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Spotlight 051

Cultures Enchanted: Transplanting A Psycho-Analysis

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Editorial Appraisals:

Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book summarized. Otherwise most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

I Think, Therefore I Draw: Understanding Philosophy Through Cartoons by Thomas Cathcart and Daniel Klein [Penguin Books, 9780143133025]

A hilarious new exploration of philosophy through cartoons from the duo who brought you the New York Times bestselling Plato and a Platypus Walk Into A Bar... Understanding Philosophy Through Jokes

Thomas Cathcart and Daniel Klien have been thinking deep thoughts and writing jokes for decades, and now they are here to help us understand Philosophy through cartoons, and cartoons through Philosophy. Covering topics as diverse as religion, gender, knowledge, morality, and the meaning of life (or the lack thereof), *I Think, Therefore I Draw* gives a thorough introduction to all of the major debates in philosophy through history and the present. And since they explain with the help of a selection of some of the smartest cartoonists working today, you'll breeze through these weighty topics as you guffaw and slap your knee.

Cathcart and Klein's *Plato and a Platypus Walk into a Bar...* and *Heidegger and a Hippo Walk Through Those Pearly Gates* have been a favorite of philosophers and non-philosophers alike for years. Packed with dozens of witty cartoons and loaded with profound philosophical insight, *I Think, Therefore I Draw* will delight readers and leave them enlightened.

Contents

Excerpt: Sure, we all know that the best cartoonists are keen observers of the state of our society, its quirks and ironies. We also know that some of their cartoons offer acute psychological and sociological insights. But what we often miss are the remarkable philosophical points the finest cartoonists make.

Like the best jokes, the best cartoons address philosophy's Big Questions. They explain and illustrate these perennial conundrums and their various answers in ways that are sometimes ingenious, sometimes profound, and sometimes even a bit useful. Yup, these cartoons are incisive snapshots of the Biggies.

But where did these amazingly talented philosophical cartoonists come from?

Our hunch is that they are PhDs in philosophy who couldn't find employment or, if they could, found that serving lattes at Starbucks was less fulfilling than they had hoped. Then again, these PhDs may have gone the academic route and begun teaching a course in underdetermination and provability at a small liberal arts college, only to find themselves sinking into a deep depression that was relieved only by doodling in the margins of library books. Funny doodles.

As a result, we have been blessed with Nietzschean cartoonists, Aristotelian cartoonists, Sartrean, Russellian, Quinean, post-Kantian, and Marxist cartoonists—even cartoonists who understand what in hell Derrida was trying to say and are able to clue us in via a droll drawing and a witty caption.

Wittgenstein once said that a serious and good philosophical work could be written that consisted entirely of jokes. (He was not trying to be funny at the time.) Undoubtedly, if Wittgenstein's subscription to Punch hadn't lapsed, he would have featured cartoons in his pronouncement.

Here, then, is a collection of our favorite philosophical cartoons and our annotations about what they teach us about the Big Questions in philosophy. Questions like, "Is there really any difference between girls and boys?" and "Is there a cosmic scheme?" and "What went wrong with

right and wrong?" Eighteen of the most frequently asked questions in the history of philosophy.

Many of the cartoons are spot on topic, but a good number of them slip into the philosophical realm through the back door. At least, we think they slip in that way—we have been known to stretch a connection here and there when we whimsically get carried away. In these cases, we beg your indulgence.

Which brings us to the manner in which we have sequenced the Big Questions sections: by pure free association. Hope you don't have a problem with that.



"I don't sing because I am happy. I am happy because I sing."

Love Is But a Song We Sing

Rare is the cartoon whose caption is a quote attributed to a noted philosopher. But here New Yorker cartoonist Edward Frascino uses a line allegedly uttered by the great American philosopher William James.

Frascino can be forgiven his apparent plagiarism, because the line has a life of its own, especially among feel-good pop psychologists and New Age gurus, who take James's words to mean something like, "Don't worry, be happy" or "Accentuate the positive."

But that is not what James meant at all.

First, it should be noted that in James's time, psychology was just beginning to separate itself from the discipline of philosophy, and his book The Principles of Psychology was a very philosophical work indeed.

In his essay "What Is an Emotion?" he examined the cause-and-effect relationship between bodily instincts and emotions. In James's famous example, that sequence is not "I see the bear, I fear it, so I run." Rather, it is "I see the bear, I instinctively run from it, and that physiological reaction causes me to feel fear." Our consciousness of our churning legs, accelerated heartbeat, and surge of adrenaline is the emotion. Ditto for crying and feeling sad.

And ditto encore for Frascino's birdie, who sings instinctively and therefore feels happy.

It turns out love really is but a song we sing.

A Pile of Analogs

There is something refreshing about cartoonist Baloo's egotistical and defensive God. It makes us feel we really were created in his image. But what exactly is it that such a God finds offensive about the concept of intelligent design?

The second classical "proof" of the existence of God is called the "argument from design," and its best-known version is the "argument from analogy." It goes like this:

In our everyday experience of ordinary objects, when we come across something that shows a lot of evidence of design—say, Pokémon Go—we conclude that a person must have designed it. And it turns out we are absolutely right about that; his name is Satoshi Tajiri. (He had loads of helpers, though.)

So, by analogy, the universe itself, which clearly shows evidence of design and is way more complex than Pokémon Go, must have had a designer way smarter than a person, even smarter than Satoshi.

Well, that designer is called God! End of argument by analogy.

Saint Thomas Aquinas approved of a version of the argument from analogy. But several centuries later, the British empiricist David Hume replied that there can't possibly be anything analogous to the universe. The universe is the Whole Deal—it's everything—so, by definition, it's unique. You simply can't create an analogy to Everything. So much for the second "rational" proof for the existence of God.

We think the reason Baloo's God finds the argument so offensive is that he can picture this God saying, "What? I'm supposed to be flattered that I'm a way smarter designer than Satoshi Tajiri? Please. I created him, for God's sake!" <>

The Arabic Freud: Psychoanalysis and Islam in Modern Egypt by Omnia El Shakry [Princeton University Press, 9780691174792]

The first in-depth look at how postwar thinkers in Egypt mapped the intersections between Islamic discourses and psychoanalytic thought

In 1945, psychologist Yusuf Murad introduced an Arabic term borrowed from the medieval Sufi philosopher and mystic Ibn 'Arabi—*al-la-shu'ur*—as a translation for Sigmund Freud's concept of the unconscious. By the late 1950s, Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* had been translated into Arabic for an eager Egyptian public. In *The Arabic Freud*, Omnia El Shakry challenges the notion of a strict divide between psychoanalysis and Islam by tracing how postwar thinkers in Egypt blended psychoanalytic theories with concepts from classical Islamic thought in a creative encounter of ethical engagement.

Drawing on scholarly writings as well as popular literature on self-healing, El Shakry provides the first in-depth examination of psychoanalysis in Egypt and reveals how a new science of psychology—or "science of the soul," as it came to be called—was inextricably linked to Islam and mysticism. She explores how Freudian ideas of the unconscious were crucial to the formation of modern discourses of subjectivity in areas as diverse as psychology, Islamic philosophy, and the law. Founding figures of Egyptian psychoanalysis, she shows, debated the temporality of the psyche, mystical states, the sexual drive, and the Oedipus complex, while offering startling insights into the nature of psychic life, ethics, and eros.

This provocative and insightful book invites us to rethink the relationship between psychoanalysis and religion in the modern era. Mapping the points of intersection between Islamic discourses and psychoanalytic thought, it illustrates how the Arabic Freud, like psychoanalysis itself, was elaborated across the space of human difference.

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Excerpt: Decolonizing the Self

No discussion of psychoanalysis and Islam can avoid the question of colonialism and the relationship between Islam and the West. Gayatri Spivak has gone so far as to suggest that "institutional psychoanalysis can be a latter-day support of ... epistemic violence; while Jacques Derrida has noted "the psychoanalytic colonization of a non-American rest-of-the-world." Referencing colonial Algeria, he suggests that "it was altogether exceptional and untypical for psychoanalysts to raise the question of their own practice in its political, ethno-psychoanalytical and socio-institutional dimensions."

And yet, as Ranjana Khanna has detailed, psychoanalysis has been widely used by theorists of decolonization ranging from Aimé Césaire to Frantz Fanon, remarking that it was not possible to "think of selfhood entirely independently of psychoanalysis." In fact, she continues, the political stakes of decolonization "demanded that subjectivity come to the fore in consolidating a theory and practice of political commitment." Nevertheless the presence of non-Western analysts raised the pressing question of "Who can legitimately lay claim to psychoanalytic knowledge?" Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks examines "the manner in which psychoanalysis ... has served to exclude the non-Western analyst from theory or has demanded a reinscription of his/her subjectivity in consonance with Freudian (cultural) ideology." Far from advocating a rejection of psychoanalysis, Seshadri-Crooks proposes it as a tool with which to understand "the historical ruptures and the epistemic violence engendered by colonialism, with regard to the (re-)inscription of subjectivity as such." Indeed, countless texts of postcolonial critical theory and history have attended to the historicization of such epistemic ruptures and realignments of subjectivity.

At the same time, conventional narratives of Arab intellectual history focus on colonialism as a formative rupture that split twentieth-century thought (and subjects) into liberal secular and religious trends. Moroccan historian Abdallah Laroui and Egyptian political theorist Anouar Abdel-Malek, for instance, expound the twentieth-century Arab intellectual as the product of the struggle for the reconquest of identity in the face of a constitutive self-alienation created by the colonial encounter. For Laroui and others, the intelligentsia's response to colonialism and European hegemony led to two dominant trends, traditionalist Islamic thought and modernist thought—the former characterized by a repetitive recitation of the past or an alienation through time, and the latter by an eclecticism characteristic of ideological backwardness, or an alienation through space.

My concern here, however, is of a decidedly different nature. Rather than assume the rigidity, mimesis, or univocity of "traditional" and "modern" thought, I explore the ways in which writings on the self drew from both psychoanalysis and the Islamic discursive tradition, understood as convivial bodies of knowledge subject to continuous reinterpretation. Further, in thinking about the routes of psychoanalysis in postwar Egypt, I attend to what endures of precolonial ontologies and epistemologies, to the continuities rather than ruptures, and to the trace rather than the cut. If as Pandolfo says, "psychoanalysis ... developed at the margins of European modernity, from the debris of minor or obliterated traditions, and in the form of a counter-move," then so too did postwar Arab

writings on the self. What intellectual exchanges, conceptual translations, and encounters between traditions took place between Islam and psychoanalysis?

In fact, theoretical literature on the anthropology of Islam, such as Katherine Pratt Ewing's insightful ethnography of Sufism in contemporary Lahore, or Amira Mittermaier's anthropology of the imagination in Egypt, have es-chewed simplistic interpretations of postcolonial Muslim personhood as caught between the fetters of tradition and modernity. Most pertinently, Javed Majeed has compellingly argued that the Sufi poet Muhammad Iqbal might be seen as a possible landmark "in which Islamism and Western critical theory can be considered, not as oppositional discourses, but together, with overlapping concerns, as critiques of and responses to colonial modernity.' Similarly, Naveeda Khan explores Iqbal's engagement with philosopher Henri Bergson in order to demonstrate his recasting of Islam as an "open religion with possible futures as yet uninstantiated."

Referencing psychologist Yusuf Murad, leading Egyptian literary critic Mahmud Amin al-Alim referred to him as the consummate "philosopher of integration." Rather than the "tale of mutual ignorance" that some have claimed to exist, for example, between Islamic and Western theories, debates in the formative postwar period in the Middle East did not view eclectic blendings, in Frederick Cooper's phrasing, as "personally destabilizing, as intellectually contradictory, or as threatening to [one's] sense of cultural integrity: in between [was] as much a place to be at home as any other." For example, in postwar Egypt, an entire generation of scholars and their students began to teach the social sciences in Arabic at Egypt's national university, establishing an Arabic language lexicon for fields such as sociology and psychology within a university that had heretofore been dominated by French and British influence. Scholars created synthetic visions that combined Durkheimian sociology with Ibn Khaldun's theory of civilizations, or the dialectical dynamism of psychoanalysis with the mystical philosophy of Ibn `Arabi, all the while uncovering epistemological resonances between modern European and Arab discursive traditions and demonstrating the contemporaneity of classical Arabic and Islamic texts. Whether scholars were translating Bergson and Fanon, reading Freud, or rethinking Qur'anic ethics, European philosophy was simply not to be dismissed.

And yet even as they were in dialogue with various strands of European thought—existentialism, socialism, and Marxism, to name but a few—postwar intellectuals often agitated for complete political and cultural decolonization. As Yoav Di-Capua has detailed, the postwar period was dominated by a con¬cern for the creation of a "new Arab man"—sovereign, authentic, and free—and on the elaboration of a postcolonial ontology centered on being rather than essence. The 1940s and 1950s constituted the beginnings of a "working through" of the constitutive self-alienation of the colonial era (and hence the focus on the nafs or psyche) and a negotiation of the oftentimes divergent agendas of intellectuals and the state. The drive toward national liberation and social justice led to an ambivalent relationship to the postcolonial state, viewed at once as the avatar of national independence and an apparatus of political repression.

In particular, psychoanalysis could not be completely divorced from the attempts to professionalize psychology in the postwar period while putting its views and findings at the service of medicine, criminology, and state social engineering in the hope of creating the postcolonial "new man." At times, psychoanalysis was harnessed to postwar concerns centered on youth and sexual deviance, or on crime and psychopathy, for instance. This was particularly the case given the fact that psychoanalysis itself had made only negligible inroads into clinical practice. Inevitably, such attempts led to tensions between philosophical and ethical orientations and pragmatic political concerns that emerged when intellectual objectives became tethered to postcolonial political programs.

Homo psychoanalyticus was thus not characterized by "the neutralization of ethics and of the political realm" and a dissociation of the "psychoanalytical sphere from the sphere of the citizen or moral subject in his or her public or private life." Rather, psychoanalysis presented the possibility of

enjoyment in the use of the other as an instrument or object, while at the same time offering a means of undermining that sovereign pleasure, precisely by critically analyzing one's own psychic implication in it. Simply put, psychoanalysis oscillated between ethical ideals centered on the opacity of the human subject (her resistance to intelligibility and understanding) and the belief in the transparency of humans and the possibility of their instrumentalization. Such divergent views marked the difference between the prospect of a psychoanalysis that would be at "at the service of those who suffer, and not an instrument of power or mastery over them."

More specifically, the trajectory of psychoanalysis in Egypt indicates a tension between a notion of the human subject as conceptually opaque, as only incompletely knowable to itself or others due to the existence of the unconscious, and as operationally transparent as the erstwhile object of postcolonial projects of social reform and amelioration. This tension, one internal to psychoanalysis, has often been discussed in terms of the divide between certain strands of Freudian or Lacanian psychoanalysis that posit a "radically unknowable, radically incalculable" subject and those of American ego psychologists that aim for the adaptation of the human subject to his environment. This latter tradition has been criticized for its amenability to projects of human engineering that render the human subject whole, transparent, and calculable, in effect leading to a psychologized subject who becomes the object of Foucaultian biopower.

Among those who drew on psychoanalysis, we observe that the key term of reference was never the ego, but rather always the polysemic Arabic term nafs (soul, spirit, psyche, self), a concept implying a spiritual core, alongside the presence of the unconscious (al-la-shu'ur) as a place where God could be manifested. Such domains far exceeded the operations of the ego while simultaneously grounded in the praxis of ethics. It would be reductive, then, to think that intellectual and ethical concerns could simply be mapped onto political agendas, and questions beyond postcolonialism and nationalism deeply engaged thinkers concerned with the science of selfhood and the soul. I therefore eschew an analysis that would view psychoanalysis as merely yet another technology of the late colonial state or of postcolonial nationalism, or as epiphenomenal to larger political developments in the Arab world. Psychoanalysis found outlets in theoretical and philosophical debates where thinkers elaborated on the conceptual history of the unconscious and of desire, while attuned to the ethical contours of the subject. At the same time, the exigencies of postcolonial politics often rendered psychological theories in the service of disciplinary projects and prescriptive visions of the postcolonial subject. The Arabic Freud traces the movement of these two components of psychoanalytic thought, outlining how these two strands—the philosophical and the pragmatic—intersected and diverged in various ways within the history of analytic thought within twentieth-century Egypt.

Structure, Method, and Argument

By exploring the formation of modern discourses of subjectivity in fields as diverse as psychology, Islamic philosophy, and the law, this book demon¬strates that psychoanalysis was a tradition with deep and varied roots in the Egyptian postwar setting, not only among psychologists and mental health professionals, but also among Islamic thinkers and legal practitioners. At the same time this is not a reception history; it does not in any way seek to exhaustively assemble together all those who wrote about or approached Freud's ideas in Egypt, nor does it catalog Arabic translations, commentaries, and exegeses of Freud. Rather, I both stage and historically reconstruct a philosophical encounter between psychoanalysis and Islam, one in which Arab intellectuals emerge as producers of philosophy and theory rather than merely as objects of study or the simple products of their political context. As Edward Baring notes, we should be wary of "a mode of history that reduces philosophical texts to their contextual moment. One should not see biographical, political, or cultural background as an `origin' for philosophical ideas."

We will encounter Arabophone writings on the self by a variety of scholars virtually unknown to a Western audience, all of whom were in conversation with a range of figures of

psychoanalysis, such as Sigmund Freud, Karen Homey, Henri Wallon, and Ian Suttie. Such a dialogue was enabled by a longstanding engagement with the classical Arabic tradition of scholarship on the soul or nafs, one that included key luminaries of Islamic thought, al-Ghazali and Ibn `Arabi, as well as lesser-known thinkers, such as Ibn 'Ata' Allah al-Sakandari.

I mobilize both sets of writings, those on psychoanalysis and those of classical and contemporary Islamic thought, as theoretical frameworks and objects of philosophical analysis, shuttling back and forth, much as my own historical actors, between frameworks. At the same time, my analytical orientation is not confined to those of the scholars that I study, and I draw freely from the psychoanalytic tradition, drawing on scholars such as Jacques Lacan who were at times at odds with the theoretical formulations of my historical actors. I do so with the intent of emphasizing certain affinities, while highlighting key differences between these traditions, rather than a dogmatic fidelity to a particular psychoanalytic orientation.

Part I, "The Unconscious and the Modern Subject," explores postwar intellectuals' engagement with psychoanalytic theory in philosophical and ethical debates on the nature of the soul, the self, and the psyche. Part II, "Spaces of Interiority," explores the more pragmatic concerns that emerged with the professionalization of psychology, particularly within the psychology of sexuality and youth and criminal psychology. Traversing literatures minor and major, ranging from scholarly texts on psychoanalysis to lay literature on self-healing, the following chapters address many of the key questions of psychoanalysis and its intersection with multiple traditions, Islamic and otherwise, by exploring, in turn, the modern subject of consciousness, ethics, sexuality, and the law within mid-twentieth-century Egypt.

Chapter 1, "Psychoanalysis and the Psyche," considers Freudian itineraries in postwar Egypt through an exploration of the work of Yusuf Murad, the founder of a school of thought within the psychological sciences, and the journal he coedited from 1945 to 1953, Majallat Jim al-Nafs. By training a generation of scholars, Murad left a wide-ranging legacy on psychology, philosophy, and the wider academic fields of the humanities and the social sciences. Melding key concepts from psychoanalysis with classical Islamic concepts, Murad elaborated a psychological theory of the subject as an integrative agent, embodying a complex synthesis of unity and multiplicity. Theorizing the temporality of the subject, the epistemology of psychoanalysis and the analytic structure, and the socias, Murad both drew upon and departed from European psychoanalytic thought, while often insisting on the epistemological and ethical heterogeneity of different theories of the self.

Chapter 2, "The Self and the Soul," reconstructs a historical interlude between Sufism and psychoanalytic psychology in postwar Egypt. How might we think through the relationship between psychoanalysis and the Islamic tradition, while respecting the "ontological stakes" of the latter, namely, the belief in divine transcendence and divine discourse? I address this question through a detailed exploration of the writings of Abu al-Wafa al-Ghunaymi al-Taftazani and his mentor Muhammad Mustafa Hilmi, both prominent Egyptian intellectuals who expounded Sufi ideas for a broader reading public, beginning in the 194os. Situating these figures within the larger intellectual and religious context of mid-twentieth-century Egypt, I explore the elective affinities between Sufism and certain strands of psychoanalysis in terms of a dialogical relationship between the self and the Other, as mediated by the unconscious.

Chapter 3, "The Psychosexual Subject," traces the intersection of psychoanalysis and the invention of the psychosexual subject in postwar Egypt. Following a set of discussions on Freudian theory and sexuality in Majallat Ilm al-Nafs, as well as a series of popular and didactic books, I explore newly emerging languages of desire and ethics and their relationship to gender and sexuality. In sharp contrast to the alleged incommensurability between psychoanalysis and Islam, postwar psychoanalysis was able to breathe new life into an earlier premodern classical literature centered on desire and the appetites and on the ethical cultivation of the child. The invention of the

psychosexual subject, in other words, did not necessarily entail a simple shift of pleasure and desire away from the theological pastoral toward secular science and medicine as some scholars have asserted.

Between June 1947 and February 1949, a series of articles in Majallat l'm al-Nafs debated the heuristic value of Freud's ideas, particularly surrounding the Oedipus complex, for an understanding of criminality. Chapter 4, "Psychoanalysis before the Law," traces this debate spawned by professor of criminal psychology Muhammad Fathi, while paying particular attention to the social role of the criminal at midcentury. I argue that the convergences or divergences found between psychoanalysis and the law were in part related to disputes regarding the causal nature of crime. Further complicating these debates was the juridical status of psychoanalysis itself as it struggled to assert its autonomy as a field of therapeutic practice within the Egyptian legal system. At the center of all of these arguments lay the criminal, himself increasingly enmeshed within new legal and forensic practices, as well as multiple legal regimes over the course of the twentieth century.

In the epilogue, I return to the central question of this book—what does it mean, now, to think through psychoanalysis and Islam together as a creative encounter of ethical engagement? Addressing recent scholarly interventions, such as those of Julia Kristeva, that operate within larger civilizing mission narratives that couple psychoanalysis with the secularization of Judeo-Christian legacies, I question the notion of psychoanalysis as the purview of any singular civilization. What might it mean to rethink the secular ends of analysis and open ourselves up to an ethical encounter with the Other?

Rethinking Ibn 'Arabi by Gregory A. Lipton [Oxford University Press, 9780190684501]

The thirteenth century mystic Ibn `Arabi was the foremost Sufi theorist of the premodern era. For more than a century, Western scholars and esotericists have heralded his universalism, arguing that he saw all contemporaneous religions as equally valid. In Rethinking Ibn `Arabi, Gregory Lipton calls this image into question and throws into relief how Ibn `Arabi's discourse is inseparably intertwined with the absolutist vision of his own religious milieu--that is, the triumphant claim that Islam fulfilled, superseded, and therefore abrogated all previous revealed religions.

Lipton juxtaposes Ibn `Arabi's absolutist conception with the later reception of his ideas, exploring how they have been read, appropriated, and universalized within the reigning interpretive field of Perennial Philosophy in the study of Sufism. The contours that surface through this comparative analysis trace the discursive practices that inform Ibn `Arabi's Western reception back to the eighteenth and nineteenth century study of "authentic" religion, where European ethno-racial superiority was wielded against the Semitic Other-both Jewish and Muslim. Lipton argues that supersessionist models of exclusivism are buried under contemporary Western constructions of religious authenticity in ways that ironically mirror Ibn `Arabi's medieval absolutism.

Excerpt:

In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it. The following Generations, who were not so fond of the Study of Cartography as their Forebears had been, saw that that vast Map was Useless, and not without some Pitilessness was it, that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters. In the Deserts of the West, still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that Map. JORGE LUIS BORGES, "On Exactitude in Science."

While my ostensive concern in this book is to analyze how particular ideas of the medieval Muslim mystic Ibn `Arabi have been translated within a contemporary field of interpretation, the meta-subject that frames this analysis is the larger issue of religious universalism. And while my approach is necessarily critical, I am not overly concerned to weigh in on the ongoing debate regarding the ontology of religion itself—that is, whether or not religion is "of its own kind" (sui generis). Yet, it seems fairly clear to me that the related, and likewise ongoing, scholarly struggle to find a universal definition of religion is well-nigh impossible. This is so, as Talal Asad has persuasively argued, "not only because its constituent elements and relationships are historically specific, but because that definition is itself the historical product of discursive processes."' For the methodological purposes of this study, I thus profess a type of philosophical quietism where my general aim, in Wittgensteinian fashion, is to take account of "language-games, describe them, and sometimes wonder at them." In the following chapters, I therefore attempt to remain at the level of discourse by asking how those ideas and ideals we privilege as religious are conceived, received, and ultimately naturalized. More specifically, I seek to show how the speculative metaphysical ideas of Ibn 'Arabi have been read, appropriated, and universalized within the discursive context of Traditionalism or the Perennial Philosophy (philosophia perennis) with a primary focus on the interpretive field of Perennialism associated with the sui generis, or "nonreductive," tradition of religious universalism connected to Frithjof Schuon.

Thus, even though this book takes seriously claims of religious terra firma—that is, religion "as such"—its analytical concern revolves around the discursive "maps" that chart such claims. Of course, the metaphor of mapmaking in the field of religious studies is well worn, made famous many years ago by J. Z. Smith's seminal essay "Map Is Not Territory."' Smith's essay ends with his oft-quoted rejoinder to the mathematician Alfred Korzybski's famous dictum, "`Map is not territory'—but maps are all we possess."' Yet, Smith's cartographic metaphor is equally applicable to the religious practitioner in the so-called real world as it is for the scholar of religion in the academy. In performing what he calls a "deep"—and indeed "transgressive"—reading of Smith's essay, Peter Wright has recently emphasized this essential point:

> The student of religions ... is not all that different from the practitioner of a religion. The practices of reading and writing, interpretation and criticism—i.e., the practices that ... constitute for Smith the study of religions as a humanistic adventure among texts—belong to the same family of activities that constitute ordinary religious practice. The scholar of religions and the adherent of a particular religious tradition are both engaged in a quest romance that produces a species of "cartography."

Thus, while there may be what scholars like to think of as a "critical distance" between the academic discipline of religious studies and the object of their study—the religious themselves—it nevertheless appears to be a difference of degree rather than of kind.

One of the ways that the differences among such maps have been categorized is by orders of abstraction away from the original "insider map of believers." Yet, when dealing with contemporary scholars of religion who consider their own scholarship a vehicle for spiritual gnosis, as was famously the case with the comparativist Mircea Eliade, then any supposed distance between the academic study of religion and asserting religious truth rapidly vanishes into the thin air of theory itself. As Steven Wasserstrom observes, "Eliade's Historian of Religions himself somehow recapitulated the paradigmatic experience of the traditional believer; only thus could he see the real forms, and therefore only in this way could then show them to the reader." Similarly, in his introduction to The Essential Writings of Frithjof Schuon, religious studies scholar and Perennialist Seyyed Hossein Nasr claims that "ideally speaking, only saintly men and women possessing wisdom should and can engage in a serious manner in that enterprise which has come to be known as comparative religion."

To be sure, the art of mapmaking is an elitist enterprise. As cosmographical projections, maps

assert particular correspondences to reality, able to be read and followed by anyone with skill enough to do so. As such, all maps inevitably claim, to one degree or another, the universal through their ability to offer privileged access to truth. In its most unassuming form, such universalism is based on the assertion that territory can be abstracted outside of time and culture—a particular locality can be reified and placed within a less complicated dimension, represented by semiotic simplifications. The usefulness of cartography in the history of humanity is of course beyond question. The notion, however, that maps are reliable representations of reality is more complicated. Indeed, the full quote of Korzybski's popular maxim referred to above reads: "A map is not the territory it represents, but, if correct, it has a similar structure to the territory, which accounts for its usefulness." One of the best ways of articulating the problematics underlying Korzybski's deceptively simple insight has been dubbed Bonini's paradox by William Starbuck: "As a model grows more realistic it also becomes just as difficult to understand as the real-world processes it represents. This paradox has numerous ramifications in many fields, but for my purposes here it is useful to consider what it brings to bear on the concept of the universal. The closer we approach any notion of "reality," the more complex such ideas are, and increasingly less useful. The idea of the universal, like a map, is only of use when it simplifies reality; yet, when reality is simplified, there is always a choice involved—something must always be left out. Thus, the paradox of religious universalism is that all such discourse simultaneously reveals and conceals: the more it shines light upon a claimed universal perspective, the more it occludes others. As Milton Sernett observes:

> Perhaps psychohistorians will someday explain for us why the archives of the past overflow with examples of how religion has, on the one hand, served as a cross-cultural unifying principle while, on the other hand, it has been a means by which insiders define themselves over against outsiders.

Even though universal perspectives are useful as models of unification, they are also necessarily divisive as discourses through which specific communities operating within particular times and places stake out their claims. In this sense, as Ernesto Laclau put it, "the universal is no more than a particular that has become dominant." Yet, from a metaphysical perspective, the fact that universals are derived from so-called particulars does not necessarily diminish their universal status. In the case of universalizing religions such as Christianity or Islam, historical particulars constitute much of revelation itself. But to argue that such particulars can become universally applicable is not necessarily to argue that they transcend their particularity. Rather, part of the paradox of universalism is an inherent confusion between the universal and the particular, as Laclau observes: "Is it universal or particular? If the latter, universality can only be a particularity that defines itself in terms of a limitless exclusion; if the former, the particular itself becomes part of the universal, and the dividing line is again blurred."

The concern that fuels the theoretical impetus behind this book thus focuses on universalist mapping practices that tend to lose sight of—or simply disregard—the inherent, dialectical tension between the universal and the particular as conceived within all religious discourse. As a pertinent example of this, and one that I revisit in chapter 4, the Perennialist scholar James Cutsinger recently asserted that to be objective, scholars of religious studies "must entertain the possibility" that Frithjof Schuon was able to directly access "the Truth—with that capital 'T' " in ways that are not explicable through "sheerly natural causes or purely human phenomena." Cutsinger goes on to make the even bolder claim (coming as it does from a professor in a religious studies department at a public research university) that such a gnostic "power of immediate or intuitive discernment [is] unobstructed by the boundaries of physical objects and unaffected by the limitations of historical circumstance."" Taking Cutsinger's definition of gnostic power at face value, it stands to reason that if "limitations of historical circumstance" could indeed be shown as constitutive for any given transcendent claim to universal knowledge, then such a claim would necessarily be called into question. Thus, setting aside the thorny question of

ontology, and in response to Cutsinger, the contention that threads together the various arguments throughout this book is simply this: all universal claims inevitably carry the burden of their own socio-historical genealogies. That is to say, every map bears the situated perspective of its cartographer.

In regards to my personal cartographic perspective, one final note is in order. In terms of the field of Ibn 'Arabi studies, the insights contained in this book are critically indebted to two of the most formidable, contemporary scholars who write on Ibn `Arabi in European languages: Michel Chodkiewicz and William Chittick. In the last several decades, their immeasurable contribution has enriched and transformed how Ibn `Arabi is read and understood. Both scholars are at pains to articulate the importance of sacred law for Ibn 'Arabi—a point I revisit from different perspectives throughout this work. No doubt, they would also agree that Ibn Arabi's discourse would qualify as universalist in some fashion. Yet in terms of critically inspiring my particular theoretical interposition, Chodkiewicz has importantly, albeit discretely, brought to light the absolutist and exclusivist nature of Ibn 'Arabi's particular brand of universalism in opposition to Chittick's more inclusivist interpretive framework. In the first half of this book, I spend significant time fleshing out this particular aspect of Chodkiewicz's wideranging insight, while critiquing the aspect of Chittick's work that has seemingly attempted to attenuate what I refer to as Ibn 'Arabi's political metaphysics and its embedded supersessionism. Yet, any critique of Chittick I proffer here must be understood as situated within a larger indebtedness owed to his prolific and careful expositions of the Andalusian Sufi's corpus. Without having encountered and benefited from Chittick's extraordinary erudition, I could never have begun my ongoing journey of understanding and appreciation of Ibn 'Arabi's work and thought. I thus offer the interventions of this book not in the spirit of opposition, but as additional vantage points to a necessary and ongoing conversation.

Chapter Overview

I have set out my subject in two overlapping parts of five chapters (including the conclusion). In the first part, I analyze Ibn Arabi's universalism by comparing his original textual discourse with regnant claims made by interpreters who work within (or on the margins of) the interpretive field of Schuonian Perennialism. Such claims may be said to form a tradition of "strong misreadings" of Ibn Arabi's original texts in the Bloomian sense, where innovative interpretations have been seminal in establishing a foundational universalist scaffolding for understanding Ibn 'Arabi and his perspective on the religious Other. By thus offering revised readings that challenge this Perennialist canon of interpretation, I set out a new backdrop against which the practices of Ibn Arabi's contemporary interpreters are made to stand in sharp relief. In the second part, I flesh out the emergent contours and then track them to earlier discursive practices of European knowledge regimes and their attendant rules of subject formation.

Chapter 1, "Tracking the Camels of Love; is based on a revised reading of Ibn Arabi's most famous verses from The Interpreter of Desires (Tarjumãn al-ashwãg), which begin by laying claim to a heart "capable of every form" and conclude by asserting to follow "the religion of Love." Here, I contend that modern Euro-American presuppositions regarding the nature of "religion" as a "system of beliefs" inform how the celebrated verses are commonly received and interpreted. While Ibn Arabi's claim to a heart "capable of every form" is synonymous with a claim to be capable of every belief (i `tiqãd), it is not—as is often supposed—tantamount to accepting the validity of every religion. Rather, I argue that the celebrated verses of The Interpreter profess to inherit the comprehensive perfection of the Prophet Muhammad as God's beloved and, in so doing, reflect a discourse of religious absolutism and a subsumptive cosmology of power. It is precisely this cosmology of power that has been almost completely occluded by readings equating religion with belief.

In chapter 2, "Return of the Solar King," I challenge the widely held Perennialist view that Ibn `Arabi rejected the supersessionist doctrine of abrogation (naskh), by demonstrating that his positions on the religious Other should be understood within a larger religio-political cosmology that envisions all religions and their laws as subject to the cosmic rule

of Muhammad. Even though this chapter clearly shows that Ibn 'Arabi held Judaism and Christianity as abrogated by Islam, it nuances this assertion by showing that through obedience to the Qur'anic command requiring submission and the payment of the indemnity tax (jizya), the People of the Book are metaphysically subsumed within the broader cosmography of Ibn Arabi's conception of Islam and the absolute cosmological authority of the Prophet Muhammad.

In chapter 3, "Competing Fields of Universal Validity," I situate Schuonian Perennialism within the larger discursive tradition of essentialist, religious univer-salism through a comparison with the universalism of Friedrich Schleiermacher (d. 1834). In so doing, I throw into relief how Schuon, and those writing within the orbit of his interpretative field, make a Copernican turn away from Ibn Arabi's hierarchical Muhammadan cosmology to a multireligious model of cosmic pluralism united by a Schleiermacherian notion of a transcendent and universally valid religious a priori, or "religion as such." To clearly demonstrate this turn, I historicize Ibn Arabi's discourse on the religious Other in relation to his Andalusian home of Seville and show how it notably echoes the polemical style of Ibn Hazm (d. 1064) against Judaism and Christianity. Like Ibn Hazm, Ibn `Arabi claims that the People of the Book were guilty of textual corruption (tahrīf al-nass) and not simply a corruption of meaning (tahrīfal-ma`ãni) as implied in Perennialist discourse. Rather than due to any particular soteriological power of Judaism or Christianity, or their respective symbolic systems, the salvation of the Protected People (ahl al-dhimma) appears to be metaphysically determined for Ibn 'Arabi by their submission to Islamic authority and their participation in its political sphere.

In chapter 4, "Ibn 'Arabi and the Metaphysics of Race," I reveal a buried order of politics underneath the Perennialist cosmology discussed in chapter 3 ironically constituted by and through long-held European discursive strategies of racial exclusion. Through a detailed comparison of Schuon's discursive practices with that of nineteenth-century Aryanist discourse, this chapter argues that although Schuon claims to recognize the universal validity of all religions beyond the limits of exoteric exclusivity, his work consistently presents as self-evident the metaphysical superiority of an Indo-European spiritual typology over that of the Semitic. Here, Ibn Arabi's "Semitic" propensity for subjectivism is understood as lacking the enlightened objectivity necessary to consistently discern the transcendent formlessness of essential truth from religious particularism. Thus, Ibn Arabi's own exclusive association with Islam and the Prophet Muhammad is rejected as an exoteric, and therefore less authentic, mode of spirituality in contrast to the more "essential" and autonomous religious truth of "pure metaphysics." The extent to which Ibn 'Arabi is thus decoupled from so-called Semitic subjectivism is the extent to which he is claimed to be an enlightened representative of Islam and authentic purveyor of the universal core of all religions—the religio perennis.

In the concluding chapter, "Mapping Ibn `Arabi at Zero Degrees; I situate key discursive elements of Schuonian Perennialism within a genealogy of German idealism leading back to Kant (and ultimately Plato) to show metaphorical resonances with a Kantian metaphysics of autonomy and its attendant universalism. In contradistinction to Ibn Arabi's heteronomous absolutism explored in the first part of this study, here I track how Schuon's religious essentialism functionally echoes the discursive practices that mark Kant's "universal" religion as definitively defined against Semitic heteronomy. While both Kantian and Schuonian universalist cosmologies thus appear to reflect a similar Copernican turn where an autonomous, a priori universal perspective forms the essence of all religion, I argue that these respective discourses also metaphysically reflect the imperial cartography of the Copernican age itself and its attendant ideological conceit of a universal perspective that claims to transcend the confines of geocentric cosmology—that is, its own ethnocentric situatedness. I thus contend that it is precisely the discursive practices and grammar of this larger Euro-hegemonic tradition of universalism—along with its attendant religious, racial, and civilizational superiority—that Schuonian Perennialism naturalizes within its interpretive field. I conclude by suggesting that the overlapping discursive

formations of Kantian and Schuonian universalism conceal absolutist modalities of supersessionism that are ironically similar to those openly posited by Ibn 'Arabi. The exclusivism inherent within such discourse not only calls into question the Western ideal of religious universalism and the possibility of nonexclusivist religious identity but also throws into relief the historically constituted and situated nature of all discourse that aspires to transcendent truth.

The British in India: A Social History of the Raj by David Gilmour [Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 9780374116859]

An immersive portrait of the lives of the British in India, from the seventeenth century to Independence

Who of the British went to India, and why? We know about Kipling and Forster, Orwell and Scott, but what of the youthful forestry official, the enterprising boxwallah, the fervid missionary? What motivated them to travel halfway around the globe, what lives did they lead when they got there, and what did they think about it all?

Full of spirited, illuminating anecdotes drawn from long-forgotten memoirs, correspondence, and government documents, The British in India weaves a rich tapestry of the everyday experiences of the Britons who found themselves in "the jewel in the crown" of the British Empire. David Gilmour captures the substance and texture of their work, home, and social lives, and illustrates how these transformed across the several centuries of British presence and rule in the subcontinent, from the East India Company's first trading station in 1615 to the twilight of the Raj and Partition and Independence in 1947. He takes us through remote hill stations, bustling coastal ports, opulent palaces, regimented cantonments, and dense jungles, revealing the country as seen through British eyes, and wittily reveling in all the particular concerns and contradictions that were a consequence of that limited perspective. The British in India is a breathtaking accomplishment, a vivid and balanced history written with brio, elegance, and erudition.

Excerpt: A few years ago the Scottish comedian Billy Connolly was surprised to learn that he had Indian ancestors. Appearing on the BBC television programme Who Do You Think You Are?, he was hoping to find out which country his great-grandmother Florence had been born in, Ireland or Scotland. In fact, as he soon discovered, she was born in India, in Bangalore, the daughter of Daniel Doyle, a labourer from County Wicklow who had enlisted in the British Army as a youth and was sent to India in 1856. For a few years in the south her father's career had prospered. From a rifle regiment he was transferred to the Royal Horse Artillery, a more prestigious unit, where he received three 'good conduct' medals and was promoted from gunner to corporal. Yet that, alas, was the high point of his career. To the amusement of his irreverent great-great-grandson, Daniel's name was soon appearing repeatedly in the Regimental Defaulters Book; his misdemeanours were unspecified but seem to have consisted chiefly of violence and drunkenness. Eventually he was court-martialled and reduced to the ranks, and in 1866 he was admitted to hospital in Bangalore suffering from diarrhoea, dysentery, alcoholism and syphilis.

Salvation for Doyle came three years later with his marriage, after which his army report rated him as `regular, good and temperate'. The agent of this remarkable transformation was his wife, Margaret, the daughter of John O'Brien, another Irish soldier in India, a private in the Madras Fusiliers whose regiment had been sent north to help counter the Rebellion of 1857. O'Brien was part of the relief force that arrived too late to save the British in Kanpur (Cawnpore) although it did manage to reach the besieged city of Lucknow. Badly wounded in the shoulder during the conflict, O'Brien decided to retire on his pension to Bangalore. Although the subsequent Doyle-O'Brien marriage might have seemed a purely Irish union taking place in a tropical ambience, this was not in fact the case. As the registry records demonstrate, John's wife, Matilda, was an Indian girl who at the age of thirteen converted to Christianity a month before her marriage. Billy Connolly's reaction to the news that he thus had Indian forebears and probably — given that Matilda had several siblings — a large number of Indian cousins, was both charming and bemused. Although the comedian still felt he was a `Glaswegian, Scottish person' — large, white and hairy — he was 'very proud and happy to be part Indian' as well.'

As Connolly's story suggests, much of Britain's relationship with India, especially at a personal and popular level, has very quickly been forgotten. One cannot help wondering why his maternal grandmother, to whom he was very close, never told him that her own grandparents had lived in India and that her mother had been born in Bangalore; if she had been ashamed to admit her Indian ancestry, she could have left that bit out. The story also indicates how much of the British-Indian relationship, again at a personal level, was accidental. Most British people did not go to India to conquer it, govern it or amass a large fortune there. When Daniel Doyle enlisted in the 3rd Battalion of the both Rifles, he did not know that he would be sent to India and spend half his active life there as a soldier who would never be called upon to fight a battle. Like private soldiers, many British women and children lived in India by accident, without having chosen to do so; chance or unexpected circumstances had brought them there. If we look merely at Connolly's own profession, the theatrical, we find a good number of future actors living fortuitously on the Subcontinent: a list of those who were born in India, or went to school or spent parts of their youth there, would include Vivien Leigh, Merle Oberon, Norman Wisdom, Lindsay Anderson, Spike Milligan, Tom Stoppard, Felicity Kendal and Joanna Lumley, many of whom will appear later in this book. If we examine an even smaller profession, that of writers, we find that Thackeray, Kipling, Saki, Orwell (and Orwell's second wife, Sonya) were all born in India.

The British in this book lived in India from shortly after the death of Queen Elizabeth I until well into the reign of Queen Elizabeth II, a span of some three hundred and fifty years. Life for them was

very different — and was led very differently — in diverse ages, just as it was in Britain. For nearly three-quarters of that time British settlements — and later possessions — were administered by the East India Company (EIC); for the last ninety years of the Indian Empire (1858—1947) they were under the direct rule of the British government. All divisions by `period' are artificial and prone to generalization, but perhaps one can divide Britain's time in India roughly into thirds. The first (and largest) had its share of war and violence, especially on the west coast, but was mainly a matter of small enclaves concentrating on trade. The second, stretching from the 1740s to the 1850s, was a period of conquest and expansion during which the East India Company, one of several rival European entities, emerged to become the paramount power in India. The third (and shortest), ending in 1947, was an era of consolidation and subsequent withdrawal. Yet even these divisions would need to be divided into contrasting subdivisions. As at home, the behaviour of the British in India was very different in the Regency period from what it was in the more earnest years of the early Victorians.

The different eras can of course be divided in other ways, culturally and sociologically as well as politically and militarily. Some British historians have periodized the empire in terms of British attitudes to India and the Indians. Roderick Matthews, for example, has marked his compatriots' `mental journey' with `milestones marked Greed, Scorn, Fear and Indifference', a division that sounds harsher than his work subsequently suggests. An older historian, Clive Dewey, has divided the centuries of British rule into 'five oscillations', the attitude of `friendship' (working with Indian agents and institutions) alternating with the `Gospel of Uplift' or exhortation to `improve' (telling Indians what was good for them and then trying to enforce it).

I would not dispute that these and other divisions are useful. Most eras have a. zeitgeist and sometimes seem to have more than one. Yet human beings remain individuals under whatever pressure they are subjected to and whatever wider forces they are caught up by. At lives on the Subcontintent. I believe that writers of social history should attempt to write impartially about customs and behaviour even when we find them abhorrent; we should look at them in the context of their time and not from the vantage point of a usually smug present. From childhood I managed to resist the exhortations of uncles and grandfathers to go hunting and shooting, but I have tried to write about `blood sports' in India without prejudice against them. Some readers may feel that I have given too much space to spearers of boar and pursuers of jackal, but pig-stickers, like prostitutes, are a part of history.

As British people continued to live in India long after Independence in 1947, I have had to decide at what point to end this book. I have chosen the mid-196os, when most of the 'stayers-on' had left or died and before the hippy `invasion' had really begun. Perhaps I was influenced by my own very limited experience of hippiedom. In my 'gap year' in 1971 I went to India with a couple of friends, three eighteen-year-olds travelling overland and camping in the open without apparent danger in Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kabul was a sort of junction for the new invaders. The real hippies stayed there a month, until their visas ran out, strumming guitars and smoking hashish before deciding whether to go south to the beaches of Goa or east across the Gangetic Plain and then up to Nepal. As it was mid-April and the heat was mounting, we set off for Kathmandu.

On our return from Nepal to India we stayed at Dehra Dun, in the foothills of the Himalaya, where I had an introduction to a remarkable woman, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, who invited us to stay at her home for a few days. The sister of India's first and greatest prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, Mrs Pandit had been ambassador to the Soviet Union and the United States as well as high commissioner to London; she had also been a politician and president of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Although she was now in her seventies and had retired from political and diplomatic life, she remained passionately interested in those subjects and did not conceal her disapproval of the current prime minister, her niece Indira Gandhi. I fear that my friends and I were not good company for her. Suffering from a mild form of dysentery, we were rather tired after six months 'on the road', and our

formidable hostess was clearly not impressed by the sight of fledgling hippies lounging around her drawing room, ineptly fingering a guitar Lor patting a Nepalese tom-tom. One day she strode impatiently into the room, gestured dramatically at the view through the window and exclaimed, 'The Englishmen I used to know would have climbed that mountain before breakfast.' I appreciate her point now rather more than I did at the time; such men doubtless were a different breed. Remembering Mrs Pandit with gratitude, I have decided to end this book with Britons who climbed the Himalaya before breakfast. <>

Empire of Enchantment: The Story of Indian Magic
by John Zubrzycki [Oxford University Press, 9780190914394]

India's association with magicians goes back thousands of years. Conjurors and illusionists dazzled the courts of Hindu maharajas and Mughal emperors. As British dominion spread over the subcontinent, such wonder-workers became synonymous with India. Western magicians appropriated Indian attire, tricks and stage names; switching their turbans for top hats, Indian jugglers fought back and earned their grudging respect.

Empire of Enchantment tells the extraordinary story of how Indian magic descended from the realm of the gods to become part of daily ritual and popular entertainment across the globe. Recounting tales of levitating Brahmins, resurrections, prophesying monkeys and "the most famous trick never performed," Empire of Enchantment vividly charts Indian magic's epic journey from street to the stage.

This heavily illustrated book tells the extraordinary, untold story of how Indian magic descended from the realm of the gods to become part of daily ritual and popular entertainment across the globe. Drawing on ancient religious texts, early travelers' accounts, colonial records, modern visual sources, and magicians' own testimony, Empire of Enchantment is a vibrant narrative of India's magical traditions, from Vedic times to the present day.

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'So Wonderfully Strange'

DILSHAD Garden, on the eastern outskirts of New Delhi, is an unlikely location to be probing the veracity of a four-century-old account of Indian magic. To use the appellation `Garden' was a town planner's clever sleight of hand. There are few open spaces in this congested warren of low-rise, seventies-style government housing. The grit and fumes of the Grand Trunk Road make it even harder to imagine how northern India might have looked in the Mughal period.

My destination was a small park surrounded on three sides by ochre-coloured flats. My guide was the infectiously enthusiastic Raj Kumar, General Secretary of the Society of Indian Magicians, winner of the International Merlin Award, master of the Rope Trick and levitation act, team leader at the Delhi School of Magic, and founder of MAZMA, the Society for Uplifting Traditional Magic & Performing Arts. It was late November, the middle of the marriage season—the busiest period of Delhi's always-hectic social calendar. Raj Kumar was negotiating the maze of traffic, while fielding bookings for magic shows on his Samsung 7. Talent scout and teacher, he had dozens of semi-pro mystifiers on his books, ready to dazzle guests at weddings, corporate gigs and birthday parties.

Waiting at the park were a dozen-or-so jadoowallahs, traditional street magicians, who had come from Ghaziabad, just across the Uttar Pradesh border. Raj Kumar proudly informed me how he had pulled them out of poverty by buying each a motorbike. Without their own transport, getting to the small towns and villages where they still perform is difficult. Making a living as a street magician in New Delhi is tough. Begging is officially banned in the Indian capital and under the law, street magicians are lumped together with beggars and other vagrants, making them easy targets for the police. But this was very much Rajkumar's territory and over the next two hours his rag-tag assemblage performed unmolested, presenting a repertoire of tricks that bore a striking similarity to what the Mughal Emperor Jahangir had witnessed in the early seventeenth century.

Jahangir presided over an empire at the height of its power and decadence. He never went near a battlefield and rarely drew a sword, though in his memoirs he admits to ordering one of his grooms to be killed on the spot and two palanquin bearers hamstrung and paraded around his camp on a donkey, for disturbing a nilgai, or Indian deer, during a hunting trip. The peace and stability his father, Akbar, bequeathed allowed Jahangir to indulge in shikari, sensual pursuits, poetry and drinking the latter being an addiction he spoke of with pride:

> Encompassed as I was with youthful associates of congenial minds, breathing the air of a delicious climate—ranging through lofty and splendid saloons, every part of which decorated with all the graces of painting and sculpture, and the floors bespread with the richest carpets of silk and gold, would it not have been a species of folly to have rejected the aid of an exhilarating cordial—and what cordial can surpass the juice of the grape?'

He was also a connoisseur of all things exotic: zebras, turkeys and other strange animals including a creature brought to his court by a dervish from Ceylon with the face of a bat and the body of a monkey, minus the tail. His garden bloomed with 'the apricots of Suliman and Abbas'. It was scented with sandalwood `peculiar to the islands of Zeir, or Zubberbad'. He owned the finest elephants to transport the imperial assemblage—wives, almirahs, carpets, silver utensils and a canopy of velvet wrought with gold, said to weigh several tonnes that protected his peripatetic court from the rays of the meridian sun.' He was also fascinated by magic—once halting his convoy to watch the performance of a Carnatic juggler who could swallow a chain three yards long. His obsession with necromancy interfered with the day-to-day running of the court to such an extent that a group of complainants, wishing to report abuses of power by the Governor of Bengal, had to dress up as magicians to get his attention.

Mid-way through his memoirs, as he contemplates a life well lived, a life of `gold, and jewels, and sumptuous wardrobes, and in the choicest beauties the sun ever shone upon' ,4 Jahangir digresses to `matters of less serious importance'. There can be found in Bengal, he informs his readers, `performers in sleight of hand, or jugglers, of such unrivalled skill in their art, that I have thought a few instances of their extraordinary dexterity not unworthy of a place in these memorials'. He goes on to describe how a troupe of seven came to his court boasting of `producing effects so strange as far to surpass the scope of the human understanding'. Not only did they keep their word, 'they exhibited in their performances things of so extraordinary a nature, as without the actual demonstration the world would not have conceived possible'.' Over the course of what would have been several days and nights, they effected no fewer than twenty-eight tricks, a compendium of marvels that encompassed many of the legendary feats of Indian magic—all executed with such skill and consisting of such marvels, that the loquacious Mughal would often be lost for words.

The chief juggler began by promising to produce any tree in an instant, merely by placing a seed in the earth. Khaun-e-Jahaun, one of Jahangir's nobles, ordered a mulberry tree. 'The men arose without hesitation, and having in ten separate spots set some seed in the ground, they recited among themselves, in cabalistical language unintelligible to the standers-by, when instantly a plant was seen springing from each of the ten places, and each proved the tree required by Khaun-e-Jahaun.' In front of their bewildered audience, they produced

other trees in the same manner—mango, apple, cypress, fig, almond, walnut and so on. Fruit was picked and distributed for tasting. `Before the trees were removed there appeared among the foliage birds of such surprising beauty, in colour, and shape, and melody of song, as the world never saw before,' continues Jahangir. The foliage turned to variegated Autumnal tints, before the trees slowly sank into the earth. Stated the emperor: `I can only further observe, that if the circumstances which I have now described had not happened in my own presence, I could never have believed that they had any existence in reality.'

That evening, one of the jugglers came before Jahangir and spun in a circle, clothed in nothing but a sheet. From beneath it he took a magnificent mirror that produced a light so powerful 'it illuminated the hemisphere to an incredible distance round'. Travellers would later report that on that very same night, at a distance of ten days journey, the sky was so floodlit it exceeded 'the brightness of the brightest day that they had ever seen'. In the following days, feats of ventriloquism were followed by demonstrations of fireworks that were launched into the air without being touched. A cauldron produced cooked rice and stewed fowl without a fire being lit. A flower turned into a fountain that burst forth with showers of rose petals. A hole dug in the ground and filled with water turned into a sheet of ice so thick an elephant could walk across it. In quick succession, arrows were shot into the sky where they somehow remained suspended, successive arrows attaching themselves to the one's fired before, forming a heavenly archway. A red rose dipped into a vessel of water changed colour 'a hundred times'. The magicians created the same effect using a length of white thread and later used a mirror that altered the tint of anything put behind it. From sleight of hand, they progressed to acrobatics. Seven men formed a column, head to head and feet to feet. The man supporting the other six then lifted one foot as high as his shoulder. Standing thus, Jahangir stated, he exhibited 'a degree of strength and steadiness not exactly within the scope of my comprehension'.

From an empty bag emerged two cocks that `fought with such force and fury, that their wings emitted sparks of fire at every stroke' . Two partridges of the 'most beautiful and brilliant plumage' appeared, followed by two frightful black snakes that attacked each other until they were too exhausted to fight any longer. When a sheet was thrown over the bag and lifted off, there was no trace of the snakes, the partridges or the cocks. A marvellous birdcage revealed a different pair of birds as it revolved, a carpet changed colours and patterns each time it was turned over, and an otherwise empty sack produced a seemingly endless variety of fruit and vegetables. Standing before the Mughal emperor, a man opened his mouth to reveal a snake's head.

Another of the jugglers pulled the serpent out and in the same manner produced another seven, each of which was several feet in length. They were thrown on the ground where they were 'seen writhing in the folds of each other, and tearing one another with the greatest apparent fury: A spectacle not less strange than frightful.' Also wondrous was a ring that changed its precious stone as it moved from finger to finger. The magicians then showed a book of the purest white paper devoid of writing or drawing. It was opened again to reveal a bright red page sprinkled with gold. Then appeared a leaf of beautiful azure, flecked with gold and delineated with the figures of men and women. Another leaf was of a Chinese colour and fabric, on which herds of cattle and lions were drawn. 'At every turn of the leaf, a different colour, scene, and action, was exhibited, such as was indeed most pleasing to behold.' Of all the performances, the magical book gave Jahangir the most delight: 'So many beautiful pictures and extraordinary changes having been brought under view, that I must confess my utter inability to do justice in the description.'

But these were mere tricks compared with two feats that went 'far beyond the ordinary scope of human exertion, such as frequently to baffle the utmost subtlety of the understanding to penetrate'. Firstly, the magicians `produced a man whom they divided limb from limb, actually severing his head from the body. They scattered these mutilated members along the ground, and in this state they lay for some time.' After a sheet was placed over the remains, one of the jugglers went underneath,

emerging a few minutes later together with the man who had been dismembered, 'in perfect health and condition, and one might have safely sworn that he had never received wound or injury whatever'.

It was the Rope Trick, the twenty-third of the Bengali jugglers' legerdemain display that was the most marvellous of all and would become the benchmark against which all feats of Indian magic would be measured.

They produced a chain of fifty cubits in length, and in my presence, threw one end of it towards the sky, where it remained as if fastened to something in the air. A dog was then brought forward, and being placed at the lower end of the chain, immediately ran up, and reaching the other end, immediately disappeared in the air. In the same manner a hog, a panther, a lion, and a tiger, were alternately sent up the chain, and all equally disappeared at the upper end of the chain. At last they took down the chain and put it into a bag, no one even discovering in what way the different animals were made to vanish into the air in the mysterious manner above described. This, I may venture to affirm, was beyond measure strange and surprising.

Though he had seen magic at his father's court, Jahangir was forced to admit that `never did I see or hear of anything in execution so wonderfully strange, as was exhibited with apparent facility by these seven jugglers'. He dismissed the troupe with a donation of fifty thousand rupees and ordered each of his amirs to give upwards of one thousand rupees in appreciation of their performance.

Was Jahangir's description a fantasy of his alcohol-addled mind? Had the passage of time blurred his memory? Did the translator embellish the text? Reflecting on the performance of the Bengali jugglers, Milbourne Christopher, the magic historian, warned: `Always remember that what a layman thinks he sees and what the magician actually does, are not necessarily the same. Further, many spectators, in telling about tricks, invent considerably to make their accounts more interesting.

Like their Bengali ancestors, Raj Kumar's jadoowallahs carried few props—a couple of baskets, some sheets, a few sticks and some lengths of rope—anything that could fit on the back of a two-wheeler. And of course, there was no stage, just compacted dirt with a hint of grass. My impresario had promised authentic Indian street magic. I was not disappointed.

Dressed in a brightly embroidered black shirt and matching felt cap, and sporting a well-hennaed beard, Farukh Shah went first, I suspect because he was the most senior of the troupe. The Indian way of executing a trick is to start off with plenty of patter. Not a lot happens initially, but great care is taken to convince the audience that the props, in this case two empty baskets and a couple of pieces of cloth, are what they are—not cleverly concealed receptacles for what comes next. With some masterly misdirection and skillful sleight of hand, Shah produced a small tree with red blossoms, seemingly out of nowhere. It looked more like shrub than the fruit-laden, bird-filled orchard Jahangir was granted, but its provenance was clear. He then pulled out a thick quatro-sized book with a bright red glossy cover. Each time he flipped through the pages a different set of images appeared: birds, animals, Hindi and English alphabets, currency notes, flowers and trees. The Mughal would have been impressed.

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Next came a levitation trick. Shamin Khan covered his brother Asim with a blue sheet, tapped his stick on the ground and watched his lithe frame slowly rise above the ground, his head and legs clearly visible. Though I had been told the secret to the trick, it was impressive nonetheless. It was followed by a rope-tying feat, where two members of the audience were invited to tie ropes around one of the jugglers, checking the knots as they went. Other members of the troupe then held the ends of the two longest ropes and pulled them tightly. Spinning in a circle, the juggler unloosened the bindings without touching them, the ropes falling like leftover spaghetti on the ground. In place of a caldron that produced rice and stewed fowl without a fire being lit, another of the jadoowallahs, Aas Mohammed, took out a wicker plate and tossed some uncooked

rice on it. As he shook the plate, the raw grains magically turned into puffed rice, which was then passed around like a plate of prasad, the holy food offered at temples. Instead of producing snakes from his mouth, Mohammed disgorged marbles and brass balls, before spitting out a jaw full of rusty nails. Ashik Ali's turn came next. Muttering incantations he covered his son, Shahrukh, with a blanket. With boy's outline clearly visible, he dismembered the body, pulling legs, arms and head away from his torso. Once the blanket was removed, the boy was whole again.

The members of Raj Kumar's troupe use smart phones, post images of their shows on Facebook, connect with each other via Whatsapp and pull out laminated testimonials and faded photographs of their performances. They are hired by government agencies to promote HIV-awareness and impress on poor people the need to put their savings in the bank (think vanishing coin tricks). But much of their repertoire has changed little over the centuries. All have learned their trade from their fathers, who were taught by their fathers and so on, going back many generations. Although it is getting harder to make ends meet by being a street magician, they know no other life.

India's pantheon of magicians jadoowallahs, tamashawallahs, jadughars, madaris, mayakaris, maslets, qalandars, sampwallahs, sanperas, katputliwallahs, bahurupis, peep-showwallahs, the list goes on—ranges across creed and caste. Stronger than religious ties, is their association with the barah pal, the brotherhood of twelve, an ancient collective of strolling players that includes jugglers, snake charmers, animal handlers, puppeteers, ventriloquists, storytellers, impersonators and acrobats. Regardless of their backgrounds, members of this peripatetic brotherhood can share a cooking hearth made out of three stones whenever their wanderings bring them together. Economic changes are breaking down what were once strong bonds between these communities. But their arts of legerdemain live on as an integral part of the social, cultural and religious fabric of India as they have for millennia.

For something so enduring, there have been very few reliable books on Indian magic published in recent decades aside from Lee Siegel's masterly account Net of Magic and Peter Lamont's lucid and entertaining The Rise of the Indian Rope Trick. More recently Chris Goto-Jones has charted the influence of Indian, Japanese and Chinese conjurers during the `Golden Age of Magic' in his book Conjuring Asia. Until the early twentieth century much of the writing on India comprised anecdotal accounts of travellers, merchants, pilgrims and missionaries, as well as the memoirs of Western magicians whose texts were often little more than an extension of their showmanship. In flamboyant prose, they fired up the public's expectations about the miracles and marvels of East. Most were drawn to India because it was considered the birthplace of magic and therefore the source of all that was truly inexplicable. As John Nevil Maskelyne, the great nineteenth-century English magician and inventor (the penny drop toilet lock was his innovation) once wrote: 'The difficulty of producing a new magical effect, is about equivalent to that of inventing a new proposition in Euclid." India promised a cornucopia of undiscovered treasures, tricks and routines whose secrets could be easily stolen and appropriated. By adopting oxymoronic names such as the Fakir of Siva and dressing in shimmering sherwanis and triumphantly plumed turbans, these Western conjurers tried to give the public what they craved: a glimpse of the mysterious Orient that was out of reach to all but a few. By doing so, they were forgetting one of the cardinal rules of magic: skilful presentation is always more important than technique—and when it came to display, jadoowallahs took line honours. Their poverty, the primitiveness of their surroundings, the use of common articles such as baskets, clay pots and pieces of cloth to execute the most extraordinary of feats, only accentuated their exotic allure, much to the consternation of their Occidental cousins.

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My first encounter with Indian street magic was in December 1979. I was on a train from Calcutta to Guwahati in Assam, but a twenty-four-hour bandh, or strike, over illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, led to a lengthy unscheduled stop in Alipur Duar. Tired of waiting in my third-class compartment, I wandered into the square outside the station where a crowd of curious onlookers had encircled an old

man and a young boy who were preparing to do the Basket Trick. The boy climbed into a round cane basket just big enough to fit into. After putting on the lid, the man started chanting incantations that grew louder and louder. Without warning he picked up a large steel sword and started plunging it into the basket. Blood covered the sword and the boy's screams were terrifying. There seemed no way he could have avoided the thrusts of the three-foot long blade. I could sense the crowd getting edgy. If this was theatre, then the performance was utterly convincing. Suddenly everything went silent. In went the sword one last time. A blanket was thrown over the basket. After a few moments, the blanket and the lid of the basket were removed and the boy appeared with the sword through his neck. Grasping the hilt in one hand and the tip of the blade in the other, the magician lifted the boy off the ground and presented him to the now completely astonished crowd. The boy showed no signs of discomfort, there were no obvious wounds and no trickery involved. I was sure there was no hidden brace. When sufficient baksheesh had been collected, the boy was lowered back into the basket, a blanket was thrown over it and a few minutes later emerged completely unscathed.

The Basket Trick is one of the oldest and most mystifying feats of magic in the world. Expertly executed by an ancient looking wizard on a dirt-covered square without trapdoors, mirrors or curtains, it is a spectacular illusion. If magic is defined as 'the artful performance of impossible effects' »6 then the Basket Trick falls squarely in this category. But defining the wider meaning of magic in an Indian context is as elusive as finding evidence of the Rope Trick. In 1982, the social anthropologist Edmund Leach, whose field work took him to Taiwan, the highlands of Burma, Kurdistan and Ceylon, concluded: `After a lifetime's career as a professional anthropologist, I have almost reached the conclusion that the word [magic] has no meaning whatsoever'. Few contemporary social anthropologists, he added, could `confidently distinguish magical from non-magical acts'. Writing a decade earlier, the Dutch cultural anthropologist Jan Van Baal warned: `Magic is a dangerous word, more dangerous than magic itself, because it is such a handsome term to cover everything that we fail to understand. The term is used far too often as a vague kind of explanation, but in fact it explains nothing.'

Both Leach and Van Baal were referring to ritual or sympathetic magic rooted in religion, nature rites and belief in the supernatural, rather than magic for the sake of entertainment. In India, the lines between these two types have been deliberately—and very effectively—blurred. A Hindu or a Muslim holy man will vanish objects, pass skewers through his body or walk on hot coals to convince alms givers of his spiritual powers. The street magician will copy those feats or add similar ones such as being buried underground or lying on a bed of nails, for the same pecuniary ends. P. C. Sorcar's 1960s two-and-a-half-hour showbiz extravaganza started with the ritualistic drawing of a mandala on the stage and the lighting of an oil lamp before a portrait of the Goddess Durga. Dressed as a mock Maharajah, India's most famous magician then presented a program that had more bling than a Bollywood movie but was as authentically Indian as chicken tikka masala.

In this book, the boundaries for what constitutes magic are also deliberately blurred. The most commonly used Sanskrit word for magic, indrajala, can refer to the net of the god Indra, sleight of hand, jugglery, illusions, the appearance of things, traps, stratagems and deceptions employed in warfare to confuse one's enemies. Similarly sihr, the Koranic term for magic or sorcery, can refer to juggling and conjuring tricks, astrology, the production of spectacular effects through the help of spirits and demons, the use of drugs or perfumes to confuse people, the charismatic seduction of crowds, as well as sowing dissent. Rather than trying to separate magic, religion and science as Western theorists such as James Frazer have done, a more suitable approach is to consider the jadoowallah's craft as the core around which other forms of popular entertainment and ritual practices occur. Traditonally, a typical troupe of traditional street entertainers would comprise men, women and children in overlapping roles. Music is used to attract the attention of passersby. When a sufficiently large crowd has gathered, acrobatics, balancing acts and juggling displays warm the audience up. There may be a puppet show, some

clowning or a comedy routine. Live cobras dart at spectators, before being lured back into their baskets by the sonorous sounds of the pungi. A goat balances on a cylinder no wider that a Coke bottle, a monkey dressed like a groom at a wedding does summersaults to the beating of the damru and then carries around a begging bowl. Coin tricks, Cups and Balls, Diving Ducks and egg bag routines, lull onlookers into a false sense of security ahead of a series of more complex and often gruesome feats. Chickens are decapitated and restored to life, a man's tongue is severed, swords are swallowed, a child trapped in a basket screams as they are stabbed by a knife. What was sleight of hand begins to look like real magic. If the audience is mainly Hindu, Indra, the god whose net of magic created the world, will be invoked; if Muslim, the same magician's patter will be sprinkled with Koranic references. After the performance, women might read palms, dispense herbal remedies or divine answers newly married girls ask about how best to ensure the birth of a male child. Once common in rural and urban areas, such troupes are becoming rarer these days as economic imperatives and changing audience tastes erode traditional crafts.

Trying to define what constitutes a magical act in this context runs the risk of becoming meaningless even before considering that other blurred boundary between magic and religion. At one extreme are feats that to many would be classified as being purely physical and associated with circus routines such as clowning and tightrope walking. At the other are deceptions that might be classified by some as black magic or witchcraft. Nor are individual performers specialists in one art. Among the Qalandars, a nomadic tribe found in parts of the Punjab and Sindh, children are taught singing and dancing, tumbling, rope walking and other acrobatic feats, as well as sleight-of-hand tricks and working with performing animals such as bears, goats and monkeys. The term juggler became the widely used word for an Indian magician in nineteenth-century England, because of the public's exposure to troupes that combined a range of physical acts alongside straight conjuring. The Oriental Troupe, which entertained English audiences in the late 1860s and was billed as coming directly from the Kingdom of Oude (Awadh, the princely state in north India that was the epicenter of the 1857 Uprising against the British), included a contortionist who could thread a needle with her toes while blindfolded, an acrobat who could walk on tight-rope with buffalo horns tied to his feet, a gymnast who could summersault atop a twenty-foot high pole, as well as a magician who made cats and pigeons appear out of nowhere. At London's Crystal Palace they appeared alongside a Norwegian giant and a hippopotamus posing as a 'Blue Hairless Horse'.

I am acutely aware that as a Westerner my perception of what is magical in India's performing arts, literature, society, religion and culture will differ from an Indian's. Similarly, in a country as large and as ethnically, religiously and linguistically diverse as India, where populations coexist at vastly different stages of development, there will be myriad opinions on what constitutes magic. Though the boundaries are blurred, a line has to be drawn somewhere, which I did, but not before considering whether I should also examine the miraculous powers of god men such as Sai Baba, the widely reported phenomenon of milkdrinking Ganesha statues, and Sachin Tendulkar's success at the crease after taking the advice of Parsi astrologer, Bejan Daruwalla, and changing the number on his shirt to thirty-three. Although the apparently supernatural powers of religious ascetics, the place of magic in Hinduism and even the predictions of soothsayers, diviners and astrologers are mentioned, I mostly steer clear of Sai Babas and Daruwallas. The core of this book is the role of the magician as an entertainer, whether on the street, in the court or on a conventional stage.

In my research I found evidence of magic almost everywhere I looked: in the verses of the Atharva Veda, the stories of Somadeva and Dandin's descriptions of Pallava society with its statutes of Kama, the god of love, and his consort, Rai, making erotic sounds—to name just a few. Archival material in New Delhi, Bombay, London, Cambridge and other libraries revealed the wonderful Professor Ahmad, court conjurer of the princely state of Charkhari who entertained the Amir of Afghanistan at a state dinner in Agra with

his Marvellous Sphinx trick. The archives often illuminated the darker side of India's magical history. After being recruited by corrupt or incompetent impresarios, hundreds of jugglers, acrobats, dancers and musicians were abandoned in cities such as London, Brussels and Berlin, forcing the India Office to arrange for their repatriation. One of those was Amar Nath Dutt, who was duped into going to New York by a curry cook posing as a prince from Baluchistan. After being dumped on the streets of Queens, he joined a revolutionary cell in Paris bent on the overthrow of the British Raj and trained as a bomb maker. He ended up using his pyrotechnic skills to bring dazzling Indian deceptions to the Western stage as Linga Singh. In the 1930s, a Kashmiri who called himself Kuda Bux, created a media storm by staging the first fire walk in England. His fame helped pave the way for other Indians such as Gogia Pasha and P. C. Sorcar to bring their blend of Western and Eastern marvels to the world stage.

Magical menageries from India, such as the Oriental Troupe, became a staple of world fairs and international exhibitions. They were seen by millions of people, ensuring that by the end of the nineteenth century the wonder-workers of Madras, Delhi, Lucknow and Lahore were synonymous with the greatest possession of the largest empire in the world. Accounts of ropes being thrown in the air and remaining upright without any visible support, yet strong enough for an animal or even a man to climb up and disappear; of fakirs being buried alive for months and brought back to life; of conjurors instantaneously raising mango trees laden with fruit from the bare earth, filled the pages of newspapers and journals. In December 1899, London's Strand Magazine declared in its typically unequivocal tone: 'Ask the average man for what India is most celebrated, and chances are ten-to-one that he will ignore the glories of the Taj Mahal, the beneficence of British rule, even Mr Kipling, and will unhesitatingly reply in one word, "Jugglers".
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Empire of Enchantment: The Story of Indian Magic describes how India's `jugglers' achieved this accolade and what has happened since. To tell the story of Indian magic is to hold a mirror to India's religious traditions, its society and culture. Magic permeated the Vedic period, Sufis and yogis staged miracle contests to see whose jadoo was more powerful, Buddhists and Jains resorted to spells and incantations to win philosophical debates. Indian fortunetellers were in great demand in ancient Rome. The Tang emperors of China employed Indian alchemists who peddled secret formulas that promised longevity and sexual prowess. After watching the tricks of conjurers, the sixth-century sage, Samkara, used their principles to explain the concept of maya or illusion. During the Abbasid caliphate, the booksellers of Baghdad sold Indian conjuring manuals translated into Arabic. In the late eighteenth century, Muscovites were startled by the appearance of yogi who kept his arms raised above his head as a penance. He was mid-way through a decades-long pilgrimage that took him through Ceylon, Malaya, Afghanistan, Persia, Mesopotamia and back down the Silk Road to Tibet.

The story of Indian magic cannot be told without examining its place in the globalisation of popular culture and the interplay between Eastern and Western traditions of performance magic. In 1813, the enterprising captain of an East Indiaman docked on the Thames with a troupe of jugglers. Their appearance at Pall Mall would change the face of Western conjuring forever. Other troupes quickly followed and in the late 1810s a South Indian named Ramo Samee started performing in America, continental Europe and England, becoming one of the most famous magicians of his day. Within a few decades, continental conjurers were blackening their faces and performing the Basket Trick and levitation acts. By the time professional Indian magicians with their Western-style routines and matching outfits, began travelling to Europe and America in the early 1900s, they found the market flooded with the likes of Samri S. Baldwin, 'The White Mahatma,' Gustave Fasola, 'The Famous Indian Fakir,' and Howard Thurston, who strutted the stage the stage looking like a Tatar chieftain while presenting routines he claimed were based on secrets whispered to him by holy men on the banks of the Ganges. Even Harry Houdini started his career posing as a `Hindu fakir'.

Thurston's show included a version of the great Indian Rope Trick. With a provenance stretching

back to the sixth century BCE, it remains one of the most legendary feats in the world. In the early 1900s, it was being presented as proof that India was a land where real magic was still possible. Determined to bury that notion and take down the legend of the Rope Trick, the Magic Circle, the most prestigious society of prestidigitators in Britain, offered a 500-guinea reward to the first person who could perform the feat without props. The prize was never claimed.

Unlike most people who have written on this topic, I am not a magician, though I have tried rather unsuccessfully to pick up a few sleights of hand during my encounters with India's wonder-workers. Barring a couple of exceptions, the reader will not discover the secrets to any of the tricks described in this book—many of which, in any case, seem inexplicable, even to a hardened sceptic such as myself. There is enough disenchantment in the world and I don't intend to compound it. Nor is this a comprehensive account of the jadoowallah's craft. Hidden in back issues of Bengali-language magic journals jealously guarded by collectors, in the arcane manuals of Tantriks and occultists, in yet-to-be discovered manuscripts gathering dust in libraries and archives, are any number of stories of India's magical lore and of encounters with its mystifiers waiting to be told. My hope is that this overview of India's magical traditions will encourage more scholarship on how the worlds of jadoowallahs, jugglers and jinn shaped its society, culture and religion—and enriched the rest of the world. <>

Philosophical Essays Against Open Theism edited by Benjamin H. Arbour {Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, Routledge, 9781138799998]

This new collection of philosophically rigorous essays critiques the interpretation of divine omniscience known as open theism, focusing primarily on philosophically motivated open theism and positing arguments that reject divine knowledge of future contingents in the face of the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge. The sixteen new essays in this collection, written by some of the most renowned philosophers on the topic of divine providence, represent a philosophical attempt to seriously consider open theism. They cover a wide variety of issues, including: the ontology of time, systematic metaphysics, perfect being theology, the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, the problem of evil, and the nature of divine knowledge in general. *Philosophical Essays Against Open Theism* advances the discussion by wrestling against the assertions of open theism, and will be of interest to both proponents and opponents of this controversial issue.

Excerpt: Imagine Abby, a bright undergraduate majoring in philosophy at a prestigious university. After completing a standard introductory philosophy course during her first semester as a fresher, Abby then took two survey courses, one in metaphysics and the other in epistemology. Following this, Abby felt she was ready to pursue more advanced topics in philosophy. So, during her sophomore year, she took an ethics class in the fall as well as a course in ancient philosophy; in the spring she studied logic and medieval philosophy.

In the beginning of her third year, Abby felt prepared for advanced electives, so she enrolled in a course surveying the philosophy of action while also taking modern philosophy. She learned about how different thinkers have understood decision-making and the nature of causation. Her professor covered a range of topics, including determinism, chaos theory, and the various ways philosophers have thought about the relationship between free will and moral responsibility.

In the spring, Abby was eager to find out whether her religious beliefs would stand up to the scrutiny of rigorous philosophical analysis. So she decides to take a course in the philosophy of religion taught by one of the world's leaders in the field, an individual who also happens to publish widely on the metaphysics of time, causation, and modality.

Having already been exposed to numerous philosophical debates, Abby finds the majority of the material in the class enjoyable, and she doesn't have any difficulty squaring many of her Christian beliefs with reasonable positions in analytic philosophy. However, the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge catches Abby by surprise. This particular philosophical puzzle ends up challenging Abby's long-held beliefs about divine knowledge.

Abby's theistic commitments coming into the course include the belief that God has exhaustive definite foreknowledge. She is committed to the idea that God not only knows what could happen in the future, but also what is actually going to happen. Abby is also committed to the idea that at least some of the actions of human beings aren't determined by God or anything else; rather, she maintains that humans possess free will, including the ability to help shape the future by choosing between multiple possibilities. But after being exposed to various constructions of the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge, Abby finds herself genuinely wondering how God could know whether or not she will, say, drink orange juice with her breakfast tomorrow if it is genuinely up to her to make the decision. Imagine the conversation Abby has with herself in her head.

"If God is infallible," she thinks, "then God cannot be wrong. So if God believes that I will drink orange juice tomorrow, then it must be the case that I will, in fact, drink orange juice tomorrow. But if God believes that I will drink orange juice tomorrow, and if God cannot be wrong, then how can I be free to refrain from drinking the orange juice? For if I were to refrain from drinking the orange juice, the present belief that God has would be wrong! Since nobody has the ability to bring it about that God is mistaken, it would therefore seem that I don't have the ability to refrain from drinking the orange juice tomorrow. And, without that ability, I'm not free."

The argument that has Abby so worked up is based on the idea that whatever lies in the past is no longer within our control, and therefore is no longer up to us in the same way that the future is up to us, which is known as temporal asymmetry. Temporal asymmetry, together with the assumption of a libertarian understanding of free will, entails that the past differs from the future in that, whatever happened in the past is no longer within our control, whereas whatever comes about in the future remains in some sense "up to us." Versions of the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge, including those that depend of temporal asymmetry, are plentiful, but a few stand out as very careful articulations of the problem. The most basic version runs as follows:

(1) Because God is infallible, all divine knowledge is infallible.
(2) God knows at t1 that an agent S will freely do an action A at t3.
(3) S is free to refrain from doing A at t3.

This puzzle appears to present us with a dilemma. If God infallibly knows that an agent S will freely do an action A at t3, then S does A at t3. But, assuming a libertarian conception of free will, an agent is free with respect to doing something only

if that agent has the ability to do otherwise. Therefore, if S does A "freely" at t3, then S must have the ability to refrain from doing A at t3. But, if S has the ability to refrain from doing A at t3, then S has the ability to bring it about either that God knew something that is false (which is impossible, even for God), or that God knew something different than what we antecedently said God knew. But, assuming temporal asymmetry, no agent has the ability to change the past, and what God knew at t1 is a part of the past once t3 arrives. So, it seems that if God knows at t1 that S will do A at t3, then S does not do A freely at t3. Alternatively, if S does enjoy the ability to do otherwise with respect to either doing A or refraining from doing A at t3, then God cannot know at t1 whether or not S will do A at t3.

William Hasker offers a more thorough explanation of the predicament.

> (B1) It is now true that Clarence will have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow. (Premise)
> (B2) It is impossible that God should at any time believe what is false, or fail to believe anything that is true. (Premise: divine omniscience)
> (B3) Therefore, God has always believed that Clarence will have a cheese 0melet for breakfast tomorrow. (From 1,2)
> (B4) If God has always believed a certain thing, it is not in anyone's power to bring it about that God has not always believed that thing. (Premise: the unalterability of the past)
> (B5) Therefore, it is not in Clarence's power to bring it about that God has not always believed that he would have a cheese omelet for breakfast. (From 3,4)
> (B6) It is not possible for it to be true both that God has always believed that Clarence would have a cheese omelet for breakfast, and that he does not in fact have one. (From 2)
> (B7) Therefore, it is not in Clarence's power to refrain from having a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow. (From 5,6) So Clarence's eating the omelet tomorrow is not an act of free choice.

Consider also Linda Zagzebski's statement of a different version of the foreknowledge dilemma. The state of affairs

> (1) God's being infallible (or essentially omniscient) and
> (2) God's believing at t1 that I will do S at t3

are jointly inconsistent with

> (3') The accidental contingency" of S at t2

and hence with

> (3) My being free to refrain from doing S at t3.3

Zagzebski's formulation of the dilemma rests on the notion of accidental necessity, which is closely related to temporal asymmetry. Medieval philosophers suggested that just because the past is no longer under our control does not mean that the events which are not fixed were always determined to obtain. Rather, whereas certain events were at one time indeterminate and therefore contingent, once they obtain, these events become necessary. But the type of necessity that affixes to the events of the fixed past isn't an essential necessity, but rather is an accidental necessity. This preserves the common sense notion of the fixity of the past while blocking arguments for determinism.

In an effort to answer the vexing question of whether or not God knows which future contingents will obtain, Abby begins to research the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge. Initially, Abby finds herself overwhelmed by the volume of the literature on the subject. Abby researched several responses that purport to preserve exhaustive foreknowledge including divine timelessness, Ockhamism, Molinism, and Calvinism. Despite her belief that God is indeed timeless, she finds herself persuaded by philosophical arguments offered by open theists which suggest that timelessness doesn't help with the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge. She rejects Ockhamism because she worries that its application of counterfactual power over the past does away with the temporal asymmetry thesis—the idea that the past is fixed and cannot be changed, whereas the future is indeterminate. Abby wishes that Molinism worked, but she finds herself convinced that it doesn't really address the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge at all, and therefore fails to

reconcile the two, but rather presupposes some unnamed solution to the puzzle. In fact, Abby thinks that Molinism is really just an elaborate story that reduces to divine determinism, and she doesn't think it preserves a genuine ability to do otherwise on the part of created beings. Given her commitment to robust freedom, she rejects Calvinism and continues to think it doesn't reconcile a libertarian conception of freedom and foreknowledge at all, but rather does away with genuine freedom altogether (here understood to entail the ability to do otherwise) in favor of hard determinism. Having surveyed all the options available, Abby thought for a while that she would have to punt to mystery by defending the doctrine of antinomy—that what appears to be a contradiction is really a paradox that can be resolved only in the divine economy. But because of her commitment to pursuing analytic explanations to philosophical puzzles, appeals to antinomy left her unsatisfied.

However, after reading an important article surveying the various responses, Abby realizes she isn't interested in most of what has been written about the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge. Rather, she is interested in a response known as open theism, which is being taken seriously by philosophers of religion in light of the relatively recent revival of interest in analytic metaphysics. So, with renewed interests, Abby sets out in search for defenses of classical theism and its traditional understandings of divine omniscience (which is thought to include knowledge of future contingents) against alternative definitions required by open theism. Abby finds herself wanting to somehow preserve the idea that God knows the future, but she's inclined to admit defeat if she cannot find some way to escape the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge without giving up free will Some of Abby's friends are concerned about her. Vexed by the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge, Abby finds herself flirting with the idea that God doesn't know the future. Some of Abby's philosophically inclined friends have pointed out to Abby that open theism also fails to reconcile freedom and foreknowledge; rather, open theists simply deny that God enjoys exhaustive foreknowledge of which future contingents will actually obtain. Some of Abby's religiously minded friends suggest that she speak with a pastor to find out what theological grounds there are for affirming divine knowledge of the future. A different group of Abby's religious friends are encouraging her to give up on philosophy entirely, arguing that philosophy is at fault for corrupting her conception of the divine. Still others friends have suggested that she refocus her attention by spending more time studying Scripture without giving up on her philosophical quest for wisdom and understanding.

Open Theism: Proponents and Critics

These days, Abby's story is far from uncommon. Since open theism began to attract attention nearly fifty years ago, theologians and philosophers have produced a significant amount of literature on the subject. Typically, theologians have paid very little attention to the philosophical matters, and philosophers have returned the favor by doing an equally poor job of paying attention to the theological matters. Therefore, virtually none of the extant literature focuses on open theism by paying attention to the overlap of philosophy and theology. Instead, theologians tend to interact principally with special revelation, whereas the majority of philosophers who have written on open theology have, to date, largely ignored the questions about Scripture and exegesis. From a theological perspective, those who defend open theism include Terrence Fretheim, Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, and John Sanders. Philosophically motivated open theists include David Basinger, William Hasker, Alan Rhoda, Richard Swinburne, Dale Tuggy, Peter van Inwagen, and Dean Zimmerman. Greg Boyd is one of the few who is as interested in the theology as he is the philosophy."

Interestingly, throughout the entire history of western civilization, adherents of all three Abrahamic faiths have consistently confessed that God knows the future. The witness to such understandings of omniscience have been particularly strong from Christianity. Faithful Christians across both east and west, Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant, have maintained that God enjoys exhaustive knowledge of the future, including which of various future contingents will obtain. However, although many have thought that Anselmian perfect being theology requires such an

understanding of the scope of divine knowledge, many open theists insist that openness alternatives to classical conceptions of omniscience need not impugn Anselmian conceptions of the divine nature. The overwhelming majority of the extant responses to open theism means focusing on predominantly theological literature rather than philosophical in nature. Sadly, although much ink has been spilt in responding to open theism, very little of what critics have offered involves substantial philosophical reflection on the complex metaphysical issues involved in contemporary debates about the relationship between free will, causation, and divine omniscience.

Acknowledging such a lacuna in scholarship is not meant by any means to suggest that the theologically focused work put forward by evangelical opponents of open theism fails to meaningfully contribute to the discussions. On the contrary, Christians will do well to read the work of Millard Erickson, John Frame, Norman Geisler, John Piper, Steven Roy, James Spiegel, Bruce Ware, and others, even if one disagrees with the Calvinistic and/or Thomistic theologies of divine providence that they advocate. For anyone wanting to understand how conservative Christian theologians critique open theism, one needn't look very hard to find books full of such criticism. But people like Abby won't find these types of books particularly helpful since their authors don't engage the relevant philosophical issues about the nature of time, causation, and the metaphysics of modality in a serious way. So, debates among theologians about open theism seem to have come to an impasse with very little progress being made on this front in the last ten years.

However, philosophical critiques of open theism are far more difficult to find. This is especially tragic since the advances made on behalf of open theism have taken place on the philosophical side of things than in theology. That is, the majority of those who are advancing openness theology do so by appealing to philosophical and metaphysical motivations for their relatively novel conception of divine omniscience. Furthermore, of the critiques that have already been put forward, open theistic responses have come in fits and starts, and yet open theists continue to advance their innovative understandings of divine omniscience as though such a view is without any serious philosophical objections.

Hence, there is need for a project in this area. Because opponents of open theism have yet to offer comprehensive philosophical critiques of open theism, we are seeking to fill that lacuna. Furthermore, whereas other responses to open theism have focused principally on theological matters, the essays in this volume focus primarily on philosophical issues, although some of these issues have important implications for various theological doctrines. Accordingly, the contributing authors frequently make use of many areas of contemporary analytic philosophy in arguing against openness theology, because it seems to us that analytic theology as a methodology has the best potential to adjudicate in the debates over the extent of divine knowledge. We employ such methodologies in an effort to forestall approaches that yield little more than debates about whose exegesis of various passages of Scripture is superior.

A robust analytic theology of divine omniscience that is consistent with what has historically been considered an orthodox doctrine of God requires an understanding of numerous areas in both philosophy and theology—especially is such is thought to also account for what omniscience entails for the debates about the extent of God's knowledge of the future (including future contingents). Accordingly, in critiquing openness theology in all of its contemporary expressions, we appeal to contemporary analytic work in various areas of metaphysics, including causation, modality, ontology, and time, as well as issues in philosophy of language, studies concerning the nature of truth, and action theory (especially free will and moral responsibility), not to mention aspects of the history of philosophy and theology that pertain to the Christian tradition and classical expressions of theology proper and divine omniscience.

Species of Open Theism

Accurately understanding open theism requires that we provide a thorough taxonomy of various accounts of open theism. There is no singular, monolithic view which is open theism; rather there

are a variety of open theisms. The most natural divide among versions of open theism separates theologically motivated accounts of open theism from philosophically driven versions of open theism. Because the essays in this volume are focused on philosophy more so than theology, we will set theologically motivated open theism to one side for the time being. Even with this division in place, there are at least three distinct types of philosophically driven open theism, and arguments against one version may or may not hold any water when considering some other type.

What unites all open theists is the affirmation that the future is epistemically open for God, which entails the denial that God does possess exhaustive definite foreknowledge. Epistemic openness is defined by Alan Rhoda:

> The future is epistemically open at time t if and only if for some state of affairs X and some future time t* neither <X will obtain at t*> nor <X will not obtain at t*> (nor their tense-neutral counterparts) is infallibly known either (i) at t or (ii) timelessly.

The future can be epistemically open even if God infallibly knows certain aspects of the future; what is important to open theists as regards epistemic openness is that God's knowledge of the future is not exhaustive. Moreover, on nearly all of the leading versions of open theism, God has perfect knowledge of the entire realm of possibilia, and therefore knows exhaustively about what might (or might not) happen. God might enjoy foreknowledge of some future events, given that those future events are now determined and therefore no longer contingent. But, according to open theists, it is not the case that God's knowledge of the future is exhaustive, for God does not have knowledge of the future. That is to say, assuming indeterminism, God lacks knowledge concerning whichever actual future state of affairs is going to obtain.

Furthermore, open theists deny that God's knowledge of the future is definite, although they differ among themselves as to whether or not the future itself is definite. To be clear, according to all open theists, for whatever elements of the future are presently contingent, God lacks knowledge of which of those possible states of affairs is going to actually obtain, and therefore God's foreknowledge isn't definite." Open theists differ about whether God has beliefs about whether some state of affairs is going to obtain. Several of the theologically motivated open theists have argued that passages in Scripture which show that God is surprised when things don't turn out the way God expected serve as excellent proof texts in favor of open theism. Of course, this interpretation suggests that God has beliefs about what is going to happen, but notice that on this analysis, it seems that some of God's beliefs turn out to be incorrect. Others, notably Peter Geach, argue that the metaphysics of prevention allow for God to know at one moment that the plane is going to crash, but at some later moment God knows that the plane isn't going to crash because the pilot prevented the crash. All this to say, whatever type of beliefs God may have about future contingents, given that what might happen in the future isn't settled, God's knowledge of the future cannot be said to be definite. Much of the debate on these matters hinges on how one understandings the semantic content of tensed language with respect to modality in propositions concerning the future, which we discuss briefly later.

Versions of open theism can be further divided into sub-categories based on how advocates of varieties of open theism respond to key questions concerning the status of propositions concerning future contingents (hereafter PCFC). Alan Rhoda helps clarify the nature of the debate by introducing another technical term, namely, alethic openness.

> The future is alethically open at time t if and only if for some state of affairs X and some future time t* (i) neither <X will obtain at t*> nor <X will not obtain at t*> is true at t and (ii) neither of their tense-neutral counterparts, <X does obtain at t*> and <X does not obtain at t* >, is true simpliciter.

One simple way to differentiate types of open theism involves how open theists understand the application of the principle of bivalence to PCFC. Some open theists deny that bivalence applies to PCFC. Instead, they prefer either probabilistic or

multivalent approaches to the truth-values of PCFC; among these thinkers are J.R. Lucas, Richard Purtill, Dale Tuggy, and Dean Zimmerman. However, this is not the majority opinion among open theists. Most open theists affirm that bivalence does apply to PCFC.

There are still further sub-divisions of open theism, even among open theists who affirm that the principle of bivalence does, indeed, apply to PCFC. Such differentiations stem from how an open theist answers this question: are any of the PCFC that have bivalent truth-values actually true? Hasker, Swinburne, and van Inwagen affirm that at least some PCFC are true, and their position requires the affirmation that there are some truths that are unknown by God. So understood, divine foreknowledge is limited in that it isn't exhaustive of all future truths, and has therefore been called limited foreknowledge open theism (hereafter LFOT). Part of what motivates advocates of LFOT is the belief that truth is omnitemporal. That is, defenders of LFOT deny that propositions ever change their truth-value, and they maintain that the omnitemporality of truth applies to PCFC just as it does to other propositions. These thinkers maintain that divine omniscience does not entail knowledge of all truths. Rather, they offer modal reformulations of omniscience such that God knows all truths that are logically knowable.

Armed with modal reformulations of the definition of omniscience, advocates of LFOT deny that the existence of truths are unknown by God poses any problem for divine omniscience because knowledge of such truths is logically impossible, even for metaphysically perfect beings.

Other open theists take modal reformulations of divine omniscience to be problematic. However, an open theist need not deny that the principle of bivalence apply to PCFC in order to avoid LFOT. Open theists that are averse to the existence of any truths unknown by an omniscient God have defended alternatives to LFOT known as open future open theism (hereafter OFOT). OFOT differs from LFOT in that the former can affirm that God knows all truths, a maneuver made possible by rejecting the omnitemporality of truth.

OFOT comes in at least two varieties. Defenders of each version of OFOT affirm that divine omniscience entails knowledge of all truths, so they stand against LFOT's redefining omniscience in modal terms. However, advocates of OFOT affirm that God enjoys knowledge of all truths for different reasons. According to what we regard to be the most promising version of open theism, all PCFC involving "will" or "will not" language are false. This position, which is sometimes called `all-falsism,' is thought to preserve the principle of bivalence for PCFC. All-falsism relies on a Peircean interpretation of PCFC as opposed to the interpretation of PCFC offered by Ockhamists. Alan Rhoda summarizes this debate nicely.

According to Ockhamism, the truth value of a proposition about the future depends solely on what is the case at the future time (implicitly) referred to in the proposition. Thus, the truth of "The coin will land heads at L" depends solely on what is the case at L. If, when L arrives, the coin has landed heads, then the proposition has always been true. Since we are supposing that the coin did land heads at L, it therefore has always been true that the coin was going to land heads at L. At all times prior to L, the future was alethically settled in that respect. Generalizing, it follows from Ockhamism that any proposition about a future contingent has either always been true or has always been false. The future has always been alethically settled in all respects.

In contrast, the Peircean proposes that whether a proposition about the future is true at a given time depends on whether sufficient conditions for its truth obtain at that time. Thus, "The coin will land heads at L" is true at F, says the Peircean, only if sufficient conditions obtain at F for the coin's landing heads at L. Likewise, "The coin will not land heads at L" is true at F just in case sufficient conditions obtain at F for the coin's not landing heads at L. In general, then, no `will' or 'will not' propositions about future contingents are true because sufficient conditions for their obtaining are not yet in place.

All-falsism, together with the denial of the omnitemporality of truth, means that PCFC involving "will" and "will not" language shouldn't be interpreted as contradictories (as the Ockhamist

asserts), but rather as contraries. Peirceans interpret both "will" and "will not" as modal operators. According to Peirceans, "will" should be read as, "in all causally possible open futures," whereas "will not" should be read as "in no causally possible open futures." The Peircean understanding of the semantics of "will" and "will not" is depicted in the diagram immediately below.



Alan Rhoda and Patrick Todd are the leading defenders of this version of OFOT, but Rhoda and Todd defend all-falsism for different reasons that involve highly nuanced understandings of the relationship between issues in philosophy of language and presentism as the metaphysics of time, all as these matters pertain to the semantic content of PCFC. Besides this all-falsism approach, there is yet another version of OFOT.

Richard Purtill, Dale Tuggy, and Dean Zimmerman each affirm open futurism, but they all deny that the principle of bivalence applies to PCFC. They find the affirmation of Piercean semantics a price too high to pay and prefer instead to reject bivalentism. Of course, such a position entails the rejection of classical logic and requires that Purtill, Tuggy, and Zimmerman adopt a multivalent logic, such as that formalized by Jan Lukasiewicz. In both its bivalent and non-bivalent forms, OFOT denies that God possesses any foreknowledge of future contingents whatsoever, but it can do so without having to affirm the existence of truths unknown by God.

What Is to Come: A Description of the Chapters

The essays in this volume as a whole engage with all of the philosophical versions of open theism described in the previous section. However, some essays contain arguments that undermine one or more versions of open theism without serving as knock down arguments against all versions of open theism, or of open theism simpliciter. Regardless, we sincerely hope that these essays advance the discussion by pushing back against a novel interpretation of divine omniscience, especially since this concerns a perennial philosophical puzzle. The chapters are divided up into three sections. The first section includes essays about open theism and the metaphysics of time. The essays in the second section cover other philosophical issues as they pertain to open theism. The chapters in the third section address open theism from the standpoint of other concerns in philosophical theology.

The first section begins with a chapter by Eleonore Stump, who argues against limited foreknowledge versions of open theism. Building on her previous work, Stump argues that divine eternity, properly understood, entails divine timelessness. She goes on to argue that divine timelessness is able to preserve a robust understanding freedom, indeed, a libertarian conception of freedom. After paying particularly close attention to the claims of William Hasker, Stump concludes that traditional construals of divine timelessness provide adequate resources to the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge, thereby rendering open theism unnecessary.

Sandra Visser responds to the alleged incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and free will in light of metaphysical presentism. The most reasonable motivation to be an open theist, she argues, arises out of a deep conviction that anything deserving to be called free will is incompatible with both causal determinism and divine (fore)knowledge. Such a strong incompatibilism is also typically accompanied by (and usually entails) presentism. These philosophers, some of whom are also Christians, are thus pushed to open theism. Many of them take great pains to show how their open theism doesn't take them all that far from orthodoxy. In the end, though, Visser argues that open theists deny providence, sovereignty, and a robust omniscience. In her chapter, she shows that arguments that treat causal determinism and divine knowledge in the same way are mistaken. She concludes by examining how it

might be possible that God know the future, even if it is not real.

The philosophy of time section concludes with an essay by Benjamin Arbour, who brings modal metaphysics into conversation with open theists' understanding of the philosophy of time. Building on the work of philosophers who note that the nature of time is contingent, Arbour suggests that open theists are mistaken to make time such a fundamental aspect of systematic metaphysics. He continues by showing that open theists who favor open futurism are advocating for a wholesale revisioning of modal metaphysics and possible world theory in general. Arbour concludes by demonstrating that, if open futurists are able to avoid these troubles, the principle of the fixity of the past doesn't preclude a possible world's version of Ockhamism, which is compatible with both the main tenants of open futurism and exhaustive divine foreknowledge.

The second section covers an array of other philosophical issues and their relation to open theism. David Alexander opens the section with a chapter about origins essentialism. Alexander suggests that origins essentialism (0E) conflicts with most versions of open theism, which endorses the Asymmetry Thesis. According to Jonathan Kvanvig:

> "[T]he Asymmetry Thesis" [is] the thesis that the part of the future that is determined by present and past events is secure in truth value and falls within the scope of omniscience whereas the parts of the future that remain undetermined by the present and past do not fall within the scope of omniscience and perhaps are not secure in truth value.

So the future has two parts, one knowable and the other unknowable. Like Kvanvig, Alexander argues that the Asymmetry Thesis is false. More precisely, he argues that the Asymmetry Thesis is false given that the following thesis is true:

> Strong Origins Essentialism (SOE): For any event E, the causal ancestry of E is essential to the identity of E.

According to SOE the occurrence of some event E logically implies all of the events in E's causal ancestry. But some free actions are in E's causal ancestry. Hence the occurrence of E logically implies some free actions. Now if E is future and E falls within the scope of the things that God knows, then God will also know the free actions that are part of E's causal ancestry. But Alexander observes that surely some of those free actions are also in the future. Hence in order to know E, God must know some future free actions. But this is incompatible with every version of open theism. Hence, Alexander demonstrates that either open theism is false, or that SOE is false, or that God can know E without knowing everything in E's causal ancestry. After arguing against the latter two options, Alexander concludes that open theism is false.

Paul Helm continues the section with a chapter on compatibilist understandings of freedom. In discussing the nature of openness, Helm reasons that openness is obviously a state that can be enjoyed in various degrees. Helm discusses the typical openness position which rests on indeterminacy. He goes on to discuss the flimsiness of the openness position, together with the theological costs involved in adopting any openness position. Helm suggests that compatibilism, properly understood, entails a degree of openness, and not merely a purely epistemic openness, but also an ontic degree of openness as well. This, Helm suggests, should satisfy all who desire their theology to be `open.'

Katherin Rogers contributes next, and hers is a chapter on Anselmian conceptions of free will. She notes that all open theists insist that freedom entails open options. If God knows what you will choose tomorrow, you cannot choose other than God foreknows, and are not free, or so the open theist argues. Building on her work on Anselm of Canterbury, Rogers suggests that the foundational criterion of freedom is aseity—that your choice is from yourself. This inspires the "Grounding Principle": only an actual choice can ground the truth of propositions about the choice and be the source of knowledge of the choice. Aseity requires that a created agent choose, absolutely on his own, between open options. True, God knows what you will choose tomorrow, but Rogers insists that this is only because you choose it. She continues that, according to open theists, even divine foreknowledge caused by your own choice conflicts

with robust enough alternatives. But it is unreasonable to jettison divine foreknowledge in order to preserve alternatives which play no role at all in enhancing freedom of the sort that can support moral responsibility.

The final chapter in the philosophical issues section comes from Robert Stewart. Assuming open theism for the purpose of reduction, he argues that either God has some false beliefs, or it is possible for us to have propositional knowledge of something that God does not know. If Stewart is correct on either point, then, on open theism, God is not properly omniscient. To show this, Stewart claims to know that his wife will love him tomorrow. He notes that such propositions concern the exact the sort of knowledge of the future that open theists typically insist God cannot have—knowledge of a future free human choice. But, if one can know that his wife will love him tomorrow, all hope seems lost for open theism.

The third and final section of the book takes up concerns against open theism raised by other areas of philosophical theology. James Anderson offers the first chapter, arguing that open theism fails to provide adequate resources to account for an important kind of prayer. Anderson maintains that there is nothing unintelligible in principle about past-directed prayers, provided that certain situational conditions are met. He further argues that while Thomism, Calvinism, and Molinism can allow for such prayers, open theism cannot—at least, not without betraying some of its foundational tenets. Consequently, Anderson notes that any evidence for the intelligibility and efficacy of past-directed prayers constitutes evidence against open theism. He concludes by offering two distinct lines of evidence for the intelligibility and efficacy of past-directed prayers, thereby undermining the viability of open theism.

The philosophical theology section contains two essays on the problem of evil. The first of these comes from Greg Welty, who suggests that when considering the problem of evil, open theists seem pulled in two different directions, depending on which theological criterion is prioritized: divine risk, or divine control. Open theistic strategies on the problem of evil either move in a 'more risk' direction (thereby emphasizing divine non-culpability)

or in a 'less risk' direction (thereby emphasizing divine responsibility and control). Welty argues that moving in the former direction makes God more irresponsible, and actually increases divine culpability. (In addition the burden of the risk seems to fall on creatures rather than on God.) But moving in the 'less risk' direction involves the open theist in appealing to `greater good' and/or `skeptical theist' strategies, in which case there is no distinctive open theist theodicy (since such strategies are available to non-open-theists as well.) In fact, if some combination of `greater good' and `skeptical theist' responses can neutralize the problem of evil, without recourse to any open theist distinctives, then a Christian (all else being equal) should prefer a stronger rather than weaker doctrine of divine providence. Thus, contrary to some recent writing, Welty concludes that open theism doesn't seem to give the theodicist an edge on the problem of evil.

The second essay on the problem of evil comes from Kenneth Perszyk, who takes up soteriological concerns in the face of open theism. He aims to continue comparative assessment of divine providence by considering the soteriological problem(s) of evil. After briefly describing the core components of the Molinist and open theistic accounts of providence, Perszyk distinguishes different soteriological problems of evil and considers what Molinists and open theists can say about them. He argues that open theism does not fare better than Molinism in solving these problems, and that Molinism may in fact be a benefit, especially for those attracted to universalism.

Keith Wyma rounds out not only the section on philosophical theology, but also the entire volume, with a chapter discussing Christian conceptions of atonement. Wyma begins by noting Greg Boyd's arguments that open theism helps address the problem of evil by making God more trustworthy to struggling believers. Believers in the midst of suffering often don't ask whether there is a God (the standard problem of evil). Rather, theists find themselves asking whether they can trust God, or whether God is just. Does God really care about them, or is God really working for their good? Call

this the pastoral problem of evil. Greg Boyd contends that open theism helps believers positively answer these questions, because the fact of God's merely probabilistic knowledge of our future, free actions allows believers to see that God didn't put them in situations—like, say, a marriage that has ended in divorce—while either intending or even definitely knowing that the situations would turn out like that. Open theism supposedly lets God off the hook in a way that more completist views of God's foreknowledge and providence can't.

However, Wyma argues that open theism has just the opposite effect on the pastoral problem. First, considering that who exists in the world is very much influenced by human free choices—who decides to marry (or at least have sex with) whom—it's clear that when Jesus died on the cross, neither He nor even the Father could have known for whom he was dying, let alone for what sins freely committed by those salvation-recipients. In short, Jesus didn't die for your (or my) sins, but only to write a blank check for all possible humanity. Unfortunately, the notion of Jesus' making a grand sacrifice for the mass of abstract humanity in its abstract sinfulness doesn't address at all the question of how much he loves you (or me) as real individuals, sinful in concrete, ugly and nasty ways. Part of the pastoral problem is believers' struggle over whether God can love them, in all of their particular guilt and shame. If the cross is where God definitively proves his love for us, open theism's characterization of atonement significantly undercuts how much individual believers can infer from that. Second, open theism creates a dilemma about situations, like the one above, that might cause a believer to question trust in God. On the one horn, to whatever extent God really doesn't know the situational outcomes, God becomes less trustworthy. God may be more obviously guiltless regarding bad outcomes, but that very lack of knowledge makes God a less capable object of our trust as God, as our guide and shepherd through life. On the other horn, to whatever extent God's omniscience over the future-probabilities is more definite—which would make God a more capable object of our trust about our future—open theism runs into the same pastoral problems more traditional accounts of God's foreknowledge do.

Thus, one of Boyd's principal supports for open theism—namely, its assistance with the pastoral problem of evil—fails. <>

Pantheologies: Gods, Worlds, Monsters by Mary-Jane Rubenstein [Columbia University Press, 9780231189460]

Pantheism is the idea that God and the world are identical—that the creator, sustainer, destroyer, and transformer of all things is the universe itself. From a monotheistic perspective, this notion is irremediably heretical since it suggests divinity might be material, mutable, and multiple. Since the excommunication of Baruch Spinoza, Western thought has therefore demonized what it calls pantheism, accusing it of incoherence, absurdity, and—with striking regularity—monstrosity.

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In this book, Mary-Jane Rubenstein investigates this perennial repugnance through a conceptual genealogy of pantheisms. What makes pantheism "monstrous"—at once repellent and seductive—is that it scrambles the raced and gendered distinctions that Western philosophy and theology insist on drawing between activity and passivity, spirit and matter, animacy and inanimacy, and creator and created. By rejecting the fundamental difference between God and world, pantheism threatens all the other oppositions that stem from it: light versus darkness, male versus female, and humans versus every other organism. If the panic over pantheism has to do with a fear of crossed boundaries and demolished hierarchies, then the question becomes what a present-day pantheism might disrupt and what it might reconfigure. Cobbling together heterogeneous sources—medieval heresies, their pre- and anti-Socratic forebears, general relativity, quantum mechanics, nonlinear biologies, multiverse and indigenous cosmologies, ecofeminism, animal and vegetal studies, and new and old materialisms—Rubenstein assembles possible pluralist pantheisms. By mobilizing this monstrous mixture of unintentional God-worlds, Pantheologies gives an old heresy the chance to renew our thinking.

Excerpt: The project at hand grew out of my earlier work on multiverse cosmologies, which concluded on a somewhat frustrated note regarding the so-called public conversation between science and religion. In fact, I came to realize, the ongoing debate over the existence of the multiverse provides a clear picture of the grim state of this conversation. Despite the decades of scholarship illuminating the historical identity, persistent entanglement, and productive crossings of the regimes we now call "science" and "religion," the default assumption among scientists, theists, and their audiences remains that these categories are self-identical and starkly opposed. The "conversation," then, amounts either to replacing a given thing called "religion" with another given thing called "science"; to rejecting the latter by appealing to a particularly uninteresting form of the former; to supplementing one of them with a strong dose of the other; or, God help us, to "reconciling" them—a task that almost always amounts to orthodox theology's contorting itself around any given scientific discovery so as to hold open an increasingly small space for itself without appearing too backward. As it turns out, we can see all of these strategies at work in the positing, defense, and critique of the multiverse—that

hypothetical compendium of an infinite number of universes apart from our own.

The question to which the multiverse provides an answer is why the universe seems so finely tuned. Why, physicists ask, do gravity, the cosmological constant, the nuclear forces, and the mass of the electron all happen to have the values they have—especially when it seems that any other values would have prevented the emergence of stars, planets, organic life, and in some cases, the universe itself? What these physicists fear—and with good reason, considering this particular theological strategy's stubborn refusal to die—is the perennial classical theistic answer to this question. The scientist asks: why is the universe so perfect? And the theist predictably responds: because an intelligent, benevolent, anthropomorphic Creator outside the universe set the controls just right, launching the universe on a course "he" knew would produce beings to resemble and worship him.

Strictly speaking, such theological concerns cannot be said to have generated the idea of the multiverse in the first place. Nevertheless, the reason an increasing number of theoretical physicists find it so compelling is that the multiverse provides a metaphysical solution that finally rivals the undead Creator. After all, if there is just one universe, then it is very difficult to explain how the cosmos manages to be so bio-friendly without appealing to some kind of force beyond it. If, however, there are an infinite number of universes, all taking on different parameters throughout infinite time, then once in a while, one of them is bound to turn out right, and we just happen to be in one of those. In short, the infinite multiverse is the only answer big enough to stand up to the infinite God of classical theism, with his omni-attributes and his ex nihilic creative powers.

Once again, then, the "conversation" between religion and science amounts to an either/or, metonymically encapsulated in the figures of God and the multiverse, respectively. And once again, popular science books and their recapitulations in social, journalistic, and televised media subject the public to a familiar cadre of (remarkably all male) scientists proclaiming the final death of the old father-God. just to keep things fair and balanced, such media will also trudge out a familiar counter-cadre of (remarkably all-male) religious leaders and theologians decrying the willful ignorance of secular scientists, whom they accuse of being so desperate to avoid God that they will take refuge in the outright absurdity of an infinite number of worlds.

This whole fruitless exchange has led me to believe that the least interesting question one can ask with respect to any given phenomenon (evolution, the big bang, the creation of beetles or mountains, last year's World Series victory) is whether or not God did it. The reason it is so uninteresting to ask this question is that one can always say God did X, whatever X might be. And if one's opponent makes the counterclaim that, not God, but Y accomplished X, one can always make the counter-counterclaim that God made the Y that went on to do X. These are moves that theists and atheists can always make in antagonistic relation to one another. For the theist, there is always a way to insert a "God of the Gaps" back behind any given physical process, if that is what he is hoping to do. Conversely, the atheist can always find a way to call that God a needless or intellectually dishonest addition to an otherwise elegant, scientific hypothesis. This "debate," I would submit, has always been a dead-end game. It has never gone anywhere and will never go anywhere, in saecula seculorum. After all, if it were possible to prove or disprove the existence of a humanoid, extra-cosmic creator, someone would have done it by now.

Apart from being tiresome and unproductive, this deadly back and forth over the existence or nonexistence of an extra-cosmic humanoid misses all the constructive theological work the natural sciences themselves are producing. Those theists and atheists who fret endlessly over their perennial superman tend to miss the new and recycled mythologies pouring out of the scientific sphere. To remain with the example of modern cosmology, they miss the way that some physicists tend to encode dark energy as a malicious demiurge at war with the forces of gravity and light. Or the way that others place mathematics in the position of Plato's Forms, rendering the physical world an imperfect copy of an eternal, unchanging,

immaterial realm. Or the way that simulation theorists are trying to ingratiate themselves to the highly advanced scientists whom they believe created humanity out of the more sophisticated equivalent of PlayStations. "How did our simulators make us," they ask, "and why? And how do we get them to love us enough to keep us alive?"

These ruminations amount to speculative and practical theological inquiries in their own right, such that attending to them changes the terms of the science-and-religion game. Rather than asking what sort of God a given scientific discovery still allows room for a theist to believe in, religious studies scholars can turn the critical tables around to ask what sort of gods and monsters such scientific theories are producing, and what sorts of ethical values and social formations they reflect and reinforce. And overwhelmingly, the natural and social sciences are currently producing a slew of what I have provisionally called pantheologies. Despite their steadily secular self-identification, these sciences are generating rigorous, awestruck, and even reverential accounts of creation, sustenance, and transformation—processes that are wholly immanent to the universe itself.

The plan for this book, then, was to account for the flurry of purportedly secular cosmogonies pouring out of astrophysics, nonlinear biology, chaos and complexity theories, new materialisms, new animisms, post-humanisms, and nonhumanisms as overlapping, nonidentical assemblages of that old philotheological category of "pantheism." To accomplish this, I thought, I would need first to determine what pantheism is. I would then trace a quick, historical topography of the concept in order to locate the more modern theories of immanence within its multifarious terrain. The moment I set out to do so, however, I discovered that there is no real conceptual history of pantheism. What there is instead is a tangle of relentless demonization and name-calling. In short, "pantheism" is primarily a polemical term, used most often to dismiss or even ridicule a position one determines to be distasteful. It is almost never a term of positive identification; rather, it marks a cliff off which a derisive speaker can claim that the position in question threatens to throw thinking—and all existence itself—if it is entertained too seriously. "We cannot possibly affirm X," the rhetoric goes, "because X would lead to pantheism" ... and such a consequence is thought to suffice as an adequate repudiation of the proposal under consideration.

Having hit this particular wall, the project at hand needed to take a few steps back. Rather than beginning with a genealogy that might be extended to the modern natural sciences, the book begins by examining the perennial disgust with pantheism and asking why it continues to be so repugnant. To be sure, there are plenty of reasons one might decide not to affirm pantheism as one's favorite theoretical framework, or as one's go-to devotional stance. But why, this study asks, does it so rarely get the opportunity to be a stance in the first place? Whence the vitriolic, visceral, automatic, and nearly universal denunciation of pantheism?

As the reader will see momentarily, I have addressed this question by locating in anti-pantheist literature some recurring themes—most notably, those of monstrosity, undifferentiation, (specifically maternal) femininity, dark primitivity, and dreamlike Orientalism. The problem, it seems, is that pantheism not only unsettles, and not only entangles, but demolishes the raced and gendered ontic distinctions that Western metaphysics (with some crucial exceptions) insists on drawing between activity and passivity, spirit and matter, and animacy and inanimacy—distinctions that are rooted theologically in the Greco-Roman-Abrahamic distinction between creator and created, or God and world. Insofar as pantheism rejects this fundamental distinction, it threatens all the other privileges that map onto it: male versus female, light versus darkness, good versus evil, and humans over every other organism.

At this point, the broader project shifts from the diagnostic to the prescriptive. If the panic over pantheism has to do with a fear of crossed boundaries, queer mixtures, and miscellaneous miscegenation, and if these monstrosities are said to threaten the carefully erected structures of Western metaphysics, then—at least for those of us who seek a creative destruction of such structures—the question becomes how pantheism, in its most transformative sense, might actually take shape.

The whole book, then, has become a prelude to what I had thought would be its opening question, which is to say, what is pantheism?

Navigation

The present study aims to explore the possibility James opens and then closes: to ask what a "pluralist pantheism" might, in fact, be. The task is not a straightforward one; as we have already begun to see, the object of constant denigration is the monistic "all-form" ("The universe," laughs Lawrence, "in short, adds up to ONE. ONE. I. Which is Walt."), and this polemical literature is the venue in which "pantheism" most clearly takes conceptual shape. If it is the case, as Philip Clayton suggests, that "no philosophically adequate form of pantheism has been developed in Western philosophy," then the absence is even more striking in the case of pluralist pantheism—if there even is such a thing. The position will therefore have to come together piecemeal, patchworkily, monstrously arising from the depths of the barely said and unsaid in a wide range of literatures. Far from dreaming up such a position ex nihilo, then, this study seeks to show it is already in subtle formation: first, in self-professed pantheisms that present themselves as monistic (at each turn, James writes, "something like a pluralism breaks out"); second, in historical philosophies that tend to ignore, sidestep, or actively dismiss the category of "pantheism"; third, in scientific discourses that tend to ignore or actively dismiss "religion" and "theology"—especially general relativity, quantum mechanics, nonlinear biologies, and multiverse cosmologies; and fourth, in the burgeoning, ever-multiplying para-scientific theories these discourses have inspired.

Such para-scientific theories can be loosely assembled under the category of theories of immanence, or of post- or nonhuman studies, and include such formations as ecofeminisms, "new" materialisms, new animisms, animal studies, vegetal studies, assemblage and actor-network theories, speculative realism, complexity theory, and nonlinear science studies. In their loosely collective, "strung-along" effort to decenter "the human," these modes of immanent analysis open the possibility of something like a pluralist pantheism—or, to mobilize the plurality, "pantheologies." They do so, first, by dislodging agency and creativity from humanity (theism's perennial "image of God") and second, by locating agency and creativity in matter itself. Viewed through the manifold lenses of such studies, the "world" with which the pantheist would identify God is neither inert and passive, as classical theism would have it, nor total and unchanging, as the monist would have it. Rather, "world" names an open, relational, and self-exceeding concatenation of systems that are themselves open, relational, and self-exceeding.

"At any moment," Jane Bennett writes, "what is at work ... is an animal-vegetable-mineral sonority cluster." Such (monstrous) clustering is at work whether we are speaking about cells, bacteria, the "human" genome, water, air, a cloned sheep, or a "collapsed" wave function: each of them is composed of a mutating band of others. If, with Karen Barad, we add discursivity into the mix, then our multiple-universe becomes an un-totalizable and shapeshifting hybrid of narrative-theoretical-material assemblages that are neither reducible to, nor constitutive of, "oneness." And this multiply unified, multiply divided, constantly evolving multiplicity is what the pantheologies in question would call divine. As such, they will look very little like their monistic counterpart, which, to be honest, is easier to find in the philosophical forest. Depending on one's starting point, "pantheism" divinizes either a messy multiplicity or a smoothed-out whole, and this particular expedition is foraging for the mess.

Beginning from immanence rather than unity, the exploration at hand will define "pantheism" minimally as the identification of divinity with the material world. Each of the chapters that follow will focus on one of the four major terms of this definition: pan (all), hyle (matter), cosmos (world), and theos (God). Pantheologically speaking, of course, these are all equivalent terms, but they have distinct, if interdetermined, genealogies that this study will examine in turn. For better or worse, the passage from one of these terms to another will be mediated and interrupted by the promiscuous goat-god Pan, who will appear in short, animal-material-vegetal bursts of divinity to keep things monstrous and queer. He will do so even, perhaps

especially, in the face of the Christian tradition that tries variously to demonize, romanticize, devour, and assimilate him.

In order to begin its pantheological conjuring, chapter i ("Pan") will dive more deeply into the questions of number, identity, and difference. When a hypothetical pantheist affirms that "God is all," what does she mean by "all," and for that matter, what does she mean by "is"? Does "all" denote a seamless unity of existence—whether by virtue of an invisibly shared essence or an enormous sum? Or does it rather refer to "all things" in their shifting plurality—in their different differences from, relations to, and constitutions of one another? What are the stakes of affirming the pantheist one versus its many, and what in either case does it mean to identify God (or anything else) with it?

This chapter will address these questions by evaluating the charges of acosmism and indifference leveled against Spinoza. We will focus in particular on Hegel's accusation that Spinoza's Deus sive natura swallows "all that we know as the world" into an "abyss of the one identity" (Abgrund der einen Identität)—a conclusion Hegel reached by filtering his reading of the "Oriental" Jew through his limited and romanticized understanding of Hindu cosmology. Revealing the allegedly world-denying monisms of "Spinoza" and "India to be Orientalizing byproducts of one another, the chapter proceeds to revisit Spinozas doctrine of substance with an ear toward the concrete, the particular, and the multiple. By reading Spinoza both with and against himself, and alongside his admirer Friedrich Nietzsche, it will argue that, far from transcending or even preceeding the embodied "modes" that express it, Spinoza's substance is in fact constituted by them. As such, Deus sive natura is irreducibly many in its oneness, and irresistibly embodied. The "all" that God-or-nature "is" therefore amounts to a dynamic holography: an infinitely perspectival dynamism that unsettles not only the static singularity of substance, but also its eternal determinism, by virtue of the materiality of the modes.

Chapter 2 ("Hyle") will inquire into the meaning of this materiality. Beginning from Bayle's proclamation that matter is "the being whose nature is most incompatible with the immutability of God," this chapter will ask what matter has historically meant, why Western thought has so obsessively removed divinity from it, and how this anti-materialism has gone on to shape the modern scientific imagination. It will simultaneously locate particularly vibrant exceptions to this materiaphobic trend in the Ionian, Stoic, and Epicurean schools, which produce a generative materiality that arguably finds its culmination in Giordano Bruno (1548-1600). In a body of work that eventually gets him burned at the stake, Bruno deconstructs the Aristotelian privilege of (male) form over (female) matter by configuring the latter as the active, animate, enspirited, and ultimately divine origin of the former.

This particular Brunian maneuver finds a powerful resurgence in the recent post- and nonhumanist transvaluations of materiality that insist on matter's agency, intra-activity, and creativity in the face of mechanistic scientific orthodoxy—transvaluations that have been particularly inspired by microbiologist Lynn Margulis's nonlinear principles of autopoiesis and symbiogenesis. Bruno's heretical materiality also finds unexpected resonances with those "animist" cosmologies derided by colonial anthropologists as primitive, feminine, childish, and incapable of making distinctions. Linking this charge to the perennial anti-pantheist cry of dark, abyssal undifferentiation, this chapter finds in "new animist" accounts of indigenous cosmologies an enlivening of matter that takes Spinoza's and Bruno's insights even further than their authors will go—whether willingly or in spite of themselves. Especially when crossed with nonlinear and new materialist thought, these new animisms produce a pan-animate materiality that amounts to a (largely unintentional) transubstantiation of divinity as multiply, relationally, and irreducibly incarnate—perhaps even pantheological.

Chapter 3 ("Cosmos") will ask what we mean by "world" and what it means to associate God with it. Historically, the pantheist "reduction" of God to world has seemed insulting and absurd; the world, after all, is finite, passive, and given—the theater of just-thereness, whereas God is the source of infinite activity and newness. But what if the world

is both more or less than we have thought it to be? What if, far from sitting there self-identically, "world" designates an open, evolving, and interpoietic multiplicity of open, evolving, and interpoietic multiplicities? What would it mean to identify all of that as the source and end of all things, which at the end of the day "is what everybody means by `God'"?

In order to address these questions, this chapter will first track the rise and fall of the deterministic, "clockwork universe" of the seventeenth century, according to which the world is a lifeless set of interlocking machines set in

llmotion by an exclusively agential, extra-cosmic creator. Contemporary reductionist biologies, cosmologies, and neurosciences retain this deterministic mechanism even as they abandon the God who historically secured it, transferring his chief functions to the allegedly timeless and universal laws of nature.

Under the global reign of Western capitalism, this vision of a passive, exploitor able, and inanimate cosmos has had disastrous racial, gendered, and ecological consequences. It is therefore not only pantheologically instructive but politically expedient to turn to those reanimations of the cosmos both within and beyond the natural sciences, and to track the variously panicked responses they have provoked.

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Exemplary in this regard is the ongoing controversy over James Lovelock's and Lynn Margulis's "Gaia hypothesis," which attributes an immanent, non-totalized, and symbiotic creative-destructiveness to the world itself. Ae0 Td[n]Tj r 0 Td[n]Tj0.443 0nn">90 Td[n]ashgn, ainrsyl cogcbae4 ((s)0.5 (siv)-8.2 (e)-3 (h)-8.(g)-7 (m)-6.lis)]TJ

By glimpsing this becoming-divinity in the fictional works of Alice Walker and Octavia Butler, we will ultimately redirect the so-called problem of evil into more productive, practical questions. Rather than asking how an omnipotent and benevolent God could let suffering into "his" creation, we will ask how the ongoing de- and re-worldings of an immanent divinity might condition the possibility of survival, transformation, responsibility, and ethical discernment. Finally, we will ask, if the vibrantly material, complexly emergent, indeterminate, and intra-constituted multiverse can be affirmed pantheologically as the creative source and end of all things, then why not just call this source and end "world(s)"? What difference does it make to call such worldings divine?

Admittedly, it may make no difference at all. To the extent that it is possible to maintain such distinctions, the present work aims for conceptual (re)construction rather than theological apologetics. As such, its hope is not to defend pantheological thinking against this or that rival, much less to win converts, but rather to see what such thinking might look like. To give an ancient-modern heresy a chance to have its say before it gets laughed off the stage—or even to grant it a different reception. <>

Freud's India: Sigmund Freud and India's First Psychoanalyst, Girindrasekhar Bose by Alf Hiltebeitel [Oxford University Press, 9780190878375]

Freud's Mahabharata by Alf Hiltebeitel [Oxford University Press, 9780190878337]

Editorial Appraisal:

Alf Hiltebeitel is a well-regarded Sanskritist, whose work is noted for a careful application of philological and folkloristic literary methods to themes in classical Indian history and literature. These two volumes continue in this manner but provide a degree of self-revelation missing from his previous efforts, giving a special depth of exploration which many a discerning reader will cherish, so that these two volumes are likely to become universally regarded as his masterwork.

Praise for Freud's India and Freud's Mahāhhārata

"Spectacularly impressive. You can dip into these amazing volumes and find all manner of marvelous things—not only the valuable information about Freud, Bose, goddesses, and the Mahābhārata, but Hiltebeitel's highly creative ideas about them." —W E N DY D O N I G E R, Mircea Eliade Distinguished Service Professor of the History of Religions, University of Chicago

"Freud's India and Freud's Mahābhārata comprise the magnum opus of a distinguished historian of religions. It lovingly orbits around two cultural oeuvres of roughly the same length: the great Hindu epic of the Mahābhārata and the Collected Works of Sigmund Freud. It is as if Hiltebeitel has treated the Mahābhārata as one immense psychoanalytic exploration of the maternal poly-theisms of Indian Hindu culture and the Collected Works of Sigmund Freud as an unintended but appropriate mythology of Western civilization and its male monotheisms. Behind this astonishing comparison haunts the question: 'Can psychoanalytic methods work in different ontological structures? Can they work here, for example, in the panpsychic nondualism of the Bengali founder of Indian psychoanalysis Girindrasekhar Bose?' The answer appears to be: 'Yes, they can, uncannily so. And the analysis goes both ways." —JEFFREY J. KRIPAL, author of Secret Body: Erotic and Esoteric.

The sharp contrast between cultures with a monotheistic paternal deity and those with pluralistic maternal deities is a theme of abiding interest in religious studies. Attempts to understand the implications of these two vast organizing principles for religious life lead to an overwhelmingly diverse set of facts and their meanings. In Freud's India, the companion volume to Freud's Mahābhārata -- Sigmund Freud and Girindrasekhar Bose. Hiltebeitel examines the attempts of these two men to communicate with and understand each other and these issues in the heated context of emotionally divisive allegiances. The book is elegant in its nuanced attention to these two thinkers and its tightly controlled exploration of what their interactions reveal about their contributions and limitations as representatives of

the psychology and religion of their respective cultures. Anxieties about mothers, says Hiltebeitel, separate Eastern from Western imaginations. They separate Freud from Bose, and they separate Hindu foundational texts from the foundational texts of Judaism.

Excerpt: The title of this book, coupling Freud with India, was decided upon after considering other titles. The subtitle has been a constant. The title is not meant to be coy; Freud did not make as much of India as he could have. It is meant to catch the eye of two chief groups of prospective readers: those interested in Freud and psychoanalysis, and those interested in India. That is a good-sized readership and hardly a new combination.

I have taken some risks in presenting such breadth of material. The foremost risk involves readers who begin with an interest in Freud and psychoanalysis, but have little knowledge of India. These readers will be carried along through the book's first three chapters that treat Freud's correspondence with Bose and the next three that discuss Bose's main challenges to Freud. Only the concluding three chapters cover the complex Indian material necessary to the book's argument, but by then I hope to have made it accessible and intriguing. Resistant readers could read only the first six chapters, by which they would be replicating Freud's own detours around Indian materials—but they can discard that option.

The companion book, titled Freud's Mahabharata presents more Indian material as part of this same project. The latter makes the Indian and primarily Greco-Mediterranean Goddess one of its three principal characters as a figure who links the two pioneer psychoanalysts. Freud's Mahābhārata makes points about how both Freud and the Hindu epic treat mythologies that complement the discussions of Freud and Bose made in this book, and the book ends by proposing a new Freudian theory of the Mahābhārata.

I am less worried about readers interested in India, whom this book addresses throughout. Indian readers are known for their longstanding comfort with an adversarial Freud and with Freudian analysis as providing an inevitable angle on the study of Indian life and thought that has more interest for them than the Indophilic Carl Jung.' Readers about India cannot be surprised that the same angle has been exploited since the 1950s by many serious scholars both from South Asia and the West. The risks I take are more personal here—about Freud and Bose, and about myself.

About Freud and Bose, I resist the hagiographic impulses that have shaped most writing about them, and I argue that their correspondence allows one to trace the ups and downs that put each of them, occasionally, in an unflattering light. About myself, I speak of risk because a book on Freud, India, and psychoanalysis these days invites a choice as to whether one talks personally about one's life. If I join those who have done so,' which I do with a few sidelights about religion, it is because I do not see the point in trying to hide the fact that thinking about my life and upbringing has been an engaging and ongoing part of this project. I take this risk, but only in the preface, so that readers can

sometimes think between the lines of the main text about my personal input.

Beginning and ending with the near present, I highlight thirteen vignettes in telegraphic form, some of which have an affinity with Freud's life, as one will meet it in this book:

1. My mother Lucille Barnett Hiltebeitel passed away at age 101 on June 13, 2014. Freud's mother died at 95.

2. I was my mother's firstborn, as was Freud. Unlike Freud, I was also my father's firstborn. I was born in a Catholic hospital in New York City early during World War II. During an air-raid alert, my mother was "given the baby" and told "you take care of it!" She "threw" me "under the bed."

3. I had a Catholic nanny named Fanny, who was Irish, from ages two to four, before my family made its big move. Freud also had a Catholic nanny, who was Czech, up to his third year, but in reverse circumstances. Fanny was my nanny in New York City before we moved to Weston, Connecticut, in the country, whereas Freud at three moved from rural Freiberg to Leipzig and then a year later to Vienna. My earliest memory is of crossing a New York City street (I imagine it to have been 89th Street near Broadway) holding Fanny's hand. Neither nanny made the big move.

4. My sister Jane, my only sibling, was born eleven days before my fourth birthday, for which my mother just made it home from the hospital. Freud had two brothers and five sisters, and thus many more sibling rivalries. By my reconstruction from family stories reinforced by some childhood memories, my rivalry with my sister derives from her hospital visit for a tonsillectomy when she was about two. From that time, she suffered fears of being left alone, which left my mother feeling guilty that she had not stayed with Jane in the hospital. My mother quit her job in New York City to be able to be in Weston with Jane. My experience of this change, from long range and over many incidents, including when my second marriage began to unravel in the mid-eighties, is that my mother's unending concerns for my sister had as their counterpart a determination that all must be alright with me. This loss of closeness with her is my distant analogue to whatever Freud experienced when and after his immediately younger brother Julius died at the age of eight months, before Freud was two.

5. When I was about ten or twelve, my Jewish mother took me twice on the holidays to the Catholic churches of my home towns—first to Westport's on Easter and then, along with my sister, to Weston's new church on Christmas Eve while it was being finished (there was hanging plastic sheeting for walls in the back where we sat). These are two of the few mysterious things she did with me. Freud reports that by age three, his nanny had carried him to all five Catholic churches in Freiberg.'

6. My Lutheran-by-birth father's hypersensitive ears developed since childhood a hatred of Lutheran choral exuberance, which had to do with his preference for the visual arts and his life as a painter. He made stained-glass windows for the Rockefeller Chapel in Princeton, New Jersey, when he was in art school. I have panels of a Virgin Mary and a Joseph that he made.

7. He told me at the lunch table once when I was about fifteen, uncontradicted by my mother, "Son, I am not your father; I am your mother." I had just gone to the kitchen for a second glass of milk, which he accused me of "swilling." My mother replied, "Oh, leave him alone." My father's remark made a contradictory impression on me. I felt I had lucked out in having a nurturing, though somewhat nutty, father to compensate for my mother's haughtiness. I took his remark to be about who wore the pants in the family, or about the bisexuality of both members of my parental unit.

8. In 1970, my uncle Alfred, after whom my mother had named me, died at eighty-two. According to my mother his last words, after a life of identifying as a Viennese expatriate Jew who escaped the holocaust, were "Save me, Jesus." His mother was Catholic.

9. My father died in 1984 when I was forty-two, just as Freud was forty-one. Having dealt with Parkinson's disease since about 1969, he was courageous about his loss of painting skills with his loss of hand coordination, and also about growing

housebound and being unable to take walks in the woods. But exchanges with him grew more scarce and difficult. I was in Washington and came up to Weston to see his body and attend the cremation. Some months later, the family reunited to place his ashes in the outlet of a brook on a trail named after him in the Weston Conservancy, at which I read a passage from his library by Henry David Thoreau about thrashing through underbrush. When I published my first book on the Draupadi cult in 1988, about the cult's mythologies, I dedicated it "in memory of my father who taught us to see."

10. My sister was killed in early 1996 when her car was hit from behind by a truck at a red light that rammed her into another truck ahead of her. She was returning home after seeing her Jungian therapist. I received the news that evening from her husband, who called me from Russia. My two sons, Adam and Simon, and I decided to drive the next day from Washington to Norwalk, Connecticut, to break the news to my mother. She was playing cards with friends when we arrived in the late afternoon. She said that when she saw us through the window, she knew we were bringing bad news.

11. Not long after Jane's funeral, my mother decided to move to Washington, D.C., to live near me. For several years, she saw a therapist about my sister, but fired her when she fell asleep while my mother was talking. Thinking that my father would have wished it, I tried being a dutiful son, seeing her at least once a week, usually to take her out to dinner, and introducing her to friends, including girlfriends and my eventual third wife. Women usually liked her. But two events made me rethink my accommodation. In 2007, she was rushed to a hospital where two weeks of tests with no exercise (despite my urgings to her doctor) found nothing wrong with her. Upon release, she had lost motor skills, could no longer use a walker, and was obliged to relocate from her chosen residence at a Hyatt. Physical therapy was a nonstarter and she became wheelchair-bound. Meanwhile, in 2006, I was told I had an essential tremor, which I knew would probably soon mean a diagnosis of Parkinson's, which it did by 2008. Because my mother had suffered through my father's Parkinson's, and because I had learned to expect no sympathy from her, I decided not to tell her. Then after her hundredth birthday in January 2013, I began to see much less of her. I arranged her birthday party at my wife's country place in Middleburg, Virginia, calling my mother's few surviving relatives, and threw a catered party for twenty-eight guests. Just a week later, my daughter-in-law told me that my mother had told her and Simon that she was "surprised that Alf had done nothing for my hundredth birthday."

12. My mother's death in June 2014 was to me a surprise, since I had decided she would live to 104, and that we would have more time to grow alike in our senility, like Molloy and his mother in Samuel Beckett's trilogy.4 I was in Colombia when I received the news that she was losing consciousness, and I decided not to go back. She was with Simon, who was overseeing her last shift from assisted living to hospice care. I urged him to follow up on his plans to come with his wife and two girls to Colombia to join me and my wife the next day, and leave her with Adam. She died holding Adam's hand soon after Simon and his family had gotten to Colombia. Through all this, I was prepared by Freud's biography to recall that he did not mourn his mother's death, felt no grief over it, and did not attend her funeral. Freud, too, had the fear that his mother, who died at ninety-five, would outlive him. More than this, I believe that my mother's grip on things was not unlike that of Amalia Freud as Freud and her grandchildren knew her. Freud's son Martin called her a "tornado," and a granddaughter described her as "full of charm with strangers

but overweening, demanding, and tyrannical with her family" and "a most selfish old lady." At her son's seventieth birthday celebration to which Freud had discouraged her from coming, but at which she was nevertheless the first guest, she announced to the assembled party, `I am the mother.' " My father and sister had terms for my mother's huffiness long before I did. My father called her an "injustice collector" to explain her skill in showing everyone else at fault whenever there was a family argument. In the late 1960s, my sister coined the name "war hostess" for her trait of commandeering our friends and other guests for after-dinner games and arguments, long before there was a component of senility to her behavior, such as Simon writes of:

I recall how often (and I mean incessantly) she would tell me with great pride those last few years of her life about the time you'd been called off to Spain to deliver a series of lectures that would prepare Spain for war. It's such a wonderfully strange idea. I picture you at a lectern, tens of thousands of Spanish soldiers standing at attention in neat cohorts that stretch to the horizon before you, the king and queen with all the generals with all their medals arrayed on chairs to your sides on the golden dais, nodding gravely as you explain, as Krsna did to Arjuna, that they need to stop hesitating and fulfill their Ksatriya duty.

I was in Spain for a month in 2009 to lecture on the heroines of the Indian epics.' Year after year, my mother would await the announcement of the MacArthur "genius awards," sure that I must be a contestant. Worst of all for me, she felt entitled to be mean to whomever she felt like telling off, even after being told I had made peace with them, or with myself about them.

13. I have always had a predilection for goddesses that I don't claim to understand, but which probably has something to do with the fact that I converted to Roman Catholicism during the writing of this book.

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The first chapter written for the whole study, about three dead mother stories in the Mahābhārata, is now chapter 3 of Freud's Mahābhārata.

But both books have been impacted by André Green's article "The Dead Mother," which is about an imago that "has been constituted in the child's mind, following maternal depression, brutally transforming a living object, which was a source of vitality for the child, into a different figure," one who may eventually give the patient "the feeling that a malediction weighs upon him that there is no end to his dead mother's dying."' Green sees Amalia Freud's dealing with the death of Julius behind Freud's variation on "the dead mother complex"

But why go into all this? Old age is no picnic for anyone, and my mother's foibles made me cringe only in her last years. I tell such stories after much thought and vacillation because I lived with them, and recalled many more like them, as this book took shape, and I feel that it is a fuller and more honest book thereby. I feel some survivor guilt, and I acknowledge that Freud only spoke positively about his mother. To paraphrase one of his well-known epigrams: biography is destiny.

I started work on the project in the fall of 2012, and I soon began to announce the book in publications as "forthcoming," with "Uncanny Domesticities" as part of the title, giving name to a trope that ran through early chapters as applied to Freud, Bose, and the Goddess. I kept that title until late 2015, when I scrapped it. I decided then to overhaul the whole book and retitle it, for a time settling on either "Visnu on Freud's Couch" or "Freud on Visnu's Couch": titles that I eventually rejected because they were limited by their play on the older title, Vishnu on Freud's Desk, and because they applied only to the third part of this volume. In the meantime, I had found Henri and Madeleine Vermorel's 606-page Sigmund Freud et Romain Rolland: Correspondence 1923-36: de la sensation océanique au trouble du souvenir sur l'Acropole. The Vermorels' book first caught my eye in August 2014, on a shelf for returned books at the Freud Museum library in London. I was immediately intrigued that the dates of the Freud—Rolland correspondence overlapped the time span of the Freud—Bose letters, and since I knew that the Freud—Rolland correspondence touched on India, I thought there could be the potential to read the two exchanges for light they might shed on each other. I read the book over the 2014-15 winter holiday. I then took time out from Freud and company to write Nonviolence in the Mahabharata: Siva's Summa on Rsidharma and the Gleaners of Kuruksetra."

Having put the Freud—Bose book in the twilight for a while, once I returned to it, owing to what I had discovered in the Vermorels' book, I decided in December 2015 to thoroughly rewrite the three chapters—which now intercalate the two correspondences—and to highlight some of the Vermorels' fruitful findings elsewhere. Since readers will be making the Vermorels' acquaintance in these early pages—most, I suspect,

for the first time—I will say some words about them, and about what it means that a chance find looms so large in this book. (It was also at the Freud Archives, in its bookshop, that I found Janine Burke's The Gods of Freud, which led me to the poet H. D., whose 1933-34 work with Freud is also introduced in chapter 3.)

It seems, as a rule, that writers on Freud in English know they should read about him in German, but very few read about him in French. The result is that, aside from Jacques Lacan and his followers, French scholarship on Freud and psychoanalysis tends to exist in the English-speaking world as an unvisited island. Yet the body of non-Lacanian collaborative work in French is distinctive and considerable, and from the 1950s through their 2013 publication, De la psychiatrie à la psychoanalyse," the Vermorels have been on its pulse as writers, readers, and respondents. As a recent interview of Henri Vermorel by Marie Roumanens says, the Vermorels began their careers as interns and then as doctors together in the 1950s, participating in the movement for a humane opening of psychiatric institutions in France after the Second World War. Members of the Psychoanalytic Societies of Paris and Lyon, each has a private psychoanalytic practice at Chambéry, the capital of the Savoy Prefecture, and both have taught clinical psychology and psychoanalysis at the University of Savoy for over thirty years. Roumanens lists three reasons for carrying out her dialogue with Henri: that he began his work (with Madeleine, as he quickly points out) at a time when psychiatric hospitals included a farm where patients worked; that his (and their) work took part in a transformative movement that saw psychoanalysis begin to think about relations to the environment; and that he (with Madeleine) renewed the study of the origins of psychoanalysis by showing the influence of German Romanticism on Freud's thought. It is the latter that they work into their book on Freud and Romain Rolland, as well as their 1995 book, Freud, Judéité, Lumières et Romantisme.

The Vermorels offer a new interpretation of Freud's lifelong yet, as they argue, deepening interests in religion, and they interpret the correspondence with Rolland about the "oceanic feeling" as impactful on Freud's late-in-life interests in pre-Oedipal themes involving the mother. I will argue that this coincides with what Bose was challenging Freud to consider, which allows me to explore what Bose might have been able to contribute from an Indian perspective to Freud's rethinking, had Freud been as encouraging of a give-and-take exchange with him about things Indian as he was with Rolland. Both the correspondence with Bose and that with Rolland ended as Freud was shifting his ground to turn, for his last sustained effort, to Moses and Monotheism." On the one hand, this last turn coincides with what Richard A. Bernstein (in Freud and the Heritage of Moses) and Jacques Derrida (in Archive Fever) have hit on in Freud's softening on religious traditions (not on religion itself), whereby he relates them to a people's collective traumas. On the other hand, it finally made both Rolland's and Bose's openings onto Hinduism seem antithetical to Freud's driving interests.

To my surprise, this book and its companion volume thus have a chance to say something new about Freud himself, not to mention about Freud and Bose, Judaism and Hinduism, images and their rejection, God and the Goddess, and Moses and the Mahabharata in the light of Freud's analysis of religious traditions in terms of peoples' collective traumas.

Freud's Mahabharata by Alf Hiltebeitel [Oxford University Press, 9780190878337]

Excerpt: This book takes its title seriously, although since Freud never refers to the Mahābhārata, it might at first seem no more than a lure. The volume proceeds through an uneven three-part structure, with the first and last chapters being the first and third parts, and the middle four chapters constituting the second part. Chapter 1, titled "Freud's 'The "Uncanny"' and the Mahābhārata," examines Freud's essay, "The `Uncanny,'" and works its way back from it to the Mahābhārata, as from time to time we see how Freud's thoughts relate to that text. It thus offers only a pointillistic introduction, one in which most ideas hint at fuller treatment in later chapters. Chapters 2 through 5, then, are a medley of varied post-Freudian readings of Mahabharata scenes, themes, and episodes, viewed through the lenses of authors who are sympathetic with Freud (myself included) and in chapter 5, this includes that of his Indian correspondent, Girindrasekhar Bose. Chapter 6 is titled "Moses and Monotheism and the Mahabharata: Trauma, Loss of Memory, and the Return of the Repressed." As the third part of the book, it provides the payoff, explaining what is suggested by the title. Drawing on all preceding chapters, it offers a new theory of the Mahabharata that can be called "Freud's Mahabharata" because he inspired it.

As to the Mahābhārata, it is the "great epic of India," both in its baseline text of the Poona Critical Edition and in the Mahabharata tradition as it unfolds. Thus, I single out three different Mahābhāratas that I have come to study. That is, since 2011, I have made a distinction between text and tradition, pointing out that the tradition begins with the earliest known Sanskrit interpolations in the baseline text that are traceable to the epic's Southern recension. I thus now call the baseline version, derived mainly from the epic's Northern recension, the text, leaving all subsequent manuscript-based texts, beginning with the Southern recension, as tradition. My usage follows up on the work of T. P. Mahadevan, although he does not use "text" and "tradition" in this sense.

Thus, the study of the Mahabharata text and tradition in these forms has involved me in one type of Mahabharata study that must be done in Sanskrit, which I have been doing since 1967 in my dissertation, and which I continue to work on to this day. The Mahabharata tradition also unfolds in other Sanskrit forms—for instance, in the Purānas, one of which, the Bhavisya Purana (Parana of the Future), has a lengthy unit called the Krsnamsa-Cariita (Deeds of the Portion of Krishna), who, it is said, incarnated on earth with a portion of himself to become a hero named Udal in the "Mahabharata of the Kali-yuga," called the Ālha. This oral epic's retelling in Sanskrit is probably a mid-nineteenth-century translation from the Hindi vernacular. I translated the Krsnamsa-Carita from Sanskrit into English in 1997, as the basis for five chapters of my 1999 book on India's regional oral epics. That book delved as extensively as I could into India's rich and diverse vernacular Mahabharata traditions, which are found in every language of the subcontinent. Among the latter are two folk traditions found in Tamil cults: the Draupadi and Kūttāntavar cults, each with its own, very different distillation of the Mahabharata tradition. Each is expressed in folkloric narrative or myth, ritual, iconography, and drama.

These two cults yield the other two Mahabharatas that I reflect on in this book. One can be called the Draupadi cult's Mahabharata, which I have studied since 1975 with my wonderful fieldwork interpreters and assistants. The first such co-worker was C. T. Rajan, with whom I worked steadily from 1975 to 1988. Then, in 1990, I worked with my former undergraduate student Lee Weissman, who was researching his dissertation at the University of Chicago, and the Swiss folklorist Eveline MasilamaniMeyer, both superb at Tamil. The rhythm-and-blues singer J. Rajasekharan accompanied me on field trips, when available, from 1990 to 1994. S. Ravindran worked with me from 1994 to 2004, and from 1998 as a graduate student in anthropology at Columbia University. And Perundevi Srinivasan, first as my Human

Sciences graduate student at George Washington University, and then from 2008 as a colleague at Rutgers University, Claremont Colleges, and Sienna College, accompanied me to Dharmapuri District for a stretch every summer from 2000 to 2011, and continues now as co-author of the book she and I are writing about the Draupadi cult in Dharmapuri District.

The other, and third Mahabharata, is the Kūttāntavar cult's Mahabharata studied with C. T. Rajan in 1982; with Professor E. Sundaramurti of the Department of Tamil Literature at the University of Madras, in Coimbatore and Salem Districts; with J. Rajasekharan and Lee Weissman in 1990 at its festival in Kūvākkam village, with follow-up fieldwork there done with Rajasekharan and S. Ravindran from 1991 to 1994, and with Ravindran at the Singanallur Kūttāntavar festival in Coimbatore city in 1995.

Along with offering these further acknowledgments, my point here is to zero in on the period from 1990 to 1992 as the most formative phase of my work in terms of getting where I am now. As in Freud's India, in whose preface I wrote a personal, family history in vignettes that occasionally recalled Freud's life but was about my own, and about experiences relevant to the subjects of that book, I do something similar in this preface. In this case, though, I discuss the problems I faced in trying to juggle work on these three Mahabharatas during that two-year period, which occurred after my father had died in 1984 and while my wife was leaving me, before our amicable divorce in 1993. What I wrote about my father's death in Freud's India included that I was forty-two (just as Freud was forty-one when his father died); and when I published my first book on the Draupadi cult in 1988, about the cult's mythologies, I dedicated it "in memory of my father who taught us to see." He died during the year I had begun writing that book, and my dedication expressed as best I could all that it owed to him. From this point, for a few pages, I hope you will forgive me the immodesty of engaging in the trope of the Historian of Religions as a hero for sticking to his work.

So, in this book I first discuss the Mahabharata of the Sanskrit text and its Sanskrit textual traditions. During that 1990-92 period, after fifteen years of concentrating more and more intensely on fieldwork on Tamil cults and culture, I was beginning to feel the need to get back to the Sanskrit texts, from which I had grown to feel more and more estranged, and insecure about my Sanskrit, which I had not seriously worked with since 1981. In 1995, Jim Fitzgerald helped me immensely to refurbish my Sanskrit by sending me Muneo Tokunaga's machine-readable transliteration of the Mahabharata, from the Poona Critical Edition. It gave me a new agility to whiz around the text that I had never imagined possible—one that seemed at first to be cheating on it. By 1997, though, I was able to translate the Krsnamsa-Carita from the untranslated Bhavisa Purana.

Yet what I needed was to form a picture of how my earlier fieldwork and my textual study could continue together, if that were to happen at all.

Each of the three Mahabharatas, for different reasons, beckoned to be set aside, but at the cost of what I knew could only be a failure to carry out the promise of earlier and, in the case of the two cults, ongoing field studies.

My first moment of clarity on the Sanskrit Mahabharata came with long-lasting results, but I am still surprised it appeared in this early period and in the form and place it did. Sometime in the summer of 1992, I was invited to the Siva-Visnu Temple in Lanham, Maryland, for lunch and to give a talk about my Sanskrit epic research, which had grown so perilously thin. There were only a few people in attendance, but my host's collegeage daughter asked for my thoughts about the origins of the Mahabharata, to which I replied that I had "come to think of it first and foremost as a work of literature." Her resulting scowl told me she was well enough informed to realize I had said something unpalatable to her views—that the Mahabharata was a sacred oral history dating back to a preliterate age. The clarity of my position surprised me, as would its staying power. I doubt that I would have formulated it that prematurely, had it not been for the need I had to return to the Sanskrit texts while differentiating them in my mind from the vernacular, folk Mahabharata traditions I had been

busy with. Not until 1999, having recently read Robert Alter's The Art of Biblical Narrative, did I write, "I believe that the largest inadequacy of Mahabharata scholarship, including my own up to 1991, is simply the failure to appreciate the epic as a work of literature.'" By that time, and leading up to my 2001 book, Rethinking the Mahabharata: A Reader's Guide to the Education of Yudhisthira, I was theorizing the Mahabharata as a dateable written text composed over a short period of time by a "committee" or atelier of `but-of-sorts Brahmins"—a text with likely interpolations, yes, but with no convincing way to argue that they were any more than a day, a week, a decade, or at most, say, two generations old.

Then, by 2006, I could enjoy the support of my positions in Mahadevan's study of the epic's Northern and Southern recensions; and by 2009, I could begin to enjoy a basic, though always restless, "working agreement" to consider the short-term composition of the epic by a new generation of scholars such as Aditya Adarkar, Vishwa Adluri, Joydeep Bagchee, Adam Bowles, Simon Brodbeck, Brian Collins, James Hegarty, Dan Rudmann, and Fernando Wulff Alonso.

I turn now to the second and third Mahabharatas that I was considering abandoning in 1990-92. I discuss the Kūttãntavar cult's first, since the problems with it reach further back than my problems with the Draupadi cult. Kūttāntavar is a minor hero in the Sanskrit epic text and tradition, which names him Irāvat, but he looms in importance in the Draupadi cult, which knows him as Aravān, and still more so in his own Kūttãntavar cult, which knows him by both of these Tamil names. In both cults, Aravān is worshiped for his self-mutilating sacrifice as a battle-opening offering to "mother" Kãlī, and in his own cult in Kūvākkam village and at a few other Kūttāntavar temples in nearby villages, he is worshiped by Indian transsexuals, including eunuchs or castrati. Today, and since about 1995, they call themselves Aravānis, naming themselves after him; but when I did my fieldwork they called themselves Alis.

My problem with the Kūttāntavar cult and its Mahabharata surfaced for the first time in 1982, in the room C. T. Rajan and I had taken at the Rolex Hotel in Villupuram, the hub town near Kuvakkam village, where its Kūttāntavar festival was gearing up for the big ceremonial events that would occur on its sixteenth night and seventeenth day. The Rolex was also popular among Alis who had come to town for the festival, and we hosted several of them in our room for tea, biscuits, and conversation, during which they volunteered to show us how they put on makeup and plaited their hair with strings of jasmine. They urged me to take photographs, which made me wonder if I was being exploitative. But my moment of lasting discomfort came when one Ali, who lingered behind after the others had left, asked if we wanted "to see my" (that is, his/her) "operation." To my surprise, Rajan seemed unfazed by this offer, and turned to me for our answer. But I had felt a chill run down my spine, and responded with a rather too firm "No," judging from the look on our guest's face, who soon collected himself/herself and left. Today, my reaction reminds me of Freud's remark that there is an "unplumbable navel" in every dream beyond which the interpreter cannot go. Freud was talking about a moment in his "specimen dream" of "Irma's Injection." While he was looking into Irma's mouth, he had been reminded of a vagina. But Freud, having looked, was talking about sexual matters he did not want to discuss publicly, not what he did not want to look at.

Rajan and I soon discussed my "No" as an exceptional breach of my loyalty to the anthropologists' credo of participant observation, which it certainly was. This was additionally puzzling to me, since I had recently gone so far as to drink a chilled bottle of sticky, foul-tasting orange soda called Kali Cola when it had been offered to me during the raking of the coals to form a fire pit on a sweltering afternoon, resulting in a bout of dysentery. But it was more than a rejection of participant observation, as came home to me in 1990, when the same pattern confronted me, this time in the form of a joke. Lee Weissman, Rajasekharan, and I had been enjoying the night-long sights and sounds of this, my second "eunuch jamboree," as we had come to call the sixteenth night's revelries in which the Alis "have fun" in activities like dancing, magic shows, beauty

pageants, and sex in the fields—for which the rate quoted for oral sex was "12 rupees for Indians, 50 for Americans." That rate was not offered seriously, and thus required no decision; and the three of us roared with laughter. But I was reminded of the offer eight years earlier.

Both offers had touched the uncomfortable nerve of a latent "unruly homosexuality" (as Freud called his feelings about his friend, Wilhelm Fliess). All this came home to me personally in 1990, because I was experiencing a kind of emasculation, with no woman in my life. For about two years, in asking myself what to do about six months of fieldwork sponsored by the American Institute of Indian Studies regarding about forty Kūttāntavar temples, I was blocked from writing anything. Aware of the problem, I thought I might unblock myself in a series of lectures at the Sorbonne, to which I was invited by Madeleine Biardeau. The series was titled "Le Mahabharata dans les traditions populaires de l'Inde du Sud." Six of my eight lectures were about Kūttāntavar, and in them, I began to organize data and plan some strategies for future writing. The Kūttāntavar cult presented a bewildering variety of local detail, from tugs of war to putting the deity's icon on a horse or a swing. During my second or third lecture, with the anthropologist Gananath Obeyesekere in attendance, I stated a working principle that, in interpreting such things in the Kūttāntavar cult, I assumed the priority of the Sanskrit Mahabharata. From his startled look I sensed the remark caught Obeyesekere by surprise; I surmise that it made him think I sounded more like a Sanskritist than an anthropologist. But I did not begin to revive that dossier in written articles until 1994, after I had domiciled myself with a new woman-friend. We turned our basement into our study, and there I wrote three articles on Kūttāntavar in a few years. But from 1990 to 1992, my Kūttāntavar cult Mahabharata studies had been in danger of being scuttled.

Third, I turn to where I was in 1990-92 with the Draupadi cult Mahābhārata, which had been the center of my research life from 1975 to 1990. Through 1989 and the first half of 1990, I worked on my second volume of Draupadi cult studies, and specifically on Draupadi cult rituals. While I had invested great energy and love in my first volume, which was on Draupadi cult mythologies, published in 1988, the disruptions in domestic life had left me disenchanted with the second volume; and since it seemed quite possible to think I had done enough with two volumes on the Draupadi cult, I seriously entertained the thought that I had brought my Draupadi cult studies to a disenchanted end, and would stop visiting Draupadi temples and festivals in the future, at some emotional loss. That did prove to be what happened between 1990 and 1998, when, as luck would have it, Ravindran and I were doing fieldwork on a Duryodhana festival near Dharmapuri, and we just happened to walk through a village where the culminating ceremonies of a Draupadi festival were going on. That was to lead to the resumption of my Draupadi cult studies with Perundevi.

Now, at some point in late 1990 or soon thereafter, I became aware of a dream that I had discovered a Draupadi temple in the Pine Barrens of New Jersey. I didn't want to admit to myself that I had had this enchanting dream, thinking that if I didn't admit it, I could keep on having it. Yet I cannot say whether the dream was a recurrent one, which is what I wished to think, or whether it originated as a solitary dream or even a daydream. My own part in discovering the temple is obscure, as is how I knew it was a Draupadi temple. I don't recall ever seeing Draupadi or one of her icons. But it was an Indian-style Draupadi temple, with one strange feature. Instead of a mortar and pestle in a corner, there was an old four-legged washing machine with wooden hand-pumped clothes wringers of the type my mother used in the house we lived in when I was four and five. I had first heard about the Pine Barrens from my high school girlfriend, whose family vacationed in nearby Wildwood. And by the time of the dream, I had driven past and through the Pine Barrens several times en route from Connecticut to Washington D.C., along the scenic Garden State Parkway. I must have had the dream sometime after the spring of 1990, for that is when I did fieldwork at the Vatukku Poykaiyūr Draupadi temple, which I identify with the dream, for three reasons.

One, which is part of my recollection of the dream, is the visual sight of wispy evergreen casuarina trees near the shoreline Vatukku Poykaiyūr temple, of which I was reminded by the scrub pines that grow along the Atlantic seashore. Second, an association with the dream, is that I did the fieldwork at Vatukku Poykaiyūr with Eveline Masilamani-Meyer, who would soon be visiting me from Switzerland. And third, which I had forgotten but which clinches the connection, I wrote in my 1991 book that the anthropologist Lawrence Babb "tells us that it was `claimed by some' of his Singapore informants 'that the shrine of Draupadi [in Singapore] was originally established by a community of boat repairmen from the village of Vadukku Poigaiyiur near Nagapattinam,' on the Tanjavur District coast of the Kaveri delta." I had evidently transposed the boatmen's journey from Singapore, all the way to New Jersey. But why would I expend energy trying to keep this dream in my unconscious or, in current terms, to make it a recurrent lucid dream?'

Those were the years when I was unsuccessful in finding good female companionship. There was nothing to gain from figuring out that I was fantasizing Draupadi in my wife's place, as she had often said I did. But I had also formed an attitude when I would return to the States, flying over the Tamil landscape I had come to know. My attitude was that America and the India I was discovering were two utterly separate worlds, planets apart, and that the India now disappearing below me, that meant so much to me, would have to wait until I returned. My subliminal knowledge of the secret temple in New Jersey helped me to dispense with that attitude, which was unhealthy for a writer who wishes to communicate things of relevance about the places and people he studies.

All three of these Mahābhāratas, each with its distinctive mythology, have thus survived their threatened extinctions in 1900-92, and have made their way into Freud's Mahabharata. The textual and Draupadi cult Mahābharatas come up in virtually every chapter, and the Kūttāntavar cult Mahābhārata is featured in in chapter 5.

Now, I am aware that there is risk these days in highlighting myth. Interpretation of myth no longer has the caché or urgency it had among psychoanalysts in Freud's time,' but that is the time this book recalls. As Bernard This says, "Freud is not a mythographer.... In studying the productions of the unconscious, and the fantasms that recall these ancient stories that Hellenists translate, Freud had known to produce what was significant from his familial constellation.'" Up through chapter 5, when I make points about myth, it may seem at times to Freud-attuned readers that in imagining Freud's and Bose's responses to material with which I can only sometimes demonstrate their familiarity, that I risk imputing a free association with Indian myth to them. Although I also bring in other methods to the study of Indian myths, I would not discourage that impression. Let me just try to sharpen the checks and balances on free play that such a procedure suggests, by saying that it is never a matter of just myth, but also of iconography, ritual, and in several cases of cults, and that the myths discussed come from varied literary and anthropological contexts.'

Chapter by chapter, this book introduces terms and themes that are followed up in later chapters. As a "pointillistic" introduction to the epic, chapter 1 is meant to provide an undemanding entrée to the book's Mahābhārata subject matter. The discussion of Freud's "The `Uncanny' " makes it possible to introduce Freud's Mahābhārata with an argument that can also be phrased in Bernard This's terms: Freud's "empire" was "founded" on his phylogenetic reading of Freud's Oedipal family drama, retold about "the one who, responding to an enigma, had liberated the city from this monster who suffocated all those who could not answer his questions.

Chapter 1, however, not only treats Freud's handling of the Oedipal but also reintroduces from Freud's India his belated overtures to the pre-Oedipal, along with his discussion of burial alive, ghosts and doubles, and castration anxiety among his "classes" of the "uncanny." I discuss parallels between Freud's eventually stubbornly held view that "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny" and Indian theories of karma and reincarnation. My argument in chapter 1 is that the Mahābhārata forges a comparable "empire" with Freud's in its

own uncanny handling of myth. Chapter i introduces two prominent epic terms that parallel Freud's "uncanny": maya, or "illusion," which centers on the doings of Krsna; and adbhuta, the "wondrous." In ninth- and tenth-century Indian aesthetic theory, the latter is considered one of the nine "moods" or "sentiments" that can be dominant in works of literature, and I discuss adbhutarasa (which Sheldon Pollock glosses as the "uncanny" 11) as a third option, along with the two traditional contestants for the Mahabharata: the heroic (vīrarasa) and the peaceful (santarasa).

Chapter 2 then introduces André Green's concept of "the dead mother," alive but emotionally dead to her child, around which I introduce the epic's main story through the interactions between the peace-loving King Yudhisthira and his bellicose mother Kunti. Chapter 2 also introduces the Mahabharata text more thoroughly as a whole, as what we can call a "dead mother" text in the sense of what Green calls the "dead mother complex." In this chapter, I study the tensions between the eldest Pām lava Yudhisthira and Kunti as one that exemplifies Green's dead mother complex, in which a living mother has stopped loving a child, resulting in a "depressed position," but in which the child may be creative in working through the impasses that the distance from his mother introduces. I trace these tensions through the text, from the Mahabharata's beginning to its end, and also find them suggestive for the Draupadī cult possession scenes during dramas that enact Draupadī s disrobing.

Chapter 3 then widens the dead mother theme. I started this eventual two-book project in the fall of 2012, with a paper I presented in an American Academy of Religion panel, which has become the basis for this chapter. Against the background of three of Freud's texts that present the rarity of his addressing the topic of dead mothers, chapter 3 presents in counterpoint three dead mother texts from the Mahabharata. All three feature Kunti, but she is one among a cohort of really dead or divine past mothers in the Pāndava lineage. It thus introduces many women and goddesses in the Mahabharata, whom I discuss further in chapter 4. The most important of the Mahabharata's three dead mother texts is the third, from an episode during the Pāndavas' year in concealment. As the five brothers and Draupadi near the capital city where they will each don a disguise, the middle brother Arjuna directs Nakula, a younger brother, to hide their weapons in a tree, after which they spread the rumor that they have put the stinky corpse of their 180-year-old mother in the tree, following their "family custom" of tree burial, so as to keep people from finding the weapons. We are left with the question of which mother he means—the still very much alive Kunti being one of five candidates. I discuss this as an example of Vedic ritual humor, and the whole episode as illustrative of virtually everything that Freud describes as "uncanny."

In chapter 4, I take up Fernando Wulff Alonso's hypothesis that the Mahābharata poets worked from a Greek repertoire in modeling many of their stories. Here and in chapters 5, and 6, I discuss the epic's divine plan for the Unburdening of the Earth, the goddess Earth, and its Greek counterpart in the Iliad's Plan of Zeus. Treating Wulff's theory noncommittally but appreciatively allows me to take note of ways that the Mahabharata's goddesses and heroines are increasingly domesticated, "tamed," or "spousified" as one moves from the baseline text into the tradition. As mentioned in the preface to Freud's India, I scrapped the idea of including "Uncanny Domesticities" in the title of this project in late 2015. But I kept it for this chapter, where it speaks not to the home lives of Freud or Bose but to that of goddesses and heroines in the Mahabharata. Chapter 4 pursues questions about the Mahabharata as a text and tradition, and presents the idea that the earliest baseline text gives us something like what Freud calls "primary process." Chapter 4 also treats the uncanny theme of live burial in the myth of the five former Indras, and considers Indian karma in that myth as a possible translation of the Greek hubris.

Chapter 5 then reintroduces from Freud's India Girindrasekhar Bose's concept of the "Oedipus mother" through a discussion of Aravān-Kūttāntavar's self-mutilating sacrifice as a battle-opening offering to "mother" Kālī. It again recalls

Freud's "The `Uncanny,"' discussing the hero's "castration" and his prenatal experience of listening to his mother's discussion with Krsna from the womb. It treats a Mahabharata tradition that is totally unknown in any Sanskrit text. It was developed in Tam ilnadu, but there are comparable narratives about different heroes from all over India. In my two volumes on Draupadī cult myth and ritual, each has a chapter on Aravãn, and I wrote three articles on Kūttāntavar plus an additional one as a new chapter in my 2011 collection of essays titled When the Goddess Was a Woman. Chapter 5 attempts a unified picture of this hero's mythology and ritual as an illustration of Bose's idea of the "Oedipus mother." The three articles from the late 1990s, to which I brought a conventional Freudian perspective, thus come under review from a Bosean angle.

Finally, chapter 6 offers a new theory of the epic based on Freud's Moses and Monotheism, where he argues that religious traditions deserve to be studied not only in what they say consciously about themselves but also in what they have registered unconsciously from past trauma, loss of memory, and the return of the repressed. Here I posit that the Unburdening of the Earth myth alongside the Mahābharata's repeatedly highlighted stories about forest-based gleaners reflects a repressed and forgotten trauma over the Brahmanical experience of India's second urbanization in the seventh to third centuries BCE. Against this background I discuss the traumas of Draupadi and other heroines as reflections of the trauma of the earth, and discuss Vedic jokes at these women's expense as evidence that their grand portrayals are nonetheless a return of the repressed, all transposed into a vague yet hallowed Vedic past lost to living memory.

Chapter 6 is the last to have been written. It came as an afterthought, like a bolt from the blue. I was rereading Richard Bernstein's Freud and the Legacy of Moses to see if there was more I needed to say about it. Coincident with that rereading, Arti Dhand sent me her essay on karma yoga for prepublication comment while I was also reading through T. P. Mahadevan's forthcoming book as editor-in-chief of the series in which it was to appear. Both raised points about the Mahabharata that I thought Freud's Moses and Monotheism helped me to see better. Although I would have to depart from their conclusions, it seemed the right context to discuss these two important studies.

In short, my aim in this book is to examine some features of the Goddess's domestication in and by the Mahabharata that take advantage of things one can learn from Freud's "The `Uncanny— and his overtures to primary process and the pre-Oedipal and Oedipal. By Chapter 6, I tie things together by presenting a new theory of the Mahabharata based on Freud's 1937 Moses and Monotheism and his 1905 Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious. By these lights, Freud's Mahabharata turns out to be a full package of Freud-inspired readings of India's great epic. <>

The Oxford Handbook of Spontaneous Thought: Mind-Wandering, Creativity, and Dreaming edited by Kieran C. R. Fox, Kalina Christoff [Oxford Library of Psychology, Oxford University Press, 9780190464745]

Where do spontaneous thoughts come from? It may be surprising that the seemingly straightforward answers "from the mind" or "from the brain" are in fact an incredibly recent understanding of the origins of spontaneous thought. For nearly all of human history, our thoughts - especially the most sudden, insightful, and important - were almost universally ascribed to divine or other external sources. Only in the past few centuries have we truly taken responsibility for their own mental content, and finally localized thought to the central nervous system - laying the foundations for a protoscience of spontaneous thought. But enormous questions still loom: what, exactly, is spontaneous thought? Why does our brain engage in spontaneous forms of thinking, and when is this most likely to occur? And perhaps the question most interesting and accessible from a scientific perspective: how does the brain generate and evaluate its own spontaneous creations?

Spontaneous thought includes our daytime fantasies and mind-wandering; the flashes of insight and inspiration familiar to the artist, scientist, and inventor; and the nighttime visions we call dreams.

This Handbook brings together views from neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, phenomenology, history, education, contemplative traditions, and clinical practice to begin to address the ubiquitous but poorly understood mental phenomena that we collectively call 'spontaneous thought.'

In studying such an abstruse and seemingly impractical subject, we should remember that our capacity for spontaneity, originality, and creativity defines us as a species - and as individuals. Spontaneous forms of thought enable us to transcend not only the here and now of perceptual experience, but also the bonds of our deliberately-controlled and goal-directed cognition; they allow the space for us to be other than who we are, and for our minds to think beyond the limitations of our current viewpoints and beliefs.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: Toward an Interdisciplinary science of Spontaneous Thought

Abstract: Enormous questions still loom for the emerging science of spontaneous thought: What, exactly, is spontaneous thought? Why does the human brain engage in spontaneous forms of thinking, and when is this most likely to occur? And perhaps the question most interesting and accessible from a scientific perspective: How does the brain generate, elaborate, and evaluate its own spontaneous creations? The central aim of this volume is to bring together views from neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, phenomenology, history, education, contemplative traditions, and clinical practice in order to begin to address the ubiquitous but poorly understood mental phenomena collectively known as "spontaneous thought." Perhaps no other mental experience is so familiar in daily life, and yet so difficult to understand and explain scientifically. The present volume represents the first effort to bring such highly diverse perspectives to bear on answering the what, when, why, and how of spontaneous thought.

Key Words: mind-wandering, creativity, dreaming, daydreaming, spontaneous thought, self-generated thought

Excerpt: Where Do Spontaneous Thoughts Come From?

It may be surprising that the seemingly straightforward answers "from the mind" or "from the brain" are in fact an incredibly recent, modern understanding of the origins of spontaneous

thought. For nearly all of human history, our thoughts—especially the most sudden, insightful, and important—were almost universally ascribed to divine or other external sources. Cultures around the world believed that dreams were messages sent from the gods; inventions like writing and agriculture were credited to ancient culture heroes and tutelary deities long lost in the mists of legend; and the belief that artistic creativity was inspired by the Muses held sway for two millennia. Even the original sense of the word inspiration was that the divine had been "breathed into" a mere mortal, accounting for the new idea or insight. There were of course exceptions—Aristotle, for instance, put forward the naturalistic hypothesis that dreams were created by the mind of the dreamer —but nowhere, it seems, was there a widespread belief in the spontaneity, originality, and creativity of the unaided human mind.

We still sometimes worship our great intellectual innovators—artists, scientists, philosophers—as semi-divine figures. But somewhere, somehow, our perspective changed and we began to see ourselves as the authors of our own thoughts, however inexplicable their origins might seem. Perhaps the beginnings of this shift in perspective are echoed in the ancient myth of Prometheus, who "stole and gave to mortals" the "fount of the arts, the light of fire"—in other words, the power of conjuring up novel thoughts. Although this internalization of thought's origins began long ago, only in the past few centuries have human beings truly taken responsibility for their own mental content, and finally localized thought to the central nervous system—laying the foundations for a protoscience of spontaneous thought.

This shift has broadly answered the who and the where of spontaneous thought: we are the source of our thoughts, and these thoughts seem to be constructed in our heads. But enormous questions still loom: What, exactly, is spontaneous thought? Why does the brain engage in spontaneous forms of thinking, and when is this most likely to occur? And perhaps the most interesting and accessible question from a scientific perspective: How does the brain generate, elaborate, and evaluate its own spontaneous creations? Each chapter that follows aims to provide at least preliminary answers to these perplexing questions.

The central aim of this volume is to bring together views from neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, phenomenology, history, education, contemplative traditions, and clinical practice in order to begin to address the ubiquitous but poorly understood mental phenomena that we collectively call "spontaneous thought." Perhaps no other mental experience is so familiar to us in daily life, and yet so difficult to understand and explain scientifically. The present volume represents the first effort to bring such highly diverse perspectives to bear on answering the what, when, why, and how of spontaneous thought.

Although "spontaneous thought" as a term has been used throughout the last decade in both the psychological and neuroscientific literature, recent years have marked tremendous progress in our theoretical understanding of what spontaneous thought is and what phenomena it encompasses. Spontaneous thought can be defined as thought that arises relatively freely due to an absence of strong constraints on its contents or on the transitions from one mental state to another (Christoff et al., 2016). In other words, spontaneous thought moves freely as it unfolds (Figure 1.1).



There are two general ways in which thought can be constrained (Figure 1.1). One type of constraint is flexible and deliberate, and is implemented through cognitive control. Another type of constraint is automatic in nature. Automatic constraints can be thought of as a family of mechanisms that operate outside of cognitive control to hold attention on a restricted set of information. Examples of automatic constraints are emotional significance and habits, both of which can constrain our thoughts without any effort or intention on our part.

Spontaneous thought can also be understood as a broader family of mental phenomena, including our daytime fantasies and mind-wandering; the flashes of insight and inspiration familiar to the artist, scientist, and inventor; and the nighttime visions we call dreams. There is a dark side to these mental phenomena as well—the illumination of which is yet another major goal of this volume. Repetitive depressive rumination, uncontrollable thoughts in obsessive-compulsive disorder, the involuntary and life like re-experiencing of post-traumatic stress disorder—all these, we suggest, can be considered dysfunctional alterations of spontaneous thought, and need to be understood in relation to our natural and healthy propensity toward novel, variable, imaginative thought (see Chapter 2).

Spontaneous should in no way suggest random or meaningless. Another key aim of this volume is to highlight the ample evidence in favor of the idea that goal-related and "top-down" processing often co-occurs with and can sometimes guide spontaneous thought. Although the cause and meaning of specific thoughts or dreams often elude us, the rare but sensational occurrences of transgressive thoughts or highly bizarre and emotional dreams tend to obscure just how mundane (but, quite possibly, useful) most of our self-generated mental content really is. The degree to which mental processes that are ostensibly

spontaneous and beyond our control appear to be planned, relevant, and insightful with respect to our personal goals and concerns is striking—and, we believe, deserving of further exploration.

These ubiquitous spontaneous mental phenomena raise some intriguing questions: Can we engage in planning and other executive processes in the absence of conscious awareness? To what extent are "we" in control of our own minds? The true qualities and content of spontaneous thought also fly in the face of many culturally sanctioned but unwarranted beliefs about the inexplicability of our fantasy lives, the randomness and meaninglessness of dreams, or the disorderliness of creative thoughts and insights in artists and scientists. A closer look at psychological, neuroscientific, and philosophical work shows not only the co-occurrence of cognitive processes like planning, mentalizing, and metacognition with various forms of spontaneous thought, but also a compelling correspondence between the content of one's spontaneous thoughts and the content and concerns of one's daily life.



The Oxford Handbook of Spontaneous Thought is the first volume of its kind to bring together experts from so many diverse fields to explore these phenomena, and should therefore be of interest to psychologists, neuroscientists, philosophers, clinicians, educators, and artists alike—indeed, to anyone intrigued by the incredibly rich life of the mind.

Overview of the Handbook

This Handbook is divided into seven separate but closely interrelated parts. This introductory chapter comprises Part I, providing an overview of spontaneous thought in general and the many chapters of this book in particular.

Part II dives right into fundamental theoretical issues surrounding the definition and investigation of spontaneous thought. In Chapter 2, Caitlin Mills, Arianne Herrera-Bennett, Myrthe Faber, and Kalina Christoff ask why the mind wanders at all, and propose the default variability hypothesis: the idea that by default, spontaneous thought tends to exhibit high variability of content over time—variability that serves as an adaptive mechanism that enhances episodic memory efficiency and facilitates semantic knowledge optimization. Chandra Sripada, in Chapter 3, puts forward a theoretical framework within which spontaneous and deliberate thought can be compared, respectively, with "exploration" of the environment in search of new resources versus "exploitation" of the resources we already have at hand. In Chapter 4, Carey Morewedge and Daniella Kupor provide an overview of people's metacognitive appraisals of the meaning and relevance of spontaneous thoughts, with the surprising conclusion that people tend to attribute more importance to thought whose origin is mysterious—perhaps hearkening back to the ancient human view of the origins of thought discussed at the outset of this chapter. Dylan Stan and Kalina Christoff, in Chapter 5, propose that a key quality of mind-wandering is an accompanying subjective experience of ease, or low motivational intensity. In Chapter 6, Georg Northoff proposes a novel theory aiming to explain how spontaneous brain activity generates and constitutes subjectively experienced spontaneous thought. Finally, in Chapter 7, Jonathan Smallwood, Daniel Margulies, Boris Bernhardt, and Elizabeth Jeffries present their component process framework of spontaneous thought, explaining how different types of thought can arise through the interaction of specific underlying neurocognitive processes.

Part III explores broader philosophical, evolutionary, and historical perspectives on spontaneous thought. In Chapter 8, Zachary Irving and Evan Thompson provide an in-depth introduction to the philosophy of mind-wandering, reviewing several psychological and philosophical accounts and providing a new view of their own. Thomas Metzinger, in Chapter 9, addresses the question, "Why is mind-wandering interesting for philosophers?" In Chapter 10, Dean Keith Simonton relates the spontaneity of human thought to other spontaneous generative processes, highlighting the connections with "selectionist" views of evolution and creativity. John Antrobus, in Chapter 11, offers an analysis of how the brain in both waking and sleeping can so effortlessly produce a constant stream of visual imagery and thoughts—and what use they might have. Rounding out Part III, Alex Soojung-Kim Pang, in Chapter 12, explores how spontaneous thought was viewed in the past, how it was used by creative people to further their endeavors, and how deep historical research could lead to an understanding of the role of spontaneous thought in the history of ideas.

Part IV focuses on mind-wandering and daydreaming. In Chapter 13, Jessica Andrews-Hanna, Zachary Irving, Kieran Fox, Nathan Spreng, and Kalina Christoff present an interdisciplinary overview of the rapidly evolving neuroscience of spontaneous thought. Investigating what we have learned from intracranial electrophysiology in humans, Kieran Fox, in Chapter 14, then synthesizes the available evidence on how and where self-generated thought is initiated within the brain. In Chapter 15, Arnaud D'Argembeau provides a detailed discussion of the link between mind-wandering and self-referential thinking, and their common neural basis. David Stawarczyk, in Chapter 16, provides a detailed overview of the phenomenological properties of all kinds of mind-wandering and daydreaming, covering both the historical trajectory of these investigations and the present state of research. In Chapter 17, Eric

Klinger, Igor Marchetti, and Ernst Koster discuss the critical importance of goal pursuit to spontaneous thought, elaborating on how these thoughts are adaptive in everyday life but can go awry in a variety of clinical conditions. Claire Zedelius and Jonathan Schooler, in Chapter 18, provide a fine-grained view of the many different kinds of mind-wandering and the evidence that they have distinctive effects on task performance, mood, and creativity. In Chapter 19, Julia Kam and Todd Handy comprehensively review the evidence from human electrophysiology that mind wandering involves a decoupling of attention from the external world. Finally, Jeffrey Wammes, Paul Seli, and Daniel Smilek, in Chapter 20, review what we know about mind-wandering in educational settings, and how excessive, unintentional mind wandering in the classroom impacts learning and academic performance.

Part V covers creativity and insight, and their relation to other forms of spontaneous thought. Roger Beaty and Rex Jung, in Chapter 21, offer an overview of how large-scale brain networks interact during creative thinking and creative performance. In Chapter 22, Mathias Benedek and Emanuel Jauk offer detailed empirical evidence for a "dualprocess" model of creative cognition, wherein the flexible switching between controlled and spontaneous cognition is critical to an optimal creative process. Charles Dobson, an artist as well as a professor of fine arts, offers in Chapter 23 an insider's view of what he calls "flip-flop thinking," and outlines his firsthand experiences of what helps (and what hurts) the creative process. In Chapter 24, John Vervaeke, Leo Ferraro, and Arianne Herrera-Bennett develop an intriguing account of the "flow" state as a form of spontaneous thought characterized by a cascade of successive insights and learning experiences. Oshin Vartanian, in Chapter 25, delves into how self-referential thoughts can be elicited by aesthetic appreciation of artworks, such as paintings. Finally, in Chapter 26, David Beversdorf provides an extensive review of the neurochemical basis of flexible and creative thinking.

Spontaneous thought does not cease when we close our eyes and turn out the lights. Part VI explores the many normal, extraordinary, and sometimes pathological varieties of spontaneous thought that take place throughout the sleep cycle, and how these are related to memory consolidation and involuntary memory retrieval. In Chapter 27, G. William Domhoff provides an overview of the neural basis of dreaming and REM sleep, while Chapter 28, by Kieran Fox and Manesh Girn, provides a comprehensive review of what is known about the neural correlates of all sleep stages throughout the sleep cycle. In Chapter 29, Jennifer Windt and Ursula Voss provide an in-depth treatment of the phenomenon of lucid dreaming, bringing psychological, philosophical, and neuroscientific perspectives to bear to better explain this remarkable mental state. Tore Nielsen, in Chapter 30, explores the fascinating topic of "microdreaming" and hypnagogic imagery as a paradigm for a fine-scaled neurophenomenological approach to inner experience. In Chapter 31, Elizaveta Solomonova offers an interdisciplinary look at the little-known phenomenon of sleep paralysis, and the spontaneous visions and emotions that accompany it. Erin Wamsley, in Chapter 32, explores how spontaneous thought in both waking and sleep can be seen as an expression of memory consolidation and recombination, and John Mace, in Chapter 33, provides a comprehensive overview of involuntary memories—how often they occur, how they can chain together, how they differ from voluntarily recalled information, and what their function might be.

Part VII takes us to the fringes and also the cutting edge of research on spontaneous thought: its relationship to clinical conditions and altered states of consciousness. Dylan Stan and Kalina Christoff begin, in Chapter 34, by outlining the many potential clinical benefits and risks of spontaneous thought. In Chapter 35, Claire O'Callaghan and Muireann Irish describe the neural underpinnings of how spontaneous thought changes in relation to aging and dementia syndromes. Elizabeth DuPre and Nathan Spreng, in Chapter 36, explore the relationships between depression, rumination, and spontaneous thought. In Chapter 37, Aaron Kucyi explores the intriguing relationships between mind-wandering and both chronic and acute pain, and how these interactions are mediated by largescale brain networks. Halvor Eifring, in Chapter 38,

investigates how religious and contemplative traditions around the world have tended to see mind wandering as an obstacle, while at the same time viewing spiritual attainment and liberation as a spontaneous process of transformation that cannot be actuated deliberately. In Chapter 39, Wendy Hasenkamp outlines how meditation and mindfulness practices can provide a window into the rapid fluctuations of mind-wandering. Peter Suedfeld, Dennis Rank, and Marek Malas offer in Chapter 40 an account of spontaneous thought in extreme and unusual environments, exploring rarely seen records of the thoughts and experiences of polar explorers, astronauts, and those undergoing severe sensory deprivation. Finally, Michael Lifshitz, Eli Sheiner, and Laurence Kirmayer detail in Chapter 41 how the powerful unconstrained cognition brought on by psychedelic substances can be guided by culture and context.

All told, these chapters provide the most comprehensive overview of the wide-ranging field of spontaneous thought to date—and there could be no better guides to this realm than the 64 outstanding scientists, historians, philosophers, and artists who have come together to write them.



Spontaneous forms of thought enable us to transcend not only the here and now of perceptual experience, but also the bonds of our deliberately controlled and goal-directed cognition; they allow the space for us to be other than who we are, and for our minds to think beyond the limitations of our current viewpoints and beliefs. In studying such an abstruse and seemingly impractical subject, we need always to remember that our capacity for spontaneity, originality, and creativity defines us as a species—and as individuals.

The painting adorning the cover of this Handbook is by artist and neuroscientist Greg Dunn, who draws inspiration for his work from the ancient sumi-e tradition of ink wash painting still practiced in Japan. The essence of sumi-e, which has deep roots in Taoism and Zen Buddhism, is to combine discipline with spontaneity, to evoke a complex essence with simplicity—to bring order, so to speak, out of chaos, and to give rise to a creation that is coherent and integrated, yet natural and unforced. We could think of no better artist to provide a visual overture to the multifaceted

exploration of these same themes throughout the pages of this book.

picture

Philosopher Alan Watts eloquently captured the tension and interplay between spontaneity and purpose when he wrote, "spontaneity is not by any means a blind, disorderly urge, a mere power of caprice. A philosophy restricted [by] conventional language has no way of conceiving an intelligence which does not work according to plan, according to a one-at-a-time order of thought. Yet the concrete evidence of such an intelligence is right to hand ...". We hope the chapters that follow help to illuminate this elusive wisdom of spontaneous thought in all its many manifestations. <>

Coping With the Gods: Wayward Readings in Greek Theology by Henk S. Versnel [Religions in the Graeco-Roman World, Brill, 9789004204904] pdf Open Source

Inspired by a critical reconsideration of current monolithic approaches to the study of Greek religion, this book argues that ancient Greeks displayed a disquieting capacity to validate two (or more) dissonant, if not contradictory, representations of the divine world in a complementary rather than mutually exclusive manner. From this perspective the six chapters explore problems inherent in: order vs. variety/chaos in polytheism, arbitrariness vs. justice in theodicy, the peaceful co-existence of mono- and polytheistic theologies, human traits in divine imagery, divine omnipotence vs. limitation of power, and ruler cult. Based on an intimate knowledge of ancient realia and literary testimonia the book stands out for its extensive application of relevant perceptions drawn from cultural anthropology, theology, cognitive science, psychology, and linguistics.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: This book is based on the Sather Lectures that I gave at the University of California at Berkeley in spring 1999. These words evoke happy memories and feelings of gratitude that merit further clarification. Even given the exceptional quality of its faculty, its wealth of material scholarly amenities, the grandeur of its campus and the splendour of the Bay Area, it cannot be an unqualified pleasure to serve the university of California at Berkeley as a member of the Department of Classics. The annual advent of yet another fresh Sather professor, who, going by the panegyrical portrayal of the Sather chair in the letter of invitation, cannot be blamed for deeming herself the world's top mastermind, is only the briefest summary of a wide array of arduous obligations. Regular participation in the time consuming (as I am told) explorations of the Sather

committee, followed by the departmental disputes concerning the qualifications of a new candidate, not seldom ending up in a screaming row (as I am told); a moral commitment to attending six Sather lectures—or at least some (or one) of them—on a subject miles out of one's own field of interest—; cheerfully complying with (as in my case) the request to mend the English of one or more lectures including the pronunciation; taking the genius out for lunch before one of his lectures or accommodating one of the receptions after it. All this prettied up with the bonus of having at least one certainty in life, namely, that a member of the department will never taste the glory of a Sather professorate. This bouquet of corollaries might easily deter scholars of a less noble and selfless disposition from joining the Berkeley Classics Department.

Hence, instead of detailing a long list of colleagues who showered me with their kindness and hospitality in any of the qualities just listed (and hence not even commemorating the party at which I was regaled on a sizzling sucking pig on the spit), I feel that the best way of expressing my gratitude is by wholeheartedly thanking all colleagues present at the time for never having made me notice how demanding all these obligations must have been.

As to the participants in my seminar on ancient magic, I am still looking back with delight to those magical hours in the company of a fine and enthusiastic bunch of students. On being asked they hastened to instruct me that an A was the normal rating for normal fulfilment of normal assignments, while B and C were functionless folkloristic relics like the human appendix, never to be put into use. On sharing this—in Dutch perspective suspicious—information with the Chair he told me that indeed I was misinformed: besides A one could also give an A+. This tip now proved very opportune. Albeit clearly more versed in Latin prose composition (clausula included) than in the intricacies of such magical strings as MASOLABEO MAMAXO MAXO ENKOPTODIT, the class quickly adapted and it soon turned out that the rating A+ came in handy. If, on the other hand, not all participants struck me as being conspicuously more gifted than their Dutch colleagues, yet they all did display a remarkably greater eagerness to pronounce (and defend) an opinion (whatever opinion). I keep hoping that the sometimes hilarious fits of laughter during our sessions were not exclusively due to my more audacious ventures in the pronunciation of non-existent American words. In sum: Guys, thank you for putting up with me. I loved every day of my stay at Berkeley.

This, then, is the right moment for an exception to the rule by lauding two of the Berkeley friends for their invaluable help. Laura Gibbs, by common consent the pivot of the magic class, omniscient guide and generous rescuer in cases of emergency (very much including the intricacies of the computer), threatened to break off her friendship unless I sent her the manuscript of the book for inspection. Concentrating on the main text she showered me with suggestions, corrections, and heartening comments. In the meantime, Donald Mastronarde, hospitable and helpful chairman in my Berkeley year, had accepted the task to assess the book for publication on behalf of the Sather committee.

Far exceeding this assignment he meticulously scrutinized the total text, including footnotes and punctuation, saving it from a hoard of typos and errors (the English preposition will always remain a treacherous pitfall to (for?) the non-native speaker) and an occasional very embarrassing misinterpretation of a Greek text. That his knowledge of the Greek language (including the accent) far excels mine is nothing to be ashamed of, but his corrections in French, German and other citations set me purple with shame. A magician on the computer, he also conjured my antiquated Greek Keys Universal into Unicode Greek. I have not been able to find the appropriate words to adequately express my gratitude for the efforts of these two magnanimous benefactors.

It should not be taken as a lack of gratitude, on the other hand, if I shall not comply with the modish lore of the preface to spend half its space on an exhaustive list of academic institutes, audiences and hosts due to whose hospitality and endurance I had the occasion of trying out each of my lectures more than once. One of the reasons for my reticence lies in what I believe to be the real function of such a

polyonymia, for which see p. 54 f. of this book. The ever increasing number of these guest lectures, I hasten to add, was directly related to the inordinate amount of time that has elapsed between giving and publishing my Sather lectures. I am particularly grateful for the fact that, besides stimulating correction, clarification, and above all reconsideration, these try-outs helped me to constantly keep in mind the necessity of publishing the book before the predicate after its title in the website list of Sather professors would shift from 'not yet published' into 'not published'. Recently this urge received some extra impetus from the wish to have the book out before Robert Parker publishes his Sather lectures…

On the Contents of the Book

When I received the frightening invitation for the Sather lectures in 1996, the one responsibility that did not really agitate me was that about the choice of the subject matter. After the 'ritual craze' of the second part of the last century (to which I confess complicity) I thought it might be time for a return to the gods of the Greeks. And as its title indicates that is what this book is about. Nearly all topics of the present book have a prehistory in my research or at least in my interest over the years since the seventies of the last century. In my TER UNUS of 1990 I expressed my aspiration to continue my research on modern reactions to dissonance and inconsistency as apparent in issues such as, first, the bewildering divergence in the assessments of polytheistic systems as exemplified by Jean-Pierre Vernant and Walter Burkert; secondly, the archaic Greek struggle with theodicy—divine arbitrariness versus divine justice—; and third, the divergent responses to divine rulership among both Greek contemporaries and modern scholars. My wish has been fulfilled and its upshot can be found in the present book. Polytheism had always had a prominent place in my teaching, but so far this had not resulted in a publication. My ideas can now be found in Chapter I. On the second topic mentioned I gave a paper at a Bristol conference "From Myth to Logos?" of 1996. I did not make it available for publication in the conference proceedings but reserved it for the Sather lectures: Chapter II is a radically revised and expanded version of that paper. On ruler cult I published one of my first articles (in Dutch). Particularly in this case I was happy to obtain an opportunity to rethink the whole issue, which now appears as Chapter VI. Chapter III is the only one that in a more concise form has appeared in print.

That, over the years, insights on all these subjects have undergone sometimes considerable development and change, is a matter of course. Even during the fifteen years since I began my research for the present book the rapid progress in scholarship sometimes has caught up with my ideas as laid out in the lectures. This never necessitated radical modifications of my own ideas. It did mean, inter alia, that interpretive strategies similar to the ones I had initiated in my works on Inconsistencies in Greek and Roman Religion (1990 and 1993) and which in a more elaborated form I continue putting to the test in the present book, in the meantime had independently found niches in the works of others.

To give a few examples (which all will be dealt with in extenso in the relevant chapters). Suggestions about the double (or multiple) nature of divine identities depending on the contexts in which they operated (Ch. I) were rather rare when I embarked on trying them out with my students in the seventies of the last century. Though initially not very popular due to the influence of the then so-called structuralistic approach of the 'École de Paris', they have been gaining ground since the nineties and are now widespread in recent scholarship. As will become apparent however, heated discussions continue to rage to the present day and hence validate further reflection. In the discussion on ruler cult (Ch. VI) a landslide has taken place. While a number of scholars including myself had already suggested that modern distinctions such as the 'genuine' versus the 'political' nature of its religiosity were leading into a deadlock, it was the study of Simon Price 1984 that turned the scales and opened new perspectives. However, by simultaneously launching his first crusade against the use of the modern term 'belief/believe' in the study of Greek religion he risked closing the door on upcoming new insights in and redefinitions of the notion 'belief'. When, for the present occasion, I continued following my own track by introducing new approaches to an understanding of the religious overtones of ruler

cult this called for a preliminary critical discussion of the now fashionable idea that, as one title has it, "The Athenians did not believe in their gods." I soon found that recently scholars of different denominations have been testing alternative strategies concerning the notion 'belief' which turned out to be of great benefit to my own argument (the results can be found in Appendix IV). Comparably, recent trends in linguistic pragmatics and speech-theory as well as in gnomic expression advanced my own understanding of what, in Ch. II, I had tried to argue before I spotted these new approaches, a gratifying experience indeed.

All the same it may occur that an approach which, fifteen years ago, might claim some originality, is not so 'wayward' anymore. Imagine my relief when I recently discovered that 'the least' the official Sather rules require is "a new synthesis." The more so since one of my major goals, particularly with the first three chapters, was to offer the reader (including, with any luck, both interested general readers and students in classics or religious studies) a more or less comprehensive introduction into some of the most seminal issues of ancient Greek religion. This may also justify their unusual size, which may perhaps be condoned by viewing them not as immoderate excrescences of chapters but as mercilessly pruned condensations of the monographs that their subject matter would have merited.

Turning to the contents of the present study, it first should be noted that the book may be understood as being divided into two parts even if it is not presented as such in visual form. The central theme of the first three chapters can be summarized as 'the systematics' or 'syntax' of the divine world: how did polytheism work, how did (the) Greeks make sense of the inscrutable divine meddling in and with human life, and how did monistic and pluralistic conceptions of the divine world relate? The latter three chapters are concerned with questions about divine nature and qualities, more especially with correspondences and tensions between human and divine features in the nature of the gods.

Chapter I. (Many Gods) treats Greek polytheism. Since the lecture opened the last Sather series of the twentieth century I decided that it should at least present a brief comparative discussion of the positions of the two greatest late twentieth-century champions on Greek religion: Jean-Pierre Vernant and Walter Burkert. The first regards Greek polytheism as an orderly, transparent system, with well-defined boundaries and a symbolic meaning of each of the different divine 'powers' in meaningful relationship with others. The second characterizes Greek polytheism as "potentially chaotic." In this chapter it is argued that both views have their merits but each at a different level of discourse and viewed from a different perspective. If indeed a potential chaos prevailed, Greeks had their own ways of coping with it. They had an extensive range of divine images in store, and boasted an uncommon capacity of evoking different identities of a god in rapidly shifting perspectives, generating (seemingly) incompatible statements to the distress of the modern observer. By switching between diverse registers of ordering, for instance (but not only) between the worlds of myth and cult, or between national (Hellenic), local (of the polis), and personal or group-religiosity (e.g. in henotheistic forms of religion), they managed to elude the chaotic potential of the Greek pantheon. For them the idea that there is one Zeus with many different epithets (predicates, functions, localities) was no less valid than the idea that there are many different Zeuses varying according to myth, cult, place. (Late) modern scholars as a rule have serious difficulties in handling such coincidentiae oppositorum and hence tend to ignore, downplay, smooth out or deny the inherent inconsistencies. Ancient Greeks, on the other hand, could cope with their inconsistent gods by avoiding mixing up their different contextual registers.

Chapter II. (The Gods) examines the implications and complications of the well-known Greek tendency to attribute sudden changes in human life, either fortunate or, more often, catastrophic ones, to the interference of a supernatural power under the name of Zeus or anonymously referred to as 'the gods' or 'the god'. Here it was inevitable to revive the great debate between two most successful Sather Professors, Eric Dodds and Hugh Lloyd-Jones, the first arguing for a gradual

evolution from an a-moral (arbitrary) towards a more ethical, equitable, attitude in divine conduct, the other contending that the morality of justness has always, as early as Homer, been a dominant element in Greek theological reflection. My suggestion is that things are more complicated than this. There is an abundance of texts, from Homer into the Classical Period and beyond, that stage the two contrastive options of an a-moral arbitrary and a morally inspired just divine intervention as co-existent, sometimes even presented in peaceful contiguity. Quite often the two visions do not even seem to be differentiated in terms of sharp boundaries or explicit intellectually satisfying reconciliations. In other words, the 'logical' tension between the two different views does not seem to have been consistently experienced as tension. This picture of a 'luxuriant multiplicity' is best explained as a corollary of an endemic gnomic type of wisdom sayings characterized by an often asyndetic paratactic style. It pervades Greek literature of the Archaic and (early) Classical periods and belongs to the most characteristic traits of Greek theological expression. And it is precisely these testimonies of what we experience as contradiction, incongruity, and inconsistency in e.g. Homer, Solon, and Herodotus from which modern hermeneuticians in their 'drive towards coherence' try to save their authors. I hope to show that in doing so they unconsciously claim their author for our modern paradigm and thus alienate him from his own. Recognition of this necessarily involves a reappraisal of the terms in which the dilemma has been conceived in earlier scholarly discussion.

Chapter III. (One God) discusses mono/henotheistic tendencies with a special focus on the remarkable and—again in our eyes dazzlingly inconsistent yet peaceful—co-existence of the belief in 'one god (who is all)' and the simultaneous continued existence of polytheistic forms of belief and religious practice. For the archaic period the focus is on Xenophanes' theology, for the classical period I examine (again) the notions 'the god' and 'the gods' but this time not on the motives behind their interventions, but on the way they are deemed to be: what is the difference between the 'many gods' as a polytheistic sum total of individual deities (as discussed in Ch. 1 and Appendix I) and the anonymous collective referred to as 'the gods' launched as an instrument for conveying sense to the inexplicable? For the Hellenistic period, finally, the notion of henotheism of gods such as Isis is explored. Throughout this chapter, as in others, strategies well-known from cognitive dissonance theory, as well as the concept of 'complementarity' (two contradictory predicates or qualities can both be experienced as true and valid) will be called in to shed light on the vexed problems concerning the coexistence of the one and the many. One of the conclusions is that there are several different types of oneness.

Chapter IV. (A God) opens with a discussion of the sacrificial scene in the beginning of the Homeric Hymn to Hermes, inter alia showing the significant cleft yawning between the interpretations of the structuralist (Paris) and the evolutionist/functionalist (Burkert) theories concerned. Next it sets out to devise the image of the god Hermes, arguing that contrary to some modish scholarly ideas gods do have individual identities, personalities, a distinctive description (in the sense of French/Dutch 'signalement'). Even though the literary (Homeric Hymn, the genre of the fable, comedy), visual (herms, vase paintings) and cultic/ritual (typical Hermaic forms of sacrifice) evidence on the god Hermes has received much attention in recent years, it has never been fully realized how revealingly all these different components mirrored, informed and supplemented each other, and thus co-operated in the construction of a recognizable personal image of the god, pervasive and consistent over a long period of time.

Altogether it will be shown that the construction of the god Hermes represents an extreme experiment in ambiguity: it pushes out frontiers in the amalgamation of divine and human traits in a god's nature. Culinary aspects play a major role in the central argument.

Chapter V. (God) elaborates upon one of the findings of Chapter IV namely that gods cannot live without a generous dash of (very) human ingredients in their nature, not only in mythical narrative, which thrives on this fact, but also in cult. While 'naturally' gods cannot be expected to consume human food, hence prefer nectar and

ambrosia or a sniff of knise, no less naturally various types of sacrifices include diverse types of normal human food as eagerly partaken of by gods. Gods, and especially Zeus, are supposed to be all-seeing, yet they do not always see what happens behind their back. Gods are omnipresent, yet they are supposed to live 'right here,' in this temple. Ignoring or trivializing these commonplace oscillations between superhuman and human aspects in divine nature entails detrimental consequences.

A ubiquitous scholarly credo—common among all sorts of specialists, but especially popular among 'structuralists'—has it that polytheism by its very nature does not tolerate the idea of divine omnipotence, since each god has his/her own department. Texts that would seem to contradict this article of faith are either ignored or 'disarmed' as rhetorical excrescences. The truth, however, appears to be that a Greek god may alternatively be conceived of as being restricted in his potential, for instance by the limitations of his own specialization, or be acclaimed as being able to do anything he wishes. It all depends on context, perspective, discourse and the rhetorical or poetical flashes of the speaker or author, who can change his stance even within a few lines of a literary passage. This is amply illustrated by an exposé of the miracles of Epidaurian Asklepios, which exemplarily display the two sides of divine capacity: human power (or even powerlessness) versus superhuman omnipotence. Conclusion: Greek gods are omnipotent whenever it suits the interest of the human actor, most conspicuously in the situation of prayer.

Chapter VI. (Playing the God) discusses the early stages of the deification of rulers from the fourth century onwards. In Chapters IV and V we have seen gods who are of necessity pictured with human features. In the present chapter it is human beings that claim a share in divine nature. The inevitable clashes between the two contrasting qualities within one (human) being and the strategies to cope with the problems are interpreted in the perspective of theories on ludism and theatricality. Against modern trends in denying Greeks the notion of belief it is argued that the question "did the Greeks believe in the divinity of their rulers?" is fully justified. However, for an answer we must first reconsider—and where necessary revise—what we so far used to mean by the term 'believe'. In this chapter we will try out concepts such as "willing suspension of disbelief " (Coleridge), "sincere pretence" (Kellendonk), "honest hypocrisy," while paying special attention to Greek ὡς ("as if") in order to open new avenues towards sounding the religious over/undertones of ruler cult. To be sure, interpretations of the religious elements of ruler cult will never exceed the level of suggestion. Even so I hope that within these boundaries this approach will take us a step beyond the at the time revolutionary and still important assessment by Simon Price.

Four sections have been removed from their original setting (two of them from Chapter I, the other two from II and VI, respectively) and have found accommodation in appendices. All of them concern basic relevant issues, but none was immediately necessary for—hence would delay—the progress of the main argument. Moreover, three of them, being exceptions in this book in presenting my personal participation in an ongoing dispute, should better be set apart: readers who dislike critical discussion may ignore them.

Altogether the main themes of this book are, first, that monolithic, one-sided or universalist theories in the field of Greek theology by their very nature tend to be misleading since they illuminate only part of a complex and kaleidoskopic religious reality, which is neither fully transparent/structured nor entirely chaotic. Secondly, it is argued that ancient Greeks particularly in the field of religion or philosophy of life displayed a disquieting capacity to validate two (or more) dissonant, if not contradictory, representations as being complementary rather than mutually exclusive. They not only accept the validity of either one in its own right, but also allow them to co-exist in such a smooth and seemingly unreflected manner that it often shocks the modern mind.

Greeks certainly could acknowledge tensions, problematizing them for instance in tragedy, but surprisingly often they did not or did not in an explicit manner. This position constitutes both their similarity and their difference as compared to the

modern reader (without, for that matter, making them "desperately alien", as an all too fashionable expression claims). The modern reader recognizes the seduction of smoothing over logical dissonances (as we learn from theories of cognitive dissonance etc.), but is not able to really live with it, at least not to the extent of consistently launching it as a strategy for "coping with the gods," as I hope to show the Greeks did.

Some Questions of Method

For the hermeneutic principles that guide my interpretations I refer the reader to the introductory chapter of my TER UNUS, which was the first of two volumes under the collective title "Inconsistencies in Greek and Roman Religion." The present book may be seen as the third (and last) volume that rightfully might be subsumed under this collective title.

In that Introduction I devoted a few remarks to the, then novel but soon widely welcomed, 'desperately alien' school, as I will refer to it in the present book. At that moment (1990) I could not foresee its enormous upcoming success, which, because of its relevance to the present book, induces me to briefly return to this issue. The idea goes back as far as Fustel de Coulange, who claimed that "Greece and Rome present themselves to us with an absolutely inimitable character. Nothing in our time resembles them. Nothing in the future will ever resemble them." A century later the idea found a resonance in Paris where Paul Veyne claimed that: "Nothing is farther distanced from us than that ancient civilisation; it is exotic, what do I say, it is abolished." It was the early "École de Paris" led by Jean-Pierre Vernant in particular that stressed the alienness of the Greeks, arguing that they were others, that Greek society was different, and that the Greek mind, being a product of that society, cannot be used as a mirror in which we view ourselves. Till the present day its partisans never tire of reminding us that the religion of the Greeks was 'other', 'desperately foreign' or 'desperately alien'. The latter expression in particular is scattered lavishly throughout their works.

Since Moses Finley, though quite a different type of scholar, held the very same opinion, deploying similar expressions such as "unbridgeable divide," "fundamentally alien," and again "desperately alien," it will come as no surprise that one of his great admirers, Paul Cartledge, very much stimulated by the French connection, based a monograph with the title The Greeks: A Portrait of Self and Others precisely on the concept of 'otherness' as an instrument for definition or self-definition. Once more in this fine book the Greeks are foreign, emphatically and desperately: "For me (. . .) the ancient Greeks are in crucial respects, ideological no less than institutional, 'desperately foreign'". In his view one of the historian's tasks is even to promote alienation: "one of my aims has been as it were to 'defamiliarize' Classical Greek civilization." Gradually, the reader gets the impression that being desperate about another's otherness is not such a desperate position after all. On the contrary, those swept along in the current boom of altérité—and let me confess that I have enthusiastically exploited this notion myself—seem just to love it.

Inevitably however, slogans such as 'desperately alien', by their near ritual repetition—"the new orthodoxy of the foreignness of Greek society" as E. Kearns called it—acquire the precarious status of a dogma if not an axiom. 'Precarious' since the effects tend to become counter-productive. Axioms and dogmas by definition exempt their adherents from the obligation to explain exactly what they mean by them or from reflecting on their advantages and limitations. Innovative, more especially revisionary, theories may be necessary but require just the same critical assessment as did the ancient and worn-out schemes that they claim to replace. Indeed, in the famed words of the astronomer Carl E. Sagan: "It pays to keep an open mind, but not so open that your brains fall out." Or, perhaps more to the point, the mind that adopts a new idea without question, thus turning it into a dogma, may be typified—with a variant of the dreaded notice at Italian churches or museums: 'chiuso per restauro'—as 'closed for innovation'. After all, if a culture is characterized as exotic, desperately alien, absolutely inimitable, separated from us by an unbridgeable divide, the question prompts itself whether it is at all possible to understand or even to describe it on the basis of its literary and material legacy when we have no

other interpretive tools besides our own (desperately different) concepts and terminology. How can we reach the unreachable, how find access to the inaccessible?

It is therefore crucial to call to mind an alternative approach. For instance, in the other extreme stance of those who consider Greek culture as the earliest form of Western civilization. Which, of course, is exactly the target of the 'desperately aliens'. One might even consider the most generalizing suggestion of Marguérite Yourcenar: "Modern man is a great deal less different than he thinks from man of the 19th, of the 15th century, or of the first century BC or even as compared to man from the stone age." This posture, however sweeping, at least takes into account the absolute minimum precondition for historical and anthropological research, viz. "that the most distant cultures, both in space and time, show behaviour that is, to a certain point, meaningful, and understandable as human."

As at several points in this book the positions of Vernant and Burkert will be opposed and compared it may be fitting to present the plea for a basically universal and ongoing identity of the human race as worded by Walter Burkert. Never renouncing his interest in ethology and sociobiology in his search for relics of primordial ritual behaviour in historical Greek cult, Burkert contends: "The conglomerate of tradition which constitutes religion perhaps owes its particular form less to the cunning of reason than to the cunning of biology." In line with this, his book Creation of the Sacred opens with a discussion of precisely this distinction between culture and nature in which he takes exception to the monolithical focus on culture, including religion, as the one and only definer of humanity—referring to Clifford Geertz's expression: "there is no nature apart from culture"—and the concomitant dominant interest in differentiation instead of unity in human expression. While acknowledging Vernant's important contributions from the viewpoint of religion as a cultural marker of the polis, Burkert claims that we should not ignore the phenomena common to all human civilizations, the universalia of anthropology. Among them are language, art and religion, which accordingly may be viewed as a "long-lived hybrid between the cultural and the biological traditions." Instead of the notion of Greeks as cultural others we are here confronted with the concept of Greeks as natural humans, like us. Instead of a professed strategy to 'defamiliarize' Greek culture, we discern a quest for human universals. Instead of 'desperately alien', Greeks and moderns are all recognizable links—hence commensurable components—in the great chain of human evolution.

Confronted with this never-ending dispute, in which one will recognize the vexed complications of the 'anthropological doubt', I confess that I do not see a workable alternative to the no-nonsense conclusion as phrased by Dilthey:

> Interpretation would be impossible if expressions of life were completely strange. It would be unnecessary if nothing strange were in them. It lies, therefore, between these two extremes.

And I am not alone in this. Curiously, many a propagandist of 'desperate otherness', as if acknowledging the inevitability of the Diltheyan conclusion, grudgingly admits as much. So does for instance Cartledge: "On the other hand, there are or should be limits to the 'othering' of the Greeks"; "although Classical Greek culture is both as a whole and in fundamental details deeply alien, it is nevertheless possible for us to gain a sympathetic understanding of Greek culture". And so does, most surprisingly (and to my knowledge once only), Vernant:

> The works ancient Greece created are different enough from that of our mental universe to give us a sense of disorientation from ourselves. (. . . .) At the same time, they are not as foreign to us as others are, since they are still living in our cultural tradition to which we continue to remain attached. Remote enough from us to study him as an object and as any other object to which our modern psychological categories do not entirely apply, Greek man is nevertheless close enough for us to be able, without too many obstacles, to enter into communication with him.

All this considerably differs from the isolated mantras that we have been discussing. And here we approach the rationale of this excursus: I hope it shows that axiomatic proclamations such as

'desperately alien' without further context or specification are desperately unscholarly, senseless, useless, and counterproductive testimonies of what Geertz labelled "forceless banalities." Banal too, but far less detrimental, is the alternative proposed by Dilthey (and implied in the pronouncements of Cartledge and Vernant just quoted) that Greeks are both different from and similar to the modern reader. The only way to make this banality interesting is by asking in what respects, to which degree, under which circumstances, and how distinctively Greeks, and above all which Greeks conceived their world in ways different from or similar to those of us moderns. This, then, is another major aim of this book, in which I will argue that it is good to defamiliarize the ancient Greeks, but not to the degree of dehumanizing them.

This implies, by way of example, that I both appreciate and have my doubts concerning the following statement by Cartledge: "few aspects of antiquity are harder to comprehend than the mental universe of paganism, a universe inhabited by and full of a multiplicity of gods rather than governed by one omnipotent deity." In this book I hope to show that in some respects it no doubt is, but that there is reason to question the universality of this statement. Investigating problems inherent in such issues as polytheism/monotheism, theodicy and divine omnipotence we will discover that ancient Greeks applied interpretive strategies that did not substantially differ from the ones launched by modern Christians. As far as they do differ they do not differ desperately. The difference between Greeks and moderns is not to be sought in the variety of theological solutions (some of which Greeks and moderns share) but in their ability to accept (in our eyes) incompatible ideas as both/all true and simultaneously available. Consequently, the suggestion that "the government of one omnipotent god" should be relatively more transparent than a regime of many gods is at least open to discussion. Even the most superficial acquaintance with the recent debate among Christian theologians on the notions of monotheism, theodicy, and omnipotence suffices to elucidate that things are just a bit more complicated than that.

Generally, it is hard to avoid the impression that we often exploit our classical texts as tools to show how clever we are in interpreting them, meanwhile imposing our interpretive paradigm on their expressions, and thus paving our road towards the professorate (if not the Sather professorate). It would not be a bad idea at all if for once we would read their texts in what currently seems to be felt as a wayward manner, for example in order to see how they coped with questions that our paradigm still does not allow us to solve. Indeed it is during the years of writing this book that I gradually learned to appreciate Nietzsche's words: "Only late does it dawn on one what we can have from the Greeks, only after we have learnt much and pondered much."

In Aesop's 60th fable a satyr gives up his friendship with a man who first blew on his hands to make them warm and later blew on his bites of food in order to make them cool. A person who blows hot and cool with the same mouth, he admitted, was just a bridge too far for him. The prosaic message as usual added in the envoy to the fable says: "We conclude that we should shun friendship with those whose character is ambiguous." Now these envoys are specialized in missing the point, as it most flagrantly does here. I can only hope the reader of this book won't. In the forthcoming chapters I will never stop blowing hot and cool from the same mouth, but not on the same objects and not in the same circumstances. That is what the satyr missed by making his false generalization. That is what I often noticed as a modern pitfall particularly alluring to those who have some difficulty in appreciating ambiguous positions, ancient or modern.

Finally, I am sure that many a specialist in any of the six topics treated in this book will find much to disagree with. I hope, however, that the great variety of topics will make it practically impossible for one scholar to disagree with all of them. But how about the author himself? Does he believe in the truth of everything he has written? My answer is that definitive truth being unattainable, in the end it may turn out to be a matter of trust rather than of truth or, to paraphrase a statement of an anthropologist, a matter of hoping to be "the one that has produced the more persuasive fiction." During the process of thinking, arguing and writing, however, the author is bound to 'do as if ' he

believes in (the results of) what he is doing. If this may sometimes make him phrase his insights in a rather unqualified way, please read the excursus on 'Augensblicksglauben' in Ch. VI before passing judgement. In the end, however, any author—particularly the one who does not have the opportunity to comply with George Orwell's advice "Never mention religion if you can possibly avoid it"—may find his greatest comfort in a brilliant quote of T.S. Eliot.

> About anything so great as ancient Greek religion it is probable that we can never be right; and if we can never be right, it is better that we should from time to time change our way of being wrong. <>

Plural and Shared: The Sociology of a Cosmopolitan World by Vincenzo Cicchelli, translated by Sarah-Louise Raillard [International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology, Brill, 9789004359253] With a Forewod by Natan Sznaider. This book was first published in 2016 as Pluriel et commun. Sociologie d'un monde cosmopolite by Les Presses de Sciences Po, Paris.

We live in a globalized world in which a person in Burkina Faso can identify with Star Wars heroes, and in which a New York trader drinks the same Starbucks coffee as his Taiwanese counterpart. How are individuals socialized in Rome, Bombay, and Tokyo? To answer this question, a unique investigation has been carried out using two scales of analysis usually tackled separately by global studies: the scale of the cosmopolitan world and its global narratives, imaginaries, iconographies; as well as the scale of everyday life and socialization to otherness. This two-fold perspective constitutes the innovative approach of this volume that endeavors to address an operationalization of the cosmopolitan perspective and reacts to current debates and new research findings.

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Excerpt: I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: 'We hold these truths to be self- evident: that all men are created equal'. I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia the sons of former slaves and the sons of former slave- owners will be able to sit down together at a table of brotherhood. I have a dream that one day even the state of Mississippi, a desert state, sweltering

with the heat of injustice and oppression, will be transformed into an oasis of freedom and justice. I have a dream that my four children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character. I have a dream today.

This is part of Martin Luther King's speech on the steps of Lincoln Memorial in Washington D.C. on August 28th, 1963. A Christian dream based on the Jewish spirit of Exodus and liberation from slavery. Is it also a cosmopolitan dream? And if the answer is yes, what should we sociologists do about? Let people dream and let sociologists do their job of deconstructing dreams and getting down researching reality? Something similar is going on with cosmopolitanism. It is a shining word, a promise of a better world, a dream not yet come true. It has the sound of ancient Greeks celebrating the collapse of the old polis and the opening of new political spaces. It has the sound of the 'Age of Empire' where citizenship cannot be bound to small entities anymore. To become 'Citizens of the World' became the new calling of the ancient elite. But it also has the sound of disengagement, of a radical individualism not bound to group and other territory, a fellowship of like- minded women and men pursuing their happiness beyond any kind of belonging. 'To be at home in the world', this is what it means to be an intellectual despairing at the narrowness of his or her surroundings. Cosmopolitanism also sounds like the Enlightenment of the 18th century, expansion of markets and moral sentiments, expansion of reason and moral will. In short, cosmopolitanism is the victory of mind over matter, the imagining of a better world, where people crisscross without border posts, without passports where everybody acts interdependently in a peaceful world. A world of yesterday turned into an utopian future and reclaimed by social thinkers elevating 'homelessness', 'fluidity', 'liquidity', to new heights. Cosmopolitanism has the sound of nobility in a plebeian age, the nobleness of Kant in a postmodern age. Thus, each new study on this topic is more than welcome. Vincenzo Cicchelli's book is an important new entry in the creation and institutionalization of a cosmopolitan sociology moving between imagination and reality, between dreams and a state of awakening.

'Plural an Shared: The Sociology of A Cosmopolitan World' is an important book in this respect. It could change how people think about cosmopolitanism and how its history emerged. The stakes are high for Cicchelli, because nothing less than sociological and political judgment is at risk when we look at the recent politics of cosmopolitanism and its enemies. The central thesis of the book is led by a question: can the new cosmopolitan world be open and closed at the same time? What are the stakes for the freedom of globalization and the sober realization that at times one pays dearly for freedom and dreams? Cosmopolitanism sounds noble, but it does not sound like the kind of language sociology speaks. Cicchelli knows that, he is aware that his own language needs to cross a divide and he wants and needs to know how to square social reality with new concepts like cosmopolitanism. How can we return sociology to its founding creed to become a 'positive science of morality?' In this respect Cicchelli sees himself continuing the classic tradition of sociology. He does not want to reinvent the wheel but sees his sociological enterprise as part of a social science with a genealogy and history. At the same time, he is aware that a cosmopolitan sociology is posing a challenge to this idea that binding history and borders tightly together is the only possible means of social and symbolic integration. This has always been an empirical challenge. How can this be demonstrated to convince the unconvinced? Reading to the empirical analyses here will leave the skeptic a bit less skeptical about it. It is an invitation to a cosmopolitan sociology, a tour de force about its history, philosophy but finally also arriving to its current manifestations about how people think, talk and act in a cosmopolitan way. The book shows clearly that modern cosmopolitan politics begins with the principle that sovereignty is not the highest principle and is not sacrosanct. Rather the highest principle is human dignity and well- being, and the duty to prevent suffering wherever it occurs. And this is why a new cosmopolitanism is in the air: through criticism like the one of Cicchelli's, the concept can be not only rediscovered but also reinvented. This is the crux of the matters. What

makes cosmopolitanism so interesting for social and political theory of modern societies is its thinking and living in terms of inclusive oppositions. It attempts to overcome the naive universalism of early Western sociology. The world is generating a growing number of mixed cases, which make less sense according to the 'either/ or' logic of nationality than to the 'this- as- well- as- that' logic of transnationality. Our intellectual frames of reference are so deeply ingrained that this transnational way of thinking has been comparatively undeveloped.

Cicchelli's cosmopolitan sociology is an antidote to ethnocentrism and nationalism. It should not be mistaken for multicultural euphoria. On the contrary, cosmopolitanism starts from the hard- won insight that there is an invariable connection between ethnocentrism and the hatred of foreigners and tries to advance beyond this sort of 'common sense'. Cicchelli shows us a plural world. And plurality causes resentment, a counter- reaction to the 'mixing' of culture. Cosmopolitan culture is not only mixed with other cultures; it is itself a mixture of cultures. In a certain sense, its pluralism lays in the mixture of cultures it absorbed — it gave them a unifying cast without negating them. This must be a provocation to those who argue that life should be simple and more primitive and contained within clear defined borders. Thus reading here through the pages, there is a bothering question: What is a cosmopolitan sociology, or better asked, are we as sociologists cosmopolitan by definition? And what is the relationship between a cosmopolitan sociologist and cosmopolitan sociology? Cicchelli will lead you through processes of cosmopolitan socialization to get you there. How many different ways to live are there? Is the insight that there are many ways to live your life what it means to be a cosmopolitan? The study here will show you how cosmopolitan ideas spread among people at all levels of society. And part of the reason it did so is because philosophy became religion, specifically the syncretistic religions that are still considered one of the prime characteristics of specifically Hellenistic culture, which is also stressed by Cicchelli. It presents, therefore, the clearest historical example of what actually happens when universalistic philosophy and particularistic local cultures exist side by side for centuries: they mix and produce new forms of both. They produce new forms of rooted cosmopolitanism, and they produce new forms of localism that are open to the world. Thus, we see how universal values (like toleration) that are emotionally engaging descend from the level of pure abstract philosophy and into the emotions of people's everyday lives. It is by becoming symbols of people's personal identities that cosmopolitan philosophy becomes a political and social force and therefore cosmopolitan sociology. And it is by embodying philosophy in rituals that such identities are created, reinforced, and integrated into communities. The book you will read will give you some of the answers to these rather important questions. A cosmopolitan sociology means, therefore, that issues of global concern are becoming part of the everyday local experiences and the 'moral life- worlds' of the people. This book is a more than necessary intervention in this debate. Natan Sznaider

Capturing Alterity: Cosmopolitan Socialization at Its Core

Nearly two and a half centuries have elapsed since the eruption of the two foundational transitions that shaped modernity — the American and French political revolutions and the industrial revolution — the obsessive study of which ultimately led to the birth of sociology. During the early years of their discipline, most sociologists believed in the power of inexorable historical forces that had caused the transition from the Old Regime to modernity. As always, with his elegant prose and literary excellence, Alexis de Tocqueville [1835– 1840] concisely described how democracy — what he believed to be the primary driver of history — modified whatever it did not produce and had therefore changed forever the traditional world in which his ancestors had lived. We do not share the sociological founding fathers' faith in the ineluctable, irreversible and teleological movement of historical forces. It is no longer possible to believe that social change can be reduced to a handful of independent trends located somewhere outside of society. Notwithstanding our scepticism towards the philosophy of history, the last thirty years have witnessed the wide- ranging impact of a broad set of changes, which can be summarized

as 'globalization'. Who would deny that we now live in a massively interconnected world, in which what was once remote and irrelevant has now become immediate and pertinent to our destiny? Given that some scholars have even argued that globalization has changed history as much as the advent of modernity did at the turn of the 18th century, this great transformation urgently compels us to undertake an extensive reform of sociology (Beck, 2006). While this book is based on the premise that the world has been dramatically reshaped by large- scale historical phenomena, it does not claim that these changes are necessarily cause for us to abandon the sociological tradition entirely — a tradition that, according to some, is now incapable of comprehending our new environment. On the other hand, the approach defended in these pages is that, instead of cutting off their nose to spite their face, contemporary sociologists should refine the approaches, concepts, and methodology that they have inherited, comprehensively adapting them to the study of the global world and innovating while building upon the groundwork already laid down by their predecessors. This book stands therefore apart from other contributions which claim to mark the birth of an entirely alternative sociology based on cosmopolitanism.

This book stems from the simple and broadly shared assumption that the key mechanism of globalization — independently of the scale of observation we take, the level of analysis we privilege, and the meaning we attribute to this word — is the simultaneous opening up and closing off of cultural, political, and symbolic boundaries that unite and divide social institutions, human communities and individuals. This is the deeply paradoxical nature of globalization and its repercussions. As a kind of Janus Bifrons, this two-fold process leads to the emergence of a global world which is both more inclusive and exclusive, integrated and fragmented, promising and frightening. This book does not study the origin of this process, analyse how multifarious transnational phenomena have shaped the contemporary global world, or exhaustively describe the basic structures of the latter. However, it shares four basic tenets with global studies. Firstly, globalization is an epochal change, leading to the emergence of a global society in which our lives are strongly globalized, whether we like it or not. Secondly, it cannot be reduced to an economic phenomenon or to the domination of an increasingly financialized variant of capitalism. Thirdly, globalization entails powerful competition between new global players (China, India, and Brazil, e.g.) and developed Western nations with a view to imposing a new international order, a new economic hierarchy and a new cultural hegemony through the use of 'soft power'. Last but not least, globalization poses a vast social challenge, as large- scale transnational processes provide those who are mobile and educated with a great deal of opportunities for empowerment, but can also generate new inequalities, frustrations and forms of disillusionment or uprooting among those who are not. Those who perceive themselves as 'losers' in the global economic competition, either because they are excluded from wealth distribution and/ or they feel that they are ethnically, culturally, or religiously discriminated against, are often tempted by identitarian closure as a fall- back position. While I am deeply convinced that globalization is a multilevel phenomenon — much of the literature has already investigated its strength and complexity — I have deliberately chosen to look beyond its political, economic, social, institutional and legal aspects in this book. While the above considerations form the backdrop of any investigation of globalization, in this volume I shall focus on the symbolic and cultural dimensions of the phenomenon. I argue that a heuristic means to evaluate how the globalization of culture works today is to introduce the specific approach of 'cosmopolitan sociology', rather than cosmopolitanism.

As readers are likely more familiar with the concept of cosmopolitanism than that of cosmopolitan sociology, let us point out that the heuristic potential of the latter stems from the shortcomings of the former. As many scholars have observed, for a variety of reasons, cosmopolitanism is not per se a sociological perspective.

In public discourse, cosmopolitanism has fervent supporters as well as fierce enemies. Its millennia-old history is shrouded in misunderstanding,

prejudice and hyperbole that equate cosmopolitanism with an elitist lifestyle; that stigmatize individuals whose loyalty to their own countries is called into question (as was the case of German Jews during the interwar period); and that make it difficult to develop a sociological discourse independently of the public criticisms which are levied against it.

As has been explored in the existing literature, cosmopolitanism attracts more controversy than consensus; even for its champions, it poses a slew of paradoxes (Appiah, 2006). Often considered as a form of idealistic discourse, on account of its difficulty moving beyond a prescriptive moral stance, cosmopolitanism is even sometimes mistaken for pacifist, 'peace and love' or anti- globalization movements.

Moreover, as cosmopolitanism is not only viewed as a humanistic aspiration, but is sometimes conflated with the achievement of a properly human destiny, some authors consider it to be an evolutionary stage of human history. Rejecting this naïve idea, this book argues that we must abandon the belief that 'cosmopolitanization' is a linear and irreversible process. At the same time, it is unthinkable that cosmopolitanism will disappear completely from our horizon of expectations: its cyclical history is proof that this utopian idea is an enduring human trait. To paraphrase what Umberto Eco once wrote about the search for the perfect language in European culture, the story of cosmopolitanism could be equated to 'a story of a dream and of a series of failures': 'though our story be nothing but the tale of the obstinate pursuit of an impossible dream, it is still of some interest to know how this dream originated, as well as uncovering the hopes that sustained the pursuers throughout their secular course' (idem).

In short, therefore, cosmopolitanism is a loaded concept. As powerful and compelling as it is, it should be approached with care, lest it turn into an auto- poietic narrative without any empirical proof. To overcome these shortcomings, cosmopolitan sociology — whose basic tenets I shall outline in this volume — can develop new tools derived from global studies and the matrices of the cosmopolitanism thought.

While a sociology of cosmopolitanism cannot, inherently, be entirely cosmopolitan, I have coined the expression 'cosmopolitan sociology' to describe how the features of the global world might be defined from the perspective of cosmopolitanism, whose main concern is how the transnational processes intertwining individuals beyond national borders reflect, magnify, and alter our relationship (as individuals, groups, and institutions) with the Other and the world at large. A cosmopolitan approach must be based on how otherness and sameness, plurality and universality, openness and closure are handled by individuals, groups and institutions. While globalization involves the comparative interaction of different forms of life, it does not necessarily engender the 'spontaneous germination' of cosmopolitan attitudes, orientations and behaviours in our societies. At the same time, while no one could argue that the global world is entirely cosmopolitan, it would be misleading to underestimate, overlook, or deny that a large number of cultural repertoires, global icons, transnational imaginaries and shared iconographies and narratives, on the one hand, as well as the defence, promotion and hybridization of identities on the other hand, have produced a world that is culturally both plural and shared. Diversity is more glorified than ever, whilst all of humanity now shares an ever- growing number of commonalities. The inherent unity and diversity of the cosmopolitan world is its key feature and the necessary starting point for all investigations we might conduct. On one hand, this intrinsic duality forces people to continuously face the greatest number of cultural differences that humanity has ever experienced. As the world appears to shrink as a result of globalization, and the pervasiveness of global media looms ever larger, sensitivity to cultural differences and awareness of diversity are more acute than ever before. Through the cultural consumption of foreign products and forms of international mobility, our societies are continuously confronted with otherness. On the other hand, this duality also prompts individuals to consider their identity and forms of belonging as potentially transcending their national community and immediate environment to reach broader circles of sociability. According to Kwame Anthony Appiah's definition (2006, p. xv), cosmopolitanism is

'universality plus difference', the sum of our shared humanity plus the habits, traditions, customs and creations of people in specific historical contexts, unique elements which enjoin us to 'take seriously the value not just of human life but of particular human lives'.

This book establishes as its foundation the dialectic between the particular and the universal in cultural dynamics, in order to explore how contemporary cosmopolitan repertoires are shared and how people experience a world abounding with cultural differences. It thus argues that a fully- fledged cosmopolitan sociology should create distinctive concepts and methodologies to deal with these topics. My objective is thus to locate cosmopolitan theories amidst social actors' experiences of a shared and plural world, moving away from cosmopolitanism as a theoretical and normative perspective in order to examine the tangible, ordinary mechanisms of global society that are shaping the cultural imaginaries and the lives of individuals today. We live in a world in which a person in Burkina Faso can identify with interstellar Star Wars heroes, and in which a New York trader is eager to experience exotic food and a variety of encounters with alterity. How is human experience shaped in a such world? In an attempt to answer this question, an investigation has been carried out using two scales of analysis which are usually tackled separately by studies of cosmopolitan issues: the scale of global cultural dynamics and the scale of everyday life and ordinary socialization with regard to otherness. This two- fold approach offers a valuable means to avoid the common pitfall of trivializing cosmopolitanism, sometimes mistakenly assimilated as another form of conventional multiculturalism.

By now, readers will already have understood that this volume touts the dialogue between global studies and cosmopolitanism, as I have borrowed the concepts of scales, boundaries and imaginaries from the former. Admittedly, there are important differences between the broad area investigated by sociology and the human sciences, the so- called 'global studies', and the age- old philosophical orientation and moral stance that is cosmopolitanism. Yet the encounter between global studies and cosmopolitanism may be a fruitful act of cross- pollination, rather than a sterile mismatch, provided that one of the major outcomes of globalization (the pervasiveness of alterity) becomes the primary and specific topic of study for cosmopolitan sociology: the complex mechanism of the inclusion of the other, as Ulrich Beck has emphasized many times throughout his oeuvre. In Beck's view, the internalization of the Other is a major sociological asset to describe what he called the cosmopolitanization of the world. To propose cosmopolitanism as a sociological perspective implies a parallel insistence on the recognition of the Other and on its nondissolution in the universal (Beck, 2006). The perspective of the inclusion of the Other is ambitious, as it is meant to provide sociology with powerful tools to explore the outcomes of globalization. It also is a convenient way to renew the discipline — often accused of being Euro- and Western- centric — by taking into account non- Western sociological theories, the dynamic between the

new centres and new peripheries of sociological production, and the historical and cultural context where foreign concepts are applied. Ethically and politically, the inclusion of the Other provides a moral bulwark against xenophobic temptations and a political solution to combat the eruption of nationalist tendencies.

Nevertheless, it seems difficult to imagine what inclusion might entail. In spite of programmatic assertions reflecting how cosmopolitan scholars are enthusiastically and generously in favour of an approach encompassing the dialectic of the universal and the particular, we must recognize that this attempt is far from being self- evident. More than is commonly admitted, cosmopolitanism is far from being able to comprehend complex attitudes towards the world and towards otherness. In the verses quoted in the epigraph to this preface, Constantine Cavafy suggests not only that we must take into account the classic dialectic between the Ego and the Other when analysing identity: the poet likewise evokes the paradoxical role played by an Other — in this context, the Barbarians — seen both as a frightening monster and as a horizon of expectations. Cavafy emphasizes the deep ambiguity of the relation to the Other which is simultaneously seen as a danger, a threat and a

resource. In a global world, the Ego and the Other can also fall into the trap of a dangerous liaison. In fact, as the inclusion of the Other is a demanding challenge for cosmopolitan sociology, this book endeavours to investigate in depth the processes of socialization that have been altered by globalization. If the cosmopolitan world is shared and plural, and otherness is ubiquitous, it is therefore necessary to elaborate a specific methodological framework designed to understand how people are socialized to deal with the manifold forms of alterity that go beyond national borders and how they manage the dynamics of belonging at various scales. Given that cosmopolitanism is an inadequate term to describe the concrete interactions of people with alterity in their everyday lives, I have suggested using the expression 'cosmopolitan socialization' to further explore the components of the cosmopolitan spirit. The use of cosmopolitan socialization is meant to bridge the two levels of the analysis of the cosmopolitan world (cultural dynamics and the lived experiences of cosmopolitanism). As a natural extension of classic sociology and as a core concept of the sociological tradition, the perspective of cosmopolitan socialization can thus generate new research on the lived experiences of cosmopolitanism.

The analysis of the cosmopolitan spirit proposed herein is based on the assumption that when the Ego is open to others, exchanges unfold in a peaceful, symmetrical and reciprocal fashion. Moreover, this assumption also posits that intentional openness, with all its attendant virtues and positive emotions (empathy, benevolence, solidarity, hospitality, etc.) stems from the Ego's efforts to establish a fulfilling relationship with the Other. Such openness has, however, been sorely challenged by global events such as Brexit and President Trump's election, as well as the fact that many European societies have recently witnessed the rise of populist movements and xenophobic tendencies, illustrating just to what extent parochialism and isolationism may thwart openness to alterity — a phenomenon that cannot be explained by economic factors alone. In this new, challenging and somewhat unexpected context, we need to rethink the issue of living together. Hospitality towards those who no longer have a home, whether fleeing from wars, massacres or other horrors, is the fundamental value of cosmopolitan humanism. At the same time, everyone has the right to enjoy a decent society: this implies shared institutional rules and a certain degree of political courage to prevent the creation of a zero-sum game. Of course, individuals are able to demonstrate openness towards others, as Elijah Andersen has indisputably shown in his book examining the 'cosmopolitan canopies' where racial tensions are neutralized. But this does not always happen spontaneously. If inclusion is the founding principle of any cosmopolitan orientation to the world, its realization relies on the development of a praxis and an education which enjoy institutional support.

To conclude, it is imperative that we explore the shape taken by the simultaneous opening and closing of cultural boundaries, the interlinkages between universalism and particularism, and the intrinsic plurality and unity of the world at both the macro- and micro- level. Such as it is presented in this book, this is the contribution of cosmopolitan sociology, which draws upon a perspective that is no more idealistic or utopian than it is elitist or ideological.

Cosmopolitanism through Weal and Woe

> Ser moderno es ser contemporáneo, ser actual: todos fatalmente lo somos.
> ['To be modern is to be contemporary, current: we are all inescapably so.' Jorge Luis Borges
> 'Prologo', Luna de enfrente, 1925]

This book was inspired by three different experiences, all tied to the kind of education and training received by sociologists of my generation, as well as to the growing awareness that, over time, the concepts forged by the discipline belong to a broader historical perspective.

Sociology and Experiences of the Contemporary World

The first of these experiences is one that we have all had, when we glance at our bookshelves one day and suddenly realize that we feel estranged from texts that had once been deeply important to us. When I think about the history textbooks and

works of literature, history and philosophy that I consumed during high school in Italy, uneasiness creeps up on me. While most of those books were quite worthwhile and helped to shape my perspective on the world, they would no longer be able to help teenagers understand the world today. The rapidly growing interdependence between societies; the proliferation of global risks and threats such as epidemics, terrorism, nuclear and environmental disasters, the impact of climate change and human and drug trafficking; the transformation of capitalism, and the attendant rise of economic liberalism, unprecedented market deregulation and increasing international trade; the recurring economic recessions since the end of the post- war boom; the decline of the labour movement and, more broadly, the relative deindustrialization of Western societies; the high penetration rate for new technologies and the rise of the knowledge- based society; increasing mobility and migratory flows; radical geopolitical changes following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War, the emergence of non-Western powers and the relative decline of Western hegemony; fresh challenges to the social-democratic model and the crisis of Europe, whose political integration remains largely incomplete and where new inter- state rivalries are emerging: all of these phenomena have irrevocably transformed our understanding of history.

What could textbooks written during the Cold War and steeped in a bipolar and Western worldview (whether liberal or Communist) tell us about the world today? Such volumes were the product of a geopolitical context marked by cleavages and conflicts (East- West and North- South) that informed international relations after the end of the Second World War. The authors of these books had themselves been educated during the era of decolonization and the rise of civil rights movements: it would have been impossible for them to comprehend the forces that led to the birth of the 'global society', which has now become, regardless of how we may feel about it, our contemporary reality.

The second experience stems from my years at university studying the social sciences. As a sociology student in France during the first half of the 1990s, I joined a discipline that was largely focused on investigating the social dynamics at play within what was then considered their natural environment: namely, the nation- state. The studies included in the curriculum were rarely comparative in nature and largely ignored other national sociological traditions, with the exception of Germany and, to a lesser extent, the United States. Today, the reverse is true: we can see the growing ambition, especially among young sociologists, to compete on the 'global market' of sociology by importing and criticizing other paradigms and by actively participating in debates thanks to the use of the lingua franca that English has become. Since the 1990s, we have indeed witnessed the globalization of social sciences. The desire to expand the scope of sociological research by hewing to international trends carries the risk, however, of impoverishing local productions and blindly imitating dominant research practices (which could lead, in short, to the 'Americanization' of sociology). At the same time, the isolationism and the ensuing marginalization of certain national academic traditions — in the name of defending cultural diversity, an otherwise laudable objective — would be an unfortunate consequence of the globalization of research practices.

I am inclined to believe that at the age of globalization, identity- based movements and universalist aspirations are all part of the same historical trend. Sociology is no exception: the desire to justify local academic specializations is expressed alongside the yearning to belong to a transnational scientific community. While we must remain aware of this paradox and refrain from naively pledging unconditional adherence to the globalization of sociology, we must also remember that this dynamic entails rethinking the relationship between traditional and emerging centres of knowledge and production and their periphery.

The third experience we shall discuss here, one that is shared by many teachers of sociology, highlights the contradiction between the need to refresh certain sociological concepts, in light of increasingly rapid social changes, and the need to build upon an established body of knowledge. I have often shared with my students my astonishment at the fleeting nature of our knowledge in a constantly

changing world. Can European sociologists continue to pursue sociological research in the same old way, given the rise of new paradigms created by new knowledge- producing countries that are incredibly critical of our ethnocentric analyses of modernity (Roulleau- Berger, 2016)? Some of the most important new sociological developments include subaltern and post- colonial studies, coming from India; dependency theory, formulated by Latin- American thinkers; and recent efforts to consider international relations from a more global perspective (what Zhao Tingyang calls 'worldness'), by drawing on the Chinese theory of Tianxia (literally meaning 'everything under the sky'). Yet more voices have emerged, calling on Western scholars to turn towards the scientific output of countries in the global South, in the hopes of achieving a 'more vital, more pertinent and more truthful' form of sociology.

I also tell my students that observable phenomena today are often part of longer- term processes and thus require that we adopt a historical perspective that distinguishes between what is transitory and what is long- lasting. Immanuel Wallerstein has highlighted the degree of transformation and inertia contained within all social systems:

> The historical systems within which we live are indeed systemic, but they are historical as well. They remain the same over time yet are never the same from one minute to the next. This is a paradox, but not a contradiction. The ability to deal with this paradox, which we cannot circumvent, is the principal task of the historical social sciences. This is not a conundrum, but a challenge.

This challenge is not easily faced: in fact, new terms are frequently invented to refer to old concepts in the social sciences, instead of examining 'which old bottles still contain good wine'.

The Global Turn and the Cosmopolitan Turn

We cannot ignore the changes that have surfaced in the social sciences during the past three decades: cutting across anthropology, sociology, political science, history and geography, a broad research trend has emerged that has been called the 'global turn'. The proliferation of a new lexicon also attests to this moment of scholarly effervescence: the past thirty years have seen the birth of global studies, world history, and connected history, in addition to new transnational and civilizational approaches, the theory of multiple modernities and the concept of cosmopolitanism. While studies contributing to the global turn are often very different from each other, and can be penned by authors who are sometimes directly in conflict with each other both conceptually and methodologically, they all share the same goal of explaining how national societies deal with a number of new phenomena that transcend geographical borders and often thwart state efforts at intervention. The authors participating in the global turn all believe that it is necessary to look at the relative failure of the nation- state paradigm — even if the latter, as well as the different cultures and identities that are expressions of it, are still far from being obsolete. The fundamental question underpinning the global turn is therefore the following: can social issues still be contained within the territorial borders of the nation-state?

Consequently, global studies began to emphasize a certain methodological concern that has now become a requisite component of all research in this realm: 'Even if its limits remain somewhat unclear, the global world has become the framework within which all of the social, cultural and political phenomena of our time must be examined, if we wish to understand their truest nature' (Cotesta, 2006, p. 1). Globalization is a two- faced Janus, relentlessly producing new forms of interdependence that simultaneously emphasize integration and fragmentation, inclusion and exclusion. It provides the most mobile individuals with just as many opportunities for cultural openness and empowerment as it engenders new forms of inequality both within and between countries, producing frustration, disillusionment and rootlessness. As a multidimensional phenomenon, globalization cannot be reduced to its sole economic facet.

Building on the idea that 'the economic definition of globalization cannot explain why an electrician in New Haven cares about the Brazilian rain forest or how global awareness of such issues has arisen', the analysis we propose below borrows a certain

number of tools from global studies in order to address: a) the fact that the fate of every human being on the planet is linked to everyone else's, independently of their country of birth or place of residence; b) the double cultural nature of the global — or what we call cosmopolitan — world, which is simultaneously plural and shared. While cosmopolitan sociology has also been influenced by global studies, it is not merely a variant of the latter. Rather, as we aim to develop new tools that may be useful for the study of cosmopolitanism, with this volume we are contributing to the 'cosmopolitan turn', a movement so named by Beck and Grande and whose core ideas we shall examine below.

Who's Afraid of Cosmopolitanism?

The champions and critics of cosmopolitanism have long been locked in what appears to be a never-ending battle. This debate draws its potency from vague but powerful fears regarding the potential impact of a cosmopolitan world on national identity and sovereignty. The very word cosmopolitanism is ambiguous and loaded at the same time, its connotations the product of a lengthy historical accumulation. Short of searching for the origins of cosmopolitanism, which are lost in the mists of Western thought, let us recall that the Greek word cosmopolites was coined by the Cynic philosopher Diogenes. In modern societies, cosmopolitanism is extolled and vilified in equal measure, much like globalization.

Cosmopolitanism often possesses a negative connotation when it is associated with the refusal 'to revere local or national authority and a desire to uphold multiple affiliations'. The image of individuals without borders, or even as traitors to their country, was in fact one of the foundational elements of German anti- Semitism. As Enzo Traverso has shown, from the establishment of the Bismarkian Reich, a strict line was drawn between Jews and Germans:

> Jews embodied financial mobility, cosmopolitanism and universality in an abstract sense, as well as international law and a mixed urban culture; Germans, on the contrary, were deeply rooted in the land, created wealth through their hard work rather than through financial manipulation, possessed a culture that expressed their national ingenuity and did not conceive of the borders of the State as abstract legal constructs but rather as the limits of a 'vital space'.

In the Marxist internationalist tradition, on the other hand, cosmopolitanism refers more specifically to a form of domination. It is viewed as the ideological expression of the class interests of the burgeoning capitalist bourgeoisie, immortalized by the following words in the Communist Manifesto: 'The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country'.

Regardless of whether it is being praised or condemned, cosmopolitanism takes one of four different meanings in public discourse. The first is associated with certain significant global brands. Operating via international cultural industries, these brands seek to promote a lifestyle, especially among the middle and upper classes, that encourages the consumption of products that are either deculturalized (displaying local characteristics that are largely implicit or forgotten over time) or, on the contrary, that possess strong local roots (which then become a distinctive sign of recognition at the global level).

The second meaning occurs in open, international environments, where intellectuals, scholars, world travellers and illustrious minds of all kinds share their globetrotting experience. Cosmopolitanism can then be a positive way to signal one's sometimes painful experience with exile. Most of the time, however, this use of cosmopolitanism emanates from erudite minds that support a worldview where a sense of cosmopolitan belonging is superior to national affiliation. 'The philosopher is neither French, nor English, nor Florentine: he belongs to all countries', as Voltaire stated in his Philosophical Dictionary (1784). Historically, this argument in favour of cosmopolitanism has inspired a spirit of tolerance in a number of cities, including Alexandria, Damascus and Istanbul, and sometimes throughout entire geographical- cultural regions (Mitteleuropa) and empires (e.g., the Austro- Hungarian and Ottoman empires). Many novels have portrayed the multiculturalism of these worlds, usually sprinkled

with a healthy dose of orientalism and exoticism: Aziyadé by Pierre Loti (1878), Death in Venice (1913) by Thomas Mann, The World of Yesterday by Stefan Zweig (1944), Leo Africanus (1986) by Amin Maalouf, and Danube (1986) by Claudio Magris (1986), just to name a few. These novels all express a certain nostalgia for a lost world, an often largely fictitious past where different cultures were able to flourish amidst an atmosphere of tolerance.

In contrast to these two positive connotations, we often hear far- right wing criticisms of cosmopolitanism. By associating cosmopolitanism with a universalized lack of differentiation, critics then accuse it of threatening the very fabric of European and even Western existence. According to Pierre Milloz, cosmopolitanism is 'behind the breakdown of what should be an essential objective, in France especially: asserting and defending the uniqueness of the French identity throughout the world'. Milloz is the author of a text whose subtitle is even less veiled: 'Cosmopolitan ideology, that's the enemy' [L'idéologie cosmopolite, voilà l'ennemi]. We can also cite Félix Martel, who maintains that 'our sovereign institutions like the judiciary and the national education system have been contaminated and subjected to the ideals of socio-cosmopolitanism'.

At the other end of the political spectrum, however, no fear of the crumbling nation appears: far- left criticisms of cosmopolitanism instead attack the dominance of the globalized elites. The latter are seen as wielding a form of global power that simply dresses up the imperialist tropes of the past in new clothes and adapts them to contemporary mores. It is therefore unsurprising to see far- right websites condemning the ideological convergence between farleft movements and the 'global superclass', the global business elite. For those who have chosen to prioritize the best interests of their country, liberals and progressives are seen as the gravediggers of France and Western civilization more broadly.

Despite their different connotations, these four different interpretations of cosmopolitanism are all based on the idea that globalization engenders a large number of contacts with cultural difference as it pries open, shifts or even eliminates national borders. In the first meaning, globalization is seen as a fantastic opportunity to create a global market with billions of consumers of culturalized or deculturalized products. In the second case, globalization allows individuals, and especially city dwellers, to develop a relationship to alterity from a universalist standpoint, even going so far as to encourage cohabitation in culturally heterogeneous spaces. According to the third perspective, globalization is a Leviathan, a terrifying monster that threatens to gobble up all local cultures through a variety of transnational processes such as immigration, ultimately regurgitating an indistinct and amorphous mass. In that scenario, otherness is perceived as a threat and patriots must fight against the scourge of globalization to defend their national sovereignty and identity. In the fourth case, the disappearance of national borders is not inherently viewed as a negative development, but it is linked to market deregulation and the creation of new forms of inequality and hegemony that are sometimes concealed by an excessive focus on issues of cultural diversity. Ultimately, the argument for or against cosmopolitanism takes the form of a binary opposition. Just as the champions of cosmopolitanism, perhaps feeling penned in by their immediate social circles, are quick to chalk their adversaries' criticisms up a vertiginous fear of a world that has become too large, so the latter rebuke cosmopolitans for their lack of loyalty and community spirit. If cosmopolitans suffer from claustrophobia, then their adversaries are agoraphobic.

An Alternative

This work does not ascribe to any of the positions outlined above. We shall on the contrary argue that the cosmopolitan outlook is primarily based on the belief that borders can be crossed without losing one's roots — that one can be cosmopolitan without denying one's affiliation to a specific culture. As an ideal of transcendence with regard to local forms of belonging, cosmopolitanism allows individuals to define their relationship to the world as a kind of 'terrestrial universum'. This drive towards including all of humanity on one's social horizon does not, however, lead to the negation of specific cultures, customs or identities. As Pascal

Bruckner has observed, for both those who barricade themselves behind an identity-based form of nationalism and those who heed the call of the open road, 'considering rootedness and universality as mutually enriching complementary notions' has in fact become an urgent intellectual task.

In this volume, we shall not adhere to the triumphant vision put forth by Thomas Friedman of a 'flat world' where geographical and historical cleavages have become increasingly irrelevant, nor shall we share in the fear evoked by Régis Debray regarding the disappearance of national borders in today's world. In fact, while Debray's praise for borders ultimately transforms him into an apologist for identity- based movements, Friedman sees the increasing number of opportunities for exchange and success as stemming precisely from the mitigation of internal cleavages in the contemporary world. On the contrary, we shall start from the central premise that the borders both uniting and dividing human groups have become simultaneously more porous and more rigid as they have shifted and reconfigured.

Studying the cosmopolitan world raises many questions. Merely noting the unprecedented possibilities for connection would be a banal observation. While all kinds of interdependent links have been fashioned at the global level, cosmopolitan sociology primarily seeks to understand the consequences of these interdependencies, evidenced by the proliferation and co- existence of cultural and identity references, and to interpret its implications for the different spheres of social and human existence.

Excerpt: The Cosmopolitan Imagination: Understanding a Shared and Plural World

> For as every body has its shadow, so every soul has its scepticism. -Oscar Wilde

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It is only thanks to the advent of globalization that cosmopolitanism — a concept incomparably older than the discipline of sociology — has finally encountered the social and historical conditions it needs to thrive. However, does cosmopolitanism shed new light on our contemporary societies? That shall depend whether the champions of cosmopolitanism can use the basic tenets of cosmopolitan thought to exploit the essential tension between universalism and particularism, thus elaborating new constructs that are capable of describing the complex dynamics at play in the cosmopolitan world.

Although cosmopolitanism has been on the rise for the past twenty- five years or so, the price of this success remains a controversial subject of research: social scientists warn that there is a high risk we will overlook the discontinuity between the philosophical premises of cosmopolitanism and their sociological translation, or that we will lose ourselves in a lush thicket of terminology; there is also the risk that we will render analyses of cosmopolitanism banal, by conflating them with any number of other studies on transnational phenomena. Given that sociological studies of cosmopolitanism are for the most part implicit variations on the larger narrative of globalization, we must equip the latter with more original and innovative concepts.

Currently, researchers face two possibilities. On the one hand, they can choose to wipe the slate clean, leaving the past behind and banishing traditional sociological concepts to the attic. This position has notably been defended by Ulrich Beck, whose work offers a manifesto for a new paradigm. However, the argument according to which adopting the perspective of the 'cosmopolitanization of the world' necessarily entails rejecting all references to sociological tradition is highly debatable. Some authors have maintained that the conceptual frameworks elaborated by the discipline's founders should not be lumped in with the analysis of national societies. This volume, on the other hand, has chosen to take the second position, introducing new tools within conceptual approaches that have already proven to be valuable. The difficulty lies in the fact that the discipline must show ingenuity as well as both conceptual and methodological imagination, without necessarily abandoning all its former convictions.

The Matrices of Cosmopolitanism

Without going into a lengthy historical presentation of cosmopolitanism, it is nonetheless useful to examine the basic lines of thought that cosmopolitanism uses to apprehend contemporary reality. At the risk of wanting to find traces of cosmopolitanism at all costs, even where it is the least likely to crop up, some authors have adopted a long- term approach that depicts the successive reincarnations of cosmopolitan thought and its ability to adapt to a wide variety of historical conditions, including those that might seem the most hostile to its growth.

An Oxymoron

It has rightly been observed that the word 'cosmopolitan' is composed of the 'apparently improper' combination of the words polites (citizen) and kosmos (world, universe). This oxymoron presents a certain heuristic value, as it forces us to reflect upon the inherent tension between the local roots required for citizenship and the desire for openness necessary to experience broadest horizons of humanity. If we take its most radical meaning, the phrase 'citizen of the world' encourages individuals to free themselves from the bonds of proximity which they are assigned at birth, as well as from a sphere of existence intrinsically determined by geography. In this critical and libertarian interpretation, individuals are supposed to throw off the shackles of ethnocentrism and nationalism that otherwise distort their vision and unyoke themselves from the patriotic and cultural prejudices that limit their horizons. This self- assertion is more than just a solipsistic celebration of the individual, however. On the contrary, what cosmopolitanism clamours for is membership in the largest possible community, the community of humanity as a whole.

The long history behind this vision of the individual and his or her relationship to the world can be outlined using three matrices of meaning. The first matrix is based on the idea that there is an underlying unity to all humankind, a supreme community that brings together all peoples and all religions: in other words, a Stoic cosmopolis, where all individuals can claim the right to citizenship anywhere on the planet and where any kind of exclusion or closing off is viewed as illegitimate, for 'the horizon of the cosmopolitan is first and foremost defined as the terrestrial universum, the whole world'. The cosmopolis was essentially viewed as a form of political unity that transcended the borders dividing ethnic groups, cultures, religions and classes by appealing to the principle of intrinsic equality. The second matrix of meaning can be described as a set of moral obligations towards others: striving towards greater tolerance for the customs and beliefs of other peoples, the aspiration to world peace, and the duty to provide hospitality to those we do not know are all attributes that make cosmopolitanism a principle of responsibility and solidarity. The third cosmopolitan matrix stems directly from the first two and completes them: it is used to describe the interest expressed in other people, places and cultures. As cosmopolitans are able to be at ease outside of their native countries, they enter into dialogue with others, who they consider to be their equals in terms of human dignity.

A cosmopolitan outlook thus requires individuals to: a) be able to go beyond their own culture, local allegiances and national affiliations; b) possess a sense of responsibility towards others based exclusively on a shared vision on humanity, regardless of their ethnicity, culture, religion, political affiliation or nationality; and c) express openness, interest and respect for other cultures and diversity as a whole. These three matrices of meaning — a belief in the shared community of humanity, the adoption of set of moral obligations towards others, and the ability to transcend personal boundaries and express interest in other cultures — all overlap to highlight what is unique about cosmopolitanism: its ideal of embedding the individual within the community of humanity.

A Global Ecumene

Over the course of its 25-century-long history, cosmopolitanism has experienced several cycles of fortune and misfortune, of decline and of resurgence, as well as a number of major conceptual transformations. In fact, contemporary cosmopolitanism, better termed 'neo-cosmopolitanism', is not the direct descendent of more ancient forms: three important periods

concept of cosmopolitanism. According to Beck, the condition of any contemporary individual, from the elites down to ordinary social actors, and the interplay of imaginaries (grand narratives and iconographies) are now based on a new principle: the interconnectedness of human experience. With the advent of the second modernity, the old distinctions between 'inside' and 'outside', 'national' and 'international', 'us' and 'them' are seen as having lost all validity.

While largely subscribing to Beck's theories, some authors have criticized his use of the word cosmopolitanization, arguing that it is hardly an alternative to globalization, since both expressions refer back to the same reality. In fact, both have three different levels of meaning that Beck is not always careful to distinguish. They indicate an observable process, an objective, and a form of rhetoric about contemporary social realities. And by drawing on indicators regarding transnational occurrences to illustrate the cosmopolitanization of the world, Beck allows himself to correlate the two phenomena and to use both terms interchangeably, at times suggesting that the emergence of cosmopolitan outlooks and practices might be the conscious consequence of structural realities. Yet this is far from being an empirical certainty, since living in a global world does not necessarily mean becoming a cosmopolitan. Moreover, assimilating the processes of cosmopolitanization with the processes of transnationalization would mean conflating the analytical and prescriptive uses of this author's perspective. It appears that Beck may be confusing cosmopolitanism as a process and cosmopolitanism as an outcome. By using the first to refer to the mechanisms that both physically and metaphorically pry open the borders of nation-states, and by also deeming as cosmopolitan the society that is the product of that transformation, Beck turns the explanandum — the cosmopolitan society as the outcome of historical changes — into the explanans, with cosmopolitanism then serving to explain the changes to social life that have occurred in the post- modern era.

These criticisms were elaborated with the goal of making cosmopolitan analyses more fruitful, in particular by teasing out a genuine descriptive stance from the more ethical concern that sometimes drives cosmopolitanism — and which becomes a powerful normative temptation for some sociologists. Cosmopolitanism, however, is much like democracy as described by Alexis de Tocqueville. From a conceptual point of view, Tocqueville considers American democracy both as a fact — a political regime that was the product of significant historical transformations over a long period of time — and an ambition — a political horizon to be achieved and perfected through the joint action of men, mores and public opinion influencing institutions. Tocqueville sees democracy as the driver of history, an irreversible social project, the ultimate human conquest. From a methodological perspective, he also analyses American democracy both as an empirical type, with observable characteristics, and as an ideal type, whose traits are reconstructed by the observer. Through comparison, this allows him to prove that while American society comes closest to achieving the democratic ideal (in the modern era), it can nonetheless be further perfected.

Cosmopolitanism can similarly be seen as both an objective and an already established reality, at least in part: that is, both a social phenomenon with well- defined characteristics and an ideal type elaborated by sociologists. Some might object that focusing on the historical nature of cosmopolitanism — which both Beck and his critics do — means adopting a teleological view. For example, according to Peter Coulmas, faith in the progress of history 'is the very condition underpinning a cosmopolitan understanding of the world'. We have nonetheless already seen that the history of cosmopolitanism is far from linear, being instead composed of peaks and valleys, rising in prominence and dwindling in popularity over the years as its content substantially changes. Moreover, even if we limit ourselves to the last two centuries of Western history, it would be overly naïve and ultimately false to argue that we have moved from a closed- off world to an open one, from an exclusive to an inclusive universal, from rejecting the Other to accepting alterity. In this regard, we must diverge from authors such as Martha C. E. Van Der Bly, who, starting from the premise that the anthropological capacity of human beings to cross borders is far greater than their

desire to live in an enclosed world, subsequently interprets global history as a long- term process of societal convergence. In reality, much like globalization, cosmopolitanism is in no way an inevitable outcome. We must therefore treat it as a process that allows observers to compare their factual reality with a theoretical ideal.

Before considering cosmopolitan sociology as a means to analyse the cosmopolitan world, as this volume purports to do, a final warning is in order. Our endeavour in no way claims to have the same broad scope as the field of global studies. In reality, our main goal is to understand how individuals and groups deal with the global reality in which they live, by examining the cultural, subjective and experiential dimensions of global society — elements that have sometimes been overlooked by global studies. To do so, we must be aware that the link between globalization and cosmopolitanism is not a causal one. Living in a global world does not mean that one must adhere to the ethical objectives of cosmopolitanism, nor that one must adopt a lifestyle that is compatible with a cosmopolitan outlook.

The Sociology of Cosmopolitanism and Cosmopolitan Sociology

Cosmopolitanism is more of a general cultural attitude than a strict doctrine; as a result, it is not always easy to draw a line between cosmopolitanism and a number of similar concepts — interculturalism, multiculturalism, internationalism, and globalization, just to name a few. The poorly defined edges of cosmopolitanism often lead to linguistic confusion. As Ulf Hannerz reminds us, terms do not necessarily become buzzwords because they are the most accurate or concise descriptions, but rather because they stimulate our imagination. This is the case for the terms 'cosmopolitanism', 'cosmopolis' and 'cosmopolitan'.

We must therefore make a terminological distinction. We suggest using the expression 'cosmopolitan world' to refer to the world established through cultural transnational processes, with a view to accurately highlighting the specificity of the global society from the perspective of the cultural processes of separation and unification: the cosmopolitan world is culturally both plural and shared, this irreducible duality being the unstable outcome of a lengthy historical cultural process. In this context, we can call the study of certain major contemporary phenomena as the 'sociology of cosmopolitanism', while 'cosmopolitan sociology' should refer to the set of concepts allowing for a specific analysis of the former. The sociology of cosmopolitanism allows us to envision the study of transnational occurrences without reference to any of the specific tenets of cosmopolitanism, whereas cosmopolitan sociology (the subject of this volume) is an attempt to operationalize the conclusions of cosmopolitan thought by adapting them to our contemporary world, while nonetheless rejecting some of its vaguer and more out- dated utopian aspects.

Cosmopolitan sociology has established its distance with regard to the field of global studies, as evidenced by the terminological inflation of the past twenty- five years. Numerous authors have reviewed the laundry list of expressions minted by sociologists around the idea of cosmopolitanism. Is the proliferation of new terminology a sign of vibrant scholarship, or on the contrary the proof of a certain scientific uncertainty? Without going in details about individual terms, we can present the four different ways that these terms are used, according to Gerard Delanty. The first use, he argues, refers to the development of a political framework based on law and justice, elements that are necessary to establish global governance. The second use is associated with a type of liberal multiculturalism that emphasizes pluralism and cultural difference in the creation of post- national political communities. Thirdly, the new terminology can also be used to signal the increasing transnationalization of the world engendered by international flows and the subsequent appearance of new lifestyles and cultural consumption practices. The fourth use of this terminology is deployed by social scientists attempting to perfect their understanding of globalization from the inside.

It is possible to simplify these four categories by eliminating the third usage, which once again conflates cosmopolitanism and transnational processes. We therefore end up with three different approaches that refer to the adjective 'cosmopolitan': the first is used when we examine

assumptions regarding the changes that permitted the rise of contemporary cosmopolitanism; the second describes the institutions and agencies of international governance; and the third refers to the values, attitudes and behaviours of contemporary individuals.

Universalist Ethics and the Spirit of Cosmopolitanism

As its history clearly demonstrates, cosmopolitanism has always endeavoured to look at difference and unity as two sides of the same coin. In its current guise, cosmopolitanism is a source of inspiration for the social sciences. It allows us to train a keen eye on societal dynamics, to the extent that longterm historical trends have led to a certain degree of unification across the world while nonetheless permitting (and even encouraging) the expression of internal diversity. Unity and plurality have co-existed throughout the past millennium, well before the advent of the global society as we understand it today.

While one of the most urgent tasks of cosmopolitan sociology must be to understand how different human communities can successfully cohabit in the global society, it is also necessary to comprehend the dynamics of contemporary cultures and identities engendered to the various mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion mobilized by groups and individuals. Below, we discuss some of the tools that can be used to address these issues.

Tensions between the Universal and the Particular

Cosmopolitan sociology cannot dispense with confronting the arguments, assumptions and limits of universalism, which is one important legacy of cosmopolitan thought. Our approach seeks to contribute to the critique of certain essentialist, jingoistic and ethnocentric ideas scattered throughout the social sciences by confronting them with the notion of universalism. More specifically, cosmopolitan sociology is structured around the tension between two different stances: recognition of and respect for diversity and human particularities on the one hand, and the drive to encompass these within the broader context of humanity. 'Cosmopolitan social theory understands social relations through a universalistic conception of humanity and by means of universalistic analytical tools and methodological procedures. Its simple but by no means trivial claim is that, despite all our differences, humankind is effectively one and must be understood as such'.

The central role of universalistic orientations within cosmopolitanism has nonetheless incited much controversy. Samuel Scheffler has emphasized that a radical use of universalism would lead to a number of untenable positions with regard to cultural belonging. Other authors have highlighted the incoherence of universalist theories that nonetheless remain culturally situated at their core. While it has been roundly demonstrated that globalization is not limited to the Western world, cosmopolitanism, as a specific theory of global processes, has yet to abandon its Western- centric viewpoint and become plural itself.

These comments should be construed as methodological safeguards. Although cosmopolitanism accepts universalism as the ultimate horizon of the human understanding of social phenomena, it also tries to tackle some of its more obscure aspects. Cosmopolitanism stands up against new exclusionary forces, including those that surreptitiously reappear under the aegis of respecting differences. Unlike anthropological universalism, which operates in terms of transcultural constants, cosmopolitan universalism does not wish to remain a disembodied ideal: it emphasizes both our shared humanity and our cultural differences. Since the main premise of a cosmopolitan outlook is that 'the human species can be understood only if it is treated as a single subject, within which all forms of difference are recognized and respected but conceptualised as internal to the substantive unity of all human beings', defining the relationship between the universal and the particular remains the main task of this approach.

Presenting cosmopolitanism as a sociological perspective means that we must truly recognize the Other and not merely dissolve difference in universality. Kwame Anthony Appiah uses a pithy expression to define cosmopolitanism as 'universality plus difference', the sum of our shared humanity plus the traditions, customs, creations and

habitual behaviours of peoples throughout various historical contexts. Our common humanity and our plurality must be considered together, like two sides of the same coin. What makes the cosmopolitan approach pertinent for the study of paradoxes in our contemporary world is not so much its stance in favour of a universal community, above and beyond local cultures and affiliations, but rather its attempt at reconciling a form of solidarity that is afforded to all of humanity with specific and particular forms of solidarity. For this reason, contemporary cosmopolitanism can be seen as a kind of post- universalism.

Interlinkages

Universalism cannot be reduced to the mere mention of a common and shared humanity, nor can particularism be construed as just a call to respect cultural differences, no matter how noble- minded such efforts may be. As Jean- Loup Amselle has shown in his study of interlinkages between the universalizing tendencies of various cultures and their particularistic incarnations, the expression of a specific identity can only occur thanks to the use of a shared code that comes from a sense of belonging to a universal culture. Paradoxically, 'the choice of a common reference point like Coca Cola or in the past the Bible or the Quran represents the price that different cultures have had to pay in order to access the global market of identities'. This means that, in order to be able to express themselves, cultures need to share a common point of reference; identities are therefore always called upon to define themselves in reference to a larger context. In other words, an idiosyncratic expression of culture is only possible if inclusive frameworks are transformed into unique signs, or if particular signs are translated into universal signs. As a result, it can be argued that 'universalism, far from thwarting the manifestation of differences, is in fact the ideal means for their expression' and that today as in the past, different identities are constructed 'by branching off or otherwise deviating from global signifiers'. If it is understood correctly, universalism also acts as an intellectual resource 'which, far from being opposed to the identification of specificities and particularities, creates the very framework that makes such recognition and acceptance possible'.

Relationships to Alterity

It is important to confirm just to what extent the relationship between the universal and the particular allows us to address two commonly accepted ideas: first, the existence of a human species composed of interdependent groups that are not culturally isolated from each other; and second, a constant dynamic of exchange, transfer and appropriation that has become more significant in the contemporary era. Since 'the global other is in our midst', it becomes crucial for the cosmopolitan approach to examine how individuals and groups deal with difference and plurality. If the cosmopolitan condition can be characterized by the inclusion of otherness in one's self- definition, and we therefore are entitled to refer to a cosmopolitan approach whenever 'new relationships develop in situations of openness between the self, the Other and the world', it is necessary to implement a kind of sociology that examines how the ego (i.e., an individual or a group) becomes aware of, recognizes, judges and defines others, establishes peaceful and cooperative or antagonistic and hostile relationships with others, creates a shared sense of belonging, or ultimately rejects the other as falling outside one's circle of friends, family and allies.

Universalist theories are often criticized for negating differences, by arbitrarily grouping all societies under the umbrella of a dominant culture. Within a universalist paradigm, all human behaviour, social norms and institutions are situated within a single civilization. The result is that cultural differences are somehow overlooked, being either transcended or excluded. The particularist view, on the contrary, can make it impossible to search for a common thread of belonging, since it postulates the radical alterity of what is observed.

And yet, neither universalism nor particularism should be reduced to these two paradigms. Individuals can in fact view others as similar to themselves, even as extensions or perfected versions of themselves, by denying their differences. This can lead individuals to reject the specific values held by others and deny them autonomy by imposing their own cultural models through a form of ethnocentrism that presupposes

the universality and transposability of said models. In some cases, this attitude results in assimilationist policies. Quite to the contrary, individuals can rightfully argue that assuming the inherent equality of all human beings is the best way of finding common ground with others, regardless of incidental differences. As Robert Fine has observed, universalism has two different faces: one which espouses a universal view of humanity and obeys the logic of radical inclusion, and another which universalizes the self but particularizes the Other.

Viewing others as different from oneself can in turn give rise to two equally contradictory positions. First of all, the ego can accentuate the alterity of others, ultimately relegating them to a radically different sphere of meaning. If the pigeonholing of difference becomes ontological, it prevents any shared sense of belonging from arising, given the abysmal chasm between the self and the Other. Glorifying the local nature of identity can also lead individuals to adopt an isolated view of cultures as cut off from any global references, and to legitimize hierarchies among different cultures. This attitude is seen the most clearly among people who feel that their culture is a kind of gift to the world and thus likely to become universally appreciated. Emphasizing specificity can justify ignorance and disinterest towards other cultures or, on the contrary, produce a large body of scientific research. This was exemplified by Orientalism, which provided the West with a powerful repository for radical otherness. Over the course of centuries, Orientalism became a form of representation crafted by those who wielded the power to name, categorize and study alterity, revealing that knowledge of the Other is closely linked to the power that one has over said Other. Consequently, Orientalism became not only a field of academic study, but also a set of prejudices that the West developed about the East. The Orient was less a tangible reality than a knowledge object produced through an asymmetrical relationship. Erudite Eurocentrism helped to transform the key elements of difference between the West and the East into theoretical models that justified the superiority of the former over the latter.

Recognizing difference can also mean fully accepting that all individuals have the right to be what they are, irrespective of what the observer and the observed may have in common. Despite recently coming under critical fire, the best lesson of 'cultural relativism' doubtless remains the following: if correctly understood, cultural relativism entails a relationship with the Other that contrasts starkly with the 'old ethnocentric, parochial confidence that one's own tribe was a model for the species', and rejects the still widespread arrogant belief in the superiority of Western civilization.

Towards a Symmetrical and Reflexive Universalism

Our cosmopolitan approach cannot, therefore, overlook the reality of the relationships that Europe established with the people and places that it considered to be 'exotic'. In any relationship to alterity, there exists an axiological dimension that refers back to the mechanisms driving the ego to appreciate or to reject others' values. Starting with the archetypal conquest of the Americas by Europeans, the history of colonialism reveals just to what extent the ability to view other, non-European peoples as ontologically different prompted the creation of protectorates and other forms of political guardianship. A civilizing mission cannot be envisioned so long as the other populations involved are seen as one's equals. Consequently, colonizing powers often refused to recognize the cultures and traditions of colonized peoples, thus leading to their elimination and the imposition of a foreign dominant culture viewed as superior. This kind of relationship to otherness still informs our geopolitical understanding of the world, even in the post- colonial landscape, where the shortcomings of both universalism and particularism are still visible. In his geopolitical work, The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington argues that power relations between states are entirely founded on culturalist attributes that divide civilizations into discrete units pitted against each other by regional leaders. The belief in intractable differences justifies the division of the contemporary world into separate blocs that cannot be assimilated and must exist in a state of perpetual conflict with each other. At the same

time, the Western world's claim to universality cannot be justified if it does not open itself up to other traditions of thought. For Mondher Kilani, it would be fruitful to orient discussions towards the elaboration of:

> a broader universalism that is subjected to the hegemony of one part of humanity by the rest. In short, the Western strain of universalism handed down by Enlightenment thinkers and led astray by hierarchical ambitions should not a priori strip foreign discourse — or any discourse that does not follow exactly the same path or use the same terms and is not merely a repetition of the same — of its legitimacy.

The prejudices associated with universalism are just as strong as those associated with particularism and the illusions of specificity are just as toxic as the illusions of universality.

This is precisely why a cosmopolitan approach to the co- existence of human communities must incorporate such caveats and reject the imperialist temptations that can be embodied by universalism, as well the tendency to view cultures in isolation, illustrated by a radical version of particularism. On the contrary, our approach must draw on an inherently inclusive version of universalism that is based on pluralism, and on a kind of particularism that is willing to adopt a broader lens. Only a symmetrical and reflexive brand of universalism shall enable cosmopolitan sociology to address the issue of recognizing difference while claiming the unity of our shared humanity.

In a volume that examines the legal foundations of the cosmopolitan state, H. Patrick Glenn argues that, in order to think about contemporary institutions from a cosmopolitan perspective, we must carefully define the adjective 'common' to mean 'compatible with different cultures'. It is therefore necessary to locate the elements of human culture that all individuals can identify with. As Amin Maalouf has said, 'People ought to be able to make their own modernity instead of always feeling they are borrowing it from others'. Maalouf also stipulates that efforts should be made so that:

> no one feels excluded from the common civilisation that is coming into existence; in which everyone may be able to find the language of his own identity and some symbols of his own culture; and in which everyone can identify to some degree with what he sees emerging in the world about him, instead of seeking refuge in an idealised past. In parallel to this, everyone should be able to include in what he regards as his own identity a new ingredient, one that will assume more and more importance in the course of the new century and the new millennium: the sense of belonging to the human adventure as well as his own.

The goal of the cosmopolitan approach is therefore to use diversity as the gateway to respect for the plural architectures on which contemporary societies are built, without further entrenching the pre-existing differences that can pit cultures against each other and instead by opening up the discussion on what these cultures might have in common. The 'true universal' cannot be 'confused with any particular culture or with any historical society: it can only be a horizon, an ideal or a governing principle'.

Border Dynamics

Are we heading towards more open societies, or are we on the contrary witnessing the resurgence of identity- based politics and the cultural retreat of social groups, especially at the local and national scales? Can we observe, even if only on the level of representation and discourse, the validation of cosmopolitan ideals? Or are these in fact being roundly rejected?

Opening Up and Closing Off

Given that human beings are paradoxically inclined to open up to others and simultaneously to close themselves off in an attempt to shut out the infringement of the outside world, such questions may seem woefully naïve. However, the constant confrontation with cultural difference that characterizes the global society poses a challenge to the human need for a certain degree of impermeability to one's identity — the ability to close off that Lévi- Strauss pinpointed as the basis for the sustainability of particular cultures. This is precisely why cosmopolitan sociology seeks to tackle the paradox of contemporary societies,

which are both opening up and closing off to an unprecedented degree.

The concept of borders is useful to describe this trend; Frederick Barth presented some of the fundamental elements of border theory as early as 1969. Since then, a kind of diversified sociology has developed that focuses primarily on collective identities, communities and ethno- national groups by analysing social, ethnical and symbolic borders. And yet, only recently has this concept been adopted by the proponents of global studies and cosmopolitan sociology more broadly, with a view to studying how societies function when they are wrestling with globalization. It has been observed that, far from being eroded, borders have been reworked by a number of transnational processes, with the result that studying them can help to understand social dynamics in a post- national context. It is specifically to counter widespread rhetoric in public discourses regarding their disappearance that the concept of borders became quite central to debates on cosmopolitanism and globalization. But how can we move beyond the shared observation that 'the social proclivity to boundary fetishism' is the matter at stake in our global society, and instead use this perspective as a tool to analyse the contemporary world?

Orders and Identities

In order to answer this question, we must take a look at how borders are transformed. While the primary function of borders was traditionally to define the geographical limits of the state and thus establish its sphere of sovereignty, borders no longer seem to be limited to such territorial ambitions. Today, in fact, borders have a tendency to spread and crop up wherever information flows, the movement of individuals and the circulation of goods are the most intense and thus require granular, selective mechanisms of control, as is the case in global cities for instance. Identifying these new and shifting borders means that we must adopt a more focused perspective. It is possible for borders to be geographically distant from the spaces that they are supposed to delineate and protect, insofar as they are transformed into measures controlling mobility rather than territories: for example, there are British customs posts in the very heart of Paris, where the Eurostar trains leave from the Gare du Nord.

Changes such as these have a produced a major shift in how we conceptualize borders and use them to study global society. Global borders behave less like clearly traced lines on a map and more like canals whose traffic must be managed by speeding up or blocking passage depending on the circumstances, given that the process is not the same for trustworthy regular travellers and for those whose mobility raises suspicion, and possibly even fear and rejection. Given the increasing diffusion and mobility of borders today, which are less cartographical realities than processes, Chris Rumford has chosen to move from the analysis of borders to that of bordering processes.

The epistemological space of cosmopolitan sociology resides somewhere between universalism and particularism, as it seeks to uncover both what unites and what divides, what functions as shared beliefs, what stems from the porousness of geographic and cultural borders and what constitutes an impenetrable barrier. It means that we must take into account how human groups establish shared points of reference, and how, conversely, they can adopt a reclusive attitude and withdraw from others. This is precisely the contribution made by studies on the symbolic borders that concern everyday cosmopolitanism, and whose primary mechanism is the inclusion or exclusion of others (Lamont and Molnár, 2002). Although borders have become increasingly blurry, they can still play a pivotal role in the everyday lives of individuals by permitting cosmopolitan encounters and experiences.

According to Ulrich Beck, considering borders as mobile patterns will allow us to better describe the erosion of distinctions between the domestic and the foreign, the endogenous and the exogenous, the internal and the external, an erosion that is the hallmark of globalization. From this perspective, borders do not separate one set of loyalties from another: individuals can be members of varying numbers of circles and it is precisely their multiple points of intersection that define them. There is room for other worlds, no matter how deeply rooted a social actor may be. Some communities

may force individuals to swear loyalty and allegiance, but others on the contrary may require much less in the way of commitment, even if they play an important role in an individual's life. Cosmopolitans navigate the waters of multiple communities, some of which are more meaningful for them than others, and some of which occasionally involve competition or conflict. Cosmopolitans may even end up choosing to reject all of the labels attributed to them.

If the plurality of cultural spheres has become the very grounds for constructing identities in a world marked simultaneously by mechanisms seeking to expand common points of reference, by significant distinctions and by intense competition between legal and elective forms of belonging, it is indeed due to the nature of contemporary borders. Individuals can exploit borders like a sort of 'connective tissue' that allows them to stay in contact with different communities and even to project themselves into a variety of distant collectives. Far from being exclusively situated in well- defined spaces, the forms of loyalty engendered by the functioning of mobile borders highlight the fact that belonging has become 'selective and perhaps also transitory'.

The Ego and the Other

When they are understood as lines of both division and contact, borders can reconcile an open and fluid vision of cultural identities with the fact that these identities are constantly forced to become more rigid under the effect of all sorts of (re)invented traditions or of demands for territorial and identity recognition. Tracking the 'floating signifier' of cultural productions under the crystallizing surface, especially when such productions claim to be pure and atemporal, allows us to consider phenomena such as hybridization, creolization and syncretism, as well as the possibility of multiple forms of belonging.

This refers back to an important dimension of cosmopolitan sociology: leaving behind a static view of cultures goes hand- in- hand with the hypothesis that all identities contain a portion of alterity that it would be detrimental to seek to conceal, as it is precisely the drive to repress difference that leads to a purist, immobile and unequivocal conception of belonging. One of the most virulent criticisms lobbied at Samuel Huntington was that the author had conceived of the ego and the Other in an antagonistic relationship where the Other was the enemy and where one's positive self- definition was automatically coupled with a negative definition of the Other. 'For peoples seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are essential, and the potentially most dangerous enmities occur across the fault lines between the world's major civilizations'. For individuals to emerge victorious from this confrontation and for them to avoid having to choose between conflicting loyalties, Huntington sees only one way out. In that context, Huntington's categorical rejection of multiculturalism — the negation of the state, a sign of the West's decline — finally makes sense, as well as his refusal to imagine that variations could occur within a single civilization. Threats to Western civilization are posed 'by immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and to propagate the values, customs, and cultures of their home societies'. What Huntington neglects to mention, however, is that identities may be considered multiple whenever individuals can claim to have diverse allegiances along a vertical axis ranging from local affiliations to the most abstract levels of civilization- wide belonging, but also when they engage in horizontal exchanges and encounters with different cultures which can lead to various forms of hybridization.

Assuming that all forms of identity have their share of internal otherness can help us to salvage the concept of identity, which is both scientific (with undeniable success in contemporary sociology) and moral (in regard especially to liberation and emancipation movements); and to truly do it justice — since nothing is more imperative for humans than to have a sense of one's identity — while nonetheless guarding against its more harmful uses, including its exploitation by fundamentalist movements of all stripes.

Cosmopolitan sociology views identities as porous, multiple and historically situated. In a world where there is constant interaction with cultural difference, a sociological approach to identity that limits itself to studying 'the Pygmalion effect' — according to

which how others see us plays a decisive role in how we define ourselves, even at the deepest level — and which neglects to take into consideration the tangible aspects of individual relationships to alterity would be woefully incomplete. In a plural world, the Other can no longer be seen as an undifferentiated entity merely functioning to validate the self. 'The hermeneutics of social action forces us ever more urgently to engage with "other cultures" in a context of growing hybridity and cultural interpenetration'.

Consequently, we must incorporate a greater degree of reflexivity in our study of subjectivity. While a cosmopolitan outlook is by definition otheroriented, we must not infer from this that the Other remains a passive entity. Paraphrasing Anthony Cohen when defining anthropology as the reflexive science of otherness, we should consider the cosmopolitan approach as the study not just of the Other, but also of the self. In this regard, 'reflexivity can be our most powerful tool'.

Two Tests

In this new post- national context, three major topics have recently become pertinent for cosmopolitan sociology: the emergence of new shared imaginaries, new forms of supranational regulation, and the new spatial and temporal parameters of the human experience. By seeking to comprehend a world where the drive towards both unification and diversity occurs amidst the reshaping of cultural borders, cosmopolitan sociology asks three essential questions: how does the contemporary world fit into collective and historical awareness? How is this world governed? And how do people experience it? In order to answer the first and last of these questions, we shall conduct two tests.

Now that we have presented the theoretical underpinnings of cosmopolitan sociology in the pages above — concepts that stem from combining cosmopolitan theory with the tools of global studies — we shall attempt to do the following in the first and second parts of this volume, respectively: a) to outline the distinctive features of the cosmopolitan world by analysing the emergence of a shared and plural world, as well as the growing historical and collective awareness of this duality; and b) to understand how individuals experience the cosmopolitan world and become familiar with cultural difference.

Based on the notion that we cannot study the structural realities of globalization without also investigating the mechanisms that produce cosmopolitan imaginaries (narratives and iconographies), the macro- sociological observation conducted in the first part of this text shall unfold in three stages. The unprecedented importance of interactions between local and global phenomena and the acceleration of interdependence across different societies shall allow us to contextualize the significant transformations of the nationstate, a fundamental institution of political modernity (Chapter 1). In turn, this latter scalar analysis provides the prolegomena to our analysis of the cultural dimensions of the cosmopolitan world, and in particular how these dimensions give rise to storytelling and transnational imaginaries (Chapter 2). Do such imaginaries contribute to the development of a cosmopolitan consciousness, an awareness of what humans have in common beyond the limits of the nation- state? What kinds of grammar and vocabulary are produced by narratives of the world? And finally, which mechanisms help to maintain and promote the plurality of the cosmopolitan world by applying the concept of borders (Chapter 3)?

It is necessary to look at how individuals live and act in the cosmopolitan world, as well as the shape that individual relationships to others take in contemporary societies characterized both by constant contact with different forms of alterity and by a multiplicity of identity and cultural references. In the second part, we shall take a micro-sociological tack to examine how individuals are socialized within the global society and what their lived experiences of cosmopolitanism look like. According to Kwame Anthony Appiah, a cosmopolitan approach should start by taking individuals as the proper subject of moral concern — in other words, it should also consider seriously the choices made by individuals, including those related to lived culture, as well as the global spread and hybridization of culture. It is therefore necessary to combine the imaginary and experiential components of the cosmopolitan world in a single perspective, an objective we shall

attempt to fulfil in three different stages. First, we will take a critical look at how sociology has traditionally discussed socialization, emphasizing in particular the classical authors who can help us to understand how socialization operates in the cosmopolitan world (Chapter 4). Chapter 5 will then draw on the results of several international quantitative studies in order to answer the delicate question of how to define a cosmopolitan individual. Finally, Chapter 6 will look at the essential mechanisms that shape the spirit of cosmopolitanism, as well as the latter's basic tenets and intrinsic ambivalence.

Globalization has given scholars a potential subject of investigation, one which cosmopolitan sociology has made its own. If the global society can be defined as the expansion, at the worldwide level, of a relevant social space, then we should be able to scale up and apply a number of sociological concepts, taking into account the input of cosmopolitan studies though. Our challenge lies not in establishing a comprehensive, exhaustive definition of cosmopolitanism, but rather in searching for how to integrate different levels of analysis within a conceptual framework that compares and contrasts relationships and intersections between the micro and macro levels.

Drawing on a wide variety of sources, this volume emphasizes the work of sociologists engaged in promoting a cosmopolitan approach, the data produced by global studies and cosmopolitan surveys, and literary and other cultural productions. Literature in particular is still only rarely used in such studies, despite its great potential for sociological discovery. As John Tomlinson argues in his work on the cultural importance of speed and its impact on social relations and biographical experience, 'the novelist, the poet, librettist or film director can often grasp the phenomenology of an event with a sharpness, clarity and resonance which makes the efforts of social and cultural analysts appear (as they often indeed are) clodhopping'. To those more traditional categories, we can add: the singer, the screenwriter, the blogger.

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The objective of cosmopolitan sociology is analysing the various manifestations of the cosmopolitan spirit — including its darker sides. The discipline must therefore confront the question of universalist ethics, equipping itself with a plural conceptual framework in order to examine complex realities.

This is clearly stated by David Hollinger in a seminal passage explaining the distinction between cosmopolitanism and universalism:

> For cosmopolitans, the diversity of humankind is fact and something of an opportunity; for universalists it is a challenge. Cosmopolitanism shares with universalism a suspicion of enclosures, but the cosmopolitan understands the necessity of enclosures in their capacity as contingent and provisionally bounded domains in which people can form intimate and sustaining relationships, can create diversity, and can protect threatened constituencies against outside forces [... .] Cosmopolitanism differs from universalism in the respect it shows for the instinct to give special treatment to those with whom one is most intimately connected and by whom one is socially sustained. Cosmopolitanism respects the honest difficulties that even the most humane and generous people have in achieving solidarity with persons they perceive as very different from themselves. <>

Prophetic Translation: The Making of Modern Egyptian Literature by Maya I. Kesrouany [Edinburgh Studies in Modern Arabic Literature, Edinburgh University Press, 9781474407403]
In this novel and pioneering study Maya I. Kesrouany explores the move from Qur'anic to secular approaches to literature in early 20th-century Egyptian literary translations, asking what we can learn from that period and the promise that translation held for the Egyptian writers of fiction at that time. Through their early adaptations, these writers crafted a prophetic, secular vocation for the narrator that gave access to a world of linguistic creation and interpretation unavailable to the common reader or the religious cleric. This book looks at the writers' claim to secular prophecy as it manifests itself in the adapted narrative voice of their translations to suggest an original sense of literary resistance to colonial oppression and occupation in the early Arabic novel.

Contents

Excerpt: About the series: Edinburgh Studies in Modern Arabic Literature is a new and unique series that will, it is hoped, fill in a glaring gap in scholarship in the field of modern Arabic literature. Its dedication to Arabic literature in the modern period, that is, from the nineteenth century onwards, is what makes it unique among series undertaken by academic publishers in the English-speaking world. Individual books on modern Arabic literature in general or aspects of it have been and continue to be published sporadically. Series on Islamic studies and Arab/Islamic thought and civilisation are not in short supply either in the academic world, but these are far removed from the study of Arabic literature qua literature, that is, imaginative, creative literature as we understand the term when, for instance, we speak of English literature or French literature. Even series labelled 'Arabic/Middle Eastern Literature' make no period distinction, extending their purview from the sixth century to the present, and often including non-Arabic literatures of the region. This series aims to redress the situation by focusing on the Arabic literature and criticism of today, stretching its interest to the earliest beginnings of Arab modernity in the nineteenth century.

The need for such a dedicated series, and generally for the redoubling of scholarly endeavour in researching and introducing modern Arabic literature to the Western reader, has never been stronger. Among activities and events heightening public, let alone academic, interest in all things Arab, and not least Arabic literature, are the significant growth in the last decades of the translation of contemporary Arab authors from all genres, especially fiction, into English; the higher profile of Arabic literature internationally since the award of the Nobel Prize in Literature to Naguib Mahfouz in 1988; the growing number of Arab authors living in the Western diaspora and writing both in English and Arabic; the adoption of such authors and others by mainstream, high-circulation publishers, as opposed to the academic publishers of the past; the establishment of prestigious prizes, such as the International Prize for Arabic Fiction (IPAF) (the Arabic Booker), run by the Man Booker Foundation, which brings huge publicity to the shortlist and winner every year, as well as translation contracts into English and other languages; and, very recently, the events of the Arab Spring. It is therefore part of the ambition of this series that it will increasingly address a wider reading public beyond its natural territory of students and researchers in Arabic and world literature. Nor indeed is the academic readership of the series expected to be confined to specialists in literature in the light of the growing trend for interdisciplinarity, which increasingly sees scholars crossing field boundaries in their research tools and coming up with findings that equally cross discipline borders in their appeal.

There is no shortage of studies that make a link between the rising national consciousness and resistance to British colonial rule in Egypt in the early decades of the twentieth century on the one hand, and the emergence of new narrative genres in Arabic literature, particularly the novel, on the other. The novel as literary form offered itself to writers as an ideal vehicle for giving voice to a new-found sense of national identity previously overshadowed by the pan-Islamic identity of the Ottoman caliphate and later the hegemony of foreign colonial powers. But intellectual endeavour to forge, or perhaps more accurately to articulate, an Egyptian identity was not limited to the writing of novels. That endeavour naturally took many other forms, of which one (perhaps not entirely unrelated to writing novels) was translation of fiction and non-fiction from European languages,

especially French and English. Interestingly, some of those very translators also wrote their own novels as well as non-fiction works, while some were even directly involved in the political and not only intellectual life of the country. It is not therefore inconceivable that whatever grand national project or quest motivated their novel writing and/or political pursuits also motivated their translations: the choices of authors and texts that they translate and the political and social thought they contain and its relevance to Egyptian reality at the time. In a time of social and political transformation, it is not inconceivable either that the strategies adopted in translation and adaptation and the degree of 'faithfulness' to the original were also dictated consciously or unconsciously by the same ulterior motives that lay behind the writing of novels. Important as the subject is, studies of the phenomenon have been scarce. Whereas critics and scholars have for decades devoted a fair amount of attention to researching the early Egyptian novel in relation to rising national consciousness and the birth of the nation-state, they have been less forthcoming on the matter of the many concomitant translations of the same period.

It is into this little-trodden terrain that the current book offers to venture, bringing the latest developments in translation theory and postcolonial approaches to bear on some little-studied translations from European languages by major Egyptian authors in the early decades of the twentieth century.

Excerpt: Prophetic Tendencies: Egyptian Translators of the Twentieth Century

> It were as wise to cast a violet into a crucible, that you might discover the formal principles of its colour and odor, as to seek to transfer from one language into another the creations of a poet. Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792–1882)
>
> The form (of the story) crystallised in the newly arrived seed and a contemporary style was readied for it. But there remained above and beyond both a mysterious thing which I call the intuitive feel for the soul of narrative art, its rhythm, and its temperament. These were available exclusively to writers intimate with Western culture. Stories written by others, despite fulfilling all the [formal] requirements, still lacked that secret scent which makes story [writing] an art. This phenomenon persists to this day [1960]. There is no harm, therefore, in admitting that the story came to us from the West and that its foundations here were laid by pioneering individuals who had been influenced by European, especially French literature. For even though some English masterpieces had been translated into Arabic, the origins of the story in our culture are rooted in French literature. The Egyptian temperament at that time felt no alienation from France as it did from England – perhaps because of the cultural similarity among the peoples of the Mediterranean basin. Another factor may have also contributed to that, namely the fact that some French writers had played important political roles in the history of their country. The names of these writers became widely known as symbols of liberation movements. [Victor] Hugo, whose Les Misérables ÓāfiÕ [Ibrāhīm] translated, was such a writer; al-Manfalūṭī followed suit and rendered in Arabic only texts of French literature. Yaᵃya Óaqqī (1905 – 92)

The Arabic novel has yet to tell its own story. Accused of being a purely borrowed form, it has been compelled to follow other stories unfolding in other places. As a form, the Arabic novel was in fact always partially on loan from European traditions, but this loan came packaged in translation. Traditionally, translation implied the translator's submission to an outside power: either the original source or divine inspiration. It is not surprising that in the history of Western literature, translation was always bound to revealed religions; it was expected to reproduce the original word intact in singular vernaculars. The paradoxical task of translation was thus born: religious meaning always eludes perfect translation at the same time that it demands it. Translation proceeds as though the transmission of meaning in a new language is possible without much loss, while the experience of revelation, the original religious meaning as it were, is reserved for those with faith in the divine source. This onerous task befalls the

translator as she becomes a channel, ideally a clear vessel, that mediates the passage of the original word to its target text. What becomes of this expectation in a colonial setting, when such mediation is already framed in unequal power relations, between two antagonistic idioms, and two very different worlds, reductively referred to as European and Arab? What becomes of the translator when she finds herself in a colonial situation that wants to speak not just for her but also through her?

Prophetic Translation: The Making of Modern Egyptian Literature explores such acts of literary translation in colonial Egypt in the early twentieth century. It approaches them within the colonial moment that shapes their production and circulation, but also thinks through how to read them as prophetic texts, not in the sense of foretelling a future, but as texts that expose the complicated relationship between colonial discourse and tradition, literature and religion. The prophetic emerges on three levels: first, the translators saw themselves as modernist prophets and agents of change. Second, they wrote various religious narratives such as biographies of the prophet. Third, under the spell of romanticism, the prophetic becomes a narrative position produced in their theories and practice of translation. Releasing the translation from any obligation to recognise the original, these texts reveal their worlds as colonial representations and carve out new spaces of interpretation by desecrating both original texts and accounts of origins. They arrest the colonial logic of representation in the process, calling attention to the present text precisely as a new text – a transformation of received and traditional genres – that could bear witness to a changing Arab moment. This new text is not new because it is modern – in fact, reading it in and as translation confirms its deviation from another borrowed colonial narrative, that of liberal nationalism. Rather, prophetic translation points specifically to how competing local and colonial discourses transform from representations to realities in colonial Egypt. The prophetic, moreover, is not a secular project that replaces religion with literature – it does not pretend to rid us of the divine. Rather, the prophetic emerges in the space between sacred and secular, original and translation, being neither here nor there. In this way Prophetic Translation moves beyond the question of fidelity in translation and the compatibility between fictional imagination and Islam, as well as the 'novelty of the novel', and towards understanding the significance of the proliferation of experimental, 'translated' narrative forms at the turn of the century. In undoing the relationship to the origin, prophetic translation also undoes a teleological narrative that carries us from a starting point to a destination. No longer is it possible when reading these texts to answer where they come from and where they may be headed, for prophetic translation becomes a mode of close reading that constantly interrupts both the original and its translation.

Mustafä Lutfī al-Manfalūtī (1876–1924) understood that potential well when in the introduction to his adaptation of Edmond Rostand's Cyrano de Bergerac (1897) as al-Shāʿir (The Poet) (1921), he confessed: 'I have tried to abide by the original in its entirety, and controlled myself to only remove sentences that were of no importance or added only expressions that were necessary for the context.' His 'Arabised version' is 'the actual French original', and he only 'changed it from a play into a short story so that the reader can see it on paper as the audience sees it in the theatre'.3 In those few lines, al-Manfalūtī, who knew no foreign languages and based his adaptations on his acquaintances' rough, mostly non-literary, and often oral, renditions of French literature, identifies the three pivots of literary translation in early twentieth-century Egypt: fidelity, context, and genre. Translation of European literature took on various forms – such as iqtibās (paraphrase), taʿrīb (Arabisation), and naql (copying) – with various degrees of tampering with the original. While some critics have argued that translation becomes more literal with the turn of the century, Prophetic Translation invests in the inevitable betrayal of all forms of literary translation and specifically in the promise of this betrayal to revising genealogies of the Arabic novel. By betrayal, I refer to the inevitable loss in the process of transferring meaning from one language and context into

another. While several critics read these early translations of novels, short stories, and philosophical texts as failed emulations, this book treats them as early articulations of 'literariness' that interrupt the canonisation of the Arabic realist novel as the penultimate 'modern' genre. Throughout I place the adjective 'modern' in quotation marks, wary of its teleological connotations in the Egyptian nahda or renaissance of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth, traditionally said to begin in 1798 with Napoleon's arrival in Alexandria, continue until 1914, and mark an awakening from the age of ʿdecadenceʾ or `asr al-inhitāt. I insist on close reading as interruptive of these teleological framings of a translated modernity in twentieth-century Egypt, shifting the focus from elite constructions of the modern to its articulations in exemplary translations from the period. This book reads the elite intelligentsia's translations of European romanticism and realism away from their national grammar, and towards mapping how literature emerges from the confluence of discourses in their translations. It examines various instances of translation, from plagiarism to accurate translation, and finally auto/biographical adaptations of the lives of European authors.

> Al-Nahda (Arabic: النهضة / ALA-LC: an-Nahḍah; Arabic for "awakening" or "renaissance") was a cultural renaissance that began in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Egypt, then later moving to Ottoman-ruled Arabic-speaking regions including Lebanon, Syria and others'

How do we read these translations of major reform-minded Egyptian intellectuals as performances of betrayal? Whom do these adaptations betray, and how do we approach this betrayal in mapping new literary histories? Muhammad Siddiq describes the 'most fatal blind spot' in the literary reform discourses of the nahda as 'the desperate belief that a sufficient number of desirable features of European modernity can be successfully grafted onto a carefully edited and updated core of Islamic curriculum' to fast-forward through years of 'stagnation' into 'modernity'. But what if this 'fatal' blind spot were reframed within a close reading of perfect translation as a necessary failure since the copy could never be an exact replica of the original? This book examines closely both the theory and practice of literary translation of several prominent Egyptian writers to reassess this supposed blind faith in the 'emulation' of the Western master text. It reframes these early translations, even though they are elite cultural expressions, as moments of unrealised reformist aspirations and utterances that resist, even while pretending to copy, the logic of narrative representation. They bridge memories of a pre-colonial literary fantasy with the aspiration of producing literary texts that could recall Arabic as a truth-language.

All the translators studied in this book have seemingly succumbed to that fatal blind spot. Al-Manfalūtī, whose Arabic 'translations' were free adaptations, barely conceals the European garments under his Azharite dress, writes Abdelfattah Kilito (ʿAbdulfattāh Kīlītū). Muhammad al-Sibāʿī (1881– 1931), known for his more 'accurate' and 'good' translations of British literature, has recently been described as complicit in a dangerous self-orientalism. Muhammad Husayn Haykal (1888–1956) and Tāhā Husayn (1889–1973) – whose translations varied from excerpted rewritings to full texts and critical biographies – are often the modernist gatekeepers, moderating the encounter between East and West from a comfortably conciliatory, or tawfīqī, position. In revising these accusations, every chapter reads the intersection between translation theory, praxis, and literature.

But could these various models of translation – if we were to model 'translation as a becoming' as Lydia Liu suggests – complicate the reception of these authors and their works? How did these adaptations of European fiction and philosophy influence modern Arabic narrative? This book explores the emergence of a narrative voice – not of the historical author but as a locus of discursive relationships that also includes the reader – that conceives of the poetic word as essentially

performative, creating the world it references. I insist on the creative dimension both as a legacy of romanticism but also as a resistant residue of the translators' Islamic education at the kuttāb, a traditional elementary school for boys, and al-Azhar, Egypt's oldest university associated with al-Azhar mosque. In many ways, literary translation presented itself as prophetic – promising new meanings and worlds that are essentially literary. All four translators reference prophecy in their literary and Islamic writings, and the tension between literary genius and the Muslim prophet persists throughout their works.

The prophet Muhammad becomes an important figure of emulation in the early twentieth century, in the throes of colonial occupation and within the struggle to author a native literary expression. Mahmūd Taymūr described the prophet's 'personality' as 'a living translation of the Book of God . . . God intended . . . that Muhammad should be the model for all human beings'. Translation becomes an act of emulation and not mere mimicking of the original, and this act mirrors the emulation of the prophet as a human ideal of perfection. Both forms of emulation remain incomplete and unrealised. These translations do not pretend to 'represent' an immediate Egyptian present, recognising in their different ways that they come from elsewhere. Rather they conceive a new literary language that recalls a prehistory of 'modern' Arabic narrative – the latter supposedly a product of the nineteenth century – as it confronts premodern cultural forms with modern exigencies. In the process, they move us away from a nationalist discourse that champions the novel, and towards specific literary articulations that have participated in producing the 'modern'. They also compel us to revise dominant genealogies of the Egyptian novel that read its development through European conceptual categories, measuring its success as a literary capacity for 'representing' the world in a 'modern' Arabic language. Read closely, these translations reveal themselves as sites of generic confusion and transformation and urge us to reexamine the comparative lens that translates adab as literature.

Significantly, these texts were not exactly 'translations', if by translation here we mean an accurate copying of content from one language into another. Some are complete adaptations that do not mention the original title or author. Even those texts that pretend to be faithful to the original rewrite it in subtle ways to make it relevant to the translating culture's background. In some instances, as per the translator's whim, education, background, or intended audience, entire parts of the original are removed, names are changed, forms adapted, and plots drastically altered. Inevitably, some of these translations were plagiaristic: in some instances, the translations pretend to be the originals. In other cases, ideas are adapted or copied without mentioning the original source, and in yet others original ideas are intentionally and unintentionally attributed to other writers. That translation took mostly the form of adaptation tells us that Arabic literature in the early twentieth century was negotiating with rather than failing to emulate another model perfectly – and these 'failures' are the most productive sites of study. As Pierre Cachia puts it, from the beginning, 'Arab translators did not view their task as one of slavish transposition, but rather of adaptation to the needs of a new public'.
Samah Selim draws a parallel between the 'story' of the nahda and that of the Arabic novel, both beginning in translation and adaptation. Focusing on entertainment fiction, Selim explores other nahḍas that do not figure into the 'modern novelistic canon'.18 When the novel as a genre was institutionalised, translations and popular fiction fell out of its literary trajectory. This process is complex, as some of the elites studied in this book pushed entertainment literature to the margins to establish a European-like canon that occasionally returned to the Arabic literary tradition. Using translation, this book complicates the canonisation of the Arabic novel: it explores whether there were aesthetic categories in the Arabic tradition that could determine the 'genre' and hence reading of these translations. Michael Allan finds none, and explains this lack in relation to how Orientalist scholarship translated adab as literature in a universal language of European humanism: in the process, 'modern' Arabic literature acquired its status outside of the historical moment that transformed it. Roger Allen notes how universal literary values dictate the Arabic novel's maturation according to

European criteria – the year 1988 marking Naguib Mahfouz's receipt of the Nobel Prize seals this teleology. In a popular narrative that transposes such values onto the literary history of the Arabic novel, it is generally agreed that the Arabic novel moves from romanticism to realism to modernism and then to an experimental postmodernism. But this genealogy is only possible if we ignore the legacy of the simultaneous translation of realism and romanticism in the early twentieth century.

The transformation of adab into modern Arabic literature also demanded the 'modernisation' of the Arabic language. We find, for instance, that al-Manfalūṭī critiques and uses classical rhetorical devices, al-Sibāʿī's language marks a transitional phase between classical and modern standard Arabic, Haykal adopts a simpler fuṣḥå while Husayn rejects the colloquial in favour of classical Arabic. The colloquial is a corrupted dialect, writes Husayn, which would waste the heritage that only classical Arabic has preserved. In colonial Egypt, Timothy Mitchell tells us, language use became abstract, pointing to a discursive violence that erased local differences by classifying them under general and familiar terms. Jeffrey Sacks also describes Mitchell's abstraction as linguistic violence, as it endorsed 'a realm of "meaning" that is believed to exist quite apart from words themselves under the theological name of "language" or "truth" or "mind" or "culture"'. Similarly, ʿAbd al-Muṣṭafā Badr adds translation to the mix: the popular and unfaithful literary translations initiated a troubling loss of linguistic reference or dalāla.

Prophetic Translation reads the translations of romantic and realist texts closely to locate in them this changed relationship to language not just in specific instances of adaptation, but also in the transformed narrative voice that appeals to the prophetic potential of literature. Although it addresses the translators' Islamic writings, it locates the prophetic as a narrative capacity produced in their literary adaptations. The prophetic emerges as an analytical position rather than a transcendental one: it does not issue from the translators' will, but from overlapping discourses in their adaptations that move us away from the writer as the mouthpiece of the nation. The translations make room for a new narrative subjectivity – the subject's formation in the act of telling or writing – made possible precisely in the formal struggle between realism and romanticism, biography and autobiography. They include adaptations of novels, philosophical texts, and auto/biographies. In each case, I discuss the formation of this narrative subject in relation to the shifting use of personal pronouns, the critique of omniscient narration, and the radical uprooting of the original. What these translations expose is both realism's and romanticism's failed promises of representation. They inadvertently challenge social realism as a sure path to reform, as well as European romanticism's modes of subjectivity. Read beyond the reforming intentions of their translators, these translations offer a different approach to the literary history of modern Arabic narrative. Because the original historical and political contexts that fostered the birth of European romanticism and realism cannot be translated into colonial Egypt, this book suggests that these translations must necessarily fall out of hegemonic accounts that appeal to universal generic values of narrative. Instead, they stage the formation of the literary object through translation, and this construction is formal and aesthetic, as well as historical.

The translators produce a set of aesthetic criteria that come through their translations, mostly in their critical writings on the purpose of translation and literature. Each chapter explores the translator's specific task of translation, his translation performance, and finally the new set of aesthetic criteria that emerges from such a paralleling. In moving us from the realm of religious to literary interpretation, the translators do more than inculcate the secular as Shaden Tageldin, Muhsin al-Musawi, and others have argued. Rather, this shift from the religious to the literary registers how early twentieth-century Egyptian literature reconciled the moral with the aesthetic. In conversation with discussions in comparative literature, translation, and postcolonial studies, this book treats translation as formative of the literary in early twentieth-century Egypt. The literary is not simply a secular imitation of a Western text, but

one that uses translation to interrupt as it borrows. While the social climate and the question of literacy are fundamental, the book's major ambition is to trace how aesthetic categories are produced in translation to offer a different way of reading the Egyptian novel's history and an alternate way of thinking about religion and literature. In a time when modern Arabic literature becomes complicit in the modernisation story of Egypt, through borrowing new literary forms in translation, this book explores how translation disrupts rather than endorses such modernisation accounts.

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The Prophetic, the Secular and the Profane

Manipulative translation compels us to approach interpretation as an inevitable act of betrayal. For Derrida, such betrayal brings secularisation and translation together, returning us to the opening paradox: the sacred text demands translation but loses its sacred status as original naming when obligated to communicate. Both translation and 'secularisation' long for a pure language that would just mean and not have to denigrate itself by communicating or explaining. Both, however, predictably become impossible when they begin to speak – 'façon de parler' – and no longer just are.85 Derrida wonders where the 'appeal to guard oneself (from secularization) in order to safeguard the sacred language . . . takes place: is it in the sacred language or outside it? . . . Can one speak a sacred language as a foreign language?' This limit between the two places is what I am naming the space of the profane that brings translation and religion together in a literary text that aspires for a language of its own while remaining bound to that very impossibility. In colonial settings, as Gauri Viswanathan explains, the institution of modern literary studies demands a similarly paradoxical relationship between power and religion. British colonial institutions in India, for example, established their superiority by dissociating from Christianity – the logic being that Christian texts presented themselves as truth texts, authorities in and of themselves with no need for self-justification. The English Nation as equivalent to the Christian God is 'rewritten as (but emphatically not supplanted by)' another equivalence between that nation and 'new forms of knowledge' proven by historical progress.88 Derrida describes the impossibility of such rewriting from a strictly linguistic point of view: both secularisation and translation have to present themselves in language, and that language ends up betraying their truth-claims at every step. Although historical colonial violence is undeniably a result of a power dynamic that pretended to be secular, I am proposing that literature in translation could expose the frailty of those language claims. For one, the Qurʾān makes a different truth claim (being arguably the most self-referential of Abrahamic scriptures): even while it promises one truth, textually it revels in multiple layers from commentaries to aʿādīth. The plurality of interpretation functioned differently in this context such that the British dominion over 'truth value' in Viswanathan's analysis was less absolute in Egyptian literary conversations on theology.

Critics have long agreed on a problematic Islamic shift in the works of several nahḍawī intellectuals, notably Husayn, al-Aqqād, and Haykal. Their Islamic narratives feed the 'viable language' of the nation-state, writes alMusawi, especially since they separated religion from literature, and Islam as personal faith from the Muslim Brotherhood's doctrinal conflation of Islam and politics. They also adopted the orientalist 'reductive humanization of the character of Muhammad'. However, the writer-prophet straddles both the aesthetic and historical – especially with the Islamic writings of Haykal and Husayn in the 1930s. As cultural prophets, they saw themselves producing something 'new', but their actual translations implicate the 'new' in Islamic discourse and Arabic literary tradition, complicating the 'secularity' of a colonial morality that separated between personal faith and doctrine. Talal Asad has taught us how the secular emerges from within religion in the colonial context; the elite figures considered in this book have repeatedly been read as complicit in the propagation of the secular. The translators were familiar with Orientalist representations of Islam, as is evident in al-Manfalūṭī's retort to Lord Cromer

(Chapter Two), al-Sibāʿī's rewriting of Carlyle (Chapter Three), Haykal's critique of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Husayn's conversation with André Gide (Chapter Four). Even though Islam is often abstracted in these responses, their translations maintain the tension between sacred and profane, making it difficult to identify them as absolutely secular. Prophetic Translation reads their translations closely beyond their declared affiliations to explore how the secular becomes synonymous with modern constructions of adab as literature. Roberto Schwarz describes a similar situation for the Brazilian novel: when the novel form comes to Brazil, the inherent contradictions of European universality (erasing class struggle) after 1848 are passed on as paradoxes of liberalism. To catch this peculiar paradox, the Brazilian writer uncovers 'something singular' in literature, 'an emptying out of what is already hollow'. In adapting the borrowed form of the novel to the new context, the Brazilian writer exposes the emptiness central to that form, precisely that which it pretends to erase or forget, in this case class difference and struggle. This original emptiness as it were – the 'already hollow' part of the original – becomes the territory of profanation in these translations. Beyond producing modern literature as secular, these translations reveal that which was never there in the original.

This literary profanity relates to Giorgio Agamben's notion of 'profanation', the way by which things are given a non-utilitarian function, not in a return to some original prior state, but to what has never existed. Agamben finds a power in profanation that secularisation renders impotent, for while 'political secularization of theological concepts (the transcendence of God as a paradigm of sovereign power)' preserves the power of the 'heavenly monarchy' in the 'earthly' one, profanation 'neutralises what it profanes. Once profaned, that which was unavailable and separate loses its aura and is returned to use.' The profane also has the power to return to 'common use the spaces that power had seized, while the secular works to preserve power structures'. The literary profane does not preserve the transcendental in the secular; rather, it reveals how colonial secularisation ingrains itself in the host culture through reading practices. These literary translations do not simply shift the locus of power from God's word (through the Prophet's revelations) to their own utterances – and as such do not merely 'reproduce' the secular in a native idiom. Rather, they profane the separation between literary and religious interpretation, bringing the stakes of narrative representation to bear on European ideals of subjectivity and universal reason. Literature does not become the secular modern; rather, this book engages Islam and adab specifically in the ways they appear in the translations. Even when Islamic themes and ideas are borrowed, and the historicity of the Qurʾān questioned as it is by Husayn, the literary is not simply secular. If literature in translation occupies a site of tension between divine and secular, then the prophetic narrative voice interrupts the presumed equivalences between literature and modernity. Translation becomes neither domesticating nor foreignising but a space where various representational claims are simultaneously adapted and contested. The prophetic narrative voice does not exist outside of language, but occupies different places within it so as to profane the logic of colonial language and the relegation of literature's role to moral instruction at al-Azhar. Thus, 'religion' in this book emerges in the dialogue between translation and original.

Literary translation as an act of profanity makes way for the prophetic. Maurice Blanchot, without naming it profane, implicates literature with prophecy in Le Livre à Venir (The Book to Come) (French 1959; English 2003). In the earlier Lëspace littéraire (The Space of Literature) (1955; 1982), Blanchot had marked Franz Kafka's entry into literature as a dispossession from meaning in substituting the impersonal 'it' or 'il' for 'I'. The 'il' – a neutral pronoun – makes the subject speak from a place of emptiness that is not transcendent but emerges from within the text. The 'it' (il) does not replace the subject, Blanchot insists, but is instead 'a mobile fragmentation' that challenges our understanding of place as 'fixed' or 'unique'. The literary takes shape precisely in that non-space, at once within the text but not identifiable to one speaker within it. Similarly, in The Book to Come, the prophet's words exist outside of common-use

language because they stand in for God's word. The message is not communicable, but 'wandering speech' (parole errante), recalling Walter Benjamin's letter to Martin Buber (17 July 1916), 'I can only understand writing, as far as it effects matter, poetically prophetically . . . that is to say, immediately.' Ian Balfour succinctly draws out the prophetic as 'mediated immediacy or immediate mediation . . . the . . . most definitive language'. The question remains: if language is not communicating content, what exactly is it doing? Language as a performance of naming, as comes through in Benjamin's rereading of Genesis, is action; a word literally acts on the world in naming it. For Benjamin, this act of translation, of naming the world and rendering it legible, precedes the functional aspect of language as communication.

By displacing the originals into new contexts, the translations profane the originals' status as singular. The prophetic in this book emerges from this profanation in particular moments of adaptation of a foreign text, beyond the translator's conscious volition. In other words, it is the use of literary language that produces the prophetic as a legacy of both romantic symbolism and Qurʾānic language. It also makes possible a different approach to translation that could help explain the nuances of colonial borrowings of genres under occupation beyond frameworks of resistance. The translators' narrative voice is prophetic but does not promise religious prophecy. It unknowingly borrows the intersection between the prophetic and literary in Blanchot's work. Beyond the secular, what emerges is profane translation that straddles the divine and secular but does not replace either. It also mobilises a new conception of literary language that is neither radically different from the adab tradition nor the product of a liberal, humanist, and national project. The literary text in and as translation develops a 'hollow' status as it claims to be coming from the space in between original and translation. In that sense, it comes to profane and not simply secularise both the tradition and the borrowed text.

Finally, it is important to distinguish between an Islamic text and what I am calling a prophetic voice.106 Some critics have argued that an Islamic novel is impossible as the form's creativity is inherently irreconcilable with Islamic ideals. Even though the Arabic novel was an imitation of the European model, Edward Said finds the 'desire to create an alternative world' that motivates the Western text 'inimical to the Islamic world-view'. Since the Prophet 'has completed a world-view', Islam approaches the world as already perfect, requiring no amendment. While Said's claim is contestable, since fictional narrative has always been a part of Arabic prose tradition, the teleological narrative of the European realist novel is new to Arabic literature. Traditional forms of Arabic prose tend to be more episodic than teleological. My interest, however, is in the promise of the prophetic received in the translation of European literature. The translations mark an important literary historical moment before Qurʾānic discourse (either as citation, commentary, or rewriting) becomes a creative intertext in the Arabic novel. Theology and literature continue to exist side by side and are approached in similar representational terms, but, significantly, one does not supplant the other. Even though Egypt's religious landscape coupled with the translators' Azharite education impacts their articulations of prophecy, translation profanes this prophetic vocation. For example, al-ʿAqqād makes a distinction between genius and prophecy through the Prophet Muhammad and allows for reproduction only of genius. Al-Manfalūṭī, on the other hand, transforms waʿy into khayāl (imagination) and declares himself a model to be emulated, placing himself in the line of illiterate prophets. It is in this particular sense of the prophetic and against stifling colonial dynamics of identification that the translations of the early twentieth century are able to craft a narrative voice unique to them.

In each instance of translation, the terms of identification vary according to particular formal and linguistic adaptations of the original. In every chapter I consider each translator's particular theory of translation alongside his actual translation to locate the prophetic in that space in-between the two, not as a religious capacity but specifically as a narrative one that challenges predictable linguistic reference. In various forms, the translators

engaged contemporary discussions on the inadequate equivalences between languages. As Liu puts it, 'One does not translate between equivalents; rather one creates tropes of equivalence in the middle zone of interlinear translation between the host and guest languages.' The dynamic of emulation, which echoes the impossibility of complete emulation of the Islamic prophet, enables the birth of the prophetic, which profanes the original and the tradition, without establishing a simple relationship of equivalence between the two.

The translators profane the originals in finding something of their own in the ideals of European romanticism and realism that was never really there. Even if we consider the rampant onslaught of colonial and imperial capitalism in early-twentieth-century Egypt, we can still identify in these translations a profanation that introduces a kind of literary reading – one that was never in use and foreign to the Arabic literary tradition – to common use. As common use, however, these translations end up claiming a place supposedly organic to that same tradition. This book draws upon Agamben's idea of the profane to think of prophecy as a narrative capacity opening up fissures in the narrative text and unsettling predictable temporalities of classical European literature (and by extension a classical European project of teleological enlightenment). Thus, the prophetic fulfils the promise of a literary voice that occupies many places and no place within language.

Literary translation as profane is not ahistorical, but rather interruptive; much like the 'il' in Blanchot's analysis, the prophetic voice speaks from within the text, occupying different places and voices, repeatedly producing the literary object in an 'untrascendental contingency' (Derek Attridge's term). The act of reading is repeated and singular every time, particular in speaking to its reader and context, while simultaneously appealing to literature's universalist humanism. In every chapter, I assess whether this promise is fulfilled, in what capacity, and in whose language, insisting that the prophetic, much like perfect translation, resides most powerfully in lack of fulfilment.

The works considered here include al-Manfalūṭī's 1923 translation of Bernardin de Saint-Pierre's Paul et Virginie (1788/9) and his 1915 adaptation of François-René de Chateaubriand's René (1802) and Atala (1801); Muhammad al-Sibāʿī's 1911 translation of Thomas Carlyle's On Heroes (1841) and 1912 translation of Charles Dickens' A Tale of Two Cities (1859); ʿĀhā Óusayn's 1946 translation of André Gide's Œdipe (1930) and Thésée (1946), and Voltaire's Zadig (1747) in 1947; and Haykal's two-volume biography of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1921; 1923). The literary prophetic emerges in each case in the free adaptation of the originals, and throughout, the prophetic voice is not consciously subversive. As I already mentioned, most Egyptian translators of the time engaged in self-orientalisation rather than outright subversive mimicry of the colonial text, as Shaden Tageldin explains: imagining themselves as equals to the coloniser in a relationship rapt in seduction.113 While every chapter recognises this self-orientalising, the prophetic voice displaces it from the author's person into his text. As such, the prophetic complicates the idea that subjectivity and individuality are transacted and forged through the absolute copying of European forms. Rather, subjectivity remains incomplete, inasmuch as translation and emulation of the Muslim prophet remain incomplete. This incompleteness is not a 'failure' but, remarkably, a transaction with the original text. The literary prophetic, emerging and developing in plagiarised and creative translations, simultaneously annexes and radically separates the translator from the European master text, challenging our approach to translation as strictly domesticating or foreignising.

Mirror, Mirror at Sea, Won't You Just Reflect Me?

Arguably, it was Napoleon Bonaparte's use of translation when he arrived in Alexandria in 1798 that instigated this double function of translation as annexing and radically severing the translated text from the original. Onboard his ship L'Orient, Napoleon printed his Arabic speech to the Egyptians, promising that he would liberate them

from the oppressive rule of the Mamluks. This promise proclaimed in a language he did not speak was made possible in and on French terms: the allegiance to France was the precondition for the people's liberation. Albert Hourani reads this paradox as beginning 'with the traditional Muslim invocation', but then citing a new idea, for 'this proclamation, it declared, was issued by the French Government, which was "built on the basis of freedom and equality"', and Napoleon 'proceeded to apply these principles to Egypt'. Napoleon's declaration initiated secular translation politics – wherein the master text himself, Napoleon, was speaking in translation, announcing himself as the supplementary text to the Qurʾānic invocation. Thus, even after he was defeated by Sir Horatio Nelson at the Battle of the Nile in 1801, this particular promise of translation, consolidated by the printing press, journals, and other institutions that he set up, persisted and became increasingly influential with the rise of Muhammad ʿAlī to power as governor of Egypt and Sudan in 1805, and particularly after 1811, when the Mamluks were eliminated at the Citadel. And while the British colonial presence dominated Egyptian political life from 1882 until 1952, the French texts that Napoleon introduced in translation had the most tangible effect on the political, social, and cultural constitutions of the country. Napoleon established the Institut d'Égypte, made up of French scholars, whereby the French invader (Napoleon) became at once the legislator who created a library, a health service, a botanical garden, an observatory, and a museum. The French scholars devised an Arabic–French dictionary and put together an Egypto-Coptic-Franco calendar. With the introduction of his own printing press, Napoleon supervised the publication and distribution of two journals in Cairo. Both compiled and edited by the Orientalist, Jean Joseph Marcel, the first, La Décade égyptienne (The Egyptian Decade), concerned itself primarily with literature and political economy, and the second – Le Courrier de l'Égypte (The Courier of Egypt) – took up mainly political issues. The journals established the superiority of French knowledge and urged Muhammad ʿAlī as early as 1809 to send Egyptians on missions to France asking them to bring back as many French books as they could carry. About six hundred books came into Cairo at once in 1809, because 'Muhammad ʿAlī considered that his means to achieve reform was copying [that is, translation] from the West'. In 1835, Muhammad ʿAlī established the School of Languages (Madrasat al-alsun), which taught only foreign languages. Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ al-Tahtāwī (1801–73), a pioneering Egyptian literary translator, headed the school until his banishment in 1850.

Al-Tahtāwīʾ s work marked the beginning of a new phase of literary trans-lation. There were different and overlapping approaches to translation that ranged from completely free appropriations to more literal attempts, but throughout translation remained a creative act of adaptation. Although distinctions between translation styles may hold in a more comprehensive overview of different literary translations, they are not entirely accurate. For one, the translations in this book range from very literal to complete adaptations and they are all published within the same period, from 1911 to 1949. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, many of these adaptations approached the originals freely, adapting or removing parts, changing the original's structure and in many cases intended meaning, and occasionally removing the original authors' names.

Thus, translation here implies a combination of all these styles, from literal proximity to original texts, to less faithful adaptation that accommodates the receiving culture, and finally to free rewriting of original texts
and lives of authors in an effort to sculpt a new prophetic voice for the Egyptian writer. Translation during this period was synonymous with taʿrīb and iqtibās, Arabisation and adaptation, and remained so until after World War II. For instance, al-Manfalūtī develops a prophetic voice through his free rewritings of French fiction, while al-Sibāʿī articulates his version of the heropoet-prophet through a subtle rewriting of Carlyle's two eponymous lectures, and Haykal makes Rousseau into the Carlylean hero of historical biography. Approaching translation as a fusion of all these styles is more productive than treating it as a series of stylistic phases unfolding in some form of

chronological development. The translations in this book are creative adaptations even when they pretend to complete fidelity, because they always manipulate the Western original. Against Franco Moretti's 'distant reading', this book espouses a close reading that can account for the nuances in these different performances of adaptation.

For instance, these 'creative translations', as Mattityahu Peled calls them, took on a more complex shape and urgent role during the later decades of the nahda. While in the previous phases of translation under Muhammad ʿAlī, the imperative was to be literal and copy European 'modernity' as accurately as possible, the later phases involve more literary adaptation as fiction becomes the space of political critique. During the nahda, translation of European literature took on the immense task of representing the new nation and by extension, the new authorial self. According to Selim, the nahda embraced translation to achieve a fast-paced modernity in the Arab world. Tageldin clarifies that for the nahdawī thinkers, 'becoming modern' was never about giving up Arabic; rather, the nahda 'unfolded in translation: it transported French or English into Arabic. Thus it appeared to "preserve" Arabic while "translating it"'. The nahdawī authors of the late nineteenth century paved the way for the twentieth-century translators, who found in translation a promise of literary freedom. Al-Manfalūṭī, al-Sibāʿī, Haykal, and Husayn write within and against this promise of translation. In every chapter, this 'preservation' of Arabic in translation is related to the duplicitous promise of translation to deliver absolute equivalence.

The translators' romantic leanings shaped that freedom: al-Manfalūṭī adapted Chateaubriand, al-Sibāʿī translated Shakespeare and Carlyle, Haykal rewrote Rousseau's life, and Husayn found himself in Gide. Romanticism here does not refer strictly to French or English traditions, even though the three groups of romantic Arab poets were educated in both. Rather, the adjective 'romantic' implies the opposite of what was understood to be realistic narration or mimetic representation. The chapter on al-Manfalūṭī deals with this polemic in more depth, as he became the target of the realist writers, and suggests that the 'escapist' tendencies promised by sentimental and romantic literature made possible a 'way out' of the tyranny of the coloniser's master text precisely in the prophetic voice and despite the author's affiliations. This reading is not meant to bestow a subversive potential on these authors that they do not possess. Rather, it approaches translation as a literary promise, resorting to other texts about and in other worlds, that betrays a certain allure for these thinkers; coupled with romanticism, the allure transforms into a narrative voice that manipulates language and genre.

This new narrative vocation, although subjective in its vision, is not to be confused with a fully developed narrative subjectivity. Under the influence of romanticism, it was not until the 1919 Nationalist Revolution against British occupation, confirms Selim, that the first fictional subjectivities begin to appear.128 The national fiction of the 1930s competed with popular serialised fiction from the get-go. Literary subjectivity may have become more articulate in the 1930s, but it starts taking shape in an earlier dialogue with translations of al-Manfalūṭī, the poetic project of the Dīwānīs, and the auto/biographical translations of Haykal and Husayn. Prophetic Translation reads the narrative function produced in plagiarised translation as a way to understand the later evolution of narrative subjectivities. For as there are periods of translation, there are corresponding periods of development of the Arabic novel.

Genre, Literary History and Translation

A telling example is ʿAbd al-Muᵃsin ʺāhā Badr's foundational Taṭawwur al-riwāya al-ʿArabiyya al-ᵃadītha fī Misr (1870–1938) (The Development of the Modern Arabic Novel in Egypt (1870–1938)). Badr categorises the novels published in Egypt from 1870 to 1938 into three currents: the first includes the didactic and entertainment novels popular from 1870 until 1919; the second and third phases coincide in the years from 1920 to 1938. These phases include all translators considered in this book, despite their very different

translation styles. In this early phase of translation there was an interest in detective fiction and the works of Victor Hugo, Sir Walter Scott, and William Thackeray – and in a misunderstood and shallow version of romanticism, as these authors, Badr continues, turned to romantic literature believing it did not involve analysis. The best examples are al-Manfalūṭī's peculiar adaptations of sentimental fiction marked by the absence of the original author's name and removal of 'unfamiliar' details like dialogue. In Badr's analysis, such translation occasioned a crisis in literary expression because knowledge of the precise reference of words (dalāla) became uncertain. In Chapter One, I argue that this is precisely the precondition of al-Manfalūṭī's adaptations of French fiction and ultimately the dimension of the prophetic as he articulates it in the first volume of the trilogy Al-NaÕarāt (Visions) (1910).

For Badr, the second phase is of the artistic novel (1920–38), which came into its own after 1919 under the influence of two translations: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's Werther and Alexandre Dumas, fils's La Dame aux Camélias. The last two translations introduced the middle-class hero and narrative subjectivity into Arabic literature. The artistic novel was more realistic in its depiction of Egyptian reality and includes Yahyā Haqqī, Mahmūd Taymūr, and ʿĪsā ʿUbayd. Because of the simultaneous translation of romantic and realist European fiction, the writers of the artistic novel struggled to reconcile the politics and aesthetics of the novel, a crisis that significantly reaches its peak in the romantic translations in the interwar period (such as Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyāt's 1925 translation of Alphonse de Lamartine's Raphaël). This current would tangentially include the translations of al-Sibāʿī whose translation of Charles Dickens's A Tale of Two Cities in 1912 is one of the sincerest engagements of the realistic style in the history of the Arabic novel. Coexistent with this current is the novel of subjective translation, which includes Haykal, Husayn, al-ʿAqqād, al-Māzinī, and Tawfīq al-Hakīm. The subjective novel revolves around an inflated authorial self, although Badr leaves out the role of translation in the evolution of this self. After all, Haykal wrote a book on Rousseau; Husayn translated French literature prolifically; and al-Māzinī translated collections of English fiction by Oscar Wilde, John Galsworthy, and H. G. Wells, to name a few. Some of these translations were complete adaptations that did not mention the original's title or author; others mentioned the original author but completely changed the title; others completely changed the content; and others claimed to be translations of European texts when they were native and original novels. Pierre Cachia finds that the varied translation styles testify to an evolving taste and desire for different types of Western narratives and the emergence of a reading public.

The prophetic narrative voice in early adaptations and emulations of European fiction troubles these neat genealogies of the Egyptian novel by confronting new styles with narrative traditions and recalling the legacy of the maqāma, sīra, hadīth, and the One Thousand and One Nights. Although brought about through translation, the prophetic narrative voice remains in conversation with older narrative forms, and carries in it traces of the Arab storyteller figure, such that the narrative voice maintains an oral address in the written text.

Moreover, the history of translation into Arabic challenges a straightforward, teleological genealogy of the Arabic novel. For one, romantic, sentimental, and realist fiction was being translated and emulated at the same time. The aesthetic criteria of the three types of fiction, which developed chronologically in European literature, came into Arabic all at once, and gave rise to what Niranjana calls 'a conceptual economy'. Because Western philosophies of representation pretend to coincide with the reality out there, as she calls it, 'translation in the colonial context produces and supports a conceptual economy that works into the discourse of Western philosophy . . . as a philosopheme (a basic unit of philosophical conceptuality)'. This economy, a product of a hegemonic Western philosophy of representation imposed on the colonised, makes them 'beg for the

English books' and produces representation as reality, making it even more compelling for the colonised to write like the coloniser. Translations into Arabic certainly produce a 'conceptual economy' of representation that remains in conversation with the European text. It is important to reiterate that translation of European texts by native translators does not guarantee subversive appropriation of the originals. In fact, the translators of the early twentieth century were still in Franz Fanon's first phase of (post)colonial writing, that of emulating the master text, and they were also under British colonial domination and Ottoman rule since 1517 (which collapsed in 1924), not to mention the powerful influence of the short-lived Napoleonic expedition (1798–1802). As such, in producing these translations, the translator did not purport subversively to adapt the master text.

Besides, in colonial Egypt, the translation of romantic and Enlightenment fiction overlapped with the lingering legacy of the adab tradition of communicating a moral. While Blanchot's prophetic word is radically cut off from sense, the historical situation of the literary text in twentieth-century Egypt placed a burden of didacticism on literature in what was seen as a national imperative to educate the masses. The translations, however, respond to the prophetic imperative in choosing a different source from immediate reality, and remaining cut off in that sense, such that translation is not secondary and derivative in a colonial system of dysfunctional equivalences. Instead of simply heeding the imperative to 'represent', and under the obligation to 'instruct', these translations produce the literary precisely as critique of discursive modalities of colonial modernity. Literature comes to both document and be the historical, as we find that many of these texts were literally put on trial and the translators sent to prison or exile. The prophetic invective to create the world in language entails the very real ways in which these writers interrupt political histories and the cultural time of modernity, as their texts become punctuating events that both reflect and produce historical moments. As Husayn writes in 'al-Adab wa-l-ʿayāt' (Literature and Life) (1955), 'literature is a source of human history, and perhaps in comparison to some nations, or some of their epochs, the most dangerous historical source'. From within the texts emerge the discursive and non-discursive practices in which historical time becomes the text's present moment – its publication, circulation, and reception. Because these translations revise the original, and refer it to the receiving context, they also point to how the modern comes about in the equivalence between colonial secularism and literary discourse. For example, the ways in which the translations confront various linguistic registers (the ʿāmmiyya and fuṣḥā, romanticism and realism) capture the tension between divine and profane when the author situates his text as a contingent act of reading. Instead of maintaining distinctions between high and low forms, I ask: how do these translations re-present dominant ideological structures?

I read these translations closely to rethink their relationship to Islam as a discourse and a lived religion on the one hand, and their place in genealogical accounts on the other. Such double reading helps identify the shift they occasion from religious to literary interpretation, such that the emulation of the prophet Muhammad as model-human parallels the emulation of the original; translation as intervention, however, supercedes authorial intention. In examining other nahḍas through popular fiction that habitually falls outside popular accounts of the Arabic novel's origins, Selim challenges 'the hegemony of the European liberal concept of the subject' as a locus of 'authorship and copyright in the literary domain'. Only popular translations in her view escape 'the Romantic conventions of authorship that the Nahda appropriated and carnivalised'. The translators' historically situated acts of translation critique the liberal individual's 'I', the objectively contained 'he', and the all-knowing omniscient narrator.

The elites' literary translations played a major role in simplifying the Arabic language. Daniel Newman recognises the simplistic but necessary approach that places translations and new literary genres like the novel and drama midway between 'conservative', 'high literature, including religious output (Quran and hadith exegesis)' and 'creative' or 'liberal' journalistic writing. The 'modernisation'

of the language was the domain of the elite's translations, and while they impact the people's relationship to Arabic, they remain the prerogative of the educated, both the Christian Syrian emigrés and the Muslim translators who were more hesitant to renovate the language (see Chapter One). Thus, the 'profanation' of the Arabic language (à la Agamben) through translation as adaptation, appropriation, and commentary reconfigures both the elites' and the masses' languages. I discuss in every chapter the inclusion, exclusion, and imagination of the masses in this aesthetic project both to recognise how differences in political languages get established and to unsettle the originals' universal claims through close reading.

What becomes of the translator's prophetic aspiration in this complicated 'conceptual economy'? Nahḍawī intellectuals have retrospectively been attacked for their chosen depoliticisation. Under the obligation of iltizām or commitment, later intellectuals denigrated the earlier preoccupation with aesthetics over politics. But what if aesthetics in translation suggest a different politics of liberation from a master/text? If translation reproduces the original's failure to produce a coherent meaning, and the translator still exercises some form of choice, how do we read the impact of prophetic translation? Although censorship relaxed in the nineteenth century and early twentieth, al-ʻaḥṭāwi was exiled because of his translation of François Fénélon's Télémaque, and Husayn was put on trial for his claims in Fī al-hiʿr al-jāhilī. The depolicitisation of the translator's role arguably compelled him to seek authority in the master text. Stephen Sheehi describes this dynamic in the work of Syro-Lebanese Buṭrus al-Bustānī to conclude that 'only the supplemental mediation of the European Self can bestow knowledge, and thereby mastery and subjective presence, to the modern Arab'. Similarly Tageldin finds that Orientalist discourse seduced Egyptians under French and British rule because it seemed to cast both Europeans and Egyptians as equals. Seduction enables a forgetting of power difference and makes it possible for the 'colonised [to] lose themselves in the coloniser in order to regain their "sovereign" selves'. The prophetic specifically as manipulative translation, however, hinders these absolute equivalences.

The complex identification and seduction between coloniser and colonised plays out in Niranjani's 'conceptual economy', wherein the colonised is made to fall in love with the European text. However, through literary translation as manipulation, this conceptual economy also critiques colonial power. I focus on the literary encounter between two politically inequiva-lent languages in translation to rethink the political; in my analysis, the political transcends pronounced commitment into a counter-discourse of aesthetic criticism that disables authorial intention. For instance, I emphasise the adaptations of the Arabic language to accommodate the European text, which translate the foreign while maintaining its foreignness from both source and destination. These adaptations, I argue, are a product of the prophetic narrative voice that legitimates them not necessarily as conscious rewritings or imitations of an original, but more importantly as inevitable products of the slippages between an authoritative, originary text and its derivative, secondary translation and not only in the political opposition established between the two. As such, they echo Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's task of the translator as 'surrender to the text', listening to the silences and gaps, making translation 'the most intimate act of reading'. The prophetic narrative voice treats the original with an intimacy that rewrites colonial supremacy and translation pays its debt to the original in its afterlife by revealing its inevitable failure of signification as just that – inevitable. I have divided the book into chapters that focus on specific translation styles that show us how narrative self-constitution undid voiced political positions and how translation unmade the object it meant to construct – namely, modern Arabic literature. <>

The Translator as Mediator of Cultures edited by Humphrey Tonkin, Maria Esposito Frank [Studies in World Language Problems, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 9789027228345]

If it is bilingualism that transfers information and ideas from culture to culture, it is the translator who

systematizes and generalizes this process. The translator serves as a mediator of cultures. In this collection of essays, based on a conference held at the University of Hartford, a group of individuals – professional translators, linguists, and literary scholars – exchange their views on translation and its power to influence literary traditions and to shape cultural and economic identities. The authors explore the implications of their views on the theory and craft of translation, both written and oral, in an era of unsettling globalizing forces.

Excerpt: What Abram de Swaan has famously called the world language system has grown increasingly complex in recent years as everyday contacts between people across the world have grown ever more intense. The second half of the twentieth century was characterized by the decline of empire, as the process of decolonization changed the face of international relations fundamentally, bringing new populations to the international negotiating table, creating (or coinciding with) massive movement of people from country to country, changing the shape and intensity of local conflicts, and, in a final paroxysm, bringing the east-west division between the forces of capitalism and those of socialism to an end. The world was freed for what we have come to call globalization, in which economic networks increasingly crossed borders, aided by advances in technology, and conventional indicators of political power seemed to apply less and less. Even as these changes were occurring, assumptions about the nature of the disciplines were changing too. Culturally-based fields like comparative literature, history and anthropology were forced to reinvent themselves to take into account a world no longer centered on Europe, no longer focused on the printed text, and no longer capable - in the midst of massive consumption, increasing cultural homogenization, and huge rises in population - of holding its parts in isolation from one another.

As for theories and practices of translation, a plethora of publications attests to an intensified interest and a nuanced understanding of the field today. This current boom signals a shift comparable in import, one could say, to the one Renaissance culture produced thanks to an acute philological sensitivity and historical perspective that led to, among other things, the end of the ad verbum method and the introduction of ad sententia methods of rendering Greek texts into Latin, and Latin texts into the vernacular. This momentous change presupposed, as James Hankins has pointed out, a more general shift in the underlying conception of language itself, which reveals a

newly achieved awareness of the historicity of language. Indeed, a modern approach to language, no longer seen as an isolated, natural or atemporal phenomenon, undergirds the first Renaissance treatise on translation theory, Leonardo Bruni's De recta interpretatione (1424-26), Valla's politically and religiously consequential application of textual and historical criticism, and Erasmus' biblical retranslations. As Richard Waswo sees it, among the greatest discoveries of the Age of the Renaissance was an intellectual one: the discovery of the constitutive nature of language. For the most insightful humanists of the time language did not simply describe or reflect the world but expanded and explained it. Indeed, the actual world these humanists were living in was itself expanding (backwards in time to the rediscovery and re-appropriation of a multifarious Graeco-Roman legacy, and outwards as Europe discovered and appropriated a larger world), thereby engendering a sort of cosmopolitanism, which, at least culturally, contained the seeds of our contemporary global outlook.

In today's world, translation studies and their rapid recent expansion can be seen as a product of work in cultural studies and literary theory, but also in policy studies and political theory. They have taken on a certain priority because the matter of language, locally, nationally, globally, has assumed a new urgency.

Holding this world together, or keeping it apart, is language. At the boundaries of languages are the translators - mediators of cultures, enablers, but also gatekeepers. They are what we might call professional or committed bilinguals. Behind them stand what Milton and Bandia call the "agents" of translation - those individuals and organizations who set the terms of the processes of translation and in some sense determine the forms that linguistic traffic will take. While English may be growing in strength and authority as a world lingua franca, and while the demise of smaller languages has reached epidemic proportions, the number of written languages in the world is steady or growing, and the number of languages with some official standing at the national or regional level has expanded enormously over the past fifty years as a result of decolonization and also of the emergence of an era of cheap Internet connections and new electronic publishing opportunities. Their very variety may contribute to their decline as they compete with more powerful international idioms. Indeed, the question that language policy makers must face today is above all the management of this vast array of competing linguistic channels. If the management of world affairs demands communication, the maintenance of human identities demands variety. How can we give the cultures of the world enough room to breathe, while working together to deal with the world's problems? How can we preserve linguistic difference without hindering linguistic communication? Is it even possible?

While the present volume is not intended to be prescriptive, but rather descriptive, it is questions such as these that lie behind it. In it the reader will find specific, but by no means confined, instances of translating challenges and potentialities. Its genesis was a conference held at the University of Hartford in 2006 entitled "The Translator as Mediator" where translation issues concerning post-colonial and "post-missionary" language attitudes and policies, border identity, transcreation, betweenness, technological mediations and futuristic renditions, international crime and law, and literary translation were discussed in an interdisciplinary context.

Several of the papers began as contributions to the conference, though most have undergone significant changes since then; others, including the extended conversation with Antjie Krog, have been added to supplement and expand them. Some (Cooper, Jackson, Tramuta, Tonkin) deal directly with the textual exchange of cultural values and ideas through literature and philosophy; others (Edwards, Colapietro) examine the complexities and pitfalls of the translation process while Dasgupta provides us in his introduction with a historical "template" for thinking about the nature of translation itself. Still others deal with the practical processes of interpretation and translation (Nicholson, Reagan), while Pool imagines a post-technologist world fundamentally different from the here-and-now. Krog confronts the direct realities of living in a multilingual and linguistically highly competitive environment, in which the relative standing of

languages is undergoing rapid shift. In truth, the South African situation, with its processes of linguistic inclusion and exclusion, is a microcosm of the worldwide linguistic contest. Increasingly, translators seem to be the guardians and arbiters of many of these linguistic interactions - essential figures in the preservation of multilingualism, and also (as Venuti 1995 describes them) the invisible conveyors of cultural values from language to language.

Our first section deals with the practicalities of translation in the world of today and tomorrow. We begin the section with Antjie Krog's conversation with Rosalind Morris and Humphrey Tonkin both because of its scope and because it provides us with a unifying theme - that of reconciliation. Our second section, which contains the volume's most wide-ranging essays on the theory of translation, considers the role of the translator as negotiator. The final section addresses the interpretation and exchange of texts. The three - reconciliation, negotiation, textual exchange - together sum up the mediating role that the translator must strive to provide in today's fractured and fractious world.

Between temples and templates: History's claims on the translator by Probal Dasgupta

The present articulation of history's claims on translation theory is built around four propositions: (a) The sacred temple, in the ancient first wave of the activity, set up one broadly identifiable type of translation enterprise; (b) The scientific template, in the modern second wave, associated itself with a second type; (c) These enterprises have a missionary element in common that should elicit resistance on our part; (d) The legacy of these missionary enterprises themselves can be recycled, in a swords-to-plowshares transformation, if we post-missionary translators agree to play these enterprises off against each other as we reconfigure the field. The present exposition elaborates these propositions in terms drawn from the substantivist research program in linguistics and cognitive science.

As translation comes of age, history catches up with it, whereupon self-conscious translators begin to respond to history's claims on them. This is not to say that a single consensual take on translation theory can be expected to emerge from such a process. The present articulation of history's claims on translation theory is built around four propositions: (a) The sacred temple, in the ancient first wave of the activity, set up one broadly identifiable type of translation enterprise; (b) The scientific template, in the modern second wave, associated itself with a second type; (c) These enterprises have a missionary element in common that should elicit resistance on our part; (d) The legacy of these missionary enterprises themselves can be recycled, in a swords-to-plowshares transformation, if we post-missionary translators agree to play these enterprises off against each other as we reconfigure the field.

The present exposition elaborates these propositions in terms drawn from the substantivist research program in linguistics and cognitive science. When substantivism was first introduced - in a translation-theoretical context - it came with a practical unpacking attached, a passage that we may wish to revisit first to get clued in. What I then wrote, twenty years ago, was:

> It is important to see that no translator can hope to passively `consume' a supposed `technique' of substantivist translation. Substantivism is a mode of self-consciousness about the nature of the task. The simplest way to understand what we are suggesting for the practice of translation is to return to the counter-image of the Bible translator whose practice, with its sophisticated successors, embodies [the default version of the traditional formalistic approach to translation]. We have argued that the typical missionary translates the Bible with the hope of conveying the same original divine message in simply another mortal medium; the outcome is that he deifies, and reifies, certain properties of the source language text which become wooden and parodic in his target language output. This reflects the fact that he believes languages are equidistant from the divine Logos and that, consequently, he thinks he can translate without registering in the product itself the problematicity of the act of translating.

> Against the background of this counter-image, we are trying to see, and to live by, a new image of the non-converting translator. This missionless worker is not trying to convert the heathens to some true faith by forcing the forms of their language into the ideally determinate text of some already valorized Word, but is instead trying out - without submission to alien imposition but also without that sanctimonious `resistance' whose violence merely codifies another passive response to an alien initiative - viable options in the uncharted area where the target language can represent to itself, reflexively and critically, the impressions that the source language text formally appears to make on the ideal source-language-listener figures that the text throws up and lets drop as it wends its polyglossic way. At one level, this can mean that our ideal translator produces work that emphasizes its lack of innocence, stresses the unavailability of pure or transparent equivalences; but that mode of work, the heroic or violent/ workaholic enterprise of modernism and its "post"-continuations, is only one of the options; quieter methods are possible which keep the traces of heroic problematicity hidden in the new text, while leaving them visible to the complicit, critical reader.

Since 1989, it has proved possible to elaborate substantivism as a research program in linguistics and cognitive science.

What distinguishes substantivist analysis from the formalist mainstream in linguistics may be summarized as follows. The prevalent formalist approach focuses on grammatical rules as the primes of rigorous characterization of language. Formalism maximizes the economy of grammatical rule formulations. All other methodological decisions flow from the primacy of the rule of grammar. Formalist methodology aggregates rules to establish as unitary a system as possible.

In contrast, the substantivist approach regards the cycle from sentence composition through speaking, hearing, and understanding to fresh composition as the rich substantive domain of grammatical inquiry embedded in the context of discourse. It seeks a maximally transparent and economical account of this cycle within which rules of grammar and other descriptive devices are to be seriously conceptualized, going beyond abbreviations that may work at a first approximation level but are not sustainable. Substantivist methodology appeals to cross-system translation and seeks to associate each formal object with several semiotic systems.

While contemporary elaborations of substantivism have launched a relatively new enterprise, the twin imperatives - the formalist imperative of writing a tight grammar and the substantivist imperative of providing a coherent account of discourse - were noticed when serious characterizations of language phenomena were formulated for the first time, in ancient India. Around the time that Panini's grammar of Sanskrit was codified, Vyadi (a.k.a. Dakshayana) wrote a major commentary on it - the Samgraha. This text has not come down to us, but references to it allow us to reconstruct its scope. Bhartrihari's much later work Vaakyapadiiya rearticulates and codifies the project initiated in Dakshayana's early substantivist supplement to Panini's formalistic grammar statements.

The role of Bhartrihari's work as the classical basis for substantivism was stressed in Dasgupta. In the context of the generative re-run and amplification of the ancient Indian grammatical research program in our times, kickstarting substantivist research today involves bridge-building between grammatical theory and the study of the use of language. We can find resources for such bridgebuilding in Bhartrihari's reconfiguration of Panini's apparatus - a point elaborated.

In the context of translation studies, what becomes crucial is the multiple contextualization imperative that drives substantivist inquiry. In the present intervention it is argued that we can unsettle the default contextualization of translation in the modern developmentalist missionary enterprise by re-actualizing its classical precursors. Such unsettling serves the cause of cultural and linguistic dehegemonization.

Before we work this out more fully, a brief initial elaboration of this comment is called for. We are taking the position that most current approaches to cultural studies (including translation studies) tend to

be formalistic, in the sense of accepting default perspectives - dichotomizing the unity-seeking sciences of nature and the diversity-cherishing studies of culture, and tacitly allowing a western cultural default to position a particular view of `nature' as a universal or culture-free view. Formalistic views, we suggest, serve a center-driven socio-economic hegemony. This hegemony projects the default culture as if it were a culture-free center from which other views, taken to be `culturally specified,' diverge - just as male hegemony (still prevalent in so many enterprises even in our supposedly post-sexist times) projects itself as the default condition and women as marked. The strategy is to manage diversity by co-opting peripheral actors into such a system. These actors are given the task of agreeing to disagree, and thus to represent difference.

The point of departure for substantivism is this initially available formalistic. approach. That substantivism becomes possible at all is due to the fortunate fact that formalism is being placed under interrogation - under what we see as in effect substantive interrogation - by dissident actors dissatisfied with the system's tokenism made available in the standard multiculturalisms of a Canada or an EU. It is becoming increasingly clear that these rainbow menus silently install at the center of the menu an English default that manages perceptions and controls policy and documentation.

Such English-centered menus might have made sense, in terms of optimizing traffic flow or whatever, if human nature turned out to have a set of `natural defaults' associated with it that could plausibly be represented in a particular language like English. But dissident actors reject the view that there exist absolute, universal natural human inclinations. They request registered specifications of which preferences x, y, z are natural for which persons p, q, r in what contexts a, b, c.

This question of naturalness-for and naturalness-in theoretically and methodologically leads to a strategy of tracking concretely experienced differences as one travels through times, places, and contexts. In political practice, such tracking will have to translate into a serious, non-centered multiculturalism. Note that there are bound to be attempts to smuggle defaults back in - for instance, by installing some a priori method that would try to predigest all that inquirers engaged in real or imaginary cross-boundary travel can possibly encounter. For some comments addressing one version of that `baggageless travel' proposal, see Dasgupta.

Substantivism refuses to derive one experience from another and thus abjures the practice of installing defaults and acknowledging centers. Thus, the fundamental maneuver of substantivist inquiry is that of translating across views and systems to match things up and identify alignments that often harbor heterogeneity. Such cross-formal, substantive comments express concretely experienced generalizations. These, unlike abstract and center-focused formalizations of generality, do not theoretically and politically subordinate peripheral cases to principles and exemplars populating a center.

The substantivist perspective in translation studies develops a particular take on the interplay between what we shall describe as two major moments in the history of translation. The moment of the temple once established a classical basis for the choice of translatable texts and for the legitimation of what shall count as authentic translations. What the moment of the template has proposed, a proposal coterminous with modernity, is a recasting of rationality in terms of a universal nation-state model.

This recasting so completely transforms the nature of written texts that it becomes a serious, urgent, and fraught enterprise to spell out this radical transformation for our self-understanding and to come to terms with where we, where our various subject positions, define and keep redefining our bearings in relation to rationality. We do all this (re)defining precisely in the context of our resistance to some of the forces at work in the trajectory of modernity, a resistance partly scripted into the trajectory itself, but never entirely co-opted.

We may usefully focus on certain key phenomena in order to get an initial grip on what is at stake. Our contextualization in terms of these two moments - what we shall call our `bicontextual

perspective; to compress this for future reference - highlights the different positioning of text canonization forces at work within the two dispensations. Note that we are speaking not just of moments in the sense of temporal instants, but of moments in the sense of dynamic impulsions in a constellation of mutually relevant forces. Notice too that the current visualization focuses only on a few concrete instances of a vast volume of traffic and thus resorts to some idealization. There is no exhaustiveness claim embedded in this portrayal; all forms of supplementation and fleshing out are welcome.

The moment of the temple finds in the blinding illumination of certain sacred or otherwise majestic texts a compelling basis both for choosing to translate them and for deciding how to evaluate particular translations as authentic. The overwhelmingly significant texts, consecrated at the point of origin of their canonicity, are reconsecrated in the translation. If a translation seems luminous - or numinous - to those most crucially concerned, no independent criteria are in¬voked to evaluate its legitimacy or authenticity.

In sharp contrast - a contrast that one inevitably stylizes and exaggerates in this formulation, if we may repeat our point about the consequences of expository idealization - the moment of the template appeals to critically scrutinized knowledge and systematic accuracy as validation criteria. It does this both at the point of choosing translatable texts and at the level of evaluating translations. A first approximation account of the moment of the template, in contrast to the temple's vision of translation as reconsecration, can choose to focus on translation as the revalidation - under target language community scrutiny - of textual norms initially established under the source community's critical gaze. On such a view both communities are assumed to be sites of the circulation of publications enabling critical discourse and appropriate action by civil society.

But such a first approximation tends to accept too uncritical a portrait of the putatively open and ubiquitous public space. The same first approximation lets us get away with a hasty description of the onset of modernity in terms of the nationstate. It then sells us the assumption that in this globalized day and age those national sovereignties have to move over, and in fact are right now giving way to a new dispensation.

If we take that assumption at all seriously, we are obliged to wonder where this. leaves translation studies or comparative literature. For surely, we reason, whatever games the quintessential nation-state machine of standard modern vintage was playing with us translators to keep its regime going must have taken some sort of beating when we were not paying attention, right? The same process has befallen everything else that we thought we understood and that we seem to have sleepwalked away from. So, even in our vagueness, we find all this unsurprising, as we surrender to yet another first approximation.

The bicontextual perspective does not force such vagueness on us. It certainly does not endorse the slide from the first approximation into a series of semi-reflective responses.

A knowledge-oriented moment of the template asks the translator to agree to perform matching operations that appeal to comparable templates - matching the translated text against the formal and conceptual templates of the original; matching the way the new text is circulated among new community readers against the template of the way the first version reached its readership; and so on. These protocols of critical scrutiny, in such a regime of text reproduction across language sovereignty boundaries, imply a telos of text production that envisages export and reproducibility options under the aegis of universalizable generic norms.

The potential for template matching becomes a systemic imperative that begins to co-define the textual genres themselves at the site of production of the original texts.

This is not to say that the appeal to knowledge indiscriminately makes all texts count as translation-worthy or even translatable. The moment of the template institutes principles of selection that massively realign, but do not replace, the classical moment's norms of textual excellence and its criteria for deciding what to translate. New and old canonization processes interact, in ways we

need to map, and feed into a much expanded translation enterprise. This enterprise not only manages inter-state relations in an era of linguistically distinct nation-states. It also responds to a commercial regime that proliferates documents calling for technical and functional translation driven by utility rather than religious, aesthetic, or intellectual excellence.

Somewhere in this high volume traffic, the time scales begin to configure separately and drift apart. The arcade of short-term wares come into a certain forefront that redefines the archives of the state and the industrial-commercial system as a stable, long-term background, on which the arcade's meanings depend, but whose function as the site of meaning production the arcade begins to displace - in a cultural power struggle whose consequences for translation studies we cannot afford to explore here without getting seriously sidetracked.

Our strategy in the present intervention is to note, but to prescind from, the archive/ arcade duality within the moment of the template. We focus on the fact that the moment of the template sets up a translation apparatus as a public service system, as one systemic constituent of the public space. For our immediate purposes we simply take the stand that running such a public system involves both archive level and arcade level activities.

To the extent that translation counts as an automatically available service in the public sphere, the moment of the template structurally provides for a universal translibrary of theoretically producible translations of all valid texts. (If any reader can demonstrate that Borges, visualizing his Library of Babel, did not have such a translibrary niched in his vision, we have some further translation problems to surmount.) The template turns serious translation into a revalidation of the text as writable, whereas at the moment of the temple the function of serious translation was to reconsecrate the text as significant. In this formulation we speak of "serious" translation to register a certain continuity between the two moments at the level of identifying texts that are `excellent' and therefore deserve to be translated. What becomes fascinating when we take a closer look is the radical transformation that precisely this continuity renders visible, as a mutation in attributions of excellence.

It is not unnatural or inappropriate to begin with the obvious thought that translation was once wedded to faith and later shifted its centre of gravity to ratiocination, the thought encoded in our terms Temple and Template. In order to spare you a redundant guessing exercise, we will cut to the chase and tell you at once that, at the level of that simplified, schematic view of the macroscopic drift, our argument highlights a certain return of the repressed. We take the position that initially the expansion of reason, of science, of technology does imply a universal regime of translation as revalidation of intellectually worthy records. But the focus then shifts from the truth to our ways of establishing and sustaining communities of beholders of sharable truths - in other words, to our cultures, defined in terms of matters of faith and of latter-day reinventions of faith. The skeletal schema of our argument as we have just presented it, however, is neither what we are really proposing, nor a sustainable view, nor even pertinent to translation studies. If you want to get from this abstract headline to a minimally usable concrete characterization of our proposal, what you need to watch is the history of translation's target languages. Expository compulsions limit the examples we can look at.

The moment of the temple translates major texts into big languages - from Greek and Hebrew into Latin, for instance, or from Pali into Tibetan and Chinese. There is some sponsorship even at that moment for a trickle of translation into small languages in cases like the Asokan inscriptions, communicating majesty and transmitting his majesty the emperor Asoka's instructions and exhortations to the local level subject populations. When the wheel of history turns to make popular instruction an important preoccupation, that trickle turns into a flood.

At that turn of the wheel, Mediaeval Europe translates the Bible into its proto-national vernaculars. Mediaeval India translates the Ramayana and the Mahabharata into its incipient public languages, giving these epics through the

same process the status of source texts of Hindu religious practices, whose original Vedic scriptures remain a priestly possession (thematically sidelined, though ritually uncontested, by the popular religious culture built around the newly salient epics). This process empowers the vernaculars as vehicles of religious life but not as sites of consecration. It makes it possible to pose the question to which revalidation is the dominant modern answer. Translation's target language communities, the incipient modern discursive communities, are the site of this late mediaeval epistemic mutation - a point made at some length for the South Asian case of this mutation involving bhakti, Sufism, a musical realignment, and a paradigm shift in logical theorizing in Sanskrit.

But it would be an error to conclude that epistemic events in the vernaculars, including serious translation into them, get to call the shots in that late mediaeval process that forms part of the moment of the temple but already begins to set the stage for the moment of the template. Latin in Europe and Sanskrit in India continue to set the terms of systematic intellectual articulation. It is not just a matter of scientific work right up to Newton's Principia being written in Latin. Even at such a turning point as the late eighteenth century translation of Kalidasa's play Shakuntala into English by William Jones, Latin serves as the reference language. Jones knew little Sanskrit, and found Kalidasa's sentences hard to construe. Indian scholars helping him glossed each word for him. On this basis he produced a word for word rendering in Latin, a language for which his skills of construing and parsing were not a problem. This interlinear Latin version literally underwrote the iconic English translation by Jones. That is an example of how crucial Latin remained even in the late eighteenth century. In Asia, Indian scholars continued to produce treatises in their disciplines in Sanskrit and in Arabic well into the eighteenth century. An adequate account needs to take on board not just this fact about Asia, but the role of Latin in western discursive practices.

The willingness to call new political formations `empires' was not the only bit of the Roman legacy that drove the western project of `modern' imperialism.

Our tentative hypothesis is that the master languages retained control over the codes, while a newly salient category of circulables began to flourish in the subject languages. For a late medieval or early modern European, translating into the master language amounted to connecting a text with the reference discourses and calibrating it with the intellectual systematization. Vernacular European languages, with a flourishing traffic of circulables, had by then arranged an investment of the communities' attention in these circulables. But the intellectual memory or storage system of the supracommunity stayed wedded to the master language, despite the tattered state of its classical vestments of power.

The cathexes of attention and memory had to go through a major realignment when the template's encyclopedic enterprise took off in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The central thesis of our argument is that today the ground is shifting beneath our feet again, as we reconfigure our dealings with the template - and with the temple. Just how does today's reconfiguration involve revisiting the major shifts that inaugurated the moment of the template? To approach an answer, one must first itemize those shifts.

Our "moment of the template" visualization redescribes the Enlightenment as proposing a transfer of epistemic authority from the temple-sponsored monarch - endowed with powers of a priori divine judgment - to a republic whose citizens judge on the rational basis of a procedure of aggregating facts (where pertinent) and opinions (where facts fail) and running them all through a template. In our conception, this template may look like an innocent surface comparison procedure, but in reality it comes with an encyclopedia attached that supplies its terms of reference. All the fine print of the enlightenment is in this encyclopedia, by which we mean not the work by Diderot that you and I have agreed to not keep republishing and rereading, but the notional encyclopedic foundation of all modern writables - at the level at which serious translation throughout the modern period has amounted to the revalidation of a document as indeed a writable.

On our reading, this notional encyclopedia works with a nature-culture bifurcation - from Vico to Rousseau, if one wants a formulaic abbreviation - that has consequences for the design of the conceptual network of encyclopedic knowledge. Natural science entries in the encyclopedia in principle erase the history whereby scientific work arrives at what is taken to be the state of the art on each issue. For the point is to portray nature; and the truth of a portrait is independent of the drafting process that led to the final valid depiction. Cultural entries in principle point up all history, including the history of the reflection that has led to a particular metacultural characterization of a cultural fact. For the point is to portray culture; and culture in its essence is "man-made" and inextricably involves the history of "man" as a design principle.

One conceptually and politically striking characteristic of these principles that many observers have noticed is that they build the European expansion project into the epistemic structure of the Enlightenment. For the principles imply that culture is supposed to further bifurcate into the central cultures of the meritorious intellectual masters of the project and the peripheral cultures of the lowly subject populations. The latter, on this take, initially get colonized but are later co-opted into the cleaned-up post-imperial act of a putatively inclusive planetary post-enlightenment dispensation. We omit the obvious glosses to these terms, abundantly available in the current literature.

Another feature of these principles that seems to have received little attention is the slippage between the simple primes of the scientific axiomatic systems that must underpin the natural entries of the encyclopedia and the easy elementary precepts that the encyclopedia operates with. For the encyclopedia, as a popular pedagogic apparatus, must translate the macro-social memory's archival writables into the micro-social attention milieu's arcade of circulables - a translation process that treats the elementary precepts as pedagogic units. In other words, the axiomatic systems sponsor a decomposition of complex concepts into the simple primes on which they are conceptually based; but the pedagogy operates with an unpacking of difficult material for advanced learners into easy units of early learning.

Many pedagogic systems work with the attractive notion that simple primes and easy units of learning can converge on a common starting point for pedagogic packages and for axiomatizations. The Enlightenment in its early days depended for its moral and intellectual credibility on this convergence. But we of the late centuries of the Enlightenment know from experience that the simples and the easies diverge fairly quickly as a pedagogy or an axiomatization develops.

Thus the populist picture of an enlightenment based on a grass-roots constituency keeping the despotic power of the political or intellectual elite under the constant control of the public is not sustainable. The elite reinvents itself not just through micro-political mechanisms that work in every society, but by way of working out a logical structural imperative of the enlightenment process itself.

The point is not just that an intellectual structure emerges in the background, and with it an elite as a social carrier of this structure. Our point here is that a certain conceptual and linguistic centralization takes place that counterpoints the diversification through which the European expansion process plays out. Through this conceptual and linguistic centralization, an English emerges as the background cognitive absolute pulling the templates together and reinstating the Enlightenment's inaugural logic that once pitted the writables against the circulables.

Today's English, in this fashion, takes the place of what two hundred years ago was called Latin. By the same token, English occupies the polar position of an official intellectual codifying device against whose bureaucracy the expressive specificity of circulables in such newly regionalized languages as a French or a German or an Italian must cast itself in a reinvented role, responding to this demotion from very recent intellectual sovereignty to a state of intellectual disenfranchisement.

When we note that translation into, and original literary production in, the reinvented interregional language Esperanto has become, today, a site where we are able to rearticulate subject positions

in this rapidly reconfigured cultural space, we initiate one thread of discussion (and of interpretation of actions) that pertains to the bicontextual perspective and is likely to lead to contributions that other perspectives also will find useful.

If we broach the thematics of possessive culturalism - a version of possessive individualism writ large - and inquire if a transition towards a non-possessive public space in cultural politics can emerge through an active reconsideration of, some elements of the bicontextual articulation of current dynamics, there again a whole range of potential interventions opens up, perhaps in dialogue with substantivist linguistics. We mention that line of inquiry, again, only to point out yet another thematization that the bicontextual perspective makes available.

For a formulation extremely close to the present remarks where those leads are pursued, where Esperanto was called a "transcode." The relation between codification and cultural possession, not pursued there, would obviously become the starting point of any serious inquiry on these matters, if we keep the goal of a non-possessive public space in view, an obvious collapse of the serious archive into the advertising arcade.

Our point in this intervention is not to rehearse or even to extend those older explorations, but to note the urgent necessity of some theoretical groundwork that helps us make sense of our travails today as translators trying to come to terms with history's claims on us. As English, in the role of a Latin reincarnated, begins to host an intellectual hijack of the global public space, occupying completely the scientific space in the template, we find that the aesthetic and moral space in the template, where culture had once been niched (recall the discussion, above, of the ahistoricity of the natural and the emphatic historicity of the cultural as these sectors of the enlightenment enterprise were co-defined), stops being available to English.

Practices that cultivate a growing realization that this is so gravitate towards a new deployment of the regional languages of the world for the new purpose of reconnecting the social milieux of moral and aesthetic agents. English has come to represent a theoretical, intellectual universality that disconnects, thus creating a counterpoint space for regional languages as reconnectors in this sense. This space becomes politically important as we come to see reconnection as a resource that democracy requires and as we start visualizing ourselves, translators, as providers of this resource. It is of course possible, and rather common, for us to be seen as servants of the bureaucracies, since such a lot of our work falls under the utility rubric. But the translation of creative writing helps serious self-fashioning and sustains those interpersonal milieux in which such matters as the social entitlements of very young children become practically, and politically, relevant. (Perhaps we are taking too much for granted in these remarks; we may need to point out explicitly that the recent Indian enterprise of trying to get the republic to deliver educational and health care services to the very young has found it necessary to mobilize public opinion and has been looking for allied arguments in the "cultural" domain so that this mobilization does not depend on commodity economics alone, but continues to expand the reach of the political.)

Does any conclusion emerge from this line of reasoning? Substantivism 'does not give any prizes; as Wittgenstein once said about philosophy as a whole. One conclusion - rather than the unattainable 'the' conclusion - runs as follows. The languages newly disenfranchised under this global hegemony of English, as well as the iconically powerless Esperanto clearing-house of the traffic of circulables, begin to make better sense on a translation studies map when we ask why books by J. K. Rowling or Dan Brown are translated into Italian or Finnish. The locus of such translation lies in the global system's inability to choose between the capitalism of comfort, which recognizes one's emotional and connective entitlements, and the industrial logic of English.

To the extent that the customer measures up to the global system's championship norms and is able to get by effortlessly in English at every level, it would make sense for translations from English into regional languages to stop. Obviously it does not, because in their lighter moments people would rather take the help they can get. It helps when you

can get your light reading in a language you are comfortable with, such as your mother tongue, in which you feel connected to your significant others and can make sense of narratives about such mutual significance in microcommunities. Translation is also assistance.

At the level at which solidarity and milieu connectedness constitute the context in which mutual aid makes sense, the principles of human cooperation that underwrite the use of language (if we believe the theories of conversation standard in the pragmatics literature) need to redefine their bearings in a politics of help, of sustenance.

Such a politics cannot, epistemologically or morally, afford to begin with the thematics of power, the thematics of a sanitized form of oppression that you are willing to tame into a trouble-free object of polite, `cooperative' discourse. We have spent far too much energy asking for theories that will provide sustainability at the level of the biological or multilingual environment but will deliver this in total disconnection from human practices of sustaining vulnerable others. Once we begin to see that, newly disenfranchised, the non-English languages that have an Enlightenment history of scientific and political articulation can perform new labor in the sustenance and reconnection domain, and that translators who deal with these languages must respond in this context to a specifically sustenance-inflected claim of history at every step of their work, our take on rationality begins to change in our practice.

In the terms that the present intervention throws up for our attention once English, playing the part of a Latin reincarnate, takes over the template as completely as it plans to, this development will make space for the use of other languages for the work of an equally completely reinvented temple. I would thus argue that instead of pushing for more use of Norwegian or Slovak or Catalan for primary scientific publication, activists need to let English "do its worst" in-the science publication domain, and to maximize the use of regional languages in the enterprise of pedagogy, dissemination, public discussion, and assistance. The goal directing such activism is to build new continuities between translation, pedagogy, and assistance in a context focused on getting communities and other stakeholders to recognize the importance of enforceable human rights and entitlements.

Notice how this wild reconfiguration turns everything from the moment of the temple on its head. Back then, the central language Latin was in charge of the temple, and local languages handled the little interpersonal comparisons and transactions in the rational terms of people's templates. These did not count for much, since faith outweighed empirical levels of reasoning in the classical episteme. Today, English is central because it is in charge of the template, and it is the peripheral languages where a new temple begins to find new homes.

What new temple? The temple that has to do with the fundamental human desire to be of service to other humans, heart to heart, that continues an authentic religious impulse entirely independent of choosing to believe in specific cosmogonies or theologies. Systems that proposed to compel people to provide necessary services - based on the state or on big money - have turned out not to know how to provide them. It turns out that compulsion and its currently favored replacement, incentives, do not in fact deliver. People respond to the urgent needs of others only when they feel like responding. The issue therefore is how to elicit the responses of cooperation.

Eliciting responses is a literary question, and often one that only the 'translator' can deal with - in the broadened sense of `translation' that we are suggesting peripheral language activists today have to work to actualize. We may be on the brink of a period of history that gives translators a dizzying degree of theoretical importance.

If this turns out indeed to be so, the best our well-wishers can do is pray that we may find out, before it is too late, how we can all cope with the tasks set for us by history. You will forgive us for this talk of prayer if it offends your secular ear, but of course the discourse of prayer and forgiveness becomes an aesthetic necessity at the close of these remarks, if we are to begin to make sense of the dialectic of the scientific core of the template and the religious core of the temple at the juncture of the template's cultural commitments. <>

Handbook of Comparative and Historical Indo-European Linguistics, Volume 1 edited by Jared Klein, Brian Joseph, Matthias Fritz in cooperation with Mark Wenthe [De Gruyter Mouton, 9783110186147]

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Handbook of Comparative and Historical Indo-European Linguistics, Volume 3 edited by Jared Klein, Brian Joseph, Matthias Fritz in cooperation with Mark Wenthe [De Gruyter Mouton, 9783110540369]

Excerpt: In my graduate school days at Yale in the early 1970's, I dreamed of being part of a team that would produce an update and enlargement of Brugmann's Grundriss, in which the individual living branches of Indo-European would be traced from their roots to the modem day. As the years went by, this seemed increasingly to be no more than an idle fantasy. Then in the summer of 2004, I received an email message from Matthias Fritz (engineered by Stephanie Jamison) asking me whether I would be interested in participating in his proposed De Gruyter Handbook of Comparative and Historical Indo-European Linguistics (not precisely the original title). I asked him what the book entailed, and he told me that there would be sections on every subgroup of Indo-European, including chapters on phonology, morphology, syntax, and lexicon. Seeing an unexpected opportunity to fulfill my youthful dream, I said that I would participate, provided that three additional chapters would be added in each case: on documentation, dialectology, and, for those subgroups that had an ulterior history (i.e. everything but Anatolian and Tocharian), on evolution. A chapter on dialectology of course needs no special defense, but one on documentation has become something of an obsession of mine. It is of course not terribly critical for Greek, but for every other subgroup (including Italic, as soon as one moves beyond Latin), the reader needs to know what the primary sources are and how to find them. Thus, those looking for somebody to blame for the long gestation period of this book should probably focus their wrath on me for having added 34 chapters (27.2 %) to the book in one fell swoop.

Things did not, however, progress smoothly. I, for one, had at that point never engaged in editorial work and had no idea how to proceed; nor was it clear to me what my role was to be in the project. Years went by as the individual chapters of the book piled up in my office. In 2011, I received a notice from one of the authors saying that he wished to withdraw his contribution in order to publish it elsewhere. I saw then immediately that the entire project was about to unravel and proceeded to resign from my position. Very quickly I was contacted by Uri Tadmor of De Gruyter and urged not to resign; I was told that Brian Joseph would be brought on to assist me. By that time, I had indeed gained experience in editing; but it was not until June 30, 2012 that I seriously sat down to set things in motion for the production of this book. Ultimately, I was able to convince De Gruyter that I needed an additional in-house assistant, and Mark Wenthe, despite his very heavy teaching schedule, kindly agreed to assume this role.

From the date just noted, I have put this project at the highest level of priority, working at it consistently and placing all my other long-term research projects on hold. Some chapters were dropped,' many chapters had to be reassigned to new authors, and original submissions in three instances had to be redone by others. The result, I would like to believe, is the most significant presentation of the field of Indo-European Linguistics since the second edition of Brugmann's Grundriss, which appeared just over 100 years ago. The two works, however, have almost nothing in common. Brugmann's book was deductive, starting with Proto-Indo-European and deriving the phonologies and morphologies of the individual Indo-European languages. This work is inductive, beginning with the oldest attested subgroups and working toward the most recent ones, from there moving on to languages of fragmentary attestation, larger subgroups (Indo-Iranian and Balto-Slavic), wider configurations and contacts (Italo-Celtic, Greco-Anatolian relationships), and,

ultimately, Proto-Indo-European and beyond. All of this is preceded by sections on general methodological issues, the use of the comparative method in selected language groups outside of Indo-European, and on the history, both remote and more recent, of the Indo-European question. Many may wonder about the need for the discussions of language families other than Indo-European, but the original title of this book, since changed, included the phrase "An International Handbook of Language Comparison". While limitations of space forbid anything beyond a cursory glance outside Indo-European, these chapters will at the very least give the reader an overview of some of the most important literature on the language groups they cover.

It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the cooperation and assistance of many others in the preparation of this book. First and foremost, kudos goes to Matthias Fritz for having conceptualized this project ex nihilo and having recruited the vast majority of its authors. To my two active collaborators, co-editor Brian Joseph and editorial assistant Mark Wenthe I would like to express my deepest appreciation. Both of them read and commented upon every paper and thereby insured that each chapter was seen by three pairs of eyes in addition to those of the author. To my former M.A. student Julia Sturm, I owe more than I can express for her uncanny ability to answer, virtually without exception and with startling speed, my bibliographical queries, particularly with regard to tracking down first names of authors, editors rendered anonymous under the rubric "et al.", and places and houses of publication. To a string of graduate assistants, including Marcus Hines, Nick Gardner, and Joseph Rhyne, I owe thanks and appreciation for having assembled master lists of references cited in the book, first by section and then further integrating these into one consolidated list. I am confident that the final, pruned version, in whatever form it may ultimately be disseminated, will prove valuable, not least as an up-to-date bibliographical resource on Indo-European Linguistics.

I also wish to thank all the other 120 contributors for the cooperation and patience they have shown as this complex operation has unfolded. I know that most would have liked to see this book become a reality years ago.

Finally, beyond editorial preparation, there is of course the actual production of this book. I am here indebted first to Uri Tadmor for having confidence in me and providing me with the assistance I needed to bring this project to fruition. Next, my most heartfelt thanks goes to Barbara Karlson for keeping on top of this enterprise and serving as my first contact on all matters of detail concerning publication. As the "voice" at the other end of the line, she has helped to insure that this project stayed on track. Jared Klein, Athens, GA (USA)

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Excerpt: Comparison and relationship of languages

The comparative method is central to historical linguistics. It is the method by which we demonstrate

linguistic relatedness and reconstruct proto-languages. The results of the comparative method not only give us information about the types of changes, phonological and otherwise, that the linguistic descendants have undergone, but also a reconstructed vocabulary which can be used to make inferences about the culture and homeland of the proto-language's speakers. Finally, by studying the patterns of change which we reconstruct using this method, we are able to gain insight into linguistic evolutionary processes, such as how treelike language split has been.

Nearly two hundred years ago, Bopp Bopp and Windischmann 1816, Rask, 1811, and others began to elucidate principles such as regularity in sound correspondences, grammatical change, diagnostics for relatedness, and reconstruction methods which provide ways of inferring the properties of proto-languages and their speakers. In doing so, they were building on a longer tradition of comparison which can be traced through William Jones to the 18th and 17th Centuries, and perhaps even earlier to Dante (Shapiro 1990). While historical linguists tend to emphasize the antiquity of the discipline, historical study has not, of course, remained a 19th Century endeavor. Far from being a static field, historical linguistics has benefitted greatly from recent research into synchronic language systems. In particular, historical linguistics has benefited from sociolinguistics, as developed by Labov and Weinreich, and many others since. Studies of how changes permeate through speech communities, how speech communities themselves are defined, and how speakers interact with each other and use linguistic markers to signal aspects of their identity have all been crucial in developing theories of how language changes at the micro-scale. This has, in turn, given us a better understanding of how the patterns that provide evidence for language relationship arise.

In this article, I provide an overview of the most important characteristics of the method with a focus on demonstrating linguistic relationship. While there have been many overviews of the comparative method in linguistics, I here focus on the comparative method in linguistics as one of a number of "comparative methods" which can be used to find out about the past. Comparative methods are not unique to linguistics, but are also found in other fields of study, especially biology. Situating historical linguistics within other fields that study evolutionary processes is particularly important now that historical linguistics more frequently takes on the tools of other disciplines such as evolutionary biology. Furthermore, there is more work in prehistory which synthesizes results from anthropology, archaeology, and linguistics.

Language relationship

While I do not dwell here on the different ways in which terms such as "comparison" and "relationship" have been used in historical linguistics, it is worth briefly considering both how we define language relationships and the consequences of these definitions for historical study. The comparison of languages to reconstruct their common ancestors — and to draw family trees — has typically been based on a notion of "normal" or "regular" language transmission (Thomason and Kaufman 1988). Such transmission is assumed to proceed from parents to children who are acquiring language in largely or wholly monolingual communities. Under this model, changes accrue when children adduce grammars with slightly different properties from their parents' grammars. The different patterns could be due to spontaneous innovation, reanalysis, or differences in the frequency of the relevant features in the speech to which the child is exposed. We realize, of course, that this is an overly simplified picture of both acquisition and change, and relies on an idealized picture of what a language is. Children's peers are just as important an influence on acquisition as their caregivers are, and adults too are capable of innovations. Thus the parent-to-child transmission model is at best an idealization of how linguistic features are passed on; more accurate is a population-based model where learners deduce the features of their language based on input from their whole community (for more on agent-based models of this type, see Croft 2000). However, given that learners, on balance, come to almost identical conclusions about the properties of their language, generational models are a useful way of conceptualizing the most frequent type of linguistic transmission. This allows us to compare child-

learner-centered transmission with other situations, such as creolization and mixed language formation, where both the transmission facts and the linguistic outcomes differ.

A further point of idealization comes from how we define a "language". The input to language comparison is typically taken to be uniform. Either we are working with features which do not usually vary across speakers (such as basic vocabulary) or we abstract away from variation for the purposes of comparison by treating one speech variety as representative. Clearly, such assumptions will matter more in some areas than others. Internal linguistic diversity clearly matters in models of language transmission, as the learner's input is never uniform. How learners abstract away from variation (and also acquire the patterns of variation) is crucial to understanding the role of acquisition in change. The transmission model gives us a working definition of language relationship. Two languages are related to one another if they show systematic similarities (that is, `correspondences') across grammar and lexicon.

Linguistic comparison has been conducted for a much longer time than formalized comparative methods. However, there is also much work which compares languages without direct reference to either their evolutionary history or transmission processes. It is probably the case that whenever two people speaking different languages come into contact with one another, they notice similarities and differences between their languages. Some cultures have well-developed theories of folk-linguistic comparison which ascribe causes to similarities between two languages. Such theories are also found in the Roman world, where we find frequent comparisons between Latin and Greek, as well as etymologizing within word families.

However, such comparisons were unsystematic and as such cannot be used for reconstruction. That is, while such theories suggest relationships between individual words, because the comparisons are unsystematic, they cannot be used to infer which changes happened at which times and to which words. This is the breakthrough of the late 18th and early 19th centuries; the discovery that similarities between related languages are systematic, while those between unrelated (more precisely, not demonstrably related) languages are ad hoc and unsystematic. All languages show resemblances, but only those which descend from a common ancestor have regular resemblances.

Regularity

Regularity in change, while an important part of language comparison, is not without its critics. Debates about regularity in sound change have concentrated on two areas. One is whether change is in fact regular, or whether it only appears so after the fact as an epiphenomenon. The latter view is championed by lexical diffusionists such as Phillips, and earlier by Gilliéron. The other concerns the universal applicability of the principle of regularity, and whether all language families show it.

Recent work on the nature of sound change has sharpened our knowledge on the nature of sound change and its exceptionalities. For example, we now know that there are principled exceptions to regularity. Some arise through borrowing between related languages or dialects. Others arise because of frequency effects of particular words interacting with dialect. Thus far, claims about the non-application of regularity in sound change in individual languages have been shown with further research to be unfounded. An early demonstration of this comes from Bloomfield (1925).

Features for determining relatedness

While all features of languages can, in principle, be compared, some features are more suitable than others if the goal of comparison is to determine linguistic relatedness. Importantly, the best evidence for linguistic relationship comes from shared features which have high transmission rates and low diffusion rates, such as basic vocabulary and morphological paradigms. This guards against using similarities which may be due to borrowing (such as are often found in material culture vocabulary). While an initial claim of linguistic relatedness may be based on few features, relatedness can only be said to be comprehensively demonstrated once systematic correspondences can be demonstrated in multiple areas of the language. This guards against using accidental similarities, similarities due to independent development, or

typological universals. For example, the use of the verb 'say' as a light verb is not evidence of language relationship, because most languages with light verb systems make use of this verb.

The comparative method is applied not only to sound change, but to other areas of language such as syntax, and related methods are used to reconstruct aspects of culture, society, or religion. However, as the number of traits to be reconstructed gets smaller, the greater the possibilities are for accidental similarity.

Lastly, it is important to compare language features which have phylogenetic meaning. That is, the features most useful for demonstrating relatedness are those which are transmitted (rather than derived from other facts about the language). For example, comparing phoneme inventories independently of lexical material does not provide information about genetic relatedness, because phoneme inventories have properties shaped by the physiology of speech. Secondly, there is no reason to suppose that phoneme X in one language corresponds in any meaningful way in another language, unless we also have the evidence of shared lexicon. Inventory alone does not give us the crucial evidence of cognate lexical items. In fact, related languages frequently do not have the same phoneme inventories, and if they do, the same phonemes may not correspond to one another in the same word. For example, both English and German have a phoneme /t/, but because of a sound change where German initial */t/ was affricated, English /t/ corresponds not to German /t/ but to /ts/; compare tongue : Zunge, tug : Zug `train', etc.

Horizons for determining relationships

As the time depth since the initial split between two branches increases, the more changes will have accrued and the less likely it is that systematic similarities will be readily discernible. This does not mean that the languages are not related, of course, just that there is insufficient evidence to uncover the relationship. Because the comparative method relies on correspondences in several domains to provide evidence for relationship, it has a horizon, beyond which the evidence for regularity is too slight to build the required case. Different authors have tried various ways to get around this problem, from relaxing the strictness of requirements for regularity, to concentrating on morphological or syntactic features rather than lexicon, on the (probably incorrect) assumption that changes in lexicon accrue faster than changes in syntax or morphology.

The comparative method and family trees

As can be seen from the previous discussion, I am separating the comparative method (that is, the identification of regular correspondences between putatively related languages) from other aspects of historical linguistics which are also commonly discussed as part of the comparative method. These include reconstruction, subgrouping, and discussions of how treelike the changes in the data are. The comparative method allows us to identify systematic correspondences between the languages under analysis, to detect the lexical items which do not satisfy the criterion of regular correspondence, and to marshal evidence for linguistic relatedness. Family trees, however, allow us to represent hypotheses of language relatedness and descent.

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While any aspect of language can be compared, not all comparisons are equally valid for demonstrating relationship. To show that languages are uncontroversially related, the languages must exhibit systematic correspondences in multiple domains: lexicon, morphology, and syntax. Sporadic shared similarities are found between all languages, and are due to chance, universal (or near universal) features of linguistic systems, borrowing, or convergent development. As the time depth of relationship becomes more remote, the less evidence will be preserved and the more difficult it is to demonstrate relatedness.

Language contact and Indo-European linguistics

Convergence as an alternative to substratum

In 1939 there appeared a brief, but thought-provoking posthumous article by Trubetzkoy on the "Indo-European Problem". The article's claim is commonly taken to be that Proto-Indo-European arose by convergence from several different,

James Dalgleish: This is what Wikipedia has to say in the article on The Wheel: 'According to most authorities, the wheel was invented in ancient Mesopotamia in the 5th millennium BC, originally in the function of potter's wheels.'

The article is illustrated by a depiction of carts on the Sumerian "battle standard of Ur".

However, it goes on to say, 'A possibly independent invention in China dates to around 2800 BC. It is also thought that the invention of the wheel dated back to Ancient India.' So the borrowing might have been in either direction.

The English word wheel comes from the Old English word hʷeol, hʷeogol, from Proto-Germanic *hʷehʷlan, *hʷegʷlan, from Proto-Indo-European *kʷekʷlo-, an extended form of the root *kʷel- "to revolve, move around". Cognates within Indo-European include Icelandic hjól "wheel, tyre", Greek κύκλος kúklos, and Sanskrit chakra, the latter two both meaning "circle" or "wheel".

Approaching it from a linguistic direction, Briggs, Driver derive gilgal from galgal, and this from a root meaning to roll.

The *American Heritage Dictionary Semitic Roots Index* has the following:

alt. DEFINITION:

To roll. 1. Galilee, from Latin Galilea, either from Aramaic gelila, circuit, district (from gelal, to roll) or from Hebrew gelîlâ, circuit, district (from galal, to roll).

Sticking my neck out, I would speculate that gelal itself might be a reduplication of a biliteral root.

Interestingly, CD Buck says 'Words for 'wheel' include an inherited group derived from a root for 'turn' and others from roots meaning 'run' or 'roll'. IE *kʷelos, kʷolos, redupl. *kʷekʷlos, from *kʷel in Sanskrit car- move, wander.' [ʷ in kʷelos etc. should be in superscript]. Greek kuklos and Latin volvere would be obvious offshoots. So, with reduplication in both language families, the case for borrowing would be even stronger. The Sumerian aspect is interesting. Possibly gilgal/galgal is a loanword to both PIE and early Semitic from Sumerian. It would be interesting to know the Sumerian term.

neighboring languages. While Trubetzkoy does indeed hint at such a proposal, it is more a speculative thought experiment than based on empirical evidence and arguments. In fact, the strong lexical and morphological similarities between the early Indo-European languages, including the idiosyncratic root suppletion in the personal pronouns (e.g. nom. *eg[-] : oblique *me- `I'), strongly argue for inheritance from a common ancestor, rather than origination through convergence, for in convergence it is structural features that come to be more similar, while the lexicon tends to remain distinct. In some geographical areas, e.g. the Balkans, lexical convergence may be more extensive. Even there, however, the lexica remain quite distinct; and the affixes and other grammatical elements in the convergent structures are native, not borrowed.

What is more important in the long run is Trubetzkoy's role in the development of the very concept of Sprachbund or convergence area is `linguistic area'). To this must be added the claim at the foundation of Trubetzkoy's (1939) thought experiment, namely that the interaction between the languages of convergence areas is the same as that between dialects of a given language.

The new concept of structural convergence between distinct languages introduced an important alternative to traditional ideas about language contact as resulting primarily in lexical borrowing, with the added concept of substratum (or in some cases superstratum) influence as an explanation of structural similarities not ascribable to genetic relationship.

I examine both these traditional ideas about language contact and the alternative notion of convergence, with major focus on their relevance to Indo-European linguistics. I begin with lexical borrowing (section 2). Section 3 addresses the concept of substratum. Section 4 deals with convergence. Section 5 addresses the relationship between convergence and Indo-European dialectology. Section 6 presents conclusions and implications.

Lexical borrowing

The most obvious effect of language contact is lexical borrowing. As long as the context is clear,

the sources and direction of borrowing tend to be uncontroversial. Elsewhere, we have to rely on several criteria in order to argue for borrowing. These include etymological "motivation", cultural context, and historical priority. For instance, the relation between words for `sugar' and `candy' (Skt. sarkara : Pers. sakar : Arab. sukkar : Engl. sugar, etc. and Skt. khanda : Pers. qand : Arab. qandi : Engl. candy) can be explained as a series of borrowings from India via the Middle and Near East to Europe, because only in Sanskrit are the words in question etymologically motivated — as semantic specializations of preexisting words meaning `sand, grit' and `piece, chunk' respectively. Similarly in the set Engl. sky scraper : Fr. gratte-ciel : Span. rasca cielos, an American English origin is likely, since the construction of tall buildings deserving the name began in Chicago (after the Great Fire). Without such evidence of etymological motivation and/ or historical or cultural priority, the source and direction of borrowing is extremely difficult to detect. In fact, in the case of sky scraper, it would be impossible, given that — through the process of calquing — each language created its own word from native resources, such that each word appears to be etymologically motivated.

The implications of these criteria and potential difficulties for Indo-European linguistics can be briefly illustrated with the case of the following set of words for `wheel': PIE *kʷekʷlo- : Sumer. gigir : Semit. *gilgal : Kartvel. *brbar/*grgar (Gamkrelidze and Ivanov 1995). The PIE word is universally analyzed as involving (partial) reduplication of the root *kwel/kwl- 'turn' and is thus etymologically motivated. As it turns out, the same analysis holds for the Kartvelian words, based on the roots bar/br and gar/gr, respectively, as well as for Sum. gigir (Halloran 1999, s.v. gisgigir), and Semitic galgal (cf. gll `turn'). We are thus dealing with a case strikingly similar to that of 'sky scraper'. Gamkrelidze and Ivanov, accepting the older view that the wheel was invented in the Near East, argue for a spread of the words from that area — presumably by calquing. More recent evidence (Anthony 2007) shows that wheeled vehicles arose at roughly the same time (ca. 3,500 BCE) both in the Near East and in Europe, making it difficult to determine the source for the words for wheel. Any of the languages could have been the source, or some other, unknown language. Parpola argues for a PIE origin, considering even the simple root gir of Sumerian to be of PIE origin. But in the case of Semitic it would be difficult to consider the root g-l-1 underlying galgal `wheel' to be a borrowing from PIE. Murtonen provides ample evidence for the antiquity of this root, not only in Semitic, but even in Afro-Asiatic.

Substratum

The notion that migration and resulting contact can lead to linguistic change has been around since at least the time of Dante's De vulgari eloquentia (ca. 1300 CE). Influence by substratum (or superstratum) languages has been assumed especially commonly in Romance linguistics (see the discussion in Cravens 2002). In Indo-European linguistics, the notion of substratum influence seems to have been first introduced by Pott (1833/ 1836) in order to explain the retroflex consonants of Sanskrit (I ignore more generic references to the effects of language contact, such as William Jones's speculation [1788 (1786)] that Celtic and Germanic are "blended with a very different idiom").

As has often been noted, many cases of linguistic change attributed to substratum influence are problematic, and "internal" explanations (not involving contact) are at least as explanatory, if not better; and some proposals, such as Millardet's (1933) invoking an unknown "subtrat X" to account for the appearance of retroflex consonants in several Romance languages, are downright silly. See e.g. the critical discussion by Cravens (2002), as well as Hock (1986/1991) with references. On the other hand, examples like Indian English seem to lend strong support to the possibility of substratum influence, with extensive Indianization, especially in its phonology (unaspirated voiceless stops, retroflex for English alveolar stops, etc.). In fact, Thomason and Kaufman (1988) argue that, in effect, priority should be given to contact explanations over purely internal ones.

Rather than succumbing to either "substratophobia" or "substratomania", the best approach would be to decide particular cases on empirical grounds

and, in some cases, to admit that a decision may not be possible. As it turns out, the latter generally seems to be true in the case of early Indo-European languages for which substratum influence has been proposed.

An early Indo-European subgroup for which external (generally Afro-Asiatic or North African) substratum influence has been frequently invoked is Insular Celtic (see e.g. Pokorny 1949; Wagner 1982). As Watkins (1962) has noted, with focus on the Celtic verb:

> Without sure knowledge of the presence of such substrate populations, and without any notion of the nature of the languages they might have spoken, such a line of speculation is otiose: it is merely a deplacement of the problem, a substitution of one unknown for another.

If, however, by the utilization of more recent techniques of linguistic analysis, we can account for the peculiar development of the Celtic verbal system, as a direct and unmediated successor of the Indo-European verbal system, then the necessity for recourse to such hypothetical substrata simply disappears.

In the study of early Slavic and Baltic, it has often been claimed that the use of the genitive with negation and to mark partitive objects reflects substratum influence from neighboring Uralic, which uses the partitive case under the same circumstances. On the Uralic side, the use of the partitive has been attributed to Baltic influence. Under the circumstances, a principled decision as to which language was the source of the phenomenon may not be possible — although the similarities are certainly likely to result from contact. Situations of this sort, where we find structural similarities in neighboring languages without there being a likely (single) source for the similarities, are typical of convergence areas.

In the case of Sanskrit retroflexion, first addressed by Pott, as well as other features shared by Sanskrit/Indo-Aryan and other languages of South Asia, the general consensus is still that these features reflect Dravidian substratum influence. I have argued that the evidence for Dravidian substratum influence is not cogent, the features in question can be explained internally, and a case can be made for bi- or multilateral convergence instead of unilateral substratum influence. Further, Tikkanen (1988) points out that the Dravidian substratum hypothesis ignores the alternative possibility that an early form of Burushaski (or some other northwestern language) may have been the source of the "Dravidian" features of Sanskrit. Even in Indian English, there is evidence that a unilateral substratum account is not appropriate. In addition to extensive influence of Indian languages on English, we also find influence of English on the languages of South Asia.

Cases like the ones just discussed do not, of course, invalidate the possibility of substratum effects in early Indo-European languages. An area where such effects are quite likely is Anatolia; see e.g. Yakubovich (2010) on Hurrian and Luwian. Even here, however, one wonders whether the influence was unidirectional or bidirectional.

Convergence as an alternative to substratum

We have seen in the preceding section that convergence, the phenomenon advocated by Trubetzkoy, must be considered an important alternative to the unidirectional process of substratum influence. Convergence can be briefly defined as an increase in structural similarity between different, distinct languages that are not necessarily related. To be successful, convergence requires extended bilingual contact, such that the effects of contact can build up and differences in structure can over time be diminished.

Most important for present purposes are two additional aspects of convergence. First, in convergence areas it is typically impossible to single out one language as donor; rather, every language may contribute to the shared features. Second, features may be spread unevenly, with some found only in a portion of the area. This is the case for South Asia (Masica 1976) and the Balkans (Hock 1988). Convergence areas, thus, are similar to dialect continua, and in this sense Trubetzkoy's claim that there is no difference between the two phenomena is borne out.

Except for Trubetzkoy's (1939) thought experiment, convergence has generally been an underutilized concept in studies of early Indo-European language contact. A major exception is Gamkrelidze and Ivanov's (1995) claim that lexical as well as structural similarities between Proto-Indo-European and Kartvelian and Mesopotamian languages show that PIE was spoken in a convergence area close to the Caucasus and the Near East. The "Glottalic Theory" however — perhaps the most important structural support for the hypothesis — remains controversial, and hence the argument loses its force.

Convergence and Indo-European dialectology

As noted in the preceding section, convergence areas are similar to dialect continua, in that linguistic features are not evenly spread over the entire area but may cover only part of it. In fact, convergence areas tend to exhibit the same crisscrossing network of isoglosses as dialect continua.

This fact has consequences for Indo-European dialectology: If two neighboring varieties of Indo-European share particular features, it is not a priori possible to determine whether these features reflect common dialectal innovation (within a PIE dialect continuum) or secondary convergence at a point when the varieties have become distinct languages but have remained in contact.

A case in point may be the relationship between Baltic and Slavic. Before Meillet (1908) challenged the view, Balto-Slavic was commonly recognized as a distinct sub-group of Indo-European. Since then, the debate whether the similarities between Baltic and Slavic should be attributed to descent from a common, Balto-Slavic ancestor or to contact between two distinct subgroups (Baltic and Slavic) has not come to a clear conclusion (see Klimas 1973 for a useful survey). Perhaps the issue can never be fully resolved, because, as is well known, there is no clear line of demarcation between different dialect and different language and hence between dialect and language contact. However, one common innovation of Baltic and Slavic, Winter's Law [postulated it in 1978, is a proposed sound law operating on Balto-Slavic short vowels */e/, */o/, */a/ (< PIE *h_2e), */i/ and */u/ according to which they lengthen before unaspirated voiced stops, and that syllable gains rising, acute accent.], might perhaps be considered too idiosyncratic to be attributed to language contact and would therefore be more likely the result of dialect contact. But it is difficult to be certain as to what constitutes a sufficiently high degree of idiosyncrasy to rule out language contact.

As the case of Baltic and Slavic shows, convergence may affect not just PIE and other, non-Indo-European languages, but also various Indo-European languages or subgroups. In fact, except for Turkish, which is only marginally involved, all the languages of the Balkan convergence area belong to the Indo-European family.

A recent paper by Garrett suggests an even greater relevance of convergence for early Indo-European. In his view, the usual classification of Indo-European into subgroups such as Anatolian, Indo-Iranian, Greek, Italic, Celtic, is anachronistic, reflecting 19th-century ideas of race, ethnicity, and nation. Instead we should conceptualize early Indo-European society as a relatively loose array of tribes, which affiliate and reaffiliate in numerous ways before finally crystallizing into more defined groups such as Anatolian or Greek. This interpretation makes it possible to account for, say, the similarity of the iterative-duratives in -ske- of East Ionic Greek with the identical category of Anatolian (specifically Hittite) and the agreement of Greek with Italic alone in their devoicing of the PIE voiced aspirates as the result of convergent developments at the early tribal level.

Garrett's approach holds out the promise of accounting for other similarities which cause difficulties under the traditional view of Indo-European dialectology. One such case might be the early palatalization of labiovelars in Armenian, Albanian, and part of Greek, as in PIE *k^{w}etwores > Arm. -c `ork `, Gk. tessares '4' and *g^{w}hermo- > Alb. zjarm `fire'. The limitation of this palatalization to labiovelars (to the exclusion of plain velars) may be sufficiently idiosyncratic to rule out independent innovation. At the same time, the development affected only part of Greek; and the earliest form

of Greek, Mycenaean, still had unpalatalized labiovelars. This makes it difficult to assume common innovation in a PIE dialect continuum, but would be explainable if we assume that Garrett's loose affiliation of Indo-European tribes persisted in some form beyond Mycenaean times and made it possible for Armenian, Albanian, and part of Greek to participate in a late convergent development.

Outlook

Of the various effects of linguistic contact briefly discussed in this article, convergence is probably the most interesting and exciting for Indo-European linguistics. Lexical borrowing has been dealt with in great detail for at least 150 years. Substratum explanations have often been approached with considerable caution; and we have seen some of the reasons for this caution. In several cases we have seen that convergence may be a more appropriate approach. More important yet, convergence is still an underutilized concept in Indo-European linguistics and for that reason alone deserves greater attention. To this must be added the exciting further insights promised by Garrett's hypothesis of intertribal convergence to account for phenomena that do not fit comfortably into the traditional distinction between language and dialect contact. <>

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