Stars, War & God

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Einstein's Shadow: A Black Hole, a Band of Astronomers, and the Quest to See the Unseeable by Seth Fletcher [Ecco, 9780062312020]

Einstein's Shadow follows a team of elite scientists on their historic mission to take the first picture of a black hole, putting Einstein's theory of relativity to its ultimate test and helping to answer our deepest questions about space, time, the origins of the universe, and the nature of reality.

Photographing a black hole sounds impossible, a contradiction in terms. But Shep Doeleman and a global coalition of scientists are on the cusp of doing just that.

With exclusive access to the team, journalist Seth Fletcher spent five years following Shep and an extraordinary cast of characters as they assembled the Event Horizon Telescope, a virtual radio observatory the size of the Earth. He witnessed their struggles, setbacks, and breakthroughs, and along the way, he explored the latest thinking on the most profound questions about black holes. Do they represent a limit to our ability to understand reality? Or will they reveal the clues that lead to the long-sought Theory of Everything?

Fletcher transforms astrophysics into something exciting, accessible, and immediate, taking us on an incredible adventure to better understand the complexity of our galaxy, the boundaries of human perception and knowledge, and how the messy human endeavor of science really works.

Weaving a compelling narrative account of human ingenuity with excursions into cutting-edge science, Einstein's Shadow is a tale of great minds on a mission to change the way we understand our universe—and our place in it.

Excerpt: We live twenty-six thousand light-years from the center of the Milky Way. That's a rounding error by cosmological standards, but still—it's far. When the light now reaching Earth from the galactic center first took flight, people were crossing the Beringian land bridge, hunting woolly mammoths along the way.

The distance hasn't stopped us from drawing a fairly accurate map of the heart of the galaxy.

We know that if you travel inbound from Earth at the speed of light for about twenty thousand years, you'll encounter the galactic bulge, a peanut-shaped structure thick with stars, some nearly as old as the universe. Several thousand lightyears farther in, there's Sagittarius B2, a cloud a thousand times the expanse of our solar system containing silicon, ammonia, doses of hydrogen cyanide, dashes of ethyl formate, which tastes like raspberries, and at least ten billion, billion, billion liters of alcohol. Continue inward for another three hundred and ninety light-years or so and you reach the inner parsec, the bizarro zone within about three light-years of the galactic center. Tubes of frozen lightning called cosmic filaments streak the sky. Bubbles of gas memorialize ancient star explosions. Glowing streams of gas arc toward the core. Gravity becomes a foaming sea of riptides. Blue stars that make our sun look like a marble slingshot by at millions of miles per hour. Space becomes a bath of radiation; atoms dissolve into a fog of subatomic particles. And near the core, that fog forms a great glowing Frisbee encircling a vast dark sphere. This is the supermassive black hole at the center of the Milky Way, the still point of our slowly rotating galaxy. We call it Sagittarius A*.

Every object in the Milky Way orbits the galactic center and, thus, the black hole, which is about as wide as Mercury's orbit around the sun. Our home star completes a circuit about every two hundred million years. Every galaxy probably has an enormous black hole at its core. Galaxies and their central black holes seem to evolve together. They go through stages. Sometimes the black hole spends eons inhaling matter as fast as physically possible, converting that matter into energy in a long-lasting cataclysm, each instant the equivalent of billions of thermonuclear weapons detonating simultaneously. In these "active" stages, the black holes fire jets of matter and energy across the universe, landscaping the cosmos like great rivers cleave continents and build deltas. Depending on their mood, black holes decide when their host galaxies can grow new stars: when they're on a rampage, blowing shock waves and howling cosmic winds, baby stars can't grow. When a black hole settles down into a quiescent state, the next generation of stars gets to form.

No one is sure how the black holes themselves formed. Astronomers have discovered black holes at the edge of the visible universe that contain the mass of billions of suns. These black holes must have reached this size when the universe was less than a billion years old. Yet according to the conventional understanding of how black holes grow, they couldn't have gotten so big so quickly. There hadn't been enough time. And yet, there they are.

In the fifty years since the physicist John Wheeler popularized the term "black hole," these objects have given people a lot to think about. They're strange enough to inspire buttoned-down scientists to earnestly ponder outlandish questions. Are we living inside a black hole? Was the Big Bang the flip side of a black hole forming in another universe? Does each black hole contain a baby universe? Can we use black holes for time travel? Would the near vicinity of black holes be a good place to look for extraterrestrial life?

Will scientists ever discover the most fundamental laws of nature—a theory of everything? Black holes might be the key. The twentieth century produced two spectacularly successful theories of nature: general theory of relativity, and quantum theory. General relativity says the world is continuous, smoothly evolving, and fundamentally local: influences such as gravity can't travel instantaneously. Quantum theory says the world is twitchy, probabilistic, and nonlocal—particles pop in and out of existence randomly and seem to subtly influence one another instantly across great distances. If you're a scientist who wants to dig down to the deepest level of reality, the obvious question is: which is it?

General relativity describes the universe on the largest scales. Quantum mechanics governs the subatomic world. The two theories crash together most violently in black holes. We say, for example, that Sagittarius A* is a four-million-solar-mass black hole, implying that the black hole "contains" four million suns' worth of matter. But Einstein's equations tell us that the interior of a black hole is a vacuum, and that all the matter that has ever fallen in is packed into an infinitely dense surface at the center of the black hole called a singularity. To understand what happens at the singularity—

and, by extension, at that other singularity known as the Big Bang—scientists need a theory of quantum gravity: a framework that unites general relativity with quantum mechanics.

It would be a lot easier to knit the two theories together if scientists could find loose threads to pull. Problem is, both quantum mechanics and general relativity have passed every experimental test they've ever been subjected to. But general relativity has never been tested near a black hole, where gravity conjures its true strength. And that's one of the many reasons scientists have long wanted to get a close look at a black hole.

It's funny, actually, how confidently scientists talk about black holes, given that no one has ever seen one. They've spent decades building mathematical models and observing the indirect effects of invisible masses that they've decided can only be black holes—but no one has ever gotten a direct look. If you could study a black hole up close, you could test the predictions that have piled up over the decades. Take Sagittarius A*, which is huge and, by cosmic standards, nearby, and therefore the best candidate for up-close study. A close look at Sagittarius A* could answer a long list of hard questions. Here's one example: general relativity predicts that Sagittarius A* will cast a shadow with a very specific shape. If astronomers get a picture of that shadow and it doesn't look the way they expect, they've just uncovered a major clue in the search for a deeper understanding of nature. It would be strong evidence that Einstein's equations are only an approximation of some deeper physical law—and it would provide clues about the identity of that deeper law. And if scientists ever come to understand nature at its most fundamental, it would be, as the late Stephen Hawking once wrote, "the ultimate triumph of human reason—for then we should know the mind of God."

This is a book about a group of astronomers on a quest to take the first picture of a black hole. They call their effort the Event Horizon Telescope. Their target is Sagittarius A*.

The book is based on nearly six years of reporting, starting in February 2012, with deep access to the project. I followed the astronomers to telescopes for tests and observing runs, attended their

conferences, sat in on meetings, hung around their offices, stayed at their houses, and conducted so many interviews in person and via phone, email, Skype, Zoom, and text message that I'm not sure how to count them. With rare exceptions, I was the only journalist on the scene.

When I set out to follow the scientists of the Event Horizon Telescope (EHT) as they assembled the worldwide network of radio telescopes it would take to see to the edge of Sagittarius A*, I was confident I'd find a good story. The science was fascinating, the people were interesting, and the scenery—mountaintop observatories in places like Hawaii and Mexico—was excellent. But it didn't really click together until one night when I sat up talking to a wise astronomer at a hotel bar. We were at a weeklong conference, and a few of the EHT scientists had spent the evening pacing around a high table in the bar, sighing and muttering about the organizational chart they were trying to finish. They'd all gone back to their rooms by the time this astronomer explained to me what was really happening. "You know what they're fighting about, don't you?" he said. "They're fighting over who gets their name on the Nobel Prize." <>

Ghost: My Thirty Years as an FBI Undercover Agent by Michael R. McGowan and Ralph Pezzullo [St. Martin's Press, 9781250136657]

The explosive memoir of an FBI field operative who has worked more undercover cases than anyone in history. Within FBI field operative circles, groups of people known as "Special" by their titles alone, Michael R. McGowan is an outlier. 10% of FBI Special Agents are trained and certified to work undercover. A quarter of those agents have worked more than one undercover assignment in their careers. And of those, less than 10% of them have been involved in more than five undercover cases. Over the course of his career, McGowan has worked more than 50 undercover cases.

In this extraordinary and unprecedented book, McGowan will take readers through some of his biggest cases, from international drug busts, to the Russian and Italian mobs, to biker gangs and contract killers, to corrupt unions and SWAT work.

Ghost is an unparalleled view into how the FBI, through the courage of its undercover Special Agents, nails the bad guys. McGowan infiltrates groups at home and abroad, assembles teams to create the myths he lives, concocts fake businesses, coordinates the busts, and helps carry out the arrests. Along the way, we meet his partners and colleagues at the FBI, who pull together for everything from bank jobs to the Boston Marathon bombing case, mafia dons, and, perhaps most significantly, El Chapo himself and his Sinaloa Cartel.

Ghost is the ultimate insider's account of one of the most iconic institutions of American government, and a testament to the incredible work of the FBI.

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April 10, 1994, started no differently than dozens of days before it. My internal clock roused me before dawn in the bedroom of our modest three-bedroom home in Swedesboro, New Jersey, and my brain immediately started reminding me of the things I had to accomplish that day at work— evidence tapes to review, transcriptions of phone surveillance logs to check. The life of an FBI Special Agent assigned to a Drug Squad was always busy

with cases to investigate, paperwork to fill out, and trials to prepare for.

Today wasn't going to be any different. Or so I assumed. What stood out that morning as I lay in bed under the queen-sized comforter next to my beautiful wife, Samantha, was the fact that at this point in my young career as an FBI Agent and father, my life seemed damn near perfect.

Professionally things couldn't have gone better if I'd written the script myself. I had what I considered to be the best job in the world, protecting Americans and our way of life from those who would do us harm. I'd served as an FBI Special Agent for seven years and as a uniformed policeman for several years before that. During my first major undercover operation, my dedicated colleagues and I spent two years penetrating an international drug smuggling operation, which ended on the night of October 15, 1992, when we seized forty-six kilograms of high-grade Pakistani heroin, valued at $180 million. It was the largest heroin seizure ever in Philadelphia history, and still ranks as one of the top ten heroin seizures of all time.

It had been an enormous coup. And the kicker was that we obtained the heroin without paying one cent of U.S. taxpayer money. That's right. We had convinced the bad guys to front us the drugs. In other words, the bad guys expected us to pay them back, which we did in a sense, but not with money—with arrests halfway around the world in Pakistan.

In the blink of an eye, I'd gone from an unproven new FBI Agent to "Golden Boy." High-level management types, who didn't know my name or those of my colleagues before, were now heaping praise and awards on us. A year and a half later as the case moved toward trial, we still couldn't do any wrong.

In terms of my personal life, I'd had the luck and good sense to marry an incredible woman, who was strong, kind, and who shared the same blue-collar values that I had: work hard, take care of your family and loved ones, create a better life and a wider range of opportunities for your children.

When I kissed Sam and slipped out of bed, she sighed as if to say, I love you. Be safe. I had total confidence that while I went to play cops and robbers in the big city of Philadelphia, she would attend to the needs of our three children with boundless energy, spirit, and love.

With the lights off, I padded down the hallway in bare feet to look in on them. First, our two sons, Russell and Michael, ages eight and six. Their small bedroom formed a picture of everyday American life Norman Rockwell might have painted. Beds pressed together and sleeping so that their heads were inches apart, baseball gloves and other sports gear on the floor, a half-finished Lego construction tilting in the corner, shelves crammed with plastic guns, dirty clothes, coloring books, and Ninja Turtle figurines.

Around a corner, I peeked in the little bedroom of our three-year-old bundle of joy, Paige. Her fat cherub cheeks magically taking in and exhaling little breaths of air; a soft black and white blanket tossed haphazardly across her chubby legs. Was it my imagination or did she wink at me when I gave her a quick peck on the cheek and brushed the golden curls away from her eyes?

Silently I moved to our tiny, cold bathroom and slipped on my gym clothes—running gear and Everlast Boxing T-shirt cut at the sleeves to show off my guns. FBI American Eagle backpack in hand, I crept downstairs, collected my car keys, and passed the dark shadows of the wooden rocker in front of the TV, the expensive new couch we would be paying off forever, and the toys on the floor. It might have struck some people as suburban chaos, but I wouldn't have changed a thing.

Outside, still hours before dawn, I noticed in the moonlight that the lawn needed cutting and the front flowerbox with red geraniums had to be rehung, and mentally added them to next weekend's chores, which would have to be worked around baseball practices, karate lessons, other kids' activities, and Sam's weekend job as a bartender. It's the way she had worked her way through college. Now we needed the cash to supplement my modest salary. Nobody got rich working as an FBI Special Agent, nor did I get overtime for the long hours.

I wasn't complaining. Nor did Sam. Life was good. We'd recently purchased our first house on a cul-de-sac in a nice development surrounded by young families like ours—a schoolteacher across the street, a construction worker next door—our kids were happy and healthy, we were both gainfully employed, and my career trajectory was pointing up.

Feeling good, I fired up the fire-red Pontiac Trans Am in the driveway—a recent government seizure from some flashy drug dealer. It wasn't ideal for surveillance, but got me places fast, when needed. I checked to see that my formal FBI duds—business suit and tie—hung from a hanger in back. Then I went through my FBI backpack. Inside were two handguns—a duty-issued 9 mm Glock and my Smith & Wesson 6906—handcuffs, and flashlights. In tan manila folders were FD-302s (interview summaries), court orders and applications, rough-draft transcripts of phone calls, and handwritten interview notes, which would be needed in various upcoming criminal trials. My badge and credentials were stuffed in a front pocket for easy access. They afforded me powerful legal and law enforcement powers and significant personal and professional responsibility.

In a separate plastic bag I carried my normal work clothes. Since I was assigned to a Drug Squad they consisted of a comfortable pair of jeans, an oversized Phillies baseball shirt long enough to conceal my firearm in public, and a pair of black running shoes. Working drugs, I needed to dress to blend in on the street with shoes that allowed me to run like hell if chasing a suspect. I also worked SWAT, which explained the long gun locked in the trunk.

At 4:45 AM, traffic was light on 295 heading north. KYW 1060 all-news radio reported that the downtown Coventry Market Deli was closing after fifteen years, and that the Phillies had downed the Reds 2-1 on a Pete Incaviglia homer in the ninth inning.

My head was elsewhere, on the massive amount of prep work I had to complete for the upcoming trial. I mentally organized the order of witnesses, the FBI diagrams needed, and considered the legal tricks and maneuvers defense counsel would likely

deploy. Rumor had it that the Pakistani defendants might be pleading guilty. That could make much of what I was planning unnecessary, but I was determined to be prepared nonetheless.

As I crossed the Ben Franklin Bridge from New Jersey to Pennsylvania, a light mist started to fall turning the bricks of Center City dark red. If that was an omen of what was to come, I didn't read it.

A few minutes before 5:15, I turned past the concrete barricades in front of the William J. Green, Jr. Federal Building, and stopped at the entrance to the parking lot. I had to show my FBI credentials to the bored, grumpy security guard, before he pushed the button that raised the security barrier so I could enter the basement and park in my assigned spot.

Up on the sixth floor, I punched my FBI access code into the cipher lock and display and entered the main FBI reception area. There was no one to greet me from behind the desk, nor would there be for another three hours. Official FBI business hours started at 8:15 AM and ended at 5 PM on the dot.

Beyond the inner area, concealed behind bulletproof glass, hung triangulated photos of President Bill Clinton, Attorney General Janet Reno, and FBI Director Louis Freeh. To the right sat a memorial plaque dedicated to Agents killed in the line of duty.

A sober reminder of the dangers we faced, as I passed the main conference room—empty except for fifty precisely lined chairs, U.S. and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania flags, and a wooden podium. Down the first hallway on my left sat the Organized Crime Squad #1, where old-timers with noses red with burst blood vessels chain-smoked at their desks as they tracked down mobsters whose names ended with vowels. Across from them was the Drug Squad #2, full of hard chargers who competed with my Squad (Drug Squad #3) for drug arrests, stats, and bragging rights. We were a competitive bunch.

On my way to my desk in Drug Squad #3, I passed some early arrivers like Pete Jerome, who bleated the FBI's equivalent of a morning greeting, "Look what the dog dragged in. You look like shit."

"Thanks, Jerome. Same to you."

If you didn't have thick skin, you didn't belong here. "Survival of the fittest" was the modus operandi. Those who couldn't trade rapid-fire insults were obliterated without mercy.

In the southwest corner past a long row of gunmetal filing cabinets stood four rows of five desks. Kind of like a classroom in grammar school, except we referred to this as the bullpen. Mine was the last desk in the last row, farthest away from the supervisor's office. Just the way I liked it. Out of sight, out of mind.

My desk was arranged my way, too—everything in its place, a place for everything. Neat and symptomatically OCD. I slung my backpack over the back of my chair and started checking my desk phone messages. Then I removed my daily handwritten todo list from my pocket. Today's called for arranging Urdu-speaking language translators for the defendants in the upcoming trial, making sure the witnesses, especially the foreign law enforcement officers who helped us, had plenty of time to travel to the United States.

After roughly twenty minutes prioritizing the day's tasks, my Squad mates started drifting in. Some looked sleep-deprived, some pissed off, others seemed lost in thought. Ours was a rainbow coalition of black, white, and brown, male and female, young and old, skinny and fat. We got along fine, despite the rough verbal jousting, which usually dealt with premature hair loss, recent weight gain, clothing choices, and choice of spouse or partner.

This morning's started up as usual with senior Agent Will Thompson circling his favorite target, Matt Boggs, who looked like the live embodiment of MAD magazine cartoon character Alfred E. Neuman, down to the space between his upper front teeth.

"Hey, Matt, you get a haircut?" Thompson asked.

Boggs obviously had and it was a doozy—a brutal Prince Valiant job sitting atop his larger than normal-sized head.

"Yeah, I got it yesterday," Matt answered, seemingly relieved that it was a simple question.

"You actually pay someone to cut your hair like that?" asked Special Agent Green jumping in.

"Yeah, five bucks," Boggs answered. "What do you think?" A perfect setup for Thompson, who quickly quipped, "I hope they let you keep the bowl."

Green and Thompson laughed, and Boggs's face turned red.

Now it was Special Agent Tanguay's turn. With his Clark Gable mustache and gigantic belly, he turned to me and grunted, "Hey, Mike. You still planning to run in the marathon?"

"What's it to you, Fat Boy?" I asked without looking up. "Run or walk?"

"Run, wise guy," I answered.

"Whoever you hire to carry you better have a strong back." This was Tanguay's lame way of commenting on my un-runner-like physique, which could be best described as stout or stocky— short of stature with ample upper body strength from lifting weights. Because of my size, I would be competing in the Boston Marathon's Clydesdale Division for males 180 pounds and up.

As part of my training, I rode down the elevator at 6 AM to the small gym and locker room in the basement and changed into my running gear. A half-dozen male Agents in less than sweetsmelling shorts, sweats, and T-shirts, grunted hellos. As a way to encourage us, our employer allotted forty-five minutes (classified as 66E Time) each day during working hours for physical training.

I laced up my gray New Balance 990s and exited the building. As I turned left on Market Street and hit my stride, the sun started to light up the overcast sky. I wasn't a natural or speedy runner, but once I started something I didn't quit. In fact, I'd completed my first marathon, the 26.2-mile Marine Corps Marathon, four years earlier with a respectable time of four hours, twenty-nine minutes.

My goal this morning was a briskly paced five miles along the Delaware River. As I passed the Liberty Bell and Independence Hall, I thought about the primary targets in the heroin case, Mohammed Salim Malik and his nephew, Shahid Hafeez Khawaja. Soon I'd be facing them in court.

I made a quick note to self: Buy a couple new Brooks Brothers suits so you look sharp. I thought of them as a reward for making the big case that had taken us to Canada, Europe, and Hong Kong. Second note to self: Hide the credit card bill when it arrives at home.

Seagulls barked overhead. To my left and right, I glimpsed the facades of upscale restaurants, brick colonial townhouses, small neighborhood bars, and tugboats moored at the shore.

I'd first laid eyes on heroin kingpin Malik in January 1994 when the Pakistani government put him and his nephew on a plane and they arrived at Philadelphia International Airport in shackles escorted by U.S. Marshals. I stood waiting to slap handcuffs on them and read them their Miranda rights, per the FBI custom whereby the Agent who makes the case gets the honor of taking the defendants into custody.

I'd met the much younger Khawaja before—a goofy kid who loved strip joints. We'd spent many hours watching him ogle half-naked women, while I was trying to get him to focus on the details of the deal. He looked shocked and scared when he stepped off the airplane, which was kind of what I had expected. It was his uncle Malik who surprised me.

He was a tiny man with a regal bearing and a gentle, calm manner. Not the fearsome Pakistani drug warrior who sat at number-five on the DEA's most wanted list that I had expected.

But looks were deceiving. As kindly as Malik appeared, the thousands of kilograms of heroin he'd sold around the world weren't agreeable at all—not to countless individuals and families whose lives it affected. The forty-six kilograms of heroin we had seized from him had been measured at 90 percent purity. If consumed, even by a longtime junkie, it would induce immediate cardiac arrest. Cut three, four, or five times before it reached the street by middlemen and criminals it would inevitably inflict damage on college kids from good families, guys in the military, fathers with promising careers, and, even, mothers pushing baby carriages.

I'd seen the damage heroin could do as a uniformed cop working the streets of Burlington, Vermont. One night, I was sitting in the station house at the end of my shift, when I heard car tires screech at the rear of the station where we gassed up our cars. The occupants of the speeding car pushed someone out, and tore off. I arrived to see a young well-dressed man lying on street, convulsing. When he slipped into unconsciousness, I tried to resuscitate him by using mouth to mouth.

While I was working on the kid, my colleagues called an ambulance. Unfortunately, the young man died on the way to the hospital. I found out later that he was a student attending a nearby college and came from a good family. As a father myself, I couldn't imagine their loss.

After my run, I showered and dressed for street-work with my baby S&W stuck in the back waistband of my jeans.

Upstairs, the Squad area was full and the verbal insults were flying. Seconds later our supervisor, Al Packard—aka "The Colonel"—strode in wearing a starched white shirt, blue-and-red striped tie, and military-style crew cut. He shot us all the evil eye as if to say: Get your asses back to work. We did.

No one fucked with The Colonel. Not only was he a real Lt. Colonel in the Marine Reserves and physically imposing with massive forearms, he was also an excellent boss, who deflected the administrative bullshit so we could do our jobs.

Sony headphones over my ears, I began to attend to the non-glamorous task of painstakingly listening word for word to a criminal conversation, and comparing it to typed transcripts to make sure that the pages were a true and accurate representation of the words captured on tape. It was tedious, dull, and boring, and not the kind of FBI activity depicted in movies or TV shows, but absolutely critical to the success of our upcoming federal criminal prosecution.

After a couple of hours hunched over an outdated tape recorder, I took a break and walked around the office to kibitz with some of my buddies and check the SWAT training schedule to make sure I knew where and when I had to be over the next couple of weeks.

Seeing that it was getting close to lunchtime, I headed up to the Evidence Room Vault, which occupied more than half of the entire eighth floor. Since seized in October 1992, the forty-six kilograms sat among boxes of other FBI evidence including seized drugs, guns, knives, suitcases, computers, backpacks, and phones.

I told the vault support employee on duty that I wanted to review, mark, and prepare the drug evidence for transport to court. She asked me to sign in and write down the case file number.

As I entered the caged vault, I noticed a man in a white shirt and tie standing with another support person. He wasn't someone I recognized from our Division, and had FBIHQ written all over him. Strange, but none of my business.

While I started looking for the Pakistani heroin, two more support people entered the vault, walked over to the stranger without acknowledging me, and whispered something in his ear. Their behavior struck me as odd and alerting. An unpleasant feeling started to spread through my body.

The stranger turned to me and asked in an aggressive manner, "What are you looking for?"

I didn't know him from Adam and he hadn't bothered to introduce himself. So I responded with my usual curt, "Who the fuck are you?"

He replied simply, "You need to go see your SAC"—meaning the Special Agent in Charge, or Big Boss, or top guy in the entire office.

It had the effect of a slap to the face. Staggered and pissed off, I asked myself: Why is a complete stranger telling me to leave the evidence vault and go see the Big Boss? Then I noticed that one of the boxes he was examining had my case file number written on it.

What the hell is going on? I asked myself. Why is he looking at the evidence in my case?

Alarms sounded in my head. Rather than standing there and arguing, I returned to the Squad area to look for The Colonel, but he wasn't there. My mind racing a thousand miles an hour, I went down to Mahogany Row, where all Executive Management sat, and proceeded directly to the SAC's office,

skipping two levels in the chain of command, my supervisor and the ASAC (Assistant Special Agent in Charge).

Our SAC was an outstanding leader who made a point of showing up at your desk on a regular basis and asking you what was going on with your various cases. He made it clear that if you worked hard, you had nothing to fear. On the other hand, if you were lazy, he would make your life miserable.

He and I had an excellent working relationship. So upon entering his office, I started ranting that there was some guy from HQ up in the evidence vault dicking around with my evidence. I reminded the SAC that I had an important trial coming up and didn't need some pencil pusher auditing some bullshit compliance issue when I had more important things to do.

The SAC looked me dead in the eye and said, "Mike, the trial is the least of your worries."

My heart skipped a beat.

"What?" I asked. "What are you talking about?"

He stared at me with steely eyes of a medieval executioner, causing a chill to course through my body. I'd never seen this side of him before.

"Mike," he started, "we have reason to believe that drug evidence is missing from the evidence vault. It's a very serious matter. An internal FBI investigation is underway. I want you to return to your Squad area now. You're not to discuss this matter with anyone including your wife, unless and until directed by me. You understand?"

I could barely get the words out. "Yes, sir."

"Dismissed."

I felt like I was going to either faint or throw up. I had no idea what had happened, but the SAC had made it clear that there was a huge problem and somehow I had ended up in the middle of it.

I literally couldn't think straight. Fragments of thoughts passed through my head and somehow, I don't remember how, I was back in the Squad area. But since I couldn't talk to anyone, I didn't want to be there. So I hurried outside.

All the while I kept telling myself to calm down and try to think straight, but it was impossible. My blood pressure had shot so high it felt like my head was about to explode.

Am I a suspect? I asked myself. Does the SAC really think that after all the work I did to make the case, I stole the Pakistani heroin?

To my rational mind that didn't seem possible.

But his words kept repeating in my head: The trial is the least of your worries.

Clearly, he does regard me as a suspect. Why?

Starting to panic, I got in my car and started driving aimlessly around the city. Nothing like this had ever happened to me before, and I didn't know what to do. I couldn't discuss the situation with other Agents, and I didn't want to upset my wife and kids. How could I go home and say, "Hi, honey. You know the case I worked on for two years around the clock? Well, the evidence was stolen, and the FBI thinks I did it?"

In the days that followed, the pressure grew. FBI internal investigators read me my Miranda rights and took my fingerprints. Incredibly, my own employer, the agency I had worked like a dog and risked my life for, was now accusing me of stealing almost $200 million in heroin and cocaine, and reselling it on the street like a common dope dealer.

How was this possible? Not only was my perfect life over, and the reputation I had worked so hard to establish in the toilet. If I couldn't find a way to prove my innocence, there was a strong possibility I'd end up in federal prison hanging with some of the asshole drug dealers I'd put away! I was in the fight of my life. <>

Belonging: A German Reckons with History and Home by Nora Krug [Scribner, 9781476796628]

A revelatory, visually stunning graphic memoir by award-winning artist Nora Krug, telling the story of her attempt to confront the hidden truths of her family's wartime past in Nazi Germany and to comprehend the forces that have shaped her life, her generation, and history.

Nora Krug was born decades after the fall of the Nazi regime, but the Second World War cast a long shadow throughout her childhood and youth in the city of Karlsruhe, Germany. For Nora, the simple fact of her German citizenship bound her to the Holocaust and its unspeakable atrocities and left her without a sense of cultural belonging. Yet Nora knew little about her own family's involvement in the war: though all four grandparents lived through the war, they never spoke of it.

In her late thirties, after twelve years in the US, Krug realizes that living abroad has only intensified her need to ask the questions she didn't dare to as a child and young adult. Returning to Germany, she visits archives, conducts research, and interviews family members, uncovering in the process the stories of her maternal grandfather, a driving teacher in Karlsruhe during the war, and her father's brother Franz-Karl, who died as a teenage SS soldier in Italy. Her extraordinary quest, spanning continents and generations, pieces together her family's troubling story and reflects on what it means to be a German of her generation.

"As multilayered as memory, the book intertwines text, photo, graphic art, and thematic complexity into a revelation almost as powerful for readers as it must have been for the author."

—KIRKUS REVIEWS
(starred review)

Belonging wrestles with the idea of Heimat, the German word for the place that first forms us, where the sensibilities and identity of one generation pass on to the next. In this highly inventive visual memoir—equal parts graphic novel, family scrapbook, and investigative narrative—Nora Krug draws on letters, archival material, flea market finds, and photographs to attempt to understand what it means to belong to one's country and one's family. A wholly original record of a German woman's struggle with the weight of catastrophic history, Belonging is also a reflection on the responsibility that we all have as inheritors of our countries' pasts.

"A mazy and ingenious reckoning with the past … Krug is a tenacious investigator, ferreting out stories from the wispiest hints — a rumor or a mysterious photograph … Even as she fills in the missing details, the stories are left open-ended; there is no rush to condemn or redeem, merely to get as close to the truth as possible … The wisdom of this book is that it does not claim to [wash away stains, mend scars, make whole.] The notion of 'consolation' is one I suspect Krug would regard with suspicion. What she seems in pursuit of is a better quality of guilt … That's where honor seems to lie, this book suggests: in the restless work of remembering, in the looking again, the recalibration and the revision. In

getting the whole picture, and getting it right." — *New York Times*

"A deep and affecting mix of text and illustration." —Booklist

"As the Jewish heir of grandparents who themselves had to flee the upsurge of fascism in their German homelands, I found granddaughter Nora Krug's heartrending investigation of her own family's painstakingly occluded history through those years especially moving. But as an American living through these, our very own years of a seemingly inexorable drift into one's still not quite sure what, I found Krug's achingly realized graphic memoir downright unsettling, for what will our own grandchildren one day make of us and our own everyday compromises and failures to attend?" — Lawrence Weschler, author, among others, of Calamities of Exile and A Miracle, A Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers

"Belonging is a heart wrenching, suspenseful and fascinating odyssey that straddles, and seeks to uncover, an uncharted, inaccessible, unfathomable past. It is a kaleidoscope of interrupted lives, leading inexorably to its ultimate conclusion. I couldn't stop reading it." —Hava Beller, writer and director of The Restless Conscience <>

AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order by Kai-Fu Lee [Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 978-1328546395]

Dr. Kai-Fu Lee—one of the world's most respected experts on AI and China—reveals that China has suddenly caught up to the US at an astonishingly rapid and unexpected pace.

In AI Superpowers, Kai-fu Lee argues powerfully that because of these unprecedented developments in AI, dramatic changes will be happening much sooner than many of us expected. Indeed, as the US-Sino AI competition begins to heat up, Lee urges the US and China to both accept and to embrace the great responsibilities that come with significant

technological power. Most experts already say that AI will have a devastating impact on blue-collar jobs. But Lee predicts that Chinese and American AI will have a strong impact on white-collar jobs as well. Is universal basic income the solution? In Lee's opinion, probably not. But he provides a clear description of which jobs will be affected and how soon, which jobs can be enhanced with AI, and most importantly, how we can provide solutions to some of the most profound changes in human history that are coming soon.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: China's Sputnik Moment

The Chinese teenager with the square-rimmed glasses seemed an unlikely hero to make humanity's last stand. Dressed in a black suit, white shirt, and black tie, Ke-Jie slumped in his seat, rubbing his temples and puzzling over the problem in front of him. Normally filled with a confidence that bordered on cockiness, the nineteen-year-old squirmed in his leather chair. Change the venue and he could be just another prep-school kid agonizing over an insurmountable geometry proof.

But on this May afternoon in 2017, he was locked in an all-out struggle against one of the world's most intelligent machines, AlphaGo, a powerhouse of artificial intelligence backed by arguably the world's top technology company: Google. The battlefield was a nineteen-by-nineteen lined board populated by little black and white stones — the raw materials of the deceptively complex game of Go. During game play, two players alternate placing stones on the board, attempting to encircle the opponent's stones. No human on Earth could do this better than Ke-Jie, but today he was pitted

against a Go player on a level that no one had ever seen before.

Believed to have been invented more than 2,500 years ago, Go's history extends further into the past than any board game still played today. In ancient China, Go represented one of the four art forms any Chinese scholar was expected to master. The game was believed to imbue its players with a Zen-like intellectual refinement and wisdom. Where games like Western chess were crudely tactical, the game of Go is based on patient positioning and slow encirclement, which made it into an art form, a state of mind.

The depth of Go's history is matched by the complexity of the game itself. The basic rules of gameplay can be laid out in just nine sentences, but the number of possible positions on a Go board exceeds the number of atoms in the known universe. The complexity of the decision tree had turned defeating the world champion of Go into a kind of Mount Everest for the artificial intelligence community — a problem whose sheer size had rebuffed every attempt to conquer it. The poetically inclined said it couldn't be done because machines lacked the human element, an almost mystical feel for the game. The engineers simply thought the board offered too many possibilities for a computer to evaluate.

But on this day AlphaGo wasn't just beating Ke-Jie — it was systematically dismantling him. Over the course of three marathon matches of more than three hours each, Ke had thrown everything he had at the computer program. He tested it with different approaches: conservative, aggressive, defensive, and unpredictable. Nothing seemed to work. AlphaGo gave Ke no openings. Instead, it slowly tightened its vise around him.

The View From Beijing

What you saw in this match depended on where you watched it from. To some observers in the United States, AlphaGo's victories signaled not just the triumph of machine over man but also of Western technology companies over the rest of the world. The previous two decades had seen Silicon Valley companies conquer world technology markets. Companies like Facebook and Google had become the goto internet platforms for

socializing and searching. In the process, they had steamrolled local startups in countries from France to Indonesia. These internet juggernauts had given the United States a dominance of the digital world that matched its military and economic power in the real world. With AlphaGo — a product of the British AI startup DeepMind, which had been acquired by Google in 2014 — the West appeared poised to continue that dominance into the age of artificial intelligence.

But looking out my office window during the Ke Jie match, I saw something far different. The headquarters of my venture-capital fund is located in Beijing's Zhongguancun (pronounced "jonggwan-soon") neighborhood, an area often referred to as "the Silicon Valley of China:' Today, Zhongguancun is the beating heart of China's AI movement. To people here, AlphaGo's victories were both a challenge and an inspiration. They turned into China's "Sputnik Moment" for artificial intelligence.

When the Soviet Union launched the first human-made satellite into orbit in October 1957, it had an instant and profound effect on the American psyche and government policy. The event sparked widespread U.S. public anxiety about perceived Soviet technological superiority, with Americans following the satellite across the night sky and tuning in to Sputnik's radio transmissions. It triggered the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), fueled major government subsidies for math and science education, and effectively launched the space race. That nationwide American mobilization bore fruit twelve years later when Neil Armstrong became the first person ever to set foot on the moon.

AlphaGo scored its first high-profile victory in March 2016 during a five-game series against the legendary Korean player Lee Sedol, winning four to one. While barely noticed by most Americans, the five games drew more than 280 million Chinese viewers. Overnight, China plunged into an artificial intelligence fever. The buzz didn't quite rival America's reaction to Sputnik, but it lit a fire under the Chinese technology community that has been burning ever since.

When Chinese investors, entrepreneurs, and government officials all focus in on one industry,

they can truly shake the world. Indeed, China is ramping up AI investment, research, and entrepreneurship on a historic scale. Money for AI startups is pouring in from venture capitalists, tech juggernauts, and the Chinese government. Chinese students have caught AI fever as well, enrolling in advanced degree programs and streaming lectures from international researchers on their smartphones. Startup founders are furiously pivoting, reengineering, or simply rebranding their companies to catch the AI wave.

And less than two months after Ke-Jie resigned his last game to AlphaGo, the Chinese central government issued an ambitious plan to build artificial intelligence capabilities. It called for greater funding, policy support, and national coordination for AI development. It set clear benchmarks for progress by 2020 and 2025, and it projected that by 2030 China would become the center of global innovation in artificial intelligence, leading in theory, technology, and application. By 2017, Chinese venture-capital investors had already responded to that call, pouring record sums into artificial intelligence startups and making up 48 percent of all AI venture funding globally, surpassing the United States for the first time.

A Game and a Game Changer

Underlying that surge in Chinese government support is a new paradigm in the relationship between artificial intelligence and the economy. While the science of artificial intelligence made slow but steady progress for decades, only recently did progress rapidly accelerate, allowing these academic achievements to be translated into realworld use-cases.

The technical challenges of beating a human at the game of Go were already familiar to me. As a young Ph.D. student researching artificial intelligence at Carnegie Mellon University, I studied under pioneering AI researcher Raj Reddy. In 1986, I created the first software program to defeat a member of the world championship team for the game Othello, a simplified version of Go played on an eight-by-eight square board. It was quite an accomplishment at the time, but the technology behind it wasn't ready to tackle anything but straightforward board games.

The same held true when IBM's Deep Blue defeated world chess champion Garry Kasparov in a 1997 match dubbed "The Brain's Last Stand.' That event had spawned anxiety about when our robot overlords would launch their conquest of humankind, but other than boosting IBM's stock price, the match had no meaningful impact on life in the real world. Artificial intelligence still had few practical applications, and researchers had gone decades without making a truly fundamental breakthrough.

Deep Blue had essentially "brute forced" its way to victory — relying largely on hardware customized to rapidly generate and evaluate positions from each move. It had also required real-life chess champions to add guiding heuristics to the software. Yes, the win was an impressive feat of engineering, but it was based on long-established technology that worked only on very constrained sets of issues. Remove Deep Blue from the geometric simplicity of an eight-by-eight-square chessboard and it wouldn't seem very intelligent at all. In the end, the only job it was threatening to take was that of the world chess champion.

This time, things are different. The Ke-Jie versus AlphaGo match was played within the constraints of a Go board, but it is intimately tied up with dramatic changes in the real world. Those changes include the Chinese AI frenzy that AlphaGo's matches sparked amid the underlying technology that powered it to victory.

AlphaGo runs on deep learning, a groundbreaking approach to artificial intelligence that has turbocharged the cognitive capabilities of machines. Deep-learning-based programs can now do a better job than humans at identifying faces, recognizing speech, and issuing loans. For decades, the artificial intelligence revolution always looked to be five years away. But with the development of deep learning over the past few years, that revolution has finally arrived. It will usher in an era of massive productivity increases but also widespread disruptions in labor markets — and profound sociopsychological effects on people — as artificial intelligence takes over human jobs across all sorts of industries.

During the Ke-Jie match, it wasn't the AI-driven killer robots some prominent technologists warn of that frightened me. It was the real-world demons that could be conjured up by mass unemployment and the resulting social turmoil. The threat to jobs is coming far faster than most experts anticipated, and it will not discriminate by the color of one's collar, instead striking the highly trained and poorly educated alike. On the day of that remarkable match between AlphaGo and Ke-Jie, deep learning was dethroning humankind's best Go player. That same job-eating technology is coming soon to a factory and an office near you.

AI Superpowers has broad appeal across politics, technology, science, investing, foreign relations, the meaning of life, education, economics, startups, and employment. The following are points from the book show its implications:

Overarching Observations:

- China is catching up rapidly in AI, and is expected to be fully caught up with the United States within 5 years.
- AI will likely replace 40-50% of human jobs in 15 years.
- The jobs that will remain are those that require human compassion (nurses, carers, childcare) .
- Robots will not rise up and revolt, Westworld-style. That is the stuff of science fiction.

Possible Essay Topics

- AI is not an arms race
- AI Scientist's Solution to AI Job Losses (and no, it's not UBI)
- These 3 Charts Will Predict if You'll Lose Your Job to AI
- How AI Will Revolutionize Retail
- How AI Will Revolutionize Education

On China building a parallel universe for Internet and tech innovations (vs U.S.)

- China has the unique combination of a large market, tenacious entrepreneurs, and an incredible fight-to-the-death competitive environment. When fueled with a lot of capital, these three elements

become: highly valued companies with a lot of users, a small subset of entrepreneurs who become experienced and resourceful and companies that were hardened by competition and come up with impregnable business models.

- The above has led to innovations that were not seen in the US. For example, an almost cashless and credit card-less society that depends on virtual, friction-free, peer-to-peer mobile cash transfer, a news engine that has no editors and creates more user addiction than the Facebook newsfeed, a country with 60 million shared bicycle rides per day and a country that orders take-out 10 times more often than US.
- Chinese tech companies have achieved almost 1:1 value to their equivalent companies in the US.
- Not only are these business model innovations happening in China, AI innovation is happening too—the world's most valuable companies in speech recognition, machine translation, computer vision, and drones are all in China.

On Silicon Valley

- Today, the US and China are about equal in terms of innovative business and technology ideas.
- Chinese companies, startups, VCs and entrepreneurs are now all studying the Chinese AND the American models.
- Yet, Silicon Valley VCs and companies are used to a uni-epicenter world (for example, when Microsoft and Intel dominated the technology world), so they are only aware of American models, and do not follow the Chinese models. That's like going to school and only studying English and not math.
- Many Silicon Valley people attribute the Chinese system to the following reasons, but they are wrong:
- "They're only made possible by government protectionism" -- There may have been some historic examples, but today Chinese entrepreneurs work harder, they are more resourceful, their companies

have come up with different and sometimes better business models and there is more venture capital in China AI than US AI. The Chinese companies are worthy of respect and should be studied and understood.

- "Chinese companies are just copycats" -- That was true 10 years ago, but we saw a transformative change in the last 10 years -- the Chinese entrepreneurs have used copying to practice their skills, and some of them have evolved to become innovators. (Pure copycats always fail, in China and US) This is yet another example where China just moves too fast, so if an American keeps a stereotype of a few years, that would soon get outdated.

- "Chinese companies stay in China and cannot be international" -- First, China is about as large and valuable a market for tech and AI as the rest of the world combined. Second, Chinese companies are successfully partnering and investing in developing country startups to fight back on American domination, with some good success. So they will inevitably go international, though it is not very fast because the local market still has so many treasures to be uncovered.

On revolutionizing business, education, medical

- AI as a tool will replace human jobs and tasks.

- In the future, retail shops will be able to track each customer that walks through, what they like browsed and bought. That would be reconciled with his/her online buying and other patterns, to come up with targeting and optimizing online and offline. Furthermore, retail shops will offer automated and efficient autonomous checkout and immediate home delivery through autonomous vehicles and robots. High end stores can have concierge services that also learn from the AI.

- There will no longer be cashiers or human decision-making on things like inventory and stock replenishment.

- Retail shops will be optimized to work alongside e-commerce. Retail should sell things that are perishable, need to be inspected, and urgent. The regular items should just ship through e-commerce. This will dramatically increase the per-square-foot sales/profit.

- AI tools can assist doctors to make diagnoses more accurate and efficient, to allow doctors to focus on a patient interaction

- AI tools can do the exam grading and targeted lessons for students, to allow teachers to focus on student interaction.

- Education should train as many students to become the "perfect half" to AI as possible.

On a blueprint for Human-AI coexistence

- Those claiming AI is just to enhance humans in every situation are too optimistic.

- Human-AI symbiosis will also happen in many jobs where AI forms the analytical core while human wraps warmth and human-human interaction around AI. Everyone should learn to use AI as tools in his/her own domain.

- However, not all jobs will lead to such symbiosis. In particular, repetitive and routine jobs will not be human-AI symbiosis. McKinsey estimates that half of human tasks can be automated today, and that will lead to partial job replacements, lowering of income, and eventually displacement of jobs for routine/repetitive jobs that AI can do.

- Some people compare AI to electricity or the industrial revolution, and point to the fact that neither of these two big sweeping technology revolutions led to job losses. But industrial revolution replaced craftsman jobs with jobs on the assembly line, while AI decimates assembly line-like jobs completely.

On the government

- There are three areas where the Chinese government is doing pro-AI activities:

- o Funding AI research and subsidizing AI industries -- while this is sizable, it isn't the most critical.
  - o Infrastructure building -- a new city for autonomous vehicles, and new highways that enhance autonomous vehicle safety.
  - o Attracting top talent back to China, and emphasizing AI in education.
- The US has a natural advantage in AI because of its strong universities and research systems. Out of the top 100 AI researchers, the US easily has the majority. Yet, recent policy did not increase their funding. Furthermore, graduates have trouble getting visas to stay in the US — the smartest people around the world are being attracted by US universities to study here, and often their studies are subsidized by a university endowment or government funding. But once they graduate, if they want to start a company, they generally cannot get a visa. They have to go back to their home country or a country with special plans targeting these experts (Singapore, Canada).
- Also, lobbying can be costly at times. For example, trucker unions have appealed to the US government to slow down testing of autonomous trucks on highways, which is the most mature compared to passenger cars in busy city areas. Testing autonomous drivers would provide the perfect application which can show economic value the fastest, and allow the collection of valuable data to improve safety in all autonomous vehicles. Instead of slowing down technology development, a better policy would be to help retraining of the displaced truck drivers. <>

Internationalized Armed Conflicts in International Law by Kubo Macak [Oxford Monographs in International Humanitarian & Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 9780198819868]

Internationalized Armed Conflicts in International Law provides the first comprehensive analysis of

factors that transform a prima facie non-international armed conflict (NIAC) into an international armed conflict (IAC) and the consequences that follow from this process of internationalization. It examines in detail the historical development as well as the current state of the relevant rules of international humanitarian law. The discussion is grounded in general international law, complemented with abundant references to case law, and illustrated by examples from twentieth and twenty-first century armed conflicts.

In Part I, the book puts forward a thorough catalogue of modalities of conflict internationalization that includes outside intervention, State dissolution, and recognition of belligerency. It then specifically considers the legal qualification of complex situations that feature more than two conflict parties and contrasts the mechanism of internationalization of armed conflicts with the reverse process of de-internationalization.

Part II of the book challenges the conventional wisdom that members of non-State armed groups do not normally benefit from combatant status. It argues that the majority of fighters belonging to non-State armed groups in most types of internationalized armed conflicts are in fact eligible for combatant status.

Finally, Part III turns to belligerent occupation, traditionally understood as a leading example of a notion that cannot be transposed to armed conflicts occurring in the territory of a single State. By contrast, the book argues in favour of the applicability of the law of belligerent occupation to internationalized armed conflicts.

The law is all about making distinctions. One of the longest-standing distinctions in public international law has been between the notions of inter-state war, or what today is called international armed conflict (IAC), and civil war, or non-international armed conflict (NIAC). These types of armed conflict have been governed for a long time by different legal rules. In 1625 Hugo Grotius wrote that, by the Law of Nations, prisoners of war may be made slaves only if `taken in a solemn [inter-State] War', while in `civil Wars [...] Prisoners are generally put to the Sword, because they cannot be made Slaves'. Only in a solemn War 'both Sides' had the right of killing enemies, and only in a solemn War the property of the enemy could be acquired simply by taking possession, while 'in civil Wars, whether they be great or small, there is no Change in Property but by the Sentence of a Judge'. While the law applicable to the two types of armed conflict has seen change and a certain convergence over the centuries, present-day international humanitarian law (IHL) still draws a clear distinction between IACs and NIACs.

Life, however, is often more complex than the law. Actual armed conflicts these days rarely conform to this strict dichotomy of IACs and NIACs. As recent complex conflict situations in Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Ukraine have shown, armed conflicts may start as classic NIACs between a rebel group and the state's government but, due to outside intervention or other factors, may later develop into IACs. In some cases, armed conflicts may even be transformed from non-international to international, and then back again to non-international, with important consequences for the applicable law. Armed conflicts that have been transformed from a NIAC to an IAC are referred to as `internationalized' armed conflicts. Internationalized armed conflicts differ from classic inter-state IACs in their intra-state origin and the continued intra-state setting in which they are conducted. Outside intervention in a NIAC raises the question of whether such conflict should be considered as one single internationalized armed conflict or as two or more separate but parallel international and non-international armed conflicts. Above all, the notion of internationalized armed conflict poses the question of the legal rules applicable to these conflicts and, in particular, whether and, if so, to what extent the rules applicable to classic IACs are equally applicable to internationalized armed conflicts.

There is much here that needs careful, painstaking, and historically informed analysis. Kubo Macák provides all this. In his well-researched, well-reasoned, and well-written work he develops a comprehensive typology of the ways in which armed conflicts are internationalized and de-internationalized. With the notion of `operational autonomy' of the conflict parties he offers a workable criterion for the classification of complex conflict situations involving more than two conflict parties as either one single internationalized conflict or two or more international and non-international armed conflicts existing independently side by side. Macák challenges the perceived wisdom that the application of the rules of IHL relating to combatant status and belligerent occupation are predicated on the existence of an inter-state IAC. He argues that members of non-state groups participating in an internationalized armed conflict are eligible, in principle, to combatant status and that the law of belligerent occupation may be applied to internationalized armed conflicts. Even if one may not fully agree with all aspects of Macak's findings on the applicable law, one has to admire the seriousness and profoundness of his scholarship. The work makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the notion of internationalized armed conflicts and will establish its author as one of the pre-eminent experts in the field of IHL of the coming generation.

…Macák's book deals with a traditional topic, and focuses very ably on one of the most delicate current problems in IHL: the conundrum of how to address the tormented relationships between (the law of) international armed conflict and (the regulations of) non-international armed conflicts in

a world where conflicts often change nature many times. In particular, this is true when discussing what could now be seen as a nearly twenty-year single conflict: the so-called 'war on terrorism' or 'war on terror', which to a large extent has radically transformed if not the law of armed conflicts at least the political discourse around it and to a large extent its implementation.

The ideas, and the approach to them taken in this book have the merit to address a traditional issue with new lens, offering an interesting perspective from a solid legal standpoint, as well as a constructive and creative interpretation. It is always difficult for law, and for lawyers, to deal with transitions; normally, law is more suited to capturing the static aspects of reality, while the dynamics are often too blurred to be captured and are frequently left aside. The binary construction `international y non-international armed conflicts' is usually seen as the basis for the application of IHL and its study. At the same time, armed conflicts, almost by definition, are full of movements and are inevitably expression of (often unlawful and yet) successful or unsuccessful transitions. The book revolves around one of the most sensitive of these potential transitions; it is a successful attempt to capture the multifaceted nature of the problems raised by these transitions and represents a serious addition to the reflections in this field.

[Internationalized Armed Conflicts in International Law](#) contains a detailed analysis of cases and practice which makes it a useful tool not only for academics, but also for practitioners. Macák's ability to show the evolving nature of armed conflicts, the insufficiency of the binary distinction between their characterization as international and non-international, the eventuality of shifts (such as their `internationalization'), and potential consequences, makes this book an incredibly useful prism to understand better the realities of today's armed conflicts…

In a distant land, tensions are brewing. After long years of suffering under a military regime described by many as despotic, racist, and corrupt, the opposing factions have finally united and risen up to depose the hated government. Under the banner of national liberation and supported by

much of the population, the insurgents quickly consolidate control over a large part of the territory. However, after the initial shock at the opposition's rapid progress, the government armed forces soon mount powerful counteroffensive. And then, as the fighting stalls, the rebels' morale receives a sudden boost when several neighbouring countries issue public declarations of support. Some even pad their words with wads of cash. However, not all neighbours are equally supportive. One country makes a statement that because the conflict has now reached the level of a 'true civil war', strict neutrality must be observed in dealings with all belligerents. Another sends in its troops, stripped of their official insignia, to assist the embattled government. Refugees are now fleeing the country by the tens of thousands, further destabilizing the region. Meanwhile, the rebel leadership, keen not to lose the momentum and the popular support it now enjoys in parts of the country, declares an independent republic there. As the hostilities continue, gradually, a sizable proportion of the international community recognize the nascent state. However, the actual control over territory continues to shift over time, with the erstwhile rebels establishing authority over several areas outside their new state, and vice versa. Hundreds of enemy fighters are captured and held by both sides. The end of conflict is nowhere in sight.

If this factual pattern sounds more than faintly familiar, it is because parts of it play out around the world at almost all times. It is true that most armed confrontations, like this hypothetical example, begin as internal conflicts.' However, in a world defined by the twin forces of globalization and fragmentation, virtually no armed conflict remains confined to the territory of one state, free from foreign involvement. This holds true for nearly all major conflicts that have shaped the post-Cold War era: ex-Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and so on. As this book goes to press, the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine continues to simmer, with conflicting claims made by both sides as to the extent of Russian involvement in the fighting.

This is not a book about any of these conflicts, and yet it is a book about all of them. Each of them illustrates, albeit in differing ways, that an

originally internal conflict may change and evolve, acquiring gradually additional elements of international character. Such developments have profound implications for the application of international law to these situations. This is because international humanitarian law (IHL), as the branch of international law that regulates armed conflict, is based on a persisting bifurcation between international armed conflicts (IACs) and non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). Each of these legal categories is governed by a different legal framework, and traditionally the regulation of the former has been much more comprehensive than the regulation of the latter.' Although the last few decades have seen a progressive trend of convergence between the two, the distinction between IACs and NIACs is here to stay. It is therefore essential to understand at what point a NIAC transforms into an IAC and what consequences that transformation brings from the legal point of view.

And that is the focus of this book. Rather than examining the nature of specific conflict situations at a given static point in time, it adopts a dynamic lens for its scrutiny. Accordingly, it searches for the tipping points that may convert NIACs into IACs. On that basis, the book argues for a specific conceptualization of internationalized armed conflict in international law. Such conflicts are understood here as prima facie NIACs, the legal nature of which has transformed, with the effect that the law of IAC becomes applicable to them. However, the intra-state origin of such conflicts provides for an uneasy match with many of the precepts of the law of IAC, which has historically evolved as a regulatory framework for inter-state wars. Of those, the regulation of combatancy and the law of belligerent occupation are where the principal legal questions lie and which will be examined in depth in this book.

Research Overview: Aim, objectives, and scope

The aim of this book is to provide a comprehensive examination of the notion, process, and effects of internationalization of armed conflicts in international law. In achieving that aim, this research project has been guided by three primary

objectives: (1) to set forth a clear, reasoned, and practical conceptualization of conflict internationalization; (2) to comprehensively identify the existing forms of conflict internationalization in contemporary international law; and (3) to establish how the law of armed conflict applies to conflicts that have been internationalized in this sense. Together, the fulfilment of these objectives should confirm the continuing relevance of the concept of internationalized armed conflicts for the theory and practice of international law.

A few remarks should be made regarding the scope of enquiry of the present work. First and foremost, this book does not purport to exhaust all legal questions concerning conflict internationalization. Rather, its focus and methodological approach is grounded in the discipline of public international law. In particular, that means that the enquiry is not into standards for conflict qualification under domestic laws, nor into the domestic regulation of military operations that may qualify as internationalized armed conflicts. To the extent that the analysis refers to such materials (for instance, domestic military manuals or amnesty laws issued by various states), it is only with the aim of assessing their relevance for the international legal rules governing the situations within the scope of this study.

Secondly, the book examines conflict internationalization from the viewpoint of IHL (also referred to as the law of armed conflict throughout the text). Accordingly, the enquiry is restricted to the law applicable in armed conflicts (jus in bello) and excludes questions of the lawfulness of the use of force (jus ad bellum). Moreover, the study touches only incidentally on the related areas of international human rights law (IHRL) and international criminal law (ICL). It is important to note that IHRL does not cease to operate in times of armed conflict and it may thus provide additional protection to victims of internationalized armed conflicts, although the exact relationship between IHL and IHRL remains subject to ongoing debate. For its part, ICL primarily contributes to the enforcement of IHL by criminalizing serious violations of IHL. Additionally, international criminal tribunals have refined and developed IHL by applying the rules relevant to cases involving such

violations. Although the present study recognizes these important overlaps, it looks to IHRL and ICL only to the extent that these bodies of law bear upon the correct understanding of the rules of IHL applicable to conflict internationalization.

Thirdly, within IHL, the focus of the enquiry is on (1) the rules governing conflict qualification, and (2) the regulation of combatancy and belligerent occupation. The former are, in a way, meta-rules of IHL, determining which legal framework (or part thereof) applies to a particular situation. Accordingly, the book examines those rules to identify the specific modalities of conflict transformation. The enquiry then turns to the latter sets of rules in its analysis of the effects of internationalization. This is because combatancy and belligerent occupation are widely accepted as the two main areas of crucial difference between the law of IAC and NIAC, as attested by the wealth of literature referring to them in this connection. That difference, however, is certainly not exhausted by those two matters and other issues might also be mentioned in this connection. To some extent, the analysis may be applicable mutatis mutandis to these other issues. Additionally, it may serve as a bellwether of sorts: in other words, if the two cardinal bastions of the law of IAC are found to be transposable to internationalized armed conflicts, this may be taken as an inductive indicator with respect to other matters subject to different regulation. However, such considerations are excluded from the scope of the present enquiry. <>

[True Indie: Life and Death in Filmmaking](#) by Don Coscarelli [St. Martin's Press, 9781250193247]

From Don Coscarelli, the celebrated filmmaker behind many cherished cult classics comes a memoir that's both revealing autobiography and indie film crash course.

Best known for his horror/sci-fi/fantasy films including Phantasm, The Beastmaster, Bubba Ho-tep and John Dies at the End, now Don Coscarelli's taking you on a white-knuckle ride through the rough and tumble world of indie film.

Join Coscarelli as he sells his first feature film to Universal Pictures and gets his own office on the studio lot while still in his teens. Travel with him as he chaperones three out-of-control child actors as they barnstorm Japan, almost drowns actress Catherine Keener in her first film role, and transforms a short story about Elvis Presley battling a four thousand year-old Egyptian mummy into a beloved cult classic film.

Witness the incredible cast of characters he meets along the way from heavy metal god Ronnie James Dio to first-time filmmakers Quentin Tarantino and Roger Avary. Learn how breaking bread with genre icons Tobe Hooper, John Carpenter and Guillermo Del Toro leads to a major cable series and watch as he and zombie king George A. Romero together take over an unprepared national network television show with their tales of blood and horror.

This memoir fits an entire film school education into a single book. It's loaded with behind-the-scenes stories: like setting his face on fire during the making of Phantasm, hearing Bruce Campbell's most important question before agreeing to star in Bubba Ho-tep, and crafting a horror thriller into a franchise phenomenon spanning four decades. Find out how Coscarelli managed to retain creative and financial control of his artistic works in an industry ruled by power-hungry predators, and all without going insane or bankrupt.

True Indie will prove indispensable for fans of Coscarelli's movies, aspiring filmmakers, and anyone who loves a story of an underdog who prevails while not betraying what he believes.

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So You Want to be an Indie filmmaker?

It was my first car chase. I'd grown up watching some great ones. The Mustang vs. the Charger in Bullitt. The Pontiac vs. the New York subway :rain in The French Connection. For me, it would be a 1971 Plymouth 'Cuda vs. a "driverless" 1968 Cadillac hearse. We had no stunt drivers, just me eager student filmmakers willing to drive from our crew. We had no ty permits, but we did have a dead-end road out in the hills of Thousand laks, California, which we figured would be empty during our late-night loot. Did I mention we would be blowing off a shotgun from the 'Cuda -id crashing the hearse into a tree at the end of the chase? How the hell did ever think I'd be able to pull this scene off with no stunt team and no udget? This is how we made Phantasm. Welcome to indie filmmaking!

the traditional image idolizes the indie filmmaker as edgy, hip, and cool. ;ertainly once Quentin Tarantino burst onto the film scene in the early ineties, this image drew a huge flock of wannabes to the indie world. He lade it look so damn easy.

But all those wannabes quickly found out it's ot. Indie filmmaking is damn hard.

Making a no-budget indie film is like going to war. But you're not Genrai MacArthur storming the beaches with a force of a hundred thousand oldiers. Instead, you're more like a small squad of Vietcong guerillas behind nemy lines, trying to complete an impossible mission using guile and your vits, the odds stacked against you. It's risky, difficult, and dangerous. I can wear to it. I've been there.

In addition to writing and directing Phantasm, I also did the cinematography. I had no choice. We couldn't afford a thousand dollars a week for a low-budget director of photography. We could barely afford meals for our dedicated crew. My mom handled that. We sweet-talked camera purveyor Panavision into providing us a state-of-the-art Panaflex film camera package for peanuts. Let's make a movie!

To shoot that car chase required some serious risk taking, myself included. Most of the stunt driving was handled by our go-to camera grip on the show, George W. Singer Jr. He had no previous film experience but came on board my first film as a background extra, and never left. George was a surfer—fearless, compact, and hard-core.

We shot that Plymouth muscle car from every angle. Sometimes we'd put the $75,000 Panaflex camera right on the centerline of the asphalt and George would race the 'Cuda straight at it, aiming for it, then swerve away at the last instant. It made for, as George would say, "One bitchin' shot!"

We also hung that camera off the side of the speeding Plymouth for the actor close-ups. We had no camera mount, so we stole a food tray from a carhop drive-in restaurant. One of us would hang on to it during shots, hoping that flimsy little tray wouldn't break loose on the hairpin turns.

The challenge was filming that shotgun. When one of the actors pops up through the sunroof of the speeding 'Cuda and fires his twelve-gauge pump shotgun into that hearse, there was only one way to get the shot. I had to get in the car's trunk with that forty-pound Panaflex rig strapped to my shoulder while we raced along and actor Bill Thornbury

fired the weapon point blank at me. Of course we were using blank cartridges. What we didn't know then, but what a well-known TV actor found out later and paid for with his life, was that those blank cartridges blow a lot of dangerous wadding and flaming debris out of the gun barrel at a high muzzle velocity. You certainly wouldn't want to be closer to a blank-loaded gun than about ten feet if it were aimed at you. Crammed in the trunk of our feature car, I was less than two feet away. Ignorance is bliss.

Common sense told me I needed some kind of protection. One of my loyal crew members, Roberto Quezada, would be crouched in the trunk beside me, with two jobs—to read the light meter and to keep one hand on that Panaflex camera. There was no room in the trunk for a piece of transparent Plexiglas protection like they would have on a real movie. Wrapping me in a furniture pad wouldn't cut it: racing at high speed the wind would blow it right off. "We got any aluminum foil?"

My producer pal Paul Pepperman wrapped my head in aluminum foil as I put on my thick parka and zipped it up to my neck. Our camera assistant, Marc Schwartz, offered up his small camera pad and gaffer taped it over the left side of my face. The right side would be left bare: I had to look into the eyepiece and figured the Panaflex camera would protect my face. Marc slid a glass blank in over the lens to protect it from getting fried. At least the lens would be safe. We were ready to roll.

Bill was given the loaded pump shotgun. We only had four blank shells. We had just the one take to get the shot. George revved the engine, threw it in gear, and the muscle car took off. I yelled, "Go!" and, like an action star, Thornbury hurled off that sunroof, and as the wind whipped the thing by me, I was almost decapitated. Bill popped up, aimed the shotgun at camera and fired. BLAM, BLAM, BLAM, BLAM! I have to admit I winced from the sound of the discharge, but witnessed several fiery blasts blow right by camera. We got the shot and I screamed, "Cut, cut, cut!"

George skidded the 'Cuda to a stop by our truck and Marc ran up and yanked the Panaflex away

from me to safety. George leaped out of the driver's seat to help me and stopped dead in his tracks. "Dude, your face is on fire.

***

Our Phantasm stuntman, George Singer, skidded the black Barracuda to a stop and leaped out of the driver's seat to help me, then suddenly stopped dead in his tracks. "Dude, your face is on fire." The burning wadding and fiery debris that had been spit out of the shotgun barrel was now embedded in the camera pad that was taped securely to my face. George and Paul and Roberto jumped to my aid, desperately trying to tear the burning camera pad loose from my head. After several sharp tugs it ripped free before my skin could catch on fire. My vision was so obscured that I had been completely oblivious to the danger I was in, due to all that aluminum foil wrapped around my head.

So we got the shot. And that's all you're trying to do on an indie film .. . get the shot. However, we couldn't rest on our laurels, we had a movie to finish. Next up, we needed to crash that hearse into a tree. But how in hell could we do that? On a regular studio movie your rigging effects team would lay down a cable track which would guide the driverless car directly into the tree with no risk to any stuntman. Of course, we didn't have those kinds of resources when we made Phantasm. But we did have a bunch of young, resourceful indie filmmakers who wouldn't take no for an answer, including George Singer. "Hey George, do you think if we put our truck behind the hearse and pushed it up to like thirty miles an hour, that you could then steer the coach from the backseat and into that tree and maybe just before impact drop down into some stunt pads to protect yourself from impact?"

"Sure thing, bro. Let's go for it." <>

[Culture and the Death of God](#) by Terry Eagleton [Yale University Press, 9780300203998]

New observations on the persistence of God in modern times and why "authentic" atheism is so very hard to come by
How to live in a supposedly faithless world threatened by religious fundamentalism? Terry

Eagleton, formidable thinker and renowned cultural critic, investigates in this thought-provoking book the contradictions, difficulties, and significance of the modern search for a replacement for God. Engaging with a phenomenally wide range of ideas, issues, and thinkers from the Enlightenment to today, Eagleton discusses the state of religion before and after 9/11, the ironies surrounding Western capitalism's part in spawning not only secularism but also fundamentalism, and the unsatisfactory surrogates for the Almighty invented in the post-Enlightenment era.

The author reflects on the unique capacities of religion, the possibilities of culture and art as modern paths to salvation, the so-called war on terror's impact on atheism, and a host of other topics of concern to those who envision a future in which just and compassionate communities thrive. Lucid, stylish, and entertaining in his usual manner, Eagleton presents a brilliant survey of modern thought that also serves as a timely, urgently needed intervention into our perilous political present.

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 Excerpt: Those who find religion boring, irrelevant or offensive need not feel too deterred by my title. This book is less about God than about the crisis occasioned by his apparent disappearance. In pursuit of this subject, it begins with the Enlightenment and ends with the rise of radical Islam and the so-called war on terror. I start by showing how God survived the rationalism of the eighteenth century, and conclude with his dramatic reappearance in our own supposedly faithless age. Among other things, the narrative I have to deliver concerns the fact that atheism is by no means as easy as it looks.

Religion has been one of the most powerful ways of justifying political sovereignty. It would be

absurd, to be sure, to reduce it to such a function. If it has provided a craven apology for power, it has also acted from time to time as a thorn in its side. Yet God has played such a vital role in the maintenance of political authority that the waning of his influence in a secular age could not be greeted with equanimity even by many of those who had not the faintest belief in him. From Enlightenment Reason to modernist art, a whole range of phenomena therefore took on the task of providing surrogate forms of transcendence, plugging the gap where God had once been. Part of my argument is that the most resourceful of these proxies was culture, in the broad rather than narrow sense of the term.

All of these stopgaps had other business in hand. They were not just displaced forms of divinity. Religion has not survived simply by assuming a number of cunning disguises, any more than it has been secularised away. Yet despite the fact that art, Reason, culture and so on all had a thriving life of their own, they were also called on from time to time to shoulder this ideological burden, one to which they invariably proved unequal. That none of these viceroys for God turned out to be very plausible is part of my story. The Almighty has proved remarkably difficult to dispose of. Indeed, this is perhaps the most extraordinary aspect of the narrative the book has to tell. Again and again, at least until the advent of postmodernism, what seems like an authentic atheism turns out to be nothing of the kind.

Another recurrent feature of my argument is the capacity of religion to unite theory and practice, elite and populace, spirit and senses, a capacity which culture was never quite able to emulate. This is one of several reasons why religion has proved easily the most tenacious and universal form of popular culture, though you would not suspect so by leafing through a few university cultural studies prospectuses. The word `religion' crops up in such literature about as often as the sentence 'We must protect the values of a civilised elite from the grubby paws of the populace.' Almost every cultural theorist today passes over in silence some of the most vital beliefs and activities of billions of ordinary men and women, simply because they happen not to be to their personal taste. Most of them are also ardent opponents of prejudice.

The Limits of Enlightenment

Societies become secular not when they dispense with religion altogether, but when they are no longer especially agitated by it. In a British survey of 2011, 61 per cent of the respondents claimed to have a religion, but only 29 per cent of them claimed to be religious. Presumably they meant that they belonged to a religious group but were not especially zealous about the fact. As the wit remarked, it is when religion starts to interfere with your everyday life that it is time to give it up. In this, it has a certain affinity with alcohol. Another index of secularisation is when religious faith ceases to be vitally at stake in the political sphere, not just when church attendance plummets or Roman Catholics are mysteriously childless. This need not mean that religion becomes formally privatised, uncoupled from the political state; but even when it is not, it is effectively taken out of public ownership and dwindles to a kind of personal pastime, like breeding gerbils or collecting porcelain, with less and less resonance in the public world. In elegiac mood, Max Weber notes that in the modern era, 'the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public life either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations. It is as though the kingdom of God gives way to the Bloomsbury Group.

In this sense, religion follows the trajectory of art and sexuality, those other two major constituents of what one might call the symbolic sphere. They, too, tend to pass out of public ownership into private hands as the modern age unfolds. The art which once praised God, flattered a patron, entertained a monarch or celebrated the military exploits of the tribe is now for the most part a question of individual self-expression. Even if it is not confined to a garret, it does not typically conduct its business amidst the bustle of court, church, palace or public square. At the same time, Protestantism finds God in the inmost recesses of the individual life. It is when artists, like bishops, are unlikely to be hanged that we can be sure that modernity has set in. They do not matter enough for that. In England after

1688, the church-and-state settlement was such that religious disputes could be conducted for the most part without fear of political recrimination or loss of personal liberty. Ideas that might prove seditious in Paris could be freely aired in London. Religious fervour would pose no challenge to the foundations of the state. Pas de zèle was the watchword. Nor were religious sceptics inclined to act in a treasonable way. Hence the markedly non-militant character of the English Enlightenment, such as it was, which by and large remained comfortably ensconced within the social and political establishment.

Philosophically speaking, its background was empiricist rather than rationalist, Locke rather than Spinoza. It was the radical, semi-underground Enlightenment which would find its inspiration in the latter, while the mainstream culture of the so-called Glorious Revolution took its cue from the former. For a patrician Whig like the Earl of Shaftesbury, the deity was essentially an English gentleman. He was certainly not the curmudgeonly old fanatic worshipped by some ranting seventeenth-century plebeian foaming at the mouth, with what one commentator has dubbed the 'psychopathy of enthusiasm'. 'They give the name of infidel to none but bankrupts,' Voltaire observed of the English. The same shyness of religious ardour exists in England today. One would not expect the Queen's chaplain to inquire whether one had been washed in the blood of the Lamb.

The privatisation of the symbolic sphere is a strictly relative affair, not least if one thinks of the various Victorian contentions over science and religion, the culture industry, the state regulation of sexuality and the like. Today, one of the most glaring refutations of the case that religion has vanished from public life is known as the United States. Late modernity (or postmodernity, if one prefers) takes some of these symbolic practices back into public ownership. This includes religion, which in the form of the various revivalisms and fundamentalisms becomes once more a political force to be reckoned with. The aesthetic, too, is reclaimed from the social margins to extend its influence over daily life. Sexuality also becomes political once more, not least in the shape of the women's movement and the rise of militant sexual minorities. High

modernity, by contrast, is marked by a divorce between the symbolic and the politico-economic, one which frees symbolic activities for new possibilities while relegating them to the sidelines. There is thus loss and gain at the same time. If the purity police no longer break down your bedroom door, it is partly because sexuality in an individualist culture is nobody's business but your own.

The eighteenth-century Enlightenment in France, Germany, Holland and elsewhere in continental Europe was certainly agitated by questions of religious faith.' As such, it was a continuation by more pacific means of the ferocious sectarian conflicts which had left the Continent torn and bleeding in the preceding centuries. Now, however, it was an issue of faith versus Reason rather than Catholic versus Protestant, a matter of polemics rather than pitched battles. It is a cliché of intellectual history that though the Enlightenment was much preoccupied with science, Nature, Reason, progress and social reconstruction, what lay closest to its heart was the subject which caused it the most rancour and moral outrage, namely religion. Jonathan Israel maintains that the Enlightenment's `chief preoccupation during its first century and a half, and the theme with which it was most preoccupied in print, was its relentless war on ecclesiastical authority, theological ways of viewing the world, and religion seen as an instrument of social and political organisation and oppression'. Frank Manuel remarks that 'in both their belief and their disbelief, men of the Enlightenment were profoundly agitated by religion as an exploration of human nature? J. G. Cottingham holds that 'the coherence, as well as the confidence, of the Enlightenment, rested on religious foundations? All history was the history of secular struggle against a priestly, power-hungry caste. Hegel notes in the Phenomenology of Mind that the abiding concern of the Enlightenment is the battle against religion — though he also insists that since religious faith has in any case been reduced to propositional status, as a body of theoretical knowledge or science of the deity, it has grown every bit as impoverished as the rationalism which lays siege to it. We shall be returning to this theme later in the chapter.

In his magisterial account of the radical Enlightenment, Jonathan Israel observes that `theological debate lay at the heart of the early Enlightenment'. It was, he considers, `neither science ... nor new geographical discoveries, nor even philosophy as such, but rather the formidable difficulty of reconciling old and new in theological terms, and finally, by the 1740s, the apparent collapse of all efforts to forge a new general synthesis of theology, philos¬ophy, politics, and science, which destabilised religious beliefs and values, causing the wholly unprecedented crisis of faith driving the secularisation of the modern West? This spiritual crisis, Israel points out, has its roots in a thoroughly material history — the expansion of European commercialism and imperialism in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the rapid growth of the great international monopolies, the dislocating effects of diaspora, a new social fluidity and diversity, the impact of new technologies, the partial dissolution of traditional social hierarchies and their accompanying symbolic systems and the like.

The Enlightenment may have been troubled by the question of faith, but it was not especially anti-religious. `It is doubtful,' writes Ernst Cassirer, ... [that] we can consider the Enlightenment basically as an age irreligious and inimical to religion ... the fundamental objective (especially in the German Enlightenment) is not the dissolution of religion but its "transcendental" justification and foundation'. We should recall that the word `atheism' did not enter modern European languages until the sixteenth century, and that for some considerable time afterwards it was doubted whether such a position was actually tenable. As Malcolm Bull wryly puts it, 'at the same time that atheism was everywhere denounced, its existence was held to be impossible'. (Despite this, one might point out, the House of Commons in 1666 could cite Thomas Hobbes's atheism as a cause of the fire and plague of London.) Many of the so-called atheists denounced from the pulpit and burnt at the sake were not really godless at all. As Bull notes, it was a century after the term originated that the first indisputable modern atheists arrived on the scene, and it was well into the eighteenth century that the word `atheism' became commonplace usage.

Atheism, he points out, arose well before atheists, rather as the idea of anarchism was invented long before real-life anarchists began to emerge, and as nihilism predated the appearance of nihilists.

It would be curious, then, if the Enlightenment had taken the form of an aggressively secular movement, as some of its modern apologists assume. When it came to religion, a good deal of this audacious intellectual project landed us back on a spot not far from where we were in the first place, furnished with a new, more plausible set of rationales. The task was not so much to topple the Supreme Being as to replace a benighted version of religious faith with one that might grace coffee-house conversation in the Strand. For the most part, it was priestcraft rather than the Almighty that the movement had in its sights. Radical objections to Christianity came to a head in a hostility to the role of the church in politics. Indeed, Peter Harrison claims that the concept of religion as a system of social practices is itself a product of the Enlightenment. Traditionally, and certainly in medieval times, the relevant term was not `religion' but `faith. The very concept of religion as we have it, then, emerges in the context of an institutional inquiry. It is a sociological phenomenon to be scientifically investigated from the outside, as well as to be approached comparatively (the comparative study of religion was central to Enlightenment thought)." The very term holds the thing off at judicious arm's length. In this sense, the modern idea of religion, and a rational inquiry into its historical origins and effects, are twinned at birth.

It was religion in this institutional sense that most of the philosophes took as their target. It is a familiar fact that there were relatively few outright atheists among their ranks. For it to have been otherwise would be as surprising as if hordes of Europe's premier intellectuals today turned out to be Trotskyists. It is true that there were some rank unbelievers among the intelligentsia. Godwin, Holbach, Helvetius, Diderot, La Mettrie, Montesquieu, Benjamin Franklin and (perhaps) Hume are cases in point. Yet many other thinkers were not so convinced of the vacuity of faith. If the Holbachians saw religion as a mania or contagious pestilence, there were others who insisted on its

civic necessity, or even on its benevolence. A spontaneous atheism was typical of the naturalistic social order to which the Enlightenment helped to give birth, but not of the movement itself. As far as the common people were concerned, we are speaking of a world in which almost everyone believed in angels and hardly anyone in atheism. (Fewer, however, believed in witches as the eighteenth century drew on.) A general loss of belief was to follow in the wake of the Enlightenment, but not in the main because of it. Such scepticism has its foundation in social conditions. Modern societies, as we shall see later, are faithless by their very nature. It is the convictions or lack of them embodied in their everyday practices that matter, not what archbishops or militantly secular scientists might argue. Lucien Goldmann claims that the middle class represents for the first time in history 'not merely a class that has generally lost its faith, but rather one whose practice and whose thought, whatever its formal religious belief, are fundamentally irreligious in a critical area [i.e. the economy], and totally alien to the category of the sacred'.

As Nietzsche recognised, it was middle-class society itself that, contrary to its own best intentions, succeeded in bringing religion into disrepute. In this respect, science, technology, education, social mobility, market forces and a host of other secularising factors played a more vital role than Montesquieu or Diderot. That this was the case was not generally apparent to the philosophes themselves, who tended to attribute the failure of their anti-clerical onslaughts to the vested interests of the clergy and the ignorance of the canaille, rather than to the fact that pieties and principles embedded in age-old forms of life are not to be uprooted by a few eloquent polemics. In its campaign against the churches, the Enlightenment could be hampered by its naively rationalist faith that ideas are what men and women live by. It was also thwarted by the fact that the social forces making for secularism were still at an early stage of evolution.

All the same, though ideas do not alter history in isolation, there are few more compelling examples of their social impact than the period in question. As

Jonathan Israel writes, 'the trends towards secularisation, tolerance, equality, democracy, individual freedom, and liberty of expression in western Europe and America between 1650 and 1750 were powerfully impelled by "philosophy" and its successful propagation in the political and social sphere'. These ideas, he argues, nurtured a newly insurgent rhetoric intent on arousing the common people against authority and tradition. The Enlightenment was a political culture, not just a set of philosophical texts. The name of the dreaded Spinoza, a byword for socially subversive godlessness, was lauded and detested far beyond scholarly circles. The movement may not have been capable of extirpating religious belief, or even of desiring to do so, but neither was it simply a minor coterie of dissident intellectuals.

The majority of these zealots of Reason still held to some form of religious faith. Newton and Joseph Priestley were Christians, while Locke, Shaftesbury, Voltaire, Tindal, Toland, Paine and Jefferson were Deists. The Scottish Enlightenment was for the most part hostile to both atheism and materialism. Rousseau was a theist, while Gibbon, despite his notorious religious scepticism, held that aspects of religion could prove productive for social life, not least as a bulwark against the likes of the godless Jacobins. He was even rumoured to have returned to the religious fold in his final days. Herder, though a cleric, rejected the idea of a personal God and was a Spinozist of sorts, steering between supernaturalism on the one hand and materialism on the other. Despite this, he considered religion to lie at the very core of a culture. Pierre Bayle, scourge of prejudice, superstition and priestly despotism in his Historical and Critical Dictionary, viewed actually existing religion as a species of psychopathy, believing that the 'the terror-stricken savage and the pagan of antiquity were both psychically ill'. Yet he accepted the existence of God. Kant, the greatest Aufklärer of all, was no enemy of religion.

The Enlightenment sought to reconstruct morality on a rational basis, but as Alasdair MacIntyre has pointed out, the morality in question remained largely Christian in provenance. John Gray, a doughty critic of Enlightenment thought, remarks that in Nietzsche's view the `project of unifying all

values under the aegis of a rational reconstruction of morality is merely a long shadow cast in the slow eclipse of Christian transcendental [sic] faith'.

This rationalist ethics retains the universal, foundational character of Christian moral doctrine, along with its appeal to absolute truth and supreme authority. Nietzsche, as Gray appreciates, held that God had survived his apparent assassination at the hands of secular society. He had gone into hiding under a number of aliases, one of which was morality.

In a similar way, Friedrich Jacobi recognised that the Enlightenment conception of Reason has a prehistory, one which includes elements of the very Christianity it challenges. In our own time, Jürgen Habermas has also claimed that the values of freedom, autonomy, egalitarianism and universal rights derive from the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love. Autonomy may be a cherished modern value, but it is one with a venerable theological pedigree, since God himself is traditionally seen as pure self-determination. The parallel between an autonomous Reason and a self-sufficient deity is already being noted as early as ancient Stoicism. 'Let reason search into external things,' urges Seneca, `... yet let it fall back upon itself. For God also, the all-embracing world and the ruler of the universe, reaches forth into outward things, yet, withdrawing from all sides, returns into himself"

Gotthold Lessing, along with many another savant, argued for a union of Reason and revelation. The Gospel of the future would be based upon Reason, but was prefigured in grosser, more primitive form by both Old and New Testaments. Despite this, Lessing was a Christian of a kind, and an admirably tolerant one for whom religion was a matter of inner conviction rather than rational demonstrability. A whole range of thinkers preached the virtues of natural religion, of which Christian revelation was simply one somewhat redundant expression. As one commentator wryly remarks, such thinkers are among those who `believe that Christianity is true precisely to the extent that it is superfluous'. The Deists in particular were reluctant to pay excessive heed to the word of a scruffy, plebeian, first-century Jew in an

obscure corner of the earth. J. G. Fichte was to inherit this prejudice. The title of Matthew Tindal's best-known study, Christianity as Old as Creation, appears to inflate the claims of Christianity while in fact diminishing them. Christian doctrines are simply one version of certain imperishable human truths accessible to the light of Reason. Edward Herbert of Cherbury believed that the Ten Commandments could be deduced from rational principles.

Polite eighteenth-century circles found such a toothless brand of Christianity far preferable to the sectarian rancour of the previous century — what one seventeenth-century commentator describes as 'the general increase of open libertinism, secret atheism, bold Arminianism, desperate Socinianism, stupid Anabaptism'. The Earl of Shaftesbury put in a plea for what he called `complacency, sociableness, and good humour in religion', which would hardly be to the taste of Oliver Cromwell. David Hume, probably an atheist or diluted Deist and certainly a full-blooded naturalist, rejected even this thoroughly anthropologised version of religion. He had no such faith in the resources of Reason, maintaining that it is powerless to penetrate metaphysical mysteries. If Reason in Hume's eyes could not come up with a watertight account of the nature of causality, it was unlikely that it could shed much light on the Archangel Gabriel. Knowledge could not extend to the objects of faith, not least because in Hume's view knowledge itself was simply a kind of faith. It was the product of habit and custom. Morality, likewise, was simply a set of human contrivances, with no metaphysical foundation. Hume also upbraided natural religion for assuming that there was a common human nature. In this respect at least, such rationalism was not sceptical enough.

The Enlightenment's assault on religion, then, was at root a political rather than theological affair. By and large, the project was not to replace the supernatural with the natural, but to oust a barbarous, benighted faith in favour of a rational, civilised one. It was the role of ecclesial power in consecrating the ancien régimes, the unholy alliance of throne and altar, which scandalised these scholars most deeply, as the intellectual avatars of an emergent middle class. Some of them were less philosophers in the modern sense of the word than

ideologues and intellectual agitators. They were public intellectuals, not cloistered academics. If the version of rationality they promoted could be antiseptic enough, they were admirably fervent in its cause. The impulse which inspired them was as much practical as intellectual. What seized their imagination was the Baconian project of harnessing knowledge and power, placing the findings of scientific reason at the service of social reform and human emancipation. The apostles of Enlightenment could take a lofty enough view of Reason, but their brand of rationality was for the most part pragmatic and mundane. Reason was to be autonomous not in the sense of being quarantined from worldly affairs, but in the sense of being absolved from sinister vested interests. Even epistemology could be pressed into the cause of human welfare. John Locke's doctrine that the mind is originally a tabula rasa could be used to banish the spectre of Original Sin... <>

Hiking with Nietzsche: On Becoming Who You Are by John Kaag [Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 9780374170011]

A revelatory Alpine journey in the spirit of the great Romantic thinker Friedrich Nietzsche
Hiking with Nietzsche: Becoming Who You Are is a tale of two philosophical journeys—one made by John Kaag as an introspective young man of nineteen, the other seventeen years later, in radically different circumstances: he is now a husband and father, and his wife and small child are in tow. Kaag sets off for the Swiss peaks above Sils Maria where Nietzsche wrote his landmark work Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Both of Kaag's journeys are made in search of the wisdom at the core of Nietzsche's philosophy, yet they deliver him to radically different interpretations and, more crucially, revelations about the human condition.

Just as Kaag's acclaimed debut, American Philosophy: A Love Story, seamlessly wove together his philosophical discoveries with his search for meaning, Hiking with Nietzsche is a fascinating exploration not only of Nietzsche's ideals but of how his experience of living relates to us as individuals in the twenty-first century. Bold,

intimate, and rich with insight, Hiking with Nietzsche is about defeating complacency, balancing sanity and madness, and coming to grips with the unobtainable. As Kaag hikes, alone or with his family, but always with Nietzsche, he recognizes that even slipping can be instructive. It is in the process of climbing, and through the inevitable missteps, that one has the chance, in Nietzsche's words, to "become who you are."

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Excerpt: Prologue: Parent Mountains
Set for yourself goals, high and noble goals, and perish in pursuit of them! I know of no better life purpose than to perish in pursuing the great and the impossible: animae magnae prodigus. —Friedrich Nietzsche, Notebook, 1873

It took me six hours to summit Piz Corvatsch. This was Friedrich Nietzsche's mountain. The summer fog that hangs low in the morning had all but disappeared, exposing the foothills a mile below. I came to rest on a well-worn slab of granite and appreciated how far I'd come. For a moment I looked down on Lake Sils, at the shimmering base of Corvatsch, an aquamarine mirror that stretched

across the valley and doubled the landscape that was, I thought, already impossibly grand. Then the last of the clouds burned away, and Piz Bernina emerged in the southeast. In fact, I hadn't gone all that far. Bernina, the second-highest point in the Eastern Alps, is Corvatsch's "parent," the culminating point in a ridge that runs north to south, bisecting two massive glacial valleys. After the twenty-eight-year-old Johann Coaz first scaled its peak in 1850, he wrote, "Serious thoughts took hold of us. Greedy eyes surveyed the land up to the distant horizon, and thousands and thousands of mountain peaks surrounded us, rising as rocks from the glittering sea of ice. We stared amazed and awe-struck across this magnificent mountain world."

I was nineteen. Parent mountains had a certain power over me. Looming or distant, the parent is the highest peak in a given range, the point from which all other geological children descend. I had been drawn to the Alps, to the hamlet of SilsMaria, the Swiss village that Nietzsche called home for much of his intellectual life. For days, I wandered the hills that he'd traversed at the end of the nineteenth century, and then, still trailing Nietzsche, I went in search of a parent. Piz Corvatsch, at 11,320 feet, casts a shadow over its children, the mountains that encircle Sils-Maria. Across the valley: Bernina. Three hundred miles to the west, at the French border of this "magnificent mountain world," stands Bernina's far-removed progenitor, Mont Blanc. After that—absurdly remote, estranged, and omnipresent—rests Everest, nearly twice the size of its French child. Corvatsch, Bernina, Mont Blanc, Everest—the road to the parent is, for most travelers, unbearably long.

Nietzsche was, for most of his life, in search of the highest, routinely bent on mastering the physical and philosophical landscape. "Behold," he gestures, "I teach you the Übermensch."

This "Overman," a superhuman ideal, a great height to which an individual could aspire, remains an inspiration for an untold number of readers. For many years I thought the message of the Übermensch was clear: become better, go higher than you presently are. Free spirit, self-conqueror, nonconformist, Nietzsche's existential hero terrifies and inspires in equal measure. The Übermensch

stands as a challenge to imagine ourselves otherwise, above the societal conventions and self-imposed constraints that quietly govern modern life. Above the steady, unstoppable march of the everyday. Above the anxiety and depression that accompany our daily pursuits. Above the fear and self-doubt that keep our freedom in check.

Nietzsche's philosophy is sometimes pooh-poohed as juvenile—the product of a megalomaniac that is perhaps well suited to the self-absorption and naïveté of the teenage years but best outgrown by the time one reaches adulthood. And it's true, many readers on the cusp of maturity have been emboldened by this "good European." But there are certain Nietzschean lessons that are lost on the young. Indeed, over the years I've come to think that his writings are actually uniquely fit-ted for those of us who have begun to crest middle age. At nineteen, on the summit of Corvatsch, I had no idea how dull the world could sometimes be. How easy it would be to remain in the valleys, to be satisfied with mediocrity. Or how difficult it would be to stay alert to life. At thirty-six, I am just now beginning to understand.

Being a responsible adult is, among other things, often to resign oneself to a life that falls radically short of the expectations and potentialities that one had or, indeed, still has. It is to become what one has always hoped to avoid. In midlife, the Übermensch is a lingering promise, a hope, that change is still possible. Nietzsche's Übermensch— actually his philosophy on the whole—is no mere abstraction. It isn't to be realized from

an armchair or the comfort of one's home. One needs to physically rise, stand up, stretch, and set off. This transformation occurs, according to Nietzsche, in a "sudden sentience and prescience of the future, of near adventures, of seas open once more, and aims once more permitted and believed in."

This book is about "aims once more permitted" and sought after, about hiking with Nietzsche into adulthood. When I first summited Corvatsch, I thought that the sole objective of tramping was to get above the clouds into open air, but over the years, as my hair has begun to gray, I've concluded that this cannot possibly be the only point of hiking,

or of living. It is true that the higher one climbs, the more one can see, but it is also true that no matter the height, the horizon always bends out of view.

As I've grown older, the message of Nietzsche's Übermensch has become more pressing but also more confusing. How high is high enough? What am I supposed to be looking at or, more honestly, searching for? What is the point of this blister on my foot, the pain of self-overcoming? How exactly did I reach this particular mountaintop? Am I supposed to be satisfied with this peak? At the doorway of his thirties, Nietzsche suggested, "Let the youthful soul look back on life with the question: what have you truly loved up to now, what has drawn your soul aloft?" In the end, these are the right questions to ask. The project of the Übermensch—like aging itself—is not to arrive at any fixed destination or to find some permanent room with a view.

When you hike, you bend into the mountain. Sometimes you slip and hurtle forward. Sometimes you lose your balance and topple back. This is a story of trying to lean in just the right way, to lean one's present self into something unattained, attainable, yet out of view. Even slipping can be instructive. Something happens not at the top, but along the way. One has the chance, in Nietzsche's words, to "become who you are." <>

[Seven Types of Atheism](#) by John Gray [Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 9780374261092]

From the provocative author of Straw Dogs comes an incisive, surprising intervention in the political and scientific debate over religion and atheism
When you explore older atheisms, you will find that some of your firmest convictions—secular or religious—are highly questionable. If this prospect disturbs you, what you are looking for may be freedom from thought.

For a generation now, public debate has been corroded by a shrill, narrow derision of religion in the name of an often vaguely understood "science." John Gray's stimulating and enjoyable new book, Seven Types of Atheism, describes the complex, dynamic world of older atheisms, a tradition that is,

he writes, in many ways intertwined with and as rich as religion itself.

Along a spectrum that ranges from the convictions of "God-haters" like the Marquis de Sade to the mysticism of Arthur Schopenhauer, from Bertrand Russell's search for truth in mathematics to secular political religions like Jacobinism and Nazism, Gray explores the various ways great minds have attempted to understand the questions of salvation, purpose, progress, and evil. The result is a book that sheds an extraordinary light on what it is to be human.

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Excerpt: How to Be an Atheist

Contemporary atheism is a flight from a godless world. Life without any power that can secure order or some kind of ultimate justice is a frightening and for many an intolerable prospect. In the absence of such a power, human events could be finally chaotic, and no story could be told that satisfied the need for meaning. Struggling to escape this vision, atheists have looked for surrogates of the God they have cast aside. The progress of humanity has replaced belief in divine providence. But this faith in humanity makes sense only if it continues ways of thinking that have been inherited from monotheism. The idea that the human species realizes common goals throughout history is a secular avatar of a religious idea of redemption.

Atheism has not always been like this. Along with many who have searched for a surrogate Deity to fill the hole left by the God that has departed, there have been some who stepped out of monotheism altogether and in doing so found freedom and fulfilment. Not looking for cosmic meaning, they were content with the world as they found it.

By no means have all atheists wanted to convert others to their view of things. Some have been friendly to traditional faiths, preferring the worship of a God they think fictitious to a religion of humanity. Most atheists today are liberals who believe the species is slowly making its way towards a better world; but modern liberalism is a late flower of Jewish and Christian religion, and in the past most atheists have not been liberals. Some atheists have gloried in the majesty of the cosmos. Others have delighted in the small worlds human beings make for themselves.

While atheists may call themselves freethinkers, for many today atheism is a closed system of thought. That may be its chief attraction. When you explore older atheisms, you will find that some of your firmest convictions — secular or religious — are highly questionable. If this prospect disturbs you,

what you are looking for may be freedom from thinking. But if you are ready to leave behind the needs and hopes that many atheists have carried over from monotheism, you may find that a burden has been lifted from you. Some older atheisms are oppressive and claustrophobic, like much of atheism at the present time. Others can be refreshing and liberating for anyone who wants a new perspective on the world. Paradoxically, some of the most radical forms of atheism may in the end be not so different from some mystical varieties of religion.

Defining atheism is like trying to capture the diversity of religions in a formula. Following the poet, critic and impassioned atheist William Empson, I will suggest it is an essential part of terms like `religion' and `atheism' that they can have multiple meanings. Neither religion nor atheism has anything like an essence. Borrowing an analogy from the Austrian-British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, they are more like extended families, which display recognizable similarities without having any single feature in common. This view inspired the American pragmatist William James to write The Varieties of Religious Experience, the best book ever written on religion by a philosopher and one that Wittgenstein much admired.

A provisional definition of atheism might still be useful, if only to indicate the drift of the book that follows. So I suggest that an atheist is anyone with no use for the idea of a divine mind that has fashioned the world. In this sense atheism does not amount to very much. It is simply the absence of the idea of a creator-god.

There is precedent for thinking of atheism in these terms. In the ancient European world atheism meant the refusal to participate in traditional practices honouring the gods of the polytheistic pantheon. Christians were described as `atheists' (in Greek atheos, meaning `without gods') because they worshipped only one god. Then as now, atheism and monotheism were sides of the same coin.

If you think of atheism in this way, you will see that it is not the same as the rejection of religion. For most human beings religion has always consisted of practices more than beliefs. When Christians in the Roman Empire were required to follow the Roman religion (religio in Latin), this meant observing

Roman ceremonies. These included acts of worship to pagan gods, but nothing was demanded in terms of belief. The word `pagan' (pagani) is a Christian invention applied in the early fourth century to those who followed these practices. `Paganism' was not a creed — the people described as pagans had no concept of heresy, for one thing — but a jumble of observances.

A provisional definition of religion may also be useful. Many of the practices that are recognized as religious express a need to make sense of the human passage through the world. `Birth, and copulation, and death' may be all there is in the end. As Sweeney says in T. S. Eliot's "Fragment of an Agon," `That's all the facts when you come to brass tacks.' But human beings have been reluctant to accept this, and struggle to bestow some more-than-human significance on their lives. Tribal animists and practitioners of world faiths, devotees of flying-saucer cults and the armies of zealots that have killed and died for modern secular faiths attest to this need for meaning. With its reverent invocation of the progress of the species, the evangelical unbelief of recent times obeys the same impulse. Religion is an attempt to find meaning in events, not a theory that tries to explain the universe.

Rather than atheism being a worldview that recurs throughout history, there have been many atheisms with conflicting views of the world. In ancient Greece and Rome, India and China, there were schools of thought that, without denying that gods existed, were convinced they were not concerned with humans. Some of these schools developed early versions of the philosophy which holds that everything in the world is composed of matter. Others held back from speculating about the nature of things. The Roman poet Lucretius thought the universe was composed of `atoms and the void', whereas the Chinese mystic Chuang Tzu followed the (possibly mythical) Taoist sage Lao Tzu in thinking the world had a way of working that could not be grasped by human reason. Since their view of things did not contain a divine mind that created the universe, both were atheists. But neither of them fussed about 'the existence of God', since they had no conception of a creator-god to question or reject.

Religion is universal, whereas monotheism is a local cult. Many `primitive' cultures contain elaborate creation myths — stories of how the world came into being. Some tell of it emerging from a primordial chaos, others of it springing from a cosmic egg, still others of it arising from the dismembered parts of a dead god. But few of these stories feature a god that fashioned the universe. There may be gods or spirits, but they are not supernatural. In animism, the original religion of all humankind, the natural world is thick with spirits.

Just as not all religions contain the idea of a creator-god, there have been many without any idea of an immortal soul. In some religions — such as those that produced Norse mythology — the gods themselves are mortal. Greek polytheists expected an afterlife but believed it would be populated by the shades of people who had once existed, not these people in a posthumous form. Biblical Judaism conceived of an underworld (Sheol) in much the same way. Jesus promised his disciples salvation from death, but through the resurrection of their fleshly bodies, divinely perfected. There have been atheists who believed human personality continues after bodily death. In Victorian and Edwardian times, some psychical researchers thought an afterlife meant passing into another part of the natural world.

If there are many different religions, there are also many different atheisms. Twenty-first-century atheism is nearly always a type of materialism. But that is only one of many views of the world that atheists have held. Some atheists — such as the nineteenth-century German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer — have thought that matter is an illusion and reality spiritual. There is no such thing as 'the atheist worldview'. Atheism simply excludes the idea that the world is the work of a creator-god, which is not found in most religions.

What Religion is Not

The idea that religion is a matter of belief is parochial. What did Homer `believe'? Or the authors of the Bhagavad-Gita? The web of traditions that western scholars have described as `Hinduism' comes with no prescribed creed, no more than does the mixture of folk religion with mysticism that western scholars call `Taoism'.

The notion that religions are creeds — lists of propositions or doctrines that everyone must accept or reject — emerged only with Christianity. Belief was never as important as observance in Jewish religion. In its earliest biblical forms, the religion practised by the Jewish people was a type not of monotheism — the assertion that there is only one God — but of henotheism, the exclusive worship of their own God. Worshipping foreign gods was condemned as disloyalty, not as unbelief. It was only sometime around the sixth century BC, during the period when the Israelites returned from exile to Jerusalem, that the idea that there is only one God emerged in Jewish religion. Even then the heart of Judaism continued to be practice, not belief.

Christianity has been a religion of belief from the time it was invented. But there have been Christian traditions in which belief is not central. Eastern Orthodoxy holds that God is beyond any human conception — a view fleshed out in what is known as negative or apo-phatic theology. Even in western Christianity, `believing in God' has not always meant asserting the existence of a supernatural being. The thirteenth-century Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) was explicit that God does not exist in the same way that any particular thing exists.

In most religions, debates about belief are unimportant. Belief was irrelevant in pagan religion and continues to be unimportant in the religions of India and China. When they declare themselves unbelievers, atheists are invoking an understanding of religion that has been unthinkingly inherited from monotheism.

Many religions that feature a creator-god have imagined it very differently from the God that has been worshipped in Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Since the rise of Christianity, the divine mind that is supposed to have created the world has often been conceived as being perfectly good. However, Gnostic traditions have envisioned a supreme God that created the universe and then withdrew into itself, leaving the world to be ruled by a lesser god, or Demiurge, which might be indifferent or hostile to humankind. Such Gnostic ideas may seem to us far-fetched. But they have some advantages

over more traditional conceptions of a Supreme Being. For one thing, they resolve the `problem of evil'. If God is all powerful and all good, why is there evil in the world? A familiar response has it that evil is required by free will, without which there can be no true goodness. This is the central claim of Christian theodicy (in Greek, `justifying God') — the attempt to explain evil as part of a divine design. An entire tradition of atheism has developed against theodicy, memorably articulated by Ivan Karamazov, who in Dostoevsky's novel The Brothers Karamazov declares that if a tortured child is the price of goodness then he will hand back to God his entry ticket to the world. I consider this type of atheism — sometimes called misotheism, or God-hatred — in Chapter 5.

Taking monotheism as a model for religion is misleading. It is not only animism and polytheism that are left out of the picture. Nontheist religions are ignored as well. Buddhism says nothing of any divine mind and rejects any idea of the soul. The world consists of processes and events. The human sense of self is an illusion; freedom is found in ridding oneself of this illusion. Popular Buddhism has retained ideas of the transmigration of souls that were current in India at the time when the Buddha lived, along with the belief that merits accumulated in one life can be passed on to another. But the idea of karma, which underpins these beliefs, denotes an impersonal process of cause and effect rather than reward or punishment by a Supreme Being. Nowhere does Buddhism speak of such a Being, and it is in fact an atheist religion. The smears and fulminations of the 'new atheists' make sense only in a specifically Christian context, and even then only within a few subsets of the Christian religion.

Seven Types of Atheism

In his book Seven Types of Ambiguity (1930), Empson — whose own version of atheism I discuss in Chapter 5 — showed how language could be open-ended without being misleading. Ambiguity, he suggested, is not a defect but part of the richness of language. Rather than signifying equivocation or confusion, ambiguous expressions allow us to describe a fluid and paradoxical world.

Empson applied this account of ambiguity chiefly to poetry, but it is also illuminating when applied to religion and atheism. Describing ambiguity as 'any verbal nuance, however slight, which gives room for alternative reactions to the same piece of language', he observed that 'any prose statement could be called ambiguous'. There could be no such thing as ultimate clarity. 'One can do a great deal to make poetry intelligible', Empson wrote, 'by discussing the resultant variety of meanings.' It was the nuances of meaning that made poetry possible. In a later book, The Structure of Complex Words (1951), Empson showed how the most straightforward-looking terms were `compacted with doctrines' that left their meaning equivocal. There is no hidden simplicity concealed by complex words. Inherently plural in meaning, words enable different ways of seeing the world.

Applying Empson's method, I will examine seven kinds of atheism. The first of them — the so-called 'new atheism' — contains little that is novel or interesting. After the first chapter, I will not refer to it again. The second type is secular humanism, a hollowed-out version of the Christian belief in salvation in history. Third, there is the kind of atheism that makes a religion from science, a category that includes evolutionary humanism, Mesmerism, dialectical materialism and contemporary transhumanism. Fourth, there are modern political religions, from Jacobinism through communism and Nazism to contemporary evangelical liberalism. Fifth, there is the atheism of God-haters such as the Marquis de Sade, Dostoevsky's fictional character Ivan Karamazov and William Empson himself. Sixth, I will consider the atheisms of George Santayana and Joseph Conrad, which reject the idea of a creatorgod without having any piety towards `humanity'. Seventh and last, there are the mystical atheism of Arthur Schopenhauer and the negative theologies of Benedict Spinoza and the early twentieth-century RussianJewish fideist Leo Shestov, all of which in different ways point to a God that transcends any human conception.

I have no interest in converting anyone to or from any of these types of atheism. But my own preferences will be clear. Repelled by the first five varieties, I am drawn to the last two, atheisms that

are happy to live with a godless world or an unnameable God. <>

A Field Guide to the English Clergy: A Compendium of Diverse Eccentrics, Pirates, Prelates and Adventurers; All Anglican, Some Even Practising by Fergus Butler-Gallie MA (Oxon) BA (Cantab), Clerk in Holy Orders [Oneworld Publications, 9781786074416]

Judge not, lest ye be judged. This timeless wisdom has guided the Anglican Church for hundreds of years, and has fostered a certain tolerance of eccentricity among its members. The Reverend Robert Hawker invented the Harvest Festival, but he also excommunicated a cat for mousing on Sundays. Bishop Lancelot Fleming would commandeer Navy helicopters when he was late for service. The Reverend John Allington - "Mad Jack," to his friends - wore a leopard skin instead of a surplice, and insisted on being carried around in a coffin. A Field Guide to the English Clergy celebrates the cream of the crop: the drinkers (and publicans), the inventors, the lion tamers, the suicidal missionaries, and even one piratical Archbishop. But despite their sometimes bizarre behavior, many in the clergy saw the church as their true calling. After all, who cares if you're wearing red high heels when there are souls to be saved?

It will not escape the eagle-eyed reader that this is a compendium of eccentrics that features exclusively clergy of the male sex. Here, I'm afraid, your humble narrator can but plead cowardice. It is not that there is a shortage of eccentric, successful or nutty women, or, indeed, women renowned for their sense of adventure or love of good living currently in Holy Orders. However, the Church of England's regrettable tardiness in ordaining women to the Priesthood means that most of these potential subjects are still alive and, being women of great ingenuity as well as. great godliness, many have access to excellent lawyers and some (particularly those in rural ministry) to unlicensed firearms. In light of this, a decision was made to restrict this collection to clergy who have shuffled off to a Better Place. It is to be hoped that the large numbers of women clergy who undoubtedly warrant a place in this collection will not feel too aggrieved by the author's decision to exclude the

quick from his collection. Confident that God will continue to call as many manifestly strange women to the Priesthood as men, the author looks forward to a tome being produced in the not too distant future, replete with tales of these remarkable Priests; produced, however, by an individual braver (or with better legal representation) than he.

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-a Glossary

Excerpt: Eccentrics

the way of man ís froward and strange' proverbs
21:8

The archetype of the dotty Anglican Vicar is one
with enduring appeal. Whether the imagined
parson of a half-remembered past or the character
who gives a

touch of anecdotal variety to the drudgery of
parochial existence, a clergyman with unusual
habits is a stock figure in the English cultural
lexicon. The secret of the clerical eccentric's
longevity in the popular imagination (long after it
appears to have abandoned many of the other
appendages of cultural Christianity) is that he is
essentially a hybrid figure, standing at the
crossroads of two rich seams of public strangeness.
Put simply, to be a clergyman is eccentric enough,
but to be English on top of that is almost overkill.

The parson is recognisably part of the broader
tradition of English eccentricity. Quite what it is in
the English character that has engendered such a
predisposition is unclear — perhaps it is a legacy
of those who seek to disrupt a culture historically
bound by complex rules of etiquette and propriety,
or maybe it's just a result of people trying to

entertain themselves amid the perpetual drizzle.
Either way, whether collecting curios, walking oddly
or fostering inappropriate relationships with
animals, the English have carved a niche as a
nation with a streak of eccentricity running right
through national life.

The Church of England is, of course, no exception.
With its stated aim of ministering in every
community and its presence at most of the stranger
rituals of national life - from conducting coronations
to judging competitions based around amusingly
shaped vegetables - the Church, and its clergy, can
justifiably claim to be the warp on which the mad
tapestry of England has been woven.

Priests are part of a much older Christian vintage:
that of the 'Holy Fool'. These were figures,
particularly prevalent in the Eastern Orthodox
tradition, who, through their odd behaviour, are
said to make the rest of us consider where the real
foolishness lies - namely in the ways of the world.
The Holy Fool might seem strange in their
behaviour to us, but, so the tradition says, it is in
fact our ways that are strange. There is a concept,
going back to the Gospels, of 'the Holy' being so
inconceivable to limited human reasoning that it
must appear to us as madness. It is a tradition that
makes contemporary counterculture look positively
mainstream. The great clerical eccentrics were
undoubtedly considered to be insane or, at the
very least, obsessive, and yet they often proved to
be effective communicators of an 'other-worldly'
holiness. It is partly the appeal of this, and partly
the goodly heritage of old-fashioned Englishness
that gives the eccentric Vicar his enduring appeal -
he treads the thin line between prophet and clown.

The men whose lives are detailed in this section
represent a mere tasting menu of eccentricity
plucked from the rich à la carte selection of clerical
strangeness down the ages. There was, alas, no
room for figures such as the Cornish incumbent who
was so prone to wandering off during services that
he had to be chained to a communion rail by the
ladies of the congregation. Nor was there space
for the Lincolnshire clergyman who, fancying himself
an amateur surgeon, got an elephant drunk on ale
and tried to dissect it. However, the motley
collection of mermaid-impersonating, steam-roller

driving, bicycle-stealing clerics whose lives are detailed in the following pages are the cream of the crop, glorious in their eccentricities and their folly.

The eccentric Vicar is not, however, a figment of a half-imagined past. It might be the continued legacy of the Holy Fool or it might be something in the (Holy) water, but the Church of England is still replete with `froward and strange' clergy to this day. While they are unlikely to follow in the footsteps of their forbears and urinate on you or force you to play leapfrog, they will undoubtedly be interesting, idiosyncratic figures - it rather comes with the territory. And so, dear reader, if you seek the great clerical eccentric, that fabled mid-point between Old English `character' and Old Testament prophet, my advice is to look among the pews; they'll almost certainly be waiting for you there.

Nutty Professors
'Much learning doth make thee mad' acts 26:24

The world of academia is an indisputably strange one. If one spends prolonged periods of time dealing with theories, it is perhaps inevitable that the actual skills required for the practice of life become a little rusty. When this general intellectual disengagement is combined with clerical otherworldliness, then a peculiar type of creature is born. Those clergy who spent their careers not only in the public practice of religion but also in pursuit of often staggeringly arcane intellectual goals are the subjects of this chapter.

It will be noted that a sizeable proportion of these idiosyncratic individuals have links to the universities of Oxford and Cambridge. These ancient institutions were both founded with the explicit aim of training clergy for the English Church. Given that both universities owe their very existence to the Church, it is hardly surprising that they have strong clerical traditions to this day. They are, for all their vaunted academic success, eminently strange places. Their colleges are fortress-like structures where teaching, eating, drinking, fighting, fornicating, indeed just about anything you can think of, all take place on top of one another. They have their own recondite traditions, in dress and in behaviour. They run on vast feasts washed down

by wine from some of the finest cellars in the Western world. It is no surprise that these incubators of intellect should produce a steady stream of figures for whom the 'real world' is as familiar as the surface of Mars. Both universities are replete with tales of weird and wacky dons - from the history fellow who insisted on giving his tutorials while wedged in his bath to the academic who used to mark his place in library books with bacon sandwiches. The single-minded pursuit of academic brilliance, combined with the unique environment of college life, is a combination that produces some of the most thoroughgoing eccentrics on record. That said, it should be remembered that, for most of their history, Oxford and Cambridge were not the academic hothouses they aspire to be today; they were more a holding pen for the nation's gilded youth and, crucially, the only place where an individual could train for Holy Orders. There were, undoubtedly, a number of figures who lost whole years in libraries, but there were just as many who lost whole years in libation as well.

That said, both universities are now engaged in the dual (and inherently interlinked) processes of modernisation and monetisation. If the world of vintages and Virgil is forever to give way to political concerns and plywood furniture, then Oxbridge's celebrated eccentrics may find themselves squeezed out from their natural habitat by a brave new generation of management consultants. Yet the oddballs of Oxford and characters of Cambridge, lay and ordained, have not breathed their last just yet and, if one visits either university, it is still possible to see, wandering about in an air of dazed confusion at the very concept of reality, the heirs to the tradition of academic strangeness detailed in this section. As for the clergy of this section, some remained in that rarefied university environment to vandalise foliage or rifle through ashtrays, while others took their high-minded eccentricity out with them to be inflicted on unfortunate parishioners, producing tomes on subjects as diverse as werewolves and pornographic plants. A certain type of ageing firebrand would maintain that the pursuit of knowledge and the life of faith are inherently at odds but, if the lives of the following show

anything, dear reader, it is that they are both as odd as each other.

Bon Viveurs

Go thy way and eat thy bread with joy and drink thy wine with a merry heart' Ecclesiastes 9:7

Given that the central rite of the Christian religion is based around the communal consumption of food and drink, it is hardly surprising that some clergy feel attracted to both. Indeed, the pervading conceptualisation of Heaven found in the Bible and in Church tradition is of an enormous banquet, and many have taken it as no coincidence that the first miracle performed by Christ was the turning of water into wine at the wedding feast at Cana, crucially after the revellers were 'well drunk'. An appreciation of the finer things is not limited to life, but might be enjoyed for eternity as well. Of course, when we speak of hedonism in this context we are not dealing with a scone too many at a village fête or sneaking an extra glass of sherry after evensong. Rather, we speak of unabashed gourmands, slathering every meal in double cream and proper, gut-busting boozehounds, who thought nothing of drinking their own bodyweight on a Saturday night before conducting worship a few hours later. The definition of bon viveur employed here is not limited to those who took seriously the biblical command to 'eat and drink' but also those who followed the command to be `merry'; this chapter contains its fair share of priestly playboys, thrill seekers and mischief makers as well as `gluttons and winebibbers.

The clergy in this section are a veritable smorgasbord of characters who, having reconciled themselves to their place in the vale of earthly sorrow, decided to make the best of it and enjoy life to its full. They are only a selection; there was, sadly, no room here for the parson who spent so much time in the saddle that he constructed three hunting lodges in corners of his parish to save him riding all the way home to get a drink, nor the senior Cambridge cleric who was admonished by the Archbishop of Canterbury himself for his bibulous ways, only to die four days into teetotalism. St Irenaeus, an otherwise somewhat stern Bishop in the second century, taught that 'the glory of God is man fully alive', and whether that

fullness of life manifested in hours spent gallivanting around the countryside on horseback, chugging vats of brandy, or meticulously planning intricate menus, each of the figures in the section that follows can be said to have followed the Bishop's dictum. While an admirable tradition of asceticism and self-denial is also a part of the Church's historic inheritance, these clergymen show that a full-throttled, calorie-laden, champagne-fuelled bender is just as much in line with the Christian tradition as any monastic rigour.

The author would humbly suggest that one of the reasons we have such an enduring fascination with the particular sort of people who enjoy themselves, regardless of the consequences, is that they invoke a sort of jealousy among those of us who can't quite bring ourselves to be so unapologetically carefree. These individuals were unencumbered by giving a damn about their waistlines, their livers, their personal safety or, perhaps most importantly, what anybody else thought, in the firm belief that still better things were to come in the hereafter. Consequently they felt able to have the sort of adventures that common sense ordinarily constrains us from indulging in. These, therefore, are Priests who provoke a certain armchair envy and rectors whose lack of rectitude we secretly admire. They are, in short, vicars who enable us to live vicariously through their rambunctious enjoyment of all that the Good Lord had blessed them with. Perhaps, even if we are not minded to follow their example by volume (indeed, professional medical opinion would strongly advise against such a course), we might at least take to heart something of their carefree joie de vivre and `drink our wine with a merry heart'.

Prodigal Sons

God bath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise and hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the mighty I Corinthians 1:27

Quite what is meant by `success' in a clerical careeris not particularly easy to pin down. Unlike their secular brethren, clergy are supposed to have an eye on the long game - by which is meant eternity. As such, determining which Priests are or are not `successful' would require an unreasonably intimate knowledge of the beyond. While a

clergyman might choose to count heads on a Sunday or even count the coins on the collection plate, it is pretty clear that mere numbers cannot be a measure for `success' when one's primary battleground is not the spreadsheet but the soul.

The figures in this section are neither hardnosed bruisers who fought their way to prominence, but nor are they necessarily meek and mild. However, whether as a result of rising through the ranks of the Church as Bishops or Archbishops, becoming the most renowned wit of their day, accidentally being acclaimed as a sporting icon or, through quiet heroism, saving thousands of lives, each could be considered a `success' in one way or another. They can all be considered `Prodigal Sons'; figures who, like the son in the parable in St Luke's Gospel, ended up fêted against the odds. Very often their circumstances, early lives or personalities were less than auspicious and yet, in the end, they found themselves celebrated for one reason or another. In some cases their prodigal status manifested itself in terms of professional preferment or administrative efficiency despite manifest oddity or disinterest, but in others it has been necessary to defer to the old adage vox populi, vox Dei. Congregations are, after all, the people who see clergy week in week out; if they can't tell clerical saint from sinner, then no one can.

As befits biographies of those who all (ostensibly) believed in the Resurrection, no distinction is made between success in life and success post-mortem - while some climbed the dizzy heights of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, several of these clergy departed this life forgotten, only for their impact to become clear later. They were all individuals who, in any other career, would have been disastrous; indeed, in a secular context many would be considered unemployable. From their idleness to their inappropriate comments, their strange habits to their downright stubbornness, these are men who would, according to conventional wisdom, be considered weak and foolish in equal measure. And yet, for all their failings, they all made their mark on the world - some in ways that affected millions, others through just one life changed for the better.

Regrettably, the leading clergy of today no longer aspire to win the Polar Medal, blame social

democracy for weak tea or shout `BALDOCK' at random intervals.

They are engaged in chairing meetings, managing figures and studying for MBAs. Typically, just as the reputation of corporate jargon and practice reaches its lowest ebb in the secular world, the Church of England has sought to embrace it with open arms. As such, unlikely as these successes might have seemed in the past, they would be nigh on impossible now. Political changes in the last few decades mean that the Church now appoints its own senior figures without input from anyone else. As a consequence, the generations of lunatics, curmudgeons and visionaries inflicted on the Church in either strokes of bureaucratic genius or as the result of elaborate civil service jokes have, regrettably, come to an end.

There will always be eccentrics, rogues, bon viveurs and bizarre intellectuals among the clergy, but it is difficult to see a future for the brave and brilliant, but often irascible or insane individuals of the sort detailed in this section. They have been sacrificed to the idol of earnestness, to the cult of taking-things-seriously. The result of this is not that the Church has won back some great lost dignity but, by fearing the difficult or eccentric, has diminished her pool of talent and made herself seem less human, ironically rendering the institution even more ridiculous than before. It is always sensible to remember, dear reader, that God (like many of the characters described in the following pages) does appear to have a sense of humour after all.

Rouges
Beware they which come ín sheep's clothing,. but inwardly are ravening wolves' St Matthew 7:15

The Victorian era was one in which, if people could get things wrong, they generally did. Whether it was their preparations for the Second Boer War or their firmly held belief that the common cold could be cured by the application of Bovril, the denizens of the nineteenth century were masters of misconception. Perhaps the most egregious of their errors was the belief, regrettably passed on to consecutive generations, that Christianity is about being 'meek and mild'.

Even a cursory glance at the Victorian hymn gives a view of the Christian faith so sickly sweet that one runs the risk of developing diabetes. Much contemporaneous theology has, in other guises, sought to perpetuate the view that Christians are called to be grinningly optimistic about life, as well as obsequiously friendly to all and sundry. The concept that one of the most complex and influential thought systems in the history of humanity can be boiled down to `being nice' was not only a monumental oversimplification but it also, more regrettably, almost put an end to the tradition of cutting Priests out of mad, bad and dangerous cloth. Vicars, as the public face of Christianity, had to be the epitome of the mild stereotype — gentle, inoffensive, and, ideally, boring to boot.

Those in the eighteenth century, as the figures in this section will show, held no such preconceptions. From piratical Archbishops to trespassing parsons, the Georgian Church was replete with big characters for whom a calling to Priesthood meant a subsidy for various adventures. If someone had told them that `Jesus wants you for a sunbeam', they might have found themselves on the receiving end of physical violence. Indeed, theirs was a ministry totally compatible with a life of crime.

Some of the figures in the following section were emphatically bad, the `wolves in sheep's clothing' warned of by the Bible. Others ended up living lives of roguery and adventure not because of any great rejection of the precepts of faith but, rather, because they were foolish or vain, or, in a couple of cases, simply had a low boredom threshold. These rogues serve as a reminder of a fact that is often forgotten, not least by Priests themselves, namely that the clergy are people, too. Despite the need to step out each Sunday and play the saint, they are prone to the lust, laziness and downright ludicrousness that constitutes the human condition. They are just as likely to inflate their own importance, have their hearts broken, or collect an enormous stash of French pornography (i.e. the Reverend Dr Edward Drax Free) as any other person. While they are called to 'have their conversation in heaven' they are squarely rooted on earth during their ministry.

This inherent tension can sometimes be creative — many are the saints or campaigners who have turned their inner turmoil into definitive action. Yet it can also be disastrous.

This section is not made up of the well-trodden exemplars of St Mary Magdalene, Thomas Becket or Martin Luther King but instead tells of chancers, wrong 'uns and adrenaline junkies who also happened to be called to serve as Priests. So, cast your tea cosy aside and meet some of the raunchiest, raciest, and most reckless vicars in the Church's history... <>

Resurrection as Salvation Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism by Thomas D. McGlothlin [Cambridge University Press, 9781108426565]

Resurrection as Salvation Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism is the first study to focus on the reception of Paul's link between resurrection and salvation, revealing its profound effect on early Christian theology - not only eschatology, but also anthropology, pneumatology, ethics, and soteriology. Thomas D. McGlothlin traces the roots of the strong tension on the matter in ancient Judaism and then offers deep readings of the topic by key theologians of pre-Nicene Christianity, who argued on both sides of the issue of the fleshliness of the resurrected body. McGlothlin unravels the surprising continuities that emerge between Irenaeus, Origen, and the Valentinians, as well as deep disagreements between allies like Irenaeus and Tertullian.

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Excerpt:

[Resurrection as Salvation Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism](#) asks a new question of familiar works on a familiar topic. The familiar works are Christian writings from the second and third centuries, and the familiar topic is resurrection. The "old" question on this topic concerns the nature of resurrection: What did early Christians think resurrection is, especially in its relationship to embodiment? But the new question is this: How did differing understandings of the purpose of resurrection, inherited from Second Temple Judaism and the New Testament, shape early Christian accounts of resurrection — not just what it is, but why it happens, and relatedly how and to whom?

Why this new question? Put simply, there is clear evidence for two understandings of the purpose of resurrection in Second Temple Judaism and the New Testament, yet the reception of these two understandings in early Christianity has gone unstudied — masked in prior scholarship by attention to the fierce debates over the "old" question, the relationship between resurrection and embodiment. According to the first understanding, resurrection is a prerequisite for judgment. It happens to the righteous and the wicked indiscriminately and is a preliminary step on the way to the reward of the righteous or punishment of the wicked. This view appears in Daniel, 4 Ezra, 2 Baruch, and, in the New Testament, most clearly in John and Revelation. According to the second understanding, resurrection is God's reward for the righteous. Correspondingly, resurrection is tightly linked to salvation, and the resurrection of the damned is either denied or not mentioned. This view is found in 2 Maccabees and Josephus' descriptions of the Pharisees and receives its fullest development in the Pauline epistles.

The thesis of this book is that the juxtaposition of these two views profoundly shaped early Christian understandings of resurrection in two ways. First,

the Pauline development of the second view (resurrection as aspect of salvation) connected resurrection to a slew of key theological loci, prompting some writers to explore and further develop those connections. But, second, this juxtaposition forced others, whose starting point was the first view (resurrection as first and foremost a prerequisite for judgment), to find ways to redirect or avoid the force of the Pauline connections. Tracing this process opens new windows into early Christian thought on resurrection and complicates the conventional narrative built around "fleshly" versus "spiritual" understandings of resurrection, showing how prior scholarship's exclusive focus on the nature of resurrection has produced an incomplete picture of resurrection in the second and third centuries.

The Pauline epistles fill out the connection between resurrection and righteousness by linking both to Spirit-driven conformity to the resurrected Christ. This connection prompted later writers to embed resurrection not only in the doctrines of creation and divine justice (as a focus on resurrection as a prerequisite for judgment did), but also in Christology, pneumatology, and anthropology. If both resurrection and righteousness come from the indwelling Spirit of the resurrected Christ, what must be true about the resurrected Christ, the life-giving Spirit, and the human being? These Pauline innovations also increased the challenge of integrating the two understandings of resurrection: How can resurrection be Spirit-driven conformity to the resurrected Christ if all, both the righteous and the wicked, will be raised to face judgment? The alternative to grappling with these questions was to ignore or deemphasize these Pauline links. A whole new dimension of the place of resurrection within early Christian theology thus emerges when attention shifts from the what question to the why question. The task of this book is to reveal that new dimension.

Establishing this thesis will require two steps. The first is to show that there were, in fact, two understandings of the purpose of resurrection in Second Temple Judaism, that both are reflected in the New Testament, and that the Pauline epistles make especially important contributions to the second view by linking resurrection to key loci like

Christology and pneumatology. The second step is to demonstrate how careful attention to the reception of this Pauline development, including how that view is reconciled with resurrection as a simple prerequisite for judgment (if the two views are reconciled at all), reveals important aspects of early Christian thought on resurrection that remain otherwise hidden. Establishing the first is relatively easy, and other scholars have already noted much of the key data. I will therefore devote one chapter to surveying this data and highlighting patterns important for the remainder of the study (the most important pattern being the Pauline connections between resurrection, righteousness, and Spirit-driven conformity to the resurrected Christ, which I will label the "Pauline resurrection schema"). The second task requires detailed case studies of key early Christian authors and texts. In each case study, I will endeavor to show how the author or text grapples, whether explicitly or implicitly, with the Pauline resurrection schema and how the two views of the purpose of resurrection might relate to each other — even if appreciating the full effect of the Pauline schema within each author's theology sometimes requires venturing into areas of their thought seemingly far afield from the concerns of Pauline theology itself. These case studies will comprise the remainder of [Resurrection as Salvation Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism](#).

One of the most important results that emerges from these case studies is a redrawn map of resurrection in early Christianity. The conventional map, drawn according to views on resurrection and embodiment, shows Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Methodius as a pro-flesh bloc arrayed against Origen and the Valentinians. But Irenaeus and Tertullian turn out to have based their fundamental understandings of resurrection on different views of its purpose, with correspondingly different pneumatologies, anthropologies, and exegeses of key Pauline texts. Two Valentinian texts, however, join Irenaeus in making the Pauline connection between res¬urrection and salvation their starting point (over against Tertullian) — despite disagreeing strongly with both Irenaeus and Tertullian on resurrection and embodiment! Origen formulated a brilliant but perhaps unstable

synthesis of both views by embedding the resurrection of all into God's pedagogical engagement with free rational creatures aimed at salvation, and Methodius of Olympus formulated an ingenious synthesis of his own. Not only is this map far more complex than the conventional one, but it also reveals surprising neighbors.

Prior Scholarship on Resurrection in Early Christianity

Resurrection in early Christianity is already a well-studied field, as it should be. From Paul onwards, numerous early Christian authors engaged in sharp polemics over the resurrection. Often, these debates focused on the relationship between resurrection and embodiment. Does "resurrection" imply renewed embodiment? If so, what kind of continuity exists between the body of this life and the body of the resurrection? And how, if at all, is the latter a transformed version of the former? Scholars have worked to track, sort, and explain the various positions on these questions in early Christianity. Reflecting the ancient debates themselves, then, much scholarship on resurrection in early Christianity focuses on the relationship between resurrection and embodiment.

Such studies often proceed by establishing "what the New Testament really says about resurrection" (in practice, often "what Paul really meant by `spiritual body' in 1 Corinthians 15:44) and then using that as a yardstick for all later positions, seeking explanations for deviations from the true Pauline teaching along the way. This approach to resurrection in early Christianity is valuable insofar as it takes seriously what many of the protagonists in the debates said they were doing: contending for the right interpretation of Paul's teaching on resurrection. I do not label it the "old question" in any pejorative sense; it is simply the well-trod path through the material. It can suffer from a myopic focus on the ambiguous discussion of bodily continuity and transformation in 1 Corinthians 15:35-49, and the resulting assessments of later authors' views on these same questions are often overly dependent on the scholar's initial judgment of Paul's teaching. But these pitfalls do not negate the validity or importance of the overall endeavor. Careful attention to what early Christian authors

thought about the relationship between resurrection and embodiment, along with how they positioned themselves vis-à-vis the contested Pauline texts, remains necessary.

Some scholars have come to suspect that more was at stake in these debates than the explicit points of disagreement might suggest. But even when these scholars have sought to read "behind" the ancient polemics to uncover the deeper issues at play, they have focused on analyzing polemics concerning the nature of resurrection — the what question. Noting the insistence in many quarters on the connection between ecclesial authority and witnessing the risen but pre-ascension Christ, Elaine Pagels has argued that the doctrine of the bodily resurrection (at least of Jesus) served to legitimate the developing ecclesial hierarchy. John Gager, drawing heavily on Mary Douglas' theory of "natural symbols," has suggested that "disputes about resurrection ... involve more than just doctrinal matters in a narrow sense. They are also condensed statements about perceived difficulties in the body social and about proposed solutions for those difficulties." Since the "spirit" represents the individual and the "body" represents society, he argues, eschatologies in which the two are reunited emphasize the subordination of the individual to broader social structures, such as the ecclesiastical hierarchy or, eventually, the Christian empire. Paying careful attention to the images deployed to describe resurrection, Caroline Walker Bynum has argued that the concerns driving most post-Pauline discussions of resurrection differed from the apostle's own: images of growth and transformation, such as Paul's seed analogy, came to be replaced by images of reassembly and stasis, revealing a deep fear of bodily processes and the hope that resurrection will still them. Claudia Setzer has focused on the ways in which arguments about bodily resurrection helped Jewish and Christian communities to distinguish themselves from outsiders and construct their communities.

Most recently, Ouhti Lehtipuu has looked to debates over the nature of the resurrection body and the timing of the resurrection to explain why resurrection was so controversial in the second and third centuries. She concludes that these issues were so controversial because they were ambiguous

enough to be useful for drawing boundaries to exclude theological enemies, which many second- and third-century Christian authors were seeking to do. But since questions of who will be resurrected and to what end were points of diversity but not of controversy, she chooses not to treat them in her study. Instead, she focuses on explicating the ways in which various authors argued that their own understanding of the nature and timing of resurrection was clearly correct and then used that understanding as a (tendentious) litmus test for orthodoxy. What Lehtipuu does not offer is an account of why this particular ambiguous issue, resurrection, was used as a litmus test during this particular time, the second and third centuries. Other equally ambiguous issues, such as the nature of the Eucharist or the relationship between divine sovereignty and creaturely free will, have played similar boundary-defining roles at various points in Christian history and could have done so during the second and third centuries. What is needed is more than the claim that resurrection was controversial because it was debatable. Why was resurrection debated so fiercely when it was, and other issues when they were? By studying the very questions Lehtipuu sets aside, focusing on a critical issue that has been occluded by the obvious controversies that swirled around other questions, I seek to bring a fresh analysis that helps explain both why and how resurrection was controversial in this period.

Even though this study asks a different question of the ancient material, it can be read as a combination of these two approaches to resurrection in early Christianity. It shares with the first approach a focus on what the theological texts under discussion actually claim to be doing: drawing on received authoritative texts to articulate coherent theologies. No doubt much more was going on under the surface, and studies that attempt to get behind the theological arguments are valuable for the hidden tensions and seams they can reveal. [Resurrection as Salvation Development and Conflict in Pre-Nicene Paulinism](#), however, will focus on early Christian theological exegesis as such. But by focusing on understandings of the purpose of resurrection, I will read "behind" or at least "around" the flashpoints surrounding the nature of the resurrected body. In the process,

tensions and seams will emerge, but so will ingenious developments.

The Pauline link between resurrection and Spirit-driven conformity to Christ makes the early Christian reception of Paul particularly important for this study. According to the "Pauline Captivity" narrative that dominated studies of the second-century reception of Paul from F. C. Baur in the nineteenth century through the 1970s, Paul was embraced ("held captive") by Marcion and Valentinus but ignored by writers like Papias, Ignatius, and Justin." The "real Paul," according to Baur and his German Lutheran colleagues, was the Paul of justification by faith and emancipation from legalistic Judaism. These emphases conflicted with attempts to preserve Christianity's link to its Jewish heritage. More recently, Markus Vinzent has offered a bold renarration of this time period, with special attention to the resurrection of Christ." Vinzent argues that the resurrection of Christ was a distinctively Pauline emphasis and was therefore all but forgotten until Marcion revived Paulinism, forcing authors like Irenaeus to respond. In his view, the resurrection narratives in the canonical gospels do not count as evidence against the Pauline distinctiveness of the resurrection of Christ because he sees those gospels as written after and in dependence upon Marcion's gospel, in the middle of the second century. He also dates other texts that mention Christ's resurrection, such as the letters of Ignatius, after Marcion. Vinzent's thesis is provocative on many levels and has elicited varied responses, sometimes critical, even as it is acknowledged that the state of the evidence makes it all but impossible to conclusively disprove his thesis. Even if all of Vinzent's reconstructions of the time between Paul and Marcion are correct, however, they actually have no effect on the present study. Paul remains the clear force to be reckoned with on the theme of resurrection (including Christ's resurrection), and the task of integrating Pauline views with ideas found in other texts (including the canonical gospels) remains no matter the historical reality of when or why those texts were written.

The present study begins with Irenaeus, who was supposed to have ended the Pauline Captivity with a tendentious reading of Paul through the lens of

the Pastorals (i.e., an interpretation of Paul not centered on justification by faith). Recent critics of this narrative, however, have pointed out that Paul was more important for earlier second-century authors than acknowledged by the Pauline Captivity narrative (an observation that loses some of its force if they are all dated after Marcion, per Vinzent); furthermore, the so-called Hauptbriefe, the Pauline letters accepted as authentic by scholars in the tradition of Baur, actually play a far more important role in Irenaeus' Against Heresies than the Pauline Captivity narrative would lead one to expect. This study will confirm this point. Irenaeus' rejection of his opponents' interpretation of 1 Corinthians 15 was grounded in a broader theology based upon and extending the Pauline links outlined above: the resurrection of Christ as paradigm, through the indwelling Spirit, of both the morally renewed life and a future resurrection. In fact, it is Irenaeus' faithfulness to and extension of this view that generates unresolved systematic tensions in his thought with respect to the resurrection of the wicked. But this study will also complicate this narrative by going beyond Irenaeus to the reception of Paul in Tertullian, Origen, and Methodius (alongside Valentinian texts). While Paul was certainly important for each of these authors, he was important in very different ways.

Terminology: "Paulinism," "Resurrection," "Moral Transformation"

The Pauline resurrection schema was so important for early Christian understandings of resurrection because so many theologians were engaged in what I am calling "Paulinism." "Paulinism" has meant many things in scholarship, from the theology immanent within the historical Paul's own mind, to early attempts to do theology under the mantle of Paul by invoking his name, to later theological developments that focus on Paul to the exclusion of others; but I employ the term to denote the project, undertaken by later authors, of articulating and developing the theological emphases of Paul "the Apostle," usually in conversation with insights drawn from other authoritative authors. A comparison with "Origenism" might be helpful: Origenists, writing decades or even centuries after Origen, sought to do justice to what they perceived to be Origen's deepest insights, but they neither slavishly

reproduced his thought nor ignored other theological guides. (It should go without saying that whatever negative connotations have grown up around the term "Origenism" due to negative assessments of Origen's theology should not be transferred to "Paulinism.") Just as "Origenism" embodied a special but not exclusive focus on the theology of Origen, so "Paulinism" points to a special but not necessarily exclusive focus on Paul. And although not all early Christian theologians can be characterized as engaged in "Paulinism," many of the most influential, and all of those treated in this study, were. The rifts that developed within this shared project are the "conflict" in the Paulinism of this period — whether the obvious and highly public conflict over the nature of the resurrected body (the subject of many other studies) or the hidden yet no less important conflict over the purpose of resurrection itself (the subject of this study).

For this study as a whole, I do not take a particular kind of event — for example, a revivification of corpses — as paradigmatic for "resurrec¬tion" and treat all other uses of resurrection terminology or motifs as "metaphorical" or even somehow defective. Rather, I seek to allow each source to define "resurrection" for itself by tracing its deployment of the language of resurrection. I take this language to be constituted primarily by terms along with their cognates and corresponding Latin translations. In practice, identifying discussions of resurrection in the texts examined in this study is only difficult if one comes to the texts with a predefined understanding of what actually counts as "resurrection." The texts themselves are quite clear about when they are discussing rising up from the dead, even if they are sometimes less clear about what this looks like. I use the term "general resurrection" as a shorthand for a resurrection that encompasses all people. One sometimes finds scholars talking about a "general resurrection" that is actually restricted to a subset of humans, usually the righteous. By "general resurrection," they appear to mean "multiple people resurrecting at once." I find this usage needlessly confusing and therefore avoid it. I prefer to call the eschatological resurrection of a subset of humans "the eschatological resurrection of the [subset]."

A final term requires discussion: moral transformation. I will use this term frequently as a shorthand for the freedom from enslavement to sin that Paul connects to conformity to the resurrection of Christ. "Moral transformation" is not, of course, Paul's own language. Rather, to take just two examples, Paul speaks of a transition from slavery to sin to slavery to righteousness (Rom. 6:17-18) or of coming to bear the fruit of the Spirit rather than the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:19-23). Other authors can speak of this transition in other terms: Irenaeus speaks of becoming more spiritual, Origen of abandoning vice and growing in virtue. Rather than privilege one author's preferred idiom, I use the term "moral transformation" to highlight the family resemblance that exists among such discourses about changes in human character and behavior — changes that are hopefully but not necessarily for the better. (I use "moral transformation" rather than the more specifically positive "moral renewal" or "improvement" because, for Origen, the fact that some become morally worse over time, while regrettable, must be theorized alongside the moral improvement of others.) I have no intention of artificially isolating these discussions from other loci with which they are intimately bound up in each author. In other words, I do not highlight this family resemblance across authors in order to extract their discussions of "moral transformation" from the web of theological connections in which they are always embedded so that I can then compare their respective understandings of "moral transformation" with each other. My purpose is exactly the opposite. I use the general term "moral transformation" precisely in order to highlight the ways in which the same basic theme can be embedded differently in webs of theological connections.

Methodology and Scope

It is important to stop here and declare plainly what this book is not. It is not a new study in the tradition of seeking to determine who got Paul "right." Therefore, it does not begin with the claim that the true center of Paul's theology is a particular construal of the Pauline resurrection schema, rather than justification by faith or a particular understanding of bodily continuity in transformation, and then measure all later readings

of Paul against that yardstick. This study is also not an attempt to find a new approach to answering the old questions about the nature of the resurrection. Those questions are important, and this study will comment upon them, but this study is not aimed at answering them.

Instead, this study traces a constellation of related motifs through key early Christian theological texts and figures. Most of these motifs appear in the Pauline resurrection schema, which is based on the understanding of resurrection itself as part of God's salvation. But one of them, the resurrection of all to face judgment, comes from outside the Pauline epistles and could be in tension with the Pauline schema. Moreover, this study begins not from the claim that these Pauline motifs are the center of any authentic Pauline theology, but rather from the observation of their coincidence in the epistles and potential tension with the general resurrection for judgment. Therefore, instead of assessing later authors against the standard of a new "Pauline theology," this study proceeds by tracing how later authors developed and integrated all of these themes (or found ways to avoid needing to do so). This task, it turns out, was both difficult and highly productive.

As for scope, this study is extensive but not exhaustive. I do not seek to treat every possible text or figure in the second and third centuries. Instead, I have chosen particular authors or texts as case studies. I have made these choices with an eye to the extent of their surviving writings and the depth of their engagement with the key motifs that are the focus of this study, especially the Pauline ones. I have thus omitted Clement of Alexandria because, although his surviving writings are voluminous, he does not develop Pauline themes connected to resurrection in a systematic way. Perhaps he did in his treatise on the resurrection, but that is now lost. Similarly, Athenagoras' On the Resurrection, although interesting for what it says about the continuity between the body of this life and the body of the resurrection, does not integrate that teaching into broader theological loci in any extensive way. The various apocryphal Acts contain much of interest regarding resurrection, but considerations of space prevent me from

treating them here. Perhaps this study will set the stage for a new look at them.

Chapter Outline
The first chapter establishes the existence of two understandings of the purpose of resurrection in Second Temple Judaism and shows how these two understandings are reflected in the New Testament. I pay especially careful attention to the way in which the Pauline epistles develop the link between righteousness and resurrection already found in 2 Maccabees and Josephus' description of the Pharisees, because this Pauline development in one way or another drives so much later reflection on resurrection.

For Paul, Christ is already raised from the dead, and the Spirit of Christ indwells the Christian. That indwelling Spirit produces a twofold conformity to Christ: a renewed moral life now and a renewed bodily life in the future. Which of these renewals is explicitly labeled "resurrection" shifts among the letters (with a difference discernible between the disputed and undisputed letters), but the overall pattern, which I call the "Pauline resurrection schema," remains consistent. I also argue that the Pauline epistles never clearly affirm the resurrection of non-Christians, which correlates remarkably well with the view that resurrection is fundamentally tied to God's saving work through Christ and the Spirit. I close by considering why, although almost all of these points have been noted in prior scholarship, they have not been brought together in a way that reveals their significance.

The case studies begin with Irenaeus of Lyons (Chapter 2). Not only was Irenaeus the first Christian author whose extant writings engage extensively with Paul, but much of his engagement with Paul was directed against people who used Paul to deny the resurrection of the body. (Irenaeus was aware that some appropriated the language of "resurrection" to mean something other than what he thought it should mean, but he did not seem particularly concerned about them.) The key point of dispute was what it means to become "spiritual." Irenaeus' opponents took this to mean a change in anthropological composition that removes the fleshly body of this life from the person. Irenaeus, by contrast, drew from across the Pauline corpus to

argue that becoming "spiritual" is in no way mutually exclusive with possessing a fleshly body, since this spiritualization process has already begun in this life through the bestowal of the Holy Spirit and concomitant moral transformation. In fact, since the human being receives all life (including the biological life of the body) from the life-giving Spirit of God channeled through the human soul, this already-inaugurated spiritualization process actually produces the eventual resurrection of the body. In effect, Irenaeus built on the prompts provided by the Pauline resurrection schema to show precisely how becoming "spiritual" guarantees rather than excludes the resurrection of the body. Although Irenaeus never spoke of moral transformation as itself resurrection, the two are connected by the fact that the Spirit produces both. Irenaeus' use of Paul in this way, however, remains in tension with his clear affirmation that all will be resurrected to face judgment, both those in whom the Spirit is working in this life and those in whom the Spirit is not working. He made no attempt to integrate these two understandings of resurrection with one another. Irenaeus is thus a clear example of someone who made the understanding of resurrection as an aspect of salvation foundational to his theology and then struggled to explain the general resurrection.

Tertullian (Chapter 3) took the opposite approach. He made the understanding of resurrection as the prerequisite for judgment foundational. In opposition to those who took "resurrection" to denote a spiritual return to life in the present (a threat Tertullian took far more seriously than Irenaeus), Tertullian insisted that "resurrection" can only mean the return to life of all people through the reunification of their souls with their corpses in order to face judgment. He struggled, however, to account for the connection between resurrection and the economy of salvation in Paul. His solution was to read "resurrection" in Paul as a cipher for that which the eschatological resurrection of all people makes possible, namely the reward of the righteous that follows upon their vindication at the final judgment. Correspondingly, Tertullian only used arguments for the resurrection of the body that apply equally to all people, whether or not the life-giving Spirit has been poured out upon them in

baptism and is working in them to produce moral transformation in the present. The resurrection of the body does not require the indwelling Spirit, for the human soul is perfectly capable of bestowing life on the body. For Tertullian, then, the reception of the indwelling Spirit and the concomitant moral transformation are not at all connected to the resurrection of the body itself; rather, they are connected to what comes after resurrection. This move places the general resurrection to judgment on much surer footing than in Irenaeus' theology but produces strain on Tertullian's interpretation of Paul.

The Treatise on the Resurrection (Epistle to Rheginos) and Gospel of Philip (Chapter 4), despite the difficulties of dating, provide windows into the views opposed by Irenaeus and Tertullian. These Valentinian texts describe both a present reality in the Christian's life and a future event as resurrection, even though the nature of that future event is difficult to discern. In this way, they reflect the use of "resurrection" across the Pauline corpus more faithfully than Irenaeus and Tertullian, belying the latter's fear that calling something experienced now "resurrection" necessarily excludes a future resurrection. These texts also provide the first opportunity for discerning what "resurrection" means when used to denote multiple events. Rather than taking one resurrection to be the "real" resurrection and the other(s) to be "metaphorical" resurrections, I search for themes or motifs that bind together both events named "resurrection." For the Treatise on the Resurrection, it is revelation of true reality.

Similarly, for the Gospel of Philip, it is transformation corresponding to true perception of reality. When resurrection in these texts is understood in this way, their ambiguity about embodiment in the second resurrection becomes easier to understand. In these texts, bodily continuity is simply not what is important about resurrection. To search for greater precision on that question is to miss the ways in which these texts are clear about the nature of resurrection. These texts thus work off of the Pauline resurrection schema. Correspondingly, there is no hint anywhere that the eschatological resurrection will be general.

Origen (Chapter 5) found a way to integrate the general resurrection into an account of resurrection deeply indebted to the Pauline resurrection schema, particularly the connection between resurrection and moral transformation. In his early and speculative On First Principles, he articulated an understanding of the human body as an instrumental rather than ultimate good. That is to say, the variety of forms taken by the bodies of rational creatures is a divine response to the variety of moral states that exist among rational creatures as a result of their diverse, freely willed falls away from the contemplation of God. The bodies of rational creatures are therefore logically posterior to their moral states. Otherwise, Origen reasoned, God would be responsible for the unjust inequality that pervades the creation. The resurrection, then, involves the bestowal upon the rational creature of a body that is newly calibrated to its moral state — whether for good or ill. Thus, not only do those who have put on virtue in this life receive more glorious bodies, but those who have sunken further into vice receive less glorious bodies. Origen's later and exegetical Commentary on Romans shows that this understanding of resurrection continued to underlie his thought later in his career. It also shows, however, how Origen took seriously the way in which the New Testament invokes resurrection in a wide variety of ways, including the resurrection of Lazarus, the resurrection of Jesus on Easter, the resurrection of the believer in baptism, the resurrection of all at the end of time, and the identification of Jesus himself as "the Resurrection" (John 11:2.5). Origen carefully distinguished between these various resurrections not in order to keep them separate from each other but rather in order to discern how they all relate to one another. The common thread running through all of them is moral transformation.

The case studies close with Methodius of Olympus (Chapter 6), one of Origen's earliest critics. Rather than beginning with Methodius' criticisms of Origen, though, I articulate Methodius' own theological concerns. Methodius' own understanding of the resurrection, which was for him always eschatological and general, grappled with the connection between resurrection and moral

transformation no less than Origen's. According to Methodius, God will raise all people from the dead at the end of time, and in so doing root out the sin that has become entrenched in humans. If resurrection and moral transformation are linked together, and resurrection can only mean an eschatological event that happens to all people, then God must bestow that complete (and positive) moral transformation on all people through the resurrection. God will still, however, punish those who did not at least try to root out this entrenched sin during this life. I argue that this odd result — morally perfected people punished forever — represents Methodius' idiosyncratic attempt to take seriously the Pauline connection between resurrection and moral transformation so emphasized by Origen without simultaneously taking on board the multivalence of resurrection language. The tensions involved in this view emerge clearly in Methodius' exegesis (or avoidance) of key Pauline texts.

I end with a brief conclusion summarizing the significance of these findings, highlighting the theologically generative power of the juxtaposition of these two understandings of resurrection in all of the material studied, describing the need for further study of these questions in subsequent centuries, and noting its implications for the reception history of Paul and for systematic theology. <>

LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media by P. W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking [Eamon Dolan/Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 9781328695741]

Two defense experts explore the collision of war, politics, and social media, where the most important battles are now only a click away.

Through the weaponization of social media, the internet is changing war and politics, just as war and politics are changing the internet. Terrorists livestream their attacks, "Twitter wars" produce real-world casualties, and viral misinformation alters not just the result of battles, but the very fate of nations. The result is that war, tech, and politics

have blurred into a new kind of battlespace that plays out on our smartphones.

P. W. Singer and Emerson Brooking tackle the mind-bending questions that arise when war goes online and the online world goes to war. They explore how ISIS copies the Instagram tactics of Taylor Swift, a former World of Warcraft addict foils war crimes thousands of miles away, internet trolls shape elections, and China uses a smartphone app to police the thoughts of 1.4 billion citizens. What can be kept secret in a world of networks? Does social media expose the truth or bury it? And what role do ordinary people now play in international conflicts?

Delving into the web's darkest corners, we meet the unexpected warriors of social media, such as the rapper turned jihadist PR czar and the Russian hipsters who wage unceasing infowars against the West. Finally, looking to the crucial years ahead, LikeWar outlines a radical new paradigm for understanding and defending against the unprecedented threats of our networked world.

Contents

Excerpt: From a military perspective, Social Media Environment and Internet Replication [SMEIR] is a surreal development. A generation ago, the internet was a niche plaything, one that the U.S. military itself had just walked away from. Only the most far-sighted futurists were suggesting that it might one day become a crucial battlefield. None imagined that the military would have to pay millions of dollars to simulate a second, fake internet to train for war on the real one.

But in the unbridled chaos of the modern internet, even an innovation like SMEIR is still playing catch-up. Thwarted by an eagle-eyed tactical operations officer, actual terrorists wouldn't just fade back into the crowd. They'd shoot the civilians anyway and simply manufacture evidence of U.S. involvement. Or they'd manufacture everything about the video and use armies of botnets and distant fanboys to overwhelm the best efforts of fact-checkers, manipulating the algorithms of the web itself.

Nor can such a simulation capture the most crucial parts of the battlefield. The digital skirmishes that would have determined who actually won this fight wouldn't have been limited to Louisiana or SMEIR. Rather, they would have been decided by the clicks of millions of people who've never met a person from Dara Lam and by whatever policy that social media company executives had chosen for how to handle Fariq propaganda. The reality of what took place in the (fake) battle would have been secondary to whatever aspects of it went viral.

Just as soldiers in Louisiana are struggling to adjust to this new information conflict, so are engineers in Silicon Valley. All the social media powers were founded on the optimistic premise that a more closeknit and communal world would be a better one. "[Facebook] was built to accomplish a social mission, to make the world more open and connected," wrote Mark Zuckerberg in a 2012 letter to investors, just as his company went public. Yet as we've seen, these companies must now address the fact that this very same openness and connection has also made their creations the place for continual and global conflicts.

This duality of the social media revolution touches the rest of us, too. The evolutionary advantages that make us such dynamic, social creatures — our

curiosity, affinity for others, and desire to belong — also render us susceptible to dangerous currents of disinformation. It doesn't even help to be born into the world of the internet, as is the case for millennials and Generation Z. Study after study finds that youth is no defense against the dangers we've explored in this book. Regardless of how old they are, humans as a species are uniquely ill-equipped to handle both the instantaneity and the immensity of information that defines the social media age.

However, humans are unique in their ability to learn and evolve, to change the fabric of their surroundings. Although the maturation of the Internet has produced dramatic new forces acting upon war and politics — and, by extension, upon all of society— these changes are far from unknown or unknowable. Even LikeWar has rules.

First, for all the sense of flux, the modern information environment is becoming stable. The internet is now the preeminent communications medium in the world; it will remain so for the foreseeable future. Through social media, the web will grow bigger in size, scope, and membership, but its essential form and centrality to the information ecosystem will not change. It has also reached a point of maturity whereby most of its key players will remain the same. Like them or hate them, the majority of today's most prominent social media companies and voices will continue to play a crucial role in public life for years to come.

Second, the internet is a battlefield. Like every other technology before it, the internet is not a harbinger of peace and understanding. Instead, it's a platform for achieving the goals of whichever actor manipulates it most effectively. Its weaponization, and the conflicts that then erupt on it, define both what happens on the internet and what we take away from it. Battle on the internet is continuous, the battlefield is contiguous, and the information it produces is contagious. The best and worst aspects of human nature duel over what truly matters most online: our attention and engagement.

Third, this battlefield changes how we must think about information itself. If something happens, we must assume that there's likely a digital record of it — an image, video, or errant tweet — that will

surface seconds or years from now. However, an event only carries power if people also believe that it happened. The nature of this process means that a manufactured event can have real power, while a demonstrably true event can be rendered irrelevant. What determines the outcome isn't mastery of the "facts," but rather a back-and-forth battle of psychological, political, and (increasingly) algorithmic manipulation. Everything is now transparent, yet the truth can be easily obscured.

Fourth, war and politics have never been so intertwined. In cyberspace, the means by which the political or military aspects of this competition are "won" are essentially identical. As a result, politics has taken on elements of information warfare, while violent conflict is increasingly influenced by the tug-of-war for online opinion. This also means that the engineers of Silicon Valley, quite unintentionally, have turned into global power brokers. Their most minute decisions shape the battlefield on which both war and politics are increasingly decided.

Fifth, we're all part of the battle. We are surrounded by countless information struggles — some apparent, some invisible — all of which seek to alter our perceptions of the world. Whatever we notice, whatever we "like," whatever we share, becomes the next salvo. In this new war of wars, taking place on the network of networks, there is no neutral ground.

LikeWar isn't likeable. This state of affairs is certainly not what we were promised. And no matter how hard today's technologists try, their best efforts will never yield the perfect, glittering future once envisioned by the internet's early inventors.

Yet recognizing the new truths of the modern information environment and the eternal aspects of politics and war doesn't mean admitting defeat. Rather, it allows us to hone our focus and channel our energies into measures that can accomplish the most tangible good. Some of these initiatives can be undertaken by governments, others by social media companies, and still others by each of us on our own.

For governments, the first and most important step is to take this new battleground seriously. Social media now forms the foundation of commercial, political, and civic life. It is also a conflict space of immense consequence to both national and individual citizens' security. Just as the threat of cyberwar was recognized and then organized and prepared for over the past two decades, so, too, must this new front be addressed.

This advice is most urgent for democratic governments. As this book has shown, authoritarian leaders have long since attuned themselves to the potential of social media, both as a threat to their rule and as a new vector for attacking their foes. Although many democracies have formed national efforts to confront the resulting dangers, the United States — the very birthplace of the internet — has remained supremely ill-equipped. Indeed, in the wake of the episodes you have read about in this book, other nations now look to the United States as a showcase for all the developments they wish to avoid. So far, America has emerged as one of the clearest "losers" in this new kind of warfare.

A model to respond comes from a number of countries that have moved beyond the previously discussed military reorganization to the creation of "whole-of-nation" efforts intended to inoculate their societies against information threats. It is not coincidental that among the first states to do so were Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Sweden, all of which face a steady barrage of Russian information attacks, backed by the close proximity of Russian soldiers and tanks. Their inoculation efforts include citizen education programs, public tracking and notices of foreign disinformation campaigns, election protections and forced transparency of political campaign activities, and legal action to limit the effect of poisonous super-spreaders.

In many ways, such holistic responses to information threats have an American pedigree. One of the most useful efforts to foil Soviet operations during the Cold War was a comprehensive U.S. government effort called the Active Measures Working Group. It brought together people working in various government agencies — from spies to diplomats to broadcasters to educators —

to collaborate on identifying and pushing back against KGB-planted false stories designed to fracture societies and undermine support for democracy. There is no such equivalent today. Neither is there an agency comparable to what the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention does for health — an information clearinghouse for government to connect with business and researchers in order to work together to battle dangerous viral outbreaks.

It would be easy to say that such efforts should merely be resurrected and reconstituted for the internet age — and doing so would be a welcome development. But we must also acknowledge a larger problem: Today, a significant part of the American political culture is willfully denying the new threats to its cohesion. In some cases, it's colluding with them.

Too often, efforts to battle back against online dangers emanating from actors at home and abroad have been stymied by elements within the U.S. government. Indeed, at the time we write this in 2,018, the Trump White House has not held a single cabinet-level meeting on how to address the challenges outlined in this book, while its State Department refused to increase efforts to counter online terrorist propaganda and Russian disinformation, even as Congress allocated nearly $80 million for the purpose.

Similarly, the American election system remains remarkably vulnerable, not merely to hacking of the voting booth, but also to the foreign manipulation of U.S. voters' political dialogue and beliefs. Ironically, although the United States has contributed millions of dollars to help nations like Ukraine safeguard their citizens against these new threats, political paralysis has prevented the U.S. government from taking meaningful steps to inoculate its own population. Until this is reframed as a nonpartisan issue — akin to something as basic as health education — the United States will remain at grave risk.

Accordingly, information literacy is no longer merely an education issue but a national security imperative. Indeed, given how early children's thought patterns develop and their use of online platforms begins, the process cannot start early

enough. Just as in basic health education, there are parallel roles for both families and schools in teaching children how to protect themselves online, as well as gain the skills needed to be responsible citizens. At younger ages, these include programs that focus on critical thinking skills, expose kids to false headlines, and encourage them to play with (and hence learn from) image-warping software. Nor should the education stop as students get older. As of 2017, at least a dozen universities offered courses targeting more advanced critical thinking in media consumption, including an aptly named one at the University of Washington: "Calling Bullshit: Data Reasoning in a Digital World." This small number of pilot programs point the way, but they also illustrate how far we have to go in making them more widely available.

As in public health, such efforts will have to be supported outside the classroom, targeting the broader populace. Just as in the case of viral outbreaks of disease, there is a need for everything from public awareness campaigns to explain the risks of disinformation efforts to mass media notifications that announce their detected onset.

Given the dangers, anger, and lies that pervade social media, there's a temptation to tell people to step away from it altogether. Sean Parker created one of the first file-sharing social networks, Napster, and then became Facebook's first president. However, he has since become a social media "conscientious objector," leaving the world that he helped make. Parker laments not just what social media has already done to us, but what it bodes for the next generation. "God only knows what it's doing to our children's brains," he said in 2017.

The problem is that not all of us either want to, or even can, make that choice. Like it or not, social media now plays a foundational role in public and private life alike; it can't be un-invented or simply set aside. Nor is the technology itself bad. As we've repeatedly seen in this book, its new powers have been harnessed toward both good and evil ends, empowering both wonderful and terrible people, often simultaneously. Finally, it is damned addictive. Any program advising people to "just say no" to

social media will be as infamously ineffective as the original 1980s antidrug campaign.

Instead, part of the governance solution to our social media problem may actually be more social media, just of a different kind. While the technology has been used to foment a wide array of problems around the world, a number of leaders and nations have simultaneously embraced its participatory nature to do the opposite: to identify and enact shared policy solutions. Such "technocracy" views the new mass engagement that social networks allow as a mechanism to improve our civic lives. For instance, a growing number of elected governments don't use social media just to frighten or anger their followers; they also use it to expand public awareness and access to programs, track citizen wants and needs, even gather proposals for public spending. Some also are seeking to inject it more directly into the political process. Switzerland, for instance, may be the world's oldest continuous democracy, but it has been quick to use social networks to allow the digitization of citizen petitions and the insertion of online initiatives into its policy deliberations. In Australia and Brazil, the Flux movement seeks to use technology to return to true political representation, whereby elected leaders commit to a system allowing parliamentary submission of and digital voting on key issues, moving the power from the politician back to the people.

What is common across these examples of governance via network is the use of social media to learn and involve. It is the opposite of governance via trolling — the all-too-frequent use of social media to attack, provoke, and preen.

This points to perhaps the biggest challenge of all: it will be hard to overcome any system that incentivizes an opposite outcome. Not just our networks but our politics and culture have been swarmed by the worst aspects of social media, from lies and conspiracy theories to homophily and trolling. This has happened for the very reason that it works: it is rewarded with attention, and, as we have seen, this attention becomes power.

Super-spreaders play a magnified role in our world; there is no changing that fact now. But it is how they are rewarded that determines whether

their influence is a malign or benevolent one. When someone engages in the spread of lies, hate, and other societal poisons, they should be stigmatized accordingly. It is not just shameful but dangerous that the purveyors of the worst behaviors on social media have enjoyed increased fame and fortune, all the way up to invitations to the White House. Stopping these bad actors requires setting an example and ensuring that repeat offenders never escape the gravity of their past actions and are excluded from the institutions and platforms of power that now matter most in our society. In a democracy, you have a right to your opinion, but no right to be celebrated for an ugly, hateful opinion, especially if you've spread lie after lie.

Indeed, social media actions need to be taken all the more seriously when their poisonous side infects realms like national security, where large numbers of people's lives are at stake. Those who deliberately facilitate enemy efforts, whether it be providing a megaphone for terrorist groups or consciously spreading disinformation, especially that from foreign government offensives, have to be seen for what they are. They are no longer just fighting for their personal brand or their political party; they are aiding and abetting enemies that seek to harm all of society.

We must also come to grips with the new challenge of free speech in the age of social media — what is known as "dangerous speech." This term has emerged from studies of what prompts communal violence. It describes public statements intended to inspire hate and incite violent actions, usually against minorities. Dangerous speech isn't merely partisan language or a bigoted remark. These are, alas, all too common.

Rather, dangerous speech falls into one or more of five categories: dehumanizing language (comparing people to animals or as "disgusting" or subhuman in some way); coded language (using coy historical references, loaded memes, or terms popular among hate groups); suggestions of impurity (that a target is unworthy of equal rights, somehow "poisoning" society as a whole); opportunistic claims of attacks on women, but by people with no concern for women's rights (which allows the group to claim a valorous reason for its

hate); and accusation in a mirror (a reversal of reality, in which a group is falsely told it is under attack, as a means to justify preemptive violence against the target). This sort of speech poses a mortal threat to a peaceable society, especially if crossed with the power of a super-spreader to give it both validation and reach.

Cloaking itself in ambiguity and spreading via half-truths, danger-ous speech is uniquely suited to social media. Its human toll can be seen in episodes like the web-empowered anti-Muslim riots of India and the genocide of the Rohingya people in Myanmar. But what the researchers who focus on the problem have grown most disturbed by is how "dangerous speech" is increasingly at work in the U.S. Instances of dangerous speech are at an all-time high, spreading via deliberate information offenses from afar, as well as via once-scorned domestic extremists whose voices have become amplified and even welcomed into the mainstream. The coming years will determine whether these dangerous voices will continue to thrive in our social networks, and thus our politics, or be defeated.

This challenge takes us beyond governments and their voters to the accountability we should demand from the companies that now shape social media and the world beyond. It is a strange fact that the entities best positioned to police the viral spread of hate and violence are not legislatures, but social media companies. They have access to the data and patterns that evidence it, and they can more rapidly respond than governments. As rulers of voluntary networks, they determine the terms of service that reflect their communities' and stockholders' best interests. Dangerous speech is not good for either.

This is just one dimension of the challenges these companies must confront. Put simply, Silicon Valley must accept more of the political and social responsibility that the success of its technology has thrust upon it. "The more we connect, the better it gets" is an old Facebook slogan that remains generally representative of how social media companies see the world. As we've seen, that slogan is neither true nor an acceptable way for these firms to approach the new role they play in society.

Although figures like Mark Zuckerberg have protested at various times that they should not be considered "arbiters of the truth," this is exactly what they are. The information that spreads via their services — governed by their legal and software codes — shapes our shared reality. If they aren't the arbiters of truth, who is?

Accordingly, these companies must abandon the pretense that they are merely "neutral" platform providers. It is a weak defense that they outgrew many years ago. Bigots, racists, violent extremists, and professional trolls do not have to be accorded the same respect as marginalized peoples and democratic states. In turn, the authoritarian governments that exploit their networks and target their users must be treated as adversaries — not potential new markets.

In the process, Silicon Valley must also break the code of silence that pervades its own culture. Our past research has brought us into contact with soldiers, spies, mercenaries, insurgents, and hackers. In every case, they proved oddly more willing to speak about their work — and how they wrestle with the thorny dilemmas within it — than those employed at big social media companies. As technology reporter Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai has similarly written of his experience reporting on Facebook, "In many cases, answers to simple questions — are the nude images blurred or not, for instance — are filtered to the point where the information Facebook gives journalists is not true."

These companies should walk their talk, embracing proactive information disclosures instead of just using the word "transparency" ad infinitum in vague press releases. This applies not just to the policies that govern our shared online spaces but also to the information these companies collect from those spaces. It's unacceptable that social media firms took nearly a year after the 2016 U.S. election to release data showing definitive proof of a Russian disinformation campaign — and even then, only after repeated demands by Congress.

It is perhaps especially troubling that, despite all the political and public pressure, most are still dragging their feet in disclosing the full extent of what played out across their networks. Of the major social media companies, Reddit is the only

one that preserved the known fake Russian accounts for public examination. By wiping clean this crucial evidence, the firms are doing the digital equivalent of bringing a vacuum cleaner to the scene of a crime. They are not just preventing investigators and researchers from exploring the full extent of what occurred and how to prevent a repeat. They are destroying what should be a memorial to a moment of mass manipulation and misinformation that very much altered world history.

Just as all companies have a role in public health, so does Silicon Valley have a responsibility to help build public information literacy. Owning the platforms by which misinformation spreads, social media companies are in a powerful position to help inoculate the public. The most effective of these initiatives don't simply warn people about general misinformation (e.g., "Don't believe everything you read on the internet") or pound counterarguments into their heads (e.g., "Here are ten reasons why climate change is real"). Rather, effective information literacy education works by presenting the people being targeted with specific, proven instances of misinformation, encouraging them to understand how and why it worked against them. Here again, the firms have mostly buried this information instead of sharing it with victims. Social media firms should swallow the fear that people will abandon their services en masse if they engage in these sorts of initiatives (we're too addicted to quit anyway). In their quest to avoid liability and maintain the fiction that they're blameless, social media firms have left their customers unarmed for battle.

This battle will only become more intense. Therefore, these companies should steal a lesson from the fictional battlefields of Dara Lam. It's not enough to experiment and train for today's battles of LikeWar; they must look ahead to tomorrow's.

The companies must proactively consider the political, social, and moral ramifications of their services. It is telling that, across all the episodes described in this book, not a single social media firm tried to remedy the ills that played out on their networks until they became larger problems, even though executives could see these abuses unfolding in real time. Even when these firms' own employees

sounded alarms about issues ranging from hate groups to harassment, they were consistently ignored. Similarly, when outside researchers raised concerns about

emerging problems like neo-Nazi trolling and Russian disinformation campaigns during the 2016 U.S. election, the firms essentially dismissed them.

Changing to a proactive strategy will require the firms to alter their approach to product development. In the same way that social media companies learned to vet new features for technical bugs, any algorithmic tweak or added capability will require them to take a long, hard look at how it might be co-opted by bad actors or spark unintended consequences — before the feature is released to the masses in a chaotic "beta test." Much like the U.S. Army playing war games at Fort Polk, these companies should aggressively "game out" the potential legal, social, and moral effects of their products, especially in regard to how the various types of bad actors discussed in this book might use them. The next time a malicious group or state weaponizes a social media platform, these companies won't be able to beg ignorance. Nor should we allow them to use that excuse any longer.

Amid all this talk of taking responsibility, it's important to recognize that this is the appropriate moment in both the internet's and these companies' own maturation to do so. As internet sociologist Zeynep Tufekci has reminded us, "Facebook is only 13 years old, Twitter 11, and even Google is but 19. At this moment in the evolution of the auto industry, there were still no seat belts, airbags, emission controls, or mandatory crumple zones." The critics of social media should remember that the companies aren't implacable enemies set on ruining the social fabric. They're just growing into their roles and responsibilities. By acting less like angry customers and more like concerned constituents, we stand the best chance of guiding these digital empires in the right direction.

And this points to our own individual role in a realm of escalating online war — that is, recognizing our

burgeoning responsibilities as citizens and combatants alike.

Like any viral infection, information offensives work by targeting the most vulnerable members of a population — in this case, the least informed. The cascading nature of "likes" and "shares" across social networks, however, means that the gullible and ignorant are only the entry point. Ignorance isn't bliss; it just makes you a mark. It also makes you more likely to spread lies, which your friends and family will be more inclined to believe and spread in turn.

Yet the way to avoid this isn't some rote recommendation that we all simply "get smart." That would be great, of course, but it is unlikely to happen and still wouldn't solve most problems. Instead, if we want to stop being manipulated, we must change how we navigate the new media environment. In our daily lives, all of us must recognize that the intent of most online content is to subtly influence and manipulate. In response, we should practice a technique called "lateral thinking." In a study of information consumption patterns, Stanford University researchers gauged three groups — college undergraduates, history PhDs, and professional fact-checkers — on how they evaluated the accuracy of online information. Surprisingly, both the undergraduates and the PhDs scored low. While certainly intelligent, they approached the information "vertically." They stayed within a single worldview, parsing the content of only one source. As a result, they were "easily manipulated."

By contrast, the fact-checkers didn't just recognize online manipulation more often, they also detected it far more rapidly. The reason was that they approached the task "laterally," leaping across multiple other websites as they made a determination of accuracy. As the Stanford team wrote, the fact-checkers "understood the Web as a maze filled with trap doors and blind alleys, where things are not always what they seem." So they constantly linked to other locales and sources, "seeking context and perspective." In short, they networked out to find the truth. The best way to navigate the internet is one that reflects the very structure of the internet itself.

There is nothing inherently technological about this approach. Indeed, it's taught by one of the oldest and most widely shared narratives in human history: the parable of the blind men and the elephant. This story dates back to the earliest Buddhist, Hindu, and Jain texts, almost 4,00o years ago. It describes how a group of blind men, grasping at different parts of an elephant, imagine it to be many different things: a snake, a tree, a wall. In some versions of the story, the men fall to mortal combat as their disagreement widens. As the Hindu Rigveda summarizes the story, "Reality is one, though wise men speak of it variously."

When in doubt, seek a second opinion — then a third, then a fourth. If you're not in doubt, then you're likely part of the problem!

What makes social media so different, and so powerful, is that it is a tool of mass communication whose connections run both ways. Every act on it is simultaneously personal and global. So in protecting ourselves online, we all, too, have broader responsibilities to protect others. Think of this obligation as akin to why you cover your mouth when you cough. You don't do it because it directly protects you, but because it protects all those you come in contact with, and everyone whom they meet in turn. This ethic of responsibility makes us all safer in the end. It works the same way in social media.

That leads us to a final point as to how to handle a world of "likes" and lies gone viral online. Here again, to succeed in the digital future is to draw upon the lessons of the past, including some of the oldest recorded. Plato's Republic, written around 520 BCE, is one of the foundational works of Western philosophy and politics. One of its most important insights is conveyed through "The Allegory of the Cave." It tells the story of prisoners in a cave, who watch shadows dance across the wall. Knowing only that world, they think the shadows are reality, when actually they are just the reflections of a light they cannot see. (Note this ancient parallel to Zuckerberg's fundamental notion that Facebook was "a mirror of what existed in real life.")

The true lesson comes, though, when one prisoner escapes the cave. He sees real light for the first time, finally understanding the nature of his reality. Yet the prisoners inside the cave refuse to believe him. They are thus prisoners not just of their chains but also of their beliefs. They hold fast to the manufactured reality instead of opening up to the truth.

Indeed, it is notable that the ancient lessons of Plato's cave are a core theme of one of the foundational movies of the internet age, The Matrix. In this modern reworking, it is computers that hide the true state of the world from humanity, with the internet allowing mass-scale manipulation and oppression. The Matrix came out in 1999, however, before social media had changed the web into its new form. Perhaps, then, the new matrix that binds and fools us today isn't some machine-generated simulation plugged into our brains. It is just the way we view the world, filtered through the cracked mirror of social media.

But there may be something more. One of the underlying themes of Plato's cave is that power turns on perception and choice. It shows that if people are unwilling to contemplate the world around them in its actuality, they can be easily manipulated. Yet they have only themselves to blame. They, rather than the "ruler," possess the real power — the power to decide what to believe and what to tell others. So, too, in The Matrix, every person has a choice. You can pick a red pill (itself now an internet meme) that offers the truth. Or you can pick a blue pill, which allows you to "believe whatever you want to believe."

Social media is extraordinarily powerful, but also easily accessible and pliable. Across it play out battles for not just every issue you care about, but for the future itself. Yet within this network, and in each of the conflicts on it, we all still have the power of choice. Not only do we determine what role we play, but we also influence what others know and do, shaping the outcomes of all these battles. In this new world, the same basic law applies to us all:

You are now what you share.

And through what you choose, you share who you truly are. <>

[Handbook of the American Novel of the Nineteenth Century](#) edited by Christine Gerhardt [Handbooks of English and American Studies, DE GRUYTER, 978-3-11048081-8]

Excerpt: This De Gruyter handbook series has been designed to offer students and researchers a compact means of orientation in their study of Anglophone literary texts. Each volume — involving a particular historical or theoretical focus — introduces readers to current concepts and methodologies, as well as academic debates by combining theory with text analysis and contextual anchoring. It is this bridging between abstract survey and concrete analysis which is the central aim and defining feature of this series, bringing together general literary history and concrete interpretation, theory and text. At a time when students of English and American literary studies have to deal with an overwhelming amount of highly specialized research literature, as well as cope with the demands of the new BA and MA programs, such a handbook series is indispensable. Nevertheless, this series is not exclusively targeted to the needs of BA and MA students, but also caters to the requirements of scholars who wish to keep up with the current state of various fields within their discipline.

Individual volumes in the De Gruyter Handbook series will typically provide:

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— knowledge of representative authors and works of those periods;
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— examples of how historical and theoretical information weaves fruitfully into interpretations of literary texts.

Internationally renowned colleagues have agreed to collaborate on this series and take on the editorship of individual volumes. Thanks to the expertise of the volume editors responsible for the concept and structure of their volumes, as well as for the selection of suitable authors, HEAS not only summarizes the current state of knowledge in the field of Anglophone literary and cultural studies, but also offers new insights and recent research results on the most current topics, thus launching new academic debates.

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Excerpt: Reading the Nineteenth-Century Novel in the Present

In 2016, Zachary Turpin, a graduate student at the University of Houston specializing in nineteenth-century periodicals and digital humanities, dug up a previously unknown novel by Walt Whitman, The Life and Adventures of Jack Engle: An Auto-Biography (1852), a truly spectacular find. This long-lost serial novel about an orphan in New York was speedily republished in the Walt Whitman Quarterly Review and as paperback (University of Iowa Press, 2017), and its quasi-Dickensian quality drew excitement from the scholarly community and enthusiastic commentary in major American newspapers and magazines, including the New York Times (20 Feb. 2017) and the New Yorker (23 March 2017). In Europe, the reactions were equally enthusiastic: the Guardian predicted a Whitman "revival" (Kean 2017), the Neue Zürcher Zeitung saw parallels between Jack Engle and

Hawthorne's preface to the Scarlet Letter (Brôcan 2017), and the Süddeutsche Zeitung called Whitman's novel a "veritable sensation" (Müller 2017, 12). When the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung dedicated an article to the "embittered competition" among publishers about bringing out Jack Engle's first German translation (Hintermeier 2017), this added a further transnational dimension to the twenty-first-century reception of a novel that in itself combined references to Spain, England, and France with comments on changing literary tastes, generic conventions, and printing practices on both sides of the Atlantic. The nineteenth-century American novel appears to strike a chord with the contemporary moment across cultures, even though and precisely because readers, critics, and scholars are still in the process of making sense of the form in its own historical contexts.

American novels that were published during a time marked by the Westward movement and the Civil War, immigration, industrialization, and struggles over women's and workers' rights have a powerful presence today, and the discussions they continue to spark have as much to do with the twenty-first century as they do with the nineteenth. Although the American novel of the nineteenth century served an important function in shaping emergent notions of national identity, and engaged with specifically American tensions at the time - even seeking to intervene in them directly as did Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin - it has also had an enduring transcultural scope and appeal that produces new readings from decidedly twenty-first century perspectives. From recent revaluations of Charles Brockden Brown's Wieland, Frederick Douglass's The Heroic Slave, and John Rollin Ridge's Joaquin Murieta in environmental terms to new takes on Catharine Sedgwick's Hope Leslie and Elizabeth Stuart Phelps's The Silent Partner, Sarah Orne Jewett's The Country of the Pointed Firs and Kate Chopin's The Awakening regarding representations of disability and queerness, current scholarship understands American novels of the nineteenth century both in their historical situatedness and on terms that are unique to our own time. This double orientation in and of itself may be nothing new, since literature always contributes to ideas about the past conditions that

have brought it about and, at the same time, forms a dynamic touchstone for thinking about the present. And yet the American novel of the nineteenth-century appears to resonate especially strongly with the early twenty-first century in ways that enable important new arguments about changing modes of reading, the history of the book, questions of the archive, and the novel as a genre that lie at the core of how literary history is being written today.

Three developments are particularly suggestive for the presence that nineteenth-century novels have in the current cultural moment, and each of them has important implications for contemporary literary scholarship: the steady flow of rediscoveries of previously unknown examples of the genre, the increasing digitalization and availability of a wide range of texts online, and shifts in their adaptations across media and across cultures.

For one, American novels that were published more than a century ago but have been lost and forgotten keep being rediscovered today. The circumstances under which they are often found, and the questions they raise highlight how changing ideas about nineteenth-century novels depend on and also shape developments in the twenty-first century. The rediscovery of Whitman's Jack Engle is in itself a case in point. Its reappearance in 2016 was made possible by the fact that the book, like many popular novels at the time, was originally advertised in the New York Times and serialized anonymously in the New York Sunday Dispatch, and rests on today's possibilities of searching and browsing expanding online databases and digital archives. Linked to the nineteenth century's burgeoning newspaper and journal industry and to twenty-first century modes of scholarship and digital publishing, Jack Engle's rediscovery thus recharges debates about the formative role that newspapers and literary journals played for the development of the nineteenth-century novel, not only in aesthetic but also in economic terms (215 Media and Print Culture), while also highlighting how related cultural forces inflect the presence of these novels in the twenty-first century. At the same time, Whitman's rediscovered novel also raises questions that get to the heart of nineteenth-century literary history as a twenty-first century practice.

The sheer existence of Jack Engle has transformative potential. It not only suggests that America's most innovative and influential poet started his career as a much more prolific writer of popular prose than previously assumed, and that he wrote sentimental, sensational novels well into the 1850s, when he was already working on his groundbreaking Leaves of Grass, which was first published in 1855. This simultaneity in Whitman's "workshop" (Folsom in Schuessler 2017) also unsettles more wide-ranging assumptions about the relationship between poetry and prose (as well as novel and novella), literary innovation and generic convention, and authorship and biography in the nineteenth-century, while raising important questions about the ways in which these paradigms continue to inform notions of artistic quality and national literature well after the canon debates of the 1990s.

An equally remarkable rediscovery highlights another set of vital connections between nineteenth-century American novels, the contemporary moment, and the practice of literary history. This one comes from England, where American scholar Gretchen Gerzina, writing a book on Black London, found that an 1893 edition of the British Daily Telegraph announced True Love: A Story of English Domestic Life as a work of "the first negro novelist" (Gerzina 2016). And indeed, True Love turned out to be a novel by Sarah E. Farro, a writer of domestic fiction previously unknown to be African American. As in the case of Jack Engle, this find made the news (it was discussed on Public Radio International and in the LA Times on May 26 and in the Independent on June 1, 2016), and the novel was quickly republished - digital page images of the complete first edition became available on the Internet Archive, and excerpts were included in the [Portable Nineteenth-Century African American Women Writers](#). Yet in the case of Farro's domestic tale, the junctures between nineteenth- and twenty-first century media cultures and current literary scholarship also have a more pronounced transnational bend (Transnationalism and transculturation). Because True Love was first published in Chicago in 1891 and also read in London - an achievement apparently not marred by the fact that the narrative includes curious

(mis)translations of American into British cultural phenomena - its nineteenth-century publication and circulation history parallels the framework of transatlantic scholarship that enabled its rediscovery; in turn, the core assumptions of transnational studies have themselves been reaffirmed by the novel's narrative and physical movements across national and cultural boundaries. Perhaps even more importantly, the fact that this rediscovered African American novel is set in England, and wholly among white characters, also undermines prevailing notions of race and nineteenth-century literature (Gerzina 2016; 714 Race and Citizenship). What does it mean that this text has not been part of the canon of African American literature until 2016, even though the field has been rapidly expanding and now includes a highly diverse set of nineteenth-century novels, ranging from William Wells Brown's Clotel; or the President's Daughter: A Narrative of Slave Life in the United States (1853), Hannah (Bond) Crafts's The Bondwoman's Narrative (1853-1861), Frank J. Webb's The Garies and Their Friends (1857), Harriet E. Wilson's Our Nig; or, Sketches from the Life of a Free Black, in a Two-Story White House, North (1859), and Martin Delany's Blake; Or, the Huts of America (1859-1862), all the way to James H.W. Howard's Bond and Free; or the True Tale of Slave Times (1886), Amelia E. Johnson's Clarence and Corinne, Or, God's Way (1890), Emma Dunham Kelley's Megda (1891), and Frances Ellen Watkins Harper's four novels (1868 - 1892)? In which ways has Farro's decision to not write about black characters, race relations, the United States, or the geographies of the Black Atlantic contributed to her long obscurity? What was to be gained - and lost - for African American novelists embracing domestic fiction, and affiliating themselves with conventions of the European novel? And how do the questions commonly asked in transnational American studies themselves have to be adjusted in order to assess the cultural work performed by African American novels such as True Love, which reach across the Atlantic while their transgressive imagination seems unconcerned with issues of colonialism, national expansion, and imperialism? At the very least, Farro's novel serves as another reminder that there were many more black authors in the nineteenth century than it is still

assumed and that "the larger percentage of black novels produced from 1850 to 1901 were written by women" (Babb 2017, 38); that their literary output was not limited to slave narratives or early novels of social protest; and that they adeptly juggled the forces of transnational markets in ways that continue to resonate far beyond the boundaries of their own space and time. Together, the discoveries of Whitman's and Farro's novels - and other novels like them, including Julia C. Collins's The Curse of Caste; or The Slave Bride (1865, rediscovered in 2006), Hannah Crafts's The Bondwoman's Narrative (1853-1861, rediscovered in 2001), and S. Alice Callahan's Wynema, A Child of the Forest (1891, rediscovered in 1990) - do more than add new, unruly texts to the expanding archive of nineteenth-century literature. That they were found at all (and often actively searched for) is based upon changing concepts of literary relevance, national literature, and literary scholarship, and each of these previously lost texts reshapes our understanding of the forms and functions of nineteenth-century novels in a web of transcultural engagements across place and time.

The second phenomenon that highlights how intensely nineteenth-century American novels are present in the here and now - the rapid process of digitization -is linked to such textual discoveries yet pulls in a different direction. As the examples of Whitman's Jack Engle and, to a lesser degree, Farro's True Love have shown, such rediscoveries are increasingly enabled through the possibilities opened by digitalization. Jack Engle, like many popular novels at the time, was advertised in newspapers and published in a periodical - outlets that are now largely available online - while Whitman's notebooks and manuscripts are accessible through digital copies in the monumental Walt Whitman Archive. This multifaceted landscape of electronic databases is what made the kind of scholarly detective work performed by Turpin possible to begin with. However, the wide availability of nineteenth-century American novels and their paratexts online, and the format of their virtual presentation also alter people's modes of reading and the relationship between reader and text more broadly. This accentuates further connections between these novels' situatedness in

their own cultural moment and in ours, and the impact that these connections have on literary history as a contemporary practice. For instance, the growing number of large, collaborative digitization endeavors such as The Wright American Fiction project, the Making of America Project with its massive library of monographs and periodicals, and Digital Schomburg: African American Women Writers of the 19th Century, and of individual websites dedicated to single authors and novels, such as the Sarah Orne Jewett Text Project and "Clotel" by William Wells Brown: An Electronic Scholarly Edition, all dramatically increase the availability of nineteenth-century novels for twenty-first century readers in ways that resemble, and structurally repeat, the upsurge in (mostly middle-class) access to these texts that the revolution in print technologies had brought about 150 years earlier (Media and Print Culture; Brown, Clotel; Jewett, The Country of the Pointed Firs). Moreover, such digital databases often intensify the experience of nineteenth-century novels in their physical concreteness. To use William Wells Brown's Clotel and Sarah Orne Jewett's The Country of the Pointed Firs as examples, the covers, illustrations, and page images of books and journals in the original layout can now be accessed outside of rare book sections or special collections, sometimes in resolutions and with zoom functions that outdo the human eye, which creates a new kind of intimacy between readers and nineteenth-century novels, bringing us closer to their messy materiality without making printed versions obsolete. Conversely, reading digitized versions with hyperlinks to different sections, various epitexts (such as letters or reviews that are related to the novels but outside the bound volume), and helpful annotations also dissolves the novels' physical boundaries as far as linear organization, chapter hierarchies, and related ordering schemes of printed books are concerned. Here, the shift from paper to electronic challenges print-based notions of nineteenth-century novels as relatively stable, `organic' units and corresponding notions of reading in unprecedented ways, echoing the effects that nineteenth-century journals and their immensely popular practice of serialization had on all-too holistic notions of the novel as physical object. In other words, if in the twenty-first century context of

rapid digitization nineteenth-century novels morph into something other than printed books, this shift highlights qualities that these novels have possessed since the moment of their first publication. The digital format shows them even more clearly as dialogic, intertextual entities that have always transcended the deceptively delimited space between two covers. Considering the complex publication histories of texts such as Clotel, with three parallel novels printed as books between 1853 and 1867 and a fourth serialized in The Weekly Anglo African between 1860 and 1861 (Brown, Clotel), twenty-first-century hypertext archives help nineteenth-century novels come to their own in new ways. As such, their online presentations revive earlier debates about the relationship between the so-called classics and popular culture, while also enabling new kinds of scholarship at the crossroads of book history and digital humanities, science and technology studies, and hypertext theory.

The third development that exemplifies the resonance between nineteenth-century American novels and the present moment draws attention more fully to their enduring significance in the realm of popular culture. Contemporary adaptations of nineteenth-century novels increasingly participate in the undoing of parameters that have long served as uncontested pillars of the study of nineteenth-century American literature - notions of the distinction between original and copy, notions of racial difference, and of American exceptionalism. Two examples - recent European remediations of classic American novels in comics form - may illustrate the import of such transatlantic conversations across cultures, media, and languages. Huck Finn: die Graphic Novel (2013), by the German cartoonist Olivia Vieweg, is an adaptation that reimagines Huckleberry Finn's adventures in contemporary East Germany, using both the plot and the cultural memory of the novel as points of reference. The comic not only retells the story in a twenty-first century setting and transposes the interracial friendship between Huck and Jim onto an impoverished adolescent boy from post-reunification Eastern Germany and a nineteen-year-old enslaved Southeast Asian sex worker, it also draws on the context of Mark Twain's novel as

a point of reference. This is not a simple parallel between historical moments but a sophisticated engagement with the relation between storytelling and social - especially racial - realities in which human beings are traded as property, used as labor, and rejected as useless within neoliberal consumer capitalism. Crossing place and time in complex contrapuntal ways, this adaptation expresses transcultural and transhistorical tensions between the US, Europe, and Asia, between race, gender, and precarity, and between geography and mobility. As such, it sheds fresh light on Twain's narrative strategies of troubling foundational narratives of nineteenth-century American culture, and continues its work through different means, including a rough, reduced color scheme that echoes nineteenth-century and East German printing conventions alike: Vieweg's word-and-image art suggests finely modulated links between quasi-feudal structures in the antebellum South and post-reunification East Germany, and between the serenely beautiful yet threatened ecologies of the Mississippi and Saale rivers, and calls attention to frictions between regionalist and environmental imaginaries in the US and Europe that recent studies are only beginning to explore. Similarly, a celebrated graphic novel adaptation of Herman Melville's Moby-Dick by award-winning French author and artist Christophe Chabouté is not simply another retelling of the classic story but a visual interpretation with the eyes and sensibilities of a twenty-first century cosmopolitanism that revisits the novel as a microcosm of its cultural moment, including its crisis of masculinity, its anxieties over cultural belonging, and its intellectual mobility. Here, the comic's bold yet delicate black and white panels channel the novel's central concerns with cultural otherness, cross-species violence, and metaphysical and racial `darkness' in ways that harken back to Melville's America as they point forward to twenty-first-century Europe. These examples do not merely document the continuing relevance of nineteenth-century novelistic storytelling and world-making, they also accentuate how changing modes of reading are in themselves an integral part of the historical dynamics that separate the present from and link it to the past.

What all of these twenty-first century engagements with nineteenth-century American novels also emphasize is that looking at the novel in terms of genre is not just a matter of looking at its literary form. Just as interesting and revealing are its transformations through various physical manifestations, in periodical print, book editions, digitization, as well as its adaptations in other media, which contribute to the fluidity, if not generic indeterminacy, that characterizes the novel and how it has been recently discussed (cf. also 2 Romance and Gothic). Moreover, while the nineteenth-century novel in the United States served to define national identity and American notions of democracy, its contemporary manifestations also highlight how fundamentally the genre has been shaped through its transatlantic crossings, again very much in physical form (and accompanied by pirated reprintings). The first American bestseller, English writer's Susanna Rowson's Charlotte Temple (1791) - a story of a young Englishwoman abandoned by the father of her child in the new nation (Sentimentalism) - exemplifies this relationship. The significance of the novel as a genre, as an institution, and as an archive of physical objects in the United States goes beyond helping to develop an American national identity - with and against Europe. In this sense, Jonathan Arac has aptly called the time between the mid-nineteenth and the mid-twentieth centuries the "Age of the Novel," not only in the United States but also between the United States and Europe, and sees it as a fully transatlantic formation, which points to an exchange across the Atlantic rather than a process of mutual othering. The novel also enabled new reading practices and was in turn shaped by them as it was coming into new being in the nineteenth century through print technologies and emergent needs of a reading public to redefine gender, sexuality, race, class and nation (Media and Print Culture). From the romance and the historical novel, the sentimental and the sensational novel, the novel of slavery, Civil War and Reconstruction, to the regionalist, realist, and naturalist novel and the first inklings of modernism at the close of the nineteenth century, the novel underwent major transformations in that century, and the history of reception has continued to shift its form. The nineteenth-century novel in the US and Europe began as a popular

form - seen as not quite respectable, and derided for the cheap amusement that its gothic, sentimental, and sensational modes offered to a readership defined as largely female and middle class. Its ongoing creative reception in the form of popular adaptations across media, for all its transformative nature, is therefore in line with processes that have been integral to the history of the genre. If, as Leah Price has observed, "the history of books is centrally about ourselves" because it "asks how past readers have made meaning [and also] where the conditions of possibility for our own reading come from" (2004, 318), the nineteenth-century American novel is a testament to this dual process.

The study of nineteenth-century American novels is a highly dynamic endeavor, one that looks different in 2018 than it did fifty, twenty, or even ten years ago. The place that texts such as Farro's True Love or Melville's Moby-Dick assume in varying cultural contexts and people's modes of reading shift and evolve together, and the scholarship of nineteenth-century American novels participates in this process. While it is true that certain modes of inquiry, established critical categories, and a core set of primary texts have remained the same in the field of nineteenth-century American novels, transformations in reading practices, theoretical proclivities, and scholarship have also fundamentally altered how we look at the novel as a cultural practice. Indeed, the dynamics between recognized and newer methods and materials add to the historical dimension of literary studies. As such, the aim of the present handbook is twofold - it not only seeks to offer a kaleidoscope of some of the most recent developments in the study of nineteenth-century American novels, but also to reflect upon and record changing modes of reading, which are integral to the history of the nineteenth-century novel and shape its construction in the present moment.

The continuities and disruptions between how nineteenth-century American novels are read now and earlier approaches come to bear on this volume on every level. It is the guiding idea of the volume, and of the series in which it appears, The Handbooks of English and American Studies: Text

and Theory, to combine theoretical and conceptual perspectives that shape the field today with close analyses of texts in their historical contexts. This is precisely an attempt to understand and further develop present modes of analysis by rethinking their relationship to earlier forms of inquiry. In particular, the last few decades in literary studies have been dominated both by a strong focus on critical theory with its quick succession of highly specialized paradigms and `turns,' and by a new historicist interest in the political underpinnings of and cultural work performed by all literary texts. Both of these developments were largely reactions against the much earlier desire of the New Critics to systematically bracket biographical, social, and political concerns and to solely focus on literature's uniquely complex imaginative strategies. This handbook tries to move beyond the seeming conflict between older 'text-based' methods, and more recent 'context-based' readings and 'theory-oriented' approaches that followed in their wake. Instead, it suggests new modes of close reading that account for the unique formal and aesthetic features of nineteenth-century novels, understand these texts as deeply embedded in their own historical contexts, and are informed by contemporary theory as a direction for nineteenth-century literary scholarship in the twenty-first century.

The interest in contemporary critical perspectives that reflect their own historicity while discussing nineteenth-century novels in their respective historical contexts also translates into the two different types of contributions that are combined in this handbook. Together, they provide an overview over major issues and approaches to the nineteenth-century novel as well as an array of readings and scholarly contexts associated with specific novels, ranging from the early republic to naturalism and early modernism. The handbook begins with seven overview chapters that address key formal, thematic, and theoretical approaches, followed by twenty-two chapters dedicated to detailed discussions of individual novels that span the nineteenth century. Both parts are meant to complement one another in the sense that the chapters on specific approaches also discuss key novels in quite some detail, while each of the

chapters on individual novels foregrounds how different approaches yield different readings. More importantly, both types of chapters also tell and retell the history of the nineteenth-century American novel with different emphases: whether they focus on sentimentalism or [The Portrait of a Lady](#), they always link new questions that have been long in the making to a seemingly familiar but unstable body of texts, in ways that present most recent developments in the field with an eye to their historical dimensions.

First, the seven overview essays — on sentimentalism, romance and the gothic, realism and naturalism, race and citizenship, media and print culture, transnationalism and transculturation nature and the environment - provide a representative selection of core approaches to the American novel in the nineteenth century, while addressing the time's practices of writing and reading, and broader intellectual developments from decidedly contemporary perspectives. Indeed, because literary criticism and theory came to their own in the nineteenth century - much like the novel as a genre did - many concepts and approaches that shape current scholarship in the field correspond with related nineteenth-century critical debates. For example, the chapter on "Romance and Gothic" explains these two terms' immense critical currency in contemporary scholarship on nineteenth-century novels, including recent readings that revaluate these novels' rhetoric of darkness in racial and ethnic terms, discuss their notion of terror in relation to the psychology of violence, or emphasize how narratives of home function as sites of political struggle over the relationship between individual and the nation in corporeal terms. Yet various studies from the time itself - such as Clara Reeve's The Progress of Romance (1785) or Nathaniel Hawthorn's preface to The House of the Seven Gables (1851) - already began to conceptualize the relationship between (gothic) romance and the novel in historical, transatlantic, and gender-specific terms, and the chapter demonstrates how profoundly discussions about nineteenth-century romance and gothic writing are informed by the genealogy of both concepts (Romance and Gothic).

Similarly, the overview chapter on "Realism and Naturalism" highlights how new directions in theorizing these two concepts drive much current scholarship on nineteenth-century American novels, be it in regard to the transnational, hemispheric, and transpacific aspects of certain classics, or concerning the tensions between realism and the political goals of many African American novels of the time. Such recent reconceptualizations of realism and naturalism also resonate with newer kinds of realism, from social to speculative, that have been part of American literature since the start of the twenty-first century. Still, the chapter consistently links current trends to questions that were asked of realism and naturalism in the nineteenth-century itself, perhaps most famously during the so-called `realism wars' that turned the debates among William Dean Howells, Henry James, Mark Twain and others about the formal features and social responsibilities of American novels into a public spectacle (713 Realism and Naturalism). And, to give one more example, the chapter on "Nature and Environment" demonstrates how the recent ecological turn in the humanities, inspired by a growing concern for the links between global anthropogenic climate change and the literary imagination, has enabled new readings that understand the place of plants and animals, geographical and oceanic phenomena, chemical and cosmic perspectives in nineteenth-century novels no longer in mainly symbolic terms, but as modes of negotiating concrete, material questions of nature and culture, or of human and nonhuman agency. Here, too, the chapter emphasizes how fresh approaches developed by feminist, affective, or material ecocritics revisit discussions about resource depletion, urbanization, environmental protection and animal rights that took place in the nineteenth-century itself, and that helped to bring about the novel as a genre in the first place (Nature and Environment).

Along the same lines, the other overview chapters also discuss major approaches in the study of nineteenth-century novels with an emphasis on the latest developments, yet remain firmly grounded in their history. As such, they provide a conceptual framing for the readings of individual novels that constitute the remainder of this handbook, without

aiming to be either comprehensive or conclusive. And since the overview chapters and those on specific novels are meant to complement each other, the latter, too, call attention to questions of conceptualization and periodization from different perspectives, and bring them in contact with other, equally formative concepts, themes, and generic developments. This is the case, for instance, with regionalism (discussed at length in the chapters on Jewett's The Country of the Pointed Firs and Chopin's The Awakening), sensationalism (which features prominently in the chapter on Ridge's Joaquin Murieta), historical romance and historical novel (discussed in the chapters on Cooper's The Pioneers, Child's Hobomok, and Sedgwick's Hope Leslie), the utopian novel (in the chapter on Bellamy's Looking Backward), and the war novel (in the chapter on De Forest's Miss Ravenel's Conversion and Crane's The Red Badge of Courage). Other concepts central to the study of the novel — especially race, gender, and class — have such broad relevance and application that they inform most if not all parts in this handbook and thus do not have additional dedicated overview chapters.

The twenty-two chapters that offer paradigmatic discussions of individual novels similarly emphasize recent developments while being strongly grounded in how these current approaches have evolved. This is also the idea behind these chapters' shared structure: they each begin with a historical contextualization of the novel, then provide a close reading that examines some of its signature formal and aesthetic features and plot elements in ways that highlight recent approaches in relation to earlier ones, and close with a delineation of current theoretical perspectives on the novel. This means the novels' social and political contexts, detailed analyses of the literary texts themselves, and the engagement of specific theoretical discourses speak to one another in each individual chapter. The choice of novels, too, is grounded in the conviction that there are important lines of connection between these particular novels' historical significance and the current cultural moment. With the overall number of chapters being necessarily limited, the handbook brings together novels that have been canonized as classic

American novels and for whom newer approaches have continuously enabled new understandings (such as The Scarlet Letter, Moby-Dick, Uncle Tom's Cabin and Huckleberry Finn) with novels that have been added to the canon more recently (such as William Wells Brown's Clotel, Martin Delany's Blake, John Rollin Ridge's Joaquin Murieta, Lydia Maria Child's Hobomok, Catharine Sedgwick's Hope Leslie, or Louisa May Alcott's Little Women). A number of novels were included for their specific relevance to the development of the genre. Charles Brockden Brown's Wieland is a case in point here: Brown is widely considered to be the first professional author in the US; his novel — published in 1798 — shapes a general sense of beginning in the nineteenth-century American novel and gothic romance; and it is often taught for its remarkable transatlantic imagination. Other examples were chosen for their relevance to major themes in the nineteenth-century novel, such as Elizabeth Stuart Phelps's The Silent Partner, which is included instead of her Story of Avis to give more space to issues of class and early forms of social realism.

Various novels that don't have a separate chapter are discussed in greater length in the seven conceptual chapters, where they also connect with related texts - such as Melville's Typee and Charles Brockden Brown's Arthur Mervyn and Edgar Huntly, which are discussed in the chapter on "Romance and Gothic," or Frederick Douglass's novella The Heroic Slave, discussed in the chapter on "Nature and Environment." Slave narratives, including Douglass's Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave and Harriet Jacobs's Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, which are so central to the development of the American novel regarding the intersections of race with authorship and voice, and with regional, national, and transnational identities, are discussed in the chapter on "Race and Citizenship." Overall, the novels covered in this volume were selected to provide an in-depth sense of the cultural contexts, formal specificities, and theoretical implications of the American novel in the nineteenth century. This said, they cannot represent the novels that were left out, such as Harriet E. Wilson's Our Mg, long regarded as the first novel by an African American woman,

and Frances Ellen Watkins Harper's Iola Leroy, or Shadows Uplifted, which explores both the horrors of slavery and the crisis of reconstruction; Fanny Fern's Ruth Hall, E.D.E.N. Southworth's The Hidden Hand, and other immensely popular novels of female empowerment and autonomy; or George Washington Cable's The Grandissimes: A Story of Creole Life (1880) and Stephen Crane's slum novel Maggie: A Girl of the Streets (1893). Each of these novels and their histories of reading leave a gap reminding us that no handbook can promise complete coverage of its subject, and that every such project must necessarily remain incomplete. Yet together, the chapters in this volume provide if not a comprehensive a fully-fledged and detailed account of the American novel of the nineteenth century.

Its overall combination of theoretical framing, historical contextualization, and close reading, together with its emphasis on a large number of chapters dedicated to individual novels, sets the present volume apart from existing handbooks and literary histories of the nineteenth-century American novel, but it also builds upon this earlier work. Robert Paul Lamb und G.R. Thompson's A Companion to American Fiction 1865 - 1914, for instance, provides a wide overview of "Historical Traditions and Genres" (including realism, romance, regionalism, and the short story sequence), introduces "Contexts and Themes" (from ecology and Native American Resistance to cities and class) and then focuses on a smaller number of "Major Authors." Alfred Bendixen's Companion to the American Novel, with a broader historical scope, similarly outlines "Historical Developments" and "Genres and Traditions," combined with readings of "Major Texts" from Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter to Cormac McCarthy's The Road. Gerald J. Kennedy and Leland S. Person's The American Novel to 1870 (volume 5 of The Oxford History of the Novel in English) also combines various chapters on overall concepts, influences, and themes, from "Literary Nationalism" to "Novels of Faith and Doubt," with discussions of "Leading Novelists" and "Major Novels," while the volume on the following period, Priscilla Wald and Michael A. Elliott's The American Novel, 1870-1940, consistently discusses novels in thematic and other groups, including "The

Novel and the Reconstruction Amendments," "The Religious Novel," or "The Immigrant Novel," emphasizing most recent trends. Russ Castronovo's The Oxford Handbook of Nineteenth-Century American Literature takes this further and radically abandons the attempt to structure literary history by formulating new master narratives; instead the volume collects innovative and highly specific essays within three parts that highlight contemporary transformations and are aptly titled "Shifts," "Zigzags," and "Impacts." This handbook connects with all of these approaches to periodization, emphasizing a distinctly transcultural and transhistorical dimension. Bringing together established concepts such sentimentalism, realism and naturalism with newer ones such as ecology, risk and chance (Howells, A Hazard of New Fortunes), affect and consumption (De Forest, Miss Ravenel's Conversion, Alcott, Little Women), it leaves each of these concepts and approaches flexible so as to demonstrate their malleability and open-endedness. And rather than starting out with fixed notions of what constitutes the development of the American novel, it unfolds this history in each chapter so that a multi-perspectival, multi-voiced story emerges, told from Europe and the United States.

Since the American novel is a product of the nineteenth century, this handbook, as similar volumes before it, tells a story of becoming and in so doing also provides a record of the time's massive social and political changes. This form of engaging the American nineteenth century through its novelistic imagination has very much become part of the current cultural moment. Readings of the nineteenth-century American novel continue conversations about what we mean by 'America' in a transcultural framework, and shift what we thought we knew about its literature and authors. Together, these novels manage what Whitman expressed in one of his most haunting poems, "Crossing Brooklyn Ferry" (1856): to transcend space and time. Reading the nineteenth century from the vantage point of the twenty-first, the present volume captures this fascination and participates in this ongoing double-movement. Through its contemporary resonances the contributors to this volume understand the historical

dimension as very much part of our own sense of crisis. Handbooks of literary history such as this bind together what is moving apart, trying to both construct a coherent story and questioning old limitations. The Handbook of the American Novel of the Nineteenth Century participates in this attempt, while at the same time resisting definitive geographical, national, and historical closure.

American Literature in Transition, 1960-1970 by David Wyatt [American Literature in Transition, Cambridge University Press, 9781107165397]

See Spotlight # 16: Novel America, May 2018 for other coverage of series

The decade of the 1960s has come to occupy a uniquely seductive place in both the popular and the historical imagination. While few might disagree that it was a transformative period, the United States remains divided on the question of whether the changes that occurred were for the better or for the worse. Some see it as a decade when people became more free; others as a time when people became more lost. American Literature in Transition, 1960-1970 provides the latest scholarship on this time of fateful turning as seen through the eyes of writers as various as Toni Morrison, Gary Snyder, Michael Herr, Amiri Baraka, Joan Didion, Louis Chu, John Rechy, and Gwendolyn Brooks. This collection of essays by twenty-five scholars offers analysis and explication of the culture wars surrounding the period, and explores the enduring testimonies left behind by its literature.

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PART I MODES

Excerpt: A year before Jacques Derrida delivered his first lecture in the United States, Frank Kermode accepted the Mary Flexner Lectureship at Bryn Mawr College. The honor is "given to an American or foreign scholar highly distinguished in the field of the `Humanities,' using the term `Humanities' in its broadest connotation."' In the second decade of the twenty-first century — given the current "crisis" in the Humanities — there is something almost quaint in the Bryn Mawr formulation. In his six lectures, Kermode took it as his task to reveal such crises as recurrent rather than unique. Entitled "The Long Perspectives," the lectures were published in 1967 as The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction.

Kermode begins with the question of where we find ourselves in time. Are we nearing its promised end? The "growing sense of apocalypse in American life"' of which Norman Mailer writes in The Armies of the Night (1968) is not properly Kermode's subject, but he does deal with the history of the idea of apocalypse and our many related "fictions of the End." Within this tradition Kermode discerns a shift away from fictions imagining a literal end of the world and toward a suspicion of any paradigm proposing to impose such a shape on time. As mid-twentieth-century persons, Kermode maintains, we

live in "the middest," at best, perhaps, in an epoch "of transition," and because "we move from transition to transition, we may suppose that we exist in no intelligible relation to the past, and no predictable relation to the future."

Is there anything that can deliver us from this sense of perpetual ongoing transition, of living in T. S. Eliot's "waste sad time / Stretching before and after?"4 Why not break up the time into a series of decades, a convention surely artificial but one that is useful in helping us to mark out the days?

It will not do, my reader might object, to introduce a volume entitled American Literature in Transition by throwing into question the bounding outlines of the project. But this is precisely what is called for, especially with the volume in the series dedicated to the 1960s. No decade in the twentieth century comes to us more shrouded in myth; the two words "The Sixties" trigger in many minds an autonomic response. Literature itself, and the study of it, Kermode argues, assists in clearing away such reflexive motions of mind — the reversion to myths about that "time" — by replacing them with more flexible and adaptive fictions.

After demonstrating how suspicious we have become of fictions of "the End," and thereby of our corresponding fictions of "the Beginning," Kermode proceeds to argue for the efficacy of some sort of time reconciling fictions. They offer us a "comfort." Here is Kermode at his best: "in `making sense' of the world we still feel a need, harder than ever to satisfy because of an accumulated skepticism, to experience that concordance of beginning, middle and end which is the essence of our explanatory fictions."

Words like "need," "satisfy," and "fiction" reveal Kermode's debt to Wallace Stevens, and it is Stevens, more than any other modern writer, who presides over Kermode's project. Stevens works for Kermode because he offers his fictions not for their truth but for their usefulness; as he writes in the Necessary Angel, poetry "helps people to live their lives." Stevens was resolute in declaring that we must remain self-aware about the provisional status of our ongoing attempts at poesis, our fictive makings. We do not offer them our unquestioning assent but approach them rather by way of "the

nicer knowledge of / Belief, that what it believes in is not true." The temporary authority we may grant to our fictions is all a matter of attitude — hence the distinction, implicit in Stevens and explicit in Kermode, between myths and fictions. "Fictions can degenerate into myths whenever they are not consciously held to be fictive ... Fictions are for finding things out, and they change as the needs of sense-making change. Myths are the agents of stability, fictions the agents of change. Myths call for absolute, fictions for conditional assent."' One fiction routinely projected onto the 1960s, a fiction in some quarters degenerating into a myth, is of its having been a unique and largely unhappy interval of crisis and change.

Whether contributors to this volume began a career in the study of literature in the 1960s or belong to a younger generation, as many do, it is unlikely that any of us have been untouched by this rhetoric of crisis. Only one year after Kermode drew attention to the enduring appeal of the "concept of crisis," the dynamic was given further elaboration in a lecture delivered at the University of Texas by Paul de Man. The lecture was published in 1967 and appeared as "Crisis and Criticism" in de Man's 1971 Blindness and Insight.

Attempting in 1967 to account for "the crisis-aspect" of contemporary criticism, the outward symptom of which is "the incredible swiftness with which often conflicting tendencies succeed each other," de Man concludes that there is "nothing particularly new" about the phenomenon and that again and again in the history of thought "the notion of crisis and that of criticism are very closely linked." De Man is quite skilled at dehistoricizing any subject he touches: his undersong is, "It was ever thus." And yet his felt need to address a current so-called crisis is itself a sign of something deeply embedded in the historical moment out of which he writes. It is a moment in which the old confidences and practices about the work of criticism have given way to a profound skepticism. The skepticism arises out of a newly emergent consensus about the activity we call "signification."

Ferdinand de Saussure may have asserted as early as 1911 the "arbitrary" relation of the signifier to the signified, but very few literary critics, either on

the Continent or in the United States, were speaking about the slippage between word and thing before the 1960s. It is only literature that has always known this, as de Man proceeds to argue.

Literature, unlike everyday language, begins on the far side of this knowledge; it is the only form of the language free from the fallacy of unmediated expression. All of us know this, although we know it in the misleading way of a wishful assertion of the opposite. Yet the truth emerges in the foreknowledge we possess of the true nature of literature when we refer to it as fiction.

And so we come round again to Kermode's word, despite de Man having stripped it of Kermode's accompanying terms, words like "comfort," "concord," and "need." Whether we find ourselves drawn to Kermode's affirmative or de Man's deconstructive sensibility, their virtually overlapping efforts encourage us to think of crisis as more a fiction than a fact.

At the end of his life and the end of his century, John Dryden took a long look back.

> Thy Chase had a Beast in View;
> Thy Wars brought nothing about;
> Thy Lovers were all untrue.
> Tis well an Old Age is out,
> And time to begin a New.

The fantasy being expressed is of a new and more promising start, even a clean break. As Dryden well knew, however, having lived through a monarchy, its beheading, a Restoration, and then a further Glorious Revolution, one age never goes out before another begins. When it comes to ages, all history offers, especially literary history, is a continual series of refrains and overlaps. Decades are a construction of the calendar, not indicators of distinct eras.

And yet the fiction of the determining decade can prove useful in giving a manageable shape to "the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history," a condition Eliot saw as belonging to his, the twentieth, century. Of the decades of the century, the sixties have come to occupy a uniquely seductive place in both the popular and the historical imagination; former TV anchor men compete with Pulitzer Prize-winning historians to give the interval significant form. It is a

time "when America turned," to use Lieutenant John Kerry's words from his 1971 speech before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. While few might disagree that a turning did occur, the United States remains divided on the question of whether it was a turning for the better or for the worse.

The sixties were, arguably, the transitional decade of the "American Century." Yet a transition from what to what? How does one mark out and distinguish all that came before from all that followed? Michael Herr restates the problem instead of answering the question.

You couldn't find two people who agreed about when it began, how could you say when it began going off? Mission intellectuals like 1954 as the reference date; if you saw as far back as War II and the Japanese occupation you were practically a historical visionary. "Realists" said that it began for us in 1961, and the common run of Mission flak insisted on 1965, post-Tonkin Resolution, as though all the killing that had gone before wasn't really war. Anyway, you couldn't use standard measures to date the doom.

Dispatches here engages in an anguished response to the question of when the Vietnam War really began. As perhaps the crucial event of the American 1960s, the war was to offer a remarkable challenge to the storytelling imagination. Without a defining beginning point — the convenience of a Pearl Harbor — there was no way to contain the war within a convincing narrative. And as the decade wore on and the war continued, any desire for "closure" was as frustrated among those who believed in fighting the war as it was among those who fought to stop it.

For George Herring, the sixties were a mere interval in America's Longest War. He dates the doom as beginning in 1950 and as ending in 1975. The sixties were certainly the heart of it, with the largest American casualty rates occurring in 1968 and 1969. Then Nixon's "Vietnamization" set in, and the troops began, slowly, to come home.

By the time he completed Dispatches in 1977, Herr had come to see the war as the new American ghost. Like Morrison's "rememory," it was a past the future was destined to bump into, especially when

least looking for it. What Herr foresaw was that the war would remain present even when appearing to be absent, a phenomenon on evidence in a book published in the year Herr began his own. The word "Vietnam" appears only a few times in Joan Didion's 1968 Slouching Towards Bethlehem. But the war is felt to be there in the creeping dread she feels in Death Valley on the night the diver goes down in search of a missing body and comes up raving about "underground nuclear testing," there in the sorrow she feels in the graveyard on Oahu commemorating an earlier war, and there in the very "atomization" of American society she announces at the beginning to be her subject. Herr and Didion sense that something has begun that is not going to stop as America chose, perhaps once and for all, to commit itself to fighting perpetual war on behalf of a perpetually receding peace, a turning Robert Lowell predicted in 1967.

> peace to our children when they fall
> in small war on the heels of small
> war — until the end of time
> to police the earth, a ghost
> orbiting forever lost
> in our monotonous sublime.

Thus, "until the end of time," Lowell writes, as if the consequences of the present crisis are to prove infinite. Vietnam is only the most salient example of an experience associated with the sixties that had an end as hard to imagine as its beginning was difficult to locate. To cite another example: the civil rights movement began, of course, well before Rosa Parks refused in 1955 to give up her seat on the bus and could be said to have its beginnings in the first slave revolts in the New World. Cresting during the mid-sixties in the great marches and speeches and acts of legislation occurring in 1964 and 1965, the movement promised to deliver the United States to a post-racial future. Then that future unfolded into one in which, fifty years later, the same old battles still needed to be fought, at least in the hearts of men, as the nation suffered through the killings of its black citizens in Sanford, Florida, in Ferguson, Missouri, in Baltimore, Maryland, and at a church in Charleston, South Carolina.

It is a difficult thing to believe in the reality of change when faced with the persistence of hardened attitudes. And yet a number of the essays in this book argue that because of the sixties, real change did happen. To those who continue to view the period as a hapless regression or a turning gone wrong, Toni Morrison has made an eloquent rejoinder: "Killing the Sixties, turning that decade into an aberration, an exotic malady ripe with excess, drugs and disobedience is designed to bury its central features — emancipation, generosity, acute political awareness and a sense of shared and mutually responsible society." By contrast, historian Gerard J. DeGroot can dismiss the sixth decade of the twentieth century as "an era of magnificent futility." Only the sixth decade of the previous century — and they were both decades of civil war — continues to evoke equally passionate disagreements.

The decade of the sixties is unlikely any time soon to disentangle itself from metaphors of crisis. For Didion, it was the time of the "Second Coming," and she turned to Yeats's poem — itself written in response to the Russian Revolution — for guiding inspiration. Mailer, marching in 1967 across the Potomac, smells wood smoke in the air, the smell of the old, true America, and senses himself to be stepping "through some crossing in the reaches of space between this moment, the French Revolution, and the Civil War." In his very choice of title James Baldwin calls down a biblical apocalypse in The Fire Next Time.

In searching for adequate fictions about the past, for the words "crisis" and "apocalypse," we might consider substituting words like "endings" and "beginnings." These, at least, can sometimes be pinned down. By the end of the sixties, the great moderns, except for Marianne Moore and Ezra Pound, had departed the scene. Hemingway and Loy died in 1961, Faulkner in 1962, Frost and Williams in 1963, Eliot in 1965, and Hughes and Toomer in 1967. Even the word "modern" itself experienced a kind of death. While working toward my Ph.D. at UC Berkeley, I befriended a fellow graduate student who devoted considerable effort searching for a term with which to label the new writing by Barth, Barthelme, Heller, Pynchon, and Vonnegut. She decided to go with "black

humor." It would be a decade before work combining extreme verbal effects with flattened affect became widely spoken of as "postmodern."

Other important endings occurring in the sixties include the legal end of Jim Crow, the legal end of an old quota immigration system and its replacement in 1965 by a more inclusive arrangement, the beginning of the end of most, although not all, non-coeducational colleges and universities, the end of the dominance of the city with the out-movement to the suburbs, the end of the postwar economic boom and the peaking of the value of the minimum wage in real terms in 1968, and the end of the canonical and its diffusion into the multicultural.

As for beginnings, in literature, one might point to the efflorescence of the hyphenated literatures: Asian-American, Native-American, Mexican-American. None of these traditions began in the sixties, but the willingness to attend to them and to move them into the curriculum did. In 1968, a group of scholars launched an enterprise resulting in The Heath Anthology, offering a new configuration of writers meant "to reconnect literature and its study with the society and culture of which it is fundamentally a part." "Context" became the new watchword.

Other beginnings, sometimes described as liberations, were more strictly political. Supreme Court decisions in 1965, 1967, and 1973, along with the founding of the National Organization for Women (NOW) in 1966, opened new possibilities in the lives of women. Gay liberation can trace a dramatic moment of inception to the Stonewall riots of 1969. Even the natural world required liberating, and the modern environmental movement, with roots reaching back to the founding of the Sierra Club in 1892 and the Audubon Society in 1905, can be dated not only to the passage of the Water Quality Act of 1963 but to the publication of a book, Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, in 1962.

No wonder the sixties were the decade in which the study of literature became openly politicized. When Toni Morrison said, "All good art is political," she appeared to be voicing support for this way of looking at things. But, as she added, art has to be

"beautiful and political at the same time." Morrison's "and" speaks to the abiding tension in literary studies between the celebration of form and the unpacking of content.

In her 1964 "Against Interpretation," Susan Sontag argued for this divide as an inevitable consequence of a mimetic theory of art. The theory, as Sontag understands it, places art "in need of defense" against the charges that it is either a lie (Plato) or merely therapeutic (Aristotle). It is the need to produce a defense of art from these charges, Sontag continues, "which gives birth to the odd vision by which something we have learned to call `form' is separated off from something we have learned to call `content,' and to the well-intentioned move which makes content essential and form accessory."

For Sontag, interpretation has become the villain of the story. "What the overemphasis on the idea of content entails is the perennial, never consummated project of interpretation. And, conversely, it is the habit of approaching works of art in order to interpret them that sustains the fancy that there really is such a thing as the content of a work or art." In order to counter the "open aggressiveness" of interpretation toward the literary work, Sontag calls for a criticism "that dissolves considerations of content into those of form." As practitioners of such an approach, she recommends Erwin Panofsky, Northrop Frye, Roland Barthes, Walter Benjamin, and the "best essays" in Eric Auerbach's Mimesis.

Sontag's essay anticipates the explosive growth of interpretative communities occurring during the closing decades of the twentieth century and may even seem to presage the publication, in 2015, of a volume entitled, The Limits of Critique. We have even been recently admonished that "Context Stinks! Despite such objections, the content-oriented and contextualizing critics appear to have prevailed, if one can judge from the syllabi in major departments of English as well as the titles of most works of academic criticism. Many of the chapter titles in this volume are content driven; to approach literature as if it is about some historical issue, social practice, or political institution has become almost habitual.

The sixties were the decade in which the contextualizing began. To speak of women's literature or black literature or gay literature was immediately to evoke some sort of ground out of which the imagination had sprung. But in the sixties the desire to assert such defining and constraining categories of value was passionately expressed rather than theoretically sophisticated. The theory came later and assumed the name of the "New Historicism." Now the limits of this approach have themselves been put into question. Such turnings upon prevailing critical practice are not only familiar but also necessary; any long perspective on the history of how we read will reveal a continual swinging between the attending to content and the attending to form.

The question remains: which novels and plays and poems and works of nonfiction deserve to make their way 'onto anyone's reading list? In answering this question, content alone will not serve us; only when its content has been rendered "beautiful," to use Morrison's word, does a piece of writing call forth our lasting attention and vie for inclusion in the canon. As Eliot argued in 1919, it is only the "new (the really new) work of art" that permanently enters tradition and, in entering, alters it. And the "new," Eliot believes, can only be new if it marks an innovation in literary form.

I have divided the chapters in this volume into three sections: Modes, Forces, and Movements. The opening chapters on recognized kinds of utterances draw attention to the power of literary forms to persist and to renew themselves. Once it has been established that writers in the sixties succeeded in making it new, the volume then takes a more topical approach, one in which the shaping power of events and institutions is given greater attention. The volume ends by turning to questions of how writers succeed in grouping themselves together in order to achieve social change.

Contributors to this volume come to the form-content debate from their own unique angles of vision. As the general editor of the volume, I have made my position clear but have not sought to achieve consensus on the question of just what was, in the American 1960s, truly new. The result is a gathering of essays indicative of the possible range of responses to the question of what constitutes a compelling and enduring work of art. <>

[A Field Guide to the English Clergy: A Compendium of Diverse Eccentrics, Pirates, Prelates and Adventurers; All Anglican, Some Even Practising](#) by Fergus Butler-Gallie MA (Oxon) BA (Cantab), Clerk in Holy Orders [Oneworld Publications, 9781786074416]

Judge not, lest ye be judged. This timeless wisdom has guided the Anglican Church for hundreds of years, and has fostered a certain tolerance of eccentricity among its members. The Reverend Robert Hawker invented the Harvest Festival, but he also excommunicated a cat for mousing on Sundays. Bishop Lancelot Fleming would commandeer Navy helicopters when he was late for service. The Reverend John Allington - "Mad Jack," to his friends - wore a leopard skin instead of a surplice, and insisted on being carried around in a coffin. A Field Guide to the English Clergy celebrates the cream of the crop: the drinkers (and publicans), the inventors, the lion tamers, the suicidal missionaries, and even one piratical Archbishop. But despite their sometimes bizarre behavior, many in the clergy saw the church as their true calling. After all, who cares if you're wearing red high heels when there are souls to be saved?

It will not escape the eagle-eyed reader that this is a compendium of eccentrics that features exclusively clergy of the male sex. Here, I'm afraid, your humble narrator can but plead cowardice. It is not that there is a shortage of eccentric, successful or nutty women, or, indeed, women renowned for their sense of adventure or love of good living currently in Holy Orders. However, the Church of England's regrettable tardiness in ordaining women to the Priesthood means that most of these potential subjects are still alive and, being women of great ingenuity as well as. great godliness, many have access to excellent lawyers and some (particularly those in rural ministry) to unlicensed firearms. In light of this, a decision was made to restrict this collection to clergy who have shuffled off to a Better Place. It is to be hoped that the large numbers of women clergy who undoubtedly warrant a place in this collection will not feel too

aggrieved by the author's decision to exclude the quick from his collection. Confident that God will continue to call as many manifestly strange women to the Priesthood as men, the author looks forward to a tome being produced in the not too distant future, replete with tales of these remarkable Priests; produced, however, by an individual braver (or with better legal representation) than he.

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-a Glossary

Excerpt: Eccentrics

the way of man is froward and strange' proverbs 21:8

The archetype of the dotty Anglican Vicar is one with enduring appeal. Whether the imagined parson of a half-remembered past or the character who gives a

touch of anecdotal variety to the drudgery of parochial existence, a clergyman with unusual habits is a stock figure in the English cultural lexicon. The secret of the clerical eccentric's longevity in the popular imagination (long after it appears to have abandoned many of the other appendages of cultural Christianity) is that he is essentially a hybrid figure, standing at the crossroads of two rich seams of public strangeness. Put simply, to be a clergyman is eccentric enough, but to be English on top of that is almost overkill.

The parson is recognisably part of the broader tradition of English eccentricity. Quite what it is in the English character that has engendered such a predisposition is unclear — perhaps it is a legacy of those who seek to disrupt a culture historically bound by complex rules of etiquette and propriety, or maybe it's just a result of people trying to

entertain themselves amid the perpetual drizzle. Either way, whether collecting curios, walking oddly or fostering inappropriate relationships with animals, the English have carved a niche as a nation with a streak of eccentricity running right through national life.

The Church of England is, of course, no exception. With its stated aim of ministering in every community and its presence at most of the stranger rituals of national life - from conducting coronations to judging competitions based around amusingly shaped vegetables - the Church, and its clergy, can justifiably claim to be the warp on which the mad tapestry of England has been woven.

Priests are part of a much older Christian vintage: that of the 'Holy Fool'. These were figures, particularly prevalent in the Eastern Orthodox tradition, who, through their odd behaviour, are said to make the rest of us consider where the real foolishness lies - namely in the ways of the world. The Holy Fool might seem strange in their behaviour to us, but, so the tradition says, it is in fact our ways that are strange. There is a concept, going back to the Gospels, of 'the Holy' being so inconceivable to limited human reasoning that it must appear to us as madness. It is a tradition that makes contemporary counterculture look positively mainstream. The great clerical eccentrics were undoubtedly considered to be insane or, at the very least, obsessive, and yet they often proved to be effective communicators of an 'other-worldly' holiness. It is partly the appeal of this, and partly the goodly heritage of old-fashioned Englishness that gives the eccentric Vicar his enduring appeal - he treads the thin line between prophet and clown.

The men whose lives are detailed in this section represent a mere tasting menu of eccentricity plucked from the rich à la carte selection of clerical strangeness down the ages. There was, alas, no room for figures such as the Cornish incumbent who was so prone to wandering off during services that he had to be chained to a communion rail by the ladies of the congregation. Nor was there space for the Lincolnshire clergyman who, fancying himself an amateur surgeon, got an elephant drunk on ale and tried to dissect it. However, the motley collection of mermaid-impersonating, steam-roller

driving, bicycle-stealing clerics whose lives are detailed in the following pages are the cream of the crop, glorious in their eccentricities and their folly.

The eccentric Vicar is not, however, a figment of a half-imagined past. It might be the continued legacy of the Holy Fool or it might be something in the (Holy) water, but the Church of England is still replete with `froward and strange' clergy to this day. While they are unlikely to follow in the footsteps of their forbears and urinate on you or force you to play leapfrog, they will undoubtedly be interesting, idiosyncratic figures - it rather comes with the territory. And so, dear reader, if you seek the great clerical eccentric, that fabled mid-point between Old English `character' and Old Testament prophet, my advice is to look among the pews; they'll almost certainly be waiting for you there.

Nutty Professors
'Much learning doth make thee mad' acts 26:24

The world of academia is an indisputably strange one. If one spends prolonged periods of time dealing with theories, it is perhaps inevitable that the actual skills required for the practice of life become a little rusty. When this general intellectual disengagement is combined with clerical otherworldliness, then a peculiar type of creature is born. Those clergy who spent their careers not only in the public practice of religion but also in pursuit of often staggeringly arcane intellectual goals are the subjects of this chapter.

It will be noted that a sizeable proportion of these idiosyncratic individuals have links to the universities of Oxford and Cambridge. These ancient institutions were both founded with the explicit aim of training clergy for the English Church. Given that both universities owe their very existence to the Church, it is hardly surprising that they have strong clerical traditions to this day. They are, for all their vaunted academic success, eminently strange places. Their colleges are fortress-like structures where teaching, eating, drinking, fighting, fornicating, indeed just about anything you can think of, all take place on top of one another. They have their own recondite traditions, in dress and in behaviour. They run on vast feasts washed down by wine from some of the finest cellars in the Western world. It is no surprise that these incubators of intellect should produce a steady stream of figures for whom the 'real world' is as familiar as the surface of Mars. Both universities are replete with tales of weird and wacky dons - from the history fellow who insisted on giving his tutorials while wedged in his bath to the academic who used to mark his place in library books with bacon sandwiches. The single-minded pursuit of academic brilliance, combined with the unique environment of college life, is a combination that produces some of the most thoroughgoing eccentrics on record. That said, it should be remembered that, for most of their history, Oxford and Cambridge were not the academic hothouses they aspire to be today; they were more a holding pen for the nation's gilded youth and, crucially, the only place where an individual could train for Holy Orders. There were, undoubtedly, a number of figures who lost whole years in libraries, but there were just as many who lost whole years in libation as well.

That said, both universities are now engaged in the dual (and inherently interlinked) processes of modernisation and monetisation. If the world of vintages and Virgil is forever to give way to political concerns and plywood furniture, then Oxbridge's celebrated eccentrics may find themselves squeezed out from their natural habitat by a brave new generation of management consultants. Yet the oddballs of Oxford and characters of Cambridge, lay and ordained, have not breathed their last just yet and, if one visits either university, it is still possible to see, wandering about in an air of dazed confusion at the very concept of reality, the heirs to the tradition of academic strangeness detailed in this section. As for the clergy of this section, some remained in that rarefied university environment to vandalise foliage or rifle through ashtrays, while others took their high-minded eccentricity out with them to be inflicted on unfortunate parishioners, producing tomes on subjects as diverse as werewolves and pornographic plants. A certain type of ageing firebrand would maintain that the pursuit of knowledge and the life of faith are inherently at odds but, if the lives of the following show

anything, dear reader, it is that they are both as odd as each other.

Bon Viveurs

Go thy way and eat thy bread with joy and drink thy wine with a merry heart' Ecclesiastes 9:7

Given that the central rite of the Christian religion is based around the communal consumption of food and drink, it is hardly surprising that some clergy feel attracted to both. Indeed, the pervading conceptualisation of Heaven found in the Bible and in Church tradition is of an enormous banquet, and many have taken it as no coincidence that the first miracle performed by Christ was the turning of water into wine at the wedding feast at Cana, crucially after the revellers were 'well drunk'. An appreciation of the finer things is not limited to life, but might be enjoyed for eternity as well. Of course, when we speak of hedonism in this context we are not dealing with a scone too many at a village fête or sneaking an extra glass of sherry after evensong. Rather, we speak of unabashed gourmands, slathering every meal in double cream and proper, gut-busting boozehounds, who thought nothing of drinking their own bodyweight on a Saturday night before conducting worship a few hours later. The definition of bon viveur employed here is not limited to those who took seriously the biblical command to 'eat and drink' but also those who followed the command to be `merry'; this chapter contains its fair share of priestly playboys, thrill seekers and mischief makers as well as `gluttons and winebibbers.

The clergy in this section are a veritable smorgasbord of characters who, having reconciled themselves to their place in the vale of earthly sorrow, decided to make the best of it and enjoy life to its full. They are only a selection; there was, sadly, no room here for the parson who spent so much time in the saddle that he constructed three hunting lodges in corners of his parish to save him riding all the way home to get a drink, nor the senior Cambridge cleric who was admonished by the Archbishop of Canterbury himself for his bibulous ways, only to die four days into teetotalism. St Irenaeus, an otherwise somewhat stern Bishop in the second century, taught that 'the glory of God is man fully alive', and whether that

fullness of life manifested in hours spent gallivanting around the countryside on horseback, chugging vats of brandy, or meticulously planning intricate menus, each of the figures in the section that follows can be said to have followed the Bishop's dictum. While an admirable tradition of asceticism and self-denial is also a part of the Church's historic inheritance, these clergymen show that a full-throttled, calorie-laden, champagne-fuelled bender is just as much in line with the Christian tradition as any monastic rigour.

The author would humbly suggest that one of the reasons we have such an enduring fascination with the particular sort of people who enjoy themselves, regardless of the consequences, is that they invoke a sort of jealousy among those of us who can't quite bring ourselves to be so unapologetically carefree. These individuals were unencumbered by giving a damn about their waistlines, their livers, their personal safety or, perhaps most importantly, what anybody else thought, in the firm belief that still better things were to come in the hereafter. Consequently they felt able to have the sort of adventures that common sense ordinarily constrains us from indulging in. These, therefore, are Priests who provoke a certain armchair envy and rectors whose lack of rectitude we secretly admire. They are, in short, vicars who enable us to live vicariously through their rambunctious enjoyment of all that the Good Lord had blessed them with. Perhaps, even if we are not minded to follow their example by volume (indeed, professional medical opinion would strongly advise against such a course), we might at least take to heart something of their carefree joie de vivre and `drink our wine with a merry heart'.

Prodigal Sons

God bath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise and hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the mighty I Corinthians 1:27

Quite what is meant by `success' in a clerical careeris not particularly easy to pin down. Unlike their secular brethren, clergy are supposed to have an eye on the long game - by which is meant eternity. As such, determining which Priests are or are not `successful' would require an unreasonably intimate knowledge of the beyond. While a

clergyman might choose to count heads on a Sunday or even count the coins on the collection plate, it is pretty clear that mere numbers cannot be a measure for `success' when one's primary battleground is not the spreadsheet but the soul.

The figures in this section are neither hardnosed bruisers who fought their way to prominence, but nor are they necessarily meek and mild. However, whether as a result of rising through the ranks of the Church as Bishops or Archbishops, becoming the most renowned wit of their day, accidentally being acclaimed as a sporting icon or, through quiet heroism, saving thousands of lives, each could be considered a `success' in one way or another. They can all be considered `Prodigal Sons'; figures who, like the son in the parable in St Luke's Gospel, ended up fêted against the odds. Very often their circumstances, early lives or personalities were less than auspicious and yet, in the end, they found themselves celebrated for one reason or another. In some cases their prodigal status manifested itself in terms of professional preferment or administrative efficiency despite manifest oddity or disinterest, but in others it has been necessary to defer to the old adage vox populi, vox Dei. Congregations are, after all, the people who see clergy week in week out; if they can't tell clerical saint from sinner, then no one can.

As befits biographies of those who all (ostensibly) believed in the Resurrection, no distinction is made between success in life and success post-mortem - while some climbed the dizzy heights of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, several of these clergy departed this life forgotten, only for their impact to become clear later. They were all individuals who, in any other career, would have been disastrous; indeed, in a secular context many would be considered unemployable. From their idleness to their inappropriate comments, their strange habits to their downright stubbornness, these are men who would, according to conventional wisdom, be considered weak and foolish in equal measure. And yet, for all their failings, they all made their mark on the world - some in ways that affected millions, others through just one life changed for the better.

Regrettably, the leading clergy of today no longer aspire to win the Polar Medal, blame social democracy for weak tea or shout `BALDOCK' at random intervals.

They are engaged in chairing meetings, managing figures and studying for MBAs. Typically, just as the reputation of corporate jargon and practice reaches its lowest ebb in the secular world, the Church of England has sought to embrace it with open arms. As such, unlikely as these successes might have seemed in the past, they would be nigh on impossible now. Political changes in the last few decades mean that the Church now appoints its own senior figures without input from anyone else. As a consequence, the generations of lunatics, curmudgeons and visionaries inflicted on the Church in either strokes of bureaucratic genius or as the result of elaborate civil service jokes have, regrettably, come to an end.

There will always be eccentrics, rogues, bon viveurs and bizarre intellectuals among the clergy, but it is difficult to see a future for the brave and brilliant, but often irascible or insane individuals of the sort detailed in this section. They have been sacrificed to the idol of earnestness, to the cult of taking-things-seriously. The result of this is not that the Church has won back some great lost dignity but, by fearing the difficult or eccentric, has diminished her pool of talent and made herself seem less human, ironically rendering the institution even more ridiculous than before. It is always sensible to remember, dear reader, that God (like many of the characters described in the following pages) does appear to have a sense of humour after all.

Rouges
Beware they which come ín sheep's clothing,. but inwardly are ravening wolves' St Matthew 7:15

The Victorian era was one in which, if people could get things wrong, they generally did. Whether it was their preparations for the Second Boer War or their firmly held belief that the common cold could be cured by the application of Bovril, the denizens of the nineteenth century were masters of misconception. Perhaps the most egregious of their errors was the belief, regrettably passed on to consecutive generations, that Christianity is about being 'meek and mild'.

Even a cursory glance at the Victorian hymn gives a view of the Christian faith so sickly sweet that one runs the risk of developing diabetes. Much contemporaneous theology has, in other guises, sought to perpetuate the view that Christians are called to be grinningly optimistic about life, as well as obsequiously friendly to all and sundry. The concept that one of the most complex and influential thought systems in the history of humanity can be boiled down to `being nice' was not only a monumental oversimplification but it also, more regrettably, almost put an end to the tradition of cutting Priests out of mad, bad and dangerous cloth. Vicars, as the public face of Christianity, had to be the epitome of the mild stereotype — gentle, inoffensive, and, ideally, boring to boot.

Those in the eighteenth century, as the figures in this section will show, held no such preconceptions. From piratical Archbishops to trespassing parsons, the Georgian Church was replete with big characters for whom a calling to Priesthood meant a subsidy for various adventures. If someone had told them that `Jesus wants you for a sunbeam', they might have found themselves on the receiving end of physical violence. Indeed, theirs was a ministry totally compatible with a life of crime.

Some of the figures in the following section were emphatically bad, the `wolves in sheep's clothing' warned of by the Bible. Others ended up living lives of roguery and adventure not because of any great rejection of the precepts of faith but, rather, because they were foolish or vain, or, in a couple of cases, simply had a low boredom threshold. These rogues serve as a reminder of a fact that is often forgotten, not least by Priests themselves, namely that the clergy are people, too. Despite the need to step out each Sunday and play the saint, they are prone to the lust, laziness and downright ludicrousness that constitutes the human condition. They are just as likely to inflate their own importance, have their hearts broken, or collect an enormous stash of French pornography (i.e. the Reverend Dr Edward Drax Free) as any other person. While they are called to 'have their conversation in heaven' they are squarely rooted on earth during their ministry.

This inherent tension can sometimes be creative — many are the saints or campaigners who have turned their inner turmoil into definitive action. Yet it can also be disastrous.

This section is not made up of the well-trodden exemplars of St Mary Magdalene, Thomas Becket or Martin Luther King but instead tells of chancers, wrong 'uns and adrenaline junkies who also happened to be called to serve as Priests. So, cast your tea cosy aside and meet some of the raunchiest, raciest, and most reckless vicars in the Church's history... <>

Confessions by Augustine of Hippo [Our Sunday Visitor, 9781681922843]

A nice set of gift editions bound with sturdy cloth.
Text of the Confessions and "Augustine's Testimony Concerning the Confessions," are adapted from the translation of Albert C. Outler, Ph.D., D.D., available through the Christian Classics Ethereal Library. First published in 1955. (

 In Confessions, Augustine tells the story of his sinful youth and conversion to Christianity. He describes his ascent from a humble farm in North Africa to a prestigious post in Milan, his struggle against his own sexuality, his renunciation of secular ambition and marriage, and the recovery of his faith. Augustine's concerns are often strikingly contemporary, and the confessional mode he invented can be seen in writings today. Includes an introduction written by Joseph Pearce.

Saint Augustine of Hippo by Michael R. Heinlein
The complex and multifaceted life of Saint Augustine has an enduring witness and universal appeal for those who seek to follow Christ. The Confessions is his autobiography, covering the early years of his life through middle age. We learn a great deal about his struggles in the battle for grace and virtue, as well as the difficulties associated with searching for the truth in the midst of secular, sinful influences.

Augustine's whole life can be understood as a quest for love and truth. Born in Thagaste in northern Africa, in 354, Augustine pursued a classical

education. Studying rhetoric in Carthage, he fell head over heels in love with wisdom in the study of philosophy, particularly of the Greeks. He desired to share what he learned and became a teacher of rhetoric and philosophy, establishing schools and holding various professorships in Carthage, Rome, and Milan. But while his professional success increased, his interior life became more and more dissatisfying.

Exposed to Christianity as a child through his mother and her deep faith, Augustine was not baptized or committed to the Christian faith until he was much older. Before becoming a Christian, he even spent time involved with the heretical Manichaeans. His experience with the sect left him thirsting for more.

Like so many of us, Augustine walked a long and winding road that led him finally to embrace the Faith. This meant reconciling his previous life — in which he even fathered a child out of wedlock and named him after the pagan god Baal — with a new life in Christ.

Augustine models for us what conversion looks like: it is a gradual turning toward and moving ever closer to Christ, but it is never turning back. For Augustine, conversion to Christianity even meant resigning his professorship in rhetoric. He wanted to live a good life, but because he knew it was only possible with God's help, he gave God his all and left behind his worldly life in search of an eternal one. He was baptized in Milan, along with his son, by Saint Ambrose, at the Easter Vigil in 387.

One of the most important moments on his path to conversion was when he heard a mysterious child's voice summon him to "take and read" the Bible. Opening the Scriptures at random, fulfilling what he took to be a divine command, he came upon Saint Paul's exhortation to the Romans about how the whole Gospel is aimed at making believers and shaping their behavior. In one of the most poignant and quoted passages of his autobiography, Augustine describes the beauty of finding the God who was with him throughout his meandering search, recognizing the peace God alone can give in response to our every longing.

One of the most important aspects of his conversion was the continual and persistent support of his mother, Saint Monica. Her greatest desire was to pass on the Faith to those she loved, and this became particularly obvious when Augustine was ill as a boy, and her husband forbade his baptism. Monica was able to see her husband enter the Church at the time of his death. She followed Augustine in his many travels before his conversion and constantly prayed for him. Of course, she knew that her son was ambling aimlessly in search of Christ, though he himself did not know it. But she offered him a mother's patient love. Her spiritual strength and persistence became the foundation for Augustine's faith when at last he converted. Some of the most moving portions of his Confessions speak of his relationship with his holy mother, especially his remembrance and prayer for her at the time of her death.

By his mid-thirties, Augustine had lost his mother and son to death, and he found himself back in his native north Africa. After selling all he had and giving the profits to the poor, he used his one remaining possession — the family home — as the location for a new religious community of like-minded men, even writing a rule that endures today as a basis for many religious congregations. Augustine was eventually ordained a priest and became famous as a preacher. Many of his sermons survive as some of the most treasured of his writings.

Augustine later became bishop at Hippo, near his home in northern Africa. In his exercise of that office, he came to be a model for all who share in that ministry. Bishops are to exercise the ministry of unity, and Augustine offers a model through the lens of teaching, which is one of the threefold tasks of any bishop. His was an integrated life, and he internalized the unity he sought to build because he believed what he read, taught what he believed, and practiced what he taught. This is all on display in the Confessions, which serves as part theological treatise, part philosophical lecture, and part prayer, all the while remaining within the context of a serious reflection on his own life.

The Confessions is not just a dry, linear enumeration of dates and events. Rather, the work is a spiritual

autobiography, in which Augustine bares his soul to the reader, sharing the wisdom he learned along the road to his conversion. Augustine's story gives hope to those who may have, as the song goes, "been looking for love in all the wrong places," as he did for so many years. Augustine's life illustrates that we will not be content with anything that keeps us from the God of love, peace, and truth. And he helps us recognize how God is constantly at work in our lives as a provident and loving Father.

Within Augustine, and in his writings, we encounter a reasonable and intelligent faith, one of depth and substance, springing from his interior relationship with God. In Augustine, faith and reason are in continual dialogue, mutually enriching and building off each other. The entirety of Augustine's life and teaching evidences the importance of this dialogue.

This is found in all of his writings, from his commentaries on Scripture or the political scene of his day, to his catechism and his critiques of heresies of his time. His writings cover the gambit of theological topics, everything from astrology to sexuality. His arguments on topics like the Trinity, the just war theory, and the validity of the sacraments have stood the test of time and remain among the most cited of his works by theologians and philosophers in the West. His teachings on sin and grace were even held in high esteem by many of the Protestant reformers.

Toward the end of his life, the Roman Empire was disintegrating, and northern Africa was also attacked in his last months. It was reported that Augustine was responsible for a miraculous healing during the siege. The saint died in Hippo, in modern-day Algeria, in 430. After his death, the city was destroyed by fire, except for his residence, which housed his voluminous written works.

The process of canonization was not yet codified in the early Church when Augustine died, but his sanctity was ratified by acclaim of the people. In 1298, he was recognized as a Doctor of the Church by Pope Boniface VIII. He was one of the original four to be so distinguished, along with Saint Ambrose, Saint Jerome, and Saint Gregory the Great. <>

The Imitation of Christ by Thomas à Kempis [Our Sunday Visitor, 9781681922829]

The Imitation of Christ is adapted from the translation by Aloysius Croft and Harold Bolton, originally published by The Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee, WI, 1940.

A nice set of gift editions bound with sturdy cloth.

The Imitation of Christ is a handbook for spiritual life. The text is divided into four books: "Helpful Counsels of the Spiritual Life", "Directives for the Interior Life", "On Interior Consolation" and "On the Blessed Sacrament". It focuses on the interior life and withdrawal from the world. It places emphasis on the devotion to the Eucharist as key element of spiritual life. Includes an introduction written by Leah Darrow.

Thomas à Kempis By Michael R. Heinlein

Referring to the Gospel of John 14:6, The Imitation of Christ summarizes the principal directive on which Christians must base their life: "Without the Way, there is no going. Without the Truth, there is no knowing. Without the Life, there is no living."

Said to have been written between 1418 and 1427, The Imitation's entire project is helping the reader pattern his or her life on Jesus Christ, pure and simple. That might seem like a "no-brainer" to us, but at the time it was regarded as a bit radical. Many in the Church had lost their way, choosing the easier ways of hedonism and sin rather than the arduous path of holiness. This was particularly true among the clergy. Their spirituality was sorely lacking, and their moral life was, too. From the clergy to the laity, the Church suffered from a widespread lack of spiritual depth.

Sadly, the worst of such behavior was typified at the highest level of the Church — namely, the papacy. The Church today has become a bit spoiled, with six of the eight pontiffs of the twentieth century either canonized or with active causes promoting their canonization. This was not always the case. Consider just two examples, both of which would have been in the memory of the author and the first readers of The Imitation.

In the mid-eleventh century, Pope Benedict IX held the office of the papacy on three separate occasions. After two expulsions, he decided he wanted to marry, so he finally left the papacy after selling his office to his godfather. He was described by Saint Peter Damian (1007-1072) as "a demon from hell in the disguise of a priest."

Then there was the Western Schism, during which three different men claimed to be pope simultaneously between the years 1378 and 1417. The consequences of this schism divided not only the Church, but all of Europe. Rooted in corruption and greed, it was a source of great scandal that provided a fertile field for sowing the seeds of the Protestant Reformation.

Unfortunately, though, it got even worse before it got better. The reign of Pope Alexander VI (1492-1503), regarded by many as perhaps the most corrupt and morally bankrupt of papacies, followed the publication of The Imitation. He is known not only for harboring mistresses in the papal apartments and fathering children with them, but also for hosting orgies in papal residences.

Many in the Church during these times knew that something was wrong. Many longed for a more pious practice of the Faith, a simpler spirituality where one could root life completely and solely in Jesus Christ — "the Way, the Truth and the Life."

This was the aim of Gerard Groote when he founded the Brothers of the Common Life in the fourteenth century. The community's undogmatic style and desire for a simple, pious Christian life quickly became popular through preaching and the establishment of schools throughout Germany and the Netherlands. Initially open to all as a lay community, it eventually became ordered to clerical life. The Brotherhood, therefore, functioned as a reform movement intended to foster a greater sense of spirituality among clergy and religious in an effort to stem the tide of corruption and lax morality known in such quarters. The Brotherhood largely died out following the Protestant reformation, although its last member — by way of the Augustinian canons — died in 1865. Its appeal, however, spread far and wide to clergy and laity alike, and the basic principles that inspired the movement remain relevant in our own day.

The Brotherhood's unique brand of spirituality, known as the devotio moderna, consisted of deepening one's interior life through contemplation and reflection on one's own relationship with God, and the retrieval of simple, pious ways of showing him love, particularly through devotion. The Imitation, originally written for clergy and religious, became a neat summary of the Brotherhood's spirituality of putting Christ, and imitation of his life, at the center of one's spirituality.

Authorship of The Imitation traditionally has been attributed to the medieval scholar Thomas à Kempis, who was a member of the Brotherhood of Christians and a prominent figure in the devotio moderna movement. He was a protégé of Florentius Radewyn, successor to the community's founder Gerard Groote. He was born around 1380, the son of a blacksmith and a schoolmistress, and the name à Kempis, which would come to be his most common identifier, came from his western German hometown of Kempen. He became a student of the Brothers of the Common Life by the age of twelve at Deventer in the Netherlands. His education within the community was steeped in its deeply Pietistic tradition. This education would prove to be a foundation for the rest of his life and career.

À Kempis would spend the remaining seventy years of his life at the Augustinian monastery of Mount St. Agnes at Zwolle, Netherlands. He entered around 1403, when his own blood brother was serving as prior. By about 1413, Kempis was ordained to the priesthood.

What is remembered of his career is his composition of spiritual texts in the form of sermons, prayers, hymns, and the like. He is known for having published works on the lives of the Brotherhood's founders, Groote and Radewyn. Additionally, he is remembered as a copyist — that is, one who copied the Bible in handwritten form, a task that took years to complete. This was commonly work conducted in scholarly monasteries before the invention of the printing press. À Kempis was known to have completed at least four copies in his life. Because of his involvement in this work, and his related knowledge of Scripture, his writings

are saturated with scriptural references, particularly from the New Testament.

À Kempis died in 1471, and his relics remain enshrined in Zwolle today. While many of the great spiritual masters have been beatified or canonized, no such recognition has been afforded to à Kempis. Despite evidence from those who lived with him attesting to his holy life, as well as the widespread cultus emanating from the popularity of The Imitation of Christ, he has not yet been beatified by the Church.

A beatification process was initiated on his behalf about two centuries after his death, but the cause was put to a stop and never reopened after its founding bishop died. It has been widely reported that one of the reasons for this is that à Kempis may have been buried alive. When his remains were exhumed, it is reported that the inside of his casket lid contained scratch marks in the wood, and there were fragments of the wood under his fingernails. If such was the case, then he would have died without witnesses, which means it is possible he died rejecting the Faith in some way, especially in such terrible circumstances. Some have attributed this, however, to internal Church politics. Other accounts of à Kempis' death do not indicate any such possibility.

Historians are unsure if authorship of The Imitation is entirely from the hand of à Kempis alone. It could be that he served as an editor for a collection of an array of writings pertaining to the spirituality of devotio moderna, from sermons and the like, originating from among members of the Brotherhood. Regardless, The Imitation has proven to be one of the most frequently read books of all time. It is said to be the second most published book in history, runner-up only to the Bible itself. First published on the eve of the Protestant Reformation, coinciding with the widespread use of the printing press, the text's influence was quickly apparent.

The practical spiritual advice of The Imitation has been of great help to many in their varied spiritual journeys. It has played a central role in the spiritual lives of many heroes of the Faith, including Saint Thomas More, who said it was one of three books every Christian should own.

Scholars have claimed that many of the themes of the devotio moderna movement influenced the thought of the Protestant reformers. The Imitation became influential and formational for many involved in the Counterreformation, including Saint Ignatius Loyola, founder of the Society of Jesus (Jesuits). Ignatius' own Spiritual Exercises are based, in part, on The Imitation, which he came to know during his own conversion experience. Saint Francis de Sales called the text "a charming labyrinth of piety."

The Imitation's renown as one of Christianity's most read texts is a fond reminder of the contributions of those who belonged to the Brotherhood, particularly Thomas à Kempis, and their desire to build up the Body of Christ by fostering imitation of the Head. After all, where else but from Christ do we learn how to make sense of life? He teaches us how to live as the men and women God made us to be, modeling the life of virtue and the primacy of charity. Christ's way frees us from blockades and distractions and keeps us focused on our goal through prayer.

Christ, too, teaches us how to handle the complexities and burdens of life, such as embracing our struggles and sufferings as an opportunity to share in his Cross, our hope and salvation. The Imitation promotes all of this, as well as a strong Eucharistic devotion, seen as an opportunity for us to focus and be nourished in our total desire to imitate Christ. The Imitation beckons its readers to know him who is "the Way, the Truth and the Life" and to be like Christ in all our thoughts, words, and deeds. <>

Interior Castle by Teresa of Avila [Our Sunday Visitor, 9781681922867]

Text of Interior Castle adapted from the translation of the Benedictines of Stanbrook, England, edited by the Very Rev. Fr. Benedict Zimmerman, O.C.D., Third Edition with Additional Notes. First published in 1921, Thomas Baker, London. Preface and Archbishop John Francis Noll biography by Michael R. Heinlen, Introduction by Teresa Tomeo,

Interior Castle is St. Teresa of Avila most important and widely studied work. It guides the spiritual

seeker through each stage of development until the soul's final union with the divine.

Includes an introduction written by Teresa Tomeo.

A useful well-designed gift edition of this mystical classic

Saint Teresa of Avila by Michael R. Heinlein

Saint Teresa of Avila's greatness is manifested in a host of ways. But it is perhaps her recognition as a Doctor of the Church that encapsulates them all. Designated with the honor in 1970 by Pope Paul VI, Teresa became the first woman held up to the Church as an exemplary theologian and a master teacher of the Faith.

She has been referred to as the doctor orationis — the doctor of prayer — because the majority of her writings are poetic expositions on prayer. In her autobiography, she describes prayer as "nothing else than an intimate sharing between friends; it means taking time frequently to be alone with Him who we know loves us."

While we can learn much from her writings about how to grow in holiness, we can also learn much from her own life. All her life she aspired to greatness, and this greatness is something we should aspire to as well.

From a young age, she wanted a life of adventure. As a child of about four, inspired after reading the tales of heroes of the Faith, she set out with her brother to achieve sainthood by becoming a martyr at the hands of the Moors. Fortunately, her plans amounted to little after their uncle stopped them not far from their home. Many of us today can identify with this scene, because it reminds us that our plans are always inferior to God's.

As a young adult, Teresa sought greatness in ways that many a young woman of means might. She was taken up with the things of this world. She hung around with worldly friends and enjoyed those social occasions in which she could show off her fine clothes. She had a penchant for jewelry and perfume.

For her schooling, Teresa was sent to a local academy for young women of affluent families.

Given the choice between religious life and marriage — the only two options for women of her time — she had negative feelings about both. There was a restlessness deep within her, as the greatness she desired could not be found in the worldly ways she knew. After a lengthy battle with serious illness and great mental anguish, she decided to enter the local Carmelite convent in Avila. There, Teresa was still ambivalent about religious life, but it seems she tried it in desperation to find the peace for which she longed. In religious life she would slowly come to encounter the Lord and find in him the peace she desired. Ultimately, her life teaches us that our truest peace will only ever be found in God alone.

Like many saints, Teresa seemed to hit rock bottom spiritually before she began the path to true greatness for which she was longing in the depths of her soul. Eventually she found that the Carmelite convent she entered was not conducive to the life of prayer she truly desired. While the nuns kept the outer practices familiar to convents at her time — like fasting, communal recitation of the office, regular confession, etc. — her convent relaxed many of their rules. Several of its well-to-do nuns did not have to give up much of their wealthy means. They were even entitled to their own apartments, complete with a small chapel, kitchen, and guest quarters.

Teresa was not satisfied with the laxity of her initial years in religious life. She suffered again from fits of ill health. Convalescing, she decided to take the advice of a friend and commit more firmly to mental prayer. But she quickly talked herself out of it, and she continued to suffer the consequences.

Eventually, in what she would later describe as a second conversion, Teresa came to know God's intimate presence in her life. As she persevered in prayer, she developed a greater awareness of God's presence and of her distance from him on account of her own sinfulness. Over time her prayer deepened, and she enjoyed mystical experiences of interior voices and visions, as well as ecstatic moments at the height of contemplative prayer.

The divine intimacy that she found was what she had been longing for and unable to find. Here at last was the true greatness she had been seeking

so restlessly throughout her life. Teresa teaches us that prayer is the necessary means to achieving the unity with God for which we have been created. Moreover, through her we learn that we can only find the meaning of life, and the greatness we seek, in God alone.

Teresa's life also teaches us that we must be people of action. She knew that the quality of religious life she experienced in her first years as a nun was not what it should be — and she was not alone. This was the age of the Reformation, and many of the problems among religious and the clergy were coming to a head across Europe. Many reformers of religious communities recognized that religious life needed to be refashioned. It was necessary to retrieve the way of life intended by the various founders of those religious orders.

So Teresa set out to bring reform to the Carmelites in Spain — no small task for a woman of her time. It required a great deal of bravery. Ironically, despite many other reform movements within religious communities throughout Europe (which were mostly well received by superiors and the Church hierarchy), Teresa's attempts at reform were looked upon with suspicion. Her reforms attracted criticism from her monastery in Avila, as the nuns felt their way of life threatened. Many doubted the fruits of her contemplative visions — Spain during her time was home to a number of female "visionaries" who turned out to be frauds — but Teresa did not back down.

Eventually, after her death, a distinct status for Teresa's Carmelite observance was formed, known as the Discalced (or shoeless) Carmelites, indicative of their strict observance of the ancient Carmelite rule. Overall, Teresa founded nearly twenty convents in as many years. And there were additional religious houses for men, sometimes opened in collaboration with another Spanish Carmelite mystic and reformer, Saint John of the Cross.

As if her contemplative life combined with her strenuous work to establish reformed Carmelite houses throughout Spain was not enough, Teresa also authored a number of spiritual works. Through her writings and in her own conduct, Teresa teaches

us that true greatness consists in allowing the qualities of Christ to live in us.

Deeply humble, Teresa only desired what God willed, and at times she had to be convinced to share her spiritual insights through writing. Asked once to write something on prayer, she replied: "For the love of God let me work at my spinning wheel and go to choir and perform the duties of the religious life, like the other sisters. I am not meant to write. I have neither health nor intelligence for it."

At last Teresa did write that work on prayer, and it became known throughout the centuries as one of the greatest spiritual treatises on the topic. The work was the Interior Castle, a book that allows us to learn from Teresa's own experience of prayer and the stages of the spiritual life. She teaches us how to obtain the divine union for which we have all been made, and for which we all long, even if we do not always realize it.

Teresa of Avila died in 1582 and was canonized in 1622, on the same day as Saints Ignatius Loyola, Francis Xavier, and Philip Neri. Her cult spread quickly, with many desiring her to be named a patron of Spain, and numerous miracles were attributed to her intercession. Her feast was spread to the universal Church in 1688, and she was the first female non-martyr saint to be so honored.

Saint Teresa of Avila's teachings have survived the ages, in part because of their multifaceted appeal and universal approachability. Pope Paul VI described her writings as making known "a mother of wonderful simplicity and yet a teacher of remarkable depth." <>

Introduction to the Devout Life by Francis de Sales [Our Sunday Visitor, 9781681922881]

Text of the Introduction to the Devout Life is adapted from the translation available through the Christian Classics Ethereal Library. Preface and Archbishop John Francis Noll biography by Michael R. Heinlein.

A useful well-designed gift edition of this mystical classic

As Bishop of Geneva in the first quarter of the 17th century, Francis de Sales saw to the spiritual needs

of everyone. The desire to be closer to God that he found in people led him to compile these instructions on how to live in Christ. Francis's compassionate [Introduction to the Devout Life](#) leads you through practical ways of attaining a devout life without renouncing the world and offers prayers and meditations to strengthen devotion in the face of temptation and hardship. Includes an introduction by Pat Gohn.

Saint Francis de Sales by Michael R. Heinlein

When Saint Francis de Sales was born in 1567 in Thorens-Glières, France, his father had his life planned out for him. This life would be one of nobility, with a career in law that would culminate with his appointment as a magistrate. Francis' earthly father planned a prosperous and prestigious future for him, but it turned out that his heavenly Father had other plans.

The saint's early life began with academic training close to home at a school for sons of noblemen, specializing in composition. He then studied philosophy, rhetoric, and theology at a Jesuit-run college in Paris. After obtaining his baccalaureate degree in 1584, Francis continued to study theology in Paris as he grew in his own practice of the Faith. He earned two more masters' degrees, followed by a doctorate in law in Padua, Italy, in 1591. During his doctoral defense, his oratory skills and intellectual prowess left all forty-eight professors amazed.

Because he was of noble origin, Francis was accompanied during most of his studies by a servant and a priest-tutor. In addition to his academic pursuits, he also received "gentlemanly formation," including lessons in dancing, fencing, and boxing. He excelled in horsemanship, especially jumping and dressage.

As Francis was receiving his education, the doctrine of Calvinism was taking root throughout Europe, causing many Catholics to break away from the Faith. This would touch Francis' life in many ways, both professionally and personally. As various Calvinist doctrines were debated publicly, especially in Paris during his time of study there,

briefly he became convinced of predestination, a primary tenet of Calvinism.

In 1586, a period of depression and spiritual darkness struck Francis, growing out of an experience in which he became convinced that he was predestined for eternal damnation. This consumed him for nearly two months, leaving him emotionally and physically exhausted. While visiting a famous chapel in Paris, dedicated to Mary under the title of Our Lady of Good Deliverance, Francis completely abandoned himself to the will of God, promising to love and serve God no matter what was in store for him. His eyes were drawn to an inscription of the Memorare, a prayer to Our Lady composed by Saint Bernard of Clairvaux, on the chapel's wall. He felt immediate peace and tranquility as a result of his newfound trust and confidence in God through Mary's intercession, and he vowed to recite this prayer every day of his life from then on.

During this spiritual trial, Francis felt an intensified call to the priesthood. The call seems to have been there from an early age, but he kept it secret, especially from his father. His father wanted for his son what he considered to be the best, so in obedience to him, Francis spent a short time practicing law after earning his degree. His father purchased an estate for Francis, assembled a law library for his use, and arranged an engagement to the daughter of a prominent judge. Francis gave it all up, however, to pursue the priesthood. Supported by his mother and given approval, albeit with great reluctance, by his father, Francis was ordained a priest in 1593. (Sadly, by the time his father died in 1600, the two had never fully reconciled.)

Francis' ordination came about quickly when he was nominated (without his knowledge) by a priest-cousin to be provost of Geneva, a position second to the bishop. He rose to prominence quickly within the local Church of Geneva, although Catholic leadership was exiled to eastern France because of the Calvinist occupation of the city.

Through his preaching and teaching, Francis manifested great evangelical skills for overcoming the divide between Catholics and Calvinists. He accomplished this mostly through tireless efforts of

preaching and the publication of various tractates in which he put forward the teachings of the Church in simple, understandable language. More than two-thirds of the population of Chablais, the region in which Francis labored for about four years, returned to the Church, and a revival of Catholic practices thrived thanks to his leadership. It is believed that a deceased Protestant child came back from the dead long enough for the saint to perform the baby's baptism. And Pope Clement VIII even asked Francis to seek out Calvinist leader Theodore Beza, then in his early eighties, and persuade him to come back to the Church.

None of Francis' missionary work among the Calvinists came without great personal cost to him, however. On several occasions, he came close to martyrdom. Forced to live in a garrison, his health deteriorated. Once, he even had to spend a night in a tree in order to avoid being attacked by wolves. Interestingly, even while he preached the truth of the Catholic faith, old theological doubts tempted him again, especially regarding the primary Calvinist tenets on predestination, grace, free will, and the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist. To make matters worse, his father cut off all material assistance to him in hopes that he would abandon his mission. Yet, through it all, Francis persevered, forced to depend solely on the providence of God, something in which he rejoiced greatly.

The Protestant Reformation, which was gaining much traction throughout Europe, was just as divisive politically as it was religiously. Church and state were very much intertwined, and Francis found himself capable of shrewd negotiations with political entities for the good of the Church, even forging alliances between the pope and French king Henry IV. Henry, who had returned to Catholicism but had been poorly committed to it, was quite fond of the saint, calling him "a rare bird, indeed ... devout, learned, and a gentleman. A very rare combination."

Francis eventually was named coadjutor to the bishop of his exiled Geneva see, succeeding him in 1602. As the diocesan bishop, he was responsible for implementing the reforms of the Council of Trent, saying, "The first duty of the bishop is to

teach." Much of his tenure as bishop was spent doing just that, especially as he fulfilled the task set out by Trent to visit all the parishes and ecclesial institutions in his diocese.

Francis forged a strong bond with his people and left a major mark through his teaching, preaching, and example. During this time, he also developed a deep, loving, spiritual friendship with a widow named Jane Frances de Chantal. Together the two founded a new women's religious community, the Order of the Visitation of Holy Mary, which was less strict than many orders of the time and open to older women and widows who wanted to live a life dedicated to development of the interior life, particularly humility and gentleness. Francis served as Jane's spiritual director for many years, and their correspondence remains among the most treasured in that genre of spiritual writing.

Francis is remembered as a uniquely gifted spiritual director, and his writings were unique because of his strong belief that anyone could serve God in any vocation. This was a striking departure from the common thinking of the day, which held that entrance to a religious community or the clerical state was really the only path to holiness. But Francis insisted that everyone is called to holiness, and this was the major theme of his Introduction to the Devout Life, a collection of letters between himself and a cousin's wife, whom he served as spiritual director. Considered too lax at the time, the work is now noted for its spiritual rigor. It was an immediate best-seller and remains one of the most loved spiritual books of all time.

Francis' last years were spent dealing with increasing health problems, but his attention shifted also to continued writing and work with the Visitation nuns. In addition, he was called upon numerous times to perform careful ecclesiastical and political negotiations. A variety of arduous and taxing journeys in his last years took a toll on him. He suffered a stroke, and while he lay on his deathbed, a nun begged for some last advice. Given paper and pen, he wrote three times, "Humility." Francis died on December 28, 1622, in Lyon, France. He was canonized in 1665, named a Doctor of the Church by Blessed Pope Pius IX in

1877, and formally named patron of writers in 1923.

Francis' advocacy for the apostolate of the laity and recognition of the universal call to holiness made him a man ahead of his time. Marking the fourth centenary of the saint's birth, Pope Paul VI wrote on his enduring relevance: "No one of the recent Doctors of the Church more than St. Francis de Sales anticipated the deliberations and decisions of the Second Vatican Council with such a keen and progressive insight. He renders his contribution by the example of his life, by the wealth of his true and sound doctrine, by the fact that he has opened and strengthened the spiritual ways of Christian perfection for all states and conditions in life. We propose that these three things be imitated, embraced, and followed." <>

Story of a Soul by Thérèse of Lisieux [Our Sunday Visitor, 9781681922805]

A useful well-designed gift edition of this mystical classic

This edition of Story of a Soul by Thérèse of Lisieux is adapted from the text edited by T. N. Taylor, Priest of the Archdiocese of Glasgow, Witness Before the Tribunal of the Beatification. Burns, Oates & Washbourne.

Story of a Soul conveys St. Thérèse of Liseux's "Little Way" of spiritual childhood - her elevator to Heaven. This is a way for all to grow in holiness through unfailing confidence and childlike delight in God's merciful love. St. Therese shows us how her "Little Way" of love and trust comes straight from Sacred Scripture. Includes an introduction written by Elizabeth Foss.

Saint Thérèse of Lisieux by Michael R. Heinlein

Of all the saints whose holiness blossomed in the setting of the family, Saint Thérèse of Lisieux is perhaps the most famous example. Within the context of her loving and devout family, Thérèse began to discover her "Little Way" of holiness.

Thérèse was born the ninth and final child of Saints Louis and Zélie Martin on January 2, 1873, in Alençon, France. Zélie died of breast cancer four

years later, and Louis' brother-in-law helped arrange for the widower's family to move north to Lisieux.

From an early age, Thérèse learned from her parents to accept everything in her life as a gift from God, keenly understanding his grace and providence. Likewise, she learned to rely solely on God's will to find her peace. Thérèse teaches us that holiness is found in doing little things consistently and with great love.

Zélie's death when Thérèse was four years old was a traumatic event for the young girl — one which she remembered vividly. She wrote later that it was then that "my naturally happy disposition completely changed. Instead of being lively and demonstrative as I had been, I became timid, shy, and extremely sensitive; a look was enough to make me burst into tears. I could not bear to be noticed or to meet strangers and was at ease only in my own family circle. There I was always cherished with the most loving care."

It was not until she was thirteen years old, at Christmas, that she finally overcame her tendency toward emotional hypersensitivity, which would usually end in fits of uncontrollable tears. She would later describe this Christmas experience as a necessary step in her "conversion" — in her ability to abandon herself for the love of God.

During her childhood, Thérèse was considered weak and unusual. At the age of nine, she became so sick that it appeared the end was near. Her father even requested Masses at Our Lady of Victories Church in Paris, and her family kept vigil at her bedside. As three of her sisters were leading prayers of intercession to the Blessed Mother in front of the family's statue of her, Thérèse experienced a miracle: the statue began to smile at her. She was healed.

Thérèse and her four older sisters (her other four siblings did not survive infancy) each discovered God's call to the religious life. And Thérèse was quite insistent upon doing God's will as soon as possible, despite the many difficulties she encountered on that path.

Refused entry to the Carmelite convent in Lisieux because of her young age, Thérèse seemingly

could not contain the zeal with which her soul desired total union with Christ. She even used a meeting with Pope Leo XIII during a pilgrimage to Rome as an opportunity to seek his assistance. The pope replied "Well, my child, do whatever the superiors decide.... You will enter if it is God's Will." According to God's designs and her own perseverance, the local bishop later gave his consent for Thérèse to enter the Lisieux Carmel when she was fifteen.

Although she entered the convent with a desire for spiritual greatness, her attitude slowly changed. As she wrote: "Above all I endeavored to practice little hidden acts of virtue." But her "Little Way" should not be dismissed as easy or unheroic, for it requires total trust in and abandonment to the will of God, which is the source of our joy. She firmly believed that holiness was attainable for all the baptized. When one of her cousins got married, Thérèse wrote to her, "We all take a different road but each one leads to the same goal. You and I must have a single aim: to grow in holiness while following the way that God in his goodness has laid down for us."

Therese explained the "Little Way" further: "But how shall I show my love, since love proves itself by deeds? Well! The little child will strew flowers ... she will embrace the Divine Throne with their fragrance, she will sing Love's Canticle in silvery tones. Yes, my Beloved, it is thus my short life shall be spent in Thy sight. The only way I have of proving my love is to strew flowers before Thee — that is to say, I will let no tiny sacrifice pass, no look, no word. I wish to profit by the smallest actions, and to do them for Love." She also believed that her divine mission was just beginning in this life: "After my death, I will let fall a shower of roses." As a result, one of her most popular names today is "the Little Flower."

Scripture, devotionals like The Imitation of Christ, and the daily office and Mass formed the center of Thérèse's commonsense spirituality. She learned about the importance of a hidden life of charity and the esteem for bodily mortifications from the great Carmelite saints like John of the Cross and her namesake, Teresa of Avila.

Life in the Carmel of Lisieux was taxing for Thérèse. Her life behind the grate of the Carmel turned out to be the proving ground for the "Little Way." Living with the other nuns was not always easy. She was maligned and mistreated. But in the midst of these difficulties and the simple jobs that were assigned her at first, Thérèse found her "Little Way."

Thérèse performed a variety of small jobs in the Carmel, including duties like scrubbing floors and positions such as sacristan. However, her spiritual gifts were eventually put to use in a more significant position — assistant novice mistress. Assisting the young novices with spiritual discernment, Thérèse was sweet yet firm, unafraid to call a young nun to task for anything that might be keeping her from holiness. Some of the keen spiritual insights Thérèse shared with her novices are applicable to all who desire holiness: "I realized that, while for the most part all souls have the same battles, yet no two souls are exactly alike.... Each soul, therefore, should be dealt with in a different way.... Our own tastes, our personal ideas must be forgotten, and we must guide souls not by our own way but along that particular path which Jesus indicates."

But her life at the Carmel was not destined to be long. One day she found blood in her handkerchief, and she was soon after diagnosed with tuberculosis. Rather than rejecting God's plan for her, however, she experienced "joy" and awaited death as the final act in her complete union with Christ. In her great suffering, she taught of its greater purpose: "I have reached a point where I can no longer suffer, because all suffering has become so sweet."

Thérèse experienced intense physical suffering and offered it all to the Lord, in union with him to the end — uttering as she breathed her last, "My God, I love you!" She died on September 30, 1897, at the age of twenty-four.

Thérèse identified her discovery of her personal mission in her spiritual autobiography, Story of a Soul:

> I understood that since the Church is a body composed of different members, the

noblest and most important of all the organs would not be wanting. I knew that the Church has a heart, that this heart burns with love, and that it is love alone that gives life to its members. I knew that if this love were extinguished, the Apostles would no longer preach the Gospel, and the martyrs would refuse to shed their blood... .
Then, beside myself with joy, I cried out: "O Jesus, my Love, at last I have found my vocation. My vocation is love! Yes, I have found my place in the bosom of the Church, and this place, O my God, Thou hast Thyself given to me: in the heart of the Church, my Mother, I will be LOVE!"

In great joy, she declared her mission to be love, which, as she says, is at the center of the Church. Although she never left her convent, she would be proclaimed universal patroness of missionaries in 1927. Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger explained this seeming irony thus: "She understood that she herself, the little nun behind the grille of a Carmel in a provincial town in France, could be everywhere, because as a loving person she was there with Christ in the heart of the Church."

Pope Saint John Paul II spoke of Thérèse's vocation, saying,

> Jesus himself showed her how she could live this vocation: by fully practicing the commandment of love, she would be immersed in the very heart of the Church's mission, supporting those who proclaim the Gospel with the mysterious power of prayer and communion. Thus she achieved what the Second Vatican Council emphasized in teaching that the Church is missionary by nature (cf. Ad gentes, n. 2). Not only those who choose the missionary life but all the baptized are in some way sent ad gentes.

Her simplicity and practical approach to the spiritual life make Saint Thérèse of Lisieux one of the most popular saints in the Church. Popular devotion to this saintly contemplative spread far and wide soon after her death. This was facilitated mostly by the publication of her autobiography, and many reports of favors attributed to her intercession caused her canonization process to be initiated earlier than was the normal interval after

death at the time. Pope Saint Pius X, who inaugurated her cause, called her "the greatest saint of modern times."

She was canonized in 1925 by Pope Pius XI. The universality of her message reached a pinnacle in 1997 when Pope Saint John Paul II declared her a Doctor of the Church. The pope said in his homily that day that she is "the youngest of all the `doctors of the Church,' but her ardent spiritual journey shows such maturity, and the insights of faith expressed in her writings are so vast and profound that they deserve a place among the great spiritual masters." <>

Storm Lake: A Chronicle of Change, Resilience, and Hope from a Heartland Newspaper by Art Cullen [Viking, 9780525558873]

From a 2017 Pulitzer-winning newspaperman, an unsentimental ode to America's heartland as seen in small-town Iowa--a story of reinvention and resilience, environmental and economic struggle, and surprising diversity and hope.
When The Storm Lake Times, a tiny Iowa twice-weekly, won a Pulitzer Prize for taking on big corporate agri-industry for poisoning the local rivers and lake, it was a coup on many counts: a strike for the well being of a rural community; a triumph for that endangered species, a family-run rural news weekly; and a salute to the special talents of a fierce and formidable native son, Art Cullen.

In this candid and timely book, Cullen describes how the rural prairies have changed dramatically over his career, as seen from the vantage point of a farming and meatpacking town of 15,000 in Northwest Iowa. Politics, agriculture, the environment, and immigration are all themes in Storm Lake, a chronicle of a resilient newspaper, as much a survivor as its town.

Storm Lake's people are the book's heart: the family that swam the Mekong River to find Storm Lake; the Latina with a baby who wonders if she'll be deported from the only home she has known; the farmer who watches markets in real time and tries to manage within a relentless agriculture

supply chain that seeks efficiency for cheaper pork, prepared foods, and ethanol. Storm Lake may be a community in flux, occasionally in crisis (farming isn't for the faint hearted), but one that's not disappearing--in fact, its population is growing with immigrants from Laos, Mexico, and elsewhere. Thirty languages are now spoken there, and soccer is more popular than football.

Iowa plays an outsize role in national politics. Iowa introduced Barack Obama and voted bigly for Donald Trump. Is the state leaning blue, red, or purple in the lead-up to 2020? Is it a bellwether for America? A nostalgic mirage from The Music Man, or a harbinger of America's future? Cullen's answer is complicated and honest--but with optimism and the stubbornness that is still the state's, and his, dominant quality.

Contents
Author's Note

Excerpt: Never did I seriously think of writing a book. Editing a country twice-a-week newspaper in my hometown of Storm Lake, Iowa, was plenty for me. But about a week after I won the Pulitzer Prize for editorial writing in April 2017, a couple of New York publishers asked me on the same day if I would like to write a book. I laughed at the first caller and took the second more seriously but still

thought it ludicrous. I could not write much more than seven hundred words at a time. But a third and most important publisher, my big brother John of The Storm Lake Times, told me to call them back. I always listen to John.

We struck up a conversation with editor Wendy Wolf at Viking. I suggested a series of essays and personality sketches that would paint a picture of how rural Iowa had morphed since my career humbly launched thirty-eight years ago in Algona, Iowa. She wanted to know more about the family story, of how the second smallest newspaper (we think) in the Pulitzers' 101-year history won for taking on corporate agriculture over pollution and local government secrecy.

So it became the story of a hometown newspaper founded in 1990 by John in a tempest, joined by his little brother as editor, and how we interpret this place on the broken prairie with a pretty (but polluted) lake. A patchwork expanse of corn and soybeans, peppered by industrial-scale hog and poultry confinement buildings, surrounds us while the steady slice of the meatpacker's cleaver occupies us. People stream in from around the globe, from Cuba to Myanmar, speaking thirty languages, searching for the first rung on the American ladder to a dream. While much of rural Iowa is emptying out of people and aspirations, our little town is revitalized by immigrants to whom we introduce you. Some of us blame the newcomers for problems as old as the railroad, and succor it with a brand of radical politics steeped in resentment that finds voice in Donald Trump and our congressman Steve King.

The story goes back to Algona in a 1980s rural depression that saw farmers hanging themselves in barns. Could the rural places we loved survive? It goes back to Mexico in 2005 to find Storm Lake's twin city and font of our new neighbors praying for a shot at freedom. In the people we find the spirit that draws us to them, and which eludes so many others building a political pitch on running them off.

Our story dwells mainly in the here and now of Storm Lake—buffeted by the currents of corn markets and wind and rain and political sleight of hand. We explore how we can maintain the world's most productive agricultural complex without

destroying ourselves and the people downstream. The challenge is even greater with climate change bearing down on Iowa's—and everyone's—way of life. Change is underfoot against that horizon that should sustain our special little place. That's a story of hope, which is what farming and family newspapering are all about… <>

Why We Fight: Defeating America's Enemies - With No Apologies by Sebastian Gorka Ph.D. [Regnery Publishing, 9781621576402]

"Sebastian Gorka was [President Trump's] strategist. Dr. Gorka knows Donald Trump and the threats we fact. Buy and read Why We Fight to find how we win and what it means to be an American hero." — RUSH LIMBAUGH

WAR. It will happen again. We must be ready.
Sober words from Dr. Sebastian Gorka, a man who has made the unvarnished truth his specialty. And there's one eternal truth that Americans are in danger of forgetting: the most important weapon in any geopolitical conflict is the will to win.

And we must win.

In this powerful manifesto, Dr. Gorka explains the basic principles that have guided strategists since Sun Tzu penned The Art of War in the sixth century B.C. To defeat your enemy, you must know him. But that's the last thing liberal elites are interested in. Willful ignorance about our adversary—whether it's Russia, China, or the global jihadi movement—has been crippling. Tearing off America's politically correct blindfold, Dr. Gorka clarifies who our foes are and what makes them tick.

An eight-year vacation from geopolitical reality under Obama left our country dangerously weakened. Dr. Gorka addresses the pressing questions we face as we rebuild under President Trump's leadership:

- What are the most serious threats to American security?
- How are they different from the threats of the past?
- What can we do to counter these threats?

- How can we achieve the "perfect victory" of vanquishing our enemies without mortal combat?

All the money and weapons in the world cannot substitute for the will to fight for our precious country and what she represents. To remind us of what the will to win looks like, Dr. Gorka intersperses the stories of four American heroes—Stephen Decatur, Chesty Puller, "Red" McDaniel, and a warrior who never took up arms, Whittaker Chambers—men who believed in their country and put everything on the line for her.

Excerpt: What It Means to Be a Freedom Fighter
The cell was cold. In the winter the only warmth came from the bodies of prisoners crammed into a tiny space designed for just two inmates, but under the new regime, housed up to a dozen.

They were awakened at six in the morning by a noise coming through the ventilation grate of the

executioner's team building temporary gallows in the central prison courtyard below them.

The absence of the morning reveille told everyone what was about to happen: someone was about to be killed. The question was: Who was about to be killed? Was it Bela, their brave leader?

Two inmates climbed onto the bunkbed and craned their heads toward the ventilation grate to listen. For thirty minutes, they could only hear muffled hammering and the occasional footfall. Then, silence.

Suddenly a voice, reading from the usual script, said: "The President of People's Republic has denied the request for a stay of execution!" Paul, Leslie, and Michael, who had all risked their lives to resist the communist takeover and were betrayed along with their leader, Bela, knew that there had been no request for clemency. Bela would not beg before the dictatorship's lackeys.

A clear and powerful voice rang out: "I die for my country! Jesus Christ, give me strength!" There was a loud crack of wood slapping against wood followed by silence.

The year was 1951, and the inmate, Paul, was my father.

Born in 1930 in Budapest, Hungary, my father was formed by the experience of war. When Hitler invaded Poland—a nation with centuries of ties to Hungary and many common noble families—my father hadn't even reached the age of ten. After the outbreak of hostilities, the government of Hungary maintained a formal neutrality. In practice, because Berlin had promised to restore to Hungary some of the territories taken from her after World War I, Budapest supported Germany and eventually declared war on both the Soviet Union and its Allies.

But by early 1944, the Regent of the kingdom of Hungary, Admiral Miklós Horthy, was no longer willing to be an accomplice to Hitler's Third Reich and the extermination of the Jews, and secretly approached the Allies to offer an armistice with his beleaguered nation. Sadly, the Hungarian initiative would never see the light of day as Hitler deployed his top commando, Otto Skorzeny, to

Budapest to kidnap Horthy's son and force the regent to abdicate. The Nazis then occupied Hungary and installed a puppet government of fascists calling themselves the "Arrow Cross."

A country that had been the proud partner in the Austro-Hungarian Empire was now an occupied nation and a satrapy of the megalomaniac Austrian Corporal Adolf Hitler. Its once thriving Jewish community was corralled into ghettos before being murdered on the banks of the Danube or shipped in boxcars to the death camps.

This was the world of my father's childhood: a world of war and foreign occupation which shaped the man he became.

Both my parents died long ago, but I vividly recall my father's stories of the war years and my mother's account of the deprivation after the war; she was only six when it ended. These stories included escorting Jewish classmates who wore the Star of David on their jackets to school, protecting them from the abuse of German occupational forces. Others surrounded life after the siege of Budapest, when the invading Soviets had defeated the Nazis and took control of the country.

In 1945, my father, at the age of fifteen, was climbing through the ruins of the city with his best friend, Leslie, when a junior Soviet officer accosted them and pressed them into work. The boys were told to collect dead bodies and slide them into the basement of a bombed-out building that had been filled with lye and turned into a mass grave. When they had completed a full day of backbreaking work, the Russian officer took the boys to a field kitchen. On the way, they crossed paths with another Soviet officer who asked what was going on. When his colleague explained, the second officer began to shout and insist that the boys go back to the mass grave and work until it was full of cadavers. The two officers railed at each other until the first one pulled out his Tokarev service pistol and shot the second officer dead. He then led the boys to get their bowl of potato soup. This was a sudden and violent lesson in the value of life in Soviet culture.

By the time Hitler had been defeated, my father, having heard from his own parents about Hungary

in the days of its freedom and having lived through the horrors of war on his doorstep, was praying for a rapid a return to normality. Especially after he heard of the Yalta Conference, at which the Allied leaders made a commitment that the countries of Central Europe would once again be independent and choose their own governments. But it was not to be.

In my first book, [Defeating Jihad: The Winnable War](#), I chronicled my father's experience after the war—his arrest by the new communist regime, the torture, imprisonment, and eventual liberation by patriotic freedom fighters in the 1956 Revolution. Allow me to explain the effect his story had on me.

Most of my fellow Americans will find it hard to relate to the background that shaped my views. Unless, perhaps, you have served overseas in the armed forces in a region still plagued by dictatorship. Even so, less than one percent of our nation serves in the armed forces, and only a fraction of those are sent overseas.

It is hard to explain the lasting effect upon me of my father's answer to a question I asked as a young child when I noticed faint lines on his wrists. He responded, "That's where my interrogators hung me by the wrists, my hands tied together with wire behind my back from a pipe in the ceiling."

Or of walking into the rebuilt torture chamber in the basement of the erstwhile secret police headquarters in Budapest with my father, who had been brutalized there half a century earlier. I was a grown man and it was forty years since he had been tortured, but there we were in a reconstructed interrogation room where my father had been hung from pipes.

In spite of these traumatic experiences, the father I knew was always the fun one in any group. Growing up as an only child, I would watch from the top of the stairs as my parents hosted wonderful parties in our modest home in West London. My father regaled our guests so merrily that it was hard to believe he had lived through those years of horror in Nazi and then Soviet-occupied Hungary.

Susan, my mother and the daughter of a fellow political prisoner of my father's whose only crime

had been being a leader of the Hungarian YMCA, was the consummate hostess. A truly incredible cook with a formidable intellect, she taught architecture, spoke seven languages, and relished art and fine culture. My father was a simpler soul, always ready with a risqué joke or a song and a subtle yet mischievous twinkle in his eye. And all this despite the death, destruction, and betrayal that he had witnessed, as the faint scars on his wrists attested.

I was only nine, the same age my father had been when World War II broke out, when the geopolitical significance of my father's life in Hungary was finally revealed to me. After four decades, I remember it so very clearly.

We were watching the evening news in our living room. My parents were very engaged with the world around them and my immersion in matters political started at an early age. It was November 1979, and the champion of Western democracy and all things British, Margaret Thatcher, was the prime minister. Just a few days earlier, a huge scandal had erupted when an investigative journalist revealed that the famed art historian and director of the Courtauld Institute, Sir Anthony Blunt, had been a member of the "Cambridge Apostles," a ring of Soviet spies during the Cold War which betrayed Great Britain and her allies. The scandal raged all the more forcefully because Blunt had admitted his guilt in 1964 in exchange for immunity from prosecution. The whole affair was kept secret from the British people for fifteen years.

The case of the Apostles, or "Cambridge Five," as they were called, was the most dastardly and damaging case of treason during the Cold War. The ring's members—Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, Blunt, and John Cairncross—had studied in Cambridge, where they were recruited to spy on the British government for the KGB. After graduating, four of the five joined the civil service, to include British intelligence, and betrayed the trust shown them by selling their nation to the Soviets.

When it was revealed that Sir Anthony, a fixture of high society, had been one of the spies and granted immunity, the prime minster was forced to respond publicly. In her statement to Parliament, Mrs. Thatcher confirmed Blunt's treachery, for which

he would be stripped of his knighthood, but reassured the nation that his actions had never endangered any British lives.

As we watched the prime minister on television, my father said, "Oh, I know no British agents died. But hundreds of Hungarians, Poles, Czechoslovaks, and Yugoslavs did." One of them was Bela Bajomi, hanged in the courtyard of the political prison in Budapest, as Leslie, Michael, and my father listened from their cell.

It was that statement by the head of the British government that spurred my father to write his own story, published in London as Budapest Betrayed. He detailed how as a teenager after the war, he saw the promises of Yalta—that occupied countries like Hungary would begin again in freedom— violated from the Baltics to the Balkans, as Nazi regimes were replaced by communist dictatorships.

The Cost of Resisting Evil

Once the communists had fully taken over Hungary, my father started college. It was there he decided to resist the new dictatorship.

Identifying a handful of patriots among his fellow students, he helped Bela Bajomi organize a secret Christian resistance group. The plan was to covertly collect information on what the Communist Party was doing, how the Soviet troops were deployed across the country, and how the Kremlin was stealing the country's national assets and industries. The information would then be spirited out to a Western country, and when the world saw that Stalin was in breach of the treaties made at the close of the war, pressure could be applied against Moscow.

The members of the group succeeded in obtaining internships in strategic industries and offices crucial to the communist takeover. Bajomi managed to establish a secret line of communication to the United Kingdom. Soon enough, prosaic letters were being mailed at regular intervals to an MI-6 cut-out with the crucial data inserted between the anodyne script with an invisible ink. For several months, at great risk to their liberty and their lives, these young men, including my father, smuggled the truth out of captive Hungary with the hope that it would

be used to weaken Moscow's grip and restore the nation's independence. But it wasn't to be.

As my father chronicled in his autobiography, the reports sent to London would eventually land on the desk of none other than Kim Philby: Soviet agent, Cambridge Apostle, and traitor to the West. Once he had received enough collateral information to identify the group's members by name, Philby betrayed them to his Soviet handlers, who then informed Moscow. When Moscow informed the Hungarian secret police, my father and his fellow patriots were arrested, tortured, and imprisoned. Bela, their leader, was executed.

At his trial, my father was also to be given a death sentence at the age of twenty. However, thanks to a well-connected great uncle, he was spared execution. Instead he received a "ten-year" sentence, which would have doomed him to die in prison since his classified sentencing document was stamped: "not to be released even after serving sentence." This document came into my father's hands after the communist regime fell in 1990.

As you can read in Defeating Jihad, my father spent two years in solitary confinement for being an "enemy of the state," following two years in a prison coal mine, and another two years in the main political prison outside Budapest. On October 23, 1956, the Hungarian people fought back against the dictators, and my father's and mother's lives changed forever.

After eight years of full-fledged communist dictatorship, several thousand students and factory workers banded together in an uprising that would become the Hungarian Revolution of 1956: the first attempt by a nation under Soviet occupation to free itself from the Kremlin. With captured weapons and homemade Molotov cocktails, the oppressed stood up to their oppressors, and for ten heady days, Hungary was free. The freedom fighters captured a Russian tank, battered down the prison gate, and liberated my father and his fellow prisoners of conscience from the hell of their communist confinement.

Hungary's freedom was short-lived, however. With hundreds of tanks called from Ukraine, Romania, and thousands of Soviet reinforcements, Moscow

viciously crushed the revolution. Prime Minster Imre Nagy and other leaders were kidnapped and murdered. Hearing that he too was on a shoot-to-kill list, my father escaped across the minefields into neutral Austria with his prison mate's seventeen-year-old daughter and future wife, Susan.

When asked in the refugee camp where they would like to live—unaware that it was Philby in London who had betrayed them all—my father told the resettlement officer that they wanted to live in England. That is how I came to be born and raised in London, a British subject but Hungarian by family upbringing.

I didn't know the full story of my father's fight for a free Hungary or how he had suffered until the Blunt scandal erupted, prompting my father to write his book and share the shocking details of his childhood. But our home was often the location for reunions with onetime comrades and fellow prisoners like Father Bela Ispanki, the enigmatic Catholic priest and personal secretary to Cardinal Mindszenty, who was arrested and imprisoned for rallying Hungarian Christians against the communist dictatorship, and Laci, who had become a successful psychiatrist with a house on Lake Geneva. After the freedom fighters crashed through the prison gate with their Russian tank, Laci was made temporary prison warden whilst the true political prisoners were sifted from the common criminals, whom the revolutionaries were not keen on "liberating."

The values of my father and his compatriots formed the moral environment of my childhood. Tyranny, whether Nazi or communist, wasn't an abstract concept in a history book. It was the marks on my father's wrists. Resistance to dictatorship wasn't a vague platitude. I could touch it in the form of the tiny crucifix my father had carved out of a multicolored toothbrush handle in prison, Jesus' white body lying on the Bakelite blue of the cross. It was in the stories he shared of prisoners covertly collecting the raisins from their meals to make wine so the priests imprisoned with them, like Father Bela, could celebrate a secret Mass inside the prison. Determined to preserve our freedom, which he didn't take for granted, my father taught me

how to handle a gun as soon as I could reliably hold one up and use it safely. He knew that all dictatorships want the population disarmed, and that a citizen without a means to protect himself and his liberty is not a truly free man. Thank you, Father.

And then there was my father's mode of interacting with the world. Despite the torture, the imprisonment, and the life of an exile, my father was amazingly "normal." He wasn't ever bitter or maladjusted. On the contrary, he loved the company of good people and perhaps trusted others a little too readily—more so than his cynical son, who had grown up in a free country. Despite all he had gone through, he told me that the only thing he was truly angry about was being deprived of the opportunity to row for Hungary in the Olympics. He had inherited his athletic ability from his father, Agoston, an Olympian and the fastest long-distance runner in Hungary between the wars. When my father was arrested at age twenty, he was a member of the Hungarian national rowing team. But I never saw him fulminate at what had been done to him. In fact, the only time I ever saw my father cry was when someone mentioned the name of Bela Bajomi, or of other fellow patriots who had made the ultimate sacrifice in the fight for freedom.

It was in this world that I learnt what justice is and that truth is not relative. From earliest childhood it was clear: evil walks the earth, and from time to time a man must resist it, often at great cost. That is why when the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, occurred, I processed them quite differently from my friends and those around me.

The perpetrators of the deadliest terrorist assault in modern times were connected in my mind to the totalitarians of the twentieth century, who had almost destroyed Judeo-Christian civilization. Yes, the al-Qaeda operatives did what they did in the name of a religion and not a godless ideology like fascism or communism, but the nineteen hijackers of 9/11 were brethren to the German soldiers who abused my father's Jewish friends. They were cut from the same cloth as the thugs who tortured him in the basement of the secret police headquarters on Andrassy Street and partisans of a cause that

would admit no compromise. Bin Laden's "soldiers," like Hitler's Gestapo, would kill or enslave you if you dared resist.

It was this perspective on the threat America and the West faced in the new century that would eventually bring me to the United States to explain that connection to the brave men and women of our military and law enforcement and what it would take to defeat the "new totalitarians." From the Green Berets of Fort Bragg to the Special Agents of the FBI, the analysts of the CIA, and the SEALs of the US Navy, I have shared the same message: "The loss of liberty is always but one generation away." There will always be those—whether they are Hitler's divisions, Stalin's spies, today's jihadists, or tomorrow's unknown threat—who would rob us of our freedom and destroy the values of our Judeo-Christian civilization if our vigilance flags.

It Will Happen Again and We Must Be Ready to Win

I was born in England, and Hungarian blood runs in my veins, but I am a proud American and legal immigrant to the greatest nation on God's earth. It was the highest honor of my life to serve as deputy assistant and strategist to President Donald Trump.

This book builds upon Defeating Jihad, but has a broader scope and a different structure. It is the product of my twenty-four years in the national security sector, both in government and in the private and academic sectors. It is a guide to the most important facts all Americans should know about the threats our nation faces now and will face in the future. But it is more than that.

Both the early nineteenth century Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz, in his classic work On War, and the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, in The Art of War, taught that the central aspect of all conflict is the will to win. To be sure, you must be able to inflict damage on your opponent—it is hard to defeat a tank with a bow and arrow—but the most important ingredient for victory is a will to win that is greater than your enemy's. From ancient Greece to the Vietnam War and to what we used to call the Global War on Terror, this has always been the case.

Yet having taught in our civilian and military institutions of higher education, such as Georgetown University and the National Defense University in Washington, I see America as a nation all too often forgetting this eternal truth. We fail to take seriously the key lines from the Marine Corps manual MCDP 1, Warfighting: "Although material factors are more easily quantified, the moral and mental forces exert a greater influence on the nature and outcome of war," which is "an extreme test of will."

To help correct that failure, I present here a handful of examples of men who had that crucial will to fight. Some are well known, such as Stephen Decatur, a central figure in a pivotal conflict early in the life of the nation, the Barbary Wars. Others are less famous but are of equal importance as exemplars: Chesty Puller, the most decorated marine in American history; Captain Eugene McDaniel, a naval pilot shot down in Vietnam who survived the horrors of Viet Cong prisons for six years; and Whittaker Chambers, not a warrior, but a hero nonetheless because of his resistance to totalitarianism and his commitment to the truth.

Their stories will provide inspiration for the new generation of defenders of the republic, a generation we all must encourage and build. For without an America of heroes ready to fight and win, the future will belong to those who serve the latest totalitarian incarnation of evil.

Why Jefferson Really Had a Koran and What He and Adams Thought about Islam

When Keith Ellison, America's first Muslim congressman, was sworn into office in 2007, the Fake News media made much of his having taken the oath on a copy of the Koran that belonged to Thomas Jefferson. The message was that we could all learn a lesson in broadmindedness from our multicultural third president.

Nothing could be farther from the truth.

Jefferson acquired a Koran to understand the Jihadi enemy our new nation faced in the form of the Barbary Pirates. He and his fellow Founding Father John Adams offered an assessment of that enemy in the following report to Secretary of State

John Jay. And remember: He who can falsify the past owns your future.

American Commissioners to John Jay
Grosr. Square March 28th. 1786

Sir,

Soon after the arrival of Mr. J. in London, we had a conference with the Ambassador of Tripoli, at his House.

The amount of all the information we can obtain from him was that a perpetual peace was in all respects the most advisable, because a temporary treaty would leave room for increasing demands upon every renewal of it, and a stipulation for annual payments would be liable to failures of performance which would renew the war, repeat the negotiations and continually augment the claims of his nation and the difference of expence would by no means be adequate to the inconvenience, since 12,500 Guineas to his Constituents with 10 pr. Cent upon that sum for himself, must be paid if the treaty was made for only one year.

That 30,000 Guineas for his Employers and £3,000 for himself were the lowest terms upon which a perpetual peace could be made and that this must be paid in Cash on the delivery of the treaty signed by his sovereign, that no kind of Merchandizes could be accepted.

That Tunis would treat upon the same terms, but he could not answer for Algiers or Morocco.

We took the liberty to make some inquiries concerning the Grounds of their pretentions to make war upon Nations who had done them no Injury, and observed that we considered all mankind as our friends who had done us no wrong, nor had given us any provocation.

The Ambassador answered us that it was founded on the Laws of their Profit [sic], that it was written in their Koran, that all nations who should not have acknowledged their authority were sinners, that it was their right and duty to make war upon them wherever they could be found, and to make slaves of all they could take as Prisoners, and that every Musselman who should be slain in battle was sure to go to Paradise.

That it was a law that the first who boarded an Enemy's Vessell should have one slave, more than his share with the rest, which operated as an incentive to the most desperate Valour and Enterprise, that it was the Practice of their Corsairs to bear down upon a ship, for each sailor to take a dagger in each hand and another in his mouth, and leap on board, which so terrified their Enemies that very few ever stood against them, that he verily believed the Devil assisted his Countrymen, for they were almost always successful. We took time to consider and promised an answer, but we can give him no other, than that the demands exceed our Expectations, and that of Congress, so much that we can proceed no further without fresh instructions.

There is but one possible way that we know of to procure the money, if Congress should authorize us to go to the necessary expence, and that is to borrow it in Holland. We are not certain it can be had there. But if Congress should order us to make the best terms we can with Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers and Morocco, and to procure this money wherever we can find it, upon terms like those of the last loan in Holland, our best endeavours shall be used to remove this formidable obstacle out of the way of the prosperity of the United States.

Inclosed is a Copy of a Letter from P. R. Randall Esqr. at Barcelona, the last from Mr. Barclay was dated Bayonne. It is hoped we shall soon have news from Algiers and Morocco, and we wish it may not be made more disagreeable than this from Tunis and Tripoli. We are &c.
John Adams
Thomas Jefferson <>

From Personal Life to Private Law by John Gardner [Oxford University Press, 9780198818755]

Mounting a lawsuit against someone who has wronged you is a prospect no less fearful than being on the receiving end of such a lawsuit. Litigation in the courts has a reputation for being a byzantine process far removed from ordinary life, often failing to address people's real grievances

while adding to their pain. Yes, there is money to be had if you win. But beyond that, what is it all in aid of?

In [From Personal Life to Private Law](#), John Gardner argues that, in spite of their legal intricacy, many of the questions that perennially occupy the courts in civil cases are actually timeless puzzles about the human condition. The architecture of the law of torts and the law of contract turns out to track the contours of personal life much more closely than you might expect. Using a wide range of examples from literature and life as well as law, Gardner explores big questions about our relationships to our own pasts and our own futures as well as to other people. What are friends for? Why does it matter how your actions turn out? What is the good of saying sorry? Why regret your mistakes? How can anyone be compensated for an irreversible loss? Why would you want to hold onto the life you already have? And what does any of this have to do with all those protracted legal disputes about damaged cars, ruined holidays, and leaky roofs?

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Introduction

Excerpt: They murdered his wife. They destroyed his future. Now they have to pay.

Three themes, and then a fourth

Even knowing nothing of the author's work, it would not take long for a commuter at Brighton railway station to work out that Wilbur Smith's new novel belongs to the Death Wish subgenre. The backdrop shows a silhouetted lone figure, striding into a vast barren landscape below an ominous sky. 'Now they have to pay' is not intended to suggest that the man is delivering an invoice. He is out for blood. Predator promises to be a tale of ruthless, savage, and, no doubt, extremely gratifying revenge.

Remove it from its place in a publisher's publicity campaign, however, and the haiku-like teaser could bring something different to mind. It could represent—in very condensed form—a summons, a statement of claim, the pleading used to begin court proceedings in what I will call `private law'

cases. What is alleged on behalf of the claimant is a wrong against him (`they murdered his wife') and a loss to him associated with it (`they destroyed his future'). What is claimed, in light of the wrong and the loss, is a remedy (`now they have to pay'). Wrong, loss, remedy—the litigation equation, the trinity of torts, the alchemy of assumpsit.

It is intriguing that the language of private law—the language of debt, repayment, rectification, and so forth—is also the language of revenge. How is it that a three-line synopsis of the no doubt gripping Predator could equally be a three-line synopsis of the inevitably tedious Plaintiff? Here is one link between the two. Private law exists, in part, for the sublimation of vengeful feelings. It is a central plank of the argument for having any law, private or otherwise, that it cools heated reactions to actual and alleged wrongdoing, that it substitutes its laborious rituals and distractions for the horrors of the blood-feud, the vendetta, the duel, the lynching, and so forth. Strong arguments against private revenge, then, provide strong arguments in favour of private law. The two have an inverse relation. But a more intriguing question is whether, to make a strong argument in favour of private law, one first needs to muster a strong argument in favour of revenge. Is there a direct (non-inverse) relation between the two? Some people think so. Getting one's own back in the avenger's sense, they think, is the authentic moral blueprint for getting one's own back in the restitutionary or reparative sense. The hero of Plaint rightly takes his lead from the hero of Predator, albeit thankfully with a cooler head and more measured expectations.'

This strikes me as implausible, for two related reasons. First, the sense in which the hero of Predator gets his own back is obscure. It is surely metaphorical. His wife plainly does not return from the dead. His satisfaction when he avenges her death is not, one assumes, a resumption of the very same feelings that he had before she was killed. His execution of the murderer is not literally the extraction of a payment, for he does not literally receive it. The key plotline is not of his finding new love and reinstating connubial bliss. For him, nothing goes back to how it was. Whereas there is an ordinary literal sense, to be explored in some detail in this book, in which the hero of Plaintiff does

get something back. As his lawyer will explain, he is entitled in law to a sum of money from the wrongdoer, calculated to restore him to 'the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation." He still does not get his wife back. But if her earnings were paying fox the penthouse and the safaris, he gets damages to cover the loss of those. True, his losses are covered only 'so far as money can do it', and in the circumstances that may not count for much.' But, with that proviso, what he gets back from the wrongdoer, he literally does get back.

Secondly, it is very hard to justify revenge. Actually, it is hard to justify even extremely mild punishment. For both revenge and punishment involve the intentional infliction of suffering or deprivation. If the person on the sharp end does not suffer and is not deprived, the act of revenge or punishment has failed. It is extremely hard to explain why anyone should aim to bring extra suffering or deprivation into the world, especially in the name of putting right suffering or deprivation already brought about. Happily, one need not do so with remedial measures of the kind that are characteristic of private law. Any suffering or deprivation of the defendant here is but a side-effect of reparative and restitutionary measures. Such measures are designed, not to add new losses, but to reallocate losses which, thanks to the defendant, are already faits accomplis. To make them succeed, the defendant need not bear any new suffering or deprivation, or indeed any suffering or deprivation at all. If he is insured, so much the better; the deprivation will be spread thinly and will ideally go unnoticed by everyone, so there will be no suffering. Could the justification of such relatively innocuous measures in which there need be no new deprivation, let alone suffering, possibly depend on the justification of more noxious measures by which extra suffering or deprivation is created? I doubt it.

This book has nothing much to say about the justification of punishment, let alone about the justification of revenge. Predator will not be our concern. Nor, for the most part, will Prosecutor, a third instalment in our imaginary trilogy (in which the hero of Predator is finally arrested and

indicted with the help, let us suppose, of the scrupulous killjoy hero of Plaint. I spent many years thinking and writing about philosophical issues in criminal law, while always remaining very unsure about how to justify punishment, even when it takes the form of withholding pocket money from youngsters or giving someone the cold shoulder at a party. One big reason why I stopped working on philosophical issues in criminal law (around 2008) was that I had reached the point at which, in my view, I could not proceed further without a more secure sense of how to justify punitive responses and, indeed, a more secure sense of how to justify the mysterious `blaming' attitudes which seem to underlie punitive responses.6 What are they all about? I was not sure where to start. Strangely, for a philosopher of criminal law, I was not even sure that punitive responses and blaming attitudes can be justified.

Even now the same doubts remain. One big reason why I took up more serious work on private law (from 2008 onwards) was that I saw more prospect of making both moral peace and philosophical progress with private law's (as it seemed to me) less toxic remedial apparatus. In particular, those mysterious blaming attitudes did not seem to be of the essence. I vaguely hoped that I might come back to criminal law some day, armed with some transferable insights from the study of private law. In Chapter 4 of this book there are some hints of possible directions for further thought about punishment. But all that, I must confess, is incidental. It is not the topic of the chapter. Rather, I am trying to get to the bottom of a puzzle about so-called `general damages' for torts and breaches of contract. The puzzle concerns the longing to repair the irreparable. So, you see, I have come to grasp over the years that the remedial apparatus of private law is itself extremely hard to explain and defend. I had underestimated the scale of the ethical and the philosophical challenges. This book is testimony both to the scale of the challenges and the very limited progress I have made, so far, in meeting them. I feel that with private law I have only slightly bettered my frustrating attempts to understand what is going on in criminal law.

The remedial apparatus of private law dominates the rather complex middle chapters of the book,

Chapters 3 and 4. They focus on the 'now they have to pay' part of the Plaintiff plot. What counts as paying in the relevant sense? Why does it count as paying? And why are `they' (the ones who committed the wrong) the right ones to be doing the paying? Chapters 2 and 5, meanwhile, are concerned with the 'they destroyed his future' part of the narrative. Chapter 2 explores the importance of how wrongs turn out—their outcomes—while Chapter 5 tries to understand how and why the losses of the person wronged are the main outcomes that matter in private law contexts. The 'they murdered his wife' part of the story— what is wrongdoing? why does it matter so much?— runs through the whole book. Chapter 1, however, pays special attention to an aspect of wrongdoing that is of particular salience in private law: wrongs, or some of them, are committed against particular people. What does that mean? And why is it so important to the rest of the story of private law? Why does it matter, for the plot of Plaintiff that the person who was murdered by `them' was his wife?

This whistle-stop tour misses out Chapter 6. Chapter 6 explores the part of the story that is left implicit in Wilbur Smith's publicity tercet. Let me make it explicit now:

> They murdered his wife. They destroyed his future.
> Now they have to pay. And he is the one who gets to make them pay.'

In Predator, it is personal execution; in Plaint it is by resort to an elaborate institutional process. Either way, why is so much left up to the person who was wronged? Why so much power for that person, and so much elbow-room in how it is exercised?

In some ways, Chapter 6 counterbalances the rest of the book, which is mainly about the ways in which timeless themes of private law are also timeless themes of personal life. In that chapter we encounter some timeless themes of private law that are more reflective of its specialized institutional arrangements. When they are carried back over into personal life these themes tend to be ill-fitting. But the ill-fitting themes are not the ones that you might expect them to be. It is not, as many think, that coercion and authority have less of a role in

personal life than they have in the law. It is discretion—latitude to treat people your way, whether or not it is the right way—that has less of a role in personal life than it has in the law. You may find that a surprising discovery. It goes hand in hand, however, with a sub-text of the book as a whole. The timeless themes of private law, the four themes from Plaint are not distinctively, or especially, liberal themes. They have less to do with the value of personal freedom than many have tended to imagine (although it is fair to say that replacing Predator with Plaintiff does have some distinctively liberal benefits). That is why the timeless themes of private law are so timeless, whereas liberal civilization has its beginning, middle, and—one hopes not too soon—its end.

Personal life

The expression `personal life', which I have used several times already and which figures in the book's title, may strike you as pleonastic. If I am a person, then surely all of my life is my personal life? Maybe that is too literal-minded. These days, people tend to use the expression `personal life' to mean something akin to `intimate life' or `private life'. Sometimes they are referring euphemistically to their romantic dalliances and sexual liaisons. But no less often they mean, more broadly, the part of their lives that they share with family and close friends. An implicit contrast is often being drawn with the part of their lives that is occupied with work or career, for which the expression `working life' or `professional life' is often reserved. There is already something vaguely disturbing about the way in which these are idiomatically cast as different lives, rather than as different parts or facets of a single life. With Alasdair MacIntyre, one may be tempted to worry about the way in which modernity partitions each human life into a variety of segments, each with its own norms and modes of behaviour. So work is divided from leisure, private life from public, the corporate from the personal. So both childhood and old age have been wrenched away from the rest of human life and made over into distinct realms. And all these separations have been achieved so that it is the distinctiveness of each and not the unity of the life of the individual who passes through those parts in terms of which we are taught to think and feel.'

This book does not follow MacIntyre in his hysterical diagnosis of our contemporary condition (`the liquidation of the self ') or in his nostalgic prescriptions. You will not find me yearning for some imaginary golden age in which there was (scope for) greater unity in people's lives. But the book is supposed to encourage a turn towards greater unity in how we think about people's lives, especially but not only in how they interact with law and politics. It is supposed to nudge those thinking about modern private law, in particular, towards the position that Liam Murphy calls `monism'. For monists, 'all fundamental normative principles that apply to the design of institutions apply also to the conduct of people.'" As Murphy elaborates:

> Monism is of course compatible with the existence of specifically political principles of a nonfundamental kind, such as the principle that taxation should be levied according to taxpayers' `ability to pay'. What monism rejects is any defense of such a principle by appeal to a fundamental one that does not also apply directly to people's conduct. It should therefore be clear that monism does not have the absurd implication that all morally defensible legal principles are ipso facto valid moral principles. In rejecting the distinction Rawls draws between politics and morality, I am not rejecting the distinction between law and morality. Thus it might be appropriate to enact legislative or constitutional provisions that are not plausible moral principles.

This passage calls for careful interpretation. In one way, monism does have the implication, pace Murphy, 'that all morally defensible legal principles are ipso facto valid moral principles.' Actions which the law defensibly classifies as wrongs are, if nothing else, mala prohibita. They are made immoral by the fact that they are defensibly made illegal. The absurd implication that Murphy is trying to guard against is only that they are also mala in se: that they must already have been immoral for it to have been morally defensible to have made them illegal. And in one way, pace Murphy, the monist is rejecting 'the distinction between law and morality'. She accepts it when it is interpreted to mean that the immorality of some action, its being malum in se, is not an adequate defence of its

being made illegal. But she rejects it when it is interpreted to mean that the defence of legal norms depends ultimately on considerations that do not bear on the defence of the actions, quite apart from the law, of the people whose actions those norms regulate. No: ultimately the only considerations that are relevant to defending the law are considerations that are also relevant to defending what people do quite apart from the law (and I would add, going beyond Murphy, vice versa).

Unlike Murphy, I will generally avoid the word `morality' and its cognates when I am referring to these considerations. Roughly, `personal life' is my name for what people do (as well as what they think, believe, want, etc.), quite apart from the law. In the following chapters I argue in what Murphy would call a `monist' vein that what private law would have us do is best understood by reflecting on what we should be doing quite apart from private law, which obviously entails reflection on the reasons why we should be doing it. Actually, maybe it creates the wrong expectations to say that I argue for this view. Perhaps it is less misleading to say that I attempt to substantiate it, or make it credible. I attempt to reveal by example and analysis that, in defiance of its reputation for remote and impersonal technicality, for lacking a human touch, the main concerns that drive and structure private law are ordinary human concerns that also apply to you and me when we relate to each other, quite apart from the law, for example as friends or neighbours or lovers or colleagues or, for that matter, as strangers queuing for the bus or holding the door open for each other or saying 'good morning' as we pass.

Theoretical writing about private law, in my view, stands today in need of a strong dose of this kind of monism. There is a pronounced contemporary tendency to think of private law as an autonomous domain, requiring a specialized apparatus of analysis and evaluation. It is the domain of `private right', where that does not count as a mere redescription of private law but also as a constraint on the possible ways of justifying it. This `private right' view has emerged mainly in reaction to another view, in which private law is regarded as but one more tool of public policy, to be evaluated

using standard techniques from the policy sciences. Here the economists of law reign supreme. But even as they rightly deny the autonomy of private law from public policy, the economists wrongly insist on the autonomy of public policy from everything else. They regard public policy as a specialized domain in which preferences alone are to rule, and they decline to condemn or even evaluate anyone's preferences, for public policy purposes, except in terms of other preferences. Not for them the central questions of classical ethics—What goals and relationships (and hence `preferences') should one have? How attached should one be to them? How should one feel about their loss or abandonment? In short, what life should one lead? If the economist admits that these are sensible questions at all, he typically relegates them to a different line of business. They are not the business of the policy sciences, and hence not relevant to the analysis and evaluation of private law. And here (subject only to disagreement about the `hence') we see where the economist of private law and her `private right' adversary find themselves, surprisingly, on the same side. Each seeks a way of insulating the study of private law (alone or with other things) from the study of the wider human condition.

The main thing that inspired me to write this book, and that still animates many of its discussions, is the thought that there can be no such insulation except at the price of extreme, and I might add gratuitous, distortion. The big themes of private law—at least those selected big themes that I foreground in the following chapters—are also among the big themes of life. And how we should think about them in connection with private law is none other than the same way in which we should think about them in connection with everything else to which they are relevant—for example, when we reflect on how to bring up our children, on how to put our friendships back on an even keel, on how to respond to our failures, on how to relate to people who have disappointed us, on how to make a fresh start, and so on.

In substantiating this thought, the book makes extensive use of literary examples, some developed at length. This technique might not be to the taste of all readers. I do, however, have a few modest points to offer in its favour. I have never

been much of a fan of stripped-down thought experiments of the kind favoured by many contemporary moral philosophers, such as the `trolley problem' and 'the survival lottery'. But I have never been entirely sure what it is about these thought experiments that makes me so uneasy. Part of it surely has to do with the way in which they draw their users into a search for impossibly sharp distinctions, with low tolerance for the indeterminacies and ambivalences which I believe are central to the lives of finite rational beings like ourselves. But I realize now, having written this book, that I have another distinct problem with such examples. For the most part, they deliberately eliminate any hint of background story. They treat problems about what some generic agent is to do now as touched on only occasionally, and in strictly demarcated ways, by the way in which the agent came to be facing those problems, the role she is occupying, and the place that her actions have in the wider story of her life. Some moral philosophers prize this elimination of background story. They think the stripping out of such distracting particularity essential to do justice to the idea that morality binds us all unconditionally. To avoid the dangerous charms of this slippery idea is one reason why I avoid the word `morality' and its cognates throughout the book. Although (as you will see) the book gives a mixed review to the philosophical legacy of Bernard Williams, I share his unease with the modern view of morality as a specialized body of norms that bears down upon our everyday lives from a source beyond our everyday lives, constraining and inhibiting us in our pursuit of what are somehow more personal reasons that would otherwise prevail. In the picture I present, every reason is in the relevant sense a personal reason. That they help to bring this out is one reason why I share Williams' taste for literary examples, examples in which the participants have histories, established roles and relationships, personalities and characters, and in which the problems that they face are always in a way problems of what to do now given what has gone before. The italicized words should resonate with private lawyers. For all they may share the passion of some moral philosophers for impossibly sharp distinctions, they tend also to share the instinct for what I am calling background story. They know that

the rationally important features of a narrative cannot be isolated without a narrative; a stripped-down though-experiment of the kind favoured by many moral philosophers is simply not suitable for adjudication, or even (I would add) for much useful reflection.

In light of what I have just said about morality, it would be reasonable to say that my Murphy-style monism is not aimed only at those who regard private law as a domain autonomous relative to public policy, nor only at those who regard public policy as a domain autonomous relative to morality, but also at those who regard morality as a domain autonomous relative to the wider human pursuit of value. At the fundamental level, there is only value and our engagement with it as finite rational beings. There is only what J S Mill called 'the Art of Life'."

But take care how you read the label `monist' here, especially now that I have thrown in Mill's name. You may associate Mill with classical utilitarianism, and hence with the hopeless quest for a `felicific calculus'. I will have no part in that quest. For in a more familiar sense, not Murphy's sense, this book has conspicuously pluralistic sympathies. It presents the world as a world of indefinitely many irreducibly different values competing for our, and hence for private law's, attention. This is another way in which the position taken here differs from those found in much contemporary theorizing about private law. One perennial selling-point of the idea that private law (or policy science, or morality) is an autonomous domain relative to the wider human pursuit of value is that, in the wider human pursuit of value, there are so many possible values to pursue. Given the finitude of human life, the pursuit of any of these values by any of us, let alone by all of us together, is inevitably to the neglect of others. We may look to law (or policy, or morality) to help us bring order to the chaos of value that we confront. But how is it to do so? Perhaps by the institutional prioritization of a certain value, or a certain cluster of values. This brings us to various familiar attempts to isolate a value or cluster of values that private law especially, or exclusively, serves: the value of equality, the value of choice, the value of wealth, the value of reciprocity, and so on. Value-pluralism, if not completely defied, is at

spotlight

least tamed by such a domain-specific value selectivity.

This book does not hold out much hope for the taming of value-pluralism. Everything that matters in life matters in private law, and it matters in private law much as it matters in life. This means that endless values are in play in private law. Many of them are alive in the pages of this book. You may wonder how the book can nevertheless bring any order to our thinking about the subject. To which the best answer I can offer is this. Many themes of private law, and many associated puzzles, concern how we are to engage with value, whatever that value may be. Much of the material in this book likewise. If the value of my relationships is all instrumental, why should I care about my relationships? What makes it my task to put things right when I damage something valuable of yours? Why would you want to hold on to the value you already have, when you could do much better by letting go? It hardly matters which particular value or values we are talking about when we raise these questions; the puzzles remain the same. (A caveat: sometimes there is a particular value, for example that of security or freedom, in engaging with other values, whatever they may be, in some particular way. The book sometimes pays special attention to these, as they may be called, `enabling values'.)

None of this is to say that we were wrong to hope that private law might help us bring order to the chaos of value that we confront. It does so, however, by creating artificial determinacy under conditions of often radical indeterminacy. That is where the law's authority comes in. A common hope is that philosophical writing about private law will reveal, or point to a way of working out, which legal doctrines and decisions are uniquely optimal or imperative. That is not a reasonable hope. Very often there is, apart from the law, no uniquely defensible legal doctrine or decision. That is why the law is needed. It is needed to settle which way we are going to go, from now on, on a matter on which there is, apart from the law, more than one defensible way to go. Give turning cars or crossing pedestrians the right of way? Treat covenants between neighbours as automatically binding their successors in title? Require proof of fault or have a strict liability regime for defective products that

injure? Make libel a crime or a tort? It is not that nothing bears on these choices. Often, it is that too many irreducibly different concerns bear on them, leaving us plagued by reasonable indecision or reasonable differences of opinion about what to do next. Value is wasted on all sides as we struggle with the doubts and disagreements that come of the diversity of relevant value. An authoritative choice sometimes has to be made. That is very commonly the role of the law. Then the applicable model is not that of malum in se, but of malum prohibitum. If you want to know how to act for the best in such a situation, hire a lawyer. There is no point at all in asking a philosopher.

Private law

Private law, of which I have been speaking freely, is an exotic category as far as many lawyers trained in the common law tradition are concerned. It has a faintly Napoleonic flavour. It suggests a more hermetic departmentalization of the law than the common law is capable of sustaining. But no mystery attaches to my use of the expression in this book. I will be talking primarily about the law of torts and the law of contract. I do not mean to doubt that there is also a law of unjust enrichment, which has some commonality with, but also some important dissimilarity from, the body of law to which I am attending here. There are also equitable wrongs, such as breach of trust and breach of confidence, that have something in common with torts but also some of their own doctrinal apparatus. You will not be surprised to find me saying nothing specific about them. You may find my lack of specific attention to the law of property more startling. But it has a simple explanation. The law of property, for my purposes here, can be regarded as mainly a long footnote to the law of torts. It provides some of the detailed rules by which things that people do may come to qualify as trespasses, conversions, and detinues. In general, this book remains aloof from the question of what should qualify as torts. For that reason, the law of property hardly comes up. That shows how much turns on the words 'for my purposes here', which I casually added four sentences ago. I am interested here in a set of themes that are common to the law of torts and the law of contract, and which are implicated in the law of property mainly

because of the way in which they are alive in the law of torts.

You may worry that these pragmatic common lawyer's circumscriptions of my subject matter are at odds with my references, in this introduction, to `timeless themes of private law', a turn of phrase which may strike you as a little—shall we say?—metaphysically inflationary. But they are not so intended. I am not suggesting that private law is found at all times and all places where there are human beings, or even in all human legal systems. All I mean to suggest is that the themes recur in many legal systems across the long history of human law. Legal arrangements closely resembling the common law of torts and the common law of contract are found well beyond the common law, and well before the modern age. The themes traversed in this book are not legally parochial. Would it be going too far to say that a legal system in which one or more of the themes were not represented would not have private law? If there were no legal duty of repair owed by wrongdoers to those whom they wronged, if the duty of repair were not a duty to repair losses caused by the wrongdoer, or if there were no cause of action in the courts available to the person wronged at her discretionary initiative, would 'private law ... cease to exist'? I hesitate to get tangled up in this question. It is of no consequence here. This is not a book about the very idea of private law. It is a book that assumes you know roughly what private law is, and explores some of its timeless (maybe better now to say: enduring) themes.

Chapter synopsis

In section 1 of this introduction I already gave some forewarning of the coverage of the chapters that follow. But here is another outline, this time in sequential order, to help you find your way through the book. Such help may be needed since the topics of the chapters do not track any of the established ways of carving up the subject favoured by lawyers or by other theorists.

Chapter 1 explores the sense in which the duties of the law of torts and the law of contract may be said to be `relational'. It takes a stand against the hyper-relationalism of many writings on private law, and the hypo-relationalism of others. It does

so in two moves. First, it introduces the idea of a `strictly relational' duty, which is a duty that one has for the reason that one is in a certain relationship. It argues that even strictly relational duties need not be justified by irreducibly relational arguments. They may be justified by the non-relational value of there being relationships to which such duties attach. This first move already tells against a certain kind of hyper-relationalism in thinking about private law. The second move goes further. Private law duties, I argue, need not be and often are not strictly relational. They are only `loosely relational'. It turns out to be tricky, but important, to capture (non-impressionistically) the distinction between strictly and loosely relational duties. The distinction is explored and refined by reflecting on the duty of care in the law of negligence, and its modern history. Finally, we consider the import, but also the theoretical dispensability, of rights talk in private law. What matter are duties owed to others, and breaches of them, also known as wrongs against others.

Chapter 2 shifts attention from the wrong to the loss that is suffered by the person who is wronged. A law of torts (or of breach of contract) that does not pay attention to such losses is oxymoronic, or near enough. But on what basis can such losses intelligibly be attributed to the wrongdoer? The chapter argues that the problem goes right to the heart of the theory of human action. There cannot be human action at all—or even a decision to act—if there cannot be human action that is part-constituted by the way it turns out. There is no reason to decide, never mind a reason to attempt, if there is no reason to achieve, succeed, bring about what one decided, etc. An explanation of action, in short, depends on an explanation of the possibility of causal responsibility. The problem faced by private law, then, is not so much the problem of explaining how losses matter as the problem of explaining where we should stop: what are the limits of our causal responsibility? The chapter does not establish such limits. But it does explain that the problem is aptly described as one of establishing. The limits are vague, to say the least, and private law is needed to render them less so. This is one of several ways in which private

law is not only an instrument of what we should do, but also helps to constitute what we should do.

Chapter 3 turns to the case in favour of the wrongdoer repairing the losses that she caused to the person wronged. The literature on repair by wrongdoers often emphasizes reconciliation. The chapter is sceptical. Is reconciliation always desirable? More importantly, when reconciliation is desirable, why is repair by the wrongdoer of losses that were caused by the wrongdoer an effective way to achieve it? There must be an independent case for such repair that makes it a suitable strategy of reconciliation. The chapter advances such an independent case, namely the case that, by repairing the losses she caused, the wrongdoer comes closer to doing what she should have done in the first place. More precisely she conforms, as far as can still be done, to reasons that she did not conform to when she failed in her duty. These reasons support her having a fallback duty, a duty of repair. The chapter raises some questions about repair effected through representative agents (such as insurance companies and banks), and explores some attractions and limitations of money as a general currency of repair. In the process, it reveals an issue to be explored further in Chapter 6 about the ability of the wronged person to thwart the repair by spending the reparative money paid by the wrongdoer on something else entirely.

Chapter 4 continues the investigation of remedies for wrongdoing. It focuses on the deficit (or `remainder') that is inevitably left when a fallback duty is performed according to the principle defended in Chapter 3. At best, what one did when one performed the duty of repair was only second best, as compared with not committing the wrong in the first place. Does this remainder count for anything? The chapter explores the traces that the remainder leaves in the feelings of the wrongdoer, if she is reasonable, and asks whether, all else being equal, she has reason to express these feelings. The answer is negative. But the expression of the feelings, for example in a heartfelt apology, is nevertheless rationally intelligible. This may seem a long way from the concerns of private law, but it is not. It explains what I call the `placebo effect' that apologies may have even when not heartfelt, and that explanation carries over into the

explanation of money payments in damages that are not literally reparative, such as 'general' damages for bereavement or loss of companionship. These are irreparable losses that are treated, when certain steps are taken by the wrongdoer, as if they had been repaired in conformity with the principle defended in Chapter 3.

Chapter 5 turns to the question of the measure of damages, and in particular the question of why they should be oriented towards restoring the life the wronged person would have had, had the wrong not been committed. Why not instead some better life that he should have had? Why is the measure pegged to the status quo (the existing direction of the wronged person's life) at the time of the wrong? The chapter raises some of the most troubling and difficult questions in the book. It invites us to consider the difference that it makes to be invested in a life already, to be engaged already with some value through one's personal goals and relationships. It also invites us to consider the difference between value that is already realized in the world and otherwise identical value that is realizable but as yet unrealized. It sketches a picture according to which it is often reasonable to want to keep things one already has, or would have had but for the wrongdoer, even in a situation in which (thanks to the wrongdoer) one now has an ideal opportunity to do things differently and better. In short: that it is easier to hold on than to let go, even when all else is equal, is not irrationality. The line of thought eventually leads to consideration of the value of security (security in other valuable things) as part of the justification for private law. The chapter ends with brief reflections on the socially conservative implications of the view defended in the chapter, which turn out to be more apparent than real. Security, including the security that private law can provide, should be more of a preoccupation of progressive politics than it is.

Chapter 6 has two concerns. One is to reflect on the special institutional arrangements of private law, in which extensive discretion is given to those who claim to have been wronged to initiate, maintain, and abandon their pursuit of a remedy through the courts. The second is to reflect, more broadly, on the role of freedom, choice, and

autonomy—what might be called 'liberal values'—in the defence of private law. The chapter rejects the widely favoured idea that the case for the wrongdoer to owe a reparative duty to the person wronged entails that the person wronged should be the one to pursue that remedy and have control over the process by which it is obtained (or not, at that person's discretion). There is no entailment. Indeed, what the process by which the wrongdoer is brought into line should be is an open question. Is it one best answered by thinking about the plaintiff's freedom, choice, or autonomy as valuable in their own rights? No. Such things should count for little. Instead, we should think instrumentally. We should think about which institutional set-up is most efficacious in righting the wrong, least wasteful, and most sensitive to the circumstances of the case. Even when damages are awarded, and the successful plaintiff is left free to spend her award on something completely unrelated to repair of her loss, the explanation is unlikely to be that we prize, in its own right, her freedom to live as she chooses. The explanation, the chapter suggests, has more to do with the importance of ensuring finality in judicial decisions. The chapter rebukes those who export that concern, and others like it, too readily into their personal lives. That the law allows you to spend your hard-won damages on a cruise (when it was nothing like a cruise that the defendant ruined) does not make it alright. <>

[The International Legal Personality of the Individual](#)
by Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen [Oxford University Press, 9780198820376]

This is the first monograph to scrutinize the relationship between the concept of international legal personality as a theoretical construct and the position of the ultimate subject, the individual, as a matter of positive international law. By testing the four main theoretical conceptions of international legal personality against historical and existing norms of positive international law that regulate the conduct of individuals, the book argues that the common narrative in contemporary scholarship about the development of the role of the individual in the international legal system is flawed.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, international law did not apply to states alone until World War II, only to transform during the second half of the 20th century so as to include individuals as its subjects. Rather, the answer to the question of individual rights and obligations under international law is - and always was - strictly empirical. It follows, of course, that the entities governed by a particular norm tell us nothing about the legal system to which that norm belongs. Instead, the distinction between international law and national law turns exclusively on whether the source of the norm in question is international or national in kind. Against the background of these insights, the book shows how present-day international lawyers continue to allow an idea, which was never more than a scholarly invention of the 19th century, to influence the interpretation and application of international law. This state of affairs has significant real-world ramifications as international legal rights and obligations of individuals (and other non-state entities) are frequently applied more restrictively than interpretation without presumptions regarding 'personality' would merit.

Excerpt: The concept of `personality' has been a pressing topic since the infancy of international legal thinking. Traditionally, it serves the purpose of drawing a distinction between those entities that are relevant to the international lègal system and those that are not. Few scholars have seriously disputed the international legal personality of States. But the general consensus does not seem to go much beyond that. The academic debate on the conditions for acquiring international legal personality, and the consequences following from this label, is ongoing. This book contributes to the debate by scrutinizing the historical and actual relationship between the concept of international legal personality as a theoretical construct and the position of individuals as a matter of positive international law. More specifically, the book tests the four main theoretical conceptions of international legal personality against historical

and existing international legal norms that regulate the conduct of individuals. With the presumption that findings concerning the ultimate subject—the individual—by implication apply to other non-State entities, the overarching aim is to assess how the concept of international legal personality has functioned historically and still functions in the current legal reality. The present introductory chapter will provide the background for the study. First, Section 1.1 sets the scene by describing the dominant academic position on the international legal personality of individuals. Section 1.2 then spells out the main argument of the book. Section 1.3 explains the key definitions and assumptions underlying the study and clarifies a number of preliminary caveats. Finally, Section 1.4 outlines the structure of the subsequent chapters.

Setting the Scene: The Mainstream Approach to International Legal Personality

The concept of international legal personality was a particularly contentious issue in international legal theory in the first half of the twentieth century. Several schools of thought developed during this period with radically diverging views on the role of the individual in the international legal system. At the time, however, relatively few treaty provisions and customary norms regulated the conduct of individuals directly. By comparison, academic interest in international legal personality as a theoretical construct declined after the Second World War, while the number of positive international legal norms governing individuals grew exponentially. Since 1945, issues ranging from investment protection to criminal liability that used to fall within the exclusive domain of national law have widely become subject to international regulation.

A standard contemporary textbook includes a chapter entitled `International Legal Personality' or `Subjects of International Law'. This chapter is typically limited to an account of the traditional definition of international law as 'the law governing the relationship between States' and subsequent developments towards further involvement of individuals, particularly the rise of international human rights law and international criminal law

during the second half of the twentieth century. But the concept of international legal personality as a theoretical construct is not usually discussed at length. Many textbooks limit themselves to referring to the International Court of Justice's (hereafter ICJ) Reparations for Injuries Advisory Opinion of 1949 as the end-all of the academic debate on this issue. Having stated that international legal personality `... is no doubt a doctrinal expression, which has sometimes given rise to controversy', the Court famously found:

> The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community. Throughout its history, the development of international law has been influenced by the requirements of international life, and the progressive increase in the collective activities of States has already given rise to instances of action upon the international plane by certain entities which are not States. This development culminated in the establishment in June 1945 of an international organization whose purposes and principles are specified in the Charter of the United Nations. But to achieve these ends the attribution of international personality is indispensable.

The ICJ deemed it necessary to assess the overall question of whether the parties to the UN Charter had intended to endow the UN with international legal personality before pronouncing on the capacity of the organization to bring an international claim. As explained further below, this line of reasoning follows the modified `States-only' conception of international legal personality.' With the apparent support of the ICJ, most twenty-first-century textbooks on international law thus convey the following narrative to students: The developments in positive international law correspond to the change in the 'States-only' conception from the orthodox version, which by definition excluded all non-State entities, to the modified version accepting that even individuals may be granted derivative or secondary international legal personality.

The present study shows, however, that this account of the evolution of the role of the individual in the international legal system is flawed. Contrary to conventional wisdom, international law did not apply to States alone until the Second World War, only to transform during the second half of the twentieth century so as to include individuals as its subjects. Rather, positive law developments since the eighteenth century consistently corroborate Hans Kelsen's 'a posteriori' conception according to which the international legal personality of an entity—be it a State, an armed opposition group, or an individual—is solely contingent upon interpretation of international norms. In other words, the answer to the question of individual rights and obligations under international law is, and always has been, strictly empirical. The major change since the Second World War lies not in the formation of new international legal persons, but rather in the substantive issues governed by international law. In the words of James Crawford: 'Our system is one which international lawyers of four generations ago would have had no particular difficulty in recognising or working with, once they had got over its bulk.

The attentive reader is perhaps already wondering why it matters to present-day international lawyers that theory and practice pertaining to the international legal personality of individuals were not quite in accord with one another throughout history. Given that the modified 'States-only' conception, which is currently the prevalent theoretical position, accepts that individuals may be granted direct rights, duties, and capacities, there would seem to be no imminent real-world problem. This book demonstrates, however, that it does in fact matter.

First of all, the modified 'States-only' conception promotes an unwarranted bias against the international legal personality of individuals. Treaty provisions are interpreted under the assumption that the parties did not intend to govern individuals directly. Moreover, when this assumption is rebutted because the evidence that an international norm does indeed regulate the conduct of individuals is deemed to be sufficiently convincing, the norm in question is interpreted restrictively. As a result, individuals are sometimes

granted a lesser material status in international law than positive norms merit.

Secondly, the book will show that the orthodox 'States-only' conception continues to influence how contemporary scholars, as well as judges of international courts, distinguish between international and national legal norms. When the orthodox 'States-only' conception dominated international legal scholarship, norms were categorized as international or national simply by reference to their addressees: international norms were directed at States, while norms governing all other kinds of entities by definition could not form part of the international legal system, irrespective of the nature of their source. Although the orthodox `States-only' conception has long since been discarded in favour of the modified version, the idea that a legal norm may be categorized as international or national according to the kind of entity it regulates still thrives. The most obvious example is perhaps the (then) European Court of Justice's (hereafter ECJ) seminal 1962 Van Gend en Loos Judgment. The Court concluded that `... the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law ...', because the subjects of Community law `... comprise not only Member States but also their nationals'.11 Hence, the characterization of Community law as 'a new legal order' unambiguously rests on the assumption that international law—in contrast to Community law— cannot apply directly to individuals. Since 1962, the ECJ and its successor, the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter CJEU), have consistently repeated this line of reasoning to affirm the separateness of EU law from the international legal system. The CJEU's 2014 Opinion 2/13 (on EUaccession to the ECHR) is a recent case in point. As we saw in the ECJ's famous 2008 Kadi I Judgment, the idea of EU law as a new legal order on its own has important consequences for the relationship between EU law and conflicting norms of international law, including measures imposed by the UN Security Council.

EU law is not the only discipline, however, where the orthodox 'States-only' conception of international legal personality continues to influence the application of international legal norms. In the field of international humanitarian law, for example, it is frequently inferred that insurgents are not directly bound by common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II, because treaties cannot by definition govern non-State entities. This rationale was explicitly invoked by the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (hereafter SCSL) in its 2004 Decision on Jurisdiction in the Norman case. The Appeals Chamber noted that the law of non-international armed conflict only applies to armed opposition groups to the extent that the provisions in question are reflective of customary international law. This of course complicates any attempt to hold members of armed opposition groups responsible for violations of international humanitarian law, as it must not only be proven that they have breached a relevant treaty norm but also that this norm is a part of customary international law.

In the field of international criminal law, it is a widespread notion that the categorization of criminal courts revolves around 'the involvement of the international community'. Surely, it would seem straightforward to define criminal courts according to the legal nature of the source of their authority. A court would then be international if it is established by a treaty, and national if it is set up under the domestic law of a particular State. However, reluctance to accept the direct application of international law to individuals led post-Second World War scholarship to define 'an international court' as 'a court instituted by one or a group of nations with the approval of the international community'. This definition is recurrent in academic writings as well as in recent rulings issued by for example the SCSL, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (hereafter ECCC), and the International Criminal Court (hereafter ICC). The SCSL's 2004 Judgment in the Taylorcase and the ECCC's 2011 decision in Case 00217 illustrate that emphasizing 'the approval of the international community' rather than the nature of the court's constituent document has significant ramifications for the application of the customary rules on immunities as well as the extent to which defendants may invoke domestic constitutional rights in the proceedings.

These examples show how present-day international lawyers continue to allow a line of

reasoning, which was merely a scholarly invention of the nineteenth century, to influence the interpretation and application of international law. It is high time to bring international legal theory into alignment with positive international law.

The Argument

This book argues, first and foremost, that positive international law does not corroborate the common narrative that the international legal system was transformed during the second half of the twentieth century so as to include individuals as its subjects. The orthodox positivist notion that international law exclusively regulates the relationship between States, while domestic law governs the conduct of individuals, was never more than a theoretical position. Rather, the evolution of positive international legal norms since the eighteenth century supports Hans Kelsen's idea that the international legal personality of any entity depends exclusively on the content of international norms. Against this background, the book claims that we must abandon the currently dominant modified 'States-only' conception of international legal personality, which in practice unfolds as a presumption against direct individual rights or obligations in international law. Moreover, it is long overdue that international lawyers stopped relying on the notion that norms of international law may be separated from national legal norms on the basis of their respective addressees. Only the orthodox 'States-only' conception of international legal personality, which has long been discarded in international legal theory, draws this link between the notion of personality and the question of whether a norm is international or national in kind.

Importantly, the argument put forward in this book is based on the assumption that adopting Kelsen's 'a posteriori' conception of international legal personality does not imply an endorsement of his heavily criticized postulate of necessary unity between international law and national law. Indeed, there are no impediments to supporting the 'a posteriori' conception of international legal personality while at the same time endorsing a dualistic construction of the relationship between international law and national law. This combination has two main consequences. One is

that the international legal personality of any entity is solely a matter of presumption-free interpretation of international norms. Whether individuals have rights and obligations under international law is thus entirely an empirical question. The other is that the entities governed by a particular norm tell us nothing about the legal system to which that norm belongs. Instead, the distinction between international law and national law revolves exclusively around the nature of the source of each particular norm.

Preliminary Caveats, Definitions, and Assumptions

As outlined above, this book's purpose is to expose the epistemic bias against the international legal personality of individuals, seemingly prolific among contemporary international lawyers, and thereby to provide guidance to the practitioners, such as judges and legal advisers, who face the task of solving concrete legal problems. Before embarking on the substantial inquiry, however, it is important to spell out what is not the aim of the book. For example, it should be emphasized at the outset that the book is not meant to be a de lege ferenda exercise. The purpose is not to promote a particular normative agenda. Neither is it to conduct a sociological study of the influence of international legal scholars on practitioners or vice versa. The ambition is simply to show that scholars, including those who pledge allegiance to positivism, have failed to provide a satisfactory account of the position of the individual as a matter of positive international law, and that this misconstruction influences the way in which international law is currently interpreted and applied in practice.

An integral part of the book's argument is that the categorization of a norm as either international or national turns exclusively on the nature of its source. It is an important caveat, however, that this is not an inquiry into law-ascertainment, that is the distinction between law and non-law. The book does not attempt to contribute to the continuous debate on how we identify the sources of international law, except to say that the concept of international legal personality is of no value in that regard.

A related topical issue in the current academic debate, which the book does not address either, is whether individuals have gone 'from law-takers to law-makers'. The extent to which individuals take part in contemporary international lawmaking processes is not directly relevant to the present study. The book therefore only addresses the argument that international legal personality is conditional upon State-like features, including international lawmaking capacities.

Individuals

Judged by its title, this book concentrates exclusively on the international legal personality of `individuals'. But its purpose is not to define the legal personality of human beings vis-à-vis other actors on the international stage. Rather, the primary aim is to use the example of the individual as the ultimate non-State actor to examine the relationship between the theoretical concept of international legal personality and positive norms of international law. The rationale is that if an argument concerning international legal personality holds true for individuals, it applies by implication to all other non-State entities, including, for example, groups of individuals, private companies, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. Limiting the object of the study to individuals is thus a mere matter of expediency, and other entities are included in the analysis where pertinent.

International law and domestic law

This book does not address the question of how to solve concrete conflicts between norms originating from different legal systems. It only purports to examine whether the concept of international legal personality is useful in the determination of the legal system to which a particular norm belongs. Nonetheless, some introductory remarks on the relationship between international law and domestic law are necessary.

Contemporary textbooks generally include a chapter on the relationship between international law and national law, presenting the dichotomy between `monism' and `dualism' in international legal theory. It is a common notion that `monism is dead, and dualism has been replaced by pluralism.' However, like the standard approach to

the concept of international legal personality, most textbooks claim that this debate is primarily of academic value and consequently of little use for the understanding of practice.

The subsequent chapters will provide several examples of how the scholarly debate on the concept of international legal personality has consistently been intertwined with the debate on monism versus dualism/pluralism. The aim of the present section is merely to explicate that the `dualistic' approach, which is recognized by most twenty-first-century scholars as the better reflection of positive law, rests on the following two assumptions: first, international law and national law are separate legal systems; second, the rules of any national legal system decide the impact of international law in national law and vice versa.

The term `monist' is frequently used about a State which automatically incorporates international legal norms into its domestic legal system, whereas a `dualist' State requires international law to be `translated' into national law before it can be applied by national courts. This terminology is unfortunate, because it conflates the overall relationship between the international legal system and the national legal system(s) with the concrete approach to the incorporation of international law into domestic law within a particular State.

Many misunderstandings about the position of the individual in the international legal system seem to originate from a confusion of the status of a norm in international law with its effect in national law. Alexander Orakhelashvili, for example, claims that treaties can be directly applicable to individuals only if the constitutional legislation of the State in question gives primacy of international law over national law. In this way, Orakhelashvili fails to acknowledge that from the perspective of international law, the validity of treaty provisions is not contingent upon the effect they are given in a particular national legal system. A State may very well incur international responsibility if it does not implement a treaty in domestic law. However, from the national viewpoint, national law decides the effect to be given to that treaty. In other words: whereas international law determines the content of an international legal rule and the consequences of

ignoring it, national law decides the effect that the rule is given in the domestic setting. As will become apparent in the following chapters, disregard for this fundamental distinction continues to muddle the academic debate on the position of the individual in the international legal system.

Primary rules and secondary rules

It is commonplace to distinguish between primary and secondary rules in international law. As this distinction is central in the examination of several issues under scrutiny in this book, it calls for a brief presentation up front.

Roberto Ago is celebrated for having introduced the distinction in 1962 in connection with the International Law Commission's (hereafter ILC) work on the law of State responsibility. By Ago's definition, primary rules are `... the rules of international law which, in one sector of inter-State relations or another, impose particular obligations on States'. Secondary rules, which cover the field of responsibility, `... are concerned with determining the consequences of failure to fulfil obligations established by the primary rules.' In the early 1960s, however, it was hardly an innovation to divide rules of international law into a primary and a secondary category. Charles de Visscher, for example, had contended in 1925 that it is fundamental to distinguish between `les règles primaires ou normatives' and les règles secondaires, constructives ou techniques'. In A Textbook of International Law from 1947, Alf Ross argued that international law comprises `central primary norms of intercourse', which must be `supplemented by secondary rules relating to breaches of law and responsibility.' Even though HLA Hart's The Concept of Law, which was first published in 1961, is frequently cited as the theoretical basis for the distinction between primary and secondary rules of international law, it is more likely that Ago was inspired by civil law writers such as Ross. Regardless of its theoretical origin, however, the distinction remains controversial and should be applied with caution. Throughout this book, the distinction between primary and secondary rules is therefore used strictly as an analytical tool, and only to the extent that it serves to promote the understanding of the

issues at hand. The term `primary rules' refers to rules governing substantive rights and obligations, whereas the term `secondary rules' will be used (more broadly than the ILC definition) in reference to all the 'meta-rules' that regulate the normative context of the operation of primary rules. Besides rules of responsibility, `secondary rules' thus also include rules of interpretation and rules of change.

Guide to the Reader

The book is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the concept of international legal personality as a theoretical construct, and is, first and foremost, intended to lay the theoretical foundation for the study in Chapters 3-8 of the position of individuals as a matter of positive international law. It is not the ambition to conduct a detailed study of the intellectual history based on the wealth of existing literature on the fundamental notion of personality in international law. The idea is merely to identify four main schools of thought pertaining to the concepts of 'law' and `Statehood', which lead to four different views on the conditions for acquiring international legal personality and the competences ensuing from this status. The four conceptions of international legal personality will be described on the basis of the work of one or more of their most prominent advocates. The examination primarily concentrates on the role attributed by the selected scholars to individuals in the international legal system. Furthermore, particular attention is devoted to these scholars' perceptions of the relationship between international law and national law, and the weight they give to the notion of personality in the determination of the legal order to which a particular norm belongs. A number of the scholars whose writings are discussed in Chapter 2 have played a significant role as, for example, arbitrators, judges, participants in treaty drafting committees, or members of the ILC. The account of these authors' respective conceptions of international legal personality will thus inform the analysis of their statements as practitioners.

Chapter 3 begins the study of the role of individuals as a matter of positive international law with an examination of a number of issues of general relevance. First, it discusses the concept of

individual rights and obligations under treaties, as well as customary international law, by scrutinizing, in particular, relevant Judgments and Advisory Opinions of the ICJ and its predecessor the PCIJ. Second, Chapter 3 illustrates that the customary rules on diplomatic protection have given rise to a great deal of confusion as to the international legal personality of individuals. Hence, a thorough examination of the relationship between the concept of individual rights under international law and the doctrine of diplomatic protection is necessary as a prelude to the inquiry into the special fields of international law in Chapters 4-8. Third, Chapter 3 provides some preliminary remarks on treaty interpretation, especially the question of how to determine whether a provision contains direct individual rights or obligations, or merely governs the relationship between the contracting States.

Chapters 4-8 deal in turn with special disciplines in international law, which characteristically involve the interests of individuals. Each chapter will study legal documents, including treaties and secondary legislation, travaux pre'paratoires, and case law in order to assess the evolution and the present-day position of the individual in these particular areas. The analysis will focus on the influence of the various conceptions of international legal personality on the formation of positive norms governing the interests of individuals as well as on the subsequent interpretation and application of such norms, including the determination of whether they are international or national in kind.

Chapter 4 discusses international claims, that is, claims arising out of injury inflicted upon an individual by a foreign State in violation of international law. Such claims may be enforced either through diplomatic protection or by granting the injured individual himself the right to bring a case against the foreign State before an international dispute-settlement body. The common idea is that claims of individuals against foreign States were solely asserted through diplomatic protection before the Second World War, whereas the right of individuals to petition international courts independently is a post-1945 phenomenon. By studying international claims practice in three historical periods (before the First World War, the

interwar period, and after the Second World War), Chapter 4 tests this account against positive international law, and inquires whether the concept of international legal personality played a role in the contracting States' choice of one method of dispute resolution over the other.

The study of international humanitarian law in Chapter 5 is divided into the law of international armed conflict and the law of non-international armed conflict. Rather than conferring direct rights on individuals, the norms governing international armed conflicts mostly consist of inter-State obligations. The first part of the chapter assesses the extent to which the law of international armed conflict engages individuals directly and the impact of the different conceptions of international legal personality on the formation and application of the relevant treaty norms. The study includes both provisions that do regulate the conduct of individuals directly, and provisions where such direct regulation was discussed but ultimately discarded in favour of an inter-State model.

The (long) historical development of the law of non-international armed conflict, which by nature involves at least one non-State actor, is particularly interesting for present purposes. The second part of Chapter 5 begins by outlining the original response of legal scholars to the practical demand of States for international regulation of civil war—the development of the doctrine of `recognition of belligerency' between the late eighteenth century and the Second World War. Subsequently, the chapter examines the role of the concept of international legal personality in the post-Second World War formation of treaty norms governing non-international armed conflicts. Chapter 5 ends with a discussion of how the various conceptions of international legal personality are reflected in the diverging jurisprudential explanations for the bindingness of international law on armed opposition groups, which are put forward in the current academic debate.

No one seriously disputes that the individual is a subject of international criminal law. But it is much less certain whether international crimes a priori entail individual responsibility, which would be in line with the `individualistic' conception of

international legal personality, or whether the responsibility arises a posteriori consistent with the Kelsenian approach. Following a brief account of some historical antecedents, Chapter 6 provides a detailed examination of the pivotal post-Second World War trials, and the subsequent development of individual responsibility for international crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereafter ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereafter ICTR), and the ICC. Moreover, the chapter shows that the common practice of categorizing criminal courts as either international, internationalized, or domestic according to the `involvement of the international community' ultimately rests on the orthodox 'States-only' conception of international legal personality.

Together with international criminal law, international human rights law is frequently presented as the principal evidence that the structure of the international legal system changed in the course of the second half of the twentieth century so as to include individuals as its subjects. Against this background, one might presume international human rights law to be a field where the theory on international legal personality has played a particularly central role for the development of positive norms. Chapter 7 examines whether such an assumption finds support in practice. Following a summary presentation of some key events in the history of international human rights law before the Second World War, the analysis concentrates on one prominent example, namely the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter ECHR). The chapter deals with three core issues. First, it describes the evolution of the procedural status of individuals before the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ECtHR). Second, it studies the Court's practice concerning the interpretation of the ECHR, including the margin of appreciation doctrine. Third and finally, Chapter 7 analyses the practice of the ECtHR as regards the place of the Convention in the international legal system.

Under the umbrella of international economic law, Chapter 8 examines the relationship between the concept of international legal personality and positive international norms pertaining to, first, `State contracts', that is, contracts to which at least one party is a State and at least one other party is an individual. Second, the chapter studies the field of international investment law, which (unlike, for instance, international trade law) is characterized by a considerable degree of involvement of the individual investor. Third and last, some pertinent aspects of EU law in relation to the international legal personality of individuals will be discussed. Considering EU law in this chapter may be unexpected, since it is not commonly regarded as a part of international (economic) law, but rather as 'a new legal order' of its own. However, the point is precisely to challenge the popular conception of EU law as separate from the international legal system, and to illustrate that this notion rests, at least in part, on the orthodox 'States-only' conception of international legal personality.

Chapter 9 summarizes and synthesizes the preceding chapters' findings on the position of the individual as a matter of international lex lata as well as the role of the concept of international legal personality in that context. On this basis, the chapter concludes the book by questioning the overall value of the concept of personality in international law. <>

Seals and Sealing in the Ancient World: Case Studies from the Near East, Egypt, the Aegean, and South Asia edited by Marta Ameri, Sarah Kielt Costello, Gregg Jamison, Sarah Jarmer Scott [Cambridge University Press, 9781107194588

Studies of seals and sealing practices have traditionally investigated aspects of social, political, economic, and ideological systems in ancient societies throughout the Old World. Previously, scholarship has focused on description and documentation, chronology and dynastic histories, administrative function, iconography, and style. More recent studies have emphasized context, production and use, and increasingly, identity, gender, and the social lives of seals, their users, and the artisans who produced them. Using several methodological and theoretical perspectives, this volume presents up-to-date research on seals that is comparative in scope and

focus. The cross-cultural and interdisciplinary approach advances our understanding of the significance of an important class of material culture of the ancient world. The volume will serve as an essential resource for scholars, students, and others interested in glyptic studies, seal production and use, and sealing practices in the Ancient Near East, Egypt, Ancient South Asia and the Aegean during the 4th-2nd Millennia BCE.

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Excerpt: Small Windows, Wide Views

In the ancient world, stamp and cylinder seals were one of the primary tools of administration, and could play a significant role as markers of social and individual identity. Like mobile phones today, seals played an important role both in how a person functioned in the world and in how others viewed him or her. On a practical level, they could be used to identify the bearer, identify a product, sign documents, seal containers, and lock doors. They could function within large-scale, official, or state-level administrative, economic, and redistributive systems, for small-scale household administration, or for almost anything in between. At the same time, however, most seals are also extraordinary examples of art in miniature, carved with everything from the seal owner's name and position to entire mythological scenes featuring numerous deities, heroes, and monsters. Finally, the combination of the material from which the seals were made and the imagery found on them meant that the seals themselves often also had amuletic, aesthetic, or even economic value and could play an important role as personal adornment. These multiple roles and functions that seals had in antiquity means that in spite of their small size they can provide expansive views into the beliefs, practices, and lives of their owners and the societies in which they lived.

While studies of seals and seal impressions, as well as sealing technologies, have appeared in excavation volumes, scattered journal articles, and conference sessions, as well as in edited volumes, they have generally been oriented toward a specific geographical region or methodological approach. In this collection we have invited scholars working in four regions of the ancient world where seals have been more or less significant parts of the archaeological record to participate in a conversation that transcends geography, chronology, and methodology. The contributions in this volume represent cross-regional, cross-chronological, and interdisciplinary approaches to the use and manufacture of seals as well as to the practice of sealing in the greater Near East, South Asia, the Aegean, and Egypt.

In recent years, new methodologies, fresh perspectives, and interdisciplinary approaches to glyptic studies have been employed in each of these regions, but no comprehensive collections have been published. This volume showcases ongoing studies that are a development of a scholarly tradition first born out of the cataloguing enterprises of the nineteenth century. The chapters included here build upon the interdisciplinary groundwork laid in the past half-century to advance seal studies in four core regions where seals and sealing played important roles in everything from daily administration to cultural expression. The goal of this collection is not only to bring together junior and senior scholars in the field in order to revisit and reboot glyptic studies in their respective regions, but also to introduce scholars working in different geographical areas to the expert analyses of the materials, methodologies, and issues of neighboring cultures. Contributors revisit established methodologies for examining iconography and chronology, but also creatively explore new methodologies that focus on social identity and stratification, administrative function, iconography, transculturality, production technology, stylistic variation, and cultural appropriation. In addition to highlighting new scholarly approaches, many contributors use innovative technologies in their research methods. The aim, in short, is to present cutting-edge research across regions in a field that is by its very nature cross-regional and interdisciplinary, but is underrepresented as such, in order to both widen our own horizons and present new work on an important class of artifacts.

The chapters in the volume have been organized into four sections by geographical area (ancient Near East, Egypt, the Aegean, and South Asia and the Gulf). We see throughout that in each region seal production and use evolves and changes over time. The introductory chapters to each section present an outline of this basic process. Pittman sketches for us a robust picture of the emergence of the cylinder seal in the Mesopotamian tradition. 'Wegner provides a typological overview of the evolution in seal forms (including cylinders, stamps, scarabs, and other specialized seal forms) in Egypt and discusses the continuities and discontinuities that

characterize Egyptian sealing traditions. Parpola provides an in-depth overview of the development, types, materials, and uses of Indus seals. Weingarten's introduction too presents a chronological outline of seal development in the Aegean, citing various contextual changes that coincide with changes in seal use.

One of the things that has become clear to us in assembling this volume is the degree to which scholars working in each of the four geographical and cultural areas covered are limited by the types of evidence that are available to them as well as by the larger theoretical framework within which individuals in their field work. For example, while scholars working in the ancient Near East have a solid chronological and stylistic framework - supported by both archaeological and artistic evidence - for the development of seal designs over time, archaeologists working in the Harappan world are confronted with a huge corpus of seals dated primarily to a single 600-year period, with less well-defined chronological differentiation. Similarly, scholars working in Egypt often have strong textual records that document state and local hierarchical structures and support the evidence of seals and seal impressions, while scholars working in the Aegean have only the evidence of the seals themselves. As in many disciplines, the evidence available affects the types of analyses that can be done, and the questions that can be addressed. Nonetheless, one of our greatest hopes in framing this volume is that by introducing readers to approaches undertaken by scholars studying seals and seal use in regions and time periods outside their own, we can encourage them to ask new questions and explore new methodologies.

In reading the introductory chapters, as well as the chapters that follow, the first question that arises then is perhaps one of primacy. How is it that, beginning as early as the seventh millennium BCE, this specific technology is found over such a large area? Is the spread of seal production and use over the vast areas of western and middle Asia as well as the eastern Mediterranean basin and North Africa the result of a single moment of invention and its gradual spread, or of multiple, polycentric developments? Is the adoption of seals for decorative or administrative use reflective of a culture's attainment of a certain level of socio-cultural development? Similarly, if we believe that seals were used primarily to control the production, storage, and distribution of goods, does this mean that cultures where seals are used have attained a certain level of economic complexity? Or are seals only one of a number of possible solutions to the issues raised by increasing socio-economic complexity?

Although the volume is organized by region, thematic connections are just as strong as geographical proximity. The ultimate value of glyptic artifacts is their ability to provide modern scholars with a window on an earlier society; by peering through this window we are able to learn more about (1) modes of visual communication (iconography, writing, storytelling); (2) markers of personal and social identity; (3) the processes and practices of seal production, use (administration), and reuse; (4) the connections between groups both within one and among many regions; and (5) the motivations of the communities who used these technologies. In the following pages we highlight these themes across regions, in the hope that the reader can use this introduction as a tool to navigate through the chapters in an alternate way.

Seals and Sealing as Tools of Visual Communication (Iconography, Narrative, Text)

If a picture is worth a thousand words, then is a miniature picture worth fewer? Or, in contexts where we are often lacking textural evidence, is it worth far more? As an artifact class, seals are primarily a means of visual communication, and as such they have the ability to communicate vast quantities and varieties of information. By examining seals, their impressions, and the objects on which these impressions were made, we are able to approach questions of identity, ownership, and social status, as well as attempting to understand the specifics of use and function; ultimately we are able to further understand the meaning they convey. But, as with all things, it is the visual appearance of seals that makes the first impression and as such represents the first step in understanding these artifacts. When scholars

examine a seal as an object and contemplate the iconography of the images or the meaning of a text inscribed on it or used with it, they are taking the first step toward understanding the conversation that the seal and its imagery carried on in their original context.

All scholars who work with seals can relate to the final point that Albrecht Goetze made in his preface to the Pierpont Morgan Library Seal Catalogue, published in 1948 as part of the Corpus of Ancient Near Eastern Seals in North American Collections, on the image-making power inherent in such a small object. Seals are small, but the images speak volumes, hinting at the variety of images that must have existed on larger works. While many of the approaches in this volume bring new methodologies to the study of seals, several authors return to the fundamental analysis of the imagery found on seals. Parpola presents a detailed discussion of the iconography of Indus seals, asking what the various categories of iconography might mean. Ameri combines an art-historical approach with models provided by recent scholarship on narrative to first define the cast of characters found in Harappan iconography and to then examine the scenes in which they interact with each other or with the inhabitants of the "known" world. Weingarten's work on cushion seals highlights changes in iconography that are linked with the change in seal shape. Maria Anastasiadou's contribution focuses on the iconography of an individual seal, comparing the iconography of a two-sided Middle Minoan seal recently discovered in a tholos tomb with a two-sided seal kept at a museum's collection and probably dated to the Archaic period and presenting us with a stunning case of imitation of a Middle Minoan seal by an Archaic seal.

While the small size of seals means that in many cases artists are limited in the amount of imagery they can include, some scholars have examined seals as models for larger works, such as sculpture and wall painting, and concluded that in many cases iconography does transcend media, and the imagery found on seals is a reflection of the greater storytelling capacity of larger works. Similarly, Ameri attempts to piece together the individual icons found in the seals of the Indus

Valley to create narratives that can give us greater insight into the mythology of the Harappan world. For her, as individual elements are added together in monoscenic compositions, and monoscenic compositions are read with others in a narrative, not only can we attempt to reconstruct mythological contexts but we can also identify a relationship between narrative composition and administrative or social function. Rakic also attempts to connect the changing iconography of seals in the Akkadian period to changes in both the administration and the visual propaganda of that dynasty.

Many seal images either contain textual elements or were meant to be "read" in conjunction with text. As outlined in many of the contributions in this volume there is evidence that seal technologies developed alongside the creation of early scripts, suggesting a strong link between the development of these two technologies from the earliest times. Pittman and Scott each draw attention to changes in seal imagery as proto-cuneiform comes into use. Scott then discusses how the understanding and status of the imagery changes as cuneiform is used to record the same information previously denoted through seal imagery. As Younger asserts, when Linear B first appears in Mycenaean palatial taxation records, the emergence of text alongside seals in administration affected the communicative role of imagery in the Aegean as well. Wegner's chapter examines the rich textual source material in Egypt that illuminates the ways seals and sealing practices related to the concept and practice of active administrative systems. In Old Kingdom Egypt, as Nolan outlines, seal and text were used alongside each other in integrated systems. Ben-Tor's work on Middle Kingdom Egypt examines the use of scarabs with royal names, private names, or simple designs in administrative systems and suggests a new life for these objects as administrative tools rather than amulets. Later, as the New Kingdom beaurocracy took tighter control of the administration, textual record keeping also likely changed the role of seals in New Kingdom Egypt, as discussed by S. T. Smith. In the Harappan world, on the other hand, the seals, which are the primary supports for a still-undeciphered script, exist as a constant reminder of an unanswerable question regarding the link between the text and

the image. Yet, as Parpola points out, here too there is a change over time, with rectangular bar seals incised with only script overtaking those with figural imagery in the later parts of the Mature Harappan period. In one of the more theoretical chapters in this volume, McGowan explains the multivalency of Aegean seal imagery as another type of communicative language; seal imagery is, in her view, text that can be read in multiple ways.

Seals and Sealing as Markers of Personal and Social Identity

The visual imagery on seals does not exist in a vacuum, however. Seals, both as objects and as carriers of specific text or iconography, were frequently linked to identity and status. In fact, the iconography of the seals and the question of the individual identity of seal users has been a large component of more recent scholarship. In this volume Costello contends that control over seal imagery was a sign of control within the community: the banquet seal was an icon of elite power that extended their control over lower social groups. Laursen, examining burial contexts in the Gulf, also identifies seal ownership as a marker of elite status. Furthermore, he states that although seals were used in the Gulf tradition for the administration of goods, they remained a vehicle for the communication of ownership by an individual or group. Parpola too underlines the seal image in the Indus tradition as a marker of individual identity, as does Younger for a portion of the Aegean material, while Hussein seeks to link Talismanic seals with non-elite groups in Aegean society. Parpola's chapter also addresses the question of the relationship between iconography and identity in Indus seal imagery. J. S. Smith problematizes the relationship of seal to owner in cases where seals are recarved. Rakic uses administrative functions of Akkadian seals to link the imagery of identity to the iconography of power. Perhaps, as Jamison suggests, a similar context existed during the Harappan hegemony. And in Egypt, as Regulski points out, the tighter control over seal imagery and seal use as the Second Dynasty tightens their control over administration leads to a decrease in seal use by provincial entities.

Glyptic studies now benefit from other art-historical and anthropological approaches as well. The concept that a seal image may be related to identity is receiving new attention. Scholars are now using gender studies and socio-anthropological investigation to question the ways in which images have meaning within a community beyond linking them to individual characters. Seal imagery is packed with information about social behaviors and beliefs. As discussed by McCarthy, we can use the evidence of seals to learn how groups interacted with one another, whether within small communal settings such as a household or in a larger, palatial context. The interactions he identifies can then be used to establish a deeper understanding of gender roles within those contexts. Costello takes a related approach to the banquet seals of the Early Dynastic period. Her contribution examines the material from which the seals are made, the linages they bear as well as the meaning of those scenes, the performativiry of seals as jewelry, and the disposal of some of the seals in a lavish public funerary rite. Together, these two approaches demonstrate how seals functioned to constitute power among elite Sumerian women. Regulski too seeks to disentangle the social relationships of administrative groups in Early Dynastic Egypt by highlighting distinctions between a centralized administrative system and local/regional traditions.

Process and Practice: Seal Production, Use, and Reuse

Although seal use and administrative practice have been actively studied for a few decades, it is only recently that scholars have begun to examine the production of the seals themselves. Regardless of the approach taken, a close examination of visual details and technological production of seals has become a necessary component of research and allows for a greater understanding of the human elements involved. If, as Scott suggests, the seal imagery at Uruk had active power to represent the social status of humans or indicate commodities that were traded, then it was the creators of the seals who imparted agency and meaning to those images. This latter point is expressly investigated by Green and Jamison, who, by conducting detailed studies of workshop practices and

production sequences in the Harappan world, focus on identifying the human creators of bureaucratic tools as agents of meaning-making. McGowan examines the different stones from which seals are produced and the possible deeper meanings of the stone selection so as to provide the seals with an added layer of security. J. S. Smith examines layers of carving (and meaning) in seal production. Anastasiadou questions the act of seal production and image selection by examining an Archaic seal which in fact imitates a Middle Minoan seal. Weingarten's chapter examines the shifting trends in the study of Aegean seals and presents ongoing research on Aegean "cushion seals," a relatively short-lived seal shape that spanned the divides between the Middle and Late Bronze Age and the First and Second Palace periods; the changes in shape happened at a time when production shifted. Only through careful visual and scientific analysis are examinations of this type possible.

Building on the pioneering work of scholars such as Enrica Fiandra, scholars can use the information contained on the reverse of sealings to determine how the seal image and the sealing's function together impart meaning about administrative use. Research that looks more closely at the administrative function of seals is undertaken by a number of authors in this explore the function of seals in Predynastic Egypt, using Near Eastern models to try to explore the social relationships of administrative groups in Early Dynastic Egypt and highlighting distinctions between a centralized administrative system and local/regional traditions. In a similar vein, S. T. Smith's examination of the change in seal use from the Middle to the New Kingdom periods in Egypt also provides new insight into a strictly chronological approach by including not only a discussion of changes over time, but also observations on how public and private practices drove those changes.

Ben- Tor, on the other hand, tackles the more basic problem of whether and how scarabs were used for administration at all.

As we see in a number of contributions to this volume, archaeological context is essential for an understanding of administrative seal function. Pittman highlights this point in general, but uses it

specifically in order to extract the meaning of iconographic groups within the administrative contexts at the site of Konar Sandal South in Iran (KSS). Similarly to Pittman's use of the contexts at KSS, Scott identifies certain administrative groups at Uruk which appear also to work within their own architectural contexts. Comparable work has been done on material from the Aegean mainland (see Younger, this volume). And more specifically, archaeological context has allowed scholars of the Aegean to determine the difference between internal storeroom administration and inter¬regional tax administration (Weingarten, this volume). Rakic too examines the administrative function of seal imagery in an archaeological context, concluding that seal imagery was linked to identity or status of particular administrators (individuals). Wegner's case study examines archaeological data from the corpus of over 20,000 sealings from the Late Middle Kingdom (ca. 1850-1700 BCE) settlement and royal cult complex of Senwosret III at South Abydos. In this context we can see that a rapid change in seal practice is the harbinger of social change. Similarly, Nolan examines the ways that groups or administrators used their tools in order to understand the roles of groups within a bureaucracy.

The afterlife of seals is another aspect of their use and reuse that has to date been poorly understood. Both Laursen and J. S. Smith tackle this

important time in the life of a seal. Laursen, for example, analyses the "Post-Harappan" life of the Indus Valley sealing tradition by examining a set of circular seals that seem to be hybrids of classic Harappan seals. These rapidly became popular amongst the merchants of the Dilmun Culture centered on Bahrain Island. Over time, the iconography of the seals changed. While the earliest circular seals rarely incorporate features from Mesopotamian glyptic, this becomes a more important source of inspiration for later Dilmun Type seals. J. S. Smith, on the other hand, explores the authority that is retained in Late Bronze Age seals that have been recarved from their original form. Drawing on Thing Theory's concept of the "idea in a thing," this chapter considers the relationship between seal authenticity, recarving, and changing systems of authority, particularly in Late Bronze Age Cyprus.

Seals and Sealings as Evidence for Regional and Interregional Interaction

As Weingarten notes, Aegean seal imagery was likely also linked to group identity within various types of settlements. Similarly, seals can also function as markers of regional or national identity (see Hussein, this volume). The fact that merchants were very aware of the identifying value of seals from different regions is made strikingly clear by the variety of seal types found on the second-millennium ship wrecked off the coast of Turkey at Uluburun. Often a viewer would not even have needed to see the text or imagery incised on a seal to know where the person they were interacting with had come from. Simple visual cues such as the shape or material of a seal (for example, stone cylinder seals from Mesopotamia, round stone seals from the Gulf, or compartmented copper seals from Central Asia) would allow a merchant or administrator to quickly identify the origin of a person or even of a sealed product, as seals of different shapes would leave different impressions.

We first encounter interregional adaptation of and communication via sealing use in Pittman's chapter. In her work she examines the system of seal imagery used by Iranian administrators as they trade with their counterparts in Mesopotamia. Her research represents groundbreaking work in disentangling the complex set of mercantile relationships between regions in the third millennium BCE; styles of seal imagery which have hitherto been described as "hybrid" can now be identified as belonging to a very specific regional tradition being used in the context of a highly interconnected world. Parpola uses seal imagery from the Indus to identify crucial moments of interregional contact, and Laursen examines how sealing technologies and iconographies are received and adapted by artists in the Gulf who seek to produce seals that are unique to them while at the same time adopting iconographic elements specific to their trading partners. J. S. Smith talks extensively about the power seal imagery had specifically because of its locus in a merchant setting.

There is a great deal to be learned from examinations of local and intraregional studies of sealing practice. McCarthy looks very carefully at the footprints left by local administrations in early Mesopotamian sealing practices; how might local traditions at sites in the Middle Euphrates and Khabur Basin have affected larger regional practices? Rakic too looks at how a complex system at the very heart of the Akkadian dynasty in turn affected the entire region. In the Indus region Jamison asks how the creation of seals linked local groups. And in Egypt Regulski highlights how a "decentralization" of sealing practice more clearly defines shifts in regional culture.

Motivations

The greatest value of this volume is that it allows us to observe the production and use of seals and sealing technology over a wide geographical area, during the period when they became most common and also underwent the greatest changes in terms of meaning and use. Viewing these tiny artifacts with such a large lens allows us to look for commonalities in the way seals were produced and used while at the same time reminding us of the many fundamental differences between these four regions. It is by bringing all these different materials and approaches together that we can begin to understand some of the key motivations in play in the production and use of seals and start to focus more on the human actors involved in the

process of ancient administration and image making.

On a fundamental level, seals are a means of communicating information, whether about function, identity, status, quantity, quality, official or unofficial administration. Yet, as a technological innovation, seals provide a means of replicating that single piece of information an infinite number of times (or until the seal breaks). While the most common function of this replication is for practical purposes of administration, both Ameri and Regulski suggest that its ritual functions should also play an important role. This functional aspect of seal use is critical and should not be overlooked. The mechanical replication of the seal design as it is impressed on a soft surface allows for the production of large quantities of precise and identical images, and eliminates the possibility of error in the reproduction of these images. In more recent times the invention of the printing press allowed for the easy production and distribution of written matter to a wide range of people, allowing for the dispersal of information over a far greater area than had previously been possible. While it is unlikely that seal impressions had as wide an impact as printed matter, the impact that the replication of images that they permitted had on the distribution of visual symbolism over a large area should not be undervalued.

Seals and sealings are artifacts of social media. Building social relationships and maintaining an identity within communities was essential for economic success in antiquity, as it is now, and the imagery on seals, as well as the seals themselves, were powerful tools within this endeavor. As we interact today using icons, whether on Facebook (where we can "be" whatever we like through our own chosen images), Instagram, or other social media, it becomes ever more obvious how much power was inherent in the creation and use of seal imagery.

It is with great pleasure and a keen appreciation for the study of seals and sealings that the editors offer this volume to its readers. Whatever the tack chosen by scholars today, whether toward administrative analysis, new chronological implications, technical production, socio-

anthropologic examination, intercultural revelations, or symbolic value, we see fresh and exciting approaches developing across regional barriers. Scholars continue to build upon the groundwork laid by the earliest scholars in the field, while sailing ahead to new interpretive frameworks. <>

The First Islamic Classic in Chinese: Wang Daiyu's Real Commentary on the True Teaching edited, translated, introduction by Sachiko Murata [State University of New York Press, SUNY Press, 9781438465074]

A translation of Wang Daiyu's Real Commentary on the True Teaching, the first and most influential work written in the Chinese language about Islam.

The Door of Mercy: Kenan Rifai and Sufism Today: International Symposium Proceedings, Volume 1 edited by TURKKAD Turkish Women's Cultural Association, Istanbul Branch [Nefes Publishing House, 9786059901413]

www.nefesyayinevi.com

Excerpt: The Importance of Sufism in Chinese Islam by Sachiko Murata & William C. Chittick

From the outset it was our understanding that the first task of the Kenan Rifai Chair would be to help Chinese Muslims re-establish links with their own intellectual tradition. It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that the twentieth century was disastrous for Islam in China. Muslims had lived in China for fifteen hundred years and had founded flourishing communities in many parts of the country. Today there are at lean thirty million Chinese Muslims. Many belong to ethnic minorities, but many more are indistinguishable from non-Muslim Chinese.

After the communist revolution of 1949, all forms of religion and tradition were treated as the enemy, in practice if not in theory. Islam was singled out for special persecution, not least because it had always been considered a foreign import. Still today many Muslims hide their Islamic identity because of the prejudice against them. One of the results of persecution was that a generation of scholars was lost and the intellectual links with the past were broken.

When China opened up to the outside world thirty years ago, Muslim communities were able to send students abroad with the aim of regaining Islamic knowledge. A new generation of scholars and ulama appeared, but they have received their learning in places like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. They have some knowledge of Qur'an, hadith, and Sharjah. hut they tend to be indoctrinated with the ideologies of the Islamist movements. Moreover, they have no training in the traditional intellectual fields like Sufism and philosophy. And it is the Sufi and philosophical dimensions of Islam that had determined the nature of the Islam of their Chinese forefathers. In other words, the new ulama come back to China without the Islamic learning that would allow them to understand the teachings of the great Chinese Muslims of the past.

Perhaps the best way to grasp the difference between the new forms of Chinese Islam and that of the past is to observe the difference between the traditional and the modern architecture of Chinese mosques. Wherever there are sizable Muslim populations, new mosques arc sprouting up like mushrooms. Financed mostly by Saudi money, these arc gaudy concrete monstrosities. In contrast, the few mosques that were nut destroyed during the Cultural Revolution are hardy distinguishable from Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist temples. They are beautiful examples of traditional Chinese architecture, seamlessly integrated with their natural and social surroundings. They illustrate the Far Eastern ideal of balance and harmony—an ideal that is of course displayed in old mosques throughout the Islamic world. In the Chinese case, you can only recognize the traditional mosques as mosques from up close, when much of the apparently Chinese calligraphy turns out to be Arabic. The insides of these mosques are unquestionably Muslim places of prayer, even if the general ambience is fully harmonious with traditional Chinese forms.

The contrast between traditional and modern Chinese mosques is reflected in the intellectual discord between traditional and modern Chinese Islam. The old style Islamic thought fits seamlessly into Far Eastern civilization, and the new style attacks traditional Chinese and Islamic forms like noxious and destructive weeds. Traditional Chinese

Islam harmonizes with Chinese civilization for one main reason, which is that it is thoroughly imbued with the inner dimensions of Islamic teachings what is commonly called Sufism. This rootedness allowed the Chinese Muslims to see the splendor of the truth resonating in Chinese civilization. They took seriously the teaching that God sent prophets to all peoples, and they saw prophetic wisdom in Chinese cultural and literary forms, even if they thought that most Chinese had lost touch with the real meaning of that wisdom. The ability to see into and beyond external forms is of course a hallmark of Sufi teachers throughout Islamic history.

We were introduced to traditional Chinese Islam in 1994 when the two of us attended a conference on dialogue between Islam and Confucianism at the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur. One of the Chinese presenters at the conference, a scholar from Singapore, gave a paper on Wang Daiyu, who wrote the first book on Islam in the Chinese language, which was published in 1642.3 We were fascinated by the paper, and upon returning to the United States, Dr. Murata found several books by Wang Daiyu and other Chinese Muslims in the Yenching library at Harvard. We decided to study one of the books of Wang Daiyu, and Professor Tu Weiming. who had also attended the conference in Kuala Lumpur, agreed to read the text along with us.

As we gradually discovered, Wang Daiyu stood at the beginning of' a movement that lasted into the beginning of the twentieth century. though it was largely eclipsed by the political and social turmoil that followed. Modern scholars have commonly called this movement the "Han Kitab," using a Chinese-Arabic compound meaning "the Chinese Books." Dozens of Muslim scholars after Wang Daiyu published Chinese-language books on Islam, and these scholars came to be known as the Huiru, the "Muslim Confucians." They were called "Confucian" because of their firm grounding in the Confucian classics and their remarkable ability to express the teachings of Islam in the language that had been familiar to the intellectual elite of China for centuries.

Professor Tu agreed to assist us in our study of Wang Daiyu because he, like us, recognized in the

Muslim-Confucian texts an example of religious dialogue much more profound and meaningful than the sort of discussions that usually go on today. We found this especially true when, after five years of studying Wang Daiyu, we turned our full attention to a second Muslim scholar, Liu Zhi, who began publishing at the beginning of the eighteenth century. He is a perfect example of a Muslim Confucian. He was thoroughly versed in Neo-Confucianism, the school of thought that has dominated East Asian intellectual history over the past one thousand years. This is a form of Confucianism that addressed the challenges of its two main rivals, Daoism and Buddhism, and developed extensive teachings about the nature of the universe and the human self—topics that were not highlighted in the Confucian classics. Liu Zhi, on the basis of his profound Neo-Confucian and Islamic learning, wrote a trilogy about Islamic teachings. The first volume deals with the overall Islamic worldview, the second with the rationale behind Islamic rituals and social practices, and the third with the life of the Prophet, who is the embodiment of Islamic theory and practice.

In order to understand the significance of the Muslim-Confucian synthesis developed by Wang Daiyu, Liu Zhi, and others, we need to keep in mind the manner in which Islamic thought developed over history, especially in the Persianate lands of Islam, which extend from Albania to China. For example, although al-Ghazali was widely known and universally recognized as a great synthesizer of the various branches of Islamic learning, his influence was overshadowed by later figures who wrote books addressed to a wider audience. Some of the best examples of these later authors are poets like 'Attar, Mawlàna Rûmi, and Hafiz,

who were among the most Influential propagators of the mature Islamic worldview. 'Their poetry Is permeated with explanations of the key themes of Islamic thought, but it is readily accessible to any Persian reader. Throughout most of the Persianatc lands, Mawlänã was a far more influential teacher of Islam than al-Ghazali—even if we have not yet found much evidence that the Persian poets were widely read in China.

For that matter, al-Ghazali was also largely unknown in China. The most influential author among the Confucian Muslims seems rather to have been Ibn 'Arabi, as seen through the filter of Persian books written by 'Aziz Nasafi and 'Abd al-Rahmãn Jãmi, two of the three scholars whose books were translated into Chinese before the twentieth century. The third scholar was Najm al-Din Rix'i, the author of Mirsad al-'ibadi. This book became one of the most popular textbooks of Islamic teachings among the Chinese Muslims.

Ibn 'Arabi's popularity throughout the Persianate world derived from that fact that he offered a vision of God, the universe, and rhe human soul that was far more comprehensive than that offered by any other Muslim thinker before or after him. The major characteristic of the worldview that he developed—the broad outlines of which were shared by most Muslim scholars—can be called anthropocosmism. Professor Tu Weiming uses this word to describe the Far Eastern worldview as developed by the great Neo-Confucian thinkers. An anthropocosmic vision is one that looks on the universe and human self as two sides of the same living reality.

The Muslim Confucians recognized that this Islamic anthropocosmic vision translated easily into Confucian terminology because of its parallels with Chinese thought. If they based their major teachings on specific texts by Nasafi, Jãmi, and Najm al-Din Rãzi, it was not because of some accident of history, but precisely because these texts provided clear and systematic examples of the anthropocosmic vision.

If you ask Muslims today which Arabic texts should be translated into other languages, most would respond with Qur'an, Hadith, and various works on jurisprudence, perhaps some Kalam, and maybe al-Ghazali. The Confucian Muslims, however, did not translate any Arabic works. Of course, they themselves read Arabic because they were trained in the Islamic sciences. But the issue for them was not what you need to know to be a scholar of Islam. 'I he issue was rather what the Muslim community needs to understand in order to except the Islamic worldview and

to live accordingly. It is good to teach people how to say their prayers, perform the other rituals, recite the Qur'an, and observe Islamic law. But how do you explain to them, in their own language, the necessity of doing these things? In other words, you cannot simply tell people that you must do x, y, and z "because God says so"---even if most mullahs tell people precisely this. If people are to accept and follow certain guidelines, they must have good reasons for doing so. Given that the Islamic guidelines shape every dimension of human life, their rationale needs to be stronger than the rationale for anything else. This was the quandary faced by the Confucian Muslims: how do you explain convincingly, in the Chinese language, the worldview lying behind Islamic ritual and social teachings.

The Huiru solved their quandary by writing and translating books that explained the meaning of existence, the role of human beings in the cosmos, the consequences of human action, and the necessity of prophetic guidance. In order to carry these ideas over into the Chinese language, they had to be masters of Chinese thought, and that meant thorough familiarity not only with Neo-Confucianism, but also with Daoism and Buddhism. In the Islamic sources such issues were addressed precisely by the Sufi teachers.

Let us conclude by saying that the four hundred years between the death of al-Ghazali and the death of Jãmi was one of the most creative and productive periods in Islamic intellectual history. Practically all of the great philosophers, theologians, Sufis, and poets who appeared during this period saw reality in terms of an anthropocosmic vision, and ii was this vision that they expressed in their works. They understood the goal of human life to be the achievement of a transformed perception of reality, in which man and the universe function in perfect harmony. They saw the road leading to this vision as embodied in the prophets. beginning with Adam and culminating with Muhammad.

Without knowledge of the manner in which these Muslim sages and thinkers expressed this unitary, anthropocosmic vision and how they understood it as the very vision of the Koran, it is impossible to

see that the line of transmission of Islamic thought from al-Ghazali down to the Muslim Confucians is in fact unbroken. If Chinese Muslims today cannot grasp that the principles and most of the details of their ancestors' thought arc drawn directly from sophisticated expositions of the Islamic vision written by great Muslim scholars, they will imagine that they must reject their own intellectual heritage. They will try to reinvent the Islamic vision on the basis of information imported from the West and the various politicized forms of Islam that dominate so much of contemporary discourse in the Middle East. It is the task of the Kenan Rifai Chair in China to remind the Chinese world of the rich Islamic resources for understanding the human situation that are present in their own language. <>

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