Finding Our Way Between Authorities

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Editorial Appraisals:

Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book summarized. Otherwise most of our content represents the authors’-editors’ own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

The Spinoza–Machiavelli Encounter: Time and Occasion by Vittorio Morfino, translated by Dave Mesing [Spinoza Series, Edinburgh University Press, 9781474421249]

Vittorio Morfino draws out the implications of the dynamic Spinoza--Machiavelli encounter by focusing on the concepts of causality, temporality and politics. This allows him to think through the
relationship between ontology and politics, leading to an understanding of history as a complex and plural interweaving of different rhythms. This extraordinary book opens up new avenues for understanding both Machiavelli and Spinoza as well as early modern political philosophy and materialism.

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Translator’s Introduction: Unscripted Space, Devoured Time

Vittorio Morfino’s Il tempo e l’occasione: l’incontro Spinoza-Machiavelli constitutes a decisive intervention for contemporary studies of Spinoza. Owing in part to Spinoza’s apparent paucity of references to Machiavelli, Spinoza’s relation to him has often implicitly been treated as occasional: perhaps the two share some affinities for realist or anti-utopian political positions, with Spinoza taking up certain Machiavellian or Machiavellian-like insights, but the relation does not go beyond this point. This book challenges such assumptions by demonstrating a connection between Spinoza and Machiavelli as specific as it is pervasive, arguing that Spinoza’s understanding of causality in the Ethics owes much to his study of Machiavelli’s writings on history and politics, a claim with multiple implications for Spinoza’s own views on history and politics as well as temporality. Morfino succinctly treats different approaches to the Spinoza–Machiavelli question in the introduction, and I will not rehearse them here. Instead, I will briefly recapitulate the main steps in his overall analysis in order to frame it in terms of the object alluded to in the title of the book – Spinoza’s encounter with Machiavelli.

After synthetically summarising different approaches to the Spinoza–Machiavelli question throughout the twentieth century in the introduction, Morfino proceeds to carry out four steps in the remainder of the text. First, in chapter 1, through close examination of Spinoza’s own library, Morfino delivers a clear and thorough framework of the possible means through which Spinoza read Machiavelli. His analysis shows that Spinoza had multiple access points to the Florentine’s work: Machiavelli’s complete works in Italian (which Spinoza seemed capable of understanding, given the presence of an Italian–Spanish dictionary in his library, as well as an Italian language monograph), a Latin translation of The Prince, and discussions of Machiavelli in texts of Bacon, Descartes and others. Morfino is careful to note that these basic facts, of course, do not necessarily mean that Spinoza studied Machiavelli in these ways, or only in these ways, since such information cannot speak to the practical aspects of reading or other kinds of study. As such, in addition to his detailed account of these possible means, Morfino outlines Spinoza’s general approach to citation, where proper names are rare, and together with impersonal figures (such as the ‘theologians and metaphysicians’ in the appendix to Ethics I), negative, except for a remark about ancient atomists in a letter to Hugo Boxel. Morfino then considers Spinoza’s direct citations of the ‘ever shrewd’ Machiavelli.

Both of the latter two elements also contribute to Morfino’s extensive analysis of the Theological-Political Treatise and Political Treatise in chapter 2. He does this through the rubric of ‘Machiavelli’s implicit presence’, by which he does not intend an esoteric reading of Spinoza’s work, showing some kind of secret fidelity to an atemporal Machiavellianism. Instead, again undertaking a precise and painstaking labour, Morfino demonstrates substantive links between arguments within Spinoza’s political works and Machiavelli’s texts, above all Discourses on Livy and The Prince. Some key aspects that Morfino outlines in this chapter, which simultaneously constitutes a kind of mini-treatise on Spinoza’s political works, include the decisiveness of Machiavelli’s conceptual pair
‘virtue’ and ‘fortune’ for Spinoza’s discussion of election in the Theological-Political Treatise, and the deployment of Machiavelli’s remarks on keeping pacts in the framework of natural law theory, especially in contrast to Hobbes. In the unfinished Political Treatise, Morfino outlines Machiavelli’s presence in what he terms the ‘skeletal structure’ of the text, emphasising the idea that imperium represents a momentary equilibrium of forces, rather than a model of politics where civil society names a stabilised transcendence of the state of nature.

Third, Morfino draws out the consequences of his reconstruction of Spinoza’s use of Machiavellian arguments even more fully, in what are undoubtedly some of the most exciting pages in the book. A full reckoning with these details is best left to the text itself, but we can note here that the consequences Morfino uncovers are especially relevant for Spinoza’s concepts of causality and eternity, and by extension, for how to think Spinoza’s political works in tandem with the Ethics. The idea at the heart of the chapter is that Spinoza’s encounter with Machiavelli’s approach to history and politics bears its most dazzling traces in the structure of Spinoza’s account of common notions and the third kind of knowledge. In a famous passage on teleological prejudice in the appendix to Ethics I, Spinoza lists mathematics as what provides a standard of truth that breaks the circle between human experience and the inscrutability of levels of divine providence and will. Morfino both cautions against reading the passage from superstition to science, or imagination to reason, as a necessary law, and suggests that mathematics be understood a singular event among others.

In the same passage, Spinoza also remarks that other causes break with teleological prejudice and lead to true knowledge of things, but does not list them. Morfino suggests that these causes are physics and political theory. Based on Spinoza’s remark that the causes are unnecessary to enumerate ‘here’, Morfino further suggests that Spinoza has written or will write about these causes elsewhere. If Spinoza discusses physics in the short treatise of Ethics II, it is less clear that he discusses political theory in the same way, even though many readers have productively utilised material from the Ethics in this sense, especially parts three and four. However, Morfino argues that ‘there are two specific passages where, more strictly than elsewhere, Spinoza traces a line of demarcation between the teleological knowledge of history and politics and the knowledge of the essence and characteristics of the political body – that is, between the imaginary sanctification of history and power, and the knowledge of their dynamics’.6 These passages are TTP III, where Spinoza uses the Machiavellian concepts of virtue and fortune in his conceptual critique of the election of the Hebrew people, and the opening of TP I, where Spinoza differentiates himself from theorists of reason of state, emphasising a need for what we could call, with some simplification, political realism.

Machiavelli stands out as the point of departure for both of these political critiques of teleological prejudice. On the basis of the hypothesis that physics and political theory also constitute ways of breaking with imagination and superstition, Morfino proceeds to further argue that these ways of knowing are also helpful for thinking about one of the most difficult problems in Spinoza’s work, the third kind of knowledge or intuitive science. Following Machiavelli and a number of others including Aristotle, Morfino emphasises a parallelism between medicine and politics. Intuitive science thus concerns adequate knowledge of a singular physical body or adequate knowledge of a singular social body.

These arguments are best considered in their full detail in chapter 3, but two further insights which undergird this section of Morfino’s analysis concern causality and eternity. Morfino claims that one of the most fundamental effects of Spinoza’s encounter with Machiavelli is a shift in his conception of causality, from a serial and linear understanding in his early Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect to an immanent and structural understanding in the Ethics, as well as implicitly in several passages of the TTP and TP. An important corollary to these arguments is a claim concerning Spinoza’s ‘anti-humanist’ conception of eternity, which treats eternity not as a totalising concept, but rather as a principle of intelligibility for the connection of durations that make up the
temporal fabric of being. ‘As such’, Morfino concludes, ‘eternity forbids the conception of history as both a straight line and a cycle, in order to open on to an anti-humanistic conception of eternity as the aleatory interweaving of necessity, an eternity that does not impose any binary as obligatory for history.’

In this way, the fourth and final step of the overall argument takes on the idea of philosophy of history, in order to examine a possible general way of reading Spinoza and Machiavelli. Morfino thus begins the final chapter by sketching a basic orientation that includes beyond Spinoza’s encounter with Machiavelli, or arguments in the texts of either. Morfino analyses two thinkers who have proposed such readings: Lessing in the case of Spinoza’s TTP, and Vico in the case of a combination of Machiavellian and Spinozist insights. The chapter is organised around a refusal to conceive history as a univocal stream of time, flowing towards the progressive realisation of necessary, universal knowledge. The examinations of both Lessing and Vico thus serve as models that further specify the stakes of a general approach to Spinoza and Machiavelli, and Morfino reconstructs their readings in order to highlight the implications of extracting a philosophy of history from them. He concludes that instead of such a picture of history, what the Spinoza–Machiavelli encounter urges is knowledge of the singular connection particular to an object. In the case of a historical object, it is this model that Spinoza’s TTP and Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy exemplify.

If such a refusal of a general philosophy of history constitutes one of the key implications at the intersection of Spinoza’s and Machiavelli’s philosophy, one thing that remains somewhat opaque is the question of exactly in what their encounter consists. While it should not prevent us from wagering yet more hypotheses on the basis of careful examination of their work, specificity in this regard is fraught with difficulties. Morfino suggests thinking their encounter as necessarily plural, involving some of the materials he excavates at the outset of the argument, and perhaps more encounters devoured by time. The Spinoza–Machiavelli encounter is also plural if we judge it by the results of the book in your hands: in addition to the historical material that Morfino excavates, he offers an extensive discussion of key arguments across Spinoza’s work, new insights regarding the content of Spinoza’s understanding of causality, and an appreciation for how it is interwoven in key moments of Spinoza’s mature work. As such, a productive response to the material in The Spinoza–Machiavelli Encounter lies not in searching for the origin of the unscripted space opened up by this book, but rather in the challenges and uses it presents for Spinoza scholarship and contemporary philosophy. One aspect of such a programme might be the displacement of the ideological couple ‘origin’ and ‘end’ for the pair ‘encounter’ and ‘relation’. Spinoza’s relation to Machiavelli is thus indeed an occasional one, provided we understand an occasion in the same sense as the Florentine secretary. In a history abounding with occasions, the existence of such unscripted space is necessary. What continues to be left to chance is the efficacy of relations between encounters that have taken hold, as so many footholds for finding balance in a history without guarantees.

Excerpt: Vittorio Morfino’s Opening Remarks
For almost two centuries, the question of the relationship between Machiavelli and Spinoza was only addressed in negative terms, mostly in Catholic and Reformed apologetics. Then for the entire twentieth century it remained at the margins of the imposing philological and critical labour dedicated to Spinoza’s work: here we find far more hints of a path to follow than genuine efforts to follow it. Adolph Menzel was the first to take up the question at the beginning of the twentieth century. While he stressed Machiavelli’s importance for the political theory of Spinoza’s Political Treatise (but not, however, the Theological-Political Treatise), Menzel did not go beyond an analysis of the two direct citations, emphasising a common anti-utopian method of presentation. The latter would become commonplace in the Italian and German studies between the two world wars, and its fascination would not escape Maggiore, Solari, Ravà, Strauss and Gebhardt. Spinoza’s polemic in TP I, 1 was thus held to be directly inspired by the well-known passages from The Prince on effectual
truth. The only noteworthy result of the analysis of this theme was Strauss’s observation in Spinoza’s Critique of Religion that the tones of the two authors’ anti-utopian polemics are different: Machiavelli’s text is lucid and cold, combating utopia exclusively in its practical effects, while Spinoza’s is harsh and sarcastic, combating utopia in the name of philosophy with an attitude that is fundamentally non-political.

This point, however, exhausted the anti-utopian discussion. Other themes examined by these authors were first of all that of virtue: both Maggiore and Ravà highlight the influence of Machiavelli’s concept of virtue for Spinoza’s theory of virtus sive potentia. Second, these authors also give a date for the Spinoza–Machiavelli encounter. Building on the work of Guzzo, Ravà opposes Menzel’s restriction of Machiavelli’s influence to the TP by locating it instead already in the chapters on Hebrew history in the TTP. In his work, Gebhardt takes stock of the results achieved by these studies. In the inventory of the sources of the two works, he proposes the first sparse and largely incomplete list of Spinozian passages inspired by Machiavelli, without, however, devoting any critical reflection to the problem.

After a long period punctuated by Carla Gallicet Calvetti’s book, which I will consider below, there was a rebirth of interest in Spinoza’s Machiavellianism within French and Italian Marxism in the second half of the twentieth century. Alexandre Matheron, author of two important studies on Spinoza at the turn of the 1970s, showed how TP I, 2 refers to ‘popular Machiavellianism’ rather than the true teaching of Machiavelli, which is much more comprehensive. He claims that by means of a radical subversion of the position of both philosophy and politics (displayed in the first two paragraphs of TP I), Spinoza moves beyond the political-philosophical dilemma, genuinely changing the terrain. Spinoza rejects philosophy, inasmuch as it produces a utopia, and as for politics, ‘conforming without doubt to the teaching of the authentic Machiavelli, he reveals the arcane “Machiavellianisms” as derisive pragmatic formulas’. Regarding the continuity between Machiavelli and Spinoza, Laurent Bove, who was a student of Matheron, takes into consideration the concepts of prudence, virtue and necessity in the Dutch philosopher. In keeping with the thesis of his book on the theory of conatus in Spinoza, Bove maintains that ‘for Spinoza, reading Machiavelli [confirmed] the identification of actual essence (the conatus) and a logic of being [une logique de l’existant] striving to endure, consisting of a strategic dynamic determined by affirmation and resistance’.

Pervaded by a sensibility that is more theoretical than historical-philosophical, Negri’s and Althusser’s Marxist readings of the Spinoza–Machiavelli relation attempt to identify a materialist and revolutionary tradition of thought, and end up in a perfectly oppositional symmetry. First in The Savage Anomaly and then in Insurgencies, Negri identifies the line of Machiavelli–Spinoza–Marx as a humanistic and revolutionary tradition opposed to the dominant bourgeois tradition of modernity. In several posthumously published writings, Althusser sketches instead an underground current of materialism, which he defines as a materialism of the encounter or the aleatory. For Althusser, Machiavelli, Spinoza and Marx, as well as other authors, represent an anti-humanist tradition in which reality is thought beyond every teleological and theological order, and, what amounts to the same thing, beyond every legitimisation of existing reality. We owe an analysis of one of the ways in which this underground current has been transmitted to Gabriel Albiac, a Spanish student of Althusser and the author of an essential study on the Marrano sources of Spinozism. Albiac shows that in the texts of Abraham Pereira, who attempted to reconstruct rabbinic orthodoxy after two centuries of Marranism, Machiavelli appears as the sworn enemy who makes religion into a pure functional cover for domination. Precisely in becoming detached from the Jewish community of Amsterdam, Spinoza could have appealed to this sworn enemy of all religion by theoretically radicalising him. From this perspective, in fact, ‘the path for a rigorously materialist conception of virtue remains open. After Machiavelli, Spinoza is on the lookout. It is with him that the final decomposition of the Christian prince occurs — and also the subject, which is its shadow.’
The research of Carla Gallicet Calvetti, a Catholic scholar of Spinoza and author of the only monograph on the Spinoza–Machiavelli relation in the twentieth century, is situated between these two periods. Her study, which has the undisputed merit of widening the points of agreement between the two thinkers in comparison to Gebhardt, starts from a double interpretative presupposition which constitutes perhaps its strongest limitation. First, Gallicet Calvetti argues that Machiavelli’s influence is only detectable at a political level and that the method of effectual truth itself produces a fracture between politics and metaphysics. Second, she maintains that the relation is legible only in the terms of fulfilment.

This marginality of the Spinoza–Machiavelli question within the basic lines of Spinozist research must be explained. It is true that, with the exception of two long citations in the TP, nothing seems to link Machiavelli the politician with Spinoza the metaphysician. But the same proximity in political theory, explicitly signalled by the two long passages in the TP, has long remained incidental within Spinozist criticism when compared to, for example, the attention given to Spinoza’s relationship to Hobbes, as well as to natural law theory more generally. This situation mirrors the way that attention has not been given until recently to the only current of ancient thought in which Spinoza openly takes part: atomism. Thus, the possibility of demonstrating the existence of a truly philosophical relationship between Machiavelli and Spinoza has only been intimated by some critics, and as such, what we find are merely passing observations, more the fruit of intuition than rigorous research.

What explains this lack of interrogation of texts whose very materiality seems to demand it is, I think, the relations of force traversing their interpretation. A powerful general interpretation is in fact capable of eliminating the possibility of a particular question, reducing material traces on the basis of which it could have been posed to the artefact of a meticulous philology. It is not difficult to identify in the Romantic and in particular Hegelian image of Spinoza the cause of one such exclusion. It was indeed precisely Hegel who in the Science of Logic and the Encyclopedia established the interpretative lines of Spinozist thought for the future. Hegel interprets Spinoza’s thought as a philosophy of the infinite, in which the passage to the finite is nothing but verschwinden, vanishing, and not aufheben, dialectical overcoming. For Hegel, Spinozism is a philosophy of eternity without temporality, and therefore without history and without politics; it is a philosophy of which Spinoza’s illness, tuberculosis (Schwindsucht, which etymologically means the tendency to disappear), is the symbol. For a long time this powerful shadow cast over Spinoza’s philosophy by the all-encompassing [alles zermalmende] Hegelian system oriented the research of academic historiography, and it was not until the 1960s that a new perspective in Spinoza studies emerged. In particular, the work of Gueroult, Matheron and Deleuze changed the relations of force composing the field of Spinoza interpretations, at first only in France, and then in most of Europe. With regard to my own work, however, by far the most important page in this recent history is the dazzling and obscure one that Althusser devotes to Spinoza in the opening lines of Reading Capital:

The first person ever to have posed the problem of reading, and in consequence, of writing, was Spinoza, and he was also the first in the world to have proposed both a theory of history and a philosophy of the opacity of the immediate. With him, for the first time ever, a man linked together in this way the essence of reading and the essence of history in a theory of the difference between the imaginary and the true. This explains to us why Marx could not have possibly become Marx except by founding a theory of history and a philosophy of the historical distinction between ideology and science, and why in the last analysis this foundation was consummated in the dissipation of the religious myth of reading.

This Althusserian detour through Spinoza allows for an entirely new reading of the Spinozist theory of the finite, no longer reducible to the universalised manifestation of Schopenhauerian noluntas.

Metaphysics and politics are thought against one another in a theory of history elaborated on the basis of the distinction between the true and the imaginary, itself made possible by an analysis of
biblical discourse as meaning rather than truth. From this perspective, the question of the Spinoza–Machiavelli relation becomes central, if we only consider the fact that here Spinoza takes up the distinction between the imagination of the thing and effectual truth from The Prince XV.

Certainly Machiavelli is not a philosopher in the strict sense, but rather a political thinker. However, once again taking up some Althusserian hints in ‘Is it Simple to Be a Marxist in Philosophy?’, I have searched in Machiavelli’s politics for his philosophy, finding in this way, in a virtuous or vicious circle, Spinoza’s philosophy, or at least a new shade of Spinoza’s philosophy, that is, a new way of confronting the materiality of his texts. Properly understood, such research does not pretend to be the objective confrontation of two thinkers given as a conclusive totality. It is by means of the continual passage from one to the other, each taken into consideration in the materiality of every fragment, that I have tried to answer the questions I have posed. These questions are not purely historiographical: in the space between [Zwischen], which at once separates and binds Machiavelli and Spinoza, I have sought the means to think history independently from every philosophy of history, but also from the tired song of its absence, intoned by nihilism. <>


Spinoza’s Authority Volume II: Resistance and Power in the Political Treatises edited by A. Kiarina Kordela, Dimitris Vardoulakis [Bloomsbury Studies in Continental Philosophy, Bloomsbury Academic, 9781350011069]

Spinoza’s Authority Volume I: Resistance and Power in Ethics: Spinoza’s political thought has been subject to a significant revival of interest in recent years. As a response to difficult times, students and scholars have returned to this founding figure of modern philosophy as a means to help reinterpret and rethink the political present. Spinoza’s Authority Volume I: Resistance and Power in Ethics makes a significant contribution to this ongoing reception and utilization of Spinoza’s political thought by focusing on his posthumously published Ethics. By taking the concept of authority as an original framework, this book asks: How is authority related to ethics, ontology, and epistemology? What are the social, historical and representational processes that produce authority and resistance? And what are the conditions of effective resistance? Spinoza’s Authority features a roster of internationally established theorists of Spinoza’s work, and covers key elements of Spinoza’s political philosophy, including: questions of authority, the resistance to authority, sovereign power, democratic control, and the role of Spinoza’s “multitudes”.

Reviews: “The two volumes of Spinoza’s Authority have a great deal to offer students and working scholars alike. They contribute to the continental tradition of the interpretation of Spinoza, and they also describe Spinozism as an approach to current social and political issues.” – Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

“This is an excellent and timely collection of studies of Spinoza’s political philosophy. It provides a comprehensive and up-to-date panoramic view of the engagement with Spinoza’s politics from within the tradition of continental philosophy” – Yitzhak Y. Melamed, Charlotte Bloomberg Professor of Philosophy and the Humanities, Johns Hopkins University, USA

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Spinoza’s Authority Volume II: Resistance and Power in the Political Treatises: Spinoza’s political thought has been subject to a significant revival of interest in recent years. As a response to difficult times, students and scholars have returned to this founding figure of modern philosophy as a means to help reinterpret and rethink the political present. **Spinoza’s Authority Volume II** makes a significant contribution to this ongoing reception and utilization of Spinoza’s 1670s Theologico-Political and Political treatises. By taking the concept of authority as an original framework, this book asks: How is authority related to law, memory, and conflict in Spinoza’s political thought? What are the social, historical and representational processes that produce authority and resistance? And what are the conditions of effective resistance?

**Spinoza’s Authority Volume II** features a roster of internationally established theorists of Spinoza’s work, and covers key elements of Spinoza’s political philosophy.

Reviews: “One of the most decisive political and philosophical questions of our age is that of power. What is real power? Who holds power? What can be done with power? And what are its limits? The essays of this volume provide new resources for addressing the problem of power today. Their wager is that Spinoza’s understanding of authority may help break free from the sad passions of today’s politics and thinking. Through an unflinching analysis of authority, we may begin to articulate an ethics of power.” – Anthony Paul Smith, Assistant Professor of Religion and Theology, LaSalle University, USA

“This rich collection of papers shows the importance of Spinoza’s political writings for the themes of authority, power, law, and freedom. I cannot imagine a better introduction to his philosophy. It should pique the interest of every student of modern political philosophy.” – Steven Smith, Alfred Cowles Professor of Government & Philosophy, Yale University, USA

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Review: These volumes in Bloomsbury’s series of studies in continental philosophy arise from the editors’ and authors’ conviction that a study of Spinoza’s views about authority can be productive politically. The volumes include works of scholarship, then, but scholarship with a purpose beyond that of understanding Spinoza. The editors and authors take Spinoza to have enduring relevance for the criticism of and resistance to harmful power structures in society today. The
essays ought to be read as works themselves on political philosophy and critical theory as well as works on Spinoza.

Volume I focuses on political aspects of Spinoza’s *Ethics*. Explicitly political content in the *Ethics* is scarce. It is limited, on a narrow view of the political, to discussions of social contract and related notions at 4pp36-37 (*Ethics*, Part 4, propositions 36 to 37) and their scholia; Spinoza’s account of the social function of traditional virtues at 4p54s, which follows a formal argument that humility is not in fact a virtue with a qualified recommendation of humility, repentance, and reverence for “the crowd”; accounts of the free man’s behavior in society at 4p69, 4p70, and 4p73; and entries in the Appendix to Part 4 correlate to these passages. Authors in Volume I find, however, foundational political concepts in Spinoza’s uses of *potestas* and *potentia* and tend to use these terms, following Gilles Deleuze (*Expression in Philosophy*, Chapter 14) or Antonio Negri (*The Savage Anomaly*, Preface), to refer, on the one hand, to a capacity, ability, or power to do what one is not at present doing and, on the other hand, an ongoing causal activity or exercise of power. (Accounts of these terms vary across authors in these volumes, however, and this distinction captures only very roughly and imperfectly the complex, difficult views of Deleuze and Negri.) Because this tradition tends to identify *potestas* with authority, it can find a great deal of material in the *Ethics* to hold political interest. This last identification, I should note, is explicitly evident in Spinoza’s political writings: whatever else *potestas* means for Spinoza, he consistently uses the term in political contexts to refer to the sovereign power in a state. Understood as a political term -- and this is something more of an interpretative leap -- *potentia*, because it is the ongoing causal activity of a thing, can be a basis in Spinoza’s thought for realism in political theory. Authors in this volume emphasize Spinoza’s uses of these terms as well as explicitly political passages in the *Ethics*.

Dimitris Vardoulakis’ ambitious “Equality and Power” is an attempt to understand Spinoza’s claim at 4p36 that the greatest good can be enjoyed by all equally. Vardoulakis argues that Spinoza offers us a distinctive account of human equality. Each of us is badly, and unequally, limited because, by 4a1, any of us can be overpowered. Nevertheless, from this status we find “an equality in the participation and engagement of contestation” (16). To my mind, this sort of equality is reminiscent of Hobbes’s view of equality: we may be unequal in strength, but we remain equal in the politically important sense that any of us can be killed by the others. Hobbes’s account is a feature of the state of nature, however. Vardoulakis finds a reason in the ongoing engagement of subjects in a state to distinguish Spinoza’s account of equality sharply from that of Hobbes and other figures.

Aurelia Armstrong, in “Spinoza’s Ethics and Politics of Freedom,” defends a social conception of the route to freedom that Spinoza describes. It is easy, emphasizing the elitism in the *Ethics* and the language that focuses on the increasing power of a single human mind, to take perfection to be the private goal of a sage in isolation. In an admirably clear argument, which emphasizes the free man propositions of Part 4, Armstrong shows that state and society are essential to the project primarily because civil laws make behavior in accordance with reason habitual, a first and critical step to action from reason.

In “Grammars of *Conatus*,” Cesare Casarino builds a detailed account of *conatus*, the striving that characterizes each individual in Spinoza’s metaphysics. To emphasize only part of this detailed essay, which works from Deleuze’s emphasis on resistance, Casarino takes *conatus* to have aspects involving both *potestas* and *potentia*. Insofar as it involves *potestas*, he argues, *conatus* amounts to force expressed as power. Insofar as it involves *potentia*, *conatus* amounts to resistance. An especially interesting feature of this essay is Casarino’s identification of this distinction with the distinction between the essence and existence of singular things, a point that is clearest in the essay’s conclusion (80).

Juan Domingo Sánchez Estop argues in “Beyond Legitimacy” that Spinoza’s account of authority places him in the tradition of Machiavelli and Marx rather than that of Hobbes, Hegel, Locke, and Rousseau. Authority, he argues, is not the basis for legitimate *potestas*; rather it arises from the
exercise of potestas. Why "the exercise of potestas" rather than potentia, which usually marks expression or activity? I suspect that Sánchez Estop has a good answer to this question: just as potestas in the possession is authority, the imaginative perception of potestas is subjection or obedience. People are not made subjects through the active exercise of power (alone, at least) but through the imaginative positing of an authority. If this is right -- and I am not sure that it I follow Sánchez Estop here -- then Spinoza does seem to anticipate many themes in Marx. Still, this very engaging paper could benefit from some discussion of potentia, which one might well identify with Machiavellian and Marxist emphases on genuine material causes of political structures.

Negri's own entry, "Spinoza: A Different Power to Act," revisits the distinction between potentia and potestas. Negri offers a nuanced and detailed, but difficult to follow, account of the relation. He also resists the easy distinction between the two with which this review and, to my eyes, his The Savage Anomaly begins, defending instead an interpretation on which there is some kind of "continuously produced struggle" between the two. It is a difficult essay, but it may be a valuable resource for scholars working to build an interpretation of Spinoza on the basis of the terms. Negri's conclusion, moreover, contributes a great deal to the volume's aim to emphasize the relevance of the author's ideas for an understanding and critique of society.

In "Spinoza's Biopolitics," A. Kiarina Kordela combines careful and detailed discussion of Spinoza's Theological Political Treatise (hereafter, TTP) and theories of knowledge and eternity in the Ethics with a broader argument that Spinoza's conception of the power of acting of an individual human being as a "singular expression of substance" (208) is the same as Marx's conception of labor-power. This view is nicely compatible with the familiar conviction, in this school of thought, that potentia in Spinoza is a political concept and yields a specific, accessible version of that conviction. Kordela's view -- the identification of the power of individuals, which is their essence and the object of that intuitive knowledge which would be the best kind of self-knowledge, with labor-power -- is fruitful, moreover, insofar as it allows her to find in Spinoza's account of intuitive knowledge a kind of political self-awareness and, in the imaginative view that that the mind is immortal, a dangerous kind of political illusion.

Several of the articles in Volume I move outside the central theme of power to other political themes of the Ethics. Joe Hughes's "The Cold Quietness of the Stars" responds to Alain Badiou's characterization of Spinoza's geometrical method. Badiou, in a manner strongly reminiscent of the long scholium that ends Ethics 2, has taken the political lesson of Spinoza's method to be an understanding of how to act in the knowledge of universal necessity. Hughes reconceives the method of the Ethics as itself a kind of creative activity and a political activity distinct from the imaginative activity, which is also political, that characterizes religion.

Warren Montag argues in "Commanding the Body" that the legalistic language of Ethics 3p2s suggests that Spinoza's criticism there of two common views -- the view that the mind controls the body and the important related view that the mind is free -- are criticisms of the common political conceptions of control and freedom as well. There is little doubt that Spinoza's views about the mind-body relation have some implications for politics. I find this essay misleading, however, insofar as it suggests (147-148) that important terms with political connotations, iuris and praejudicia, may be found in 3p2s. Imperium is present, where Spinoza discusses the view that the mind commands the body, but these other terms are not. The essay, which offers a number of valuable historical generalizations about these and other Latin terms, therefore gets off to a shaky start.

"Interrupting the System: Spinoza and Maroon Thought" is James Edward Ford III's response to a passage in a letter to Pieter Balling of 20 July 1664, in which Spinoza reports a dream of a black and scabby Brazilian (nigri, & scabiosi Brasiliani). Negri has suggested in The Savage Anomaly that the figure is Caliban. In an interrogation that asks less who Spinoza meant to invoke than what his invocation means, Ford argues that the Maroon, because of the communal rather than solitary nature of the Maroons, is a more productive
identity for Spinoza’s Brazilian. The suggestion is a good one, given the prominence of Portuguese and Dutch slavery in Spinoza’s cultural surroundings, and Ford uses the insight to good effect, especially in discussing the challenges that racial complexity poses for Spinoza’s views about power-sharing (191).

Ford’s essay does raise the concern for me that a passage that at least seems on the face of it to be simply an uninteresting, depressingly typical, and wrongful expression of racist fear might be read ultimately as an expression of sympathy. In places (179-180) Ford seems to suggest as much, namely, that Spinoza’s persistent dream of a scabby black man is really the dream of someone who is like Spinoza, and that the dream really expresses an opposition to slavery. I am sorry to say that I think that the first, depressingly typical, reading is more probable. Still, Ford’s engaging essay offers a great deal of interesting discussion of Caliban and Maroons and what a Spinozist today -- if not Spinoza himself -- might productively say about race, colonialism, and society.

Volume II of Spinoza’s Authority focuses on Spinoza’s explicitly political texts and primarily on the TTP. The essays collected may be divided roughly into three groups: three chapters concern Machiavellian themes in Spinoza; four consider Spinoza’s conception of interpretation, and especially scriptural interpretation; and one, the work of Chiara Bottici and Miguel de Beistegui that closes the study, offers an account of obedience. Vittorio Morfino finds three Machiavellian themes in the TTP: he takes Machiavelli’s account of the importance of fortune to influence Spinoza’s account of the Hebrew Nation; he takes fortune to be manifest, in particular, in the chance preservation and transmission of memory in society; and he takes Spinoza’s accounts of authority to owe a debt to the accounts of conflict in Machiavelli’s Discourses. Of these, the discussion of fortune is the most compelling and intriguing. Fortune is undoubtedly a central theme of the TTP, and Morfino offers many useful insights into Spinoza’s treatment of fortune.

However, I have two reservations about the use of Machiavelli here. The first is that fortune is a theme in a great number of classical authors and a central figure of Roman culture. These authors include, for example, Quintus Curtius and Tacitus, who are sources for Spinoza in the TTP and Machiavelli alike. Spinoza undoubtedly has Machiavelli in view in many passages in the TTP, and he discusses Machiavelli by name in the Political Treatise (TP). With respect to a theme as common in and important to Roman writing as fortune, however, readers need some explicit argument showing that there is a deep connection here between Machiavelli’s conception of fortune in particular and Spinoza’s account of fortune. The second is that Spinoza offers an account of fortune at TTP 3 that is consistent with universal necessity: we will call fortune what is beyond our knowledge. Machiavelli makes fortune responsible for half of what befalls us (in The Prince, Chapter 25, a passage the Morfino quotes), leaving free will responsible for the other half. Morfino sets aside this apparent divide between the philosophers by asserting that Machiavelli means by this invocation of free will nothing more than “the necessary inclination of the agent” (10). More than mere assertion is necessary here, however, especially given the first concern. The long history of invocations of fortune in the literature that Spinoza draws upon in the TTP may well include accounts of fortune that Spinoza found more congenial than that of The Prince.

Filippo Del Lucchese, drawing upon Morfino as well as Hannah Arendt and Laurent Bove, argues that the relationship between law and conflict in Spinoza may be understood in the same way as the relationship between mind and body: law is the idea of conflict. The thesis draws to some extent upon a univocal reading of natural and civil law: if, according to natural law, we human individuals are always in conflict, then, in a way, natural laws describe, or are of conflict. I have trouble, however, in seeing how the thesis applies to civil laws. Luccece’s response to such difficulty, generally, is to invoke Spinoza’s identification of right and power, which, on the view of this essay, tends to undermine any kind of strong distinction between what we ought to do and what we in fact do.

In “Authority and the Law,” Vardoulakis attempts to show how Spinoza can produce a conception of
authority that leads to a democratic politics. Developing a detailed account of Adam and the fall, he takes Spinoza to found a conception of law on an understanding of Adam’s disobedience, making authority and law the result of a misunderstanding or misrepresentation of divine law (62). Authority, on such a shaky basis, is always subject to criticism. Vardoulakis’s detailed account of Adam is useful and engaging. Although he does mention the late chapters of the TTP at the end of his essay, a reading of Spinoza’s apparently very sharp constraints on freedom of religion and, in particular, his placement of control of religion under the power of states would have been a welcome addition. Spinoza does at least seem to maintain that the state’s authority in some questions is beyond dispute, and that feature of the TTP stands in apparent tension with Vardoulakis’s conclusion that, for Spinoza, all authority is, by its origin, properly subject to criticism.

Turning now to the essays that focus on questions of interpretation, James R. Martel’s excellent, provocative essay on Hobbes, Spinoza, and scriptural interpretation is an argument that Hobbes, more than Spinoza, permits and even encourages a variety of interpretations of scripture. Hobbes on this account acknowledges the metaphorical nature of much of scripture and the variety of interpretations that can result. In insisting that some readings are dangerous and idolatrous, Martel argues, Hobbes does not thereby rule out a variety of acceptable readings (72-73); we can have no knowledge of God at all, so there is no basis to privilege some readings over others. One might object to this view that a central function of the sovereign on Hobbes’s account is to supply a single authorized interpretation of scripture. Martel appreciates this tension and dedicates a section to unraveling it. He argues that for Hobbes ultimately even sovereign interpretations depend upon “ordinary discourses of language” (76).

Spinoza is more conservative, on Martel’s account, because reason in Spinoza permits some knowledge of God: there is in some sense a correct religious view which will resonate to some extent with the philosopher’s knowledge of God. There is a basis in Spinoza, then, where there is not for Hobbes, for hoping the state’s law can really be God’s law (80).

The view, which is well-presented and fascinating, raises difficult questions. I have two principal concerns. The first is Martel’s quick transitions among texts. For Hobbes, it seems to me on the face of it that De Cive is a much less secular text than Leviathan and that Behemoth is tailored more to particular historical circumstance than either of the others. A particularly pressing version of this problem arises for Martel’s account of reason in Hobbes: De Cive clearly has a much stronger conception of right reason than anything that Martel attributes to Hobbes and anything that might plausibly be attributed to Leviathan. In Leviathan, right reason is elusive, and it is the right source for Martel; why, though, should Martel rely upon De Cive for some conclusions about Hobbes but not rely upon it for a stronger conception of right reason? Similarly, for Spinoza, doctrinal questions about the relation between the Ethics, where the philosophical knowledge of God is mainly to be found, and the TTP are pressing. My second concern is a question about norms and interpretation in Hobbes. Martel demonstrates that Hobbes takes the variety of scriptural interpretations to be a fact, and he offers at least very persuasive claims about the source of any sovereign interpretation in the readings of ordinary people. Neither of these points show, however, that Hobbes takes a variety of readings of scripture to be acceptable or desirable within a single state.

Supposing that he is correct about the authors’ views, perhaps Martel’s contention that Hobbes is more tolerant of a variety of readings than Spinoza in virtue of his very thin conception of reason may still be turned on its head. In arguing that there is a source of knowledge in reason, Spinoza at the same time argues that everybody (indeed all things!) have reason. That gives Spinoza a basis for arguing that a person might well resist a sovereign who insisted that religion requires something different from the tenets of universal faith. By contrast, where reason is only a faculty of adding and not a source of original knowledge, as it is in the first two part of Leviathan, there is not the same sort of basis for asserting that a sovereign’s authorized interpretations of scripture are against
reason. Suppose that Hobbes rejects any view on which readers can know that they understand scripture correctly and that he insists that, for the sake of peace, some one interpretation must nevertheless be held as right by all. The Spinozistic basis for criticizing the sovereign interpretation, which depends upon the ordinary person’s knowledge of some religious truths, will not arise for Hobbes so understood.

Siarhei Biareishyk examines the importance of Spinoza’s account of error for his views about interpretation. He defends a highly original account of three varieties of error corresponding to the three kinds of knowledge (that is, of cognitio). On this view, causal attribution errors correspond to imaginative knowledge; error in the formation of universal notions corresponds to knowledge by reason; political error, which undermines the sovereign authority to interpret scripture, also undermines "the very essence of singular sovereignty" (109) and corresponds therefore to knowledge of the third kind, knowledge of the essences of singular things. Biareishyk argues that the TTP both explains and commits this last kind of error.

Kordela and Joseph Bermas-Dawes, in "Spinoza’s Immanent Sovereignty," argue that on Spinoza’s account the fact that power and right remains with citizens in a state is in tension with the claim that the sovereign has the authority to interpret. The essay features significant engagement with the TP and its Chapter 4 account of authority. The authors develop in response to their initial question an account of political authority that makes it largely imaginative and therefore independent of metaphysical truths. The response explains, without justifying, subjects’ attribution of authority to the sovereign.

Gregg Lambert’s "Spinoza and Signs," which focuses on TTP 17, offers another account of the importance of imagination and error to authority. Lambert focuses on the relation between Spinoza’s views about interpretation and imagination and on his resistance to the project of utopian political theory. As Lambert presents Spinoza’s view, the structure of laws in any society is contingent, and structures vary with the particular circumstances and origins of states. The thesis explains nicely the strongly realist opening of the TP.

The volume’s final essay stands apart from the others thematically. Bottici and Beistegui pose a puzzle about obedience in Spinoza: why do people fight for servitude? The authors offer detailed discussions of destructive superstition in the TTP and of the project that stable governments have of organizing, containing, and channeling the flow of human affects through the imagination (168). The essay relies heavily on Spinoza’s theory of the affects, which has its source principally in the Ethics, so it raises the question of doctrinal continuity between Spinoza’s works, a pressing issue. The essay also features several sections relating Spinoza, once more, to contemporary social and political issues.

The two volumes of Spinoza’s Authority have a great deal to offer students and working scholars alike. They contribute to the continental tradition of the interpretation of Spinoza, and they also describe Spinozism as an approach to current social and political issues. Reviewed by Michael LeBuffe, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews <>

The Emancipation of Biblical Philology in the Dutch Republic, 1590-1670 by Dirk Van Miert [Oxford University Press, 9780198803935]

The Emancipation of Biblical Philology in the Dutch Republic, 1590-1670 argues that the application of tools, developed in the study of ancient Greek and Latin authors, to the Bible was aimed at stabilizing the biblical text but had the unintentional effect that the text grew more and more unstable. Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) capitalized on this tradition in his notorious Theological-political Treatise (1670). However, the foundations on which his radical biblical scholarship is built were laid by Reformed philologists who started from the hermeneutical assumption that philology was the servant of reformed dogma. On the basis of this principle, they pushed biblical scholarship to the center of historical studies during the first half of the seventeenth century.

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Excerpt: Biblical Philology in the Sixteenth Century

There are as many copies [of the Bible] as there are manuscripts. —Jerome

This book focuses on biblical philology in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic, but to understand the development of biblical scholarship in that age, it is necessary to briefly review the history of biblical philology in the preceding
century and to relate what happened in the Dutch Republic to developments in science and philosophy and to the history of biblical philology in other European countries. This overview will help frame the central question addressed by this monograph.

Classical Philology and Biblical Philology

During much of the Early Modern period, philology (textual criticism, linguistic analysis, and historical contextualization) usually pertained to classical philology: the study of texts by Greek and Roman authors. Of course, the philological study of the Bible was continuously on the agenda (one need think only of Gianozzo Manetti and Lorenzo Valla), but men like Petrarch, Poggio Bracciolini, Niccolò Niccoli, Giovanni Aurispa, Francesco Filelfo, Coluccio Salutati, Leonardo Bruni, Guarino da Verona, Vittorino da Feltre, and many, many others, published nothing on the Bible. Scholars by and large focused on new or unpublished texts...

Around 1604, the famous French scholar Joseph Scaliger confided something to his boarding students:

> There are more than fifty additions or changes to the New Testament and to the Gospels. It's a strange case, I dare not say it. If it were a pagan author, I would speak of it differently.

This often-quoted passage reveals a great deal about the deconstructive power of philology in general and of biblical philology in particular. This book deals with the emancipation of biblical philology and this development’s consequences for the authority of the Bible.

I understand (biblical) philology to be the study of a (biblical) text by means of textual criticism, linguistic analysis, and historical contextualization. These terms are anachronistic in that the writers and scholars in the period under consideration would not have understood what they were doing in this way, but they are apt terms for what I aim to describe. The broad sense in which I use textual criticism includes the identification of variant readings (and sometimes opting for the best one) through the collation of manuscripts or on the basis of comparisons of the Hebrew and Greek texts with the Septuagint and the Vulgate; it also includes conjectural emendations. By linguistic analysis I mean the discussion of semantics and syntax, which seventeenth-century scholars often conducted by comparing different translations. Linguistic analysis in this book encompasses the meanings and ambiguities of words, the study of idiomatic expressions, and the sociolinguistic situation of the biblical authors. Historical contextualization is my label for analyses of the political, military, religious (ritual, calendrical, theological), and cultural situations in which the biblical texts took shape, including aspects of material culture. Much of this historical contextualization involved biblical antiquarianism. Perhaps one might as well speak of ‘historical criticism'.

I will consistently refer to this triad to avoid confusion with the term ‘biblical exegesis, which people use in the sense both of the study of textual or linguistic criticism and the theological or dogmatic ‘interpretation' of the text (more true to the Greek meaning of the word). I will steer clear of dogmatic discussions if these are not explicitly predicated in one way or another on textual criticism, linguistic analysis, or historical contextualization. I have used the term ‘biblical criticism' sparingly, because I reserve ‘criticism' to denote textual criticism. Besides, ‘critique' may have unduly negative connotations for some readers less familiar with the history of scholarship, whereas most biblical critics in fact attempted to make the biblical text secure, not to destabilize it (the term indicates the ability to make clear distinctions). In some cases, I will use the term ‘biblical scholarship' to describe biblical philology as an endeavour and not so much as a method.'

One last thing I will not do is to consider biblical hermeneutics, i.e., the theorizing of the conditions that govern the interpretation of the text. Again, philology (or criticism) in many cases is about these conditions (in particular when explicitly treated as ars critica), but I have focused as much as possible on practices and not on theory. More often than not, the quotidian practices carried out in the thick bushes of annotations at the bottom or in the margins of densely printed pages are not in line with the neat professions of faith proclaimed in prefaces.
For centuries, humanists had fought battles over the interpretations of classical texts. These discussions focused on textual variants, references in the texts to historical and mythological circumstances, meanings of words, comparisons of Latin texts with their Greek models, rhetorical structures, literary analyses, and implicit historical contexts. Having cut their teeth on these pagan texts, classical philologists found themselves on dangerous ground if they turned away from Greek and Roman antiquity and ventured to apply their sharp philological tools to antiquity's supreme book: the Bible. Scaliger's apprehension, as evident from the quotation that appears at the beginning of this preface, was justified: philology eventually contributed significantly to the erosion of scriptural authority. But it did so in ways that were by no means straightforward or intentional.

Philology as a method lay at the foundation of the Protestant principle of sola scriptura. For at least a century-and-a-half, between Erasmus and Spinoza, Protestant scholars mobilized philology to secure the authority of Scripture against the Church of Rome, which defended the Vulgate, the late-fourth-century Latin translation attributed in its entirety to Jerome. Hermeneutical theories about the role that ought to be assigned to philology differed from one exegete to the next. I point out that such theories were usually governed by larger concerns over religious, political, or philosophical interests and ideas. Had they not been, philology would have been left only the emphasizing of particularities and the deconstruction of larger narratives. And if a larger framework were absent, how could one evaluate the evidence brought by philologists, who tended to disagree among themselves perhaps as often as theologians or philosophers did?

Although it was by no means self-evident that philology undermined the authority of Scripture, this study assumes that in the long run, biblical philology did contribute significantly to this erosion. It attempts to describe and analyse part of this process. The present monograph shows how Jacob Arminius, Franciscus Gomarus, the translators and revisers of the States' Translation (the Dutch Authorized Version of 1637), Daniel Heinsius, Hugo Grotius, Claude Saumaise, Isaac de La Peyrère, and Isaac Vossius all drew on techniques developed by classical scholars of Renaissance humanism, notably Scaliger, who devoted themselves to the study of manuscripts, Near Eastern languages, and ancient history. I will assess and compare the accomplishments of these scholars in textual criticism, the analysis of languages, and the reconstruction of political and cultural historical contexts, and I hope to demonstrate that their methods were closely linked. The selections of texts of these scholars, studied below, are based on two criteria. First, most were in one way or another connected to Scaliger, although this does not apply to the majority of the people responsible for the States' Translation. A second criterion is that the texts discussed below have thus far received only scant attention. The biblical philology of Scaliger has been well studied, and Drusius's annotations on the New Testament, Gomarus's Davidis Lyra, Grotius's Annotationes, La Peyrère's Praeadamitae, and Isaac Vossius's On the True Age of the World have also received some attention, but much more can be said about these and other works. Arminius's biblical philology has never been studied, and this book presents the most elaborate account to date of the making of the States' Translation, of Heinsius's Aristarchus sacer and Sacrae exercitationes, and of the contributions to the discussion of men with long hair by Saumaise and others. It also, and for the first time, examines the earliest responses to La Peyrère, which can be found in disputations defended at Leiden University. In addition, it draws on unpublished correspondence to and from Heinsius and on a number of pamphlets that have never before been discussed. Admittedly, this study might also have taken into account the accomplishments, obvious from a number of existing studies, of Thomas Erpenius, Jacobus Golius, Sixtinus Amama, Ludovicus de Dieu, and Constantin L'Empereur. They would have contributed much to enforcing the concept of a 'Scaliger school' centred in Leiden, but as I am neither a Hebraist nor an Arabist, I found it wiser not to treat these scholars' works.

Finally, biblical philology started to appear on the curricula of Dutch universities in the 1650s, when students defended disputations that did not merely uphold the self-evidence and perspicuity of
Scripture, as they had done in previous decades, but that also dealt with questions of a philological nature.

As to geography, Leiden University takes centre stage. Scaliger lived and worked in Leiden during his most influential years. Spinoza’s house in Rijnsburg was about an hour-and-a-half’s walk from Leiden University. Scaliger’s students Grotius and Heinsius were raised in Leiden. Drusius and Gomarus participated, from highly different perspectives, in the great debate over Remonstrantism in the 1610s, which brought the Dutch Republic to the brink of civil war, and both were accomplished biblical critics. Saumaise practised biblical philology in Leiden as well, where he was frequently joined by the young Vossius. La Peyrère was inspired by Saumaise when he met him in Leiden and before he provoked Vossius to enter the fray of biblical philology. This is to say that some of the major protagonists in the history of biblical philology of the first half of the seventeenth century had a strong connection with Leiden. So deeply influenced were they by Scaliger that one might speak of a ‘Scaliger school’: Scaliger exerted a huge ‘programmatic influence’. In England, for example, seventeenth-century scholars of natural philosophy and theology, orthodox and heterodox alike, all invested heavily in the type of critical and humanist scholarship that had been developed on the continent by the likes of Scaliger and Isaac Casaubon (1559-1614): a textual-critical and sociolinguistic approach, sensitive to the unique cultural contexts of texts from antiquity.

One such influence was Scaliger’s interest in Near Eastern languages. In his wake, scholars such as Thomas Erpenius, Jacobus Golius, and Constantin L’Empereur made Leiden an intellectual powerhouse of Arabic and Hebrew studies, at a time when Franker University had also become a stronghold of Hebrew studies. The study of Maimonides in particular proved a stimulus for the development of biblical philology.

Admittedly, these chronological and geographical limitations are practical, if not arbitrary. Surely, Valla and Erasmus, Bombergh and Benito Arias Montano (1527-1598), Beza and Henricus Stephanus (Henri Estienne), to name but a few, are part of a grand narrative which could be extended further back into the sixteenth century than I have done here." Surely, too, scholars in France, the Vatican, the Habsburg Empire, England, the German countries, just as the biblical critics in Scandinavian regions and Central and Eastern European territories, take an active part in this history, as chapter 1 demonstrates.

My goal, then, is limited: this book presents but one part of a much larger story. But it is a part that deals with a crucial period and place, when biblical philology was on the eve of turning radical. The widely entrenched tradition of biblical philology, with all its rival confessional agendas and political interests, was not only firmly in place, but even proved popular when Spinoza seized on it in his Theological-Political Treatise. How Spinoza precisely did this is not the subject of this study. Anthony Grafton, following previous aborted attempts by now largely forgotten scholars, has recently demonstrated that Spinoza, in the philological chapters of the Treatise, was indeed intimately, if not perfectly, familiar with this tradition. What I want to show is that, before Spinoza, more people than ever before were well aware that the biblical text posed textual, linguistic, and historical problems and that these, ironically, became more serious with every new attempt to solve them.

To better understand the pertinent chronology and geography, however, it seems wise to provide, by way of an introduction in chapter 1, an admittedly very general chronological and geographical survey of the tradition of biblical philology, of which this book treats only one part.

Of course, the history of biblical philology in the Renaissance should be, and has been, considered in the context of other crucial developments, notably in natural history (or physics), astronomy (or mathematics), and philosophy.

Profound epistemological changes in these fields influenced the reading of the Bible and did not cease doing so. It has become clear, for example, that defenders of Copernicanism recognized that the Bible consists of historical texts and that the Bible was written in a language attuned to people
at a certain time and place in history. This idea of ‘accommodation’ highlighted the historicity of the Bible. Kepler understood the historicity of the Bible, and so did Newton, who acknowledged that the text of Scripture had been corrupted and took refuge in philology next to natural philosophy and history, in an attempt to penetrate as deeply as possible into God’s creation. The accommodation theory played an important role in the discussion about miracles, in which knowledge of nature seemed to clash with revelation. But the relation between scientiae such as natural science and biblical philology on the one hand, and biblical authority on the other, was by no means straightforward. As Brad Gregory has recently stated, the natural sciences, no less than textual biblical philology per se, ‘did not and could not have demonstrated that miracles had not or could not have happened’.

Nor can the polemics over the Bible be understood without taking into account the advanced spread of information due to the printing press, the widening of the European horizon due to contact with the Americas, or the new observations of flora, fauna, and astronomical phenomena and their implications for the relation between the readings of the ‘two Books’: the Bible and the Book of Nature. The New Philosophy and the erosion of the Aristotelian worldview showed that theology and philosophy were, as they always had been, intimately connected, despite the attempts of Descartes and his adversaries to keep them apart.

Whether classical and biblical philology was stimulated by Baconian ideas concerning the value of fact-finding, accumulation, and organization is also a question not dealt with in this monograph. I do suggest, however, that biblical philology was rooted in a humanist tradition that preceded the rise of Baconianism, Cartesianism, and Spinozism. In my view, the rise of the New Sciences (I consciously avoid the contested and perhaps outdated term ‘Scientific Revolution’), and in particular of observational and experimental practices, was connected, in ways we still need to establish, to the intrinsically empirical epistemology which informed the exercise of philology. Philologists were trained to collect and compare data, to look for regularities, and to come up with hypotheses (conjectures) to explain anomalies, and to submit them to scrutiny by discussing them in letters or presenting them in publications. Humanist philology was a highly social enterprise, conducted by citizens of the imagined community known as the Republic of Letters, and it was this same commonwealth of learning, this scientific community, in which the New Sciences and New Philosophies took shape. The implication of my approach is that humanist philology played a larger role in the history of science than has hitherto been acknowledged; and it should be taken into account as an explanatory mechanism, not so much because of the well-known fact that humanists made available the texts of antiquity and stimulated scholars and scientists by confronting them with the ideas conveyed by these texts, but because of the epistemological foundations informing the methods they employed to make these texts available. The historicist character of those methods has been shown to be one of the pedigrees of modernity. For seventeenth- and eighteenth-century classicists, this was inconsequential.

This study ignores the association of ‘humanism’ with scepticism, however much biblical philology can be placed in a ‘humanist’ tradition characterized by epistemic humility. Humanism, the New Sciences, and the New Philosophies came to be tied into the same disputes in which biblical polemics also partook and which shaded into one another: disputes over the desirability or necessity of the toleration of diverging opinions, over the libertas philosophandi, over the proper division of State and Church power (which made it political), and, ultimately, over ‘secularization.

This book does not deal with ‘secularization’ as an explanatory concept. However, insofar as readers may think of ‘secularization’ as an implicit corollary of what is argued here, I need to point out that the term as I would understand it does not mean atheism (as a nonreligious worldview), secularism (as an ideology opposed to religion), dechristianization, or dwindling church attendance. If I had incorporated the concept of ‘secularization’ in this study, it would not have had anything having to do with changes in personal beliefs, but with the cessation of the Church’s control over society and the slackening of the grip of Christian theology in
all sorts of domains that are not properly theological or ecclesiastical.

Secularization would thus concern the process by which universal claims over the correct theological interpretation of the Bible lost their moral and legal power to dictate these interpretations to an entire society. This legal detachment meant that attempts to curb religious deviance by a particular church upheld by the State lost their moral and physical power to force people to adhere to certain doctrines. As a consequence, secularization is a process that resulted in a plurality of interpretations being accepted as inevitable, a situation in which verbal confrontations were to be preferred over physical conflict. This process lurks in the background, because biblical philology had consequences for scriptural authority. Thus this monograph potentially has wider implications, but if these were to be treated within a larger framework of something like ‘secularization, the book’s scope would have been, by necessity, much broader, taking into account wider geographical and social contexts.

Such wider contexts include, for example, the French Wars of Religion, which heightened the stakes of biblical philology. The Dutch Revolt caused Calvinism to define itself ever more strictly, highlighting distinctions that set it apart from Lutheranism and Anglicanism. The impact of the German Thirty Years’ War on scholarship has not yet been sufficiently studied. Politico-ecclesiastical tensions in England caused biblical philology to gain importance, while lay interpretations of the Bible were an important aspect of the Civil War. Politico-religious contexts both stimulated and hampered biblical philology. We will assess these circumstances as far as they seem connected to the case studies that are the subjects of the chapters to follow.

All these grand themes require a synthetic approach far beyond my abilities. I have resisted temptations to pay arbitrary lip service to these concurrent large narratives, lest I open a Pandora’s box of historiographical polemics. This book is already complicated enough.

I do, however, wish to place this book within a particular trend in historiography to emphasize the history of scholarship both in its relation to the history of science and as a field of cultural history in its own right. Since the rise of interdisciplinary studies and the decline of religiously inspired historians’ hold on the history of the Bible in the last two decades of the twentieth century, the history of scholarship has established itself as an interdisciplinary field in the history of ideas, and it has been successful in largely ridding itself of its reputation, popular since the attacks of Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire, as unphilosophical pedantry and dead-from-the-waist-down erudition.

Biblical history in particular offers grounds to study the confrontation of Eastern and Western traditions, as well as the tensions between religion and science and among rival confessions and intra-confessional interest groups. It shifts the research perspective from a clash between philosophy and religion to the continuity of a tradition of historical criticism, informing what came to be known as the Enlightenment. Dmitri Levitin has recently drawn attention to the rise of the history of scholarship in the historiography that focuses on the origin of modernity.’ While the vast majority of this historiography concerns England, France, and Germany, this book applies this line of thought to the geographical centre of the contested narrative: the Dutch Republic in general and Leiden in particular.

This monograph reveals that philology was very frequently used to stabilize the biblical text, and was often not in the service of radical agendas. This observation runs counter to the tendency in twenty-first-century historiography to foreground radicalism, heterodoxy, and progressiveness and to enlist ‘science’ (in our case, philology) squarely in the service of modernity. Such a historiography is too linear and too crude. Philology functioned often as a handmaiden of theology. The problem was not so much that biblical philology historicized the Bible, but that it could also serve unorthodox ideas, as any handmaiden could. It could be used to support political and eschatological agendas of various parties and individuals, or merely to provide ambitious scholars with a platform to further their careers.
However, the accumulation of philological evidence collected by various and often adversarial stakeholders made it more and more difficult to bring these results together into a unanimous Reformed interpretation of the Bible. Gradually, scholars had to acknowledge that the problems of establishing access to an ‘original’ and ‘pure’ Hebrew and Greek text stood in the way of defending the perspicuity and self-evidence of the Bible.

So the Bible was assessed and used in novel ways due not only to the results of natural science. Primarily, the innovations in approach stemmed from historical scholarship of the Bible: the study of the transmission, the language, and the historical context of the Bible compromised the self-evidence of Scripture. As such, philology played a complicated role, comparable to the new knowledge of nature, which was generated in the same period. The New Sciences did not automatically lead to ‘secularization’, but more often than not actually supported the idea that nature gave evidence of divine workmanship. Philology likewise forced readers to rethink their relation to the Bible without necessarily diminishing the belief in the divine nature of its message. This book, then, not only seeks to play down the idea of a ‘pre-critical’ period in biblical philology, but also implies that the rise of biblical philology was intrinsic to the rise of the New Sciences in the seventeenth century.

The types of arguments Spinoza wielded in the core chapters of his notorious Tractatus theologico-politicus continued an uninterrupted tradition of humanist philological criticism which originated with the Church Fathers and extended through Valla, Erasmus, and the Polyglot Bibles, the steady rise of the profile of Hebrew scholarship, through Scaliger and his Leiden school of philologists, including the growing currency of Arabic, and on into the wider context of Dutch society through vernacular discussions on the role of the Bible in contemporary politics and moral conduct. Spinoza’s Treatise used the language of an existing and well-established academic discipline, which in the fifty years preceding its publication had been made professional, scientific, and even popular in the Dutch Republic. <>

Spinoza and Biblical Philology in the Dutch Republic, 1660-1710
by Jetze Touber [Oxford University Press, 9780198805007]

Spinoza and Biblical Philology in the Dutch Republic, 1660-1710 investigates the biblical criticism of Spinoza from the perspective of the Dutch Reformed society in which the philosopher lived and worked. It focuses on philological investigation of the Bible: its words, language, and the historical context in which it originated. Jetze Touber expertly charts contested issues of biblical philology in mainstream Dutch Calvinism to determine if Spinoza’s work on the Bible had bearing on the Reformed understanding of the way society should handle Scripture. Spinoza has received considerable attention both in and outside academia. His unconventional interpretation of the Old Testament passages has been examined repeatedly during the past decades. So has that of fellow “radicals” (rationalists, radicals, deists, libertines, and enthusiasts), against the backdrop of a society that is assumed to have been hostile, overwhelmed, static, and uniform. Touber counteracts this perspective and considers how the Dutch Republic used biblical philology and biblical criticism, including that of Spinoza. In doing so, Touber takes into account the highly neglected area of the Dutch Reformed ministry and theology of the Dutch Golden Age. The study concludes that Spinoza—rather than simply pushing biblical scholarship in the direction of modernity—acted in an indirect way upon ongoing debates, shifting trends in those debates, but not always in the same direction, and not always equally profoundly at all times, on all levels.

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Excerpt: Spinoza and Biblical Philology in the Dutch Republic
In 1712 Johannes Meier (1651-1725), professor of Oriental languages in Harderwijk, wrote to Gijsbert Cuper (1644-1716), a renowned scholar in Deventer. Meier apologized for the delay in responding to Cuper’s earlier letters: he had been absorbed in the study of the biblical Temple of Solomon. He complained that:

while contemplating this magnificent building, the many halls and spaces, I have been taken up for two months by so many complications, that up to this day I have not been able to respond. [...] What we find in Holy Writ about the Temple is twisted and difficult, especially in those two chapters I Kings 6 and 7, as well as Ezekiel 40, 41, and 42, and there are hardly any interpreters to be found who agree on it with one mind and one explanation

Five years earlier, Meier had published an academic dissertation on the prophet Ezekiel’s vision of the Temple. In it he responded to all the interpreters who disagreed among themselves, insofar as they touched upon the Temple vision in Ezekiel 40-48. Before addressing such matters of detail, however, Meier had to contend with the criticism of one thinker who had questioned the authenticity of the book of Ezekiel in the first place. This was Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677), who had drawn upon a Talmudic tradition to argue that rabbis had come close to discarding the book of Ezekiel, considering it irreconcilable with Mosaic law. Spinoza had even suggested that during a secret meeting a certain Hananiah had modified the text of Ezekiel’s prophecy, so as to save it for the canon. Meier devoted much of his introduction to defending the authenticity of the prophetic text from Spinoza’s criticism.

It may seem surprising that a philosopher, famed for his geometrical system that rationally proves the unity of all and the prudence of doing good, would be challenged on account of his biblical philology in an unprepossessing theological dissertation. Yet this was exactly one of the major responses prompted by Spinoza’s biblical criticism, enshrined in his Tractatus theologico-politicus (1670), as the present book sets out to argue. This book discusses biblical philology as practised by Spinoza, as well as by Reformed philosophers, theologians, and classicists in the late seventeenth-century Dutch Republic. It concentrates not so much on the philosophical criticism of theological concepts, but rather on the way Spinoza and his contemporaries worked with the editorial, linguistic, and historical aspects of biblical texts. It aspires to enrich Spinoza scholarship by showing that a much broader segment of Dutch society was affected by the philosopher’s biblical criticism than is usually accounted for—and at the same time that such criticism was less of a break with the past than often assumed.

Early Modern Biblical Philology
Spinoza employed philology, including textual criticism, linguistic knowledge, and historical contextualization, to situate the biblical texts in the past that had produced them. Philological method goes back to antiquity, but in Western Europe the period when philology manifested itself as a ground-breaking intellectual technique was the Renaissance. A landmark in the introduction of philological source criticism was Lorenzo Valla’s (1407-1457) exposure of the Donation of Constantine as a forgery. This ‘charter of the papal state’ supposedly ratified the donation of swathes of land in central Italy by Emperor Constantine the Great to Pope Silvester I. Valla pointed out (in 1440, but his account was first published in 1517)
that its linguistic style and several historical particulars belied its authenticity, indicating medieval origins. A broader philological project consisted of Valla’s annotations to the New Testament, with possibly far-reaching consequences for the authenticity of many biblical passages. Valla’s annotations were published in 1505 by Erasmus (ca. 1467-1536), who subsequently set out to assess the text of the New Testament critically himself. This resulted in his annotated Novum Instrumentum (1516), a new edition of the Greek text of the New Testament, a translation in Latin, and annotations elucidating editorial decisions, linguistic idiom, and historical context.

With Erasmus’s critical edition of the New Testament we come to the heart of this book: the application of philological techniques to make sense of texts that record sacred persons, utterances, and events. As the sixteenth century progressed, the unity of Latin Christianity broke down irreversibly. In Northern Europe, Reformed churches urged a renewal of religion by returning to Scripture as the true source of salvation, penetrating beyond the exegetical sediment that had covered it in the Middle Ages. This was coupled with the humanist desire to revisit the biblical texts in their source languages. The Reformed churches—particularly those of a Calvinist stamp—married piety with philology and set out to reconstruct the authentic Sacred Pages, and to translate them in vernacular languages and thus to make them available to all individual Christians.

Over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, new standard editions and translations of the Old and New Testaments appeared in all Calvinist areas. At the same time, biblical scholarship exposed problems that seemed impossible to resolve: apparent interpolations in the biblical texts, unique Hebrew terms and a ‘Hebraizing’ Greek, inconsistent chronology, contradictory passages. In the confessional struggles that followed the consolidation of rival churches in Europe—the Catholic Church in its various national branches, and the Lutheran, Anglican, and Calvinist churches—contestants seized upon the problems of biblical scholarship that most embarrassed their opponents. Protestants decried Catholics for using a corrupted Bible, the Vulgate, claiming that their own Hebrew and Greek sources were closer to the original. Catholics dismissed the Hebrew Old Testament, claiming that the Greek Septuagint version derived from a manuscript nearer to the original. Biblical scholarship that aimed to renew authentic Scripture was thus always political, entangled with interconfessional polemics.

From around the middle of the seventeenth century, in what seems like a flood of criticism, several authors picked up these irresolvable issues of biblical scholarship and instrumentalized them for their own, non-ecclesiastical purposes. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) employed the results of philology in his biblical criticism, fully integrating theology with his political theory centred upon undivided sovereignty. Isaac de La Peyrère (1596-1676) seized upon biblical ambiguities to make the case that the human race had a prehistory that antedated the creation of Adam and Eve, and he qualified the divine election of the Jews (even though in another sense he accorded them a privileged status in his eschatology). And Spinoza—Spinoza deconstructed all certainties concerning the authorship and the integrity of the biblical texts, leaving the reader with a bare minimum of propositions that could be said to be undeniably biblical as well as divine. As various historians have observed, by the end of the seventeenth century the destructive potential of philology for the usefulness of the Bible threatened to overwhelm well-intentioned clergy in Protestant Europe. Whereas philology had its roots in the Renaissance and the Reformation, nevertheless the mid-seventeenth century did mark a watershed in the status of the Bible in Christian Europe.

The effect of biblical philology on church and society in the Dutch Republic in the second half of the seventeenth century, which saw the publication of Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus, is the subject of this book. It thereby seeks to enhance our appreciation of the efficacy of Spinoza’s biblical criticism in his own time. Spinoza acquired his reputation as a philosopher for his rationalism, plain and abstract, his system devised without reference to any external authority. Yet it is important to realize that one major aspect of his
contribution to intellectual history, his critique of the
Religion of the Book, involved engagement with the
technical minutiae of biblical philology. Dirk van
Miert has meticulously reconstructed how ‘biblical
philology’, a combination of textual criticism,
language studies, and historical contextualization,
became both fashionable and potentially
problematic in the Dutch Republic from the late
sixteenth century onwards. Much like his
predecessors, Spinoza employed philological
techniques to question the current relevance of
source texts, embedding them in the historical
circumstances that had produced, transmitted, and
received them. Van Miert has evoked ‘the perfect
atmosphere for the emancipation of biblical
philology’ in the decades running from 1640 to
1670. True, biblical philology continued to serve
the confessional churches as an integral part of the
education of the ecclesiastical elite, in preparation
for their duties in society. But it also increasingly
served outsiders who used it to confront the
churches head on.

This Book
Starting from the Tractatus theologico-politicus,
Spinoza’s outstanding work of biblical criticism, I
move outward in ever-widening circles to explore
the fascinations and threats of biblical philology in
the Dutch Republic in the second half of the
seventeenth century. The focus here is on the Public
Church, the dominant Dutch ecclesiastical institution
to emerge from the Calvinist brand of the
Reformation, which was given its definitive shape at
the Synod of Dordrecht. The first responses to the
Tractatus theologico-politicus indicate the
exegetical issues that the Calvinists wrestled with,
the limits of what was acceptable, and the
particular sensitivities that shaped debates about
innovations in biblical interpretation. A broader
exploration of Reformed biblical scholarship in the
second half of the seventeenth century shows that
these exegetical issues did not crop up exclusively
as a consequence of the rationalist approach to the
biblical interpretations of a few philosophers, such
as those proposed by Spinoza and Meijer. By
paying attention to biblical history and to
antiquarianism in particular, we see that the
philological study itself of biblical texts exposed a
multitude of potentially unsettling uncertainties
regarding the interpretation of Scripture. Finally,
the perspective shifts from scholarship to
ecclesiastical politics, so as to judge the extent to
which scholarly issues permeated the deliberations
of the administrative institutions responsible for the
functioning of the Church in everyday life.

Chapter 1 homes in on Spinoza as a Bible critic.
Based on existing historiography on Spinoza’s
biblical criticism, it parses the main relevant
historical contexts in which Spinoza came to
articulate his analysis of the Bible: the Sephardi
community of Amsterdam, freethinking philosophers,
and the Reformed Church. It concludes with a
detailed examination of the Tractatus theologico-
politicus, Spinoza’s major work of biblical criticism.
This first chapter may be considered an extended
introduction. It lays the foundation for the
remainder of the book. Along the way I highlight
some themes that Spinoza discussed on the grounds
of the biblical texts themselves: the textual unity of
the Bible, and the biblical concepts of prophecy,
divine election, and religious law. The focus is on
the biblical arguments for these propositions.

Chapter 2 moves forward to examine the first
responses to Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-
politicus. We encounter not only the well-known
published refutations, such as those by Regnerus
van Mansveld (1674) and Frans Kuyper (1676),
but also reactions that can only be reconstructed
through their traces in correspondence and other
writings. Within these responses we discern two
main lines of thought: on the one hand, puzzlement
at the metaphysics that implicitly underlies
Spinoza’s terse biblical exegesis; on the other
hand, indignation at his carefree employment of
well-established philological methods in arguments
that led to outrageous conclusions. I focus on the
latter, the philological issues that Spinoza used to
his advantage and to which his critics attempted to
formulate ad hoc answers. For the most part the
critics failed to dispel the spectre of obsolescence
that Spinoza’s philological investigation of the Bible
conjured up. Prophecy, election, and religious laws
emerging from the Bible took on the indelible hue
of historical contingency.

In chapter 3 we broaden our scope to chart the
potential and the pitfalls of biblical scholarship
among the Dutch Reformed in the second half of the seventeenth century. Whereas the names of Joseph Justus Scaliger, Hugo Grotius, and Petrus Cunaeus (1586-1638) resound in the modern history of scholarship—to mention only the most famous historians and orientalists who engaged with biblical philology in the first half of the seventeenth century—Dutch Reformed biblical philology of the second half of the century is relatively unknown. Focusing on Old Testament scholarship, we trace several debates in which philological arguments, similar to those Spinoza employed, were used by scholars such as Johannes Coccejus, Johannes Braun (1628-1708), and Campegius Vitringa (1659-1722) to debate the nature of Jewish religion (centring on the garments of the priests) and architecture (the Temple of Solomon). Moreover, we observe the extent to which such highly specialized debates spilled over to the writings of non-professionals such as Willem Goeree (1635-1711) and Adrianus Beverland (1650-1716), which could lead to unconventional speculations, unwelcome from a clerical perspective. Even though the particulars of the radical biblical criticism of the likes of Spinoza and, for instance, Adriaan Koerbagh (1632-1669) might differ and were more challenging than the naturalizing and, as we will see, eroticizing tendencies of some of these lay theologians, contemporaries perceived them all as existing along a continuum and, accordingly, publicly condemned them together.

Chapter 4 investigates the dynamics of the Public Church as it dealt with the centrifugal potential of biblical scholarship, including Spinoza’s. As indicated above, it is vital to take into account the Reformed clergy’s canonization of the States’ Translation, and the accompanying annotations and formulaic doctrines, to appreciate how little room there was for innovative scholarship to influence the official interpretation of the Bible. The ecclesiastical establishment attempted to ward off the detrimental effect of the criticism of outsiders by maintaining these standard texts and formulas as defensive walls around God’s Word. Nevertheless, cracks appeared soon enough, even in this defensive system, and within the clergy itself, despite the protestations of unity, individuals broke ranks and threatened to undo the hermeneutical concord. In following several protracted conflicts at the level of the classis, the regional layer of ecclesiastical administration, we get an impression of the tensions that continuously undermined the aspirations to harmony. The importance of biblical scholarship was indirect in the case of Lambert van Velthuysen (1622-1685) in Utrecht in the 1650s and 1660s, but it was front and centre in the anti-Coccejan campaign of the rural Classis of Zevenwouden in Friesland in the 1680s (in which the names of Spinoza and other philosophers popped up). The Zevenwouden campaign backfired, provoking a response from the Reformed minister Frederik van Leenhof (1647-1712), who became progressively more Spinozist in his publications: at first openly embracing a radical historical interpretation of the Bible (1684), he ended up propagating a purely secular ethics (1703). Van Leenhof’s example goes to show how humanist biblical scholarship and Spinozist hermeneutics could come together in the heart of the Reformed Church and lead to unexpected, unhoped-for results, even if Spinoza’s open challenge to the Church was to remain an exception.

In chapter 5 we take a long-term view of one issue of biblical scholarship, so as to estimate the limits of scholarship’s potential to alter the perspective on the nature of the Bible as a text of either divine or human origin. We follow discussions concerning the Fourth Commandment, the precept to rest one day every week, as they went on continuously over the course of the seventeenth century and beyond. The terms of the debate remained discouragingly constant: the Fourth Commandment was regarded as being either universally obliging or historically contingent. Within this static spectrum, though, we observe some surprising movements. Franciscus Gomarus, the theological nemesis of Arminius, argued that the Fourth Commandment was a Jewish religious law, which in its decalogical form did not compel Christians to observe Sunday rest. <>

Kant, God and Metaphysics: The Secret Thorn, by Edward Kanterian [Routledge, 9781138908581]

Kant is widely acknowledged as the greatest philosopher of modern times. He undertook his
famous critical turn to save human freedom and morality from the challenge of determinism and materialism. Intertwined with his metaphysical interests, however, he also had theological commitments, which have received insufficient attention. He believed that man is a fallen creature and in need of ‘redemption’. He intended to provide a fortress protecting religious faith from the failure of rationalist metaphysics, from the atheistic strands of the Enlightenment, from the new mathematical science of nature, and from the dilemmas of Christian theology itself. Kant was an epistemologist, a philosopher of mind, a metaphysician of experience, an ethicist and a philosopher of religion. But all this was sustained by his religious faith.

Kant, God and Metaphysics: The Secret Thorn aims to recover the focal point and inner contradictions of his thought, the ‘secret thorn’ of his metaphysics (as Heidegger once put it). It first locates Kant in the tradition of reflection on the human weakness from Luther to Hume, and then engages in a critical, but charitable, manner with Kant’s entire pre-critical work, including his posthumous fragments. Special attention is given to The Only Possible Ground (1763), one of the most difficult, interesting and underestimated of Kant’s works. The present book takes its cue from an older approach to Kant, but also engages with recent Anglophone and continental scholarship, and deploys modern analytical tools to make sense of Kant. What emerges is an innovative and thought-provoking interpretation of Kant’s metaphysics, set against the background of forgotten religious aspects of European philosophy.

Review: This book analyzes Kant’s pre-critical writings on metaphysics up to around 1769, paying particular attention to religious themes and placing these works in the context of Reformation and early modern Protestant theology and its influence on philosophy in that period. The book’s subtitle, “The Secret Thorn,” is taken from Heidegger’s claim that “for Kant the question as to whether and how and within which limits the proposition ‘God exists’ is possible . . . is the secret thorn that drives all thinking in the Critique of Pure Reason and subsequent works” (Heidegger 1976: 449. Quoted at xv). Kanterian subjects Kant’s pre-critical works to this line of interpretation, which is not unique to Heidegger but somewhat common among scholars on the continent, particularly in Germany, though it is uncommon in Anglophone Kant studies.

Kanterian therefore presents this book as a corrective to what he regards as a sanitized picture of Kant’s metaphysics and its development that predominates in Anglophone philosophy (perhaps in part due to its Marburg School neo-Kantian heritage), according to which religious factors are not primary influences on or themes in Kant’s metaphysical thought, whose central core is rather at least primarily philosophical and scientific. This sanitized picture of Kant gets things precisely backwards, for Kanterian: in fact, Kant’s metaphysics has a “doctrinal religious core, more or less stable since Luther” and accepted by Kant throughout the pre-critical and into the critical periods, during which time Kant cycles through “various ontological, epistemological, and methodological positions,” which are merely “the auxiliary part of [his] defensive project” (325). In other words, Kant’s philosophical project is essentially a form of Lutheran apologetics (158, 235, but note also 1), and the metaphysics he famously struggles to reform constitutes only the outer, auxiliary part of his system, while its inner, religious core remains constant until at least near the end of Kant’s life. The reason Kant changes his mind about the auxiliary elements of metaphysics at various times throughout the pre-critical period, up to and including the critical turn, is primarily that he gradually but repeatedly comes to recognize the inadequacy of his earlier positions for defending his faith.

In this review I focus on some of the evidence and arguments Kanterian marshals in support of this reading of Kant. But it should be emphasized that this book is extraordinarily rich and useful even if one remains unconvinced by its main thesis. The book contains extremely detailed discussions and often trenchant criticisms of nearly all Kant’s pre-critical writings concerned with metaphysics -- much more, in fact, than is necessary to develop and defend its main thesis. It reads like an extended commentary on Kant’s major pre-critical works that refuses to choose between either understanding Kant’s texts in their historical context or evaluating
the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments from our twenty-first century vantage point. Kanterian does both superlatively well, and in that respect his book should take its place alongside other major studies of Kant's pre-critical development in English such as Laywine (1994) and Schönfeld (2000), not to mention Kuehn's biography (2001). Moreover, readers with a particular interest in religious themes in Kant's pre-critical philosophy will find here an exhaustive presentation and discussion of not only published texts related to those themes but also unpublished Reflexionen and letters.

The book begins with a long and largely freestanding chapter summarizing the religious background to Kant's age, organized in four concentric circles, discussing first the problem of the certainty of salvation after the Protestant revolution, second the development of a corresponding metaphysical and theological [Lutheran] orthodoxy, third the rise of the new science and its philosophy, and fourth the triumph and peril of reason in the Enlightenment. (2)

Although Kanterian relies heavily on secondary sources in this chapter, it is a marvelous summary with which to begin a book on the religious roots of Kant's metaphysics. It turns out, however, to be only loosely connected with the rest of the book, except to the extent that it provides context for occasional comparisons between Kant and other figures in later chapters, and it introduces the central motif of weakness that Kanterian finds running through the Protestant tradition from Luther to Kant. He explains: "Despair, based on the realisation of one's weakness, followed by trust and the feeling of safety, are essential components of the spiritual structure or movement described [by Luther and Zwingli]. They will be present in Kant's thought as well" (7. See also 113f., 127f., and 390).

Chapter two discusses Kant's early works Living Forces (1747), Universal Natural History (1755), and New Elucidation (1755), while chapter three discusses Physical Monadology (1756) and other works preceding The Only Possible Ground (1763), which is discussed in chapter four. Kanterian presents The Only Possible Ground as the centerpiece of Kant's pre-critical project, "the first fortress" Kant built in defense of his religious faith, "the most important, systematic, far-ranging and ambitious of his works so far, indeed of anything he was to write prior to the first Critique" (190). Chapter four is thus the centerpiece of Kanterian's book as well. Chapter five, entitled "First cracks in the wall," then discusses the Prize Essay (written in 1762 but published in 1764), Negative Magnitudes (1763), and Kant's 1762-64 lectures on metaphysics; and chapter six turns to Observations (1764), Kant's remarks on Observations (probably before 1766), Dreams (1766), and other writings from the mid-1760s. These two chapters detail Kant's reasons for coming to regard his "first fortress" as unsound, his increasingly intense attacks on the type of (auxiliary) metaphysics he developed in The Only Possible Ground, and the rise to prominence of moral themes in Kant's writings. Kanterian portrays this period as involving a deepening of the weakness motif in Kant's thought, which ultimately leads him not to abandon his defensive project but only to adopt a new strategy:

One of Kant's philosophical aims was to build a metaphysical fortress for his articles of faith, i.e. to defend faith through knowledge. But realising the extent of the cognitive human weakness, he became increasingly sceptical about this project. It then gradually dawned upon him that he can and needs to defend faith through ignorance. The critical turn appears in a new light with this shift from knowledge to ignorance in mind. (312)

Chapter seven then looks at Reflexionen from the 1760s for evidence that Kant remained interested in theological metaphysics during this entire period, and that the critical turn itself has religious significance in Kant's thinking. The book concludes with an epilogue gesturing at how "the modern drama of religion" that Kanterian finds playing itself out in Kant's pre-critical period also continues to the end of Kant's life.

Let us return to Kant's earliest works. Both Living Forces and Universal Natural History are primarily scientific works, but as Kanterian emphasizes Universal Natural History also contains a physico-theology and many passages expressing religious confidence and enthusiasm: "Kant expresses his
awe for the wisdom and beauty of God's creation, his faith in the eschatological progress of the universe, and his awareness of the humble place of man in the grand scheme of things” (97). Kant also explicitly aligns himself with the (broadly Leibnizian) project of reconciling science and religion (which for Kant in 1755 means reconciling Newtonian physics and its consequences with various Leibnizian metaphysical and theological commitments):

the conviction about the infallibility of divine truths is so powerful to me that I would consider everything which contradicts them as fully refuted . . . But the agreement that I witness between my system and religion, raises my confidence vis-à-vis all difficulties to a level of fearless calm. (1:222. Quoted at 103)

What is the basis of Kant's religious conviction? One possibility is the physico-theology he articulates in the same work: Kant argues (again along broadly Leibnizian lines) that God's existence is proven not directly from observation of purpose and beauty in nature, but rather from the knowledge that such beauty and harmony proceeds from laws of nature, which are themselves beautiful and harmonious. But Kanterian both rejects this argument and denies that it is the basis of Kant's religious conviction: "Kant's religious confidence and enthusiasm are remarkable, although not matched by the cogency of his arguments. They are in fact rational fillers and articulations of undoubted presuppositions". Later Kanterian cites Anselm in support of the generalization that:

proofs of the existence of God . . . are hardly intended to make their authors accept a hitherto rejected belief (that God exists), but are constructed to strengthen beliefs already held, to spell them out (in the sense of 'faith seeking understanding') or to defend them against opponents. (115)

This seems unfair. Even if true, it would not show that Kant understands his own project in this way, for which Kanterian provides no convincing evidence from *Universal Natural History* itself. The more straightforward interpretation is that Kant understands the arguments he gives in that work to justify the religious faith he expresses there, even if in fact they do not, as Kant himself later realizes.

*Universal Natural History* was published in the same year as *New Elucidation*, which introduces a new modal argument for God's existence as the ground of all possibility. It may seem odd that Kanterian places *The Only Possible Ground* at the center of his account of Kant's pre-critical project while also claiming that the modal argument it develops is essentially the same as the one in *New Elucidation* (193, 210). But what makes *The Only Possible Ground* Kant’s "first fortress" on Kanterian's view is apparently that it combines both the modal argument and the physico-theological argument from *Universal Natural History*. (It is also Kant’s only pre-critical work devoted primarily to rational theology). I do not have the space to discuss Kanterian's extremely detailed critical analysis of both arguments, especially the modal argument in *The Only Possible Ground*. Suffice it to say that he eviscerates both arguments, then draws the following conclusion:

neither proof in isolation, nor both of them in combination, really manage to live up to the conception of God Kant is committed to independently and prior to the formulation of these proofs. In this respect, Kant’s attitude to God is reminiscent of Anselm and other thinkers raised in the Christian tradition. The existence of God, not to mention the intelligibility of his concept, is an unquestioned given, with rational theology premised on it. (268)

This is the same claim Kanterian made about *Universal Natural History*, in that case without convincing evidence. Does *The Only Possible Ground* offer better evidence for it?

Kanterian gives several reasons to think it does. First, Kant opens the work by denying that "the most important of all our cognitions, there is a God, would waver or be imperilled if it were not supported by deep metaphysical investigations" (2:65). Second, Kant emphasizes, as Kanterian explains, that "physico-theology makes a much greater impression on the human soul; its subjective certainty is greater than that of the abstract modal argument" (268), although "Kant admits that the physico-theological proof is logically much weaker
than a *priori* proofs," especially the modal argument, to which Kant ascribes "mathematical certainty" (266). Third, Kanterian claims that physico-theology is not, however, the source of religious conviction either, which is rather what Kant calls "natural common sense" (268). I quote Kant from the Cambridge translation (1992):

> It was not the will of Providence that the insights so necessary to our happiness should depend upon the sophistry of subtle inferences. On the contrary, Providence has directly transmitted these insights to our natural common sense. . . . Thus, that employment of sound reason, which still lies within the limits of ordinary insights, yields sufficiently convincing proofs of the existence and properties of this Being, though the subtle scholar will everywhere feel the lack of demonstration and of the exactitude of precisely determined concepts and regularly connected syllogisms. Nonetheless, once cannot refrain from searching for this demonstration, in the hope that it may present itself somewhere. . . . To achieve this purpose, however, one must venture the bottomless abyss of metaphysics. (2:65-66 at 111)

Fourth, although this passage (as well as 2:118) obviously refers to physico-theology, Kant also writes that

> It is, perhaps, only since revelation has taught us the complete dependency of the world upon God that philosophy has also made the requisite effort to regard the origin of things themselves, which constitute the raw material of nature, as something not possible independently of an Author. (2:124 at 165)

Kanterian argues that these passages show the following:

> The Only Possible Ground is written against the background of the assumed truth of scriptural revelation. This background is not addressed in the book, but it is presupposed, as 2:118 and 2:124 intimate. The metaphysical speculation of the modal argument is a secondary or even tertiary project, a fortress built to defend, in the loftier realm of philosophy, received faith. (251)

The secondary project is presumably physico-theology, which would not supply "the religious sentiment underlying Kant's philosophy" unless it were in turn underwritten by revelation (249).

I find these arguments unconvincing. As Kanterian seems to admit, Kant does not appeal to revelation as the basis of religious conviction, but only "to get us into thinking about the possibility of an actual creator, as opposed to a mere architect" (255), which possibility Kant says "natural common sense" investigates "within the limits of ordinary insights." Kant's view expressed in these passages is therefore the same as in *Universal Natural History:* namely, that physico-theology is the basis of religious conviction all by itself. In *The Only Possible Ground,* however, Kant recognizes the logical weakness of physico-theology, but he argues that the modal argument remedies this weakness. So the overall thrust of the work is that physico-theology is the subjective basis of religious faith, which receives theoretical justification from the modal argument.

Again, Kant almost immediately pokes holes in the arguments of *The Only Possible Ground.* Kanterian convincingly shows both that central threads of the Prize Essay and of *Negative Magnitudes* undermine the modal argument, and that Kant does not seem to fully grasp this consequence in those works (291f., 302f.). This pushes Kant's full realization of the failure of his "first fortress" back to the mid-1760s, as reflected in the sceptical, anti-metaphysical tone of works such as *Observations,* Remarks on Observations, and especially *Dreams.* From this vantage point, Kanterian's interpretive thesis about Kant's earlier works through *The Only Possible Ground* seems to be not (only?) that Kant thought of his pre-critical project as apologetical -- which I do not think he convincingly shows -- but also (or rather?) that *in fact* religious faith is an unquestioned given for Kant, which both motivates his search for philosophical arguments in its defense and explains his adoption of weak arguments to that end.

To support this 'in fact' thesis, Kanterian cites *Reflexionen* from the mid-to-late-1760s showing that Kant remained interested in theological metaphysics even during his 'sceptical' period, when he no longer recognized any sort of theoretical
argument as justifying belief in God but increasingly appealed instead to moral grounds in its support. So Kant’s intellectual development has two main phases:

   First, ‘the force of conviction’ is given to early Kant, in the 1755–1763 period, through a physico-theological awe that presupposes revealed faith. Second, in the critical phase this certainty shifts to the moral disposition, which now turns out to be the direct source of certainty . . . While ‘the force of conviction’ is still generated through awe, this is now done without a visible link to Christian revelation. (252)

It is noteworthy that Kanterian finds little textual evidence of Kant affirming a revelation-based faith, of the sort he easily produces in Crusius (311f. See also 356f.) and Kant’s teacher Martin Knutzen (359f.). He discusses passages in Kant’s Remarks on Observations addressing the use of scripture for moral improvement (320), as well as an obscure reference to “real documents” in R 3907 (350). But this thin textual evidence is overwhelmed by Kanterian’s presentation of similarities between philosophical and theological themes in Kant’s writings from the mid-to-late 1760s and those appearing in Kant’s predecessors, including “Leibniz (in his controversy with Clarke), Bacon, Hobbes, Bayle, Collier, Crusius, Pascal, Hume, and also Martin Knutzen and F. A. Schultz” (352). Why does this not show that Kant’s interest in religious themes during this period is due, not to his unquestioned acceptance of a revelation-based faith, but rather to his engagement (directly or indirectly) with these and others of his philosophical predecessors, in whose works these same themes figure prominently?

If Kanterian’s thesis that God’s existence is ‘in fact’ an undoubted presupposition for Kant means not only that Kant affirms this belief on the basis of bad arguments (as it seems to, e.g., at 266), but that he recognizes the inadequacy of these arguments while nevertheless continuing to affirm God’s existence, then to defend this thesis Kanterian needs to show that Kant continued to affirm God’s existence after recognizing the failure of the modal argument and before embracing a moral justification for this belief. But this is the weakest part of Kanterian’s book: his chapter on the ‘sceptical’ period underestimates the depth of Kant’s scepticism in the mid-1760s, especially in Dreams, and it does not establish a gap in time between Kant’s recognition of the unsoundness of his ‘first fortress’ and his shift to a moral argument for God’s existence.

I think Kanterian’s book deserves much praise for showing the centrality of religious and theological themes in Kant’s pre-critical works and generally in the debates in early modern metaphysics that Kant engaged with. But Kanterian goes too far in characterizing Kant, and for that matter also “Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, and Crusius” (158) and (all?) “other thinkers raised in the Christian tradition” (268), as accepting God’s existence (if indeed they do at all) as an unquestioned premise and engaging in fundamentally apologetical philosophical projects. Reviewed by Michael Rohlf, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Kant On Reality, Cause, and Force: From the Early Modern Tradition to the Critical Philosophy by Tal Glezer [Cambridge University Press, 9781108420693]

Kant’s category of reality is an often-overlooked element of his Critique of Pure Reason. Tal Glezer shows that it nevertheless belongs at the core of Kant’s mature critical philosophy; it captures an issue that motivated his critical turn, shaped his theory of causation, and established the role of his philosophy of science. Glezer’s study traces the roots of Kant’s category of reality to early modern debates over the intelligibility of substantial forms, fueled by the tension between the idea of non-extended substances and that of extended objects. This tension influenced Kant’s pre-critical work, and eventually inspired his radical break towards transcendental idealism. Glezer explores the importance of reality for Kant’s conceptions of cause and force, and sheds new light on his philosophy of physical science, including gravity. His book will interest scholars of Kant and of early modern philosophy, as well as historians of scientific ideas.
Introduction: "What Corresponds to Sensation"

PART I SUBSTANTIAL FORMS AND REALITY

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PART II THE MAGNITUDE OF REALITY

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10. The Applicability of Transcendental Principles in Experience

11. Reality and the Derivation of Gravitation
Excerpt: "What Corresponds to Sensation"

"What corresponds to sensation in the appearance" (A175/B217) is Kant's description of what the category of reality is supposed to represent: it is supposed to capture the common notion that certain features of our sensations correspond to certain features of things. This category is remarkable among the fundamental concepts that Kant takes to define our powers of cognition in that, by claiming a correspondence between how things seem and how things are, it is the only one to invoke this distinction directly at all. My aim in this study is to show that Kant's terse and often dark discussions of reality are at the root of his mature grasp of this distinction, and of the sense of objectivity it engenders.

To be precise, the distinction invoked by the category of reality is not simply between sensation and appearance, but rather more subtly between sensation and something "in the appearance": while appearances have some of their features — namely, their spatiotemporal features — imposed upon them by the faculty of sensation itself in virtue of its form, the category of reality rather pertains to what appearances have in them beyond those formal features; it captures what appearances contribute to sensation rather than the other way around. This is what Kant is trying to express by further describing reality as the concept of the matter, rather than the form, of appearance (A20/B34).

These two descriptions should cause practiced readers of Kant to feel that the concept of reality is precariously close to the edge of what can be meaningfully said or even entertained in thought: on the one hand, it is a category — a transcendental concept of the understanding — and as such it is guaranteed to be objectively valid, and represent something we can actually experience. But, on the other hand, as the concept of the matter of appearance, it represents something in abstraction of the form it must take in order to be part of our experience, and so it seems closer to such abstract concepts as "the systematic order of nature," or "thing in itself," which, for Kant, represent rational presuppositions that are not applicable to objects since they lie entirely beyond possible experience. A sign of reality's delicate situation within Kant's systematic framework is raised by another of his descriptions of the category: while it is constitutive of appearances, i.e. of things as they appear to us, it is also the concept of "the transcendental matter of all objects, as things in themselves" (A143/B182).

Any comprehensive reading of Kant's Critical philosophy must therefore present the category of reality in a way that overcomes this seemingly inherent tension. This requirement is plainly related to the great philosophical task of explaining how something separate from experience could nevertheless give rise to objects of experience, while avoiding the pitfalls of dogmatic idealism and transcendental realism. For Kant, the absence of such an explanation has been a perennial "scandal of philosophy", and to resolve this scandal is a central ambition of the Critique of Pure Reason. It is curious, therefore, that the category of reality has not figured more prominently in the sprawling literature surrounding this basic philosophical and exegetical issue, vexed as it is.

The present study is a measure to correct this lapse, and reassert reality's place at the core of the Critical project. What I take this core to be, for the purposes of this study at least, is defined on one side by a historical reconstruction of a problem posed by Kant's Early Modern predecessors, which led him to frame his Critical system in the first place; on another side, it is defined by a systematic reconstruction of Kant's attempt to address this problem in the context of the Critical system itself, which ultimately leads to his account of how natural science is possible. Accordingly, the scope of this study, both historically and systematically, stretches from certain Early Modern debates wherein the problem begins to take shape, through the problem's gradual refinement in Kant's early, pre-Critical writings, to the systematic unfolding of its solution in his CPR and Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Through these reconstructions, it
will become evident that a single concept recurs again and again, in several guises, at or near the focus of Kant’s attention: the concept variously identified as "substantial form," "quidditas," "realitas," "thinghood," or, in Kant’s Critical writings, as the category of reality.

I argue that in order to understand the category of reality as Kant came to understand it in his mature, Critical period, we must begin by taking it to be the rudimentary notion of an independent ground of experience. Kant seeks to prove that such a notion can be made intelligible or meaningful, and thereby to allow that experience could indeed be so grounded. Since, for Kant, a notion is meaningful only if there is a way to incorporate it into experience, he must show that what the category of reality represents conforms with the conditions of experience. In particular, he must show that it conforms with space and time, which are the sensible conditions of experience, by showing how reality can be measured, or treated as a magnitude.

However, insofar as reality is taken in the rudimentary sense of an independent ground of experience, it seems essentially incapable of measurement: as such, it does not consist of mutually external parts that can be gone through successively, as the process of measurement requires. To overcome this predicament, then, Kant must offer a principled manner in which reality can be associated with something extended — something whose parts are external to one another — by which it may be measured.

A central thesis of this study is that the Kantian concepts of causal power in general, and of physical moving force in particular, are ancillary to this association, and that they have their place in Kant’s Critical system only insofar as they serve the purpose of measuring reality; from a systematic (or, to use the Kantian term, architectonic) point of view, they are upshots or corollaries of the articulation of the category of reality into a valid, meaningful concept. Indeed, some of the darker details of Kant’s expositions of these concepts can only be fully appreciated when considered under this overarching purpose.

Finally, and importantly, this association with extension cannot allow reality to be thoroughly determined as a measurable magnitude within experience, because it would thereby forfeit its role in representing the independent ground of experience. Therefore, Kant constructs the association of extension with reality, through the concepts of cause and force, as an interminable procedure of approximation, whose conclusion is a mere regulative idea of reason.

This course through the Critical system is not everywhere easy to navigate, but when viewed in the proper historical perspective, its main landmarks heave into view. In Part I of this study, therefore, I identify the historical sources for Kant’s concept of reality, claiming that it descends from Early Modern — especially, Leibnizian — versions of the Scholastic concept of realitas, often identified with that of substantial form. Drawing on this identification, I am able to show in subsequent chapters that reality’s central role in Kant’s thought is analogous to the central role of substantial forms in seventeenth-century debates over the nature of physical bodies and physical explanation.

In the Early Modern Scholasticism of Francisco Suárez, substantial forms were summoned to serve as explanatory principles in natural philosophy. Adjusting elements of Aristotelian metaphysics to fit recent strides in experimental science, Suárez claimed that bodies have individual essences, or substantial forms, that are responsible for their causal dispositions. Partly in reaction to this version of Scholasticism, Descartes devised a revolutionary approach to the metaphysics of matter: he repudiated substantial forms as unintelligible, since they could not be treated with the apodictic certainty he took to be the standard of intelligibility; and since this standard is paradigmatically attained in mathematics, Descartes sought instead to reduce all material properties to extensional properties, and all explanatory terms to mathematical terms. In his natural philosophy, matter is nothing but its shape, size, and motion.

Descartes’s radical program bred a generation of Cartesians, among them the very young Leibniz. However, early in his intellectual life Leibniz took
up the cause of reintroducing a fundamentally non-Cartesian mode of explanation into natural philosophy, arguing that the essence of matter is not exhausted by its extensional, geometrical properties. Instead, he endorsed an alternative, dynamic conception of matter, by which all the properties of a body are due to its inherent "forces," rather than to its extension. Now, Leibnizian "forces" must be understood differently from Newtonian forces (such as those that later figure in Kant’s own dynamic theories of matter): Leibniz’s distinctive idea of force is entrenched in a metaphysical picture by which forces are expressions of underlying metaphysical substantial forms, the very same entities that Descartes tried to abolish from natural philosophy. Material bodies, in this picture, are not themselves substances, but merely phenomenal objects entirely dependent on nonextended — and hence nonmeasurable — substances.

Leibniz’s reaction to Descartes grew more elaborate the more he struggled to explain how nonmeasurable metaphysical tendencies could "add up" to measurable, extended phenomena. To put it in terms of his Specimen Dynamicum (1695), he struggled to explain how physical "derivative forces" are derived from metaphysical "primitive forces," and how appreciable "living forces" are aggregates of infinitesimal "dead forces." The problem of metaphysically grounding phenomena, encapsulated for Leibniz in the concept of force or substantial form, is thus transformed in his natural philosophy into a problem of applying mathematics: how can quantifiable, material properties be grounded in nonextended, substantial forms?

Keeping in mind this Leibnizian construal of the problem of metaphysical grounding makes it easier to detect a similar theme in Kant’s early writings (very plausibly due to Leibniz’s influence). Following Leibniz, Kant construed certain metaphysical issues as problems of determining the extent to which mathematical concepts can reach toward the foundations of physical objects. Against Leibniz, however, his inclination in the 1750s and 1760s was to resist curtailing the reach of mathematics, and argue instead that mathematical concepts can — and even must — be applied to the very grounds of phenomena. A notable example is The Physical Monadology (1756), which attempts to reconcile the multiplicity of parts essential to material bodies with the simplicity essential to substances: there, he envisaged dimensionless, point-like substances that generate spatial spheres of influence by the (broadly, Newtonian) forces they emit. For my purposes, however, I chose to open Part II of this study with an examination of Kant’s essay Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy (1763), a different attempt to establish that the mathematical concept of magnitude or measure is valid not only in physics but also in metaphysics.

The central argument of Negative Magnitudes is to the effect that the ground of change is always measurable, and it proceeds along the following lines: since change always involves two opposing states, something can change only if it can be opposed without contradiction. Kant contends that, whereas logical opposition (expressed by negation) amounts to contradiction, "real" opposition (expressed by subtraction or negative magnitude) does not. Therefore, the ground of anything changeable must have a measurable magnitude that can be subtracted, and thus really opposed. Now, since Kant intends this line of reasoning to apply to grounding in general, he thinks it expands the domain of the concept of magnitude to include metaphysical grounds, pace Leibniz. One of the themes I wish to highlight by focusing on Negative Magnitudes is the fact that Kant’s exposition of real opposition and negative magnitude closely ties them with the classical problem of coherently representing the moment of change.

Significantly, this theme reappears in connection with the category of reality at later junctures in Kant’s intellectual career.

Although in the 1760s Kant resisted the Leibnizian demarcation between extended phenomenal objects and nonextended intelligible substances by expanding the realm of mathematical representation, he seems to have reverted to such a demarcation himself in his Inaugural Dissertation (1770), the work that marks the end of his pre-Critical period. There, he agrees with Leibniz that
certain essential constraints on our cognition are responsible for the spatiotemporal, mathematical properties of the objects of our experience (although, unlike Leibniz, he associates these constraints with a distinct cognitive faculty of sensibility). These objects are, in some sense, grounded in things as they are in themselves, whose properties we can describe only as far as certain fundamental rational concepts reach (again, unlike Leibniz, these are associated with a distinct faculty of intelligence). Kant's position in the Inaugural Dissertation, I believe, is that everything we can know of things in themselves — i.e. that they fall under such rational concepts as "substance," "existence," and "cause" — follows directly from the basic supposition that they are such things that ground phenomena.

The concept of ground is the article, so to speak, of which all the other rational concepts are clauses; therefore, when Kant realized that the concept of ground, as it would apply to things in themselves, lacks warrant, he also realized that no rational concepts at all could apply to things in themselves. The demand that concepts be warranted, i.e. that their applicability in experience be justified, constitutes Kant's crucial shift toward the Critical period, and it is ushered with a famous letter to Marcus Herz (1772). In this letter, Kant contrasts the a priori concept of magnitude with that of ground. He explains that the prospects of finding warrant for (or justifying the applicability of) the concept of magnitude seem, at least prima facie, rather bright despite its apriority: we know that our objects have magnitudes since magnitude is a property they must borrow from our own faculty of sensibility. But it is difficult to see how comparable warrant could be found for the concept of the ground of experience, since — by definition — such grounds, if we could conceive of them, would not themselves depend on our faculties for their properties. Thus, the grounding relation is invalidated, undoing all the other rational concepts Kant thought could apply to things in themselves, and unraveling the sense of objectivity he hoped to maintain in the Inaugural Dissertation.

In the CPR (1781, 1787), this very concept of the ground of experience evolves into the concept or category of reality. To produce the warrant that was missing in the Inaugural Dissertation's picture, Kant must find a way to apply reality in experience. And, since conformity with space and time is a condition for a concept's applicability, this amounts to treating reality as a magnitude. And indeed, when we look for a succinct statement of what we learn about the world when we learn that the category of reality is applicable in it, we find it summed up in the CPR's Anticipations of Perception as the principle that reality is measurable, or, in Kant's words, that "the real ... has intensive magnitude" (B208). By noting the similarity between Kant and Leibniz in their construals of this issue, we can better appreciate the full import of this principle, which may otherwise seem, at first, surprisingly thin.

Most of Part II reconstructs the steps of Kant's procedure for ascribing magnitude to reality, moving through the CPR's Anticipations of Perception, the Second Analogy of Experience, and parts of the MFNS (1786). In this Introduction, I sketch this procedure by dividing it into three parts, matched with the constituents of Kant's definition of magnitude as "the consciousness of the homogeneous manifold" (A161/B203). I take this definition to list three desiderata for anything purporting to be a magnitude, which, on my reading, Kant addresses in the following order: first, indicating that reality involves a manifold, then that it is conscious, and finally, homogeneous.

The Anticipations of Perception contains what appears at first to be a consideration — albeit not a very compelling one — to the effect that reality must have a magnitude because the sensible state to which it corresponds has a magnitude: presumably, it is a magnitude reflecting the time it takes for us to imagine the sensation gradually diminishing to nothing. But if this were indeed the consideration Kant put forward, it would have failed in several respects; for example, in attempting to base an a priori principle on a claim that — even if true — relies on matters of empirical psychology. Even more egregiously, such a consideration would fail to establish one of the essential features of magnitudes in general, namely, the formal relations among its parts: it invites us to envisage a manifold of states constituting a series of diminishing gradations, but
offers no way to determine which states belong in that manifold, how they are ordered, and what are the ratios among them.

I believe Kant’s argument is not deficient in this way, because he does not aim to address these issues in the Anticipations at all, and in fact addresses them elsewhere. Rather than aiming at a comprehensive proof that reality has a magnitude, the Anticipations’ aim is limited to providing an inkling of how reality could be associated with a manifold. The gist of the argument is as follows: if we are to treat a sensible state at a spatiotemporal point as having a reality, i.e. as having a ground for being, we must represent it as capable of coming into being from its complete lack. Now, in order to avoid incoherence at the moment of its coming into being, we must represent it as changing gradually; in other words, the opposition between that state and its absence must be mitigated by a manifold of intermediate states. Thus, we associate the reality of a state obtaining at a single point with a manifold, even though the state has no mutually external parts, thereby taking the first step in forming an intelligible notion of intensive magnitude.

For this manifold to amount to a magnitude, however, it must be bolstered with a principle or law that unifies it by imposing an order on its constituents: to represent a gradual change, we must be able to identify the states of the manifold as grades or degrees of one and the same quality, and say which is the greater and which is the lesser degree, i.e. which is earlier and which is later in the course of an alteration. Formally, this is an issue of time-determination, and the principle by which such determinations are made is a cause. It is in this spirit that Kant remarks in the Anticipations that one may regard reality as a cause (A168/B210).

Since the central discussion of time-determination and causation in the CPR occurs in the Second Analogy, I claim that this chapter should be approached as an elaboration of the theme introduced in the Anticipations, a claim supported by the extensive parallels between the two chapters. This is especially evident in the fact that, according to the Second Analogy, a cause has an intensive magnitude entirely contained in a single instant, but giving rise to a manifold of states throughout an extended alteration. Now, Kant’s conception of a cause is as a concept or law that governs the alteration from one state to another: a cause determines, for every instant during the alteration, which state it contains. With respect to Kant’s definition of magnitude, such a causal law counts toward the desideratum of consciousness, insofar as we take “consciousness” in its peculiar, somewhat technical Kantian sense, as the act of cognizing a manifold synthesized in intuition, by unifying it under one concept or law.

Now, as far as the Second Analogy goes, a causal law may determine which of any two states in a manifold is the more intense, but not how much more so. But this further determination is required if we are to treat the manifold as a magnitude, since a magnitude must have a mathematical structure amenable to algebraic operations. Adding and subtracting states of heat and cold, or states of red and blue, for instance, are incomprehensible unless we find a way to represent the states as commensurable. Anachronistically, but helpfully, we may say that various states of heat can be made commensurable with one another by representing them in terms of average kinetic energy, and similarly varieties of color in terms of the frequency of electromagnetic radiation.

For Kant, this property of a manifold — that its parts are commensurable, or homogeneous — requires that the parts be stripped of their differentiating marks. Thus, homogeneity is fundamentally a property of the manifold of pure space and time, of which all parts are the same. The only state that can be expressed in such abstract terms is a state of motion, and so reality must be fundamentally regarded not generally as a cause for change, but specifically as a cause for change of motion. In other words, reality must be fundamentally represented as a moving force in order to fulfill the third desideratum of homogeneity, and, finally, be considered as a magnitude.

Kant’s most sustained investigation of motion and force is found in the MFNS. In my view, this is where the endeavor to treat reality as a magnitude culminates, since it contains an analysis of motion
both as a magnitude and as an expression of reality, and shows that these two issues are inextricable. Kant approaches the former issue — of treating motion as a magnitude — as that of adding and subtracting motions, because showing motion to be a magnitude is the same as demonstrating how it can be subjected to algebraic operations. Toward such a demonstration, he offers a method by which to identify basic algebraic operations on motions with constructions of relatively moving spatial reference frames: to add together two motions $a$ and $b$, for example, Kant represents motion $a$ relative to a reference frame whose motion is $b$.

This solution, however, leaves moot the distinction between apparent and real motion: because such reference frames are constructed in pure intuition, as mathematical constructions, they offer no basis to prefer any one construction over indefinitely many mathematically equivalent alternatives. A related problem is that, being pure a priori constructions, these reference frames yield a conception of motion that seems to belong entirely with the form of appearances rather than their matter, and so seems ill suited to express reality (viz. the matter of appearances) as a magnitude. To address this further issue of treating motion as the expression of reality — the latter of the two mentioned earlier — Kant argues that this method of pure construction is, formally, insufficient to represent change of motion, and must be enhanced with a notion of grounding.

His argument revolves, once again, around a version of the problem of the moment of change. In this version, Kant claims that motion at the moment of change must be represented as the combination of two motions within one and the same space (rather than relative to two different reference frames). He then shows that this necessarily involves representing them as infinitesimal motions, which in turn involves an appeal to a general rule or law of motion of a certain appropriate form. For Kant, laws of this form are concepts of moving forces, and constitute the manner in which reality can finally be incorporated into experience according to the conditions of sensibility.

This observation concludes Part II of this study, but has further implications that I begin to explore in Part III. Most importantly, it reveals a sense in which the perpetual pursuit of natural science by formulating and confirming empirical laws of motion is in fact the pursuit of the thoroughgoing incorporation of reality into experience. When we shift the weight of the CPR to accommodate the true significance of the category of reality, we can gain new insight into the indispensable, transcendental role of natural science; a fuller understanding of how scientific inquiry is a condition for the possibility of experience. Specifically, we can see why scientific progress moves us ever closer to grasping the grounds of experience that the category of reality represents.

Kant is deeply committed to a view of scientific progress by which scientific inquiry proceeds toward some ultimate goal. Various elements of this view — not easily made to cohere — are strewn throughout his theoretical works. Thus, the MFNS’s Phenomenology chapter (4554) contains an account of how concepts of moving forces are scientifically formed; the CPR’s Appendix to the Dialectic (A642/B670) offers a set of principles to guide the formation of such force-concepts toward an ultimate goal, depicted as a comprehensive genus—species hierarchy; the CPR’s Transcendental Ideal (A571/B579) justifies this commitment to scientific progress by fixing it in the transcendental idea Kant terms "the All of reality," which is the concept of the ideal collection of the reality associated with each possible empirical concept. Part III of this study relies on the interpretation developed in Part II in an attempt to fit these elements together, starting with the latter element.

The so-called All of reality is an idea of reason: a concept that does not represent a possible object, but rather a direction in which our array of objectively valid concepts can always be expanded. Unlike some other ideas of reason that occur in the CPR, the All of reality is a transcendental idea — it has an indispensable function in making cognition possible, and is part of what defines the proper use of our faculties. This cryptic idea, with its ancient provenance and echoes of high metaphysical speculation, is yet to receive all the scholarly attention it deserves.
despite its importance — perhaps because it is sometimes mistaken to be an unfortunate vestige of Kant's pre-Critical views. The All of reality, however, is especially pertinent to this study, because, as its name suggests, it sheds light on the relationship between the category of reality and the definitive goal of scientific inquiry.

Roughly, the All of reality is based on the notion that reality constitutes the content of empirical concepts; the All of reality, then, is the idea of the collective contents of all possible empirical concepts. It is difficult, however, to see exactly what it means for the contents (or, in Kant’s term, “realities”) of different empirical concepts to be collected together. This difficulty is exacerbated by Kant’s tendency to describe the idea metaphorically: within the All of reality, realities are added together in a way Kant describes in terms of spatial, part—whole containment or comprehension, and illustrates with the relation of a stretch of horizon to its segments. The murkiness of this idea, furthermore, also obscures the root of its purported transcendental status.

In this study, I can do little more than gesture at the root of its status: I believe that the All of reality derives its transcendental status from being presupposed by the “principle of thoroughgoing determination” — a principle that directs us to determine each of our objects in every possible respect — and that this principle, in turn, is itself transcendental because it expresses Kant’s conception of an object in general as it emerges from the main argument of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. My attention here, however, is rather devoted to the former difficulty: to explain the meaning of the reality containment relation by which the contents of various empirical concepts are collected in the All of reality. To this end, I turn to another chapter of the CPR, the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic.

The Appendix contains Kant’s version of a traditional conception of systematic knowledge, namely, the hierarchy of genera and species. This infinite, ideally comprehensive hierarchy of empirical concepts is presented as the ultimate goal of scientific inquiry, subjecting science to a principle of systematicity whose elements are the complementary principles of generalization and specification. Through these elements, the principle of systematicity directs us always to form new empirical concepts, more general and more specific, to expand whatever conceptual system we already possess. Although generalization and specification have always been heuristically pursued in science, Kant thinks their heuristic success is not a happy accident, but rather arises from a hitherto unrecognized transcendental import, and that this transcendental import is connected to that of the All of reality.

Now, there are rich thematic connections between this genus—species hierarchy and the All of reality. Among these connections we may note that both ideas describe an arrangement of all possible empirical concepts into a single system; in both cases, the system takes the form of a lattice; and, again, both ideas share a transcendental status. Drawing on these and other connections, I argue that the genus—species hierarchy of the Appendix is an articulation of the All of reality, just like the concept of a moving force is an articulation of the category of reality. Accordingly, I take the genus—species relation itself to be an articulation of the reality containment relation.

Thus, we can begin to explain the relation of reality containment by the more fully articulated relation of genus—species subordination. Admittedly, the genus—species relation is itself quite baffling, but the Appendix offers much richer resources for its interpretation. In my opinion, the most important resource for understanding how a genus—species relation is established (and, indeed, why that should amount to a scientific achievement) is a paragraph in the Appendix where Kant analyzes an exemplary scientific achievement in terms of generalization and specification.

For Kant, the paradigmatic — and, strictly speaking, singular — historical achievement of proper science is Newton’s derivation of universal gravity. In the Appendix, following a series of lesser examples, Kant considers how the regulative principles of generalization and specification have been at work in Newton’s derivation in his Principia. Of course, Newton himself makes no explicit use of such principles, and so Kant recasts Newton’s
argument to reflect his own philosophical interests. The reconstructed version Kant includes in the Appendix, however, is only a brief sketch, and must be read with reference to his more detailed — and profound — rendering of Newton’s argument and method found e.g. in the MFNS’s Phenomenology chapter. The final step I take in this study is an attempt to locate the pattern of generalization and specification in the details of Kant’s version of Newton’s derivation of gravity.

A prominent feature of the derivation is its approximative, iterative method. Each step of the derivation begins by considering a system of celestial motions in isolation from its environment, idealizing and simplifying it, and then showing it to be (approximately) in conformity with the law of universal gravity. Then, the discrepancies between the idealized motions and the actual, observed motions are noted. Finally, these discrepancies are shown to be deviations arising from the gravitational influence of further celestial bodies that were initially left out of the model. Thus, by expanding the purview of the system under consideration to include further regions of space, the unexplained deviations from the theory of gravity are found to be further evidence for its veracity.

Newton’s dialectical method is important to Kant because it broadly matches his conception of the iterative way in which reason operates. As he integrates Newton’s derivation into his own framework in the Appendix, Kant transposes its iterative steps into the language of genera and species: at each step, the law describing the idealized celestial motion is the genus, and the law describing the more precise motion is the purported species. By showing that the discrepancy between the motions is caused by a difference in the situations they presuppose (viz. the presence of bodies beyond the system), and that in fact the same law governs both motions, the species is subordinated to the genus. On the interpretation I propose, then, Kant draws a correspondence between the concatenated steps of the derivation of gravitation, according to his reconstruction of Newton’s method, and the series of generalizations and specifications he envisions as the proper operation of reason in the Appendix.

From this overview of the book’s argument, it is clear that, despite its seemingly narrow concern with the category of reality, its claims are meant to pertain to some of the most central, intricate, and closely contested issues in Kant’s thought. Taking a position on these issues involves far-reaching systematic commitments, which cannot be fully articulated in a single book. The contours of a more comprehensive exegesis, then, must remain mostly implicit here, although some indication of them is offered in the concluding remarks.

Kant and his German Contemporaries, Volume 1: Logic, Mind, Epistemology, Science and Ethics edited by Corey Dyck, Falk Wunderlich [Cambridge University Press, 9781107140899]

This collection of new essays, the first of its kind in English, considers the ways in which the philosophy of Immanuel Kant engages with the views of lesser-known eighteenth-century German thinkers. Each chapter casts new light on aspects of Kant’s complex relationship with these figures, particularly with respect to key aspects of his logic, metaphysics, epistemology, theory of science, and ethics. The portrait of Kant that emerges is of a major thinker thoroughly engaged with his contemporaries—drawing on their ideas and approaches, targeting their arguments for criticism and responding to their concerns, and seeking to secure the legacy of his thought among them. This volume will open the door for further research on Kant and his methods of philosophical inquiry, while introducing readers to the distinctive and influential philosophical contributions of several previously neglected figures.

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Excerpt: The present volume represents an attempt to advance and extend the interest in Kant’s various intellectual relationships with his contemporaries. For the sake of the detailed discussions to follow, it will be useful to introduce these figures (though a number have been mentioned already) way into his philosophical system; and Martin Knutzen (1713-51), a well-known professor (and one of Kant’s teachers) at the University of Königsberg, who wove Pietistic commitments into a broader Wolffian metaphysical framework.

The second and undoubtedly most populous group, that of Kant’s peers, consists in those of his contemporaries with whom he either had direct contact (in person or through correspondence) or whose work and reputation Kant was familiar with, such that they likely constitute part of the intended audience for his philosophical works. Kant’s engagement with the members of this group takes various forms. In some, and indeed the most important cases, they exert a direct and positive influence on his thinking. Particularly significant here are: Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728-77), a polymath and author of two influential philosophical works, with whom Kant corresponded on topics of central importance for his developing thought (and to whom it appears Kant had originally intended to dedicate the first Critique); Moses Mendelssohn (1729-86), the leading figure of the Jewish Enlightenment and author of (among other texts) highly influential treatments of metaphysics, aesthetics and political philosophy; and Johann Nikolaus Tetens (1736-1807), whose principal philosophical work (Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung [1777]) reportedly lay open on Kant’s desk as he laboured on the first Critique.

Others among Kant’s peers may not have exerted such a profound influence on his mature philosophical work, but Kant was certainly aware of their contributions in specific areas, and his own philosophical positions frequently relate and respond to theirs in various ways. Among the many that might be mentioned here, we might note: Leonhard Euler (1707-83), the famous Swiss mathematician, a high-profile member of the Prussian Royal Academy of Sciences and a leading critic of the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy; Georg Friedrich Meier (1718-77), a loyal expositor of Baumgarten’s philosophy and an original thinker in his own right, whose logic textbook Kant used (though, by one account); Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840), an anthropologist and generation theorist whose work informed Kant’s aims in the third Critique; and and to briefly account for their connection, direct or otherwise, with Kant’s thought. To this end, we might distinguish, broadly, between three groups of contemporaries in terms of their relation to Kant: (1) those who supplied the antecedent background to his thought and its early development (i.e., his...
immediate predecessors); (2) those scholars and academics

with whom Kant directly interacted, particularly in his Critical period and, in a number of cases, regarded as the natural audience of his publications (i.e., his peers); and (3) those who, either as actual students or merely as intellectual heirs, adopted Kant's thought and undertook to transmit but also to transform it (i.e., his earliest successors).

In the first group, Kant's predecessors, belong those German thinkers who contributed to shaping the intellectual context that framed Kant's philosophical (and religious) education and his early publications. Foremost among these is Christian Wolff (1679-1754), the founder of a philosophical system based on broadly Leibnizian foundations, which dominated German intellectual life for the first half of the eighteenth century. While Kant appreciated the spirit of rigour and systematicity that Wolff introduced into German philosophy, and offered praise for his general logic and his project of a universal practical philosophy, he was also clear on the defects of the Wolffian philosophy, which frequently served as a foil for the development of his own views. Wolff's primary intellectual (and indeed political) opposition was supplied by Pietism, a theological movement that gained considerable influence in Prussia, the members of which saw to Wolff's exile in 1723 (though he would return in 1740 at the invitation of Frederick II). While the original Halle Pietists were not primarily philosophers, and the relevance of the movement for the development of Kant's thought (as he was educated in a Pietist institution) has been disputed, a number of later thinkers of distinction and importance for Kant were connected with their movement. Among these are: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-62), a Leibnizian thinker and founder of the discipline of aesthetics, whose texts formed the basis for Kant's lectures in metaphysics and ethics and who was himself educated in the famous Pietist orphanage in Halle; Christian August Crusius (1715-75), an important influence upon Kant (and his occasional target), who incorporated a number of core Pietistic concerns in a sophisticated Ernst Plainer (1744-1818), a 'philosophical doctor' and author of one of the first textbooks in anthropology. Lastly within this group of peers are to be numbered Kant's earliest critics, among the most active of whom were: Johann Georg Hamann (1730-88), a part of Kant's social circle in Königsberg and a highly original if abstruse thinker in his own right, and author of the first 'metacritique' of Kant's Critical philosophy; Christian Garve (1742-98) a philosopher and translator held in high regard by many, including Kant himself, who, along with the eclectic philosopher Johann-Georg Heinrich Feder (1740-1821), authored the first (and since notorious) review of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason; and Johann August Eberhard (1739-1809), an ardent defender of Leibniz and one of Kant's most active critics, and among the few to whom Kant offered a detailed (if polemical) response.

The final group of Kant's contemporaries to be considered are his early successors, a group that includes his own students and disciples as well as his closest intellectual heirs. Among the former belong Marcus Herz (1747-1803), Kant's student, chosen respondent to his Inaugural Dissertation, and a sounding-board throughout his philosophical career, who published a number of philosophical works, including an important exposition of Kant's Dissertation; as well as the thinker who was undoubtedly Kant's most famous student, Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), who made signal contributions to aesthetics, philosophy of language and history, and who, despite (or maybe because of) his remaining a devotee of Kant's pre-Critical thought, was an important opponent of the Critical philosophy. Among those successors who did not study directly under Kant are some of the most important figures in post-Kantian German philosophy. These include Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757-1823), who made important early contributions to the Critical philosophy and held the first chair in Kantian philosophy, but who came to view that project as radically incomplete; Salomon Maimon (1753-1800), a Lithuanian Jew who was unable to attend Kant's lectures but whose subtle criticism of transcendental philosophy earned Kant's admiration, and who developed an original, sceptical philosophical perspective in subsequent works; and finally, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), one of the major figures in post-Kantian
idealism, whose first book was published anonymously with Kant’s assistance (and with Kant himself mistaken by many as the author). These, then, are many of the primary figures who formed Kant’s intellectual atmosphere, and whose distinguished and often foundational contributions to all areas of philosophical interest ensured that, far from being isolated from the wider intellectual world through his immersion in this context, Kant was rather offered a window on, and a platform for engaging with, some of the most important developments in a variety of areas of philosophical inquiry in the eighteenth century.

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*Kant and his German Contemporaries, Volume 1: Logic, Mind, Epistemology, Science and Ethics* has a number of aims, the foremost among which is to build on and significantly extend the recent research mentioned in the preceding section in documenting how tightly intertwined Kant’s philosophy is with the philosophical efforts of his eighteenth-century contemporaries. Since no single volume, or even pair of volumes, could claim to cover the unsurpassed scope of Kant’s Critical philosophy, or indeed do justice to the richness of German thought in this period, the contributions to this volume will focus on a handful of topics in Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophy, including issues in logic, metaphysics, epistemology, the history and philosophy of science, and ethics and moral psychology. In this way, we hope to supplement the existing literature on the relationship of Kant’s thought to the recognized major figures of early modern philosophy, which includes two recently published volumes devoted to this topic. Given this, it is decidedly not our intention to argue for the displacement of all but the German context when considering the development, reception, interpretation or evaluation of Kant’s thought, but merely to begin to fill out a large and largely missing part of the existing picture. In addition, it is also an important aim of the volume to reflect the international character of the scholarship on, and interest in, this topic. For this reason, nearly half of the contributions are from scholars based outside of North America and the United Kingdom, with the intention that the present volume should bring deserved attention to the work of a number of Kant scholars and scholars of the German Enlightenment who do not publish primarily in English.

Each of the following chapters serves to cast light on aspects of Kant’s complex relationship with his German contemporaries. Beginning with the first two chapters, which concern the topic of logic, the authors consider Kant’s historically less well-received contributions to modern logic, namely his foundation of a transcendental logic and his dismissal of mathematical methods from general logic, and both contend that key misapprehensions concerning each can be addressed by locating his discussions in a more appropriate context. In Chapter 1, Brian A. Chance argues for an important, if largely overlooked, role for Wolff’s empirical psychology in Kant’s organization of the topics of transcendental logic. In particular, he contends that Kant makes use of a Wolffian conception of purity that is to be distinguished from its better-known connection to apriority in structuring the key divisions in his transcendental logic. In Chapter 2, Huaping Lu-Adler situates Kant’s use of circle notation, a usage he likely borrows from Euler, within the context of the active eighteenth-century debate regarding Leibniz’s ambitious project of framing a logical calculus. Yet, as she argues, Kant’s use of the circle notation departs from the proof-theoretic use that Euler puts it to; rather, for Kant, this notation is employed simply to display the logical form of concepts, the extensions of which are taken to contain objects in general, and where this departure from Euler offers a more satisfying philosophical explanation of the diminished utility of this notation for Kant’s mathematics and logic.

Turning to Kant’s relationship to his peers and successors on traditional metaphysical issues in Part II, the three chapters show that in spite of some crucial differences, there are nonetheless important continuities between Kant and his contemporaries concerning the account of the knowledge of the self and its unity, the nature of our confidence in the soul’s immortality and the division of the faculties. In Chapter 3, Udo Thiel offers a comparison of Tetens’s views on the self and its unity with those of Kant. According to Thiel, Tetens attempts to blend broadly ‘rationalist’ and ‘empiricist’ approaches in maintaining our knowledge of the self’s unity, and
while Tetens deploys various notions of and arguments for the unity of the self that find analogues in Kant's later treatment, Thiel notes that an important difference between the two remains inasmuch as Tetens infers from the (merely logical) unity of the self to the substantiality of the soul. In Chapter 4, Corey W. Dyck argues that while Meier is commonly acknowledged to be important for an understanding of Kant's logic, Meier's writings on rational psychology are also worthy of consideration, especially inasmuch as they foreshadow Kant's own Critical position concerning the soul. So, Meier is likewise critical of attempts to demonstrate the soul's immortality, but he nonetheless defends what arguably amounts to a Kantian moral belief in immortality inasmuch as he thinks that our assent in this case is warranted primarily on the grounds of its importance for morality as such. In Chapter 5, Brandon C. Look turns to one of Kant's most important successors, Salomon Maimon, and his efforts to defend dogmatic metaphysics in the wake of Kant's criticism. As Look documents, Maimon draws upon Leibnizian metaphysical and epistemological doctrines in his critique of Kant, particularly in raising objections to the core Kantian distinction between sensibility and understanding, which criticism arguably leads Kant to a new appreciation of the resources of the Leibnizian account of the cognitive faculties and to a reconsideration of his diagnosis of the foundational error underlying Leibniz's metaphysics.

The next set of chapters turns to classical epistemological issues, as the authors make the case that some of the key details of Kant's position on truth and of his refutation of external world scepticism are better understood in direct connection with influential treatments on the part of his peers. In Chapter 6, Thomas Sturm considers how contextualizing Kant's various discussions of truth with respect to Lambert's offers a compelling alternative to recent interpretations of Kant's account of truth while showing how it gives a clear and distinctive direction to the first Critique's Transcendental Analytic, understood as a 'logic of truth'. Sturm contends that for Kant, as for Lambert, and unlike, for instance, Putnam's Kant, an account of truth is conceptually independent of, and prior to, the account of knowledge or, indeed, any claims regarding the distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves (which is where commentators typically first turn in framing Kant's account). In Chapter 7, Paul Guyer makes the case for the later importance of Mendelssohn for Kant's thought, particularly with respect to the Refutation of Idealism in the B edition of the first Critique. As Guyer argues, Kant's Refutation bears a striking resemblance to Mendelssohn's own in the Morgenstunden, although Kant departs from Mendelssohn in rejecting his modesty regarding what can be known concerning things in themselves, and in making the case for our knowledge of the existence of things independent of our representations of them. Continuing in this epistemological vein, Falk Wunderlich in Chapter 8 turns to the charge on the part of Platner that Kant's Critical philosophy amounts to a form of scepticism. Wunderlich accordingly documents Platner's evolving criticisms of the Critical philosophy as, by turns, endorsing scepticism and dogmatism, all the while attempting to integrate and augment aspects of Kant's thought within his own philosophical perspective. In addition, Platner's engagement with Kant's first Critique illustrates some of the challenges and complications attending the reception of that text among independent late-Enlightenment thinkers in Germany.

The two chapters of Part IV document the importance of the contemporary theory and practice of science as informing not only Kant's aim in his Critical project, but also his later efforts to shape its reception and influence by active scientists. In Chapter 9, Eric Watkins explicates Lambert's conception of cognition and science in an effort to disclose the fundamental continuities between his project and that of the first Critique. Without taking away from the unquestioned originality of the latter, Watkins spies an important precedent for Kant's efforts in Lambert's emphasis on the importance of a priori cognition as a foundation of science, where this cognition is understood in the familiar Kantian (i.e., non-metaphysical) sense. In Chapter 10, Jennifer Mensch contends that, Kant's endorsement of Blumenbach's views on the 'formative force [Bildungstrieb]' in the third Critique notwithstanding,
Blumenbach actually exerted less influence on Kant’s views on generation and race than is widely suspected. Through detailed consideration of Kant’s views on these topics as expressed in his reviews of Herder’s Ideas, Mensch argues that Kant’s approving remarks had a more strategic intention, namely to secure the support of a rising scientific star while gently correcting his views to better accord with Kant’s own.

In Part V, issues relating to practical philosophy are the focus, as each of the chapters documents how key aspects of Kant’s mature ethical thought — his doctrine of the postulate of immortality, his rejection of empirical approaches to morality and his deduction of the idea of freedom — can be understood as drawing on or responding to the discussions on the part of his contemporaries. Returning to the topic of immortality in Chapter 1, Paola Rumore turns to examining an important but overlooked aspect of Crusius’s influence on Kant, namely his deployment of ‘moral proofs’ of immortality. As Rumore shows, Crusius (like Meier) sought an alternative to what he regarded as the defective Wolffian theoretical demonstrations of the soul’s survival of the body’s death through the moral properties of rational spirits (such as their conscience) as well as through the necessity of eternal reward and punishment for moral action, though Crusius likewise stressed, in a clear anticipation of Kant, that the resulting confidence in immortality does not replace but only complements the power of the moral law to motivate our actions. Stefano Bacin makes the case, in Chapter 12, that Feder’s moral philosophy, developed in a series of publications that coincides with Kant’s major moral writings, not only constituted an important counterpoint to Kant’s own, but also presented a likely target for a number of Kant’s criticisms. So, Feder’s revival of Wolff’s project of a universal practical philosophy, though with a decidedly empirical slant, as well as his conception of will and happiness and his faith in common-sense morality, offered an influential empirical alternative to the Critical ethics with which Kant engages at numerous junctures. Finally, in Chapter 13, Heiner F. Klemme argues that Christian Garve’s doubts regarding any theoretical resolution of the antithesis between freedom and necessity informs Kant’s argumentation late in the Groundwork. While Garve does not think that a failure to refute the fatalist undermines our moral practice, which is grounded on feeling, Kant recognizes that Garve’s well-intentioned scepticism risks playing into the fatalist’s hands, and so offers a defence of the possibility of freedom (as compatible with natural causation through transcendental idealism) and a further, practical deduction such that we are justified in acting in accordance with the idea of freedom, given that freedom’s impossibility cannot be shown.

In the end, the portrait of Kant that will emerge from following chapters is of a major thinker thoroughly engaged with his contemporaries — drawing on their ideas and the ways they approached philosophical inquiry, targeting their arguments for criticism and responding to their concerns, and seeking to secure the legacy of his thought among them. Yet, in any project of this sort there are bound to be omissions, some that are readily understandable and others that require justification. Concerning the latter, among the most obvious omissions are chapters dealing (exclusively) with Kant’s relations to Baumgarten, Knutzen, Hamann and Herder; however, Kant’s relation to Baumgarten will be the exclusive topic of another forthcoming volume, Knutzen’s importance for Kant has already been explored in a number of English-language publications, and Hamann’s and Herder’s principal philosophical contributions do not lie within the areas of focus for the present volume (and indeed theirs and others’ will be taken up in a number of chapters in its successor).

There are others, of course, who would have benefitted from coverage here: among those mentioned above, H. S. Reimarus and Lessing are perhaps the most deserving, though at least concerning the latter there is a substantial body of philosophical literature already available in English. An obvious omission that is much more difficult to justify, though hardly difficult to explain, is the absence of any consideration of Kant’s relation to his female contemporaries. Among the many women who contributed to German intellectual life in the eighteenth century, there are lamentably few with whom Kant engaged intellectually, and among these there are even
fewer for whom there is a written record. Kant’s well-known correspondence with Maria von Herbert (1769—1803) constitutes an important, if not a wholly edifying, exception, and this exchange has been the exclusive focus of some recent discussion. In this respect particularly, it is hoped that the contributions in this volume will provide a needed foundation and otherwise-lacking encouragement for scholars to extend this research further into the many neglected figures among Kant’s German contemporaries, even — and especially — into those figures whose philosophical and historical importance might in no way be a function of their engagement with its most influential thinker. <>

Kant on Love by Pärttyli Rinne [Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte, De Gruyter, 9783110543858]

What did Immanuel Kant really think about love? This book is the first in-depth study of the concept of love in Kant’s philosophy. It argues that love is much more important to Kant than previously thought, and that understanding love is actually essential for Kantian ethical life. Perhaps surprisingly, for Kant, love permeates human existence from the strongest impulses of nature to the highest ideals of morally deserved happiness.

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Excerpt: This work presents the first systematic, exegetical, and comprehensive study of the concept of love in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Love is often considered to be among the most important yet perplexing of all human phenomena, and Kant is generally thought to be among the greatest philosophers in the Western tradition. I thus find it remarkable that Kant’s views on love have not previously been investigated in much depth, or with an outlook on the way the concept of love figures and operates within his philosophy as a whole.

My research will show that love is actually important to Kant’s philosophy, at any rate a lot more important than commonly assumed. It may come as a surprise to see how often Kant thinks about love, how much he writes about it, and that he holds various philosophical views about it. In particular, an understanding of how the concept of love functions in Kant’s practical philosophy is necessary for an overall understanding of his ethical project. Even though we might think otherwise at first glance, love plays an integral role in Kant’s conception of human life.

Love is a complex and multifaceted concept, and Kant’s philosophical ideas on love yield no exception to this fact. Not only are these ideas important for understanding Kant, I also think that
his views on love are interesting as such. What the views are and how they fit together is the topic of the present volume. If one is generally open to learning from Kant, this book will hopefully show that it is also possible to learn from what he thought about love. The nature of my work is mostly interpretative, and in particular I will formulate two exegetical claims, which mark the core of the study. First, I hold that in Kant we can detect a general division of love, according to which love in general divides into love of benevolence [Liebe des Wohlwollens] and love of delight [Liebe des Wohlgefallens]. The general division of love in Kant is a key for understanding love in Kant. Second, I hold that by identifying various aspects of love in Kant, such as self-love, sexual love, love of God, love of neighbour, and love in friendship, and by studying the various things he says about the different aspects of love, we can detect an ascent of love from the strongest impulses of human nature to the highest ideals of morally deserved happiness. It is these two claims that will be clarified and defended during the course of the work.

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There are of course reasons for the lacuna in previous research. In general, the study of Kant's moral philosophy or ethics, broadly construed, has tended to emphasise the foundations of moral philosophy as articulated in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason. Traditionally, fewer resources have been directed to research on Kant's last major contribution to moral philosophy, The Metaphysics of Morals, where love figures much more prominently than in the Groundwork or the Critique of Practical Reason. In the anglophone research community, the tendency to give less weight to The Metaphysics of Morals can also be at least partially explained by the fact that a reliable, complete translation of the entire work has only been made available in recent decades. The emphasis on the Groundwork in relation to The Metaphysics of Morals has tended to yield a picture of a `cold' Kant, a picture of a philosopher who emphasizes duty over everything else and is wary of, if not outright hostile towards, emotions or affective dispositions as part of the moral life.

When I have discussed my project with mon-Kantian academic philosophers, I have often been met with surprise: 'Love in Kant? Oh, I didn't know that Kant said anything at all about love! If he did, surely it must have been some kind of antithesis of love that he was really after...' And so on. Within the community of academic philosophers in general, Kant's views on love are clearly not well known. Within the circle of scholars working on Kant's ethics, however, this kind of picture no longer obtains, and as more attention has been given to the 'Doctrine of Virtue' in The Metaphysics of Morals and to Kant's anthropological works, we now have a much fuller, more balanced, and more comprehensive picture of the emotional life of the Kantian moral agent. We now know that the role of the `natural', sensory-aesthetic part of the human cognitive apparatus as related to 'pure practical reason' or 'freedom' (to use Kant's own dualism) is much more complex and nuanced than commonly assumed by those not all that familiar with Kant's ethics. Thanks to the work of Kantian ethicists emphasising or defending the importance of emotive elements in Kant's moral philosophy, what we have been witnessing in the last thirty years or so is the emergence of a `nicer' Kant, whose overall take on moral philosophy is 'kinder', `warmer', or more humane than what reading merely the Groundwork might imply.

My work represents this `warmer' school of Kantian ethics. However, even my kind of approach might appear too `cold' for those who wish to ground ethics or moral norms in emotive dispositions, pain and pleasure, empathy or `warm-heartedness', instinctive benevolence, or the feeling of love. The account of love in Kant that I seek is meant to be true to the foundations of Kant's moral thought and to the letter of his text, so that the picture I provide will be not only defensible but also exegetically balanced and accurate. For instance, even in the context of the `nice' Kant presented here, the feeling of love can never be the objective foundation of morality. The foundation is pure practical reason and respect for the moral law.

I won't be talking much about what Kant could or should have thought about the problem of love; rather, I will systematically reconstruct the positions he did hold. My aim is to arrive at a general
outline of the concept of love as it figures in my chosen target system, or in other words, in the propositional natural language 'data set' I wish to analyse. That is, I will be investigating how the word 'love' [Liebe] takes on different functions and meanings when it appears in various contexts within the philosophical writings of Kant.

This kind of approach has its limitations, to be sure, and I am not out to claim that Kant's conceptions of love simply sprang from pure reason in a historical vacuum. In the tradition of Western philosophy, investigations into love date back to the Presocratic Empedocles. In particular, the notion of Eros in Plato's Symposium has had an immense effect on subsequent European philosophy and culture. The connection between the concept of love and the notion of the highest good, which we will continue to see in Kant, originates from Plato. Besides Plato, another decisive factor contributing to how it was possible for someone to conceptualise love in 18th-century Prussia is the Christian religion, and especially the teachings of Jesus as they were preserved in the New Testament. It is not much of an exaggeration to assert that from a decidedly historical perspective, one cannot understand the context in which Kant writes about love without acknowledging the existence of at least two historical documents: the Symposium and the Sermon on the Mount.

It would be possible, and highly interesting, I think, to trace the historical genealogy of the concept of love from Plato to Kant, to consider the parallels and continuities between, for instance, the way love figures in Aristotle's and Kant's conceptions of friendship, to analyse the extent to which Kant's conceptualisations of love are indebted to, say, Augustine or Aquinas, or to his more immediate predecessors like the British moralists, or Leibniz, Wolff, or Baumgarten, or indeed to his Pietist upbringing. I would be especially inclined to point out (and this may be obvious to some) that the link between love and the highest good is common to both Platonism and Christianity, that this link is sustained through the Middle Ages in the Scholastic fusion of Plato, Aristotle, and Jesus, that it remains clearly visible in the British sentimentalists like Hutcheson, and that it influences Kant's construction of the regulative ideality of his ethical system as a whole. But this kind of historical, cultural and comparative approach is beyond the scope of my study.

The concept of love is scattered throughout Kant's massive corpus, and I will have enough work on my hands in just getting the exegesis right. Likewise, I will not enter the 'post-Kantian' domain and interpret my results in the light of later strands of German idealism; nor will I use my findings to engage with contemporary discussions in the philosophy of love. Although I believe that the approach and the general framework developed in this book can later be reworked and used to formulate a contemporary, post-Kantian philosophy of love, this is not my aim here. This study is very much Kant immanent.

As I mentioned above, Kant's conception of love has not been investigated comprehensively or in detail in the literature to date. This is not to say that there aren't any discussions of this topic, however. Since a key component of my argument concerns the novelty of my claims, I feel obliged to say at least something about how love has previously been analysed and discussed in the study of Kant. Therefore, I will now offer some general reflections on the state of previous research, and in doing this, I will refer to individual accounts only insofar as they are particularly representative of the points I wish to make.

The Kant-Bibliographie 1945-1990, which aims to present a comprehensive bibliography of Kant-related academic writings from the period between the aforementioned years, lists some 9000 titles, 5 titles of which contain the word 'love' or 'Liebe'. From this one can plausibly generalise that from 1945 to 1990 the 'love ratio' in Kant scholarship was approximately 1800. Things have changed in this regard, and in the last couple of decades in particular, research on love in Kant has grown to the point where at least one or two new papers on the topic are published each year. However, the total number of research articles in the field still only amounts to a good handful. There is no danger of drowning in the secondary literature.

I think it is possible to divide the existing research roughly into three categories. First, there are those accounts that engage with a specific aspect of love
or discuss love within a particular work by Kant. These accounts yield partial knowledge, and when the discussions are sufficiently detailed and well argued, they greatly promote our understanding of love in Kant. Most of the research on love in Kant belongs more or less to this category. Examples of the first kind of approach include works by Marcia Baron, Melissa Fahmy, and Dieter Schönecker, where the focus is the 'Doctrine of Virtue' of The Metaphysics of Morals or neighbourly love more generally. Second, there are accounts that mention 'love' in the title but do not actually provide an interpretation (in any significant detail) of what Kant had to say about the issues the title refers to. Third, there are accounts that at least ostensibly aim to provide a more general outlook on the concept of love in Kant, or somehow claim or attempt to articulate general propositions about love in Kant. It is this third category that is actually the most interesting for the purposes of my work, since what I am after here is precisely a more general account of this kind. However, none of these previous discussions is anything close to a book-length monograph (the closest is Streich (1924)). They are not even articles dedicated solely to this issue, but rather propositions within papers, which pursue various general aims. I do not wish to come across as blaming these authors, nor am I suggesting that they should have done otherwise. What I am saying is that regarding the concept of love in Kant, the lacuna in the research is real.

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Besides being generally exegetical in the sense that I interpret rather than evaluate, my approach has some other features that are worth highlighting. When I analyse the concept of love by investigating how the word 'love' appears in various propositional structures within a given text or set of texts, I analytically divide the concept of love into different aspects, according to how the word 'love' appears in different contexts. For example, a particularly high number of references to 'love' occur in contexts where Kant is speaking about the 'self' or 'one's own happiness', 'sexuality', 'God', 'neighbours' or 'other human beings', and 'friendship'. Analysed in these terms, the concept of love will consist at least of the aspects of 'self-love', 'sexual love', 'love of God', 'love of neighbour', and 'love in friendship'. Naturally, the interrelationships between the aspects are also very important. The aspects must be organised into a whole as rationally as possible. Just how this is to be accomplished, however, is impossible to say without first becoming well acquainted with the object of study. It is by comparing the aspects with each other that a general structure of the target concept can be approached. In this way, the concept is marked out by the instances of the word in the light of the aspects that have been identified, but in contrast with the mere word, the concept comprises a more comprehensive propositional domain, which includes all the aspects (or the proposition sets the aspects consist of). The comparative arrangement of the aspects should reveal the possible regularities or invariances between aspects, so that these invariances can then be said to belong generically to the concept. As such, dividing the concept of love into different sorts of love is of course nothing new (cf. e. g. Fromm 1957; Lewis 1963), but the divisions are not self-evident, and the particular way I make these divisions is novel in the study of Kant.

To clarify my approach further, I think my investigation into the concept of love in Kant must be called quasi-inductive. I do not claim to be analysing every possible aspect of love, let alone every single instance of the word 'love' in Kant's corpus. I am after a relatively robust yet manageable account of the concept of love, and I therefore limit the construction of the framework to those aspects that figure most prominently in Kant's philosophy. While the method is inductive in the sense that I gather textual data and make generalisations based on sample populations of the word 'love', my results are neither certain nor absolutely necessary. What I will say is merely that my division of the concept of love in Kant is one possible, plausible, or viable way of setting up a framework of analysis, and that while my results remain incomplete and hopefully subject to criticism, this study is nevertheless the first comprehensive approximation of what the concept of love in Kant's philosophy might look like.
To return to the basic claims made at the beginning of this introduction: what is the general division of love in Kant? As noted above, I identify five (or six) particularly important aspects of love to be discussed in the study: self-love, sexual love (and love of beauty), love of God, love of neighbour, and love in friendship. This list is not exhaustive and could be constructed otherwise, but these aspects do exist in Kant’s writings, and within this framework of aspects Kant consistently uses or implies a division between two generic kinds of love: love of benevolence [Liebe des Wohlwollens] and love of delight [Liebe des Wohlgefallens]. These two loves appear regularly. In general, love of benevolence in Kant is goodwill that is directed to the well-being of its object. It can be weak or active, but the wishful or actively sought end of all instances of love of benevolence is that things go well for the object, no matter how minimal one’s interest in the well-being of the object actually is. Love of delight, on the other hand, is a pleasure taken in the physical or moral perfections, or even the sheer existence, of the object. It does not carry an aim or an interest in the same way that love of benevolence does. Rather, it is a reaction or a response to an encounter with the object of love and its qualities. It is primarily a feeling aroused by the object in conjunction with the cognitive faculties or capacities of the agent.

In different contexts, love of benevolence and love of delight will vary according to their objects and the aspects of love to which they relate, so that they acquire somewhat different meanings and different functions depending on the aspect in question. However, I have found only one direct reference to a general division of love in Kant’s published works, and the existence of the division must be shown and systematically reconstructed with various sources for each of the individual aspects. The direct remark is contained in the first part of Religion within the Bounds of mere Reason, where Kant discusses the origin of evil and, more precisely, its relation to self-love. Kant refers to a general division of love in a lengthy footnote: 'Like love in general, self-love too can be divided into love of benevolence and love of delight (Benevolentiae et Complacentiae), and both (as is self-evident) must be rational.' (R, 6:45.22-25) In the specific context of self-love, the general division of love basically means that we want things to go well for ourselves (love of benevolence), and that we are pleased (love of delight) when things do work out well for us (overall self-love is more complicated than this, and I discuss the complexity of the general division of self-love in ch. 1.2). The remark in the Religion also asserts that both love of benevolence and love of delight 'must be rational'. It is not entirely clear what this means, and whether the 'must' [müssen] should be understood as normative or as part of the description of the loves in question. It is also not clear whether the rationality that Kant is talking about here is meant to apply to love of benevolence and love of delight generally or merely (or specifically) in the context of self-love. We know from the passage itself and from several places elsewhere that Kant allows for the existence of inclination-based love of benevolence and pathological love of delight (see e. g. ch. 4.1). It is therefore clear that the phrase 'must be rational' cannot be taken to mean 'must be based on reason'. In the specific context of self-love, the rationality of love of benevolence for oneself means that the inclination-based love of benevolence for oneself includes the successful long-term use of instrumental reasoning, i. e. it is rational as prudence. Rational love of delight for oneself, on the other hand, means either taking pleasure in one’s own prudence or a kind of self-contentment that is based on one’s respect for the moral law (in the last case the love of delight for oneself would be based on reason) (R, 6:45fn.; see ch. 1.2). However, if we interpret the words 'must be rational' as referring to love of benevolence and love of delight more generally, beyond the context of self-love, we may note that Kant never talks of mere non-rational animality in terms of the general division of love, and his usage of the terms seems to be limited to the context of rational beings. In this sense, love of benevolence and love of delight always imply reason, even when a token of benevolence or delight is pathological or based on inclination (ch. 1). This means that for Kant, love of benevolence and love of delight appear in rational creatures, entangled in their rational capacities. Some loves are derived from pure practical reason, like practical love of neighbour as the duty to be benevolent and beneficent to others.
Similarly, love of God is an idea derived from moral reason (ch. 3). It is also the case that Kant’s ethical writings involve a demand for cultivation, which ethically means the conscious striving to make one’s cognitive apparatus more fit for what morality demands. This includes making use of one’s feelings of love in the service of moral reason, and in this general sense the ‘must be rational’ can be interpreted as involving a demand to cultivate natural feelings of love of benevolence and love of delight in order to improve oneself morally (see esp. ch. 5).

Even though Kant’s published works contain only one direct reference to love’s being ‘generally’, ‘as such’, or ‘all-in-all’ [überhaupt] divided into love of benevolence and love of delight, his usage of the terms of the division runs from the early Herder lectures on ethics (1762-64) up to the late Metaphysics of Morals (1797) (see ch. 4). The first time the general division of love comes up explicitly in Kant’s corpus is in the Collins notes on ethics, where ‘all love’ [alle Liebe] is divided into love of benevolence and love of delight. There, the specific context is love of neighbour. With respect to neighbourly love, in the 1780s Kant also uses the distinction between pathological and practical love, which is especially familiar to readers of the Groundwork and the second Critique. The division of love of neighbour into love of benevolence and love of delight resurfaces in The Metaphysics of Morals. I investigate how the general division of love of neighbour can be mapped onto the more familiar pathological-practical distinction. If all the evidence is taken into account, including what Kant says about love in friendship (ch. 5), we can see that love for other human beings is generally divided into love of benevolence and love of delight, so that it is possible to love others benevolently 1) from inclination or 2) from reason, and to take delight in others 3) pathologically or 4) intellectually (see ch. 4.1; 4.3; 5.2.2; Appendix).

From a religious perspective, God’s love of benevolence is the ground of creation and moral duties, and his love of delight is (hopefully) an eventual favourable response to the sincere moral striving of the human being (ch. 3). How exactly the general division of love in Kant operates is to a great extent the main problem of the whole study, and my exegetical work is largely meant to corroborate the existence of the general division of love in Kant. The investigation of the general division of love reveals that the aspects of love are not isolated from each other but overlap to some extent and, taken together, form a dynamic and highly complex network of closely intertwined concepts. It should also be noted that Kant’s conception of love cannot be entirely reduced to the general division: under the broad and complex rubric of self-love, we find the strongest, rudimental, non-rational impulses of human nature, namely those of self-preservation (love of life) and sexuality (sexual love in the narrow sense), which are discussed in terms of love but not grasped by the general division.

The second major claim of the study is that if we look at the different aspects of love alongside each other, we see an ascent of love from the natural, animal impulses toward the highest moral-physical good in the form of cosmopolitan friendship — or so I will argue. Through the aspects of self-love, sexual love (and love of beauty), love of God, love of neighbour, and love in friendship, love is seen to condition important focal points in humanity’s ascent from crude animality to morally deserved happiness. This picture of an ascent of love in Kant is obviously an interpretative reconstruction. Kant never systematised his discussions of love into a single whole, but the reconstruction I offer is nevertheless based firmly on what he said. It is made from the pieces Kant laid out, even though he himself never put all the pieces together. The picture contains both descriptive elements, which Kant uses to portray human nature, and prescriptive elements, which explicate notions of duty as they relate to love. The ascent concerns both the subjective level of an agent’s character development and the communal level of the species. It also contains the regulative ideal of the highest good as the perfection that we humans ought to strive for. Overall, this view of an ascent of love is a conceptual classification or a hierarchy of the different kinds of love as they relate to creation, nature, and the highest moral-physical well-being. I call this picture the ascent model of love in Kant. The model consists generally of the various notions of love spelled out by Kant in his
works, the interrelations between these notions, and the way in which the general division of love brings a relative unity to Kant's concept of love as a whole. The ascent model of love ultimately provides a panoptic view of the aspects of love discussed in this book. To make the claim more precisely, the ascent model of love is a viable general model of love in Kant.

For readers familiar with Plato's Symposium and the famous 'ladder of love' discussed in that work, the notion of an ascent model might ring a bell. Isn't Diotima's and Socrates' account of Eros in the latter half of the Symposium precisely an ascent model? Am I trying to argue that Kant is actually some kind of Platonist when it comes to love? The answer to the first question is: yes, the first ascent model of love in Western philosophy was formulated by Plato. To the second question, I'm inclined to answer no, but this must be carefully qualified to avoid misunderstandings. Naturally, if I am generally arguing that an ascent of love can be detected in Kant, there are going to be at least some structural similarities with Plato's (or Diotima's) account in the Symposium. With Plato, one begins by erotically loving the physical beauty of an individual young man, and the impulses of self-preservation and the sexual instinct likewise lie at the natural basis of Kant's conception of love. Echoing Plato's 'ladder metaphor', Kant often associates love with the notions of 'higher' and 'lower', and he continually talks about love in relation to our striving for perfection, or in relation to the cultivation of our faculties — where the ultimate end is obviously the complete highest good. What is clearly different, however, is that for Plato, the 'peak' of love's ascent is a kind of quasi-mystical vision, where the lover suddenly grasps the fundamental oneness of the idea of beauty, as if in a single, sweeping intuition. Now this is not a comparative study of love and the highest good in Plato and Kant; it is not even a study of the highest good in Kant, and I will not go into much detail in my comparison. Using Plato's ladder casually as a heuristic point of departure through which to elaborate on Kant's notion of love, I believe we can say that for Kant, the 'peak' we strive to reach is a more communal notion of love (conditioned by respect) in cosmopolitan friendship. Subjectively, it consists in love for the moral law, the full attainment of which signifies the absence of all contra-moral inclinations in the agent. Communally, or on the species level, it consists in the prevalence of benevolence (Liebe des Wohlwollens) and intellectual delight (Liebe des Wohlgefallens) in equal, reciprocal, and respectful human relationships that ultimately obtain throughout the planet. For Kant, the attainment of these highest modes of love is a gradual, laborious, and neverending project of moral development.

For Kant, the ascent of love is less about subjectively coming to 'see' something and more about making moral progress in terms of love in one's interactions with other human beings. I am not saying that Plato's account cannot also be construed along these lines, but on the face of it at least, there are clear differences between the two. Plato's ladder of love emphasises the vision of the one as the highest good, whereas my ascent model of love in Kant emphasises the duty of moral progress.

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If I now briefly compare my perspective with the previous, more general propositions made on Kant and love, I believe the benefits and originality of my approach can be brought to light. First of all there is an older doctoral dissertation (55 pages) from Germany with the title The Concept of Love According to Kant [Der Begriff der Liebe bei Kant] (Streich 1924). Detlev Streich's main claim is that love can never be a moral motive for Kant. While this is strictly speaking true, Streich's coarse-grained position reduces love to a feeling, and he does not problematise his conception in the light of Section XII of the Introduction to the 'Doctrine of Virtue', where the feeling of love is described as a subjectively necessary predisposition for receptivity to duty. Streich does not discuss love of God or analyse the varieties of self-love; he only mentions sexual love in passing and has a particularly one-sided view of love in friendship (he thinks it's merely burdensome [lästig]). More recently, in an article on Kant and the biblical commandment of love, Martin Moors claims to 'formulate a general evaluation of Kant's philosophy of love' (Moors
However, Moors does not exactly provide this, and instead identifies six aspects ‘with regard to Kant’s practical concept of love’. Included in Moors’s account are ‘religious’, ‘theological’, ‘theonomical’, ‘ethical’, ‘voluntaristic’, and ‘anthropological’ varieties of love. From my perspective, the first three would seem to come close to love of God, the fourth and fifth to love of neighbour, and the sixth to the notion of passion. Moors does not discuss the varieties of self-love in significant detail; he says nothing about sexual love (and love of beauty), nor does he mention love in friendship. For Moors, Kant’s notion of love as duty ‘evaporates completely’ (Moors 2007, p. 267), but he does not notice that an end of the duty of love is the happiness of others. From a more charitable perspective, Jeanine Grenberg has defended ‘a Kantian understanding of the role of love in a well-lived human life’, a love the conception of which is ‘entirely moral’. Grenberg seems to effectively reduce ‘Kant’s notion of love’ to love for the moral law. But I think a Kantian comprehension of love’s role can hardly be reduced in this way, and besides love for the law, Grenberg provides no account of the many things Kant has to say about love.4 The most interesting, detailed, and modest general proposal is that provided by Schönecker in the Introduction to his paper on love in Section XII of Kant’s Introduction to the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’. First of all, Schönecker makes clear that his list is not perfect, and the aim is only to demonstrate the complexity of the concept of love. Schönecker divides love in Kant into at least four contexts and twelve different meanings. The first context is biological and includes 1) sexual love, 2) self-love, and 3) love of life (self-preservation). The second context is the duties of love, where Schönecker identifies 4) amor benevolentiae, 5) heartfelt benevolence, 6) love for all human beings, 7) love as an aptitude to the inclination of beneficence, and 8) practical love. Schönecker’s third context is love in friendship, where he distinguishes between 9) love as friendship with humanity, 10) the duty of benevolence as a friend of human beings, and 11) benevolence in wishes. The last context is love as a moral predisposition of amor complacentiae, which is 12) love of delight [Liebe des Wohlgefallens]. Without going into de tail, Schönecker’s analysis is very helpful, and from my perspective the only main contexts that are omitted from his account are love of God and love of beauty. As Schönecker does not ground his tentative analysis on the general division of love into love of benevolence and love of delight, it is understandable that he is not so sensitive to the operation of the division within the contexts he distinguishes. I think Schönecker’s loves 4 — 11 can actually be viewed in terms of varying kinds or degrees of love of benevolence. Love of delight, on the other hand, is a broader motion than Schönecker acknowledges in his list; it also figures in self-love, love of God, and, arguably, in love in friendship. The context of biological or natural love can also be construed such that the non-rational impulses of love of life and sexual love (the latter of which, in the broad sense, involves more than just biology) belong to an umbrella concept of self-love, which further includes the general division of love on an actually rational level (see ch. 1).

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This study is divided into 5 chapters according to the aspects of love on which I will focus. In these chapters, I analyse the operation of the general division of love in the relevant contexts and carve out the various building blocks that, taken together, form the ascent model of love in Kant. Kant’s discussions of love take place mainly within moral philosophy, philosophy of religion, anthropology, and teleology, while he does not really talk about love in the framework of theoretical philosophy (‘love’ is not mentioned in the Critique of Pure Reason). Apart from the first Critique, my readings emphasise the main published works from the mature period, and I only use the lecture notes and minor writings as auxiliary tools of interpretation when helpful. My reading strategy is fairly consistent from chapter to chapter; while I tend to organise my discussions thematically around the problems related to the general division of love, I normally read Kant’s works chronologically to appreciate the transformations his thoughts on love undergo over time. I believe that, like any great system or project of human thought, Kant’s philosophy must be understood as a dynamic and cumulative endeavour, where more stable positions are found on which details are then built, while some positions change, wane, or become redefined,
and the thought itself remains constantly at work, constantly in flux. Following the methodological advice of Ernst Cassirer, mine is not so much a study of `puzzles' or 'apparent contradictions' in the 29 volumes of Kant's collected works but rather a study of the dynamic structure of a particular philosophical concept — a concept which a philosopher can only form gradually over the course of several decades of conceptual labour. Such a concept of love, while certainly not the only possible such concept, can nevertheless be very beautiful, and can perhaps help us more generally to understand what love is, how it arises, what it feels like, and what it requires from us rationally. To understand love better is the deeper, underlying aim that has resulted in this book.

In the first chapter, I offer a three-level interpretation of self-love in Kant. I argue that the concept of self-love can be divided according to ascending levels of rationality. I show that there is a low, arational, ground-level form of self-love that consists of the strongest animal impulses of human nature: love of life (self-preservation), sexual love and parenting (species preservation in the narrow sense), and instinctive sociality. I call this level 'animal mechanical self-love'. My analysis then turns to an actually rational level that I call the `middle level' of self-love, where self-love is divided (in a very complex way) according to the general division of love into love of benevolence and love of delight. Lastly, I analyse self-love hypothetically, on an ideally rational level of infinite approximation towards the highest good. I argue that even in this infinite ascent an element of self-love persists. Overall, I thus argue for the persistence of self-love on three levels.

The second chapter has two exegetical tasks. I begin by analysing the relationship between sexual love and love of beauty, which relationship figures prominently in Kant's earlier philosophy but wanes towards the 1790s. I then formulate a distinction between narrow and broad sexual love, where narrow sexual love consists merely of the natural impulse of procreation, whereas broad sexual love is the natural impulse united with the moral love of benevolence in the context of heterosexual marriage. In comparison with the other chapters in this study, the chapter on sexual love also contains an evaluative element, which reflects the fact that most of the previous research in this area is feminist and therefore evaluative in orientation (as far as I know, my study is the first to analyse sexual love in Kant from an exegetical point of view). From this perspective, I show how broad sexual love supports a less misogynistic picture of Kant than is often presented, even though problems and internal tensions remain in Kant's discussions on the issue of sex.

The third chapter formulates an ascent model of love of God. I begin with the observation that love of God comprises two `directions': a movement upwards, from human beings to God, and a movement downwards, from God to human beings. I call this starting point the two-directionality thesis of love of God. I proceed by analysing human beings' love for God and then God's love for human beings. For Kant, morality leads to religion, and love for God is the foundation of all inner religion. It is close to the regulative ideal of loving the moral law, which involves fulfilling one's duties gladly [gern] (thus implying the absence of contra-moral inclinations in the perfect agent). I show how God's love can be analysed in terms of its role as both an end and a ground: God's love of benevolence toward humans is (from a religious perspective) the ground of creation and duties, and God's love of delight is a moral delight God in the end hopefully takes in the sincere moral striving of the human being.

The fourth chapter proposes a novel `feeling-action-cultivation' account of love of neighbour. I track down Kant's discussions of neighbourly love from the early Herder notes onwards, focusing on The Metaphysics of Morals. I propose that love of neighbour consists of both moral-rational and sensory-emotive elements and that it includes the cultivation of a moral disposition. Love of neighbour divides into love of benevolence and love of delight, so that love of benevolence towards others is either 1) benevolent or beneficent inclination or 2) active rational benevolence (practical love). Practical love is further divided into beneficence, gratitude, and sympathy. Love of delight is either a pathological or an intellectual delight taken in the perfections (or even the sheer humanity) of another. It is not merely an actual feeling but also a
predisposition of sensibility to be subjectively receptive to duty.

The final chapter reconstructs Kant’s mature philosophy of friendship from the perspective of love. I show the existence of the general division of love in this context and analyse the way its components function. Love in friendship is at least love of benevolence, but if the lecture notes on ethics are included as evidence, it is both love of benevolence and love of delight. In general I argue that in the context of friendship, love (conditioned by respect) marks the path towards the highest good in equal and reciprocal human relationships. Friendships as such are intimate, but the notion of a ‘friend of human beings’ [Menschenfreund; Freund der Menschen] brings with it a broader cosmopolitan outlook that indirectly aims at the ideal moral community in terms of friendship. I call this overall account the ‘ascent view of love in Kantian friendship’. Taken together with the previous chapters of this study, this account corroborates the general division approach and the ascent model of love in Kant.

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Before moving to the main discussion, I would like to say a word or two about certain aspects of love to which I do not devote entire chapters but that also deserve mention. First, I approach the notion of love of beauty through the lens of sexual love (ch. 2.1). This is by no means the only strategy available, and love of beauty could also be considered for its own sake (even though there are only two direct passages on it in the Critique of Judgment). One could, for instance, begin one’s discussion with the third Critique, establish that love of beauty is love of delight, and then try to establish links between these passages and Kant’s discussions in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ and the Vigilantius notes on ethics with an eye to elaborating further on the general qualities of love of delight. But this kind of more experimental exegesis is beyond the scope of the present work. Love of beauty has been recently discussed by Anne Margaret Baxley and Gabriele Tomasi, and with reference to their discussions I adopt a merely reactive attitude in ch. 2.1, pointing out that an exegetical problem concerning love in the Critique of Judgment is left untouched by these accounts. However, this is not the main point of the chapter, and in all honesty I do not provide a general account of love of beauty.

Second, I discuss love of honour under self-love. Love of honour is an ambiguous notion detached from the general division of love (in itself it is neither love of benevolence nor love of delight). Love of honour consistently marks a concern for respect (from others), but it comes in physical and moral variants, the physical variant belonging to the conceptual cluster of self-love and the moral variant being grounded in respect for the moral law. My discussion of love of honour is indebted to the careful accounts provided by Houston Smit and Mark Timmons and Lara Denis (2014), but I should still note that neither Smit and Timmons nor Denis attempt to connect love of honour to love’s general concept. I consider the relationship between love of honour and love in general at the end of ch. 1.1. The moral ideal of love for the law is discussed in ch. 1.3 and especially in ch. 3.1. I consider love of human beings in conjunction with love of neighbour, especially in ch. 4.2.1.

Further, there are various ‘aspects’ of love that are mentioned by Kant only in passing, in singular isolated contexts or in adverbial constructions, but that are never elaborated on or systematically developed. Some of these might be more, some less important for someone interested in a general concept of love, but since they are not given substantial consideration by Kant in terms of love, I do not discuss them or incorporate them into my framework. Of such loves, the most prominent is undoubtedly parental love, yet even though the natural impulse toward the preservation of offspring belongs to ‘animal mechanical self-love’ in the Religion, the only published reference to ‘parental love’ [die Liebe der Eltern] occurs in the Prolegomena, where Kant uses love of God and parental love as examples through which to explain, formally, the notion of an analogical relation as such. Parents do have a duty to provide for their children, according to Kant, and children are said to have a duty of gratitude (which is a duty of love) towards their parents. When Kant discusses the difference between hatred and anger in the lectures on ethics, he mentions a parent’s
anger toward a child’s bad behaviour as an example of anger that presupposes love. That parents love their children would seem to be implicit in Kant’s writings, but he does not discuss the parent-child relation in connection with love to any great extent. Hence, I do not include parental love in my framework.

Love of truth is mentioned a couple of times in the lectures but never in the published works. In the first Critique, Kant writes that ‘we shall always return to metaphysics as we would to a beloved woman with whom we have had a quarrel.’ Although this is an interesting metaphor, to my knowledge Kant never elaborates on it. Even more remote examples of ‘briefly mentioned loves’, which for the most part never appear in Kant’s published works, include ‘love of the fatherland’, as contrasted with universal love of human beings, ‘love of justice’, ‘peace-loving’, and the carnivorous ‘love of roast beef’, none of which are developed further in terms of love. The existence of constructions like ‘love of roast beef’ merely shows that, in the most general terms, ‘love’ can be used to signify any kind of relatively intense liking or desire. From this flexibility of the concept of love it does not follow that the framework of love should be expanded ad infinitum to accommodate ever-new aspects or kinds of love. Rather, it shows the need to restrict the framework through careful, quasi-inductive evaluations, so that the concept of love can remain at the same time broad and informative. <>

Kant on Persons and Agency by Eric Watkins (Cambridge University Press, 9781107182455)

Today we consider ourselves to be free and equal persons, capable of acting rationally and autonomously in both practical (moral) and theoretical (scientific) contexts. The essays in this volume show how this conception was first articulated in a fully systematic fashion by Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century. Twelve leading scholars shed new light on Kant’s philosophy, with each devoting particular attention to at least one of three aspects of this conception: autonomy, freedom, and personhood. Some focus on clarifying the philosophical content of Kant’s position, while others consider how his views on these issues cohere with his other distinctive doctrines, and yet others focus on the historical impact that these doctrines had on his immediate successors and on our present thought. Their essays offer important new perspectives on some of the most fundamental issues that we continue to confront in modern society.

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Excerpt: Our conception of ourselves today as free and equal persons who are capable of acting rationally and autonomously in both practical (moral) and theoretical (scientific) contexts does not reflect an everlasting truth, but rather emerged as
a hard-won conquest within a particular historical context. The story of the emergence of this self-conception is long and multifaceted, but one particularly crucial moment occurred in the European Enlightenment when the socio-economic and political structures of the ancien régime came under attack by an ambitious and increasingly literate middle class that was pressing its interests against established powers, even against so-called enlightened and benevolent despots, such as Frederick II of Prussia. Underlying the ensuing upheavals in the then dominant social, political, religious, and economic structures were various intellectual developments at the time, which played a central role in the agents' self-professed understanding of what was driving change, the ways in which they formulated and argued their positions, and how they understood themselves.

Many early proponents of the Enlightenment made their case for putting power in the hands of such agents by noting the promise of the technological advances that were possible in the wake of the Scientific Revolution and its implementation in solving local problems. But especially a second generation of advocates advanced a different line of argument, one centered on the authority of human reason as a universally shared capacity, regardless of a person's social rank, position, and religion. This strategy proved in many ways richer and more powerful, since it undergirded and applied to a broader range of activities and contexts and had nearly universal appeal as a result. Arguably the most influential and most profound thinker to articulate this line of argument was Immanuel Kant. While his positions on the nature of reality (Transcendental Idealism), the limits of our knowledge of it (Epistemic Humility), and the fundamental principle of morality (the Categorical Imperative) have — with good reason — received the lion's share of scholars' attention, it is his view of the nature of reason itself that is even more fundamental. Particularly important is Kant's thesis of the unity of reason, the idea that both theoretical and practical reason function according to the very same principles within a free and autonomous agent. For this faculty has implications for what a person's most valuable capacities are, and, consequently, for the various ways in which we can understand our place and life-projects in the world.

That a people could rationally will laws that would be both scrutinized by all and binding on all is a powerful idea that Rousseau popularized, one that Kant then articulated more fully in his metaphysics and in his moral and political philosophy (with its emphasis on the public use of reason and its authority). In religion, Kant advocated the use of reason both to criticize superstition (so as to avoid "enthusiasm") and to lay bare the fundamental rationality of the "invisible church" that would unite all people in a "realm [Reich] of ends." In such a realm all persons, in virtue of their rationality, are treated not as things with a price, but as ends in themselves worthy of unconditional respect, precisely because of their capacity for autonomous agency. In these and numerous other ways, Kant articulated a powerful and enduring conception of what it means to be a person acting in a complex and ever-changing world, a conception that was, to be sure, criticized and modified in various ways by his successors, but one that was accepted in many respects. For example, Kant's emphasis on the fundamental dignity of persons is reflected in modern constitutions (e.g., in Germany's Grundgesetz), which reveals that his conception continues to be an attractive view of how we understand ourselves most fundamentally today.

Kant on Persons and Agency investigates three different aspects of Kant's conception of agency: autonomy, freedom, and personality. The first part is devoted to autonomy and how agency relates to it. The second considers freedom and its role in Kant's account of agency. The third focuses on Kant's conception of persons and how persons are agents. The volume concludes with a synoptic vision of Kant's conception of "the end of all things."

In the first chapter, "The Unconditioned Goodness of the Good Will," Eric Watkins considers what it means to assert, as Kant does in the first section of the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, that the good will alone is an unconditioned good and that all other goods are conditioned by its goodness. He begins by distinguishing different kinds of goodness (e.g., intrinsic vs. extrinsic, conditioned vs. unconditioned, good with vs. without
limitation), before clarifying what Kant means by a condition in his theoretical philosophy (metaphysical dependence that is also explanatory), and using that conception to account for what unconditioned goodness is.

He then explains how the goodness of the good will is related to the kind of universal legislation that is fundamental to Kant’s conception of autonomy, and to Kant’s claim at the very end of the Groundwork that there are limits to what we can comprehend about the unconditioned necessity of the laws that we autonomously legislate to ourselves.

In the second chapter, "Universal Law," Allen Wood considers several of Kant’s formulas of the Categorical Imperative, which express in different ways how we should behave if we are to act morally and autonomously. He argues that the so-called Universal Law and Law of Nature formulas of the Categorical Imperative neither can be, nor are intended by Kant to serve as, universal criteria for distinguishing right from wrong on any given occasion. Were they intended as such, they would be subject to both false negatives and false positives, as critics have charged. Instead, Wood claims, Kant uses these formulas, especially that of the Law of Nature, to expose the illegitimacy of the justifications that one might offer in defense of maxims that would (improperly) exempt one from the moral law. Wood supports his claim by discussing several of the examples that Kant employs, showing how this more modest intent determines what maxims are selected for discussion, what questions are asked about these maxims, the purpose for which the agent asks these questions, and even the specific moral defects and virtues that the agent displays in using the formulas.

Stephen Engstrom’s contribution in the third chapter of this volume, "Understanding Autonomy: Form and Content of Practical Knowledge," explains crucial features of Kant’s conception of autonomy in terms of his conception of practical knowledge. In particular, Engstrom is concerned to show how a proper understanding of practical knowledge can allow one to address two objections commonly raised against Kant’s doctrine of autonomy, namely that if we (as rational beings endowed with a will) are the source of our moral obligations, then they cannot be at once necessary and contentful. They cannot be necessary, since we could, it seems, rescind them at will, and even if a purely formal law, like the law of contradiction, might be necessary, it cannot have any content, since it is purely formal. Given that Kant conceives of the will that legislates for itself as practical reason and of practical reason as a capacity for practical knowledge, Engstrom then provides a detailed description of both the form and the content of practical knowledge as involving acts of self-legislation. In light of Engstrom’s analysis, our moral obligations have a necessary content because the form of practical rational knowledge is not only legislative (and thus necessary), but also self-legislative (and thus contentful insofar as the self necessarily brings a content into its own knowledge).

In Chapter 4, "The Principle of Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory: Its Rise and Fall," Pauline Kleingeld notes that Kant’s Principle of Autonomy, which played a central role both in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and in the Critique of Practical Reason, had all but disappeared by the time of the Metaphysics of Morals. She argues that its disappearance is due to significant changes in Kant’s political philosophy. That is, whereas the notion of legislation, or lawgiving, that Kant accepted in the mid-1780s does not require any actual consent — genuine universality is sufficient for a law to be just — in the Metaphysics of Morals and in other works in the 1790s he added the further condition that laws must be given by the citizens themselves, through their representatives in parliament. With this further condition, the analogy that Kant saw between his political and moral philosophy in the mid-1780s no longer obtained, and the Principle of Autonomy, which is firmly based on that analogy, is no longer suitable for its original purpose.

The second part of the volume focuses on freedom and its role in agency. Chapter 5, "Evil and Practical Reason," by Lucy Allais, explores the relation between Kant’s account of practical reason as autonomy, the idea of freedom in his political philosophy, and his account of the innate evil in human nature. It offers a secular account of Kant’s thesis of innate evil, understood in terms of our
being imperfect creatures who come into a world in which we are unavoidably situated in relations of current and historical systematic injustice that taint our moral options. In particular, seeing yourself as an agent (someone who acts for reasons) involves seeing your actions as governed by the constraint of respecting the humanity of others, which suggests that there is internal pressure to see yourself as having an ordered will of a certain sort (to interpret yourself as basically good), since this is part of what it is to see yourself as a rational agent who acts for reasons. This suggests further a picture of rational agency which contains a mechanism by which self-deception is likely to arise in circumstances of systematic injustice and to take the form of dehumanizing others. If we need to see ourselves as good to some degree in order to see ourselves as agents, but we find ourselves in circumstances in which we know we are going to fail to be good, we may be liable to despair, and thus be under internal psychological pressure to dehumanize others so as to avoid confronting the ways in which we are implicated in injustice and domination. The role of affective attitudes such as forgiveness and trust is that they enable us to avoid despair by providing an optimistic perspective on our future willing that may be necessary for our properly seeing ourselves as agents.

Chapter 6, "Freedom as a Postulate," by Marcus Willaschek, focuses on solving two puzzles that arise concerning Kant's views on how freedom could be a postulate. First, why does Kant not provide an argument for the postulate of freedom in the Critique of Practical Reason's Dialectic, just as he does for those of God and the immortality of the soul? Second, how can freedom be a postulate if it is proved on the basis of Kant's famous "fact of reason"? Willaschek provides a detailed reconstruction of Kant's "fact of reason" argument, which shows that his missing argument for freedom as a postulate can be found in the Analytic and that this does not undermine his claim that the appropriate doxastic attitude toward freedom is belief (as opposed to knowledge). But Willaschek also draws a more general lesson from Kant's position, namely that Kant's conception of a postulate of practical reason is both broader than has been thought and also more attractive as a contemporary position than commentators have acknowledged.

In the seventh chapter, "The Struggle for Freedom: Freedom of Will in Kant and Reinhold," Paul Guyer argues that throughout his career Reinhold, even if not in those exact words) and to the thesis of the freedom of Willkür to choose between good and evil (again, even if not always in those very words). He then shows why Kant sometimes suggested otherwise, but argues that his fundamental reason for insisting on the freedom of Willkür is compelling. What's more, Guyer suggests that we should not take Kant's repudiation of the definition of freedom of Willkür as the ability to choose either the moral law or its subordination to self-love, to repudiate either the difference between Wille and Willkür or Kant's commitment to the freedom of Willkür. In this way Guyer is able to diagnose and rectify prominent misconstruals of Kant's position by Reinhold and others.

In Chapter 8, "The Practice of Self-Consciousness: Kant on Nature, Freedom, and Morality," Dieter Sturma argues that Kant's solution to the problem of freedom and natural determinism in the third antinomy, which is based on his conception of a causality through freedom, is not acceptable under the terms of contemporary systematic philosophy. The primary object of criticism is Kant's presupposition of a dualistic theoretical approach and the associated two-worlds view of the empirical and the noumenal. However, in his conception of freedom and agency, Kant is not necessarily obliged, Sturma argues, to accept a strong interpretation of the two-worlds view. Instead, his critical philosophy is systematically determined by two orders: the realm of causes and the space of moral reasons, which Kant has in mind when he invokes the image of the "starry heavens above and the moral law within." Sturma argues further that, at the end of the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant emphasizes that these two orders are closely intertwined with the self-consciousness of the person, which excludes an ontological dualism. He then points to a number of Kant's reflections and hints about the practice of self-consciousness from which — as an unofficial doctrine — a conception of freedom and agency can be derived that is not
committed to a strong version of the two-worlds view and that is compatible with his concept of autonomy. In short, according to Kant, the life of a person is characterized by the ability to set empirical conditions against rational constraints, since persons are beings who can respond to reasons as well as generalize, differentiate, and act due to reasons. The laws of nature and the moral laws thus have to satisfy different standards of validity and, accordingly, express themselves in different kinds of objectivity.

The third part of the volume considers Kant’s conception of a person and the central role that agency plays in it. In Chapter 9, "Kant’s Multiple Concepts of Person," Béatrice Longuenesse argues that in the course of his criticism, in the Third Paralogism, of the rationalist derivation of the concept of a person from the mere use of ‘I’ in ‘I think,’ Kant offers resources for developing an alternative notion of person. This is the notion of a person as an embodied entity endowed with unity of apperception and with the capacity for moral accountability. This is not, however, the notion of person Kant himself endorses at the end of his criticism of the paralogism of personhood. Rather, there Kant claims that the rationalist notion of person that was the target of his criticism can remain, albeit on behalf of the practical rather than the theoretical use of reason. Longuenesse offers an analysis of this surprising about-face on Kant’s part, comparing it to his own pre-critical attempt to derive a notion of person from the mere analysis of our use of ‘I’ in ‘I think’ and ‘I do.’ She then argues that in preserving a rationalist notion of person for practical use, Kant is prey to his own paralogism, which she calls a paralogism of pure practical reason. Finally, she suggests that the empirical notion of person one might have expected to emerge from Kant’s criticism of the third Paralogism can be seen as an ancestor of the notion of person Harry Frankfurt offers in "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." Kant’s concept differs from Frankfurt’s, however, in offering a criterion for the second-order assessment of one’s first-order volition: the categorical imperative of morality.

In Chapter 10, "We Are Not Alone: A Place for Animals in Kant’s Ethics," Barbara Herman presents a novel account of Kant’s position on our moral obligations with respect to animals. Specifically, Herman argues that one should not read the famous "Amphiboly" passage from the Metaphysics of Morals — where Kant speaks directly to our duties to self with respect to animals — as arguing that we should avoid violent and cruel treatment of animals only out of moral concern for maintaining the affective system that supports us in our duties to human beings. Instead, she draws on the way in which we come to know ourselves as embodied beings in and through the life activity of animals, through our experience of their movements and activities as well as of their pain and suffering, and that this experience helps us to understand more fully what is at stake in paying attention to one’s ends. Herman takes this connection to animal life and bodies to suggest reading the Amphiboly argument as follows: if there were no duty with respect to animals, if we were allowed to ignore and override their pain, in permitting cruelty to animals, we would thereby treat our natural unconditional response to suffering as, morally speaking, conditional, which runs counter to basic tenets of Kant’s moral theory.

In "The Dynamism of Reason in Kant and Hegel," the eleventh chapter in the volume, Robert Pippin focuses on the sense in which Kant, especially and increasingly in (and around) the third Critique, came to understand that reason not only is responsible for a spontaneous activity, but also is a purposive, self-actualizing, self-determining, and teleologically structured faculty of agents. It thus has an irreducible practical and productive character. This fits with Kant’s characterization of reason as having needs and desires, that is, a fundamentally conative character involving a practical necessity (even if its desires can never be fully satisfied theoretically). Pippin then shows that Hegel picks up on and develops these features of reason further throughout his own philosophical system (including the Science of Logic) by understanding reason’s understanding of itself and its own activity as fundamentally developmental even as he introduces non-Kantian elements, such as a dynamic notion of determinate negation.

The volume concludes with "Once Again: The End of All Things," by Karl Ameriks. "The End of All Things,"
is, appropriately enough, one of the last things that Kant published, and it is still generally regarded as one of his most mysterious works. Ameriks argues that, like many of the late essays, it has a complex political—theological subtext, while also being one of the few pieces in which Kant tries to connect, all at once, the implications of his notions of the person and agency with his complex metaphysical doctrines of the transcendental ideality of time and the idea of the highest good. Ameriks focuses especially on the importance of moral considerations to determine the most appropriate attitude toward our ultimate fate and on the sense in which we ought to take our immortality. In raising these issues, Ameriks provides a fitting concluding perspective on what is still alive in the final phase of Kant’s publications. <>

The French Revolution and Social Democracy: The Transmission of History and Its Political Uses in Germany and Austria, 1889–1934 by Jean-Numa Ducange, translated by David Broder [Historical Materialism Book, Brill, 9789004331389]

Beyond France’s own national historiography, the French Revolution was a fundamental point of reference for the nineteenth-century socialist movement. As Jean-Numa Ducange tells us, while Karl Marx never wrote his planned history of the Revolution, from the 1880s the German and Austrian social-democrats did embark on such a project. This was an important moment for both Marxism and the historiography of the French Revolution. Yet it has not previously been the object of any overall study. The French Revolution and Social Democracy studies both the social-democratic readings of the foundational revolutionary event, and the place of this history in militant culture, as seen in sources from party educational materials, to leaflets and workers’ calendars.


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Excerpt: When the original version of this book was published in 2012, it had been a long time since any history of pre-Nazi-era German social democracy had come out in French. The exception was the general history by Jacques-Pierre Gougeon, a work whose rather debatable approach above all emphasised the SPD’s turn toward a reformist, managerialist politics. This dearth of publications is symptomatic of the near-disappearance of academic studies of the history of the workers’ movement and Marxism in the French-speaking countries. The decline has been just as manifest in Germany, after the spectacular output in such histories in both East and West Germany from the 1960s to the 1980s – a period
in which the origins of ‘state socialism’ in the East, and the SPD’s compatibility with the market in the West, were both hot topics. In Italy, in the Netherlands with the publications linked to the IISG, and indeed in the Soviet Union, ‘Second International Marxism’ was long a central focus. But after 1990, the crisis of the various forms of organised socialist politics and the end of the ‘Soviet century’ brought a striking collapse in research connected to this subject. English-speaking academia is a more varied terrain and one also less directly affected by the crisis of Marxism (for want of mass political forces that identified with it), and in this context the publication of such works has developed in a different direction. More recently, especially thanks to the Historical Materialism Book Series, we have seen the appearance of numerous important works on this period in Marxism’s history.

The ‘Kautskyan Moment’

The first thing to underline this small renewal is the historiographical importance of the ‘Kautskyan moment’, for instance in Lars Lih’s work on the history of Russian social democracy. Here is not the right place to examine in detail the works of the ‘pope of German social-democracy’: the book that you are about to read gives sufficient account of those. But what is worth underlining in advance is the limits of the critique of ‘Kautskyism’. A whole Marxist tradition from Karl Korsch to Michel Löwy has cast Kautsky as the emblem of a cold and dogmatic orthodoxy, a scientistic positivism more akin to Darwinism than to Marxism. For these authors, ‘Kautskyism’ opened the way to the worst kind of regression in the workers’ movement, legitimising both the reformist social democracy that maintained a formal relationship with Marxism and the worst kind of statist tendencies, ultimately culminating in Stalin. There are thus countless texts which compare the pre-1914 vulgate of the Second International, forged by Kautsky, and the vulgate of the Stalinised Third International.

This critique doubtless has certain merits and a certain coherence, especially if we remain at the level of theoretical considerations. But it has also had the effect of repressing major historical realities. First among these is the fact that, even simply at the level of theoretical debates, the incontestably dogmatic aspects of so-called ‘Second International Marxism’ are rooted only in Kautsky’s very most mechanical texts. Yet any attentive reader of reviews like Die Neue Zeit or DerKampf will see what a high level some of the contributions reached, far less dogmatic than in the 1920s when the Comintern set up barriers to most debate.

From historians’ point of view, the radical critique of ‘Kautskyism’ also delegitimised research into the impressive mass movement embodied by the various expressions of German and Austrian social democracy. Two reviews of the French edition of the present work underlined this consideration. In the pages of Actuel Marx the Marxist historian of the French Revolution Claude Mazauric remarked that: ‘As an admiring reader of this strong dissertation, I can only repeat the powerful conclusion reached by the late Henri Lefebvre: the worst historical tragedy of the twentieth century was the collapse of the German workers’ movement and the destruction of its social organisations in the German-speaking countries, where they were deliberately uprooted. To that we can compare the weight of the unrelenting counter-revolution which is still on our heels’. Similarly, in a piece on this book appearing in the American Historical Review, the historian of Germany and Eastern Europe William W. Hagen concluded that: ‘It is another reminder of what was lost to Adolf Hitler’s national socialism’. To delve into this universe is to return to the origins of the first great emancipation project in Western Europe before it was finally destroyed by Nazism.

Questions of Method

This is not to say that our approach is some sort of exercise in rehabilitation, which would not make much sense. Rather, this study seeks to pursue a certain tradition in writing the history of Marxism, as embodied by various figures from Georges Haupt to Eric Hobsbawm, and illustrated in the Englishspeaking world by contributions like those by Robert Stuart or Andrew Bonnell which do not only concern themselves with intellectual history. From this point of view, The French Revolution and Social Democracy seeks to get to grips with a number of methodological problems in order to set out an
approach attentive to the full historical density of Marxism and the workers' movement.

In reaction against an overly ideological history – the history of the Internationals, or what we might call the ‘history of conference resolutions’ – numerous historians have instead focused on a working-class history ‘from below’. This has incontestable merits. But in its conviction that all theoretical reflection begins and ends with ‘theorists’ it also tends to reject any remotely serious study of the content of the texts, which are reduced to debates among intellectuals cut off from the mass of their respective political organisations’ militants and sympathisers. We instead consider it essential to combine a sustained interest in the content of the texts with a history more centred on grassroots actors. That, at least, was one of the ambitions that inspired us as we wrote this book.

As we mounted our study of the ‘popularisation’ of Marxism, we did not find a dogmatic and fossilised universe. It is by no means certain that Kautsky’s cold, rigid, vulgarised Marxism was as grey and dismal as his later interpreters would make out. Pamphlets, leaflets, propaganda, historical myths – especially the ambiguous myth around the cult of the French Revolution – fed an ‘alternative culture’, full of elements that could mobilise hundreds of thousands of militants and leave an enduring mark on their class mentality. Yet this popularisation – sometimes limited to the mention of a few historical dates in a workers’ calendar, a bibliographical reference or even a few short citations from Kautsky – can never be entirely separated from doctrinal debate and the political developments of the moment. The Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917 are a striking example of this, for the theoretical debates surrounding these revolutionary processes were in part linked to the propaganda and the idea of revolution that coloured the party at all levels.

Our other methodological concern was to write an ‘entangled history’ [histoire croisée] set in relation with ‘cultural transfers’ – concepts elaborated by Michel Espagne and Michel Werner that are relatively influential in writing on Franco-German history. Particularly important in this regard, when we look at the historiography of the French Revolution specifically, was a focus on the reception of the great classics of our period, from Jean Jaurès’s Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française to Albert Mathiez’s works.

Karl Kautsky and Franz Mehring in fact did little to get to grips with the tradition of French Marxist studies of the Revolution. They often mentioned the existence of such a tradition but never studied it in detail. The interpretation that the liberal historian François Furet terms a ‘Jacobin-Marxist reading’ – a term he uses pejoratively, but which can also be used in a descriptive sense – deeply influenced the whole Left’s reading of 1789, mixing republicanism and socialism. And it is interesting to note that one of the key problems for Kautsky and other Marxists in this period was precisely this connection between Marxism and republicanism, which they considered rather suspect. For a whole leftwing tradition in nineteenth-century France, Robespierre was to be admired, but in Germany and Austria he was the object of a great deal of suspicion.

Knocking down the walls that surround a tradition strongly rooted in French national heritage allows us to show what Jaurès owed to his engagement with Germany and the SPD. What might, reading these pages, seem rather obvious, was not in fact evident in any historiographical summary at the time. Many saw Jaurès as such a genius that he could be considered self-sufficient, or almost that. In reality, Jaurès’s whole complex relationship with revolution and Marxism passed precisely byway of this engagement. The study of transnational networks has become widespread in recent years and could doubtless shed light on other aspects not sufficiently addressed in the present volume, especially by means of a history of mobility, migration and points of contact between different nationalities.

Historical Time and Historical Narration
On many points, our work is only a first approach, which could well be developed further. The first such point concerns the ‘grand narratives’ that entered into crisis in the 1980s. Our concern was to understand how a coherent narrative of the past was first constructed in a left-wing political organisation. We did this by basing ourselves on
an example that everyone at the time considered an undeniable moment of rupture: 1789. While in 1880s France the history of the Revolution was known through the transmission of memory and the mediation of the school classroom – which meant that the socialists’ task was more a matter of making the republican reading more left-wing, rather than defining a new one – in Germany and Austria, it was an opposition party that defined an interpretation of the French Revolution through thinkers like Kautsky. In fact, in this period the German social-democrats’ interpretation counted for far more than the French socialists’ did, including with regard to events of universal significance like the ‘Great French Revolution’. For instance, the narrative advanced by Kautsky was translated and read across much of Mitteleuropa, unlike Jaurès’s. Any synthesis on the history of the French Revolution must integrate this fact, even if it above all focuses on French authors.

The second point concerns other political camps. The narrative on revolutions elaborated by the social-democrats cannot be reduced to questions internal to the history of socialism, or indeed ones linked to the historiography of the French Revolution. At the end of the nineteenth century, even the spectacular progress German social democracy had made was unable to mask the rising strength of anti-Semitism and pan-Germanism, which violently attacked the internationalism of the workers’ movement. As we know, behind its façade of internationalism a ‘negative integration’ led social democracy to become increasingly assimilated to Wilhelmine Germany, ultimately explaining its turn to support the war effort in 1914. It would be naïve to imagine that the German social-democrats had no attachment to Germany, even in their narratives on the French Revolution. Even in the 1880s, one of the works that was most read by SPD militants, Wilhelm Blos’s study, admired the popular action of the Revolution but was sharply critical of the brutality of revolutionary change. One of the best-informed readers of the Revolution, Heinrich Cunow – author of a remarkable, pioneering study on the press during the Revolution – placed his knowledge in service of the ‘ideas of 1914’ and German imperialism.

Nonetheless, the social-democratic milieu can hardly be totally identified with the other political camps (‘lager’) on this point, for its internationalist outlook remained one of its constant specificities, even after it had temporarily been overwhelmed by the war. The SPD’s lasting attachment to the French revolutionary tradition – sometimes challenged but never rejected – was absolutely exceptional in the Germany of the time, and thus in itself constituted an exceptional historical reality. In this lay the seeds of a great clash between different conceptions of the world and of history, which would end tragically with the triumph of Nazism. There was, indeed, another modernity, ‘another Germany’, whose bearings and points of reference included the French Revolution – not because it was French, but because it had opened up a new period in human history. Significantly, traces of this outlook remained up till 1933: the experience of 1914–18 did not totally break the pre-1914 Marxist narrative on the French Revolution. The ‘Kautskyist’ narrative did not disappear from SPD ranks, and it would also inspire the vulgate defined in the USSR, which in turn coloured the young KPD. It was here that Kautskyism doubtless had something of a family relationship with the Third International, contributing to the development of its dogmas, but also spreading an internationalist culture that championed the French revolutionary moment in opposition to a narrow and aggressive chauvinism.

We still need further reflection on temporalities in Marxism, a theme only timidly outlined in this book. Julian Wright has provided us with brilliant elaborations on this point. The socialists’ timeframe was that of history with a capital H. History occupied a decisive place. In our own time, when what François Hartog calls ‘presentism’ – the obsession with immediacy and imminent action, at the expense of an analysis of past experience – has taken over wide layers of activist politics, it is difficult to understand what this sense of History might have represented in a different era. From this point of view, the Marxism of the 1880s–1930s was a transitional phase that made up part of a regime of temporality in which the past conditioned action or was even its precondition. This shows the limits of the ‘Second International Marxism’ that
assumed a rigid approach toward the relationship between past, present, and future, and which denied legitimacy to non-linear narratives. At the same time, it also shows the incontestable pedagogical force of this Marxism, a confident and powerful Marxism that contributed to the best elements of the history of the workers' movement and the ‘workers’ dream’ that it once represented.

Some will ask if this debate, however interesting it may be, is perhaps a little dated. From the perspective of contemporary French politics, that is certainly not the case. Understanding the Marxist reading of the French Revolution allows us to grasp the specific political culture of the workers’ movement and the Left in France even in our own time, in which references to republicanism remain a hot topic. Even in the 2017 election we saw the former Socialist Party left-winger Jean-Luc Mélenchon draw inspiration from Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe at the same time as he remained viscerally attached to Robespierre and Jaurès. Much has changed, but it is striking that even in July 2017, the same Robespierre and Jaurès so disdained by a certain Marxist tradition elaborated in the Germany of the 1880s–1930s were being cited by new France Insoumise MPs in the Assemblée Nationale ... A few days later, the hard right French weekly Le Point ran the title ‘From Robespierre to Mélenchon, a History of Political Violence’, in order to attack the bloodshed that must come with any attempt to challenge the social and political order.

Political conditions have developed and changed considerably. But the fact remains that these figures so connected to the memory of the Revolution, and so passionately debated in the late nineteenth century, are still evoked in contemporary political debate. This gives us yet further reason to plunge into this history and these debates on the foundational moment that was the Revolution of 1789–93.

The different interpretations of the French Revolution have sparked a wide variety of debates. But despite the breadth of this discussion – or perhaps for this very reason – it is over four decades since the last historiographical synthesis of this subject, in the very country in which the Revolution was born. The last French-language attempt to capture this phenomenon as a whole, at least at the European level, was the short but richly-textured work by Alice Gérard.3 In the wake of the 1989 bicentenary, some of the many conferences that were held internationally provided an opportunity to revisit the past decades of disputes, which had still far from died out. This made it possible to measure the long-term importance of the questions raised by the French Revolution, across a great variety of national contexts. In the months immediately prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, there were numerous events in the two Germanies to mark the bicentenary of the French Revolution, which themselves built on a great tradition. If the French Revolution had long been negatively perceived in the context of Germany’s own national construction process, from the 1950s onward the study of the Revolution moved toward new perspectives. A similar shift could be observed in Austria, where there were few pre-World War II studies on the Revolution. Yet while these new publications heralded important changes, it is also true that the France of 1789 had already previously had at least some favourable echoes in the German-speaking countries, ever since the very outset of the revolutionary process. Countering the conservative historiography that long predominated in these countries, over the nineteenth century a tradition developed that saw the French Revolution in positive terms. The early working-class organisations in fact embraced the legacy of the Revolution. Understanding this is fundamental to understanding social democracy’s complex relationship with reference points connected to the French Revolution.

The Historiography of the French Revolution

While publications on this subject doubtless slowed in the period following the bicentenary, the historiography of interpretations of the Revolution seems to be enjoying a certain resurgence. Multiple recent publications are testament to this. The French translation of Eric Hobsbawm’s essay Echoes of the Marseillaise: Two Centuries Look Back on the French Revolution,6 and soon after this the republication of François Furet’s writings upon the tenth anniversary of his death, attest to the renewed interest in the
great divides that have persisted throughout decades of historiography on the Revolution.7

Equally, numerous representatives of the ‘classical’ school of historiography have revisited earlier debates in which they were themselves protagonists. In his 1789, L’héritage et la mémoire, Michel Vovelle spoke of his own role in the historiography and in the debates that surrounded the bicentenary;8 more recently, Claude Mazauric has published a study that built on his series of research projects regarding the complex relationship between Marxism and the Marxist-derived interpretations of the revolutionary sequence of 1789–99. In 2008, the journal widely known as the point of reference for studies of the 1770–1820 period devoted an issue to the centenary of the Société des Études Robespierristes founded by Albert Mathiez. Resulting from a conference, this issue of Annales historiques de la Révolution française provided an opportunity to look back on a century of scholarly activity and its controversies.

Two centuries on, studies of the Revolution have largely reoriented their focus toward other themes. Yet some of the problematics that emerged from the classical tradition continue to be interrogated. The synthesis of a certain Jacobin legacy blended with Marxist influences, this current long made particular reference to Jean Jaurès. It considered his Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française a pioneering work in driving a new socio-economic reading of the Revolution. The staging of major recent conferences shows the continued interest in two among these themes in particular. The first is the origins of the French Revolution, the question of the bourgeoisie’s place within it, and the way in which a ‘bourgeois order’ constituted itself in the wake of the Revolution. The very concept of a ‘bourgeois revolution’ continues to be interrogated, albeit according to different approaches. Recently, the position that this question assumed at the heart of the discussions in numerous nineteenth-and twentieth-century historiographical debates has itself been the subject of research. The second theme concerns the so-called Terror of 1793–4, probably the most controversial episode of the Revolution’s history. Rich works explaining the Terror’s institutional, social and cultural mechanisms are today seeking to revisit the previously-established interpretations. These latter had long depended on a historiographical conjuncture in which debates corresponded to the critique or championing of the political models that emerged from the revolutionary process.

These two themes have been debated ever since the Revolution itself. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels interrogated them repeatedly throughout their work, as they laid the bases of a new interpretation of history in the 1840s. In their era, almost every political current or sensibility had written its own history of what was termed the ‘Great Revolution’. Marx never had time to write his planned history of the Revolution. Yet inspired by some of his comments, the German and Austrian social-democrats would from the 1880s onward embark on writing their own histories. This took multiple forms, and it was also connected to their attempts to disseminate the new materialist conception of history as widely as possible through the different structures that they created. This was an important moment for both Marxism and the traditions of the interpretation of the French Revolution. Yet it has not previously been the object of any overall study. The most critical works on this tradition, like those by François Furet, instead limited themselves to a valorisation of the young Marx as against his later evolution. They ‘jumped’ directly from Marx to so-called ‘Leninist’ interpretations; and in so doing, they overlooked several decades of historiography.

Indeed, social-democratic writing on the French Revolution remains relatively overlooked. Even the one work that does address this topic does not investigate the particularities of the ‘Great Revolution’ of 1789–99, and the process through which it unfolded. Yet more decisively, it stops in 1905, at the beginning of the most important period of social-democratic books and articles on the Revolution; it moreover does very little to analyse the exchanges that took place, and especially the debates with the French. A collective work that appeared in the DDR upon the bicentenary also contained numerous contributions on this subject, but they were often limited to examining the content of intellectual debates, and rarely interrogated the relationship between these
discussions and the rest of the party’s production. The specificity of social-democratic writings — meaning not only the interpretations that they advanced over several decades, but also the accompanying mechanisms for transmitting a reading of history at all levels of the party — has not thus far been brought into frame. But new studies on European social democracy and socialism do today allow us to gain such a perspective.

The Historiography of the Social-Democratic Parties
Social democracy was long an important historiographical battleground, contested by the historians of the two German states. Their rivalry was symbolised by the existence of two publishers called Dietz, with both the West and East German versions claiming the inheritance of their pre-1933 social-democratic forebear. The countless debates on questions that ranged from the SPD’s level of integration into Wilhelmian society to the place that Marxist reference points occupied in its ranks, contributed to a better understanding of the SPD’s history, particularly with regard to the pre-1914 period. In Austria, the SPÖ’s history was much less of a Cold War battleground, but it was also the focus of major studies, in particular those revolving around the question of ‘Austro-Marxism’ and the specificities of the ‘third way’ advanced by Austrian social democracy. Over the last two decades, the interest in these subjects has dried up, even though some reviews and institutes in the German-speaking countries continue to publish on these themes.

We can see a similar shift in France, albeit in different conditions. The generation of Germanists and historians of the workers’ movement that paid such attention to the German and Austrian social-democratic parties was part of a historiographical context in which the Second International, and the European space it encompassed, constituted an important object of study. This context revolved around a heritage that was discussed and contested by different political sensibilities, and first of all the socialists and communists. With the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the opening of the archives on what was called ‘the international communist movement’, there was a sharp turn toward the study of communism and its various national ramifications. In a different context, albeit one with certain historiographical similarities, part of the historical writing on contemporary Germany has turned toward the history of the DDR — itself an exceptional case of ‘the opening of the archives’. Telling in this regard is the fact that the last overall study of the history of German social democracy was published some fifteen years ago.

Nonetheless, research on communism in Europe has sometimes crossed paths with research on socialism, and on closer inspection we see that the pre-1914 history of the parties of the Second International continues to drive research. Such studies are certainly lesser in extent than they were thirty years ago, and they are also different in orientation; as the title of L’histoire des gauches en France suggests, they largely focus on the national context. If the history of internationalism was still investigated from time to time in the 1990s, this nonetheless marked a striking contrast with the Histoire générale du socialisme of 1972–8, which spanned every continent.

Over time, political-theoretical history has gradually taken on board the lessons of social history. Historians moved away from research too narrowly focused on political debates, and which lacked an analysis of the lived experience of organisations and their members. We will add that the end of the passions that had once surrounded the history of the Second International, compounded by the considerable weakening of left-wing parties’ references to the past, today encourages a rather calmer re-exploration of the content of these debates. This allows a greater emphasis on contextualisation, without setting up any particular anathemas. Pursuing a historiographical dynamic that looks beyond the ‘party’s organisational and ideological representations, and particularly its leading bodies’, and moreover criticising the history conveyed by parties themselves, numerous historians have instead turned their attentions to political and militant practices. This attests to a renewed interest in studying social-democratic and socialist organisations.
What we need, then, is to grasp – insofar as the sources allow – the diversity of party structures and their modes of functioning, the way in which militants participated in them, and the ideas that these latter assimilated through the vulgate that was preached at the various different levels of the organisation. Here, we consider the mass of documentation that social democracy itself produced, and especially the short pamphlets and transcriptions of lectures, which are also the object of research by other historians. We moreover seek to understand how the reference to Marxism – however rudimentary it may have been – was constructed in a political organisation, and how militants themselves adopted and referred to this reference. In this context, divergences over immediate political and strategic questions also encompassed fields that were less directly affected by conjunctural fluctuations, such as culture. History, too, is affected by these imperatives, especially when it comes to a major event like the French Revolution: indeed, historical reference points and their teaching occupied an important place in the ‘alternative culture’ that the social-democrats sought to project. From this point of view, works regarding other organisations, at the hinge between sociology and history, can also help us to understand how a militant memory of the French Revolution was constituted, and provide elements for understanding how a historical reference point is transmitted and spread through a political organisation across different eras.

The histoire croisée of Socialisms

In parallel to those works which seek a better understanding of the concrete reality of the social-democratic parties, other research has studied the transfer of ideas from one country to another, throughout the history of socialism. The history of the French Revolution – an event of global or at least European significance, and one which the different currents of the nineteenth-century workers’ movement characterised as the ‘Great Revolution’ – offers a unique example of transnational history in the context of party-political organisations which had along-standing internationalist identity.

Recent developments in histoire croisée allow us to think through the complex interactions that traversed European socialism’s debates over the course of several decades. They have built on earlier works on ‘cultural transfers’, which had already given orientation to several studies that allowed a break with past histories framed only in terms of the national context. Reviewing the use of such transfers, Werner and Zimmermann note that ‘the original situations and those which result from the transfer are grasped by way of stable and supposedly known national reference points, for example “German” or “French” historiography’. The pair instead suggest that we should go beyond the limits that some such research has encountered, and imagine ‘theoretical frameworks and methodological tools that allow us to address phenomena of interaction, implying a plurality of directions and a multiplicity of effects. We think that “entanglement” [croisement] affords us the possibility of thinking through these configurations’. If our interests concern the history of socialisms and social-democracy, such a framework allows us to grasp the complex confrontation between the different histories of the ‘Great Revolution’ in Germany and France. Histoire croisée allows us to grasp why a work is or is not discussed, or brought into a debate or not; it opens up routes to understanding the decision to translate a book at a given moment, or else the refusal to do so, given the interactions between these two situations when many works appeared simultaneously. This ‘means analysing the resistances, the inertias, the changes – of trajectories, of forms, of contents’. Histoire croisée thus enjoins us to expand the historiography of the French Revolution into other national and linguistic spaces; not only in terms of how these events were received abroad, but also in terms of understanding the way in which the Revolution was gradually defined by way of debates and exchanges that took place at the international level.

So here we will take a dual perspective, which seeks to integrate new breakthroughs in approaches to the history of social democracy, and also to give account of these organisations’ own intellectual production. The relationship between the two has rarely been examined, and yet it is at the heart of the social-democratic conception of history. Rarely is anything published by chance:
Theoretical production is closely connected to political activity, and the concern to get to grips with the history of the French Revolution is often the reflection of wider preoccupations. It is in this sense that it is worth relating the great debates that cut through political parties and events, shaking up the organisation’s everyday existence. Writing cannot simply be reduced to the publication of scholarly tomes: history based on research, together with the consultation or even translation of sources, cannot be put on the same plane as occasional rhetorical references to 1789 in political articles or speeches, which were much more dependent on the immediate conjuncture. Hence the importance of referring to different types of document, if we are to understand this writing and its intended audience. Such documents range from a short popularising pamphlet to a detailed article, a book review in a newspaper or a theoretical journal, or an erudite, scholarly work mainly designed for intellectual discussion ... up to the transcription of talks given at meetings.

The fact that the party combined such different types of writing also poses the question of how they were circulated. When we look at an organisation like the SPD, which was very hierarchically organised and had multiple ramifications, we have to mount a specific study of the different kinds of document through which it constructed a vulgate of the history of the French Revolution. We should measure the reception and the influence of a given work not only in terms of its initial readership, which was sometimes rather low, but also in terms of the different ways in which it was reproduced and summarised. A book could serve as the basis for a pamphlet that popularised its arguments, which could in turn be a starting point for the detailed curriculums published by party training schools where thousands of intermediate cadres would acquire abasic understanding, and then themselves be tasked with transmitting these points of reference. In this volume, we will accord a special place to something that is often left aside in studies on social democracy: namely the ‘second-fiddle’ figures, often read en masse, who wrote for a thousands-strong readership in papers, workers’ almanacs and historical calendars. There is also a constant attention toward the tensions between a transmission of history that was necessarily affected by the twists and turns of political life, and the parallel attempts to lay down an interpretative tradition that sought to ‘establish a continuity with a suitable historic past’, which necessarily implied ‘norms of behaviour by repetition’. One of the central focuses of our study will be the developments in history-writing that evolved in consequence of the social-democratic parties’ changing imperatives.

Taking this perspective, we will study in some detail the works of certain prominent social-democrats such as Karl Kautsky, but also, to a lesser extent, Heinrich Cunow and Hermann Wendel. All of these wrote about the French Revolution, to varying degrees, across almost this whole period. For Kautsky, this meant devoting considerable attention to the history of the Revolution in specific connection with the political events of his own time. For others, this was a matter of asserting themselves as ‘specialists’ on the revolutionary period by way of their published writings. Learning his trade in Austria before he became the leading theorist of the SPD, Kautsky embodies the links between Germany and Austria in the history of social democracy. So even if the original link between Austria and the French Revolution was weaker, the relations that the German party entertained with Austrian social democracy nonetheless imply a common study of this history. Austrian publications offer an interesting example of the reception of publications from Germany, at the same time as they exhibit some of their own differences and particularities with regard to the history of the Revolution.

What Revolution?
In social-democratic works and educational documents, the Revolution was most often framed in terms of the years from 1789 to 1799, or 1789 to 1794. Before 1914, at least, they also displayed a specific interest for Babeuf. In Germany, there was an obvious line of continuity with Napoleon, who in a certain sense pursued the work of the Revolution and spread it to German territories, introducing major reforms across part of the country. The Napoleonic occupation of Germany – which could itself be the object of a specific study – will here
be addressed insofar as it occasionally made up part of the history of the ‘Great Revolution’, especially upon the centenary of the Wars of Liberation of 1813.

The history of the French Revolution had its own specific characteristics. This was not, a priori, a history that directly challenged the party, in the manner of the history of the First International, whose instrumental use has been well-documented. Referring to this French past did not imply the same strategic consequences as did a national revolution like 1848, many of whose actors remained alive even into the early twentieth century. Indeed, what interests us here is the specificity of the French Revolution. At the same time, we will not completely overlook the other revolutionary processes of the nineteenth century, insofar as they themselves had a certain resonance with 1789–99. The revolutions of 1830 and 1848, and even more so the 1871 Paris Commune, posed questions that often cross paths with the heritage of the French Revolution of 1789. But the specific debates that they raised would be the object of a different study.

From Legalisation to Suppression, 1889–1934
The chronological span of this work begins with the writings that appeared on the centenary of 1789. This anniversary came a few months after the lifting of the proscriptions which had previously weighed down on the German party, and 1889 was also the year of the creation of the Second International, within which the SPD would henceforth occupy a central position.

In our preamble, we will note how a particular reading gradually developed from the 1840s to the 1880s, which would lay the foundations of the contributions that appeared from the 1889 centenary onward. How did the social-democrats see the French Revolution upon its hundredth anniversary? After studying the centenary itself, we will direct particular attention to the debates that drove discussions of revolutionary history, and especially Eduard Bernstein’s ‘revision’ and his confrontation with Jaurès’s conceptions. Then we will turn to the period of the 1905 Russian Revolution, which put more immediately contemporary analogies back on the agenda.

The period running from the 1906 Congress to the Russian Revolution of 1917 constituted an important moment for the social-democracies. It was in these years that they became powerful and structured parties. In this perspective, we will seek to understand the place that the French Revolution occupied in their existing frameworks, and the conditions in which new works on this subject were published, in an era where local and national party education bodies became widespread and defined detailed programmes. How, then, was the historical reference to the French Revolution inscribed in the militant’s everyday environment? Who were the readers, the teachers, who ‘ferried across’ this revolutionary history?

Profound changes took place between the Russian Revolution and the suppression of the social-democratic parties in 1933–4. The Russian and German revolutions of 1917–23, the test of power, as well as the competition on the Left from the communists, multiplied analogies with the Terror, as did the political polarisation of the late 1920s. Having passed from being a counter-society to a party that managed the affairs of state, social democracy saw important upheavals. How could the history of the French Revolution now be written, within such a changed context? Given this complex mix of new elements and continuities, it is quite proper that our analysis should extend across more than four decades of history.

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Social-democratic movements around Europe claimed the legacy of what was called the ‘Great Revolution’; in Austria and above all in Germany they sought better to understand this history in order to shed light on the problems posed in their own time. As they gained strength in their respective countries, they were the first parties in the history of the European Left to write and circulate a developed interpretation of the French Revolution inspired by Marxism. From their book reviews of academic studies to their popular dailies, the history of the ‘Great Revolution’ gradually took up a place at the heart of social-democratic identity. In the period between Marx’s first notes and Jaurès’s Histoire socialiste, when French socialism was greatly divided and still only
raising its head, the social-democrats picked up Marx’s project of writing a history of the ‘Great Revolution’. For the centenary, Karl Kautsky wrote a handbook based on a series of articles, which sought to grasp the ‘class contradictions’ during the French Revolution. For his part, Wilhelm Blos wrote a ‘people’s history’ of these events, destined to become one of the most widely read historical works among the pre-1914 social-democrats. Faced with the German-speaking countries’ own lack of revolutionary experience, they celebrated the 1789 Revolution, which though considered bourgeois was also the only one that had fulfilled the tasks of its era. It was a bourgeois revolution that had exerted a powerful influence in Germany, especially by way of the Napoleonic occupation; and it also heralded fresh struggles. The social-democrats saw themselves as heirs to the demands of the ‘Great Revolution’, and regularly expressed as much by way of the foundational link between the centenary of the French Revolution and the creation of the Second International in 1889. In Germany and Austria unlike in France, there was no heritage to pursue, no socialism that could be inscribed within a political regime like the Republic; rather, up till 1914 it was necessary to establish anarcho-socialist-democratic history and fight an authoritarian regime. In the absence of any victorious revolution in their own nations, the social-democrats drew on French points of reference.

From Bebel’s speech to Kautsky’s study, via the vulgate in the pages of the Arbeiter-Kalender, the French Revolution made up part of militants’ surroundings. One of the most telling examples was the presence of the 1793 Constitution in the commentary on the Erfurt Programme, a pamphlet distributed in hundreds of thousands of copies. While the historiography of the French Revolution is sometimes addressed in light of the content of historians or theorists’ writings alone — texts whose real impact is difficult to measure — the social-democratic example allows us to see how a work seeking to link theoretical imperatives to political practice was considered a tool available to party militants and supporters, such that it could become the basis of the vulgate expounded in newspapers and educational schools. In this sense, the teaching of this history is an important indicator; it was considered in the context of Bildung, itself a much-prioritised element of social-democratic organisation at least up till the early 1920s. When we study the variety of sources offered by the social-democratic parties and the way in which historical references appeared therein, we can get a measure of the specificity of this output, even beyond its content. From Die Neue Zeit’s theoretical elaboration to the regular presence of revolutionary dates in the workers’ calendars, we can reconstruct a whole hierarchy within which ‘smugglers’ and intermediaries played an essential role.

The Uses and Transmission of History
The study of the production of a vulgate on the history of the ‘Great Revolution’ shows that it does not constitute a linear project, a dogma, which was defined in some moment and then simply reproduced in various media and structures. Indeed, there is always a tension between the concern to establish an interpretative tradition that can be assimilated by militants, and the transmission of this same history at the scale of several decades, which closely depends on the developments and the debates of the present moment. The production — the writing — of history should itself be seen in the context of the social and political upheavals which traversed this whole period. For example, the Russian Revolution of 1905 marked an important turning point because even beyond all the reflection and analogies which it sparked in that moment, it drove a revived interest for the history of the French Revolution at all levels of the party, including in the party schools. It helped give a stimulus to numerous publications on this theme, the most important and ambitious of which was Heinrich Cunow’s Die revolutionäre Zeitungsliteratur, whose contents — extracts of which were reproduced in the party press — were a fundamental basis for the ‘itinerant professors’ in charge of transmitting the history of the French Revolution. We should note that while most of this output was transferred from Germany into Austria, this latter had its own specificities, such as the greater attention in the Austrian context to the women’s movement during the French Revolution: Emma Adler published a book on the women of the Revolution while Adelheid Popp...
regularly referred to the first women's clubs of 1789–94.

Attentive to social and economic structures, the social-democratic historiography regularly revisited the ‘terrorist’ episode in the Revolution. From the outset, the social-democrats' relationship with the revolutionary model of 1789 and – even more so – 1793 was never unambiguous. Even in 1889, Wilhelm Blas had distanced himself from any kind of radical rupture. In countries where a historiography hostile to the legacy of the French Revolution had dominated for decades, the social-democrats, instead, sought to celebrate this inheritance. But the problem of the use of revolutionary violence demonstrated the tensions running through their analyses. Indeed, from 1889 to 1934 this was one of the clearest continuities: on all but a handful of occasions, Robespierre and Robespierrianism appeared in a negative light, in this sense greatly differing from a whole section of the left-wing historiography in France. Greeting Gustav Tridon's work and his rehabilitation of Hébert, in the 1870s Wilhelm Liebknecht began a long tradition of celebrating this latter as a popular tribune, or even a precursor of the workers' movement. The social-democrats laid claim not to the 'over-the-top' aspects of the Hébertists, but their supposed role as spokesmen of the Parisian people. Up till World War I the vulgate would spread a positive image of Hébert and also Marat, described as a visionary with an early understanding of the class struggle ... and who, we could add, had died too early to have had any relation to the state Terror. Again in his case, what was foregrounded was his role as a spokesman of the popular masses, through the connection with his paper l'Ami du peuple. The repeated expressions of hostility to the state Terror – identified with Robespierre personally – should be understood in line with the social-democrats' wider orientations. While repressive measures could be justified as a means of politics in the era of the bourgeois revolutions, they were now unthinkable: a constant of the social-democrats' writings was the superiority of party organisation over disorderly revolutionary violence. The great bourgeois revolution in France must be followed by another, future, superior proletarian revolution, which would stand in continuity with Marx and the German philosophers of the 1840s. From the 1880s this superiority was embodied in the Social-Democratic Party, a united party which contrasted with the fragmentation and weakness of its French Socialist counterparts, who were unworthy of their past. The gradual strengthening and growing rootedness of the socialdemocratic parties within a context of legality provided the space for such an interpretation.

From the Atlantic to the Urals ... While it was closely linked to a German-speaking context, we can also situate this social-democratic history in a wider, European movement. The turn of the century saw the birth of the social and economic history of the French Revolution. From France to Russia, from the 'Great Revolution' of 1789 to the failure of the 1905 Russian Revolution, similar questions appeared across Karl Kautsky and Heinrich Cunow's works just like those of Jean Jaurès and Peter Kropotkin. All of them sought to write a social history – particularly of the popular layers – that broke with the dominant political history. Jaurès's echo in Germany and Austria, and perhaps even more so Kropotkin's, spoke to common objectives as well as real differences. Jaurès's rarely-studied engagement with the foreign historiography deserves a specific study. From the first volumes of his Histoire socialiste, the German social-democrats debated his conceptions; exchanges with Eduard Bernstein, Franz Mehring and Karl Kautsky compelled Jaurès to add greater definition to his conception of a socialism that pursued the ideals of the French Revolution, while the socialists hostile to him sought to use the German orthodoxy to promote an alternative reading of the Revolution itself. This was an entangled history, and also the history of the refusal to introduce certain theoretical choices: as with most works on the French Revolution in this era, political stakes were closely intertwined with historiographical debates. Yet among other things, what was new here was the international aspect of this engagement.

As for a large part of the European Left, existing political models and interpretations of revolutionary history were challenged by the Russian Revolution of 1917, which took place in the
same sequence as the German and Austrian revolutions. There was a proliferation of analogies – and they were negative. The idea that the Bolsheviks constituted a minority of conspirators among an uncontrolled mass seemed to the social-democrats to be a sterile imitation of the Jacobin past, especially since the protagonists themselves laid claim to such a comparison. A rejection of revolutionary violence present already in the 1880s took on its full meaning after 1917 with the appearance of Soviet communism. The question of violence and its structural rejection in the German and Austrian social-democratic movements is still to be examined more closely and would merit a specific study. This latter would necessarily have to pay attention to their reading of the revolutions of the past.

The shattering of internationalism, the difficult postwar relations between France and Germany, and the parties’ participation in the business of state – and, at the same time, the emergence of new models like the USA – combined to diminish the place that went to the history of the French Revolution. Party educationalists concentrated on more technical aspects of immediate political questions. Heinrich Cunow well illustrates this profound change: his only specific publication on the French Revolution in these years was a short essay on the cafés during the Revolution ... as compared to a 400-page book in the prewar period. In this same era, particularly in the 1920s, new contacts were established with intellectuals and some academics, within the framework of Franco-German rapprochement. It was in this context that the first real discussion on Robespierre took place in the social-democratic reviews, echoing Albert Mathiez’s works. This latter’s attention for German studies and then the publication, after his sudden death in 1932, of his notes criticising the social-democrat Hermann Wendel’s book on Danton, were the origin of an international debate on Robespierre and the Montagnards, in a moment in which fresh attention for academic historiography now allowed Jaurès’s interpretation to be introduced into Germany, as against the largely critical reception of two decades previously.

The winding paths of Die Klassengegensätze von 89, the first handbook elaborated within the context of the 1880s establishment of a Germanophone Marxism, are themselves testament to these evolutions from the 1880s to the early 1930s. The effectiveness of this paperback volume, which may seem to have been outmoded by the distance of time and the many new pieces of research, should itself be considered as an object of historical inquiry. A study of its international reception before 1914 would probably show that across two decades a great number of socialists and social-democrats in many countries were introduced to the history of the French Revolution by this short textbook. This was, of course, true in Austria, where it served as the basis for one of the first talks with slides, but so, too, in central and eastern Europe, where it was translated into numerous languages corresponding to the Second International’s sphere of influence; the several Russian editions in particular indicate a wide readership. It was from the 1920s, when the vulgate based on this pamphlet was no longer in use in the party that had elaborated it, that its posterity became clearest: the communists of the KPD, often leaders who had come from the pre-war SPD, partly themselves adopted it. Kautsky’s summary, which had so irritated Engels when it was first published in Die Neue Zeit, would spread beyond the boundaries of the German-speaking world and help train the cadres and militants of the international workers’ movement. It was republished in the USSR during the first years of the new regime. The first translations of works on the French Revolution in China began after the ‘May 1919 Movement’. In response to the conservatives who had translated Gustav Le Bon’s The Crowd, there were translations of Kropotkin (in 1930–1) and the books from the social-democratic centenary by Blos (1929) and Kautsky (1930), with which the Chinese Communists educated themselves in the history of the French Revolution. One of the last translations of Die Klassengegensätze von 1789 took place in Japan in the mid-1950s. In 1939, upon the 150th anniversary of 1789, a French textbook for Soviet schools copied word-for-word some of the passages on the sans-culottes and the revolutionary government from Kautsky’s book ... without citing the author. The name of this ‘renegade’ had become unmentionable; yet the theoretical matrix that he had carried forth remained a fundamental
reference point, not long before the official interpretation of the French Revolution was established in 1941.

These examples all testify to the international influence of the German social-democrat’s textbook among thousands of cadres and militants, including in communist ranks, long beyond the golden age of the Second International. In France itself, where there was an abundance of textbooks and histories of the French Revolution, we still find traces of Kautsky’s La lutte des classes en France en 1789 in the PCF party school in 1936, even though it had not been reissued since 1901. There was no Marxist textbook on the French Revolution, while both the style and the substance of Jaurès’s vast fresco were difficult to get to grips with. The social-democratic vulgate thus remained somewhat effective, even beyond its initial readership. Such an example well illustrates how in a certain theoretical and political conjuncture, a foreign historiography can represent a point of reference on a historical event where there is no similar work in the country concerned.

Other continuities remain to be studied. In exile in Paris and then Zürich, Hermann Wendel sought in his own way to celebrate 1789 and its values. In 1936 he published a book on the history of La Marseillaise since its origins, mainly in France but also in Germany. If this song was the anthem of the Third Republic, it was also the ‘hymn of the freedom of peoples’, especially the Germans forced to flee Nazi Germany. As in his final articles in Die Gesellschaft where he had spoken of the ‘primitive utopia’ of the Ventôse decrees, in a German political journal published in Paris called Tage-Buch he compared Robespierre’s terror to National Socialism. If Wendel celebrated 1789, he rejected a 1793 which in his view corresponded to the terrors of the regimes of the present.

The Legacy for Germany, and the two Germanies

A close study of the transmission of these references over the long term allows us to understand the link between the social-democratic tradition and the emergence of a renewed study of the French Revolution in the two German states and to a lesser degree in Austria. This historiography particularly focused on studying the Jacobins in the German-speaking countries, in the manner of Walter Grab’s studies published in West Germany and Helmut Reinalter in Austria. While none of the pre-1934 social-democratic books were republished, we can find an example like the extracts from Cunow’s Die revolutionäre Zeitungsliteratur reprinted in an anthology compiled by Walter Grab, next to some of the most famous historians of the time. As for the DDR, where historians laid claim to their Marxist ancestry, the works by Kautsky and Cunow were sometimes cited, though never republished. Conversely, the reappropriation of Franz Mehring – who from the late 1950s became something of a national hero in the DDR – allowed the reintroduction of his early-twentieth-century texts, as part of a vast endeavour to publish his collected works. A proper understanding of the exaltation of the Spartakist leaders’ works in the DDR would demand a close study of the careers of certain ‘smugglers’ who had earned their spurs in the SPD schools before 1914 before joining the KPD in the 1920s and then finding themselves in positions of responsibility after the collapse of Nazism.

Hermann Duncker, a teacher at the SPD and then KPD party school, would up to his death in 1960 occupy important educational functions in the DDR;10 for his part, the DDR’s first president Wilhelm Pieck had himself been an ‘itinerant teacher’ for the SPD before 1914. Walter Markov, one of the most important historians of the French Revolution, whose work extended across the whole history of the DDR, had been steeped in French revolutionary history during the Weimar Republic. The German historiography’s contribution to the knowledge of France’s popular movements can also beset in a longer-term picture. The first collection of source documents on the sans-culottes, prior to the publication of Albert Soboul’s thesis, came out in East Berlin in 1957, in collaboration with Walter Markov. Thus the space of the Franco-German debate between socialists and social-democrats, underway since the beginning of the twentieth century, persisted notwithstanding the very different conditions.

The history of the French Revolution has long been influenced by Marxism, or at least engaged in debate with methods and concepts that came from
Marxism. The social-democratic work on this subject was a unique moment of this history. It allows us to measure the extent to which the history of the Revolution was elaborated in function of the imperatives weighing down on those who endeavoured to write it. Within an entangled history of the historiography of one of the most controversial events facing historical scholarship, the social-democrats’ output deserved to be restored to its proper place. <>

Intelligent Materialism: Essays on Hegel and Dialectics by Evald Ilyenkov, edited and translated by Evgeni V. Pavlov [Historical Materialism Book Series, Brill, 9789004232471]

Evald Ilyenkov is a unique figure among the many interesting (and many dull) Soviet thinkers that have recently been introduced to English-speaking readers. Although a thoroughly academic philosopher (both in the choice of his subject matter and in his institutional locations), Ilyenkov’s ideas are presented in a manner that one does not often find among academics. Texts selected for this collection are not the only texts dedicated to Hegel and dialectics but they are representative of Ilyenkov’s main themes and interests. It is hoped that this collection will continue to draw interest to the Soviet engagement with Hegel and dialectics.

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Excerpt: Editor’s Note:

Evald Ilyenkov is a unique figure among the many interesting Soviet thinkers that have recently been introduced to English-speaking readers. Although a thoroughly academic philosopher (both in the choice of his subject matter and in his institutional locations), Ilyenkov’s ideas are presented in a manner that one does not often find among academics. It is not uncommon to find academic texts, especially academic texts on Hegel, to be pretentiously hermetic. Philosophical books written in a semi-comprehensible insider language abound, while any attempt at clarity or accessibility is relegated to secondary efforts of ‘popular’ presentations. Turgid idiom rules to the point that clear and lucid philosophical works stand out as peculiar. Suspicion that clarity equals vulgarity persists.

To those accustomed to the heavy prose of Hegelian literature, Ilyenkov’s style will inevitably appear as a simplified and popularised presentation of the master’s mysterious and impenetrable prose. However, Ilyenkov does not aim to simplify or water down any of the ideas under consideration. His philosophical style is born not of dry academic sterility but of passionate engagement with both the ideas and the public that must be made to understand them. The ultimate audience of even Ilyenkov’s most complex and academic works is still the general educated public that can and therefore will understand even the most complex ideas if they are presented in an intelligible manner (which, after all, is the ultimate public duty of the philosophical class).

Texts selected for this collection are not the only texts dedicated to Hegel and dialectics but they are representative of Ilyenkov’s main themes and interests. It is hoped that this collection will continue to draw interest to the Soviet engagement with Hegel and dialectics. We leave this collection without a detailed introduction since there are already a number of excellent works on Ilyenkov and Soviet philosophy.
The opening short text – ‘Hegel Today’ ['Gegel' i sovremennost'] – was published in Pravda on 23 August 1970. It is the least academic essay of this collection as it was intended for general consumption by millions of Soviet citizens who read Pravda on a daily basis. The text was dedicated to the anniversary of Hegel’s birth and once again demonstrated the role of the philosopher in Soviet philosophy.

The second essay deals with Ilyenkov’s analysis of the subject matter of logic via his discussion of the same in Hegel. ‘Hegel and the Problem of the Subject Matter of Logic’ ['Gegel' i problema predmeta logiki'] was published in a collection called Filosofia Gegelia i sovremennost [Hegel’s Philosophy Today], edited by L.N. Suvorov. This theme proved to be an important one in Ilyenkov’s engagement with Hegel’s logic and overall philosophical contribution. Ilyenkov moves away from the usual Soviet approach that paid lip service to Hegel’s role as a ‘predecessor’ of Marx (and Lenin), and offers a theoretical analysis of Hegel’s overall philosophical approach to reality.

The third essay, like many other works by Ilyenkov, was not published during his lifetime. It first appeared in Russian in a collection of his works in 1991. ‘The Peak, the End and the New Life of Dialectics (Hegel and the End of Old Philosophy)’ [Vershina, konez i novaya zhizn’ dialektiki (Gegel’ i konez staroi filosofii)] was published in Filosofia i kultura [Philosophy and Culture]. The original occasion for this piece was the 1974 Hegel Congress that took place in Moscow, but Ilyenkov was unable to take part in it. This essay was his contribution to the discussion of Hegel that was taking place at the Congress.

The fourth essay – ‘Hegel’s Science of Logic’ [Nauka logiki] – first appeared in 2000 in a collection called Evald Ilyenkov’s Philosophy Revisited, edited by Vesa Oittinen. Like the previous piece, it was never published during Ilyenkov’s lifetime. According to the curator of Ilyenkov’s archive, Alexei Novokhatko, this text was originally intended as an introduction to the new translation of Hegel’s Science of Logic. However, the translation came out with an introduction by another Soviet philosopher (Mark Rozental).


The sixth essay – ‘The Problem of the Ideal in Philosophy’ [Problema ideal’noi filosofii] – was published in two parts in Voprosy filosofii. This essay should not be confused with a later text – ‘The Problem of the Ideal’ [Problema ideal’nogo] – also published in Voprosy filosofii in two parts, but in 1979. This latter essay is an edited version of a larger text by late Ilyenkov – ‘Dialectics of the Ideal’ – originally written for a collection but rejected during editorial process. ‘Dialectics of the Ideal’ has now been translated into English by Alex Levant.

The seventh essay – ‘Understanding of the Abstract and the Concrete in Dialectics and Formal Logic’ [Ponimanie abstraktnogo i konkretnogo v dialekticheskoi i formalnoi logike] – was published in an edited volume Dialektika i logika:formy myshleniia [Dialectics and Logic: Forms of Thinking].

The eighth essay – ‘The Logical and the Historical’ [Logicheskoie i istoricheskoie] – was published in a collection Voprosy dialekticheskogo materializma: elementy dialektiki [The problems of dialectical materialism. The elements of dialectics].


The final essay of the collection – ‘Materialism Is Militant and Therefore Dialectical’ [Materializm voinstvuyushchii – znachit dialekticheskii] – was published in a popular Party magazine Kommunist. This essay was dedicated to the anniversary of the publication of Lenin’s 1909 book that became, in the Soviet period, one of the most read and cited books of philosophy – Materialism and Empiriocriticism.
Essays selected for this short collection represent only a small fraction of Ilyenkov’s engagement with Hegel and dialectics. We hope that these pieces will allow English-speaking readers to sample the sort of philosophical conversations that Ilyenkov and many of his friends and students were attempting to have while under the close supervision of the official diamat (‘dialectical materialism’) orthodoxy. Evgeni V. Pavlov

Hegel Today
The 200th anniversary of the birth of the great German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is celebrated by the scientific communities of all the civilised countries. And it is understandable—it is as impossible to imagine the history of thinking, the history of logic, without Hegel as it is to imagine the development of music without Beethoven or of world literature without Leo Tolstoy or Dostoevsky.

A lot separates us from the epoch captured in Hegel’s thought and expressed in the concepts of his system, but the heated debates about his scientific heritage are still going on. Dialectics, the history of which is forever connected with the name of Hegel, is too valuable a weapon in the battle of ideas to remain without a true master in this conflict, and each of the parties in philosophy fighting today for influence over the minds of people wants to make Hegel its ally, and use his status and authority for its own purposes.

Neo-Hegelians and neopositivists, Catholic Thomists and existentialists, phenomenologists and irrationalists—all present their own interpretations of Hegel’s thought, all draw their own image of the thinker, all add their own light and shadows to his jubilee portrait. Among the many voices in this choir we find some that belong to the latest confused revisionists who by some misunderstanding nonetheless consider themselves Marxists.

Just for this reason the issue of the genuine relationship between Marxist philosophy and Hegel deserves today to be part of the most serious and principled conversation. Not the least important reason for such a conversation is the circumstance that the correct relationship to Hegel, established by Marx, Engels and Lenin, organically belongs to the content of Marxism itself, and the critical-materialist assimilation of Hegel’s dialectics remains one of the necessary conditions for a genuinely deep and serious Marxist education. ‘It is impossible completely to understand Marx’s Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel’s Logic’—categorically stated Lenin.

Marx, Engels, and Lenin clearly demonstrated Hegel’s historical merits as well as the historically conditioned limitations of his scientific discoveries. They clearly indicated limitations that Hegel’s dialectics was unable to overcome, identified those illusions the power of which, despite the mental powers of their creator, it was unable to defeat. The greatness of Hegel, as well as his limitations, is found in the fact that he fully exhausted the possibility of developing dialectics on the basis of idealism, or within the axioms that idealism imposes on scientific thinking. Hegel, regardless of his intentions, clearly demonstrated that idealism leads thought into the fatal dead ends and dooms even the dialectically enlightened and the best dialectically trained thought to aimless gyrations around itself, to the infinite procedure of ‘self-expression’, ‘self-consciousness’ and peculiar—logical—narcissism. For Hegel (and that is why he is the most consistent and non-hypocritical idealist who, by being one, solved the mystery of any other prematurely born and unfinished idealism) ‘being’—external and existing independently from thinking of the real world of nature and history—inevitably turns into an occasion for demonstrating the art of logic, into a bottomless reservoir of ‘examples’ that again and again confirm the same elementary schemes and categories of logic. As young Marx sarcastically pointed out, the ‘matter of logic’ blocks for Hegel the ‘logic of matter’, and therefore both the Prussian monarch and the louse in his head could for an idealist-dialectician serve equally well as ‘examples’ of ‘in-and-for-itself existing unity’.

Both a boiling teapot and the French Revolution are transformed in such an approach into simple ‘examples’ that illustrate the relationship between the categories of quality and quantity. But this way any empirical reality that catches our eye—no matter how bad and accidental it is—is transformed here into an ‘external embodiment of
absolute reason’, into one of the necessary dialectical steps of its self-discernment ...

This defect of Hegel’s dialectics is directly connected with idealism thanks to which dialectics is easily transformed into a method of subtle and logically sophisticated apologetics of everything existing.

After Hegel’s achievement, we can only go forward in one direction – toward materialism, toward a clear understanding of the fact that all dialectical schemes and categories, discerned in thinking by Hegel, are not at all some original principles of activity and work of the ‘pure spirit’. They are but reflected in the collective consciousness of humanity in the process of its centuries-long development and tested by practice universal forms and laws of the development of the external, existing outside and independently of thinking, real world. It is this materialist rethinking of Hegel’s dialectics that Marx and Engels initiated in the 1840s; and this materialistically rethought Hegelian dialectics played for them the role of the logic of development of the materialist worldview.

The transformation of Hegel’s dialectics into a genuine scientific method of thinking could only be achieved one way – in the process of its application to the study of material conditions of the life of society. This approach, used by Marx and Engels, remains even today the only possible escape from the darkness of ‘vulgar Hegelianism’ into the light of the scientific understanding of both the external world and of thinking itself. Any other approach condemns even dialectically literate thinking to the fruitless spinning around in the enchanted circle of canonical categories. The orthodox Hegelianism therefore plays no independent role in the consequent struggle of ideas, but always aligns itself with this or that party and, in the end, it always ‘legitimises’ the social forces that appear to be winning. In the beginning of the 1930s, German neo-Hegelians were logically justifying the doctrine of Fascism, presenting it as the latest embodiment of the ‘absolute spirit’. With the same success, neoHegelians direct their philosophy into the channel of ultra-Left sentiments. Here we can mention the work of Herbert Marcuse who with brilliant logical art justifies the anarchist hooligans like Cohn-Bendit and his gang ... Dialectical categories are transformed by this misuse into the terms of the language of demagoguery and apologetics. The analogous use of dialectical categories can be easily identified in the writings of the official ‘dialecticians’ of the contemporary ‘Chinese school’.

The rational kernel of Hegel’s philosophy – dialectics as logic and contemporary materialism’s theory of scientific cognition – lives these days only in one form, in its Marxist-Leninist interpretation and application to the study of the external world, to the scientific reflection on the objective laws of the material world and the perspectives of its development that takes place independently of human wishes and desires. It is precisely in his development of dialectics – with all of its distortions and omissions, with all of its abstractness and ‘husk’ in which the process of its maturation took place – that Hegel guaranteed his own immortality in the grateful memory of humanity, in the pantheon of its heroes of the spirit. Dialectics is what connects Hegel with our times, with the eternal living spirit of progress and the teaching of Marx-Engels-Lenin that reflects the fundamental tendencies of progress.

‘Dialectics is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism. This is the “aspect” of the matter (it is not “an aspect” but the essence of the matter) to which Plekhanov, not to speak of other Marxists, paid no attention’ – emphasised Lenin. Hegel’s dialectics, in Lenin’s evaluation, is first and foremost the deepest and the most comprehensive ‘generalisation of the history of thought’ – although only exclusively of thought – and herein lies its limited idealist nature.

Lenin insistently recommended that contemporary natural scientists ‘arrange for the systematic study of Hegelian dialectics from a materialist point of view’ and expressed his conviction that they will ‘find (if they know how to seek, and if we learn how to help them) in Hegelian dialectics, materialistically interpreted, a series of answers to the philosophical problems that are being raised by the revolution in natural science and which make the intellectual admirers of bourgeois fashion
“stumble” into reaction'. And this advice still holds: even today the materialistically understood Hegel is the best remedy against fashionable ailments of the neopositivist and existentialist types.

Hegel could not answer the question that is fatal to every kind of idealism: where does thinking come from and what determines its dialectical development? When he announced that thinking was ‘divine’, Hegel simply avoided the question, presented the lack of answer to this question as the only philosophical ‘answer’. The very same move, even if without the vain use of God’s name, is made by contemporary opponents of the theory of reflection in the Yugoslav journal Praxis. When they announce that ‘dialecics’ is exclusively the form of ‘self-consciousness of human subjectivity’, they present dialectics as an externally unconditioned (‘absolute’) scheme of all cognition and practice. Hegel ‘deified’ after all not just something, but precisely dialectics of human thinking. But, having mystified this dialectics, Hegel still explored it in the real history of thinking, describing and systematising its forms and laws with depth and thoroughness that would not be matched by any professional logicians before or after him. It is here that we find the colossal advantage of Hegel’s Science of Logic over the pretentious ‘logic of science’ constructed by neopositivists. While complaining about Hegel, neopositivists absolutise (deify) known forms of thinking in the most shameless manner. Only what they deify here are the weak postulates and axioms of formal logic. And they want the whole of contemporary scientific thought to pray to this anaemic ‘god’.

Bourgeois philosophy borrowed from Hegel everything mortal and passing – his mysticism of divine thinking, his propensity to compromise with the powers that be, with ‘god’ and religion; and, conversely, for more than a hundred years it has been trying to discredit anything in his philosophy that had led or is leading toward Marxism, declaring it ‘old-fashioned’ and ‘harmful’. Schopenhauer and Kantians started this with their slogan ‘Back to Kant!’ with the help of liberals like Rudolph Haym and early positivists like Eugen Dühring and Eduard Bernstein. They all saw in Hegel, first and foremost, ‘Marx’s spiritual father’ and therefore they tried to ‘exterminate that evil in the embryo’. This general motif is still determining the entire attitude of bourgeois philosophy toward Hegel. In essence bourgeois philosophy long ago rejected one of its greatest sons and everything valuable and progressive that he had to offer. Today it values only his weaknesses, the very same weaknesses that he shares with the rest of idealism. But there is nothing specifically Hegelian in these weaknesses and therefore Hegel as a concrete thinker disappears completely.

The genuine, concrete and living Hegel with all of his contradictions belongs today only to Marxism that managed to draw all the conclusions from his dialectics.

Today, the only living Hegel is the one who is materialistically rethought and critically assimilated. This Hegel belongs to the future. His immortality is found in the fact that his philosophy was one of the most important theoretical sources of Marxism-Leninism. <>

The Last Utopians: Four Late Nineteenth-Century Visionaries and Their Legacy by Michael Robertson [Princeton University Press, 9780691154169]

The entertaining story of four utopian writers—Edward Bellamy, William Morris, Edward Carpenter, and Charlotte Perkins Gilman—and their continuing influence today

For readers reared on the dystopian visions of Nineteen Eighty-Four and The Handmaid’s Tale, the idea of a perfect society may sound more sinister than enticing. In this lively literary history of a time before "Orwellian" entered the cultural lexicon, Michael Robertson reintroduces us to a vital strain of utopianism that seized the imaginations of late nineteenth-century American and British writers.

The Last Utopians delves into the biographies of four key figures--Edward Bellamy, William Morris, Edward Carpenter, and Charlotte Perkins Gilman—who lived during an extraordinary period of literary and social experimentation. The publication of Bellamy’s Looking Backward in 1888 opened the floodgates of an unprecedented wave of utopian writing. Morris, the Arts and Crafts pioneer, was a committed socialist whose News
from Nowhere envisions a workers' Arcadia. Carpenter boldly argued that homosexuals constitute a utopian vanguard. Gilman, a women's rights activist and the author of "The Yellow Wallpaper," wrote numerous utopian fictions, including Herland, a visionary tale of an all-female society.

These writers, Robertson shows, shared a belief in radical equality, imagining an end to class and gender hierarchies and envisioning new forms of familial and romantic relationships. They held liberal religious beliefs about a universal spirit uniting humanity. They believed in social transformation through nonviolent means and were committed to living a simple life rooted in a restored natural world. And their legacy remains with us today, as Robertson describes in entertaining firsthand accounts of contemporary utopianism, ranging from Occupy Wall Street to a Radical Faerie retreat.

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Excerpt: One summer recently, I made a twelve-hour trip from London—by train, ferry, bus, and dinghy—to Erraid, a tiny island in the Scottish Hebrides that lies close by the southwestern tip of the larger island of Mull. Erraid was uninhabited until the late nineteenth century, when the Stevenson engineering firm-built cottages for the families of the lighthouse keepers. Robert Louis Stevenson, son and nephew of the firm's proprietors, stayed in one of the cottages before he wrote Kidnapped, his adventure tale set partly on Erraid. That summer I too stayed in one of the Stevensons' cottages, its thick, beautifully crafted granite walls apparently impervious to the passage of time. The cottages now house a commune—or, to use the currently preferred term, an intentional community. I had come to stay for a week with the dozen people who inhabit the island year-round, supporting themselves in frugal but comfortable fashion by gardening, fishing, tending livestock, making candles, and hosting visitors attracted by the chance to experience a Hebridean version of the simple life.

Each morning the residents and guests gathered in one of the cottages to choose work assignments for the day: splitting firewood, cleaning out the chicken coop, painting a room, cooking a meal. Most days, I chose gardening. The residents are justifiably proud of their gardens, which occupy several large, handsome plots just in front of the cottages, surrounded by low stone walls built by the lighthouse keepers to shelter their crops from grazing sheep and the harsh North Atlantic winds. That summer the weather was glorious, and every time that I stood up from thinning carrots or picking beans and looked about, I gasped involuntarily at the beautiful vista before me. Directly across was the sparsely settled Ross of Mull, its deep-green, sheep-flecked meadows rising toward rugged Ben More mountain. To the northeast, a mile across the sound, I could just make out the squat, dark tower of the abbey of Iona, the island where Christianity first established a foothold in Britain in the sixth century. There was seldom anyone in sight. I could hear nothing but the bleating of sheep, the cry of gulls, and occasionally—if the wind was right—the bell of the ferry between Iona and Mull. Bathed in sunshine, breathing in the cool, salt-tinged air, I couldn't help saying to myself, "This is utopia!"

I knew that, temporarily intoxicated by the salt air and the stunning landscape, I was being foolishly extravagant. I was well aware of the term's etymology: coined by Thomas More in his book of the same name, utopia is a Latin term for no place. I'd come to Erraid not on an impossible quest to find perfection but because of my interest in the legacy of four once-celebrated writers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—a group that I'd come to think of as the "last utopians."

These four writers—Edward Bellamy, William Morris, Edward Carpenter, and Charlotte Perkins...
Gilman—lived and wrote near the end of an extraordinary period of utopian writing and social experimentation in Great Britain and the United States, dating from roughly 1825 to 1915. Not coincidentally, this period also represented the triumph of industrial capitalism in both countries. Nineteenth-century utopian writers and the founders of the era’s communal experiments were among the intellectuals both impressed and dismayed by the era’s changes: the disruption of traditional modes of agricultural and artisan labor; the rapid spread of new technologies and the accompanying damage to the natural environment; the immense growth of urban centers; the vast, and vastly unequal, increases in wealth; the alterations to traditional family structures and conceptions of women’s and men’s roles in the world. The disruptions of industrial capitalism provoked a variety of intellectual and cultural responses, ranging from Karl Marx’s predictions of capitalism’s imminent demise to British philosopher Herbert Spencer’s embrace of the era’s savage inequalities as a necessary feature of an ultimately beneficent social evolution. Along with Marxian socialism and Spencerian social theory, utopianism provided hundreds of thousands of people in nineteenth-century Britain and the U.S. with a means of understanding and responding to the era’s wrenching changes.

Marx was particularly aware of the parallels between his own intellectual project and those of utopian writers. He devoted a section of the Communist Manifesto to the earliest and most influential of the nineteenth-century utopian writers, Claude Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, and Robert Owen, labeling them as "utopian" socialists. He intended the epithet to be dismissive; these writers had failed to attain the insight of Marx, a "scientific" socialist. Despite Marx’s disdain, two of the utopian socialists, Fourier and Owen, were enormously influential in the U.S. and U.K. Both writers imagined that society could be transformed through the establishment of utopian communities, and over a period of three decades, beginning in the 1820s, dozens of Fourierist and Owenite communities were founded in North America and Great Britain.

The enthusiasm for utopian social experiments waned after midcentury, but during the later nineteenth century, utopian literature—both works of social theory and imaginative romances in the vein of More’s Utopia—proliferated. The self-taught economist Henry George’s visionary Progress and Poverty (1879) was wildly popular in both the U.S. and U.K., while novelists such as Marie Howland and John Maenie published utopian fictions that reached small but appreciative audiences.

Then, in 1888, the American novelist Edward Bellamy published Looking Backward 2000-1887, narrated by a Bostonian who time-travels 113 years into a utopian future. Before the book’s publication, Bellamy was a midlist author of cleverly plotted romances with a reputation as a lightweight Nathaniel Hawthorne. By the early 1890s, Looking Backward had become one of the most successful books of the century, and Bellamy was transformed from a reclusive New England writer into an international political figure. The novel was hailed as the Uncle Tom’s Cabin of the industrial era, a comparison meant to suggest that just as Harriet Beecher Stowe’s novel had inflamed the movement against slavery and helped spark the Civil War, Looking Backward might well inspire a massive reaction against industrial capitalism. The book in fact sparked a short-lived political movement in the U.S. with the now-unfortunate name of Nationalism, intended to signify its appeal to all sectors of society. In the U.K., where Looking Backward was also widely popular, it was embraced by Fabians and others on the political left. Moreover, the book initiated a vogue for utopian fiction that continued for the next twenty-five years. More English-language utopian works—over five hundred—were published in the quarter-century following the appearance of Bellamy’s novel than had appeared in the nearly four hundred years between More and Bellamy. Many of these novels directly proclaimed their debt to Bellamy, with titles such as Looking Forward, Looking Further Forward, and Looking Further Backward.

Most of these derivative fictions reached few readers and quickly receded into well-deserved obscurity. However, one of the novels written as a
direct response to *Looking Backward* was widely read when it appeared in book form in 1891 and has come to be regarded as one of the classics of the genre, equal in its imaginative power to Thomas More’s foundational text: William Morris’s *News from Nowhere*. Morris is the most widely known of the last utopians, although relatively few of the millions of people around the world who recognize his name are aware that he wrote a utopian novel. They know him as a designer of high-end interiors and an inspiration for the Arts and Crafts movement, a sort of Victorian lifestyle guru. During his lifetime, however, Morris was as famous for his poetry and his politics as for his design work. During the 1880s and 1890s, Morris became one of England’s most prominent socialists, and he regarded his designs, his narrative poetry, and his prose fictions as elements of an integrated utopian vision. From childhood, Morris had been influenced by Victorian medievalism—the renewed interest, after centuries of neglect, in Gothic architecture, medieval craftsmanship, and tales of courtly love and adventure. In his maturity, he transformed what was often a nostalgic turning aside from present realities into a critique of capitalism, and he imagined a postindustrial future in which unalienated artisans produced works of beauty while living in a pastoral landscape where labor was indistinguishable from play.

Morris’s vision of a de-urbanized future was shared by his acquaintance Edward Carpenter, who was active in the same socialist circles as Morris. Carpenter was England’s most famous apostle of the simple life, a British Thoreau whose essays and poems denouncing middle-class civilization led George Bernard Shaw to nickname him the Noble Savage. Morris was more sympathetic to Carpenter. An 1884 chat about Carpenter’s farm in rural Derbyshire caused Morris to ruminate, “I listened with longing heart to his account of his patch of ground, seven acres: he says that he and his fellow can almost live on it; they grow their own wheat, and send flowers and fruit to Chesterfield and Sheffield markets: all that sounds very agreeable to me.” Morris admired not only Carpenter’s nearly self-sufficient rural life but also his partnership with his “fellow,” Albert Fearnehough, a former Sheffield ironworker. Morris had no idea that the two men were lovers.

In the 1880s, when the word “homosexual” was unknown in the English language, Carpenter’s relationships with a succession of young working-class men were widely admired in his socialist circles as models of cross-class friendships. Carpenter took advantage of the era’s conceptual fuzziness about human sexuality to write a series of increasingly bold essays and books about what he called “homogenic love” and the “intermediate sex.” He united his contemporaries’ interest in utopian projections of the future with his own armchair-anthropologist theorizing to argue that men-loving men and women-loving women constituted the utopian vanguard. In the long-distant past, he believed, members of the intermediate sex had rejected the conventional roles of warrior, hunter, and gatherer and served instead as tribal healers, priests, artists, and visionaries, making possible the advance of civilization. Now, with nineteenth-century civilization breaking down into antagonistic camps—class against class, men against women—people of the intermediate sex could again lead humanity into a transformed future. From their positions on the margins of patriarchal capitalist society, homogenic lovers were uniquely suited to model more fluid and equal human relationships and to envision an egalitarian future.

On her first visit to England in 1896, Charlotte Perkins Gilman sought out both Morris and Carpenter. Now best known as author of the protofeminist short story *The Yellow Wallpaper,* Gilman’s reputation at the time rested on her work as an activist and speaker in the Nationalist political movement inspired by Bellamy’s *Looking Backward.* Following her return from England, she wrote a series of utopian fictions that climaxed with the novel *Herland* (1915). Like Bellamy’s *Looking Backward,* Gilman’s novel portrays an egalitarian socialist society; in accord with Morris’s and Carpenter’s ideas, it depicts a largely agrarian land in which people in comfortable tunics and leggings enjoy days of agreeable labor punctuated by vegetarian meals and wholesome recreations. Unlike the utopias of her male colleagues, however, Gilman’s is populated...
exclusively by women, who reproduce by parthenogenesis, bearing only daughters. Carpenter imagined that homogenic lovers could serve as the utopian vanguard; Gilman believed that emancipated women would play that role.

Edward Bellamy, William Morris, Edward Carpenter, and Charlotte Perkins Gilman are the subjects of The Last Utopians, which is centered on the flourishing of utopian literature and social thought in the United States and Great Britain from the mid-1880s until 1915. These four figures were not the only significant utopian writers of the period, and, although there were intellectual and personal connections among them, they did not think of themselves as a group. I focus on them because their particular strain of utopianism seems to me not only admirable but also relevant to our current political moment.

Utopia is notoriously difficult to define. In the popular imagination it signifies an impossibly perfect ideal—no place. But Thomas More’s neologism is a bilingual pun; utopia is a Latinization not only of the Greek ou-topos, no place, but also of eu-topos, good place. Utopia is not necessarily a fantasy of perfection, and utopianism can be seen simply as the envisioning of a transformed, better world, which is how I use the term in this book. That’s a capacious definition. What unites the utopianism of Bellamy, Morris, Carpenter, and Gilman are four distinctive elements.

First, all four writers were democratic socialists. Appalled by the widespread poverty and misery engendered by late nineteenth-century industrial capitalism, they sought an egalitarian alternative. Their socialism had distinctive Anglo-American roots. With the exception of Morris, they had little use for Marx. They derived their socialist ideals from a mix of Robert Owen’s and Charles Fourier’s communal theorizing, Emersonian Transcendentalism, Walt Whitman’s proclamations of comradeship, Thomas Carlyle’s reactionary anti-capitalism, and John Ruskin’s aesthetically influenced attacks on the industrial system. Marx and Engels frequently expressed their exasperation at what they saw as the naïve and unscientific nature of this strain of late nineteenth-century British and American socialism, but it was the dominant form of socialist thought at the time.

Late nineteenth-century socialism’s roots in Owenite and Fourierist communalism led many adherents, including the last utopians, to a critique of the patriarchal family that was rare among orthodox Marxists, most of whom believed that radicalizing the working class was paramount. The last utopians emphasized women’s economic independence as crucial to a transformed society, and they imagined new forms of family and community! Edward Bellamy was the sole exception. He was unable to conceive that women’s economic equality might disrupt the insular privacy of the Victorian family. All the others imagined—and in the case of Carpenter and Gilman, lived out—alternatives to lifelong heterosexual marriage. Their works portray a future marked by gender equality and by fluid, alternative forms of romance, family, and community.

All four writers’ egalitarianism was shaped by their religious ideas, which constitute the last utopians’ third distinctive feature. At heart they were religious more than political thinkers. Bellamy, Carpenter, and Gilman espoused a post-Christian liberal spirituality that was common among late nineteenth-century cultural progressives, while Morris, who claimed to be an atheist, referred frequently to the “religion of socialism.” Influenced by a distinctly nineteenth-century combination of Christian evangelicalism, Transcendentalism, and concepts borrowed from Asian religions, the last utopians believed that the self was an illusion, that everyone was united in an inclusive divine spirit, and that humanity was destined to realize its oneness. They believed that the utopian future would be achieved through a nonviolent process of mass conversion, not violent proletarian revolution. Political change depended on a process of evangelization. Even Morris, a self-proclaimed atheist and revolutionary, typically spent his Sundays on London street corners addressing passersby, offering them the good news of socialism.

Their immanentist theology—that is, the idea that the divine is immanent within humanity and nature—influenced the last of their distinctive
ideas: their reverence for the natural world and commitment to elements of a Thoreauvian simple life. Carpenter, who threw over successive careers as a Cambridge don and a university extension lecturer for life as a market gardener in rural Derbyshire, served as a model. He built a small writing hut for himself, with one side open to the elements, and claimed that he could not have written "Towards Democracy," his breakthrough poetic masterwork, had he not composed it in the open air. Only Bellamy, who preferred not to venture outside the Massachusetts house where he had lived since birth, was immune to the call of the wild. Yet even Bellamy shared the last utopians’ concern for the environment, their horror at the unchecked and increasingly severe pollution of late nineteenth-century cities.

The Last Utopians is the first book to focus on the distinctive strain of transatlantic utopianism found within the work of Bellamy, Morris, Carpenter, Gilman, and their contemporary heirs. It builds on a substantial body of work on late nineteenth-century utopianism. Much of this work, influenced by the idea that the United States itself represents a utopian experiment, deals exclusively with American writers: Bellamy and Gilman, certainly, but also William Dean Howells, who wrote a trilogy of novels about the imaginary land of Altruria, along with many lesser-known contemporaries. Other works take a transnational perspective on the period, placing American and British writers in dialogue, as I do here. All these books reflect the vibrancy of the academic field of utopian studies, which has flourished over the past forty years, with its own professional associations and journals.

The Last Utopians differs from earlier studies in significant ways. First, it brings Edward Carpenter into the discussion of utopianism. Carpenter never wrote a utopian novel, so he has been excluded from studies that focus on narrative fiction. I take inspiration from Dohra Ahmad, who in Landscapes of Hope analyzes political manifestos alongside novels, and who defines as utopian any text that "proposes and enacts a better order that does not yet exist anywhere." Using this criterion, much of Carpenter’s poetry and prose can be understood as utopian discourse that celebrates a not-yet-existing better order. Carpenter, who fell into obscurity following his death in 1929, has received much attention since the 1970s from queer theorists and historians of sexuality. I place his celebration of the "intermediate sex" in the context of works by his utopian contemporaries.

The Last Utopians has fundamentally different purposes from the earlier books I’ve cited, which are literary and intellectual histories intended for a specialist audience. This book is concerned with lives as well as texts, and it centers on a series of narrative biographies that detail the ways these writers tried to live out their utopian commitments. Following the unexpected success of Looking Backward, the deeply private Bellamy ventured outside his comfortable haven in Chicopee Falls, Massachusetts, to drum up political support for the Nationalist political party and, later, for the Populist movement. The Oxford-educated Morris turned his back on his comfortable upper-middle-class upbringing to speak for socialism on street corners and, donning a workman’s smock, to labor as a jack-of-all-trades artisan. Carpenter threw over his prestigious post as a Cambridge don and moved to England’s industrial north, working first as a lecturer and then as Derbyshire’s most highly educated market gardener. Gilman braved scandal to divorce her husband, giving him custody of their young daughter, in order to tour the country as a lecturer for Nationalism and women’s rights. Later, she again defied convention by marrying her younger cousin, an attorney who unreservedly supported her career.

The Last Utopians combines biography and literary analysis in an effort to understand the ways that, just over a century ago, utopianism not only animated important works by Bellamy, Morris, Carpenter, and Gilman but also shaped their lives. I set these writers and their works within the context of their tumultuous times in order to understand why, for a period of some thirty years from the 1880s until the First World War, utopian fiction had an unprecedented success, utopian speculation suffused the era’s intellectual life, and a wide variety of cultural radicals experimented with ways to live out their utopian beliefs.

The Last Utopians does not attempt a comprehensive survey of utopianism in either the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries or today, H. G. Wells, for example, produced multiple works of speculative fiction, both utopian and dystopian, around the turn of the twentieth century; however, Wells's utopian vision, articulated most clearly in A Modern Utopia (1905), has little in common with the works of the last utopians. His ideal future is technocratic, authoritarian, and hierarchical, with power centered in the hands of an elite class of intellectuals descended from Plato's Guardians. Similarly, my final chapter does not consider twenty-first-century techno-utopianism. Belief in the power of technology and computer science to deliver a transformed future is widespread, but the everyday utopians whom I discuss are suspicious of what they see as technological hubris, preferring to emphasize the values of simplicity, sustainability, and community.

These contemporary utopians insist, even if implicitly, on the value of imaginative visions of the future. Milan Simecka, a philosopher and dissident under Czechoslovakia's Communist regime, published an essay on utopianism during the 1980s, when he was working as a laborer after having been expelled from his university teaching position. Simecka railed, understandably, against the Marxist utopia, yet he went on to argue that "a world without utopias would be a world without social hope, a world of resignation to the status quo and the devalued slogans of everyday political life." The utopian visions of Bellamy, Morris, Carpenter, and Gilman have not, more than a century later, been realized, but elements of their transformative visions—environmentalism, economic justice, equality for women and sexual minorities—remain central to progressive politics today. Utopian studies theorists and scholars argue that imagined utopias are best understood as heuristic devices, useful tools that serve the dual purpose of critiquing the present and offering possibilities for the future. In the words of Lucy Sargent, "The function of Utopia is not its own realization."

Rather, the purpose of utopia is to stimulate critical thinking and to promote the political imagination. In Karl Mannheim's apt aphorism, "The impossible gives birth to the possible."

In mapping the utopian contours of two historical moments—the period from the 1880s to 1915 and the early twenty-first century—this book implicitly interrogates its own title. After World War I, utopianism never regained the importance it held during the previous century, but neither did it disappear. The title is intended to be provocative, to raise questions about the place of utopian thinking today and to stimulate readers' own utopian imaginings. The Last Utopians plunges deeply into the lives and works of four writers active at a high point for utopian fiction and speculation in both the United States and Great Britain, and it briefly surveys some of the varieties of contemporary utopianism in the two nations. In writing about utopianism both then and now, I strive for a stance of sympathetic distance. That is, I acknowledge the flaws in the last utopians' grand visions, the ways in which authoritarianism and racism and gender essentialism are woven into the fabric of their dreams, but at the same time I try to avoid the scolding tone of much recent writing about these authors, which seems aimed at demonstrating the current academic community's intellectual and moral superiority. The last utopians, imperfect creatures of their time, dared to publish their dreams, and millions of people in the U.S. and U.K. were thrilled by their visions. A hundred years later, we're rightly fearful of grandiose schemes, and the audience for conventional utopian fiction has shrunk toward the vanishing point. Nevertheless, lived utopianism—contemporary manifestations of what Ernst Bloch called "the principle of hope"—is widespread. Visions of social transformation remain essential to progressive political thought and practice. Millions of people in the U.S. and U.K. are demonstrating through their daily actions the truth of Oscar Wilde's characteristically witty observation: "A map of the world that does not contain Utopia is not worth even glancing at." <>

Consciousness and Loneliness: Theoria and Praxis by Ben Lazare Mijuskovic [Value Inquiry Book Series, Cognitive Science, Brill Rodopi, 9789004375642]

Current research claims loneliness is passively caused by external conditions: environmental, cultural, situational, and even chemical imbalances in the brain and hence avoidable. In this book, the author argues that loneliness is actively constituted by acts of reflexive self-consciousness (Kant) and
transcendent intentionality (Husserl) and is, therefore, unavoidable. This work employs a historical, conceptual, and interdisciplinary approach (philosophy, psychology, literature, sociology, etc.) criticizing both psychoanalysis and neuroscience. The book pits materialism, mechanism, determinism, empiricism, phenomenalism, behaviorism, and the neurosciences against dualism, both subjective and objective idealism, rationalism, freedom, phenomenology, and existentialism. It offers a dynamic of loneliness, whose spontaneous subconscious sources undercuts the unconscious of Freud and the “computerism” of the neurosciences by challenging their claims to be predictive sciences.

The following treatise concerns a special theory of consciousness and its application to human loneliness. In terms of a methodology, it follows along the lines of the History of Ideas discipline, which was originally instituted in the early part of the twentieth century under the aegis of Johns Hopkins University by A.O. Lovejoy and George Boas. In the ensuing years, it was emulated by other institutions of higher learning, including the Ideas and Methods and the Committee on Social Thought programs at the University of Chicago, the History of Ideas at Brandeis University, and the History of Consciousness at the University of California at Santa Cruz as well as various other universities all implementing different combinations, concentrations, and approaches between the disciplines.

It consists in an attempt to implement an interdisciplinary perspective by emphasizing certain strains of metaphysical dualism and subjective idealism and then applying these tenets to a substantive theory of the self and the innate quality of human loneliness. It concentrates on a historically important paradigm of the mind, grounded in a premise asserting that consciousness is both immaterial and active and more specifically that it exhibits a reflexive form of self-consciousness as well as the transcendent features of a purposive intentionality.

It is a sequel to four previous efforts by the author, The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of Thought and Soul from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant; Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology, and Literature; Contingent Immaterialism: Meaning, Freedom, Time, and Mind; and Feeling Lonesome: The Philosophy and Psychology of Loneliness, with all four studies designed to coalesce in supporting a theory of consciousness in relation to human loneliness.

By their very nature interdisciplinary studies assume that there are certain principles and paradigms that are so central in Western thought that their themes are best explored in unison with other related disciplines thereby enhancing the possibility of comprehensive insights within the participating inter-related fields.
Against the combination of reductive materialism and naïve empiricism, the present study contends that these dual perspectives are unable to account adequately for the activity of human consciousness, the reality of the self, and its inescapable sense of an enclosed subjective isolation. It further seeks to coherently integrate the various intertwined filaments of dualism, rationalism, and idealism, which are threaded throughout the many historical conceptions of the self found in the Greek psyche, the Christian soul, the Cartesian cogito, the Leibnizian monad, German idealism, Husserlian phenomenology, and Sartrean existentialism, which mutually conclude in portraying human consciousness as inevitably lonely. The work defends a substantive concept of the self, while offering a theory of cognitive consciousness coupled with a psychology of motivational drives animated by the fear of loneliness and the consequent desire for shared intimacy. While defending this view, it criticizes and rejects the underlying assumptions in regard to the alternate model of the “self” presented in the related movements of materialism, mechanism, determinism, empiricism, phenomenalism, behaviorism, and the current vogue of reductivism and ethical relativism so evident in the neurosciences.

But first let me begin by addressing a distinction suggested by Kant between the Critique of Pure Reason employing the synthetic or progressive method of proof, as opposed to the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, which rather summons the analytic or regressive approach (Sections 263–64, 274–75, 278–79, 283–284) by recruiting his distinction for my own purposes. The difference is highlighted by a passage in Kemp Smith.

Thus there are two ways to address the problem of cognition. We can simply start with human consciousness—“in its simplest form, as consciousness of time”—and then proceed by amplifying on the a priori synthetic judgments that form the base. Or we can begin with the validity of scientific knowledge and mathematics and then move reggressively backward by explicating the conditions under which alone such validity is possible. In other words, in the Critique Kant seeks to show how human consciousness is not only possible but necessary by exploring its transcendental conditions, whereas in the Prolegomena, he assumes the genuineness of certain a priori knowledge in mathematics and physics and proceeds accordingly. A further distinction can be made. In the First Preface to the Critique, Kant promises to outline the conditions under which ordinary experience and science can be objectively validated but he also suggests that there is an even more fundamental issue: How is consciousness itself possible? It is this second consideration that will consume our attention.

In my first studies on loneliness, I simply assumed its universality as a negative psychological first principle, something to be avoided, and then went on to argue for self-consciousness as its primary constitutive condition, while in the present work, I intend to begin with the earliest and most primitive forms of consciousness and then proceed to the conclusion that humans are innately and inevitably lonely. In brief, there are two very different ways to prove something. Either one can travel backward from an assumed conclusion to its premises, the explicative method; or one can move forward from an indisputable starting point in consciousness—time-consciousness—in order to arrive at a conclusion, the ampliative method. In the present text, I have chosen the latter and more difficult path but hopefully it will prove to be the more rewarding option.

In prior publications, including articles and books, I sought both historically and conceptually to trace the prevalence and influence of a single philosophical premise, or if one prefers, an assumption, namely that the mind is both immaterial and active, in order to document its frequent use as it appears throughout the conceptual history of
Western philosophy in a set of four distinct arguments ending in an equal number of different conclusions. These combined invocations are found in Kant's first edition Critique of Pure Reason, in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason section of the Transcendental Dialectic (1781). Interestingly and significantly enough, the four arguments, all based on a single premise, are deleted and completely recast anew in the second edition (1787). The term “pure” in the title signifies their grounding in non-sensuous, non-empirical acts of consciousness culminating in four separate conclusions. The quartet of proofs is regarded by Kant as illusory metaphysical fallacies generated when reason is left unrestricted by the bounds of sensuous experience. The Second Paralogism, which is especially important and controversial, Kant christens the “Achilles,” the most powerful of all rationalist doctrines pertaining to the activities of the soul. Historically, since the time of Plato and Neo-Platonism, these four demonstrations have served dualist, rationalist, and idealist philosophers as a formidable arsenal against materialism and empiricism. Nevertheless, for all four Paralogisms Kant systematically shows how reason, without adequate empirical criteria or supports, fails in its attempt to generate metaphysical truths that transcend human experience and what can be legitimately scientifically confirmed. Although the Paralogisms present meaningful theses, they illegitimately go beyond the possibility of any empirical confirmation or verification. Thus they stand self-condemned by their inability to furnish empirical criteria or proofs for their assertions. It is important to note in this context, however, that Kant’s criticisms are different from those of the logical positivists and analytic philosophers, who reject these metaphysical proofs as inherently meaningless and in principle unverifiable because they cannot be tested empirically. By contrast, Kant believes they are meaningful assertions but nevertheless disprovable, although he continues to entertain the conceivability that they still may be true in a noumenal realm of “things-in-themselves,” in some unspecified transcendent reality. Later Kant, in the Critique of Practical Reason, basing his ethical philosophy on the conceivability of the existence of God; the freedom of the will; and the immortality of the soul as articles of faith. But in any case, the four Paralogisms stand completely empty of any sensuous content and therefore they cannot be tested nor can they provide any scientific information. Kant thus distinguishes transcendent metaphysical propositions or judgments, which cannot be empirically confirmed, from transcendent epistemic knowledge, which legitimately lies at the base of all human experience thus supporting both our ordinary and scientific consciousness and human experience in general.

The Second Paralogism, Of Simplicity, is especially subjected to damning criticism by Kant. This is the Achilles of all dialectical [i.e., fallacious] inferences in the pure [rational, non-empirical] doctrine of the soul. It is no mere sophistical play contrived by a dogmatist [i.e., rationalist] in order to impart to his assertions a superficial plausibility, but an inference which appears to withstand even the keenest scrutiny and the most scrupulously exact investigation. It is as follows. Every composite [material] substance is an aggregate of several substances, and the action of a composite, or whatever inheres in it as thus composite, is an aggregate of several actions or accidents distributed among the plurality of the substances. Now an effect which arises from the concurrence of many acting substances is indeed possible, namely, when this effect is external only (as, for instance, the motion of a body is the combined motion of all its [physical] parts).

But with thoughts, as internal accidents belonging to a thinking being, it is different. For suppose it be the composite that thinks; then every part of it would be a part of the thought, and all of them taken together would contain the whole thought. But this cannot consistently be maintained. For [immaterial] representations (for instance, the single words of a verse), distributed among different beings, never make up a whole thought (a verse), and it is therefore impossible that a thought should inhere in what is essentially composite. It is therefore possible only in a single [i.e., simple, immaterial] substance, which, not being an aggregate of many, is absolutely simple.
The controlling premise is that what is simple is immaterial and hence a unity. It is also important to notice that the argument doubles as both an argument against “dogmatic” or Leibnizian rationalism as well as indirectly against classical materialism and the “modern Epicureans,” whose movement was gaining increasing prominence in the scientific world of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries.

Prior to Kant, the “Achilles” argument had been consistently recruited by rationalist philosophers from Plato and Plotinus to the Cambridge Platonists and Leibniz in order to conclude that the “unity of self-consciousness” is only possible on the condition that the soul is both immaterial and active. While Plato’s Forms are taken to be immaterial and unchanging, the soul was not only conceived as immaterial but also actively self-moving as well. In Platonic thought, it is this dynamis, this activity, which allows the soul to seek and attain a cognitive unification with a transcendent realm of realities predicated on the basis that both the soul and the Forms share in an attribute that is essential to each as well as common to both, namely immateriality. Metaphysically, however, the critical question revolves around a single question: “Can senseless matter think?” This issue will be the primary focus of my concern throughout all that follows.

The First Paralogism argues for the soul as an independent substance, roughly Descartes position; the Second Paralogism, strongly reminiscent of Leibniz, infers the soul’s unity of consciousness as deriving from its immaterial nature in the A edition, as in the quotation indicated above (1781), and in behalf of the soul’s immortality in the substituted B edition (1787); the Third Paralogism similarly addresses Leibniz’s conception regarding the continuous temporal identity of the self thus offering a criterion for personal, i.e., moral identity; and the Fourth Paralogism essentially provides a proof for the apparent ideal nature of an “external reality,” of “outer things” as generated by the illusory appearance of spatial objects existing independently of the mind. Kant’s “critical” transcendental and positive answer to the Fourth Paralogism actually depends on his celebrated Copernican Revolution, which contends that the noumenal realm of “things-in-themselves” must “conform” to the ideal structures, the a priori synthetic categories “spontaneously” generated by the activities of the mind (Kant, Critique, B xxiii).

All four Paralogisms are predicated on the premise that the soul is both im-material and active, which is essentially a Platonic and neo-Platonic theory but nevertheless shares a critical feature with Aristotle’s reflexive conception of the Unmoved Mover—the activity of thought thinking itself (Meta., 1075a). This principle and paradigm will follow us throughout the text as well.

Once more, Kant rejects all four demonstrations, despite their seductiveness, as fallacies on the ground of their shared belief that rational, i.e., nonempirical or a priori knowledge is attainable concerning a metaphysical self and its relation to a transcendent realm of noumenal “things-in-themselves.”

The immateriality premise, with its four separate conclusions, has historically exerted and continues to influence thinkers beyond Kant in Western thought. The assumption, which ultimately derives from Plato’s Phaedo (78b ff.), continues to shape certain critical philosophical discussions ever since the Hellenic Age. The form of the argument is fairly straightforward. The essential nature of the soul consists in its ability to think; consciousness, or thought, being immaterial is unextended, i.e., simple, without parts; and what is both simple and active is intrinsically (a) a substance; (b) a unity; (c) a continuous (personal or moral) identity; and therefore (d) it constitutes the soul’s ideal relation to an “external” realm of seemingly “spatial” and “material” existences. Such are the strengths imputed to the soul by the dualist, rationalist, and idealist traditions prior to Kant. In general, Kant’s criticism of the Paralogisms is primarily directed at Leibniz’s monadological metaphysics representing the culmination of rationalist thought in the West (Monadology, Sections 1–21).

However, in Plato’s version of metaphysical dualism, which is offered in the Phaedo and the Republic, although humans possess both a physical body and an immaterial soul, it is the soul as a “pure,” non-empirical entity that alone guarantees...
its substantial reality, continuity, and eventual immortality. Against this Platonic doctrine of an immaterial soul, the atomistic materialism of Leucippus and Democritus stand in opposition. The metaphysical disagreement between the two schools of thought leads Plato to comment on the much larger context of the controversy by referring to it as the Battle between the Gods and the Giants, between the Idealists and the Materialists as expressed in Plato’s Sophist (245e-246e). Basically Plato’s description of the conflict between the two camps characterizes the entire on-going struggle in Western thought between religion and humanism, on the one side, and science on the other.

The controversy over “whether senseless matter can think?” is one of the most ancient and important arguments in the History of Ideas, as it concentrates on the nature of human consciousness and continues into our present Age. It is a struggle between two prevailing constellations of thought: dualism, rationalism, idealism, phenomenology, and existentialism versus materialism, mechanism, determinism, empiricism, phenomenalism, behaviorism, and our current neurosciences. It pits Plato against Democritus; Plotinus against Epicurus; Augustine and Aquinas against Skeptics and Atheists; Ficino against Valla; Descartes against Hobbes; Leibniz against Locke; Kant against Hume; Hegel against Marx; F.H. Bradley against J.S. Mill; Husserl and Sartre against D.M. Armstrong and Gilbert Ryle; and H.D. Lewis and Richard Swinburne against B.F. Skinner and Daniel Dennett. Whereas the Gods assert the reality of the self, reflexive self-consciousness, and transcendent intentionality, the Giants on their side defend the primacy of the brain and the assorted mechanisms of the central nervous system. As the counter-dialogues continue to unfold, it will pit the spontaneity of consciousness against the determinism of science.

It is possible, of course, to add other philosophical dimensions beyond the dualistic schema I am proposing. For example, Wilhelm Dilthey distinguishes three fundamental types of world views (Weltanschauungen): materialism (Hobbes); subjective idealism (Kant); and objective idealism (Hegel), each offering a different perspective on consciousness, reality, and values. The first consists of naturalism or materialism, which interprets the world as logically unified through a system of cause and effect relationships. The second is connected to subjective idealism, or the philosophy of freedom, which comprehends the world as unified by the imposition of an order forced upon it through the moral strivings of the human will. And the third, that of objective idealism, springs from an intuition of an underlying cosmic harmony in which the apparent antinomies, contradictions, and conflicts are ultimately reconciled and resolved.

There is also Spinoza’s “double aspect” theory, which proposes to solve the mind-body problem by interpreting the body and the mind as two sides of the same “coin” (substance) and the closely related later theories of neutral monism propounded by William James, Bertrand Russell, and A.J. Ayer, admittedly neither of which readily fits my dualistic schematic.

I have charted the course and force of all four paralogistic arguments from their initial uses in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy and then later on into Christian theology, the Italian and English Renaissances, and ending in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries and more specifically from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant, a period during which the proofs become vitally important in the metaphysical, epistemological, religious, and ethical controversies of the time as they involve such issues as (1) the immortality of the human soul; (2) the “transcendental” conditions necessary for the unity of consciousness (or the rationalist premise that the soul essentially expresses a unifying immaterial activity in order for consciousness to exist and function as a unity); (3) the necessary and sufficient criterion for the establishment of personal or moral identity; and (4) its use as the major premise for metaphysical dualism and epistemological and ontological idealism. Thus if one assumes that active souls and thoughts are immaterial and directly, immediately present “to” or “within” consciousness, then it becomes problematic how an unextended soul, self, mind, or ego could conceivably “know” or “interact” with a material, extended, “external world” existing independently and separately from consciousness; or how the soul can have any
possible commerce or interaction with the world or any knowledge of other minds. If the two realms—mind and matter, soul and body—share no common property, attribute, or predicate in common, it necessarily follows that any direct knowledge and/or interaction between the self, the world, and other selves becomes not only problematic but indeed inconceivable.

Welcome confirmation of the plausibility of my historical and conceptual thesis has appeared in the form of scholarly evaluations regarding my work. The legitimacy of the conclusions I reached in The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments are critical in serving as the common background for the historical, conceptual, and theoretical treatments I will be offering in the present work as I continue to explore the ramifications of Plato’s perennial conflict between the Gods and the Giants.

A work that touches on the same issues concerning materialism as are discussed here is Ben Lazare Mijuskovic’s The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of Thought and Soul from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant (Nijhoff, 1974). Mijuskovic recognizes the central role played by Cudworth’s formulation of doctrines in the eighteenth-century about the soul, the person, and the nature of thought.

In the following discussion on the relationship between immaterial substances and personal identity, I am indebted to two studies: Ben Lazare Mijuskovic’s The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments and John Yolton’s Thinking Matter. Mijuskovic shows how the argument about immaterial substances and the grounding of personal identity developed independently in England prior to Descartes as a reaction to the perceived threat of the rise of Epicurean and newer forms of materialism. Mijuskovic details the intense sensitivity of orthodox thinkers to the threat of materialism posed by immaterial substance and documents their defenses against the threat.

In and after the seventeenth century, consciousness figured in a central role in at least four fairly distinct themes: personal identity; immortality of the soul; epistemic certainty; and the transcendental conditions of experience, as in Ben Mijuskovic’s discussion in The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments (Nijhoff, 1974), which touches on all four thematics.

And:

What remains surprising, however, is that so little work has been done before on the Achilles argument. Ben Lazare Mijuskovic’s pioneering work was the first in modern times to draw attention to the importance of the argument, but aside from the subsequent work he has done, there is little else in print.

Importantly, the four conclusions do not have to remain distinct from each other. Various philosophers combine two, three, or even appeal to all four enlistments, e.g., Cudworth and Leibniz. And still, in other cases, progressive conclusions are recruited and supportively interwoven. Thus, for instance, it is argued that (a) if the soul is immaterial and unextended; and it has no parts; then it cannot be destroyed; ergo it is immortal, since destruction is defined as the dissembling of a compound; further (b) if consciousness is constituted as a unity binding sensations, feelings, and thoughts together within the same consciousness, into a single, substantial self; and further (c) if the self continues as the same identical substance throughout its existence as a temporally constituted awareness; then it necessarily follows that (d) the soul must always continually think at some level even when it is not consciously, explicitly aware of its own thoughts. By unifying these several major and minor premises together, the theory of the unconscious can be derived as a final consequence, a conclusion explicitly reached by Plotinus, Cudworth, Leibniz, and Kant (with his concept of the “productive imagination”), Schopenhauer (with his noumenal Will), and Hegel (even during sleep). This is a good example of how metaphysical premises can “seep” into epistemological conclusions.

Due to the simplicity principle, and implicit within the doctrine of rationalism, is the contention that the mind always thinks at some level. If it did not, then it could not continue to be the same self. For Descartes, for instance, once created by God, the soul, as an active immaterial simplicity, is permanent and indestructible. The power of
thinking is its defining attribute and therefore it follows that it must continually think and hence exist forever, even during sleep, “l’ame pense toujours” (Descartes Reply to the Fourth Objections). Antoine Arnauld, however, in the “Fourth Set of Objections” to the Meditations criticizes Descartes on this point arguing that even if Descartes were to succeed in demonstrating that soul and body are distinct, it does not preclude the possibility that the Deity could simultaneously cease their connection at death and therefore he has not proved the soul’s immortality. In response, Descartes added the Synopsis to the Meditations, written a year later, in which he appeals to a “purer” form of the simplicity argument in order to argue his case for immortality and Arnauld declares himself to be satisfied.

As we proceed we shall see that the possibility of an implicit uninterrupted consciousness beneath our explicit states of self-consciousness will soon lead us to considerations regarding Kant’s spontaneous subterranean “productive imagination” and Hegel’s “feeling soul.”

But when we consider the opposing empirical paradigm regarding the discontinuity involved in interrupted perceptions, which is presented in Locke and Hume’s contrasting position, namely that all states of consciousness can only be based in disappearing and evanescent sensory perceptions (Locke’s sensations, Hume’s impressions and/or ideas), it then follows that during deep sleep and fainting spells the soul ceases to think altogether and therefore for certain periods of time—basically every night—it would cease to exist. Even worse, if consciousness is not continuous, it then follows that “one” may be a different “self” at each unit of time. For strict empiricism, personal continuity cannot be secured.

When my perceptions [i.e., impressions and ideas] are remov’d for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist.

Not only would we intermittently cease to exist and re-exist but then it is theoretically possible that each time we awoke, we could be a different person. Similarly, Locke had speculated that if reflective (as opposed to reflexive) mnemonic consciousness of the “self” supposedly establishes the criterion of personal identity, then in sound sleep, when we cease to think “doubts are raised whether we remain truly the same substance” or self. Indeed, this is also why Locke is able to speculate about a prince waking up with his own memory but transposed into the body of a cobbler. Hence, Locke and Hume’s strong empiricist positions are in marked contrast to the dualist, rationalist, and idealist traditions going all the way back to Platonism and Neo-Platonism, which holds that the soul (or self) continues to experience not only conscious thoughts but unconscious ones as well throughout its entire existence in this world (and presumably into the next as well). If one is restricted to considering empirical perceptions alone, i.e., Lockean sensations or Humean impressions and ideas as the only legitimate contents of consciousness, then not only are unconscious thoughts obviously excluded but even the reality of the “self” becomes problematic.

Significantly this strict empirical train of argumentation would also disallow the Freudian unconscious as we shall see. But interestingly, it will open the door in Kant to the much deeper and irretrievable sphere of the subconscious mind.

Historically, the theory of the unconscious finds its first gestations in Plato’s doctrine of innate ideas and reminiscence (Meno); Aristotle’s “dispositional” distinction between knowing something potentially in our dormant states of consciousness as opposed to actually putting it into play when we are awakened (De Anima, iv.3.30. 1–17; v.12, 1–15; v.3.2., 1–26). Hence, the theory of the unconscious derives from these inferentially connected premises regarding the immaterial nature of consciousness and its implicit hierarchy of thoughts. Again, I am not concerned to argue that the soul is immortal (possibly that is a matter of faith alone) but rather to suggest that there are both (a) unconscious thoughts which are grounded in empirical memories, as in Plotinus, Cudworth, and Leibniz—and later Freud—but more importantly and significantly that beneath the
unconscious there is also (b) a much deeper “layer” of spontaneous subconscious activities and contents that lie much deeper and powerfully as endorsed by Kant, Schopenhauer, and Hegel as we shall see.

Plato’s Divided Line passage in the Republic (vi. 509 D-511 B) distinguishes five levels of existence and five corresponding states of consciousness and cognition: (a) images and echoes leading to eikasia or the imagination; (b) physical objects leading to pistis or belief; (c) “pure” mathematical and geometrical concepts leading to dianoia or discursive understanding; (d) Universals or Forms leading to episteme or immediate intuitive knowledge; and (e) the Good leading to noesis or comprehensive knowledge. These qualitative differences are summarily and consistently denied by the empiricist tradition, which reduces consciousness to the immediacy of sensory or phenomenal appearances alone. Plato’s Divided Line section thus represents a cognitive classification of lower and higher forms of consciousness as they progressively ascend toward an inclusionary coherence of qualitative—as opposed to quantitative—differences within consciousness. The Allegory of the Cave reinforces and illustrates the journey of the soul from its lowest subterranean depths to its highest attainment, from the obscurity of a shadowy darkness to the illuminated brilliance of the Good. There is a critical dualism lying between a realm of independent objects and corresponding levels of cognition that I propose to navigate: from (a) prisoners in a cave passively watching vagrant shadows and hearing echoes against a wall; (b) their unchainment allowing them to see visible objects; (c) their ascent and exit from the cave to view a diurnal landscape outside; (d) their nocturnal observation of the celestial order of the stars; and (e) finally their grasp of the sun as both the source and provider of existence and life as well as light and knowledge (Republic, vii, 514a–521b). The entire journey of the soul is intended to signify a series of metaphors representing the principle of qualitative distinctions within consciousness, a movement and a progression from passive sensory imagery to actively grasping pure, non-sensory concepts, imageless Forms, and intuited Intelligibles. It is a continuum of consciousness ranging from a state of relative darkness and confusion to the highest intensity and brightness of an immutable Goodness (Plato) or Oneness (Plotinus). All this, of course, is a Platonic vision but the principle of qualitative distinctions and levels of consciousness will play itself out against the reductive quantitative materialism of science as we continue, which only admits of a single, homogeneous substance reducing both reality and consciousness to mere matter, motion, and physical sensations. This is one of the great divides between humanism and religion on the one side and the empirical sciences on the other side.

All dualists, rationalists, and idealists assume an extensive variety of active qualitative distinctions and levels within human consciousness, while the materialists and empiricists deny them and assert quantitative differences alone. Further, we will see that empiricism remains mired in the correspondence theory of belief, according to which in some unspecified sense mental ideas “correspond” to physical objects, whereas idealism reaches toward an increasingly graduated, comprehensive, integrated, and coherent system of knowledge. It is important to note that empiricism is ultimately grounded in physical sensations alone, whereas dualism and idealism both seek to stress various qualitative differences and levels, including distinctions between cognition and ethical and aesthetic values. This Platonic paradigm will be later reflected in Hegel’s dialectical levels and structures of consciousness spanning from the prenatal, natal, psychotic, sensory, perceptual, conscious, and self-conscious to the rational and spiritual.

As we survey the depths and complexities of consciousness, we realize there is an incredible span of qualitative levels from shallow to deep and from superficial to intricate. Before us lies a panoramic hierarchy of sensory, affective, cognitive, and creative states of the mind, from the vegetative, prenatal, subconscious, unconscious, and conscious and spilling into an active reflexive self-consciousness and a transcendent intentionality, all of which leaves us quite uncertain about who we are, how we know, what we can know, and what we are capable of doing. But at the very fount of this hierarchical consciousness, there lies a creative, powerful, and mysterious subconscious that
ultimately defies our ability to fully penetrate reality, human nature, and even our own psychological motives. Thus a question remains unanswered: Does man ever escape the original dark forces of primordial consciousness; or do these powers follow him like a tenebrous shadow as long as consciousness persists? None of these states, stages, or levels of consciousness is ever left behind. The evolution of human consciousness is not like a snake shedding its skin. It carries all its past within itself.

What exists? What can we really know? Is reality physical, mental, mystical, or all three? Does realism, conceptualism, or nominalism rule? Is consciousness spontaneous or determined; evolving or stationary; active or passive; reflexive or intentional or both? What is the relation, if any, between reason, experience, and faith; between sensations, feelings, meanings, intuitions, inductions, and inferences; are there imageless concepts or thoughts; is the imagination, reason, or language supreme; are analytic, synthetic, and/or a priori synthetic propositions the touchstones of truth or merely its vehicles? How do transcendent concepts, fantasies, dreams, hallucinations, delusions, and ineffable visions play into what we think and believe? In short, consciousness displays a startling fluidity as it meanders without secure barriers within the labyrinthine and expansive channels of the mind. Powerful passions and sustained thoughts flow and intermingle through the subterranean streamlets of the soul. But as we move forward, we will learn that beyond—or beneath—all this lies an unfathomable dark and irretrievable subconscious: a spontaneous fount of creative energy.

Against all these protean permutations of consciousness is set forth the impoverished and restrictive catalogue of Hume’s empirical impressions tied to the five senses and the constraining principle of the “association of ideas” mechanism most notably founded upon his notions of “resemblance,” “contiguity” and the anticipatory psychological feeling or sentiment of expectations and “constant conjunctions,” and all this generated by the accidental, fortuitous, and transient couplings of the imagination; mere beliefs in the existence of an external world; the doubtful security of the causal maxim; the contingent assurance of a fictional “self,” and the uncertain companionship of other “selves.” But Hume is unable to adequately account for his key epistemic elements. There is no impression of “contiguity,” “identity,” and/or “resemblance” as there is an impression of yellow or blue. Relations are not accounted for by Hume. They “derive” or “arise” from the activities of the mind and not from Hume’s whirl and flux of passive impressions and their fainter ideal copies both superabundantly displayed under his general notion of mental “perceptions.”

How deeply or how well have we penetrated reality? What are the limits of knowledge? Indeed how well do we even know ourselves? Consider the Hellenistic Skeptics and Sextus Empiricus, who point out that whether we appeal to the criterion of sensation or reason both merely lead to an infinite regress or circularity but never to any certainty. In his turn, Montaigne even more insistently questions the cognitive limitations of human sensation, let alone reason, which confines us to only five senses.

The first consideration that I offer on the subject of the senses is that I have my doubts whether man is provided with all the senses of nature. I see many animals that live a complete and perfect life, some without sight, others without hearing; who knows whether we too do not still lack one, two, three, or many other senses? For if any one is lacking, our reason cannot discover its absence ... We have formed a truth by the consultation and concurrence of our five senses; but perhaps we needed the agreement of eight or ten senses, and their contribution, to perceive it [i.e., truth] certainly and in its essence.

As Montaigne queries, “What do I know?” Man may be more of a question than an answer. And Pascal describes man as merely a “thinking reed” at the mercy of every wind that blows his way. Consider further Spinoza’s “rationalism,” which posits a single Substance he indifferently calls Nature or God, expressing an infinite number of attributes but that we—qua “rational” beings—are only conscious of two, namely, thought and extension. Recall Leibniz’s speculation that God has chosen only one, allegedly the “best of all possible
worlds,” from an infinite set of compossible universes thus implying that there may be many other possibilities and modes of consciousness as well as being(s) in the universe. And Kant confines human knowledge to phenomenal appearances provided by our subjective (a) intuitive forms of space and time and (b) the mediate categories of the Understanding, while making allowances for an absolutely unknowable reality, a noumenal, transcendent world of “things-in-themselves” ineluctably inaccessible to any ultimate knowledge of our own self, reality, or other selves.

A few others, however, are fully prepared to acknowledge the many paradoxes displayed by the physical universe and the natural sciences.

The stable foundations of physics have broken up ... The old foundations of scientific thought are becoming unintelligible. Time, space, matter, material, ether, electricity, mechanism, organism, configuration, structure, pattern, function, all require reinterpretation. What is the sense of talking about mechanical explanation when you don’t know what you mean by mechanics?... If science is not to degenerate into a medley of ad hoc hypotheses, it must become philosophical and must enter upon a thorough criticism of its own foundations.

And yet, materialism, empiricism, behaviorism, and the current battalions of the neurosciences all fly under the same banner of observational science, while remaining confidently entrenched that we have nothing qualitatively new to learn but merely to add more upon more sophisticated and minute quantitative measures to our present store of “scientific knowledge.” Armed with the single-minded epistemological principle, which holds that all our ideas are simply derived from particular precedent sensations; that there can be no idea in the mind, which is not first given in sensation; it follows that the possibility of a subconscious source of generative activity, of spontaneous energy is perfunctorily and summarily dismissed. In our present age, this is what passes for science—reductive materialism, lifeless mechanism, inexact determinism, superficial behaviorism, and the Faustian conceit of the neurosciences that we already know everything of value. As we proceed, we will discover that the rules and laws that appear to govern the natural world may not always apply to the human realm; that psychological predictions will ever remain quixotic aspirations when consistently applied to human consciousness.

And Kant’s four discredited Paralogistic “fallacies” may yet portend of realities both below and beyond human accessibility.

As H.J. Paton intimates:

It is not unreasonable to suppose that Kant under the influence of Leibniz continued to regard [metaphysical] reality as composed of monads, although he became convinced that the proofs advanced by Leibniz were fallacious and that knowledge of reality is unobtainable by man. If we assume some such belief to be at the back of Kant’s mind, it must be remembered that for Kant the conception of the monad has altered. His monads are not self-sufficient, and there is some sort of contact between the knower and the known.

The allusion to “some sort of contact [or relation] between the knower and the known” remains unaccounted for and forever indeterminable by Paton as well it should, since presumably it “involves” an unknown reality, a noumenal realm. The known in the above context is the conceptual “object” and the phenomenal world but qua empirical it is still an ideal product of the human mind and vulnerable to all sorts of possible distortions. Reality itself, however, remains impenetrable. In short, it is quite possible that there are intrinsic and insurmountable limits to knowing our world, other selves, or even our own self.

One of the most far-reaching metaphysical implications of the four-fold employment of the simplicity argument is the last, Kant’s presumably errant Fourth Paralogism, Of Ideality, which he also rejects, although ironically enough he assumes throughout the Critique as the ruling premise for his entire doctrine of subjective idealism in the light of his version of the Copernican Revolution—namely that the unknown noumenal realm must conform to our subjective and ideal forms of intuition, space and time, and the equally ideal categories of the Understanding. For Kant, whatever reality is “in itself,” it is the active structures of the human mind
that organizes and orders our empirical experiences. The choice is simple: either concepts conform to objects or objects conform to concepts. He has chosen the latter solution.

The Fourth Paralogism seeks to establish, on the basis of an immaterialist foundation of consciousness, that our awareness of the “reality,” the ideality of an “external world” must always remain as a doubtful and even an illicit inference because the mind is immaterial and unextended and the external world is (presumably) material and extended. Since the two substances share no common property, predicate, or attribute, and we are only in immediate and direct contact with our own mind—and therefore only indirectly with an independent realm of an existence beyond our mind—it follows that we are completely confined to a form of metaphysical and epistemological idealism characteristic of the earlier idealist philosophies of Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz, and Berkeley. (Kant attempts to refute these possibilities in his “Refutation of Idealism” (B 274–279) primarily on the grounds of empirical change).

And although Kant rejects the Fourth Paralogism, as a metaphysical illusion, nevertheless it continues to exert a determinative influence on his thought just as it had on past thinkers and promises to continue doing so on future thinkers by promoting an idealist interpretation of consciousness. Accordingly, the proponents of metaphysical dualism and subjective and objective idealism contend that if both the self and its activity of thinking are immaterial, then it necessarily follows that any real—or even adequate—form of (a) knowledge and/or (b) interaction concerning the independent existence of an “external world” as distinct from the mind becomes highly problematic.

The view that consciousness (or, in general the mind) and its physical basis (or, in general the body) seem so essentially different from one another that they must have distinct existences is based on a deep-rooted idea in the history of philosophy. This idea and its variants were constitutive of arguments for the metaphysical independence of mind and body throughout early modern philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, perhaps most notably exemplified in the work of Descartes [and Leibniz]. The essential and complete nature of the mind, generally speaking, seems to consist solely in thinking, and, as such it must be unextended, simple (with no parts), and essentially different from the body and therefore immaterial. This was Descartes’s idea in a nutshell, ultimately drawing a strong ontological conclusion (regarding the distinctness of mind and body) from a starting point constituted by epistemic considerations (regarding the distinctness of their appearances). As Ben Mijuskovic (1974, Chapter 5) observes, in this type of argumentation, “the sword that severs the Gordian knot is the principle that what is conceptually distinct is ontologically separable and therefore independent” (p.123). Mijuskovic, in locating this form of reasoning in its historical context, also notes the presence of the converse of its inference: “If one begins with the notion, implicit or explicit, that thoughts or minds are simple, unextended, indivisible, then it seems to be an inevitable step before thinkers connect the principle of an unextended, immaterial soul with the impossibility of any knowledge of an extended, material, external world and consequently of the relation between them” (p. 121). That is, this time an epistemological conclusion regarding an epistemic gap (between mind and body) is reached from a starting point constituted by ontological considerations (regarding the distinctness of their natures).

To drive the matter home: if we contend that the only instrument or means of contact open to us that we possess, in relation to our efforts to reach an independently existing external world, is restricted within our own subjective sensory mental sphere of the soul, that we are confined within our own immaterial mind, which includes Locke’s mental ideas as “immediate modes of consciousness” and Hume’s immediate impressions and ideas as mental “perceptions,” then any possible “access,” “contact,” or “interaction” beyond our immaterial self-conscious existence is in principle impossible and contradictory. On these terms, the mind is in principle unable either to cognitively know or to physically interact directly with “outer objects” or “other selves” because it is trapped within its own “veil of perception,” its own “way of ideas,” and
thus within its own solipsistic limitations. As Berkeley rhetorically inquired: “What can be like an idea but another idea”?

Obviously also precluded is the possibility of penetrating or knowing another’s mind. Under these conditions, we are restricted to Descartes inferential guesses about what other minds are sensing, feeling, thinking, or experiencing and in general whether they even exist at all. And does not all this doom us to an insoluble solipsism and loneliness?

Many historians of philosophy are mesmerized by Locke’s empiricism and Hume’s phenomenalism and therefore neglect to realize that both thinkers actually betray strong dualistic metaphysical tendencies. Locke’s tabula rasa and sensory inputs and Hume’s perceptual impressions and ideas are likewise mental existents, ideal constructs.

Locke regards the mind as a substance, but a substance that is immaterial. He accepts the usual dualism, ‘the two parts of nature,’ active immaterial substance and passive material substance ... It is a fundamental point with him that the universe cannot be explained in terms of either matter alone or mind alone. The one cannot be reduced to the other. Of the two, perhaps, mind is the more indispensable; for mind is the active, productive principle. Matter produces nothing.

Students and scholars have to realize that when an author transitions from matter to physical sensations and then to phenomenal, i.e., mental images, they have “imperceptibly” moved from a material realm to the psychic immaterial sphere of the soul or mind. This is an absolute act of trespassing.

But since Locke’s strictly perceptual theory of consciousness is confined to simple, distinct, and immediate sensations, it follows that the same self cannot endure beyond the immediacy of the present moment; its only empirical reality is reduced to instantaneous sensations or to Hume’s fleeting impressions: “Whatever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call an idea” (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ii, viii, 8; italics mine). As we shall see, the empirical theory of a perceptual self will fail to account for both (a) the immanent temporality of consciousness and (b) the unity of consciousness and therefore a substantial self.

Consonant with our interpretation of Locke as a dualist, he goes on to problematically declare, “The next thing to be considered is how bodies produce [i.e., cause] ideas in us; and that is manifestly by [material] impulse, the only way which we can conceive bodies operate in” (Essay, ii, vii, 11). But how can that be if the two substances share nothing in common?

Hume’s metaphysical dualism is much less obvious primarily because commentators concentrate on his phenomenalist rejection of the “self” as a substance. However, in the section in the Treatise titled Of the immateriality of the soul, he declares the following principle:

This maxim is that an object may exist, and yet be nowhere; and I assert, that this is not only possible, but that the greatest part of beings do and must exist after this manner. An object may be said to be no where, when its parts are not so situated with respect with each other, as to form any [material] figure or quantity; nor the whole with respect to other bodies so as to answer to our notions of contiguity or distance ... Now this is evidently the case with all our perceptions and objects, except those [caused by the physical sensations] of the sight and feeling [i.e., touch]. A moral reflection cannot be plac’d on the right or the left hand of a passion nor can a [perceptual] sound or smell be of a circular or square figure. These [mental] objects and perceptions, so far from requiring any particular place, are absolutely incompatible with it, and even by imagination cannot attribute it to them (Hume, Treatise, 235–236; italics his).

The “object exists” in our perception but not in extra-mental reality. Clearly for Hume perceptions are immaterial, they exist “no where,” they are situated in no place. And yet he is not a metaphysical dualist precisely because there is no real self for Hume. There are only mental impressions and ideas, i.e., perceptions.

Consequently in Hume’s discussion of the Achilles argument, the following answer is proposed to the
question, “Are there any immaterial beings?” and his answer is “yes,” there are, namely impressions and ideas, i.e., perceptions.

Hume argues that only impressions of color and solidity and the extended objects they compose can stand in spatial relationships. Only they, among our objects of experience, are capable of local conjunction. No other impressions, be they impressions of sensation or impressions of reflection, are extended or spatial. These non-spatial impressions confirm the maxim “an object may yet exist and be nowhere” (T, i iv 5, 235).

One could hardly have a more fundamental distinction. Since extension was meant to be the essence of the material by many philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ... it is not far-fetched to claim that Hume is implicitly here developing a fundamental and irreducible distinction between mental and physical entities.... Hume offers an argument which parallels the Achilles argument in many respects. He expressly condemns the materialists, “who conjoin all thought with extension.”

What this means is that for Hume perceptions are mental and immaterial and by explicit contrast both matter and motion are extended and material. In this respect Hume is categorized as a “Minimal Mental/Physical Dualist.” He is not, however, a dualist in the strong and “proper” Cartesian sense of the term because he denies the reality of the self as an independent substance. His position is that there are both (a) extended material objects and motion in the world and also (b) immaterial perceptions but (c) there is no immaterial soul or self. Think of it this way.

Perceptions are what we usually call thoughts. Here the term perception obviously means mental, mind-dependent, ideal and therefore immaterial. Confusion arises when one mixes the term sensation, because of the physical association of the word with material objects, and then concludes that physical objects cause mental perceptions. But Hume was perfectly aware that qua perceptions, his impressions and ideas are not physical as testified in his previous remarks (above). They are properties of the mind (absent a self) and not the body. Hume was influenced in this regard by both Malebranche and Berkeley: “Officially [Hume] renounced all the physical implications of ‘impressions’ just as Berkeley meant to do when he spoke (Principles, Section 5) of sensations as impressions in the sense of ‘imprinting an idea on the mind’ (Cummins, ibid., Section 19). Hume thus clearly elects to replace Locke’s term “sensation” because of its material associations with his own mental terms of “impressions,” “ideas,” and “perceptions” as having ideal connotations alone.

So to the critical question whether perceptions are physical or mental, Hume unequivocally answers they are mental and mind-dependent.

Are one’s thoughts in space? Normally we do not think of a thought as having a spatial existence or of existing independently of our minds. But consider this. I have just experienced a fleeting thought. Try to catch it and paint it green.

Returning to Kant, he deletes the entire first edition Paralogism section, including the Second Paralogism, which deals with the unity of consciousness and basically replaces it with a philosophically irrelevant and uninteresting criticism of Moses Mendelssohn’s proof for the immortality of the soul based on the latter’s version of Plato’s Phaedon. Gone also is the Fourth Paralogism Of Ideality, which treats the relation of the self to “outer objects,” which in actuality underpins Kant’s Copernican Revolution (B xvi) and is intended to undercut metaphysical dualism.

I have suggested, in other writings and Feeling Lonesome, that Kant felt forced into these deletions and emendations in the second edition because his positive account of the unity of self-consciousness (apperception), offered in the second edition Deduction (1787, B 131–132), was compromisingly similar to his negative criticism of the metaphysical Achilles argument, which he presented in the first edition Second Paralogism (1781, A 351–352), and which he previously disavowed as a dogmatic error, a philosophical illusion, and a noumenal extravagance. But if the Achilles is a fallacy, according to Kant, then it would appear that the B 131–132 version, which posits the transcendental unity of apperception, should be as well.

To anticipate, essentially there are two Ariadne guiding threads leading us through the maze of the
Critique. First is the question whether the ultimate premise is the transcendental unity of apperception as nestled in the following critical phrase:

For [immaterial] representations (for instance, the single words of a verse), distributed among different beings, never make up a whole thought (a verse), and it is therefore impossible that a thought should inhere in what is essentially composite. It is therefore possible only in a single [i.e., simple immaterial] substance, which not being a [material] aggregate of many, is absolutely simple. Critique, A 352

Or as Kemp Smith, quoting William James' The Principles of Psychology, states:

Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each man think of his word as intently as he will, nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence. KEMP SMITH, Commentary, 459, note 4

salvaged, as we shall learn, by realizing that his "objective deduction" is actually grounded in his abbreviated discussion of the underlying psychological "subjective deduction," which is once more dependent on (1) the "spontaneity" of the creative "productive imagination" and (2) the issue of how consciousness itself is possible? (A xvi-xvii). In a later chapter we shall see more precisely how these two questions and issues are related to the subjective and objective deductions; and why Kant excised the first edition Paralogisms; and whether it is simply a coincidence that he rewrote the entire second edition Deduction while deleting the first edition Paralogisms?

In any case, all four Paralogisms are directly and positively dependent on the Achilles premise and the accompanying paradigm of an active mind.

Most commentators generally choose the second edition Transcendental Deduction version over the first edition because Kant himself clearly wishes his work to be judged by his later account.

Schopenhauer, however, is a notable exception as he favors the premise of immanent time-consciousness emphasized in the first edition Deduction (A 99 ff.) over the unity of consciousness in the second edition (B 131–132) as being the stronger candidate for the Critique's grounding premise. As these issues and questions unfold throughout what follows, we will discover an intrinsic relationship between immanent time-consciousness, the reflexive unity of self-consciousness, and subjective loneliness, which can only proceed forward on the condition that active internal time-consciousness is the correct premise for the Critique. If I am correct in this interpretation, then obviously the consequent abandonment of time as merely a passive form of intuition proposed by Kant in the Aesthetic will have to be put aside.

My interest in the twin aspects of consciousness—reflexivity and intentionality—and their relation to loneliness began with several published articles I wrote during my early graduate studies and teaching career. The first paper deals with Plato's conception of synthetic a priori relations formulated in his dialogue, Meno, 75b, where he seeks to provide an insight into the inseparable relation between the Forms of Virtue, on the one hand, and Knowledge on the other—"Virtue is Knowledge [of the Good]"—as analogous to the proposition that "All colors are extended." To say that the relation is both necessary and universal is to say it is a priori.

The critical point is that color and extension, although they are qualitatively and quantitatively distinct are always found together. It tells us something about the world that is both necessary and universal; the two elements are existentially implicative. If one were to assert, "All colors are colors," obviously such a proposition would be tautologous and therefore analytically and trivially "true" (or valid) by the law of identity. But the statement, "All colors are extended" is synthetically true, meaningful, and informative (ampliative); it unifies two different concepts, which together form an intrinsic relation expressing an existential co-dependency, and it also offers something informative about the world and human experience independently of both.

The revolutionary nature of this Platonic synthetic a priori relation is later fruitfully exploited first by Kant and then by both Husserl and Sartre but for all three in very different ways and for quite
different purposes. In Kant, it consists in positing a synthetic a priori connection unifying two distinct concepts (subject-rx-object); relation (cause-rx-effect); as well as principles (quantity-rx-quality). These synthetic a priori categorial relations function as sets of rules and judgments as they constitute the conditions for the possibility of human consciousness. In Husserl, the synthetic a priori provides the key to how phenomenological eidetic meanings are related to each other. And in Sartre, it constitutes the ontological, i.e., existential relation between “Nothingness” or Consciousness and the reality of Being.

I would further suggest that Hegel’s categories in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic, which we will address in later chapters, as they unfold dialectically or emanate organically into his metaphor of the bud, blossom, and fruit (Phenomenology), also exhibit what basically amounts to synthetic a priori relations and processes. Hegel’s dialectical “movements” are synthetically injected with the organicity of life, growth, and development as emanating from the inside of consciousness. Kant’s categories, by contrast, are instead “statically” relational, while Hegel’s are dialectical. But both Kant’s transcendental categories and Hegel’s dialectical categories or pure structures function from the inside out. This was Leibniz’s transfiguring insight. Indeed, from where else could they possibly “arise”? The important consideration is that both for Kant’s categories and Hegel’s dialectical moments, stages, or levels of consciousness, they are the result of interior activities native to the mind and the real issue is whether Kant’s twelve relations are sufficient to account for human experience (Kant) or should they progressively emanate and grow in order to envelope all reality (Hegel).

The ultimate question between the Gods and the Giants is whether the solution to the “problem of consciousness,” and more specifically to the question “whether matter can think?” is to be discovered as arising from “spontaneous acts” from within consciousness; or whether consciousness is instead empirically, passively, and contingently caused by and dependent upon physical external forces—i.e., physiological stimulus-response patterns? These issues encouraged me to inquire more deeply into the possibility of a wider application for other synthetic a priori relations, judgments, and principles with the goal of deploying them and further assigning them to play a commanding role in advocating for a “coherence system of truth.” I believe this possibility is already implicit in Plato’s pregnant intimations describing the relation of his ethical intuitions to each other, as for example the four cardinal Forms, Justice, Moderation, Wisdom, Courage, etc., as subsumed and unified within the ultra-Form of the Good; that the Forms of Virtue are all unified by, in, and through synthetic a priori relations resulting in Plato’s intuitive principle that the multiple virtues are intrinsically bound and tied through knowledge of the Good. If we concentrate on Plato’s Divided Line passage in the Republic (509d-511e), we note once more that the individual Forms are all comprehensively unified by the Form of the Good. Philosophically, as the soul dialectically, systematically ascends toward higher and higher stages of sensory, discursive, and intuitive knowledge, it realizes that knowledge of the Good is increasingly achieved and secured through the synthesizing and binding activity of conceptual unification. In effect, Plato’s comprehensive ideal of the Good promotes an early version of the coherence theory of truth. In Plato as well as Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and Blanshard there are identical qualitatively graded steps of ascension toward increasing levels of cognition, knowledge, and reality. As a goal in Kant, this would roughly correspond to his ideal Regulative Principle of seeking the Unconditioned but at the same time distrusting it (Critique, A 509=B 537 ff.). Correspondingly, as Kemp Smith has cogently and persuasively argued at length throughout his Commentary, Kant’s transcendental system, with its virtues of synthetic a priori relations in the Critique, programmatically leads to a coherence theory of truth. Thus one does not have to be committed to a transcendent reality in order to seek comprehension and coherence in this world.

Similarly, Hegel’s dialectical use of a developmental synthetic a priori in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic also allows him to progressively evolve his system through continuously enriched circles of rational
thought; circles within larger circles. And, in the next chapter, I intend to show that Husserl’s phenomenological method also results in a web of synthetic a priori relations or structures providing him as well with his own possible account of a coherent system of eidetic meanings and rational truths replete with internal connections displayed within an infinite field of cognitive insights and intuitive possibilities. What I am contending is that once one is committed to heuristically emphasizing synthetic a priori relations, doing so discloses an incredibly wide cognitive portal well beyond Hume’s restrictive twofold classification holding between his tautologous analytic “relations of ideas” and his contingent synthetic “matters of fact.” In contrast, both Hegel’s “dialectical phenomenology” and Husserl’s very different eidetic phenomenological version, consisting of active synthetic a priori relations, both reach out beyond themselves; they are inherently intentional and transcendent; qualitatively they have somewhere to go, to develop from within their own internal resources as they are spontaneously generated. Intrinsically connected synthetic a priori meanings and relations are more than a mere accumulation of disconnected empirical facts, more than the sum of mere groupings of contingent parts. By contrast, in empiricism objects are fortuitous “aggregations,” accidental collections of sensory “parts.” Another disadvantageous feature of such empirical combinations is that the component parts are qualitatively homogeneous, which is to say that a heap of sand retains the same quality regardless of its size with the consequence that science is limited to quantities alone. This is a topic we will address further beginning in Chapter 3 and continuing.

There is, however, another very important set of cognitive distinctions concerning Plato’s division, which arises in the Divided Line passage. Already in Plato, we discover a difference between the immediacy of sensory givens versus discursive judgments, between sensation and thought, as we shall see play out as we proceed. One of the complications will be that both passive sensations, on the one hand, and active intuitions, on the other, are “immediate,” a problem because sensations are (presumably) physical, passively “given,” while by definition intuitions are “pure” or immaterial and actively thought. The viability of this distinction will be tested when we deal with immanent time-consciousness in Chapter 4.

The second article I wish to enlist focuses on the issue of solipsism in Descartes’ discussion concerning the problematic relation of the self to the external world, as well as to other selves, by maintaining that although the cogito—“I think=I am”—presents an intuitive, immediate, and direct path to the truth, it cannot similarly function as the “bridge” to the external world and/or to other selves. The “stretch” beyond the self to a world existing as distinct, separate, and apart from the reach of the self can only be vainly attempted based on the fallible power of thought to make inferences beyond the bounds of the self, transcendent to the self in regard to an independently existing external world and the existence of other selves. Contrary to the indubitable nature of intuitive knowledge in regard to our own self, mediate inferences are always dubitable as Descartes contends in his First and Second Meditations: “Of the things which may be brought within the sphere of the doubtful” and “Of the Nature of the Human Mind; and that it is more easily known than the body.” This is the locus classicus of the self’s own entrapment within the prison of solipsism.

In the article, I argue that the epistemic problem of the identity of the piece of wax (Meditation ii), whether in terms of its substantial identity it remains the same after it has been removed from a heated oven, despite all the changes in its primary and objective quantities (e.g., its measurable extensity, shape, solidity, weight, etc.), as well as its secondary and subjective qualities (e.g., color, smell, touch, etc.) only allows for a non-intuitive, inferential act of thought; for a mediate judgment; and therefore restricts us to a dubitable inference concerning its continuous identity thereby limiting us to a mere belief as opposed to certain knowledge. Consequently, these inferential judgments are very different from the “clear” (immediate) and “distinct” (definable), universal, and necessary (a priori) acts of intuitive consciousness exemplified in the case of the cogito. (Physical pains are clear and immediate, e.g., a toothache, but not distinct and definable.)
Similarly, in Descartes’ example of the passing hats and coats, which he perceives traversing by his window, he can only infer, judge, believe, or guess—but he cannot intuitively or directly know—that they are men with minds like his own and not instead automatons or robots. Their very existence, as well as their humanity, remains a doubtful inference at best; it can never reach the status of an infallible intuition and secure knowledge in the manner of the cogito. The conclusion thus follows that the “I think” entails a unique intuitive act emanating from an insular, hermitic substance, which is distinct from all other substances, assuming there are any such. (Aristotle defines a substance as that which can exist independently of everything else.) But in that case, all other existents beyond or transcendent to one’s own mind must remain forever separate and/or unknowable and continue so. Nevertheless, the important conclusion for idealists and their advocacy in behalf of a self-conscious mind—as opposed to the passive Humean paradigm of the “mind” exhibited in empiricism—is that consciousness displays two distinguishable features. First there are passively given sensations and secondly there are acts of intuition, which both serve to confirm the existence of the self and provide a criterion for the truth: whatever is both clear (immediate) and distinct (definable) is intuitively true. The conclusion then follows that there is a threefold classification between elements within consciousness: (a) immediate passive sensations; (b) infallible immediate, intuitive acts as in the cogito; and (c) fallible mediate inferential acts concerning the external world and other minds. It follows that the soul or mind possesses the ability to perform both (b) and (c), namely acts of self-cognitive intuition and the active ability of inferring connective relations as well as conducting discursive judgments. But if one is confined to the intuitive certainty of one’s own existence through direct acts of reflexive self-consciousness in the manner of Descartes, then one can only dubitably believe in the existence of an external world and other selves; in which case both solipsism and loneliness inevitably follow.

In addition, for Descartes a second problem arises in that the self is conceived, described as “pure,” i.e., vacuously empty; it has no content; only reflexive, circular activity. In this respect, it is not unlike Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover that only thinks about its own pure contentless thought; it is a purely non-sensuous activity. So at this point at the start of my philosophical journey, I could only be certain of two things: I alone exist (an intuition) and I dubitably judge or infer that there may exist, i.e., there may be an existence “beyond” my self but I cannot be sure of the latter judgment or belief.

Worse yet! When I next turned to Hume, there was a plenum of sensory impressions pervading my sphere of an indeterminate consciousness but no self. Hume’s empiricism reduces consciousness to the immediacy of mental “perceptions,” which he further resolves into simple, single impressions and their fainter copies, i.e., ideas and then he contingently appends them (the impressions) to an untethered natural feeling of belief concerning an imagined fictitious “self,” which he describes as transacted by the force of the imagination. Hume’s “self” consists of a randomly dispersed flux of vanishing impressions, tiny droplets of consciousness, with each simple, self-sufficient drop consisting of single separable impressions, and further each dot appearing momentarily as a fleeting, transient substance. Each single impression is a substance in its own right. In his famous section, Of personal identity in the Treatise, Hume reduces the “self” to a disunified aggregate or “bundle” of distinct instantaneous impressions (his “atomistic psychology”) consisting solely of isolated disunited units (his impressions). His fictional “self” represents “something” other than a substantial personal self. Hume’s “self” is merely a phenomenal, an artificial “construction” made from replaceable mental sense-data or sense-qualia (in the current empirical vernacular) fortuitously, accidentally, contingently patched together by an absent and undetermined agency (the elusive non-existent “self”) and subject to the whim of a floating imagination. All that remains in “consciousness” are tiny rapidly disappearing spots of color, intermittent squeaks of sound, and pangs of hunger that somehow manage temporally to succeed each other “with inconceivable rapidity.” As each unique impression passes by a presumed undefined “observational medium”—but not a self—which is, by his own account, entirely devoid of any connective
attachments to an observing mind or self. The perceptions appear and disappear in a Heraclitean rate of flux. There is no real or substantial self; the “self” completely dissolves with each moment of time. In effect, according to Hume, the alleged substantiality and continuity of the “self” simply consists in a psychological belief produced by an anticipatory imagination of succeeding perceptions temporally passing beyond the present moment; what he nevertheless importantly describes as a succession.

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception [i.e., impression] or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and can never observe any thing but the perception ... If any one upon serious and unprejudiced reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him ... But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement (Treatise, t, iv, vi, (pages 252–253)).

First it is critical to realize that Hume’s “observation” of perceptions that are other than the “self” are diametrically opposed to Descartes’s cogito, which is reflexively self-conscious of the self itself. Further, it is also important to note here that sensations as well as feelings are definable in terms of simple, single impressions. The mosaic portrait of the mind Hume offers paints each particular impression in the same style as Seurat’s punctilistic painting, A Sunday at la Grande Jatte. Each dot is isolated and separate from every other, a disunified aggregate of atomistic sensory points. Thus the question naturally arises, is there even a “bundle”? For how do I know—or do I?—that the bundle belongs to me and not to you; how can I be sure they are my impressions and not yours?

Against Hume’s celebrated “bundle theory” of the self, I argue that once Hume admits to a temporal succession of impressions, a flow, a stream of impressions, he has essentially forfeited his entire argument because one cannot be aware of a temporal flow, a succession of impressions without presupposing a permanent, underlying self-connecting, synthesizing, binding, and thus unifying past-present-future-time in the same temporally extended consciousness. In effect, we cannot simply reduce human consciousness—and thereby individual existence, if indeed that has any meaning without a unified temporal structure—into unrelated, discrete instants; into disconnected moments. In order to be actively self-conscious, to be a continuously self-unified consciousness, there must be a secure repetitively re-recognized unification of a temporal flow as belonging to me and to no one else. This is Kant’s point in his foundational description of the constitutive and temporal a priori syntheses of apprehension in sensory intuition, spontaneous production in the imagination, and the temporal retainment in conceptual cognition as all three moments contribute and are held together in the same consciousness.

Whatever the origin of our representations, whether they are due to the [empirical] influence of [material] outer things, or, are produced [i.e., created] through [spontaneous and autonomous] inner causes, whether they arise a priori or being appearances have an empirical origin, they must all as modifications of the mind, belong to [a temporal] inner sense. All our knowledge is thus subject to time, the formal condition of inner sense. In it they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relation [i.e., unified]. This is a general observation, which throughout what follows, must be borne in mind as being quite fundamental. KANT, CPR, A 99

It is critical to notice here that however skeptical we may be concerning the existence of an external world, the reality of other selves, and even of our own self as a continuous substance, we cannot under any circumstances or in any manner deny the existence of a (self-)conscious temporal presence or the inner flow of temporality. As Paton explains in behalf of Kant:
Our minds seem to last though time, as they do not seem to extend through space. We are immediately aware only of colours or other sense, and perhaps of bodies, as in space. If we think of minds as being in space, we do so because we ascribe to them the space occupied by the body with which they seem to be connected. On the other hand, we seem to be immediately aware of our minds as living through time, or at least to be immediately aware of the stream of our ideas as continuing through time. PATON, KME, 100–101, cf. 148; cf. KEMP-SMITH, Commentary, 241–242

The empirical “spatialization” of time is very important because it suggests that space is more fundamental than time; that time is subservient to space and thus space is promoted to the foundational status of an objective “science,” whereas the subjective temporal nature of consciousness is demoted to an ephemeral appearance, as we shall see in Chapter 4. The opposing counter suggestion made by Kant, Bergson, Husserl, and others will be twofold: (1) time-consciousness is primary and original; and (2) space is secondary and derivative. Further, time is “expressed” qualitatively whereas space is “expressed” quantitatively.

Two articles address the ultimate premise of Kant’s transcendental Analytic by discussing the importance of the Leibnizian themes of the unity and continuity of consciousness in Kant. Indeed, the origin of both principles—the unity of consciousness and its continuity—are basically Leibnizian (ultimately Plotinian) in origin and both are intended as counter-theses to the principles of materialism and empiricism. Kant, in his speculations about the self, is primarily following Leibniz’s concerns. When in the Monadology, Leibniz defines and describes the activity of the soul as a unity, identity, and continuity (Sections 1–21), as well as when he declares that “nature makes no leaps” (New Essays, iv, 16), he is arguing for the innate powers of the mind. It is not nature that refuses to entertain gaps and discontinuities but rather it is consciousness itself that is constituted as both a unified and a continuous substance. As thinking beings, we could not be self-conscious if things appeared and disappeared randomly and without warning; or if we were deprived of constant, continual temporal re-cognitions and pervasive repetitions within our minds. Lovejoy’s conception of Nature’s “great chain of Being” is not situated “somewhere out there” in the cosmos but instead it resides in the mind.

What again guarantees Kant’s trust in the mind’s ability to continuously unify and identify our human experiences as our own is once more the viability of his Copernican Revolution, which dictates that the “noumenal world” must conform to the mind’s cognitive activities and structures; “reality itself” must surrender to Kant’s “transcendental” conformative principles, imposed rules, and unifying relations, which are already lying in wait within the human mind (Critique, B xvi–xvii, B xxiii, note a). Consequently, “reality” must conform to the mind’s innate and active patterns or structures rather than having consciousness be forced to “correspond” to the independent existence of objects external to the mind. It is the mind that secures the unity, identity, and continuity, which otherwise would be randomly scattered who knows where. In the coherence theory, it is the mind that does the work; in the correspondence theory, the work is done for the mind by the external world. In the rationalist tradition of Western thought, ever since Plato and Aristotle, forms and concepts are intrinsically active. Actually even Kant’s “given forms of sensibility,” the “intuitions” of space and time suggest activity as opposed to passivity, as we shall discuss in the next chapter.

In any event, in order to make a case for the self’s sense of subjective isolation and hermitic integrity, it is necessary to determine that there is a self and that it is unified, self-aware, and “substantial.” It is both (a) the acts and (b) the structures of consciousness that actively coordinate sensory data within each of us that provides for the unity, identity, and continuity of the same selfconsciousness, of an intransigent substance.

But how did all this begin, these endless questions, confusions, and uncertainties surrounding the issue whether our thoughts are completely reducible to the brain, its sensations, and its re-active responses; or whether consciousness is immaterial and its unity
is attributable to the active ordering structures of the soul, mind, self, or ego? Why is it so complicated? Was it always so confusing from the very start of Western philosophical speculations about the soul, its thoughts, human consciousness, and the nature of man? This is precisely what David Chalmers has called “the hard problem of philosophy”: the true nature of human consciousness.

Perhaps it is best to start all over again from the very beginning and hopefully disentangle the interwoven conceptual threads in order to eventually tie them together correctly and properly.

It seems patently obvious that certain distinguishable principles are critical in understanding our selves, our surroundings, and our connection to other selves. These premises have retained their conceptual identity and integrity throughout the history of Western ideas and consciousness, although quite often students and even teachers of philosophy are unaware of their many intrinsic implications. Because of this uncertainty, it is worth taking a more careful look at Plato’s concept of self-consciousness as an active, self-contained, internal dialogue, which he briefly but succinctly summarizes in two important dialogues, the Theaetetus and the Sophist.

Socr: And do you accept my description of the process of thinking? Theaet: How do you describe it?
Socr: As a discourse that the mind carries on with itself about any subject it is considering ... I have a notion that, when the mind is thinking, it is simply talking to itself, asking questions and answering them, and saying Yes or No. When it reaches a decision—which may come slowly or in a sudden rush—when doubt is over and the two voices affirm the same thing, then we call that its 'judgment.' So I should describe thinking as [an internal] discourse, and judgment as a statement pronounced, not aloud to someone else, but silently to oneself.
Theaet: I agree (Theaetetus, 189e–190a).

In this description, the soul or mind is both immaterial and active. The “two voices” indicates reflexive self-consciousness; it is able to be self-aware of thinking its own thoughts in a decidedly two-fold manner. And the purpose of its thinking is intentionally directed to reach a decision, a judgment.

Again:
Str: And next, what of thinking and judgment and appearing? Is it now not clear that all these things occur in our minds both as false and as true?
Theaet: How so?
Str: You will see more easily if you begin by letting me give you an account of their nature and how each differs from the other.
Theaet: Let me have it.
Str: Well, thinking and discourse are the same thing, except that what we call thinking is, precisely, the inward dialogue carried on by the mind with itself without spoken sound.
Theaet: Certainly.
Str: Whereas the [temporal] stream which flows from the mind through the lips with sound is called discourse (Sophist, 263D-E).

Clearly in this passage thought or consciousness is described as an internal temporal flow or stream.

In addition, there are two other passages in the Theaetetus, that provide foundational insights into the issues surrounding both (a) the activity of thought and (b) its passive contents. The first metaphor analogizes the mind or consciousness to a “good thick slab of wax” upon which sensory impressions imprint their likenesses, like a signet ring upon wax (Theaetetus, 194b-195b). This metaphor is similar in all major respects to Aristotle’s later paradigm of the soul or mind as a blank tablet upon which sensory experiences “write” (De Anima, 430a). However, according to Plato, if this is our operational cognitive model, then it fails to explain how errors can occur, since the first and now weakened, passively given sensory “wax impressions” would be superseded, repressed, or even effaced by the more recent and stronger wax imprints=sensations =perceptions. If this is the case, then how are we to account for mistakes? What is lacking, what remains unaccounted for in this materialist and empiricist attempt to solve the “problem of error” is the
activity of the mind both to relate, and to compare, and to contrast distinct judgments with and against each other in the mind, in consciousness in order (a) to deliberate on the differences; (b) to reflexively consider the options; and only then (c) to decide, to choose between them which wax-sensations or wax-impressions are “true” or closer to the mark. Such a power or capacity can only reside in the transcending ability of thought to overcome the immediacy of sensations, a temporal activity, which is able to reach beyond the merely immediate and passive sensations and to reflexively consider the several alternatives and then intentionally, purposively choose.

Later in the dialogue, Socrates analogizes memory to an aviary in which the owner has secured in his possession a number of birds each representing individual pieces of tentatively assumed “knowledge.” When the possessor needs to “know” something, then he can actively catch, inspect, and select, i.e., judge each of the birds as the most appropriate or likely candidate and then hopefully select the correct one (Theaetetus, 197b-199b). In Plato’s analogy, the owner may still be mistaken, but clearly in such cases the soul is an active participant and by comparing this paradigm with the prior empiricist passive model of consciousness, the tabula rasa model, we can see that the latter is unable to account for either knowledge or errors, the first because without a temporal consciousness the incoming sensations are immediately obliterated and replaced by the new ones; there is only a present; and therefore nothing to compare; and the second obstacle persists because the option of choosing certainty from error is non-existent; there is only a now and a pervasive absence of any evaluative mediating judgments capable of passing between truth and falsity, yea or nay.

The critical problem in philosophy is not so much how can we grasp what is real—insects do it instinctively—but how it is possible to make mistakes if the mind is passive and at the complete mercy of the incoming stimuli; if we are only capable of passively recording sensory inputs; if we are merely responsive and reactive, how can we ever be mistaken? Lower organisms, insects for example, simply react instinctively to stimuli; they cannot make mistakes, they cannot make judgments; they are unable to select one option over another or to make assessments concerning danger or taking chances, nor do they need to do so in order to survive. They do not exhibit levels of consciousness. But humans are primarily creative beings and certainly not simply instinctive creatures. The ability to make mistakes and to improve on them is the defining characteristic of higher order animals.

Two millennia after Plato, we might remember that Descartes invokes not only doubt and deliberation in the context of judgments concerning truth and error (Meditations I and II) but he also caps them both with “free will” precisely in order to “account” for the precipitous tendency of humans to rush to conclusions and therefore commit errors (Meditation IV, Of the True and the False). I am not so much anxious to endorse and attach the Cartesian “solution” of free will to the problem of error, of course, but I am determined to be critical of the severe limitations of naïve empiricism and the reduction of the “mind” to the brain and its attendant sensations. How do we make mistakes in empiricism? Is it really the case that we can leave the matter in the hands of passive and immediate sensations?

In response I wish instead to promote a viable alternative, namely by summoning the reflexive nature self-consciousness; its active ability to deliberate by forming relations of comparison and contrast; and also its transcendent power of intentionally, purposefully allowing the mind to select and choose between alternatives, thus enabling the self to draw both “true” and “false” conclusions.

There are four issues in regard to what the Platonic dialogues can teach us and what they cannot in going forward. The first is that Plato, as a metaphysical dualist, is unable to bridge the divide between (a) physical things; (b) active immaterial souls; and (c) unchanging eternal Forms. In the Parmenides, which presents a youthful Socrates conversing with the elderly philosopher, it quickly becomes clear that insurmountable difficulties lie before Socrates’ effort to account for the proposed “interaction” of particular physical things to partake, share, or merge with the essences of the
eternal Forms because of their radical differences as substances. Similarly, in the Timaeus, Plato’s cosmological myth, he attempts to use Space (chora) as a mediating, transitional link, a tertium quid between a world of physical objects and the immaterial Forms. As such, Space is described as an existent reality, the “nurse or womb of all Becoming,” an empty receptacle, a pure matrix of possibilities in which objects appear (while Time is described as “the moving image of Eternity” during which transient events take place). As such Space is without qualities. It represents a pure objectless extension. But the problem is that as an intermediary “substance” connecting things and Universals, although (a) Space in Itself as a “bastard” Form shares with the immutable Essences the quality of immateriality and likewise shares (b) with things the attribute of extension, nevertheless physical objects cannot “partake” (metechein) in the reality of the Forms because Forms and material objects share no attribute in common. Thus, Plato’s vain hope “in like knowing like” is laid to rest and there is no path or bridge that can be established in order to overcome the “problem” of metaphysical dualism.

Matters appear more hopeful, however, in the middle dialogues, in terms of “like knowing like” by virtue that both active immaterial souls and the unchanging immaterial Forms share a common quality (Phaedo, 79b-80e). We know from Plato’s middle dialogues, e.g., the Phaedo and Republic that the soul is able to partake in pure, imageless, non-empirical meanings. We know that in metaphysical idealism the “external world” is transformed into a system of mental, ideal concepts and structures. In the next chapter, we shall consider three philosophers who promote a version of ethical idealism through meanings and relations without any reference to transcendent Platonic Forms.

Thus a secondary issue that arises is whether there are imageless, nonsensory concepts at all. For instance, Plato considers that in the world of nature, no two things, for example two sticks, are ever “absolutely equal” and yet we possess the concept of perfect equality or conceptual identity and that the mind is able to formulate the meaning and relation of absolute equality as produced by the internal resources of the mind itself (Phaedo, 74b-74d). In any event, as we continue we shall see that there are both imageless meanings and relations as well. These are all issues we shall have to consider.

For Kant, of course, imageless categories serve as relational activities constituting the faculty of the Understanding. They are indirectly validated, justified, or “deduced”; they are deemed to be a priori, i.e., necessary and universal active forms of thought precisely because they are conditions, presuppositions, assumptions for the very possibility—and therefore actuality—of human self-consciousness and experience. They are described as constitutive, connective acts of self-consciousness precisely because of their capacity of providing active relational structures within consciousness. The problem then is to defend cognitive relations as ideal forms or structures of thought without having (a) to appeal to an independent or transcendent realm of pre-existing universal forms in the manner of Plato; or (b) to appeal to empirical sensations in the fashion of Locke and Hume. This can only be done if the ideal meanings and relations are generated from within the mind itself. In short, meanings and relations do not exist independently of minds and they are not “given” by sensory experience. In what follows, we shall compare and contrast these metaphysical and epistemological options in order to determine their respective plausibilities.

Second, the Platonic soul is self-conscious, apperceptive, and metaphorically actively circular; it initiates its own activity from within its self and reflexively returns those thoughts back to its self as their source; it thinks about its own thoughts and knows what it is thinking about. In the context of the history of ideas and consciousness, the principle and model of reflexive self-consciousness is shared by all dualists, rationalists, and subjective and objective idealists from Plato through Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Descartes, Cudworth, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Royce, and as we shall see even Husserl and others as well. Its clear formulation and intrinsic implications are expressed in the following illuminating quotation from J.N. Findlay’s introductory essay to Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind.
The notion of Geist (Mind or Spirit) is of course central in Hegel. It is the descendant of the Kantian Unity of Self-Consciousness and of the Absolute Ego of Fichte and Schelling. It also claims a collateral source in the Aristotelian nous which, in knowing the [conceptual] form of an object, thereby knows itself [Meta., 1075a] and which, in its highest phases, may be described as a pure [immaterial] thinking upon thinking. The Greek influence on Hegel’s thought is all-important from the beginning but the roots of that thought remain Kantian and Fichtean. Kant had made plain that we require mind [i.e., conceptual] objects, unities which proceed according to a rule [according to the categories and principles] and which can be reidentified on many occasions, in order to have that unity in our conscious minding which makes us enduring conscious selves, and which enables us to be conscious of ourselves as self-conscious. In the conscious constitution of objects, athwart the flux of time, we have the necessary foundation for the latterly and hammered home by Husserl.

It is important to note that Professor Findlay is underlining the universal corelational connection between the conceptual subject and its object. It is a fundamental relation that is as crucial for Kant as it will be for Freud, as important for epistemology as it will be for psychology. It is critical that consciousness is constituted from within rather than being caused from without and the reference to "the flux of time" and Husserl is another connection we will pursue with profit.

Also significant is that the rationalist use of the terms self-consciousness and "reflection," as opposed to the empiricist employment of the terms perception and "reflection," are very different and must be carefully distinguished from each other. For Locke, both outer and inner "reflections" are always materially and causally initiated by external sensory experiences, e.g., physically seeing a tree (an "outer" perception) or feeling hungry (an "inner" perception) and they are always contingently dependent on sensory stimuli involving receptive bodily organs. Thus, outer visual sightings and inner depletions of nourishment are merely passive observations of "objects," "events," or previous "states of affairs," e.g., memories present to consciousness. Seeing trees and feeling pangs of hunger are both perceptions, passive observational experiences of physical states of affairs attributed to the body. For Locke and Hume as well, "sensations," "ideas" or "impressions," qua immediate modes of consciousness, cannot refer either directly or indirectly back to the self in order to form a self-conscious principle of unity. I cannot reflexively think about what I am thinking. The self can only experience its sensations but never its self. Perceptions and reflections are caused by and directed at specific observations, either external or internal but both "reference" the body. They are caused by experiencing particular precedent physical objects or feelings that cannot be in any manner self-referential; experience is an empirical observation; a response to externally caused sense data passively registered, experienced—as opposed to an actively constituted relation—and it is always restricted to prior sensory experiences, which can never "go beyond" their circumscribed immediacy; it is a perception of externally produced sensations (Locke) or impressions (Hume). If one has never experienced the taste of a pineapple, it cannot be conceptually communicated to them. The sensation or impression always precedes the "thought" or idea. Consciousness can experience seeing a tree or being hungry during the occurring sensations; or later having the mnemonic reflection of, the memory of the sensations having occurred. Sensation and impressions are, of course, the "contents," "ingredients," or "elements" in conscious thinking. But the critical point is that the materialist and empiricist paradigm of consciousness completely negates any possibility of a self-conscious reflexive activity. Perceptions refer to sensations; reflections refer to the self; reflections mirror, correspond, copy and re-present impressions; but reflexion is self-referential. In the materialist dictionary of Hobbes, for example, a "phantasm," is a bodily sensation, an appearance caused by a physical object impinging on the body’s sense organs and imagined images are decaying sensations; there are physical events at both ends. Again, in the vocabulary of Locke and Hume, perceptions are mental entities. In Chapter 7, we shall confront
more directly the “paradox of the unobserved observer.”

It follows that in the empiricist paradigm, the concentration is on the impressions at the total exclusion of the self; all that is perceived are impressions, which are collectively uniquely various in terms of time, space, shape, strength, and circumstance; separable, distinct, and non-repeatable at each moment of time. Particular sensations momentarily exist and vanish. Impressions are essentially discontinuous, whereas the activity of the self is essentially continuous; impressions are non-temporal, i.e., instantaneous, while the self is temporally sustained. In strict empiricism, the “self” is irrelevant, nonexistent. In Hume’s analysis, consciousness is a dream without a dreamer. But if there is no self, there can be no loneliness.

The empiricist paradigm is basically linear and externally determined from the outside by physical motions striking the body and transmitting impulses to the brain resulting in re-actions like tiny billiard balls bouncing off cushions. The entire force of the interaction can be quantitatively measured and described as an external spatial occurrence even when the model is applied to events “inside” the human body, to feelings such as anger and fear. This is the same scientific paradigm employed by the ancient Epicurean adherents and continues today in our contemporary neurosciences. In mechanistic terms, it is no different than the atomism of Leucippus and Democritus. On the physicalist paradigm, without external stimuli, the brain lies dormant, in relative repose, the jagged lines of the encephalograph machine mutely repeating monotonously and meaninglessly the rhythm of the heart and the sleeping repository stirrings of the brain.

By contrast, self-consciousness in the dualist/rationalist/idealist traditions is active and circular. It is spontaneously generated from the mind’s own internal resources. The synthetic a priori relations, Kant’s categories, create a structured ordering, which is superimposed on the incoming “sensory” data. The relations in turn form recognizable patterns; but they are not the products of sensations, although they work upon and “apply” to sensations in the sense that the sensory “material,” i.e., the mental contents or elements are forced to conform to an active epistemic order imposed on the “material” present to the mind. Again, consciousness is constituted from within the mind rather than caused—and determined—from without the mind.

As Professor Findlay underscores (above), at its most basic and essential level in Kant, the concept of the “self” is mutually related to and distinguished from the concept of an “object”; it is self-related, self-mediated (cf. Critique, A 107–110). Sensations are the “content” of consciousness and not its activity. Sensations alone cannot be self-aware but unlike particles of matter, which are gravitationally attracted to each other, phenomenal sensations are not. Their activity is chemical, electrical, and synaptic as opposed to gravitational. Further, relations are not sensations. Blue and loud are sensations but not relations. And there is no sensation of the causal relation itself. Relations are spontaneous products, creations of the mind. (We shall have quite a bit more to say about the word “spontaneity” throughout the text.) The conceptual relation of causality derives from the mind, not from nature. The empiricists, following, Hume substitute the imagination for reason and belief for knowledge. But there is no sensation of resemblance or contiguity. They are relations. Although the mind requires the existence of an external world, it is not identical or even compatible with the external world. The first is physical and the second is mental. Interestingly, Hume declares that the real nature of the human body is unknown and the brain is left unmentioned throughout the Treatise.

Third, according to the Platonic model, human consciousness is intentional, transcendent, decisional, purposeful, and judgmental as Plato intimates in the quotations selected above. It deliberates with an “end in view,” while engaged in the active process of eventually plumping down for a resolution, a decision; it is teleological in intent; it points toward resolving issues and initiating an action beyond the deliberative process of considering options. Self-consciousness is one “aspect” of consciousness and intentionality is another but both are synthetically and a priori actively anchored in the same self. In
opposition, the materialist and empiricist model is limited to a stimulus-response model of behavior. Physical sensations merely cause re-actions, unthinking responses in snails as well as in man.

As we shall see, both self-consciousness (Kant) and intentionality (Husserl) are active. In terms of metaphors, the first is circular and the second is unidirectional; the first activity turns inwardly and the second points outwardly. The difference is that although both sources emanate, erupt, or spontaneously arise from within the soul, they travel in different directions. In terms of Plato’s description of the activity of thought and thinking as decisional and Aristotelian’s as deliberative both acts are incorporated in the following succinct Peripatetic dictum: “The intellect by itself, however, moves nothing; but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, vi, Ch. 3, 35–37). In effect, Aristotle’s notion of choice includes desire first and deliberation second, both wanting and thinking in order to act. For Aristotle, consciousness is both motivational and cognitive, both practical and theoretical. It is structured, as W.D. Ross describes it, as a two-fold activity. It can be characterized either as desiderative reasoning or rational deliberation. The “means” are reflexively considered but the end, the goal is always intentional.

The purpose of thinking is either: (a) to know what is true; or (b) to do what is wise or good, or to make what is beautiful or useful. In short, consciousness is always purposeful, i.e., intentional, as opposed to outwardly mechanical as in empiricism. In Plato, ultimately the end consists in the soul’s desired unity with the supra-Form of the Good. In Aristotle’s case, the goal is always human well-being or happiness. In this manner, Aristotle seconds Plato’s suggestion in the Theaetetus by linking thoughts that are intentionally aimed at arriving at a decision and discharged into actions. When combined these “rationalist” descriptions are diametrically opposed to the passive tabula rasa paradigm of classical empiricism (although originally derived from Aristotle, De Anima, 430a) and the Epicurean mechanistic model of behaviorism currently championed by the “cognitive behavioral” sciences and the neurosciences of our own day.

Fourth, Plato’s view on language as expressed by Socrates in the Cratylus is basically that no safe conclusions can be reached from a study of the etymology of the name to the nature of the thing for which the name stands. Consequently, Plato’s attitude toward language and linguistics is rather unfavorable and little can be learned from their study. For Plato active thoughts, imageless concepts, and intuitive insights are very different from the artificiality of languages and the conventional use of speech, which fail in conveying the elaborate and intricate modes of consciousness upon which we have been commenting. Concepts and meanings will always outrun both words and language. The highest form of knowledge for Plato is universal, rational, necessary, conceptual, and intuitive as opposed to particular, empirical, contingent, sensory, and transient. Verbal expressions are always handicapped by their indirect modes of representation. Initially there is the material object; then the visual representation; then the conceptual meaning; then the written symbol or nominal term applied, which is long-removed from the original object or reality and virtually “lost in translation.” There is a world of difference between a meaning versus a symbolic sign and its indirectly mediated relation to the meaning’s innermost reality. Thus, although in the Theaetetus and Sophist passages I cited above, Plato connects thoughts and discourse, consciousness and language, we know from the corpus of his work that consciousness and language are essentially opposites. Language at best serves as an artificial tool designed for pragmatic and classificatory uses as it is applied to the lower orders of reality diagrammed in the Divided Line passage. As opposed to the discursive conceptual mediacy of mathematical and geometric knowledge (third level), for example, language is first applied to sensations and limited to opinion (doxa). Second it describes tangible, physical objects, which lead to belief (pistis), both of which deal with the particular and the sensory. Thus, the implementation of languages is basically practical and technical. Languages in general simply serve as instruments of communication in order to do things as the ancient Epicureans long ago maintained (Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, V, 1028–90). Various languages are basically conventional tools artificially invented for useful purposes.
value of different languages is always pragmatic; they serve to get things done. Compare Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, Sections 1–5. As we proceed, we shall see that linguistically oriented philosophers will fail to account adequately for the primacy and interiority of reflexive consciousness. For example, for both Bergson and Husserl the use of language will be undercut by the fundamental qualitative immediacy of intuitions and eidetic insights. For both, consciousness is primary and original and language is secondary and derivative. Accordingly, words are viewed as limited and imprecise instruments, clumsy vehicles of communication used to distinguish things from each other only to be set apart and left hanging disconnectedly, separated from each other. The permutations and vagaries of language are learned behaviors; the words are mere nominal symbols and signs and accordingly their “nuanced meanings” vary from society to society and even from person to person as any competent anthropologist will be pleased to tell us. They are relative to various environments and specific situations. In short, language is a poor handmaiden to consciousness, thought, conceptualization, and the richness of intuitive insights. Today, in the Anglo-speaking world, the armies of linguistic analysts and analytic philosophers hold the field, but we shall soon see their hegemony challenged.

In terms of the history of ideas and consciousness, an important paradigm shift occurs in the seventeenth-century as Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume embark on an empirical strategy to define the essence of man in terms of his use of language as opposed to reason, to discredit the definition of man as “the rational animal.” Accordingly, the Battle between the Giants and the Gods turns on the pivotal question whether the empiricists or the rationalists are more capable of capturing “the truth of consciousness” and one of the important issues revolves around the question, which is more primary: consciousness or language? As we proceed, we will address this critical issue in different chapters when we discuss at greater length the philosophies of Henri Bergson and Edmund Husserl. For the time being, let us leave the issue in the subtle minds of the Platonists and the capable hands of the Epicureans.

Finally, let us turn now to Plato’s dualist metaphysics, for an obvious difficulty looms before us in the form of the classic “problem of metaphysical dualism.” If one defines (1) the mind as an immaterial, active substance and (2) the material world as an extended and inert physical entity (Descartes), then it follows that the first cannot possibly (a) know of the existence of the second or (b) interact, since they share no attribute, accident, property, or predicate in common. Rousseau regards this paradox as a testimony to the inexplicable mystery of God’s Power and Will, which can only be appreciated through Christian fideism (The Faith of a Savoyard Vicar). But that is Rousseau.

By contrast, in what follows I wish to agree with David Hume that the (seeming) paradox, the inexplicable dilemma of how immaterial perceptions and the material world can be connected, is best addressed as one of the unfathomable mysteries of Nature—rather than religion and faith. In light of Hume’s principle of radical empirical contingency—that “anything can produce anything”—he is able to draw a distinction between on the one hand (1) an extended material world of objects and motion and, on the other hand (2) the presence of immaterial mental impressions and ideas, in a word, perceptions in the mind. Thus he declares that as far as “matters of fact” are concerned, “any thing can produce any thing.” As he expresses it, “reason as distinguished from experience can never make us conclude that a cause or productive quality is requisite to every beginning of existence” (Hume, Treatise i, iii, xiv; page 157). Notice his problematic use of the concept of quality as opposed to quantity. Perceptions are qualities, not quantities. Causes, as material, are always expressed in quantitative terms but not perceptions. Further he declares that “Any thing can produce anything. Creation, annihilation, motion, reason, volition; all these may arise from one another, or from any other [material] object we can imagine” (Hume, Treatise, 173). Hume is here suggesting that matter under certain circumstances can spontaneously “produce” or result in perceptions.

[T]o consider the matter a priori, any thing may produce any thing, and that we shall
never discover a reason, why any object may or may not be the cause of any other, however great, or however little the resemblance may be betwixt them. HUME, Treatise. 247

Further, Hume goes on to assert that “there is no absolute or metaphysical necessity, that every beginning of existence should be attended with an object [as cause].” So it is conceivable, according to Hume, that particular physical causes may have very different and distinct mental effects. Thus not only are effects without causes possible, or that “nothing” may produce “something,” but also various causes may produce very different effects, effects that are completely dissimilar in nature from their antecedent “causes” or better expressed “attendant circumstances.” Hume’s theory of the radical contingency holding between ideas and things was heavily influenced by Malebranche’s “occasionalist” doctrine. Malebranche argues that the “interaction” between the thought of my moving my arm and the actuality of my arm physically moving is contingent on God coordinating the intervention. (Basically, this argument derives from Descartes’ contention that God continually preserves, i.e., re-creates the entire universe and every event in it.) Accordingly, every empirical “connection” is radically contingent. For aught I know a thrown pebble could extinguish the sun; a bitten apple could turn into a puff of smoke. Hume’s ruling metaphysical principle in these arguments and contentions is that, within the world of Nature, in terms of “matters of fact,” whatever does not imply a logical or metaphysical contradiction is imaginable, possible, and conceivable. These three descriptive terms are essentially synonymous. Accordingly, one can imagine conditions or situations in which (1) mental impressions, ideas, and perceptions are contingently present along with and/or associated with (2) certain physical conditions or circumstances. Indeed for Hume the contingent possibility of immaterial states of consciousness, i.e., mental perceptions existing “beside,” “along with,” or “accompanied by” material causes is not only conceivable but actual. Simply put, certain material combinations can produce immaterial, mental perceptions. And later, in the Enquiry, Hume continues to insist “That the contrary of every [empirical] matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction.” Since (a) the cause and (b) the effect are distinct and contingent existences, it follows that something material can cause, produce, result, or condition an immaterial entity; that there is no necessary “relation” between a cause and what may conceivably follow; and that—under certain circumstances—material conditions can contingently evolve or eventuate to produce immaterial existences. Accordingly, Hume advises us that we must separate the question concerning the [material] substance of the mind [presumably the brain] from that concerning its thought; and that confining ourselves to the latter question we find by the comparing of their ideas, that thought and [material] motion are different from each other, and by experience, that they are constantly united; which being all the circumstances, that enter into the idea of cause and effect, when apply’d to the operations of matter, we may certainly conclude, that [matter and] motion may be, and actually is the cause of thought and [mental] perception Treatise., I, iv, v; page 248

Hume’s radical separation between (a) matter and mind; the physical body and its mental perceptions; causes and effects is heavily influenced by Malebranche’s “occasionalist” principle, namely that there is no possible rational or empirical connection between the two sets of occurrences. By the same token, Schopenhauer will similarly follow Malebranche’s Eclaircissement and Hume as well in exploiting this principle of distinction in the World as Will and Representation and Bergson will follow suit in Time and Free Will.

Again, students of Hume are often misled by his empiricism to “connect” it, i.e., misinterpret it as materialism. But the first is an epistemic principle and the other a metaphysical one. They do not have to be mutually implicative or even dependent on each other as Hume demonstrates. Again, materialism is a metaphysical theory that reduces all reality to matter and motion. On the other hand, phenomenalism is an epistemological principle, which states that “the external world,” “the causal maxim,” and “other selves” are merely constructions
of mental sense data and there is no problem in asserting that both exist.

The dualism illustrated above in Hume is between matter and motion on the one side and passive mental perceptions (impressions and ideas) on the other. Perhaps for Hume rather than saying that extended matter is the “product” of thought, it would be more precise to say that it is the “accompaniment” of thought. Similarly, H.D. Lewis essentially agrees with Hume’s conditional dualistic principle, although he does not cite Hume.

There seems, therefore, to be no limit to the disparities we may find between causes and effects, and there is no reason at all to rule out ab initio the possibility of interaction between mind and body when these are affirmed to be radically different in nature ... We find that certain sorts of things happen, others not; and it seems perversely conceived on our part to deny the facts as we seem patently to find them, namely that mind is distinct from body and that these do affect one another, simply because we are unable to say how this comes about or is possible.

But as we proceed, we shall see that the problem of the “coupling” of (a) an extended material realm of physical objects and (b) an unextended mental sphere of the mind is the problem of how to “connect” (a) passive re-active brains versus (b) the spontaneity of consciousness “to” or “with” each other; how the two can be meaningfully related to each other. Doesn’t matter get “in the way” of mind?

More recently, Noam Chomsky in his article citing my Achilles of Rationalist Arguments, which discusses Bishop Stillingfleet’s disputation with Locke on whether God could have conceivably “created thinking matter,” argues the same conclusion I had reached three-and-a-half decades ago in companionship with Hume.

In Hume’s judgment, Newton’s greatest achievement was that while he “seemed to draw the veil from some of the mysteries of nature, he shewed at the same time the imperfections of the mechanical [materialist] philosophy; and thereby restored nature’s ultimate secrets to that obscurity, in which they ever did and ever will remain.” On different grounds, others reached similar conclusions. Locke, for example, had observed that motion has effects “which we can in no way conceive motion able to produce”—as Newton had in fact demonstrated shortly before. Since we remain in “incurable ignorance of what we desire to know” about matter and its effects, Locke concluded, no “science of bodies [is] within our reach” and we can only appeal to “the arbitrary determination of that All-wise Agent who has made them to be, and to operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak understanding to conceive.”... [Similarly] Descartes claimed to have explained the phenomena of the material world in mechanistic terms, while also demonstrating that the mechanical philosophy is not all-encompassing, not reaching to the domain of mind—again pretty much in accordance with the common-sense dualistic interpretation of oneself and the world around us 167–168).

We may therefore legitimately, or at least plausibly, conclude that there are certain (and possibly many) metaphysical issues that by their very nature absolutely defy strictly rational or empirical solutions. Why is there something rather than nothing, as Parmenides, Leibniz, Fichte, Schopenhauer, and William James inquire? Is not the existence of this world as possible as its nonexistence? As James remarks, “the unrest which keeps the never stopping clock of metaphysics going is the thought that the non-existence of this world is just as possible as its existence.” Consider also Heidegger’s formulation of the same sentiment in the opening paragraph to his Introduction to Metaphysics, which begins with “The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics.”

Why are there beings rather than nothing? That is the question. “Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?” Many never run into this question at all, if running into the question means not only hearing it and reading the interrogative sentence as uttered, but asking the question; that is taking a stand on it, posing it, compelling oneself into the state of this question.

To this question, no reliable or satisfying answer can be given, not by science, not by reason, and
not by blind faith. And chance is hardly a compelling or even a satisfying philosophical answer—although perhaps it is a good guess.

The doctrine of materialism is a metaphysical “worldview”; it is not a science. By its very essence, the assertion that the nine (or eight or ten) planets would continue to revolve around the sun in the absence of any sentient life in the universe is an unverifiable proposition in principle; by its very terms it cannot be tested, confirmed, or verified. It is well beyond the protection of positivism. What sense would it make to declare that if all living organisms (including plants and sea urchins) in the universe were extinguished, the sun would still shine and the days would be warmer than the nights? In principle, there is no rational or empirical way to confirm or disconfirm these assertions. They are each and every one of them absolutely unverifiable. And so are the ultimate metaphysical principles of dualism and idealism. Both are underived premises, or “first principles.” According to Pascal, “The heart has its reasons, which the head (reason) does not know” (Pensées). For Fichte, ultimate assumptions are spontaneous acts of volition determined by our subjective “interests and inclinations” (Science of Knowledge). And for William James, they are decisional convictions decided by our “passional natures” (“The Will To Believe”).

There is no answer to the question why something exists rather than nothing any more than there is a solution to how our minds and matter interact, if they share nothing in common. It seems manifestly clear that both matter and mind, under certain obviously compatible conditions and circumstances within our commonly shared world, not only can be but actually are found “paired” together, alongside one another, and seemingly acting in “consonance” with each other just as sight and sound can act in concert despite their qualitatively functional differences and diversities. One cannot produce colors from sounds or sounds from colors, although both clearly serve the human body and the human mind. No matter how or by what manipulative adjustments we try to alchemically quantitatively maneuver sounds we cannot produce sights; and sights cannot cause sounds. As Hume perspicaciously points out, there is no causal explanation of how, nor any metaphysical reason why, when material objects strike each other there is both a physical reaction and a psychic awareness “within” our mind. Why is there motion at all? And there is no reason or explanation why the thought of volitionally moving my arm ends in my arm mechanically moving. Apart from Malebranche’s occasionalism, Leibniz’s preestablished harmony, and Berkeley’s immaterialism and his plea that “we see all things in God,” all these ad hoc explanations, adjustments, and accommodations are all fideistically and desperately predicated on the imposition of divine interventions or more literally intrusions. But in the end, we are simply left with either a supernatural or a natural mystery.

Finally, there is one vital activity of consciousness that we cannot ascribe to Plato but nevertheless it is critical to all that follows: the concept of spontaneity. In Chapter 3, which treats the freedom of self-consciousness, we will learn that Leibniz is the first to use the term “spontaneity” explicitly in conjunction with consciousness and in turn connects it and attributes it to Aristotle’s notion of intelligence thereby recruiting it in a highly important and technical philosophical sense. Others simply assume that self-consciousness is in general active and that it stands diametrically opposed to the inertness of matter. But with Leibniz, spontaneity assumes a critical meaning; it intends something very special; a sui generis act. Because Leibniz’s monads, as soul substances, are absolutely self-enclosed and windowless, they are logically and metaphysically forced to exclude any conceivable contact or interaction from outside or beyond themselves. It therefore necessarily follows that any activity of the psyche/soul/mind/cogito/monad/ego can only be initiated from within consciousness. In what follows, we shall document the manner in which Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Bergson, Husserl, Royce, and Sartre will enlist this critical concept in their philosophies.

In brief, then, I propose that the metaphysical—as opposed to the religious—philosophies of dualism and subjective idealism perform a more credible job of providing insight into the intricacies of human consciousness as opposed to the reductivist strategies and methodologies of materialism,
mechanism, determinism, empiricism, phenomenalism, behaviorism, and the neurosciences.

Apart from the foregoing considerations, and they are admittedly speculations albeit incredibly important ones, there will always remain an unfathomable and impermeable factor underlying the hidden and often alienating powers of human emotions and cognitions. Kant was right. The metaphysical nature of man is such that he will always search in vain and never reach the unknown origins of our feelings and thoughts and values. But the endless seduction to seek both below and beyond in order to unravel, and understand human consciousness and reality in our search for answers and solutions will continue to defy empirical, rational, mystical, and fideistic penetration.

After completing the Achilles study and mapping the progress of the simplicity argument in its four traditional guises, I was surprised to discover four new applications for its immaterialist principle. The new contexts concern an establishment for: (5a) a doctrine of “absolute” meanings and relations in consciousness, with a special application to epistemological and moral idealism; and (5b) a foundation for both an idealist and phenomenalist interpretation of space; (6) the freedom or transcendence of consciousness; (7) the establishment of immanent time-consciousness (in contrast to the Aristotelian and Newtonian conception of time as an objective measurement of material objects traveling through space); and (8) the drawing of a critical distinction within consciousness between its qualitative and intensive features versus its quantitative and extensive features.

Accordingly, I propose to continue my historical and conceptual tracing of these newly discovered affiliations. By “trace,” I also intend to indicate their intricate conceptual developments and consequences. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the immaterialist premise—although now recruited for a novel set of distinguishable conclusions—essentially remains what A.O. Lovejoy designates as a “unit-idea.” In other words, the “idea,” or in the present context, the principle that the human mind is both (a) immaterial and (b) active remains the same and retains the same meaning. The premise cannot change, although to be sure, there are significant variations between the quartet of inferences we will now examine and their conclusions. All eight versions—the previous four as well the quartet of new ones—are developed in conjunction with the same identical premise. In terms of the History of Ideas discipline, as Lovejoy observes, the concept of God in Western thought is not a stable “unit idea,” since it conceptually shifts from theism in St. Augustine, to pantheism in Spinoza, and deism in Lord Herbert of Cherbury, with each author manifesting very different conceptions and definitions of the Deity. But what is so unique and permanent about the Achilles premise-arguments-conclusions is first that its major assumption—that human consciousness is both immaterial and active—remains unchanging; and second that like a giant cosmic octopus its tentacles consisting of no less than eight distinct conclusions grip both man and reality. In addition, what is equally and doubly important is that all eight conclusions agree in demonstrating a single universal conclusion, namely, that senseless matter cannot think!

The goal of the present study, then, is to show that there is a conceptual constellation of intrinsically related problems and proposed solutions, which all stem from the same premise, but at the same time each conclusion is distinguished and stands alone from the seven other proofs.

One must appreciate the far-reaching influence of these eight arguments in order to achieve an adequate understanding of the ancient, modern, and contemporary periods in Western philosophical thought and its developmental trends toward dualism, rationalism, idealism, phenomenology, and existentialism. A primary value of this study, then, is to distinguish and disentangle separate lines of thought, aspects of argumentation that have been heretofore confounded and confused—if even recognized. Hence, I propose to treat these novel demonstrations in separate chapters although frequently the arguments overlap and interweave with each other. Thus an author may present a combination of Achilles proofs in the same work or even in the same passage. However, my
justification for separating the arguments into their multiple uses is to clarify the issues involved. The fact that historically particular authors have enlisted the premise for one thesis but not for another, whereas other writers have recruited it for several conclusions, clearly testifies to the separateness of its employments. In this respect, the present exploration into the discipline of the history of ideas and consciousness is intended to assume an “analytic” and clarifying function.

A couple of qualifying comments are in order. First, historically quite often the immaterialist thesis has been summoned in order to argue in behalf of the immortality of the human soul. Although this does not happen to be my own inclination, nevertheless it is an undeniable consideration that innumerable numbers of human beings in history and contemporaneously have been and are committed to the soul’s immaterial or spiritual immortality and that it is based on the Achilles principle, as in the case of H.D. Lewis above (EM, 324). Personnally, in agreement with the emphases on “dualistic” metaphysical strains readily apparent in Aristotle, Hume, and Sartre, I believe consciousness is immaterial but once its contingent, physical conditions are neutralized and dispersed at death, so are human sensations, feelings, and thoughts and along with them any possibility of a continued conscious existence or an afterlife.

Second, I will go on to argue that the present combination of the natural, behavioral, as well as our current neurosciences together simply avoid out of hand the activities of self-consciousness and intentionality; spontaneity; the existence of the subconscious; and collectively deny the qualitative values of ethics and aesthetics by simply substituting crude quantitative molecular motions in the brain.

The edifice of human knowledge contains a number of metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical floors that are further subdivided into different corridors throughout the entire residence. Some tenants labor in the humanities or the social sciences while others are engaged in the natural or mathematical sciences and still others in the arts. Thus, once in the corridor, there are doors opening to rooms that are uniquely furnished and decorated. Each chamber serves as a sanctuary for its occupants. The simplicity premise possesses a passkey for a large number of corridors and many rooms. And sometimes there are even evictions.

To ask why the history of ideas and consciousness is valuable is somewhat like inquiring what benefit is it to unify such diverse phenomena as the falling of objects toward the earth, the ebb and rise of the tides, and the elliptical orbit of the planets with all three subsumed under the single comprehensive law of gravity. As an interdisciplinary methodology, the history of ideas and consciousness exhibits an intrinsically unifying and synthesizing force. The conception that the mind is immaterial, active, self-conscious, and intentional has had—and continues to have—a formidable impact on Western thought in general. Thus to question why it is important to highlight certain first principles, basic premises, or assumptions is to fail to recognize that there is a finite set of fundamental presuppositions, which either continue uninterruptedly and/or resurface time and again in the millennial annals of Western thought. The commitment to dualism, rationalism, and idealism, as opposed to materialism, empiricism, and behaviorism—and now the threat of the neurosciences—will always remain an option for the human mind. The idealist principle that “senseless matter cannot think” will perpetually be present with its contradictory thesis that “thinking” can be reduced to the material cellular motions in the skull and brain. But regardless how opposed someone may be to the immaterialist thesis, nevertheless it is worth studying if for no other reason than as Cicero advised, one should know his opponent’s arguments better than his own.

In what follows, I enlist the Achilles thesis in order to make the best case I can for (1) a version of metaphysical substance dualism; (b) epistemological subjective idealism; and (c) an existential description of the human condition by engaging in a historical and conceptual journey through the lengthy odyssey of the human spirit. The purpose of the current inquiry is to resist reducing the self solely to its material conditions. Ultimately I wish to connect a theory of consciousness to the inevitability of human loneliness.
A principle, as I understand it, is an underived, assumed starting point. A paradigm is the ensuing model, picture, or system derived from the principle. Individuals come and go and each of us dies in our own time but principles have the possibility of subsisting forever, as eternal options equally present to our intellectual capacities and existential choices.

The most dangerous limitation of the neurosciences is embedded in its implicit and explicit assault on the reality of qualitative differences between the sciences, which they pit against the valutative theories of philosophy as embodied in art, ethics, religion, and humanism.

Further, the history of ideas and consciousness seeks to break through the barriers between different disciplines. It is interdisciplinary in its approach, scope, and methods. And if there is any value in goals, which strive to remove obstacles between not only different disciplines or fields within the humanities, but also between the social and natural sciences as well, then this sort of inquiry I believe is worthwhile. What is critically at stake in the present study is the question “whether senseless matter can think?” It is as much the concern of the materialist, empiricist, physiologist, psychologist, behaviorist, sociologist, and neuroscientist as it is of the dualist, idealist, phenomenologist, and existentialist.

Before continuing, however, I need to discuss a serious criticism leveled at the History of Ideas discipline. It is put forth in a book review, which many years ago appeared in the Marxist New Left journal, Telos, authored by David Gross. It concerns George Boas’ The History of Ideas. As the critic humorously but disparagingly points out, since, according to the historian of ideas, virtually all important ideas begin with Plato, it is not unexpected to discover that this is also the case with Professor Boas’ erudite study. Only in this case, Professor Boas succeeds not only in locating the idea’s birth but its death as well.

The notion of a “microcosm” is a case in point. The concept first appears, not surprisingly, in Plato’s Philebus, but the word [or idea] itself is not actually used until Aristotle coins it in his Politics. From that date on, the word jumps across centuries and millennia until it finally collapses from fatigue in the sixteenth century. The place de la mort has in fact been located by Boas. It is in Padua, in Northern Italy, where a commemorative stone exists to this day. In the meantime, the idea had entered the minds of a number of people along the way; there is evidence, for instance, that Philo Judaens, Seneca, Porphyry, Godefroy of St. Victor, and Agrippa of Nettesheim, among others, were at one time or another intimates of the idea. Finally, we are told, the notion of a microcosm began to vanish at the beginning of the modern period with the rise of empirical science.

The preceding is obviously a strong indictment of the entire History of Ideas program, hardly tempered by its witiness. Indeed, Gross expands the criticism and applies it to Lovejoy’s classic, The Great Chain of Being, as well as to Boas’ study, since Lovejoy himself confesses that the idea of a “Chain of Being” disappears, virtually expiring in the nineteenth-century. But truly seminal ideas are undeniably permanent, persistent, and intrinsically valuable and I would argue there are many seminal concepts and principles, which function like seeds continually germinating ever anew throughout the intellectual soil of Western thought.

Gross’ objection to the History of Ideas methodology is basically the same one which Karl Marx directs against Hegel in The German Ideology, namely, that “life determines consciousness” and not, as (allegedly) Hegel would have it, “consciousness determines life”; that our material economic conditions determine our social ideas and not the other way around. Indeed, Marx specifically refers to Hegel as a “historian of ideas” in The German Ideology. According to Marx, the capitalist economic system has resulted in necessitating the exploitation of masses of alienated workers, separating them from the fruits of their labor; the ownership of their own products; and by pitting them against their fellow men by competition. Unfortunately, Gross continues, philosophers like Hegel have merely sought to understand the world rather than improve it: “Philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point is to change it” (Theses on Feuerbach, Thesis 11). But Gross fails to
acknowledge Marx’s significant debt to Hegel because unless self-conscious reflexive ideas—in the guise of class-consciousness—intervene, man’s lot would continue to get worse and worse without any hope of transcending the situation. Thus Marx actually appeals to a transcending dialectical class-consciousness in order to overcome the alienating situation of proletariat exploitation, a fact to which Gross is obviously unaware. Plus Marx’s strategy for his world revolution is gleaned from Hegel’s Lordship and Bondage dialectic because he realizes, as Gross obviously does not, that unless the proletariat self-consciously, reflexively realize what is happening to them, they could never overcome, transcend their enslaved conditions. The master, as Hegel is well aware, has nowhere to go, whereas the slave alone has the opportunity to develop, to transcend his alienated situation.

Further, Gross’ review condemns the discipline of the History of Ideas as valueless and unjustified because “For the Ideen-historiker it is essentially a concept in a vacuum, i.e., a notion which somehow floats above time and space, and therefore above history [and independently of men].” Consequently, according to Gross:

The greatest weakness of intellectual historians like Boas or Arthur Lovejoy is their inability to understand how ideas are generated out of society—how they (figuratively) grow and expand in response to [economic] problems within a specific social milieu. Ideas don’t “happen” because the Weltgeist decides to objectify itself through the minds of philosophers. This is what Boas seems to suggest when he announces that ideas “shape human thought and action.” The inference here is that the energizing agents of thought are ideas themselves, and that intellectual concepts increase and multiply by virtue of their own inherent dispositions. As a methodology this is a patent absurdity. Ideas are effusions that arise out of life, which is to say, out of the particular social and personal Lebenswelt of the thinkers involved ... To crystallize a moment of transcendence and to hypostatize that a particle of thought (i.e., “idea”) apart from its necessary interconnection with practice, and apart from its essential nature as activity, is to fundamentally misrepresent The Nature of Thought itself. And yet this is substantially what the historian of ideas sets out to do. His job is to transmute intellection into “ideas,” and thinking into “thoughts” (i.e., reified categories which appear to have a separate existence divorced from history). These fossilized forms, these “ideas,” are then studied for themselves. Gross, BB, 212

Here a number of things must be said. In one sense, Gross is partly right. Factually, the History of Ideas is repeatedly accused of irrelevancy and abstractness. It is criticized for treating ideas as if they were Platonic essences, completely independent of the world and its problems, while “subsisting” apart from living men and human concerns. However, I would rather agree with Etienne Gilson that great ideas, principles, and arguments “never die; they are ageless and always ready to revive in the minds which need them, just as ancient seeds can germinate again when they find fertile soil.”

This does not mean, however, that the value of important principles and arguments can exist apart from men, but rather, quite the opposite; they will always survive within human minds, human surroundings, special contexts, and revive whenever they are needed and the occasion demands. This is also the reason why we are able today to uncover living continuities between our own period and that of former times enabling us not only to understand but also to empathize with former ages. For example, our forensic notion of voluntary and involuntary choice, personal imputability, and moral responsibility is strongly indebted to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The alternative politics of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau guide us today as forcefully as they have in their own age painted as they are with the wide brush strokes of Plato’s Ring of Gyges myth in the Republic and its conceptual exploration of the dynamical relations between the State of Nature, Human Nature, and the Social Contract.

But Gross is fundamentally wrong. It is clear he has a specific and unfortunately narrow definition as to what counts as a philosopher and philosophical issues. For Gross, it is confined to a person who...
understands “how ideas are generated out of society—how they grow and expand in response to problems within a specific social milieu.” Gross is here obviously influenced by Marx’s notion, expressed in the Theses on Feuerbach quoted above. This suggests that ideas—he is obviously restricting himself to economic, political, and social ideas—are the only relevant ones. But this would confine philosophical ideas to specific relative and particular contexts by restricting them to fundamentally economic situations alone. This would be an unfortunate violation of philosophy’s liberating interdisciplinary mandate. The Republic of Plato alone offers an entry into an incredible wealth of metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, psychological, aesthetic, and educational subjects and approaches. Rousseau in Emile called it the greatest work on education ever written. The individualized treatises of Aristotle deal with metaphysics, physics, logic, psychology, ethics, politics, aesthetics, rhetoric, the heavens, and so on. What in this universe is Gross thinking? Although Marx argues that the economic base may be the reality, nevertheless even he clearly recognizes the inestimable value of the ethical and aesthetic superstructure, which guides man in producing according to higher and nobler laws. When man’s alienated labor is freed and performed with the unbounded energy of unalienated labor, “man then constructs in accordance with the laws of beauty” (Economic and Philosopthic Manuscripts of 1844). In what follows, we shall learn that the strict economic approach alone, much like the neuroscientific approach, makes no allowance for the humanistic values of ethics and aesthetics. Economics is fundamentally quantitative; not evaluative.

The simplicity premise already has an entrenched impressive and long-standing presence in the disciplines of philosophy, psychology, ethics, religion, art, sociology but most especially in the powerful literary expressions of man’s innate loneliness spanning the time from the Greek myths and dramas to our current existentialist writings. The present work serves to extend that literary presence and also to serve as a plea to promote the History of Ideas as an architectonic discipline precisely because it has a great deal to do with us, our world, our values, our time, and our ideals.

Great ideas exhibit an overpowering and forceful integrity of their own. That does not mean, of course, that they are independent of human beings but rather that we must think in terms of universal principles, arguments, and strategies common to all mankind. The History of Ideas is an intrinsically synthetic, unifying, and coherent enterprise.

Finally, it seems appropriate to caution the reader about certain inherent weaknesses in the study of the history of ideas and consciousness. The discipline is by its very nature both extremely broad and, at times, admittedly quite vague, even in its general outlines concerning the fields which may be said to comprise it. This latter consideration makes it difficult to achieve the desired thoroughness in regard to the “completeness” of any particular study. There will always remain a sentiment that more works or authors should have been consulted, more hidden sources and relationships uncovered, as well as the frequent and normal pitfalls of interpretation. These difficulties are obviously discouraging but unavoidable, since unlike those academic colleagues, who only concentrate and confine their research on a single author, period, or discipline. By contrast, interdisciplinary historians range deep and wide in their nomadic quests and journeys. In the course of pursuing his or her task, historians of ideas treat many authors, often too many. If they are honest and cautious, they will not pretend to a greater competence than their abilities dictate and they themselves possess. But even within these recognized scholarly limitations, the philosophical historian is more vulnerable to hasty generalizations, to being influenced by Bacon’s idiosyncratic “idols of the cave”; and to being unduly impressed by passages and arguments taken out of context from the many diverse authors and numerous works she or he consults. The result is that there is too much material to master and the lone scholar cannot always hope to be an authority on all she or he treats. Obviously, one will be more familiar about some authors rather than others, but even so there simply cannot be the expertise one expects in commentaries that are confined to a single author, discipline, or historical period. In confessing this weakness, I take a certain degree of comfort in the fact that others have felt it as acutely
as myself but yet had the resolve to continue despite the risks. I cannot help but gather a considerable degree of encouragement from Professor Lovejoy's concluding comment.

The study of the history of ideas is full of dangers and pitfalls; it has its characteristic excess. Precisely because it aims at interpretation and unification and seeks to correlate things which are not on the surface connected, it may easily degenerate into a species of merely imaginative historical generalization and because the historian of an idea is compelled by the nature of his enterprise to gather material from several fields of knowledge, he is inevitably, in at least some parts of his synthesis, liable to the errors which lie in wait for the non-specialist. I can only say I am not unmindful of these dangers and have done what I could to avoid them; it would be too sanguine to suppose that I have in all cases succeeded in doing so. In spite of the probability, or perhaps the certainty, of partial failure, the enterprise seems worth attempting. LOVEJOY, GCB, 21

The present study is integrally connected to my four previous studies, The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of Thought and Soul from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant (1974); Loneliness in Philosophy, Psychology, and Literature (1979; 2012); Contingent Immaterialism: Meaning, Freedom, Time and Mind (1984); and Feeling Lonesome: The Philosophy and Psychology of Loneliness (2015), as well as related articles. But unlike Professors Boas’ and Lovejoy’s defining works, the Achilles premise with its diverse eight demonstrations and conclusions continues to endure since Plato’s time and accordingly reaches out today with an invitation for collaborative studies by other scholars representing various disciplines.

In the present chapter, I have tried to show that in terms of the history of consciousness and ideas several key ideas and principles have withstood the neglect of time and the assaults of critics. In the text that follows, however, I intend to explore a variety of distinctions between the subconscious, unconscious, and self-conscious; sensations and relations; immediacy and mediacy; intuition and inference; determinism and spontaneity and freedom; scientific and objective time as opposed to personal and subjective time-consciousness; a posteriori propositions and a priori synthetic judgments; quantitative extensities and qualitative intensities; consciousness and language; the correspondence theory of truth and the coherence theory; and loneliness and intimacy among others.

In any event, I feel much as Hume did—although unable to express myself with his wonderful eloquence—constrained to embark upon uncharted seas, in a fragile intellectual vessel, which I can only hope will sustain me through difficult journeys and unfamiliar visitations. My thesis is a sail, at times strong, at other times quite ineffectual, and even on occasion a cumbersome hindrance; my scholarly abilities are but slender and brittle oars, which momentarily aid me but remain clumsy implements as I struggle to successfully navigate my explorations. Will I founder on “Doubt’s Boundless Sea”; will I completely lose my bearings before the obscurity of endless ideas and timeless ages; or will I perhaps reach a pleasant shore and in retrospect view my travels as a worthwhile passage? <>

Conversion Disorder: Listening to the Body in Psychoanalysis by Jamieson Webster [Columbia University Press, 9780231184083]

Conversion disorder—a psychiatric term that names the enigmatic transformation of psychic energy into bodily manifestations—offers a way to rethink the present. With so many people suffering from unexplained bodily symptoms; with so many seeking recourse to pharmacological treatments or bodily modification; with young men and women seemingly willing to direct violence toward anybody, including themselves—a radical disordering in culture insists on the level of the body.

Part memoir, part clinical case, part theoretical investigation, this book searches for the body. Is it a psychopathological entity; a crossroads for the cultural, political, and biological in the form of care; or the foundation of psychoanalytic work on the question of sexuality? Jamieson Webster traces conversion’s shifting meanings—in religious, economic, and even chemical processes—revisiting
the work of thinkers as diverse as Benjamin, Foucault, Agamben, and Lacan. She provides an intimate account of her own conversion from patient to psychoanalyst, as well as her continuing struggle to apprehend the complexities of the patient’s body. When listening to dreams, symptoms, worries, or sexual impasses, the body becomes a defining trope that belies a vulnerable and urgent wish for transformation. Conversion Disorder names what is singular about the entanglement of the fractured body and the social world in order to imagine what kind of cure is possible.

Excerpt: This book is not some hymn to the unity of the human, body and soul, or to a unity of the human and the environment, enthralled by some idea of a naturalistic order. Rather, conversion, mapped in this way, pinpoints a pressure felt around division and unity or order and disorder. This brings me to the title of this work: Conversion Disorder. In what follows, I will give a more detailed history of the term from Freud to the present. For now, it suffices to say that "conversion disorder" is a diagnosis that is part of the subgroup "somatic symptoms and related disorders," which includes hypochondria, pain disorder, and somatic symptom disorder (APA 2013). Conversion requires a neurological evaluation of symptoms that can range from dizziness to loss of consciousness to changes in motor or sensory functions, from difficulty seeing, smelling, and touching to paralysis, weakness or numbness in the body, and even difficulty speaking or swallowing. The diagnosis gives a nod to psychoanalytic history, the link between the first conception of psychoanalysis and the vicissitudes of neurology, something that was a source of contention in the last edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Many felt it should go the way of hysteria, which disappeared in the 1980s. Freud uses conversion hysteria and hysteria interchangeably, though "hysteria" in its later iterations came to denote a set of structural issues other than symptomatic conversion. What conversion disorder retains of hysteria, unlike the other somatoform disorders, is the lack of anxiety that accompanies its bodily symptoms. They are not a source of constant preoccupation, as they are in hypochondriasis, pain disorder, and somatic symptom disorder, all of which produce abnormal thoughts, feelings, and behaviors in response to distressing somatic symptoms. In conversion disorder, the symptom is there—glaring even—but it is oddly unattended to by the patient. This is why it is linked to dissociation, alexithymia, or depersonalization: a splitting of the subject. For Freud, the belle indifference of the hysteric shows the force of repression and the power of the symptom, in particular to free the mind from anxiety or mental preoccupations.

I like the two words together, "conversion" and "disorder," implying that conversion in itself is neither a simple disorder nor a simple hysteria. A sense lingers that there is a hidden order in conversion beyond or behind all its disarray. Conversion keeps its potential power in reserve, a power alive and unpacified, a power that twists and turns and wreaks havoc. Perhaps this is why it is capable of remaining on the books despite this young field’s many fluctuations. Perhaps this is why conversion is about being able to slip into the provinces of the body, almost without notice. The other somatoform disorders—and hysteria, too—are too noisy, circumscribed, and suspect. Conversion, on the other hand, rearranges the pieces on the board, changes their function, and refuses to expend its energy on the distractions of anxiety.

This does not mean that the everyday symptomatic concerns of the body should not be linked to the
question of conversion. I'm certainly aware of these, and their proliferating insistences are at the core of why I turned to this topic. The body has always been one of the most important markers in analysis. It makes its presence felt at every moment, especially since it can also do so by virtue of its absence. Speech deprived of body, the patient on the couch like a corpse, always alerts the analyst to a problem, even simply by virtue of the boredom or sleepiness this lifelessness exerts upon their listening ear. The vacillations in the affective life of the body carry an analysis along or grind it to a halt.

If I survey my practice, everyone is troubled by what it means to have a body, having a series of bodily symptoms that define their life. Much of the everyday increasingly takes place via assimilation: life tailored to the demands of work, self-promotion, and lifestyle, ironized, mediated, and distanced, on the one hand, and, on the other, shot through with sentimental and aggressive claims to authentic experience. The body rebels first. Even when lifestyle tries to cater to this body in protest—like the streamlining of diet, exercise (usually something like yoga or Pilates), and meditation, along with a generalized ethos of well-being—something doesn’t sit right. We do not know what to do with this body of ours at a time when the demands made upon it exceed the vicissitudes of physical exertion. It breaks, along with the ability to feel or be reassured by pleasure.

Patients have difficulty speaking to this predicament, tending to use the diffuse but strident voice of anxiety for quite a long time before finding a means of addressing the specificity of their situation. They take pressures and pains and protests in the body personally, meaning that they assume a kind of guilt in relation to their existence. It’s their fault, just like the failure to achieve wealth, success, fame, beauty, and even orgasm is their fault. From within this stagnant economy of culpability (one that easily reverses into blame at other moments) you can find the deep longing for a way out, for another way of life, including a way to find the conviction to pursue something other than what has been offered—this I also want to name conversion.

Conversion disorder as linked to the body is often associated with a kind of immediacy, concreteness, or dogmatism—I’m sick because I’m sick—which is pitted against the delay implied by the act of thinking and reflecting. While this is certainly one of our contemporary ills—dogmatism requires very little thought—nevertheless, conversion disorder teaches us that thought is not necessarily the antidote to the doctrinaire. One of the wagers of this work is that by addressing the question of the body in the conversion process of psychoanalysis, knowing the weight and pressure of maintaining any link to the life of the body, we can ease a path through the deadlock between the suspension implied in thinking and the carelessness of immediacy. The bodily symptom has the potential to structure this divide differently.

Another wager, so characteristically psychoanalytic, is that wrestling with the body means dealing with the sexual. Any deadlock in psychoanalysis is first and foremost sexual in nature—the very language of tension concerns this drive-ridden erogenous body. We must ask what Freud or psychoanalysis more generally means by the sexual—a question I intend to exhaust, if possible. In focusing specifically on the body and sexuality, I avoid the vicissitudes of gender and its social construction more than I have in the past, and perhaps more than I am comfortable with doing. Here, I assert something primary about what it means to live with a body and with sexual drives and what these have to do with conversion or radical change.

I have come to the conclusion that what is important is not what a body demonstrates or speaks, that is, making the body a question of translation or interpretation. Many see analysis as a constant process of translating this body into language. The question of conversion has taught me that we need to move differently. I have come to see in this body a surface that holds a degree of sexual tension that begins to define what it even means to speak; that is, the body and its particular relationship to the unconscious change the nature of discourse, not vice versa. Psychoanalytic work is embedded in discourse that nonetheless manages to touch this sexual body and change what it is possible to do, no less feel. This is why I invoke the insane
tautology in psychoanalysis that conversion must be subject to conversion.’

There is one truth I have found as an analyst: I must follow this body. I must follow the drive as it appears in a session, pushing toward some place or point unknown to either me or the patient, which produces the utmost tension in a treatment. This act of following creates more friction than any deconstructive work, any genealogical deduction, any intersubjective moment of contact or empathy. I do not discount these. But my faith is in the circuit of a treatment as bound to this stamp of the body that appears in critical moments, fuels the transference, and moves in the direction of its own dissolution. The so-called desire for psychoanalysis must be assumed by the one who directs the analysis in this way, with the impropriety of this attention to the body. Even to begin to be able to set the stage for this kind of work with a specific client is a cardinal achievement. I follow you in order to extinguish myself there.

Even Freud threw up his hands in the face of conversion—something he named too obscure to continue working with—turning back to anxiety (as failed conversion) and effectively throwing the concept into erasure. Conversion will only happen at the limit, and you walk into this terrain without knowing what, or when, or how, or even why. I ask this of my readers as much as I ask it of my patients because it is here that the weight of conversion rests. The transference will carry you forward, or it won’t. And if it doesn’t, you probably should go elsewhere. You don’t ask why something has grabbed you—what takes you in is simply a fact—this or that conversion. To ask is already an undoing of the force of the act, much as Freud said that to be neurotic was simply to ask why, to ask about the meaning of existence.

This backsliding is a moment I live through on a daily basis with patients. Sometimes it just isn’t possible to proceed any further with me; I understand the pressure and the about-face. Something can be said, vigorously, that had not been said before. It is registered by me. I imagine, perhaps wrongly, that it is heard by the patient as well. It feels like a moment of breath in a terse exchange. In this space, I am sometimes met with their unrelenting why, their request for an explanation that can extend into the future—why and so what and now what, as if I could simply answer these questions. The moment, the act of saying something new, is foreclosed, which I mean in the strong sense of the term: It is abolished.

I find this closure unbearable, which I feel in my body. It builds up on the periphery like storm walls or a beachhead threatened by the sea. I try to shed some of this at the end of the day, to chip away at so much lost opportunity, at so much given away. As an analyst I feel exhausted by everything that is allowed to return to helpless and impotent requests or the harsh outlines of guilt and self-laceration: letting one’s words slip or, better yet, handing oneself over to an aggression that wants to knock over the pieces on the gameboard—directed at me in countless demands, fits, and hateful investigations of my person. I take none of this personally; I like being attacked—it feels more alive than depressive lethargy and obsessive emptying out. But it does bruise the analytic body.

One becomes an analyst because one believes in the power of openings, of reversals and revelations, of breaks in a system that can create new sensualities, new symptomatic configurations. But one also becomes an analyst because one believes in repetition, in trauma, in defense, in entrenchment. Caught between these two, where else will all this be felt than in the body of the analyst, which is met as an open or closed conduit? In what other profession must one remain at this threshold—and for so long? And finally, what in the conversion of the analyst makes bearing this at all possible? What if the answer is—nothing? Nothing in your personal analysis prepares you for this kind of work. Nothing tells you how much you will have to take on, how difficult it is to live through so many other lives, to have them live in your body. They do live there. All the conversions in a treatment happen because of this living. <>

Lacan Contra Foucault: Subjectivity, Sex and Politics
edited by Nadia Bou Ali and Rohit Goel
[Bloomsbury Academic, 9781350036888]

Lacan Contra Foucault seeks to ground the divergences and confluences between these two
key thinkers in relation to contemporary philosophy and criticism. Specifically the topics of sexuality, the theory of the subject, history and historicism, scientific formalization, and ultimately politics. In doing so, the authors in this volume open up new connections between Lacan and Foucault and shine a light on their contemporary relevance to politics and critical theory.

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Given their profound and often polarizing influence on the humanities and social sciences, the paucity of sustained engagement with the (dis)connections between Foucault and Lacan ‘strikes the eye’. Lacan Contra Foucault was originally conceived as a staging of a ‘civil war’, an intimate enmity between two of the twentieth century’s most influential thinkers. The idea grew out of an eponymous conference held in Beirut, itself a site of protracted civil war that Lacan visited in 1974. Just four years later and a decade after he left Tunisia, Foucault travelled to Iran to witness the Islamic revolution.

Civil war and revolution ... Lacan and Foucault. In Beirut, Lacan met with students who were working in a context in which war has recurred since Lebanon’s inception, since class struggle has been disavowed only to return, with equal force, in the form of ‘sectarian’ strife. Lacan was a subtle analyst of repetition, attentive not only to the phenomenon’s more obvious capacity to maintain order but also to its less apparent, transformative potential. He saw in repetition - of traumas, historical events, symptoms and so on - an unconscious plea to change the existing order of things.

By way of contrast, Foucault went to Iran in 1978 in search of something radically new, a conscious break from the past and present of Europe: the ‘political spirituality’ of the mass revolution was an opportunity to reignite political imagination beyond what he took to be an anachronistic Marxism that was unable to contend with a new European regime of power. By the 1970s, when Foucault was delivering his late lectures on neoliberalism, he went to Iran looking for a new way to resist a force that no longer only governed with the sword of juridical repression, nor just through the disciplining of docile bodies, but more on a (neoliberal) basis of freedom that it therefore actively promoted.

For Foucault, resistance meant finding a new beginning from which to launch ethical, political and subjective politics. Lacan, on the other hand, warned of the ever-present possibility of the return of the repressed. The relations between social institutions and the unconscious inform a political topology that requires a psychoanalytic act, a scilicet, to incite a new form of knowledge, one that inverts the relationship between truth and knowledge and frees the former from the mechanisms of jouissance that dictate relations of exploitation in society.’ Thus, for Lacan, transforming the present order requires analytical attention to the return of the repressed, a focused listening to symptoms even if, upon first hear, they sound like a broken record.

Lacan and Foucault maintained different positions for thinking of politics, for Lacan, working-through and transformation; for Foucault, variously, anarchic violent resistance (his endorsement of the 1792 Paris massacres), increased visibility (his support of the Prisoner Information Group), silence (the Ars Erotica interlude in The Will to Knowledge), ‘care of the self’ (his later efforts to develop a neoclassicist ethics of constructing the self). The difference between Lacan and Foucault was prefigured in their disparate evaluations of May 1968. Lacan did not waver in his critical analysis of the movement. Students indignant about what they
felt as an incapacity of structural linguistics to ground meaningful political change battle cried that 'structures don’t go down into the streets'. Lacan couldn’t help but see irony in the slogan, graffitied in classrooms and on city walls, an affirmation of precisely what the slogan claimed to negate. He warned the students that their actions heralded the bureaucratization of the university and saw May ’68 as a symptom of capitalism, a site of 'struggle between capitalist accumulation of knowledge and the irruption of truth linked to jouissance'. He thus refused the fake opposition between structure and event and began formulating his theory of the four discourses in an attempt to formalize the contingency and contradiction inherent to structure itself.'

It was between 1967 and 1968 that Lacan turned to Marx’s concept of surplus-value, Mehrwert, and Freud’s Lust to formulate his own concept of surplus-jouissance, plus-de jouir, in order to analyse the institutional stakes of capitalist exploitation. What Lacan saw in the student protests was an instantiation of what he called 'university discourse', an enjoyment of knowledge - in this case an empirical knowledge of the particular, the excluded, the supposedly substantial pleb - at the cost of 'truth': 'a knowledge is always paid at its price below the usevalue that truth generates, and always for others than those who are in the truth. It is thus marked by surplus enjoyment. And this Mehrlust laughs at us since we don't know where its hidden .... That's why in May, all hell got loose'.

Foucault actively promoted a 'dangerous' form of 'hyper and pessimistic activism' that he argued must be grounded in acknowledging that resistance to power had to appeal to the immanent normative justifications of that power. He as well opposed May ’68, but only briefly and for more superficial reasons. If Lacan saw in ’68 a symptom of a 'university discourse' structuring capitalist society, Foucault initially railed against the lack of risk in the movement, as compared to March ’68 in Tunisia, where people took to the streets facing the real threat of losing their lives. A cosmetic opposition, very soon after returning to Paris Foucault would switch positions and embrace the movement, celebrating ’68 for pushing him to analyse the situation of the plebs - the mad, the prisoner, the pervert and so on.

If this were to be a `civil war’ between Lacan and Foucault, however, we can not but recall Marx’s claim that all civil wars are generally without a principle, a staging of an antagonism that is a mere respite from the monotonous pace of production. It is not then a `civil war' that needs to be staged, for in fact the volume has culminated in contributions that have done the precise opposite; rather than further instantiate non-principled divisions in the already diminishing field of critical theory, Lacan Contra Foucault redraws the contours of two irreconcilable trajectories for the purpose of reactivating the absent cause or principle of real antagonism in their theoretical corpus: structuralism itself and its relationship to politics.

Lacan Contra Foucault is a retroactively staged conflict after the passing of the event of structuralism in the mid-twentieth century: it is a Nachträglichkeit in the Freudian sense, whereby a conflict is introduced but only to reconstitute an event as an aprèscoup, an afterwardness. We cannot but recall Lacan’s interpretation of Nachträglichkeit as the only possible sense for history in as far as ‘history is already being made on the stage where it will be played out once it has been written down, both in one’s heart of hearts and outside’. In this sense, the volume seeks to reconstruct a series of facts that have already determined the historical turning point that was the eclipse of structuralism in the wake of neoliberal politics globally. Can we however insist on rereading this turning point retroactively as a moment in the maturation of the intellectual and political potency of structuralism? Moreover, in what way are the differences between Lacan and Foucault ultimately irreconcilable when it comes to politics? Their works clearly have had different afterlives: on one hand, we have a curious emergent link posited between Foucault and neoliberal theories of subjectivity; on the other hand, we see a growing number of analyses that posit homological links between Lacan and Marx.' The task of this volume then is to demarcate the overpass that characterizes the Lacan-Foucault relation. By 'overpass', we mean a relation of non-
intersecting correspondence between two independent but superimposed planes.

Although Lacan and Foucault have had a number of direct encounters - via the 1968 student movement, Diego Vasquez’s Las Meninas and the Cercle d’Epistemologie - it is important to ground their divergences and confluences in relation to the topics of sexuality, the theory of the subject, history and historicism, scientific formalization and ultimately to politics. This volume builds on a small but sophisticated body of scholarship about Foucault and Lacan. Three works stand out: first, Joan Copjec’s Read My Desire, which offers a systematic Lacanian critique of historicism - ‘the reduction of society to its indwelling network of relations of power and knowledge’ - and demonstrates how the psychoanalytic conception of history and historical processes addresses Foucault’s concerns more adequately than his own historicist program. Second, Knox Peden’s ‘Foucault and the Subject of Method’ (in Concept and Form. Volume Two: Interviews and Essays on the Cahiers Pour l’Analyse) demonstrates how Foucault grappled with a theory of the subject throughout his oeuvre in ways closer to Lacan than either thinker’s disciples are willing to countenance. Like Lacan, Foucault was preoccupied by the relation between the subject and truth, but refused to ground this relation transcendentally. Third, the Cercle d’épistemologie’s ‘A Michel Foucault’ in the Cahiers pour l’analyse Vol. 9, 1968. In this text, a group of young normaliens posed a series of methodological questions to Foucault on how to think the subject in relation to truth while maintaining a non-synthetic approach to the subject and method. Foucault’s attempt to answer these questions resulted in The Archaeology of Knowledge, a transitional text between the ‘young’ Foucault’s structuralist phase and the later ‘post-structuralism’ of The History of Sexuality and Discipline and Punish. Foucault’s ‘final’, 1980s work on The Hermeneutics of the Subject,” might be seen as a third wave in which he returns to the questions of the subject and truth, grounding the relation in ‘spiritual’ rather than formal scientific practice.

Born in 1901, a quarter of a century before Foucault (1926-84), Lacan died three years earlier (1981). Their intellectual chronologies carry some echoes of the parallel but not overlapping trajectories, or the overpass, of their respective concerns. Lacan elaborates his graph of desire in Seminar V Formations of the Unconscious (1957-58) and Seminar VI Desire and Its Interpretations (1958-59). Foucault publishes the History of Madness in 1961 and the Birth of the Clinic in 1963. Lacan discusses knowledge and jouissance in Seminar VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1959-60) and Seminar VIII: Transference (1960-61). Foucault’s Archeology of Knowledge appears in 1969. In 1970, Foucault delivers his lecture The Order of Discourse. The following year, 1971, is the year of Lacan’s Seminar XVIII: On A Discourse that is Not of a Semblance. Finally, Foucault publishes Discipline and Punish in 1975, while Lacan’s Seminar on the Sinthome, in which he considers the possibility of a non-ideological subject, is delivered in 1975-76. Thus we see that their trajectories are often parallel but rarely if ever intersecting.

In this introduction, we will first set out what is at stake in the Lacan-Foucault confrontation for contemporary critical theory; we will then summarize Foucault’s conception of the historical a priori in relation to the nexus tying together subject and truth, as well as his conflictual relation to psychoanalysis; next we will elaborate Lacan’s accounts of the subject, science, desire and knowledge, before finally introducing and summarizing the six contributions to this volume.

The sublime object of critical theory
In 1989, Slavoj Žižek proposed that the true antagonism at the heart of critical theory is not Foucault against Habermas - power-knowledge versus ideal communicative speech - but the unresolved conflict between Althusser and Lacan over the clean cut of interpellation and subject formation. In Žižek’s formulation, Habermas and Foucault are two sides of the same coin insofar as they take no account of the fantasy that structures social reality or its ideological form of appearance. Nor does their mode of thought allow for the consideration of the category of desire as what is inarticulable. In other words, Habermas and Foucault have no account of the structures that belong to the order of the real, as what is
unsymbolizable in Lacan’s formulation, and which ought not to be confused with everyday reality. In Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality, the social order appears as the result of an intersubjective process: the aim of human speech is to reach understanding; the illocutionary effect of speech is to reach a rationally motivated consensus. Speech does not miss the mark but the task of communication is to somehow mark understanding.

The task of communicative action for Habermas would be to make normative distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate uses of power in a manner that would posit unavoidable universals; hence his debate with Foucault centred fundamentally on the latter’s challenge to the normative and universal function of communicative action. For Foucault, critique cannot be guarded by universal norms, it must be the defiant practice of genealogy from within the axes of self, focusing on the relation between structure and subject in both his work and Lacan’s.

In ‘Cutting off the King’s Head’ (Chapter 1), Mladen Dolar proposes that Foucault’s concept of power as ‘what does not exist’ (ça n’existe pas) works to detotalize the social as that which cannot be delimited. Power in Dolar’s reading emerges as a non-concept, neither substance nor subject, which is accompanied by Foucault’s notion of self-care as a practice rather than a type of consciousness. Self-care becomes ‘a relation of power to itself, a power bending on itself, as it were, an internal loop of power’. From this relation between power and selfcare, Foucault’s subject appears to be irreducible to either the imaginary or the symbolic; instead, it is the result of a regime of governmentality or discipline that is characterized by multiplicity and heterogeneity versus the premodern sovereign or One as a locus of power. The question raised by Dolar is whether the great break of modernity, in Foucault’s analysis, can be read as a disavowal of the One. Could Foucault’s dismissal of psychoanalysis as a discourse of biopower, as a repressive hypothesis that merely re-instantiates the ‘monarchy of Sex, the monarchy of the Father, the monarchy of One’, be the result of his own blind fixation on the King’s head? Dolar argues that psychoanalysis’s key contribution with regard to the regime of modern power is its attention to ‘the rise of the underside of the symbolic father’ in the super-ego as an injunction to enjoy, rather than a repressive force. Ultimately, Dolar argues, what Foucault leaves us with is an alternative between two choices: multiplicity or Oneness, sovereignty or heterogeneous dispositifs. He does so at the cost of curtailling the very interrogation of sex as what doesn’t exist but insists in its impossibility. Chiesa picks up on Dolar’s reposing of the question of power in Foucault as a disavowal of the One, to argue that the latter’s reliance on a transcendental concept of power reproduces an ontological concept of life as what is outside structure.

In ‘Author, Subject, Structure’ (Chapter 2), Lorenzo Chiesa discusses the similarities between Foucault’s and Lacan’s understandings of the category of the subject as what is irreducible to the ego conceived as a locus of the unity of representation. Both Foucault and Lacan highlight the importance of Freud as an event that disrupts the totality of the discourse of an author; Lacan through his insistence on the return to Freud and Foucault in his understanding of the author as a function that is not equivalent to the characteristics of the individual subject. Chiesa shows that the question of the subject in Foucault and Lacan outlines the central problematic of structuralism: how to maintain a position that neither obliterates the subject in a nihilistic iconoclastic killing spree of ontological categories nor reintroduces it ‘in the guise of a vacuously structural old-fashioned apriori’. However, as Chiesa points out, the fundamental divergence between Foucault and Lacan can be located in the vitalist conclusions that Foucault, due to a circuitous reliance on a transcendental concept of power, draws from the question ‘what is an author?: Thus for Foucault, the concept of life acquires an ontological connotation as what is outside structure. For Lacan, however, there is a reciprocity between the subject and structure, a reciprocity anchored in the signifier that is at once the locus of representation and the impasse of representation. Contra Foucault, Lacan rejects the ideality of matter (conceived as Nature or Life) by positing structure itself as ‘matter’ insofar as it is an ontological cut or the real of the subject: ˙structure is the most real as the absolute difference of the
Logical flaw of structure: Moreover, this logical flaw of structure, as the un-thought, is only formalized retroactively by the thinking subject as that which is ‘discursively impossible’. For Chiesa, this dialectical co-implication of subject and structure, as what is generated from a condition of impossibility, is the kernel of structuralism in Lacan’s understanding. By way of contrast, Foucault’s version of structuralism as a different mode of perceiving ultimately results in an ‘indifferent perception of life’ as a positive force. While Foucault rejects the category of subject in order to counter humanism with a crypto-vitalist anti-humanism, Lacan maintains that the subject of the unconscious is neither human nor unhuman but inextricable from the modern subject of science. What we have with Lacan, Chiesa proposes, is a minimalist hyperstructuralism: the subject is not merely a necessary property of structure but its most extimate element. The inextricability of the subject of psychoanalysis from the modern subject of science that is examined by Chiesa is further elaborated on in Tomsic’s chapter.

In ‘Better Failures: Science and Psychoanalysis’ (Chapter 3), Sarno Tomsic argues that despite Foucault’s rejection of psychoanalysis as part of the modern regime of bio-power, many of the problems that he encounters in accounting for the workings of power-knowledge have answers that lie in the psychoanalytic account of libidinal economies. While Foucault sought the answers to the libidinal link between enjoyment and power in ancient Greece, Lacan proposes that there is a fundamental shift in the nature of enjoyment (jouissance) with the capitalist invention of ‘surplus jouissance’ and the quantification of enjoyment. Lacan’s critical epistemology is not far from Foucault’s insofar as they both take their cue from the radical de-psychologization of knowledge in scientific modernity, as a result of which knowledge is no longer grounded in subjective illusions but in ‘efficient objective fictions’ such as structure and force. Tomsic argues that Foucault’s death of man is indeed nothing but the discovery of the subject of the unconscious as a new topology, which is not de-subjectivized. Tomsic examines the critical epistemologies of Lacan and Foucault through the specific topics of failure and error and argues that in both their accounts the subject is the conflictual point which reveals the ‘inconvenient truth of power relations’: it exposes the link between knowledge and exploitation as well as being a site of resistance to them. The ‘epistemology of failure’ that psychoanalysis posits through its mobilization of discursive errors and failures of language is premised on a structure of repetition that is comparable to Beckett’s imperative of ‘failing better’. It is an imperative of action against the structure through the process of working-through: ‘work on structure and work against structural resistance’. Tomsic argues that this critical epistemology can be traced back to Alexander Koyre’s rejection of positivist epistemologies and his proposition that scientific truth is that which in its insistence exposes the impossibility of the real. But while Lacan sides with Koyre, Foucault inherits Canguilhem’s vitalist preoccupation with the life-sciences. Tomsic concludes that there are two contradictory images at work in Foucault’s understanding of psychoanalysis: it is considered both as a component in the regime of power-knowledge and as introducing a radically new form of interpretation. The later Foucault removes the function of error and failure from psychoanalysis, which are fundamental for its epistemology, and misconstrues the unconscious and sexuality as epistemic objects or positive ontological entities, whereas Lacan’s entire practice is in fact a radical subversion of both. In Chapter 4, Anne van Leeuwen interrogates the repercussions of Foucault’s understanding of sexuality in twentieth-century feminist thought.

In ‘Merely Analogical: Structuralism and the Critique of Political Economy’, Anne van Leeuwen analyses the Foucauldian influence on twentieth-century feminism, in the specific works of Gayle Rubin and Judith Butler, that she argues, virtually eliminate a materialist Marxist analysis of political economy from the scope of feminism. Van Leeuwen proposes that feminist readings of Marxism as a humanism foreclose the fundamental insights generated from the encounter between Marxism and structuralism, in particular Levi-Straussian anthropology and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Van Leeuwen argues that there is an un-dialectical analysis that has characterized most modern feminist theory, one that reduces feminist critique to
the `deconstruction of imaginary production', on the one hand, and 'a humanist materialist analysis of commodity production that would endeavor to dissolve all forms of social antagonism, on the other. Tracing the genealogy of the feminist analysis of the reproduction of gender/sex in the capitalist mode of production to Foucault, Van Leeuwen argues that while Butler and Rubin maintain a trans-historical understanding of the production of gender/sex, Foucault's history of sexuality cannot but be read as the history of capitalist modernity: sex is a product of modern bio-power and so is its repression. Foucault rejects a `naïve speculative pseudo-materialism' which perceives of sex as what exists prior to the interpellation by bio-power as well as the 'liberal idealist form of emancipation' offered as a correlate to that thesis. However, Foucault in his concept of bio-power makes way for feminist theory's shift of focus from commodity production to productive power rendering the 'critique of political economy and the critique of the political economy of sex merely analogical'. In order to counter this logic, Van Leeuwen instead employs the homological reading of Marx and Lacan, put forth by Tomsic in The Capitalist Unconscious, to argue that commodity fetishism is an objective distortion that is supported by a fantasy of union of exchange-value and use-value in the commodity form. Marx's critique of fetishism is homologous to the psychoanalytic notion of fantasy and exposes the structural negativity underlying the social link. Furthermore, the Marxian critique can be supplemented by Levi-Strauss's analysis of cultural forms as what come to fill the void generated from the universality of the sexual division of labour. Both Levi-Strauss and Marx expose the structural negativity that is elided by the very relations that are an expression of it and thus provide the grounds for understanding the function of socio-symbolic forms in the reproduction of structure. The rejection of structuralism and psychoanalysis by feminist theory comes at the cost of overlooking the isomorphism between the commodity form and the sexual (non) relation thereby rendering the structural antagonism generated through them to a mere analogy that resists theorization. Picking up on the epistemological question of repetition introduced by Tomsic, and the notion of biopower interrogated by Dolar, Chiesa and Van Leeuwen, Joan Copjec's chapter (Chapter 5) questions biopower through employing the psychoanalytic challenge to the ontology that informs Foucault's notion of biopower: ontology is not simply about being and non-being but about the production of more than being in being and it is only by realizing the negativity at work (surplus jouissance) in the social link that a critique of capitalism becomes possible.

In `Battle Fatigue: Kairostami and Capitalism', Joan Copjec analyses Kairostami's film, Taste of Cherry, as a staging of two of the fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis, repetition and the drive. The film revolves around the story of the main protagonist, Badii, who pursues suicide and searches for an accomplice to carry out the task. According to Copjec, Taste of Cherry provides a commentary on the 'radical impasse of being' that emerges in a context in which a combination of 'war, capitalism, and theocratic-legalism' prevails. The premise of the film, Copjec argues, is not a testimony of resistance to bio-power, a force which emerges according to Foucault in modernity as an abandonment of the 'ancient right to live and let live' and that commands life with the ultimate threat of death, rather, it stages an 'ontological declivity', an excess that the 'finalism of Being has neither time nor use for'. Departing from both Foucault's notion of bio-power and Heidegger's Being-toward-death, Copjec instead reads Kairostami and Levinas through psychoanalysis as critics of capitalism insofar as they indict it for its 'refusal to affirm the exorbitant nature of desire'. According to Copjec, what capitalism demands is a sacrifice of desire and a reduction of it to a biological register of needs that are to be gained through the sacrifice of labour by the worker. Against the final cause of death, Copjec poses fatigue as a necessary lost cause, a Lacanian 'short-circuit' that is a moment of respite in the repetition compulsion of the drive, which exists only in its insistence as an internal fault in Being itself. To make sense of Badii's search for an assurance that death is possible despite all evidence of the contrary, Copjec employs one of Lacan's fundamental insights: dying is an impossibility and it is only by placing faith in it that one can withstand the
pressure of living, what Copjec deems as the 'indefectibility of existence'. Kairostami's preoccupation with the theme of death, according to Copjec, is with the 'death of others', it is a commentary on a radically lost past that acts as burden of existence. Badii's failure at despair, his inability to surrender to suicide and his ultimate failure at nihilism can be read as an act of freedom against capitalism. Copjec argues that the capitalist understanding of freedom as what constrains the efforts of labour is countered by Kairostami's depiction of fatigue and despair as fundamental components of the death drive: fatigue is what 'lurches forth' from the 'small difference drawn off by repetition'. For Copjec, fatigue like the death drive insists in a structure of repetition, which meets its own internal resistance through the production of surplus jouissance, an excess element that cannot be consumed. Copjec seeks the possibility of freedom in recognizing that element which remains in the present as an irreducible remainder. This 'always missed element' stands for that which defines the present in its 'evanescence. Copjec argues that this evanescence of the present is not equivalent to its transitory nature but is evident in the persistent demand for repetition. The present persists in the insistence of repetition that gives it 'an absolute character, denied by legalist bound to the past as well the venture capitalists bent on the future. Continuing with the interrogation of Foucault's relation to capitalism, already explored in Tomsic, Van Leeuwen and Copjec's contributions, Zdravko Kobe provides a meticulous examination of Foucault's troubled relation with both Marxism and psychoanalysis.

In 'Foucault's Neoliberal Post-Marxism' (Chapter 6), Zdravko Kobe provides a detailed reading of Foucault's lectures on governmentality between 1977 and 1979, his conflicted relationship to Marxism and his consideration of the subject of neoliberalism. Kobe begins with Foucault's early structuralist phase where he argued, close to Althusser, for a theoretical anti-humanism that would be the grounds for compatibility between Marxism and structuralism against official Marxism. The chapter tracks the different phases of Foucault's engagement with Marxism, Maoism and Freudo-Marxism leading to 1975 when an official break can be discerned with Marx and Freud when the notions of power and discipline that he formulated in Discipline and Punish and The Will to Knowledge could no longer fit into the Marxian framework of The History of Sexuality. In 1977, Foucault reacted in support to the rise of the Nouveau Philosophes and the Second Left movement in France in declaration of his belief that the era of revolutions is over. Kobe tracks meticulously through Foucault's interviews from the time to show how Foucault reaches a moment of refutation of the entire Marxian and socialist body of thought from 1830 onwards. By then, Foucault deemed Marxism as 'completely enmeshed in nineteenth-century problems' and 'useless for thinking the problems of modern society. The task that Foucault sets out to complete after 1977, Kobe argues, is a 'reinvention of the political thought of the left. From the refusal to reduce political questions to economic reasons - Foucault's understanding of Marxism - emerged the notion of power and biopower that addresses itself to populations and their life processes rather than simply individuals. Kobe shows how the notion of biopower introduced a fundamental problem for Foucault as it brought his analysis back to the state formation, which he was trying to avoid. Foucault, Kobe argues, introduces the concept of governmentality in order to eliminate the state and to replace the history of apparatuses of security with an analysis of forms of power. It is during this phase of Foucault's intellectual development that neoliberalism becomes a focus of discussion, whereby as a mode of governance it comes to produce freedom rather than restrict it. Kobe provides a scrupulous account of Foucault's interest in neoliberalism in order to show that what attracted him to it was in fact his previous commitments: anti-humanism and socialism. The question that irked Foucault in his investigation of neoliberalism was: how can a socialist governmentality be invented? However, as Kobe points out, the proximity of Foucault to neoliberalism can be discerned in the manner by which he represents it according to its own mode of self-presentation and in the way he accepts its rejection of the welfare state. It is as though Foucault forgets his initial claims against any political form of governance that appears neutral.
Kobe shows that there is an ‘uncritical leniency and unusual simplifications’ in Foucault, whereby neoliberalism was seen as a project to be mined for the renovation of political thought on the left. Kobe traces this moment in Foucault’s thought to Maoism, ‘as a generic Marxism, a quasi Marxism without Marx, Maoism thus turned out to be a necessary stage of development in the path from Marxism to neo-liberalism’. In the appendix to his chapter, Kobe provides a close reading of Foucault’s shifting relation to psychoanalysis, pointing out that it is before his rejection of Marxism that Foucault was highly critical of psychoanalysis as a regime of power immanent to capitalism. After 1977, which appears to be a real watershed in Foucault’s theoretical development according to Kobe, criticizing psychoanalysis became futile. This rendered Foucault’s engagement with fundamental psychoanalytic concepts like the unconscious facile. This led Foucault to side with the ‘humility’ of liberal dictums regarding pleasure against Freud and Lacan’s ‘conceit’ with regard to their negative conception of power. <>

_Psychoanalysis and the GIObal_ edited and with an introduction by Ilan Kapoor [Cultural Geographies + Rewriting the Earth, University of Nebraska Press, 9781496206800]

_Psychoanalysis and the GIObal_ is about the hole at the heart of the “glObal,” meaning the instability and indecipherability that lies at the hub of globalization. The contributors use psychoanalysis to expose the unconscious desires, excesses, and antagonisms that accompany the world of economic flows, cultural circulation, and sociopolitical change. Unlike the mainstream discourse of globalization, which most often assumes unencumbered movement across borders, these contributors uncover what Lacan calls “the Real” of the glObal—it’s rifts, gaps, exceptions, and contradictions.

_Psychoanalysis and the GIObal_ adopts a psychoanalytic lens to highlight the unconscious circuits of enjoyment, racism, and anxiety that trouble, if not undermine, globalization’s economic, cultural, and environmental goals or gains. The contributors interrogate how unconscious desires and drives are externalized in our increasingly globalizing world: the ways in which traumas and emotional conflicts are integral to the disjunctures, homogeneities, and contingencies of global interactions; how social passions are manifested and materialized in political economy as much as in climate change, urban architecture, refugee and gender politics, or the growth of neo-populism; and how the unconscious serves as a basis for the rise and breakdown of popular movements against authoritarianism and neoliberal globalization.

_Psychoanalysis and the GIObal_ represents a major step forward in understanding globalization and also in extending the range and power of psychoanalytic critiques in, and of, geography.
Excerpt: Psychoanalysis and the GlObal by Ilan Kapoor

This book is about the hole at the heart of the GlObal: it deploys psychoanalysis to expose the unconscious desires, excesses, and antagonisms that accompany the world of economic flows, cultural circulation, and sociopolitical change. In contrast to the mainstream discourse of globalization, which most often assumes unencumbered and smooth movement across borders, the point here is to uncover what Jacques Lacan calls "the Real" of the GlObal—its rifts, gaps, exceptions, and contradictions. So, for example, rather than celebrate the prospect of greater capital accumulation, cultural hybridity, or environmental cooperation brought about by our interconnected world, the book’s contributors adopt a psychoanalytic lens to highlight the unconscious circuits of enjoyment, racism, and anxiety that trouble, if not undermine, globalization’s economic, cultural, and environmental goals and gains.

The use of the concept of "the global," a term that fortuitously bears a void at its center (global), is meant to take account of these chasms and inconsistencies. It is an admittedly awkward term— a notably abstract, adjectival noun—yet thereby helps convey the notion of instability and indecipherability (i.e., the Real) that lies at the hub of globalization. Thus, to put it formulaically, the GlObal = Globalization + the Real.

The contributors to this book, accordingly, psychoanalyze the global, attempting to uncover its unconscious, which, as implied earlier and elaborated further later, is mostly synonymous with, or at least proximate to, the Real. They interrogate how unconscious desires and drives are externalized in our increasingly globalizing world: the ways in which traumas and emotional conflicts are integral to the disjunctions, homogeneities, and contingencies of global interactions; the ways social passions are manifested and materialized in political economy and urban architecture, as much as climate change, refugee and gender politics, or the growth of neo-populism (Brexit, Donald Trump, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, etc.); and the ways the unconscious serves as a basis for the rise and breakdown of popular movements against authoritarianism and neoliberal globalization.

Psychoanalysis, the Unconscious, and the Real

If Sigmund Freud is the one who discovered the unconscious, seeing it as the realm of the repressed (i.e., the domain of primal fantasies, fears, and forbidden desires), Lacan is the one who revealed it to be "structured like a language", that is, a site with a logic and grammar where desire speaks out. As a result, psychoanalysis is about deciphering the unconscious, listening to and prodding the deadlocks of desire when and where they manifest themselves. Such is certainly the task of this edited volume, and its authors draw on both Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory (although mainly on the latter) to tease out these deadlocks.

Now because of this goal of interpreting the unconscious as a signifier, the Lacanian variant of psychoanalysis, likely more than the Freudian one, easily lends itself to a cultural practice: one is able read and decode not just texts but, perhaps more important, socio-institutional politics as well, so as to uncover their unconscious desires. Treating the unconscious linguistically, as Lacan does, denaturalizes and de-psychologizes it, wresting it from notions of an inner condition or individual mind. The unconscious is thus constructed as transindividual, so that it becomes part of our subjectivity without residing inside us. Moreover, as Slavoj Zizek underlines, "the unconscious is outside" (1991, 69): since it exists only in relation to the symbolic order, it is always extrinsic and Other. This is why the essays in this collection see unconscious desire (e.g., anxieties, fetishes, enjoyment, perversion) as externalized and materialized in such varying social practices and institutions as capitalism, financial policymaking, media representations, gender empowerment
projects, social movement politics, or city planning and architecture.

Just as the unconscious exists as the limit to consciousness, so the Real exists as the limit to our symbolic world. "The real is ... the mystery of the unconscious," writes Lacan, proceeding to underline the enigma and trauma at the core of the speaking subject. In fact, this idea of the traumatic Real is typically Lacanian, although important traces of it can also be found in Freud (1976), who sees trauma as fundamental to subjectivity. In the Freudian scheme, real or imagined childhood traumatic encounters have lasting impact on the subject's life, including the prospect of yielding to self-destructive behavior. But it is Lacan (especially the late Lacan) who makes the Real so central to the psychoanalytic endeavor. According to him, the Real is one of three registers that structure our psychical lives: the Symbolic is the world of language, customs, laws; the Imaginary is the sphere of consciousness that provides us with the illusion of stability and wholeness; and the Real is that elusive point of eruption in "reality" that indubitably fissures the Symbolic and the Imaginary.

For Lacan, the Real stands for the gap(s) within the symbolic order, that is, what human animals get cut off from when they become sociolinguistic beings. The Real has no positive consistency: it "resists symbolization," existing only to the extent that language fails. Our sociolinguistic reality, then, is haunted by an ineliminable internal void, an always present/absent dimension of lack, excess, or antagonism. And this is why, psychoanalytically speaking, it can be argued that the glObal is ruptured by an abyss: the Real threatens every attempt at establishing a stable global economic order, a unified national or cosmopolitan identity, or a gentrified urban aesthetic.

The Hole in the Global

The Real refers, then, to the dirty underside of the glObal—its holes and excesses—and it is psychoanalysis that helps discern the contours of such ruptures and negativity. So we may well stand wondrous at the "outer" natural beauty and technological achievements of our planet, but the psychoanalytic Real is quick to spoil the party by pointing to our own complicity in globalization's accompanying environmental decay and socio-technological intemperance. The glObal, in this sense, is never fluid or unfettered; it is always discontinuous, contradictory, and unstable.

Such an unsettling view contrasts sharply with what Radhakrishnan calls a certain triumphalism in the mainstream discourse of globalization "as though the very essence of reality were global". "Hyperglobalist theory" is notable precisely for its celebration of a borderless world, facilitated by new communications technologies and an integrated global economy. Here, the market is taken as the ultimate horizon of globalization, as transnational corporations span the globe and economic and information flows intensify. Neoliberalism is increasingly naturalized as the ideology of this economic globalization, with its promotion of capital mobility, free trade, and market mechanisms as a cure-all for socio-environmental problems.

There is much to reckon with here: despite the contention that globalization is not just about economic flows, it is difficult to deny that the
market drives much of what is commonly accepted as other forms of globalization (e.g., cultural or migratory flows). Thus, Nestor Canclini may well applaud the cultural hybridity and production of newness brought about by globalization, but as David Harvey is quick to remind us, newness and product differentiation are synonymous with flexible accumulation. In this sense, capitalism establishes the horizon for globalization, and a Lacanian psychoanalysis would push the point further by suggesting that capitalism is, in fact, central to the construction of our present-day symbolic order as well. This is indeed the import of Japhy Wilson’s piece (chapter 8), which develops a theory of the Real of Capital exploring three of its contemporary cultural symptoms (black holes, gothic monsters, and divine providence). This is also the argument of Adam Okulicz-Kozaryn and Rubia Valente (chapter 10), who underline how the fetish for big cities and architecture is closely bound up with the development of global capitalism.

Unconscious desire has much to do with both the establishment and sustenance of such a capitalist global order. As Eleanor MacDonald maintains in chapter 4, "anaclitic" or acquisitive desire is central to explaining the materialistic and instrumentalist propensities of our capitalistic cultures. Rob Fletcher concurs (in chapter 3), stressing that it is our unconscious attachment to, and enjoyment (jouissance) of, contemporary capitalism that helps hold it in place. In fact, late capitalism successfully exploits such desire/enjoyment, always ready to offer up new products, which are cheerfully consumed yet never quite satisfy; what is on offer is always lacking in some way, with the result that we continually desire more and better products. And such infinite lack is precisely what keeps capitalism going, enabling it to become vampire-like, in the way that Wilson describes it in chapter 8.

Chapter Summaries:
- Introduction: Ilan Kapoor: "Psychoanalysis and the Global": An introduction to the key concepts that frame this book (the unconscious, the Real, enjoyment, ideological fantasy). It reflects, first, on why the question of unconscious desire is crucial to a contemporary critique of globalization ideology and, second, on the extent to which psychoanalysis can be universalized. Keywords: psychoanalysis, the unconscious, the Real, jouissance, ideology, globalization, political economy, culture, the city, Freud, Lacan, Zizek.
- Chapter 1: Dan Bousfield: "Faith, Fantasy, and Crisis: Racialized Financial Discipline in Europe": This chapter critically assesses the racialized hierarchies underpinning European responses to debt and financial crises. It begins by exploring the social and cultural identities that underpin contemporary understandings of capitalism and economic decision making. Bousfield argues that the coherence of European capitalism reflects a Lacanian sense of fantasy that denies the racialized hierarchies that frame European responses to the crisis. Specifically, belief in capital and the European project was used by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (cJEU) to justify imposing market discipline and responsibility on new European members through extralegal decision making. Technocratic responses to crisis deploy a supposed "necessity" and "objectivity" to bypass democratic, legal, and constitutional limits but rest on a vision of capitalism that denies the subjective and fantasmatic nature of this authority. As these "policies of faith" are propagated via European debt and restructuring, Bousfield sees it is necessary to expose their cultural and political assumptions about capital, capitalism, and expertise. Keywords: European crisis, capital, Lacanian fantasy, European Stability Mechanism (ESM), Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTS).
- Chapter 2: Maureen Sioh: "The Logic of Humiliation in Financial Conquest": Financial crises, far from being watershed moments of extraordinary financial danger, are now a common part of life in the era of globalization. This chapter focuses on the Western response to the
1997-98 East Asian financial crisis. In a crisis that saw national currencies lose 75 percent of their value and stock markets wiped out, the international focus instead became an antagonistic and racialized referendum on identity in the form of Asian values. Building on psychoanalytic frameworks used to study narcissistic injury, anger, and psychopathology, Sioh argues that the referendum on Asian values can be understood as contests over the changing place of the East Asian states within the global hierarchy. In addition, Sioh claims that while humiliation is a key factor in enforcing discipline in economic globalization, the West's desire to humiliate was also an unconscious acting out of anxieties as a reaction to the perception of economically and geopolitically ceding its premier international position. Western anxieties of retaliation by former colonial subjects and now erstwhile competitors in globalization erupted in the very aggressive public discourse that highlighted the long-denied racialized dimension of the global economic order. **Keywords:** East Asia, emerging economy, financial crisis, humiliation, racism, narcissistic injury and rage, psychopathology.

**Chapter 3:** Robert Fletcher: "Beyond the End of the World: Breaking Attachment to a Dying Planet": Increasingly, contemporary environmental governance reflects Fredric Jameson's well-known dictum that "it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism." There is growing promotion of capitalist market mechanisms despite widespread claims that in fact this same capitalist system is responsible for many of the ecological and social problems it is now called on to address. Fletcher suggests that Lacanian psychoanalytic theory can help illuminate this dynamic, demonstrating the deep-seated attachments subjects may develop even to situations they perceive as negative and claim to want to leave.

He applies a psychoanalytic perspective to arguably the most urgent environmental challenge facing the planet today: anthropogenic climate change. He suggests that, more than a lack of practicable alternatives, it may be our unconscious attachment to the contemporary capitalist order, despite our expressed desire to transcend it, that helps hold it in place. To break this attachment, Lacanian theory suggests that what is needed is the development of a more powerful attachment to a valued alternative, generating the desire needed to face the pain required to sever the hold of the status quo. In short, as Zizek asserts, "freedom hurts" and requires coming to terms with the fact that many of us may not be nearly as willing to make the dramatic changes necessary to develop a just and sustainable world as we would like to believe. **Keywords:** psychoanalysis, environment, capitalism, climate change, oil, fantasy, ideology, enjoyment, disavowal, drive, the Real.

**Chapter 4:** Eleanor MacDonald: "Integrative and Responsive Desires: Resources for an Alternative Political Economy": This chapter argues that, while there are three modalities of desire depicted in psychoanalytic theory, Freudian theory tends only to accord serious consideration to one of these: the "anaclitic" mode. MacDonald posits that the advantageous position accorded to anaclitic desire in the dominant paradigms of psychoanalytic thought is consonant with a particular imagined relationship between self and Other—that of acquisition. In this sense, psychoanalytic theory dissembles Western culture’s desacralization of self-Other relationships, while naturalizing capitalism’s market ethos. MacDonald suggests that an alternative political economy must not merely criticize the acquisitive and instrumentalist propensities of our culture; it needs also to draw on the emotional
resonance of other modalities of desire. These alternative desires are derisively designated by the dominant forms of psychoanalytic theory as narcissism and passivity. MacDonald argues that these latter modalities should be more neutrally and more accurately characterized as integrative and responsive, offering important affective resources to engender counter-cultural responses and an alternative environmentalist political economy. **Keywords**: desire, capitalism, political economy, narcissism, consumerism, environ-ment-alism.

- **Chapter 5**: Anna J. Secor: "I Love Death": War in Syria and the Anxiety of the Other: This chapter examines how the war in Syria props up global circuits of anxiety and enjoyment. Secor argues that the affective geopolitics of the conflict has called forth a masochistic register in which what is sought is the Other’s anxiety on the global stage. She shows how the photograph of the dead Syrian child, Alan Kurdi, washed up on the Turkish beach in September 2015, becomes a support for an eroto-politics in which anxiety is the affective experience of the lethal side of jouissance. Further, she argues that the eroto-politics of the Syrian war is masochistic; in the debasement of the body as object, its blind aim is the anxiety of the Other—that is, of God. She further elaborates this point through an analysis of a music video, "I Love Death" (2014) by the Syrian performance artist (and refugee) Batool Mohamed. She argues that this YouTube video makes explicit the position of Syrian bodies as the support for an obscene enjoyment, not only within the orbit of the immediate violence, but in the global field. **Keywords**: anxiety, affect, geopolitics, Syria, masochism, images, refugees.

- **Chapter 6**: Chizu Sato: "Empowering Women: A Symptom of Development?": Over the last two decades, empowering women has become a popular scenario in the social fantasy of development. While technologies for empowerment shift, today’s "smart economics" continues to see women as potentially rational entrepreneurs able to multiply investments through their contributions to their own familial, communal, and national well-being. Mirroring the evolving technologies used for women’s empowerment, critical feminist academics elaborate analytic tools that capture these technologies’ nature. Yet the tendency of their analyses to remain at the level of unthreatening critique bears investigation. This chapter draws on Lacanian psychoanalytic insights to extend transnational feminist critiques of women’s empowerment in development. Sato sees the constantly evolving invention of new technologies of women’s empowerment, as well as concomitant critiques, as a symptom of development, that is, as an effect of an intersubjective dialectics of desire constituting women as subjects/objects of empowerment. Through a practice of transnational feminist literacy that attends to the dynamics of negativity, Sato helps expose our relationships with such changing technologies as well as their critiques and offers a possibility for a different articulation of women’s empowerment, attempting to move beyond the mutually constitutive practices of those who empower, those who are (to be) empowered, and those who critique. **Keywords**: women’s empowerment, development, smart economics, transnational feminist literacy practices, Lacanian psychoanalysis, the Real, negativity, enjoyment.

- **Chapter 7**: Lucas Pohl: "Architectural Enjoyment: Lefebvre and Lacan": In a recently published manuscript, Henri Lefebvre develops the notion of an "architecture of enjoyment" (l’architecture de la jouissance). Surprisingly, he does not mention Jacques Lacan, although it was Lacan who originally introduced the term
jouissance to academic discourse. This chapter uses this previously unknown manuscript of Lefebvre as a unique starting point to exemplify a different reading of Lefebvre and Lacan. Pohl discusses the basics of their notions of enjoyment, while giving special attention to the latter’s political implications and ways to grasp architecture in its relation to the production of space. Finally, Pohl’s chapter seeks to outline the possibilities of an architectural enjoyment. By focusing on vertical architectures, particularly Ballard’s novel High-Rise and a 2014 Frankfurt building detonation, Pohl’s claim is that a discussion of Lefebvre and Lacan can assist in grasping architectural enjoyment to better understand the utopian fantasies and the constitutive lacking structure that haunts a building. Keywords: enjoyment, architecture, the Real, spatial theory, Frankfurt, Lefebvre, Lacan, J. G. Ballard.

- Chapter 8: Japhy Wilson: "Anamorphosis of Capital: Black Holes, Gothic Monsters, and the Will of God": This chapter draws on Marxian value theory and the psychoanalytic critique of ideology in developing a theory of the Real of Capital, which Wilson approaches through an exploration of three of its sociocultural symptoms: black holes, gothic monsters, and divine providence. Viewed "from awry," these anamorphic stains in the symbolic universe of late capitalism reveal specific dimensions of the Real of Capital—as immaterial but objective, as an abstract form of domination, and as the hidden subject of capitalism itself. Keywords: anamorphosis, the Real, global capitalism, drive, enjoyment, cosmology, popular culture, evangelism, Zizek.

- Chapter 9: Nathan F. Bullock: "A Feminist Psychoanalytic Perspective on Glass Architecture in Singapore": The goal of this chapter is to expand the emerging field of psychoanalytic geographies by using a feminist perspective that includes visual analysis to critique the glass architecture of contemporary Singapore. Bullock considers four major glass buildings in Singapore: Marina Bay Sands, Marina Bay Financial Centre, the Esplanade Theatres by the Bay, and the Singapore Flyer. Given that these buildings are largely composed of glass—the defining feature of their façades and construction—and are prominently placed in highly visible locations surrounding Marina Bay—the architectural center of the city—the buildings function as the iconic architecture of Singapore. In their role as icons, the buildings perpetuate the spectacle of the city—its "landscape of consumption" targeted at the transnational capitalist class. Bullock’s feminist psychoanalytic perspective characterizes this architectural spectacle as a drag performance. Keywords: Singapore, iconic architecture, urban spectacle, mirror stage, drag, masculinity.

- Chapter 10: Adam Okulicz-Kozaryn and Rubia R. Valente: "City Life: Glorification, Desire, and the Unconscious Size Fetish": Social scientists have spilled much ink trying to understand what cities do to humans. This chapter argues that an unconscious size fetish plays a key role in luring people to the city. Although the city provides many freedoms to urbanites, Okulicz-Kozaryn and Valente claim that it also entraps city dwellers in dreams and illusions. For the authors, urbanization has tended to be depicted as an overly positive phenomenon, especially by economists; there is, therefore, a need to highlight its shortcomings and problems and to understand why people prefer living in cities regardless. Okulicz-Kozaryn and Valente argue that cities have much in common with capitalism and that likely both do more harm than good. Keywords: urbanization, cities, size fetish, desire, disavowal, capitalism.

- Chapter 11: Pieter de Vries: "Corruption, Left Castration, and the Decay of an Urban Popular Movement in Brazil: A
Melancholy Story": In this chapter, de Vries reflects on the current situation of disarray within the Brazilian Left, what he calls "Left melancholy," by analyzing, first, the discourse of corruption in Brazil and, second, the history of the decay of a popular urban social movement in Recife. The chapter rests on two arguments. First, Left melancholy is a narcissistic sentiment resulting from a feeling of loss the subject experiences when compromising her desire. The loss of the object of desire (that of radical transformation) generates feelings of guilt and disorientation that are sublimated by a never-ending drive to get things done, as manifested in the enjoyment of corruption and engagement in a multitude of dispersed developmental activities. In psychoanalytic terms, de Vries claims this is a shift from desire to drive: while in desire the object of desire is always fleeting, in drive loss itself becomes the object. De Vries's second argument is that the disavowal of Left desire in Brazil expresses itself biopolitically, taking on the structure of drive and emerging as a by product of the clash between popular participation and neoliberal market forces. The result of this (failed) encounter, according to de Vries, is the hollowing out of popular sovereignty. Keywords: biopolitics, desire, drive, enjoyment, melancholy, castration, Left politics, Brazil.

- Epilogue: Ilan Kapoor: "Affect and the Global Rise of Populism": The epilogue offers a brief reflection on the recent rise of populist politics (e.g., Trump, Brexit, Modi, Erdogan, Duterte) and its ties to both the unconscious and global political economy. The advent of neo-populism, Kapoor suggests, is further evidence of the need for psychoanalysis in understanding the global. Keywords: populism, the unconscious, global capitalism, demagoguery, loss, fantasy, enjoyment, ideology critique, Laclau, Zizek.

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