

Art as History & Gossip

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
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[Modern Gothic: The Photographic Art of Jamie](#)
[Mahon](#) by Jamie Mahon [Schiffer,
9780764353246]

Here fantasy is made flesh in the award-winning photographs that showcase Jamie Mahon's imagination. Through sublime locations, superb photography, and striking models, Mahon and his clique of extraordinary Gothic creators, props, costume, makeup, lighting, offers a true level of artwork to within this alternative subculture.

Through his signature style, Mahon's use of depth, passion, and color become an entire reality of its own. Whether it's the ethereal otherworldliness of his Gothic heroines and villainesses, or the adrenaline-charged action of his Fantasy characters, each image seeks to leap from its page to shock and awe you. So, embrace the dark side, fall down the rabbit hole of unfettered desire, and come participate in this wicked world of sinful visual style.



Enter the Dangerous World of Gothic Glamour

Jamie Mahon is an award-winning, UK based photographer. His portfolio focuses on fashion, portraiture, and landscape, with a specific interest in alternative subculture. Mahon's work has been featured in international publications and media.

Mahon attended the University of Wales College Newport, and holds a Bachelor's degree in Photographic Art.

When once asked what genre of photography I create, the most emotive description I could find for my style of imagery is "Modern Gothic."

I am drawn to a subculture that has inherent dark, provocative, and mysterious themes; and the powerful beauty of the women within this culture.

The images shown in this collection contain a mixture of contemporary gothic fashion; and conceptual ideas that I wanted to bring into reality. During the progression of my career, I have advanced and developed new techniques to evolve my style of art; to an aesthetic that is easily identifiable as my own.

However, the reality of my work is that it would all be nothing if it was not for the generosity of a small network of talented collaborators; the people who have given me more than I would have ever expected, through their time, craft, and talent. The selection of work presented in this book culminates several years of hard work and dedication, showcasing the best of my vision to stimulate, excite, and provoke my audience. Jamie Mahon



<>

[John Dee and the Empire of Angels: Enochian Magick and the Occult Roots of the Modern World](#)
by Jason Louv, [Inner Traditions, 9781620555897]

A comprehensive look at the life and continuing influence of 16th-century scientific genius and occultist Dr. John Dee

- Presents an overview of Dee's scientific achievements, intelligence and spy work, imperial strategizing, and his work developing methods to communicate with angels
- Pieces together Dee's fragmentary Spirit Diaries and examines Enochian in precise detail and the angels' plan to establish a New World Order
- Explores Dee's influence on Sir Francis Bacon, modern science, Rosicrucianism, and 20th-century occultists such as Jack Parsons, Aleister Crowley, and Anton LaVey

Dr. John Dee (1527-1608), Queen Elizabeth I's court advisor and astrologer, was the foremost scientific genius of the 16th century. Laying the foundation for modern science, he actively promoted mathematics and astronomy as well as made advances in navigation and optics that helped elevate England to the foremost imperial power in the world. Centuries ahead of his time, his theoretical work included the concept of light speed and prototypes for telescopes and solar panels. Dee, the original "007" (his crown-given moniker), even invented the idea of a "British Empire," envisioning fledgling America as the new Atlantis, himself as Merlin, and Elizabeth as Arthur.

But, as Jason Louv explains, Dee was suppressed from mainstream history because he spent the second half of his career developing a method for contacting angels. After a brilliant ascent from star student at Cambridge to scientific advisor to the Queen, Dee, with the help of a disreputable, criminal psychic named Edward Kelley, devoted ten years to communing with the angels and archangels of God. These spirit communications gave him the keys to Enochian, the language that mankind spoke

before the fall from Eden. Piecing together Dee's fragmentary Spirit Diaries and scrying sessions, the author examines Enochian in precise detail and explains how the angels used Dee and Kelley as agents to establish a New World Order that they hoped would unify all monotheistic religions and eventually dominate the entire globe.

Presenting a comprehensive overview of Dee's life and work, Louv examines his scientific achievements, intelligence and spy work, imperial strategizing, and Enochian magick, establishing a psychohistory of John Dee as a singular force and fundamental driver of Western history. Exploring Dee's influence on Sir Francis Bacon, the development of modern science, 17th-century Rosicrucianism, the 19th-century occult revival, and 20th-century occultists such as Jack Parsons, Aleister Crowley, and Anton LaVey, Louv shows how John Dee continues to impact science and the occult to this day.

Excerpt:

Reading Dee

Though it contains a biographical overview, this book is not a biography of Dee. Rather, it is a biography of his ideas, of the angelic magic, and an attempt to trace the footprint of his impact in the world. There are several existing biographies of Dee, the best of which is Glen Parry's [The Arch-Conjuror of England](#). Beyond simply creating a new biography, I have here drawn on academic research into Dee's work, Dee's own writing and spirit diaries, as well as Hermetic psychohistory and later experiments with the angelic system by operative magicians like Elias Ashmole, Aleister Crowley, and Jack Parsons. There is also a large amount I have left out—in particular, information on the minutiae of Dee's involvement in Elizabethan court politics. In the process I hope to have provided a good introductory overview for the casual reader, and perhaps assisted in encouraging a more open-minded appraisal of Dee and his work. I also hope that this book is not the end of the reader's Dee studies, and that the next stop is the primary texts—Dee's diaries.

Following Méric Casaubon's 1659 publication of [A True & Faithful Relation of What Passed for Many Years Between Dr. John Dee and Some Spirits](#), Dee was relegated to the very marginalia of history; he would wear this "sackcloth and ashes" for two and a half centuries, forgotten as anything except an embarrassing relic of scientific error. It was not until the twentieth century that scholars began to cast new light on the Doctor. British historian Charlotte Fell-Smith published the first biography of [John Dee](#) in 1909 (the same year that Aleister Crowley and Victor Neuburg undertook an exploration of Dee's magic in Algeria). But it was in the 1960s and '70s that another British historian, the eminent Dame Frances Yates, established what has been called the Yates thesis or Warburg interpretation—the grand narrative that [Hermeticism, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition](#) laid the foundations upon which science was built. Yates did more work than perhaps any other scholar before or since in reestablishing Hermeticism, alchemy, and magic as a necessary and vital part of the evolution of European thought rather than an aberration—for Yates, Dee was the case in point. The Renaissance magi, Yates argued, believed that the Neoplatonic and Hermetic quest to reascend the Great Chain would elevate them to rulership and command over the natural world—and this idea, in turn, led to modern experimental science. For if man was created in God's image, as is revealed in Genesis 1:26, so, by the logic of Hermeticism, could man not only play God but become like God.

Increasingly interested in Dee throughout the 1970s, Yates cast the Doctor as a supreme magus, a "great man" whose magical and scientific pursuits formed a coherent and world-changing whole, and who inspired the Rosicrucian movement of the 1600s, which in many respects became the grounds from which modern science emerged. During the same period, Richard Deacon's 1968 biography [John Dee: Scientist, Geographer, Astrologer and Secret Agent to Elizabeth I](#) painted Dee—somewhat fancifully—as a secret agent for the queen. Dee, who indeed signed letters to Elizabeth "007," was cast as the ultimate man of mystery, an illuminated insider privy to the secrets of both the

occult and international espionage. Likewise, Yates's colleague Peter French developed her notes into another full-length biography of Dee, 1972's [John Dee: The World of an Elizabethan Magus](#), which fully takes on Yates's view of Dee as a Hermetic mastermind whose every move was calculated to achieve the Great Work of restoring nature.

Such a romantic big-picture view of Dee is certainly enticing. This "1970s Dee," cast as arch-magus and secret agent, gained significant traction in the incense cloud of the counterculture occult revival, and consequently formed the larger-than-life caricature that students of Dee first encounter, with the Yates thesis itself forming the historical groundwork that later Dee studies would be measured against.

Yet by the mid-70s, the Yates thesis was already being rejected as far too grandiose; in addition, by romanticizing Dee as a Hermetic magus, Yates had overlooked his many scientific and political achievements. Science historian J. L. Heilbron, in introducing a 1978 translation of [John Dee on Astronomy: Propaedeumata Aphoristica, 1558 and 1568 Latin and English](#) by John Dee and Wayne Shumaker, held to the long-standing scientific view that Dee's occultism was a shameful error, and that as Dee's immersion in the occult came after his mathematical and scientific contributions, it represented only a slide into superstition, mental illness, and irrelevance; for Heilbron, Dee's 1582 reformation of the calendar was his last scientific contribution of any worth.

Starting in the 1980s, following the growing dominance of post-structuralist discourse in the academy, Dee studies blossomed as an academic field unto itself, as new scholars of Western esotericism standing on the foundational shoulders of Dame Yates reassessed Dee with far finer tools, and in far greater detail. For Dee and his fellow travelers—dwelling at the crossroads of Catholicism, Protestantism, Hermeticism, Islam, Judaism, operative magic, and science—scientific and magical thinking blurred together with no clear delineation. Yet despite this ideological drift, picking apart the various threads of Dee's thinking

would take far closer analysis than lumping his various pursuits together as aspects of a singular Great Work. Rather than arch-magus, later scholars began to see Dee as a Mercurial representative of the Renaissance, who immersed himself in the various intellectual trends of his time, and whose work therefore represents a kind of hypertext of Renaissance thought.

This new wave in Dee scholarship was initiated by historian Nicholas Clulee, whose 1988 [John Dee's Natural Philosophy: Between Science and Religion](#) remains central to the field. Clulee neither held to Yates's romantic narrative of Dee as all-encompassing Hermetic magus, nor did he discard Dee's occultism as historians of science had. Rather, he examined each of Dee's interests and scientific contributions individually, tracing Dee's intellectual growth from humanism to the later angelic conversations, analyzing Dee's "omnidisciplinarity" one topic at a time. Clulee sought to address the angelic conversations on their own merit as a purely religious exercise, extracted from dialogue with Dee's scientific pursuits. In removing Dee from the overall narrative of the scientific revolution and assessing him on his own terms, Clulee provided a remarkable breakthrough in understanding Dee, upholding a high standard of intellectual integrity. Without the tension of struggling to fit Dee into a master narrative—either the official narrative of scientific progress or the Yates interpretation of Dee as arch-magus—Clulee opened breathing room to assess Dee for what he was, a complex individual who, like any intelligent human being, had a wide array of interests and career trajectories in his lifetime, and whose thinking changed and evolved over his many decades of government service, against a shifting backdrop of uncertain geopolitics and patronage.

Just as the portrayal of Dee as arch-magus was reconsidered, so was Dee as a grand conspirator and agent of the state. Though Dee was employed by the Crown, and was a zealous patriot in service of Elizabeth's England, he was also poorly compensated, and Elizabeth's government routinely adopted a dismissive attitude toward the eccentric researcher, even as it used his ideas. Dee's work

itself, however, can inarguably be said to have exerted massive influence on world history.

In 1999, the scholar (and later bestselling fiction author) Deborah E. Harkness fully assessed Dee's occultism, building on Clulee, as well as Christopher Whitby's 1981 doctoral work on Dee's spirit diaries, [John Dee's Actions with Spirits, Volumes 1 and 2: 22 December 1581 to 23 May 1583](#), to draw out a new and more fully-formed picture of Dee the magus. Harkness's work resists Yates's oversimplification, but nonetheless seeks to tie together the many phases of Dee's work, showing not only a clear progression in Dee's thinking but demonstrating how Dee's angelic conversations crowned his occult studies and his geopolitical work. Harkness's book [John Dee's Conversations with Angels: Cabala, Alchemy, and the End of Nature](#) builds a big-picture view of Dee that is at once more nuanced and also reenchanting—even shocking—in its interpretation of Dee's life work. While Yates argued that Dee laid the foundation for science, Harkness argues that Dee was steadily working at nothing less than a new spiritual and geopolitical ordering for the entire planet, with Elizabeth I as the terrestrial and spiritual emperor of all mankind, with a new and all-uniting religious dispensation to be given to the world by the angels, which would bring under its fold not only the warring factions of Christendom but also Judaism and Islam, and return fallen humanity to the original divine plan.

In seeking to problematize early occult readings of Dee, successive generations of scholars have, it seems, unwrapped deeper and deeper layers of occult complexity; like the "scrying" of Dee's angelic Aethyrs, the study of Dee himself is a process that only becomes more complex, fascinating, and even challenging to modernity itself as it progresses. Dee is an inexhaustible subject. In life, he stood at the crossroads between magic and science, between the medieval and the modern, between Protestantism and Catholicism, and between the terrestrial and celestial worlds themselves. Dee's vision was indescribably broad, his ambition Faustian, but when one is able to ascend at last to the heights from which he saw the

world, the overall vision becomes breathtakingly elegant—a Hieroglyphic Monad.

The Guide for the Perplexed

Dee's work was difficult to comprehend even in his own time period. This situation is only compounded today, as his work relies on the context of the Elizabethan, Catholic, and Protestant worldviews, as well as the terrestrial disciplines of mathematics, optics, astronomy, and geography, and the celestial disciplines of theology, astrology, alchemy, Hermeticism, Qabalah, and operative magic among others, not to mention a working understanding of Hebrew, Greek, Latin, and their internal mathematical structures. Dee's work in these disciplines was not pursued in a vacuum, but must be understood as an outgrowth of a very specific historical period and geopolitical context.

Adding to this situation is the complexity of the angelic system itself. Because the study of Hermeticism and magic was progressively excised from the Western intellectual project in the century after Dee's death, little work has been done on Dee's findings, and what work has been completed has been by cultural outsiders, rather than scientists trained to Dee's level. This later work, particularly that of the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, helps elucidate Dee's magic in some ways, and unnecessarily muddies and confuses it in others. Attempting to understand Dee through the lens of the Golden Dawn does us no favors either, since that order's corpus is a dauntingly complex semiotic hoard in its own right. The task we are left with is comparable to resurrecting calculus had it been abandoned after Newton and Leibniz. And to do so, we must first think as Dee did, which is a momentous undertaking in itself.

Do not let this discourage you—the more Dee's ideas are under-stood, the simpler and even more intuitively self-evident they become. I hope to have already done the brunt of this work for you, and here aim to provide a comprehensive introduction to Dee's thought to the modern reader. Ample endnotes have been provided for further research. In many places, I have attempted to elucidate some of Dee's thinking by drawing comparisons to the more recent work of the Golden Dawn, Crowley,

and others. In order to preserve the original narrative of Dee's work, I have separated these comments out into footnotes where possible.

In order to orient yourself within this book, the following map will be helpful:

Book I, *The Magus* addresses Dee's early life, education, government service, and major works, including his work on astronomy and astrology (the *Propaedeumata aphoristica*), Qabalah and alchemy (the *Monas hieroglyphica*), mathematics (the preface to Euclid's *Elements*), and imperialism (General and Rare Memorials). These sections should help to build a picture of where Dee's thinking was at when he began the angelic conversations in his fifties. By following Dee through his education and career, the reader should also become familiar with the worldview and knowledge Dee brought with him when he sat down at his scrying table. Overviews of Hermeticism, Dee's proposed new science of archemastery, Qabalah, and operative magic are here given, which with the benefit of hindsight can be seen to logically build on each other and lay the groundwork for the angelic sessions.

Book II, *The Angelic Conversations* addresses the angelic sessions themselves. Here the locus of the narrative shifts from Dee to the angels, their geopolitical goals, and their system of magic or "Real Cabala." Dee here becomes somewhat less important to the story, and it should be clear that his intellectual work up to this point has, from the angels' perspective, only served as a prop to allow Dee to reach high enough up the Great Chain to even begin to make fumbling communications with the next order of beings upon it.

Book III, *Antichrist* assesses the continuing development of the angelic magic in the centuries after Dee's death, and traces its central influence on the occult underground, with particular focus on Rosicrucianism, Elias Ashmole, speculative Freemasonry, the Golden Dawn, Aleister Crowley, and Jack Parsons.

This book therefore covers almost half a millennium, and links together a wide stretch of the history, religion, and science of Western civilization. It is

my hope that in doing so I will have wrought at least some semblance of order out of chaos, and perhaps brought the West one step closer toward understanding its spiritual heritage.

For the sake of historical accuracy, I have employed multiple spellings of Qabalah in this book, which each denote slightly different things: Kabbalah for the original Jewish system of scriptural interpretation, Cabala for the Christian version borrowed from Jews by gentiles during the Renaissance and applied to Neoplatonic thought (including the Real Cabala of John Dee), and Qabalah for the Hermetic and occult version that emerged after the Enlightenment and was central to the work of Crowley and the Golden Dawn.

One final note: throughout this book, particularly in the third section, I have discussed movements and people—from Thelemic occultism to evangelical Christianity, Aleister Crowley to Ronald Reagan—who have convinced themselves that the divine timeline can be advanced by taking extreme and even evil actions. I am not advocating for or excusing this view; rather, I have hoped to show the havoc that people knee-deep in ideology can wreak upon those around them and the world, particularly when in positions of power.

Apocalyptic religious extremism has turned our world into a hell, in the childlike belief that this will accelerate divine punishment and redemption. If we do not see this psychopathology clearly, and grow beyond it, it may yet be our death. Therefore, throughout this book I have hoped to show the 'Western esoteric tradition as it is, warts and all—both its transcendent brilliance and its long and disturbing shadow.

Seeing the clear light of reality requires nothing less.

[Richard III: England's Most Controversial King](#) by Chris Skidmore [St. Martin's Press, 9781250045485]

From acclaimed historian Chris Skidmore comes the authoritative biography of Richard III, England's most controversial king, a man alternately praised as a saint and cursed as a villain.

Richard III is one of English history's best known and least understood monarchs. Immortalized by Shakespeare as a hunchbacked murderer, the discovery in 2012 of his skeleton in a Leicester parking lot re-ignited debate over the true character of England's most controversial king.

Richard was born into an age of brutality, when civil war gripped the land and the Yorkist dynasty clung to the crown with their fingertips. Was he really a power-crazed monster who killed his nephews, or the victim of the first political smear campaign conducted by the Tudors?

In the first full biography of Richard III for fifty years, Chris Skidmore draws on new manuscript evidence to reassess Richard's life and times. Richard III examines in intense detail Richard's inner nature and his complex relations with those around him to unravel the mystery of the last English monarch to die on the battlefield.

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Excerpt: Shortly after Palm Sunday, 1484, a Silesian knight, Niclas von Popplau, arrived in England. His first journey had been from the Kentish coast, where he had landed, to pay his own pilgrimage to the internationally renowned shrine of Thomas Becket at Canterbury, which Popplau later noted in a journal he made of his visit 'was more beautiful than any I have seen before, decorated beyond all measure with many gem stones'. Journeying to the capital, Popplau visited Westminster Abbey, where, among others, he saw the tomb of Edward the Confessor. Eight days after Easter, Popplau set off from London with the intention of visiting the king himself, currently residing in Yorkshire. As the Silesian travelled northwards, through Ware, Cambridge, Stamford and Newark, he found himself something of a novelty to the local population, at times being pursued by 'beautiful women who followed me around' attempting to kiss him. 'If I refused to kiss one', he later wrote, 'she would depart in embarrassment, but would return half an hour later, and with much deference offered me food and drink. And all this they did just so as to deprive me of my virginity.' Still, Popplau found them to be the 'most beautiful women, the likes of which I have not seen anywhere in the world. They love the Germans, they like to be flirted with, they have more beautiful home-spun breasts, and by nature from head to foot larger and sturdier limbs, than German women.' As for the men, Popplau found them 'hot headed and choleric disposition, and when they burst out in anger take no pity on anyone'.

Passing through Doncaster and on to York, Popplau noted how the city 'was the patrimony of the present king of England, before he was elected or became king by his own power'. Arriving in York, he found the minster there 'an even more beautiful church than in London, and much more ostentatious, in all its buildings more extensively decorated'. On 1 May, Popplau arrived at a 'strong castle' not far from York, likely to have been Pontefract Castle. 'Here are kept the king's treasure', Popplau noted, 'and great lords like the king's children and the sons of princes which are kept like prisoners.'

The following day, Popplau was granted an audience with King Richard III, 'in the presence of all princes, earls, councillors and all his nobility'. Popplau addressed Richard in Latin, delivering letters from the Holy Roman Emperor as well as the king's sister, Margaret, the duchess of Burgundy. Richard was apparently 'astonished' at Popplau's eloquence; reading the letters, Popplau later wrote, Richard 'himself approached me, took me by the hand and drew me to him. He answered me in Latin through an interpreter that his majesty the king would gladly do everything I asked as far as lay within his power to do, for the sake of His Imperial Majesty the Prince of Burgundy and also for my own sake, on account of my eloquence, which he would not have expected of me, had he not heard it himself.' Richard then addressed Popplau three times ('as is the custom in England', Popplau noted): 'I welcome you, and be freely welcome with me.' After Popplau left the king's court, he was conducted to a nearby inn by one of Richard's gentlemen of the royal chamber, though they quickly found that they were not alone; 'many people followed us to the house, including women and maidens. They entered the inn secretly, but with the hostess's permission, so that they might look at me alone.'

The next day Richard sent for Popplau to attend mass at the nearby church, no doubt designed to impress the Silesian with the quality of musicianship that he had already collected from across the country. Popplau was suitably impressed. 'There I heard the most delightful music that I heard in all my life, which in the purity of the voices might well

be compared to the angels.' After mass, Richard ordered a Flemish nobleman who was currently residing at court, John, lord of Bergen op Zoom, to take Popplau by the hand and lead him to his chamber, in a tent erected near to the church. Going inside, Popplau was struck by its lavish contents:

'There I saw the King's bed, covered in red velvet and a cloth of gold ... in the same way as His Imperial Majesty's bed is so adorned. And in the king's tent there was also a table covered all around with cloths of silk embroidered with gold, set up next to the bed.' Catching sight of Richard himself as the king prepared to sit down to dinner, Popplau was equally impressed at the splendour Richard had cloaked himself in. 'The king went to dinner and wore a collar of gold with many pearls the size of peas, and diamonds. The collar was as thick as a man's hand, and was worn over his left shoulder across his back and under his right arm.'

It was a display, Popplau believed, that had been 'deliberately placed by the wise men of his court in such a way that I should see him sit at table in his regal splendour'. At the king's table were 'his princes and Lords'; Popplau observed how when Richard 'had sat down there sat with him two princes, the king's blood-relatives, and the earl of Northumberland, who is the most powerful in all England. But they sat a long way from the King at the very end of the table.'

When Richard noticed Popplau had entered the tent, he ordered that he should sit at the table 'alongside his two kinsmen'. Popplau replied that rather than sit with the king's companions, his 'greatest pleasure and desire', especially since he was due to depart shortly, was to sit close to the king, 'to see his royal majesty's face and exceedingly famous virtues', an answer which, Popplau noted, 'greatly pleased the king'.

As the pair conversed at the table, Popplau observed how Richard 'grew animated' at his answers, 'so that he barely ate of any dish, but continually talked with me':

He asked me about his Imperial majesty, all kings and princes of the Empire who were known to me,

about their customs, fortunes, dealings, and virtues. I answered with everything that was to their honour. Then the king was silent for a while. Afterwards he began again to question me, of many things and dealings, and finally also of the Turks. And I replied to him that before Martinmas 1483 his Majesty the King of Hungary with the aid of forces sent by His Imperial Majesty and his Imperial Majesty's lands, had slain more than 12,000 Turks of the Turkish emperor. When the king heard this, he was greatly pleased and answered 'I would that this kingdom and land of mine lay on the Turkish border instead of the kingdom of Hungary.

Then I would certainly just with my own people and without the aid of other kings, princes and lords drive away not only the Turks but all my enemies and opponents.

'O Dear God, what a gracious lord I recognised in that king', Popplau wrote, full of praise for his royal host. The German also noted how the king was 'three fingers taller than I, but a little slimmer, and not as muscular and much thinner', adding that 'he has very delicate arms and legs, also a great heart'.

Several days later, Richard gave Popplau a gift of fifty nobles. Popplau stayed at the royal court for around eight days, when he 'was almost always present at court at his meals', before finally deciding to continue his journey. Informing the king of his departure, Richard replied that he would 'not impede my intended way. But should, my planned journey complete, I care to return to his majesty on the way back, I should be even more welcome to him than now.' Richard then gave Popplau a gold collar 'which he took from the neck of a gentleman'. Overwhelmed by the king's generosity, Popplau begged 'that he should not grant such a gift to me, being entirely undeserving, for I had not come to his Majesty to seek handouts or gifts, but his royal majesty's favour'. To this Richard, almost offended, retorted that 'if for the sake of my own honour I would refuse his gifts, which it was his honour to give, how did I expect to gain his favour? Therefore, if I desired his good grace, I should also accept this gracious mark of honour, and not reject it.' Popplau meekly thanked Richard and with

hesitation accepted the gift, though he could not help but notice that the collar was of significant weight, weighing thirteen ounces in gold.

Popplau was given safe conduct to travel the country unharmed, though for the moment he was 'commanded' by the king to rent an inn, where he continued to be visited by members of Richard's chamber, together with 'the king's musicians, shawms, pipers and lutenists', whom Popplau rewarded with a gift of four crowns. Richard gave Popplau an additional fifty nobles, and when the German attempted to refuse yet another gift, the king became 'animated' and 'sent me a message asking whether I were of royal or princely blood that I should hold his gifts in contempt, to whom I replied that I had refused his majesty's gifts not out of contempt, but simply on account of honour. And he rebuked me with harsh words, and pressed me to such a degree that I had to accept it.'

When Popplau was ready to depart, he was given letters of safe conduct by the king, while one of Richard's men, a Spanish captain called Juan de Salazar, a soldier of fortune who would later fight on Richard's behalf, approached the German with 'letters and instructions for his good friends in his own country, that they should show me friendship and favour, and he did this of his own free will, even though I had not ever approached or asked him for it'.

Popplau would soon depart England for Portugal, where he visited the court of King John II. Once again, Popplau gave ample descriptions of the generosity with which he was treated at a royal court. Throughout his work, his willingness to describe the courts and holy places across Europe suggests that the knight had been sent on a mission for political purposes, rather than for his own pleasure. The same year as his visit to Richard's court, Popplau had been promoted to the rank of palatinus at the court of Emperor Frederick III, becoming one of the monarch's close associates. His tours across Europe seem to have been to gather information for his master, which would include descriptions of the castles that he saw, in particular the military installations at the French naval base of Honfleur and detailed accounts of Portuguese

expeditions to Africa. Yet it is striking that Popplau had clearly been impressed with his English host, noting that, when he had finally departed, 'the king of England had given me a dead boar' (either a boar to eat during the farewell party that Richard had commanded be held at the local inn, or referring to the collar of gold, which would have been decorated with Richard's insignia of the white boar).

Popplau's description of Richard provides us with a rare, contemporary glimpse into the world of Richard III. Of course, we are viewing Richard as he would wish to be seen, knowing that Popplau was likely to pass on any report of his conduct to his royal master, Frederick III. Richard's personality and behaviour had become the talk of the courts of Europe. Barely over a year before, Richard had been the unwaveringly loyal younger brother of Edward IV, the Yorkist king who had reigned, albeit with one deposition in 1470, for over twenty years. Edward's death, aged just forty-one, in April 1483 had transformed everything. Many had expected his eldest son, Prince Edward, aged thirteen, to inherit the throne as Edward V. A coronation was planned, but would never take place. Richard, having been entrusted as the new king's Protector, eventually chose to accept the crown for himself, being crowned Richard III on 6 July 1483. In the whirlwind of political events, Edward V and his younger brother, Richard, duke of York, disappeared into the Tower of London, never to be seen again. Within eighty-eight days, Richard had gone from brother to Protector to king. Immediately, his unforeseen reign had been beset by rebellion, including by his closest ally, Henry, duke of Buckingham.

Popplau's visit to Richard's court was against the backdrop of a king determined to demonstrate his military capabilities and defend his kingdom; for several weeks afterwards, Richard would continue to remain in the north, basing himself at Scarborough, where he prepared for naval warfare against the Scots. If Richard was able to express his generosity to Popplau in a confident manner, he hid well his own anxieties and concerns, as well as his own significant personal grief for the

sudden loss of his son, Prince Edward, who had died at Middleham in April 1484. Without an heir, Richard's dynasty seemed even more uncertain than that of his elder brother at the time of his sudden death. Richard, aged only thirty, would have time to father future heirs; far harder was it to rid himself of the rumours that were swirling around the courts of Europe that he had actively initiated the deaths of his brother's heirs, Edward V and Prince Richard. Just months before, in January 1484, the French chancellor, Guillaume de Rochefort, had warned the Estates General at Tours, faced with the minority of the thirteen-year-old king, Charles VIII, that the French nobility must not follow the example set in England the previous year. 'Think, I beg you', de Rochefort had pleaded, 'what happened in that land after the death of King Edward, that his children already grown up and remarkable, were killed with impunity, and the royal crown was passed, with the people's blessing, to their killer.' Hearing the same rumours that surrounded Richard's ascent to the throne, Popplau noted that 'King Richard, who reigns at the moment, has also killed King Edward's sons, as is said, so that he and not they might be crowned.' Yet Popplau had also heard a different version of the tale, one which he was inclined to agree with, that 'some say they are still alive and are kept in a dark cellar'.

Popplau's account of Richard's court presents itself in stark contrast to later accounts of Richard's reign, providing us with a sense of the 'real' Richard, a king both generous, impassioned and learned. Yet if we are to place Richard in the context of his own time, and not that of later accounts such as William Shakespeare's fabled Richard III, it is to the contemporary sources that we must return if we are to divorce fact from fiction.

The Richard III we have ourselves inherited through historical tradition is one that has been shaped and moulded by that convenient fiction, of viewing Richard as the personification of evil, a child-killer, a man whom nothing, or no one, would stop him from obtaining his ambition of wearing the royal crown. This later re-invention of Richard III has already been decried by so-called 'Ricardians' as

'Tudor propaganda', but in many respects the nature of historical debate surrounding Richard III still remains depressingly predictable.

As far back as 1788, the antiquary William Hutton, in his book *The Battle of Bosworth Field*, recognised that Richard, 'of all the English monarchs, bears the greatest contrariety of character': 'Some few have conferred upon him almost angelic excellence, have clouded his errors, and blazened every virtue that could adorn a man. Others, as if only extremes would prevail, present him in the blackest dye; his thoughts were evil, and that continually, and his actions diabolical; the most degraded mind inhabited the most deformed body.' Yet, Hutton admitted, 'Richard's character, like every man's, had two sides ... though most writers display but one.' Nearly 230 years on, historical scholarship has ensured that more information has been unearthed on Richard III than most medieval monarchs, yet the popular debate has stubbornly refused to move on. All too often, Richard III's life and reign remain defined by the question, 'Was he a good or bad king?', or, more predictably, 'Did he kill the princes in the Tower?'

It is difficult to break out of the dramatic cycle of events, moulded by the sources that we are reliant upon. Richard's fame often has more to do with the deeply ingrained portrait of the king that we have inherited from Shakespeare. Through the dramatist's pen, Richard was transformed from an historical figure into the archetypal villain. Throughout Shakespeare's first history cycle, Richard appears as a 'carnal cur', 'hell's black intelligencer', a 'bottled toad', 'an indigested and ill-formed lump' and a 'lump of foul deformity', whose penchant for evil deeds and appearance are formed into one hideous personality.

Shakespeare's Richard III was not entirely a dramatic invention. Over the past century since Richard's death, historical writing had sought to denigrate Richard's name. In the years immediately following the battle of Bosworth, the Warwickshire antiquary John Rous, who had in Richard's own lifetime praised the king as 'a mighty prince and especial good lord' who was 'full commendably punishing offenders of the laws, especially

oppressors of the Commons, and cherishing those that were virtuous, by the which discreet guiding he got great thanks and love of all his subjects great and poor', now turned against the dead king, who he declared was 'excessively cruel in his days ... in the way that Antichrist is to reign. And like the Antichrist to come, he was confounded at his moment of greatest pride.' He described the king as 'small of stature, with a short face and unequal shoulders, the right higher and the left lower', though even this had been later altered in the manuscript so that Richard's left shoulder was to be higher than his right, just as portraits of the king would be altered to depict Richard as a hunchback.

Popplau's account of his stay at Richard's court is the most detailed contemporary description of Richard and his royal household, though further glimpses of Richard's personality can be gleaned from the king's own letters, together with surviving payments and warrants. Other contemporary chronicles and accounts also exist to provide flesh to the bones of our knowledge, though, compared to the sixteenth century, the fifteenth century and the narrative accounts of its politics fall into an unsteady period of historical writing, departing from the monastic chronicles of the medieval period, yet not fully ensconced in the humanist histories of the Tudor period. The consequences of this mean that, particularly for the reign of Edward IV, historians possess less strictly contemporary information than any other reign in English history since Henry III. If establishing the precise sequence of events proves problematic at times, still more elusive is the establishment of motive or the understanding of personality in politics. If it is difficult to discern the intentions behind Richard's actions at times, it is, as Geoffrey Elton observed, 'because no sound contemporary history exists for this age that its shape and meaning are so much in dispute now'. Many authors now considered to be crucial sources of information were unaware that they were writing 'history' for a public audience; many simply considered that they were making notes in private commonplace books or letters, interspersing important national events occasionally among events of a more personal or local nature. Personal letters such as those from the Paston,

Plumpton, Stonor or Cely collections provide an invaluable window into the private thoughts of individuals reacting to political circumstance, yet compared to the voluminous State Papers collected in the reign of Henry VIII, they are meagre. Other professional recorders of events did so with an agenda that suited their own needs, and not those of the twenty-first-century historian.

One of the most important sources for the years 1471-85 is the account generally known as the 'Second Continuation of the Croyland Chronicle', yet its authorship, and by inference its purpose and bias, remains contested among historians. While we know that its author was a doctor of canon law and a councillor of Edward IV, elsewhere he claims that he wrote and completed the narrative within ten days, ending on the last day of April 1486. Even if the work's direct authorship cannot be concluded upon, it is clear that reference has been made to official documentation in its compilation. Certain elements even demonstrate a distinct personal knowledge of Richard's reign, such as the recording of an oath taken by the nobility to Richard's son, Edward, in 'a certain room near the corridor which leads to the queen's chambers'.¹ One gets the sense that the narrator of events, perhaps told to the scribe who composed the chronicle, was at the heart of power: the fact that John Russell, bishop of Lincoln and Chancellor during Richard's reign, is known to have resided at Crowland Abbey during April 1486 surely points to his guiding influence in the composition of the political sections.

For Richard specifically, recent discoveries in the twentieth century have transformed our understanding of his reign. The Great Chronicle of London, first published from a manuscript in 1938, was the product of the industry of the draper Robert Fabyan, who was writing up to his death in February 1513. It provides us with important near-contemporary evidence of the reign from a London perspective; the equally important discovery of Dominic Mancini's manuscript account of the 'Usurpation of Richard the Third', in the archives at Lille, reveals another first-hand account of Richard's ascent to the throne, written no more than six months after the event. Yet even Mancini is the

product of what rumours, information and disinformation were circulating throughout the capital during that heady summer of 1483; no source is beyond reproach as truly independent. It was the Italian historian Polydore Vergil, writing in the early sixteenth century, yet whose work, the *Anglia Historica*, was not published until 1534, who imposed a new pattern of historical development upon the events of the fifteenth century. Instead of writing history in an annalistic fashion, as previously employed by medieval chroniclers, Vergil chose to divide English history into royal reigns. As a result, the personality of a king would now play an ever greater role than before. For Vergil, Richard's own personality would be critical in understanding the failure of his reign. He was 'little of stature, deformed of body, the one shoulder being higher than the other', while he had 'a short and sour countenance, which seemed to savour of mischief, and utter evidently craft and deceit. The while he was thinking of any matter, he did continually bite his nether lip, as though that cruel nature of his did so rage against itself in that little carcass. Also he was wont to be ever with his right hand pulling out of the sheath to the midst, and putting in again, the dagger which he did always wear. Truly he had a sharp wit, provident and subtle, apt to both counterfeit and dissemble; his courage also high and fierce" It was a highly influential portrait of Richard that would remain for centuries, establishing a template that would be followed by Thomas More, and the later Tudor chroniclers Edward Hall and Ralph Hollinshed, before being cast into literary legend by Shakespeare.

Admittedly, much has been done to dispel the myth of the 'black legend' of Richard III. Since the publication of Horace Walpole's *Historic Doubts on the Life and Reign of Richard III*, published in 1768, Richard's memory has found loyal defenders, from Clements Markham to Josephine Tey. Richard's generosity, his piety and his pronouncements on the dispensing of justice have been held up as signs that he was a 'good king', whose virtues have been suppressed, yet these features of Richard's personality and reign should not be gathered together in an attempt to make a case for the defence of the king, for it ignores the wider context

of medieval nobility and kingship that Richard was immersed in. His behaviour and words cannot be taken in isolation; kings before and after Richard acted in a similar manner, for that was what was expected of them. Yet to create a white legend of Richard's personality seems merely to perpetuate the sterile debate of a 'good' Richard versus an 'evil' Richard. The history of Richard III needs to be treated with balance and more accurate scholarship, something that can only be achieved by returning where possible to the original sources and contemporary accounts of Richard's life and reign, exploring his life as it was, not as it was later to be seen.

Nor can our understanding of Richard's personality, his motives and ambitions, be gleaned from the last few years of his life alone. For over a decade, Richard stood by Edward IV as his loyal brother, following him into exile and earning his spurs fighting successfully at the battles of Barnet and Tewkesbury. Richard's experiences in the wars against Scotland shaped his sense of leadership and longing for military glory, while an early taste of Richard's ruthlessness can be witnessed in his early land transactions and determination to build an affinity and power base of his own. The fact that Richard managed to establish himself as one of the greatest and most powerful noblemen of his age, in spite of his status as one of Edward IV's younger brothers, demonstrates Richard's early determination to succeed. Richard's early career as duke of Gloucester, built as it was on the shifting sands of the brutal world of fifteenth-century politics, is important for understanding why Richard later chose to take the decisions he did in becoming king.

This work has unapologetically been written as a narrative history of Richard's life and reign; in doing so, attention has been paid mainly to the high court politics of the age, and Richard's role within this world. I have attempted to focus also on how Richard constructed his own power base, for it was his northern affinity, constructed in his early years as duke, that would prove so crucial for him obtaining the throne. Richard's accession to the throne had only been made possible, not just

through Richard's own personality, but through a coalition of support that placed the crown on Richard's head. Too much attention is traditionally paid to Richard's individual role in his accession, when, like any political coronation, this was only possible with the support of certain key members of the nobility, who backed regime change. Richard's success depended as much upon their own individual grievances and ambitions as his own.

This is surely the key point about the battle of Bosworth, where Richard fell defeated, not by Henry Tudor, but by the defection and loss of support of his own army and his 'northern men' on whom he had relied to build his career first as duke of Gloucester, then as Protector and finally as king. While individual personalities are crucial for understanding the nature of power in the fifteenth century, it is important not to forget that kings and noblemen were the corporate representation of a far wider range of ideals, and, more realistically, ambitions, of the men who served them.

Richard III reigned for just 788 days, yet his reign is unique in late medieval history for the wealth of archival evidence we have inherited, partly through the survival of his signet docket book, together with privy seal and Exchequer warrants, many of which remain unpublished. It is possible to fashion from these an almost day-by-day account of Richard's reign, and it is through this detail, of returning to the original sources, that I have attempted to bring a fresh perspective on Richard's reign.

Aged only thirty-two at his death, Richard III remains a strong candidate for being our most celebrated and controversial king. Hundreds of books have been written about him, while he remains the only English king with two organisations dedicated to his name, with the Richard III Society, originally founded in 1924, 'in the belief that many features of the traditional accounts of the character and career of Richard III are neither supported by sufficient evidence nor reasonably tenable', currently with a membership of several thousand. Recently, popular interest in Richard III has surged with the discovery of the king's remains in Leicester, prompting even more books, articles and television programmes. This book is not an attempt to

compete with the popular mania surrounding Richard. Instead, by exploring Richard's life in fresh detail, its aim is not only to see the king's life and reign through the lens of the fifteenth century, but to gain a sense of why Richard behaved and ruled in the fashion he did, for 'good' or for 'evil'. <>

[Expressive Minds and Artistic Creations: Studies in Cognitive Poetics](#) Edited by Szilvia Csabi
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[Expressive Minds and Artistic Creations: Studies in Cognitive Poetics](#) presents multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research papers describing new developments in the field of cognitive poetics. The articles examine the complex connections between cognition and poetics with special attention given to how people both create and interpret novel artistic works in a variety of expressive media, including literature, music, art, and multimodal artifacts. The authors have diverse disciplinary backgrounds, but all of them embrace theories and research findings from multiple perspectives, such as linguistics, psychology, literary studies, music, art, neuroscience, and media studies. Several authors explicitly discuss empirical and theoretical challenges in doing interdisciplinary work, which is often considered as essential to future progress in cognitive poetics. Scholars address many specific research questions in their articles, including most notably, the role of embodiment and simulation in human imagination, the importance of conceptual metaphors and conceptual blending processes in the creation and interpretation of literature, and the function of multi-perspectivity in poetic and multimodal texts. Several new ideas are also advanced in the volume regarding the cognitive mechanisms responsible for artistic creations and understandings.

The volume overall offers an expanded view of cognitive poetics research which situates the study of expressive minds within a broader range of personal, social, cultural and historical contexts. Among other leading researchers, many contributors are world-famous scholars of psychology, linguistics, and literature, including Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., Zoltán Kövecses, and

Reuven Tsur, whose defining papers also survey the roles and significance of conceptual mechanisms in literature.

Excerpt: Most of current research in the field of cognitive poetics is multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary, including the works of scholars from the fields of literature, anthropology, aesthetics, semiotics, linguistics, cognitive science, neuroscience, philosophy, history, and psychology, among others. The volume *Expressive Minds and Artistic Creations: Studies in Cognitive Poetics* aims not only to take a fresh look at literature and other poetic artifacts from a cognitive perspective, but also to create a fruitful collaboration between the different disciplines for the advancement of scholarship on cognitive poetics.

Cognitive poetics has traditionally been interested in literary research, but scholars from various fields, ranging from aesthetics through psychology to neuroscience, have employed different empirical methods and terminology in their individual analyses of literary and multimodal texts. These different approaches to studying literature and multimodal artifacts provide a wealth of new knowledge about the ways people interpret and appreciate poetic works. Yet a critical development in the rise of cognitive poetics in recent years is the attention given to the strengths and weaknesses of various research approaches and findings, with an eye toward understanding a greater diversity of perspectives on poetic experience. The dialogs that occur among scholars from different disciplines are an important part of what makes cognitive poetics such an exciting, fertile field of study. To take one significant example, how do scholars reconcile traditional individual analyses or readings of literary texts with larger-scale scientific studies on how ordinary people come to interpret specific instances of literature or multimodal artifacts? Is such a reconciliation even possible in practice? The present volume highlights both specific empirical research on literary texts and multimodal artworks and the explicit negotiations that scholars engage in as they attempt to situate their analyses and findings within the larger, emerging field of cognitive poetics.

The title, [Expressive Minds and Artistic Creations: Studies in Cognitive Poetics](#), refers not only to the producers of literature and art, but also to people who engage with these artifacts for meaningful, aesthetic purposes. Readers and art observers do not merely "receive" what has been artistically produced (i.e., "literary reception"), because they are active, mindful creators of their own individual interpretations of these artworks. The study of cognitive poetics is fundamentally centered on the expressive, creative dialog among writers and readers, artists and observers, leading to both subjective and collective poetic experience.

This book examines language, literature, and cognitive processes and goes into great detail about the connections between cognition and poetics, between expressive minds and artistic creations, and how different approaches can inform a deeper understanding of literary and multimodal texts. Each chapter spotlights some new development in the field of cognitive poetics, calling attention to further possible pathways for future research, with particular attention given to the issues of embodiment, simulation, figurative operations, multiperspectivity, and multimodality.

Within the field of cognitive literary studies, the chapters emphasize how literary studies may contribute to cognitive scientific research through the investigation of embodiment and emotion in poetic experience, the role of context in conceptual metaphor and conceptual blending theories, and the influence of multimodality and musicality in literary expression and interpretation.

The volume begins with a foreword by Zoltan Kövecses, who examines the relationship between poetry and metaphorical cognition. Kövecses outlines the fundamental characteristics of creativity within the human metaphorical conceptual system that are shared by both great poets and ordinary people, such as the common use of primary metaphors in language and thought. Moreover, creative language use emerges from "context-induced metaphors," which reflect the influence of immediate social and physical environments in how people conceive of different situations. In this way, metaphorical creativity is motivated by more than

just past embodied experience and is expressed in coherent ways by means of people's specific understandings of in-the-moment social and linguistic contexts. This preface provides a good example of how new directions in cognitive poetics scholarship significantly extend more established ideas on poetic thinking and expression.

The main body of the book consists of four parts, reflecting four important themes in cognitive poetics that the papers address in different, detailed ways. All these parts investigate the relationship between cognition and poetics and contribute to a better understanding of the interpretation of literary and multimodal texts and cognition.

Part 1, on Imagination as Simulation, concentrates on some of the psychological processes that people, regardless of their expertise, automatically engage in when they experience literary texts and other artistic artifacts. A primary focus here is on the role that embodied simulations have when people interpret expressive meanings. Embodied simulations refer to processes in which people imagine themselves engaging in the actions mentioned in language or implied by the artistic works. Current behavioral and neural empirical findings from cognitive science concerning simulation, situated conceptualization, grounded cognition and emotion, and the bodily experience of literature are applied by authors in this section to characterize how people interpret expressive artworks as having specific, coherent meanings.

Marco Caracciolo's paper on embodiment in literary reading analyzes key issues through the case study of the novel *American Psycho* with the help of linguist David Ritchie's scalar account of embodied simulation. The chapter focuses on the ways in which reading literary narratives is influenced by embodied simulation phenomena such as motor resonance and bodily imagery. Types of embodied involvement are shown by the alternation, and juxtaposition, of passages in the novel ranging from "low embodiment," in which readers are less bodily engaged, to "high embodiment," in which readers are more likely to experience bodily imagery. Caracciolo claims that the results of cognitive psychology and

psycholinguistics are significant for literary analyses, and further empirical research on embodiment and literary reading is necessary in the future.

Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. and Lacey Okonski explore allegorical experience and claim that allegory is a fundamental cognitive principle that underlies several aspects of everyday imagination and reasoning, and it is therefore not merely a rhetorical, literary tool to convey abstract, symbolic ideas in concrete ways. Indeed, ordinary human experience propels the existence of allegory, and embodied conceptual metaphors may reflect different patterns of allegorical thought. Our life and discourse are full of manifestations of allegory as seen in the study of religious and political discourse, legal and literary texts, and proverbs. Different empirical studies clearly demonstrate how both ordinary readers and expert critics perceive allegory in poetry and novels and situate allegory as having deep ties to embodied action, similar to other contemporary ideas on metaphorical thought and language.

Part 2, *Beyond Metaphors: Conceptual Integration and Other Complex Figurative Operations*, focuses on conceptual mechanisms and processes in language, music, and the poetic/musical mind, such as metaphor, metonymy, hyperbole, irony, paradox, and different conceptual integration or blending processes. The dialogs between cognitive linguistics and cognitive poetics, including studies on music, are highlighted, with particular attention being given to how different conceptual mechanisms shed light on the creation and interpretation of language, music, and poetic/musical imagery. New insights concerning blending and conceptual integration theory within multimodal artworks also suggest some of the deficiencies with older versions of these theories.

Cristóbal Pagan Cánovas and Anna Piata explore the conceptualization of time in poetic language with the help of conceptual integration theory. By meticulously analyzing Greek, English, and Spanish examples, Cánovas and Piata demonstrate how various poetic effects—powerful aesthetic and emotional effects—can be created with the help of

time-space blends, depending on whether the spatial feature of path-trajectory is manipulated in various ways in the conceptual template. This chapter also argues that conceptual integration theory offers several advantages over conceptual metaphor theory in explaining the diverse range of metaphors and their meanings in poetic discourse.

Mark J. Bruhn also concentrates on conceptual integration theory and proposes a "systems-theoretic adjustment" to this account, particularly in regard to the notion of the generic space. Bruhn suggests that the role that the generic space plays in the blending process has not been properly explained in earlier research, which viewed it as an optional by-product of preexisting conceptual mappings across input spaces. Instead, Bruhn claims that the generic space has the important role of providing the cause for matches between the input spaces of the blend. For this reason, the generic space does not select the relevant mappings, but constrains against any other mappings than the relevant ones when interpreting poetic meanings. To illustrate this claim, Bruhn examines three increasingly complex creative blends as case studies involving a sentence-level metaphor, an extemporaneous discourse exchange, and an iconic lyric poem.

Paula Pérez-Sobrino's chapter explores several different cognitive operations through twelve examples of classical and contemporary musical works that involve both music and text. Pérez-Sobrino spells out details regarding the directionality and scope of the mappings between language and music that give rise to specific communicative effects. For example, the dynamic and flexible conceptual mechanisms of metonymy and its complexes, metaphor and its complexes, as well as hyperbole, paradox, and irony are compared and contrasted to account for various meaning constructions and possible communicative effects in multimodal contexts. By outlining these complex cognitive operations in specific multimodal artworks, Pérez-Sobrino illustrates one way to overcome the limitations arising from the two-domain layout of isolated metaphors.

Part 3 deals with Multiperspectivity: Proximity and Distance in literary language and highlights questions regarding the possible existence of similarities and (near) universals in the choices of linguistic tools and the narrative perspectives adopted in the study of literary works in different languages, literary works, and centuries. In addition, grammatical and contextual conventions apparent in literary texts are also shown to often be the results of authors' manipulations of texts, done in order to create various emotional effects in readers.

Wei-lun Lu, Arie Verhagen, and I-wen Su tackle the problem of viewpoint in literary narratives in English and Chinese with the help of a MultiParT (multiple-parallel-text) approach. Using multiple translated versions of Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland*, the authors attempt to systematically account for individual variations in the translated texts. One important finding is that the Chinese translations are more heavily demonstratively viewpointed than the original English text. Furthermore, the English and Chinese texts do not often correspond in their viewpoint constructions. Also, there are certain, systematically different, viewpointing preferences that appear in the Chinese translations. The use of MultiParT in crosslinguistic cognitive poetic research thus offers new insights into viewpointing constructions, among other issues.

Antonina Harbus takes "the long view" to approach dynamic affect in Early English verse and investigates the ways in which modern readers can interpret, and react emotionally and aesthetically to, medieval texts. The interaction between poetic language and different cognitive structures and processes is examined closely through a new diachronic perspective. Analyzing (translations of) short elegiac poems written over 1,000 years ago in Old English, Harbus investigates how linguistic features, including metaphoric language and affective triggers, can produce literary effects, which in turn give rise to reader's emotional responses to these texts. Even though the content, language, and cultural referents of these texts are remote to contemporary readers, the texts are still

comprehensible primarily because of the shared embodied human experience across time and cultures.

Natalia Igl uses perspectivization and multiperspectivity to examine two German avant-garde novels of the New Objectivity movement by Irmgard Keun and Alfred Döblin. She shows how the relationships among cognitive linguistic principles, textual and narrative strategies, and contemporary poetological positions collectively provide a critical foundation for understanding viewpoint splitting and deictic shift, polyphony, and multimodality in the two novels. Igl situates her analyses as being related to the "aesthetics of observation," which she views as the recursive embedding of viewpoints that allows for a multiplicity of readings, ones that are often in direct tension with one another. From this perspective, cognitive poetics functions to reveal deeper insights, which also include conflicts, between the theoretical models of poetic experience and the workings of actual creative artifacts.

Part 4, on Multiperspectivity: Verbal and Visual Modalities, adds another perspective on the analysis of multiperspectivity by focusing on various modalities. Partly related to the previous section, the chapters in this part emphasize how visual devices in literary texts may be traced back to different patterns of narrative perspectivization and described in terms of subjectivity and viewpoints. A goal of this section is to discern how people comprehend multimodal representations, such as visual language, graphic literature, and cartoons. It is important, though, to not only focus on what we read but to also consider when and how we read, so the locations and means of literary reading, and the changing technological environment of the last decade, must be a critical part of cognitive poetic studies. Another objective here is to discover whether the complicated arrangements of multimodal texts and the elusive sensations in poetry can be successfully studied within the framework of cognitive linguistics and cognitive poetics. Finally, a further aim is to see whether, and to what extent, cultural background

knowledge is necessary to understand multimodal artifacts.

Michael Burke and Esmeralda V. Bon explore the relevance of the means and locations of literary reading and investigate whether these have changed in the last decade, since e-readers and other electronic devices have appeared. The multiplicity, flexibility, and preference of places and manner of literary reading are examined, and the direction of change from paper to digital and hybrid reading is outlined through the comparison of the findings of past and their own survey studies. For example, Burke and Bon show that contemporary students are mostly "hybrid readers" now, given the various places and ways in which they engage with literary texts. Their empirical results on the importance of the location of reading, which influences the reader's reception process, are interpreted within the theory of embodied or situated cognition. Burke and Bon argue for a cognitive poetics that is sensitive to the ways and places literary texts are encountered, understood, and appreciated.

Sonja Zeman addresses the issue of the vivid visual and pictorial nature of verbal poetry and the literary pictorialism of literature—that is, the way in which pictorial impression arises from textual language. The model described, which is illustrated by several literary examples, uses vision, picture-viewing, and mental imagery to shed light on the visual/pictorial character of texts and its relationship to the reader's experience. By applying the results of recent neurocognitive studies, Zeman suggests that, instead of keeping visuality, pictoriality, and vividness as core concepts in literary analyses, a general model of representation of poetic iconicity must be developed and applied to cognitive poetic works.

Christian W. Schneider and Michael Pleyer investigate the relevance of mental scanning in multimodal visual texts, especially comics. Complex scenes and events, such as those presented on the still images of comics, can be viewed either holistically and statically in their entirety, or successively and dynamically as events unfold in time. Schneider and Pleyer examine the temporal

configurations in *Watchmen*, a multimodally self-reflexive comic, to show how the past, present, and future can be perceived by focusing on the simultaneous configuration of comics panels.

Reuven Tsur's chapter is about mental strategies that contribute to elusive perceptions in poems. Tsur examines the significance of poetic structures in two poems by the French Symbolist poet Paul Verlaine and compares them with those appearing in poems written by English Romanticists. By referring to John Keats's "Negative Capability" and the perceptual qualities of strong and weak gestalts, he intertwines his analysis with the meanings of Rudolf Arnheim's term "passively receiving mind" (as opposed to "actively organizing mind") and some neuropsychological findings to point out that an actively organizing mind is less sensitive to elusive sensations in poetry than a passively receiving mind. Tsur lists and analyzes the linguistic tools, including the syntactic, semantic and phonetic structures, in Verlaine's text that maneuver the speaker/reader into passivity.

The volume ends with a postscript by Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., who imagines the future of cognitive poetics, and expresses his commitments, hesitations, and desires with respect to the advancement of the scholarly study of poetic experience. Gibbs's main suggestions include striving for clarity and transparency in the methods employed in cognitive poetic analyses, considering alternative hypotheses, as well as expanding the scope of cognitive poetics to consider different noncognitive factors in artistic expression and understanding.

All these chapters present various cognitive literary studies from an interdisciplinary point of view, including literature, culture, aesthetics, semiotics, linguistics, cognitive science, neuroscience, philosophy, history, and psychology. The authors offer new linguistic and literary analyses, demonstrate the relevance of psychological and neuroscience research for studying expressive artworks, and expand cognitive poetics to include the study of the making and understanding of multimodal creations. Looking across the chapters, many issues arise concerning the variety of methods employed within cognitive poetics as we try to

better recognize what analytic tools best answer different, specific theoretical questions. Certain tensions also emerge in how we conceptualize cognitive poetics in terms of the study of generic or contextualized individual minds and bodies in the experience of poetic meaning. Many authors here also push against the limitations of several contemporary, cognitive theories of meaning construal, which opens up novel possibilities for research into creative, poetic, artistic expression. Most notably, many of the present chapters illustrate some of the pleasures and struggles of individual scholars who do not merely collaborate with people from neighboring disciplines, but who individually aim to embody interdisciplinarity within their own respective research efforts. In this manner, this collection sits at the cutting-edge boundary of new directions in cognitive poetics in regard to what we are now learning about artistic expression and understanding, the diverse ways of theoretically characterizing poetic experiences, and the empirical challenges that each of us faces in studying creative artworks and their complex meanings. <>

[Maxime Ballesteros: Les Absents](#) by Maxime Ballesteros and Caroline Gaimari [Hatje Cantz; Bilingual edition, 9783775743563]

French photographer Maxime Ballesteros captures candid moments in a world where sexual freedom and exploration is celebrated and commonplace. Many of his analog images provide glimpses of only a fraction of a scene—a pair of legs in suspenders, or the intimate proximity of bodies in a bath—nonchalantly shot from the hip, as he follows his protagonists to wild parties, into private apartments, to the early morning beach. Little wonder that fashion and lifestyle magazines such as *Purple*, *Numéro*, *Vice* and *032c* scramble to recruit the photographer. His debut book, [Maxime Ballesteros: Les Absents](#), gives readers a unique view of the gritty, flawed, raw and sexualized world that exists around us.

Excerpt: from the editor Caroline Gaimari: Maxime is someone who lives to take pictures—which would be a worrying wager if he wasn't so good at it. His pictures underline the existence of subjective

reality. We could be in the same place, at what I would describe as a "boring" party, and days later, when the proof of the party had adequately sat bathed in dye couplers and rehalogenising bleach, I would be confronted with the possibility of a somewhat parallel universe: there was another party happening in that same exact place and time. We had in fact been together in a place of unprecedented sexual freedom and earthly delight, I just hadn't had the eyes (or the will) to see the beauty in it at the time. Maxime has the gift of bringing out in people a love of the moment that has been cast aside in our modern age. The photos that he takes aren't in the realm of slapstick: the instant, easy gratification of a social media cookie reward. Maxime is a hunter, locked and loaded, waiting—hidden in plain sight—for the exact moment to take the shot, when the aim is precise, and his subject is blissfully unaware of his presence.

And despite being mostly hidden, Maxime intimately connects with his subjects. This, of course, is not really "news" —he is a photographer, and intimate connection with one's subject is arguably the most important tool in that trade. The specificity of Maxime's connection, however, is that his subject may be, for example, a pair of heels, the bearer of whom being most often completely unaware of the intimate connection happening in her (or his) southern hemisphere. It's a sort of futuristic virtual reality, where objects and places express their feelings and emotions through Maxime's lens.

And to be one of his human subjects —what a lucky place to play! All of these flexible daredevils are so coolly sexually confident! And the young men so brazenly, innocently nude. He is not a voyeur, this is reportage of youthful sexual empowerment and ownership. He proves with ease that it's not just the eyes that are the window to the soul; pairs of crossed legs find themselves in conversation and arched torsos express an unprecedented language of the body.

In Maxime's world, the esoteric comes across as downright banal, and the banal is made striking. Quirkiness is made beautiful, nudity is made commonplace. Not only could we wish to experience the same debaucherous festivities as

Maxime, what a delight it must be just to walk down the street seeing through his eyes!

2004 You will never get better.
You will never be okay.
The happiest days and nights inevitably preface the saddest. You swell with happiness, and the next day feel like you've been pierced in the belly.
Nothing splashes. It pours slowly on you.
Why are you so vulnerable?
You will not get better because you lose yourself at every turn. You will not get better because you expect nothing. You expect nothing from life. And your absolute lack of ambition has already buried you alive. You are awfully short of endurance.
You wander quietly in the incredible mess that serves as your head, and apartment. You know your internal clock by heart. You should make a schedule for your depressions.
So you might manage the rest of your time better.

2016 I've never been to Miami, Florida. It seems gigantic, but I would only be introduced to a tiny portion of it.
Walking up and down Mid and South Beach, crossing the bay to Wynwood or Downtown.
The buses and sidewalks seem empty, and the streets full of pick-up trucks in a rush and Lamborghinis slowing down.
The smell of gasoline in the heat fights against the salty breeze of the ocean.
The air-conditioned world of the inside contrasts amazingly with the reality of the outside.
The luxurious hotels stand still in the heat, the rain and the strongest wind.
We can look at the waves raging on the beach from a balcony with a glass of exquisite whisky, forgetting about the sounds of the V12 purring in circles behind, on Collins Ave.
We take an elevator down below, scrub our eyes from the sand kicking in our faces, bewitched by the warmth and suddenly sublime taste of the

wind, a paper bag from the liquor store in my hands.

I'm amazed by the surrealism of the multicolor papier-mâché like architecture, that stands so high, and somehow so still on the grey asphalt. So much that one could easily forget about the oil spills on the tar, invisible from the beachfront terrace of a 37th floor. It almost feels like parallel worlds that would have been shaken up and forced into a little glass soda bottle. At dusk, as if cooling down with the humid air, the streets would start smiling, the aggressive and incessant honks be replaced by a melody of high heels clicking and bypassers' conversations, punctuated with laughter transported by the wind.

The artificial lights would cover up the cracks of the not-so-old facades, and the eyes would adapt to the moonlight brushing the beach.

Running from black-tie parties to dive bars, to a psychedelic tour bus to empty wooden cabins on the beach, we try to inhale as much smells as a sleepless night will allow us.

And I fall asleep with a smile, under a light blanket.

It's freezing and I don't know how to stop the air conditioning, but I wrap myself in the warm feeling that those we shared our night with have left inside of me.

[Essential Effects: Water, Fire, Wind, and More](#) by Mauro Maressa [CRC, 9781138196926]

As a traditional effects animator, in order to animate, I need to use all the resources available to me. I draw with my right hand, which I call the artist. I use my left, which I call the technology, to flip and roll my animation drawings. If I use only my right hand, it may result in a nice drawing and potentially a great standalone piece of art. If I only use my left hand to flip the drawing I will end up with a very wrinkled piece of paper. The brain is in the middle to reason out timing, volumes, composition, arcs, action, design, and so on. In order for me to animate properly, I need all the resources available to me to work in unison. While

my hands do the physical work, it is my mind that needs to recall the stored information that I have accumulated through study and observation. Without that stored information, you are going to be stumbling along hoping you're going in the right direction. The rolling of the animation drawings is my playback machine, which allows me to view the action of my animation four to five drawings at a time. Today's technology allows us to animate in a computer, but we are missing the direct physical connection with the drawing. That tangible association is what I miss most. The network that is the brain to hand to paper, the direct current of creating a piece of animation from my mind through my hand to the paper, is a joy I can't imagine not experiencing. That's why I think the use of a stylus on a tablet is more palpable to me. While the computer is an incredible tool, I have to use a number of commands for it to do what I want it to do, and then I may have to go to another program and another set of commands to continue to create my animation. I guess I just don't have the mindset. I envy how some people can use the computer and their amazing accomplishments. It's a tool that I would encourage every artist to learn how to use. But remember that the tool does not dictate the art! It is the artist who must incorporate his tools with his art, be they a pencil or a computer.

What I hope to impart to you in this book is a series of basics lessons and examples on which you can build a foundation for animating effects. These are techniques that a tech-savvy animator can also use and really should know and use in his or her animation. When I'm teaching, I try to get my students to understand that in order to build a strong foundation for a career in effects animation, you must pay attention to basics. You want a strong foundation when you build a house so that it will stand for a long time. You don't want to build a career that flounders and collapses. Too often I've seen young animators who want to step in and animate the most complex of scenes and who get frustrated when they have to do things over and over again without reaching the desired results simply because their process and techniques fall short from lack of a basic understanding of how

things work or physical theory. While I can admire their desire and passion to jump in and attack a challenge, I can't help but shake my head at their unwillingness to work at learning all they need to, so that they can attempt to combine all the little intricacies that make up the more elaborate and complex ones.

There is a certain poetry of sorts in animating effects. The ebb and flow of a design within the context of an environment created in a film. The way water flows and smoke rises to the sky or is specifically designed for that environment that lets the viewers accept the veracity of the scene without hitting them over the head with the effects. I have often said to people who want to know what I did in a film, "If I do my job right you will never notice what I did, but if I muck it up, it may take the viewer out of the picture and disturb the flow of the storyline!"

An effects animator's job is not to lead the storytelling but to accompany it and help the story move forward. An effect may frame the mood of the character or his or her surroundings.

More often than not, the effects are a minor character, often playing a minor role, that accompanies the characters through their journey in the film. It is a specialized field within the specialized media of animation. It has been an incredible experience for me that has been both gratifying and rewarding in more ways than I can say. Animation has been a joy for me. I would jump out of bed every morning eager to start my day. Imagine, they paid me a salary to draw all day and make a living doing it and to work with some of the most interesting and talented people I have ever known! Don't get me wrong, it's a lot of hard work and can be grueling and repetitive at times, but it has also been greatly satisfying and worth the hard work. I'll wager that anyone you ask about their animation careers will say the same thing. It has been a tremendous journey that I don't foresee ending for me any time soon in the future. All that I have learned along the way has and will still help me in whatever new challenges I may encounter in my later years. I'm certain you will feel the same way about it.

Excerpt: I was born in Italy and moved to the United States with my family in 1959. My father preceded my mother and the three children by 3 years, establishing himself before having the rest of us come join him. We moved to Milford, Massachusetts, where my brother and sister and I grew up. My father worked as a tailor for a couple of different companies, while my mother worked as a seamstress. After a few years, they had saved enough to buy a house with a storefront, from which they operated their tailor shop until their retirement in the late 1980s. My brother showed promise as a fashion designer, and after attending school in Boston and New York became successful in that profession until his sudden and untimely death in 1999. My younger sister attended college and later on would marry and have two children. After high school, I went to art school and studied fine arts at the New England School of Art in Boston and then went on to the University of Massachusetts at Amherst to get my BFA.

I started teaching art in the Milford school system that year. It was the same year I would meet my future wife, Cynthia. We got married 2 years later and decided that, since I had the summers off from teaching, it would be great to take a cross-country trip for our honeymoon. So we drove through 36 states in our van. Along the way, as we drove through Los Angeles, because I was a big fan of Disney I decided to try my luck at the studio in Burbank. I didn't think anything of it at that time, but something like that is not possible today. I parked on the street across from the main entrance and walked to the security offices, where I asked if I could get an interview for the animation department. The nice lady instructed me to have a seat, and 20 minutes later I was interviewed by a nice gray-haired man who looked at my portfolio and was very positive. Knowing that I lived in Massachusetts, he told me that if I ever decided to move to Los Angeles I should try the studio again. When I got back to the van and Cindy waiting patiently inside, I told her about the interview and discussed the possibility of moving to Los Angeles for the rest of the trip home. We moved to Los Angeles 6 months later!

We got settled in and Cindy was able to find work at a department store. It was a bit of luck that Cindy happened to mention to one of her coworker friends that I was applying for work at Disney. Her friend, Betty, was an older lady who happened to have a friend that worked at Disney and asked if I would like to meet him. She invited us to a dinner party at her house about a week later where I met Donald "Don" Duckwall. He was a very gracious man and asked me if I would like to have a tour at the studio and to be sure to bring my portfolio with me. I met with Don the following week at the studio, and he gave me a tour of the animation building on the main lot. One of the people he introduced me to on the tour was Eric Larson. Eric was one of Walt Disney's "Nine Old Men" and was head of the training program there. I had never met a nicer, gentler, and more unassuming man in all my life. He looked at my portfolio and made some comments about the work but said that after 6 months in animation I would probably see a marked improvement in my drawings and how I posed my characters. He asked whether I would like to enter the animation training program. I had no idea what I was doing and only had an inkling of how animation was produced, but I loved the films and wanted to be involved in the making of them. Of course I jumped at the opportunity and started studying under Eric's patient tutelage in April. My two animation tests went well, but I fell victim to layoff due to the end of production on "The Small One," a short film done by Don Bluth at the studio at the time. There was no need to keep a newcomer like me while they were gearing up on their next film, especially when they had experienced artists already! I soon learned that layoffs are a common occurrence in the animation industry and animators would just pickup and move on to the next job.

Don Duckwall came in to tell me the news and informed me that he had called Harry Love, who was looking for artists at Hanna-Barbera.

So I went to work at Hanna-Barbera and was there for the next 3 years. I started out as an assistant animator, and my job would be to follow up on the work of the seasoned animators working on such

Saturday morning cartoons as Godzilla, SuperFriends, Fred and Barney, The Smurfs, and Scooby-Doo and Scrappy-Doo. It was an incredible learning experience for me and indeed for all of us young animators who were in the early stages of our careers and soon to go on to be a part of the renaissance of traditional animation of the late 1980s throughout the 1990s! We all worked under the mentorship of animators who had started their careers in the 1930s and were still going strong, animators like Iry Spence, Hal Ambro, Volus Jones, Ken Muse, Ed Barge, Dave Tendlar, Ed Aardal, Oliver "Lefty" Callahan, Charlie Downs, Rudi Cataldi, and so many others. They were animators who all started working at such studios as MGM, Disney, Fleischer, and UPA, and all had notable careers. My immediate supervisors were Bill Kile and Bob Goe. After settling in at Hanna-Barbera, I kept going to Bill and Bob for test animation assignments that I could work on at home in the evenings, which they would then look at and critique. I had set up a rig on my drawing desk at home with a hole cut in the center and a piece of Plexiglas with floating pegs for my animation paper. I did this for the next 6-7 months almost every night, working on animation of people and animal characters from the shows we were working on at the studio that Bill or Bob would make up for me until Bill surprised me one day and gave me a production scene to work on. It was on SuperFriends and it was a character riding a metal horse crossing railroad tracks and getting stuck in the tracks. After that Bill would give me a scene to work on regularly until he promoted me to animator.

Hanna-Barbera began working on an animation feature called Heidi's Song, and Bob Taylor would be the director. Bob gave me the opportunity to come work on that feature, and I worked closely under Hal Ambro, Iry Spence, and Charlie Downs as well as regularly talking with other people, whom I was constantly asking for pointers. All the animators at the studio animated their characters as well as any effects that might be part of those scenes.

Bob Taylor directed me to Ed Aardal one day when I got a scene that had a lot of effects in it. Ed was an old-time animator who started working as a character and effects animator at Disney in 1939. Ed was a great and patient teacher and spent many hours teaching me about effects. I suddenly started excelling at doing effects. So I got to work on a lot more scenes that had both characters and effects! Charlie Downs broke his wrists while roller skating one day and was not able to work for a while. He recommended that I take over working on some of his scenes of the Man Mountain character in the film and was given a great opportunity.

While we were working on Heidi's Song at Hanna-Barbera, I picked up freelance work from Heavy Metal: The Movie. I was part of the L.A. crew that worked on the "Taarna" sequence of that picture in 1980. After completing Heidi's Song, we started on preproduction work for another feature at Hanna-Barbera, but in 1981 I got the opportunity to go to work for Ralph Bakshi on his feature Fire and Ice. The idea of working alongside with Frank Frazetta was a chance I could not pass up, so I left Hanna-Barbera. I worked on many of the characters in Fire and Ice, but the last 2 weeks of that project had me working on the destruction of Nekron's fortress and the lava sequence. I animated all the lava by using grease pencil on clear celluloid sheets in order to expedite the process, avoiding the Xerox process and going to ink and paint directly, where all they had to do was paint the cels.

After Fire and Ice, I returned to Disney as an effects animator on the Tokyo Disneyland pavilion called "Meet the World" and later went on to The Black Cauldron as an assistant character animator where I got to work alongside my old pal from Hanna-Barbera, Charlie Downs, once again working on a lot of henchmen and incidental characters.

I chose to leave Disney after that film in 1985 to start a new phase in my career, that of working in live-action special effects. While Boss Film Corp. was gearing up for their next film, Poltergeist II, I spent a few months at Filmation Studios in the interim working on He-Man, She-Ra: Princess of

Power, and Pinocchio and the Emperor of the Night. Then I started working at Boss, which was a live-action special effects studio headed up by multi-Oscar-winning special effects wizard Richard Edlund, ASC. I worked off and on for Boss over the next 8 years on a number of films: Poltergeist II, The Monster Squad, Big Trouble in Little China, and Solarbabies and as animation supervisor for Far and Away, Solar Crisis, Batman Returns, and Alien 3. In that same period of time, I also worked at another live-action effects house called Perpetual Motion Picture with Barry Nolan on Bill and Ted's Excellent Adventure and served as animation supervisor on Warlock then as well.

I returned to traditional animation in 1992 at Baer Animation Studios, working with animator Dale Baer and his small group of hard-working and talented artists. We worked on a number of commercials and Disney's The Prince and the Pauper, which was outsourced to Baer Studios at the time. I then returned to Disney again in February of 1993 to start animating effects on Pocahontas. As that film was not yet ready for a full crew, I was put on the "B" picture called The Lion King. Everyone was anxious to work on Pocahontas at the time, as that was supposed to be the next blockbuster. No one thought that The Lion King would amount to much since it was about a bunch of cute animal characters and would not appeal to many people! 6 or 7 months into production, the crew was invited into the screening room to see the trailer that would be released soon to advertise The Lion King. That was the opening sequence of the film! Needless to say, everyone walked out of that screening room 20 minutes later with a renewed sense of energy that lifted the spirits of the entire studio. We all knew we had a hit on our hands! The Lion King was a great success and that creative energy carried over to Pocahontas and The Hunchback of Notre Dame. Even though these films would not be as successful as The Lion King, the quality and the artistry on all the films that followed was magnificent! The artists excelled at every level of production.

At this time, Disney Feature Animation was riding a wave of hits, so the studio built a brand-new

facility for the Animation Department that would be located next to the main studio in Burbank. A few of us in the Effects Department were some of the first to move into the new building. This was around the time we were working on The Hunchback of Notre Dame. The studio had two other feature animation units as well as the Burbank main studio. One was in Orlando, Florida, and one in Paris, France. I was fortunate to get the opportunity to visit each of these studios over a 1 year period to help in the training of the effects departments in each of those studios. They needed very little training, as the artists in both studios were very good.

Both would play an integral part in the production of the LA-based studio productions, and the Florida studio would soon produce two great films of their own: Lilo and Stitch and Brother Bear. While in Paris, I was asked to join a group of artists from LA on a quick recruiting tour in London and Dublin led by Roy E. Disney. Roy was a true friend and champion of the Animation Department and the main reason animation at the studio survived after Michael Eisner and company came to power at the studio in 1985. At that time, there was serious talk of dismantling the Feature Animation Department, but Roy would have none of that and fought to keep it a viable entity at Disney. He was to be rewarded by seeing the great success that feature animation would have in the 1980s through the 1990s and into the twenty-first century. But the artists were moved from the original animation building that Walt had built and made so many great films in. So, Animation was moved, lock, stock, and barrel, to some warehouses in Glendale a few miles away from the main studio. And it then produced some of the most memorable modern-day animated film classics!

I was in my hotel room in London one evening getting ready to return to Paris and then a week later to return to LA. I received a phone call from Alice Dewey, the producer of the next film scheduled to be released after Pocahontas, called Hercules, which Ron Clemens and John Musker were to direct after the great success of their last film, Aladdin. Alice asked if I would be interested in

heading up the Effects Department on that film. I gave it a great deal of thought and pondered all the possibilities of such a task that would be awaiting me and after an intense 2 seconds, I said yes!

I began work on Hercules as soon as I returned to the studio in Burbank. There was already a group of effects animators working on designs for the film. So it wasn't long before the art director and directors picked the look they liked for the effects on the film. With the complexity of the design of the water, smoke, fire, and the sheer volume of the number of effects that needed to be done, we needed help from our friends and colleagues in scene planning to fashion techniques to alleviate some of the pressure. Hercules was an extremely heavy-effects movie. We not only had a large crew in the Burbank studio but the effects departments in Florida and Paris were also helping us as well. This was true for the other departments on the film, and credit must be given to the coordinated efforts of all the people whose job was to keep track of the hundreds of scenes and thousands of animation drawings. Throughout the production, I found myself repeating, "We're going to need a bigger boat!" Such was the volume of work pouring into the department. But I had a great team of animators and assistants that made it all look easy!

I would be remiss if I didn't mention one of the key animators on my crew, Dorse Lanpher. Dorse was a calming element within the vortex of that production and a great sounding board for me. He had started his animation career in the 1950s at Disney and had experienced and seen just about all there was to see. I was very fortunate to have him as one of my animators and a friend. His astuteness and advice helped me through some rough times in dealing with personalities and the rigors of production. I will be eternally grateful to him. Sadly Dorse passed away in his home in 2011, several years after his retirement, leaving a great many of us that had worked alongside him very sad. He was a mentor to many of us who worked with him and has been sorely missed by us all.

Another key member in the Effects Department was our assistant production manager, Kim Gray. She was an incredibly efficient manager and a great cheerleader who kept things constantly moving forward. The fact that we had crews working in three different time zones, on two continents, and it all fell neatly into place every week was due to the collaborative efforts of a lot of people, and it was good to know you could always depend on everyone knowing their job and carrying it out efficiently. I'm very proud of the people I worked with on my crew and what a great job they all did on a film I am extremely proud of! In 1997, I was honored to receive an Annie Award from ASIFA for my work on Hercules and it would not have been possible without the concerted effort of that marvelous crew I had the pleasure of working with!

My next film was to be called Kingdom of the Sun—this would eventually become The Emperor's New Groove after several rewrites. The artistic leads were sent to research the Inca-based story line. We spent 2 weeks traveling around Peru taking in as much of the culture as possible, then returned to LA and started on the production. The original story was going to be much more ambitious. The original concept of the director, Roger Allers (The Lion King), was a bit darker and more mystical story with plenty of special effects. The story went through a rewrite (a common occurrence in the animation world) and a change of leadership. It's a story documented in a film called Sweatbox, done by Trudie Styler, wife of the singer—songwriter Sting who was doing the music for Kingdom. The effects crew ended up being considerably smaller than originally thought.

While we all waited for the story changes, our crew ended up being loaned out to other projects in the works. I, along with a small group of animators and assistants, worked on the sequence of Fantasia 2000 called "Rhapsody in Blue" directed by Eric Goldberg (Pocahontas). This was a very simple and highly stylized-looking film with the clean line look of Al Hirschfeld, the great caricaturist of Broadway stars and many other celebrities. When we finally got back on our film, it was now called The Emperor's New Groove and

was more of a comedy. Under the new Director, Mark Dindal (Cats Don't Dance), the production went into high gear and was finished in time to meet the scheduled release date that had been set for the original Kingdom film—a tribute to Mark's leadership.

My first foray into digitally animated features was Chicken Little, again working with Mark Dindal. I started out designing the effects and then later animating effects. I mostly animated cars and spaceships in Maya® for that film. My effects designs were for reference for the digital animators and programmers to try and emulate the digital effects into the more cartoony look the director wanted for the film, which they did quite successfully. The second digitally animated film I worked on was Meet the Robinsons and on this film my role was purely as an animator, mostly props and vehicles and a bit of elemental effects (and bubbles).

Around this time, it was clear that the studio was going 100% digital. Although there had been massive layoffs a few years before after the traditionally animated feature Home on the Range in 2004, a great many more were laid off in 2007, and I was one of them. I returned about 9 months later to work on what would be the last two-dimensional traditionally animated feature that Disney would do to this date, The Princess and the Frog. The great part of working on Princess was that we worked on Cintiq® tablets with styluses and produced our effects on the tablets. We were able to do our own manipulation of the effects using the Toon Boom Harmony program, so that we were able to hand over a nearly finished effects element to color model. The art director could then make his final tweaks with a minimum of effort as the basics of the elements were already blocked out, allowing the art director to concentrate on the fine-tuning of the effects to his liking.

I now teach traditional character animation and effects animation at Otis College of Art and Design in Los Angeles and do some work on independently produced traditional animated films, TV shows, and commercials, as well as my personal artwork.

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[Design by Nature: Creating Layered, Lived-in Spaces Inspired by the Natural World](#) by Erica Tanov, photographs by Ngoc Minh Ngo [Ten Speed Press, 9780399579073]

The first design book that translates elements of nature—including flora, water, and wood—into elements of decor for beautiful, lived-in, bohemian interiors, from acclaimed designer and tastemaker Erica Tanov.

Inspired by nature's colors, textures, and patterns, design icon Erica Tanov uses her passion for textiles to create beautiful, timeless interiors that connect us to the natural world. Design by Nature incorporates simple motifs from nature into the home, with new and imaginative decorating ideas

for an organic and bohemian style that mixes and layers rugs, pillows, throws, and drapery, and incorporates unique patterns and fabrics such as shibori, ikat, and jamdani. Practical design and decorating tips enable you to incorporate patterns and motifs from both ordinary and unexpected landscape elements, as well as develop a keener eye for the beauty that surrounds you every day. With nature as inspiration, along with stunning photos from renowned photographer Ngoc Minh Ngo, *Design by Nature* offers an enduring and intuitive approach to design that transcends fleeting trends.

A Way of Seeing

It's what we notice.

Often it's the little details and everyday things that inspire me most.

Like the heart-shaped crack in the sidewalk that I see on walks with my dog, Lily. As the seasons change, the heart remains but its contents vary. Encrusted with dirt and pebbles in the summer or with a bit of moss peeking out after a fresh rain, it never fails to fill me with wonder.

While I find inspiration everywhere—art, movies, travel, people—nature is my primary muse and the anchor for my creativity. I grew up in California, a place of extraordinary natural beauty, so nature has always been at the core of my inspiration and has influenced my aesthetic.

I love being outside. It's where I feel most alive, grounded, and at peace.

My design process begins with observing my surroundings.

Nature can inspire me literally—a plant I see and draw can reemerge in a print—or abstractly—the dense colors of overlapping foliage can appear as a color scheme; the curling, folding edges of a leaf as a ruffled hem. The natural world also inspires the spirit of my work. Being in the presence of nature grounds me and gives me the calm temperament that allows me to begin the creative process.

My appreciation for nature and the ability to observe probably began with the hikes my sister, Eden, and I would take with our dad. Being surrounded by the majestic trees and fragrances of the forest while we explored the winding paths filled me with awe. We'd stop for lunch in a secluded nook of the trail, perching on large rocks or tree stumps, pretending to be wood nymphs. Eden and I would pop cherry tomatoes into our mouths, pressing our ears against each other's cheeks to hear the little tomato explode as we bit down, amazed that such a huge sound and sensation could come from such a small, succulent thing. These early childhood times spent outside in places that I loved solidified my relationship with the natural world.

I was also finding inspiration in my everyday surroundings. As a young girl, I would tag along with my aunt to the flea markets where I discovered the love of the hunt. I remember once finding a sack of old embroidered linens. Although they were stained and riddled with holes, I beamed with pride over my purchase because I'd paid only a few dollars for the whole bag. Looking at the doilies, my dad commented that I should seek out quality over quantity (a philosophy I took to heart). Still, there was something I loved about the old fabrics; the history they held and the stories they told, stains and all. I didn't know what I would do with them, but I had a budding hope of making something beautiful.

I showed an early love of decorating interior spaces. When I was in second grade, my mom, who had always provided me with an abundance of art supplies, encouraged me to plan and choose the decor for my new room. I had a vision of creating a magical secret garden. I picked out an orange-and-pink-flowered wallpaper, thrilled to have stripes and vines of happy flowers climbing toward the ceiling. I chose a grass-green shag carpet so it would look as if the flowers were growing from the floor.

A few years later, my grandfather built a dollhouse just for me. With my initials—E.T.—carved into the front door and a secret drop-down stairway from the attic—features he designed—it

felt very special. I remember spending so much time deciding on the wallpaper and getting lost in creating a whole world, miniature but still complete. I created accessories to complement the furniture my grandpa had made; little cookie sheets from chipboard and tin foil and baked tiny rolls and cookies that I shellacked so they would keep. I used vintage handkerchiefs I found at the flea market as monogrammed sheets on the beds. Designing a space where I had artistic control was a formative experience for me. Being granted the freedom to create my own environment helped me establish a solid sense of my artistic self from a very young age.

When I was twelve, I began taking sewing classes. I was very small for my age and was still wearing kid-size clothing when everyone else was moving into the teen section. So I started making my own clothes. I became known as an eclectic dresser, putting together unusual outfits, mixing prints and patterns and vintage pieces I was starting to collect. In high school, I can vividly recall making myself a ruffled floral miniskirt out of upholstery fabric, which I wore with an army-green cotton-twill bomber jacket (that I also made), a white cotton blouse with a ruffled collar, and my gold Esprit ballet flats. I loved this outfit because of its unlikely mix of silhouettes, textures, and colors.

My fashion sense became more refined over time and, after I graduated from Parsons School of Design in New York, I went to work for fashion designer Rebecca Moses. After two years of working on Seventh Avenue, I became disillusioned with certain aspects of the fashion world and wanted to do something that allowed a more personal expression of my creativity but wasn't quite sure what that would be.

I took on various jobs—assisting stylists, working for a milliner—and spent time hanging out in cafés with my journal, pondering my next move. During that time, I started designing and sewing lingerie inspired by vintage pieces I had collected from regular flea-market hunts and a pair of my grandfather's monogrammed silk pajamas that I had inherited. I was combining elements that were

important to me: fine craftsmanship, subtle old-world details, and timeless styles.

Once I had a small collection of samples, I decided to take them around to my favorite stores, starting in Soho and then scheduling appointments with Henri Bendel and Barneys. It was different back in 1990. Buyers were much more eager to meet with young, unknown designers, enchanted by viewing their wares out of a vintage suitcase. These meetings led to orders—more than I expected—and soon I was in full production: making patterns, sewing, shipping, invoicing. I had a business. I was a designer.

As my business grew, so did my yearning for a more relaxed lifestyle. After nine years in New York, I was ready to return to California and open my first store. Dragging my soon-to-be-husband, Steven, a musician and composer, along, we moved to Berkeley into a building that once housed my grandfather's laundry business—a building full of memories and history that felt like the ideal place to continue growing my business and start our new life together on the West Coast.

Being back in California, surrounded by natural beauty, sparked new ideas and creativity. I began designing my own prints, which was a new medium for expression, and gradually ventured from lingerie and clothing into home goods—pillows, bedding, tablecloths, and, eventually, wallpaper and furniture.

A couple of years after moving to Berkeley, Steven and I decided to start a family, and we moved to a sweet Craftsman bungalow to have more space and separation between work and home. We now have two children, Hugo and Isabelle, who are the center of our world. Definitely our greatest collaboration. Being a mother is the most important part of my life, and it has forced me to be less uptight and more relaxed about my style, knowing there will always be some degree of mess. But it doesn't mean I've sacrificed my love of nice things. I have an off-white sofa that the kids jump, eat, and sleep on, and a dining room table covered in water rings and bits of paint and markers. We really live in our house, and I love that about it. I've never felt

as if I had to sacrifice style in order to have a home where people feel comfortable. Our house is beautiful but not pristine.

I never allow things to be too precious, and I anticipate that something will eventually become stained or broken.

As a collector with a minimalist husband, I've learned to balance my penchant for amassing beautiful objects with his desire for simplicity by being selective in filling our home only with things I truly love and feel a deep connection to. Over time, I've curated my stores in the same way—by choosing well-crafted pieces, and combining them to create a sense of lived-in grandeur.

A writer once described me as an "imperfectionist," and it rings true. I steer away from anything too perfect or manicured and prefer to create beautiful, relaxed spaces by embracing objects with their imperfections. I'm basically a refined hippie—attracted to the loose, natural, and raw and things in disrepair—yet am also drawn to pieces with a hint of glamour and opulence. I believe in buying high-quality goods although the name of the maker or designer is not important. I buy lasting things that I love.

Everything I do, from designing clothing or wallpaper to arranging a room, aspires to reflect the effortless beauty of the natural world. My designs are often inspired by simple sights: the trees in my backyard, the fallen leaves and blooming flowers I see on my walks, or a single fern casting its shadow on my porch. I love the flawed beauty inherent in nature. Perfectly imperfect. I want everything I design and make to have that same relaxed sensibility.

My wish is for you to find inspiration in your own surroundings. It isn't about traveling far and wide to beautiful landscapes (although that never hurts), but, rather, it's about discovering beauty right outside your door. It can be something as grand as an old tree with wide-reaching limbs or something as small as a tiny leaf or acorn. You can find inspiration in a weed blowing gracefully on the freeway or the pattern of the craggy bark of an oak tree. You can be moved by the intense ochre

colors of lichen growing on a branch or fallen twig or the damp fertile smell after a rain. Everything is source material.

I've arranged the chapters in this book around the elements of nature that are the most important in my work: wood, water, dirt, weeds, and decay. All of these expressions of the environment work together in my designs, and overlap with one another. It's not just the obviously celebrated aspects of the outdoors that call to me—perfect flowers and pretty flora—but the overlooked parts too, moss, decomposing leaves, and withering petals. It is nature in its totality that brings so much texture and richness to my world and my work.

This is not a "how to" book. I don't have any design rules to pass on to you. In fact, I don't even believe in design do's and don'ts. You can't teach someone a sense of style. It is for each individual to interpret the world in his or her own way. Trust your instincts and surround yourself with objects you love that have meaning to you.

My design process and the way I style interiors is hugely intuitive—second nature—and my hope is to inspire you to find beauty in the simplest, often overlooked parts of your surroundings, and to bring that beauty into your life, in your own way.

No matter where you are, beauty of some kind surrounds you. You don't have to live in the countryside to discover beauty right outside your door. To me, nature is any environment you find yourself in. Beauty is everywhere and accessible to everyone. I truly believe that.

Whether it's the crack in a sidewalk with a bit of life emerging, a crumbling stone wall, a reflective puddle after the rain, or a grove of redwoods, everyone has access to the beauty of the natural world.

It's the ability to see that beauty that's important, and what you do with that beauty that makes you a creative person. And it is also how you bring what inspires you into your life and the life of those around you.

Finding Inspiration

This book is about simply opening all of your senses to what is already in front of you. I hope that these pages help you discover nature's everyday miracles in the seemingly ordinary and that they inspire you to both find and create your own beauty.

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About the Author

[Space Odyssey: Stanley Kubrick, Arthur C. Clarke, and the Making of a Masterpiece](#) by Michael Benson [Simon & Schuster: 9781501163937]

Celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the film's release, this is the definitive story of the making of 2001: A Space Odyssey, acclaimed today as one of the greatest films ever made, including the inside account of how director Stanley Kubrick and writer Arthur C. Clarke created this cinematic masterpiece.

Regarded as a masterpiece today, 2001: A Space Odyssey received mixed reviews on its 1968

release. Despite the success of Dr. Strangelove, director Stanley Kubrick wasn't yet recognized as a great filmmaker, and 2001 was radically innovative, with little dialogue and no strong central character. Although some leading critics slammed the film as incomprehensible and self-indulgent, the public lined up to see it. 2001's resounding commercial success launched the genre of big-budget science fiction spectacles. Such directors as George Lucas, Steven Spielberg, Ridley Scott, and James Cameron have acknowledged its profound influence.

Author Michael Benson explains how 2001 was made, telling the story primarily through the two people most responsible for the film, Kubrick and science fiction legend Arthur C. Clarke. Benson interviewed Clarke many times, and has also spoken at length with Kubrick's widow, Christiane; with visual effects supervisor Doug Trumbull; with Dan Richter, who played 2001's leading man-ape; and many others.

A colorful nonfiction narrative packed with memorable characters and remarkable incidents, [Space Odyssey](#) provides a 360-degree view of this extraordinary work, tracking the film from Kubrick and Clarke's first meeting in New York in 1964 through its UK production from 1965-1968, during which some of the most complex sets ever made were merged with visual effects so innovative that they scarcely seem dated today. A concluding chapter examines the film's legacy as it grew into its current justifiably exalted status.

Excerpt: The ODYSSEY as Prototype.

The very meaninglessness of life forces man to create his own meanings.--STANLEY KUBRICK

The twentieth century produced two great latter-day iterations of Homer's Odyssey. The first was James Joyce's Ulysses, which collapsed Odysseus's decade of wandering down to a single city, Dublin, and a seemingly arbitrary day, June 16, 1904. In Ulysses, the role of Ithaca's wily king was played by a commoner, Leopold Bloom—a peaceable Jewish cuckold with an uncommonly fascinating inner life, one the author effectively allowed us to

hear. Serialized from 1918 to 1920, it was published in full in 1922.

The other was Stanley Kubrick and Arthur C. Clarke's 2001: A Space Odyssey, in which the islands of the southeastern Mediterranean became the solar system's planets and moons, and the wine-dark sea the airless void of interplanetary, interstellar, and even intergalactic space.

Shot in large-format panoramic 65-millimeter negative and initially projected on giant, curving Cinerama screens in specially modified theaters, 2001 premiered in Washington, DC, on April 2, 1968, and in New York City the following day. Produced and directed by Kubrick and conceived in collaboration with Clarke, one of the leading authors of science fiction's "golden age," the film was initially 161 minutes long. Following a disastrous series of preview and premiere screenings, the director cut it down to a leaner 142 minutes.

Where Joyce's strategy had been to transform Odysseus into a benevolently meditative cosmopolitan flaneur, and to reduce ten years of close calls and escape artistry to twenty-four hours in proximity of the River Liffey, Kubrick and Clarke took the opposite approach. Deploying science as a kind of prism, which during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries entirely transformed our sense of the size and duration of the universe, they vastly expanded Homer's spatiotemporal parameters. 2001: A Space Odyssey encompassed four million years of human evolution, from prehuman Australopithecine man-apes struggling to survive in southern Africa, through to twenty-first-century space-faring Homo sapiens, then on to the death and rebirth of their Odysseus astronaut, Dave Bowman, as an eerily posthuman "Star Child." In the final scene, the weightless fetus returns to Earth as Richard Strauss's 1896 composition Thus Spoke Zarathustra pounds cathartically on the soundtrack.

In 2001: A Space Odyssey, the meddlesome gods of the ancients have become an inscrutable, prying alien super-race. Never seen directly, they swoop down periodically from their galactic Olympus to intervene in human affairs. The instrument of their

power, a rectangular black monolith, appears at key turning points in human destiny. First seen among starving man-apes in a parched African landscape at the "Dawn of Man," 2001's totemic extraterrestrial artifact engenders the idea among our distant ancestors of using weaponized bones to harvest the animal protein grazing plentifully all around them. This prompting toward tool use implicitly channels the species toward survival, success—and, eventually, technologically mediated global domination.

After vaulting into that happy future in a match cut that has deservedly acquired the reputation of being the single most astonishing transition in cinematic history, 2001 leads us to understand that a lunar survey team has discovered another monolith, this one seemingly deliberately buried under the surface of the Moon eons before. When excavated and hit by sunlight for the first time in millions of years, it fires a powerful radio pulse in the direction of Jupiter—evidently a signal, warning its makers that a species capable of space travel has arisen on Earth. A giant spacecraft, Discovery, is sent to investigate.

While parallels with The Odyssey aren't as thoroughly woven into the structure of 2001 as they are in Ulysses, they certainly exist. Seemingly prodded into action by flawed programming, a cyclopean supercomputer named HAL-9000—represented by an ultracalm disembodied voice and a network of individual glowing eyes positioned throughout Discovery—goes bad and kills off most of the crew. The sole surviving astronaut, mission commander Dave Bowman, then has to fight the computer to the death. Apart from dueling a cybernetic Cyclops, Bowman's name references Odysseus, who returns to Ithaca, strings the bow of Apollo, shoots an arrow through twelve axe shafts, and proceeds to slaughter his wife's suitors. A nostos, or homecoming, was as necessary to Kubrick's and Clarke's Odyssey as it was to Homer's.

Much like Joyce and in keeping with their expansive vision, 2001's authors took parallels with Homer as a starting point, not final word. When they began work in 1964, one initial motivation

was to study the universal structures of all human myths. They were aided by Joseph Campbell's magisterial study *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*, which provided them with a template for the conscious creation of a new work of mythology. Early in their collaboration, Kubrick quoted a passage to Clarke concerning the universal rite of passage of any mythological hero, which Campbell suggested invariably encompasses "separation—initiation—return." This tripartite structure "might be named the nuclear unit of the monomyth," Campbell wrote—a term he borrowed from Joyce, who'd coined it in his last major work, *Finnegans Wake*.

Campbell's research helped Kubrick and Clarke delve into the archetypal workings of human mythological yearnings, expanding that template to encompass not just one story and hero, and not even just one species, but rather the entire trajectory of humanity—"from ape to angel," as Kubrick put it in 1968. In this, they also overtly referenced Friedrich Nietzsche's 1891 philosophical novel *Also sprach Zarathustra*, with its concept of mankind as merely a transitional species—sentient enough to understand its animal origins but not yet truly civilized. It was an idea both could get behind, Clarke with his innate optimism about human possibilities, and Kubrick with his deeply ingrained skepticism. It was this seemingly contradictory mesh of worldviews that gave *2001: A Space Odyssey* its exhilarating fusion of agnosticism and belief, cynicism and idealism, death and rebirth.

In Clarke, Kubrick had found the most balanced and productive creative partnership of his career. While the director made all the critical decisions during the film's production, the project started out—and in important ways remained—a largely equal collaboration between two very different, singularly creative characters. Like Joyce, both were expatriates, with the Kubrick family finally settling for good in England during the making of *2001*, and Clarke being a resident of Ceylon—later Sri Lanka—from 1956 until his death in 2008.

At *2001*'s release in 1968, Kubrick was thirty-nine, the same age as Joyce when *Ulysses* was being serialized. He was at the pinnacle of his abilities,

having already made two of the twentieth century's great films. Each was a devastating indictment of human behavior as expressed through the military mind-set. Released in 1957, *Paths of Glory* served as a comprehensive indictment of the hypocrisy of the French general staff during World War I—though its meanings were by no means limited to any one army or conflict. And his 1964 satire *Dr. Strangelove*, written in collaboration with Peter George and Terry Southern, cut to the core of the Cold War nuclear arms race, equal parts savage critique and caustic black comedy. A resounding critical and commercial success, it set the stage for the large-scale studio support necessary to realize *2001*.

Kubrick's method was to find an existing novel or source concept and adapt it for the screen, always stamping it with his own bleak—but not necessarily despairing—assessment of the human condition. A self-educated polymath, he was in some ways the ultimate genre director, switching virtuosically between established cinematic categories and forms with a restless analytical intelligence, always transcending and expanding their boundaries. During his career, he reinvented and redefined the film noir heist film, the war movie, the period costume feature, the horror flick, and the science fiction epic, each time transforming and reinvigorating the genre through extensive, timeconsuming research followed by an uncompromising winnowing away of clichés and extraneous elements.

Kubrick treated every film as a grand investigation, drilling down into his subject with a relentless perfectionist's tenacity as he forced it to yield every secret and possibility. Once he'd decided on a theme, he subjected it to years of interrogation, reading everything and exploring all aspects before finally jump-starting the cumbersome filmmaking machinery. Having concluded his preproduction research, he directed his pictures with all the authority of an enlightened despot. Following a stint as hired-gun director on *Spartacus* in 1960, he conceived of a personal kind of slave revolt, never again working on a project he didn't produce himself. While in practice, studios such as

MGM footed the bills and exerted some influence, this gave him near-complete artistic independence. (Still *Spartacus*, which Kirk Douglas both produced and starred in, marked Kubrick's definitive induction into big-budget Hollywood filmmaking. The picture, which dramatized the bloody trajectory of a Thracian gladiator as he led a successful uprising against Rome, won four Oscars and a Golden Globe award for Best Motion Picture Drama.)

As the ne plus ultra example of Kubrick's methods, *2001: A Space Odyssey* wasn't just rooted in extensive preproduction fieldwork, it continued throughout—an uninterrupted, well-funded research project spanning its live-action filming and extending across its postproduction as well (which, given the importance of its visual effects, was actually production by another name). All the while, the director and his team pioneered a variety of innovative new cinematic techniques. Highly unorthodox in big-budget filmmaking, this improvisatory, research-based approach was practically unheard of in a project of this scale. *2001* never had a definitive script. Major plot points remained in flux well into filming. Significant scenes were modified beyond recognition or tossed altogether as their moment on the schedule arrived. A documentary prelude featuring leading scientists discussing extraterrestrial intelligence was shot but discarded. Giant sets were built, found wanting, and rejected. A transparent two-ton Plexiglas monolith was produced at huge expense and then shelved as inadequate. And so forth.

Throughout, Kubrick and Clarke remained locked in dialogue. One strategy they'd agreed on in advance was that their story's metaphysical and even mystical elements had to be earned through absolute scientific-technical realism. *2001*'s space shuttles, orbiting stations, lunar bases, and Jupiter missions were thoroughly grounded in actual research and rigorously informed extrapolation, much of it provided by leading American companies then also busy providing technologies and expertise to the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration, or NASA. In late 1965, George Mueller, the czar of the Apollo lunar

program, visited *2001*'s studio facilities north of London. Apollo was then still flight-testing unmanned launch vehicles, while NASA launched the precursor Gemini program's two-man capsules in an ambitious series of Earth-orbiting missions. After touring the film's emerging sets and viewing detailed scale models of its centrifuges and spacecraft, the man in charge of landing men on the Moon and returning them safely to Earth—the ultimate Odyssean voyage yet accomplished by the species—was impressed enough to dub the production "NASA East."

Clarke was fifty when *2001* came out. When Kubrick first contacted him early in 1964, he had already enjoyed an exceptionally prolific career. Best known as a formidably imaginative science fiction novelist and short-story writer, he was also a trenchant essayist and one of the twentieth century's leading advocates of human expansion into the solar system. Apart from his fictional and nonfictional output, he had played a noteworthy role in the history of technology. Clarke's 1945 paper on "extraterrestrial relays," published in the British magazine *Wireless World*, proposed a global system of geostationary satellites, which, he argued, would revolutionize global telecommunications. While some of the ideas he presented had already been in circulation, he synthesized them impeccably, and the paper is regarded as an important document of the space age and the information revolution.

Clarke's fictions were greatly influenced by the work of British science fiction novelist Olaf Stapledon (1886-1950), whose seminal *Last and First Men* and *Star Maker* encompassed multiple phases of human evolution across vast timescales. Clarke's early novels *Childhood's End* (1953) and *The City and the Stars* (1956) likewise encompassed sweeps of time so expansive that monumental civilizational changes could be examined in great detail. Still considered his best work, *Childhood's End* closed with the human race being shepherd through an accelerated evolutionary transformation by a seemingly benevolent alien race, the "Overlords." In it, humanity is depicted as obsolete—destined for

replacement by a telepathically linked successor species composed, oddly, of children. Clarke's strange vision of mankind outgrowing its childhood was also influenced directly by the great Russian rocket scientist and futurist Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, who, in an essay published in 1912, stated, "Earth is the cradle of the mind, but humanity can't remain in its cradle forever." As the central utopian credo of the space age, Tsiolkovsky's pronouncement would find direct expression in 2001's final scenes.

As with *Ulysses*, 2001 was initially greeted with varying degrees of incomprehension, dismissal, and scorn—but also awed admiration, particularly among the younger generation. Its first screenings were a harrowing ordeal, with audience reactions at the New York premiere including boos, catcalls, and large-scale walkouts. Most of the city's leading critics dismissed the film, some in personal and humiliating terms. And as with Joyce, some of Kubrick's and Clarke's peers went out of their way to disparage the film. Russian director Andrei Tarkovsky, possibly the greatest filmmaker of the twentieth century, found 2001 repellant. Calling it "phony on many points," he argued that its fixation on "the details of the material structure of the future" resulted in a transformation of "the emotional foundation of a film, as a work of art, into a lifeless schema with only pretensions to the truth." Soon after its release, Clarke's friend and fellow science fiction writer Ray Bradbury wrote a negative review decrying 2001's slow pace and banal dialogue. He had a solution, though: it should be "run through the chopper, heartlessly."

In retrospect, these initial waves of hostility and incomprehension can be understood as a result of the film's radical innovations in technique and structure—another similarity to *Ulysses*. They were followed by grudging reappraisals, at least on the part of some, and a dawning understanding that a truly significant work of art had materialized. 2001: A Space Odyssey is now recognized as one of the exceedingly rare works that will forever define its historical period. Put simply, it changed how we think about ourselves. In this way, too, it easily withstands comparison to James Joyce's masterpiece.

In both of these modernist Odysseys, audiences were asked to accept new ways of receiving narrative. While Joyce didn't invent stream of consciousness and interior monologue as literary devices, he brought them to unprecedented levels of proficiency and complexity. Likewise, Kubrick didn't create oblique auteurist indirection and dialogue-free imagistic storytelling—but by transposing it into the science fiction genre and setting it within such a vast expanse of space and time, he effectively kicked it upstairs. 2001 is essentially a nonverbal experience, one more comparable to a musical composition than to the usual dialogue-based commercial cinema. An art film made with a Hollywood blockbuster budget, it put audiences in the unaccustomed position of "paying attention with their eyes," as Kubrick put it.

Joyce's tidally impressionistic portrait of provincial Dublin allowed us to sample previously inaccessible internal currents of human thought and feeling. Kubrick's and Clarke's 2001: A Space Odyssey presented a disturbing vision of human transformation due to technology, positioning all our strivings within a colossal cosmic framework and evoking the existence of extraterrestrial entities so powerful as to be godlike. Each was highly influential, with innumerable successor works striving to equal their philosophical breadth and technical virtuosity. Neither has yet been surpassed. <>

[Philosophy and Conceptual Art](#) edited by Peter Goldie and Elisabeth Schellekens [Oxford University Press, 9780199285556]

The fourteen prominent analytic philosophers writing here engage with the cluster of philosophical questions raised by conceptual art. They address four broad questions: What kind of art is conceptual art? What follows from the fact that conceptual art does not aim to have aesthetic value? What knowledge or understanding can we gain from conceptual art? How ought we to appreciate conceptual art?

Conceptual art, broadly understood by the contributors as beginning with Marcel Duchamp's ready-mades and as continuing beyond the 1970s to include some of today's contemporary art, is

grounded in the notion that the artist's 'idea' is central to art, and, contrary to tradition, that the material work is by no means essential to the art as such. To use the words of the conceptual artist Sol LeWitt, "In conceptual art the idea of the concept is the most important aspect of the work...and the execution is a perfunctory affair". Given this so-called "dematerialization" of the art object, the emphasis on cognitive value, and the frequent appeal to philosophy by many conceptual artists, there are many questions that are raised by conceptual art that should be of interest to analytic philosophers. Why, then, has so little work been done in this area? This volume is most probably the first collection of papers by analytic Anglo-American philosophers tackling these concerns head-on.

This is a collection of fourteen pieces, arranged into four parts: conceptual art as a kind of art; conceptual art and aesthetic value; conceptual art, knowledge and understanding; and appreciating conceptual art. Actually, there is much overlap among the articles so that the division into parts has little significance. According to the editors, the "majority" of the papers were presented at a conference at King's College London in 2004. The book also has an introductory overview, a dozen illustrations, a round-table discussion among a few conceptual artists, and an index at the end. I would have liked a brief note about each of the contributors.

Peter Lamarque ("On Perceiving Conceptual Art") takes issue with a certain characterization: the physical form of a conceptual artwork is "secondary"; hence conceptual art is anti-aesthetic. This argument, Lamarque points out, is a non sequitur. Lamarque summons up literature, in which the way the words on the page look are irrelevant to literary appreciation, yet literary appreciation - - discovering themes and how narrative details contribute to those themes -- is an aesthetic activity. Lamarque admits that whatever ideas are represented by conceptual art are unlike literary themes, though holds that there must be a way of appreciating conceptual art that is analogous to

literary appreciation. In part, we must experience conceptual art as distinct from the "real things" that they resemble. We are to perceive "salience and significance," which are not reducible to "the cerebral reflection of ideas in philosophy [nor] the apprehension of themes ... in literature." Can more be said about these saliences and significances? Some examples would have helped.

Derek Matravers ("The Dematerialization of the Object") gives a kind of historical account of conceptual art which variously embodies or argues against such writers as Clement Greenberg and Walter Benjamin. His bottom line is, "Conceptual Art emerged out of the perception that modernism -- and by extension, the traditional way of doing art -- was exhausted." Would someone, please, tell me what it means for a way of doing art to be exhausted?

According to Gregory Currie ("Visual Conceptual Art"), the conceptualists deny that "works of art are things primarily to be looked at." He holds that works of art are things to be looked at, but looked at "in the right way." The "right way" is "in the service of the artist who has made the thing we are looking at." Towards this end, Currie advances what he terms "Action-Result proposals," of which there are two forms: in one, the result has priority; in the other, the action (of producing the result) has priority. When the action has priority, we try to understand the appearance in terms of the action that produces it. In traditional art, the result has priority; in conceptual art, the action has priority. But here Currie lets the matter drop. How are we to explain why someone presented, say, a pile of clothes as art? What are the appropriate terms of the explanation? It is, for example, wondered why Goya produced the so-called black paintings of his old age: Was he mad? Disillusioned with politics? This seems to run in the conceptual art direction (priority of action over result) rather than the direction of visual art (priority of result over action); yet it would be false to classify the black paintings as conceptual art.

Robert Hopkins ("Speaking Through Silence: Conceptual Art and Conversational Implicature") asserts, "There exists conceptual art, that is art that

can be fully appreciated (as art) without being the object of sense experience." Really? Why, then, do accounts of conceptual art, including the present volume, contain photographs of the works? Hopkins goes on to distinguish conceptual art from traditional art by claiming that in conceptual art but not traditional art, "The work's artistic properties are fully determined by a less than fully specific conception of its base properties." In other words, the artistic properties of a conceptual artwork can be ascertained even if the work is never realized in material form. I disagree. Doesn't the sight of Duchamp's Fountain elicit both the work's comicality and its odd forlornness? Would these be elicited from the "concept" alone? Hopkins, near the end, claims that it is not irrelevant whether the artwork is a deep hole or a urinal. Their "precise nature" is "irrelevant," he says, but what does that mean? It doesn't matter how deep the hole is? Or that the urinal is turned on its back? All that matters, apparently, is that the "expectation of sensory satisfaction" be "frustrated." But then, wouldn't one and the same piece of conceptual art, perhaps reproduced over and over, play that role? Why would we need a corpus of different conceptual artworks? As for the constant frustration of the expectation of sensory satisfaction that Hopkins attributes to every work of conceptual art, why should we bother? It would be like patronizing over and over a restaurant that refused to serve food. Hopkins's title refers to the Gricean concept of conversational implicature. Encounters with conceptual art are "conversations where our questions go unanswered," though as Hopkins admits, silence is a kind of answer. So we as it were ask the conceptual piece: "Why are you art where there seems to be nothing aesthetic?" Answer: Silence. And so on. Myself, I'd find another conversational partner.

Elisabeth Schellekens ("The Aesthetic Value of Ideas") sheds some light on the sorts of ideas conceptual art is supposed to express. She calls these art-reflexive ideas (e.g. Robert Barry's Inert Gas Series, which involves releasing helium gas into the atmosphere, brings up the "idea" that a work of art can exist without being seen); socio-political ideas (e.g. a 1970 work titled Q. And babies? A.

And babies, a photograph of bodies piled up on a road in Vietnam, which refers to the massacre at My Lai; the piece is said to convey the idea that the war in Vietnam committed "gross injustices"); and philosophical ideas (e.g. a work by Michael Craig-Martin, An Oak Tree, which consists of a glass of water accompanied by a sheet of paper claiming that the object really is an oak tree though it bears the "accidents" of a glass of water -- an allusion to, probably a joke about, the metaphysical concept of transubstantiation). Schellekens claims that we must go further than simply entertaining the idea in the form of a proposition; the cognitive value of the work "lies in breathing life into the idea that it seeks to represent by making us grasp the idea phenomenologically," which is said to mean that conceptual works "trigger the imaginative exercise that can eventually lead to experiential knowledge ..." A full investigation of this claim would take us well beyond the confines of a book review. I will just point out that a picture of bodies piled up proves nothing about justice or injustice; that is an extra-artistic, philosophical investigation. Schellekens thinks that ideas often have aesthetic qualities: the idea of transubstantiation can be "sublime," for example. I would agree. Duchamp's Fountain is witty, but not because there is something witty about urinals. Still, does Inert Gas Series express an idea with aesthetic qualities? Does And babies? I think not.

Diarmuid Costello ("Kant After LeWitt: Towards an Aesthetics of Conceptual Art") embraces a view dear to my heart -- especially since I defended it several years ago ("Duchamp and Kant: Together At Last," *Angelaki*, 7 (2002)). In sum: Kant, in *The Critique of Judgment*, defines fine art as the expression of "aesthetic ideas," which are "presentations of the imagination which prompt much thought, but to which no determinate thought ... can be adequate." Of course, if Kant is right, every artwork expresses aesthetic ideas, whether by Poussin or LeWitt. The distinction Costello draws between traditional and conceptual art is that the latter makes a "liminal aesthetic use of its form," whatever that means.

Carolyn Wilde ("Matter and Meaning in the Work of Art: Joseph Kosuth's One and Three Chairs") considers Kosuth's work (also mentioned by Schellekens) in which three objects are placed in close proximity: a wooden chair, a photograph of that same chair to scale, and a placard of a dictionary definition of "chair". She presents Kosuth's loopy theory (fostered by Kosuth's reading of Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic) in which realistic art -- showing "how things are" -- is a (like a?) synthetic proposition (because it says something about the world), and abstract expressionism a mere non-propositional "ejaculation" (like statements about good and bad). Works that are "statements about what art is" are analytic, and in Ayer's parlance, say nothing about how the world is. Presumably conceptual art fits into the latter category, but surely if conceptual art makes a statement about what art is, it does say something about the world, namely which things are and are not art. (I think Wilde agrees.) In any event, Wilde does not endorse Kosuth's theory, partly on ground that Wittgenstein rejected the idea that all language is supposed to convey a proposition. The closest Wilde gets to a view of her own is this:

An interest in the conditions of art is an interest not just in the forms which art can take for its own sake. It is an interest in the ways in which a work of art can articulate the many different interests and meanings which we find in the world beyond the work itself.

But then, what role does conceptual art play in these "interests"?

David Davies ("Telling Pictures: The Place of Narrative in late Modern 'Visual Art'") takes issue with the claim that traditional art is distinguished from "late modern" art in the following way. The "appreciatable properties" of a traditional artwork are grasped only in an "experiential encounter" with the work and "any properties of a work not accessible in an experiential encounter ... have no bearing on the work's artistic value." Late modern art -- Davies begins with Jackson Pollock -- is "discontinuous" with traditional art because late modern works require "an explanatory narrative" which sets out the meaning of the work; an

experiential engagement with the work, unmediated by such an explanatory narrative, is insufficient to get at the work's appreciatable properties. The rest of his paper is puzzling in so far as it focuses on narratives that can be given to "explain" various late modern works, but does not mention any examples of traditional art where "explanatory narratives" must be brought in. Why do we need an explanatory narrative to appreciate, say, Renoir's Luncheon of the Boating Party?

Peter Goldie ("Conceptual Art and Knowledge") asks, given that conceptual art does not aspire to have aesthetic value, what other kind of "artistic value" might it aspire to? Some have said "cognitive value." Goldie sets out and then attempts to rebut an argument by James Young in Art and Knowledge whose conclusion is that conceptual art has "no non-trivial cognitive value." According to Goldie, Young says that traditional artworks -- "illustrative representations" -- can yield knowledge "not by constituting arguments to a conclusion, but by showing things in the right perspective." Picasso's Guernica does not constitute an argument that the bombardment of civilians is terribly wrong; but it puts audiences in a position where they recognize the rightness of its perspective. (Aside: How are audiences supposed to know that Picasso has the "right" perspective? Certainly not merely by looking at Guernica.) "Semantic representations" -- e.g. true declarative sentences -- have no cognitive value unless supported by argument. Conceptual works that are semantic representations are not accompanied by argument, therefore have no cognitive value. Goldie, in response, points out a kind of conceptual art that yields "significant what-it-is-like knowledge." The example is a work, Space Closed by Corrugated Metal, by Santiago Sierra, which was a sort of audience-participation piece: people were invited to the opening of a gallery only to be confronted by a building closed off by corrugated iron. Those who showed up came to know what it is like to be locked out from a place where one had a right to be (anger, frustration, etc.). Goldie says this knowledge is "non-trivial," as opposed to the "trivial" knowing-what-it-is-like to have an "optical bleed" (caused by Bridget Riley's

Cataract III, staring at which leads to the experience of seeing colors not in the painting). Speaking for myself, I'd rather experience optical bleed, since I'm not familiar with it; I've already experienced anger and frustration, thank you. Goldie revisits An Oak Tree (remember that one? the glass of water claimed to be changed into an oak tree?). This is an example of a kind of work said by Young to be "discourse-dependent," which means works that "cannot be understood and do not represent, except in conjunction with what is said about them." An Oak Tree, Goldie claims, helps us to think about transubstantiation. This is cognitively valuable, not because it yields justified true belief, but because it "facilitates knowledge." So whether conceptual art has cognitive value depends on what one means by the term. Young means: justifies true belief, and an artwork can't do that. Goldie means: gets us thinking, and an artwork can do that. Of course, lots of art, conceptual and traditional, gets us thinking. Indeed, all kinds of stuff gets us thinking.

Kathleen Stock ("Sartre, Wittgenstein, and Learning from Imagination") begins by saying that "it seems plausible to claim that the imagination of the viewer is importantly involved in appreciation of [conceptual artworks]." But then we hear nothing more about conceptual artworks until the end when -- much, much later, after a complicated discussion of imagining in Sartre and Wittgenstein -- Stock arrives at the conclusion that one can, after all, learn about objects from images of them, and this conclusion "potentially deflects any concern about the role of imagining generally in understanding conceptual art." Yet we are never told what exactly the role of imagining is in understanding conceptual art except that it is "importantly involved".

Matthew Kieran ("Artistic Character, Creativity, and the Appraisal of Conceptual Art") aligns with Davies in attempting to draw similarities between traditional and conceptual art (though not the same similarities as Davies). Kieran is the more successful. We value art for the sensory experience involved and for the craft of the artist. Now conceptual art in general seems to offer deficient sensory

experiences and little in the way of craft. But, we also value art for the "creativity and imaginativeness that has gone into the work," which is why we value a painting done by a person more than its perceptually identical twin which came about by accident -- thrown by a centrifuge, say. The reason why creativity and imagination are not seen in conceptual art, Kieran observes, is that viewers look for them in the material object alone. "But if we look at Duchamp's Fountain and ask ourselves what has the artist done, it looks as if, if we're looking at the end product, the answer is nothing." So we must look to the

creative processes of thought that have gone into whatever is presented before us and why ... We evaluate such works as good or bad in terms of, amongst other things, the patterning of thought that has gone into them, their originality, subtlety, insight, wit, or daring.

But there's a gap here. If the "end product" (the conceptual art-object) shows no signs of creativity, how can we attribute creativity to the maker of that object?

Margaret Boden attempts to fill this gap. Her essay, "Creativity and Conceptual Art," applies "creativity" to ideas. "A creative idea is one that is new, surprising, and valuable" (though she sometimes speaks of events as being surprising -- e.g. the outsider winning the Derby). She distinguishes three types of creativity (borrowed from her book, *The Creative Mind*, 2004) with the goal of discovering which type is appropriate to conceptual art. "In exploratory creativity, the existing stylistic rules or conventions are used to generate novel structures (ideas) ..." But since "conceptual artists reject previously accepted styles," conceptual art is not "grounded in" exploratory creativity. "Transformational creativity" alters "some defining dimension of the style or conceptual space ... so that structures can now be generated which couldn't be generated before." Her example is Schoenberg's atonal system which "transformed the space of Western tonal music by dropping the fundamental home-key constraint." Boden straddles the fence on whether conceptual art exhibits transformational creativity. While she

says that Duchamp's Fountain did not transform sculpture (since it isn't sculpture) and that John Cage's 4'33' (4'33' of silence) did not transform music (since it isn't music), she admits that such works have transformed the concept of art.

"Combinatorial creativity involves the generation of unfamiliar (and interesting) combinations of familiar ideas." While this is Boden's definition, it seems to overlap too much with exploratory creativity. She might better have defined combinatorial creativity as substituting its denial for a familiar idea. Her examples of combinatorial creativity come in a list whose form is instead of this familiar idea, its denial: "Instead of personal making, execution by the hands of others ... Instead of physicality, absence ... Instead of sound, silence ..." Of course, as Boden would insist, these denials must prove interesting. (Kant, in his third Critique, tells us that the genius produces original works but not "original nonsense.") I think Boden is on the right track, but I'm not convinced there is real distinction between transformational and combinatorial creativity. Certainly some of the achievements of modernism can be described as a denial of a familiar idea: instead of tonality in music, atonality (Schoenberg); instead of a sense of depth in painting, flatness (Pollock); instead of narrative ballet, abstract movements (Cunningham). One of the benefits of, well, combining combinatorial with transformational creativity is that conceptual art will exhibit the same sort of creativity as non-conceptual modernist works. (At least, I think that's a benefit.)

Dominic McIver Lopes ("Conceptual Art Is Not What It Seems") undertakes to explain the "appreciative failure" audiences exhibit towards conceptual art. Some think that conceptual art befuddles its audience because it demands they give up on traditional definitions of art. "The trouble," McIver Lopes says, "is that there is plenty of evidence that we are not committed to traditional definitions of art." For example, abstract paintings have "gained a relatively wide audience," yet "do not as a rule induce appreciative failure." The appreciative failure to which conceptual art is especially prone is to be explained by our commitment to a "folk ontology" of art. However, I'm left at a bit of a loss as to what this folk ontology is. McIver Lopes

implies that it is an ontology of external things with relatively well-established functions: "Objects are available for looking at, sonic events for listening to, and stories for imagining." But then, could not conceptual art be fitted into this ontology? They would be objects (in a broad sense) for thus-and-such response on our part -- and here we would need to describe the response. Surely this folk ontology accommodates such objects-verging-on-abstraction as literature and music. Why not conceptual art? McIver Lopes suggests that the difficulty with conceptual art arises when we take its instances to be "plastic art" (pictures or sculptures) when they aren't. He calls this "the art-form hypothesis" (for explaining the lack of appreciation of conceptual art), but I'm unclear whether the art-form hypothesis is a special case of the "ontological hypothesis" (according to which conceptual art butts heads against some alleged folk ontology of art) or whether the art-form hypothesis is a separate thing. It probably doesn't matter. When new art-forms appear, they do not necessarily induce appreciative failure. Photography is not painting and movies are not plays; but their initial audiences did not thereby experience appreciative failure. Why then is conceptual art met with appreciative failure? I would say it's not because we mistakenly take conceptual artworks to be paintings or sculptures when they are not; rather, it's because we don't know how to take them. The problem is to give audiences some directions for responding to conceptual art. But McIver Lopes declines. "The question cannot be given a philosophical answer."

The book ends with a discussion by Michael Baldwin, Charles Harrison, and Mel Ramsden, members of Art & Language, "a collective of British artists founded in the middle of the 1960s." By and large, this is a sophisticated, witty, and at times cutting history of how conceptual art came to be. I'll point out one interesting distinction drawn "between conceptual art thought of on the one hand as a kind of Duchampian extension of minimalism occasionally outside the realm of middle-sized dry goods, and on the other as a fundamentally textual cultural practice." As for text-like conceptual art, Harrison has this to say. Suppose someone declares

that everything perceived by his senses but not noted by his conscious mind during his trip to Baltimore is his work of art. "What do you mean?" we ask him.

The 'What do you mean?' is supposed by the artist and his admirers not actually to impinge on the assertion. To treat that assertion as a speech act -- or its textual equivalent -- is to commit a kind of foul. It seems nevertheless necessary to treat it as the speech act it actually is. But to do this is to impede it. What we had in mind was a kind of text in which the interrogative is included along with the appropriative claim -- and one which would therefore be an object of a quite different order. The consequence was considerably to increase the detail of the appropriative gesture -- the theoretical content that it wore on its face.

Well, no wonder conceptual art suffers from appreciative failure!

At this point, I think we could all do with a re-reading of the chapters on art as metaphor in Arthur Danto's [Transfiguration of the Commonplace](#).

Reviewed by Robert J. Yanal, Wayne State University <>

Lawrence Weiner in Conversation with Robert Storr

Lawrence Weiner, b. 1942, Bronx, New York; lives and works in New York and Amsterdam

Edited transcript from a previously unpublished public conversation between the artist and Robert Storr held on 13 January 2009 at the 92nd Street Y, New York as part of the Artists' Visions, Conversations Series Program. The audio recording was provided courtesy of the 92nd Street Y Archives, New York, NY.



Lawrence Weiner, 2013
Artwork © Lawrence Weiner. Photo: Alyssa Gorelick

robert storr Through sculptural works that are made in the medium of "language + the materials referred to", as you describe it, and presented through a system of typefaces and colors applied on the wall with paint or vinyl-cut letters, you address the many ways in which art can infiltrate daily experience, public experience, private experience. Backstage we were discussing how hostile the initial reception to your art was. Could you talk about how it was to be in a place where there was no guaranteed audience?

lawrence weiner To answer, let me put it into another context. How did it happen that a group of artists during the 1960s in California, in New York, in Paris, in Tokyo and throughout the world began to have a change of thought of what the concept of art was possible to be, and how did it happen that the audience of art became the society itself? Yes, there was indeed basic resistance. There still is to a lot of things. And for some strange reason this happened all at the same time, so nobody was basically influencing anybody else. [Harald] Szeeman's show *When Attitude Becomes Form* was later on, in 1969. Almost everybody knew what everybody else did. But the press was half and half. They got violent, but one has to remember that it was a violent time. This kind of work was against everything they believed in art. That gave you a little bit of hope, at least, that what you were saying was understood.

rs Recently there has been so much discussion about globalization, but when you were starting out there was cosmopolitanism and internationalism.

lw Yes, indeed. I make work that is a specific object but has no specific form, and it changes its form based on the specific situation or context.

rs Do you keep assiduous records of all the different incarnations that a work has had until a certain point, and do you think about how it might develop further as you go along?

lw I pay a lot of attention, but I only keep records of who accepts responsibility for the work. I don't keep records of my drawings. They are like messages in a bottle.

rs Language is a very important element in your work and a lot of translations have been done in relation to your pieces. What do you think of the act of translation and how much control do you exercise over it? How much do the slippages that occur between languages become part of your thinking?

lw I am involved with material objects and they translate pretty easily, in general. There are slippages and also cultural specificities but usually it is quite an easy process.

rs Were you interested in linguistic theory per se at the beginning of this process or since, or is that, in a sense, a separate territory?

lw That's a separate territory – it's just the acquisition of skills. I was more interested in the possibilities opened up by the discourse between [Noam] Chomsky and [Jean] Piaget. You know, when I was doing the last drawings for the retrospective of my work at the Whitney [Museum of American Art]¹ I found myself almost writing in red letters on the drawing, "The public is not stupid." The public doesn't require signage telling them what to do with the work. Also, a wonderful thing about art is that it doesn't require a hierarchy to exist. When you put art out in the street without explanation, the majority of people figure out that it's art! That happens because art invites such an immediate response. They might not like it but they know it's art.

rs And they puzzle over it.

lw Yes, they do. Art that doesn't have a metaphor allows itself to enter into the culture.

rs A lot of text-based work that has been done is very declarative and, to a degree, confrontational. Is yours an entirely different approach to putting words in public places?

lw I go back to the Jean-Paul Sartre problem: how do you differentiate what your responsibilities as a human being, and what your responsibilities as an artist are? Art has no value structure. Being on the barricade is a lot different than talking of being on the barricade.

rs You have produced work in a wide range of cultural systems and geographical locations. In Vienna there is an amazing piece that you did. In the middle of the city there are massive concrete structures – flak towers – built by the Nazis as anti-aircraft gun positions during World War II, and they are uncanny places. You made a piece in 1991 on the top of one of those towers² where the text read, "Smashed to Pieces in the Still of the Night." Can you talk about this text appearing in the middle of a city with deep memories of the war and the Holocaust? That certainly is a public statement about a public reality, but it is not a sociological, or overtly ideological, or political statement.

lw Yes. It was more of an observation. I wandered at night in the city and I could hear beer bottles being broken. It's a very different sound than that of bottles broken during the day and, to me, that's a sculptural phenomenon in itself. In fact the work is all about the difference of material objects in the day and at night because there is a different sound structure. And sound is a legitimate sculptural form. It just, by chance, turns out to go along with my politics. [both laugh]

rs The context does make a difference. You did a project for the Venice Biennale that I directed in 2007. A fantastic word-based piece that appeared on the facade of a Mussolini-era building and it spoke of changes in materials.³

lw Of loss of inherent dignity of the materials.

rs Putting that kind of text about the dignity and transformative nature of materials on a building that is all about the frozenness of an esthetic idea is implicitly a critique of the neoclassical style that Mussolini promoted. At least I understood it as that. To what degree do you see architectural situations or social situations as foils to work with or around?

lw What if that work, that I was very pleased to do, was really about the loss of inherent dignity of materials? It just happened to be on a Mussolini building and, happily, it meant that Mussolini didn't win. But it's true that the work itself does give some form of hope esthetically. By being exposed, the work brings about a conversation. I believe that if a work of art does not represent a cultural structure, then it really can present itself as itself. Art is made by one human being for other human beings. With my art, I'd like to set up ways that people can see an object, relate to it, and use it in a way that had not entered into whatever cultural structure was standing in at the moment. You know, I think of everything in very material terms. That's why people discussing Conceptual art would say, "Yes, he's in, but he's a materialist." For example, I love graphite and the whole point of putting a graphite line on a piece of paper is that you are attempting to stop entropy because graphite slows down the flow of neutrons going across the page. And that page will age less than a paper without a drawing on it. In fact they use graphite for nuclear reactors for that property.

You know, someone asked me recently to give a quote for a magazine about what being contemporary is, and so I thought about it. For me, it's the ability to forego the comfort of *déjà vu*: you can know something, but you don't always have to put yourself back into a place where you knew what was happening and what is happening. Because, in fact, the minute you do, you give up the reasons for somebody to put a work in a space for you to look at. That's why I like to go into exhibitions that I am a bit confused by. That's what art is about. It's about presenting something that is looking for a function, for a place to be. For me art is just another means that people use to understand

their relationship to the objective material world that they live in.

rs I don't think I've seen any exhibition at the Whitney that looked as good as the retrospective that you did; the way in which it unfolded and the way in which the whole ensemble worked, not just individual pieces, was exceptional. I wonder if you could talk about making exhibitions or dealing with an ensemble of works like that. In that exhibition what the work was and what the presentation was, were completely of a piece.

lw Thank you. That's what I tried to do. Usually in gallery situations there are less restrictions than in museum situations. At the Whitney the curatorial staff and the installation staff allowed me to build a structure that, at the same time, had an openness. As far as the content goes, maybe there was a reason for the work to be shown at that particular moment. For me, the designing and building of an installation is like putting together a movie.

rs You've been living between New York and Amsterdam for a very long time, while traveling around the world to make your projects. Can you talk about how that came to be and what it is like to have this transatlantic reality?

lw It's been less and less a New York /Amsterdam life in the last couple of years because I've been on the road so much. I was interested in the idea of the Old World and the New World. My daughter was there, and I was working in Europe as much as I was in the States, so it made sense to do that. I liked Holland and still do, even if I don't agree with its politics right now – I am rather disappointed. But I think everybody in the world can say that about their country right this moment. It's a very disappointing time. All that attracted me in Holland – its sense of design, its sense of dignity – has been pushed aside to become so-called "modern."

rs You just finished making a film and you made films in the past. Can you talk a little bit about the earlier projects and then about this one?

lw The purpose of making a film is to be able to take the concepts and inter-relationships of human beings and objects and build your own *mise en scène*. You're building your own museum. You have

complete control. I had made a porn movie in 1976 [A Bit of Matter and a Little Bit More] for the Kitchen [New York], but there was heavy censorship at the time and the structure backed down and decided not to show it. Recently, censorship has started quite heavily all over the world. The Swiss Institute asked me to make another porn movie. And it seemed to work. It's called WATER IN MILK EXISTS (2008). I am very pleased, but I don't think it's a new career. [both laugh]

1. Lawrence Weiner: As Far as the Eye Can See, Whitney Museum of American Art, New York, 15 November 2007 – 10 February 2008.

2. Today the building Haus des Meeres (House of the Sea) houses a public aquarium, Esterhazy Park, in the central Mariahilf district.

3. The main text in the piece reads: "Matter so shaken to its core to lead to a change in inherent form to the extent of bringing about a change in the destiny of the material."



Flakturm im Esterházypark. Topographie Wiener Festwochen, Vienna, 1991



Lawrence Weiner

SMASHED TO PIECES (IN THE STILL OF THE NIGHT), 1991

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[Sprezzatura: Concealing the Effort of Art from Aristotle to Duchamp](#) by Paolo D'Angelo [Columbia Themes in Philosophy, Social Criticism, and the Arts, Columbia University Press, 9780231175821]

"The essence of art is to conceal art. A dancer or musician does not only need to perform with ability. There should also be a lack of visible effort that gives an impression of naturalness. To disguise technique and feign ease is to heighten beauty. To express this notion, Italian has a word with no exact equivalent in other languages, *sprezzatura*: a kind of unaffectedness or nonchalance.

"In this book, the first to consider *sprezzatura* in its own right, philosopher of art Paolo D'Angelo reconstructs the history of concealing art, from ancient rhetoric to our own times. The word

sprezzatura was coined in 1528 by Baldassarre Castiglione in *The Book of the Courtier* to mean a kind of grace with a special essence: the ability to conceal art. But the idea reaches back to Aristotle and Cicero and forward to avant-garde works such as Duchamp's ready-mades, all of which share the suspicion of the overt display of skill. The precept that art must be hidden turns up in a number of fields, from cosmetics to interior design, politics to poetry, the English garden to shabby chic. Through exploring different articulations of this idea, D'Angelo shows the paradox of aesthetics: art hides that it is art, but in doing so it reveals itself to be art and becomes an assertion about art. When art is concealed, it appears as spontaneous as nature—yet, paradoxically, also reveals its indebtedness to technique. An erudite and surprising tour through aesthetics, philosophy, and art history, *Sprezzatura* presents a strikingly original argument with deceptive ease.”

Excerpt:

Concealment

We might begin with a dive from a springboard.

What makes a dive a beautiful dive? What is it that, in competitions, ensures that a dive gets a high score? Let us look for an explanation in the words of a writer who, in his early years, was an excellent diver as well. In *Letteratura e salti mortali*, Raffaele La Capria argues that for a dive to be a beautiful dive, one that is to be appreciated by the judges, it is necessary, of course, that the figure is perfect in the approach, as much in the flight as in the entry. Woe if the body is disorganized, woe if some part of it is not perfectly aligned! The diver's jump from the springboard must be the highest possible, the flight must be graceful, and the entry must be smooth, plowing through the water surface with the proper grade. Almost every dive, at least in competitions, is a somersault, and requires not only athleticism and training but also self-control, courage, and concentration. Each dive is a tour de force, a display of skill, determination, and strength. But all of this is still not enough to make a dive beautiful. What must be present is a peculiarity, a feature that is at the same time the most indefinite, the least definable, and the most

elusive. It is above all to this peculiarity that La Capria wants to draw our attention, and his entire discourse is aimed at its characterization. In his words, "Thus a dive is a tour de force ... but it must possess a quality if it is to be a beautiful dive: it must be performed, regardless of its difficulty level, with *souplesse*, as my trainer used to say, or sweetness, as I felt it, and grace. Without effort or, if the effort is present, it must remain unseen. The dive must be performed with the same smile Flo Griffith had while running the hundred-meter final, a smile that she showed in the last thirty meters and that for me was one of the most unforgettable things of the 1988 Olympic Games.

Obviously, this kind of observation is not only made in the context of dives. We refer to a similar, even identical, principle when we think about public behavior. We think that truly refined conduct consists of an unforced ease, a kind of effortlessness and spontaneity of manners, and an absolutely nonrigid respect of conventions, always ready to bend according to opportunity, situations, and circumstances. When remembering the industrialist Gianni Agnelli on the first anniversary of his death, Sergio Romano cited exactly this ability to conceal his own talent as one of the primary traits of the man who, for decades, embodied the icon of grand seigneur for all Italians. Romano writes that Agnelli played this role, or, better, his various roles of businessman, Italy's "ambassador" abroad, and political compass, with nimbleness and distance, that is, with an ability to conceal his own commitment and give the impression that what he did, he did effortlessly without being over-engaged.

Similarly, in interior design there is a particular kind of care that consists of an apparent carelessness, a shabby elegance, that shows itself when, as Alvar González-Palacios points out, "elegance is imposed by chance, and, despite it perhaps being formal in tone, it can at the same time reflect a sort of indifference to details, producing what is called 'shabby chic.' This is a particular kind of chic, made up of exquisite objects and torn sofas, loose and over-washed covers, stained or faded lampshades,

an unaffectedness resulting from the use and abuse of inventiveness.

But the field in which it is most natural for us to point to the ability to dissimulate one's own mastery, and to spurn affectation, is that of the arts. That art has to be concealed represents for us an understanding and depiction of art that became prevalent in contemporary culture, that is, art as fine and great art. A diver is not the only one who must dissimulate effort and struggle. This kind of dissimulation is required of a dancer as well: it is not good if her face shows a grimace from fatigue or pain, as everything must appear effortlessly, lightly, smoothly, and naturally performed. And we could say the same about a painter, a writer, or a poet. No wonder Raffaele La Capria's book is titled *Letteratura e salti mortali* (Literature and Somersaults): the point of his argument is that, just as dives must be performed with an apparent ease, so in literary works the effort, the quest for effect, and the display of skills must remain unseen. Referring to the amount and kind of work that is required to complete a musical or literary piece, Thomas Mann wrote in *Doktor Faustus*: "The appearance of art is thrown off. At last art always throws off the appearance of art." Facilement, facilement, Frederic Chopin is said to have instructed his students when they sat at the piano, even when they were about to play extremely difficult pieces. Those who, in art, grow excited about the overcoming of difficulties, technical skills, or the ostentation of abilities—as happens with virtuosity, a phenomenon typical, though not exclusive, of musical performance—end up mistaking the artist for the tightrope walker. They would underappreciate form in their (always quite obtuse) admiration of the crafty ability of execution. This kind of wonder is hopelessly naïve, and pertains to simpletons and children, who, as we learned in a recent study, are indeed unable to appreciate art that conceals its sophistication behind an apparent simplicity, and are much more disposed to value what is patently complex, is duly executed, and manifests the exercise of skills.

In order to express this kind of naturalness, which is not a gift from nature but the result of serious

study, and to illustrate the necessity that art, skills, and mastery remain concealed and not be shown off boastfully, the Italian language has a beautiful and ancient word, one of those words that makes a language unique: *sprezzatura*. In its original meaning, which is the one that interests us, this word is not related to scorn or disdain (even if it is sometimes used precisely in this sense). Rather, since it is etymologically connected with disregard and heedlessness, we should bear in mind expressions such as "heedless of danger": one is heedless of art, ability, and ostentation, just as she is heedless of a dangerous situation, that is, she is not ignoring the situation but preventing it from making her behave rigidly or with apprehension. The connection to disregard—a connection that creates difficulty in the very translation of the word—becomes clear if we take a look at some of its lexical variations. For example, in his *Letters from Virgil*, Saverio Bettinelli (in the middle of the eighteenth century) compares two poets, one of them, "because of an unknown harshness and violence impressed to his verses, seemed somewhat gaining in force and gravity," while the other could benefit from "a certain heedlessness [*sprezzatura*], simple and gracious in appearance." Bettinelli concludes, "in the former one could sense too much of the struggle and study, while in the latter appreciate too little of it."

But, one might ask, what is *sprezzatura* if not disregard? Giacomo Leopardi talks about it as "negligence, certainty, carelessness, and I would even say ignorant confidence." In his *Dizionario*, Niccolò Tommaseo defined it as a "manner of doing and talking that appears to be neglectful, but that often consists in masterly ease." The *Great Italian Dictionary* by Salvatore Battaglia refers to it as an "intentional carelessness, more apparent than real, that gives naturalness and spontaneity to a literary work or a style, and also a kind of elegance that is perceived as much more refined as it is artificial and studied." Cristina Campo warns us against the danger posed by apparent synonymies:

[What could be called its] "sister word," namely, elegance, doesn't acknowledge *sprezzatura*'s creative quality, its fresh

communicative flame; manner restricts it in the domain of deliberation; ease dissolves it in gestures. Carelessness is more similar, but it fills up only sprezzatura's hollow, negative, and thus temporary shape. Sprezzatura is actually an overall moral stance that, just like the very word, needs a context that is nearly lost today, and that, again like the word, is in danger of fading away together with it.

Like many other words, this subtle and intense word was not anonymously born to the language. There was a time in which it was considered a neologism, a creation of a single author's mind. And it is precisely as a neologism that Baldassarre Castiglione, who invented or used it for the first time in his famous *Courtier*, presented it. "And, to use possibly a new word, to practise in everything a certain 'nonchalance' [sprezzatura] that shall conceal art and show that what is done and said is done without effort and almost without thought." Let's try then, as Cristina Campo suggests, to reconstruct the context of the term sprezzatura within the literary work in which it first appeared.

The context is the first book of the *Courtier*, nearly at the beginning of the dialogue. The chosen company of gentlemen and ladies gathered at the Palazzo Ducale in Urbino begins to play the "game" of "portraying a perfect courtier." They only had time to discuss the equestrian and military exercises that should be expected of the perfect courtier, and to enumerate some of the physical and moral qualities he should possess. Nonetheless, they immediately realized that these qualities are nearly worthless if not accompanied by a particular kind of constraint, a quality of a different order. This quality, which must permeate all the others, since in a sense it is a prerequisite for them, had been given a familiar and ancient name, namely, grace. But even if in this case the name is ancient ("grace" stands for the Greek *charis*, the Latin *gratia* or *venustas*), its meaning is not obvious or unequivocal at all. Rather, grace in behavior seems to be something as mysterious and indefinable as the homonymous grace in the theological sense of the particular kind of benevolence and help that God concedes—or doesn't concede—to human beings according to his

unfathomable plan. At the very beginning of the *Courtier* grace is considered in this way as well, that is, as an innate quality, resulting from an inexplicable gift, something intended to remain cryptic and indefinable or something that can be defined only in a tautological way. "From the very force of the word, it may be said that he who has grace finds grace." But a *distinguo* (distinction) is drawn immediately afterward. While it is very true that for many grace is a natural gift rather than an ability that could be acquired by learning, for others, I mean for those who aren't blessed with it and thus have to acquire it, is there a way to learn to be graceful at all? Count Ludovicus's answer represents a fine rhetorical masterpiece. At first, he hedges a bit: "I am not bound to teach you how to become graceful, or anything else; but only to show you what manner of man a perfect courtier ought to be." Knowing how to define the qualities of a perfect courtier doesn't necessarily imply that one knows how to teach someone to acquire these qualities. But, "although it is almost a proverb that grace is not to be learned" (the count can admit that), to some extent at least it can be acquired from study and exercise, and he can even give a universal rule for grace:

But having before now often considered whence this grace springs, laying aside those men who have it by nature, I find one universal rule concerning it, which seems to me worth more in this matter than any other in all things human that are done or said: and that is to avoid affectation to the uttermost and as it were a very sharp and dangerous rock; and, to use possibly a new word, to practice in everything a certain nonchalance [sprezzatura] that shall conceal design and show that what is done and said is done without effort and almost without thought. From this I believe grace is in large measure derived, because everyone knows the difficulty of those things that are rare and well done, and therefore facility in them excites the highest admiration; while on the other hand, to strive and as the saying is to drag by the hair, is extremely ungraceful, and makes us esteem everything slightly, however great it be. Accordingly we may

affirm that to be true art which does not appear to be art; nor to anything must we give greater care than to conceal art, for if it is discovered, it quite destroys our credit and brings us into small esteem.

Grace and sprezzatura. The first term, as discussed, has a long history, and should be thought of in relation to the concept of beauty. If through the centuries beauty has been identified with order, measures, proportions, and hence with relations and rules that can be expressed numerically (think, for example, of Polykleitos's canon and its implementations in Vitruvius's works, which found so many applications in the course of history), the latter, sprezzatura, expresses the fascination and splendor that emanate from beauty. This term lends credence to the idea that the appeal of beauty cannot be fully explained through proportional relations, order, and unity. Indeed, it is the case that even out-of-proportion or irregular things might well be appreciated, while, on the other hand, there are regular and proportioned things that might not, as Catullus knew only too well when he said, comparing Quinzia with Lesbia, that the former has many perfections, but not true beauty, because she has nulla venustas, that is, no grace. Pliny the Elder, in glorifying the art of the renowned ancient painter Apelles, writes that he surpassed all the painters that preceded and all who were to come after him.... His art was unrivalled for graceful charm, although other very great painters were his contemporaries. Although he admired their works and gave high praise to all of them, he used to say that they lacked the glamour that his work possessed, the quality denoted by the Greek word *charis* [Latin *gratia*]; and that although they had every other merit, in that alone no one was his rival.

In the Italian Cinquecento, and thanks to Castiglione's work, grace plays a prominent role in the aesthetic discourse. Sometimes it has been understood as the distinctive trait of spiritual beauty as opposed to physical beauty, as in the work of Mario Equicola, Judah Leon Abravanel (Leo the Hebrew), and Benedetto Varchi; sometimes, as in Agostino Nifo, it is at once physical and spiritual, or, as in Vincenzo Danti, it derives

from the "internal parts" of physical beauty itself. Even if grace has often been distinguished from beauty, it was not always in opposition to it, and at times it appeared as the expression, the revelation, or the very effect of beauty, as in Giovanni della Casa's *Galateo*. But some (Agnolo Firenzuola in his *Discorsi della bellezza delle Donne* being a case in point) emphasize the mysterious character of grace as opposed to beauty's predictability and quasi-numerability, hence defining grace through a locution that, despite its vagueness, is fated to have a unique legacy: *un non so che* (a certain something).

Despite a comprehensive investigation of the role of the notion of grace from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth, it still remains among the desiderata of the history of aesthetic ideas.

I won't be dealing with this concept here. Nor will I discuss those positions that declare that grace has an indefinable nature. Rather, I am interested precisely in the paradoxical definition of grace proposed in the *Courtier*, which identifies it with the principle of art concealing art, hence capturing the very essence and function of sprezzatura. Now, is this principle a novelty as well, just like the word chosen for it by Castiglione? Or does it have a long history? And, moreover, did it leave a legacy in the subsequent centuries? Will it become a motto that summarizes important reflections, or is it rather just an isolated boutade? Even at a quick glance, it seems highly probable that the *Courtier* represents an excellent starting point for tracing the subsequent history of the principle of *artem celare* [art concealment]. It is quite well known, and had a strong influence in Italy and a large circulation in Spain, France, England, and the German-speaking countries.

Due to this we can be almost certain that both sprezzatura and art concealing entered the larger European aesthetic debate as well. Castilian, French, German, and Latin translations immediately faced the difficulty of how to use the word sprezzatura. French is perhaps the language with the closest word: nonchalance. When "translating" the *Courtier* into modern Italian, Aldo Busi and Carmen Covito use precisely that French

expression: "I could exhume an old neologism and say sprezzatura, or I could use a foreign word and say nonchalance, but if the purists get itchy, I would rather say a certain ease ." Nonchalance is quite a good option, because it expresses the sense of a self-assured carelessness, even though it leaves out the heedlessness (*sprezzo* in Italian) of danger; in Singleton's modern English translation the term is not translated and the French equivalent, nonchalance, is in brackets. In any event, nonchalance is better than *mépris* (or *mesprison*), which expresses too much contempt, but nonetheless can be found in sixteenth-century translations, as well as in some modern ones. The French *dédain* (English disdain, but *sprezzatura* is not disdain) is even more inappropriate, while *négligence* only partially conveys the concept (*sprezzatura* is negligence, but a paradoxical diligent negligence, or a negligent diligence).

The misleading term *deprecio* (contempt) has been mostly used in Castilian, while in other cases the antonyms *affettazione* and *sprezzatura* are rendered with the opposition *cuidado* and *descuido*. *Verachtung* (contempt) is again the choice of the second of the two sixteenth-century German translators, namely, Noyse, while the first translator, Kratzer, uses *Unachtsamkeit*, which is a little more accurate but still expressive only of *sprezzatura*'s sense of inattention, and not its stress on simulation. English has many possibilities, and almost all of them have been employed. Modern versions use, for the most part, the terms carelessness and effortlessness, or, as we have seen, the French nonchalance. Negligence is also a possible choice even if, as always, it misses the paradoxical sense of care and attention required by *sprezzatura*'s particular kind of negligence. In his seminal translation, which indeed was the first English one, in order to say that the courtier has to exhibit an unconcerned behavior, Sir Thomas Toby put aside all these possibilities and opted for the term *disgracing*, although at times he preferred *recklessness* (*reckless* being a synonym of *careless*). However, both terms have been judged "lexically and culturally" inadequate.

In Italy, it took time for the term *sprezzatura* to get some currency. While today it is almost unanimously considered one of the pivotal concepts in the *Courtier*, still drawing attention from scholars, in 1562 Lodovico Dolce didn't deem it worthy of appearing in his *Table of the Most Important Contents and Maxims in the Courtier*. But, if not the word, the theme of *artem celare* reverberated immediately in the literature on manners and behavior. Alessandro Piccolomini's *Raffaella*, a dialogue dedicated to female education and behavior printed in 1539, reflected the *Courtier* almost literally:

In brief it will avail her much to strive that in all things she leaves not the middle way and eschews all affectation the most she may. To cleanse and attire oneself openly in the house and that in the presence of others is to show a certain contempt and lack of thought for what is done whether for adornment or other cause, which I know not how to describe to you otherwise. Yet in this, also act with judgment, for to go carelessly in all would be perchance a fault no less than to go affectedly.

And, in turn, a few decades later, Stefano Guazzo's *Civil Conversazione*, another very influential handbook on public behavior, opens with an indirect but explicit quotation of Castiglione's aforementioned passage: "In this Discourse you have not in the least deviated from the Character of a perfect Courtier, whose Excellence it is, to do all Things with such an early Grace, that tho' what he does, seems merely casual and by Accident, yet it is really the Effect of the most skillful Judgment."

These are just two among many possible examples, but I believe they are sufficient to persuade the reader that most occurrences of the principle of *ars est celare artem* that we shall encounter in the following chapters when addressing eighteenth- and nineteenth-century authors can be traced back, in one way or another, to the *Courtier* passage with which we began. Less evident, though, yet still true, is that this passage can also function as an excellent starting point for tracing backward the history of the principle. I am not interested in pointing out that it is obviously possible to find some close antecedent of the principle. One

example is the *De iciarchia*, a text written by Leon Battista Alberti in his last days, in which he addresses, in addition to government, individual conduct. There is a passage of the text that Ettore Bonora once identified as one of the forerunners of Castiglione's *sprezzatura*:

There are things in which a man must give all of his spirit, and diligence, and be totally committed in order to do them well. And it seems that doing them well means here to present oneself with simple modesty and refined attitude, so that those things would delight the observer. Such things are horse riding, dancing, walking, and the like. But in doing them, one must above all moderate gestures and facial expressions, movements and bodily figure as carefully as he can and with the most disciplined art, so that nothing appears to be done with planned craftiness, so that the observer would read this skill as a natural gift.

Rather, I am interested in highlighting a less predictable circumstance, and that is the fact that in the text, Castiglione himself makes two references, and gives many hints, that disclose an entire prehistory of the idea of *artem celare*. Right after the passages about *sprezzatura* and art concealing, the Courtier's speaker says: "And I remember having once read that there were several very excellent orators of antiquity, who among their other devices strove to make everyone believe that they had no knowledge of letters; and hiding their knowledge they pretended that their orations were composed very simply and as if springing from nature and truth rather than from study and art; which, if it had been detected, would have made men wary of being duped." And then he adds: "It is said also to have been proverbial among some very excellent painters of antiquity, that over diligence is harmful, and Protogenes is said to have been censured by Apelles because he did not know when to take his hand from the tablet." These quotations represent two possible directions for our research: the latter encourages us to investigate the theory of figurative arts, while the former addresses ancient rhetoric. Let's start with rhetoric.

[Raymond Jonson and the Spiritual in Modernist and Abstract Painting](#) by Herbert R. Hartel, Jr.
[Routledge, 9781138712546]

This is the most thorough and detailed monograph on the artwork of Raymond Jonson. He is one of many artists of the first half of the twentieth-century who demonstrate the richness and diversity of an under-appreciated period in the history of American art. Visualizing the spiritual was one of the fundamental goals of early abstract painting in the years before and during World War I. Artists turned to alternative spirituality, the occult, and mysticism, believing that the pure use of line, shape, color, light and texture could convey spiritual insight. Jonson was steadfastly dedicated to this goal for most of his career and he always believed that modernist and abstract styles were the most effective and compelling means of achieving it.

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Excerpt: Reconsidering the Canonical in American Art History and the Spiritual in American Modernist Painting

Raymond Jonson (1891-1982) is one of many American artists of the first half of the twentieth century who demonstrate the richness and diversity of a highly neglected and under-appreciated period in the history of the visual arts in the United States. As more scholars, dealers, and collectors have explored American painting over the past sixty years, the period between Impressionism and Abstract Expressionism remains comparatively overlooked and obscure. Most of the attention that has been given to this period has focused on artists who worked in figurative and representational styles, on artists who are associated with the Ash-Can School, American Scene Painting, Regionalism, and Social Realism. Today, Edward Hopper, Grant Wood, Thomas Hart Benton, and Jacob Lawrence are famous, and rightfully so. However, with the exception of a few modernists such as Georgia O'Keeffe, Arthur Dove, Marsden Hartley, and Stuart Davis, many important and talented pioneers of modernism in the United States remain obscure figures in the history of American art. Consequently, early modernist art in the United States is still rather nebulous, and post-World War II developments seem to have few domestic precedents. There were many great American artists working in Expressionist, Cubist, abstract, and Surrealist styles who never received the critical and scholarly attention they deserved and whose work remains overlooked, under-valued and little-studied. Raymond Jonson is one of these artists. His time has come, and it is long overdue.

My initial interest in Jonson exemplifies how this branch of American art has gradually emerged from the shadows of art history over the years. I first heard of Raymond Jonson in 1990, when I was an undergraduate. The occasion was the surprising sale of his seminal painting *Composition Five—Wind* at auction at Skinner's in Boston. The painting sold for \$70,000, more than ten times the high estimate, and smashed all previous sales records for the artist. This was such a surprise for the art market at the time, which was cooling off from the

very heated 1980s, that the event was reported in numerous art magazines, which is where I learned about it. This was the first time I ever heard of Jonson or saw a painting by him, and I was intrigued by this American modernist who was so skillful, innovative and creative and yet so different from what I knew of American art of the 1920s, which meant O'Keeffe, Davis, and Hopper. As a doctoral student I remained interested in Jonson and I took course on American art of the 1930s taught by Professor Marlene S. Park, which included a week devoted to the abstract painters of the period. This rekindled my interest in Jonson and the Transcendental Painting Group and eventually led to a fruitful topic for my dissertation under Marlene's guidance. The rest is history ... American art history.

Visualizing and expressing the spiritual was one of the fundamental goals of early abstract painting in the years before and during World War I; it was basic to Wassily Kandinsky, Franz Marc, Frantisek Kupka, Kasimir Malevich, Piet Mondrian, and others. It was also important to nearly contemporaneous modernists who pioneered abstraction in the United States such as Arthur Dove, Marsden Hartley, Georgia O'Keeffe, and Agnes Pelton. These artists had concluded that traditional representational painting and images and subjects taken from Christianity and other mainstream religious beliefs were no longer effective or persuasive in the modern world, that life today needed new ways to connect to the spiritual and the divine. They turned to alternative spirituality, the occult and mysticism, to Theosophy, the fourth dimension, Rosicrucianism, and Swedenborgianism. They believed that the pure use of line, shape, color, light and texture could evoke, express, and convey spiritual insights, feelings, understanding, and states of being. Jonson was steadfastly dedicated to this goal for most of his career and he always believed that modernist and abstract styles were the most effective and compelling means of achieving it. Kandinsky was the most important artist for him in trying to convey the spiritual through abstraction. He became fascinated with Kandinsky in 1921, and he

remained a great source of inspiration and guidance for the rest of his life.

Fierce independence, self-reliant individuality, unwavering dedication to the cause of modern art, and uninhibited creativity made Jonson not only a great modernist but a truly American one. His biography is also quintessentially American. Jonson was born in 1891 in Iowa to Swedish immigrants and, as the son of an itinerant Baptist minister, grew up all over the West before his family settled in Portland, Oregon, when he was eleven. He lived in Chicago from 1910 to 1924, where he first went to study commercial art but quickly realized that pure art, and modernist art at that, was his calling. In these early years, he mastered the craft of painting, studied modern art from Europe and the United States at various exhibitions and collections and early books on the subject, and advocated the cause of modernism in the Midwest for himself and his artist-friends. He was also active in stage set design, lighting, and illustrations for posters and brochures for the Chicago Little Theatre and other theater companies. The Chicago Little Theatre was one of the most important theater companies in the simple-stage movement of the early-twentieth century in Europe and the United States.' Thus, Jonson was avant-garde in theater art and design before he was avant-garde in painting. Jonson explored Symbolism, Fauvism, Expressionism, and Cubism in his many portraits, landscapes, and figurative narratives done during his years in Chicago. Jonson and his wife Vera moved to Santa Fe in 1924 to escape the problems of modern urban life, and they lived in New Mexico for the rest of their lives. Jonson's painting rapidly matured and become fully modernist around the time that he relocated to New Mexico, and this is evident in his paintings from the mid-1920s, in particular his Seasons, Compositions, and Earth Rhythms series. Thus, he was one of the first modernist painters to settle permanently in New Mexico and one of the first whose modernist sensibilities were profoundly and directly influenced by the landscape and light of the American Southwest. In 1929, he gave up landscape painting almost completely to pursue colorful, dynamic, abstracted paintings of subjects as varied and seemingly mundane as numerals,

alphabet letters, colors, the cosmos, plants and trees, and the sciences. In the 1930s, he explored pure abstraction with increasing frequency until he achieved a profound stylistic breakthrough in 1938 that resulted from his study of the highly geometric Bauhaus paintings of Kandinsky and László Moholy-Nagy and Kandinsky's writings and theories as espoused in *Concerning the Spiritual in Art* and *Point and Line to Plane*. He was also influenced by the shortlived Chicago Bauhaus and the artists, writers, and philosophers who were part of the Transcendental Painting Group. Jonson came to refer to his purely abstract paintings in oil, watercolor, and casein tempera, many of them executed using airbrushes, as "absolute painting." The period from 1938 to 1950 constitutes his years of greatest innovation and expression of the spiritual in pure abstraction. In his long, late career, his essential goals remained the same as he experimented with acrylics and color-field and gestural styles on large canvases, and these paintings are among his mostly boldly colorful and tactile of his career.

The scholarship on Jonson to date is scant and not very developed, yet it does correctly place him among the best and most important abstract painters in the United States in the 1930s and 1940s, when abstraction was no longer popular or of much interest. Ed Garman's 1976 monograph *The Art of Raymond Jonson, Painter* was the most thorough study of Jonson prior to this book. It suffers from being incomplete and disorganized and a lack of art-historical methodology and critical detachment. Garman was an abstract painter and not an art historian, and he was a close friend of Jonson for over forty years and a fellow member of the Transcendental Painting Group. Yet his book was a tremendous help for later scholarship and is much appreciated for that. Elizabeth McCauley's 1980 exhibition catalogue *Raymond Jonson: The Early Years* was the next major study of Jonson. It provides a more coherent chronological narrative of the first half of the artist's life than Garman's book did, but it is still very incomplete and offers limited analysis of his work. Since these publications, the curatorial staff at the Jonson Gallery at the University of New

Mexico has produced short essays on various aspects of Jonson's life and work for brochures that have accompanied some of the exhibitions they have curated, including *Poetry of the Theatre: Raymond Jonson and the Chicago Little Theatre Years, 1912-1917* in 1994, *Raymond Jonson: Abstract Landscapes, 1922-1947* in 1988, *Raymond Jonson, Cityscapes 1989*, *Raymond Jonson: Geometric Form in the Pursuit of a Unifying Principle* in 1990, and *To Form from Air: Music in the Painting of Raymond Jonson* in 2010. In these essays, Malin Wilson, Joe Traugott, Tiska Blankenship, and others have written about various aspects of Jonson's life and work. Unfortunately, the small scale of these publications has limited their scholarly usefulness, but they are nonetheless very important to this book. Jonson's theater designs have been studied by theater scholar Arthur Feinsod, both in a short essay for the Jonson Gallery and in a chapter in his book *The Simple Stage: Its Origins in the Modern American Theater*, the most thorough study of the simple stage movement in the United States.

Jonson has been included in recent surveys of modernist and abstract art in America during the first half of the twentieth century and surveys of art in New Mexico and the Southwest, although he is never included in broader surveys of modern and American art. Susan Larsen and John R. Lane discuss Jonson in the catalogue to the exhibition *Abstract Painting and Sculpture in America: 1927-1944* from 1984. Although now more than thirty years old, this book remains the most thorough overview and useful survey of modernist and abstract art in America during the Great Depression and World War II. Gail Levin and Marianne Lorenz summarize Jonson's stylistic development and relationship to Kandinsky in a perceptive but brief manner in *Theme and Improvisation: Kandinsky and the American Avant-Garde, 1912-1950*, of 1992. Jonson has been included in a few studies of the Transcendental Painting Group that have been published over the past forty years. Robert C. Hay's 1980 master's thesis "*Dane Rudhyar and the Transcendental Painting Group, 1938-1941*" was the first study of the Transcendental Painting Group of any depth or scholarly focus. It was followed by

the 1982 exhibition *The Transcendental Painting Group: New Mexico, 1938-1941*, which provided a wealth of reproductions but little analysis, and the 1997 exhibition *Vision and Spirit: The Transcendental Painting Group*, which contains an updated bibliography and detailed chronology and has informative essays by Garman and Blankenship on all the artists involved.

This monograph examines the life and work of this long-lived and prolific artist who went through numerous stylistic changes. Chapter 1 examines Jonson's early life in the West and Chicago, his involvement with the Chicago Little Theatre, and his active role as a leader of the Chicago avant-garde. It explores his developing goals and purposes as a modern artist, his most important artistic influences from modern art, and the impact of the simple stage movement on his evolving modernist style of painting. Chapter 2 examines Jonson's landscape paintings of the 1910s and 1920s including the *Earth Rhythms* series and his *Seasons and Compositions* of the 1920s to demonstrate how his painting gradually became fully modernist through the combined influence of Symbolism, Fauvism and Cubism. It also explores how he became disenchanted with urban life and desired to leave Chicago, which led him to move to New Mexico in 1924. Modernism in New Mexico is still dominated by the legacy of Georgia O'Keeffe, one of the most famous twentieth-century American painters who is always associated with the region. Jonson settled in New Mexico about five years before O'Keeffe first visited the region and about 25 years before she moved there permanently. Jonson was familiar with O'Keeffe's work and he and O'Keeffe knew one another superficially; they were never close and did not socialize.' Jonson sold painting supplies to earn a living during the first ten years he was living in New Mexico, and O'Keeffe was one of his customers. He believed that O'Keeffe did not like his paintings and so that would probably make it impossible for Alfred Stieglitz to ever exhibit his works in his galleries in New York City.' Chapter 3 examines the boldly colorful paintings of 1929 to 1936 in which Jonson slowly worked toward greater abstraction by using numerals, alphabet letters, plants and trees, colors,

the cosmos, and the sciences as more conceptual but still recognizable and intelligible subjects for art.

The second half of Jonson's long career is still relatively obscure and poorly understood compared to the period from 1910 to the 1930s, when he was closer to the major developments of early modernism in the United States. Chapter 4 analyzes Jonson's earliest purely abstract paintings of the 1930s and his developing theories on the spiritual in abstract art. It also examines in detail his important contributions to the Transcendental Painting Group. Chapter 5 explores the sources, influences, and development of Jonson's "absolute painting" in the period from 1938 to around 1950. In this chapter, I attempt to interpret how Jonson conveys, suggests, and expresses the spiritual in abstract painting and do so keeping in mind how we respond to pure visual effects and why some works are more effective and engaging than others in giving visual expression and form to the spiritual. To do this, I have studied Jonson's letters, notes, diaries, and lectures to learn more about his ideas, theories, sources, and influences and how he himself thought his works effected viewers emotionally and spiritually. Chapter 6 explores Jonson's late career, from around 1950 until he ceased painting in 1978. This part of Jonson's oeuvre is enormous and yet the least known and understood. I examine important changes that occurred in his paintings at this time, many of which are reflections of and experiments with post-World War II developments in abstract painting including Abstract Expressionism, Color-Field Painting and Op Art. I also consider how this late period continues Jonson's goals for the spiritual in abstract art.

This book is the most comprehensive study of Jonson ever written. Jonson kept many of his own works for his self-curated retrospective collection which he bequeathed to the University of New Mexico upon his death. Hence, many of his best and most important paintings are located in the Art Museum of the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque. However, many other important and great paintings are in the New Mexico Museum of Art, the Smithsonian American Art Museum, the Joslyn

Art Museum, the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, the Portland Art Museum, the Cleveland Museum of Art, the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, the Nelson Atkins Museum of Art, the Albuquerque Museum of Art, the Art Museum at the University of Texas at Austin, the Rose Art Museum, the Ackland Art Museum of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, and various private collections in New Mexico, Texas, Colorado, Arizona, Oregon, California, New York, and New Jersey. It brings many long-lost, forgotten, and overlooked paintings and drawings to light and constructs a richer, livelier, and more thorough chronicle of the artist's life and work than has ever been attempted. Jonson kept meticulous and extensive records of his works and saved an enormous amount of letters, diaries, notes, sketches, lectures about his art and the history of modern and abstract art, and his class teaching notes. This study has taken full advantage of these primary sources, which are available at the Art Museum of the University of New Mexico at Albuquerque and at the Archives of American Art. I am confident this book will be enormously useful to scholars, collectors, dealers, and all admirers and enthusiasts of modern American art. I believe it will make Jonson better known and understood. I hope it will stimulate more critical awareness of his work and encourage readers to think about what Jonson's paintings mean and seek to do. I hope it will inspire future study of an artist who is so deserving of it.

Metaphysical Associations

Jonson was one of the driving forces behind the Transcendental Painting Group (TPG) and the American Foundation for Transcendental Painting (AFTP), the origins of which virtually coincided with the development of his purely abstract style in 1938. The TPG was a small, short-lived association of painters based in New Mexico who worked in various abstract or quasi-abstract styles and were dedicated to the idea that abstract art was the most effective way of visualizing and conveying the spiritual. The TPG included Jonson, Emil Bisttram, Agnes Pelton, Lawren Harris, Florence Miller Pierce, Stuart Walker, Ed Garman, Horace Towner Pierce, William Lumpkins, and Robert Gribbroek. It was

essentially the Western equivalent to the American Abstract Artists (AAA), which was founded in New York City in 1936 and quickly became a national force in promoting abstraction in a period when many artists, critics and collectors had lost interest in modernism in favor of more realistic and figurative styles and subjects of national and local history and identity and social and urban problems. This period which included the Great Depression and World War II was dominated by Regionalism and Social Realism, and modernist and abstract artists had to struggle for critical acclaim and support. The TPG was founded in June 1938 after conversations among various artists who met at Jonson's home in Santa Fe on June 7 and then at Bisttram's home in Taos on June 10 led to the idea for it. Shortly after the TPG was created, the AFTP was formally established by these artists and a few friends who were sympathetic and supportive to their cause but who were not artists or were artists who did not often paint abstractly. The two most important members of the AFTP who were not members of the TPG were Dane Rudhyar, a musician, astrologist, spiritualist, and occasional painter, and Alfred Morang, a writer and painter who never devoted himself fully to abstraction. This second organization was intended to consist of artists and non-artists who supported the central ideas of the TPG and who would handle the mundane work needed to promote and publicize abstract art and these artists in particular with exhibitions, catalogues, brochures, and press releases. The governance of both organizations was carefully structured; this was necessary for the AFTP because it was legally incorporated in New Mexico. When the TPG was established, Jonson was chairman and Lumpkins was secretary and treasurer. When the AFTP was established shortly thereafter, Harris was president, Pelton was an honorary president, Rudhyar and Bisttram were vice-presidents, Jonson was secretary, Lumpkins was treasurer, and Morang was publicity director. The TPG enjoyed a few noteworthy successes in its first three years. In 1939 its members exhibited their work at the Golden Gate International Exposition in San Francisco. In 1940 they exhibited several works at the Museum of Non-Objective

Painting in New York City (now called the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum). The TPG and AFTP lasted briefly; by 1942, their meetings and activities had ceased and their funds had run out, and by 1945, the AFTP was legally dissolved. Various circumstances, including the relocation of certain members due to World War II, the absence of Pelton from New Mexico (she lived in California at the time), the sudden death of Stuart Walker in 1940, and the dissipating interest and enthusiasm of some members led to the demise of both organizations.

The purpose and goals of the TPG were made clear in their manifesto, which was issued in a brochure published and circulated in 1938:

The Transcendental Painting Group is composed of artists who are concerned with the development and presentation of various types of non-representational painting; painting that finds its source in the creative imagination and does not depend upon the objective approach. The word Transcendental has been chosen as a name for the group because it best expresses its aim, which is to carry painting beyond the appearance of the physical world, through new concepts of space, color, light and design, to imaginative realms that are idealistic and spiritual. The work does not concern itself with political, economic, or other social problems. Methods may vary. Some approach their plastic problems by a scientific balancing of the elements involved; other [sic] rely upon the initial emotion produced by the creative urge itself; still others are impelled by a metaphysical motivation. Doubtless as the group grows other methods will appear.

The Transcendental Painting Group is no coterie, no accidental group of friends. The members are convinced that focal points in terms of group activity are necessary in order to present an art transcending the objective and expressing the culture development of our time.

The main activity of the Group will be toward arranging exhibitions of work. The goal is to make known the nature of transcending painting which, developed in

various phases, will serve to widen the horizon of art.

There was no common or shared style among the members of the TPG nor an attempt to forge one, but their work does demonstrate some broad similarities of style and symbolism that originated in their shared philosophical and spiritual ideas and goal for abstraction and their familiarity with the works of one another and the writings of Rudhyar and Morang.

Jonson learned about the AAA in 1937, perhaps through letters from Arthur but certainly through letters he received from Josef Albers. Jonson and Albers knew one another since the early-1930s and corresponded periodically for years. In mid-1937 Albers wrote to Jonson about the AAA, briefly describing it, suggesting that Jonson contact it and giving him the address of its secretary.⁴⁷ Jonson never attempted to create any affiliation with it, probably because the distance between New Mexico and New York City was so great that he knew he would never be able to fully or appropriately participate in its activities. His awareness of this new group in New York City along with his continuous frustration with problems exhibiting abstract art during the 1930s must have encouraged him to collaborate with like-minded artists in the West to create an organization similar to the AAA. The two organizations are testimony to the continuation of the ideals and values of abstraction in the United States during an era when it was often considered foreign, elitist and irrelevant. The TPG was different from the AAA in that it was fundamentally and completely devoted to the idea that abstract art is spiritual. Furthermore, it was a much smaller organization and did not last nearly as long, and it was geographically marginalized by being based in New Mexico. It never got the publicity of developed the moderate clout that the AAA achieved.

The use of the term "transcendental" became a complicated matter as the TPG tried to establish its identity as a group and its sense of purpose as the initiators of a new movement. The term seemed problematic at first because it suggested connection to Transcendentalism, the mid-nineteenth-century

American philosophical movement whose leading proponent was Ralph Waldo Emerson. The TPG chose the term to emphasize that their abstract painting was intended to go beyond physical, tangible reality and matters of individual, national, ethnic, or religious identity and culture to deeper meanings and truths which were timeless and universal. They eventually came to accept the term because Transcendentalism's non-sectarianism and emphasis on personal experience and comprehending the Divine through nature with no ritual or dogma made it appealing." Jonson defended the TPG's use of the word when he wrote in 1938:

I might say our aim is to transcend all isms! Certainly the words abstract and non-objective have been used to death. They emanate from Europe and our hope has been to point out that in America we have painting also ... The Guggenheim Foundation is primarily European. I know of no American represented in the collection ... Naturally we are attempting to differentiate between the European idea as represented by the Guggenheim collection and ourselves—and that is one reason for the new name—transcendental. We stand for those fundamental serious items and do not hesitate [sic] to say that art to us is meaning and reason for life.

Jonson's defense of the term "transcendental" reveals how frustrated he was with existing terminology for abstract art. He explained this more thoroughly when he wrote to Pelton in 1938 about how he and Rudhyar had settled on the term "transcendental":

I am entirely dissatisfied with the term non-objective and have tried to find a word or name that would cover what we are attempting to do. Rudhyar is here and is helping me with this and one suggestion he has offered is TRANSCENDENTAL. As your non-objective work is a fine example of what I have in mind I should like to know what you think of using the word transcendental to designate it instead of abstract or non-objective ... Does this word seem to you to cover the aim of our work

insofar as the objective departure and the hope for spiritual content are concerned? Although Jonson consistently thought of his work as achieving the spiritual in truly universal and timeless ways, he also believed that the term "transcendental," with its implicitly American connotations, served to call attention to those painters in the United States in the 1930s and 1940s who were not Regionalists or Social Realists, to alert the public to the fact that abstract art was still being created in the United States and that it should not be ignored or discredited.

Jonson was one of the strongest supporters of the TPG and AFTP; he played a crucial role in their formation in 1938 and was probably the last member to give up any hope that they would survive. Jonson's role in establishing these organizations is indicated by the positions of leadership and authority he held in both, those of president and secretary. For Jonson, the TPG and AFTP must have seemed like a second "Cor Ardens," a cherished opportunity to try once again the "little hit of idealism in art" which he had eagerly pursued earlier in his career. Even though Cor Ardens had failed, Jonson retained the belief that such a fraternal organization of artists could succeed in generating public interest in abstract art. He explained the purpose, goals, and governing structure of the TPG in a letter to Arthur written in July 1938, only weeks after it was formed:

During June a group of us arranged an exhibition with the idea of seeing how our works looked together. From it we planned to form a group for the purpose of exhibiting—talking together and attempting to publish a few folders or booklets etc. Out of it we have formed a group. Therefore, I am sending you a copy of what we have formulated to date...

I realize it is pretty idealistic and that many people will laugh because it does not fit into the program that fools them and plays up to their bad taste . . . It [the TPG] hopes to become a focal point for the development of a type of Art [sic] vitally rooted in the spiritual needs of the times and expressing the most truly creative, fundamental and permanent

impulses emerging from the American continent; an art which releases from its creators the deepest springs of vitality and consciousness and which aims to stimulate in others, through deep and spontaneous emotional experiences of form and color, a more intense participation in the life of the spirit.

The TPG and AFTP had their roots in the concerns among several artists in the West in the 1930s about their modernist and abstract painting and, more broadly, abstraction everywhere in the United States being ignored and dismissed by collectors, dealers, and museums. Jonson's concerns about this intensified in the mid-1930s, when he was exhibiting less often than ever in his career after his exhibitions in New York City and Chicago in 1931 and 1932 led to few sales and modest attention from buyers and critics. It was at this time that the network of friendships that brought the members of the TPG and AFTP together came about. Jonson was closest to Pelton, Bisttram, Harris, and Rudhyar before, during, and after the TPG. As Jonson's friendship with Pelton evolved, so did his desire for the means of exhibiting the works of non-representational painters who dealt with the spiritual. Jonson and Pelton came to know one another around 1933. Pelton first learned of Jonson's work when she saw his exhibit at the Delphic Studios in New York City in 1931 and may have seen a few of his works even earlier." Jonson was introduced to Pelton around 1933 by his sister Esther, who at the time lived in Southern California and was a newspaper art critic. Jonson first saw Pelton's work when she shipped several paintings to him to be included in an exhibit he was curating which was held at the Museum of Fine Arts in Santa Fe in the summer of 1933. He was excited and fascinated by her work, considering them stunningly beautiful expressions of the spiritual and, although very different from his work, related to it in an underlying sense of how to visualize the spiritual effectively. As he wrote to Pelton upon receiving her paintings for the upcoming exhibition:

I cannot begin to tell you how thrilled I am with them!! They are stunning!! You have a new admirer!! They clicked with me immediately and when I tell you I spent

most of an afternoon alone with them—looking and looking and ending up with a complete acceptance you will perhaps get some idea of what I would like to say. I feel that "Beneficence" and "Equilibrium" are entirely successful—containing a complete spiritual expression. I am completely moved by these two ... How does it happen that we have never met. I was shocked just as I believe you would be if you could sit here in the studio and see some of the works I have done. Our work is not alike but I do believe some inner significance touches the same rhythm, chord or spirits.

As their friendship developed in the following years, Jonson and Pelton exchanged views on how abstraction was marginalized in contemporary American painting. Their concerns and speculative solutions anticipate the creation of the TPG by five years. They believed that only through cooperative efforts would abstract artists in America in the 1930s be able to have their works seen and their ideas known. Jonson lamented the situation in a letter to Pelton from September 1933:

I have never exhibited at the Carnegie International. [Pelton asked in an earlier letter if he had.] For the past ten years I have not sent to juries. And of course I am not invited. So I have done little exhibiting. But I think we should be included in all the large and so called [sic] important exhibitions. But how to do it is a question. There are so few of us who work in the abstract with the idea of a magical quality that few people will, or even desire to, contact with it. In other words we are not heard. And of course we are continually harassed [sic] with financial difficulties which prohibits a personal action in the way of presenting the work. I have felt that the best we can do is create the work. It will eventually be heard.

Two years later, Jonson wrote again to Pelton about his frustration with having no venues at which to exhibit his work, which he felt was still shunned because it was abstract, and this time he alluded to the possibility that a collective effort among abstractionists might solve this problem:

When I read of various exhibitions I begin to wonder if we should not take more of an active part in that department. But if the so called [sic] powers that be will have nothing to do with us I do not see what we can do especially when we are not in position to finance these activities ... For instance the Whitney Museum has on at present an exhibition of "Abstractions" and I wonder if the best of the country is represented. I mean the best of the abstract. I'll bet you were not invited. I certainly was not. But some day I shall arrange an exhibition. Meanwhile the thing for us to do is work—work and work.

Three years later, fortuitous circumstances led to the creation of the TPG, although practical difficulties were always present and it lasted only three years.

Jonson and Rudhyar became friends around 1933 through Pelton, who knew Rudhyar since 1930, and the two men corresponded regularly over the years. Rudhyar was an important source for Jonson's knowledge of mysticism and alternative spirituality in the 1930s and 1940s, during the years of the TPG and when Jonson first achieved pure abstraction. In late 1938, the two collaborated on a series of drawings and watercolors symbolizing the twelve signs of the zodiac, with each drawing by Rudhyar serving as the basis for the watercolor by Jonson depicting the same signs. Most of them are obviously symbolic of the zodiac signs they are intended to represent. Although not very important to Jonson's stylistic development, they are more indicative than most of his paintings and drawings of his interest in and knowledge of the mystical, alternative spirituality and the occult. Jonson's friendship with Rudhyar, the exposure to his writings, and this artistic collaboration exposed him to this wealth of ideas at a crucial time in his development. Though Jonson's religious and spiritual thinking remained mostly private, intuitive and un verbalized, his awareness of these important early influences for abstraction are not to be discounted and they inform some of his purely abstract works.

Another instance of Jonson working symbolically with spiritual and mystical ideas at this time is the

Maitreya symbol he painted for Charles Morris in 1941. Morris described in a letter what the Maitreya is, that he wanted Jonson to create a painting of it based on a drawing his daughter Sally had made, and what he wanted the image to include:

I enclose a little sketch (made by Sally) of what I call the Maitreyan symbol.

Maitreya is the man-god of my new religion, representing the Maitreyan ideal of personality which I am presenting as the new ideal of man toward which we should struggle. I try to show that there have been six other ideals which men have followed (Christian, Buddhist, etc.) and that this ideal, while new, includes something of all these other six. The symbol aims to show this relation.

Jonson quickly replied that he could create a painting of this design and that he felt the ideas behind it were in keeping with his own spiritualist ideas. Within two months, the project was completed and the work was delivered to Morris. Buddhist doctrine and concepts such as the Maitreya were very important to Theosophy. Blavatsky produced many diagrams for her book *Isis Unveiled* in which spiritualist doctrines were explained and integrated through the use of complex geometric diagrams. Numerous other spiritualists and Theosophists used diagrams to help explain their ideas.

Jonson's most extensive discussion of his interest in alternative spirituality and mysticism, which reveals that he had studied paranormal psychology, magic and Theosophy, is his lecture "Psychic Phenomena," which he gave to the Axis Club in Santa Fe in June 1941. Jonson said that his study of Theosophy led him to believe that if some of its claims were true, then many supernatural, para-psychological phenomena could be explained. However, he did not subscribe to many mystical ideas, which he clearly found preposterous and highly superstitious. In this lecture, he said that there were three aspects of the human being: the physical body, the soul, and the astral form. He explained that the astral body or aura was the force that directed and empowered the physical body upon the instigation of the soul (which he called the "ego"), that it was

essentially circular, made of very fine textured material, very durable yet flexible, and that it contained forces which could be tapped by humans in the physical, natural world. He associated the human aura with the supposed field of spiritual energy that surrounds the earth and in which human activities, feelings, and thoughts are forever stored. As Jonson wrote:

There are according to the doctrine of Theosophy those methods and results that are constructive and genuine. For instance one fascinating principle is that pertaining to the field of recording all the thoughts, actions, etc. that are produced here on earth. This field is a band around the earth a certain distance out in space, in ether, and there is the material for us if we are able to tap it. Many things have taken place that could be accounted for if this is a fact. Genius may therefore be the ability of tapping this reservoir of knowledge and I believe the Theosophist would claim this ability is the result of reincarnation.

Jonson's explanation of this Theosophical concept suggests that the circular and rounded forms and smoothly textured surfaces in his paintings had spiritual meaning and significance, that his frequent use of such motifs and textures may relate to various Theosophical ideas and beliefs. Jonson's ideas about circles being spiritual, exalting, and holy in a somewhat Christian sense is probably most clearly illustrated in *Watercolor No. 20-1941*. In this no longer extant watercolor, a mountain peak is circumscribed by two airbrushed circles which seem like haloes.

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[How the French Live: Modern French Style](#) by Siham Mazouz [Gibbs Smith, 9781423648161]

At home with modern French families . . .

Si Mazouz, curator of the popular blog [French-By-Design](#), introduces a dozen sophisticated French families in her debut book, *How the French Live* to engage and inspire.

Si shares each family's personality and values through the lens of their uniquely styled homes. The aesthetic is clean and unpretentious; décor elements are eclectic—reflecting each family's Frenchness regardless of where they live. Each chapter closes with a family recipe to prolong the warmth of the hospitality they've shared.

This is the new paragon of a generation living the French lifestyle in France, Morocco, and the U.S.

Si Mazouz is a French girl expatriated in San Francisco. She is the curator of the FRENCHBYDESIGN blog, where she compiles daily a selection of interiors, house tours, or DIY projects. She is also a strategic marketing and social media consultant.

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Excerpt: Our family moved nine years ago from Provence, southern France, to the United States, first to Charlotte, North Carolina, and then to San Francisco, California. We haven't dramatically changed our way of living since we moved away from our homeland. We have kept our family habits, instill the same values to our kids, and eaten the same diet. Even in the way we decorated our first American home, we followed the same principle we always had: less house, more home. Less lawn manicuring, and more time spent outdoors to build family memories on sunny days. Less new furniture buying, more thrifting and repurposing the old and making it new again.

It seems to me that American friends I have made tended to envision French decorating style as "chateau-esque" or shabby chic rustic. While this used to be true, the rule has changed. Modern French families tend to mix and match décor elements from different eras and styles to create unique interiors that represents them. They don't furnish their homes to follow a trend or to impress visitors. They want their homes to represent their lifestyle; they add elements of their travels or inherited pieces that remind them of their family experience and speak to them.

The French have a particular affection for the old and antiques, and they despise total-look interiors. You will rarely see matching sets in a living room, but rather an antique sofa with a Scandinavian modern armchair or an ethnic rug. Au revoir to grandma's armoires and matching buffets: if these are used in modern interiors, they are usually painted a bold, unexpected color to create a modern look and fit the space. Neither do we French like symmetry in our interiors. You'll rarely

see a sofa flanked by matching chairs or end tables with identical table lamps.

All of these differences between French style and what I often see in American homes have made me wonder whether we, the French, have a common way of decorating and living as families regardless of whether we live in the motherland or are exiled from the French hexagon and live as expatriates. To answer my own question and to photograph and write this book, I visited fourteen French families living in France or abroad. This threw me outside of my comfort zone on many levels: reaching out via email to perfect strangers found via Instagram, personal blogs or contacted through referrals; knocking on their doors across the world from where I live; and shooting their interiors and interviewing them. And something pretty amazing happened! Not only have I realized that there is indeed a French way of living but I also witnessed the French culture in action. Most of the lovely families that agreed to participate in this book not only opened up their homes and private world to me but also showed me what the French culture is all about: for example,

families with young children or even teenagers rarely miss a dinner meal together. Rarely did I leave these homes without an invitation to stay over and share a simple meal and a glass of wine after the photo shoot was over. That's the French way for you: a meal is not just a meal, it's a way to show a connection, to share a special bonding moment. I will be forever grateful to these families for reminding me how genuine and gracious my native culture is.

None of the interiors was styled by a professional interior designer. I wanted this book to be authentic, to show real interiors and real families. In a world of perfectly styled pictures, I felt I needed to be true to these families and their own style so that you, the reader, can get a true view of how the French live. I hope these house tours will help you decorate your home without feeling tied to rules of interior design. In all the chapters presented, a common philosophy the owners was "My home looks like me." Let's say no to total-look interiors that might look pretty on paper but lack

soul and personality, and yes to interiors that feel natural and authentic, that gather décor elements with meaning, be they inherited family pieces of furniture or objects that remind one of a family travel escape. Less house, more home—the French way.

Of course, I couldn't have written a book about French families without mentioning the importance of food in the French culture. In France, meals are not just a way to feed oneself; they are a staple of the culture: a meal can last for hours—people share and argue over sensitive topics. Meals are a way to connect, to exchange, to build memories. I therefore asked each family to share their signature recipe, a simple recipe they like to make for special occasions, or comfort food they like to cook for their loved ones. At the end of each chapter, the family shares an easy recipe with you. Go ahead, cook, and tell your family that tonight you're having a meal together, without cell phones or tablets at the table. Reconnect with your loved ones; because, in the end, those simple moments are what home and family truly means.

[Anatomy of a Great Home: What America's Most Celebrated Houses Tell Us about the Way We Want to Live](#) by Boyce Thompson [Schiffer, 978-0764354656]

What elevates a house to best-of-class status? Find out in this insider's look at more than fifty award-winning homes designed by nearly three dozen A plus American architects. Regardless of their size or design style, the best new and remodeled homes share common traits. They deliver eminently livable space that can accommodate nearly any lifestyle event. They respect and relate to the natural environment. They take on the personalities of their owners. And they are works of art that no one will ever want to tear down—the ultimate test of sustainability. Comprehensive in scope, this book profiles a wide variety of extraordinary homes—from urban infill to custom homes, suburban remodels, seaside cottages, and subdivision housing. It distills their broad patterns and refined details into practical lessons with endless applications, making it an inspirational guide for designers, builders, and anyone planning their own dream home.

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Architects

Excerpt: **GREAT HOMES POSSESS A SPIRIT THAT TRANSCENDS THEIR PARTS**

In a purely physical sense, a house is little more than a collection of thousands of parts assembled over six months or more to provide shelter. But to the people who live there, it is much more—it's a canvas, an intimate reflection of our lifestyle, tastes, and aspirations. It mirrors our priorities, whether they are collecting Eames furniture, breeding roses, enjoying happy hours next to a fire pit, or owning an architectural masterpiece that's the envy of the neighborhood. When a house aligns with our personal goals and enriches our lives, we live in a great home.

The intriguing question is how design empowers that perception. The starting point would be an ideal layout that facilitates options as simple as monitoring your children playing, or as complex as creating an ideal spot for a heightened yoga experience. It doesn't take much for some people to feel like they live in a great home. A killer back porch at the edge of the woods—a place to sip coffee on a cool morning, spot birds, or play bluegrass music with friends—may be all that's needed. For some people, bricks, sticks, and mortar may be immaterial. They may simply prize the connection to neighbors and community. Surveys show that homebuyers search for a tree-lined block, an award-winning school district, or an ideal new-home community before they settle on a particular house.

When it comes to the delights of architecture, some homes simply resonate more deeply than others. Ask most architects to describe a great home, and they invariably point to proportions—alignments between the roof surfaces, window size, and home height. Or they may talk about how the building was designed "correctly," with appropriate details for its style, or the way it relates to its environment. It's high praise when architects or builders say they would like to live in a particular house, since they are in the business of creating them.

What's particularly interesting is that the same homes rise to the top of multiple design competitions each year. It's as if the industry shared an archetypal vision of successful design. I've always thought that, if the factors that shape that perception could be put into words and identified

with images, maybe the quality of new homes built each year could be elevated. Because—let's face it—many new homes do not improve the aesthetics of the built environment.

Yet typically there is agreement about award-winning homes, whether modern, traditional, or something in between. Their appearance is modest and creative, rather than tacky or forced. Their bones shine through, revealing how they were built, in an intelligent fashion. More often than not, the best homes embrace state-of-the-art technology to reduce operating costs and improve homeowner controls, often rendering those controls invisible. Their flexible floor plans can be adapted as life circumstances shift. To win an award, whether it's from the American Institute of Architects, a home builder association, or a shelter magazine, architectural details need to be interpreted, designed, and built correctly. And interiors must deliver on the promise of the exteriors—a critical failing of much mass-market housing.

The funny thing is that the best homes often produce an emotional response—you know immediately whether you like them or not, just as you do when you meet a sympathetic stranger. You are drawn by the way they look from the street. Then, as you walk their rooms and halls and porches, you start to imagine living in them. You visualize spending an evening with your family at home—you are making street tacos while your teenager sits at the kitchen island slaving over biology homework. You imagine having friends visit, sharing drinks and stories beside a backyard fire pit. You think about escaping to a private room to read a British murder novel or doing morning stretches in your Zen garden.

Lately I've been doubling back with architects who routinely win architectural competitions to get their ideas on what results in a great home. My goal in picking their brains and analyzing their projects is to develop a package of core design principles. So many books and websites express these ideas in a technical fashion—in so-called architect-speak. I've tried to present my discoveries in a way that everyone can understand. Even if you can't afford to hire an elite architect to design your home, you

could employ these principles to improve your life at home.

Rooms, for example, feel more inviting with windows on at least two sides to promote cross breezes. Having a room away from the family room where you can practice trumpet, draw, or write may be vital to your mental well-being, especially if the public rooms are wide open. Having a thoughtfully laid out kitchen, so that you don't have to run a track meet to cook a meal, can be a godsend. Homebuyer surveys show that having enough storage to declutter a house is critically important to satisfaction. You may really come to appreciate a mudroom by the back door for shedding backpacks, suitcases, and dirty shoes.

At industry meetings, architects often reference the same iconic homes as the greatest achievements. What is it about Frank Lloyd Wright's Fallingwater, Jefferson's Monticello, the classic Sears Bungalow, or the Case Study Houses commissioned by *Arts + Architecture* magazine that people love so much? A big part of the attraction is a strong architectural aesthetic, one that raises the design to the realm of art. Interestingly, the most cherished homes usually also work on a practical level. They often harness the power of the sun, present great views of the natural landscape, and execute interior details true to their style. They have a strong personality, one that reflects the character of an ingenious designer, conscientious builder, or impassioned owner.

Great design lies within everyone's reach, and that's a good thing. In all but the darkest times, we aspire to live in a better environment. That's true of the homeless who upgrade from newspaper to cardboard on a park bench, or the corporate executive who trades from a brownstone in the Bronx to a swank apartment in Manhattan. Indeed, to many people, a home is great simply because they have one, especially if they worked long and hard to buy it. But as this book attempts to demonstrate, it can also be the starting point for even greater satisfaction, personal growth, and enjoyment.

[Barefoot Luxury: Mexican Resort Living](#) by Sandra Espinet [Gibbs Smith, 9781423649373]

Glamorous Latin American getaways of the ultimate luxury class.

Latin America is known for its grand resorts and ultimate in warm-weather relaxation. And Sandra Espinet knows all about this elegant style, designing gorgeous home interiors in Mexico's high-end resort communities for the extravagantly wealthy. As a designer, Espinet has developed a signature style that assures ease and comfort while answering her clients' desires for plush, imaginative escapes. Her anecdotes and design tips will urge the reader to leave the workaday world behind and escape to the warm weather, glorious sunsets, and grandeur of Mexican luxury living.

Sandra Espinet operates her elite design firm, S.E. Design Services, in Los Cabos, Mexico. She has received numerous awards and has appeared on several HGTV shows and as a guest on radio shows and design blogs. She divides her time between Los Angeles and Mexico. She is the author of [The Well-Traveled Home](#).

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Excerpt: I have been asked so many times what it is like to live and work as an American expat in the small and somewhat remote resort town of San Jose del Cabo, at the southern tip of Baja California del Sur, Mexico. My answer is honestly that because of my dual residency, much of my professional and social life still continues to revolve around Los Angeles. Yet the space and vistas and casual lifestyle of Baja help me refine my notion of a luxurious enclave away from the mass production and commonplace convenience of more popular vacation destinations. Part of my continuing fascination with marquee resort properties is the blend of remoteness and comfort, like the safari tent in Rajasthan, India, or a compartment on the Orient Express. By living so much of my life in my Baja "outpost," where imports must be carefully considered, I am better able to sift through design essentials and design overkill.

I can actually beta test with my own two feet the plushness of a custom rug carefully commissioned to cover a terrace on the edge of the earth. I live and travel back and forth between Cabo and Los Angeles, and this splitting of time enables me to feel and experience the calm Zen of living on a beautiful and dramatic beach in a casual Mexican fishing town while still getting my fix of urban attraction, art, and contemporary culture back in the States. It's the perfect arrangement for my mind to experience the yin of relaxation and the yang of activity. The allure of the faraway shore and the comforts of civilization. The barefoot and the luxurious.

I've always been infatuated with the storied luxury hotels of the world. I've thrilled to the exclusive ambiance and elegant discretion of jet-set destinations; the glamorous mystique of the Aman Resorts or the Six Senses Hotels; how the fashionable bustle of the tony lobbies contrasts with the reverent hush of impossibly long hallways, all of it mingling with the ghosts of bygone movie stars, mistresses, and magnates. But I never imagined this sideline obsession would intersect with my actual interior design career, or allow me to use these rarefied milieus as aesthetic touchstones for the residential resort environments I would create along the dazzling coastlines of Mexico.

After graduating from the New England School of Design and then the Atlanta College of Art, I was hired as a junior hospitality designer by a succession of architecture and design firms, ultimately culminating with a position at the sublime Ocean Reef Club in North Key Largo, Florida. There I quickly became enthralled with the lifestyles of the senior designers, who traveled the world in order to absorb traditional and exotic design features and then translate them into unique experiences for the swelling ranks of the new affluent traveler. My design mentors knew how to distinguish between traditional and trendy and, even more, how to create impressive rooms with a sense of tasteful fantasy and plush comfort in equal measure. The hospitality industry is where I got my feet wet, so to speak. To this day, I have huge respect for the interior designers, architects,

purchasing agents and executives who work in the design of upscale hotels, resorts, restaurants, spas and other hospitality-oriented projects.

In order to remain fresh and current in the creation of my own trademark resort-inspired residential endeavors, I routinely patronize five-star luxury hotels and resorts the world over. Not just to enjoy the beauty and the spalike amenities but also to keep up with my amazing peers in the hospitality field. Their passion for originality, perfection, and over-all excellence is a huge source of inspiration for me. I'm always amazed with the service, style, and design of hotels like the Rosewood Mayakoba in Playa del Carmen, Mexico, or the Amanjiwo Hotel in Borobudur, Indonesia, or the Singhita in South Africa. I agree with my expanding clientele that one of the ultimate luxuries in life is to be able to live as if you were on a protracted holiday, in an amazing location, replete with a spectacularly comfortable and stylish interior. In short, I design residential retreats of sorts with all of the appointments, amenities, and considerations of a superb hotel. I try to replicate the quietly elegant, palpably informal perfection of these pampered yet uncluttered and unpretentious environments for my clients and my own personal life. This is the essence of what I call "barefoot luxury."

[Art Collecting Today: Market Insights for Everyone Passionate about Art](#) by Doug Woodham [Allworth Press, 9781621535737]

Grounded in real-life stories, [Art Collecting Today](#) is the essential practical guide to today's art market. A lightly regulated industry with more than sixty billion dollars of annual sales, the art market is often opaque and confusing to even the most experienced collectors. But whether a seasoned collector, an uninitiated newcomer, or an art-world insider, readers will learn within these pages how the art marketplace works in practice and how to navigate it smartly. Those who may have been put off by art-world practices will finally feel they have the knowledge needed to participate freely and fully, and collectors will be able to pursue their passion with more confidence.

Important topics covered include:

- How to evaluate, buy, and sell art while avoiding costly mistakes and time-consuming roadblocks
- How the market works in practice for essential artists like René Magritte, Christopher Wool, Amedeo Modigliani, and Yayoi Kusama
- How collectors can be taken advantage of, and the actions they should take to protect themselves
- Why tax laws in the United States reward "art investors" yet penalize "art collectors"
- How cultural property laws impact the market for works by such artists as Frida Kahlo and Andy Warhol
- Advice for new and prospective collectors

Informed by close to one hundred interviews with collectors, lawyers, art advisors, gallerists, and auction specialists in the United States and Europe, as well as by the author's own experiences, [Art Collecting Today](#) offers a lively and thought-provoking analysis of the day-to-day workings at play today in the fine art marketplace.

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Excerpt: People are passionate about art. They like looking at it, thinking about it, and talking about it. Some also like collecting it.

This book provides invaluable market insights for everyone interested in the inscrutable and endlessly fascinating world of art. Whether a seasoned art world professional or an uninitiated newcomer, readers will learn how the art marketplace works in practice and how to smartly navigate it. The essential premise of this book is that by sharing the good, the bad, and the ugly about the market, collectors will be able to pursue their passion with more confidence. Those who may have been put off by art world practices will finally feel they have the knowledge needed to participate confidently.

In pursuit of this idea, I will take you to the night of October 18, 1973, when the actions of a collector heralded the beginning of a hypercommercialized art market focused on contemporary art. In the years since, art collecting has come to require specialized knowledge. I will explain how the marketplace puts a price on an artwork and how different markets have formed for six well-known artists, including Christopher Wool, Yayoi Kusama, Rene Magritte, and Amedeo Modigliani.

Because buyers are sometimes blinded by passion, I will share practical wisdom for buying art effectively from galleries and at auction. A recurring question is which of these two channels offers buyers a better deal. While there is no single answer, I will explain how prices in these markets relate to each other so that buyers are more informed and can make smart purchase decisions.

Selling art is much harder than buying it. We will visit an evening auction where the ideas I explain in this book are used by siblings to sell their parents' valuable art collection. For those curious about deal-making practices at the very top end of the auction market where multimillion dollar works of art are sold, I will explain the mysterious world of enhanced hammer deals and guarantees.

Well-intentioned rules and tax laws can lead to unintended consequences, and the art world is no different. But there are many surprising twists and turns. I will explain how Andy Warhol is now considered cultural property by German and Italian authorities, subject to export rules and

potential sale restrictions, and how tax laws in the United States reward art investors but penalize art collectors.

Where money goes, scoundrels follow. The marketplace is littered with incidents of duped buyers and sellers. As the price of art soars, the schemes and shenanigans of people who prey on those passionate about art grow bolder and more nefarious. I share throughout the book examples of bad behavior but, more importantly, actions collectors can take to protect themselves.

I wrote this book to help open the world of art to more people. It reflects my experiences as a collector, businessman, economist, and president of the Americas for Christie's. It also draws on interviews I did in 2015 and 2016 with close to one hundred collectors, lawyers, art advisors, gallerists, and auction specialists in the United States and Europe.

A little bit about me: I grew up in a middle-class family in Toledo, Ohio, that had little interest in art. When I was in high school, however, my girl-friend's father opened an art gallery in town for prints. He explained to me the different techniques artists use to create prints and showed me my first Picasso. The experience was fascinating and made me start questioning further. Why was a Picasso print so valuable? Why did the gallery source everything from New York? Who were the younger artists with a shot at being the Picasso of my generation? Since this was pre-Internet days, I soon found myself spending time in the Toledo Museum of Art looking at art and trying to make sense of it.

A lucky break occurred a short time later when I heard about a local group of collectors who met to talk about the goings-on in the world of contemporary art. I joined the group and became their youngest member when I was fifteen years old. The most important collectors in Toledo at that time were Joseph and Mildred Gosman, who had an outstanding collection of Postwar and Contemporary art that included work by Robert Rauschenberg, Georgia O'Keeffe, Willem de Kooning, and Joseph Cornell. They taught me the importance of constantly looking at art to see what

resonates, confuses, and pushes the envelope. Their advice has informed my approach to art ever since—to stand in front of as much art as possible to constantly challenge my eye. To critically assess what makes an artist important relative to his or her peers. For historical work, to understand the socioeconomic zeitgeist when the work was created because it shapes in some way what you are looking at. Because New York was the center of the art world, I had to find a way to be there. I used money from my summer jobs in high school to go to Manhattan and spend time in museums and galleries. When I was in my early teens, I went to the Whitney Biennial for the first time, kicking off a decades-long relationship with the museum. I have been fortunate to be able to contribute to the museum over the years, including as an advisor to the board of trustees on the museum's strategy and financial plan associated with moving from its Upper East Side location to the Meatpacking District.

In addition to art, I also love economics, specifically how markets function. I graduated from the University of Michigan with a PhD in Economics. I met my future wife there, who was also a PhD student in economics. Our first date was to the Detroit Institute of Arts, an institution I reconnected with decades later when I led the Christie's team helping the Institute extract itself from the City of Detroit bankruptcy. I talk about how the Detroit Institute narrowly escaped being liquidated at the end of Chapter 1.

Shortly after getting my PhD and a Brookings Institution fellowship, I joined McKinsey and Company. I worked my way up over the years to become a partner based in New York, working primarily with clients in the wealth management and asset management industries. During my time there, I learned an important lesson about collectors. Whenever I started working with a new client, I asked around to find out which members of the senior management team were collectors. Most were not, but the few who were collectors were inevitably the business leaders most open to new ideas for growth and overcoming obstacles. Over

time, I realized that collecting was a great predictor of business acumen.

After a long career at McKinsey and stints running businesses elsewhere, I wanted to pivot away from financial services and get more involved in the art world. I served as president of the Americas for Christie's, where I was responsible for all the company's activities and senior client relations in North and South America. I am now on the board of the arts venture Twyla, backed in part by Google Ventures, which is creating ways for new collectors to connect with artists and buy editioned work by them. I also advise clients on legacy planning associated with their art collections, including helping them to assess alternative disposition strategies.

A few final notes: all of the interviews I did for the book were off the record. These ground rules made it possible for interviewees to speak freely and honestly about their experiences with the art market. I honored their privacy, which is why you will see so many examples in the book identified by randomly assigned names. I also sometimes changed minor details to protect their identities. I want to thank all of the people I interviewed for their trust and confidence in me. <>

[The Modern A-Frame](#) photographs by Ben Rahn and Chad Randl [Gibbs Smith, 9781423647638]

Midcentury spaces made new: A-Frame homes from rustic to ultra-modern, mountain retreats to seaside getaways.

The A-Frame home surged in popularity in the 1950s, and has captured the public's imagination with its playfully modern, steep-sloping roofline ever since. [The Modern A-Frame](#) celebrates seventeen diverse accounts of these minimalists cabins reinvented for the twenty-first century. Nostalgic escapes, heritage homes, full-time simplicity, and artists at work categorize the A-frames whose engaging stories are shared. Whether fabricated from a 1960s kit or as a new build via retro inspiration, the variety of styles and homeowners in this photo-driven collection beautifully captures the romance of a classic

structure, which beckons to travelers and homebuyers today, just as it did sixty years ago.

Perfect for the architectural enthusiast, midcentury-minded designer, or armchair traveller.

Ben Rahn has been photographing architecture and interiors for more than twenty years. He founded A-Frame Studio in 2003 out of a desire to combine his love of design with his keen photographic eye. His work has been recognized internationally and has appeared in publications such as *Dwell*, *Wallpaper*, *Conde Naste Traveller*, and more. He lives in Toronto, Canada.

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Acknowledgments

Excerpt: Design ideas come and go. They rise up through a combination of forces—the persistence of influential or determined advocates, are sonance with the spiril of the age, editors looking for good copy and alluring images. Then they fall away, almost imperceptibly at first, as the concept moves from startlingly new to conventional, from challenging the status quo to being the status quo.

As an idea becomes common and then cliché, early promoters lose interest or even disown it. Only after a period of time and forgetting might the idea reemerge. A new generation, motivated by admiration for the idea's merits or nostalgia for the era that it evokes picks it up and reinterprets its meaning through contemporary priorities and tastes.

The triangular building is one such idea. Born of a neolithic search for shelter, it was also utilized as storehouse, stable, and shrine. Mostly forgotten by the early twentieth century, enough precedents survived to trace the lineage of a new revival. Finding new use as a base for recreation, the A-frame became one of the most recognizable (and malleable) building forms of the 1950s-70s, typifying an era of optimism, abundance, and play. Then triangular design seemed to disappear—from the preferences of tastemakers, from the pages of magazines, from popular consciousness, if not from the landscape. In recent years, the reemergence of the A-frame has been marked less by the construction of entirely new examples and more the rehabilitation and creative adaption of designs dating from that postwar boom.

It's little wonder such an unassuming building appeared on so many disparate points of the globe across the span of millennia. The angle of excavated post holes demonstrate the ancient presence of structures assembled of opposing rows of beams tilted to meet at a point overhead and with a covering that served as both walls and roof. Japanese tenchi-kongen forms set into the ground, pole and thatch houses of New Guinea set on platforms above ground, and Scandinavian sadeltakshus "saddle roof houses" all shared this triangular shape. Its beams and covering were made with whatever material was readily at hand, from bamboo to birch, from sod to wood shingles. Gable ends were enclosed with wattle and daub, or plank, or brick. Vernacular builders appreciated the triangular building's combination of structural strength and efficiency, but they must have also liked its geometric purity and symbolic potency.

These same attributes appealed to designers such as Bruno Taut and Rudolf Schindler who picked up the form in the first decades of the twentieth century. An Austrian émigré to Southern California and protégé of Frank Lloyd Wright, Schindler was a central proponent of modern architecture. During the 1920s and 1930s he designed a number of triangular structures that demonstrated his interest in integrating form, technology and contemporary materials. His Gisela Bennati Cabin built on a hillside above Lake Arrowhead, California, with its innovative use of plywood, glazed gable ends, and open loft interior was a clear precursor to the thousands that would follow.

In the aftermath of World War I, the United States enjoyed a period of unprecedented economic expansion that brought leisure time and disposable income to ever larger portions of the population. Second cars and second televisions were followed by second homes built on shorelines and newly carved ski resorts. A playful design vocabulary seemed appropriate for this new recreation environment and architects responded, extending Schindler's experimentation with triangular forms. MIT architecture student Henrik Bull developed an influential example cantilevered over the slopes in Stowe, Vermont; Andrew Geller nestled a version like driftwood among the dunes of a Long Island beach. San Francisco designers John Campbell, Worley Wong, and Terry Tong developed an early triangular house kit consisting of all the materials weekend carpenters needed to build their own including pre-cut lumber, hardware, and nails.

The publication of these versions in influential magazines such as *Arts and Architecture* and *Sunset* introduced the trend to ever larger audiences. By the 1960s, national wood product companies and local lumber yards were producing plan books and prefabricated kits. The A-frame came into wide spread use, and, because of the idea's popularity, came to encompass any structure with a steeply pitched roof. The A-frame's spread was not limited to the United States as the form again reasserted a global presence. Postwar A-frame vacation homes were built from the Alps to Argentina and

Australia, as in the past, utilizing Local materials to both practical and aesthetic ends.

Partly due to its association with prosperity and the good life, partly because its form was instantly recognizable, the A frame also had considerable commercial appeal. Triangular motel offices, pet stores, and gas stations appeared along shopping strips from coast to coast. Fast food chains such as Whataburger and Der Wienerschnitzel developed A frame motifs for their outlets. Prominent roofs illuminated by floodlights and painted bright red and orange served as enormous billboards distinguishing these establishments from others, luring cars off the road, and sticking in the minds of consumers. To some, the skyward reach of the A-frame was a spiritual evocation. Places of worship, including Fero Saarinen's chapel and Concordia Theological Seminary in Indiana, the Air Force Academy Cadet Chapel in Colorado, and others in South Korea, Norway, and elsewhere, utilized the triangular form, likening it to hands folded in prayer.

Then, for more than two decades starting in the mid-1970s, the A-frame became a formula non grata. Poisoned by its own popularity, the A-frame saw a precipitous drop in interest and cool factor. Arbiters of taste considered it tired and dated as new recreation typologies and practices emerged. Resort condos and homes with conventional forms and year-round amenities replaced quirky cabins and cottages intended for seasonal use. Perhaps there was nothing more damning to the once--Avant Garde credentials of triangular design than to the reproduced as a fast food restaurant or as a children's toy (Fisher-Price's Little People A-frame doll house was introduced in 1974). the 1970s energy crisis dealt a further blow, increasing the cost of travel to distant vacation spots and the cost of climate controlling A-frames that (with open interiors, lack of insulation, and unventilated ceilings) were notoriously difficult to keep warm in the winter and cool in the summer.

Beginning in the late 1990s, however, there began a small trickle of renewed interest in A-frame design. A few plans were still on offer for amateur builders. A few amateur builders were still building

from those plans or their own. More substantially, by the 2000s there was a growing interest in purchasing surviving postwar A frames specifically with the intent to revitalize them. The A-frame was swept up in a current of rising appreciation for what had come to be called "Midcentury Modern," a trend that had likewise increased the estimation of all things Charles and Ray Fames-related and the appearance of retailers such as Design Within Reach. The challenge of updating an old idea and asserting its contemporary relevance drove other A-frame rehab projects.

A building typology defined by its distinctive triangular appearance might seem an unlikely candidate for reinterpretation. Yet from its earliest history the A-frame accommodated great variety. To those looking closely, postwar designs drew together multiple interpretations within their angled walls, at the same time evoking the unpretentiousness of a vernacular hut and the studied purity of Modernism. They were contemporary and traditional, edgy yet inviting. Some designs featured dormers that cut through the roof plane on the second or first floor; some reoriented the structure so that a glass-fronted ground-level dormer became the primary facade and entrance. Others played with the roof pitch, emphasizing the vertical by steeply angling the roof walls, or alternately flattening the form, attenuating it along the ground plane. Some versions pushed together two or more triangular volumes in a cross-gable or T-shaped plan (one featured eight intersecting gables).

Variations reveal designers grappling with liabilities innate to the A-frame, especially the shortage of headroom and daylight. They exhibit responsiveness to the needs of individual clients. They demonstrate the designer's desire to inject their creative energies and style into this form while retaining the A-frame's iconic recognizability and its appealingly clean arrangement of line and plane. The inherent restrictions of the form present an alluring challenge. It's why A-frames have been the subject of studio exercises in architecture schools like The University of Virginia. As faculty and practicing designers know, limitation—in site,

or budget, or materials—often stimulates creative solutions.

A-frame renovation remains a niche activity. Postwar A-frames appeal to a select group interested in design and design history, to those seeking simplicity or a departure from convention. They will remain unappealing to those who remember the form mostly for its period of decline when it was considered more tacky than trendy, its connection to history a liability rather than an asset. And they will no doubt remain unappealing to those who equate square footage with happiness. If these disinterested parties buy an A-frame it's usually for the valuable land upon which it sits. The A-frame is swiftly demolished and hauled off in a dumpster, redefined as construction debris replaced by something much larger (and usually less angular). Those who are drawn to the A-frame as an idea, who see it as something to save and celebrate and update with a sensitivity to its past have diligent plans. As the projects in the following pages illustrate, they carry on the tradition of adaptation, finding ways to upgrade the house while acknowledging its history. They seek a livable blend of old and new, using the strictures of the form as a spur to creativity.

The A-frame first excited my interest as a design idea that rose and fell only to rise again. As a student of popular architectural culture, historic preservation, and the process of design, I find these examples fascinating markers of shifting taste across time. Whether triangular buildings, shag carpeting, or Victorian era Main Street facades, what is treasured one day is disparaged the next. When these ideas reemerge (as they commonly do) they tell us something about the past, but also, reconfigured and interpreted, about the era of their re-adoption. What does the interest in A-frames as documented in this book suggest about our own time? Is it a discomfort with the direction of contemporary design and a desire to retreat to comfortably recognizable symbols of a bygone era? A symptom of timidity about the future? Or does it suggest a yearning for a time of playful experimentation, when every house doesn't look

like every other house and simplicity bred creativity? <>

Oxford Early Christian Gospel Text

A series of critical editions of early Christian non-canonical gospel texts, comprising the text itself in the original language, a facing translation, a substantial introduction, and extensive notes.

Titles in the series include:

[The Gospel of Mary](#) edited by Christopher Tuckett [Oxford Early Christian Gospel Text, Oxford University Press, 9780199212132]

This volume, the first in a major new series which will provide authoritative texts of key non-canonical gospel writings, comprises a critical edition, with full translations, of all the extant manuscripts of the Gospel of Mary. In addition, an extended Introduction discusses the key issues involved in the interpretation of the text, as well as locating it in its proper historical context, while a Commentary explicates points of detail. The gospel has been important in many recent discussions of non-canonical gospels, of early Christian Gnosticism, and of discussions of the figure of Mary Magdalene. The present volume will provide a valuable resource for all future discussions of this important early Christian text.

[Gospel Fragments](#) edited by Thomas J. Kraus, Michael J. Kruger, and Tobias Nicklas [Oxford Early Christian Gospel Text, Oxford University Press, 9780199208159]

As the value and importance of the non-canonical Jesus tradition continues to be recognized, there is an ever-increasing need for scholarly introductions to this tradition. This co-edited edition comprises the Greek critical editions, with full translations, of several key gospel fragments including *P.Egerton 2*, *P. Oxy. 840*, and *P.Oxy. 1224*. These fragments, preserved despite the widespread destruction of non-canonical manuscripts, are invaluable primary witnesses of ancient Christianity and the transmission of early Christian texts. Introductions to the fragments discuss dates, origins, interpretations, and the relationship of the texts to the canonical gospels. Detailed commentaries expand points of

interest to facilitate further scholarly research on these texts in the future.

[The Gospel according to the Hebrews and the Gospel of the Ebionites](#) edited by Andrew Gregory [Oxford Early Christian Gospel Text, Oxford University Press, 9780199287864]

Scholars are divided on the number of gospels to which fragmentary Jewish-Christian gospel traditions should be attributed. In this book Gregory attributes them to two gospels: the [Gospel according to the Hebrews and the Gospel of the Ebionites](#), with no need for any postulated Gospel of the Nazoraeans. As two distinct texts, each gospel is treated on its own terms, with its own introduction, followed by a text, translation and commentary on each fragment, and further discussion about what we may conclude about the overall character of the text on the basis of the fragments that survive. Yet they share certain common features that warrant them being treated together in one volume with an introduction that discusses certain critical issues that are relevant to them both. One common factor is the partial and indirect way in which these texts have been preserved. No independent manuscript tradition survives for either text, so they have been transmitted only to the extent that they were quoted or discussed by a number of early Christian authors, none of whom claims to be the author of the text from which he appears to quote or to which he appears to refer. This raises a number of questions of a literary nature about how excerpts from these texts may be interpreted. Another common factor is that these gospel traditions are usually referred to as Jewish-Christian, which may raise questions about their historical origins and theological outlook. Any judgment about the historical origins or theological nature of these gospels must rest upon prior examination of what may be reconstructed of their texts, and Gregory is careful to distinguish between what we may conclude from these gospels as texts and how they might contribute to our knowledge of early Christian history. The book also includes a number of appendices in which he discusses issues that have been prominent in the history of scholarship on

these texts, but which he argues are not relevant to these two gospels as he presents them. These include claims about an original Hebrew gospel of Matthew, the postulated Gospel of the Nazoraeans and the so-called 'Jewish gospel', as well as what may be known about the Nazoraeans and the Ebionites.

Excerpt: Recent years have seen a significant increase of interest in non-canonical gospel texts as part of the study of early Christianity. The discovery of the Nag Hammadi library has greatly enhanced our first-hand knowledge of the diversity of early Christian literature, including the production of 'gospel' texts, the most famous of which may be the Gospel of Thomas. Other 'gospel' texts beside those found at Nag Hammadi are extant elsewhere. In recent years, more and more attention has been focused on texts such as these, with powerful claims being made in some quarters about the positive potential value of such texts for the study of Jesus himself and/or the earliest stages of Christianity.

The nature and extent of these so-called 'gospel' texts vary considerably. Further, the very word 'gospel' is itself problematic in relation to its usage to refer to a literary work. By convention, the first four books of the New Testament (attributed to authors known as Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John) have been called 'gospels' for a very long time. But at the start of the Christian era, the word 'gospel' did not refer to written texts at all; it was the word used by Christians such as Paul to refer to the saving message of the new Christian movement, as often as not focusing on claims about the saving significance of the death of Jesus (cf. 1 Cor. 15.1-4). Fairly soon, however, the word shifted its meaning and was used to refer to literary works: and in the case of the books that later became part of the New Testament, these were works which gave fairly extended accounts of the life and teaching of Jesus, as well as relatively detailed accounts of his trial and crucifixion and (in three cases out of four) accounts of resurrection appearances after his death.

The issue of the genre of these four canonical books, and the question of whether they should be

regarded as generically similar, have been debated extensively over the years. The question 'What is a gospel?' is thus a perennial one when thinking about the four canonical gospels. There is perhaps some consensus now that these texts ought to be seen as broadly 'biographical' in nature, though also bearing in mind that ancient ideas of what constituted a 'biography' are not necessarily identical with modern ideas.

The same question becomes infinitely more complex when extended to consider the range of other texts of the early Christian movement which either claimed for themselves the title 'gospel' or which were claimed by others to be a 'gospel'. Further, how (if at all) these 'other' gospels should be divided and categorized is not at all obvious.

In terms of what might constitute a ('genuine'/'real') gospel, any claim based on a firm idea of the 'essence' of a ('true') gospel (i.e. an 'essentialist' approach) is one that is fraught with difficulties and would probably fall into the trap of excluding far too much too quickly. Certainly, if, as some have argued, a work can be called a (genuine) 'gospel' only if it focuses on the saving work of Jesus's death and resurrection, then almost all of the non-canonical (so-called) 'gospel' texts would be excluded (along perhaps with even one or two of the canonical ones!). Others have worked with a much looser 'definition, seeing a 'gospel' as a text which purports to give information about the life and teaching of Jesus. This in turn might then exclude some texts, especially if 'life' in this context is taken to mean Jesus' life prior to his passion: for many of the so-called 'gospel' texts claim to provide primarily teaching given by Jesus after his resurrection.

An alternative approach might be to accept as a 'gospel' anything which claims the name 'gospel' for itself, and/or perhaps is claimed by others to have such a name (a so-called nominalist approach). This would certainly provide a more extensive list than some 'essentialist' approaches; it would, however, come up against potential problems in cases where the text concerned is not extant in full and/or no third party refers to it: hence we do not have any claims, one way or the

other, about what title the text claimed for itself or how others regarded it.

For the purpose of this series, a relatively pragmatic approach has been adopted about which texts to regard as 'gospels' (and to see as, at least potentially, possible candidates for inclusion in the present series). As an overarching criterion, we have tended to accept the distinction that many might instinctively make, separating 'gospels' from other early Christian works (e.g. letters of apostles, or accounts of the history of the early church) on the basis that 'gospels' make at least some claim to give direct reports of the life and/or teaching of Jesus, but taking 'life and teaching' broadly enough to include accounts purporting to give teaching given by Jesus after his resurrection. Further, we have mostly accepted the claims—of either manuscripts themselves (e.g. in colophons) or of ancient authors talking about such texts—to identify some works as 'gospels'.

The overarching criterion does then serve to exclude some texts, even those which either claimed to be 'gospels' or were perhaps claimed by others to be 'gospels': for example, the so-called Gospel of Truth from Nag Hammadi (although the work itself makes no claim to such a title, it is thought by some to be possibly the work of this name mentioned by Irenaeus) and the Gospel of the Egyptians from Nag Hammadi (whose colophon does claim the title 'gospel' for itself) are both excluded from consideration here on the grounds that neither makes any explicit claim to be giving accounts of the life and/or teaching of Jesus. On the other hand, a text such as Papyrus Egerton (which is so fragmentary that no claim to a 'title survives, and the work is not referred to by any third party as far as is known) is included here on the basis that it purports to be giving information about Jesus; equally, too, the *Epistula Apostolorum*, although not explicitly claiming to be a 'gospel', is included here on the same grounds. So too the fragments known as the 'Jewish Christian gospels', which survive only in quotations from the Church Fathers, are included here on the basis that the Fathers themselves clearly refer to the texts they quote as 'gospels' (the Gospel according to the

Hebrews, and the various excerpts that scholars often refer to as belonging to the Gospel of the Ebionites or to the Gospel of the Nazoraeans).

In terms of any possible classification, or taxonomy, of the various 'gospels', various approaches are possible. Again, one can take a very pragmatic, 'concrete' approach and categorize the different texts on the basis of the different ways, and extents, to which the texts have been preserved and survive today. Thus, some texts survive, mostly in full, in a wide range of manuscripts and in different languages. Examples in this category might include the *Epistula Apostolorum* and the *Infancy Gospel of Thomas*: in each case there is a range of manuscripts which contain the text. A second category might include those where a substantial amount—possibly even all—of the text survives, but where we are reliant on effectively one manuscript for all (or most) of the text concerned. In this category, we can think of the *Gospel of Thomas*, the *Gospel of Mary*, and the *Gospel of Peter*: in all three cases, there are (arguably) a very few other fragments extant, but for the bulk of the text we are reliant on a single manuscript. (In the case of *Thomas* and *Mary*, the manuscript in question is in Coptic, which almost certainly represents a translation of the text from a Greek original; *Thomas* is also to be distinguished from *Mary* and *Peter* in this context by virtue of the fact that the Coptic text of *Thomas* has the complete text of the gospel, whereas the major manuscripts containing the texts of *Mary* and *Peter* provide only parts of the full text of those gospels.) A third category of text might be ones which are not fully extant but which survive in at most a fragment of a single manuscript. Here we could include fragmentary texts preserved in P.Oxy. 840, P.Oxy. 1224, Papyrus Egerton 2. In each case, the surviving fragment is the only witness to the text and provides only a small part of the original whole. (The same is, of course, also true of the *Gospel of Mary* and the *Gospel of Peter*.) A fourth category of texts would consist of those where there is no surviving manuscript of the text itself, but we know of the existence of the text via

comments of Church Fathers who sometimes give a quotation of the text: such texts would include the so-called Jewish Christian gospels, excerpts of which are often attributed to three texts known as the *Gospel of the Hebrews*, the *Gospel of the Ebionites*, and the *Gospel of the Nazarenes* (though there is considerable debate as to whether it is right to distinguish these as separate writings). As a final category, one can think of 'texts, or individual stories or traditions, which were added to existing texts to expand them: here we can think of the story of the woman taken in adultery in John 7.53-8.11, the story of the man working on the Sabbath in Luke 6.4 D, the endings of Mark's gospel, etc. Perhaps this grouping of different gospel 'texts' serves to highlight the great range and variety of materials, and the ways in which they have been preserved.

Other attempts have also been made to categorize the various 'gospels' on the basis more of their contents than the manner of their current attestation. The difficulty with such attempts is that so many of the texts concerned are extremely fragmentary, and we do not know whether an assessment on the basis of the surviving part(s) of the text would be appropriate as a description of the whole. For example, the *Gospel of Peter*, in the section preserved in the main manuscript containing the text, gives an account of the passion of Jesus. But whether we should call it a 'passion gospel' (as some have done) is not certain, given that we do not know if the whole text was taken up with an account of the passion or whether the account of the passion was preceded by an (extensive?) account of the life of Jesus, as in the canonical gospels.

However, given these caveats, we can perhaps make a (admittedly rather rough-and-ready) distinction between a number of categories. Some texts we might classify as 'narrative gospels,' in that they appear to be giving accounts of incidents in the life of Jesus in the form of a narrative. Here we might include P. Egerton 2, P.Oxy. 840, and perhaps too the *Gospel of Peter*. Second, we can distinguish a group of 'sayings gospels': these would include the *Gospel of Thomas* (which consists

of sayings of Jesus alone with virtually no narrative elements at all), possibly too the Gospel of the Egyptians cited by Clement of Alexandria (though this is highly fragmentary, and only extant through citations by Clement, so we cannot be sure of its contents). A third category might include 'infancy gospels. Texts here would include the Protevangelium of James and the Infancy Gospel of Thomas: clearly the need was felt by some to fill out some of the details of the infancy stories in the other (canonical) gospels. Finally, we might distinguish 'resurrection discourses' or 'resurrection dialogues': in many such texts (often associated with so-called 'Gnostics'), the risen Jesus appears and gives extended teaching to his disciples, often by means of a dialogue with them. One such text, though not usually thought to be 'Gnostic,' is the *Epistula Apostolorum*.

One should not, however, make the mistake of thinking that such categories can ever be watertight; nor is it the case that they are necessarily mutually exclusive: for example, the Gospel of Thomas can appropriately be described in one way as a 'sayings gospel' (in that it consists of sayings of Jesus); but it may also represent teaching that is thought of as being given by the resurrected Jesus: hence it may also be classified as in some sense a 'resurrection discourse/ dialogue' as well.

The fact that, almost by definition, all such 'gospel' texts claim to be giving information about the actions and/or teaching of Jesus himself can raise the question of the reliability of such information. Certainly in relation to some of these gospels, notably the Gospel of Thomas, the intense interest which they have aroused has been due to a considerable extent to the possibility that these texts might be providing information that is independent of the canonical witnesses and be giving us genuinely new information about the (so-called) historical Jesus. Such issues may be raised by individual editors of the separate volumes of this series. Without wishing to predetermine what any individual editor of a particular volume might wish to argue, we would probably say that, for the most part, the non-canonical gospels treated in this

series are not likely to extend our knowledge about the person of Jesus significantly beyond that provided by the canonical gospels. Many of these texts seem to presuppose the existence of the canonical gospels as already in existence, and as often as not, perhaps being used here as sources. (The great potential exception remains the Gospel of Thomas, whose status in this respect remains the focus of considerable scholarly debate and disagreement.)

In fact, it may be that the greatest contribution of the non-canonical gospels is to throw light on the period after the time of the writing of the canonical gospels, and to enable us to see something of the ways in which the early Christians used and developed their traditions and beliefs about Jesus in this period. Even if they tell us little about the figure of Jesus himself, they may be far more interesting and fascinating for the light they throw on later periods of Christian history, in some cases (e.g. in the second century) when other sources are sadly lacking.

We have already noted that many of these non-canonical 'gospel' texts are extant only in fragmentary form and/or in a range of languages. In view of the claims sometimes made about some of the details of such texts, it is vitally important that the actual textual evidence be presented accurately, so that, for example, lacunae in fragmentary manuscripts—and conjectural emendations or additions to fill them—are clearly recognized for what they are. It is also the case that the increased scholarly interest in these texts means that, at times, a not inconsiderable body of secondary literature has arisen. It is therefore extremely valuable for scholars to have access to clear introductions to these texts, outlining the main issues in their studies, and providing a clear indication of the current state of scholarship.

The present series aims to provide such information: to make the textual evidence clearly available and to provide readers with an up-to-date survey of the state of scholarly discussions about the texts concerned. Inevitably, each editor's own views will be put forward, but the primary aim of the series is to provide the necessary information about each

gospel text in order to enable each reader to be in a position to make up his or her own mind about some of the issues concerned. In this way it is hoped that the riches which these gospel texts provide for increasing our knowledge of the early Christian movement(s) and enabling scholars to assess their significance will be enhanced and developed. This series builds on and develops the work of a research project that was funded by the AHRC as part of its Research Enhancement scheme, and we are very happy to express our gratitude to the AHRC, to the University of Oxford, and to Oxford University Press, for their support in this endeavour.

Literary Issues

This book offers an edition of fragmentary evidence that may be attributed to two early Christian texts: the Gospel according to the Hebrews and the Gospel of the Ebionites. As two distinct texts, each gospel will be treated on its own terms. Yet they share certain common features that warrant them being treated together in one volume with an introduction that discusses certain critical issues that are relevant to them both. One common factor is the partial and indirect way in which these texts have been preserved. No independent manuscript tradition survives for either text, so they have been transmitted only to the extent that they were quoted or discussed by a number of early Christian authors, none of whom claims to be the author of the text from which he appears to quote or to which he appears to refer. This raises a number of questions of a literary nature about how excerpts from these texts may be interpreted. Another common factor is that these gospel traditions are usually referred to as Jewish-Christian, which may raise questions about their historical origins and theological outlook. Any judgement about the historical origins or theological nature of these gospels must rest upon prior examination of what maybe reconstructed of their texts, so in what follows I shall begin with such literary-critical issues before addressing questions of a historical or theological nature.

'Jewish-Christian gospel tradition': its sources and its scope Scholars continue to debate the number and nature of the gospels to which such 'Jewish-

Christian' gospel traditions that survive should be attributed, but there is widespread agreement on the broad contours of the primary evidence that needs to be taken into account. It consists of quotations and references found in the writings of Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Eusebius of Caesarea (who draws on the otherwise lost testimony of Papias and Hegesippus), Didymus, Epiphanius, Jerome, and Pseudo-Origen. This range of witnesses provides the primary evidence on which I shall concentrate in this volume. Other authors and sources who have featured prominently in other discussions of Jewish-Christian gospel tradition include Ignatius of Antioch, Pseudo-Cyril, Romanos the Melodist, some medieval Latin and Irish authors, and some marginal glosses found in certain manuscripts of the Gospel according to Matthew, but I argue that they should not be considered witnesses to the two gospels that I discuss in this volume.

Other sources for Jewish-Christian gospel traditions have also been proposed, but they lie outside the scope of this volume for reasons both of pragmatism and of principle. By far the longest of these other texts, and the only one to survive in its entirety, is the Gospel according to Matthew. Its description as a Jewish-Christian gospel is much debated,¹ but its canonical status, and therefore the enormous attention that it receives elsewhere, puts it firmly beyond the scope of a series of critical editions of early Christian gospel texts that were not included in the canon. Non-canonical gospel traditions (besides those quoted in the Church Fathers noted above) that have been considered Jewish-Christian in nature include the Gospel of Peter,² the Gospel of Thomas,³ and short or fragmentary texts such as P.Oxy. 840 and P.Oxy. 1224. These texts are (or will be) discussed elsewhere in the series to which this book belongs; there is not sufficient reason to include them as texts in an edition of the traditions that scholars usually identify as belonging to Jewish-Christian gospels.

From Quotations to Texts: Preliminary Methodological Considerations

The fact that no gospel from which this Jewish-Christian gospel tradition is excerpted survives in

any manuscript tradition of its own presents particular kinds of difficulties for anyone who seeks to reconstruct and interpret these texts. Scholars who work on these traditions need to be sensitive not only to the factors which may have affected the transmission of the texts of the writings of the 'Church Fathers' in whose works they are quoted, but also to the likelihood

that each of these authors had his own particular reason for quoting each excerpt that he did. Thus modern readers must acknowledge not only that the texts in which these excerpts have been preserved are themselves subject to the usual vagaries of textual transmission, but also that we have no means of assessing how these traditions were transmitted prior to their transmission as part of the texts of the authors in which we find them today. This places a number of obstacles between us as modern readers and the ancient texts to which these fragments are usually attributed, and it is important to acknowledge them, even if we can neither overcome nor circumvent them. First, we cannot assume that any of our sources quotes on the basis of first-hand or direct knowledge of the text that he cites; ancient authors often cited from collections of excerpts that were presented out of context.¹ Second, even if an author were quoting directly from a text that he knew, we cannot be confident that his quotation is in any way representative of that text as a whole; because he is quoting it for his own purposes, he may have quoted a passage because he found it particularly striking, not because it was characteristic of his source, or central to the purpose or vision of the author. Third, we cannot be confident how accurately an

author has quoted, whether from a collection of excerpts or from an early Christian gospel; ancient writers cited even authoritative sources with a great deal of freedom,² so it is possible that an author has cited his source inaccurately either accidentally or because he wished to alter his source so that it might better support the point that he wished to make.

This need not mean that all the patristic texts in which excerpts of Jewish-Christian gospel tradition

are preserved need to be treated with suspicion—although some certainly do—but it does mean that all need to be treated with great care. Close attention must be paid to the literary context in which each excerpt is introduced, together with any other factors that help to shed light on each passage. Thus it is necessary to try to identify the rhetorical context in which each excerpt is provided before it is practicable even to consider the interpretation of each excerpt. To put it another way, the immediate literary context that needs to be identified for each excerpt is the situation that has led an author to quote Jewish-Christian gospel tradition in order to support or to illustrate the point that he is making. For Epiphanius, that context is always polemical. This need not necessarily mean that he deliberately misquotes his source, but it does mean that when he quotes from the Gospel of the Ebionites (as modern scholars have named his source) he does so only in order to refute it and the views that he attributes to those whom he associates with it. His purpose is to mock, not to understand. For other authors, however, the reasons why they draw on Jewish-Christian gospel tradition may be more varied and unclear: because it may have been already known to their own hearers and readers as some form of authority, because it just happened to illustrate or support a point that they wished to make, regardless of its source, or because it (like any reference to another text) indicated their own learning and exegetical sophistication." Therefore although identifying the immediate literary context of a quotation and its function in the text of the author who quoted it is a necessary preliminary step in seeking to understand each tradition that is quoted, it does not follow that taking this step will in itself allow us to identify the likely literary context in a Jewish-Christian gospel from which the excerpt may be taken, never mind any supposed historical context or postulated community in which that gospel may have been composed or transmitted. If an author has misunderstood or misrepresented the text that he quotes then we may be able to say very little or nothing beyond what may be said solely on the basis of the content of the quotation in the form in which it is presented to us, recognizing fully all the

difficulties inherent in reading a quotation out of context.

One conclusion might be to despair. But that is not the approach taken here. Rather, by giving due attention to the immediate context in which each fragment of Jewish-Christian gospel tradition has been preserved, the focus of this edition of these gospels is unashamedly literary in the sense that it seeks to examine them as fragmentary texts, not necessarily as evidence to be used in the reconstruction of postulated Jewish-Christian parties whose relationship to these texts may be less clear and less direct than others have supposed. Thus although it begins by reading each fragment in its immediate literary context, this study is concerned primarily with the content and the interpretation of the texts from which they come, notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in that task—and not with the secondary question of any historical community, situation, or any other external reality that they may reflect. Such secondary questions are not unimportant, but may only be addressed once these excerpts have been investigated with a view to what they might reveal of the texts from which they come, and they lie outside the focus of this edition. We need to ask what (if anything) the surviving traditions might allow us to conclude about their postulated sources before we may consider what they might reveal of postulated authors or communities who are even further removed from us than are the excerpts themselves.

Given that these texts survive only in so far as they are preserved in the writings of other authors, so that the direct context in which we read them is that of the author who quoted or referred to them, it is tempting to eschew any attempt at identifying the gospel from which each quotation may have been taken and to consider each excerpt individually, or alongside other traditions quoted by the same author. The fact that there is continuing debate about the number of gospels from which they have been taken only increases this temptation. Thus Craig Evans has recently proposed that scholars work not with postulated gospels from which these traditions may have been taken, but with the sources that we have, i.e. traditions known variously

to Origen, Epiphanius, and Jerome. Yet, as attractive and as neat as Evans's proposal maybe, this is a book that seeks to provide an edition of the early Christian gospel texts that it discusses, so it does not seem possible to put aside the ongoing debate about the number of gospels to which these traditions may most reasonably be attributed, no matter how difficult that debate might seem, or how confusing and uncertain the ancient evidence on which it is based. Nor does it seem necessary to conclude that we cannot present a reasoned if tentative case for how best we might arrange these traditions as fragmentary witnesses to the gospels from which they may have come, even if no arrangement is likely to command universal assent.

[A Companion to James of Viterbo](#) edited by Antoine Côté and Martin Pickavé [Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition, Brill Academic Publishing, 9789004243262]

This is the first book-length treatment of the philosophical thought of one of the major thinkers at Paris in the late thirteenth century.

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Excerpt: James of Viterbo was a master of theology at the University of Paris in the last decade of the 13th century. He was a contemporary of Godfrey of Fontaines, Giles of Rome, and Henry of Ghent, and was, like them, a major player in the philosophical and theological debates that were raging in this extremely fruitful period. Even though he did not have the same influence on subsequent thinkers as his more celebrated colleagues, James developed highly original theories in areas as diverse as cognitive psychology, metaphysics, ethics, and political philosophy. However, despite his originality, despite the importance of his role in shaping the philosophical debates of his day, and despite the fact that due to the efforts of Eelcko Ypma and others we now possess the majority of James's works in modern editions, there exists no single work that provides an in-depth survey of James's philosophical thought or an assessment of its importance.¹ This is a serious gap, as James's importance in later medieval philosophy is now more and more recognized and his teachings are the focus of a growing attention.

The aim of the present volume is to fill this gap in the scholarship. The volume consists of ten chapters covering the main areas of James's philosophy (his metaphysics, theory of cognition, natural philosophy, ethics, and political thought) as well as key themes within it (his doctrines of the will, divine ideas and possibles, relations, and innatism). It also features two appendices, each dealing more

directly with a specific work of James, or in one case, a work that was falsely attributed to James.

The volume opens with Erik Saak's chapter on James's life and works. Saak charts James's development from his student days in his hometown of Viterbo to his rise as regent master of theology at the University of Paris, and from thence to senior church official as archbishop of Naples in the 1300s. Saak examines James's development against the backdrop of the social, political, and economic transformations occurring in Italy and France in the late 13th century. He notes that although most of James's philosophical oeuvre is devoted to the same kind of technical and abstract discussions one finds in the works of his contemporaries, James was by no means, as Saak puts it, "an ivory tower intellectual" removed from the debates of his time. The *De regimine Christiano* is evidence enough for this, but even James's *Quodlibeta* echo the political controversies of his day, and on these James takes significant stances. One clear instance is found in his first *Quodlibet*, question 17, which asks whether the pope can absolve a usurer who has not made restitution, but which James uses as an occasion to broach the more general question of the pope's right to intervene in secular matters. Saak notes that James bases his affirmative answer to the question on positions that are developed in fuller detail in the *De regimine Christiano*. This leads him to question the 1302 dating of the *De regimine* favored by Dyson, among others—one of the arguments for this late dating being that the composition of the *De regimine* was occasioned by the controversy between Boniface VIII and Philip IV, which came to a head in the early 1300s, much later than when James disputed his first *Quodlibet*.

Chapter 2 is devoted to James's metaphysics. Mark D. Gossiaux, a noted specialist in 13th-century metaphysics and the author of several works on various aspects of James's philosophical thought, carefully explores James's contribution to five key issues: the nature of metaphysics, the analogy of being, the relationship between essence and existence, the distinction between substance and accidents, and the problem of individuation, taking

care in each case to pick out what is unique to James's view and to indicate how he differs from his contemporaries. On the nature of metaphysics, Gossiaux shows that while James follows the mainstream Avicennian view of metaphysics as ontology, that is, as a science concerned with being qua being, and in ruling out that God is the primary subject of metaphysics, he also believes that God is included in the subject of metaphysics, a view which sets him apart from Aquinas and Giles of Rome. Turning to analogy, Gossiaux notes that while James makes extensive use of Simplicius, James's central claim that being is predicated by attribution is the view defended by Averroes. Accordingly, James grants that the concept of being is not a simple one, but refrains from saying, as Henry of Ghent did, that it is entirely devoid of unity; it is rather "simply many" and one in a "qualified sense." Gossiaux devotes close attention to spelling out the details of James's understanding of the essence-existence distinction (whether they are really distinct or not) and showing how it differs from the views advocated by Aquinas, Giles, and Henry. James's own approach to the issue is to try to articulate a solution that accommodates the partial truth found in each. Thus, distinguishing between the primary and secondary meanings of concepts, James defends the view that taken in its primary meaning *esse* is the same as essence, whereas taken in its secondary meaning it is distinct from essence. The resulting doctrine, however, is hardly one that follows the general consensus as James's theory betrays an essentialist understanding of *esse* that puts him clearly at odds with Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome. In the final section of his chapter, Gossiaux reconstructs James's account of the individuation of both material and immaterial substances. As Gossiaux demonstrates, James's thinking on this issue is guided by a distinction between singularity and individuality. Since an individual is understood to be an actual existing compound of substance and accidents, the individuality of such an individual is due not to only one principle of individuation, but to several. This allows James to adopt a position that incorporates different insights from the rival positions he criticizes.

The next chapter, by Antoine Côté, is devoted to James's theory of divine ideas and possibles and offers a particularly clear example of James's general tendency to always try to find a middle way that accommodates the best of opposing theories, though Côté raises questions about how successful James's accommodation ultimately is. On the one hand, James follows the mainstream of the medieval tradition in holding that divine ideas are nothing other than the divine essence; on the other hand, he believes that God cannot truly cognize creatures without cognizing them as other, and this means that creatures qua cognized by God must in some respect be distinct from the divine essence. In trying to articulate the particular sort of distinctness cognized creatures are supposed to enjoy, James draws inspiration from various sources, but especially from Henry of Ghent. However, his understanding of divine ideas and possibles differs from Henry's on several important points, and not necessarily to James's advantage. The chapter concludes with an examination of the (unanimously negative) reception of James's theory at the hands of Godfrey of Fontaines, Bernard of Auvergne, and William of Alnwick.

Chapter 4 is another chapter dedicated to metaphysical themes. It deals with James's theory of relations, in particular his views regarding their ontological status, and is the work of Mark Henninger, perhaps the foremost expert on medieval theories of relation. The metaphysics of relations plays a special role in James's thought, as can already be gathered from the fact that he dedicates five lengthy questions of his *Quaestiones de divinis praedicamentis* (=QDP; questions 11 to 15) to the matter, which together comprise almost three hundred pages in the critical edition. According to Henninger, James, like many 13th-century scholastics, was a foundationist; he believed that a relation is really identical with its foundation, and hence that it is also mind-independent, since the foundations of relations are real things in extra-mental existence. But like many 13th-century foundationists, James denied that relations are strictly reducible to their foundations. Henninger explores both James's various arguments in favor of the mind-independence of relations, and his

arguments in support of the view that a relation is, as James puts it, “a real mode of being,” that is, a real feature ontologically identical with its foundation, but nonetheless not reducible to it. After examining James’s theory, as set out in QDP, question 11, and comparing it with those of other major figures in the 13th century, Henninger concludes that James is best described as a “modest realist” when it comes to relations, that is, someone who is equally opposed to the conceptualist view that relations are mere beings of reason, and to the “hyper-realist” view, according to which relations are ontologically distinct from their foundations. Among the major scholastics of the late 13th century, Henry of Ghent is the one to whose theory of relations and their ontological status James comes closest.

The editors team up in Chapter 5 to examine James’s natural philosophy. According to the medieval philosophers, the object of natural philosophy is change and the features of reality that make change possible or relate to it in an essential way. The chapter is organized in three sections, focusing first on form and matter as the inner principles of change, time, and place as the features of at least some kinds of change, and, finally, on James’s depiction of the main varieties of change, namely, qualitative, quantitative, and substantial, as well as his concept of “absolute action.” The authors devote special attention in the first section to James’s innovative theory of matter. James’s analysis leads him to postulate alongside “bare” matter the existence of “incomplete forms,” which are both active (but not actual) principles and the “beginnings” (exordia) of the full-fledged forms that are the terminus of change. Acknowledging the Augustinian inspiration of the doctrine, James explicitly calls these active principles “seminal reasons.” He is aware, of course, of the more obvious objections the doctrine faces; in particular, the objection that the preexistence of all forms in the guise of seminal reasons makes real change impossible. James, however, denies that this consequence follows from his own understanding of the theory. After discussing the more noteworthy features of James’s account of time and place, the chapter goes on to

examine James’s characterization of the main sorts of change. Here the authors highlight James’s tendency to “modalize” change, that is, to view forms in potency (whether qualitative or substantial) and those same forms in actuality as only modally distinct. This tendency is of course of a piece with the doctrine of seminal reasons; it is also of a piece with his conception of “formal self-motion,” a form’s “inner drive” to completion, which turns out to be the most important causal factor in the explanation of qualitative and substantial change.

Turning to psychology, the next two chapters (Chapters 6 and 7) focus on what is surely one of the most enduringly fascinating aspects of James’s philosophy: his theory of knowledge, and the innatist premises that underwrite it. These two chapters are the work of Jean-Luc Solère, the author of an important body of work on medieval theories of cognition that makes him ideally qualified to explain and assess the originality and importance of James’s cognitive theory.

The first of these two chapters focuses on James’s original version of innatism. In the first section, Solère works out the basic tenets that underpin James’s cognitive psychology. He notes that James wants to provide an account of cognition that assigns the principal active role to the mind while retaining as much as possible of Aristotle’s account, which emphasizes the soul’s passivity in perception and cognition. James’s solution, which owes a lot to Simplicius but also, as Solère decisively establishes, to Philoponus, is to endow the soul with sets of innate predispositions, called “aptitudes” or idoneitates, which James describes as “incomplete actualities” of particular forms. These aptitudes are more than the general capacity any human mind has for knowledge, but less than the full-blown possession of a particular form. James holds that these predispositions move themselves formally but not efficiently to complete actuality, but that their unfolding as full-blown forms requires “stimulation” or “triggering” by material objects. In the second section, Solère turns to a closer characterization of James’s innatism, noting that it extends not only to the activity of the intellect but to sensory perception as well; he also seeks to highlight the most

significant parallels between James's innatism and that of other authors. While there are superficial similarities with the views of Plato and Augustine, James is closest in inspiration and in point of detail to the Neoplatonists Boethius, Simplicius, and Philoponus. His views also display notable structural similarities with the more famous and much later forms of innatism advocated by the likes of Descartes and Leibniz. The last section seeks to situate James's theory of predispositions in the context of his times, comparing it with Aquinas's theory of innate habitus, as well as with the innatism of Richard Fishacre and Thomas of York.

The second of Solère's two chapters is devoted to three issues pertaining to the nature and "parts" of the intellective soul and its mode of operation: the distinction of the intellective soul's faculties, the existence and nature of intelligible species, and the knowledge of substance. On the first issue, James sides with Aquinas in holding that there is a real distinction between the soul and its faculties. However, by interpreting faculties in terms of general abilities or propensities (*ideoneitates*), as opposed to particular propensities for particular kinds of objects, he recasts the distinction between different psychological faculties in a completely new way. This should not surprise us, since it is entirely in line with his innatism. This reconceptualization of faculties as general *ideoneitates* also allows James to reject the traditional distinction between the so-called "agent intellect" and "possible intellect." In his examination of James's discussion of intelligible species, devices many of his contemporaries consider necessary for intellectual cognition to occur, Solère notes that while James is critical of the arguments marshalled in favor of intelligible species by the theory's supporters, he does not want to dispense with them altogether. Since a species is a form of an external thing relative to a cognitive power, and the soul does possess such forms in the guise of *ideoneitates*, it follows that it does have species, in that sense of the term. In the last section of the chapter, Solère examines James's solution to the problem of our knowledge of substance, that is, the problem of knowing how the intellect can know a thing's substance, if knowledge of reality is channeled

through phantasms, and phantasms convey information pertaining only to a thing's accidental features. James's answer, Solère shows, follows directly from his innatist premises.

Chapter 8 is devoted to another central theme in James's philosophical thought and indeed one of paramount importance in post-1277 medieval philosophy: the will. Stephen Dumont, the chapter's author, notes that James held more disputations on free will than on any other single topic. While still a student at Paris, he had witnessed firsthand the polarized and public debate between the great masters on the issue. On one side was Henry of Ghent, who repeatedly attacked Thomas Aquinas's teaching as deterministic and developed a strong "voluntarist" conception of the will as a self-moving power. At the other extreme was Godfrey of Fontaines, who forcefully rejected Henry's idea of a self-moving will as a violation of the most fundamental principles of Aristotelian philosophy. Dumont examines James's theory of the will in detail, focusing on James's inaugural *Quodlibet*, question 7, and paying particular attention to his explicit location of it in relation to Aquinas, Henry, and Godfrey. Of particular interest is James's own account of the will's self-motion, which again makes use of the notion of *ideoneitates*. This shows once more how James employs his innovative understanding of natural processes in his psychology. Dumont also explores a little noticed but extensive (not to mention scathing) response to James's new theory by Godfrey himself, who now diagnoses within it a further, even deeper conflict with Aristotle. The chapter concludes that James's theory of free will is certainly a voluntarism, but one moderated from the radical version advanced by Henry. In the end, James goes to some lengths to accommodate his theory to Aquinas in ways that Henry would have certainly rejected. This assessment seems to be confirmed by James's handling of a set of related issues, such as Anselm's doctrine of the two affections, the concept of *sine qua non* causality, and the location of the moral virtues.

Ultimately, James's treatment can be fairly seen as a culmination of the entire 13th-century Parisian

debate on the will just before a new theory arrived with John Duns Scotus.

With the next chapter the volume turns to yet another area in which James's original turn of mind comes fully to the fore: his ethical theory. Thomas Osborne considers three aspects of James's moral teachings: his doctrine of self-love as the basis of all acquired virtue, his theory of the virtues in general, both acquired and infused, and his doctrine that legal justice and acquired friendship are the forms of the acquired virtues. The most controversial of these three doctrines is undoubtedly the first, as James, in opposition to the common view held by Aquinas, Giles of Rome, and Godfrey of Fontaines, defends the thesis that all acquired virtue including natural love of God is ultimately based on self-love. Osborne argues that James's theory of self-love must be understood against the backdrop of his Neoplatonic understanding of love as unity and in light of his interpretation of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.8, which is very close to that of Siger of Brabant. Osborne then turns to James's theory of the virtues, explicating James's contention that the cardinal virtues can be acquired or infused and his understanding of the connection of the virtues and their subject, highlighting the ways in which James differs from his contemporaries in these matters. In the last section of the chapter, Osborne focuses on James's doctrine of legal justice and friendship as the forms of the acquired virtues. Although James borrows significant elements of his teachings on the virtues from Henry and Aquinas, his views "set him apart from his contemporaries and predecessors."

The final chapter is dedicated to James's political philosophy. It is authored by Robert Dyson, one of the leading specialists in medieval political philosophy and the editor of James's *De regimine Christiano*, the Augustinian Hermit's magnum opus in the area of political thought, to the discussion of which the chapter is devoted. At the outset, Dyson signals his disagreement with Henri Xavier Arquillière's influential assessment of the *De regimine* as the "first systematic exposition of the conception of the Church." Although the first and shorter of the two parts of the *De regimine* is

indeed dedicated to ecclesiology, Dyson argues that the real import of the work lies in the political doctrine that is presented in the second part, the central thrust of which is to assert the sovereignty of the pope in both the spiritual and temporal realms. Dyson dates the *De regimine* to 1302, that is, at the height of the conflict between Boniface viii—to whom the *De regimine* is dedicated—and King Philip iv of France, and believes that the work's significance is best understood in that context. Accordingly, the first section of the chapter is devoted to a review of the main episodes of the controversy, from its origins in a tax dispute in 1296, to the promulgation of the bull *Ausculta fili*, in 1301. Then, after briefly examining the style

and literary character of the *De regimine*, Dyson turns his attention to its central argument, which pertains to the question of the boundary between priestly power and secular power. Of special importance, as Dyson underscores, is the distinction James draws between two sorts of royal power, the royal power over temporal things and the royal power over spiritual things. The first power is that wielded by kings; the second is that possessed by priests insofar as they judge sinners. James, in other words, does not believe that royal power is confined to secular rulers. As Dyson argues, this has the effect of offsetting the objection (later articulated by Marsilius of Padua in the *Defensor pacis*) that since the priestly power is limited to the spiritual realm it has no application to temporal matters. By making the priestly power a royal power, James ensures that this is not the case. And since James also believes that the spiritual jurisdiction is superior to the temporal one, this means that the spiritual ruler's judgements take precedence over those of the temporal ruler in temporal matters, at least to the extent that sin and salvation are at stake. Given that the pope stands supreme in the realm of spiritual power and that all human actions, in principle, can involve sin, the pope's jurisdiction extends *de jure* to all human actions. Dyson denies that James's views are particularly original here—they largely echo those suggested in Innocent iii's bull *Novit* of 1204, and those deployed by Giles in his *De ecclesiastica potestate*—but he does laud the sophistication and

subtlety of James's execution of his hierocratic program.

Two smaller contributions have been appended to the volume, each dealing with a specific work. The first appendix is Stephen Dumont's piece on the attribution of the *Quaestiones septem de Verbo*. These *Quaestiones* had long been considered an authentic work of James of Viterbo, largely on the strength of stylistic considerations and because they had been copied alongside three of James's four *Quodlibeta* in the only manuscript in which they were thought to be extant, namely Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell'Archiginnasio A 971. However, as Dumont conclusively demonstrates, the *Quaestiones de Verbo* are not the work of James at all, but rather that of his younger confrère in the Augustinian order, Henry of Friemar. The first important step towards establishing this fact lies in pointing out, as Dumont is the first to do, that the *Quaestiones de Verbo* are extant in another manuscript, namely, Toulouse Bibliothèque d'Étude et du Patrimoine 739, where they are attributed to one Master Henry of the Augustinians. Dumont shows that the Henry in question is none other than Henry of Friemar, who had been regent Master in Paris for the Augustinians in the first decade of the 14th century. That Friemar is the author of the *Quaestiones de Verbo* is shown by an examination of catalogues of his works compiled by later members of the order that list the *Quaestiones de Verbo*, and by doctrinal parallels between the *Quaestiones de Verbo* and Friemar's *Quodlibet*.

The second appendix, by Gianpiero Tavolaro, presents a suggestive new hypothesis regarding the dating, nature, and purpose of one of James's most enigmatic works, his so-called *Abbreviatio in r Sententiarum Aegidii Romani*, found in a single autograph manuscript, Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale, vii C 52. Scholars who have studied this work, the title of which was added in the 15th century, know that it is not, in fact, an abridgement of Giles's commentary: the solutions presented in it are either those of Giles or those of Thomas Aquinas—and indeed James often prefers the latter to the positions advocated by his confrère. Because James does not defend his own personal

views in the *Abbreviatio*, it has been generally assumed by scholars that it was compiled by James for the purposes of teaching, either at the time of his lectorate in Viterbo, in 1283–85, or at the time of his later lectorate in Naples, in 1300–02. But Tavolaro shows that there are problems with these datings. After a careful study of the stylistic characteristics of the *Abbreviatio*, the nature of the genre to which it belongs, and the particular way James uses the passages he cites, he concludes that the *Abbreviatio* consists of the notes used by James to lecture on the *Sentences* in Paris between 1287 and 1288. According to Tavolaro, we should therefore rather refer to the work as James's *Lectura super primum librum Sententiarum*.

As this overview makes clear, the contributions in this volume deal primarily with James of Viterbo's philosophical teachings, including his natural theology. This is not to say that James did not also make valuable contributions to theology proper. He did.² However our objective in preparing this volume was to provide the first comprehensive assessment of James's philosophy, not his theology. One of the outcomes of our undertaking is a reassessment of James's role in late 13th-century thought. James should be regarded as one of the major philosophical voices in the period between Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus. He not only developed his philosophical views in constant exchange with his contemporaries, as the reception of his positions demonstrates, but he was also considered a force to be reckoned with by his contemporaries. That their reactions were often critical can be explained by the truly innovative and somewhat radical nature of his views, especially his theory of ideoneitates and its application to natural philosophy and psychology. Moreover, his version of innatism, to give just one example, makes James one of the most important and most systematic defenders of innatism in the history of philosophy.

We hope that by making his philosophy more widely accessible the present volume will encourage further research not just into James of Viterbo, but also into wider aspects of late 13th-century thought. James, for instance, is a good

example of how the Greek commentators on Aristotle, especially Simplicius, newly translated from the Greek into Latin by William of Moerbeke, became increasingly important for later medieval Latin Aristotelianism. Moreover, with Christopher Schabel's edition of James's three Ordinary Questions on the will underway, we are coming closer to having all of James's major works available in modern critical editions; some of his texts have now also been translated into modern languages. This too will help to make James's thought better known to everyone interested in medieval thought. <>

[Agape, Justice, and Law: How Might Christian Love Shape Law?](#) edited by Robert F. Cochran, Zachary R. Calo [Law and Christianity, Cambridge University Press, 9781107175280]

In a provoking essay, philosopher Jeffrie Murphy asks: 'what would law be like if we organized it around the value of Christian love, and if we thought about and criticized law in terms of that value?'. This book brings together leading scholars from a variety of disciplines to address that question. Scholars have given surprisingly little attention to assessing how the central Christian ethical category of love - agape - might impact the way we understand law. This book aims to fill that gap by investigating the relationship between agape and law in Scripture, theology, and jurisprudence, as well as applying these insights to contemporary debates in criminal law, tort law, elder law, immigration law, corporate law, intellectual property, and international relations. At a time when the discourse between Christian and other world views is more likely to be filled with hate than love, the implications of agape for law are crucial.

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Excerpt: The idea that law should be a manifestation of love stands in stark contrast to reigning modern legal theories. Liberalism controlled legal discourse through much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Its focus is on protecting individual rights, but liberalism offers few resources for adjudicating competing rights

claims. Law and economics judges law based on efficiency, but has shorn law of its moral depth and provided little basis for protecting human dignity (at least for the "have nots"). Critical legal studies and its interest group progeny have deconstructed law and highlighted ways in which law masks power, but have failed to provide a basis for reconstructing law so as to protect the common good; if, as Critical legal studies asserts, law is merely power, it is likely to merely serve the interests of the powerful.

Though each of these schools of thought has brought insight to law, each is ultimately reductionistic, pointing to only a limited aspect of law's reality. These theories have also divorced law from the deeper sources of moral meaning that informed legal thought in the past. This book offers agape as a resource for critiquing contemporary legal theory and for thinking anew about concrete problems within law. Law grounded in agape offers the possibility of more fully encouraging human flourishing in relationship and community than the theories that have dominated legal discourse in recent decades. Agape, as understood today, has its source in the Christian tradition, but we believe it offers a vision for law that will be of interest to those from other traditions as well, both because they are likely to have analogous sources of value and because agape presents an inherently attractive foundation for law.

In the ancient world, "agape" was a seldom used and colorless word, analogous to the English word "like." According to Josef Pieper, "it was a word begging for meaning and Christianity gave it meaning." Agape became the Christian word for love. Forms of it occur 341 times in the New Testament. It was the word the New Testament used to capture the love Jesus commanded for God, neighbors, and enemies. Judaism is also responsible for some of what agape has come to mean. The Jewish translators of the Septuagint chose "agape" as the word for the love of God and neighbor, which Jesus identified as the two most important commands in the Mosaic Law.

Four Forms of Love — Agape's meaning is best understood when compared with other Greek words for love — eros, philia, and storge.

The broad range of meanings for eros illustrates that even four terms for love may not be enough. Eros can be used for three very different forms of love — Platonic contemplation of God, romantic love, and sexual attraction. These forms of eros share an attraction to beauty (whether of God, a wonderful person, or an exotic dancer). Their starting point is the need of the lover and their goal is the satisfaction of that need. Eros's danger is obsession — one in the throes of eros may sacrifice reason, money, family, friends, and everything and everyone else for the beloved.

Philia is friendship, a love of those with whom one enjoys common interests. Friends look at something together, whereas lovers look at one another. Philia can be, as Aristotle taught, a school for virtue. The modern notion of friendship often misses this aspect of philia. In the classic notion, the goodness of a friend is part of the project of friends (a characteristic philia shares with agape). Like eros, philia is exclusive — it selects as its objects particular, attractive individuals.

Storge is natural affection, a love like that felt by parents (or at least most parents) for their children (or at least most of their children). In ancient Greek, it was almost always used to describe relationships within the family. Storge can be generated by regular contact with its object and can be felt toward those who are unattractive. It is characterized by loyalty. It is likely to inspire deep ties to the local community, but weak ties or even hostility toward other communities and the broader community. It, like eros and philia, can generate unfair treatment of those outside one's intimate circle. Jesus implicitly criticized this aspect of storge when he asked, "From whom do kings of the earth take toll or tribute? From their children or from others?"

In contrast to the other forms of love, agape is "other-regarding care," "unclaiming love," and "universal benevolence." It is other-directed, offered without regard for the interests of the lover

or the attractive qualities of the beloved. Timothy P. Jackson defines agapic love as requiring the unconditional willing of the good for the other, equal regard for the well-being of the other, and passionate service open to self-sacrifice for the sake of the other. Gene Outka characterizes agape as "a regard for the neighbor [that] is for every person qua human existent, to be distinguished from those special traits, actions, etc., which distinguish particular personalities from each other." C. S. Lewis notes that the forms of love other than agape are "always directed to objects which the lover finds in some way intrinsically loveable." By contrast, agape enables one "to love what is not naturally lovable; lepers, criminals, enemies, morons, the sulky, the superior and the sneering." Agape, in other words, is not based on the merit of the recipient, but an ethical duty grounded in the humanity of the other. Agapic love is both particular and universal. It takes as its object the particular neighbor one confronts — the wounded traveler on the side of the road — yet it emanates from a universal love that does not discriminate. As Kierkegaard writes, "Since one's neighbor is every man, unconditionally every man, all distinctions are indeed removed from the object."

Like friendship, agapic love is aspirational. It wants the good for the beloved, including the moral good. As Augustine says, "Love reprimands, ill will echoes." This aspirational character of agape is captured in a line from the movie *Junebug*. Ashley (played by Amy Adams) says to her sullen, ne'er-do-well husband Johnny, "God loves you just the way you are but he loves you too much to let you stay that way."

Paul offers the classic New Testament account of agape:

[Agape] is patient; [agape] is kind;
[agape] is not envious or boastful or
arrogant or rude. It does not insist on its
own way; it is not irritable or resentful; it
does not rejoice in wrongdoing, but
rejoices in the truth. It bears all things,
believes all things, hopes all things,
endures all things.

Agape and Justice — Amidst a general recognition among scholars of agapic love's centrality to the

Gospel message and Christian ethics, the relationship between agape and justice has been a hotly contested issue. This issue is particularly important in determining agape's possible implications for law, politics, and social responsibility. Christian thinkers, however, have achieved little consensus on the question of whether agape stands in tension with justice or is rather its fulfillment. Competing theological understandings of agape continue to inform competing understandings of how Christianity should relate to the late modern liberal order.

Some authors contrast agape and justice. Anders Nygren argues that agape supersedes the order of justice — once one is committed to an agapic regime, there is no need for justice. Reinhold Niebuhr holds love and justice in "constant tension," as individual "ideals of brotherhood" and "the moral ambiguities of communities" collide within moral and social life. David VanDrunen identifies agapic love as the standard to be applied in one's personal life and in the church, and justice (generally retributive justice) as the standard to be applied by the state. In contrast, Paul Ramsey, Timothy Jackson, and Nicholas Wolterstorff argue that agape demands justice.

Gene Outka notes that different understandings of justice may be at the heart of many of the disagreements about the relationship between agape and justice. He identifies four ways of understanding justice that might relate in different ways to agape: (1) "similar treatment for similar cases," (2) "to each according to his merit or works," (3) "to each the same thing," and (4) "to each according to his needs." Outka identifies the last as closest to agape.

Reconciliation of agape and justice may be in part a matter of understanding both concepts in a biblical sense. On the one hand, biblical justice may look more like love than its modern counterparts. Ramsey argues that agape "elevated [earthly cities] and their justice was infused and transformed by new perspectives, limits, and principles." Biblical justice may include meeting people's needs, a role that most in the modern world consign to charity. Wolterstorff notes that the section of Isaiah with

which Jesus defines his ministry' describes biblical justice in broader terms than the justice of Enlightenment individualism. Biblical justice is not only a call "to let the oppressed go free" but also "to share your bread with the hungry, and bring the homeless poor into your house [and] cover [the naked]."

Moreover, biblical love — agape — may look more like justice than its modern counterparts. Timothy Jackson notes that, "Punishment is often love's taking justice seriously." Paul Ramsey has argued that just war theory was developed by Christians as an application of agape toward both aggressors and victims. Agape will restrain sin, for the sake of both sinners and victims.

William Temple thoughtfully describes the relationship agape and justice might have to legal institutions: "[justice is] the primary form of love in social organization." Justice is the way agape is manifested by those with responsibilities to a group. Those in authority should not show love to privileged individuals only, but to all who might be affected by their actions. We are communal beings and must attend in love to everyone involved. Justice may be the most loving thing one can do for all of the people for whom one is responsible.

Agape and Jurisprudence — While agape has been an important dynamic in Christian thought about political justice, surprisingly little attention has been given in the modern era to its relationship to law and jurisprudence. Neither theologians nor legal scholars have focused on how agape — the central ethical category of Christianity — should inform thinking about legal meaning and order.

This omission of agape from Christian legal thought might be explained by both theological and jurisprudential factors. Many Catholics and Protestants have resisted seeing agape as an apposite category for legal thought. Within each tradition, a different pair of dichotomies has tended to separate law from agape. Among Catholics, that dichotomy is nature and grace. As Michael Moreland notes in his essay herein, "while Protestant theologians ... explored at great length the distinctiveness of agapic Christian love in ethics

and politics, Catholic writers more often made arguments about natural law and practical reason when reflecting on social questions." There has been a tendency within certain strands of Catholic social thought, particularly the Thomistic tradition, to separate nature and grace and, by extension, law and love.

While Protestant social thought has given more sustained attention to agape, much of it is colored by a suspicion that love is counter to the vocation of law and politics. The perceived dichotomy between law and grace has limited the influence agape might have on the civil law. Particularly within main currents of Reformed and Lutheran thought, the coercive work of the state and the redemptive work of the church remain at a vast remove from each other. This impulse is captured in Luther's warning that ruling the world by the Gospel, rather than the "godly estate" of the sword, would loose "the ropes and chains of the savage wild beasts." "Christians, among themselves and by and for themselves," might live according to a love that forgives and does not seek redress, but this cannot be the basis for a legal order. A ruler might engage in acts of mercy or clemency but agape, in the full sense of its Christian meaning, has little to offer the operation of law. David VanDrunen's essay herein addressing why "Christian Love is an Improper Category to Apply to Civil Law" stands within such a tradition. These disjunctive accounts of the relationship between law and love continue to bind the Catholic and Protestant jurisprudential imaginations.

Modern legal thought poses additional challenges to thinking agapically about law. In the modern era, we seldom think of law having any relationship to theology, much less the theological virtue of love. The tension between law and love is not an entirely modern phenomenon, but something has changed in modernity, particularly with respect to how law is conceptualized in relationship to religion. As Remi Brague argues, "in modern societies, law, far from being conceived of in any relation with the divine, is quite simply the rule that the human community gives itself, considering only ends that it proposes for itself."³⁶ Law in modernity is thus increasingly

defined as a closed system of meaning, subject to its own internal rules, and reduced to an expression of self-interested power. Theology, in turn, is not only irrelevant for understanding law, but is rendered antithetical to the construction of legal meaning.

Given these obstacles, how might agape meaningfully speak to law? The essays in this volume explore this relationship. Possibilities include the following:

A New Framework for Thinking about Law — Though we have noted ways in which there might be both theological and jurisprudential resistance to the idea, agape offers resources for drawing Christian thought into conversation with law. Recent years have seen the development of ever more sophisticated scholarship on the relationship between religion and law, but there have been relatively few efforts to connect theology with fundamental questions of law and legal theory. Agape provides a way to facilitate this connection, while also speaking to the distinctive conditions of legal modernity. An agapic account of law addresses questions of power and mercy, judgment and forgiveness, autonomy and the common good. It offers ways to rethink issues arising in the practice of law and the operation of legal institutions. More generally, it provokes reflection about the deeper moral life of law that has eluded modern legal theory.

The questions addressed in this volume stand within the long tradition of Christian political and legal thought. Yet, it is the current state of legal thought that gives urgency and shape to this project. As noted in the beginning of this introduction, modern schools of legal thought have failed to provide a grounding for law that encourages human flourishing. The possibility of agape-grounded law challenges the tendencies of liberalism toward isolationism, of law and economics toward selfishness, and of Critical legal studies toward cynicism.

The deconstruction of law, which often has revealed law as mere instrumental power, also may open space for law's reconstruction on theologically

informed terms. In our view, agape can both illuminate the modern situation and serve as a constructive alternative. As Oliver O'Donovan writes, "Recovery of theological description enables us to understand not only what the goods of our institutions and traditions are, but why and how those goods are limited and corruptible, and to what corresponding errors they have made us liable." This volume offers agape as a source of theological description for diagnosing both the limits and the possibilities of law in the late-modern age.

Agape and the Substance of Law — As Dallas Willard and Gary Black Jr. have argued:

[In the] social or governmental setting, [agapic] love does what it can to establish and sustain arrangements and practices that will benefit everyone or as many as possible. . . [Agape compels us] to care deeply for the economic, political, social, familial, and religious circumstances within our communities, because we care for (love) the people interacting and engaging in all these aspects of human life.

Jesus summarized the Mosaic Law as love of God and neighbor. Much of the Mosaic Law, as well as much modern law (from the prohibition of murder to the prohibition of double parking), requires citizens to act agapically toward one another. Law based on love would protect all citizens, especially those who have the greatest need — "the widow, the orphan, and the stranger."

Too many people view law either as (1) merely a means of protecting their interests, or (2) too corrupt and corrupting to be worthy of their involvement. However, agape might lead legislators, judges, lawyers, and voters to adopt laws that treat citizens well. One need only travel to one of the many countries that do not have functioning legal systems to see the harm citizens suffer. Citizens who do not have access to the rule of law suffer great injustice — sex trafficking, wage slavery, casual rape, and police brutality. These citizens need law. Those motivated by agape will be passionate in protecting victims and enforcing the law. Passing and enforcing just laws is one of the most loving things people can do. Law

grounded in agape may be a way of thinking about and developing law that will bring meaning to those involved in creating law and yield human flourishing for those impacted by law.

Agape, Law, and Character — Agapeic law would not simply be concerned with making people's lives more pleasant. As Jeffrie Murphy notes, agape is not "cuddly." If agape is the aim, a country will "design legal practices and institutions with a view to the moral and spiritual improvement in virtue of affected citizens." Murphy argues that law organized around the value of agape, from regulations governing pornography to the treatment of those in prison, will be concerned with citizens' character. Law can teach citizens to care for one another. In the Hebrew scripture, love for neighbor manifested itself in a practical outworking in everyday life — placing a retaining wall around the roof to keep people from falling and allowing the poor to glean leftovers from the orchards and fields. Hopefully, citizens who engage in such practices and their modern counterparts will develop the habit — the virtue — of caring for other people in ways not required by law.

There are, however, dangers to grounding law in love. C.S. Lewis expresses it well:

Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies.

But the risk of the abuse does not necessarily mean that something should be avoided all together. The danger of overreach may merely be a risk. Citizens should be aware of, as they seek to faithfully ground law in love. Moreover, law truly grounded in love will give citizens a substantial amount of freedom within which to operate, at times to fail, and to grow morally.

Essays herein explore law's relationship to agape as a matter of both theory and practice. Part I traces the development of agape in Jesus and Paul — the two most important biblical contributors to its meaning. Part II explores many of the issues raised in this introduction: the meaning of agape, the challenge of acting with agape in law toward all

people, the promises and risks of agapeic law, the tensions both between love and justice and between love and law, the danger that law grounded in agapeic love will be oppressive, and the danger that law grounded in agapeic love will not have the muscle to rule effectively. Part III considers the role agape might have in particular areas of law — criminal punishment, judging, torts, elder law, immigration, corporations, intellectual property, and international relations.

Throughout the history of Christianity, many of the greatest Christian thinkers have explored the meaning of agape. The essays herein explore and build on the insights of many of these, including: Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, John Calvin, Soren Kierkegaard, Anders Nygren, Gene H. Outka, Paul Ramsey, C.S. Lewis, Martin Luther King, Jr., Reinhold Niebuhr, and Popes Pius, John Paul II, Benedict XVI, and Francis.

This book is designed for Christians who want to think deeply and seriously about the implications of the Christian faith for civil law, as well as for non-Christians who want to understand how Christians might thoughtfully engage this subject. Moreover, we believe that agape is not merely a duty imposed on Christians, but is a compelling vision of human relations that will be attractive to those in other traditions. In this respect, agape offers a new and timely lens through which to think about questions of pressing import within law and politics. Yet agape is not simply another interpretive paradigm or another variant of "law and" scholarship. Rather, agape might be understood as the end of law and as thus containing within it a new jurisprudential logic. If this is the case, agape offers ways to fundamentally reorient our thinking about legal meaning and legal problems.

Part I: Biblical Foundations

In Part I, Robert Cochran and Darryl Tippens explore the contributions to agape's meaning by its two main New Testament proponents, Jesus and the Apostle Paul. Cochran examines what Jesus' words and life teach about agape, and considers their implications for both the substance and administration of law. Tippens considers Paul's treatment of agape as law, as epistemology, and

as justice, as well as its communal, story-shaped, and liturgical nature. He explores implications for both legal education and law practice.

Part II: Modern Perspectives on Agape, Justice, And Law

Part II presents normative and theological essays on the relationship between agape, justice, and law. Both Linda Ross Meyer and Timothy Jackson identify dangers that can arise when mixing love and law. Meyer argues that the "chaotic good" of a loving humility may be an antidote to a sometimes-evil lawfulness, as well as a sometimes-ravaging love. Jackson calls on love to place limits on law, and law to place limits on love.

Like many of the authors in this volume, Nicholas Wolterstorff and David VanDrunen explore the relationship between agape and justice. Wolterstorff argues that there is no conflict between them, either in their motivation or in their direction. He also criticizes the notion of retributive justice and argues that the New Testament supports a "reprobative" account of punishment. In contrast, VanDrunen argues that there is tension between justice and Christian love; that God has ordained the state to enact retributive justice (tempered by forbearance); and that Christian love finds its full and proper expression in the life of the church, not in the government.

Part III: "What's Love Got to Do with It?" Applications of Agape to Law

Authors in this Part provide assessments of agape's application to particular areas of law. The essays appear roughly in order of the size of the group or entity affected by law, from individual criminal defendants (Jeffrie G. Murphy on punishment and Charles Mathewes on judging) and injured parties (Michael Moreland on torts), through vulnerable groups (Lucia Silecchia on

the elderly and Jennifer Lee Koh on immigrants), to commercial institutions and their rights and responsibilities (Thomas C. Berg on intellectual property and Lyman Johnson on corporations), and

finally to nations (Alberto Coll on international politics).

These essays bring the promise and challenge of agape to contested questions of contemporary importance. Biblical themes run throughout the analyses: love of enemies and aliens, human judgment, violence and peace, care for the sick and poor, and the responsibilities of wealth and power. In addition, some authors give substantial attention to treatment of agape and law within particular Christian traditions and by some seminal Christian theologians.

Immortality and the Body in the Age of Milton

edited by John Rumrich, Stephen M. Fallon
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Seventeenth-century England teemed with speculation on body and its relation to soul. Descartes' dualist certainty was countered by materialisms, whether mechanist or vitalist. The most important and distinctive literary reflection of this ferment is John Milton's vitalist or animist materialism, which underwrites the cosmic worlds of *Paradise Lost*. In a time of philosophical upheaval and innovation, Milton and an unusual collection of fascinating and diverse contemporary writers, including John Donne, Margaret Cavendish, John Bunyan, and Hester Pulter, addressed the potency of the body, now viewed not as a drag on the immaterial soul or a site of embarrassment but as an occasion for heroic striving and a vehicle of transcendence. This collection addresses embodiment in relation to the immortal longings of early modern writers, variously abetted by the new science, print culture, and the Copernican upheaval of the heavens.

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Excerpt: We possess or are possessed by a narrative sensibility, an inner chronicler capable of entertaining actions and potential outcomes based on recollected observation and experience. Such consciousness allows a body to consider its present situation as Shakespeare's Macbeth does: as if standing upon a "bank and shoal of time" while observing the flow of events from past to future (1.7.6). The bodily benefit of a reflecting, interested intelligence, coherent and more or less continuous, seems obvious. From the standpoint of evolutionary biology it appears as a dynamic adaptation that has greatly improved humanity's odds of survival, at least in the short run. Yet it is also destabilizing. The inherent ability to recount and recalculate one's current position in the course of life eventually produces a chilling awareness of an inescapable and universal destination. The persistent intelligence abetting the instinct to survive never stops reminding us that we shall not. On the one hand, literary culture greatly enhances the

resources available to our inner chroniclers and thus equips us to live, as Kenneth Burke has claimed, by providing an ample repository of situational prudence. On the other hand, it bears the inscrutable impression of a long and varied struggle to cope with the perceived inevitability of death. This collection considers early modern points of reference for this more complicated cultural impulse.

In early modern Europe the predominant cultural system for accom-modating the stubborn fact of mortality was Christianity, specifically its promise of salvation. The rational soul of orthodox Christian theology may be taken as a rough psychological equivalent to what is now signified by consciousness or the conscious self. Confronted by the prospect of death as the end of that self, the genius of the Christian religion is to beg the question by simply assuming the immortality of the soul. Belief in the ghostly persistence of a spiritual essence or shade was after all not uncommon in the ancient world. Resurrection of the body rather than mere continuance of the self's spiritual essence became the essential article of Christian faith, and from its earliest days. In the middle of the first century, decades before the gospels appear, Saint Paul argues in a logical chain of conditional propositions that refusal to believe in resurrection of the body entails refusal to believe in either Christ's own resurrection or the efficacy of his sacrifice: "if the dead are not raised, then Christ has not been raised. If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins. Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished" (i Cor. 15:13-18). Paul insists not on immortality of the soul, which he assumes, but resurrection of the body. The Christian idea of salvation retains the crucial sense of the Latin word from which the word "salvation" derives, *salvos*, "safe, unharmed," and its Indo-European root, *solh*, meaning "whole."

The fundamental tenet that the whole person undergoes resurrection from death runs counter to dualistic traditions also central to Christianity. Yet the promise of bodily salvation did not require the faithful to deny a broader ontological dualism. The divide between matter and spirit was also a tenet

of orthodoxy, and belief in the existence of disembodied or purely spiritual beings was commonplace. Angels were generally conceived of in this way — as free-floating intelligences. Postmortem but pre-doomsday human souls were thought to persist in an obscure, bodiless condition known as the "middle state," which was commonly thought by Protestants to anticipate but not complete the embodied soul's final status. In short, although embodiment remained for early modern believers definitive of human being specifically and critical to the faith, the orthodox ontology of Christianity was broadly dualistic. In Milton's time, however, the faithcritical tenet of holistic human being became increasingly difficult to reconcile with a philosophy of ontological dualism.

Appearing in 1637, the same year that *Lycidas* saw print, Descartes in the *Discourse on Method* first explored the distinction between mind (unextended substance) and body (extended substance), a distinction he elaborated explicitly four years later in the *Meditations on First Philosophy*. For Descartes, the mind or soul (in French time means both) was thus linked to but ontologically independent of the body while nonetheless consciously correlated with its physiological mechanism. Descartes's radical dualism was not generally embraced, and in England the philosophical reaction against it was swift. Soon after Descartes's death in 1650, Henry More, for example, insisted that thinking substance, though ontologically distinct, is inextricable from bodily or extended substance, "it being of the very essence of whatever is, to have parts or extension in some measure or other"; "the Soule dilates it self in the dilating of the Body, and so possesses it through all the members thereof." Descartes's substantial segregation of mind and body, however, began with fundamental skepticism toward any entity outside the realm of thought, including one's own unthinking body. Insistence on the soul's "amplitude of presence" is in terms of More's philosophy not a counterargument to that skepticism but a contradiction on the basis of a metaphysical axiom. He merely defined being as necessarily involving extension "in some measure or other." In short, More does not offer a reply on

epistemological grounds to Descartes's skepticism toward the world or one's own body as part of the world.

The mind's or soul's bodily immanence is not defended on such grounds until the twentieth century, with the development of phenomenology. Edmund Husserl in establishing this school of philosophy explicitly decides to restrict himself, like Descartes, to an epistemological frame of reference. Rather than endorse Descartes's methodological skepticism regarding the outside world, however, he famously resorts to suspension (*epoché*) of ontological inquiry altogether, bracketing off any fundamental question about what exists, and therefore any skepticism toward it, to pursue instead an unfettered examination of the world as it is experienced:

We put out of action the general thesis which belongs to the essence of the natural standpoint; we place in brackets whatever it includes respecting the nature of Being: this entire natural world therefore, which is continually "there for us," "present to our hand" and will ever remain there, is a "fact world" of which we continue to be conscious, even though it pleases us to put it in brackets.

Where Descartes had begun with methodical doubt regarding the external world, including the body, and found ontological assurance only in thought, Husserl chose to remain oblivious to existential concerns that pertain to "the natural standpoint," and instead to accept the "fact world" as a given.

Husserl thus deliberately assumed a stance of indifference to the ontological misgivings that informed Cartesian skepticism and thereby established the discipline of phenomenology. Yet ultimately he found it difficult to account for the inquiring mind in relation to the experiencing body. The psychologically inflected body is after all also part of, and cannot be extricated from, the bracketed "fact world" of the *epoché*. To address this problem, Husserl put the embodied natural self in brackets, too, and then posited a transcendental ego as a necessary condition of experience of the embodied self in the world: "By phenomenological *epoché*, I reduce my natural human ego and my

psychic life — the realm of my psychological self-experience — to my transcendental phenomenological ego, the realm of transcendental phenomenological self-experience."

The very act of bracketing off, of establishing the epoché as a premise of phenomenological investigation, presupposes a distinctive awareness of the separateness of that which is bracketed. Husserl is compelled to account for the thinking subject's awareness of that bracketed world as transcendental: something separate and distinct from bodily experience. In the end, Husserl's transcendental ego fails to bridge — indeed presumes by deliberately deciding to ignore — the Cartesian ontological divide between body and mind.

It fell to Husserl's student Martin Heidegger to reject his teacher's signature epistemological method of bracketing off the world of "what is." Rather than avoid questions of ontology, he takes being itself as the target of his investigation:

For Husserl, phenomenological reduction ... is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back to the transcendental life of consciousness ... For us, phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being ... to the understanding of the Being of this being.

In Cartesian philosophy the external world appears before the thinking subject as a discrete object of doubt and meditation, but for Heidegger the "phenomenological vision" is fundamentally implicit in and subsumed by the world. Nor does the world in Heidegger's view present us with objects for philosophical investigation once we intend a standpoint from which to view them, as in the case of Husserl's transcendental ego. Heidegger admits no ontologically or psychologically transcendent basis of inquiry.

Instead there is for Heidegger only apprehension of "Being in the World," an apprehension that bodily participates in that being. There is no existentially distinct psychic realm for it to occupy.

"Being in the World" obviates the division between the body and the world because it includes the "mind" or "soul" that apprehends and makes conjectures about what is. This special, apprehending, and inquisitive part of "Being in the World" Heidegger refers to as Dasein:

Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is distinguished by the fact that, in its very being, that being is an issue for it ... It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its being, this being is disclosed to it. Understanding of being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's being.

The part of existence that is conscious of being and wonders about it "with and through its being" — roughly corresponding to Descartes's cogito or Husserl's transcendental ego — is what Heidegger means by Dasein.

This insistence that conscious human being ineluctably participates in "Being in the World" would not strike the post-Reformation writers included in this collection as a revolutionary claim. Indeed, with allowance for the historically distinct train of philosophical discourse that leads from the Cogito to Dasein, Heidegger's insistence on the embeddedness of Dasein recalls the basic theological orientation of many of the Protestant writers taken up in this collection. As a young man, Heidegger himself, though he was raised in the Roman Catholic faith, came to think of himself as a Protestant Christian theologian and identified specifically with Luther's struggle to assert a unified human subject in opposition to the systems of medieval theologians that had tended to alienate spirit from body. As Ken Hiltner notes, "like Heidegger centuries later, Luther found himself mired in a tradition of duality, particularly with respect to the spirit-flesh dyadic structure propounded by the Church." "Metaphysical theologians deal with a silly and crazy fiction when," Luther complained, "they invent the notion that the spirit, i.e., reason, is something absolute or separate by itself." For Luther, God established the world as well as ourselves and intimately expresses himself to his creatures through it: "the whole

creation is a face or mask of God," claimed Luther in his Lectures on Galatians. A philosophy that portrays reason as an entity essentially distinct from the rest of creation, as if it were master of its own intellectual domain, abstracts an essential self from its divinely established residence — "oure earthly mancion wherein we now dwell," per Tyndale's translation of 2 Corinthians 5.1. It is at best a vain intellectual pretension and at worst a prideful separation from God, as in the case of Satan's insistence that "the mind is its own place" (*Paradise Lost* 1.254).

John Milton is more forceful even than Luther in taking Christian acceptance of the body beyond the grudging embrace of more orthodox early modern philosophers and theologians. His monism may be described as "an affront to any of the available dualistic conceptions, including the Platonic, the Christianized Aristotelian, and the Cartesian." But it would be a mistake to take Milton's conception of the unity of human being as merely a logical consequence of his philosophical monism. Conviction as to "the unity of soul and body" came first for Milton, as Arthur Barker claimed; it is to this existential conviction that one must trace his monism and other related heterodoxies elaborated in his theological treatise, such as Traducianism and an utterly unique conception of the Incarnation.

Milton's insistence on the coherence of body and soul is unmistakably evident in his heretical Mortalism, which denies the possibility of the soul's disembodied persistence and postmortem awareness of bodily death — such as is represented in the case of Old Hamlet's ghost, for example. In Heidegger's terminology, death is the defining limit of Dasein, belonging "in a distinctive sense ... to the Being of Dasein": "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being ... When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein have been undone. This ownmost non-relational possibility is at the same time the uttermost one." When others die, we can be aware of their deaths and of death generally in this way; we cannot be similarly aware of our own.

Confronting death as the ultimate but always present and irreducibly peculiar condition of one's being, resisting the urge to evade that definitive "non-relational" limit, is for Heidegger the basis of ontological authenticity. In Milton's case, as William Kerrigan argued in his seminal article "The Heretical Milton: From Assumption to Mortalism," the young Milton's fascination with the possibility of escaping death via bodily assumption ultimately gave way to Mortalism. Yet his youthful preoccupation with ontological translation reflected the same unified vision of the human subject that in his mature work informs his heretical Mortalism. For Milton, even when he was a young man indulging the fantasy of bodily assumption, it was always all or nothing.

While we maintain that Milton's phenomenological vision of human being as indivisible was fundamental and the source of other related heresies, this distinctive understanding of human ontology is articulated in his theological system by interpretation of the biblical account of creation generally. In Book 1, chapter 7 of *Christian Doctrine* he argues on the basis of scriptural usage that creation cannot be *ex nihilo* but proceeds from the living God, who, being omnipotent, virtually possesses "corporeal power in his own substance". Like the God whose creative power materially subsists in this "heterogeneous, multiform, and inexhaustible virtue," his creations, even those, like man, with a spiritual aspect, are one:

Man is an animate being [animal], inherently and properly one and individual, not twofold or separable — or, as is commonly declared, combined or composed from two mutually and generically different and distinct natures, namely soul and body — but that the whole man is soul, and the soul is man; namely a body or substance which is individual, animated, sensitive, and rational.

In *Paradise Lost* the angel Raphael, in explaining creation to Adam, makes the same case in an enjambment-laden passage that conveys human rationality as the deeply rooted development of a dynamic, situated, bodily process:

O Adam, one Almighty is, from whom All things proceed, and up to him return, If not depraved from good, created all Such to perfection, one first matter all, Endued with various forms, various degrees.

In comparison with sublime angelic subsistence the human body may be felt as a normative disability — and bodily existence as a kind of debasement that the soul must strive to overcome or transform. But it is a humiliation that permits humanity "to surpass even the angels."

Our collection of essays examines representations of the embodied self in the writings of Milton and certain of his contemporaries, as well as ways in which the bodily contingencies of conscious human experience were construed as occasions for transcendence. Recent interpretation of embodiment in early modern literature draws on theological contexts detailed in landmark studies by Peter Brown and Caroline Walker Bynum. Scholars have invoked Galenic and Aristotelian physiological models and traced their implications: with respect to bodily shame and social self-regulation for example, as in the work of Gail Kern Paster; or to the varied corporeal inflections of the experience of subjectivity, as in the work of Michael Schoenfeldt. More recently, scholars have pursued this line of inquiry to examine the early modern body as a transitional site between environmental otherness and identity. These studies of embodiment, of which there have been many over the past two decades, offer pertinently detailed, historically localized, and theoretically sophisticated accounts of how early modern authors registered the human experience of awareness in the flesh. Our collection depends on these precedent studies on the conception of the body in early modern culture and adds to them by taking seriously the theological inversion of bodily shame posited by Chrysostom and Milton, specifically.

There is a great deal of evidence concerning Milton's ideas about the body, including his own. Yet sustained scholarly attention to the significance of the body in Milton's works has been scarce. We know how Milton dressed and wore his hair, the details of his blindness and gout, what he said about his complexion, features, and stature; we

know that as a young man he worked out with a sword; and we know even, as Edward Phillips put it, that "he would so far make bold with his body as now and then to keep a Gawdy-day." In Milton's epic, furthermore, Raphael insists on the bodily functions of angels, and in *Christian Doctrine* and in *Paradise Regained* the heretical Milton insists on the utter uniqueness of the ontologically hybrid Son of God and Mary. Yet despite all the evidence — in Milton's remarks about himself, in the early biographies, and in his poetry and prose — none of the many handbooks and companions to Milton published in the past quarter century includes a chapter devoted to the topic of the body in Milton's works. There are some recent exceptions to the general neglect of this line of inquiry, largely concerning the significance of eating and digestion. Michael Schoenfeldt's study of early modern corporeality includes a full chapter on the alimantal vision of *Paradise Lost*, and Kent Lehnhof has focused more particularly on the complex signification of scatology in Milton's epic. Catherine Thomas, writing on Milton's *Masque*, addressed the poisonous impact of desire on the Lady's chaste body. Denise Gigante has given a compelling and detailed investigation of eating and aesthetics in Milton. Most recently, Garrett Sullivan has argued that in *Paradise Lost* the placement of humanity within a "vegetal" cosmos of animate matter amounts to a literary critique of Cartesian dualism.

The most pertinent precedent for our collection, however, is a chapter by William Kerrigan entitled "The Way to Strength from Weakness." It specifically concerns the invigorating effect of Milton's blindness on his literary ambition and is a model for our approach. Kerrigan's chapter suggests that while the body was recognized as a site of humiliation and material immanence, it could also be experienced as the peculiarly human basis of glory. Our contributors thus examine ways in which early modern authors both registered the recalcitrance of the flesh and imagined embodied transcendence. Although Milton is the crucial figure, our collection places him in relation to other early modern authors, who serve to represent the broad and varied cultural relevance of our topic as well as to illuminate what is distinctive about Milton.

Our contributors take up, among others, Francis Bacon, John Bunyan, Margaret Cavendish, Nicholas of Cusa, John Donne, George Herbert, and Hester Pulten.

The chapters in this collection, divided into four parts, situate the ontology of the human subject as understood by Milton and his contemporaries in the context of seventeenth-century theological and natural philosophical controversies. They suggest that the development of immortal longings in seventeenth-century literary culture may be seen to track the historical phases of broader seventeenth-century religious and political culture: from a tight focus on the status of the individual soul (as in the soteriological debates in the first part of the century), to concern with the social institutions that might best accommodate and relate the individual subject to others (as in the strife over religious and political organization at mid-century), to, finally, a less militant but more general epistemological tendency toward demystification (as expressed in development of the new science in the second half of the century as well as in Christological controversies). The essays in our collection follow roughly the same three-part historical trajectory, and yet in their persistent concern with the body and aspirations for transcendence — individually, socially, and scientifically — are "all, all of a piece throughout," as Dryden's lines from the *Secular Masque* would have it.

Part I sets forth the characteristically Christian trans-valuation of bodily experience that Milton's reading of Chrysostom illustrates: that the weakness and humility of the flesh can be the phenomenological basis of soaring human achievement. The first chapter establishes a philosophical framework, as Gardner Campbell finds in William Kerrigan's conception of the "enfolded sublime" the embodied hermeneutics of *Paradise Lost*, which Campbell terms "incarnate immortality." In the enfolded sublime the whole is gathered into a resonating, vibrant passage, which, according to Kerrigan, enables the "arrest of the hermeneutic circle." Campbell reads these moments of the enfolded sublime as incarnational: the immortal, transcendent whole is somehow made

present in a mortal, worldly part, in a manner recalling the paradoxes of Nicholas of Cusa. As the whole text is embodied in a part, so the divine is embodied in the poet, which makes possible radical intersubjectivity. If the first chapter suggests that in the enfolded sublime the poet and readers are for a moment raised above mortal limitations to commune with the divine above comprehension, James Nohnberg in the second chapter follows the binaries of *Lycidas* — the mortal body of Edward King and the immortalized body of his poetic persona, the corruptible body of the first Adam and the immortal subsistence of the second one, or the perishable occasion of Milton's poem and the continued, quasi-immortal life of the poem itself — in a meditation on the body both as pathetically susceptible to violent destruction and as gloriously susceptible to immortalizing deification. The absent body of the drowned King becomes for Nohnberg a "negative proof" of his bodily assumption into heaven. The intersubjectivity of the enfolded sublime is, in Nohnberg's chapter, complemented by the intersubjectivity made possible in and between classical pastoral and mythology and Christian myth and poetry.

Pivoting on the discussion of the mortal body and glorified body in *Lycidas*, Part II turns to the role and fate of the body in soteriology, as well as to Milton's unusual biographical and poetic expressions of embodiment. The attempt to understand the longing for immortality as beginning in the body has its roots in Plato's theory of eroticism, which begins in carnal attraction to physical beauty before leaving the body behind. By comparison, Milton's account of angels' erotic bliss insists that the body ascends to higher, immortal bliss rather than being transcended. The physical expression of the unfallen Adam and Eve's love in Eden is represented as atmospheric and cosmically resonant rather than as anatomically constrained. The situational resonance of bodily love in Eden stands in stark contrast to the mere sexuality of the age's most notorious erotic poetry, the sonnet sequence that Pietro Aretino wrote to accompany sixteen illustrations of the postures of sexual intercourse. Gordon Braden's analysis of several poems in the sequence in the context of

poems by Petrarch and his imitators reveals the acuteness with which Aretino has deployed the Petrarchan tradition in which he, like Milton, wrote, both with specific relevance to the myth of Narcissus. But in Aretino's rendition the end is carnal gratification merely, with a solipsistic disregard for anything beyond it. Aretino's fantasy of postmortem carnal relations with Adam and Eve, Braden remarks, "is as close as Aretino gets to the immortalization of the flesh discussed elsewhere in this volume." Vera Camden in her chapter presents the sharply contrasting biographical and artistic example of John Bunyan, arguing that for Bunyan the sublimation of carnal psychic energy that threatened alienation from Christ — as vividly recorded in *Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners* — becomes the engine of the artistic achievement of *Pilgrim's Progress*. Camden locates in Freud's essential discussion of sublimation, "Leonardo Da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood," a key to reading Bunyan's verse "Apology" prefixed to *Pilgrim's Progress*, in which "metaphors of masturbation and impregnation are displaced onto the writing process." Bunyan's verse becomes legible as a record of the process of sublimation, as energies that had pulled him away from Christ are redirected toward salvation. Camden emphasizes Freud's insistence on the enigmatic nature of artistic creation, which for him originates in but cannot be fully accounted for in the sublimation of sexual drives. Freud himself resists in this way reductive Freudian reading.

Where Braden's Aretino exalts bodily pleasure over all, and Camden's Bunyan channels the drive for bodily pleasure into spiritual creation, the next two chapters in Part II explore how for Milton the bodily and the spiritual are neither separable nor antithetical; Milton's perfectible body is continuous with the glorified, saved body. In contrast to Bunyan, Milton presents his body not as an implacable generator of internal rebellion but as disposed to restraint and regulation, a site of successful volitional discipline. Drawing widely but incisively from Milton's self-representational digressions, Gregory Chaplin demonstrates Milton's heroic sense of his own corporeal agency, which starkly conflicts with Calvinist insistence on fallen

human beings' total depravity and particularly with the conventional Puritan emphasis on the danger posed by the rebelliousness of the desiring body. Chaplin argues that Milton's claims for his (and our) ability to govern the flesh and choose virtue may extend well beyond the Arminianism generally ascribed to him, arriving at heretical Pelagianism, a doctrine Chaplin sees at work in *Paradise Lost*. In the great epic and in the other late masterpieces, Chaplin locates in Satan, Samson, and the Son of God differing models of the will in relation to the body and to God. The final chapter of this part, by Stephen M. Fallon, pursues the logic of Milton's sense of volitional empowerment set forth by Chaplin and addresses the possibility that in *Paradise Lost* the very fact of mortality itself, the ultimate consequence of original disobedience, is for Milton the preferred outcome for the display of human virtue. Fallon's chapter, returning to the long debate on the fortunate fall in *Paradise Lost*, argues that the fall is unfortunate in theological terms but fortunate in existential terms.

In Part III attention shifts from the fate of the individual soul to natural philosophy and politics. Today the scientific goal of indefinite extension of a consciousness mortal and animal in its origins is for the first time in human history perhaps not merely an exercise in wishful thinking. But the desire to domesticate the miraculous by immortalizing the human body — and so making the central promise of Christianity superfluous — is not new. As Gregory Foran explains, Francis Bacon's highest ambition is the defeat of death itself. Citing an early modern analogy between divine potentia absoluta, God's power to act outside his ordained natural laws (potentia ordinata) in producing redemptive miracles, and the monarch's freedom to act outside the law for the solus populi, the good or health of the people, Foran argues that Bacon saw in natural philosophy the potential for creating new natures that acted outside existing natural laws. Bacon's project thus appropriates both God's and the monarch's role in acting outside of extant laws for the good of the people. Cementing the connection is Bacon's emphasis that Jesus' saving miracles, like those contemplated in the Great Instauration, are

directed to the health and immortalization of the body. Rather than make the not unreasonable claim that in the New Atlantis Bacon was a prophet of secular liberal modernity, the essay aligns Bacon more firmly with later animist materialists like Milton and Gerrard Winstanley, who sought to promote not the future promise of science but political reform in their own time. Milton's animist conception of a unified human physiology and psychology feeds into his celebrated definition of a book as an extension of its author's life. As John Rumrich argues, the claim that a good book preserves the authorial "spirit" is informed by his vitalist-monist conception of matter. Milton's famous claim that a "good Booke is the pretious life-blood of a master spirit, imbalmd and treasur'd up on purpose to a life beyond life" is more than metaphorical. The life-blood, Rumrich demonstrates, is the source from which Milton's vital, animal, and intellectual spirits are expressed, and these spirits are continuous with and ultimately identified with reason or the soul. As one reads a "master spirit," one's own spirits and reason are occupied, possessed, and transformed by the spirits and reason of the author, a prospect that may be inspiring or alarming. In his claims for the "good Booke," Milton echoes and transforms the perennial argument that books preserve one's fame by giving it a physiological basis and by insisting that that fame secures immortality in this world, an immortality both less and more than the "immortality of fame" Milton contemplates in a 1637 letter to Diodati (CPW 1.327) or the "fame in Heav'n" that Apollo promises the poet at the same time in *Lycidas*. David Harper in turn contends that this understanding of the potency of a book as described in *Areopagitica* (1644) haunts Milton's response to King Charles's posthumous *Eikon Basilike* (1649). Harper's *Eikonoklastes* is not merely a living presence; it is a violent actor. Milton's effort to smash the image of the king is not merely rhetorical but genuinely iconoclastic in its effort to demolish "the king's book," or rather the king in the book; to erect a new image of the king; and thus to display the vicious character of its author.

This book's fourth and final part takes up other variations on the individual's desire for immortality, particularly versions of transcendence or the transformation of embodiment suggested by the new science. Louisa Hall addresses the innovative response to the new cosmology in the work of Hester Putter, a still relatively unknown poet who spent most of her adult life in the serial confinement of fifteen pregnancies. Her mid-century poetry devises an escape from her narrow surroundings into the open universe of Copernicus, as Putter exemplifies the alternative early modern reaction to Copernicanism recently elaborated by Dennis Danielson, in which the decentered earth is represented as one of the wandering stars, freed from its bondage in the cellar of the universe. She imagines an afterlife with her body reconstituted as a celestial body in perpetual motion, roaming the vast reaches of space and its multiple worlds. Dustin Stewart's Margaret Cavendish resembles Hall's Putter in her desire to break the bonds of female subservience and claim a condition of unregulated freedom in the atomist philosophy of matter. Stewart is the first to demonstrate Cavendish's extensive dialogue with John Donne, by way of excavating Cavendish's response to the Anniversaries in her mid-century closet drama *Youth's Glory, and Death's Banquet*. In an uncanny and disturbing echo of Donne's attempt to bury Elizabeth Drury within himself figuratively, Cavendish's Father Love wishes to have his dead daughter, Sanspareille, literally buried in his body. Sanspareille, however, asserting agency in a way denied to Drury, seeks a fame both independent and embodied, in the shape of the propagation of her living books in libraries. In our final chapter, John Rogers tells the arresting story of the transmutation of Milton's materialism, his account of creation, and his promise of bodily ascent in the hands of Mormonism's founder, Joseph Smith, in nineteenth-century America. Influenced certainly by popularizations of *Paradise Lost* (perhaps by the poem itself) and by the appearance of the heretical *De doctrina christiana* a few years before founding his church, Smith's account of divinity, creation, and cosmological strife is a complex echo and yet more heretical extension of Milton's thought

and writings. As Rogers demonstrates, Smith not only promises with Milton celestial ascent of the virtuous, he maintains that human beings, formed from animated matter coeternal and separate from the God of the Bible, can ascend to godhead itself.

Kerrigan argues that all of *Paradise Lost* is enfolded in a half-line, spoken by Raphael, in the midst of the poem's more than ten thousand lines: one first matter all (PL 5.472).³² While we have grouped this collection's chapters in parts by theme, like the parts of Milton's masterpiece they are closely interwoven, with the common thread being Milton's and other writers' emphasis on embodiment and their resistance to dualist modes of thought and dualist severing of incorporeal from corporeal substance. The first matter grounds and unites all that is, negating the traditional (and orthodox) understanding of an impassable gulf between material bodies and an immaterial paradise in Heaven.

To greater and lesser extents, the writers discussed in what follows recuperate the body, no longer a prison to be escaped or a shell to be cast off by an immaterial soul. Several of the contributors address the implications of emerging vitalist ways of thought on the perennial idea of books as guarantors of immortality. Rumrich describes the natural philosophical foundations for literalizing claims for the life of books, and Harper outlines the struggle between two living books, one by a living

sixteenth-century Sonetti lussuriosi, turning the Puritan dissenter's nightly struggles with lust and self-gratification into godly poetry and prose allegory. Where Aretino's speaker celebrates bodies, his own and his lovers', finding in their congress transcendence enough and showing no interest in procreation, Camden's Bunyan and Stewart's Cavendish leave behind them living books as children. Bodies, books, and the world are, in the minds of most of these writers, alive, as they react against various dualist notions of living spirit animating intrinsically dead matter. The material world around us is thus redeemed, promoted from a place of alienation to a place of significant labor.³⁴ An emphasis on the importance of labor in the world, its dignity, and its potential to fuel the ascent of the monist individual - to make him or her "more refined, more spiritous, and pure" (PL 5.475) — runs through the collection, bearing vivid witness to the fact that this central Miltonic theme makes him not only a writer for all time but a man of his age.

[Conceptual Blending in Early Christian Discourse: A Cognitive Linguistic Analysis of Pastoral Metaphors in Patristic Literature](#) by Aleksander Gomola [De Gruyter, 9783110580631]

The paper argues for the crucial role of conceptual blending in creating and developing of Christian doctrine. It assumes that typological patristic exegesis of the early Christian period, viewed through the lens of Conceptual Blending Theory, may be regarded as a series of conceptual integration processes, with typological blends as building blocks of Christian doctrine, including the doctrine of salvation. To prove this, the paper discusses selected Adam-Christ typological blends present in the writings of the early Christian authors, seeing in them linguistic realizations of moral accounting metaphor that underlies the doctrine of salvation and demonstrating in this way a key role of conceptual integration in shaping Christian doctrine.

Excerpt: At the end of Martin Scorsese's *Silence*, a film that tells the story of the persecution of Christians in 17th-century Japan, the director's dedication appears on the screen, reading: "For

Japanese Christians and their pastors." Scorsese's depiction of the Christian community in shepherding terms seems so obvious to us that we barely notice it (and that is why I added italics to his dedication). Yet it should puzzle us, since out of all the major world religions only Christian communities are "flocks" led by "shepherds" or "pastors." There are no "pastors" or "sheep" in Islam, Buddhism or modern Judaism.

The fact that more than two billion people in the world (and especially more than a billion Catholics) perceive themselves as "sheep" led by their "shepherds" is a phenomenon worthy of closer examination, first of all by the cognitive linguist interested in how humans conceptualize and express in language various aspects of their experiences, including their religious identity and sense of belonging. Hence, this book is a cognitive linguistic exploration of the uniquely Christian metaphor of the church as a flock and it investigates how it was employed by Christian authors in the period of the most dynamic growth and development of Christian language and doctrine, namely in the patristic era.

The main aim of the book is to demonstrate that the apparently simple metaphor of the church as a flock was in actuality a very sophisticated conceptual tool used by patristic authors to generate a number of novel meanings in Christian language. Utilizing the methodology of Conceptual Blending Theory as developed by Fauconnier and Turner, it shows how patristic authors, employing a set of stock elements taken from shepherding experience mediated through the Bible, were able to create a whole spectrum of variations on this metaphor, each with a novel meaning, much in the same way that chemists are able to create substances with diverse properties using a limited set of elements in different configurations.

Due to the ubiquity of the metaphor of the church as a flock both within Christian language and without (one does not have to be a Christian to know and use this metaphor) we tend to forget that unlike many other uniquely Christian concepts (God as the father, Christ as God's Son, baptism as a spiritual birth, and so forth) the image of the church

as a flock is virtually absent from the earliest Christian texts. Paul never used it with reference to Christian communities (even though biblical scholars call some letters attributed to Paul his pastoral letters), and as a matter of fact, the image appears only once in a fully-fledged form, in Acts 20:28-30. Yet this very image of the church as a flock soon became a commonplace metaphor in Christian language.

Contrary to what one might think, this metaphor was utilized not merely to distinguish between members of the clergy and members of the laity; its role was much more varied and complex. It is represented by a number of subcategories with specific functions in the patristic literature and used to conceptualize many ideas, from everyday church practice through baptismal theology to soteriology and Christology. For example, bishops' teaching or the distribution of the sacraments is pictured as the feeding of sheep; sinners are conceptualized as "mangy sheep" that may infect other members of the flock; "false teachers" or adversaries in church polemics are regularly depicted as wolves scattering the flock; baptism is presented as washing or branding sheep; and humanity is seen as the lost sheep that is brought back by Christ to the fold of heaven. Other important functions of variants of the "church is a flock" metaphor include its role in the supersessionary claims of Christianity and in the divine authority of the clergy. In the first case, the metaphor facilitated the appropriation of the Jewish scripture as a Christian text by identifying "the flock of the church" with "the flock of Israel." In the second case, it allowed members of the clergy, conceptualized as shepherds, to identify with Christ, the Johannine Shepherd, and to claim his authority. These and many other examples discussed in this book demonstrate the adaptability of the image of the church as a flock in patristic literature. By explaining this adaptability in cognitive-linguistic terms and exploring the mechanisms responsible for creating all of these new meanings, the book proves that the "church is a flock" metaphor played a crucial role in shaping a number of important elements of early Christian doctrine.

The adoption of a cognitive linguistic perspective to study a specific conceptualization that systematically occurs in patristic literature means that the findings and conclusions of this book go beyond the interests of only one discipline. Biblical and patristic scholars, although they are undoubtedly familiar with "the church is a flock" metaphor, will learn from the book which mental processes were responsible for its varied and often ingenious use in patristic writings. To cognitive linguists this book should be interesting as it is one of the first (if not the first) comprehensive studies to demonstrate the role of conceptual integration in creating novel meanings in religious language. Last but not least, since early Christianity was a fertile breeding-ground for many novel ideas and their conceptualizations in language, this book might be interesting for anyone curious about the role of cognitive linguistic processes in the development of the Christian doctrine, from its modest beginnings as several relatively short texts in the second half of the 1st century CE, to the huge library of patristic literature four centuries later.

Overview

The book consists of two parts. In the first part, comprised of chapters 1 through 3, I present the theoretical framework — Conceptual Blending Theory — preceded by a more detailed discussion of the aim and scope of my study. I also discuss the role of conceptual integration as a cognitive process responsible for creating novel meanings in the interpretation of the Bible, this being a prerequisite for further exploration of this process in the next part of the book, and the cultural-experiential basis of the image of the church as a flock. The second part, comprising chapters 4 to 9, is a detailed exploration of the "church is a flock" metaphor and its many variants in selected patristic writings, from the Apostolic Fathers to Gregory the Great.

Chapter 1 presents in more detail the aim and the scope of the book with a brief overview of the literature on the role of conceptual integration in early Christian texts and in the Bible. This is followed by a presentation of the basic tenets and notions of Conceptual Blending Theory, of

conceptual integration mechanisms, and of the different types of blends (conceptual networks). I also demonstrate how conceptual integration may manifest itself in material objects and rituals, as non-linguistic blends are also examined in my study. The chapter closes with a discussion of the folk model of shepherding that is the conceptual basis of all the networks examined in the book.

Chapter 2 briefly discusses how conceptual integration is responsible for patristic authors creating novel meanings when they read the Bible. Three selected conceptual networks created by the church fathers as the result of their exegesis are examined, each representing a different category of conceptual integration. Such an examination of the role of conceptual blending in biblical interpretation is a necessary background for further analysis, since most blends explored in my study are derived from the Bible.

Chapter 3 investigates the cultural-experiential basis of the image of the church as a flock by presenting the role of shepherding imagery in describing social and political relations in the Mediterranean in antiquity, as well as this imagery's role in the Bible.

Chapter 4 unravels the structures of the three specific conceptual networks identified in early Christian writings to be examined in detail in the book. I shall call them: the THE FLOCK OF THE CHURCH IS THE FLOCK OF ISRAEL blend, SHEPHERDS ARE THE SHEPHERD blend, and the THE CHURCH IS GOD'S FLOCK blends with its several subcategories. These are not the only variants of the metaphor of the church as a flock to be found in patristic literature, yet its analysis indicates that they are most popular with and most systematically used by Christian authors. I discuss constituent elements of each network, as well as their underlying conceptual integration processes. This chapter is an introduction to the more detailed presentation of each of these networks in chapters 5 to 8, where their linguistic realizations in patristic writings and church documents are presented in connection with their roles in early Christian discourse.

Chapter 5 discusses the linguistic realizations of the THE FLOCK OF THE CHURCH IS THE FLOCK OF ISRAEL blend: a conceptual basis for perceiving the church as the new Israel and an important interpretative instrument allowing Christianity to appropriate the Hebrew Bible as its sacred text and to relate instructions addressed in the Hebrew Bible to the religious leaders of Israel as being addressed to Christian bishops. In chapter 6 the linguistic realizations of the SHEPHERDS ARE THE SHEPHERD blend are examined in detail. This blend, equating members of the clergy with Christ conceptualized as the shepherd in John, is the most important conceptual argument justifying their God-sanctioned authority in the church; but more than that, it also instructs the clergy on how to behave in the face of persecution, reminding them of the need to be ready to suffer and even to die for their flock, just as Christ had done.

Chapters 7 and 8 explore the conceptualization most often associated with the image of the church as a flock, or the THE CHURCH IS GOD'S FLOCK blend. In chapter 7 I discuss early instances of this blend in the New Testament and briefly mention shepherding imagery in The Shepherd of Hermas where, interestingly, the blend never occurs.

Chapter 8 is devoted to the various usages of the THE CHURCH IS GOD'S FLOCK blend in early Christian literature. I examine how the blend is used by patristic authors and in church documents to define the roles of the clergy and the laity, and to provide biblical arguments which support the mitigation of the rigours of penance in the early church. I also demonstrate the enormous conceptual potential of the blend, discussing examples of the specific cross-space mappings that underlie the new meanings created through the blend in early patristic texts. These include sheep's grazing as a conceptualization for teaching the laity; wolves as a conceptualization of the various threats to a community; and how contagious disease operated as a conceptualization of believers' heresy or immoral conduct.

The linguistic realizations of the THE CHURCH IS GOD'S FLOCK blend discussed in chapter 8 illustrate its role as a conceptual framework for the

church's self-identity, order, and practice; yet the blend also turns out to be responsible for shaping central aspects of Christian doctrine. Therefore, chapter 9 presents selected examples of how patristic authors use the blend as a conceptual tool to develop theological ideas related to baptism, church unity, Christology, and soteriology. I discuss how baptism is conceptualized as branding and washing sheep, and investigate the doctrinal meanings and moral instructions attached to these images in patristic literature as well as how they are reflected in early Christian iconography. I also demonstrate how the blend is utilized in patristic texts to promote church unity. Finally, I show how the parable of the lost sheep becomes the conceptual basis of Gregory of Nyssa's Christological anti-Arian argumentation and how it is used as an input space to create soteriological blends by many authors, from Irenaeus to Hilary. Like earlier sections of the monograph, this chapter shows that the image of the church as a flock is not a rhetorical figure or a disposable element in Christian thought but one of its conceptual cornerstones, indispensable, even if too often taken for granted.

In this study we have examined the metaphor of the church as a flock and its role in the shaping and development of early Christian doctrine. We have seen that despite it being virtually absent from the New Testament writings, this metaphor quickly became one of the most important conceptualizations of the church as a socio-religious community to be utilized by patristic authors. We examined its three main subcategories: the THE FLOCK OF THE CHURCH IS THE FLOCK OF ISRAEL blend, the SHEPHERDS ARE THE SHEPHERD blend and the THE CHURCH IS GOD'S FLOCK blend and their respective roles in early Christian thought. Our analysis revealed that the conceptualization of the church as a flock was not used merely to distinguish members of the clergy from ordinary Christians. On the contrary, it was an important conceptual instrument that enabled patristic authors to create a number of novel meanings and to develop and

shape Christian doctrine in the period of its most dynamic growth.

This detailed presentation of the ubiquity and versatility of the conceptualization of the church as a flock in patristic literature would not have been possible without Conceptual Blending Theory and its methodology. The explanatory power of this theory allowed us to demonstrate that all instances of shepherding imagery in the patristic texts discussed in this study, however varied and sometimes apparently disparate, are actually products of the same cognitive process of conceptual integration, this involving the projection of various aspects of the religious experience of early Christians onto the domain of shepherding experience. In other words, they are variants or subcategories of the same, basic blend.

The diversity of these subcategories implies that we could find them in virtually every genre of patristic literature: first of all in homilies, but also in church orders, exegetical or doctrinal treatises, letters and polemics. This diversity is related to what might be called - to borrow an analogy from chemistry - the "reactivity" of all the blends discussed in this study and especially the THE CHURCH IS GOD'S FLOCK blend: they easily "react" with other concepts and fit into various contexts of church teaching and experience. That is why we could follow how the church fathers used them not only to define the respective roles of the laity and the clergy but also to shape early practices of penance; to develop the theologies of baptism and soteriology including post-Nicene Christology; to fight heresies; and to promote the unity of the church.

How might we explain in cognitive linguistic terms the great popularity of the blends with shepherding imagery in patristic thought? It seems that there are at least two reasons for the phenomenon. Firstly, all of the blends discussed in this study meet the two important requirements for successful conceptual integration, these being the "human scale" and "coming up with a story. Although they convey the patristic authors' intended meanings through the prism of "ovine" and not human experience, they nevertheless achieve "human scale" as they are grounded in the cultural, background knowledge of

shepherding. We could also see that many take a more or less explicit narrative form; for example the blends with the organizing frame of the lost sheep parable such as the THE LOST SHEEP blend Or the A STRAYING SHEEP blend, but also the BEWARE OF THE WOLF blend, the BAPTISM IS BRANDING SHEEP blend or the THE LOST SHEEP IS HUMANITY blend. This narrative form facilitates their elaborations and the creation of new meanings. Secondly, and more importantly, virtually all of the blends we have discussed in this study take their shepherding elements from the Bible, which implies that by utilizing such blends patristic authors could claim divine authority for their arguments. In this way the blends were to a large extent God's word addressed to patristic audiences adapted to specific conditions and circumstances.

From this it follows that the blends with shepherding imagery we have investigated must be regarded as something more than merely "interpretative keys" to the biblical text. Seen from the cognitive-linguistic perspective, they turn out to be indispensable conceptual tools that enabled patristic authors to extract their intended meanings from the Bible, itself understood as God's word. Since Christians were "sheep," every reference to sheep in the biblical text could be utilized - through conceptual integration - to create a specific meaning depending on the context of the reference and its interpretation or - to put it in cognitive linguistic terms - depending on how a patristic author ran a particular blend. Recall how Tertullian proves in 8.3.1, by means of the THE LOST SHEEP blend, that because Christ did not bring back a dead sheep to the fold, Christians who committed mortal sins could not be - for this very reason - restored to the community of believers. Or recall how an apparently trivial element of real shepherding experience, that is branding sheep, when it becomes the basis of the organizing frame of the BAPTISM IS BRANDING SHEEP blend, generates - through conceptual integration - significant doctrinal meanings like belonging to Christ's flock not to Satan's flock (9.1.1). Finally, recall how by emphasizing that Christ/the shepherd takes up "the whole sheep" on his shoulders, not the

skin without entrails, Gregory of Nyssa communicates to his readers the fundamental soteriological truth, that God has saved the entire human nature (9.3).

I am not suggesting that patristic authors created new theological meanings or addressed practical issues of early church life solely by themes of the blends with shepherding imagery, since even in this book we could see how conceptual integration allowed them to doctrinally develop the Adam-Christ typology by means of other blends. Yet my study provides reams of evidence that blends with shepherding imagery occur systematically in all genres of patristic literature, are utilized by major patristic authors, and are so deeply ingrained in the minds of the church fathers that they treat conceptualizing the church as a flock as the most natural, if not the only possible, way of speaking about this socio-religious community. This leads to several conclusions, important both to biblical and patristic scholars and to cognitive linguists.

Beyond those that concern cognitive linguists, there are some conclusions to be drawn which might be of some importance to biblical and patristic scholars. The examination of patristic literature in this study — necessarily selective — has shown the usefulness of the cognitive-linguistic approach and more specifically, the usefulness of the conceptual integration perspective in exploring patristic thought, revealing those of its aspects that had previously been hidden from us. Deploying cognitive linguistic analytical instruments allowed us to see that numerous and varied instances of utilizing shepherding imagery in patristic texts are in actuality linguistic realizations of the same conceptual network. Thus, cognitive linguistic analysis provides significant insight into patristic thought, showing that the same cognitive process was responsible for the church fathers' creation of novel meanings in many areas of Christian thought. In this way, the conceptualization of the church as a flock turns out to be a unifying perspective in patristic thought and its presence in such disparate domains of Christian doctrine as church discipline, baptismal theology, soteriology and Christology makes the whole doctrine much more coherent and

compelling to believers. No less importantly, the cognitive linguistic approach helps biblical scholars to see better how biblical shepherding imagery is utilized by patristic authors and thus to follow the Wirkungsgeschichte of particular biblical passages. What is more, this approach helps us understand why many of the passages examined in detail in the previous chapters were so original and imaginative: it turns out that there is one cognitive-linguistic mechanism underlying these and many other metaphors investigated in this study, and this explains the presence of such stunningly rich patristic imagery. This singular device is, of course, conceptual integration. Interestingly, we could also see that conceptual integration allowed patristic authors in many cases to present to their audiences interpretations of a biblical text that clearly contradicted its original meaning, for example when in John Chrysostom's elaboration of the THE LOST SHEEP blend the lost sheep became "the black sheep" or when Augustine, while interpreting the same parable, suggested that the good shepherd should sometimes resort to a lash (8.3.1). Last but not least, our analysis has also shown that depicting the church as a socio-religious community in shepherding terms was an original Christian invention, not taken over from the ancient Greco-Roman culture (as was the case with the cathedra as the symbol of the bishop's authority, the basilica, or the territorial division of the church into dioceses). Therefore, we may say that cognitive linguistics provides a valuable contribution to patristic scholarship with regard to the study of the origins of the conceptualizations used by the church fathers.

Returning to cognitive linguistics, there are some conclusions ready to be drawn that could point the way towards further research of this topic area. As mentioned at the outset of this book, cognitive linguists seem so far to have devoted little attention to conceptual blending in religious language. In addition, there has been (it seems) no systematic study of conceptual networks as "meaning generators" in a major religious system. This monograph fills this gap by providing ample evidence for the key role of conceptual integration in creating novel meanings in Christianity. The

analysis of patristic texts has shown that their authors, deploying stock elements from the folk model of shepherding, were able to create a wide range of variants of the THE CHURCH IS A FLOCK conceptual network and used them systematically as efficient conceptual tools in their argumentation and reasoning. The network was used not only to form a simple conceptualization of the hierarchical structure of a typical Christian community; on the contrary, we find its linguistic manifestations in many Christian concepts and contexts, not only ecclesial but also exegetical and doctrinal. One of the most important findings of this study is the demonstration of how the SHEPHERDS ARE THE SHEPHERD network was used to legitimize the divine authority of members of the clergy as leaders of a religious community. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how patristic authors, virtually all of them bishops, could have been able to claim this authority without having this specific conceptual tool at their disposal. Equally important is the demonstration of the versatility of THE CHURCH IS GOD'S FLOCK network with its many subcategories. Some of them strengthen the hierarchical conceptualization of a Christian community (for example the BISHOPS ARE RAMS or the TEACHING IS FEEDING SHEEP), yet a lot of them are employed by patristic authors to conceptualize highly abstract theological concepts like baptism, Christ's saving mission, or Nicene Christology and thus must be regarded as the "building blocks" of Christian doctrine.

This study has also corroborated another axiom of cognitive linguistics, namely the creativity and ingenuity of language users in creating and running blends. We could see in patristic texts wolves turned into sheep, how the shepherd (Augustine) speaks to wolves with the authority of the Lamb, we could see how newly baptized Christians become branded or shorn sheep, sinners are mangy sheep, the whole of humanity is the lost sheep, and members of the clergy turn out to be cows offering spiritual milk to laypeople from the two udders of the Old and the New Testament! Given these and other ingenious (bizarre?) elaborations of the blends discussed in this study we can risk saying that — if necessary — conceptual integration with

shepherding imagery could have allowed patristic authors to create virtually any meaning they wished and to justify it biblically. We could also observe how conceptual integration may manifest itself in nonlinguistic forms in a religious system in the form of material anchors such as cilicium, bishop's staff, or the mosaics with shepherding imagery found in early Christian baptisteries.

Many of the conceptualizations examined above were created on the fly, especially during the act of preaching, yet we could also see how such networks created by one patristic author were taken over by other authors who then elaborated upon them — like the SHORN SHEEP blend that we find in Cyril of Jerusalem, Ambrose and Augustine — or simply reused them as in the case of the network defining the roles of the members of the clergy and the members of the laity in 8.1. Thus, this study allowed us to follow the process by which the THE CHURCH IS A FLOCK network was transformed into a well-established conceptualization, one that would soon become the most important metaphor for the Christian community, completely overshadowing earlier conceptualizations such as the metaphor of the church as the body found in the Pauline letters. This fact is another piece of evidence that highlights the key role of conceptual integration in the construction of religious systems and the mental representations of believers' religious identity. Finally, it is worth noting that we could follow this process practically from its beginnings. Whereas the origin of many conceptualizations used by Westerners literally "since time immemorial" may be reconstructed only hypothetically,¹ we could see THE CHURCH IS A FLOCK metaphor — to borrow once again an analogy from chemistry — in statu nascendi, observing its growing significance in patristic literature.

It is said that those objects that apparently seem to be the most obvious are often the most fascinating objects to study and the image of the church as a flock seems to be a fine example. This monograph has revealed its hidden complexity and conceptual potential. It has shown how the early Christian authors, employing a limited stock of shepherding

imagery, were able to create a wide array of concepts, all of which pertained to the experiences of members of a new religious community, one that emerged from the belly of Judaism in the first century CE but that would soon become its very own beast. It also allowed us to see how conceptual integration was, in the patristic era, the catalyzer of novel meanings essential in the development of Christianity as a major world religion, with the image of the church as a flock as its hallmark.

[Biotechnology, Human Nature, and Christian Ethics](#)
by Gerald McKenny [Cambridge University Press, 9781108422802]

In public debates over biotechnology, theologians, philosophers, and political theorists have proposed that biotechnology could have significant implications for human nature. They argue that ethical evaluations of biotechnologies that might affect human nature must take these implications into account. In this book, Gerald McKenny examines these important yet controversial arguments, which have in turn been criticized by many moral philosophers and professional bioethicists. He argues that Christian ethics is, in principle, committed to some version of the claim that human nature has normative status in relation to biotechnology. Showing how both criticisms and defences of this claim have often been facile, he identifies, develops, and critically evaluates three versions of the claim, and contributes a fourth, distinctively Christian version to the debate. Focusing on Christian ethics in conversation with secular ethics, McKenny's book is the first thorough analysis of a controversial contemporary issue.

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Excerpt: In recent decades, bioethicists, policy makers, journalists, and others have been intrigued by biotechnological interventions that aim not at the prevention or treatment of diseases or injuries, but at desired changes in performances (athletic, cognitive, sexual), behaviors (moods, emotions, dispositions), and physical traits (longevity, height, physiognomy). These changes, which are commonly, if imprecisely, called enhancements, are brought about by a wide assortment of technologies. Notwithstanding their novelty and technical sophistication, some of these technologies, including pharmaceuticals (for example, anabolic steroids, Adderall, and Viagra) and surgical manipulations, are continuous with efforts at human self-transformation that reach back into the archaic human past. Other technologies, such as those that involve genetics, neuro-digital interfaces, and tissue-regenerative processes, are historically unprecedented. But in either case, these technologies are enabling us, at least to some extent, to control, select, bypass, replace, and alter human biological functions and traits to degrees and in ways that were never possible. It is unsurprising, then, that their development has been accompanied by recurring questions about human nature. In particular, many people ask whether the potential of biotechnology to implicate biological functions and traits in these ways requires us to take human nature into account in our ethical evaluations of biotechnology. Does human nature have some normative significance (that is, some meaning, value, purpose, or role) that ethical evaluations of biotechnology should consider? If so, then what is that significance and how should we take it into consideration? In short, what is the normative status of human nature, and how should it count in ethical evaluations of biotechnologies that implicate human nature?

These questions, and the answers that have been or may be given to them, are the subject matter of this book. At the end of the first chapter I offer a rationale for addressing them in a book-length inquiry in Christian ethics. But it is appropriate to

say something here about the context in which they are to be understood. This context can be conceived narrowly to cover the past two or three decades, in which widely publicized developments — first in genetics and psychopharmacology, then in neuro-digital interfaces and regenerative medicine — have generated widespread and sometimes heated debates on the normative status of human nature. Nearly all the authors whose work I examine in this book belong to this period. However, the positions most of these authors take have antecedents in the work of authors (including Hannah Arendt, Hans Jonas, C. S. Lewis, Karl Rahner, and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin) who wrote in the decades immediately following World War II and whose concerns reflect developments in genetics and reproductive technology that occurred during those decades, along with the discrediting of eugenics. This broader context suggests that a common discourse on biotechnology and human nature runs through our era of biotechnology, in which optimism regarding scientific and technological progress is haunted by the memory of abuses of knowledge and technique. Taking a still broader context into account, the capability of biotechnology to intentionally intervene into human nature, and especially its capability of selecting, replacing, and altering biological functions and traits, can be understood as an event that is comparable in its significance to the modern "discovery" that social and political arrangements are not merely given but are subject to human construction. Of course, we have come to realize that social and political arrangements are far more recalcitrant to human construction than was initially suspected, and the same has proved true, at least up to now, in the case of human nature. It is also true that human beings have always sought and found ways to intervene into their nature despite its alleged givenness, just as they did with their social and political arrangements. These points should caution us not to exaggerate the novelty of the so-called biotechnological era. Nevertheless, intentional intervention into human biological nature is now a full-scale program, and this circumstance affects our attitudes and practices regarding our nature as well as our self-understanding as agents,

even as the actual achievements of human biotechnology thus far remain modest and intermittent. It also poses the question whether the basis for the modern hope that human nature and the basic conditions of human life are fundamentally alterable and can be improved by human action, which has always oscillated between the realm of politics and that of science and technology (while usually taking both in), has come to rest, at least for now, in the latter realm (where Bacon and Descartes placed it) rather than the former. (For someone like me, whose official academic career began in 1989, it is at least symbolically significant that the first human gene therapy clinical trials as well as such an ambitious biotechnology project as the Human Genome Initiative were getting underway at about the same time as the last vestiges of a utopian political program were unraveling with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union.)

If it is the case that hopes and ambitions regarding the human condition are increasingly directed to biotechnology, then the conversation about the normative status of human nature considering biotechnological enhancement belongs to a larger set of conversations, all of them characteristically modern, that focus on the proper stance toward human vulnerabilities and limitations in light of what is at least thought to be our increasing power to overcome them. Should humans commit themselves to those moral norms and virtues and social and political arrangements that enable them to live rightly and well with their characteristic vulnerabilities and limitations or to those that press them to overcome as many vulnerabilities and limitations as they can? Of course, these alternatives are not mutually exclusive; the question is what it would mean to do justice to both. My point, however, is that biotechnological enhancement is one of the most important contemporary sites in which the claims of both are contested and will be resolved, for better or worse.

Considerations drawn from this broader context take us beyond Christian ethics to the description, explanation, and criticism of modern culture. Those tasks lie beyond the scope of this book. But their

relevance suggests that it is as important for Christian ethics to determine its relationship to contemporary biotechnology as it is to determine its relationship to modern political orders and movements. This book is a contribution to that task. It begins by clarifying how contemporary biotechnology implicates human nature and thus raises the question of its normative status, what it means to claim that normative status attaches to human nature, why that claim can be problematic, and why it is important for Christian ethics to try to make that claim in a way that avoids the problems that have always attended it (Chapter 1). It then goes on to formulate and critically examine three versions of that claim and to propose a fourth one (Chapters 2-5). Following a conclusion that presents the results of the inquiry, an appendix addresses the question of the implications of the normative status of human nature considering the distant but possible prospect of the transformation of human nature into something else.

Before turning to the main body of this inquiry, it is appropriate to say a word about its scope. It is not a general inquiry into the ethics of biotechnological enhancement or even an inquiry into the role of the normative status of human nature in resolving concrete ethical issues related to biotechnological enhancement. Still less is it an inquiry into the ethics of technology. Finally, it is not an inquiry into human nature. It is instead an inquiry into the normative status of human nature in light of the growing capabilities of contemporary biotechnological enhancement to implicate human nature. During this inquiry, much is said about the ethics of particular biotechnological enhancements, not a little is said about human nature, and something is said about the ethics of technology. But the emphasis of this book is on what it means to claim in the context of biotechnology that normative status attaches to human nature and how the normative status of human nature should count in the ethical evaluation of biotechnological interventions that implicate human nature. If the reader protests that this focus is too narrow, I would say two things in defense of it. First, there are already many fine studies in Christian ethics and related fields of the ethics of biotechnological enhancement, the ethics of

technology, and human nature, but there is no thorough study in these fields of the normative status of human nature in relation to biotechnology. Second, if (as I am convinced) Christian ethics is in its own way as heavily invested in what biotechnology means for our biological nature as modern science, technology, and politics are in their way, then there is a need for a study in Christian ethics that takes it as seriously as it is taken in these other domains. It is my hope that this book will go some way toward meeting that need.

[The Hermeneutical Spirit: Theological Interpretation and Scriptural Imagination for the 21st Century](#) by Amos Yong [Cascade Books, 978-1-5326-0489-8]

In the contemporary biblical studies climate, proposals regarding the theological interpretation of Scripture are contested, particularly but not only because they privilege, encourage, and foster ecclesial or other forms of normative commitments as part and parcel of the hermeneutical horizon through which scriptural texts are read and understood. Within this context, confessional approaches have been emerging, including some from within the nascent pentecostal theological tradition.

This volume builds on the author's previous work in theological method to suggest a pentecostal perspective on theological interpretation that is rooted in the conviction that all Christian reading of sacred Scripture is post-Pentecost, meaning after the Day of Pentecost outpouring of the Spirit on all flesh in anticipation of the coming reign of God. In that respect, such a pentecostal interpretative perspective is not parochially for those within the modern day movement bearing that name but is arguably apostolic in following after the scriptural imagination of the earliest disciples of Jesus the messiah and therefore has ecumenical and missional purchase across space and time. The Hermeneutical Spirit thus provides close readings of various texts across the scriptural canon as a model for Christian theological interpretation of Scripture suitable for the twenty-first-century global context.

Excerpt: Young's proposal is delineated by looking at the challenges for hermeneutics in contemporary

global context that need to navigate multi- and inter-cultural projects in search of a more transcendent, overarching, or trans-cultural vantage point; by unfolding the opportunities inherent in this hybrid space for Asian American Pentecostals in particulars' and by sketching the contours of a hermeneutical paradigm that is observant of its interpretive rules (science), its subterranean impulses (sighs), and its historical practices and teleological performances (signs). The goal is to invite further hermeneutical reflection not only from pentecostal Christianity but all who believe there is something else to be considered when understanding human interpretation in relationship to divine presence and activity opened up in the Day of Pentecost narrative.

Theological-Scriptural Interpretation scholars are also beginning to recognize the need to account for interpretive habits, sensibilities, and practices of the modern pentecostal movement. Daniel Treier, for instance, addresses the opportunities and challenges for postcolonial hermeneutics from the site of global pentecostal Christianity, observing that particularly in the majority world, the focus on the Old Testament, notions of immediacy vis-à-vis encounter with the divine, and cultural diversity invite if not require a "critical contextualization" or "critical syncretism" between gospel and culture in the present era. My own efforts have been less focused on postcoloniality although I agree global Pentecostalism provides a generative site for approaching the important issues.

"Understanding and Living the Apostolic Way: Oral Culturality and Hermeneutics after Pentecost" shifts from the Asian to the African horizon (through an invitation to present at a conference on African Pentecostalism), and makes the bold claim in conversation with African pentecostal perspectives that there is a pentecostal way of reading and interpreting.

Herein expanding on Yong, [Future of Evangelical Theology](#), and, on the notion of theological hybridity, also Yong, "From Every Tribe, Language, People, and Nation."

[Introducing Theological Interpretation of Scripture](#), Treier relies mostly on Jenkins, [The Next Christendom](#) and [The New Faces of Christianity](#), for his analysis, but may indeed be intrinsic, in this or other related versions, to any Trinitarian Theological-Scriptural Interpretation. The rest of the chapters in this volume seeks to add fuel to the fire of this claim.

Theological Anthropology: Luke, the Spirit, and the Human

The theological-anthropological thread through part II of this volume is a happy coincidence, or fortuitous Spirit-led (pneumatological) providence, as the case may be. Written over a span of approximately four years (from 2008 to 2011—with chapter 4 first and the other two toward the latter part of this time), in retrospect, the movement in each case was from the Day of Pentecost narrative toward a more expansive Lukan exploration. Together, we can view these chapters as various incursions into theological anthropology from a Lukan frame of reference.

What do disability studies and pentecostal studies have in common? "Many Tongues, Many Senses: Pentecost, the Body Politic, and the Redemption of Dis/Ability" responds to this questions in four steps (sections): 1) identification of some of the reasons behind the lack of interaction, so far, between disability and pentecostal studies; 2) exploration of how disability perspectives might bring to the fore previously unrecognized resources for rethinking pentecostal understandings of disability; 3) explication, with the help of a disability hermeneutic, of the pentecostal theology of "many tongues" bearing witness to the gospel with the resulting motif of "many senses" capable of receiving and giving witness to the wondrous works of God; and 4) reassessment of the possibility of pentecostal contributions to theology of disability and disability studies in light of the "many senses" motif. Dialogue at the intersection of disability studies and pentecostal studies will be challenging but also helpful for both sides, even as such joint efforts right also bear witness, in a creative and distinctive way, to the marvelous works of God in

and through the diversity of embodied human experiences.

Chapter 4 took shape as part of the outworking of my theology of disability, specifically progression from systematic considerations to the arena

of biblical theology. It helped me fill out the underdeveloped pneumatology of the former volume via what might be loosely conceived as a biblical theology of disability that flowered in the latter book. The means was via delving more deeply into Luke's pentecostal and pneumatic theology and mining these Lukan resources—from Acts and the Gospel—in dialogue with disability perspectives for theological anthropology. My cue was to follow the multisensory manifestations of the Spirit in the Pentecost event to developing a (Lukan) theology of many senses (and many sensory abilities).

The fifth and sixth chapters of this book were written around the same time (circa early 2011), initially for presentation at two different conferences, one devoted to theology of the family and the other to theology of children. As I was invited to share

children, again situated in eschatological framework, with distinctive implications for Christian beliefs and practices drawn especially from material in the Third Gospel.

As will be clear, although the aspects of theological anthropology covered in part II are ineluctably ad hoc—related to the conferences themes toward which I was invited to present a pentecostal perspective—this is not inconsistent with how at least the postliberal strand of Theological-Scriptural Interpretation interacts with the historic dogmatic loci (as discussed above). Yet the pneumatological lens that at least for me is inspired by a pentecostal imagination also brings to bear resolutely theological commitments, including but irreducible to the goal is a preliminary pentecostal contribution to both contemporary efforts to formulate a multidimensional and interdisciplinary theology of sin.

The seed for this chapter was planted when I was invited to give one of the plenary addresses for the biennial "Faith and Science" conferences hosted by Evangel University, a leading Assemblies of God liberal arts institution of higher education. Delivering the keynote was Baylor University biomedical neuroscientist Matthew Stanford, who was going to speak on his book [The Biology of Sin](#) (2010). Having also done extensive work at the theology and science interface, I thus begun to think about what a pentecostal and even pneumatological theology of sin might look like in dialogue with the sciences. But because Luke did not in his two volumes clearly address hamartiological matters, I approached my task from another angle: what was it that was wrong with the world that the Day of Pentecost outpouring of the Spirit was projected to repair or resolve? Might this provide a route to Luke's implicit theology of sin?

"Jubilee, Pentecost, and Liberation: The Preferential Option of the Poor on the Apostolic Way" was initially drafted for an edited volume exploring the relationship between evangelical theology and liberation theology. Inspired both by recent trends in liberation theology that show remarkable diversification compared with the perceived

Marxist underpinnings of the first generation's efforts and alerted by the widely repeated anecdote that while liberation theologians opted for the poor, the poor were opting for Pentecostalism, chapter 8 considers how pentecostal spirituality that has served the poor across the majority world has both gained further theological traction and specification and expanded evangelical thinking on this topic via sustained engagement with the "many tongues" of liberation theology in the present global context as refracted through the apostolic witness, particularly of the third gospel and its sequel volume. Starting with contemporary liberationist impulses in global and evangelical theological discourses, the argument moves from there to developments of pentecostal liberationist thought, and concludes with scriptural reflections, focused particularly on Luke-Acts.

If the Exodus narrative has been central to liberation theology since its emergence, the Third Gospel has arguably been its principal New Testament locus, one that even pentecostal scholars have been drawn to. Intriguingly, however, although conceived separately, there is a correlative thread between the holistic soteriology promoted by liberationist perspectives and the multidimensional hamartiology elicited from an interdisciplinary reading of the Lukan texts. The pentecostal work of the Spirit intends to bring liberative good news to human beings at the many levels of their sin-impacted existence.

The final chapter of part III, "Apostolic Evangelism in the Postcolony: Opportunities and Challenges," explores how such good news is communicated. Delivered as the plenary address to the 2016 annual meeting of the Academy for Evangelism in Theological Education, it asks what evangelism, the proclamation of the Christian gospel, looks or sounds like in a postcolonial era, a time in which there is a reluctance to assert a metanarrative that marginalizes the many voices of the pluralistic public sphere. Part of the response is: perhaps like how it may have originally gone forth in the first century via the apostolic followers of Jesus the Messiah. This answer is queried through a

rereading of Luke-Acts, connecting the central themes of the Spirit's empowerment for apostolic witness and evangelistic praxis across the first century Pax Romana, and then asking about the significance and application for contemporary evangelism across the global postcolonial landscape. In the end, the point is, as all pentecostally inspired reading gestures toward, performing Christian witness—evangelism in this case—which is the desired perlocutionary effect of the Lukan locutions (to resort to the discourse of speech-act theory prevalent among at least some Theological-Scriptural Interpretation advocates).

Part III thus sketches the full sweep of what might be understood as a Lukan soteriology, one that begins with the Third Evangelist's implicit theology of sin, progresses through his doctrine of salvation as disclosed in the ministry of Jesus and the mission of the Spirit, and culminates in the apostolic practice of evangelism through which such good news is made known to the world. The ad hoc character of our inquiry through these chapters also consists in what occasioned their writing: a science-and-faith conference on the one side and an evangelism colloquium on the other, for instance, resulting in diverse contextual elicitations that contribute toward this soteriological exercise. Yet the consistent Lukan vision, grounded by the Pentecostal message of the Spirit's redemptive work through Christ, brings together a perhaps not-so-surprisingly coherent pentecostal and Christian soteriology for the present era.

Theological-Scriptural Interpretation: Apostolic Hermeneutics

The last triad of chapters veers away from Luke and Acts but they provide alternative windows into my readings of Scripture over the last ten years that I believe is relevant for the dialogue between pentecostal hermeneutics and TIS. If the apostolic label pertains to the full scope of the New Testament writings, then the dominant focus on Luke-Acts in this book is merely a starting point for considering apostolic interpretation of Scripture after Pentecost. Fundamentally, all of the apostolic writings were produced in light not only of Easter (the resurrected and ascended Christ) but also of

Pentecost (the Spirit's gift to the world). From this Trinitarian perspective, we read the New Testament to find out not only what the apostles believed but also how they so believed, and we read the Old Testament to see how they read their sacred Scriptures from their pentecostal location.

The tenth chapter, "'The Light Shines in the Darkness': Johannine Dualism and the Challenge of Christian Theology of Religions Today," is the first essay I wrote that is now collected in this volume. Situated amid my earlier efforts in pneumatological theology of religions," the burden of this essay to move theology of religions to engage more deeply with some of the historically exclusivistic positions deemed rooted in biblical depictions of the people of God as being in the light and others as being in the darkness. Even in the face of the pervasiveness of this theme in the Gospel of John, this chapter seeks to make the case for a less exclusivistic approach to Christian theology of religions—especially through considerations of the Johannine account as an apologetic against confrontational and hostile Jews set against the background of Qumranic sectarianism—in order to open up to the possibilities of a more dialogical and hospitable set of postures and practices vis-à-vis those in other faiths.

Some readers of this book interested primarily in the theology of religions arguments might compare my reading of the Fourth Gospel with observed how important it is to wrestle with that of others who have also the Johannine message in a pluralistic world. For Theological-Scriptural Interpretation purposes, however, chapter 10 contrasts with the dominant thrust of my pentecostal hermeneutic manifest in the rest of this book both in providing a reading of an entire single New Testament book, and in looking at the world behind the text and asking about its exegetical, applicational, and theological implications.

In particular, it focuses on the creation narrative in the book of Genesis, seeking to resist the concordism prevalent in some conservative Christian circles that insists on harmonizing Scripture with science and inevitably ends up either misreading

the former or rejecting the latter. Instead, I suggest that pentecostal Bible-reading practices and hermeneutical sensibilities not only allows for a reading of nature that is complementary with a reading of Scripture but also has the potential to shape a theology and hermeneutic of nature and creation that can sustain the scientific enterprise even while registering pentecostal perspectives, especially in the dialogue between theology and science.

As with chapter 7 in this book, this essay is part and parcel of my ongoing endeavors within the theology and science arena. It here tests the viability of the pentecostal "this is that" hermeneutic in reading the early chapters of Genesis. More relevantly for Theological-Scriptural Interpretation purposes, it suggests a pneumatological hermeneutic, even a pneumatological theology of creation, through which to both appreciate the creation narratives and interact with, rather than dismiss, mainstream science. Last but not least, chapter 8 provides us with a glimpse of a pentecostal Theological-Scriptural Interpretation reading of the Old Testament.

We now turn to readings of the Bible, particularly Luke and Acts, from a pentecostal perspective that is rooted first and foremost in the Day of Pentecost event. The following is intended both to argue for how such a hermeneutical posture is intrinsically Trinitarian in its overarching orientation, and to demonstrate such a pneumatic-Trinitarian Theological-Scriptural Interpretation at work. We will ask in the conclusion if and to what degree the arguments in these chapters are compelling. <>

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