommodate religious

dissent, especially in the Middle Atlantic region, a hotbed of sectarian diversity. But there wasn't much of a free market for religion in the colonial period because religious identity was closely connected to particular ethnic or immigrant identities: the Presbyterianism of the Scots-Irish; the Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Anabaptism of various groups of Pennsylvania Germans; the Judaism of the Sephardic communities in Eastern seaboard cities; the Roman Catholicism of Maryland's English founding families. The emergence of revivalism in the late eighteenth century and the movement to terminate state establishments after the Revolution cut across this tradition of inherited religious identity Different as they were, Evangelical Protestants and Enlightenment deists—the coalition that elected Thomas Jefferson president—could together embrace disestablishment, toleration, and the primacy of individual religious conscience and choice. This introduced amazing diversity and religious change in the early nineteenth century, in what came to be known as the Second Great Awakening. Within a few decades, however, ascribed religious identity was back in the

ascendancy. By the 1830s, Baptists, Methodists, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Disciples, and Episcopalians were establishing cultural networks—including denominational schools and colleges, mission organizations, and voluntary societies—within which committed families intermarried and built multigenerational religious identities.

The onset of massive migration from Europe in the 1840s strengthened the salience of ascribed religious identity, creating new, inward-looking communities as well as a deep and contentious division between the largely Roman Catholic immigrants and the Protestant "natives."

Moderate and liberal Protestant denominations moved away from revivalism and sought self-perpetuation by "growing their own" members in families, Sunday schools, and other denominational institutions. Religion as a dimension of relatively stable group identities persisted into the middle of the twentieth century; indeed, after World War II, sociologists saw it as a key foundation of the American way. Will Herberg famously argued that the American people were divided into permanent pools of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, with little intermarriage. Yet by the end of the 1960s, it was clear that the century-long dominance of ascribed religious identity was under challenge. Interfaith marriage had become more common as barriers of prejudice and discrimination fell; secularization made religion seem optional to many people; and internal migration shook up established communities and living patterns.

In addition, conversion-oriented Evangelical Protestantism was dramatically reviving, with an appeal based on individuals making personal decisions to follow Jesus. At the same time, a new generation of spiritual seekers was exploring religious frontiers beyond Judaism and Christianity. As at the end of the eighteenth

century, Evangelicals and post-Judeo-Christians together pushed Americans to reconceptualize religion as a matter of individual choice. By the 1990s, survey research indicated that religious bodies that staked their claims on ascribed identity—mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics above all, but also such ethno-religious groupings as Lutherans, Jews, and Eastern Orthodox—were suffering far greater loss of membership than communities committed to the view that religion is something you choose for yourself (Evangelicals, religious liberals, and the "spiritual but not religious" folk we call Metaphysicals). Within the religious communities that have depended on ascription, that news has been slow to penetrate.

The bottom line for the future of religion in America is that all religious groups are under pressure to adapt to a society where religious identity is increasingly seen as a matter of personal choice. Ascription won't disappear, but there is little doubt that it will play a significantly smaller role in the formation of Americans' religious identity. This is important information, not least because it affects various religious groups in profoundly different ways. It poses a particular challenge for those groups that have depended upon ascribed identity to guarantee their numbers, challenging them to develop not only new means of keeping and attracting members but also new ways of conceptualizing and communicating who and what they are. Preeminent among such groups are the Jews, whose conception of religious identity has always been linked to parentage; only converts are known as "Jews by choice." If to a lesser degree, Catholics and Mormons have historically been able to depend on ascriptive identity to keep their flocks in the fold. But in a world of choice, American Catholicism has increasingly had to depend on new Latino immigrants to keep its numbers up, while the

LDS Church, focused more and more on converts from beyond the Mountain West, has had to change its ways to accommodate "Mormons by choice."

In the wide perspective, what choice has done is to substantially weaken the middle ground between the extremes of religious commitment and indifference. With the option of "None" before them as an available category of identity, many Americans no longer feel the need to keep up the moderate degree of commitment that once assured that pews would be occupied on Sunday mornings. American society has become religiously bifurcated—a bifurcation signaled by political partisanship. Since the 1970s, the Republican Party has increasingly become the party of the more religious; the Democratic Party, the party of the less religious. In order to take account of this growing divide between the religious and the secular, the narrative of religion in America must thus go beyond both the Protestant hegemony story and the multiplicity story The new understanding of religious identity as chosen, in a society where "None" is increasingly accepted as a legitimate choice, stands at the center of the narrative this series will construct.

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While fragmentation, disconnection, and separation are powerful dynamics in contemporary U.S. Catholicism, they are not the entire story. Altered, innovative, even new expressions of Catholicism are emerging. Face-to-face, print, and web-based resources for spiritual guidance are more numerous and accessible than ever before. Faith-based, intentional communities of young adults, mostly college graduates, committed to service are popular. Families organize into small communities for mutual support and spiritual growth. Ethnically rich forms of prayer,

devotion, and practice have been embraced anew in seeking to strengthen spiritual life and in welcoming new immigrants, as Timothy Matovina points out in chapter 2. In some places, parish-based initiatives in community organizing thrive. Women's religious communities have confronted new challenges, some transforming their motherhouses and grounds, now far too large for their communities' needs, into environmental centers for promoting simple living and community agriculture. These all constitute emerging modes of Catholic presence and practice. What these developments point to, at least for now, is the ongoing power of Catholic thought, liturgy, and practice to shape and inspire the imaginations of Catholics. Disagreement and disconnection do not, it seems, tarnish the luster of powerful symbols, rituals, stories, and practices carried in the Catholic tradition, as Chinnici and Andrew Walsh detail in chapters 5 and 6, respectively. They continue to resonate, to attract, and to inculcate a sense of shared identity and shared responsibility, not only for the local parish but for the larger human community and natural environment as well.

Despite decades of trauma, disillusionment with church leaders, dissent from church teaching, defections, and pitched conflict over "true" aggiornamento, the Roman Catholic Church remains the single largest religious body in the United States, with nearly 70 million people, accounting for roughly a quarter of the U.S. population. If that proportion has held steady for more than four decades, it is because of immigrants, primarily Hispanics; in the meantime, an unprecedented and accelerating loss of membership among Catholics of Western European descent is underway. The Catholic Church is now losing members at a faster rate than other religious bodies. Yet, given its size, the Catholic Church in the United States will be a significant presence for the

foreseeable future. What its influence will be is a key question.

There is good evidence that large numbers of Americans will continue to identify as Roman Catholic despite disagreement with formal magisterial teaching and dissatisfaction with some dimensions of church life. Even in the face of the clergy abuse crisis, as William Dinges and Katarina Schuth show in chapters 1 and 4, most Catholics continue to report high levels of satisfaction with their local parish and their pastor. Large numbers of Catholics continue to do as they have long done—mark the transitions of life through sacramental practices within the bounds of a local parish. But as Dinges (chapter 1), Chinnici (chapter 5), and Walsh (chapter 6) describe, these same people see less difference between themselves and other Christians, so the salience of institutional affiliation is declining. Catholics act with increasing independence, defining their relationship to the church on their own terms and in ways that many in the hierarchy find increasingly troublesome but are largely helpless to resist, hamstrung as they are by a shortage of priests, which itself strains essential elements in the church's self-understanding and practice.

In delineating the emergence of today's pluriform American Catholicism, the contributors to this volume explore a set of key questions:

- Who are U.S. Catholics today, and what do they believe and practice? How is the U.S. Catholic Church coming to terms with its growing ethnic diversity?
- How successful is the U.S. Catholic Church in maintaining continuity of tradition and practice, especially around ecclesial office and sacrament?
- Can the U.S. Catholic Church develop a durable sense of shared unity in a situation of growing theological

diversity among Catholic people and a sharp decline in the number of ordained clergy and vowed religious?
- How do Catholics encounter God in prayer and worship, and what difference does that make for their relationship to formal church leaders, to their neighbors outside the church, and in their civic lives?
- Will the conflicts over the trajectory of the Second Vatican Council's teaching and reform reach some resolution, and what influence are they having on the life of prayer and the forming of Catholics' beliefs, attitudes, and dispositions?
- What public role is Catholicism playing in the wider society today, and what changes in how it plays that role can be anticipated?

The public presence of Catholicism in twenty-first-century America is complex. At this moment, its visible force seems to depend on the ability of the hierarchy to reestablish its credibility and inspire or compel assent to official teaching and action on the part of Catholics. Its ability to do so is questionable. Yet public presence exists and is growing through another venue—the laity's encounter with Catholic theological and social teaching, coupled with liturgical practice, in ways that shape their imaginations and sensibilities and so inspire their political, economic, and social actions. The force of religious ideas and religious sensibilities on the lives of individuals in a voluntary and individualistic society, which also exists on a global stage that is becoming increasingly postmodern in its social, economic, and political dimensions, is fluid and elusive. As the essays in this volume show, a pluriform American Catholicism now exists. It will continue to evolve rapidly into the foreseeable future. Its shape will significantly determine

Catholicism's fortunes, including its modes and the extent of its public influence. <>

AMERICANIST APPROACHES TO THE BOOK OF MORMON edited by Elizabeth Fenton And Jared Hickman [Oxford University Press, 9780190221928]

As the sacred text of a modern religious movement of global reach, *The Book of Mormon* has undeniable historical significance. That significance, this volume shows, is inextricable from the intricacy of its literary form and the audacity of its historical vision. This landmark collection brings together a diverse range of scholars in American literary studies and related fields to definitively establish *The Book of Mormon* as an indispensable object of Americanist inquiry not least because it is, among other things, a form of Americanist inquiry in its own right--a creative, critical reading of "America." Drawing on formalist criticism, literary and cultural theory, book history, religious studies, and even anthropological field work, **AMERICANIST APPROACHES TO THE BOOK OF MORMON** captures as never before the full dimensions and resonances of this "American Bible."

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17. Book of Mormon Poetry by EDWARD WHITLEY

Learning to Read With The Book of Mormon

The Book of Mormon has simultaneously been all too difficult and all too easy for Americanist literary critics to engage. This catch-22 is evinced by the clockwork reiteration, at least once every generation, of a specific scholarly gesture that combines dutiful nomination of and practical inattention to The Book of Mormon as an object of Americanist literary study.' To be blunt, professors of American literature seem to have recognized they have every reason to devote their best efforts to what is arguably "the only important second Bible produced in this country" and "the foundational document" of what is undeniably "one of the nation's most successful, domestically produced religions"; but they evidently have had just as many reasons not to.2 This predicament has much to do with the story of The Book of Mormon's emergence, which, by now, thanks to the likes of Tony Kushner's Angels in America and Trey Parker and Matt Stone's Broadway musical, is a relatively familiar feature of the American cultural landscape. In September 1823, Joseph Smith, Jr. reportedly received a visit from an ancient American prophet named Moroni, who informed Smith that, 1,400 years earlier, he had buried the sacred record of his people in a hillside near Smith's home in upstate New York. Four years later, in September 1827, after various experiences scrying for treasure with a "seerstone," Smith claimed to have recovered that record in the form of golden plates, as well as related artifacts, including an apparatus (called "the interpreters" or, using biblical terminology, Urim and Thummim) understood to enable Smith to "translate" the plate text from a language called "reformed Egyptian" into English. After a false start involving the loss of

116 manuscript pages, The Book of Mormon as we have it seems largely to have been produced at a remarkable pace between April and June 1829, with Smith dictating the text—typically with the aid of his seerstone and without any direct consultation of the ostensible original, the plates—to his main scribe, Oliver Cowdery.

The final product, published in March 1830 by E. B. Grandin in Palmyra, New York, was a 600-page tome narrating, in the main, the 1,000-year history of a group of Israelites who, in advance of the diaspora forced by the Babylonian invasion, escaped to the Americas around 600 BCE. Although The Book of Mormon adduces additional Old World migrations to the New, the primary story it tells begins and ends with a single family, led by the visionary patriarch Lehi, whose progeny divide into two opposed factions—Nephites, named for his obedient son Nephi, and the Lamanites, named for a son who rebels, Laman. This spiritual distinction is underscored in the text in two ways: by privileging the Nephite perspective—they are the narrators of The Book of Mormon; and by racializing the Lamanites as undesirably nonwhite—the Nephite narrative describes them as "curs [ed]" with "a skin of blackness." However, the text also undermines this distinction: by depicting phases of Lamanite righteousness and Nephite wickedness, but, above all, by having the Lamanites eventually emerge, within the narrative frame, as the victors of a millennium of intermittent warfare and by making their descendants—widely understood by early Mormons to be contemporary Native Americans—the narrative's most pertinent addressees.' By relating this saga of a "broken off" "branch" of the house of Israel (1 Ne 10:12, 15:12, 19:23-24; 2 Ne 3:5, 10:22), The Book of Mormon recenters Judeo-Christian sacred history in the Americas, most overtly in its account of the personal ministry in the Western Hemisphere

of the resurrected Christ, who reveals that the New Jerusalem of his Second Coming will be headquartered in the New rather than Old World.' Furthermore, The Book of Mormon constructs its own "coming forth" as an eschatological event: an inauguration of a millennial American present byway of a revelation of the American past. And—crucially—not to forget: By the time of Smith's death just fourteen years later in June 1844, this kingdom of God on earth was being actively built—much to the unsettlement of many Americans—by as many as 25,000 people.

On the basis of that brief description, one can perhaps readily see why The Book of Mormon has been deemed by many Americanist scholars as either too hot to handle or unworthy of handling with care. Since its appearance, The Book of Mormon has been inextricably entangled with the project of appraising the religious movement whose most familiar name, not coincidentally, is drawn from the text: Mormonism'. More specifically, Joseph Smith's prophetic legitimacy has been understood by many to hinge on the authenticity of the claims he and others made about the text's provenance—namely, that it was a divinely aided translation of a genuine ancient document relaying actual historical events. Evidence of Book of Mormon antiquity has been mobilized to vindicate Smith on two fronts: more wealdy, in the negative, to disprove allegations of malfeasance and misrepresentation in his account of the plates and their translation that might call into question his character; more strongly, in the affirmative, to posit that the only explanation for apparently antique elements in The Book of Mormon is ultimately a supernatural one proving Smith to have been miraculously touched by God in some way.9 By the same token, evidence of Book of Mormon modernity has been made to incriminate Smith as, at best, a "pious fraud"—someone who came

to justify, perhaps even partly believe in, what is understood to be, fundamentally, the lie that the text was other than a mundane contemporary composition, his own and/or others.

Because of these particulars of the text's publication and dissemination, The Book of Mormon has tended to neatly demarcate "religious" and "secularist" interpretive positions along a temporal axis: To accept the antiquity Smith and others seemed to allege for The Book of Mormon was (and often still is) to recognize oneself as a believer, a "Mormon";" to commonsensically assume the modernity of the text was (and often still is) to call Joseph Smith a deceiver in some measure and mark oneself as a disbeliever, at times even an anti-Mormon of some stripe. This hermeneutical dualism has tended to transform all discussants of the text into either debunkers or defenders of the Mormon faith. Consequently, academic study of The Book of Mormon typically has been cowed or co-opted by the charged theological questions surrounding the text's historical status. In this scheme, the Americanist who might think of putting The Book of Mormon on her research agenda or syllabus is placed in either the uncomfortable or the all-too-comfortable position of taking a polemical stance: To historicize The Book of Mormon as nineteenth-century American literature may seem to entail a secularist dismissal of Mormonism's faith claims. The consequences for The Book of Mormon are bad either way: The Americanist scholar disinclined to resume the allotted role of philosophe discrediting a text sacralized by a religious community probably just won't read it; and the Americanist scholar keen to resume that role is likely to produce an ungenerous and shallowly topical reading presupposing the moral and aesthetic thinness of the text.

On this last point, one might discern how The Book of Mormon has, on the other hand, been all too easy for nineteenth-century Americanists to take up. Insofar as reading of The Book of Mormon has largely been mediated by questions about the marvelous historicity Smith and early Mormons imputed to it, a preeminent form of "secularist" reading of the text has been to see it as an indiscriminate catch-all of nineteenth-century Americana. This precedent was set in one of the earliest sustained critical engagements with the text, competing Christian restorationist Alexander Campbell's 1832 Delusions, which argued The Book of Mormon contained "every error and almost every truth discussed in N. York for the last ten years. [Smith] decides all the great controversies—infant baptism, ordination, the trinity, regeneration, repentance, justification, the fall of man, the atonement, transubstantiation, fasting, penance, church government, religious experience, the call to the ministry, the general resurrection, eternal punishment, who may baptize, and even the question of freemasonry, republican government, and the rights of man."" More than 100 years later, in what registers as one of the first mainstream recommendations of The Book of Mormon for serious scholarly study, Fawn Brodie struck the same note, although she altered somewhat its timbre: The Book of Mormon, she wrote, "can best be explained, not by Joseph's ignorance nor by his delusions [here she is certainly conversing with Campbell], but by his responsiveness to the provincial opinions of his time. He had neither the diligence nor the constancy to master reality, but his mind was open to all intellectual influences, from whatever province they might blow."

Under this paradigm, Joseph Smith is a tabula rasa for the nineteenth-century American context at large and The Book of Mormon is not Smith's translation of plates engraved by ancient American prophets but rather a record of his own inscription—indeed, his overwriting—by the history immediately around him. Much of the scant Americanist work on The Book of Mormon has proceeded on this model, treating the text piecemeal as a kind of handy prooftext for whatever one's historical thesis about nineteenth-century America is, as though it's somehow all in there. There's no denying that The Book of Mormon can indeed seem like something cooked up after hours at a conference of nineteenth-century Americanists, an object almost too good to be true. Just consider: At a fraught postcolonial—and neocolonial—moment of the US's world-historical arrival, at the opening of the era of literary nationalism, here comes an epic history of the Israelite inhabitants of ancient America, endowing the New World with Old World heft, supplying not only a millennial present (these were a dime a dozen) but an extravagant ancient past that presages that millennial present; and then consider that these ancient American Israelites were taken to be the ancestors of contemporary American Indians, thereby registering the complex links between settler and Native nationalisms." From such an angle, The Book of Mormon almost too brazenly serves itself on a platter to Americanists.

Notably, these two hermeneutical poles—of "religious" conviction in the robustness of the text's antiquity and "secularist" considerations of the repleteness of the text's modernity—align in denying Smith and the text any complex agency in representing and intervening in history. The text is either Smith's mere reading-off of words God projected onto the seerstone in order to recover more or less wholesale a long-lost ancient world or a simple relay via Smith of garden-variety nineteenth-century American discourses. To put this in literary—critical parlance, The Book of Mormon has until

quite recently been subject to the crudest kind of "symptomatic reading:' By symptomatic reading, we here mean a basically historicist mode of interpretation that understands texts to be definitively shaped, in the final analysis, by the societal structures within which their authors Smith's America as an eschatological prism through which the past can be seen to be seeking its fulfillment in the present and the present finding its fulfillment in the past. In other words, following Walter Benjamin's construal of the messianic, The Book of Mormon openly aspires to be metahistory—a radical rewriting and alternative enactment of history in light of a specific defiant fact: the persistence of Native legacies and lives in the face of Euro-Christian settler colonialism in the Americas. The Book of Mormon is a portal to a new historiography and inhabitation of time constellated around the world-historical event of indigenous survivance of genocide in the Western Hemisphere. It is Americanist work of an especially ambitious—and, more than ever, relevant—sort. Hence, there is no escaping historicity when it comes to The Book of Mormon, but the specific historicity question that has dominated the text's discussion—is it a raging symptom of the ancient milieu its narrative world may seem to evoke or the modern milieu in which it came forth?—can be radically reframed by way of a surface reading of the text's fruitful obsession with tracing time's movement, specifically toward what is asserted to be a point of potentially clarifying culmination in nineteenth-century America. By revealing how actively and creatively The Book of Mormon itself historicizes, such a surface reading may in turn facilitate a finer symptomatic reading of The Book of Mormon, a more granular historicization of the profundity of the text's own work of historicization that may teach us a great deal about the pasts, presents, and futures that might be gathered

under the rubric of 'America." It is here, at this point, that the work of this collection begins. The contributors to this volume, despite their manifest differences of orientation, can be seen to join hands in realizing The Book of Mormon's capacity to sustain the most original and searching Americanist inquiry by, first and foremost, recognizing the text's own such inquiry.

The authors of this collection's essays approach The Book of Mormon from a variety of methodological and theological perspectives, but all share a commitment to taking seriously the book's relationship to and impact on the culture into which it emerged. The works in this volume thus speak to each other, at times directly, in fruitful ways, and we have arranged them into sections to highlight some of their most compelling shared concerns. The Book of Mormon's status as an object always has held deep significance to believers and detractors alike. Metal plates, handwritten translations, missing pages—all have borne as much significance to the book's reception as its contents. The essays in our first section contend with The Book of Mormon's vexed materiality, assessing the relationship between the book's various physical manifestations and the meaning it has generated over time. Jillian Sayre shows how Smith's text and other early Mormon writings create an affective link between past and present in the service of an impending messianic future; in so doing, she highlights and critiques the tacitly secular assumptions of previous theories of print culture —particularly those following Benedict Anderson's notion of "imagined communities." Demonstrating the always-permeable relationship between "text" (the contents or ostensible "inside" of a book) and "paratext" (all of its framing, "outside" features), R. John Williams resists the notion of sidelining history when approaching Smith's text, and he treats

The Book of Mormon as a case study in the impossibility of delineating the boundaries of any book. Paul Gutjahr's piece focuses on the role a single editor, Orson Pratt, showing that editions of the book produced after Smith's death reflect Pratt's investments in systematic theology and scientific epistemology. Though its status as a sacred text might seem to set it apart from human designs, The Book of Mormon never has been a static document, and the essays in this section all take revealing approaches to its textual history.

Of prime importance to any understanding of The Book of Mormon is recognition of its status as a sacred text. As the essays in this book's second section collectively demonstrate, though, The Book of Mormon's relationship to the scriptural record is anything but simple, and its overt religiosity does not prevent it from engaging with the issue of secularism. Examining some of the book's most explicit engagements with the King James Bible, Grant Hardy argues that The Book of Mormon not only stands as a scripture itself but also creates a world in which scriptural texts can proliferate. Intertextuality, anachronism, and wordplay, Hardy suggests, are not accidental to the text but intrinsic to its aims; at the heart of The Book of Mormon lies a notion of the divine that delights in linguistic and narrative creativity. Eran Shalev examines the tradition of biblical imitation in texts of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Although it shared much with its pseudo-biblical predecessors, The Book of Mormon fundamentally changed the landscape around these texts, because it claimed that its language was authentic rather than metaphorical—in so doing, it may have rendered the genre obsolete. Drawing on the long philosophical tradition grappling with the distinctions between speech and text, Samuel Brown argues that The Book of Mormon generates a symbiotic relationship between the two. This merging, he suggests,

simultaneously allows The Book of Mormon to suggest that all scripture requires a supplement and to bridge the distance between the human and the divine. In an essay also concerned with The Book of Mormon's relationship to the act of writing, Laura Thiemann Scales contends that the recognition of textual mediation is central to its theory of prophecy. Through an assessment of the text's complicated uses of narration, Scales shows that the commingling of human and divine voices does not undercut the book's claims regarding personal revelation but instead operates as an essential component of its theological mission. Examining the world of dissent and religious argument that emerges among the Nephites, Grant Shreve shows how the text defines a public sphere in which competing voices jockey for acceptance in the absence of traditional religious institutions. Rather than simply presenting secularism as the endpoint of modernity, though, The Book of Mormon simultaneously considers how revelation might intervene in human history and convert all choices into a singular option.

The Book of Mormon is undeniably and deeply concerned with the status of indigenous peoples on the American continent, in ancient times as well as the nineteenth century Smith inhabited. The essays in this book's third section thus address The Book of Mormon's depictions of Amerindian peoples and the ongoing efforts to grapple with its unsettling accounts of colonialism, violence, and racial and sexual differences. Reading The Book of Mormon within a larger cultural conversation about the structure of kinship—one heavily influenced by white notions of indigenous family structures—and the links between the living and the dead, Nancy Bentley argues that the book stands not as a relic of ancient ways of being but rather as a new expression of modern subjectivity. Peter Coviello reconsiders The Book of Mormon's fraught depictions of race within the context of

early Mormon negotiations of the nation-state's multilayered alignment of whiteness with particular structures of sex, gender, and secularity. The Mormon entrance into whiteness, he argues, required more than a simple adoption of "racism" and was, in fact, a brutal and perilous process highlighting the intersectionality of sex and religion with American notions of race. Elizabeth Fenton examines the relationship between Smith's text and contemporary theories regarding the history of indigenous American populations. Focusing particularly on the theory that Americans descended from the lost Ten Tribes of Israel—a theory The Book of Mormon explicitly rejects—Fenton argues that the book presents Christianity as a belief system with numerous, independent points of origin while simultaneously deferring the millennial end it forcefully predicts. Focusing on Samuel the Lamanite's reworking of Matthew 23-24 (which appears in the Book of Helaman), Joseph Spencer and Kimberly Berkey excavate The Book of Mormon's subtle but nevertheless present interest in the intersectionality of race and sex. Unique in this collection is Stanley Thayne's work, which takes an ethnographic approach to contemporary Native American interpretations of The Book of Mormon. Through interviews with an LDS member of the Catawba Nation, Thayne shows how one reader grapples with the intricacies of overlapping identities to produce a reading of the text that is at once local and hemispheric, Mormon and indigenous, past and future oriented.

The essays in the final section of this collection engage with The Book of Mormon as a site of cultural production, both operating in conjunction with existing genres and producing new ones in its wake. Terryl Givens situates the text within broader Christian debates about the primacy of grace and works within the framework of salvation to show how it addresses the lack of assurance endemic to most Protestant belief systems. Although the book itself does not offer certitudo salutis, it does, through an innovative literalization of covenant theology, satisfy a yearning for deliverance and a will to connect with the divine. Amy Easton-Flake's essay also highlights The Book of Mormon's cultural innovation, noting that, against the grain of a society that positioned women and mothers as the moral centers of the home, it insists that men and fathers take the lead in religious instruction. Reading the text alongside conduct manuals of the era, Easton-Flake shows that The Book of Mormon might itself be read as a kind of guide for faithful men who would assume an active role in familial religious life. Focusing on The Book of Mormon's prophecy regarding Columbus's arrival in the Americas, Zachary Hutchins suggests that the text uses Columbus to foreground the imperfect and always incomplete nature of revelation. Columbus's significance within Smith's text and the works that follow from it, including those by Mormon author Orson Scott Card, might be read as an evocation of the possibility that terrible error and fallibility are embedded within the structure of revealed religion. And finally, Edward Whitley explores the rich tradition of poetic writing inspired by The Book of Mormon. Examining a variety of poetic genres, from the elegy to the epic, Whitley suggests that Book of Mormon poetry offers readers a theory of history in which time is neither linear nor progressive. By calling forth a past to speak in the present, these poems highlight The Book of Mormon's own construction of temporal plurality and recursive history.

We have made some editorial decisions for this volume that bear mentioning. There are numerous editions of The Book of Mormon available to readers, and so in the interest of

uniformity we have asked our contributors to use Royal Skousen's The Book of Mormon: The Earliest Text for citations. Skousen's edition is the product of a years-long, meticulous study of Joseph Smith's original manuscripts, and it is the most accurate version of the text to date. It not only corrects errors that have appeared in other editions of the book (largely because of typesetting mistakes) but also stands as an accessible scholarly rendering of the work. In the interest of making our own book accessible to readers, though, we have asked our contributors to use chapter and verse format rather than page numbers when citing the The Book of Mormon; this way, readers may refer to whatever copy of the book they happen to have on their shelves. We also have opted to italicize the title of The Book of Mormon and capitalize its initial article throughout the volume. Some readers may find this typographical choice a bit jarring, as much writing about the book follows the convention of rendering scriptural titles in roman type and presenting their initial article in lowercase (as with the Bible or the Quran). Our choice reflects a desire to remain as neutral as possible on the question of The Book of Mormon's truth claims by following the convention for printing the title of a long work of verse or prose. The aim of this collection is to assess the book within the context of nineteenth-century Americanist inquiry, and the typography reflects this. Finally, except where it would cause confusion, the essays in this collection will follow the convention of referring to authors, editors, and other public figures by their last names. Joseph Smith, Jr. thus will appear simply as "Smith" in most cases. <>

WHERE THE LIGHTNING STRIKES: THE LIVES OF AMERICAN INDIAN SACRED PLACES by Peter Nabokov [Viking, 978067003432]

Profiles sixteen locations of sacred relevance to Native Americans, explaining how each site reflects the diversity of a unique Native American culture, in a volume that covers such areas as Tennessee's Tellico Valley, Rainbow Canyon in Arizona, and the high country of northwestern California. 30,000 first printing.

Contents

My first encounter with the merging of physical and spiritual habitats described in this book

came on a hot South Dakota afternoon in 1958. A Lakota Indian friend named Ed Clown from the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation had a place he wanted me to see. For an hour we followed dirt roads west of the town of Dupree until we parked on a road shoulder and began to walk across ranks of plowed furrows. A quarter mile off stood a solitary butte with unmowed ground cover, rounded boulders and stunted pines. Up top looked like a good place to catch a breeze. Later I learned we were not far from the geographical center of North America.

Encircling the butte were busted strands of rusty wire that drooped between rotting posts. We stepped over them and didn't look back. Unlike those regimental lines of naked, sliced dirt behind us, here the grass blew and peaked like waves. Big rocks, crusted with patches of gray and ocher lichen, sank into the earth. We used a single-file path that lay so deep the grass tunneled over it. The smell was of sage and manure. Our movements flushed insects; a dirty-yellow meadowlark skipped ahead.

Ed turned with a sharp glance; I stepped up the pace. On the summit I followed him to a rock with charred spots. He dribbled tobacco from a Bull Durham pouch, cracked a match, burned the mixture and said some words. My eyes strayed past some U-shaped rock enclosures at the rim, across the fields to a hazy line of cottonwoods along a river. Under the sky the horizon was wide and curved and spread, as a Lakota phrase goes, with awanka toyala, "the greenness of the world."

I think the butte belonged to a white rancher who looked the other way about Indians' coming up. But Ed wasn't behaving as if anybody owned the place. It seemed more the opposite, as if the real authorities hovered in the air around us.

When I was six, my mother told me that American Indians "were here first," and I've spent much of my life investigating what that all means.

Certainly one of the results of such a long residence is a range of deep and complex ties to the environment, including those that prompted an Australian Aborigine t0 ask a National Geographic writer if America had people who had lived there as long as his had in Australia. "Only the American Indians," the visitor replied, "[are] as old in that land as your people are in this one." The Aborigine nodded thoughtfully. "That's very old. Perhaps as old as the Dreamtime," he said. "They must have sacred places in the land as we have:

My awareness of this older Indian presence in America deepened when I was twelve and our school class stumbled upon the remains of a Pautuxant Indian village near my hometown. There was something raw about the way that evidence rose from the dirt. The sense of responsibility we felt toward those arrowheads, beads and trade pipes was serious and new to us. Ten more years of reading and thinking about Indians led me to this butte in South Dakota.

A gentle man of few words, Ed Clown didn't explain the place. Now I know that once upon a time a solitary vision seeker had experienced an important revelation here, which launched its reputation as a promising location to encounter spirits and beg for luck and power. At that time it seemed enough that Ed had brought me to a place he cared about, that I knew it was a sacred spot, and that I'd behaved accordingly. Today I wonder whether he also wanted me to understand that there was more to some American places than met the eye and to appreciate that his people had known that for a long time.

We didn't unwrap our lunches until we were back at the road shoulder and sitting on Ed's tailgate. By the time we were driving away and I had twisted around, the butte was a bump on the skyline. The whole trip took little more than six hours. Yet in that time I'd discovered something new about the possible lives of places in this country of mine. In ways that I had years and years ahead to learn more about, that butte was alive.

After that experience I found other environments all across North America with similar powers and biographies. The anthropologist Robert Heizer used to say that California Indians lived in two worlds at the same time. There was the practical world where they hunted, traveled, loved, fought and died. And there was the equally real world of the spirits. Trees, animals, springs, caves, streams and mountains might each contain a life force, spirit or soul and must be treated with caution and respect.

Since that summer in 1958, I have put a lot of time into investigating how different American Indian societies positioned their people between those two worlds, how they believed the spirits of place responded and how transactions and relationships between them conferred various senses of the "sacred" upon those places.

This book is not about Indian systems of land tenure or indigenous techniques for management of land and natural resources or environmental laws affecting Indians. I wrote it to establish the pre-Christian origins of religion in North America, to give readers a sense of the diversity of American Indian spiritual practices by focusing on beliefs related to different American environments, to remind them of the profound affection and affiliation that many Indians felt and still feel toward this American earth and to illustrate the persistence of those beliefs, practices and feelings against great odds.

Especially revered were the locations where their creators, or spirit beings, had formed the cosmos: the planets, the earth's topography and plants and fellow creatures. Indians often named places to commemorate where the earliest mythic figures had played out their great adventures. In story and song they memorialized the landscapes which supernatural heroes or trickster spirits had transformed into their present shapes, or special places where they left traces behind them. They noted how odd-looking rocks or other landscape features bore resemblance to characters in their stories, and they considered this more than coincidence.

They cherished the places where a First People had emerged from the earth or landed from the sky or been created in situ, and they remembered the lakes, caves, bluffs and mountains where they settled, even before human beings as we know them ever arrived on the scene. Some of these locations stood out as freaks of nature; others were remarkably monumental or beautiful while some would not draw a second glance.

Their spirits of place dwelled among, could be identified with, or were embodied by stars, planets, clouds, mountains, caves, trees, lakes, rivers, springs, rocks and plants. The linkages between these spirits, their habitats and early Indian communities determined everyone's health and success or failure in life.

On isolated overlooks and at cave mouths and other sites considered to be portals or thresholds between human and spirit worlds, individual Indians suffered, prayed and sought visions and transacted with the shy, evasive entities who lived there.

But they also undertook collective pilgrimages to contact their mythological beings on their own grounds and noted places where moral or religious teachings were first given to them.

They painted on rocks and carved into trees so that future generations would know the p0wers of these special locations and give them wide berth or use them with care.

Indians avoided ominous, frightening spots known to be associated with dangerous spirits, or sometimes they deliberately headed for them to acquire the powers to do harm.

Around grounds set aside for group ceremonies, tribal councils and lawmaking, they behaved with circumspection and respect. During visits to them, they refrained from speaking loudly, displaying weapons or quarreling.

Indians credited their myths and tales with explaining why the natural world behaved and looked the way it did and with identifying their sacred places. They wore masks to merge with the spirits during rites that tied their societies to particular landscapes.

They revered and revisited routes where their ancestors had migrated across the land, especially those spots where they had stopped, died, rested, split off or resumed their travels.

They piled rocks into cairns to remember fallen heroes and places of victory in battle.

They honored locations associated with great prophets, teachers and leaders.

They consecrated areas for the peaceful rest of their dead.

They marked the best traveling routes and mountain passes and shortcuts to locations where they gathered natural resources or traded for them.

Through place-names, they staked user claims to these foraging areas, hunting grounds, fishing stations and historical and sacred locations.

They cherished the places where they gathered ritual materials, the meadows where they collected plants, the rapids and riverbanks where they fished and the woods, seas and plains where they hunted. They reciprocated with offerings to the plants they harvested and the animals they killed.

All over North America the landscape is saturated with Indian memories and stories that describe such beliefs. Of course, these practices differed greatly from habitat to habitat, but it is fair to say that Indians played a part in the inner life of the land, and it responded as an influential participant in theirs.

One need not romanticize Indian attitudes toward nature in order to acknowledge that attitudes and ethics about beings and forces that reside in the natural environment and the wider universe were and remain a bedrock of American Indian belief systems.

This book focuses on relationships between Indians, environments and religions. Along the way I also challenge three stereotypes.

First is the mistaken idea that before the arrival of Europeans, the religious attitudes of Indians toward the natural environment were frozen in time. Before 1500, Indian peoples responded to changing environmental and historical circumstances; after that their cultural lives continued to evolve down to the present day. This process of adaptation, and the tensions between doing things the old way and trying (or being forced to try) something new—what we might call conservatism versus innovation—had been going on long before Euro-Americans arrived. Rarely did it mean the disappearance of earlier religious beliefs. Some transformed, others withered, but many became more

complex through the winnowing, blending and layering processes over time. Like societies everywhere, American Indian cultures and their religious systems are the products of this tug-of-war between historical change and inherited traditions.

A second error is thinking that Indian attitudes toward the environment were simple and similar. In the past, when Indian rituals and beliefs were more dependent upon and interwoven with highly localized ways of living off the land, their differences may have been more pronounced. But even today, we have no monolithic Indian culture, no single web of relationships to nature. Shared themes and common principles may resurface throughout this book. But these sixteen biographies of place dramatize a tribal diversity that is the result of different ecologies, histories, languages, economies, worldviews and values.

A third problem with understanding American Indian sacred places is the expectation that they will please the eye. It may be misleading to conjure up a picturesque mountain or lake, or some promontory where local lore describes Indian lovers leaping to their deaths. Coffee-table books or calendars with color photos may not be the best way to appreciate the time-depth, spatial variety and cultural complexities of Indian ties to their religious landscapes.

This book also tries to counterbalance writings on American Indians and ecology that are driven by romantic ideas about "harmony with nature" or are turned to the service of environmental advocacy. I profile landscapes that are often unlike those enjoyed by outdoor tourists, photographers and sports buffs. I focus on habitats permeated with beliefs about what lies within or beneath what the eye can see. The environments whose "lives" I narrate should also be distinguished from phrases like "spirit of place" or "geography of hope" by

which nature writers or conservationists evoke the psychological benefits and moral and political responsibilities of immersion in one's own neck of the woods.

Nor should Indian attitudes about the environment be hijacked in order to confer the blessings of aboriginal authenticity or spiritual supremacy upon a contemporary agenda. And one also distorts Indian religious beliefs by reducing them to universal principles or archetypes, whether they are environmental, psychological or religious. Before we surrender to our own concerns, with their relevance to our ecological emergencies, it may be more respectful and interesting to learn about these aboriginal American thought worlds on their terms. One would be a fool not to applaud and explore whatever tips or inspirations they might offer for living more equitably and sustainably with the environment. But the less anyone pontificates how that should be done, the less readers will look for prepackaged self-help or cultural conversion programs and the more they will take their environmental futures into their own hands.

The prompt for this book was my dismay at what happened following the passage of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act. When President Jimmy Carter signed that legislation on August 28, 1978, for a fleeting moment the topic of American Indian sacred places commanded the nation's attention. It felt like a great success on behalf of more than fifteen thousand years of Indian presence, prayer and practice in this land. But it was not.

The act was the climax of two decades of mounting complaints about the abuse of Indian religious and cultural rights. Iroquois from New York State demanded the repatriation of wampum belts that were locked up in their state museum. Taos Pueblo fought for return of its Blue Lake watershed in northern New

Mexico, taken from them by the U.S. government in 1906. Lakota tribes sought the return of lands in the Black Hills of South Dakota, appropriated from them in the 1870s. Indians from California to Illinois to Minnesota were outraged by museum displays of Indian skulls and skeletons. Alaskan native whalers and hunters resisted environmental laws that restricted their hunting practices. Native parents fought school codes that forbade their children from wearing long hair. Native prison inmates petitioned for the right to pray in traditional sweat baths. Oklahoma craftsmen protested arrests for using feathers from protected birds on their ritual fans and rattles. Members of the Native American Church were fed up with harassment by lawmen for using a controlled substance (peyote cactus) as their sacramental food. For the first time in more than half a century, Indian concerns were not only political and economic. They were cultural once again.

Most challenging to America's values of inviolable private property and the government's mandate to keep its public lands available to boaters, campers, extreme sportsmen, hunters, tourists, miners and lumbermen were Indian claims to special places that their oldest stories talked about and where their oldest spirits still lived.

Land developers, road builders and park rangers learned that whenever bulldozers unearthed old Indian bones in inconvenient places, a ceremonial reburial could be negotiated without too much delay. More stubborn conflicts arose when Indians claimed that the government's multiple-use policies or private development threatened their sacred rivers, mountains or forests. The beliefs and practices related to these "cultural resources" were rooted in the American earth and could not be relocated.

At long last, in late 1977, the U.S. Senate's Select Committee on Indian Affairs responded. It drafted Senate Joint Resolution 102, which had two goals: first, it reaffirmed the First Amendment's freedom-of-religion privileges for native practices, "including but not limited to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites." Second, it made doubly sure that federal agencies extended all First Amendment rights to Indians. After a year of public hearings, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act was passed by the Senate and the House and signed by President Carter.

Then came the backlash. In defiance of every guiding principle in the 1978 Religious Freedom Act, each following year saw Indians losing more and more control over their rights to sacred places on public lands. Indeed, the major court decisions that compose this book's four sections seemed almost calculated to send a symbolic message by securing the government's claims to the four sacred directions and reminding Indians who was still in charge.

To the east, in eastern Tennessee in 1979, members of the Cherokee Nation proved no match for powerful interests that were bent on constructing the Tellico Dam across the Little Tennessee River.

To the south, in northern Arizona in 1977 and 1983, complaints by the Navajo that their Rainbow Canyon was being destroyed by Glen Canyon Dam fell on deaf ears, as did Hopi and Navajo arguments that expanded ski-lift facilities threatened the sanctity of the San Francisco Peaks.

To the north, in western South Dakota in 1982, law suits by Lakota and Cheyenne religious leaders to halt the expansion of parking lots on the slope of Bear Butte in the Black Hills were dismissed.

To the west, in northern California in 1988, a campaign by Yurok, Karuk and Tolowa tribes to halt a U.S. Forest Service road in their sacred high country went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, where it ended with a devastating legal precedent for Indians everywhere.

Subsequent orders and directives restored some bite to the 1978 legislation. In 1992, amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act passed by the U.S. Congress preserved Indian rights of privacy about sacred places. President Clinton's 1996 Executive Order asked federal land managers to "accommodate access to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites."

But more recent court losses, such as the Devil's Tower Case of 1998, reminded one and all that on the legal level, native terrain was as vulnerable as ever. Indian places were still drowned by dams, drained by wells, stripped by chainsaws, peeled by mines, penetrated by oil rigs and overcome by land developers, tourists, spiritual seekers, skiers, hikers and rock climbers.

I have organized this book around those four major court cases in the east, south, north and west. Within these four sections I reconstruct sixteen stories of American Indian habitats and associated belief systems that introduce a range of different tribal relationships to the natural world. Each chapter sketches the conditions that established those relationships and the creeds and rituals that sustained them. Included also are stories about scholars—Indian and non-Indian—who helped us understand them and some personal experiences that helped me make sense of them.

My hope is that these narratives will make readers more aware of the diversity of native heritages and the complexities of Indian-white relations that still echo in their own backyards.

May they become more respectful of the thousands of years of human thought, prayer and ritual that have saturated the places where they live. And may they be more willing to support Indian peoples in their struggles to maintain these sorts of connections to the American earth. <>

OUR HISTORY IS THE FUTURE: STANDING ROCK VERSUS THE DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE, AND THE LONG TRADITION OF INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE by Nick Estes [Verso, 9781786636744]

How two centuries of Indigenous resistance created the movement proclaiming "Water is life"

In 2016, a small protest encampment at the Standing Rock Reservation in North Dakota, initially established to block construction of the Dakota Access oil pipeline, grew to be the largest Indigenous protest movement in the twenty-first century. Water Protectors knew this battle for native sovereignty had already been fought many times before, and that, even after the encampment was gone, their anticolonial struggle would continue. In **OUR HISTORY IS THE FUTURE**, Nick Estes traces traditions of Indigenous resistance that led to the #NoDAPL movement. **OUR HISTORY IS THE FUTURE** is at once a work of history, a manifesto, and an intergenerational story of resistance.

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My grandfather Andrew, who had an eighth-grade education, wrote in the preface of Kul-Wicasa-Oyate what would have been a fitting epigraph for this book about our nation's history of the defense of our land, our water, and our people:

My people's history has been lost or destroyed since the coming of the white man. My people, in many ways, have been lost and destroyed by the coming of the white man ... This book is not the whole story of my people nor is it all that is best in our heritage. Some of our traditions, our hopes and our roots, we will never write down for the world to see. What we will allow the world to see is, in good part, in these pages. Read them my brothers and you white man, you read them too. It is a history of a proud people: a people who believe in the land and themselves. My people were civilized before the white came and we will be civilized and be here after the white man goes away, poisoned by his misuse of the land and eaten up by his own greed and diseases.'

In September 2016, at a #NoDAPL protest in Chicago organized by the Native community and groups such as #BlackLivesMatter, I told this family history in front of a crowd of thousands outside the Army Corps headquarters. That city's vibrant Native community was itself a result of federal relocation programs onto traditional Potawatomi territory, an Indigenous nation subjected to genocide and removed from its homelands in the place currently called "Chicago." My ancestors could never have imagined that thousands, perhaps millions, would one day rally to defend the river, our relative Mni Sose. Half a century ago, there were no mass protests against the dams that still wreak havoc on our river, a history I have spent the more than a decade speaking and writing about, with little interest from the outside world.

As we marched, a light rain fell.

"Tell me what the prophecy looks like!" we chanted.

"This is what the prophecy looks like!"

And it was prophecy. Prophecy told of Zuzeca Sapa, the Black Snake, extending itself across the land and imperiling all life, beginning with the water. From its heads, or many heads, it would spew death and destruction. Zuzeca Sapa is DAPL—and all oil pipelines trespassing through Indigenous territory. But while the Black Snake prophecy foreshadows doom, it also foreshadows historic resistance and resurgent Indigenous histories not seen for generations, if ever. To protect Unci Maka, Grandmother Earth, Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples will have to unite to turn back the forces destroying the earth—capitalism and colonialism. But prophets and prophecies do not predict the future, nor are they mystical, ahistorical occurrences. They are simply diagnoses of the times in which we live, and visions of what must be done to get free. In the past, youth followed the guidance of Indigenous elders, the old ones. But in these prophetic times, it is the old ones who are following the leadership of the young, the youth leaders of the #NoDAPL movement—among them, Zaysha Grinnell, Bobbi Jean Three Legs, Jasilyn Charger, and Joseph White Eyes, among others, who brought the message of the Black Snake to the world through thousand-mile relay runs from April to July of 2016.

For the Oceti Sakowin, prophecies like the Black Snake are revolutionary theory, a way to help us think about our relationship to the land, to other humans and other-than-humans, and to history and time. How does one relate to the past? Settler narratives use a linear conception of time to distance themselves from the horrific crimes committed against Indigenous peoples and the land. This includes celebrating bogus

origin stories like Thanksgiving. But Indigenous notions of time consider the present to be structured entirely by our past and by our ancestors. There is no separation between past and present, meaning that an alternative future is also determined by our understanding of our past. Our history is the future. Concepts such as Mni Wiconi (water is life) may be new to some, but like the nation of people the concept belongs to, Mni Wiconi predates and continues to exist in spite of white supremacist empires like the United States.

The protestors called themselves Water Protectors because they weren't simply against a pipeline; they also stood for something greater: the continuation of life on a planet ravaged by capitalism. This reflected the Lakota and Dakota philosophy of Mitakuye Oyasin, meaning "all my relations" or "we are all related." Water Protectors led the movement in a disciplined way, by what Lakotas call Wocekiye, meaning "honoring relations." To the outside world this looks like "praying," the smoking of the Canupa, the sacred pipe, offering tobacco, ceremony, and song to human and other-than-human life. The late Lakota linguist and scholar Albert White Hat Sr. notes that Wocekiye was purposely mistranslated to "praying" by Christian missionaries to describe "bowing and kneeling to a supreme power, which is much different from the original meaning of acknowledging or meeting a relative." There was no equivalent to "praying" in the Lakota language, although the word has taken on that meaning because of Christian influence.'°

For the Oceti Sakowin, Mni Sose, the Missouri River, is one such nonhuman relative who is alive, and who is also of the Mni Oyate, the Water Nation. Nothing owns her, and therefore she cannot be sold or alienated like a piece of property. (How do you sell a relative?) And protecting one's relatives is part of

enacting kinship and being a good relative, or Wotakuye, including from the threat of contamination by pipeline leak—in other words, death. This would also spell death for the Oceti Sakowin and its nonhuman relations. In this way, the rallying cry of Mni Wiconi—"water is life"—is also an affirmation that water is alive. Hunkpapa historian Josephine Waggoner has suggested that the word mni (water) is a combination of the words mi (meaning "I") and ni (meaning "being"), indicating that it also contains life."

Mni Wiconi and these Indigenous ways of relating to human and other-than-human life exist in opposition to capitalism, which transforms both humans and nonhumans into labor and commodities to be bought and sold. These ways of relating also exist in opposition to capitalism's twin, settler colonialism, which calls for the annihilation of Indigenous peoples and their other-than-human kin. This is distinct from the romantic notion of Indigenous people and culture that is popular among non-Natives and has been aided by disciplines such as anthropology—a discipline that has robbed us of a viable future by trapping us in a past that never existed. In the last two centuries, armies of anthropologists, historians, archaeologists, hobbyists, and grave robbers have pillaged and looted Indigenous bodies, knowledges, and histories, in the same way that Indigenous lands and resources were pillaged and looted. Their distorted, misinterpreted Indigenous histories are both irrelevant and unfamiliar to actually existing Indigenous peoples, and they are deeply disempowering.

There exists no better example of Indigenous revolutionary theory, and its purposeful distortion, than the Ghost Dance. In popular history books, the Ghost Dance appears briefly, only to die at the Wounded Knee Massacre in 1890. The Ghost Dance, in the revolutionary sense, was about life, not death; it was about

imagining and enacting an anticolonial Indigenous future free from the death world brought on by settler invasion. It originated with Paiute prophet and healer Wovoka. In his vision, the Great Spirit's Red Son transforms the earth. This Red coming of the Messiah wipes away the colonial world, bringing back the animals, plants, and human and other-than-human ancestors destroyed by white men and, in turn, destroying the destroyers. Wovoka did not predict the future. Rather, he profoundly understood the times in which he lived, and his prophecy occurred in response to the hardships brought on by reservation life. Its message of a coming Indigenous future spread like wildfire up the Western Canadian coast, down to the Southwestern United States and Northern Mexico, and onto the Plains. The Ghost Dance unified Indigenous peoples behind a revolutionary movement—one that sought nothing less than the complete departure of the colonial reality. Its visions were powerful and remain so today. Indigenous dancing had itself been outlawed and was therefore a criminal act. Lakota and Dakota Ghost Dancers attempted to shut down the reservation system by refusing to send children to boarding schools or to heed the orders of Indian agents. But the absence of the colonial system was not enough to bring about true freedom; rather, freedom could only find its genuine expression in actions that would create a new Indigenous world to replace the nightmarish present.

The beauty and power of the Ghost Dance moved Oglala prophet Nicholas Black Elk, who saw it as parallel to his own vision: that the people must unite to nourish back to health the tree of life, so that it can bloom once again. The dance brought Black Elk new visions of Wanikiya, the Lakota word for the Red Messiah that literally means "to make live." In 1932, poet John Neihardt published a literary interpretation of Black Elk's vision in Black Elk

Speaks, an influential book that Standing Rock scholar Vine Deloria Jr. described as "a North American bible of all tribes." After the Seventh Cavalry Regiment massacred more than 300 Lakota Ghost Dancers at Wounded Knee in 1890, the Ghost Dance and Black Elk's vision were thought to be dead or dying, like Native people. Neihardt contributed to this notion by fabricating the most-quoted lines in Black Elk Speaks. "A people's dream died there," mourned Black Elk in this made-up version, seeing the carnage at Wounded Knee and his relatives' bodies strewn across the bloody snow. "The nation's hoop is broken and scattered." But Black Elk never believed that, and he knew that collective visions for liberation didn't die at Wound Knee. "The tree that was to bloom just faded away," he said reflecting on the massacre forty years later, "but the roots will stay alive, and we are here to make that tree bloom."

Roots are an apt metaphor to explain how the aspirations for freedom—the tree of life—had stayed alive. Ceremonies, dance, language, warrior and political societies, and spiritual knowledge were forced underground, each of them made illegal by the punitive Civilization Regulations and only fully "legalized" in 1978 with the American Indian Religious Freedom Act. Like many, to protect himself and his family, Black Elk had converted to Catholicism, but he never lost faith in his vision. For him, liberation wasn't a one-off event, a single action, or a moment. If history books do not altogether deny the Wounded Knee Massacre, sympathetic treatments tend to label the Ghost Dance as a "harmless" trend that would have faded into the past, like the Indians practicing it. But if it were just dancing that was the threat, then why did the United States deploy nearly half its army against starving, horseless, and unarmed people in order to crush it?

Indigenous resistance draws from a long history, projecting itself backward and forward in time. While traditional historians merely interpret the past, radical Indigenous historians and Indigenous knowledge-keepers aim to change the colonial present, and to imagine a decolonial future by reconnecting to Indigenous places and histories. For this to occur, those suppressed practices must make a crack in history.

Karl Marx explained the nature of revolutions through the figure of the mole, which burrows through history, making elaborate tunnels and preparing to surface again. The most dramatic moments come when the mole breaks the surface: revolution. But revolution is a mere moment within the longer movement of history. The mole is easily defeated on the surface by counterrevolutionary forces if she hasn't adequately prepared her subterranean spaces, which provide shelter and safety; even when pushed back underground, the mole doesn't stop her work. In song and ceremony, Lakotas revere the mole for her hard work collecting medicines from the roots underfoot. During his campaign against US military invasion, to protect himself Crazy Horse collected fresh dirt from mole mounds. Because he knew it to contain medicines, he washed his body with the dirt. Hidden from view to outsiders, this constant tunneling, plotting, planning, harvesting, remembering, and conspiring for freedom—the collective faith that another world is possible—is the most important aspect of revolutionary work. It is from everyday life that the collective confidence to change reality grows, giving rise to extraordinary events.

At Oceti Sakowin Camp, courage manifested through the combination of direct actions and the legal strategy to defeat DAPL in court, which the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe spearheaded. Direct actions drew media attention and thus amplified the messages of #NoDAPL and Mni Wiconi, putting pressure on

the federal courts and institutions to weigh in on the issue of Standing Rock's sovereignty. Direct actions also had the immeasurable psychological effect of empowering the powerless to action, by encouraging everyday people to take control of their lives and to shrug off the self-doubt and genuine fear that accompanies centuries of violent occupation. It also formed in everyday camp life.

The camps also performed another critical function: caretaking, or providing nourishment, replenishment, comradery, encouragement, warmth, songs, stories, and love. The ultimate goal for Dakotas, and therefore the Oceti Sakowin, "was quite simple: One must obey kinship rules; one must be a good relative," wrote the Dakota scholar Ella Deloria. This was the underground work of the mole and the foundation of any longterm struggle, though it often receives less attention than headline-grabbing spectacles of mass protest and frontline action. Yet, both are equally important and necessary. As Dakota scholar Kim TallBear argues, caretaking labor is often gendered, and is seen as the work of women. But the fact that many contemporary social movements—in particular #NoDAPL, Idle No More, and #BlackLivesMatter—were led by women, and Two-Spirit and LGBTQ people, is important."

My friend and relative, Lakota Water Protector Marcella Gilbert, pointed out how these roles have been taken up by generations of Indigenous women. Marcella's mother, Madonna Thunder Hawk, and her aunties, Phyllis Young and Mabel Anne Eagle Hunter, were all leaders and participants of the Red Power Movement during the 1960s and 1970s. They were all pivotal members of the American Indian Movement, helped found the International Indian Treaty Council at Standing Rock in 1974, and formed Women of All Red Nations that same year—movements I will describe later in this book. Their leadership continued at Oceti

Sakowin Camp by seeing to it that the next generation carried on the tradition. Phyllis Young was a respected Standing Rock elder and former councilwoman. Madonna and Mabel Anne fell back into leadership roles in their own camps, teaching and mentoring young people. For Marcella, freedom was education. She was a product of the "We Will Remember" Survival School, founded in Rapid City, South Dakota, in 1974. Her mother, Madonna, helped to create the school, where students were taught treaty rights and Native culture and history. We Will Remember was one of many survival schools created to address rampant discrimination against Native students in public schools, and to undo the indoctrination of Christianity and US patriotism at government- and church-run boarding schools. For Marcella, the #NoDAPL camps continued the tradition, providing a radical grassroots education on Indigenous self-determination and political autonomy—what it's like to live and be free—to thousands of young Native people. In other words, moments like #NoDAPL are ones where the Indigenous movement reproduces itself and grows.

Our History Is the Future explores the movement to protect the Missouri River marching under the banner of Mni Wiconi. How did it emerge, and how does settler colonialism, a key element of US history, continue to inform our present? #NoDAPL and Mni Wiconi are part of a longer history of Indigenous resistance against the trespass of settlers, dams, and pipelines across the Mni Sose, the Missouri River. The Oceti Sakowin—our relationship to Mni Sose, and our historic struggle for liberation—are fundamentally tied to our prior history of Indigenous nationhood and political authority. This book is less a story about objects, individuals, and ideas than it is a history of relationships—those between the Oceti Sakowin, Mni Sose, and the United States as an occupying power. By focusing on these

relationships, we can see that Indigenous history is not a narrow subfield of US history—or of the history of capitalism or imperialism, for that matter. Rather, Indigenous peoples are central subjects of modern world history.

This is not simply an examination of the past. Like #NoDAPL and Mni Wiconi, what I call traditions of Indigenous resistance have far-reaching implications, extending beyond the world that is normally understood as "Indigenous." A tradition is usually defined as a static or unchanging practice. This view often suggests that Indigenous culture or tradition doesn't change over time—that Indigenous people are trapped in the past and thus have no future. But as colonialism changes throughout time, so too does resistance to it. By drawing upon earlier struggles and incorporating elements of them into their own experience, each generation continues to build dynamic and vital traditions of resistance. Such collective experiences build up over time and are grounded in specific Indigenous territories and nations.

For the Oceti Sakowin, the affirmation Mni Wiconi, "water is life," relates to Wotakuye, or "being a good relative." Indigenous resistance to the trespass of settlers, pipelines, and dams is part of being a good relative to the water, land, and animals, not to mention the human world. Contrast this with the actions of Energy Transfer Partners (the financial backers of DAPL)—and of capitalism, more broadly, which seeks above all else to extract profits from the land and all forms of life. This is not to suggest that Indigenous societies possess the solution to climate change (and in fact, many Indigenous nations actively participate in resource extraction and capitalist economies in order to strengthen their self-determination). But in its best moments, #NoDAPL showed us a future that becomes possible when everyday Native people take control of their own destinies and

lands, while drawing upon their own traditions of resistance. I am interested in the kind of tradition of Indigenous resistance that is a radical consciousness, both anti-capitalist and anti-colonial, and is deeply embedded in history and place—one that expresses the ultimate desire for freedom.

In this book, I move through seven episodes of Oceti Sakowin history and resistance. This history is by no means exhaustive, but I have chosen to focus on these particular cases to show how they inform our present moment, and to chart a historical road map for collective liberation.

Chapter 1 tells the story of the #NoDAPL movement at Standing Rock and its origins in the battle against tar sands extraction and the Keystone XL Pipeline, whose defense of Lakota and Dakota lands are part of a tradition of resistance against US imperialism that began centuries ago. I turn to the beginning of that history in chapter 2, which describes the Oceti Sakowin's emergence as a nation and its first encounters, in the nineteenth century, with the United States as a predator nation.

Before long, those encounters evolved into the Indian Wars of the nineteenth century—the subject of chapter 3—that raged across the Northern Plains, in which the Oceti Sakowin defended against US military invasion and counterinsurgency tactics. By the turn of the twentieth century, Indigenous people had been largely confined to ever-dwindling reservations. The Oceti Sakowin, however, confronted the US military—the Army Corps of Engineers—again in the mid twentieth century, as US policy turned to the use of large-scale river development to continue the project of Indigenous dispossession—with policymakers attempting, all the while, to relieve themselves of the responsibilities outlined in the treaties.

In chapter 4, I outline these schemes through the story of the mid-century Pick-Sloan Plan, which authorized the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation to dam the main stem of the Missouri River. These dams specifically targeted and destroyed Native lives and lands, with 611,642 acres of land condemned through eminent domain, 309,584 acres of which were vital reservation bottomlands. Flooding also forced more than a thousand Native families to relocate, in patent violation of treaties and without prior consent. The memory of this experience was still fresh at the #NoDAPL camps.

Chapter 5 outlines the story of the urban-centered American Indian Movement (AIM) and their 1973 occupation of Wounded Knee in the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation—the culmination of more than a decade of Red Power organizing. This became the catalyst for a mass gathering of thousands at Standing Rock in 1974, which resulted in the founding of the International Indian Treaty Council—a body that would eventually lead international efforts for Indigenous recognition that have had a deep, global significance.

Chapter 6 traces the history of twentieth-century Indigenous internationalism—particularly, the Oceti Sakowin's central role in spearheading the four-decade-long campaign for Indigenous recognition at the United Nations, which was the basis for the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The global Red Power movement eventually became a catalyst for the contemporary #NoDAPL movement at Standing Rock. Chapter 7 draws out these links, reflecting upon the ways our past and present struggles are connected, as they are to both past and present international anti-colonial and anti-capitalist movements around the world.
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