Wordtrade.com| 1202 Raleigh Road 115| Chapel Hill NC 27517| USA
ph 9195425719| fx 9198691643| www.wordtrade.com

September 2018

Spotlight 033

Strident Times Measured

Table of Contents

Studies in European Law and Policy, Cambridge University Press, 9781107198470]

Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World by Adam Tooze [Viking, 978-0670024933]

The Life of Reason in an Age of Terrorism edited by Charles Padrón, Krzysztof Piotr Skowroński [Value Inquiry, Philosophy in Spain, Brill-Rodopi, 97890043610041]

The Husband Hunters: American Heiresses Who Married into the British Aristocracy by Anne de Courcy [St. Martin's Press, 9781250164599]

Fewer, Better Things: The Hidden Wisdom of Objects by Glenn Adamson [Bloomsbury Publishing, 9781632869647]

Bibliography

South Toward Home: Adventures and Misadventures in My Native Land by Julia Reed [St. Martin's Press, 9781250166340]

Excerpt: In 1967 Willie Morris wrote a memoir, North Toward Home, in which he recalled his childhood in the Mississippi Delta, a place with its share of dark history, but also one of abiding grace and goodness, humor and eccentricity. Like Willie, I grew up in the Delta, in Greenville, about seventy miles up the road from his birthplace in Yazoo City and, like Willie, I went north, first to Washington, D.C., and then to Manhattan, not toward home exactly, but for a career in journalism and what I hoped would be a rich, full life. It was. But a few years after Willie returned home, I came back South too, first to New Orleans, where I have lived off and (mostly) on since the early 1990s and, more recently, to my beloved Delta, where I'm building a house.

Until I came back, I don't think I realized how much I'd missed the landscape and the sense of community, the humor and the good-heartedness, the agricultural scent of earth and chemicals more powerful to me than any of Proust's madeleines.

Most of all, I'd missed the fact that fun was so damn easy to get up to. I had some fun with Willie a time or two before he left us in 1999, but his prose is what I remember best. I frequently quote his line that "it's the juxtapositions that get you" down here, because they sure as hell still abound.

A couple of years ago, for example, I found myself slap in the middle of some typically jarring contradictions when my good buddies Roy Blount, Jr. and William Dunlap and I served on a panel together in Jackson, Mississippi, the city Willie ultimately called home. Our assigned topic was fairly loose, but we knew we'd be touching on possums—Roy and I have both written about them (there's an essay about the misunderstood marsupial on these pages) and Dunlap has not only painted one, he is the creator of the tasty opossum cocktail (vodka, a splash of cranberry juice, a dash or two of orange bitters, and an orange slice as garnish). As a prop of sorts (and perhaps a spot of inspiration), we decided to bring the cocktails with us onto the "stage," which was actually the chancel of a Methodist church that had been commandeered for the occasion.

As it happened, a few months before the event, Mississippi governor Phil Bryant had signed a bill into law that allowed handguns inside churches. For an added flourish, Bryant chose to do so with his own personal handgun, a Glock, atop the large family Bible on his desk, a newspaper image greeted with an alarming amount of equanimity by a large segment of the populace. Roy and Dunlap and I, on the other hand, did not fare so well with the locals. Weeks after our panel, we learned we'd caused something of a scandal for drinking alcohol in the Methodist sanctuary. Too bad we weren't packing heat instead. No one would have flinched.

This is the kind of stuff that keeps you pretty much constantly on your toes. It also provides ample fodder for people like me who make a living documenting the various goings-on in these

environs. The particular goings-on in this volume were all penned for Garden & Gun magazine, where I've been writing since its happy inception more than a decade ago. Its very name is a juxtaposition, taken from a fabled, sadly long-shuttered bar in Charleston, South Carolina, where I was lucky enough to be taken as an underage college student visiting the city for a friend's debutante party. There were ceiling fans and balconies, sailors and socialites, the occasional drag queen and the frequent sockless Gucci wearer. It was an eclectic, high-low mix of folks, one not entirely representative of the South, but close enough that the founders of a magazine about Southern culture chose to take its name.

My column in the magazine is called, appropriately, "The High & The Low" and I have a great time brainstorming its wide-ranging topics with my intrepid editor, David DiBennedetto. I write about our music and our food (two of the region's best gifts to the rest of the country), our critters (and our penchant for hunting and making a meal of them), our drinking habits (prodigious), our talent for making our own fun (highly necessary), and some of our more embarrassing tendencies (including our seemingly bottomless propensity for committing a whole lot of craziness in the name of the Lord). I still get mighty embarrassed by the behavior of some of the folks in my region, but it also has been my fellow Southerners who have brought me the greatest joy—on the page, over the airwaves, around the dinner table, at the bar or, hell, in the checkout line.

Willie contended he could best write about the land of our birth from the distance Manhattan afforded him. I find it useful—and endlessly entertaining—to be right here in the thick of things. What I love most about where I live is that my fellow residents have always had an enormous capacity for laughing at themselves—for good reason, of course, but it's a quality we could all do with a lot more of in these fraught times. It's hot and even more humid, the mosquitoes are murderous, and we might all be half crazy, but I am grateful every day that I ended up returning South toward home.

Driven: A White-Knuckled Ride to Heartbreak and Back: A Memoir by Melissa Stephenson [Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 9781328768292]

A searing memoir about one woman's road to hope following the death of her troubled brother, told through the series of cars that accompanied her

Growing up in a blue-collar family in the Midwest, Melissa Stephenson longed for escape. Her wanderlust was an innate reaction to the powerful personalities around her, and came too from her desire to find a place in the world where her artistic ambitions wouldn't be thwarted. She found in automobiles the promise of a future beyond Indiana state lines.

From a lineage of secondhand family cars of the late '60s, to the Honda that carried her from Montana to Texas as her new marriage disintegrated, to the '70s Ford she drove away from her brother's house after he took his life (leaving Melissa the truck, a dog, and a few mixed tapes), to the VW van she now uses to take her kids camping, she knows these cars better than she knows some of the people closest to her. Driven away from grief, and toward hope, Melissa reckons with what it means to lose a beloved sibling.

Driven is a powerful story of healing, for all who have had to look back at pain to see how they can now move forward.

excerpt:

Prologue

Texas: August 2000

FIVE ON FRIDAY DURING rush hour in a city and state both new to me, and my dead brother's truck starts honking its horn, loud and aggressive as gunfire. Honk honk honk. The truck has no air conditioning and the tweed upholstery feels both slick and scratchy against the damp backs of my legs. I'm on an access road that flanks the

interstate, following an inside lane to where it U-turns at the underpass. I feel like a rodent lost in a closed-circuit maze. As I turn toward my side of the highway, the horn blares again. Honk. Honk. HONK. I have no choice but to keep going, a road hazard in a red '79 Ford F-150 with Confederate flag plates. This truck, it seems, is driving me.

One guy flips me the bird. Others stare. Some throw their hands up in confusion. Those who get a good look discover a hundred-pound white girl with a ballerina's neck and an arm full of tattoos behind the wheel, shocked beyond tears. I cross into the far right lane so I can pull over before I get my ass kicked. Each time the horn honks, I feel my brother is fucking with me for making off with his ride. The honking seems to be growing louder, though I know that's not possible. Honk HONK HONK I coast into a spot near some trees at the edge of a Kentucky Fried Chicken parking lot and cut the engine. The chaos ends as suddenly as it began, and for a moment my whole being feels like the still space between heartbeats: body buzzing, ears deaf with silence, the world arrested. Is this what it feels like, I wonder, to be dead?

I sit, waiting for my next move to announce itself. The thought of having the truck towed because of a horn glitch is beyond embarrassing. My husband knows far less about cars than I do, so there's no point in calling him. I search the cab as if I might find a solution in an object. The console holds a half-pack of my brother's smokes, a collection of mix tapes (some I made for him), matchbooks, and spare change. I light a cigarette and assess my predicament.

Two weeks ago, my new husband and I left our home in Mon-tana for Texas, a move I regret already. My brother died suddenly six days ago, after we arrived in San Marcos, where our zip code ends in 666. Now I'm stranded in a KFC parking lot as the temperature climbs above 110. My new driver's license is nothing but a piece of paper folded inside my wallet — temporary, a placeholder. And this truck? I don't even know the dimensions of the thing. I could walk home, but my gut says this is the kind of truck someone might steal. It has little orange running lights on top, a fresh red paint job, a corrugated steel toolbox, and the sort of after-market steering wheel you'd find on a racecar. I don't dare abandon my only sibling's prized possession, left to me by default.

I close my eyes and focus. (Grief has overwhelmed my systems — I can now experience the full range of human emotion in minutes, but logic comes slowly, like reciting the alphabet backwards.) The heat amplifies in the stillness. What would Matthew do?

The toolbox.

I climb into the truck bed and unlock the steel box with the smaller of the two keys. Inside: my brother's tools, a pair of leather work gloves, and a repair manual. Though I'm wearing only Converse, cutoffs, and a black tank-top (Texas has already cured me of the need for undergarments), the sun sears my back with such intensity that sweat drips down my chest, my sides, slides off my chin and splatters on the manual.

I gather up my findings, unlatch the hood, and stare down the giant six-cylinder engine. All my cars so far have been four cylinders and fuel-injected, not carbureted like this one. To get a better look, I climb into the engine compartment and perch myself on the edge of the body.

Think.

Wires and a fuse control the horn. If the horn can honk, the fuse is good. It has to be a bad wire, something pinched or ungrounded, a loose connection. The horn went off each time I turned. I picture that tiny racing wheel atop a thick steering column, and I know that's gotta be it — the wires crammed like a geisha's foot into a shoe. I open the manual and flip through electrical diagrams. Though I have loved cars my whole life, my experience is in driving them, not fixing them. I haven't done much more than change oil or an occasional tire — even those jobs managed in spite of self-doubt.

Stop it. Just THINK

I search the index for "horn." If I can find the thing, I can disconnect it, but the diagrams offer no drawing or picture of the actual horn. It's hard to find what you need when you have no idea what it looks like. Though the front of the truck is shaded by a tree at the edge of the lot, I grow hotter and more nauseous by the minute. When Matthew died, so did my appetite. The more I study the diagrams, the less sense they make.

A kind of mental vertigo I am prone to when under pressure takes hold. In my final year of college, a French teacher caught me daydreaming in class and threw chalk at my head to illustrate the meaning of the verb jeté ("to throw"), a word I knew inside and out after a decade of ballet lessons and five years of French. But put me in the headlights and I'll go deer on you every time.

Breathe.

I remind myself there is no sweaty man yelling at me in this parking lot. The smell of fried chicken provokes a wave of nausea so intense that I climb off the truck and stand in the grass with my head between my knees. Tears come instead of vomit. My brain gives up on logic, taxed from the brief attempt to fix a simple thing. As reason slips away, my emotions kick into overdrive, and I kick a live oak tree older than me as cars whiz by. A stray customer wanders out of the KFC with a hot bucket under her arm. I kick the tree again, curse, and punch it. The pain in my knuckles turns my rage into shame, and I curl up, knees to chest, back resting against the giant front tire. My throbbing knuckles feel more real than any other part of this new Texas life. I sob till I'm hyperventilating, like I did when I was a child.

The last time I had a public meltdown was a half-decade ago, during college, when my Volkswagen van got the yellow parking boot while I was in class. Turned out I owed $150 in tickets, $150 I didn't have, so I went fetal on the curb and cried. Now I have better reasons for crying — a dead brother, a busted truck, and a cross-country move to hell — but I feel just as stupid as I did when I was four or eighteen.

I focus on breathing. The idea of another cigarette appeals to me, and I open my eyes. On the ground next to my feet are those gloves. His gloves. The leather holds the shape of his hands. I slide them on, one at a time, my fingers so small inside I feel like a child, a forever little sister. This, I think, may be as close to him as I'll ever again get.

I stand, steadying myself on the Ford as the world wobbles. In spite of the horn, I do the thing I do best, the thing I do every chance I get, the thing I do when all else turns to shit: I fire up that engine and drive.

***

What inspired you to write Driven?

I grew up in a family full of great storytellers. We laughed often, and my brother became the best storyteller of us all. When he died, I suffered two losses: My only sibling was gone, of course, but because of the way he died, I also lost the ability to tell his stories. No matter how funny the tale, or how moving, people didn't want to hear it when they realize it's about someone close to me who died young.

For years, all narratives that connected back to my brother (which were most of the stories that made up my life) felt off limits. No one wants to hear that, I'd think. My favorite person in the world had become a black hole—a dark and open wound that I skirted with silence.

Eventually I realized I could write about him, and our family, and that felt good. When I wrote about him, I found a place for all those stories I'd silenced after his death. At some point, when the stories grew into chapters, I accepted that I was writing a book about my brother.

Of course, I duped myself into doing something I don't think I could have done intentionally. Focusing on my brother gave me purpose. It wasn't until I had a full draft that I realized I'd written a book about me, too.

How did your family come together around cars?

My family was not so different than any other family living between the coasts, when it comes to cars. My earliest memories are from car trips around my home state of Indiana, singing songs with my family, playing I Spy with my brother to pass the time, getting punched in the arm each time he saw a VW Bug before I did and shouted Slugbug! We were closest, physically, when riding in those cars. For me, that made for good memories. Perhaps that's why I came to love road trips so much, or perhaps that wanderlust was part of me from the get-go.

My father liked talking cars the same way I did, and do. It's a thread that binds us. My mother and my brother didn't care so much about them one way or another, but they'd still laugh over a story about Dad denting our brand new Plymouth Volaré on a tree while trying to escape his mother-in-law, and how, for years after, we could always distinguish our sky-blue Volaré from the many others in the parking lot because of that dent.

Cars brought us together, got us from point A to point B, and reflected how we changed and grew as a family over the years. They made for good stories, too. My mother still drives the 1999 Honda CRV she bought new off the lot. It's in mint condition with only 70K miles on it, which says as much about her as my two VW camper vans, both with roughly 200K miles on them, say about me.

Do you have to care about cars to care about this book?

I'm a firm believer that, in writing, we get to the universal through the specific. I'll read about anything, really, whether it's motorcycle maintenance, a spelling bee obsession, or how to care for orchids. The more truthful and specific people are about the things that interest them, the more I can connect with their story, no matter how distant it may be from my own life experience.

The cars in Driven are vehicles for a narrative of love and loss and rebuilding that I hope readers can connect with even if they can't tell distinguish a Ford Ranchero from a Chevy El Camino.

How did you balance the humor and the heaviness in Driven?

I simply tried to tell my own, honest version of the story, down to the details about each character.

There's a theory I've heard that I ascribe to: You can't dull emotions selectively; if you try to take the edge off the difficult feelings, you curb your ability to feel the good stuff, too. If there's one thing I've always had in spades (a thing I hope the book has, too) it's emotional range. It's a natural extension of how I grew up. A phrase from a poem by one of my favorite writers, Jim Harrison, comes to mind: to move wild laughter in the throat of death. My family has lost a lot, but there's been laughter as well as tears at every funeral. Those are the kind of resilient, big-hearted people I come from.

What are some of the books that you always keep on hand?

Selected and New Poems by Jim Harrison, Never Let Me Go by Kazou Ishiguro, Big Magic by Elizabeth Gilbert, The Sweet Hereafter by Russell Banks, 27 Wagons Full of Cotton by Tennessee Williams, The Year of Magical Thinking by Joan Didion, and everything by Marilynne Robinson and Flannery O'Connor. <>

On the Ganges: Encounters with Saints and Sinners on India's Mythic River by George Black [St. Martin's Press, 9781250057358]

Journey along one of the world's greatest rivers and catch a glimpse into the lives and cultures of the people who live along its banks

The Ganges flows through northern India and Bangladesh for more than 1,500 miles before emptying into the Bay of Bengal. It is sacred to Hindus who worship Ganga, the river goddess. But it has also long been a magnet for foreigners, some seeking to unravel its mysteries and others who have come in search of plunder. In On the Ganges, George Black, who chronicled the exploration of

the American West and the creation of Yellowstone National Park in Empire of Shadows, takes readers on an extraordinary journey from the glaciers of the Himalayas to the sacred city of Varanasi to the "hundred mouths" of the Ganges Delta.

On the Ganges, parts of which originated from a New Yorker article published last year, introduces us to a vivid and often eccentric cast of characters who worship the river, pollute it, and flock to it from all over the world in search of enlightenment and adventure. Black encounters those who run the corrupt cremation business, workers who eke out a living in squalid factories, religious fanatics, and Brits who continue to live as if the Raj had never ended.

By the end of his journey, Black has given us a memorable picture of the great river, with all its riddles and contradictions, both sacred and profane, giving the last word to a man scavenging for the gifts left by pilgrims: "There are good days and there are bad days. It all depends. Everything is in the hands of our mother, Ma Ganga."

CONTENTS

The Aging Prostitute
A Walk in the Park
Going Native
Last Jewel in the Crown
Packed and Pestilential
Multiple Personalities
The Bollywood Goddess
The Coin Collector

Excerpt:

Travelers' Tales

Month after month, snow blankets the great wall of rock that separates India from China and Tibet. It settles, compacts, changes its crystalline structure, freezes solid. The mountain peaks, the highest on earth, are covered with endless fields of ice. Sometimes people call them the Third Pole.

No one really knows how many glaciers there are in the Himalayas. Some say ten thousand; some say more. In India, the second largest is the Gangotri Glacier. In our warming world, it isn't as big as it used to be. Before I left New Delhi for the mountains, I went to see India's best-known glaciologist, Syed Iqbal Hasnain. A jovial, white-haired, grandfatherly man, he told me that the glacier used to cover more than two hundred and fifty square kilometers—about a hundred square miles. "But now it's breaking up in many places. You will see blocks of dead ice that are no longer connected to the main ice body." He chuckled, which seemed odd for someone who was so alarmed by his own findings. But I've often found that maintaining a sense of humor is a common trait among scientists engaged in possibly hopeless endeavors.

The tip of the Gangotri Glacier—what scientists call its toe, or its snout—has receded by about two miles since the first European explorers reached it two hundred years ago. It loses another sixty feet every year. When glaciers decay, they become sad, derelict things. The ice cracks and crumbles and turns a dirty pale blue before melting away altogether. At the snout of the Gangotri Glacier, a thin stream of gray, silt-laden water trickles from a cave surrounded by a bleak, colorless rubble field. So much of the ice is gone that you would have to use your poetic imagination, or look at a very old photograph that shows the long-vanished arch of the cave, to understand why, for centuries, Indians have called it Gaumukh: the Cow's Mouth.

Two hundred miles downstream, the stream reaches a town called Devprayag, which sits on a triangular promontory. By now it has picked up countless tributaries, passed through innumerable villages and pilgrimage towns and a couple of dams, and become a broad, whitecapped torrent. At Devprayag, it is joined by another river of roughly equal size, the Alaknanda, which flows deep and green from the east. From there to the Indian Ocean, another thirteen hundred miles, it is Ma Ganga—Mother Ganga, or, as the British chose to call it, the Ganges.

At Haridwar, the "Gateway of God" and one of the holiest places in Hinduism, the Ganges leaves the mountains and enters the endless dusty plains of North India. Its main tributary, the Yamuna, runs dead and black through Delhi, then skirts the walls of the Taj Mahal in Agra before eventually joining the Ganges in a place that is sacred to Hindus but carries the name it was given by an invading Muslim emperor: Allahabad, City of God. Farther on, bodies burn around the clock in another city, one that has four names: Kashi, Benares, Banaras, Varanasi. The hinterland towns and villages of the great Gangetic Plain seem sometimes to encapsulate everything that ails India: caste prejudice, corruption, rape and sex trafficking, Hindu-Muslim violence, poverty, and pollution. A pall of brown dust and soot hangs over the fields for most of the year, rising from the cookstoves that burn firewood, kerosene, and cow dung in tens of thousands of villages. Three kilometers thick, the brown cloud drifts northward to the Himalayas, turning the ice dark, increasing the speed at which it is melting. But the northern plains, especially the state of Uttar Pradesh with its two hundred million people, also control India's political destiny.

When the river finally approaches its delta—the Hundred Mouths of the Ganges—geographers and believers part company. The Ganges divides.

Names change. Swollen by the power of the Brahmaputra, the Son of Brahma, the main stem sweeps eastward into what used to be East Bengal and is now Bangladesh. From the geographer's point of view, this is the true Ganges. It picks up the Jamuna, becomes the Padma, morphs finally into the Meghna, whose estuary is twenty miles wide. But the sacred Ganges of Hinduism—which is also to say the secular Ganges of the British East India Company and the Raj—peels off before the border and heads south, changing its name again as it cuts through the fertile rice fields and palm groves of West Bengal. By the time it reaches Calcutta, present-day Kolkata, it has become the Hooghly.

Seventy miles south of the megacity, and one thousand, five hundred and sixty-nine from the Gangotri Glacier, the Hooghly arrives at last at a flat, oval island, the final point of land. At its southernmost tip is Gangasagar, the last of the river's innumerable pilgrimage sites, where the river dumps a coffee-colored plume of silt a mile long into the Indian Ocean.

By the time it reaches the Bay of Bengal, Ma Ganga has fed half a billion people. The great river is the source of their rice, their wheat, the sole guarantor of their two-dollar-a-day survival. But it is also a seducer, a magnetic field that for centuries has drawn in millions more—empire builders and seekers after enlightenment, butchers and plunderers, scholars and teachers, painters and poets and moviemakers, curiosity seekers and consumers of poverty porn, package-tour pilgrims and yoga-mat carriers and bungee jumpers and drug-addled Deadheads, devotees of the sacred and the profane. They come to witness ineffable beauty and surpassing ugliness, the river as goddess and place of worship and the river as open sewer and factory drain.

Most leave as bewildered as when they arrived. Invariably they report, record, scribble down their thoughts. They contemplate the incomprehensible. How can there be thirty-three million gods? And why do others of the same religion say thirty-three? Why is it auspicious this year to marry between 3:48:16 P.M. on February 14 and 5:29:37 A.M. on the following day? How can an open sewer be holy? They struggle to-make sense of the endless conundrum of India.

This place! How can we describe it to you?

They write reports to their imperial masters, newspaper stories, magazine articles and travel journals, scholarly histories, ecstatic poems, catalogs of fish, inventories of temples, lists of the hundred and eight names of Ganga, the thousand and eight names of Lord Shiva, analyses of dissolved oxygen and fecal coliform bacteria. They send prayers to heaven. They write emails home, groping for words. They take countless photographs. They make feature films and reverent documentaries. They post jerky amateur videos on YouTube.

In their suitcases and backpacks, the travelers carry the tales of those who traveled before them. I still remember the first time I read about the Ganges. For an eleven-year-old, I had an odd assortment of passions: soccer, stamp-collecting, and scouring junk shops for antique books and prints. One day, for a few pennies, I bought a slim, leather-bound volume with its title gold-tooled on the spine: Strange Lands and Their People. Published in 1827, its purpose was to edify, horrify, excite curiosity, but above all to rally the reader behind the civilizing mission of Christianity. The text was broken up every few pages with a woodblock print showing some piece of local exotica: a sled pulled by reindeer in Lapland, ranks of Muslims pressing their foreheads to the ground in prayer, the skeleton of a woolly mammoth encased in Siberian ice. In the chapter on India, the image was of a widow throwing herself on her husband's funeral pyre on the banks of the Ganges in Benares. Formally dressed Englishmen stood off at a distance, clapping their hands to their mouths in horror.

I thought of that woodcut often as I traveled along the Ganges, imagining that this might have been one of the books that early English travelers packed in their portmanteaus and steamer trunks for the three-week journey from Calcutta to

Allahabad, whiling away the long hours under a sunshade on the sweltering deck of a budgerow or swaying from side to side in a palanquin. Today's travelers do their reading on the long flight to Delhi, by the dim night-light in the 2AC coach of the Shiv Ganga Express as it clatters across the endless plains of Uttar Pradesh, or sitting cross-legged on the ghats of Vara nasi, the steep steps and platforms where the pilgrims come at dawn for their holy dip. The books they carry could stock a small library. There are accounts by those who have traveled all the way from the Cow's Mouth to the ocean on foot, sunburned, stricken with dysentery, sleeping every night in a different but identical village, getting by on a dozen words of Hindi, starting with chapati and dal and chai. Others have made the journey by boat and where necessary by bus, nostalgic for the days of the Raj, tossing out droll asides about impassive or incompetent oarsmen and native bearers. Others have sailed the whole way. Some have struck off on side trips through the labyrinthine channels of the delta in Bangladesh. Others have attempted the journey to the Himalayas in reverse, fighting against the current in jet boats, until they had to admit defeat when faced with the last of the rapids.

As I traveled the Ganges from source to mouth—not in a single journey but in many discontinuous ones—I carried my own share of these books, with each of the authors leaving something new imprinted on the long chain of narrative, adding their own notes of curiosity, distaste, cynicism, ecstasy, and reverence.

Rudyard Kipling, writing for The Pioneer, the newspaper that briefly employed him in Allahabad, hated the sight of dead bodies floating in the river.

Mark Twain wrote the line that has been quoted more than any other: "Benares is older than history, older than tradition, older even than legend, and looks twice as old as all of them put together."

Seventy years later, Allen Ginsberg would sit for hours in a kind of morbid trance among the naked sadhus on the cremation ghats. One night, stoned as usual on ganja, he watched, fascinated, as "the middle corpse had burst through the belly which fell out, intestines sprang up (that is) like a jack in the box charcoal glumpf."

George Harrison spent equally long hours in the beehive-shaped meditation chambers of the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's ashram in Rishikesh, composing songs for the Beatles' White Album. "That Maharishi's a nice man, but he's not for me," said Ringo Starr, who was homesick for Liverpool and tired of eating eggs and beans.

When Poland opened its borders in the 1950s after the death of Stalin, the journalist Ryszard Kapuscinski's first trip was to India. Like everyone, he watched the bodies burning on the ghats of Varanasi. From there he took the train to Calcutta, where he struggled through the crowds sleeping on the floor of Sealdah Station in the floodwaters of the monsoon.

Kapuscinski, who carried with him The Histories of Herodotus, the first travel reporter, understood the nature of journeys better than anyone. "A journey, after all, neither begins in the instant we set out, nor ends when we have reached our doorstep once again," he wrote. "It starts much earlier and is really never over, because the film of memory continues running on inside of us long after we have come to a physical standstill."

Part of my own film of memory was made up of stories that were drawn from other authors whose names would never be known, those who wrote the great legends of Hinduism: the Mahābhārata, the Rāmāyana, and the Puranas. They were a constant reminder that the Ganges is no ordinary river and that a physical journey is not the only way of going to its source. I found its beginnings in the unlikeliest of places, as far as you can get from the glaciers and the ocean and the cremation fires, in a land that had no rivers at all. <>

The Immeasurable World: Journeys in Desert Places by William Atkins [Doubleday, 9780385539883]

In the classic literary tradition of Bruce Chatwin and Geoff Dyer, a rich and exquisitely written account of travels in eight deserts on five continents that evokes the timeless allure of these remote and forbidding places.

One-third of the earth's surface is classified as desert. Restless, unhappy in love, and intrigued by the Desert Fathers who forged Christian monasticism in the Egyptian desert, William Atkins decided to travel in eight of the world's driest, hottest places: the Empty Quarter of Oman, the Gobi Desert and Taklamakan deserts of northwest China, the Great Victoria Desert of Australia, the man-made desert of the Aral Sea in Kazkahstan, the Black Rock and Sonoran Deserts of the American Southwest, and Egypt's Eastern Desert. Each of his travel narratives effortlessly weaves aspects of natural history, historical background, and present-day reportage into a compelling tapestry that reveals the human appeal of these often inhuman landscapes.

CONTENTS

Excerpt:

It was the night of the blood moon. The term was coined by Bible Belt millenarians who believed the phenomenon—a lunar eclipse when the full moon is at its perigee, therefore magnified and pink—portended Armageddon. Joel 2:31: "The sun shall be turned to darkness and the moon to blood before the great and dreadful day of the Lord comes." The timing was just good fortune but it turned out I'd have among the best views on earth. In my ignorance it was its redness I anticipated as much as its bigness or for that matter the fact that it would be eclipsed, and so when it rose into view, more embers than blood, I was disappointed—as disappointed as one can ever be by a new-risen full moon.

By the time I'd rehydrated my noodles and poured my daily half-beaker of wine, the moon had returned from grey-pink to its customary white, like a fingertip pressed against glass, and every cactus and every shrub, and the strawbale cabin, had generated a hard exclusive shadow. It seemed to me that the chief characteristic of night in the desert was not darkness but this light that was not the sun's.

THE CABIN STANDS on a ridge above the San Pedro River sixty kilometres east of Tucson, Arizona. It is a one-room structure about three metres by five, with a door facing north-east. In each of the other three walls is a single window, screened with mesh against insects. It's nice to open the windows to the evening breeze, but during the day they stay shut to keep out the heat. The interior walls are thickly plastered, bumpy and cracked. The floor is packed earth laid with two

rugs heavily nibbled by mice. Furniture: a cabinet for cooking utensils, a folding steel cot and mattress, a pine table and matching chairs, and an iron-banded trunk a century old, containing Mexican blankets, batteries and a first-aid kit and dozens of candles. The table resembles an altar. On it, most of the time, stands a storm lantern and a bottle of screw-top Cabernet Merlot ($8.99, Trader Joe's).

Each of the four windows (there's one in the door) gives onto a hillside thick with mesquite, paloverde, creosote bush, ocotillo, prickly pear, barrel cactus, and saguaro, the region's characteristic cactus, the cactus of cowboy films. It is the saguaros' giant

candelabra forms that break the line of each hillside and provide landmarks. The tallest for kilometres stands beside the cabin. From the south-west-facing window you can see the Rincon Mountains, with the Little Rincons before them, dropping down to the San Pedro Valley, and the few dwellings of the Cascabel community ten kilometres away. When the sun rises behind me, a blade of light drops from the distant peaks of the Rincons, down the foothills and towards me across the alluvial plain, until slowly, like a lava flow, the threshold where light meets shadow approaches the cabin—and then: there! The warmth as the sun's rays touch the back of my head and my shadow is thrown down long before me.

From a hook fixed to a rafter-end I hang a kettle of water on a bungee each morning, and by 6 p.m. it is hot enough for a shower. On the cabin's opposite side, where there is more shade, lies the two-hundred-litre drum that provides all my water, raised on a bed of rocks and protected against the sun with a jacket of wire-strung saguaro ribs.

The ridge separates two washes (dry, except after cloudbursts): one is broad and shallow, the other is deep and narrow and what they call an arroyo. The ridge rises to the north-east—halfway up this hill, about thirty metres from my door, is a double wooden frame into which two identical square boards are slid, each painted white on one side and on the other red. Every evening, before my shower, though I don't always remember, I walk up the hill along a path marked out with rocks on each side, and slide out the boards, flip them over, and slide them back into the framework. From the ridge near his home down near the San Pedro, my friend Daniel checks each morning with his binoculars, if he remembers; if the boards do not change for a day or two, he'll come and make sure I'm okay.

There are a few books here: a natural history of the Sonoran Desert and a book about the dangerous animals of the region, every one hair-triggered, you'd be forgiven for inferring, to sting you, bite you, maul you, or char you with its fiery breath. My own contribution is a paperback facsimile of John C. Van Dyke's 1901 book The Desert. It describes a man's journey, alone, into this desert, the Sonoran, a journey made chiefly in 1898, though its precise course is unclear. He was an accomplished art historian, but trust Van Dyke's guidance at your peril. Here he is, homicidally, on the subject of food and water, for instance: "Any athlete or Indian will tell you that you can travel better without them. They are good things at the end of the trip but not at the beginning." Rattlesnakes he describes as "sluggish." He shoots grey wolves in California, where there were no wolves, and eulogises the purple flowers of the saguaro, which are white (though the fruits are red). Alerted to certain errors by a well-meaning desert ecologist, he graciously acknowledged the mistakes, promised to correct them in future editions—The Desert had a long life—and so far as is known made no effort to do so. A note appended to the manuscript of his autobiography spells out his aim: "to describe the desert from an aesthetic, not scientific, point of view."

I no longer sleep inside but, after my sunset shower, drag the cot out to the clearing in front of the door, where I am not disturbed by the lizards in the roof—or, more accurately, where the noise they make is subsumed by the larger racket of the desert at night. I lift each of the bed's feet and slip containers of water under them—tin mugs, a wooden saucer, a saucepan—to keep conenose kissing-bugs or scorpions from joining me. I position the two chairs beside the bed, one at the foot, one alongside my head, and stand lanterns on them. In a row on the ground between them half a dozen candles are stationed. In the mornings the hardened wells around their wicks are black with flying insects. Within this lit perimeter I sleep more easily than I have for months, which is not to say deeply. Waking in the night to the buzzing of cicadas or the yapping of coyotes, I experience a weight of tranquility that has the quality of a quilt. It might be the peace of the dying.

Most afternoons, as the warmth first intensifies like an oven preheating, then levels off at a temperature that permits nothing but sitting in the

cabin's shadow cowled in a wet scarf, I try to remember how the song goes:

High on a hill was a lonely goatherd ...

One little girl in a pale pink coat heard...

This is my main afternoon work: to remember the words. And day by day, one by one, they return to me, though it's a year since I last heard the song, coming from a cracked Samsung smartphone on the edge of the Worst Desert on Earth, while to the north a massacre was happening.

The Desert and the Sea: 977 Days Captive on the Somali Pirate Coast by Michael Scott Moore [Harper Wave, 978-0062449177]

With echoes of Catch-22 and Black Hawk Down, author and former hostage Michael Scott Moore masterfully walks a fine line between personal narrative and journalistic distance in this page-turning and novelistic account of 977 days held captive by Somali pirates.

Michael Scott Moore, a journalist and the author of Sweetness and Blood, incorporates personal narrative and rigorous investigative journalism in this profound and revelatory memoir of his three-year captivity by Somali pirates—a riveting, thoughtful, and emotionally resonant exploration of foreign policy, religious extremism, and the costs of survival.

In January 2012, having covered a Somali pirate trial in Hamburg for Spiegel Online International—and funded by a grant from the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting—Michael Scott Moore traveled to the Horn of Africa to write about piracy and ways to end it. In a terrible twist of fate, Moore himself was kidnapped and subsequently held captive by Somali pirates. Subjected to conditions that break even the strongest spirits—physical injury, starvation, isolation, terror—Moore's survival is a testament to his indomitable strength of mind. In September 2014, after 977 days, he walked free when his ransom was put together by the help of several US and German institutions, friends, colleagues, and his strong-willed mother.

Yet Moore's own struggle is only part of the story: The Desert and the Sea falls at the intersection of reportage, memoir, and history. Caught between Muslim pirates, the looming threat of Al-Shabaab, and the rise of ISIS, Moore observes the worlds that surrounded him—the economics and history of piracy; the effects of post-colonialism; the politics of hostage negotiation and ransom; while also conjuring the various faces of Islam—and places his ordeal in the context of the larger political and historical issues.

The Desert and the Sea is written with dark humor, candor, and a journalist's clinical distance and eye for detail. Moore offers an intimate and otherwise inaccessible view of life as we cannot fathom it, brilliantly weaving his own experience as a hostage with the social, economic, religious, and political factors creating it. The Desert and the Sea is wildly compelling and a book that will take its place next to titles like Den of Lions and Even Silence Has an End.

CONTENTS

In Algiers one speaks simply of the existence of two varieties of Islam—one, which is called the Islam of the desert, and a second, which is defined as the Islam of the river (or of the sea). The first is the religion practiced by warlike nomadic tribes struggling to survive in one of the world's most hostile environments, the Sahara. The second Islam is the faith of merchants, itinerant peddlers, people

of the road and of the bazaar, for whom openness, compromise, and exchange are not only beneficial to trade, but necessary to life itself. -RYSZARD KAPUSCINSKI, Travels with Herodotus

Excerpt: "Michael, I got a problem," said Rolly Tambara.

"What's the matter?"

"A pirate, he kick my Bible."

We sat in the shade of a conveyor belt on the work deck of a hijacked tuna ship. Rolly was my best friend on board—my best friend in the Indian Ocean, where we were anchored, my best friend in Galmudug, the region of Somalia where we'd met, my best friend in the Horn of Africa and maybe for a circumference of three or four thousand miles. He was a fisherman from the Seychelles, an old, wrinkled-eyed Catholic with a stout, short frame and a nearly bald head. He spoke a French-inflected Creole. We'd both been hauled aboard the Naham 3 after some time as hostages on shore.

"Which pirate?" I said.

"I not know his name."

Rolly had been reading a tattered Bible in another corner of the deck when a Somali came downstairs from the bridge to make tea. While he waited for his water to boil, the pirate sat next to Rolly to inspect his reading material. The sight of a Bible offended him. Unwilling to touch it with his fingers, he leaned back to kick it with his salty bare foot.

"Where'd it go?" I said. "Did you get it back?"

"I run and get it," said Rolly.

"What happened to the pirate?"

"He go back upstairs wit' his tea."

"You don't know his name?"

Rolly shook his head.

"You should tell Tuure," I said.

Ali Tuure was the pirate leader on this condemned vessel, a stoop-shouldered elderly Somali with ragged hair and a snaggle-toothed smile. His weird sense of humor and sense of (relative) fairness gave him clout among the pirate guards. He walked around like a skeleton and greeted people with a skinny raised hand and a wheezy "Heeyyyyyy," like a morbid imitation of the Fonz from Happy Days. He didn't like the sight of a Bible, either, but he never tried to impose Islam on his hostages, and he would have hated any display of (relative) disrespect.

Roily walked across the deck to make his appeal to the Somalis upstairs. It caused a lot of confusion. I mixed a cup of instant coffee and wandered to the shoreward side of the ship. The town of Hobyo lay across the water, and to my nearsighted eyes it looked like a blurry jumble of rocks on the brownish desert shore. Zinc roofs reflected the sun in sharp pinpricks.

The Naham 3 was a fifty-meter long-liner, flagged in Oman but operated by a Taiwanese company. The hostages consisted of Chinese, Cambodian, Vietnamese, Indonesian, and Filipino fishermen. They sat behind us—chatting, smoking cigarettes, playing cards. We lived like inmates of a floating internment camp. I was a skinny, lost-looking castaway, an American writer in his early forties who could remember a pleasant expatriate life in Berlin like a distant dream. After three or four months of captivity, I had shed about forty-five pounds. The Naham 3 had a hanging tuna scale, a spring-loaded contraption with a hook, and if you slung a loop of rope around the hook you could dangle from it like a dead fish.

A Chinese crewman, Jian Zui,* stood by the rail with a cigarette. He had a plump, deadpan face that broke sometimes into a bright grin. He held out his cigarette pack to me.

"No, no."

He tossed the end of his cigarette into the water and looked out at Hobyo. He placed two flat hands together and mimed a dive overboard. It shocked me, in that prison atmosphere, to see him demonstrate such a forbidden act: I glanced

around at the Somali gunmen lazing on the upper deck. Jian Zui and I could hardly communicate, but we thought alike—I'd imagined the same escape dozens of times. I wondered if he could swim.

At last he smiled, as if the idea were a lark. He folded his hands to imitate Christian prayer. "Santa Maria," he said, and rolled his eyes to heaven.

Among the Chinese on our ship, "Santa Maria" was slang for "dead." He meant that if we jumped, we might die.

I nodded.

Soon a motorboat came bouncing across the swells. Supply skiffs buzzed out twice a day from Hobyo. "Moto," said Jian Zui, and when it pulled alongside our ship, the arriving Somalis tossed up a thick line. Other men lashed it to the railing while both vessels lurched up and down on the water. Three or four Somalis sprang aboard. Another heaved up a heavy sack of khat, a leafy green stimulant plant that Somalis like to chew the way Westerners like to drink alcohol. The pirates argued about who should haul the sack upstairs.

For a few weeks in the summer of 2012 I watched these skiff deliveries with cautious optimism. I had mentioned my location in German during a phone call home to California. My mother had asked about a "care package"—Can we send you a care package, Michael?—and the optimism in her voice made me dizzy with grief. A care package, to reach this vessel, would have to move through several layers of clan and criminal networks on the savanna. It was a sweetly intended idea, but what would be left of a care package when it came over the rail? A pair of shorts?

I felt a hot pressure behind my eyes.

A plane made a wide circle around Hobyo from the south, and I spotted it before I heard its engines. The gusting breezes on the water were constant, and they swept noises around in unpredictable ways. I couldn't see much without my glasses, but it was probably a European or American surveillance plane. While it made a wide turn over the land, a fierce old Somali with a damaged-looking face came out from the bridge deck and waved his pistol.

"American!" he hollered.

He thought it was a Western plane, too, and he didn't want me standing where it could spot me. A group of young pirates upstairs had moved to the far side of the deck. Low-ranking guards had learned to hide from aircraft to keep from exposing their faces to surveillance.

"American!" the old Somali hollered at me one more time, waving his pistol. This pirate had never shown me anything but hatred, and it burned me with outraged common sense to take an order from him. I lingered near the gunwale, watching the Somalis unload, until I was satisfied that no ludicrous, unlikely care package was on the skiff.

"Ah, Michael," Rolly said from under the conveyor belt, against the gusting breeze. "Not make them angry, Michael." <>

Seacoast Plants of the Carolinas: A New Guide for Plant Identification and Use in the Coastal Landscape by Paul E. Hosier [Southern Gateways Guides, The University of North Carolina Press, 9781469641430]

This accessibly written and authoritative guide updates the beloved and much-used 1970s classic Seacoast Plants of the Carolinas. In this completely reimagined book, Paul E. Hosier provides a rich, new reference guide to plant life in the coastal zone of the Carolinas for nature lovers, gardeners, landscapers, students, and community leaders. Features include:

- Detailed profiles of more than 200 plants, with color photographs and information about identification, value to wildlife, relationship to natural communities, propagation, and landscape use.
- Background on coastal plant communities, including the effects of invasive species and the benefits of using native plants in landscaping.
- A section on the effects of climate change on the coast and its plants.

- A list of natural areas and preserves open to visitors interested in observing native plants in the coastal Carolinas.
- A glossary that includes plant names and scientific terms.

With a special emphasis on the benefits of conserving and landscaping with native plants, this guide belongs on the shelf of every resident and visitor to the coasts of the Carolinas.

CONTENTS

This volume updates and expands upon an earlier book written by Karl Graetz and first published in 1973 by North Carolina Sea Grant. For over four decades, Graetz's book informed residents and visitors to the Carolinas coast about native plants. However, knowledge of coastal processes and the flora and fauna of the region has increased dramatically since 1973. Continued development of coastal resources and new generations of scientists, residents, and visitors have created the need for an update of the original Seacoast Plants book.

In this volume, I share information about the unique environments, natural processes, and important plants that surround us when we are at or near the coast. Learning about coastal plants is an intellectual exercise, a way to discover how to use coastal plants wisely in developed spaces, and a prelude to understanding the need to conserve coastal plants, especially those imperiled or found only in certain areas.

This book affords a means of identifying the common plants in the coastal Carolinas. The plant profiles provide physical, chemical, and biological features for each species along with detailed photographs, many displaying seasonal characteristics such as flowers and fruits. The information about each species aids one in understanding and appreciating the ecology of our coastal flora, as well as the wildlife and human uses and values of these distinctive plants.

I describe a range of plants considered one or more of the following: native, exotic, landscape, weedy, or invasive, which are defined in the glossary in Appendix 2. Whether you're planning for your property, making a casual visit, or participating in an extensive field trip, you are likely to encounter these common plants. Understanding the ecological role of our native plants, the usefulness of certain exotic landscape plants, and the effect that invasive and weedy species have on native plants and landscapes leads us to better appreciate, conserve, and preserve native plants in their natural habitats.

I offer practical information that can help you decide which plants to select as part of a pleasing, functional, and low-maintenance landscape plan using native plants. The plant profiles do include some exotic plants, but only those that are especially popular, grow exceptionally well, and have a long history of use in coastal settings with

little indication of weediness or invasiveness. Information about introduced plants of special concern—invasive and weedy species—is also included in the plant profiles chapter to alert you about the undesirable growth habits of these problematic species. The descriptions of these species are clearly marked at the beginning of the profile with the cautionary statement, "Not recommended for planting; instead, remove where already growing."

The plant communities described in this book occupy the upland and wetland areas on barrier islands and the adjacent mainland influenced by salt water either through tidal flooding or salt aerosols. Specifically, these communities include dunes ranging from small embryo dunes to mature, well-developed dunes; maritime grasslands; maritime shrub thickets; maritime forests; and freshwater wetlands and saltwater-influenced wetlands, namely brackish marshes, salt marshes, and salt pannes.

The intended audience includes coastal naturalists, ecologists, horticulturalists, landscapers, homeowners, gardeners, students, and visitors to the coast. Individuals with an interest in the nursery trade and representatives of federal, state, local, and nonprofit agencies will find this guide helpful in accomplishing their important work.

Chapter 1 provides the background for understanding the Carolinas coastal environment, including its distinctive and remarkable natural processes and the resulting complex of plant communities. Sandy soils, intense salt aerosols, nearly constant wind, and scarce soil nutrients are examples of what scientists consider distinguishing characteristics of the coastal zone, while the varied plant communities result from the impact of these physical features on the biota.

Chapters 2 through 4 survey the ecology of coastal plants from the wrack line on the beach to the salt marshes that occupy barrier islands, barrier beaches, and nearby mainland estuarine shorelines. These chapters focus on environmental factors to which members of the flora have adapted and the ways in which they have adjusted to surviving in what, for most plants, is a stressful environment.

Chapter 5 identifies plants that are invasive in the coastal Carolinas. Some species are already firmly entrenched with no hope for eradication. Others are nearly under control but require vigilance, lest they expand into natural communities and disrupt the innate balance among species. The ecology of others suggests that they are capable of spreading rapidly if environmental conditions change, possibly in response to climatic change.

Chapter 6 provides practical guidance in selecting native plants to replace current foundation and general property plants. Native plants are adapted to coastal environmental conditions and generally thrive with minimum care. Understanding their ecological requirements allows one to select appropriate native plants. These native species are accustomed to the soils of the Carolinas, resist native pests, and can withstand salt aerosols or saltwater flooding. Exotic species often used as foundation plants are collected from coastal habitats elsewhere in the world and are often well adapted to coastal conditions but sometimes require more care in their new geographic locations. Some introduced species are well-behaved, well-adapted exotic plants, such as Japanese aralia and Chinese podocarpus; these exotic plants can be recommended for landscaping coastal homes and businesses. Planting these species is worth the extra effort in maintenance to enjoy their beauty. Rain gardens are an excellent way to grow native plants that benefit the local environment. Rain gardens are depressions created in the landscape to collect rainwater from impermeable surfaces, such as roads, driveways, and sidewalks. Many native plants are excellent candidates for rain garden plantings.

Chapter 7 considers the effects of frequent coastal storms on vegetation, primarily trees and shrubs in natural and human-centered plant communities. Both research and practical experience show that it is possible to minimize the effects of hurricanes and nor'easters by carefully choosing certain native

plants. Pre-storm preparation and post-storm repairs are minimal with the wise selection of native plants for landscaping.

Scientists predict that the rate of change in earth's climate will continue to accelerate in the twenty-first century, with coastlines among the first areas to experience the changes. Chapter 8 explores some of the particular vulnerabilities of the Carolinas coastal region. While the extent cannot be predicted with precision at this time, we can anticipate some climatic changes. It would be prudent to plan for them.

Chapter 9 profiles the plants common to the coast of the Carolinas. This section includes descriptions and other information concerning more than zoo species of common and distinctive coastal plants found in the Carolinas. These profiles include native, exotic, and invasive plants.

The book also includes additional reference materials. Appendix I describes 21 natural areas in the coastal Carolinas where you can observe native plants. These areas are reachable by car, foot, or boat. This section notes the specific plant communities that are best expressed at each natural area. Appendix 2 includes a glossary of geological, ecological, and botanical terms. Appendix 3 matches each profiled plant's common name to its respective scientific name. In addition, there is a list of references for further information. <>

Mechanical Design of Structural Materials in Animals by John M. Gosline [Princeton University Press, 9780691176871]

Mechanical Design of Structural Materials in Animals explores the principles underlying how molecules interact to produce the functional attributes of biological materials: their strength and stiffness, ability to absorb and store energy, and ability to resist the fatigue that accrues through a lifetime of physical insults. These attributes play a central role in determining the size and shape of animals, the ways in which they can move, and how they interact with their environment. By showing how structural materials have been designed by evolution, John Gosline sheds important light on how animals work.

Gosline elucidates the pertinent theories for how molecules are arranged into macromolecular structures and how those structures are then built up into whole organisms. In particular, Gosline develops the theory of discontinuous, fiber-reinforced composites, which he employs in a grand synthesis to explain the properties of everything from the body wall of sea anemones to spiders' silks and insect cuticles, tendons, ligaments, and bones. Although the theories are examined in depth, Gosline's elegant discussion makes them accessible to anyone with an interest in the mechanics of life.

Focusing on the materials from which animals are constructed, this book answers fundamental questions about mechanical properties in nature.

Contents

Excerpt: This book provides a broad overview of the mechanical design of the three major classes of structural materials in animals: tensile, rigid, and pliant materials, but it has been based on the detailed analysis of a small number of selected examples. Thus, in the section on tensile materials we considered the design of collagen fibers, as found in mammalian tendon and sea-urchin spine ligament, and the design of silk fibers, as produced by spiders. In the section on rigid materials we analyzed the structural design of mammalian bone and insect cuticle. In the section on pliant materials, we analyzed the design of sea-anemone mesoglea, slug mucus, several rubberlike animal proteins, and vertebrate skin and artery.

One of the most consistent themes in these analyses is that the basic structural organization of essentially all biological structural materials is that of fiber-reinforced composites. Indeed, in our discussion of collagen tendon, bone, and insect cuticle, we explicitly used composite-material theory to quantify the structural design of these materials. That is, we used estimates of fiber aspect ratios and volume fractions, and of the fibers' known material properties to estimate the properties of the matrix components, which are essentially impossible to quantify experimentally. This allowed us to obtain reasonable semiquantitative understandings of the composite design of these materials.

Tendon and cuticle are both made from two discrete components: short, rigid filaments and the softer matrix that surrounds them, which holds the filaments together into the composite structure of the material. In the case of tendon, the crystalline collagen fibrils are held together by a soft gel of the proteoglycan called decorin, and because the aspect ratio of the collagen fibrils is very large, of the order of 5 x 104, and the fiber volume fraction is quite high, this soft gel is sufficient to create the reasonably strong, stiff, and spring-like tensile-fiber systems that we see in tendons and ligaments. Similarly, in the case of insect cuticle, we were able to take known values for the stiffness, aspect ratio, and volume fraction of chitin fibrils that have been isolated from insect cuticle, and with this information we estimated the properties of the matrix materials that exist in these composites as well.

We also attempted to apply composite-fiber theory to the stiffness of bone, and we saw that the orientation-dependent stiffness of bone did not follow the theoretical values expected for a typical fiber-reinforced composite. However, if we took account of the fact that the hydroxyapatite crystals in bone are not fibers but platelets, unlike a parallel-fiber composite, the hydroxyapatite crystals could simultaneously reinforce in two directions, at slightly different levels. With this geometry, we found that the composite of mineral-crystal platelets and a matrix formed by collagen fibers could reasonably explain the properties of bone.

One important feature of composites like these is that the structural integrity of the composite arises from the structural properties (stiffness and strength) of each component individually, as well as the strength of the interface between the two components. Indeed, the failure of composite systems is most often initiated by failure at the fiber-matrix interface. Spider silk, however,

provides a different kind of composite design where there is no interface between fiber and matrix. Spider dragline silk, like many artificial polymer fibers, is made from a single kind of polymer molecule, a protein called a fibroin. When these polymers are drawn from the spinneret complex at the posterior of the spider's abdomen, the molecules become organized to create a biphasic structure that is reminiscent of the fiber-reinforced composite systems described above. The fibroins that form spider silk have amino-acid-sequence designs that establish the unique "composite" design of this material. That is, silk fibers contain polymer crystals that are interspersed in a relatively amorphous matrix, but both of these phases are created from a mixture of two silk proteins that have quite similar organizations. The sequence designs of these proteins are those of block copolymers, where there are sequence blocks that encode the crystalline structures that alternate with blocks of sequence that encode an amorphous or semicrystalline "matrix." Specifically, the crystalline structures are formed by blocks of about 10 alanine residues that form /3-pleated-sheet crystals that are the reinforcing "fibers" of this composite, and the matrix component of this material is formed from longer sequence blocks that are rich in glycine and proline. The details of these sequences are given in chapter 10, but the result is that this packaging of matrix and fiber components into a single molecule allows the creation of a composite-like system at the nanometer scale thatis an order of magnitude or two smaller than the composite systems seen in collagen, cuticle, and bone. The take-home message here is that this single-molecule nanocomposite structure allows spider silk to achieve mechanical properties that are truly remarkable.

The stress-strain curve for spider dragline silks (major-ampullate-gland silk) starts with a linear high-stiffness zone that extends to strains of 0.02-0.03, with initial stiffness values of about 10 GPa at low strain rates. However, at high strain rates, like those that occur during the impact of a flying insect with the spider's web, the initial stiffness approaches 20-30 GPa. Comparing these initial stiffness values for spider silk with those for collagen tendon, insect cuticle, and bone in table 16.1, we see that spider silk is 7-20 times stiffer than collagen tendon (at about 1.5 GPa) and about 2.5-7.5 times stiffer than insect cuticle (at about 4 GPa for mature locust cuticle). Bone, by virtue of its high content of rigid mineral platelets, is actually somewhat stiffer than silk that is tested at low strain rates. That is, the tensile stiffness of a bone sample loaded parallel to the long axis of a bone is about 20 GPa, which is roughly equivalent to the stiffness of spider silk at high strain rates, considering the dramatic effect of strain rate on the stiffness of silk. The presence of a high volume fraction of exceptionally stiff filler particles, the hydroxyapatite-crystal platelets (E 120 GPa), is able to raise the composite stiffness of bone to a level that is comparable to the pure-protein silk fibers. Thus, using tensile stiffness as a basis for comparison, spider silk and bone are at the top end of the "quality" scale, but what about strength and toughness?

In spite of the high initial stiffness of spider silk, its strength and toughness are actually the more exceptional attributes of dragline silk fibers, and it will be interesting to compare the strength and toughness of silk with the other materials. Let's start this comparison with an artificial carbon fiber, as an indication of the upper range of stiffness and strength possible from organic materials. Clearly, evolution has not figured out how to convert a polymer fiber, like collagen or silk, into a carbon fiber, which is the current standard for synthetic high-performance reinforcing fibers in composite materials. But carbon fibers establish a clear upper limit to what can be expected from truly high performance fibrous carbon-based tensile and rigid materials. Carbon fibers have stiffness values in the region of 300 GPa and strengths of the order of 4 GPa, and high-volume-fraction parallel composites made from carbon fibers have only slightly lower levels of strength and stiffness.

We provide additional information about the properties of carbon fibers, as well as information on the properties of tendon, silk, bone, and insect cuticle. None of the natural materials analyzed in this book comes close to the levels of stiffness and strength seen for carbon fibers, but the strength of spider silk is the closest, being about a third of that of carbon fibers. This strength comparison is impressive, but even more impressive is the fact that spider silk energy to break (i.e., its toughness) is an order of magnitude greater than that of carbon fibers. Spider silk is not renowned for its elastic-energy storage capacity, but this property is also tenfold greater than that of carbon fiber. This high toughness and energy storage capacity comes largely from the 30-fold greater extensibility of silk relative to that of carbon fiber.

Comparison of spider silk with the other biological materials—collagen, bone, and cuticle—reveals clearly the greatly reduced levels of strength, extensibility, energy to break, and even energy storage capacity of these other animal materials. Even collagen tendon, which is renowned as a superb tissue spring in vertebrate locomotion, has an energy storage capacity that is a factor of ten less than that of spider silk. This is interesting because spring energy capacity is not considered a particularly useful attribute for a spider web, where energy dissipation during the impact of a flying insect with the web is seen as the more useful property for the web material. Indeed, the energy storage capacity of spider silk is about one-third that of its energy to break, indicating that energy dissipation, which is key to prey capture in the web, is the crucial material property for spider draglines and the silk used to create the web's frame and radial threads.

There is another general principle that we can take from our investigation of these four materials; namely, that the properties observed for collagen, silk, bone, and cuticle are strongly influenced by the processes by which they are made in the living organism. We have seen above that spider silk is drawn from the silk-gland-spinneret complex in the abdomen of the spider, and this system provides a draw-processing mechanism that is essentially identical to the processes used by the textile-fiber industry in the production of synthetic fibers such as nylon, rayon, and polyester. These processes gradually elongate the polymer molecules in the fluid state, a process that facilitates the assembly of the crystal-forming domains of the silk molecule to form crystalline structures that establish the solid-state structure of the silk-fibroin network. Extensive draw processing in the final stages of silk formation in the terminal duct then elongates the flexible polymer domains between the crystalline cross-links, and as the silk thread emerges from the silk-gland spigot it dries, and the extended, flexible chains between the crystalline cross-links stiffen greatly to produce the material we know as spider dragline silk. As a consequence, spiders can make silk fibers for their draglines and web construction that are orders of magnitude longer than the length of their abdomen. Indeed, a spider spinning its web produces a length of silk that is at least 1000 times longer than the length of its silk-gland-spinneret complex.

This process of spider-silk synthesis is quite different from the processes involved in the formation of tendon, cuticle, and bone, whose material synthesis and assembly into the structural material occur at a size scale that in some cases is considerably smaller than the individual cells that synthesize the structural components that are transformed into these materials. For example, the chitin fibrils in insect cuticle have average lengths of about 300 nm and diameters of about 2.5 nm, giving them modest aspect ratios of about 120. Bone platelet size parallel to the long axis of a bone was estimated to be at least 110 nm but likely less than 200 nm. The platelets are 30-40 nm wide and about 3 nm thick, giving them longitudinal aspect ratios of only 40-70. The reinforcing structures of chitin and bone are indeed smaller than the cells that produce them. In the case of the collagen tendon, however, the basic structural subunit, the collagen fibril, has a considerably higher aspect ratio of about 104-105, and an overall length of the order of 5-10 mm. Thus, the linear dimensions

of collagen fibrils are considerably greater than the size of the cells that synthesize the collagen molecules. However, these high-aspect-ratio fibrils are necessary because the matrix that holds the fibrils together in collagen fibers, the décor in gel, is exceptionally soft.

In each case, for the three discontinuous-composite systems, the overall material performance is limited by the aspect ratio of the reinforcing fibers, by the stiffness of the matrix, by the inherent stiffness of the reinforcing fiber, or by some combination of these attributes. This is not the case for the silk produced by spiders, where the "fiber" and "matrix" components are continuously linked through the covalent backbone of the silk-fibroin protein, and this protein composite is, as a consequence, much stronger and tougher than the discontinuous-fiber composites produced by their insect and vertebrate cousins.

This summary comparison of the tensile and rigid biological materials with high-performance synthetic materials might leave us wondering why the materials made by animals don't have more impressive properties. The answer lies in the evolutionary history of these materials. Materials design in living systems is an agelong process. As we have seen in chapter 13, the most primitive materials created during the evolution of the earliest animals, such as the sea anemone, are very soft, pliant materials that are based on collagen fibers embedded in extremely soft proteoglycan-like matrix materials. Sea anemones evolved late in the Proterozoic era, about 550 Ma, but as the more advanced animal groups evolved, more complexity developed in animal structural materials. Insects first evolved in the Carboniferous period, about 400 Ma, and the Orthoptera (grasshoppers and locusts) evolved at about 330-300 Ma. Birds first evolved in the Jurassic era, at about 160 Ma, but modern birds appeared around 75 Ma. Interestingly, insects in their early evolution were considerably larger than current insects, possibly because they did not have to compete with other animals of similar size, but most likely because atmospheric oxygen levels were considerably higher during this period, and this enabled insects, with their tracheal respiratory systems, to support the greater energy demands required for flight by larger size. However, when modern birds appeared on the scene, their competition with and predation on the insects likely drove insect size down, bringing them to the size scale that we know today.

The locust is one of the larger of the modern insects, and it is certainly much smaller than the majority of modern birds; indeed, there is very little overlap in the size range of insects and birds, so the competition between birds and insects in the modern era has been one of bird eating insect. We saw in our analysis of the scaling of the specific modulus of insect cuticle, bone, and a range of artificial composites that there is a strong correlation between the stiffness (i.e., the specific modulus) of these materials and the size of the flying "machines" made from them. Indeed, the roughly fivefold greater specific modulus of bone relative to that of insect cuticle extrapolated very nicely to the specific modulus of wood and of the synthetic materials that have been and are currently used in the construction of artificial flying machines. The implication of this fivefold greater stiffness and similar strength is that skeletal stiffness based on bone has allowed birds to be much larger than insects, and this has established the predator-prey relationship that defines insect-bird competition in our modern world. Apparently, the quality of structural materials in different animal groups has helped to establish size differences between those groups, and presumably differences in locomotor performance as well. Thus, the design of structural materials has played significant roles establishing the ecological and behavioral interactions among animals. <>

Unnatural Selection by Katrina van Grouw [Princeton University Press, 9780691157061]

A lavishly illustrated and designed look at how evolution plays out in selective breeding

Unnatural Selection is a stunningly illustrated book about selective breeding--the ongoing

transformation of animals at the hand of man. More important, it's a book about selective breeding on a far, far grander scale—a scale that encompasses all life on Earth. We'd call it evolution.

A unique fusion of art, science, and history, this book celebrates the 150th anniversary of Charles Darwin's monumental work The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, and is intended as a tribute to what Darwin might have achieved had he possessed that elusive missing piece to the evolutionary puzzle—the knowledge of how individual traits are passed from one generation to the next. With the benefit of a century and a half of hindsight, Katrina van Grouw explains evolution by building on the analogy that Darwin himself used—comparing the selective breeding process with natural selection in the wild, and, like Darwin, featuring a multitude of fascinating examples.

This is more than just a book about pets and livestock, however. The revelation of Unnatural Selection is that identical traits can occur in all animals, wild and domesticated, and both are governed by the same evolutionary principles. As van Grouw shows, animals are plastic things, constantly changing. In wild animals the changes are usually too slow to see—species appear to stay the same. When it comes to domesticated animals, however, change happens fast, making them the perfect model of evolution in action.

Suitable for the lay reader and student, as well as the more seasoned biologist, and featuring more than four hundred breathtaking illustrations of living animals, skeletons, and historical specimens, Unnatural Selection will be enjoyed by anyone with an interest in natural history and the history of evolutionary thinking.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: This is a book about selective breeding.

Although that's something that happens to captive animals, including domesticated ones, it's not the same as domestication. Domestication is what happens first—the transition of wild animals to self-sustaining populations of tame ones. This book is about what happens after that: the continuous metamorphosis of those tame populations into more beautiful, more useful, more productive, more efficient, or simply different versions of their former selves. Most of all, this book is about selective breeding on a much, much bigger scale, a scale that includes transformations in all wild animals (and plants too). We'd call it evolution.

While there are a lot of people nowadays making a big scientific fuss about domestication, selective breeding—a poor, humble Cinderella of a subject—has been virtually ignored. To say that this book is entirely unique, however, wouldn't be strictly true. There was another. It was published in 1868, exactly 150 years ago. The author was Charles Darwin.

The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication (usually referred to simply as Variation under Domestication or even just Variation) wasn't, I'm sorry to say, Darwin's finest accomplishment. It wasn't anywhere near as lucid or as focused as even the first chapter of On the Origin of Species (also called "Variation under Domestication") where he'd first made his eloquent analogy between selective breeding and his theory

of evolution by natural selection. (Don't worry if you don't already know the historical background to this, it's all explained in chapter 3.) Variation (the book) was intended to expand on Origin and, most of all, to put forward a way in which the subtle variations between individuals might be inherited. Unfortunately, Darwin didn't have the answer.

The first thing I'd like to make clear is that I haven't always been an authority on selective breeding. That's Husband's field, and, until he came into my life about a decade ago, I was as biased against the achievements of animal fanciers as the majority of other modern naturalists. That is to say, I was ignorant, and proud of it.

We met and fell in love during the European Bird Curators' Conference in Vienna in 2007. At that time I was a curator of the bird collections at the British Natural History Museum and Hein van Grouw was the collections manager of birds and mammals at the national natural history museum of the Netherlands. Imagine the scene if you will: a candlelit dinner in the spectacular museum rotunda; admiring the view from the oculus under the stars with all the lights of Vienna stretching beneath us reflected in the dark waters of the Danube. The unspoken chemistry pulled us together by invisible threads, alone in that beautiful, romantic space oblivious to the people around us. It was roughly at this point that the man who was to become Husband shattered the illusion by telling me he kept pigeons.

Pigeon fanciers, at least in my country, wore flat caps and white coats with club badges sewn on. They were at least sixty, in attitude if not in actual years. They were not, generally, hot. I found the idea hilarious, and slightly disconcerting.

How foolish I was not to take fanciers more seriously. Oblivious was I to the fact that many of these men (and women too), in their own way, know at least as much about birds as any museum ornithologist or field birder. In their highly skilled hands pigeons are but putty that can, within a few generations, be molded into any shape and remade in virtually any color. Fanciers can fast-forward evolution like an H. G. Wells time machine. They can transfer a single trait from one variety to another without introducing unwanted traits; change a posture from horizontal to vertical; lengthen feathers in one body part and not another; or produce new combinations of colors and patterns. Animal fanciers were the masters of genetics long, long before Bateson first used the word, before Mendel's experiments with peas and before Darwin as a young man even set foot on the Beagle. They've produced greater diversity in individual species under domestication than exists, or has ever existed, anywhere in the natural world. And yet many modern advocates of biodiversity, from professional biologists to armchair naturalists, so readily dismiss and even revile their accomplishments.

Husband, it turns out, has spent his life breeding fancy (exhibition) pigeon varieties—but not for exhibition. He's also bred chickens, gerbils, canaries, budgerigars, and Barbary doves and made an extensive lifetime's study of the variant traits (particularly color aberrations) shared by species throughout the animal kingdom. He's spent decades experimenting in a way that would have delighted Darwin: for example, breeding the silkie mutation into Frillback pigeons to find out whether feather barbs play a part in feather curls; using the pointing mutation to decipher whether silkie-feathered birds are more susceptible to the cold than normal-feathered ones; producing a hybrid between a white chicken and a white pheasant to see if leucism shares the same inheritance in both species. The list goes on.

Darwin too was happiest when he was observing living things and carrying out his own experiments. They ranged from testing the effects of seawater on seeds in an effort to understand the colonization of oceanic islands to studying the senses of earthworms by observing their responses to different musical instruments. One of my favorites is his method to test the correlation between eyesight and hearing in very young kittens. Darwin had observed that kittens appear to be unresponsive to

sound until their eyes have opened at around nine days. This was Darwin's method: (1) creep up to a nest of kittens, carrying brass poker and shovel, being careful not to make any sudden vibrations; then (2) bash poker and shovel together to make as much noise as possible! The kittens slept on, unfazed.

We recently watched our little troupe of bantams foraging in the garden. (Being Husband's birds, they're not recognized breeds but a motley collection of interesting genetic traits.) There were obviously a lot of good things to eat under the woodpile, but only the birds with the trait for shortened limbs could squeeze into the small gap—the others had to remain on the outside and listen to them feasting. Darwin's conclusion would have been the same as ours: if food had been scarce, the short-legged individuals would have a better chance of survival than the normal ones.

I've divided this book into four parts of three chapters each: "Origin," "Inheritance," "Variation," and "Selection." The first, "Origin," lays the foundation for the rest.

The book begins with a look at our system of classification, devised by Linnaeus long before the evolutionary relationship between living things was accepted by science. While the system works well for the most part—with the majority of animal and plant species appearing to be static and unchanging—it is, after all, an artificial structure entirely at odds with the gradual nature of evolution. Nowhere are the cracks more obvious than in how the system deals, or fails to deal, with domesticated animals.

Animals are plastic, ever-morphing things. Their appearance undergoes seamless transformations from one geographical location to the next and steadily over time; sometimes branching into two or more forms when before there was one. While the changes in wild animals tend to take place over unobservable eons, in domesticated animals they can be recorded within a single human lifetime. This branching plasticity is the subject of chapter 2.

The third chapter introduces Darwin's theory of natural selection, which, like any natural law, works on an elegantly simple formula of component elements. There are two ingredients: selection and variation. But in order for natural selection to work, the variation has to be heritable. This was Darwin's sticking point, and is the subject of part 2.

"Inheritance," the second part, begins with blending; the qualities of either parent mixed together to produce offspring intermediate between the two. Blending had, for centuries, been the accepted explanation of how inheritance works, but it entails a loss of variation at every step. Darwin's theory, on the other hand, required a steady stream of new variation. In other words, Darwin had a problem.

The actual mechanism for inheritance discovered by Mendel, along with just a few of its many complexities, is the subject of chapter 5. Mendelian inheritance and Darwinian natural selection should have been a match made in Heaven and, had Darwin still been alive when Mendel's work was plucked from obscurity, I have no doubt that it would have been received by him with open arms. Unfortunately the followers of both camps were divided over the question of whether evolution progressed by giant leaps or small steps, a debate that's the subject of chapter 6.

At this halfway stage in the book, shortly after the close of the nineteenth century, it's time to bid farewell to Darwin and his followers and to return to the prerequisites for natural selection.

In chapter 7, the first chapter of part 3, "Variation," I introduce a new and emotive word: "mutation." Despite their association with freaks and monsters, mutations are, in fact, the original source of all variation: just tiny random changes in the way that DNA is copied that can result in major physical differences, or minute ones.



That the same, or very similar, mutations can occur in very different animal groups is the subject of chapter 8, while chapter 9 reminds us that genes are not buttons that can be pressed to magically produce guaranteed results. Traits that evolve under certain environmental conditions often require the same conditions in order to be fully expressed. The environment—internal as well as external—is equally as important as genes.

Moving on to the fourth and final part, "Selection," chapter 10 looks at the many different facets of selection—some of them working in opposition to each other—and their counterparts between wild and domesticated animals. The effects of reproductive isolation on populations and the way that their future evolution can subsequently be influenced by the random action of accidental forces are addressed in chapter 11.

Up to this point the book has dealt exclusively with selective breeding, arguing that artificial selection is comparable with other evolutionary processes and an excellent analogy for Darwin to have used to explain his theory of natural selection. It's only when we get to chapter 12 that I introduce the process of domestication itself and, once again, I consider it as an evolutionary one—not so much a "thing we do to animals" but a gradual process of mutual symbiosis in a world increasingly dominated by humans.

This book is intended, with the benefit of a century and a half of hindsight, to be something akin to what Darwin might have produced as Variation under Domestication, had he only had that elusive missing key—an understanding of how inheritance works. In the spirit of his first chapter of Origin I've made the case that Darwin's analogy between natural and artificial selection was appropriate in more ways than he could ever have known. Although the book includes a strong historical element, it was not my intention to attempt to write a history of evolutionary achievements. I've kept the focus deliberately on Darwin and the challenges he and his theory encountered up until the beginning of the Modern Synthesis. Although it's been extensively researched from a variety of published sources (there's a selected reading section at the end, though it was impossible to

include everything), I've made good use of Husband's extensive knowledge and lifelong experience, combining this with my own interest in evolutionary biology to produce what I hope will be considered a scholarly book, but one brimming with firsthand observations in the style of Darwin himself.

My hopes for Unnatural Selection are many and diverse. Obviously I'm praying that it will get good reviews, that it will be stocked by bookstores and libraries all over the world, and that people will flock to buy it. If I allow my imagination to run really wild then it'll maybe even win a prize (boy, I'd love to win a prize). My primary hope, however, is that it will encourage people to look at domesticated animals and their environment in a different way, or rather in the same way that you would consider any other animal in its environment. It's time to stop thinking how badly a pet dog would fare in "the wild" and realize that the man-made environment is just an environment like any other. There will likely be pet dogs in the world long after the wolves have all been obliterated. Pet dogs—even the ones with short noses—are, like it or not, an evolutionary success. As I say at the end of chapter 7, my response to anyone complaining, "Look what humans have done to the Pekinese," is to reply, "Look what flowers have done to Sword-billed hummingbirds! "

I have another hope, too. It is that, like my friend's dad whose story is told at the close of chapter 2, one or two skeptics out there might just be inspired to reconsider their views about evolution, perhaps reaching the opinion that it's not such á bad, such a cold, and empty place after all. I wish this, not through any crusader's desire for conquest, but in the same way that anyone might want to share something they find beautiful and moving. Natural selection is indeed a terrifying concept to the human mind. But it also has a profound, breathtaking magnificence and an exquisite poetry. It takes courage to step into the abyss (I've taken that step myself), but, as I'll say again in chapter 3, there is a path, and the view is sublime. <>

Microbes and Other Shamanic Beings by César E. Giraldo Herrera [Palgrave Macmillan, 9783319713175]

Shamanism is commonly understood through reference to spirits and souls. However, these terms were introduced by Christian missionaries as part of the colonial effort of conversion. So, rather than trying to comprehend shamanism through medieval European concepts, this book examines it through ideas that started developing in the West after encountering Amerindian shamans. *Microbes and Other Shamanic Beings* develops three major arguments: First, since their earliest accounts Amerindian shamanic notions have had more in common with current microbial ecology than with Christian religious beliefs. Second, the human senses allow the unaided perception of the microbial world; for example, entoptic vision allows one to see microscopic objects flowing through the retina and shamans employ techniques that enhance precisely these kinds of perception. Lastly, the theory that some diseases are produced by living agents acquired through contagion was proposed right after Contact in relation to syphilis, an important subject of pre-Contact Amerindian medicine and mythology, which was treasured and translated by European physicians. Despite these early translations, the West took four centuries to rediscover germs and bring microbiology into mainstream science.

Giraldo Herrera reclaims this knowledge and lays the fundaments for an ethnomicrobiology. It will appeal to anyone curious about shamanism and willing to take it seriously and to those enquiring about the microbiome, our relations with microbes and the long history behind them.

Excerpt: This book revaluates familiar myths and understandings of the world with insights developed while doing fieldwork far away from home. It is part of a trilogy derived from my doctoral dissertation in social anthropology. The dissertation dwelt on Nordic seamanship, on relating to the environment without and within, on syncretism, perspectivism, and shamanism. This book

is the last part, the trip back home, back into ourselves. So, what or who are we?

My grandfather was a rural medic, in Quindio, Colombia a place infested with venomous snakes. He was adamant that one should get to know them, to see the world from their perspective, acknowledging their ecology, where they lived, and what they ate. Most of their attacks were in self-defence, out of fear. If in your interactions with them you were calm and respectful, even the most poisonous were mostly harmless. My grandfather supported his views on animal subjectivity with authors like Konrad Lorenz. He would have been an avid reader of Ingold, Haraway, Bennet, and Tsing. However, the roots of his views are more likely to be found in the adventures of the miscreant uncle Rabbit and his victimized predator uncle Jaguar, which he used to tell me. Although warranting care for deceiving appearances, these were more than fables, these are far older stories.

I studied my undergrad in biology, focusing on physiology, ethology, and theoretical biology, and so, I am an unrepentant functionalist and would not hesitate to subscribe to a naturalistic' understanding of reality.

However, my degree monograph was a theoretical exploration of biosemiotics, suggesting that organisms and other biological systems develop processes of interpretation, and in their own ways, and for their own sake make sense of their world. I find it very hard to fathom how some people assume humans are the only beings with intentions, points of view, or emotions: the only beings to communicate, the only persons. My views, as well as those of my parents, and grandparents, are in many ways closer to what some authors would denominate animism. So, again, who are we? We are the Westernized, or rather their descendants, and we are also descendants of the indianos, the Indianized, the Africanized; the colonizers, and the colonized.

When I was little, I was terrified of the night and fascinated by those monsters that linger in Latin American imaginaries: the witches who transform into jaguars; the one-legged Patasola; the Duende, a goblin with a humongous hat and backward feet; and the Llorona, the spirit of the woman who cries for her abandoned baby. I felt more sympathy for the Madremonte, the mother of the forest, and for the Mohan, the mischievous guardian spirits of the waters. However, their stories, when they had them, were so diluted and abstract, that they had become caricatures, folkloric fictions.

Years later, working with traditional Afro-Colombian fisher peoples in the Pacific, I met with 'the visions', a rich oral tradition referring some of those stories, linking them with specific ecologies, medicinal plants, behaviours, and powers. The Tunda was a one-legged Amerindian woman (Afro-Colombian for Amerinds), who would appear in the shape of a close relative or a lover, and lure her victims into the wildness of the mangrove, taking away their speech, reducing them into sexual slavery and madness. However, there are also herbs and prayers to call Tunda; she teaches her protégés the art of invisibility, and hides them from the authorities. These visions could also appear and harass you in dreams. My friends and hosts interpreted some of my own dreams in that way. However, the visions seem to flee from modernity, disappearing together with the ecologies with which they are associated. The visions made evident that the folkloric monsters of my childhood were translations of the masters of game, some of the beings with which Amerindian shamans deal. I sought to explain them as symbolic constructs, enunciating the affordances and dangers of specific environments and the social relations people established in them.' However, these interpretations neglect the experiences associated with these beings, how people understand them, and the ways people seek to interact with them.

Later still, reflecting upon my experiences while on-board the industrial fishing trawlers in the North Sea, I began to explore how we relate to microbes, how we may perceive them, and came across a possible alternative translation, which would seem to account for more of the characteristics of masters of game. This led me to explore the early records

of Amerindian shamanism and Amerindian myths associated with syphilis, developing a biocultural ethnohistory of Amerindian shamanism and microbiology.

Microbes and other shamanic beings explores whether and to what degree microbiology might be commensurable with shamanism, whether it might offer better translations than anthropology, following missionary theology has so far. The book develops three major arguments. First, shamanism has been generally understood through reference to spirits and souls. However, these terms were introduced by the missionaries, who carried the earliest translations, to convert Amerinds into Christianism. Rather than trying to comprehend shamanism through medieval European concepts, we should examine it through ideas that started developing in the West only after encountering Amerindian shamans. Since the earliest accounts, Amerindian shamanic notions have shared more in common with current microbial ecology than with Christian religious beliefs. Shamans have described the beings with which they deal in ways that correspond to contemporary understandings of microbes. Second, various human senses allow the unaided perception of the microbial world. We focus on entoptic vision, which affords the perception of microscopic objects flowing through our retina. The techniques employed by shamans enhance these kinds of perception, and their depictions of shamanic beings correspond to the images produced by these forms of vision. Third, the theory that some diseases are produced by living agents acquired through contagion was proposed near after the Encounter by a physician who translated and adapted Amerindian knowledge about syphilis, an important subject of pre-Contact Amerindian medicine and mythology. Amerindian myths of the Sun and the Moon described shamanic beings causing syphilis and closely related diseases, their dynamics, histories, and treatments. Western medicine took four centuries before revaluating its paradigms, rediscovering germs, and turning microbiology into a mainstream science. I argue that a deep decolonization of thought should reclaim this knowledge back. At a time when the war on microbes is becoming unsustainable, shamanism may afford a refined diplomacy to interact with the highly social microbial worlds which constitute and permeate us.

Contents

<>

Fundamentals of Microbiome Science: How Microbes Shape Animal Biology by Angela E. Douglas [Princeton University Press, 9780691160344]

An essential introduction to microbiome science, a new cutting-edge discipline that is transforming the life sciences

This book provides an accessible and authoritative guide to the fundamental principles of microbiome science, an exciting and fast-emerging new discipline that is reshaping many aspects of the life sciences. Resident microbes in healthy animals--including humans—can dictate many traits of the animal host. This animal microbiome is a second immune system conferring protection against pathogens; it can structure host metabolism in animals as diverse as reef corals and hibernating mammals; and it may influence animal behavior, from social recognition to emotional states. These microbial partners can also drive ecologically important traits, from thermal tolerance to diet, and have contributed to animal diversification over long evolutionary timescales.

Drawing on concepts and data across a broad range of disciplines and systems, Angela Douglas provides a conceptual framework for understanding these animal-microbe interactions

while shedding critical light on the scientific challenges that lie ahead. Douglas explains why microbiome science demands creative and interdisciplinary thinking—the capacity to combine microbiology with animal physiology, ecological theory with immunology, and evolutionary perspectives with metabolic science.

An essential introduction to a cutting-edge field that is revolutionizing the life sciences, this book explains why microbiome science presents a more complete picture of the biology of humans and other animals, and how it can deliver novel therapies for many medical conditions and new strategies for pest control.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: This book is about animal microbiomes: the microorganisms that inhabit the body of animals, including humans, and keep their animal hosts healthy. In recent years, animal microbiomes have become a hot topic in the life sciences. Academic, commercial, and funding institutions are investing in major microbiome research centers and funding initiatives; microbiomes are the topic of special issues in journals, conference symposia, and new undergraduate and graduate courses; microbiomes

have twice been a Science journal "breakthrough of the year" (in 2011 and 2013); and the US National Microbiome Initiative was announced from the White House in May 2016.

Why all the excitement about microbiomes? The reasons are twofold: microbiome science provides a radically different way to understand animals, and it offers the promise of novel therapies, especially for human health.

And why have I written this book? My purpose is to communicate that we can only understand fully how animals function by appreciating that an animal interacts unceasingly with the communities of microorganisms that live within and on the surface of its body. This book provides the evidence for these interactions, and introduces the main concepts that shape how the discipline of microbiome science is conducted. Some of the concepts are new, for example driven by recent developments in genome science, but others have been developed over many decades of research in the related discipline of symbiosis. The two disciplines of microbiome science and symbiosis overlap extensively, and although this disciplinary ambiguity may appear untidy, it enriches our understanding of the microbiology of animals.

There is a third question: Who is this book for? It is for everyone with tertiary level education in biology who is curious about microbiomes. This book complements the recent excellent books that do not require advanced biological education, such as Ed Yong's I Contain Multitudes: The Microbes Within Us and a Grander View of Life and Martin Blaser's Missing Microbes: How the Overuse of Antibiotics Is Fueling Our Modern Plagues. The Animal Microbiome aims to be useful to researchers, to colleagues developing courses on microbiomes, and to students. In particular, I hope that at least a few of the microbiome gainsayers who declare that microbiome science "is all correlation with no substance" will read this book, and be persuaded by the mounting evidence for the pervasive effects of the microbiome on animal biology. Equally, I trust that the "microbiome enthusiast" who is tempted to attribute any animal trait with an unknown cause to the microbiome will appreciate the evidence that animal-microbiome interactions are inherently complex and frequently context-dependent.

Scope of This Book

The realization that every animal is colonized by microorganisms that can shape its health and well-being is transforming our understanding of animal biology. The purpose of this book is to provide some initial explanations and hypotheses of the underlying animal-microbial interactions. For this, we need multiple disciplinary perspectives.

We start with evolutionary history in chapter 2. The propensity of animals to associate with microorganisms has ancient roots, derived from both the predisposition of all eukaryotes to participate in associations and, likewise, the tendency of many bacteria to interact with different organisms, often to mutual benefit. Chapter 2 outlines the patterns of these interactions, especially in taxa related to animals and basal animal groups. Interactions are mediated by chemical exchange, enhancing access to energy and nutrients and providing chemical information that enables the interacting organisms to anticipate and respond adaptively to environmental conditions. Many of these core interactions were firmly established in the ancestor of animals. The multicellular condition of animals, sophisticated immunological function of even basal animals, and key animal innovations, including the polarized epithelium and the gut, play important roles in shaping the pattern of animal-microbial interactions.

Although all animals are associated with microorganisms, we know more about the microbiome of humans than any other animal. Chapter 3 addresses current understanding of the role of the microbiome in human health. Studies of the microbiology of humans combined with experimental analyses of model animals are revealing complex problems—and some solutions. The complexity lies in the great diversity of

microorganisms within each individual human, as well as considerable among-individual variation; and the importance of the microbiome is reinforced by the increasing evidence for microbial involvement in some diseases, especially metabolic and immunological dysfunctions. Western lifestyles, including diet and antibiotic treatment, have been argued to contribute to the incidence of microbiome-associated diseases, with opportunities for microbiological restoration by microbial therapies.

Our understanding of interactions between animals and the microbiome is most developed in relation to the immune system, and this is the focus of chapter 4. It is now apparent that animal immune system is a key regulator of the abundance and composition of the microbiota, and that immunological function is strongly regulated by the composition and activities of the microbiome. The immune system cannot be understood fully except in the context of the microbiology of the animal. Furthermore, this highly interactive system is overlain by microbial-mediated protective functions, essentially comprising a second immune system.

Chapter 5 investigates the role of the microbiome in shaping animal, including human, behavior. It has long been known that pathogens can drive animal behavior, and there is now increasing evidence that resident microorganisms can have similar, although often more subtle, effects. Research has focused primarily on three aspects of animal behavior: feeding behavior, chemical communication among animals, especially in relation to social interactions, and the mental well-being of mammals, including humans. As chapter 5 makes clear, this topic has attracted tremendous levels of interest, but fewer definitive data.

The impacts of animal-associated microorganisms on host health and their interactions with the immune system and nervous system of animals (chapters 3-5) have one overriding theme in common: that these interactions are complex, with multiple interacting variables. This complexity can often appear to defy comprehension. Chapter 6 discusses the ecological approaches that have the potential to solve many of these problems of complexity. Treating the animal as an ecosystem, we can ask multiple questions: what are the ecological processes that shape the composition and diversity of microbial communities, and how do these properties of the microbial communities influence overall function of the ecosystem? Research on complex microbiomes, especially in the animal gut, as well as one-host-one-symbiont systems are revealing the role of interactions among microorganisms and interactions between the microorganisms and host in shaping the diversity of the microbiome. Furthermore, the response of individual taxa and interactions can influence the stability of communities to external perturbations, ranging from the bleaching susceptibility of shallow-water corals to the gut microbiota composition of humans administered with antibiotics.

In chapter 7, the evolutionary consequences of animal-microbial associations are considered. There is a general expectation that the fitness of both animal and microbial partners is enhanced by these associations largely through the reciprocal exchange of services. Nevertheless, hosts can exploit their microbial partners, and there are indications that animals can be addicted if to their microbial partners. At a broader scale, this chapter investigates how these associations affect the rate and pattern of evolutionary diversification of the microbial and animal partners. In addition to evidence for coevolutionary interactions and facilitation of horizontal gene transfer, various studies point to a direct role of microbiota in interrupting gene flow and speciation by both prezygotic and postzygotic processes.

Finally, chapter 8 addresses the implications of the microbiology of animals and some key priorities for future research. It is now abundantly clear that the microbiome has pervasive effects on the physiological and developmental systems of animals and the resultant animal phenotype. One of the big biological questions in the life sciences today concerns how the phenotype of an animal

maps onto its genotype and the underlying physiological and developmental mechanisms. The answers to this question will require the integration of the microbiome with the traditional animal-only explanations of animal function. As this book illustrates, the technologies and concepts to achieve this intellectual transformation of animal biology are largely in place. Why is this integration of disciplines needed? Beyond the fundamental priority to understand and explain, the microbiome offers important, but currently untapped, routes to promote human health and to mitigate and manage some of the damaging effects of human activities on our environment.

The Ancient Roots of the Animal Microbiomes

The ubiquity of interactions between animals and microorganisms is not a trait unique to animals, but an expression of the propensity of all organisms to interact, often to mutual advantage. Even bacteria have a rich social life, mediated principally by the exchange of chemicals (section 2.2). Bacteria share primary metabolites, a process known as syntrophy or cross-feeding, for enhanced access to chemical energy and specific nutrients, and they use chemical compounds as sources of information, enabling them to anticipate or respond to changing conditions.

The predisposition to associate with other organisms is fully integrated into the biology of the eukaryotic cell (section 2.3). All known eukaryotes are derived from a common ancestor bearing Rickettsia-like bacteria that evolved into mitochondria. The legacy of the propensity of eukaryotes to interact with bacteria is within every cell of the human body—and of most other eukaryotes. In parallel, unicellular eukaryotes engage in a wide diversity of associations with bacteria, from which they derive nutrients or other benefits, and some protists act as reservoirs for important human pathogens.

The biology of eukaryotic groups most closely related to animals is strongly influenced by bacteria (section 2.4), with evidence, for example, that the sporophore of the edible mushroom cannot develop under microbiologically sterile conditions and that sulfonolipid molecules of bacterial origin determine the morphological organization of choanoflagellates (the sister group of animals).

The antiquity of animal-microbial interactions is further reinforced by genomic research on representatives of basal animal groups, including the sponge Amphimedon queenslandica. There had been a general expectation that morphologically-simple animals would have genomes with a small gene content lacking many genes involved in the immune system, which plays a central role in microbial interactions in complex animals. Instead, the genomes of basal animals are gene-rich and include representatives of many gene families involved in immunity (section 2.5.1). These data suggest that the animals have an ancestral molecular capacity to interact with microorganisms. Furthermore, the multicellular condition of the animal creates new and different habitats, including the polarized epithelium and the gut, that microorganisms can colonize (section 2.5.2).

Taken together, these lines of evidence reveal that animals evolved and diversified in the context of preexisting interactions with microorganisms. As the next chapter reveals, these interactions are crucial for the health and fitness of animals, including humans.

The Microbiome and Human Health

Biomedical science and the prospect of microbial therapies for a range of chronic diseases are a major driver of microbiome science. We have more information on the microbiome of humans than any other animal, including extensive catalogs of taxonomically important sequences, especially bacterial 16S, metagenome data and genome sequences of individual microbial taxa (section 3.2). This information is the basis for comprehensive characterization of the human microbiome and its variation. Most of the microorganisms in the human body are in the large intestine (colon), and their computed weight is roughly equivalent to the weight of the human brain. The composition of the microbial communities associated with humans

varies widely with location in the body and, within each location, among individual people. Some of the variation can be related to age, lifestyle, health status, and ethnicity, but much of the variation appears to be idiosyncratic.

Epidemiological studies on the human microbiome are revealing correlations between microbiome traits and health, especially in relation to metabolic and immune-related disease, and these approaches are being complemented by experimental studies on model organisms to understand the causal basis of these correlations (section 3.3). The laboratory mouse is a particularly valuable tool for research on the gut microbiota. Germ-free mice can be "humanized", i.e., colonized by microorganisms from human fecal samples, to test for causality and investigate mechanism. Other useful model systems are the larval zebrafish, where experimental studies are facilitated by the transparency of its body and gut, and Drosophila fruit flies, which are particularly amenable to large-scale experimental designs and mechanistic studies.

Combined studies on humans and model systems have shown how perturbations of the microbiome (a condition known as dysbiosis) can cause or exacerbate disease (section 3.4). For example, obesity is commonly linked with reduced populations of Akkermansia muciniphila, inflammatory bowel disease is correlated with low abundance or loss of Faecalibacterium prausnitzii, and Fusobacterium nucleatum is positively associated with some colorectal cancers.

The gut microbiome can also have health effects at a distance, including predisposition for atherosclerosis of the arteries and metabolic syndrome. Western lifestyles, including diet, antibiotic use, and excessive cleanliness, are widely argued to reduce the diversity of the human microbiome, and the resultant dysbiosis may be associated with various chronic diseases (section 3.5). Consistent with this scenario, high-fat/low-fiber diet administered over several generations results in a net reduction of diversity in the gut microbiota of mice. Probiotics and fecal microbiota transplants are being applied for microbiome restoration and, although their use is exceeding demonstrations of efficacy, some positive indications of their value are emerging.

Defining the Rules of Engagement: The Microbiome and the Animal Immune System

The immune function of an animal is the product of multiple and diverse interactions with its microbiota. In the healthy animal, the response of the immune system to the microbiota and the reciprocal effects of the microbiota on the immune system generate a community of benign and beneficial microorganisms interacting with an immune system of appropriate reactivity. Perturbation of this balance by dysfunction of either the immune system or the microbiome results in ill-health. Because of the multiplicity of interactions, the rules of engagement between the microbiota and host immune system are predicted to be highly dynamic. Nevertheless, some general themes are emerging.

One key theme is the central role of microbicidal immune effectors in regulating the abundance and distribution of the microbiota (section 4.2). In the mammalian gut, products of the adaptive immune system, especially IgAs, and the innate immune system, including lectins and antimicrobial peptides, collaborate to limit most gut microorganisms to the outer regions of the mucus, thereby avoiding direct contact between microorganisms and the gut epithelial cells. Innate immune effectors in invertebrates, similarly, restrict the abundance and distribution of microbial colonists. Differential susceptibility to these immune effectors can have a defining effect on the composition of the microbiota, with evidence that high host immunoreactivity can promote beneficial microorganisms in some systems (e.g., Vibrio in squid) but have the reverse effect in other systems (e.g., the gut microbiota of Drosophila).

A second theme is that the microbiota regulates the immune function of the host by multiple different interactions, some of which promote immune

reactivity and others that dampen immune responsiveness (section 4.3). These effects are particularly evident in relation to the cellular immune system, including the balance of pro- and anti-inflammatory T cells of the adaptive immune system in mammals, and the abundance and properties of hemocytes in some invertebrates. These effects extend to microbial regulation of the development of the immune system, with evidence that stimulation by microbial products is required for the final stages in the differentiation of innate immune cells of mammals and possibly also of insects.

The final theme is that the animal immune system is a subset of the global defensive system of animal. This is because resident microorganisms play a crucial protective role (section 4.4). In some cases, the protective effects are mediated by resource capture (exploitation competition), i.e., the resident microorganisms deplete the availability of limiting resources required by the incoming pathogen, or by stimulation of the host immune effectors that are selectively deleterious to the incoming pathogen (apparent competition). In addition, various microorganisms produce compounds that are toxic to natural enemies of their animal host. This effect, which is known as interference competition, can involve specific microbial partners with the genetic capacity to produce one or many secondary metabolites, or communities of microorganisms with diverse metabolic capabilities. How these microbial-mediated defensive capabilities interact with the intrinsic immune system of the animal is largely unknown. However, as will be discussed in chapter 7 (section 7.2.3), there is initial evidence that acquisition of microbial defense can lead to evolutionary changes in the responsiveness of the animal immune system.

Microbial Drivers of Animal Behavior

Animals behave: they perform evolutionarily adaptive actions in response to environmental stimuli, as influenced by their internal state. Contrary to the traditional view that the behavior of a healthy animal can be explained entirely by the function of the nervous system in conjunction with the endocrine and immune systems, there is now increasing evidence that animal-associated microorganisms influence multiple behavioral traits, especially in relation to feeding behavior, mental well-being, and animal communication.

The chief evidence for microbial influence on animal feeding comes from the effect of microbial perturbations that alter food consumption (section 5.2). In particular, mice with a null mutation in the TLR5 gene display hyperphagia, and microbial involvement is indicated by hyperphagia in wild-type mice colonized with the gut microbiota from the mutant mice. It has been suggested that microorganisms may alter the function of animal signaling circuits that regulate feeding by synthesizing signaling molecules, thereby increasing the titer of appetitive or satiety signals, or by producing metabolites that alter the production of these signaling molecules in the animal. Furthermore, these microbial effects may be more pronounced in hosts with microbial communities of low diversity, where the dominant taxa are very abundant, although this requires experimental validation.

In a similar fashion, some of the most persuasive evidence for microbial effects on mental well-being comes from microbiome perturbation studies (section 5.3). Germ-free mice display behavioral traits indicative of altered anxiety or social interactions, as well as learning capabilities, and these differences have been associated with changes in neuronal function or titers of neuroactive metabolites in key regions of the brain. Complementary neurophysiological and endocrine data indicate that members of the gut microbiota modulate communication between the gut and the brain, either via the vagus nerve or by impacts on bioactive compounds circulating in the blood. The relevance of these studies on rodent models to humans is suggested by the results of double-blind trials on healthy volunteers in which probiotic bacteria improved self-reported indices of emotional health.

A valuable framework for investigating the role of microorganisms in animal communication is provided by the fermentation hypothesis, originally developed to explain the olfactory basis of social behavior in mammalian carnivores (section 5.4). It is argued that the odoriferous volatiles that are released from the anal glands and function in the recognition of individual animals and group members are the products of microbial fermentation of complex lipids and other substrates in the glands. The fermentation hypothesis is supported by evidence that the composition of the microbial communities in the anal glands of hyenas vary more between animals from different groups than from the same group, and this taxonomic variation is correlated with variation in the volatile fermentation products released from the glands. Similar studies conducted on an insect, the German cockroach, demonstrate that the aggregation pheromone of this species is a complex mix of fermentation products synthesized by the gut microbiota. Microbial fermentation products offer exquisite specificity (suitable for individual or group recognition) because different microbial communities generate different blends of compounds, which can be discriminated very readily by the chemosensory systems of animals. The composition of the fermentation products may also be reliable indicators of the health and reproductive status of the animal, although this remains to be established.

More generally, many metabolites in the body fluids of animals are the products of animal-associated microorganisms, offering the opportunity for the evolution of novel signaling molecules by coupled microbial-host metabolism. For example, the male-specific pheromone, trimethylamine, mediating social communication in the house mouse arises from differences between the sexes in metabolism of this microbial product.

Study of the microbial drivers of behavior in the healthy animal is a very young discipline, currently generating many more review articles than original research papers. To date, the empirical data often provide incomplete and occasionally contradictory evidence, suggesting that the microbial effects are complex and often subtle. We should not anticipate a simple microbial explanation for complex behavior or a microbial cure-all for the many behavioral and psychiatric disorders that beset humankind. Nevertheless, there is now a sufficient body of evidence to indicate that animal behavior is influenced not only by pathogens and parasites, but also by the microbial communities that inhabit all healthy animals.

The Inner Ecosystem of Animals

An important goal of microbiome science is to explain and predict the interactions between an animal and its microbiota, including how these interactions respond to change in environmental circumstance and host condition (e.g., developmental stage, health status). Because host-microbial interactions are inescapably complex, ecological principles provide a powerful framework to achieve this goal.

From the perspective of the individual animal, the animal and its micro-biota comprise an inner ecosystem, nested within and interacting with the outer ecosystem of external organisms and the physical environment. The perspective of the microbial partners is different: because each animal has a finite size and lifespan, the persistence of the microbial partners depends on continual flux between animals, often via the external environment. The extent to which animal-associated microorganisms sustain free-living populations varies widely, from taxa that are unknown apart from the host, through taxa with transient free-living populations to self-sustaining populations in the external environment (section 6.2).

Returning our focus to the inner ecosystem within an individual animal, the composition of the microbiota is determined by interactions among microorganisms, as well as between microorganisms and the host (section 6.3). Valuable information can be gained from the pattern of co-occurrence (or coexclusion) of microorganisms across different host individuals, together with experimental analysis,

often using simplified microbial systems, to discriminate among multiple alternative processes that can underlie the observed patterns. For example, co-occurrence may signify mutually beneficial interactions or niche overlap. Generally, negative correlations dominate the co-occurrence networks in animal-associated microbial communities. It has been suggested that at least a fraction of these negative correlations represent antagonistic interactions that promote community stability, while cooperative interactions can cause instability by promoting coupled population increase or loss of mutually dependent taxa. There are also indications that these symmetrical +/+ and —/— interactions among bacteria likely interact with +/— interactions with predators (e.g., predatory bacteria, bacterivorous protists) and phage, and also with the host. The relative importance of among-microbe and host-microbe interactions in shaping the microbiota community composition and function is poorly known, and an important issue for future research.

Animal health and fitness are promoted by stability in the taxonomic and functional composition of the microbiota (section 6.4). It has been suggested that the inner ecosystem can adopt different, apparently stable states that are correlated with (and, in some cases, predictive of) host health. These states can be induced by environmental perturbation, such as antibiotic treatment or disease. Alternative states have also been proposed in different healthy hosts (e.g., for the gut microbiota of different people), although some analyses are indicative of continuous variation of the microbiome among healthy individuals. Microbial communities also undergo broadly predictable changes in taxonomic and functional composition associated with animal development, comparable to successional changes in other ecosystems, as well as changes that are correlated with fundamental biological rhythms linked to time of day and season. Initial data suggest that the animal responses to these external environmental factors are reinforced and stabilized by interactions with the microbiota of the inner ecosystem.

Evolutionary Processes and Consequences

The association between microorganisms and animals has immense evolutionary consequences at scales ranging from the fitness of participating organisms to the rates and patterns of evolutionary diversification of both animals and their microbial partners.

Many associations are believed to be founded on reciprocity, i.e., the reciprocal exchange of services that confer greater benefit to the recipient than cost to the donor (section 7.2.1). Multiple ways in which animals benefit from gaining access to metabolic capabilities of microorganisms have been established, but the advantage of associating with animals to the microbial partners is generally described nonquantitatively in terms of the animal as a habitat that confers access to nutrients or enemy-free space. The possibility that some animal hosts may exploit their microbial partners (section 7.2.2) is raised by a study demonstrating that Chlorella algae incur net cost from their association with the ciliate Paramecium bursaria. The likely significance of the reverse, exploitation of animals by their microbial partners, is indicated by patterns of host-symbiont metabolic interactions that constrain both freeloading (failure to provide a service) and overconsumption by the symbiont.

Many microbe-dependent traits of animals cannot readily be explained in terms of microbial services, but relate to microbial impacts on the signaling networks that regulate animal functions required for sustained animal health. Some of these interactions are likely to be addictive, i.e., the animal is dependent on the microbial partner(s) for a trait even though it has the genetic capacity to perform the trait autonomously (section 7.2.3). Three types of addiction can be identified: the outsourcing of a trait to the microbiota, dependence on a microbial cue for appropriate expression of the trait, and constitutive compensation for microbial manipulation of a trait.

Many animals and their microbial partners display congruent phylogenies, such that microorganisms associated with closely related hosts are more closely related than microorganisms in phylogenetically distant hosts (section 7.3). Congruent phylogenies can be generated by diversification of the microbial partner onto a preexisting host phylogeny (as has occurred in Lactobacillus reuteri associated with vertebrate guts) or by codiversification. Coevolution, i.e., the reciprocal genetic changes in host and microbial partners, has been demonstrated between plant sap-feeding insects and vertically transmitted bacterial symbionts, but its wider incidence in microbial associations with healthy animals is uncertain.

As well as shaping the patterns of diversity, associations between microorganisms and animals can influence the rate of diversification of all partners (section 7.4). There is increasing evidence that residence in animal guts can promote microbial diversification via horizontal gene transfer of bacteria and out-crossing in yeasts, and that the rates of diversification in animal clades can be elevated in lineages bearing microbial symbionts relative to symbiont-free clades (e.g., in gall midges bearing and lacking fungal partners). The processes underlying diversification rates may be diverse, and could include direct effects of microbial partners and their products on mating preference and host viability. However, further research is required to assess the prevalence and mechanism of microbe-mediated speciation in animals.

The Animal Reimagined: Mass Extinction and the Microbiome

In section 8.4.1, I addressed the susceptibility of some microbial associates of animals to thermal stress, a key feature of climate change, and in section 8.4.2 I described several routes by which invasive animals can, in principle, perturb the microbiome of native species with likely consequences for the phenotype and fitness of native taxa. These are not, however, the only routes by which the microbiome of animals can become compromised in the Anthropocene.

In relation to microbiome diversity loss, the greatest recent attention has been given to the human microbiome. There is evidence that the microbial diversity is reduced in human populations with Western lifestyles relative to hunter-gatherer lifestyles; that Helicobacter pylori, a bacterial inhabitant of the stomach, has declined from very high prevalence to near extinction in some human populations over the last century; and that low microbial diversity can be associated with multiple chronic conditions, especially metabolic and immunological diseases, that have increased dramatically in recent years. Proof-of-principle for a ratchet-like decline in microbial diversity has been obtained in a multigenerational study of mice fed on a diet that promotes simplification of the gut microbial community, although the relevance of this laboratory study to natural populations, including humans, is uncertain. Analyses of the microbiome of other animals are being driven by concerns over environmental pollution by antibiotics used in medicine and animal husbandry, as well as other antimicrobials (e.g., triclosan) used in consumer products. The continued research efforts on the impacts of these products on the microbiome of natural animal populations will both benefit from and contribute to greater understanding of the effects of these products on the human microbiome.

As discussed in chapter 3 (section 3.5.3), probiotics and prebiotics to promote the diversity of the human gut microbiome are seen as strategies for restoration of microbiomes that have been depleted by antimicrobials, excessive cleanliness, and inappropriate diets. These approaches, however, presuppose a high degree of functional redundancy with low incidence of taxa specifically adapted to certain host genotypes and weak coevolutionary interactions between different members of the microbiota and the host. As discussed in chapters 6 and 7, our understanding of the ecological and evolutionary interactions in these complex systems is very limited. There is an urgent need for interdisciplinary research to establish the

feasibility and most effective routes for ecological restoration of the microbiome from both the biomedical and environmental perspectives.

As these considerations illustrate, microbiome research combines the study of genuinely complex and difficult fundamental questions with the need to solve pressing problems of biomedical and environmental concern. The solutions to these problems require two conceptual realignments: to recognize the central importance of the microbiology of animals, and to recognize their study is an interdisciplinary endeavor. <>

Sacred Knowledge: Psychedelics and Religious Experiences by William A. Richards, Foreword by G. William Barnard [Columbia University Press, 9780231174060]

Sacred Knowledge is the first well-documented, sophisticated account of the effect of psychedelics on biological processes, human consciousness, and revelatory religious experiences. Based on nearly three decades of legal research with volunteers, William A. Richards argues that, if used responsibly and legally, psychedelics have the potential to assuage suffering and constructively affect the quality of human life.

Richards's analysis contributes to social and political debates over the responsible integration of psychedelic substances into modern society. His book serves as an invaluable resource for readers who, whether spontaneously or with the facilitation of psychedelics, have encountered meaningful, inspiring, or even disturbing states of consciousness and seek clarity about their experiences. Testing the limits of language and conceptual frameworks, Richards makes the most of experiential phenomena that stretch our understanding of reality, advancing new frontiers in the study of belief, spiritual awakening, psychiatric treatment, and social well-being. His findings enrich humanities and scientific scholarship, expanding work in philosophy, anthropology, theology, and religious studies and bringing depth to research in mental health, psychotherapy, and psychopharmacology.

CONTENTS

Excerpt:

Appreciation by G. William Barnard

The book that you are about to read is a treasure.

But before I describe what awaits you within this text, I want to say a few words about the book's author, Bill Richards, a crucially important figure in the tradition of psychedelic researchers and therapists.

I vividly remember the first time that I had the good fortune to meet Dr. Richards, when he came to visit me in Dallas a few years ago on his way to south Texas. When I went to pick him up at the DFW airport, I knew the bare basics about his background, but I didn't know what he looked like. So, as I was scanning the people who were streaming into the baggage claim area to pick up their luggage, I wondered how I would ever recognize him.

I shouldn't have worried. It was immediately clear to me: "that's him," the tall man with a shock of white hair and glasses who was standing there with a huge elfin grin on his face and (almost literal) twinkles in his eyes, the man who clearly was enjoying every moment of that crowded, noisy baggage claim area.

I immediately knew that we were going to hit it off.

I wasn't mistaken.

Dr. Richards is that rare example of a scientifically rigorous, tremendously learned intellectual who, nonetheless, is genuinely lit up from within. He is someone who, instead of just talking about sacred knowledge, psychedelics. and religious experiences, has clearly taken his own advice and has somehow managed to become, if I may be so bold, a shining example of a living mystic, a walking, talking, genuine. real-deal sage—all the while remaining extremely down-to-earth, witty, and warm.

As you begin to read Sacred Knowledge, I am sure that it will quickly become clear that the author is someone who has mulled over a whole host of complex and profound issues for quite a long time, and has something to say that he believes is deeply worthwhile. This book is not only extremely timely and relevant: it also addresses, with seemingly effortless ease, many of the subtler metaphysical implications of psychedelics—that is, it doesn't just deal with the enormous therapeutic potential of these substances, but also their tremendous spiritual potential as well These aren't topics that arc easy to address, but with his lucid prose, his gentle, self-effacing humor, and his distinctive voice (genial yet learned, heartfelt yet straightforward). Dr. Richards makes articulating such difficult topics look easy.

As an elder of the psychedelic movement, Dr. Richards offers his readers something precious: his own decades-long, deeply hands-on experience with psychedelic research. He was there during the early 1960s. a time in which he, along with numerous friends and colleagues, first began (with enormous hope and optimism) to research the potential psychological and spiritual benefits of psychedelics. (Dr. Richards was a close friend with Walter Pahnke, the lead researcher for the famous "Good Friday Experiment" that took place on April 20. 1962, in Boston University's Marsh Chapel, when twenty students from the Andover-Newton Theological School took part in a doubleblind study that was designed to ascertain whether psilocybin could reliably induce mystical experiences.) Dr. Richards was also there in 1977. when (as he puts it) he had the "dubious distinction" of acting as the last researcher and clinician to administer psilocybin to a patient at the Maryland Psychiatric Research Center—the only institution at that time in the United States that was legally allowed to conduct research on psychedelic substances. Then, in 1999, when the tide shifted toward a more sane and nuanced response to psychedelic substances, Dr. Richards was at the forefront of the re-initiation of responsible, careful research on psychedelics, research that began at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine and that eventually expanded to other centers of study in North America and Europe and that continues on to this day.

Throughout this book, Dr. Richards draws upon this enormous wealth of experience as he (rather

adroitly) switches between, on the one hand, skillfully discussing the high points of decades of scientific research on psychedelics and, on the other hand, discussing with subtlety and care a wide range of profound religious and metaphysical topics. I will admit that, for myself at least, it is refreshing to see, in our current intellectual climate, which often values disengagement, skepticism, and irony, how Dr. Richards is willing to speak passionately and clearly from his heart about subjects that many (if not most) academics shy away from, such as healing, finding meaning, and spiritual awakening.

These crucially significant topics are addressed from three distinct perspectives. First, Dr. Richards speaks from his decades of clinical work, as someone who has legally and openly, for over twenty-five years, utilized and researched the effects of a variety of psychedelics within a therapeutic context and is therefore able to include numerous riveting first-person accounts of his patients' experiences with these substances and the subsequent transformative effects on their lives. Second, Dr. Richards writes out of his (again) decades-long immersion in, and lively engagement with, the religious and philosophical literature that focuses on the study of mysticism and other "nonordinary" states of consciousness. Third. Dr. Richards offers us a few judiciously chosen and clearly described accounts of his own experiences with psychedelics. In a straightforward, completely non-ironic (but not in any way naive) way, he is willing to make the bold and perhaps (at least to many people) rather startling claim that psychedelic substances, if taken in the proper context and with a specific mind-set or intentionality, can and do reliably catalyze genuine mystical and visionary experiences.

I think that this deeply courageous claim needs to be taken seriously. Speaking personally, as someone who has dedicated his entire professional career to a careful examination of the psychological and philosophical implications of mystical experiences and other "nonordinary" states of consciousness, and as someone who has spent numerous years studying the Santo Daime tradition, a religion that centers on the sacramental ingestion of the psychedelic substance ayahuasca, I am persuaded that powerful psychedelic experiences are Far from being pathological hallucinatory misfirings of our brain circuitry. They are instead, at least potentially, genuine encounters with not only typically hidden strata of our psyche, but also levels of reality that deserve, if' anything does, to be called "sacred" As a scholar of mysticism, what is so striking to me about this text is that Dr. Richards, after having clearly immersed himself in the literature that surrounds this rather arcane (yet important) topic, is able to demonstrate, thoroughly and compellingly, the striking correspondence between the key qualities of classical mystical states of awareness and the states of consciousness that arise when. for example, a volunteer in one of his research studies is given a powerful dose of psilocybin. (Perhaps equally, if not more, impressive are the accounts of the transformative effects of such experiences in the daily lives of those who took part in these studies.)

Again, speaking personally, it is my hope that this book will help to dispel the decades of deeply distorted misinformation (if not outright falsehoods) that has characterized our nation's decades-long repressive attack on psychedelics. Here, at last, arc words of moderation, words of clarity, words of sanity, on this highly sensationalized topic. As this text so clearly notes, psychedelics should in no way be confused with highly addictive, often toxic drugs, such as heroin, cocaine, methamphetamines (and yes, let's say it openly, alcohol and nicotine). Unlike these often deeply destructive drugs, the substances that Dr. Richards focuses on in this text (for example, LSD, mescaline, psilocybin, and DMT) are nonaddictive and nontoxic. Furthermore, as this text so vividly shows, if taken or administered responsibly within a skilled psychotherapeutic or religious context, these substances also have the potential to have tremendous therapeutic, as well as spiritual, value.

Dr. Richards is by no means advocating psychedelics as some sort of panacea. I le is keenly aware of the risks that can arise from the irresponsible, hedonistic misuse of these powerful substances. Nonetheless, Dr. Richards is also cognizant of the thousands of careful studies that took place in over a decade of intensive clinical and scientific research in the late 1950s. 1960s, and early 1970s that demonstrated, time and time again, that these substances have clear psychotherapeutic and medical potential (the treatment of alcoholism was particularly promising). Dr. Richards also knows, from his rich experience as a clinician, the enormous potential rewards that can arise with the carefully monitored use of these substances. The book's description of the psychotherapeutic and spiritual breakthroughs of his research subjects and clinical patients is perhaps one of the highlights of the text.

In this book Dr. Richards devotes significant attention to the implications of some of the most crucial and startling findings of this research. It as seems to be the case, the experiences that arc catalyzed by these substances arc indistinguishable from the mystical accounts that fill the religious literature of every major religious tradition, then scientists and scholars have been given a rare and precious opportunity: mystical experiences, which typically are extremely ephemeral and unpredictable, can actually be catalyzed in a fairly reliable and replicable way with the correct use of psychedelic substances (that is, if carefully prepared volunteers, with worthwhile goals and in a comfortable and uplifting setting, are given the right dosage). The crucial implications of this opportunity for the study of mysticism cannot be understated: these exalted states of consciousness, once so rare and difficult to study. can now be Fairly reliably accessed, and hence can be carefully and respectfully investigated by scholars, scientists, clinicians, and religious professionals within safe and responsible settings.

Dr. Richards also does not shy away from the implications of this research for fundamental questions about the nature of selfhood and even about the nature of reality itself. Dr. Richards, with his calm and lucid prose, approaches these topics in a subtle and yet systematic manner. Page by page he unfolds his vision of the wondrous depths of the psyche and the equally wondrous underlying beauty of this world-a vision that, in his case, is not simply lofty yet unsubstantiated metaphysical speculation, hut rather buttressed by the compelling and detailed accounts of the experiences and insights of his patients and research volunteers (as well as by narratives of his own generously offered and lucidly written experiences).

This text also offers calm and sober advice on how to deal with psychosomatic distress while taking psychedelic substances; how (when taking these substances) to maximize the potential for safely receiving a psychologically and spiritually transformative mystical experience; how to best integrate these profound experiences into one's daily life; how these substances can potentially give meaning to both daily life and the experience of dying; how psychedelics can help survivors to cope with the grief associated with the death of a loved one; and finally, the rather astonishing potential of these substances to deal with various severe addictions as well as clinical depression. (The recent study at Johns Hopkins that found an 80 percent abstinence rate from nicotine addiction after only three psilocybin treatments combined with cognitive-behavioral therapy is, at least to me, especially intriguing.) Dr. Richards is even willing, in his incurably optimistic way, to offer several thoughtful and intriguing musings on the potential of these substances for increased creativity in the arts, sciences, and even religious life.

For any reader interested in the therapeutic and mystical implications of psychedelics, this book will be both eye-opening and richly rewarding.

***

Sacred Knowledge is a humble offering of knowledge and perspectives that I have been privileged to gradually acquire, having had the unique opportunity to participate in the implementation of legal research projects with

psychedelic drugs for over twenty-five years of my professional life. The incredibly rich variety of human volunteers I have accompanied and supported during the amazingly different states of consciousness that can be facilitated by these mind-manifesting substances have included men and women between the ages of twenty-four and eighty-one, varying in racial, educational, occupational, national, and religious backgrounds. Some have been suffering from anxiety, depression, and other manifestations of psychological distress. Others have been persons whose lives have been limited by addictions to alcohol or narcotic drugs. Still others have been persons with rapidly advancing cancer who are coming to terms with the lives they have lived and the imminence of death.

And volunteers have also included professional leaders in the fields of mental health and religion, as well as others from many different occupations who have asked to participate in research studies out of a yearning for personal, educational, or spiritual development. Almost all of these diverse volunteers had no prior personal experience with psychedelic substances and would not have been interested in participation were it not under legal, medical auspices. Thus they neither would have identified with any countercultural group nor would have been interested in what has come to he called recreational drug use. So it is that this book has emerged from the psychedelic experiences of very ordinary people who have been well engaged in the mainstream of life.

I write as a clinical psychologist with formal academic training that also included studies in theology, comparative religions, and the psychology of religion. I also write as a psychotherapist with a broadly based orientation that often could be labeled as existential or transpersonal. Like many readers, I have asked deep questions, have quested for meaning, and have sought to comprehend the processes of personal growth amid the inevitable struggles that most of us share in everyday existence. Since I have had the good fortune to personally receive psychedelic substances in legal contexts and find myself free to share some of the experiential knowledge thereby acquired, the source materials for this book have arisen not only from observations gleaned from research volunteers and the scientific analyses of data, but also from discoveries within the corridors of my own mind.

The cache of knowledge expressed in the pages ahead, both experiential and scientific, includes insights about human existence and the struggles and suffering most of us experience. It describes processes that foster healing and provide meaning, including some that may facilitate spiritual awakening. The discoveries made by the hundreds of persons whom I have encountered in the depths of their psychological and spiritual lives have profound relevance for beginning to more fully comprehend who we arc, who we may become, and perhaps what the ultimate nature of reality may be. This collection of observations and experiences is of relevance not only for philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, theologians, microbiologists, neuroscientists, and quantum physicists, but also for each of us who discovers himself or herself in the process that Buddhists call one precious human life." As will be apparent as the content of this book unfolds, this growing edge of science also is a frontier of religious and spiritual knowledge.

A secondary intention is to provide information that may serve to more fully educate readers about what an increasing number of thoughtful and critical people believe to be the remarkable promise of psychedelic substances, when they are responsibly administered and ingested. This knowledge can dispel more of the distorted remnants of the sensationalistic press of the 1960s that continue to influence attitudes in the medical, religious, and political communities as well as in the population at large. These attitudes, often based on ignorance, distorted information, unrestrained passion to combat drug abuse, and legislative decisions that have disregarded the findings of sober science, have become manifested in public policies in national and international arenas that

have forbidden or discouraged exploration of this frontier.

During the forty-five-year period of the so-called drug war, which some now call the war on some drugs or the plant war, the understanding of the man on the street appears to have become increasingly skewed. For many people the term `psychedelic," which simply means "mind-manifesting," has become all hut indelibly associated with tie-dyed T-shirts, rose-colored glasses, rebellious behavior, and the risks associated with drug abuse. The insightful and inspiring writings about psychedelics by serious scholars such as Aldous Huxley, Alan Watts, and Huston Smith have almost been forgotten. Too often, young explorers of the mind, plagued by impulsiveness and misinformation (if not pills of questionable composition), have ended up in emergency rooms, courtrooms, and sometimes prisons. More mature users of psychedelics have tended to be more discrete, maintaining the privacy of their experiences out of fear of social censure and adverse impacts on their careers.

It is my hope that the range and depth of experiences presented in this book, along with the principles of maximizing the safety and potential benefit of psychedelic use, will prove helpful to readers who seek to more fully comprehend their own experiences in alternative states of consciousness, regardless of how they may have been Facilitated, as well as those of friends and family members. Perhaps this information may also serve to catalyze our thinking about the origins of the powerful cultural taboo under which we have been living. Still further, this hook may foster thoughtful deliberations about responsible and rational ways by which socially sanctioned access to these substances may be established to protect the freedom of those who have acquired adequate knowledge of potential risks and benefits and who desire to legally explore the "inner space" of their own minds with the respectful use of entheogens.

In lieu of footnotes, the reference style employed in Sacred Knowledge provides sufficient information in the main text to enable the reader to locate supplemental information and sources in the bibliography. It provides a carefully chosen listing of relevant articles, books, and documentary films for further discernment and enjoyment by readers who find themselves motivated to explore particular topics in greater depth.

Now at age seventy-four, as I look back on my life, I realize that, like others near my age, I have lived through a remarkable period of social change. Not long ago, had someone told me that the Soviet Union would cease to exist, that the Berlin Wall would come down, that a president with brown skin would occupy the White House in Washington for two terms, or that women and gay and lesbian citizens would he approaching full equality, I would have tended to say. "Be real; live in the real world." Having participated in the original emergence, the repressive period of dormancy, and the reemergence of psychedelic research, including the many lessons learned during this dramatic saga that enhance the probability of safety and benefit, I find I have information to share that may help to pave the way for modifications in the current drug laws in the United States, in the United Kingdom, and in other countries. Beyond encouraging legislation that may culminate in new guidelines for research and medical, educational, and religious use, it is my hope that this book may serve to catalyze the many urgently needed projects of responsible research with these substances that have yet to be designed and implemented. As I stated in my first published article, coauthored with my friend Walter Pahnke in 1966, "a significant danger confronting our society may lie in losing out on the benefits that the responsible use of these drugs may offer."

One Discovery of Transcendence

When my own first intense encounter with mystical consciousness occurred, I was a twenty-three-year-old graduate student of theology and psychiatry. Studying at the University of Göttingen in Germany, formally known as the Georg-August Universität, I had volunteered to participate in a

research project with a drug I had never heard about called psilocybin. Synthesized and distributed to psychiatric researchers and clinicians by the Sandoz Pharmaceutical Company in Switzerland, this new drug was the primary psychoactive substance in the psilobe genus of mushrooms that indigenous peoples had called "magic" or "sacred" and appear to have used in their religious practices for at least three thousand years and perhaps since as long ago as 5000 BCE. On this date in the modern world, December 4, 1963, however, the dark ages of psychedelic research still prevailed and, in the context of Western psychopharmacological investigations, drugs like psilocybin usually were administered without preparation or guidance.

At the time, it was hoped that the radically different, sometimes disorganized or psychotic states of consciousness that often ensued, fortunately temporary in duration, would advance our understanding of schizophrenia and similar states of mind. Hanscarl Leuner, the professor of psychiatry conducting the investigations in the Nervenklinik in Göttingen, just had published a scientific monograph on his observations titled Die experimenlelle Psychose (The Experimental Psychoses). In those days psychedelic drugs were freely available to qualified researchers in Europe and in the United States, sent through the mail. Psilocybin was marketed as Indocybin. The distribution of LSD, known as Delysid, as stated in a 1964 Sandoz pamphlet, was simply "restricted to psychiatrists for use in mental hospitals and psychiatric clinics"

Not only did I know nothing about psilocybin, LSD, or mescaline, I had not yet even heard the term "psychedelic," though it had been coined seven years earlier by Humphrey Osmond. a British psychiatrist, in a letter to Aldous Huxley. However, two of my new friends reported to me that they had volunteered for an interesting research project in the nearby psychiatric clinic that entailed receiving an experimental drug. Its name was hard to remember, but it was reputed to provide some insights into early childhood. One friend had experienced himself sitting in his Father's Lap and. since his father had been killed in World War II, this was profoundly comforting and meaningful to him. The other had seen visionary imagery of Nazi SS soldiers marching in the streets that he called "a hallucination: I was intrigued and, being curious about the psychodynamic processes in my early childhood and having never seen a "real hallucination." decided to walk over to the clinic and inquire whether I also could qualify as a participant in the research project. I viewed my own mind as a psychological laboratory in those days, took myself much too seriously, and sometimes went without breakfast to write down my dreams in the morning. Somewhat pompously. I called this discipline "collecting my phenomenological data" (I was fond of big words then! In retrospect I realize that a healthy breakfast might have done me much more good.)

I found that I was permitted to apply and submitted myself to a cursory medical screening. I remember being asked if I got drunk very often (I didn't). Then, informed I was acceptable, I was led to a rather dim and drab basement room, just large enough for a cot, an end table, and a chair. I met Gerhard Baer, a pleasant psychiatric resident about my age who wore a spiffy white coat with a stethoscope. After a brief chat, he gave me an injection of a derivative of psilocybin in liquid form. Though periodically observed during the next three to four hours, basically I then was left alone. Drawing on the piety of my Methodist childhood, I silently affirmed trust that God would be with me should any difficult childhood memories emerge.

To my utter amazement, I soon discovered in my visual field the emergence of an exquisitely beautiful, multidimensional network of intricate, neon-like geometric patterns, drawing my attention ever more deeply within. I could see this display with open eyes, but found that when I closed my eyes it was even more vivid and sharply focused. I recognized life within the undulating designs and began to feel as though I somehow could enter into the energy flowing within them. Soon, I felt immersed in incredibly detailed imagery best

described as Islamic architecture and Arabic script, about which I knew nothing. Then (forgive the poetic license), I seemed to fully become the multidimensional patterns or to lose my usual identity within them as the eternal brilliance of mystical consciousness manifested itself Suddenly this consciousness was experienced as outside of time, a pinnacle from which history could be viewed. My awareness was flooded with love, beauty, and peace beyond anything I ever had known or wildly imagined to be possible. Awe.' "Glory," and "Gratitude" were the only words that remained relevant.

For a few moments "back on earth." as garbage men emptied the clinic's metal cans in the alley outside the mom's narrow window, faintly registered tinkling temple bells. There were also a few minutes when Gerhard entered the room and asked mc to sit on the edge of the cot with my legs crossed so he could test my knee reflexes. I recall complying with his request, silently holding my arms outstretched with open palms. Intently, he struck my patellar tendons with his little hammer and jotted down his findings while I felt what I later called "compassion for the infancy of science" I was aware that the researchers appeared to have no idea of what really was happening in my inner experiential world, of its unspeakable beauty or of its potential importance for all of us.

When left alone again, immersed in awe, eventually my ego or everyday personality reconstituted itself enough to fear that I somehow might forget the utterly convincing reality of this magnificent state of consciousness. Tentatively, I established again that my body indeed could move. Then, I stretched out my right arm to grasp a piece of blue paper on the end table beside me, picked up a pencil, and wrote, "Realität ist. Es ist vielleicht nicht wichtig was man darüber denkt!" (Reality is. It is perhaps not important what one thinks about it!) I underlined the first "ist" three times.

After returning to normative consciousness about four hours after the injection and futilely trying to describe something of my experience to Gerhard, I walked slowly and thoughtfully back to my dormitory room in the Uhlhorn Studicnkonvikt, a short distance away from the clinic. I climbed to the fourth floor, softly opened and closed the door of my room, and immediately lay prostrate on the wide, rough, highly waxed floorboards like a monk before an altar, speechless with reverence and gratitude. I was thankful for privacy, well aware that if others were observing me they might view my behavior as rather strange, if not downright crazy. Intuitively I felt that all was well and did not want well-meaning friends to worry about me.

A few days later, still in awe over what had occurred in my life, I looked at that little piece of blue paper. "What's the big deal?" I thought. "Of course, reality is! Every idiot knows that!" It felt as though I had written "water is wet" and, for some reason, thought the insight was profound. Here, for the first time, I had encountered the limitations of language in trying to express mystical forms of consciousness. I meant to capture primal, eternal being, what the Christian theologian Paul Tillich called "The Ground of Being" or perhaps what Buddhists mean by "The Pure Land," something profoundly and intensely real that underlies the entire phenomenal, temporal world that most of us experience in everyday living. The words scratched on that scrap of blue paper were only an insipid souvenir from my first deep [bray into transcendental forms of awareness.

So the words in Sacred Knowledge, much as they are intended to communicate as comprehensively and accurately as my literary skills allow, sometimes demand patience and poetic license from you, the reader. I offer you my best as we explore the edges of an incredibly fascinating and important frontier, even though a voice within me would prefer simply to play music for you instead—perhaps Chopin Nocturnes with their many subtle nuances of emotional expression, or the profoundly powerful yet joyful and playful Fantasia and Fugue in G Minor by Johann Sebastian Bach. <>

Handcuffs and Chain Link: Criminalizing the Undocumented in America by Benjamin Gonzalez O'Brien [Race, Ethnicity, and Politics, University of Virginia Press, 9780813941325]

Handcuffs and Chain Link enters the immigration debate by addressing one of its most controversial aspects: the criminalization both of extralegal immigration to the United States and of immigrants themselves in popular and political discourse. Looking at the factors that led up to criminalization, Benjamin Gonzalez O'Brien points to the alternative approach of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and how its ultimate demise served to negatively reinforce the fictitious association of extralegal immigrants with criminality.

Crucial to Gonzalez O'Brien's account thus is the concept of the critical policy failure—a piece of legislation that attempts a radically different approach to a major issue but has shortcomings that ultimately further entrench the approach it was designed to supplant. The IRCA was just such a piece of legislation. It highlighted the contributions of the undocumented and offered amnesty to some while attempting to stem the flow of extralegal immigration by holding employers accountable for hiring the undocumented. The failure of this effort at decriminalization prompted a return to criminalization with a vengeance, leading to the stalemate on immigration policy that persists to this day.

CONTENTS

Excerpt:

Criminalization and Reform

The convergence between immigration and crime began much earlier in the nation's history than is typically noted. The culmination of a period of increasing hostility to Mexican immigrants that had begun in 1924 with the formation of the Border Patrol, Senate bill 5094, also known as the Undesirable Aliens Act, helped to set the United States on a path where undocumented immigration would be handled as a crime-control issue, with a focus on border militarization and the apprehension of undocumented workers. By attaching criminal penalties to the act of undocumented entry, S. 5094 created a legal linkage between immigration and crime that previously had been largely rhetorical. From the nation's founding, there had been a suspicion of the foreign born and a tendency to attribute greater criminality to this group, but with Mexican immigrants this linkage would be legally formalized. In the post—World War I period, borders would harden, and the tradition of Mexican immigration being simply a function of labor demands would come to an end. S. 5094 criminalized undocumented immigration, making Mexican immigrants for the first time "illegal" as the term is understood today.

The Bracero Program in 1942 tried to guarantee access to undocumented labor through a guest-worker program for those who wished to come to the United States to work, but it did little to address undocumented immigration, which many employers continued to rely upon despite the Bracero Program. Those who had already entered illegally, as well as those who entered illegally despite the Bracero Program, were still seen and treated as criminals. It was not the character of the immigrants nor their contributions to the nation that mattered, but simply whether they had submitted to inspection and entered the United States legally.

This would lead to the 1954 mass-deportation program known as Operation Wetback, which was evidence of how entrenched criminalization had become in immigration enforcement. The goal of this program was the forced removal of one million

undocumented immigrants through aggressive apprehension and deportation. Over the course of Operation Wetback, many lost their lives due to poor conditions in their means of transportation back to Mexico. Mae Ngai (2004) compared the ships used to transport some to eighteenth-century slave ships and wrote that others died as a result of being dropped in the desert, far from either water or shade. These human costs of America's campaign of criminalization continue today, with immigrants losing their lives trying to cross areas that are increasingly inhospitable because of the militarization of the southern border, something all too frequently ignored in elite discourse or media coverage of undocumented immigration.

For fifty-seven years following passage of S. 5094, there was no congressional attempt to comprehensively address undocumented immigration; interventions were instead piecemeal attempts to either ensure access to labor (the Bracero Program) or forcibly remove the undocumented (Operation Wetback). Despite the reliance of the United States on Mexican laborers, including undocumented laborers, not until 1986 was a comprehensive approach even attempted. This attempt was the result of a moment of punctuated equilibrium created by the election of a president in favor of open borders, a growing undocumented population, a divided Congress, and an increasingly frustrated American public who throughout the 1970s and 1980s had become more aware of undocumented immigration as an issue.

While IRCA increased the size of the Border Patrol, border security was paired for the first time with an amnesty program, employer sanctions, and a guest-worker program in an attempt at a more holistic approach to the issue than had been attempted in the past. This new approach was reflected in differences in the way undocumented immigration was framed in Johnson-Reed, S. 5094, and IRCA. Debate over Johnson-Reed and S. 5094 was largely negative when it came to Mexican immigrants, with the criminality frame being relied upon regularly to push for stricter restrictions, either by including Mexico in national quotas (Johnson-Reed) or by criminalizing entry or reentry (S. 5094). In contrast, while most of the frames referenced in IRCA were still negative, there were far more positive framings of undocumented immigrants. More members of Congress spoke of the undocumented as economic contributors, family oriented, and in pursuit of the same dream that had brought other immigrants to this country. This new rhetoric reflected the shift in policy away from an almost exclusive focus on enforcement to a multipronged attempt to overhaul the relationship between the United States and both its undocumented population and the laborers from Mexico and Central America that it relied upon.

Unfortunately, IRCA turned out to be a critical policy failure and helped to reinforce the previously existing path of US immigration policy, which treated undocumented immigration not as a labor issue but instead as a law-and-order issue, with an almost singular focus on punitive methods of control. Critical policy failures, as explained in the introduction, are policies that attempt a significant shift in how problems are addressed but come to be seen as failures because of their shortcomings. This leads to a return to the previous approach to the problem and can reinforce the earlier preferred policy path, in this case criminalization. When IRCA's pivot away from enforcement came up short, when the guest-worker program, increase in the Border Patrol, and employer sanctions failed to have their intended effect of slowing undocumented immigration, the United States returned to the path of criminalization.

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 reintroduced the rhetoric of old, with an emphasis on nativist characterizations of the undocumented population as a threat to Americans. The IIRIRA debate focused on the supposed role of immigrants in drug smuggling, theft, gang activity, and even murder despite evidence to the contrary. IIRIRA was a return to what was politically safe, what Jonathan Simon calls "governing through crime" (J. Simon zoos). Undocumented immigrants were lumped in

with criminals so that politicians could justify a one-dimensional but ultimately politically convenient response—criminalization. The solution was easy: more Border Control, more INS (and later ICE), more raids, more deportations, all of which, even if they did little to truly address undocumented immigration, could be sold as being essentially "tough on crime." Never mind that in the fifty-seven years between passage of S. 5094 and IRCA these methods proved to be ineffectual at reducing undocumented immigration or the US reliance on undocumented labor. The politics of nativism and racism were embraced once again, and the angry rhetoric that characterized undocumented immigration as a matter of personal responsibility, as a decision to deliberately flaunt the laws of the United States, returned.

This return to the criminalization of the undocumented of course ignored what had been highlighted in the IRCA debate: the role of employers. As early as 1924, agricultural interests had defended their access to undocumented labor, while the immigrants were scapegoated for working for low wages and in poor conditions, for coming in search of a better life and a way to help their families. Until the passage of IRCA, the US Congress had looked the other way when American companies often deliberately violated the law to increase profits. IRCA changed this, briefly. In the IRCA debate, employers were criticized frequently and their role was emphasized. Unfortunately, IRCA's great ambition to overhaul US immigration policy by discouraging the hiring of undocumented immigrants and the creation of a guest-worker program for legal access to Mexican labor ultimately came up short. Instead of reflecting on IRCA as good policy, as a step toward comprehensively addressing undocumented immigration, many now view it as having done little more than reward illegal behavior through its amnesty program, while also insulting all those who had immigrated legally.

The intertwining of immigration and crime has long been part and parcel of elite rhetoric and US policy. Path dependence and the appeal of simple approaches to complex problems suggest that it will be very hard to break out of this cycle. Yet, the convergence of factors that occurred in the 1980s, creating a moment of punctuated equilibrium in which real change in immigration policy was possible, could happen again. Recognizing these windows of opportunity will give reformers a better shot at immigration policy that is truly comprehensive and not simply focused on restriction and criminalization.

In these moments of punctuated equilibrium, public opinion, and the elevation of immigration onto the policy agenda that often results from greater public awareness and concern, is important. We could be close to one of those moments, as the divisive rhetoric of the Trump administration reveals the racism and xenophobia that have long simmered under the surface of US immigration policy. What remains to be seen is whether this alternate vision can be realized in a political environment in which the president campaigned on the creation of a deportation force modeled on Operation Wetback and a wall between the United States and Mexico, regularly using graphic descriptions of immigrant criminality to justify these policies.

Unfortunately, comprehensive reform faces significant hurdles, not the least of which is the belief of many Americans that undocumented immigrants are criminals. More than 60 percent of both blacks and whites agreed that undocumented crossing is a crime and that unauthorized immigrants are criminals, revealing just how deeply this frame has penetrated the American psyche. Though the other two criminal threat frames had lower levels of agreement, approximately 40 percent of both blacks and whites agreed that undocumented immigrants are involved with drugs and gangs, while 52 percent of whites and roughly 36 percent of blacks agreed that they increase neighborhood crime rates. These findings are troubling, to say the least. For comprehensive immigration reform to become a reality, Americans must trust that at least a good number of the approximately eleven million undocumented

immigrants currently in the United States are law abiding, hardworking, and nonthreatening. If they believe these individuals are criminals, legalization will be resisted and comprehensive reform will be stymied, since it can only be achieved with some kind of path to citizenship for those already in the United States.

The media must play a role in helping to change public opinion, and immigration advocates must find creative ways to use the media to push for reform instead of restriction. Most Americans reported that they heard immigrant threat frames from some media source, and the models revealed that all else being equal, news consumption increased perceptions of criminal threat, at least among white Americans. The media's obsession with crime is really nothing new, but like blacks, undocumented immigrants are disproportionately portrayed in ways that suggest criminality and danger. These portrayals have a significant effect on attitudes toward the undocumented population and perceptions that this group is predisposed to criminality. In the right-wing sound bites about headless bodies, rape, and kidnappings we can see the echoes of Ronald Reagan's talk of welfare queens and crack babies, both scare campaigns aimed at tapping into nativist or racist tendencies in the American public. Media are the conduit through which these messages reach the public, and it is clear that they have their intended effect. Since frequent consumers of television news are more likely to believe that undocumented immigrants are criminals, advocates of compassionate immigration reform must find a way to address the narratives and imagery of immigrant criminality that are so common in the media.

'While more Americans believe this narrative than would be desired, most Americans do not believe that undocumented immigrants drive up crime rates or are involved in drugs and gangs. Optimism can also be drawn from the finding that most Americans support a path to citizenship or a guest-worker program, with a minority in support of deportation and felony charges. Notions of immigrant criminality did influence these preferences, though, and a belief that undocumented crossing is a crime increased support for deportation and reduced support for a path to citizenship. This pernicious effect of legal criminalization will continue to reverberate for the foreseeable future because it has been part of US immigration policy for so long. Findings in chapter 4 suggest that perceptions of criminality help to drive further criminalization by increasing support for restrictive policies that treat undocumented immigration as a crime, which in turn influence which solutions politicians see as viable. Counternarratives must be developed that focus on what is supported by study after study: that undocumented immigrants are not criminals and often offend at rates lower than the native-born population. This message must be aggressively promoted, and the decriminalization of undocumented entry and comprehensive reform just as aggressively pursued. It will take decades, if not longer, to erase the stereotypes associated with undocumented immigrants because of America's history of immigration policy.

The findings of Handcuffs and Chain Link: Criminalizing the Undocumented in America suggest many valuable paths for future research, the most important being research on public opinion toward immigrant criminality. In future studies, positively valanced frames should be included to determine whether the American public believes, for instance, that undocumented immigrants are law abiding or less likely to be involved in crime. In addition, survey experiments could be used to analyze counternarratives to the criminal threat frame. Does, for instance, citing figures showing low offense rates have any impact on policy preferences? How can perceptions of criminality be challenged in a way that results not in a backlash effect but instead in actual attitude change?

The polls drawn on for Handcuffs and Chain Link: Criminalizing the Undocumented in America had some limitations. The WISER poll, which I relied on for an analysis of policy preferences, had a small sample size. Larger national studies would allow examination of geographic effects, as well of proximity. Does living close to a large Latino

community have any effect on perceptions of criminality? Future work could also include a wider range of policy options than were available here, perhaps especially increasing the size of the Border Patrol and security on the border. Including these as options could also help explain why a belief that undocumented immigrants increased crime rates had no effect on policy preferences for either blacks or whites.

The criminalization of undocumented immigration remains an understudied area, though the literature at least on the policy side is growing. However, often ignored is the path dependence that has resulted from legislation like S. 5094 and IIRIRA, which have helped to entrench immigration as a law-and-order issue. The criminalization of undocumented immigration needs to be interrogated further. This book is meant as a starting point. There is much more work to be done.

In Defense of Gun Control by Hugh LaFollette [Oxford University Press, 9780190873363]

The gun control debate is more complex than we often acknowledge. What is often phrased as a single question -- should we have gun control -- Is actually made up of three distinct policy questions. First, who should we permit people to have guns? Second, which guns should be allowed? Thirdly, how should we regulate the acquisition, storage, and carrying of the guns people may legitimately own? To answer these questions we must decide whether (and which) people have a right to bear arms, what kind of right they have, and how stringent that right is. We must also evaluate divergent empirical claims about (a) the role of guns in causing harm, and (b) the degree to which private ownership of guns can protect innocent civilians from attacks by criminals, either in their homes or in public.

Hugh LaFollette sorts through the conceptual, moral, and empirical claims to fairly assess arguments for and against serious gun control, and ultimately argues that the US needs far more gun control than we currently have in most jurisdictions.

Excerpt:

Why We Need Gun Control

We begin this inquiry seeking clear, definitive answers to three distinct but related questions:

- Whom should we permit to own guns?
- Which firearms should we allow them to own?
- How should we restrict (a) the times and ways people can purchase and sell them, (b) the times (if any) when (some) owners can carry them, and (c) the ways owners must store them?

If our aspiration was to find incontrovertible answers to these questions, our hope has been dashed. The armchair arguments tend to support at least moderate gun control; however, these arguments were insufficient to settle the issue. Arguments for an instrumental right to arms have some argumentative purchase but are far short of what advocates aver or want. Finally, the empirical evidence, although suggestive, is far from unassailable. It does reveal a connection between homicides and gun ownership; it also undermines the strongest claims made on behalf of owning—and especially carrying—guns. We must decide how to proceed on less than unassailable evidence.

Before beginning to mount a more sustained argument for serious gun control, I must carefully consider an argument I first raised in chapter 2: the social costs of enforcing any significant constraints on private ownership of guns would be intolerable. The nature of this argument is not that these costs would be too high inasmuch as they deprive people of a source of enjoyment or an effective right to self-defense—although pro-gun advocates also believe that. This argument purportedly shows that serious control is wrong even if the standardly identified costs of owning guns (homicides, suicides, etc.) exceed its putative benefits (e.g., enhanced self-defense).

A Strategy

Freedman claims that our inability to find definitive evidence does not result from failing to adequately

manipulate available data. Using more sophisticated statistical techniques will not resolve this policy debate. He argues that, as with all public policy debates, we must rely on "shoe leather" and "natural experiments:' I think Freedman's (and Horowitz's) suggestions parallel advice Charles Lindbloom offered to government administrators half a century ago. "Theorists often ask the administrator to go the long way round to the solution of his problems ... when the administrator knows that the best available theory will work less well than more modest incremental comparisons".

Lindbloom's proposal for "muddling through" looks akin to a proposal I made near the end of the previous chapter. We have armchair arguments bolstered by empirical evidence suggesting that gun control can be beneficial. True, the NRC Committee found that evidence for any specific proposal is thin. I explained why that will not—indeed cannot—change. Nonetheless, we can use the evidence we do have to frame a series of "natural experiments." We can implement the most promising policies in different cities, states, and counties, and see what happens. If homicides, suicides, or accidents decline, we cannot straightforwardly infer that the policy caused the improvement; if the rate does not decline, we cannot necessarily infer that the policy failed. Despite these limitations, we take the evidence we obtain and make policy baby steps. We can use this strategy as individuals frequently do. We cannot confidently predict whether to request a raise, what would be the best college major, where to invest our retirement funds, whom to date, and for whom to vote. We make educated but imperfect predictions from available data and act accordingly. Sometimes our actions misfire and we change course. Sometimes they appear to work and we continue on the same track. Since the policies we are discussing are not bans but rather forms of control (akin to myriad controls on alcohol), then we need not worry that these experiments will thereby violate some serious right to bear arms. None are bans, and some of these are—or are close policy cousins of—proposals gun advocates themselves make or are committed to making.

More relevant to the current debate, this is what governments normally do when developing and implementing policies. It was the strategy we used to promote automobile safety. We assumed that many accidents were not intentional but occurred because of poor design or shoddy workmanship by the auto manufacturers, or from human exhaustion, inebriation, anger, bad judgment, or inattention. We had evidence—albeit less than rock solid evidence—that seat belts, air bags, speed limits, wider highway lanes, and enhanced safety design of cars (mounting gasoline tanks so that they are unlikely to explode upon rear impact, introducing anti-lock brakes, etc.) worked. Doubtless some policies failed or were only marginally successful. Others worked stellarly. Over time we assembled an array of rules, laws, and regulations that significantly decreased the number of automobile deaths per mile driven (Insurance Institute for Highway Safety 2016). Pro-control advocates think we can do the same with gun control measures. As a plan to save lives, this is a strategy we should not only consider but pursue. Following are some promising specific proposals. Even if some fail, we need not despair. Some will work. Especially when paired with indirect approaches to gun control that I propose toward the end of the chapter.

Some Feasible Measures:

Assault Weapons Bans

There is some dispute about what such bans would cover. Minimally they cover fully automatic weapons (depressing the trigger fires multiple bullets). In many jurisdictions it also covers semi-automatic weapons (the trigger must be squeezed to fire each bullet, but since the spent cartridges are automatically ejected and a new one automatically loaded into the firing chamber, a shooter can average shooting close to one bullet a second). There is no compelling rationale for generally allowing people to have such weapons. Moreover, there are demonstrable costs of

permitting them: when they are used in rampage or spree killings (think Virginia Tech, Newtown, and Orlando), the shooter can kill a large number of people in a very short time. It is also easier for a young child bearing such a weapon to kill others accidentally.

Of course, gun advocates will deny the first claim. They insist that there is a compelling rationale for having them: there are occasions where having them could be beneficial for self-defense. I would be shocked where that not sometimes true. Of course, it is also true on occasion that having artillery would sometimes be useful for self-defense. Artillery would be close to essential if one were battling a totalitarian regime.

However, even strong gun advocates pooh-pooh the idea that we should allow private ownership of heavy weapons (Hunt, L. H. 2016: 41). They acknowledge that there would be few cases when these would be necessary. They also acknowledge that although the number of people killed with these weapons is relatively small, the risks to others of allowing their private ownership are significant. Therefore, we can legitimately ban them.

We can use the argument they make against permitting the private ownership of bazookas to explain why we may legitimately ban assault weapons. Assault weapons do not have obvious important uses, they are dangerous, and they are not infrequently used to intimidate others, including government officials (Stanglin, D. 2013; Domonoske, C. 2017). There is one additional obvious difference that weighs against permitting assault weapons: no one can meander into a school or mall or theater with a bazooka. However, a number of spree killings do involve assault weapons. They are small enough to carry and powerful and fast enough to shoot large numbers of people in a very short time.

Body Armor Ban

We should not permit anyone other than police or the military to have body armor. It is not that there are not situations in which a private citizen might benefit from having it. There are. However, most people assume that such cases would be rare; in contrast, allowing ordinary citizens to purchase such protection would make it easier for criminals to acquire it as well. Police officers would have more trouble stopping criminals wearing a Kevlar vest. Moreover, robbers or potential killers wearing such armor would make it more difficult for ordinary citizens to defend themselves with a handgun. Those who want to be able to defend themselves against criminals with vests would then have reason to obtain Kevlar-penetrating bullets for self-defense. Of course, once these became widely available, they, too, would be more easily acquired by criminals. The cycle of escalation this would encourage should worry us.

Waiting Periods

Waiting periods would not prohibit anyone from owning a gun. They would simply ensure that an individual could not purchase one on a whim or an episodic desire for revenge. Individuals would have to apply for a license and then wait a specified length of time before acquiring the weapon. Even a two- or three-day waiting period may give someone time to "cool off" Indeed, a waiting period will likely inhibit some people from going to the trouble of trying to obtain a firearm.

Maintaining and Expanding Gun-Free Zones

Gun-free zones are areas where private citizens cannot carry guns, even if they have a carry permit. We designate an area a gun-free zone if we think admitting armed private citizens there would be too risky for innocent others. We always designate airlines as gun-free zones. Typically we also so designate schools, government buildings, bars, night clubs, and so on. Why? We fear that an armed person in such an environment could kill or maim numerous people if she were mentally unstable, depressed, irate, inebriated, or wanted to make a political statement. Fights regularly break out in bars. If the disputants are armed, one might shoot the other. In a crowded nightclub, mall, or theater once one person starts shooting, others may follow suit, even if in self-defense. Certainly

that would happen if we allowed all prison inmates to be armed. If nothing else, this shows that it is not categorically true that "more guns, less crime" (McMahan, J. 2016).

The NRA claims these bans are counterproductive since armed citizens could stop a spree or rampage killer. Lott agrees (Lott, J. R., Jr. 2010/2000/1997: 4022). I have no doubt that that could happen. I also have no doubt that gun-free zones have saved many lives, not only from a planned attack but also from potential crossfire of armed citizens trying to down the shooter. One clear bit of evidence that most pro-gun advocates do not believe their own claims about gun-free zones is that the United States House and Senate floors do not allow representatives or visitors to be armed. That is incompatible with the contention of those who control these legislative bodies that gun-free zones are a bad idea. Behavior speaks louder than words.

Repealing Stand Your Ground Statutes

Stand your ground laws "allow individuals to use force, including le¬thal force, in self-defense when there is reasonable belief of a threat, without having any duty to retreat first" (McClellan, C. B. and Tekin, E. 2012: 3). Such statutes were passed to give people greater latitude when defending their homes or themselves. One of the earliest such laws was passed in Florida. Two different studies found that passage of these laws led to (a) more homicides being deemed "justified" and (b) more homicides in the state that adopted the law (Humphreys, D., Gasparrini, A. and Wiebe, D. 2017a; Humphreys, D., Gasparrini, A., and Wiebe, D. 2017b; Hoekstra, M. and Cheng, C. 2013). If this evidence is reliable, and it certainly seems plausible, then these laws are detrimental and should be repealed.

Higher Taxes on Guns

There are two rationales for taxing guns at a higher rate than other consumer items. One, since the widespread availability of guns partly explains gun violence, a tax might slightly lower gun prevalence and, thus, gun violence. A higher tax could make, people who do not really need firearms less inclined to purchase them. Two, a higher tax on guns is fair to those who do not own guns. The public pays more than $700 million a year for uninsured hospital costs for people with gunshot wounds (Spitzer, S. A., Staudenmayer, K. L. et al. 2017). Doubtless, too, we all pay higher medical insurance premiums to defray medical expenses for gunshot victims who do have insurance. To ease this burden on the taxpaying and insurance-paying public, we could specify that all additional tax revenues go toward covering these hospital and insurance costs. I do not expect that these taxes would cover all such costs. However, they would help. This is a straightforward way of asking people who own guns to bear the financial burdens of that ownership.

There is an additional rationale for higher taxes, at least for those who can afford it. If gun advocates are sincere in saying that the core reason for private gun ownership is self-defense, and if they are correct in claiming that the poor bear the principal burden of gun violence, then higher taxes on wealthy owners could underwrite the fees and taxes on guns that the poor must pay for guns they need.

Limiting or Controlling Private Gun Sales and Transfers

Many criminals who obtain weapons get them from a friend or family member, or purchase them privately from someone within their neighborhood (Cook, P. J., Parker, S. T., and Pollack, H. A. 2015: 35). If such transfers were prohibited or had to meet the same registration requirements as purchases of guns from retailers, then this would decrease criminals' access to firearms.

Registration

This is simply one effect of the previous consideration. If all gun purchases had to be registered, then we would have a way to trace the ownership of weapons used in the commission of a crime. More importantly, we need registration to ensure that some people (four-year-olds, certifiably mentally ill people, former violent

felons, etc.) are not allowed to acquire guns, and that no one is permitted to purchase some firearms (a working bazooka).

Revoke Immunity for Gun Manufacturers

In 2005 Congress passed the so-called Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which gives gun manufacturers and retailers broad legal immunity against suits "result[ing] from the criminal or lawful misuse" of firearms or ammunition (15 gult7.4 2f j0>>Bw g r l m u . 2 (s t

If the free market decided that the danger of underwriting gun ownership were financially infeasible, or if they can offer coverage only at exorbitant rates, then that would limit the number of people who can actually own guns. However, were that true, we would be confident that the dangers of allowing gun ownership were excessive. In contrast, were guns as safe as Hunt avers, insurance companies would pounce on the possibility of writing lucrative policies. Policies would be widely available; premiums, astonishingly cheap. On the other hand, were Hunt mistaken, premiums would be high. However, this does not count against the proposal since the companies would determine cost based on their objective assessment of the risk of privately owning guns.

Perhaps these indirect mechanisms will not work. However, it is plausible to think they, coupled with the more concrete proposals advocated in the previous major section, would have the benefits of gun control without depriving most people of the ability to own firearms for self-defense. These mechanisms are a form of serious gun control that guns owners should willingly accept. <>

Trump and Political Philosophy: Patriotism, Cosmopolitanism, and Civic Virtue edited by Marc Benjamin Sable, Angel Jaramillo Torres [Palgrave Macmillan, 9783319744261]

This book seeks to address the relation of political philosophy and Donald Trump as a political phenomenon through the notions of patriotism, cosmopolitanism, and civic virtue. Political philosophers have been prescient in explaining trends that may explain our political misgivings. Madison warned during the debates on the Constitution that democracies are vulnerable to factions based on passion for personalities and beliefs; various continental thinkers have addressed the problem of nihilism—the modern loss of faith in objective standards of truth and morality—that in Max Weber's analysis pointed to the importance of charisma, in Carl Schmitt's to the idea that politics is essentially rooted in the definition of friends and enemies, and in early Heidegger resulted in the emphasis on the enduring significance of local, rather than cosmopolitan values. The former concerns—regarding demagoguery, charisma and nihilism—will enable an evaluation of Trump as a political character, while the latter concerns—regarding the status of universal versus local values—will enable us to evaluate the content of "Trumpism." Taken together, these essays seek to advance the public conversation about the relationship between the rise of Trump and the ideological forces that seek to justify that rise. <>

Trump and Political Philosophy: Leadership, Statesmanship, and Tyranny edited by Angel Jaramillo Torres, Marc Benjamin Sable [Palgrave Macmillan, 9783319744445]

Trump and Political Philosophy: Leadership, Statesmanship, and Tyranny aims to recover from ancient and modern thinkers valuable arguments about statesmanship, leadership, and tyranny which illuminate reassessments of political science and practice after the election of Donald Trump. Like almost everyone else, contemporary political scientists were blind-sided by the rise of Trump. No one expected a candidate to win who repeatedly violated both political norms and the conventional wisdom about campaign best practices. Yet many of the puzzles that Trump's rise presents have been examined by the great political philosophers of the past. For example, it would come as no surprise to Plato that by its very emphasis on popularity, democracy creates the potential for tyranny via demagoguery. And, perhaps no problem is more alien to empirical political science than asking if statesmanship entails virtue or if so, in what that virtue consists: This is a theme treated by Plato, Aristotle, and Machiavelli, among others. Covering a range of thinkers such as Confucius, Plutarch, Kant, Tocqueville, and Deleuze, the essays in this book then seek to place the rise of Trump and the nature of his political authority within a broader

institutional context than is possible for mainstream political science.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: To edit a volume that is a compilation of essays on the hypothetical opinions of classical and modern philosophers on the 45th Presidency of the United States is undoubtedly a challenge.

The predicament is compounded by the inescapable fact that Donald Trump is unlikely to be interested in philosophy. According to his own public testimonies, Trump's favorite books are the Bible and The Art of the Deal—not necessarily in that order. Perhaps this book will find a place on the bookshelves of citizens interested in the fate of American democracy, and more generally the world they are living in as the twentieth-first century approaches its third decade.

This volume is divided into three parts: Ancient and Medieval Political Thought, Modern and Liberal Thought, and Continental Perspectives. The quarrel between ancient and moderns can help us to better understand statesmanship, tyranny, and leadership—themes critical for the America which has witnessed the rise of Trump. Political philosophy is, among other things, a meditation about real and desired regimes.

It should be noted that this book has a companion volume, Trump and Political Philosophy: Patriotism, Cosmopolitanism and Civic Virtue, and the project was originally intended as a single volume. If the reader finds some great thinker or political stance lacking here, we hope that they will look in there for insights.

This collection is undoubtedly diverse, not only in terms of the thinkers with whom our contributors engage, but also in their politics. We have included authors who believe, explicitly or implicitly, that

Donald Trump lacks the moral, political, and technical capacities to govern the United States. We have decided to give voice as well to those who are optimistic about Trump and believe that he deserves a chance to demonstrate that he can deliver the goods.

Our decision is likely not to garner much assent from either side of the political spectrum, but since this book is written from the point of view of philosophy, we think that dogmatism is the most perfidious of intellectual vices. All in all, we subscribe to the Socratic injunction that one is an educated person to the extent one knows one's ignorance. Moreover, it is our conviction that the strengthening of the public sphere needs an open and non-dogmatic discussion of ideas about what Trump's surprising electoral victory means. If, as several of the contributors point out, the dangers of the present political landscape stem from our inability to rationally discuss the great issues of our time—that we are more comfortable arguing with the like-minded—we hope that this book will foster a dialogue across political divides that can improve the quality of American democracy.

Of course, this book cannot provide all the insights that the philosophers might bring to bear on contemporary politics, or even just Trump, even taken together with its companion volume. But like the proverbial exiled poet, we have launched this book like a message in a bottle thrown into the sea. We hope some fishermen in search of human messages will find it and read it. Perhaps it can help them to get their bearings amidst a troubled moment in the American political landscape.

Leadership, Statesmanship and Tyranny: The Character and Rhetoric of Trump edited by Angel Jaramillo Torres and Marc Benjamin Sable

This volume gathers together a set of essays which, like its companion volume, Trump and Political Philosophy: Patriotism, Cosmopolitanism, and Civic Virtue, seeks to make sense of contemporary politics through the works of many of the greatest political thinkers. Following a venerable tradition, we have arranged this volume chronologically, and grouped the essays into sections based on whether they discuss premodern, modern or postmodern thinkers. However, the reader has probably come with the primary intention of understanding Trump's rise in light of political philosophy, rather than seeking to use Trump to understand the history of political philosophy. This introduction, then, will lay out the philosophical disputes which underlie varying interpretations of Trump, with a focus on the broad theme of what counts as wholesome or pernicious leadership.

This collection discusses the ways that Trump exercises leadership for good or ill, and thus the extent to which he exhibits the qualities of either a statesman or a tyrant. Statesmanship is the way a political leader successfully deals with matters of government. Tyranny is government which abuses its citizens and a perennial human possibility. Its actualization has troubled all the great political thinkers, who have imagined ways to avoid it. Because tyranny and statesmanship are types of leadership, and since political philosophy seeks the objective good, true leadership is the opposite of nihilism. In the best description, a true leader knows the why and wherefore of human actions, and good leadership is thus equivalent to statesmanship. In referring to Trump we are obviously referencing his character as a person and as political leader. We understand rhetoric here very broadly, as referring to his comportment and political style, since his significance stems as much from how he communicates and shapes the political discourse as what he communicates, i.e., his ideology or political views.

The authors of the essays included here do not view Trump and rhetoric through a single theoretical lens. Moreover, they take their bearings from political history as well as from political philosophy. The contemporary political predicament is probed from American, European, Middle Eastern, and Chinese traditions of political thought: The volume is thus wide in scope and ambitious in its approach. The essays, however, can be grouped under two broad categories: on the one hand, Trump's rhetoric and

his demagogy and, on the other, his character and how it relates to democratic institutions.

A good place to frame the debates here is the typology in Joseph Reisert's essay, "Knave, Patriot, or Factionist," which deftly relates the question of Trump's character to his political craft. He delineates three possible interpretations of Trump. Roughly, these are (a) a selfish demagogue who seeks political power for personal advantage, (b) a skillful politician who utilizes rhetoric in defense of his country, and (c) a clever demagogue who manipulates the masses in order to impose his ideological agenda. On the first score, some have seen in Trump a man whose main purpose in life is to strengthen his own economic well-being, which includes his immediate family. Not only his rhetoric but also his biography seems to fit this characterization. In office he placed his daughter and her husband as chief advisors, at least temporarily. A self-centered man as a type has certainly been probed and discussed by ancient and modern philosophy. It is what we know today as the bourgeois. On the second score, Trump's defenders argue that his rhetoric appeals to that section of the citizenship that has not attended elite schools. It is a language that from the point of view of over-educated elites might seem irrational, but in fact is a bridge that allows underdogs to communicate with the leader. Both Trump and his supporters concur in the fact that the time has come for a national reawakening. On the final score, Trump's policies may constitute a kind of ideology. For those who are sanguine about Trump, this ideology takes its bearings from the American political experience. For the time being, Trumpism seems to be a practice in search of a theory.

Character and Leadership

Small-mindedness, willfulness and greed are certainly among the traits which render one unfit for leadership, while a concern for the regime's stability, the defense of the masses and seriousness of purpose would define the statesman. George Dunn, Ashok Karra, Yu Jin Ko, and Murray Dry deploy these concepts to critique Trump, utilizing the thought of Confucius, Xenophon, Shakespeare, Hamilton and Lincoln, respectively. In effect, each condemns Trump as lacking the character of a decent political leader, and all conclude that he is driven by egoistic motives, i.e., a Rousseauian knave of one sort of another.

Christopher Colmo on Alfarabi, Gladden Pappin on Machiavelli, Arthur Milikh on the Federalist, and Feisal Mohamed on Carl Schmitt are all more focused on reading the relationship of the leader's character to the regime. Pappin and Milikh are more generous to Trump, inclined to see him as a patriot or at least as representing important value for the American people (in Milikh's case) or that of the working class against the elite (in Pappin's). They are inclined to view him as a patriot. By contrast, Mohamed's assessment is more critical; he views Trump as potentially taking advantage of expanded presidential powers to impose dominance by his political base. In short, as a Rousseauian factionist. Colmo is primarily interested in Trump's rise as a thought experiment on how Alfarabi would understand a regime totally without religious foundation, and what that would entail for political leadership, leaving the precise question of Trump's character open.

The Character of Trump

George Dunn's essay is the only in this collection devoted to a non-Western thinker (if we regard Alfarabi as Western). The question Dunn asks is simply what Confucius would have thought about Donald Trump. Not surprisingly the answer to this question is complex. Dunn offers a variety of reasons for why Confucius might have supported Trump, but also tells us why the iconic Chinese philosopher would take issue with the 45th president and his behavior. According to Dunn, both Confucius and Trump share conservatism as part of their personal constitution, for both live in times they consider corrupt and look back to a time they deem great. Unlike Trump, however, Confucius put great emphasis on the concept of culture (wén) as a way to overcome man's natural state, one of zero-sum conflict that makes all worse off. Culture was very significant for Confucius, as well as his followers Mengzu and Xunzi. According to Dunn, a

philosopher in the Chinese tradition is, among other things, an expert of culture, which includes "all the practices that were regarded as the marks of a civilized human being." Confucius' notion of the ideal man or the gentleman sets high demands on political leaders. Dunn suggests that Confucius would not have regarded Trump as a gentleman, but rather as a "small man" (xiàorén). It is not fanciful to point out that Dunn's Confucius would have concurred with the moral judgment of Oscar Wilde, who made Lord Darlington quip that a cynic is "a man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing."

The Athenian general, politician and political philosopher, Xenophon, belongs to the same axial age as Confucius, and surprisingly may help us better understand present-day American political figures. Karra's essay presents three portraits of political personalities by Xenophon: those of Glaucon, Meno, and Hiero. The author shows ignoble characteristics which the reader can use to evaluate contemporary political figures. In Karra's account, Xenophon shows Glaucon as "an extremely ignorant but extremely ambitious man", lacking the slightest idea of how to govern. Meno, on the other hand, appears as greedy and grasping, while Hiero is seen as a man who is deeply unsatisfied with his everyday life, despite reaching supreme power. In the first two cases, Socrates is presented as a man who educates ambitious young men in moderation. The reader cannot avoid thinking that Trump lacks Socratic education. In Karra's presentation of the third case, that of Hiero, Xenophon's Simonides appears as witness to the tyrant's life, a life made distasteful due to the excessive and base nature of his pleasures. Karra ends his essay suggesting that ignorance, greed, and intemperance—the vices he discusses in his Xenophontic portraits of ignobility—render a man unfit to govern. Behind this portrait looms the figure of Trump.

Taking his bearings from Stephen Greenblatt's Invisible Bullets, Ko analyzes the saga that begins with a rebellion against Richard II and ends with a rueful chorus anticipating the disastrous reign of Henry VI. Ko follows Henry V—the hero of the saga—as he spent his youthful years as Hal frequenting taverns in the company of Falstaff rather than attending the court of his father, King Henry IV. Drawing on the Foucaultian idea that power produces its own subversion, he investigates whether Trump can be said to have the traits of both the lord of misrule Falstaff, and the mischievous Hal. The 45th president is known for his abstinence, but as a young man he carried on with a score of Falstaffian characters, from whom he learned the mendacious arts, in the world of Tammany Hall politics, real estate chicanery and tabloid entertainment that was 1970s New York City. This was to Trump what the tavern and Falstaff were for young Hal. The presentation of the relationship of Hal and Falstaff demonstrates the extent to which an education in the toughness on the streets may be beneficial for a future leader. At the same time, Ko is not sanguine about the current state of American politics, as Trump's strange combination of Falstaff and Hal does not exhibit the virtues of the mature Henry V.

In "American Constitutionalism from Hamilton to Lincoln to Trump," Murray Dry explains how Washington and Hamilton developed in tandem the foreign and economic policy of America's first administration. Dry probes Hamilton's concerns regarding the danger of a man unfit for office reaching the Presidency. According to Dry, while Hamilton understood that the statement, "ambition counteracts ambition" could be used to paradoxically found a virtuous republic, Lincoln's actions and thought exhibited both prudence and civic virtue. Behind Dry's presentation stands the idea that America has been successful to the degree it has because it has combined the way of Hamilton and the way of Lincoln. The danger of Trump, points out Dry, is that Trump seems to behave in a manner which is both anti-Hamiltonian and anti-Lincolnian.

Trump's Character, Leadership and the American Regime

In "Trump, Alfarabi, and the Open Society," Christopher Colmo engages in a thought experiment imagining what the medieval philosopher Alfarabi, would have thought about the American republic, in general, and about Trump's style of governing, in particular. According to Colmo, Alfarabi would be struck by the possibility of a regime where the church and the state are separated into different spheres of influence, and freedom of speech is guaranteed by the constitution. As a student of kalam (defensive theology), Al-Farabi would have tried to see whether the American regime might deserve to be defended. Colmo argues that Al-Farabi might be the thinker who thought most profoundly about the possibility of a politics that does not need philosophy, or knowledge of objective truth. For Alfarabi there are "two kinds of rulers who do not need philosophy: the traditional king, who follows his predecessors, and the one 'who rules through a certain shrewdness and cunning that he learns from experience.'" The ruler who needs philosophy will take as his guide policies based on universals, while the ruler who does not need philosophy will learn only from experience. In the latter case, prudence and shrewdness replaced philosophy. Colmo seems to argue that Trump is a species of ruler who does not need philosophy because he possesses mere shrewdness. Although for Alfarabi prudence cannot be separated from shrewdness, Trump's "art of the deal" does away with the sphere of prudence entirely. (Following Aristotle, Alfarabi understood prudence to be the shrewd pursuit of one's ends, but the nature of those ends was justified by knowing them as objectively true or right.) Trump's rejection of universals might explain his preference for particulars as such. In this light one can understand his advocacy of economic nationalism at the expense of globalization. This is just one of the ways in which a medieval Islamic political philosopher can help us to understand present-day America.

In his essay "Machiavellian Politics, Modern Management and the Rise of Donald Trump," Gladden Pappin resorts to an important distinction in Machiavelli—the humors of the grandi and the popolo, the elites and the people—to explain the rise of Trump in modern commercial America. Pappin argues that although "Trump's election was portrayed in potentially apocalyptic terms," it took place within the constitutional framework. Pappin finds elective affinities between Machiavelli's notion of "managing" (maneggiare) and the concept of commercial "management." The modern turn—inspired by John Locke—from political managing to the commercial management of captains of industry "has arguably made the singular `venting of the popular humor' more difficult." Pappin argues that, in the world of modern industrial management, Peter Drucker, "wittingly or unwittingly describes a world of activity suffused with Machiavelli's strategies, but modified in crucial ways. Those ways lie at the root of our current political problems." Although the scientific management of Drucker and Taylor promised an era of economic prosperity, it ended up chiefly benefitting the managerial classes while harming workers. The world described by Drucker is no longer functioning in modern America due to globalization and mechanization through robotics. These two phenomena have led the working class ("the popular humor") to become fragmented, but with the capacity "to be constituted as a whole". Donald Trump is seen by Pappin as a kind of modern-day Machiavellian prince, allied with the popolo against the modern grandes, namely, the managerial elites. With Trump, the American polity is returning to the Machiavellian world where the two political humors are again at odds.

Like Pappin's essay, Milikh's relates Trump's leadership to the nature of the modern regime, and like Colmo's essay (and Dry's, discussed above) he relates it to the particular nature of the American regime. However, while Dry focuses on the disjuncture between Trump and great figures in the American political tradition, Arthur Milikh argues there is a deep affinity between the founders and

Trump, specifically the Hamiltonian project of fostering commerce to increase American national power. "Trump and the Federalist on National Greatness in a Commercial Republic" maintains that Trump won the 2016 presidential election in part due to his promise to "Make America Great Again", and that "the clearest articulation of national greatness is found in The Federalist." Milikh focuses on demonstrating that "for Publius commerce will serve as the means by which America will develop its [own] form of greatness". He argues that republican principles can only survive in a unified nation that is powerful enough to defend its sovereignty and independence from foreign encroachments. Publius' political thought advanced a new form of greatness that was not based on military control of other countries—as in Europe and the rest of the world—but founded upon competitive commercial exchange. According to Milikh, Trump proposes a new paradigm whereby the United States will shrewdly use all the tools at its disposal to gain an edge over other nations in the economic disputes of the future. Milikh maintains that Publius imagined a political regime of human rationality. "In this regard", argues Milikh, "America will be the first non-theocratic country, the reason for which it is the example of human nobility".

The subject of Feisal Mohamed's essay is Carl Schmitt, the German scholar who compellingly described the nature of politics as depending on the friend-enemy distinction. Just as the beautiful-ugly dichotomy is to esthetics, or the good and bad distinction to morality, so Schmitt claimed the friend-enemy dichotomy was the essence of politics. In his essay, Mohamed sets out to examine whether the Schmittian understanding of politics can be applied to Trump's measures, principally "the so-called Muslim ban" and his pardon of Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio, both of which have, for now, been stymied by the exercise of judicial review. For Mohamed the Trump administration has all the features of the "commissarial dictatorship", a situation that allows the executive power to decide whether the state finds itself in a state of exception. This allows a president to circumvent the rule of law. But Mohamed does not single out Trump for condemnation: When behaving like a dictator, he simply takes advantage of an American legal tradition that "rhymes well with the commissarial dictatorship that Schmitt finds in the Republican tradition". Ever since Hamilton described the need for an executive with "energy", argues Mohamed, the presidency has claimed "unilaterally to exercise force against external enemies". Mohamed ends his essay on a pessimistic note, for Trump might be only a prelude of what is to come: the victory of reactionary forces claiming sovereign decisionism for the sake of the Volk.

Rhetoric and Demagogy

Political philosophy has always been interested in investigating what makes a ruler capable of governing well. The essays by Patrick Lee Miller, Bernard Dobski, Leslie Rubin, John Burt, Kenneth Masugi, Joseph Reisert, Marc Sable, and Kate Crehan lay out different accounts of whether the 45th president has used the rhetoric of a statesman or sheer demagogy.

Patrick Lee Miller takes his bearings from Plato's portrait of philosophers, sophists, and tyrants to lay out a typology of truth. Miller points out that there are three ways of disregarding the truth, "with three correlative types of people." The philosopher is a seeker of truth and is always honest, even if he appears to be lying. The sophist, on the other hand, manipulates words for purposes other than seeking the truth: to become rich, famous, or more powerful. Sophistry is then the genus under which demagogy falls, a species defined by its political motive. Miller argues that when Trump had not yet reached power, he ignored the truth in the fashion of a generic sophist. This changed, however when he became president, for he began to lie with tyrannical purposes. For Miller, the tyrant seeks to exert his power by defining the truth. He is in the business of inventing an alternative reality where the truth becomes his will to power.

Bernard Dobski begins his essay by belittling "comparisons of Trump to the `baddies' of the

twentieth and twenty-first century" such as Hitler and Stalin. He argues that a better analogy is with the Athenian political leader, Cleon, primarily as presented by the political historian, Thucydides. Like Trump, Cleon was a "flatterer of the city demos". Drawing on an insight by Timothy Burns, Dobski claims that the most significant trait of Cleon is anger triggered by frustrated hopefulness.' Dobski backs his assertions by laying out a variety of historical examples taken from the History of the Peloponnesian War and probing the judgment of philosophers such as Aristotle. But Dobski doesn't engage in an all-out attack on Cleon, whose virtues allowed Athens to maintain its hegemony for a while. Against prevailing opinions about Thucydides' alleged realism, Dobski presents us with a more complicated portrait, one in which justice is given its due. He claims that Cleon's appeals to Athenian pride contain an implicit notion that Athens deserves to rule. Like Trump's "Make America Great Again" slogan, the grounds for this claim are never spelled out. Dobski finishes his essay by showing that Cleon's politics might be complemented by Pericles', whose rhetoric provided those grounds and whose policies were more self-controlled. He suggests that the 45th president might learn from Pericles' example.

Aristotle belongs to the next generation. Leslie Rubin's essay provides penetrating "observations on Aristotle's insights into the campaign for the presidency" in 2016. Her essay focuses on two Aristotelian political ideas. Firstly, she uses "the philosopher's understanding of demagogy" to shed light on the current moral predicament of American politics. Secondly, Aristotle's reflections on regime stability enable Rubin to set forth some remedies for the conditions that made possible the election of a demagogue in the 2016 presidential elections. She points out that demagogy can be a method of regime change. In particular, she warns us that tyranny typically begins when democracy descends into demagogy. In Rubin's opinion, Trump engages in textbook demagogy, fulfilling many of Aristotle's descriptions of the demagogue. The reader of Rubin's essay will find countless examples that show how Trump's actions conform to Aristotles' diagnoses. That this is the case makes one think that the philosopher's chief thoughts may truly be timeless. Hers is a cautionary tale of the dangers when a demagogue divides a polity into two, of enemies against friends. Her solution takes up an idea by Aristotle—to strengthen the middle class, for it educates "natural peacemakers". This could be accomplished, in part, by "understanding the political/moral role of education" and its impact in promoting the republican virtues of prudence and moderation.

In his essay, Reisert eschews an all-out attack on Trump, finding reasons why Rousseau might have supported some of Trump's qualities and political inclinations. He reminds us that Rousseau's concept of the general will is chiefly thought to function only in a polity the size of eighteenth-century Geneva. Although Rousseau was in favor of direct democracy as the best way to make decisions in a city, he nevertheless reflected on the best way to select candidates for public office in representative democracies. Still, Reisert argues that, if Rousseau had his way, Trump would have never become president, due to his lack of experience and civic virtue. He is the product of the reality TV and social media era and "the decline of civic experience and civic virtue in the public." However, Reisert conceives a scenario where the opening of the highest office to political novices such as Trump might be beneficial to a polity suppurating with corruption. When it comes to Trump's policies, Reisert argues that Rousseau would not have been displeased by Trump's support of particularist patriotism and his criticism of cosmopolitanism. However, Reisert points out that Rousseau would have rejected Trump's embrace of "finance and commerce."

In "Lincoln, Moral Conflict, and Herrenvolk Democracy in the Age of Trump," John Burt argues that the mature Lincoln's political posture, taken after coming out of political retirement in 1854, as the slavery crisis reached its peak, provides a model for democratic rhetoric from which we can glean insights for the current era. According to Burt,

Lincoln developed a strategy of dialog with those who "undermine the mores and norms upon which democratic culture depends" and those who "seem to have closed themselves for persuasion." Drawing on his previous work, Lincoln's Tragic Pragmatism, he points out that the rhetoric of many Trump supporters is "suicidally apodictic," because it is designed to close off an argument. Burt maintains that Trump's politics is a negation of two traits upon which the United States had historically fulfilled its democratic promise. Firstly, America has been a multicultural society with a common identity based not on common blood or religion, but on a commitment to the idea that all men are created equal. Secondly, America has been committed to "a world founded upon multilateral agreements ... to international institutions of collective security ruled by open covenants." The latter reflects democratic values because it treats relations between nations as requiring dialog and consent. He sees both the domestic commitment to equality and the foreign policy of international institutionalism as under attack by the Trump administration. For Burt, the option facing present day America is either a return to Lincolnian rhetoric and actions founded on Kantian liberal politics that has consent and persuasion as its greatest values, or a Schmittian agonistic politics that bestows more importance to competition and zero-sum politics. The latter is, according to Burt, the hallmark of Trumpian politics. At stake is the very soul of the American Republic. As a strategy for coping with opponents who seem to have closed themselves off from persuasion and thus from democratic culture, he recommends that we adopt two Lincolnian rhetorical strategies. First, that we construct an idealized version of opponents, and speak to that idealized opponent as if she were persuadable, asking for small concessions that "keep alive the possibility of a shared political life even in the face of a deep conflict." His second suggestion is to address the fears which we believe close the minds of our opponents. Both strategies were ultimately unsuccessful in breaking the death-spiral of apodictic argumentation by pro-slavery Southerners, but Burt points out that they did enable Lincoln to wage a bloody civil war without rancor and welcome them back into the national community afterwards.

Like Burt, Kenneth Masugi finds important analogies between Lincoln's era and the age of Trump, but his interpretation is the polar opposite: He claims that Trump embraces a Lincolnian call for citizens to embrace common citizenship that will strengthen a sense of patriotism. According to Masugi, Trump is like Lincoln, because he was able to make inroads against the establishment of the Republican Party, thus steering the party into a place closer to the interests of the people. Drawing on Aristotle's notion of political friendship (politike philia) in the Nicomachean Ethics, Masugi maintains that the tenth and 45th presidents "bring together citizens for all practical purposes of politics" based on the three Aristotelian types of friendship: utility, pleasure, and virtue. Masugi claims that the central theme of Lincoln's campaign was how to foster American nationalism and that Trump's attempt to make America great again is a means to "recovering the America of Lincoln and the founders." The two fundamental passions that Lincoln highlighted in his Dred Scott speech and in the Gettysburg address are self-interest and a sense of duty. Masugi goes out of his way to demonstrate through a discussion of key Trump speeches that the current president appeals to both interest and duty, thus embracing a Lincolnian politics. We leave for the reader to decide whether Burt's or Masugi's reading of Trump squares better with the character of Lincoln.

In "Charisma, Value and Political Vocation," Marc Sable applies Weberian conceptions of legitimacy, ethics and political vocation to make sense of the 2016 election. One can read this essay as a meditation on why rhetoric succeeds or fails. With regard to political legitimacy, Sable holds that, at the end of the day, the sources for Weber seem to be only two: traditional and charismatic legitimacy—although traditional legitimacy is in the end nothing more than institutionalized charisma. If this is the case,

only charisma ultimately grounds political legitimacy. Sable thus suggests that the distinction Weber made in "Politics as Vocation" between the ethics of responsibility and the ethics of final ends may lack foundations, even as it can be used to critique all the major candidates of 2016. He argues that Hillary Clinton represented institutional charisma in crisis, while Trump represented a sheer personal charisma that succeeded among a great part of the electorate precisely because it challenged a neoliberal value system in which many had lost faith. In short, Clinton versus Trump: institutional versus personal charisma. According to Sable, Hillary Clinton's defeat is best explained by her failure to articulate the values of an American civic nationalism, such as individual freedom, social justice, popular democracy, and postracial equality.

In "The Common Sense of Donald J. Trump," Kate Crehan provides an arresting reading of Gramsci's prison books to explain Trump's populist appeal. She argues that Gramsci's understanding of the causes that led to the rise of fascism in the 1920s can shed light on the present-day American predicament. She focuses on Gramsci's concept of senso commune, which is "a taken-for-granted `knowledge' to be found in every human community." A variegated phenomenon, senso commune can be regarded as the opposite of critical thinking. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, argues Crehan, an appeal to common sense is seen as beneficial by politicians. In the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump successfully positioned himself as the candidate of common sense as opposed to the "elitist" Hillary Clinton. Trump brilliantly used his knowledge of the media to garner the sympathy of Tea Party supporters. Crehan concludes her essay by suggesting that a different appeal to senso commune may be necessary to "bring about social transformation" for the benefit of the "subaltern" classes. Only an alliance between the intellectuals and "those who are subordinated" will allow for the cultural victory of the progressive sector in America. Crehan sees in the Occupy Wall Street movement—"a mass of `ordinary people" with the effective slogan "We are the 99 percent"—a paradigm for future attempts to challenge populist conservatism in the Trump era.

Judging Trump

The editors believe that including viewpoints which defend—or at least explain sympathetically—Trump as a political leader, is necessary both to elevate the theoretical conversation and preserve the preconditions of democratic discourse. However, we also believe it is our duty, as scholars and as citizens, to make clear our own position on Trumpian leadership.

This introduction began by laying out three possible interpretations of Trump as a political leader: "knave, factionist, or patriot." Classical political thought, with its emphasis on virtue, typically presented tyranny as a function of the tyrant's base character. By contrast, modern and postmodern interpretations tend to emphasize the tyrant's willful imposition of political goals contrary to the common good. We believe that Trump has a tyrannical soul, in both senses, and that he vacillates between knave and factionist. First, judging his personal character, we cannot overlook his intemperance and injustice. In the Republic, Socrates describes the tyrant as a person enslaved to his appetites, carnal or pecuniary, incapable of self-control. The evidence of both in Trump seems to us overwhelming. This personal corruption, we think, is reflected in a second tyrannical quality: His demagogy treats all inconvenient facts—let alone arguments—as mere obstacles to the fulfillment of his appetites for fame, wealth and power. While this has ancient antecedents, postmodern skepticism makes this problem all the more profound. Admittedly all rhetoric treats persuasion, not truth, as its end, but tyranny occurs when leaders do so shamelessly in order to impose their will. Shame in the face of truth is what separates decent from indecent leaders, be they ancient demagogues or modern ideologues. It is fortunate that Trump's excessive appetites and his "will to power" seem to be in conflict, i.e., that his personal desire for approval and wealth renders his nihilistic

demagogy in pursuit of his agenda less effective, i.e., undermines his capacity to suborn political opposition. Those who would treat Trump as a decent leader do so because they believe he defends America—or rather a vision held by their section of it. In a word, we think him neither statesman nor true patriot, but a factionist whose primary nature as a knave makes him less dangerous.

Granted, it is easier to condemn Trump's leadership when one rejects his policies. Certainly, if Trumpism—and not just some particular policy articulated by Trump—is objectively right, in aggregate, then we might label him not a factional ideologue but a normal democratic politician engaged in a new sort of rhetoric. The claim of Trump's apologists seems to be that he defends the true American national interest against grave threats and advocates for those whose rights have been neglected. On the contrary, however, we believe that his policies are, to borrow Madison's telling phrase, "contrary to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." Still, we do believe that it is possible to distinguish gross demagogy from decent rhetoric, by the very fact that his discourse makes rational discussion of the issues fundamentally more difficult. By treating every debate as a conflict between friends and enemies, in which both the true and the desirable is judged according to whether it advances his agenda, he educates the American people to disregard reason itself, and he encourages blind partisanship. If statecraft is soulcraft, Trump teaches the vice of nihilism by example. His rise is then equally an effect of civic corruption and its reinforcement.

Finally, although partisan factors have limited public opposition from within Trump's own party, we take some solace from the fact that his most extreme threats to constitutional norms—threats to fire the Special Counsel, upend voting protections, and bully the press—have provoked effective opposition and generally achieved little. This indicates to us that the American republic is not as corrupted as his staunchest defenders believe. But for a discussion of the degree to which civic virtue is still present in the American public today, we recommend that our readers turn to the companion volume. <>

Core Socio-Economic Rights and the European Court of Human Rights by Ingrid Leijten [Cambridge Studies in European Law and Policy, Cambridge University Press, 9781107198470]

Core Socio-Economic Rights and the European Court of Human Rights deals with socio-economic rights in the context of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The book connects the ECtHR's socio-economic case law to an understanding of the Court's responsibility to recognize the limitations of supranational rights adjudication while protecting the most needy. By exploring the idea of core rights protection in constitutional and international law, a new perspective is developed that offers suggestions for improving the ECtHR's reasoning in socio-economic cases as well as contributing to the debate on indivisible rights adjudication in an age of 'rights inflation' and proportionality review. Core Socio-Economic Rights and the European Court of Human Rights will interest scholars and practitioners dealing with fundamental rights and especially those interested in judicial reasoning, socio-economic and supranational rights protection.

CONTENTS
Series Editors' Preface
Acknowledgements
List of Abbreviations
Table of Cases
Introduction: Reasoning Indivisible Rights
PART I Setting the Stage
1 The ECHR and Socio-Economic Rights Protection
1.1 The Civil and Political ECHR and the ECtHR
1.2 No Watertight Division
1.3 Socio-Economic Protection through Substantive ECHR Rights
Conclusion
2 Making Sense of the ECtHR's Socio-Economic Protection
2.1 The Effectiveness Thesis

Excerpt:

Series Editors' Preface: Jo Shaw & Laurence Gormley

Over the years, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has acknowledged that the socio-economic sphere cannot be totally disconnected from its work as a human rights adjudicator, albeit one distanced from the domestic legislative sphere where most redistributive decisions continue to be made. The aim of this book is to explain the socioeconomic dimension of case law arising out of the enforcement of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Filling a gap in the literature, the author presents an innovative approach for improving the European Court of Human Rights' adjudication in socio-economic rights cases by using a so-called core rights approach. The intention is to go beyond the paradox that can present a roadblock to further development of the ECHR, namely that the rights in the ECHR are overwhelmingly focused on civil and political questions while the ECtHR is frequently faced with questions in which it has to adjudicate around the impact of national legislative measures on the socio-economic rights of claimants. In effect, the core rights thesis posits a `limit on the limitations', offering a clearer guide as to how the ECtHR has proceeded in previous cases and may proceed in the future.

The centrepiece of this book is the sustained treatment of the so-called core rights doctrine, namely that a distinction should be drawn between the most fundamental aspects of a right and the more peripheral aspects. The author argues, on the basis of a comparative approach that includes the review of core rights doctrines as applied in other contexts (e.g., Germany and South Africa), that a version of such a doctrine has the capacity to enrich the ECtHR's approach to the vexing question of how far it should show deference to national choices whilst at the same time recognizing the need for protection, particularly where complainants are vulnerable and/or dependent upon the state. The

key point is that while the role of the ECtHR may so far be relatively minimal in relation to social rights, per se, a core rights doctrine focusing on socio-economic interests may offer a more comfortable basis for adjudicating the question of what degree of deference the Court should pay to contracting parties' choices in the fields of social and economic policy. This is especially relevant in relation to welfare and budgetary issues, and identifying the cases where review of those measures should be robust based on the existing ECHR rights. Ultimately, this provides a better understanding of what the ECtHR, as a supranational court, actually does in such sensitive cases.

***

Reasoning Indivisible Rights

Despite its civil and political rights mandate, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR; the Court) increasingly rules on cases concerning socio-economic rights. It decides whether the replacement of a social benefit was proportional or whether the reduction of a pension was justified. Other complaints lead it to reflect on whether the authorities' efforts to provide adequate housing were sufficient or whether a state should have done more to prevent health damage that results from environmental pollution. Dealing with socio-economic issues is a risky endeavour that highlights the complexity of the task the ECtHR faces as the final arbiter of fundamental rights conflicts under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR; the Convention). It illuminates the difficulties inherent in striking the right balance between providing effective individual rights protection and deferring to the national authorities whose (democratic) decisions - especially in a field like social policy - need to be respected. Essentially, the puzzle presented by this development is how a supranational Court that proceeds on the basis of civil and political rights norms can protect socio-economic rights without overstepping the boundaries of its legitimate task. The Court is criticized for not providing very transparent socio-economic rulings characterized by consistent reasoning. Because of its vulnerable position and the fact that the effectiveness of the Convention system is dependent on the acceptance and implementation of its judgments by the member states, this reasoning, as well as the ECtHR's role in protecting social rights in the first place, is in need of further clarification.

The argument I develop in this book is that the notion of core rights protection can explain, as well as guide, the ECtHR's socio-economic rights protection. It provides a justificatory explanation for its engagement in this field while presenting a structured approach for the ECtHR's reasoning that fits its unique role and task in a multilevel system of fundamental rights protection. The notion of core rights, briefly stated, entails that a distinction can be made between more and less important, or fundamental, aspects falling within the (potential) reach of a fundamental right. This idea allows for expounding the connection between the Court's emerging socio-economic practice and the role of the Strasbourg system of fundamental rights protection. Why exactly it makes sense to explore a core rights perspective in regard to the ECHR's socioeconomic dimension will be elaborated on shortly. I will start by giving some broader context to the questions that are central to this book by introducing the ECtHR and its relation to certain features of and developments in judicial fundamental rights protection.

Fit and Future

The idea of core socio-economic rights protection fits the ECtHR's emerging socio-economic case law and provides suggestions for the further development thereof. In this book, I showed how core rights protection can fill a gap in the justificatory explanation that has been given for the ECtHR's protection of socio-economic rights. The ECtHR protects these rights on the basis of the civil and political rights norms enumerated in the Convention. The ideas of effectiveness and indivisibility provide important clarifications in this regard. First, it is clear that effectuation of the ECHR norms requires a broad interpretation. This interpretation can be teleological or autonomous, and is most likely an evolutive one. The Convention

is said to be a living tree, the branches of which grow in different directions. One of these is the socio-economic sphere. Second, indivisibility means that civil and political rights and economic and social rights are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. They must be treated as such, and hence the ECtHR refers to socio-economic rights and interprets the Convention norms accordingly. Especially now that socio-economic rights have become more widely accepted, indivisibility holds great promise. If these rights are considered to form another living tree, it should not come as a surprise that the branches of the different `rights trees' grow more and more intertwined.

Effectiveness and indivisibility justify the Court's engagement in the socio-economic sphere. They fail, however, to provide a comprehensive explanation. Both notions focus primarily on the creation of interpretive room in order to allow individual protection. Yet whereas holding a Convention right applicable is one thing, reviewing cases involving socio-economic interests is quite another. Moreover, besides effective individual protection, the ECtHR as a supranational Court should show deference to decisions made at the national level, as well as provide sufficient guidance in order for member states to be able to comply with the Convention. Effectiveness and indivisibility do not provide an answer to the criticism that has been levelled at the Court's socio-economic case law, namely that it is too incremental, at times inconsistent and shows a significant gap between prima facie and definitive protection. Also the question of whether there are limits to the Court's socio-economic rights protection remains unresolved. What follows from the different strains of criticism is that the doctrines of proportionality and the margin of appreciation cannot complete the puzzle: a close look at these doctrines in fact draws attention to the opaque use of the proportionality test and unclear application of the margin. In this book, I proposed the idea of core rights protection as an additional explanation and justification. Together with effectiveness and indivisibility, a core rights perspective provides for a more complete understanding of the ECHR's socioeconomic dimension. It moreover suggests ways for dealing with the interpretive room offered by the Convention and the potential thereof.

The idea of core rights deserves particular care. It can easily be misunderstood, and its technical finesses are not always appreciated. What is more, the idea of core rights protection may be perceived as going against what a belief in fundamental rights today seems to be primarily about, namely a broad coverage of rights combined with a balancing of case-specific interests. In this study an effort was made to shed a fresh light on core rights protection. Core rights theory and practice is diverse and has more to offer than is often assumed. On the basis of various examples, a core rights perspective was developed to fit the particular legal context of the ECtHR and its socio-economic rights protection. I will use these final pages to make some last remarks as to this perspective's added value. In addition, I will say something on the implications of this study in relation to the current trends and developments in fundamental rights protection.

In Part III I offered some insights on the nexus between the idea of core rights and the Strasbourg practice. There, the inspiration that could be drawn from the different core rights doctrines was combined and confronted with what was said on the position and task of the ECtHR. This Court is expected to effectively secure fundamental individual interests. The mechanism set up by the Convention serves as a last resort for those within the Council of Europe who feel their rights have not been duly respected or actively protected. As a judicial organ, and this is exacerbated by the fact that it does not form part of a national balance of powers, the ECtHR is slow, however, to interfere with democratic decisions taken at the national level. The Court cannot assume lawmaking capacities, particularly in a field like socio-economic policy. This field is characterized by sensitive budgetary and political choices, and moreover not traditionally covered by the

Convention. Somewhat paradoxically, though, the ECtHR is also required to elucidate guidelines for the member states to comply with the Convention. A web of both negative and positive obligations has been inferred from the different rights in the Convention and the protocols thereto. Yet a clear view of what is demanded for compliance is often lacking. That there is a desire for objective information in this regard is obvious from encounters with national judges, lawmakers and the executive. This is where ECHR scholars can make a difference in practice, namely by attempting to point out red threads to the extent that these are discernible.

When it comes to the protection of socio-economic rights under the Convention, the morning mist is slowly lifting. Since it first explicitly recognized that the socio-economic sphere cannot be disconnected from that of the Convention altogether, a rich socio-economic case law has emerged. This case law covers issues related to pension payments, the provision of medication, access to housing, etc. Yet the Court often does not explicitly address why it considers a socio-economic interest to be covered by the Convention, or what obligations follow from this. A core rights perspective can elucidate things: it adds to the explanations given to the socio-economic case law by clarifying the emphasis the ECtHR places on certain issues and the conclusions it reaches. The core rights perspective that I argued fits the practice of the Strasbourg Court, starts from the idea of absolute-relative core rights protection. It was seen in the various core rights examples that core rights are perceived as absolute or relative with regard to either or both their content and protection. This ties in with a two-stage approach to render rights definitive that starts from the interpretation of these rights, followed by reviewing whether the right or the interest with which it conflicts, prevails. Absolute-relative core rights protection means that socioeconomic cores are general rather than case-specific. Although interpretation always proceeds from the facts of individual cases, a general notion of what core socio-economic interests deserve prima facie protection can guide a decision on whether or not a particular issue falls within the ECHR's scope. At the same time, the eventual protection offered is relative. This means that under the Convention there can be justifications for not complying with socio-economic cores, although the review by the Court must have sufficient bite. Absolute-relative core rights protection suits the Strasbourg fundamental rights context because it recognizes the need for a clear enough demarcation of the scope of the Convention rights. In turn, it emphasizes that the rights - even if they are not civil and political - that deserve prima facie protection must be taken seriously, even when in the light of the position and task of the Court, absolute protection cannot be demanded. At least, that is, when the limitable rights of the Convention are concerned. In that case, core socio-economic rights can intensify (the different aspects of) the proportionality test or be translated into procedural requirements that need to be met to comply with the Convention. This allows to take into account state concerns while providing robust protection. Inversely, under the absolute Article 3 ECHR, a state that fails to guarantee core socio-economic protection, i.e., minimum essential socio-economic protection for vulnerable and dependent individuals, does not comply with the Convention.

Core socio-economic rights protection, as a matter of rights reasoning, suggests the following: the Court should be more clear about what is and what is not prima facie covered by the ECHR rights. Rather than opting for an overbroad interpretation or skipping the interpretation stage altogether, for purposes of clarity and demarcating the Court's task, it needs to explain why a complaint falls within the Convention's scope before it proceeds to reviewing the issue. For socio-economic issues concerning fair trial or the respect for one's home, for example, this is uncomplicated. Beyond this, however, complaints about interferences with or the lack of minimum essential levels of socio-economic rights (a subsistence minimum) can be sufficiently linked to the scope and aims of the Convention to be included. The same goes for socio-economic

complaints that involve alleged discrimination and the protection of vulnerable individuals, even if no minimum levels are at stake (although, in the latter case, this will often be the case). Determining negative and positive prima facie obligations in regard to core socio-economic rights protection need not be avoided. The standard this sets provides the necessary guidance while leaving (some) room for justifiable limitations. This means that the state must demonstrate that individual core socioeconomic needs have adequately been taken into account. At the review stage, the Court should clarify what the fact that a core socio-economic issue is at stake means for its review: whether by means of a strict(-er) proportionality sequence or by relying on procedural-type review and reviewing whether the provision of minimum protection was evidently insufficient, socio-economic cores deserve serious consideration. Rather than inviting a wide margin and being easily outbalanced by state interests, this allows for effective indivisible protection without losing sight of the scope of the Convention. This is not to say that a core rights perspective is a solution to all the complexities of the Court's socioeconomic practice. In cases concerning alleged discrimination, for example, core socio-economic rights cannot be straightforwardly protected. In this context, also the ground of discrimination and the question whether there was a relevantly similar position play an important role. Even if a core rights perspective cannot work miracles, however, it provides an analytical tool as well as an argument for a more targeted approach. Future research may further support the case for core socioeconomic protection under the ECHR by looking more closely into issues of discrimination, vulnerability and existing (European) consensus on minimum social rights.

It was mentioned in the Introduction that the scope of this book is limited. It deals solely with the ECtHR's protection of socio-economic rights. The different findings are relevant, in other words, for the supranational protection of socio-economic interests under civil and political rights norms, particularly in Europe. Regardless of these limitations, however, in the Introduction I linked the practice, and especially the reasoning, of the ECtHR to broader developments in the field of fundamental rights adjudication. It was considered that in dealing with conflicts between individual and general interests, courts around the world frequently make use of proportionality review and balancing. An important trend, moreover, is the recognition of positive obligations - also when the norms concerned are phrased in negative terms. Finally, I mentioned the more constructive approach to economic and social fundamental rights protection that is visible today. The case law of the ECtHR can be seen as exemplary of these different trends. The Court has contributed to the consolidation of proportionality analysis as the approach to fundamental rights adjudication, as well as to the acceptance of positive obligations. Moreover, as I have amply shown, the ECtHR's case law also signals the possibility of (supranational) judicial socio-economic rights protection. It thereby confirms the emerging perception that next to civil and political rights, economic and social guarantees should also be taken seriously as legal constructs on the basis of which individual claims can be protected. Having introduced the practice of the ECtHR in connection with these trends, it may be asked what are the broader implications of the argument I presented.

Although the ECtHR was labelled a forerunner and its practice avantgarde, this Court in particular should remain cautious in its approach to fundamental rights protection. Its position is a sensitive one, as the acceptance and implementation of its judgments is dependent on the willingness of the member states. The Court is far removed not only from the actual effects of its decisions and judgments, but also from what occurred and was decided at the national level. Its human rights mandate may provide the ECtHR with some leeway in applying the Convention in an evolutive way in order to ensure effective protection. At the same time its role can neither be described as particularly transformative, nor is it expected that the Court supports certain social or

political goals. In the light of this, as well as in the context of the criticism that is voiced, it was asked in the Introduction whether a combination of the various trends just mentioned could in fact also hamper the success of the Court. Its reliance on proportionality analysis or ad hoc balancing, in combination with the room for positive and, moreover, economic and social rights protection, may have the effect (or at least give the impression) that the Court is doing more than its competences allow for. Even when the ECtHR relies on a wide margin and does not often find a violation of the Convention in the socio-economic sphere, it may sometimes be considered that it is not for the Strasbourg Court to determine whether a fair balance has been struck in a particular field in the first place. In turn, little attention for the Convention's scope combined with a wide margin the moment socio-economic cases are concerned, may fail to give sufficient `weight' to the important individual interests involved.

Besides providing a fuller explanation of the Convention's emerging socio-economic dimension, the core rights perspective provided suggestions for the Court's reasoning in socio-economic cases. It was not argued that proportionality review needs to be avoided, or that positive obligations or socio-economic rights cannot have a place in the Court's case law. Rather, for a combination of these to work in a way that leaves enough room for national decisions and that renders guidance for the domestic authorities, it was suggested that the interpretation stage should not be overlooked. Where Möller speaks of the `global model of constitutional rights', he rejects the traditional dominant narrative and presents a modern account of judicial fundamental rights protection at both the constitutional and the ECHR level. This account is characterized by positive and socio-economic rights, horizontal protection, proportionality analysis and by rights inflation, i.e., by a very broad understanding of the scope of rights that allows practically all (autonomy related) individual interests to automatically pass the interpretation stage. A similar conception is visible in many important academic works on fundamental rights adjudication. It is suggested that clear statements on the interpretation and scope of rights are no longer needed, because balancing - especially in the context of positive obligations - is in fact all that matters.

My point that interpretation and review must be dealt with in an integrated fashion is not to say that the two should be part of a single, overall test. Rather, the two stages cannot be analyzed in isolation. Ad hoc balancing combined with an opaque or even nonexistent interpretation of what the Convention prima facie protects is vulnerable to the criticism that the Court's reasoning is unstructured and unclear. In the supranational context of the ECtHR, it fails to recognize that the mandate of this Court is tied to specific norms the interpretation of which provides a benchmark for their application. For the protection by the ECtHR of (positive) socio-economic rights under civil and political rights norms - but perhaps also in other complex (supranational) judicial contexts, or in other cases where specific norms are concerned - a threshold applies. The Court should not balance the various interests at stake in a given case 'from scratch', regardless of their importance and character. It is often simply for the national legislator, aided by executive and national judiciary, to conduct this important task.

Moreover, and this was corroborated by the examples given from the Court's case law, neglecting the scope of rights can have the effect that the focus lies almost entirely on the general, rather than on the individual interests at stake. In the context of socio-economic rights this creates a bias against protection of (positive) socio-economic rights, even when such protection is demanded by their importance. The reasonableness test that is often applied in the adjudication of socio-economic rights may factor in this importance by clarifying the requirements a reasonable policy must meet, such as providing for marginalized groups and ensuring non-discrimination. If proportionality is the prescribed test, however, a court mostly does not explain in abstract terms what a proportional

measure or decision looks like. In this connection, it is helpful to state prima facie rights and obligations (concerning minimum protection, non-discrimination and protection of vulnerable individuals) to give the test sufficient substantive bite while recognizing that the indivisible scope of fundamental rights - at least at the supranational level - is not unlimited.

Thus, the gist of the argument presented here is that the global model may fare better, at least in some judicial contexts, when inflation is viewed with some suspicion. A core rights perspective reveals a clear image of the socio-economic dimension of the Convention by allowing for more attention to be given to the initial stage of interpretation. The inclusion of core socio-economic rights in turn may lead to more insightful review as well as providing targeted protection.

In the end, thus, this book has some implications for contemplating judicial rights reasoning. Different to what current trends prescribe, it supports the argument that the demarcation of the scope of rights is not of inferior importance, at least not in every legal context. Even when the recognition of positive obligations, indivisible protection and proportionality review are applauded, this is no reason to stop discussing what is justiciable on the basis of a particular rights norm in the first place. As the example of the protection of minimum essential levels of socio-economic rights under the European Convention on Human Rights has shown, this does not require a detailed interpretation of rights norms detached from the facts of the cases that come before the Court. Engaging with the content of justiciable rights, however, allows for deliberation on the role of (supranational) judicial review amidst other avenues for decisionmaking. It also serves as a reminder of the importance of fundamental rights. And that is what core rights protection is fundamentally about. <>

Brexit, President Trump, and the Changing Geopolitics of Eastern Europe by Theodor Tudoroiu [Palgrave Macmillan, 9783319779195]

This book analyzes the combined consequences of Brexit and of the new US foreign policy under President Trump on the geopolitical situation of Eastern Europe. It perceives the evolution of the East European regional security complex as a struggle between the European Union's Kantian, win-win geopolitical vision and Russia's neoclassical geopolitics, also promoted by President Trump. In the most probable scenario, the latter approach will have the upper hand. The EU's post-Brexit control by the Franco-German axis will likely be followed by the geopolitical irrelevance of the EU due to the renationalization of member states' foreign policy, with Germany becoming the main West European actor. Consequently, Eastern Europe will be turned into the arena of a mainly three-cornered neoclassical geopolitics rivalry opposing Russia, the Franco-German axis and then Germany, and the US in alliance with the post-Brexit UK and certain East European states. The book will appeal to scholars across the fields of International Relations, Geopolitics, European Studies, and Area Studies.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: One day in November 2016, a Russian MP stormed an uneventful session of the State Duma in Moscow to shout that Donald Trump had won the US presidential election. President Putin's `lawmakers spontaneously leaped to their feet and delivered a raucous standing ovation' (Weir 2016). Europeans had good reasons to be in a very different mood as they began to 'wait in fear of the next Trump tweet'. Soon, there was 'an insurgent in the White House' and Washington

found itself 'in the grip of a revolution' (The Economist, February 4, 2017). In addition to Russia, China, and Iran, another `hostile revisionist power has indeed arrived on the scene, but it sits in the Oval Office, the beating heart of the free world'. Under its influence, the USA would dismantle the international liberal order it has constructed since Bretton Woods, support dictators all over the world, and betray its allies. In Eastern Europe, it would seek a grand alignment with much admired President Putin. If invaded, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) eastern members would first be checked if they `fulfilled their obligations to us' (Sanger and Haberman 2016). Accordingly, a period of `geopolitical recession' was announced. Alarmed East European leaders sent a letter to the President-elect explaining the dramatic regional consequences of his intension to end sanctions on Russia and to accept 'the division and subjugation of Ukraine.' Aptly, their supreme argument was flattery: `Putin does not seek American greatness. As your allies, we do'. To the general surprise, during the following

months everybody noted that `Donald Trump's foreign policy looks more normal than promised' (The Economist, April 15, 2017). 'More normal' does not mean `normal;' the behavior of the new President remains as atypical and unpredictable as ever. Still, at least in Eastern Europe, the US foreign policy does not look very different from what it used to be during the last period of the previous administration. Some prefer to take this as a strong indication of the fact that, ultimately, nothing is going to significantly change in that region. This book is based on a very different view. On the one hand, the Washington-Moscow relationship can develop in a number of very different ways, which include the unlikely but not impossible grand alignment desired by President Trump. On the other hand, East European geopolitics will be considerably influenced by the major changes in the EU integration process triggered by Brexit and by the Union's identity crisis the latter illustrates. Consequences might not be obvious today, but their medium- and long-term impact on Eastern Europe and on the entire European continent is likely to be dramatic.

The theoretical approach used in this book is presented in Chapter 2. It is based on Stefano Guzzini's view of neoclassical geopolitics enriched with elements from the Regional Security Complex Theory. The resulting thin cognitivist approach accordingly combines materialist and ideational elements. Its object of study is the East European regional security complex, which is defined as incorporating post-communist EU member states, the rest of the European Union, western Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) republics, and Russia. Two external powers, the USA and the post-Brexit UK, penetrate this complex.

Chapter 3 analyzes in what way the need for domestic legitimacy of President Putin's authoritarian regime and the deep impact of neoclassical geopolitics on the development of Russia's identity as an international actor have turned Moscow into an aggressive revisionist power that seriously endangers the stability of the East European regional security complex through the use of effective instruments that range from cyberwarfare and energy blackmail to hybrid wars and frozen conflicts. The Kremlin's actions have already led to the `militarization of thinking' in Eastern Europe and increasingly threaten European Union's Kantian geopolitical vision. Russian cooperative projects such as the Eurasian Union or the Greater Europe proposal also exist, but they are indicative of the Kremlin's willingness to adopt a non-antagonistic attitude in Eastern Europe only on its own terms, which are inspired by neoclassical geopolitics and require a never-ending series of Munich-type concessions from its partners. Due to Washington's and Brussels' rejection of such concessions, Russian aggressiveness has come to represent a sort of structural constraint that will impact considerably the future trajectory of the entire regional security complex.

A very different actor is scrutinized in Chapter 4. The `civilian power' European Union is a mature tightly coupled security community that lacks a fully

`communitized' foreign policy. Brussels' efforts to export its Kantian, win-win geopolitical vision to the Eastern neighborhood—which include the Eastern enlargement, the European Neighborhood Policy, and the Eastern Partnership—have resulted in conflict with Moscow. Institutionally and intellectually unprepared, lacking effective instruments and experience, the EU was unable to face the Russian neoclassical geopolitical offensive, as illustrated by the Ukrainian crisis. Even more importantly, inside the Union the populist wave and a number of overlapping serious economic and political crises have led to a `dynamic of disintegration' and to an `existential crisis.' Brexit represents the starting point of a process of change that might lead either to deeper integration or to the dominance of the Franco-German axis, which in turn could eventually evolve toward the geopolitical irrelevance of the EU accompanied by the transformation of Germany into the most important West European actor.

The role of the USA and its probable future evolution are analyzed in Chapter 5. Simplifying this complex topic to an extreme, at the systemic level of analysis there is the key linkage between the `pivot to Asia' required by China's geopolitical rise and the `reset' of the relations with Russia needed in order to transfer resources to the Pacific. At the individual level, there are President Trump's personality traits (that I examine using Aubrey Immelman's psychology approach) and ensuing worldview, which includes hostility to China and admiration for President Putin. In between, at the state level of analysis, there are the opposition of Republicans and US foreign policy establishment to a Kremlin-friendly foreign policy and the critical issue of the Russiagate scandal, which greatly constraints the President's pro-Moscow actions. Four possible scenarios ensue that include moderate US-Russia tensions, limited cooperation, a short-lived grand alignment, and a genuine one allowing for a complete American pivot to Asia leading to major tensions and possibly to a Cold War with China.

Chapter 6 examines the European states .and identifies a hierarchy among their ability to influence geopolitical interactions within the East European security complex. The Franco-German axis will likely acquire unprecedented influence by taking control of the European Union. If—or rather when—both the axis and the Union decline for reasons related to the lack of balance between France and increasingly hegemonic Germany and to their opposing views on a number of issues that include the critical EU common commercial policy, Berlin will become the prime West European actor. Post-communist EU member states as well as the CIS republics will try to use US and British support in order to avoid joining Berlin's or Moscow's spheres of influence. Moreover, they will have to deal with major domestic challenges related to the rise of populist nationalism and to the ensuing development of authoritarian regimes.

However, this does not mean that East European states will passively be subjected to great power actions and structural factors. Chapter 7 shows the importance and complexity of small state agency within the CIS using the case study of Moldova. This tiny post-Soviet republic is marked by poverty, corruption, state capture, the frozen conflict of Transnistria, and the failed frozen conflict in Gagauzia that was almost reignited during the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. Moscow has instrumentalized all these issues and has made considerable efforts to bring the country within its sphere of influence. Paradoxically, in recent years, this has failed because of the strong pro-EU attitude of the corrupt and highly unpopular oligarch in control of the Moldovan Parliament and government. But in response to his undemocratic practices, the electorate has become largely pro-Russian. A Kremlin-friendly President was elected. His vocally pro-Moscow party will win the fall 2018 parliamentary elections unless they are rigged or otherwise distorted by the imaginative pro-European strongman. Between these two camps, there is the democratic pro-European opposition fighting a quixotic battle that it cannot win. If de facto independent Transnistria and resolutely pro-Russian Gagauzia are added, it is clear that in Moldova—as elsewhere in the CIS—domestic

politics and geopolitics cannot be analyzed as separate realms anymore.

The concluding chapter analyzes the most likely future trajectories of the East European security complex. Four main scenarios are identified; however, three are less probable because they are based on either a successful Washington-Moscow grand alignment or on the deepening of the European integration process. In the remaining one, Eastern Europe becomes the arena of a mainly three-cornered rivalry whose actors are Russia, the Franco-German axis and later Germany, and the USA in alliance with the UK and certain East European states (either within NATO or, more likely, through US-UK-Poland-type trilateral alliances). Russia uses hybrid wars and reignited frozen conflicts to expand its sphere of influence within and even outside the CIS, but the active role of the USA prevents it from turning the region into a Hobbesian arena. Tense episodes alternate with more peaceful ones, allowing for the survival of substantial economic cooperation.

To summarize, this book:

- is the first to analyze the combined consequences of Brexit and of the new US foreign policy under President Trump on the geopolitical situation of Eastern Europe;
- claims that security developments in this region are best studied within the theoretical framework of an East European regional security complex that has replaced the previous loose supercomplex composed of the EU-Europe security complex and of the CIS one;
- perceives the evolution of this regional complex as a struggle between European Union's Kantian, win-win geopolitical vision and Russia's neoclassical geopolitics also promoted by President Trump. It is highly probable that the latter approach will have the upper hand; and
- finds that the most likely Brexit- and President Trump-influenced scenario is that of the decline of the European Union, which will lead to the partial and then total renationalization of member states' foreign policy. Consequently, Eastern Europe will become the arena of a mainly three-cornered neoclassical geopolitics rivalry opposing Moscow, the Franco-German axis and then Berlin, and Washington in alliance with London and certain East European states. <>

The Plot to Hack America, 2nd Edition: How Putin's Cyberspies and WikiLeaks Tried to Steal the 2016 Election by Malcolm Nance [Skyhorse Publishing, 9781510734685]

"The Plot to Hack America reads like a spy thriller, but it's all too real." –US Daily Review

Over 500 Amazon *FIVE STAR* Reviews!

"Nance states that, by their choices, actions, and statements, 'Trump and Pence chose Russia's values over America's.'" –Michael Lipkin, New York Journal of Books

Published a full month prior to the divisive Trump vs. Clinton 2016 presidential election, this book exposed the Russian hacking while the CIA was drafting their own report. In April 2016, computer technicians at the Democratic National Committee discovered that someone had accessed the organization's computer servers and conducted a theft that is best described as Watergate 2.0. In the weeks that followed, the nation's top computer security experts discovered that the cyber thieves had helped themselves to everything: sensitive documents, emails, donor information, even voice mails.

Soon after, the remainder of the Democratic Party machine, the congressional campaign, the Clinton campaign, and their friends and allies in the media were also hacked. Credit cards numbers, phone numbers, and contacts were stolen. In short order, the FBI found that more than twenty-five state

election offices had their voter registration systems probed or attacked by the same hackers.

Western intelligence agencies tracked the hack to Russian spy agencies and dubbed them the “Cyber Bears.” The media was soon flooded with the stolen information channeled through Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks. It was a massive attack on America but the Russian hacks appeared to have a singular goal—elect Donald J. Trump as president of the United States.

New York Times bestselling author of Defeating ISIS, Airey Neave Memorial Book Prize finalist for Hacking ISIS, career intelligence officer, and MSNBC terrorism expert correspondent Malcolm Nance’s fast paced real-life spy thriller takes you from Vladimir Putin’s rise through the KGB from junior officer to spymaster-in-chief and spells out the story of how he performed the ultimate political manipulation—convincing Donald Trump to abandon seventy years of American foreign policy including the destruction of NATO, cheering the end of the European Union, allowing Russian domination of Eastern Europe, and destroying the existing global order with America at its lead.

The Plot to Hack America is the thrilling true story of how Putin’s spy agency, run by the Russian billionaire class, used the promise of power and influence to cultivate Trump as well as his closest aides, the Kremlin Crew, to become unwitting assets of the Russian government. The goal? To put an end to 240 years of free and fair American democratic elections.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: Beginning in March and April 2016, an unknown person or persons hacked into the computer servers of the Democratic National Committee. Over time it became clear that the hackers were targeting very specific information in the DNC files—the opposition research the Democrats had dug up on their Republican opponent Donald J. Trump. Once they had the information they wanted, the cyber-spies rooted around in the computers for several months thereafter, stealing other files such as personal emails, digital voice mails, and sensitive personal information on donors. This included the donors' bank account, credit card, and social security numbers. The DNC discovered the intrusion while performing a security check, and shut their network down. However, the damage was done.

For an old spy and codebreaker like myself, nothing in the world happens by coincidence. Intelligence officers are a peculiar lot. Whether they are active or retired, their brains are wired for a completely different way of seeing the world around them. Some come from the Human Intelligence world, where they learn to read, manipulate, and distrust everyone in order to "social engineer" intelligence from people who do not want to give them anything. Others are forged in the signals intelligence world, where all data is just a massive electronic puzzle to be constantly analyzed, turned over, and fused together into an exploitable product, or into a final code to be decrypted or broken. Some, like myself, come from both worlds, and are at turns analytical and skeptical of seemingly obvious information. This hybrid mindview doesn't approach the world as streams of linear data; it attempts to analyze information like a constantly flowing game of three-dimensional chess. All the moves are technically the same as in regular chess, but the traditional allowances of forward and backwards one square, or a lateral or L-shaped pattern, are

too limiting for those trained to sniff out hostile intent; we require additional ways of processing information to be satisfied. Up vertically, down every angle of the compass rose and then across every median, line of longitude, latitude, and every other angle of measure are just about right ... then we add layers of frequency analysis figuring out the timing, spacing, depth and distance between each item we call data points. When an event has been then identified on the continuum of intelligence, we compare it with everything that has ever occurred in history to see if it resembles other patterns played by another spy who employed that process. We then process the context and precedence of each observed activity against common sense to determine if an event chain is coincidence, or if it bears the marks of hostile intent. Ian Fleming, the old British Secret Intelligence Service officer who created the fictional character of James Bond, characterized the amazing events in his books with an observation in his 1959 book Goldfinger: "Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. Three times is enemy action."

Times have changed since Mr. Fleming's Dictum. In light of current trends in the intelligence business, I like to characterize this phenomenon as Nance's Law of Intelligence Kismet: "Coincidence takes a lot of planning."

Reading about the DNC hack was not initially alarming; hackers had also penetrated the Obama and McCain campaigns in 2008. The DNC hack was newsworthy but not really noteworthy until it was paired with two additional events. At the time of the hacks I was writing a massive tome on hackers associated with ISIS and al-Qaeda, so I was attuned to any information about electronic data theft. Then on June 1, 2016 one of my military hacker friends pointed out that an entity who called himself Guccifer 2.0 had opened a WordPress page and was dumping information stolen from the DNC hack.

Guccifer 2.0 claimed he had all the hacked material from the DNC and would be releasing it through his webpage. The name Guccifer struck a nerve, as the real Guccifer, a prolific Romanian hacker, had just been extradited to the United States. Guccifer 2.0 was a copy-cat, and a lazy one at that. My hyper-suspicious intelligence mind started kicking into gear and the game of multidimensional chess was on.

Two weeks later Steve Biddle, the national security writer for the snarky web magazine Gawker posted the entire Donald J. Trump opposition file from the DNC's servers. Immediately both Fleming's Dictum and Nance's Law struck at the same time. There was no way that the single most damaging (and dull) file from the DNC hack would be "accidently" released weeks before the Republican National Committee convention. It was straight from the Karl Rove political playbook: Release damning information early, hold bad information until appropriate. More startling was that word was spreading across the global cyber security community that the DNC hack and Guccifer 2.0 had Russian fingerprints all over it.

I started my career in Naval Intelligence when I entered as a Russian language interpreter sent to DLI, the Defense Language Institute. For years before my Navy enlistment I had studied the Soviet Union and the KGB's history of political intrigue in preparation for a career in intelligence. Little did I know that two years of studying Russian on my own and four months of waiting at the Presidio of Monterey for my language school slot would result in my taking a completely different language. I was assigned to study Arabic, then I spent decades watching the Russian client states of Libya, Syria, and Iraq, as well as their ties to European terrorist groups Red Army Faction, Action Direct, the Irish Republican Army, and the Combatant Communist Cells. No matter what my target was, the KGB cast a shadow across every spectrum of my operations. Whenever we conducted a mission involving Syria, we watched for Russian cruisers and destroyers heading to Tartus, or the IL-38 "May" surveillance aircraft that dogged us and kept a weather eye on the Soviet naval units in the Gulf of Sollum anchorage off the Egyptian and Libyan border. Russian "Illegals"—covert intelligence officers—

would try to attach themselves to us like leeches in seedy strip clubs in Naples or when puking on the streets of the Marseilles red light district. We went to monthly counterintelligence briefings that explained how the KGB recruited assets, and how they manipulated even the lowest-level young soldier, sailor, or marine through heterosexual and homosexual "honeytraps."

The formerly classified briefings of Yuri Bezmenov, now posted up on Youtube.com, are where we learned of the targeting and recruitment techniques of the KGB. Until the fall of the Soviet Union the watchword was "Beware of the Bears. The Bears are everywhere."

After the fall of the Soviet Union the KGB became known as the FSB. In the last ten years Russian intelligence melded all of its offensive techniques to create a new kind of war: Hybrid Warfare—a melange of hostile cyber, political, and psychological operations in support of their national objectives, whether during peacetime or in open war. It is now standard operating procedure.

A few months after the hacks, at the start of the Democratic Party Convention in Philadelphia, the WikiLeaks organization, led by the information transparency activist Julian Assange, leaked the stolen documents with the intent to "damage" Hillary Clinton. The information leak had the intended effect, as airing the DNC's dirty tricks conducted against the Sanders campaign created a rift between diehard Bernie Sanders supporters, and led to the resignation of Representative Debbie Wasserman-Schultz as chair of the DNC.

Once the emails were released the source of the hacking became the number one question asked by global security and intelligence experts. The story was literally a Whodunnit? How did information from just one political party get released to the benefit of the unpredictable Republican nominee, Donald Trump? Civilian security specialists joined the US and NATO allies as they commenced a massive cyber-sleuthing operation. The United States Cyber Command, headquartered at the National Security Agency (NSA) on Fort George G. Meade in Maryland, as well as the FBI and their cyber subcontractors, detected the leak source: The FSB and its sister the GRU—Russia's national and military intelligence bureaus. The metadata—information inside the emails showing the pathway from the DNC computers to WikiLeaks—led straight back to a suspected Russian intelligence organization, a conglomeration of cyber spying groups codenamed CYBER BEARS.

All of the old lessons of identifying Russian mantraps started to come back to me as the stolen DNC data was revealed. It had a pattern that was familiar and that virtually every other intelligence officer could recognize. The pattern showed that someone was playing 3-dimensional chess with our democracy.

Russia has perfected political warfare by using cyber assets to personally attack and neutralize political opponents. They call it Kompromat. They hack into computers or phones to gather intelligence, expose this intelligence (or false data they manufacture out of whole cloth) through the media to create scandal, and thereby knock an opponent or nation out of the game. Russia has attacked Estonia, the Ukraine, and Western nations using just these cyberwarfare methods. At some point Russia apparently decided to apply these tactics against the United States and so American democracy itself was hacked.

The president received a briefing days before WikiLeaks released the data to the public. The Russian spy agency had been ordered to make a bold move, hack the American elections, and engage in political warfare to elect Donald Trump President. Whether he knew it or not, Trump was the perfect candidate for a political asset. Former KGB officer Yuri Bezmenov said the KGB targeted "Ego-centric people who lack moral principles—who are either too greedy or who suffer from exaggerated self-importance. These are the people the KGB wants and finds easiest to recruit."

This activity could only have been directed from the highest level of the Russian Federation, from Vladimir Putin himself.

In The Plot to Hack America, I have attempted to explain the story of the first massive Russian cyberwarfare operation against the United States electorate, and how Vladimir Putin attempted to engineer Donald J. Trump's improbable election as president of the United States. Here you will find a fairly detailed breakdown of the entire CYBER BEARS organ of the Russian Federation: the FSB, the GRU, Russian military intelligence, and criminal cyberwarfare subcontractors. It will become clear that they are using every weapon in the Kremlin's propaganda arsenal. It will catalog the entirety of all of their known cyber and media activities related to the 2016 US political campaign. Within its chapters are revelations about how television media, global communications, and cyber operations were used to exploit and attack the US electoral system. There is strong evidence their work with WikiLeaks met clearly scripted dates and actively responded to events in order to destroy Hillary Clinton and the Democratic Party and to elect Donald Trump as president.

The Plot to Hack America will also try to explain how the CYBER BEARS group was detected; how CYBER BEARS hacks personal and intelligence data from its enemies and then uses that intelligence to choose political allies and "useful idiots" to do their bidding in the target nation; and why they may or may not be disseminating Black propaganda, forged emails, false statements, and computer viruses, that are released into the WikiLeaks data dumps. CYBER BEARS teams also often masquerade as American voters and post Pro Trump positions and materials on Twitter, Facebook and other sites to support the election of Donald Trump.

The Plot to Hack America details how Russian intelligence, the FSB's "Active Measures" units, created and structured a strategic political warfare campaign, and how it influences the internet via distribution of international media through Russia Today (RT) television, which pushes political propaganda daily. The Russian television media arm of the Kremlin, Russia Today (RT) television is engaged in a strategic propaganda campaign to further Russia's political goals and has been used to co-opt the extreme wings of the American political parties including tacit and open support for neo-Nazis, anti-government extremist libertarians, conspiracy theorists, and the marginalized left such as the Green Party. RT gives these organizations an international mouthpiece in an attempt to validate them in mainstream media to the detriment of American stability.

This is a real-life spy thriller, happening in real time. It is my hope that The Plot to Hack America will inform the American electorate of how Russia executed a full-scale political and cyberwar on America, starting with Watergate 2.0, to elect Donald Trump president of the United States.

The key to unraveling the objectives of LUCKY-7 is to accept that Russia is not an ally but a strategic opponent who views America's standing as an obstacle to its own greatness. Should the chicanery of the 2016 election go without response, America would become target number one for Kompromat at even the lowest level elections. Future hacking and political releases would directly affect US policy and could disable the processes that keep us safe. Politicians from both sides of the aisle could find themselves at risk of political blackmail, or they may entertain troll opinions generated by another nation. Russia believes that they have now perfected the tool by which America could be brought down by revealing to the world how easily we are manipulated through propaganda to the point that our own governmental functions cease to work. China will jump into the game with both feet should LUCKY-7 be successful. Imagine two global cyberwars being waged secretly against America and our political establishment incapable of passing a law or allocating funds to stop it because the legislators have already been influenced by a foreign power.

The Next Attack

The Russian ability to launch an attack with a "weapon of Mass Disruption" has yet to occur, but could come at a time of Russia's choosing. Should the Kremlin game out that the time is right to politically and economically destabilize America

and finally topple it from being the shining city on the capitalist hill to collapsing under its own ignorance and faith in a parlor tricking, reality show con man, then a massive hack on election day is well within its capability. The LUCKY-7 Information Warfare Management Cell doesn't need to get into the electronic voting machines. The Russian IWMC and its LUCKY-7 operations team just needs to change one column of electoral tallies in one state just long enough to make the tens of millions of Trump voters finally believe that the election was being stolen by Hillary Clinton. No matter what the evidence, no matter who will ask for calm, they won't believe anything other than treachery because Donald Trump has convinced a third of the American electorate that the entire American electoral system has always been corrupt. The greatest danger now is that any outcome other than the election of Donald Trump will not be accepted, and demands for a new election and rejection of the result will cripple the nation in ways not seen since 1860 secession. It could lead some states to suggest just that should the outcome be not to their liking. At that point the prospect of a second American civil war is not only viable, but likely.

The Russian use of cyber weapons to perform criminal acts and damage our electoral process was intended to remove faith in America itself. Along with Donald Trump's claims that the election will be rigged, they have achieved this goal. Due to their meddling, activities that were considered routine politics in America are now suspect. Politics itself is under fire, due to the combination of hacking and demagoguery.

Though we have yet to see an actual disruption that matters in the lives of the average American citizen, one can be sure that it will come at a time when, once recognized, the only alternative to the attack may be a real war.

Decentering European Intellectual Space edited by Marja Jalava, Stefan Nygård, Johan Strang [European Studies, Brill, 9789004364523]

Decentering European Intellectual Space reconsiders the nature of cultural Europe by challenging intellectual historians to pay closer attention to the asymmetries and encounters between Europe's fluctuating cores and peripheries.

Contents

12 Feminist Intellectuals: From Yugoslavia, in Europe by Zsójïa Lóránd
Index

At the Periphery of European Intellectual Space by Stefan Nygård, Johan Strang and Marja Jalava

European intellectual history has in the past two decades been enriched by excellent contributions from transnational or global perspectives. These studies have questioned the national paradigm and sketched an image of Europe as a complex interwoven intellectual space.1 Beyond the European context, the nature of intellectual transnationalism has been explored in pioneering inquiries of the planetary reach of, for instance, literature or the culture industry. These studies relate to the vast field of historical and social scientific scholarship that has emerged out of the sharp increase in border-crossing perspectives, cultural hybridity, and the circulation of people, ideas, and institutions.

Intended as a contribution to this growing literature, our volume asks whether intellectual historians, preoccupied with entanglement and hybridity, run the risk of painting an excessively harmonious picture of Europe as a cultural and intellectual space, reproducing the all too familiar image of a borderless space of texts and ideas where everyone is able to participate on equal grounds. Whereas studies on the geographies of knowledge production have convincingly shown that place, space, and their asymmetrical interrelations deserve careful consideration when assessing the socio-cultural conditions of intellectual life and the circulation of ideas, questions of spatiotemporal hierarchy have not been a major concern in the field of intellectual history. In general, European intellectual history or the history of intellectuals in Europe has focused primarily on relations and entanglements between the dominant nineteenth-century empires and nation-states such as France, Great Britain, Germany, or Russia. Less attention has been paid to the inevitable asymmetries of power that exist between big and small, center and periphery, core and margin, satellite and province—to name only some of the most frequently used terminologies for analyzing political, economic, or cultural hierarchies. This book is devoted to an examination of precisely such intra- European asymmetries. The aim is to reconsider the nature of European intellectual space and introduce into the debate analyses of the position and strategies of intellectuals, writers, artists, and scholars from non-dominant regions within Europe. If Europe in this period, roughly between the mid-nineteenth and the late twentieth centuries, was a global center of intellectual life and cultural production, what, then, was the role of its own internal peripheries?

Intra-European and Colonial Relations

The intra-European hierarchies studied in this book were conditioned by largescale political developments such as the rise of competing forms of nationalism, colonial expansionism, social movements contesting the supremacy of the national state, the collapse of empires, the totalizing claims of the state between the world wars, and the rise of the bipolar Cold War constellation where Eastern Central Europe was suddenly provincialized, while Western Europe gradually lost its self-evident cultural centrality to the United States. Such macro-level developments had an important bearing on intellectual hierarchies, but it was never a one-to-one relationship. Sometimes the centers of European intellectual life overlapped geographically with military, political, or economic domination, and sometimes they did not. Moreover, insofar as the book is concerned with the extent to which space and location condition the strategies, outlook and self-understanding of individual and collective actors, we should recognize the specific role played by intellectuals in composing and contesting spatial constructions in the first place, including the notion of national territory. Having achieved some degree of hegemony, such spatial formations tend to take on a life of their own and determine the interaction between intellectuals and ideas, or the way historical actors position themselves in a larger whole.

Rather than systematically assessing the relationship between empirical reality and conceptual representations, the aim of this book is to explore the experience of being outside a dominant core and the strategies for acting that result from this experience. Perceptions of hierarchy shaped the behavior of intellectuals in the geo-cultural peripheries or "semi-peripheries," and gave rise to a whole spectrum of strategies for dealing with asymmetry, as demonstrated by the individual chapters in this volume. These strategies ranged from struggling for attention, translating modernity, imitating the centers, and stressing the need to catch up on the one hand, and contesting or rejecting intellectual exports from the center and celebrating peripheral "authenticity" on the other hand. Sometimes the relation between geography, politics, and culture was articulated by mobilizing symbolic resources to compensate for geopolitical disadvantage. Typically, this has taken the form of marketing national cultural achievements and emphasizing culture over physical reality.

The aptness of the terms "center" and "periphery" in describing intellectual relations has often been debated and criticized. Today, the conception of the periphery as a passive recipient of ideas developed in the core, or a provider of "raw materials" for the center, has been largely refuted. At the same time, the notions of "center" and "periphery" continue to raise strong emotions for and against. Some of the most important difficulties concern the units of analysis used for spatially defining a "center"—nation, city, region, specific institutions, etc.—and the "centralizing" and "peripheralizing" logics across social fields such as politics, the economy, science and higher education, and art and literature. Continuing this line of inquiry, as it pertains to the relations between intellectual spaces and their conceptualizations by writers, artists, and intellectuals, the contributions in the book suggest that speaking of centers in European intellectual space can refer to something spatial or temporal, and most often a mixture of both. "Europe" is no less ambiguous a term. In this volume, it relates both to the region, with its constantly negotiated borders, cores, and margins, and to the idea of Europe as the cradle of the Enlightenment and the beacon of modernity, with its claims to define the direction of universal progress and accompanying civilizing missions.

Drawing attention to multiple forms of structural and symbolic inequality, postcolonial studies has significantly contributed to disengaging us from a static center–periphery or "diffusionist" model of cultural interaction. Postcolonial studies has also been an important factor in a more general "spatial turn," highlighting place as being constantly produced and reproduced in interaction with its surroundings. In other words, places are not essences but processes, rooted in social practices, disciplinary power, and ideology. But to what extent is it reasonable to apply theories addressing the inequalities of colonial or racial domination on intra-European conditions? One problem is the extent to which postcolonial studies targets Eurocentrism as a part of Western supremacy in the world. In their search for alternative de-centered visions, accounts inspired by dependency theory, postcolonialism, or subaltern studies have sometimes tended to flatten "Europe" into a single, monolithic entity, leaving out the asymmetrical relations and hegemonic struggles within Europe itself. To paraphrase Dipesh Chakrabarty, it is certainly true that scholars who study Europe are usually free to ignore or compartmentalize the experiences of Asians and Africans, but equally compartmentalized are the experiences of actors from peripheral, marginalized, or "backward" European regions.

While postcolonial readings of intra-European asymmetries have inspired us to analyze forms of dependency and domination, it is a matter of debate how far we can carry the analogy. On the one hand, insofar as we are dealing with spatial asymmetries, one of the hypotheses of the book is, indeed, that the logic of combined and uneven development, in the language of world- systems theory, is more easily observable from the periphery, much in the same way as the dominance of Europe is most aptly seen from the outside. There

are entanglements and structural similarities in terms of imperial dependency between the non-European colonies and the fringes of former European empires. To be sure, colonial history is an integrated part of the history of Europe that cannot be separated from the "internal" developments within the region. Moreover, colonial expansionism and colonial discourse impacted on how populations especially in frontier regions within Europe were perceived and treated, as pointed out by Roísín Healy and Enrico Dal Lago. Evidence of "discursive colonization"—using colonial categories in framing relationships between self and other, often to justify the need to civilize the disadvantaged—can certainly be found within Europe itself. Sometimes these dichotomies, borrowed from a colonial setting and merged with the widespread scholarly and political racism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, led to the subjugation of native populations by the colonizers. In other cases, the hierarchies were more discursive. Violent or discursive, they were expressions of world-ordering within a dominant paradigm of progress and modernity.

If the asymmetrical relations that such world-ordering produces are more tangible at the margins, this follows not necessarily from subjugation but from the fact that "latecomers" or culturally "underdeveloped" regions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had to make great efforts to insert themselves into an interconnected global system of nation-states. In doing so, peripheral intellectuals were faced with the power of universalizing discourse emanating from the centers, which they adapted, rejected, or transformed according to local demands. A specific problem for intellectual and cultural historians relates to the complexity of the multidirectional universe in which scientific, literary, and artistic practices are carried out, sometimes described as networks that connect a variety of urban and institutional nodes. The hierarchical dimensions of this universe translate into basic differences between, for example, those who can afford to universalize "local" experience and those who cannot.

On the other hand, insofar as applying postcolonial discourse on intraEuropean developments means speaking of the European margins in the same breath as of former colonies, there is a risk of denigrating the suffering and the typically categorical outside position of the latter. After all, the European peripheries were in the period studied in this book predominantly considered "European" in the eyes of the centers, not as the "absolute Others of Europe." As such, they belonged to the group of "enlightened" and "civilized" cultures whose intellectuals, in principle, were entitled to participate in the discussion, although sometimes as "distant relatives," as the Polish exiled poet and essayist Czesław Miłosz suggests from his Polish-Lithuanian perspective: while they may have been acknowledged as Europeans, the peripheries were certainly not considered core "members of the family (quarrelsome but respectable)."

Our volume thus contributes to previous research on Europe as seen from its geographical margins, including important works by Larry Wolff and Iver B. Neumann on Eastern Europe and Russia, Maria Todorova on the Balkans, Roberto Dainotto on Southern Europe, and Peter Davidson on "the North." Rather than focusing on a specific cardinal direction, however, we try to bring together experiences from a selection of "non-dominant" regions in Eastern, Western, Southern, and Northern Europe. The different Europes discussed here can be broadly divided into the central–imperial, the peripheral small states, and the "semi-central" former empires or intermediate countries such as Spain and Sweden. While some chapters look at Europe as an intellectual space from its margins, others provide views from multicultural and multilingual contexts. Yet another group of articles assesses the role of asymmetry within intellectual networks or between intellectual fields. "Asymmetry" is in this context understood as an umbrella term for the mix of temporal and spatial hierarchies, for which historical actors (as well as

analysts) have used a cluster of conceptual pairs such as center–periphery, core–margin, modern–backward, East–West, North–South, dominant–dominated, metropolis– satellite, or developed/developing–underdeveloped.

Scales and Borders

One way of dismantling the dichotomy of intra-European versus colonial hierarchies is to look beyond the framework of nation-states, which, despite the transnational turn in historical studies, continues to influence the way we structure our analyses. Moving beyond and across the boundaries of nation-states forces us to reconsider the question: where is the periphery? What kind of borders separate cores and margins? Should we follow the borders that separate nation-states and linguistic or cultural regions? Or should we break up these large-scale, ideological constructions into a more nuanced picture, take into account the existence of peripheries in the centers, centers in the peripheries, and perhaps shift attention from nationalized states to cities and urban centers, or even more specifically, to universities, publishing houses, or galleries, which after all constitute the main locus of intellectual life? And yet, as the historian Angelika Epple points out, the criticism of a narrowly national and/or state-centric framework does not necessarily mean that the historical significance of nation-states and the differences in local opportunity structures and cultures can be denied. Instead, the issue at stake is that there are multiple relations between different localities and actors, and the national scale is one of many possible spatial dimensions—no doubt an indispensable one when studying Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the period with which our volume is concerned, national(ized) discourses implied constraints that must neither be overlooked nor exaggerated. Hence, our objective is not to undermine nation-states; rather, we emphasize the degree to which such entities are never fixed, but fluid, relational, and historically changing.

Regardless of which spatial scale we choose as our point of departure, however, we should acknowledge that centers and peripheries constitute each other in a mutually enforcing interaction, as this volume demonstrates with respect to non-dominant regions within Europe. There is also a striking similarity in terms of how such mechanisms work on different scales. The same kind of peripheral opposition to the provincial universalism of the self- sufficient core clearly characterizes twentieth-century relations between the Western and the non-Western world as well as the relations between dominant and non- dominant nation-states within Europe, but also between the centers and peripheries of any individual European country. Conversely, the uniformity of the center is often exaggerated when seen from the periphery, be it “Europe” in postcolonial studies, “France” or “Germany” from the viewpoint of nondominant European countries, or urban centers from a rural or small-town perspective.

Different answers to the question of scale impact on how we describe trans-local relations within an inter-urban, inter-national, or cosmopolitan framework, which needs to be adjusted according to our different objects of study. The contributions in this volume focusing on European “peripheries” thus bring into the discussion a broad variety of scales and spatial dynamics. In most cases, the social field in which intellectual debates are situated transgresses national boundaries. Tensions between overlapping scales are mobilized in multiple ways by individual actors who draw on international references in order to strengthen the national, as in the nineteenth-century idea of a cosmopolitanism of nations, or conversely mobilize internationality in order to undermine locally dominant positions.

While remaining largely within the framework of European nation-states and urban centers, and paying close attention to their interconnections, the contributions in this volume seek to highlight the ways in which intellectuals, writers, and artists manouver in the universe of national and imperial states competing with each other over political, economic, and cultural “progress.” The book is both about elucidating how asymmetries are produced and about exploring how they determine the

actions of individual and collective actors in the light of the different hierarchies. By reconsidering the premises for studying asymmetrical relations in European intellectual history, it aims at forging a perspective that avoids the tendency sometimes present in transnational intellectual history to overemphasize reciprocity and equality. The aim is also to coin a perspective which avoids the opposite tendency of fighting the injustice of a one-dimensional hierarchy sometimes associated with postcolonial discourse. Discussing examples from Northern, Eastern, and Southern Europe, the chapters analyze the ways in which historical actors in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe conceptualized intellectual space and how they dealt with its hierarchical aspects. By paying particular attention to the weaker part in asymmetrical relations, they highlight the extent to which perceptions of hierarchies defined the agendas of historical actors, how asymmetries were used, even instrumentalized, for strategic purposes at "home" and "abroad," how intellectuals managed tensions between local and transnational space, and how these spaces in themselves were produced and reproduced in continuous interaction with each other.

The Structure of the Book

The book is divided into three parts. The first part, Reconsidering European Intellectual Space, concerns the strategies of peripheral intellectuals around 1900. At that time, Western Europe with metropoles such as Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and London was widely acknowledged as the center of both European and global intellectual space. Although the period between the latter part of the nineteenth century and the First World War has been perceived as leading to the zenith of both global and intra-European interlinkages and structures, it was also a time when European intellectuals could still harbor a belief in European superiority.19 By and large, the production of national territory in the long nineteenth century—in part as a counterforce to turn-of-the-century globalization—resulted in the emergence of the nation-state in Europe as the dominant strategy for social organization, including intellectual life, although the idea of a borderless republic of letters also continued to be part of the self-understanding of intellectuals. As a result, for instance, literary, artistic, and academic markets only partly overlapped with national territories and borders. The chapters by Narve Fulsås & Tore Rem and Stefan Nygård & Johan Strang examine how these tensions and ambivalences impacted on the transnational strategies of Nordic small-country intellectuals with a strong self-proclaimed peripheral identity, whereas David Cottington's chapter examines the consolidation of a pan-European avant-garde network which contributed greatly to the decentering of Paris as the fulcrum of modernism. The field of avant-garde studies has shifted from a rigid image of international modernism with one undisputed center to a focus on decentered or at least multi-centered networks and to an understanding of notably cubism as "a language with many dialects." Other field-specific asymmetries are examined by Tommaso Giordani in his chapter on the interaction of German, Italian, and French Marxism, highlighting the interplay between two different intellectual fields: a Marxist European one dominated by Germany, and the national ones in France and Italy. Moreover, the chapter underlines variations in how the relation between the national and the transnational was conceptualized by actors from different contexts—in this case Italy, France, and Germany—as well as the obvious limits of center–periphery modelization for a field such as international Marxism.

The second part of the book, Negotiating the Center, explores European intellectuals coping with dramatically transformed geo-cultural settings that were evident particularly after the First World War. The war brought along the collapse of the Romanov, Hohenzollern, Habsburg, and Ottoman Empires, ushering in an era of disorientation, lack of horizon, and identity crisis in Eastern and Central Europe, but it also led to new forms of international activities and concerns. The hierarchies examined by Diana Mishkova involve comprehensive perceptions and uses of asymmetry in the context

of regional and civilizational discourse or national identity politics, the politics of belonging and demarcation with respect to imagined centers and significant others. In her contribution, Emilia Palonen evokes the fluid nature of Europe as a center. She discusses the transnational trajectories of the Budapest School of Marxist humanism, drawing attention to the complex spatiality of a network spread across the globe in the cold-war period, from Melbourne to Moscow, at the same time as many of the key actors remained firmly anchored in European debates. The transformations of the twentieth century had significant implications for the developing world order, with the United States becoming the major challenger to the previously dominant Great Britain, France, and Germany, as discussed from a Spanish point of view in the chapter by José María Rosales. The defeat of Spain in the war with the usa in 1898, along with the loss of its colonial territories, was experienced by Spanish intellectuals as a negative decentering process, whereas the Nordic scholars, studied in the chapter by Marja Jalava & Johanna Rainio-Niemi, seized upon the opportunities that were opened up by America's expanding cultural, academic, and economic influence on Europe. The latter chapter, in particular, emphasizes the flexibility of the peripheries in adjusting to such transformations, sometimes by playing centers against each other. One crucial aspect that sets the intellectual and academic fields of these countries apart is that while the question of dealing with geopolitical decline was a major concern for intellectuals such as Manuel Azaña and José Ortega y Gasset in Spain, as demonstrated by Rosales, Finnish and Norwegian intellectuals aspired to link their native cultural and scientific spaces to an emerging global academic center. With regard to old and new, progress and decline, these and other chapters reveal diverging combinations of spatial and temporal criteria for defining centrality, between accumulated cultural capital, position in global power-geometry, or promise for the future.

The final part, Cold War Dynamics, discusses the reconfiguration of Europe- an intellectual space after the Second World War. This space was solidified by an East–West division along the Iron Curtain, and yet, characterized by a constant blurring of the division and the ensuing fluctuation of center– periphery conceptions. In his chapter, Manolis Patiniotis examines the geopolitical tensions between centers and peripheries arising from cold-war national and transnational interests. He does this by exploring the Greek attempts to outline the dividing line so that the country would stay within the "free world," thus highlighting the role of the margins in the making of centers—Greece asserting its place as "the core of the center"—in twentieth-century transatlantic efforts to outline the borders of Western civilization. In Łukasz Mikołajewski's chapter, the focus is on Polish exiled authors who, with varied strategies and success, wanted to address both broader Western European audiences and readers in communist Poland at the same time. Finally, Zsófia Lóránd's chapter on Yugoslav feminism traces the asymmetries that emerged from the shifting ways in which Yugoslavia was seen in Europe before and after the break-up of the country in the early 1990s. The chapter not only highlights a meta-level asymmetry in terms of the still low number of women featured in intellectual history writing, but also raises the important issue of the non-simultaneity of political, economic, literary, and artistic geometries; when we, in the context of Yugoslav and Western feminism, pose the question of who was considered "advanced" and who needed "to catch up." The answer, of course, depends on the point of emphasis. For Yugoslavian feminists, gender relations may have appeared more advanced at home, but at the same time they saw themselves as lagging behind their Western colleagues in terms of freedom of expression and level of theorization.

Collectively, the book produces a multi-layered image of Europe by examining the relationships between intellectual spaces, fields, and markets of different size and status. The scale of analysis ranges from conceptualizing the place of nation-states and regions, in the chapter by Mishkova, to

the field-specific asymmetries of Marxist theory or Yugoslav feminism examined by Giordani and Lóránd, respectively, and the global reach of the Budapest school of Hungarian intellectuals discussed by Palonen. Each contribution offers a different perspective on our general proposition to think "geometrically" about intellectual practices, by foregrounding asymmetries that operate on different levels and are to a varying degree acknowledged, contested, or challenged by the actors affected by them. While some of them dealt with geo-cultural asymmetry by mobilizing symbolic capital associated with a center in their own local setting, others sought to nuance the notion of advanced/ backward, act as if the center–periphery dichotomies were meaningless, make use of them for personal gain, or to counterbalance a disadvantageous position by playing competing centers against each other. The key issue is that

the perception or self-perception of geo-cultural position has been and still is a crucial factor in shaping how the individual actors navigate between the local, the national, the regional, and the transnational. It influences their understanding of how "external" events impact on "internal" developments, and their general level of interest in keeping up with, or opposing, developments elsewhere.

Europe through a Kaleidoscope

Taken together, the chapters suggest that investigating Europe as an intellectual space is a kaleidoscopic exercise. Just as with each turn of the kaleidoscopic lens the pattern is significantly modified, European intellectual space naturally varies between points of observation. Moreover, it is constantly reproduced through negotiations that are more hierarchical and biased than they are reciprocal. The situatedness and the role of the local filter should always be considered when assessing conceptualizations of Europe as an intellectual space, whether they emanate from the core or the periphery. The book therefore stresses the need to look critically at the very logic of producing asymmetries, to recognize the importance of these dynamics for the self-understanding of individual actors with different horizons of expectations, to pay attention to individual actors' strategies for dealing with geo-cultural constraints, and to consider the extent to which asymmetries foster or even force actors into reflectivity and resistance vis-à-vis universalizing tendencies.

On the level of national space, the ideal-typical poles in the transnational process of negotiating cultural Europe are, on the one hand, small latecomer nations such as Finland in the Northern European context, where the actors are characterized by a predominantly peripheral self-understanding. Intellectuals belonging to this group were generally more inclined to instrumentalize "Europe" for specific local purposes than to try and participate in transnational discussions on equal grounds. Then we have the cultural centers, typically constituted by metropoles such as Paris, Berlin, and London in the nineteenth century, with a stronger tendency to universalize local debates, a tendency that was both contested and reinforced by the peripheries. And in between we find such countries as Sweden, Poland, Italy, Hungary, and Spain, where perceptions of geo-cultural position were fundamentally transformed or persistently ambivalent in the period discussed in this book.

In addition to diverse understandings of supranational space, closely connected with notions of time, progress, and modernity, different regions and competing factions within them tended to operate with different "Europes" to begin with. Indeed, the extent to which we can talk about a European intellectual space crucially depends on our acknowledging the intrinsic ambivalences of the concept, the porousness of "borders," the "internal peripheries" of core regions that are obscured when the nation-state is the dominant unit of analysis, and the importance of relations to trans-European spaces.

By focusing on conceptualizations other than those of the centers or of regions subjected to colonial domination in the twentieth century, the volume conveys not only the role of hierarchy but also the

multi-directional transfers of ideas between "centers" and "peripheries," the crucial role of mediators, and the complex mechanisms by which asymmetries are produced and reproduced through the behavior and choices made by historical actors in dealing with structural constraints. While the world-systems perspective of combined and uneven development—and the claim that progress in one part of the world is matched by underdevelopment elsewhere—is not irrelevant for understanding how transnational intellectual space works, the chapters included in this book clearly illustrate the difficulties involved in reducing the role of the peripheries to recipients or producers of "raw material" to be processed by the centers.

Exploring different ways of studying intellectual asymmetries and investigating the power of perceptions of centrality and marginality are pertinent tasks for the study of modern European intellectual history today. While it has been a great merit of transnational history to recognize the integral part played by "foreign" references in the creation of national spaces, the passionate critique of methodological nationalism and the focus on hybridity has also served to obscure the hierarchical dimensions of, in our case, intra-European intellectual encounters. With its specific reference to intellectuals—writers, artists, historians, and social theorists—the book speaks to the long-standing debates on the tensions between, on the one hand, the idea of an egalitarian and supranational community of intellectuals, and, on the other hand, local rootedness, national, urban, or linguistic allegiances and discourses, and the symbolic power they continue to entail. <>

Institutionalizing the Just War by Allen Buchanan [Oxford University Press, 9780190878436]

Institutionalizing the Just War offers a new approach to thinking about the ethics of large-scale armed conflict. Allen Buchanan takes a unique approach to just war theory, arguing that theories that are content with articulating abstract moral norms specifying right acts of war-making, provide too little guidance for responding to the real world moral problems of war. Buchanan here instead takes an institutional approach, combining moral analysis with data on how institutions are designed, and providing concrete proposals for morally progressive innovations at the institutional level. Buchanan's institutional approach in this book - which is based on the revision of previously published essays -- is singular and will be of great interest not just to scholars of just war theory, but anyone interested in the morality of war within political science, political philosophy, philosophy of international law, and public policy.

Excerpt:

To be useful, proposals for institutional innovation need not be immediately feasible to implement, but they must not be too distant from the current feasibility horizon. To be "close enough" to feasibility, proposals for institutional innovations must not only be realistic in the sense of being compatible with the actual distribution of power and the interests that motivate the exercise of power, but also able to marshal broad moral support. More specifically, it must be possible to make the case that if the proposed institutions were created they would be legitimate according to criteria for legitimacy that are grounded ultimately in a Political Philosophy that can command broad allegiance and that is well-developed, coherent, and adequately defended. At present, liberal cosmopolitanism satisfies those desiderata better

than any alternative. In my judgment, liberal cosmopolitanism is also the most morally plausible view presently on offer.

I believe that taken together these chapters make a compelling case for a new, genuinely interdisciplinary approach to thinking about multilateral institutions generally and in particular regarding their potential for regulating war. The main ideas of each chapter and how they serve to illustrate this fundamental theme can be summarized as follows.

Before proceeding to the summary, a word about the title is in order. Significant work has been accomplished in the last century and a half, beginning with the establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross, in institutionalizing some important aspects of the jus in bello, the part of just war theory that concerns how wars are to be conducted. For that reason I chose a sculpture honoring Henry Dunant, founder of the ICRC, for the front cover image of this book. Dunant's deep empathy for the suffering of unattended wounded soldiers he encountered in the aftermath of the battle of Solferino prompted his conscience. The ultimate result was not only the creation of an international organization to provide succor to the victims of armed conflict, but a new body of international law—the humanitarian law of war—with a complex array of institutions to clarify and help implement it.

The institutionalization of the jus ad bellum, the part of just war theory that consists of principles prescribing the conditions under which recourse to war is just or right, has been less effective and much less developed. The UN Charter, the most important single document of international law regarding recourse to war, prohibits the use of military force across borders except in self-defense (or defense of other countries) unless it is authorized by the United Nations Security Council. Since the 1990s this law has been interpreted in a broader fashion, so as to allow Security Council authorization of wars of humanitarian intervention, in cases where massive violations of the human right to physical security have occurred or are eminent. But international law, and the institutions that support it, still provide inadequate control over the initiation of war. Notoriously, the Security Council has failed to authorize humanitarian intervention in recent cases of genocide.

There is a more general failure, however, that is the focus of my thinking in this volume: international law and institutions do little to help ensure that state leaders will make morally sound and factually informed decisions regarding recourse to war. Nor do domestic institutions provide serious protections against the predictable errors and abuses of recourse to war decision-making. Yet even if domestic institutions were much better in this regard than they are, there is good reason to think that they would be inadequate unless they were properly supported by the right sort of international institutions. This is true even in the case of democratic domestic governments operating under laudable constitutional constraints and within the boundaries of the rule of law. Democracy by definition includes institutional devices for helping to ensure that government officials, including the commander in chief who ultimately makes the decision to go to war, are accountable to the people of that polity; but that is no assurance that the rights and interests of foreigners will be accorded due regard. On the contrary, being accountable only to their own fellow citizens puts leaders at risk for slighting the rights and interests of the citizens of other countries.

Institutionalizing the Just War is in part an effort to elevate the discussion of how further principled institutionalization of the jus ad bellum might be achieved. In other words, it offers proposals that could help achieve better compliance with widely agreed-upon principles concerning recourse to war, by achieving their more effective implementation through reliance on suitable institutions. In that sense, this is addressed to government officials and NGO workers who recognize that the most pressing human problem regarding war is not the lack of a fully developed theory of the morality of war, but rather a failure to put into effect what we already

know about the morality of war. But it is also an intervention designed to encourage jus ad bellum theorists to take seriously the practical task of constraining recourse to war. A central message of Institutionalizing the Just War is that if just war theorizing is to make human life better, it must engage with the limitations and potential value of institutions. To do this, just war theorists will have to descend from the lofty heights of ideal theory to think about how the presence or absence of institutions makes a difference to the morality of going to war. This central point can be put in an even more provocative way: philosophers should quit acting as if they thought that just war theory is a theory for the state of nature—a condition in which there are no institutions worth mentioning and in which questions of institutional innovation simply do not arise.

Chapter One, "Institutionalizing the Just War," advances a basic thesis that informs all the subsequent chapters: traditional just war theory was developed on the implicit assumption of negligible institutional capacity for improving decisions to engage in war and explores how the moral possibilities enlarge once this assumption is abandoned. This amounts to assuming that just war theory is a theory for people in the state of nature as it was traditionally conceived in the Social Contract tradition—a condition in which in effect all issues of morality are issues of individual morality. (Hence the tendency of many contemporary just war theorists to begin by eliciting intuitions about the rightness of acts of violence among individuals, abstracted from any institutional context.)

Once we take seriously the idea that institutions can reshape the moral possibilities, a second major thesis of the chapter comes clearly into view: the proper object of assessment for just war theory is not norms considered in isolation, but rather norm/institution packages, due to the fact that whether a norm is valid can depend upon whether it will function within a particular institution. For example, the widely held view that wars with the object of forcibly democratizing another country are never justified is plausible only if one assumes (1) that the validity of norms does not depend upon institutional context; or (2) that existing institutional resources for constraining decisions to initiate such wars are inadequate and the creation of better institutional resources is either not feasible or would be an improvement, all things considered. But neither of these two assumptions, I argue, is valid. Failing to consider how institutional innovation can change the moral landscape of war serves to support a morally suboptimal status quo, while at the same time fostering an arbitrarily restrictive understanding of the scope of just war theorizing.

This chapter does not advocate forcible democratization; instead it argues that while this type of warfare could be justifiable under certain demanding institutional constraints, in the absence of significant institutional innovations, there is a very strong presumption against it. One goal of this first chapter, then, is to gain greater clarity about exactly why forcible democratization (under current conditions) is unjustified. The conclusion reached is that it makes no sense to argue either that forcible democratization is justified or that it is not without specifying the institutional setting within which norms regarding the use of force to achieve democracy would be applied.

The fundamental methodological implication of this chapter is clear: practically relevant work in this and other departments of just war theory cannot be restricted to formulating abstract norms to capture intuitions elicited by consideration of hypothetical cases presented in an institutional vacuum. A knowledge of existing institutional capacities combined with a realistic appraisal of the opportunities for institutional innovation grounded in an understanding of principles of institutional design are also needed. Otherwise, we will be left with moral norms that are so abstract that they provide little guidance for responding to the real problems of war.

Chapter Two, "A Richer Jus ad Bellum," draws out further implications of Chapter One's thesis that traditional just war theory was developed on the assumption of negligible institutional capacity—

whether domestic or supranational— for regulating recourse to war. In other words, traditional just war theory typically addresses its principles to the conscience of state leaders, while remaining silent on the question of whether different principles might be appropriate if leaders made decisions within institutional structures aptly designed to improve their decision-making. I argue that contemporary mainstream just war theorizing suffers this limitation as well: it proceeds as if the institutional context of decisions to initiate war need not be considered in developing a systematic account of the morality of war. The result is an arbitrarily narrow understanding of the domain of just war theorizing, a truncated set of issues to which the just war theorist ought to address. Among the important moral issues that a comprehensive theory of just war ought to address but which are not even broached by traditional or contemporary mainstream just war theory are these: (1) whether and if so under what conditions leaders should not apply the objective criteria for right war-making actions directly, but should instead rely on heuristics designed to reduce the risk of abuse and error in their decision-making that arises from their imperfect information and conflicting motives and incentives; (2) what is the proper division of labor between heuristics and institutional constraints on decision-making as distinct but potentially complementary ways of reducing the risk of abuse and error; (3) what are the proper criteria for evaluating the actual decision-making of leaders, including an account of the virtues that are appropriate for individuals empowered to initiate and conduct war; and (4) whether a morally sound social practice of offering public justifications for going to war ought to regard certain types of justifications as illegitimate due to the high risk that their use will result in erroneous or duplicitous decisions to initiate war.

The first two chapters set the stage for the third, "Institutional Legitimacy": if some of the most important issues just war theory should address can only be sensibly engaged by recognizing the limitations of existing institutions and being willing to contemplate institutional innovations, then a understanding of what makes an institution legitimate is needed. Further, the needed understanding of institutional legitimacy must encompass both the state and its internal institutions, as well as international institutions.

This chapter refines and augments an analysis of institutional legitimacy designed to illuminate both the legitimacy of states and of international institutions first advanced in a widely cited essay I co-authored with Robert O. Keohane: "The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions." It begins by distinguishing between normative and sociological legitimacy. It then proceeds on the assumption that institutions designed to further liberal cosmopolitan values can only do so if they are widely perceived to be legitimate, because the raw exercise of power without at least the trappings of legitimacy is rarely effective in the longer run, and that, therefore, when the legitimacy of actual or proposed institutions is called into question, an effective response on their behalf will rely in part on plausible arguments to show that they satisfy reasonable criteria for legitimacy. A virtue of the "Metacoordination" View of institutional legitimacy developed in this chapter is that it is general enough to illuminate the legitimacy of both states and of multilateral institutions that are quite unlike states, but sufficiently contentful to provide guidance for developing sound criteria for legitimacy that are tailored to specific types of institutions. This chapter offers a complex standard for legitimacy: a set of criteria that are relevant for assessing the legitimacy of a wide range of international and domestic institutions, including those that are designed to improve decisions regarding the initiating of war. These criteria will be shown to be useful in subsequent chapters, when specific institutional innovations are proposed.

The understanding of institutional legitimacy developed in this chapter is called the Meta-coordination View to emphasize that the distinctive practical role of the concept of normative legitimacy is to facilitate coordination, based on certain types of moral reasons, regarding the

assessment of whether an institution is worthy of particular forms of respect. A key feature of this analysis is the recognition that institutional legitimacy must be understood ecologically: that whether a particular institution is legitimate can often depend upon its relationship to other institutions.

Chapter Four, "Reciprocal Institutional Legitimation," further explores the idea, first advanced in the preceding chapter, that institutional legitimacy is ecological, by explaining through the use of pertinent examples how the legitimacy of an institution may depend upon the role it plays in an institutional division of labor and more specifically on whether other institutions operate in such a way as to enhance its legitimacy and vice versa. A key example is the fact that a state's participation in international human rights institutions can enhance its legitimacy, inter alia, by providing an independent determination of whether that state is respecting the human rights of its own citizens. Conversely, to the extent that international human rights institutions are created by states that are democratic and respect human rights, this enhances their legitimacy. Similarly, whether a multilateral regime for humanitarian intervention is legitimate may depend upon how it functions in a division of labor to which other legitimate institutions contribute. The idea of reciprocal institutional legitimation is exploited in the last two chapters of this volume, which offer respectively, proposals for the institutional regulation of humanitarian military interventions and military interventions to protect democracies.

Chapter Five, "The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention," is a significantly modified version of an earlier published article of that title, supplemented to emphasize the need for institutional change not only at the international but also at the domestic level, if humanitarian intervention is to be justified. It addresses a problem that is generally neglected in the literature on humanitarian intervention: how are state leaders to justify to their own fellow citizens the decision to use the country's armed forces and its material resources for the sake of helping foreigners, when doing so does not further the interests of those citizens and is not required for the protection of their rights?

This fifth chapter first argues that making the case for the internal legitimacy of humanitarian intervention depends upon the rejection of a simple but prima facie attractive conception of what the state is for: if the state is only an institutional resource for furthering the interests of its citizens and protecting their rights, then humanitarian intervention is not legitimate (except in cases where it serves the interests of the citizens or protects their rights). I then go on to argue that this highly constraining understanding of what the state is for, which I call The Discretionary Association View, is mistaken. The chief conclusion of Chapter war is never permissible because war is only justified against parties who have already actually done wrong by showing that under certain conditions conspiring to inflict temporally distant future harms counts as wrong-doing. The key point here is that creating a dire threat of wrongful harm is doing something wrong, even if the threat is not likely to be immediately realized. Chapter Seven then goes on to explain the inadequacies of widely employed consequentialist arguments against preventive war, arguments designed to show that preventive war is too morally risky, due to the extraordinary potential for error and abuse that recourse to the idea of preventing temporally distant and uncertain harms poses. The crucial point is that these risks are not fixed: they can be reduced to acceptable levels if the decision to engage in preventive war is made within well-designed institutional constraints, procedures aptly designed to improve the epistemic context of decisions and counteract leaders' incentives to exaggerate the seriousness of threats of temporally distant harms. This chapter concludes that although preventive war would be justifiable if the decision to engage in it were made through the right sort of institutional procedures, the US decision in 2003 to invade Iraq in order to prevent possible future harms was not justified. That decision was made in the absence of

the demanding institutional constraints that alone could make the decision to engage in preventive war justified. There is a clear link between this chapter and Chapter Two, which emphasized, inter alia, that jus ad bellum theory should address the moral evaluation of practices for justifying going to war: a social practice that regards the appeal to prevention as a legitimate kind of justification for going to war is morally defective unless it operates in the context of a suitably designed institution for ameliorating the inherent risks of appealing to this sort of justification for war-making.

Chapter Eight, "Pre-commitment Regimes for Intervention," like the preceding chapter, is a modified version of an article coauthored with Robert O. Keohane. It explains how an institutional innovation that is compatible with existing international law concerning the rights of sovereignty could facilitate timely intervention to protect democracies from authoritarian coups or from a resurgence of internal violence, through pre-authorization. The practical urgency for such a proposal stems from the fact that interventions to protect democracies from authoritarian coups or prevent the resumption of ethno-national violence are unlikely to receive Security Council authorization due to the exercise of the permanent member veto by two authoritarian regimes, China and Russia. This essay outlines a pre-commitment regime, to be created by treaty, by which a legitimate government can in effect avail itself of an insurance policy by authorizing a particular state or group of states to intervene if there is an attempt to overthrow it by force or if there is a resumption of large-scale ethno-national violence. The precommitment contract is a kind of rational self-binding mechanism that is properly viewed as a prudent exercise of sovereignty by a democratic government on behalf of its people, rather than an abdication of sovereignty. The chief virtue of the idea of a precommitment regime for intervention is that it provides a way of supplementing, not rejecting, the authority of the Security Council to authorize intervention, by providing for the possibility of intervention when the exercise of the permanent member veto precludes it and doing so without adopting a broad—and highly dangerous—norm allowing intervention whenever democracy or internal peace and security are threatened. And it provides this benefit without violating state sovereignty; instead, precommitment regimes provide a new way for vulnerable democracies to protect themselves through the exercise of sovereignty, by entering into a treaty that authorizes intervention in advance.

A Plea for a Change in Methodology

The interdisciplinary but explicitly normative institutionalist approach employed in this volume can be applied to a wide range of multilateral institutions designed to cope with a diversity of problems. The specific institutional proposals advanced focus on the problem of regulating recourse to war, but the theory of institutional legitimacy offered and the methodological strategy followed throughout are of much broader applicability.

Accordingly, my hope is that this volume will do something to bring about a significant change in the intellectual culture of contemporary political philosophers, prompting them to think institutionally and to recognize that their favorite technique of eliciting intuitions about hypothetical cases involving individuals (and not individuals as institutional agents!), without a specification of institutional realities and possibilities, can only take one so far.

To be frank, my suspicion is that "so far" is not very far at all. When contemporary just war theorists produce extremely complex criteria for determining when an act of going to war is right—including remarkably complicated requirements regarding as many as three distinct types of "proportionality"—they ignore the fact that the epistemic demands for applying their criteria may be too great for flesh and blood leaders. They also ignore the fact that leaders are unlikely to act in ways that are consistent with valid moral norms unless they have sufficient incentives to do so and that different institutions create different incentives. So long as political philosophers confine themselves

to articulating and defending moral norms that are so abstract as to be valid irrespective of institutional context, they need not concern themselves with institutional analysis, nor with a consideration of whether sound decision-making regarding war should be constrained and structured by institutions that are designed to prevent leaders from attempting to apply directly appropriate criteria for the rightness of war-making acts. But the price of this "advantage" is that there will remain an enormous gap between the highly abstract moral norms they endorse and the development of morally sound practical responses to the problems. In other words, even if decision-makers ingested and internalized the basic norms of the best just war theory, they would still face a host of unanswered questions; they would still not know what to do. Unless something is done to bridge this gap, just war theorizing will remain an intellectual exercise for a small number of specialists rather than an example of how expertise in moral reasoning can make a positive difference in the world.

My worry can be put in another way. I fear that mainstream just war theory has become largely a matter of different theorists intervening in a dialogue among themselves that is so narrowly framed as to ensure its almost total irrelevance to the problems that actual individuals face when confronted with the possibility or reality of war. In other words, they are responding more to problems identified in their literature— and in particular to the question of criteria for right acts of war-making—rather than to the full range of moral problems of war. Suppose, as I have argued, that the morality of war contains much more than the identification of criteria for right acts of war-making. Suppose, as I argue in Chapters One and Two, that it also includes the articulation of sound heuristics and institutional procedures for decision-making, the identification of sound social practices regarding what are regarded as legitimate public justifications for going to war, and an account of the virtues of war leaders, where this includes practical knowledge of when to rely on heuristics and how far they should be bound by institutional procedures for decision-making and by existing international law. If that is so, then any approach to just war theory that confines itself to articulating criteria for right war-making acts that are valid irrespective of institutional context and without regard to the epistemic and motivational limitations of human beings will be of limited value. <>

The Life of Reason in an Age of Terrorism edited by Charles Padrón, Krzysztof Piotr Skowroński [Value Inquiry, Philosophy in Spain, Brill-Rodopi, 9789004361041]

With The Life of Reason in an Age of Terrorism, Charles Padrón and Kris Skowroński gather together a broad assortment of contributions that address the germaneness of George Santayana's (1863-1952) social and political thought to the world of the early twenty-first century in general, and specifically to the phenomenon of terrorism.

The essays treat a broad range of philosophical and historical concerns: the life of reason, the philosophy of the everyday, fanaticism, liberalism, barbarism, egoism, and relativism. The essays reflect a wide range of viewpoints and perspectives, but all coalesce around discussions of how Santayana's thought fits in with and enhances an understanding of both our challenging times, and our uncertain future.

Contributors are: Cayetano Estébanez, Matthew Caleb Flamm, Nóra Horváth, Jacquelyn Ann Kegley, Till Kinzel, Katarzyna Kremplewska, John Lachs, José Beltrán Llavador, Eduardo Mendieta, Daniel Moreno Moreno, Luka Nikolic, Charles Padrón, Giuseppe Patella, Daniel Pinkas, Herman Saatkamp, Jr., Matteo Santarelli, Krzysztof Piotr Skowroński and Andrés Tutor.

Contents

A Reasonable Life by Charles Padrón and Krzysztof Piotr Skowroński

In today's world (2017) there are very few issues that generate such passionate interest within a spectrum of points of view and positions, as does terrorism. We could mention here a handful of comparable others such as global warming and the environment, immigration, the inequalities between the haves and have-nots, political corruption, and animal rights, all as commensurate preoccupations. But terrorism seems to trump the others in visceral intensity and coverage in the media. Even what it is, its very definition, what constitutes it, and what its sources and causes are, both material and immaterial, have been discussed, analyzed, and debated non-stop since the days of revolutionary France, in the 1790s.

Jorge (George) Santayana lived to the ripe old age of two months short of eighty-nine. Born in 1863, his death in 1952 in Rome was an appropriate and fitting end to a life that spanned the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and two continents: Europe and North America. There were plenty of occasions during his own life in which his normally serene gaze could span out and take in what was transpiring in the world at large. Some of the events and developments were the following: the Spanish-American War (1898–1902); the Boer War (1899–1902); the Russian pogroms of 1903; the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia (1917); World War I (1914–1918); the Mexican Civil War (1920); the Irish Civil War (1921–1922); Mussolini's March on Rome (1922); Muslim Brotherhood Terrorism (1928–1949); the Night of the Long Knives (1934); the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939); World War II (1939–1945); the Israeli War of Independence (1948–1949); and the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949). The sheer variety of these social, political, and international conflicts and wars, in many instances replete with what today we would designate as outright

terrorism, attest to the violence, killing, and terror that Santayana had to be aware of, as any serious perusal of his personal letters (eight volumes of them) reveal: he kept up with world events and news.

The Life of Reason is Santayana's five-volume work published in 1905–06. It is widely considered a classic of American philosophical naturalism, and along with his four-volume Realms of Being (1927–40), is considered his most substantial philosophical achievement. In fact, in acknowledgment of the recently completed re-publication of all five volumes carried out by the critical Santayana Edition (The MIT Press), headed by Martin Coleman, a joint Harvard-Instituto Cervantes collaboration has held a panel discussion on the work on 13 April 2017. In short, the work has endured the test of time, and still remains a wellspring of philosophical insight for us in 2017.

The Life of Reason abounds in incisive, comprehensive discernment into what it means to be human in a rapidly changing, oftentimes overwhelming world. It is difficult not to encounter in its pages an abundance of lyrical, beautifully written, lucid passages of understanding and wisdom that were relevant to the early twentieth-century, but also to the twenty-first century. Two of the work's unintended consequences, originating out of the book, were the expressions the life of reason, and a life of reason, that still today enjoy wide circulation in the educated world. But what constitutes reason, and how it is defined, remain puzzling questions that still spawn intense agreement and disagreement, critical discussion, and thought.

The same applies to the other face of this volume's intellectual half: terrorism. Those of us living today in Europe and the United States (and in other places across the world) reside in a social and political context in which terrorism and terror are widespread phenomena, in certain locales even daily occurrences. It is neither unprecedented nor novel. It might seem to be the case that it is, but history teaches us differently.

Santayana can offer us much in the way of understanding and framing a healthy, measured, and sane approach to the violence and hatred that we hear of, read about, watch vicariously on our screens all too often, or even experience personally. There are many people in the world alive who have witnessed (and suffered) personally from such horrific events. These events are incessantly punctuating our daily lives. Santayana can also help to lessen our increasing anxieties and fears. His writings confer understanding on the predicament as to why there is so much violence and terror in the world in the first place, how best to accept and digest it, not as determined or inevitable, but as typical (and consistent) with long-established human behavior. The essays collected in this book aim to address three principal components of this relation between an understanding of the world embodied in Santayana's *The Life of Reason* (and other works of his), and the terrorism that is tearing at the seams of the contemporary world: (1) discussions of some of the dynamics active today that distinguish our present period of terrorism and terrorists through the lenses of Santayana's thought; (2) discussions of Santayana's thought and how it relates to political and social realities, both of his own era, and ours; and (3) complementary critical discussions of Santayana's thought in respect to other irrational, controversial, and contravening attitudes and views of life (isms) that Santayana distinguished were a part of his own time, and are still alive and well in our current context. It is our hope that we have enriched, however modestly, thought and discussion on one of the most challenging, and seemingly intractable, problems of our times.

Justice and Sorrow by John Lachs

From time to time, people have their fill of the uncertainties of life. The changeability of human relations, the fickleness of fortune and the difficulties in the way of deciding what (and whom) to believe prepare us to embrace views that offer absolute assurance. The origin of the views may lie in religion or in some secular grand vision of the world, but its outcome is always the same:

presumed certainty of access to the very essence of reality.

This is the thought that constitutes ideology, offering an explanation in simple terms of everything that seems important. Often, a single book—the Bible, Das Kapital, for example—is adequate to provide the conceptual structure needed; in other instances—such as National Socialism—the place of a central text is assumed by an oft-repeated grab bag of pseudo-scientific declarations. Ideologies connect with the firmly held hopes and beliefs of people, assuring them that their convictions are right and their fears unfounded. The success of ideology rests on the simplified explanations it provides and the final victory it promises.

The promises, however, embroil it in a telling contradiction. It tends to draw a sharp line between good and evil, declaring war on everything impure or inferior. This imposes an obligation on true believers to serve as the shock troops of the right and the good, sacrificing, if necessary, even their lives. In this way, the certainty they sought becomes the inevitability of lifelong struggle and final death. In the case of suicide bombers, death comes soon and by their own hands, having transferred victory to a heaven expected to be magnanimous.

William James was right that religious or absolutistic commitments foster the strenuous mood, releasing vast energies and enthusiasms. This is why, initially at least, "the strenuous type of character will on the battle-field of human history always outwear the easy-going type, and religion will drive irreligion to the wall." [William James, "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,"] Aggression has a clear advantage over civilization, attacking where it wants and attempting to intimidate people disinclined to fight. Commercial nations tend to go to war only as a last resort, preferring instead to busy themselves with securing the conditions of a good life. And they fight only long enough to feel safe again, returning from the military to private life as soon as possible. We saw this pattern repeated in the Second World War, the Korean War, and the struggle to resist the Iraqi attempt to annex Kuwait.

Economic and political integration through the European Union and the cross-alliances of nations have succeeded in reducing the frequency and magnitude of national aggression in the last seventy years. But large-scale organized invasions have been replaced by a particularly vicious form of terrorist activity. Its plan, if it can be said to have a central plan at all, is to disrupt normal life and strike fear in the hearts of people. Bold and momentous actions, such as those on 9/11, are meant to create the impression that no one is secure and there is no place to hide.

Terrorist actions are performed with stunning cruelty and deep-seated disregard for the rules of decency humans have developed with difficulty over centuries. Airplanes are flown into tall buildings, railroad stations are blown up and children become targets of extermination. Air passengers are executed by means of bombs filled with nails, women are raped and people are starved and tortured for no particular reason. Horrendously, the heads of innocent individuals are cut off in cold blood to serve as demonstration of the utter recklessness of the attackers. There is no better measure of the terrorists' indifference to life than that they are willing to sacrifice their own if they can take a few unsuspecting people with them.

Japanese kamikaze pilots near the end of the WWII were prepared to lay down their lives, hoping to sink enemy ships. A surprising and novel development at the time, it was rightly viewed as a part or form of warfare. Although it was a virtual certainty that the pilots would not survive, the mayhem was limited to combatants. The self-destruction was just a desperate extension of the techniques of war, instead of a marauding effort to break the spirit of people. Suicide bombers, by contrast, aim to disrupt the regular movement of life and shatter as much as they can of the illusion of sheltered safety. The aim is the collapse of political and civil life as they are practiced in the West.

The current wave of terrorism is meant to undo us by its ferocity. Much Medieval torture was cruel but rational: its purpose was the systematic oppression of rivals. Although heretics were targeted for extermination, they would not be allowed to die without first recanting their alleged repugnant views. The damage torturers inflicted was directed outward, causing pain to others but leaving the terrorists unscathed. The very point of making enemies and dissenters tremble was to have the terrorists prevail, and for that they had to survive. The moment terrorists are willing—even anxious—to die, we are introduced to another world with a value-system radically different from our own.

The hallmark of a life of reason is its inclusiveness. It respects desires that can be made compatible parts of a harmonious whole and endeavors to create the greatest possible sum of satisfactions. This grand aim is by no means easy to achieve: it requires social discipline and individual self-control.

Murderous impulses must be suppressed and a generally benign attitude toward neighbors must displace the attempt to run other people's lives. When we are guided by reason, toleration is the norm; love of the other is too much to ask, but leaving room for many forms of perfection is an achievable standard.

By contrast, terrorists imbued with a fanatical ideology acknowledge no legitimacy to any beliefs other than their own. For them, even symbols of ancient civilizations must be destroyed and all dissenters instantly put to death. They act in a world that stretches beyond the empirical and feel certain that they carry out the judgments of a jealous God. The rewards they expect far outweigh the sacrifice of their lives; in fact, they believe a glorious exit from our mundane sphere is the price of eternal blessedness. Since they see compromise as defeat, conversation with them yields no results; everything they do aims at their victory.

Loss of freedom, pain and death constitute the armaments of social life. The threat of incarceration is enough to keep most people in line. The possibility of a deadly clash with superior forces acts as the ultimate sanction that looms large in the minds of criminals. Under normal circumstances, the order of the world can be maintained by the prospect or the actual deployment of police or military might. But people who do not value their lives have nothing to fear; the worst thing we can do to them is, in their eyes, a badge of honor. They seek martyrdom by blowing themselves up, nullifying the efficacy of threats and punishments.

Civilized societies find themselves impotent in the face of such abandon. Preemptive action is not in their blood, yet waiting until a spectacular explosion kills scores of people peacefully going about their business is a costly policy. The result is hesitation, which gives the impression that something is being done without violating many rights and freedoms. But in the face of deadly determination, this leaves liberal societies vulnerable. Terrorist intentions are difficult to detect, so the authorities are perpetually at a disadvantage. What they can do short of turning free societies into police states is sharply limited and leaves the initiative in the hands of murderers.

Terrorists enlist the power of social media, making videos of gory executions available everywhere. The sheer wantonness of the horror shakes the foundations of the humane world. States that employ capital punishment make executions as painless and private as possible; terrorists, by contrast, derive maximum effect from placing them front and center in cold-blooded cruelty. Many citizens of modern nations are shielded from the face of death.

They relegate dying to the wards of hospitals, denying themselves the experience of even peaceful passing. Being used to body parts in their regular place, the shocking visage of a gratuitously dismembered person panics them. They don't at once capitulate to terrorist demands, but large-scale and sustained executions may over time wear down their resolve.

Retaliation in kind is not an option for humane societies; cutting off the heads of two terrorists for

every one they sever is a barbarian response to barbarism. But terrorist values gain entrance to our souls nevertheless. Though we never act to accomplish it, we wish awful things to happen to the murderers. We hope that their heads will be cut off or that they will die a slow, painful and gruesome death before they can do much harm. Stopping them is not enough: we want to see them tortured, frustrated in their aims, and humiliated before their summary executions. Above all else, we want to make sure they are taught the horror of arbitrary evil.

This is the power of terrorists over us: they infect the soul with images and desires inappropriate to civilized people. We seek revenge in the currency of the crime, escalating the horror visited upon human beings. We feel elated at news that terrorists have been shot full of holes or blasted by rockets. We heap vicious curses upon vicious perpetrators and hardly notice that in the process we become like the people we condemn. And then in moments of insight and candor, we recognize that, in intention at least, we are no better than our enemies. The same destructive impulses motivate us and we learn to delight in the suffering and death of others.

The wish that ill fortune befall people acts as a cancer whose disordered growth makes a life of reason impossible. If untreated, it interferes with the operation of the vital organs of human interaction, focusing efforts on useless cruelty. Aching for revenge is an atavistic desire demanding expression, even though in quiet moments of reflection we know that it is wrong to honor it. Yet the primitive drive to strike out to cause pain crowds out the tolerant and generous maximizing tendency that has made life good for untold generations. The satisfaction of seeing others come to grief yields no positive result, and those who have shame left in their moral armamentarium back away, red-faced, from feeling it.

Does this mean that for the health of our souls we must put the horror behind us and forgive the terrorists? This may seem a generous act and something that would demonstrate the vast difference between bloodthirsty savages and those who follow the edicts of civilization. To bolster this view, we could declare that though terrorists start out sadly misguided, sustained conversation with us would get them to see things right. We could make ourselves believe that words have a magical power, so that if we have the better arguments, our enemies will capitulate.

No words can adequately capture the foolishness of this vision. Civilization wins only when it uses the same sort of power as threatens it. Singing the praises of our values and our way of life will not stop massacres. The only strategy that works is to meet talk with talk and force with force; nothing short of the readiness to place our lives on the line can discourage and ultimately defeat people who respect only ferocity. We cannot talk ideologues out of their convictions; this is why the conversation-partners of terrorists soon fill the cemeteries. And we cannot make lasting peace with people whose ultimate aim is dominance through war.

Clearly, forgiveness is the wrong strategy. Instead, the order of society demands that we pursue the killers and bring them to justice, if at all possible before they kill again. In the process, many of them are likely to die. Others among them will suffer terrible wounds or will be incarcerated without the hope of release. Difficult as it may be, we cannot greet these developments with jubilation. The measure of a civilization is the way it deals with necessary punishment. It needs to curb its natural tendency to take pleasure in the pain of others, even if the misery is deserved. It must view the transgression and the consequent rectification as interconnected parts of lamentable events.

It is sad that humans reach the level of depravity displayed in terrorism. It is distressing that we are the ones who have to make them pay. For human beings, justice often involves an element of sorrow. <>

Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court by Richard H. Fallon, Jr. [Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press, 9780674975811]

Why do self-proclaimed constitutional "originalists" so regularly reach decisions with a politically conservative valence? Do "living constitutionalists" claim a license to reach whatever results they prefer, without regard to the Constitution's language and history? In confronting these questions, Richard H. Fallon reframes and ultimately transcends familiar debates about constitutional law, constitutional theory, and judicial legitimacy.

Drawing from ideas in legal scholarship, philosophy, and political science, Fallon presents a theory of judicial legitimacy based on an ideal of good faith in constitutional argumentation. Good faith demands that the Justices base their decisions only on legal arguments that they genuinely believe to be valid and are prepared to apply to similar future cases. Originalists are correct about this much. But good faith does not forbid the Justices to refine and adjust their interpretive theories in response to the novel challenges that new cases present. Fallon argues that theories of constitutional interpretation should be works in progress, not rigid formulas laid down in advance of the unforeseeable challenges that life and experience generate.

Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court offers theories of constitutional law and judicial legitimacy that accept many tenets of legal realism but reject its corrosive cynicism. Fallon's account both illuminates current practice and prescribes urgently needed responses to a legitimacy crisis in which the Supreme Court is increasingly enmeshed.

Excerpt: As my title of Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court suggests, this is an ambitious book. By design, it blends three perspectives on constitutional law. The first is that of the longtime constitutional law professor that I am. As a law professor, I take constitutional law and doctrine seriously. I believe that what the Supreme Court says in one case matters for future cases, both in lower courts and in the Court itself. I also credit the idea that debates in the Supreme Court are about law, not just politics.

The book's second perspective is that of philosophy. Although I am not a philosopher, it is impossible to talk about law in the Supreme Court without embracing positions on multiple jurisprudential questions. These include issues involving the relationships between law and language and, perhaps especially, between law and political morality. In an era when we refer unhesitatingly to judicial liberals and judicial conservatives, anyone who cares about constitutional law also needs to think about political theory.

The book's third perspective is that of political science. As political scientists remind us, we should not let normative preoccupations cause us to skip over questions about how the Supreme Court got the power that it has, about why people put up with judicial power as we know it, and about what the Justices need to do to maintain their power.

The perspectives of law, philosophy, and political science intersect, diverge, and overlap in many interesting ways, including in their concerns with judicial "legitimacy." Legitimacy is a concept with multiple senses. It sometimes means different things to lawyers, philosophers, and political scientists. Among my ambitions is to sort out confusions and to set the stage for a multidisciplinary inquiry into matters of pressing common concern.

The late Justice William J. Brennan used to counsel law clerks that "the most important number in the Supreme Court is five." When the clerks asked why, he would reply, "With five votes, you can do anything." For reasons that I shall explore, Brennan was wrong: there are some things—indeed, many things—that the Justices cannot do, even with five votes. But suppose Brennan was right. By what moral and legal right could five Justices impose their views on the rest of us? Or, perhaps more aptly, how would the Justices need to decide the controversial cases that come before them in order to justify, legally and morally, their claims to obedience? Yes, the Justices have the power to decide many important issues as a matter of political fact. In addition, the Constitution's language and history do not dictate clear answers to many of the questions that the Justices confront. Thus comes the inevitability that the Justices' moral and political views will sometimes influence their decisions. Yet the Justices are not merely politicians in robes, or at least they ought not to be. Questions of justification—both of judicial power generally and of the exercise of judicial power in particular ways—are this book's dominant concern.

Political conservatives have often railed against "judicial activism." Political liberals have more recently shuddered at Supreme Court threats to scuttle progressive legislation and to pare back protections of abortion. Everyone has a stake. Nearly every thoughtful person experiences disquiet, if not outrage, at some Court decisions, especially when the Justices are narrowly divided into conservative and liberal coalitions that pit those appointed by Republican presidents against those named to the Court by Democrats.

At a time when many people have lost confidence in the Supreme Court and have come to regard it as a "political" institution in a pejorative sense, the book's questions about the relationships among law, language, and legitimacy deserve urgent attention. But they are intellectually risky questions to pursue, not so much because they are politically controversial as because of the need to cross disciplinary lines in the quest for answers. Academic specialization, which is often a virtue, can leave no one properly credentialed to confront large intellectual challenges. As I have said, I am not a philosopher, nor am I a political scientist. Yet the most important questions about law, language, and legitimacy in the Supreme Court do not lie within the exclusive province of any single discipline. Those questions involve law but are not narrowly legal. Issues concerning the meaning of language are highly pertinent, as are issues of moral justification. But our worries about law in the Supreme Court have empirical and practical dimensions that require much more than purely philosophical knowledge. And while we cannot grasp the full complexity of our current predicament without focusing on the political scientific question of how political and judicial power work within our constitutional regime, political scientists have no distinctively moral or legal expertise.

Perhaps no one knows enough to speak with state-of-the-art sophistication about all of the matters that bear on my topic of law and legitimacy in the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, I venture the risk of speaking beyond my expertise because I am convinced that vital current issues cannot be understood except through an approach that links legal, philosophical, and political scientific inquiries. Within our politically and morally divided nation, all of our institutions may be destined for, or indeed may be in the midst of, legitimacy crises. But the Supreme Court is at least as vulnerable as Congress and the president, and in the long run it may be more so. The Court's members have no renewable democratic mandate stemming from periodic elections. Questions involving the entitlement of narrow majorities of the Justices to impose their will are likely to arise with even greater urgency in the future than they have in the recent past.

The Challenges of Legitimacy

The central organizing concept for the book—which links the perspectives of law, philosophy, and political science—is that of legitimacy. "Legitimacy" is a word with many meanings. When we speak

about legitimacy, it is easy to talk ourselves into confusion. In this book, I draw a number of clarifying distinctions—for example, between the kind of sociological legitimacy that centrally interests political scientists and the legal and moral legitimacy that predominantly concern lawyers and philosophers. Among the book's principal ambitions is to draw together the perspectives of law, political science, and political theory in unraveling and ultimately solving some of the puzzles that surround law and legitimacy in the Supreme Court.

In the legal and especially the moral sense of "legitimacy" that defines the core of the book's inquiry, invocations of the concept seek to answer questions along the lines of, By what moral right does the government of the United States, and especially the Supreme Court, establish controversial rules of law, some of which many people think mistaken or even morally repugnant, and then enforce its dictates coercively? Or, perhaps better, How would the Supreme Court of the United States need to decide the cases that come before it—both procedurally and substantively—in order to justify imposing its will on those who reasonably disagree with its conclusions about the bearing of the Constitution on politically charged issues?

The book offers original answers to these questions. Some emerge from a vision of the nature of the law that binds the Supreme Court. As Chapter 4 argues at length, law, in the relevant sense, resides in norms of judicial practice that structure and constrain but do not always uniquely determine legal judgment. Such norms allow room for reasonable disagreement but mark some positions as legally untenable or unreasonable. What complicates matters is that even the norms that exclude some conclusions as legally unreasonable can themselves have vague, disputable fringes. In other words, we have, and need to understand the possibility of, debates about whether some judicial rulings are beyond the pale of the legally tenable. The frequent indeterminacy of constitutional language—which the book will explain, especially in Chapter 2—contributes to the need for, and helps to explain disagreements concerning the nature of, sound judicial judgment.

With law and language often failing to determine uniquely correct answers to hard constitutional questions, legitimacy emerges as a crucial concept—legally, morally, and sometimes sociologically. In the legal and moral senses with which I am most concerned, legitimacy differs importantly from correctness. We cannot reasonably expect every judicial judgment to be correct. Human judges are incorrigibly fallible. Nor can we expect the Supreme Court always to decide cases in ways that we applaud. Reasonable legal disagreement, like reasonable moral disagreement, has always existed and will not go away. We need to come to terms with it. We also need to come to grips with the idea that presidents with political ideologies different from ours will appoint Justices whose judicial philosophies we disapprove of—up to a point.

In conditions of relatively widespread reasonable disagreement, legal and moral legitimacy connote respect-worthiness. Even when we disagree with Supreme Court judgments, we can respect them, provided that they satisfy certain conditions. At this point in the book I can offer only a first approximation of the considerations that bear on the legitimacy or respect-worthiness of the Court's decisions. But it is vital to understand the nature of the decisions that the Court renders and the nature of the domain in which it claims an entitlement to respect.

The Court holds itself out as a legitimate authority. This is a complex term that I shall unpack later. In political theorists' terminology, however, a legitimate authority is a decision maker with the capacity to change the normative obligations of others. Throughout U.S. history, the Supreme Court has famously claimed the authority to alter others' duties—and not just those of the immediate parties to cases before it. In Cooper v. Aaron, the Court upbraided Arkansas's governor and legislature for refusing to accede to the Court's school desegregation ruling in Brown v. Board of

Education, even though the Arkansas governor and legislature were not parties to the earlier case. In the course of its opinion, the Court appealed to "the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution." Similarly, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, a case involving abortion rights, the Court claimed the authority to direct citizens to "end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution." When the Court refers to others' obligations of obedience to its decisions, I take it to speak in a moral, and not just in a legal, sense.

A few brief examples will illustrate the consequences. Following the Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, officials cannot punish abortion, even if they think it immoral. State officials must furnish licenses to gay couples who seek to marry, even if those officials believe that same-sex marriage contravenes God's law. When Kim Davis, a county clerk in Rowan County, Kentucky, defied the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges by refusing to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, a judge held her in contempt of court and ordered her jailed. Obergefell also bars legislators from enacting laws that some believe necessary to maintain a decent society.

If we ask how or by what right the Supreme Court gets to change not only legal but also moral obligations, we may be tempted to answer by stating that the Constitution gives the Court this power. But this response begs a central question. Does the Constitution in fact give the Supreme Court the power to alter people's legal and moral obligations if it deviates from the original meaning of constitutional language (as it may have done in upholding abortion rights in Roe v. Wade and rights to gay marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges) or if it overturns its own precedents for nonoriginalist reasons (as the majority may have done in Citizens United)? In considering this question, we can see again the sting of accusations that the Justices are in essence merely politicians, or politically motivated lawmakers, in robes.

Analysis of the Court's legitimate power needs to delve deeper. Although the Supreme Court claims to be a legitimate authority, its legitimate authority is derivative. We accept the Court's authority because we accept, and most of us feel obliged to support, the Constitution and the American legal system as a whole. And within that framework, the Justices' legitimate authority depends, in the first instance, on their carrying out the mandate of prior legitimate

authorities. In other words, the Court's principal function is to determine what prior authorities—and, in particular, the Constitution—have decided or established, and to apply the dictates of prior authorities to the cases that come before it.

A difficulty, of course, is that prior authorities—centrally including the Constitution—do not always speak clearly or determinately. As a result, the Supreme Court must sometimes establish law for the future. At the barest minimum, it must make clear what the Constitution's language left unclear. (For example, the Constitution provides that no one can be deprived of life, liberty, or property without "due process of law"—but no one thinks that this phrase determinately establishes exactly what "process" a state must provide before it can temporarily remove a child from the custody of a parent whom state officials believe to be unfit in the twenty-first century) In instances in which the Court functions for all practical purposes as a lawmaker, it must so behave as to constitute itself and its decisions as legitimate authorities in their own right and as capable of changing the normative obligations of others going forward.

The Court's claims to legitimate authority are, accordingly, Janus-faced. They look simultaneously backward, to what prior legitimate authorities have established, and forward, to the future, as the Court strives to make decisions that qualify as legal and moral authorities to whose dictates others ought—in the moral sense of that term—to adhere. The notion of moral authority is crucial. It depends not on brute force but on the Court's claimed capacity to make good decisions in both the

backward-looking and the forward-looking senses. When the Court speaks in the name of the law in resolving contentious issues, it almost necessarily claims to make the morally and practically best decisions that the law allows. The Constitution vests the Court with its powers based on the premise that its decisions will produce better and fairer results—within the limits that the law allows—than would occur otherwise. Most of us accept the Court's legitimate authority on the same basis.

So far, so good, you may say, but haven't I myself begged one of the main questions that I set out to answer: What should we say about the legitimacy of the Supreme Court's decisions in cases in which we believe that the Justices have erred, maybe even badly? In such cases, legitimacy in the relevant sense depends on a compendium of considerations that bear on respect-worthiness. It will take most of this book to discuss those considerations in adequate detail, but three play especially central roles. First, the Justices must stay within the bounds of law, or at least exhibit reasonable judgment about what they can do within the bounds of law. Second, the Justices must exhibit good or at least reasonable practical and moral judgment—another matter about which we must expect some disagreement. But in both cases, I emphasize, we should not take too exacting or unforgiving a stance. We need to expect reasonable legal and moral disagreement. We should not come too readily to angry or cynical conclusions about the Justices or their constitutional conclusions.

In this context, a third consideration becomes crucial. In the name of legitimacy, we can and should demand that the Justices support their judgments with arguments that they advance in good faith. Like legitimacy itself, the concept of good faith will loom large in this book. Here I can introduce it but not explicate it fully.

When the Justices take positions in such cases as Bush v. Gore, Roe v. Wade, Citizens United v. FCC, and Obergefell v. Hodges, they need to offer supporting legal arguments. Sometimes those arguments assume substantive premises—for example, about the values that the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, or the Due Process Clause protects. Sometimes, moreover, the Justices' arguments involve methodological commitments—for example, about the significance of the original public meaning of constitutional language or about the judicial obligation to follow precedent. These substantive and methodological commitments need not be simple, much less simplistic. For example, a Justice can reasonably believe that the original meaning of constitutional language should control in some, but not all, cases, or that precedent binds in some cases but not in others. Arguing in good faith does not entail the denial of complexity in constitutional reasoning.

Good faith does, however, require that the Justices—like the rest of us—sincerely believe what they say when engaging in constitutional argument. Leaving the Justices temporarily aside, imagine that you and I engage in an extended constitutional discussion that includes a sequence of cases. We can respectfully disagree about many substantive and methodological points as we proceed. But suppose I reject your argument in one case, involving a claim that there is a constitutional right to gay marriage, by asserting that "there can be no such right because the originally understood meaning of constitutional language is always controlling; otherwise the Constitution would not be law." Suppose then that in discussing a subsequent case, I take a position contrary to the original meaning of constitutional language—for example, by insisting that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars affirmative action—and you challenge me by pointing out that when that provision was ratified, in 1791, no one understood it as doing so. If I insist that affirmative action by the federal government is unconstitutional even so, I may have a plausible explanation. For example, I might say that in the first case, I mistakenly or carelessly spoke too categorically: what I actually believe is that the original public meaning should always determine constitutional outcomes unless clear and contrary judicial precedents that have

become woven into the fabric of our law dictate otherwise. If so, I could reasonably ask you to respect my reasoning in both cases.

But suppose my response in the second case is, "Although I said that the original understanding controlled the first case, I did so only for rhetorical purposes, without really believing it, and I certainly don't feel bound by history now." At this point you would reasonably conclude that arguing with me about constitutional law is pointless due to my lack of good faith in argumentation. My side of the argument would be a charade. You would have no reason to respect me or the conclusions that I reach unless you agreed with them anyway. And I would justifiably respond to you in the same way if you said that recent judicial precedents should always be followed when it suited your purposes but as readily renounced precedentbased reasoning whenever you did not like the conclusions to which it pointed.

As we would respond to each other, so we should respond to the Justices of the Supreme Court. Within the bounds of reasonable legal disagreement, we can respect Justices with whom we disagree, provided that the disagreement is principled. We can even respect Justices who change their minds, so long as they provide reasons for doing so that they genuinely believe and intend to adhere to in the future. But our respect for the Justices—and our appraisal of the Court's decisions and its institutional legitimacy—would rightly suffer grievously if we came to view the Justices as cynical manipulators whose arguments possess no integrity.

Argumentative good faith is not, of course, the only criterion that bears on the legitimacy of judicial decision making in the Supreme Court. Even if all the majority Justices in Roe v. Wade sincerely believed the Court's arguments to be good ones, some critics would think the Court's conclusion too legally and morally unreasonable to deserve their respect. In response to those critics, we might have more to say on the merits, but we should get the point with regard to legitimacy. Sometimes we will disagree about legal and moral legitimacy. Disagreement about legitimacy should not happen as frequently as about the correctness of judicial decisions, but it will not vanish entirely.

If disagreements about legitimacy persist, we should also be ready to pursue a conversation—to which Chapter 7 seeks to contribute—concerning how sociological legitimacy relates to moral legitimacy. To oversimplify greatly for the moment, we should prepare to consider when, if ever, the Justices should allow other people's perceptions of the moral legitimacy of their decisions to affect their actual decision making.

As this preliminary discussion will have signaled, my approach to issues of law, language, and legitimacy in the Supreme Court will sometimes involve close attention to the meaning and application of legal concepts, centrally including that of legitimacy. Subsequent chapters will also probe the concept of law as it applies to adjudication in the Supreme Court and the meaning of constitutional "meaning." In light of the deeply practical nature of my interests, some may regard this angle of approach as naïvely misguided. I believe otherwise. In adopting a conceptual framework for addressing matters of profound practical import, I borrow an insight from the great economist John Maynard Keynes. In their economic thinking, he maintained, the world's most ostensibly practical people are "usually the slaves of some defunct economist." In constitutional law, too, I believe that practical people are often in the grip of long familiar theories and sometimes resulting confusions that drive and explain their actions, even if they are not conscious of it.

For those who resist this claim, my conceptual approach offers something weaker but still significant. I shall seek to explain how it could be the case, even if currently it is not, that the Justices' debates about the requirements of law and legitimacy in the Supreme Court might be meaningful, genuine ones, despite the obvious fact of ideologically inflected disagreement. In other words, I shall offer an account of what law and

legitimacy might be such that we could have them right now, manifest in the Supreme Court, despite what might look on the surface to be cacophonous inconsistency. And if we do not have genuine law and meaningful legitimacy in the Court, then we should insist on getting them. If persuaded that some high-sounding ideals are unattainable, we should not succumb directly to Cynical Realism but should seek instead to identify more modest yet significant standards of legitimate judicial decision making, under law, even in and by the Supreme Court. Especially in the current climate of political discord, we should view judicial legitimacy as a practically meaningful ideal, not a species of pie-in-the-sky utopianism.

A Preview of the Argument Ahead

My analysis begins in Chapter i with further examination and explication of the concepts of judicial legitimacy and legitimate judicial authority. Chapter 1 carefully distinguishes sociological, legal, and moral conceptions of legitimacy and explains how they relate to one another. The chapter also explains why these different senses of legitimacy matter. (The book recurrently emphasizes that in discussions of concepts such as law and legitimacy, it is vitally important to maintain a focus on what, practically, is at stake or why anyone ought to care.)

Chapter 1 also develops the important thesis that moral legitimacy needs to be conceptualized in partly dualist terms. It defines both a minimum, beneath which a political regime (or a judicial decision) should command no respect at all, and an ideal. We should demand minimal legitimacy from the Supreme Court and hope for it to approximate the ideal as closely as possible. Nevertheless, it is important not to think of moral legitimacy, including the moral legitimacy of Supreme Court decision making, in all-or-nothing terms.

With the notion of judicial legitimacy as applied to the Supreme Court having been preliminarily explicated in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 begins an exploration of the Supreme Court's backward-looking obligations by probing the notion of constitutional "meaning." We agree that the Supreme Court must enforce the Constitution and that, in order to do so, it must determine what the Constitution means. But when we talk about the meaning of the Constitution, to what do we refer?

In many if not most of the important cases that come before the Supreme Court, Chapter 2 argues, constitutional language frames the challenge for judicial resolution but does not determine a uniquely correct outcome. In light of reflection on history and language, this conclusion should provoke no surprise. We know that the Founding generation disagreed about many issues. And beyond purely historical disagreements lie deep conceptual issues about what "meaning" means. With respect to these issues, Chapter 2 argues that meaning is a concept with many senses, not just one, and that there will often be multiple candidates to supply the Constitution's original meaning—even if we assume that the original meaning should always control. In short, the chapter establishes that although language is surely relevant to constitutional adjudication in the Supreme Court, hard cases are seldom ones in which outcomes can hinge exclusively on matters of historical or linguistic fact.

With Chapter 2 having argued that the Supreme Court must often choose among competing candidates to supply the Constitution's meaning, Chapter 3 pursues the question of how and why historical practice and precedent subsequent to the Founding era matter to constitutional adjudication. In the Federalist Papers, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton both acknowledged the indeterminacy of constitutional language, but both appeared to think that practice and precedent would help to alleviate the problem. Constitutional meaning would become fixed over time, they maintained.

Chapter 3 explores that hypothesis but comes to nearly the opposite conclusion from the one that Madison and Hamilton reached.

The modern worry about a legally unconstrained Supreme Court may be as much exacerbated as

alleviated by judicial precedents. Nearly everyone agrees that past judicial rulings can alter what otherwise would be the Justices' backward-looking obligations in some cases. Yet no one thinks that the Supreme Court must always adhere to precedents that it regards as mistaken. To take perhaps the most noncontroversial example, nearly everyone agrees that the Supreme Court acted rightly when, in the middle of the twentieth century, it swept aside a number of precedents that had permitted statemandated segregation on the basis of race.

With cases such as these in view, we need to think about what the Supreme Court should or must do, as a matter of law, when it must consider not only the Constitution's original meaning but also the meaning ascribed to relevant constitutional language by other authoritative decision makers at subsequent times. Given a conflict of authorities, do the Justices simply get to choose as they will?

Chapter 4 takes up the challenge of conceptualizing "law" in the Supreme Court. It begins with a familiar but fundamental premise: the Constitution is law not because it claims that status, or because the Framers commanded that subsequent generations should obey the Constitution, but because Americans today accept it as the governing charter of the United States. In the leading practice-based theory of law, Professor H. L. A. Hart identified judges and other officials as the decisive cohort whose "rules of recognition" fix the meaning of legal and constitutional norms. Chapter 4 accepts Hart's basic portrait of the foundations of our constitutional order but with one possible modification and with another change of emphasis. First, Chapter 4 insists that the practices of Justices and other officials in recognizing the Constitution as valid are nested in and conditioned by the attitudes and practices of other officials and ultimately the American public. Second, Chapter 4 emphasizes that the rules or standards of recognition that apply to contested cases in the Supreme Court are often vague and indeterminate. In such cases, the Justices must exercise moral and practical judgment, albeit within bounds that the law defines.

The result is a roughly (but only roughly) two-tiered picture of law in the Supreme Court. One tier consists of the myriad easy cases to which applicable rules or practices of recognition yield a clear resolution. The other encompasses hard cases in which prevailing rules or standards of proper Supreme Court adjudication call for the exercise of moral or practical judgment. There is of course no sharp dividing line between these two categories. Among other things, cases can become hard because of their moral stakes, which different Justices will appraise differently. Nevertheless, recognition that the Justices confront many easy cases, and understand them as such, should help to reassure us that there is law in the Supreme Court. Even apart from "easy" cases, Chapter 4 argues that important, tacitly recognized rules guide and sometimes determine the Justices' decision making. To back up that claim, it offers a number of meaningful examples.

Chapter 5 continues the discussion of law in and binding on the Supreme Court by examining the topic of constitutional constraints. Who can enforce the law that ostensibly binds the Justices? And if the answer were "no one," should we conclude that constitutional adjudication in the Supreme Court is like tennis without a net after all? Having posed these questions, Chapter 5 confronts and rejects the argument that because no other institution can enforce the Constitution against the Supreme Court, the Court cannot be bound by law in any meaningful sense. In particular, this chapter identifies a number of mechanisms through which other institutions can and do constrain the Justices. To borrow a phrase from political scientists, the Justices operate—and know that they operate—within politically constructed bounds.

The existence of political and other constraints on the Justices of course generates the possibility of collisions between the Justices' felt constitutional obligations and the checks that the Constitution creates against judicial power. The problem here is probably an insoluble one, well expressed in the ancient query "Who will guard the guardians?" Chapter 5's important empirical point, however, is

that the law that applies in the Supreme Court can sometimes be enforced against the Justices, however imperfectly, by other institutions of government and their officials.

Chapter 6 examines the role of constitutional theories and methodological argumentation in the Supreme Court. Theories such as originalism and various versions of living constitutionalism aim to serve two functions. They seek to identify optimal or correct answers to disputed questions and, equally importantly, to provide assurances that judicial rulings are both substantively and procedurally legitimate.

Without disparaging the importance of methodological premises in constitutional argument, Chapter 6 aims to transform and transcend the increasingly tired and stylized debate about the comparative merits of well-known constitutional theories. As a brief review makes plain, all of the familiar theories are too incomplete or underspecified to resolve all possible cases. As a result, constitutional theories and the Justices' articulated methodological principles frequently misfire in their aspiration to provide assurances of legitimacy in judicial decision making. Absent further specification, commentators recurrently excoriate the Justices, and the Justices embarrass each other, with charges of unprincipled manipulation. But the proper response, Chapter 6 argues, does not lie in the ex ante development of algorithmically determinate substitutes. The possibility of such rigidly mechanical theories should frighten rather than inspire us. The flow of experience inevitably churns up unforeseen issues. We should not risk the disastrous constitutional outcomes that rigid theories developed in advance of experience might impose.

As a better approach, Chapter 6 proposes a Reflective Equilibrium Theory, modeled on John Rawls's celebrated methodology of moral and political deliberation. When the Justices' case-by-case intuitions about constitutional justice are at odds with their prior interpretive methodological assumptions or commitments, Reflective Equilibrium Theory prescribes that they—like the rest of us who care about constitutional law and engage in constitutional argument—should consider and reconsider our case-specific convictions and our views about sound interpretive methodology at the same time, in search of an equilibrium solution. Most often, case-specific judgments should yield to demands for the consistent application of sound interpretive principles. This is the hallmark of principled decision making. Occasionally, however, unshakeable convictions about the constitutional correctness of particular outcomes should instigate a reformulation or revision of prior methodological commitments (as may have occurred for some of the Justices in the iconic school desegregation case of Brown v. Board of Education). In cases of revision or reformulation, we should hope that the complexities of a new case enrich a Justice's perspective and provoke her to adjust her theory of constitutional interpretation in order better to realize the simultaneously backward- and forward-looking aspects of legitimacy in judicial decision making. Even and especially in such cases, however, the Justices should acknowledge an unyielding obligation of argument in good faith, which requires them to make only arguments in which they believe and to rely only on interpretive premises that they genuinely endorse, looking forward to future cases.

Chapter 7 concludes the book by offering legitimacy-based appraisals of the Supreme Court today and of the prospect for better tomorrows. It discusses evidence of the Court's diminishing sociological legitimacy, explains why this evidence should occasion concern, and offers prescriptions. <>

Fifty-one Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law by Jeffrey Sutton [Oxford University Press, 9780190866044]

When we think of constitutional law, we invariably think of the United States Supreme Court and the federal court system. Yet much of our constitutional law is not made at the federal level. In 51 Imperfect Solutions, U.S. Court of Appeals Judge

Jeffrey S. Sutton argues that American Constitutional Law should account for the role of the state courts and state constitutions, together with the federal courts and the federal constitution, in protecting individual liberties.

The book tells four stories that arise in four different areas of constitutional law: equal protection; criminal procedure; privacy; and free speech and free exercise of religion. Traditional accounts of these bedrock debates about the relationship of the individual to the state focus on decisions of the United States Supreme Court. But these explanations tell just part of the story. The book corrects this omission by looking at each issue-and some others as well-through the lens of many constitutions, not one constitution; of many courts, not one court; and of all American judges, not federal or state judges. Taken together, the stories reveal a remarkably complex, nuanced, ever-changing federalist system, one that ought to make lawyers and litigants pause before reflexively assuming that the United States Supreme Court alone has all of the answers to the most vexing constitutional questions.

If there is a central conviction of the book, it's that an underappreciation of state constitutional law has hurt state and federal law and has undermined the appropriate balance between state and federal courts in protecting individual liberty. In trying to correct this imbalance, the book also offers several ideas for reform.

CONTENTS

Excerpt:

One could fill a bookshelf with compilations of landmark constitutional decisions. Valuable as these writings may be, they uniformly tell just part of the story. In describing opinions on equal protection, criminal procedure, due process, free speech, freedom of religion, and other bedrock

constitutional guarantees, they all omit two essentials.

One omission is that they begin and end with discussions of rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court, rarely discussing, rarely indeed even mentioning, related rulings of the state supreme courts that construe similar state constitutional guarantees. Yet virtually all of the foundational liberties that protect Americans originated in the state constitutions and to this day remain independently protected by them. Those interested in the right to speak freely without risk of government suppression or the right to practice one's religion without restriction, to give two examples, ought to understand the role that the courts of all sovereigns in the country—national and state—play in construing these guarantees. In our federal system, nearly every state and local law must comply with two sets of constraints, those imposed by the Federal Constitution and those imposed by their state counterparts, as it is the rare guarantee of any significance that appears just in the National Constitution as opposed to most (if not all) of the state constitutions. And some liberty guarantees appear only in state constitutions. When individuals seek protection from their state or local governments, they generally will not care whether the state or federal constitution, the state or federal court, does the protecting.

The other omission is that the full story of landmark decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court cannot be understood in isolation. When the National Court enforces a federal right, prior state court decisions in the area often influence the decision, whether on the ground that interpretations of the original state constitutional guarantees illuminate the meaning of the later federal provision or on the ground that the States' experiences in recognizing the right warrant nationalizing it. The States' experiences are just as relevant, indeed more relevant, in the other direction. When the National Court declines to enforce a right, the state courts become the only forum (fora, if you prefer) for enforcing the right under their own constitutions, making it imperative to see whether and, if so, how the States fill gaps left by the U.S. Supreme Court. Both accounts must be aired to understand the true sources of American liberty and their availability today.

This book aims to fill these gaps. It tells the story not of cases but of rights, not of one court but of many courts, not of federal and state judges but of American judges.

The book does something else. It talks about the role of the States in developing American constitutional law from a different vantage point. At many times in American history, the States have set a negative example that has affected the development of constitutional law. This book builds on those accounts by offering stories in which the States set positive examples that hold the potential to be just as influential in the development of American constitutional law.

Chapter 2 lays the foundation for the book by offering some basics about American federalism. It explains how most state and local laws in this country remain subject to two sets of constitutional constraints—those under the federal and state constitutions. It shows how that was not always so when it comes to the liberty and property protections associated with the Bill of Rights and indeed was not the case for most of the first 150 years of American history. Not until the U.S. Supreme Court's extension of most of the Bill of Rights to the States, completed for the most part by the early 1960s, did any of these federal individual rights guarantees apply to the States. Our system of dual sovereigns now comes with dual protections against overreaching state and local laws. In the aftermath of that development, the chapter explains why American lawyers and judges would do well to pay attention to the liberty and property protections in the federal and state constitutions and the reasons why the state guarantees often offer a promising source of protection.

All of this is a windup to the heart of the book, four stories about four individual rights, each revealing the complex interaction between the state and

federal courts in construing similar state and federal constitutional guarantees.

The first story, featured in Chapter 3, concerns school funding. State law developments are particularly salient when the U.S. Supreme Court declines to recognize a right. In San Antonio Independent School District u Rodriguez, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1973 (less than two months after Roe v. Wade) refused to create a constitutional right to equal funding between and among public school districts in Texas. In the decades since, one state supreme court after another (and many state legislatures to boot) have required their own States to create greater equal-funding remedies than the ones the Rodriguez plaintiffs had sought—but failed to obtain. Since Rodriguez, the States have adopted so many schoolfunding innovations that it's fair to ask whether the plaintiffs won by losing. The answer is more complicated than one might expect.

State law developments are just as relevant in the years before the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes a new constitutional right and in the years after it implements the right. Chapter 4 describes the development of the exclusionary rule—a criminal defendant's right to exclude evidence obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure—an account that cannot be understood without considering the state-federal dialogue that led to it and that continues to shape it to this day. Construing their own constitutions more than a century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court and several state courts raised the idea, often haltingly and often just in passing, of excluding evidence obtained in violation of protections against unreasonable searches and seizures as a way of vindicating the guarantee. The suggestions gradually led to holdings, as several state courts adopted an exclusionary rule, abandoning the common law rule that the illegality of a seizure did not affect the independent evidentiary question whether the items discovered during it could be admitted in a later criminal trial. In 1914, the U.S. Supreme Court appeared to adopt an exclusionary rule for federal law enforcement, making its own break from the common law rule. By 1949, when the Court was asked to nationalize the exclusionary rule through the Fourteenth Amendment but declined the invitation, sixteen States had adopted their own exclusionary rules. And by 1961, when Mapp a Ohio extended the rule to the States, roughly half of the States had adopted the rule for themselves under their state constitutions, a point that the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized in justifying its decision.

The apparent end of this chapter of the story opened another. In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court created an exception to the exclusionary rule for federal and state police officers who rely in good faith on the existence of a warrant. Since then, close to twenty States (and counting) have refused to embrace the good faith exception under their own constitutions, confirming that a dialogue begun in the nineteenth century is apt to continue well into the twenty-first century. A pragmatic question posed by Chapter 4 is this: How much did criminal defendants as a group win and lose by prevailing in Mapp? And which venues, the state or federal courts, were most responsible for the winning? The answer, again, is more complicated than one might think.

The plight of Carrie Buck offers a variation on these themes in Chapter 5. Most lawyers and many Americans know about the U.S. Supreme Court's ignominious rejection of her claim that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the State of Virginia from sterilizing her against her will. What few people know is that many state courts grappled with the same issue long before the Supreme Court decided Buck v. Bell. Before 1927, many state courts had granted relief under federal and state law to men and women seeking relief from compelled sterilizations on a variety of state and federal constitutional grounds. Yet after 1927, after Justice Holmes' unrestrained praise for eugenics in Buck v. Bell, an 8-1 decision joined by Chief Justice Taft and Justice Brandeis, few state courts showed any willingness to enforce their own state constitutional guarantees in similar cases. The compelled-sterilization story offers several warnings. Be careful about assuming that state

court judges, even majoritarian-elected state court judges, cannot be trusted to enforce counter-majoritarian guarantees. And never place too much faith in any one set of judges or any one court or, for that matter, any one branch of government as the sole protector of our liberties. The aftermath of Buck demonstrates what happens if Americans rely too heavily on just one of those courts, the U.S. Supreme Court, as the exclusive guardian of our rights: We run the risk of creating state courts that lack the necessary fortitude to fill the gap when we need it most.

We meet the plight of a religious minority, the Jehovah's Witnesses, in Chapter 6. Before and during World War II, Witness families faced a startling wave of discrimination in this country, all stemming from actions required by their faith. They sought to assert their free exercise and free speech rights by seeking an exemption from public school requirements that they participate in flag-salute and pledge-of-allegiance ceremonies at the beginning of each school day. Here too we have landmark rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court: one rejecting the Witnesses' claim (Millersville School District v. Gobitis), and the other, just three years later, granting relief to the families and overruling Gobitis in the process (West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette). And here too we have a set of underappreciated rulings by the state courts during the same era, several of which anticipated Barnette and set the stage in word and deed for it. But this story differs in one respect from the others. The state court judges, truth be told, were largely just as slow to recognize the risks to liberty in these disputes as their federal counterparts. All in all, this is a story about across-the-board judicial failure—perhaps explained by the unfolding world war—with the state and federal judges together sleeping through the initial efforts to enforce these individual rights and waking up at roughly the same time.

Why these four rights, the reader might ask? Each set of cases presents a distinct tale of caution or hope and illustrates the types of complications that sometimes arise in prematurely nationalizing constitutional rights and the occasional benefits that flow from measured restraint in refusing to do so. Why not cover other prominent rights disputes: segregated schools, same-sex marriage, an individual right to possess a weapon, property rights, and so on? The short answer is that many of these stories have been covered in considerable detail elsewhere. The long answer is that I will discuss some of these other disputes in abridged fashion in the epilogue and try to put them in the context of these other chapters.

Last of all, Chapters 7 and 8 raise the idea of reform. I offer several ways in which lawyers, state and federal judges, and law schools might take both sides of American constitutional law more seriously—and in the process strengthen each indispensable half.

In offering federal and state accounts of the development of these constitutional rights, the book strives to shelve one account of American constitutional law and to replace it with another. The book tries, usually successfully, not to take sides on what the state and federal courts should have done in construing these guarantees. Its focus instead is on describing what they did in order to see if there is anything to learn along the way. That's why I pay little attention to whether the state and federal court decisions were right. And that's why I pay little attention to whether the state and federal courts should have applied originalism or living constitutionalism or pragmatism to the issues. That's also why I frequently take for granted that vigorous individual rights protection by some court is beneficial even if that may not always be the case—even if legislative and executive branch protections of individual rights, as I sometimes point out, often offer equally promising, if not more promising, ways to resolve these problems. With these qualifications in mind, I try to put each of these rights disputes in the context of a remarkably complex, nuanced, ever-changing constitutional system—that of American federalism—one that ought to make lawyers and litigants pause before reflexively assuming that the U.S. Supreme Court should nationalize answers to vexing constitutional questions. If there is a central conviction of the

book, it's that an underappreciation of state constitutional law has hurt state and federal law and has undermined the appropriate balance between state and federal courts in protecting individual liberty. <>

The Black and the Blue: A Cop Reveals the Crimes, Racism, and Injustice in America's Law Enforcement by Matthew Horace and Ron Harris [Hachette Books, 9780316440080]

CNN contributor offers a searing indictment of America's law enforcement.

"This is a must-read.... Telling this story demonstrates nothing but raw courage for a black police officer who wants the truth to prevail." --John Lewis

"[T]his [is a] hard-hitting, convincing indictment of the biases in today's law enforcement.... A must-read for anyone interested in understanding and solving these problems." --Booklist (starred review)

Matthew Horace was an officer at the federal, state, and local level for 28 years working in every state in the country. Yet it was after seven years of service when Horace found himself face-down on the ground with a gun pointed at his head by a white fellow officer, that he fully understood the racism seething within America's police departments.

Using gut-wrenching reportage, on-the-ground research, and personal accounts garnered by interviews with police and government officials around the country, Horace presents an insider's examination of police tactics, which he concludes is an "archaic system" built on "toxic brotherhood." Horace dissects some of the nation's most highly publicized police shootings and communities highlighted in the Black Lives Matter movement and beyond to explain how these systems and tactics have had detrimental outcomes to the people they serve. Horace provides fresh analysis on communities experiencing the high killing and imprisonment rates due to racist policing such as Ferguson, New Orleans, Baltimore, and Chicago from a law enforcement point of view and uncovers what has sown the seeds of violence.

Timely and provocative, The Black and The Blue sheds light on what truly goes on behind the blue line.

CONTENTS

Excerpt: I am a cop. Make no mistake about it. I've been part of the best and the worst that my noble profession represents. I've worked hard and played hard, true to cop culture. I've been in sports leagues with cops, I have eaten, drunk, and worshiped with cops. I have picnicked, partied, and celebrated with cops. I have cried with cops and when some of us have died, a part of me has died with them. I have pursued bad guys and protected communities in every state in the country, even Guam, and at nearly every level of law enforcement. I've held lots of titles. I was a police officer in Arlington, Virginia, before I joined the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, where I started as a special agent and progressed to become an ATF senior executive. I've headed task forces, conducted trainings, overseen high-risk operations, coordinated multistate investigations, and more.

Still, at my core, I'm just a cop, one of the hundreds of thousands of men and women who have at some point taken an oath to protect and serve the people of this great nation.

I'm the guy who responds to the pleas for help; the guy who breaks up family fights; who pushes through the bolted door, knowing that danger and death may lurk on the other side. The guy who goes on that "routine call," aware that it could be my last; who comforts crime victims; who finds missing children and talks down irate lovers. I'm the officer on that dimly lit road trying to figure out whether the object in a person's hand is a cell phone or a handgun, who in a split second must decide whether a motorist reaching for the glove box is nervously searching for his registration and insurance card or making a dangerous lunge for a weapon.

I am Officers Gabriel Figueroa and Paul Abel in Pittsburgh, who rescued a child from the back seat of an SUV as it teetered precariously on the edge of a steep hillside while the unconscious driver and front-seat passenger sat slumped over, overdosed on heroin.

I am Officer Katrina Culbreath in Dothan, Alabama, who, after listening in on a trial where an 18-year-old mother pleaded guilty to shoplifting in order to feed her 17-month-old daughter, drove the woman to a local grocery store and bought her food.

I am a man who has shed too many tears and stood at attention too many times as the mournful wail of bagpipes, signaling the final goodbye to a fallen comrade, washed over me.

I am Officers Jose Gilbert Vega, 63, a father of eight and two months from retirement, and Lesley Zerebny, 27, a rookie just returning from maternity leave after the birth of her 4-month-old daughter, both gunned down as they responded to a domestic disturbance call in Palm Springs, California.

I am the five Dallas officers killed by an insane gunman as they protected the constitutional rights of Black Lives Matters supporters to march in protest against shootings involving police—Brent Thompson, Patrick Zamarripa, Michael Krol, Lorne Ahrens, and Michael Smith.

I am also a "male black," shorthand for the millions of African-American men who, because of the decades of myths and prejudices, are inherently viewed as suspicious and dangerous. Our presence prompts women to hold their purses just a little tighter, families to click their car doors shut, store clerks to phone in about a "suspicious black man." We are always a threat, always "strapped." The scary weapon we carry is the very skin we're in. We are "armed" with it everywhere we go.

Like other black men, I feel the frustration, the humiliation, the fear, and the rage just knowing I am at risk for doing nothing more than breathing. As a black man, I brace myself through every police encounter, whether I am a corporate executive, cafeteria worker, or computer geek, schoolteacher or United States senator, professional athlete or architect, or cop.

So, even as a cop, I am the black child who was told by loving parents that no matter how absurd the reason for the stop by police, no matter what insults are hurled my way, no matter what degradation I'm subjected to, submit so you can make it home alive.

I am filmmaker and Harvard University professor Henry Louis Gates Jr., arrested at his home in Cambridge, Massachusetts, after someone telephoned to say they thought a suspicious black man had broken into Gates's home.

I am Gregory Gunn, the son of a respected Montgomery, Alabama, police officer, who was walking home after a late night of work and playing cards. Gunn was unarmed when he was stopped by the police, because the officer said Gunn looked "suspicious." The officer shot and killed him.

I am Tamir Rice, a 12-year-old boy playing a decades-old game of imaginary cops and robbers with a toy gun. It was given to him by a relative. The police were called and Rice was shot dead within two seconds of the officers' arrival.

I am DeJuan Guillory, a 27-year-old father of three and the son of a former police officer. He

was riding his ATV four-wheeler with girlfriend when an officer stopped him and asked them for their IDs after just responding to a call about an ATV theft. Guillory's ATV had not been stolen. However, the officer shot and killed him and later charged his girlfriend with attempted first-degree murder of a police officer.

As a career African-American law enforcement officer, I've literally lived on both sides of the barrel, my finger on the trigger, one second away from using deadly force in one case and, in the next, as a black man with a police officer's gun pointed at my face, a blink away from being killed.

In writing The Black and the Blue, I entered this discussion from both sides. Consequently, I found that the crimes and injustices in law enforcement are about race, and are also about more than race.

We cannot pretend that the racism, prejudices, and biases we—black, white, men, women, native born, or immigrant—all carry are not issues within our society and, hence, law enforcement. But the issues go much deeper. Cases of police misconduct, inappropriate police shootings, racial profiling, and police "mistakes" point to much broader, systemic issues, rather than just a few bad apples. Too often, they reflect a culture of disregard among police for the people they are paid to serve, an us-against-them mentality that affects us all. In many cases, unacceptable tactics and procedures are woven into the fabric of local policing by our elected officials, who provide tacit and, in some cases, explicit approval of discriminatory, unconstitutional police conduct. Practices that are ingrained in most of our departments lead to encounters that put the public and police officers at risk.

Too often, police officers aren't adequately trained in the real day-to-day requirements of the job. Additionally, we send officers into the nation's cultural and racial divide without the proper tools. Consequently, they make errors in judgment. They chase a suspect down an alley when they shouldn't, and somebody ends up getting shot. Officers use force that wouldn't have been necessary if they had used their heads. What should have been routine results in tragedy.

We welcome men and women into law enforcement who should never be there. I've worked with men and women we all knew were time bombs waiting to explode. Then there are scores of officers who, despite their track records of misconduct and malfeasance, manage to go from one law enforcement agency to the next.

Too often, misconduct by officers at every level of the police hierarchy is tolerated or condoned by a cop culture that places loyalty between cops ahead of our sworn oath to serve and protect the public. This is often referred to as the "blue line." Officers fear the dangerous consequences of being ostracized by other officers. Most frustrating: When officers' bad acts are revealed, rarely are those officers held accountable. Unfortunately, we are so acculturated by police mythology embedded in movies and television shows (one-quarter of the top 100 television shows are law enforcement dramas) that we rarely find fault in what officers do. Even when police departments want to get rid of bad cops, when they decide an officer should be prosecuted in the death of a civilian, the public rarely places blame on the police, regardless of the brutality, regardless of who gets killed.

When I started writing this book, I told a friend, a former chief of the New York City Police Department, that I didn't want to minimize the risks officers face. While I understand the frustrations of African-Americans and others, I want to make sure they understand how difficult the job can be. My friend turned to me and said, "Black people know how hard the job is. What they don't understand is how it is that we, the police, are never wrong. They don't understand how, in case after case, a person is shot and killed by police, but the police never are at fault. They never do wrong."

The need to address the subject of police and race has been brought into sharper focus recently by the Black Lives Matter movement. Capitalizing on the

lightning speed of social media, Black Lives Matter has shone a beacon on instances of questionable shootings of black men by police. BLM's efforts stirred hundreds of thousands of people across America into action.

Despite claims to the contrary, Black Lives Matter is not anticop, just as the women's movement is not anti-men, and the civil rights movement was not antiwhite. Black Lives Matter generated improvements in a handful of police departments around the country. More police departments are seeking different use-of-force tactics and have adopted body cameras to better monitor their officers' interactions with the public.

Some, like the Cleveland Police Department, have instituted new hiring procedures to better screen out possible problem officers. Some have increased training to focus more on how to handle complex human interactions, such as with the mentally ill and the homeless, two groups who now account for a very large share of police departments' enforcement load.

Fewer have followed the lead of the Seattle Police Department, which is training officers to recognize and handle the biases that we all have. Meanwhile, the New Jersey attorney general has mandated that every police department begin bias and use-of-force training.

Most people know that something is wrong, but we are poles apart on what it is. Study after study shows that white and black Americans see this issue dramatically differently. In Minnesota, the home of two of the most high-profile shootings of black men, more than 90 percent of black Minnesotans hold a favorable opinion of Black Lives Matter, according to a local poll. However, only 6 percent of their white neighbors share that view. Visualize that for a minute. The question is asked and 90 black people out of 100 move to one side of the room and only 6 white people out of 100 join them in agreement. Everybody else is in opposition.

Conversely, virtually all the white respondents to the poll had a positive view of law enforcement while only about 1 in 4 of the black respondents did. Let's try our visualization again, this time with 98 white people on one side of the room and 26 black people joining them in agreement.

That's not a gap. That's a chasm.

***

Sixty miles south of my home is a small municipality in New Jersey called Bordentown Township. The population is 11,367, according to the 2010 US Census. Two very important things happened there in 2016. One alarmed me; the other gave me hope. The first was the arrest of the town's former police chief, Frank Nucera Jr., who had just stepped down after years on the force. Nucera was charged by the FBI with committing a federal hate crime and violating a person's civil rights while he was chief. Nucera, I would learn, is a confirmed racist. Once, when discussing a situation where he believed an African-American had slashed the tires on a patrol cruiser, he told a fellow officer, "I wish that nigger would come back from Trenton and give me a reason to put my hands on him. I'm tired of'em. These niggers are like ISIS. They have no value. They should line them all up and mow 'em down. I'd like to be on the firing squad. I could do it."

According to taped conversations, Nucera routinely made such statements to his officers, referring to African-Americans as "niggers," "nigs," and "moulinyans," an Italian slang for nigger. He liked to intimidate local African-Americans by positioning police dogs at the gymnasium entrance during high school basketball games or by having his officers walk the dogs through predominantly black apartment units. If his officers weren't tough enough, he'd lead by example. When a black 18-year-old and his 16-year-old girlfriend were being arrested for allegedly failing to pay a hotel bill, even as they swam in the hotel's pool, Nucera approached the male teenager from behind, grabbed his head, and slammed it into a metal doorjamb. "I'm fucking tired of them, man," he said after the incident. "I'll tell you what, it's gonna get to the point where I could shoot one of these

motherfuckers. And that nigger bitch lady [the 16-year-old's aunt], she almost got it."

I have known lots of New Jersey police chiefs. I was a member of the New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police. I knew incompetent chiefs, corrupt chiefs in New Jersey and other states, as well. Still, I was stunned that someone as morally and intellectually bankrupt as Nucera could have headed a police department in New Jersey, or any state for that matter, in these times. It would be easy to say Nucera was a bad cop, an aberration that fortunately has been excised from the law enforcement body, but who he is and what he was speaks to the explicit or tacit approval of racism and bias by mayors, city officials, and other police officers who have worked with officers like him. Nucera had been a member of the Bordentown Police Department for years. He was promoted through the ranks to become chief. Consequently, in all those years, his racism was no secret to those who worked with him day to day. In the end, it was even rewarded. His rise to the position of chief is disheartening.

Still, as sickened as I was by Nucera, there was a wrinkle of hope: his arrest. It made me think that maybe, just maybe, we are ready to rid our departments of noxious cops, dangerous police behaviors, and bad police policies that put people in danger and do a disservice to all Americans. Nucera, it turns out, was done in by one of his own men. A white police officer in his department was so offended by his racism that he went to the FBI and agreed to secretly record his conversations. Those recordings led to his arrest.

The courageous officer's actions hint at a relatively small, but significant attitudinal shift among individual officers. That shift communicates a new attitude in law enforcement: that we recognize the role police have historically played as oppressors and occupiers of African-American communities, and we want to change that relationship.

President Barack Obama began the dialogue when he convened law enforcement from across the country to develop a guide for policing in the 21st century. Terrence Cunningham, however, as head of the International Association of Chiefs of Police in 2016, signaled to law enforcement officers everywhere that its leadership has decided it is time for a change.

"There have been times when law enforcement officers, because of the laws enacted by federal, state, and local governments, have been the face of oppression for far too many of our fellow citizens," he told his 16,000 members in San Diego. "The laws adopted by our society have required police officers to perform many unpalatable tasks, such as ensuring legalized discrimination or even denying the basic rights of citizen¬ship to many of our fellow Americans. While this is no longer the case, this dark side of our shared history has created a multigenerational—almost inherited—mistrust between many communities of color and their law enforcement agencies. We must forge a path that allows us to move beyond our history and identify common solutions to better protect our communities. For our part, the first step in this process is for law enforcement and the IACP to acknowledge and apologize for the actions of the past and the role that our profession has played in society's historical mistreatment of communities of color."

Despite Cunningham's statement, cops like Nucera prove, unfortunately, the past is not always past. Nor does his statement soothe the pain of the families of victims of police shooting and abuse such as Walter Scott, Philando Castile, Alton Sterling, Tamir Rice, Laquan McDonald, Eric Garner, Freddie Gray, and Sandra Bland, or of Fred Watson and his children.

Still, it's refreshing to have law enforcement acknowledge past misdeeds regarding African-American and Latino communities and point toward a new direction in police behavior. Additionally, some police departments, in most cases prodded by US Justice Department consent decrees after an individual police officer's action revealed systemic abuse, are moving toward a system of law enforcement, in which police officers are judged by

how many people they positively serve, rather than solely by how many arrests they make and how many summonses they issue.

What departments are discovering is that while, yes, there are bad police officers, the real problem is bad systems—inadequate training, reward, and promotion issues; lack of community engagement; and mis¬matched expectations between what patrol officers see as their jobs and what the communities see as the police officer's responsibility.

Organizations and groups like Black Lives Matter have pushed the conversation forward by focusing all of us on the centuries-old problem of black men and women, girls and boys being routinely disrespected, discounted, harassed, jailed, and shot down indiscriminately by police.

But if black lives matter, all of them must matter, not only the ones whose lives are snuffed out by police. If Michael Brown's life mattered, then so did Richard Jordan III, a 10-year old-who loved to play football and was slain in a drive-by shooting in Memphis, Tennessee, at 4:30 p.m. on November 13, 2017, while in a car with his family, and 1-year-old Robin Keefer, who was fatally shot four days before Richard Jordan, also in Memphis, as she played in her family's apartment, and Robin Keefer's 2-year-old sister, Laylah Washington, shot and killed five months earlier, also in another drive-by.

After years in law enforcement, cops become immune to most things. Still, I always knew that one day there would be something I encoun¬tered that would shake me—some case, some murder, some thing that would burrow into my psyche and stay with me for the rest of my life. That event would be my personal reckoning.

It came on a hot summer evening in 2006, not long before I moved to Newark. Four friends Terrance Aeriel, 18; Natasha Aeriel, his 19-year-old sister; Dashon Harvey, 20; and Iofemi Hightower, 20—had gathered on Saturday, August 5, in the playground of Mount Vernon High School, located in a middle-class Newark suburb. At around 11:30 p.m., a group of men approached them as they played music. And then the horror began. Natasha Aeriel was shot first, collapsing from a bullet to the face near a set of bleachers. The other three were then marched behind a low wall for what would be the last seconds of lives that had hardly begun. They were forced to kneel and then shot one by one, execution-style. Natasha survived.

The incident made national news. The suspects were ultimately caught. I was in charge of the ATF's Denver Division when it happened. The news hit me harder than some, because the murders struck close to home. Three of the victims were students at Delaware State University, my alma mater, and the other one had applied to go there. Three of them were in the university's marching band, the DSU Approaching Storm, the same school band that played during halftime at my football games while the other players and I were in the locker room preparing for the second half. One of them guided prospective students around Delaware State as an ambassador for the university. They were good kids; kids with hope and purpose. It was so senseless. A gang initiation.

Shortly after I arrived in my new post in New Jersey, I was conduct¬ing a special briefing for some of my supervisors just a year after the murders. As part of the briefing, we were shown the crime scene photos. Their dead faces peered back at me from the photographs flashed across the screen, and my heart broke.

Those black lives mattered, too. They mattered to me and their fam¬ilies and their friends and the teachers and advisers at their schools and their next-door neighbors. I couldn't get those faces out of my head. They haunted me. In response, I set up the Horace Foundation Endowment for Criminal Justice Studies at Delaware State University, which gives scholarships to students from northern New Jersey to study criminal justice. I'm not rich, so people sometimes ask me why I started a scholar¬ship fund. In response, I quote a song by one of my favorite artists:

Nobody can do everything, but everybody can do something.
Nobody can do everything, but everybody can do something.
Nobody can do everything, but everybody can do something.
Everybody can do something.
Everybody can do something.
Everybody can do something. <>

Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World by Adam Tooze [Viking, 978-0670024933]

"An intelligent explanation of the mechanisms that produced the crisis and the response to it...One of the great strengths of Tooze's book is to demonstrate the deeply intertwined nature of the European and American financial systems."--The New York Times Book Review

From a prizewinning economic historian, an eye-opening reinterpretation of the 2008 economic crisis (and its ten-year aftermath) as a global event that directly led to the shockwaves being felt around the world today

In September 2008 President George Bush could still describe the financial crisis as an incident local to Wall Street. In fact it was a dramatic caesura of global significance that spiraled around the world, from the financial markets of the UK and Europe to the factories and dockyards of Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, forcing a rearrangement of global governance. In the United States and Europe, it caused a fundamental reconsideration of capitalist democracy, eventually leading to the war in the Ukraine, the chaos of Greece, Brexit, and Trump.

It was the greatest crisis to have struck Western societies since the end of the Cold War, but was it inevitable? And is it over? Crashed is a dramatic new narrative resting on original themes: the haphazard nature of economic development and the erratic path of debt around the world; the unseen way individual countries and regions are linked together in deeply unequal relationships through financial interdependence, investment, politics, and force; the ways the financial crisis interacted with the spectacular rise of social media, the crisis of middle-class America, the rise of China, and global struggles over fossil fuels.

Finally, Tooze asks, given this history, what now are the prospects for a liberal, stable, and coherent world order?

The First Crisis of a Global Age

Tuesday, September 16, 2008, was the "day after Lehman." It was the day global money markets seized up. At the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, DC, September 16 began with urgent plans to sluice hundreds of billions of dollars into the world's central banks. On Wall Street all eyes were on AIG. Would the global insurance giant make it through the day, or would it follow the investment bank Lehman into oblivion? A shock wave was rippling outward. Within weeks its impact would be felt on factory floors and in dockyards, financial markets and commodity exchanges around the world. Meanwhile, in Midtown Manhattan, September 16, 2008, was the opening day of the sixty-third meeting of the UN General Assembly.

The UN building, on East Forty-second Street, is not where financial power is located in New York. Nor did the speakers at the plenary session that began on the morning of September 23 dwell on the technicalities of the banking crisis. But what they did insist on talking about was its wider meaning. The first head of government to speak was President Lula of Brazil, who energetically denounced the selfishness and speculative chaos that had triggered the crisis.' The contrast with President George W. Bush, who followed him to the rostrum, was alarming. Bush seemed not so much a lame duck as a man out of touch with reality, haunted by the failed agenda of his eight-year presidency.' The first half of his address spiraled obsessively around the specter of global terrorism. He then took solace in the favorite neoconservative theme of the advance of democracy, which he saw culminating in the "color revolutions" of Ukraine and Georgia. But that was back in 2003/2004. The devastating financial crisis raging just a short walk away on Wall Street merited only two brief paragraphs at the end of the president's speech. The "turbulence" was, as far as Bush was concerned, an American challenge to be handled by the American government, not a matter for multilateral action.

Others disagreed. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, president of the Philippines, spoke of America's financial crisis as having unleashed a "terrible tsunami" of uncertainty. It was spreading around the globe, "not just here in Manhattan Island." Since the first tremors had shaken the financial markets in 2007, the world had repeatedly reassured itself that the "worst had passed." But, again and again, "the light at the end of the tunnel" had revealed itself as "an oncoming train hurtling forward with new shocks to the global financial system."' Whatever America's efforts at stabilization were, they were not working.

One after another, the speakers at the UN connected the crisis to the question of global governance and ultimately to America's position as the dominant world power. Speaking on behalf of a country that had recently lived through its own devastating financial crisis, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina was not one to hide her Schadenfreude. For once, this was a crisis that could not be blamed on the periphery. This was a crisis that "emanated from the first economy of the world." For decades, Latin America had been lectured that "the market would solve everything." Now Wall Street was failing and President Bush was promising that the US Treasury would come to the rescue. But was the United States in a fit state to respond? "[T]he present intervention," Fernández pointed out, was not just "the largest in memory," it was being "made by a State with an incredible trade and fiscal deficit." If this was to stand, then the "Washington Consensus" of fiscal and monetary discipline to which so much of the emerging world had been subjected was clearly dead. "It was a historic opportunity to review behaviour and policies." Nor was it just Latin American resentment on display. The Europeans joined the chorus. "The world is no longer a unipolar world with one super-Power, nor is it a bipolar world with the East and the West. It's a multipolar world now," intoned Nicolas Sarkozy, speaking as both president of

France and president of the European Council. "The 21st century world" could not be "governed with the institutions of the 20th century." The Security Council and the G8 would need to be expanded. The world needed a new structure, a G13 or G14.

It was not the first time that the question of global governance and America's role in it had been posed at the United Nations in the new millennium. When the French president spoke at the UN against American unilateralism, no one could ignore the echoes of 2003, Iraq and the struggles over that disastrous war. It was a moment that had bitterly divided Europe and America, governments and citizens. It had revealed an alarming gulf in political culture between the two continents. Bush and his cohorts on the right wing of the Republican Party were not easy for bien-pensant, twenty-first-century citizens of the world to assimilate. For all their talk of the onward march of democracy, it wasn't even clear that they had won the election that first gave them power in 2000. In cahoots with Tony Blair, they had misled the world over WMD. With their unabashed appeals to divine inspiration and their crusading zeal they flaunted their disregard for the conception of modernity in which both the EU and the UN liked to dress themselves—enlightened, transparent, liberal, cosmopolitan. That was, of course, its own kind of window dressing, its own kind of symbolic politics. But symbols matter. They are essential ingredients in the construction of both meaning and hegemony.

By 2008 the Bush administration had lost that battle. And the financial crisis clinched the impression of disaster. It was a stark historical denouement. In the space of only five years, both the foreign policy and the economic policy elite of the United States, the most powerful state on earth, had suffered humiliating failure. And, as if to compound the process of delegitimatization, in August 2008 American democracy made a mockery of itself too. As the world faced a financial crisis of global proportions, the Republicans chose as John McCain's vice presidential running mate the patently unqualified governor of Alaska, Sarah Palin, whose childlike perception of international affairs made her the laughingstock of the world. And the worst of it was that a large part of the American electorate didn't get the joke. They loved Palin. After year's of talk about overthrowing Arab dictators, global opinion was beginning to wonder whose regime it was that was changing. As Bush the younger left the stage, the post—cold war order that his father had crafted was crumbling all around him.

Only weeks before the General Assembly opened in New York, the world had been given two demonstrations of the reality of multipolarity. On the one hand, China's staggering Olympic display put to shame anything ever seen in the West, notably the dismal Atlanta games of 1996, which had been interrupted, it is worth recalling, by a pipe bombing perpetrated by an alt-right fanatic. If bread and circuses are the foundation of popular legitimacy, the Chinese regime, bolstered by its booming economy, was putting on quite the show. Meanwhile, as the fireworks flared in Beijing, the Russia military had meted out to Georgia, a tiny aspirant to NATO membership, a severe punishment beating. Sarkozy came to New York fresh from cease-fire talks on Europe's eastern border. It was to be the first of a series of more or less open clashes between Russia and the West that would culminate in the violent dismemberment of Ukraine, another aspiring NATO member, and feverish speculation about Russia's subversion of America's 2016 presidential election.

The financial crisis of 2008 appeared as one more sign of America's fading dominance. And that perspective is all too easily confirmed, when we return to the crisis from the distance of a decade, in the wake of the election of Donald Trump, the heir to Palin, as president. It is hard now to read the UN speeches in 2008 and their critique of American unilateralism without Trump's truculent inaugural of January 20, 2017, ringing in one's ears. On that overcast Friday, from the steps of the Capitol, the forty-fifth president summoned the image of America in crisis, its cities in disorder, its international standing in decline. This "carnage," he declared, must end. How? Trump's answer boomed

out: He and his followers, that day, were issuing a "decree, to be heard in every city, in every foreign capital, and in every hall of power. From this day forward, a new vision will govern our land. From this day forward, it's going to be only America first, America first . . ." If America was indeed suffering a profound crisis, if it was no longer supreme, if it needed to be made "great again," truths that for Trump were self-evident, then it would at least "decree" its own terms of engagement. This was the answer that the right wing in American politics would give to the challenges of the twenty-first century.

The events of 2003, 2008 and 2017 are all no doubt defining moments of recent international history. But what is the relationship among them? What is the relationship of the economic crisis of 2008 to the geopolitical disaster of 2003 and to America's political crisis following the election of November 2016? What arc of historical transition do those three points stake out? What does that arc mean for Europe, for Asia? How does it relate to the minor but no less shattering trajectory traced by the United Kingdom from Iraq to the crisis of the City of London in 2008 and Brexit in 2016?

The contention of this book is that the speakers at the UN in September 2008 were right. The financial crisis and the economic, political and geopolitical responses to that crisis are essential to understanding the changing face of the world today. But to understand their significance we have to do two things. We have to place the banking crisis in its wider political and geopolitical context. And, at the same time, we have to get inside its inner workings. We have to do what the UN General Assembly in September 2008 could not do. We have to grapple with the economics of the financial system. This is a necessarily technical and at times perhaps somewhat cold-hearted business. There is a chilly remoteness to much of the material that this book will be dealing with. This is a choice. Tracing the inner workings of the Davos mind-set is not the only way to understand how power and money operated in the course of the crisis. One can try to reconstruct their logic from the boot prints they left on those they impacted or through the conformist and contradictory market-oriented culture that they molded. But the necessary complement to those more tactile renderings is the kind of account offered here, which attempts to show how the circulation of power and money was understood to function—and not to function—from within. And this particular black box is worth prizing open, because, as this book will show, the simple idea, the idea that was so prevalent in 2008, the idea that this was basically an American crisis, or even an Anglo-Saxon crisis, and as such a key moment in the demise of American unipolar power, is in fact deeply misleading.

Eagerly taken up by all sides—by Americans as well as commentators around the world—the idea of an "all-American crisis" obscures the reality of profound interconnection. In so doing, it also misdirects criticism and righteous anger. In fact, the crisis was not merely American but global and, above all, North Atlantic in its genesis. And in a contentious and problematic way it had the effect of recentering the world financial economy on the United States as the only state capable of meeting the challenge it posed." That capacity is an effect of structure—the United States is the only state that can generate dollars. But it is also a matter of action, of policy choices—positive in the American case, disastrously negative in the case of Europe. Clarifying the scale of this interdependence and the ultimate dependence of the global financial system on the dollar is important not just for the sake of getting the history right. It matters also because it throws new light on the perilous situation created by the Trump administration's declaration of independence from an interconnected and multipolar world.

***

To view the crisis of 2008 as basically an American event was tempting because that is where it had begun. It also pleased people around the world to imagine that the hyperpower was getting its comeuppance. The fact that the City of London was imploding too added to the deliciousness of the

moment. It was convenient for the Europeans to shift responsibility across the channel and then across the Atlantic. In fact, it was a script prepared ahead of time. As we will see in the first section of this book, economists inside and outside America critical of the Bush presidency, including many of the leading macroeconomists of our time, had prepared a disaster script. It revolved around America's twin deficits—its budget deficit and its trade deficit—and their implications for America's dependence on foreign borrowing. The debts run up by the Bush administration were the bomb that was expected to go off. And the idea of 2008 as a distinctively Anglo-American crisis received a backhanded confirmation eighteen months later when Europe experienced its own crisis, which appeared to follow a rather different script, centered on the politics and the constitution of the eurozone. Thus the historical narrative seemed to neatly arrange itself with a European crisis following an American crisis, each with its own distinct economic and political logic.

The contention of Crashed is that to view the 2008 crisis and its aftermath chiefly through its impact on America is to fundamentally misunderstand and underestimate its economic and historical significance. Ground zero was America's housing market, for sure. Millions of American households were among those hit earliest and hardest. But that disaster was not the crisis that had been widely anticipated before 2008, namely, a crisis of the American state and its public finances. The risk of the Chinese-American meltdown, which so many feared, was contained. Instead, it was a financial crisis triggered by the humdrum market for American real estate that threatened the world economy. The crisis spilled far beyond America. It shook the financial systems of some of the most advanced economies in the world—the City of London, East Asia, Eastern Europe and Russia. And it went on doing so. Contrary to the narrative popular on both sides of the Atlantic, the eurozone crisis is not a separate and distinct event, but follows directly from the shock of 2008. The redescription of the crisis as one internal to the eurozone and centered on the politics of public debt was itself an act of politics. In the years after 2010, it would become the object of something akin to a transatlantic culture war in economic policy, a minefield that any history of the epoch must carefully navigate.

If mapping this misunderstanding, charting the global financial crisis outward from its hub in the North Atlantic and presenting the continuity between 2008 and 2012, is the first challenge of this book, the second is to account for the way in which states did and did not react to the turmoil. The impact of the crisis was uneven but global in its reach, and by the vigor of their reactions, emerging market governments spectacularly confirmed the reality of multipolarity. The emerging market crises of the 1990s—Mexico (1995); Korea, Thailand, Indonesia (1997); Russia (1998); and Argentina (2001)—had taught how easily state sovereignty could be lost. That lesson had been learned. After a decade of determined "self-strengthening" in 2008, none of the victims of the 1990s were forced to resort to the International Monetary Fund. China's response to the financial crisis it imported from the West was of world historic proportions, dramatically accelerating the shift in the global balance of economic activity toward East Asia.

One might be tempted to conclude that the crisis of globalization had brought a reaffirmation of the essential role of the nation-state and the emergence of a new kind of state capitalism. And that is an argument that would gain ever greater force in the years that followed, as the political backlash set in." But if we look closely not at the periphery but at the core of the 2008 crisis, it is clear that this diagnosis is partial at best. Among the emerging markets, the two that struggled most with the crisis of 2008 were Russia and South Korea. What they had in common apart from booming exports was deep financial integration with Europe and the United States. That would prove to be the key. What they experienced was not just a collapse in exports but a "sudden stop" in the funding of their banking sectors." As a result,

countries with trade surpluses and huge currency reserves—supposedly the essentials of national economic self-reliance—suffered acute currency crises. Writ spectacularly larger, this was also the story in the North Atlantic between Europe and the United States. Hidden below the radar and barely discussed in public, what threatened the stability of the North Atlantic economy in the fall of 2008 was a huge shortfall in dollar funding for Europe's oversized banks. And a shortfall in their case meant not tens of billions, or even hundreds of billions, but trillions of dollars. It was the opposite of the crisis that had been forecast. Not a dollar glut but an acute dollar-funding shortage. The dollar did not plunge, it rose.

If we are to grasp the dynamics of this unforecasted storm, we have to move beyond the familiar cognitive frame of macroeconomics that we inherited from the early twentieth century. Forged in the wake of World War I and World War II, the macroeconomic perspective on international economics is organized around nation-states, national productive systems and the trade imbalances they generate. It is a view of the economy that will forever be identified with John Maynard Keynes. Predictably, the onset of the crisis in 2008 evoked memories of the 1930s and triggered calls for a return to "the master.'" And Keynesian economics is, indeed, indispensable for grasping the dynamics of collapsing consumption and investment, the surge in unemployment and the options for monetary and fiscal policy after 2009.20 But when it comes to analyzing the onset of financial crises in an age of deep globalization, the standard macroeconomic approach has its limits. In discussions of international trade it is now commonly accepted that it is no longer national economies that matter. What drives global trade are not the relationships between national economies but multinational corporations coordinating far-flung "value chains." The same is true for the global business of money. To understand the tensions within the global financial system that exploded in 2008 we have to move beyond Keynesian macroeconomics and its familiar apparatus of national economic statistics. As Hyun Song Shin, chief economist at the Bank for International Settlements and one of the foremost thinkers of the new breed of "macrofinance," has put it, we need to analyze the global economy not in terms of an "island model" of international economic interaction—national economy to national economy—but through the "interlocking matrix" of corporate balance sheets—bank to bank. As both the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the crisis in the eurozone after 2010 would demonstrate, government deficits and current account imbalances are poor predictors of the force and speed with which modern financial crises can strike. This can be grasped only if we focus on the shocking adjustments that can take place within this interlocking matrix of financial accounts. For all the pressure that classic "macroeconomic imbalances"—in budgets and trade—can exert, a modern global bank run moves far more money far more abruptly.

What the Europeans, the Americans, the Russians and the South Koreans were experiencing in 2008 and the Europeans would experience again after 2010 was an implosion in interbank credit. As long as your financial sector was modestly proportioned, big national currency reserves could see you through. That is what saved Russia. But South Korea struggled, and in Europe, not only were there no reserves but the scale of the banks and their dollar-denominated business made any attempt at autarkic self-stabilization unthinkable. None of the leading central banks had gauged the risk ahead of time. They did not foresee how globalized finance might be interconnected with the American mortgage boom. The Fed and the Treasury misjudged the scale of the fallout from the bankruptcy of Lehman on September 15. Never before, not even in the 1930s, had such a large and interconnected system come so close to total implosion. But once the scale of the risk became evident, the US authorities scrambled. As we shall see in Part II, not only did the Europeans and Americans bail out their ailing banks at a national level. The US Federal Reserve engaged in a truly

spectacular innovation. It established itself as liquidity provider of last resort to the global banking system. It provided dollars to all corners in New York, whether banks were American or not. Through so-called liquidity swap lines, the Fed licensed a hand-picked group of core central banks to issue dollar credits on demand. In a huge burst of transatlantic activity, with the European Central Bank (ECB) in the lead, they pumped trillions of dollars into the European banking system.

This response was surprising not only because of its scale but also because it contradicted the conventional narrative of economic history since the 1970s. The decades prior to the crisis had been dominated by the idea of a "market revolution" and the rollback of state interventionism. Government and regulation continued, of course, but they were delegated to "independent" agencies, emblematically the "independent central banks," whose job was to ensure discipline, regularity and predictability. Politics and discretionary action were the enemies of good governance. The balance of power was hardwired into the normality of the new regime of deflationary globalization, what Ben Bernanke euphemistically referred to as the "great moderation." The question that hung over the dispensation of "neoliberalism" was whether the same rules applied to everyone or whether the truth was that there were rules for some and discretion for others. The events of 2008 massively confirmed the suspicion raised by America's selective interventions in the emerging market crises of the 1990s and following the dot-com crisis of the early 2000s. In fact, neoliberalism's regime of restraint and discipline operated under a proviso. In the event of a major financial crisis that threatened "systemic" interests, it turned out that we lived in an age not of limited but of big government, of massive executive action, of interventionism that had more in common with military operations or emergency medicine than with law-bound governance. And this revealed an essential but disconcerting truth, the repression of which had shaped the entire development of economic policy since the 1970s. The foundations of the modern monetary system are irreducibly political.

No doubt all commodities have politics. But money and credit and the structure of finance piled on them are constituted by political power, social convention and law in a way that sneakers, smartphones and barrels of oil are not. At the apex of the modern monetary pyramid is fiat money. Called into existence and sanctioned by states, it has no "backing" other than its status as legal tender. That uncanny fact became literally true for the first time in 1971-1973 with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system.

Under the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944, the dollar, as the anchor of the global monetary system, was tied to gold. This was itself, of course, no more than a convention. When it became too hard for the United States to live with—upholding it would have required deflation—on August 15, 1971, President Nixon abandoned it. This was a historic caesura. For the first time since the advent of money, no currency in the world any longer operated on a metallic standard. Potentially, this freed monetary policy, regulating the creation of money and credit as never before. But how much freedom would policy makers actually have after throwing off the "golden fetters"? The social and economic forces that had made the gold peg unsustainable even for the United States were powerful—at home the struggle for income shares in an increasingly affluent society, abroad the liberalization of offshore dollar trading in London in the 1960s. When those forces were unleashed in the 1970s without a monetary anchor, the result was to send inflation soaring toward 20 percent in the advanced economies, something unprecedented in peacetime. But rather than retreating from liberalization, by the early 1980s any restriction on global capital flows was lifted. It was precisely to tame the forces of indiscipline unleashed by the end of metallic money that the market revolution and the new neoliberal "logic of discipline" were inaugurated. By the mid-1980s Fed chair Paul Volcker's dramatic campaign to raise interest rates

had curbed inflation. The only prices going up in the age of the great moderation were those for shares and real estate. When that bubble burst in 2008, when the world faced not inflation but deflation, the key central banks threw off their self-imposed shackles. They would do whatever it took to prevent a collapse of credit. They would do whatever it took to keep the financial system afloat. And because the modern banking system is both global and based on dollars, that meant unprecedented transnational action by the American state.

The Fed's liquidity provision was spectacular. It was of historic and lasting significance. Among technical experts it is commonly agreed that the swap lines with which the Fed pumped dollars into the world economy were perhaps the decisive innovation of the crisis. But in public discourse these actions have remained far below the radar. They have been displaced from discussion by controversies surrounding the bailouts of individual banks and subsequent waves of central bank intervention that went by the name of quantitative easing. Even in the memoirs of Ben Bernanke, for instance, the transatlantic liquidity measures of 2008 receive little more than a passing mention by comparison with the fraught politics of the AIG takeover or mortgage credit relief.

The technical and administrative complexities of the Fed's actions no doubt contribute to their obscurity. But the politics go beyond that. The bank bailouts of 2008 provoked long-running and bitter recrimination and for good reason. Hundreds of billions of taxpayer funds were put in play to rescue greedy banks. Some interventions yielded a return. Others did not. Many of the choices made in the course of the bailouts were highly contentious. In the United States they would exacerbate deep rifts within the Republican Party, with dramatic consequences eight years later. But the problem goes beyond individual decisions and party political programs to the way in which we think and talk about the structure of the modern economy. Indeed, it goes directly back to the analytical agenda of reimagining international economics, forced on us by the crisis and articulated by the proponents of the macrofinancial approach. In the familiar twentieth-century island model of international economic interaction, the basic units were national economies that traded with one another, ran trade surpluses and deficits and accumulated national claims and liabilities. Those entities were made familiar by economists, who gave them an empirical, everyday reality in statistics for unemployment, inflation and GDP. And around them an entire conception of national politics developed. Good economic policy was what was good for GDP growth. Questions of distribution—the politics of "who whom?"—could be weighed up against the general interest in "growing the size of the cake." By contrast, the new macrofinancial economics, with its relentless focus on the "interlocking matrix" of corporate balance sheets, strips away all the comforting euphemisms. National economic aggregates are replaced by a focus on corporate balance sheets, where the real action in the financial system is. This is hugely illuminating. It gives economic policy a far greater grip. But it exposes something that is deeply indigestible in political terms. The financial system does not, in fact, consist of "national monetary flows." Nor is it made up of a mass of tiny, anonymous, microscopic firms—the ideal of "perfect competition" and the economic analogue to the individual citizen. The overwhelming majority of private credit creation is done by a tight-knit corporate oligarchy—the key cells in Shin's interlocking matrix. At a global level twenty to thirty banks matter. Allowing for nationally significant banks, the number worldwide is perhaps a hundred big financial firms. Techniques for identifying and monitoring the so-called systemically important financial institutions (SIFI)—known as macroprudential supervision—are among the major governmental innovations of the crisis and its aftermath. Those banks and the people who run them are also among the key actors in the drama of this book.

The stark truth about Ben Bernanke's "historic" policy of global liquidity support was that it

involved handing trillions of dollars in loans to that coterie of banks, their shareholders and their outrageously remunerated senior staff. Indeed, as we shall see, we can itemize precisely who got what. To compound the embarrassment, though the Fed is a national central bank, at least half the liquidity support it provided went to banks not headquartered in the United States, but located overwhelmingly in Europe. If in intellectual terms the crisis was a crisis of macroeconomics, if in practical terms it was a crisis of the conventional tools of monetary policy, it was by the same token a deep crisis of modern politics. However unprecedented and effective the Fed's actions might have been, even for those politicians whose support for globalization was unfailing, its practical implications were barely speakable. Though it is hardly a secret that we inhabit a world dominated by business oligopolies, during the crisis and its aftermath this reality and its implications for the priorities of government stood nakedly exposed. It is an unpalatable and explosive truth that democratic politics on both sides of the Atlantic has choked on.

***

It should not be surprising, given what has been said, that the Europeans were only too happy to forget the entanglement of their global banks in the transatlantic crisis. In 2008 the British had their own national catastrophe to digest. In the eurozone, led by France and Germany, the 2008 financial crisis has vanished down a memory hole, closed over by the "sovereign debt crisis" of 2010 and after. There is no appetite for acknowledging the dependence on the US Federal Reserve and little sense of obligation or deference either. In this respect too the Americans have lost their authority. The Europeans all too easily dismissed the American crisis fighting of 2008-2009 as yet another instance of the kind of improvisation and indiscipline that had got the world into trouble in the first place. It became the first stage in a transatlantic culture war over economic policy that culminated in the acrimonious debate about the crisis of the eurozone, which takes center stage in Part III of this book.

Given that they were essentially interrelated crises and that the first was much larger in scale and dramatic in speed, the contrast between the relatively effective containment of the global meltdown in 2008, described in Part II, and the spiraling disaster of the eurozone, narrated in Part III, is painful. Around Greek debt the Europeans constructed their own crisis with its own narrative. It had the politics of sovereign debt at its heart. But, as senior economic officials of the EU will now publicly admit, this had no basis in economics. The sustainability of public debts may be a problem in the long term. Greece was insolvent. But excessive public debt was not the common denominator of the wider eurozone crisis. The common denominator was the dangerous fragility of an overleveraged financial system, excessively reliant on short-term market-based funding. The eurozone crisis was a massive aftershock of the earthquake in the North Atlantic financial system of 2008, working its way out with a time lag through the labyrinthine political framework of the EU. As one leading EU expert closely associated with the EU's bailout programs has put it: "If we had taken the banks under central supervision then already [in 2008], we would have solved the problem at a stroke." Instead the eurozone crisis expanded into a doom loop of private and public credit and a crisis of the European project as such.

How do we account for the strange morphing of a crisis of lenders in 2008 into a crisis of borrowers after 2010? It is hard not to suspect sleight of hand. While Europe's taxpayers were put through the mill, the banks and other lenders got paid out of money pumped into the bailout countries. It is a short step from there to concluding that the hidden logic of the eurozone crisis after 2010 was a repetition of the 2008 bank bailouts, but this time in disguise. For one sharp-tongued critic it was the greatest "bait and switch" in history. But the puzzle is that if this were so, if what was happening in the eurozone was a veiled rerun of 2008, then at least one might have expected to have seen American-

style outcomes. As its protagonists were well aware, America's crisis fighting exhibited massive inequity. People on welfare scraped by while bankers carried on their well-upholstered lives. But though the distribution of costs and benefits was outrageous, at least America's crisis management worked. Since 2009 the US economy has grown continuously and, at least by the standards set by official statistics, it is now approaching full employment. By contrast, the eurozone, through willful policy choices, drove tens of millions of its citizens into the depths of a 1930s-style depression. It was one of the worst self-inflicted economic disasters on record. That tiny Greece, with an economy that amounts to 1-1.5 percent of EU GDP, should have been made the pivot for this disaster twists European history into the image of bitter caricature.

It is a spectacle that ought to inspire outrage. Millions have suffered for no good reason. But for all our indignation we should give that point its full weight. The crucial words are "for no good reason." In the response to the financial crisis of 2008-2009 there was a clear logic operating. It was a class logic, admittedly—"Protect Wall Street first, worry about Main Street later"—but at least it had a rationale and one operating on a grand scale. To impute that same logic to the management of the eurozone is to give Europe's leaders too much credit. The story told here is not that of a successful political conjuring trick, in which EU elites neatly veiled their efforts to protect the interests of European big business. The story told here is of a train wreck, a shambles of conflicting visions, a dispiriting drama of missed opportunities, of failures of leadership and failures of collective action. If there are groups that benefited—a few bondholders who got paid, a bank that escaped painful restructuring—it was on a small scale, totally out of proportion to the enormous costs inflicted. This is not to say that the individual actors in the drama—Germany, France, the IMF—lacked logic. But they had to act together and the collective result was a disaster. They inflicted social and political harm from which the project of the EU may never recover. But amid the outrage this shambles should inspire, we are apt to forget another of its long-term consequences. The botched management of the eurozone crisis coming on the heels of the transatlantic financial crisis of 2008-2009 was damaging not only for millions of Europe's citizens. It had dramatic consequences for European business too, on whom willy-nilly those same people rely for jobs and wages.

Far from being beneficiaries of EU crisis management, business was one of its casualties, and the European banks above all. Since 2008, it is not just the rise of Asia that is shifting the global corporate hierarchy. It is the decline of Europe. This might ring oddly to Europeans used to hearing boasts of Germany's trade surplus. But as Germany's own most perceptive economists point out, those surpluses are as much the result of repressed imports as of roaring export success. The inexorable slide of corporate Europe down the global rankings is clear for all to see. Though we might wish otherwise, the world economy is not run by medium-sized "Mittelstand" entrepreneurs but by a few thousand massive corporations, with interlocking shareholdings controlled by a tiny group of asset managers. In that battlefield of corporate competition, the crises of 2008-2013 brought European capital a historic defeat. No doubt there are many factors contributing to this, but a crucial one is the condition of Europe's own economy. Exports matter, but, as both China and the United States demonstrate, there is no substitute for a profitable home market. If we take the cynical view that the basic mission of the eurozone was not to serve its citizens but to provide European capital with a field for profitable domestic accumulation, then the conclusion is inescapable: Between 2010 and 2013 it failed spectacularly. And not first and foremost as a result of missing eurozone institutions, but as a result of choices made by business leaders, dogmatic central bankers and conservatively minded politicians.

Of course, we may not welcome a world organized this way. Europeans may warm to the spectacle of the European Commission as a consumer champion

taking on global monopolists like Google and challenging Apple's tax evasion. But the fines levied on Silicon Valley are a tiny portion of those firms' cash hoards. A rather different vision of the balance of power is suggested by those moments in 2016 when the financial world waited with bated breath to learn the size of the settlement that the US Department of Justice was going to impose on Deutsche Bank for mortgage fraud. Deutsche's financial condition was understood to be so fragile that the US authorities held its fate in their hands. A bank that for more than a century had been a powerhouse of Germany Inc. was at the mercy of the United States. In the wake of the crisis it was the last European investment bank with any global standing.

Europeans may wish to opt out of the global battle for corporate domination. They may even hope that they may thus achieve a greater degree of freedom for democratic politics. But the risk is that their growing reliance on other people's technology, the relative stagnation of the eurozone and the consequent dependence of Europe's growth model on exports to other people's markets will render those pretensions to autonomy quite empty. Rather than an autonomous actor, Europe risks becoming the object of other people's capitalist corporatism. Indeed, as far as international finance is concerned, the die has already been cast. In the wake of the double crisis, Europe is out of the race. The future will be decided between the survivors of the crisis in the United States and the newcomers of Asia. They may choose to locate in the City of London, but after Brexit even that cannot be taken for granted. Wall Street, Hong Kong and Shanghai may simply bypass Europe.

If this were simply a drama of Europe's self-inflicted wounds, it would be bad enough. But to write the history of the eurozone crisis as simply European would be barely less misleading than writing the history of 2008 as all-American. In fact, the eurozone crisis spilled over, repeatedly. At least three times—in the spring of 2010, in the fall of 2011 and then again in the summer of 2012—the eurozone was on the brink of a disorderly breakup with the distinct possibility of the sovereign debt crisis sucking in trillions of dollars of public debt. The idea that Germany or any other country would have been immune was fatuous. The resulting inversion of the fronts was spectacular. In 2008 it had been the worldly Europeans calling on the out-of-touch Bush administration to recognize the reality of globalism. Eigh¬teen months later it was the centrist liberals of the Obama administration pleading for the eurozone to stabilize its financial system in the face of dogged and unheeding resistance from conservatives in Berlin and Frankfurt. Already in April 2010, in the judgment of the rest of the G20 and far beyond, the eurozone crisis was too dangerous and the Europeans too incompetent for them to be left to sort out their own affairs. To prevent Greece from becoming "another Lehman," the Americans mobilized the IMF, that quintessential creation of mid-twentieth-century globalism, to rescue twenty-first-century Europe. That rescue in May 2010 stopped a further escalation, but it locked Europe, the IMF and the United States as an accessory into a nightmarish entanglement from which they still had not extricated themselves seven years later. Nor did it staunch the panic in bond markets. As late as the summer of 2012 the prospect of a major European sovereign debt crisis threatened the United States and the rest of the world economy. It was not until July 2012, with insistent urging from Washington and the rest of G20, that Europe stabilized, and it did so by means of what was generally taken to be the belated "Americanization" of the ECB 45

***

If one stopped the clock in the fall of 2012, the difference to the scene four years earlier in New York would have been remarkable. Despite the unpromising start, it would have been churlish to deny that American corporate liberalism, as embodied by the Obama administration, had prevailed once again. Indeed, even today, our sense that the financial crisis had an ending, that at some point in the not too distant past something like normality was restored, depends on looking back

to the fall of 2012. At that point the acute threat of a comprehensive crisis was ended. And a sign of that restored normality was the fact that America had not been dethroned. Obama's reelection in November 2012 clinched it. The Palin tendency had been stopped in its tracks. Internationally, the emerging markets were booming, helped along by the Fed's generous supply of dollars. The EU was playing catch-up. Whereas in 2008 Obama had put distance between himself and the Bush-Cheney years by adopting a tone of modesty and caution, in 2012 he resumed a classic exceptionalist narrative. America was "indispensable." The phrase coined in the Clinton era had a new lease on life. There was a revival in big-picture foreign policy thinking. The new frontier was the "trade" treaties of TTIP and TPP, in reality gigantic projects of commercial, financial, technical and legal integration with geopolitical intent. Insofar as the first Obama term had been disappointing, this could be laid at the door of conservative opposition. That was depressing but predictable. Modernity and the global capitalism that gave it so much of its dynamic are demanding pacesetters; foot-dragging from conservatives is only to be expected. But in the end history moves on. Even in Europe, pragmatic managerialism in the end prevailed over conservative dogma.

If we are to understand the last ten years historically, we have to take this moment of renewed complacency seriously. Given subsequent events, our retrospective view is easily clouded by a combination of rage, indignation and fear. But at the time the sense of self-confidence restored was real enough and it left an intellectual legacy. It was the moment when the first surveys of the crisis began to be written. The most optimistic insisted that The System Worked. Another declared that 2008 had turned out to be The Status Quo Crisis 48 The more pessimistic version argued that we lived in a Hall of Mirrors Precisely because the crisis had been contained so early and effectively, it had produced a false sense of stability. That in turn had sapped the energy necessary for fundamental reform. And this meant that there was an acute risk of repetition. But repetition is not the same as continuation or extension. What all of these narratives took for granted—both the more and the less pessimistic versions—was the fact that the 2008¬2012 crisis was over. That was also the basis on which this book was begun. It was intended to be an anniversary retrospect on a crisis that had reached closure. The tasks that seemed urgent in 2013 were to explain the interconnected history of Wall Street and the eurozone crisis, to do justice to the transnational quality of the crisis—its effects across Eastern and Western Europe and Asia—to highlight the indispensable role of the United States in anchoring the response to the crisis and the novel tools that the Fed had deployed, to chart the painful and protracted inadequacy of the European response and to cast light on an intense but underappreciated period of transatlantic financial diplomacy. All of that is still worth doing. But it has now taken on a new and more ominous meaning. Because it is only if we get to grips with the inner workings of the dollar-based financial system and its fragility that we can understand the risks that lurk in the situation of 2017. If Trump's presidency marks the nadir of American political authority, that is all the more troubling given the deep functional dependence on the United States revealed not only by 2008 but by the eurozone crisis as well.

What we have to reckon with now is that, contrary to the basic assumption of 2012-2013, the crisis was not in fact over. What we face is not repetition but mutation and metastasis. As Part IV of this book will chart, the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2012 morphed between 2013 and 2017 into a comprehensive political and geopolitical crisis of the post—cold war order. And the obvious political implication should not be dodged. Conservatism might have been disastrous as a crisis-fighting doctrine, but events since 2012 suggest that the triumph of centrist liberalism was false too. As the remarkable escalation of the debate about inequality in the United States has starkly exposed, centrist liberals struggle to give convincing answers for the long-term problems of

modern capitalist democracy. The crisis added to those preexisting tensions of increasing inequality and disenfranchisement, and the dramatic crisis-fighting measures adopted since 2008, for all their short-term effectiveness, have their own, negative side effects. On that score the conservatives were right. Meanwhile, the geopolitical challenges thrown up, not by the violent turmoil of the Middle East or "Slavic" backwardness but by the successful advance of globalization, have not gone away. They have intensified. And though the "Western alliance" is still in being, it is increasingly uncoordinated. In 2014 Japan lurched toward confrontation with China. And the EU—the colossus that "does not do geopolitics"—"sleepwalked" into conflict with Russia over Ukraine. Meanwhile, in the wake of the botched handling of the eurozone crisis, Europe witnessed a dramatic mobilization on both Left and Right. But rather than being taken as an expression of the vitality of European democracy in the face of deplorable governmental failure, however disagreeable that expression may in some cases be, the new politics of the postcrisis period were demonized as "populism," tarred with the brush of the 1930s or attributed to the malign influence of Russia. The forces of the status quo gathered in the Eurogroup set out to contain and then to neutralize the left-wing governments elected in Greece and Portugal in 2015. Backed up by the newly enhanced powers of the fully activated ECB, this left no doubt about the robustness of the eurozone. All the more pressing were the questions about the limits of democracy in the EU and its lopsidedness. Against the Left, preying on its reasonableness, the brutal tactics of containment did their job. Against the Right they did not, as Brexit, Poland and Hungary were to prove.

***

Distance in time, historians like to tell themselves, is a tonic. It permits the detachment and sense of perspective that are commonly touted as virtues of the discipline. But that depends on where time takes you. History writing does not escape the history it attempts to reconstruct. The more pertinent question to ask is not how much time must pass before history can be written, but what has happened in the interim and what, at the time of writing, is expected to happen next. This book, for one, would have been easier to write and might be clearer in its conclusions if it had been finished even closer to the time of the events it begins by describing. It may be easier to write a book like this ten years from now, though given the current train of events, that may be unduly optimistic. Certainly, the tenth anniversary of 2008 is not a comfortable vantage point for a Left-liberal historian whose personal loyalties are divided among England, Germany, the "Island of Manhattan" and the EU. Things could be worse, of course. A ten-year anniversary of 1929 would have been published in 1939. We are not there, at least not yet. But this is undoubtedly a moment more uncomfortable and disconcerting than could have been imagined before the crisis began.

Among the many symptoms of unease and crisis that have afflicted us in the wake of Donald Trump's victory is the extraordinary uncouth variety of postfactual politics that he personifies. He doesn't tell the truth. He doesn't make sense. He doesn't speak coherently. Power appears to have become unmoored from the basic values of reason, logical consistency and factual evidence. What has caused this degeneration? One can cite a complex of factors. Certainly unscrupulous political demagoguery, the debasement of popular culture and the self-enclosed world of cable TV and social media are part of the problem, as is Trump's personality. But to attribute our current state of post-factuality to Trump and his cohorts is to succumb only to further delusion. As this book will show, what the history of the crisis demonstrates are truly deep-seated and persistent difficulties in dealing "factually" with our current situation. It isn't just those denounced as populists who have a problem with truth. It goes far wider and far deeper and it affects the center as much as the margins of mainstream politics. We do not need to go back to the notoriously misleading and incoherent case made for the war against Iraq and its fawning media coverage. It was the current

president of the European Commission who announced in the spring of 2011: "When it becomes serious, you have to lie." At least, one might say, he knows what he's doing. If we believe Jean-Claude Juncker, a post-truth approach to public discourse is simply what the governance of capitalism currently demands.

The loss of credibility is flagrant and it is comprehensive. The damage goes deep. To say that liberals should simply "pick yourself up, dust yourself off, and start all over again," as the Depression-era song goes, that if America has failed we should look for leadership to a fresh-faced president of France or the relentlessly reliable chancellor of Germany, is either simpleminded or disingenuous. It does no justice to the scale of the disasters since 2008, or to the failure of the lopsided politics prevailing in both Europe and America to offer an adequate response to the crisis. It does no justice to the extent of our political impasse, with the center and the Right having failed and the Left massively obstructed and self-obstructing. Nor does it acknowledge that some losses are irreparable and that sometimes the appropriate response is not just to keep on going but, instead, to linger for a while, to pick over the ruin of our expectations, to tally up the broken identifications and disillusionments. There is a certain immobility in such an effort at reconstruction. But even as we look back, we can rely on the restless dynamic of global capitalism to force us onward. It is already tugging. As we shall see in the final chapter, the next moments of economic challenge and crisis are already upon us, not in America or in Europe but in Asia and the emerging markets. Looking back is not an act of refusal. It is simply a contribution to the necessary collective effort of coming to terms with the past, of figuring out what went wrong. To do that there is no substitute for digging into the workings of the financial machine. It is there that we will find both the mechanism that tore the world apart and the reason why that disintegration came as such a surprise. <>

Everything Trump Touches Dies: A Republican Strategist Gets Real About the Worst President Ever by Rick Wilson [Free Press, 9781982103125]

A respected, long-time Republican strategist, ad-maker, and contributor for The Daily Beast, skewers the disease that is destroying the conservative movement and burning down the GOP: Trumpism.

In Everything Trump Touches Dies, political campaign strategist and commentator Rick Wilson brings his darkly funny humor and biting analysis to the absurdity of American politics in the age of Trump. Wilson mercilessly exposes the damage Trump has done to the country, to the Republican Party he served for decades, and to the conservative movement that has abandoned its principles for the worst President in American history.

No left-winger, Wilson is a lifelong conservative who delivers his withering critique of Trump from the right. A leader of the Never Trump movement, he warns his own party of the political catastrophe that leaves everyone involved with Trump with reputations destroyed and lives in tatters.

Wilson unblinkingly dismantles Trump's deceptions and the illusions to which his supporters cling, shedding light on the guilty parties who empower and enable Trump in Washington and the news media. He calls out the race-war dead-enders who hitched a ride with Trump, the alt-right basement dwellers who worship him, and the social conservatives who looked the other way.

Everything Trump Touches Dies deftly chronicles the tragicomic Trump story from the early campaign days through the shock of election night, to the inconceivable trainwreck of Trump's first year. Rick Wilson provides not only an insightful analysis of the Trump administration, but also an optimistic path forward for the GOP, the conservative movement, and the country.

CONTENTS

Excerpt:

If you're like me, the Trump presidency has turned you into a light sleeper.

Admit it. Some nights, when the world is quiet but your mind is racing, you check Twitter to see if he's started a nuclear war. Each morning, strung out from the fever dreams of Donald Trump and Steve Bannon performing a nude interpretive dance of Stephen Miller's "Triumph of the Wall," you wake up wondering if today's the day he's seen wandering naked on the White House lawn, screaming at clouds.

Come on. You know you've done it.

It's because you're struggling, like the vast majority of Americans, with the fact that our terrible, sloppy, shambolic president may just be insane. Not "Haha, he's so crazy" or "He's pretending to be crazy, but it's actually 87-dimensional quantum chess" crazy, but legitimately, clinically insane. I'd have to look up the DSM-V category to be more precise, but the term of psychiatric art I'm looking for is "shithouse-rat crazy."

Is crazy too strong a term? Perhaps instead you'd like to argue that a man with Donald Trump's dignity, stature, resolute self-control, deep erudition, and modesty presents as a perfectly rational national leader in every way. In that case, you'd be correct if the nation in question is some third-world hellhole—pardon me, I meant to use the new term of art, "shithole"—ruled by a President for Life with a penchant for elaborate military uniforms, missile parades, a high comfort level with endemic corruption, relatives installed in positions of power, and a rumored taste for human flesh.

Donald Trump, the avatar of our worst instincts and darkest de-sires as a nation, sits in the Oval Office. I did what I could to stop it. I've watched the stalwarts of the Republican Party and the conservative movement slip into the sewage tank of nationalist populism with barely a ripple.

We failed to stop Trump in 2016, but that doesn't mean I'm going to sit by as the Nickelback of presidents wrecks my country. I'm not going to buy into "But Gorsuch" and "But executive orders" as a pale substitute for character, conservative governance, legislative accomplishments, and principle. Donald Trump is an objectively terrible president, in every sense of the word.

So how the hell did I get here?

As a rock-solid Republican Party guy stretching all the way back to the 1988 presidential campaign of George H. W. Bush, I've worked to elect Republicans and conservatives all over the country. I helped put a lot of them in office in red, purple, and blue states and districts, in races from the presidency on down.

I'm one of a handful of people your candidate or SuperPAC calls when it's time to drop the big, nasty negative ads, and I have a thick enough skin to take the criticism on behalf of the candidate once those ads are hitting the target. I'm the creator of some pretty famous—infamous if you're a Democrat or Roy Moore—attack ads. You've read and heard my work in speeches under the bylines

of members of Congress, governors, and CEOs. I've run ads across the proverbial fruited plain.

After 2016, though, I've had a kind of political midlife change. No, I didn't get a 25-year-old girlfriend, a sports car, or a hair transplant.

When Trump slithered down the golden escalator in his epony-mous tower in 2015, I felt bile rising in my throat. This guy? This jackass? I was quite sure nothing had changed about his blustering ego, fever-swamp birtherism, and con-artist modus operandi. Given the ideological underpinnings of Trumpism—slurry of barely coherent nationalism, third-world generalissimo swagger, and the worst economic ideas of the 19th century—I recognized he was an existential risk to the country, win or lose.

I had met Trump a handful of times. The first time was during Rudy Giuliani's 1997 reelection campaign for mayor of New York when my then-business partner and I were producing Giuliani's television ads. Trump later agreed to appear in a tourism film for the City of New York we shot. The general view inside Rudy World seemed to be that Trump was a loudmouth and a jackass, but enough of a City player to throw him the occasional favor. The next time was at a wedding at Mar-a-Lago for a mutual friend. Ironically the best man at that wedding was the governor of Florida at the time, one John Ellis Bush.

The last time I'd seen Trump in person was 15 years before while filming a gag bit for New York City's Inner Circle, where Trump motorboated Giuliani's fake breasts while the mayor was in his drag persona, Rudia. If you haven't seen it, don't Google it. If you have, I am deeply sorry. It's scarring. If you're looking for nightmare fuel, a pompous, bloated, and bewigged Trump kissing Drag Giuliani is the high-octane version.

Contrary to what Breitbart or Fox or Rush Limbaugh will tell you, I don't oppose Trump because I'm a Republican-in-Name-Only. I oppose Trump from the right, not the left, and as a constitutionalist, not as a globalist Soros neocon shill out to impose political correctness, sharia law, and full communism. Yes, I know that accusation is a roaring non sequitur, but welcome to rhetoric in the era of Trump. Their arguments are so consistently dumb, contradictory, and nonsensical that I have to believe there's a secret Word Finder App for Conservatives Who Love Donald but Aren't Smart and Want to Seem Smart to Other People Who Aren't Smart.

I supported Marco Rubio in the primary and worked for a pro-Rubio SuperPAC, but I would have taken any Republican in the field over Trump. Even Ted Cruz, and that says a lot. Like most sensible people, I dismissed Trump as a Roger Stone con game. Hell, I would have picked a random guy walking out of a bus station over Trump.

Everything about Trump's opening speech was moral poison to anyone who believed in any part of the American dream. Everything about his nationalist hucksterism smelled like the destruction of conservatism and a knock on the door of authoritarian statism.

So instead of toeing the party line, lining up behind a morally bankrupt and ideologically suspect Republican nominee, and being a good soldier, I decided that my principles and my country came before my party and politics. As a Republican, a conservative, and an American, I simply couldn't do it. I couldn't be a part of Trump's dismantling the party, the movement, and the nation I loved. I'm an O.G. anti-Trump Republican.

That Donald Trump isn't a conservative and is a Republican only as a flag of convenience was just part of my objection. Quite ironically for a cold-hearted, expedient political operative, I felt Trump lacked the moral and personal character to be the leader of the free world, to make the most consequential decisions, and to hold the lives and security of millions of Americans in his hands.

His tiny, tiny lemur-paw hands.

All this led, through a series of misadventures worthy of a Georges Feydeau farce, to my

becoming one of the founders of the Never Trump movement. I'm an apostate in the era of Trump and Trumpism, and I have absolutely no regrets. I didn't make this choice lightly or trivially. Before you ask, I didn't do it because George Soros offered me a stack of gold bars and membership in the Illuminati. It cost me professionally, personally, and financially.

I could easily have pivoted, done the well-he's-the-nominee-and-party-über-alles act so many consultants and elected officials did, despite their loathing Trump just as heartily as I do. Some days, I hear Cypher's voice from the Matrix saying, "Why, oh why didn't I take the blue pill?"

If I'd been truly amoral, I could have easily spun up a ScamPAC called Americans Making America Great Again American Eagle Patriot Trump Brigade for Freedom Build the Wall Anti-Sharia PAC. AMAGAAEPTBFFBTWAS PAC would have dropped a few million fundraising emails to the obviously enormous ocean of credulous boobs who click "Donate" at the sign of a red hat and a sparkly eagle gif, and watched the donations roll in. I could have my volcano lair by now.

How far did I go off the Republican reservation? Well, although I'm still a registered Republican, every day is a moral and political stress test. I helped run Evan McMullin's independent bid for president. In an election in which neither of the major party options was at all palatable for a conservative like me, we wanted to offer voters something better. We wanted to give them a candidate and a message that honored the values for which this country ostensibly still stands: liberty, equality, the rule of law, and a reverence for the Constitution.

Old fashioned, I know. Conservative, remember?

I wasn't alone in understanding that there were two elections in 2016. The first election—the one everyone noticed—was in the usual partisan frame. It was Republican Trump against Democrat Clinton, and both sides ran to their corners and fought a political battle we've all seen before. Set aside for a moment why he won and why she lost. Those are interesting questions, but the frenzy of the visible election wasn't the most consequential issue.

The real election of 2016 was for the heart and soul of the Republican Party and the conservative movement and for the baseline values and norms a country needs to survive as a going concern in the democracy game. We've since learned that the consensus of the American intelligence community was correct. The election was shaped and manipulated by Russian intelligence operations altering the American political landscape, an endgame in the long twilight struggle.

Hypnotized by a celebrity con man vomiting out Steve Bannon's spittle-flecked, nationalist message to the furious and the febrile, Trump received virtually unlimited media coverage. GOP primary voters killed off a field of good men and accomplished leaders one by one in favor of Trump. Conservative leaders compromised their long-held principles again and again to favor Trump.

Republican voters had a choice between Trump's Troll Party and the Grand Old Party I knew. They chose the Troll Party.

It's a common, facile argument that the old GOP deserved death. After all, we weren't perfect. Just ask any talk radio host. We didn't produce enough Ted Cruz types to have a majority large enough to make the Purity Posse happy. We didn't throw Granny off the cliff, starve the orphans, return to the gold standard, and then put the womenfolk back in the kitchen. I get it.

As a party, we are flawed. All parties are. We frequently overpromised and underdelivered on free-market and conservative policy outcomes. We fell into the arms of DC's army of lobbyists and interest groups, most of whom are anything but conservative. For our base, the imagined best became the enemy of the good.

In my career, I have been a gleeful hatchet man for the GOP. I was willing to fight the ideological battles, large and small, in campaigns, on TV, in

writing, and lately on social media. We had good years and terrible years. We elected presidents, took back Congress after decades, lost it, and took it back again. Our leaders ranged from bad to extraordinary. We pushed and pressed and worked to expand our reach because there wasn't an alternative.

Through it all, the GOP was the one party even vaguely amenable to limited-government conservatism, to at least some adherence to the Constitution over the social preferences of the moment, and to the constraints on government power that our Founding Fathers so cherished. The choice was an imperfect, leaky ship with tattered sails and a bickering crew sailing in the right direction or drowning in a sea of bigger and bigger government and surrendering to every liberal social whim of the day.

It was nice while it lasted.

Now the disease of Trumpism has consumed the Republican Party and put the entire conservative movement at risk. It has been hijacked by a bellowing, statist billionaire with poor impulse control and a profoundly superficial understanding of the world. The blazing, white-hot embrace of actual, honest-to-God stupidity has been as contagious as smallpox and as fatal as Ebola. This new creature, shambling toward its eventual political destruction, has reached a point where it supported an accused child molester for U.S. Senate.

Trump's Troll Party puts wild-eyed nationalist, anti-establishment ranting before the tenets of our constitutional Republic. Trump's party insists on ideological uniformity, obedience to the Dear Leader Kim Jong Don, even though Trump's policies are as mutable as his moods are mercurial. Whether you're a Republican from Florida or Vermont or Alabama or Montana, the Trump Party demands every candidate and elected official rigidly adhere to Trump's line, regardless of the regional differences that still mark the country.

All you have to do to stay in the good graces of this new political force is to swear Trump is always right. All you have to do is loathe with the fire of a million suns anyone who levies the slightest criticism of Trump. You must compromise everything you believe to praise and placate him. He is President for Life. Bow before Zod.

No, thanks. Hard pass.

In 2015 I stood up and spoke out and found myself with a lot of new friends and a lot of new enemies, including a certain frequent tweeter with an exotic dead-animal hairstyle and a notoriously short temper. While no one—including his campaign staff—thought he could win, all the smart guys in the room (myself most certainly included) looked at the numbers and called it wrong.

Mea freaking culpa. We didn't factor in Jim Comey's last-minute surprise and a whole lot of help from the Russians. If you thought my biggest worry was that Trump would lose the election, you aren't paying attention.

Everything we Never Trump folks warned you of, including massive, decades-long downstream election losses, is coming. Alienating African Americans and Hispanics beyond redemption? Check. Raising a generation of young voters who are fleeing the GOP in droves? Check. Age-old beefs, juvenile complaints, and ego bruises taking center stage while the world burns? Check. Playing public footsie with white supremacists and neo-Nazis? Check. Blistering pig-ignorance about the economy and the world? Check. Pushing a tax bill that jacks economic inequality into the stratosphere? Check. Shredding the last iota of the GOP's credibility as a party that cares about debt, deficits, and fiscal probity? Check.

Immanuel Kant talks about the "unreal seen" (the phenomenon) and the "unseen real" (the noumenon). Well, the phenomenon of the 2016 election was about Donald and Hillary. It was a hell of a show, a political and moral spectacle, as is the current administration. The noumenon—the deeper, more real answers—come down to where this country,

the GOP, and the conservative movement go, and whether we let Donald Trump take us there.

A brief word before we get the party started. In 30 years of politics, I had more scraps and scrapes with Democrats furious with my candidates taking their lunch money and ending their careers than I can tell you. Only rarely did I get a death threat I took seriously. Now, the threats are coming from the Trump base, and they never stop.

The harshest criticism I and many others in the Never Trump movement have experienced comes from the Trump right and its enablers. There is no hatred more pure, no anger more vicious, and no spleen more commonly vented than from the clumsily named anti-anti-Trump segment of the conservative commentariat.

We've been called traitors, RINOs, establishment shills, and betrayers of the conservative cause. Nothing angers them more than being reminded how they dismissed, diminished, and sacrificed the values they once fought for on the altar of Trump and Trumpism. Nothing is guaranteed to trigger a tidal wave of their fury more surely than a critique of their sudden moral and political flexibility after a lifetime of ideological purity and rigor. They're addicted to "But Obama" whataboutism, constant historical revisionism, cherry-picked chest-beating over ephemeral policy wins, and the grunting triumphalism of Trump's accidental victory.

I pity them. They've bet their honor, careers, and reputations on a man and a mob, not on a nation, a Constitution, a system of ideals, and a conservative temperament. I understand their defensive, pissy rage. That anger they feel each time we remind them of the gulf between conservatism and Trumpism is the pain of their souls trying to reenter their bodies.

There are three big reasons I'm writing this book.

First, when I look at what's become of the Republican Party, the conservative movement, and the United States, I feel like I'm visiting some dark, alternate universe. The party of Lincoln and Reagan and the movement of Burke and Buckley have been hijacked by a new strain of politics that is as dangerous as it is ludicrous: nationalist populism. I am a conservative who believes that the law and the Constitution must limit and bound the powers of the state. I believe in the power of law, not the power of the mob. I believe leaders are the servants of the people, not the contrary.

The current direction of Trumpist Republicanism is ideologically and philosophically repulsive to genuine conservatives. The adoption of the authoritarian statism designed by Steve Bannon, Stephen Miller, and their alt-right fellow travelers and embodied by Donald Trump should terrify the right. Instead, they're merrily on board with a lunatic with delusions of godhood, abandoning every principle they ever fought for and replacing them with L'état, c'est Trump.

There are a lot of books on the market decrying Trump from the left. Trump and Trumpism need a critique from the right that isn't just a long swoon and a reach for the smelling salts. I've forgotten more about conservative policy and philosophy than Trump will ever know and that the New Establishment has abandoned. Sure, I want to save the Republic from Trump and Trumpism, but I don't mind telling members of my party and movement to fuck themselves on the way there.

I'll admit I am also driven to write this book by a stirring bit of guilt. I've spent a career electing Republicans, defending the conservative movement and philosophy, and fixing the messes made by all-too-human elected officials. I am the guy you call when it's time to run the ads that end the campaign, in part because my skin is thick enough to endure the inevitable screeching and rending of garments that come when it's time to wade into the fight. You call me when you're in the back of the police car outside the shady massage parlor and you have to be on the floor of Congress to vote in 24 hours. I'm not some hand-wringing do-gooder, and if you've fought either by my side or against me, you know I'm down to scrap.

I helped fill that chest freezer full of red meat to throw out to the Republican base when the going

got tough, often reducing the entire argument to the tactics of a single election-winning message, a single attack ad, a single oppo drop. And no, Democrats, don't get smug and morally superior; your team has our analogues, and your base loves the mirror-image red meat itself. I'm not here to apologize for leaving your candidates in smoking, radioactive craters.

Yes, I was part of dumbing-down the arguments, creating the Frankenstein monster of the post-2008 base, hoping that we could achieve the big goals of the movement that consisted—we thought—of more than just the Palin-Trump Axis of Idiocy. The old big tent of the GOP was always a rambling circus with evangelicals, foreign policy and national security conservatives, economic freedom warriors, and constitutionalists, all living in relative harmony. We knew the money came from one part of the coalition, the grassroots energy from another, the media heat from yet another. It was imperfect, but in the long march from the 1980s to today, we grew by thousands of elected officials all over the country.

The creature that emerged after Sarah Palin crawled from the political Hellmouth in 2008 kept growing, hungry not for policy victories that realigned the regulatory state, but for liberal tears, atavistic stompy-foot rages, and purity over performance. Her folksy charm became a furious whine, and the base of the party followed that tone.

In work for campaigns, associations, corporate clients with skin in the game of politics, and a constellation of SuperPACs, we fed the monster and trained it. I know how patronizing that sounds, the thought that we could activate and—call it what it is—manipulate voters. Well, we did. As the tools of data, targeting, and analytics improved, we got very, very good at it.

We kept feeding the monster. We rewarded its darkest impulses. We brought it out when the time was right. The portfolio of messages, political rhetoric, and communications venues we built constituted a suite of powerful political tools.

The tools of politics, like all tools, are morally agnostic. A scalpel in the hands of a doctor is a tool. A scalpel in the hands of a serial killer is a horror. Rational adults in both parties used the tools of persuasion, elections, and communications developed by other rational adults inside broad lanes.

Then Trump came along. We lost control of those tools, the party, and the movement. The monster is out of its cage, and its new trainers (both here and in Russia) encourage only its dumbest, darkest, most capricious, cruel, and violent behaviors. This book is, I hope, one of a number of poison darts in the neck of the monster.

The problem in writing this book is time; every day brings some new outrage, scandal, excess, or moment of historic dumbassery by this president. That said, deadlines wait for no man, so I trust you'll pardon this volume for not chronicling every moment of President Death Touch's misrule.

Let's get started. <>

Fewer, Better Things: The Hidden Wisdom of Objects by Glenn Adamson [Bloomsbury Publishing, 9781632869647]

From the former director of the Museum of Arts and Design in New York, a timely and passionate case for the role of the well-designed object in the digital age.

Curator and scholar Glenn Adamson opens Fewer, Better Things by contrasting his beloved childhood teddy bear to the smartphones and digital tablets children have today. He laments that many children and adults are losing touch with the material objects that have nurtured human development for thousands of years. The objects are still here, but we seem to care less and know less about them.

In his presentations to groups, he often asks an audience member what he or she knows about the chair the person is sitting in. Few people know much more than whether it's made of wood, plastic, or metal. If we know little about how things are made,

it's hard to remain connected to the world around us.

Fewer, Better Things explores the history of craft in its many forms, explaining how raw materials, tools, design, and technique come together to produce beauty and utility in handmade or manufactured items. Whether describing the implements used in a traditional Japanese tea ceremony, the use of woodworking tools, or the use of new fabrication technologies, Adamson writes expertly and lovingly about the aesthetics of objects, and the care and attention that goes into producing them. Reading this wise and elegant book is a truly transformative experience.

CONTENTS

Excerpt:

Engaging with the Objects Around Us

Like most American children, I had a teddybear when I was young. Two, actually. One was big and floppy, slightly walleyed, with a tight-fitting T-shirt bearing his name in hand-stitched red letters: PHIL. The second, smaller one was my favorite, ranking so highly in my imagination that he did not even have a name. If pressed, I would have referred to him as Bear, but he was more like an alter ego of myself. Compact and surprisingly heavy, with tiny glittering eyes and no garments or other accessories, he was a constant companion and an actor in whatever imaginary narratives I invented. Despite his modest size, he was a big presence in my life.

I owned Phil and Bear before I even knew how to talk, and I interacted with them mostly without words, through touch. Today I look at children three or four years of age and wonder how they will be different, not only from my generation but from all others preceding mine. Most kids still are given stuffed animals by their parents, often in profusion, and in many colors, shapes, and sizes. But what really seems to capture a child's attention is technology. If you want to see a distracted ten-year-old suddenly achieve total focus, hand them a smartphone or a digital tablet and watch them go down the rabbit hole. They will probably already be well adapted to the device and its possibilities, and able to navigate it as if by ancient instinct. I have heard stories, possibly apocryphal, of kids swiping at the cover of printed magazines in an effort to move the picture on to the next one. Many a behind-the-times parent, using an analog camera loaded with celluloid film, has witnessed their child's baffled disappointment when the picture fails to appear immediately on-screen on the back.

Clearly, children are getting a lot out of technology, and they will continue to get more out of it as they grow older. They will have countless transformative experiences in the infinite and depthless zones of the digital, not only stimulation and entertainment, but also information and awareness. What will they be like when they reach maturity? Quite likely, their breadth of understanding will be vastly superior to my own generation's. Their grasp of the world will be as unlimited as the Internet itself. They will have explored its distant reaches, virtually, from an early age. On the other hand, to the extent that these children clutch a smartphone rather than a teddy bear to their small selves, they may be losing an intimate connection to physical objects, which has nurtured human development for many thousands of years. Commentators have worried semiseriously about the emergence of an entirely new species, the "brittle bodied, hefty headed Homo Technologicus," who can surf the web with ease but has trouble throwing a ball.' We are running a giant experiment on this generation, without a control group.

Interestingly, young people do seem to realize that they are missing out on something. My brother's family lives in Munich, but last summer they came to see me in New York. During their visit, I noticed that my fifteen-year-old niece, Sophia, had set up a framed photograph of her cat Pepper next to her improvised bed in the living room. She had brought it with her all the way from Germany. I was surprised and asked her why she had bothered. Didn't she have pictures of the cat on her phone? She replied in a way that was as perceptive as it was tongue-twisting: "Yes, but I want a picture of Pepper. And the point of the phone is not to show a picture of Pepper, while the point of the picture of Pepper is to be a picture of Pepper."

Sophia had cleverly noticed an important fact about traditional (that is, nondigital) objects. Because they are unable to transform themselves at the level of content, they must answer to our needs without the benefit of adaptability. A physical artifact has to have, as Sophia put it, "a point." A framed photo, like a pot or a pen or a table, must serve its purpose, just as it is, without apps or upgrades. In the digital era, this irreducible thingness may seem like a drawback. But let's not forget that it is also an enduring human value. A well-made object is informed by thousands of years of accumulated experiment and know-how. Whenever we make or use an everyday tangible thing, or even when we contemplate one seriously, we commune with this pool of human understanding.

A smartphone may help its user to navigate an unfamiliar city perfectly well, and goodness knows it can hold a lot of cat pictures. But it was probably manufactured a world away from its user, with great negative impact on the environment and on workers' lives. It can also diminish our awareness of our immediate surroundings, as when we follow Google Maps like a mouse in a maze, facedown, rather than looking at the streets around us. It's when we don't engage with our material environment in a focused manner that we truly lose our way. As a culture we are in danger of falling out of touch, not only with objects, but with the intelligence they embody: the empathy that is bound up in tangible things.

I am speaking here of material intelligence: a deep understanding of the material world around us, an ability to read that material environment, and the know-how required to give it new form. This skill set was once nearly universal in the human population, but it has gradually shifted to specialists. Meanwhile, materials themselves have proliferated, becoming more numerous and complicated thanks to scientific research. As a result of these tendencies toward specialization and complexity, even as our literacy in other areas (like visual codes and interactive technology) has increased, our collective material intelligence has steadily plummeted. We are all born with this faculty. It is instinctive—it's why a child loves his teddy bear. But like any inherent capacity, it can flourish or fade depending on how it is nurtured.

There are many different facets of materiality, many ways we can engage with physical objects.

We may or may not notice them, or know what to make of them, but the objects are there all the same, awaiting our understanding. Here's a good example of what I mean. My grandfather Arthur grew up in Coffeyville, Kansas. When his sister Gail was thirteen years old, she was hired to mind the neighbors' 160-acre farm for a few days while they were away. When she returned a week later with four dollars' wages, an impressive sum for a girl her age, her parents asked how it had been. She said fine, but there had been one problem. The hog had died. It was August, and under the summer sun a bunch of farm dogs had chased the two-hundred-pound pig until it expired in the heat. This was in the days before landlines came to rural Kansas, much less smartphones, so she couldn't call for help.

Here's how my grandfather told the story:

> What to do? There was the family's winter meat supply useless on the ground and getting ready to spoil. So my sister did the only thing she could. She got out the butcher's knife and butchered the pig. She kindled a fire in the kitchen cook-stove. She skinned the hog and cut it into pot-sized chunks. She cooked it on the woodstove in the hot kitchen. She washed and sterilized twenty mason jars. She cut up and packed the meat in the jars. She cooked the meat jars in the pressure cooker. She flipped down the latches on the jars. She let the jars cool and moved them to the cyclone cellar. Then she washed up and went to bed.

This was a thirteen-year-old! What is amazing is that this skill set was more or less expected of girls her age (though impressive enough, I guess, that my grandfather remembered the tale many years later). The difference between my great-aunt Gail and today's children has something to do with a rise in squeamishness, but it is mainly a decline in material intelligence. She grew up on a midwestern farm in the midst of the Great Depression. Although the family was impoverished, they had a deep connection to the material world. Homesteaders like them would have been intimately familiar not only with raw meat and mason jars, but with many different types of timber, stone, clay, straw, metals, and innumerable other materials, and many different processes for working with them. If they needed to build a fence, they wouldn't go to Home Depot—they would cut down a tree and split it into posts. Every day they fed and milked cows. After the cows were slaughtered or died, their hides furnished shoe leather for the family.

There's no going back to the old days, nor should we necessarily want to. I doubt Aunt Gail was especially glad to have had the chance to butcher that pig, and my grandfather remembered that when he went out to the freezing cold milking shed early in the morning, he would mutter to himself, "I sure as hell don't want to be a farmer when I grow up." But he had something important going for him. Like most people of his generation, he was sensitively attuned to the material landscape around him. And this, in turn, provided a strong sense of social cohesion. In Coffeyville there was a feeling of shared enterprise, a commonly held set of skills and experiences. People may not have agreed about everything, but they faced similar day-to-day challenges. They worked and lived within an established cycle of harvests, of booms and busts. Whether they liked it or not, they were all in it together.

Now, being literate in the materiality of a dust bowl farm is one thing. Doing the same in our technologically sophisticated times is much more difficult. One doesn't have to be nostalgic to notice what we're missing: In an average New York City apartment building, you can easily live for years just ten feet above another family's heads and never once see them. A contemporary office is typically constructed from wipe-clean plastics, wipe-clean fabrics, and wipe-clean laminated composites, all of which are created in industrial settings in locations that are unknown and probably far distant. Our material environment is not only less accessible and more complex than it ever has been, but its origins are also remote from us, in every sense.

It's true that a farm family of the 1930s had to depend on their material intelligence for survival, while today's city dwellers and office workers can get away with ignoring their physical environment and still make a fine living. Maybe this feels like a sort of progress. But basic necessity is only one side of our relationship to materials. There are others, too: pleasure, discovery, inventiveness, and, particularly important, responsibility. Our relationship to materials determines much about the way we live on earth. Many people think of themselves as being committed to sustainability, but they focus on a relatively limited set of issues: what type of fish they order at a restaurant, how many airplane trips they take, whether they turn the lights off when they aren't in a room. As important as some of those issues are, they pale compared to the impact of the objects we shape and live with. One of the most significant aspects of material intelligence is that it can help us to make better choices about how we live on the planet.

So while it makes sense to be "pro-object," that doesn't have to mean being in favor of any object. Having an overabundance of things is sadly out of keeping with our real human needs. Most things being made today are not worth the precious resources of material, effort, and space we have devoted to them. This does not mean that we should abandon objects and look elsewhere for our future, though—or that we should attempt to reduce or even eliminate our dependency on the physical. On the contrary, the reason that we have too many unsatisfying objects in our lives is that we don't care enough about any single one of them.

William Morris, the great craft reformer of the late nineteenth century, was one of the earliest writers to espouse environmentalism, over a century ago. "Surely there is no square mile of earth's inhabitable surface that is not beautiful in its own way," he wrote, "if we men will only abstain from willfully destroying that beauty.' He also famously asked his contemporaries to "have nothing in your house that you do not know to be useful, or believe to be beautiful." This sentiment still rings true today, particularly if we add the idea that objects should be meaningful. Let's not think of things as ends in themselves, props to put on the mantelpiece. Rather, let's consider them as points of contact between people. Every object represents a potential social connection. By better understanding the tangible things in our lives, we better understand our fellow humans.

Morris, like many design reformers of the past, thought that each object had an inherent value, that true judges of quality could see for themselves whether it was any good. From this perspective, things are bound by logical rules, based on function, systems of ornament, and appropriate use of materials. Today, we might look at things a bit differently: An object can only be good for someone. Its "goodness" is not essential to it, but rather arises through the relationships that it brings into being. Thus the real test of an object's worth lies not in its efficiency, novelty, or even beauty (which, in any case, is in the eye of the beholder), but in whether it gives us a sense of our shared humanity. It is hardly ever wrong to value an object. The problem lies in not valuing things enough.

A single thing may carry hundreds of stories about the people who made it or who have lived with it. The challenge is to read those stories. Accordingly, this book paints a full, kaleidoscopic picture of material experience. Making things, using them, and learning about them—all these ways of interacting with objects connect. We make things out of materials. Then we use them, in ways that bring us into intimate contact with their qualities. These objects in use both prompt and aid our search for knowledge; we learn from the material landscape around us, and that, in turn, informs how we make things. And so the cycle starts again. All along the way, there are opportunities for human empathy. Makers and users can equally appreciate the warmth of wood, the cool hardness of metal, the pliability of rubber. Just as a skilled maker will anticipate a user's needs, a really attentive user will be able to imagine the way something was made. The material object serves as a bridge between these two perspectives.

One of the most fascinating aspects of the material landscape is the way everything in it is interwoven, in ways that are just as profound and subtle as the "networked" realm of the digital. When we overemphasize the promise of the digital information economy, we not only express an irrational preference for the new over the old, we also miss the physical know-how that binds our society together. The cultural habit of marginalizing this kind of expertise has deep historical roots and has always been related to class condescension. I believe that by challenging this legacy and building respect for material intelligence across our culture, we can form a bridge that emphasizes shared experience: a greater awareness of the things we hold in common. <>

The Husband Hunters: American Heiresses Who Married into the British Aristocracy by Anne de Courcy [St. Martin's Press, 9781250164599]

A deliciously told group biography of the young, rich, American heiresses who married into the impoverished British aristocracy at the turn of the twentieth century – The real women who inspired Downton Abbey

Towards the end of the nineteenth century and for the first few years of the twentieth, a strange

Wharton, herself born into this `right set', based her novels on what she saw around her, from personalities to places, from clothes to customs, so that they are virtually a biography of the times. In the period between 1870 and 1914 — Wharton was twenty in 1880 — 454 American girls married titled Europeans. One hundred were to British aristocrats — sixty to eldest sons, forty to younger sons, six to dukes, with 1895 the peak year for such marriages. By any standards, this was a staggering number.

It was a real invasion, and recognised as such. So well-known was it that when Sir William Gordon-Cumming spotted Leonie Jerome, the youngest of the Jerome sisters, walking in Hyde Park on her first visit to London in 188z, he went up to her and said: 'Over here husband-hunting?' The year before, the Punch Almanack had featured a group of 'New York Millionairesses' about to start for Europe, shown studying 'not Murray and Baedeker — oh dear no! — but Burke and Debrett', making notes of all unmarried peers and bemoaning that photographs are not published as well as ages and titles. There was even a magazine to help them do this: Titled Americans was a New York quarterly, with a list of eligible single noblemen at the back.

For me, the interesting thing was not so much that they made these marriages, as why. Why should so many of these young women troop across the Atlantic when there were plenty of good-looking and much wealthier young men in America (where males still outnumbered females)? The obvious answer, that it was a case of cash for coronets, is from many points of view too simplistic. And what were the social and economic factors behind these marriages that made such a lasting impact on British society?

There was, on the face of it, no reason why American girls, spoilt and cosseted in their own country, should wish to spend the rest of their lives far from their families and the friends they had grown up with, plunging into marriages that surrounded them with strangers, reduced them immediately to the property of a man whose right to control their lives and money was unquestioned, and whose country was the embodiment of much that their background had taught them to disapprove of.

After all, it was only just over a hundred years since the fiercely fought War of Independence that had created the United States and given birth to its Constitution. America had supposedly freed itself from the idea of hereditary aristocrats; the Republican credo of its citizens' equality was trumpeted forth at every opportunity — often contrasted with the effeteness and decadence of these scions of the Old World — and yet here were its daughters turning eagerly towards them. It was the meeting of a whole set of diametrically opposed ethics.

The first surprise to me was that 'the husband-hunters', as they quickly became known, were often the mothers rather than the daughters. Some girls, it is true, had a firm idea that they wanted to marry an English aristocrat, and led the way towards their potential target, but more often than not it was the mothers who took this decision.

Some brought their daughters over to Europe in their early teens, sometimes because it was less embarrassing to say: `I'm educating my daughter in France,' than 'Mrs. Astor hasn't asked me to her ball,' sometimes to put a gloss on them so that these girls would shine more brightly in the marriage market when they returned to New York, and sometimes to establish a foothold so that if New York turned its back on their daughter when she made her début, she could be taken back to Europe and then, with the right connections and enough money, filtered into English society where, it was hoped, she would make a brilliant match.

Modern women might find it difficult to understand just how much of a role the mother of a marriageable girl played in finding her daughter a spouse. Although love was desirable, it did not play nearly such a large part in the mating game as it does today — far more important were other factors such as family background, money, probity and general `suitability'. Thus many of these

marriages were just as much a creation of the American mother as of the American daughter. For often, as I show in this book, it was the American mother who was the true husband-hunter, who took the initiative in seeking a match for her daughter in the Old World, rather than an adventurous daughter suggesting a trip to Europe — and who realised that a peeress daughter would be the key that allowed her mamma to unlock the gates of society back home. Even Mrs. Astor would not refuse admittance to the mother-in-law of an earl. Punch, always a mirror of its times, has an 1890s cartoon of an American mother holding her daughter on a leash so that she has no option but to marry the insignificant little peer beside her as both stand in front of the altar.

Another aspect that emerged equally strongly from my research was the clash between the matriarchal society of the US and the patriarchal society of England, often resulting in a rude shock for the American bride, who had grown up seeing her mother do more or less what she wanted, paid for by an unquestioning husband, and who expected to do the same. For American upper-class society was run by women, for women; whereas in England it was fitted around the demands and expectations of male lives. Women may have fulfilled a vital role, but it was a secondary one — secondary to the demands of husband, estate, Parliament and sport.

The alien horde, as such girls were sometimes dubbed, was eagerly welcomed by some, in the main those who hoped to profit by it, while others felt that much of English life was being polluted. `Seadown — marry Seadown?' says the baronet Sir Helmsley Thwarte in horror when his son Guy tells him that Lord Seadown is interested in the eldest St George girl. `There won't be a family in England without that poison in their veins.'

Looking at it from the other side: why should a peer marry one of these girls who came from a culture so different from the one in which he had been brought up? Again, money was the obvious answer; again, it was not quite as simple as that. Today, no one would raise an eyebrow if a peer married an American girl. Then — for the peer — it was a completely different matter. `Society' was a closed circle of around 1,500—2,000 families, most linked through marriage or cousinage. 'You were either in it or outside it,' said the critic and novelist George Slythe Street. And to stay in it, you married within it.

For centuries, the patriarchs of these families, almost invariably peers, owned most of Britain and, because of the system of primogeniture — their heirs were always the eldest son or the eldest son of the nearest male relative — the great estates remained largely intact. Not only that; through the rents raised from them or the produce of the farms on them, their owners were assured of an income that was sizeable to vast. All they had to do was pick a suitable bride from a similar family; although she might inherit comparatively little, she had the necessary breeding and training in the ways of a large house and the rest would be supplied by her bridegroom's large income.

Producing these incomes were the agricultural poor, who worked the land and for whom life was constant hard labour. Even children helped, lifting potatoes, scaring crows, milking cows or leading horses. 'When I was ten I left school to work on a farm for £3 a year,' wrote Tom Mullins in 1873. `Before bridges were built we often had difficulty getting our horses and wagons across flooded streams. Often my clothes were quite wet when I took them off at night and still wet when I put them on again next morning. On Sundays I walked ten miles to have dinner with my parents, and then walked ten miles back to start milking.'

Then, towards the end of the nineteenth century, there was an irreversible change in the settled order of things. From around 1873 England, and especially its countryside, suffered what became known as the Long Depression, accounted for by several interlocking factors. It began with a series of appalling harvests for seven or eight years from 1873 to the end of the decade, accompanied by a drift from the land to towns and cities," partly

because of increasing industrialisation, partly because of the dwindling number of agricultural jobs. Local trade, which had relied on the custom of these workers, migrated from the small market towns to the larger county towns, putting many small traders like bakers or haberdashers out of business, while those that were left, now in a more commanding position, began to bargain, so that landlords were forced to reduce the rents they charged tenant farmers.

Contemporaneous with the poor harvests and loss of labour on the land came a dramatic fall in the price of grain. Vast fields of wheat now waved on the prairies of America, with different types grown to extend harvest time. Early settlers from Minnesota, Ontario and Wisconsin brought spring wheat; in the Central Great Plains the original bread-grain crop, soft winter wheat, was grown, to be harvested in summer; with Turkey red wheat, brought to central Kansas in the early 1870s by German Mennonite immigrants from southern Russia, in the autumn. When refrigeration came (in about 1870), farmers who had relied on livestock were also hit, as this meant that meat could be shipped from the great meat-producing countries like North and South America, and Australia. During those twenty years of change, the price of English wheat and barley fell by half — and landowners' incomes dropped like stones.

'That summer [1879] was followed by a severe winter,' wrote Mary Elizabeth Lucy, chatelaine of Charlecote in Warwickshire, of one of the decade's dreadful harvests. 'The Avon rose to such a height covering the marble vases on the lower steps of the terrace that Spencer lost all his meadow hay to the value of £700. The previous year too all the hay in the Place Meadow was carried away by a flood and for the last three years the harvest had been so bad that farmers were unable to pay their rent and many had thrown up their farms: Spencer had five in Hampton Lucy parish on his hands. Many of his tenants were asking for a reduction of rent, which he was obliged to grant for fear of having more farms on his hands.

'The times for agriculture are too sad! Spencer's income was reduced by more than half.'

So parlous had the state of agriculture become that in 1885 Joseph Chamberlain, then President of the Board of Trade, said that `almost universally throughout England and Scotland agriculture has become a ruinous occupation'.

As for the aristocrats to whom this land belonged, many simply watched helplessly as their estates became burdened with debt and their houses began to crumble around them: the idea of earning a living was not something they could comprehend. They were not educated to work, they had no family business to go into (to be 'in trade' was to be outside society) — in short, they could not change their ways.

`Behind him was the English squirearchy, generations of it stretching back, his justification for the only sort of life he knew how to live,' wrote Mary Elizabeth Lucy of her son. 'When unpaid bills mounted he sold [his father's] collection of paintings piecemeal. The houses in London, taken in order to give the girls a chance to find husbands, the hunters, the shooting parties, the grouse moors in Scotland — all these were looked on as necessities; old masters were expendable.' For some of these men, an American wife, with her dowry of dollars, was a lifeline.

On the other side of the Atlantic strikingly different factors were at work, hinging largely on the idea of élitism. Where British society had its natural pecking order, its pinnacle being the Prince of Wales (later Edward VII), no such system operated in the US; there was therefore a constant struggle not only over acceptance but also pre-eminence. It was a class system based on exclusion, but none the less rigorous for that.

For generations New York society had been run by the `Knickerbockers' — descendants of the original Dutch and English founders. Although rich, they lived quietly, managing their affairs and largely seeing only each other. No outsider was let in. Then came the great fortunes, made through speculation,

mining, railways, shipping and banking, and, with them, the spending of this wealth to such an extent that it almost became a métier (something that in many ways resonates today). The Gilded Age was born.

The wives of these men, who had the same enterprising, energetic, winner-takes-all spirit as their husbands, battled for supremacy in salon and ballroom, their ambition not simply to outdo each other but to climb over the stockade into that inner circle where the absolute élite had their being. Wharton's Mrs St George was possessed by an `almost religious zeal ... to fight for entry into the circle of Knickerbocker families whom she revered as "aristocracy" superior to any in the Old World'. For such women, money was of no avail: they had to find another way in.

Often, their daughters — married to a peer willingly, cajoled or forced to do so — were their ultimate weapon. For once a daughter had become Lady XX, the respect for a title among New York's inner circle ensured that she would now be welcomed by them ... and with her came her mother, who had now achieved her objective: she was 'in society'.

As Edith Wharton put it near the end of The Buccaneers, 'Mrs. Elmsworth, Mrs. St George and Mrs. Closson had long since taken for granted their acceptance ... by the best New York society as mothers of daughters who had married severally, a duke, an earl who would become a marquis, a courtesy lord who was the earl's brother, a prominent young British statesman widely regarded as a future Prime Minister ...'

What I aim to do here is to examine the reasons behind this social phenomenon; and its lasting impact on British life.

Of the `real' `buccaneers', several rose to the topmost peaks of British society while others, through their marriages, enabled their families to enter the much more exclusive circle of American society — then almost impenetrable to those whom its leader, Mrs Astor, chose not to know. Much has been written about a few of them, such as Consuelo Vanderbilt, who became the unhappy Duchess of Marlborough, bringing with her an enormous dowry that would today be worth around $100 million. But there were many others who, though lesser known, achieved their titled goal — and, sometimes, even love.

So let me introduce the girls whose stories I shall be tracing here, their mothers and the major figures in their backgrounds. The one who could be called the pioneer of these Gilded Age brides was the stunningly gorgeous Jennie Jerome, daughter of 'the King of Wall Street', financier Leonard Jerome. She married Lord Randolph Churchill and became the mother of Winston Churchill.

She came from a New York where the pre-eminent family was the Astors, whose fortunes had been founded three generations earlier by John Jacob Astor, who began by trading in furs. By the time Caroline Schermerhorn Astor (`the Mrs Astor', as she was always known), from an 'old New York' family, had married John Jacob's grandson William Backhouse Astor Jnr, and begun to reign over New York society, the Astors were primarily property-owners and landlords, their immense wealth transmuted into 'old money' by the passage of time. Carrie, Caroline's youngest daughter, later married Orme Wilson, thus raising him to Astor heights.

Helping to keep Caroline on her throne, and laying down the rules that governed her kingdom, was Ward McAllister, self-created social arbiter.

Caroline Astor's brother-in-law, her husband's older brother John Jacob Astor III, had one son, William Waldorf Astor who, because he was descended from the senior branch of the family, believed that his wife Mamie should be the reigning queen. Finally, after years of unsuccessful and increasingly bitter struggle with his aunt Caroline to achieve this, he gave up and left for England, where he became a British citizen and was later raised to the peerage.

On the other side of the fence surrounding the élite was an equally famous and almost as rich family, the Vanderbilts. The man who had made them wealthy was still very much alive, the tough, combative, coarse-tongued Cornelius (`Commodore') Vanderbilt, a man who would never have been welcomed in the polite society that he himself scorned. The Commodore's eldest son, Cornelius Vanderbilt II and his wife, the icy Alice, had never managed to crash the barricades. It took another daughter-in-law, Alva, married to a younger son, William Kissam (`Willie K') Vanderbilt, to do so.

She did this with a ground-breaking ball, talked of for years afterwards, ostensibly given in honour of her best friend Consuelo (née Yznaga), a `buccaneer' who had married the Duke of Manchester's heir, Viscount Mandeville. In England Consuelo Mandeville became a close friend of the Prince of Wales.

By the time the next generation of Vanderbilts came along things were a little — but not much — easier. Alva had destined her daughter Consuelo from birth to an upward marriage and when Consuelo was seventeen Alva settled (successfully) on the Duke of Marlborough. When Alva herself had been ostracised by New York society after divorcing Willie K, Consuelo's marriage secured Alva's re-entry: as the mother-in-law of a duke she was persona grata once more.

Consuelo's first cousin Cornelius (Neily') Vanderbilt III, son of Alice and Cornelius Vanderbilt II, did not have the same success when he made a marriage of which his parents disapproved. He was cut off from the Vanderbilt clan when he married Grace Wilson, whom they thought an adventuress. Nevertheless, the cool and clever Grace managed to succeed Mrs Astor as the ruler of society.

Grace herself was the youngest of the `marrying Wilsons', so known because all five of the siblings made matches that lifted them effortlessly upwards. They were the children of the handsome, dashing Richard Thornton Wilson, entrepreneur and Civil War profiteer and his wife Melissa. The eldest, May, married Ogden Goelet, [pronounced Goo-lett, with the accent on the second syllable] scion of a rich 'old New York' family; their daughter, also known as May, carried on the family tradition by marrying the Duke of Roxburghe. Orme Wilson, eldest of the two sons, achieved a major coup not only by marrying Carrie Astor, daughter of the Mrs. Astor, in the teeth of her disapproval, but by winning her and the rest of the Astor family round. The next daughter, Belle, married Michael Herbert, the fourth son of Lord Herbert, and settled happily into English aristocratic society, while the younger boy, Richard, married into a rich Boston family.

Perhaps the `best' marriage of all was made by Mary Leiter, daughter of Mary Theresa and Joseph Levi Leiter, of Marshall Field fame, who married George Curzon, to become a marchioness and Vicereine of India, where her sister Marguerite (`Daisy') met her own future husband, the Earl of Suffolk.

Others who figure in my account of those Gilded Age days are Mrs Stevens's son Harry was engaged to Edith Wharton, then Edith Jones, before Mrs Paran Stevens succeeded in bringing the romance to a halt so that she could continue to benefit from her son's trust.

Adèle Beach Grant was an American heiress who became Countess of Essex after a broken engagement to another peer, while Maud Burke, from San Francisco, married Sir Bache Cunard — later calling herself Emerald Cunard — and revolutionised the face of British opera. Mr. and Mrs. Bradley Martin migrated to Britain, marrying off their daughter Cornelia at only sixteen to the Earl of Craven, while Tennessee Claflin's shady antecedents did not prevent her from becoming the wife of baronet Sir Francis Cook. Fanny Work, Alice Thaw and Anna Murphy, who married respectively the Hon. James Burke Roche, the Earl of Yarmouth and Sir Charles Wolseley, were examples of marriages where the exchange of title for fortune brought neither partner happiness.

Other American notables were the social leader Mamie Stuyvesant Fish, a plain woman, almost illiterate, with a raucous laugh but witty, lively, irreverent and gay, the heiress Elizabeth Drexel, from an 'old New York' family and her husband Harry Lehr, social pet and jester, notably to Mamie Stuyvesant Fish.

The story of the beautiful Virginia Bonynge, later Lady Deerhurst and stepdaughter of Charles Bonynge and his wife Rodie Daniel, and the battles between Charles Bonynge and the 'Bonanza King', John Mackay and his wife, were avidly discussed in drawing rooms on both sides of the Atlantic.

Finally, commenting on all that was going on, and, thanks to its immense network of informers, an unrivalled source of information to the members of that society (and to me as well), was the witty, scurrilous and uninhibited magazine Town Topics.
<>

Bibliography

South Toward Home: Adventures and Misadventures in My Native Land by Julia Reed [St. Martin's Press, 9781250166340]

Driven: A White-Knuckled Ride to Heartbreak and Back: A Memoir by Melissa Stephenson [Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 9781328768292]

On the Ganges: Encounters with Saints and Sinners on India's Mythic River by George Black [St. Martin's Press, 9781250057358]

The Immeasurable World: Journeys in Desert Places by William Atkins [Doubleday, 9780385539883]

The Desert and the Sea: 977 Days Captive on the Somali Pirate Coast by Michael Scott Moore [Harper Wave, 978-0062449177]

Seacoast Plants of the Carolinas: A New Guide for Plant Identification and Use in the Coastal Landscape by Paul E. Hosier [Southern Gateways Guides, The University of North Carolina Press, 9781469641430]

Unnatural Selection by Katrina van Grouw [Princeton University Press, 9780691157061]

Microbes and Other Shamanic Beings by César E. Giraldo Herrera [Palgrave Macmillan, 9783319713175]

Fundamentals of Microbiome Science: How Microbes Shape Animal Biology by Angela E. Douglas [Princeton University Press, 9780691160344]

Sacred Knowledge: Psychedelics and Religious Experiences by William A. Richards, Foreword by G. William Barnard [Columbia University Press, 9780231174060]

Mechanical Design of Structural Materials in Animals by John M. Gosline [Princeton University Press, 9780691176871]

Handcuffs and Chain Link: Criminalizing the Undocumented in America by Benjamin Gonzalez O'Brien [Race, Ethnicity, and Politics, University of Virginia Press, 9780813941325]

In Defense of Gun Control by Hugh LaFollette [Oxford University Press, 9780190873363]

Trump and Political Philosophy: Patriotism, Cosmopolitanism, and Civic Virtue edited by Marc Benjamin Sable, Angel Jaramillo Torres [Palgrave Macmillan, 9783319744261]

Trump and Political Philosophy: Leadership, Statesmanship, and Tyranny edited by Angel Jaramillo Torres, Marc Benjamin Sable [Palgrave Macmillan, 9783319744445]

Core Socio-Economic Rights and the European Court of Human Rights by Ingrid Leijten [Cambridge Studies in European Law and Policy, Cambridge University Press, 9781107198470] Brexit, President Trump, and the Changing Geopolitics of Eastern Europe by Theodor Tudoroiu [Palgrave Macmillan, 9783319779195]

The Plot to Hack America, 2nd Edition: How Putin's Cyberspies and WikiLeaks Tried to Steal the 2016 Election by Malcolm Nance [Skyhorse Publishing, 9781510734685]

Decentering European Intellectual Space edited by Marja Jalava, Stefan Nygård, Johan Strang [European Studies, Brill, 9789004364523]

Institutionalizing the Just War by Allen Buchanan [Oxford University Press, 9780190878436]

The Life of Reason in an Age of Terrorism edited by Charles Padrón, Krzysztof Piotr Skowroński [Value Inquiry, Philosophy in Spain, Brill-Rodopi, 9789004361041]

Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court by Richard H. Fallon, Jr. [Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press, 9780674975811]

Fifty-one Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law by Jeffrey Sutton [Oxford University Press, 9780190866044]

The Black and the Blue: A Cop Reveals the Crimes, Racism, and Injustice in America's Law Enforcement by Matthew Horace and Ron Harris [Hachette Books, 9780316440080]

Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World by Adam Tooze [Viking, 978-0670024933]

Everything Trump Touches Dies: A Republican Strategist Gets Real About the Worst President Ever by Rick Wilson [Free Press, 9781982103125]

Fewer, Better Things: The Hidden Wisdom of Objects by Glenn Adamson [Bloomsbury Publishing, 9781632869647]

The Husband Hunters: American Heiresses Who Married into the British Aristocracy by Anne de Courcy [St. Martin's Press, 9781250164599]