

The Platonic Reach

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[Every Body Hurts: Transitions, Endings, and Resurrections in Fan Cultures](#) edited by Rebecca Williams [University Of Iowa Press, 9781609385637]

Have you ever been a fan of a show that was canceled abruptly or that killed off a beloved character unexpectedly? Or perhaps it was rebooted after a long absence and now you're worried it won't be as good as the original? Anyone who has ever followed entertainment closely knows firsthand that such transitions can be jarring.

Indeed, for truly loyal fans, the loss can feel very real—even throwing their own identity into question. Examining how fans respond to and cope with transitions, endings, or resurrections in everything from band breakups (R.E.M.) to show cancellations (Hannibal) to closing down popular amusement park rides, this collection brings together an eclectic mix of scholars to analyze the various ways fans respond to change. Essays explore practices such as fan discussion and creating alternative fan fictions, as well as cases where fans abandon their objects of interest completely and move on to new ones. Shedding light on how fans react, both individually and as a community, the contributors also trace the commonalities and differences present in fandoms across a range of media, and they pay close attention to the ways fandom operates across paratexts and transmedia forms including films, comics, and television.

This fascinating approach promises to make an important contribution to the fields of fan, media, and cultural studies, and should appeal widely to students, scholars, and anyone else with a genuine

interest in understanding why these transitions can have such a deep impact on fans' lives.

Contributors: Stuart Bell, Anya Benson, Lucy Bennett, Paul Booth, Joseph Brennan, Kristina Busse, Melissa A. Click, Ruth Deller, Evelyn Deshane, Nichola Dobson, Simone Driessen, Emily Garside, Holly Willson Holladay, Bethan Jones, Nicolle Lamerichs, Kathleen Williams, Rebecca Williams

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Excerpt:

Fannish Affect and Its Aftermath

"Fandom Is Love" was a rainbow-colored bar meme that became popular more than a decade ago, following up on the 2,004 "Marriage Is Love" color bar in support of gay marriage rights. A simple HTML code, it could easily be embedded in websites and on LiveJournal profiles to show one's association with and positive feelings for fandom at large. Unlike the older slogan "Fandom Is a Way of Life," which emphasized fandom affiliation as behavior and identity, the "Fandom Is Love" affiliation foregrounded the affective element, defining community via shared emotions. Fandom as a virtual space is created by, but also in turn generates, a variety of strong emotions. While fan studies has only recently begun to fully articulate and theorize fandom's affective component, the emotional investment of fans has always been a truism, acknowledged without having to be spelled out.

Love, passion, even obsession is a necessary component of being a fan, and sharing these strong emotions with others drives the creation of fan spaces, whether in private or public, offline or online. Fans may love or hate, but a strong emotional involvement is all but a prerequisite. What isn't quite so clear is how these strong emotional investments come into being, and how they change over time. Of course, feelings ebb and

wane, affection and frustration often switch with one scene or storyline, but even when hating a source text passionately, fans still are defined by their affective engagement.

When we consider fandom as a shared emotional space, it becomes obvious that this space — that is, the collective of other fans, shared conversations, and fannish artifacts — articulates many of the emotional components and, in turn, affects a given individual's feelings. In other words, fandom not only is love, but it can create and destroy love as well. I want to look at a few instances to show that fannish attachment and disenchantment are dependent not only on the fan objects themselves, but also on fan communities' internal conversations and strife. So, just as a new album, film, or TV show may spark interest and create fans, so can new fan fiction, fanvids, and reviews. And just as a disappointing source text can turn people away, so can disappointing fan works and fannish infighting. Obviously, I am not suggesting that any one story, any one event can singlehandedly create or destroy anyone's given investment in a text. I do suggest, however, that only looking at the TV show, the records, or the books does not fully articulate the onset or the ending of the love affair that is fandom.

Given the interconnectedness of fannish texts and social media, it is not difficult to show how fandom creates fans and facilitates the rise of fannish texts. Rare is the text or song or book that we just pick up without any previous awareness, whether through friends and family, news media, or fandom: reading a film review in our daily newspaper, hearing colleagues talk about a new show, or hearing family debate a new book all create a social space that influences our initial engagements. Fannish spaces increase and accelerate such cross-influences and recommendations. After all, if fandom is love, we want to spread this love as far and wide as we can, not only to be able to talk to others about our beloved object but also, often, in the hope of creating more fan works. Sharing one's gleeful embrace of a new text, creating brief summaries with screen caps to entice others, writing fan fiction that might tempt readers to try the source text, or creating recruiter yids are all ways

in which fans share their fannish love in the hope to infect others with their latest obsession.

As a fan fiction fan myself, I can point to the exact story that caught my interest and made me start reading compulsively in a given fandom, often long before I watched the first episode. Not only did I read *Due South* and *The Sentinel*, *Inception*, and James Bond fan fiction before seeing the relevant source texts, I can still name the story that got me excited, that pulled me into reading more, and, eventually, into watching the show or film. Certain yids were so visually stunning that I vowed to give the show a shot. One fanvid convinced me to finally watch *Deadwood*, because it featured its many women characters and convinced me that the show wasn't really a Western; another made me realize I should give *Senses* another chance, because it condensed and foregrounded themes I was interested in. That alone doesn't assure the creation of a new fan, but it suggests that the overflow of fannish love may indeed generate more love and more fans, who in turn create more fannish artifacts, increasing the love. At its best, fandom is a love feedback loop that in turn generates more love, more fannish discussions, more fannish creations. And once inside that feedback loop, that maelstrom of fannish squee, it doesn't matter whether the initial impetus was a random changing of channels, a recruiter post, a popular piece of fiction, or my love for the actor or showrunner from another series.

This feedback loop becomes important at the end of the love affair as well.

After all, as the chapters throughout this volume show, while the process of emotionally disentangling from a show may be gradual, the specific moment a fan officially leaves is due to specific events that often generate strong fan responses. Most of this volume has discussed in great detail the emotional relationship between fans and their fan objects and the aftereffects that dis-appointment with the texts or their authors can cause. The chapter authors chronicle this moment when love turns to disaffection or even hate, and while the reasons differ widely, the often intense emotions of fans more often change from one extreme to the other when the text, its authors, or

performers disappoint. The range of fan objects discussed in this volume is broad: bands, TV shows, amusement park rides, and even technology itself, all can evoke the moment of an ending, whether with a shocking scene or announcement or slowly over time. Likewise, the responses chronicled throughout this book are varied: mourning individually or collectively, celebrating and retaining a changing love over time, creating community through protest, or creating transformative fan works. What all these chapters share, however, is that every one of them, regardless of specific fan object or particular fan response, testifies to the intense emotional investment that fans have had at one point.

The backlash against the show becomes multiplied and reverberates in the same way that the initial love for the show did. Intensification and amplification benefit and harm shows in equal measures — a fact that many shows and products riding the fan wave learn the hard way when their fans become disappointed. Joseph Brennan describes this as a discrepancy between fan expectations and "perceived producer disloyalty," so that the breaking of an assumed industry/fan contract creates emotional backlash. My disappointment in *Dollhouse*, for example, was predicated on the strong feminist sensibilities showrunner Joss Whedon had shown in his earlier shows. Likewise, as Evelyn Deshane points out in her close reading of fan reactions to the deaths of beloved characters Beverly Katz and Allison Argent, character deaths are a common cause for fan disappointment and personal endings. Most recently, for example, there was an extreme backlash to *The 100* after it killed off the central recurring character Lexa, who was part of its most popular femslash pairing. This particular death, however, not only recalled scores of other killed-off lesbians but also carm on the heels of the show using social media to actively market the pairing and hail LGBT audiences. In fact, one writer and social media strategist joined a fan group and explicitly offered inside information promising that the character would not be killed off. As such, Lexa's death exemplified both producer disloyalty and fan responses to the murder of a fan favorite.

The difference between an individual disappointment and turning away from a beloved fan object and the collective response we often see on social media is that fan communities reverberate and intensify the already existing emotions. Fans share their frustration, anger, and hurt just as they share their anticipation, excitement, and delight. Thus, hashtags that are often suggested by shows during the airing to aggregate fan responses can intensify the fan-nish excitement or they can intensify the fannish disappointment. In fact, when social media campaigns try to create fannish affect, they often fail to account for the fact that it is difficult to control.

Fandom communities not only mirror and intensify our emotions, they also often guide the responses. It is here that fandom creativity offers fans the stories, characters, and plot lines, the representation and identification that the source texts may be missing. Where a vibrant source text creates fan communities that celebrate their shared love and generate more discussion and stories, a disappointing or ending source text can create fan communities that offer alternatives. As with Nicholas Dobson's Star Trek fan films, or Nicolle Lamerich's fan edits, transformative fan works extend and expand the shared community love. Even the recollection and shared discussion can extend fandoms, as Simone Driessen and Lucy Bennett describe in regard to Backstreet Boys and R.E.M. fandoms, respectively.

Many fans continue participating in a fandom even when they have stopped following the show: for example, Supernatural, Teen Wolf and Once upon a Time are still on the air, yet a large number of the stories on AO3 (the online fan fiction repository Archive of Our Own) ignore one or more seasons of canon. Likewise, the deaths of central characters are often denied, and entire communities, archives, and fan groups evolve around the denial of those deaths, whether it is Blake's 7 communities that sidestep the series finale, The Phantom Menace fans who steadfastly work around Qui-Gonn's death, or Harry Potter fans who responded to J. K. Rowling's postscript to the final book with "Epilogue, What Epilogue?" In so doing, these fans create communities in which they turn a hurtful, disappointing, and frustrating canon event into a

constructive, collective, and creative one. There are many different ways in which collective fan responses can shape and affect the way important events ultimately are received and responded to, creating fandom above and beyond the source texts. Most of fan fiction, of course, falls under this category, but even there certain types of collective endeavors stand out. Virtual seasons used to be a popular way to collectively expand the canon: different volunteers would write scripts that would be released online weekly so as to mimic a regular TV schedule.

Likewise, fans often generate fanverses that divorce themselves from canon continuity and offer alternate timelines instead. Not all of them are responses

to traumatic fan disappointments, but many respond to characters leaving or dying, popular ship pairings getting pulled apart, or genre changes in the show. After Lexa's death on The 100, for example, many fans followed actor Alycia Debnam-Carey to Fear the Walking Dead and began merging the two

show universes to create their happy (and alive!) pairing: the fanverse Elyza Lex (named after a collectively created fictional character and alluding to characters and the actors' names in both fandoms) has more than a hundred stories on AO3 by dozens of writers, collectively expressing their anger at the show and their love for the characters. Fannish affect here turns the anger and frustration of Lexa's death into the shared creation of a fanverse, allowing disappointed fans to come together and explore their love for this pairing in new and creative ways.

Few collective projects that endeavor to keep a show on the air or renew a series after cancellation are successful, but they allow fans to turn their shared feelings of disappointment and betrayal into something constructive. And sometimes fan ardor yields results: a century ago Sir Arthur Conan Doyle succumbed to his fans and resurrected Sherlock Holmes after his death at Reichenbach Falls, and the third Star Trek season was a response to letter writing campaigns. Tabasco sauce and peanuts packages sent to the networks supported another season for Roswell and Jericho,

respectively, and it was fan devotion that ultimately allowed for the creation of the Firefly movie *Serenity* and the successful Kickstarter campaign for the *Veronica Mars* film. Other times, fans focus their anger and frustration in other directions, such as the We Deserved Better campaign: responding to the death of Lexa on *The 100*, fans quickly organized to protest the death by showing how it fit into a long line of dead gay characters. The quickly created website not only showcases the history of the "Bury Your Gays" trope and the particularly noxious way in which the production team and showrunners behaved, but also raises money for The Trevor Project, a national suicide-prevention nonprofit for LGBT youths, and offers a pledge for television producers and writers for better LGBT representation. Not unlike political fan activism, the community structures here facilitate social engagements beyond the specific fannish object, though unlike most of the usual examples, the energy is in spite of, not because of, the show itself.

What I hope to show here is that while the relationship between every fan and the fannish object is important, it is always already filtered through friends and family, news and media, and, in the case of members of fan communities, through other fans. And while all the examples so far have been positive — fan artifacts, renewal campaigns, or even political advocacy through the collective fan group — fannish emotions are complicated and often hover on the knife's edge of love and hate. As a result, the flip side of celebrating one's favorite show, pairing, or character is feeling a profound hatred of other shows, pairings, or characters. This often relentless, and sadly, at times, utterly inappropriate, hostility of fans in respect to other fans can poison fannish communities to the point where fans leave. Their fannish ending isn't a response to anything in the source text but is a direct result of the fan community itself and of the behavior of other fans. Just as the excitement of my Tumblr suddenly overflowing with *The Force Awakens* GIFs intensifies my desire to go see the film, so an increase in negative comments and outright wank can poison my love for actively participating in a fandom. It may not necessarily make me hate the fan object per se, but without the

shared enjoyment I take from my community and with a constant barrage of negative responses, I have withdrawn more than once from a group and eventually from the show.

Few of us fan scholars like to dwell on the darker sides of fandom. After all, many of us are still fighting academic and personal prejudices, because even as the geek and the fan have mainstreamed, many of us remain the wrong type of fan: too female, too embodied, too emotionally invested. As fans, we want to share the amazing communities, creations, and actions we encounter in our fandoms. Moreover, there are specific ethical issues that make it difficult to discuss fannish flame wars, wanks, and kerfuffles: often the textual traces get erased and the participants do not want to revisit the often emotionally devastating events. And yet, I don't think we can talk about endings without addressing the ways fandom communities themselves can create an atmosphere that causes fans to leave. Just as fannish love can increase when shared within a fan community, negative reactions can easily bounce around and become more extreme, more focused, and stronger. Whether fan communities attack one another in ship wars or several members call out and criticize an individual, the results often get personal quickly. At times, the initial subject is external, but in taking different sides, the fan community splits. August 2015, after NHL star Patrick Kane was investigated

for a rape allegation, his fans were devastated but quickly divided into those who believed him innocent and those who didn't. Many who believed him guilty decided to leave the fandom not because of his actions, but rather because they hated the way the team, the NHL, and other fans immediately took his side. Likewise, *Supernatural* is a very tendentious fandom, with two main slash ships (and their respective actors) creating the main dividing line. With the prominence of real people shipping in the fandom and the long identification of actors and characters, hate for the characters often flows over into hate for the actors, and love for the actors sometimes manifests in hatred for their spouses. Moreover, when all these strong feelings get turned onto the fans of the opposing

pairing, it often leads to vicious behavior that can cause people to leave a fandom.

Tumblr, with its globally shared tags, brings together different communities who would otherwise ignore one another. Unlike on LiveJournal, where it was easier to simply follow fans who shared one's shipping and characterization preferences, a post on Tumblr merely tagged SPN or Supernatural shows up for everyone. Worse, many shippers purposefully "tag their hate"—that is, they will tag the pairing they loathe and thus force its fans to read their negative outbursts, necessitating a Tumblr such as *antisnpbullying*. Like SPN, most big media fandoms on Tumblr with more than one pairing create ship wars that at times tilt into something more. Most online fannish fights merely have fans fighting out their preferences in public and being nasty about it, but at times it becomes more: anonymous ad hominem attacks in people's inboxes have become all but common for more popular writers who engage in controversial debates, as have doxing threats.

Members in *Once upon a Time's* Swanqueen fandom, for example, have experienced such extreme animosity that some created the Tumblr *sqreceipts* for the simple purpose of keeping track of abusive attacks. I have no more than anecdotal proof from friends who stopped posting after such directed hate attacks or the constant hateful responses to their posts. But looking through even recent Tumblr conflicts, one can see how many of the participants have since deactivated their accounts.

Often, the personal attacks go beyond mere insults to accuse other fans of being racist, sexist, or ableist, or homo-, trans-, bi-, or acephobic. Fandom brings together people of different ages and nationalities, let alone races, classes, genders, and sexualities. Calling people out when they are insensitive or offensive is an important way to engage, and much needed in a place that often mirrors the biases of the general media culture. In particular, the inherent racism that pervades nearly all fan-doms to varying degrees has certainly created hostile environments that have caused some fans of color to stop engaging or leave entirely. In

turn, however, blunt, if not false, accusations can create a toxic environment as well. In *The Force Awakens* fandom, for example, there is a vocal contingent of anti-Reylo fans, that is, fans who hate Rey/Kylo, the pairing of the main female character and the main male villain in the latest *Star Wars* movie. Anti-Reylos read the pairing's on-screen encounters as rape, and they point out the age difference and potential familial relationship. Often declaring themselves younger or even underage, with many self-defining as childhood abuse survivors, anti-Reylos not only hate the pairing but find its very existence triggering. Calling Reylo fans abusive and pedophiles, in turn, causes Reylo fans to become nasty, often each side spamming the other with their vitriol. On the anon meme failfandom_anon many fans describe how they have left their fandom or, at least, have stopped reading and engaging on Tumblr because of the highly aggressive atmosphere.

Much has been written about the way online communication, with its seeming anonymity (or pseudonymity), facilitates vitriolic attacks that would never occur face-to-face. And yet sometimes fans move their animosities into actual spaces, cyberstalking and doxing other fans, calling their employers, or threatening to call the police on them. I want to end with an example that is clearly not typical but that shows both the negative affect fannish love can generate and the way fan community spaces can become so hostile that other fans end our fannish love affair rather than the show or music group or sports team itself.

In April 2015 at the BBC Sherlock con 221B, a group of fans derailed an eighteen-plus panel that was meant to discuss adult fiction in the fandom. Having previously accused people of defending rape and being pedophiles, they returned the discussion repeatedly to the morality of writing fiction about criminal sexual behavior, ultimately causing one of the panelists to break down in tears as she described her own sexual abuse and how writing fan fiction is therapeutic for her. Shortly thereafter, someone uploaded this breakdown on YouTube, exposing the panelist's breakdown for anyone to see. Even though YouTube eventually took down the video and the con committee banned the proud ringleader of the group, who

had announced her intentions before the con and had a history of attacking people online and in person, the fallout from this con affected large parts of Sherlock fandom. I don't know if the greenirene (her Tumblr pseudonym used to post an account of the panel, alluding to her cosplaying Irene Adler in a green dress in the filmed scenes) left fandom or not, but the chilling effects of fandom wank, ship wars, fannish fails, and subtle yet constant prejudices should not be forgotten when we think of fan endings.

Paul Booth's chapter in this collection reminds us that there is a "thin line between love and hate" in fannish discourse: our strong attachment to a fannish object can quickly turn to feelings of a different sort, covering a wide range of feelings that don't always fit easily into the fannish extremes. If I focus instead on the extreme affect fannishness produces, it is not to deny the range of fannish engagements, but rather to focus on the way few fannish emotions exist merely between fan and object. In its stead, I foreground the role of the community at any stage of the fannish relationship: the relationship among fans is as important as, if not more important than, the relationship between fan and fan object. At any point in our fandom journey — whether in our first fandom or as a fannish veteran, whether in the very first stages of falling in love with a text or slowly removing ourselves from the community, whether leaving a fandom bitterly or transitioning to a different mode of engagement — we tend to feel strongly about the fan objects, their creators, and our fellow fans. These strong emotions may be positive or negative, but they all spring from the intense, if not excessive, affect that lies at the heart of fannish engagement. The ultimate ending may indeed not be the moment a producer angers, a writer disappoints, a music or sports star misbehaves, a character dies, or our community shatters into pieces, but rather the moment we stop caring about it.

[Perfect Me: Beauty as an Ethical Ideal](#) by Heather Widdows [Princeton University Press, 9780691160078]

How looking beautiful has become a moral imperative in today's world

The demand to be beautiful is increasingly important in today's visual and virtual culture. Rightly or wrongly, being perfect has become an ethical ideal to live by, and according to which we judge ourselves good or bad, a success or a failure. [Perfect Me](#) explores the changing nature of the beauty ideal, showing how it is more dominant, more demanding, and more global than ever before.

Heather Widdows argues that our perception of the self is changing. More and more, we locate the self in the body—not just our actual, flawed bodies but our transforming and imagined ones. As this happens, we further embrace the beauty ideal. Nobody is firm enough, thin enough, smooth enough, or buff enough—not without significant effort and cosmetic intervention. And as more demanding practices become the norm, more will be required of us, and the beauty ideal will be harder and harder to resist.

If you have ever felt the urge to "make the best of yourself" or worried that you were "letting yourself go," this book explains why. [Perfect Me](#) examines how the beauty ideal has come to define how we see ourselves and others and how we structure our daily practices—and how it enthralls us with promises of the good life that are dubious at best. [Perfect Me](#) demonstrates that we must first recognize the ethical nature of the beauty ideal if we are ever to address its harms.

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Excerpt: [Perfect Me](#) has been a personal rollercoaster as well as a professional one. Not only were the arguments I ended up making not those I intended to make, but working on the topic has challenged and changed my views in all kinds of ways. I began the book with something of a split personality. On feminist grounds I was highly critical of beauty norms, and I originally thought the answer could be found through revisionist second wave feminist accounts. I did hold the view that unrealistic and demanding beauty ideals were a way of perpetuating gender subordination; and one that was particularly pernicious as it made otherwise strong and independent women self-critical and vulnerable. As [Perfect Me](#) shows, I still endorse much of this critique, especially regarding the harms of demanding and unrealistic beauty ideals, but I now think something else far more nuanced, complicated, and interesting is going on. While I endorsed these second wave feminist accounts, something didn't ring true in my lived experience, both in my history with beauty practices and my experience as a woman and vocal feminist in philosophy. As [Perfect Me](#) progressed, I realized I had used beautifying and presenting as an obviously "made-up" woman to assert my identity and survive in philosophy. If women are not welcome in philosophy in general, women with strong northern accents, heels, eyeliner, and nail polish are even less welcome, and must be, self-evidently, not smart. But yet I have never forgone make-up; although before working on [Perfect Me](#) I would take my nail polish off before an interview or giving a paper. Working on [Perfect Me](#) made me reflect on this: why have I not thrown away my polish and paint? For a long time I couldn't answer this and struggled, as many feminists have, with what I saw as my hypocritical behavior. But working on [Perfect Me](#) has made me revisit the wisdom of simply refusing to beautify. If I am honest, I know it is not wholly harmful or imprisoning to engage in beauty practices, and in the very particular context of philosophy—male dominated but socially awkward—it has been a form of defiance (albeit in a very small way and I am not claiming this is a huge difference or discrimination). I am still working through this, but I think I have used powder, paint, leather, and heels

to assert myself. In presenting my polished face and nails, I am a challenge. I unsettle and undermine the status quo. A woman like "that," like me, jars, doesn't fit, upsets. Just by being there I raise questions. This works less well as I age, and possibly I will end up conforming to a different philosophy norm; that of the eccentric. It has also likely made my life much harder than if I had I adopted the outward form of a serious philosopher. This is a small part of my own complex story with beauty, and as the beauty ideal embeds stories beauty will become more complex and more important. Beauty is not simple. It matters, and academics need to engage seriously and urgently. If we want to live in the world, understand the world, and ultimately change it, we need to start by taking seriously what actually matters to people, and beauty matters, and for many it matters consciously and continually.

At the beginning of the project, a close friend teased me that I had turned to beauty because I'd turned forty. Maybe it was that, or perhaps it was trying to bring up a daughter in a world of pink with occasional purple highlights. At the age of three, she had already been told she couldn't play in the playhouse as she was wearing trousers and therefore a boy. (Not a good moment.) This work has allowed me, somewhat, to square the circle between my northern upbringing in a broadly workingclass community (although my parents were decidedly middle class—with books; my dad had been to Cambridge!) with the elite community of philosophy to which I now belong. My best mate and I did lots of beautifying from the ages of ten onwards. We painted each other's nails, shopped for and shared clothes, and spent hours brushing and styling hair. She is still my best friend, godmother to my daughter, twice my bridesmaid, and we still shop for and swap clothes, do nails, and go on Spa days (Spa days being a newer addition). I love this kind of beautifying, and I love seeing my friends beautiful, and take pride and joy in their beauty. For the record, I totally reject narratives that women are always in competition. Yet, despite these very positive experiences of beauty—and I still paint nails (of anyone) at every opportunity—I have experienced the changes in the demands of beauty with some horror. Horror at

the rising minimal demands (body hair removal and Botox being very obvious examples), horror at the lengths we are willing to go to (rising requests for labiaplasty from girls as young as ten), and horror at how we have come to think of success in beauty as success nearly everywhere (academia being an unusual outlier). We are in the midst of an epidemic of anxiety and shame that is verging on despair, and we are calling this normal. In *Perfect Me* I seek to name these phenomena, to do justice to my experience of beautifying and my love of women while recognizing that beauty norms, even in their best form are problematic, and as they are emerging will be catastrophic.

Beauty without the Beast

In *Perfect Me* I have mapped the changing nature of the beauty ideal. I have argued that the current and emerging beauty ideal is different from previous ideals. It is an ethical ideal, which is dominant and on the way to being globally dominant. The ethical nature of the ideal is new and, together with its dominance, is transformative. Moreover, the beauty ideal is increasingly demanding, and, as normalization of beauty practices and procedures continues apace, the future looks frightening. If the worst of current trends continue, we will find ourselves in a world where we are preoccupied with appearance to the point of obsession, where our effort is channeled primarily into improving our bodies at the expense of the myriad other activities and tasks that we could do, both individually and collectively. Moreover, as we are already beginning to discover, a beauty ideal as an ethical ideal is not as rewarding as its promises suggest. If we invest too much, value appearance too much, we do not flourish, we are not happy, and yet, as beauty matters more, failing to strive for better selves is to fail and morally fail. As technological possibilities increase, the amount that we could, and should, do to better ourselves will go on increasing. Those who can afford it will do whatever is possible, and those who cannot will aspire to it; they will save and sacrifice, and such goods will become even more desirable. As this happens, so too the pressure to engage and the risks we are willing to subject ourselves to will also rise. And, if current models of ethics are not replaced and choice

remains sovereign, taking extreme risks will be routine. Indeed, as beauty matters more, almost any risks will be "worth it": after all, I am worth it.

It is already the case that some of us feel like this. Most of us believe our appearance is crucial to identity, girls as young as three judge character based on body shape, and young women would rather be thin than smart: "I reckon that if I fitted into size 10 jeans I would be happier. I would rather have that than straight A's." Attaining the ideal matters more than almost anything else, and girls prioritize their bodies over their health.¹ This is not an isolated rich white girl's problem, although the extent to which engagement is possible does depend on resources. As the authors of a study of Indian young women put it, "for all the choices the participants may have felt they had, being 'fat' was not one of them."² Men too are feeling the pressure, and for all of us bodies matter more, and failure to comply to the beauty ideal is costly and increasingly political. The process of worrying about our bodies, striving, succeeding, failing, and striving again is normal and continual. It is a background condition of our lives, a preoccupation of daily conversation, and increasingly dominating of our thoughts and habits. It is core to the way we structure our lives and our very selves. We are our bodies, and our bodies are ourselves, and no matter how much success we have we ultimately fail. We sag, bulge, wrinkle, and crumple. No matter what we do, thinness, firmness, smoothness, and youth cannot be maintained.

This is a bleak picture indeed. In such a scenario, the pleasures of beauty will recede, and the pressure to engage in ever-more-risky beauty practices will become overwhelming. At this point the harms to our physical and psychological health and to our social structures and relationships will be vast, and yet, having embraced the ideal difficult to forgo. The extent of what will be required to be normal is potentially unending and the pursuit of the body beautiful could supersede all other agendas and achievements. The epidemic of body anxiety could be a foreshadowing of worse to come.

Yet none of the traditional arguments are sufficient to account for what is happening under the current

beauty ideal. The old arguments of coercion and desperate choice, adaptive preference, and gender exploitation fail. They do not capture the most pressing moral concerns of the new beauty ideal, nor do they chime with, or respect, women's lived experience under the ideal. This is not because they have nothing to offer. They do. The desperate choice argument fails, but it shows how it is possible that context and force of circumstance can be limiting and leave us with little choice. Likewise, while we might think a world where appearance did not matter would be better, in the world we do have beauty does matter, undermining claims of false consciousness and adaptive preference. And while men benefit from women beautifying, arguments of gendered exploitation do not account for the engagement of women; particularly financially independent and postfeminist women. Such arguments are no longer, if they ever were, explanatory, but they are illuminating. They highlight what is and what is not going on. That choice is profoundly limited matters; that there are gendered differences matters; that over-engagement in beauty practices is not good for us and comes at the expense of everything else matters. But these arguments miss the dual nature of the beauty ideal and the dual nature of the self under the beauty ideal.

The brutal future sketched above of an ever more dominant, demanding, and punishing ethical ideal is not the only possible future. There are elements within the beauty ideal that offer other possibilities. The beauty ideal is not merely an evil taskmaster, but also a beckoning seducer. It promises, it inspires, and it is alluring and empowering, hopeful and positive. Importantly, unlike calls to reject the ideal, it is not shrill. Its iron fist is hidden beneath smooth skin, manicured nails, bejeweled fingers, and silk gloves. Recall the students who grew their body hair and were surprised to find it hard to be hairy. The pleasures of beauty are not illusory, beauty offers pleasurable individual and communal practices, and it sanctions other forms of pleasure that are currently only available in a beauty context. Moreover, in a visual and virtual culture where beauty matters more—and maybe eventually most—the inherently unpleasant nature of many beauty practices is off set by the rewards.

Beauty work is rewarded in social and communal ways—beauty success is valued and praised—and beauty work is increasingly moral work. Body work is virtuous. It is good for us and good to do.

Ignoring the pleasures of beauty and focusing only on the harms not only fails to take account of the evidence and ignores women's lived experience, but it fails strategically. It does not work. Women

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failures, with little respite or reward. Nor do I want to live in a world, however, where the body is denied, or where a version of "natural" beauty is elevated. Appearance does and should matter, and denying the body has proven, on very many occasions, far more dangerous, destructive and inhuman than overemphasizing the body is likely to be. Likewise, "natural" beauty does not exist, bodies are always constructed, and "natural" beauty makes beauty the preserve of the blessed few; and usually these blessed few are those who already have economic, social, and cultural power. While beauty hides power, it also erodes it. The extent to which beauty cuts through hierarchies is often exaggerated, and Edmonds speaks of beauty in Brazil as "an essential form of value and all-too-often imaginary vehicle of ascent for those blocked from more formal routes of social mobility." Nonetheless, beauty can shortcut some power hierarchies, and, as beauty matters more, other social goods, such as class and wealth, might matter less in comparison. Furthermore, beauty serves other egalitarian purposes, in that it provides a shared topic that crosses racial groups, class, age, and, if we move to less gendered norms, sexualities. Therefore the question is what can be done to nurture and extend the positive aspects of beauty, those that enhance, respect, connect, and cherish, as opposed to those that criticize, humiliate, and shame. In short, can we have beauty without the beast?

Whether or not we can, we have to try. Indeed what other option is there? If I am right and a globally dominant beauty ideal that functions as an ethical ideal is emerging, then we are in new territory. We have never before been in a situation where appearance and bodies are so central, especially in this particular hypervisual way. Pretending that we can deny appearance ideals and advocating non-engagement is not a good enough response. It abandons young women (and older women and others) to increasingly demanding norms. Throughout, I have rejected the approach of telling women what to do and not do. Such an approach is women-blaming and divisive, and it does not address the beauty ideal. Only collectively can change happen, and if we seek to mitigate the harms and costs of the emerging

inhuman and punishing beauty ideal, we should focus collectively. Collectively there are a number of possible sites of interventions. For instance regulation on some issues might begin a culture change. Regulation could be on images, ads, and beauty coverage: for instance, on what you are permitted to say and imply beauty practices can do for you. Recall the advertising of the "make yourself amazing" clinics, or consider the reporting of the Meg Matthews' face-lift (which if not quite an endorsement is hard not to read as encouragement).⁵ Regulation could broadly follow the French law and only permit factual statements, or it could require health warnings or statements of risk, and information labels could be placed to alert the consumer to the fact that images are digitally altered.⁶ In addition, the regulatory changes suggested by Keogh and others could improve the safety of practices and procedures by improving training and qualifications, information and consent procedures, and redress. These changes however must not focus only on protecting those who engage, but also the providers of processes, and they must be attentive to communal concerns. If they are not, then such regulation will be counterproductive, as it will, whatever its intention, make procedures more normal and mainstream. In addition, perhaps most pressingly, regulation or improved voluntary governance could ensure routine and robust collection of data, so that as we move into the future, we will have an accurate picture of the extent of engagement, risks, and complications: data we quite simply do not currently have.

Such regulation contributes to cultural change, but more than this is required if the beauty ideal is to be challenged and the extensive and significant harms that attach to it reduced. Collectively, we need to focus on creating a less toxic environment. Collective action has to begin with collective discussion, and the first step in such action must be to recognize how important beauty is, and is becoming, and how extensive the demands of beauty are under an increasingly dominant and potentially global ethical ideal. We need to be able to speak about the extensive harms of beauty, the harms of normalization, of the epidemic of anxiety that is increasingly regarded as normal

and about the massive physical, psychological,
social, and financial costs that accompany the

make others more resilient, and there are many programs under way that focus on schools and include body positivity in the curriculum." In addition, for all the criticisms of body positive campaigns (and many of these I have sympathy with), such campaigns maybe the beginning of a more celebratory and women-loving culture. Such campaigns focus on raising resilience, on encouraging young women to be proud of their nonbeauty attributes as well as their appearance and, when it comes to the body, to focus on what the body can do, as well as how it looks.

We can also seek to change how we look at ourselves and others. We do not have to endorse the view that "every woman somehow finds herself, without her consent, entered into a beauty contest with every other woman." We can change the way we treat others and collectively see the body and appearance as always to be celebrated. To this end we can reject some wholly harmful practices. For instance, we can collectively shame not failing bodies, but shaming talk. Body shaming should be as unacceptable as other forms of discrimination. If I am right, even a little, about the extent to which ourselves are located in our bodies, then criticisms of how we look, whether in the flesh or virtually is likely to be particularly devastating. This is a practical place to start, regulation may help, but we can also collectively make body shaming talk unacceptable. Perhaps "everyday lookism" could be a sister campaign to "everyday sexism"? Let me add, on a personal note, it is possible to change your own attitude to bodies. Since beginning this project I have changed how I look at others. I now look for something beautiful in everyone, and I have never yet failed to find it. This has not only reduced my own anxiety at first meetings and made me kinder to those who I might not have the best relationships with (it's hard to be hostile to someone when you are thinking what great hair texture they have), but it has also made me much less critical of my own aging, and increasingly flawed body. It is a tactic that anyone can adopt.

If we carry on regardless, ever more isolated in our quest for the perfect me, the future will be bleak indeed. Yet there are many possible futures. The first step in finding more human ways to live under the beauty ideal and to begin to transform it, is to

recognize the ideal and the self under the ideal as they actually are. It is a dual ideal, which is potentially destructive and cruel, but also a celebratory and potentially life-enhancing. Most importantly, and this is the distinctive claim of [Perfect Me](#), it is an ethical ideal. <>

[The Letters of Sylvia Plath Volume 1: 1940-1956](#) by Sylvia Plath edited by Peter Steinberg, Karen Kukil [Harper, 9780062740434]

A major literary event: the first volume in the definitive, complete collection of the letters of Sylvia Plath—most never seen before now.

Sylvia Plath (1932-63) was born in Boston, Massachusetts, and studied at Smith College. In 1955 she went to Cambridge University on a Fulbright fellowship, where she met and later married Ted Hughes. She published one collection of poems in her lifetime, [The Colossus](#) (1960), and a novel, [The Bell Jar](#) (1963). Her [Collected Poems](#), which contains her poetry written from 1956 until her death, was published in 1981 and was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for Poetry. Other posthumous publications include [Ariel](#), her landmark publication, [Crossing the Water](#), [Winter Trees](#), [Johnny Panic and the Bible of Dreams](#) and [The Journals of Sylvia Plath 1950-1962](#).

One of the most beloved poets of the modern age, Sylvia Plath continues to inspire and fascinate the literary world. While her renown as one of the twentieth century's most influential poets is beyond dispute, Plath was also one of its most captivating correspondents. [The Letters of Sylvia Plath](#) is the breathtaking compendium of this prolific writer's correspondence with more than 120 people, including family, friends, contemporaries, and colleagues. Many of these letters are from Sylvia to her mother, so those get a bit depressing. She tries so hard to make everything seem okay and conform to lame, boring, white middleclass 1950s society.

The footnotes provide little information--I would rather get a brief note explaining why someone is important than a birth/death date and the person's address. Why do I need to know where Haven House's maid lived? I also don't care about whether an object mentioned is still included with the letter

(usually, not) or whether the letter's date was deduced from postmark or not. Surely these notes are of interest only to the most pedantic of Plath fans.

The Letters of Sylvia Plath includes her correspondence from her years at Smith, her summer editorial internship in New York City, her time at Cambridge, her experiences touring Europe, and the early days of her marriage to Ted Hughes in 1956.

Most of the letters are previously unseen, including sixteen letters written by Plath to Hughes when they were apart after their honeymoon. This large compendium also includes twenty-seven of Plath's own elegant line drawings taken from the letters she sent to her friends and family, as well as twenty-two previously unpublished photographs.

This notable, collected edition of Plath's letters is a work of immense scholarship and care, presenting a comprehensive and historically accurate text of the known and extant letters that she wrote. Intimate and revealing, this masterful compilation offers fans and scholars generous and unprecedented insight into the life of one of our most significant poets.

This volume covers her late teens to early twenties, but already we see Plath's early signs of bipolar disorder. She swings from dark lows and an early suicide attempt while at college, to exotic highs when she meets Sassoon, her first boyfriend, down again when he appears to reject her, then up to ecstatic heights at Cambridge University where she meets Ted Hughes. More miserable lows follow when they're parted.

Excerpt:

Sylvia Plath was many things to many people: daughter, niece, sister, student, journalist, poet, friend, artist, girlfriend, wife, novelist, peer, and mother; but perhaps the most overlooked feature of her life was that she was human, and therefore fallible. She misspelled words, punctuated incorrectly, lied, misquoted texts, exaggerated, was sarcastic, and sometimes brutally honest. All, and more, are aspects of [the Letters of Sylvia Plath](#).

The first letters collected in this volume are to Sylvia Plath's parents, written in February 1940. They were found in the attic of the Plath family home at 92 Johnson Avenue, Winthrop, Massachusetts. Plath was seven and a quarter years old and staying temporarily with her grandparents nearby at 892 Shirley Street when her correspondence begins. Written in pencil on 19 February, the letter to her father, Otto, includes a heart-shaped enclosure in which she expresses concern for his health, 'I hope you are better' and is signed 'With love / from / Sylvia'. Plath's readers may recognize the same imagery in 'Daddy', when the speaker claims her father had 'bit my pretty red heart in two'. Otto Plath died later that year. On 20 February, Plath wrote to her mother, the first of more than 700 letters sent over the next twenty-three years, adding a crayon drawing to illustrate the text. Throughout her life, Sylvia Plath would express herself in the medium of drawing, as well as the literary arts, often combining the two in her correspondence.

Between 1943 and 1948, Plath spent her summers away from the family home at camps in New Hampshire and Massachusetts. She wrote nearly every day to her mother, less frequently to her brother and maternal relatives. These letters show from the start the importance afforded to correspondence in the Plath household. We may take for granted today the ease and instantaneousness of communication, but in the 1940s replies were slower. On 18 July 1943, Plath wrote 'I didn't get a letter from you yesterday, I hope you are all right ... Are you well? I worry when I don't receive letters from you.' These letters tender a catalogue of quintessential activities from swimming and hiking to arts and crafts and eating. The young Plath had a voracious appetite as evidenced by this meal in July 1945: 'For lunch I had a bird's feed of 6 plates of casserole & sauce containing potatos, peas, onions, carrots, chicken (yum, yum); five cups of punch and a scoop of vanilla, coffee, and orange ice cream.' Here, Plath's sense of humour shines through: 'If you're hard up on ration points when I come home you can have Joe slaughter me and you can eat me for pork.' In time, Plath became competent and energetic about food preparation. She hosted a

large party while attending Harvard Summer School, serving 'a huge bouffet, with delectable varieties of meat, fish, hors d'ouvres, desserts' (5 August 1954). She made the most of limited resources on 'a single gas ring' as a Fulbright student at Newnham College by managing 'to create a steak dinner complete with sherry, hors d'oeuvres, salad, etc. in rebellion versus English cooking' (14 December 1955).

The earlier letters also include Plath's youthful verse and some of these poems appear here in print for the first time. In a letter dated 20 March 1943, Plath sent her mother the following quatrain:

Plant a little seedling
Mix with rain and showers,
Stir them with some sun-shine,
And up come some flowers.

The predominant themes of fairies and nature that appeared in these poems were acknowledged by Plath much later when she was asked 'What sort of thing did you write about when you began?' She replied:

Nature, I think: birds, bees, spring, fall, all those subjects which are absolute gifts to the person who doesn't have any interior experience to write about. I think the coming of spring, the stars overhead, the first snowfall and so on are gifts for a child, a young poet.

In their focus upon her immediate surroundings, the poems by the young writer composed at summer camp established a practice that she continued until the end. In 'Camp Helen Storrow', the speaker observes 'The trees are swaying in the wind / The night is dark & still' (7 July 1945); likewise in Plath's late poem 'Mystic', the speaker's memories allude to her time at summer camp, 'I remember / The dead smell of sun on wood cabins'. Plath had success writing about places. For example, her poems about Cape Cod, Massachusetts ('Mussel Hunter at Rock Harbor'), Grantchester, England ('Watercolour of Grantchester Meadows'), and Benidorm, Spain ('The Net Menders') were each accepted for publication by the New Yorker. Similarly, she regularly published travel articles in the Christian Science Monitor.

Plath's non-familial letters begin with a friend Margot Loungway Drekmeier (seventeen letters,

1945-7); her best friend's mother Marion Freeman (twelve letters, 1946-62.); and a German pen-pal Hans-Joachim Neupert (eighteen letters, 1947-52.). In these we learn of Plath's little-known interest in philately; her sincerity and graciousness to a woman she considered a 'second mother'; and her ability to relate to a foreign pen-pal and convey what it was like growing up in America. What readers will see here is Plath's empathetic attention to her recipients and how, like writing a poem or short story for a specific market, she was able to craft a letter concentrating solely on her relationship to the addressee. There are often inside jokes and other content that will be above our heads, but Plath's letter writing is a serious art form.

Following the appearance of her short story 'And Summer Will Not Come Again' (Seventeen, August 1950) and weeks from matriculating at Smith College, Plath received her first fan letter from Edward Cohen of Chicago. In one of her replies, Plath provided a self-portrait as a nearly eighteen-year-old:

Maybe you don't know how it is not to be accepted in a group of kids because you're just a little too individual. Shyness, in their terminology is conceit, good marks signify the horror of horrors ... a brain. No doubt this all sounds oozingly pathetic, but it's one of the reasons that I'm the way I am. I'm sarcastic, skeptical and sometimes callous because I'm still afraid of letting myself be hurt. There's that very vulnerable core in me which every egoist has ... and I try rather desperately not to let it show. (11 August 1950)

Of the eighty-five collected letters written during her first semester at Smith College, all but two are to her mother. An additional sixty-six letters were sent to Wellesley between January and May of 1951. The result is a nearly uninterrupted narrative of her first year away from home. That spring, Plath also sent eight letters to her good friend Ann Davidow-Goodman Hayes, who did not return to Smith after the first semester. These letters to Ann, as well as to her other lifelong friend Marcia Brown Stern, span both volumes and provide a glimpse of the strong bonds Plath made with her classmates.

Many of Plath's journal entries at the start of her college years are undated. To the contrary, Plath's letters were either meticulously dated by her or have been assigned dates by the present editors. This may allow those journal passages with no dates to be identified. For example, Plath's undated journal entry 45 recounts 'Another blind date. This one is older.' She provided a more staid version of the evening in a letter written to her mother on 3 December 1950. Journal entry 64 contains 'Notes on an experimental film', which was *Un Chien Andalou* directed by Luis Buñuel and Salvador Dalí. Plath wrote to her mother on the night of 10 April 1951: 'Saw a brief Dalí shock movie — my one free act for the rest of the year.' This exercise may lead to a ripple effect, forwards and backwards, of being able to date additional journal entries.

There are no journals from autumn 1953 to autumn 1955. Publishing Plath's letters from this period fills an autobiographical void and offers firsthand accounts of her life from readmission to Smith College in 1954 to her departure for Britain in September 1955. The letters to Gordon Lameyer, Philip McCurdy, her mother, Richard Sassoon, and Jon Rosenthal, for example, establish her successful re-immersion in both academic and social life. Plath always took her studies and writing seriously, but she regularly travelled to Boston, New York, and New Haven for dates and cultural events. Hungry for new experiences because they encourage 'personality adjustments', she challenged her own comfort in numerous ways such as taking a two-seater plane flight and adjudicating a highschool writing contest. In her last semester at Smith, Plath enrolled in a special studies course, 'The Theory and Practice of Poetics', and produced 'a "batch" of poems weekly', amounting to more than fifty new works (9 January 1955).

While her goal was still to appear in the *New Yorker*, by the time she graduated Smith on 6 June 1955 Plath's poetry was appearing in major American publications such as *Harper's* and the *Atlantic Monthly*. She had made the acquaintance of famous writers and poets, too, among them Elizabeth Bowen, and W. H. Auden, and Marianne Moore, who offered advice and support. With nearly a decade of experience to this point, Plath

was practical in her approach to submitting her work and handling either acceptance or rejection. When she arrived in Britain she was presented with a new market of periodicals to which to offer her work and a different audience of readers. While still submitting poems to American journals, Plath quickly tried magazines based in London, Oxford, and Cambridge. She maximized exposure by publishing her work in Britain and America. For example, 'Epitaph for Fire and Flower' was published simultaneously in Cambridge's *Chequer* (Winter 1956-7) and Chicago's *Poetry* (January 1957).

In her first term at Newnham College, Cambridge, Plath joined the Amateur Dramatics Club, performing in a small 'nursery' production and in the big autumn performance of *Bartholomew Fair*. To Marcia Brown Stern, Plath wrote about the many possible groups and activities open to students: 'there are clubs for everything from puppetry to piloting, communists to heretics, wine tasters to beaglers! Indifference is the cardinal sin' (c. 14 December 1955).

Plath spent her Christmas 1955 break from Newnham on the continent, in Paris and Nice, with Richard Sassoon. Upon her return to Cambridge, Sassoon abruptly ended their relationship. Plath was not short of male attention (she wrote to her mother that there were '10 men to each woman!'), but Sassoon's departure disturbed her. She sent Sassoon a number of letters that winter and thoughtfully transcribed excerpts into her journals. Although printed in the *Journals of Sylvia Plath* (Faber, 2000), these excerpts appear in this volume to lend documentary force and context in the storyline of her spring 1956 correspondence.

On 25 February 1956, Plath wrote to her mother that 'it is a new day: bright, with sun, and a milder aspect' and notified her that she was 'going to a party celebrating the publication of a new literary review'. The following week, Plath wrote again to her mother:

Met, by the way, a brilliant ex-Cambridge poet at the wild St. Botolph's Review party last week; will probably never see him again (he works for J. Arthur Rank in London) but wrote my best poem about

him afterwards: the only man I've met yet here who'd be strong enough to be equal with; such is life; will send a few poems in my next letter so you can see what I'm doing. (3 March 1956)

True to her word, on 9 March Plath sent her mother 'Pursuit' with a full explication. It is not until 19 April, however, that Plath formally introduces 'this poet, this Ted Hughes' by name. 'He is tall, hulking, with a large-cut face, shocks of dark brown hair and blazing green & blue flecked eyes; he wears the same old clothes all the time: a thick black sweater & wine-stained khaki pants.

The courtship and marriage of Plath and Hughes has been well documented in the past by biographers, but never before in Plath's own, unedited words. Their marriage was kept secret, as Plath feared she would lose her Fulbright scholarship if the authorities discovered she was married. On their honeymoon in Spain, the couple resumed a routine established in Cambridge of reading and writing verse. As noted earlier, Plath relished preparing meals under somewhat rustic conditions. Thus, in Benidorm, she had the time and opportunity to 'cook on a fickle one-ring petrol burner, and write and write. We are happy as hell, writing stories, poems, books, fables' (10 August 1956).

The happiness continued through a September spent with the Hughes family at the Beacon in Heptonstall. In addition to writing while in Yorkshire, they made frequent excursions on the surrounding moors. Plath returned to Cambridge, alone, on 1 October. Once back in her room, at Whitstead, she wrote the first of sixteen letters to Hughes over the next twenty-two days. The journey 'was hell', but she returned to news that 'POETRY has accepted SIX of my poems!!!!!!!!!! Like we dreamed of.'

As the month progressed the separation became unbearable. In the first of two letters to Hughes on 21 October, Plath writes 'I feel so mere and fractional without you.' In the second letter that day she admits 'I am terribly lonely for you.' The next day, Plath imparted the results of some research, 'I looked up the fulbright lists and found three married women on it; so singleness is not a

condition of a fulbright for ladies' (22 October 1956).

This volume closes with two letters written on 23 October 1956, four days prior to Plath's twenty-fourth birthday. To Peter Davison, an editor at the Atlantic Monthly and former boyfriend, Plath submitted her husband's manuscript of children's fables and caught up on general news and acceptances. She concludes optimistically, 'I look most forward to coming back home next June. I feel somehow like a feminine Samson with hair cut, if such is possible---being so far away from editors & publishing houses!' To her mother she exuberates:

ted is coming to live & work in cambridge for the rest of the year; in the next two weeks we are going on a rigorous campaign of making our marriage public to first my philosophy supervisor, next the fulbright, next newnham; we are married and it is ridiculous and impossible for either of us to be whole or healthy apart.
<>

[La Parisienne in Cinema: Between Art and Life](#) by Felicity Chaplin [Manchester University Press, 9781526109538]

Excerpt: The term *la Parisienne* denotes far more than simply a female inhabitant of Paris. She is a figure of French modernity, and this can be taken in two senses, the technical/industrial and the cultural. The technical or industrial sense refers to the modernization of Paris and its transformation into the capital of the modern world. This process included the reconstruction of Paris by Baron Haussmann and the widening of the boulevards, the extensive use of iron and glass in the construction of the arcades, the expansion of the railway system, the revolution in printing technology, the rise of the department store, the new system of capitalism and consumer culture, and increased leisure activity amongst the city's inhabitants. In the days before Haussmann, 'it was impossible to stroll about everywhere in the city. Before Haussmann, wide pavements were rare; the narrow ones afforded little protection from vehicles. Flânerie could hardly have assumed the importance it did without the arcades'. Anne Friedberg traces the appearance of the flâneuse to the emerging consumer culture and development of department stores in late

nineteenth-century Paris which afforded women a legitimate reason to occupy public space: 'The female flâneur, the flâneuse, was not possible until she was free to roam the city on her own. And this was equated with the privilege of shopping on her own'. With the boulevards and arcades, as well as the construction of extensive parks and gardens, women could for the first time be seen in public, on display, without being considered filles publiques or prostitutes.

Fashion, too, dictated the redesigning of Paris: in *The Arcades Project* Walter Benjamin writes that 'the widening of the streets, it was said, was necessitated by the crinoline'. This remark indicates a close relationship between the creation of the boulevards and fashionable women in their abundant crinoline dresses, parading down the wide streets of Paris, participating in the spectacle of modern life. This was the era when women began to stroll publicly in the city streets, their emergence facilitated by the arcades and department stores which legitimated their temporary leave of the interior or private sphere and their entry into the public sphere as consumers. The expansion of the railway network, from a few disparate strands totaling 1,931 km in 1850 to an intricate network of 17,400 km in 1870, opened Parisian industry and commerce to interregional and international competition. David Harvey sums up the effect of this expansion in the following way: 'it was not only goods that moved. Tourists flooded in from all over the world, shoppers poured in from the suburbs, and the Parisian labor market spread its tentacles into ever remoter regions to satisfy burgeoning demand for labor power'. The ease with which provincials and foreigners could now travel to Paris was also formative for la Parisienne who, according to Georges Montorgueil, 'est de partout, mais ... ne devient qu'à Paris la Parisienne' (is from everywhere but ... only becomes the Parisienne in Paris).

A further important development in the creation of the Parisienne type was the revolution in printing technology in the nineteenth century. This resulted in both a dramatic decrease in the production cost of print media and the considerable increase in the availability of visual material, which in turn saw not

only the proliferation of illustrated journals, particularly fashion journals, but their dissemination across a wider readership, including both the working and lower-middle classes. For the first time, women across a much broader social spectrum were exposed to a single homogenizing image of the fashionable woman. Iskin writes that women could 'acquire a certain amount of information on how to look like a chic Parisienne by reading fashion magazines, illustrated journals and ordering from department store catalogues'.

This revolution in printing technology took place contemporaneously with the rise of haute couture and the development of the department stores and prêt-à-porter clothing. In 1872 there were 684 couturiers in Paris compared to only 158 in 1850; by 1895 the number had increased to 1,636. Tamar Garb writes that the 'department stores and shopping arcades proffered an unprecedented array of goods aimed at seducing women and creating in them the desire to consume luxury goods indispensable to their identity as women'.

Brian Nelson argues that shopping facilitated a woman's entry into and occupation of the public sphere. This reflected a more general tendency in Paris of the nineteenth century, resulting in increased visibility and mobility in the modern city: 'The newly revitalized city gave rise to a new culture. Life became more public'. According to Nancy Rose Marshall, it was in 'the new urban spaces in which the concept of the Parisienne was formed'.

In a cultural sense, la Parisienne is a figure of French modernity in that she was a feature of the visual arts, literature, physiognomies and popular culture of nineteenth-century France. She appears in the novels of Balzac, Flaubert and Zola; in the short stories of Maupassant; in Henry Becque's 1885 play *La Parisienne*; and in the poems of Baudelaire. She was also the subject of many studies and physiologies, including Taxile Delord's *Physiologie de la Parisienne* (1841), Théodore de Banville's *Les Parisiennes de Paris* (1866), Arsène Houssaye's *Les Parisiennes* (1869), Georges Montorgueil's *La Parisienne* (1897), and Louis Octave Uzanne's *Parisiennes de ce temps en leurs divers milieux, états et conditions* (1910), an

expanded edition of the original 1894 version, which appeared in an English-language edition entitled *The Modern Parisienne* (1912). There have also been numerous paintings, lithographs, etchings and pastels of Parisiennes: Tissot, Morisot, Stevens, Renoir, Helleu, Cassatt and Toulouse-Lautrec, among others, all sought to capture the type in their work. Visual artists, too, explicitly titled their studies *la Parisienne* or included the descriptor *Parisienne* in the title. According to Marie Simon, the proliferation of paintings featuring *la Parisienne* demonstrates 'the individual being replaced by the abstract. Artists no longer painted a woman but a human type, a quality'.

The attempt to capture the *Parisienne* type visually continued into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in photography. Three photographic monographs took the type as their primary subject matter: André Maurois's *Femmes de Paris* (1954), featuring photographs by Nico Jesse; *Parisiennes: A Celebration of French Women* (2007), a collection of photographs of Parisian women taken by celebrated as well as anonymous photographers; and Baudouin's *75 Parisiennes* (2013), which puts into play various pre-existing themes or motifs, revealing the vitality and currency of the *Parisienne* type. Baudouin draws on an already existing iconography of *la Parisienne* in composing his photographs, focusing on the repetition of familiar motifs such as the Eiffel Tower, the little black dress, the feather boa, the chevelure, the fashion journal and the cat. The iconography of *la Parisienne* that Baudouin draws on is largely informed by nineteenth-century visual and literary representations of the type. Baudouin also provides each sitter's profession and Metro station, which serves to indicate the meta-sociological aspect of the *Parisienne* type, a type not restricted by economics, class, nationality, ethnicity or status, but rather transcending these limits.

While there is significant scholarship on *la Parisienne* in the fields of art history, fashion theory and culture and cultural histories of Paris, there is little written on the (re)appearance and function of the type in cinema. In part, this is because her presence in cinema is not always immediately discernible and frequently forms or creates a subtext to the films. The goal of this book is to

outline a 'cycle' of *Parisienne* films; however, this cycle, like the type itself, is never complete and is always in the process of evolving, due both to the plasticity of the type and to the myriad possible ways of representing her. The films under consideration are limited to narrative feature films, which is not to deny the presence of the *Parisienne* type in short films, documentary or experimental films.

An iconographical approach

Erwin Panofsky's theory of iconography was first developed in relation to Renaissance art and later applied to cinema. His theory of the iconographical type was developed in relation to silent cinema, and later applied to sound cinema by Stanley Cavell and Jean-Loup Bourget. *La Parisienne* constitutes what Panofsky calls a 'type' because it possesses both a fixed and fluid iconography, the fixed aspects being those necessary for any preliminary identification of the type, the fluid referring to the variations the type undergoes during its development. In his essay 'Style and Medium in the Motion Pictures', Panofsky argues that in early silent cinema we find the introduction of 'a fixed iconography which from the outset informed the spectator about the basic facts and characters ... There arose, identifiable by standardized appearance, behavior, and attributes, the well-remembered types ... The conduct of characters was predetermined accordingly'. The introduction of types into silent film was necessary to help the audience confronted with the new medium 'understand the meaning of the speechless action in a moving picture'.

For Panofsky, the 'readability' of these types 'depend on pre- or extra-cinematic knowledge'. The idea of the pre- and extra-cinematic is particularly pertinent to this study, which seeks to demonstrate how pre-cinematic knowledge (nineteenth-century art, literature and mass culture) and extra-cinematic knowledge (stars and intertexts) inform the *Parisienne* type in cinema. *La Parisienne* may not initially be a recognizable type, particularly when compared with the more easily recognizable types of the silent era such as the villain, the gangster, the vamp or the 'good woman', due in part to the moral ambiguity of the

Parisienne type and to the fact that she seldom resembles herself. Thus, built into the Parisienne type is an elusiveness or multiplicity which makes easy recognition more difficult than it is with the more generic types originally considered by Panofsky. Yet, la Parisienne is a type nonetheless and she does possess certain motifs which make her recognizable, provided these motifs are thoroughly and accurately identified.

Panofsky argues that the introduction of a fixed iconography became less important once the cinemagoing public was acclimatized to the different typological signifiers and that these signifiers were 'virtually abolished by the invention of the talking film'. Despite this, however, there survives 'the remnants of a "fixed attitude and attribute" by which types can be recognized. While Cavell and Bourget agree that cinema introduces a fixed iconography, both have challenged Panofsky's claim that sound cinema effectively abolished the need for typology. Bourget remarks that he is struck by the persistence of iconography after the silent era. In a similar vein, Cavell writes that 'such devices persist as long as there are still Westerns and gangster films and comedies and musicals and romances. Which specific iconography the Villain is given will alter with the times, but that his iconography remains specific (i.e., operates according to a "fixed attitude and attribute" principle) seems undeniable'. Cavell further argues that cinema 'created new types, or combinations or ironic reversals of types; but there they were, and stayed', as well as for the 'continuing validity of a Panofskian iconographic program for the study of film'.

In *Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance*, Panofsky proposed a model for the analysis of Renaissance painting which corresponds to three levels or strata of meaning. The first, or pre-iconographical, level of a work of art is made up of motifs, pure forms which are the 'carriers of primary and natural meanings'. The second level involves the identification and description of the images; that is, the secondary or conventional meanings conveyed by the motifs. 'Motifs thus recognized as carriers of a secondary or conventional meaning may be called images' (Panofsky). This is the stage of iconographical

analysis proper. The third level consists of an iconological interpretation, that is, the interpretation of the images and their 'intrinsic meaning and content'.

Bourget argues that Panofsky's three-stratum model can be applied to cinema. For Bourget, an analysis of cinema which draws on models or methods from art history is highly productive, primarily because it restores an imbalance in film studies, which has often focused on questions of narrative or plot derived from the history of literature, often neglecting the image or figure. Bourget also considers a reference to art history in the analysis of cinema fruitful in that films will often cite motifs, either intentionally or unintentionally, which come directly from the history of painting. For Bourget, nothing assures that the reference to painting is completely intentional, while at other times the reference is manifestly intended.

In 'Style and Medium in the Motion Pictures', Panofsky raises the idea of medium specificity to found cinema as an art form, distinct from other art forms in terms of its technicality. Yet in terms of iconography, cinema can be subjected to the same type of analysis as painting. Having established cinema as a distinct art form through its medium specificity, Panofsky emphasizes not the kinetic but the photographic aspect of cinema. He de-emphasizes the technical specificity of the medium in favor of its origins in pictorial rather than narrative art: cinema originally not as 'filmed theatre' but literally as 'moving pictures'.

In 1982, Bourget adapted Panofsky's iconographical model for cinema; however, Panofsky's iconographic approach had already been used in film studies by Lawrence Alloway. Steve Neale writes that while Panofsky himself considered the application of the terms iconography and iconology to an analysis of films, it was Alloway 'who sought to apply them in a systematic way to the analysis of genres and cycles'. In a 1963 article for the film journal *Movie*, Alloway argues for the application of Panofsky's method to cinema: 'The meaning of a single movie is inseparable from the larger pattern of content-analysis of other movies'. For Alloway, iconography provides a way of 'charting the flow and the

evanescence' of films which belong to a popular art which does not possess 'an unchanging significance' but is rather in a constant state of flux.

For Alloway, the natural subject matter of Panofsky's first stratum when applied to cinema 'consists of the physical reality of the photographed world' which includes the actor and thus relates to the star system: 'The star whose

limited space in which to discuss them. Chance and availability have played their part in the selection process as well, and there are certainly films which might take their place in the cycle of Parisienne films which receive no mention in this study.

While this book confines itself to an iconographical approach to the Parisienne type, the relevance of critical approaches such as feminism and feminist film theory must also be noted. While a sustained feminist engagement is outside the scope of this book, such engagement seems an obvious omission from any detailed consideration of the type. There are two reasons, however, why this is not the place for such an engagement. First, this book, intended as an introduction to la Parisienne and her iconography in cinema, deals predominantly with visual and narrative conventions, derived primarily from nineteenth-century art, literature and visual culture. Thus, it lays the groundwork for further scholarship which may consider concepts such as gender, race and ethnicity, all of which are relevant to the study of the Parisienne type. Secondly, a feminist or gender studies approach may appear too polemical for a work intended as an introduction or overview.

Beyond the iconographical approach, however, the Parisienne type in cinema could and should be critically examined through an engagement with feminist film theory, reception studies and theories of spectatorship. Laura Mulvey's seminal essay 'Visual pleasure and narrative cinema' (1989), for example, might be a useful starting point for a discussion of identification and spectatorship practices in relation to the Parisienne type in cinema. Mulvey's claim that the visual pleasure in cinema is 'split between active/male and passive/female' appears relevant to the films discussed here. Indeed, the following lines appear to describe well the way this heterosexual matrix functions, particularly in mainstream films featuring la Parisienne: Traditionally, the woman displayed has functioned on two levels: as erotic object for the characters within the screen story, and as erotic object for the spectator within the auditorium, with a shifting tension between the looks on either side of the screen. For instance, the device of the showgirl allows the two looks to be unified technically without any apparent break in the

diagnosis. A woman performs within the narrative, the gaze of the spectator and that of the male characters in the film are neatly combined without breaking narrative verisimilitude.

While it can certainly be argued that Parisienne films, particularly those of 1950s Hollywood, conform to this notion of what Mulvey calls "neatly combined spectacle and narrative", there are certain traits of the Parisienne type which in fact work against this. As we shall see, the self-fashioning aspect of la Parisienne, alongside her role as active rather than merely passive muse, in some ways undermines the description of her as a purely male fantasy. In the representation of la Parisienne, one also frequently finds the comingling of life and art, the presence of 'real-life' women behind, or blended with, fictional characters. This is the case whether it is a historical personage overdetermining the representation, or the actress herself. Thus, it is argued here that feminist critiques of la Parisienne would have limited purchase, in spite of the visual pleasure and spectacle these films offer. La Parisienne is a fascinating figure precisely because she continually escapes representation, and as we shall see, more than one theorist of la Parisienne has noted the difficulty of capturing her essence.

In the nineteenth century (and continuing in cinema with a few exceptions), la Parisienne remains in part at least a male construction, but in part only. If, as Janet Wolff has argued, the "literature of modernity describes the experiences of men", women must appear colored by this experience, as objects rather than subjects of the modern world. Deborah L. Parsons, however, questions the notion that Baudelaire's depiction of women occurs within what Wolff calls a "classic misogynist duality". Rather, according to Parsons, Baudelaire's poetry raises the question of 'the place of women in the city and art of modernity that goes beyond personal prejudice'. Of interest for Parsons is the woman who appears fleetingly in the poem 'À une passante', the 'unknown woman who cannot be easily defined and thus controlled'. Parsons also notes that 'all the women common to Baudelaire's work are observers, and through them it is possible to question the assumption of the masculinity of public space and to formulate the beginnings of the

conceptual idea of a flâneuse'. Indeed, the figure of la Parisienne was one of the first flâneuses in a time when women were liberated from the interior space of the home, primarily through changes in the configuration of social space through the introduction of arcades, parks and gardens. The image of the flâneuse, first captured in Baudelaire's poetry, is that of the liberated, autonomous woman. A more contemporary example of the way la Parisienne might circumvent the standard feminist critique of male fantasy is in the figure of Brigitte Bardot. According to Ginette Vincendeau, Simone de Beauvoir praised Bardot's new form of sexuality in *Et Dieu ... créa la femme* as 'progressive' and a 'welcome change from what she saw as the passivity of the femme fatale'. Vincendeau herself notes a 'tension between the Bardot character [in *Et Dieu*] as subject (agent) of the narrative, initiating action and expressing her own desire without guilt, and as object, both of male desire and the camera'. However, elsewhere she admits a 'paradox' which makes Bardot fascinating: 'rather than being either pure male fantasy, or affirmation of women's desire, she is both. The force of her star persona is to reconcile these two antagonistic aspects'.

In confining this study to the development of a descriptive aesthetics and establishing the Parisienne as a type in cinema through developing an iconography of the Parisienne type based on the recognition of various motifs, the foundations are laid for future scholarship that will deploy other approaches to the subject such as feminism, gender studies, or indeed, other more critical or evaluative approaches, such as ethno-criticism, that could not be pursued here. Indeed, the Parisienne type contains a kind of in-built critique of ethnic/national identities, and is supposed to transcend national/ethnic borders towards a more cosmopolitan identity. It is important to remember that la Parisienne is not a stereotype (e.g. white, middle class, European) but a type in the iconographical sense; that is, recognizable through certain recurring motifs, yet also constantly being reinvented. That la Parisienne is 'from anywhere and everywhere' is one of the main arguments put forward in this book. This definition leaves room for Parisiennes from any number of national or ethnic

backgrounds, as such films as Céline Sciamma's *Bande de filles* (2014) demonstrate. Indeed, the main character of Sciamma's film, Vic (Karidja Touré), rather than presenting a challenge to the Parisienne as a type, may reinforce it, by demonstrating both its fixed and mutable nature. Further, contemporary popular images of la Parisienne such as one finds in recent style guides or magazines like *Vogue*, as well as in photography such as in Baudouin's work, go well beyond any Eurocentric stereotype.

Iconography of la Parisienne

The iconography of la Parisienne can be categorized according to the following concepts: visibility and mobility (both social and spatial); style and fashionability, including self-fashioning; artist and muse; cosmopolitanism; prostitution; danger; consumption (the consumer and the consumed); and transformation. Central to the iconography is the city of Paris, its streets and monuments, and its overall signification as the capital of modernity. The nature of the project, however, is such that it is constantly expanding, shifting ground and overlapping, and indeed one of the main problems is the question of containment, of how to set limits and bring content under complete control of the proposed form. This is partly due to the nature of la Parisienne as a type, a figure who never resembles herself. What constitutes a chapter of this book, then, is really a limit set on the Parisienne type itself, a limit that is continuously exceeded. This excess will take the form of an overflow from one chapter to the next; however, it is difficult to avoid damming the flow with definitive statements. Thus, a more open-ended approach is taken, bringing the categories to bear on the films only to indicate certain fixed attributes or motifs while at the same time allowing the more mutable aspects of the type to emerge.

The six chapters set down in this book reflect the notions or categories associated with the Parisienne type and explore each of them in turn, building up an overall iconography from the motifs associated with them. The titles of the chapters take not the categories themselves, but their associated figuration (not 'Cosmopolitanism' but 'Cosmopolite'; not 'Danger' but 'Femme fatale'), to shift the emphasis away from concepts which tend to fix the

Parisienne toward the figure itself, which is far more mutable. The precondition for la Parisienne as a type is that she generally fulfils all the categories at once, but some more prominently than others within the films set for discussion. How she appears in each film also sets the tone and focus of the discussion in each chapter. Often visual considerations are paramount, while at other times the narrative function of the type is more evident. At other times, again it might be a question of reference, of the relation between cinema and other media such as painting, literature or advertising.

Chapter 'Muse' argues that la Parisienne is a type which exists between art and life, and who exists on the boundary between representation and reality. The figure that emerges from this blurring of art and life is la Parisienne as muse. Chapter 'Cosmopolite' considers the cosmopolitanism of the Parisienne type, in the sense of 'anyone' and 'anywhere', and argues that la Parisienne was conceived not only as a figure of French femininity but of femininity as such. Chapter 'Icon of Fashion' explores the relationship between la Parisienne, fashion and film. Chapter 'Femme fatale' looks at la Parisienne as femme fatale within the context of French film noir. Tracing her development in nineteenth-century art and literature, Chapter 'Courtesan' examines the way the Parisienne as courtesan is (re)presented in cinema. Finally, Chapter 'Star' investigates the contribution particular actresses' star personae have made to the Parisienne type in cinema and, reciprocally, how the type has inscribed itself on the personae of these stars.

Geographically speaking, the films come primarily from France and America because the Parisienne type is most ubiquitous in these national cinemas. Of interest for the development of the Parisienne type is what Vanessa Schwartz in *It's So French!* describes as the transatlantic cultural exchange between French and American cinema in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, the development of the Parisienne type owes much to the rapport between French and American cinema of this period, because for la Parisienne to develop as a type, or even a stereotype, a global or cosmopolitan perspective was necessary. Indeed, this

transatlantic cultural exchange figures as the culmination point in the development of the Parisienne type and it is therefore not surprising to find a concentration of films featuring la Parisienne made by Hollywood during the 1950s and 1960s. There are earlier cinematic incarnations, including silent cinema, but they have become more recognizable in light of this cycle of so-called Hollywood 'Frenchness' films. Thus, when approaching the Parisienne type in cinema (and this is something that can be said of any type in an iconographical sense), there is frequently a retrospective elaboration at work, insofar as much of what leads to recognizing the type in earlier films derives from exposure to later films, particularly from what Schwartz calls the cycle of 'Frenchness films' (*It's So French!*). Chronology is not a necessary consideration for charting the iconography of a type.

The films included in this book were chosen for both their affirmation and interesting treatment of the Parisienne type. There is certainly no claim to exhaustiveness in coverage of the field, nor does this book offer a comprehensive portrait or visual history of la Parisienne in cinema. Attempts to include many examples to demonstrate the ubiquity of the type in cinema, as well as the richness of variations of the type, have been tempered by the desire to provide more meaningful and sustained engagement with individual films.

The pleasure of living: Lucile in *La Chamade*

A quiet Paris boulevard in the grey dawn light; grand Haussmann buildings line one side of the street and a row of lamp-posts the other. Cut to a shot of a wide boulevard leading to the Place de la Concorde, the Madeleine and Obelisk prominent in the center of the screen. The buildings which line the street on the right hand of the screen take on the golden hue of the morning sun. The sky lightens and Paris begins to wake. Cut to a tree-lined residential street, the sky now pale blue; the camera pans slowly to the right to reveal a sandstone mansion with large curtained windows framed by gently moving leaves. Cut again to an interior shot, a close-up of a gossamer curtain lightly billowing in the breeze, before the camera

pans slowly right to settle on a close-up of Lucile, her head resting on a soft white pillow, her face the picture of serenity. Cut to a long shot of Lucile, alone in a large bed in a high-ceilinged, tastefully decorated room. She slowly rises, walks languidly over to the open window and inhales with almost sensual pleasure the first hint of spring air. The slow pace of her elegant movements, accompanied by the dreamy score, suggests she is a lady of leisure. Dressed in a flowing white negligee, she gracefully walks into the adjoining bathroom. In the mirror, she contemplates her reflection before applying a light mist of floral water to her face and perfectly coiffed blonde hair.

The opening credit sequence of *La Chamade* establishes a languorous pace and emphasizes the pleasure of simply existing, a pleasure that is afforded to a kept woman who has ample time to enjoy life. The grandeur of the mise-en-scène suggests opulence, luxury, pleasure and wealth. The sequence mirrors the opening passage of Sagan's novel on which the film is based:

Elle ouvrit les yeux. Un vent brusque, décidé s'était introduit dans la chambre. Il transformait le rideau en voile, faisait se pencher les fleurs dans leur grand vase, à terre, et s'attaquait à présent à son sommeil. C'était un vent de printemps, le premier: il sentait les bois, les forêts, la terre, il avait traversé impunément les faubourgs de Paris, les rues gavées d'essence et il arrivait léger, fanfaron, à l'aube, dans sa chambre pour lui signaler, avant même qu'elle ne reprît conscience, le plaisir de vivre.

She opened her eyes. A bluff, determined wind had entered the room, billowing the curtain into a sail, bending the flowers in a large vase on the floor, and now attacking her sleep. It was a spring wind, the first: it smelt of earth, woods, forests, and having swept unscathed over the suburbs of Paris and the streets reeking of gas fumes it arrived, brisk and swaggering, in her room, at dawn, to point out, even before she was awake, the pleasure of living.

The opening paragraph of Sagan's novel depicts the pleasure of living, of the utmost importance to Lucile and afforded her by Charles. Lucile tries, ultimately unsuccessfully, to maintain this pleasure of living when she abandons her life with Charles to

embark on a relationship with the younger and significantly poorer Antoine. After deciding to live with Antoine and, at his instigation taking a job to occupy herself, Lucile finds herself at an overcrowded bus shelter in the rain. Her exasperation with her new situation is expressed thus in Sagan's novel:

Lucile attendait l'autobus place de l'Alma et s'énervait. Le mois de novembre était spécialement froid, spécialement pluvieux et la petite guérite devant la station était bondée de gens frileux, maussades, presque agressifs Le seul charme réel de l'argent, pensait-elle, c'était qu'il vous permettait d'éviter cela: l'attente, l'énervement, les autres.

Lucile impatiently awaited the bus at the Place de l'Alma. It was a particularly cold and rainy November, and the little bus shelter was crowded with shivering, sullen, almost aggressive people The only real charm of money, she thought, was that it permitted one to avoid all this: the exasperation, the other people. Lucile returns to Charles, and her choice to be a kept woman is ultimately tied up with her idea of what constitutes the pleasure of living. What Charles's money affords Lucile above all is leisure time and solitude. Lucile's philosophy of life is given voice in Harry's monologue from William Faulkner's *Wild Palms* (1939), which she reads aloud in a bar after having walked out on her job. The lengthy monologue, which espouses the virtues of idleness, ends with the line: '[N]othing is better, nothing to match, nothing else in all this world but to live for the short time you are loaned breath, to be alive and know it'.

The opening credit sequence of *La Chamade* also highlights three important motifs: the city of Paris, pleasure, and Lucile/Deneuve's hair and face. The setting is significant as it places Lucile within the tradition of the Second Empire and Belle Époque courtesan living in Paris, the city of pleasure: 'One of the myths of the belle époque that was not wholly untrue was that Paris was now the world capital of pleasure'. Lucile/Deneuve's hair plays a significant role in establishing her character, and in connecting it to the greater themes of affluence and idleness. Her well-groomed hair connotes a

sophisticated elegance associated with la Parisienne but also identifies Lucile with the star image of Cathérine Deneuve. Ginette Vincendeau makes a direct comparison between Deneuve's hair and her physical gestures which are both 'graceful and controlled', while her bloneness connotes 'sophisticated affluence' and her hairstyle signifies 'the well-groomed woman'. Deneuve's hair both frames and illuminates her face, accentuating what Guy Austin describes as its mask-like quality. This quality contributes to the elusiveness and ambiguity of the characters Deneuve incarnates but also lends itself particularly to the roles of kept woman and prostitute.

As a modern-day version of the nineteenth-century courtesan, Lucile continues the association of the kept woman with fashionability, style and elegance through her hair and make-up, and her wardrobe by Yves Saint Laurent. Lucile wears chic ensembles in a classic neutral color palette throughout the film: her everyday look consists of neat mid-length A-line skirts, turtleneck sweaters, paisley-print collared shirts, trench coats, double-breasted coat dresses, and low-heeled court shoes. For evening events, Lucile wears eye-catching, seductive couture dresses, including a long-sleeved, candy-pink, floor-length gown featuring sequined details; a red, white and navy geometric-patterned, long-sleeved, knee-length dress featuring a pussy-bow tie neckline; and a high-neck, floor-skimming black gown worn with an elaborate black coat featuring a froth of feathers. Deneuve once remarked of Saint Laurent's designs:

His clothes for daywear help a woman to enter a world full of strangers. They enable her to go wherever she wants without arousing unwelcome behavior, thanks to their somehow masculine quality. However, for the evening, when she may choose her company, he makes her seductive.

Lucile's costuming in *La Chamade* constitutes a fashionable, highly polished look in which she is mostly covered up, which adds to the clothing's restraint and elegance: there are no plunging necklines, short hemlines or excess exposure of skin; her arms and décolletage are seldom on display. Even when she is holidaying on the Riviera, Lucile eschews a bikini in favor of jeans or chino pants

worn with crew-neck T-shirts or collared shirts with the sleeves casually rolled up. Lucile's tailored skirts and double-breasted coat addresses recall Saint Laurent's costuming of Deneuve in Buñuel's *Belle de jour*. Paula Reed characterizes Deneuve's costuming in Bunuel's film as 'chaste eroticism and French chic' and remarks that in her 'tailored coats and dresses, she is the perfect Parisienne'.

Lucile's status as both a kept woman and a Parisienne is communicated through her fashionability and style; the result, on the one hand, of her costuming by Yves Saint Laurent, and on the other, of Deneuve's star persona. By the mid-1980s, Deneuve was already an 'institution' with an established image, that of elegance. Deneuve has been described as possessing a 'provocative elegance', 'famous for her chic type of French beauty' and 'relentlessly typecast as the elegant and expressionless bourgeois woman'. Rocamora describes Deneuve as the 'ultimate Parisienne', claiming that Deneuve's identity 'cannot be dissociated from the glamorous fictional images — the imagined Parisian women that have made her famous the world over'. Sabine Denuelle refers to Deneuve's 'elegance naturelle', while James Fox, writing for *Vanity Fair*, describes her as 'a living symbol of French style'.

As a kept woman, Lucile's most notable cinematic precursor is the eponymous heroine of Max Ophüls's film *Madame de ...* (1953), played by Danielle Darrieux. Alongside her clothing, hair and makeup, Lucile's jeweler also connotes her fashionability and represents the gifts that she receives as a kept woman. However, her jewelry does not only serve to highlight her elegance; it also functions as a prop that propels the narrative which links her to Ophüls's heroine. In *La Chamade*, Lucile's earrings serve the function both of indicating to Antoine Lucile's ongoing association with her rich benefactor Charles and of underscoring for Antoine the impossibility of keeping Lucile in the manner to which she has become accustomed. Similarly, the action of Ophüls's film turns around the circulation of a pair of gifted earrings which 'complete the circle to give the husband proof of his wife's infidelity'. In Ophüls's film, *Madame de* sells her earrings to pay off certain pressing debts. In *La Chamade* Lucile

sells a necklace given to her by Charles to leave her job and still meet the expenses of her life with Antoine.

The title of Ophüls's film is deliberately elusive: it refuses to reveal to whom the eponymous Madame belongs. Instead, we are left with an intriguing ellipsis. This raises the question of ownership and of the woman as property or chattel. Madame de's very appearance on screen is preceded by all of her accoutrements. In the opening scene of the film, Ophüls's camera pans around her boudoir, focusing on the contents of her wardrobe and her jewelry box, before finally settling on her face. This creates an inextricable link between Madame de and her accessories. In a similar vein, Lucile is also connected to her material possessions. When Lucile decides to leave Charles, he insists she take everything with her. She refuses, and he consoles himself with the thought that he can at least look at her dresses in the wardrobe and see her car in the garage. Like Madame de, Lucile's belongings are, in Charles's mind at least, an extension of her being, a reminder of her; they stand in for her and are indissociable from her.

For Sabine Denuelle, Danielle Darrieux as Madame de is a quintessential Parisienne: 'La Parisienne est encore est toujours du côté du plaisir, de la beauté et de l'amour, et Max Ophüls lui donnera pour longtemps les traits de Danielle Darrieux dans Madame de' (La Parisienne is still and always associated with pleasure, beauty and love, and Max Ophüls will long give her the traits of Danielle Darrieux in Madame de). Lucile, like Madame de, is also a Parisienne strongly associated with pleasure, beauty and love. The association of Lucile and Madame de also operates on an inter- and extra-cinematic level. Indeed, Lucile/Deneuve can be considered the spiritual daughter of Madame de/Darrieux, a fact highlighted by the fact that Deneuve also plays Darrieux's actual daughter in Jacques Demy's *Les Demoiselles de Rochefort* (1966) and again, more recently, in François Ozon's *8 femmes*. Darrieux is considered in both her French and Hollywood films as incarnating the quintessential Parisienne type. Jean-Christophe Ferrari includes Darrieux (with Leslie Caron, Claudette Colbert and Audrey Hepburn) as among the main actresses who personified Hollywood's

Parisienne: Darrieux had the elusiveness, piquancy and carefree manner of speech that Hollywood associated with the Parisienne'. In her Hollywood Parisienne films *The Rage of Paris* (1938) and *Rich, Young and Pretty* (1951) Darrieux was, according to Ferrari, 'easily able to assume the role of the Parisienne thanks to her inimitable style and elegance'. Deneuve's star persona shares the qualities of style, elegance and elusiveness with Darrieux, all of which are accentuated in *La Chamade*.

Deneuve's role as Lucile is preceded by several other famous roles which inform Deneuve's star persona and infect the character of Lucile. When Truffaut cast Deneuve in *La Sirène du Mississippi* (1969) she had just finished filming *Belle de jour* for Buñuel, in which she played bourgeois housewife-turned-prostitute Séverine Serizy. At the time, Truffaut wrote that what he liked about Deneuve was her mysterious quality: 'She is wonderfully suited to parts involving a secret, or a double life. Cathérine Deneuve adds ambiguity to any situation and any screenplay, for she seems to be concealing a great many secret thoughts, we sense there are things lurking behind the surface'. Lucile's elusiveness is informed by two of Deneuve's other roles: her portrayal of Séverine in Buñuel's film, and Marion in *La Sirène du Mississippi*. Marion is visually linked to Lucile by way of a long, black coat trimmed with ostrich feathers which she wears to a soirée with Charles. The coat, especially in the snow-covered context of Truffaut's film, creates another visual connection, this time to Jean Béraud's painting, *Parisienne, Place de la Concorde* (1890), in which a black feather boa encircles the neck of a chic Parisienne crossing the snow-covered Place de la Concorde. In this way, Lucile's costume not only connotes the elegance of the chic Parisienne but connects her to her nineteenth-century predecessors in art. The black feathered coat also points to the way in which Deneuve's other roles infiltrate the character of Lucile.

Deneuve's star persona, particularly the specificity of her face, plays a vital role in the treatment of Lucile as both kept woman and elusive Parisienne. The following description of Lucile is found in Sagan's novel: 'Lucile était insaisissable. Elle était gaie, polie, souvent drôle mais elle se refusait

obstinément à parler d'elle, de Charles ou de ses projets', 'Lucile was a most elusive person. She was gay, polite, often amusing, but stubbornly refused to talk about herself, or Charles, or of any plans for the future'. In Cavalier's film, this elusiveness is communicated primarily using Deneuve's face, which is often shot in close-up. Geoffrey Nowell-Smith remarks that Deneuve is an 'actress who always remains behind the screen, drawing the spectator towards her rather than projecting outwards, let alone inviting complicity'. For Austin, Deneuve is 'glacial' and incarnates 'the white woman, a figure of control, of unattainable beauty, refinement and rigidity, pallor and poise'. Austin argues that Jacques Demy's *Les Parapluies de Cherbourg* (1964) established Deneuve's star persona: 'Deneuve drives out of the film a star, the white woman incarnate, with her mask in place'. Linked to this concept of the mask or the screen is Deneuve's acting style, which Austin describes as 'typically minimalist and impassive'.

If the face of Lucile/Deneuve always remains metaphorically behind the screen, then Cavalier at times literalizes this notion by way of mise-en-scène. Lucile is often shot behind glass. In a scene at a café she is shot from the outside looking in. In the many scenes in which she is driving or riding in the passenger seat of a car, she is filmed through the front windscreen. In a key scene, in which Antoine meets Lucile at the airport, their initial reunion takes place with a glass partition between them. In this scene, it is always Lucile, and never Antoine, who is shot behind the glass. This treatment creates another barrier, in addition to the mask of her face, between Lucile and the outside world and those who look at her. Being placed behind glass also suggests the way in which Lucile, as a highly paid courtesan, is a luxury good or precious commodity, who can be courted but not owned by the poor lover and who can be bought but not courted by the wealthy suitor. <>

La Chevelure (Her Hair) by Charles Baudelaire

Ô toison, moutonnant jusque sur l'encolure!
 Ô boucles! Ô parfum chargé de nonchaloir!
 Extase! Pour peupler ce soir l'alcôve obscure
 Des souvenirs dormant dans cette chevelure,
 Je la veux agiter dans l'air comme un mouchoir!

La langoureuse Asie et la brûlante Afrique,
 Tout un monde lointain, absent, presque défunt,
 Vit dans tes profondeurs, forêt aromatique!
 Comme d'autres esprits voguent sur la musique,
 Le mien, ô mon amour! nage sur ton parfum.
 J'irai là-bas où l'arbre et l'homme, pleins de sève,
 Se pâment longuement sous l'ardeur des climats;
 Fortes tresses, soyez la houle qui m'enlève!
 Tu contiens, mer d'ébène, un éblouissant rêve
 De voiles, de rameurs, de flammes et de mâts:
 Un port retentissant où mon âme peut boire
 À grands flots le parfum, le son et la couleur
 Où les vaisseaux, glissant dans l'or et dans la moire
 Ouvrent leurs vastes bras pour embrasser la gloire
 D'un ciel pur où frémit l'éternelle chaleur.
 Je plongerai ma tête amoureuse d'ivresse
 Dans ce noir océan où l'autre est enfermé;
 Et mon esprit subtil que le roulis caresse
 Saura vous retrouver, ô féconde paresse,
 Infinis bercements du loisir embaumé!
 Cheveux bleus, pavillon de ténèbres tendues
 Vous me rendez l'azur du ciel immense et rond;
 Sur les bords duvetés de vos mèches tordues
 Je m'enivre ardemment des senteurs confondues
 De l'huile de coco, du musc et du goudron.
 Longtemps! toujours! ma main dans ta crinière
 lourde
 Sèmera le rubis, la perle et le saphir,
 Afin qu'à mon désir tu ne sois jamais sourde!
 N'es-tu pas l'oasis où je rêve, et la gourde
 Où je hume à longs traits le vin du souvenir?
 Of Her Hair
 O fleece, billowing on her neck! O ecstasy!
 O curls, O perfume rich with nonchalance, O rare!
 Tonight to fill the alcove's warm obscurity,
 To make that hair evoke each dormant memory,
 I long to wave it like a kerchief in the air.
 Africa smoldering and Asia languorous,
 A whole far distant world, absent and almost spent,
 Dwells in your forest depths, mystic and odorous!
 As others lose themselves in the harmonious,
 So, love, my heart floats lost upon your haunting
 scent.
 I shall go where both man and tree, albeit strong,
 Swoon deep beneath the rays of sunlight's blazing
 fires.
 Thick tresses, be the waves to bear my dreams
 along!
 Ebony sea, your dazzling dream contains a throng
 Of sails, of wafts, of oarsmen, and of masts like
 spires.
 A noisy harbor where my thirsty soul may drain
 Hues, sounds and fragrances, in draughts heavy

and sweet,
 Where vessels gliding down a moiré-and-gold sea
 lane
 Open their vast arms wide to clutch at the domain
 Of a pure sky ashimmer with eternal beat.
 Deep shall I plunge my head, avid of drunkenness,
 In this black sea wherein the other sea lies
 captured,
 And my soul buoyant at its undulant caress
 Shall find you once again, O fruitful idleness,
 O long lullings of ease, soft, honeyed and
 enraptured.
 O blue-black hair, pennon with sheen and shadow
 fraught,
 You give me back the vast blue skies of dawn and
 dusk,
 As on the downy edges of your tresses, caught
 In your soft curls, I grow drunken and hot,
 distraught
 By mingled scents of cocoanut and tar and musk.
 Sapphires, rubies, pearls — my hand shall never
 tire
 Of strewing these through your thick mane — how
 lavishly! —
 Lest Life should ever turn you deaf to my desire!
 You are the last oasis where I dream, afire,
 The gourd whence deep I quaff the wine of
 memory.
 — Translated by Jacques LeClercq <>

[Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue](#) edited by
 Alessandro Stavru, Christopher Moore [Brill,
 9789004321915]

Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue provides the
 most complete study of the immediate literary
 reaction to Socrates, by his contemporaries and the
 first-generation Socratics, and of the writings from
 Aristotle to Proclus addressing Socrates and the
 literary work he inspired.

Excerpt: Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue: An
 Overview from the First-Generation Socratics to
 Neoplatonism by Christopher Moore and
 Alessandro Stavru

Scope and Organization of This Collection of Essays

The last decade has featured a spawning of
 studies on Socrates and the Socratic literature that
 is unprecedented in both quantity and

methodological variety. Nearly a dozen edited
 collections have appeared (among them three
 Companions to Socrates), along with a great many
 editions, translations, monographs, and scholarly
 articles. Basic issues of Socratic scholarship that in
 the second half of the twentieth century had been
 bracketed or even rejected as uninteresting or
 fruitless—such as those of the “historical Socrates,”
 the “Socratic question,” or the “Socratic schools”—
 have returned as urgent research directions in this
 recent upsurge in Socratic studies.

The hypotheses advanced to resolve these issues
 still need to be verified, and some of them remain
 highly problematic. It is difficult, in the first place,
 to establish the extent and the reliability of
 “Socratic literature” as such, and, consequently, to
 determine whether and to what degree such
 literature can yield a “Socratic personality” or a
 “Socratic philosophy.”

One major feature of the “Socratic question”
 concerns the reliability of the extant sources’
 apparent claims about the man named Socrates of
 Alopecce. Granted, these are all and without
 question literary portraits of Socrates, that is,
 fictional representations of his personality and
 teaching. But it is also a fact that these
 representations (i) contain a number of realistic—
 while perhaps not altogether historical—features
 that exceeds by far those we can find in other
 fictional genres of antiquity, and (ii) exerted, both
 through their fictional and their realistic features, a
 great influence on ancient philosophy and history.
 These considerations limit or even undermine
 whatever hopes one might have to make univocal
 claims about the “fictionality” or the “historical
 reliability” of Socratic literature.

Many attempts have been made to solve the
 Socratic question by identifying and then studying
 those sources assumed to yield the “historical” or at
 least a “reliable” or a “realistic” Socrates. Scholars
 have often restricted their inquiry, accordingly, to
 specific texts, or to some range of texts, by a
 “quadriga” of authors, namely Aristophanes, Plato,
 Xenophon, and Aristotle. Such a selection led to
 important scholarly work, but it often failed to
 account for the literary and philosophical

complexity to which these texts refer, and upon which they largely depend.

In fact most scholars opted for a focus on Plato alone. This yielded a wide range of studies that while meant to deal with “Socrates” actually investigated problems particular to the Platonic corpus. But a similar treatment was applied to the other major Socratic authors. Calls to re-examine their presentations of Socrates led mostly to studies restricted to the works or the portions

of texts these authors explicitly devoted to Socrates—and only in rare cases to explorations of their literary and authorial context. For example, Socratic scholars dealing with Aristophanes mostly limited their study to the *Clouds* and some passages of *Frogs* and *Birds*; or those dealing with Xenophon to his Socratic works; or those working on Aristotle to the passages in which the name “Socrates” occurs. Little attention has been paid to the presence of Socratic themes in other works or passages of these authors, or to the conceptual and intertextual links between the Socratic passages of these authors and other testimonies of the Socratic literature.

This collection aims to set out on a new path. It presents a comprehensive picture of Socrates and the Socratic dialogue in ancient Greek and Roman literature, from the comedies of Eupolis and Aristophanes, written during Socrates’ middle age, to the treatises of Proclus, more than eight hundred years later. Each chapter addresses an author or group of authors whose work reveals something significant either about the thinking associated with Socrates and his nearest associates, especially the authors of “Socratic dialogues,” or the power and texture of the Socratic icon as formed in these dialogues and passed down, reinterpreted, and redeployed in the thought, biography, oratory, and literature of the ensuing generations.

Special attention is paid to the Socratic literature of the first generation. Almost two thirds of the contributions directly explore texts written by authors who either knew Socrates directly (from the Comix to Xenophon) or may have relied on oral reports about him (Aristotle and Aristoxenus). Even the last third of contributions (from Epicurus to Proclus) contributes to reconstructing and

understanding the dialogues of the first-generation Socratics, as it deals with the reception and interpretation both of well-known and of fragmentary Socratic literature.

That Socrates has left neither writings nor formal institutions comparable to the schools founded after his death (the *Clouds*’ “Thinkery” notwithstanding) shows the necessity of studying his thought through this second-hand, interlocutory, reflective Socratism. In other words, the way Socrates lived his life—in public, inconstant conversation, in pursuit of the promising youth of his city, in a shared philosophy of mutual examination—means that to study Socrates requires studying his effect and influence on those around him and those, in turn, around them.

We may note a basic dichotomy among the first-generation literature on Socrates. On the one hand we have the *logoi Sôkratikoî*, written by companions and pupils of Socrates; on the other, works by Comix or Sophists, whose main feature is their polemic against both Socrates and his circle. This collection includes both. The extant and fragmentary texts by Socrates’ associates constitute its main focus, as we will see, but not its only focus. Nor could it be, as the Comix and the Sophists provide an indispensable background for understanding how Socrates and the dialogues reporting about him were perceived “from outside.” Comic literature of the fifth century gives important information for reconstructing the origins of the Socratic dialogue, especially the political and philosophical motivations prompting the Socratics to represent their master through a new literary form (chapters 1–3). Sophistic literature of the fifth and fourth century provides a lively insight into the way Socrates’ teaching was perceived before and after his death, as well as into the polemics between the Socratics and attentive readers of the *logoi Sôkratikoî*, such as Polycrates and Isocrates (chapters 3–4).

Most of the chapters (5–40), while “monographic” and concentrating on a single author or corpus of texts, deal with a wide range of extant and fragmentary Socratic dialogues. This applies to the section on the major companions of Socrates (Antisthenes, Euclides, Aristippus, Aeschines, and

Phaedo) as well as to those on Plato, Xenophon, and later reception. Throughout these sections we get a vivid picture not only of Socrates and his teaching but also of the intraSocratic polemics that characterize each of these authors' work.

We can summarize and say that this collection tackles Socrates as he has been depicted in the *logoi Sôkratikoï*; in the literature that deals polemically with Socrates and these dialogues; and in the later reception that relies in turn on these dialogues and polemics. But these swathes of literature could prove too capacious taken without some principle of further selection. Our main criterion of choice was that of intertextuality: we decided to include only contributions about authors and texts that refer directly, and not merely hypothetically, to topics treated in the Socratic dialogues, or, from the other direction, about authors and texts to which the Socratic dialogues explicitly refer. This meant excluding from the collection figures who may have in fact played a pivotal role for Socrates' education and teaching, such as Archelaus, Anaxagoras, or Euripides (cf. dl 2.18–19). Their importance for the Socratic dialogue can be only indirectly inferred, textual evidence for their influence on Socrates' thought being very poor.

The Chapters of This Collection

Across forty chapters, the collection brings into one place, for the first time, and by an international range of scholars, the remarkable sweep of sources, perspectives, and arguments worth considering by the present-day student of Socrates and the dialogues that rose around him, and of their philosophical legacy. We hold that understanding Socrates means, in an essential and pronounced way, understanding his significance to those who watched and talked to him, heard about him, and learned from him through the written testimony of the Socratic dialogues. The collection focuses therefore on the Socratic dialogues, their context, and their reception in later centuries. We have arranged the collection into two halves: the period and authors around Socrates, and later reception. In the first half, we address Athenian comedy, members and competitors of the Socratic circle, Plato, and Xenophon. In the second half,

chapters tackle the Peripatetics, Hellenistic schools, Roman Imperial writers, Middle Platonists, Neoplatonists, and other authors important for understanding the reception of Socratic dialogues.

Around Socrates

The collection begins with a section on texts dealing with the literary and rhetorical context of Socrates' lifetime. Three chapters are devoted to Old Comedy and the peculiarly intense and ramifying force that Aristophanes—our earliest comprehensive witness to Socrates—had in influencing what everyone since Plato has thought about Socrates. Everyone remembers that in Plato's *Apology* (19c), Socrates blames Aristophanes, especially his *Clouds*, for fomenting prejudice and hatred against himself. But as Jacques Bromberg ("A Sage on Stage: Socrates and Athenian Old Comedy") reminds us, an entire sub-genre of comic drama arose in the 430s–420s, lampooning Socrates and parodying intellectuals of every variety. This broader vantage allows us to reassess Aristophanes' motivations in depicting Socrates as he did. On this reassessment, the anti-Socratism supposedly manifest in the *Clouds'* conclusion fits less a picture of a malicious playwright than a jokester who inserts every stock comic routine (including arson and shouting) into his putatively "novel" creation. Bromberg also advises us to remember our Athenian history. The *Apology's* interpretation of the *Clouds'* public effect comes no less than a quarter-century after the play's performance, decades during which popular attitudes toward intellectuals underwent enormous change and during which the memory of the plays by Eupolis, Cratinus, and Plato Comicus that also mocked Socrates and other intellectuals faded, leaving the depiction of an air-walking and logic-chopping Socrates both menacing and in splendid isolation. Plato's selective memory of a time in his infancy ended up affecting both ancient and modern understanding of Socrates' position in democracy and artistic Athens, Bromberg argues. It has also, he adds, determined the narrative arc of the biographies of many other ancient intellectuals.

Bromberg reads Aristophanes as a representative of Old Comedy; by doing so he can picture Socrates against the background of the thinkers

and innovators of the late-fifth century parodied in the yearly comic festivals. This becomes a story of Plato's being late to a democratic-dramatic feast that may have been more playful than it later seemed. Andrea Capra ("Aristophanes' Iconic Socrates") shows the other side of the story: Aristophanes' effectiveness at determining the visual aspect, and the "iconic" status, of Socrates. As we see from Plato's *Symposium*, *Apology*, *Theaetetus*, and *Phaedo*, the *Clouds*' picture of a "skywalking, sun-scrutinizing Socrates-Silenus" did not go away; it defined the look, and thereby the character, of the Socrates of ensuing logoi Sôkratikoî. Socrates' first entrance in the *Clouds* reflects a story about Silenus that was familiar to the Athenians. When uttering his first words, Aristophanes' Socrates likely presents himself in the guise of Silenus, as a scholion to Pindar and a passage from Aristotle's *Eudemus* seem to suggest. Capra shows that this very image of Socrates is recalled by Plato both in the *Apology* and in the famous prayer to the sun in the *Symposium*, where the Silenic features of Socrates are explicit. This brings Capra to conclude that the mask of the comic actor of the *Clouds* was Silenic in character, as Eugène Dupréel had previously suggested.

The third chapter begins with yet another aspect of the *Clouds*' picture of Socrates: the image of one of his most illustrious educator-colleagues, Protagoras. Aristophanes gives to Socrates not only the interests in natural science characteristic of men like Diagoras of Melos but also the argumentative, grammatical, and even epistemological theses properly attributed to Protagoras, whose fame helped the playwright consolidate in one man the major intellectual trends of his day. It is well known that Protagoras then appears in key roles in Plato's *Protagoras* and *Theaetetus*. Michele Corradi ("Protagorean Socrates, Socratic Protagoras: a Narrative Strategy from Aristophanes to Plato") argues, however, that Plato does not simply distinguish Socrates from Protagoras. Like Aristophanes, he brings them into ambiguous relations of similarity and parallel. Of course the one's moral realism, and the other's moral relativism, push their favored epistemic theses far apart. But Protagoras' overriding concern for paideia, for the cultivation of his students'

wellbeing, is Socrates' concern too, and Plato can demonstrate this, in part, by revealing this Protagorean side to his misunderstood hero.

Contemporary with the Socratics, equally committed to education and philosophia, but outside their circle, is Isocrates. Not so far outside the circle, to be sure: Isocrates respected Socrates, studied the written dialogues of his companions, presented himself in contrast to them, and thereby competed with them for students. Yet he rarely specifies exactly to whom his arguments apply. David Murphy ("Isocrates as a Reader of Socratic Dialogues") reconstructs Isocrates' charges against the Socratics. All major first-generation Socratics expounded ideas that display points of contact with Isocrates' works. In *Against the Sophists* Isocrates' criticism toward the "disputers" fits various Socratics, but most of all Antisthenes—as author of *Truth*, *Archelaus*, or *On Kingship*, and *Protrepticus*—who was the most prominent of them in the 390s. Once Plato achieved prominence after the foundation of the Academy, Isocrates turns attention to him. In *Helen* he comes close to citing the Protagoras; *Busiris* contains a parody of Sparta-inspired passages of the *Republic*; *Nicocles* defends the pursuit of *pleonexia* against Plato's *Gorgias*; and in *Antidosis* Isocrates counters the accusation Plato launched at him at the end of the *Phaedrus*. Even after Plato's death, Isocrates continues this assault: the *Panathenaicus* dismisses a kind of education Plato defends in *Crito*, *Gorgias*, *Republic*, and *Laws*; *Antidosis* rejects the criticism of forensic activity Plato had formulated in the *Theaetetus*. It is notable that Isocrates' work does not feature references to complex dialogues such as *Sophist*, *Parmenides*, *Statesman*, or *Philebus*.

This section ends with a chapter that reflects this collection's title. James Redfield ("The Origins of the Socratic Dialogue: Plato, Xenophon, and the Others") defines the "Socratic" dialogue, in its strictest sense, as a genre of more or less realistic historical fiction written by those who knew Socrates in 399 and were brought together by the trauma of his execution. Redfield claims that colloquial literature had already begun in the fifth century, in comedy, whence it migrated into tragedy. In the second half of the century, Socrates developed a characteristic manner of "conversing"

with individuals, for the purpose either of questioning or instruction. After Socrates' death in 399, his companions, partly in compensation for the loss of their master, reproduced and fixed in writing these conversations, hoping to preserve their memory. In a burst of creativity, influenced by and in competition with one another, they created the genre of the Socratic dialogue. Through it each Socratic came to embody his own authorial goals, and while Plato's and Xenophon's dialogues reached perfection in their own way, we know that their less-well-preserved peers wrote dialogues that were famous, too, for their elegance and creativity throughout Antiquity.

This leads us to the next section, which is devoted to the immediate Socratic circle (excluding Plato and Xenophon for the moment). These chapters provide a thorough overview and fresh reappraisal of the methodological, scholastic, intellectual, historical, and philosophical evidence related to these authors lost writings. Each focuses on various issues debated in their fragmentary works, showing how Socrates' companions dealt with problems and themes derived from his conversations, life, and teaching.

The first chapter is on Antisthenes of Athens, the oldest and undoubtedly the most prominent of Socrates' pupils at his death in 399. Vladislav Suvák ("On the Dialectical Character of Antisthenes' Speeches Ajax and Odysseus") addresses the author's best-preserved works, a pair of apparently epideictic speeches. Suvák undermines the appearance that the Ajax and Odysseus are merely rhetorical works and that they therefore lack the dialectical character of other important Socratic writings. In fact, these paired speeches exemplify an argumentative pattern consistent both with Antisthenes' "theses" featured in his fragments and with Socratic investigation into virtue. They should count as part of the Socratic literature, Suvák argues, not relegated, as most scholars maintain, to the sophistic tradition.

Another major Socratic, probably a few years older than Plato, is Euclides of Megara. Aldo Brancacci ("Socratism and Eleaticism in Euclides of Megara") deals with the Socratic and Eleatic features that characterize the extant discussions of

him—mostly reported by doxographical tradition. The one surviving fragment of Euclides, thought to derive from his *Eroticus*, dwells on his conception of a "double demon": a "positive" one that urges action in a specific way (as later in Xenophon's daimonion); and a "negative" one that inhibits action in a specific way (as in Plato's daimonion). A peculiar feature of Euclides' double demon is that it belongs not only to Socrates (as in Xenophon and Plato) but also to every human being. This prompts Brancacci to suggest that Socrates may have adhered to a traditional demonology, from which Xenophon and Plato would later detach themselves by introducing a more abstract notion, that of the daimonion. The "double demon" is a problematic notion, however, since it is at odds with the fundamental principle of Euclides' ethics, that of the non-existence of evil. In fact, the path along which Euclides developed Socrates' intellectual heritage was meant to ensure an ontological foundation of his ethics by introducing a conception of a good he recovered from the Eleatic tradition: the good is always one, equal, and identical to itself; and the good is not an abstract theoretical truth but an objective reality, while evil simply does not exist.

Aristippus of Cyrene, whose age might have been about the same as Euclides', has long been thought one of Socrates' rogue students. But this is surely unfair, as Kristian Urstad ("Aristippus on Freedom, Autonomy, and the Pleasurable Life") argues. Far from foregoing principle and self-control, Aristippus in fact prizes autonomy and self-sufficiency. This enables him to indulge in pleasures without being enslaved by them: in Aristippus' eudaimonistic outlook, freedom is a condition of the soul that allows its possessor to engage in all sorts of pleasures without being worsted by them in any way. Urstad points out that this enables Aristippus to convert the Socratic principle of self-control (*sôphrosunê*, *enkrateia*) with respect to the desire for pleasure into the art of moving correctly within pleasure. Thus his idea of freedom should be understood as a truly Socratic detachment from contingencies, as a pull towards self-sufficiency that is characteristic of Socrates' eudaimonism as represented in the works of Xenophon and Plato in particular.

Another Socratic who might have been as old as Euclides and Aristippus, and who was a close friend of the latter, is Aeschines of Sphettus. Unlike Antisthenes, Euclides, or Aristippus, Aeschines did not found a school. He is, however, as Claudia Mársico (“Shock, Erotics, Plagiarism, and Fraud: Aspects of Aeschines of Sphettus’ Philosophy”) claims, essential for understanding what the Socratic circle debated. Mársico’s chapter focuses on one topic of debate: how Socrates could educate both those he loved and those he did not. Aeschines’ extant writings, and in particular his two fragmentary dialogues on *erôs*, display an innovative method of education: a “mental shock” that provokes the improvement of both their characters and their readers. In the *Alcibiades*, this mental shock takes the form of Socrates’ violent back-and-forth tugging of Alcibiades’ emotions. Similarly, in the *Aspasia*, Aspasia induces Xenophon’s wife to blush by means of a series of prodding question. In both cases, the protagonist “shocks” or disrupts the interlocutor’s assumptions of knowledge, leaving him or her calm and newly concerned for self-improvement. Aeschines’ shock method was not confined, however, just to his writings. His biographical fragments show that he was a highly controversial personality, whose provocations enraged his many enemies. This makes him effectively a *Doppelgänger* of Alcibiades, who also drew the enmity of his fellow citizens.

One of the youngest companions of Socrates was Phaedo of Elis. Danilo Di Lanzo (“Phaedo of Elis: the Biography, Zopyrus, and His Intellectual Profile”) traces his intellectual and biographical profile, giving special attention to his dialogues *Zopyrus* and *Simon*. In antiquity, these were famous for their “great elegance,” and although we have only the scarcest fragments of them, what remains conveys illuminating glimpses of Phaedo’s thought. The *Zopyrus* deals with Socrates’ outward appearance. *Zopyrus*, a Persian physiognomist, diagnoses Socrates as wicked, stupid, and a sexual maniac (a pederast or a womanizer, depending on the testimonies). Socrates’ companions break into laughter (or become enraged), but this is promptly stopped by Socrates, who admits to these faults and that he has overcome (or erased) them only thanks to reason (or philosophy). Di Lanzo shows

how this story and another fragment hint at a broader background. He reconstructs the whole dialogue as about the value of exercise and training against the supposedly indomitable force of passion. A similar theme can be found in the *Simon*, where in a fragment another associate of Socrates, the cobbler Simon, declares his dedication to wisdom and reproaches Aristippus’ proneness to luxury, reminding him that temperance can be achieved only through sobriety of hunger and thirst. As Di Lanzo points out, this fragment is important for visualizing the relationship between Simon and the Cynics, who saw in him the most authentic follower of Socrates. The Simon depicted by Phaedo represents therefore an intermediate position between Antisthenes’ rigorist Cynicism and Aristippus’ hedonistic stance.

Needless to say, the section about Plato could have been much longer. However, we deliberately decided to keep a balance with the other sections, since scholarly investigations into Plato, while hardly complete in terms of Socrates’ influence on his life, are easy to find. By this we mean papers and monographs about Plato’s depiction of Socrates; his travels from and life in Athens as a response to Socrates’ trial and execution; his pedagogical goals and the positive or negative influence on them by Socrates’ strictly conversational approach; and the dialectical, epistemic, and metaphysical positions Plato propounds or depicts and their relationship with those of his predecessors and contemporaries. Even a bibliographic sketch of the topics we omit would outweigh this Overview; we trust the reader may appeal to the references and scholarly apparatus mentioned throughout the chapters on the Platonic dialogues.

The first chapter of this section provides a thorough study of Plato’s relations with his peers. Luc Brisson (“Plato and the Socratics”) combines an analysis of the intertextual relationships between Plato’s and others’ *logoi Sôkratikoí* with a discussion of later anecdotes telling of Plato’s competition with Socrates’ other pupils. Plato’s explicit and implicit references to his peers have rarely been studied in their complexity. On the other hand, the anecdotal evidence—or, as the case maybe, latter-day guess-work, score-settling, or free-wheeling

attribution of unmoored chreia—provides a subtle if unstable picture of Socrates' associates. Brisson tackles both aspects, thus providing a robust picture of the intellectual, doctrinal, and personal relations among the first-generation Socratics. He starts with the supposed rivalry between Plato and Xenophon, and goes on to outline Plato's relations with the members of the Socratic circle. These include the politicians—Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides—and the associates who did not found schools of their own, including Chaerephon, Cherecrates, Crito, Critobulus, Apollodorus, Acontodorus, Aristodemus, Aeschines, Phaedo (whose foundation of the Elia school Brisson doubts), Simon, Cebes, Simmias, Phaedrus, Glaucon, and Diodorus. He finishes by dealing with the purported enmities between Plato and the schools that claimed to rely on Socrates: the Cynics in the wake of Antisthenes and Diogenes of Sinope; the Cyrenaics with Aristippus; and the Megarians with Euclides.

One particular focus of cross-Socratic comparison is in the origins or popularization of the term *philosophos* and cognates, a word-group that Plato and Xenophon used frequently. It would be valuable to know more precisely the way *philosophos* and its cognates contributed to the self-constitution of the Socratics. Livio Rossetti ("Philosopher Socrates? Philosophy at the Time of Socrates and the reformed *philosophia* of Plato") assesses the available evidence. We have good reason to suppose that this word-group existed already in fifth-century Athens—as we see from Herodotus and Thucydides—albeit infrequently. After Socrates' death the number of occurrences increases significantly. Rossetti reviews references from the late 390s, including in Aristophanes, Alcidas, and Lysias. Among the Socratics, evidence is scanty—and perhaps not at all reliable—in Antisthenes, Aristippus, Aeschines, and Phaedo.

Hundreds of references, by contrast, are to be found in Isocrates, Xenophon, and Plato. Rossetti argues that Plato seems to have taken over an idea of philosophy common outside the Socratic circle that meant little more than an intellectual exercise performed among two or more interlocutors, and then reintroduced it among the Socratics as a technical term. In his work,

philosophia became a reason for living for those who practiced it ("philosophy" as an excellence), and a qualifier for those who taught it (the "philosophers"), the institutions within which it was performed (the "philosophical" schools), and the books in which it was fixed for future generations ("philosophy" books).

A difficult topic in Socratic studies is Socrates' purported commitment to or visitation by a divine "sign." The meaning of its intrusion into the eminently rational life of Socrates baffled even his contemporaries. The first writers of Socratic literature—among them Euclides, Plato, Xenophon, and the Academic author of the *Theages*—came to little consensus about its nature, function, or interpretation. Indeed, there is so much disagreement, Stefano Jedrkiewicz ("A Literary Challenge: How to Represent Socrates' *Daimonion*") argues, that these authors may not have been trying to make factual claims about Socrates' life and references to his *daimonion* at all. In any event, its portrayal and narrative explanation seems to have become almost an intrinsic part of Socratic literature itself: Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, and Apuleius all came to write essays on the *daimonion*. Plato's portrait has some remarkable features, and a remarkable purpose, when we see it against these other portraits.

As much as the *daimonion* signifies Socrates in Plato and the other Socratics, so too does the analogy from experts. This is the analogy from the fact, for example, that a ship-captain ought not to be selected by lot to the conclusion that a statesman ought not to be selected by lot. The frequency with which Plato, Xenophon, and even Aeschines put this in operation suggests that Socrates in fact used them; Aristotle seems to corroborate this evidence. But these "expert-analogies," as Petter Sandstad ("The Logical Structure of Socrates' Expert-Analogies") calls them, are often taken to be fallacious; and if one of Socrates' characteristic argument tropes is fallacious, then he becomes riskily akin to sophists and eristic arguers. Thus a defense of Socrates seems to require more careful logical analysis of this common argumentative figure. Sandstad diagnoses the familiar negative evaluations of the expert-analogy in Plato and other Socratics, and proposes a novel, plausible,

and textually-supported one, where Socrates argues validly from species to genus to species. Sandstad's conclusion is that Socrates was, for his time, a good logician who made use of a valid logical form in his arguments.

The next five chapters study a select number of Platonic dialogues. The authors address both the "Socratic" context for Plato's writing dialogues and the "Socratic" context revealed by the dialogues. Unique in the Socratic literature is the "autobiography" section in Plato's *Phaedo* (95e–102a), where Socrates describes his early curiosity about, and then dissatisfaction with, materialistic causal explanation. Yet it is precisely from a curiosity about natural philosophy that both Plato and Xenophon take efforts elsewhere to distance Socrates. After all, his abuse in the *Clouds*, and his tragic downfall in his trial of 399, are both related to Athenian discomfort with the *phusiologia* typified by Anaxagoras and natural philosophy. Thus the "autobiography" section has a very uncertain status. Perhaps Plato treats what Socrates says in it as true but from so much earlier in his life as no longer to be a liability; or perhaps he treats it as false, either as narratively-valuable fiction or a presentation of his own coming of age. Jörn Müller ("Socrates and Natural Philosophy: the Testimony of Plato's *Phaedo*") deals extensively with the "first" and "second" sailings described in the passage, and highlights the links with generally acknowledged and distinctive features of Socratic philosophy. Müller argues that the way Socrates tells the autobiography is true, or is to be taken as true, including his investigative self-reliance, recognition of his epistemic limits, ethical intellectualism and teleological world-view (especially as seen in Xenophon), and optimistic theology. Plato's aim is apologetic: he wants to keep Socrates apart from Anaxagoras, who had also been accused for impiety. Thus Plato counterbalances the accusation of impiety levelled at Socrates in his trial.

In his dialogues Plato takes over structures, motifs, and language from such traditional genres as tragedy, comedy, and satyr play. Michael Erler ("Crying for Help: Socrates as Silenus in the *Euthydemus*") deals with the comic motifs of the *Euthydemus*: the unmasking of false avowals of

knowledge; Socrates' comic features; and, most importantly, Socrates' "cry for help" as a reaction to *aporia*. In drama, the "cry for help" motif occurs to explain the entrance on stage of a person or a group to protect or rescue someone in need (the chorus, as in the *parodos* of Aristophanic comedies or in satyr plays such as Aeschylus' *Diktyulkoï* or Sophocles' *Ichneutai*). Plato integrates this motif in the *Euthydemus*: here Socrates calls to the eristic practitioners Euthydemus and Dionysodorus for help, hoping to get support in his investigation, but he is eventually disappointed. In fact, the motif of crying for help addressed to the eristic Sileni turns out to be a cry for help that Socrates addresses to himself. The comic flavor of the *Euthydemus* points therefore to a serious issue: that of unmasking Euthydemus' and Dionysodorus' claim that they are in command of a knowledge which in fact they do not have.

Plato's *Gorgias* is also profoundly influenced by contemporary literature. Ivan Jordović ("Bios Praktikos and Bios Theôrêtikos in Plato's *Gorgias*") tackles the last part of this dialogue, which contrasts the notions of a "practical" life (*bios praktikos*), personified by Calicles, with the "theoretical" life (*bios theôrêtikos*), which Socrates represents. As Jordović points out, this section of the *Gorgias* has intertextual connections with the contrast in Aristophanes' *Clouds* between the Better and the Worse Arguments, as well as with Euripides' and Thucydides' juxtapositions of "quietism" and "meddlesomeness" (*apragmosunê* and *polupragmosunê*). This dichotomy can even be observed in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, in the first conversation between Socrates and Aristippus about the choice between three ways of life: of ruling, of being ruled, and of quietism. These connections reveal Plato's intimate knowledge of contemporary authors, and also that he aimed his dichotomy of *bios praktikos*–*bios theôrêtikos* at transforming philosophy into a powerful politics. Among his goals, perhaps the most important one was to delegitimize the court verdict of 399: as the jury was composed of members of the *demos* who led a *bios praktikos*, it was by definition incompetent to judge Socrates fairly, who by contrast led a *bios theôrêtikos*.

In the Platonic (Ant)erastai, or “(Rival) Lovers,” whose authenticity has been doubted since Antiquity, Socrates examines a young man’s optimistic view of philosophia. This conversation occurs at a grammar school, in view of two boys who, at the dialogue’s opening, Socrates describes as eagerly drawing circles and imitating inclinations with their hands. He guesses they were debating about Anaxagoras or Oenipides. One of their admirers harrumphs that, at any rate, they babble about the things in the heavens and drivel on, philosophizing. It is at this point that this admirer’s rival defends philosophy. He does not treat astronomical or mathematical investigation as definitional of philosophy; he suggests instead that philosophy is polumathia, then that it is having a measured amount of learning, then that it is appearing wise in all important skills. Even this last definition he cannot sustain. Sandra Peterson (“Notes on Lovers”) provides a commentary for this infrequently examined dialogue, in the process rejecting the strongest arguments against Plato’s authorship; situating the back-and-forth conversation in a context of dialectical games; clarifying Socrates’ attitudes about philosophy; and speculating about the person of the harrumphing admirer. Whether the Rival Lovers is Platonic or otherwise Academic, it deploys many of the tropes of Socratic dialogue and presents Socrates in conversation about that most significant discipline, philosophy, more explicitly than anywhere else in the Socratic literature.

The last chapter of this section addresses the origins of the dialogues whose authenticity has been doubted. Often Plato’s dialogues have been thought, even if unconsciously, to have been written at once; and even if not at once, then eventually once and for all. Conversely, dialogues thought only doubtfully Plato’s—written perhaps by a student or colleague in the Academy, or someone at least closely familiar with Plato’s Socratic dialogues—are usually treated as independent of Plato. Harold Tarrant (“The Socratic Dubia”) turns to statistical linguistic analysis of brief spans of the dubia and overturns these assumptions. The central passages of certain suspected dialogues—Socrates’ radical history of Hipparchus’ Athenian innovations in the Hipparchus, for example, or

Socrates’ radical history of the education of the Spartan and Persian royalty in the Alcibiades—look much more Platonic than the dialectical exchanges at the margins. Tarrant hypothesizes that the picturesque kernels of these dialogues were Plato’s, never finished by the master but preserved and then fleshed out by members of the Academy. The consequences for our understanding of Socrates is that certain of these dialogues may reveal a picture of him developed over many years.

The counterpoint to Plato in Socratic studies has always been Xenophon. In recent years the literature on Xenophon’s Socratic and non-Socratic works has grown in substance, rigor, and availability. This section of the volume therefore required an updated and thorough approach to Xenophon, with a chapter devoted to each of the Memorabilia’s four books and to each of his other Socratic works. Since recent scholarship on Xenophon has shown that peculiar aspects of Socrates’ personality and teaching can be found in almost every one of his works, a chapter deals with a dialogue in which the character Socrates is absent, the Hiero, and another with the Socratic features of Xenophon’s non-Socratic works in general.

Socrates’ defense strategy at his trial has been debated since the time of Plato and Xenophon. According to both authors, Socrates provoked the jury in many respects. Pierre Pontier (“How to Defend the Defense of Socrates? From the Apology to Memorabilia Book 1”) focuses on the apologetic strategies displayed in Xenophon’s Apology and in the “defense pamphlet” (the Schutzschrift) included at the beginning of Memorabilia. As Pontier shows, Xenophon characterizes Socrates’ defense speech as eulogetic: instead of defending himself, he legitimates his deeds, attributing them to the appearance of a divine entity, the daimonion, at all decisive moments of his life. Taking Socrates’ “boastfulness” (megalêgoria) as a simple provocation would be wrong, however, according to Pontier, since Socrates’ choice to die was prompted by a variety of circumstances, not least of which was the daimonion itself. The political background of this choice is outlined in Memorabilia 1, where Socrates is contrasted with

the oligarchs Critias and Antiphon. The latter had a fate similar to Socrates', also condemned to death in a political trial after having defended himself in a memorable fashion. Xenophon was aware of the symmetrical trajectories of the defenses of Socrates and Antiphon: he deliberately brought them together, thus demonstrating that they should not be confused, since Antiphon's "best" defense would eventually be outclassed by Socrates' "most free and most just" defense.

Apology also characterizes Book 2 of the *Memorabilia*. Here Xenophon responds to the non-formal charges against Socrates, especially that he encouraged his companions to disparage useless family members and to engage in shameful activities. Gabriel Danzig ("Nature, Culture and the Rule of the Good in Xenophon's Socratic Theory of Friendship: *Memorabilia* Book 2") argues that Socrates' emphasis on utility in social relations led him to act in ways that, while they could be seen as problematic, in fact had a positive effect, promoting mutually beneficial alliances among friends and family members. In particular, Socrates persuaded his virtuous companions to form a network of friends that would enable them to profit personally and also to dominate the city in a virtuous oligarchy. Thus, Xenophon's Socrates rejected cultural norms in favor of a natural conception of human association that emphasizes mutual cooperation and benefit. In contradiction to the widely held opinion that Xenophon whitewashed the image of Socrates, this portrait shows how offensive the opinions and behavior he promoted were to his neighbors. Xenophon uses the necessity of a defense to offer his own broad vision of Socrates, which means that in *Memorabilia* 2 he offers many more lessons than the narrowly apologetic ones.

In *Memorabilia* 3, Xenophon presents us with disparate material: seven chapters on leadership, two rather puzzling philosophical chapters, and a potpourri of conversations in which Socrates helps artists, advises a hetaera, and dishes out advice on physical fitness and gourmet dining. David M. Johnson ("From Generals to Gluttony: *Memorabilia* Book 3") shows that all these issues are in keeping with the most general goal of the *Memorabilia*, to show how Socrates helped all who spoke with him.

Such a variety of topics and interlocutors demonstrates Socrates' all-around usefulness in a way a more unified piece of writing could not. In fact, *Memorabilia* 3 shows its greatest kinship with wisdom literature, especially in its use of brief exchanges in the form of chreia. With pithy bits of advice offered by a wise man aimed at broad utility rather than depth, ancient readers accustomed to this genre would have found this section of the *Memorabilia* less problematic than we moderns do—especially if we approach the book looking for the sort of organic, dramatic whole we find in Plato's Socratic dialogues, or in Xenophon's own *Symposium* and *Oeconomicus*. Xenophon's way of presenting Socrates is to show him approached by an interlocutor with a specific problem or question: he responds to the issue at hand, giving his interlocutors the advice they can use.

In Book 4 of the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon sets out the system of education that accounts for Socrates' usefulness in his companions' search for happiness. One chapter shows how Socrates persuaded different kinds of youth to take up that education; another deals with one of these propaedeutic methods in detail; chapters 3 through 7 treat of the five stages of the education; and the final chapter of the book (and of the whole *Memorabilia*) explains Socrates' behavior at trial. The fact that this final chapter summarizes the previous seven chapters of the book, but not the three earlier books, suggests that Xenophon composed *Memorabilia* 4 for independent publication, or at least with a unified vision. Christopher Moore ("Xenophon's Socratic Education in *Memorabilia* Book 4") argues for this hypothesis, and claims that Xenophon's main concern here was to illustrate the precise way Socrates proved useful to his fellow citizens. Socrates taught a graduated curriculum, starting with *sôphrosunê* (which Moore shows to be distinct from *enkrateia*), then justice, *enkrateia* ("self-control"), conversation, and only in the last stage *autakeia* ("self-sufficiency"). Only in this last stage do we come upon the usual subjects of education, some of which Socrates could himself teach; for some of which he recommended an expert; and yet others of which (geometry, astronomy, cosmology, arithmetic, health, and

forecasting) he thought his friends could learn for themselves.

A peculiar trait of Xenophon's Socrates is the breadth of his knowledge and variety of skills. His competence at estate managing on display in the *Oeconomicus* has caused particular puzzlement to scholars. They have generally assumed that the main character of the dialogue, Ischomachus, serves as Xenophon's alter ego, thereby supplanting Socrates. An important exception to this view was that of Leo Strauss, who saw in Ischomachus the representative of a way of life both opposed to Socrates' way of life and disavowed by him. Louis-André Dorion ("Fundamental Parallels Between Socrates' and Ischomachus' Positions in the *Oeconomicus*") distances himself from both threads of interpretation, and identifies sixty-two points of convergence between Socrates and Ischomachus. Dorion claims that these parallels point to a more or less complete agreement between Socrates and Ischomachus on a wide range of issues. Xenophon himself identifies with both of these characters, making it possible to speak of an Ischomachus-Xenophon with Socratic features. The *Oeconomicus* should therefore be understood as an attempt to valorize the kind of life led by this joint character, one that reflects both Xenophon's own experience in estate managing and the Socratic teaching.

A completely different Socrates occurs in Xenophon's *Symposium*, a dialogue that has connections to both the *spoudaiogeloion* genre of sympotic literature and the political sympotic elegy. Maria Consiglia Alvino ("Aphroditê and Philophrosunê: Xenophon's *Symposium* between Athenian and Spartan Paradigms") highlights the political and educational aspects of Xenophon's *Symposium*, and dwells on the pedagogical value of music and dance. Alvino attends especially to the discussion of Socrates' *kalokagathia* and *sôphrosunê*, two notions that convey Xenophon's own philosophical and ethical ideas. This political aspect of the *Symposium* is confirmed by the sources Xenophon makes use of. He draws ideological inspiration from Critias' sympotic elegy, the Spartan Constitution. Another source Xenophon seems to refer to is Plato's *Laws*, and especially the section devoted to the sympotic laws. (Xenophon could have known this work in the form of public

lectures, which would be a reason for dating the composition of the *Symposium* to the 360s.) As a result, Xenophon's *Symposium* mixes Spartan and Athenian ethical paradigms and the literary mimesis of sympotic genres, thus revitalizing a pedagogical institution that had been banned from Athens. The main purpose of the *Symposium* seems therefore to be political, not literary. Xenophon aims at reorganizing Athenian democracy through educational reform. Socrates' philosophical teaching aims at a general improvement and emancipation of the civic body.

A dialogue in which Socrates' name is not even mentioned is Xenophon's *Hiero*. Yet the dialogue deals with typically Socratic issues such as happiness, the good life, and political rule. As Federico Zuolo ("Xenophon's *Hiero*: Hiding Socrates to Reform Tyranny") points out, Xenophon uses the character of the poet Simonides to convey Socratic thoughts. Simonides functions as the emblematic wise man, who turns the tyrant Hiero from the commonsensical opinion that his life is preferable to all other types of life. Yet Xenophon "hides" Socrates behind Simonides, preempting the cognitive dissonance that would arise from representing Socrates in a non-Socratic situation. After all, the wise man in the *Hiero* is in intimacy with a tyrant and gives the tyrant remarkably realist—even immoralist—advice; and this is contrary to the moralistic image of Socrates represented throughout the *Memorabilia* and other dialogues. The *Hiero* offers a model for counseling tyrants meant to challenge the Platonic and Academic model.

Xenophon's experiments with a variety of literary forms (history, (auto)biography, technical treatise, Socratic dialogue) has led to a tendency to isolate his Socratic works (*Memorabilia*, *Apology*, *Symposium*, *Oeconomicus*) from the rest of his oeuvre, and to deal with these corpora as if they were written by two separate people. Recent scholarship has shown, however, the value of treating Xenophon's corpus as a whole, particularly when examining important concepts in Xenophon's thought, such as grace, disorder, and freedom. Noreen Humble ("Xenophon's Philosophical Approach to Writing: Socratic Elements in the Non-Socratic Works") examines Xenophon's non-Socratic

works from six different angles. The first three concern methodology: the rhetoric of philosophical inquiry, the use of dialectic, and the adaptation of the medium to the intended audience. The remaining three treat pedagogical themes and principles at the core of the writings of both Plato and Xenophon: leadership and education, self-examination, and the usefulness of philosophy. The principles and methodology are general in nature, and therefore not confined to Xenophon's depictions of Socrates. Humble shows how Xenophon in his non-Socratic works tried to put into practice lessons he learned from Socrates. In many of his characters one can observe the same spirit of wonder and inquiry that pervades his Socratic works, the same concern with political life and leadership, and the same concern with leading a good life. The ensuing picture of a "Socratic" Xenophon is much closer to that recognized by Renaissance humanists than to that sketched out by more recent scholars.

Later Reception

The chapters of the second part of the book, devoted to the later receptions of the Socratic dialogue, take up a range of significant authors who did not themselves write Socratic dialogues but were instead readers, beneficiaries, critics, or chroniclers of them, from Aristotle and Aristoxenus to Epicurus, the Stoics, Cicero, Persius, Plutarch, Apuleius, Maximus of Tyre, Diogenes Laertius, Libanius, Themistius, Julian, and Proclus. This sequence of studies does not have the pretense of completeness, but it aims to address the varied uses to which certain authors put their readings of Socratic dialogues, and the evidence, interpretative framework, and overall evaluation each relied on. The study of these authors is particularly important, as most of them very likely relied on first-generation Socratic literature since lost to time. In fact, it is partly thanks to them that we now have some of the precious few "fragments" of the lost Socratic dialogues.

In what Plutarch calls one of Aristotle's "Platonic" writings, perhaps the lost dialogue called *On Philosophy*, Aristotle writes that the Delphic inscription "Know Yourself" set the tune for Socrates' perplexity and search into it. He thereby

puts self-knowledge at the beating heart of the Socratic project, and presumably puts Socrates squarely into the lineage of philosophers. But two important questions remain concerning Aristotle's remarks about Socrates. One is about the extent of Aristotle's appreciation for or distancing himself from the Socratic project. Another is about the sources of Aristotle's knowledge about Socrates. It is to the latter question that Nicholas Smith ("Aristotle on Socrates") gives a definitive answer. In his analysis of all Aristotelian references to Socrates, Smith shows that Aristotle relies on sources beyond Plato and Xenophon. Equally interesting, textual evidence suggests that Aristotle draws on a specific passage of Plato's *Protagoras* (352c1–2) when recounting the Socratic denial of *akrasia* in *Nicomachean Ethics* (1145b21–27). Smith shows that Aristotle's account of Socrates is based on a "developmentalist" reading of Plato, since he attributes the Socratic speeches from the "early dialogues" to the historical Socrates but those from the "later dialogues" to Plato.

Traditional scholarship has often found Aristoxenus' *Life of Socrates* an untrustworthy testimony to the life of Socrates, given its apparent inconsistencies with Plato and Xenophon. Recent reassessments, however, note that Aristoxenus' account provides a balanced picture of Socrates, which is not at odds with earlier Socratic literature. Alessandro Stavru ("Aristoxenus on Socrates") follows this more positive hypothesis. He reviews all fragments available in the extant editions of Aristoxenus' *Life of Socrates*, and provides new texts not included in these collections. Stavru shows that Aristoxenus' characterization of Socrates as an irascible, sex-driven man who eradicates his licentiousness through education is widely confirmed: not only by Aristotle and other Peripatetics, but implicitly also by Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, Phaedo, and other Socratics. Both the account based on Aristoxenus' father Spintharus, who knew Socrates personally, and the report about Socrates' youthful association with Archelaus, the historical reliability of which has been shown by recent studies, give us good reasons to claim that Aristoxenus had solid grounds for depicting Socrates the way he did.

We often think of Epicurus as forcefully independent of Socrates. But in some ways his

pedagogical mode seems indebted to Socrates. Jan Heßler ("Socratic Protreptic and Epicurus: Healing through Philosophy") argues that Epicurus uses the elements of Socratic protreptic known from the dialogues of Plato. Arguing this requires drawing out the features of protreptic writing found in the classical period, especially in the Euthydemus (though also the pseudo-Platonic Clitophon, the "Euthydemus" passage of Xenophon's Memorabilia (4.2), and Aeschines' Alcibiades and Aspasia), and best articulated, as it turns out, by Philo of Larissa and Clement of Alexandria. These authors allow us to see that Epicurus employs the Socratic logos protreptikos, which was to exhort and promise a cure from passions. Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus features many aspects of this healing protreptic, but with a significant difference: while the protreptic of the Socratics is mostly aporetic, aimed only at liberating the interlocutor from his false beliefs, Epicurus provides concrete instructions for specific situations by giving advice in the form of fixed doctrines.

It is commonly held that Zeno of Citium founded the Stoa in the wake of Socrates, and that the early Stoics took themselves to be Socratics. Robert Bees ("From Competitor to Hero: the Stoics on Socrates") challenges this view, claiming that, to the contrary, the early Stoics conceived their philosophy as an explicit alternative to Socrates and the Socratics, whom they considered as their competitors. Only in the so-called Middle and Imperial Stoa did the criticisms of Socrates fade away and Socrates became an exemplum. Bees dwells extensively on texts that seem to draw a succession line from Socrates to Antisthenes and Cynicism up to Crates and Zeno, and shows how this line was very likely a forgery invented by later Stoics hoping to be called "Socratics" (as in Diogenes Laertius), if it is not an altogether modern reconstruction (since it does not feature in Philodemus' De Stoicis). Other characteristics of early Stoicism seem to confirm that Zeno's doctrine can be seen only as an alternative to the Socratic approach. For example, there are no grounds for claiming that Zeno connected the Stoic sage, who has secure knowledge and knows everything, to Socrates. Nor is there evidence that the central tenet of Stoicism, oikeiōsis, goes back to Socrates. Bees argues that

oikeiōsis is an act in which nature induces man to behave according to the objects he deems "his own" (his own nature, descendants, and fellow human beings), while Socrates' care of the self is a concern for the "true self" of the individual man, the soul. The fragments relating to Zeno's immediate followers Cleanthes and Chrysippus confirm this polemical trend toward Socrates. The first Stoic to appreciate Socrates was Antipater of Tarsus, a scholar of the Middle Stoa. His pupil Panaetius of Rhodes also dealt with the life of Socrates, and defended him against the accusation of having been rich and bigamous. Posidonius of Apamea went even further in his admiration of Socrates. He explicitly criticized Zeno's rational monism and posited an irrational part of the soul, as Plato did. In Imperial Stoicism, Socrates became a model for ethics: his way of life substantiated fundamental Stoic tenets, as the one that death is "unimportant"; for Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, Socrates was a philosophical hero, the embodiment of Stoic doctrine.

An author who was profoundly influenced by Stoicism is Cicero. Much of what he writes is of core importance for reconstructing first-generation Socratic literature, as it often draws on Socratic dialogues (e.g., of Phaedo) that are no longer extant. At the end of his life, Cicero sketched a theory of conversation, which he expounded in the first book of De officiis. Despite its relative brevity, the passage offers an account of the practical ethics of the Stoic Panaetius. As François Renaud ("Cicero and the Socratic Dialogue: Between Frankness and Friendship [Off. 1.132–137]") points out, there are good reasons to believe that Cicero's theory of conversation points at the Socratic dialogues, which he considered the supreme instances of philosophical conversations. This seems to follow from a comparison of De Officiis with Plato's Gorgias, from which one decisive agreement surfaces: for both Cicero and Plato, freedom of speech is a call at once for truth and friendship. The role that reproof and correction play in Cicero's conversation hints, directly or indirectly, at the Socratic refutation as correction and at its analogy to medical treatment. Cicero's position on this crucial issue is, however, intension with the kindness or civility demanded by the

humanitas as well as with the “golden-mean” ethics, the prime issue of *De officiis*.

A Stoic representation of Socrates in early Imperial Rome is featured in Persius’ Fourth Satire, which is a satiric adaptation of the Platonic Alcibiades. The Fourth Satire focuses, on the one hand, on the differences between Persius’ depiction of Socrates and the “traditional” representation offered by Plato and Xenophon, and on the other hand, on the way the Socratic mode of life, as adopted and modified within Stoicism, shaped Persius’ poetics. Diego De Brasi (“Socrates and Alcibiades as ‘Satiric Heroes’: The Socrates of Persius”) argues that Persius’ depiction of Socrates is rooted in his own satirical poetics, but is also a genuine example of Socratic exhortation to philosophy. Persius, like Socrates, emphatically urges his interlocutors (that is, his readers) to live “philosophically,” that is, always to acknowledge their own shortcomings. In Persius’ Satires, Socrates is the greatest example of a life spent practicing and urging others to practice philosophy. But Socrates’ constant arousing and reproaching his fellow human beings is also an image of Persius’ own poetics, which consists in the uncovering and chastisement of human faults and sick morals.

The next three chapters deal with the reception of Socrates in Middle Platonism. It has been argued that Plutarch was particularly well informed about Socrates, as he had access to sources that have since been lost. Sometimes he provides relevant information for which he is the only testimony, which makes him a useful complement to the first-generation Socratic literature and helps lay bare the ideological bias of Plato’s and Xenophon’s interpretations. Geert Roskam (“Plutarch’s Reception of Socrates”) shows how this is so. In addition to Plato and Xenophon, he mentions, as sources on Socrates, Aristotle’s *On Nobility*, Aristoxenus, Hieronymus, Demetrius of Phalerum, Panaetius, the Megarian School, and Terpsion. Relying on these sources, Plutarch was familiar with the most important aspects of Socrates’ life. He mentions most of the biographical details that are known to us, especially Socrates’ association with Alcibiades and his divine sign. Plutarch also had a good knowledge of Socrates’ philosophy, and in particular of topics such as the *elenchus*, ignorance,

and *maieutics*, Socrates’ attitude towards the sophists, and his refusal to be considered a teacher.

Another Middle Platonist who profoundly admired Socrates was Apuleius. His Socrates is the epitome of the perfect philosopher, who combines philosophical insight with religious worship. Friedemann Drews (“‘A Man of Outstanding Perfection’: Apuleius’ Admiration for Socrates”) deals with the portraits of Socrates depicted by Apuleius in Books 1 and 10 of the *Metamorphoses*, as well as in *De Deo Socratis* and *Florida*. Each differs significantly from the others. In *Metamorphoses*, Socrates cannot control his bodily needs and passions, which has led scholars to claim that he is an anti-Socrates, since the historical Socrates was renowned for his physical endurance and temperance. Drews interprets this antithetical character as a *figura deformata* which in the course of the narration is restored to his true form. This happens at the end of the *Metamorphoses*, when the bizarre character of Book 1 is re-transformed into the true Socrates. So the reader is meant to recognize that the deformed Socrates is not the “real” one. His re-metamorphosis does not come as a surprise, but follows the development of the *Metamorphoses* from the world of witchcraft and deception towards one of true religion and philosophy. Apuleius’ admiration of Socrates’ divine wisdom is even more evident in *De Deo Socratis*, where Apollo testifies to his wisdom, and Socrates is able to communicate with his “god”—his *daemon* and guardian angel.

The Socrates of Maximus of Tyre’s *Dialexeis* is more conventional than Apuleius’. Maximus’ Socrates is one of the great philosophers of the past, all of whom deserve equal respect, according to Maximus, but who has the distinctive honor of supplying the jumping-off point for no fewer than eight of his surviving forty-one orations. These include *Dialexis* 3, in which the subject is Socrates’ refusal to defend himself (or defend himself properly) when on trial for his life; *Dialexeis* 8–9, where the subject is the nature and function of *daimones*; *Dialexeis* 18–21, where the subject is Socratic (or Platonic) *erôs*; and *Dialexis* 12, which is devoted to the question of the morality of revenge. In each of these eight orations, the case of Socrates is used as a particularly vivid means of

communicating a general philosophical truth, about values, conduct, soul, or cosmos, rather than an object of analysis in its own right. Socrates' presence in the *Dialexeis* is not just deep but pervasive; Michael Trapp ("Socrates in Maximus of Tyre") observes that Socrates fails totally to feature in only sixteen of the forty-one orations (a number of appearances that is exceeded only by Homer). Maximus finds no difficulty in combining information from different Socratic authors and treating them as all on the same footing: details from Xenophon's *Symposium* fit comfortably into the composite picture of Socrates the lover, just as material from the *Oeconomicus* helps paint the picture of his constant efforts to find suitable advisers for himself and his friends (itself a Xenophonic rather than a Platonic emphasis). Similarly, material from Aeschines' *Alcibiades* combines with elements from the Platonic *Symposium*, *Alcibiades*, and *Protagoras* to depict relations with the most charismatic and dangerous of the pupils, just as Aeschines' *Aspasia* meets Plato's *Menexenus* in references to *Aspasia* as a Socratically endorsed instructress.

Remarkably, the only extant *Life of Socrates* is that found in Diogenes Laertius' *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*. Diogenes places Socrates fifth in the Ionian succession of philosophers, following Anaxagoras' student Archelaus. This is the Archelaus who, while called a "physicist," also studied law, value, and justice, thereby introducing Socrates to "ethics," who went on to augment the topic enough to be called the "inventor" of it. The remainder of Diogenes' second book covers Socrates' immediate successors and their students. Indeed, Diogenes arranges a majority of the books with Socrates as pivot: Book 3 on Plato, Book 4 on *Academics*, Book 5 on Plato's student Aristotle and his followers, and Book 6 on Antisthenes and his Cynic legacy. Tiziano Dorandi ("*Socrates in the Ancient Biographical Tradition: From the Anonymous PHib. 182 to Diogenes Laertius*") studies the structure, meaning, and value of this Socratic *Life*. He specifically draws out Diogenes' reliance on sources that may not originate in Plato, Xenophon, or Aristotle; the Hellenistic traditions of biography from which Diogenes' mixed form derives; and the important Cynic influences on the interpretations of

Socrates. Dorandi also puts Diogenes' *Life of Socrates* in relation with a little-known third-century BCE papyrus from el-Hibeh (PHib. 182).

Another lively portrait of Socrates is that delivered by Libanius, a supporter of a return to pagan Hellenism. His *Apologia Socratis*, from 362 CE, exceeds in length all other extant *Apologiai*, and takes a novel form, purporting to be the speech of a beneficiary of Socrates'. Heinz-Günther Nesselrath ("*An Embodiment of Intellectual Freedom? Socrates in Libanius*"), after showing the stereotyped use of Socrates in Libanius' letters, and dealing with the authenticity of some Socrates-featuring declamations, reads this long *Apologia* in its cultural context. The speaker ignores the charge of Socrates' impiety—perhaps to avoid giving the Christians arguments useful in defense of their introduction of new divinities—instead focusing on the charge of corrupting the youth. As it turns out, though, when Libanius defends Socrates' right to criticize the poets, he seems now to defend the Christians.

Socrates' legend flourished in the rhetorical tradition of Late Antiquity, particularly in Themistius and Julian the Emperor. These two intellectuals of the fourth century CE are in many ways exact opposites: Julian was an idealist and a philosopher by vocation, remembered mainly for his ambitious plan of pagan restoration despite the Empire's large-scale conversion to Christianity (whence his epithet "Apostate"); Themistius, Julian's erstwhile teacher, was a skilled politician successful as princeps' advisor during the reign of several Christian emperors, his open profession of paganism notwithstanding. For Julian, Socrates is the savior of souls who directs all men towards the true knowledge of themselves and the true faith in their (pagan) gods; Themistius sees Socrates instead as a symbol of the *politikos philosophos*, a man who speaks in public with people of all ranks, in a simple and direct way. Maria Carmen De Vita ("*Political Philosopher or Savior of Souls? Socrates in Themistius and Julian the Emperor*") shows that, despite their differences, these portraits are complementary. Both attest, in their *imitatio/aemulatio* of figures and myths of Classical Antiquity, to the rhetoric capacities of "new Hellenes," and both employ the figure of Socrates,

with his typical attitudes, as an appropriate testimonial for their own ideological program. Each of them highlights different aspects of Socrates and attests to the vitality the icon of Socrates had in Late Antiquity: Themistius focuses on the philosopher's eloquence and his active life in the polis; Julian draws on the invitation to care for one's soul and the necessity of having faith in the gods.

The Neoplatonists are thought to have turned their back on Socrates, given both their overriding commitment to Plato and their apparent uninterest in Socrates' avowals of ignorance. Danielle A. Layne ("Proclus on Socratic Ignorance, Knowledge, and Irony") shows that this presumption is wrong. Neoplatonists, despite being concerned mainly with Plato's Socrates, advanced complex arguments on various "Socratic" subjects, including his confessions of ignorance and their seeming contradiction with his avowals of knowledge. Proclus insists that Socrates' avowals of ignorance need not be qualified by an appeal to Socratic irony, since Socrates' "grade" of ignorance would not taint the philosopher's corresponding form of knowledge with "indeterminacy, mixture with ignorance, or uncertainty." Proclus appealed to various activities of intellection as well as grades of not-knowing or ignorance, letting Socrates avow both a kind of knowledge and a kind of ignorance without contradiction. This entails that when Proclus' Socrates speaks of his ignorance and his corresponding knowledge, he is referring primarily to different modes of intellection (opining/judgment versus understanding) and their appropriate objects (sense versus intellectual). Proclus' Socrates rightly claims both knowledge and ignorance insofar as his ignorance refers to sense phenomena and not to eternal reasoning principles. This ignorance is therefore justified since no one can know the sensible, and the recognition of this ignorance is a kind of wisdom itself, which evidences one's own awareness of the various kinds of intellectual activities and their respective objects.

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[Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity](#) edited by Harold Tarrant and François Renaud, Dirk Baltzly, Danielle A. Layne [Brill's Companions to Classical Reception, Brill, 978-9004270695]

This volume demonstrates the variety of ways in which ancient readers responded to Plato, as author, as philosopher, and as leading intellectual light, from his own pupils until the sixth century CE.

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13 Variations of Receptions of Plato during the Second Sophistic by Ryan C. Fowler	404 BCE), Plato witnessed many of his compatriots losing their lives, or like Alcibiades wasting their lives, in their quest for everlasting glory. In contrast to such pitiful pursuits of ambition, individuals like Thucydides and Plato' sought to be remembered by their literary pursuits, with the historian explicitly desiring his writings to be a "resource for all time". Similarly, Plato suggests in the Symposium through the character of Diotima that there were numerous ways of attaining greatness or "immortality" (208c-209e), one of which explicitly endorsed the verse of Homer or Hesiod, the legal institutions of Solon, or other serious types of writing. For Plato, such "progeny" could bring longer-lasting credit upon their "parents" than successful generations of children and grandchildren. Committing oneself to the (re)production of ideas was the real way to live on, because in such productions one comes into contact, or gives birth to, a beauty that was more enduring than the finite beauty of the body. Heeding this, Plato must have wondered about the reception of his literary progeny by future generations. Did he anticipate that his dialogues alongside the poems of Homer or the chronicles of Thucydides would survive so successfully into our culture that one might believe or hope they always will?
PART III Early Christianity and Late Antique Platonism: Introduction: Early Christianity and Late Antique Platonism	The Laws show Plato considering how written legal code should be managed by understanding persons once the legislator was gone,' while the later pages of the Phaedrus (275c-278b) shows Plato reflecting on the fate of written text and their content once its author could no longer respond to questions.
14 Origen to Evagrius by Ilaria Ramelli	Indeed, Plato knew very well that questions would be asked about the meaning of his work and that unlike living persons in dialogue, his texts would go on saying the same thing, just as long as they made straightforward statements at all. Due to this, we can safely presume that he expected his writings would be misunderstood and subject to attack, and that they would therefore need defenders (275d—e). The Phaedrus therefore valued leaving successors behind over leaving writings (276e-277a, 277e-278b), but there is no suggestion that the combination of the two could not be the best option.
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Despite Socrates' infamous criticism of written text in the Phaedrus (275a—e), Plato's enduring fame and legacy certainly pivots upon the illustrious beauty and wisdom found in the dialogues. Born early in the disastrous Peloponnesian War (431-

It is likely that the Phaedrus, not afraid to refer to Plato's long-term educational rival Isocrates, was aware that rivalries between writers had the ability to result in attacks of a kind that showed no real understanding of the motives of the writer. It is possible that the opening chapter of Isocrates' *Helen* had the Protagoras in mind when criticizing those who tried to prove that all the virtues amount to the same thing and that there is one science of them all. In fact, several stories in the biographical tradition talk of the rivalry between Plato and other educational writers of his day; it is usually hard to evaluate this tradition's reliability, but the overall impression is such as to remind us that Plato was already being responded to in his own lifetime, and perhaps even at the beginning of his career as a writer of dialogues.¹ He may also be responding to criticism in some of his dialogues, but the nature of the dialogue is such as to obscure any contemporary targets, and there is usually little agreement among scholars about alleged cases of indirect attack. Furthermore, attacks on a writer and thinker during his lifetime are influenced by people's response to him as a person and in a particular context. This is a dimension that largely ceases to be a factor or is greatly reduced (think of Diogenes' personal dislike of Plato's arrogance) once that person has passed away.

It is convenient, therefore, to think of Plato's "reception" in a narrower sense as the response to Plato's writings and to other indications of his philosophy from 347 BCE, when his death left others to represent him to the world. It will, however, be impossible to overlook the contribution of all who had known him. This is because several of these figures significantly influenced his reception in ways that cannot be ignored. Most obviously, the first two successors as Head of the Academy, Speusippus and more particularly Xenocrates, took philosophy in directions that would seem to bear some relationship with the direction of Plato's own thought during his later years.

Also important was the account of Plato's writings and arguments that Aristotle was offering at various points of his treatises, and more particularly his reference to "the so-called unwritten doctrines" (*Phys.* 209b14-15) which seem to have been elaborated at greater length in the *On Philosophy*,

lost to us but known to the Aristotelian commentators. From Aristotle we receive in particular a rather different account of the principles of Platonic metaphysics: including the One, the Indefinite Dyad, the Ideas, and Matter as "great and small". There is great dissension among modern scholars concerning how seriously we should take these reports, and there was a similar disparity concerning the attention given to them by the ancients. Apart from anything else, what was it that subsequent generations were supposed to be studying and responding to? Was it what Plato had written, or was it what Plato believed? It is difficult to think of "reception" without also postulating a set of texts that must be "received", even if the ultimate exercise is to penetrate the depths of Plato's mind. And again, few would argue that Plato's "beliefs", however they were known to us, were especially important unless he had very good reasons to believe as he did, whether as the result of some particularly strong foundations in argument or because he himself had had access to some superior vision of the world and our place in it. Indeed, the ancients often held that the divine could speak through inspired writings almost in spite of what the author ordinarily thought, and a range of Platonic texts suggest as much (e.g. *Meno* 99c11-d1; *Ion* 533c-534e; *Tim.* 71e-72b). Ancient reception usually involved either a direct response to the writings, or a response to the vision that is taken to underlie the writings, a division that might also be thought to inspire other thinkers or religious systems; in this latter case the reports of Aristotle could indeed become important.

Another follower of Plato who seems to have had his own perspective on the *Laws* in particular was Philip of Opus, who was often held to be the author of the *Epinomis* and who perhaps prepared the *Laws* for publication. The *Epinomis* offers a rather different view of the Platonic universe (especially the heavens), and of Platonic education. Not all the ancients accepted that the *Epinomis* did not have Plato's full authority behind it, and are happy to employ it for the reconstruction of the Platonic system, among them Theon of Smyrna and Apuleius.

Given Plato's apparent willingness to go on thinking his views through and to present them in different ways, it is perhaps not surprising that many of his

followers, fully discussed in Dillon, had different perspectives on where his thought was heading at the end of his life. For those who had not known Plato personally but became intensely interested in his work, they had to seek Plato by looking back through the prism of his immediate followers. An element of uncertainty was introduced, adding to the challenges readers face in confrontation with Plato's infamous ability to withhold any obviously authorial voice from his dialogues, thereby concealing his level of seriousness or playfulness at any given point. These factors have made for a particularly rich reception over the first millennium since Plato started writing. The dialogues would be read both privately and at gatherings, acted through for the entertainment of spectators, imitated in the writings of others, and cited — sometimes for the genuine authority that they offered, sometimes as little more than ornament to testify to the erudition of the later author. They would provoke a variety of reactions, both favourable and unfavourable. Hopefully this volume will be able to offer the modern reader a taste of that wide-ranging response.

Organization of This Volume

The majority of contributions to this volume are sufficiently limited in time to permit arrangement according to three periods. A few concern early reception as far as Cicero, who was writing approximately three centuries after the death of Plato. Cicero is a major source for earlier philosophy, and professed an allegiance to Plato's school, the Academy, though that school perhaps ceased to exist formally in 88 BCE and had then been under strain from internal disputes about the true heritage of Plato. Consequently Plato is frequently mentioned or alluded to. Cicero also wrote a translation of a large part of Plato's *Timaeus*, which often gives clues concerning how Plato is being interpreted at a particular point. Several of Cicero's philosophic works have survived either in whole or in part, and this stands in sharp contrast to the fate of others discussed in Part I. Only fragments of the work of Plato's early successors, Speusippus and Xenocrates, have survived, so too that of the early Stoics who also claimed to work within the tradition instituted by Socrates, and again this is also the same with the

later successors, the so-called "Academic Skeptics". However, sufficient material was thought to survive to warrant articles on these three areas. Something will also be said in the introduction to Part I concerning the more hostile reception encountered among the early Peripatetics and in the Epicureans.

During the first two centuries of the Roman Empire, covered within Part II, it is clear that Plato was widely read, and that he was popular among non-philosophic authors as well as philosophic ones. Accordingly a wide range of chapters will here address a diverse set of authors. Prominent early in the first century CE, Philo of Alexandria used Plato as an authority at regular intervals in his presentation of the Jewish scriptures to the wider world. Later in the same century and early in the second, Plutarch of Chaeronea, better known as a biographer writing *Lives* of prominent Greeks and Romans, was also the author of several works of philosophy of a broadly Platonist nature, including some that engage with specific points of Platonic interpretation. Already obvious in his work is the strong interest in the mathematics present in Plato's work, which receives detailed attention in the surviving work of his contemporary Theon of Smyrna. Several Platonist authors flourished around the middle of the second century CE, including the versatile Apuleius, whose persona seems to belong between that of Platonist philosopher and sophist, Numenius who was as much a Pythagorean as a Platonist, and perhaps Alcinous, whose sole surviving work, a handbook of Platonist doctrine, is not strictly datable. Other figures of the period, such as Dio and Lucian, offer insights into how Plato could be used in literature of an altogether different kind. The influential medical writer Galen, physician to Marcus Aurelius later in the second century, often makes use of Plato, and wrote summaries of Platonic dialogues as well as a commentary on the medical content of the later pages of the *Timaeus*. By the later years of the second century Plato had also become an author of interest for a variety of Christian authors, especially at Alexandria.

During these centuries the Platonic commentary had also been developing, and some seventy papyrus columns of commentary on Plato's *Theaetetus*, copied at around 150CE, give an insight into the

type of running commentary that could then be written, together with the kind of issues that would be raised and the answers that could be given. Several columns of this papyrus have recently been displayed at the Neues Museum in Berlin. Less substantial fragments also survive of other commentaries on works of Plato. Together, these remains of commentaries seem to reflect what went on in the teaching of Platonic texts by professors of Platonic philosophy, affording a valuable glimpse into advanced education under the Roman Empire. It is above all these commentaries that offer a link with the Plato studies that continued within the Platonist schools until the sixth century CE.

Part III is dominated by those known as "Neoplatonists", usually conceived as beginning with Plotinus. However, Plotinus himself and many of his successors would have been surprised at the suggestion that he was founding something new. In fact many had seen him as working in the same tradition as Numenius about a century before him. It is clear that Plotinus developed the ideas of his own teacher Ammonius Saccas, who is said to have reconciled the views of Plato and Aristotle but remains a shadowy figure. His philosophic circle was based at Rome, and in it Amelius too was a prominent figure. The school seems to have taken great pains to differentiate itself not only from Numenius but also from the apocalyptic movements associated with him, especially contemporary Gnostics. All tended to draw inspiration from the same Platonic texts, variously understood, though from many other sources also. Plotinus wrote a large number of contemplative treatises, known as the *Enneads* after Porphyry's arrangement of them into groups of nine, but commentary seems not to have been his style.

We associate commentary rather with Plotinus' pupil Porphyry, who wrote Aristotelian commentaries and a commentary on Ptolemy's *Harmonics* as well as Plato commentaries. These last are now lost, but are usually the source of the detailed interpretations with which Proclus later credits Porphyry. A significant amount of an anonymous commentary on the *Parmenides* survived into modern times in a palimpsest, and appears to stem from somewhere close to the circle of Plotinus. Thereafter Iamblichus became the principal figure

in the movement as he sought to isolate the most important works of Plato and to impose rules for their exegesis. His staunch defence of a variety of ancient religious traditions and practices made him a natural enemy of Christianity, and, though Theodorus of Asine appears to have been a most interesting thinker and interpreter of Plato, it was largely Iamblichus who inspired not only the brief attempt to revert to paganism on the part of the Emperor Julian, but also the fifth century CE climax of Platonic studies in the school of Syrianus, as represented in the works of Proclus and Hermias. Damascius was salvaging what he could of that school's traditions, and writing Platonic commentaries that still owed much to Iamblichus, when Justinian the emperor introduced legislation that in effect brought it to a halt, though somehow credible Platonic studies (if with a considerable reduction in theological ideas that Christians would have found objectionable) continued for a time to flourish at Alexandria under Olympiodorus.

Late antiquity also offers us glimpses of the reception of Plato that had little to do with the Neoplatonist scholarly tradition. During Plotinus' lifetime a huge contribution to Christian reception was made by Origen, though some Christians strongly resisted the influence of pre-Christian intellectual figures. The martyrdom of the Platonist mathematician Hypatia at the hands of an Alexandrian Christian mob reminds us that the Platonic tradition could also appeal to women, and perhaps this event more than anything else led the Athenian Neoplatonists to take very seriously the potential of women to achieve as much as men in matters both practical and philosophic. The activities of the Platonizing Emperor Julian were an important reminder that Plato too had political and legislative ambitions, and that the political reception of Plato could also be important. But politics increasingly involved Christianity, and throughout these times the range of intellectuals calling themselves Christians was wide enough to include many who adopted Plato as an insightful figure. Another Brill companion to the reception of Platonism commences with Augustine, who is therefore the last specifically Christian thinker treated here.

Throughout the periods covered there are important developments that do not permit a whole chapter, and others that would involve too much complex discussion to achieve satisfactory results in this format. Accordingly, we have chosen to introduce each period separately, to say a little about each contribution contained within it, and to add material that falls outside the scope of any chapter. Hence the editorial team provides a separate scholarly introduction to each of the three chronological periods, Hellenistic, early imperial and late antique.

The first and fourth chapters in this section represent a period before the rise of the Hellenistic philosophies, when Plato's heritage was still alive and well, and a time when Plato was once again becoming a central figure in philosophic thinking. In between we have essays on the reception of Plato by the Stoics and by the Academic Skeptics, who may still have been preserving glimmers of the school's Platonic heritage, but whose arguments and influence are intimately bound up with their need to counter their Hellenistic, and principally Stoic, opponents.

Reception proper begins with the willingness to receive and build upon the works of another. It does not require the reproduction of doctrines so much as a thoughtful response. Several figures that had studied with Plato do not receive chapters in this book because of a lack of extant material rather than because they did not have such a response. Heraclides of Pontus was one of these, and one for whom the Platonic heritage seems to have been literary rather than doctrinal. He wrote dialogues set in the past, and tackled issues within them that were of such a kind as might easily have attracted Plato too. An account of Heraclides that sets him clearly, if somewhat loosely, within the Platonic tradition is given by Dillon (2003).¹

The figure of Hermodorus of Syracuse is notable for two reasons. First, he wrote a book about Plato, demonstrating both his own interest in the master and that of an appreciable audience. Second, he traded in Plato's books in his native Sicily, thus incurring sufficient disapproval from certain people to make his retail activities into a semi-humorous proverbial crime. Dillon, who again offers a useful

account of this figure, spends most time on fragments 7-8, which offer a version of Platonic categories and a Platonic theory of matter that seem to be based, independently of Aristotle, on Plato's oral teaching, and thus presumably on a rather late stage of Plato's thinking.

This brings us to an important feature of the reception of Plato by his own pupils. Many of those who had studied with him in the last decades of his life, and had responded to the Platonic heritage as insiders, were primarily concerned with his later creative phase, from the Republic on perhaps,² rather than on works commonly thought to have preceded the Republic. The most obvious instance, if the relevant reports are to be believed, is the case of Philip of Opus' work to finalize the project that Plato had undertaken in the Laws. Here we should quote unnamed persons mentioned in the anonymous Prolegomena to Plato's Philosophy (24.13-19):

They say that the Laws was the last to be written, because [Plato] left them uncorrected and disorganized (*adiorthôtous kai sunkekhymentous*), because he failed to have enough time to assemble (*syntheinai*) them on account of his death; and even if they now seem to have been compiled (*syntetakhthai*) properly, this is not due to Plato himself having been their compiler (*tou synthentos*), but to Philip of Opus, who became an inheritor of Plato's school.

While the final clause, if it is intended to mean that Philip at some time became scholarch, would be at odds with our other testimony, and while "inheritor" (*diadokhos*) would normally refer to a scholarch, it is by no means certain that the persons concerned had meant to imply that he was an inheritor in that sense, but rather that he was an inheritor of this particular educational project. There is no particular reason to distrust this rather unusual information, and the four verbs that begin with *syn*—reinforce the impression that Philip undertook a considerable task of organization. This seems to have earned him the title of *anagrapheus*, not a simple word for a secretarial assistant, but used rather to denote the "promulgator" of laws. That the Laws did not represent the definitive version as contributed by Plato's own hand is suggested by a

passage in Book ix that speaks of the law code as a work that is not thoroughly worked out and still taking shape from disparate materials (857c, 858b—c). Whatever the case regarding Philip's reorganization, to which Diogenes Laertius also testifies (3.37), his authorship of the *Epinomis* is rather better attested, and that too seems to have been an attempt to round off Plato's project, as well as to contribute his own particular understanding of Plato's later educational, cosmological and theological theory. Again it was furthering Plato's ongoing work that seemed to matter, not preserving intact any perfect system, so that even though Plato's oral legacy was still exercising an influence, it was influencing a direction of development not constraining the minds of his successors.

As for Speusippus, Plato's nephew who became the first scholarch (formal head) of the Academy, the ancients seem to have believed that he was for the most part true to Plato's doctrines. This may be learned from Diogenes Laertius' statement (4.1) and from Numenius' less conciliatory remarks about the Old Academy (ft. 24.5-18). In this latter case it is the general character (ethos) of the doctrine that was said to remain unchanged, but they were said to have "dropped some [doctrines] while distorting others" (24.11), failing to do their utmost to preserve unanimity in all matters. Since it is notorious that Speusippus did not accept the existence of transcendent Ideas, and was a more pronounced anti-hedonist it is clear that he felt under no obligation to abide by everything that Plato had promoted. Besides a hint that he may have explained creation in the *Timaeus* along the same figurative lines as Xenocrates, it is difficult to extract from the surviving fragments anything more significant about his reception of Plato than an Encomium of Plato in the list of Speusippus' works (D.L. 4.4-5)¹² — unless we look rather towards his reception of an educational project and of the place of division and classification within it. This is what Phillip Horky has done in chapter one, arguing that Speusippus "was committed to developing theories of definitional dialectic that were focused on proper procedure, which could not proceed solely from *aliores* if they were to obtain the proper essences of things." The

Speusippian project appears to relate particularly to "those [Platonic] dialogues composed later in life", and so to emphasize matters of science and mathematics.

Horky continues his chapter with a new look at Xenocrates as an inheritor of the Platonic legacy. A little more maybe deduced from the fragments about Xenocrates' reception of Plato, though mainly thanks to material in Plutarch's work *On the Psychogony* in the *Timaeus* (frr. 158, i88 IP'), material that may have been passed down in the commentary tradition, beginning with Crantor the work's first exegete. Might it perhaps be inferred that Xenocrates' approach to philosophic teaching did not involve the systematic exegesis of Platonic texts in a way that later became the norm? Seeing in Xenocrates educational ideals and practice akin to that of Speusippus, Horky (p. 44) detects "a positive epistemology ultimately assumed from Socratic debates in the *Republic*, *Meno*, and *Phaedo*", while looking rather to the Eleatic Stranger and *Timaeus* "for the procedures and subject areas relevant to education".

Aristotle was another pupil of Plato who responds to him in a variety of works, but for the most parts his responses are found in works that were written as an independent teacher of his own philosophy. Most often the views that he associates with Plato are among those that he rejects before finally coming to his own position. Sometimes Aristotle is responding to a Plato that we can relate to because it is familiar from a fairly literal reading of the dialogues, while at other times he draws upon what he has heard himself of school discussions, or what others have reported. It is from Aristotle, therefore, that most of our information about Plato's much discussed unwritten doctrines comes, though the term was probably not his own since he refers to "those doctrines that are called 'unwritten' (*ta legomena agrapha dogmata*, *Phys.* 2o9b15). It is entirely possible, given the tendency of Plato's successors to take his work one step further, that some of those still representing themselves as Academics were making much of what Plato had spoken about but never committed to writing, whether because of lack of opportunity or because they were inherently not the kind of views that he thought could be promulgated. It is

particularly interesting in this context that Hermias, in considering Plato's remarks about the superiority of oral teaching in the *Phaedrus*, has oral philosophy being passed from Socrates to Plato, from Plato to Xenocrates, and from Xenocrates to Polemo. This may be an indication that it was Xenocrates who most commonly looked to Plato's oral teaching for support, explaining why Aristotle, as head of a rival school, was inclined to attack it.

Aristotle and His School

Aristotle's reports of Plato's oral teaching have been the subject of several books, among them those of Harold Cherniss (1944 and 1945); they have been central to the work of the Tübingen school of Platonic studies, as represented by the works of Konrad Gaiser, Hans Joachim Krämer, and Thomas Szlezák; their work has been given interesting new support from across the Atlantic by Gerson (2013), while Gerson (2005) has also been instrumental in promoting the view that Aristotle had been faithful to Plato in many unexpected ways, and indeed that he was Plato's greatest pupil. Nor can it be denied that he built further on Plato's thought in many areas as he thought appropriate. His reception of Plato is thus a topic that could legitimately demand a companion volume to this one, and no mere chapter could have done justice to the complexity of the issues and the variety of modern scholarship. We shall therefore content ourselves with just a few remarks about his reception of Platonic dialogues, usually though not exclusively dialogues from the *Republic* onwards.

In the first chapter of the *Poetics* Aristotle mentions the Socratic dialogue, alongside the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus, as being a mimetic form of literature that operates by words alone, indicating that he recognizes it as being something more than a simple vehicle for the exposition of one's philosophy. In an earlier work *On Poets* (fr. 3 Ross) he also regards such dialogues as belonging to a genre founded by Alexamenus of Teos. However, this does not mean that his extant treatises ever treat Plato's works as something that requires the kind of interpretation expected of literary works in dramatic form. Like those for whom these works were written he is interested rather in the soundness of the ideas that the dialogues had promoted, and

at *Politics* 2.6 he even includes the *Laws* among "the discussions of Socrates" which were all supposed to have been "ingenious and innovative and inquisitive" (1265a1012), which is presumably a telling slip rather than the result of his knowing an earlier version of our text. Here the *Politics* had been offering an extended discussion of Plato's theoretical states, and the previous five chapters had dealt only with that of the *Republic*, before this one chapter comparing that of *Laws*. It seems clear that the latter work had failed completely to attract the same public attention as its predecessor, in spite of the greater attention to detail that Aristotle could see there and the by-passing of the *Republic*'s most controversial ideas like the community of women and of property.

From the point of view of the history of Plato's reception it is Aristotle's reading of the *Timaeus* that proved most controversial. Here it is noteworthy that he is already responding (*de Caelo* 1.1 o.279b32-280a3) to the position of Xenocrates and (probably) Speusippus to the effect that the Platonic picture of the world being generated at a given time, found in the *Timaeus* and evidently still being promoted as useful, is "for the sake of instruction". It helps in the same way that those witnessing a geometrical proof are helped if they can observe a diagram being generated. Aristotle is of course arguing against the assumption that the world can be both generated and indissoluble, an assumption that he finds explicit in the *Timaeus* (28a30-32). Neither here nor in the following argument against the position of the *Timaeus* (*de Caelo* 1.12-2.1) is there any close discussion of the Platonic text or what is meant by it, as if Aristotle is not concerned about what Plato believed but what his work may be assumed to be saying. The same may be said of a few other references to the *Timaeus* in the *de Caelo*, and at times Aristotle's simplification induces him to understand Plato in a misleading way related to his own way of seeing the world, as where he affirms that the *Timaeus* identified location and matter (*Phys.* 2o9b11-12). However, given that Plato's successors had themselves taken ownership of the *Timaeus*, Aristotle may also have in mind ways in which they too were interpreting the work, and in particular its receptacle.

There are other dialogues of Plato with which Aristotle engages from time to time. Several important essays on Aristotle's reception of Plato can be found in Harte, McCabe, Sharples and Sheppard (2010), of which three make the *Meno* central, one the *Philebus*, one the *Symposium*, while McCabe's essay on the way in which *Metaphysics Z* 13-16 engages with Plato concerns a range of works. It is well worth citing a key sentence of her conclusion:

On either account, this Plato is not a single monolithic set of doctrines, but rather a set of views, loosely or generically similar, but distinct, dialogue by dialogue (across a broad spectrum of dialogues: *Phaedo*, *Republic*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Theaetetus*, *Parmenides*, *Cratylus*, *Timaeus*).

This suggests that Aristotle was in this case engaging very much with the kind of Plato that we think we know from our reading of the dialogues, not with some neatly packaged system marketed as the "unwritten doctrines". Other essays in the same volume also give one the same impression: Aristotle could engage separately with the arguments and conclusions of a range of Platonic dialogues from the *Meno* through to the *Philebus*. And when this is what he was doing the discussion did not have to be premised on any fixed metaphysical system that held the key to all or most dialogues. In fact it is in the very same passage, *Physics* 200¹ 1-17, that Aristotle (a) makes the *Timaeus*' receptacle both location and matter, and (b) refers to "those doctrines that are called 'unwritten'; but he treats the two as involving significantly different theories." Aristotle understood the importance both of answering the dialogues, singly and collectively, and of responding to the metaphysical underpinnings of Plato's system, whether as he personally understood them or as others depicted them to be. In the end what mattered to him was not what Plato believed but eliminating all theories that he considered mistaken, particularly those that he took to be influential.

Aristotle's reception of Plato was not by any means confined to physics and metaphysics, for his ethical works keep revisiting Platonic themes, critiquing: Plato's contribution but also trying to build upon whatever helpful foundations Plato could offer.

Perhaps the most important influences emerge in the final book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where the discussion of pleasure first builds upon Academic debate including the *Philebus* in chapters 2-3, and then proceeds to develop further the idea of pleasure as an important ingredient of a human life, even though it should be aiming more directly at some kind of life, a life which will give pleasure if unimpeded, and particularly at the theoretical life. In his description of the theoretical life Aristotle resorts to talk of the divine and of "acting the immortal as far as possible" (1177b33), which surely is a deliberate echo of the Platonic formula of "assimilation to the divine as far as possible" (*Theaetetus* 176b1). This involves giving priority to the life of what is most divine in us, a priority with which Plato could hardly disagree at least of all if Plato is the author of the *Alcibiades I* (133c).

While Aristotle and Xenocrates vied over who would educate Athens the generation of philosophers with personal experience of Plato was dying out. Theophrastus, Head of Aristotle's school, the Lyceum or Peripatos, is said to have heard Plato before switching his allegiance to Aristotle. But it is highly unlikely that he spent long enough with the aging Plato to have any special insights into his philosophy. The catalogue of his works (D.L. 5.2-5o) and his extant remains demonstrate a strong interest in Presocratic philosophy, but the only title of special relevance to Plato is the *Epitome of Plato's Republic* in two books. However, Theophrastus too was unable to ignore Plato's *Timaeus*, most particularly in the *De Sensu*, on which Baltussen has provided some learned and intriguing commentary; from this it emerges that Theophrastus uses his knowledge of the *Timaeus* very selectively, sometimes rearranging material, mixing quotation and paraphrase, basing criticisms on his own theoretical framework, and systematically attacking Plato on matters of definition and of genus. Baltussen draws the conclusion that Theophrastus was guilty of "a degree of manipulation and/or unfairness", and makes the interesting suggestion that Theophrastus may have been working from a personal summary 21

Likewise Theophrastus' name occurs frequently in Proclus' commentary on that work. On the very first lemma of the commentary, and after a short

discussion of Longinus' approach to it, Proclus tells us that "Praxiphanes ... the friend of Theophrastus" (in Tim. I 14.20-21) criticizes the first words of the Timaeus on the grounds that Socrates (a) did not have to be counting his friends, and that he should not have switched between cardinals or ordinals. We know that Proclus' information came from Porphyry, but one wonders whether Porphyry had been aware of the criticism through Theophrastus' having repeated it. Theophrastus' name recurs again at I 120.30, in relation to the debate over the Nile floods, at I 456.17 when he is praised for noting that Plato premised causation on providence, at n 6.22 where he tackles Plato on how the senses grasp the universe at Timaeus 31b, at II 120.19-122.11 on the generation of the soul at 35a, at II 136.2 on soul again at 40c, and at III 151.2 on Chaldaean astrology.¹ Not all of the material is hostile, and not all is from Theophrastan discussions of the Timaeus, but he does again emerge as one who read that dialogue with close interest, though rather literally and not as one who intended to penetrate to the depths of Plato's intent.

In other Procline works devoted to Platonic exegesis Theophrastus is mentioned at the beginning of the Republic-commentary (in Remp. I) 8.15 with regard to the name he gave to the work; early in the Cratylus-commentary (in Crat. 16.30); twice in Book one of the in Parmenidem (635.5, 659.14-17); in the Alcibiades-commentary but as an example rather than one whose observation were relevant to the text (in Ale. 309); while in the Platonic Theology he is mentioned only with regard to what he had said about people not valuing soul without body, recalling in Tim. II 122.10-14 and II 136.1-2.23 Overall these references do not look upon Theophrastus as an exegete, but rather as a well regarded critic who had to be answered by the earliest Platonist commentators.

Other Peripatetics are likewise known to have criticized Platonic texts. We have mentioned Proclus' use of Praxiphanes, and Dicaearchus (fr. 44 = D.L. 3.38) is known to have criticized the Phaedrus, as well as Plato's psychological doctrines more generally. Strato of Lampsacus was likewise no friend of Plato, and Damascius (in Phd. 2.63) preserves a collection of seven arguments of his against the argument from opposites in the Phaedo.

Nor was it long before Epicurus, no friend of his rivals and active in Athens from 306 BCE, had joined the critics of the Timaeus and of Plato more generally, followed by Colotes who seems to have extended Epicurean polemics to Socrates as well,²⁶ and whom we shall discuss shortly.

The "First Interpreter" and the Academy under Polemo

Criticism does not go unanswered. It is no accident that the Academic scholar whom Proclus (in Tim. I 76.1-2) calls "the first exegete" was a contemporary of Theophrastus, and almost certainly no friend of Theophrastus, from whom he is said to have poached the quick-witted young Arcesilaus (D.L. 4.29-30). Unfortunately we do not have as much information of these exegetical activities as we would have wished, and, while they may have extended to dialogues other than the Timaeus, we have no information about them. Proclus refers to him only once more (I.277.8-10), as the originator of a view that explained Plato's description of the world as "generated" in terms of its being dependent on a cause other than itself. Plutarch refers to his work on the Timaeus a number of times in De Animae Procreatione (1012d-1013b, 1020c, 1022c—d, 1027d), and the phrase "those who take the position of Crantor" (hoi periton Krantora, 1012f, 1022d) and the fact that Eudorus follows him at 1020c both testify to his having been influential, firstly regarding the basic construction of the soul at Timaeus 35a, and secondly regarding its harmonic arrangement. It is noteworthy that Crantor interpreted the universal soul as having been constructed out of the same basic ingredients that it was intended to have cognition of, intelligible, sensible, and the differences and similarities — both internal and between one another (1012f—1013a). For Platonic cognition was for him, as Aristotle had already observed (de Anima 406b16-18), of like by like.

Since the human soul was constructed according to the same principle (Timaeus 41d), only less perfectly so, this would have made it an entity naturally designed to have cognition of all it needed to know, if somewhat imperfectly so. So our souls would have been designed for the cognition

and comparison of two types of reality, being by nature intermediate between the two, the familiar objects of sense (presumably bodily things) and the objects of intellection (presumably some variation on Platonic idea-paradigms). While this may exhaust the things that we know, it does not exclude further entities less accessible to our cognition, and most obviously god and matter, for the *Timaeus* observes that there are special difficulties in the Cognition of the creator-god (28c), and that the receptacle (presumably identified with matter) is "touched on by a kind of artificial reasoning in the absence of sensation" (52b). These were things of which we could have no like-by-like cognition, assuming that our souls did not also have god and matter in their composition.

Given Crantor's closeness to Arcesilaus, the insight into his epistemological thinking given by his views on the world-soul is intriguing, for this interpretation justified both the view that human beings were endowed with considerable cognitive gifts such as to equip them for philosophy and the exercise of caution concerning particular problematic questions given the imperfections that affected the human soul but not the universal soul. It also allowed for the existence of a divine and a material principle, neither of which was routinely available to human cognition at all. However, Crantor may have died in 290 BCE, approximately twenty-five years before Arcesilaus would take control of the Academy, and there would be plenty of time for Arcesilaus to develop what he had learned from Crantor in novel ways.

Meanwhile the school remained for most of that time under Polemo's management and for the remainder under that of Polemo's partner Crates who is not suspected of making any innovations. Polemo himself had a reputation chiefly for his contribution to ethics and for living the kind of life that others wanted to emulate. It was no doubt within this umbrella that Polemo developed his own theory of Socratic love, about which there has been recent discussion,²⁸ and which proved influential in late antiquity. The emphasis on practical ethics and on a higher kind of love make it plausible to think of Polemo as somehow involved in a revival in the fortunes of the Platonic Socrates, something that becomes even more attractive once one bears in

mind that Zeno of Citium, the founder of another Socratic school, is supposed to have studied with him for a time. Strictly speaking, however, very little is known about Polemo's reception of Plato, and the sources do not regard him as an innovator.

The chief hope of saying a little more would seem to be offered by the acceptance, for Polemo, of at least part of the account of Old Academic philosophy offered by Cicero's "Varro" at *Academica* 1.19-42. Sedley (2002) put the case for the physics in particular owing much to Polemo, and Dillon (2003) relies on the physics and logic to flesh out a Polemonian version of Academic doctrine.³⁰ However, we know so little about Polemo's writings and any context in which he might have required a summary of his own Academic philosophy, and have every reason to suppose that much of the picture had come to Cicero from Antiochus of Ascalon whose position "Varro" represents, that we cannot be sure enough of the details to make reliable suggestions about how Polemo might have been interpreting Plato. Indeed, once again there is more in our sources about his reception of the Platonic educational project than on his manipulation of doctrine.

Polemo has some claim to have been a teacher of Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic school, though the information comes through Antiochus of Ascalon, who would have had good reason to make the most of any connection. Presumably he himself will have read reports that Zeno "heard" Polemo, which is the potentially confusing way that the Greeks usually refer to the pupil-master relationship. At any rate the Stoics seem to have made much of various passages in Plato, as the contribution of Alesse argues. She concentrates on the Stoic appropriation of aspects of Plato's portrait of Socrates in dialogues like the *Protagoras* and *Euthydemus*, on their response to the *Theaetetus* (which could have been part of the same Socratic project), and on their picture of the governance of the single universe, which arguably draws inspiration from the *Timaeus*. Zeno also wrote a *Republic* that incorporated elements of erotic theory such as is found in the *Symposium* into the utopian state. It is perhaps no accident that the Socratic, the erotic, and the *Timaeus* (avoiding taking the figure of the creator too seriously) were

all receiving attention in the work of Polemo and Grantor.

The Hellenistic Philosophies in Debate

However, it was regarding epistemology that the defining dispute of the Hellenistic age was to occur. The Stoics not only paid close attention to the Theaetetus as discussed in Alesse's contribution, they also tried to solve its final problem by trying to show what it is that can make an act of judgment into the realization of something's truth, and thus have it contribute to a system of knowledge. Their solution, while a more satisfying empirical explanation of knowledge than had been produced by Epicurus, brought a hostile reaction from the Academy, and particularly from Grantor's close friend Arcesilaus, who may or may not have become Head of the Academy by this time.

As Snyder explains, the evidence for Arcesilaus and the "New Academy" that he is supposed to have introduced is sparse and difficult to handle. Though we refer to them as "skeptics" we cannot be sure that they used this term or even that they would have approved of it. He failed to record the stance that he took even on the central issues of epistemology, and much of what has come down to us comes from opponents and suffers from elements of satire or polemic. His classes seem to have been successful in part because of his skills in argument, and he preferred turning these skills against his opponents to justifying doctrines associated with the Academy. However, there is a little that can be said about the way in which he and his successors read Plato — or at very least the way in which they justified their refusal to come to firm conclusions, and it is generally agreed that it was the Socratic element in Plato, popular with Stoics too, that most attracted him, whether because he found inspiration in it, or simply because it was here that there was most scope for anti-Stoic argument.

It may be significant that the Epicurean school too was also turning its polemical attention to Socrates now, even though he had escaped lightly at the hands of Epicurus himself. The protagonist seems to have been Epicurus' young friend Colotes, whose polemic against Socrates, among other philosophers, would be reported and answered by

Plutarch in his *adversus Colotern* (1116e-1119c).¹ It is noteworthy that he wrote two partially extant pamphlet-like works, sometimes referred to as "anti-commentaries" though they do not have a commentary-like structure, *Against Plato's Lysis* and *Against Plato's Euthydemus*. Though very fragmentary, these books from the charred remains of Philodemus' library at Herculaneum are especially valuable for the insights they offer into third-century debates surrounding the Platonic Socrates. The later of the two pamphlets contains a possible reference to Arcesilaus' school:

The most characteristic novelty of Arcesilaus was his argument that the sage would practice suspension of judgment, and if this reading is correct it implies an attack on the reluctance to make decisions, since it would prove impractical. Arcesilaus was also famous for his practice of arguing both pro and contra, and we know that the New Academy had offered an argument for Plato having been a "suspensionist" based on his own use of *argumentum in utramque partem*, and the *Lysis* is the first dialogue to be mentioned in this regard (Proleg. 10.16-20), and for good reasons. It is rare for the *Lysis* to be mentioned by ancient Platonists, even in contexts discussing Plato's view of friendship, and one wonders whether Colotes' attack on it, aimed at a part of it where contrary arguments are employed, already has Arcesilaus' methods in mind. Whatever the case, it may certainly be said that Colotes seems to have shifted the attack on Plato away from the *Timaeus* that had previously been the focus of inter-school debate, towards works of a more Socratic nature. It is logical to assume that this coincides with an increased importance of these works in other schools, not only in the Academy but also in Stoic ethics.

Attacks on the Socratic Plato could have been prompted by a revived Socratic interest in the Academy, and they could in turn reinforce the interest in Socrates as the Academy devised its defence against the charges. An attack on Socrates' use of contrary arguments, for instance, may very well have prompted a reply known from Diogenes Laertius 2.29. Five Platonic dialogues are known to have been used in antiquity as examples of Socrates' willingness to argue both for and against: *Lysis*, *Charmides*, *Euthyphro*, *Phaedrus* and

Theaetetus. It is probably no accident that three of these, Theaetetus, Euthyphro, and Lysis, appear in Diogenes Laertius as cases where the conversations reported by Plato resulted in a significant improvement of the eponymous interlocutors, making Theaetetus inspired (*entheos*), Euthyphro willing to drop his case and Lysis extremely moral (*êthikôtatos*). All these dialogues end inconclusively, and the alleged improvements, which cannot be attributed to any positive teaching, are attributed to Socrates' skills in protreptic or apotreptic, "because he had the ability to discover arguments derived from the actual facts" Hence Socrates turns out to be a fine teacher in the end not because he espouses any philosophical position, since he may argue both sides of the case, but rather because of his versatility at discovering any required argument from real life. This line of defence is very much in accord with our expectations of Arcesilaus.

As we move to the second century BCE the Academy is dominated by Carneades, and the Stoa by Antipater and his pupil Panaetius. The evidence for these Stoics' devotion to Plato is actually stronger than any for Carneades, whose decision to follow Arcesilaus in not writing makes us singularly reliant on what sources have thought fit to record, and who was variously interpreted even by those who followed him. It is plausible that the unwillingness of Carneades and other Academics to make direct appeals to the authority of Plato left the door open to a more thorough appropriation of at least part of his legacy by contemporary Stoics. Carneades and his followers are treated in the final section of Snyder's chapter, while Panaetius' reception of Plato is discussed in that of Alesse. At this point it is perhaps worth noting that Panaetius seems also to have made a wider investigation into Socrates, regarding all the "Socratic dialogues" of Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes and Aeschines as being "true" or "authentic", hesitating over those of Phaedo of Elis and Euclides, and rejecting those of other writers (D.L. 2.64). That would appear to suggest that he took much of what Plato put into the mouth of Socrates as being faithful to the general character of Socratic conversation, though late Neoplatonic evidence has him rejecting the Phaedo for reasons

associated with Socrates' sustained argument for the immortality of the soul.

The World of Cicero

In the early first century BCE further we can see some efforts on the part of the Academy to give the appearance, at least, of being more conscious of the legacy of the school's founder Plato. Even before this, at around 110 BCE, we know from Cicero's *De Oratore* (see 1.45-47, 84-94) that Charmadas, never actually Head of School but a prominent Academic who had himself heard Carneades, was prepared to teach Plato's *Gorgias* and to make use of it alongside the *Phaedrus* in his attack on rhetoric-without-philosophy. Philo of Larissa had just then taken over as Head of the Academy, and appears to have gradually softened the assumed "skepticism" of Carneades, without ever conceding the most contentious issue of epistemology: the possibility of a criterion of knowledge such as the Stoics defined it. Around 90 BCE Antiochus of Ascalon was already teaching apart from Philo, and claiming to be presenting "Old Academic" as opposed to "New Academic" views. It is important that this was not solely the expected attempt to enlist the support of Plato on his side, but a new acknowledgement of the importance of Plato's earlier successors, and it may have resulted from the fact that Posidonius the Stoic was beginning to seek clarification of Plato's views, especially in the *Timaeus*, from the early Academic tradition, seemingly taking note of Speusippus as well as Xenocrates and Crantor. However, the acknowledgement of a valuable earlier tradition that had not been preserved within the Academy presented a direct challenge to the school's claim to represent the whole Plato. The school itself disintegrated in 88 BCE because of the second Mithridatic war, and Philo came to Rome, where he wrote two books that attacked the idea that the Academy that he represented differed from that which had endured until the time of Crantor and Polemo. In so doing he reclaimed the authority of Plato, and Antiochus was visibly distressed when he encountered Philo's books in Alexandria a little later and wrote an uncompromising reply of his own that sanctioned the Stoic criterion, and with it virtually the whole Stoic epistemology.

The debate over these matters lies behind the fragmentary remains of Cicero's *Academica* and some later echoes in Augustine's *contra Academicos*. In the final version of the work Cicero had undertaken to represent the views of Philo himself, and adopted Vano as his spokesman for Antiochus; the reception of Plato is treated from both points of view at *Academica* 1.15-42 (Antiochus) and 44-46 (Philo). Philo is simpler. The passage speaks of a Plato cuius in libris nihil adfirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur, nihil certi dicitur ("in whose books nothing is affirmed, many questions are argued on both sides, there is a search into everything, and nothing is stated for certain", Ac. 1.46). It is the kind of Plato that is promoted in modern times by many who emphasize the importance of the dialogue form, enabling the author to hide while he examines a question from several points of view, and often including caveats in cases where he appears to be reaching conclusions. As at *Academica* 2.74, Plato is thought of as adopting this stance because of the influence of Socratic ignorance. It is a cautious rather than a skeptical Plato. Though the text is here about to break off it does not seem that any detailed account of Platonic theory, however cautious, is about to be offered.

Rather than giving an account specific to Plato, Antiochus' spokesman offers at *Academica* 1.15-42 an account of a single philosophy shared by Plato, the Old Academy, and, with a few modifications either in substance or in terminology, by the Peripatetics and Zeno the Stoic. The whole passage has given rise to much controversy, with Sedley (2002 and 2012) and Dillon (2003) arguing for substantial Old Academic influence, but others, e.g. Inwood (2012), being less convinced.⁴⁵ In many ways the account of the physics in particular presents a Plato that is deeply coloured by the perception of the *Timaeus* that had already emerged in Theophrastus and would follow through to the Stoics. What it seems to lack is the kind of detailed reading of a passage that Posidonius was capable of during this period, interpreting Plato's words at *Timaeus* 35a—b against the background of Speusippus, Xenocrates and Grantor (F141a = Plutarch, *de Animae Procreatione* 1023b—d) and also against that of like-by-like cognition among

the Presocratics (F85 = Sextus, *Adv. Math.* 7.93). He also made much of the wording of Phaedrus 245c5 (F290 Hermias, in *Phdr.* ad loc.), arguing that Plato was only arguing for the immortality of soul as a whole. We are unable to say whether Posidonius' work did or did not antedate the exchange between Antiochus and Philo, for he lived on until 51 BCE, but the very general accounts of Plato in the *Academica* seem not to be influenced by the new attention to detail.

As for Cicero himself he knew a great deal of Posidonius, but he may not necessarily be familiar with anything from late in his life, just as he shows little awareness of the activities of persons like Andronicus of Rhodes or Aenesidemus the re-founder of Pyrrhonist skepticism. In his *de Republica* and *de Legibus* he follows Plato's example in following his Republic with his Laws, and there are plenty of other suggestions of influence, but never of such a kind as to constrain his own thinking, which was based on his own distinctively Roman experience. Close study of his translation of the *Timaeus* shows us both that he is capable of a close reading, and that this reading is coloured by his view of Plato overall. At last we can say that the reception of Plato involves hermeneutics. Renaud's treatment tackles not only Cicero's reception of the *Timaeus* in detail, but also his reception of the *Gorgias*, in which his own expertise in public oratory would clearly influence his reading of Plato's text. At the conclusion of his chapter he gives grounds for thinking that with his *Timaeus* Cicero is already on the verge of what we think of as "Middle Platonism": the principal subject of Part n of this volume.

Early Imperial Reception of Plato

Part II of this volume deals largely with the imperial period up to around 200 CE. In the comparatively stable period that was instituted by Augustus, reinforced by Vespasian and preserved by the Antonine emperors, including Marcus Aurelius Antoninus who was himself a Stoic philosopher of note, education in general flourished, being reinforced by those known as "sophists" and brought to its pinnacle in philosophy. It was generally those schools that best catered for the religious aspirations of the time that fared best,

and none fared better than Platonism, not simply because of its teaching but also because of a wide awareness of the richness of Plato's dialogues. Plato was on the lips of a very wide range of educated persons, and their repeated allusions to Plato show not only their own erudition but also the literary knowledge of the audiences for which they were written. The audience members might have held the papyrus scrolls of Plato in their own hands, or listened to others reading them,¹ or even watched dramatized performances of them as a few literary and archaeological sources reveal.

At the beginning of this period significant efforts were being made to offer people the tools for understanding Plato and philosophy more widely. No longer was a philosophic education mainly the prerogative of those who could afford a prolonged stay in Athens, for the Second Mithridatic War had at very least interrupted the traditional schools there, resulting in something of a philosophic diaspora. While Athens remained a centre of note, others developed, fuelled by an unprecedented demand for access to this highest form of education. Nor did the teachers in one part of the Mediterranean world wish to lose sight of developments elsewhere.

To begin the section Tarrant discusses some of the types of writing that were shaping Platonist education from early in the period. These included commentaries of texts of Plato, handbooks of Platonic doctrines, and doxographic texts, and similar passages within texts, which presented the doctrines of various schools. He discusses the part played in the revival of Platonism by figures like Posidonius, Eudorus and Thrasyllus, all of whom were seemingly influential yet difficult to understand through a lack of surviving evidence would suggest. He notes some early steps in Platonic hermeneutics, and the links already being made between Plato and Pythagoras as a result of the *Timaeus* and its protagonist's alleged Pythagorean position.

The extensive surviving works of Philo of Alexandria already show the influence that Plato had in the Julio-Claudian era. Yli-Karjanmaa discusses Philo's project of Jewish apologetic and the nature of his own style of writing, prior to the

huge part played therein by Greek philosophy and particularly Platonism. He analyzes the Platonic works that Philo appeals to most, which bear a close relation to those to which Platonist philosophers usually made appeal in the early empire. His close analysis shows how the Jewish sacred texts are what he has to explain, and Platonism one of the principal sources of his explanation so that he is Jewish by birth but Platonist through choice.

Like Philo, Plutarch, writing in the Flavian and early Antonine eras, was much more than a Platonist, but nevertheless a central figure in the Platonic revival. Platonism, as Bonazzi explains, stood at a crossroads as if searching for a new identity. The craving for a Platonic system, particularly in metaphysics and ethics, was balanced by the consciousness that the earlier history of Plato's school had sometimes been anti-systematic if anything. As a priest at Delphi, Plutarch had a particular interest in religious philosophy, which the *Timaeus* did much to satisfy. Taking the creation there depicted more literally than most interpreters he shows strong interest in the figure of the Demiurge and in the Ideas, while at the same time conscious of human fallibility. As Bonazzi explains, he applies the tools of scepticism to the empiricist philosophies of the Hellenistic age, one thus left room within the Platonic tradition for Arcesilaus and his successors while seemingly committed to religious and innatist theses of his own. In this he was similar to the Theaetetus-commentator, who was probably close in date, but he differed in his more public mission to offer Plato's philosophy as an exemplar, and to introduce Platonic theoretical, even theological, foundations into the management of human action and the promotion of human virtue.

Active well before Plutarch's time was the Pythagorean Moderatus. While we have only a few fragments, debate has raged since Dodds (1928) over a report in Simplicius (*In Phys.* 230.36-231.7), via Porphyry, of Moderatus' theory of three Ones, and whether this is a sign of the early interpretation of three hypotheses of Plato's Parmenides along metaphysical lines: One above Being, a One Being associated with the Forms, and a psychical one participating in the One and the Forms. Sensible particulars do not even participate.

The four levels postulated must relate rather to the first (137c-142a), second (142b-155e), third + fourth (155e-159b), and fifth (159b-i6ob) hypotheses - with the third regarded not as a corollary to the second, as often today, but as a transition to the fourth. That is because the third introduces the One's Participation in time and being at 155e, but the fourth stresses participation in the One among the others (157c2-158b6), and also participation in limit (158d8—e4). The fifth stresses rather the non—participation of others in the One (159d1—d7) as also in anything else (159e6-160b1). Accordingly this schema attributed to Moderatus is not a familiar Neoplatonist one,¹ as some, times supposed.² The new Apuleius text (29) shows that metaphysical interpretations of second part of the Parmenides were not unknown in his day even though it may have normally been seen as a logical exercise, while it is becoming increasingly clear that Gnostics held such interpretations quite early, and almost certainly by Plotinus' time.

While Moderatus appears to have taken a Pythagorean approach to the Parmenides and presumably to other Platonic works, Theon of Smyrna seems to have remained firmly in the Platonist camp while writing his work on Plato's mathematics. As Petrucci here explains, seemingly technical in nature, Theon's *Expositio* actually represents an attempt to build up a Platonic system of mathematics, including harmonics and astronomy, by taking Plato's dialogues as basis even when mathematics since his time seemed to have made advances. Application of specific exegetical methods to select passages from the *Timaeus*, *Republic* and *Epinomis* (taken as genuine) is at the core of the work. Petrucci compares passages in Plutarch, Dercyllides, Aelianus and the Pythagorizing Platonist Nicomachus in demonstrating the range of interest in mathematical passages and in their significance in order to affirm Plato's authority also in the field of mathematics.

Plutarch lived two decades into the second century, Theon perhaps slightly later. A number of Platonist teachers who flourished in the second century have not received chapters simply because of the fragmentary nature of the material. Dillon is a good place to begin for most of them, though

scholarly thinking on Albinus has moved on since. Gioè (2002) contains the fragments of most of those discussed here. In the earlier years came Gaius, while Albinus was his respected successor, who was lucky enough to have taught Galen in Smyrna at around the middle of the century. Both Gaius and Albinus are mentioned by Proclus, with the most important fragment dealing with the different manner in which Plato expresses his doctrines in the *Timaeus* when dealing with things in generation. We see here an early case of the important principle of Platonic hermeneutics that expression changed to match the nature of things discussed. Proclus treated Albinus along with Atticus as a somewhat routine and unexciting Platonist. His miniature Prologue is treated briefly in Tarrant's chapter. The Platonist Severus, from the same period, differed in important ways from other interpreters on matters of doctrine, but perhaps not on how one should read Plato.

More interesting from the point of view of Platonic reception was Calvenus Taurus, who taught Aulus Gellius in Athens, meaning that several moments from his school have been immortalized in Gellius' *Noctes Atticae*. In his case we receive insight into his in-depth approach to Pausanias' speech in the *Symposium* (NA 17.20 = 10T), into his reading of the "instant" at Parmenides 156d (7.13.11 = 11T), and into the type of material discussed in his *Commentary on the Gorgias* (7.14 = 14T). More important are his careful distinctions between various ways in which the world might be considered "generated" (*genêton*) that have been preserved for us by Philoponus, who made extensive use of a commentary on the *Timaeus*. The author would appear to be committed to explaining Plato in a dedicated and painstaking manner. Finally, a Taurus, said to be from Sidon, but plausibly identical with our Taurus (21F), who is elsewhere said to be from Beirut, is said to have given definitions of geometry from Plato's *Meno* (98a), Aristotle and Zeno in a *Commentary on the Republic*, but the text matches that of the anonymous in *Theaetetus* (xv) which is actually offering a definition of "simple knowledge".

Atticus, whose fragments are found in *des Places*, is another commentator whom Proclus treats as rather dull, often associating him with Plutarch (frr. 10, 19,

22-24, 32, 35), but also with Albinus (fr. 15) and Harpocration (fr. 24). Proclus mocked him for the way in which he stuck to a rather literal reading of the text, but expressed surprise that he postulated two mixing-bowls for the mixing of soul in the *Timaeus* (fr 14). He is known principally for his work directed against Aristotle and those Platonists who embraced him, parts of which are preserved by Atticus (frr. 1-9). Harpocration was his pupil, but clearly a less literal reader of Plato, showing some signs of the more imaginative reading of the *Timaeus* that Numenius had inspired.¹ His twenty-four book *Commentary on Plato* contained material interpreting the *Phaedo*, *Phaedrus*, and *Alcibiades I* as well as the *Timaeus*. His theory of three gods and a double demiurge, as Proclus would have it, is recorded at in *Timaeum* r 304.22-305.6, and presumably relates to his interpretation of the *Timaeus* as well as other works.

From the point of view of reception the part philosophical, part sophistic oeuvre and persona of Apuleius offers much more of interest than the usual teachers of Plato and Platonism, who discussed in their commentaries various details of the Platonic text without much concern either for Plato's strategies of communication or for their own opportunities to transmit the Platonic message. As Roskam shows in this volume, Apuleius has had rather a poor reputation as a philosopher, with many preferring to see him as a sophist or orator without sufficiently considering how these other parts of his persona are subsumed within his stated role as a Platonist philosopher. Roskam resists the tendency to divide Apuleius' works into literary and philosophic parts, for Apuleius is acutely conscious of language's role in the communication of philosophy as well as of the capacity of literary creations to set the mind of the reader working along lines that are ultimately fruitful from the philosophic point of view. Erudition in Apuleius is above all Platonic erudition, language serving thought. Hence Roskam says much about the *Metamorphoses* (or *Golden Ass*) as the work of a philosopher with content that has some philosophical point. The philosopher, as conceived by Apuleius and many others, was committed to searching for the ways in which an individual or a society could become better. Philosophy was not

just sorting out intransigent problems in philosophy, or in the details of Platonic texts — matters relevant only to philosophic practitioners. Ethics mattered; the example of Plato's life mattered; and Plato's voice (captured in the song of the swan at the outset of the *de Platone*) also mattered. Therefore Apuleius' voice also mattered.

O'Brien here tackles the *Didaskalikos* of Alcinous, a text that has become, somewhat alarmingly, something of a canon of so-called Middle Platonism in spite of our ignorance about the author, the background to and date of the work, and the role that it is intended to play in a Platonic education. It is a handbook of Platonist doctrine, and it was never intended to focus on how Plato should be interpreted — unless of course "interpretation" is to mean no more than saying what Plato believed. O'Brien draws attention to signs of the author's admiration for Plato's contribution in the various areas of logic, and of his attribution of much of Aristotelian logical science to Plato before him. The usual reliance on the *Timaeus* and certain other favored dialogues, including the *Epinomis* (regarded as genuine by Theon and Apuleius), was to be expected, but this tendency not to stray too far from the texts (if with some linguistic difference raises questions for O'Brien about the accuracy of the author's knowledge of Plato, and a misreading of *Phaedo* 82b receives particular attention. One "hermeneutic" feature that emerges is the unwillingness of the author to make great effort to ensure that consistency is found across the handbook, allowing the apparent inconsistencies within the corpus to remain. This seem unambitious, but might be being used as a lever to puzzle readers somewhat and thereby motivate them to more in-depth studies of Plato that will discuss the unity of the corpus more fully. Two areas in which O'Brien treats these problems more fully are Alcinous' account of Platonic Psychology (including epistemology) and details of his *Demiurgy*.

We move next from one short work whose author we know almost nothing about to a very large corpus whose author tells us much. The medical practitioner and writer Galen was one of the ancient world's star researchers, using experiment and observation on a massive scale. Yet he also wrote philosophic works, and philosophy pervades

even the more technical physiological writings. Surprisingly, it was not the empirical systems that he admired, but Plato. Rocca introduces us to Galen's philosophic education and the place of Platonism within his works, drawing attention to those areas that were of real interest to him. His fascination with the details of the natural world led to a quasi-religious interest in how it could all have been designed and created to fulfill the purposes required by each of the human parts and each of the species. While other areas of Plato's philosophy were important to him, especially the partition of soul into various faculties as demanded by the Republic, the account of creation in the *Timaeus* and especially that of the creation of human parts (on which he wrote a commentary) was of central importance to him. So, as for Alcinous and many others, demiurgy was a topic of especial concern for him. Rocca introduces us to the distinctive variations of Platonic demiurgy favored by Galen, especially the way that the "young gods" were sidelined or regarded as mere facets of the primary demiurge. The result of these interests is that Galen's great work *On the Use of Parts* becomes an act of worship to a monotheistic deity.

We now move to a very different theology, and a completely different source of inspiration. In her entry on Numenius Athanassiadi argues that his philosophy brings together two second century trends. The first is the diminishing distance between a wide range of religious practices, on the one hand, and the practice of philosophy on the other.¹ This coincides with what may be called the "mystagogic" aspect of Plato reception. The second is the creation of dogmatic Platonism and the rejection of skeptical Academy. Athanassiadi argues that the idea that assimilation to the divine is the goal of living is central to the thought of Numenius and to his reception of Plato. Much of the apparent obscurity of Numenius' writing admits of an explanation when we realize that Numenius' Plato is a mystical philosopher who transmits his doctrines in a deliberately obscure manner lest they fall into the wrong hands. Moreover, Numenius' work arises from a classroom context in which he seeks to guide students to mystical experience and as a consequence adapts his images and terminology to that end. Given the

variability of teaching contexts, Athanassiadi thinks it is unsurprising if Numenius' terminology is not entirely consistent. In addition Numenius feels free to interpret the mystical Plato by reference to a variety of religious traditions. Indeed Athanassiadi argues that inconsistencies in Numenius' system can be clarified by reference to the Chaldaean Oracles and she thinks it possible that Numenius might have played some role in the composition of these obscure hexameters. The evidence of Porphyry in *On the Cave of the Nymphs* shows us that Numenius was also concerned to reconcile his understanding of Platonism with the interpretation of Homer, as well as with Mithraism. Other features of Numenius' work, such as the doctrine of the rational and irrational soul in human beings, as well as a benign and an evil soul in the universe, betray the influence of Hermeticism and Gnosticism. Numenius' intellectual promiscuity and incorporation of Jewish and Christian elements perhaps explains why he was relatively neglected by the Neoplatonic tradition in spite of the fact that they, along with Numenius, accepted Plato as a mystagogic philosopher.

The early imperial period saw Plato grow in importance across a wide range of literature. The period is also known as "the second sophistic", a title given to it as a result of the polished literary productions, usually aimed at polished performances, achieved by a wide range of intellectuals, many of them philosophically inclined and others not. Here Fowler gives a sense of the range of literary productions and of the range of ways in which Plato was relevant. Some of the figures touched on here (Plutarch, Apuleius, Galen) are also treated more for their philosophic contributions in other chapters, but they are revisited since their omission would hinder the appreciation of this broader intellection picture, in which Plato remained important, though often for literary reasons and without necessarily involving the commitment to a Platonist stance. Plutarch's literary emulation of Plato is interesting in its own right; Apuleius is not atypical of the "sophists" of the period even when cultivating his philosophic image; Galen had literary and performative ambitions as well as purely medical ones. Among figures treated only in this chapter are Dio

Chrysostom, the polished Greek sophist; Aristides to whom we should rather give the name of "orator"; Maximus of Tyre, author of philosophic orations for a less philosophic chew tele; Lucian the irreverent author of satirical sketches reminiscent of Platonic dialogues in their literary form and their allusions, used for parody rather than authority; Justin Martyr, who employs a Platonist education and the dialogue form for Christian ends; and Longus, representative of the Greek novelists whose work had Platonic undertones and employed Platonic allusions.

The breadth of Fowler's chapter should not lull one into the premature belief that the second century reception of Plato has been treated exhaustively here. The path towards Neoplatonism is already being set by a variety of responses to Numenius, from that of his friend Cronius to the Chaldaean Oracles and beyond. The path towards the Platonizing treatises of the Sethian Gnostics (to be discussed by Turner) is already under way in other Gnostic sects and perhaps the Hermetic Corpus. The thirst for Plato went far beyond those with literary and philosophic ambitions. It may be timely, in anticipation of Addey's chapter later, to note that Diogenes Laertius, the writer of philosophic lives, while himself inclining towards Epicureanism, reveals at 3.47 that he is in fact writing for a lady, who is herself quite appropriately a lover of Plato who zealously seeks his doctrines. He reveals that he prefers to append to his biography of Plato a brief account of the nature of his writings, the order of the dialogues and his method of induction, rather than to go into the details of his doctrines - which would be like offering "an owl to Athens" (or "coals to Newcastle") if offered to one who knew them as well as she did. We have evidence mainly for the reception of Plato by the writers themselves. But each of the writers whom we have tackled had his audience, which also plays a part in determining the prominence of Plato.

Finally, let us affirm that the division of this book into three parts does not imply that there is any distinct break or radical change in the reception between the final article of one part and the first of the next. Numenius is an influential thinker whose study is essential for the study of Christian Platonism through Origen and of Neoplatonism

through Amelius and Porphyry. The dates of many of the religious manifestations of Platonism are not able to be determined with precision. If there is the suggestion of a hiatus between the last of the so-called "Middle Platonists" and the pupils of Ammonius Saccas it is not because Plato's dialogues stopped being read and debated.

Early Christianity and Late Antique Platonism

We now come to a period when Platonism reaches a crossroads, with Christian and non-Christian reception, which initially found much to agree on, becoming increasingly divergent, particularly where the latter went hand-in-hand with the overt expression of polytheistic beliefs. Their initial agreement is emphasized in Ramelli's chapter dealing fleetingly with Clement of Alexandria, and much more fully with Origen in whom scripture may take preference over Plato, but rarely conflicts with him because he was held to be following the same Logos. Underlying Ramelli's treatment is the belief that the Christian Origen was so devoted to Plato that there is no bar to assuming that he and the so-called Platonist Origenes known to Longinus, Plotinus and Porphyry were the same man. Sharing the same teacher, Ammonius, and the same admiration for Numenius, particularly as regards his allegorical treatment of myth was concerned, they had similar interests in Plato, similar hermeneutic assumptions, and probably a similar selection of key passages in mind. The influence of Origen on Christian writings endured for some time, involving such well-known figures as Eusebius, Gregory Nyssen and Evagrius, and arguably even the Athenian Neoplatonists.

Both Ammonius, as primary oral influence, and Numenius whose writings were widely influential, are also key elements of Plotinus' background, and hence in the background of "Neoplatonism" more widely. Hence we now consider some typical features attributed to Neoplatonic reception of Plato, asking what kinds of generality scholars typically offer about Neoplatonist reception of Plato? We put the matter thus, not because these generalities are flatly false, but rather because the study of individual philosophers within the Neoplatonic tradition shows that such assumptions

are often only partially true, or true in unexpected ways, or truer of some Neoplatonists than of others. The mistake lies not in speaking at a fairly high level of generality about a Neoplatonic reception of Plato, but in supposing that this reception is utterly monolithic and uniform.

If we think about the form of philosophical writing prompted by reflecting on the meaning of Platonism in the 2nd to 6th centuries CE, the detailed commentaries on individual Platonic dialogues stand out. Though many of these are now lost, references to these works would show us that Alcibiades I, Gorgias, Republic, Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, Phaedrus, Symposium Timaeus and Parmenides were all deemed important enough to prompt commentaries. Other forms of writing characteristic of the Neoplatonic reception of Plato were systematic works relating the teachings of a range of a Platonic dialogues to a single topic (e.g. Proclus' Platonic Theology) or books dedicated to the solution of specific problems, typically with reference to a range of passages from Plato's dialogues (e.g. Proclus' essay Ten Problems on Providence).

These forms of writing presuppose that Plato is a systematic and dogmatic philosopher: his dialogues communicate doctrines and the doctrines of different dialogues are consistent and complementary. While in this regard Neo-platonic reception of Plato is not different from Middle Platonic reception, it presupposes that every word of the text is suffused with meaning. Admittedly, Alcinous' Handbook or Apuleius' On the Doctrines of Plato have a less advanced audience in mind, yet even with this consideration the outlines of Plato's doctrines are not tied very tightly to Plato's text. Moreover, even if we consider a Middle Platonic work in commentary form, such as the Anonymous Commentary on Plato's Theaetetus, the level of detail in the exegesis of Plato's text is markedly different. The anonymous Theaetetus commentator attempts to resolve problems raised by Plato's text. But what he does not deem puzzling, he passes over in silence. By contrast, no detail is too minor for consideration by Neoplatonic commentators.

The Neoplatonic commentaries also place far greater emphasis on the central theme or *skopos* of each dialogue than does the Anonymous Commentary on Plato's Theaetetus.¹ The latter identifies a prothesis for the Theaetetus and in this respect it follows schemes for the organization of Plato's dialogues that give some quite general characterization to each one's subject or mode of teaching. But such a prothesis falls short of a Neoplatonic specification of a *skopos*. Each dialogue has a single unifying theme in relation to which every aspect of the dialogue can be explained. The central themes of the important dialogues are distinct and complementary. Collectively a crucial twelve dialogues constitute a course of education capable of transforming a person's life and assimilating him or her to the divine — a notion that we return to regarding the mystagogic character of Plato's works below. These strong assumptions about the unity of each Platonic dialogue do not preclude a strong commitment to intertextuality, both within the Platonic corpus and in relation to other works that are assumed to partake of the same wisdom as Plato. Proclus' methodology in the Fifth Essay of his Republic Commentary is not atypical of the Neoplatonic reception of Plato's works. Proclus takes up ten problems or questions one might have about Socrates' treatment of poetry in the Republic. Some of these involve Puzzles about what is said (or not said) in Republic II in relation to other parts of the Republic. Other questions address the consistency of what is said in the Republic with other passages in the Platonic corpus. Each work is unified by its *skopos*, but nonetheless what is said in the Republic is inevitably consistent with remarks in the Laws or the Phaedrus and intertextual comparisons may shed additional light on Plato's doctrines.

Another regular feature of the Neoplatonic reception of Plato's dialogues is the correlation between Plato's teachings as revealed in the dialogue under examination and the wisdom of other sacred traditions. So, interpreting Plato from Plato, Amelius argued that Timaeus 39e7-9 shows that there are three Demiurges in Plato's cosmology: one that is the Forms, one that has the Forms present to him, and another that sees the Forms in something distinct from himself (Proclus, in

Tim. III 103.18-24.).² Within the Platonic corpus, he found further confirmation of this in Epistle I 312e's reference to the "three kings". But beyond the Platonic corpus, he saw the same teaching reflected in the Orphic distinction between Phanes, Ouranos and Kronos (Proclus, in Tim. I 306.10-14). In addition to Orphic theology, the Neoplatonic commentary tradition is filled with correlations between the theology of Plato and that of the Chaldaean Oracles. Some Neoplatonists were also at pains to show that Plato's theology and cosmology was one and the same with that concealed behind the allegorical "screens" used by Homer and Hesiod. The status of Aristotle is more ambiguous. The Neoplatonists recognize that sometimes Aristotle disagrees with the views of Plato and these critical remarks are often the basis for an essay vindicating Plato. (Proclus' final essay in the Republic Commentary, defending Plato's ideal of civic unity from Aristotle's criticisms in the Politics, is an example.) However, most Neoplatonists have no compunctions about elucidating Plato's teachings by means of Aristotelian distinctions such as that between dynamis and energeia. In addition, their commentaries on Aristotle frequently seek to show how the two philosophers are consistent and complementary.

The Platonisms constructed by Neoplatonic authors on the basis of their reception of the dialogues were thus capacious — finding room for much of Aristotle, as well as Orphic, Homeric and Chaldaean theology. Were the Platonic building materials for these Platonisms merely the dialogues we now possess, whether genuine (like the *Timaeus*), dubious (like *Alcibiades I*), or spurious that figure in Aristotle's mysterious characterization of Plato's first principles, such as the One and the Indefinite Dyad, form the locus of Neopythagorean as in writers such as Eudorus or Moderatus. It is, of course, possible that there was a continuous history of oral teaching from the Old Academy to the second century CE that explains this overlap. Or it maybe that Neopythagoreanism adumbrated various accounts of similar sounding first principles on its own or because Neopythagoreans took inspiration from Aristotle's characterization of the first principles of Plato's philosophy. Whatever the

cause, it is as if the reception of Plato by Neoplatonic philosophers is conditioned by the central concepts of what esotericists now call Plato's unwritten doctrines.

As stated, the Neoplatonists treat Plato's dialogues as semantically dense. Nothing is insignificant — not even the number of persons depicted as present for the conversations or the landmarks noted in the dialogue. Moreover, a feature in one of Plato's dialogues can sustain a number of different readings, depending on the level at which we read it. Corresponding to the ontological levels of the cosmos — the physical, the psychic, the noetic — there are physiological, ethical or theological readings of aspects of Plato's texts.³ This sort of semantic density is alien enough to many modern readers of Plato. But it does not yet capture the sense in which the Neoplatonists suppose that Plato's philosophy is mystagogic. This feature of their reception of Plato requires explanation.

A standard feature of Hellenistic moral theorizing is the specification of a school's telos or goal of living. For the Epicureans it was the pleasant life; for the Stoics, the life in agreement with nature. Middle Platonic philosophers like Epistle 11? What of the "unwritten doctrines" or oral traditions of Plato's teaching. At least the following can be said: from the time of Numenius⁴ was defly accepted that Plato was a Pythagorean. Even though Numenius' views many matters were deliberately rejected by many Neoplatonists, Iamblichus also sought to establish Plato's Pythagoreanism. Many of the concepts nominate the Platonic telos as "assimilation to god" (Tht. 176b1-2). It is one thing, however, to say that the goal we ought to aim at is becoming like god and that it is Plato who informs of this truth about the objective of the happy life. This would doubtless be important information for anyone seeking happiness. It would be doubly important if the works of Plato conveyed valuable advice on how one might become like god. It is quite another to say that through the activity of reading and understanding Plato one becomes like god. Plato's philosophy is mystagogic in the sense that, say, the rituals associated with the Eleusinian mysteries or the rites of Mithras are. They do not merely convey doctrines. Rather, the correct understanding of

Plato's works purifies those who seek the divine and initiates them into communion with the gods.' But just as it requires someone who is a priest of Mithras to correctly initiate you, so too for Plato's works to have their mystagogic effect, you must read them with an appropriate master. Establishing a philosophical lineage is important for ancient philosophy generally, but this conception of Plato's philosophy as mystagogic explains the particular concern of the Neoplatonists in this regard that characterizes the treatments of the various hypotheses in the latter half of the dialogue is also reminiscent of the structure of ritual.

The mystagogic character of Platonic philosophy fits naturally with the Neoplatonic conception of the first principles of the universe. The super-essential One is, of course, strictly beyond the reach of both reason and language. If a philosopher is to be assimilated to it, this cannot be accomplished through the grasp of some body of information about it. There is no positive information about it and thus no positive characterization that could be communicated through any work of philosophy. The second hypostasis, Intellect, involves a union between thought and its object that transcends discursive thinking. Thus if Plato's philosophy is to help us to achieve the goal of living it must not only tell us things, it must do things to us, for what we seek to achieve through the understanding of Plato's works is inexpressible. Summing up, the Neoplatonic reception of Plato prompts philosophical responses taking the form of commentaries on his works that treat him as a dogmatic and systematic philosopher. Focusing on a limited number of dialogues, it treats each one as strongly unified and semantically dense with layers of meaning corresponding to the multiple levels of reality within the Neoplatonists' metaphysics. While each Platonic dialogue has a single theme, dialogues can be interpreted in relation to one another and in relation to other texts that are assumed to partake in the same ancient wisdom as Plato and Pythagoras. Moreover, every word communicates something and often more than one thing, since Plato's dialogues have distinct layers of meaning. Finally, it is characteristic of the Neoplatonic reception to treat Plato's works as mystagogic. Ideally, one does not merely read him.

Rather, one is initiated and brought into communion with the divine through him.

It is a familiar observation that the Neoplatonic reading of the first principle of Plato's philosophy coincides with the increased importance of the Parmenides and its elevation from a merely logical exercise to a work of theology, individual Neoplatonists examined in subsequent chapters conform to these generalizations to different degrees and in different ways. Some conform to a greater number than others. But while many philosophers treated in this section form part of the authorized "golden chain" running from Plotinus to Damascius, some differed in being committed to Christianity, with inevitable consequences for the status of Plato. Others, like Julian, while fiercely "pagan", remained outsiders and are simply not mentioned by philosophers like Proclus or Damascius.

While Numenius and Plotinus can be seen as twin fonts of the Neoplatonic reception of Plato, it is only the latter who became the authorised font in the eyes of the subsequent tradition. Yet he too was an outlier within that tradition in many ways. Gerson argues that Plotinus received Platonism and articulates that philosophy in ways that Plotinus supposed make the best sense of that inheritance. Importantly, Platonism was not exhausted by Plato's dialogues. Moreover, while Plato was — in Plotinus' estimation — one of the great Platonists, he was by no means the only Platonist. This is why Plotinus was quite willing to adopt Aristotle's notion of the activity of thought thinking itself into his solution to the problem of how all things arise from the One. This "neither ... nor ..." consequences adduced for the One of the first hypothesis fit well with the purely negative characterization of the One beyond Being. In addition, the metaphysics of emanation and the levels of reality characteristic of Neoplatonism encourage the effort to correlate different hypotheses with different layers of being. But the highly structured repetition with variation resort to a sometimes unorthodox Platonist (i.e. Aristotle) is not a betrayal of Platonism in this broader sense. Plotinus also does not find the expression of Platonism in Plato's dialogues to be as authoritative for him as the underlying principles of this broader Platonism. So Plotinus' *Enneads* show

far less systematic and sustained engagement with individual dialogues than do the works of subsequent Neoplatonists. What was more authoritative for him was the tradition of oral teaching passed down through Ammonius Saccas. Thus on Gerson's reading Plotinus did not suppose that Platonism was transmitted exclusively, or perhaps even principally, through the dialogues of Plato. To extract Platonism from Plato takes philosophical work.

When we see Plotinus at work on this task, Gerson admits that the *Parmenides* is an important piece of the puzzle. While the "three natures" corresponding to the One, Intellect and Soul are things that Plotinus took to be indicated by Plato's dialogue (*VI* [10], 8.23-7), Plotinus also finds these principles in *Epistle 11* as well as *Republic* and *Philebus*. Equally crucial to Plotinus' notion of the life of intellect are *Sophist* 248e and the intelligible living being of *Timaeus* 30c. So while the *Parmenides* is an important dialogue for Plotinus, it is not yet quite the "keystone" dialogue that it is for Iamblichus and some who come after him.

Gerson also discusses two aspects of Plotinus' philosophy rejected by most subsequent Neoplatonists: matter as a first principle or *arché* of evil and the undescended soul. Later writers such as Proclus took Plotinus' position to be that matter provides a causal explanation for the existence of evil in the sensible cosmos. Such a view would be an unacceptable deviation from the metaphysical monism of what Proclus and others assumed to be the true Platonism. It would place Plotinus in the same camp as Numenius and the Gnostics — philosophers who posited an origin of evil distinct from, and in conflict with, the unitary Good that is the source of all things. Gerson's explanation of Plotinus' view makes Proclus' interpretation of him a misreading. When Plotinus says that matter is an *arché* of evil, Gerson claims that he does not mean that it a causal principle, though Proclus took it this way.

Platonists such as Numenius or Plutarch who embrace a version of metaphysical dualism in which there are forces opposing the orderly, good, and intelligible arrangement of things can find plenty of passages in Plato's dialogues to authorize their

view. So too can those, like Proclus, who suppose that evil is an accidental or epiphenomenal thing, lacking an existence at the level of the totality. It is not obvious which camp has the better claim to fidelity to Plato. However, as Gerson notes, Plotinus' idea that there is an aspect of human souls that has never departed from the intelligible realm is one that is pretty far from any explicit words of Plato. Indeed, the most vivid depiction of the "fall" of human souls into the realm of Becoming — *Phaedrus* 248c, ff — strongly recommends the view that the soul in its entirety descends into incarnation.

Gerson argues that Plotinus regarded the undescended soul as a necessary consequence of the possibility of knowledge. If knowledge is incompatible the grasping mere representations of the intelligible objects of that knowledge then the soul must be identical with those intelligibles within the life of Intellect. Hence there must be an aspect of the self that does not descend from the intelligible realm and remains unified with the Forms, though normally we do not attend to this aspect of ourselves (*Enn.* IV 8.6). This illustrates nicely Gerson's point about Plotinus as a philosopher who seeks to work through the problems that arise from Platonism (broadly construed) even at the expense of fidelity to much that is contained within the dialogues.

This epistemological optimism on Plotinus' part explains why he does not celebrate Plato as a mystagogic philosopher. Iamblichus, Proclus and other Neoplatonists who suppose that the soul descends entirely into the body need the reading of Plato to do something to them — to initiate them into an understanding whose possession passes discursive limitations and to unite them with intelligible objects that they are psychically separated from. So while Plotinus' reception of Platonism yields a metaphysics that is very similar to that of later Neoplatonists, his relation to the works of Plato is palpably different.

Porphyry's reception of the Platonic legacy is surely colored by his devotion to Plotinus, but in his methods and in the form of his writings he also more closely resembles the Neoplatonists who come after him. Though we have lost the majority of Porphyry's vast body of writing, it is clear from

what we still possess that he was far more systematic in his endeavor to reconcile Aristotle's works, and particularly his *Categories*, with what he took to be Platonism. Moreover, we know that Porphyry wrote detailed commentaries on individual Platonic dialogues — a form of writing that Plotinus seems not to have engaged in. Michael Chase's entry on Porphyry also nicely illustrates his adoption of philosophic methods that are characteristic of Aristotle, but not so commonly practiced in Plato's works or in Plotinus' *Enneads*. Thus the fragments of Porphyry's *Timaeus* Commentary show him distinguishing among the various senses of the word "generated" in order to elucidate how a correct understanding of the cosmos' status as generated is consistent with the Aristotelian view that there was never a time at which the cosmos did not exist (fr. 36 and 37, Sodano). On the other hand, the fragments of his commentary also evince the stance toward Plato's dialogues that I above termed "semantic density". Thus, Porphyry utilizes Plato's casual mention of the Demiurge as both "maker and father" (Tim. 28c3) in his extended campaign against pre-Plotinian views that suppose the *Timaeus*' Demiurge works with a pre-existent matter. A maker, such as a carpenter, does indeed work with pre-existent materials. But a father generates the whole from himself, as the child results from the parent. Had Plato merely called the Demiurge a "maker" then there might be room for the confusion of those like Plutarch, Numenius and Atticus who posit matter as unengendered. But Plato's word choice precludes this according to Porphyry.

Porphyry also resembles the subsequent tradition of Neoplatonism in other ways that Plotinus does not. Porphyry was concerned to provide allegorical interpretations of Homer in a Neoplatonic vein, as evidenced by the essay *On the Cave of the Nymphs* (Od 13.102-12)¹⁵ In addition, it is evident from Proclus' commentaries on both the *Timaeus* and the *Republic* that Porphyry provided detailed exegesis of Plato's myths. While Plotinus takes up issues arising from mythic passages in Plato, such as the myth of Er (cf. *Enn.* III 4 [15]), his engagement with the myth is problem-based and does not involve any extended exegesis of the meaning of Plato's text's.

We noted above the view that the rise of Neoplatonism is linked to the greater centrality of the *Parmenides* for inheritors of Plato's philosophy — though Gerson also noted the multiple sources in which Plotinus himself found the teaching on the three hypostases. The fragmentary *Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides* has sometimes been attributed to Porphyry. In his entry, Clark remains agnostic about the question of authorship but usefully contrasts the nature of this anonymous commentary with the *Anonymous Commentary on the Theaetetus*. The former, unlike the latter, does not offer philological observations on Plato's text but instead draws from the lemmata under consideration philosophical theses about the single and simple first principle of all things, as well as human knowledge of it. As Clark notes, these concepts are hardly explicit in Plato's text. Thus, while the work seems to take the form of a running commentary, it also functions as an occasion for the elaboration of the author's original philosophy. The author of the commentary refers to Plato's other works for confirmation of his views — in particular *Epistle VII*. Moreover, there is wide agreement that the *Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides* contrasts the form of Platonism that the writer discovers in the dialogue with an alternative found in the *Chaldaean Oracles*. Each of these features illustrates the closer resemblance of the *Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides* with the trends identified above as characteristic of the Neoplatonic reception of Plato.

There is widespread agreement that Porphyry was a crucial figure in the Neoplatonic reception of Plato. The sad state of his surviving works means that the study of this influence is problematic, but scholarship dedicated to understanding him has advanced in recent years.¹⁶ Iamblichus is similarly crucial, but here we are somewhat better served by his surviving works? Finamore's entry takes up the psychological and epistemological background to the dispute between Iamblichus and Porphyry about theurgy. At issue is the question of how we are to achieve the goal of living: likeness to the divine. Theurgy was — or perhaps more accurately became through time — a form of ritual that sought to unite the soul of the practitioner with the gods.¹⁹ The respective contribution of philosophy

and theurgy toward the goal of union with the divine formed the basis for the debate between Iamblichus and Porphyry in the latter's Letter to Anebo and the former's response, *On the Mysteries*. Given the identification of the intelligibles in Neoplatonic philosophy with gods, the issue is both soterio-logical and epistemological.

We noted above Plotinus' epistemological optimism and his corresponding belief that a part of the soul does not descend into the body. As we observed, this seems to go against the grain of Plato's mythic depiction of the soul's descent in the *Phaedrus*. Iamblichus brings the discussion of the human soul's relation to the Forms into closer contact with Plato's dialogues. Finamore's discussion of the fragments of Iamblichus' *Timaeus Commentary* shows how Iamblichus attempted to locate his complex anthropology and epistemology within Plato's account of the generation of the cosmic soul and human souls. Finamore notes that Iamblichus' complex account of the human soul, and its relation to the superior souls of angels, heroes and daimones was not accepted in full by Proclus and the Athenian Platonists. While it is true that Proclus sometimes regards specific readings of Plato's texts by "the divine Iamblichus" as just a bit too wild and high-flown, there is also no question that he sought to devise his account of the human soul with much closer and more specific reference to Plato's dialogues than did Plotinus.

The relatively sober and textually grounded character of Iamblichus' reception of Plato is clear from Baltzly's essay on Amelius and Theodore of Asine. Amelius was, of course, the close companion of Plotinus and Porphyry's literary rival. The very scant biographical evidence on Theodore associates him with both Porphyry and Iamblichus. Both Amelius and Theodore were the subject of critical work by Iamblichus — now lost, but known to Proclus — directed against "Amelius and his school and Numenius". Iamblichus seems to have been particularly exercised by what he saw as the methodological problems underlying Theodore's engagement with the texts of Plato. Most of the Neoplatonists applied some kinds of number symbolism to the interpretation of Plato and the elaboration of their Platonic philosophy. Theodore seems to have been unique in exploiting the fact

that Greek utilizes letters to play the role of numerals in order to draw philosophical lessons from Plato's dialogues. That is to say, he used the techniques of what is sometimes called "isopsephy" or "gematria". He also drew inferences about key concepts, such as life or soul, on the basis of the shapes of letters making up the words. The semantic density of Plato's dialogues that we have identified as a presupposition of Neoplatonic hermeneutic practice is, at least for Iamblichus, a density that goes only so far. While allegorical interpretations of details within the prologue to a dialogue or fanciful etymologies of the names of characters are legitimate means of extracting Platonic philosophy from Platonic dialogues, the analysis should not be carried as far as purely syntactic features such as the shapes of the letters that make up the words. Or at least this seems to be the basis of Iamblichus' hostility to Theodore's methods. Iamblichus' own advocacy for theurgic ritual as an indispensable aid to the study of philosophy has given him a reputation for being a "wild" or "spooky" Platonist. Viewed from the perspective of the Theodorean fringe of Neoplatonism, Iamblichus seems a relatively sober philosopher whose Platonism is grounded in a not entirely implausible engagement with Plato's dialogues.

We have noted the tendency among the Neoplatonists to treat Plato's philosophy as mystagogic — not merely conveying information about the cosmos, the human soul and the gods, but somehow initiating the qualified reader and ushering him or her into the presence of the divine. One way in which this mystagogy might actually be effected is through the acquisition of mutually supporting "metaphors to live by" derived from the reading of Plato. That is to say, reading Plato with an authorised hierophant such as Iamblichus or Syrianus removes ways of seeing oneself and the cosmos around you that are grounded in the body and sense experience. Through the master's lectures on Plato one begins to replace these defective ways of seeing with metaphors for living that are more appropriate to incorporeal nature relation to Plato's political works. In a letter to his new emperor, Themistius relation to Julian to see himself as the long-delayed realisation of Plato's ambition

to install a philosopher as king (adverting not only to the Republic, but also to Epistless. As O'Meara argues, however, Julian saw fit to understand his relation to the empire much more in terms of Plato's Laws. It is true that he understood his obligation to forego the pleasures of uninterrupted philosophising in terms of the philosopher-ruler's descent into the cave in the Republic. However, O'Meara argues that he also saw himself as a servant and guardian of the laws and that this self-conception derived from immersion in Plato's Laws.

The mystagogy of Platonism and the lived experience of immersion in Platonic philosophy also emerges from Addey's chapter on Plato's women readers. It is easy to dismiss the mystagogy of Plato as a Neoplatonic accretion that reflects the god-intoxicated atmosphere of the late Roman Empire rather than anything in Plato. Addey reminds us that we can find the theme of mystagogy in Socrates' description of Diotima and in the structure of the teaching on eros that he attributes to her. Her speech involves a purification through elenchus, instruction (including a myth of origin), and finally the vision or epopteia of the Beautiful. Plato portrays her as one who understands sacrifices and rituals. Addey surveys the biographical tradition for female philosophers or female readers of Plato. Fraught though this evidence is, there seems little doubt that women in antiquity read Plato since letters by men addressed to them presuppose their acquaintance with the dialogues. Our evidence seldom allows us to know, in their words, how they received Plato's philosophy. But we can say that, at least with respect to the descriptions offered by male writers in the biographical tradition such as Eunapius, Diotima seems to have provided a paradigm for them. Their mastery of the mystagogy of Plato was often coupled with expertise in the rites of the Chaldaeans and the gifts of the seer. Addey's study of Sosipatra is particularly interesting in this regard. If these O'Meara's chapter on the emperor Julian considers, among other things, the Nay in which the philosophical Caesar understood himself and his role in descriptions resemble the truth, then women were able to fashion themselves and perhaps their understanding of what a female

philosopher ought to be like through the image of Plato's Diotima.

It was seemingly at some time in the fourth century that one Calcidius wrote, for a Christian bishop, a translation and partial commentary (arranged according to topics) on the Timaeus. As Hoenig here explains, while his work was to become famous and influential it is much more difficult to determine the context in which the writer worked. His references to Numenius and others betray that fact that he often seems more comfortable working with early imperial Platonist ideas than with the Neoplatonists, whose work was becoming a much greater challenge for the Christian community to warm to: particularly no doubt after the principate of Julian. While it seems that he was not ignorant of the Neoplatonist curriculum as encountered in Iamblichus, and while he has often been held to be dependent on Porphyry, Calcidius somehow fits better with the Middle Platonists. He may not have been entirely alone in this, as two Platonists referred to with admiration in Syrianus' *On Hermogenes*, Aquila and Evagoras, may also have been relatively conservative Platonists; it cannot even be presumed that Plutarch of Athens, who refounded the Athenian school and taught Syrianus, had embraced the heritage of Iamblichus with anything like the enthusiasm of Syrianus. Hoenig shows the relative conservatism of Calcidius on such questions as god and fate, and concludes by noting the way in which the translation and commentary complement one another in a project that makes a famous Greek thinker more accessible to a Christian audience with little facility for reading Greek.

From an audience with limited Greek we come to Augustine, an author with limited Greek. While pagan Neoplatonists sought to show the confluence between the philosophy of Plato and other sources of authority, they also acknowledged no greater authority than Plato. For Christian Platonists such as Augustine, this is by no means the case. Accordingly, their reception of Plato must be distinctly different in this important regard. While it is by no means easy to determine from his extant work whether a writer like Calcidius was a Christian or not, and the same could also be said of Pseudo-Dionysius whose Platonizing work

demonstrates a debt to the even unlikelier source of Proclus, at least the western church now took a more independent path, leaving the Greek philosophical traditions more marginalized. While Augustine was much more receptive to the study of pre-Christian ideas than Tertullian, for instance, Augustine presents us with a difficult historical puzzle. There is no mystery about what Greek-speaking philosophers such as Origen or Eusebius knew of Plato's dialogues, but there remains a mystery about how much Augustine knew of Plato's works and how he knew them. Van Riel tackles the perennial problem of Augustine's knowledge of the works of Plato and the manner in which he saw Plato in relation to "the Platonists". Though we now continue the Neoplatonist story, Augustine will be the last avowedly Christian author in this volume, but Brill's Companion to Medieval and Modern Platonism begins here, and will treat others.

Wear's entry on the exegetical methods of Syrianus returns us to the Neoplatonist commentary form and to the themes of semantic density and mystagogy. Damascius' Commentary on Plato's *Phaedo* includes some interesting assessments of the methods of two of his predecessors, Syrianus and Iamblichus (I 207.3-9). Damascius deemed Iamblichus' interpretation of the argument from opposites in the *Phaedo* to be too high-flown and removed from the specifics of Plato's text. He contrasted Iamblichus rather unfavourably with Syrianus in this respect. The problem, as Damascius sees it, is that Iamblichus brings the whole of Plato's philosophy to the interpretation of each part. This is perhaps unsurprising since Iamblichus is thought to be responsible for the most explicit articulation of an axiom of Neoplatonic metaphysics: the claim that "all things are in all" (albeit in different modes or manners depending upon the subject). Wear argues that Syrianus and Iamblichus are in agreement that this axiom applies in a sense to Plato's dialogues as well, though they do not agree in exactly what sense. Iamblichus regards nearly the totality of the Platonic system as implied in each lemma, as if the Platonic texts external to the specific passage from Plato's *Phaedo* were already present in the passage under discussion. Syrianus proceeds more cautiously. It is often necessary to see a specific passage in relation to

broader claims in Platonic philosophy in order to understand the meaning of the specific passage, though Syrianus is willing to concede that the specific passage, in its local context, does not yet establish the general theses that define Platonism.

But why should the understanding of the parts presuppose the understanding of the whole? Wear argues that this is a question to which Syrianus offered an answer: Plato's text is filled with symbols. Thus, the attributes such as Whole, Plurality, Likeness considered in the second hypothesis of the *Parmenides* are symbols of distinct and ordered levels of divinity on Syrianus' reading of the dialogue (Proclus, in *Parm.* 1061.25-1062.9). But Syrianus' extraction of the meaning behind these symbols pays far greater attention to the details of the text at hand than do the allegorical readings attributed to Iamblichus. Thus, to take another of Wear's examples, Syrianus regards Plato's use of the Plural "days and nights" rather than the singular "day and night" at *Tim.* 37e1 as important clues for extracting the theological level of meaning behind the *PhySical* one. Plato's dialogues thus exhibit what we have called "semantic density" because they are symbolic in this way. Syrianus' identification of the symbolic source of their semantic density is perhaps connected with their mystagogic function. The original sense of a symbolon was that of a token, that verified the identity of its bearer. Often this was an object broken in two, with the separate halves assigned to the different parties. If a Platonic dialogue, then, contains a symbolon of the divine, it contains that which "plugs one in" to the missing half held by the divine, thus authenticating the bearer as one who may be re-united with the gods.

We have chosen to dedicate a separate chapter in this volume to Hermias' Commentary on the *Phaedrus* instead of dealing with it in the chapter on Syrianus. This is not simply because there is scholarly dispute about the degree of dependence of Hermias' work upon the lectures of Syrianus. Rather, it is because the *Phaedrus* becomes a key dialogue in the reception of Plato's philosophy among the Neoplatonists and the commentary of Hermias is the only surviving specimen of its kind. A dialogue like the *Phaedrus* also poses an

interesting test case for the Neoplatonic interpretive principles. In particular, *Phaedrus* 264c is the key text by which the Neoplatonists justify their insistence that each dialogue is unified by a unique, single *skopos*. Yet the *Phaedrus* itself discusses a great many topics and philosophers today still disagree about the extent to which it has a unifying theme and what that theme might be. Baltzly and Tarrant focus their discussion not only on Hermias' treatment of the unity of the dialogue and its textual division, but also upon the reflections on the interpretation of myths in Socrates' remarks about the myth of Boreas and Oreithuia mentioned by *Phaedrus* at 229b. They argue that the narrative at the centre of Socrates' second speech — the journey of souls in company with the gods to the vault of heaven where the intelligibles are glimpsed — was not something that the Neoplatonist regarded as a myth in quite the same sense as the psychic journeys related in the myth of Er in the *Republic* or in the *Gorgias*. Instead, Socrates' palinode was treated by Hermias as inspired speech rather than myth. In addition to the inspired vision of Socrates' second speech, the detail of dramatic setting and characterization in the *Phaedrus* is matched only by the *Symposium*. Hermias' Commentary provides us with evidence of the way in which the Neoplatonic reading of these dramatic elements of the dialogue relentlessly related them to the *skopos* and the textual divisions determined by it.

Proclus — along with his fellow-student Hermias and their teacher Syrianus is the Neoplatonist who best fits the portrait of "the" Neoplatonic reception of Plato that we sketched at the beginning of this introduction. Opsomer's chapter on Proclus amplifies these themes by discussing his practice of composing exhaustive commentaries on Plato's works. Plato's works repay such detailed attention because, according to Proclus, Plato is the most authoritative theologian and theology is the most important and most difficult topic for the human mind to grasp. The vast gap between our minds in their embodied condition and the superlatively transcendent nature of the divine explains why Plato must resort to so many different modes of communication in order to convey his inspired teachings to us. Opsomer gives careful

consideration to Proclus' discussion of the modes through which Plato speaks about the gods. Since Proclus' reception of Plato's dialogues is more or less equivalent to the totality of Proclus' philosophical system, concentrating on the ways in which Proclus supposed Plato to communicate theology to us is the most succinct way of characterising Proclus' reception of Plato. Accordingly Opsomer's chapter concentrates on how Proclus supposed that Plato tells us things rather than on what Proclus supposed Plato was telling us.

Layne continues with explicitly hermeneutical concerns within the Neoplatonic reception of Plato in her essay on the Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy. The Prolegomena engages with at least three of the themes we've been examining: Plato as a dogmatic philosopher and the semantic density of his dialogues. In addition, while the Prolegomena does not specifically address the means of Platonic mystagogy, it explicitly identifies the aretaic ends of the dialogues within the Iamblichean canon. The author of the Prolegomena often elides the difference between the character of Socrates within Plato's dialogues and Plato himself. It is Plato, for instance, who is a midwife of knowledge. But the author of the Prolegomena also emphasizes the distinctness of Plato and the historical Socrates in order to better demonstrate the divinity of Plato and his superiority to all other philosophers. While other authors in the Neoplatonic tradition largely assume without much argument that Plato's dialogues contain and communicate Plato's philosophy, the Prolegomena explicitly addresses the issue of why Plato writes and whether Socrates' tentative tone or disavowals of knowledge suggest any commitment to skepticism.

We have observed that the semantic density of Plato's dialogues is manifest in their containing layers of meaning corresponding to the hypostases of Neoplatonic metaphysics. The Prolegomena explicitly develops the analogy between Platonic dialogues and the cosmos by correlating elements of the dialogues with the six kinds of causes identified by the Neoplatonists. Within the Neoplatonic account of causes, some are more

important than others. The unifying theme of the dialogue corresponds to the paradigmatic cause.

Given the importance and distinctively Platonic provenance of the paradigmatic cause (Proclus, in *Tim.* i 2.5, if) it is little wonder that the Neoplatonic commentary tradition spends a great deal of time over the correct identification of the *skopos*. The *Prolegomena* is also the clearest source we have on the reading order of the dialogues and their correlations with the grades of virtues. In the cosmos—dialogue analogy, the achievement of the corresponding virtue in the reader plays the role of the final cause or the Good. The exact means through which the dialogue achieves these aretaic ends is unspecified. It is presumably not merely by virtue of the fact that the dialogue informs the student about, say, cathartic virtue. The *Prolegomena* indicates the ends of specific Platonic mystagogies, but the means remain mysterious.

There are contexts in which it might be positively advantageous to have agreement that reading Plato promotes the goal of assimilation to the divine, but still leave scope for some measure of disagreement about the specific means through which this might happen. Such is the situation of Olympiodorus described in Michael Griffin's essay. The student body who made up the audience for his lectures in Alexandria was increasingly composed of Christians. Olympiodorus invites them to regard the division that really matters as one between the educated — the *pepaideumenoí* — and the masses. The differences between Christians and Hellenes are unimportant in relation to this more important gap, especially since both share a set of common general concepts. Olympiodorus is particularly keen to provide the myths in Plato's *Gorgias* with allegorical readings in which the references to pagan gods and goddesses are symbols that can be interpreted in terms of this stock of common general concepts. If Plato's dialogues are symbolic and require allegorical interpretation, then the deep truth toward which they point will be a truth common to all sincere and educated forms of spirituality, whether Christian or Hellenic.

Some works of Damascius represent a departure from the themes we have been examining thus far.

His commentaries on the *Phaedo* and the *Philebus* largely follow the patterns we have observed in Syrianus and Proclus. While he often winds up subtly disagreeing with his predecessors, the point of raising these interpretive issues is — superficially at least — the extraction of Platonic philosophy from the dialogues. Sara Ahbel-Rappe argues that Damascius' *Problems and Solutions Concerning First Principles* pursues a very different goal. Rather than elucidating Plato's text, in this work Damascius seeks to problematize fundamental aspects of the Neoplatonic account of first principles, ending in puzzlement or *aporia*. Ahbel-Rappe argues that the comparisons drawn between Damascius' teacher, Isidore, and Socrates in Damascius' *Life of Isidore* provide the real life context for Damascius' aporetic method. Damascius finds value in an aspect of the character of Socrates that his predecessors largely neglect: the idea that the highest wisdom is the awareness of one's own ignorance. By contrast, Neoplatonists such as Proclus and Hermias overwhelmingly interpret Socrates' professions of ignorance as feigned for the sake of educating pupils such as Alcibiades or Phaedrus. Damascius, however, regards the state of puzzlement or *aporia* as an appropriate response to confronting first Principles that are ineffable and beyond the limits of language. It is not as if Damascius' predecessors would disagree that the first principles are ineffable. But Damascius' philosophical works — at least some of them — seem to evince a somewhat different attitude toward this fact. What is important for Ahbel-Rappe's argument is that the figure of Socrates in the Platonic dialogues can serve as a model for the way in which this attitude could be lived.

The expulsion of Damascius and colleagues from Athens did not mark an end to the influence of the Athenian school. Damascius himself could continue to express himself privately or beyond Byzantine frontiers, and Simplicius in particular adopted a policy of writing in-depth commentaries on Aristotle, who was now perhaps a safer alternative for study than Plato. But for Simplicius Aristotle had been a plank of an essentially Platonist curriculum, and even if "curriculum" was a notion that he now had to abandon, he was still, as Gabor shows, an

admirer of Plato, who expressed concern about the haste with which some Aristotelian commentators had rejected Plato without trying to study him thoroughly. He knew a variety of Platonic works, many in some depth, and continued to adhere to a variation of the idea that Plato and Aristotle were in harmony. Simplicius' writings provided posterity, increasingly unable to engage in face-to-face Platonic study, with new opportunities, should it so choose, to ponder not only traditional philosophy but also the issues of Platonic interpretation that have here concerned us.

Sum Up

Our journey through the ancient reception of Plato has taken us from the fourth century BCE up to the sixth CE, during which time his writings continued to be studied principally in the original Greek, by native or highly competent speakers. Throughout that time the language had changed little enough in its basic characteristics for them to be able to appreciate, and often also to debate about, many of the original nuances of the text. However, we have met one figure, Augustine, whose ability to appreciate Plato at first hand maybe doubted, and whose influence over the western church — and hence over western scholarship — was enormous. Calcidius may have been a native Greek speaker, but he left behind a Latin translation that likewise had enormous influence on how Plato was viewed in the west. Though the role of Plato would inevitably diminish once he could no longer be appreciated for his literary and linguistic merits, in the east he could for a while continue to be seen as a central part of one's intellectual heritage, particularly while a significant number of "pagans" still saw Athens rather than Jerusalem as the fount of the wisdom to which they subscribed. Those most involved in the study of Plato had a strong sense of tradition that guaranteed that Plato would be central to oral intellectual life.

Whatever happened at Athens in 529CE it dealt a severe blow to Platonism by curtailing formal oral discussion of Plato. Even though such discussion may have lived on longer at Alexandria it is clear that it did so less than freely. Platonists with non-Christian names disappear, the Parmenides disappears, and along with it so does overt polytheism. Under these

restraints the enormous possibilities offered by the text of the dialogues rapidly faded. At different times and in different places Platonic study underwent revivals, but the language of intellectual circles retreated further from its Athenian heritage. Scholarly investigations could not quite recapture the urgency of the questions that were once debated in Platonist schools.

In modern universities that urgency is often rekindled, new traditions of interpreting Plato flourish, thought through in different languages. A clash of traditions can result in the same perplexity that Proclus had experienced when dealing with the earlier interpreters who had seen very different things in the texts from what his teacher Syrianus had found. Our experience of Plato is colored by our own experiences of life and of study, our own assessment of intellectual dangers that confront society, and our own understanding of interlocking "-isms". Plato will forever be that metaphorical swan that flies dangerously close to our hermeneutic nets only to evade them just when we think we have him within our grasp. Our own attempts to interpret will either be interpreted themselves so as to highlight their deficiencies or quietly forgotten when others cannot follow them.

Here we hope that we shown some of the same problems in operation in antiquity. Most of those we have tackled — though not all — approached the texts with both scholarly and philosophic ability, but their abilities were more inclined to fuel dissension than to remove it. A competitive spirit was also part of their Greek heritage, and they did not readily shy away from debate. In the case of nearly all of them what mattered in the text was what mattered for him or her. It was right, after all, that they should be conscious of whatever they could bring to the understanding of Plato as individuals, and of what contribution they themselves could bring to scholarly debate. Even so, what mattered to the individual might be colored by religious perspectives, childhood experiences, commitment to hermeneutic principles that have become too rigid, and so on. They, like us too, might sometimes have been unaware of how these constraints exercised a hold on their reading. We should not denigrate them for being left with

only a partial vision of that flying swan that had been their quarry.

Perhaps the most problematic aspect of their work for the modern reader is the conviction with which some of the ancients adhered to positions that we should rapidly dismiss as untenable. Lacking the constraints of modern scholarly tools, and unable to distinguish between genuinely ancient texts and more recent `forgeries, they worked at a disadvantage as compared with us. Nor did they have the benefit of modern science to constrain their thoughts, and especially their superstitions. They could easily adopt as authoritative guiding voices texts that had become more influential than they deserved, such as the Chaldaean Oracles and the Orphic Rhapsodies. Some realized, often too well, the multi-layered complexities of Plato's texts and slipped too readily into the most fearful hermeneutic mazes. Others reacted against excessive finesse, preferring the direct kind of reading that would probably have appealed to the widest audience.

Not all, however, were so confident in their own readings of Plato. From Cicero until the end of the second century many Platonist texts give the impression of a process of rediscovery in which advances were being made, but much more remained to be discovered. Plutarch could be a little like this, and so too a later age could Damascius, if in very different ways. Yet it was not their more flexible attitudes that have left their mark on the history of interpreting Plato. Some prefer to go gloriously wrong with Proclus than to be left guessing with Arcesilaus.

There is an obvious lesson to be learned from this: the interpretation of Plato is a work in progress. It always has been, even — or perhaps especially — for those who spoke a Greek close to his own. We must be satisfied if we are able only to make small steps forward to a moderate consensus on issues where the evidence is in abundance. Like Socrates we must admit that our knowledge is subject to limitations. Nor are these limitations necessarily to be regretted, We must remember that many ancient readers — like many still today — read or listened to the works of Plato for enjoyment, not in order to exercise their hermeneutic skills. Even

skillful writers like Lucian were able to employ Plato extensively in their literary work without feeling under any obligation to interpret him and without putting their readers under any obligation to interpret him either. And whereas Plato would have earnestly hoped that his readers would thoughtfully respond to his works, it is less clear that he wanted them "interpreted" in any but the blandest sense. After all, it is Plato's own merits, not that of his interpreters, that have guaranteed his survival.

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[Plato and the Power of Images](#) edited by Pierre
Destrée, Radcliffe G. Edmonds III [Mnemosyne,
Supplements, Brill, 9789004345003]

Plato is well known both for the harsh
condemnations of images and image-making poets
that appear in his dialogues and for the vivid and
intense imagery that he himself uses in his matchless

prose. How then does Plato handle the power of
images? The uses of imagery might be imagined to
include allegories, similes, metaphors, analogies,
models, and even vivid writing styles that capture
characters in dialogue—perhaps even ideas of
images and image-making not directly connected
with writing, for the question of why Plato uses
vivid images in his writings is obviously linked to
how he understands images and the way the mind
handles them.

In the analysis of all of these, the focus is the way
in which Plato moves beyond abstract philosophical
reasoning to engage with the poetic and literary,
whether in his devastating critiques of the abuses of
the power of poetry and poetic devices or in his
superb and subtle uses of those same powerful arts
and devices. While Plato is famous—or infamous—for
his banning of Homer and the poets from the
ideal city of the Republic because of the corrupting
power of poetry, Plato is also famous—or
infamous—for the powerful myths and images he
employs, not just in the Republic but elsewhere
throughout his dialogues. The metaphor of the Ship
of State, the tripartite description of the soul, the
allegory of the Cave, the model of the divided line,
are all memorable images from that dialogue, not
to mention the vivid scenes from the concluding
Myth of Er, the towering vault of heaven, the sirens
singing on their revolving cosmic spheres, the souls
of evil-doers being dragged back to torment, like
wool being carded over thorns, or the lottery of
souls where the heroes of myth choose their new
incarnations.

Just as, in the Phaedo, the image of Simmias evokes
the memory image of Cebes, so too the images of
the Republic recall to us Plato's other fantastic
images, the spherical double men of Aristophanes'
speech in the Symposium, the whip-scars on the
naked soul of the Great King in the underworld in
the Gorgias, Socrates' self-description as the
gadfly on the rump of the somnolent Athenian
public in the Apology, the poignant song of the
dying swan in the Phaedo, the great chariot race
around the vault of the heavens of the soul chariots
in the Phaedrus and the terrible crashes that lead
to the soul's incarnation.

These vivid and powerful images that Plato employs raise a variety of questions: How does the power of these images fit with the critiques that Plato raises against other use of images in these and other dialogues? Why should Plato employ a vivid sense image like, e.g., the winged chariot of the soul, to talk about something that is not perceptible to the senses? What makes some images more powerful than others? Why might an image of a soul chariot that inaccurately represents the idea (one that, e.g., has four horses instead of two) nevertheless be more powerfully memorable than a more accurate representation that is less striking in other respects? How does Plato reconcile the gap between the image's appearance and the truth it signifies? Is the relation of the image to that which it represents some kind of mimesis, reflection or refraction or inversion or perhaps even perspectival distortion? What is the role of color, shape, size, even beauty? How does this power of image work for Plato in any case?

The essays in this volume represent an attempt to grapple with questions like these, even if the sheer quantity and quality of Plato's images make a comprehensive treatment beyond the scope of this or any volume. This volume continues the lines of investigation begun in two prior volumes, *Plato and the Poets* (edited by Pierre Destrée and Fritz-Gregor Herrmann) and *Plato and Myth* (edited by Catherine Collobert, Pierre Destrée, and Francisco Gonzalez), published in this same *Mnemosyne* series.

The volume comprises twelve chapters which offer various perspectives on the ways Plato has used images, and the ways we could, or should, understand their status as images. Although Plato's *Republic* may contain some of the most famous of Plato's images, as well as his most famous critique, the volume starts examining images in Plato by analyzing the image of Plato's Socrates himself, notably in the speech of Alcibiades in the *Symposium*, where Alcibiades explicitly says that he will offer his encomium of *Erôs* as a praise of Socrates "by means of images" (215a).

In "Alcibiades' Eikôn of Socrates and the Platonic Text (Symp. 215a–222d)," Andrew Ford proposes a new and challenging reading of one of the most

memorable images in Plato, Alcibiades' extended comparison (eikôn) between Socrates and the popular carved statuettes of Sileni. Reading the passage as a virtuoso example of the sympotic game of "drawing similes" (eikones legein), Ford suggests that Plato exploits the eikôn as a way of praising his own writing: just as such objects could be opened up to reveal little figurines of gods (agalmata theôn) within, Plato's text is presented as a cunning kind of verbal icon that has a precious hidden meaning for those able to penetrate its surface sense. Ford's essay also raises the questions of why Plato resorts to such similitudes and why, at least in discussing some issues, the language of the Platonic text can only be like what it represents.

Reading the same speech from quite a different perspective, Elizabeth Belfiore, in "The Image of Achilles in Plato's *Symposium*," shows that some aspects of the imagery of Plato's *Symposium* can help us to achieve a better understanding of Plato's use of heroic figures. Plato must resort to imagery because of Socrates' strangeness: "With a man such as Achilles was," says Alcibiades, "one might compare Brasidas, and others, and with such a man as Pericles one might compare Nestor and Antenor," but Socrates can be compared with no other human, ancient or modern (221c–d). Thus, Alcibiades says that Socrates is not the image of anyone else, and, in particular, that he is not the image of Achilles, first on this list of heroic figures. Comparison of significant words and actions of Socrates in the *Symposium* with those of Achilles in the *Iliad* reveal that Socrates is indeed not an image of Achilles in the sense of a likeness. He is, on the contrary, an Achilles in reverse, whose words and deeds are just the opposite of those of Achilles. That is, he is a mirror-image of Achilles, in the sense of an image that is the reverse of the original.

After these rather different openings into our theme, Francisco Gonzalez, in "The Power and Ambivalence of a Beautiful Image in Plato and the Poets," embarks upon the larger question of the status of images in Plato's dialogues, pointing out that Plato's critique of the poets for their use of images in noway implies that philosophy can dispense with images. The starting point of any discussion of the topic must be the fact that Plato's

relation to images, and thus also to the poets in whom he sees the masters of images, is deeply ambivalent. What Gonzalez shows is that this ambivalence is rooted in the ambivalence that characterizes images themselves on Plato's account, an ambivalence that especially comes to the fore in the beautiful image. Such an image is ambivalent in that by its very nature it both produces satisfaction with itself, is desirable in itself, and points beyond itself, leaving one unsatisfied. Here again, the Symposium is one important place to start, in particular the contest between Agathon and Socrates. What we learn from this contest is that the beautiful image can be more than an image only when it ceases to satisfy. In the end it is an emphasis on the 'erotic' character of images, and thus on their ambivalence between possessing and lacking that of which they are the images, that distinguishes the philosopher from the poet.

The status of images is further explored from the 'erotic' perspective by Radcliffe G. Edmonds iii ("Putting him on a pedestal: (Re)collection and the use of images in Plato's Phaedrus"). In the Phaedrus Plato plays with the problematic status of images, employing some of his most vivid and memorable images to illustrate how images may be used philosophically in the processes of *sunagôgê* and *anamnêsis*. The beautiful beloved serves as an image of the divine reality, and the lover sets up, adorns, and worships this icon as if it were the god itself, for it both reminds him of his prenatal glimpse of the hyperouranian realm and leads his soul back toward that divine reality. Plato describes the lover's treatment of the beloved as an image of the divine in terms similar to those of the true rhetorician's construction of a speech that leads the soul of the hearer toward truth. The lover actively tends to this divine image, fashioning it in the likeness of the god he recollects following in the path toward the hyperouranian realm, while Socrates claims that, when he finds someone who can employ philosophical collection and division, he will follow in that man's tracks as if he were a god. Both the worship paid to the beloved icon and good speeches employ images and mnemonic associations to lead the follower, step by step, toward the truth. While Phaedrus fixes his desire upon the images, both the beloved boy and the

speeches, Socrates uses these images as signs on his philosophic path, reminders of whence he has come and whither he is going.

Christopher Moore approaches the problem of mistaking the image for the reality from a different angle, exploring how creating images of the self can actively lead to the likening of the self to that image. In "The Images of Knowing Oneself," images are linked to the famous theme of self-knowledge; indeed, in all the dialogues where such a theme comes up, Socrates urges practically all his interlocutors onto self-knowledge, and he does so through images. Some are images suggesting what to do; others suggest how to be. The first kind depicts people doing analogous activities: the mirror-gazer (Alc.), the myth-rectifier (Phdr.), the riddle-solver (Apol.), the comic butt (Phlb.), the self-diagnostician (Chrm.). The second kind provides a form, such as Typhon (Phdr.) or Prometheus (Prot.), the meditation on which conduces to self-knowledge. Plato has Socrates deploy these images because knowing oneself means more than simply cataloguing one's beliefs or accepting one's (im)mortality. Self-knowledge assumes and ratifies a dynamic picture of what it is to be human, as, e.g., active, transformable, and ideally rational. Urging someone to know himself thus involves bringing him to accept such a picture of himself.

And what about the problem of truth and falsehood of images—which include the themes of perspectivism, misappearance, and inaccurate representation? Gerd van Riel offers yet another context for the analysis of images, that of Plato's theology in "Perspectivism in Plato's Views of the Gods." In the Sophist, Plato clearly prefers the image that accurately reproduces the proportions of the model (*eikastikê technê*), over the "perspectival" image (*phantastikê technê*), which—though more artistic—falls short in truth-value, and this rejection of perspectivism, van Riel argues, underlies Plato's theology. Contrary to what recent interpreters have held, Plato's theology is not about introducing a monistic system headed by a thinking (and hence, comprehensible) *Nous*. Rather, Plato's view of the gods is based on accepting human beings' fundamental incapacity to grasp the nature of the gods and the necessity, therefore, for them to represent and understand the gods through

images—be they pictures, statues, or mythic tales—even if these can never accurately depict them.

Our next six chapters are primarily devoted to the Republic which is, paradoxically enough, the dialogue where Plato both criticizes the poets the most harshly, and uses images—similes, metaphors, analogies and myths—the most extensively. If these poetic images provide compelling and effective methods of inquiry, why is the so-called allegory of the cave, perhaps the most famous image created by Plato, so particularly compelling? In the “The Power of Plato’s Cave,” Grace Ledbetter offers a fresh way to answer this question by looking closely at the way that Plato has Socrates present the image. The Cave could have been told in many different ways, and not all of them would have been as powerful as the version Plato offers. Plato has crafted Socrates’ narrative in particular ways—for example, so that the narrative does not simply describe, but asks Glaucon to draw inferences from the material. Ledbetter argues that the “telling” of the Cave itself performs a rhetorical ascent out of the cave. The Cave narrative compels by giving its audience an experience analogous to the very thing it describes.

In the Republic, this active effect of images is of crucial importance in the political realm *stricto sensu*, as well as in Plato’s descriptions of the soul. In “Political Images of the Soul,” Olivier Renaut examines the use of images which compare the soul to a city; he argues that political images of the soul are a means for going beyond a mere isomorphism between psychology and politics; they explain how the two fields interact, so that politics can act upon the soul of the individual. If the city-soul analogy, strictly understood, fails in explaining the valid relations of inclusion between individuals and the city they belong to, the political metaphors are powerful devices for making the rule of law a reality in the city. Transferring the power of reason to the power of law is a task that political metaphors of the soul seem to fulfill for an audience of citizens in the Platonic city.

In “The Ship of State and the Subordination of Socrates,” Alex G. Long considers what Socrates’ use of images shows about the relationship

between him and the philosopher-guards of the ideal city. Sometimes, such as when Socrates employs an image in order represent the Form of the Good, the use of an image appears to show Socrates at a lower level of understanding, lacking full knowledge of Forms, but his use of images should not always be connected with

his knowledge of Forms. When he compares the city to a ship, he is not trying to understand a Form; rather, he is trying to explain why philosophers are not respected, despite their possession of true political expertise. An image is chosen in order to make the combination of expertise and disrespect seem unsurprising, not because Socrates lacks full knowledge of the relevant subjects. Against the assumption that the only contrast between Socrates and the philosopher-guards is an epistemic contrast, Long also argues that Socrates and the guards have different political tasks in the ideal city, and in several passages, including the Ship of State, it is the nature of Socrates’ political role that explains why he behaves differently from a philosopher-guard. Unlike Socrates, actual philosopher-guards do not need to devise ways of persuading others about the desirability of rule by philosophers, and moreover the guards would not have been trained for this task by their philosophical education.

In contrast to the Cave or the Ship of State, the hypothetical goat-stag is one of the less well-known images from the Republic, but Kathryn Morgan (“Plato’s Goat-Stag and the Uses of Comparison”) shows how this mysterious goat-stag serves as a programmatic introduction to Socrates’ multiple images in Book 6 of the fate of philosophy and the philosopher in the contemporary city. Whereas most scholarly treatments have interpreted the goat-stag in terms of Plato’s complex images of the soul, she argues that it is best seen as a reflection of the particular nature of the philosopher king. The easiest way for an ideal state to be established would be to establish as rulers people who combine the traits of political experience and philosophical expertise. There is, however, considerable doubt among Socrates’ interlocutors whether this is a viable hybrid, and so Socrates pauses to create a second-order image that focuses on the problematics of unnatural combinations. Prior and

subsequent references to this fabulous animal in Aristophanes and Aristotelian tradition show that the goat-stag becomes emblematic of the difficulties of complex entities that have no real-world referent.

Returning to the problematic allure of images, Penelope Murray ("Poetry and the Image of the Tyrant in Plato's Republic") analyzes the paradoxical use of images from the perspective of poetry and poetic images in that dialogue. Towards the end of the discussion of poetry in Republic x Plato describes poetry as an *erôs*, a passion from which all right-thinking people should tear themselves away, like lovers who realise their passion is doing them no good. Mimetic art as a whole had earlier been figured as a *hetaira* who consorts with an inferior part of the soul to bring forth base offspring, and now poetry herself is envisaged as a dangerously seductive female whose charms must be resisted at all costs. This *erôs*, which has been engendered since childhood by education, *paideia*, has its analogue in the master-passion which takes control of the tyrant's soul at 572e–575a8, while the figure of *erôs tyrannos* is itself a theatrical image (cf. Eur. Hipp. 538). Murray looks at how poetry, tyranny and desire are linked through a network of imagery and verbal echoes which reinforce the argument for banishing poetry, focusing on the poetic qualities of Plato's writing and his use of figurative language to generate meaning through associations that are not spelled out explicitly, but which are nevertheless there for the reader to interpret.

While readers usually take images to illustrate how souls are to be conceived, in the final essay of the volume, Douglas Cairns ("The Tripartite Soul as Metaphor") explores the rather different idea that the souls themselves are metaphors in the tripartite model of the soul as deployed in the account of the deviant personality types in Republic 8 and 9. The levels of the hierarchy and the stages of degeneration from the ideal make frequent use of personification. Agency, however, is not attributed only to the *eidê* of the *psuchê*, but also to the individual and to his desires. Interaction takes place between the individual and the *eidê* of his *psuchê*, but also between the individual and his desires, as well as between one desire and another and

between the various *eidê* of the *psuchê*. There is, moreover, interaction not just between one individual and another, but also between one individual and various personified elements of another's personality. Since personification characterizes the model at all levels, it makes no sense to ask what the *epithumêtikon* (for example) can 'really' do; it is only in so far as it is personified that it can 'do' anything. The tenor of the metaphor is not some non-metaphorical or less metaphorical version of the tripartite soul, but simply the person, and the agency of persons remains Plato's central focus throughout the discussion, both as the phenomenon that the model of the tripartite soul is designed to elucidate and as the source domain for many of the metaphors that structure that model. It is the fact that personal agency structures both the vehicle and the tenor of the metaphor that gives rise to the frequent intrusion of the explanandum (the behaviour of whole persons) in the explanans (the model of the tripartite *psuchê*). This phenomenon is itself a further sign that Plato has no intention of using his model to dispense with the notion of persons as agents.

Two themes thus recur throughout the collection, the problem of how an image resembles what it represents and the problem of how to avoid mistaking that image for what it represents. Through their resemblance to true reality, images have the power to move their viewers to action and to change themselves, but because of their distance from true reality, that power always remains problematic. This ambivalence recurs in treatments of Plato and his use of images throughout the centuries of the philosophic tradition. For example, Philoponus, in his commentary on Aristotle's treatise on the soul, borrows an image from Plutarch of Athens that derives from Plato's Divided Line to discuss the nature of imagining (*phantasia*). Just as a point that marks the end of a line coming down from above and also a line coming up from below is both a singular point and the endpoint of two different lines, so too an image has a double nature, betwixt and between reality and falsehood.

In the same way the imagining can be taken both as one and as two, because, on the one hand, it

gathers into one what in perceptible things is divided and on the other receives an impression of the simple and, one might say, unitary quality of the divine in imprints and different shapes. [Philoponus, in Aristotle De anima iii, 515. 26–29 see [\[The Poetics of Phantasia: Imagination in Ancient Aesthetics\]](#) by Anne Sheppard [Bloomsbury Academic, 9781474257596]

With a thorough examination of ancient views of literary and artistic realism, allegory and symbolism, [The Poetics of Phantasia](#) brings together a study of the ways in which the concept of imagination (*phantasia* in Greek) was used in ancient aesthetics and literary theory. The Greeks and Romans tended to think of the production of works of art in terms of imitation, either of the world around us or of a transcendent ideal world, rather than in terms of originality and creativity. Study of the way *phantasia* is used in ancient writing about literature and art reveals important features of the ancient approach to the arts and in doing so will also shed light on modern concepts of imagination and the literary and artistic differences between realism and allegory. Covering a range of literary and philosophical material from the beginnings of Greek literature down to the Neoplatonist philosophers of late antiquity, [The Poetics of Phantasia](#) discusses three discrete senses of imagination in ancient thought. Firstly, *phantasia* as visualization is explored: when a writer 'brings before his eyes' what he is describing and enables his audience or reader to visualise it likewise. The second theory of *phantasia* is that which is capable not only of conveying images from sense-perception but also of receiving images from intellectual and supra-intellectual faculties in the soul, and thus helping people grasp mathematical, metaphysical or even mystical concepts. Finally, *phantasia* is seen as a creative power which can conjure up an image that points beyond itself and to express ideas outside our everyday experience.]

Like a philosopher engaging in dialectic, the process of creating an image can bring together into a single sign things that may be separate (like a goat and a stag), or present in multiple forms (a chariot, a sea monster, a tripartite beast, and even a whole city) something that is actually unitary, like

the soul. Thus, like the philosopher who neither knows fully nor is wholly ignorant, but seeks always to move toward the truth, the ambivalent position of the image between reality and falsehood provides a means to move toward the truth, if used philosophically, but away from it, if used without the precautions of philosophic inquiry.

The perilous potential of images, then, requires careful handling, and Plato hedges his images with cautions and caveats, as well as specific critiques of the ways images can mislead. Throughout his work, Plato plays with the many ways in which images represent, using different kinds of images in different dialogues and circumstances. Various essays in this volume address the ways particular Platonic images represent by means of mimesis or analogy, through mirror images that may be clear or distorted or even reversed, or with likenesses in visual or other sensible qualities. Each of these modes of representation provides different effects and serves different ends in Plato's dialogues, from the reversed mirror image of Achilles in the Symposium to the perspectival paintings or sculptures mentioned in the Sophist to the abstract analogy of the Divided Line in the Republic. The sensible qualities that the images provide are predominantly visual in the Platonic dialogues, although auditory representations in music or even tactile sensations of pain and pleasure may also be used. The images whose relation to what they represent works through logical analogy (or even mathematical ratio) rather than visual mimesis seem to provide the surest and clearest guide toward truth, but the Divided Line or the eclipse in the Phaedo are hardly the most memorable images in Plato's corpus, nor are they the ones that have provoked the most philosophic activity over the centuries. Other features of the images' representations factor into the power of images.

One way in which Plato discusses the power of images is in erotic terms, images whose beauty or vividness provokes the viewer into action. However, the more attractive the image appears itself, the more dangerous it becomes as a distraction from, rather than a guide to, what it represents. Whether such pleasing images appear as the tempting whores of poetry or a statue that arouses lust or even a model of the soul as a city that accounts for

internal conflicts, Plato warns repeatedly of the problems that arise from stopping at the image rather than continuing to pursue its referent, of remaining satisfied with the image itself. The images that engender the best philosophic *erôs* are those that are neither too transparent in their abstraction nor too opaque in their surface appeal, but rather those whose translucence allows a glimpse of the signified while still reminding the viewer of the presence of the sign. An impossible composite, such as a goat-stag or a tripartite monster, may serve to warn that the sign cannot be taken as the thing it represents, but Plato also includes many warnings in his dialogues about the images he uses like the famous one from the *Phaedo*, “No sensible man would insist that these things are exactly as I have described them, but I think that it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this is true about our souls and their dwelling places.” [Plato *Phaedo* 81e–82a]

Philosophically constructed images, then, may need to call attention to their constructed nature, reminding the viewer of the limited perspective of mortals who can never perceive the truth completely or wholly. This perspectivism, as van Riel refers to it, is another way to describe the gap Gonzalez discusses in the erotic response to images; in both cases, the viewer is motivated to go beyond the image in a philosophical pursuit of reality. The power of images to provoke action or change in the viewer is another recurring theme throughout the volume, from the adoring care of the beloved in the *Phaedrus* to the shaping of the self in the likeness of the philosophic image to the mental turning around in response to the image of the Cave in the *Republic*. In all these cases, Plato’s images have the power not simply to illustrate and entertain those unable to grasp philosophic reasoning, but to stir the viewers to action and to transform their very souls.

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Introduction: The Power—and the Problems—of Plato’s Images

[Plotinus and the Moving Image](#) edited by Thorsten Botz-Bornstein and Giannis Stamatellos [Value Inquiry / Philosophy of Film, Brill Rodopi, 9789004357037]

[Plotinus and the Moving Image](#) offers the first philosophical discussion on Plotinus’ philosophy and film. It discusses Plotinian concepts like “the One” and “the intelligible” in a cinematic context, relates Plotinus theory of time to the modern time-image, and finds Neoplatonic contemplation in *Contemplative Cinema*.

Excerpt: Note on the Cover Illustration by Giannis Stamatellos: The book cover shows a still from Andrei Tarkovsky’s *The Mirror*. The children have just been told by their mother that the neighbor’s house is burning. While they are looking at the fire, the camera films their reflection in a mirror. Plotinus uses the metaphor of matter (*hylē*) as a mirror upon which corporeal beings are reflected (*Enneads* III 6, 7–13; IV 3, 12; V 1, 9). The perceptibles are “images drawn on the shadow” (*Ennead* VI 3, 8, 35–36); they are projected images of the soul on


matter, reflections of the Forms that slip away on the mirror of matter like an “echo from smooth flat surfaces” (Ennead III 6, 14, 25). This scene of Tarkovsky’s *The Mirror* could be interpreted as a metaphor of Plotinus’ hypostases and his theory of contemplation. The children are looking at the burning fire; they are minds contemplating the phantasmagoric presence of the One. The camera acts like a soul that contemplates both children’s vision and the dreamlike radiances of the One reflected on the mirror of matter. The perspective of the camera is the cinematographic vision of the director and by extension of the audience, following an autobiographical reminiscence of the soul and an inner sight of the soul’s return (epistrophē) to innocence. The camera filming this moment is a soul returning to its own self. The audience contemplates a hypostatic enlightenment of being from the supreme ineffability of the One’s light to the illuminating realm of intelligible reflections at the edges of matter.

Platonic Philosophy Begins by Wonder by Nathan Andersen

Philosophy, according to Plato, begins in wonder, and films naturally evoke wonder. While some may seem at best entertaining distractions, the best manage to draw audiences up from their ordinary preoccupations and into a state of active reflection and focused contemplation. Manifestly unreal, the moving images of cinema nevertheless evoke reality and provoke reflection on the relationship between what is real and what is merely apparent. It is, perhaps, no accident that one of the most potent images from the history of philosophy, Plato’s allegory of the cave, seems to anticipate cinema, by depicting the human condition in a way that resembles the condition of the audience in a movie theater. We are, according to the allegory, like prisoners seated in a darkened cave, fascinated by shadows that we consider to be real. Yet we have an advantage in the cinema, since we know it isn’t real, and yet while we are not captive we remain captivated. Since, according to the allegory, it is the task of philosophy to alert the prisoners that what they consider to be real is an appearance, we might say that in the cinema we exist already in the condition of an openness to philosophical insight. The difference is that to

pursue such insights through film requires not that we turn away from cinematic appearances, leaving the shadows behind and escaping the cave, but that, like the philosopher who reluctantly returns to the cave, we remain among the shadows and discern the truth within them. It requires that we not look behind or beyond appearances for truths divorced from experience, but that we uncover the traces of truth within appearance.

In the wake of Plato’s thought, Plotinus provides us with an equally rich account of the relation between what we might conceive of as the ultimate reality responsible for appearances and the finite and changing world in which we find ourselves, and



of which, alone, we are aware. Whatever we might want to call the ultimate reality, we cannot characterize or conceive of it in any way that would differentiate it from or oppose it to something else. That would be to impose limits on the unlimited. It simply is. If we are to characterize it at all we should emphasize its oneness with itself. It is, just, “the One.” Yet, its oneness cannot be conceived in such a way as to oppose it to “the many” or to think of it as something other than or

apart from the manifold and changing realities that are manifestly not ultimate. Plotinus suggests that the relationship between the One unchanging truth of reality and its manifold manifestations is like that between a source and the stream that overflows it. The realities of which we are aware and in which we participate flow or emanate from the One.

This image, like that of the cave, can also be given a more cinematic reading. Instead of employing the metaphor of water flowing from a spring, we might consider the manifold appearances to project from their source. A single source of light illuminates and opens up a visible space, upon which a world projects forth. Figures emerge, taking shape, becoming recognizable, distinct. They interrupt the quiet reveries of spectators, awakening them first to notice the light and then to attend to their differentiated shapes. Caught up in and drawn towards the spectacle, the spectators only occasionally notice that it cannot fully satisfy. Struggles are resolved, only to awaken new struggles. The spectacle is, at the same time, not self-sufficient, it cannot account for itself. To witness appearances is at once to be drawn towards them and to be reminded of their insufficiency, and called back to their source. The authors in this volume have found in the contemplative metaphysics of Plotinus a rich resource for considering the way that cinematic images invite audiences to contemplate and reflect upon values that both transcend and inform them.

There are, now, many volumes devoted to the study of a single film or television series from a philosophical perspective. They often contain a range of essays showing how elements from a single film or series can be used to illustrate the ideas of this or that philosopher, or showing that puzzling elements of the film can be illuminated by relating them to philosophical doctrines. This, as far as I know, is the first volume dedicated to a single philosopher, that relates the ideas of that philosopher to a range of different films and draws out of the film theoretical implications of a body of work that was conceived many centuries before film was invented and yet manages to shed light on a range of film topics. It is a wide ranging and rewarding volume that offers insight both into cinema and into the challenging ideas of this

influential and challenging thinker. There is, I believe, room for many more volumes such as this one.

Plotinus (204/5–270 CE) is the founder of Neoplatonism and one of the most influential philosophers in antiquity after Plato and Aristotle. While Plato's philosophy has frequently been used for the purpose of film,¹ Neoplatonism has provided relatively little input in film theory, film studies, or the philosophy of film. The allegory of the cave takes the moving image seriously in philosophical terms, and in the *Timaeus* (37d), Plato defines time as "a moving image of eternity." However, the allegory of the cave, like so many of Plato's writings, is concerned with the difference between knowledge and belief, and Plato's preference for the conceptual and his dismissal of the image can cause problems for the film philosopher.

Neoplatonic philosophy can attract film philosophers for different reasons. First there is the originality of Plotinus' understanding of time, which is described as the activity of the soul in the world. Plotinus defines time (chronos) as "the life of soul in the movement of passage from one mode of life to another" (*Ennead* III 7, 11, 43–45).³ This means that the soul unfolds in transitory life stages that are not marked by temporal intervals, which obviously is an interesting concept for film studies. In *Ennead* III 7 (*On Eternity and Time*) Plotinus conceives time beyond physical motion, perceptible qualities and corporeal change and offers two arguments to support this: (1) motion occurs in time, so time cannot be defined with something occurring in it (III 7, 8, 45–47); (2) motion can stop or be interrupted but time cannot (8, 6–8). Following Plato's definition of time as the "moving image of eternity," Plotinus conceives eternity (aiōn) as the "paradigm," the unchanging and perfect life of the Forms at the level of the divine Intellect, while time is perceived as the "moving image" of eternal life, the restless and transitory life of the Soul around Intellect (III 7, 7, 1, 19). [Eternity is "the life which exists around being, all together and full, completely without extension" (III 7, 3, 36–38); it is manifested in the atemporal and non-discursive life of the higher divine Nous, while time is

expressed in the everlasting but transitory and discursive life of the cosmos (III 7, 11). Considering Plotinus' dual-aspect nature of the psyche, the soul is described as living two lives: the one related to the lower perceptible realm and discursive thought (*dianoia*); and the second related to the higher intelligible realm of the Forms and non-discursive intelligence (*noesis*). Plotinus suggests that by contemplating eternity in ourselves we are able to recognize eternity through what is eternal to ourselves within time (III 7, 5, 1–12).]

Of further interest is Plotinus' search for the "intelligible" that can be grasped neither by mere sense perception nor by abstraction or analysis but through "contemplation" (Ennead III 8). Contemplation is a visual activity and much of Plotinus' philosophy is about vision: the first effluence of the One (i.e. intelligible matter) is described as an "indefinite sight" in the first place; a "sight" which becomes "definitive" in Intellect (V 2, 1; v 3, 11). Even more, for Plotinus the perceptible universe is an illumination of the intelligible world of the Forms, that is, an animated image of the soul reflected upon the "mirror" of matter (III 6, 7–13; IV 3, 12; V 1, 9). The soul lies in-between the intelligibles and the perceptibles; it is as an "amphibian" being, living a double life between the higher world of Intellect and the lower realm of the senses. Perceptible beings are not original entities but "images drawn on the shadow" (VI 3, 8, 35–36); they are representations of the Forms that slip away on the "alien" mirror of matter (III 6, 14, 25). Plotinus conceives corporeal bodies as composite entities of matter and form (II 4, 2, 10–20), but he understands the bodies as projections of the soul. It is the body that is animated by the soul and not the soul that is fettered in the body (IV 3, 22–23; VI 7, 7).

Plotinus and Film Studies

On the one hand, it is not surprising that Neoplatonism has provided relatively little input in philosophical studies of film. At the first glance, a comparison between cinematic work and the philosophy of Plotinus seems improbable.

In Plotinus, the highest principle of all things, the One, is ineffable (V 3, 13–14; VI 8, 13), that is, the One cannot be expressed in thought or image. Any

area that is expressive requires a duality of the subject and the received, reflected, or thought images. However, paradoxically, film can be useful here as it represents a unique and unusual medium for a rapprochement of our modern consciousness with the thought of this philosopher of late antiquity. Plotinus' understanding of the life of the soul in time can indeed be compared with the world of film. The higher intelligible part of the soul according to Plotinus remains at the level of the divine *Nous*. Soul's *nous*, the higher part of the soul, contemplates the higher intelligible realm of the Platonic Forms, while soul's lower part is directed to the perceptible realm (IV 8, 8).

Then there is a reason why the lack of Plotinus-inspired film studies should surprise us. The vestige of Neoplatonism laid by the decedents of Bergson could have had more decisive consequences for film studies. Bergson's "time-image" from *Matière et mémoire*, which has been recuperated by Deleuze for film studies, is supposed to be superior to "concepts" because the image is able to evoke thought content in a more fluent and less abstract fashion. We are not far away from Plotinus. For Plotinus the soul is a "movement even more than a thing" and Emile Bréhier wanted to see in the Plotinian soul a Bergsonian "*élan vital*". Bréhier uses those same Bergsonian concepts to describe Plotinus' "vitalism" able to create a "spiritual physics" as opposed to a "mechanist physics". The soul is an intermediate and restless, constantly moving, entity situated between the intelligible and the perceptible world (IV 8, 7–8). The time-image (of both of Bergson and Deleuze) is thus clearly compatible with Plotinus' theory of time as a transitory intelligible movement of the soul in Ennead III 7, which announces a fluent way of seeing that is very interesting for cinema studies. A Plotinian moving image is a time-image, that is, an animated image springing from the soul as the result of contemplation of the intelligible world [The Plotinian soul only occasionally raises itself up to such a state through participation in the life of the Intellect whereby it re-enacts the continuous motion of which time is only a weaker reflection. Time as the life of the soul is the result of the soul's abandonment of pure contemplation (as the one expressed at the level of Intellect): to "have more"

than already belonged to it in that unity, that is, to grasp in a self-willed manner what it already possesses as Intellect. This act is what leads to its diastasis, the stretching out of the life of eternity (which is *homou panta*) into the only being able to possess itself and things in successive aggregation. It is true that soul cannot be fully eternalized like Intellect, and as such its life as time has a positive meaning; however, the other aspect mentioned above is also an essential part of Plotinus' dual-aspect theory of the soul.]

In Ennead III 7 *chronos* has a psycho-ontological value which cannot be described in terms of properties or by using quantifying measures in spatial terms.

Plotinus psychological perception of time as inner and intelligible motion has a parallel in Bergson's conception of the *durée pure* and in the continuous flow of evolving consciousness that Bergson explained in his doctoral thesis *Time and Free Will* (*Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*, 1889). For Bergson, the *durée pure* is the coincidence of currently experienced present and a remembered past in which every new moment carries with it the whole of its past in an all-embracing memory. Deleuze's concept of the "virtual" that Ansell-Pearson interprets as "eternal share of being", reflects Plotinus' theory of eternity; it is even more strikingly echoed in Deleuze's monumental work *Cinema*; and it also clearly reflects Deleuze's conception of the cinematic time-image as pure thinking beyond action, movement, and language codes.

There is still another Plotinian concept that is intriguing for film studies: the One as power-of-all-things beyond any kind of intelligence as it suggests the overcoming of both subjectivism and epistemological objectivism. This is reminiscent of Deleuze concept of cinematic experience as a means to perceive time and movement as a whole. In cinema, our mind does not need to put together the successive percepts or sensations but receives them as a whole. Of course, there are limits to those parallels, and Enrico Terrone points in his chapter in this book to the difference between the Plotinian One and Deleuzian time-based immanence: "The One, indeed, cannot be identified

with time, since time shapes the world as a whole, whereas the One is beyond the world as a whole."

Thoughts on "totality" or "unity" in Western philosophy have been developed at different times and in different places by Meister Eckhart, Spinoza, Bruno, Hegel, and German Idealism, but also by Plotinus. Often those philosophies were interested in the tension between the individual and the general, and some attempted to channel this tension towards a harmonious kind of sublation. The *durée pure* is inscribed in precisely this current: in *durée pure*, past, present and future are supposed to form an organic whole. Such ideas of unity somehow contrast with postmodern concepts of deconstruction though the opposition is artificial to some extent. What both "organicists" and deconstructionists attack is the idea of a universality that is static; both believe that static universals are incompatible with individual, creative, and contemplative reason. When Steve Choe uses in the present volume Plotinus' time has a positive meaning; however, the other aspect mentioned above is also an essential part of Plotinus' dual-aspect theory of the soul.

ideas as a critique of rationalization and the fact that "all things have become subject to its compulsion to rationalize and thus make intelligible all things according to a totalizing, instrumentalizing logic," he shows that the ontological criticism based on "the One" is both classic and contemporary for the human mind. Similarly, Cameron Barrows links Plotinus' philosophy in this volume to Martin Heidegger's notion of the "Forgetfulness of Being," which is supposed to suggest "that all has become meaningless in our postmodern world, that we can no longer ask ontologically valid questions about ourselves and the world through its abstraction." And Michelle Buchberger describes how "the individual must escape the innumerable distractions of the material world" in order to "reconnect with higher planes of existence" or a "more holistic and authentic view of existence," which Buchberger also sees as the artistic project of the writer John Fowles.

A certain idea of the "organic" enclosed to the Plotinian One remains of interest for all

philosophical reflections on film, and this does not only concern time but also material. The philosophy of the One values a contemplative exploration of spatial and temporal experience through a rediscovery of the material. Several ideas can come to mind: Béla Tarr's "emphasis on the concrete physicality of the event" as well as Tarkovsky's "belief that the camera is capable of unearthing the hidden significance of the material world". In this book, Tarkovsky will be addressed several times, in particular by Tony Partridge and Daniel Regnier, who explain parallels on account of the Neoplatonic heritage in Eastern Christian Orthodoxy by which Tarkovsky was affected. Regnier finds a deep common philosophical insight according to which reality is fundamentally transparent and hence accessible to unmediated experience in Plotinus and Tarkovsky. Looking closer, the concept of the One is also contained in one of the most important philosophies of cinema ever produced: in "realism" as it has been formulated by André Bazin. According to Bazin, any contemplated reality gains in depth, which is "that depth of focus [that] brings the spectator into a relation with the image closer to that which he enjoys with reality. Therefore it is correct to say that, independently of the contents of the image, its structure is more realistic" (Bazin 2005 t: 35). Bazin does not mention Plotinus, but in his writings he repeatedly attempts to support his idea of reality as a contemplated unity through classical sources. Hugh Gray therefore defends Bazin in his introduction to *What is Cinema?* against all those who find Bazin's classical spirit outdated and incompatible with modern theory:

Have they never heard of the philosopher Xenophanes who, gazing up at the heavens, proclaimed "the all is one"? Or of Parmenides who saw this whole as a continuum? Indeed if there had been cinema in those days one could imagine a similar argument to the present one going on between the schools of Parmenides and Heraclitus. It was these philosophers who first saw the cosmos or "reality" as a whole.

Other authors in this volume examine the overlaps of Neoplatonism and film theory in a variety of ways. Vincenzo Lomuscio explores the relationship

between beauty and becoming as well as the relationship between essence and image. Each movement in the world is an image of eternal entities, eternal souls or ideas. Stephen Clark shows how Gnostics and Neoplatonists in late antiquity employed the fascination with shadows, reflections, and moving images. They were a reminder of how far we have already fallen, as we are seduced from heaven into a spatio-temporal and material world. Sebastian Moro Tornese proposes an understanding of cinema as a way of expressing the unity of the Platonic cosmos in terms of Plotinian contemplation. Cinema is not just a mirror of the external cosmos but also an introversive mirror of the soul and the intellect. Thorsten Botz-Bornstein finds that in *Slow Cinema* boredom cannot appear if we think in truly Plotinian terms because contemplation overcomes the distinction between the subject and the object. Giannis Stamatellos suggests a Plotinian approach when viewing Peter Weir's *The Truman Show* in the light of Plotinus' dual-aspect theory of the soul, human freedom and self-determination. Finally, Panayiota Vassilopoulou offers a reconstruction of the Plotinian problematic and explores some pertinent characteristics of Bruce Nauman's work. If the self is a moving image and the work of art is a metaphor of the self, does this motion ever stop or are they always a work in progress?

[Plotinus: The Enneads](#) translated by Lloyd P. Gerson, George Boys-Stones, John M. Dillon, R. A. H. King, Andrew Smith, and James Wilberding [Cambridge University Press, 9781107001770]

[The Enneads](#) by Plotinus as collected and edited by his student Porphyry is a work which is central to the history of philosophy in late antiquity. This volume is the first complete edition of the *Enneads* in English for over seventy-five years, and also includes Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus*. Led by Lloyd P. Gerson, a team of experts present up-to-date translations which are based on the best available text, the *editio minor* of Henry and Schwyzer and its corrections. The translations are consistent in their vocabulary, making the volume ideal for the study of Plotinus' philosophical arguments. They also offer extensive annotation to assist the reader, together with cross-references and citations which will enable users more easily to navigate the texts. This

monumental edition will be invaluable for scholars of Plotinus with or without ancient Greek, as well as for students of the Platonic tradition.

Excerpt: This volume presents a new annotated translation of the *Enneads* of Plotinus (204/5-270 CE). We include as well the *Life of Plotinus* written by Porphyry of Tyre (223/4—c.305 CE), who was also the first editor of the *Enneads*. Most of what we know about the life of Plotinus and the circumstances surrounding the composition of his treatises comes from Porphyry's biography and so there is no need to repeat the details here. We follow Porphyry's idiosyncratic arrangement of these treatises, an arrangement which does not correspond to the chronological order of their composition, as Porphyry himself tells us. A table comparing Porphyry's ordering with the chronological ordering follows this introduction.

This translation into English of the *Enneads* of Plotinus is a 'successor' to two great monuments to scholarship, the translations by Stephen MacKenna (1917-1930) and A. H. Armstrong (1966-1988). [A number of excellent complete translations in European languages now exist. Special mention should be made of the Spanish translation of Igal (1982-1985), the French translation edited by Brisson and Pradeau (2002-2010), the German translation of Harder, continued by Beutler and Heiler (1956-1971), the Italian translation by Faggin (1992), and the modern Greek translation by Kalligas (1994-), with *Ennead 6* yet to appear]. It is not a replacement for those works, which can still be consulted with considerable profit. In the case of MacKenna, he was impeded by the absence of a critical edition of the Greek text. That did not appear until the publication of the *editio major* of the *Enneads*, *Plotini Opera* by Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolph Schwyzer (1951-1973). In the case of Armstrong, the first three volumes of his seven-volume work (*Enneads* 1.3) appeared prior to the publication of the third volume of the *editio minor* of the *Enneads* by Henry and Schwyzer (1964-1982) containing several hundred corrections to the text of *Enneads* 1.5 in the first two volumes. Although textual problems hampered MacKenna much more than they did Armstrong, neither work has been rendered obsolete by the results of the critical work of Henry and Schwyzer,

which, incidentally, continues to be advanced by a number of other scholars up to the present, for example, the late Jésus Igal and Paul Kalligas.

The rationale for the present translation is twofold. First, there was the desire to produce a translation that would take account not only of the textual work that has been done since Armstrong, but also of the enormous proliferation of scholarship on Plotinus generally, many facets of which have had an inevitably anonymous influence on the present work. Second, it was thought beneficial to provide a translation in one volume to facilitate the study of Plotinus, something which necessarily requires the comparison of many disparate texts. There are very few of the so-called treatises in the *Enneads* that exhaust Plotinus' treatment of a particular question or topic. Consequently, one usually has to read several passages in different treatises together in order to get a more or less clear picture of Plotinus' position. It is hoped that with one volume, and numerous cross-references, this will at least be made easier to do for the reader. In this regard, the English glossary of key terms, containing many references, should also provide assistance.

The default text used in this translation is that of the *editio minor* of Henry and Schwyzer,

conventionally designated as HS2. [The *editio major* is usually labelled HS1; the *editio minor* HS2; addenda to HS1 labelled HS3; textual addenda to HS2 labelled HS4 and the article by H.-R. Schwyzer, 'Corrigenda ad Plotini textum', *Museum Helveticum* 44, 1 (1987), 191-210, is labelled HS5. Even though Henry's name does not appear on the article (he died in 1984), he no doubt participated in the work that led up to this article and by common agreement he is listed as one of the authors.]

Unless otherwise noted, this is the text that the authors of this work have translated. We note all deviations from that text in the notes, citing, for example, the reading of HS4 over that of HS2. In a separate table, we list all the changes to the text we have followed, although space precludes a discussion of the reasons for the changes. Those who can benefit from the side-by-side Greek text

of Armstrong's Loeb edition, can do the same with the editio minor (OCT) and our translation.

The work of translating the Enneads (along with Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus*, here included) has been an intensely collaborative effort. Although the work of translating individual Enneads was originally apportioned out to the individual members of the 'team', each draft was read and critically discussed with at least two other members. The final product is genuinely collaborative, with the inevitable proviso that each member of the team would like to reserve a minority dissenting position on this or that issue. Compromise was the price paid for achieving the desired result of publication. Strenuous efforts were made to attain a uniformity of vocabulary where appropriate, although the authors could only reflect with awe on the Septuagint as an unattainable ideal of perfect unanimity that, as legend has it, was attained by the 70 translators of the Torah into Greek.

The present work, given its size limitation, could in no sense provide a commentary on the often desperately difficult thought of Plotinus, to say nothing of his inelegant, allusive, and sometimes even apparently ungrammatical Greek. The reader will certainly want to have recourse to what is now an abundance of basic exegetical commentary in many languages. For the English reader, the commentary of Kalligas (*Enneads* 1.3, English translation, 2014; translations of 4-5, and 6 forthcoming) sets a high standard of conciseness, erudition, and philosophical insight. Many individual treatises have by now had the benefit of book-length commentaries.

In the light of the challenges thrown up for the reader by a translation of the Enneads unadorned with any exegetical commentary, the authors have adopted a number of expedients. First, the notes contain brief explanations for words or passages otherwise quite unintelligible on their own. Second are the above-mentioned cross-references, which allow Plotinus to comment on himself, as it were. Third, is the extensive listing of fontes in the notes. These require a bit of explaining. The starting point for these is the appendix to the editio minor of Henry and Schwyzer, which includes hundreds of these. Henry and Schwyzer had no illusion that their

table of fontes was complete. Inevitably, everyone who works intently on one or another treatise discovers additional 'sources'. We have tried to be capacious in our listing of these sources because there is hardly a sentence of the Enneads that does not reflect Plotinus' immersion in the ancient Greek philosophical tradition, including the ongoing involvement in that by his contemporaries. Often, these fontes provide just by themselves a helpful commentary on what Plotinus is arguing since they enable us to understand exactly what he is arguing against. Nevertheless, the term fontes has a broad meaning, including everything from direct quotations from Plato's dialogues, to phrases or even illustrative examples of principles from, say, Aristotle or Alexander of Aphrodisias, to Stoic texts that may well not have been even known to Plotinus but which nevertheless are our best source for an expression of the Stoic doctrine that Plotinus is addressing. Some of the fontes provided are, of course, disputable given the parameters for selection. In addition to those taken from the editio minor, many are gratefully mined from previous translations and commentaries. In the nature of the case, and given the unavailability to us of scores of texts Plotinus had at his disposal, any index fontium is bound to be incomplete. Finally, the cross-references should not be understood by the reader as indicating that the translators always believe that the passages cited express the identical doctrine. Indeed, there are occasions when the passages, at least on the surface, seem to say conflicting things. These references are meant only to assist in the interpretative process.

In the translations themselves, the authors have adopted many orthographic, grammatical, and stylistic devices intended to facilitate comprehension. Paragraphs have been introduced to divide the text into more or less logical units. Lengthy periodic sentences have been shortened for the sake of clarity along with the liberal use of punctuation. When the reference of a pronoun is grammatically and semantically certain, the proper name has been introduced. For example, Plotinus often says 'he says' followed by a direct quotation from a Platonic dialogue. This appears as 'Plato says'. When the reference is not certain but probable, the identification is made in a footnote.

Plotinus has a number of grammatical idiosyncracies that indicate that he is introducing a new point or a new argument or making a determinatio after a dialectical discussion. For example, he uses the Greek word *n* which is normally translated as 'or' to introduce his answer to a question he himself raises or in reply to an argument of one of his opponents that he has just sketched. A sort of gloss on this feature of the text would be to render it as 'or is it not the case that ...' But apart from the facts that Plotinus is not expressing a rhetorical question, and that translating one Greek letter with seven words seems a bit much, there is a consistent pattern of use by Plotinus of this word to indicate that what follows is his own position. We render the word 'in fact' and set it off in a new paragraph to make the philosophical elements of the text as clear as possible. There are other terms, including *Toivuv* ('so'), *ouv* ('then'), *vap* ('for'), that serve a similar demarcational purpose.

A much more delicate issue is the use of capitalizations. Conventionally, the three primary hypostases of Plotinus' system are referred to in English as 'One' (or 'Good'), 'Intellect', and 'Soul'. When these words are used other than for the three primary hypostases, they appear in lower case. Unfortunately, it is not always clear whether, for example, Plotinus in a given passage is referring to Intellect or to intellect, that is, to an individual intellect. The same problem turns up for Soul or soul. Here, interpretation is inevitable, but we have tended to default to lower case, when the reference is not at least highly probable or when the reference is generic.

In addition, capitalization has been used for the Demiurge of Plato's *Timaeus*, given that this principle is invested by Plato and Plotinus with what we might term personal attributes. Plotinus uses the term *theos* rather freely to refer to one or another of the primary hypostases. Although the absolute primacy of the first hypostasis is undisputable, to capitalize 'god' in this case would be misleading if that leads one to suppose that Plotinus is arguing for anything like a form of monotheism. On the other hand, he does sometimes invest the first principle of all with personal attributes in which case personal pronouns are used.

Plotinus' ontological vocabulary cannot be mapped onto ordinary English vocabulary one-to-one. The distinctions between *eivai*, *tò óv*, *tà óvta*, and *ouata* cannot be straightforwardly rendered into English by different terms that at the same time preserve the etymological connections among these terms. The importance of rendering the Greek in a perspicuous manner is heightened by the fact that Plotinus' metaphysics is hierarchical and the higher, intelligible world is always treated as superior to and explanatory of the lower sensible world. The strategy we have adopted is to capitalize or put in lower case the identical term depending on whether it is used of the intelligible world or sensible world. Thus, *ouaia* becomes 'Substance' or 'Substantiality' when referring to the intelligible world and 'substance' or 'substantiality' when referring to the sensible world. The terms *tò óv* (*tà óvta*) are rendered 'Being' ('Beings') or 'being' ('beings') based on the same principle. An analogous procedure is followed for *eivai* when used as a noun: 'Existence' or 'existence'; the finite verb, however, is normally 'exist(s)'.

A somewhat delicate translation issue arises for the terms *tautón* and *óμοιον*. In most English translations, the former term is rendered 'same' and the latter 'like'. There are several reasons for resisting these translations. First, for Plato and for Plotinus *tautón* is ontologically prior to *óμοιον* as is evident from the fact that the former, not the latter, is one of the *μεγiota yevn* ('greatest genera'). Stated otherwise, if things are *óμοιον* that is because there is something *tavtón* prior to it. To render *tavtón* as 'same' raises a question for a Platonist that cannot be answered, namely, what explains the fact that two (or more) things are the same? Second, to render *óμοιον* as 'like' or 'similar' undermines the very foundation of Platonism. This is so because, in English at any rate, to say that one thing is 'like' another or 'similar' to another is, typically, to make a claim that is irreducibly subjective. One may find one thing like or similar to another, whereas someone else does not. These claims are beyond objective adjudication; there is no way to determine who is right. Hence, for the Platonist, claims of likeness or similarity provide no reason for positing Forms. Such claims do not require objective or scientific explanation, whereas

the whole point, one might say, of the Platonic project is that there are certain phenomenal facts that can only be explained by a theory of Forms, a theory of separate self-identical entities. Hence, the decision to translate ταυτόν as 'identical' and ὁμοιον as 'same'. The nouns, ὁμοιότης and ὁμοιωμα are, however, rendered 'likeness' which can have the connotation of 'derived sameness' as in 'this work of art was intended as a likeness of that landscape'. In addition, the important term ὁμοιωσις is rendered as 'assimilation' indicative of a process of attempting to achieve a particular sort of sameness with regard to a model or paradigm.

There is on a number of occasions some awkwardness arising from this decision. For in English, we naturally say things like 'they followed the same rule that we did' or 'we arrived at the same time' or 'one and the same principle is found both here and there' or 'the same account applies to both' when Plotinus employs the term ταυτόν in all these cases. The justification for tolerating the awkwardness is, in addition to the above points, that for Plotinus ταυτόν and ὁμοιον are quasi-technical terms, meaning that they are occasionally used in a nontechnical or colloquial way. But it was thought misleading to revert to the English colloquial translations in the latter cases, a practice that would always leave the reader wondering whether or how Platonic principles would be applicable in the given instance.

Another peculiarity of the present translation is that the term ekei, which is the ordinary Greek word for 'there' almost always means for Plotinus 'the intelligible (or non-sensible) world', and is so translated. There are a very few places where it does in fact just mean 'there' in contrast to 'here', for example, in a discussion of spatial concepts. And occasionally it refers not to the intelligible world but to the sensible heaven or heavenly things as opposed to terrestrial things, the former including the planets and the heavenly spheres.

The Greek word logos has a wide semantic range. Apart from its use for any unit of intelligible discourse, the term also has a specific technical meaning for Plotinus. It refers to the expression or manifestation of a higher principle at a lower level. Thus, for example, each hypostasis is a logos of the

one above and an enmattered form in the sensible world is a logos of the Form in the soul of the cosmos which is itself a logos of the Form in Intellect. The term is most frequently translated into English as 'rational principle'. But all principles are rational for Plotinus and this translation does not convey the important feature of the logos that it is derived from something higher in the hierarchy. In order to convey this essential feature of the technical term, we have translated logos as 'expressed principle'. For these and many other translation choices, the glossary should be consulted.

See [\[Plotinus: A Bibliography 1950-2000\]](#) edited by Richard Dufour (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2002), continued online up to the present at <http://rdufour.free.fr/BibPlotin/anglais/Biblio.html>.

[Mortal and Divine in Early Greek Epistemology: A Study of Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides](#) by Shaul Tor [Cambridge Classical Studies, Cambridge University Press, 9781107028166]

This book demonstrates that we need not choose between seeing so-called Presocratic thinkers as rational philosophers or as religious sages. In particular, it rethinks fundamentally the emergence of systematic epistemology and reflection on speculative inquiry in Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides. Shaul Tor argues that different forms of reasoning, and different models of divine disclosure, play equally integral, harmonious and mutually illuminating roles in early Greek epistemology. Throughout, the book relates these thinkers to their religious, literary and historical surroundings. It is thus also, and inseparably, a study of poetic inspiration, divination, mystery initiation, metempsychosis and other early Greek attitudes to the relations and interactions between mortal and divine. The engagements of early philosophers with such religious attitudes present us with complex combinations of criticisms and creative appropriations. Indeed, the early milestones of philosophical epistemology studied here themselves reflect an essentially theological enterprise and, as such, one aspect of Greek religion.

Excerpt: This book is first and foremost a study of the verses of Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides.

It examines these thinkers as key figures in the emergence of systematic epistemology and systematic reflection on the nature of speculative inquiry. I submit that, in each of the three thinkers, novel forms of critical and reflective thought coexist with novel positions concerning the relation and interactions between gods and mortals. Indeed, in the case of each author, critical thinking on the one hand, and reflections about the interactions between mortal and divine on the other hand, play complex, harmonious and equally integral roles, which can be understood fully only in relation to one another. The thread running throughout the book is the thesis that, for Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides alike, theology and 'anthropology' are logically prior to epistemology.¹ More specifically, their divergent views on the cognitive capacities and limitations of mortals are, and can only be properly understood as, a corollary of their correspondingly divergent views on (i) the nature of the divine, (ii) the nature of the mortal and (iii) the nature of the relation and interactions between them. The book aims not merely to argue for this thesis, but also — and in particular — to demonstrate and explore its usefulness as a fresh perspective on a range of often long-standing interpretative problems.

The book falls into six chapters. In Chapter 1, I situate the inquiries pursued in the subsequent chapters in their proper relation to broader fundamental questions concerning rationality and irrationality, and philosophy and religion. This opening chapter aims to bring to the fore the bigger issues at stake in the subsequent investigations into interrelations between theology and epistemology. In doing so, it clarifies the insight which the results of those investigations afford for our understanding of early Greek philosophy and religion more generally. Historically, we have associated under the single term 'rational' very distinct intellectual phenomena. On the one hand, we describe as 'rational' coherent, critical, inferential, questioning and explicative thinking. On the other hand, we often identify as 'rational' human inquiries that proceed without any appeal to divine interference or aid, as well as, more generally, secularising moves away from god-centred patterns of thought and explanation. In

Chapter 1, I consider the problematic influence that these deep-seated associations have exerted and continue to exert on the business of interpreting early Greek philosophy. I submit that the difficult challenge of extricating ourselves from their long shadow lies largely ahead of us. Similarly, we will examine the entrenched expectation that philosophy should operate more or less independently from traditional religion and pull in opposite directions from it, as well as the nexus of assumptions that underpins this expectation. We will ask in what ways, within the context of Greek polytheism, some philosophers can indeed be seen to come into conflict with some traditional religious attitudes and practices and to what extent such critiques were or were not perceived as a religious problem or a social threat. To be sure, philosophical critiques are important and should not be marginalised. But the engagements of philosophers with traditional or non-philosophical religious attitudes are hardly limited to criticisms. Furthermore, philosophical criticisms can sometimes be inextricably combined with positive and creative appropriations, even of those very same aspects of traditional religion that are being criticised. Ultimately, philosophical theologies constitute one aspect of the flexible and inclusive mass of beliefs, representations and practices that was Greek religion. The studies of Xenophanes and Parmenides in this book offer two extended illustrations of these principles.

In Chapter 2, we turn to Hesiod and, in particular, to the striking and enigmatic way in which his Muses articulate their relation to the poet in lines 27-8 of the *Theogony*: 'We know how to speak many falsehoods which are like verities, and we know, whenever we wish, how to utter truths.' We will consider this address both in its immediate context in the *Theogony* and against the broader background of Hesiod's reflections on the mortal and the divine, and the male and the female. I will argue that, in the *Theogony*, Hesiod decisively and consistently encourages a cautious and destabilising stance in response to the Muses' address: the Muses leave it uncertain — and no mortal poet could himself ascertain — whether the verses which they inspire comprise truths, falsehoods or some combination of the two. Hesiod's understanding of

his relation to the Muses, moreover, forms one poetic-epistemological aspect of a coherent and holistic conception of the human condition as a whole. At one juncture elsewhere in the Hesiodic corpus, however, we encounter a competing and more optimistic reinterpretation and revaluation of the Muses' address (Works and Days 646-62). We will tentatively consider certain theological developments in Hesiod's thought, which could underlie and explain this divergence between Hesiod's epistemological stance in the Theogony and at this moment in the Works and Days. More importantly, we will see that a synoptic consideration of the poet's voice, as it emerges from the Hesiodic corpus as a whole, produces a picture of epistemological and theological ambivalence. Ultimately, the primary thrust of the Muses' address to the poet is to raise, but leave unresolved, the question of the proper way to interpret it. Put differently, Hesiod's Muses crystallise, not an epistemological position, but an epistemological framework. Within this framework, the problem of epistemology becomes — for Hesiod as for the philosophers who followed his lead — the problem of understanding the nature of the interactions between mortal and divine.'

Chapter 3 addresses Xenophanes' reflections on the nature of divine disclosure. By contrast with the common view, Xenophanes does not deny categorically the reality of divine disclosure. Nor, however, does he acquiesce in traditional assumptions of disclosure. Rather, Xenophanes specifically rejects traditional conceptions of divine disclosure as theologically faulty. He supplants those traditional conceptions with his own, alternative understanding of what divine disclosure amounts to and how it works. Xenophanes' novel conception of divine disclosure grounds his novel views concerning the possibilities and limitations of mortal beliefs and speculative inquiry. It forms, moreover, one coherent aspect of his overall re-conceptualisation of divinity and of his social and moral world view. Xenophanes, then, does not simply reject traditional ideas about divine disclosure without a trace. Rather, he transforms those traditional ideas in radical ways. Xenophanes remained profoundly influenced by what he rejected.

Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to the difficult and complex case of Parmenides. In Chapter 4, we will see that Parmenides advances a physiological theory of human cognition. According to this theory, humans qua humans must, as a matter of physiological necessity, experience and form beliefs about multiple, heterogeneous, mobile and differentiated things and processes. They cannot but experience and think in terms of such sensory contrasts as light and dark, hot and cold, rare and dense, etc. Famously, however, Parmenides thought that Being or 'what-is' had very different features. What-is is ungenerated, imperishable, indivisible, homogeneous and immobile. Why, then, did Parmenides think that mortals must continue to reflect about and strive to understand the natures of generated, multiple, heterogeneous and mobile things and processes, even after they came to realise that the ultimate reality — what-is — involves no generation, multiplicity, heterogeneity or motion? I will argue that Parmenides' theory of human cognition best positions us to answer that much-debated question. To think of and in terms of generated, heterogeneous and mobile things and processes is a necessary and even appropriate aspect of what it is to think and live as a mortal. If, however, we explain in this way Parmenides' abiding interest in cosmological accounts of change and differentiation, then a new problem arises. If humans are hardwired to think in terms of sensory contrasts and about differentiated and heterogeneous objects, then how was Parmenides — a human — also able to sustain the qualitatively different kind of thought that is necessary for conceiving of the undifferentiated and homogeneous what-is? If humans must, by physiological necessity, think in terms of multiplicity and heterogeneous differentiation, then how was Parmenides also able to think otherwise? In Chapter 5, I argue that the human agent for Parmenides is not simply and strictly human. The mortal also possesses a divine part or aspect: his fiery and aethereal soul. The mortal is capable of sustaining a higher-than-mortal type of thinking by momentarily coming to think with — or as — his divine soul. This is, moreover, the fundamental reason for which Parmenides begins his poem by describing his journey to a goddess, who proceeds to disclose the truth of things to him. The goddess,

through her disclosure and guidance, enables the mortal to come to think with or as his divine soul and to sustain the higher-than-human thought which is required for the cognition of what-is. It is only through the goddess's initiation, therefore, that Parmenides was able to master the system of argumentation that is developed in the poem, and so to comprehend, evaluate and accept for himself the truth of the doctrines which the goddess revealed.

In this way, we can do justice to the emphatic prominence in Parmenides' poem of both divine disclosure and argumentative reasoning. Furthermore, as we develop this interpretation, we will see Parmenides drawing in positive and appropriative ways on a variety of contemporary and traditional religious models, including poetic inspiration, divinatory oracles, mystery initiations and metempsychosis.

These discussions of Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides are offered as essentially self-standing studies that, in conjunction, disclose instructively divergent yet related approaches to epistemology. In Chapter 6.1, we will consider more directly the critical and formative engagements by Xenophanes with Hesiod and by Parmenides with both Hesiod and Xenophanes. Our discussion of the interrelations between the three thinkers will shed further light on, and will itself in turn be illuminated by, the individual studies of them in the previous chapters.

As I indicated above, we begin in Chapter 1 by considering critically certain historical and still-influential notions of rationality and irrationality. Positive accounts of rationality, which seek to identify some of what rationality includes and excludes, will not be a starting point for this book but — within the confines of its particular scope — will be one of its outcomes. In Chapter 6.3, I recapitulate certain, more or less implicit ideas of rationality which I find to be operative in Hesiod, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles, as well as in some other models of the interactions between gods and mortals (such as divination). Within the intervening chapters themselves, we will not be helping ourselves to the terms 'rational' and 'irrational' as interpretative tools.

This book does not pretend to offer a wholesale reconsideration of early Greek philosophy nor, indeed, to exhaust the immensely rich and challenging question of the connections between theology and epistemology in early Greek philosophy. I aim to offer here a new analysis of these connections and of their significance in some key episodes in the emergence in archaic Greece of systematic reflection on the nature of speculative inquiry. I by no means wish to suggest that the story ends there. On the contrary, it is my hope that the interpretative approaches developed and pursued here could serve as useful starting points for considerations of other and later developments in philosophy, theology and epistemology. In Chapter 6.2, we will take one such forward look by considering (in a focused and circumscribed manner) one especially important and illuminating later case: the epistemological significance of the *daimôn* and Muse in the thought of Empedocles. We will find that Empedocles too couches his epistemological reflections within a broader theological framework. Furthermore, Empedocles too posits his own version of what I will refer to in this book as epistemically significant interactions'. By this term, I mean interactions between mortal and divine agents that enable the mortal to attain knowledge, or to come by potentially true beliefs and views, which he could not have attained or come by independently of those interactions. I will use the terms 'divine revelation' and 'divine disclosure' to refer to the same type of interactions.

As we shall presently see, there exists an artificial schism in the scholarship between conceptions of the early Greek philosophers as systematic, rational thinkers and as poets, mystics and religious figures. This schism also helpfully brings out a methodological divergence. Although we must eschew oversimplifying generalisations here, we can fairly say that, by and large, scholarship in the analytical tradition tends to reconstruct philosophical positions and arguments more through an internal examination pursued independently of advancing claims about their cultural, historical and literary context. Historical reconstructions of dialectical context, moreover, tend to privilege a philosopher's formative reactions to the theories of those conventionally classified as his earlier

philosophical colleagues. By contrast, what has come to be called the 'anthropological' approach seeks to re-contextualise texts that a long philosophical tradition de-contextualised. At its most radical, however, this approach dismisses the study of theoretical and philosophical reflection in the textual output of those we call early philosophers as a failure to recognise that this output was fundamentally shaped by the agonistic cultural and pragmatic circumstances in which it was produced.

The following investigations into Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides draw essentially and throughout on a consideration of their complex engagements — competitive, polemical, appropriative, critical and creative — with a range of culturally prevalent paradigms of theology and epistemology. Philosophical texts are thus examined in the light of, but are not thereby reduced or assimilated to, their religious, literary and historical contexts. What follows is by focus and structure a study of Hesiodic, Xenophanean and Parmenidean epistemology. But it is also, and inseparably, a study of poetic inspiration, divination, mystery initiation, metempsychosis and, to put it most generally, a range of early Greek attitudes to the relation and interactions between mortal and divine. Homeric material, in particular, figures prominently throughout. This means that we will be encountering in this book what we might call different sorts or modes of 'theology'. When discussing Hesiod, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles, we will generally be dealing with more or less self-conscious, systematic and elaborated reflections about the divine. But we will find that expressions and representations of divination and mystery initiations, for example, can also convey certain conceptions of divinity, albeit in a more flexible and implicit — if not sometimes underdetermined and vague — manner.

I do not wish to stake a universal methodological or theoretical claim. Different interpretative projects require and will reward different interpretative approaches. My contention is that, specifically with regard to the business of analysing the emergence of philosophical epistemology in archaic Greece, methodological purism of either stripe has led, and will inevitably lead, to reductive and distortive

portrayals. Here, the analysis of systematic, critical reflection and the contextualisation of philosophical texts in their religious, literary and historical surroundings must, I believe, be pursued in relation to each other and illuminate one another. Logical and philological analysis, cultural and religious history and literary criticism are all indispensable tools. Walter Burkert's diagnosis of the state of Pythagorean scholarship in 1962 seems urgently relevant for current attitudes to early epistemology: 'The very thing that might seem rash, in view of the fundamental differences of interpretation, is what the nature of the situation demands: as many-sided a treatment of the problem as is possible.'

Introduction to the Chapters on Parmenides

Our evidence for Parmenides all derives from a single Hexametric poem. As we noted in Chapter 1.1, Parmenides' poem opened with a proem, which narrated the chariot ride of a youth — a kouros — towards a goddess, who acts as the sole speaker for the remainder of the poem. After welcoming the kouros, the goddess describes the programme of study to follow:

And it is right for you to learn all things,
Both the unshaken heart of well-rounded reality,
And the beliefs of mortals, in which there is
no real trust.

These two aspects of the kouros' programme of study correspond to two rather distinct accounts that the goddess proceeds to issue, and to which scholars typically refer as the two parts of Parmenides' poem. In the first part, the goddess expounds the nature of 'what-is' (to eon). We learn that what-is is ungenerated, imperishable, changeless, motionless, unified and homogeneous. The goddess glosses the subject matter of this component of the kouros' programme of study as 'the unshaken heart of reality (alêtheiês)'. We will follow the practice of referring to this part of the poem as 'Alêtheia' (B2-B8.51a). After concluding her account of what-is as ungenerated, changeless, homogeneous, etc., the goddess — surprisingly — proceeds to develop a comprehensive and systematic cosmology, based on the two opposite principles 'Light' and 'Night'. Here the goddess

expounded the origin and nature of the ordered world, of celestial bodies, of gods and humans. This second part of the poem corresponds to the 'beliefs (doxas) of mortals' in the kouros' programme of study. We will follow the standard practice of referring to it as 'Doxa'. By a 'Doxastic thing', I will refer to any item which is characterised by any of the attributes denied to what-is in B8, such as mobility or having-come-into-being, and which theories advanced in Doxa take as their subject matter (e.g. stars, people, embryos). Why this second part is there, and what its status is, are two of the central and most difficult questions with which Parmenides' poem confronts us.

In the first part of the poem, then, Parmenides aligns what-is with *alêtheiê*, and this term is understood as something like ultimate or fundamental reality. The goddess, as we saw, describes the subject matter of the first part as 'the unshaken heart of well-rounded *alêtheiê*' (B 1.29). This gloss both foreshadows the alignment of what-is with *alêtheiê* and already indicates that Parmenides employs the term to signify, not so much a logical property of thought or speech ('truth'), but a core, ultimate or fundamental reality: what-is is the unshaken heart of reality (*alêtheiê*). The goddess's words—I confirm both points:

Here I conclude for you the trustworthy
account and understanding
Concerning true reality.

The goddess here uses *alêtheiê* to refer to the subject matter of her immediately preceding account and contemplation, i.e. to what-is and the properties deduced for it in B8. She does not use this terminology to qualify the account and contemplation themselves as 'true' (although we can allow, as secondary connotations of this terminology, 'truth' and 'what is true' insofar as these typify true accounts of the true nature of ultimate reality). In another indication that he is aligning or even identifying what-is and *alêtheiê*, Parmenides later describes also what-is as 'unshaken', just as he had earlier described the heart of *alêtheiê*.

Since Parmenides himself advertises that *Alêtheia* provides knowledge of 'the heart of reality', and given also the revolutionary nature and subsequent

influence of the ontology of *Alêtheia*, it is unsurprising that commentators have in the past tended to privilege *Alêtheia* while marginalising the poem's other aspects. Much recent work on Parmenides, however, has sought to correct this traditional attitude and to insist on the centrality and significance of Doxa (Chapter 4.1). And indeed, we must recognise the limitations of the tendency to privilege *Alêtheia* at the expense of the poem's other aspects for one who wonders how Parmenides might have recommended his philosophy to his audience as viable. The Epicurean polemicist Colotes contended that Parmenides' ontology left no room for our own lives to take place. Although Plutarch rightly rebukes Colotes for ignoring Parmenides' scientific inquiries (Chapter 4.1), it is difficult to fault Colotes for complaining that Parmenides did not himself clarify just how *Alêtheia*'s account of true reality as homogeneous and unchanging coheres with the heterogeneous multiplicity which surrounds us and which we ourselves comprise (apud Plutarch, *Mor.* 1113-14). We must neither ignore *Alêtheia*'s ontology when considering other aspects of Parmenides' thought nor wholly subject them to it. We should neither marginalise Doxa nor suppress the fact that Parmenides' abiding preoccupation with Doxastic things — whose qualities are incompatible with those which are deduced for 'what-is' (to eon) or 'reality' (*alêtheiê*) — and with beliefs in which, in some sense, there is no 'real trust', is a problem which requires an explanation. Parmenides does not himself affirm, deny or explicate in an express or direct way the consistency between *Alêtheia*'s contention that what-is is homogeneous and unchanging and the presence of its human audience, which comprises differentiated, mortal beings. Even if *Alêtheia* does not, pace Colotes, exclude the presence of its audience, and even if Parmenides never thought otherwise, it seems plausible that the viability of Parmenides' philosophy for such a heterogeneous audience was significantly anchored, as the proem suggests, in the epistemic transformation promised for the mortal subject as related to an encounter with the divine, and not predominantly, let alone exclusively, in the description itself of what-is as homogeneous and unchanging.

The bias that philosophers before Socrates tended to ignore the philosophising subject informed the development of the very category 'pre-Socratic'. In 1996, Anthony Long argued that work on the early Greek philosophers 'has yet to take proper measure of their attention to philosophical methodology, second-order inquiry, mind, and the relation of the knower to the known'. In particular, Long highlights three features of Peripatetic doxography which still exert a strong influence over modern scholarship: 1. the suppression of statements about the divine; the assimilation of thinking or mind to sense-perception (*aisthêsis*); the assumption that early Greek philosophers marginalised second-order, methodological questions and construed their project as describing a world external to themselves which did not include the observer in the materials investigated.⁵ We still have a way to go in redressing the blind spots which Long had diagnosed. The following study of Parmenides will address throughout all three points. It will prove important, however, to maintain a clear distinction between different (though not, of course, unrelated) lines of inquiry and interpretation. When we explore below the epistemological and religious aspects of Parmenides' poem, and attempt to shed some new light through this investigation on the poem's structure and appeal, we will not expect thereby to have disposed of the ontological paradox rightly highlighted by Colotes.

In a way, the question 'how can mortals cognise what-is?' is both inherently paradoxical (at least *prima facie*) and textually justified. As we shall see, the account in *Alêtheia* relies on the distinction — or 'krisis' — between 'is' and 'is not'. It is through a very different kind of crisis that the account in *Doxa* is structured, one between Light and Night as two opposite elements. *Alêtheia*'s concept of what-is cannot be conveyed through the contrast that underpins *Doxa*. The contrast between Light and Night, each of which both is (itself) and is not (its counterpart), may account for stars and embryos, but precisely cannot account for the homogeneous what-is, which strictly is and in no way is not. Equally, *Alêtheia*'s structuring contrast cannot express items like 'mortals'. *Alêtheia*, by privileging exclusively the crisis between 'is' and 'is not' as the

contrast that should inform our understanding of ultimate reality (B8.15-16a), while retaining 'is' and discarding 'is not', points us towards a demarcation that can convey only the homogeneous, unchanging and immobile what-is. Mortals are generated, perishable, mobile and heterogeneous: they are, essentially, *Doxastic* things. The question 'how can mortals cognise what-is?' thus straddles the conceptual frameworks that underpin the two parts of the poem. It is itself inexpressible both in terms of the structuring contrast of *Alêtheia* (which could not by itself articulate the idea of 'mortals') and within that of *Doxa* (which could not articulate 'what-is').

At the same time, it is a question that Parmenides himself raises. The programmatic description of the ensuing poem with which we started (13 .28b-30) takes the form of a conversation between a goddess and, emphatically, a mortal. We could not articulate the notion of a mortal, or the distinction between mortals and a goddess, in terms of *Alêtheia*'s structuring contrast between 'is' and 'is not'. But Parmenides' narrative framework makes it very clear that *Doxastic* opinions are specifically those of mortals B1.30. The goddess, conversely, possesses knowledge of *Alêtheia*. And yet, the mortal agent, to whom the goddess speaks, must also attain this knowledge (B1.29). In a sense, Parmenides could hardly avoid asking how a mortal could cognise what-is. He could not have formulated his second-order, programmatic reflections from within the conceptual framework of *Alêtheia*'s contrast between 'is' and 'is not'. Within this conceptual framework, which is capable only of articulating the homogeneous what-is and (perhaps) its self-knowledge, we can no longer discuss the efforts of mortal agents, like Parmenides and ourselves, to come to know this thing.

Unless we maintain either that there is not even a *prima facie* tension between *Alêtheia*'s account of ultimate reality and the manifest presence of *Doxastic* things or that *Doxastic* things can be coherently explained away as 'illusions' (I will reject both of those positions), we must recognise that *Alêtheia*'s ontology does confront us with a puzzle concerning the precise ontological status of *Doxastic* things. This does not mean, however, that any inquiry into any aspect of the relation between

the two parts of Parmenides' poem will have to begin from this puzzle, frame its interpretation around it or rely on any one particular resolution of it.

We may distinguish three different questions concerning the two parts of Parmenides' poem. First, an 'aetiological question': Why did Parmenides write and include Doxa? Why is the second part there? Second, an 'epistemological question': what are the ways in which the mortal agent, to whom the goddess speaks, can think and what are the ways in which he must think? To clarify, Alêtheia and Doxa discuss different kinds of objects, what-is and Doxastic things (humans, stars, etc.) respectively. Since Parmenides included both parts, he must consider thoughts about both kinds of objects ultimately possible for the mortal agent. But is thought concerning any kind of object unavoidably necessary for the mortal? Does the mortal's ability to cognise a different kind of object then become a problem which requires an explanation? Third, an 'ontological question': given the doctrine of Alêtheia, what precisely is the status of Doxastic things? What is the nature of the relation between what-is and Doxastic things?

Those commentators who address the aetiological question generally consider one's view on it a consequence of one's view on the ontological question (Chapter 4.1). In the following chapters, we will explore a different route with a different focus, addressing first and foremost the aetiological and epistemological questions in relation to one another. We will consider as interrelated matters Parmenides' impetus and rationale for developing and including Doxa, his conception of the mortal epistemic agent in relation both to the investigations in Doxa and to those in Alêtheia, and the role of the relation between mortal and divine in his poem. In this way, we will pursue a complementary but different perspective on the problem of the relation between the two parts of Parmenides' poem. This is not to suggest, of course, that considerations of Alêtheia's account of what-is — or 'the heart of reality' — should or could be ignored when pursuing either the epistemological or the aetiological questions. My suggestion will be, rather, that we can usefully elucidate and investigate those questions in relation

to one another, while postponing a focused discussion of what I labelled the 'ontological question' until a later stage in the argument, and while insisting only on certain limited but important points in relation to this latter question and otherwise retaining a, to some degree, open-ended and flexible attitude towards it.

In Chapter 4, we will see that, according to Parmenides, the type of thinking which underpins Doxa is an ineluctable and even appropriate aspect of mortal life. This conclusion will best position us to answer the aetiological question and explain why Parmenides wrote and included Doxa. In Chapter 5, however, we will find that the mortal agent is nonetheless capable of sustaining the qualitatively different thinking of Alêtheia by momentarily coming to think with — or as — his divine (fiery, aethereal) soul.

This will explain how Parmenides was also able to sustain the non-mortal, divine thought, which underpins Alêtheia, and to come to understand what-is. In Chapter 5.5, we will return, in the light of those foregoing discussions, to the 'ontological question'.

It is Parmenides' goddess who, through her disclosure and guidance, enables the mortal kourous to come to think with or as his divine soul, and to sustain a higher-than-human, divine thought. In 1945, Louis Gernet offered an important insight, which has often been obscured in later scholarship: a broad spectrum extends between taking Parmenides to offer the 'literal' report of an actual chariot ride to a goddess and reducing his account to 'mere imagery', divested of any reference to an encounter with the divine. What follows will aim to elucidate the sense in which Parmenides' postulation of an epistemically significant interaction with a divine power (but not thereby an actual chariot ride) is integral to his understanding of his acquisition of knowledge and required by his epistemology. On the interpretation defended below, argumentative reasoning and divine disclosure play complementary and equally indispensable roles in Parmenides' thought."

[Plotinus](#) by Eyjólfur K. Emilsson [The Routledge Philosophers, Routledge, 9780415333498]

Reviewed by Luc Brisson, Centre Jean Pépin (CNRS)

Overall, this work constitutes a general introduction to Plotinus that is pleasant to read and very well informed, by a specialist who has written a great deal on Plotinus. In particular, he is the author of a book on sense perception (1988) and another on the intellect (2007); while with Stephen Strange, he has translated *Ennead VI, 4 and VI, 5, On the Presence of Being, One and the Same, Everywhere as a Whole* (2015). After a chronology and a brief introduction, the book contains eleven chapters, dealing with the philosophical topics of intellect, soul, physical world, human being, and ethics. There are also chapters giving background on Plotinus's life, works, and legacy.

The exposition is clear, the argumentation rigorous, and no important Plotinian passage has been overlooked. This makes the book an invaluable resource. At the end of each chapter, there is a summary of the chapter and a list of the primary and secondary sources relevant to it. The book ends with a glossary, a bibliography and a general index. I would add two critical remarks at this juncture. First, one would have liked to have the benefit of an index of passages cited. Second, the bibliography is highly selective, including, for the most part, only titles in English: some indication could have been given of the bibliographical work of Richard Dufour, which continues to be available for free on the internet. [Dufour's bibliography](#) cites books and articles in other languages, representing other exegetical cultures. Moreover, the only French translation cited is the one by Bréhier (1924-1938), although a translation under the direction of myself and J.F. Pradeau, which takes international scholarship into account, has recently been published (2002-2010). Finally, the remarkable Spanish translation by Jesús Igal (1982-1998) is not cited either.

Despite these undeniable scientific and pedagogical merits, I will take the opportunity to make a few critical remarks concerning some of its interpretative presuppositions.

The first concerns the reticence adopted toward the *Life of Plotinus* by Porphyry. To be sure, this text, which, preceded by a portrait, was to have been placed at the beginning of Porphyry's edition of the *Enneads*, is of course a hagiography, for Plotinus is presented as a master who practices all the virtues perfectly, a kind of incarnate intellect. Nevertheless, it contains much critical information,

especially concerning the production of the treatises and their "editing" by Porphyry. One is surprised to find no indication of the treatise's chronological order in the references to the passages cited: a mention of the date of composition of a treatise often enables us to better understand its contents, and, above all, its links to other treatises. We also find practically nothing on Plotinus as an author: his difficulties in expression, his composition techniques, the poor quality of his grammar. The importance of his comparisons, images, and metaphors should have been mentioned, since these allow him to make extraordinary pronouncements on the three "hypostases" that are admirably well-suited and deeply beautiful.

Above all, there is no discussion of the dialogue form of most of the treatises. These treatises reflected the atmosphere of Plotinus' classes. As Porphyry explains in chapters 13-14 of the *Life*, Plotinus had commentaries read to him, which he took up and developed, then the auditors asked questions. These questions are often objections that cannot be integrated as such within the development of the argument. This is why it is dangerous not to take the dialogue form into account, and even to speak of an *imaginary objector* (*Plotinus*, p. 310); moreover, the text itself contains signs indicating the shift from one interlocutor to another. Plotinus is no professor lecturing in a modern university classroom; his treatises are not systematic writings, but dialogues with more or less friendly auditors who defend viewpoints that could be very different, for instance the Gnostics (*Life of Plotinus*, chapter 16) and even Porphyry (*Life of Plotinus*, chapter 4).

What is more, Emilsson ignores Plotinus' links to the emperors Gordianus and especially Gallienus, with the senators who came to listen to him, and even his project for founding a Platonopolis (*Life of Plotinus*, chapter 12). Unlike Plato, who wished to transform his city as a function of his political ideas, Plotinus knew that his room for maneuver was extremely limited. The result was a considerable gap between theory and practice. This is why, despite what may have been said, one finds almost no theoretical considerations on politics in Plotinus, who discouraged the members of the Senate from pursuing their careers. It is also very hard to understand Plotinus' attitude to traditional religion, astrology and divination in Treatise 3 (III, 1) On

Destiny, Treatise 15 (III,4) *On Our Allotted Guardian Spirit*, and Treatises 47 et 48 (II, 2 and 3 *On Providence*), without referring to chapters 10, 22 and 23 of the *Life of Plotinus*.

Finally, the section on Theodicy and Freedom is quite brief, and fails to take into account Plotinus' attitude to traditional religions, astrology, and above all the intense polemics against the Gnostics (Treatise 31 (V, 8) *On the Intelligible Beauty*; Treatise 33 (II, 9) *Against the Gnostics*). An entire section of Plotinus' thought must be situated in relation to his material and intellectual environment.

The Intellect, which emanates from the One, contains the Forms (*eide*) that are present in the Soul in the mode of "reasons), the Forms, and consequently the *logoi*, exist, live, and think. This explains in what sense Plotinus, like the Stoics, is a global vitalist. Everything in nature is alive: human beings, animals, plants, and even minerals. This generalized presence of the soul in the world explains "universal sympathy" and providence. In this perspective, one cannot accept Emilsson's affirmation that:

In addition to the original paradigmatic Ideas or Forms in Intellect, there are forms in souls and even forms in matter (enmattered forms). The latter are the sensible features of bodies, such as colors and shapes, whereas the forms in souls are concepts or rational formulas. These forms are descendants of the original Forms and may even be said to be the ideas at a lower stage of ontological derivation.

All these distinctions are superfluous. It is always the same forms that can be found in different modes at every level; the goal is to show that everything in the sensible world, except matter, is permeated by the intelligible. It must be admitted that the *logoi* or forms that are present in matter (*enule eide*) have being, life and thought, and it is these same forms that sensation extracts from matter to turn them into representations that will be referred to the Forms in the Intellect, from which the *logoi* derive. Finally, one cannot maintain that "the sensible object as such is just a conglomeration of qualities in matter. There is nothing substantial about the conglomerate as such, which has no independent existence." (Plotinus, p. 224). Such an affirmation may be true in the context of an interpretation of Aristotelian

categories, but not in Plotinus, as we can observe by re-reading Treatise 42, *On the Kinds of Being* (Enn. VI 1), where, as I tried to show (Plotin, *Traité*s 27-29, 2005) the categories cannot be reduced to their linguistic and logical dimension, but must be understood in relation to the *logoi*. Finally, and above all, in the vast majority of its occurrences, the term *ousia* refers to true reality, or the Forms. In this perspective, sensible things, which are, in their own way, living beings, cannot be assimilated to an inert conglomerate of qualities (several treatises deal with these questions, but once can find a critical synthesis in Treatises 27-28 (Enn. IV 3 and 4 *On Difficulties about the Soul*).

Let us return to the soul's wanderings. The human soul descends from the region of the intelligible, where part of it remains, into the sensible, first providing itself with a "pneumatic vehicle", before entering an embryo that will become a human being. In addition, Plotinus accepts the doctrine of retribution, which implies metempsychosis, as we can see from a passage from Treatise 53, Ennead I, 1, 11, 5-16. The translation of this passage that is cited (Plotinus, p. 283) does not take the dialogue form into account. Above all, the formula "as is said" does not imply a restriction, but refers to Plato (*Phaedrus* 249b and *Timaeus* 42b-d), as is noted by J.F. Pradeau in a note to his translation of Treatise 53. It is the doctrine of metempsychosis that explains why Plotinus was a vegetarian, why he recommended to the members of his circle that they also practice vegetarianism, and why he even refused medicines based on animal substances (*Life of Plotinus* 2 and 7). This subject should not be passed over.

Treatise 19, *On Virtues* (Enn. I 2) is followed by Treatise 20, *On Dialectic* (Enn. I 3), as was quite natural for a Platonist. Plotinus does not oppose the various ethical doctrines in vogue at his time to one another, but establishes a hierarchy among them, by redefining the cardinal virtues of Plato's *Republic*: moderation, courage, wisdom, and justice, at each level. In this perspective, the contemplative virtues, which have dialectic as their instrument, are placed at the very top of the list, for they enable assimilation to the divine through knowledge. However, this dominant position does not make the sage a hermit, or a philosophy professor who never leaves his classroom or his office. The sage has bodily needs (food, sexuality, etc.), and may suffer from physical or psychic ailments. This is why he

must also practice the purificatory virtues, which consist in detaching oneself from the affections coming from the body and thus allow him to practice the contemplation of the intelligible. Moreover, he must not neglect the civic virtues, which promote moderation, and make for a peaceful life in common. This is why it is odd, to say the least, to devote an entire section (pp. 325-330) to the ethics of everyday life, and to write:

Discussing Plotinus' ethics through the lenses of contemporary ethical theory or ethical beliefs can easily lead one astray and block understanding. It is commonly assumed that ethics is essentially about preserving and promoting the good of others and hence about holding partiality and egoism in check. Though incorporating other regarding norms in various ways, ancient ethics does not generally make these assumptions about the nature of ethics. It is even more important to note this in Plotinus' case than in most others. Yet, it is perfectly fair to ask if we find the Plotinian sage palatable. Is he, for instance, an egoist? (pp. 325-326)

The sage described in *Treatise 46 On Happiness* (Enn. I 4) is a human being who must face the necessities of life and who lives and moves within society. In the *Life of Plotinus*, we see a Plotinus who concerns himself with the orphans he has taken in, and who serves as an arbiter in disputes between the citizens: it is hard to turn him into an egoist who lacks compassions.

Finally, the first section of chapter 10, on Mystical Experience, remains problematic. In Plotinus and in Porphyry, the term "mystical" itself designates a kind of interpretation of myths (which Plotinus practiced, as has been admirably shown by Pierre Hadot (on Narcissus, 1976; on Ouranus, Kronos and Zeus 1981) and by J. Pépin (on Herakles, 1969; on Dionysus 1972), a practice which is not discussed in this book), and it does not correspond at all to the two definitions of "mysticism" given in the Oxford dictionary, which have meaning only in a Christian context. For Plotinus, the soul's unification with the One is a modified state of consciousness brought about by intense intellectual concentration. This kind of modified state of consciousness has nothing to do with religion, for it can be triggered by fear, pleasure, and even alcohol and drugs (Michel Hulin,

La mystique sauvage, 2008). The soul that practices the virtues, and especially the contemplative virtues, is momentarily identified with the Intellect which, for its part, becomes identified with the One. Here we see a perfect coherence between *Treatises 19* (Enn. I, 2), *On Virtues*, 20 (Enn. I, 3) *On Dialectic* and 38 *How the Multitude of the Forms Came into Being* and *On the Good* (Enn. VI 7). In short, for Plotinus, who remains a man of flesh and blood immersed within Roman society, philosophy is not a university discipline: it is a way of life, as Pierre Hadot (2002) reminded us. This reminder suffices to challenge the validity of an approach focused on conceptual speculation.

As far as posterity is concerned, there should have been some discussion of the criticism by Iamblichus and later Neoplatonists of the doctrine that a part of the soul remains in the Intelligible. The rejection of this doctrinal point led to the development of the levels of virtues, whose history is described by Marinus in his *Life of Proclus*.

As I said at the outset, this book is impeccable from a material, pedagogical, and academic viewpoint. However, it describes a Plotinus with the features of a contemporary philosophy professor living and working in a high-level university. He is an intellectual, interested essentially in epistemology and ethics, in their anthropological, cognitive, and logical dimensions. This book provides an image of Plotinus that corresponds to the standard modern interpretation, in line with neo-Kantianism, a trend that has these two characteristics: it gives priority to a subject that constitutes its object, whereas in Antiquity, it was the object that had priority; and it promulgates universal formal moral rules that are very different from those that sanctioned behavior in ancient societies, which were marked by particularism. Such an approach is not questionable in itself, but it is reductionist. It must be repeated: for Plotinus, philosophy is a way of life. What is more, Platonic thought in general cannot be reduced to a theoretical superstructure without relation to what is real, for it was in order to account for the human being's ability to act in the sensible world, to think about it, and to talk about it that Plato and his followers were led to speak of the Soul, the Intellect, and even of the One.

This is an important book that brings to the surface the merits and the weaknesses of an interpretation that is tending to become standard in a context in

which philosophy is no longer a way of life, but a university discipline. <>

[Plato and Plotinus on mysticism, epistemology, and ethics](#) by David J. Yount [Bloomsbury studies in ancient philosophy, Bloomsbury Academic, 9781474298421]

This book argues against the common view that there are no essential differences between Plato and the Neoplatonist philosopher, Plotinus, on the issues of mysticism, epistemology, and ethics. Beginning by examining the ways in which Plato and Plotinus claim that it is possible to have an ultimate experience that answers the most significant philosophical questions, David J. Yount provides an extended analysis of why we should interpret both philosophers as mystics. The book then moves on to demonstrate that both philosophers share a belief in nondiscursive knowledge and the methods to attain it, including dialectic and recollection, and shows that they do not essentially differ on any significant views on ethics. Making extensive use of primary and secondary sources, *Plato and Plotinus on Mysticism, Epistemology and Ethics* shows the similarities between the thought of these two philosophers on a variety of philosophical questions, such as meditation, divination, wisdom, knowledge, truth, happiness and love.

[Philo's Heirs: Moses Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas](#) by Luis Cortes [Academic Studies Press, 9781618116307]

The central claim of this book is that Philo of Alexandria's philosophical method served as the model for the philosophical works of Moses Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas. Moses Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas stand as two pillars in the history of religious philosophy. In their respective religious communities, each philosopher is considered the great master who expressed the doctrine of the religious tradition in philosophical terms. One of the most important points established in this book is that both thinkers inherited a set of standard philosophical topics (divine attributes, creation ex nihilo, divine providence, etc.) which were first developed as philosophical/religious questions by Philo. In effect, Philo's philosophical

method shaped the history of Western philosophy until the late seventeenth century.

It was the great Harry Austryn Wolfson who first argued that Philo Judaeus (ca. 20 BC—ca. 50 AD) had established the foundational model that subsequent religious philosophers would imitate in the three monotheistic traditions. In his monumental study of Philo, Wolfson concluded that Philo had added a new dimension to Greek philosophy when he utilized its principles to analyze scripture. In so doing, Philo created a new kind of religious philosophy that would serve as the standard for seventeen centuries:

This fundamental departure from pagan Greek philosophy ... appears first in Hellenistic Judaism, where it attains its systematic formulation in Philo. Philo is the founder of this new school of philosophy, and from him it directly passes on to the Gospel of St. John and the Church Fathers, from whom it passes on to Moslem and hence also to mediaeval Jewish philosophy. Philo is the direct or indirect source of this type of philosophy which continues uninterruptedly in its main assertions for well-nigh seventeen centuries, when at last it is openly challenged by Spinoza.

This bold claim, though accepted by many scholars in Wolfson's time, has been challenged by Philo scholars in recent years. David T Runia, one of the most important contributors to our knowledge of Philo and his legacy, has been very critical of Wolfson's methodology. Runia has also described Wolfson's view of the history of philosophy as "Judaean-centric" since Wolfson believed that Philo and Baruch Spinoza served as two "turning-points" in the history of philosophy. While it is true that Wolfson was especially interested in describing the philosophical contributions of these two Jewish thinkers, his general claim concerning Philo's method and its impact on religious philosophers, as well as his thesis that Spinoza's philosophy represents a radical break with the past, are views that many contemporary scholars still accept. Indeed, it would be hard to argue that Philo and Spinoza are not "turning-points" in the history of philosophy if one understands Philo's role in the transformation of religious philosophy and is willing to acknowledge

the fact that Spinoza must be regarded as one of the most important thinkers in the cultural shift from the early modern period to the Enlightenment.

Even if one disagrees with Runia, however, Runia and others have provided much-needed clarification on the question of Philo's influence on subsequent philosophers and theologians. In some ways, the work of these scholars helps fill in the gaps left by the broad strokes painted by Wolfson. While Wolfson was firmly convinced that Philo's philosophical approach would guide philosophers up to the time of Spinoza, he spent less time tracking down the indirect and often obscure references to Philo found throughout the Middle Ages. If we examine Runia's careful remarks about Philo's medieval legacy, we get a good idea of the difference between the scholarly approaches of Runia and Wolfson:

Throughout this period Philo was considered the author of one of the semi-canonical books of the Bible. As we saw in our account of the survival of Philo's writings, during the Middle Ages a slender liber Philonis was in circulation, containing the notice on Philo from Jerome's *De viris illustribus*, the Pseudo-Philonian *Liber antiquitatum*, and the Old Latin translation of *Quaestiones in Genesim IV* and *De vita contemplativa*. The history of this manuscript tradition has been traced with a fair degree of probability to the Abbey of St. Riquier in Western France, where it is mentioned in a catalogue dated 831. No doubt it was brought there by the founder of the Abbey in 790, Angilbert, who made three journeys to Italy and gave 200 mss. to the Library of the Abbey.

Obviously, from the evidence presented here by Runia, it is clear that Philo, as an author, was known by at least some writers in the Middle Ages. If Wolfson was known as a bold scholar, who sought most of all a comprehensive and convincing interpretation of the history of philosophy, Runia must be considered a very meticulous and careful scholar by modern standards. Runia finds the records and connects authors by time and place. Wolfson was especially concerned with the survival of ideas. The central claim of this book is that Philo's philosophical method survived at least into the High Middle Ages. I argue that Moses

Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas were both intellectual heirs of Philo. Although Philo is almost never mentioned by name by either philosopher, both follow a path that was first cleared by Philo in Alexandria.

Thomas Aquinas and Moses Maimonides stand as two giants in the history of religious philosophy. In their respective religious communities, both are considered great masters who expressed the doctrine of their religious tradition in philosophical terms. Though both teachers lived in different places at different times, their philosophical projects were in some ways quite similar. Indeed, both thinkers were convinced that the most profound religious truths could be expressed philosophically without compromising the content. The philosophical vocabularies of both masters are strikingly similar since both utilize principles derived from medieval forms of Aristotelianism. Moses Maimonides, who died in 1204, wrote his most important philosophical text, the *Guide for the Perplexed*, in Arabic because, even though he was a Jew, he was born and lived in a cultural world shaped by the great Islamic thinkers. That tradition itself had inherited many of the most important ideas from Greek, Roman, and Hellenistic philosophy. Thomas Aquinas, who died in 1274, adopted a Christianized form of Aristotelian philosophy shaped by Neoplatonic incursions. Aquinas developed his system within the context of the medieval European university curriculum, where, long before his time, philosophy had been studied by the masters of theology. Although many important sources can be identified in his works, his own teacher, Albertus Magnus (ca. 1200-1280), a key figure in the reception of the works of Aristotle in the Christian West, should be considered of primary importance. Thomas wrote his works in Latin, the language of philosophy in those same universities. His readership included students and masters of theology from the religious orders of his day. The subject of the present book, the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and Moses Maimonides as understood within the tradition first established by Philo, must also include a very brief examination of the history of philosophy in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic thought before the time of these two great teachers. This is so because neither

Maimonides nor Aquinas created their respective philosophical systems ex nihilo. One of the most important points I wish to show in this book is that both of these thinkers, even though they belonged to different traditions, inherited a list of standard philosophical topics. I argue that these topics (divine attributes, creation ex nihilo, divine providence, etc.) were first developed as philosophical/religious questions by Philo. Philo was the first major philosopher to utilize the language and methods of philosophy to examine the truths established by revealed religion. Even though Philo was a Jew, his philosophical approach was quickly adopted by Christian writers in Alexandria. These same writers (in particular, Clement of Alexandria and Origen) would become the first great philosophical theologians in the history of the Christian church. Whether it is true that Philo had little impact on subsequent Jewish thinkers (as so many scholars believe), his influence on Christian thought was vast. In effect, he taught Christian writers how to read allegorically and how to use the language and methods of philosophy to explicate Christian doctrine. In this book, I have called both Moses Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas "heirs of Philo." It would be overstating the case to call these two thinkers direct heirs since neither quotes directly from any of Philo's works. What both philosophers inherit from Philo indirectly is a method, a way of doing philosophy, and a list of the most important questions that religious philosophers must address. Maimonides inherited this method and these questions from his Islamic predecessors; Aquinas inherited the same method and questions from the Christian philosophers who came before him and from Maimonides.

One of the most important points reiterated in this book is that Philo of Alexandria changed forever the course of religious philosophy. After Philo, the writers coming to philosophy from the three great monotheistic traditions followed the model he established. In this sense, Philo is not just one of the many important philosophers whose work has survived from the classical period; he is, rather, the thinker who established the philosophical model and prepared the syllabus of key issues that would be addressed by subsequent philosophical theists for over 1500 years after his death. This is

precisely the claim first made by Harry A. Wolfson so many years ago. As we saw early in this study, philosophers had written about God and things divine long before the time of Philo, but when Philo used the language and principles of Greek philosophy to examine revealed religion, he transformed philosophy.

In a recent article, Dragos Giulea has described this change brought about by Philo as the beginning of the "noetic turn" in Jewish thought. Giulea explains this notion as follows:

Arguably one of the most important paradigm shifts of late antiquity, if not the most important in terms of theological vocabulary and conceptual instruments, the noetic turn denotes the translation of the ontological and epistemological categories of the apocalyptic discourse into noetic categories.

This great shift in philosophical discourse is also at the very core of the transition from ancient prophetic writings to the theological treatises of the early church fathers. But, as Giulea points out, this change is initiated by a Jew: "It is, however, in Philo of Alexandria in the first century C.E., that we find for the first time a coherently developed noetic ontology and a noetic epistemology." Giulea then describes exactly what constitutes this profound change:

As in certain biblical passages and the apocalyptic literature, Philo still maintains heaven as the preeminent geography of divine indwelling. The human being who intends to reach that realm has to ascend to those heights (Leg. 1.1). Nevertheless, in what concerns the access to that realm and the access to God, Philo advances a clearly innovative method: the noetic perception, the noesis. While still conceiving of ascension as the favored method of accessing God, Philo alters the nature of this ascension. Instead of transportation to heaven, dream vision or other methods, he has the intellect perform the ascent.

In effect, when Philo described this new way of accessing God, utilizing philosophical principles, he created the science that in Christian circles would later be called natural theology. Thomas Aquinas

describes the components of this science in the first question of the *Summa Theologiae*. It is one of the great ironies of intellectual history that this same science, called by Christians the "Queen of the Sciences" for centuries, was first developed by a Jew in Alexandria.

The key issues examined in this book in the works of Moses Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas (divine attributes, natural law, divine providence, creation, and prophecy) were all subjects addressed by Philo. In other words, Philo's method and approach to philosophy and the subjects he chose to consider were still the standard models for medieval Christian writers (in both East and West) and medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophers during the High Middle Ages. Maimonides and Aquinas may never have had any direct knowledge of the works of Philo, but both can be called his heirs. Although much more work needs to be done on the legacy of Philo, our conclusion from this examination of texts confirms in a general way Harry Wolfson's thesis concerning Philo's crucial role in the history of Western philosophy.

[Maximus the Confessor as a European Philosopher](#) edited by Sotiris Mitralaxis, Georgios Steiris, Marcin Podbielski, & Sebastian Lalla [Veritas Series, Cascade Books, 9781498295581]

The study of Maximus the Confessor's thought has flourished in recent years: international conferences, publications and articles, new critical editions and translations mark a torrent of interest in the work and influence of perhaps the most sublime of the Byzantine Church Fathers. It has been repeatedly stated that the Confessor's thought is of eminently philosophical interest. However, no dedicated collective scholarly engagement with Maximus the Confessor as a philosopher has taken place – and Maximus the Confessor as a European Philosopher attempts to start such a discussion.

The international colloquium entitled "Maximus the Confessor as a European Philosopher," which took place at the Freie Universität Berlin's Institute of Philosophy in September 2014, formed the basis of Maximus the Confessor as a European Philosopher – which, however, has since been enriched with further studies relevant to its research focus.

Editors include Sotiris Mitralaxis, Georgios Steiris, Marcin Podbielski, and Sebastian Lalla. Sotiris Mitralaxis is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the City University of Istanbul and Visiting Research Fellow at the University of Winchester. Georgios Steiris is Assistant Professor of Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. Marcin Podbielski is Editor-in-Chief of *Forum Philosophicum*, an international journal for philosophy, and teaches philosophy at the Jesuit University Ignatianum in Cracow, Poland. Sebastian Lalla is Assistant Professor (Privatdozent) at the Freie Universität Berlin's Institute of Philosophy and Guest Professor of Philosophy at the National University of Mongolia. The volume has 21 contributors.

The book is comprised of four parts: (1) First Philosophy: Ontology/ Metaphysics, (2) Epistemology: Knowledge, Apophaticism, and Language, (3) Anthropology: Human Nature, Ethics, and the Will, and (4) Maximus in Dialogue: From Antiquity to Contemporary Thought.

The first part begins with Dionysios Skliris' article. This acts as an introduction to Maximus the Confessor as a European Philosopher, explaining in which way Maximus the Confessor is to be considered as a European philosopher, or rather as a philosopher that provides alternatives to basic tenets of his Western contemporaries as well as to later developments in European philosophy. Following this introduction, Torstein Tollefsen focuses on the relationship of 'whole' and 'part' in Maximus the Confessor's metaphysics, forming a distinct 'Maximian holomerism' on the basis of the notion of the λόγος. Fr. John Panteleimon Manoussakis proceeds to focus on Maximus' understanding of metaphysical motion (κίνησις) with reference to Anaxagoras and Kierkegaard – and, indirectly, Origen. In the next chapter, Smilen Markov studies the importance of relation in Maximus' ontology, and particularly in the relationship between creation and the uncreated in the context of history. The part returns to the theory of motion in the last two chapters of the volume's first part, proposing that Maximus' understanding of motion is both a continuation and a radical renewal of Aristotle's

theory of motion in the context of an ontology that is markedly different from Aristotle's.

The second part of Maximus the Confessor as a European Philosopher, "Epistemology: Knowledge, Apophaticism, and Language," opens with Fr. Maximos Conostas' account of the nature of language in Maximus' thought (with reference to Gregory of Nyssa). This is followed by Jordan Daniel Wood's article on the dialectics of apophaticism and incarnation, unknowability and knowledge, hypostasis and transcendence. Michael Harrington proceeds to focus on Maximus' *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* as a precursor to scientific objectivity through the notion of natural contemplation and its comparison to Pierre Hadot's philosophy. After this chapter on Maximus' positive epistemology, the book once again returns to his negative epistemology with Natalie Depraz's treatment of Maximus' theo-phenomenology of negation, in which apophaticism is contrasted to negative theology.

The third part, titled "Anthropology: Human Nature, Ethics and the Will," begins with a 'bridge' between theological ontology and (its consequences and implications for) anthropology. This is followed by Georgi Kapriev's paper, in which he expounds the basic tenets of Maximus the Confessor's anthropology in comparison to contemporary anthropological inquiry and proceeds to propose that readers may find the seeds for solutions to certain contemporary philosophical problems in Maximus' works. Marcin Podbielski provides readers with a close textual approach to the meaning of *Πρόσωπον*, a key Maximian term. Karolina Kochanczyk-Boninska studies Maximus' understanding of sexual differentiation, of the distinction – and division – of the sexes in the case of human beings and of its philosophical preconditions.

The final part of Maximus the Confessor as a European Philosopher, "Maximus in Dialogue: From Antiquity to Contemporary Thought," is dedicated to discussions of the Confessor's philosophy in comparison to other philosophers and currents of thought, be they Maximus' predecessors, Maximus' contemporaries, or philosophers that appeared later in history.

This groundbreaking volume correctly identifies an odious convention in the division of disciplines: while major thinkers such as Augustine or Aquinas self-evidently make their way into being part of philosophy's legacy, equally major thinkers that are categorized as religious' are exiled to the hermetically sealed domain of theology, even if their contribution to classical philosophical problems is unique, pertinent, and most fecund. The book at hand delivers on its promise of reclaiming Maximus the Confessor for philosophy and of recognizing his oeuvre as a critical contribution to its history; as such, it is one of those endeavors that contribute to nothing less than a paradigm change. – Grigory Benevich, The Russian Christian Academy for the Humanities

... From metaphysics to theological anthropology, from apophaticism to ethics, this collection is a fine contribution to the expanding research on Maximus and will further generate interest in the Confessor among historical theologians, philosophers, and scholars from a wide variety of disciplines. – Paul M. Blowers, Emmanuel Christian Seminary at Milligan College

Maximus the Confessor as a European Philosopher is a fine contribution continuing the revival of interest in Maximus as a philosopher and challenging our understanding of what European philosophy is. <>

[Theorizing the Dream. Knowledge and Theories of the Dream](#) edited by Bernard Dieterie, Manfred Engel [Konigshausen & Neumann, 9783826064432]

An important part of age-old human attempts to cope with the otherness of the dream is the so-called >dream-discourse<, which tries to explain the origin of dreams, their bizarre appearance, their functions, and the methods for detecting the information which they may contain. This collection of essays will reconstruct dream-discourses from many cultures and time periods, together with the dream knowledge of important literary authors. The scope of the contributions ranges geographically from India, China, and Korea to diverse European countries and historically from Antiquity to the present, including studies on Gaudapāda, Confucius, Hō Kyun, Ji Yun, Song

Chewon, Homer, Aristotle, Cicero, Artemidorus, Augustine of Hippo, Hildegard of Bingen, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Béroalde de Verville, Athanasius Kircher, Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Novalis, Schubert, Troxler, Carus, Novalis, E.T.A. Hoffmann, Nodier, Nerval, Victor Hugo, Serrurier, Moreau de la Sarthe, Maury, Hervey de Saint-Denys, Baudelaire, Lautréamont, Freud, Jung, Proust, Joyce, Kafka, Marinetti, Tzara, Breton, representatives of current empirical dream research and many other dream theoreticians.

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The Authors

Excerpt: After a first volume devoted to the modes of writing of the Dream (Writing the Dream /write the Dream, 2016), we are pleased to be able to present a second collective work, from the conferences of the Congress organized by our research committee 'Iaca at the University of Haute-Alsace in September 2015. This time it is devoted to the theoretical aspects of dreamlike activity, always in a comparative perspective.

The title of our book is not symmetrical, we have indeed translated "Theorizing the Dream "By" The knowledge and theories of the dream "instead of using phrases like < theorize the Dream > or < The theorization of the dream, because the French duplicate allows us to put the finger on an important problem from the outset: when can we Talk about a real < > > Theory of the dream? It has developed at all times of the dream speeches that pave paths to the general explanation of the Onanism, strive to detect the secret law of a phenomenon that escapes the immediate observation, and whose meaning — if meaning there is — is for the Less difficult to fix. These multiple and always renewed efforts of Explication (from mythology to neuroscience) sometimes, but not necessarily, lead to a < theory, that is, the establishment of general laws and concepts allowing To understand this nocturnal experience by modeling it and integrating it into all the experiences of the human being (of its subjectivity, of its body, of its contact with a hereafter, etc.).

These attempts emphasize, depending on the case, the source or origin of the dream, its mode of appearance, its functioning, its function, the use that can be made of it through interpretation, the possible knowledge that they convey (on the future, on the Dreamer himself, his health, etc.). This often leads to classifications, i.e. differentiations (often hierarchical).

With the exception perhaps of that of Freud, which is the most elaborate (as a constituent part of the conceptual edifice of psychoanalysis), A theory of the dream does not integrate all aspects abovementioned. Thus Alfred Maury (1817-1892) says in his book about Sleep and Dreams (1865), after asserting to be on "the way of the true Theory of Dreams": "By studying the dreams and the sleep that brought them, I have scarcely sought the law according to which They happen, the circumstances to which they relate. 2 It shows only a modest sight, without hermeneutic pretension; He is content with the interest in the dreamlike mechanism, for the activity of the spirit during sleep. This positivist attitude, which coincides with the attempts of scientific theorizations of the dream, is typical For the proponents of experimental psychology who are in search of sensory determinism and patent causality, of which the law can be discovered through simulations. ' Maury is a private ohnologue; Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), he founded at about the same time an "Institute of Experimental Psychology" at the University of Leipzig in 1879, desiring to examine the dreamlike activity on bases modelled on the criteria of the natural sciences, with a Research carried out in the laboratory or in a situation similar to that of the laboratory, i.e. allowing methodical questions in conditions guaranteeing a certain objectivity.

This work marks a qualitative leap towards theoretical scientificity, but focuses on a possible impact of the immediate reality on the dreamlike experience, on correspondences between sensory stimuli (external and internal) and images Dreamlike (a sensation of cold triggering a winter imaginary, a painful digestion causing a scenario with a tormented body). We Work In the <positif>, trusts the experimentation, approaches the dream in a systematic way and tries to extend the knowledge by the accumulation of the data. A

significant step is the development of questionnaires and statistics, two methods of investigation that trust the large number while resting (as in clinical or laboratory observation) on the distinction between investigator and Dreamers. To interrogate the dream, it is then to question the most Dreamers Possible. This broad consideration of cases plays an important role, and Freud, who has (like many others) begun by examining his own nocturnal experience, has quickly broadened his corpus to the dreams of his patients, but also to the dreams of fiction and especially — this is a demanding Garrison Scientific Foundation — to the corpus provided by the extensive research devoted to the subject. In the wake of experimental psychology, but with of course sophisticated technical means (which led in 1953 to the discovery of paradoxical sleep, i.e. REM sleep) and systematic survey methods, neurobiology develops Theories that focus mainly on the dreamlike functioning analyzed in close relation to that of sleep. Here too, dreamers are questioned in a systematic way, but there is little concern about interpretation issues, whereas the majority of traditional approaches have a distinct hermeneutical inclination.

A <savoir> consists of erecting a phenomenon in the subject of knowledge through its observation on the spot or on the basis of documents. For the dream, this work is done through written notation (the iconographic captures are quite rare) and by the creation of collections (archives or anthologies). Collecting in the most basic sense simply means: gathering, collecting samples for examination. To note one's own dreams or those of others is the seminal gesture that denotes a willingness to know, it is a first objection, that is to say both a consideration and a making available. The notation allows the creation of a corpus indispensable for the configuration of a knowledge and the elaboration of a theory understood as a coherent set of explanatory assertions.

A theory thus conceived would be inseparable from a science of dream, which would be able to formulate reports of cause and effect, to identify a determinism, to erect a general law. This is what Freud did in a strong way with his assertion of desire (or of the Wish — der Wunsch) as the

source of any dreamlike production, this law does not tolerate any derogation. Identify the wish that underlies it, it is here all at once explain and interpret the dream. The problem is that this dream science applies to an object that is at least unstable, if not elusive, to a product that is a language translation of a primarily visual, purely subjective, night-life experience (unless the existence of supernatural messages is admitted), obviously prohibiting any verification or False.

The question of the corpus (thus of the empirical anchorage) is paramount, because there is, according to the adage, science than the general, and any research that wants to be scientific must rely on a sufficiently large number of cases, in order to validate its hypotheses. The theory is also to have the widest possible scope of application.

The Corpora Or collections of dreams can be thematic (romantic dreams, Erotic Dreams), sociological (Popular Dreams, dreams of children), historical (dreams under the National-socialism), etc. One already has a tendency to the collection in any key of the dreams because of their classification by motives, situations or scenarios. In some cases, the corpus is set up by a basic hypothesis. Thus, the Mass-Observation project, launched by anthropologists in 1937, is representative of an approach based on the collection of Dreams (by the Double bias of diaries and questionnaires) with the aim of capturing the collective unconscious of a given population within a definite historical framework, in this case the impact of the 1939-45 War on the British population. Charlotte Beradt Made a similar attempt with the impact or even the traumatic grasp of Nazism on the dreams of the Germans. These attempts do not aim at a collective unconscious in the Jungian and transhistoric sense of the term, but on the contrary the historicity of the dreamlike representations seized through a real field survey, whose conditions (questioning, classification, contextualization, form of notation, exploitation, etc.) are delicate and subject to caution as for any investigation. The Albanian writer Ishmael Kadaré (born in 1936) used this hypothesis in his novel *The Palace of Dreams*, in which a totalitarian state strives to monitor citizens through the systematic collection of their dreams; These are duly recorded,

summarized, classified and archived, sometimes interpreted and used for the purposes of ideological control and repression. Kadaré plays, in this allegorical narrative, with the postulate — or theory — that dreamlike activity can tell a lot about how the subject responds to its historical context, which is — *mutatis mutandis* — also that of investigations into the review as an element of daily life revealing on the historical level of collective affective and intellectual provisions. This hypothetical relevance of the activity and dreamlike scenarios as a source of information historical delivers much of the material but does not lead to an elaborate theory, probably because of the abundance of data and the complexity Methodology of their operation.

Work from collections of dreams is not limited to authentic dreams; Literary dreams may as well hold attention, because the dream was linked with the imagination on the one hand, because the Invented dreams, imagining dreaming characters makes it possible to confirm the concepts prevailing at a given time, either to test (albeit only on a fictional, sometimes openly playful) basis other modalities of functioning and understanding of the dreamlike phenomena. Literature has this particular that by placing your dreams Fictional in specific contexts, it mobilizes the knowledge of its time and includes a theoretical level, or at least a speech, in a more or less direct in its productions. Fictional dreamlike sequences can illustrate an existing theory as well as suggest (imagine) A divergent conception, that is to say, < theorize the dreamlike phenomena apart from a true and systematic scientific description. Moreover, literary dreams encroach upon a philosophical questioning, which lies, it, at the exact opposite of field investigations and is interested in the dream in its ontological dimension (thus the very fact of Dreaming) and mainly in the context of the elucidation of notional couples such as dream and reality, dream and perception, dream and imagination or even dream and madness.

Between personal deepening of an intimate experience and scientific research on a wide collection of examples, philosophical questioning about the concept of reality and the validity of perceptions, a medium of supernatural

communication, Psychoanalytic interrogation on the truth of the subject, apology of the night or affirmations of the Enlightenment, between imagination, vision and hallucination, between meaning and insignificance, dream and falsehood, source of knowledge and pure delirium, between religion, Myth, literature, philosophy, medicine, psychology, sociology and neurobiology, the knowledge and theories of dreams are elaborated through various and sinuous paths, of which our volume contains significant analyses.

Manfred Engel proposes a reflection of funds on the question of dreamlike theories and inscribes the cultural and historical diversity of the approach modalities in a descriptive matrix allowing, from seven clearly defined points of view, to put into Look at the theories. From there, he develops a classification according to four main types, which he illustrates the operation through a presentation of the theory of Carl Gustav Jung, in order to fill a gap of our volume.

The first thematic component of the volume is devoted to antiquity and the two great Asian traditions. Dorothy Figueira focuses her attention on a broad corpus of works, formed by the classics of literature and Philosophy of ancient India. The conception of the dream is basically that of an unveiling of other levels of reality and it is closely linked to the problem of perception and illusion. The assertion — in distinctly strong aspects — of a possible equivalence between dream and reality clearly distinguishes Works Secular, sacred and philosophical Western traditions, where the dream is only exceptionally thought of as ontologically identical to the waking state. Indian traditions (including those of Hinduism and Buddhism) focus on the illusion of duplicity of the phenomenal universe and the belief that only ideas and self-knowledge have a status of reality, which is explained in particular from the canonical texts on the dream that are the Mandukya Upanishad and their commentary by the Hindu scholar Gaudapada.

After remarks on the prophetic dimension of Dreams, Marion Eggert examines the traditions of East Asia, from Chinese antiquity to the Buddhist and neo-Confucian until the period Jose In Korea in which the said dimension, without being paramount,

allows to precisely situate the different speeches (medical, religious, Psychological, philosophical, literary, etc.) On the dream as well as the different classifications. In the Neo-Confucianism, the prognosis is fundamental in terms of moral psychology, but also in the perspective of the explanation of the dreamlike phenomenon itself, whereas in times more prone to empiricism and rationalism, one is wary; Taoism, in favour of the dimension of life and the notion of dreamlike voyage, integrates it as anticipation in an existential context and therefore in human temporality.

Christophe Chahal analyses a period of antiquity particularly fruitful in theorizations of the dream, that located between Homer and Artémidore. Starting from the culture of the dream of Homeric poems, he puts the various designs into context: Art divinatory, Dream says < à message >, incubation, physical explanation, etc. If the question of communication with the gods is paramount, parallel conceptions — for example on the inner source of dreams — are asserted, spreading a wide range of theories; Theoretical attempts, appearing in the 5th century B.C. In the texts of philosophy and medicine, are Of the rest accompanied of scientifically-oriented classification efforts.

With Stefan Seit we walk in the Middle Ages, that is to say the question of dreams in the perspective of the Christian religion, in this case in the writings of St. Augustine, Hildegard of Bingen, Albert the great and Thomas Aquinas. Saint Augustine establishes a typology of visions (bodily-sensory, spiritual and intellectual) in order to grant privilege to intellectual (or mental) visions on the other two types, too closely dependent on representations Visual. His reflections also put into play the problem of scepticism (already raised by Cicero) and the criteria for validating nocturnal appearances. Thomas Aquinas deals with the onirism in relation to the Mantic, and discusses the influence of the malignant spirits, but broadens his reflection to the various possible causes of dreams by incorporating assumptions existing since Aristotle.

Renaissance and Baroque age are fruitful in speech about the dream; Gilles Polizzi examines the

writings of Béroalde de Verville, novelist, doctor, alchemist and engineer, who develops a true phenomenology of the Dream and tries, on the basis of his different skills, to enter mechanisms through startling intuition; It uses images and modeling which, *mutatis mutandis*, invite comparison with the Freudian models, in particular with regard to the dream as Rebus and the functioning of the refoulement.

Andreas Bahr on his side analyzes closely another particular case, that of the Jesuit and universal spirit Athanasius Kircher, including some dreams important and the use it made allow to point out the significant theoretical and hermeneutical problems in the religious and literate context of the first half of the seventeenth century in Germany. Kircher categorizes the dreams according to their origin, which is a significant part of their conceptualization, although its analyses nevertheless substantially challenge the attempts of mastery through a strict typology. It also addresses the question of prophecy (based on vision or apparition) that is crucial in the context of Christianity.

We then move into the field of proper philosophical reflection. Murat Ates part of the realization that one of the possible fields of theorizing of the dream is that of philosophy, but that it is most of the time peripherally and cautiously that philosophers approach the subject. In the Age of Enlightenment, the dream is conceived as < dubious perception > whose land otherness justifies a deviation, though its uncertain nature makes it at the same time interesting to clarify the boundaries of the real. This problem overlaps with that of consciousness and identity to the test of illusion and imagination as shown by Descartes, Locke and Leibnitz. Descartes above all, with its methodical doubt, opens the way to a fundamental questioning about the truth of perceptions and the status of reality. Locke and Leibnitz in turn use the dream paradigm (connected to that of sleep) as a negative argument in their reflections on the consistency and durability of the thinking subject.

We know the importance of the dream in Romanticism, and three contributions show us the theoretical side in three different fields, in

philosophy, literature and medicine. PAUL ZICHE brings his attention to the key period of German idealism in order to determine how the concerned thinkers integrate the dream into their conceptual edifices. They give special importance to transient states (slumber and awakening), that is, to dynamic processes. Based on the romantic Dream paradigmatic which opens the novel *Henri de Ofterdingen* of Novalis and the question from the impact of privileged dreams, endowed with an existential content and a degree of reality or clarity confining clearly, he directs his attention to the positions of the thinkers of German idealism and proposes a proofreading of the texts on ontological basis and epistemological, with a view to integrating the spheres of experience and a possible continuity of mental activity including transitional dreamlike states.

Theories concerning the dreamlike activity are also developed in the context of romantic medicine, and Christian Quintes compares the writings of three doctors, G.H. Schubert, I.P.V. Troxler and C.G. Cams (Switzerland Troxler being less known than the other two) which work as part of a romantic anthropology, that is to say, in the wake of the anthropology developed particularly in Germany

The eighteenth century and which, considering the human being as a whole, was interested in the interactions between the psychic and the somatic. These three authors are in tune with the medical knowledge of their time and especially with discussions about animal magnetism. All three are particularly interested in the existential dimension of the Dream (hieroglyphic language, according to Schubert) conceived as an inseparable phenomenon of the fundamental dualism of the human being.

Ricarda Schmidt dedicates himself to the most read romantic author in Europe, namely E.T.A. Hoffmann, and shows that the ambivalence with which he uses the terms of < Rêve > and < Reveu > is founded in inseparable conception of the network of speeches on the onirism of his time, that is in romantic anthropology (above all G.H. Schubert and his analogy between dream and sleepwalking), anthropology that he models in turn by the specificity of his narrative staging of dreams, and

in particular in His dreams of love, while deepening the question of the specificity of the nocturnal dream compared to other dream states.

Patricia Oster looks at three major writers of the French romantic generation — Charles Nodier, Gérard de Nerval and Victor Hugo — which she examines by reference to the optics of the Observatory, as it is used and métaphorisé by Victor Hugo. The scientific technique to scrutinize the sky is paralleled with the romantic way of exploring the self, which reveals three theoretical options or three substantially divergent designs, all of which reject the pathologizing of the Dream and on the contrary reveals a possibility of communication with the knowledge deposited in the history of mankind.

The nineteenth century is also that of positive science and Jacqueline Carroy draws our attention to the field of scientific interest for erotic dreams as they are documented and discussed in the testimonies of all kinds (medicine, Theology, casuistry, literature, Diaristique). The debates focused on the tangible and predominantly masculine case of nocturnal pollution caused or illustrated by dreams. For this field of knowledge, part of the theorization takes place in encyclopedias and dictionaries, another in the medical treatises (with the specific case of spermatorrhoea) and theological, in which one is less interested in the Physiological mechanisms than to the question of moral responsibility of the subject who has erotic dreams.

Bernard Dieter Questions Two of the main authors who make the transition to modernity, Baudelaire and Lautréamont, and focuses in particular on the singular and paradoxical metaphor of the dreamlike construction, thus of the dream as an operation Little control. It is indeed by defeating a central theoretical concept of the 19th century, that of the abdication of the will In the dreamlike processes, these two authors establish a new poétologique relationship between dream and literature.

Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, psychology became the pilot Science in the study of the dream and culminated with the advent of psychoanalysis, whose theorizing efforts were

legion. Joachim Pfeiffer shows that Freud remains the pivotal moment in the history of the theory of the dream, because it is through his work the interpretation of the Dream, whose Genesis and editorial history are complex, that he discovers the unconscious and builds psychoanalysis. He links science to introspection, isolated interpretations of theory and method questions. Its central formula — the dream as a fulfillment of a wish (or desire) — is both developed and discussed, especially in relation to the agonizing dream (and, later, in relation to trauma). The distinction between manifest content and latent thought allows it to set up a hermeneutical device and a coherent conceptual network, particularly with regard to the mechanisms of formation of dreams. Endowed with this knowledge or Freudian grammar, the interpreter may give meaningless texts of incoherent statements of inadvertent meaning; As the dream provides access to the unconscious, its understanding is an extension of the field of knowledge.

Because of the formidable impact of Freud and Jung, and more generally of psychoanalysis on Western culture, the twentieth century (especially literary and especially in its first half) is replete with texts in which the onirism plays an important role. But it would be wrong to see in these Works Simple applications or illustrations of psychoanalytical theories, because often they set themselves apart from psychoanalytical theories or then contain significant differences in germs or even relativize by means of situations Fictional or writing practices theoretical statements of a scientific nature.

To bring this to light, our volume focuses on two strong moments: the fictional writing and the literary avant-garde. Manfred Engel carefully reconstructed the dreamlike theories of Proust, Joyce and Kafka based on factual and fictional narratives and the reflections of the three authors. The theoretical speech of Proust is eclectic and revolves around the proximity between dream and involuntary memory. Joyce focuses on dreamlike writing, close to hallucination as a mental form, but based on a cultural fund. Kafka is a dreamer in his private life as in his writing practice. Engel also points to the difficulty of reconstructing a dreamlike

theory from fictional dreams, whose function is always poetic. The comparison of three major authors updates typical designs of literary modernity generally closer to Jung than Freud.

Tania Collani questions not specific authors, but three of the most important avant-garde movements of the first half of the twentieth century in order to clarify the theoretical contours of the modern dream in relation to modern poetic prose and the aiming General of a rehabilitation of the dream. This goes through an exploration of dreamlike states of all kinds, nocturnal as diurnal, including insomnia, hypnosis, daydreaming, etc., all also understood as a search for authenticity conceptually linked to spontaneous expression, not worked.

Our volume concludes with an overview of contemporary experimental research as carried out among other things in sleep labs. Michael Schred describes the progress of this strictly scientific approach to dream conceived as a subjective experience during sleep. The emphasis here is on sleep, a dimension most often present in the Reflection on the dream, but whose examination has made tremendous progress in the context of neurobiology (just think about the discovery of REM sleep), experience with measurable neurological contextual parameters, but content accessible only in the testimony of the Awakened Dreamer, and thus through a memory skill itself analyzable. A differentiated methodology has been put in place for the examination of the dreamlike contents (their themes, their relationship to the day experience, their emotional intensity, etc.) and the use of different questionnaires allows to quantify the answers, thus to operate a Statistical capture from a relatively large sample of Dreamers.

Based on the experimentation and the search for tangible and quantifiable data, this research is obviously very different from those of the humanities, and the future will tell whether fruitful rapprochement between the knowledge and theories of the different fields could have been done. <>

[John of Damascus and Islam: Christian Heresiology and the Intellectual Background to Earliest Christian-Muslim Relations](#) by Peter Schadler [History of Christian-Muslim Relations, Brill, 9789004349650]

In [John of Damascus and Islam](#), Schadler offers a reassessment of the Christian application of the term heresy to Islam, and the description of the new religion made by John of Damascus in the eighth century C.E.

Excerpt: Scholarship in the theological and historical study of heresy, and scholarship in all fields relating to Islamic Studies over the past forty years have advanced and developed in ways unparalleled in most other fields. Heresiological studies in the Christian tradition, broadly defined, find their modern origins in two works, approaching the study of heresy from two very different perspectives, both of which focused on the first three centuries after Christ. Walter Bauer's *Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei im ältesten Christentum*, published in 1934, but only achieving wider notoriety and increasing interest after its appearance in English as *Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity* in 1972, sought to overturn centuries of received scholarship that heretical groups spun off from and established Church and were marginal to that Church in the first three centuries.¹ He argued that in many places so-called 'heretical' versions of Christianity preceded the arrival of what would become the state-sponsored imperial Church.

Perhaps the most important of these was Allain Le Boulluec's *La notion d'hérésie dans la littérature grecque: iie–iiiie siècles*. This hefty two-volume work, published in 1985, approached the concept of heresy and the Christian use of the Greek term as it had been employed as a term to describe different schools of thought within a larger field, particularly in the fields of philosophy and medicine. Following these two works, increased attention to the nature of heresiologies, or works composed of lists of heresies, has gained considerably, and wide areas of study have been developed dealing with heresy and what characterized it for the earliest Christians, including heresy and identity, and even comparative

religious heresiology.³ These have all impacted greatly on how we understand what Christians were trying to do when they compiled polemical accounts of their theological opponents, and how they organized their knowledge of what they considered were non-conforming groups of people and their beliefs and practices, of which, Islam would certainly become one.

Similarly, in the field of Islamic Studies, increased study of the literary sources, new data from archaeological finds, and greater interest in the field have aided in a process of rapid growth. Additionally, new methodologies for the study of early Islam have emerged, and these have shed new light on source material that was once viewed through different lenses. Until thirty years ago western scholars were inclined to view Islam as monolithic from the very beginning. While not always accepting the traditional Islamic account of early origins, they nonetheless envisaged Islam to be a normative system of belief and codified by the end of the century following the Prophet Muhammad's death in 632.

In more recent times it has become apparent that this view is no longer sustainable, and here again, a few works in the late 1970s have inaugurated whole new avenues of research in early Islamic Studies. A pair of works published by John Wansbrough in 1977 and 78 focusing on the Qur'an, and Hagarism by Patricia Crone and Michael Cook published in 1977 point in the same direction. These scholars were followed by Judith Koren and Yehuda Nevo, Gerald Hawting, Norman Calder, and others who typify a generation of scholars who have questioned the traditional account of Islamic origins, arguing that sources within the Islamic tradition are to be treated with great discretion, if used at all. These so-called skeptical 'revisionists', although not united in their own views, have urged the modern historian to step outside of the Islamic tradition and 'start again', in an effort to discover the true history of early Islamic origins, and attempt to understand this more gradual process characterized by widespread doctrinal pluralism and ambiguity of authority.

Thus, a need for fresh analysis of certain key primary texts that describe the religion today

known as 'Islam' both to document how the people living directly in contact with believers of that faith perceived it during its formative years, and the various strands of early Islamic tradition itself. The Greek theological literature of the eighth century tells us a considerable amount concerning early Islam when measured in light of more recent scholarship done in the field. The following is an attempt to offer a more accurate appraisal of one eighth-century theologian's perception of Islam, and the potential his work has to offer one historically and theologically accurate perspective on that new faith. The writings of John of Damascus (c. 650–750 AD) on Islam have been studied several times, but these have neither attempted to understand John's position in (or dissonance with) the theological tradition of heresiological discourse, nor have efforts yet been made to place him in his historical context with reference to the more recent scholarship in the rapidly growing field of Islamic Studies.

John of Damascus has proved a very difficult figure for historians to identify. Evidence regarding the date of most of his works is elusive, and this is because much of the evidence regarding his life is elusive. For information about him we are largely reliant on hagiographical and historical sources written some time after his death.⁹ He was born between 650 and 675, but exactly when is not known. His father probably served as a financial administrator for the caliph Abd al-Malik (685–705), and so John was well educated, growing up in Damascus around the conquering elite but also still in the midst of a vibrant Roman/Hellenic culture. Their family name, Sarjun, implies a Syrian provenance but most scholars have taken the view that John was probably not an Arab. He likely followed in his father's footsteps in Damascus, and served as a financial administrator during the reign of Abd al-Malik (685–705) and at some point in the early eighth century moved either to a monastery near Jerusalem, which may be the well known monastery of St. Sabas, or to Jerusalem itself to act as a patriarchal adviser. It is presumed he wrote much of what we have of his works today at this stage of his life, while accessing either the patriarchal libraries in Jerusalem, or the library at St. Sabas. He was clearly well connected, and

aware of events taking place in the empire and in Sinai, for his writings show support of the Sixth Ecumenical Council (680–81) and the Council of Trullo (692), and he quotes Anastasius of Sinai (d. c. 700). His treatises on Iconoclasm mention specific events that took place in Constantinople as late as 730.¹⁵ He died around the year 750, as Theophanes mentions him in his historical chronicle under the entry for 742, but he is anathematized as though dead at the Iconoclast Council of Hieria in 754. He was perhaps the most significant theologian of the late patristic period, often referred to as the last ‘Father of the Church’.

During his life, he wrote extensively in many fields, including liturgical poetry, dogmatic theology, and sermons. It is with his work in the field of theology that we are mainly concerned here, as it contains what is now recognized as the first Christian polemical treatise on Islam in Greek. In its intended location, this text is found contained in a work entitled, Πηγὴν Γνώσεως (Pege Gnoseos), or ‘Fount of Knowledge’, which is a compilation of three works; the Εἰσαγωγὴν Σογμάτων στοιχειώσεως (Elementary Introduction to Dogma), Περί Αἱρέσεων (On Heresies), and Ἐκστοσίς ἀκριβῆς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως (Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith). The three works do not always appear together in the manuscript tradition, but have come in most editions today to be translated and studied under the combined heading of ‘The Fount of Knowledge’, a tradition I continue here.

The text on Islam is located in the work called On Heresies. It is found as the last chapter in that book, which describes 100 different heresies against which Christians should be on guard. This might seem an odd place for a Christian work on Islam, and its categorization as a ‘heresy’ should be a major concern to modern historians and theologians trying to understand the history of Christian-Muslim relations. Quite a number of scholars have come to quick assumptions about what John’s placement of his work on Islam in a book on heresies implies. A major concern of this book is the intellectual background to this seemingly odd categorization, and why John incorporated a work on Islam in a book on heresies. As I thought about John’s decision, it became clear that an intellectual and theological

understanding of the many things that could be called ‘heresy’ was crucial to an understanding of how John of Damascus—and indeed any other Christians who used the term of Islam—processed that new faith. His use of the term so starkly colors all other aspects of his writing on Islam, and so strikes our postmodern ears, that without such analysis we will effectively misconstrue anything he has to say about it.

The chapter on Islam is not long, taking up only seven pages in the most recent critical edition of the text. Close textual analysis of some of the word choices John makes in describing Islam, as well as those made by his predecessors and successors can be used to show that John did not see Islam in the way modern scholarship has often supposed. The nomenclature in use to describe early Muslims as Ishmaelites, Saracens, and Hagarenes was inherited by Christians like John from earlier Roman historians, and continued use of these terms themselves has something to tell us about how John and other Christians understood Islam, as I discuss below. As regards John’s other writings on Islam (if indeed there are any), they are difficult to assess, if not least because there is no final agreement on which texts commenting on Islam the Damascene wrote, nor is there always clarity on whether John was commenting on aspects of Islam in some of his writings that fail to identify Islam or Muslims explicitly. The so-called dialogue between a Saracen and a Christian is probably not the work of John, although it has been argued that the teachings in it should at least go back to his time, if not to John himself. Hymnography that has been attributed to John that makes mention of Ishmaelites or Saracens has been analyzed by others, but the attributions of such works to John are made on shaky ground at best, making the use of such texts to get at what John was thinking dangerous. I have made no attempt to assess the authenticity of this literature, nor would such an attempt be likely to yield much fruit, the manuscript tradition for Byzantine hymnography being as vast and labyrinthine as it is, especially in reference to those named ‘John’. It is, however, necessary to briefly address the question of whether or not the text that is the focus of this book may proceed from another

hand, and what effect the question of authorship has on the present work.

It has been suggested that John took much of his book *On Heresies* principally from a work that has been given the title *Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi*. This work, which was edited by Franz Diekamp at the beginning of the twentieth century, has received far too little attention by scholars to date. It is essentially a florilegium, or compilation of excerpts from other patristic and philosophical writings put together by an as yet undetermined author in the late seventh or early eighth century, but existing in many recensions, other authors having added to it as they received it. This, together with the extensive manuscript tradition, makes attribution of a precise date difficult, and Diekamp could only postulate a date after the sixth ecumenical council (681), and before the beginning of Iconoclasm (726), of which the *Doctrina* seems unaware. Diekamp could not completely solve many of the difficulties surrounding the text. That John copied part of his work from the *Doctrina Patrum* is a possibility, and would be in keeping with his methodology. As he himself states, the Damascene was a systematic compiler. If he did not copy all or part of his heresiology from the *Doctrina Patrum*, we are at least certain that he received the first 80 heresies in his book from another source, the well known heresiology called the *Panarion*, written by Epiphanius of Salamis (c. 315–c. 403).

The extent to which John of Damascus was familiar with the *Panarion* of Epiphanius has itself been the topic of some debate. John does not simply take the heresies that Epiphanius lists and attach them to his twenty additional ones. The *Panarion* was a large work, which had seven summaries (ἀνακεφαλαιώσεις) of the heresies incorporated into it, at least as far as the manuscript tradition is concerned. The seven summaries are spaced throughout the text, and in fact divide up the heresies as we have received them. But the summaries, or *Anacephalaeosis*, also circulated independently of the *Panarion* as a whole. It is these summaries or epitome of the larger work that John used as part of his book *On Heresies*. Knorr has argued that the Damascene must have had

access to the full text of the *Panarion* on the grounds that the different recensions of the *Anacephalaeosis* (MPG 42.833–885) actually represent different versions of the text, only one of which was written by Epiphanius himself, the other of which is a later summary. He argues that these recensions are confused and that Kotter assembled his critical edition of the Damascene's work without leaving room for this fact, and the possibility that John accessed the version written by Epiphanius himself.

Louth suggested that John did not know the *Panarion* very well, on the basis that John added the Donatists as a heresy in his work, when this heresy was already covered by Epiphanius in the *Panarion* on the sect of the Cathars. Information on the Donatists is not found in the corresponding *Anacephalaeosis*, where one might expect to find a short summary, and it is on this basis that Louth suggests John may not have known the *Panarion* itself. However, Louth's argument is not conclusive, as he himself points out. The Donatists appear as merely a footnote in Epiphanius' work, mentioned only in the last few lines of the sect on the Cathars, and there portrayed as requiring no further comment.³⁵ John, on the other hand, adds material regarding the Donatists not covered in the *Panarion*, and this could provide at least one reason why he would add the group to his list of heresies. Additionally, if John

were composing a work of his own, using only the *Anacephalaeosis* of Epiphanius' full text, he may well have seen the need to add the Donatists as an additional heresy if he was not incorporating the full text of the *Panarion* which contained information on the group. Finally, it is clear that the Damascene was familiar with Epiphanius' other works as he cites them in his own treatises, and this further suggests that he was aware of the *Panarion*. John quotes the *Ancoratus*, and Epiphanius' treatise on *Weights and Measures*. It would seem likely that he was also familiar with the text Epiphanius is purported to have written against the use of images in worship, as John discusses that work in his treatise *On Holy Images*.

What is certainly clear, however, is that even had John received most of his work from other sources,

including some of the chapter on Islam, he further added to it. The section on Islam that appears in chapter 34 of the *Doctrina Patrum* comes to an end with God taking Christ up to heaven “because he loved him”. This ending in itself suggests John may have only been responsible for what follows it in his chapter on Islam. The style of the chapter changes somewhat following this episode, after which a semi-dialogical form takes over the remainder of the work, in which first God and Jesus engage in conversation, and then a ‘we say’/‘they say’ structure for the substantial remainder of the text, where ‘we’ are the Christians, and ‘they’ are the Ishmaelites.

At the same time, it is still possible that John is responsible for the full work *On Heresies*, and that a later scribe shortened the chapter on Islam before inserting it in a later copy of the *Doctrina Patrum* to give us what we have today. The truth is not clear, and the case has been put forward for both possibilities. Diekamp argued for the view that John took his work from the *Doctrina Patrum*, while Kotter has argued for the possibility of the latter. It would equally have been within the working methodology of the compiler of the *Doctrina* to have lifted *On Heresies* from John’s work, had he had access to it, and, for reasons I offer below, I tend to favor this possibility.

In what follows, however, I do not concern myself greatly with the question of the authenticity of the work. This is because as I try to trace the intellectual and philological history of the conception of the word ‘heresy’, and explain how John could use it to apply to Islam, it is not vitally important to determine whether John himself is responsible for the whole of the chapter on Islam in question, or copied it from the *Doctrina Patrum*. John’s acceptance of the application of the term ‘heresy’ to Islam is what has upset scholars, and it is what interests me, along with his understanding of that term more generally. As we can be certain that at the minimum he took the text and supplemented it, and at most wrote the full text himself, he has committed himself to the application, and for that matter to the manner in which the last twenty heresies are described in *On Heresies*.

I have also not attempted a detailed speculation on what writings of John’s might possibly refer to Islamic practices, but which bear no direct reference to Islam. In most cases, the differences between Islamic, pseudo-Islamic, Jewish, pagan, and other practices were could be so minute that to declare, for example, that John was referring to Islam when he wrote against circumcision, would stretch the limits of scholarly integrity. While it may be that by not attributing such references to Islam I have failed to acquire a more extensive picture of John’s views, I take refuge in the fact that the text I have chosen to analyze is both the Damascene’s most detailed analysis of Islam, and that most likely to be authentically written by him. Thus in what follows I do not attempt an analysis of what could ‘potentially be considered the Damascene’s corpus of writings on Islam’, but only an analysis of that text which is most explicitly by the Damascene, and which undoubtedly referred to what contemporary historians and theologians denominate as ‘Islam’.

To acknowledge that John is mostly likely the author of this short text does not, unfortunately, clarify when exactly it was written or how it was used. Thümmel argued that the *De Haeresibus* circulated independently of the *The Fount of Knowledge* because John ultimately decided not to include it in his larger work, despite what Thümmel surmised to have been his first intentions, which can be found in the dedicatory epistle to the whole of the work. His explanation for why the dedicatory epistle outlines a three-part plan of the *Dialectica*, *De Haeresibus*, and *De Fide Orthodoxa*, is that such was the original plan of the work, which was later abandoned in favor of just including the *Dialectica* and the *De Fide*. Kotter and Louth, however, have offered alternative suggestions, which also make sense of the available evidence, and perhaps more so. Louth has persuasively argued that John was in the process of revising the *Dialectica* when he died, and Kotter that he did intend the entire work to consist of all three parts, and appended the dedicatory epistle to the work shortly before his death.

When, however, the treatise on heresies was first composed, has been left open, although Thümmel suggested that it must have predated 726 when Iconoclasm broke out in the empire. This is a

reasonable suggestion, as Iconoclasm, to which John devoted three independent treatises refuting, fails to appear in the *De Haeresibus*. John's first treatise against that heresy specifically can be reliably dated to 726–730. It is of course again possible to argue that *De Haeresibus* was written after the outbreak, but that John did not see the need to include it in his heresiology. This would seem odd, however, given his strong opposition to Iconoclasm.

Two other important heresies do not appear in *On Heresies*, and this should raise further suspicions regarding its date. As has already been pointed out, John of Damascus appears to have been aware of major events taking place in the empire, or at least in Constantinople, and he was clearly well-read. But despite this, the heresies of the Athingani and the Paulicians do not appear in his heresiology. There are conceivable excuses for the omission of these, but these do not appear to hold up to close scrutiny.

To begin with Paulicianism, it is generally accepted that this heresy was referred to by Byzantine heresiologists under the rubric of Manichaeism. Epiphanius had already commented on Manichaeism in his heresiology, which was taken over by John. It would seem odd, however, given the increased attention Pauliciansim received in the seventh and eighth centuries by the political elites in Constantinople that it should receive no further attention either as its own individual sect, or elaborated on under the Manichaean heresy. Further, given John's increased attention to Manichaeism in a separate work, that he takes no effort to further comment on this apparently new form of Manichaeism in *On Heresies* is odd.

Similarly, the Athingani, who appear in the heresiology of Patriarch Germanus of Constantinople (c. 668–c. 740), and were known to Timothy of Constantinople as the Melchisedechians, are absent from John's heresiology. Again, here it might be argued that since Timothy associated them with the Melchisedechians, John may have done likewise, and therefore felt no need to add the Athingani to his own heresiology as the Melchisedechians were already included in the *Anacephalaeosis*. However, it seems that by John's time they were important enough of a group to

have figured in Germanus' heresiology separately, and this should cause us to think that a serious heresiologist might want them incorporated in his updated list of heresies. When Theophanes wrote his chronicle in 813/14, he recalled that the emperor dealt with the group specifically and they were given the death penalty in 811. In any case, the Melchisedechians receive no more than a sentence in the *Anacephalaeosis* and get no further elaboration from John.

The absence of these three heresies should cause us to question both the date and reasons for the composition of the *De Haeresibus*. On the one hand the absence of these implies a date earlier than 726 for the work, as we know John knew of Iconoclasm, and we know it was a major heresy in the empire. The simplest explanation for its absence, and the absence of the other two listed above, is that John arranged his heresiology at a relatively early date in his life, at a time when these heresies were less important than they would become over the course of the eighth century.

On the other hand their absence might be explained by the idea that the *De Haeresibus* was incorporated into *The Fount* for the specific purpose of the inclusion of the 'heresy' of the Ishmaelites, with the aim toward being comprehensive of all belief systems that he could record had come into the world to date. For, the last heresy on the Ishmaelites differs considerably from those that come before it, and those that come immediately before bear some signs of being simple space-holders. The heresy of the Ishmaelites is introduced with the claim that it is the precursor to the Antichrist and is significantly longer than the abbreviated summaries of the heresies that precede it, or, for that matter, any of the others in the book. It might also be argued that reference to the Ishmaelites as the 'forerunner to the Antichrist' indicates a date around the turn of the eighth century, when such Apocalyptic predictions were prevalent in the Levant, and the Muslims were often referred to as 'Antichrists'. The two theories are not mutually exclusive, and in fact partly work to different points. The idea that John included his heresiology in *The Fount* for the sake of achieving a kind of comprehensiveness for the history of heresies will be fully explored in this book, and as I

will show, there are good reasons for thinking John wanted to include Islam in such a work, despite clear semantic obstacles for doing so.

Chapters one and two attempt to set John in his historical and theological context, while explaining some of the reasons scholars have found it difficult to understand what led him to the improbably seeming conclusion that Islam was a 'heresy'. Situating John in his historical context and in the theological tradition of heresiological discourse has to be accomplished simultaneously because one cannot understand why he composed his work on Islam at all unless one understands also the theological tradition in which he was working, and where and how he supplemented it or re-expressed it to fit his time and place. For that reason historical conclusions regarding why he may have felt the need to compose his works as he did emerge alongside theological explanations for the terminology he chose to employ. Indeed, in chapter one I show that John's use of the term 'heresy', given how most other Christians before him had used it, is unusual. This is a word whose meaning has received a great deal of attention in modern scholarship, although surprisingly little of that attention has been devoted to the usages of authors working in a period later than the first four centuries of the Christian Church. One regularly encounters scholarship today in which the scholar attributes to John the view that Islam was a 'Christian heresy'. The tendency to read history back through modern eyes often obscures the actual intention of the author himself, and perhaps nowhere in theological studies is this tendency so dangerous as when it comes to the condemnation of other faith systems and so called 'heresies'.

Only in the second half of the book do I attempt to show that we have no clear evidence that John's view of Islam was in any way distortional, or that he invented characterizations of the Ishmaelites that were clearly false. It was necessary to delay such efforts to the second half of the book because John's work, by virtue of appearing in an 'heresiology', immediately elicits the assumption that it shares in a particular kind of discourse about the 'other', and one which sometimes appears to preclude honest assessment of that other to which one has attached the label of 'heresy'.

Heresiologists certainly did sometimes distort the beliefs of those on whom they wrote. The reasons they did so varied, but included: attempting to associate them more closely with Christianity in order to convict them more fully of their heresiological status and fit them within the pre-established heresiological framework which they inherited; link them more closely to other heresies in order to discredit them; or link them to pagan philosophies already considered to be in error. Indeed, it has been implied that John may have participated in the practice of inventing heresies (as group characterizations) for most or all of the heresies he added to the *Anacephalaeosis* of Epiphanius with only the possible exception of Islam. For the heresies that appear at the end of John's heresiology do not appear in other places, save in the *Doctrina Patrum*, whose own manuscript tradition and authorship, as mentioned above, leaves many unanswered questions.

I attempt to show that John was probably attempting to offer an accurate picture of Islam partly by establishing in chapters one and two areas in which John's independence of the heresiological tradition are apparent, and by further corroborating, as best we can, in chapters three and four his account of Islam. I do this first by showing that, in contrast to earlier scholarship on this topic, we have no good reason to suppose that John was limited in his knowledge of Islam. John's sources for early Islam, while somewhat elusive, have several parallels in other literature contemporary with him, thus corroborating his perspective on early Islam. That to which John witnesses in the Islamic tradition can be found to exist either in the Islamic tradition itself, or in other non-Islamic traditions about Islam apparently independent of John and his sources.

Chapter four deals more narrowly with Islamic and what might be called 'para-Islamic' traditions, and how these traditions are reflected in John's short treatise. Recent developments in the methodology of the study of early Islam have contributed to a larger body of research that makes it possible to see John's work in clearer light. I try to use some of these new methodologies to re-evaluate John's work, and test it against other standards of historical accuracy. Finally, chapter five compares

John's work on Islam with his immediate theological successor and oft called spiritual disciple, Theodore Abu Qurrah. An analysis of his work on Islam both reveals John's influences on Theodore, and helps corroborate certain aspects of John's description of early Islam.

A quick survey of a few of the scholars who have looked at this text reveal how important it is that a reassessment of it be carried out as I have tried to do here. Several have taken the view that the information about Islam available to the Damascene was limited, and that he was not well acquainted even with the four suras he mentions at the end of his text. Merrill argues this on the basis that the material John cites from the second, third, fourth, and fifth suras does not take into account other information contained in those same suras, and so the Damascene would have 'changed the statements and argumentation' of his treatise had he been familiar with those suras in their entirety. Meyendorff thought John was significantly more concerned with iconoclasm, and its threats to the Church in the empire, than he was with Islam. He argues on that basis that John was, "certainly better informed about the events in Constantinople than about Islam." He follows Merrill's analysis of John's understanding of the Qur'an, and argues that there is no "clear evidence that John had, in fact, read the Koran." But Meyendorff and Merrill's whole approach is dictated by the assumption that John was in contact with a normative monolithic Islam which he could read about, and on which he could report to his readers. Meyendorff argues that John's inclusion of (what are now known to be) pre-Islamic beliefs and practices in his description of Islam shows that the Byzantines had only a "casual and superficial acquaintance with Islam." Islamicists have not been much more favorable to John. Montgomery Watt, for example, states that John gives a "somewhat inadequate account of Islam from an objective standpoint", and that he "might have been expected to know more about Islam than in fact he did."

Daniel Sahas in his translation and commentary on the text thinks that John demonstrates a more accurate knowledge of the religion, but predicates his view on the theory that there was a normative Islam to be understood. Sahas writes, "As a

conclusion to this chapter we wish to defend the thesis that Chapter 101 of the *On Heresies* is an early systematic introduction to Islam written by a Christian writer. Its purpose was to inform the Christians of the newly appeared 'heresy' and to provide some preliminary answers to its 'heretical' elements." In the same way, he writes, "... he is aware of the cardinal doctrines and concepts in Islam, especially those which are of immediate interest to a Christian." The idea that John could write a 'systematic introduction' to Islam, and be aware of the 'cardinal doctrines and concepts in Islam' requires a perspective of Islam in the eighth century that has increasingly come under question in more recent times. Sahas' study sought to refute the claims made by earlier scholars that John understood little of the religion of Islam, but he has in common with his predecessors the fallacy that John's understanding can be assessed on the basis of his text and a comparison of it to the Islam that we know today. As I highlight below in chapter four, serious questions regarding Islam's origins and how the new faith developed have been asked since Sahas wrote his work, and these have a direct impact on how we might view the accuracy of John's work.

Other recent studies of the text have sometimes asked anachronistic questions of the treatise. Raymond Le Coz, for example, suggests that John was unaware of the five pillars of Islam, according to him a critical aspect of what it meant to be part of the Islamic community. But it is clear from the recent work done in the field of early Islam that the five pillars are a development within Islam that post-dated the life of the Damascene. Le Coz shows no apparent awareness of the contemporary scholarly debates on the origins of Islam, and the body of secondary source material he draws on to write his commentary is devoid of any of the revisionist scholars I mentioned above and discuss in chapter four. Like his predecessors, Le Coz takes for granted an Islam developed and a Qur'an codified and a canonical copy available to John by the time he writes, leading essentially to the same type of analysis made by Sahas, which bases how much John knew of Islam on effectively what we know of Islam today.

Of the contemporary scholars who have commented on this text Andrew Louth has come closest to supporting the view that John's treatise on Islam tells us all that might be expected about Islam at the time and place John was writing. But he sides with earlier writers in saying that John lacked a precise knowledge of the Qur'an and that John's replies, 'seem to reveal some misunderstanding of Muslim practice.' Louth's interest in the treatise on Islam is limited, however, and he does not extend his views greatly. It is clear from a deeper analysis of the text in *On Heresies*, in conjunction with a study of the recent scholarship done in the field of early Islamic studies, that John's perspective on Islam has been misunderstood and misevaluated. It is for this reason that chapter four is a necessary addition to the scholarship on John's work. Indeed, the Damascene has much to say about early Islam, and the text should be considered from a standpoint that is free of presumptions regarding either a normative Islam when John was writing, or a contemporary orthodox Islam projected back onto the Damascene's writing. It is my hope that in the following pages I am able offer such an appraisal.

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Essay Ibn 'Arabi's God, Eckhart's God: Philosophers' God or Religion's God?

It is difficult to provide a definition of God in which all plausible views are included and upon which all schools can agree. The dominant view is that God is the Origin of the universe and enjoys a kind of transcendence and sacredness; I call this the God of the religious believer or Religion's God. In philosophy, however, there are various conceptions of deity: The gods of ancient Greece, the unmoved mover of Aristotle, the necessary Being of Avicenna, the God of Aquinas's theism, the God of Spinoza's pantheism, the panentheistic God of some mystical philosophies, the One of Neoplatonism, the God of process philosophy, the God of existential philosophies, the ultimate concern of Tillich, God as the impersonal ground of Being, and arguably, Heidegger's Dasein. The God of philosophy is often an object not a person; something not someone, unchangeable, absolute and unlimited. But the God that is worshiped in ordinary religion "is a person and to be a person, an entity must think, feel, and will. In spite of being called unchangeable, he is angry with us today, pleased with us tomorrow". [W.T. Stace, *Mysticism and Philosophy*]

God, of course, is understood differently in the different religions and even between Abrahamic religions. The God who has no son according to Islam, for example, may differ from the God who has a son, as in Christianity. However, theistic religions in general and Abrahamic religions in particular, share many beliefs about God. I take these shared claims to be the attributes of Religion's God, and consider certain philosophical theologies to be closer to Religion's God than others; other philosophical theologies — pantheism, for example — differ a great deal from the God of the ordinary religious believer.

In this essay, I will provide a brief account of the traditional God of theism or Religion's God, a brief account of the God of pantheism and panentheism, and then a more extensive discussion of God in Meister Eckhart and the theory of Unity of Existence (Wahdat al-Wujūd), derived from the writings of Ibn 'Arabi. Both Eckhart and Ibn 'Arabi have been depicted as pantheists. But there are great gaps between the doctrine of the Unity of Existence and pantheism. Indeed, if one were to compare these thinkers' understanding of God and contemporary Western philosophical views, their views would be closer to panentheism rather than pantheism. The important point is that Ibn 'Arabi, and to some extent Eckhart, manage to think from the point view of the unity of Existence, while maintaining important aspects of the God of ordinary religious believers.

The God of Theism

The God introduced by Revelation is more consistent with theism's God than with the other philosophical gods. Theism's God is a sacred power that is dominant throughout the universe and actively exercises this power. God, according to such theism, is mysteriously present in our very being, and is present through special effects such as revelation or miracles at times in specific historical events.

The God of theism is personal; "He" is Aware and Willing. Certain personal qualities such as knowing, believing, and willing may be attributed to Him, although he is free from other kinds of personal qualities, such as sentiments and wishes.

He is a person who is eternally free, Omnipotent, Omniscient. He is a spirit which is present everywhere. He is absolute good and the source of moral obligations. He possesses qualities that make human prayer possible and meaningful. Finally, while He undertakes the conservation of the Universe, he is independent from it and does not need it; He is necessarily free and at the same time unchangeable and impassive.

According to Macquarrie, among all the qualities of creatures, personality is the most plausible attribute that could apply to God; a thing which is impersonal does not deserve to be called God.

Thus, traditional theism sometimes suffers from anthropomorphism. In fact, however, it is closer to the truth for traditional theists to think of God as "Supra Personal." In this way, His transcendence also may be maintained. For in this view, God is beyond the world of creatures and is not like anything. Thus, theism can hold on to the main attributes of the Religion's God, which are as follows: unity, personality, transcendence, creativity, holiness and the source of moral value.

[As it stands, the Chalcedonian formulation suffers from a major flaw in attempting to sketch out a metaphysical analysis of Christ's person that ignores the existential dimension. In conformity with the prevailing conceptualities of its day, the framers of the creed were governed by a view of nature as a static, fixed set of characteristics, thrusting them into the insufferably difficult dilemma of trying to fit a divine nature and a human nature side by side within a single person. Thus, the terminology emerges whereby Jesus is interpreted as being constituted by two natures in one subsistence. Having set out on wrong footing from the start, contends Macquarrie, they proceed to steer clear of advancing obstacles only by drawing on metaphysical notions leading to speculation.

[The concepts of anhypostasia and enhypostasia, of which Barth and others make ample use, are deemed unhelpful by Macquarrie because they, too, lapse into speculation. The two terms are intended to explain the relation between divine and human natures within Christ, preserving the unity of his Person while not compromising their distinct uniqueness by fusing them into a third hybrid nature, neither wholly divine nor wholly human. In asserting anhypostasia, one affirms the absence of an independent human personhood in Christ. Enhypostasia conveys the thought that Christ's personhood is in the Word, or Son of God. But for Macquarrie, such concepts only produce a needless muddle. Is anything gained by affirming a human nature in Christ while denying he has human personhood? asks Macquarrie. Would such a phenomenon not undermine his full humanity in an almost Apollinarian fashion?

[Barth attracts additional criticism from Macquarrie by speaking of an asymmetrical, perichoretic

relationship between the two natures within the one Person of Christ. While each nature participates in the other, there is a irreversible priority of the divine nature over the human nature. The direction is crucial. The Son of God took human nature into himself. The divine nature is that which is "originally proper" to Christ, the human nature being his only through being assumed by the Son. Thus, Barth can speak of the divine nature being determined to the human nature, and the human nature being determined from the divine. But how has Barth managed to penetrate the inner workings of God to allow him to become privy to such superhuman information? Asks Macquarrie incredulously. Is this not a flagrant case of overstepping the bounds by promoting theories for which one has no solid grounds?

Macquarrie's intent is not to jettison genuine insights into the mystery of Christ's Personhood, which the Chalcedonian formula sought to express. Rather, he feels an existential re-interpretation of those essential insights is not only true to Chalcedon's underlying intent, but is the only credible way to make sense of it in today's world. This entails departing from static notions of "nature," re-conceiving it in the dynamic sense of that which is emerging or becoming. Viewed from this angle, it becomes more readily conceivable to speak of how Jesus could manifest two "natures" concurrently.

[Thus, the picture of two mutually exclusive, static "natures" existing simultaneously within Christ, defying logic, gives way to one of compatibility and complementarity. As Macquarrie describes it, on the one hand, humanity is seeking its authentic being in its spiritual quest for communion with God, while on the other hand God is entering his creation and communicating Himself through a human being who can both receive and express the presence of God.

[One can now speak of both human nature and divine nature simultaneously emerging in Jesus as he realizes the possibilities of his human existence in ongoing self-transcendent openness to Being, and as expressive Being (Logos) becomes present-and-manifest in him. In one and the same person, both natures find expression without contradiction. In this sense, one can speak of Jesus as both God

and man. As such, he is a genuine mediator because he is "one who has his being on both sides of the divide."]

Because theism accepts these religious elements on the one hand, and commitment to rational justification on the other, it must confront problems and difficulties and attempt to offer solutions. For example: Is the concept of the eternal and timeless God coherent and can one conceive of a "timeless" being? Did time begin when the universe did? Where was God before creation? How can something be created out of nothing? Why did creation take place when it did and not before — and what was God doing in the meantime? Why did God create this world and not some other better world? Should God have created anything at all? How can an immutable being create? Are immutability, impassibility and simplicity compatible with the efficacy of prayer and God's responsiveness to human action? Is God's timelessness compatible with biblical theology?

Pantheism's God

Pantheism is regarded as a philosophical approach to the problem of God. Though its origin may be mystical, it can also be considered a philosophical view. A great variety of thinkers have been pantheists. To gather all of them under the same title is extremely difficult. To be brief, it can be said that what all pantheists have in common (by the very definition of pantheism) is that the totality of all that is does not divide into two great components, a creator God, and a created world. In other words, while theism's God is transcendent and personal, pantheism's God accepts neither the existential transcendence of theism, nor the claim that the divine has personality. If theism's God is transcendent and that of pantheism is immanent in all things, one cannot say that the two views differ in the number and quality of God's attributes; the debate between the two concerns whether theism's God exists or not. According to theism, a God which is immanent in all things is not God. With respect to personality, however, the debate between the two is over God's attributes. Most versions of pantheism deny that God is a person. Pre-Socratic philosophers, Plotinus, Bruno, Spinoza, and even Lao Tzu do not regard God as person. I

know of no prominent versions of pantheism that conceive of God as a person.

Pantheism, therefore, involves the following two characteristics: 1) it rejects God's transcendence beyond the world and the possible distinction between a creating God and the created world, and 2) it does not regard God as personal. [Whether one should speak of consciousness as opposed to personality is an interesting question not pursued here.] Pantheism can solve some problems faced by theism. By reinterpreting creation as the disclosure of the absolute, for example, it avoids some of the difficulties related to the theory of creation from nothingness.

However, by denying the personality of God and God's transcendence, it distances itself from the revealed God of the religions. This is the case because firstly pantheism does not know God as the creator of the world, and secondly it is unable to justify the anthropomorphic characters attributed to God in sacred scriptures. It cannot acknowledge the kind of consciousness that God possesses in all religions, and it certainly cannot make sense of God's Incarnation in Christianity.

On the other hand, since pantheism's God is close to the absolute God of the philosophers, some advantages of theism become problems for pantheism. If God is not personal and no change is admitted in Him, for example, He cannot be loved. Thus, the love felt by the believers in praying cannot make sense to pantheists. In the pantheistic school, there is no trace of the interaction that thinkers such as Ibn 'Arabi have with their God. In general, the God worshipped by them is other than the God about Whom Ibn 'Arabi writes:

Because of piety (taqwā), we are given Divine intuition, and God through theophany undertakes to teach us, and we understand what reason is not able to understand through thinking. I mean the things that are introduced in the sacred texts through transmitted evidence that reason regards as impossible. Thus, the believer's reason goes on to interpret them, and the pure believer accepts them ... [the mystic, however, intuitively understands them]. Then the people of unveiling see God's right hand, His hand, both of His hands, God's eye, God's eyes which have been attributed [in the sacred texts] to Him.

They see His step and His face as well. They see attributes such as God's delight, His surprise, and His transformation from one form to another ... all and all. Thus, the God worshipped by the believers and the people of intuition is not the same as the God that is worshipped by the people of thinking. [Al-Futuhāt al-makkiya (Meccan Openings)]

Ibn 'Arabi, Eckhart, and Pantheism

Eckhart and Ibn 'Arabi have both been labeled pantheists by many an interpreter. Charles Adams, for example, has claimed that Ibn 'Arabi taught a sort of pantheism according to which only one reality exists that is God, meaning that God is nothing other than the "sum of all things." [M. Sells, *Mystical Languages of Unsaying* (Chicago, 1994), 261, note: 40.] Presumably, the sum of all things is not more than the sum of its members. On my interpretation, however, the God that Ibn 'Arabi and Eckhart wrote about is quite distinct from pantheism. Both thinkers believed that beyond the apparent world there is an essence that is free from any relation and correlation and completely independent of the universe. Thus, there is a deep gap between those who believe in the absolute hidden world and those who see nothing other than the seen world and regard God as the sum of the parts of this very world. R.W.J. Austin is, I think correct when he advises that to attempt to categorize Ibn 'Arabi's teachings in different ways such as pantheism or monism impedes rather than assists in understanding his vision of Reality. His doctrine of the Oneness of Being means that God is far more than the sum of its parts or aspects. [Cf. R.W.J. Austin, *Ibn al- Arabi, The Bezels of Wisdom*.]

Of course, this paper would not be necessary if one could not find occasional phrases in the work of Ibn 'Arabi and Eckhart that suggest a kind of pantheism. Ibn 'Arabi almost sounds like Spinoza on God as the single substance who receives various attributes, when he writes:

Verily God is All-Subtle. It is because of His Subtlety and Mercy, that in everything, which is called with some name or limited to some limitations, He is the same as that object Though concerning the beings of the world it is said that this is the sky, this is the earth, this is rock, tree, animal,

angel, sustenance or food; in every object there is the same essence. As Ash'aris say, the entire world is one concreated substance. That is, it is a single substance. This is the same as what we say that [in all objects], the essence is the same. Ash'aris also said that the substance comes into difference because of accidents. This is also the same as what we say that the essence comes into difference and plurality because of forms and relations so that making a distinction may be possible. Thus, it can be said that this object differs in terms of form or accident or temperament — or whatever other name you like —, and it is the same in terms of existence. [Fusus al-hikam, ed. by Abu'l 'Alā' Afifi, al-zahra Publications, 1366 A.H. solar/ 1987 A.D., vol. 1, 88f 19]

Such paragraphs suggest that careful attention must be given to theological details. Ibn 'Arabi regards God as existence non-conditioned as the source of a division (*lā bi shart maqṣami*). The pantheists' God is conditioned by something (*wujūd bi shart-i shay'*) at the level of existents or is at most, existence non-conditioned as a division (*la bi shart-i qismi*). These descriptions clarify the issue; these two Gods are quietly different. To elucidate the issue further, existence can be classified, as terms of the levels of theophany, as follows:

The nonconditioned existence as a source of division	1- negatively conditioned existence = oneness 2- existence conditioned by names and attributes = unity	= hidden world
	3- existence non-conditioned as a division = Divine breath (Truth by which the world is created) 4- existence conditioned by creaturely determination = world	= seen world

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For many philosophers, God is the same as existence negatively-conditioned, that is, He is free from all conditions and independent from all thing. The pantheists' God is the same as the existence conditioned by creaturely individuation. This existence, according to Ibn 'Arabi and Eckhart, is not God but the universe. Neither mystic would associate God with the fourth level (There have been some Sufis, of course, who have believed that God is immanent in the world.) The noble verse "And He is Who in the heaven is God, and in the earth God" (Quran; 43:84) suggests that God is restricted to no level. He is in the heaven God, and in the earth God. Pantheists seem to suggest that He is in the heaven, heaven; and in the earth, earth.

According to Ibn 'Arabi, "divine breath" can be described as the essence of the world and the same as all things. This is existence conditioned as a division, and is what has been manifested through the Holy Emanation.

According to the eternal rule "He/ not He", one can say that the universe is, at the same time, Him and not Him:

As regards the universe, say whatever you like. You are free to believe that it is creature or to maintain that it is God, and if you like you can say that it is God and the creature. And if you like, say that it is in all aspects neither God nor creature. And if you like, believe in bewilderment." [Fusus al-hikam, 112]

Some pantheists may regard God to be associated with all existents, not in a conditioned way, but absolutely. Ibn 'Arabi's and Eckhart's God, however, is free even from this absoluteness; it is "non-conditioned as a source of division" which is present in all four mentioned levels. Thus, Ibn 'Arabi and Eckhart's belief in the station of Oneness and station of unity makes them distinct from pantheists and brings them closer to another view which is called panentheism.

Panentheism's God

Unlike pantheism, panentheism attributes a kind of transcendence over the universe to God.

Panentheists believe in the hidden beyond the seen. Those who believe in the Unity of Being speak sometimes of union "with" God and at other times they speak of union "within" God. The first is indicative of some kind of becoming and suggests that the two essences of God and the creature "come into" union. The second phrase implies some kind of being, that is, it suggests that the two objects "are" in unity. According to Ibn 'Arabi and Eckhart, the becoming and being that we have set forth are, in fact, the same; [Sells, *Mystical Languages of Unsayings*, 169] the second, however, is closer to what is called panentheism.

Panentheism which has been coined by combining four words "pan" (= all), "en" (=in), "theo" (=God) and "ism" (=believe in), means belief in "all things in God." Ibn 'Arabi and Eckhart have been associated with panentheism because they believed in a transcendental existence for the objects in the Divine world. As Ibn 'Arabi says: "No one of the beings of the world and no object is outside God. But, every quality which is manifest in the world, has an essence in the presentation of the Truth It is God's dignity that existence of nothing be outside Him. Since if the existence of something is outside Him, then He has no command of that thing." [Al-Futuhāt al-makkiya, vol. 2]

According to Ibn 'Arabi's line of reasoning, one who grants something cannot lack that thing. God's encompassing of all things means that he contains all things. Eckhart believes that the objects have come out from God but have remained inward. He means that they are in God, in a manner reminiscent of Jesus Christ, who says: "I yet remained in the father." Matthew Fox claims that such a view is a sort of panentheism: "It means that all is in God and God is in all. Such a doctrine differs from heterodox pantheism, which means literally all is God and God is all." [M. Fox, *Breakthrough* (New York, 1991)] The following may confirm the claim that Eckhart believes in some sort of panentheism:

He created all things in such a way that they are not outside himself, as "ignorant people falsely imagine. Everything that God creates or does he does or creates in himself, sees or knows in himself, loves in himself. Outside himself he does nothing,

knows or loves nothing; and this is peculiar to God himself." [Fox, Breakthrough]

Ibn 'Arabi's God and Eckhart's God

In defining the nature of mysticism, it is common to affirm that mystical experience is experience of the immanence of the divine and of unification and unity in essence with it, in contrast to the experience of the divine as transcendent. The religious, however, tend to emphasize the transcendence of God. [R. Otto, *Mysticism East and West*] So when a religious mystic speaks about union with God, the union becomes one of contemplation, similarity, love ... anything short of absorption. By contrast, those mystics that talk seriously of absorption and avoid the language of self and real union with God should be considered non-religious mystics.

Regardless of how much the argument alluded to above is correct, it is certain that Ibn 'Arabi's and Eckhart's God is the same as the God of the two Abrahamic religions, i.e. Islam and Christianity. Ibn 'Arabi's God is the same as the God who manifests with all his names and attributes the beauty and glory that came down in the Holy Qur'an. The God of Eckhart, who was a Christian preacher and a disciple of Aquinas, is the God of The Bible and very close to theism's God. The most important aspects of theism's God, which make it distinct from pantheism's God, are, as we have already indicated, first, His transcendence and second, His personality. While preserving these two aspects of God, Ibn 'Arabi and Eckhart try to establish their systems based on the unity of existence and seat the religion's God at the top of this unity.

In this regard, Muslim thinkers inspired by the Holy Quran and verses such as the verses of the Ikhlaṣ Sūra (Q 112) have placed more emphasis on God's transcendence "over" creatures and His Glory, and less emphasis on His personality. In contrast, in Christian theology, since God has been personified and manifested as Christ Jesus, emphasis on God's personality is unavoidable and more emphasis is often put on His beauty than His glory to the extent that this God is either Himself a man and lives among us or at least, He is man's father. That is why in such a theology, love is emphasized more than fear. According to Eckhart

this is why many prayers begin with "Our Father" and not "Our Lord;" the former title shows more kindness and love [Fox, Breakthrough]

In light of these two different kinds of traditional emphasis in Christian and Islamic theology, it is surprising that Ibn 'Arabi and Eckhart go in the opposite direction. Indeed, Ibn 'Arabi puts more emphasis on God's personality and Eckhart pays more attention to God's transcendence. To explain, it should be noted that most philosophers regard God not as a person but as an object and mention Him as "that." Ibn 'Arabi, however, holds that true mystics regard God as a person and not as an object and their approach to God is of three sorts, which is manifest in three kinds of remembrance (dikr). The highest remembrance of some mystics is "He" (huwa), that of others is "Thou" (anta), and that of still others, such as Abū Yazid, is "I" (anā). [Al-Futuhāt al-makkiya, vol. 2, 297] Ibn Arabi himself tended to use "He" or "Thou" in his remembrance of the divine. Eckhart, however, sometimes speaks of "He" which is the same as the station of the essence of One and the absolute hidden, and sometimes speaks about "I" which is the station of annihilation. Eckhart speaks less of "Thou".

The conclusions that I draw from these observations include the following. Ibn 'Arabi puts more emphasis on the creature's servitude and on God's personality. Eckhart, by contrast, puts more emphasis on the Lordship on the creature's side and the absolute transcendence on God's side. Both mystics, however, may be regarded as modifying the ideas of theologians and the cultures of their own times. And this modification brings emphasis to an aspect of God that had been ignored in that culture and at that time. Neither theologian, however, is unbalanced in their modifications; both discuss both God's transcendence and His personality.

Conclusions

The God of the "unity of Being", as introduced by Ibn 'Arabi and Eckhart, differs from the philosophers' God and the pantheists' God. Their God is the God of the Quran and the God of The Bible. For both the philosophers and the pantheists,

God is not a person. For the former, God is existence negatively-conditioned and for the latter, God is existence nonconditioned as a division. Neither of these two Gods are transformable. Attributes such as knowledge and will and freedom cannot be attributed to Him, much less attributes such as mercy, kindness, delight, disgust, doubt, and the like.

In his *Incoherence of Philosophers*, while criticizing philosophers who have regarded God in His creation to be caused and not free, al-Ghazālī says: The agent must be willing, choosing, and knowing what he wills to be the agent of what he wills. Averroes criticizes al-Ghazālī, stating that:

This is not self-evident He who chooses and wills, lacks the things he wills, and God cannot lack anything he wills. And he who chooses makes a choice for himself of the better of two things, but God is in no need of a better condition. Further when the willer has reached his object, his will ceases and , will is a passive quality and a change, but God is exempt from passivity and change. [M. Sells, *Mystical Union in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam* (New York, 1996), 222, note 21 (on "Bewildered Tongue")].

As has been argued, if one regards God as entirely transcendent, there will be a deep gap between such a God and the God of the religious. How can we worship a God of whom we have no knowledge? How can such a God become angry toward us? How can we satisfy Him when angry? How can one repent in His presence? How can a God who is not passive accept one's repentance? And above all, how can one love such a transcendent God? The history of paganism shows that mankind always avoids a God who is perfectly transcendent and cannot love Him. Humankind seeks a God with whom they can find some similarity. Paganism is an exaggeration of this insight.

At any rate, philosophers who believe in pure transcendence can never call people toward God. As Ibn 'Arabi puts it:

If there was no trace of religion which has brought Divine news, no one would know God; and if we were contented with the

intellectual evidence which rationalists think that lead one to Godhead, and if we stopped in that He is not such and such, then no creature would love God. When divine news came down through the language of religion suggesting that God is so and so- news that is inconsistent with the appearance of rational evidence- we love God because of these affirmative attributes God has introduced himself only through the news about Himself such as He is kind toward us, His mercy applies on us, He has kindness, mercy and love, and He comes down in limitations and conditions ... [this is because] we symbolize Him and imagine Him in our heart, in our Qibla, and in our imagination as if we see Him. Nay, but we see Him in ourselves, for we know Him through His own definition and not through our thought and idea. [Al-Futuhāt al-makkiya, vol. 2]

Ibn 'Arabi claims that Noah's tribe did not accept his call since he called them toward pure transcendence. His call was discriminatory (farq). If, however, Noah combined transcendence with analogy, and if his call like that of the Holy Prophet (Muhammad) was Quranic (a combination of transcendence and analogy), he would be followed. [Fusūs al-hikam]

Ibn 'Arabi's theology is a theology that can serve the religious. He knew that what was needed was the knowledge of the names of God, not the knowledge of God's essence; for religion calls people toward the names of God and not his essence (Godhead). Although, Ibn 'Arabi's God has a single essence, he has many names and manifestations. He is One God and at the same time He is various. Every day, every moment, and for everyone, He manifests Himself anew, in different ways. He is not the same manifestation for two persons in the same moment or for one person in two various moments. Not only in various religious creeds, but also for Muslims who follow the same Imam in congregation prayer and pray towards the same Qibla, God is different, though there is no more than One God:

In Congregation, everyone who prays in his privacy converses with his God and God encompass him ... for the people of congregation, God is manifest in the totality of oneness and not in the oneness of totality.

For, every person in the congregation converses with his Lord according to his intention and knowledge, as is required by His presence. That is why He becomes manifest for them in the totality of oneness. That is, they are preceded by totality.

Then He relates that to oneness so that, despite their various aims, ideas, qualities, temperaments and relations, they may not regard, in their worships, something to be associated with God. That is why their questions and demands may be various. But if God became manifest for them in the oneness of totality, because of the precedence of oneness, no one would be able to look at the totality. And if this was the case, their aims would become the same aim, their requests would become the same request, their quality of presence would become the same quality and their knowledge of God — the exalted — become the same knowledge. But this is not the case. [Al-Futuhāt al-makkiya, vol. 3]

According to Ibn 'Arabi, everyone has her/his own Lord who is other than the Lord of others; if one knows her / his own self, she/he knows her / his Lord. This can be true because God is not manifest as the oneness of essence (Godhead), but only becomes manifest in the station of names and attributes, and according to the demands of fixed entities. There is a manifestation for every name, and that name is the Lord of that manifestation. And since names are numerous, their manifestations as well will be numerous, and accordingly, lords will be numerous; and everyone in every condition has a lord devoted to her/him and to that condition. The lord of everyone in every condition, is the manifestation of God as a name which fulfils one's need in that moment and one has to call Him through that name; the sick call Him the Healer, the sinner calls Him the Forgiver, and the poor calls him the Giver. God is One and is not conditioned, but everyone has his own lord in every moment:

Every being is satisfied by its Lord. If some being is satisfied by its lord it is not

necessary to be satisfied by the lord of the others. Since every being has received a particular form of Lordship [from among the various forms of Lordship], and it is not the case that all beings receive from a single form. Thus, for every bondsman, only what is suitable for him is determined, which is the same as his lord. No one receives from Him because of His oneness. That is why people of Allāh deny manifestation in oneness. [Fusūs al-hikam, vol. 1]

Unlike the philosophers' God, Ibn 'Arabi's God is not only an agent but a receptacle as well. Some materialist philosophers have conceived the universe as only matter. Others have said: "Give me matter and direction, and I will build the universe," while still others thought that, in addition to matter and direction, motion (and time) is (are) necessary as well. Theistic philosophers regard the matter that materialists speak of as receptacle. Further, they hold that there is an agent and mover who is necessary to make changes in matter. In Ibn Arabi's intellectual system, which is based on the unity of Being, it is God who plays all of these roles. In other words, the substance of the universe is the Divine breath; the forms of the world are His manifestations; and the changes in the world are changes in His manifestations:

All the world is contained in three mysteries: its substance, its form, and transformation. There is not a fourth thing. If you ask from where transformation was found in the world, we will respond that God has described Himself as "Every day He exercises (universal) power" (Quran; 55:29). There are various attributions. God has described Himself to be cheerful because of the bondman's repentance. The Holy Prophet also has said: "God will not become tired unless you may become tired". Those who know Him, i.e. prophets, have said that in the Resurrection Day, he will become angry towards us so that he has never been so angry and he will never be, as His glory requires. Thus, they attribute to Him the state before this anger, when He has not been described with this anger. It has been reported in reliable traditions that in the Resurrection Day God will change into various forms.

And change is the same as transformation God accepts to become manifest in various forms for His bondmen. Also, He has not created the world at the pre-eternal time, but after that. At the pre-eternal time, He had been described to be able to create the world and to become manifest in the form of the creation of the world or not [Al-Futuhāt al-makkiya, vol. 2]

Thus, Ibn `Arabi's God, receiving all forms, is continuously changing. He is both the Giver and the receptacle, He both makes loans to His bondmen and takes loans from them. He becomes hungry, thirsty, and ill with his bondmen; and at the same time, He Himself is the Feeder, Satisfier, and the Healer:

Only he who does not believe denies Divine attributes. God says: "And lend unto Allah a goodly loan" (the Holy Quran; 73: 20). And He says I was hungry and you did not feed me, I was thirsty and you did not satisfy me. All of these, He has stated. Thus, God — the Exalted — does not avoid from attributing such things to Himself. In this way, He warns us that He will become manifest in the manifestations in accordance to their potentiality There is no relation, unless it has a relation with the God and a relation with the creation. [Al-Futuhāt al-makkiya, vol. 1]

Ibn `Arabi's God is continuously interacting with His bondman. He loves us so that He receives every attribution which is related to us:

The truthful lover is he who will be attributed with the beloved's attributions, and not he who brings the beloved to the level of his own attribution. Don't you see that God — the Glorified —, when he loves us, comes down towards us through His hidden graces; and in a form which is suitable for us and far from His own greatness and majesty? When we come to His home to pray Him, He will become cheerful. When after returning from Him, we again repent He will become cheerful. When He sees a young who should be under commands of youth desires, free from these commands, He surprises ... He degrades on behalf of us, and reveals Himself in our hunger, thirst, and illness. [Fox, Breakthrough, 157]

Eckhart's God suffers together with mankind. In The Bible it is written:

Then shall he say also unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels: For I was hungry, and ye gave me no meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me no drink. I was a stranger, and ye took me not in: naked, and ye clothed me not: sick, and in prison, and ye visited me not. Then shall they also answer him, saying, Lord, when saw we thee hungry, or thirsty, or a stranger, or naked, or sick, or in prison, and did not minister unto thee? ...Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye did it to one of the least of these, ye did it to me.

Inspired by these verses Eckhart says: "God suffers with man ... God suffers with me, and suffers for my sake through the love which he has for me." [B. McGinn, in M. Sells, Mystical Union] He teaches that the perfect detachment of the mystic forces God to act. [C. Smith, "Meister Eckhart on the Union of Man with God," in Mystics of the Books]

In line with Christian culture, Eckhart believes that there is more love in the word "father" than the word "Lord." In other words, because of His love, God has become manifest as man's father; thus, many supplications begin instead of "Oh, our Lord" with "Oh, our heavenly father." God, because of His love and kindness, came in the form of man and received human essence. "Now you must know that lovable humility brought God to the point in which he lowered himself into human nature." So it is said that Eckhart's God is a caring, passionate God and it distinguishes his God from many philosophical conceptions of God [Fox, Breakthrough]

Based on evidence such as that cited above, the God of Eckhart as a Christian is the familiar God of all Christians. However, when the mystic begins to theologize about the unity of Being, he no longer seeks such a God.

This is a hadith cited from the prophet Mohammad. "When one of God's servants is hungry, He says to the others, 'I was hungry, but you did not feed me.' He says to another of his servants 'I was ill but you did not visit me.' When the servants ask him about this, he replies to them, 'Verily so and so was ill, if

you had visited him, you would have found me with him. So and so was hungry, if you had fed him, you would have found me with him.” [Al-Futuhāt al-makkiya, vol 2].

He distinguishes Godhead and God in the station of divinity. For Christians, there are three Persons in the station of divinity. Eckhart, however, seeks annihilation in the Godhead and achievement of that station. That is why he says: "We pray that God may release us from God." [Sell, Mystical Language of Unsayng]

As we saw, Ibn 'Arabi's God is in the station of Divinity and not in the station of the essence. He is a God who becomes manifest through various names and not a God which is placed in the darkness of the essence. Thus, Ibn 'Arabi seeks to know the names and not the essence. This is the point at which Ibn Arabi's God becomes distinguished from Eckhart's God. Eckhart loves the Godhead and not the names: "Thou shalt love God as he is, a non-God, a non-spirit, a non-person, a non-form. He is absolute bare unity." [W. R. Inge, Christian Mysticism]

He who seeks to arrive at the Godhead does not tolerate even the plurality of names. That is why, Eckhart's God, unlike Ibn 'Arabi's God who is various and plural, is a God in whom no variety and plurality is admitted:

A person who truly loves God as the one and for the sake of the one and union no longer cares about or values God's omnipotence or wisdom because these are multiple and refer to multiplicity. Nor do they care about goodness in general, both because it refers to what is outside and in things and because it consists in attachment

Thus, Eckhart loves a God who has no name and definition. "He is nameless; He is the negation of all names. He has never been given a name." [Fox, Breakthrough, 175] Everyone, whatever desire and potential he has, should ignore these things and seek only a God who is beyond his desires and potentials. The sick should not call him the Healer, for in this way, the Healer which is in the station of divinity will become more beloved than the Godhead: "If you are ill and you ask for health,

then health is dearer to you than God. Then he is not your God."

Thus, it can be said that Ibn 'Arabi and Eckhart each seeks a different aspect of God. For, according to one scholar, God in the station of God and God in the station of Godhead, are two aspects of the same God, and approaching these two aspects is approaching two kinds of God. Some mystics seek unity and union with God, among them is included Ibn 'Arabi, and others seek for the God without modes (Deus sine mids). [Otto, Mysticism, 158] Eckhart belongs to this second group.

It is worth asking how one can relate to a God without modes and know him; for, it seems that such a God is inaccessible to reason and is beyond our knowledge. Indeed, according to Eckhart a God of whom we can have knowledge is not God: "If I had a god whom I was able to know, I would never be able to regard him as God." [Fox, Breakthrough]

Thus, the way to arrive at God for Eckhart is knowing nothing, seeking nothing and having nothing, i.e. annihilation. If I become colorless, I will arrive at the colorless one: "Since it is God's nature that he is unlike anyone, we must reach the point that we are nothing, in that we can be removed into the same essence he himself is." [Fox, Breakthrough, 328] According to Eckhart, in that unity of essence (Godhead), all dualities and distinctions will go away and we come from being something to being nothing. [B. McGinn, "The God Beyond God," in Journal of Religion 61 (1981)]

Eckhart's views concerning God remind one of the views of certain branches of Hinduism and Buddhism where man's end is to arrive at "annihilation" and "nirvana." This kind of mysticism, which puts more emphasis on negation, is quite different from Ibn 'Arabi's mysticism, which rests upon the affirmative aspect of the Divine names. According to some scholars of mysticism, Eckhart is similar to those Asian mystics who wish to sink in the bottomless sea of the Infinite. [Inge, Christian Mysticism, 160, note 1] It is difficult to resist the comparison when reading statements such as the following: "People must ... be quite divested of all similarity and no longer resemble anyone. Then they are truly like God. For, it is God's peculiarity

and nature to be without any equal and to be like no one. May God help us to be thus one in the unity that is God him-self?"

At the stage of nothingness described by Eckhart, there is not variety within God; the God of all will be the same. All varieties, pluralities, and debates will vanish away. This is a marked contrast with Ibn 'Arabi's God. Ibn 'Arabi's God will become manifest for mankind through the totality of oneness and Eckhart's God through the oneness of totality. In the oneness of totality, there is no motion, no movement, and no sound. All is silence, stillness, and the darkness of Godhead. As Eckhart says: "Everything in the Godhead is one, and of that there is nothing to be said. God works, the Godhead does no work, there is nothing to do; in it is no activity, God and Godhead are as different as active and inactive." [F.C. Happold, *Mysticism: A Study and Anthology* (New York, 1963), 273] Furthermore, God in itself is motionless unity and balanced stillness. [Cf. E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy* (New York, 1955)] As Mileman puts the matter: "Eckhart's God in that darkness of essence is empty even of knowledge and will." [B. Mileman, "Suffering God," in *Mystical Quarterly* 22 (1996)]

Ibn 'Arabi and Eckhart call our attention to two Gods. Ibn 'Arabi seeks to worship God even if He is in this world of corporal forms, whereas Eckhart wants to go even beyond the Divine world and arrive to Godhead — there, even worship makes no sense, for that is the station of liberty and not of servitude. Like Eckhart, Ibn 'Arabi sees "other than Allāh" as "Not He" in which "He" is manifest. Thus, he seeks to achieve a station where he is able to see "He" and "Not He" together, and thus to come to affirmation of "He / not He". Eckhart, however, seeks only for "He", i.e. that hidden identity.

According to Eckhart, all causes will vanish or at least will be invisible for the mystic. For Ibn 'Arabi, however, the perfection of man's perception requires that all things be seen as they are. That is, both incomparable with God and similar to Him. And this is to give everything what it deserves. That is why Ibn Arabi, though he believes that "There is nothing other than Allāh", criticizes those who claim to see only God. [W.C. Chittick, *The Self Disclosure of God*]

One of the reasons behind the difference between the two mystics, is perhaps that Eckhart, in addition to being a Christian, is a great philosopher. That is why one scholar says:

Although he speaks of a laughing and suffering God, when he put on his philosopher's cap, he was apt to lose touch with the biblical God and mistake the stillness of love for the unmoved Mover. In his view, the Incarnation and Passion of the eternal word affected the immovable detachment of God as little as if He had never become man. God having no motives acts without them [D. Steindle Rast, *Meister Eckhart from whom God Hid Nothing*]

Eckhart's Neo-Platonist attitude in regarding God beyond existence helped his view and caused him to depart from belief in a God like Ibn 'Arabi's God. For, there is a great distance between Ibn 'Arabi's God and that of Philosophy, even Neo-Platonism.

To defend Eckhart and justify his difference from Ibn 'Arabi, the issue can be seen that these two great mystics responded to the theological exaggerations that respectively dominated in their times and cultures. Their dual emphasis on the personified God and transcendent Godhead wrapped in an apparent unity was fostered by the exaggerations made by the thinkers, philosophers, mystics and theologians of their times. Muslim philosophers and theologians had made God so transcendent they regarded him as an unconceivable essence of whom no knowledge can be obtained and with whom no relation may be made. In facing them, Ibn Arabi places emphasis on God's personal attributes which have been abundantly mentioned in the Quran and traditions, even if the theoreticians denied them based on their reason. On the other hand, in Christianity, God is not only personal but, in some respect, identified with man through the incarnation of Christ. Jesus is God who is incarnated in human form. Thus, this God is not wholly transcendent but also wholly human, whose attributes such as body, blood, and meat. In facing this, perhaps, Eckhart was encouraged to place emphasis on a Godhead which is beyond Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

Essay: One as Paradox

This text is a translation of the chapter, "L'un paradoxal," from Christian Jambet, *La grande résurrection d'Alamut* (Paris: Editions Verdier, 1990), 139-173. Translated by Michael Stanish

This, in some sense, goes back to the great debate between the "ancients and the moderns" during the Renaissance, when the question of whether the ancients knew better was more pressing than it would be in the Enlightenment period, when the moderns appeared to have won the debate. Today, however, a revival of the religious, indigenous, and ancient in the face of modern ecological and social fallout may lead to revisiting this debate in a more global way.

Known as the "Covenant of Alastu" from the Qur'an, this time refers to the moment when God asks his creation (Adam) "Am I not [alastu] your Lord?" To which (he) replies "Yes!"

The Necessity of Neo-Platonism

The event of the Great Resurrection is the culmination of history; it fulfills, in the eyes of the Nizari Ismaili, the destiny of man in both supernatural time and the time of nations. But this perfection is also a liberation. The appearance of the Resurrector releases his faithful from the obligations of the law in order that they may experience an entirely spiritual existence, which is the truth of the paradisiacal state. It would be, in our view, inexact to perceive this liberation as exhausting itself in the simple disappearance of constraints. Perhaps we would be gravely mistaken in opposing the qiyâmat [resurrection] period to the shar'at period, as if the one would be content to efface the bonds that the other had imposed. Certainly, a liberty is substituted for a constraint. But this liberty is not exhausted in the power to do what had been forbidden. It projects those who adopt it into another space and confronts them with another logic, another theology. The resurrection is the experience of liberty, not simply because it effaces the law, but because it manifests the divine essence.

The Ismaili of Alamût experienced the power of their liberty in the contemplation of the divine unity,

finally stripped of its sails. Their joy, their exaltation, and ultimately, the new obligations imposed upon them by their completely new existence — this whole set of behaviors and feelings belongs to the greatly varied history of the forms of liberty. It is important that these feelings, this elation, the weight of the fallen chains, the rectified body which abandons the ritual gestures of obedience, this set of features in which one of the rare and beautiful moments of liberty is recognized — it is important that all of this was experienced in the encounter with the One.

The unity which, in being contemplated, liberated the men gathered together in this confined community was primarily concentrated in the figure of the Lord of the Resurrection. But, beneath this face, the feeling of liberty really depended upon the presentation of divine unity.

This is why we are unable to truly comprehend the messianic act in which this manifestation took place without seeking recourse to its metaphysical conditions of possibility or, more precisely, to the ontology that is implicitly staged by such an event. Thus, we must now ask ourselves what the divine essence must be and how it must be thought in order that the sudden emergence of its unity in the shape of man, or of a man, may be intelligible.

This interrogation is all the more legitimate given that the Ismaili thinkers themselves did not fail to expressly found the messianic act of the resurrection upon a theology and cosmology which formed an impressive metaphysical edifice. It is rare to see such a close correspondence between a rigorous philosophy and a historical experience of liberty.

Ismaili philosophy underwent many successive developments, and it is not our intention to summarize or even evoke them here. It suffices for us to question two of the most prominent theoreticians and show how, not without differences, they bring us closer to the real upon which the experience of Alamût can be founded. These two metaphysicians are thinking on the horizon of neo-Platonism. There is, on the one hand, Abû Ya'qûb al-Sijistânî (who, following the Persian pronunciation, we will call Sejestânî) and on the other, Nasîroddîn Tûsî. The first is a dâ'i, which is to

say, a Fatimid missionary. The second is a witness to the fall of Alamût. They are situated, respectively, at the beginning and at the end of this history. Despite their profound lexical or doctrinal differences, they are connected, and their choice here is justified — for the purposes of understanding an event that Sejestânî never knew of, and that Nasîroddîn commented on as a *fait accompli* — by a common passion for the ontological foundation of the particulars of their faith.

I would like to draw the reader's attention to this fact, which I find essential: if there is any moment in the history of Ismailism that strongly resembles the proclamation of the Great Resurrection, it is certainly the end of the third/ninth century. As we briefly recalled in our introduction, those we called *al-qarâmita*, the Qarmatians, were awaiting the return of the imam Mohammad b. Ismâ'il. They made themselves feared through their tremendous military incursions, and made themselves hated by the majority of the Muslim world when they removed the Black Stone from Ka'ba. And yet, it is in the intellectual milieu of the Qarmatians that Sejestânî's master, Mohammad b. Ahmad al-Nasafi, composed his *Kitâb al-Mahsûl*. He completely reformed Ismaili theology by introducing the neo-Platonism which became the henceforth obligatory frame for the metaphysical thought of Ismailism. It strikes me as highly suggestive, then, to see this time as combining an exigent quest for the Day of Resurrection and the abolition of the law, a tragic experience of liberation, and the adoption of a neo-Platonism that makes possible an intense meditation on the One. Sejestânî's treatises, saved from the disaster in which his master's works perished, are the most proximate to this tragic experience of the Qarmatians, even if Sejestânî is, for his part, a *dâ'i* faithful to the Fatimid branch. His treatises are not far, in their existential tone, from the pages of Nasîroddîn Tûsî, which are tributaries of the experience of Alamût. They express, in effect, a similar concern for the messianic act and for its causes lying in the ontological structure itself.

It is no less suggestive to note, in these two cases, the following philosophical fact: in order to problematize a messianic event, whether it be a

fervent premonition or already experienced, it is necessary to interrogate the nature of the One, the nature of the procession of existents [existants], and also to interpret the messianic event according to the laws of engendering the multiple from the One. Why was this theoretical schema so necessary?

It seems to us that there are two simple enough reasons for this. First and foremost, the neo-Platonic schema of the One and the multiple permits the One to be situated beyond any connection with the multiple wherein it would be totalized or counted as one. The One is thought beyond the unified totality of its emanations in the multiple. On the other hand, freed from any link with the totality of the existent [existant], and situated beyond Being [l'être], the One can signify pure spontaneity, a liberty with no foundation other than itself. In this way, the sudden messianic appearance of the Resurrector will be founded in the creative liberty of the originary One; thus, in the necessary reign of the existent, the non-Being that results from the excess of the One will be able to mark out its trail of light.

But, conversely, this creative spontaneity will also explain the creation of the existent, the ordained and hierarchized formation of universes. Just as much as with the unjustified liberty, the One will be able to justify the procession of the intelligible and sensible, and the gradation of the spiritual and bodily worlds. Avoiding dualism, all while thinking the duality between the One and the order of Being which it interrupts; conceiving, on the other hand, of the unity of order and creative spontaneity — all while preserving the dualist sentiment — without which the experience of messianic liberty was impossible: this is what neo-Platonic thought offered to the Ismaili.

The key to such a theologico-political structure is the concept of the imperative, or command (*al-amr*). By borrowing it from the lexicon of the Qur'an in order to introduce it into the neo-Platonic schema, the Ismaili thinkers made more than a simple theoretical modification, and constructed something better than a philosophical and religious syncretism. It is thanks to the concept of the imperative that the free spontaneity of the One founds the messianic appearance, and it is thanks to the concept of the

command that universes can be founded in this same primordial divine unity. Command and imperative, an imperative whose underside is the command itself, such will be the concept that we will have to situate. The Ismaili conception of an unsayable liberty, which is to say a real liberty, depends upon it. It is within the imperative that the unsayable is knotted to the real.

The Great Resurrection of Alamût was the historical experience of this imperative. Human liberty was experienced as the expression of the originaire [instauratrice] spontaneity and unconditioned liberty of God. The abolition of legalitarian religion, the culmination of history, the superexistence [surexistence] at the heart of a living community in a state of spiritual resurrection, the extinguishment of ancient obligations and divisions, and the sole duty to recognize the exigency of divinization, the proof of an event wherein the infinite becomes accessible and is made into the very soul of life: such are the facets of a freedom that is quite strange for us.

The Ismaili experience of liberty is not the discovery of the autonomy of consciousness or the political rights of the individual. It is the feeling of a different and powerful idea: liberty is not a moment of Being, and it is even less a piece in the game of the existent. Liberty is not an attribute, but rather a subjective affirmation without foundation. Liberty is not a multiple effect of the One, but it can be nothing but the One, disconnected from whatever network of constraints it engenders or by which, on the contrary, it would come to be seized. Liberty is the experience of this non-Being of the One, through which the One inscribes itself in the universe of both Being and beings [l'étant] as pure alterity.

But, in order to support such a schema of liberty and the One within the thinking of the imperative, the Ismaili needed a religious vision of the world. The experience of liberty is not made possible here by the distance man would impose on God. On the contrary, it is identified with the manifestation of the divine essence, with the imperious condition that the divine essence be beyond Being. The liberty of the men in the experience of Alamût was this revelation — taken seriously — that the first real,

the foundation of all reality, is not itself a reality. The foundation rests on no foundation. Indeed, this is what is proper to foundation when considered in its essence. But that it eludes its own status, that it frees itself from itself, from what remains in it of an originary ground, or from a point that is attributable to some reality — this is the radical gesture of Ismaili thought.

The presence of the Lord of the Resurrection demonstrates the infinite void of the deity. That which the Platonic sage contemplates in the ecstasy to which he was unable to lead his companions in ancient slavery is, here, what a communitarian life would like to make into a permanent exercise. That which scintillates beyond all naming will have, for the time being, to await the great day of the communitarian ideal in order to be named. The Ismailians' experience is indissolubly linked to the religious vision of the world, because this vision alone permitted them to encounter the One beyond Being. Thus, it is not in spite of God but in combat with the unnamable unity of divinity, with the unsayable of divine liberty, that the Ismailism of Alamût offers us the spectacle of a superhuman attempt at liberation.

In order to be unburdened of the ordinary constraints in the subjugated town, the Ismaili community identified its way of life with the expression of the divine imperative and the infinite liberty of the principle. By bringing themselves closer to God rather than breaking away from Him, they attempted to overcome the law of this God, which, in any case, said nothing that was not desired by God, who in the form of the Resurrector was henceforth made more manifest than He had ever been under the aegis of the law. Let us ask ourselves what kind of face this God must have had that they wanted to be so near to, to the point of deciphering it in the human person, naming themselves "muqarrabân," "Those Brought Near" [Rapprochés]?

It is in order to respond to this question that neo-Platonic thought became necessary very early on for the Ismaili. This was not a chance philosophical dressing-up, the kind of coating that some scholar would put on a pre-constituted theology, but rather a restrictive schema without which this theology

would not have been able to clearly think through the messianic event and its consequences for subjective life. Without this schema, there is no subject, no proof of liberty. Only a neo-Platonic conception of the One, structured around the powers of the imperative, could allow the Ismaili to free God from all attachments to Being as well as beings, and to think him in the dimension of the infinite. But, conversely, this neo-Platonic schema can overturn itself and become the complete order of reality. Humanity can then be thought of as the manifestation of, and privileged receptacle for, the imperative. It can devote itself to a fate other than one of submission to some supreme being: the exemplarity of creative spontaneity and primordial divine origination. In consequence, humanity would have to pay the price that this liberty carries with it: another type of submission, no longer to Being or some figure of beings, but to the order originated by the pure act with which it had identified itself, thereby turning the spontaneous liberty it had discovered into an infinite obligation. It is this movement of liberty transforming into its opposite at the very moment of its appearance, and this movement of an obligation identified with liberty at the moment of its imposition, which we will now attempt to understand.

An Examination of Kashf al-Mahjûb

Abû Ya'qûb Ishâq b. Ahmad al-Sijistânî, or al-Sijzî, is one of the most important Fatimid Ismaili authors. He lived during the middle of the fourth/tenth century. According to S.M. Stern, he must have run the jazîra, or mission territory, of Khorâsân, following the death of his master al-Nasafi, after having been in charge of the Ismaili organization in Rayy (where the dâ'îs of Mosul and Baghdad were under his command). He was, without a doubt, still alive in 360/970.

The work of this high-ranking dignitary cannot be overestimated, and his study "is absolutely indispensable, because he is our principle source for the Ismaili philosophical doctrines of the fourth/fifth century." We do not intend, however, to examine him as a historical source. Through the following reading of one of his treatises, *The Unveiling of Hidden Things* [Le Dévoilement des choses cachées], we hope simply to highlight the

metaphysical approach that was born out of the fusion of Ismaili theology and neo-Platonism. We also hope to demonstrate the conceptual edifice it constructed, emphasize the ontology that supported it, and situate the central role played by the imperative in this ontology — or, more precisely, henology. Indeed, the metaphysics of the creative imperative during the time of Alamût retained the power it had acquired during the inaugural phase in which Sejestânî played a foundational role. Of course, we will see modifications and inflections, but we can only judge them on the basis of the completely radical henology that we shall now try to present. We are proceeding according to a guided reading of the *Unveiling*, but not without mentioning Abû Ya'qûb's other texts when it seems necessary, and not without lamenting the absence of a collected study on such a crucial author.

The Unveiling of Hidden Things is composed of seven chapters, which are in turn divided into seven "investigations." The first chapter is entirely devoted to showing the true nature of God, or rather, to demonstrating that he has no nature, that he possesses no Being, and that he does not belong to the domain of existents with whose Being he does not identify.

The second chapter, "In memory of the primordial creation," is on the topic of the Intelligence, which is the primordial originated [l'instauré primordial]. The third chapter deals with the second creation — the universal Soul — whose constitutive members are human souls. As logic would dictate in this procession, after the Soul comes the third creation, Nature, whose examination occupies the fourth chapter.

The fifth chapter is not about a distinct stage of creation, but it explores the world of species, which is internal to Nature, the world of the "nativities," the world of the three kingdoms (mineral, vegetable, and animal), as well as the laws governing the relations between these species and the individuals that comprise them; it is an elementary treatise on physics.

The sixth chapter concerns the fifth creation — the prophecy — and the cycles of the prophetic mission. It concludes with an important meditation on the special function of Jesus, the son of Mary.

This meditation transitions into chapter seven, "in memory of the sixth creation," which deals with the resurrection and its authentic meaning. This resurrection supposes a Resurrector who completes the last cycle of the supernatural history of humanity. This is not the topic of only the last chapter for, in truth, its veiled presence supports all of the theses that touch upon the resurrection. If Sejestâni is able to do without a completely deployed Imamology here, it is because he will have questioned it in the exegesis of Jesus' role, since the function of the prophet Jesus is defined by the esoteric meaning of the resurrection.

This outline leaves nothing to surprise. At first sight, it is composed of three unequal parts: a first chapter dedicated to the unity of the Creator and the unsayable principle of all reality. Four chapters, then, explain the procession of the expressions of the imperative, which is to say the divine word, the Intelligence, the Soul, and Nature. Finally, two chapters speak of the prophet and the resurrection, which is to say that they speak about the exoteric (religious law, apparent reality) and the esoteric (role and effects of the Imamate). In truth, three implied structures allow us to discover the intrinsic order here.

A first structure clearly isolates the first chapter, dedicated to the principle, from the six other chapters, which are all devoted to one aspect or another of creation. The total number of chapters, seven, is homologous with the seven cosmic cycles, the seven imams of each cycle, and so on. But the number six is no less charged with meaning. It is, Sejestâni tells us, a perfect number: "From this we are led to understand that the six periods (of the cycle of prophecy), from the age of Adam to that of Mohammad, each in its own time, produce the spiritual Forms, the perfection of the Call (da'wat) of each period's prophet, and the perfect proportion given to his message by the Qâ'im, without which the component parts (of each period) exceed the number six." The procession of the six creations — the Intelligence, the Soul, Nature, the natural species, the prophet, and the imam — is, thus, isomorphic with the succession of the cycles corresponding to the six major prophets — Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Mohammad — and thus with the history "in heaven," which

determines the Earthly history of humanity. This homologation, governed by the number six, repeats itself as follows: the six days of creation, the six energies (movement and rest, matter and form, space and time), the six sides of a volume in space, the six parts of man (two hands, two feet, the back and the stomach). Just as the seventh part of man is the head, in which all of creation is summed up, so too must the first chapter bear upon the One who governs the body of creation and makes it live "unto the imperative."

But we can still discover a second structure, this time organized as a function of the preeminence of the Imamate, which isolates and emphasizes the figure of the Messiah and the theory of resurrection. In fact, while still preserving the unique position of the principle, it is possible to read the first six chapters as the exposition of the procession, from the One beyond Being up to the prophet and the Imam. There is an obvious continuity at the heart of this set formed by the exposition of the principle and its expressions, while the seventh chapter reveals the meaning of this set, the destination of the procession, the universal conversion of Being which is only made possible by the efforts of man. The generative source of universal eschatology is the perfect man, for whom the act of being is merged with his resurrection. This eschatology responds to God's call to his creation, and it transmutes the whole universe into a perfect mirror of the One. Sejestâni's book is thus a bipolar one wherein, depending on the point of view, either the first or the last chapter gives meaning to everything, like two poles reflecting one another.

Finally, the third structure. There is nothing strange in the fact that a rupture is produced following the long-awaited procession of the Intelligence, the Soul, and Nature. We are no longer talking about one or another of the immaterial hypostases, but rather two integrated figures, who are indeed external existents but ones who, in order to live, need to become flesh in this physical world: the prophet and the Imam. Indeed, we must remember the similarity that our author has pointed out, in the Book of Springs [Livre des sources], between the Christian cross and the profession of faith in Islam.

Let us recall what Sejestânî emphasizes there: a structure with four terms, four "supports of unity." The two "spiritual prototypes," the Intelligence and Soul (aslâni), and the two "foundations on Earth," the prophet and the imam (asâsâni). They are divided up thusly: the imam is likened to the foot of the cross, while the piece of wood extending from it is like the Intelligence; the left arm of the cross is homologous with the Soul, and the right arm with the prophet. These four terms exhaust the invisible and visible, celestial and Earthly, principles.

In his prologue, Abû Ya'qûb insists upon the intention that guides him: it is a matter of refuting "the masters of perdition" who "liken the Creator to the created." They believe that they are able to speak of the unknowable, of divine ipseity, and think they can define its essence by enumerating its attributes. They attribute an essence to God. Such is the association they make between the Creator and the creature: community in the possession of an essence. But the true attitude consists, on the contrary, in stripping God of all essence. The only legitimate knowledge [savoir] rests upon this fully assumed unknowing [inconnaisance]. Knowledge, henceforth, concerns the hierarchized degrees of creation, the angels, men, the resurrection, the totality of universes, and the infinite richness of the existent. But the condition of such a science is precisely the unscience [inscience] of that which does not figure as an object of knowledge — the principle. The pretention to know God in the way one knows a thing has the correlate impact of a negligence in the exploration of worlds, of numbers, and of beings. Sejestânî's Ismailism is, all told, the experience of a non-knowledge [non-savoir] and the production of a multiplicity of knowledges [savoirs]. Non-knowledge is the foundation of knowledges, just as the One is the originator of existents. In accordance with these necessary and legitimate knowledges, Sejestânî gives men the ethical duty "to become consubstantial with gnosis," "as the movement of the fire is inseparable from the fire itself."

The Problem of Divine Essence

The tawhîd is an attestation, the recognition of what exactly the unity of the Creator consists in. We must, consequently, understand what the One is, not

as one number among others, but in that which absolutely separates it from the chain of numbers. Our analysis will excise everything from the One that contradicts its power. To this end, we must remove from it the property whereby existents possess an essence.

The technical term, which Islamic philosophy will trivialize when it comes to designating essence, is al-dhât. So, for Avicenna, "it is the term that best renders the general idea of what a thing is, in a profound and intimate manner, but without considering it from a particular point of view." The word al-dhât in Avicenna's work will gradually take on the clear meaning and univocal usage that it will retain in the subsequent history of Islamic philosophy. But it will never be the sole designation for the essential Being of a given reality — all the more reason why it is not yet in its standard usage with Sejestânî. In order to say that essence is excluded from the Creator, he makes use of the notion of reity [réité], or thingness [choséité] (tchîzî in Persian). The concept of thingness for him is, first of all, strictly equivalent to that of essence: thingness names essence, but in a slightly different manner than the word al-dhât. The latter term puts the accent on the innermost center of a thing, on what the thing under consideration truly is. Essence (al-dhât) is the response to the question "what is existent?" (in Greek: ti to on). It is what Aristotle calls the ti esti, as the determination of ouisa.

This is why when one speaks of essence, one is inevitably led to enumerate certain attributes, to explore properties, to verify differences. This is also why a theory of essences leads to a theory of genres, of species, and of individuals, since essence is never defined any more precisely than as taking part in a certain order, due to inclusion in a collection. A theory of essences opens outward to conclude in a doctrine of classification.

Of course, Sejestânî refuses the proposition that God, conceived in his extraessential unity, possesses attributes, that he is subjected to an order, and that he would be the supreme term of classification. The Persian word tchîzî, like the Arabic word al-dhât, names essence quite well. But let us be carried onward by the semantic charge of the word thingness.

What is a thing? It is an existent, but not just any existent. It is the existent conceived as an object. It is what one can hold, manipulate, or contemplate. It is the existent, such as it is placed in the universe according to a certain configuration. To say that God has no thingness is to affirm that nothing in him can be made graspable, manipulable, or observable in the manner of a stone, a statue, or some other thing. Which, consequently, is to say that God has no objectivity, that he is not an object, and that he can only be a subject. Rather than insisting upon essentiality, the very concrete term thingness insists upon the petrification of Being. The thing succumbs to a certain configuration, which is a limitation on it and a determination through which the spontaneity of the real is debased, until it is lifted up in beings.

Essence, conceived as thingness, is the character of that which is apt to constitute itself in the real in the mode of "the thing." Henry Corbin wrote in a note in the *Book of Springs*: "It will concern particularly the shay'īya (tchîzî in Persian, literally, reity), an abstraction derived from shay' (thing, res) which, precisely because it results from an operation of abstraction, presupposes the operation of the Intelligence." Thingness is infinitely concrete, since it always falls under something that it is possible to grasp, and it is infinitely abstract, when understood as the essence of the thing. It becomes a pure abstraction of the mind which will define what characterizes the beings that one might encounter in the world of creatures. Knowledge determines the reity of the thing, it isolates this essence on the one hand, and leaves the fact-of-Being [fait-d'être], the *esse*, as a remainder on the other. The residual thingness, then, indicates this fact-of-Being rather than participation in an order, which is the determination at the heart of a classification.

Thingness is not simply the source of possession, intimate to this reality being conceived, the unified source of qualifications and modes, a permanence solidly contained within a hierarchy, an ontic mastery. It is, rather, the fact of being something, the fact of being presented in Being as an effectuation of the *esse*. The thing, qua thing, is distinguished from the other-than-self not primarily by its characteristics or attributes, but by its singular position, its sturdy configuration. It has a

certain shape, it enters into the universe through the fracture caused by its act of presence. This is why reity, thingness, is just as much the act of existing as it is essence. It is the passage from the one to the other. By denying that God possesses a reity we are led to remove essence from him, but we also remove the act of being and presence. Even if the Ismaili lexicon sometimes represents the One in terms of a philosophy of presence, the radicality of Ismaili thought excludes the possibility that God is the presence of himself. Every time Sejestânî says simply *tchîz*, the thing, he also intends *al-wojûd*, which in Arabic means existence or the act of being. Thingness is this act of being something, of undergoing the passage into the existence, within the Being proper to the thing, of some intelligible essence. Reity is the fact-of-Being, essence as the effectuation of the *esse*, joined with an *existere*. It is *ousia* as much as it is to *de ti*, as well as *as ti esti*. The thing, the particular exemplification of *esse*, is thus indissociable from the existent; it is indissolubly knotted to its act of being.

Sejestânî barely differentiates here between essence and the concrete existent since it is not important to distinguish that which exists from its essence, but rather to carefully discern the solid knot of Being and the existent — which constitutes the thing and its thingness — from that which is no thing and possess no thingness. This poses a lexical problem for Sejestânî. To designate the One, the focal point, separated from all things and deprived of all thingness, irreducible to Being, Sejestânî finds nothing better than the same Arabo-Persian term *dhât*, by which the tradition will later designate essence! Henry Corbin thus translates it by "the in-itself" [*l'en-soi*]. We must hear here the real of the One, itself irreducible to any *res*, to any reality. We will learn, in the explication of the concept of Intelligence, that this is nothing other than reality, which is to say, the first originated Being. Ismaili thinkers thus differentiate between the real and reality, a difference that is designated by the terms *dhât* and *tchîzî* in the first chapter of the *Unveiling*.

Only the One "is separated from all of the things by which we designate that which is created." Let

us remark once again that the term *tchîzî* has this important connotation: to-be-a-thing, which is to have limits. Yet the notion of the limit comes from sensible knowledge. The existent is first presented in the physical form of its surfaces, of its sides. Let us not neglect this aspect of Sejestânî's apophatic reasoning: God is not a thing, he has no limit, because he is not subject to bodiliness — understood not simply as the fact of being a body, but more generally as the fact of being figurable. The real is the infinite. At a time when the cosmos is a closed-off world, where the idea of an infinite actually existing in the universe seems to be a contradictory representation, it is within the One that the infinite — which is not the indefinite — finds its abode. The One is pure infinity, without foundation or reason, and this is why it possesses no thingness that could deprive it of this infinitude.

In the same movement, the thought of the One repudiates both thingness and the membership of the divine names and their attributes in the essential reality of the Originator. To situate God beyond Being is to exalt him over and above his own names. Conversely, to free the divine real from the determinations in which its own attributes would imprison it is to differentiate it from everything that can be presented as a being, or even as the essence of the existent. Shahrastânî summarizes this reasoning extremely well when he writes that the primitive Ismaili said of God: "We say that He is neither an existent, nor a non-existent, He is neither knowing, nor ignorant, He is neither powerful, nor powerless. And the same goes for all attributes. For, truly affirming [an attribute of God] would mean that He and the other existents share the modality that we would say belongs to Him, which is assimilationism."

In a slightly different style, this is also what we read in the *Brothers of Purity*: God is the originator of existence, no existent precedes him in Being, but the outpouring of his generosity causes all reality to be. That is to say, the real of the One consists entirely in this generosity and infinite power of effusion, which is the Ismaili form of freedom. God sets the supreme limit at the top of the hierarchy of existents (which implies that divine unity is outside of all limits, and that it, itself, is not the initial limit). God is the real of pure origination and he is

constituted entirely by his imperative, which brings into Being both the Pen and the Well-Preserved Tablet (the Intelligence and the Soul) — corresponding, respectively, to the Throne and the *Korsi*.

It is therefore equivalent to say that the One is radically distinguished from everything that can ever come into Being or, on the contrary, that it is entirely indistinct. It is even through its own indistinction that it exceeds the universe of the existents. That it is beyond any naming is understood in two ways: the One, the divine real, does not lie in the names that it receives, and on the other hand, no name is capable of receiving it. The One is rebellious to all signs, it is unlocalizable: by the eminence of its condition and the force of its domination, it surpasses everything that marks the network of causes upon which the creatural world depends. Reality, for its part, is always marked or distinguished by names, while the One is exalted beyond distinction itself. When we designate the One by particular namings, we are incapable of conceiving its superexistence. The name of the One is the name of the indistinct.¹⁷ This is why the authentic attestation of the Unique is the negation of attributes, whereas the affirmation of attributes is the renouncement of the *tawhîd*.

The origin of such a negative theology is not a mystery: it has to do with neo-Platonic philosophy. But what philosophy, and what sort of neo-Platonism, are we dealing with here? In order to respond to this question, it would be necessary to establish an exact history of the transmission of Hellenic schemas to Ismailism — yet this is precisely where we are left to conjectures. Nevertheless, we are not left entirely in doubt.

I will formulate the following hypothesis: the neo-Platonism which irrigated Ismaili theology — such as it will have been reformed by al-Nasafi and Abû Ya'qûb Sejestânî — is of Plotinian allegiance. It doubtlessly benefited from the dissemination, more or less contemporary with the reform in question, of the so-called Theology of Aristotle and other texts coming from the *Enneads*. We know that the Theology is a highly coherent montage, made up of Plotinian treatises assembled by Porphyry in the order of the final *Enneads*. Is Porphyry also

responsible for the original assembly of the Theology? Was it initially translated into Syriac, then from Syriac into Arabic, ultimately to be revised by the philosopher al-Kindi?¹⁹ This work has always played a decisive role in the formation of the metaphysical systems of falsafa, notably in imposing or confirming the schema of a procession of the Intelligence, the Soul, and Nature, starting from the One. And yet, indeed, this is also the schema adopted by our Ismaili "reformers" in the fourth/tenth century.

Two critical revisions of the Theology exist: a shorter ten-chapter version, and a longer fourteen-chapter version, known to the West in its Latin translation. In a well-known article, Mr. S. Pinès — working from fragments published by the Russian scholar Borisov — demonstrated the proximity of this longer version to the theses of Ismailism. Ismaili theology situated the originating function of the Word, or divine imperative, between the One and its emanations (the Intelligence and the Soul). Pinès found this same pairing of the One and the imperative in Borisov's fragments. The Word plays a decisive role there in the engendering of the Intelligence. But this vocabulary of origination and the Word, of the imperative and the sovereign speech of God, is not Plotinian. It intrudes on the Plotinian schema in order to accentuate that which concerns the liberty of the principle, and to incline the whole ontological schema towards the meaning of this liberty. If it is accepted that this is found in one of the versions of the Theology, then it must necessarily be concluded that this is due to a mutual influence of Arab Plotinism — transmitted under the name of Aristotle — and Ismaili theology. On the one hand, this confirms that the Ismaili adoption of the doctrine of the One has its origin in the spread of Plotinism. On the other hand, it must also be supposed that this adoption was not simply passive, but that it led in turn to considerable modifications in the image and doctrine formed out of a procession of the Intelligence and the Soul — beginning with the fact, which was fundamentally new for Hellenic thought, of the Word or imperative.

Could it be suggested, following Pinès, that the long version of Aristotle's Theology was itself the fruit of a work heavily determined by the

theological reform of radical Shi'ite thought? Starting from a Plotinian vulgate attributed to Aristotle, could the long version, or its Arabic equivalent, have been rewritten? Could the role of the Word have been emphasized in a general movement of thought in which Ismailism played, to say the least, a stimulating role? In other words, if Ismailism received the definitive structures of its theology from Plotinism between the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries, is it not this reformed Ismailism which, in return — by virtue of mutual contributions, through exchanges we have no trace of except for just a few conclusive effects in a few texts — could have filtered the Plotinian contribution and determined its appearance according to its own ends? With Nâsir-e Khosraw, we see that the Greek sages are called upon to found the authentic doctrine of the One, and to be in harmony with the Ismaili tawhîd.

Procession & Genesis

Thingness is the fact of substances, it is the distinctive feature of existents. They come into Being in the natural world through the effect of a genesis. Sejestânî carefully distinguishes between procession, which only applies to eternally originated beings (the Intelligence, the Soul), and genesis, which is the process of engendering existents that are composed of matter and form. But it must be remarked that the Greek concept of proodos (procession) is itself transformed. Properly speaking, the Intelligence does not proceed from the One, but is originated by the unsayable and free act of the Word, that is to say, the imperative. The Soul, in turn, is originated by the mediation of the Intelligence. There is a procession of the Soul starting with Intelligence because a mediation exists between them, but it is only through a convenience of language that we say there is a procession of their pairing. Nothing could be effused from the One other than the imperative, the originating act itself. As for genesis (the Greek genesis), its equivalent in Arabic is certainly the term al-tawlîd. Sejestânî performs an audacious exegesis of the Qur'anic verse which denies that God had a son or that he himself had been engendered (a verse which is a refutation of Christian dogma). By transposing this refusal of the tawlîd and genesis onto the level of ontological speculation, Sejestânî

demonstrates that the One could not belong to the universe of substances, where everything derives from a genesis. Furthermore, because it is not originated — being itself the originator — the One escapes the two types of engendering that are possible for the existent. "It follows that Being and essence are excluded from it as well": *tchîz* and *tchîzî*, the fact of being and essentiality, the characteristic of existing things, the thing understood as the act of existing and thingness, or even as essence.

Let us ponder the significance of this exclusion, of this Ismaili refusal: the One is not, and we must remove from it that which institutes beings in their Being. Is this to say that the One is not real? Not in the least. The One is real because it is not. Or, better put: it is the real by virtue of that which deprives it of essence and existence. We will see that everything which exists is a moment of the intelligible or an expression of the Intelligence, which encompasses the totality of realities, the perfect and complete set of essences. These multiple Beings are unified by the Intelligence, which is itself originated by the real of the One — in this case, the originated One (and no longer the originating One). But this One, which achieves the primordial origination of the Intelligence, is not. Being begins there where the first originated thing surges forth into Being. In this way, to surge forth into Being and to surge forth as Being are one and the same origination. Out of the One — which is nothing, and does not exist — Being itself comes to be in the form of the universal reality of beings, that is to say, Being and its intelligible manifestation in the Intelligence. This whole of reality is every thing, all beings, but it is also the place where Being exits from the unsayable, where it was in no way in supply of itself, where it was not in potential. Being comes to be in the very movement wherein beings are originated by the One which is not.

The One is prior to Being. But it is, just as well, totally immanent in the Being it originates. If it transcended the intelligible Being of that which it first originated, then it would be "another" Being. The One is not another Being, it is not the Being of beings which would be other than the beings whose Being it is [*il n'est pas l'être de l'étant qui serait*

autre que l'étant dont il est l'être]. The One is other than the Being of beings. Thus, it is not localizable with respect to Being or beings, but the One is rather the unbound force of that which is not bound by Being, within the originated which depends upon its non-existent origination [*instauration non-étante*]. Its result is necessity, its root is liberty.

Universal reality, the intelligible universe, therefore depends upon the inexistence of the One. It is because of this inexistence — not sutured by the One, but liberated in Being by the inexistence of the One. Totality is always a deterioration, a weaker expression of the liberty of the One, a manifestation in which the One, succumbing to Being in order to effuse it, constrains itself to the translation of the unsayable, that is, the universal. But the ordered set of the multiple moments of the Intelligence (of reality) is unified by that which resists all unification, by that which only allows itself to say "one" with the immediate stipulation of not existing, of not being seized by the register of Being. This must be insisted upon: the One is the foundation of reality, but if it is ontologically prior to Being, and if it modifies all Being with its origination liberty, then it is not present to the beings that it originates. Just as it does not transcend beings, neither is it the quiet presence of Being or the scintillating origin of everything. Being alone is capable of residing, of lying near itself, in the presence-to-self of that which is. In the One, there is not enough Being for a presence to take place. Intelligible universal reality depends on the absence of any place, on the absence of the One, of that which is able to hear itself: it depends on the One as absence, the absent One, the absence of the One. But in every hypothesis, the absence of the One is not merely the other side of its presence.

For the Ismaili, this void at the heart of Being, which supports the eternal origination, is more real than the reality that it originates. Their ontology, it seems to me, borrows the instruments necessary for thinking the opposition between the real and Being from Plotinism. It is within the mutual play of these two poles that the fate of man and the necessity of the messianic event is going to have to be thought.

It would therefore not be fitting to compare the reality of the intelligible — which is the most

eminent there is, which includes within itself everything that can lay claim to reality — and the real of the One. This real is not more eminently real than the Intelligence. Intelligible reality is, on the contrary, reality par excellence, the unique reality, the unifying sum of all realities. In this way it is real, absolutely real, Being. Conversely, the One is not absolutely real, it is even more so not the absolute of the real: it affirms the real, through which the absolutely real is originated.

This real, prior to reality, is that through which reality is endowed with its necessity at the moment it is originated in Being. In the origination of reality, the One which is not bestows the mark of "it is so" upon that which is. It is the cause of existention, not in such a manner that Being anticipates what comes to exist, but in that the existence originated by the One derives from the non-Being of the One. This existence nullifies the unsayable by passing to the act.

This origination is the real of the One. This real is independence, it is liberty on two accounts. The One is free in itself, and it is liberty in the act of origination. It is free in the real that constitutes it and in the operation actualized by this real, for there is no ontological difference between its real and the originating operation. The One is the liberty of Being, a liberty which is real because it does not exist, because it does not proceed from the One in the manner of that which exists. Liberty does not proceed from the One, but it is the One insofar as it is pure origination. Everything that will proceed from this liberty will come into its own proper necessity of Being, and will freely express the One of superessential and superexistent liberty.

In order for this originary liberty to constitute the One, several degrees at the very heart of unity must be carefully distinguished from one another. Thus, we turn here to the neo-Platonic gradation of the pure One, the One which is, and the multiple-One. This gradation corresponds to the first three hypotheses of Plato's *Parmenides*. It is clearly present in Ismaili thought, as is borne witness to in the text we would now like to analyze: it is a short chapter of *Uniting the Two Wisdoms* [Livre réunissant les deux sagesse], a text by the great philosopher Nâsir-e Khosraw. As in the rest of the

book, Nâsir-e Khosraw wishes to show the convergence between Qur'anic ontology and the legacy of Greek wisdom. He places the question of the One under the authority of Pythagoras, the "master of the arithmeticians." Pythagoras held, essentially, that the formation of the world is subject to numbers. The numerical hierarchy gives the law of the sequences proper to existents.

This Pythagorean reference is both classical and important. In truth, it signifies that Platonism is the true ontology, since it is certainly the doctrine of the One and the multiple elaborated by Platonism that we find attributed to Pythagoras here. But it is not unimportant that it is attributed to a mathematician, to the mathematician par excellence. Nâsir-e Khosraw probably intends to establish a homology between existents and numbers: not insofar as numbers are the hidden essences of things — this is certainly the case, and we can find numbers, in order, at the heart of the gradual realities of universes — but primarily insofar as Being best expresses itself in mathematical language. The truth of Being is a matter for the matheme.

Let us examine, first and foremost, the cardinal thesis of Nâsir-e Khosraw: "The origination of the universe in Being comes from the One." Origination here is *ibtidâ'*. It is not the act which engenders Being and bestows upon it a presentation in beings, but rather the fact of the universe's being originated, being produced in existence. It is the universe's essential property of possessing Being, or of having come into Being. The universe (*'âlam*) owes this property to the One. Thus, the One is — prior to Being — the giver of Being and the cause of the existent. It is precisely to justify this point that the Platonic schema must make use of the numerical chain.

The origination of the universe in Being is the eduction of the multiple starting from the One, because universal reality is characterized as such primarily by the way it is put into the multiple (*mutakaththar*): in this reality, matter represents pure inconsistency, while the limit results from the way the forms submit the inconsistency of this indefinitely divisible matter to unity. Multiplicities are the points of tangency between the One and the pure multiple. But if it is true that the universe

avoids slipping into inconsistency due to the incidence of the One in the form of each species and each individual, then it is no less true that this formal unity is a determination, or even a limitation. In a first sense, consequently, the One causes the universe to pass into existence because it determines the forms, where each form is an expression of the One that puts a limit on the inconsistent proliferation of the material multiple. The forms are hierarchized, and this hierarchy finds its reason in the numerical order of the expressions of the One.

Conversely, it will be no less true that the One existenciates [existencie] the world, universal reality insofar as it is universal, which is to say insofar as it rightfully exceeds all limits. Certainly, the universe is physically closed. It closes up the space contained in the sphere of spheres. But it is mathematically indefinite, like the numerical chain. At this precise point, we are confronted with a problem whose solution I do not see as being simple or univocal: does it suffice to say that ancient and medieval physics did not accept the infinite in actuality, that they always respected a certain image of the "closed world," in order to prohibit the infinite from exercising its power within the models that authorize the representation of physical realities?²⁶ Or, put differently: does it suffice to recall that ancient mathematics does not accept the idea of an infinite numerical set in actuality, and does not define the number by the infinite, in order to then conclude that the ontology relying on a theory of numbers misrecognized the power of the infinite?

Certain distinctions should, without a doubt, be respected. On the one hand, it is accurate to say that each number is a limit, that the One is that which determines, and that the number is the finishing stitch on the proliferation of the multiple. It is not the zero that engenders the series of numbers, but the one. The number, therefore, is not conceived of as beginning with the term designating the empty set, but always as the reflection of a certain plenitude. It would not, however, be completely accurate to understand the One simply in the role of a limit. We must consider that the One situated at the origin of the multiple chain suffers from an internal scission. It does not

stop assuming the function of a limit at all levels of numerical concatenation, a finishing stitch put on the multiple, but it also engenders the multiple as multiple. It is indeed the One that is responsible for the fact that the chain is interminable, that numbers can always be engendered, up to the very point of the inconsistency of matter. This rebellious inconsistency within form is itself the ultimate effect of the power of the One. Nowhere is this power exercised with more mastery than at the heart of the inconsistent multiple, where, nevertheless, no trace of the One is any longer discernable. The One is the infinite power of engendering the multiple, which is given adequate representation and expression only in inconsistency and the void. How can it be denied that there is something in this ontological perspective that exceeds the strict definition of the One as limit, as unifying One? How can it not be seen, consequently, that there is something like a theory of the zero in the Platonic tradition of the One, which is ignorant of itself?

In our opinion, Nāsir-e Khosraw is thinking through the two functions of the One that are thus paradoxically linked; he is trying to think them together, by hierarchizing three concepts of the One that uphold, respectively, inconsistency, the power to engender, and the power to unify.

The paradoxical nature of the One manifests itself, first of all, in the asymmetry of relations between the One and the numbers. In Nāsir-e Khosraw, this asymmetry is expressed in the vocabulary of liberty. This shows its importance for us. The One is "lacking" [en manque] no number, it is "sufficient," it is free. If the numbers did not exist, this would in no way prevent the One from existing, whereas no number would have come into Being if the One did not exist. The infinite power of the One is compensated by the inexistence of the pure multiple, or rather, the identity between non-Being and the pure multiple. The two poles toward which the existent tends — themselves external to the system of Being — are thus nothingness through the excess of the One (the One is not a number, it is not linked to the chain) and nothingness through the inconsistency of the pure multiple (the numbers linked by the chain are not the One). Still, the word "nothingness" is deceptive.

This double polarity is that of the Creator and the universe, of origination liberty and originated multiplicity. Origination, then, will be the eduction of realities in Being, through which the two positions of absolute solitude will be abandoned: the One outside of the numbers, the numbers outside of the One — this is unification, or the formation of the chain.

The One is conceivable in its non-connection with the chain of numbers. On the other hand, the inconsistency that dooms the multiple to non-Being is the material of unifying origination: the chain of numbers is actually engendered and the world really exists. Therefore, a new concept must be supposed in the One: that of the One connected to the numbers. Nâsir-e Khosraw — citing someone he calls Pythagoras — says that this One is the cause of the numbers. The universe is numbered, and it is a substance which is indefinitely divisible into parts (*mutajzzi*). This divisibility is the implication of the multiple in the One. Consequently, the numbered universe's eduction in Being is the production of the multiple by the One.

Let us return to the question of the nature of the One. That it is not a number "like the others," that it is not even a number, caught in the regime of Being and beings — this is what is attested to in its originary position: if one imagines another origin prior to the One, it must still be thought of as the One. On the other hand, the One cannot be divided and cannot be weakened in the way that numbers can be divided. This indivisibility of the One into diverse parts is the condition of its real power. It engenders a divisible multiplicity because it is itself indivisible. In another way, this shows that it is not linked to the chain it engenders, and that it is not connected to the numbers, all of which nevertheless express, to some degree, the power of the One. Nâsir-e Khosraw does not say, then, that the One is, or even that it possesses a Being which is superior to all representation. He tells us that the One only holds up in the real, that it is the real: *qa' im ast*. The One is not existent (*mawjûd*), it is not existence (*wojûd*), but it is subsistent (*qu' lm*) — or more rigorously, it persists outside of the unreal and affirms itself as the pure real. The universe of Being does not begin with the One, which is real, but from the One, whose infinite power subsists

outside of Being in such a way that Being will express it in the infinitely divisible effusion of the multiple.

The two concepts of the One that have already been elucidated are, respectively, the concept of the real free from any connections (whose only representation is in inconsistent matter), and the concept of the One connected to the numbers (whose representation is the universal chain of numbers concentrated in the unifying One). This duality is expressed by Nâsir-e Khosraw in the following pair of concepts: there is unity (*wahadat*) and the One (*wâhid*). In Persian, this pair is: *yeki, yekî-ye mutakaththar*, which corresponds exactly to the One and the multiple-One.

Let us consider the second concept of the One, that of the One connected to the multiple chain of numbers. We can no longer think it independently from this chain. There is no subsistence outside of the relation to that which it unifies and engenders. The One does not possess any real. It is, then, no longer the real. To present this connection between the One and the multiple to his reader, Nâsir-e Khosraw is constrained by his philosophical tradition to make use of a very questionable model: the pair formed by essence and its manifestation. Unity, according to this concept of the One, is henceforth connected to the multiple-One. Unity, thus, is by way of the multiple-One, just as the multiple-One is by way of unity: they need each other as black needs the essence of blackness, as soft needs the essence of softness. No softness without its manifestation in that which is soft, no blackness outside that which is black; but conversely, nothing is soft but by participation in the essence of softness. The multiple-One is the universal participation in unity. This is the universe of unified reality, because it is the universe of participation. The chosen model has the advantage, at least, of making us understand how participation, the major difficulty of Platonism, only finds a solution on the level of the multiple-One.

The full procession is set forth in the following way: real unity, the One or multiple-unity, multiplicity, and the multiple. Nâsir-e Khosraw calls origination (*ibdâ'*) the eduction of the multiple in Being, through the mediation of multiplicity. The origin of this

origination is the *mobdi'*, the originator, the One who is the cause of the multiple-One. The result of the primordial origination is the first Being (*hast-e awwal*). This does not translate to: the first being [*étant*]. It is rather a matter of that which is originarily produced in Being, of that which is, in the same movement, the integral sum of beings, and the Being of beings: *hast*. In its turn, this first originated Being, the Intelligence, engenders the universal Soul. The Intelligence is the dyad, since it is the One which is — the One manifested in Being — connected to Being. But prior to this multiple-One or One which is, we find the originator, the One of the origination.

Thus, to conclude, the various concepts of the One are declined in the following manner:

First of all, there is the One in its pure real (*yekî-ye mand*), superior to unity itself. *Nâsir-e Khosraw* opposes this real of the One to the unity connected to the multiple. But in the very interior of the non-connected One, he distinguishes more delicately still between the real of the One and the unity of the One. The pure One and unity thus constitute two distinct concepts, to which origination and primordial origination thereby correspond. Origination is no longer the connection to the multiple, but the engendering of the One that will be connected to the multiple, and from which the multiple-One will proceed. Therefore, there is a third concept of the One: the One of origination. The pure One is the originator of unity, which excludes the possibility that it could engender the chain of multiples or unify it. It is the real in its pure independence. Unity, originated by the pure One, engenders the One connected to the multiple (but which is not itself the multiple-One). Finally, the One connected to the multiple engenders the multiple-One, which is to say the dyad. The dyad (the universal Intelligence) engenders the Three (the universal Soul), which engenders the Four (the universal Matter).

We are saying here that the One is not itself the multiple-One, although it is the originated One. On this point, *Nâsir-e Khosraw's* text is not clear. On the one hand, it certainly asserts the interiority of the One and its superiority — even though it is the origin of numbers — with respect to the chain that

truly begins with the two, the dyad of the Intelligence. But on the other hand, one could defend the thesis that this chain includes the first originated term, the superior limit of origination, which can only be the One connected to the numbers. It is in this sense that the One which is already sees duality appear within itself.

But let us remember the essential point, which is the tripartition of the concepts of the One. The pure One, absolutely real and non-connected, is *ahad* in Arabic. Unity, or origination, is *wandat*, and the One that enters into connection is *wâhid*. Origination expresses the paradoxical nature of the One: it unifies the multiple, but it is rebellious to any connection to the multiple; it imposes the One upon the pure multiple, but it is beyond any unification and it liberates the infinite power of the real within each determined form. Reality becomes coherent through this origination, but it is also the superior power through which the right of the real — the unsettling inconsistency of origination — can establish itself at the heart of this same reality. Unity (*wandat*) divides the One (*ahad*) by the One (*wâhid*), all while ensuring the origination of the multiple-One. Beyond the One there is the real One, the pure One, which is the subject of no procession, the factor of no determination, but is the unsayable liberty itself.

This deduction can help clarify the following reading of *Sejestân's* first chapter. This chapter is presented, at its base, as a commentary on the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides*: what will there be of the One, if the One is One? Let us recall the consequences that the Platonic dialogue draws from the examination of this hypothesis. If the One must be One, it will not be a whole, it will be figureless, it will be nowhere, it will not be subject to movement (neither immobile nor moved), it will be neither identical to itself nor different from itself, neither similar nor dissimilar, neither equal nor unequal; it will not be within time; in short, it will in no way participate in Being and it will be absolutely unsayable.

These consequences are presented extremely precisely in investigations II to VII: the absence of figure and the exclusion of totality are demonstrated, in the second investigation, through

to the negation of the limit. The fourth investigation excludes place, the fifth forbids time, and the sixth refutes Being. The seventh investigation demonstrates that the negation of all attributes must redouble the negation of this negation: the Creator is non-existent (a non-thing) and not non-existent, and so on. Sejestânî holds the line separating the agnosticism (ta' tin that removes any real from God (and which hypostasizes it in that figure, which is still the nothingness of all things) from the assimilationism (tashbih) that confuses God with one existing reality or another. Indeed, we find here the Platonic approach which desires that the One be neither identical nor non-identical with itself.

The third investigation plays a special role. It first deduces that the One possesses no attributes, by virtue of not being a substantial Being. Sejestânî does not renounce the classical problem of divine attributes and their relationship with divine essence. Divine attributes do indeed exist, but in order that they might exist they must express the qualification of created Being. And yet this created Being, immediately originated by the principle, is none other than the Intelligence, or first substance. Thus, he is permitted to speak about divine attributes and to say that they exist, on the condition that he makes them the predicates of the first manifestation of the principle in Being. But this leads us to shift the emphasis of the problem of the relationship between divine essence and its attributes. The problem loses all meaning on the level of the One, but it gains all of its meaning on the level of primordially originated Being. The key to this theoretical procedure is indeed the concept of origination.

The principle, the One as the subject of origination, is *al-mobdî* in Arabic — the originator. This is the only suitable name, for it does not designate any particular essence of the One, but rather the operative power of which this One is eternally the agent.

The originator of Being possesses no form that could be known. It is highly significant that Ismaili thought tightly conjoins these two themes which would seem to a priori exclude one another: the originator is distinguished from all existents and

from Being itself because the originator is free of any form. But on the other hand, insofar as it is free from possessing a form and deprived of all essence, the originator can concentrate its real into the pure giving of forms, into the originative operation.

This is the manner in which Nâsir-e Khosraw reasons: everything that is known, all reality, possesses a certain form, since knowledge is defined by the representation of forms in the soul (*tasawwûr-e nafs*). An existing reality that would possess no form would be unknowable, yet form — Being — and reality are intimately bound together. This shows that reality requires a giver of forms, a "conformator" (*musawwir*) that will itself be free of any form. In effect, if the conformator itself possessed a form, it in turn would need a conformator, and so on, ad infinitum. If it is necessary for an ultimate conformator to exist, then it must be deprived of form and unknowable. The first cause of all real formations is rebellious to knowledge. The primordial One is thus quite without essence, without form, without thingness. Confirmation of this does not derive from the negative approach, an apophatic approach to the One. It is not only in its unsayable solitude that the One repels form and distinction; it is also in its originative activity. Essentially, we are understanding the One here as the originator. If it is without form, then it is certainly necessary that its operation, origination (*ibdâ'*), should have no connection with originated reality. No connection, no community of essence, is produced between what is formed and knowable and the conformator itself, between the multiple-One and the pure One. Indeed, this is why we previously distinguished three different concepts of the One. The pure One insists in its real, outside of all thingness; this solitude expresses itself in the unity which is capable of originating the universe of forms, outside of any connection. And the connected One will, in turn, express this primordial origination of Being through the pure One, which is paradoxically free of any link to that which it originates. In this way, the pure One has no other property than this totally free operation of origination, from which follows the existentialization of forms.

It is inferred from this that the primordial origination of reality takes place without mediation (miyanji). Only the realities already originated in Being (the Soul, the Intelligence, and the Body) are linked and engendered by the mediation of one another. By being, properly speaking, nothing, the real of the One cannot be submitted to this generative law. Origination is not the procession or emanation of realities, with the one following from the others, and all following from the first reality of the universal Intelligence. Origination is the surging forth of reality through the immediate operation of the real of the One; it is the imperative which causes Being to surge forth as the atemporal event of itself.

The originator is recognized through the Intelligence because it is the effect of its origination, and because the attestation of the unique is, for the Intelligence, the attestation of primordial origination. This origination is what causes the universal reality to be, insofar as it will express the One. On this topic, let us cite a long note by Henry Corbin:

Never lose sight of the fact that the Mobdî, the principle, the originator of Being, is not the First Being. It remains super-Being, hyperousios, beyond Being and non-Being, or rather, beyond non-Being and non non-Being...The First Being is essentially the made-to-be [fait-être] (hast kardeh). The Mobdî cannot be a being; it is the to-make-to-be [faire-être] (hast kardan). Hence, the first being [étant] is the first Intelligence, the primordial originated, protoktistos, the first of the Cherubim. That which the philosophers call al-haq al-awwal would therefore be on the level of this first Being. The double negativity produces a metaphysical gap that must be accounted for if one confronts the cosmogonic schema of the philosophers and that of the Ismaili Theosophs.

We were saying earlier that primordial origination is not procession. In truth, the difference between them will be accentuated by the theoreticians of the reformed Ismailism of Alamût, due to the exaltation of the functions of the divine imperative. But in Sejestânî, things are less clear. Insofar as it is the to-make-to-be, the principle is not distinguished

from the imperative and from origination because it is the One, the generative center of all existents, and it is so directly, without mediation, or rather through the mediation of the two substances of the Intelligence and the Soul. We could say that this principle is on the one hand imparticipable, and on the other hand that it is the imperative or divine speech typifying this imparticipability. Origination, meanwhile, is the monadizing activity that gives its infinite power to the Intelligence. As Proclus writes, in commenting on the analogy between the Good and the sun in the Republic: "For as we refer the sensible multitude to a monad uncoordinated with sensibles, and we think that through this monad the multitude of sensibles derives its existence, so it is necessary to refer the intelligible multitude to another cause which is not connumerated with intelligibles, and from which they are allotted their Being and their divine existence."

The Logical Time of The Attestation of the One

"The originative principle is what [the Intelligence] knows through its very act of being, in such a manner that the knowledge it possesses — through the very act of its Being — of the principle that originates it is the knowledge of the ipseity of that principle. Thus, it is not the case that there is neither existent ipseity, nor inexistent ipseity, outside of that which is revealed [to the Intelligence] through its very act of being."

Let us come back to the structure of logical time implied by this text. What is it that constitutes the ipseity of the One, its effective real? It is not, we know, some essence which would belong to it, independently of all of the other essences. In order for the One to adopt an ipseity, an act must take place. The effect of the act constituting the ipseity of the One is to impose the One upon the real, and to make the One into this real prior to all reality, through which that same reality will be brought into existence. The effect of the intelligible act, which turns out to be the ipseity of the One, is indeed to consecrate the ontological priority of the One. But this act is not the doing of the One. It is an act of knowledge, or better put, of authentic attestation, and consequently it can only follow from the truth operation which constitutes the Being of the first

Intelligence. And yet, this Intelligence is rightfully understood as subsequent to the One, since it effuses the One without mediation.

Insofar as it is absolutely unsayable and deprived of ipseity (in the way in which it is deprived of all essence), the One is this real which by no means accedes to Being, even by way of the truth. It possesses nothing that could identify it. In order to accede to the truth of its unsayable ipseity — that is, in order that it be accessible to unknowing [inconnaissance] — within the completely negative approach which determines, at the very least, the truth of its real, it is necessary for the act of the Intelligence's cognition to take place. This act is itself paradoxical, since it does not recognize the positive essence of the One (which possesses no essence at all), but it experiences the extraessential real of the One. Thus, when it is recognized as truth, the real of the One is always-already the effect of an act, as a very first determination. It might seem to be a vicious circle: the One would proceed from the Intelligence, which would proceed from the One. But this circle cannot be closed. The One, beyond its own truth, forbids such a closure. The figure representing the truth, as in the case of the great thinkers of Hellenic neo-Platonism, will very appropriately be the spiral.

Originated from the point of the unsayable by the pure act which effuses the real of the One, the first Intelligence is converted to the One though an act of knowing which truly posits the ipseity of the One. But between the pure unsayable and the real One that is henceforth established, between the pure One and the real unity of this One, there is a distance which is itself unsayable: the distance that separates that which refuses any act from that which is already seized by an act in its very refusal, which is nevertheless established even if only as a pure constituting. The One is known as constituting; it is participated in as imparticipable.

Here we have well in hand the illustration of the paradoxical nature of the One. The One must be real so that the Intelligence may proceed from it, but it is from the Intelligence that the One receives the attestation of its unsayable truth. This dehiscence of the One, which is the operation of its primordial origination, is immediately originated.

The act by which the Intelligence knows the unsayable in no way plugs up this division, but on the contrary it expresses it and reproduces its mirror image. This reproductive structure "in mirror image" is essential to Ismailism. Let us retain, for the moment, that what is being thought here will never be the quiet presence of Being, but rather the anticipatory division of the One.

This mirroring effect cannot, in our opinion, be interpreted in any other way than the following: the whole of intelligible reality affirms the real of the One and manifests its own particular exigency of the paradoxical One. As for the One, it always anticipates that attestation upon which it nevertheless logically depends. This is why it is able to see the division we are discussing as anticipating its unitude; it is submitted to the power of the two. The One owes the naming of its truth to an intellective operation, which is the fact of the first Intelligence, the first to effuse the One. Simply to say the One is to be situated "downstream from the One," as if the paradoxical One were scanning the real and marking reality with its touch, when this reality begins to be deployed on the level of the universal Intelligence, and only there. Conversely, the emergence of all reality provokes — at the moment of its coming into Being — this touch of the real, which it will then attest to in its own act of existing. The touch of an inconceivable and unverifiable real, "beyond" all naming, upstream or downstream from itself.

Naming will always be inadequate to the One, because it is naming. Naming always comes belatedly [après coup]. But with the One, we can just as well say that all naming is adequate, because it is its own naming. The One only exists, then, to the extent that it is named by the first Intelligence, and the naming adheres to the form of concrete reality wherein the One's scansion comes to leave its mark.

Thus, it certainly seems to us that Sejestānī, and the whole of Ismaili thought along with him, makes a clear distinction between the real and reality; this distinction will be taken up again with vigor by Naṣīroddīn Tūsī and the theologians of Alamūt.

The real is typified by the paradoxical One, whereas reality is organized on the level of the

Being and non-Being that structure the forms of the existent in accordance with the first Intelligence, from which the hierarchy of universes will proceed. The real is purely causative; it causes intelligible reality to exist. Reality receives this touch of the real from the One, which will have two interdependent and contradictory effects: on the one hand, the unity that engenders order and coherence, the pyramid of the species, the regularity of cosmic movements, and the numbers that determine all things, from personal destiny to the cycles of prophecy; on the other hand, the One-effect [l'effet d'Un] that creates the event of the resurrection, that exceeds any numerical chain and subjects the coherence of reality to the experience of a real liberty — in other words, it transfers reality unto the imperative.

Translated by Michael Stanish

This text is a translation of the chapter, "L'un paradoxal," from Christian Jambet, *La grande résurrection d'Alamut* (Paris: Editions Verdier, 1990), 139-173.

Select Notes: Through his missionary effort, the dā'ī Abū Abdallāh Mohammad b. Ahmad al-Nasafi (or al-Nakhshabi), a native of Bazda, a village near Nasaf, earned the adherence of important dignitaries of the Samanid state, in Transoxiana, and even emir Nasr b. Ahmad. But after Nasr b. Ahmad's death, the Ismaili mission was persecuted and al-Nasafi perished in the catastrophe (331/942 or 332/943). His *Kitāb al-Mahsūl* was criticized by another Ismaili dignitary, Abū Hātim al-Rāzī, in his *Kitāb al-Islāh*. Abū Ya'qūb Sejestānī defended his master al-Nasafi in the *Kitāb al-Nusra*. We are aware of this controversy thanks to the critical appraisal of it drawn up by the great theoretician and Fatimid dignitary Hamid al-Dīn al-Kirmānī (d. 410/1019) in his *Kitāb al-Riyād* (in which he often takes al-Rāzī's side). Let us note, as others have, that Nasafi would have asserted that Adam provided not a sharī'at, the rules of human behavior, but rather an esoteric knowledge ('ilm). In this way, Adam would be the origin of the line of prophets, an origin which would become confused with the contribution of a purely spiritual religion. The end of the historical succession of prophets in the figure of the Resurrector, abolishing the positive

religion of Mohammad, would correspond with this. These antinomian tendencies converge with those of those of the Qarmatians, and are certainly in keeping with the exasperated expectations of Mohammad b. Ismā'il's return. This is the same thinker — who seems to upset the balance of zāhir and bātin for the sake of spiritual religion, and who thinks within the element of messianic waiting — who is responsible for the neo-Platonic recasting of Ismaili theology.

See Wladimir Ivanow, "An Early Controversy in Ismailism," *Studies in Early Persian Ismailism* (Bombay: Ismaili Society, 1955), 115 ff. (particularly 145-147); S.M. Stern, "Abu Hatim al-Rāzī on Persian Religion," *Studies in Early Ismailism* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1983), 31 f., "The Early Ismā'ilī Missionaries in North-West Persia and in Khurasān and Transoxiana," *Studies*, 219 f., and "Ismā'ilīs and Qarmatians," *Studies*, 297; Wilferd Madelung, "Ismā'iliyya," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, second edition, Book III, 212, and *Religious Trends in Early Islamic Iran* (New York: Persian Heritage Foundation, 1988), 97 ff; *Kitāb al-Riyād*, p. 176 ff.

Kashf al-Mahjūb, Persian text published with an introduction by H. Corbin, Tehran-Paris, 1949; *Le Dévoilement des choses cachées*, translated from the Persian and introduced by H. Corbin (Lagrasse: Verdier, 1988). *Kitāb al-Yanābi'*, section 155 of *Le Livre des sources*, thirty-fourth source, in Henry Corbin, *Trilogie ismaélienne* (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1961), 103. *Kitāb al-Yanābi'*, sections 147-148 of *Livre des Sources*, thirty-second source, in Corbin, *Trilogie*, 100 f.

A.M. Goichon, *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sīnā*, 134. On the topic of the subtle play between al-dhāt, essence, and al-jawhar, substance - as well as its consequences for Fārābī, to whom Avicenna owes so much - see R. Arnaldez, "L'Âme et le Monde dans le système philosophique de Fārābī," *Studia Islamica* XLIII, 59.

One would need to say corporality [corporalité], following an expression proposed by Guy Lardreau. Sensibility, which causes us to accede to bodily existents, thereby allows us to have a proper grasp of Being and the being. Sensibility unveils the general nature of the existent, thingness,

to us: in order to be, one must be a face, a figure. This is true for bodies, but also for spiritual forms. Sensibility does not mislead us when it makes us interpret existence in terms of figurability or corporality. That which possesses neither figure nor limit does not exist - and we know the problem that the existence of the indeterminate bodily substance will pose for Descartes. For the concept of corporality, see G. Lardreau, "La philosophie de Porphyre et la question de 'Interpretation,'" in Porphyre, *L'Antre des Nymphes dans l'Odyssée* (Lagrasse: Verdier, 1989).

The question is controversial. The work of F. W. Zimmermann seems to show the uselessness of a Syriac transition. See "The Origins of The So-Called Theology of Aristotle," in *Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages* (London: Warburg Institute Surveys and Texts XI, 1981), 110-240. See S. Pinès, "La longue recension de la Théologie d'Aristote dans ses rapports avec la doctrine ismaélienne," *Revue des Etudes Islamiques* (1954), 8-20.

What this Platonic gesture entails is entirely elucidated by Alain Badiou in *Being and Event*, trans. Oliver Feltham (New York: Continuum, 2007). See also, by the same author, *Number and Numbers*, trans. Robin Mackay (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008). It seems to us that these two books, beyond the Cantorian cut that Badiou exalts, wish to meditate on the situation of the One in a transhistorical perspective. This meditation has the vocation of profoundly modifying reflection on Being as Being, and of authorizing a "step beyond" [pas au-delà] Heidegger. Our return to Ismaili liberty could, in the same manner, be read as the beginning of a discussion with the legacy of German ontology, and in particular with the dialogue originated by Heidegger with Schelling; a dialogue for which one must today, perhaps, substitute others — one that would be placed under the sign of a Cartesian gesture, and another that would radically challenge Heidegger's historicization of Platonism.

Alexandre Koyré's theses are complex. On the one hand, the Galilean cut is radical. On the other hand, it is prepared by a discursive network wherein the neo-Platonism of the renaissance plays a major role. Touching upon the question of the

infinite and its figuration in liberty, it seems to me that the cut of modern science, in order to be indisputably foundational, does not exclude other continuities, and that the history of Platonism is not that of an ancient ontology, or at least not exclusively ancient.

Nâsir-e Khosraw, *Kitâb-e jâmi' al-Hikmatain*, 12-18. This is the ninth hypothesis in *Parmenides* (165th). Subsequent references will appear parenthetically within the text. *Parmenides*, 137c-142a. Proclus, *The Platonic Theology*, Vol. 1, Books 1-3, trans. Thomas Taylor (El Paso: Selene Books, 1985), 125; translation modified.

On this point, we connect the "approach of the impersonal" and the "figures of insignificance" proposed by P. Stanislas Breton in *Rien ou quelque chose* [Nothing or Something] (Paris: Flammarion, 1987). A confrontation between our authors, inspired by Plotinus but dedicated to rediscovering the auto-exceeding movement of neo-Platonism with Proclus and above all Damascius, would impose itself here. In this way, the concept of the contraction of the intelligible, and above all the thought of the One as dual in Damascius, have a direct relation with that which is being thought on the part of our Ismailians. See Damascius, *Des premier principes*, trans. M.C. Galpérine (Lagrasse: Verdier, 1988), 306-307 and the introduction by M.C. Galpérine, 33. What is at play is nothing less, as Guy Lardreau writes, than "this monster for trivial classifications: a negative philosophy as the thought of pure affirmation," in *Annuaire philosophique 1987-1988*, ed. François Wahl (Paris: Seuil, 37).

[Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood: Essays on Edith Stein's Phenomenological Investigations](#) edited by Elisa Magri, Dermot Moran [Springer, 9783319710952]

This book explores the phenomenological investigations of Edith Stein by critically contextualising her role within the phenomenological movement and assessing her accounts of empathy, sociality, and personhood. Despite the growing interest that surrounds contemporary research on empathy, Edith Stein's phenomenological investigations have been largely neglected due to a historical tradition that tends to

consider her either as Husserl's assistant or as a martyr. However, in her phenomenological research, Edith Stein pursued critically the relation between phenomenology and psychology, focusing on the relation between affectivity, subjectivity, and personhood. Alongside phenomenologists like Max Scheler, Kurt Stavenhagen, and Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Stein developed Husserl's method, incorporating several original modifications that are relevant for philosophy, phenomenology, and ethics.

Drawing on recent debates on empathy, emotions, and collective intentionality as well as on original inquiries and interpretations, the collection articulates and develops new perspectives regarding Edith Stein's phenomenology. The volume includes an appraisal of Stein's philosophical relation to Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler, and develops further the concepts of empathy, sociality, and personhood. These essays demonstrate the significance of Stein's phenomenology for contemporary research on intentionality, emotions, and ethics. Gathering together contributions from young researchers and leading scholars in the fields of phenomenology, social ontology, and history of philosophy, this collection provides original views and critical discussions that will be of interest also for social philosophers and moral psychologists.

[The Presence of Duns Scotus in the Thought of Edith Stein: The question of individuality](#) by Francesco Alfieri [Analecta Husserliana, Springer, 9783319386393]

This book examines the phenomenological anthropology of Edith Stein. It specifically focuses on the question which Stein addressed in her work *Finite and Eternal Being*: What is the foundational principle that makes the individual unique and unrepeatable within the human species? Traditional analyses of Edith Stein's writings have tended to frame her views on this issue as being influenced by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, while neglecting her interest in the lesser-known figure of Duns Scotus. Yet, as this book shows, with regard to the question of individuality, Stein was critical of Aquinas' approach, finding that of Duns Scotus to be more convincing. In order to get to the heart of Stein's

readings of Duns Scotus, this book looks at her published writings and her personal correspondence, in addition to conducting a meticulous analysis of the original codexes on which her sources were based. Written with diligence and flair, the book critically evaluates the authenticity of Stein's sources and shows how the position of Scotus himself evolved. It highlights the originality of Stein's contribution, which was to rediscover the relevance of Mediaeval scholastic thought and reinterpret it in the language of the Phenomenological school founded by Edmund Husserl.

A detailed analysis of the principium individuationis entails a systematic examination of Scotus' *Ordinatio* and *Quaestiones super Libros Metaphysicorum*. In parallel with these two texts, and where necessary, we will compare the *Ordinatio* with the *Lectura*, taking account of the context in which Duns Scotus himself sought to compare his own work with that of other thinkers or schools of thought, in order to grasp the originality of the position he adopted, Carmen Cozma Francesco Alfieri, OFM. *La presenza di Duns Scoto nel pensiero di Edith Stein. La questione dell'individualità*. Roma: Pontificia Universitas Lateranensis, 2011. Pp. 331.

An in-depth research dedicated to the relevance of the doctrine of individuality, as it is crystallized on the ground of the intimate relationship between the Scholastic philosopher-theologian John Duns Scotus and the twentieth century phenomenologist Edith Stein, is offered by the book of Francesco Alfieri, OFM. This substantial hermeneutic study represents the doctoral dissertation of the Franciscan thinker, defended in 2010 at the Pontifical Lateran University in Rome. The young author teaches at the University of Bari and he is the archivist of the „Italian Center of Phenomenology in Rome“. During the last years, he has published articles and chapters in academic journals and volumes, also involving in a very impressive editorial project that is directed by Angela Ales Bello – a well-known personality of the contemporary phenomenology, and one of the greatest exegetes of Edith Stein -, which is carried out in cooperation with Edizioni Giuseppe Laterza.

Searching in a generous territory of bibliographical sources, reading and exploring them carefully, reflecting on and interpreting by a personal subtlety, Francesco Alfieri succeeds to emphasizing the Scotistic influence on Edith Stein's work. Actually, we face a complex picture avoiding a simplified bipolar manner of analysis. Not only the thought-in-continuity of two eminent philosophers makes the content of the book; but, also, a wider view of outstanding medieval contributions is bringing out into bold relief, by delineating keythemes of philosophy and theology in the Middle Ages as they permanently awake the interest of professionals. We get a fine exposure of reasoning, in a coherent elaboration, which discloses a clearer and critical comprehension regarding the profound sense of the unique individual as the ultimate real mode of being. Generally, we get an image circumscribing the closer contact of that what the Franciscan „Doctor Subtilis” called *ultima realitas entis / haecceitas*, and that is the intangible singularity of human, in Steinian language, as positioning the uniqueness (human's value) within the created universe. The erudition of Francesco Alfieri penetrates the entire investigation illuminating the „convergences” of Stein with Scotus' doctrine of the individuation principle (intrinsic, positive, and unique). It is eloquently, for example, to open the book at page 229, where we find the author's translation for a very important Scotus' piece in any critical edition – as it has been assumed by many Franciscans and researchers over the years. We refer to *Stand der Skotus-Forschung 1953* Nach Ephrem Longpré, OFM (published in „Quaderni di Studi Scotisti” 4 / 2007, 11-24). And this is not an isolated one, seeing that the author has already published certain translations concerning the topics here discussed. La presenza di Duns Scoto nel pensiero di Edith Stein. La questione dell'individualità focuses on the phenomenological reading of Scotus' writings, as it is unfolded in the anthropological vision of Edith Stein around the human individuality – like one of the main themes in her later work, especially. Acknowledging the teaching coming from the predecessors in the field, Francesco Alfieri develops a hermeneutical commentary in his very own mode of expression. By rigor and refinement alike, he registers himself in the spiritual community

space cultivated by his scientific advisor, Professor Emeritus Angela Ales Bello.

Following the line of thought centered on individuality, the book is organized in three chapters that carry on from a „Historicalcritical study of the Scotistic sources used by Edith Stein” (pp.21-75), passing through „The question of individuation principle in Duns Scotus' *Ordinatio / Lectura-Quaestiones super Libros Metaphysicorum* (q.13)” (pp.79-124), to „The intangible singularity of human being. The originality of Edith Stein's perspective” (pp.127-212). „Conclusion” and „Appendix” are followed by a thorough „Biobibliographical Note on Edith Stein” (pp.267-323). The text is plentifully of extensive footnotes – perhaps, too in plenty –, demanding an apart attention on the reader's behalf. In a detailed and nuanced presentation, Alfieri seeks to decipher the core of the convergences between Stein and Scotus. He realizes a persuasive approach concerning the particularities in emerging, over the centuries, the Scotistic „individual entity” or „individual form” within the Steinian metaphysics and anthropology. Drawing from the Aristotelian-Thomistic position, at the same time relying on Husserl, Stein operated a synthesis between phenomenology and medieval scholastic tradition, and she advanced an original view about the „essential being”. Overarching between Scotus and Stein, the latter fully appears by the option for „a Christian metaphysics, without denying the phenomenology of her master, Husserl” (p.33). Steinian concepts of the I, the soul, the spirit, and the person are revealing in this intertwining vision. The references carry from the early studies of Edith Stein, precisely from her PhD dissertation, *Zum Problem der Einfühlung / On the Problem of Empathy*, to her most important Christian philosophical work, the magnum opus *Endliches und ewiges Sein / Finite and Eternal Being*. The ontological dimension of individuality is a nucleus one. According to Alfieri, „each concrete and distinct individual finds the ultimate reality in the singular-universal relation” (p.83). In its entirety, the discourse proves to be a thoughtful look at a crucial topic in the spiritual dialogue between the two great figures of philosophy. The author aims to expound major issues, like: matter and form, *materia prima* and the individualizing concretion,

being and essence, singularity and universality, *natura commune*, identity, transcendence, potentiality and act, individual unity and quality, spiritual soul and living body, uniqueness and originality of person, experience of the own oneself and sharing with others, unity of lived experiences. All is displaying in the attempt of encompassing a better understanding of „the presence of Duns Scotus in Edith Stein’s thought”. Alfieri holds the idea that beyond any material or formal determination, the individuation principle is disclosing as „singularity” freely acting within universality. The intellectual trajectory of the author balances between Aristotelism, Thomism, and Scotism, looking for an analysis of the structure of being in its ultimate stance, to underscore the meaning of individuality experience as a path of touching the fullness of existence. The exposure is moving in terms of Stein’s affinity towards the theological anthropology, which engages an educational project, too, for the ethical, social, and political dimensions of self-and-the others in the same community of living. Undoubtedly, Francesco Alfieri is aware of many nuances he has to deal with the Scotistic doctrine as it is renewed in Edith Stein’s writings. Scrutinizing manuscripts, considering key-sentences of codices, inquiring a large bibliography and interrogating upon the authenticity of some works attributed to Duns Scotus and the position of Stein in this direction, etc., he lays out the metaphysical problem of universals, the thesis about substantial natures (neither singular nor universal, but common), the distinct intelligibility of individual, and so forth. He is interested about Steins’ re-valuation of metaphysical concepts and re-thinking of the Scholastic philosophy through the subjective experience of person. In the effort to assuring the accuracy of interpretation, inherent difficulties of the topics are surmounting. It is worth noting, for instance, the bio-bibliographical profile made to the Franciscan theologian Vitalis de Furno concerning the questions of *De rerum principio*: „author, compiler or commentator?” (pp.72-77), and the literature the author has perused in this regard (pp.258-262). Alfieri frames the problem of the ontological dimension of individuality by the “criterion of identity”, the principle of individuation; the attempt being directed towards Stein’s account of the „individual form” and the perception of the

other’s subjectivity, properly the „singularity” (principle of individuation), the selfencountering-the other’s-experience, the authentic community by grasping empathy. Likewise, he examines the Steinian issue of feeling („Fühlen”) as a spiritual perception opening the access to the qualitative fullness of the being; and he enters the discussion about the „Einfühlung” term, which is attentively treated, by considering its translation as „intropathy”, too (cf. the extended reasoning made by Angela Ales Bello in *Edith Stein o dell’armonia. Esistenza, Pensiero, Fede*, 2009). Alfieri notices and rigorously comments the diversity of terminology, the continuous re-defining literature, the investigation of parallelisms and similarities, controversial opinions, re-considerations in the endeavour of comprehending the unique individual in the play of particular and universal. A glossary – for Latin and German frequent concepts – would find an entitled place at the end of the whole study. Certainly, many important articulations of the theme are to be unveiled for the intellectual joy of the reader. In conclusion, the book of Francesco Alfieri, OFM stands for a valuable contribution to rounding the scholastic and phenomenological meditation and understanding of the (problem of) individuality in its intricate essence and manifestation, by the complexity of „finite being” in the created world. This essay provides a well-argued insight into a controversial and significant issue that remains open to further discussions as one of topical interest concerning the deep meaning of the own being; and that marks the ongoing search for the truth of living, eventually.

Excerpt:

An introduction provides an opportunity to explain, albeit just in outline, the elements which — first and foremost from a scientific point of view — made this study possible. Themes linked to philosophical anthropology, above all the principle of the human person and individuality, were the object of research by numerous twentieth-century philosophers, from those associated with neo-Aristotelianism — which was to develop into the hermeneutic currents of existentialism — such as Gadamer and Buber. to those linked to neo-Thomism. The field also includes authors associated with the reassessment of political philosophy, such

as Hannah Arendt, who is the author of classics on political philosophy that may be considered just as valid for their contribution to anthropology, since the problem of individual liberty and the primacy of personal space is at the heart of the reflections contained in works such as *Vita Activa* or *The Life of the Mind*. It even includes authors that sought to establish the democratic foundations of libertarianism, such as Nozick. Among these authors, reflection on (and thus the centrality of) the human person and individuality is a constant characteristic.

This cultural climate affecting twentieth century philosophy, particularly the need to clarify the ultimate assumptions regarding the human person and individuality, was shared by Edith Stein. With Aristotelianism and Thomism as her main points of reference, she succeeded in retrieving, from outside these traditions, important suggestions and themes associated with other currents of medieval philosophy, grafting them on to the ontological-formal and gnoseological corpus of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology.

Just over 20 years ago, the field of Italian philosophical studies saw the start of a new season of research into the writings of Edith Stein, a disciple of Edmund Husserl whose existential and spiritual journey was by then well-known. In fact, thanks to Angela Ales Bello, founder of the Rome-based Italian Center of Phenomenology, it had been possible to discuss and conduct research into Stein's intellectual contribution since the 1970s, due to her forward-looking decision to produce a critical edition of the works of Edith Stein at a time when she was still virtually unknown in Italy. Angela Ales Bello's long process of reflection was to culminate in 1992 with the publication of *Fenomenologia dell'essere umano. Lineamenti di una filosofia al femminile*, which enabled scholars and researchers to learn about the female exponents of phenomenology who had graduated from the Husserl "school" during the master's teaching in Göttingen, such as Hedwig Conrad-Martius and Edith Stein, and later, in Freiburg, such as Gerda Walther. Ales Bello's book and my frequent theoretical conversations with the author have influenced my own intellectual development and the studies contained in this thesis.

Generally speaking, this study seeks above all to address an issue that appears to me to have been neglected in Steinian studies, both in Italy and elsewhere (with very few exceptions, such as the work of Angela Ales Bello¹ and Francesco Bonin¹ who are cited in this study). With reference to historiographical reconstruction, the question of the person and individuality in the work of Edith Stein has always been considered by scholars and commentators in terms of a continuity with Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Obviously, Stein's writings contain many references, indeed whole chapters, in which the relationship with the Aristotelian-Thomist school is very strong. But from my point of view, historiographical studies on this theme fail to give sufficient emphasis to two important aspects: firstly, Stein's contacts with these two great philosophers were mainly mediated by secondary sources (with the exception of *De Veritate* by Thomas Aquinas and certain works by Aristotle, such as *Metaphysics*); secondly, and more importantly, Stein's interest in the tradition of Thomist-Aristotelian thought was no more intense or productive than the relationship that she sought to establish with Duns Scotus, although here too, she does not appear to have always had access to original and primary sources.

It was decided therefore to address this clear gap in the Italian and international historiographical tradition. With specific reference to the present question, identifying what may rightly be termed the Scotist convergences in Stein's works was thus held to be indispensable. The chosen point of reference here is *Finite and Eternal Being*, and specifically chapter VIII, which clearly represents the culmination of a whole series of reflections to be found throughout her works, starting with *On the Problem of Empathy*, written in 1916. These Scotist influences are reconstructed by means of a reverse process, of which Chapter VIII of *Finite and Eternal Being* represents the starting point. This process is not always linear, and is made even more difficult by the fact that at first sight it is Thomist works that appear to have pride of place in Stein's research. Indeed, Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle initially seemed to constitute the doctrinal boundaries within which Stein's phenomenological research into the problem of individuation should be interpreted.

However, as was evident even to Stein herself, more detailed phenomenological analysis led her — quite naturally — to a closer and closer comparison with the thought of Doctor Subtilis. Obviously Scotist themes are not merely transposed or accepted acritically by Stein. Indeed, we have just spoken of convergences towards Scotist doctrines, by which we mean that Stein was able to interpret the phenomenological method in a highly original way by applying it to the themes of medieval metaphysics. Drawing ideas, knowledge and theoretical results from both traditions, she was able to conduct, while working within the phenomenological tradition, an analysis of the question of individuation that was characterized by absolute originality. This originality was to objectively make the author one of the most important figures in twentieth century philosophy, especially with regard to anthropological issues.

Among other things, this study seeks to show that the distinctive value of Stein's work lies in the fact that from the very start it was collective: her work is everywhere full of comparisons and references to other authors, who, in the spirit of Stein's research, are fundamental to the journey that leads to the truth. The method learnt in Husserl's school consisted of work that was absolutely alien to forms of pure soliloquy. Husserl himself invited his pupils to follow given lines of research in such a way as to make them converge towards a sort of "compensation chamber" in which they would be reassessed, reorganised, discussed and revised under the aegis of the immer wieder [time and again] that was the key aspect of Husserl's method. His pupils, which included Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Alexander Pfänder, Max Scheler, Jean Hering, Alexandre Koyré, Gerda Walther etc., were forged in this collective spirit, which shaped their way of working to the point that it enabled them — particularly Stein and Conrad-Martius — to follow the principle of epoché and phenomenological reduction with regard to "archaeological excavations" that were not directed, as in Husserl, purely and exclusively towards the vastness of the Transcendental Ego, but also towards the contributions of the medieval tradition.

This collective spirit in the research of the phenomenologists has been highlighted by Angela

Ales Bello, who considers it to be a defining feature of the discipline. And, over 40 years of research, she has succeeded in transmitting this same spirit of collective collaboration to her own students — Italian and foreign — at the Center of Phenomenology in Rome. Indeed, as Ales Bello herself argues, "an interesting characteristic of our women philosophers, and more generally of the philosophical circles that were created around Husserl, is the way they conduct their research, research that is not only individual, but truly collective, as all research into what is true should be"!

It is fair to say that within this community of pupils that formed around the charismatic figure of Husserl, there were many who, at the beginning of the twentieth century, showed a factual, concrete interest in the works of Scotus. The Gottingen Circle had already established a certain convergence with Scotist texts, which however proved to be apocryphal on the basis of the modern annotated edition of his works. Heidegger himself wrote *Die Kategorie und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus* in 1916, and in 1921 Stein and Conrad-Martius jointly carried out a translation of Alexandre Koyré's *Essai sur l'idée de Dieu et les preuves de son existence chez Descartes* from the original French into German. In this task they became familiar with the *Quaestiones disputatae de rerum principio*, some of which Stein would later take up in *Finite and Eternal Being*. These *Quaestiones* were for a long time attributed to Doctor Subtilis but have since been shown to be spurious. In this thesis it will be argued — on the basis of an attentive analysis and historical-critical collation of the codices — that the real author of these *Quaestiones* is without doubt the Franciscan Vitalis de Furno, something that Stein could not possibly have known given that it was precisely in that period that systematic studies for the critical edition of Scotus' works began.

It will also be argued that Stein's interest in medieval philosophy, commonly assumed to have begun around 1929 with the publication of her translation of *De Veritate* by Thomas Aquinas, in reality dates back to 1921, as is clear from the analysis of some excerpts conserved in the Edith-Stein-Archiv in Cologne. The knowledge Stein

gained as a result of translating Koyré's work helped to both forge and consolidate the collective approach described above, to the point that Stein herself subsequently entrusted Koyré with the task of reviewing the first part of *Finite and Eternal Being* concerning medieval philosophy.

The discovery of the authorship of the *Quaestiones* made it necessary to conduct an analysis, as thorough as possible, of the writings of Doctor Subtilis on the question of the principle of individuation. This analysis was of absolute importance, given the objective of assessing Stein's above-mentioned convergences with Scotist themes. The analysis, which is primarily philological, will seek to establish the exact position on individuation in the mature stage of Scotus' thought, with particular reference to *Ordinatio/Lectura* and *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* (Q. XIII).

The central theme of this study will be the reconstruction of Stein's works, at all times following the thread of the question of individuation, since it is in connection with this theme that the convergences with Scotist thought become explicit. The text will seek to show that the Thomist position of *materia signata quantitate* is no longer sufficient, in Stein's eyes, to explain the deeper meaning of the principle of individuation, which is singular, not dual in nature. I will use the term "singularity" coined by Angela Ales Bello to consider the essence of human beings, not only in metaphysical, but also anthropological terms, seeking in this way to broaden the phenomenological point of view by establishing common ground with medieval metaphysics.

I shall now present the conclusion to this study, bearing in mind the objectives set out in the Introduction.

In Chap. 2, I sought to present a summary of the convergences among the authors of the Göttingen circle regarding the use of Scotus' doctrines. Husserl himself makes reference to Scotus, albeit only in an excerptum. In fact, my research found that in many cases the work of these authors was oriented towards pseudo-Scotist sources, for example Heidegger, who makes reference to a text that was actually by Thomas of Erfurt. Stein and Conrad-Martius were introduced to the conceptual

universe of Duns Scotus (in reality Vitalis de Furno) as a consequence of the help they gave to Koyré for the translation of his work *Essai sur l'idée de Dieu et les preuves de son existence chez Descartes* in 1921. It was only possible to obtain these results by systematic consultation of Stein's letters, especially the letters she wrote to Conrad-Martius, which show clearly that Stein's interest, and hence the convergences with and towards Scotist themes, was manifested years before the considerable interest she subsequently showed in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas.

It was necessary to conduct a close reading of chapter VII of *Finite and Eternal Being*,¹ where the author states that the *Quaestiones disputatae de rerum principio* are by Scotus and cites a paper by P. Ephrem Longpré as affirming their authenticity. However, consultation of this article shows that in reality Longpré was not referring to the *Quaestiones disputatae de rerum principio*, but to *De primo omnium rerum principio*, which is a completely different work. Stein was working with an edition that included both texts, and appears to have confused them. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that Marianus Müller, who edited the annotated edition of *De primo omnium rerum principio* (actually a *Tractatus*, a completely different genre from the *Quaestiones*), published in 1941, also cited Longpré in affirming that Scotus was its true author.

By consulting all XXVI *Quaestiones*, which are all contained in codex Is, it was possible to establish that the first XVI *Quaestiones* are also found in codex T, while the subsequent ones (XVI—XXVI) are found in codex V (for further details the reader is referred to the descriptions in Sect. 2.2.1. of Chap. 2 and the synopsis in Table I above). A careful study of the three codices, aimed at understanding the relationships between them, established beyond doubt that the author of all 26 *Quaestiones* is the Franciscan Vitalis de Furno. He thus became the unwitting source of the pseudo-Scotist doctrines for both Stein and Conrad-Martius and ultimately Alexandre Koyré. In this regard it was considered necessary, partly to allow for greater critical precision regarding Stein's works, to reconstruct Vitalis de Furno's main work and secondary bibliography (many documents of which

were not easy to find) in their entirety. The result was a meticulous study of his works and their attribution, particularly the Quaestiones.

Once Stein's sources on the theme of individuation had been ascertained. In Chap. 3 our focus was first and foremost on the Scotist doctrine of the principle of individuation. The first step was to reconstruct the historical medieval context that induced so many philosophers, including Scotus, to become involved in the debate over individuation. The study of the great Scottish philosopher evidenced enormous difficulties, regarding not so much where to find his doctrines pertaining to individuation (mainly in the *Ordinatio*) as his dense terminological stratification, a symptom of the author's own evolution over time with respect to key concepts. Faced with this shifting terminology, even Scotus' disciples found themselves obliged to resolve problems of interpretation by coining new terms such as *haecceitas*, which led unwittingly to further terminological and interpretative stratifications.

Annotated editions of Scotus' works currently reflect two schools of thought: one linked to the International Scotist Commission (*Commissio Scotista*) in Rome and the other linked to the Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure University in New York State. According to the former, the two works in question, the *Ordinatio* and the *Quaestiones super Illimos metaphysicorum* (Q. XIII), represent two stages in Scotus' writings, the more mature of which is clearly the *Ordinatio*; in contrast, the view of the latter school is that the mature Scotus is seen in *Quaestio XIII*. We felt it was appropriate to begin the examination of Scotus' works with the *Ordinatio*, analysing *Quaestiones I-VI* therein, since it is here that Scotus tackles the theme of individuation via the assessment and confutation of those views that contrasted with his own.

Scotus shows how the principle of individuation must be intrinsic, positive and unique, and that it cannot be attributed to the accidental properties that characterise each being, such as quantity and matter: individuation is deducible neither from matter nor from form, nor yet from the compound

of matter and form; its true origin is the "*ultima realitas entis*".

Once this was all established, we looked specifically at *Quaestio XIII*, which, despite resembling the *Ordinatio* in some ways, on the topic of individuation uses quite different terminology. The conceptual immaturity of the Q. XIII with respect to the absolute originality of the *Ordinatio* is exemplified by the reference in the former to the concept of "*forma individualis*", a term never used in the *Ordinatio* which in contrast refers to the concept of "*ultima realitas formae*". This interpretation is supported by the position of other authors such as Shibuya et al., who argue that, with the concept of "*ultima realitas entis*" as a positive principle, Scotus' theoretical position goes way beyond the concept of "*forma individualis*", in which Aristotelian overtones can still be felt.

We sought to highlight how Scotus gradually modified his conception of individuation, starting — it is true — from the concept of "*forma individualis*", but evolving towards the absolutely new concept of "*ultima realitas entis*".

Once confident of having determined the content of Scotus' position on individuation, in Chap. 4 we moved on to Stein's work on the issue of the nature or the constitutive element of the human being and its singularity. We began with Stein's book on empathy, her first work, since it is precisely in this context that Stein poses the question of what is meant by individuality when she asserts that this I "is 'itself' and no other". This made it necessary to reconstruct the sources of the unitary nature of the I, which Stein saw as important. In an entirely spontaneous way, her work on empathy brought her closer to Scotus in another respect: Stein considered individuality/singularity, i.e. what distinguishes personhood as such, as not entirely knowable. For Stein there could be no "total" knowledge or explication of the singularity of the person: the most that could be obtained was an intuitive accessibility, via spiritual perception by feeling (*das Fühlen*). In this way the person can be spiritually "felt" in its singularity, with its distinctive imprint, but cannot be explicated in any form of discursive knowledge.

For Stein, from *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities* onwards, individuation has an absolutely unique qualitative imprint that "tinges" first and foremost its so-called personal "nucleus": in the final part of this work, after Stein highlights the precise "locus" of the person in the said "nucleus", it is possible to discern a parallel between Scotus' concept of "ultima solitudo" and the "immanent aloneness (Verlassenheit)" referred to by Stein. She starts by dispelling any remaining doubt concerning the non-determinability of the nucleus by the quantitative and numerical elements inherent in singularity, which are merely secondary elements in its determination. She then points out that individuation is situated beyond the reach of any possible psychic or material determination. Indeed, it is the unsuppressible properties of this nucleus, its immutability, consistency and permanence, that confer a certain path on the development of the person and not the other way round: it is not the development of the person that forges the nucleus, but rather the nucleus that determines the psychic and/or material evolution of the person. No quantitative determination therefore — and this is what my work highlights — can undermine any qualitative element that characterises the nucleus of the person, which Stein insists lies outside spatio-temporality, since every instance of spatio-temporality entails a reference to either the formal or the material conditions of determination.

This "ultima solitudo" is considered by Stein, just as it was by Scotus, to be an ontological limit that must be overcome: a state of being in oneself, a state of being in contact with the depth of one's I, requires a subsequent "opening up". Ultima solitudo and depth must enable the transcendence of the I towards the others, i.e. towards forms of community life: only by living in this ineffable depth, the nexus of every personal act, can the person then find himself or herself in the world, in the *Gemeinschaft*. It is worth dwelling for a moment on the ontological statute that Stein appears to either confer on (or discover in) this ultima solitudo that characterises the being of the human person: although it characterises the human being as such, although it concerns every person as such, this ultima solitudo should not be understood in Stein's view as a specifically universal characteristic or trait, nor can

it be universalised. Its mode of adherence to the human person, in reality inextricable, is dictated by its colouring and by its being felt by a particular *Stimmung* that can only be individual. It is precisely the presence of this emotional tonality, able to instil in every human being the ability to recognise one's depth as unique, that makes any notion of a "universalised" ultima solitudo impossible.

At this point the metaphysical questions that Stein had drawn from medieval philosophy come together with the analyses and results obtained using a descriptive-phenomenological approach. Indeed, in *Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person*, she affirms that a philosophy is radical to the extent that it seeks to reach the ultimate fundamental structures of the human being. Once the possibility of any extrinsic principle for the determination of the person has been ruled out, the individuation of the intrinsic principle may begin; it must lie in the empty form together with its qualitative filling, because it is only from this that the individual acquires a unity of meaning in its full totality.

In the light of this, it was then possible to move on to a consideration of Potency and Act and its treatment of the problem of individuation. It was pointed out that Stein, following Husserl in terms of his general approach to formal and material ontology, was able to fit these doctrines within medieval (specifically Thomist and, more remotely, Aristotelian) categories in order to strengthen a concept of individuation, in its uniqueness, which is rooted in the already established concept of personal nucleus (kern). The fundamental result, which needs to be emphasised here, is that in this work Stein does not accept any determination of the principle of individuation that can, in the Thomistic sense, be traced back to quantitative conditions of matter (*materia signata quantitate*, as formed matter). The disagreements with respect to Thomas Aquinas are also highlighted and supported by Bottin's authoritative reading. The alternative interpretation to the one set out in this study, according to which the principle of individuation in Stein follows Thomistic principles, manifesting itself via the formal components of the individual, is thus without foundation. This is in fact attempted by Rosa Errico, whose approach however runs into difficulty concerning the fact that

for Stein the principle of individuation lay outside any material or formal condition, something which had been clear to her ever since her indirect contact with Scotus' *Ordinatio*.

This becomes even clearer on consulting chapter VIII of *Finite and Eternal Being*, in which, for Stein, the *materia signata quantitate* of the Thomist tradition cannot be the foundation of individuality because it leaves us embroiled in the generic relationship of matter and form, which, being of an entirely general nature, tells us nothing of the individual person or thing. Indeed, Stein echoed Duns Scotus in seeing "the principium individuationis as something that has the marks of a positive existent [etwas positiv Seiendes]", and is such insofar as it is founded not on a simple *Leerform*, but on a positive quality of the being that acquires visibility in its concreteness (*Konkretheit*). The latter is presented in Potency and Act as a particular way — an inherent human characteristic — of finding individualisation, given that for human beings an individualisation in the sense of the specification of the fundamental categories of being is not sufficient. According to Stein, the authentic *tode ti* in the personality is reached not by running through all the formal categories of the being as *ens*, the being as *esse*, the object, the what, the how (categories that derive from formal ontology reinterpreted in an Aristotelian-Thomist key), but — since it represents concreteness — by placing it or causing it to fit directly into self-sufficiency. In this sense the principium individuationis cannot be derived from an approach that concerns itself solely with the specification of variously intertwined genera and species alone. On the contrary, it is something that can be seen at work in human reality only when grasped from the point of view of qualitative fullness, itself something of a paradox in that it makes reference to ontological layers such as depth and *ultima solitudo*.

Our reading of Stein's works should also be seen as situated within the modern tendency towards a naturalisation of the personality. This demonstrates, on a phenomenological basis, that the concepts of "ultima solitudo" and "personal nucleus", which are immutable and intangible since they ensure the total idiosyncrasy of personal individuality regardless of any material (quantifiable) and

formal element, do not allow for the consideration of the primary aspect of each person in terms of any earthly category, whether this be qualitative (sociological) or quantitative (neuroscientific). From my point of view, the territory explored by Stein casts doubt on the possibility and appropriateness of a "naturalisation" of phenomenology, as well as the means by which this may be accomplished. Of course, this assumes that in the intentions of its supporters, the naturalisation of phenomenology, which is the science of the qualitative complexity of the being *par excellence*, must enter (or at least seek to enter) the specific territory of the personality. Some questions arising from naturalisation, to the extent to which they have a bearing on the definition of the Essential Identity of an individual! claim to derive the human personality from bio-psycho-physiological factors that are unique to each person! From my point of view this cannot be admitted, given that these features belong to the quantitative factors which — despite conditioning the development of the person — are quite separate from what truly qualifies the person according to Stein. As I have already highlighted, I do not accept that the same essential elements of human individuality, i.e. its uniqueness and depth, lend themselves to essentialisation: they cannot, that is, be part of a concept of Essential Identity, which would inevitably entail the moment of universalisation. For Stein, being a person means feeling oneself to be surrounded by an incommensurable depth in an *ultima solitudo*, qualitative elements that cannot be treated on the same level as universal invariants that are susceptible to some kind of formalisation. Indeed, as has been pointed out at length in the current work, Stein sees the principium individuationis as being situated well apart from any quantitative and formal condition, both instances that can be considered in specie.

More generally, what emerges is the difficulty in the naturalisation of phenomenology with reference to human beings, given that the scientific and quantitative interpretation has been called into doubt by phenomenology itself. Indeed, on the question of how a naturalisation of phenomenology is not possible — in the full debate between the quantitative and "qualitative" dimensions of the

phenomenon itself — Angela Ales Bello argues that "within the phenomenological school the idea persists that the scientific reading of nature — and indeed of human beings — cannot provide an exhaustive understanding of it; the need for a philosophy of nature that highlights its qualitative elements remains."

Of course, research in this field is open, as the scientific community should be, but I believe that a position that is theoretically respectful of the persona as such and of the anthropological specificity of the human being cannot dispense with the features that Stein's phenomenology assigned to personal individuality, which constitute a cultural and philosophical resource at our disposal.

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[Thine Own Self: Individuality in Edith Stein's Later Writings](#) by Sarah Borden Sharkey [Catholic University of America Press, 9780813216829]

Edith Stein was one of the important early phenomenologists. A German-Jewish philosopher, Discalced Carmelite nun, martyr, and saint who died in Auschwitz, Stein participated in the early 20th century revival of scholasticism and was much admired by John Paul II. *Thine Own Self* focuses on Stein's later writings and in particular her magnum opus, *Finite and Eternal Being*. Although completed in 1936, Stein's book was not published at the time because of the new laws against non-Aryan publications, and the work sat completed but unread until after World War II. The recent availability of this book in English makes a substantive scholarly analysis of this major text particularly timely.

[Thine Own Self](#) investigates Stein's account of human individuality and her mature philosophical positions on being and essence. Sarah Borden Sharkey shows how Stein's account of individual form adapts and updates the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition in order to account for evolution and more contemporary insights in personality and individual distinctiveness. Borden Sharkey explains how Stein's theory of individuality and individual forms is tied to her understanding of essence and being, and she compares Stein's distinctive metaphysical positions to those of Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and Edmund Husserl.

In addition to expositing Stein's metaphysical positions, Borden Sharkey argues that, although Stein's account of individual forms is both more contemporary and more adequate than John Duns Scotus's *haecceitas*, it is nonetheless problematic. The book concludes by defending a more Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of form—albeit one that must be rearticulated in light of contemporary and Steinian critiques.

Reviewed by Dermot Moran, University College Dublin

This is a clearly written, detailed, fine scholarly study of Edith Stein's attempt in her later work, especially *Finite and Eternal Being*, to develop a

consistent metaphysics of individuality, offering a modern version of what the medieval scholastic Duns Scotus had tried to do with his notion of *haecceitas* (literally: 'thisness'). Edith Stein maintains that human beings not only participate in the universal form of humanness but also that each possesses an individual form which has its own distinct intelligibility. The two forms (universal and individual) are not co-present as independent parts but seamlessly unite to produce the single substantial form with its unique essence. Each person (e.g. Socrates) has an essence (what it is to be Socrates) and this is what Stein calls 'individual form' (*individuelles Wesen*).

Furthermore, Stein believes, the individual as such must be recognized as intelligible precisely as an individual and not just as a member of the species 'human'. This intelligibility of the individual goes against traditional views (from Plato and Aristotle through Aquinas) according to which what is intelligible for humans is the universal. To defend her view a radical modification of the traditional Thomistic account (that places intelligibility in the formal and universal and individuation in the material) is required, and this is what Stein sets out to do in her magnum opus *Finite and Eternal Being* (completed in 1936 but published posthumously in 1950). Indeed, *Finite and Eternal Being* is Stein's most ambitious and difficult work, a sprawling ontological meditation on existence, essence and being, which was a reworking of her earlier *Potency and Act*, a work that she had proposed in 1930 for her *Habilitationsschrift* in her second unsuccessful attempt to gain that German university teaching qualification.

Borden Sharkey's new study is primarily expository of Stein's ontological discussions and succeeds very well in clarifying Stein's notions of individual form, essential being, and whatness (*quiddity*), in relation to the more familiar accounts in Aristotle, Aquinas, Scotus and others. This is careful exegesis. For example, Borden Sharkey is alert to the terminological ambiguities and inconsistencies in Stein's writing and even provides a helpful glossary of Stein's technical terms. Stein -- in part following Husserl and Heidegger -- uses several variants of 'essence' (*Wesen*), including *Wesenwas*, *Wesenheit*, *Einzelwesen*, *individuelles Wesen*, as well as

speaking of 'whatness' (Washeit), and other terms (e.g. Selbstand, subsistence) to distinguish different dimensions of essentiality and quiddity. Stein, for instance, recognizes that to be an individual is itself a form. There is an essence of individuality -- a common character individual things must necessarily have in order to be individuals. But aside from this formal essence, as it were, there is also the unique individual character of the individual -- what makes it this particular and not just a particular. She struggles to articulate this insight especially in *Finite and Eternal Being* Chapter Eight, entitled 'The Meaning and Foundation of Individual Being'.

Borden Sharkey critically engages with Stein's attempts to articulate the form of the individual. In the end she finds Stein's account of human individuality to be closer to Aquinas' account of angelic individuality (whereby each angel instantiates its own type and there are different types of angels, as expressed in the angelic hierarchy) rather than to the Thomist position on human individuality. For Aristotle and Aquinas, form is the principle of commonality (and intelligibility -- since understanding is of the common or universal) and matter the principle of individuality. Humans are identical in terms of their humanness but differ in terms of their accidental qualities. This does not seem to safeguard the true individual identity of humans. Stein criticizes Aristotle and the medievals for making matter to be the principle of individuation. Matter does not have this power. Form is what individualizes. Humanity is a universal essence, which all humans share by virtue of being human but there must also be an individual essence, what makes me the unique person I am, what gives me enduring identity.

As is well known, Stein, following a night reading St Theresa of Avila in the home of Hedwig Conrad-Martius, converted to Catholicism in January, 1922, and thereafter (to leave aside completely her personal journey into the convent) began to read herself into Thomistic philosophy, even translating Aquinas' *De Veritate*. Thus, for the *Festschrift* commemorating Husserl's seventieth birthday in 1929, she submitted an essay which was essentially a dialogue between Husserl and Aquinas: 'An Attempt to Contrast Husserl's Phenomenology and the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas'. The original

draft had been written in the form of a dialogue between these two thinkers: 'What is Philosophy? A Conversation between Edmund Husserl and Thomas Aquinas'. Here she presents the common link as Brentano. Husserl and Aquinas both sought philosophy as rigorous science, 'the serious, sober inquiry of reason'. Aquinas recognizes the limits of human reason (natural reason) but also recognizes the domain of what is absolutely true independent of human subjectivity, a domain Husserl's transcendental phenomenology (which remains fixed in the domain of a world constituted by subjectivity) cannot reach. Both Aquinas and Husserl were interested in the 'analysis of essences' (*Wesensanalyse*). But Thomas' distinction between existence and essence allows for him to think of the world as created.

Most commentators on Stein over the years have sided either with Stein's Husserlian or with her Thomist meditations, and few like her attempts to develop a dialogue -- even a synthesis -- between these two figures. Moreover, Stein was not a Thomist in the usual sense. She was not a participant in the then burgeoning Neo-Thomist movement in Europe, although she was deeply influenced by her contemporary, the German Jesuit theologian and Augustine scholar Erich Przywara (1889-1972), who was a personal friend of Husserl's and with whom Stein was in correspondence between 1925 and 1931. Przywara's *Analogue Entis* (1932) was deeply influential for her *Finite and Eternal Being*, where she records her debt to Przywara. As Borden Sharkey notes, Stein was trained in phenomenology (and was Husserl's assistant from 1916 to 1918) and was particularly interested in the justification of the human sciences, especially psychology in its relation to the unique human individual.

Stein never leaves behind her phenomenology; indeed, she continues to discuss the manner in which it can relate to metaphysics or ontology in *Finite and Eternal Being*. Stein, following Husserl and Scheler, wanted to develop both a phenomenology and an ontology of the person as a unique individual and as a substance. In a certain sense, she was an existentialist who valued the unique and original in human existence, but she moved more in the direction of ontology influenced both by her

close association with the Munich realist school of phenomenologists, especially Hedwig Conrad-Martius (and Jean Hering who wrote an influential article on essence)[5], as well as with Martin Heidegger, whom she knew quite well from her time in Freiburg. In her Author's Preface (written in September 1936) to *Finite and Eternal Being*, she acknowledges the importance of Heidegger's philosophy of existence as she found it in *Being and Time*, as well as Hedwig Conrad-Martius' ontology. Indeed, Stein acknowledges certain 'reminiscences' of Heidegger in her own study. Stein commends Heidegger's move to study Being itself and not just beings as such but disagrees with Heidegger's location of the understanding of Being solely in relation to human projection. 'Metaphysics is concerned with beings as such and not with human being alone', she writes. Heidegger, for her, has made the mistake of placing all his emphasis on the finite human *Seinsverständnis* whereas the understanding of Being cannot be a 'property of finitude'. The finite needs to be measured against an infinite understanding. Stein herself follows Conrad-Martius in thinking that finite being implies infinite being.

Furthermore, Stein, in returning to Thomas, is not being an antiquarian. Under the influence of Husserl and Przywara, she wanted to develop an ontology that is sensitive to the complexity of human consciousness as, to put it in Heideggerean terms which she does not use, the site where being is revealed. In fact, Stein begins from the more Husserlian point of view, beginning with Descartes' discovery of the ego cogito as a recognition of the fact of one's own existence as a conscious subject. In other words, all inquiry must begin from the 'life of ego' (*Ichleben*). As Stein puts it, my certitude about my own existence is the most primordial, intimate and immediate self-experience I can have).

For Stein this is consistent with Aristotle, since, following Aristotle, she thinks of the living organism as the model for understanding substance. For her, the living human has a form which itself is living and progressive: 'the being of the form is life'. There is no end to personal formation: 'the living being is never finished'. Form or essence, then, has to be conceived of as living, evolving, developing,

dynamic -- act in the genuine sense of agency -- rather than as a static constitutive principle, conceived of as a Platonic form or some kind of unfinished structure or blueprint that simply needs to be completed by matter.

Stein, then, proposes to think of individual essence in an original and challenging manner. Stein distinguishes, for instance, between the universal essence of soul (what anything must have in order to qualify as being a soul) and the specific nature or 'personal particularity' of a soul (also called the soul's essence). Personal essence can be changed radically (as in the case of genuine remorse) and yet there must be a deep continuing identity. There is -- and here the influence of St Theresa of Avila is evident -- something like an interior 'castle of the soul'. Stein recognises that most individuals never reach this depth of soul nor do they live 'collected lives' (inspired here by Heidegger). Yet, all spiritual teachings recognise the need to enter into this inner life and to recognise its depth. Stein's meditations on individual being and personhood weave around these themes. Given this complex background, as well as the tragic manner in which Stein's work was disrupted due to her persecution and death at the hands of the Nazis, it is difficult to form an overall sense of Stein's project.

Borden Sharkey does an excellent job of articulating Stein's basic intent to develop an account of human existence that recognized its common form (animal rationale) and also the uniqueness of each individual, situated, historical existence as a person. The person, moreover, is not just a mereological sum of parts but has a distinct individuality, identity and wholeness (as well as a capacity to develop). Matter alone cannot account for this individuality. Borden Sharkey sees Stein's account of the relation between individual and universal as influenced by Husserl's accounts in *Logical Investigations* and in *Ideas I*. Individuals instantiate universals. Chapter Six gives a particularly clear account of Husserl's understanding of wholes, dependent parts and independent parts, and how this is taken up by Stein. Human nature as such is a form, but too empty and incomplete to ever come into existence on its own. It needs the determinacy given by individual human beings. Borden Sharkey's book

situates Stein's discussion of individuality in relation to the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and Scotus with some reference to Husserl's ontology. She finds Stein's account of individuals attractive but in the end opts for a modified Thomist position. Borden Sharkey's critique of Stein is based on the view that the Thomistic account of angelic individuality requires that angels occupy different ranks in a hierarchy. This goes against Stein's claim for the radical equality of all human beings. Stein herself contrasts humans and angels by saying that humans have hidden depths to their natures whereas angelic natures are transparent to themselves. Furthermore, for Aquinas, strictly speaking, it is designated matter -- not prime matter -- that is the principle of individuation.

Borden Sharkey's monograph is a valuable contribution to the research literature of the later Stein. She shows great familiarity with Stein's work and great affinity with her project to develop an ontology of individual personhood. Furthermore Borden Sharkey, admirably, does not attempt to draw a sharp contrast between the earlier phenomenological Stein and the mature Catholic metaphysician. Stein was an intensely sincere and deep thinker who sought to explore the uniqueness of the individual person and the depth of personal being drawing on diverse resources. She sought to do so, in particular, by rethinking (unencumbered by the need to accurately reflect the history of philosophy) the categories of essence, form, matter, act and potency inherited from the Neo-Aristotelian Scholastics but informed by the ontological considerations of Husserl, Conrad-Martius, Heidegger and others.

Borden Sharkey's essay is a first step in a very complex terrain, but one which can yield much insight. The whole subject of the interrelation between Husserl's (and the early Munich school phenomenologists, including Conrad-Martius, Hering and others) interest in ontology (including formal ontology), Heidegger's fundamental ontology, and Scheler's and Stein's personalism is most complex and fascinating. Even more challenging is to bring these ontological discourses into relation with the historical context in Aristotle and Aquinas. Stein's work is extremely rich in insight, even if its overall systematic ambition remains unconvincing. More will

need to be done to articulate the understanding of essence in Husserl and Stein (especially given the revival of interest in formal ontology and analytic metaphysics), but Borden Sharkey has made a significant contribution to this challenging field and has admirably demonstrated Edith Stein's importance as an original philosopher of depth.

[Decisive Treatise and Epistle Dedicatory](#) by Averroës, translation, with introduction and notes by Charles E. Butterworth [Islamic Translation Series, Brigham Young University, 9780842524797] [Fasl al-maqāi fi ma bayna al-shari'ah wa-al-hikmah min al-ittisāl. English & Arabic]

Averroës (Ibn Rushd, 1126-1198) emerged from an eminent family in Muslim Spain to become the first and last great Aristotelian of the classical Islamic world; his meticulous commentaries influenced Christian thinkers and earned him favorable mention (and a relatively pleasant fate) in Dante's *Divina Commedia*. [The Book of the Decisive Treatise](#) was and remains one his most important works and one of history's best defenses of the legitimate role of reason in a community of faith. The text presents itself as a plea before a tribunal in which the divinely revealed Law of Islam is the sole authority; Averroës, critical of the anti-philosophical tone of the Islamic establishment, argues that the Law not only permits but also mandates the study of philosophy and syllogistic or logical reasoning, defending earlier Muslim philosophers and dismissing criticisms of them as more harmful to the Islamic community than the philosophers' own views had been. As he details the three fundamental methods the Law uses to aid people of varied capacities and temperaments, Averroës reveals a carefully formed and remarkably argued conception of the boundaries and uses of faith and reason.

In this remarkable work, Averroës presents a 'legal' case against the art of Kalam (speculative theology) with the Islamic Jurists sitting in Judgment. But, and this is important, this argument is not against religion per se. Now, the Latin West was very aware of the Aristotelian writings of Averroës but unaware of his other writings. The Christians knew his Commentaries and even of his controversy with Ghazali. But they were largely unaware of his

works that attempt to 'harmonize' philosophy and revelation (i.e., religious law). The 'Decisive Treatise' is among the most important of these. Here Averroes is at pains to show that not only isn't philosophy forbidden by the Koran; it is in fact commanded - but only for some.

Humanity is divided into three groups by Averroes. There are the common people (the 'people of rhetoric'), people of uncommon discernment (the 'people of dialectic'), and philosophers (the 'people of demonstration'). It is a pyramid, with the ordinary people at the base and the *falasifa* (i.e., Islamic philosophers) at the summit. But this is no celebration of diversity, the ideal that hovers over these pages is *ijma* - consensus. Averroes is charging the 'people of dialectic' with the ruin of consensus. What ruins consensus? Interpretation. The 'people of interpretation' (both *Falasifa* and Theologians) must keep the vagaries of interpretation from the people. In this the Islamic Theologians have, according to our author, failed miserably. The *Falasifa* are let off with a slap.

Now, to introduce a schema not entirely foreign to the text, one could say that in the medieval Islamic landscape there are basically three institutions: Law, Theology, Philosophy. What Averroes intends to do is forbid access to theological and philosophical speculation (i.e., interpretation) to the people. Okay, but why involve the Islamic Jurists? Because the Theologians have proven incapable of keeping their interpretational arguments from the people. This has two consequences -the ruin of consensus, and the rise of unbelief- and they are both bad. The Jurists are interjected into these interpretational arguments in order to keep these disputes from the common people. The Jurists, guided by the *falasifa*, are to decide what can and cannot be publicly said. One is tempted to say that this in effect leaves the *falasifa* as the only competent interpreter.

But it seems it would be a mistake to say that Averroes intends to do away with the Islamic Theologians. There are things in the Koran about which demonstrative certainty is impossible, thus there must be discussion of the (merely) possible - this is the legitimate realm of dialectics. It is only the overriding importance of *ijma* (consensus) in the

Islamic context that makes the Jurists more 'important' than the Theologians. The theologians discuss possibilities that should only be heard by a few; the Law (i.e., the Koran) however, is for all. But this last objection can be aimed at the *falasifa* too. The people are only capable of hearing the Law through rhetorical imagery, not speculative interpretation. Thus the theoretical (whether demonstrative or dialectical) can never be a matter of consensus.

So, if Law is for all and interpretation is not why should the Jurists consent to the leadership of the *Falasifa*? -Two reasons. First, the people are not One. The Law (i.e., Koran) is intended for all but It relates to each type differently. Secondly, there are passages in the Koran itself about which there is 'legitimate' dispute. Speculation, whether of philosophy or *Kalam*, is required and thus not to be silenced if it is hidden from the people. Again, the Law (Koran) is One, and It has one intention. It intends "only to teach true science and true practice." But this Intention manifests itself in various ways. For this the finesse and moderation of philosophy -the first well beyond the ability of the Jurists, the latter well beyond the ability of the theologians- is required.

Averroes concludes his 'case' by noting that more could be said - and then he doesn't say it. In this manner Averroes demonstrates the restraint of philosophy vis-à-vis the Islamic Theologians.

But this review is not under any such constraint; thus I add a few points. Interpretation is only dangerous if it becomes generally known. The speculations of the philosophers are not a problem because they and they alone know how to hide. One is tempted to ask whether this is 'proven' or 'falsified' by the fact that elements of the Averroistic position are taken up in the Medieval Latin West (e.g., Siger, Marsilius, Dante) that eventually come to 'fruition' in Machiavelli and then the Enlightenment. It is not simply a mistake to consider Averroes the great-grandfather of the European Enlightenment. But the Latins did not know the whole Averroes. Thus the heirs of this misunderstanding did not realize that the Enlightenment that Averroes foresaw was never meant to be Universal. The line of descent that one can draw from the Latin radical Averroists to the

Enlightenment ends by making it a point of both honor and theory to say everything to everyone. - Averroes would have been appalled.

As to the controversy between Averroes and Ghazali one can briefly say that Averroes is an inverse Ghazali; the latter demands the censure of philosophy while the former demands the censure of Kalam. In both cases consensus is not to be disturbed. Thus the argument between them is this: how is speculative mania to precede in a History in which consensus must remain undisturbed? Averroes chose the Jurists because Ghazali's choice - theological speculation- led to dissension in the community. Unfortunately, the 'secularists' in the Latin West (in the line of Radical Averroism) will, after severing all ties to theology, take to their own brand of 'speculation'. Thus Ideology replaced Revelation and philosophy goes from pillar to post. ...Perhaps there will soon be a genuine philosopher calling for an 'alliance' with religion? And why not? There are, after all, ultimately only two things of which we have been speaking: philosophy and the tools of philosophy (i.e., theology and the political).

What theoretical speculation intends is the Truth; what the Law (understood as Nomos) intends is consensus. However, Science and Philosophy are cumulative, speculation cannot be stopped. There is no 'consensus' in theoretical matters. But Revelation (Law) -whether Jewish, Christian or Islamic- routinely claims to be at an end. Thus just as speculation (philosophical mania) and religious Law could not sync up - one wonders how long the 'honeymoon' between philosophy and secular 'enlightened' law will last. The Laws (whether religious or secular) will always have the forbidden. But philosophical mania forbids itself nothing... Even though Averroes is at pains to argue that philosophers possess theoretical virtue while the jurists possess practical virtue and thus can be reconciled we must note that this would only be true if theoretical and practical virtue were themselves reconcilable. But this could only be true if mania and moderation were reconcilable.

So, "whenever demonstration leads to something different from the apparent sense of the Law, that apparent sense admits of interpretation..." In other

words, one finesses (or creates) the 'reconciliation'. But Creativity was the Ideal of the theologians (i.e., Divine Creativity) just as creativity is today an idol of 'enlightened' modernity. But for the medieval Aristotelians creativity (making) is opposed to knowing, and thus something of a *bête noire*. Creativity is a sign that something has gone wrong. Thus when Averroes, who all along in this text had insisted upon the tripartite division of humanity (the rhetorical, dialectical, demonstrative), at the very end creates a fourth type (for the Jurists) between the 'low level' of the traditionalists and the 'turbulence' of the theologians we are perhaps made aware of the ad hoc nature of this 'alliance' between Philosophy and Jurists.

Of this 'solution' we can say that the Law (Koran) is divided in two (surface and hidden) but humanity is divided in three. There are two interpretive classes (Demonstrative, Dialectical) and two classes that deal with the apparent/surface (Dialectical, Rhetorical) and the dialectical participates in both. Dialectic is neither demonstrative theory nor simple faith but a mixture of both. All the doctrinal problems that arise are due to the dialectical class. One closes this book wondering how the invention of a 'fourth type' of humanity -another mixture- would solve anything. After all, as Averroes says, demonstrative "interpretation ought not to be declared to those adept in dialectic, not to mention the multitude." Thus we should perhaps not mention that any alliance with philosophy (whether consisting of theologians or politicians) is an alliance in name only.

The major fault line in this alliance is best exposed by considering the fact that sound interpretation is not the same as true interpretation. The Jurists are concerned with behavior and results while the philosophers are concerned with a Truth that the Jurists (or our modern politicians) cannot possibly understand. It is in the end this lack of understanding -"and that will be grasped after the slightest examination by anyone who is cognizant of the condition of demonstration"- that dooms all philosophical alliances.

This brief essay by Averroes is magnificent; it pulls back the curtain, however briefly, on something that is rarely seen. Look away if you can. The Islamic

Translation Series and C. E. Butterworth have our thanks.

Averroës (Ibn Rushd, 1126-1198 C.E.) emerged from an eminent family of scholars and jurists in Muslim Spain. He distinguished himself as an authority on medicine and jurisprudence, but he is most widely known today as the first and last great Aristotelian in the classical Islamic world. His meticulous commentaries on Aristotle influenced Latin Christian thinkers and earned him favorable mention (and a relatively pleasant fate) in Dante's *Divina Commedia*.

The *Decisive Treatise* can be viewed as a plea before a tribunal in which the divinely revealed Law of Islam is the sole acknowledged authority. Averroës argues that the Law not only permits but mandates the study of philosophy and syllogistic or logical reasoning. In the course of his argument, he acquits certain earlier Muslim philosophers—particularly Avicenna (Ibn Sina) and al-Fārābī—of the charge of unbelief. He dismisses al-Ghazālī's criticisms of them as inconsistent and, indeed, as more harmful to the Islamic community than the philosophers' own views had been. For, says Averroës, al-Ghazālī discussed difficult matters before audiences unequipped to understand them.

By contrast, Averroës contends that the Law is designed to appeal to human beings in different ways, according to their varied capacities. He outlines its three fundamental methods as demonstrative reasoning, dialectical arguments, and rhetorical statements. Further, he asserts that those unqualified to properly evaluate a particular mode of reasoning should be barred from it, lest it harm them and the community. Averroës's *Decisive Treatise* and its explanatory *Epistle Dedicatory* form a clear and even impassioned defense of the legitimacy and proper role of reason in a community of faith.

The *Decisive Treatise*: Preliminary considerations

A quarter of a century ago, a scholar embarking on a study of Machiavelli lamented, not entirely in jest, the absence of any terrain not already marked out, as though in neon lights, by an illustrious predecessor who had written the

definitive study on Machiavelli nearly a score of years prior. Two ground-breaking studies by Muhsin Mandi, dating back seventeen and thirty-seven years respectively, place the erstwhile student of Averroës' *Kitāb fasi al-maqāl* (Book of the decisive treatise) and the so-called *Damima* (now properly known as the *Epistle Dedicatory*, or *Epistle on Divine Knowledge*) in a not entirely dissimilar dilemma. Indeed, Mandi has clearly proven that the *Damima* and the *Fasl al-maqāl* are, respectively, the first and second works of a trilogy and has masterfully identified the major question in both. Nor are Mandi's contributions the only ones that chart out the contours of these works, especially the *Decisive Treatise*. To his two studies must be added more than a dozen others composed by almost as many scholars since the beginning of the twentieth century, most written in conjunction with a translation of the *Decisive Treatise* or of it as well as of the *Epistle Dedicatory*.

Only two considerations justify yet another attempt to explain the *Decisive Treatise* and encourage anyone foolhardy enough to undertake it. First, Mandi's study focuses solely on what he considers to be the beginning half of the work. Second, many of the reflections prompting my new English translation of the *Decisive Treatise*, as elaborated in this interpretative essay, promise to benefit those who seek to understand its mysteries.

Of this extensive list of studies, Mandi's essay on the *Decisive Treatise* and Hourani's introduction to his English translation of that work demand immediate attention, not least because of the different way they understand the structure of the text. Whereas Hourani divides it into an introduction plus three chapters. Mandi thinks it consists of an introduction and two major parts. Hourani, in agreement with Mandi as concerns the introduction and final chapter or part, differs both insofar as he divides the first part into two chapters and by where he suggests placing the break between his chapter one and chapter two. Although my understanding of the way this text is structured calls for more than Mandi's two parts or Hourani's three chapters, I can discern no reason for the break urged by the latter. It ignores not only the

sense of the argument but also Averroës' peculiar style in this treatise.

After having shown why philosophy is obligatory according to the divine Law, Averroës enters upon a long series of arguments to show why one can follow that stricture only if the study of syllogistic reasoning is also embraced. Having made that point, he embarks upon another task—one that seems to occupy his attention in one way or another throughout the rest of the treatise but certainly through that portion of it running from this point on to the formal summary and apology that Hourani and Mandi take as ending the next section of the text—that is, chapter two and part one respectively. Averroës signals that he is about to engage upon this new task by formally declaring, "Since all of this has been determined" (*wa idhā taqarrara hādhā kulluhu*), and speaking for the first time of the beliefs of the Muslim community as well as of the various natures of human beings. The discussion of consensus (*ijmā'*) that comes up in the immediate sequel is intimately linked with the idea of Muslim communal life. In other words, none of this is in keeping with a summary statement intended to close an argument.

Still, Hourani's introduction is thoroughly helpful, not least because it so skillfully defines the intellectual context surrounding the subject of the treatise and provides such a fine overview of the broader themes treated here. In the course of focusing primarily on what he terms part one of the treatise, Mandi shows why it is to be identified as concerned with what can be inferred from the divine Law. Paying special attention to Averroës' use of such stylistic devices as *taqrīr*—that is, the "determining" or "determination" of the treatise's title—and its derivatives, as well as to the terms *idhā* and in used to begin syllogisms, he divides this first part into five sections and seventeen subsections. As the title of his essay intimates, Mandi proposes no grand explanation; instead, he limits himself to comments and reflections on these stylistic devices as a means of pointing to some of the questions Averroës raises in the first part of the Decisive Treatise.

The Decisive Treatise: Its title and dramatic setting

This work, identified in the Escorial manuscript as *Kitāb faṣl al-maqāl wa taqrīr mā bayn al-sharī`a wa al-hikma min al-ittisāl* (The book of the decisive treatise, determining the connection between the Law and wisdom), has been referred to in various other ways by the biographers. Most important, though, is that none of them calls it a "book" (*kitāb*). Nor does Averroës himself ever refer to it by this name. In its sequel, the *Kitāb al-kashf `an manāhij al-adilla*, he calls it a "speech" (*qawl*) while designating as a "book" only the *Kashf* itself. Yet, because he also uses the term "speech" in the Decisive Treatise to identify the Epistle Dedicatory, or *Damīma*, doubt remains as to the precise character of this work.

Important as they are, the terms "Law" and "wisdom" may be passed over now with the single aside that *sharī`a* and *shar'* are both referred to here as Law (the uppercase letter serving to denote their special status as revealed law), for these terms receive ample attention in the sequel. The term *faṣl* literally means "separating" but also has a legal significance and can thus suggest something like "decisive [rendering of] judgment." *Tapir* is also a legal term, one denoting a decision set down by a judge, or an assignment or stipulation. As Muhsin Mandi has cogently observed, it and its derivatives seem to constitute organizing principles by means of which Averroës indicates the steps of his argument. The most literal, and perhaps most accurate, rendering of the title would thus be "Book of decisively judging the statement and determining the connection between the Law and wisdom." Too unwieldy for normal purposes, it nonetheless draws attention to the fundamental question of what is to be decisively judged, as well as to the way that judgment is juxtaposed to the connection Averroës is intent upon determining as concerns the Law and wisdom.

The dramatic setting

Book or speech, the Decisive Treatise is characterized above all by the legal context in which Averroës couches his whole exposition as well as by his repeated references to, and even attacks

upon, the jurists and dialectical theologians. His abundant recourse to Qur'ānic verses and to language highly evocative of the Muslim revelation amply indicates that he seeks to present this argument as something like a plea before a tribunal in which the divine Law of Islam is the sole authority. He speaks, for example, of the faithful person (mu'min) and of faith (īmān), rather than of someone who merely holds a belief or of belief. And to show more clearly how closely linked are philosophy and the Law, he both distinguishes between and subtly confuses the verbs 'arafa (to be cognizant of) and 'alima (to know) so that the person who is cognizant of God—a perfectly respectable idea to any member of the faith—sometimes seems to be the same as someone who knows Him. Similarly, Averroës reminds the reader again and again of the way Islam has developed over time, of the beliefs shared by the members of the Muslim community, of the allegiance all feel to "this divine Law of ours," of its truth, of the responsibility placed upon a Muslim as Muslim, and of the intention of the Law as well as of the Lawgiver. Averroës provides, moreover, immediate evidence that he intends here to respect the strictures of the Muslim community. In the opening sentence he trumpets clearly that the investigative goal he will pursue is limited to "the perspective of Law-based reflection."

Still, his goal is to determine the connection between this Law and wisdom, or philosophy. Even though he defends or explains the latter in terms set by the former, he does not thereby concede its subservience. If anything, he tries to avoid juxtaposing the two in such a hierarchical fashion. Neither priority nor ascendancy is at issue; the connection to be determined eventually is close to one of parity—that is, agreement on all levels.

The preceding explanatory interpretation of the Decisive Treatise urges that philosophy or wisdom—at least as expressed by Averroës and those with whom he associates himself within the medieval Islamic tradition—has the same intention with respect to governance as the Law, that both seek to provide for the well-being of all to the extent possible. So stated, the agreement between the two depends in no way upon determining to

what extent individual philosophers privately assent to the Law, nor in probing the sincerity of their various efforts to buttress its claims. The reasoning leading to this interpretation looks, rather, to what is required for sound political life—and this in terms both of lasting conditions and of those that arise with the ascendancy of rule proclaiming itself to be guided by revelation. In this respect, it self-consciously introduces a new stage in the perennial reflection on the relationship between religion and philosophy, or between the divine Law and wisdom. No privileged presuppositions support this approach. It is grounded simply in a desire to explain the writing as it has come down to us, and to do so by relying solely on arguments presented by Averroës himself.

To recognize similarity, perhaps identity, of intention between the Law and wisdom leaves open the larger question of what each intends. For now, it must remain so. Though Averroës has identified in outline what the Law intends and has shown the ways in which wisdom agrees with that intention, he has done nothing to plumb the content of that intention. Nor was that, finally, part of the task he took upon himself here. A complete investigation of true science and true practice belongs, as he has clearly noted, to other discussions and to other kinds of writings. Averroës has made the reasons for confining such kinds of inquiry to these other writings amply clear, while noting here that science, or knowledge, and practice are inseparable.

The Epistle Dedicatory: its title and place

In Marcus Joseph Müller's *Philosophie und Theologie von Averroes*, the Decisive Treatise is presented as the first part of a trilogy, the other two parts being the *Kashf can manāhij al-adilla fi 'aqā'id al-milla* (Uncovering the methods of proofs with respect to the beliefs of the religious community) and the epistle presented here. Although it was placed in the Arabic manuscript between the Decisive Treatise and the Uncovering, Müller moved the epistle to the end of both works and titled it *Damima*, or Appendix, while keeping as a subtitle the title assigned by the scribe of the manuscript: *The Question the Shaykh Abu al-Walid Mentioned in the Decisive Treatise*. And so it remained, albeit with momentary hesitation by at

least one translator, until Muhsin Mandi showed convincingly why this little writing should properly be considered an "Epistle Dedicatory" to the other two treatises. Mandi's argument is so straightforward and persuasive that one can only wonder why no earlier scholar had noticed the anomaly of calling this epistle an appendix and treating it as such.

Averroës mentions this writing and its general subject matter in the text of the Decisive Treatise as something he has already completed—that is, as a question to which he has already responded. He does precisely the same with respect to the Decisive Treatise and its subject matter in the Uncovering. What is more, Müller and other scholars understood the references to the Decisive Treatise in the Uncovering to indicate that it must therefore be a sequel to that writing. Precisely the same reasoning leads to the conclusion that this little work is an epistle intended as a preface to the Decisive Treatise, not as an appendix to it and the Uncovering.'

It has no title, for the simple reason that epistles dedicatory are usually not accorded any. We know the work, instead, for what it is—for its subject matter. It is a letter, addressed to a particular person, in which the question of God's knowledge of particulars is examined, this in order to prepare the discussion of the relationship between the divine Law and wisdom or philosophy carried out in the Decisive Treatise, as well as the larger inquiry Averroës adumbrates at its end. There, he expresses his hope to investigate at greater length the intention of the divine Law, especially how it teaches true science and true practice—that is, true interpretation—and how it provides persuasion for all the people. Indeed, in addition to the precision of the title—*Kashf 'an manāhij al-adilla fi 'aqā'id al-milla* (Uncovering the methods of proofs with respect to the beliefs of the religious community)—Averroës adds a subtitle to make his goals in this work even more explicit: *Wa to 'rīf mā ze aqa 'a fihā bi-hasab al-tad wit min al-shubah al-muzayyifa zea al-bida 'al-mudalla* (Making cognizable the obscurities that foster deviation and the innovations that lead astray occurring in them [the beliefs] from interpretation).

Clearly, this last work is as much a popular work as the Decisive Treatise. What, then, of the Epistle Dedicatory?

The argument of the Epistle Dedicatory

This missive is dedicated to a particular individual, one whom Averroës never names and to whom he always refers by the polite and formal second-person plural form of address. That is not the form Averroës uses when responding to putative objections in the Decisive Treatise, nor when explaining what ought to be clear to his particular interlocutor there. No; there, as well as in the Uncovering, the form of address used is the more familiar second-person singular. The addressee of this small writing is, moreover, someone for whom Averroës may appropriately beseech God to prolong his might or power, someone who is gifted with "excellent discernment" as well as a "noble nature". It is also someone with whom Averroës has already conversed about the question investigated here, someone with a sufficient grasp of the question and of the position of the philosophers with respect to it that Averroës can dispense with preliminaries and move directly to the core of the question. The addressee is also a person interested in the resolution of the doubt, an individual who wants to understand how the conflict between the dialectical theologians and the philosophers with respect to God's knowledge of particulars can be resolved. The one person who comes to mind once all of these attributes are listed is none other than the Almohade sovereign to whom Averroës seems to refer at the end of the Decisive Treatise—namely, Abū Yacqūb Yūsuf.

But why, given all we know about the close relationship Averroës enjoyed with his sovereign, would he raise this question as one with which to open this trilogy? The answer, as becomes evident in the Decisive Treatise, is that the charges brought by al-Ghazālī against the philosophers have attracted so much attention that a public response is now appropriate. Averroës opens the trilogy with a defense of the philosophers and their approach to the question of God's knowledge of particulars—a defense grounded in a demonstration that the approach followed by the dialectical theologians leads to confusion—in order

to indicate that the work to follow seeks to protect the divine Law and its teaching, not to undermine it.

The epistle seems to consist of five major parts. After an introduction that takes account of the doubt this question of eternal knowledge has engendered in the addressee, Averroës explains that he will first provide a clear explanation of the problem, then provide a solution to it. The problem—the same one that is alluded to in the *Decisive Treatise*—concerns God's knowledge, to be sure, but also the difference between human knowledge and divine knowledge as well as the question of whether things change when they come into existence after having not existed. If they do change, how can eternal knowledge be one and the same? If they do not, how can we speak of a difference between what is and what is not? In the next two sections, Averroës passes in review additional considerations with respect to the question, then turns to the promised solution. It, too, is set forth in two sections.

Though a proper solution to the question would require a long discussion, Averroës acknowledges that this is not the place for it. He focuses, instead, on the rhetorical weakness in the solution that al-Ghazālī set forth in his *Incoherence of the Philosophers* and then points to the proper solution, one that distinguishes between eternal knowledge—which is proper to God—and the generated knowledge that is proper to human beings. It depends upon knowing how to draw a correct analogy between these two kinds of knowledge; it depends, that is, upon knowing how to reason correctly about them. The philosophers, who do understand logic and its limits, are able to draw the correct analogy.

Having solved the problem, Averroës turns to a consideration of what this means for our understanding of the way God knows things, as contrasted to the way we know things, and then concludes by affirming that the philosophers would never have explained matters as al-Ghazālī and the dialectical theologians claim. They would not have done so—indeed, they could not have done so—because that would oblige them to deny that eternal knowledge includes particulars. Yet anyone even remotely aware of the teaching of the

philosophers knows that they attribute the insight gained by means of dreams and other kinds of inspiration to precisely such knowledge of particulars.

The introduction and the conclusion are roughly equal in length, as are the statement of the problem and its solution plus the statement of what that solution entails. Differently stated, there is to be found in this short *Epistle Dedicatory* a symmetry in the formal structure of the argument that meshes with the symmetry found in its simple, almost rhetorical, character. An alert reader sees readily that the doubt has not been sufficiently laid to rest, but discerns as well that the path of the philosophers as presented here by Averroës is more salutary for those who would live by the precepts of divine Law than the path of the dialectical theologians, at least as it appears from al-Ghazālī's attempts to criticize the philosophers. A sovereign intent upon ruling intelligently a community that looks to revealed law for guidance would do well to pay close attention to the teachings of the philosophers rather than to those of the dialectical theologians. And, as we know, the treatise that follows immediately thereafter will show yet other reasons for heeding such a lesson.

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[The Elements of Avicenna's Physics](#) by Andreas Lammer [Scientia Graeco-Arabica, De Gruyter, 9783110543582]

This study is the first comprehensive analysis of the physical theory of the Islamic philosopher Avicenna (d. 1037). It seeks to understand his contribution against the developments within the preceding Greek and Arabic intellectual milieu, and to appreciate his philosophy as such by emphasising his independence as a critical and systematic thinker. Exploring Avicenna's method of "teaching and learning," it investigates the implications of his account of the natural body as a three-dimensionally extended composite of matter and form and examines his views on nature as a principle of motion and his analysis of its relation to soul. Moreover, it demonstrates how Avicenna defends the Aristotelian conception of place against the strident criticism of his predecessors, among other things, by disproving the existence of

void and space. Finally, it sheds new light on Avicenna's account of the essence and the existence of time. For the first time taking into account the entire range of Avicenna's major writings, this study fills a gap in our understanding both of the history of natural philosophy in general and of the philosophy of Avicenna in particular.

Excerpt: It is the aim of this study to analyse the core concepts of Avicenna's physics. Particular attention is devoted to a work called al-Sarnā' al-tabī'ī, which is the first section (fann) of the second part (gumia) of Avicenna's comprehensive collection al-Sifā' and, by all appearance, was the first section to be written and completed around the year 412/1022. In his cd-Samā al-tabī'ī, Avicenna formulated his most extensive account of physics in general, and of the concepts of matter and form, nature, motion, place, and time in particular. It is for this reason that this work is at the heart of this study.

Avicenna also authored a number of less exhaustive, even if not necessarily less complete, philosophical compendia, viz., al-Hikma al-'Arūḥiyya, 'Uyūn al-hikma, al-Hidāya, al-Nagat, Dānesnāme-ye Alā'i, al-Hikma al-masriqiyya and al-Isārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt. Some of these works have been neglected by modern scholarship almost in their entirety. In this study, it is my firm intention to consider all these eight works, and to compare, contextualise, and assess their respective contents in an attempt to provide a full and coherent picture of the key concepts of Avicenna's natural philosophy. In addition to that, other sections of al-Sifā', in particular al-Ilāhiyyāt, al-Samā' wa-l-'ālam, al-Kawn wa-l fasād, al-Burhān, and al-Maqūlāt, are often consulted, as they provide important information without which many details cannot adequately be evaluated or even understood.

Avicenna's al-Soma' al-tabī'ī is neither a commentary on Aristotle's Physics nor is it an interpretation of that work. It is more adequately described as Avicenna's own version of that science whose subjects have traditionally been transmitted and discussed under the title of Aristotle's Greek work Ovum), in Arabic Sam' al-kiyān or al-Samā'

al-tabī'ī and in English Lecture on Physics or simply Physics. According to Avicenna's understanding, the subjects discussed in Aristotle's work belong to, and make up, the science of "physics," which he conceives as the most common science or discipline within the area of natural philosophy. With regard to Avicenna's al-gift', then, the contents of al-Sarnā' al-tabī'ī lay the foundation for the more specific investigations carried out in the particular disciplines presented in al-Samā' wa-l-'ālam, al-Kawn wa-l fasād, al-Afāl wa-l-infi'ālāt, al-Ma' Min wa-l-ātāral-'ulwiyya, al-Nafs, al-Nabāt, and al-Hayawān. Together, these eight disciplines complete the scientific area of al-Tabī'īyyāt: the philosophy concerned with "natural [things]" - i.e., natural philosophy.

Since Avicenna's various works on physics provide us with insights into his personal reading of Aristotle's Physics, and into his own appropriation of Aristotelian physics and natural philosophy, any engagement with Avicenna's texts recommends a preceding engagement with Aristotle's writings on these subjects as well as with a range of further works from the philosophical tradition they initiated. It is for this reason that I shall make constant use of Aristotle's Physics alongside a number of Greek and Arabic sources which, in one way or another, comment on or expound Aristotle's work in a way that helps us understand and contextualise the various views and positions which Avicenna presented and discussed in his major works, especially in his al-Samā' al-tabī'ī. That said, I shall never intend to engage in an attempt to understand or to interpret Aristotle's Physics in light of Avicenna's works. To put it simply: Aristotle's Physics is a valuable resource for understanding Avicenna's al-Samā' al-tabī'ī - but not vice versa. Consequently, I consider Avicenna as a Peripatetic and a genuine follower of Aristotle, even though his positions may often not be genuinely Aristotelian. Indeed, in his own systematic works, Avicenna is no commentator on Aristotle and in many ways even exceeds Aristotle by providing novel ways of how Aristotelian materials can be interpreted and integrated, rearranged and refined in innovative ways, often in light of later developments. The result of this appropriation, viz., Avicenna's own

philosophy, as expressed in his various works, must not be taken as a way to comment on Aristotle but as a way to transform and to develop Aristotle.

This understanding of the place of Avicenna's works within the history of Peripatetic philosophy, and of the relation between the Aristotelian corpus and the Avicennian oeuvre, leads to a simple but crucial question: is Avicenna's natural philosophy as rich and innovative as his logic and his metaphysics already proved to be? As it happens, this is a question which has not yet received an adequate answer, even though, given the fruitful research on other areas of his philosophy, it clearly deserves a thorough investigation. In fact, it appears that in the field of natural philosophy in general, and of physics in particular, Avicenna's contributions are not widely acknowledged. It seems to be commonly believed that Avicenna simply was a follower of Aristotle and that, for this very reason, his physical theory is just Peripatetic. While it is certainly correct that Avicenna is - and, more importantly, that he considered himself to be - a follower of Aristotle, and while it is also true that his physical theory is Peripatetic, it is not just Peripatetic or simply so. In fact, it is *prima facie* unreasonable to assume that someone of Avicenna's stature should have been so absolutely ingenious in certain fields of philosophy and science but utterly dull and uninteresting in another.

However, this does not mean that no study of Avicenna's natural philosophy has so far been undertaken that would highlight his originality in this field. During the last couple of years, a number of insightful and accurate studies on various aspects have been published in the West, in particular by two scholars: Jon McGinnis and Ahmad Hasnawi. Their contributions provide valuable information on certain concrete aspects of, and novel insights in, Avicenna's physics, ranging from the structure of his *al-Samā' al-tabī'i* as a whole to specific concepts and their history in Greek, Arabic, and Latin philosophy (as, for example, the concepts of motion or time), and to particular arguments within Avicenna's discussions (as, for example, the proof against circular motion in a void). Nonetheless, what has so far been missing is a study of the foundations of Avicenna's natural philosophy (i) as

a whole, (ii) in all his major works, and (iii) in light of the preceding Greek and Arabic traditions. Providing such a study has become the aim of this monograph.

Avicenna's *al-Samā' al-tabī'i* consists of four books (*maqālāt*, sg. *maqāla*). All the basic concepts of natural philosophy are discussed within the first two books. It is an investigation into these concepts which forms the core of the present study. More precisely, it examines Avicenna's accounts of corporeality, matter, form, and privation (in chapter three); nature and inclination (in chapter four); place, space, and void (in chapter five); and time (in chapter six). In addition to that, Avicenna's way of presenting his thoughts in *al-Samā' al-tabī'i*, in particular those on 'matter and form, together with the fact that the first chapter in both Aristotle's *Physics* and Avicenna's *al-Samā' al-tabī'i* is devoted to methodological concerns of inquiry, argumentation, and presentation within the area of natural philosophy, made it necessary to investigate the overall method adopted in *al-Samā' al-tabī'i* as a whole (in chapter two).

There are two concepts which I decided not to investigate in detail, viz., the concepts of motion and causation. The primary reason for leaving Avicenna's account of motion aside is that there are already two studies which have considerably furthered our understanding of this subject, viz., Hasnawi's article "La définition du mouvement dans la Physique du Shifā' d'Avicenne" and Robert Wisnovsky's monograph *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context*.¹ In the former, Hasnawi not only offered an accurate treatment of Avicenna's notion as expressed in his *al-Samā' al-tabī'i* but also provided valuable material about the history of the definition of motion from Aristotle through the commentators up to Avicenna and, among other things, highlighted the influence of Themistius, John Philoponus, and Abu Nag al-Fārābī on Avicenna's views on motion. Wisnovsky, on the other hand, meticulously analysed Avicenna's understanding of "perfection," "actuality," or "entelechy" (*kamāl*) which, since Aristotle, had been the central notion within the definition of motion. While Avicenna's account of motion is not investigated in this study as such, it will, nonetheless, figure prominently and

frequently be mentioned, outlined, or discussed in various contexts, so that the core idea of Avicenna's account of motion will eventually have been treated en passant. On the other hand, Avicenna's discussion of causation in *al-Samā' al-tabī'i*, have only peripherally been taken into consideration, primarily because Avicenna's main exposition of causation and the categorisation of causes is carried out in book six of his *al-Ilāhiyyāt*. Although Avicenna frequently refers to different kinds of cause throughout his writings, and although he offers a distinct treatment of causes in the first book of *al-Samā' al-tabī'i*, questions about causation are not as such investigated in *al-Samā' al-tabī'i*. Having said this, the notion of cause - in particular in its application to matter and form, to nature, and to God, for example - is at appropriate places integrated and discussed.

In addition, this study does not contain an examination of Avicenna's treatment of the infinite. Although the infinite was an integral part of the first half of Aristotle's *Physics*, having been treated exhaustively in the third book, Avicenna moved it to what he considered to be a more appropriate place, viz., the discussion of continuity in relation to the natural bodies insofar as they have quantity, inspired by Aristotle's treatment in *Physics* V-VI and carried out in the third book of *al-Samā' al-tabī'i*. That is to say, the infinite is itself not a fundamental concept of natural things alongside, for example, motion, time, and place, or even a principle alongside matter and form. Instead, it is a subordinate feature, i.e., a feature that follows from concepts that truly are fundamental and which, in one way or another, relate to the category of quantity, especially motion and magnitude.

Apart from the noted exceptions, this present study investigates all the most important and fundamental concepts that are central to Avicenna's natural philosophy with an eye both to significant developments in the preceding Greek and Arabic traditions, and to parallel or supplementary materials from his other major works, in order to examine thoroughly and accurately Avicenna's position within the history of natural philosophy by

providing a comprehensive understanding of the key concepts, i.e., elements, of Avicenna's physics.

I regret that I could include an investigation of Avicenna's engagement with Mu'tazili and early As'arī theology only occasionally. Likewise, close to no mention is made of later Andalusian figures such as Abū Bakr Muhammad ibn Bāgga, Abū Bakr Muhammad ibn Tufayl, and Averroes, whose works may contain further material on the development of natural philosophy from Antiquity to Avicenna. Perhaps most regrettably, the materials contained in Averroes' commentaries on Aristotle's *Physics* could also not be taken into consideration.

Moreover, I could not take into account the Latin tradition of reading both Avicenna's *al-Samā' al-tabī'i* and Aristotle's *Physics* or of Averroes' commentary on the latter. Finally, the later Islamic tradition of philosophy and *kalām* in reaction to Avicenna's philosophical system has almost entirely been neglected in this study; yet, the rich materials of the post-Avicennian tradition have already riveted my attention within the research project "The Heirs of Avicenna: Philosophy in the Islamic East from the Twelfth to the Thirteenth Century."

Structure and Prospect

The first chapter of this study is concerned with providing an account of the trans-mission of Aristotle's text of the *Physics* and its Greek commentaries into Arabic, and additionally also surveys a number of other sources which were significant in the history of natural philosophy up to Avicenna. Most of the texts mentioned in this first chapter will reappear, often prominently, in the remainder of this study and illuminate either how Avicenna himself conceived of certain concepts or how certain figures in the preceding history did to whose conception, then, Avicenna reacted. While Avicenna's *al-Samā' al-tabī'i* is at the heart of this study, this first chapter seeks to describe the wide range of texts which form its basis.

The second chapter is concerned with Avicenna's methodology in his writings on natural philosophy. It expounds how Avicenna conceives of his own philosophy in most of his major works and especially in his *al-Sifā'*. The general picture drawn out in this chapter is not entirely new and has, in

other publications, either implicitly assumed or explicitly addressed." Yet, it has not been canvassed from the specific viewpoint of natural philosophy for which it is, in fact, of utmost importance, not least because in his major works, Avicenna usually comments on his methodology precisely at the beginning of the sections on natural philosophy.

The exposition of Avicenna's views on the principles of natural things, which is carried out in the third chapter, may be the most "metaphysical" topic of this study. Incidentally, this is the reason why in this chapter, more than in the others, I shall engage with the interpretations and views expressed by various authors in the secondary literature, for there simply exist more scholarly contributions on Avicenna's views on matter, form, and corporeality than on other aspects that are immediately relevant for his natural philosophy. However, this does not also entail that the scientific community has already formed a correct understanding of Avicenna's account. To the contrary, it will be shown that the interpretations that have been presented so far in the secondary literature are, more often than not, inaccurate, as they misrepresent Avicenna's intentions and testify to a misunderstanding of his words.

Avicenna's account of nature as a principle of motion within natural things is an apparent case for Avicenna's engagement with earlier opinions or, more precisely, with one particularly influential earlier opinion. That this earlier opinion has its roots in late-ancient developments in reading Aristotle's *Physics* was to be expected; that it must also be understood in light of the writings of Avicenna's immediate contemporaries, and that Avicenna is effectively reacting to an entire, and hitherto unnoticed, tradition of, as he would say, misunderstanding the power of nature, is the central theme of the fourth chapter.

Regarding the philosophical understanding of place, Avicenna finds himself in a difficult situation. Rigorously accepting Aristotle's definition with all its consequences, he has to face the opposition of virtually the entire preceding Greek philosophical tradition which, as is well-known, had turned against Aristotle. As is shown in the fifth chapter,

Avicenna was probably the first in the history of philosophy systematically to defend, and successfully to restore, what for centuries had been ridiculed as an implausible, even crazy, understanding of the reality of place. In addition to the materials drawn from the Greek tradition, Avicenna is also reacting to certain trends and tendencies of his own time, most notably the views about space and void expressed by the members of the Basrian strand of Mu'tazilism.

Time is arguably the most complex notion discussed in Avicenna's *al-Samā' al-tabī'i*—more complex than the others and also more complex than previous studies have so far noticed. According to the commonly accepted interpretation, Avicenna was influenced by ancient and late ancient readings of Aristotle which described time in terms of a flowing now which generates time much like the tip of a ballpoint pen could be seen as producing a line through its motion on a sheet of paper. It will be shown in chapter six that this understanding of Avicenna's account of time is inadequate. For one thing, Avicenna rejected the idea of a flowing now as the cause of time's existence. More importantly, however, the now is also not relevant for his understanding of time's essence. The complexity of Avicenna's account of time as the magnitude of motion and the universal source of beforeness and afterness within the world can only be unravelled if his account is read against the background of a common Peripatetic confusion about the relation between motion and time, on the one hand, and a well-known attack that charges the Aristotelian definition with circularity, on the other. It is the traces of this confusion in Avicenna, together with his defence against this charge, which is ultimately responsible for the increasing complexity of his account, as he struggled to - unwittingly - combine seemingly incompatible Neoplatonic and Peripatetic elements within a single coherent and more robust theory.

Taking it all together, this study shows that Avicenna's analysis of the central concepts and the core issues of natural philosophy is innovative and resourceful in the highest degree. His discussions are rich, his material is vast, his positions are intriguing, and his stance is both rigorously

Peripatetic and characteristically Avicennian. Although on a large scale, the structure of his *al-Samā' al-tabī'i*, and in particular of its first two books, may appear to follow closely the order of exposition in Aristotle's *Physics*, a more detailed analysis reveals that Avicenna's independence in execution, his resolution in argument, and his innovative power in discussion are tremendous and unmistakable - just as one, given the fruitful research on his logic and metaphysics, should have expected.

In this study, I analysed the core concepts of Avicenna's physics. The central text of my investigation was *al-Samā' al-tabī'i*, in which Avicenna presents his most detailed and extensive treatment of natural things. Additionally, I provided further references to passages in his other major works or employed these passages, in order to contextualise my discussions and to substantiate my interpretations. Moreover, I also examined various texts from the preceding Greek and Arabic philosophical traditions, because Avicenna's philosophy can only be adequately described in full and appreciated in detail against the background of ancient, late ancient, and early Arabic scientific developments. It is precisely Avicenna's engagement with his predecessors which demonstrates the originality of his thought, the rigour of his analysis, and, ultimately, the strength of his philosophical reasoning. If my investigation of "the elements of Avicenna's physics" was successful, then I was able to provide a convincing outline of

- Avicenna's philosophical method,
- his thoughts on matter, form, and corporeality,
- his views on nature as a dynamic principle of motion,
- his understanding of the place of bodies, and
- his conception of time within the natural world.

However, in addition to that, I hope that this study also revealed different facets of Avicenna's personality as a philosopher, as a thinker, and as a writer within the history of philosophy and science.

In the second chapter, for example, we became acquainted with Avicenna the Systematiser, who devises a complex system of interdependent sciences, being related with each other through their principles, questions, and subject-matters. Within this complex architecture, physics takes up the second most elevated position, only surpassed in commonality and importance by metaphysics. The science of physics provides the central ideas, the most important notions, and the crucial elements that lay the foundation to any further first-hand investigation of the objects that immediately surround us within the natural world. My analysis has shown that, in contrast to Aristotle, Avicenna's works do not document his inquiry into the natural world but, instead, follow the requirements of "teaching and learning." It is these two notions which epitomise Avicenna's approach in his major works - above all, those works which form his *al-Sifā'* - and represent his personal views on how reality should be conceived, how it should be reproduced in writing, and how it should be unpacked didactically.

What is more, the method of "teaching and learning" corresponds not only to the biographical information about how, when, and why Avicenna composed his *al-Sifā'*, but also to his own personal understanding of science as a universal endeavour and his conception of the philosophical procedure recommended by Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics*. It was shown that the style, the structure, and the argumentative layout of his *al-Samā' al-tabī'i* is nothing other than the rigorous application of these methodological underpinnings to the concrete situation of teaching natural philosophy to his disciples and readers. In presenting the principles of natural things "by way of postulation and positing," Avicenna ultimately follows Aristotle's advice of *Physics I.* to proceed "from the universals to the particulars" in a way hitherto unprecedented within the history of philosophy.

In the third chapter, then, we met Avicenna the Peripatetic, who does not follow the Aristotelian method in establishing the principles of natural things through an investigation of change, but who, nonetheless, fundamentally accepts and systematically develops the Aristotelian truth that

concrete objects are composed of the constitutive principles matter and form. The resulting philosophical theory is intriguing and systematic. Focusing on the natural body, first, in its fundamental respect of being a body, Avicenna explains that a body as such is a three-dimensionally extended substance. For him, being corporeal means nothing other than being extended in such a way that it is possible to identify up to three distinct and perpendicularly intersecting dimensions. Being extended, moreover, means being essentially continuous, which, in turn, entails being essentially divisible. Thus, Avicenna's account of the corporeality of natural bodies intrinsically relies on the three notions of extensionality, continuity, and divisibility. The principle of this threefold meaning of corporeality is what Avicenna calls "corporeal form," inhering in an underlying substrate called "matter." It is the union of an incorporeal matter and a corporeal form which gives rise to the essentially extended and continuous substance of body. Moreover, Avicenna demonstrates the existence of this underlying matter on the basis of an argument which intrinsically relies precisely on the notion of divisibility and continuity, i.e., on the idea of the corporeal form as inherent in prime matter. In doing so, he does not merely develop and explain his own theory but engages critically with late ancient arguments which conceived of matter as already corporeal and denied the possibility of proving the existence of an incorporeal matter altogether.

Avicenna's adherence to the idea of a corporeal form as the most fundamental form of body, however, does not commit him to the thesis of the multiplicity of forms, i.e., the ontological thesis according to which concrete objects are constituted through the inherence of two or more forms in one underlying matter. Much to the contrary, it emerged that concrete objects only have one form, where it is this one form which contains all formal determinations in a unified manner "by way of generality and specificity." A human being, for example, does not exist of matter together with the forms of corporeality, of animality, and of rationality; a human being consists only of one matter and of one form, viz., that of humanity,

which makes this human being a rational animate body.

My analysis has also shown that Avicenna presents a fundamentally unified physics in which all bodies - eternal celestial and corruptible terrestrial bodies alike - are governed by the same principles, because they all do not only consist of form and matter but consist of the same kind of matter that is distinguished and diversified through different kinds of forms, all of which contain corporeality as their most general and most common formal component. For Avicenna, matter is simply the essentially receptive and not further qualified substrate for form, whereas form is nothing other than a disposition inhering in matter. Thus, matter and form are principles which pertain to all natural beings and are, for that reason, common to all of them. Yet, their commonality is not of a numerical kind, as only God can be said to be "numerically common" to all existent things. Instead, matter and corporeal form are "generically common" precisely insofar as they fulfil a specific function in the natural world, viz., to be receptive of form and to be inherent in matter, respectively.

In addition to his universal analysis of corporality, Avicenna also considers the natural body from a more restricted perspective, viz., insofar as it is subject to change. Change, he argues, is explained through the additional aspect of privation, which signifies the body only insofar as it lacks a certain form which it is intrinsically such as to acquire. Privation is itself not a principle on equal terms with, and in addition to, the constitutive principles of form and matter; still it functions as a necessary prerequisite for change and motion. As such, privation depends on the two universal principles matter and form, because these constitute what the natural thing is in its being, whereas privation only illustrates what a natural thing could become on the basis of what it already is.

In chapter four, we were introduced to Avicenna the Attacker, who does not just seize John Philoponus' new definition of nature but who takes it up with an entire tradition of, as he would say, misrepresenting the true meaning of nature. Taking his departure from a quotation of Aristotle's definition of nature, Avicenna plays out his

strengths as a competent commentator both by providing new insights and by displaying an acute awareness of intricate issues in previous interpretations. According to his diagnosis, Aristotle and Philoponus treated the (for him) crucial distinction between nature and soul with less care as would have been necessary. Aristotle was not able to explain why the motive faculty of the animal soul should not be defined with the very same words as those he used for defining nature. Philoponus, in turn, ruined his initially correct understanding of why nature is a "primary" or "first" principle of motion through his subsequent idea according to which a body's nature is subjugated to the sovereign command of its soul with the result that soul was actually capable of altering the underlying nature, which, again, blurred the distinction between the agency of nature and that of soul.

Despite this disagreement, Avicenna fundamentally accepts Philoponus' interpretation that Aristotle's nature must be understood as an active principle involved in the production of motion, instead of being a passive principle of being moved. This is also apparent in his account of inclination, which he adopts from Alexander of Aphrodisias and Philoponus. However, it was shown that Avicenna considers the idea of inclination to have been rather poorly developed by his predecessors, especially because their accounts, again, failed to draw a clear line, this time between nature, its corresponding inclination, and its effect (i.e., either motion or rest). In Avicenna's theory, however, it is a natural body's nature which brings about an ever identical effect: its inclination for being at rest in its natural place or state. This entails that upon forcefully moving that body away from its natural place its nature still effects only one identical effect, viz., the inclination to be in its natural place. Yet, it is this inclination which manifests itself either in what we perceive as weight, when we try to move the body even further away from its natural place, or in a motion back towards its natural place, once we have released the body. Thus, for Avicenna, nature, inclination, and motion are intertwined but ultimately distinct.

The same urge for clarity and distinction is also present in Avicenna's own classification of natural

powers. Systematically differentiating between voluntary and involuntary motions as well as between uniform and manifold motions, Avicenna defines nature as "a power which produces motion and change, and from which the act proceeds in a single manner without volition." In addition to this, Avicenna also describes three types of soul as powers that likewise produce motion and change but from which only one single act proceeds with volition (as in the case of the celestial soul) or from which several acts proceed either with or without volition (as in the case of the animal soul and the vegetative soul, respectively).

Ultimately, my analysis showed that Avicenna seizes the opportunity to attack Philoponus' account of nature, not because of his own personal or singular dissatisfaction with what he found in his predecessor's commentary on the *Physics*, but because it all too aptly epitomises a theory of natural agency that was widely accepted by Greek and Arabic Neoplatonic and Peripatetic intellectuals up to his own time as a complement, or even a rival, to Aristotle's original definition. For Avicenna, that understanding of nature was a superfluous — and actually unsuccessful — attempt to improve upon Aristotle's words as well as a severe distortion of Aristotle's actual intention, because it conceives of nature along the lines of an independent power which merely permeates the bodies it governs. This, as Avicenna asserts, is an account of a universal nature, which has no place either in his conception of physics nor in his ontology.

In his philosophical investigation of place, then, we discovered Avicenna the Defender. Again, Avicenna takes it up with an entire tradition. This time, however, he does not so much have to attack a philosophical opponent but to defend the Aristotelian notion of place, which was discredited and ridiculed already by the earliest followers of Aristotle and, then, by almost all of his Greek commentators. This tradition of arguing against Aristotle's account of place found its culmination once more in the writings of Philoponus and was even applied, under different circumstances, by some Mu'tazilites in the theological tradition of Islam. Consequently, Avicenna faces both the shattered and the distorted fragments of a

philosophical concept. My examination brought to light how Avicenna's careful and meticulous analysis of the core idea of Aristotle's definition — the idea of a surface — gradually restores the definition in three steps. First, Avicenna improves upon Aristotle's approach of defining place by investigating the central notion of "surface." This was not only necessary because of the common Mu'tazilite understanding of place as the surface upon which something rests, but also because a number of Peripatetics, notably Themistius and Philoponus, had a confused understanding of that notion, as they applied it invariably to an outside surface as well as to an inside surface, in order to overcome a common objection to Aristotle's account, viz., that it, purportedly, cannot account for the place of the outermost sphere and, ultimately, fails to explain its circular motion. Against this, Avicenna argues that the outermost sphere does not have a place, even though it still engages in motion, however, not a motion in the category of place but in the category of position. In consequence, we saw that Avicenna rigorously emphasises that the idea of place must be conceived as the inner surface of the containing body and cannot be a Mu'tazilite outside surface or simply any surface whatsoever.

In a second step, he turns to the actual definition and sets out to making it more robust. In particular, Avicenna applies a new strategy for solving what may have been the greatest puzzle to Aristotle's theory, viz., the question of how to conceive of a body's place when that body itself is located in unstable surroundings. This puzzle was specifically troublesome for Aristotle, because he himself had raised it but, according to his commentators, was found unable to solve it. Avicenna's reply constitutes a novel analysis of the underlying issue. As we have seen, Avicenna argues that one should stop focusing on the unstable surroundings and finally investigate whether the body itself is in motion or at rest. He accepts the only seemingly absurd consequence that the body's place is in constant motion, while demonstrating that this does by no means nullify the distinction between the body's motion and rest, for motion and rest are explained through the presence or absence of the "form of motion" in the body — and this form pertains to the body irrespective of whether its surroundings are in

motion or at rest. Avicenna's analysis brings to light two central aspects of his philosophical reasoning: he is independent enough to disagree with Aristotle, because he rejects the condition that place must be unmoving, and confident enough not only to accept but also to argue for results that have been credited for centuries as absurd or insane or both.

Finally, we have seen how Avicenna employs what he defends as a viable account of place in his rejection of the most widespread alternative theory of place, viz., place as an independent three-dimensional space that is void in itself but always filled with body. He argues that this idea of space is invalid for various reasons: it does not exist, it abolishes all possibility of motion, and it cannot have any influence on bodies. Ultimately, it is the notion of a surface which celebrates its return in the explanation of the mechanisms behind such devices as the clepsydra, thus repudiating the hitherto prevalent idea of the "force of the void." In all this, then, Avicenna does not only defend Aristotle's arguments for place as a surface, he also defends (and develops) Aristotle's arguments against place as an extension.

Finally, we have witnessed Avicenna the Synthesiser, who devises an novel strategy for deriving the essence of time on the basis of an analysis of different motions with different speeds. For Avicenna, time is not the number of motion but the "magnitude of motion." This magnitude corresponds and conforms to motion, thus indicating the measurable size of that motion. As I have shown, however, the idea of understanding time along the lines of a magnitude or duration has strong Platonist overtones and a long historic pedigree. Ever since Plato, who formulated the theory of a stable eternity which is imitated by time as the merely moving image of that eternity, it was possible to conceive of motion as the measure of time. Ever since Boethius of Sidon in the second century BC, this idea was mistaken as an Aristotelian idea, despite the fact that Aristotle defined time as the measure of motion. This understanding not only reversed the original idea that was expressed in the *Physics*, but also paved the way for the further idea of time being nothing other than the result of a now which constantly

flows through eternity, as is demonstrated by Alexander's brief treatise on time, in which Alexander presented time, purportedly, "without deviating from [Aristotle] in any respect" as a duration measured by motion and created by the flowing now. One may surmise that it was ultimately through Alexander that this understanding became a Peripatetic commonplace. Moreover, it was welcomed and positively received by those commentators who generally intended to harmonise Plato's philosophy with that of Aristotle. It is, consequently, hardly surprising to find the same theory expressed in Philoponus' commentary.

According to my analysis, Avicenna shares only certain parts of this doctrine, in particular by integrating the notion of a magnitude into his account of time. Furthermore, he distinguishes between what is prior and posterior and what is before and after, and conceives of time, in accordance with the latter, as that which is "through itself before and after," so that all things in time ultimately derive their temporality, i.e., their individual qualification as being before or being after, from time. He also argues that the motion of the outermost sphere is the cause for the existence of time. Given that this motion is an eternal motion, the result of Avicenna's theory is the existence of an infinite magnitude which is intrinsically structured by the before and after. This infinite magnitude, then, is time. It is, finally, against the background of this time that other particular motions occur. The particular times of these particular motions, in turn, are segments or portions of the eternal time produced by the never-ending revolution of the sphere. In other words, they are magnitudes which themselves have been measured out by the individual motions to which they each apply as their magnitude. Thus, what Avicenna does is to unify Aristotle's idea of time as an epiphenomenon of motion with the Platonist idea of time as a magnitude or duration. In consequence, Avicenna devises a theory of time which accomplishes something that is almost impossible: the complete - even though complex - harmony of two utterly contradictory accounts. It is here that we perceived Avicenna as a capable synthesiser, who labours (and actually struggles) to put down into words what he conceives as a complicated amalgamation

of outright Aristotelian and unnoticed un-Aristotelian elements, when we saw him constantly rephrasing certain passages, changing his terminology, and trying to be evermore adequate in his formulations.

Finally, he appends a further chapter to his account of time in which he expounds the now and also discusses the image of the flow of a now - not, however, to reveal the essence of time or to demonstrate its existence, for that has already been accomplished in the preceding chapter. Instead, Avicenna employs the flowing now as a didactic means for his students who still may have had trouble understanding the complexity of his temporal theory. The flowing now, imagined as a temporal point pertaining to a thing-in-motion, can be mentally represented as producing the extension of the magnitude of time, just as a moving point could be said to draw out a line. This, however, is neither what time is nor how time comes into being. The now is, generally, something which results from time or, to be more precise, from the continuity of time, which is ultimately safeguarded by time's own existential dependence on the motion of the outermost sphere and its essential characterisation as that which is "through itself before and after."

Taking it all together, this study contains an analysis of the fundamentals of Avicenna's natural philosophy. It demonstrates the resourcefulness of his writings, the abundance of materials contained in his works, and the diligence in his argumentation, thus providing a decidedly affirmative answer to the question that I raised in the introduction whether "Avicenna's natural philosophy is as rich and innovative as his logic and his metaphysics already proved to be." At times, my study suggests and establishes more correct or adequate interpretations as those which could so far be found in the secondary literature on Avicenna. More often, however, it examines certain topics and concepts for the first time in detail in a western language. My overall methodical intention was to understand Avicenna through a careful analysis of the text of his works together with an investigation of the philosophical developments in the preceding Greek and Arabic traditions. In this sense, my results put Avicenna's philosophy in its historical

context of the Aristotelian tradition, while at the same time positioning his natural philosophy within its systematic context of his own philosophy as it is expressed in all his major works. <>

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