

Spotlight

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January 2018

Embodied metaphors and historical poetics

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Red Modernism: American Poetry and the Spirit of Communism by Mark Steven [Hopkins Studies in Modernism, 9781421423579]

E. E. Cummings' Modernism and the Classics: Each Imperishable Stanza by J. Alison Rosenblitt [Classical Presences, Oxford University Press, 9780198767152]

Fields Range

The range of fields that have conducted conceptual metaphor analyses is large and diverse, including linguistics, psychology, philosophy, computer science/AI, anthropology, education, neuroscience, communications, literature/literary studies, political science, mathematics, business/organizational studies/marketing, sociology, economics, law/legal studies, classics, architecture, nursing science, geography, history, theater arts, music, art/art history, dance, biology, physics, chemistry, religious studies, film and media studies, and Egyptology. Conceptual metaphor analyses have uncovered root systems of metaphors underlying theory and research in each of these academic fields, and have proven to be an invaluable tool for scholars with applied interests in first- and second-language learning, pedagogical practices, cross-cultural communication, advertising and marketing, doctor-patient interactions, psychotherapy, translation studies, and politics, to name just a few topics.

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**Metaphor Wars: Conceptual Metaphors in Human Life by
Raymond W. Gibbs Jr., [Cambridge University Press,
9781107071148]**

The study of metaphor is now firmly established as a central topic within cognitive science and the humanities. We marvel at the creative dexterity of gifted speakers and writers for their special talents in both thinking about certain ideas in new ways, and communicating these thoughts in vivid, poetic forms. Yet metaphors may not only be special communicative devices, but a fundamental part of everyday cognition in the form of 'conceptual metaphors'. An enormous body of empirical evidence from cognitive linguistics and related disciplines has emerged detailing how conceptual metaphors underlie significant aspects of language, thought, cultural and expressive action. Despite its influence and popularity, there have been major criticisms of conceptual metaphor. This book offers an evaluation of the arguments and empirical evidence for and against conceptual metaphors, much of which scholars on both sides of the wars fail to properly acknowledge.

Excerpt: What Are Metaphor Wars?

lovers of language adore metaphor. There is nothing more thrilling for metaphor enthusiasts than to stumble across a phrase or passage that beautifully and concisely captures a metaphoric understanding of some idea or event. Classic metaphors, such as William Shakespeare's "Juliet is the sun," or Robert Burns's "My love is like a red, red rose," express sentiments about people and experiences that are almost impossible to state using language other than metaphor. Both metaphors assert something new about their topics (i.e., "Juliet" and "My love") in terms of concepts from very different aspects of life (i.e., "the sun" and "a red, red rose"). We marvel at the creative dexterity of gifted speakers and writers for their special talents in both thinking about certain ideas in new ways, and communicating these thoughts in vivid, poetic forms. Many metaphors have special linguistic, aesthetic, and possibly cognitive, functions deserving our close attention and persistent admiration.

Metaphor scholars are often fanatical in their pursuit of metaphoricity in language and life. They closely study language and other human actions/ artifacts for clues on people's metaphoric conceptions about their lives and experiences of the world around them. Consider one example of metaphor in action by reading a brief narrative that was delivered by Chris Matthews on his American TV political discussion program "Hardball" (Sept 28, 2012).¹ Matthews was commenting on the upcoming TV debate between President Barack Obama and his opponent, Mitt Romney, in the 2012 Presidential contest. Read the passage and note instances where words and phrases possibly convey metaphorical meanings.

Let me finish tonight with next week's first debate in Denver. I'll be out there to watch the two of them go at it. I have no real idea what to expect. I think Romney will take some hard shots; he may spend the whole 90 minutes blasting away at the President, serving him with one indictment after another, hoping that something will stick.

I think Obama will play with him, parry the assaults, block the blows, try to keep his head clear so he can avoid getting hurt. I think it will start slow with both men trying to be cautious, neither able to land a punch, not hard enough to register with the tens of millions watching.

Then it will happen: Romney will deliver what is clearly a pre-rehearsed moment, a sound byte. It will be something about Obama not delivering on a promise, something about the economy he said he'd do but hasn't. He will expect the President to defend himself.

When he does, pointing to what he inherited from Bush, Romney will pounce. He'll say that Obama's not running against Bush. This will be the Romney strategy: get Obama to pass the buck on the tough economic recovery and then land his Sunday punch.

I suppose President Obama knows this is all coming and is preparing to deal with it. The good news is this: a month ago, all his rival had to do was say that Obama's done his best - he got his stimulus, got his healthcare program ... and here we are. I think that might have nailed it - a month ago.

Something's changed. It could have been something as definite as Bill Clinton's speech but people don't feel stuck like they did, don't think all we need is some other president - and that's Romney's problem, and it's a big one.

Matthews's commentary depicted the upcoming Presidential debate as a sporting event or, more specifically, a boxing match. Many words and phrases give evidence of the **POLITICAL DEBATES ARE BOXING MATCHES** metaphor, including "Romney will take some hard shots," and will be "blasting away at the President," but Romney will "expect the President to defend himself," and that "Obama will play with him, parry the assaults, block the blows, try to keep his head clear so he can avoid getting hurt," even if both men may not be "able to land a punch," although eventually Romney "will pounce" and be able to "land his Sunday punch."

Why did Matthews design his commentary about the Presidential debate around the metaphoric concept of **POLITICAL DEBATES ARE BOXING MATCHES**? A traditional assumption is that people use metaphor for specific rhetorical purposes, namely to express ideas that are difficult to convey using literal language, to state something in a compact manner, to memorably capture the vividness of our phenomenological experience, and, at times, to be polite.¹ Matthews's commentary appears to be motivated by several of these communicative goals. His choice of boxing metaphors conveys vivid, memorable images of the forthcoming Presidential debate that would be challenging to describe using non-metaphoric discourse.

But what if metaphors were not just special rhetorical devices? What if metaphors were fundamental tools that structure how people ordinarily think about abstract ideas and events? One possibility is that people's understanding of many aspects of everyday reality is constituted by enduring metaphorical schemes of thought. Metaphor does not signify an unworldly transcendence from ordinary language, thought, or reality. Instead, what is most clichéd and conventional about reality are those aspects of experience that are primarily constituted by metaphorical thought!

The proposal that metaphor is as much a part of ordinary thought as it is a special feature of language has been voiced by a few rhetoricians, philosophers, and others for hundreds of years. Yet this "metaphor in thought" thesis gained its greatest attention from the 1980s on with the rise of conceptual metaphor theory within the field of cognitive linguistics, most notably starting with the publication in 1980 of the widely read book *Metaphors We Live By*, co-authored by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Unlike earlier scholars who speculated on the metaphorical basis of thought, Lakoff and Johnson provided systematic linguistic

evidence to support the claim that there are metaphors in mind or "conceptual metaphors." Although some linguistic metaphors clearly present novel conceptualizations of different objects and ideas (e.g., "My love is like a red, red rose"), many conventional linguistic statements reflect the existence of enduring conceptual metaphors.

For example, consider the following list of verbal expressions, originally discussed in *Metaphors We Live By*:

"Your claims are indefensible."
 "He attacked every weak point in my argument."
 "His criticisms were right

on target."
 "I demolished his argument."
 "I've never won an argument with him."
 "You disagree? Okay, shoot!"
 "If you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out."
 "He shot down all my arguments."

Each of these linguistic statements gives concrete realization to different aspects of the metaphoric concept in which we conceive of arguments as wars. The **ARGUMENTS ARE WARS** conceptual metaphor has as its primary function the cognitive role of understanding one concept (arguments) in terms of a different, often more familiar, concept (wars).


15 Rhetorical Devices

Here is a list of 16 rhetorical devices, some of which you've heard before and others you may be learning now for the first time:

1. anaphora
2. alliteration
3. allusion
4. asyndeton/polysyndeton
5. chiasmus
6. hyperbole
7. metaphor
8. parallelism
9. personification
10. pun
11. rhetorical question
12. sarcasm
13. simile
14. simple sentence
15. vernacular
16. persuasive appeals (logos/pathos/ethos)

Conceptual metaphors arise whenever we try to understand difficult, complex, abstract, or less delineated concepts, such as arguments, in terms of familiar ideas, such as wars. As Lakoff and Johnson wrote, "It is important to see that we

multidisciplinary world of metaphor research. The literary theorist and critic Wayne Booth wrote back in 1978, somewhat tongue in cheek, that the increasing interest in metaphor, even back at that time, suggests that by the year



don't just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his decisions and defend our own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies ... Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war."

Chris Matthews's commentary reflected a more specific instantiation of the ARGUMENTS ARE WARS conceptual metaphor by suggesting how political arguments may be a particular kind of competition, namely a boxing match.

Lakoff and Johnson forged a new path for the "metaphor in thought" thesis by providing extensive, systematic linguistic evidence showing that metaphors were both ubiquitous in language and had a major role in the creation and continued structuring of abstract concepts. Since 1980, an enormous body of empirical evidence from cognitive linguistics, and related disciplines, has emerged detailing how conceptual metaphors underlie significant aspects of language, and are evident in many nonlinguistic facets of life, including categorization and social judgments, bodily gestures, mathematics, music, art, dance, and material culture.

The range of fields that have conducted conceptual metaphor analyses is large and diverse, including linguistics, psychology, philosophy, computer science/AI, anthropology, education, neuroscience, communications, literature/literary studies, political science, mathematics, business/organizational studies/marketing, sociology, economics, law/legal studies, classics, architecture, nursing science, geography, history, theater arts, music, art/art history, dance, biology, physics, chemistry, religious studies, film and media studies, and Egyptology. Conceptual metaphor analyses have uncovered root systems of metaphors underlying theory and research in each of these academic fields, and have proven to be an invaluable tool for scholars with applied interests in first- and second-language learning, pedagogical practices, cross-cultural communication, advertising and marketing, doctor-patient interactions, psychotherapy, translation studies, and politics, to name just a few topics.

In many people's view, conceptual metaphor theory is the most dominant theory within the large, diverse

2039, there will be more students of metaphor than people. Although it is unclear if Booth's prophecy will come true, CMT is primarily responsible for the incredible popularity of metaphor within many academic fields and among certain lay audiences. A visit to any large metaphor conference, such as Researching and Applying Metaphor (RaAM), or a closer look at the pages of scholarly journals, such as *Metaphor and Symbol*,

Metaphor and the Social World, *Metaphorik.de*, and *Cognitive Linguistics* will find most scholars working within the general framework of conceptual metaphor theory, even if some people also have criticisms of the theory. Skeptics of conceptual metaphor theory, including those who reject most of its assumptions and conclusions, still often acknowledge the tremendous influence that the "metaphor in thought" thesis has had on metaphor scholarship, as well as in larger debates about the nature of mind, meaning, and embodiment.

THE BROADER IMPACT OF CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY

Empirical research on conceptual metaphors has had major impact on four broad concerns in the humanities and cognitive sciences.

First, conceptual metaphor theory has been a significant part of cognitive linguistics' program to offer a new way of thinking about linguistic structure and behavior. Abandoning the traditional generative approach to linguistics, one that embraces the autonomy of language from mind, cognitive linguistics explicitly seeks out connections between language and cognition, and more deeply, language and experiential action. This new vision of linguistics stresses the importance of incorporating empirical findings from a wide variety of cognitive and biological disciplines to create a theoretical description of language. Conceptual metaphor theory has been specifically important in uncovering the detailed contents of linguistic meaning and the relevance of embodied experience in structuring abstract concepts and symbols. Consequently, conceptual metaphor theory provides a major alternative to classic modular views of language that see thought and language as separate architectural systems of

the mind, with the body and mind occupying different realms of human experience. Conceptual metaphor theory shows how the study of metaphor offers insights into the overall unity of human conceptual structures, bodily experience, and the communicative, even aesthetic, functions of language.

Second, conceptual metaphor theory offers a theoretical framework, and certain empirical evidence, for understanding the pervasiveness of metaphorical language and thought across a wide range of cognitive domains and cultural/linguistic environments. The traditional view of

metaphors asserts that these figures express only temporary, "one-shot," construals of objects and ideas, as in "My lawyer is a shark," which do not necessarily impact the fundamental, literal contents of human thought and language. Under this perspective, metaphors may be extraordinarily useful in momentarily thinking about certain ideas in new ways, and communicating these thoughts in a vivid manner, although human knowledge is primarily constituted in disembodied, literal terms. Yet conceptual metaphor theory demonstrates that metaphor is neither a rare, linguistic phenomenon nor merely a pragmatic aspect of language use. Instead, work originating within cognitive linguistics, and extending to many other fields, has revealed how metaphor should, at the very least, be recognized as a fundamental scheme of thought serving many cognitive, communicative, and cultural/ ideological functions.

Third, the claim that significant parts of abstract thinking are partly motivated by metaphorical mappings between diverse knowledge domains has altered our scholarly conception of the relationship between thought and language. Prior to Lakoff and Johnson's first book, most discussions of language and thought dependencies were narrowly focused on questions related to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, particularly within the domain of color. Research in the cognitive sciences during the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated an increasing interest in semantic memory, and showed how conceptual knowledge was both necessary for language understanding and could be analyzed in various representational formats. But this work gave primary emphasis to the architecture of conceptual knowledge (e.g., the organization of semantic memory), and far less to the actual contents of what people know. Most notably, there were few attempts to explicitly model highly abstract knowledge domains (e.g., politics, scientific knowledge, ideas about the self, emotion concepts). Conceptual metaphor theory provides one way of thinking about how abstract concepts were established and influenced different domains of human thought, as well as ordinary language use and understanding.

Finally, conceptual metaphor theory has been a leading force in what some refer to as the "second revolution" in cognitive science, namely the interest in the study of embodied cognition.⁷ Cognitive linguistic analyses of language and gesture and psycholinguistics research, in particular, have played a prominent role in showing the significant degree to which metaphorical concepts are rooted within recurring patterns of bodily activity that serve as source domains for people's metaphorical understandings of many abstract concepts. The great irony here is that metaphor, rather than emerging from rare, transcendent imaginative thought, provides evidence on the embodied foundation of abstract thinking and action. Conceptual metaphor theory significantly advances our understanding of the dynamic links between bodily experiences, and ubiquitous thought patterns about abstract topics, linguistic structure and behavior, and culture.

ATTACKING CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY

Despite its influence and popularity, there have been major criticisms of conceptual metaphor theory beginning with the publication of *Metaphors We Live By*, and continuing to this

day. These negative reactions to the "metaphor in thought" thesis have led to a series of battles among metaphor scholars, both within and across academic disciplines, which together constitute the metaphor wars that are the subject of this book.

Metaphor wars are fought by participants with many different motivations and goals. Some researchers wish to explore how metaphors reflect individual creativity, artistic traditions, and cultural motifs. Different scholars want to understand what metaphors reveal about people's communicative abilities in changing social circumstances. Other metaphor enthusiasts focus on the effects that metaphors have on people's thoughts, emotions, and interpersonal relationship. Still other researchers study the ways people interpret metaphorical meanings as a window into the nature of meaning, as well as conscious and unconscious human cognition.

Some of these varying interests stem from longstanding disciplinary concerns leading scholars to battle over whether conceptual metaphor theory offers a satisfactory theory of meaning (for philosophers), insights into creativity and poetic practice (for literary scholars), an online account of people's immediate comprehension of verbal metaphor (for psycholinguists), or cultural models (for anthropologists). Yet metaphor wars do not easily group into disciplinary categories (e.g., linguistics vs. philosophy vs. psychology vs. literature) or into a simple distinction between scientists and humanists. Individual scholars are often attracted to the topic of metaphor precisely because of what it reveals about multiple facets of human experience. Speaking personally, studying metaphor is endlessly fascinating for its lessons about the interactions of embodiment, language, and thought, and its relevance to everything from culture and history to neurons and unconscious cognition. Conceptual metaphor theory has offered me a way of understanding the emergence of meaning in both everyday life and spectacular realizations of the human spirit in art.

This complexity in how scholars approach the topic of metaphor may, however, accurately reflect the multitude of ways metaphor manifests itself in human experience. For this reason, there may never be a clear winner in the wars over conceptual metaphor. Such a conclusion should not sway us from trying to adjudicate some of the many disputes which continue to churn within the interdisciplinary world of metaphor scholarship. But resolving the debates about conceptual metaphor requires a comprehensive understanding of the vast empirical literature specifically designed to study conceptual metaphor theory, and a sensitive analysis of why some scholars, nonetheless, react so negatively to the very idea of conceptual metaphors.

Consider again Chris Matthews's political commentary and his different boxing metaphors for the Obama vs. Romney debate. Did Matthews's choice of many conventional expressions necessarily indicate that he was thinking of the Presidential debate in a specific metaphorical manner? conceptual metaphor theory scholars would argue that Matthews's speech, especially his systematic use of boxing metaphors, provides empirical evidence on the power of conceptual metaphors, such as *POLITICAL DEBATES ARE BOXING MATCHES*, in structuring people's thinking about

abstract topics. But skeptics would likely respond that Matthews merely spit out a series of clichéd phrases which have littered the English language for some time. Politics just happens to be talked about in certain conventional ways, some of which originated in metaphorical thinking. Still, the fact that a contemporary speaker, such as Matthews, used particular words or phrases does not imply that he was cognitively drawing cross-domain comparisons between political debates and boxing matches.

The major argument in metaphor wars concerns the legitimacy of drawing inferences about human thought and experience from the analysis of what people say and write. How do we really know if a speaker's metaphorical talk necessarily indicates active metaphorical thought? Some scholars voice skepticism about the conclusions of conceptual metaphor theory because of its reliance on pure intuition in their systematic analysis of conventional expressions, novel metaphors, and polysemy. They seek more scientific evidence, testing falsifiable hypotheses, to prove that so-called conceptual metaphors are "psychologically real," and not the mere fictions of cognitive linguistic analyses.

Critics also typically do not believe that conventional phrases, such as "Romney will take some hard shots," count as legitimate metaphors because these are so common or clichéd. Traditional metaphor scholarship in many fields focuses on resemblance, or "A is B," metaphors, such as "Juliet is the sun," "Man is wolf," and "My surgeon is a butcher."⁹ Certain cognitive linguistic analyses have been proposed for how people may interpret "A is B" metaphors, especially within conceptual "blending theory."¹⁰ But the fact remains that most of the evidence in favor of conceptual metaphor theory comes from an examination of metaphorical words and phrases that do not fit the traditional "A is B" form. For some, conceptual metaphor theory appears to be too reductive, and spoils the cherished idea that metaphors, like "Juliet is the sun," are special, creative linguistic forms and aesthetically appealing precisely because of their active, poetic qualities."

Conceptual metaphor theory is also faulted for its failure to offer reliable guidelines for determining how different linguistic expressions are necessarily motivated by particular conceptual metaphors. What are the criteria for specifying how some linguistic statements, such as those listed above from *Metaphors We Live By*, directly point to the existence of one kind of conceptual metaphor (e.g., ARGUMENTS ARE WARS) as opposed to some other (e.g., DISPUTES ARE SHOOTING CONTESTS), or even no conceptual metaphor at all.

Some linguists, especially those working in applied areas (e.g., educational linguistics, literary analysis, corpus linguistics), voice concern about the difficulty of reliably identifying conceptual metaphors underlying naturalistic conversation and texts. The complexities of real-life discourse make it far more difficult to perform conceptual metaphor analyses compared to working with isolated, constructed linguistic examples frequently studied by cognitive linguists. Without explicit criteria for conceptual metaphor identification, critics see no reason to posit the existence of conceptual metaphors as either generalization about the language system or critical parts of the human cognitive unconscious.

Anthropologists and linguists similarly contend that conceptual metaphor theory fails to properly acknowledge the cultural forces that shape metaphorical thinking and language. The attempt to locate the cognitive and embodied, including neural, bases for metaphorical language, in many people's view, ignores the larger social and communicative goals that speakers and writers have

when using metaphor, as well as the historical customs and ideological beliefs that may motivate some metaphoric discourses. Matthews's commentary, for instance, did not simply sprout from his private conceptual system, but emerged within a complex network of cultural understandings about Presidential campaigns and political debates. Efforts to ground



linguistic metaphors in cognitive and, perhaps neural, structures miss the vital social nature of metaphorical speech acts.

Finally, anthropologists argue that conceptual metaphor theory ignores culture in a theory of metaphor. For example, Naomi Quinn presented a lengthy criticism of conceptual metaphor theory in 1992, noting the following problems: "... the case of metaphor illustrates a uniform tendency for linguists and other cognitive scientists outside of anthropology to neglect altogether the organizing role of culture in human thought..." Quinn also suggested an alternative role for metaphor in cultural models: "...metaphors, far from constituting understanding, are ordinarily selected to fit a preexisting and culturally shared model..."

These comments are indicative of the intense negativity that conceptual metaphor theory has provoked, despite its simultaneous appeal within the metaphor community and elsewhere. As these critical observations make clear, the stakes are high in the wars over conceptual metaphor.

MY FIGHTS IN THESE WARS

No matter what one may believe about the value of conceptual metaphor theory, it is clearly appropriate to acknowledge that conceptual metaphor theory has brought metaphor center stage to the highest level of theoretical discussions about mind and language within cognitive science and the humanities. But the time is ripe for a comprehensive reassessment of conceptual metaphor theory, especially given the vast research related to conceptual metaphor from many disciplines within the cognitive sciences. I approach this task with a long personal history of involvement in the metaphor wars. When I first became interested in metaphor, and all things figurative, most scholars treated metaphor as if, in T.S. Eliot's words, it were "like a patient etherized upon a table." Like pathologists hovering over a corpse, metaphor researchers would poke at "Man is wolf" or "kick the bucket" wondering if these were dead or alive, sometimes turning the body over to see if it conveyed a different meaning from the other side (e.g., does "Man is wolf" mean something different than "Wolf is man"?). But there was little concern with where metaphors came from, or what metaphor actually does when bouncing around the real world of human speakers in interaction. Even as I, and others, began to conduct experimental studies in the late 1970s looking at the effect of context on figurative language interpretation, the emphasis was really on how short discourse contexts facilitated processing of some phrases, such as "Regardless of danger, the troops marched on," as having metaphorical as opposed to literal meaning. What metaphors actually communicated in real-life situations, the roles that metaphor had in structuring certain domains of thought, and how metaphors shaped and reflected culture, were not topics that attracted much attention.

But the revolution in metaphor studies brought about by CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY changed all that in significant ways. Metaphor was now viewed as more pervasive in everyday life and part of ordinary cognition, and not just a special, ornamental linguistic device. A good deal of my experimental research in psycholinguistics has, among other things, supported some of the proposal offered by conceptual metaphor theory, work that has advanced the suggestion that conceptual metaphors are psychologically real. Much of my recent work has been devoted to understanding the embodied roots of metaphorical language use and thinking, an idea that is also directly relevant to some of the newest developments in conceptual metaphor theory. My involvement with conceptual metaphor theory has taught me important lessons about the interactions of embodiment, language, and thought, and the relevance of conceptual metaphors in everything from culture and history to neurons and unconscious cognition. Most generally, conceptual metaphor theory has offered me a way of understanding the emergence of meaning in both everyday life and spectacular realizations of the human spirit in art.

At the same time, I have long criticized conceptual metaphor theory for its one-dimensional conception of linguistic understanding, its lack of methodological rigor by relying too much on the intuitions of individual analysts, its lack of attention to alternative proposals, and its failure to

acknowledge the complexities in people's ongoing metaphorical experience. As my view of human cognition has developed over the years, I now believe that determining the role that conceptual metaphors play in human life should not result in either a "Yes, it does" or "No, it does not" conclusion. Instead, conceptual metaphors may be emergent products of multiple, nested factors (i.e., biological, historical, cultural, social, cognitive, and linguistic), and may interact with many knowledge sources and experiences to create context-sensitive, task-specific metaphorical behaviors.

Conceptual metaphor may be an essential ingredient in a comprehensive theory of metaphor, yet it clearly is not the only part of that story. I will later argue that conceptual metaphors' effect on language use, reasoning, imagination, and different human actions really depends on the specifics of who the people are, what their motivations and goals are, the specific language and linguistic devices they use, the cognitive and social tasks they accomplish, and how we as scholars assess metaphorical performance in different real-life situations. Overall, though, some of the complaints about conceptual metaphor theory being too reductive really miss how conceptual metaphors express a deeply felt aesthetics of meaning that emerges from people's experiences of their bodies and minds in social, cultural contexts.

My plea in this book is for a fair hearing of all the cognitive science data as we continue to debate the merits of conceptual metaphor theory. Only through a complete analysis of the extant empirical research will we ever come to broader theoretical agreements about the complexities of metaphor use and understanding. This call for a comprehensive analysis of the empirical evidence is really directed to critics of conceptual metaphor theory, who often simply do not know of the abundant research on conceptual metaphors, as well as advocates of conceptual metaphor theory who sometimes blindly march forward as if it alone is the one and only true metaphor theory. Right now, there simply remains too much separation between different research enterprises on metaphor, with scholars from different theoretical perspectives pursuing their own research agendas without consideration of alternative ideas and results out there in the literature. My primary focus here will be on conceptual metaphor theory and I will not always go into great detail about the pros and cons of alternative theoretical perspectives. Nonetheless, I strive to acknowledge other factors or variables that may be critical to a theory of metaphor, now underemphasized by conceptual metaphor theory, which critics of conceptual metaphor have taken pains to explore in their own research and writings.

Describing the debates on metaphor as "wars" seems apt given the heated, sometimes vitriolic, nature of these academic discussions, and because of the significant theoretical implications that these arguments have for our vision of human thought, language, and action. Simply put, to maintain that metaphors are constitutive of the way people think offers a radical departure from long-standing beliefs in the literal, purely computational, highly disembodied ways people understand themselves and the

world around them. More dramatically, empirical research showing that metaphor is an embodied, cognitive process, which clearly manifests as different linguistic and cultural tools, highlights the "poetics of mind," a view of experience that is far removed from the standard impression of our lives as clichéd and non-poetic.

The paradox of metaphor is that it can be creative, novel, and culturally sensitive, allowing us to transcend the mundane, while also being rooted in bodily experiences and unconscious thought patterns common to all people. Metaphor wars are the result of our continued struggle with this paradox. Yet in the metaphor wars, it may be ultimately wiser to accept the multiple functions that metaphors have in human life than to proclaim victory for one side, and defeat for the other.

Conclusion and the Future

There was a time, not very long ago, when it was almost preposterous to suggest that metaphor had a major role in human life. Most everyone recognized that metaphors may occasionally burst forth, typically because of the poetic genius of very special people. Creative writers and artists possess imaginative gifts that enable them to spin words into novel metaphorical constructions. Certain verbal metaphors can pull us away from clichéd, mundane reality and let us briefly experience a transcendent, aesthetic world. All of us have some potential for appreciating the wonders of metaphor as a linguistic or artistic creation. Still, the world of metaphor has always traditionally been viewed as a special refuge that has little to do with ordinary human cognition.

Metaphor wars have been fought over a new vision of metaphorical language and thought. Contrary to the traditional view, articulated above, metaphor is a fundamental part of human conceptual systems and not just a special facet of speech and writing. The astonishing idea that metaphor may be a basic scheme of human thought has been proposed by several scholars over the centuries. It was, however, only with the publication of "Metaphors We Live By" in 1980 that empirical research began appearing in support of the conceptual metaphor hypothesis. The present book presented an overview of the vast literature demonstrating that metaphor is a critical part of how we ordinarily think and talk. These studies reveal how conceptual metaphors are not the mere fictions of cognitive linguists, but are psychologically real features of human thought and expression. At the same time, many research programs described in this book have been motivated by a desire to expand conceptual metaphor theory so that it can be more inclusive of the

incredible mosaic of human experiences beyond those that are narrowly seen as within the "cognitive" domain. For example, conceptual metaphors are now widely understood to have significant roots within human embodied activity, something that few scholars would have anticipated back in 1980. Furthermore, and quite importantly, conceptual metaphors have now been shown to structure many non-linguistic expressive experiences and, indeed, are indicative of various social, cultural, and even neural influences on human thought and language.

My primary aim in writing this book was to gather in one place many of the arguments and empirical evidence supporting the possibility that conceptual metaphors are crucial in defining human life. Describing this research is necessary because metaphor wars have too often been fought by people who simply do not know the complexity of the data that lend credence to conceptual metaphor theory, as well as offer refinements to the theory. I am hopeful that future debates about conceptual metaphors in human life will be more informed about the empirical contents of conceptual metaphor theory. My plea for a fair reading of the literature is intended as a cautionary warning to those who glibly dismiss the theory in its entirety, because of different linguistic intuitions, selective readings of the experimental data, or because of the theory's embrace of the terms "conceptual" and "cognitive." Productive arguments over conceptual metaphors must acknowledge all of the empirical evidence from a variety of academic fields that directly addresses the ways conceptual metaphors add meaningful structure to human life.

One of the most forceful criticisms of conceptual metaphor theory is that the theory is reductionist and fails to capture many of the specificities of meaningful metaphorical experience. These complaints stem, to a significant degree, from the rendering of conceptual metaphors as short,

Metaphorical Grasping

There is a conceptual metaphor, *Understanding Is Grasping*, according to which one can *grasp ideas*.

Reasoning patterns about physical grasping can be mapped by conceptual metaphor onto abstract reasoning patterns.

One can begin to grasp an idea, but not quite get a hold of it.

If you fail to grasp an idea, it can go right by you — or over your head!

If you grasp it, you can turn it over in your mind.

You can't hold onto an idea before having grasped it.

schematic pairings of words in small caps, such as LIFE IS A JOURNEY, UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING, and ANGER IS HEAT. Critics view these simplistic summaries as the presumed entirety of conceptual metaphorical experience, almost as if these words alone represent metaphorical concepts, rather than serving as shorthand for complex, dynamic webs of thoughts and feelings, each of which are continually defined and bodily enacted. We must recognize that the labels for conceptual metaphors are only communicative devices employed in scholarly discussions and are not reflections of actual metaphorical concepts and experiences. Moreover, our understanding of every conceptual metaphor changes in each moment of real life, bodily action (i.e., linguistic and non-linguistic). Conceptual metaphors do not sit individually in some mental cabinet, waiting to be activated and then mechanically applied in a generic way for each and every interpretive act. Instead, conceptual metaphors are always articulated in slightly different ways in each context. Just as each snowflake may be unique, despite the fact that all snowflakes are made of the same substances, the precise conditions under which each conceptual metaphor emerges make them all exquisitely particular.

It is really important to acknowledge the specificity of metaphorical experience when talking about conceptual metaphors and their functions in everyday cognition and expression. Each conceptual metaphor theory analysis of a particular verbal metaphor, literary work, gestural action, artwork, or musical composition may suggest that one or more conceptual metaphors partly motivate what is meaningful about different communicative and expressive actions. But nobody claims that the meanings of a linguistic metaphor or a literary creation, to take two examples, are completely defined by conceptual metaphors, or that interpretations of human artifacts can be reduced to conceptual metaphors (and their embodied and/or neural roots). Still, the empirical evidence overwhelmingly validates that embodied conceptual metaphors are enduring constraints which motivate why we act in metaphorical ways and interpret human artifacts as expressing different metaphorical meanings.

The original proposal that metaphor was part of our ordinary conceptual system was never intended to dismiss the historical, cultural, social, and aesthetic dimensions of metaphorical experience. Yes, metaphor is not just a linguistic device, and has many roots in pervasive patterns of cognitive and embodied activity. However, this claim, which offered a major reorientation to the ways that metaphor had traditionally been conceptualized and studied, is consistent with the fact that speaking, writing, gesturing, and creating artworks are all human actions that are clearly shaped by a confluence of factors ranging from historical and cultural forces, operating at slower time-scales, to cognitive and neural forces, working along fast time-scales. Metaphors in thought are not just static entities within an isolated cognitive system.

Contemporary debates over what is the right level of analysis or best empirical method to adopt when studying metaphor has led to unproductive stalemates because researchers too often quickly dismiss, or are even

completely ignorant of, the general perspective and empirical findings offered by those working from different points of view. For example, some criticisms of conceptual metaphor theory focus entirely on whether or not a cognitive approach is best to study and explain metaphor. I think this debate really focuses on the wrong question. Our attention should be directed toward how different types of knowledge and experience interact with one another to give rise to particular metaphorical actions. Investigating this issue demands that scholars not assume that they can simply study one facet of metaphor in some domain of experience from their own, autonomous, point of view (e.g., the cultural, social, linguistic, cognitive, neural perspectives). Instead, metaphor scholars must realize, and openly acknowledge that metaphorical actions always emerge from the interaction of a constellation of forces. What happens at the level of culture is shaped by actions at linguistic level. What happens at the social level is always influenced by embodied actions and experience. What happens at the cognitive level is partly determined by neural and evolutionary constraints. The discourse level is always partly embodied, and, indeed, bodily experience is itself shaped by cultural and discourse factors. Mark Johnson nicely captures this idea of the interconnectedness of thought and language with many other dimensions of our social experience:

Since thought is a form of coordinated action, it is spread out in the world, coordinated with the physical environment and the social, cultural, moral, political, and religious environments, institutions, and shared practices. Language - and all other forms of symbolic expression - are quintessentially social behaviors.

Most generally, every level of analysis is always in interaction with every other level, such that human metaphorical actions should be properly characterized as dynamical and emergent, and not merely an assortment of isolated perspectives or properties of mind.

Despite the abundance of empirical research in favor of conceptual metaphor theory, there is certainly room for new advances. Let me mention four topics that are ripe for scholarly attention.

First, conceptual metaphor theory requires greater precision in reliably identifying conceptual metaphors from the systematic analysis of language patterns. Developments in corpus linguistics and automatic conceptual metaphor identification studies will be especially critical in this regard. At the very least, though, scholars should always outline the exact steps they engage in when drawing inferences about underlying conceptual metaphors from samples of language or other expressive modalities (e.g., gesture, art, music, dance). How did you first determine what was metaphorical in your sample? How did you then explicitly infer that certain conceptual metaphors, but not others, were the motivating force for overt metaphorical expressions? Furthermore, we all need to explore in greater detail how conceptual metaphors are elaborated upon through non-metaphorical language and media. The constraining presence of conceptual metaphors is not just manifested in metaphorical language and actions. As Lakoff and Johnson earlier noted, for example, "We live our lives on the basis

of inferences we derive via metaphor," and my suggestion is that some of these inferences are often characterized in non-metaphorical ways. This possibility should be one focus of new work in metaphor studies.

Second, a classic interpretation of conceptual metaphors is that these are created from the mapping of usually concrete, often embodied, source domain knowledge which is projected to better structure target domain concepts, typically referring to ideas from a dissimilar aspect of experience. Consider the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY where the JOURNEY source domain is understood

reasons, many recurring patterns of bodily experience are deeply socialized, enculturated, and may even be metonymic in the sense of standing for larger metaphorical, and allegorical, themes in our lives. The most important implication of this idea for conceptual metaphor theory is that metaphorical meanings do not necessarily arise from the mappings of purely embodied knowledge onto abstract concepts. Instead, the source domains in conceptual metaphors are themselves metaphorical in nature. Of course, the metaphoricity of source domains may arise via feedback from source-to-target metaphorical mappings, especially as seen in the various entailments or

Unknown is up

"What's *up*?"

"It's *up in the air*."

"It's a *toss-up*."

"Don't leave me *hanging*."

"I'm *on the fence*."

Known is down

"I have it *down*."

"We got to the *bottom* of it."

"Let me *dig* into it."

"OK, it's *settled* then."

"Here's the *scoop*."

as having image-schematic structure, as in the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema. Conceptual metaphor theory usually assumes that embodied source domains within conceptual metaphors are nonmetaphorical given their direct relations to recurring patterns of bodily experience across different bodily modalities.

However, our experiences of journeys, and the emergence of image schemas, such as SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, are rarely untouched by other symbolic meanings. Our physical journeys in life, again across different bodily modalities, always are imbued with existential, social, and cultural meanings, often in the form of allegorical themes. When we walk from point A to point B, our journey is dictated by our desires and goals. The obstacles we face along the path as we move toward our physical destination are interpreted given varying cultural beliefs and personal ideals. For these

correspondences created by conceptual metaphors. After all, we may understand many aspects of LIFE from our concrete, physical experiences of JOURNEYS, but the association of JOURNEYS with LIFE can clearly create a metaphorical interpretation of journey-taking activities in life.

The most important implication of this "metaphorical source domains" hypothesis is that metaphoricity in experience will not be restricted to what we typically view as abstract concepts, but will extend more massively into concrete bodily experiences and actions. Some of the experimental results from social psychological studies, reviewed in Chapter 6, offer support for this claim. If this is true, metaphor will be recognized as emerging in a far greater range of human life experiences than has generally been

Being correlational, primary metaphors differ from complex (analogical) ones in a variety of ways that are relevant to further concerns in cognition and discourse. First, primary metaphors, though clearly domain-crossing, are much closer to the metonymy pole of the metonymy—metaphor cline than resemblance-based ones. This is not just a terminological issue, as expressions instantiating primary metaphors will often be literally and metaphorically true (namely, in all contexts that have the experiential properties of primary scenes):

The ... motivations [of primary metaphors] sound strikingly like metonymic relationships between aspects of experienced scenes ... While it is clearly metaphoric to cast difficulty as heaviness in cases where no physical burdens or physical weights are relevant, the origins of the conceptual association between the physical assessment of weight and the affective experience of exertion certainly bear comparison to the type of frame-internal relations typical of metonymy.

Second, primary metaphors are more constrained than resemblance-based ones concerning how cogently they arise from experiential correlations in "recurrent experiential scenarios" across individuals and even cultural communities. In the form of the question of whether something like "basic metaphor" actually exists, this issue has also been taken up in social psychology. The crucial point here is that the conceptual associations characterizing primary metaphors can in principle be acquired (and usually are) in the absence of any linguistic input.

Third, the deeply entrenched conceptual associations between source and target concepts in primary metaphors are regularly reflected at the level of language (systems) by highly conventionalized lexical polysemy or word-formation devices — hence the quasi-literal feel of most instantiations of primary metaphors in actual discourse. Speakers routinely refer to target concepts by making use of deeply entrenched extended uses of terms denoting the respective source, or of terms regularly derived from these source terms. In accordance with DIFFICULTY IS HEAVINESS, for instance, a "difficult task" is called "schwer" or "schwierig" in German. The core meaning of the first term is 'heavy,' the second term is transparently derived from the first and can only refer to the target (for a survey of expressions reflecting five primary metaphors across sixteen languages, see Grady, this volume). Sometimes, the metaphorical motivations of abstract lexemes are so deeply "buried" in the lexicon of a language that they can only be recovered from their etymology. Goatly makes an important point when saying that transparent metaphors of the type presented by primary metaphors do not die like other lexicalized metaphors because "their original vehicles are ... so basic and universal to our experience, being concerned with objects, space, movement, orientation and so on, that they have no chance of disappearing."

With this observation, he anticipates the fourth point, which has more recently been made by cognitive and social psychologists about non-linguistic metaphorical cognition: Correlation-based "mental" metaphors contrast with complex analogical ones in that they remain "active" for good. That is to say, their above-mentioned power to influence cognitive behavior (hypothesis v) remains undiminished, no matter how conventional the linguistic expressions they motivate may be.

The project documented in this volume elaborates on a number of (previously unrelated) suggestions from both embodied-cognition and discourse traditions to investigate manifestations of metaphor at or across multiple levels of various kinds.

Casasanto sets apart "mental" metaphors — all cross-domain associations influencing people's non-linguistic cognitive behavior — from "linguistic" metaphors — those that are also "enshrined," i.e. lexicalized in language(s). Steen's work on the activation of source-domain content in metaphor comprehension is based on a tripartite distinction between metaphor in thought, language (systems), and discourse.

To account for the interplay between bodily and cultural factors motivating conventional metaphorical expressions across languages, Kövecses also assumes a three-level model. Here, the "individual" level is concerned with the use of metaphorical expressions in actual communicative situations (i.e. discourse). The bodily/experiential grounding of metaphorical expressions is provided at the "sub-individual" level of individual cognition, e.g. in the form of image schemas and primary metaphors. Conventionalized complex metaphors appear at the "supra-individual" level of specific languages and cultures.

From a wider perspective, namely, that of complex-dynamic systems, Gibbs and Cameron suggest that what researchers call metaphor encompasses phenomena occurring at a number of levels defined by vastly different temporal scales ranging from the split-seconds of cognitive processing up to the centuries or millennia of human culture, and even evolutionary time. To these correspond equally wide-ranging scales of a spatial, material, or social nature. Social scales, for instance, range from individual human beings up to the entire species, via successively larger groups — both short-lived ones, such as those constituted by human beings united in spontaneous interactions, and progressively more stable ones, such as those constituted by human beings considering themselves members of the same community of practice, speech community, or cultural group.

Though the levels of cognition, language, discourse, and culture have traditionally attracted the attention of metaphor researchers most, a multidimensional model of metaphor should span a larger array of levels, in principle ranging from the bodily foundations — both substrates and processes — that enable human body-world interactions, i.e. movement, perception, and ultimately also cognition, all the way up to the evolutionary scale of the development of the human species (including its genome) over temporal scales that go far beyond cultural time:

1. (neuro-)physiology
2. cognition (on/off-line)
3. discourse/communication (especially but not exclusively face-to-face interaction)
4. language (systems)
5. culture
6. evolution

A few clarifying remarks on levels 2 to 5 from the perspective of this volume are in order. Studies of metaphor across the verbal and gestural planes in spontaneous face-to-face communication (as the most immediate form of discourse) naturally foreground both the multimodal character and crucial interactive functions of communication. By doing so, they have opened a new "window to the mind," i.e. produced evidence of vital relevance to studies of metaphor in cognition. Outside of metaphor theory, research on the role of gestures in embodied cognition stresses that gestures are not just communicative devices but evidence for "embodied knowledge." The "Gesture as Simulated Action" framework, for instance, holds that gestures "derive from simulated actions" and "are produced as

part of the cognitive processes that underlie thinking and speaking."

Culture appears as the wider matrix of the relatively more stable socio-historical contexts in which any communicative event is ultimately embedded. These contexts are simultaneously reflected in and constituted by speakers' participation in and (shared) knowledge/memory of cultural practices, which include social interaction/discourse, special forms of bodily behavior, and artifact use. This perspective foregrounds the "distributive" nature of cognitive systems (i.e. distributions across the members of a social group, and over time): "culture can be seen as a potent, cumulative reservoir of resources for learning, problem solving, and reasoning, 'ratcheting up' the collective insights of previous generations so individuals do not have to start from scratch." Most immediately relevant to the present project is perhaps the question of what it could mean for culture itself to be literally "embodied." Soliman and Glenberg view culture as "the tuning of sensori-motor systems for situated action," arising from social interactions at the level of small, relatively stable social groups (e.g. families). They argue that the mutual adaption of the (bodily) behaviors of individuals in close, everyday interactions creates "in-group" behavior which maximizes the efficiency of the most frequent social interactions. Culturally "distant" people are perceived as "out-group" to the extent that interaction with them is not "synchronized," thus more effortful and requiring negotiation.

People's knowledge of language is assumed to be non-modular. Following cognitively oriented, usage-based models, language (systems) are viewed as structured, dynamic inventories of symbolic units which continually emerge from the myriads of (culturally drenched) usage events that its speakers experience. In this way, language systems lexicalize conceptualizations

that are of significance to the members of the respective speech community, i.e. culturally relevant. Usage-based models make clear that individual knowledge of language is intertwined with situated usage and that the shared

knowledge that constitutes (dynamic) language systems belongs to speech communities rather than single speakers, because the (dynamic) knowledge that individual speakers possess of their language(s) is neither fully identical nor complete.

Given all this, the emphasis on embodied cognition characterizing this volume is not meant to narrow down metaphor research to aspects of individual cognition or bodily experience narrowly defined. On the contrary, embodied-cognition research explicitly acknowledges the sociocultural situatedness of all cognition: "In viewing cognition as embedded or situated, embodied cognitive science emphasizes feedback between an agent and the world."


Outside of metaphor research, it was recognized early on that dynamic systems theory provides "a crucial tool for embodied cognitive science." In a nutshell, complex-dynamic systems have

three major properties: First, they consist of a number of "interactive components or agents" that need not be homogeneous: "a brain in a body in an environment can comprise a heterogeneous, complex dynamic system". Second, the collective behavior of the entire system may result in "coherent patterns" that are unpredictable from the behaviors of its components, i.e. not related to them in a linear manner. Third, this "emergent" behavior is "self-organized" in that it does not require any "controlling component agent." The intricate structures of relatively more stable natural configurations like snowflakes or termites' nests have been cited as illustrations of such emerging patterns, as have the fast-changing and context-dependent coordination patterns of living animals like flocks of birds or schools of fish, which are described as "soft-assembled" and "interaction-dominant."

Unsurprisingly, this description also applies to the dynamics of social interaction. Studies of metaphorical expressions emerging from social interactions in particular discourse contexts will thus naturally foreground that the synergy emerging from the individuals co-acting as a group under specific contextual conditions "enslaves" the behavior of individual actors so that the group behavior cannot be understood by investigating individual behavior in isolation and so that it becomes difficult or impossible to assign causal roles to any of the individual "components" constituting the situation, including the human actors. Similar considerations apply to cognition as a complex-dynamic system in its own right made up of highly heterogeneous components and depending on the interaction of bodily components way beyond the brain itself, but also on the interaction with further component systems outside the boundaries of the biological body, including aspects of the (natural and man-made) physical environment as well as social-interactive contexts.

The opportunities afforded by this for studying metaphor (and metonymy!) as an aspect of cognition and discourse, as both embodied and socially constituted, are blatantly obvious.

In metaphor theory, the complex-dynamic systems framework has so far served to deepen the insight that a more



complete understanding of metaphor requires the appreciation of the tight relations and mutual interdependencies between its various levels of appearance. In discourse-oriented research, it has predictably foregrounded the role of distributed/group cognition in ongoing interactive meaning-making and led to the rejection of a narrow notion of embodiment that is tied to individual minds — or rather to fixed representations like conceptual metaphor theory's conventional domain analogies as a property of individual minds.

The preceding section emphasized that the dynamic systems approach fosters an appreciation of the interrelations between the various levels at which metaphor can become manifest. However, given the vast differences in the correlated temporal, material, spatial, and social scales that define these levels, partial dissociations are also to be expected. This is to say the manifestations of metaphor across levels are unlikely to reduce

to mere reflections of one another by default. Though both of these points deserve extended discussion, I will point out only a few issues that are of particular concern to this volume.

In view of what was said above about language (systems) as inventories of symbolic units, it seems likely, for instance, that not all of the correlational mental metaphors that are active at the conceptual level will also qualify as primary by being lexicalized, i.e. reflected by the conventionalized symbolic units of language. Cultural contexts may act as a kind of "filter" letting some but not all of the potentially relevant experiential correlations pass, i.e. making certain aspects of bodily experiences more accessible or salient than others. Relevant cross-linguistic data come from Australian Aboriginal languages that do not exhibit KNOWING IS SEEING, a primary metaphor otherwise extremely widespread across languages, but instead employ KNOWING IS HEARING. Obviously, the two alternative metaphors belong to a larger group of coherent experiential correspondences all reflecting the fact that the acquisition of knowledge depends on perception. Vice versa, but by the same token, cultural experience such as that provided by communicative practices (including the use of language and artifacts) can be argued to provide "feedback loops" that reach down to the sub-individual level, reinforcing primary metaphors. From this perspective, arguments over whether primary metaphors are embodied or cultural are futile because they ignore vital interactions between the interdependent levels of cognition, language, communication, and culture.

Based on the assumption that associative learning can strengthen preexisting mental correlations that are more frequently activated (e.g. through linguistic experience and other cultural feedback loops) at the expense of less frequently activated ones, Hierarchical Mental Metaphors Theory is intended to resolve issues related to the (Whorfian) element of language-specificity in conventionalized linguistic expressions reflecting experiential correlations (i.e. primary metaphors). Crucially, this entails partial divergences between "mental" metaphors and metaphors that are conventionally expressed in language (systems) or other cultural artifacts (such as calendars). Here, the question arises whether the existence of the additional "experiential contexts" provided by such feedback loops can do more than suppress or strengthen preexisting experiential correlations and actually create correlational mental metaphors that are not directly embodied but acquired solely on the basis of cultural and/or linguistic experience. According to Casasanto, this is the case.

Experimental evidence from cognitive and social psychology not only supports hypotheses for correlation-based mental metaphors but has also yielded new findings about their apparent bidirectionality, which seem to contradict conceptual metaphor theory claims about the strong unidirectionality (source > target) of all conceptual metaphors. For primary metaphors, these claims are based on linguistic evidence relating to (i) known conventional instantiations across many languages, and (ii) the fact that novel expressions exhibiting the directionality (target > source) are not readily interpretable (Grady & Ascoli, this volume). While Grady and Ascoli delve deeper into the sub-individual level to search for potential neural correlates of "sourceness" and "targetness," Shen and Porat (this volume) go in a different direction and offer a tentative explanation of the directionality of all verbal metaphors (i.e. both primary and complex ones) in terms of a multi-dimensional approach that assumes "shared labor"

between the levels of cognition and language systems, with conceptual preferences for a given directionality being turned into full-blown unidirectionality only at the level of language.

A multidimensional model might also help resolve a few misunderstandings about the complex, analogy-based metaphors that have attracted the attention of scholars interested in language and discourse/communication at least since classical antiquity. Concerning the relation between metaphor in language (systems) and communication, usage-based models of language predict that metaphor at the level of language systems will not closely mirror metaphor in actual communication, because schematizations over large amounts of usage events arise from the interlocutors' repeated experience of the (formally and conceptually) invariant elements of pieces of discourse that are otherwise unique in many respects (see Deignan, this volume, for an extensive analysis of the unique aspects of JOURNEY metaphors in authentic contexts). What is varied at the level of actual discourse will thus be reflected at the level of language (systems) by relatively more stable but also much more schematic structures.

Complex conceptual metaphors such as LIFE IS A JOURNEY or THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS were inferred on the basis of conventional metaphorical expressions (i.e. figurative idioms). They thus reflect these more stable inter-individually shared aspects of the conceptual knowledge of speakers. This is broadly in line with Kövecses' suggestions about complex conceptual metaphors as elements of the "supra-individual" level, with Zinken's notion of "discourse metaphor," and with Musolf's notion of "metaphor scenario." Rather than focusing on issues of conceptual complexity (as CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY does), these terms emphasize the importance of discursive practices in a cultural community as a valid experiential context. From a dynamic systems perspective, such "enduring" conceptual metaphors present "stabilities" that "emerge" in bigger groups and over larger timescales than that of face-to-face interactive encounters. The notion of metaphor scenario anticipates this by actively invoking a conception of public discourse as a "virtual conversation within and between communities." All of these notions also foreground functional issues to do with the "framing" potential of conventionalized domain analogies in public discourse, which raises important questions about the ways in which metaphors from earlier texts and possibly different genres may be "recontextualized," i.e. put to new uses with shifted meanings and functions by other writers.

To capture the emergence of metaphorical expressions from particular contexts of face-to-face interaction and their functionality in these contexts, discourse analysts have advanced further notions like "systematic metaphor," and "metaphoreme." While the former stresses the ways in which the full functionality of a metaphor emerges from repeated occurrences of token expressions over the course of a social interaction, the latter stresses that these occurrences — though varied to some extent — lead to stabilities in the linguistic realizations of the metaphor. Both notions thus foreground the social character of the observed "connected patterns" of metaphor as "important tools in understanding and talking" (Cameron 2010b: 91). Both also emphasize their tight dependence on the original usage context and could thus be said to capture minor or temporary stabilities in metaphorical thought and expression which emerge on the discourse level in very small social groups over the course of only a single communicative event or a sequence of closely related events.

That co-participants schematize over very small amounts of usage data does not keep these low-level generalizations from becoming productive in the sense of licensing novel and creative forms of expressions. But this happens both within the limits (or: affordances) set by these communicative situations and for the purpose of interacting in them.

Because they capture the dynamics of interactive meaning-making, the notions of systematic metaphor and metaphoreme are not entirely on a par with those relating to more enduring forms of metaphor, such as conceptual metaphor theory's complex conceptual metaphors. They should thus be seen as complementing existing work on the latter rather than be used to reject work on embodied metaphor. Discourse analysts may actually overestimate the power of discourse (at the expense of the power of embodiment) when claiming that "conventional metaphorical ways of talking-and-thinking" can evolve without the presence of any embodied motivations, "solely through the dialogic dynamics of social interaction": Though it is true that conventionalized forms will always emerge from the more varied expressions of individual speakers in dynamic, usage-based systems, that does not explain the deeply embodied nature of many of the invariant elements found across the original expressions. Primary Metaphor Theory has shown many of these to reflect experiential correlations.

At the same time, discourse analysts were absolutely right to stress that the top-down influences that conceptual metaphors may exert are far from being the sole or even major determinants of speakers' behavior in actual discourse. What is thus perhaps most relevant to the goal of building bridges between embodied-cognition and discourse approaches to metaphor is a better understanding of what precisely it means for "enduring" metaphors to act as framing devices in a number of different usage scenarios and, vice versa, what it means for actual expressions in more spontaneous forms of social interaction, to "actualize" (Gibbs 2014a: 35) some of the metaphorical potential offered by more enduring conceptualizations in highly individual, context-dependent ways.

Despite obvious points of disagreement, many open issues, and hosts of new questions, the combined efforts of the authors of this edition make it clear that understanding what metaphor is requires a thorough understanding of what it does.

The cognition-oriented chapters of Part I show that an emphasis on the embodiment of cognition in general and metaphor in particular does not amount to a denial of the linguistically/culturally situated, discursive and distributed nature of both, and that the supra-individual levels of language and culture feed back into the sub-individual one by providing further experiential contexts. Vice versa, the discourse-oriented chapters of Parts III and IV provide abundant evidence indicating that discourse data, especially if capturing the multimodal and interactive nature of communication, are directly relevant to a conception of metaphor as embodied.

Part II of this volume widens the scope to "embodied metonymy" and other kinds of "figuration" in thought and expressive behavior (both linguistic and gestural). Its chapters show how basic conceptual operations work on conceptual frames in the creation of a range of figurative (verbal and multimodal) expressions, placing special emphasis on the relation and interactions between metaphor and metonymy.

The editor and authors of this edition hope to have bridged the cognition—discourse divide in a variety of ways and thereby opened new pathways for metaphor scholars from different research traditions — not least by raising awareness of the way in which a number of issues in metaphor research that appear to be either cognition- or communication-related at first sight are in fact so strongly intertwined that they require the joint investigation from the complementary perspectives provided by the two different research traditions.

Embodiment and Discourse: Dimensions and Dynamics of Contemporary Metaphor Theory by Beate Hampe

Metaphor scholars used to debate over the "conceptual" or "linguistic" nature of metaphor. More recently, they have been considering whether metaphor is "embodied" or "discursive." Despite the shift in focus implied by this terminological change, the divide between communication-oriented and cognition-oriented approaches to metaphor has not disappeared. This introductory chapter surveys how research from the social-sciences and the cognitive-sciences perspectives on metaphor has been brought together in this volume. It identifies obvious opportunities for real convergence and argues that metaphor theory cannot but profit from an approach that strives to account for findings yielded by multiple methodologies. By showing how contributors to this volume place special emphasis on the multimodal and interactive nature of communication, the chapter assesses the potential of contemporary metaphor research for a dynamic multidimensional socio-cognitive model of metaphor that goes beyond what either of the research traditions have separately achieved.

Sources and Targets in Primary Metaphor Theory: Looking Back and Thinking Ahead by Joseph E. Grady & Giorgio A. Ascoli

Primary metaphors are deeply entrenched associations of "source" and "target" concepts, e.g. HEAVINESS and DIFFICULTY, that underlie numerous, extremely common metaphoric uses of language both within a given language such as English and across languages. Apart from reviewing relevant existing work on the conceptual and linguistic relationships referred to as "primary metaphors," especially claims about their unidirectionality and universality, this chapter also suggests a new avenue for future research on aspects of their neural organization/function, asking whether there may be neural correlates of "sourceness" and "targetness" that imply distinct processing profiles for the two sets of concepts, and suggesting plausible directions where such distinctions might be identified. More particularly, the chapter explores the hypothesis that source concepts might be correlated with localized cortical structures organized as neural maps as well as the complementary hypothesis that target concepts are not correlated with such localized structures and instead involve more widely distributed structures or processes, such as the action of diffuse modulatory neurotransmitters. In addition to considering the linguistic, conceptual, and neural distinctions to be drawn between "sourceness" and "targetness," we consider what the cognitive advantages might be of relatively unidirectional associations between such categories of concepts.

The Hierarchical Structure of Mental Metaphors by Daniel Casasanto

People think about abstract domains like TIME and GOODNESS metaphorically. This tendency may be universal. Yet the particular mental metaphors that people use can differ dramatically between individuals and groups, and may change from one moment to the next. Where do our mental metaphors come from, and how can they change so quickly in response to new patterns of experience? If mental metaphors are

grounded in universal patterns of body—world interaction, how can different people have contrasting (and sometimes contradictory) mental metaphors? Hierarchical Mental Metaphors Theory (HMMT) provides an account of: (a) how mental metaphors are formed and changed, (b) how they can be fundamental to our understanding of abstract domains, yet at the same time remarkably flexible, and (c) how distinctive language-specific, culture-specific, and body-specific mental metaphors can arise from universal patterns of interaction with the physical and social world.

Metaphorical Directionality: The Role of Language by Yeshayahu Shen & Roy Porat

Verbal metaphors are fundamentally directional. For example, people commonly refer to social relations in term of temperature (e.g. "She is a warm person"), but the inverse metaphors in which we talk about temperature in terms of social relations are not usually found. Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999) attributes this directionality to an underlying unidirectional "conceptual mapping" between the respective domains, rooted in our bodily experience. However, recent psychophysical experiments have shown these conceptual associations to be bidirectional: Not only can manipulations of an individual's experience of physical warmth affect that individual's judgment of another person or situation as friendly or unfriendly, the reverse is also true, as thinking about a friendly or unfriendly social situation can alter an individual's judgment of room temperature. To account for this discrepancy, we propose that (i) verbal (unidirectional) metaphors rely on a pre-linguistic, non-directional, association between the two domains and that (ii) language plays an essential role in rendering this association into a directional target—source relation.

Body Schema and Body Image in Metaphoric Cognition by Valentina Cuccio

Neurologists, philosophers, psychologists, and also linguists frequently employ the notion of the 'body schema.' Many divergent definitions of this notion were provided till Shaun Gallagher (1986) clarified the terminological and conceptual confusion by proposing a clear distinction between the two concepts of 'body schema' and 'body image.' I propose that two different roles played by the body in cognition can be identified on the basis of this distinction, corresponding to two different levels of embodiment. In this account, a first level of embodiment is constituted by invisible metonymies that have aspects of the body schema as their source domain. Visible

metaphors occur at a second level of embodiment and take their source domains from aspects of the body image. In the first case, the mapping is directly from sensorimotor abilities to perception; in the second case, the mapping is from concepts that are related to our bodily experiences to abstract concepts.

Primary Metaphors Are Both Cultural and Embodied by Bodo Winter & Teenie Matlock

Cognitive linguists have argued that metaphors are anchored in our embodied experiences. Cultural, linguistic, and gestural representations are often seen as reflections of underlying conceptual mappings. On the basis of three different metaphors, MORE IS UP, SIMILARITY IS PROXIMITY, and SOCIAL DISTANCE IS SPATIAL DISTANCE (aka INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS), we argue for a more active role of external representations in individual cognition. Rather than being mere "reflections" of the respective conceptual associations, external representations actively enhance and support these. Since two of the metaphors we discuss associate the same source domain



(SPATIAL DISTANCE) with different target domains (SIMILARITY and SOCIAL CLOSENESS), we also discuss to what extent primary metaphors are (by necessity) interrelated, and whether these metaphors can be treated as distinct conceptual entities at all.

Source Actions Ground Metaphor via Metonymy: Toward a Frame-Based Account of Gestural Action in Multimodal Discourse by Irene Mittelberg & Gina Jove

This chapter starts from the observation that metaphoric understandings expressed monomodally through gesture tend to rely on "primary metaphors" (Grady 1997a). Asserting that gestures draw on basic, experientially motivated, embodied construal operations, we detail how primary scenes and

subscenes (Grady & Johnson 2002), image and force schemas, metonymy, and frames (Fillmore 1982) interact in situated meaning-making. We propose that by shifting the focus from object-oriented schemas, source domains, and mappings to what we call "source actions" and "embodied action frames," we can account for the pragmatically minded nature and specific mediality of communicative gestural acts integrated in natural multimodal discourse. We argue that coverbal gestures recruit frame structures metonymically, singling out elements of "scenes" (Fillmore 1977), especially those underpinning correlated metaphoric meanings. We back up our theoretical claims with evidence from neuroscientific studies and outline a frame-based approach that helps trace avenues for further research into embodied cognition and multimodal discourse processes.

Metaphor and Other Cognitive Operations in Interaction: from Basicity to Complexity by Francisco J. Ruiz de Mendoza Ibanez

By combining three complementary perspectives, the present chapter goes beyond previous treatments of figurative language in general and of conceptual metaphor. Besides viewing metaphor in terms of the basic cognitive processes underlying it, it also investigates how metaphor combines with other metaphors and with metonymy and in what way it is related to other cases of figurative meaning construction. The present chapter paves the way toward an encompassing theory of meaning construction that employs a highly restricted set of principles to account for a broader range of phenomena than previous accounts have done.

On the Role of Embodied Cognition in the Understanding and Use of Metonymy by Jeannette Littlemore

The majority of the chapters in this book focus on the symbiotic relationship between embodied cognition and metaphor. In contrast, this chapter focuses on the relationship between embodied cognition and metonymy. It argues that metonymy is also embodied, but in a different way, and that the social, environmental, dynamic, and developmental aspects of embodied cognition can be expected to play an important role in shaping metonymic meaning. It is suggested that the relative transparency of the role played by embodied cognition in metonymy creation is influenced by the presence of movement and emotion, with increases in the amount of movement and emotion leading to increases in the transparency of embodied cognition. Following Deignan et al. (2013), it is also suggested that the transparency of the role played by embodied cognition is affected by features of the genre (communicative purpose, staging, and discourse community membership) and the register (field, tenor, and mode).

The Cancer Card: Metaphor, Intimacy, and Humor in Online Interactions about the Experience of Cancer by Elena Semino & Zsófia Demjén

Employing a dynamic systems approach, this chapter investigates the use of one particular metaphor — the "cancer card" — on an online forum dedicated to cancer. Far from being a common Card Game metaphor with a stable source — target mapping, the metaphor is collaboratively developed (i.e. used, re-used, adapted) to express the idea that patients can use their illness to their advantage in a variety of situations, while also reflecting a broader tendency to employ humor as a strategy for coping with adversity. An analysis of all 106 instances of "(cancer) card(s)" on one of the threads of the forum shows that, though related to English expressions like "play the [...] card" and to conventional conceptual metaphors

like *LIFE IS A GAME*, its use is specific to the interactions among the members of this online community. Our analysis of the "cancer card" as a group-specific "metaphoreme" emphasizes that multiple interacting factors must be considered to account for such rich and complex phenomena as the use of metaphors in online interactions.

Mappings and Narrative in Figurative Communication by Alice Deignan

Showing how metaphors are used to talk about entities, relations, and attributes in one domain by drawing on another, Conceptual Metaphor Theory has sometimes been used in language analysis to highlight and explore fixed correspondences between domains. Another perspective is given by Schön, who suggested that metaphors can draw a relationship between the topic and a common sequence of events — i.e. that metaphors can impose a narrative sequence on their topic — and by Musolf, who described "scenarios," metaphors based on fragments of experience, incorporating a culturally shared evaluation. In two case studies, these complex relationships are further explored: The first examines three artifacts apparently realizing *LIFE IS A JOURNEY*, initially in terms of correspondences between domains. The second provides a detailed analysis of two speeches about education, analyzing them both in terms of metaphorical mappings and correspondences, and as narratives. The exploration of narratives is informed by a reference corpus, which is used to provide data from the language at large about the behavior of words and phrases from the education speeches.

Contextual Activation of Story Simulation in Metaphor Comprehension by L. David Ritchie

Recent research has produced evidence that both embodied simulations and abstract lexical processes are involved in language comprehension, with the balance between embodied and lexical processes influenced by the abstractness of the language and the cultural, social, and linguistic context. The role of simulations in processing metaphorical language, however, is subject to continued debate, not least because it is influenced by a variety of factors. In previous work, I have shown that stories are often used as metaphors (metaphorical stories), and metaphors often imply or activate stories (story metaphors). In this chapter I argue that story metaphors have the potential to activate a rich and extended context and induce and shape both lexical elaboration and perceptual simulation. I propose that Context-Limited Simulation Theory provides a framework which is compatible with the experimental evidence about embodied simulation, and that a focus on story metaphors and the role of stories in metaphor use and comprehension will support our understanding of metaphor as shaped by both cognitive and discourse/social factors.

From Image Schema to Metaphor in Discourse: The FORCE Schemas in Animation Films by Charles J. Forceville

Moving toward a place and manipulating objects are probably the most important manifestations of goal-oriented actions. Both *SELF-PROPELLED MOTION TOWARD A DESTINATION* and *MAKING AN OBJECT* are thus profoundly embodied source domains for the metaphorical conceptualization of *PURPOSIVE ACTIVITY*. Of these metaphors, only the former — popularly known as *LIFE IS A JOURNEY* — has received a large amount of attention. Focusing especially on the role of the various *FORCE* schemas, this chapter investigates metaphors from both source domains in three short animation films. Animation provides a perfect medium to express these metaphors in a condensed,

asked myself, "How could it be that not just my thoughts, but my movements and actions are still centered on a body abroad, now dead? How is it that I move a certain way because of the final passing of a person whom I began mourning almost a decade ago?" Alzheimer's disease had



brought on physical, mental, and emotional changes in the loving and doting grandmother who had a significant part in raising me. Changes in personality and physical and mental capabilities required adjustments in our relationship. I had long ago learned to let go of the person I had come to know.

Cartesian/Kantian epistemologies locate the primacy of validation of knowledge in objective rationality. Feminist theories and compartmentalization as a result of theologies, too, have suffered compartmentation by rationalist epistemologies by failing to complexly conceive of the body-mind-world connection they seek to frame in order to overcome body/mind dualisms.

The contribution framed experience itself by taking another look at how we understand ourselves as necessary because theologies accessing, retrieving, and mining bodily experience as resource themselves too often end up perpetuating certain Cartesian presuppositions they aim to overcome, specifically in regards to bodily experience and perception.

To explore bodily experience as a theological resource, I will take a closer look at the embodied dimensions of our existences through discursive views of the world rather than approaching bodily experience through analyses of social constructions (though not neglecting this dimension). I will utilize "body theology," which I will frame as analytical commitments grounded in and emerging out of understanding our bodily perceptual orientations in the world. Rather than acting as theologizing subjects, exploring material reality and turning to access our bodily experience of it, we need to begin with

subject. Thus, body experience as the fundamental condition of our theology needs to approach bodily experience as the realm through which to understand sociocultural ideologies traversing and impeding on our bodies, while also being the realm that constructs and conveys socio-cultural ideologies

through perceptual values and practices evident in our bodily experience. And in a critical theological analysis of experience, not just in feminist theologies but the discourses of sensory experience generally in the Cartesian-based field of theology as perception must be our entry point.

Grandmom spent the last years of her life in a nursing home, requiring more intensive care than my father, who had been her primary caretaker, could provide.

Reflecting on those last years of her at home and in nursing care, I thought about the peculiarity of our household she had been part of—my parents, my sister, and I musing out loud about her mental state, her being "like a vegetable"—and yet so much of our lives, especially the daily lives and routines of my parents, revolved around this body. What agency did this

body hold? What power did it assert in the physical space of our home and our experiences together in it, even as we stopped searching for emotional and mental cues to help us relate? How did this body with declining cognitive capacities manage and direct the daily activities of my parents, even when it seemed to us that Orna ceased to comprehend her environment and even my father appeared to be a stranger to her?

This book is about bodies, bodily experiences, sense-perception, difference, and theology. It is a reflection grounded in feminist commitments, a reflection on how theologians interested in understanding and analyzing bodily experiences need to begin by framing them as integral to the process of our meaning-making, to our socio-cultural expressions, as integral to how we relate to the world and how we find and invest value. It joins a long line of feminist theological ventures, asserting the importance of experience in theorizing, the importance of difference to experience, and the varieties of embodiments demanding attention when thinking about difference. However, I set out to do more than simply elaborate on the merits of specific experiences as resource by narrating the particularity of the experience and accounting for the ways in which it is useful to theology. I focus on the significance of complexly conceiving of bodily experience intertwined with processes of perception, so that experience is not simply one among many possible starting points, but the realm of meaning making. Ultimately, theologies that seek to begin with a critical analysis of the human condition need to be

able to account for the ways in which bodily experience is the ground for the various dimensions of our lives.

BODILY PERCEPTUAL ORIENTATIONS

I have asserted heretofore that my being in the world is always fundamentally a bodily experiencing in the world, and this bodily experiencing is a perceptual experiencing. I am in the world as a bodily being. And my encountering the world, my shaping by the world, my learning about the world and myself is always already based in and mediated by my seeing, touching, feeling, intuiting, evaluating, remembering, and so forth, in and through my being a perceiving body. This is bodily perceptual orientation, my condition for existence and interacting in and with the world.¹

In Part One we sketched out the scope of this project, and discovered that uncritical theological appeals to sensory perception that may lead to an impasse in the quest for identifying meaning. As body theologians, we seek to affirm bodily experience as inherent to our existence in the world, and theologize to overcome hierarchies and taxonomies that emerge out of body/mind dualisms. Yet when we uncritically employ perception for epistemological purposes, we access experiences as something we have, as content to recall, access, apprehend, and mine for meaningful content to be turned into text and metaphor to be read. Thus, we undermine the overall aim of our theological reflections and reinstate a dualistic body/mind split and a consciousness-subject that can turn toward experiences accessed via sensory perception.

Experience is important and connected to meaning, but where to go from here, and how? I find myself in a curious methodological bind: I can turn to those bodily experiences and functions which are considered "common" and derive ways to analyze meaning-making in the world. For example, I could invoke widespread bodily experiences (death or pain) or common gendered experiences (such as pregnancy or menstruation). But tapping select specific bodily experiences for meanings and truths leads me down empiricist methodological avenues which tempt me to essentialize or universalize bodily functions and/or fix associated inherent meanings disconnected from context. I could try to prevent this by taking a first-person approach to embodied experiences and employ personal narratives and subjective descriptions of experience. Yet here, any analysis of meaning and truth may remain a subjective intellectual enterprise.

Theologians utilizing the senses sway between equally disembodied positions: Either fixed meanings are "out there" which are received through perceptual channels, or subjective meaning is created through intellectual interpretation of perceived raw data. This impasse is partially due to the lack of attention and clarity in how bodily sensory perception functions in our experiences, and also to our linguistic limitations. The English language, for example, makes it difficult to express our existence as unified body and mind. I am linguistically led to express the feelings I have, talk about the something I feel, express concerns about the body I have, or that pain I feel in my foot.² It requires some work to explore how I exist as body experiencing, how my reflecting on experiences is in itself an experience, how I am a body perceiving, and how my attempts to understand perception are bound to my perceiving. Because our linguistic limits can too easily constrict our theories and methods and turn on our efforts to overcome body/mind dualisms, it is crucial to work out our conception of bodily experience and sensory perception when grounding theology in experience.

Even when explicitly challenged, body/mind and subject/world dichotomies are still permeating the link between perception and bodily experience in theological projects. If theological language and power dynamics within and between discursive structures were the sole concern of a theological project, then this lack of theoretical attention to sense perception could be defensible. But I am convinced that theologians who want to take seriously the charge to overcome harmful body/mind dualisms must consider and move beyond these dualisms found in concepts of perception, lest we undermine our own projects. Drawing on my own initial questions again: Focusing on language and power dynamics in linguistic structures shifts attending to Grandmother's experience toward a discursive framing of her situation and experience. But it remains unclear how a change in discourse about Alzheimer's disease and aging might influence her experience, or how it might influence the meaning created for/by her, especially as her cognitive abilities decline. Is she just a body without a mind? Can she perceive and with what? Am I the mind observing her body as object?

Similarly, I can understand my mother's experience to a certain extent by focusing on her self-understanding as shaped by concepts (of whose choosing?) of "foreigner," "daughter-in-law," or "immigrant." But what do I know about her experiences and meaning-making beyond what she tells me in broken German? How would I understand how her bodily perceptual experience is involved? Am I the educated perceiver/judge interpreting meaning for her sensory experience and acts?

Challenging body/mind dualisms by making women subjects and elevating bodies from a pure object status is not enough if we still continue to conceive of perception in ways that uphold body/mind separations. Therefore, body theology cannot just claim and/or describe a sense experience and assert a role for it in the constitution of theologically valuable experience. Body theology must theoretically attend to perception to grapple with the complex nature of body-world-culture relationships and what constitutes a "real" embodied experience at a given moment in a given context in time and space. Only thus can body theology be grounded in experience and answer questions regarding what experience is and what it tells us about the human conditions we seek to inquire into.

My task now is to show how we can understand bodily experience and sensory perception in interrelated ways. I claimed that perception is a bodily experience inherent and significant to our being in the world: to be in this world is to be in a body, to feel, touch, smell, see in a body; to experience the world and be experienced by the world in a bodily way also positions us toward others and the world in specific ways. Having asserted that bodily perceptual orientation is how I am in the world in the previous chapter, I now turn to exploring this claim: What is bodily perceptual orientation? What does it do? How does it take place? I will show that it is important to theorize beyond appreciative nods toward an interrelation of body-mind-world. It is crucial to think through this interrelation in its complexity.

This part of the book is a development of a framework for a robust body theology. I will begin by detailing the fundamental theoretical affirmation regarding bodily perceptual orientation as condition of being: Experience is bodily perceptual orientation. To experience in the world is to experience through and with our senses, the world we

experience is always shaped by our perceptions. Reversely, how and what we perceive with our senses is also shaped by the world. To perceive is to engage in bodily and sociocultural acts. How does bodily perceptual orientation come about? What does bodily perceptual orientation tell us about conditions of human existence, about the meanings and values experienced and expressed? Pivoting around gender, race, and normalcy we will engage in exploratory movements (not exhaustive accounts) of how bodily and social dimensions of our perceptual existence come to be implicated in and through our bodily existence in the world. In our exploration, I will pick up perceptual concepts with varying degrees of attention. The various engagements we will make together connect to each other, expand and explore each other by adding different angles and weaving in further illustrations or investigations.

PERCEIVING BODY THEOLOGY

I began this project by stating that to think of our existence in the world as bodily perceptual orientation is to think beyond common tropes of nature/culture and essentialism/constructivism used in feminist and poststructuralist discussions to talk about embodiment. In such explorations, the body is often located at the intersection of nature/culture. In my investigation of our existence in the world as bodily perceptual orientation, I showed that our bodily experiences are located in interrelated dimensions of body-world-culture. Our perceptual experiences, our language, and other bodily movements shape this space and are shaped in this space. Our existence as lived body is neither solely natural or essentially biological nor exclusively cultural or discursively constructed. It is even more than both natural/biological and cultural/discursive. If we begin with bodily experience, our existence is bodily, naturally, and culturally, intertwined and interrelated: we learn and create meaning only in bodily experiencing. In bodily perceptual experience, we create, transmit, and express our bodily selves, cultural values, and the world we inhabit.

The body theologies we surveyed so far at times turn out to be inadequate in their conceptual and methodological approaches. Body/mind dualisms may be upheld by positing sensory perception in unreflective or naïve ways and/or by fixing bodily experiences statically to meaning when moving too quickly to establish theological metaphors. My contribution to body theology, rather than presenting a fully conceptualized theological work, is to present commitments which may help us to inquire into bodily experience more complexly. I am putting forward a framework within which to understand bodily experience in order to conceptually and methodologically strengthen those theological projects which seek to be grounded in embodiment. In this chapter, I will present what theological analysis can do when thinking through bodily perceptual orientation.

Body theology, as we will explore it throughout the remainder of this book, is a

way of doing critical analysis that begins by inquiring into the many ways in which we are oriented in, toward, and by the world and others. To effectively understand how we come to be in this world, we need to understand what constitutes our being in this world, including how certain ways of valorizing the mind and devaluing bodies gain such bodily and socio-cultural force that some lives get violently pushed to the margins, such that some bodies are dismissed as holding no (more) value.

In the previous chapters, I showed how our bodily perceptual experiences are how we exist in this world, how our feeling, smelling, touching, seeing, thinking, speaking, remembering, and so forth are bodily perceptual experiences which orient us in the world and are oriented by the world. There are mechanisms at play—bodily movements, sociocultural habituations—which may work in ways so that our bodily perceptual orientations position us within bounds of gendered, raced, normalized, nationalized, classed lines. These alignments are so powerful that we cannot escape their influence, reproduction, and naturalization.

To begin to counter the effects of sexism, racism, nationalism, ableism, classism, and so on is to begin understanding how these ideologies are not simply words or beliefs, and not even just perpetration of visual stereotypes (though these might be prevalent in Western cultural orientations). They take on a



biopower, to use Foucault's term. And this requires conceiving of how the gendering, racing, and normalizing of bodies is made through the full range of the human sensorium, as Paul Gilroy named it. Or to follow Mark Smith, perceptual orientations are central to the way in which dividing lines in the world are created.¹ The lines of division which come to be fundamental, even natural, in our experiences come to be experienced in a bodily perceptual way and through instances of complication, nuance, and subtlety: What we call man/woman, black/white/brown, normal/ disabled, citizen/alien are hierarchies which are aligned through our bodily perceptual experiences (through our seeing, tasting, feeling, smelling, thinking, remembering, hearing, etc.). Social concepts are not solely surface impressions (in both senses, as in impressions about surfaces and impressions on/of surfaces), but are cultural categories of deep bodily impact and deep social significances. While social hierarchies and cultural orders may be belied by everyday contingencies, compromises, and complications in the context of our experiences, bodily perception is central to the mutual emergence of body-world-meaning.

To abandon these alignments and thereby to counter violent "isms," inquiries into bodily perceptual orientations will allow us to grasp more precisely and complexly the origins and sources of the creation and reproduction of divisive imagery. This inquiry will allow us to begin with framing how bodies and experiences are made and which mechanisms turn our bodily experiences and perceived meanings to sociocultural images so damaging and powerful that they can wage war on our lives. This is true even or especially when we pride ourselves in being unprejudiced, non-discriminating, and reasoned thinkers and actors regarding social matters. By beginning our analysis so, we can begin to experience, imagine, taste, and appreciate bodily crossings and subversions of dividing lines which induce harm in our bodily experiences. By beginning to understand how the shaping of our world comes about in and through our bodily perception, we may not "just" experience our visceral reaction to others, but can begin perceiving and experiencing differently, perhaps.

In this final part, I return again to some of the questions I posed in my opening chapter and sketch a framework for body theology as a set of commitments which advances explorations into the what and how of bodily perceptual orientation. I will offer commitments of body theology as framework for analysis. Two select constructive theologies, concerned with bodily experience, and with references to the pitfalls of body/mind dualisms and/or sensory perception, will then serve as my test cases for utilizing body theology within the wider field of constructive theology. After showing via these test cases how body theology can expand and strengthen some critical claims and avoid potential manifestations and/or reiterations of Cartesian dualisms for any theologian concerned with the related issues, I will take up some of my personal questions/interests and take a body theology approach to construct a body theology beyond god-talk. I will conclude with offering possible trajectories for constructing body theologies in the future.

I do not have to write on or about bodies but without doubt will always write through bodies, my own and those with whom I am mutually emerging and becoming. So then, what would "body" as adjective do, facing disembodied though divinized masculinities of the theological Word? Our bodily experiences are what immerse us in "the stuff" of who we are and what this

life is made of, and we move as bodies in various perceptual dimensions. If bodily experience is difficult to express or narrate, it is because it is always on the edge of, never reducible to or arrested within, what is speakable.¹ But theologizing, if taken beyond thought and speech to perceptual movements, is not impossible.

Theologies that seek to be grounded in experience as a critical source for reflection—theologies that aim to robustly engage particularities of embodiment and construct complex arguments about the role of bodily particulars such as gender, race, sexual orientation, ability, or nationality—must attend to the way we exist in the world through our bodily perceptual orientations. To attend to experience as bodily perceptual existence, acknowledge the ways in which our experiences make sense, consider ambiguities and paradoxes of experience, and remain open to fluid and contingent knowledge is to do theology that has and makes "body-sense."

Understanding the extent of how our bodily perceptual orientations may also be intrinsically connected to experiences of violence, be it socio-cultural conquest or individual victimization, we can now add body theology as critical mass when weighing in on how to move away/across from stereotypical imagery or sound bites. We may cross habituated alignments, but always must do so bodily, to change the domination of "lesser" beings, such as bodies with a sex other than male, races aligned differently than white, environments emerging other than industrial, and socio-cultural ways of experiencing other than linear-rationally.

We and the world emerge together through sense-making bodies. The significance of our place in the world emerges for us through sensing bodies. Our sensing is more than just structures of thought or embodied but biological or mechanical processes. Our sensing experiences are our perceptions, feelings, experiences, expressions, motivations, intentions, behaviors, styles, and rhythms.¹ We are existing in the world in/ as/through sensing bodies; in and through our bodies and bodily senses we come to perceive the world and are perceived by it. Theology can and must gain body-sense if it seeks to be grounded in experience.

It is 2009, and I sit outside with my mother, enjoying some gaeng gai and German cheesecake. After talking about developing her own recipe for German cheesecake over six months of baking, she tells me about the first time I left Germany to go abroad for a year. "Your dad couldn't sleep well that first night. He was tossing and turning. I finally got up and got him your pillow that was still on your bed and put it next to him. It still smelled like you. He fell asleep then." She then tells me, "Go inside to your grandmother. Say goodbye. Who knows how long she will still be around? Maybe for a long time still." I go inside, already dreading the sight of my grandmother. She is lying in her bed. I think she might be looking at me, but I am not quite sure. I cannot bring myself to touch her hand, but I try to conjure up memories of her holding mine. I cannot quite remember. I try to say goodbye, but realize that I have grieved her passing some years ago already. There is a body in front of me that used

to hold me, whose warmth and comfort I sought when I was just a small child. I am crying a bit, but I think those are tears of guilt and confusion. I am trying to pray for her to die before too long, before bitterness consumes my mother more than it already has. I am not sure when this kind of God emerged for me, a God I can ask to deliver the death of a grandmother. But I get a sense that this kind of God emerged as meaningful

handful of pages to around thirty, and a series of essays on various artistic techniques—is designed for dipping; Vasari's ideal readers were busy people. Depending on the printing and language (*Lives* is now available in every major language around the globe), the 1550 edition runs a little under four hundred pages, but the expanded 1568 edition, which includes

the work "his way"). We also see, however, an "invisible" portrait of the artist himself, Giorgio Vasari, just as a novel by Hemingway may be about Kilimanjaro or the Soda Front or nightlife in Paris and Spain, but literary critics can read the author's life into his text. Just as "every painter paints himself," we can also say that "every author writes his autobiography,"



more artists and conveys a more finely calculated message, nearly doubled in length. Because the book marks such an important milestone in the story of how humans have thought about art, it deserves our close attention—indeed our careful scrutiny—because vivid, memorable, important, and enduring as it is, Vasari wrote with an agenda, and much of his information is wrong, sometimes by his own deliberate choice.

Vasari's *Lives* has been called "the Bible of Italian Renaissance—if not all—art history." But the great Italian art historian Roberto Longhi warned us, "Bisogna sapere come leggere Vasari." One must know how to read Vasari. The blank space between the inked letters contains a world of information, if only we know how to reach it. Above all, reading Vasari not only provides a portrait of the subjects of the various biographies, and of the time in which the book was written, but also offers up a hidden portrait of the author himself.

The old fifteenth-century patriarch Cosimo de' Medici once said, "Every painter paints himself." At its most basic, the phrase suggests that art is not objective, but the subjective interpretation of an idea, a scene, a moment, a vision, a portrait, absorbed by the artist, considered and digested, before it is projected into a work of art. The opinion of the artist emerges in the artwork, whether or not the artist consciously inserts it. Therefore, when we see a portrait of another Cosimo de' Medici, the sixteenth-century duke of Tuscany, for example, painted by his court portraitist, Giorgio Vasari, we see two people, and three interpretations, on one panel. We see Cosimo as interpreted by Cosimo himself (as he would like to be portrayed for posterity), and as Vasari both sees him and considers how to portray him (fulfilling the commission and satisfying the patron, but nevertheless painting

and this is particularly true when a painter writes of painters—there is as much Vasari in each of the *Lives* as there is true history of the artist portrayed.

The idea of who Vasari might be has shifted over the years, from a diligent biographer to a sly fabricator to a visionary historian.¹ The art historians Paul Barolsky and Andrew Ladis are among the modern scholars who first saw *Lives* not as an accumulation of short, loosely linked biographies but as a long, cohesive, literary work. Barolsky's witty studies of Vasari demonstrate that the artist-biographer was not just a compiler but a clever author in the proper sense of the word: aware of historical context, literary structure, thematic aims, the skilled use of anecdotes (whether fictional or factual, and whether Vasari knew if they were fictional or factual) to convey character. But we must keep in mind that all of Vasari's stories were filtered by Vasari. He acted as researcher, but also interpreter of facts, tales, and suppositions, rumors, accusations, and (very occasionally) documented evidence. He does not cite the sources of his "facts" very often, and so we are left to guess at them or simply accept his word. He often uses the phrase *scrivono alcuni*, or "some write," which covers up his sources, but is meant to lend credence to his stories.

He wrote, thought, and lived with his own agenda. As Andrew Ladis notes, Vasari makes Michelangelo "the triumphant savior of the arts, a figure of light, but in his way stand those less gifted, less gracious, and less good. These beings of shadow and darkness make Michelangelo's achievement all the greater in the end."

The 1550 edition of *Lives* is far shorter and less "worked" than the sprawling, 1568 edition. We might be tempted, then, to conclude that the 1550 edition is more reliable historically, but the situation is more complex than that. The 1568 edition

includes some new material (including biographies of Titian and the Flemish painters) along with carefully refined revisions that focus the text more sharply on Florence, its artistic traditions, and the potential of the Accademia del Disegno to perpetuate the supreme excellence of Florentine art, but the real difference between the editions lies in the expanded, solidified narrative that makes the *Lives* of 1568 a much more polished work of literature.

In the interests of furthering his master narrative, Vasari sometimes alters the facts. Yet if his stories are not always wholly true, they are still worth our attention. We should understand that they derive from some core of information that Vasari believed was fact, and were then mined, hammered, and polished, filtered through the author's personal opinion, literary verve, patriotism, the theoretical program for his artistic academy, and the aesthetic demands imposed by a carefully sculpted book.

For example, Vasari's decision to diminish the reputation and production of the wonderful painter Perugino has both an artistic basis in Perugino's relatively static style and a literary basis: for it allows the writer to create a tale of artistic progress that begins with Perugino, reaches a crescendo with Raphael, and culminates in his hero, Michelangelo.

Likewise, the idea that art steadily improved from Cimabue to Michelangelo is reductive. The abstract scheme developed in the sixteenth century no longer matches the opinions of contemporary art historians and critics. Cumulative improvement makes for a fluid narrative, but we would no longer say that Giotto is "better" than Cimabue, that Raphael is "better" than Perugino, or that Cellini is "better" than Donatello. They worked in different ways, in different times. Vasari, however, believed that art had never been better than in his own day, and loved to write in those terms. He declared that Giotto eclipsed his master, Cimabue (who may not even have been his master): "Really, Giotto overshadowed his fame just as a great light dims the splendor of much lesser one." An eloquent statement, to be sure, but it can only be one man's opinion.

Some viewers (especially in Siena) prefer Duccio to Giotto or even to Raphael, and some regard Cellini as a sculptor superior to Donatello (though almost everyone would rather have Cellini on their side in a fistfight). Different eras have had different expectations, preferences, and styles. The only cumulative experience that we can agree upon about early modern art in Italy is a general tendency toward naturalism, through the advent of foreshortening and single vanishing point perspective, techniques that guided avant-garde Italian artists in the fifteenth century. Vasari's literary plot devices, juxtaposing one artist as categorically "better" than another, and contrasting "good" artists (in all senses of the word) with "bad," are just that—literary devices to make a better story out of history.

Though Vasari knew many of the artists about whom he wrote, the majority lived a generation or so before him. He carried out his research by every means he could imagine: gathering spoken tales and conducting interviews, through scatterings of archival material, through occasional references in printed books (from the likes of Boccaccio and Petrarch), but, most of all, by examining the surviving works of art that acted as a legacy for their creators. How Vasari read those artworks colored how he would write about the artists.

Vasari states, however, that he aimed to do more than just catalog his subjects: he also meant to interpret their significance, as people and as artists. In this, we might consider that Vasari approached writing his biographies as he would have approached painting a portrait. Sixteenth-century portraiture was not intended to be an exact replica of the subject; artists resorted to a great deal of artifice and flattery. Portraits of marriageable young ladies, like Raphael's *Lady with a Unicorn*, were commissioned to be sent to a betrothed husband, who otherwise might not see his future wife before the wedding day. There was every incentive to "airbrush" the portrait into something as flattering as possible. This sometimes caused its own problems—Henry VIII was thoroughly disappointed when he saw Anne of Cleves, misled by the over-flattering portrait that had been sent ahead of the bride. Likewise, attributes were often added to portraits to convey an idea rather than represent factual reality. The insertion of a dog in a portrait was a symbol of loyalty, an attribute of the subject, not necessarily an indication that the subject owned a pet. A scattering of oranges on the windowsill in Jan van Eyck's *Arnolfini Portrait* is a symbol of the subject's wealth (oranges being imported to Bruges at great expense from Spain), not evidence that members of the Arnolfini family were in the habit of storing their fruit by the window, or even that they had a taste for citrus.

Conventional wisdom holds that a great portrait should reveal a hidden secret about its subject that its subject would prefer to remain secret. That is, the portraitist can see the truth, but is obliged by his commission to present a strategically chosen version of that truth, in order to preserve a flattering view of the subject for posterity. Portraitists could sometimes surreptitiously insert hidden messages conveying insights that a subject might prefer not to record—like letting a telltale wisp of real hair emerge from beneath the Roman emperor Domitian's sheepskin toupee, as happens in the splendid bust in the Toledo Museum of Art, or letting the raw ambition of the sixteenth-century writer Pietro Bembo show on his lean, hungry face, as Lucas Cranach did in his painted portrait—but an artist has to work these suggestions in so subtly that the subject will ultimately be pleased with the portrait, and pay for it.

In dealing with the *Lives*, then, we should approach Vasari's written "portraits" just as we might approach his painted ones: they are based on truth, as Vasari understood it, but ornamented and shaped into a work of art that at once conveyed his subject, but also presented his artful interpretation of it. We should read Vasari's texts as literary creations, based on oral and written traditions, about the adventures of real artists.

But his desire to make a moral out of the lives he documented meant that he sometimes made villains out of artists who did not deserve such a reputation. As the Vasari biographer Andrew Ladis notes, "For Vasari, as for any author, the dark side was an abiding natural force and essential to his scheme, because history without error could hardly hold interest, much less be true. Or, to quote Mae West, 'Virtue has its own reward, but no sale at the box office.'"

Vasari's juxtaposition of good versus flawed artists is perhaps most evident in the duel he constructed between the talented but sinful Fra Filippo Lippi, and the idealized, saintly Fra Angelico (officially designated "blessed" by Pope John Paul II in 1982, the first step toward canonization). Lippi's sin was using "carnal" figures as his models for holy figures, like his mistress, the former nun Lucrezia Buti, who often provided his

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Why did such an eminent group, comprising the head and the leading friars and theologians of the Franciscan order in Europe, need to flee Avignon? What was at stake, and what

From 1309 to 1377, the pope and the Roman curia resided in the city of Avignon in Provence in southern France. In this period the church underwent an extraordinary process of centralization. The rearmament of papal power was not novel, but it took a radical new turn in the fourteenth century. Ecclesiastical domination had its roots in Pope Gregory VII's series of reforms from the eleventh century, which were designed to free the church from lay control and increase the central, administrative power of the papacy. These reforms ended in a conflict with the German emperors, known as the Investiture Controversy (1075-1122). Since Gregory's time, the



Avignon Papal Palace

popes had assumed moral leadership of Christendom, strongly supported by the canonists of the thirteenth century who defended the pope's supremacy. Over time, this idea of supremacy had repercussions both for the internal structure of the church and for the church's relationship with secular rulers, emperors, and national kings alike. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, papal power had been consolidated by the Crusades, taxation systems, and the European universities, from which the popes could articulate, expand, and govern theological doctrines. In addition, there were the new orders of mendicant friars, the foot soldiers of the church, through which the papacy was able to watch over the spiritual lives of urban citizens. The result of this series of factors was that the pope could influence every aspect of Christian life.

Although this process of centralization had been taking place for quite some time, it intensified strongly in the fourteenth century. In an attempt to prevent secular states from appropriating church revenues without the pope's permission, Pope Boniface VIII issued the bull *Clericis laicos* (1296), which stated that lay rulers had no jurisdiction over clerics or their property.

By this time, kings obviously had more power than the pope, and the confrontation between Pope Boniface and secular European rulers was, as the historian Barbara Rosenwein has described it, "one sign of the dawning new principles of national sovereignty." The salvos were especially intense between the pope and King Philip IV of France, known as Philip the Fair. Thus, in 1302, Boniface tried to put an end to the conflict by boldly confronting his opponent with his bull *Unam Sanctam* (1302), which has probably become the most famous of all papal documents of the Middle Ages:

Urged by faith, we are obliged to believe and to maintain that the Church is one, holy, catholic, and also apostolic. We believe in her firmly and we confess with simplicity that outside of her there is neither salvation nor the remission of sins ... and she represents one sole mystical body whose Head is Christ and the head of Christ is God.... Therefore, of the one and only Church there is one body and one head, not two heads like a monster; that is, Christ and the Vicar of Christ, Peter and the successor of Peter.... We are informed by the texts of the gospels that in this Church and in its power are two swords; namely, the spiritual and the temporal.... Certainly the one who denies that the temporal sword is in the power of Peter has not listened well to the word of the Lord commanding: "Put up thy

sword into thy scabbard" [Mt 26:52]. Both, therefore, are in the power of the Church, that is to say, the spiritual and the material sword, but the former is to be administered for the Church but the latter by the Church; the former in the hands of the priest; the latter by the hands of kings and soldiers, but at the will and sufferance of the priest.

The unique feature of this constitution is that it represents, as Joëlle Rollo-Koster has recently argued, the most extreme assertion of the pontiff's political and juridical primacy over secular rulers that had ever been promulgated.¹ It proposed a severely hierocratic interpretation of papal power, with no independence for secular rulers: as the successor of Peter, Christ had appointed the pope the leader of Christianity, with full power on earth, both spiritual and temporal. The church is moreover portrayed as a mystical body (*corpus mysticum*), with a strong emphasis on the corporeal and juridical senses of the expression, and the pope as the head of this body, giving him the right to judge, depose, and concede power to secular rulers, although he could not be judged by any other human being.

The reactions to this extraordinary claim to sovereignty were immediate. In September 1303, under the command of King Philip's counselor Guillaume de Nogaret, who was accompanied by the notorious Sciarra Colonna from Rome, a band of 1,600 men attacked the pope's palace in Anagni, the Caetanis' fort southeast of Rome, and imprisoned the pope. They intended to take the pope to France and charge him with heresy there. After three days in captivity, however, the pope was rescued by his townspeople, but died a few weeks later, presumably from the shock he suffered.

The "Outrage at Anagni," as historians have usually dubbed it, represents a radical shift in ecclesiastical history. Forced by King Philip, Boniface's successor, Pope Benedict XI, who died on his way to Perugia less than a year after his election, annulled the *Unam Sanctam*. Nevertheless, the bull created the foundation for the popes' claim to sovereignty in the coming decades. In 1305, the canon lawyer and archbishop of Bordeaux, Bertrand de Got, was elected the new pope. Taking the name Pope Clement V, he moved to Poitiers in France, where he was crowned with the tiara in the presence of King Philip. Soon after, he settled in Avignon. Under the governance of the following six popes who resided in Avignon—seven including Clement V—the papacy grew considerably in authority and wealth.

The fate of Pope Boniface haunted his successors, reminding them of the pope's profound vulnerability, and the fear of similar events came to influence their political activities in the decades to come. Still, the reaction to the threats emanating from the increasing power of national kings and secular rulers was not to give way, but rather to adapt, astutely and carefully, to the new situation. This took place in the form of a comprehensive reorganization of the church, which strengthened the pope's authority in temporal and spiritual matters. Within a short time, the papal curia was turned into the most powerful and prosperous court in Europe, rousing mixed reactions. Different groups, both within and outside the church, harshly criticized the burgeoning power of the papacy. Besides the emperor, the critics consisted of the Italian signori who supported the emperor's control over the *regnum italicum*, thereby creating their own jurisdiction of authority with no papal intervention. The city-states in northern Italy, on the other hand, were usually torn between their imperial and papal sympathies, as reflected in the bloody conflicts between the Guelphs, the party traditionally sympathetic to the papacy, and the Ghibellines, who supported the emperor.

As the historian Arthur Stephen McGrade has described it, a literary war broke out, which engaged intellectuals all over Europe, and which rivaled in length and bitterness any previous contest between the papacy and secular rulers. That the structural changes took place in Avignon and not in Rome, where the tomb of Saint Peter, Christ's vicar, was to be found, was in itself a provocation for many Christians. Jerusalem was lost to the Muslims in 1187, in 1291 the last Christian stronghold in the Holy Land, the port of Acre, was overrun, and now even the Holy See was in exile. Moreover, the swift increase in French dominance within the Sacred College of Cardinals produced bitter reactions. Despite the fact that the pope showed his strength and independence toward secular rulers, there is no doubt that there were strong bonds between the papal curia and the French crown during the papacy's seventy-year stay in Avignon. Nepotism flourished, and the Italian members of the curia were reduced to a minority, seriously provoking the growing number of Italian immigrants—the many notaries, merchants, artisans, and traders—in the city. In short, a dense and multifaceted critique of the papacy's residency in Avignon arose—it rose from every corner of Europe, and from a mixed group of people, with various social and intellectual backgrounds, and with different intentions and arguments.

The purpose of this book is to investigate six of the most prominent critics of the Avignon papacy whose texts came to have a compelling actuality. Dante Alighieri, Marsilius of Padua, William of Ockham, Francis Petrarch, Birgitta of Sweden, and Catherine of Siena fiercely contested the claimed supremacy of the pope as articulated in Boniface's *Unam Sanctam*. They questioned the legitimacy of the pope's secular power while appealing for a profound reformation of the church, the *Ecclesia Romana*. While Dante's conviction, expressed in his *Commedia*, his political letters, and

his treatise *Monarchia*, was that only a secular monarch, the emperor, with unlimited temporal power could create peace and thus bring citizens universal liberty, Marsilius emphasized in his *Defensor pacis* the unrestricted power and freedom of citizens to elect their ruler. In their political tracts, however, both Dante and Marsilius strongly delimited the pope's power to religious affairs. William of Ockham was the Franciscan friar who more than anyone else stressed the heretical core of the pope's theocratic claims to supremacy. At the same time, Ockham transformed Franciscan discourses on poverty into a question of subjective rights and individual freedom. With Petrarch, a new turn appeared in the debate. Influenced by the Franciscan Spirituals' rhetoric, as well as by Dante's *Monarchia* and political letters, he continually depicted Avignon as an infernal city that had perverted the authority of both divine and natural laws, in contrast to Rome, whose authorial legitimacy was grounded in the glorious culture of the classical past. In Birgitta of Sweden's numerous visions and in Catherine of Siena's book *Dialogo*, as well as her letters, Rome is defended as the spiritual capital of Christendom, a Christian interpretation of the revived classical idea of Rome as *caput mundi*. Both women's eager attempts to convince the pope to return were thus strongly connected to notions of the thorough reform of the ecclesiastical institution, and the belief that the legitimacy of the pope's power was to be found in Rome, not in Avignon.

Each chapter of the book offers a case study showing how the six figures tried to cope with the precarious situation that the Avignon papacy had created. Dante, Marsilius, Ockham, Petrarch, Birgitta, and Catherine did not only come to have a decisive influence on the political events of their time; as well as being significant political agents, their literary works dominated the agenda of the contemporary political and intellectual debates, with far-reaching effects for the political



William of Ockham

discourses of early modern Europe. Intriguingly, all six authors were connected to one another, by textual transmissions, by more or less implicit references to each other, or by a common network of acquaintances, collaborators, and friends. Read together, their works reflect the broad and multifaceted scale of political resistance to the Avignon papacy, as well as

offering us a survey of the period from the papacy's settlement in Provence in 1309 until the pontiff's return to Rome in 1377.

Which questions did these authors raise? Which solutions did they seek, and which strategies and arguments did they deploy? In short, they all provide important insights into the productive exchanges between different intellectual cultures of fourteenth-century Europe, of which the Avignon papacy constituted both the pulsating heart and the contested authority.

METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS

In the introduction of her book *Avignon and Its Papacy* (1309-1417), the French American historian Joëlle Rollo-Koster offers a valuable and updated review of the scholarship on the history of the popes' dwelling in southern France, which, in fact, has been surprisingly scarce. As she argues, "Surveys of papal Avignon have been close to nonexistent." Still, she presents a comprehensive review of the scholarly tradition from Etienne Baluze's *Vitae paparum avenionensium* (1693), via the antiquarian and historical investigations that followed in the wake of the opening of the Vatican Archives in 1881, such as those of Leopold Duhamel and Robert Brun, to Patrick Zutshi's concise but expedient chapter in *The New Cambridge Medieval History* (2000). We will not repeat Rollo-Koster's helpful summary here, but rather briefly mention the studies that have been important for this present book.

The work that remains the richest and most useful synthesis of the Avignon papacy, with a special focus on papal administration and finances, is *The Popes at Avignon* (1305-1378) by Guillaume Mollat, originally published in French in 1912. The book paved the way for a new generation of scholars, among whom Yves Renouard and his study *La Papauté à Avignon* from 1954 are of major interest. The originality and strength of Renouard's perspective is his emphasis on the many connections between Avignon and Italy—economic as well as political and cultural exchanges. Another book worth mentioning is the more popular but highly sympathetic and readable *The Popes of Avignon: A Century of Exile* (2008), by the British writer, art critic, and journalist Edwin Mullin. A narrower, yet powerful, study is Diana Wood's biography of Clement VI from 1989, which gives us a fascinating glimpse of the ideas of an intelligent and ambitious pope, as well as of his actions in connection with some prime issues during his pontificate. Yet another insightful book is the study of the ecclesiastical crisis of trecento edited by Diego Quaglionni in the voluminous Italian series *Storia della chiesa* (1994). The most recent examination of the Avignon papacy is the already cited book by Rollo-Koster (2015). Thanks to the author's familiarity with the archives and sites of the late medieval Avignon, the book offers a broad approach to the multifaceted interaction between the papal court and the social scenery, the "urban fabric," as she calls it, of the city.

These mentioned historical studies have been invaluable for the contextual framework of this book. Another scholarly tradition that has been of great significance is the many surveys of the political philosophy of the fourteenth century, such as [The Foundation of Modern Political Thought](#) by Quentin Skinner [Cambridge UP], [A History of Political Thought: From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance](#) by Janet Coleman [Wiley-Blackwell], and [The Ideas of Power in the Late Middle Ages](#) by Joseph Canning [Cambridge UP]. Notwithstanding their centrality for our assessment of the political and intellectual climate of the fourteenth century, a weakness with these studies is that none of them has been primarily concerned with the

context of Avignon. One exception is the work of Jürgen Miethke, who in his book *De potentate papæ: Die päpstliche Amtskompetenz im Widerstreit der politischen Theorie von Thomas von Aquin bis Wilhelm von Ockham* offers the Avignon papacy considerably more space." Still, Miethke's selection of authorial voices in the intellectual debates is as incomplete as in the studies by Skinner, Coleman, and Canning.

The most prevalent studies of late medieval political thought completely exclude figures such as Francis Petrarch, Birgitta of Sweden, and Catherine of Siena, despite their indisputable contributions to the contemporary intellectual polemics. The reason is probably that they fall outside our modern and somewhat narrow-minded definitions of what a political "thinker" or "philosopher" is. However, the danger with such restricted conceptions is that as readers we anachronistically lose sight of details that may give us more balanced and reliable pictures of the past, indeed, even alter our understanding of a whole period. Especially the two women, Birgitta and Catherine, have fallen prey to such limited considerations, with the result that they more or less are wiped out of the historical-political scenery. But as the readers of this book hopefully will discover, these and similar conclusions are deeply wrong. Both Birgitta and Catherine played decisive roles and were among the major voices in the political debates of the fourteenth century.

The present book has no pretensions of giving a detailed historical or socioeconomic account, based on documentary and archival studies, of the Avignonese era. The primary sources for the following investigation consist of some major political, literary, and visionary texts produced during the period, which contested the legitimacy of the temporal power of the pope while calling for profound reform of the church. The term "literature" is to be taken in a broad sense, as writings or a body of written work—including political treatises, letters, visions, rhymed epistles, sermons, and orations—and not only imaginative works of fiction, which to a certain degree has become the modern, restricted meaning of the word. The methodological approach applied in this book is to read these writings with a view toward the historical setting of the Avignon papacy, and thus explore the connection between rhetoric, modes of thinking, and the historical context.

The main argument is that the particular situation created by the Avignon papacy and by the cultural exchanges that took place within the borders of what turned out to be a European cosmopolitan city drove the intellectual and political debates in new and unexpected directions. It has been essential to incorporate figures who are not represented as often in intellectual histories or in histories of political ideas, but who were nonetheless of immense significance in the political and ecclesiastical debates of fourteenth-century Europe. By examining Francis Petrarch and his passionate nostalgia for classical Rome, and the prophetic voices of the two most influential women of the period, Birgitta of Sweden and Catherine of Siena, alongside authors who more frequently appear in histories of political thought, such as Dante Alighieri, Marsilius of Padua, and William of Ockham, the book aims to contribute a more nuanced and vibrant interpretation of the shifting discussions about power and politics in fourteenth-century Europe. Per se, each of these six figures has hardly ever been explored in terms of the historical backdrop of the Avignon papacy, and even more seldom are they brought together by comparative readings, for which such a common historical context opens. Thus, in addition to enriching the more

traditional historical versions of the Avignon papacy, the book aspires to bring new and fresh perspectives on the singular texts that are explored, as well as on the actual authors' genuine responses to the seventy-year-long exile of the pope and his curia.

PRESENTATION OF THE CHAPTERS

Each of the protagonists has been the subject of long traditions of scholarly investigation, of which the most important will be singled out and discussed more thoroughly in the respective chapters. The principal contribution in this book will be to provide an exploration of Dante, Ockham, Marsilius of Padua, Petrarch, Birgitta of Sweden, and Catherine of Siena together in light of the specific setting they shared, which so intensely preoccupied their minds and which became the point of departure for their political and literary commitments.

Chapter 1 offers a new reading of *Paradiso* VI from Dante's *Commedia*. In this canto, one of the most politically charged in Dante's fictional journey through the three realms of the afterlife, Dante the pilgrim meets Justinian, the sixth-century emperor who created the body of Roman or civil law, the *Corpus Iuris Civilis*. Justinian's long monologue strongly defends the Roman Empire and is not so very different from the justification we find in Dante's political treatise, *Monarchia* (On the monarchy). The two texts were written at the same time, probably in 1317-1318, as a response to Pope John XXII's attack on the validity of the posts of imperial vicars that had been awarded by Emperor Henry VII to several northern Italian signori, including Dante's patron, Cangrande della Scala.

Dante was deeply disappointed by Henry VII's failed attempt to regain imperial control over Italy, and his defeat and death in 1313 only consolidated the power of Pope Clement V in Avignon and paved the way for his notorious successor, Pope John XXII. Thus, in the *Monarchia* Dante invokes a monarch capable of bringing peace not only to a war-torn Italy but also to a Europe ravaged by war and discord. The main reason for the problems was the temporal power of the pope due to Constantine the Great's presumed donation of the western empire to Pope Sylvester early in the fourth century. For Dante, the Donation of Constantine was profoundly wrong. His solution was to strictly divide jurisdiction between secular and ecclesiastical authority, with no interference between the two realms. Indeed, a complete transfer of secular power to the emperor was a precondition for establishing peace: jurisdiction over terrestrial matters belonged to the emperor alone, according to Dante, whereas spiritual matters in terms of humans' eternal happiness were under the jurisdiction of the pope.

Chapter 2 consists of a comparative analysis of Dante's *Inferno* VI and *Monarchia*, and Marsilius of Padua's treatise *Defensor pacis*. When Ludwig of Bavaria, Henry VII's successor, went to Rome in 1328 to be crowned, Marsilius accompanied the emperor as his personal physician and as one of his main advisers. A few years earlier, Marsilius had published his extensive treatise *Defensor pacis* (1324), in which he strongly criticized the Avignon papacy. The emperor and his adviser later applied the ideology of the treatise to their undertakings in Rome. Of importance is that the emperor's supporters also referred to Dante's *Monarchia*, leading Pope John XXII to deem both Dante's and Marsilius's works to be heretical. Despite the shared fate of these two books and both authors' attacks on the Avignon papacy, Dante and Marsilius differed greatly in their interpretations of legitimate authority.

Whereas Dante emphasized the divine origin of both secular and ecclesiastical power, Marsilius founded the idea of legitimacy on the sovereignty of the people. To Marsilius, the body of citizens represented the will of the whole and the government rested on the ultimate authority of them.

Whereas Chapters 1 and 2 focus on two figures whose initial political training and intellectual education took place within the walls of the Italian city-states, in Chapter 3 we will turn to William of Ockham, who was a Franciscan friar from Oxford. After carving out a career as a philosopher who made important contributions to logic, he became involved in the controversies of apostolic poverty in Avignon. He was imprisoned by the pope but managed to escape and joined Ludwig of Bavaria and his court, which included Marsilius of Padua, on their way back to Germany. He spent the rest of his life there in a Franciscan monastery, where he wrote a series of political tractates, including *Breviloquium de principatu tyrannico* (A short discourse on tyrannical government), the main text of Chapter 3 of this study.

In contrast to many of Ockham's other political works, the *Breviloquium* (1342) is a deeply personal text and its main focus is on the fundamental liberty granted to all human beings by both divine and natural rights. Ockham's argument, which is a wide-ranging attack on the doctrine of papal absolutism, is derived from the disputes about apostolic poverty that fifteen years earlier had condemned the celebrated theologian and scholar as a heretic. Although Pope John XXII rejected the division between ownership (*dominium*) and the use (*usus*) of things, this division constituted the heart of Franciscan spirituality—the friars' voluntary rejection of any *dominium* in order to live under what Ockham described as *prelapsarian* freedom. Ockham argued that the Franciscans had renounced all worldly rights, including the right to sue in court and to own property. Nonetheless, there was a right that was universal to all men and that consisted of the right to use external things. This was a natural right and liberty, conferred by God and nature, since it was necessary to maintain life.

Chapter 4 turns to Francis Petrarch, the "father of humanism" or "l'initiateur de la Renaissance," as Pierre de Nolhac once so famously called him because of his efforts to transform the cultural agenda through a revival of antiquity. The portrayal of Petrarch as just such a seminal, humanist figure has been modified today by a stronger focus on the contextual realities of his works, as well as more nuanced studies of the early humanist movements. Nevertheless, there has been, and still is, a tendency to under-value the impact of the city of Avignon, which in many respects shaped Petrarch's role as the most celebrated intellectual of his time.

Petrarch's works are full of ambiguities, not all of which are easy to grasp. The exiled author, or the *peregrinus ubique*—the pilgrim everywhere—as he liked to describe himself, constantly challenged his many interlocutors while he swiftly shifted positions and loyalties. In Chapter 4 we will examine a letter to Cola di Rienzo (*Lettere disperse* 8) in which Petrarch stepped decisively into contemporary politics. His fervent defense of Cola's revolution in Rome in 1347 and the subsequent establishment of the Roman Republic were followed by the author's increasingly harsh condemnation of the Avignon papacy, in which he applied a biblical and apocalyptic rhetoric common among the Spirituals: classical ideals (the restoration of Rome) and eschatological desires (the dawn of a new age) merged, according to Petrarch, in the figure of Cola.

of Santa Maria Maggiore on the top of the Esquiline Hill. However, the miserable state of the church, as Birgitta depicts it, soon turns into a profound critique of the current state of the Ecclesia Romana. As such, the topos of the widow has profound political connotations. It reflects the personification of the widowed Rome already adopted by Dante and Petrarch, and later used by Cola di Rienzo in his powerful ideological propaganda during the revolution in Rome in 1347.

interpretation of the concept of *corpus mysticum* from the period before the papacy settled in France, Catherine's response to the problem of the Avignon papacy was most diplomatic: she defended the historical and institutional role of the church while calling for profound reform, thus contributing in her own way to a conflict that had preoccupied humanists, lawyers, and theologians for almost a century.

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Captivatingly fresh and intimate letters from Augustus John's first wife, Ida, reveal the untold story of married life with one of the great artists of the last century.

Twelve days before her twenty-fourth birthday, on the foggy morning of Saturday 12 January 1901, Ida Nettleship married Augustus John in a private ceremony at St Pancras Registry Office. The union went against the wishes of Ida's parents, who aspired to an altogether more conventional match for their eldest daughter. But Ida was in love with Augustus, a man of exceptional magnetism also studying at the Slade, and who would become one of the most famous artists of his time.

Ida's letters – to friends, to family and to Augustus – reveal a young woman of passion, intensity and wit. They tell of the scandal she brought on the Nettleship family and its consequences; of hurt and betrayal as the marriage evolved into a three-way affair when Augustus fell in love with another woman, Dorelia; of Ida's remarkable acceptance of Dorelia, their pregnancies and shared domesticity; of self-doubt, happiness and despair; and of finding the strength and courage to compromise and navigate her unorthodox marriage.

Ida is a naturally gifted writer, and it is with a candor, intimacy and social intelligence extraordinary for a woman of her period that her correspondence opens her world. Ida

John died aged just thirty of puerperal fever following the birth of her fifth son, but in these vivid, funny and sometimes devastatingly sad letters she is startlingly alive on the page; a young woman ahead of her time – almost of our own time – living a complex and compelling drama here revealed for the first time by the woman at its very heart.

Guardian Review: As Virginia Woolf whimsically calculated, the world became modern “on or about December 1910”. Sadly, that was too late for Ida John, an artistically gifted and boldly emancipated “New Woman” who died in 1907.

“I must create something,” Ida insisted in a letter to one of her female confidantes; all she asked was “a studio and ability to paint for myself”. But artistic creativity was still a male prerogative and when a teenage girl of her acquaintance said that she too wanted to paint, Ida could only ironically advise her to “be a man”. Ida defied her stuffy family to marry the raffish society portraitist Augustus John, after which her occupation turned out to be breeding. She came to think of herself merely as “a Belly” and thought she had the gooey consistency of a suet pudding. When Gus, as she called him, took up with a mistress named Dorelia, Ida in desperation agreed to cohabit with the minx-like newcomer in an Edwardian seraglio.

Having presented Gus with five children in six years – the total might have been six if she hadn’t quietly treated herself to an abortion in the off year – Ida died of a puerperal fever and peritonitis, aged only 30. By then, the priapic Gus had begun impregnating Dorelia, who bore him an additional four heirs; when they broke up, he acquired three more from three different mothers. Self-exempted from nappy-changing, Gus viewed babies as amusing aesthetic objects. As they grew up, he lost interest: according to Michael Holroyd, he casually disposed of the offspring Ida left behind by distributing them like cards “in a complex game of Happy Families”, loaning them for a few months or, better yet, a lifetime to “some agreeable woman – ideally a princess”.

Reading Ida’s letters, it’s hard not to think of Gus as a bad bohemian, who lived free while reducing Ida to a reproductive slave. For him, la vie de bohème was more than a dilettantish metaphor, as it is in Puccini’s opera. The true bohemians were vagabond refugees from Bohemia: imitating a Gypsy, Gus dressed like a tramp, taught his parrot to swear in the Roman language and left London to go roving in a tinker’s caravan, which he parked in the middle of Dartmoor so that Dorelia could give birth alone to her first child.

This “solitary Stag” or “eagle of the ranges”, as Ida described him, took advantage of her deference and sense of duty. Having abandoned her own ambitions, she settled for the mute, compliant role of artist’s model, only to have Gus casually paint her out of a double portrait in which she appeared beside Dorelia. Whenever Ida chafed against the troilist arrangement, she felt guilty about her wilfulness and forced herself to snuggle up to the rival she addressed as “Mrs Harem”.

In the letters, erotic energy occasionally seems to be pulsing in all directions at once. “I was bitter cold last night in bed without your burning hot, not to say scalding, body next to

me,” Ida wrote, not to Gus, but to Dorelia. Gus’s sister, Gwen, who did manage a career as a painter, saw Ida as an androgyne, a hybrid of female and male like Virginia Woolf’s Orlando, able to share herself between her husband and his mistress.

During Dorelia’s pregnancy, Ida warned her that men are by nature “indifferent” to children. She envied that nonchalance and in part shared it. She didn’t really love her burdensome brats, she told a correspondent; she loved only Gus and viewed the children as “a curious – most curious – result of that love”. When her first baby groused and squalled, she speculated that “he would very much rather not have been created”. The second, she thought, resembled a piglet. Her fourth “beastly boy” was “a bull necked unpoetical snoring blockhead”; later, she described him as a weakling and wondered if his disposition had “anything to do with my violent efforts to dislodge him at first. Poor little unwelcome man”. As for child rearing, she proposed transferring the infants “into queer pots like the Chinese, to grow out of shape”. Such jokes crackle with resentment and frustration, as does her unsentimental report on feline fertility: after “the cat had 6 kittens (O Lord!)”, she watched Gus “drown 5 in a kettle with great apparent sang-froid”.

Ida’s consolation was the painless and playful invention of brainchildren. She reinvented her friends by fantastically nicknaming them after the unsocialised creatures of Kipling’s *Jungle Book*, with herself as Mowgli, a feral imp, whose liberty meant he could only be a boy. She also dreamed up “an invisible Puck-like spirit” called Friuncelli, another rebellious trickster, again inevitably male.

A generation later, after Marie Stopes began to educate women about what Gus termed “the mysteries of child-prevention”, Ida’s fate might have been different. Dorothy Parker said that the members of the Bloomsbury group lived in squares, painted in circles and made love in triangles. Ida did not have the benefit of that polymorphous modern geometry. She may have forfeited her chance to paint, but her letters, salvaged by her granddaughter Rebecca, after a century during which the renegade Ida was not mentioned in the family, make belated amends. Between baby-minding chores, she proved to be a witty, wickedly outspoken writer, which ensures that she will now not be forgotten.



Redux: In 1901 the 24-year-old Ida Nettleship shocked her respectable parents by announcing that she had secretly married an artist called Augustus John. They had met while studying at the Slade. Driven by a mixture of curiosity, love

and lust, Augustus had pursued Ida temptingly, but she had resisted sex outside wedlock while knowing that her parents would refuse to allow her to marry this penniless, unkempt man, who wore earrings and befriended Gypsies.

Forty years ago, Michael Holroyd revived Augustus John's reputation with one of his wryly empathetic two-volume biographies. This was an account frequently narrated from Ida's point of view, thanks to the vividness and copiousness of her correspondence. Now he has joined forces with Ida's granddaughter to publish her letters, and they offer a compelling glimpse of a lost age of bohemia that raises provocative questions about what it means to live freely.

The Johns' marriage began happily. They made large vats of soup; they acquired a cat and a parrot, which Augustus taught to swear in Romany. Ida became pregnant and enjoyed making clothes for the baby, while her husband celebrated the mystery of creation. But he knew he wasn't an "exponent of the faithful dog business" and feared that "continued cosiness is risky". Soon, Ida was installed in the countryside, while Augustus spent more time in London, where he met a beautiful girl with a Mona Lisa smile. He lured Dorelia McNeill into bed but conquest wasn't enough; he wanted to live with her as well.

His sister Gwen John, in love with Dorelia herself, responded by whisking Dorelia to the continent, where they walked from Toulouse to Rome. But Ida grew impatient with her husband's moodiness, so she wrote to Dorelia, commanding her to come and live with them: "I crave for you to come here." Ida was not just trying to placate her husband; she too felt stultified by conventional domesticity and Dorelia seemed to offer the excitement of novelty. Ida hoped that it was possible to live both considerately and freely. Then as now this was a difficult proposition, however. Though she told one friend that "far from diminishing our love for each other", the new situation augmented it, she admitted to another that she'd lost "all sense of reason or right" and was beset by jealousy.

Ordinary marriage hadn't worked for Ida but neither did the new set up. Nothing seems to have lived up to the freedom of early womanhood, when she and her female friends had run naked into the sea or (with Gwen John among them) spent a year as artists in Paris. "I think to live with a girlfriend & have lovers would be almost perfect," she wrote wistfully, two years into her marriage, wondering "whatever are we all training for that we have to shape ourselves & compromise with things all our lives?"

Ida's happiest times do seem to have been the moments when she abandoned the marriage and found stable companionship with a female friend. Unexpectedly, the friend with whom this proved most possible was Dorelia. The menage a trois reached a crisis when Dorelia became pregnant. Augustus decided that the solution was for the three of them plus children to move to a caravan on Dartmoor. Arriving there first, Dorelia gave birth alone, and then was joined a few days later by Ida. This doesn't sound the recipe for a relaxed life but it was surprisingly successful. Ida turned out to love the simplicity of outdoor life: washing their clothes in the stream, watching her children grow stronger in the fresh air. She was also happy

because there was now an equality between the two women. Both had become focused on domesticity and it was clear that Augustus would now seek freedom elsewhere. This gave her strength. She proposed to Dorelia that the two women should relocate to Paris.

Ida enjoyed this move, and she enjoyed in particular her power to shock. This time she wasn't just shocking her family but her husband, who felt abandoned by both women ("he is our great child artist," Ida wrote with pleasing dismissiveness; "let him snap his jaws"). The arrangement worked well and Ida regained some sense of agency. But she was held back by motherhood. Between them, they had five small children and she wasn't sure that she loved them enough. "How wonderful it seems to me how you and others love their children," she wrote to a friend; "I love only my husband and the children as being a curious – most curious part of that love."

It is strange that a woman so ambivalent about motherhood should have had five babies in five years. This could simply have been due to inadequate birth control. But she did claim that she wanted a large family, while admitting that "it may only be because there's nothing else to do, now that painting is not practicable – & I must create something."

A lot of Ida's unhappiness might have been avoided had she continued as a painter in her own right. Why did she stop?

A lot of Ida's unhappiness might have been avoided had she continued as a painter in her own right. Why did she stop? They had enough money for help in the house, so she could have claimed a few hours a day as her own. If Augustus felt that there wasn't room for two painters in the marriage, it seems out of character that she should accept it so easily. Perhaps she simply knew that she was second rate, and couldn't countenance it. "There is no harm in being second rate any more than in being a postman," she declared categorically, pronouncing that the only first-rate woman was Gwen John.

This is telling, because Gwen and Ida sought freedom in a very different manner. Gwen's mode of being free was essentially negative rather than positive. Where her brother sought the freedom to pursue all his desires at once, Gwen renounced desire as inherently unfree. "Leave everybody and let them leave you," she wrote in her diary; "then only will you be without fear." She knew that when she did love it cost her too much. This was the case both with Dorelia and with Rodin, whom she served as model and then lover in Paris. Rodin was a good choice of lover for Gwen, because he never asked for much of what she could give. This left her free to paint, developing a talent that now seems more remarkable than Augustus's, and remaining for Ida a kind of alter ego. Through her presence in Paris, she reminded Ida that it wasn't enough simply to move to the city of artists, because she would never have Gwen's independence or vision.

Perhaps Ida, with her gift of reinvention and with the remarkable self-awareness on display in her letters, would have found a new way to be free. She didn't have the chance, dying from puerperal fever aged 30 shortly after the birth of her fifth son. "How will it end? By death or

[illegible]

Diverse modernist poems, far from advertising a capacity to prefigure utopia or save society, understand themselves to be complicit in the unhappiness and injustice of an imperfect or fallen world. Combining analysis of technical devices and aesthetic values with broader accounts of contemporary critical debates, social contexts, and political history, this book offers a formalist argument about how these poems understand themselves and their situation, and a historicist argument about the meanings of their forms. The poetry of the canonical modernists T. S. Eliot, Mina Loy, and Wallace Stevens is placed alongside the poetry of Ford Madox Ford, better known for his novels and his criticism, and the poetry of Joseph Macleod, whose work has been largely forgotten. Focusing on the years from 1914 to 1930, the book offers a new account of a crucial moment in the history of British and American modernism.

Imagine the creature's resolution as a motto for the great labors of modernity, aesthetic and political, from modernism to socialism: the tremendous effort to get to work because of what exists. Kafka's creature must work precisely with what exists, including the burrow he has made for himself, and the burden of that work is part of what makes the present world ugly and unhappy. But the burrow he creates and recreates, a work in perpetual progress, is a refuge from the world which proves no refuge at all. It offers an allegory for the isolations and anxieties of modern life, and for a labor of thinking which can never rest, which incessantly dissatisfies. The burrow seems an allegory for Kafka's story too, and more broadly for the work of art: a part of the world which promises a refuge from that not only because of its mode of production, in which the dialectic of the forces and relations of production is concentrated, nor simply because of the social derivation of its thematic material. Much more importantly, art becomes

The autonomy is complicit. Modernist works engage with their social world through 'forms of relative autonomy', contingent upon and compromised by their historical situation. The detached observer is as much entangled as the active participant', and 'the only advantage of the former is insight into his entanglement'.

Many other modernists sought to define the matter of poetry, and the way that poetry matters or no longer matters, and they did so in many other ways. The problem remained a source of fascination, a spur to experiment, and the cause of some anxiety; I shall return to it repeatedly. The situation of poetry, for modernism, was one of acute crisis. 'Modern civilization seems to demand that the poet should justify himself not only by writing poems', observe Laura Riding and Robert Graves, 'but furthermore by proving with each poem the contemporary legitimacy of poetry itself'. This tension between the instance and the idea, between poems and poetry, is crucial. It means that, as Peter Nicholls puts it, 'the exemplary modernist poem deliberately invites the question "Is it poetry?"' Each work had to earn the name of poetry anew, as classification or evaluation. Descending to the particular, it could try to do so by employing techniques of versification. Ascending to the universal, it could try to do so by epitomising the concept of art. Yet neither those techniques nor that concept are eternal laws; they are the measures of a historical moment. In modernism, poetry opposes a necessary other at every level: prose, narrative, the novel, the world. It opposes science, religion, and capitalism. It opposes mechanical reproduction: 'A prose kinema, not [...] the "sculpture" of rhyme', writes Ezra Pound in 1920, before criticising a passage in the drafts of *The Waste Land* as mere 'photography'. Given this situation, poetry vanishes in a cloudy abstraction or crumbles into that contingent set of

verbal devices, cultural expectations, and aesthetic values. At every level, poetry is a refuge which proves no refuge. My argument is that modernist poetry engages powerfully with the fallen world when it reflects on its peculiar falls or failings, and so this book attends to some of those distinguishing features.

Or a model for poetry: to remain out of step with a time that is out of joint is better than falling in step, but better still would be to be in step with a better time. The novel, the cinema, music, and painting find themselves in different situations, determined by their own histories and by their interactions with each other and with poetry. Why then is poetry, for some modernists, both part of what exists, a symptom,


complicit even at its most critical, and the beauty which does not exist, a promise, blissful even in its falls or failings? The problem is not with The Ecliptic or 'The Man Whose Pharynx Was Bad', or not only. The problem separates poems from poetry, particular from universal, instance from ideal. This dialectic causes difficulties. When Macleod envisions 'the

poem of redintegration', his definite article tilts that poem towards the ideal: this is not just any poem, but some singular poem. Then, when we take the word 'poem' figuratively, Macleod brings the idea of poetry in general to bear upon the notion of a reconciled society. No particular poem, least of all The Ecliptic, matches that ideal or idea. For this reason, the ideal sometimes seemed oppressive or silly. Ever sceptical, Riding and Graves warn that poem is a 'more accurate, less prejudiced term' than poetry, 'a vague and sentimental idea in relation to which poet is a more vague and sentimental idea still.' The dialectic makes it difficult to reconcile small details in a given poem — a tetrameter line in a pentameter passage — with grand ambitions for poetry and for the world at large: the poem of redintegration, the supreme fiction, the rose in the steel dust. Finally, the dialectic is historical. Poetry shadows each poem, striding behind it as an ideal induced from the works of the past, and rising to meet it as an ideal to which all works aspire. But the reverse is true too: poems linger long after poetry has hurried on, when the idea no longer captures all the past's particulars. When the idea has still to assimilate the newest particulars, poetry shuffles to catch up with poems.'

This historical dimension may be more or less explicitly political, as may those grand ambitions. In Literature and Revolution (1923), Trotsky considers the works of various poets, both those hostile to the Russian Revolution and those committed to it. In the midst of these discussions, he reflects upon the historical logic of the Revolution itself, and he celebrates 'the materialist method, which permits one to gauge one's strength, to foresee changes, and to direct events'. The materialist method, he urges, 'is the greatest fulfillment of the Revolution, and in this lies its highest poetry'. That poetry transcends the poems of its day. Trotsky had precedent for this in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte' (1852). Here Marx had distinguished

between the bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth century and the proletarian revolutions of his own time:

The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped off all superstition about the past. Earlier revolutions required recollections of past world history in order to dull themselves to their own content. In



I must be a
mermaid,
I have no
fear of
depths,
and a great
fear of
shallow
living.

Anais Nin

order to arrive at its own content, the revolution of the nineteenth century must let the dead bury their dead. There the words went beyond the content; here the content goes beyond the words.

Martin Puchner links this passage to the Greek root of our word poetry — *poesie*, to make — and he argues that in the Communist Manifesto (1848) 'Marx had already invented a poetry of the future revolution. But what exactly does Marx mean here by poetry, *Poesie*, and what is its value to him?

Maybe *Poesie* is merely a glancing reference, a vague allusion, less important to Marx's argument than the great opening antithesis of tragedy and farce. Puchner is right to think that Marx does not mean, or not only, language in verse or even verbal art. Clearly Marx does not, by the poetry of the future, anticipate Les Fleurs du mal (1857) or Duineser Elegien (1923), nor Baudelaire's or Rilke's revolution in poetics. Marx does not mean The Aeneid or The Iliad by the poetry of the past, though he does describe the Roman Republic giving the 'gladiators' of the first French Revolution their 'ideals' and their 'art forms'. Tallying the efforts of the Second Republic, he speaks of the

Joseph Pearce wove this rich tapestry from the poetry of some of the finest Christian voices of the modern era: Gerard Manley Hopkins, T. S. Eliot, G. K. Chesterton, as well as Owen and Sassoon. He was inspired to do so to commemorate the centenary of World War One. The verse drama tells the story of Sassoon's journey from the horrors of trench warfare to his final acceptance and embrace of Christ and His Church. It shows how the Church allowed this great writer to make sense of his own life and to make sense of life itself – and indeed of death itself, the latter of which only makes sense in the light of Christ. It is, therefore, the story of two conversions; the conversion of the poet but also the conversion of Death.

A black and white portrait of a young man in a military uniform. He is wearing a dark, peaked cap with a crest on the front. He has short, dark hair and is looking directly at the camera with a neutral expression. He is wearing a dark jacket or uniform shirt. The background is a plain, light-colored wall.

Throughout the history of Christian civilization, the greatest works of art and literature have presented a memento mori to the people of Christendom. This reminder of death points to the Four Last Things: Death, Judgment, Heaven and Hell. [Death Comes for the War Poets](#) follows this noble tradition by having the figure of Death as one of the characters who interacts with the two soldier-poets. Those reading this drama will see the face of Death through the eyes of these poets and will come to understand the reality of death and the beauty of life in a new evangelized light. They will be dragged into the trenches with the suffering troops, will see the ugliness of death, and will emerge into the light of the Life that defeats death and makes sense of it. They will in some way experience the healing experience of conversion as the drama unfolds from the shadow of death into the full light of Christ.

work *Art and Scholasticism*—a work whose very title brings together the two categories, aesthetics and theology, that Johnson said must be held apart—Maritain wrote that European culture in the years after World War I needed "a conversation between philosophers and artists." In making this claim, Maritain had in mind a specific kind of philosopher: Catholic neo-Thomists like himself, Etienne Gilson, and Martin D'Arcy. These thinkers sought to wed traditional Catholic sacramentalism (what Maritain called the "Metaphysics of the ancients") to a critically realist epistemology, arguing that, because the intellect and that which it perceives arise from and are sustained by God, the world is an "intelligible mystery." Maritain also had in mind a specific kind of artist: post-Impressionist painters like Pablo Picasso and Paul Cézanne and modernist writers like T. S. Eliot and James Joyce.

The historical moment at which Maritain was writing seemed ripe for such an interdisciplinary conversation. After the horrors of World War I, Maritain wrote, "All feel the necessity of escaping from the immense intellectual disorder inherited from the nineteenth century." Maritain believed that, just as Catholic neo-Thomists were challenging the "original sin against the light" that was philosophical idealism, so the period's best painters, poets, and novelists were challenging the supremacy of unthinking mimesis in art.⁶ Picasso, Joyce, and others realized that "art, as such, does not consist in imitating, but in making, in composing or constructing, in accordance with the laws of the very object to be posited in being."⁷ If only theologians and artists would speak with one another, Maritain suggested, then we might be saved from the previous generation's reductive thinking about the world (privileging epistemology over metaphysics) and about art (privileging mimetic convention over formal experimentation).

Maritain knew of what he spoke. He was perhaps the preeminent Catholic public intellectual of the day: writing seminal texts on metaphysics, moral philosophy, and Christian epistemology; shaping the modern Christian Democratic movement; and helping to draft the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He was also, however, a prolific and respected aesthetic thinker. In 1926, he and his friend Jean Cocteau jointly published *Letter to Jacques Maritain* and *Response to Jean Cocteau*, works in which the two men discussed the deep resonances between avant-garde aesthetics and Catholic thinking. Indeed, Maritain engaged with modern art regularly, in both essay form (he contributed a series of reflections on poetry and religion to Eliot's *Criterion* in 1927) and in book form. In *Art and Scholasticism* (1920), *The Frontiers of Poetry* (1930), and *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry* (1953), Maritain attempted a synthesis of aesthetics and theology, outlining what Rowan Williams calls "a comprehensive theory of artistic labour on the basis of a very ambitious religious metaphysic."

How exactly did Maritain go about connecting "artistic labour" to a "religious metaphysic"? Why did he believe that artists (more specifically, modern artists) and theologians (more specifically, modern theologians) had a great deal to say to one another? In short, because they were engaged in a similar task: trying to show how the

everyday, physical world, when seen properly, is shot through with radiance and harmony, *claritas* and *consonantia*; how materiality has a radical openness to that which simultaneously exceeds and sustains it; how the immanent is the route to the transcendent.⁸ In *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry*, Maritain wrote that true art is always fractured and incomplete because it can never fully contain the perfect vision that it seeks. It always possesses "that kind of imperfection through which infinity wounds the finite." Both the theologian and the poet inevitably reach a moment when words fail, when the vision so exceeds its expression that an admission of defeat becomes the best and only way to express that vision. On the poetic side, we might think of Eliot's "Burnt Norton," where we hear that "Words strain, / Crack and some" times break, under the burden?" On the theological side, we might think of a claim by the transcendental Thomist Karl Rahner: "Every theological statement is only truly and authentically such at the point at which one willingly allows it to extend beyond his comprehension into the silent mystery of God."

In both instances, words fall short of the Word (whether that means poetic truth or divine revelation), yet this falling short is the only means by which the Word and its mysteries might be approached. Maritain wrote that Cézanne, like other modern artists, was "obdurately and desperately intent on that bound, buried significance of visible things": obdurate because, in modern times, the world didn't seem to offer up hints of divine transcendence quite as easily as it once had done; desperate because this transcendence was necessary if one were to find meaning in existence. The modern theologian was likewise aware of the importance and impossibility of the theological task, and Maritain believed that this shared sense of desperate obduracy meant that the one discipline could—indeed, should—learn from the other. For Maritain, the relationship between literature and theology was not antithetical, as Samuel Johnson claimed, but dialectical: theology tests itself against literature, literature against theology, and the two disciplines are the richer for it.



Jacques Maritain

Taking Theology Seriously

In this volume, I argue that Maritain's hoped-for conversation between literature and Christian theology did in fact occur in the years between the two world wars and that this relationship is a long-overlooked but crucial part of the literary and intellectual history of the period. In the 1930s and 1940s, poets read theologians (and oftentimes wrote about them in essays and reviews), and theologians read poets (and reflected upon them in their own writing). Marianne Moore recommended the work of the Swiss Reformed theologian Karl Barth to Elizabeth Bishop and urged Ezra Pound to read Reinhold Niebuhr; David Jones cited Maritain's *Art and Scholasticism* as a formative influence and looked to *Mysterium Fidei*, Maurice de la Taille's 1921 work of sacramental theology, to help structure his epic poem *The Anathemata*; and W. H. Auden wrote poems in response to Reinhold Niebuhr's theological irony and to Paul Tillich's concept of *kairos*. It is telling that when T. S. Eliot, one of literary modernism's savviest marketers, was trying to drum up interest in the *Criterion* in 1927, he decided to start a controversy over, of all things, the theology of Thomas Aquinas.

That was the kind of world in which modernist poetry was written—a world in which debates over Thomism could grace the pages of a literary review, and in which such debates were thought to be an enticement to potential readers. Several of the period's most important poets regularly read, reviewed, and responded to contemporary Christian theology, and this reading, reviewing, and responding helped to shape the period's very understanding of poetry. That is to say, an important strand of modern British poetry understood itself in and through the theological questions of the time. Karl Barth asked, what is divine transcendence, and how can we truthfully reason and write about it? Jacques Maritain asked, what is the nature of the sacramental, and how does its wedding of the material and the immaterial, the immanent and the transcendent, inform the aesthetic act? Reinhold Niebuhr asked, how should we understand temporal experience, and how can we relate the City of God to the City of Man, eternity to history? For many poets, to write modern poetry was to consider such questions, and to consider such questions was to enter contemporary theological debate.

For a long time, critics tended to treat modernism as primarily secular in nature. This has begun to change in recent years, with scholars emphasizing how Virginia Woolf, Joyce, Pound, and other modernists were haunted by Christianity's cultural traces despite their own lack of belief. Still, these critics tend to argue that, when modernists talk about a religious or theological concept, they are actually talking about something else. When Eliot talks about God, for instance, he is actually talking about the social and intellectual order that belief in God might provide; when Woolf discusses the soul, she really just means the self; when Joyce mentions the Eucharist, he just has the work of art in mind.

John Milbank summarizes this style of thinking nicely. In this "modern mode of suspicion, the problem was, 'isn't religion really x?'. An x which is more basic, though concealed. Isn't it really a function of social control, really a means of

discipline for production, really an aspect of the psyche's suppression of the unacceptable?" In this conception, the modernist scholar becomes a decoder, telling us what religion *really* was about for the modernists. But what if we take a radically different tack? What if we assume that, when Eliot talks about a theological term like the Incarnation, he really is talking about the Incarnation; that, for Eliot, the Incarnation is not a concept to be decoded but a concept to be explored on its own theological grounds; that, in writing poetry about the Incarnation, Eliot is taking a serious theological idea seriously?

This is not, of course, to say that thinking about the Incarnation means not thinking about things like politics or aesthetics. Since to be human is to be a political and aesthetic animal, belief in the Incarnation must influence politics and aesthetics. What I am suggesting, then, is a shift in emphasis. For Eliot, the Incarnation specifically and Christian theology generally entailed certain ideas

about aesthetics, but that did not mean that theology was ultimately reducible to aesthetics. By reading theology as theology, Eliot believed, we wrestle with God's ultimately unknowable nature—and, in doing so, we necessarily begin to think about how this divine mystery influences art, physical embodiment, and other aspects of human life. Indeed, part of what Eliot and other modern poets so admired about Christian theology was its



David Jones

comprehensiveness—how "God talk," *theo-logos*, has implications for human creativity and practice more generally.

The writers that I consider in this book—T. S. Eliot, W. H. Auden, and David Jones—reacted against what they saw as the emotivism of nineteenth-century religious liberals such as Friedrich Schleiermacher. Instead, these poets emphasized religious thinking over religious feeling. (Or, in the case of Eliot most obviously, they emphasized that religious thinking could be its own form of religious feeling.) They were unembarrassed by theology's epistemological and ontological claims. For them, religion involved intellectual *and* emotional assent, doctrinal articulation *and* ritual practice. In fact, it was largely theology's objective claims about sin and the meaning of human history that so appealed to a group of writers who had grown weary of

the fractured subjectivism of early and high modernism. We might even read this poetic interest in the ideas of Christian theology as a reaction against high modernism's absolute elevation of form over content and subjective experience over objective truth claims. Just as modern theology seemed to these poets a way out of the navel-gazing of nineteenth-century religious liberalism, so their own poetry would show self-reflexivity and theological speculation, aesthetic form and intellectual exploration, working hand in hand.

In 1918, Eliot famously claimed that Henry James "had a mind so fine that no idea could violate it." Eliot wasn't saying that James lacked ideas: in the same paragraph, he goes on to claim that James "is the most intelligent man of his generation." Rather, he was arguing that James would never be so clumsy as to express these ideas directly or to let them "run wild and pasture on the emotions." In James's novels, ideas arose from, and seemed embodied by, form itself. By the 1930s, though, Eliot and the other figures I treat were attempting a delicate balancing act: to reclaim ideas—more specifically, theological ideas—as a direct object of literary representation, while refusing to scrap the formal innovations of modernism. In other words, they wanted both Jamesian fineness and theological content; they wanted a literature of ideas that was also modernist. I call the work that resulted from such a desire "theological modernism": a body of poetry that is both theological (it considers, enlivens, and explores theological concepts such as revelation and eschatological hope) and modernist (it employs the forms and tropes of modern poetry).

Why Theology? Why Modernism?

If theology was so important to modernist poetry, why has it been ignored for so long? Part of this is because of the long critical tendency to see the modernist period as one in which God is finally put to rest and to see all modernist interest in religion as truly an interest in aesthetics. Stephen Dedalus in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* famously makes this conflation of the aesthetic and the religious explicit when he declares the artist "like the God of the creation," "within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork." Even when Stephen mentions Thomas Aquinas, it is to outline an aesthetic theory rather than to engage theological issues per se: "Aquinas says: *ad pulcritudinem tria requiruntur, integritas, consonantia, claritas*. I translate it so: *Three things are needed for beauty, wholeness, harmony, and radiance.*"

Scholars of modernism have followed Stephen's lead in translating the religious into aesthetic terms ever since.⁶² The narrative here is familiar. God/metaphysics dies and the modernist artist steps into the breach, giving meaning to existence through the well-wrought urn of the aesthetic object or through the aesthetic mode itself. God isn't so much killed off as replaced by something else.⁶³ But such an approach ignores the crucial fact that many modern poets did not see any such substitutionary logic at play in their own work or thinking. For them, theological questions needed to be approached as theological questions, and so, if we want to be good historicists, we likewise have to take seriously the intellectual enterprise of Christian theology.

In taking theology as seriously as the modernists took it, this book looks both to the institutions and to individual works of interwar poetry. In Chapter 2, I reconstruct the regular

presence of theological discussions within the networks formed by interwar literary periodicals—so regular a presence that, I argue, to be a reader of modernist magazines meant to be a reader of

contemporary theological debates. Eliot's *Criterion*, for instance, often seemed as much a theological review as a literary magazine: the works of Karl Barth, Jacques Maritain, and Reinhold Niebuhr were reviewed regularly and with great sophistication, and contributors included prominent neo-Thomist theologians and philosophers like Etienne Gilson, Martin D'Arcy, and Maritain himself. In each subsequent chapter, I pair a writer with a theologian or theologians: Eliot with Barth; Jones with Maritain and Maurice de la Taille; and Auden with Niebuhr, Kierkegaard, and Charles Williams.

These pairings are determined not only by intellectual affinities, though these exist. Nor are they based on stylistic similarities (though a case could be made that, as *The Waste Land* is the great poetic expression of the modernist movement, so Barth's *Epistle to the Romans* is its great theological expression). Rather, in each case the pairing is grounded in personal, though not merely personal, connections. Eliot knew Barth's theology, having helped introduce it to the English-speaking literary world through his editing of the *Criterion*. Jones thanked de la Taille in the acknowledgments of *The Anathemata* and concluded his most direct analysis of the relationship between aesthetics and theology, the 1955 essay "Art and Sacrament," with a quotation from *Mysterium Fidei*. Auden counted Reinhold and Ursula Niebuhr among his closest friends in the United States and claimed that Charles Williams's "personal sanctity," his incapability of "doing or thinking anything base or unloving," helped bring about Auden's own return to the Christian faith.

Moreover, each chapter goes beyond a mere comparison or historical narrative to engage with large-scale questions—about poetic form and intellectual history, about the material circulation of texts and the publics they create. In



Charles Williams

Chapter 2, this question is: Can theology speak across confessional boundaries? In other words, what can an Anglo-Catholic learn from Protestant theology? It also considers what is at stake in thinking about theology not merely as a series of propositions but also as discourse, as a particular kind of language deployed in reviews, essays, and poetry, and how interwar periodicals like the *Criterion* cultivated both a certain kind of literary reader and a certain kind of theological reader. Chapter 3 asks, what is the relationship between nature and grace, between time and eternity, and how does the notion of revelation affect Christian poetic

practice? Chapter 4 asks, what is the nature of sacrament, and how does this relate to the broader project of human sign-making? Chapter 5 asks, what is the relationship between theology and history, and how can irony, as both a mode and a style, serve as the basis for an affirmative poetics and theology?

The answers that each poet offers to these questions vary. Auden, for instance, saw theology primarily as a critical tool, showing up the pretenses of modern liberalism, whereas Eliot saw the "eternal scheme" of Christianity as offering a coherent "framework of mythology and theology and philosophy" for understanding the world. But what these theological modernists all agreed upon was that theology spoke to many of their own formal and thematic concerns. It was, as Eliot put it, "the one most exciting and adventurous subject left for a jaded mind."

Coda

An entirely different study could have been written about modernism's engagement with non-Christian religion. Indeed, many such studies have been written.

The influence of non-Christian religion on modernism was real and lasting, and to argue for the importance of Reinhold Niebuhr to Auden's late poetry, for instance, is not to say that Martin Buber was unimportant. But there was something particular and compelling about Christian theology for the figures I consider. After all, while their greatest religious poems occasionally alluded to Eastern texts and religions, they centered on things like the Incarnation and the Eucharist—on specifically Christian doctrines and concepts that they read and thought about through the work of Karl Barth, Maurice de la Taille, and others. Christian theology was not the only religious discourse these poets were interested in, but it was the religious discourse that they read most regularly and deeply, and it was the religious discourse that proved most important in their formation as poets and believers.

Finally, what exactly is "theology"? How can we differentiate theology from other areas of religious study: philosophy of religion, for example, or the sociology of religion, or the aesthetics of religion? What marks Barth's claim that "the conception of an indirect revelation in nature, in history and in our self-consciousness is destroyed by the recognition of grace" as a distinctively theological statement?

Throughout, I take theology to mean the systematic investigation of revealed truths; it is the use of human reason to try to understand things beyond human understanding. So, whereas a sociologist might study what effects religious

belief have for communal identity and a historian might examine how religious beliefs affected political institutions in a particular period, a theologian asks, given that God has revealed himself in this world, what is religious belief? The theologian takes what she sees as revealed truth—Christ's atonement for humankind's sins, for instance—and builds outwards, using the tools of logic and dialectical reasoning: What other beliefs does belief in revealed truth entail? What kind of epistemology is necessary if we are to preserve belief in revealed truth? One way to describe the

difference would be to say that religious researchers—sociologists, historians, and political philosophers—study people devoted to God; theologians study God and, given God's nature, articulate what devotion to God should look like.

Even with this relatively narrow definition in place, though, "theology" can be a slippery term. It is safe to say that a papal encyclical or a monograph published by a professor of theology would qualify as "theology." But what of a magazine article that discusses the Incarnation and its effects on artistic creation? or a generalist writing on the relationship between faith and reason? Given these gray areas, it might seem more appropriate to talk about "theological discourse" than about "theology"; to talk about the deployment of language about sin, salvation, and the nature of religious belief not just in work that is recognizable as "theology" (Barth's *Epistle to the Romans*, for instance) but also in various genres and publishing contexts—poetry, novels, reviews, essays, popular music, radio addresses.

I choose to use the word "theology" throughout this book, however, for two primary reasons. First, because the concept of "theology" as its own well-defined, intellectually



Karl Barth and Emil Brunner

rigorous discipline, set off from sociological or aesthetic understandings of religion and religious experience, was important to Eliot, Auden, and Jones. These modern poets prided themselves on being readers of theology, in large part because the term "theology" meant for them not just a body of work but a distinctive way of approaching religion: through the intellect and through doctrine. Second, I use the term "theology" because using it helps maintain the distinction between the theology that Eliot, Auden, and Jones were reading and the poetry that they were writing. These writers would have been happy to say that they wrote "theological poetry," but they would have resisted any attempt to describe their poetry as "theology." The border between poetry and theology is sometimes hard to locate in a work like *Four Quartets* or *The Anathemata*. But it is there, and part of the purpose of this project is to chart the points at which these two discourses mix, mingle, and ultimately part ways.

"A Poetics of Belief"

On October 16, 1926, the *Nation and Athenaeum*, a British politics and culture magazine then edited by John Maynard Keynes, published the results of a survey of "the state of religious belief" among its readers.¹ A little over twenty-three years later, in February 1950, the *Partisan Review*, an American politics and culture magazine then edited by Philip Rahv and others, also published the results of a survey, this time of a select group of writers and thinkers, on the dramatic increase in "the number of intellectuals professing religious sympathies, beliefs, or doctrines." These two surveys, the first published at the very height of high modernism and the second at a moment when modernism had begun to give way to something different, tell a fascinating story about the persistence of religious doctrine among the cultured elite; about the increasing respect given to religion as an intellectually defensible—and not simply sociologically interesting—object of study; and about the increasing contact between literary and theological circles in the 1930s and 1940s.

The first survey attempted to gauge the "state of religious belief" among "educated moderns" (more specifically, among the readers of the *Nation and Athenaeum*); the second canvassed a much more select group—individually chosen figures such as Clement Greenberg, Hannah Arendt, Marianne Moore, and W. H. Auden—in an attempt to discern just why there had appeared a "new turn toward religion among intellectuals and the growing disfavor with which secular attitudes and perspectives are now regarded in not a few circles that lay claim to the leadership of culture."⁴ The *Nation and Athenaeum* asked respondents a series of simple, yes-or-no questions about religious belief: "Do you believe in a personal God?" for instance, and "Do you believe in transubstantiation?" It also asked about religious practice: "Do you voluntarily attend any religious service regularly?"⁵ The *Partisan Review* asked a series of open-ended questions—"What has happened to make religion more credible than it formerly was to the modern mind?"—and asked for long, "discursive comment" in response.

Two surveys, then, of two very different populations with two very different goals. The *Nation and Athenaeum* wanted to determine to what extent the reading public continued to hold certain religious beliefs. The magazine reported the survey's results in a chart with four columns: one for the question,

one for the number of yes responses, one for no's, and one for "doubtful or no answer." The survey showed that even "educated moderns" continued to hold religious beliefs in surprising numbers. When asked, "Do you believe in a personal God?" 743 respondents said yes, 1,024 said no, and 82 said they were doubtful or did not give an answer. The magazine also printed a second chart, which reported the results of the same questionnaire being sent to the readers of the *Daily News*. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the wider circulation newspaper had a more faithful readership: to the question of belief in a personal God, 9,991 said yes, 3,686 said no, and 366 did not answer.

If the *Nation and Athenaeum* was most interested in a quantitative description of religious belief, then the *Partisan*

Review was most interested in an interpretative description. The *Nation and Athenaeum* wanted to determine the fact of religious belief: how many people believed and how many people did not. The *Partisan Review* wanted to determine the reasons for continued religious belief among the most intelligent, cultured groups. Jacques Maritain's response to being asked whether there might be a "valuable religious consciousness that can be maintained without an explicit credo postulating the supernatural" is typical: "For religion is nothing, or less than nothing, if it does not convey *truth* to us. And there is no attainment of truth if not by means of definite beliefs. Emotional or behavioristic religion, using philosophical or literary aspirin to relieve the lofty anxieties of the superego, is not worth considering. It is but an ersatz concocted by pride: for to obey divine Truth speaking to man and in man is exactly what gods like [Malraux and Heidegger] cannot accept." Maritain rejects, clearly and absolutely, any pragmatic account of religion. For him, religious belief must live or die by the truthfulness of its propositions, not by its usefulness. In Maritain's view, religion without content, without specific, doctrinal claims, is not really religion at all but a psychological and social palliative constructed by humanity to relieve its existential anxieties.

As I argue throughout, Maritain's claim—that religion is not something to be used but something to be believed in; that religion is not just "emotional" but also intellectual and



W. H. Auden

doctrinal—was something that interwar poets accepted wholeheartedly. For them, contemporary Christian theology proved such an exciting discipline because it concerned itself with arguing rigorously about matters of the gravest importance: the relationship between transcendence and immanence; the meaning of human history; the nature of temporal experience.

Eliot, Jones, and Auden did not always—even often—agree on what theology had to say about these issues. Eliot admired theologians like Karl Barth, who emphasized the frightening abyss separating divine transcendence from creaturely embodiment, while Auden looked to Charles Williams for an account of how the erotic and the divine, the bodily and the godly, might relate to each other. Jones

A man with short grey hair and glasses, wearing a black clerical jacket over a light blue shirt, is shown in profile, looking towards the right. In the background, there is a religious painting in an arched frame depicting the Resurrection, with Jesus Christ standing and holding a white cloth, set against a blue background with a yellow halo.

her own writing: one of her characters, John Ames in *Gilead*, even thinks that

But in each of these instances, theological interest is largely a matter of personal, idiosyncratic

taste. Robinson is regularly hailed as an anachronism, sharing more stylistically and philosophically with nineteenth-century Transcendentalists than with her own contemporaries, and while Updike's lyrical realism influenced many writers in the 1970s and 1980s, few, if any, picked up his love of neo-Orthodoxy. And all of these writers look not to the present but to the *past* for their theological reading: Wiman refers to Barth and Tillich but rarely to his contemporaries; Hill looks even further back. When thinking and writing theologically, these writers look to a former time.

[illegible]

In a recent book, Wiman outlines what he takes to be the needs of twenty-first-century believers: "We need a poetics of belief, a language capacious enough to include a mystery that, ultimately, defeats it, and sufficiently intimate and inclusive to serve not only as individual expression but as communal need."¹⁰ In the 1930s and 1940s, there was what Wiman calls a "poetics of belief"—the sense that real theology had to acknowledge and rejoice in the mystery of belief, in the ultimate frustration all humans must face when trying to reason or write about God. But there was also a theology of poetry—the sense that poetry, and not just individual poets, had something to learn from contemporary theological inquiry. Belief *with* content—specific theological claims about things like the Incarnation and the Eucharist—helped shape what interwar poets thought about the efficacy and sufficiency of human language and the meaning of time and history. For a brief and surprising moment, Christian theology provoked and sustained poetic exploration.

⌘ ⌘

There is fast-growing awareness of the role atmospheres play in architecture. Of equal interest to contemporary architectural practice as it is to aesthetic theory, this

'atmospheric turn' owes much to the work of the German philosopher Gernot Böhme.

Interest in sensory atmospheres and architectural and urban ambiances has been growing for over 30 years. A key figure in this field is acclaimed German philosopher Gernot Böhme whose influential conception of what atmospheres are and how they function has been only partially available to the English-speaking public. This translation of key essays along with an original introduction charts the development of Gernot Böhme's philosophy of atmospheres and how it can be applied in various contexts such as scenography, commodity aesthetics, advertising, architecture, design, and art.

The phenomenological analysis of atmospheres has proved very fruitful and its most important, and successful, application has been within aesthetics. The material background of this success may be seen in the ubiquitous aestheticization of our lifeworld, or from another perspective, of the staging of everything, every event and performance. The theory of atmospheres becoming an aesthetic theory thus reveals the theatrical, not to say manipulative, character of politics, commerce, of the event-society. But, taken as a positive theory of certain phenomena, it offers new perspectives on architecture, design, and art. It made the spatial and the experience of space and places a central subject and hence rehabilitated the ephemeral in the arts. Taking its numerous impacts in many fields together, it initiated a new humanism: the individual as a living person and his or her perspective are taken seriously, and this fosters the ongoing democratization of culture, in particular the possibility for everybody to participate in art and its works.

Atmospheric Architectures: The Aesthetics of Felt Spaces by Gernot Böhme, edited, translated by A.-Chr. Engels-Schwarzpaul, [Bloomsbury Academic, 9781474258081]

Atmospheric Architectures: The Aesthetics of Felt Spaces brings together Böhme's most seminal writings on the subject, through chapters selected from his classic books and articles, many of which have hitherto only been available in German. This is the only translated version authorised by Böhme himself, and is the first coherent collection deploying a consistent terminology. It is a work which will provide rich references and a theoretical framework for ongoing discussions about atmospheres and their relations to architectural and urban spaces. Combining philosophy with architecture, design, landscape design, scenography, music, art criticism, and visual arts, the essays together provide a key to the concepts that motivate the work of some of the best contemporary architects, artists, and theorists: from Peter Zumthor, Herzog & de Meuron and Juhani Pallasmaa to Olafur Eliasson and James Turrell.

With a foreword by Professor Mark Dorrian (Forbes Chair in Architecture, Edinburgh College of Art) and an afterword by Professor David Leatherbarrow, (Chair of the Graduate

Group in Architecture, University of Pennsylvania), the volume also includes a general introduction to the topic, including coverage of its history, development, areas of application and conceptual apparatus.

Excerpt:

The aesthetic theory of atmospheres: Historical background

As to me, I first introduced the concept of atmosphere in my German book *Towards an Ecological Aesthetics*.¹ The point of the book was a critique of scientific ecology and a plea to introduce the human factor into the science of environment. Our main interest, I argued, was not in the natural interrelatedness of nature as such, but in our own environment, i.e. in human beings. This interest on the general scope must lead to a social—natural science. But the main concern of the book was to introduce the aesthetic perspective into the science of ecology: what affects human beings in their environment are not only just natural factors but also aesthetic ones.

If you do not feel well in an environment, the reason might not be a toxic agent in the air but aesthetic impressions.

For example: again and again the population of my home town, the city of Darmstadt, complained saying "There is a bad smell in the air." The origin supposed was the production site of Merck, a big chemical and pharmaceutical company. Well, the scientists of Merck made an investigation the outcome of which was: no toxic substances in the air. No toxins, no problem. But there was a problem: the inhabitants of Darmstadt "did not feel well."

This "feeling well or not" in a certain environment clearly is an indicator of the aesthetic qualities of it. This is the point where aesthetics come into ecology. The elements of the environment are not only causal factors which affect human beings as organisms but they produce an impression on their feeling (*Befindlichkeit*). And what mediates objective factors of the environment with aesthetic feelings of a human being is what we call atmosphere. The atmosphere of a certain environment is responsible for the way we feel about ourselves in that environment.

Atmosphere is what relates objective factors and constellations of the environment with my bodily feeling in that environment. This means: atmosphere is what is in between, what mediates the two sides. Two main traits of the theory of atmospheres arise from this. Namely, first, that atmosphere is something in between subject and object and can therefore be approached in two different ways: either from a perception aesthetics or a production aesthetics viewpoint. Atmospheres are quasi-objective, namely they are out



Gernot Böhme

there; you can enter an atmosphere and you can be surprisingly caught by an atmosphere. But on the other hand atmospheres are not beings like things; they are nothing without a subject feeling them. They are subjective facts in the sense of Hermann Schmitz: to talk about atmospheres, you must characterize them by the way they affect you. They tend to bring you into a certain mood, and the way you name them is by the character of that mood. The atmosphere of a room may be oppressive, the atmosphere of a valley may be joyful. But on the other side you can argue about atmospheres and you even can agree with others about what sort of atmosphere is present in a certain room or landscape. Thus, atmospheres are quasi-objective or something existent intersubjectively.

But, as mentioned, you can approach the phenomenon of atmospheres not only from the side of perception aesthetics but also from that of productions aesthetics. Therefore stage design is a kind of a paradigm for the whole theory and practice of atmospheres: you can learn from a stage designer what means are necessary in order to produce a certain climate or atmosphere on the stage: what the sound should be like, how the stage is illuminated, what materials, colors, objects, signs should be used, and in what way should the space of the stage itself be arranged. The art of stage setting again proves that atmospheres are something quasi-objective. Namely, if each member of the audience were to perceive the climate of the stage in a different way, the whole endeavor of stage setting would be useless.

The origin of the term atmosphere and its original use as a concept in science and humanities

The term atmosphere was originally used within meteorological contexts. Here it designated the upper part of the air mantling the earth. But since the eighteenth-century atmosphere was used as metaphor describing a certain mood hanging in the air. The mediating link obviously is the weather: the weather is affecting my mood — a rising thunderstorm may frighten me, bright weather may raise my spirits.

Today atmosphere may be defined briefly as tuned space, i.e. a space with a certain mood. From here two more traits of the theory of atmospheres can be advanced: atmospheres are always something spatial, and atmospheres are always something emotional.

We talk about atmospheres by naming their characteristics. These are their tendencies to modify my own mood. The serious atmosphere of a gathering may make me serious; the melancholic atmosphere of garden scenery may make me melancholic.

The first scientific use of the term atmosphere in this sense is to be found in Hubert Tellenbach's book *Geschmack und Atmosphäre*. This book, which actually deals with the sphere of the oral, uses the term in particular for the smell of the nest: atmosphere is what makes you feel at home. This book is of lasting value for the theory of atmospheres because it links the natural with the cultural realm. Atmosphere is something which affects us deeply, that means on the level of bodily feeling.

Later the concept of atmosphere was elaborated by the so-called new phenomenology, in particular by its founder Hermann Schmitz. He conceives of atmospheres as being overwhelming emotional powers, or — as he sees it — quasi-objective feelings. He was influenced by the research on the numinous as carried out by Rudolf Otto.

Applications of the concept of atmospheres

Scenography

We mentioned already the art of stage setting could be used as a paradigm for the theory of atmosphere. Here, long before anybody thought of atmospheres, a practice of soliciting atmospheres was developed: stage setters knew how to produce a certain mood, or — as they call it — a certain climate on the stage. So, what can to be learned from the tradition of stage setting is:

- Atmospheres can be produced.
- Atmospheres are something out there, quasi-objective.
- Atmospheres are produced by certain agents or factors, by sound and illumination, but also by the geometry of a room, by signs, pictures, etc.



Rudolf Otto

But the art of stage setting is sort of tacit knowledge; you would be hard pressed to find a book telling you how and by what means a certain atmosphere can be to produced. This is why a book seemingly from a quite different strand must be mentioned, namely C. C. L. Hirschfield's theory of English gardening.⁶ This book obviously is inspired by the world of the theater. Thus Hirschfield talks about natural scenery and of the emotional character of it — what we would refer to as its atmosphere. But what is important is that he gives detailed instruction as to what sort of trees and

other plants a certain mood may produce, how the light falling through the leaf must be, how the murmur of the brooks, whether the sight must be open or closed; in short, he talks about atmospheres like an artisan who knows to make them.

This leads us to an extension of the field: stage design might be a useful paradigm of producing atmospheres, but today it is much better to talk of scenography. Under this very old term a new discipline is developing, the job of which is staging of everything: this might be political, sportive, or cultural events. The point is that these human practices are

no longer performed, as such, but must be set in scene, performed in a certain frame, celebrated in a way. Politics before the camera, sportive competitions as a festival; and the presentation of artworks must take place within a certain setting, a certain arrangement and illumination. One of the earliest fields of this type of extended scenography is the staging of commodities. The origin of this was located by Walter Benjamin within the arcades of nineteenth-century Paris. Today it is not only the single commodity what is on stage, but the brand must be staged, if possible presented as a whole world. The Nike-World is an example of this endeavor, but other brands like Joop or Dior might be even more extended, covering a strand of commodities far beyond the original.

Commodity aesthetics

The concept of commodity aesthetics was introduced by Wolfgang Fritz Haug. But his book concentrated particularly on the packaging of commodities, how they were presented in the marketplace. Since his time, we have seen an extension of commodity aesthetics into the fields of production and consumption.

The most impressive example of the first is Volkswagen's production of the Phaeton automobile in Dresden. In a corner of the Great Baroque Garden they built the so-called Gläserne Manufaktur — this may be translated as "production site in the shop window display."⁹ In this huge glass building visitors can watch how the Phaeton is finished in the assembly line. The whole process is celebrated in a glamorous environment like a church ceremony.

The other field of extended commodity aesthetics is consumption. Whereas in Haug's book the aesthetics of the commodity is its packaging, which is soon discarded, now we notice that the aesthetic outfit of the commodity has a function in the realm of consumption. The first step in this direction was noticed by Jean Baudrillard: the commodity got a function as a status symbol. Today many commodities are not really used in a literal sense, but they get their use-value merely as ingredients of a certain lifestyle of the user.

This development was the reason why I began talking about an aesthetic economy. Commodities are valued in the aesthetic economy where they now merely satisfy basic needs; for their staging-value, they are valued to the extent that they help individuals or groups to stage their lifestyles. Here commodities have their use-value; a means of producing a certain atmosphere. This gives us a reason to



talk about a new type of commodity value besides the Marxian use-value and exchange-value, namely to attribute the new type of stage-value to commodities.

Advertising

This new use of commodities, namely to produce an atmosphere, caused a shift in advertising. Whereas traditional advertising, say, from the nineteenth century up to the first half of the twentieth century represented commodities as well made and useful, contemporary advertising does not present the commodities as such but rather a scene within which they have a certain function, namely contributing to an atmosphere. So, you might notice a bottle of Beck's beer in the hand of a member of a sailing crew, or a Vuitton bag in an outdoor picnic scene. The appeal of advertising is not to a customer who wants to make use of a commodity but to somebody who wants to be embedded into a certain atmosphere of life. This also means customers want to belong to a certain group; they want to distinguish themselves from the crowd by association with a certain lifestyle. Thus, the aesthetics of atmospheres in advertising means that commodities are not presented as things which are useful within a certain practice but as signs which help to produce a certain atmosphere in life.

Architecture and design

One of the main applications of the aesthetic theory of atmospheres is architecture and design. Architecture and design have always produced atmospheres, but the thinking about architecture mainly concentrated on buildings and their visual representation; and thinking about design concentrated on the form or shape of things. This type of thinking came to its peak with Bauhaus modernity and found adequate expression in the slogan "form follows function." But since the turn to

postmodernity we have a new humanism in both fields and that means that the way we experience buildings and the surroundings, how we feel as visitors or people who live there, comes to the fore. In the theory of design, the situation is comparable: it is not only the function or, say, the use-value of things which is at stake, but what sort of impression the objects make. It is necessary to observe that this turn has something to do with the transformation of capitalism into an aesthetic economy.

changing approach to voice in democracy. Examples from many other poets—including Walt Whitman, T. S. Eliot, Elizabeth Bishop, and Wallace Stevens—arise throughout the book, and the final chapter offers a consideration of how contemporary writers find form for what George Oppen called “the meaning of being numerous.”

Connecting insights to philosophy of language and to recent work in concepts of community, *The Plural of Us* shows how poetry raises vital questions—literary and social—about how we speak of our togetherness.

Excerpt: Poetry is the expression of individuals, prompted by experience and imagination to record their feelings, their ideas, their fears and desires. It also springs from culture and community. The poet presumes, or at least hopes, that his expression speaks for others, that what he feels and thinks is not merely personal but shared, representative, even universal. And the thoughts and aspirations the poet presents from his individual perspective are not only those of the private and inward self. They may concern his interpersonal and social relations, or his participation in the common, which is established in his

remains interrogative, collaborative, improvisatory, invitational, and above all in the optative mood. As a reader, I meet Whitman's vision on my own terms, not by the assent of the group or the necessity of logic. Whitman's closing questions emerge from the acknowledgment of deep paradoxes concerning the one and the many—paradoxes of democracy and of poetry. At the very end of “Crossing Brooklyn Poetry, more than any other genre, when it wrestles with political and ethical concerns, does so within the arena of language. Though linguists seldom venture into the special realm of literature, their questions and insights about the function of pronouns help foreground the opportunities that poets exploit. Whatever the historical setting, “we” is an ambiguous pronoun in English. Just as each of us is connected to many overlapping and conflicting units and communities, so we mean lots of things by “we,” depending on context. “We” is an indexical pronoun, a deictic floater like “here” and “now.” There is of course a referential meaning of sorts—more like a kind of aura around the word. It means the speaker (or a character the speaker is pretending to be) and at least one other. But that formula doesn't get us very far. Some languages distinguish



address to the reader. How the poet makes use of the first-person plural may tell us a lot about how he imagines his intimate, social, and artistic relations. “We” can be partisan, tribal, authoritarian, and even demagogic. Yet many of our greatest poets have often meant by “we” “not the collective singular We of tradition” but rather an open-ended “You-and-I united by a common truth” or at least together “seeking truth to which we shall both be compelled to assent”; they have said “we” to create community rather than to divide groups or impose majority.’

As Walt Whitman ends his long poem “Crossing Brooklyn Ferry,” he poses a set of rhetorical questions. “We understand then, do we not? / What I promis'd without mentioning it, have you not accepted?” How many are included in this “we”—one or a multitude? Does Whitman speak as an intimate or as an orator? Is the reader included in this group, or is she overhearing an address to someone else? Is the assent here merely intellectual and emotional, or is it also implicitly political? With Whitman the reader has richly and dialectically imagined the meaning of “we.” It

“we” that includes the listener and “we” that does not, but English is not among them. “We” in English can be bounded or unbounded. First-person plural might better be called first-person plus, where the second term of the equation $I + X = We$ needs to be solved. And the equation would also perhaps involve two forms, $I + X\text{-hearer} = We$, or $I + X + \text{hearer} = We$. “We” is sometimes weighted plural (an assemblage of individuated I's) and sometimes singular (a collective or corporate unit with a uniform identity or solidity). And perhaps most important for the lyric and its textual subjectivities, the “I” behind the “We” may be strongly present, almost inaudible, or without iteration. But as linguists interested in relevance theory have pointed out, speech is rarely explicit—it depends on the inferences listeners make, based on their expectations. For all the maxims of cooperative efficiency in conversation (quality, quantity, relation, manner) outlined by Paul Grice in “Logic and Conversation,” implication in the use of the first-person plural can be imprecise: we often don't really know exactly what others are saying when they say “we.” Exclusions and

inclusions are often unconscious, as Ivins and Baldwin are pointing out. The boundaries are at times unclear even to the speaker, which is why the ambiguity of deictic words works in a joke or a poem—two places where ambiguity has value. "We" is often hard to disambiguate, and readers and listeners tolerate a large area of confusion or uncertainty about the identity of "we" in a given sentence. Poetry can exploit that ambiguity to show us something about what it means to be or to say "we," and to stretch and revise that meaning.

"We" can register many different forms of togetherness. It can be royal or communal, universal or parochial, intimate or public, personal or impersonal, inclusive or exclusive, majestic, universal, or corporate, intellectual or social. But ambiguity is a virtue in poetry, if also sometimes a problem. Gertrude Stein in "Poetry and Grammar" preferred pronouns to nouns precisely because they indicate but do not fix identity, eliding past conceptions that attach to names, allowing for more open and immediate thought: "Pronouns represent some one but they are not its or his name. In not being his or its or her name they already have a greater possibility of being something than if they were as a noun is the name of anything."

The freedom that Stein identifies is a central motivation of many poets as they play with pronouns. Poetry is not just an imitation of the world, but in creating its own world of interactions, it sometimes models values and possibilities occluded in social reality. This need not be a didactic project. As Auden himself said, "poetry makes nothing happen." But he went on in the same poem to say that poetry is "a way of happening, a mouth." I follow him there in the sense that poetry performs and voices our deepest human relations. Poetry also exploits the oratorical power of "we"—as exhortation, as seduction, as tribal affiliation. My interest is not in presenting poetry as ethically exemplary—the faults of poets are the faults of us all. Rather, I am interested in how the poetry of Auden and others, in their use of the first-person plural, raises rhetorical and ethical problems and possibilities—implicitly and explicitly, inadvertently and deliberately.

Poets may not be the unacknowledged legislators of the world (Auden frequently expressed his disdain for Shelley's famous declaration), but many are certainly interested in the governance of the tongue. One of the functions of poetry is to play us back to ourselves, and it can test those little function words that shape our thought. Poetry, though we mostly associate it with "I," speaks often of or as "we," and not only the "we" ("us," "our") of private relations, since poetry's roots are partly in oratory. Yet criticism about the lyric has mostly overlooked poets' uses of the first-person plural, attending instead to "I" and "You." Lyric has been defined primarily as the genre of the individual, and hence of the first-person singular, though contemporary critics have turned to its social dimension in their attention to lyric

address. An I/You address often brings a "we" into being, both grammatically and in a more dramatic sense, and many poets keep the "I" and "You" audible even in speaking for the group. But it would be a mistake, I think, to treat the first-person plural simply as a byproduct of lyric address. For one thing, "we" in poetry often arises without a clear situation of address. And since a collective pronoun exists for that meeting of I and You, it would seem to point to something distinct, something at least potentially more than or different from the sum of its parts.

Wallace Stevens invokes this emergent unit in his "Final Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour," which is not final but recurrent in its sense of ultimate arrival, in which "we collect ourselves, / Out of

all the
indifferences, into
one thing" where
"we forget each
other and
ourselves."
Stevens's pronoun is
moving in its
ambiguity, linking
the private
experience of
poetic thought (the
lovers' space of a
"room" and the
narrower
individual's space
of "the mind" and



Wallace Stevens

imagination) with the social experience of love and potential community." Is this the usurpation of everything by a single mind, a form of the royal we? Such a reading would link Stevens back to Matthew Arnold's ideal where man's soul is "centered in majestic unity." Or is Stevens suggesting a loss of self in the collective "one thing" that, for the poem, exists externally and potentially in "the evening air" and as an optative "world imagined"? "We say, "out of, and other phrases hover between these meanings and others. This intimate encounter within the space of literature, this textual "we" with its unlocalized "here," would seem to have little to do with actual social relations—might even appear antagonistic toward the social. But it can posit connections that history has restricted, and it can imagine a reality—a future—less fragmented than the one we live in. As Holocaust survivor Paul Celan observed, echoing the persecuted Russian poet Osip Mandelstam's "To the Addressee," a poem "can be a message in a bottle, sent out in the—not always greatly hopeful—belief that somewhere and sometime, it could wash up on land, on heartland perhaps. Poems in this sense ... are under way: they are making toward something. The "you" of poetry, then, is propulsive, making its way toward "we," acknowledging a distance from the other but wishing for a union. Poems can make "we" happen in fictive or readerly time, even if it is blocked in history! In Celan's beautiful poem "In Memoriam Paul Eluard," for instance, he recalls the French poet's St. Peter-like ethical failure when he denied his friendship with poet Zavas Kalandra before a Stalinist tribunal. The poem redeems him by looking beyond death to a "stranger" and

deeper "blue" of the soul, and by uttering and making us utter what Eluard failed to say: "the one who said Thou to him / will dream with him: We." Poems can be "making toward" a potential alliance, a group, even a community—because poetry deals in possible worlds rather than simply representing history.

The connections that form "we" above are private and intimate, but they are not ultimately separate from the civil impulse of poetry. The paradox of poetry, that it is often a private communication but also often an unrestricted and open-invitational one, not only overheard but also indirectly addressed to many if not all, makes the "we" of poetry peculiarly layered. But as criticism has stressed the "I" and "you" of lyric, it has overlooked the shared, collaborative, or generalized subjectivity that may be confrontational and oppositional but may also create a space for "we" to happen. This flexibility and ambiguity in the referential boundaries of the first-person plural allows "we" in poetry to be at once a singular meditation ("in the mind") and a space of shared, even common experience, and a granulated meeting of I's and You's. Whether directly addressing another person or group or representing that plural subject to outsiders, the poet's "we" conjures a complex and powerful unit of being for the reader.

Poetry thrives on the gaps and imprecisions of natural language and intensifies them even as it seeks clarity. The indexical indeterminacy of pronouns, their dependence on inference, creates a space for new meanings. The "we" of modern lyric evokes, often with deliberate elasticity and ambiguity, and sometimes with tension and contradiction, a range from intimate to public life, often within the same text, and sometimes even simultaneously. Elizabeth Bishop underscores this ambiguity with her quasi-epiphany near the end of "The Moose" when she writes: "why do we feel / (we all feel) this sweet / sensation of joy?" Who is included in this "we"? Is it the passengers on the bus from Nova Scotia to Boston, awakened from the drowsy rhythms of travel to behold this "grand, otherworldly" animal? Nameless, they are still individual voices. Is the reader included as well as the speaker? What about the moose that "looks the bus over"? Bishop's parenthesis, though it gathers and frames her words, paradoxically highlights the openness of the pronoun's inclusion and gives it extension beyond any direct reference in the poem. Poetry depicts small communities, those parentheses of our lives. But in using "we," poetry can also metonymically suggest broader gatherings so that the sense of the general does not withdraw from the particular into impersonal abstraction, or the local hide itself in a false universal. Poetry's "we" can be highly nuanced and variable, then, marking overlapping and concentric circles.

In celebrating Whitman and Pound, W. R. Johnson called for the renewal of "choral poetry": "What matters, for literary choral, is that the agent and the object of choral mimesis be present: the universal representative of the community singing for and to the community about the hopes and passion for order, survival, and continuity that they all share." He laments that since classical times the dominant mode has been the solo lyric, emerging from and speaking of alienation and fragmentation: not "wir und weld" but "ich und weld." But for many modern poets that "wir" was the

mantle for failed social orders and dangerous totalitarian impulses, carrying the presumption of a dominant group. Whitman may claim to speak for the unvoiced, but for much of literary tradition the male covered up the female voice. An inclusive "we" could not be so easily projected. In "Diving into the Wreck," Adrienne Rich refuses the "assiduous team" and dives alone, though once descended she discovers a faceted "we" within, a Jungian Unconscious, but also a potential social form that bends the first-person plural out of its patriarchal exclusions. "We are, I am, you are // ... the one who find our way." When Langston Hughes declares, "Let America be America Again," he begins with a singular voice, "M E," one that speaks for America's oppressed minorities. Yet like Baldwin he also exhorts a potential community, "We the people," and calls it into action to fulfill the nation's promise of inclusive diversity. The poet must, to invoke Whitman, be vigilant in creating a voice "differentiated yet a part of the whole." Modern poetry's "we" has sometimes been a hiding place for the embarrassed I. Yet if the drive to *communitas* comes and goes in the history of lyric, the desire not only to identify universals, but also to speak of them in the first-person plural, remains strong.

While function words such as pronouns don't have content in the usual sense, they do convey and perform social arrangements, and their use reflects changes in social awareness. In our age, sensitive to diversity and wary of coercive power structures, speaking for others is difficult.

Yet the first-person plural is a troublesome pronoun in any era. In a historical view of lyric subjectivity, the shifts in the first half of the twentieth century are especially marked. The problem of "we" as a functioning pronoun—referring to the group, or the common, or the artist's relation to the public—was central not only to the political but to the cultural conversation, especially in the years between the Depression and the end of World War II, when artists were drawn to solidarity and yet often horrified by emerging forms of authoritarian statism and collectivism. What did it mean in those years to speak for others, or for many to speak as one? Modernist poetry had formed in small avant-garde circles, but the culture of the



arts had shifted in the 1930s, looking beyond itself for its origin and justification. A subsequent age that emphasized collective ideologies, historical process, and public responsibility over aesthetics and individual consciousness put new pressures on the art world and fostered new reflections on voice, audience, and address. As collectivism led to division and debate in the thirties and forties, "we" became contested ground. Diverse thinkers emerged from

the thirties—Ortega, Burke, Wilson, Weil, Arendt, Niebuhr, and many others—to express concerns about the voice and spectacle of the masses and the weakening of individual voice and conscience.

The strong demand for poetry to offer "public speech" and invoke "the social muse" put the collective "we" in the foreground. Carl Sandburg confirmed Whitman's optimism with *The People, Yes*. The critic Cary Nelson has led a major recovery of protest poetry and proletarian poetry, highlighting writers of the thirties such as Kenneth Fearing, Edwin Rolfe, Genevieve Taggard, and Horace Gregory, who eschewed the poetry of aesthetics and interiority in favor of a public voice. The anthologies and critical studies of the period identified work in collective terms: Kreymborg's *A History of American Poetry: Our Singing Strength* (1934); the collective *We Gather Strength* (1933); H. H. Lewis's *We March Toward the Sun* (1936), Langston Hughes's *Let America Be America Again* (1938). There was certainly substantial resistance to this idea of poetry's role as public speech. Archibald MacLeish might declare a new set of imperatives for poetry, but Louise Bogan, writing to Rolfe Humphries on July 8, 1938, objects in capital letters: "I STILL THINK THAT POETRY HAS SOMETHING TO DO WITH IMAGINATION... I STILL THINK THAT IT IS PRIVATE PEELING, NOT PUBLIC SPEECH." Malcolm Cowley, editor of *The New Republic* from 1929 to 1944, puts the question "who is we?" directly at the beginning of a memoir of the thirties: "Great changes would surely take place and ...—most of us felt at one time or another—that it was our duty as writers to take part in them, at least by coming forward to bear witness. I say 'we' and 'us' while conscious of their being treacherous pronouns." But this is written in 1980, looking back at the 1930s.

The first-person plural was not only taken up by a left-leaning subgroup of social-realist writers. Agrarians, objectivists, and classical formalists complicate the account of poetic voice in the thirties. The major American modernists reimagined their art in this environment, altering their style and subject matter. Wallace Stevens, for instance, in "The Man with the Blue Guitar" (1936), enters into dialogue with an audience that clamors for that reflexive yet transformative "tune beyond us yet ourselves." The end of World War II and the advent of the Cold War changed the nature of the poetic "we," in part at least in reaction against the uses that had been made of public speech by fascist and other collectivist movements. Many poets shifted away, at least for a time, from political and social activism and group identity, and moved toward the self as representative figure, the "we," not of "all of us," but of "each one of us" in our individual lives of human faults and aspirations. Such evocations of everyman have sometimes seemed normative and presumptive, falling in with Cold War ideology, but they were often more self-conscious and anxious than has been generally acknowledged. Robert Lowell often distances himself not only from the public and patriotic "we" but from the comfortable village conformity of "our Independence Day." But if choral lyric disappeared with the Cold War cultivation of privacy, civil poetry has been perennial, and the first-person plural has maintained its hold on poetic voice. Indeed, it has had a considerable comeback in contemporary poetry, as I will suggest in my

conclusion. As we continue the critical project of theorizing and historicizing lyric subjectivity, we might well turn to the fluent and problematic modes of connection registered in modern poetry's use of this plural pronoun. In what circumstances, and in what terms, might the poet—whose generic default position is I—speak of "we"?

Poetry's first-person plural often prompts us to pose questions central to modern social thought: For whom does the poet write, and what authority does she have to speak for others? Is there a prior selfhood standing behind the collective, or is the "I" suspended in the voicing of "we"? Is "we" one or many? Can the poet construct a "we" that retains multiplicity within its choral force? When does the poem give assent to this claim of collective identity, and when does it distance itself? Modern poetry often creates a face of "we" that is volatile in character as well as number and avoids masking a restricted as a universal interest. Modern poetry's "we," exploiting the inherent instability of the pronoun, is especially reflexive, highly sensitive to political and historical circumstance, and often speculative. The pronoun's ambiguity, especially in the abstract realm of poetry, also provides freedom to dislodge labels and imagine potential communities.



While this is the first generic study of "we" in modern poetry, the topic has been richly addressed in modern philosophy, especially in the Continental tradition with its ethical turn and attention to community. Philosophical theories of social phenomenology and ontology do not directly inform my discussion of poetry, but they do indicate how an emphasis on language can foster fresh thinking about social reality. Martin Buber stands at the forefront of a long tradition that looks at ontology, ethics, and society in relation to language, not only with his seminal book *I and Thou* (1920) but also in lectures he gave in Germany (under great controversy) after the war, especially "What Is Common to All" (1951). The question of what it means to say "we" has special pressure in this post-Holocaust context; though Buber's lecture avoids mention of contemporary history, he is clearly arguing against the collectivist and totalitarian models of "we" that had destroyed the public sphere and enabled the genocide and destruction of war. He argues too against an Eastern tradition that finds unity in a mystical 'All' which obliterates individual will and consciousness. His praise is for the Western liberal idea of "the common" first articulated by Heraclitus, in which the single voice retains integrity in entering into discourse and harmony with others, either within the polity or more freely in the exchange of ideas and beliefs. "The genuine We," Buber writes, "is to be recognized in its objective existence,

through the fact that in whatever of its parts it is regarded, an essential relation between person and person, between I and Thou, is always evident as actually or potentially existing. For the word always arises only between an I and a Thou, and the element from which the We receives its life is speech, the communal speaking that begins in the midst of speaking to one another." For Buber this We that takes its life from speech is dynamic and full of risk, akin to fire and water. 'All this flowing ever again into a great stream of reciprocal sharing of knowledge—thus came to be and thus is the living We, the genuine We, which, where it fulfills itself, embraces the dead who once took part in colloquy and now take part in it through what they have handed down to posterity.' This "we" is not only of the past but also of the future: 'As potentiality it lies at the base of all history of spirit and deed; it actualizes itself and is no longer there. It can actualize itself within a group which then consists of just a fiery core and a drossy crust, and it can flare up and burn outside of all collectives.... Leaping fire is indeed the right image for the dynamic between persons in We.' And "the between" is, for Buber, the difficult and turbulent space of "the common," the space of discourse and dialogue, where the true meaning of "we" arises. Thus the "genuine we" requires not only gathering but also distinction to maintain that space.

Later Continental thinkers echo and develop these concepts, resisting the premise of classical liberalism that an integral "I" remains existentially prior to the common. Both Emmanuel Levinas's *Entre Nous* and Jean-Luc Nancy's *Being Singular/Plural*, for instance, explore the ethical implications of the collective pronoun. Recent philosophical attempts to imagine community beyond existing models (Blanchot, Agamben, Nancy) refuse the priority of the individual but

and like Levinas his goal is to get beyond horizons, views, or perspectives that objectify the other to "Being" as something at once arising in plural relation and circulating back to individual consciousness, the singular as the site of necessary and limited understanding. Nancy emphasizes the term "poesis" in connection with art and community, something that is posed, made, produced, inevitably exposed and disposed. Nancy, like others writing out of Europe's late twentieth-century stresses, finds that "liberalism is exhausted"; at the same time, he is seeking a "we," a concept of community, that is "no longer a matter of organizing ... according to the decrees of a sovereign Other, or according to the telos of a history." He avoids "the we" (collectivism) and seeks a "we [that] always expresses plurality" and "avoids generality." Coming out of the postwar and Cold War era (Levinas) and facing globalization (Nancy), their philosophies express as much as they analyze their historical context. Roberto Esposito in his recent book *Communitas* offers a different starting point for considering the meaning of community. By emphasizing the etymology of the term, he foregrounds the importance of gift and debt bonds (*mundus*), rather than property (*propria*) and belonging, in the forming and experience of community bonds. "We" is not only situational, as Emile Benveniste has said of I-and-you; it is also historical.

I have been struck, in my readings of the texts mentioned above, by the struggle with words, the strained usages (even allowing for translation), and the pressure not only on etymologies (Nancy finds that poesis both exposes and disposes) but also on pronouns and prepositions to set the analytical terms of relation. There is a sense that the pronoun "we" needs renovation (etiolated by journalism and constrained in identity politics) and that the available

language of commonality and community is inadequate to the ideals these writers seek. But there is also a sense that the habits of language are difficult to bend. Here is where poetry—which often foregrounds, troubles, and renovates language, and which presents possible or virtual worlds more than actual ones—has a special role to play, though it is not its only or necessary role. Buber's lecture "What Is Common to All," focused

as it is on "the genuine We," closes with a work of imagination, a quotation from J. C. F. Hölderlin's poem "Celebration of Peace":

Man has learned much since morning,
For we are a conversation, and we can listen
To one another. Soon we'll be song.

Jean-Luc Nancy acknowledges that the obstacles of definition lead him toward the imagination: "At what point must ontology become ... what? Become conversation? Become lyricism? ... The strict conceptual rigor of being-with



prefer, like Buber, potentiality to mastery in communal relations. Their ideas of open, flexible discursive communities often manifest in imaginative works and literary community. For Levinas, "we" remains centered in the problem of "between," but he questions Buber's idea of reciprocity and focuses ethics on the responsibility to the other. In *Being Singular/Plural*, Jean-Luc Nancy, echoing and revising Heidegger, changes the preposition to "with"—we must think of being as "being with." Like Levinas, Nancy asserts that "there is no meaning if meaning is not shared,"

exacerbates the discourse of its concept's. He turns to Goethe, to Baudelaire, to exemplify poetry's singular plurality. Nancy's question, "Who is it that says we?" has long been asked in a lyric voice.

The philosophical idea of potentiality so central to recent discussions of community among these Continental philosophers intersects with the sociolinguistic idea of performativity in the Anglo-American tradition, first introduced by J. L. Austin and revised and extended by other speech act theorists and philosophers of language such as Paul Grice, John Searle, and Stanley Cavell. This idea has engaged literary critics in a variety of ways, but its specific implication for poetic pronouns has not been discussed. Speech act theorists are interested in what language does in a communicative framework, more than in any prior reality that it retroactively describes or to which it refers. As J. L. Austin long ago argued, language sometimes proposes or establishes rather than represents reality, and it has affective as well as descriptive functions. Poets are intensely aware that language is not just a system of rules but a community of users who shape it in their direct and indirect speech acts. At the same time, poetry's use of pronouns is complicated by the absence of explicit context. Poetry sometimes (1) wants to refer to or speak for a preexisting group or (2) wants to expose or critique "we" as social performance rather than something natural or given. But (3) it also often tries to bring into being a particular "we" that has been obstructed in history; hence the appeal of poetry in emerging cultures. (4) Finally, though, poetry is not action, its ultimate performance may be abstract; it calls up human feeling without confining it to historical particulars or divisions, perhaps even interrupting these. This "we" is projective, parabolic, and provisional. It is also historical, and I have located my discussion of poetry's "we" not only generically but also in the particular, historically inflected example of W. H. Auden. We are now in a rather different historical environment, but it has much in common with Auden's formative thirties, which may explain the recent resurgence of the first-person plural in poetry.

My subject, then, is the communal possibilities of lyric in general. But the topic is vast and its interest arises in specific examples. To follow out the nuanced implications of poetry's many uses of the first-person plural, I have chosen W. H. Auden as my case study, as a poet singularly concerned with what he called "the human pluralities"—societies, communities, and crowds. I proceed on two fronts, then: what sort of genre does the use of "we" produce under the burden of modern history, and how is Auden's case a particularly interesting one in this respect? I examine markers of plural voice in relation to lyric theory and practice, ethics and sociolinguistics, though my focus is always on the poetry. I consider "we" from its most constricted and intimate to its fully unbounded forms, while at the same time showing the movement, overlap, and ambiguity within its range. Throughout, I am concerned with how "we" becomes some term absorbing reflections on voice in democracy.

Two broad themes emerge in this wide-ranging analysis. The first is that the first-person plural in poetry is often modulated and palimpsestic, moving between restrictive

and inclusive forms within and beyond communicative frameworks. The poet tests and stretches the boundaries of his community. "We" remains open and dynamic as it returns to and moves out from various subjectivities and interactions. The second theme is that poetry as an art not only refers and reflects but also imagines and formulates potential community.

In *Must We Mean What We Say?* Stanley Cavell asks: "Who is to say whether a man speaks for all men?" "By what right does the philosopher say 'we'? We speaks of a consent that is not common, that by rights is yours" The philosopher is speaking for himself, and yet he knows that the test of his seriousness is the worth of his thought for all men, which is why he writes in the first-person plural. He must dwell in this contradiction and ambivalence. Few would be willing to do away with this plural pronoun in the public sphere. The desire to say "we" and thus to refute the essential atomization of the social reality remains, even if he cannot "'postulate' that 'we,' you and I and he, say and want and imagine and feel and suffer together." For Cavell, at least implicitly, the "we" of reason's presumptive assent touches on ethical and political concerns. Cavell's aim is not to prohibit the invocation of "we," only to call our attention to its indeterminacy and our need to return constantly to conversation, to the fact that we do not know the minds of others and must both acknowledge this fact and the fact that "we," and meaning itself, is constituted in the continual discourse of you and I. He continues: "Why are we so bullied by such a question [of the right to say we]? Do we imagine that if it has a sound answer the answer must be obvious or immediate? But it is no easier to say who speaks for all men than it is to speak for all men. And why should that be easier than knowing whether a man speaks for me? It is no easier than knowing oneself, and no less subject to distortion and spiritlessness." The solution is not silence or a return to privacy or parochialism, or the formation of some special philosophical language that can transcend our limits; the answer is mindfulness about the imprecisions of language and about how ordinary language shapes thought, and how we nevertheless communicate and understand within it. Literature is especially formed to such mindfulness, which is perhaps why Cavell so often turns to it in making his arguments. Cavell aligns philosophy and art in this sense: both invoke a "we" that recognizes the limits of authority and acknowledges an unknowable other, even an unknowable self. Cavell's remarks make it clear that this question about philosophy is not different from questions about how we speak, practically and without certainty, in ordinary situations—in communities, in marriages. Nor is it fundamentally different from questions about how the poet speaks. One of my aims in this book is to consider how the literary imagination develops this mindfulness about our claim to speak as "we." Poetry, while it often acknowledges the Other and the limits of our knowing, nevertheless aspires (at times with urgency and great seriousness) to speak for others, for each of us, for a group, even at times for all of us together.

"We" does not always suggest a universal, of course, though poetry's abstraction can create a boundless implication, a universalized voice if not a platform of universals. Poetry's universal "we" is built up out of many

W. H. Auden seems to try them all. He is perhaps the preeminent modern poet for thinking about groups and group organization, intuitively and in the abstract, but he is rarely fixed to a theory or ideology for long. He is the poet of "private faces in public places," and of "private stuff" and "public spirit," interested in the tensions and continuities between our intimate lives and our historical relations. He loves theories and doctrines, sometimes to the detriment of his verse, and passes through them like pages of a calendar, but the questions remain the same and give coherence to the process. He is a writer not only interesting to think about but interesting to think with, in part because he is always thinking, always changing position and genre. Auden was always reading, reviewing, and versifying the social, theological, and ethical philosophers of his time (Niebuhr, Buber, Arendt, Weil, Tillich, Rosenstock-Huussy, and many others) who were preoccupied with pronouns as a lens through which to understand human relations in history. Auden moves from coterie writing to public rhetoric but eventually warns against the "chimaera" of the crowd and the false ontology of "the public." As a poet beginning with English cultural and socialist sentiments, witnessing the rise of fascism, immigrating to the U.S., and, like a latter-day Tocqueville, beginning to explore American democracy, he had a wide experience of the ideologies and embodiments of the notion of "we, the people." He was deeply engaged in questions pertaining to the poet's relationship

[illegible]

The poet George Oppen comments, “There are situations which cannot honorably [be] met by art, and surely no one need fiddle precisely at the moment that the house next door is burning.” To write poetry under such circumstances, he continues, “would be a treason to one’s neighbor.” Committing himself, then, to more direct and conventional forms of response and responsibility, Oppen leaves poetry behind for twenty-five years. The disasters of the 1930s,



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for Oppen, put poetry into a fundamental question that could not be resolved or overcome. Yet if crisis is continual, then poetry is always turning away from the neighbor in need, always an irresponsible response in a world persistently falling apart.

Writing Not Writing both confirms this question into which crisis puts poetry and explores alternative modes of “response” and “responsibility” that poetry makes possible. Reading the silences of Oppen, Carl Rakosi, and Bob Kaufman, the renunciation of Laura Riding, and other more contemporary instances of poetic abnegation, Tom Fisher explores silence, refusal, and disavowal as political and ethical modes of response in a time of continuous crisis. Through a turn away from writing, these poets offer strategies of refusal and departure that leave anagrammatical hollows behind, activating the negational capacities of writing and aesthetics to disrupt the empire of sense, speech, and agency. Fisher’s work is both an engaging and detailed analysis of four individual poets who left poetry behind and a theoretically provocative exploration of the political and ethical possibilities of silence, not-doing, and disavowal. In lucid but nuanced terms, Fisher makes the case that, from at least modernism forward, poetry is marked by refusals of speech and sense to open possibilities of response outside conventional forms of responsibility.

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Excerpt: In the middle of creative difficulties, Rainer Maria Rilke was asked by a friend to adopt a dog, Pierrot. The poet replied in a 1912 letter, “How could you even think I might adopt him, what kind of match could I be for his boundless homesickness?” It would be an imperfect pairing, not least because Rilke himself would suffer: “Furthermore, apart from the torment of helplessly looking on, I would have the additional torment of sacrificing myself for his sake.” The poet would break off, first, “little pieces” of his “heart,” then “bigger and bigger pieces toward the middle (like dog biscuits) for this Pierrot.” Finally, the sacrifice would reach its consummation: “I would, after hesitating for a little while, give up my writing and live entirely for his consolation”.

Rilke never did adopt Pierrot and, of course, did not give up writing. Indeed, in about ten years he would experience those mysterious “dictations” and that “savage creative storm” that would yield what are considered his greatest works, *The Sonnets to Orpheus* and *Duino Elegies*. Yet what if Rilke had, in fact, come into the care of Pierrot? Perhaps, as he feared, there would have been no more poems, as the poet filled his days with delightful dog-play and self-sacrificing dog-care, his obedience to the mysterious interrupted by — and the angelic voices from the ecstatic outside drowned under — a din of bark and growl. We cannot, of course, know the fate of Rilke’s writing in this hypothetical universe with Pierrot, yet the poet’s playful anxiety is earnest testimony to the precarity and vulnerability that always attends writing.

How many poets, we might wonder, do indeed “adopt the dog,” so to speak, following absorbing detours into a not-writing from which there is no return? How many writers give up writing to “live entirely” for those innumerable other things that make it impossible? The question cannot be fully answered: we cannot count all the poets who stopped writing — or never started — or all the poems not written. These are silences, elisions, absences that cannot be traced, tracked, or measured, but which, perhaps, demand some form of recognition that might trouble the complacency of the written and the readable. Writing — and poetry especially perhaps — takes place in the conditional tense of a contingent and precarious possibility. Just as poetry “may happen,” it may not: the “person from Porlock” comes just a bit earlier and nothing at all is written down.

The not-written leaves no trace, challenging our customary strategies of reading that presume presence, here-ness, letters, and legibility; it remains decisively outside our critical grasp, irretrievable and unrecoverable. And when the whole world becomes a book to be read, with everything turned into signs, even if unstable ones, for our interpretive consumption, the never or not written is all that might escape our predatory drive to continuously make sense. Despite not-writing’s “herelessness,” and without, I hope, drawing it into a legibility that compromises its essential unreadability, I would like this book to allow a body of writing that never came into being (absent texts, never written poems) to influence our relationship to writing and our approach to reading in ways that cannot be fully accounted for, told, explained.

This is not a book about writers who never came into writing; rather, it takes as its subject poets who wrote, stopped writing, and often started again to much acclaim and attention. Such a reading has its own challenges, questions, mysteries, implications, revelations that I here pursue. By way of a preface, however, I would like the books and poems never written to hover just off the page, reminding us of the anonymous, the never-poets, the unwriters whose work can never be discovered, read, thought, counted. The dark matter of literature: its missing, immeasurable part.

“No More Words”

The next day I noticed that Bartleby did nothing but stand at his window in his dead-wall reverie. Upon asking why he did not write, he said that he had decided upon doing no more writing. “Why, how now? what next?” exclaimed I, “do no more writing?” “No more.” “And what is the reason?” “Do you not see the reason for yourself?” he indifferently replied.

HERMAN MELVILLE, *Bartleby the Scrivener: A Tale of Mill*

Poetry and Responsibility


I first began thinking about not-writing and renunciation while reading Emmanuel Levinas’s occasional comments on literature. Levinas, as is well known, had a problem with literature; it is a “captivation” and an “incantation” that “lets

go of the prey for the shadow," as he has it in his relatively early essay "Reality and Its Shadow" published in 1948, which operated in part as a reply to Jean-Paul Sartre's famous call for an "engaged" or "committed" writing in *What Is Literature?* (1947). "Art," and more specifically "literature," are "essentially disengaged," Levinas argues, and constitute, "in a world of initiative and responsibility, a dimension of evasion". While Levinas's thought on the worth and constitution of "literature" develops and changes over the course of his writing, this early articulation might be taken as exemplary of a wider, ongoing, and fundamental skepticism about

the worth of the literary as a mode of political or ethical responsibility.¹ Is not literature, at best, an accessory to history, a decorative fancy and distraction, and, at worst, a deception, a lie, an evasion of an essential responsibility to world, life, and others? So, goes what has become, since the early twentieth century at the very least, an almost familiar anxiety about the role of representation and aesthetics in a "world of ... responsibility." To abandon writing, to give it up, appears, in this narrative, to be a social and political obligation, if not an ethical imperative.

Theodor Adorno's better-known assertion — "To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric" (*Prisms* 34) — produces, perhaps, a similar polemic: to engage the diversions and apparent narcissisms of lyric poetry when the world, as it is phrased in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, "radiates disaster triumphant" (3) is more than an evasion, it is a barbarism that makes incomprehensible yawping and noise when something much different is demanded. Adorno's oft-cited declaration,

however, is perhaps oft misunderstood. Lyn Hejinian, for instance, reads the dictum as urging a "barbarian position" that is "foreign to the cultures that produce atrocity". This is, as Michael Palmer suggests, to conceive the "barbarian" as the demand to rethink "the activity and signification of art" after Auschwitz (qtd. in Pritchett 131). Adorno's aphorism, that is, does not announce, perhaps, the end of poetry but calls for a fundamental rethinking of the resources and possibilities of the aesthetic in the absolute and ongoing catastrophe that "Auschwitz" names. Crisis renders suspect and precarious the practice of poetry in ways that cannot be resolved or overcome. Yet poetry, from such ground, emerges as the "foreign," "barbarous," seemingly senseless speech that arrives always from elsewhere. *WritingNot Writing* occupies the space of this contradiction of disaster's "after," attempting to think the fundamental question into which writing is put with the subsequent and emergent reconfigurations and possibilities of poetry, crisis, and their relationship.



George Oppen

George Oppen, a central figure of this study, writes in a 1962 letter to Max and Anita Pepper, reflecting on his twenty-five-year "silence" after the publication of his inaugural volume of poems, *Discrete Series*, in 1934: "There are situations which cannot honorably be met by art, and surely no one need fiddle precisely at the moment that the house next door is burning. If one goes on to imagine a direct call for help, then surely to refuse it would be a kind of treason to one's neighbor". Indeed, to write, to make art, to fiddle when the world is burning might well seem a tergiversation, an evasive turning away from the responsibilities of being in a world that is always burning up and falling apart. In many ways this crisis of art's possibilities — at least its ethical and political possibilities — in moments of an ongoing disaster is definitive of its practice in the West from modernism forward, if not in fact from its very inception. Poetry responds now to permanent crisis; it is always a possibly dubious speech within the whirring of continuous disaster.

If crisis puts poetry into question for the sake of "responsibility" and if crisis is ongoing, then poetry is always in jeopardy, always falling silent in the depths of its own incapacities. Indeed, in such a world as this, "so natural would it seem were no-one to write again," as Maurice Blanchot comments in his 1941 essay "The Silence of Writers." Blanchot continues that this "silence" of writers takes place with increased frequency "when art receives from the world more enigmas than the world receives from it". War, suffering, catastrophe, slavery, genocide — certain "enigmas" that the world might put to art and writing are readily, if inadequately, named. Indeed, within the primary period of this study, such enigmas occur in

horrifying, even if historically unexceptional, number. Depression-era poverty, World War II, the Holocaust, Vietnam, climate catastrophe are all instrumental in producing the "silences" that overcome the poets I read here. Yet poetry and poets persist, not only because of, as Thomas Hardy has it in his War World I poem "I Looked Up from My Writing," the "blinker mind" of the writer who refuses to regard the surrounding disaster. Poets, rather, write despite, because of, about, and through the very calamities that put writing into question. Hardy's poem is in fact an illuminating and exemplary account of the writer's dilemma as he writes through the impediments of doing so. The poem begins with a staging of the scene of writing's interruption:

I looked up from my writing,
And gave a start to see,
As if rapt in my inditing,
The moon's full gaze on me.

Overturning the traditional invocation of the muse and the permission to write or sing, Hardy begins his poem with its very interruption, and the homophonic pun on "inditing" turns the poet's self-absorbed nocturnal scribbling into an "indictment" that puts into question the poem's (and the poet's) moral character. Hardy's poem continues as "the Moon" tells the poet that she is looking for a man "who has put his life-light out" because his son was "slain in brutish battle / Though he has injured none." The incongruity between these tragic deaths and the scene of the writer's labor distracts the Moon in her investigation and, in the penultimate stanza of the poem, she implicitly admonishes the poet:

And now I am curious to look
 Into the blinkered mind
 Of one who wants to write a book
 In a world of such a kind.

The poet has no reply, indeed is ashamed and takes as an indictment the Moon's curiosity.

Her temper overwrought me,
 And I edged to shun her view,
 For I felt assured she thought me
 One who should drown him too.

The poet makes a poem out of poetry's interruption and the writer's complicity in the very suffering that, by writing, he cannot see. The poem becomes, thus, an inditing that indicts itself, questioning its legitimacy as a moral or ethical practice. "To want to write a book / In a world of such a kind" is, in this poem, a perverse impulse, not only dependent on a "blinkered mind" but complicit in the disasters it, so blinkered, fails to see. Hardy's poem, in this sense, is consistent with the skepticism that attends the literary, the poetic, the aesthetic in times of crisis. It is, as Levinas, Adorno, and Oppen have it, an evasion of responsibility, a barbarism, a turning away from the neighbor in need. Yet the poem's indictment of writing takes place in writing—indeed, what other form could it take? In this way, Hardy's poem undermines, even as it confirms, the ethical geography that pits responsibility against poetry. In an exemplary fashion in Hardy's poem, writing emerges from its own irresponsibility, inadequacy, complicity. Poetry is, we might say by way of Hardy's poem, neither exempt from nor completely obstructed by the disasters that surround and constitute it. Rather, poetry takes place on the

uncertain, precarious ground of inadequacy and collusion, ineffectiveness and complicity, failure and doubt. Poetry is always already "overwrought," about to fall silent on the unsteady, suspect ground of its practice.

Three of the four poets I focus on in this work—Oppen, Carl Rakosi, and Laura Riding—give up writing within the same seven-year period, 1934-1941. The other, Bob Kaufman, takes a ten-year vow of silence from the day of John F. Kennedy's assassination in 1963 to the end of the Vietnam War. All four give up writing during times of crisis. None of these poets are able to continue writing—at least poetry—in a "world of such a kind," let alone, like Hardy, make poems that perform the subtle contradictions of an "inditing" that "indicts" itself and write by way of this to provocative ends that enmesh aesthetics and politics, poetry and responsibility, in complicated, uncertain, and unstable ways. While this book primarily attempts to articulate the different territories of not-writing that these poets map through their refusals and silences, it is worth noting here at the outset that each finds poetry impossible in the face of crises that establish an oppositional relationship between poetry and responsibility. This opposition is, as I will discuss, historical. Indeed, during these times—late or second-wave modernism on the one hand and the early postwar/postmodern period on the other—the partitions between the aesthetic and the social, the literary and the political, art and ethics were being troubled over in ways that were definitive of the periods and that continue to structure our own moment's thinking of poetry and responsibility.

To give up writing for the more responsible, the more ethical, the more impactful constitutes one of the most pervasive and persuasive accounts of the decision to give up writing poetry. "Poetry makes nothing happen," as W. H. Auden notoriously wrote in his poem "In Memory of W. B. Yeats."

And when crisis comes calling, "nothing" is of little help. Yet Auden's poem continues with these infrequently quoted, more elusive lines:

it survives,
 A way of happening, a mouth.
 it survives
 In the valley of its making where executives
 Would never want to tamper ...

For Auden this "survival" might mean, in part, that poetry survives the death of the poet. "The words of a dead man / Are modified in the guts of the living," as he writes earlier. Yet, too, Auden articulates here an alternative to the outcome-driven mandate that "something" be made to "happen." Poetry, rather, escapes the grasp of "executives" and an economy that endlessly proliferates "somethings" to persist as almost an empty form of happening, divested of content and the signatures of practical response and conventional responsibility. Poetry "survives" as that foundational form of "a mouth" that is the very condition, we might say, of happening itself. That Auden's poem is so often read as an exemplary expression of poetry's ineffectiveness is symptomatic of a thinking of poetry that



Carl Rakosi Summer & Winter

always already assumes its "irresponsibility," its troubling lack of efficacy in a world that demands action.'

The human rights scholar and literary theorist Thomas Keenan writes in a decisively Levinasian mood, "It is when we do not know exactly what we should do, when the effects and conditions of our actions can no longer be calculated, and when we have nowhere else to turn, not even back onto our 'self' ... that we encounter something like responsibility". For Keenan, an exemplary experience of this responsibility is the experience of literature itself, which, as he writes, "cannot be organized in advance" (1) and opens up an experience of singularity, uncertainty, risk, and not-knowing. In this way he decisively deviates from Levinas's own skepticism of the literary to claim literature as, rather than an exception to or violation of the imperatives of response and responsibility, their fullest occasion. Keenan's provocative rethinking of responsibility—its refusal of certainty and knowing, calculability and quantification—allows a troubling of the conventional relationship between poetry and responsibility. Poetry is not an evasion, a moral barbarism, a refusal of help, but a clarification of the risks and rifts, the difficulties and dangers that attend responsiveness in "a world of such a kind," where, in an ongoing catastrophe, uncertainty, unpredictability, and instability might be the only ground for our response and responsibility.

In my first chapter, I will discuss further this quarrel between poetry and responsibility by way of Oppen. Oppen, who gives up poetry for a roughly twenty-five-year period (1934-1958), consistently explains his "silence" in the terms of ethical and political responsibility. As Peter Nicholls glosses Oppen's departure from writing, "There are, in short, emergencies which demonstrate the incommensurability of art's resources to the demands of the real" ("Avant-Garde" 5). Poetry is left behind, that is, for the sake of a responsibility it cannot meet to "the real," which, for Oppen in the 1930s, wore the face of Depression-era poverty. As he comments in a 1969 interview, "If you decide to do something politically, you do something that has political efficacy. And if you decide to write poetry, you write poetry; not something that you hope, or deceive yourself into believing, can save people who are suffering. That was the dilemma of the thirties". Oppen, then, puts down the pen, joins the Communist Party, registers voters, and works "directly" to relieve suffering.' The "dilemma" of the thirties, as Oppen calls it, is precisely this inability to reconcile the seemingly obvious and definite demands of responsibility with the uncertain ones of poetry. As he suggests, this is a historically produced dilemma that Oppen both exemplifies in his decision to stop writing and undermines through his retrospective figuring of this "silence" as fundamentally, in his phrasing, "part of the poetic undertaking." Oppen, in other words, leaves poetry behind for the sake of a "real," concrete politics he believes poetry is incapable of. In this way, the poet is entirely a product of the dilemma he describes, assuming fully the "incommensurability" of poetry and responsibility. Also, however, Oppen, after his return to writing in the late 1950s, will trouble and complicate this opposition as he figures his own silence and "not-writing" as themselves a part of the poetic project and conceives an "essential life of

the poem", which opens up a rethinking of the relationship between poetry and politics that resonates, I suggest, with a more contemporary thinking of politics and aesthetics. In this way Oppen both typifies and contradicts, or at least complicates, "the ancient quarrel"—to appropriate Plato's phrase from Book io of *The Republic*—between poetry and responsibility.

Truth's Demand

The "demands of the real," however, are not only—as they were primarily for Oppen—political in nature. Poetry's failure of truth, too, makes it inadequate to the



"demands of the real." Indeed, it is this failure of poetry to "speak" truth that constitutes the almost originary ground for its renunciation. Plato, it is rumored, inspired by or perhaps in order to become a student of Socrates, burned his poems as a young man. As Diogenes Laertius writes in his *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*,

Afterwards, when he was about to compete for the prize with a tragedy, he listened to Socrates in front of the theatre of Dionysus, and then consigned his poems to the flames, with the words: "Come hither, O fire-god, Plato now has need of thee." From that time onward, having reached his twentieth year (so it is said), he was the pupil of Socrates.

Plato, of course, will elaborate this "discourse of Socrates" that inspires, in fact demands, the renunciation or immolation of poetry in, principally, his *Republic*, where the poet is notoriously expelled from the ideal polis. The "quarrel between poetry and philosophy" to which Socrates refers in Book io was indeed already "ancient," as the philosopher notes; and as Alice Swift Riginos observes, the burning or abandonment of poems was not an uncommon feature of the philosopher's life story. For Plato, poetry as an essentially imitative art is incapable of truth, from which it is, as he comments in Book 10, "thrice removed" as an "imitation of an imitation." I will return to Plato's foundational critique and denunciation of poetic production, knowledge, and craft throughout the book; here, at the outset, let it suffice to note that for Plato poetry is not only incapable of truth's acquisition but entirely inimical to it. The poet, that is, not only fails to speak truth but is an outright liar, who, like the sophists, fashions (to borrow from Oscar Wilde) "beautiful untruths" that seduce and corrupt.

The judgment of Plato has fundamentally determined the conception in the West of poetry's relationship to truth. Indeed, after Plato poetry must almost ceaselessly defend

its claim — or its lack of one — on truth. Does the poet lie and dissemble, concealing the truth in fair and fitting garments of fiction? Or rather, does the poet, to take the phrasing of Laura Riding, uncover a "truth of so fundamental ... a kind that no other name besides poetry is adequate except truth?". Plato, then, set in motion the terms that, in many ways, still fundamentally structure our conception of representation and its relationship to an unproblematized, metaphysical "real." And — perhaps not coincidentally — Plato is the first recorded instance, even if only in rumor, of a poet's renunciation of poetry. However, he is not, of course, the last. Arthur Rimbaud perhaps remains the most exemplary, not only for the finality of his refusal but also for the Platonic terms through which he seems to announce it. "I will ask forgiveness," Rimbaud writes in the last poem in *A Season in Hell*, "for having fed on lies. Let us go now". And so he does, leaving behind poetry for a life of adventure, treasure hunting, and commodity trade.

As Plato continues to structure our conceptions of poetry and its relation to truth, Rimbaud, we might say, haunts its

poetry ends" perfectly reiterates the Platonic and Rimbaudian verdict. Indeed, Riding, who left off the writing of poems sometime shortly after 1938, is in many ways a twentieth-century Rimbaud, notwithstanding her own resistance to the comparison. Like the French poet, "Work Will Not Wait"

In her *A Room of One's Own* (1929), Virginia Woolf quotes Arthur Quiller-Couch's inaugural Cambridge lectures (published in 1916 as *On the Art of Writing*):

What are the great poetical names of the last hundred years or so? Coleridge, Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley, Landor, Keats, Tennyson, Browning, Arnold, Morris, Rossetti, Swinburne — we may stop there. Of these, all but Keats, Browning, Rossetti were University men; and of these three, Keats, who died young, cut off in his prime, was the only one not fairly well to do. It may seem a brutal thing to say, and it is a sad thing to say: but, as a matter of hard fact, the theory that poetical genius bloweth where it listeth, and equally in poor and rich, holds little truth.

Even simple minds felt obscurely that Rimbaud had extended the 'possible' of poetry by abandoning it. — Georges Bataille

practice.' If poetry constitutes a kind of lie, how then might one continue, with good conscience, to write it? And, indeed, Rimbaud's renunciation in this narrative merely reproduces within "modernity" the ancient denunciation articulated by Plato. As Jean-Luc Nancy comments, "If the denunciation of poetry as a lie is the most consistent movement in philosophy, from Plato to at least Hegel, does Rimbaud repeat such a gesture? Does the poet pronounce anew the philosopher's verdict?" ("To Possess" 290). "How can the answer not be 'yes'?" Nancy equivocally answers. In this way, Rimbaud seems to return us to the originary scene of philosophy's "ancient quarrel" with poetry, both hailing and denouncing it as untruth, deceit, lie, fantasy. Yet, too, Rimbaud's "adieu" does not purely and irrevocably leave poetry behind for truth's something else. As Georges Bataille comments, "Even simple minds felt obscurely that Rimbaud had extended the 'possible' of poetry by abandoning it." Rather than putting an end to poetry, Rimbaud in fact redetermines and redirects its possibilities. Indeed, "[w]ith Rimbaud," Blanchot writes, "... poetry ... establishes itself on its own refusal" ("Sleep" 155). Poetry, that is, refuses, "with Rimbaud," precisely the sense of it given by philosophy as an imperfect and degraded expression of "truth." To paraphrase Sir Philip Sidney in his "Defense of Poesy," poetry cannot be said to lie if it makes no claim on the truth. And so, we might say, poetry liberates itself, with Rimbaud, from philosophy's yoke.

Yet, too, poetry's relationship to truth and truth-telling remains a vexed and vexing issue for many a poet post-Rimbaud. Nowhere, perhaps, is this more evident than in the work of Laura Riding, whose motto "Truth begins where

It is no revelation to assert the "hard fact" of poetical genius's thoroughly class character. The right to write, we might say, is not equally accessible to all, and any study of not-writing must take into account those who have, to Riding's renunciation is, at least on the surface, final and absolute; she does not, as do the rest of the poets considered here, return to poetry. And, like Rimbaud, her own "adieu" is articulated as a critique of poetry as falsehood, deception, and untruth. Indeed, according to Riding, her decision to write no more poems could be explained in neither historical terms nor, as she writes, "private life terms." Rather, as she repeatedly insists, her own farewell to poetry followed from, was dictated by poetry's essential structure. Poetry, for Riding, is constituted through what she calls an "incompatibility" between its "creed" or "promise" of "complex perfection" and its "craft" that courts "sensuosity as if it were the judge of truth". To fulfill the "promise of poetry" — which poetry constitutively and inevitably fails to fulfill — Riding leaves the "craft" of it behind. Her renunciation of poetry is, then, its consummation and completion that would put to an end not just one writing life but all of poetry as a meaningful or truthful possibility. As I will discuss, this late restaging of an "ancient quarrel" with poetry reveals much about modernism, representation, renunciation, materiality, failure, language, and truth. paraphrase Woolf, neither the time nor the money nor the privilege often deemed necessary to compose.

History is riddled with the countless silences of those who do not write because they cannot be "elsewhere outside of their work." There is, then, also a quarrel between work and poetry that, historically varied and shaped as it necessarily is, decisively marks poetry, literary writing, and all cultural production. To write poetry requires, it might seem, the free time that worklessness permits, so that only those exempt from work are free to write. Writing, then, is a privilege of the privileged. Yet within the logic of this quarrel, to write is to refuse to work. To write poetry is to resist work—to reject its demands of consequence and doing that characterize wage labor. According to Kristin Ross in her essay "Rimbaud and the Resistance to Work," this rejection of work is not merely to engage otherwise an indolence or laziness that refuses doing. Rather, as she writes, "Laziness for Rimbaud is a kind of absolute motion, absolute speed that escapes from the pull of gravity.... Laziness hides an activity that is not subordinated to certain necessities, an activity that is not the everyday action of subsistence or industry". Rimbaud, then, refuses work and engages the lazy labor of poetry and vagabondage. "But," as Ross continues, "the refusal of work is not an absence of activity—nor, obviously, is it leisure since leisure reinforces the work model by existing only with reference to work — it is a qualitatively different activity, often very frenetic, and above all combative". The "refusal to work" makes possible, for Rimbaud, a "frenetic" laziness that "combatively" resists the reconfigurations of the everyday that industrial capital was effecting in the mid-nineteenth century. Too, Ross's figuring of "poetic labor's" laziness as "active" problematizes "leisure" as the necessary condition for a refusal to work. There is nothing "leisurely" about poetry's resistance to the demands of work. It is, rather, an energetic labor in subversive opposition to the regime of work and industry.

This tension between work and poetry explicitly frames and governs the writing career of Carl Rakosi, who gave up poetry for twenty-five years in order to pursue a career in social work. Like Oppen, Rakosi at times gives a political account of his years not writing. Yet, more consistently, in his prose writing and interviews, Rakosi refers to the demands on his time that work and family produced as instrumental to his departure from poetry. As he comments to George Evans and August Kleinzahler, "It didn't seem possible to make a living, have a family too, which I was starting to have [in the 1930s], and to write. When I tried, it kept me up all night. You can do that two or three nights, but you can't do it as a regular thing. So I stopped. For twenty-seven years". Despite—or because of—the apparent inability of the poet to accommodate the demands of career and family, Rakosi's (non)writing life remains an exemplary one through which the relation between wage work and art can be thought. For Rakosi, poetry decisively takes place "outside" the "workplaces of the world," as he has it in a late interview, and, as such, will not permit the conjunction of wage labor and writing. Like Ross's Rimbaud, Rakosi figures "poetic labor" as a refusal of "work" as it is defined within an economy of subsistence and industry. Unlike Rimbaud, however, Rakosi chooses work rather than poetry, which must wait until the post-labor time of his retirement in the late 1960s to recommence. Poetry requires, for Rakosi, the

plentitude of leisure time, only taking place before or after "work" and standing in stark opposition to the demands of career, profession, and utility. This refusal of a laboring functionality suggests a provocative and subversive political aesthetics resonant with Ross's framing of Rimbaud, despite Rakosi's resistance to a political valence for poetry. Yet, too, such a figuring of poetry as possible only outside the "workplaces of the world" risks obvious perils of making poetry a task suited only for those emancipated from the demands of working and privileged with the ample free time necessary to write. With reference to more contemporary scenes of art and wage work interactions, I will attempt to rethink the precarity into which poetry is put as it negotiates this vexed relationship with labor and the absence of time and leisure that is produced when, as Jacques Rancière has it, "work will not wait".

Occupying Refusal

For Melville's *Bartleby*, the decision to "do no more writing" is, according to the excerpt that begins this introduction, entirely self-evident. Indeed, so much so that he persistently and "indifferently" refuses any explanation whatsoever, which, as it might be recalled, greatly exasperates the tale's narrator to whom the scrivener's behavior is almost entirely obscure. In the assertiveness of his passivity, *Bartleby* is perhaps an exemplary figure of not-writing. His inscrutable but self-evident inaction and refusal can be neither ignored nor fully understood — an enigma in plain view. *Bartleby*, then, expresses a contradiction of not-writing: as it escapes into "all the quiet mysteries" of silence, it both withdraws into the inaudible and demands an accounting. The decision to "do no more writing" evokes, no doubt, curiosity and mystery; and the poets I discuss here are in many ways "Bartlebian," as their decisions to leave poetry behind, to borrow a phrase from Jerome McGann about the silences of Riding and Oppen, "have hung in the air ever since, like portentous signs or dark stars" (Black Riders). While most of the poets I discuss do account for their decisions with a detail and argument that *Bartleby* refuses to muster, their silences nonetheless reverberate with an ambiguity and obscurity that is not easily resolved. Not-writing tests the limits of readability, and the purpose of [Writing Not Writing](#) is not to settle its mysteries — like Melville's narrator so desperately attempts — but to study the open hollows it leaves behind.

Bartleby remains, perhaps, the most notorious literary instance of the renunciation of writing. His refusal continues to fascinate, in part, because he refuses not only to write but also to explain or justify this refusal. Melville's tale, it will be remembered, takes as its subject the encounter between an unnamed Wall Street lawyer and *Bartleby*, a copyist or scrivener, recently hired to transcribe legal documents and perform other clerical tasks. The lawyer, who narrates the story, is "unambitious" and content "in the cool tranquility of a snug retreat, [to] do a snug business among rich men's bonds, and mortgages, and title deeds". Opposed to this tidy account and representation of the lawyer, *Bartleby* stands in particular relief and from the outset is described as an enigmatic cipher: "No materials exist," reports the lawyer in the opening paragraph, "for a full and satisfactory biography of this man.... *Bartleby* was one of those beings of whom nothing is ascertainable

except from the original sources, and, in his case, those are very small." The singular action of Melville's brief tale is Bartleby's escalating refusals (almost always expressed in the form of "I would prefer not to"), including that of writing, and the narrator's moral uncertainty and confusion that results.

Adding to his vexation is Bartleby's refusal to explain his refusal, leaving the narrator (and the reader) with no "materials" to make sense of it. Here, at this introduction's end, I would like to linger on Bartleby's "negative preference", as Gilles Deleuze has it, and consider what it might suggest for a politics of not-writing, refusal, and negation.

Deleuze's essay, "Bartleby; or the Formula," is perhaps the best-known consideration of the scrivener's enigmatic and resolute refusal. Deleuze identifies Bartleby's "I would prefer not to" as an "anagrammatical" formulation that "neither affirms nor negates" and, thereby, "hollows out an ever-expanding zone of indiscernibility or indetermination" that, ultimately, "carves out a kind of foreign language within language". Those familiar with Deleuze's work will readily recognize here one of his major themes: literature's capacity to enunciate the foreign, the "minor," within language itself and thereby "deterritorialize" and open speech and being to possibilities of becoming otherwise unthinkable and unspeakable. In Melville's tale, this deterritorialization occurs by way of "making the whole [of language] confront silence, make it topple into [the] silence" of Bartleby's refusal. This sends "language itself into flight", "strips the father of his exemplary speech", and, in the visionary and revolutionary momentum of Deleuze's hermeneutics, gestures toward "a society without fathers". In Deleuze's reading then, Bartleby is no less than a "new Christ," who, "in his catatonic or anorexic state," "preserves the rights of a people to come" and enunciates a future

"human becoming" of egalitarian and universal fraternity.

Deleuze's essay, even in this abbreviated synopsis I offer, opens channels for thinking about the political capacities of refusal, abnegation, not-doing, and, indeed, not-writing. These negational valences of Bartleby were mobilized in the perhaps unlikely appearance of the "pallid" scrivener as the "patron saint"



Laura Riding

(Martyris) of the Occupy Wall Street Movement, which began on September 17, 2011, in Zuccotti Park in New York City's financial district, when a group of protesters occupied the park's public space and refused to leave. Signs with "I prefer not to" were seen and "marathon readings" of the novella were performed. As many noted at

the time, Bartleby's refusal to leave the offices of the Wall Street lawyer might be understood to constitute a sort of proto-occupation and disruption of finance's business as usual which the present-day occupiers seemed to hope to reproduce. "Bartleby's inactive action of staying put without working," as Jonathan Greenberg writes in *The Atlantic*, offered a compelling model for the Occupy Movement's own "passive resistance" meant to disrupt, through the "inactive activity" of occupation, the workings of capital."

Bartleby also modeled or prefigured what distinguishes the Occupy Movement from many — if not most—other protest movements, namely its own refusal to elaborate or clarify the "anagrammaticality" of their "I would prefer not to." To quote Greenberg again, [The Occupy Movement] seemed ... to gain political power precisely as it held back from articulating any specific list of policy demands — holding back, in Bartleby-like fashion, from any self-definition that might diminish the unsettling force of the movement and allow it to be co-opted by politics as usual. The blank Bartlebyan inscrutability of Occupy Wall Street came to constitute its greatest power. (Greenberg)"

Russ Castronovo echoes the indebtedness of Occupy to Bartleby in this regard: "As a patron saint for saying 'no' to Wall Street, Bartleby sanctifies a movement whose refusal to enumerate a set of goals and principles expressed a contemporary politics of negation". This withholding of speech at precisely the moment it is most demanded or expected is the hallmark of both Bartleby and Occupy, as they refuse to "enumerate" their negations, occupations, refusals and fold them into a lucid and communicable agenda; instead, to use the language of Deleuze, each "hollows out a zone of indetermination" within the very act of protest that resists the domestications and "co-optations" of legibility, agenda, and political speech itself as it is most often figured. This refusal to explicate, enumerate, explain, or specify their refusal is neither an evasive tactic nor the result of a fuzzy thinking that cannot manage detail or explicitness. Rather, this "hollow" that refusal produces and occupies is a form of emptiness and vacancy that resists being filled up with some other, alternative content or agenda, and instead persists in the pure form of negation and opposition.

This is what Slavoj Žižek, in a discussion of Portuguese writer José Saramago's novel *Seeing*, calls a "Bartlebian politics" of abstention and "withdraw of activity" in order "to provoke change in the system". As Castronovo glosses Žižek's argument, this is a politics "impatient with reforms" that agitates "instead for systemic transformations by refusing all ameliorative measures" (257). In "a world of such a kind," where every act risks complicity, every agenda is canalized, every instance of oppositional speech always already configured, absorbed, and diffused, maintaining refusal may offer us an innovative and revolutionary politics that obstructs the otherwise unstoppable flow of power. To say "no" or "I would prefer not to," then, not only expresses a reluctance or refusal to, as Bob Kaufman comments, "get involved," but also articulates a withdrawal from speech and explication itself that is constitutively bound and tied to established structures of sense and possibility. It is the

The politics of refusal and negation and negation border, no doubt, the politics of not-writing, and throughout this book, especially in its conclusion, I will, implicitly and explicitly, discuss this 'Bartlebian politics' of refusal, negation, withdrawal, and not-doing that are especially relevant today. Except for Kaufman, these poets do not withhold their writing in order to disrupt a political economy that privileges speech and the presence of words. Oppen, Riding, and Rakosi all, it would seem, depart from poetry in order to engage in more directly impactful — politically, socially, epistemologically—or pragmatic and necessary practices. Yet, too, in their withdrawal from writing, they, like Bartleby, create a "hollow" in poetry that sends "language itself into flight" and "carve out" the possibility for the "foreign language" of not-writing to murmur and echo in the empty space left behind. These poets, that is, withhold writing and thereby open poetry to what might "topple" it, provoking a catastrophic overturning of the poetic itself so that its limits and possibilities are reconfigured. Each of these instances, I argue, in their refusals and renunciations, both unmake and remake poetic possibility. In this way then, these are 'Bartlebian' refusals marked by an "anagrammatical" energy that both dissolves and, ultimately, indeterminately refashions poetic possibility.

Red Modernism: American Poetry and the Spirit of Communism by Mark Steven [Hopkins Studies in Modernism, 9781421423579]

Focusing on three of the most significant figures in modernist poetry—Ezra Pound, William Carlos Williams, and Louis Zukofsky—Steven provides a theoretical and historical introduction to modernism's unique sense of communism while revealing how communist ideals and references were deeply embedded in modernist poetry. Moving between these poets and the work of T. S. Eliot, Langston Hughes, Muriel Rukeyser, Gertrude Stein, Wallace Stevens, and many others, the book combines a detailed analysis of technical devices and poetic values with a rich political and economic context.

The Real Movement

"By its October Revolution the Russian proletariat not only swung open the Kremlin doors for the representatives of the international proletariat but also lodged the cornerstone in the edifice of the Third International." Elsewhere across the globe, and especially in the United States of America, the utopian soundings of this new sociality would resonate in overtone and dissonance with the inborn utopianism of what we now call modernism.

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Revolution. Those other interrelated terms, "modernism" and "avant-garde," will acquire more specific meanings later and in process, but for now we can settle with provisional definitions of "modernism" as a period in cultural and aesthetic history defined by the uneven economic developments of industrial capitalism, and of "avant-garde" as the path-breaking artistic practices that responded to those developments and eventually helped solidify modernism into an ideology. Working with those terms, this introductory chapter sketches a theory of modernism and communism, addressing the highly mediated relationship between avant-gardes and vanguards, issuing some preliminary definitions, setting out methodological qualifications, and summarizing the historical conjuncture in which modernism was formed. It also contains a handful of illustrations taken from several poets who are not at the forefront of the following chapters, which comprise detailed engagements with three of the most recognizable modernists in poetry: Ezra Pound, William Carlos Williams, and Louis Zukofsky.



Louis Zukofsky

The subsequent chapters are designed to show the interplay between communism and a limited number of literary works that attest to those writers' sense and deployment of poetry. The strategy for reading poetry here coheres with Walter Benjamin's directive for all politically committed aesthetic criticism: because "the correct political tendency of a work includes its

literary quality, because it includes its literary tendency, we can now formulate this more precisely by saying that this literary tendency can consist either in progress or in regression in literary technique." In order to make good on the real distance between literature and politics, between aesthetic creation and the destruction of capital, between modernism and communism, the claims made by this chapter and the chapters to follow are all wagered on the hypothesis that the politics of art is invariably a matter of aesthetic production, or what Benjamin calls the quality, tendency, and technique of literature. Any literary engagement with communism must be mediated by and simultaneously make its presence felt within the material substance of literature—by and within the complex interplay of language, sound, and image. As Jacques Rancière stipulates, in a similar vein to Benjamin, "'politics of literature' means that literature 'does' politics as literature—that there is a specific link between politics as a definite way of doing and literature as a definite practice of writing." Bearing all of this in mind, our engagements with Pound, Williams, and Zukofsky, as well as with a handful of other poets, take the shape of historically embedded readings, which attend first and foremost to the specifically

literary strategies through which communism finds itself mediated into lines of modernist verse. In other words, the primary interest here is in those procedures whereby political content and revolutionary context become entangled with literary form: with questions of diction, meter, rhythm, syntax, tone, and soon. But our focus is not nearly as myopic as that makes it sound. The subsequent chapters also use their favored literary works as an occasion to map the relationships between modernism, communism, and numerous other occurrences of historical and poetic interest. For instance, the chapter on Pound discusses his investments in large-scale industry, in radio, and in militarization; the chapter on Williams discusses his latent romanticism, his theories of the imagination, his evolving sense of poetic portraiture, and his late-career interest in economics; and the chapter on Zukofsky, the poet most readily identifiable with communism, rereads his poetry as a type of science fiction, underscoring its affections for interstellar exploration and cybernetic technology.

There is a loosely geographical logic to the way these chapters have been ordered and arranged. We begin with Pound because his cosmopolitanism put him in much closer proximity to the Russian Revolution and the USSR than the other two poets, even though they were generally more sympathetic to communism's ideology. During the 1910s, Pound was conscious of inhabiting the England described by Marx half a century earlier as the epicenter of global capitalism. From Paris during the early 1920s, he heard firsthand accounts of the Russian Revolution. And, during World War II, he was deeply embedded in the far Right of a European culture that was militarily cleaving between the forces of communism and those of fascism. All of this positioned Pound as a kind of geopolitical lightning rod—in his own words, one of "the antennae of the race"—receiving communist signals and relaying them back through the conductive substance of modernism. The chapters on Williams and Zukofsky return us to American soil. The argument about Williams evolves through that poet's nativist and regional sense of modernism, to describe how the Russian Revolution and the USSR actively shaped his thinking about class in the USA and specifically in New Jersey, and goes on to examine his late absorption of Marx-inflected economics, if not actual Marxism. The argument about Zukofsky emphasizes the geographical and ideological distance between the USA and the USSR. Specifically, it begins with Zukofsky's perception of the radical differences between the American and Soviet contexts, and it explores the utopianism that results from his electrifying attempts to connect the two. After these three case studies, a brief epilogue proposes summary conclusions about the relationships between modernism and communism more generally before gesturing to an ongoing narrative of both in the ascent of postmodernism. That epilogue looks to a moment when the story of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin's Russia is eclipsed by Mao's China and Castro's Cuba, two socialist states that would enter into the political unconscious of postmodern poetry.

Pound, Williams, and Zukofsky all enjoyed exceptionally long careers, collectively spanning modernism in literature and the pre-Cold War years of state socialism in the USSR

(at least up until Nikita Khrushchev succeeded Stalin as general secretary in 1953). But the duration of these poets' literary careers notwithstanding, their names have become close to synonymous with modernism in poetry in a way that lends heuristic and polemical value to their privileged positions here as case studies. These poets are our focus because of the enormous influence they are understood to have exerted over the development of modernist poetry in America and because of the critical familiarity that influence has afforded them. But rather than implicitly endorse the myth of a monumental modernism, my intention is to reexamine already familiar episodes from the development of modernist poetry precisely because of that familiarity. The point here is to demonstrate the active presence of communism in poems where, despite the critical attention from which they have already benefited, it has somehow been overlooked or underplayed. Communism has received more critical attention in Zukofsky's writing than it has in the writing of the other two, of course, but still there are more ways to appreciate how communism seized hold of his unique aesthetic. In sum, my reading within a set of poets and poems whose claim to modernism is relatively uncontroversial is a tactical maneuver, designed to focus critical attention on elements of poetry that might have been engaged with or responsive to communism without having to make at length the case that the poems are indeed modernist. These poets and their poems are modernist, in short, because they actively respond to the cultural logics of modernity; because they register the process of modernization as incomplete, uneven, and contested; and because they use all of that to imagine a non-capitalist future. That there is a good deal of consensus on what makes each of these poets modernist will therefore maximize the critical dividends of an argument that seeks to demonstrate, through these particular bodies of work, the transformative role of communism within modernism. But another reason for settling with these three poets is that they all wrote their major works within one very specific genre: the modern epic.

Always Mediate!

One of the great temptations for dialectical criticism is to use structural homology as a means of resolving different forms into a synthetic absolute—to exploit the logic of what Louis Althusser once called "expressive causality." If, for instance, a modernist avant-garde and a communist revolution were found to be analogous, the task of the critic would be to demonstrate how these otherwise autonomous phenomena might be assailable together because they are temporally or formally analogous. As an interpretive method, this approach can be dangerously reductive in its adherence to what Hegel once cautioned against as "monochrome formalism," the kind of thinking that repeats the same interpretive formula in relation to everything it encounters and thereby approaches all things as abstract. In this instance, either the revolution would be approached as if it were an avant-garde, or the avant-garde as if it were a revolution, because the two share similarities, irrespective of that insurmountable difference between political and aesthetic forms. With each category assimilating into its opposite, a literary history that accedes to this temptation might conclude that modernism, with its various aesthetic

ruptures and antibourgeois postulates, is the aesthetic ideology in which all avant-gardes are revolutionary and therefore communist. We have already encountered this kind of argument with Badiou, but it is just as prevalent within the more specialist discourse of modernist studies.

For instance, in a pioneering book published in 2006, Martin Puchner has produced such an argument, comparing aesthetic and political manifestos based on the theoretical misconception that, within this genre, it is the manifestos' "form, not their complaints and demands, that articulates most succinctly the desires and hopes, maneuvers and strategies of modernity: to create points of no return; to make history; to fashion the future." Slavoj Žižek is particularly keen to disabuse us of any overinvestment in this kind of thinking and makes his point with reference to a particularly appurtenant anecdote. "The encounter between Leninist politics and modernist art (exemplified in the fantasy of Lenin meeting Dadaists in the Cabaret Voltaire in Zurich) cannot structurally take place; more radically," he insists, "revolutionary politics and revolutionary art move in different temporalities—although they are linked, they are two sides of the same phenomenon which, precisely as two sides, can never meet." Or, as Eric Hobsbawm is surely right to emphasize, as a materialist historian, even though the shared temporality of political vanguards and artistic avant-gardes might suggest their affiliation, the suggestion alone cannot constitute sufficient conditions to suppose a unitary circuit between them. "There is no necessary or logical connection between the two phenomena," he says, "since the assumption that what is revolutionary in the arts must also be revolutionary in politics is based on a semantic muddle." Even if modernism and communism were intimately associated, a final synthesis of the two into a single, unitary phenomenon—or, in this case, a single, abstracted form—would simply be a mystification.

A properly materialist account of modernism and communism begins here, in the affirmation of their asymptotic relationship as an incontrovertible fact. Understanding that modernist literature and communist politics can only relate by way of parallax, with each phenomenon occurring semi-autonomously from the other, is methodologically necessary for a compelling account of modernism's communism. Bearing that in mind, the present undertaking recovers the details of modernism's connection to communism without converting either category into an abstracted reflection of the other. The goal is to account for literary modernism as related and responsive but ultimately irreducible to communism. The historical simultaneities and structural analogies shared by modernism and communism will more fruitfully serve as mediations, connective pathways between the double helix of politics and art, orchestrating transferences between these two autonomous phenomena without neglecting the irreconcilable differences between them. In other words, I want to insist methodologically on the necessity of mediation: a dialectical third term that facilitates the adaption of critical analysis from one level or instance to another, or the establishment of what the economists might call a "lateral field of causality" between seemingly disparate entities. While mediation has enjoyed significant and polemical attention in materialist theory, Jameson's illustrious account is the one best suited to the

present undertaking. In his explanation, mediation announces itself as "the classical dialectical term for the establishment of relationships between, say, the formal analysis of a work of art and its social ground, or between the internal dynamics of the political state and its economic base." As a critical method, mediation is in itself a durable form of anti-capitalist thinking. As Jameson notes, mediation is not only "a device of the analyst" but also used to overcome the division between regions in social life, and in such a capacity it doubles as a psychical counterforce to the reifying divisibility of life under capital. In short, it allows us to apprehend the otherwise inaccessible force and flux of totality: "Such momentary reunification would remain purely symbolic, a mere methodological fiction, were it not understood that social life is in its fundamental reality one and indivisible, a seamless web, a single inconceivable and trans-individual process, in which there is no need to invent ways of linking language events and social upheavals or economic contradictions because on that level they were never separate from one another." In that sense, the present strategy for reading accords with the universalizing aspirations of its poetic and political subject matter — communism, to be sure, is the realization of that entanglement, the "seamless web" of totality itself, as inalienable social substance. Here, at the level of method, the medium is indeed the message.

While there will be context-specific mediations between moments in the evolution of modernist poetry and various types of communist matter, at this point I want to emphasize three circumambient or fundamental mediations that pertain to the book as a whole. To that end, the remainder of this introduction summarizes those mediations and illustrates them, using a handful of politically committed poems. With these examples, however, engagements with communism derive as much from the genre of poem as from the authors' personal experience and political commitment. That these illustrative poems are all lyrics suggests they will also be, in contradistinction to the epic, both subjective and instantaneous. As such, these poems are structured by communism in ways different from those associated with the epic. In the lyric, we should expect responses to communism to take shape as though from within a single speaking consciousness and from a particular instant in space and time. In the epic, that consciousness is more dispersed, and so communism might be grasped there from multiple perspectives or from an evolving perspective. Because the lyric is composed with this personal orientation, it is all the more likely to articulate politics in such a way that we hear a distinct political accent in the shifting cadences of its speech. While that means these poems are not as well placed to grasp anything like historical totality, they nevertheless offer clarifying insights into moments of political apprehension as subjectively decisive, when the work of mediation is laid bare.

First Mediation: Labor's Obstnacy

During modernism's flourishing, one historical contradiction above all generated the conditions of possibility for an essential mediation between American letters and Russian politics: namely, the rapid intensification of that generalized conflict between labor and capital. Specifically, labor's realization as the structural opposition to capital took shape

via a politics of tactical obstnacy, to borrow a term from Alexander Kluge and Oskar Negt, which found a powerful ally in the socialist state. The Red Scare of 1919 was the product of a genuine fear that labor in the United States was going to follow Russia into socialism. The fear was well advised, given that, after 1917, Lenin, Trotsky, and the other Bolsheviks were openly declaring their intentions of worldwide revolution, the possibility of which now seemed more real than ever. As Lenin indicated in 1918, "The American workers will not follow the bourgeoisie. They will be with us, for civil war against the bourgeoisie. The whole history of the world and of the American labor movement strengthens my conviction that this is so." While the Red Terror was being reported and condemned in newspapers across the United States, various unions and labor organizations were identifying or being identified with the Russians and preparing for a year of industrial action: "Altogether during 1919 there would be 3,600 strikes in the US, involving more than four million workers—for which it was all too easy, and convenient, to blame Bolshevik agitators." The presence of obstinate labor within American poetry predates the Russian Revolution and the formation of the USSR. However, after 1917 labor found itself catalyzed anew by the real possibility of revolution. For instance, an early poem by Carl Sandburg, written in 1916, begins with a metaphysical landscape. Its speaker observes the "blue haze and red crag" of mountains, is amazed at "endless tide manoeuvres," pauses beneath "the stars on the prairie," and is said to be always "full of thoughts." But the speaker knows he cannot reside here, because the poem belongs not to that elevated inscape but to the social reality that grounds it: "And then one day I got a true look at the Poor, millions of the Poor, patient and toiling; more patient than crags, tides, and stars; innumerable, patient as the darkness of night—and all broke, humble ruins of nations." This is a moment of demystification, an epiphany made flesh, in which the truth of social contradiction makes itself known—when "the Poor," a multitude whose anonymity here has everything to do with their stated innumerability, assert a presence more concrete and more real than any of the images the speaker might otherwise imagine. This interest in the nation's immense reserves of labor power would, after the Russian Revolution, see its object reorganize under the banners of communism. The supposed patience manifestly wears thin.

Lola Ridge composed this incendiary address as early as 1920.

They think they have tamed you, workers—
Beaten you to a tool
To scoop up hot honor
Till it be cool—
But out of the passion of the red frontiers
A great flower trembles and burns and glows
And each of its petals is a people.

The first four lines echo Marx's account of capitalist ontology as a chiasmus wherein humans become objects and objects take on a life of their own. Contracted as variable capital, the worker is degraded to the status of an inhuman "tool," whereas the product of his labor, the commodity, absorbs his humanity (what this poem refers to as "honor"),

which coagulates into the sellable object. In striking opposition to this grim reality, communism presents itself as the quintessence of life: a living, blossoming flower, prospering in "the passion of red frontiers," whose constituent workers all retain their singular petal-like integrity. Other poets worked harder to represent the devastation of labor under capital—perhaps the best poem to do this is Rukeyser's "Book of the Dead" from 1938—but the juxtaposition of labor under communism and labor under capitalism finds exemplary treatment here in Ridge.

In 1934, Richard Wright concluded a long poem by prophesying the activation of labor's revolutionary consciousness, uniting black and white workers in class solidarity against capital.


I am black and I have seen black hands
 Raised in fists of revolt, side by side with the white fists
 Of white workers,
 And some day—and it is only this which sustains me—
 Some day there shall be millions and millions of them,
 On some red day in a burst of fists on a new horizon!

This poem presents a single black subject's vision of the world and his imagination of a utopian future. It relates the revolutionary blackness of its speaker to the revolutionary class of white workers. Their common "revolt" brings them "side by side," thus projecting a future of interracial harmony but also a future contingent upon the kind of solidarity promised only by communism. So it is that the shared destiny of black and white is necessarily "red," with which the metonym of "hands" becomes that of "fists." It was a vision that did not last. When the USSR abandoned its progressive policies on race and agreed to the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the probability implied by "some day" and "some red day" became an apparent impossibility. Wright, along with Ralph Ellison and Chester Himes, would later abandon this enthusiasm for the USSR.

One year later, in 1935, this poem by Lorine Niedecker used a beachside setting and a unique visual arrangement to decry capital and affirm communism.

No retiring summer stroke
 not the dangerous parasol
 on the following sands,
 no earth under fire flood lava forecast, not the pop
 play of tax, borrow or inflate
 but the radiant, tight energy
 boring from within
 communizing fear
 into strike,
 work."

Work without end, with no foreseeable reprieve, as the scorched beachscape of both finance capital and the leisure class (punned together in "the pop play of tax, borrow or inflate") solidifies like cooling "lava," into which no "dangerous parasol" can be driven. The first word of the first four lines modulates on negation, rhyming and repeating "no," "not," and "on," before the poem introduces



El Lissitzky

a new sound that also negates: "but," which alliterates that negation with the activity conveyed by the subsequent "boring." With the introduction of communism, a "radiant, tight energy," the poem changes sound and, with each line narrower than the one above it, becomes the tip of that parasol, sharpening into a monosyllabic point. The shape of this poem is an American answer to El Lissitzky's Red Wedge, which is here ready to "strike" against the hard-baked ground of capital. That word "strike" should be read for its polysemy; like "pop" and "inflate," it describes both a beachside activity and an economic or political operation—the strike, famously affirmed by Rosa Luxemburg as central to any sort of revolutionary politics. "The mass strike," she had written in 1906, "is the first natural, impulsive form of every great revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the more highly developed the antagonism is between capital and labour, the more effective and decisive must mass strikes become." Here, at the parasol's tip, its sharpest point, we find ourselves back with the labor force whose revolutionary potential has been named in the lines from Ridge and Wright.

While anticommunism's internal manifestation only intensified that preexisting antipathy between capital and the organization of labor, externally, socialist states were seen as a serious threat to economic imperialism, which in the twentieth century constituted the new kind of political rule: "Instead of aiming for territorial expansion along the lines of old empires, US military interventions abroad were primarily aimed at preventing the closure of particular

places or whole regions of the globe to capital accumulation." If 1919 was the year in which these two interrelated fears, of the communist influence over American workers and of an aggressively anti-capitalist state in the USSR, first coincided to marshal an explicitly anticommunist culture, these fears would come to a head with the "red decade" in the 1930s. Here is Michael Denning's summary of this conjuncture: "The years of depression and war saw a prolonged 'war of position' between political forces trying to conserve the existing structures of society and the forces of opposition, who were trying to create a new historical bloc, a new balance of forces." Indeed, the coincidence of these events resulted in the mainstream media, elected statesmen, business owners, and self-appointed patriots together developing a bloodily hostile obsession with the quasi-socialist organizations whose members were sought out and systematically assaulted or executed. If avant-garde modernism is theoretically anti-capitalist, then modernist poetry in America was drawn into determining relationships with communism by way of capital's antithesis, namely, labor, which at that point in history identified communism as the greatest living ally to itself. "If," writes Denning, "the metaphor of the front suggests a place where contending forces meet, the complementary metaphor of the conjuncture suggests the time of the battle."

What is less apparent in those poems from Sandburg, Ridge, Wright, and Niedecker, then, is the violent antagonism with which communism and communists were met when capital retaliated against labor. But other poets knew and wrote about this too. To cite just one example, Kenneth Fearing accounts for the extirpation of communists with an aesthetic that has been accurately described as "Marxist noir," a subgeneric peculiarity that recasts technological shock and economic unevenness within the hard-boiled settings of pulp fiction. In these lines, from a poem published in 1935, communist commitment correlates with mortal imperilment.

Nevertheless, we know; as every turn is measured;
as
every unavoidable risk is known;
as nevertheless, the flesh grows old, dies, dies in its
only life, is gone;
the reflection goes from the mirror; as the shadow,
of even a Communist, is gone from the wall;
as nevertheless, the current is thrown and the
wheels
revolve; and nevertheless, as the word is
spoken and the wheat grows tall and the ships
sail on —

The repeated word "nevertheless" maintains the fatalism that introduces each of these four overlapping vignettes. Taken as a whole, these lines depict the experience of capitalism in 1930s America. From the perspective of labor, "every turn is measured" and "every unavoidable risk is known," and there is no alternative to the economically circumscribed cycle of exploitation, depredation, and death. It is a situation from which the spectral figure of the communist—here, a proper noun—has abruptly and mysteriously "gone," as though to emphasize the structural

foreclosure of anything antithetical to the iron law of the market. In the absence of communism, capital continues to produce and circulate its commodities: "the wheat grows tall and the ships sail on." These are granted more vitality than the dying flesh that surrounds them, whose subsistence ("only life") has been relegated to a mere supporting role for the market. The technological metaphor, "the current is thrown," not only gives expression to the mechanized sphere of production and circulation but also conjures up a specific event in the cultural history of the Popular Front that feeds into the already chilling intensity of these lines. It is, of course, an allusion to Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, two left-wing radicals who were unjustly executed in 1927, despite mass protests led by communists.

Second Mediation: The Socialist State

After 1917, the world came to know what Bruno Bosteels calls "the actuality of communism," namely, the means by which communism finds "inscription in a concrete body, the collective flesh and thought of an internationalist political subjectivity." Even if socialist stagism is neither the ideal nor the only means of building communism, in the years after the Russian Revolution it was indeed the socialist state that embodied "the real movement" whose ambition was to abolish capitalism the world over. Although that abolition was ultimately unrealized, we can nevertheless identify a widespread belief in the socialist state's capacity for transformation operating in multiple poems, many of which lovingly idealize an imagined Russia. This, to be sure, is what Steven Lee has described as the ineluctable allure of Moscow during the 1920s and 1930s, its "magical, even religious significance for many minority and non-Western artists and writers," to whose number we might add the socially marginalized in general.

That attraction is what we encounter, for instance, when in 1932 H. H. Lewis enthusiastically confirmed the political commitment of his verse.

I'm always thinking of Russia
I can't keep her out of my head
I don't give a damn for Uncle Sham.
I'm a left wing radical Red."

These lines are intentionally uncomplicated, and much of their pleasure arises from what Cary Nelson describes as the third line's "wilfully childish pun," which levels its charge against the national personification of the American government. The internal rhymes of that third line, as well as the end rhymes of the second and fourth line, make this resemble that most playful of forms, the limerick, which endorses a willful simplicity. If the alliterations between "Russia," "radical," and "red" sonically register a coherent political through-line for the poem, the form itself is an effect of the speaker's class alignment, insofar as Lewis sought to compose verse in the vernacular language of American workers, placing his poetry and its speaker in direct confrontation with its social and literary situation. "This isn't Auden or Spender," writes William Carlos Williams. "This is a Missouri farmhand, first cousin to a mule, at one dollar a day. If Lewis' subject matter should distress some readers, it's about time they learned what makes their fruits and vegetables come to ripeness for them—and what kind

of thoughts their cultivation breeds in a man of revolutionary inheritance."

While, like Lewis, most American poets observed communism from afar, as a distinctly Russian or European phenomenon, and while some immersed themselves in its local manifestations through the Popular Front, several others bridged the geopolitical divide by traveling from the United States to the Soviet Union with the express purpose of experiencing the new social order firsthand. Langston Hughes visited the USSR in 1932 and composed several poems about his experience with and within the socialist state. These include a friendly address to a personified revolution ("You're the very best friend," he tells it, "I ever had") and, from the perspective of the post-capitalist émigré, this excited farewell to conservative dogmatism:



Langston Hughes

Kings, generals, robbers, and killers—
Even to the Tsar and the Cossacks,
Even to Rockefeller's Church,
Even to THE SATURDAY EVENING POST.
GOODBYE, CHRIST
Goodbye,
Christ Jesus Lord God Jehova,
Beat it on away from here now.
Make way for a new guy with no religion at all—
A real guy named
Marx Communist Lenin Peasant Stalin Worker
ME—
I said, ME!

"The poetic voice that Hughes creates," writes James Smethurst on the poet's shifting aesthetic through the 1930s, "is not that of the individual narratorial consciousness, but of a simultaneously unitary and multiple urban community." This verse, so free and open with its expostulatory rhythm and its capitalized, shouted emphases, simulates the demotic voice, meshing an African American idiom with the Soviet possibility. The first sentence, stretched across four lines, nominates the fixtures of prerevolutionary Russia and of capitalist America, readily associating the superannuated embodiments of Russian absolutism with "Rockefeller's Church," an institute that conceals the enormous wealth of the Rockefeller family with the ideological mask of organized religion. Given that these lines were penned in the USSR, it is likely that their dismissal of the church stemmed from the Bolsheviks' punitive suppression of organized religion, which Lenin and Stalin both assumed was serving as a front for the residual powers of absolutism. In the late 1920s the Soviet regime suspended all church

activities, from charity to procession, with the singular exception of closed religious services: "Enthusiastic Komsomols and activists from the League of the Militant Godless engaged in acts of iconoclasm and vandalism, whilst church bells were melted down and valuables confiscated." In the cultural space formerly occupied by religion, which has been cleared away by revolution, the poem asserts the primacy of a "new" and "real guy," who speaks the American lingo but identifies with the figureheads of the USSR, which are delivered as proper nouns on a line of their own, culminating in the speaker's resounding, pronominal identification with all of them. But this overwhelmingly positive identification was not to be shared by all poets who visited the USSR.

Though he was certainly not a minority figure like Lewis or Hughes, E. E. Cummings traveled to the USSR in 1935. Cummings was initially enthusiastic about communism, writing pro-communist poems and letters of endorsement immediately after the Russian Revolution and throughout the 1920s. But what he encountered in the USSR, under the rulership of Stalin, ultimately crushed that enthusiasm. As he would write to Pound, about a decade later, "It is all very well and to view it in theory, but unless a theory works for the betterment of the human race and one sees HOW IT WORKS by ACTUAL LIVING, it is no good." One particularly crude and ostensibly simple poem, written that year, is an expedient indicator of Cummings's reaction against the socialists' attempts to implement communism through extreme measures.

kumrads die because they're told)
kumrads die before they're old
(kumrads aren't afraid to die
kumrads don't
and kumrads won't
believe in life) and death knows whie
(all good kumrads you can tell
by their altruistic smell
moscow pipes good kumrads dance)
kumrads enjoy
s.freud knows whoy
the hope that you may mess your pance
every kumrad is a bit
of quite unmitigated hate
(travelling in a futile groove
god knows why)
and so do i
(because they are afraid to love

"hope that you may mess your pance." The irony does not pass unnoticed. As Cummings was probably aware, "s.freud" famously emphasized the association between money and anal eroticism, between gold and feces, which can be extrapolated into a determinant relationship between the accumulation of capital and the kind of excremental uncleanness described here. Finally, the third sextain appears to maintain the rhyme scheme of the first two, but there are some differences that amount to its relaxation: the rhyme between "bit" and "hate" is broken by incompatible vowel sounds, and the rhyme between "groove" and "love" requires preposterous mispronunciation.

There is an argument to be made that this final sextain's departure from the determining fixity of rhyme and its notable omission of a final clinching parenthesis reflect the belated introduction of the poem's speaking "i" and the concept of "love," neither of which want to be constrained by the communism this poem seeks to reject. Unlike the communists who travel "in a futile groove," perhaps figured here by the constrictive and almost colonic parentheses, the poem's speaker expects a kind of individuated freedom. Even though these lines rely on a conflation of the totalitarian state with its inhabitants and ideologies, and a conflation that is evidently influenced by an American sense of individualism, their technical density is first and foremost an index to the poet's understanding of the difference between the American and Soviet states, as underscored by capital.



e. e. cummings

What makes these lines critically interesting is the way that communism, even as the poet seeks to distance himself from it, registers on the poem's technical apparatus. The first sextain reconfigures the self-sacrificial heroism of socialists as little more than the mindless commitment to a death cult. Its predictable, masculine rhymes ("told" and "old," "don't" and "won't," "die" and "whie") require that each line terminate in accordance with preceding terminations, as though these lines and their subjects, the willing "kumrads," have all been ordered to that end. It is thus that the rhyme scheme harmonizes with the unquestioning fatalism the poem describes as the defining feature of all "kumrads." The fatalism of the first sextain is then referred to in the second, in the line "moscow pipes good kumrads dance," which also nominates the fatalistic effect sustained by this isomorphic rhyme scheme. The controlling force of "moscow" is then compared with psychical development, suggesting that each "kumrad" is not just politically but also psychically susceptible to his or her own "altruistic smell."

Third Mediation: Technology

Our third meditation resides in a more speculative argument, which posits that the poets themselves discovered and developed an unstable analogy between poetic

technique and manufacture technology—that they sensed a kinship between their images and their end-stops and their rhymes, on the one hand, and the machinery of industrial production, on the other. "Art," writes Theodor Adorno, "is modern when, by its mode of experience and as the expression of the crisis of experience, it absorbs what industrialization has developed under the given relations of production." That modern art's technological inflow predisposes it toward communism is particularly true of the historical avant-gardes, which materialize in what Adorno accurately describes as "an age in which the real possibility of utopia—that given the level of productive forces the earth could here and now be paradise—converges with the possibility of total catastrophe." My hypothesis for this third mediation is that, by using literary technique to distinguish between itself and the extant conditions of production or even its own social content, poetry generates "an image that is not a copy of the event but a cipher of its potential." The historical name of this potential is surely communism—a utopian mode of production that, by way of world-historical irony, only becomes a probable reality once the "productive forces" of capitalism have evolved to such an extent that they threaten history with the "total catastrophe" of absolute subsumption.

This mediation is not an attempt to suggest that extraliterary technological matter leads directly to specific formal innovations or that literary technique successfully mimics industrial technology. Rather, the relationship between technique and technology is defined by a kind of pathos. While the poets themselves were exploring this relationship, it remains irreducible that literary technique will only ever correspond to industrial technology in the loosest possible sense. David Trotter's media-historical use of the term "cool" might help make this point. For him, this term describes the human subject's conscious occupation of the "slack" between technological materiality and codified information, between machines and their messages: "Cool demonstrates that the alignment between technique and technology that has been the premise of both industrialism and postindustrialism need not be precise, or complete. Technique, in short, can be diverted, momentarily, as it slackens or slacks off." In this view, literary or cultural technique re-frames itself "not (only) as obedience to the laws of nature and their social enforcement, but as a 'reflection upon those laws.'" That is what we encounter with this third mediation—not a strict alignment or determination but a reflexively "slack" relationship, which animates form as well as, and sometimes even primarily, a poem's theme, topic, and content. While this might still seem densely theoretical, insecure in its relationship to the texts, the following comparison between two well-known examples taken from outside of American literature should help concretize the operations of a specifically technological mediation.

It might be obvious enough that Vladimir Mayakovsky's wonderment at the seemingly infinite potential of socialist technology is more receptive to communism than F. T. Marinetti's libidinal embrace of capitalism's military-industrial complex, even though both find expression through an array of techniques classifiable as futurism, perhaps the most technologically obsessed strand of avant-

garde modernism. There is, to be sure, a fundamental ideological difference between the futurism of Mayakovsky and the futurism of Marinetti: whereas the former aimed to innovate a poetry that would capture something of capitalism's utopian alternative in communism as it had been made possible by socialism, the latter's innovations consistently allied his poetry with the probable future of capitalist progress as it accelerated headlong into fascism. While that differentiation between the two goes too far to be useful for this particular demonstration, here we can nevertheless confirm that both poets engineered a similar break with their social and literary situations, and because of this they both found themselves associated with communism. While Mayakovsky used futurism to endorse communism, Marinetti explicitly defined his futurism against it, as its competition, doing so with the irony of all fascist ideologies, precisely by using communism's rhetorical means. By aiming to be contemporaneous with or incorporate a historical situation that it can never fully abide, and to present a vision of the future, a poem is not necessarily guaranteed a positive relationship with communism. Rather, it enters the historical space of utopianism—which, during the time of modernism, was dominantly occupied by a socialist state aspiring for communism. As the old structuralist argument might have it, literary style serves as "a projected solution, on the aesthetic or imaginary level, to a genuinely contradictory situation in the concrete world of everyday social life." If this is true, we need not overstate how helpful a really existing socialism was to that imaginary resolution.



Vladimir Mayakovsky

Like those two futurists, our three poets—Pound, Williams, and Zukofsky—are all linked by a shared fascination with the meaning of technology as it is torn between capitalist ideology and utopian potential. This is yet one more reason why our focus in this study is primarily on the modern epic. Epic poems, with their matchless polyphony, are exemplarily capable of agglomerating multiple other forms within themselves, and in modernism those forms frequently bear a technological inflection. It is here, within the modern epic, that poetry's adaptive responses to the first machine age find a literary space in which to combine and comeingle, to project critical visions of the present and utopian visions of the future that are variously shaped by communism. That is what we can see in the evolution of Pound's vortex-images relative to industrial turbines, in his emulations of radio voice, and in his satire on the weapons trade. We can also

see it in the transformation of Williams's poetic line, which responds to the reifying technologies of the cultural industry, in the photomechanical development of his literary portraiture, and in his belated discovery of economics as a means of understanding geographical scale. And, finally, we can see it in the way Zukofsky identifies his verse explicitly with the USSR's newly liberated means of production, propelling his poetry into the space of a science fiction equally interested in extraterrestrial exploration and cybernetic advancement. In all of these cases, poetic technique forces distance between the actualities of technology under capitalism and its utopian potential, always doing so from within the inclusive space of the modern epic.

Traveling through the channels established by these three mediations—predicated on labor, geopolitics, and technology—the various forms of communism coursed outward from revolutionary Russia to infuse the wellsprings of modernist literary production in the United States. There it would find a destination in avant-garde and artistic culture more generally, by way of journals and magazines and manifestoes, to be given new expression in the aesthetic substance of literature. Within this context, the modern epic attempted to grasp the vast field of operations in which capitalism and communism rival one another as two parts of historical totality. Simultaneously, the distance between vanguards and avant-gardes would diminish as the two were drawn together in the activation of a generic predisposition: the calling forth of avant-garde literature's inherent political potentiality, which preternaturally responds to the socialist state with its communist aspirations as though the two are long-lost twins. What this study hopes for, then, is to simultaneously confirm and expand upon T. J. Clark's remarkable conjecture that modernism "sensed socialism was its shadow—that it too was engaged in a desperate, and probably futile, struggle to imagine modernity otherwise. But of course, all of this only proves meaningful provided it can be convincingly demonstrated to have impressed itself on the texts themselves and that the poems did indeed gaze upon their socialist shadow, which is precisely what we are now going to see in the epic verse of Pound, Williams, and Zukofsky.


Our story began in 1917, with the dawning of a red sun over Moscow. We witnessed the Russian Revolution and its creation of the socialist state, viewing those events from the perspective of its own personalities and from that of poets in the United States. Since then we have seen major power shifts in the USSR—from Vladimir Lenin to Joseph Stalin, with Leon Trotsky recording the changes from near and afar—and we have also seen this socialist sequence illuminate the relations of production on the other side of the globe, where capitalism retained its dispensation. This book has aimed to demonstrate some of the ways that modernism engaged with communism as amplified by the Russian Revolution and the USSR. Its thesis—that modernist literature found a complicated political analogue in communism—was introduced as a theoretical relationship, motivated by the modern epic's totalizing impulse and by an anti-capitalist alliance between avant-gardes and vanguards. That theoretical relationship was drawn into actuality by a series of mediations, comprising the obstinacy of labor, the

socialist state, and an investment in technological immanence, which together seal the relationship between modernism and communism as historical fact. This thesis has been pursued across three very different though consistently modern epics, in which communism entered and transformed the poetry and poetics of Ezra Pound, William Carlos Williams, and Louis Zukofsky.

The writers of our chosen epics moved to remodel the genre's presentational strategies in an attempt to apprehend a world that had been split in two by adversarial modes of production. All three evolved poetic form in such ways as to capture the world-historical antagonism between capitalism and communism. And, of course, these two forces were not only modes of production. For our poets, the antagonism shaded into geopolitical ideologies, broader views on reality and ways of living daily life, and above all the dreams of an uncertain future. The modern epic did not simply welcome or denounce communism. Instead, it attempted to map the historical totality of which communism had become a significant part, thus synthesizing a vast array of historical impressions into its ever-evolving form. Moreover, it did so via poetic reconfigurations of productive and reproductive technology, the utopian potential for which remained and remains unrealized under capitalism. Indeed, whether determinately or not, communism reverberated through the aesthetic machinery specific to the modern epic: in each chapter we have seen the various ways that it seized upon or was seized by modernist poetry. Communism thus engineered a literary recalibration in admixture with several other forces. The most prominent of these forces has been capitalism, which conditioned the lived reality of the poets we have encountered and which not only rivaled communism but also provided the grounds of possibility on which a future communism might have taken place, even while it actively foreclosed that potential.

The study concludes at a moment in history, not long after World War II, when the USSR had become a very different entity from the one that Lenin and Trotsky intended or Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels might have imagined. In the introduction, I mentioned that this historical moment would be the endpoint to a particular narrative in the relationship between communism and modernism, one that is bound up in the historical process of socialism. As Eric Hobsbawm once recalled, Stalin's mode of authoritarianism "would have outraged Lenin and the Old Bolsheviks, not to mention Marx." What the USSR mutated into under Stalin's reign curtailed much of the already conflicted enthusiasm that multiple poets harbored for the socialist state and, too, for that state's communist aspirations. This is true of our three case studies. Pound's engagement with the USSR had become predominantly satirical, and this satire was directed at Stalinism. Williams refrained from referencing the USSR directly in his modern epic, save for a belated mention of Stalinist atrocities. And, after modeling a canzone on Marx's theory of the commodity in the ninth part of his epic, Zukofsky would also disarticulate his poetry from the politics it had been invested in up until that point, so as to retrain his literary focus on Spinozan philosophy and domestic life. Of course, to say that this moment is an endpoint for communism as a whole would be overplaying the significance of Stalin

and his state apparatus. The idea of communism was still alive and well in the USSR, in the Popular Front, and in various other manifestations across numerous global territories. But for these profoundly influential modernists, whose interest in communism was so fundamentally bound up in the USSR, Stalin made socialism untenable, and an untenable socialism meant an increasingly unlikely communism. What appears to be a shared sentiment here is exemplified by British poet Basil Bunting in a 1936 letter to Pound: "I'd rather have a revolution, blood and skulls, but since Stalin has reduced himself to a larger Hitler and pretty good imitation of someone else, I doubt whether I could work with communists except for exceedingly strictly limited objects and there's no other revolutionary party in sight."



William Carlos Williams

And yet, other revolutionary parties soon reared into view, leaping into history in a way that was capable of restarting this dialectic of communism and avant-garde poetry all over again. Even though the political sequence inaugurated in 1917 had been compromised beyond ideological recuperation, China was soon to present itself as a principal location for the next communist event of a comparable magnitude. Leszek Kotakowski outlines the historical coordinates. "Some characteristic features of Chinese as opposed to Russian Communism were already visible in the late 1920s," he writes. "It was only after the Chinese Communists' victory in 1949, however, that their ideology, including in particular Mao's utopian vision, began to take on a definite form." This transposition of political energy and utopian enthusiasm inaugurates the second stage of what Slavoj Žižek describes as the "displacement" internal to historical communism, the dynamic of which is

"concentrated in two great passages (or, rather, violent cuts): the passage from Marx to Lenin, as well as the passage from Lenin to Mao." Like the Russian Revolution, the advent of Chinese communism would be geographically and culturally specific, and its arrival at state socialism can be traced back to regional origins, in the Jinggang Mountains, where Mao Zedong first rallied an army of socialist guerrillas in the late 1920s. Radically dissimilar to Russia's prerevolutionary situation, which was an absolutist world defined by economic power's concentration in the nation's capital, these variegated provinces served as a germinal site for the Red Army that would seize Beijing twenty years later, thereby completing the discontinuous passage between Lenin's Russia and Mao's China.

The impact of communism's geopolitical displacement from Russia to China is visible in avant-garde poetry from the postwar period. Zukofsky, for instance, seems to have sensed it from as early as 1930: "The roving Red bands of South China," he writes. "The poor would give to the poor,/when incited." But it is Charles Olson's "The Kingfishers," first published in 1949, that provides the first notable instance of American poetry viewing Russia and China as bound together by political succession.

I thought of the Eon the stone, and of what Mao
said
la lumiere"
but the kingfisher
de l'aurore"
but the kingfisher flew west
est devant nous!
he got the color of his breast
from the heat of the setting sun!

These lines capture the transnational conveyance of communism. The words from Mao, quoted in the French through which Olson first encountered them, adapt an epic method from Pound to represent a new dawn in the Far East—another red sun. Flying in the opposite direction and on indented lines, the poem's eponymous kingfisher travels west, toward the USSR and into what the poem elsewhere describes as an "apparent darkness (the whiteness which covers all)."¹ Perry Anderson's historical interpretation of these lines is illuminating. "Contemporary revolution," writes Anderson, "came from the East, but America was subjoined to Asia: the colours of dawn in China and of the flight into the West reflected the light of a single orbit." For Olson, the sun was setting on the USSR just as it was rising over China. The poem bears witness to that realization.

Olson may have been the first poet to incorporate this historical transition, but he was not the last. Communism's political succession from Russia to China makes its impression elsewhere in postwar poetry, most notably in Allen Ginsberg's "Kaddish," a poem written for his dead mother. While the poem recalls Naomi Ginsberg's commitment to communism and her affection for the Russian Revolution, the geopolitical succession appears early on, materializing on the remote horizon of an apocalyptic daydream.

Dreaming back thru life, Your time—and mine
accelerated toward Apocalypse, The final
moment—the flowing burning in the Day—and
what comes after, looking back on the mind itself
that saw an American city a flash away, and the
great dream of Me or China, or you and a
phantom Russia, or a crumpled bed that never
existed—like a poem in the dark—escaped back
to Oblivion—

There are shades of Zukofsky's "The" in these lines, written in 1956, in the maternal connection to Russia, but this time the distance between poet and revolution is even more pronounced. Here communism occupies a seemingly impossible time and place—an unimaginable future projected from a now-distant past as dreamt about in the poem's present. It is a backward glance at looking forward. Here and now, either speaker, "Me" or a new socialist state, "China," will sustain "the great dream" once embodied in what has become "a phantom Russia." But it will be a dream and nothing more. For the American poet, communism, whether in China or in Russia, remains as good as fantasy—it is tied to a domestic image "that never existed," in a purely hypothetical space-time somewhere between "Apocalypse" and "Oblivion." Of course, Mao's China would appear elsewhere in Ginsberg's poetry, and in greater detail, but here that most venerated of all the postwar poets announces sensitivity not only to the shift from Russia to China but also to just how distant that sequence was from the "mind itself that saw an American city." Or so Robert Duncan would muse several years later, thinking similarly about the intractable division between the United States and Mao's China, rendered apparent "in the phantasm of a blinding fear of communism, of the primal peoples of the world, and of the depths of Asia. And from China," he insists, triangulating those three forces, "in the inspired poetry of Mao Tse-tung, there were signs of the ancient empire of the Mongols reawakening."

Emerging from a comparably guerrilla context but approximately one decade after Mao entered Beijing, the Cuban Revolution as engineered by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara also found its way into American poetry and poetics. While Amiri Baraka, in "Cuba Libre," and Lawrence Ferlinghetti, in "Poet's Notes on Cuba," occupy themselves with this socialist state, it is once again Ginsberg who provides the most recognizable answer, in his letter-manifesto of 1961, "Prose Contribution to Cuban Revolution," in which he links a perceived problem with political transformation to the socialist projects of "Russia, China, Cuba." Here the poet asks just what the Cuban revolution can achieve, not for class and government and economy, but for being itself.

What to do about Cuba? Can the world Reality (as we know it through consciousness controlled by the Cortex part of the brain) be improved? Or, with expanded population & increasing need for social organization and control & centralization & standardization & socialization & removal of hidden power controllers (capitalism), will we in the long run doom man to life within a fixed and universal monopoly on reality (on materialist level) by a unison of cortex-controlled consciousness that will regulate our Being's

[illegible]

Cummings' relationship to the Classics must be situated within his modernist context. Cummings' particular admiration for Sappho, for example, and his experimentation while at Harvard with Alcaic and Sapphic metres, shows him to be in step with his 1910s contemporaries, especially H.D. and Amy Lowell, who turned to Sappho for a poetic voice which they saw as both hard and pure. Also at Harvard, Cummings came under the influence of Pound's early poetry and followed the latest in developments in Imagism and Futurism. He read *Des Imagistes* and owned a copy of *Blast*. As we will see in Chapter 5, Pound's Imagism, as well as Debussy's music and the classicism of Freud, fed into Cummings' unique take on pagan revival. Many of Cummings' theories of art are articulated with Greek art on



the one hand and Cézanne on the other as the two anchoring points of reference. Cummings' self-fashioning as a modernist lyric poet, and his perspectives on Joyce, Eliot, and Pound, find expression through a dialogue with classical forms and themes.

Cummings is a modernist. He has been relegated out of the mainstream study of modernism simply because he is not considered to be a serious poet in many scholarly circles. But modernism was his literary world.³ A decisive factor in his early literary success was the support of *The Dial*, the New York literary magazine which stood at the forefront of American modernism and also served as a major point of contact with European modernism. (It was *The Dial* that first published *The Waste Land* in America.) In Paris, where Cummings lived for two and half years in the early 1920s, his place was likewise among the modernists. In 1924, the Parisian literary magazine, *The Transatlantic Review*, published four of Cummings' poems in its first number; it also (during its one year of existence) published excerpts from Pound's *Cantos* and Joyce's *Finnegan Wake* (then, *Work in Progress*).⁵ Laura Riding and Robert Graves, in their *Survey of Modernist Poetry* (1927), devoted a whole chapter to 'William Shakespeare and E.E. Cummings: A Study in Original Punctuation and Spelling'. For them, Cummings is

the primary example of the misunderstood modernist, and to defend him is to defend the modernist movement. 'The objections that are raised against the "freakishness" of modernist poetry are usually supported by quotations from poems by E.E. Cummings and others which are not only difficult in construction and reference but are printed queerly on the page:

Any case that is to be made for Cummings as a poet has to be made for Cummings as a modernist. It is not a case of trying to force scholarship to take Cummings seriously by labelling him as a modernist. It is simply that he was a modernist, and so his poetry either stands or falls within that literary context.

Some Cummings specialists have sought to place him as part-modernist and part-Romantic, but as not fully either. The principle early champion of this reading of Cummings, Norman Friedman, meant it as a wider challenge to the strict scholarly division between modernism and Romanticism: 'many critics have been unable to grasp the meaning of Cummings' art because Cummings is a modern Romantic and they have been unable to understand the significance of Romanticism and the import of its relationship to the Modernist

tradition'. However, because Friedman did not seriously pursue a wider rereading of modernism, he unintentionally inaugurated a tendency among Cummings experts to remove Cummings from

full participation in the modernist scene by insisting that he is only part-modernist because he is part-Romantic, and perhaps part-Transcendentalist, part-individual, part-uncategorizable, and more. At times, Cummings scholars have even rejected Cummings' own characterization of his work as modernist: 'A third style [in Cummings' poetry] which had been emerging has been called "modernist," even by Cummings himself. This term is unsatisfactory ...'.

Modernism is not a straightjacket, and to divide Cummings in this way from his contemporaries does not do him, or his texts, any favors. Moreover, students of modernism have by now been looking for half a century, and are still looking with increasing interest, at modernism's connections with Romantic and Decadent writing. With looser constructions of the strands feeding into early modernism, it is easier to talk about Cummings' place in the modernist world.

One thing which does, however, distinguish Cummings from some modernist voices (including Pound, Eliot, and Joyce) is his personal participation in the Great War. Cummings served in France in 1917 as a volunteer ambulance driver. He and his friend, William Slater Brown, aroused suspicion because of their preference for socializing with the French rather than with their fellow Americans, and because of

Brown's frank and hot-headed letters home, which attracted the notice of the French censors. The pair were arrested and imprisoned for three months by the French authorities on the grounds that they were 'undesirable in the war zone' and 'a suspected threat to national security'. Cummings' novelized account of his imprisonment, *The Enormous Room*, was his first major published work. With more loyalty than perspicacity, Cummings' first biographer confidently asserts that 'my readers as well as I may be hard put to it to name a book published in 1922 which has lasted at all or lasted as well'. Such a claim merits a smile. Cummings himself—as we will see—grasped the status of *Ulysses* and *The Waste Land* as well as anyone, and recognized it earlier than most. But it is true enough that 1922 was a significant year for him, being not only the year in which *The Enormous Room* was published but also the year in which he assembled the manuscript for his first solo volume of poems, *Tulips & Chimneys*.

Cummings and modernism is a tangled topic, but not a new one. On the subject of Cummings and modernism, therefore, I tap into an ongoing discussion. But I also take the more unusual step of considering Cummings as a poet of the Great War.

In spite of his numerous war poems—and in spite of the role of *The Enormous Room* in launching Cummings as a writer—Cummings is seldom thought of as a war poet. The side of Cummings' poetry that most readers remember is the poetry of the small 'i', the scattering of letters to create an image on the page, the interest in childhood, play, and spring. However, a study of Cummings and the Classics leads us towards the more ambivalent and unsettled war poems in which the status of the classical world is threatened by war, and a darker, more violent underbelly to the classical inheritance is exposed.

In Gregory's comprehensive reassessment of H.D., H.D. and Hellenism, she argues that: 'Hellenism seems for her always contextualized by war. This is not merely a matter of H.D.'s own biography, in which her shared hellenic aspirations were shattered by her experience of World War I. Rather, hellenism itself seems intrinsically linked to and brought into definition by wars, and the classic as a concept is bound to the notion of recurrent cultural catastrophe.' The Hellenism described here by Gregory is not exactly what Hellenism meant for Cummings, but it is comparably true that Cummings' Hellenism was linked to war. A comparison of the subsection 'Songs' from Cummings' *Tulips & Chimneys* with H.D.'s *Sea Garden* brings out both shared and divergent aspects of their respective Hellenisms. Both poets use classical spaces and classical time to create the erotic charge which attends the yearning for death and dissolution. Continuing these themes, Next I look at Cummings' *carpe diem* poetry of seduction in a post-war context against a backdrop of death.

[E.E. Cummings' Modernism and the Classics](#) also includes an edition of poetry and prose by Cummings which relates to his engagement with the classical world. Although I refer to this material throughout my discussion of Cummings and the Classics, I have placed Cummings' own work in a separate section at the end, so that readers can more easily flip to it, or read it separately.

The main part of the poetry consists of seventeen translations from the Classics, written while Cummings was a student at Harvard. Of these seventeen translations, ten have never before appeared in print and a further two have only appeared within a previous scholarly article (by the late R.S. Kennedy), and are not included in any volume of Cummings' work. Also published here for the first time is a short poem written in *Alcaics*, which can be added to the published 'Sapphics' for a fuller sense of Cummings' interest in classical form and metre.

The final poem included among this previously unpublished work is a parody of T.S. Eliot's *The Waste Land*. This is a poem in five sections, two of which were excerpted and published in *Etcetera: The Unpublished Poems* (1983). The editors of *Etcetera* either did not realize or did not indicate to the reader that the two texts which they published were not composed to stand alone, but rather served as parts I and III of the parody. The existence of this parody of *The Waste Land* by Cummings has not, to my knowledge, been previously noted. It was written in the 1920s and so stands among the earliest of such parodies. It is a thrilling text—a chance to investigate Cummings' perspective on Eliot (and Pound, Joyce, and others), and—for the purposes of this book—a chance to see, through the poem's many classical allusions, a very different side to Cummings' ideas about modernism and the Classics.

In addition to the poetry, there are three short pieces of previously unpublished prose. The first of these is a preface to Cummings' translation from Sophocles' *Electra*, which offers a direct statement of his method and aims as a translator. The second is an essay on 'The Greek Spirit' written for one of his classes at Harvard. The essay articulates Cummings' ideas about the reception of the Classics by new generations of readers and comments on the relationship between classical literature and 'Futurism' (a term which Cummings there uses loosely). Finally, a short story, 'The Young Faun', which was also written at Harvard, provides a new insight into Cummings' Harvard-era paganism and its relationship to the sexuality explored in his early poetry.

All of the unpublished material dates to Cummings' time at Harvard, with the exception of the parody of *The Waste Land*, which is nevertheless still early (probably late 1922/1923). The opportunity to work with this new material has naturally pulled the focus of this book towards the earlier portion of Cummings' poetic corpus. I have tried to give this previously unpublished work the frame that it deserves, by examining the classical themes which emerged from Cummings' Harvard years, the use in Cummings' early poems of phrases and ideas first worked out in his classical translations, and the influence of specific classical authors read at Harvard on Cummings' developing voice.

In the 1950s, in the last decade of his life, Cummings returned to many of the themes which had preoccupied him during his earliest productive years, including a refashioned version of the paganism of his youth. His relationship with Homer resurfaced in his late poetry, and some of the Anglophone authors whose influence affected his early reading of the Classics—Milton, Blake, Pound—also resurfaced. This full-circle return to his earlier literary

interests makes it useful to draw in discussion of Cummings' late work. Cummings' middle period, on the other hand, takes different directions. I have referred at various points to work from throughout Cummings' life, but I have not provided a sustained discussion specifically focused on the classical dimensions of *Him* (1927), *Anthropos* (1930), *EIMI* (1933), or other mid-period works. I say a little more about this in the Afterword.

This book's emphasis on Cummings' early work means that many of the published poems which I discuss in depth are either from Cummings' first published solo volume of poetry, *Tulips & Chimneys*, or they are poems of early date from *Etcetera: The Unpublished Poems* (1983)—a posthumous volume of poems selected from Cummings' papers by



E.E. Cummings' Marion

George J. Firmage and R.S. Kennedy. I wish to clarify here at the outset a key point about *Tulips & Chimneys*.

Tulips & Chimneys has a complicated history. It was completed by Cummings in 1922, when he finalized the selection of poems and the order and groupings in which they were to appear. The volume was then published by Thomas Seltzer in 1923 as *Tulips and Chimneys*. Suffering at the hands of an unsympathetic publisher, it contained only sixty-six of the one hundred and fifty-two poems which Cummings had wished to include. The publisher refused those poems which he found too shocking in subject matter, language, or style. Most of these were later published in Cummings' second and third volumes of poetry, *XLI Poems*

(1925) and 6, (1925). (The latter title alludes to the ampersand which was also rejected by the publisher, when *Tulips & Chimneys* became *Tulips and Chimneys*.) The authoritative version of *Tulips & Chimneys*, which returned to the 1922 manuscripts for Cummings' preferred selection and arrangement, was published later (Cummings 1976, edited by Firmage and Kennedy) and is reproduced in the *Complete Poems* (1991).

Seltzer's high-handed removal of Cummings' ampersand has, at least, the unintended advantage of making it easy to be clear in discussion. Whenever I mean the original manuscript assembled by Cummings and published later as the authoritative version, I refer to *Tulips & Chimneys*. When I mean the volume as published in 1923, I refer to *Tulips and Chimneys*. Both are relevant to questions about publication context, although the context provided by *Tulips & Chimneys* is usually more interesting.

The poems of *Tulips & Chimneys* are divided—as per the volume title—into a first section, *Tulips*, and a second section, *Chimneys*. With three individual exceptions, the poems are further grouped into subsections. Cummings took elaborate pains over selection and arrangement. Indeed, when accepting the heavily cut *Tulips and Chimneys*, Cummings insisted as his final line of defence that the arrangement of the poems which survived the cut must not be altered. Admittedly, what Cummings produced does not straightforwardly maximize market appeal for the twenty-first-century reader. The opening poem, 'EPITHALAMION', is long (by Cummings' standards), heavy with classical references, and somewhat unapproachable. However, the collection quickly eases up into the poetry whose style is so recognizable today.

Seltzer, on the other hand, had the opposite reaction: he had no objection to the heaviest of the poems but refused to include much of the most cutting-edge work. Thus Cummings has had the worst of both worlds. *Tulips and Chimneys* (1923) misrepresents him as a poet, engendering distortions which have continued to affect the reception of his earliest poetry—while the authorial opening strategy for *Tulips & Chimneys* (1922 ms) opens with those poems which are least to contemporary taste, further discouraging today's reader from a return to the intended publication context.

This mutilation of Cummings' first volume of poetry has had a serious and lasting effect. The poems published in *Tulips and Chimneys* had already lost much of their intended frame, and this has only encouraged further extremes, in terms of a tendency to read individual poems entirely divorced from their initial publication context. Some of Cummings' most famous and most-discussed poems are affected, such as 'All in green went my love riding', 'in Just- / spring', and 'Buffalo Bill 's / defunct'. In this book, I have tried to foreground publication context where that affects the text—as, I think, it often does profoundly—and I pay particular attention to subgroupings including 'Songs', 'Chansons Innocentes', and 'La Guerre'.

Much of this book will be concerned with Cummings' presentation of sex, male sexuality, female sexuality, and seduction. Cummings was raised in an atmosphere of repressive attitudes to sex and sexuality, which he associated most especially with his authoritarian father. The

Reverend Edward Cummings was a progressive thinker, who spoke out frequently on the diverse concerns of Boston, Mass., both from the pulpit and at many town hall debates. His opinions ranged over issues including the liberalization of sporting events on Sunday, dealing with drunks, and world peace. One of these town hall meetings saw the Reverend discussing with two medical doctors the advisability of sex education.

The debate (preceded by a piano and cello concert) was dutifully reported by the Boston Daily Globe of 16 February 1914. A good approach, thought Dr. Cabot, would be 'to enlighten children at a young age on the reproduction of plant life' as a careful preparation for fuller knowledge. Dr. Wilcox addressed the medical aspects: 'if the truth was revealed, the world would be appalled'. Finally, Rev. Edward Cummings, speaking on 'The Responsibilities of Parenthood,' told of the work which the Massachusetts Society for Sex Education ... was doing and the books and pamphlets which the society distributes freely, or which may be purchased.

He said that he had been in London, living in the East End of that city as a sociological student during the period of terror caused by the murders of 'Jack the Ripper.' He was one of the citizens' committee to watch the streets at night for the 'Ripper.'

They found out then that a lamppost was worth several policemen in the East End because crimes were committed only in the dark places. 'It is so with this subject,' he added. 'What is needed is more light on it and put an end to the "conspiracy" of silence from which the race has suffered such terrible harm.'

The Reverend was a socially liberal and sincerely civic-minded individual, who—in one sense—believed in lamp posts to illuminate humanity's darker places. At the same time, the private atmosphere of the Cummings family home was far from an atmosphere of personal sexual liberation.

In late life, in the private records which he kept of his thoughts and feelings, Cummings wrote about a letter just received from his own daughter, Nancy, and addressed to him as 'My dearest father'. The letter prompts him to realize how the idea of 'father' fills him with a profound sexual guilt triggered by the association with his own father, Edward Cummings, 'E.C.':

'why did the 1st 2 words of N's letter so strangle my heart in guilt-fear?' ask myself over & over. And not till tonight do I recall a little story E.C. told me(as a masturbating secretly body)about the danger of lying down under a tree with a girl & waking up with her pregnant!

This is Cummings' formative world: respectable Cambridge and serious-minded Boston, where citizens duly attended discussions of sex education and venereal disease preceded by cello concerts. At home: an adoring mother and an upright, authoritarian, and sexually repressing father—a dynamic which Cummings later conceptualized as the root of a deep Oedipal complex.

The struggle to overcome his sexually repressive upbringing was central to Cummings' development as a poet. The classical world played a key role. He found a sexual openness to which he responded instinctively—for example,

in a note which he scrawled during his Harvard days about the Venus de Milo: 'The woman nude; the goddess unashamed.'

Cummings found an emotional and poetic liberation through his engagement with the Classics—and occasionally a practical liberation as well. It was easier to get past the censors with a line written: 'if Hate's a game and Love's a Φuk [fuck]'. Throughout this book, we will see many classical authors, motifs, and ideas engaged in Cummings' poetic sexualities. The classical material includes (to list only a few of the major themes) satyrs, fauns, and nymphs, Helen and other ideas of iconic classical beauty, classicized maleness, and carpe diem seductions. Before delving into this multifaceted classical engagement, I want to say a few things up front about the politics of it.

Cummings' gender attitudes have come in for criticism. Some of these criticisms I believe to be more valid than others, but I want here to point in the direction of a positive case for Cummings' voice.

That case starts with Cummings as a war poet. The most unusual aspect of Cummings' war poetry is that at every stage he links the war with the sexual experience of soldiers in wartime. He writes about lovers and about prostitutes, drawing on his own wartime friendship with the Parisian prostitute Marie Louise Lallemand—a young woman whom he dated but did not have sex with. Many of Cummings' early poems concern the prostitutes whom he met, some in Paris and some elsewhere.

The prostitutes of the Great War have had no remarkable representative, no Vera Brittain. We might feel that it would be better if these women had left writing in their own, female voices. But if they must be heard through a male voice, then it matters that Cummings was entirely in love with Marie Louise, and made that perfectly clear to her. Cummings wrote to Marie Louise from the Front, and she wrote to him. We know that Cummings also gave her his father's address in America. After his release from imprisonment, Cummings returned to Paris and searched for her, but could not find her. She had been ill when Cummings was at the Front. It was now some months later, and it is not unlikely that she was dead.

Some years later, Cummings wrote to his sister Elizabeth, his only sibling, urging her to embrace the same independence of spirit which he himself treasured, and arguing that a failure to exercise one's own mind is simply cowardice.

e.g. I am taught to believe that prostitutes are to be looked down on. But before believing that,I will,unless I am afraid to do it,make the following experiment:I will talk with,meet on terms of perfect equality,without in the slightest attempting to persuade,a prostitute. Through my own eyes and ears a verdict will arrive,which is the only valid verdict for me in the entire world—unless I take somebody's word for something,which (because I desire to be alive)I do not.

Cummings writes of what he 'will' do here in the sense of what he had already done in Paris and even, briefly, as an

at some point during the war. In this I agree with Fredric Jameson's broader cultural reading of the period in his "Postmodernism" essay. Some of the texts I study are canonically high-culture modernist, and others are more popular. All perform the experimental cultural revisionism associated with modernism; more importantly, canonical distinction does not count in this study because I read texts that reflect and perform the cultural logics and the ideological conflicts of their time. These conflicts determine the period, and so the scope of my study. Empire-based ideologies of the body, for example, underwrite the idea of text in all of the works in the study.

The readings of physical elements of the text I offer here engage questions of race and sex that have sometimes been left out of generic accounts of nonsense in literature. In this study, psychological readings are personal and sociopolitical arguments that are textually constructed. That is, when texts perform sociopolitical arguments, they are psychological. I assume that psychology is right not about the brain but about culture: for the moderns, at least, it is a reading of the way Western culture thinks. While there have been critical readings of nonsense as a genre that center on its semantic intelligibility, to borrow from Daniel Tiffany's discussion of lyric obscurity, these do not argue for the psychological and ideological point of modern literary nonsense.⁶ The ordinary language philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin avoids the trap of genre but sees nonsense as language that sounds intelligent when in fact it means nothing, whereas this distinction falls apart for me. The most notable exception, for this study, is Gilles Deleuze's *The Logic of Sense*. For Deleuze, nonsense signifies the breakdown in the social division between propositions and things, and in particular between language and food, which, in the cultural as well as the infantile imaginary, connect interior and exterior bodies through the mouth. These uses of the object can be seen in an interesting range of Western texts, from Edward Lear's despairing limericks to Wittgenstein's returns to faciality and pain in his late linguistic scenarios. Deleuze's point, however, is not about features of the materiality of language, those features familiar since Plato's *Cratylus*, but about symbolic constructions, as his readings of Lewis Carroll show.

It is left to the symptomatic text to explore open secrets, uncanny sexual and racial identifications that writers confess, stage whispers that their works perform and rediscover. These open secrets include Rudyard Kipling's idea that he is a person of color, which leads him to dissolve the distinction between proper and improper language; J. M. Barrie's anxiety about the loss of infantile narcissism; Virginia Woolf's fear of contamination threatened by marriage, especially to a Jewish man, which points her toward a general theory of language; Gertrude Stein's erasures and denials, which, like her violence to Alice Toklas, are a kind of suicide that confesses sickness; and George Herriman's invisibility in color-mad America. These concerns are not meant to be reductive or comprehensive; they emerge as part of a tapestry of motivations, of interests, anxieties, and triumphs, and are often structured by the writers' relationships. These writers' concerns are not the centered enterprises of transcendental subjects, although some are less transcendental than others; they are

complexes of relation that are expressed materially, paratactically, catachrestically, and parapraxically. Each body of work produces an implicit material theory, or a sustained and conceptually developed practice, that performs the abjection it displaces. Although for many modernists, including Sigmund Freud and Marcel Duchamp, private or encrypted language is, like a chess move, already public language and can hold no secrets of its own, everything hides in the open. The modernist I is always, as Herriman says, "writing a sickrit to myself."



Dr. Sigmund Freud Psychoanalyst by Marcelo Neira

Modernism is too interested to be disinterested, as Herriman puts it. There is a contradiction in its attention to nonmeaning: interest, like a symptom, emerges through disinterest. Psychoanalysis claims to be interested in everything and considers nothing in dreams indifferent or accidental, which also mandates indifference about what to count. In the end, anything will do. This contradiction appears in Freud's early work on the materiality of the brain and continues to be important in his discussion of analytic practice. Beyond his material vision of the apparatus, however, lies another charged ideology: in Freud, indifferent matter is a colonial construct whose "sickrit" is the naked ideology of empire.

Freud holds that for psychoanalysis, nothing in dreams is "accidental or indifferent": "we expect to obtain information precisely from the explanation of such trivial and pointless details". Disinterest then can serve as a cover for interests we resist. There is a correlation between this generality of interest and the impersonal distance that is supposed to rule analytic technique, though the purpose of analysis is the

reverse — to be very interested in the patient's well-being. Freud finds it striking that Jean-Martin Charcot does not care about the difference between real and fantastic experiences, which are indistinguishable for the hysteric; to rephrase, for Charcot a hysteric is someone who expresses his or her concerns through the lack of interest in this distinction. In Freud, indifference is both the kind required by Kant for judgment and the "disinterest" traditionally attributed to the mind as an apparatus, according to Bergson! Freud says that an analysis is successful if it would convince "any impartial third person" and cannot be done for "polemical purposes."

But Freud's idea of indifference is deeply psychological in that psychological expression requires it. Indifference is bodily and is also the foundation for symbolic thought.⁴ The ability to bind or to cathect particular energies depends on a state of disinterest because predisposition or commitment to a prior position would preclude judgment. So libidinal energy will find a release where it can, even if that context is not connected with the reason the energy was dammed. Transference, to give another example, occurs when the patient seizes on an indifferent object, the analyst, to stand in for the one the patient cared for. It is "a matter of indifference" how much of a dream the patient remembers or how accurately it is reproduced because the remembered dream is not the "genuine material" anyway. It is a substitute that assists in interpretation, and the distortion it produces is equally interesting. Reviewing the evolution of analytic work from Breuer's notion of catharsis, or the moment of the formation of a symptom that is revealed by hypnosis, through the study of resistance and transference, to practice in 1914, Freud writes: "Finally, there was evolved the consistent technique used today, in which the analyst gives up the attempt to bring a particular moment or problem into focus. He contents himself with studying whatever is present for the time being on the surface of the patient's mind", removing resistances as the analyst finds them to let the patient come up with new material.

Indifference in Freud comes to analytic practice from his ideas of materiality. In the *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, his 1895 monograph about the brain "from the mechanical point of view", Freud speculates that the brain must have different kinds of neurons capable of processing internal and external stimuli. They depend on what he calls the "zone of indifference," a neutral space that sensory perceptions can inhabit before they get processed as thoughts. As Paul Ricoeur explains, "the various sensory perceptions lie in a zone of indifference and seem to require an optimum point of reception." This optimal point of reception depends on what Ricoeur rightly calls mechanical laws of summation and threshold. For perception to work, it must be general and unstressed, while thought by definition is stressed or "cathected." The process of cognition must be indifferent, says Freud, and only then lead to selection and investment or cathexis in particular objects. Cognition, to be distinguished from recognition or thought, must have a "disinterested" aim. An expectation or wish is required to process and potentially remember the stimulation, which is itself recent and indifferent. Expectation is followed by perceptual cathexis, which is followed by attention. It is not, then, only the analytical attitude that depends on

indifference, but also the mechanical quality of the nervous apparatus.

An example is the indifference required for the binding and release of libidinal energy. In *The Ego and the Id*, Freud writes that when the pleasure principle makes use of displaced libido to facilitate discharge, it is easy to observe a certain indifference as to the path along which the discharge takes place, so long as it takes place somehow. We know this trait; it is characteristic of the cathectic processes in the id. It is found in erotic cathexes, where a peculiar indifference in regard to the object displays itself; and it is especially evident in the transferences arising in analysis, which develop inevitably, irrespective of the persons who are their object.

To operate at all, libido must be able to attach to almost anyone. An example from Freud's practice occurs in the case of the Wolf-Man, whose regression to an early sadistic phase makes him desire punishment — but it was "a matter of indifference to him" whether he was punished by a man or by a woman. This material indifference as to the path of discharge segues seamlessly to the patient's indifference, which is a tool in resistance to analysis: the Wolf-Man refuses attachment to an interpretation, a Teflon patient whose doubt enabled him "to lie entrenched behind a respectful indifference and to allow the efforts of the treatment to slip past him for years altogether".

What motivates this grand indifference in Freud — in the mental apparatus, dream material, the process of analysis, the analyst, even the patient? No doubt overdetermined, it also has an ideological body, a body not of its text but of its context. To read it we turn to Freud's prized specimen of indifference, his own "Dream of the Botanical Monograph." In "Imperial Landscape," W. J. T. Mitchell argues that landscape painting should be seen as "something like the 'dreamwork' of imperialism". I want to make a similar claim for the implicit topography of Freud's dream work as it is expressed in the autobiographical "Dream of the Botanical Monograph." Freud recounts the dream three times in the *Interpretation*, first to illustrate the use of what he calls "recent and indifferent material" in dreams, then to discuss the use of early or infantile material in dreams, and later to give an example of condensation. Juxtaposing these concerns, we can say that whether early or recent matter is more indifferent is one of Freud's great topics. In fact Freud was never indifferent about indifference, and the importance of indifferent material characterizes his view of the world as material. Indifference for Freud is connected with materialism, and his dream interpretation asks how we are to think of materialism both of mind and of culture or production.

Freud apparently had the dream in March 1898: "I had written a monograph on a certain plant. The book lay before me and I was at the moment turning over a folded coloured plate. Bound up in each copy there was a dried specimen of the plant, as though it had been taken from a herbarium". Freud explains that the indifferent object that occasioned the dream was a monograph on plants that he saw in a shop window the day before. The sighting led him to think that while his wife got him the flowers that he liked, namely artichokes, he didn't get her the ones she liked. The

artichoke returns to him what he calls "the only plastic memory that I retained" from early childhood in the town of Freiberg, before his family moved to the city: he and his sister are lying on the rug and tearing leaf by leaf "a book with colored plates" given to them by their father. Likewise, he had become a bookworm.¹⁰ Freud says the dream backs up an argument he made to his friend Dr. Königstein for the medical use of cocaine. Although it is easy enough to see other readings of the dream — that it explores Freud's sexual interest in his sister and that it reproaches psychoanalysis for tearing its objects apart — I want to propose that Freud's reconstructions of the dream work show a colonial unconscious that is materially relevant to his construction of the body of the text. Freud's colonial unconscious makes a political argument out of his vision of the mind, which is both about the relation of materiality to consciousness and about the relation of material goods and their production to the center of empire, the sovereign state that controls material resources. The production of the mind in Freud cannot be dissociated from this material production.

Freud remembers pulling apart the book, which he says was "an account of a journey through Persia". This book has not been identified definitively, but is apparently Fedor Buhse's 1860 *Aufzählung der auf einer Reise durch Transkaukasien und Persien*.¹¹ Its abbreviated title is the one Freud mentions, it has colored plates, and it is concerned with commercial plants in Persia. As Diane O'Donoghue explains, Freud's father Jacob had been in business to dye imported wool and could have used the book for information on galbanum, a gum resin in demand in Vienna at the time. This destruction of Persia, at once symbolic and literal, also refers indirectly to the plunder of foreign lands for material resources. When Freud returns to the dream later in the Interpretation to discuss the use of infantile material, he adds that "pulling to pieces like an artichoke, leaf by leaf" [was] "a phrase constantly ringing in our ears in relation to the piecemeal dismemberment of the Chinese Empire".

His analysis of the dream work also relies on the trope of the use of material resources from the empire, but now the modern context of manufacturing is explicit. Freud describes the mind as "a factory of thought" (283) in which "connections are woven retrospectively" from indifferent material. Such manufacturing or weaving is easy to do, so that if in the day before his dream he had not happened to meet Dr. Gärtner, or "gardener," for example, and to remember a former patient named Flora, to help him construct his field of work as a garden, his mind would have used other resources instead to construct the dream. After all, he says, quoting from Gotthold Lessing, we shouldn't "feel astonished that 'only the rich people own the most money'". Colonial wealth comes to those who weave materials in the factory of thought. The factory of thought, to continue the modern trope, collects material through "trains of thought". Fresh impressions are particularly valuable for production: "The freshness of an impression gives it some kind of psychical value for the purposes of dream-construction equivalent in some way to the value of emotionally coloured memories or trains of thought". About these trains Freud says that "All the trains of thought starting from the dream ... led ultimately to ... my conversation with Dr. Königstein". Dr. Königstein is the colleague who

disagreed with Freud about the medical use of the coca plant, but Königstein, or the king's stone, is a city in Germany (or Saxony) and signifies the seat of the king or the center of empire. It is where the trains bring the fresh if indifferent impressions from the garden.



Not all of Freud's details continue the topographical and industrial analogies I follow here, of course, but in his third discussion of the dream, Freud adds a more explicitly political dimension to his schema that makes the colonial reading more compelling. The dream work, he says repeatedly, is under a compulsion or necessity to combine or fuse its recent stimuli into a single unity. This process is not democratic but coercive, a forced "construction" that compels a unity on its subjects. The "representation" of ideas in the mind now invokes the political sense of the term explicitly:

The individual dream-thoughts are represented in the dream by several elements. Associative paths lead from one element of the dream to several elements of the dream. Thus a dream is not constructed by each individual dream-thought, or group of dream-thoughts, finding ... separate representation in the content of the dream — in the kind of way in which an electorate chooses parliamentary representatives; a dream is constructed, rather, by the whole mass of dream-thoughts being submitted to a sort of manipulative process in which those elements which have the most numerous and strongest supports acquire the right of entry into the dream contents — in a manner analogous to election by scrutin de liste.

[illegible]

prose, disregarding other genres or arts, or even culture in general, it is my contention that time and space play a more crucial role in poetry, even in lyric poetry, since poetry can be defined as time and space condensed in images.

The idea of time and space is associated in human consciousness with the mythic separation of "the light from the darkness" and of "the waters from the waters." We can trace the development of time-space relations from the book of Genesis, Gilgamesh, The Elder Edda, and the Homeric epics, through Dante and Milton, and finally to modern poetry.

Time and language are closely connected. As George Steiner asserts in *After Babel*,

Every language-act has a temporal determinant. No semantic form is timeless. When using a word we wake into resonance, as it were, its entire previous history. A text is embedded in specific historical time; it has what linguists call a diachronic structure. To read fully is to restore all that one can of the immediacies of value and intent in which speech occurs.

Combining what one might call the synchronic and diachronic approaches in modern literary theory, Steiner summarizes: "Language itself...] is the most salient model of Heraclitean flux. It alters at every moment in perceived time." Steiner's examples reveal the crucial interrelations between language, time, and history: "The grammar of the Prophets in Isaiah enacts a profound metaphysical scandal—the enforcement of the future tense, the extension of language over time. A reverse discovery animates Thucydides; his was the explicit realization that the past is a language-construct, that the past tense of the verb is the sole guarantor of history."


Time, one of the most important philosophical ideas of humanity, serves as a powerful poetic motive in the history of world literature and is always a potent device in the structural formation of a literary work. In his book *The Culture of Time and Space*, Stephen Kern shows how the introduction of the wireless, the telephone, and other technological inventions, as well as the increase of speed and the appearance of Einstein's special (1905) and general (1916) theories of relativity, changed the human perception of time and space.

Another impact on human consciousness of technological inventions such as the telegraph, telephone, and airplane was that a resident of a big European city realized that there were five billion people on earth, and the sense of multitude was reflected by individual consciousness: a person felt that one was dissolved in that multitude and lost one's "ego" and privacy. The Russian critic Leonid Dolgoplov wrote in his essay on Andrei Bely's novel *Petersburg*, "in Gogol's and, especially, in Dostoyevsky's novels man began to lose himself and dissolved the uniqueness of his 'ego' in the life that surrounded him." Raskolnikov's life was already the "life of the street, of the city, of the whole mankind: the boundary between his room without a lounge and the street was conventional."

The idea of relativism was already present in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century: the separation between time and space was being smothered, dissolved in the consciousness of people who lived in big Russian cities, to say nothing of those who lived in Western Europe. Time is the fourth dimension of space, as Stephen Kern asserts in *The Culture of Time and Space*.


In *The Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel*, Mikhail Bakhtin proposes the term "chronotope." As he puts it, "this term [time-space, or, chronotope] is employed in mathematics, and was introduced as part of Einstein's Theory of Relativity." Bakhtin applied this term to literary theory as a metaphor (he himself mentions in parentheses that it is "almost, but not entirely" a metaphor for him). The idea of the unity of time and space—time as the fourth dimension of space—was most relevant for him. Bakhtin understood the chronotope as a "category of literature with its own significance in form and content."

Bakhtin discusses the time-space relationship and applies the chronotope only to prose, not to other genres, or to arts or culture in general. Time in literature is condensed, and therefore becomes more artistically vivid and notable; space, in turn, is intensified as it becomes a deeper part of the movement of time, plot, and history." (This phenomenon was noticed by Viktor Shklovsky much earlier than by Bakhtin.) The features and images of time are revealed through space, and space, in turn, is comprehended and measured by time. The chronotope in literature is thus characterized by this intersection and interrelation of sequences and by the junction of these features (time and space). Bakhtin states that "genre and generic distinctions [varieties]" are defined by the chronotope: "the chronotope as a formal constitutive category determines to a significant degree the image of man in literature as well. The image of man is always intrinsically chronotopic."



Bakhtin extends the meaning of the chronotope and applies it to such categories as the chronotope of reality, the chronotope of the road, the chronotope of love, and so on. He shows the development of the forms of the chronotope only in the novel, but, as was stated by Roman Jakobson in "Dialogue on Time in Language and Literature" with Krystyna Pomorska, the notion of time is one of the most

The Chronotope Model Visualized: Making way for Additional Interstitial Deconstructions



relevant and dominant features in poetry. Discussing the heritage of the Polish classical philologist Tadeusz Zielinski (1859-1944), who revealed essential instances of time-space relations in the Iliad, Jakobson comes to the conclusion that "the most effective experience of verbal time occurs in verse [...] which simultaneously carries within it both linguistic varieties of time: the time of the speech event and that of the narrated event."

It is my contention that the chronotope is crucial to our understanding of literary movements and of individual poets, and we can trace it from ancient to modern poetry. Tracing the chronotope and connecting it with history are the objectives of this book.

In neoclassical poetry, the flux of time is a successive movement with a beginning, past, present, and future (though time may be condensed or reversed). In the poetry of the younger romantics, however, especially Shelley, we have, using the metaphors of Bergson, "the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future, [...] the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances." In Shelley's "Mont Blanc" (1816), where "primaevial mountains/Teach the adverting mind," the primeval past leaves its footprint on nature.

Shelley can see the primeval past in the present time, which for him is prolonged into space and the universe. The boundaries of time and space do not exist for him: they are like a multi-folded fan. He easily travels from one reality to another (here Shelley anticipates both the theory of relativity and José Ortega y Gasset's perspectivism) and can see how "the old Earthquake-daemon taught her young Ruin." As Shelley himself writes in "A Defence of Poetry," quoting Francis Bacon, "the same footsteps of nature impressed upon the various subjects of the world." For Shelley, a poet "not only beholds the present as it is, and discovers those laws according to which present things ought to be ordered, but he beholds the future in the present, and his thoughts are the germs of the flower and the fruit of latest time."

In emphasizing this anticipation of the future, both Ortega y Gasset and Renato Poggioli called the romantics the predecessors of modernism. As Jakobson stated, "the romantics are often described as explorers of man's spiritual realm and poets of emotional experience, but as a matter of fact the contemporaries of the romantics thought of the movement exclusively in terms of its formal innovations. They observed first the destruction of the

classical unities." In the poetry of the romantics, the relations between art and life were forever changed. They made time, space, and reality palpable by breaking with the classical tradition of personifying abstract ideas, human virtues, and evils, and by turning to subjective reality: the micro-world of feelings, not only of the past, but also of the present and the future. Along with this revolution against accepted ideas, the romantics broke the old forms as well, the exhausted intonational and lexical-semantic structures that had been automatized by the epigones. They shook the old rhythms and used old forms to express new content.

A similar revolution took place in avant-garde and modernist literature at the beginning of the twentieth century. Both Stephen Kern and Marjorie Perloff write about this new perception of time and space in twentieth century literature. It is crucial, in my view, that both the French avant-garde poets and the Russian futurists eliminated the separation between the past, the present, and the future as well as between space and time.

In his otherwise brilliant book *The Culture of Time and Space*, Stephen Kern is mostly concerned with ideas, and he uses literature, including poetry, mainly to illustrate his point of view. For Kern, there is little difference between the works of Apollinaire, Cendrars, and Barzun, since for him they all put forth fascinating ideas like simultaneity, as will be discussed in the following chapter. Marjorie Perloff in her illuminating book *The Futurist Moment* is mainly concerned with the problem of form, but the differences between the works of two innovators, Aleksei Kruchonykh (1886-1968) and Velimir Khlebnikov (1885-1922), who both put forward the idea of *zaum'* or *beyonsense* (trans-sense) language, are unclear, as is the reason why Kruchonykh, who lived on for forty-six years after the death of Khlebnikov, never created anything equally innovative. I presume it was due to the fact that Kruchonykh was concerned mostly with form, limiting his search to philology and unable to go beyond it. In contrast, the greatness of Khlebnikov's genius eventually became clear even to the average reader.

I believe that the interpretation of literature should be neither reduced to the analysis of form nor to hermeneutics alone. The interpretation of what is hidden behind the word of an image-picture should go alongside analyses of the intonational systems of different poets, their stylistic devices, diction, and so on. In other words, I advocate an approach that interprets the poetic motives rather than the meaning or the form of the poems. These analyses of poets' views of reality, history, and time-space relations should ideally include analyses of artistic personalities.

The notion of "poetic motive" has been developed in Russian literary theory by Alexander Veselovsky, Boris Tomashevsky, and Boris Gasparov. Vladimir Toporov's and Eleazar Meletinsky's works should be also added to this list. In his first known article of 1919, "*Iskusstvo i otvetstvennost'*" ("Art and Responsibility"), Mikhail Bakhtin states, "the three spheres of human culture—science, art, and life—are unified only by the personality of the artist that joins them together in the union." Bakhtin further discusses the discrepancy between the personality of the artist in art and in life and concludes that "it is solely the unity of

responsibility" that guarantees the intrinsic unity of the artistic personality: "I have to be accountable with my entire life for everything that I have experienced and understood in art, so that it [everything that I realized and experienced] should not be wasted."

The classical scholar Sergey Averintsev (1937-2004) differentiates between the notions of "the author ('*auctor*'—*nomen agentis*, i.e. denomination of the subject of an action)" and "auctoritas ('*authority*'—denomination of a certain quality of the subject). Mentioning the problem of identifying the real authors of Psalms and Proverbs, Averintsev claims that the former nevertheless bears the name of King David, while the latter that of King Solomon. In both cases, the authority of the king has been institutionalized as the author, and that authority allows him to speak in the name of God. Averintsev also differentiates between Homer and Hesiod: although the latter spoke about himself in great detail in *Labors and Days*, whereas very little is known about Homer's life, their primary difference does not lie in the scope of their biographies. Rather, as Averintsev illustrates, Hesiod's own words reveal the biggest distinction between the two: "We know enough to make up lies / Which are convincing, but we also have / The skill, when we've a mind, to speak the truth." Homer was an authority as a poet, an author; Hesiod pretended to utter the truth of the gods and of the community, not his own. Averintsev concludes that Hesiod shifted the epic from the heroic to the didactic. In other words, based on a new poetic motive, Hesiod put forth a new poetic style (although, of course, this is not to suggest that Hesiod was a better poet than Homer).

In his work "Poetic Motive and Context"—which develops the notion of German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) that the motif is the poetic approach to life and reality in all its complexity—Russian scholar, poet, and translator Vladimir Mikushevich states, "art begins with an approach towards life, with a substance [...]. Yet we need a personality for the poetical comprehension of this relation. Personality and substance are the two sides of a poetic motive." I understand the motive of an artistic work as the integrity of the main theme—something that induces the artist to act—as well as the philosophical, ethical, and aesthetic approach of the artistic personality to reality.

It is crucial to trace the artistic realization of the poetic motive only in definite contexts. These two planes are united by the personality of the verbal artist who simultaneously belongs to life (reality A) and to art (reality B), which is not necessarily a "reflection" or mimetic representation, but is rather the creation of another reality with the help of artistic devices or *orudiinye sredstva* (weapons), as Osip Mandelstam put it. The execution of a poetic motive is its lexical, syntactical, and rhythmical (or metrical, if we consider the traditional system of versification) realization in the specific context of the literary work. The poetic motive is evoked or realized only in this specific context, since words can acquire meanings only in contexts, not in the dictionary.

The context of a poetic work is the "speaking picture," to quote Sir Philip Sidney, or the "plastic space" in which a poetic motive is realized or evoked. The Russian scholar Boris Eikhenbaum defines melodics as an intonational

In this book, I seek to characterize the works of modern poets based on their attitudes towards reality, time, space and history revealed in their poetics. In the following chapters I will show both similarities between the poets from different artistic movements (as for instance, the attitude towards time and space of Apollinaire and Mayakovsky) and crucial differences between the French avant—garde poets (Barzun, Cendrars, and Apollinaire), Italian and Russian futurists, or with the major Russian futurists Velimir Khlebnikov and Vladimir Mayakovsky. The attitude towards time, space, and history is equally important for W. B. Yeats, Osip Mandelstam, Ezra Pound, and T. S. Eliot—revealing both similarities and differences of the poets "sailing after knowledge" in their spiritual quest—and, despite the postmodernist "estrangement" of reality, similar traces can be found in the work of contemporary American poets John Ashbery and Charles Bernstein.

**Dreaming and Historical Consciousness in Island Greece by
Charles Stewart [Cultural Politics, Socioaesthetics,
Beginnings, Harvard University Press, 9780983532224]
paper University Of Chicago Press**

Charles Stewart tells the story of the inhabitants of Kóronos, on the Greek island of Naxos, who, in the 1830s, began experiencing dreams in which the Virgin Mary instructed them to search for buried Christian icons nearby and build a church to house the ones they found. Miraculously, they dug and found several icons and human remains, and at night the ancient owners of them would speak to them in dreams. The inhabitants built the church and in the years since have experienced further waves of dreams and startling prophesies that shaped their understanding of the past and future and often put them at odds with state authorities. Today, Kóronos is the site of one of the largest annual pilgrimages in the Mediterranean. Telling this fascinating story, Stewart draws on his long-term fieldwork and original historical sources to explore dreaming as a mediator of historical change, while widening the understanding of historical consciousness and history itself.

the past gained through dreams, spirit possession rituals, or dancing performances also count as histories? Instead of dismissing such productions as “myth” or “religion,” Charles Stewart contends in [Dreaming and Historical Consciousness](#) that our definition of history must be widened. This move is crucial in a global setting where alternative historical practices require appreciation as systems of thought rather than rejection as inferior types of knowledge. Villagers on the Greek island of Naxos have long experienced dreams of saints directing them to dig up buried objects. These dreams impelled the villagers to become both archaeologists and historians striving to uncover a past that would alter their future. [Dreaming and Historical Consciousness](#) elucidates these dreams of the past-present-future in terms of local cosmology and theorizes them as existential expressions of the struggle for agency. This ethnography of historical consciousness offers new insight into how people imagine the past, consciously and unconsciously, in daily life.

Villagers in the mountains of Naxos accept, based on dream visions, that Egyptian Christians came to their area in late antiquity. As an ethnographer I could see that local society has taken its historical scenarios seriously, and some villagers even claim to have been eyewitnesses at miraculous events such as the sudden gushing forth of a spring (holy water) on a dry mountainside in 1930. This book attempts to understand the poetics, the cosmology, the politics, and other social practices that make such accounts of the past credible for a community. It could be said that whereas historians subscribe to a correspondence theory of truth in which assertions must correspond to verifiable evidence, ethnographers work with a coherence theory that observes how propositions about the past mesh with local expectations and come to be accepted.

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guide their study and what their attitude will be toward other epistemologies. For some, this might be a point where history and anthropology must necessarily part ways. In contrast to rigorously researched histories, indigenous histories may be viewed as marginal curiosities, if not as substandard and false. I think, however, that the friction here indicates an area of creative interchange between anthropologists and historians that has not yet been fully realized. One might approach local sensibilities about the past as ontological—as grounded in a different reality—and consider how they might inspire new ways of thinking about our own relationships to the past. One may dive into other epistemologies of the past and attempt to retrieve local histories in a manner consistent with indigenous precepts and practices, perhaps representing them in novel forms. Or, to consider just one more option, one may view other histories within a post-colonial framework and consider the circumstances of their subordination and the possibility of reasserting them.

Histories can expand into myths and myths may contract into histories; truth can become fiction, and vice versa. Historians who have written about topics such as witchcraft or anti-Semitism have dealt with dubious propositions that have been taken as truths with profound consequences. In [Dreaming and Historical Consciousness](#), I move from establishing how and why the people of Kíronos considered the Egyptians as actual forbears, through the Greek state's rejection of the villagers' Christian historicity, to an examination of how the community activated the Egyptians again and again as elements of a myth-dream. In so doing, I bring an anthropological idea of historicity (as a social relationship to the past) into dialogue with the historians' sense of historicity as accepted factuality.

These matters are not all in the past, and probably never will be. When I completed this book the Kíronos myth-dream was still smoldering. The large pilgrimage church prophesied in the 1830s was inaugurated in 2010. Built with donations totaling over 3 million euros, the interior still requires considerable work, and, despite the fact that

Greece is mired in a deep financial crisis, annual donations averaging 50,000 euros have continued to pour in. Pilgrims make many of these contributions during the annual saint's day when they flock to the site where the bones of the Egyptians and their wonder-working icons were dug out of the ground, ritually reactivating historical consciousness in the process.

The current economic crisis has plunged a large portion of the Greek population into a precariousness similar to that felt by the people of Kíronos during their two major economic catastrophes. In Kíronos, these crises provoked temporal excursions, often in dreams, where people communed with the Virgin Mary and figures from the past to find bearings in the present. While the current Greek financial crisis has not apparently led to any epidemics of dreaming, it has sparked an intensification of temporal thought. Researchers such as Daniel Knight have found that crisis has activated historical consciousness just as it did on Naxos. In flights of emotional thought amounting to a collective nightmare, austerity-imposed hunger has driven Greek citizens to contemplate the famine endured under the Nazis during the 1940s. Helplessness in the face of European Union demands makes people feel as if the period of Ottoman domination, which finished over a century ago, has returned. The analysis of this interrelationship between crisis, temporality, and historical consciousness is one of this book's main contributions, and this nexus continues to be explored in studies of other crises in Greece and elsewhere.

Dreaming and Historical Consciousness

Earlier I observed that this book has tackled two separate, if thematically related, subjects: the history of dreams on Naxos and dreaming as a mode of historicizing. The intervening consideration of agency and existential temporality exposes a fundamental connection between these two topics. Major historical events generated acute challenges to the village of Kíronos. These challenges threw the villagers into a desperate uncertainty about what to do. Dreaming gave them the inspiration to do something: dig for

icons. The dreams were thus a source of agency at the same time as their imagery and narrative scenarios modeled the existential temporality that underlies human perception and decision making generally. This involved looking into the future and into the past to find ways of acting in the present. The dreams flashed up remembered events such as the French occupation of Liónas in 1917 but also images of theretofore-unknown pasts such as the arrival of icon-bearing Egyptians fleeing persecution in late antiquity. These glimpses of the past gave the community grist for historical thought, and people built on the initial dreams with waking speculations and in further dreams such as those of Markos Kapisiris. This extensive elaboration of previously unknown pasts — the reason I consider the dreams to be offering historicizations rather than memories — completed the connection between dreams in history and dreams about history. The threatening eventfulness that put the dreams in the historical record in the first place (to be historicized by me) created a pressurized search for a way to act that involved the Naxiotes in unconscious oneiric temporalizing and the production of histories in narratives and further dreams. The convoluted temporality of the dream narratives replicated the underlying future-past-present temporality at the heart of agency. This example thus reveals the transition from unconscious temporalization to historical consciousness, from the firstness of temporal ecstasy and abduction to elaboration in the historical imagination, from internal temporality to articulated history.

In discussions of agency the word "unconscious" is usually taken as the bearer of "structure," understood as frameworks inherited from the past. Bourdieu's concept of the habitus, for example, captures the manifold unarticulated, embodied dispositions and competencies that are absorbed by individuals during socialization and guide them without conscious processing. Giddens allots the Freudian unconscious an auxiliary role in his description of agency to capture how people are often motivated to act for deep personal, psychological reasons. Bourdieu's unconscious is social, consisting in embodied competency, while Freud's is psychological, an individual unconscious formed in personal histories. Both derive from the past. The former is unconscious because not ordinarily reflected upon, the latter because it is held beneath the surface by the force of repression and not (easily) admissible to consciousness.

[Dreaming and Historical Consciousness](#) calls attention to yet another type of unconscious, an existential temporal unconscious that responds to unfolding situations, especially those perceived as threatening. This unconscious may, in dreams or visions, produce "solutions" by formulating perspectives or courses of action that can be implemented. As Sartre contended, in imagination lies the beginning of the ability to change the present by thinking beyond current reality: "For consciousness to be able to imagine, it must be able to escape from the world by its very nature; it must be able by its own efforts to stand back from the world. In a word it must be free." Dreams of treasures, icons, or the Final Judgment figure possible worlds, and momentarily the mind ventures on unrealities that, in Sartre's argument, negate the actual world. The imagination underlines the fact that treasures, icons, and the end of time are not

perceptible in the present. Imagination may thus ignite the passion to make the world other than it is, to live beyond it or against it. The imagination—encompassing dreams and hallucinations—provides that capacity to hypothesize and to transcend the present.

Sartre's early work on the imagination laid the groundwork for the characteristic existentialist assertion that people were free to make choices and take actions to determine themselves according to their own goals. Anthropologists have been little influenced by this view, which Bourdieu dismissed as "subjectivism." For the most part they have sided with Levi-Strauss, who derided Sartre's existentialism as "a sort of shop-girl metaphysics." In the effort here to understand dreaming as a response to worldly situations and as a source of agency, however, Sartre reenters through the side door, albeit in modified form. To be clear: individuals are not completely free to decide, and act and effect change as they wish. In some cases, such as the catatonia identified by De Martino or the apathy seen by Jahoda and her associates, they are not even able to imagine, and in other cases such as the German Jews of the 1930s studied by Beradt they may imagine their own inability and hopelessness. To imagine does not necessarily mean to visualize oneself positively, nor does it entail an ability or commitment to act. Kóronos is thus a particular case. When the habitus of routine life ran into the buffers thrown up by exogenous events, the imagination came into play to picture alternatives. People began to dig and find icons, and now they are building an enormous church. The dreaming did not aim at a return to the status quo ante, as homeostatic functionalism might suppose, but rather worked to mediate change moving into a future in which the arrangement of life would be different.

Finally, we are left with the central imagery of the dreams and the myth-dream, which strikingly concerns occluded objects: icons variously buried, confiscated, or stolen and treasures mainly buried, hidden, or forgotten. These objects are periodically discovered, then lost again, as when the state confiscated the four newly unearthed icons in 1838 or when people dream of treasures, find them, and then lose them in the process of trying to possess them. The myth-dream of Kóronos has revolved around the discovery, rediscovery, and permanent possession of these objects. The much-dreamt-of buried icon of St. Anne is a lost key that would open the door to the discovery of many more hidden objects. For the past 180 years, Kóronos has been under the shadow of pending objects and similarly pending transformations. The history of thefts and rediscoveries reveals how deeply invested the villagers are in these objects; indeed, their activity can be interpreted as deposits on their stake in a virtual future—service in expectation of payment. As Bachelard observed, "There will always be more things in a closed, than in an open, box. To verify images kills them, and it is always more enriching to imagine than to experience." The people of Kóronos are rich in the imagination of that which they do not have and virtuosos at negating their benighted present. In the internal experiential theatre of their dreams they have perennially replayed the non-discovery of cherished objects. The box remains closed, but the villagers continue to transact, transcendently, with its contents, their future.

pure Andrei Codrescu: irreverent, unconventional, brilliant, and always funny. Codrescu takes readers into the strange classroom and even stranger mind of a poet and English professor on the eve of retirement as he begins to teach his final semester of Intro to Poetry Writing. As he introduces his students to THE TOOLS OF POETRY (a list that includes a goatskin dream notebook, hypnosis, and cable TV) and THE TEN MUSES OF POETRY (mishearing, misunderstanding, mistranslating . . .), and assigns each of them a tutelary "Ghost-Companion" poet, the teacher recalls wild tales from his coming of age as a poet in the 1960s and 1970s, even as he speculates about the lives and poetic and sexual potential of his twenty-first-century students. From arguing that Allen Ginsberg wasn't actually gay to telling about the time William Burroughs's funeral procession stopped at McDonald's, *The Poetry Lesson* is a thoroughly entertaining portrait of an inimitable poet, teacher, and storyteller.



I gave them examples of famous epitaphs, by blank verse poets like Ted Berrigan, "See you later," and "Have a nice day," and by rhyming poets, such as John Keats, who only wrote part of his own epitaph, either because he died too young, or because his executors found it too terse: "This grave contains all that was mortal of a young English poet who on his death bed in the bitterness of his heart at the malicious power of his enemies desired

"It's a good thing that when I visited the grave of John Keats in Rome in the Protestant cemetery where he is buried next to Gregory Corso, a cat who lives in the cemetery stole the panino with mortadella from my jacket pocket and made off with it in the direction of a pyramid built CE by a Roman senator during one of the periodic Egyptian crazes of the Romans. Too bad too, because I didn't have any money and I'd gotten the sandwich from a nun in a charity-dispensing convent. Behind the grave of John Keats grows a lyre-shaped tree that is obviously pruned carefully, though the cemetery itself, at the time of my visit, was in a state of neglect. Next to John Keats is buried his friend Joseph Severn, whose epitaph notes that he is the friend of John Keats, the poet buried next to him. So that even though John

Keats's name is missing from his own grave, he is made present by his dead friend next to him, which is a kind of rhyme. What does this tell us?"

A skinny mop-styled redhead girl fingering what looked like a worry bead that was actually the earbud of her iPod said: "That if you don't write your epigram you might have to rely on your friends?"

"Precisely. I now assign you in addition to an epitaph an epigram. For this class, you must also write an epigram every day. An epigram is a very short poem with a clever twist at the end that shows off your wit. For example, 'In my next life I will make a lot of croaking noises / but I will live a long time / because in my next life / I will be a gold frog / like the one that sits on your desk, father.' This is an epigram I made up in the style of the Roman poet Lucian. Now, if I was in a hurry, I might combine my assignments into an epitogram, which is an epitaph plus an epigram, something like, 'I am a gold frog in this life / and I will leap at you I from behind this tombstone / when you are finished reading.' And then I would jump out and scare the shit out of the poor pilgrim to my grave, who happens to be an executive for a U.S. insurance company with a penchant for poetry, like Wallace Stevens, who is vacationing by visiting the graves of important poets around the world. Can you identify the wit in this epitogram?"

A boy with a crewcut spoke from the back: "The price of gold, like, from the time the poet died and the time when the business guy was visiting?"

"Very astute. The business guy maybe was amazed by how cheap gold used to be when those poets lived and how much it was now, and he couldn't feel his amazement properly until he saw the poets' graves. That was one weird cat, right, but I'm not sure witty is the word for him. Before going to visit John Keats, he visited the following poets: Walt Whitman in Camden, New Jersey, Emily Dickinson in Amherst, Massachusetts, Edgar Allan Poe in Baltimore, Maryland, Tristan Tzara at the Montparnasse cemetery in Paris, France, Guillaume Apollinaire in the Père Lachaise cemetery in Paris, France, where he also stopped briefly to say hello to Jim Morrison. He saw George Bacovia in Bacău, Romania, Boris Pasternak in Moscow, Russia, before his tomb was desecrated by vandals in 2006, and César Vallejo in Montrouge, the communist cemetery in Paris, France."

I looked around the class to see if maybe Jim Morrison elicited recognition. A soft stirring. Nothing much.

"What does this say about this man?"

"That he's rich?" tried the future jokester-in-chief of the class, a square-shouldered boy named Bennigan. Class laughed. "And that there are a lot of poets buried in Paris, France?" Another boy slapped him five. Villanelles for you, Bennigan.

"Yes, poets are buried in Paris to make it easier for tourists. Poets are one big family. Anyway, at each grave this man took pictures. A couple of years later when he was found shot dead in the small apartment he kept secretly in lower Manhattan, the police detective in charge of the case, Detective Emma Flores, took pictures of these photographs of the poets' graves, framed along the walls. She believed that there was a connection. Frustrated by what she believed was her ignorance of poetry, she enrolled at the

New School and took a beginner class in Writing Poetry with poet and teacher Sharon Mesmer. You would be right to ask, 'Did she solve the case?'"

Nobody said anything.

"The answer is no. Professor Mesmer's method of writing poetry at that time, in the early years of the twenty-first century, consisted of entering a number of blog postings into a Googlator, a program that mixes up words in strange combinations and returns them to you in novel forms."

"I thought that this was supposed to be a poetry class," said a disaffected voice from the back, with hair hanging over the mouth, a voice, I instantly thought, destined for greatness. It exuded intelligence from under all that hair, like an animal's breath on a frosty morning.

"You must speak clearly in this class. You must enunciate.

What did you say?"

"There is a novel writing class," he enunciated.

"Yes, you could have taken that and yes, it's true, there are novel forms in which to write novels, but when I speak of novel forms, I generally mean them to apply to poetry because poetry generates novel forms more quickly and more easily than novels, which are long. What is your name?"

"Matthew Borden."

Matthew Borden, as I immediately found out by googling his family tree on my desktop computer, was the grandchild of the founder of the famous milk empire. For many years I'd seen his gleaming family trucks hurtling milk on the highways.

"Matt, your family business is pretty poetic. Do they approve of your interest in poetry?" I had no idea if Matthew was interested in poetry—maybe he was in it just for his English requirement—but I saw bursting udders on frosty mornings being milked by 4-H beauty queens and I became momentarily lost. I knew that machines did the milking now, and then there were details like penned animals and hormones, but there you have it. Poetry.

Matt said, "My side of the family is pretty artistic. We have a farm of super-cows, more like a showcase for kids. The animals live in heated stalls that are better than some public housing. Their names and genetic history are carved on wood over each stall. Some of them even have small televisions for entertainment. The best of them eat apples that are hand-fed to them by German-speaking Wisconsin high school girls."

He couldn't have enunciated more clearly. The face that was hidden before came out of its hairy nest, looking consumptive. He was not a mumblor, but had widespread eczema, covering both cheeks. His eyes flashed. "There are some poets in the Borden family!"

"Lizzie?" asked Bennigan.

Matt Borden grinned. "My grandmother was a personal friend of Queen Marie of Romania. They exchanged poetry."

I had to admit it. I'd been out-googled. This kid knew not only that I was from Romania, but that Queen Marie, his

grandmother's friend, wrote verses in the 1920s and made many friends in America, including a lumber baron in Washington in whose castle she spent the night, leaving in the morning for the next stop on her triumphal train tour. The baron transformed the castle into a museum dedicated to her memory. It was the most touching one-night stand in the history of poetry.

I asked him if he possessed any of his grandmother's poems and whether he might read some in class.

Matt Borden shook his head sadly. "Her poetry was buried with her in the grave in North Dakota. She left in her will that all her books had to be buried in bookcases around her tomb. She only published one book and she has that with her inside the sculpture."

"A catafalque?"

"Yeah, well, it's a story. The family had to import a French sculptor, originally she wanted Rodin, but he was already dead, to make a life-size bronze of Diana the Huntress in my grandma's likeness. She was buried standing inside of it ..." I was astonished, and the class was nervously fingering earbuds, doodling in their open notebooks, shifting in their seats, etc. I didn't blame them. It was a wacky story. I knew it was true because Queen Marie'd been a flapper, friend of Isadora Duncan and Rodin, among others. If the Queen and the Borden woman had palled about in Paris in the 1920s, they'd have surely posed naked before Rodin at one time or another.

"And the statue of Diana, the grave, stands in the family cemetery bearing a poetic inscription? What does it say?"

"Well, actually, no. Grandma died in the Eighties when they removed a bunch of intercontinental ballistic missiles from the Dakotas because of the SALT Treaty, and she bought a decommissioned nuclear silo. It's thirty stories deep. She stands in the center of what used to be the control room on the bottom."

I didn't quite understand. If she was buried in the family cemetery, how could she be resting in a decommissioned silo ... unless ...?

Matt guessed my unspoken question. "Yeah. She also left in her will that the family cemetery had to be moved into the silo. Now we are all on different levels, buried into the walls between bookshelves. The place is pretty big, there is a lot more room. All of us have spaces in there already, me too, with my birthdate engraved, because I'm not dead."

"Not yet!" said Bennigan. Nobody laughed. He knew that no matter how funny he was going to be in the future, he would not elicit such deeply emotional scent from a room full of people, such girlish sweat, such creepy-crawly terror in the armpits ... Magnificent. The classroom was like a stall filled with excited mammals. They gave off pheromones. Terror. Desire. Matt Borden was Lord Byron.

"Matt, I'm not quite getting the picture, would you very much mind coming up here and drawing this unusual structure on the blackboard?"

"No problem." Looking bored, he strolled to the blackboard. He was overweight and sloppy, his jeans hung low and the plaid flannel shirt hung out of them in the back.

He took his time, chalk in hand, eyes half-closed. Then he drew. The silo-cemetery looked like this:

Matt strolled back. He had the bored air of someone who could do anything he might be asked, like solve a quantum equation, but he only did it as a personal favor. He himself was bored by all earthly things because he knew them well, though he knew that many other people, for reasons he didn't quite understand, didn't.

"And the epitaph? What is written on her sculpture-grave?" I was trying to get back to teaching poetry proper, which is what they paid me for.

"There are no words. She's Diana the Huntress, bronze by Louis Kleppner, Rodin imitator."

There are no words. More dreadful things were never spoken on the cold hillside. Not in Intro to Poetry Writing, anyway.

I took the deep breath customary in this sort of situation, unique as it was. Taking a deep breath can, if done right, take a thing out of uniqueness and place it in a genus.

Matt's was a family story.

I got up and turned to the blackboard. "I'm going to write down for you the tools of poetry. Take note. By next week, you must have eight of them. There are two that have a purpose I'm not going to reveal to you until midterm." I wrote:

THE TOOLS OF POETRY

1. A goatskin notebook for writing down dreams
2. Mont Blanc fountain pen (extra credit if it belonged to Mme Blavatsky)
3. A Chinese coin or a stone in your pocket for rubbing
4. Frequenting places where you can overhear things
5. Tiny recorders, spyglasses, microscopic listening devices
6. A little man at the back of your head
7. The Ghost-Companion
8. Susceptibility to hypnosis
9. Large sheets of homemade paper, a stack a foot thick
10. A subscription to cable TV

"To number five, there is an exception," I said. "You cannot record anything said in this class because I don't want to go to prison for things I've said. Intro to Poetry Writing is like the confessional. Things said here are like things only your priest or your therapist is allowed to hear. Nobody in this class is permitted to repeat anything anybody in this class said or wrote. The reason for your goatskin notebook is so you can write an oath in blood in it, swearing never to whisper a word of what we say here."

I looked around. "Only kidding," I added, seeing some sincerely frightened faces, "there is no blood oath. But with the Internet these days it's hard to keep things discreet. I realize that this is not why you're here, that some of you may even want to be famous so that everybody in the world can read your poetry, but you must hold your horses until Poetry Writing 4007, which comes after Intro 2007,

I waited out the chuckles, and continued. "The goatskin notebook is for you to write your dreams in. Every day without fail you must write down what you dreamt even if you haven't slept in weeks, which is what I did when I was your age. In addition to dreams you must write down poetic ideas, which are these thoughts that come to you when you least expect them. Until now, you probably thought of these kinds of sudden thoughts as annoying, like involuntary twitches or muscle spasms, but they are actually poetic ideas. You are no longer allowed to dismiss them. You must write them down in your goatskin notebook. Also in your goatskin notebook you must jot down things that you are not supposed to hear. Once you start frequenting places where you can overhear things, you must listen for things that you are not supposed to hear, even if, as it often happens, you mishear them. Mishearing is one of the muses of poetry. There are ten muses of poetry."

A black and white portrait of a middle-aged man with short, graying hair, wearing round glasses and a goatee. He is dressed in a dark jacket over a dark shirt. The background is dark and out of focus.

1. Mishearing
2. Misunderstanding
3. Mistranslating
4. Mismanaging
5. Mislaying
6. Misreading
7. Misappropriating clichés
8. Misplacing objects belonging to roommates or lovers
9. Misguided thoughts at inappropriate times, funerals, etc.
10. Mississippi (the river)

with a 'y' at the end. Number two of your rules is to help place you within the family of poets. Every poet worth his or her salt, and, trust me, this is the only reward we get for the hard work we do, and in this sense we are still one with the ancient Romans who valued salt above all else, as does, I'm sure, the Borden family, whose cows, no matter what their level of culture, still require their salt licks, every salty poet, then, had a good fountain pen. The best of all fountain pens is the Mont Blanc, but it's terribly expensive because of its gold nib and reputation. A Mont Blanc that had belonged to Madame Blavatsky would be the instrument through which the disembodied voices of angels and demons would have traveled into the many volumes of books dictated to her by these otherworldly entities. In other words, you would be possessing an angelic instrument that, should it turn up on eBay, would fetch easily one to three hundred thousand dollars. Your extra credit for owning such a pen would amount to one fourth of your final grade. You wouldn't have one of these, Matthew?"

This book examines post-war surrealist cinema in relation to surrealism's change in direction towards myth and magic following World War II. Intermedial and interdisciplinary, the book unites cinema studies with art history and the study of Western esotericism, closely engaging with a wide range of primary sources, including surrealist journals, art, exhibitions, and writings. Kristoffer Noheden looks to the Danish surrealist artist Wilhelm Freddie's forays into the experimental short film, the French poet Benjamin Péret's contribution to the documentary film *L'Invention du monde*, the Argentinean-born filmmaker Nelly Kaplan's feature films, and the Czech animator Jan Svankmajer's work in short and feature films. The book traces a continuous engagement with myth and magic throughout these films, uncovering a previously unknown strain of occult imagery in surrealist cinema. It broadens the scope of the study of not only surrealist cinema, but of surrealism across the art forms. [Surrealism, Cinema, and the Search for a New Myth](#) will appeal to film scholars, art historians, and those interested in the impact of occultism on modern culture, film, and the arts.

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or objects" that were "gifted with a potential for mythological life." On their way through these trials, the visitors encountered artworks by almost one hundred artists from twenty-four different countries, including Argentina, Haiti, Egypt, Denmark, and Romania. Turning to the exhibition catalogue, the curious visitor found declarations of intent by Breton, essays by Georges Bataille, Pierre Mabille, and Victor Brauner, and a poem by Aimé Césaire. Breton indeed conceived *Le Surréalisme en 1947* as a



Georges Bataille

manifestation of surrealism's international scope and continued cohesion after the ravages of the war. But this was not a mere reiteration of previous accomplishments. He also intended the exhibition to mark a certain *dépassement*, a change in direction, for the movement towards the search for a new myth.

In his writings surrounding the exhibition, Breton was strategically evasive about the appearance and nature of such a new myth. But as this description of the exhibition suggests, he expected to locate it at the intersection of occultism, "primitive" thought, ancient mythology, and surrealism's very own tradition of visionary writers, artists, and thinkers. The surrealist search for a new myth, then, was far from a simple restoration of myths from the past. It was combinatory and profoundly modern even as it looked to arcane knowledge, and continued the longstanding surrealist practice of making playful juxtapositions intended to create new, blistering connections. It was less an invention of a new doctrine than a cultivation of a new sensibility permeated with magic. Yet, the playfulness and, as Breton put it, "enlightened doubt" that went into the search also had an emphatically serious side. The surrealists, in desperation, invested the new myth with their hopes of healing the world after the ravages of the recently ended war.

Film played a small but significant role in these new pursuits. The haloed objects occupying the altars at *Le Surréalisme en 1947* had a prominent position as harbingers of the new myth. Among them was one single but significant reference

to film. The very last altar in the Labyrinth of Initiation was occupied by the Czech artist Toyen's installation *The Window of Magna Sed Apta*, which was dedicated to the American director Henry Hathaway's 1935 film *Peter Ibbetson*. A decade earlier, Breton had lauded Peter Ibbetson for its depiction of *amour fou*, a mad love that defied all boundaries, in a move characteristic of the enthusiastic surrealist response to commercial cinema. The Hathaway film's presence at *Le Surréalisme en 1947*

suggests that the surrealists now considered cinema to also be an intrinsic part of their search for a new myth. The exhibition, then, inserted the surrealist engagement with cinema in a new context, littered with references to myth and magic, and framed as an esoteric passage of initiation. A few years later, Breton's essay "As in a Wood" emphasized the connection between cinema and surrealism's new orientation. In it, Breton describes film as "the only absolutely modern mystery," and praises it for its capacity to activate "the mechanism of correspondences." Through allusions to ritual and occultism, he then connects the surrealist reception of film with the framework of *Le Surréalisme en 1947* and inscribes the medium in a broader reformulation of surrealist poetics.

This book examines the connection between cinema and surrealism's turn to myth and magic as a persistent element in surrealist film production in the post-war era. Much has been written about the interwar surrealist

production and reception of film, in particular Luis Buñuel's and Salvador Dalí's two pioneering films, *Un chien andalou* (1929) and *L'âge d'or* (1930). Post-war surrealism, however, is largely uncharted territory in film studies, despite the fact that the surrealists continued both to be enamoured with film and to produce their own films. Among the few exceptions that look beyond interwar France are J.H. Matthews's *Surrealism and Film*, Michael Richardson's *Surrealism and Cinema*, and Paul Hammond's anthology of surrealist writings on film, *The Shadow and Its Shadow*. But this overly narrow understanding of surrealism is hardly limited to film studies. Alyce Mahon describes the dominant art historical conception of surrealism's history as "a neat cycle, with the movement emerging out of the ashes of World War I, taking a key role in French culture by the mid-1930s, suffering a gradual decline with the outbreak of World War II, and ultimately dying after the war." But, as Mahon remarks, "to neglect the years after the displacement of Surrealism from Paris in 1939 is to deny Surrealism its full history and cultural impact."⁹ While surrealism has exerted an undeniable and pervasive influence on twentieth-century visual, intellectual, and popular culture, the organized movement's further development has then been oddly obscured by restrictive scholarly and critical delimitations. That includes surrealism's post-war change in direction, which also entangles the movement in broader questions about the relation between radical culture and occultism, initiation, and the political power of myth. Mahon's own monograph, *Surrealism and*

the Politics of Eros, 1938-1968, significantly expands the understanding of the surrealist movement beyond the interwar period. So, do such works as Gérard Durozoï's *History of the Surrealist Movement*, Michael Löwy's *Morning Star*, Tesei Bauduin's *Surrealism and the Occult*, and Gavin Parkinson's *Futures of Surrealism*. I draw on these tendencies in surrealism scholarship across the disciplines in charting the surrealist film's turn to myth and magic.

SURREALISM AND CINEMA AFTER THE WAR



The main focus in this book is the Danish surrealist artist Wilhelm Freddie's two experimental short films *The Definite Rejection of a Request for a Kiss* (*Det definitive afslag på anmodningen om et kys*, 1949) and *Eaten Horizons* (*Spiste horisonter*, 1950), made in collaboration with Jørgen Roos; the documentary film *L'invention du monde* (1953), directed by Jean-Louis Bédouin and Michel Zimbarca, with a narrative written by the surrealist poet Benjamin Péret; the feature films of the writer and director Nelly Kaplan, with a particular focus on *A Very Curious Girl* (*La Fiancée du pirate*, 1969) and *Néa* (1976); and the films of the Czech surrealist director, animator, and artist Jan Švankmajer, with a particular focus on *The Flat* (*Byt*, 1968), *Down to the Cellar* (*Do pivnice*, 1983), and *Lunacy* (*Sileni*, 2005). Freddie's films and *L'invention du monde* were made in the years following *Le Surréalisme en 1947*, while Kaplan's and Švankmajer's works were made in the face of crucial further changes in surrealism. The films span different formats, including the experimental short film, the documentary, the feature film, and stop-motion animation. They all, however, relate clearly to the revised aims of surrealism that Breton set the movement on during and after World War II, and they contribute to, and intervene in, the attempts at forming a new myth.

Surrealism scholar Jacqueline Chénieux-Gendron points out that "[i]t is a perilous enterprise to try to separate the history of the Surrealist movement from an elucidation of its

major intellectual points." I seek to expand the understanding of surrealist cinema by relating parts of its post-war production to precisely those intellectual points that led up to and were formulated in relation to *Le Surréalisme en 1947*. However, just as the surrealist interest in myth and magic has been little explored, its meaning and ramifications are contested." Therefore, I also seek to contribute to the broader understanding of surrealism's call for a new myth. To these ends, I draw on a wide range of primary sources, including surrealist art, literature, and other writings, documentation of exhibitions and exhibition catalogues, and published interviews. I also do close readings of surrealist writings on myth and magic. I pay attention to many of André Breton's works that are seldom referenced in film studies, but I also discuss writings by many lesser-known surrealists. Constructing a broad context for the films in this manner allows me to detect the traces that the change in direction has left on them.

Approaching surrealism in this way calls for a shift in the signposts that stake out the borders and centres of surrealist activity. After World War II, Bunuel is not necessarily the central surrealist film director. Breton and Bataille cannot be considered the polar opposites that they are so often construed as. Césaire and his fellow Martinican writers had contributed significantly to surrealism and altered its often contested relation to the non-European other. Esoterically inclined surrealists such as the artist Victor Brauner and the writer Pierre Mabille are as important for this era's art and thought as Salvador Dali and Louis Aragon were for the interwar period. In line with how the 1947 exhibition foregrounded the international multiplicity of its contributors, the post-war period saw an ever-increasing diversity in surrealism, including an increased participation of women in the movement.

Like so many surrealists, the filmmakers under discussion here are also erudite theorists. If large parts of the book set out to delineate their engagement with surrealism and interpret their films' engagement with myth in relation to them, I do not, however, mean to suggest that the filmmakers' intentions exhaust the meaning of these rich films. Examining how the directors' attempts at rendering art mythical and magical take expression in practice, I also acknowledge that this practice overflows the boundaries set out in theoretical statements. The films do not, then, merely tautologically illustrate or exemplify ideas in surrealist "theory." They are active contributions to and developments of surrealist myth and magic, alternately strengthening and disrupting its tenets. I consider the films, then, to work in line with contemporary notions that cinema can function as a kind of thought. But surrealism calls for a more sustained engagement with the primacy of the unconscious and the imagination in such film-thinking than contemporary theory tends to allow for. Hence, I turn to the philosopher of science and the imagination Gaston Bachelard to emphasize the role of the vivid and unpredictable life of the imagination in surrealist film-thinking. In an important essay, Bachelard stresses that there is primarily a poetic genesis for even such a seemingly doctrine-driven work as Honoré de Balzac's Swedenborgian novel *Séraphita* (1855). For Bachelard, poetry, in the broadest sense, can never be reduced to an illustration of ideas. Instead, he considers the poetic image

to be "privileged in that it acts as both an image and an idea," and talks about it in terms of "an image-thought or thought-image." Similarly, the films that I discuss here need to be poetic contributions to the search for a new myth, results of a thinking imagination rather than an application or expression of pre-formed ideas. Adapting Bachelard's thought to film theory, then, I consider these surrealist films to be examples of "an imagination that thinks." In that respect they are able, even obliged, to think in different ways about the matters at hand than discursive language allows. They strive to create new myths, rather than simply illustrating preconceived ideas about myth.

This book, then, is about surrealism as much as it is about cinema. It argues that the change in direction towards myth and magic provides an illuminating context for parts of surrealist cinema. It is interdisciplinary and intermedial, and situates post-war surrealist cinema in a context of surrealist thought and practice, and examines how film, in turn, contributes to that context. *Le Surréalisme en 1947* recurs as a point of reference throughout the book, the center of a labyrinth into which I place the films.

FOR AN EXPANDED HISTORY OF SURREALIST CINEMA

Linking surrealist film with the development of post-war surrealism opens up new perspectives on the history of surrealist cinema. In a 2008 article, Ian Christie poses the pointed question, "why the historiography of avant-garde film [has] remained even more conventional than that of mainstream cinema." This tendency is particularly striking when it comes to the historiography of the surrealist film. A foundational problem here appears to be a general scholarly uncertainty about the definition and historical demarcations of surrealism as a phenomenon spanning visual, literary, and intellectual culture. Although a narrow understanding of surrealism is prevalent across the disciplines, film scholarship tends to take an even more limited view of surrealism. The predominant tendency has long been to posit surrealist film production to have taken place between 1928 and 1930, ranging from Germaine Dulac's Artaud-penned *La Coquille et le clergyman* (1928) to Buñuel and Dalí's *Un chien andalou* and *L'âge d'or*. Sometimes the discussion includes examples on the verge of Dada and surrealism, such as René Clair's *Entr'acte* (1924) and Man Ray's *Emak-Bakia* (1926); sometimes it extends to Luis Buñuel's 1933 documentary film *Land without Bread* (*Las Hurdes*). It also tends to encompass the early surrealist reception of film, as well as the widespread surrealist practice of writing film scripts that were never intended to be realized.

Such delimitations make sense if surrealism is understood as belonging solely to the interwar avant-garde period. But as an increasing number of scholars in other fields have realized, an essential part of surrealism's character is its steadfast refusal to be contained by conventional historical and aesthetic definitions. Herein lies also its appeal as an idiosyncratic object of study. This fundamental idiosyncrasy also pertains to the surrealist film's resistance to being pinned down by labels such as avant-garde or experimental. One crucial reason why film studies has much to gain from looking to the art historical and intellectual development of surrealism is the fact that a focus on stylistic

traits will not allow us to identify, and even less make sense of, the multiform films that have emerged out of the movement. Much as surrealist art veers between the figurative and the non-figurative, between painting, collage, sculpture, and assemblage, and much as surrealist writings encompass poetry, short stories, novels, and essays, so the surrealist film needs to be a constantly mutating beast that alternates between short film, documentary, and feature film, and may employ collage techniques and animation as well as deceptively straightforward narratives.

Some exceptions to the dominant treatment of surrealist cinema have surfaced over the years. The surrealist critic and filmmaker Ado Kyrrou wrote *Le Surréalisme au cinéma* as a wildly inclusive overview based on the assumption that cinema is surrealist by its very nature. Paul Hammond's *The Shadow and Its Shadow* anthologizes surrealist writings on the cinema, from the 1920s and well into the post-war period. Two comprehensive studies of surrealism and cinema bring an even wider historical perspective. J.H. Matthews's *Surrealism and Film* and Michael Richardson's *Surrealism and Cinema* both discuss the surrealist reception of popular cinema, the earliest surrealist attempts at making film, and the continued incursions into filmmaking by surrealists and those in the movement's vicinity. Since Matthews's and Richardson's respective studies seek to trace the engagement between surrealism and cinema in its entirety, they have limited space to establish connections between the individual films and surrealism in a larger but more specific scope. I take the opposite approach, but what I need to sacrifice in scope, I hope to make up for in depth.

The task of writing a definite history of surrealist cinema,



Wilhelm Freddie

then, remains outside the scope of this book. What I can do, however, is provide an outline of what an extended, yet stringently defined, history of the surrealist film may look like. In contrast to the dominant notion that Luis Buñuel's and Salvador Dalí's *Un chien andalou* and *L'âge d'or* were the

only true surrealist films, a considerably more heterogeneous lineage of surrealist cinema can be discerned.

In brief, such an expanded history of surrealist cinema may look something like this. Already the interwar era is more complex than has often been recognized, and is far from limited to Dulac, Buñuel and Dalí, and Man Ray. In France, the brothers Jacques and Pierre Prévert together made the short surrealist comedy *L'affaire est dans le sac* (1932); the former, a one-time surrealist poet, would then go on to script several of Marcel Carné's defining films within poetic realism, permeated with a lingering surrealist sensibility. The biologist Jean Painlevé made a long series of animal documentaries that often testify to his proximity to surrealism, including *The Octopus* (*Le pieuvre*, 1927), *The Seahorse* (*L'hippocampe*, 1933), and *The Vampire* (*Le vampire*, 1945). Jacques Bernard Brunius directed a number of documentaries, of which at least *Les Violons d'Ingres* (1939) was explicitly connected with his surrealist activities. Brussels was an early center of organized surrealism outside France, and the movement's activities extended into cinema. In Belgium, Henri Storck, later a renowned documentary filmmaker, directed the experimental short film *Pour vos beaux yeux* (1929), about a man's obsession with a glass eye and the oneiric drift this launches him into. The surrealist cult of the fictional arch-criminal *Fantômas*, both in Souvestre's and Allain's co-written novels and Louis Feuillade's serial film adaptations (1913-1914), enacts a readily apparent influence on two other little explored Belgian surrealist films.²⁸ The French poet Georges Hugnet wrote the script for the Belgian Henri d'Ursel's only short film *La Perle* (1929), in which an erotically infused and dreamlike narrative is interspersed with black-clad and masked *Fantômas*-like figures who climb house facades and stalk deserted corridors.²⁹ The Belgian poet Ernst Moerman directed the silent short film *Monsieur Fantômas* (1936) as a more whimsical extension of Feuillade's morbid tales. Moerman makes visual references to the paintings of the Belgian surrealist René Magritte, while *Fantômas*'s uncanny powers of disguise and disappearance take on a more explicitly surrealist slant: the police closing in on him from all sides, a cut replaces *Fantômas* with a double bass. In the USA, the artist Joseph Cornell made the short film *Rose Hobart* (1936) by creatively editing together shots and scenes from a film featuring the eponymous actress in new constellations, intensifying the drama and affect while eliminating linear narrative. Among his many other, often unfinished, film projects, *Jack's Dream* (1939) creates an uncanny, surrealist atmosphere of childish wonder permeated with dread.

World War II forced many surrealists into exile, not least to the USA, and so rendered surrealist film production even more erratic than it had been before. But in New York in 1943, Duchamp, Max Ernst, and Man Ray contributed one sequence each to Hans Richter's omnibus film *Dreams That Money Can Buy* (1947). Richter's project also featured two sequences by the American sculptor Alexander Calder, who exhibited with the surrealists on several occasions, and the interaction between exiled surrealists and American avant-garde artists and filmmakers left an enduring legacy. The American avant-garde films that are arguably closest to

surrealism are those of Maya Deren, in particular *Meshes of the Afternoon* (1943), *At Land* (1944), and the unfinished *Witch's Cradle* (1944), which incorporates elements of Duchamp's design from the 1942 New York exhibition *First Papers of Surrealism*. Yet, Deren's own misgivings about considering her films in relation to surrealism speaks to the movement's fraught status in an American art and film climate often all too ready to dismiss its influence.

The post-war era, in sharp contrast to its oft-neglected status, saw an unsurpassed surrealist engagement with cinema. New participants in the reformed Paris group, including Robert Benayoun and Ado Kyrou, founded the journal *L'Age du Cinéma* in 1951. Its six issues ushered in a lively new strain of surrealist film reception, which, after its demise, largely continued in the French film journal *Positif*, founded in 1952. Kyrou's and Benayoun's inclusive appreciation of everything from Italian peplum films, British Hammer horror, and soft-core pornography, to art cinema auteurs like Michelangelo Antonioni and Alain Resnais, arguably prefigures such later developments as "paracinema" and cult fandom, albeit rooted in a more discerning surrealist vigilance for the poetic charge to be found in what society at large deems to be rubble.

Surrealist film critics also coined the influential term film noir to describe a strain of American crime films. Despite the lasting and varied impression that post-war surrealism has left on film culture, the surrealist engagement with cinema in this period has largely languished in obscurity. This is at least partly due to a critical and scholarly bias towards the surrealists' rivals in the *nouvelle vague* and their *Cahiers du Cinéma*, but the more precise mechanisms behind this silence are still to be explored.

Surrealist film production in the post-war era is equally lively. Freddie made his two short films, *The Definite Rejection of a Request for a Kiss* and *Eaten Horizons*, in Copenhagen in 1949 and 1950. The surrealist writer Jean Ferry wrote the screenplay for Henri-Georges Clouzot's feature film *Manon* (1949), a classic of *amour fou* made in the context of a commercial feature film format. In 1951, the Paris surrealists Georges Goldfayn and Jindrich Heisler made the first instalment of an intended series of *Revue des Surréalistes*, edited together from found material. The film appears to be lost, and Heisler's death precluded its projected successors from being completed. Soon after that, the surrealist poet Benjamin Péret, a member of Breton's group since its Dada days, wrote the narration for the two documentary short films *L'invention du monde* and *Quetzalcoatl, le serpent emplumé*, directed by the young surrealist newcomers Jean-Louis Bédouin and Michel Zimbarca. In 1960, the Belgian surrealist Marcel Mariën made the anticlerical short film *L'imitation du cinéma* on a shoestring budget.

Following a number of short films, including the documentary *Palais Idéal* (1958) and the Maupassant adaptation *La Chevelure* (1961), the critic Kyrou directed a few features, including an adaptation of Matthew Lewis's gothic novel *The Monk* (*Le Moine*, 1971), from a screenplay by Luis Buñuel. Indeed, in the decades to follow, several surrealists turned to the feature film format. They were largely inspired by Buñuel's successful incorporation of his surrealist legacy in

feature films such as the Mexican *Los Olvidados* (1950) and *The Exterminating Angel* (*El ángel exterminador*, 1962), and his return to filmmaking in Europe in the 1960s, which spawned such remarkable films as *Viridiana* (1960), *Belle de Jour* (1967), and *The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie* (*Le charme discret de la bourgeoisie*, 1972). Kyrô's colleague Benayoun directed the two feature films, *Paris Does Not Exist* (*Paris n'existe pas*, 1969) and *Serious as Pleasure* (*Sérieux comme le plaisir*, 1975), the former featuring time travel in a decidedly quotidian environment, the latter a road movie centring around a ménage à trois. In the vicinity of the movement, Nelly Kaplan made her feature film debut with *A Very Curious Girl*. Further at the fringes of surrealism, Fernando Arrabal and Alejandro Jodorowsky formed the oppositional *Panique* movement with Roland Topor and directed several features each, including Arrabal's *Viva la muerte* (1971) and Jodorowsky's *El Topo* (1970); Topor's novel *Le locataire chimérique* (1964) was adapted by Roman Polanski as *The Tenant* (1976). In the early to mid-1970s, the now former surrealist Jean Ferry contributed three screenplays to the Belgian director Harry Kümel, of which the vampire film *Daughters of Darkness* (*Les lèvres rouges*, 1971) and the mythological mystery *Malpertuis* (1973) stand as lingering testaments to his surrealist past.

As vibrant as the 1960s and 1970s were, surrealist film history does not end there. In Czechoslovakia, Jan Švankmajer has directed over thirty short and feature films since 1964, and has worked in the context of organized surrealism since he joined the Czechoslovak surrealist group in 1971. Švankmajer's fellow surrealist David Jarab has also directed two feature films, *Vaterland—A Hunting Diary* (*Vaterland—Lovecký deník*, 2004) and *Head—Hands—Heart* (*Hlava ruce srdce*, 2010). And the Czech surrealist artist and alchemy scholar Martin Stejskal has experimented with digital animation and image morphing. While Stejskal's experiments have never been officially released, extracts from them have been displayed at exhibitions. Other surrealists have also made films on a smaller scale. In Sweden, the poet Emma Lundén directed the short film *Bockgränd* (*Buck Alley*, 2003). In Canada, Alexandre Fatta has made a number of short collage films, including *A Silly Accident* (*Un bête accident*, 2013).

The history of surrealist cinema as I sketch it here, then, oscillates between small-scale, low- or no-budget short films, and commercially distributed feature films. Even in narrowing the scope down to films and filmmakers that are markedly affected by the surrealist change in direction towards myth and magic, the stylistic heterogeneity implied in this overview largely remains.

THE SEARCH FOR A NEW MYTH

The films that I discuss in the chapters to follow, then, emerged out of a lively and dynamic surrealist film culture, but, more specifically, they are also products of surrealism's change in direction towards the search for a new myth. But what is surrealism's new myth? Announcing the idea, Breton emphasized the fact that surrealism was not vain enough to believe that it could introduce an entire new mythology. Instead, the surrealists frequently asserted the open-ended character of their mythical pursuits. *Le Surréalisme en 1947*

and other contemporaneous surrealist activities were meant to "sketch the outline of what such a myth might be—a sort of mental 'parade' before the real show." In their films, Wilhelm Freddie, Jean-Louis Bedouin and Michel Zimbacca with Benjamin Péret, Nelly Kaplan, and Jan Švankmajer all continue this attempt to outline a new myth, asserting its contingency upon changing historical circumstances while retaining many recurring points of reference. Prominent among these is surrealism's intensified engagement with magic and occultism, as indicated by *Le Surréalisme en 1947*, often refracted through a persistent interest in "primitive" thought and cultures.

At the exhibition, these strategies were plain in the design of the altars in the *Labyrinth of Initiation*. Modelled on pagan cults, the altars were collaborative efforts that incorporated imaginative votive offerings thought out by Péret and references to the signs of the zodiac, and were dedicated to works or figures from within surrealism or the larger surrealist tradition. A ritualistic ambience enveloped these sacred sites that were dedicated to elements from the art and writings of such surrealist luminaries as Lautréamont, Max Ernst, and Alfred Jarry. At *Le Surréalisme en 1947*, then, the new myth was outlined as a nexus or meeting point of disparate images and streams of thought, predicated upon the logic of collage and assemblage, and executed in a collaborative manner. What better medium to continue the investigation into its contours than film, a fundamentally collaborative art form with a propensity for montage and an attendant capacity to join together things otherwise far removed? Before delving deeper into how surrealist films do that, however, it is necessary to examine some further facets of surrealism's engagement with myth and its interest in magic and occultism.

Surrealism's attraction to myth calls for an expanded understanding of the movement's scope and ambitions. Michael Löwy defines surrealism as "an attempt to reestablish the 'enchanted' dimensions at the core of human existence—poetry, passion, mad love, imagination, magic, myth, the marvelous, dreams, revolt, utopian ideals—which have been eradicated by this civilization and its values." These concerns come to the fore with the post-war change in direction, as Breton reformulates many surrealist practices in terms that are resonant with myth and magic. Following the war, he defines surrealist poetry as something akin to an occult operation, considers surrealist games to be bound up with both ludics and the esoteric notion of correspondences, posits chance occurrences to be an "everyday magic," and claims surrealism to be the culmination of a repressed counter-tradition of magic art. Continuing surrealism's search for alternatives to a culture marked by the repression of play and poetry, magic and imagination, the new myth crystallized around such occult and ludic elements.

From the time of the movement's inception and until today, many surrealists have taken an interest in myths from around the world. But where does surrealism's interest in myth spring from? Surrealism's early attraction to ancient and non-Western mythology was intimately bound up with the movement's appreciation and appropriation of so called "primitive" art. In his 1948 essay "The Moral Meaning of Sociology," Georges Bataille comments that artists in the

interwar era were tempted to assimilate their work to the collective creation of exotic peoples. Myths, analogous in certain respects to dreams, cannot be entirely separated from recent poetic findings. It is true that a modern poem has none of the meaning of a myth, but a myth sometimes has the same attraction as a modern poem.

If myth is like dreams and poetry, then, it too can reveal facets of the exterior world that are obscured by modern humanity's instrumental, utilitarian relation with its surroundings. The surrealists found support for their detection of this similarity in the findings of psychoanalysis, and so myth fit with surrealism's early preoccupations. As Bataille points out, the surrealist interest in "primitive" art and myth also stemmed from their purported integration in a collective environment, which meant that they acted as "a manifestation of a collective being superior to the individual and named society." Myth, then, worked as a model for the surrealists' own attempts to escape the confines of art as a solitary pursuit of aesthetic worth, while it also revealed other ways of relating to the world and indicated how creation could work as a force of societal cohesion.


While the surrealist outline of a new myth draws in part on ancient mythology, it diverges from conventional definitions of mythology. In the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski's definition, myths provide explanations of the surrounding world and strengthen tradition by anchoring it in narratives about primordial events. As indicated, surrealism's approach to myth is not so much narrative as combinatory, relying on the associative powers of strong imagery and allusions to the surrealist tradition. Rather than being directed towards primordial happenings, surrealism's new myth is also profoundly modern. Here, too, it builds on earlier surrealist thought on myth. Throughout the interwar era, Breton and other surrealists returned to notions of a "modern mythology" and a "collective mythology." In a 1920 essay, Breton stresses the need to abstain from simple restorations of earlier myths. Instead, he calls for the imagery of the Italian painter Giorgio de Chirico to occupy

the position that the Sphinx had in ancient mythology. Already here, creatures born out of the imagination of surrealism's elective affinities take precedence over the

numinous beings from old myths. Louis Aragon similarly saw a modern mythology arise in the tension between the surface of contemporary Paris with its arcades and neon signs and the insight that they harbor ancient depths. Breton and Aragon both evade nostalgia in favor of injecting modernity with archaic energies and arcane meaning. During the tremors of the coming war, the surrealists found a new sense of gravity in the idea of a modern mythology. In his 1935 declaration "Political Position of Surrealism," Breton declares that his "preoccupation over the past ten years" has led him to "reconcile Surrealism as a method of creating a collective myth with the much more general movement involving the liberation of man." Art and poetry are replete with myths, but surrealism, he claims, would prove to have the ability to transform these personal myths of artists into new collective myths. Envisioning a transposition of the "climate" of surrealist art and poetry to reality, Breton suggests that the surrealist myth would be able to enact a thorough transformation of the world. Again, what better medium to illustrate and enact such a transformation of the world than film, with its capacity to faithfully capture pieces of reality only to transform them through editing and effects?

The notion of a new myth arose during the war. Breton introduced the idea in his 1942 "Prolegomena to a Third Surrealist Manifesto or Not," in which he hopes that it will be capable of "fostering the

society that we judge to be desirable." Then, in Arcanum 17, Breton expanded on his conception of a new myth. Interweaving ancient myths, the occult content dormant in the poetry of surrealist forerunners Gérard de Nerval, Charles Baudelaire, and Arthur Rimbaud, and nineteenth-century occultist Eliphas Lévi's description of magic initiation, he conceives of the new myth as a potent counter-force against the Christian myth that has repressed vital knowledge about the world. The need to challenge the foundations of Christian-capitalist civilization was indeed so pressing that Breton, in conjunction with Le Surréalisme en 1947, explains that the search for a new myth is bound up with the question of whether humanity, on the brink of extinction, can be



saved. The initiatory design of the exhibition was accordingly intended to be a "guideline" that could introduce humanity to a more desirable society.



André Breton

Initiation indeed emerges as a key surrealist concern around this time. As studied by anthropologists and historians of religion, initiation recurs throughout many cultural contexts and historical epochs. Initiation is frequently predicated upon trials meant to induce a symbolic death followed by a rebirth, accompanied by a profound ontological transformation of the initiate. In his 1940 book *Mirror of the Marvelous*, the surrealist doctor and writer Pierre Mabille indicates that initiation may be a central element in surrealism's transformation of the world. Expanding the surrealist notion of the marvelous to encompass myths, magical incantations, romantic prose, and gothic novels, Mabille draws attention to the patterns of initiatory trials that recur through narratives and imagery of the marvelous. As *Arcanum 17* suggests, Breton conceives of initiation in both mythological and esoteric terms. Like Mabille before him, he appeals to the myth of Osiris, the Egyptian god whose body was dismembered and strewn across the land before being reconstituted by Isis. Breton proceeds to reference the nineteenth-century occultist Eliphas Lévi's description of an esoteric initiation ritual, which culminates when a veiled priest whispers the words "Osiris is a black god" into the ear of the initiate. Osiris's dismemberment mirrors Breton's own inner turmoil as well as the laceration of the world effected not just by the ongoing war, but the disasters brought about by capitalism and Christianity, and their attendant disenchantment of the world. For Breton, then, the war constituted a symbolic death, a disintegration

of the orderly self-image of a presumably rational society, and the trope of initiation offered a way of conceiving a healing rebirth informed by surrealist values, now themselves transformed under the aegis of the arcane lore of myth and occultism. The initiatory structure of *Le Surréalisme en 1947* was meant to contribute to the exhibition's function as a "force of magnetization and cohesion," which would channel what Breton saw as the epoch's fragmented collective desire and let it converge "toward a single point where a new myth awaits us." If humanity were to be saved, the surrealist myth was the beacon that needed to be followed through the daunting labyrinth of a shattered post-war existence.

But while the surrealists saw fit to restore certain forms of knowledge and experiences repressed or forgotten, they never lost sight of the contemporaneity of the new myth. In the 1947 collective tract "Inaugural Rupture," the French surrealists argue that "the will to myth," along with core surrealist notions such as black humor and objective chance, "participate in the progress of the most advanced disciplines of our time thanks to which we have non-Euclidian geometry, non-Maxwellian physics, non-Pasteurian biology, non-Newtonian mechanics, disciplines in their turn united with a non-Aristotelian logic and of that non-Moses morality." Myth, then, is posited to be a progressive force of upheaval at the forefront of human advances. As these examples suggest, there is a productive tension in surrealism's preoccupation with myth between historical progress and timelessness, the modern and the arcane, which the film medium is well suited to exploit and intensify.

OCCULT TRANSFORMATIONS

As part of its transformation under the influence of surrealism's change in direction, surrealist cinema underwent a marked change. Occult rituals, initiatory trials, and tropes of alchemical transmutation recur in the postwar surrealist film. Much as with myth, surrealism evidenced an interest in occultism early on. In the second surrealist manifesto, Breton goes so far as to call for "the profound, the veritable occultation of surrealism." Drawing an analogy between the surrealists' efforts at transforming the everyday and the alchemists' search for the philosopher's stone, he situates surrealism as part of a lineage of accursed thought; like the alchemists, the surrealists sought a transformation of the world that refused to bow to the dictates of instrumental reason. In a 1950 interview, however, Breton concedes that for all the second manifesto's references to alchemy, astrology, and the occult, "twenty years ago I had only a premonition of this." Further readings in occultism in combination with the agonizing experience of the war, it would seem, had lent him a deeper understanding. Recent research on Arthur Rimbaud, Charles, and Gérard de Nerval had also revealed that these surrealist predecessors were all profoundly influenced by esoteric currents. Breton was swift to extend such an esoteric poetics to the film medium. In "As in a Wood," he glosses Baudelaire's conflation of occultism and poetry as he lauds film for its capacity to trigger "the mechanism of correspondences." I will return to film's magical poetics after a brief detour through occult territory.

In their contributions to the search for a new myth, then, surrealist films frequently evoke magic and occultism. Both are slippery terms, and the latter is largely uncharted terrain in cinema studies. Magic has been used to designate a wide range of phenomena, from ideas of "natural magic," through ceremonial rites, to the practices of "primitive" cultures. Closer to cinema studies, there is also the practice of illusionistic stage magic, which was transferred to film in Georges Méliès's pioneering works. Scholars have problematized the notion of magic for its lack of specificity. Surrealism, however, tends to embrace the multiplicity of the concept, and its constructions of magic draw in equal measure on occultism, ethnographic definitions of "primitive" magic, and Sigmund Freud's claim that art originated in magic. Occultism, in its turn, is a heterogeneous current, and belongs to the larger field of Western esotericism. The latter is an umbrella term used in scholarship to designate a wide variety of currents that are heterodox in relation to mainstream religion, also including hermeticism, alchemy, astrology—and magic. In *Surrealism and the Occult*, Tessel Bauduin traces Breton's esoteric influences from the 1920s to the late 1950s, and concludes that much of his esoteric knowledge was mediated via romantic literature and scholarship. But, as Bauduin also contends, Breton never tried to hide the fact that he maintained a certain distance in relation to esotericism. In *Conversations*, he declares that regards esotericism, as in all other areas, it cannot be a question of "fideism" or conversion on the part of surrealism. Much as with mythology, then, the surrealists subsumed esotericism and magic under their own aims.



Wouter Hanegraaff

Esotericism scholar Wouter Hanegraaff argues that Western esotericism is above all defined by its status as the other of respectable thought and conventional religion, and that it is accordingly "rejected knowledge." Surrealism's appeal to magic tends to emphasize its position of alterity in relation to the mainstream of modern Western thought. In conjunction with *Le Surréalisme* in 1947, Breton approvingly quotes the early anthropologist James G. Frazer in support of magic, which "has contributed to emancipate mankind from the thralldom of tradition and to elevate them into a larger, freer life, with a broader outlook on the world."⁸⁴ Here, he also taps into the overall sense that the occult may be revolutionary since it opposes the reigning order and, as Marco Pasi describes it, offers "sometimes radically alternative ways of conceiving society, politics, and the self." Another magical influence on the formulation of the new myth was the French occultist Eliphas Levi. Lévi constructed his occultism through connections between magic, the Kabbalah, alchemy, astrology, and the tarot, and, as

Hanegraaff puts it, worked with "scattered and chaotic fragments of learning but somehow managed to create something new and quite original out of it." There is more than a passing resemblance between Lévi's syntheses of wildly divergent traditions into a new key to unlock the universe, and surrealism's attempts at constructing a new myth intended to purge the world of dominant values and effect a healing under the sign of a recovery of repressed knowledge. The method of choice for both Lévi and the surrealists in constructing new forms of knowledge is analogy.

For post-war surrealism, new knowledge of the world depends upon a short-circuiting of rationality and logics, in favor of analogies and correspondences. Analogy came to the fore in Breton's thought during and after the war. In an

essay on the Brazilian sculptor Maria Martins, Breton writes of the importance of "[a]nalogical thought, officially abandoned since the 'Renaissance'." In relation to the painter Arshile Gorky, he posits analogy to be the "key to this mental prison," meaning the state of the contemporary West, in its capacity for "free and limitless play." Analogical thought and a relation of correspondences between different parts of the universe is one of the four constituent parts of historian Antoine Faivre's definition of esotericism, along with a conception of a living nature, the imagination's creation and interpretation of hieroglyphically dense images, and an experience of transmutation. While its usefulness as a general definition of esotericism has been contested, Faivre's typology does much to indicate how esotericism informs many of surrealism's central post-war preoccupations. In their attempts at reconstructing and re-enchanting the world, then, the surrealists found vital means in this occult heritage, and they were particularly enthralled by its close connection to poetry. Much as romantic and

symbolist poets embraced esoteric sources in their quest for a poetry that functioned as "symbolic knowledge and the key to an analogical world," the surrealists considered poetic analogy to be a potent magical antidote to the ruinous state of the world, fraught with an intuitive and revelatory knowledge. Much like occultists, surrealists believe that myth and poetry, conceived as magic, are not merely fanciful embellishments, but rather reveal facets of the world which reason alone cannot discover. This property was also extended to film.

ANALOGY AND THE POETICS OF CINEMA

Ever since the first surrealist manifesto, surrealism has given a privileged place to the poetic image. For surrealism, however, the poetic image needs to be understood in a generalized sense, equally applicable to film and art as to writing. Breton initially defines the workings of the poetic image by way of radicalizing the poet Pierre Reverdy's notion that the image is born from "a juxtaposition of two more or less distant realities"; the greater the distance, "the stronger the image will be." For the surrealists, the resultant image creates a poetic "spark" through its bypassing of habitual perception. In *Beyond Painting*, Max Ernst extends this surrealist poetics to encompass any collision of otherwise distant phenomena, whether in collage, painting, or film. Linda Williams traces the imagery in surrealist cinema to the movement's early formulations of the poetic image, but she also asserts that film had a profound influence on the initial conception of the surrealist image. As Williams puts it, Reverdy's definition of the image "looks to the cinema's power to combine elements of concrete reality." Surrealism's definition of the image, then, constitutes a generalized poetics, practiced across art forms and media. As Williams suggests, there are nevertheless inevitable medium-specific conditions for this poetics. Breton himself touches on those when he discusses cinema in terms of his post-war reformulation of poetics.

Breton increasingly came to value the poetic image to the extent that it worked according to analogy. In the 1948 essay "Ascendant Sign," he states that in its short-circuiting of causality, analogy creates a flare that reveals the world to be a network of relations. Thus providing "flashes from the lost mirror," analogy gives an insight into the interconnectedness of all things, a sensibility and knowledge otherwise banished from Western civilization, in which "the primordial links are broken." This notion of the image as a condensed harbinger of meaning resonates with esotericism, which, as Andreas Kilcher points out, "works openly and affirmatively with literary (aesthetical, rhetorical, poetological) methods [and] lends an epistemological function to similes, parables, metaphors, images, etc." Intermedial analogy, then, encapsulates many of the hopes that Breton expressed in relation to the new myth. It fosters a new sensibility that can counter destructive fragmentation. It condenses the rejected knowledge feeding into the new myth into an intense flare of light.

In "As in a Wood," Breton writes that film has the capacity to provide "an Opening Key" to a deeper, experiential knowledge by uniting day and a mystical night.¹⁰¹ For Breton, film's capacity to trigger correspondences then depends on its capacity to unite opposites. But he does not

expand on the more specific ways in which films forge these connections. He is similarly vague about how cinema pertains to magic when he mentions a handful of films, including F.W. Murnau's *Nosferatu* (*Nosferatu, eine Symphonie des Grauens* 1922), in his late monograph *L'art magique*. Tom Gunning, however, conveys how *Nosferatu* may pertain precisely to Breton's understanding of a magic art of analogies and correspondences, when he describes how "Murnau uses complex

and highly symbolic intercutting [...] to create a series of magically interlocking events carried by sinister correspondences and analogies." For Gunning, Murnau's editing points to an influence from German romantic *Naturphilosophie*, which "conceived of Nature not as inert material but as an organic entity shot through and enlivened by a system of correspondences and metaphors," an example of what Faivre describes as the esoteric conception of a "living nature." As Breton implies and Gunning demonstrates, editing and montage facilitate film to restore those primordial links that Breton considers to be broken.


Film, then, emerges as a potent magical medium through its propensity for an analogical poetics that can ostensibly reveal obscured facets of the world. But mythical and esoteric imagery and narratives add other facets to the surrealist film's outlining of a new myth. Constructing assemblages of new myths through these components, film also contributes a vital experiential and sensory aspect to this search, which again emphasizes its mediation between the modern and the arcane.

FILM AND EXPERIENCE

Breton's definition of the analogical image in terms of a sudden flare of light indicates that the knowledge it transmits is of an experiential kind, leaping out of causality to briefly illuminate reality in a way that reveals hidden connections, an otherwise obscured totality. The connections Breton makes in "As in a Wood" between a cosmic Opening Key and film editing also points to the fact that surrealism's engagement with myth and the rejected knowledge of esotericism is bound up with a wider dialectic between the archaic and the modern. Breton's understanding of cinema can be related to Gunning's remark that "the historical genesis of the light play of cinema derives from an intersection between a Renaissance preoccupation with the magical power of images [...] and a secular discovery of the processes of light and vision." Gunning considers this intersection to be an "extraordinary confluence of an ancient magical imagistic tradition and a nascent scientific enlightenment," and hence it oscillates between enchantment and disenchantment, constituting a form of magic that is painfully aware of its own artificial status. In connecting the mechanical reproduction of the film medium with repressed modes of being designated as magic, post-war surrealism can be related to Walter Benjamin's ruminations about technology and experience.

Surrealism and Benjamin shared the goal of seeking to abolish, as Margaret Cohen puts it, "the modern alienation of the senses." The attempt to liberate and expand sensory experience is a little recognized undercurrent in surrealism overall, but it is a central component in the movement's search for a new myth and its employment of an analogical

poetics that moves the spectator to new conceptions of the world. In *Cinema and Experience*, Miriam Hansen describes how Benjamin considered that the alienation of the senses in modernity "can be undone only on the terrain of technology itself, by means of new media of reproduction that allow for a collective and playful [...] innervation." In his essay "Surrealism", Benjamin postulates that surrealism has a particular potential to effect such an innervation, one that is furthermore bound up with its intense imagery. Benjamin asserts that surrealism's "profane illumination" can "initiate us" into a particular "image sphere," which facilitates a technological interpenetration of "body and image," in which "revolutionary tension" and "collective bodily innervation" intermingle. Here, he places surrealism at the forefront of his struggles with coming to terms with the conditions for experience in a technological modernity." Breton's proposition that the film medium is particularly apt at triggering the mechanism of correspondences would seem to pertain to precisely such a means of using technology to enable the kind of experience that this very same technology has repressed. Ultimately, then, surrealism's new myth is not just meant to foster a new kind of society. It also seeks to shape a new sensorium.



Jacques Hérold
Plate from *Le Surréalisme en 1947*

In this pursuit, surrealism attempts to transcend instrumental vision. Martin Jay contends that, in contrast to the prevailing critique of ocular-centrism in twentieth-century French thought, surrealism seeks to cultivate a different kind of seeing, rather than to critique seeing in itself. Diverging from the iconoclastic tendencies in Western culture, from religious to political thought, surrealists have indeed always valorized the image, mental as well as visual. Surrealism, then, does not denigrate vision as such, but rather reacts against its instrumental use in Western modernity. While

dominant Western culture considers vision to be objective, precise, and impersonal, art historian James Elkins writes, it is in fact "caught up in the threads of the unconscious," and bound up with affect, desire, and imagination. The frequent Western connection of seeing with the bright light of reason has a counterpart in the entanglement of vision with the night side of the unconscious and its alterations of that which is seen. Surrealism is ultimately in pursuit of a form

of seeing that it believes has become all but extinct in Western society, and which "does not coincide with what is objectively visible." Instead, as Breton describes it in relation to Antonin Artaud, this kind of seeing transgresses the taboo of crossing over to the other side of the looking glass. In a 1947 essay about the painter Roberto Matta, Breton brings further perspectives to the entanglement of seeing not only with the unconscious but with the other senses. He speculates that surrealist painting tends to go beyond vision and the purely optical, and bring "various other senses [...] into play." At this juncture, Breton includes "divination" among these senses, and so associates the multisensory experience of surrealist artwork with occult knowledge. In the postwar era, surrealist innervation, then, is aimed at creating a sensorium that is increasingly bound up with esoteric thought, and this entails "a certain perception of the links connecting humanity to the universe." Such experiences are what Breton wanted surrealism to translate into, but also generate from, the analogically dictated poetic image, the moving form of which is a potential purveyor of a resolution of magic and modernity.

Surrealism's evocation of multisensory experience in the cinema at once resonates with and troubles current film theoretical approaches to the embodied film experience. Vivian Sobchack has demonstrated that all film spectators are virtual synaesthetes and experience film with all the senses. Following her, Jennifer Barker, Martine Beugnet, and Laura Marks have elaborated different ways in which the experience of watching a film engages larger parts of the sensory apparatus. However, these theories of the multisensory film experience do not tend to factor in the imagination, at least not in its creative, analogical capacity. An analysis of multisensory and embodied experience in surrealist cinema, then, calls for a complement to these productive theories. Here, I again turn to Gaston Bachelard, but this time to his five volumes on the "material imagination," or "the imagination of matter." In these books, Bachelard reads poetry, alchemical texts, philosophy, and surrealist writings, and examines how they convey the imagination to be an active, creative faculty that mediates between humans and the material world. In Bachelard's estimation, the strongest poetic images also tend to go beyond the sense that is most immediately engaged and, by way of the imagination, activate the other senses. Bachelard's writings resonate with surrealism's poetics and its interest in esotericism, but his work also asserts that the imagination tends towards the creation of what he calls an "instantaneous mythology" or a "spontaneous mythology." Bachelard, then, contributes an understanding of not only the imagination's crucial role in the embodied experience of surrealist cinema, but also the connections between the surrealist new myth, the senses, and poetic experiences of the world. Here, innervation and initiation commingle.

The following two chapters consider films from the years immediately following *Le Surréalisme* en 1947, all of which are under the immediate influence of the change in direction set out in the exhibition. Chapter 4 takes a leap forward in time to the years surrounding and following the dissolution of organized surrealism in France. Chapter 5 examines the context of Czechoslovak surrealism, which builds on and negotiates the tenets set out by Breton.

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Contributors: Sean Moreland, Alissa Burger, Michael Cisco, Dan Clinton, Brian Johnson, S.T. Joshi, John Langan, Murray Leader, Juan L. Pérez de Luque, Slawomir Studniarz, Miles Tittle, Robert H. Waugh, Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock, Ben Woodard.

Excerpt: Edgar Allan Poe (1809-1849) and H. P. Lovecraft (1890-1937) are the two leading writers of weird or supernatural fiction in American literature and perhaps in all literature. Both emerged at critical junctures in the history of the genre. Poe's earliest writings in the 1830s were published during the waning stages of the gothic movement, initiated when Horace Walpole wrote *The Castle of Otranto* (1764), and inspired legions of imitators and successors, including Ann Radcliffe, Matthew Gregory Lewis, Charles Robert Maturin, and Mary Shelley. Poe either discarded or radically refashioned the cumbersome "dramatic paraphernalia" (as Lovecraft called it) of the gothic novel and focused intensely on the psychology of terror. He also sensed that fear is best conveyed in short compass and all but invented the short story as a literary mode, focusing on the "unity of effect" and emphasizing the importance of every episode, every paragraph, even every word for the story's dénouement.

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field for generations. Contemporary findings in science—especially physics, biology, chemistry, and anthropology—had rendered many of these tropes so implausible that, in Lovecraft's view, they had become unusable in serious literature. Accordingly, Lovecraft felt that only the boundless universe—the nature and extent of which had barely begun to be charted by the human intellect—contained sufficient reservoirs of mystery that it could serve as the aesthetic foundation of a weird tale. In the course of his brief literary career, Lovecraft definitively established the tale of "cosmic horror" as a central component of the weird tale, and it remains his signature contribution to literature.

Poe and Lovecraft share a number of common features, some superficial and some much more profound. Both their careers lasted less than two decades; both produced a relatively slim body of fiction, confined almost entirely to the short story; and both devoted much time to essays and criticism, and in their essays and reviews they laid down important principles for the kind of literature they wished to write. In their personalities, they tended to be solitary, withdrawn, and not entirely comfortable with women; both claimed extensive but largely self-taught learning; and poverty dogged both their lives, manifestly contributing to their early deaths. Perhaps as a result of their distinctive personalities as well as the compelling nature of their literary work, both have become recognizable icons with appeal for a wide array of readers throughout the world.

Lovecraft had a deep and abiding respect for Poe, referring to him famously as his "God of Fiction." His initial reading of Poe at the age of eight effected a revolution in his aesthetic interests. Having previously become enamored of such things as Greek mythology and the Arabian Nights, he stumbled on Poe and was never the same again: "Then I struck EDGAR ALLAN POE! It was my downfall, and at the age of eight I saw the blue firmament of Argos and Sicily darkened by the miasmal exhalations of the tomb!"³ As late as 1935, Lovecraft was admitting the Poe influence, although, interestingly enough, he denied a correspondent's assertions that his prose style was exclusively modeled on Poe's. In commenting on a story by Richard F. Searight that some had felt was written in Lovecraft's idiom, Lovecraft stated,

I can't see this in any marked degree. Rather would I say that you have simply chosen the same general cast of language which I prefer—but which hundreds of others, long before I was born, have preferred. Many think I have derived this style exclusively from Poe—which (despite the strong influence of Poe on me) is another typical mistake of uninformed modernism. This style is no especial attribute of Poe, but is simply the major traditional way of handling English narrative prose. If I picked it up through any especial influence, that influence is probably the practice of the 18th century rather than Poe.

Lovecraft may be protesting a bit too much: it is difficult to deny that his earlier work in particular manifestly echoes the overheated rhetoric and occasionally esoteric language that render Poe's prose instantly recognizable. It might well be said that Lovecraft, initially overwhelmed by the Poe

influence, both in prose and in many other elements of plot and motif, worked hard to overcome that influence and become, as it were, his own writer. That he had done so by the 1930s, creating a distinctive fusion of Poesque prose and scientific precision while at the same time effecting a fusion between traditional weird fiction and the burgeoning genre of science fiction, is undeniable.



It is remarkable that a volume treating the interrelations between these two giants of weird fiction has not been assembled before now. The influence of Poe on Lovecraft is, of course, unmistakable and has been discussed in a scattered and unsystematic manner by many critics, but it perhaps required Lovecraft's definitive ascent into the American and world literary canons to underscore the point that Lovecraft was not merely a perennial student of his great predecessor but one who—however much he himself, in his excessive humility, would deny it—in many ways has achieved equal standing with Poe as a literary figure. Indeed, the opening chapter in this book, by Brian Johnson, focuses precisely on Harold Bloom's concept of the "anxiety of influence" as it applies to these two writers, asserting that some of the early tales of Lovecraft that have been criticized as being slavishly Poesque, such as "The Tomb" and "The Outsider," feature considerably more originality than even their author was prepared to admit.

Lovecraft readily adopted Poe's critical theory of the "unity of effect," extending it not merely to the short story but even to the novella and the short novel. This fruitful subject is treated perceptively in Dan Clinton's essay in this book. Many readers who come on these two writers for the first time are struck with the numerous parallels in their treatment of weird motifs. Here, Juan L. Pérez-de-Luque examines the use of "vertical spaces" in Poe and Lovecraft—their use of attics, cellars, and dungeons to create a kind of architecture

of terror in enclosed spaces— while Robert H. Waugh examines both authors' incorporation of the feline species in some of their most noteworthy tales.

"Cosmic horror" is the one area where Lovecraft might seem to have surpassed his master. Michael Cisco's essay examines the extent to which this element also found its antecedent in Poe. For all the respect, even adulation, that Lovecraft evinced for Poe, there are signs that the former felt that, in the area of "cosmicism," he might be able to assert a kind of declaration of independence from his predecessor. Although he wrote in 1930 to Clark Ashton Smith (another writer whose sense of the cosmic was very acute) that "in literature we can easily see the cosmic quality in Poe, Maturin, Dunsany, de la Mare, & Blackwood," a letter written only a few months before his death tells a somewhat different story: "What I miss in Machen, James, Dunsany, de la Mare, Shiel, and even Blackwood and Poe, is a sense of the cosmic. Dunsany— though he seldom adopts the darker and more serious approach— is the most cosmic of them all, but he gets only a little way."

Lovecraft's most cosmic story is probably *At the Mountains of Madness*, a short novel of breathtaking scope that hints at the infinity of both space and time. The fact that it is set in Antarctica has drawn inevitable comparisons to Poe's only novel, *The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym*—a comparison that Lovecraft himself highlights by mentioning the work by name in his tale. While Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock's contribution focuses on the possible racial elements underlying both works in his sensitive analysis, I myself have doubts as to whether racialism is a dominant feature in either Lovecraft's philosophical thought or his fiction. A fair reading of the totality of his work seems, in my mind, to militate against such a judgment.

The one area where Lovecraft cannot be said to have come close to his mentor is poetry. Although Lovecraft's collected poetry dwarfs Poe's in output, few critics would place even the celebrated *Fungi from Yuggoth* sonnet series on a par with such imperishable works as "The Raven" or "Annabel Lee." Two essays here, however, find more virtues in Lovecraft's poetry—and greater parallels to Poe's—than many previous critics have done. Slawomir Studniarz conducts a sophisticated examination of the "crucial relation between sound and sense" in the poetry of the two writers, while Miles Tittle examines Lovecraft's "The Poe-et's Nightmare" in an effort to see exactly how the work of Poe might stand behind this long poem.

If there is any area in which both Poe and Lovecraft can be said to excel, it is in their all-pervasive influence on both the literature of the weird and its extensive expansion into the media. Four chapters in this volume shed light on this broad issue. Murray Leeder studies Roger Corman's film *The Haunted Palace* (1963) for its fusion of Poesque and Lovecraftian elements; Alissa Burger dissects the unreliable narrator in Poe, Lovecraft, and Stephen King; Ben Woodard examines the use of crowds and cities in Poe, Lovecraft, and Thomas Ligotti; and the volume's editor, Sean Moreland, keenly ruminates on the influence of Poe and Lovecraft on a writer who may well be their most distinguished contemporary disciple, Caitlin R. Kiernan.

The Swiss critic Peter Penzoldt famously wrote that Lovecraft was "too well read." By this, he meant that Lovecraft had read so much weird fiction that it was at times difficult to determine what was genuinely his and what was a dim and perhaps unconscious recollection of something he had read. While there is some superficial justice in this remark, it should now be evident that the core elements of Lovecraft's work — cosmicism, psychic transference, and a deep sense of the cumulative weight of history and topography on human character — are highly original and are largely outgrowths of the materialist and atheistic philosophy he evolved over his lifetime. That said, the influence of Edgar Allan Poe remained pervasive in his fiction, and this book establishes significant markers of the depth and extent of that influence. And whatever we may think of the relative merits of these two writers, they are likely to be permanently conjoined as towering pioneers in the literature of the weird.

Poe after Lovecraft, or Beyond the Flaming Walls of the World —Sean Moreland

The title of this collection may seem perversely anachronistic. Should it not be the "Poeian Lovecraft"? After all, influential American writer of the weird H. P. Lovecraft (1890-1937) often claimed to have modeled much of his work on that of his "God of Fiction," Edgar Allan Poe (1809-1849). That Poe was a major influence on Lovecraft is undeniable and obvious and will come as no surprise to even casual readers of both writers' works. Lovecraft frequently described himself as a disciple of Poe and in doing so presciently anticipated Jorge Luis Borges's characterization of him as, at base, a parodist of Poe. Indeed, Lovecraft was so acutely aware that he stood in the long shadow cast by Poe that he frequently despaired of his own originality, seeing himself as merely part of that shadow.

Yet there is in this simple account much that is misleading, and its too eager acceptance has led to a dearth of critical work dedicated to examining the manifold and complex forms that Poe's influence took in shaping Lovecraft's writings and the subsequent influence that Lovecraft's understanding of and identification with Poe has had for Poe's literary and popular cultural legacy. As its title suggests, this volume is about more than a straightforward question of chronological literary influence, and the essays it collects do more than tease out some of the ways Lovecraft's writings respond to Poe's.

As of the second decade of the twenty-first century, Lovecraft's own influence on American literature and popular culture has spread to an impressive—and controversial—degree. As Carl Sederholm and Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock attest, "We are living in the 'Age of Lovecraft,' a cultural moment in which the themes and influence of Lovecraft's writings have bubbled up from the chthonic depths of 1930s pulp writing to assume an unexpected intellectual and cultural influence." Among the consequences of Lovecraft's resurgent popularity is that his insightful—but also often tendentious—understanding of Poe has gained a great deal of popular traction to the extent that Poe's emblematic raven sometimes seems to be caught in the tentacular clutches of Lovecraft's fictional

creations. Nor is Lovecraft's haunting of Poe's legacy limited to the world of pop-cultural weirdness, horror fiction, and B-films. Again in Sederholm and Weinstock's words, Even more surprising than Lovecraft's contemporary pop culture presence is his current significance to academic and philosophical discourse. The author dismissed by American literary critic Edmund Wilson in 1945 as a hack whose only real horror was "the horror of bad taste and bad art" is now included both on college syllabi and within the Library of America series of classic American literature.

Infiltrating these more rarified terrains, Lovecraft's specter has superimposed itself on Poe's in ways that the essays collected here illuminate and explore. In doing so, these essays continue the examination of Poe's influence on other writers that the first volume in the Perspectives on Poe series, *Poe's Pervasive Influence* (2013, edited by Barbara Cantalupo), undertook. They also further the examination of Lovecraft's influences begun by the collection *Lovecraft and Influence* (2013, edited by Robert H. Waugh.) As with those in the latter volume, the essays collected here reveal "the extent to which Lovecraft studied and transformed the diverse materials he read, and the extent to which his successors studied and transformed the materials he bequeathed them."

The most obvious way Lovecraft transformed Poe's writings was by assimilating them into his own fiction. Dennis Perry and Carl Sederholm write, with specific reference to Lovecraft's incorporation of Poe's *Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym* into his own *At the Mountains of Madness*, that in a wonderful twist that reverses the direction of literary influence, Lovecraft suggests that his and Poe's fiction inhabit the same universe. At one and the same time Lovecraft is being playful, using Poe to create a moment of

sublime speculation and is introducing Poe into his own world of strange and fearful cosmic monsters. Not content merely with conjuring up Poe in his stories or having a dialogue with him, here he purposely confuses the real Poe with the one he creates in his own image. That is, the dialogue defines Lovecraft as an extension of Poe—making them one.

While Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock's contribution to this volume explores Lovecraft's reworking of Poe's *Pym* in detail, Lovecraft's tendency to incorporate Poe into his own corpus is not limited to *At the Mountains of Madness* or even to Lovecraft's fictions in general. It is also a pervasive tendency of his critical and epistolary writings, one that

makes a certain *Nachträglichkeit* necessary to appreciating how Lovecraft has shaped Poe's work for modern audiences. In light of this, where the essays in *Poe's Pervasive Influence* provide brief, broad coverage of Poe's influence on many different writers and where those in *Lovecraft and Influence* chart local engagements between Lovecraft and the work of particular literary precursors and descendants, those collected here pursue not only the tremendous impact Poe's work had on Lovecraft but also how Lovecraft's intense identification with and evangelical elevation of Poe has, for better and for worse, indelibly shaped Poe's place in American—and international—literature and popular culture. Lovecraft's reception of Poe both reveals and conceals aspects of Poe's work, changing how many modern readers approach, understand, and appreciate Poe. In short, the spectacles through which Lovecraft read Poe (like those in Poe's tale "The Spectacles") produced creative distortions that continue to significantly color Poe's legacy.

Lovecraft's role in shaping Poe's contemporary reception has been singularly important, perhaps rivaled in its scope only by that of Baudelaire, through whom Poe's work streamed into the symbolist and decadent poetics of the

late nineteenth century, and from there into the poetry and prose of the modernists. Similarly, Lovecraft became a conduit through which Poe passed into the modern genres of horror, science fiction, fantasy, and weird fiction, and Lovecraft did more than any other writer to cement Poe's image as a messianic master of the weird and cosmic.

In a manner comparable to that of his French contemporary André Breton in the first *Surrealist Manifesto* (1924), Lovecraft uses his essay *Supernatural Horror in Literature* (first

published in 1927, later revised and posthumously published in 1964) to effectively reread the history of the supernatural in literature to expose a nascent, previously obscure tradition that Poe's work both crystallizes and illuminates. Lovecraft claims, "Before Poe the bulk of weird writers had worked largely in the dark; without an understanding of the psychological basis of the horror appeal, and hampered by more or less of conformity to certain empty literary conventions." With his perception of "the essential impersonality of the real artist," his "analytical knowledge of terror's true sources," and his "master's vision of the terror that stalks about and within us," Lovecraft insists, Poe deserves recognition as the revolutionary center



of the weird tradition that Supernatural Horror in Literature seeks to canonize.

S. T. Joshi summarizes and reasserts Lovecraft's assessment of Poe's achievement when he writes that Poe revolutionised and transformed supernatural (and psychological) horror fiction in so profound and multifaceted a way that it could plausibly be said that the genre, as a serious contribution to literature, only began with him. In this sense, the entire Gothic movement could be considered a kind of "anticipation" of the true commencement of the field. The keenness with which Poe analysed the psychology of fear; the transcendent artistry of his tales, from construction to prose rhythm to aesthetic focus; the intense emotive power of his principal narratives—these and other elements make Poe not merely the *fons et origo* sensitive, capricious, introspective, isolated, and sometimes slightly mad gentleman of ancient family and opulent circumstances." This claim reflects Lovecraft's narrow focus on but a handful of Poe's tales, as Robert H. Waugh's contribution to this volume explores.

Lovecraft's identification of Poe with his brooding, fated and aristocratic protagonists and his self-identification with this idea of Poe is suggested by his enthusiastic effusions on first visiting the Poe cottage in Fordham in 1922. He writes to Maurice Moe, "Fordham is now hopelessly fused into the solid mass of elevateds, apartment-house cliffs, busses, and boulevards which is New-York. But in Poe's day it was a village of magical charm." He continues, "You will realise what beauty has been destroyed by the fiendishly gnawing city when you reflect that the sketch 'Londor's Cottage' was partially inspired by the author's own humble, rented home." Inside the little cottage-turned-museum, which he calls "a small world of magic," Lovecraft is almost overpowered by his sense of intimacy with Poe. He writes, "The atmosphere grows on one and finally grips one—it is so terribly vivid—the forties recalled in every sombre detail. The pitiful poverty shows—something sombre broods over the place."

The intensity of Lovecraft's identification with Poe also curiously distorts his attempts at critical objectivity. One example of this occurs in 1935, after Lovecraft's Floridian friend and frequent correspondent R. H. Barlow sent him a copy of the 1930 printing of Poe's *Tales of Mystery and Imagination* (1919/1923), featuring the acclaimed illustrations by Harry Clarke, over which Lovecraft's letter enthuses at length before noting,

By the way—in "M. Valdemar" I observe a curious misprint (in both text & illustration-caption), whereby the tale ends with "detestable putridity" instead of "detestable putrescence." The loss in power — as connected with prose rhythm—is obvious. It is curious—almost incredible—how deaf & callous the moderns are to one of the most important factors in prose writing—i.e., cadence or rhythm. Much of the magic of Poe resides in his masterful employment of this element—hence his work is gravely impaired if any part of the text be tampered with.

The irony is that the edition in question restored Poe's preferred lexical choice. However, given his identification with Poe and his conservative sensibility, Lovecraft cannot conceive that the lexical shift is anything other than

"modern" editorial sloppiness, testifying to the distortive force of Lovecraft's intuited intimacy with Poe.

As noted above, Lovecraft's picture of Poe and his perspective on Poe as the princeps of the weird and cosmic is founded on but a few of Poe's tales, including "M. Valdemar" and "Ligeia" but especially on one tale in particular, as he makes clear in a 1926 letter to Wilfred Blanch Talman:

As to what is meant by "weird"—and of course weirdness if by no means confined to horror—I should say that the real criterion is a strong impression of the suspension of natural laws or the presence of unseen worlds or forces close at hand. Minds of differing perspective or degrees of sensitivity react differently to a given tale. To me, *The Pit and the Pendulum* contains nothing at all of true weirdness except in the introductory atmospheric touches. The horrors are too patently physical, and of merely human origin. Poe's supreme tale—and perhaps the supreme weird tale of all the ages—is to me *The Fall of the House of Usher*.

This tendency to find Poe strangely deficient in the very cosmicism that Lovecraft initially defines through Poe intensifies in his later writings and is taken up by the first chapter of this book, Brian Johnson's "'The Strangeness of My Heritage': Lovecraft's Poe and the Anxiety of Influence." Johnson brings Harold Bloom's androcentric and patriarchal theory of influence to bear on Lovecraft's vexed relationship with his "God of Fiction," complicating and contesting earlier, reductive critical accounts that accept Lovecraft's modest and misleading self-appraisal as a pale imitator of Poe by closely examining a number of Lovecraft's stories as allegories of misreading, disclosures of the often quite creative ways Lovecraft wrestled with Poe as, in Bloomian terms, a "strong precursor" to his own visions.

Contrastively, Dan Clinton explores the broad question of Poe's influence on Lovecraft with "The Call of Ligeia: Influence and Effect in Poe and Lovecraft" by focusing on their shared stance toward questions of influence and pedigree. Exploring the interconnections between their aesthetic practices and psychobiological beliefs, Clinton traces the parallels between the (pseudo)anthropological claims that inform Lovecraft's Supernatural Horror in Literature and the (pseudo)biological claims that are the heart of Poe's theory of poetic effect. Clinton exposes how these claims inform the incursions from beyond time that form the basis for the structure and plot of many of Poe's and Lovecraft's most important fictions.

With the third chapter, "Tekeli-li! Poe, Lovecraft, and the Suspicion of Sameness," Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock takes an approach that is textually specific but vast in its cultural implications, considering Lovecraft's reception of Poe through the anxious racial politics that inform both their fictions. Focusing on Poe's novel *The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket* and Lovecraft's response to it with his novel *At the Mountains of Madness*, Weinstock provocatively concludes that what these fictions finally share is not primarily a policing of the boundaries of racial difference so much as a problematizing of them, one that throws into relief the social construction of racial antagonism in broader American cultural history.


With "Cosmic Horror and the Supernatural in Poe and Lovecraft," Michael Cisco takes on a central speculative concern shared by both writers. Analyzing a broad range of references to supernaturalism in Poe's and Lovecraft's writings, Cisco uses them to trace the virtual conversation that occurs between them, illuminating their shared philosophical orientation while simultaneously developing a novel and powerful conception of the supernatural. Seeking to go beyond approaches to supernatural literature that merely oppose it to realism, reduce it to parochial folklore, or explain it along Freudian lines as a return of the repressed, Cisco invokes philosophers including Kant and Deleuze in arguing that the supernatural is better recognized as a genuine form of knowledge arising from the imagination, one that Poe's and Lovecraft's fictions help to reveal.

With "Descending Spirits: Ideological Implications of the Vertical Movements in Poe and Lovecraft," Juan L. Pérez-de-Luque draws on philosopher Gaston Bachelard's poetics of space to reveal the significant differences that occur in the way these writers conceptualize and narratively develop vertical movements, concluding that their representations of these movements are deeply embedded in—and can tell us a great deal about—the ideological underpinnings of both writers' work. Closely related to Pérez-de-Luque's essay in terms of both its exploration of imagistic continuity and its analysis of space and architecture in their fictions, Robert H. Waugh's "The Fiery Eyes: The Black Cats of Poe and Lovecraft" provides a richly associative contrast between Poe's famous black cats and their counterparts in Lovecraft. Focusing especially on one of Lovecraft's most explicitly Poe-derived stories, "The Rats in the Walls," Waugh demonstrates how Lovecraft's adoption of these Poesque images reveals dramatic shifts in their cultural and psychological significance.

The seventh and eighth chapters shift their focus away from Poe's and Lovecraft's prose fictions in order to focus closely on the relationship between their poetics and verse productions. These chapters are particularly important because they are among the first serious and sustained engagements with Lovecraft's poetry, forcefully demonstrating its fertility for critical analysis. With "Lovecraft's Poetry and Poe's Poetics," Slawomir Studniarz takes a formalist and structural approach, considering how the phonetic, semantic, and metrical characteristics of selected Lovecraft poems respond to and embody the poetic principles Poe laid out in his own poetry and poetic criticism. Miles Tittle, with "Rarebit Dreamers: The Poetics of Lovecraft, Poe, and Winsor McCay," illuminates Lovecraft's early poem "The Poe-et's Nightmare" (1918), recognized as the first major literary expression of Lovecraft's cosmic aesthetics. Tittle begins by contextualizing the poem's engagement with both Lucretius and Poe before building an original and suggestive case for Lovecraft's knowledge of and inspiration by the sequential art narratives of American cartoonist and illustrator Winsor McCay, best known for his *Little Nemo* series.

The four final chapters return their attention to interconnections between Poe and Lovecraft's prose fictions, but they do so by considering some of the myriad ways

contemporary writers and filmmakers bring into focus previously unrecognized connections between them. With "Poe/Lovecraft/Corman: The Case of The Haunted Palace (1963)," Murray Leeder explores how the work of legendary filmmaker Roger Corman has forever altered the legacy of both writers by fusing them further in the popular imagination. Corman's *The Haunted Palace*, part of his cycle of psychedelic 1960s Poe adaptations, is nonetheless primarily a film adaptation of Lovecraft's novella "The Strange Case of Charles Dexter Ward." Drawing on in-depth personal interviews with Corman, close readings of both stories, and acute formal analysis of the film, Leeder examines the ways that Corman's film is revelatory in its treatment of both writers' stories.



Alissa Burger considers how the work of Stephen King, the late twentieth century's most popular writer of horror fiction, builds on the narrative foundations laid by Poe and Lovecraft in "'You Fancy Me Mad': The Unreliable Narrator's Defense in Poe, Lovecraft, and King." Focusing particularly on King's early Lovecraft pastiche "Jerusalem's Lot" (which became the prequel for his best-selling novel *Salem's Lot*), Burger reveals the closely related structural use of unreliable narration that links this story to the precursors to which it pays homage. Ben Woodard's chapter, "The Killing Crowd: Poe and the Deep Crime of the Media," brings both analytic rigor and speculative acumen to bear in considering how Lovecraft's fictions and those of contemporary master of philosophical horror Thomas Ligotti depart from the concept of Deep Crime embedded in Poe's enigmatic tale "The Man of the Crowd."

My own contribution to this volume, "'Not Like Any Thing of Ours': Waking Poe and Lovecraft in Kiernan's *The Drowning Girl*," examines how Caitlin R. Kiernan's crucial Tiptree and Stoker Award-winning novel "wakes" Poe and Lovecraft by both laying to rest and rejuvenating vital aspects of their fiction, fusing them with the female gothic tradition in what she calls a "feminization of the weird." This waking is aptly

[illegible]

Déjà vu is one of the most complex and subjective of all memory phenomena. It is an infrequent and striking mental experience, where the feeling of familiarity is combined with the knowledge that this feeling is false. While until recently it was an aspect of memory largely overlooked by mainstream cognitive psychology, this book brings together the growing scientific literature on déjà vu, making the case for it as a metacognitive phenomenon.

Essential reading for all students and researchers interested in memory disorders, this valuable book presents the case for déjà vu as a 'healthy' phenomenon only experienced by people with sufficient cognitive resources to oppose and detect the false feeling of familiarity.

evidence — Jacoby and Whitehouse claim to have produced something similar in the laboratory. Brown (2003) asserts that the experience has been difficult to study because of there being no identifiable trigger, and no measureable outcome other than subjective experience. The challenge, clearly, for a monograph on the *déjà vu* experience is to consider how the understanding of the experience might be advanced beyond the very subjective and mysterious reports of clinicians and experiencers.

How can déjà vu be studied?

experience would produce the kinds of mistaken judgements that Arnaud theorised about ... we know little more about déjà vu today than we did back in the days of Arnaud over a century ago" (Schacter, 2001). In fact, as this book will show, a great deal has been added to our knowledge in the last few years, and déjà vu can now seriously be thought of as one of the memory malfunctions which exposes the workings of the memory system.

Once déjà vu is seen as being the result of a memory error, it means that testable hypotheses can be made about what causes it, and ultimately it should be possible to experimentally induce the sensation. This is the ultimate goal of scientific research into déjà vu — to understand it to the extent that it can be recreated, or something analogous to it, in laboratory conditions. Once there is a reliable and theoretically driven means of generating false memories in undergraduate populations, we can then examine their relation to false memory in pathological groups, its association with false memory in the real world, how it is manifested in the brain, and so on. In Chapter 10 the existing research on the production of déjà vu in the laboratory is reviewed, and whereas there is a great deal of activity in this domain, it is possible that Schacter's claim still holds true in this regard: the field is still looking for a central paradigm to align itself with.

Déjà vu is not merely a false memory, because at the time we are experiencing it we know that it is false. It feels like we might be having a memory experience, but in fact, we are aware that we are not. It is this idea of awareness, of recognizing the falseness of the situation, which leads many people to describe déjà vu as a metacognitive or metamemory illusion/error.

I offer an overview of the methods of déjà vu research that are covered in this book. Aside of experimentation, déjà vu relies also on questionnaire research, which made up the bulk of all research before the publication of Brown's 2003 review of the experience. Questionnaires are useful for understanding experiences of déjà vu — and with such individual differences research the effect of certain factors such as age can be examined (see Chapter 6). For example, using our knowledge about the brains and memory function of older adults we can consider why people who are older or younger might experience more or less déjà vu. We can also consider descriptions and triggers and even the content and qualities of déjà vu in this manner, but clearly our ability to recall information about infrequent and difficult-to-describe subjective experiences severely limits the value of this approach. The final category of information which helps us better understand déjà vu comes from clinical cases, and the cognitive neuropsychology approach.

Why cognitive neuropsychology?

Cognitive neuropsychology is the study of cognition — thought processes — drawing upon experimental work on people with brain damage or disease, and the consideration of the brain in our understanding of psychological processes. One prominent method used by cognitive neuropsychologists has been to look for processes that are selectively damaged by brain injury or illness. In this fashion it should be possible to learn about déjà vu if

we can compare groups of people with brain damage who do and do not have déjà vu. If there are systematic differences in the brains of these patients that coincide with the differences in the déjà vu experience, we can triangulate on what is causing déjà vu. This rationale has been used in epilepsy (Chapter 7), dementia (Chapter 8) and psychiatric disorders, such as anxiety or schizophrenia (Chapter 9). It should be stressed, of course, that as well as 'using' such patients to understand the healthy mind, cognitive neuropsychological work also advances the care of such patients by better understanding and specifying their problems. Déjà vu is not always benign and infrequent but can be extremely distressing and nearly permanent where it occurs in clinical cases. Finally, it should be noted that déjà vu being as infrequent and unpredictable as it is, an approach which draws upon those people who experience it more frequently or for longer enables us to both speed up and focus our research efforts.

It is not appropriate to discard clinical cases of déjà vu as curiosities that cannot be incorporated into existing theory, or déjà vu as an anomalous, intangible experience. Cognitive neuropsychology has enabled researchers to draw upon different sources and methods to explore the human mind; it does not exist in isolation, but neuropsychological data can be used to test theories generated from elsewhere. Thus, a complete account of déjà vu should address many levels, requiring converging evidence from patient studies, experimental psychology carried out on healthy populations, the modelling of behavior, and neuroimaging. An ultimate goal is to isolate the brain networks involved in déjà vu by imaging it — as it happens.

About this book

The aim of this book is to bring together the rapidly growing research into déjà vu into a coherent whole, considering both the neuropsychological and clinical cases of people with déjà vu and recent developments in generating déjà vu in the laboratory. The starting point is the idea that the familiarity inherent in déjà vu — and the evaluation of this familiarity which generates the conflict at the core of the sensation — are both processes which exist in the human memory system, and have been described elsewhere, but have not been related to déjà vu. This memory account of déjà vu can then be assessed and described accommodating many different sources of information, but for the first time offering a synthesis of the patient and experimental psychology literatures.

More specifically, déjà vu pertains to theories of recognition memory; which is the assessment of prior occurrence based on the evaluation of a stimulus in the environment. This is the theoretical entity which is closest to déjà vu — in some ways, déjà vu is somewhat like a momentary false recognition event: we experience something in the environment which we think we have encountered before. What makes déjà vu unlike false recognition is that we are metacognitively aware of the falseness of the sensation of déjà vu. It is not that we find something familiar when it should not be familiar (which would be a form of false memory), it is more that we find it is familiar but know ourselves that it should not be familiar.

Finally, it is always helpful to understand the coverage of a book, and so here are some comments on what is in the book, and possible lacunae. The adage of 'standing on the shoulders of giants' is apt here, as this monograph focuses more on what has been published subsequent to Brown (2004), and his book covers in more detail early questionnaire studies, parapsychological and psychodynamic works and definitional issues. Thus, the current book is stronger on recent work and patient studies, and especially those which postdate Brown's book. If there are gaps in the coverage of this book, it is most likely that it is because the scientific literature still needs to catch up with what might be commonly known about *déjà vu* in various clinical groups. There is, for instance, the idea that *déjà vu* might be experienced frequently as a signal of an upcoming migraine in people who experience migraine, but this work is as yet unsupported by peer-reviewed articles in this area. To give an idea of what is as yet unknown or under-researched, the book finishes with a chapter on priorities for future research given the current state of the art in *déjà vu* research.

encompasses texts and expressions that emerge from within a wider spectrum of cultures and historical periods. In both cases — when encountering cultural and historical others — the interpreter faces the pull of prejudices and dogmatically held beliefs. Hermeneutics seeks to illuminate and overcome such impediments to understanding. It is in the spirit of hermeneutics that the young Herder launches his program of enlightenment and independent thought. And it is in the spirit of hermeneutics that he raises his emphasis on independent thought to the level of political and ethical discourse, critiquing not only what he sees as the barren formalism of modern philosophy, but also its Eurocentric premises. As it is given shape by Herder, hermeneutics is the operational modus of human understanding within the domain of historically mediated culture; it is critical in its attitude, ethical-political in its aim, and proceeds by way of an unrelenting commitment to humanity. This is a hermeneutic position that emphasizes the need for textual and philological work, yet recognizes a dimension of feeling and sympathy in understanding. And it is a position that, in so doing, reflects on the interaction between Europe and other parts of the world, and the need for intercultural exchange. For Herder, the problem of understanding texts and symbolic expressions (including non-linguistic expressions such as painting and sculpture) is but a special case of the broader challenge of understanding cultural and historical others. Further, Herder views the process of understanding as an opportunity for growth and education — *Bildung* in and through the historical-cultural world.

For Herder, the centrality of hermeneutics, as a practical as well as a theoretical discipline, emerges with particular force and urgency in the modern period. At this point, readers and historians turn to the tradition and realize that past texts, documents, practices, and works of art are no longer expressive of an immediately accessible worldview, that understanding requires interpretation, and that interpretation, in turn, benefits from methodological standards and critical ideals — it requires, in short, reflection on what it is for a culturally and historically situated being to understand its own culture and history as well as to engage expressions from culturally or temporally distant contexts. In this way, hermeneutics is conceived as a crucial dimension of modern philosophy. As it develops in his encounter with poetry, anthropology, and history, Herder's hermeneutics is still ours, and in reflecting on the stakes and challenges of philosophical hermeneutics, we do well in considering the resources and arguments it offers.

The German eighteenth-century thinker Johann Gottfried Herder has been overlooked by the philosophical tradition. It is not that Herder's work is altogether neglected, nor that his name does not come up at all. But the full philosophical scope and potential of his work — his sustained efforts to furnish the enlightenment project with a historical consciousness, his call for emancipation through education, his critique of how modern philosophy has shaped itself around a distinctively abstract and procedural model of reasoning, and his rejection of cultural, intellectual, and political practices based on Eurocentric premises and assumptions — has hardly received the attention it deserves. Herder enthusiastically declares that education should be spread to all social classes and proceeds by the

motto "get more books into women's hands." He worries that even though Europe has officially abandoned slavery ("because it has been calculated how much more these slaves would cost and how much less they would bring in than free people"), we still continue "to use as slaves, to trade, to exile into silver mines and sugar mills, three parts of the world." And he relentlessly critiques the way in which French and German intellectuals expect that "when a storm shakes two small twigs in Europe ... the whole world quakes and bleeds." Herder, it seems, is a philosopher ahead of his time. While some of these sentiments can be found in works by other philosophers in this period (Leibniz, Hume, Diderot, Lessing, and Mendelssohn all deserve mentioning), it is Herder who merges the impulses of Enlightenment thought into an anthropologically informed and critically motivated philosophy of understanding and interpretation.

Why, then, has Herder's philosophy not received the attention it deserves? Herder, for a start, does not launch a philosophical program (as we find it in Kant), nor does he compose a grand, metaphysical system (of the kinds we find in Schelling or Hegel). In fact, Herder questions the usefulness of philosophical programs and systems altogether. One could even say that Herder initiates a kind of anti-systematic philosophy — not in the sense that he encourages inconsistent or disorganized thinking, but in that he disapproves of grand theory constructions and totalizing accounts of reality — that later resonates in the works of the Schlegel brothers, August Wilhelm and Friedrich, Friedrich Nietzsche, and the later Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Throughout his work in the 1760s, Herder advocates an anthropological and historical approach to philosophical problems and questions. At the center of his work stands the notion of human nature as realized through art, language, history, and cultural practice. His philosophical project — his anthropological turn, as he calls it — is an attempt to establish an alternative to the dominant philosophical methods of the day.¹ He is particularly dissatisfied with so-called school philosophy and its attempts at moving philosophy out of the broader, public space that he views as a condition for an open society.² This philosophy, in Herder's words, cannot be reconciled with "humanity [*Menschheit*] and politics." Against what he perceives as rigid scholasticism and abstract reasoning, Herder calls for a commitment to enlightenment and *Bildung*, modestly pictured as a "logic which [*is*] not yet invented." Such a logic, he emphasizes, must "make the human being its center." When understood in this way, philosophy is no master discipline, no science of science — be it of the humanities, social sciences, or natural sciences. Philosophy, for Herder, goes hand in hand with other modes of inquiry and should call for no privileged place among them. Indeed, philosophy is at its best — and can only sustain its relationship to "humanity and politics," i.e., the society of which it is a part — when it learns from and enters into an ongoing conversation with disciplines such as history, political science, anthropology, medicine, and biology.

Herder views philosophy as a call to enlightenment. Enlightenment, in turn, is a matter of education — not education in light of this or that particular goal, but education to independent thought (*Selbstdenken*, as he puts

it. By Herder's lights, education should not be a privilege for the few, but a right for the many: a right to develop and flourish as fully human. Philosophy should thus proceed on the assumption that "each human being is free and independent from others". To the extent that such independence also provides a framework for self-determination, political participation, and citizenship, it follows that "the state must be improved from below." Self-determination, however, is not a given. Nor, for that matter, is it simply an abstract goal. For Herder it is, rather, a process; it implies a call for thinking to prove itself as independent and for understanding to realize itself as critical and reflective. There is, in other words, a close connection between *Selbstdenken* and *Bildung*. Like Kant, his mentor at the time, Herder emphasizes that independent thought depends on a will to clarify and critique one's own self-understanding as well as the larger set of (pre-reflective) practices, prejudices, and beliefs that saturate the cultural nexus of which an individual is a part. However, unlike the Kant of the critical period, Herder argues that this kind of reflection must take place from within a given cultural and historical context and not proceed by reference to the a priori conditions for subjectivity, experience, and judgment.

Throughout his work, Herder envisions a philosophy that shapes itself in ongoing dialogue with a wider, enlightened audience. His point is not that everyone could or should be a philosopher, but that philosophy must understand (and legitimize) itself with reference to questions, problems, and areas of reflection that prove relevant to society at large. Philosophers should, in his words, address the kind of truths that are, directly or indirectly, beneficial for the people. Hence, they must steer clear of an overly technical and abstract vocabulary. Philosophers should analyze and make use of knowledge drawn from across the sciences, but also, by way of critical reflection, ask what we mean by central social and political terms such as freedom, emancipation, education, and equality. As such, *Selbstdenken* is not based in a set of doctrines that are passed on from professor to student, author to reader, but in a kind of teaching that performatively demonstrates — manifests and exemplifies — the very independence for which it strives. At its best, philosophy is the practice of independent thought, an ongoing invitation to question ruling prejudices, corruptions, and bad dispositions.

The human being with which philosophy communicates is historical, embodied, and realizes itself within a context of language and culture — or, indeed, a plurality of such. Enlightenment philosophy must address all human beings, the entire human being, and muster an arsenal of rhetorical tools so as better to command the reader's attention and encourage him or her to take a stance toward what is being said as well as the mindset with which he or she typically approaches the issue or problem area under discussion. Herder's writing seeks to critique established philosophical ideals and systems, and, relatedly, exemplify an alternative way of philosophizing.

To the extent that Herder's work represents an effort to realize these ideals, it is indeed difficult to classify in terms of the systematic requirements of present-day academic

discourse. Further, the scope of Herder's enlightenment vision does not allow him to isolate one particular topic or subfield. His thinking spans epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, and political philosophy — and, indeed, emphasizes that these domains are closely related. As Nietzsche would later put it, Herder's philosophy is borne out of a "restless spirit, the taster of all intellectual dishes." Such a philosophy does not easily gain a following. In fact, it represents a challenge to the very notion of philosophy as a discipline on which a tradition can be built. Hence, we find traces of Herderian thought not only in Nietzsche, but also in the works of nineteenth-century philosophers such as the Humboldt and the Schlegel brothers, Friedrich Schleiermacher, G. W. F. Hegel, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Karl Marx. A school of Herderian philosophy, however, was never a genuine option.

Nevertheless, a version of Herder's philosophy — twisted and stunted though it was — was subject to ideological appropriation in the years leading up to, and during, the Second World War. In this period, Herder's notion of the people was grossly misconstrued and turned from an open-ended cultural-linguistic and political denominator into an ethnic or even racially grounded category.⁶ Philosophers also came, in this era, to draw a distorted picture of Herder's contribution. One example is Hans-Georg Gadamer. In a lecture presented to imprisoned officers in Paris, Gadamer criticizes the lax democracies of the West and presents, as an alternative, what he takes to be Herder's notion of the folk. This lecture, which was published by Klostermann in 1942, must have remained an embarrassment for Gadamer. However, rather than confronting this embarrassment head on, Gadamer quietly edited out the political rhetoric and published a less controversial version of the essay in his introduction to Herder's *This Too a History of Philosophy*. This version is later included in Gadamer's collected work. Perhaps it was this faux apology that made Gadamer, who remained positive about Herder's philosophy of history, focus less on his hermeneutic position. This avoidance, though, is most unfortunate. In failing fully to acknowledge Herder's importance for the hermeneutic tradition, Gadamer also comes to overlook the hermeneutic relevance of enlightenment philosophy.⁷ In his magnum opus, *Truth and Method*, Gadamer discusses Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher, and Hegel. Herder's work is mentioned every now and then, but never made the subject of a fully-fledged, philosophical discussion. Nor does Gadamer pay attention to Dilthey's effort to revive the Herderian call for an anthropological-historical turn.

Dilthey's understanding of Herder as an enlightenment thinker in the hermeneutic vein — a philosopher who did indeed come "closer to true hermeneutics than anyone else before Schleiermacher" — is also overlooked by Isaiah Berlin, who places Herder on the map of Anglophone philosophy, yet, like Gadamer, does so under the false flag of a Counter-Enlightenment. Aided by Herder's philosophy, Berlin offers a challenging criticism of narrow, rationalist Enlightenment. Yet, as pointed out by Robert Norton and others, Berlin overlooks the distinction, drawn with much care and consideration by Herder, between a particularly narrow and procedural version of Enlightenment thought

(often, but not exclusively, associated with rationalist school philosophy), on the one hand, and the broader agenda of enlightenment philosophy, on the other. Herder's philosophy fits squarely in with the latter. Or, stronger still, it is with Herder that a historically sensitive, *Bildung*-oriented program of enlightenment gets its full philosophical articulation. While figures like Diderot, Lessing, and Mendelssohn made significant strides forward, Herder takes the enlightenment project to the home field of philosophy and systematically explores what the commitment to enlightenment means for philosophical practice and understanding. In this respect, Herder also goes beyond earlier hermeneuticians such as Johann Martin Chladenius and Georg Friedrich Meier. While Meier takes the art of interpretation (*Auslegungskunst*) to include texts universally, he does not, to the same extent as Herder, discuss the relevance of a hermeneutic perspective for the larger, philosophical conception of knowledge, self-understanding, and social practice.



The image of Herder as an enlightenment philosopher, in the broader meaning of the term, has guided a handful of recent philosophical studies in the English-speaking world. Charles Taylor, John Zammito, Robert Norton, Michael Forster, Frederick Beiser, Sonia Sikka, Vicki Spencer, and many others have contributed to a new interest in and better understanding of Herder's philosophical impact. Likewise have Ulrich Gaiert, Hans Dietrich Irmscher, Marion Heinz, Christoph Menke, and others strengthened the interest in Herder from within contemporary German philosophy. In these strands of reception, however, one dimension of Herder's work has often been overlooked: Herder's philosophy of literature in the 1760s and early 1770s. It is almost taken for granted that although Herder's early work on lyric poetry and drama might harbor sundry philosophical insights, the proper home of these reflections is literary studies, German Studies, or, at best, some embryonic version of aesthetics or philosophy of language. In the following, I question this assumption. I argue that Herder's encounter with poetry significantly contributes to the development of his hermeneutics and that it is not simply

developing in parallel with his philosophical thought, but is, indeed, an integral part of it.

In Herder's view, literature (poetry) is a field in which each and every expression uniquely reflects a larger cultural and societal context. In this field, we cannot — should not, anyway — proceed by way of subsumption under general laws or categories, but must carefully consider the particular expression and move, with the aid of sympathetic feeling and reflection, from there to the universal. In Herder's books, philosophy should be a critique of all sorts of leveling of differences and erasing of diversity. Humanity is left for the worse if the manifold of its expressions are stunted. Herder's originality does not, as I see it, rest with his articulating this paradigm single-handedly, but in combining the period's unyielding respect for the individual, its interest in the notion of sensuousness and feeling, and its approach to cultural difference in a historically sensitive, hermeneutic model.

Herder's early studies of poetry are borne out of a growing awareness of the difference between the ancient and the modern periods — and, with it, a willingness to address the philosophical significance of this difference. When Herder is read through the lens of his early work, he emerges not only as a proto-historicist thinker (as we find him presented by Zammito and others) or as an early naturalist (as he is portrayed by Beiser and others), but also as a philosopher of modernity — one whose views are rooted in a broad-spanning and original conception of the human being and its ongoing striving for self-understanding and understanding across historical periods and cultures.

For Herder, the beginning of the modern period is not — as it would later be for Hegel — associated with the individual philosopher's attempt to trace epistemic certainty back to an Archimedean ego cogito. In fact, from a point of view like Herder's, the early modern quest for epistemological certainty represents but a domestication of qualities that were, in earlier times, associated with an infinite, divine being. This secularization — this domestication of the kind of certainty that had so far been a privilege of God alone — is not where modernity gets its first articulation. Herder surmises that the modern period starts with the experience — the hermeneutic challenge, we could even say — of the human being realizing its limits. As he puts it in a text from 1778, "let us, in order to become in some measure useful, call down philosophy from its heaven in the clouds onto the earth." Human being, hence also human understanding, is situated in a historical and cultural context and, as such, is not free of prejudices and biased beliefs. And if human thought and judgment is, potentially, prejudiced, then philosophy can no longer be shaped as a quest for eternal and universal truth, but must proceed critically, and with historical awareness, tolerance, and understanding. This insight, as it emerges with particular force in the modern period, has epistemological, but also ethical, ramifications. Hermeneutics — philosophy of understanding and interpretation — now stands forth as a discipline that is integral to the modern project and its articulation in philosophy. This hermeneutic ethos, this interest in the human being as historical, culture-producing, and understanding, lies at the heart of Herder's call for an anthropological turn.

It is important to be clear about what such an anthropological turn does and does not involve. Herder's suggestion is not that only modern philosophy is historically and culturally situated. From his point of view, what is new, in the modern period, is that philosophers make this situatedness an object of deliberate study, and hence seek to identify the consequences and the possibilities that follow from it. A mature and responsible use of reason is not struggling against or seeking to sublate its historicity, be it within natural science or the humanities. Instead, the modern era takes shape when philosophers no longer avoid the finality of all things human, but begin to explore it in a critical and systematic way. From this point of view, the hero of the modern period is not first and foremost René Descartes, but Jean-Jacques Rousseau and, even more so, David Hume, "certainly one of the greatest minds of our time," as Herder puts it in *Older Critical Forestlet*. For us later readers, Herder, too, deserves a place in this pantheon.

My emphasis on Herder as a theorist of the modern period, a philosopher whose call it is to map the boundaries of human reason and its potential for growth and flourishing, might lead us to ask if Herder is, then, as Rudolf Haym famously put it, a Kantian of the year 1765. Without denying the influence of Leibniz, Hume, Baumgarten, Rousseau, Diderot, Lessing, and many others, the young Herder's relationship to Kantian philosophy is indeed worthy of a study. For years, the late Kant's criticism of Herder contributed to the relative neglect of his philosophical work. Herder, though, was close to Kant in the early, pre-critical period. While Kant in the 1760s and 1770s, had not yet found a way to establish a transcendental grounding of philosophy, he had still begun to ask the kind of questions to which the three Critiques would later respond: What can I know? What should I do? What can I hope for? As he would later sum up his undertakings, though, these questions are all connected to a fourth: What is a human being? In this general sense — as a philosopher seeking to understand the human being — Herder is indeed a Kantian, although what, exactly, one has in mind when talking about Kantian philosophy must here remain quite open. Yirmiyahu Yovel has emphasized how Kant develops an often overlooked historical awareness. More recently, Pauline Kleingeld has argued for a broader cosmopolitan impulse in Kant's philosophical work. Paul Guyer has emphasized the relative continuity between the younger, pre-critical Kant and the later articulation of his critical philosophy.³⁴ Allen Wood reads Kantian ethics as an anthropological enterprise. From this point of view, there are evident parallels between Herder and Kant, although, as Zammito has pointed out, the stream of influence does, in this period, most likely flow in both directions.

What does not remain open, though, is the fact that after Kant's Critical Turn the two philosophers part ways. The question of human self-understanding — and, along with it, an inquiry into the nature and importance of understanding and interpretation — remains an entirely crucial part of Herder's work. However, in the later as well as the earlier period Herder seeks to answer the question "What is a human being?" through a study of literature, history, and culture as fields in which a human being realizes its nature.

Hence, while I recognize an affinity between Kant and Herder in philosophical questions and motivations, I also acknowledge the differences when it comes to the resources mustered and strategies chosen to respond to these questions. The affinities between Herder and Kant do not abolish the differences between them — nor, for that matter, make Herder a Kantian of the 1760s.

In emphasizing the hermeneutic aspects of Herder's work, my point is not that his philosophy can or should be reduced to a hermeneutic theory. The scope of his thinking is far too broad, and the span of his interests is far too wide for that. Instead, I wish to suggest that hermeneutics is an important, but under-illuminated, aspect of Herder's early discussions of poetry, anthropology, philosophy, history, and the relationship between them, and that we, as scholars of eighteenth-century philosophy and as contemporary hermeneuticians, will benefit from a return to his work. Hence, when I, in the following, use an expression such as Herder's hermeneutic philosophy, this is not to indicate that all of his philosophy, be it in the early or later period, is of a hermeneutic nature, but, rather, to refer to what we, broadly speaking, can call his philosophy of interpretation, as it develops along with his philosophy of language, philosophy of art, philosophy of religion, political philosophy, philosophy of nature, and so on.

Now, the call for a (re)consideration of Herder's hermeneutic philosophy—be it as it relates to Kant or diverges from his critical program — does not indicate that each and every dimension of it is equally insightful and relevant. As much as Herder champions a progressive, broad-minded, and liberal spirit, he is also a child of his time. Just as he himself argues that nobody can fully escape their cultural context and the prejudices it harbors, so also is Herder's philosophy reflective of a broader eighteenth-century horizon and its commonly shared beliefs, some of which inevitably prove less progressive than others. Sometimes this leads to baffling inconsistencies in his work. For example, we find him launch a wider set of anti-Eurocentric sentiments, but also claim, without further argument, that Chinese culture is built on naive obedience. We find him pleading for a pluralist conception of poetry and celebrating the songs of the Sami, while, simultaneously, sweepingly judge the art of the Greenlanders as inferior. Amidst surprisingly progressive insights on gender and race, we find less favorable judgments on women, men who seek to be beautiful like women, Africans, and contemporary Jewish culture. Upon facing such inconsistencies, some commentators have sought refuge in a comparative approach. They suggest that when put next to Kant's or Hegel's racist remarks, Herder, indeed, fares reasonably well. My strategy is different. Reading Herder from the point of view of his philosophical contribution, I am less interested in his actual judgment on particular cultures or issues (which at times are progressive, at other times not), than in the larger, intellectual promise of his position: his way of asking how a finite, historical being should proceed when encountering other individuals and cultures, and what particular possibilities, be they cognitive, ethical, or existential, such encounters disclose. In this context, Herder does not offer all the answers we could wish for. He does, however, provide an articulation of the problems,

challenges, and possibilities of human understanding that is still relevant.

For Herder, hermeneutics involves a turn from the point of view of the eternal to the point of view of the historical, from the divine to the human as an enabling condition for understanding and knowledge. Human reason is finite: it is formulated from within a particular cultural and historical context. Yet this finitude does not prevent it from growth and development. Reason matures and prospers — can only mature and prosper — from within (rather than in abstraction from) language, culture, and tradition. When philosophical thinking is understood as situated in history and culture, nature is no longer conceived as another. The human being has a first as well as a second nature, and second nature is expressed in culturally meditated forms. As such, it is not one and singular, but realized in an indefinite number of ways. Hence, we face the challenge of trying to understand other individuals and cultures, be they close and familiar or temporally or geographically distant.

At this juncture, it is possible to see why poetry plays an important role in Herder's early work — as it would, somewhat later, for the romantics. Firstly, poetry is expressive of a particular worldview or outlook and requires interpretative efforts that acknowledge its particularity. Art and poetry, further, are ways through which human beings get exposed to their own tradition, but also to other lifeforms and time periods. Hence, at an empirical-anthropological level, Herder seeks to map a roster of traditions and cultures (and the merging points between them). At a critical-philosophical level, he wishes to explore how a human standpoint is always formed from within a particular cultural and historical context and how it, by seeking to see the world from the point of view of others, can nonetheless take responsibility and move toward an expanded horizon and a deepened understanding of itself and the world.

Although I will draw on Herder's later texts when needed, it is my proposal that Herder's most well-crafted contribution to philosophical hermeneutics can be found in his early work. In its focus on poetological, anthropological, historical, and metaphilosophical questions, the early work addresses topics such as historical change, cultural differences, and the need, for a finite human being, to engage the expressions of others, be they from within the interpreter's own environment or from geographically or temporally distant cultures. In placing my main focus on this period — though referencing the later work throughout and turning it into a subject of systematic discussion in the final chapter — I am guided in part by pragmatic concerns. Herder's opus is too wide-spanning, consists of too many unfinished manuscripts and involves, argumentatively, too many twists, turns, and retractions for it to be possible, in the format of a relatively short and modest study, to write meaningfully about it all. His style of writing makes it necessary to analyze and reconstruct his arguments in great detail so as to be able to clarify and assess their value. From this point of view, the question is not why my study is limited to Herder's early work but, rather, why I have chosen to include works written after the mid-1770s. In the eyes of an earlier commentator, a work such as *This Too a Philosophy of History* represents a

turning point in that it lays the foundation for historicism, but also introduces a stream of mysticism into history. As I see it, Herder stands at a crossroads; he is about to leave the perspective of his early work and, against this background, sketches the program he will pursue in the years to come. Thus my emphasis, when turning to the texts from the period after 1774, will be on how his later work realizes the hermeneutic aspirations from the early period.

My reading of Herder's hermeneutics starts out, in Chapter One, with a discussion of his work in meta-philosophy. Prompted by a general fear that philosophy had become futile, Herder, at the outset of his academic trajectory, thought critically and profoundly about the potentials and limits of philosophy, his discipline of choice. Such reflections are sprinkled all over *Journal of My Voyage in the Year 1769*, but are given a more systematic articulation in the slightly earlier *How Philosophy Can Become More Universal and Useful for the Benefit of the People* (1765), the (unfinished) prize essay in which Herder first calls for an anthropological turn. In the scholarship — I am thinking of recent works by Zammito as well as Beiser — this has been taken as an indication that Herder wishes to leave philosophy behind so as to pursue empirical science. In my view, his project is somewhat different. Herder, to be sure, is critical of the dogmatic school philosophy that had followed in the wake of rationalism. Yet, the potential problems of one kind of philosophy do not, logically or practically, entail or justify the abandoning of philosophy as such. Rather, these early works explore an alternative notion of philosophy, the ideal of philosophy as *Bildung* that, in its highest form, reaches a point of maturity that an enlightened society will presuppose and, at its best, sustain.

However, if Herder, in 1765, stakes out this goal of philosophy, he has yet to demonstrate that philosophy is indeed capable of taking on this challenge. This is the topic to which I turn in Chapter Two, which discusses *Fragments on Recent German Literature*, as well as a number of shorter, unpublished texts from the same period. In essays such as *Fragments of a Treatise on the Ode* and *Essay on a History of Lyrical Poetry*, we find reflections on the status of poetry, criticism, and philosophy in the modern period. A good half a century before Hegel, Herder, in these texts, develops the thesis that in modernity, great art, art as the sensuous expression of a society's shared values, has come to an end. This, of course, does not mean that art will no longer be made and poetry no longer written. As a poet, translator, collector of poetry, and author of important literary essays, Herder is hoping for a future of poetic and cultural prospering (indeed, this is what motivates his work on poetry). Yet, in the modern period, poetry is not, as it had been for the ancient Greeks, a privileged avenue for social self-understanding. From the point of view of our aesthetic being, this opens up a new challenge: that of developing art and poetry through cultural and linguistic cross-fertilizations. From the point of view of philosophy, it entails a call to education and independent thought. The will and capacity to meet these challenges — to view the end of traditional art as a loss, but also as a call to new responsibilities — is for Herder a distinguishing mark of modern life. And in being the very field in which this responsibility gets articulated, aesthetics assumes a special role. It is as a

discourse or sub-field through which modern philosophy clarifies and grows into its own mandate.

Drawing on the tradition of Hume and the Scottish empiricists, Herder is interested in the problem of taste. As it takes form in the 1760s, Herder's philosophy of taste is the subject of Chapter Three. According to Herder, taste is a paradigmatic example of how values, reflectively or pre-reflectively, are shaped by historical and cultural contexts. He thus asks if the encounter with alternative aesthetic and moral preferences can help us to realize that our own outlook is not automatically good, right, or authoritative (and thus universal), but reflective of a particular cultural and historical context and, as such, open to evaluation and critique. In Herder's view, the diversity of cultures should not be last as a problem in need of a solution. Rather, the plurality of horizons, the manifold ways in which a human being can realize itself, establishes an element in which enlightenment philosophy lives and thrives. In this way, Herder's discussion of taste bolsters his turn away from the effort to determine a set of transhistorical and transcultural values, life-forms, or a set of such, to an effort to expand human reason from within its cultural and historical limitations.

Herder's discussion of the human sciences is explored in Chapter Four. In his view, the human sciences must be understood as sciences of interpretation. While Herder had been active as a literary critic and Bible scholar, i.e., as an interpreter, since the early 1760s, his views on interpretation are discussed in the work of poetry, but given an even more explicit form in his 1768 *On Thomas Abbt's Writings and Treatise on the Origin of Language*, published four years later. In his hermeneutic work, Herder seeks a way to get beyond the false alternatives of abstract science, on the one hand, and mere *Schöngesterei*, on the other. In this context, Herder, again with reference to Hume, introduces a notion of sympathetic feeling, or, following the parlance of the day, divination. This term, which was circulating in eighteenth-century histories of nature, opens for the situating of hermeneutic practice in the intersection between a focus on individuality, on the one hand, and a more universal reference to the *Bildung* of humanity, on the other.

Herder's approach to the human sciences is further clarified by a concrete case study: that of Shakespearean drama and its German reception. I turn to Herder's reading of Shakespeare in Chapter Five. By reference to Shakespeare — or, rather, the failure of his contemporaries to recognize Shakespearean drama — Herder discusses the ubiquity of prejudices in understanding and the need for methodological standards that can aid in the attempt at illuminating, assessing, and eventually combating illegitimate prejudices. In this way, Herder's work on Shakespeare not only marks a significant chapter in the history of literary criticism, but also a substantial contribution to Enlightenment hermeneutics.

In his work on poetry and drama, the young Herder lays out his hermeneutic alternative to the dominant philosophical models of the day. In *This Too, a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity* (1774), he seeks to show, through a tour de force of European history, why

hermeneutics is worthwhile and what it can hope to achieve — or, stronger still, why the Enlightenment needs a hermeneutic philosophy in the first place. While this text is seen as a crucial contribution to historicism, it has also been read as a step toward a more metaphysical outlook. Without denying that such an outlook is, indeed, present in *This Too a Philosophy of History*, I propose, in Chapter Six, that this does not necessarily relinquish the hermeneutic relevance of this work. When read within the framework of Herder's early philosophy, *This Too, a Philosophy of History* emerges as a motivational treatise — a discussion of the need for and relevance of hermeneutics. In this way, it is a work that reaches back to Herder's 1765 argument that philosophy can only be useful to society if, in addition to its engagement with the natural world, it shapes itself along the parameters of historical and anthropological thought.

Finally, Chapter Seven rounds off by reviewing some important hermeneutic works from the later period. The *Spirit of Hebrew Poetry*, *Letters Concerning the Study of Theology*, and *Ideas for the Philosophy of History of Humankind* exemplify, but also further develop Herder's early work in hermeneutics. However, just as it was the case in the earlier writings, the later works occasionally shelter prejudices and bias. This, however, should not make us shy away from their philosophical insights, but initiate a discussion of the gains and limits of Herder's hermeneutics, as it is fundamentally embedded in and goes beyond the world of the eighteenth century.

I conclude my study of Herder's hermeneutic philosophy with some brief remarks on how his awareness of the modern period as an era of cultural diversity — and his pitching of hermeneutics as the right response to this insight — makes him a philosopher through whom enlightenment hermeneutics proves relevant and deserving of renewed attention, especially when compared to the ontological orientation of twentieth-century philosophers like Heidegger and Gadamer.

Herder's philosophy presents human life as historically and culturally shaped. Against a picture of human nature as determined by one, indivisible essence, Herder highlights the diversity of its realizations. This argument is not unique to Herder. In the same period, Rousseau, Diderot, and others had similar ideas.¹ Herder, though, is the first to spell out the consequences of this move for the discipline of hermeneutics; he sees it as necessitating an inclusion of questions about the nature and importance of cultural-historical understanding and exchange. As it is rooted in the enlightenment period, yet goes beyond the more narrow formulations of Enlightenment, the full potential of Herder's hermeneutic position has not received the attention it deserves.

Herder writes in a period when European philosophers are beginning to realize the complexity of their cultural heritage. It is from this point of view that he addresses the problem of understanding; he responds to issues of individual diversity, cultural plurality, and reflects on the gains and challenges of cultural and historical studies. These are still issues of great importance. Herder does not always stage them in a language that feels relevant or even acceptable to us. Nor does he provide all the answers that we could wish for. Furthermore, his prose is sometimes

overtly polemical, and his insights at times clouded by prejudices reflecting the historical horizon out of which they emerge. What the young Herder does, though, is to lay the ground for a hermeneutic philosophy that is based in a model of human diversity rather than the retrieval of one monumental tradition, typically identified with that of Western Europe and its eminent works of art. Herder views the differences between (and the inner complexity of) traditions as a condition to which hermeneutics responds and the element in which it thrives. He stresses the need for a constant critical-reflective scrutiny of the ways in which we, shaped by tradition and history, approach temporal and cultural others. Tradition is a field in which great works of art get ever richer in meaning, but also a domain in which power-structures settle and false beliefs take hold.

My interest in the hermeneutic aspects of Herder's philosophy, however, is not of a merely historical nature. That is, in light of the later hermeneutic rejection of the enlightenment (in all its facets) — the claim that this period represents more or less the opposite of a hermeneutic outlook — it is important to realize that eighteenth-century thought, for all its vicissitudes and variations, shelters a hermeneutic point of view. Yet, in turning to Herder's philosophy, I have also been motivated by a wish to rehabilitate what I see as a helpful complement to the dominant trends in contemporary hermeneutic thought.¹ Hence, I would like to end by briefly reflecting on the strengths of Herder's account, especially when compared to a later hermeneutic position like that of Hans-Georg Gadamer.

In staging an encounter between these traditions in hermeneutics, I am not denying that there exists a significant degree of overlap between them. Indeed, this is what makes a comparative approach meaningful in the first place. As core contributions to modern philosophy of interpretation — in that, for instance, they view human agency as historically and culturally situated, understand language as the medium through which this is brought to reflective awareness, view historical self-understanding as a domain of knowledge that, while evidently different from natural science, must be ascribed an irreducible value, and center on *Bildung* as the way in which this historical self-understanding takes form — they will, inevitably, be in concord on central philosophical issues, especially if contrasted with explicitly non-hermeneutic positions.⁴ However, if we allow alignment in basic concerns and interests to overshadow differences in the way these concerns are articulated and the reflections and responses they occasion, we deprive the hermeneutic tradition of its philosophical richness, and, at the end of the day, its capacity for healthy disagreement and debate. I believe the hermeneutic tradition is strong enough to encompass different positions and paradigms — and navigate the possible tensions between them. As far as Gadamerian and Herderian hermeneutics go, the tensions and disagreements should, in my view, be led back to their different attitudes to the tradition.

Gadamer views the modern, hermeneutic tradition as a response to an ahistorical Cartesian paradigm that gains a stronghold in the Enlightenment period. In line with

Heidegger, he argues that the Enlightenment — and with it, the paradigm of eighteenth-century hermeneutics — objectivizes meaning.⁶ Rather than focusing on a living tradition that embraces work as well as interpreter, it sees the meaning of historical texts as located in an irretrievable past. For Gadamer, this is a mistake that must be amended, and hermeneutics must be put back on track as an investigation of "the mode of being of Dasein itself." Gadamer's hermeneutics looks into "the basic being-in-motion of Dasein that constitutes its finitude and historicity, and hence embraces the whole of its experience of the world."⁷ In his view, the modern alienation from tradition — the sense, quite widely shared in pre— and post—World War Two Europe, that the values we once took to define our societies have ceased to have a hold on us and that, as a consequence, we find ourselves in a world that is poor in meaning — is the real problem to which hermeneutics responds. Drawing on Hegel, he remarks that "substance is the 'spirit which is capable of uniting us.'"

In the face of this project, as it is voiced in *Truth and Method* and Gadamer's later work, we ought to ask whether the question of a shared, traditional meaning really is the only or most relevant issue to which hermeneutics can and should respond. Is the chief problem of understanding today really that of a tradition that has lost its authority? In my view, it is not. A list of contemporary hermeneutic problems and issues must, rather, involve, along with an interest in the dynamic unfolding of the tradition, an inquiry into individual and cultural diversity, the possibility of inter-personal and inter-cultural understanding, and the effort to understand traditions as evolving through interaction with other cultures. Especially toward the end of his life, Gadamer did occasionally reflect on the need for such understanding. However, in the course of the previous chapters, I have argued that Herder's philosophy, as it develops in a period of budding intercultural interest and exchange, is designed so as to articulate this challenge and spell out its relevance for human *Bildung*. This is one reason why it is deserving of rehabilitation within the landscape of contemporary hermeneutics.

Another reason why Herder's hermeneutics deserves to be taken seriously is the way in which the history of the discipline is typically constructed. In *Truth and Method*, Gadamer denounces the tradition from Schleiermacher to Dilthey as being borne out of the problematic intersection of aestheticism and positivism. Herder's contribution clearly goes beyond (and can help us question the relevance of) such labels. Hence, it is my hope that a study of Herder's hermeneutics can serve as an invitation not only to reconsider the relationship between the enlightenment (as a philosophical ideal) and hermeneutics (as one way in which this ideal is realized), but also the tradition from Herder, to Schleiermacher, Dilthey, and beyond. It is no coincidence that it was Dilthey, more than anyone else, who realized the hermeneutic importance of Herder's contribution and saw his work in this field as initiating a new and important paradigm in the philosophy of interpretation. And while Dilthey's work has received ample attention in recent scholarship, it has often been viewed as a Kantian contribution, thus overlooking the complex historical

It is Herder's goal to expand the Enlightenment agenda by furnishing it with a historical and cultural grounding, thus making it serve the ideals of humanity and independent thought. For Herder, we can only understand the present and take responsibility for the future to the extent that we can make sense of the past. Herder presents hermeneutics as part of a critical process of *Bildung*, suggesting that humanity is actualized in and through a complex web of symbolic, epistemic, and moral practices and their implicit conceptions of normativity. His is a model that avoids a conservative celebration of tradition for its own sake; at its best, it reflects a humanism that is liberal in its focus, political in its spirit, and driven by a deep-seated anthropological motivation — it seeks to take seriously the limits and the possibilities of a human point of view. It is in

Hölderlin was not alone in ascribing great potential to poetry and in recognizing it as a timely factor in the evolution of the human spirit. The years of his mature writings, roughly 1796-1803, saw the blossoming of early

German romanticism through the writings of Novalis, Schelling, Friedrich and August Schlegel, Tieck and others. Building on the eighteenth-century contributions of Rousseau, Herder, and Goethe, this generation of thinkers held enormous faith in "the word," in the medium of language, and never tired of exploring the connection between what Germans call *Dichtung* (creative writing) and the search for a level or atmosphere of culture that might suggest in the present that cultural unity that moderns have ascribed to the ancient Greeks. But unlike the proponents of romanticism who came to be known as the Jena school, Hölderlin's explorations were conducted, for the most part, on his own. And while we can say that Novalis's view of the novel and his romantic view of the world through or as the novel (German Roman) was influenced to a greater or lesser degree by the presence of Goethe, we cannot say the same concerning Hölderlin's late contributions, since neither Schiller nor Goethe has much to do with the direction taken by him in the practice of the poet's vocation.

Hölderlin himself contributed to the idea that Schiller had been instrumental in his career, but it warrants closer scrutiny. According to Harold Bloom, Hölderlin suffered from an "anxiety of influence" in his relation to Schiller, claiming, for example, that he could never break out of his dependence, while in reality the very statement of his dependence on Schiller was a gesture of independence. Writing about Hölderlin's self-effacing letters to Schiller, Bloom describes

an exercise in self-misprision, because in it a very strong poet evasively relies upon a rhetoric of pathos to portray himself as being weak. The revisionary ratio here employed against Schiller is what I call *kenosis* or repetition and discontinuity. Appearing to empty himself of his poetic godhood, Hölderlin actually undoes and isolates Schiller, who is made to ebb more drastically than the ephebe ebbs, and who falls hard where Hölderlin falls soft. This *kenosis* dares the profoundest evasion of naming as the death of art what is the life of Hölderlin's art, the ambivalent and agonistic clearing-away of Schiller's poetry in order to open up a poetic space for Hölderlin's own achievement.

I think Bloom's analysis of the Hölderlin-Schiller relationship very much captures the spirit of poetry as Hölderlin practiced it, with its suggestion of the agon and the clearing away, the making of space that is of vital importance to Hölderlin.

One of the interesting biographical details that emerges in the case of Hölderlin's productive lifetime is the absence of what we today call a "steady job." After his theological training, Hölderlin made numerous efforts to support himself as a private tutor, often relying on friends and acquaintances to secure these positions, which usually lasted a short while and left him wandering about from one city to the next.² Unlike many of his mentors and peers, Hölderlin never enjoyed the economic and emotional security connected with a university position or a position in government. It is interesting to speculate about what might have happened if Hölderlin had found an academic career, some administrative work in government, or a pastorate.

The fact we have to work with, however, is that his aspiration to become a poet only grew stronger as his failures in the "business" world accumulated. The growing determination to be a poet is a decisive factor in Hölderlin's poetry, and determination is meant here not only as the human act of volition but the ontic event of one coming into one's own.



The Germans have a term for one who writes occasionally, on the side, and it is *Gelegenheitsdichter*. Though in his productive lifetime Hölderlin published less than his peers, a fact which is underscored also by his lapse into madness around 1806, he was anything but a dilettante; in fact, the intensity of his late writing displays a noncompromising tenacity of poetic mission that is difficult to rival. Comparisons are frequently made between him and others, and, while they may be helpful in specific cases, Hölderlin's reliance on poetry and poetry's debt to Hölderlin are truly one of a kind.

The generation whose most creative minds set to work in the 1790s was acutely aware of the transitional nature of German culture. Hölderlin and his peers looked forward with charged anticipation to the role German thinkers might play in the unfolding events of Europe after the Revolution. The so-called golden age of German culture, encompassing the efforts of the classicists in Weimar and the romanticists in Jena, acted as a focus on Germany, placed it in the limelight, and Hölderlin was ready to take up the challenge by establishing a context in which to regard the outpourings of theoretical writings and poetry. The Enlightenment and the Revolution spawned by it were a momentous occurrence

of theory followed by practice, and, even if, historically speaking, the Revolution is said to have failed in its ideals, there can be no denying that Hölderlin's generation believed in the possibility of theory becoming practice. Poised as it was on the threshold of the modern age, with its emerging democracies, the generation of the 1790s urgently felt a responsibility to the future. At this time, as Charles Taylor has aptly observed, the artist rose to a prominence hitherto unknown to Europe. Hölderlin's specific effort in the determination of the direction of modern man had to do with the relationship of poetry to being. To perceive that a new age was in the making was merely a first step, but, given that beckoning factor, that challenge, just where did man stand in his relation to past and future? Hölderlin's efforts to find a place for poetry in the here and now hinged on this question.

The poet's interest in the remote past, in this case ancient Greece, is not nostalgic, nor is it academic. Hölderlin may indeed have longed to be among the ancient heroes, but I dare say he longed more urgently to be among heroes in the present. And though he shared with academics an interest in learning from and about the past, here, too, he went beyond the norm and addressed the issue of ancient culture's preconditions as the preconditions of all culture, all community *per se*. This poet's motivations in going back to the ancients were more in the nature of approaching what he called "the source" than they were expressions of *Weltschmerz*, or longing for the fabled golden age. In their writings the ancients dealt with the question of being on manifold levels, with conceptions of nature, gods, and demigods that modern man has abandoned. Just as the poet meant more to the ancient community than he could possibly mean to today's, so too poetry had a greater, more immediate role in the lives of ancients. What man is, in the most universal sense, and what is a community of man in the collective sense, are issues entrusted to the ancient poets, or at least, they were issues which Hölderlin discussed within the ongoing context of determining what man is. Hölderlin, his peers, and prominent earlier Europeans such as Vico, Rousseau, and Herder all "assert the priority of poetry over prose," according to Paul de Man, a priority that links poetic language to the archaic and prose to the modern. The problem with regard to our study of Hölderlin, therefore, will not reside in demonstrating that poetry was a preferred medium; rather, as de Man continues, it will lie in allowing the unique, singular contribution of Hölderlin to emerge, for the present has a tendency to become "single-minded and uniform" on this issue, whereas each thinker, from Herder to Hölderlin, has a separate agenda.

Since Hölderlin was not only a scholar of Greek language and culture but also a poet whose use of German can safely be called Hölderlinian, it is helpful when considering his poetry to recall the priority of poetic language over prose, whether or not this priority is shared by us. Comparisons are indeed helpful for this approach, and perhaps two will suffice for introductory purposes. Goethe, for example, was among many things a scholar of the ancients, and he is justifiably regarded as a classicist in terms of literary history. His best poetry exhibits a balance, a very carefully executed "measure" in spite of the profundity that might attach to the subject at hand, as seen

perhaps in his poem "Nature and Art" (*Natur und Kunst*). One is impressed with Goethe's clarity, and one admires the masterful proportions of form and content. Indeed, Goethe's poetry is so successful on this particular score that it seems almost to be a style of prose that has been taught to sing, for the modern reader does appear to sympathize more with lucidity, on the interpretative level, and the advantage of prose should be that its first striving is for lucidity. Now in Hölderlin, on the other hand, we must experiment with our conceptions of what is lucid, what is profound, what is balanced, and we must also exercise greater caution. Hölderlin's striving to clarify is anything but paternalistic, often because the issues he treats are not regarded as instances, paradigms, or lessons so much as I think he regarded the poem as a probe. When the writer is conducting a probe, or a sounding, he is not aware in advance of what he might discover. Consequently, if the poet is in pursuit of something he intuitively feels, and if each poetic event contributes to a greater clarification of what is, what stands between him and all others (including himself and all others), then each poem will reflect a new attempt and its language is tailored to suit. And in the plainest terms, spoken without theory, Hölderlin does not appear lucid. This appearance, however, while it is able to stand in comparative terms, is deceiving, since it is by now well known that some of the greatest philosophical minds of our century see the lucidity of Hölderlin's writing precisely because he dispenses with the established conception of what is lucid in favor of breaching the lock.

In her recent book on Hölderlin and Novalis, Alice Kuzniar points to an important dimension of the poet's style. "Hölderlin interrupts, complicates, and even at times suspends articulated language. He discovers a speech that maintains silence. Paradoxically then, displacement serves to orient Hölderlin's poetic voice; it renders his verse unique and distinct. This observation is in keeping with my view that Hölderlin makes a new attempt with each poem, and Kuzniar also understands that Hölderlin could not have sanctioned the idea of an "organic whole" to each poem, since he constantly revised his work, and withdrew from potentially presumptuous utterances. But in spite of any aversion Hölderlin may have had concerning the limitations of language, and in spite of Hölderlin's suspending of articulated language, the fact remains that he did write, and that we do have a text. The critic cannot afford to be coy where Hölderlin himself was bold, even if the poet wished not to err by way of boldness. The success of Hölderlin's poetry is a result of his circumspection with regard to language; we read his poetry because he was a great poet, not because he suggested that he or anyone else might be a great poet.

Schiller is another poet often compared to Hölderlin, and justifiably, since not only were Hölderlin, Schiller, and Goethe contemporaries, but the latter also endeavored, for a time, to further Hölderlin's poetic aspirations. Again, "comparison" here does not mean the two are alike and is used primarily to shed light on Hölderlin's poetic language. Though Schiller was capable of poetry on occasion rivaling that of Goethe, for him often poetry was an *ersatz* for prose, and the reader is not struck by any sense of necessity, urgency, searching, while Schiller's didactic and

moralizing bent is richly in evidence. One does not immediately know, and perhaps may never truly know, why Hölderlin wrote as he did—with tortured syntax, ambiguous antecedents and modifiers, and deliberate fragmentation—and yet, the authenticity of his poetic language is not questioned, the difficult journey is worth the effort, and, instead of having been led by the hand or swept off one's feet by some masterful stroke, the reader of Hölderlin finds clarification by virtue of having had to work for it. Paul de Man asks a good question with regard to poetry that might help to suggest why Hölderlin became so important to our century: "Can we find out something about the nature of modernity by relating it to lyric poetry that we could not find out in dealing with novels or plays?" Indeed, let us expand on this; Heidegger wrote neither novels or plays, and certainly he believed the question can be answered affirmatively even if it were to include philosophy.

When a thinker in his appropriate medium crosses the boundaries that critics establish for a particular medium, one finds a lot of speculation concerning the thinker's authority. Nothing invites second-guessing more than the crossing into another's realm, and yet, man among all creatures is the one who wanders. For Hölderlin there was no separation of poetry from truth and, therefore, no essential difference between poetry and philosophy. Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel, and others called for the reuniting of these artificially divorced spheres; Hölderlin did a lot less "calling for" and devoted himself to the task. And in Hölderlin's case the union of poetry and philosophy was not so much an issue, or a plank within a theoretical platform, as it was the given with which he worked. In his milestone book on Hölderlin and Pindar, M. B. Benn discusses how critics often grant Hölderlin legitimacy as a poet, but not as a philosopher.

We have become suspicious of all attempts to judge poetry by its philosophical content, mistrustful, even, of any marked interest in the ideas of poetry. We like to quote the saying of Mallarmé to the effect that "la poésie se fait avec des mots." We are inclined to suspect that those who look for truth in poetry must lack the feeling for beauty. We are afraid the preoccupation with ideas may kill the appreciation of aesthetic values, and we are doubtful whether the ideas of poetry are worth anything anyhow.

Indeed, professional philosophers are generally in agreement concerning who is or is not a philosopher, though of course even the philosophers have their preference, but a good part of the problem stated by Benn is that poetry, by its nature, is less easily canonized. If philosophers are individuals whose work brings them into contact with the broadest possible implications of what is true, we might expect that at least many philosophers, following the model of Plato, break the staff over the poet as one who simply prefers fiction to truth. This perception, furthermore, is not often challenged by the poets themselves, as the best poets consider the question to be academic, while among the lesser poets the question is moot.

Hölderlin clearly has made a name for himself as a poet who is read and studied by philosophers, among others, and today it is impossible to divorce his writings from the philosophical context of the generation of the 1790s in Germany. But the obstacle to viewing poetry as anything

but an aesthetic diversion remains, in part, due to the efforts of one of history's greatest "poetic" philosophers, namely Friedrich Nietzsche. For Nietzsche as a young man had a genuine, intuitive love for the writings of Hölderlin, only to abandon his interest in the poet when it became time to set forth the duties of the philosopher, which Nietzsche held to be incompatible with the effects of poetry. Ironically, in the early years of Nietzsche's worldwide reception he was considered by many critics and philosophers to be "merely" a gifted poet, a great literary talent, while his philosophical writings were suspect. Nietzsche's admiration for Hölderlin allowed him to perceive of the poet as mere poet, an unfortunate turn in the life of a philosopher who had so much to say concerning issues addressed by Hölderlin, and in his later development Nietzsche frequently regarded himself as the "mere fool, mere poet" whose writings did not carry philosophical authority. Clearly, Nietzsche was acutely aware of the problem of truth next to poetry, even the great poetic-philosophical work *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is a testimony to the difficulty of keeping these spheres separated; but what Nietzsche in his better moments was able to see, and appreciate, is the fact that *Zarathustra* is a great work of philosophy because Nietzsche the poet let himself be.



Friedrich Schlegel

Unlike Nietzsche, and later on Hugo von Hofmannsthal, much influenced by Nietzsche, Hölderlin did not have to contend with an unrelenting ambivalence toward poetry. Instead, Hölderlin became sovereign within the sphere of poetry in the manner of one who knows what he is about, and comes

into his own. Though Hölderlin on occasion raised the question of poetry's place in modern society, he did not despair and eventually condemn the poet; indeed, he remained philosophical about poetry, he persevered, demonstrating that it was a real vocation. One who fulfills his calling to such a high degree, and against formidable odds, is not a weakling who succumbs, as Nietzsche would have it, but a rare, affirmative will. What Nietzsche was generally able to praise in himself, namely the overcoming of poor health, a false career choice (academics), a heavy reliance on Richard Wagner and his worldview, he was not able to recognize in Hölderlin, who had to wrestle with demons in his own right. But even if they viewed poetry from opposite sides, still there can be no denying that Hölderlin and Nietzsche had more in common than the fact that both lost their sanity.

Both were individuals of great will and great faith, though it is not so easily seen how "faith" manifests itself here. Nietzsche's cultural criticism, and his scathing criticism of the modern man, were not undertaken in a spirit of hatred but in a spirit of love for humanity. Even the overman, or precisely the overman is a measure of Nietzsche's faith in man to become someone greater, to evolve spiritually as he evolves physically. Hölderlin, too, made the condition of man a central issue of his thought, but not by attempting to isolate man in the universe and grounding all meaning in a new man. Both Nietzsche and Hölderlin were enthusiastic about the idea of a natural man, only for Hölderlin this natural man does not divorce himself from his gods, he does not deny his spiritual needs. Hölderlin spoke of man's future as something near, something for which all the components were already in place, while Nietzsche's projection of the overman into a nameless, distant future where the present man's inhibitions are overcome clearly shows him as the cultural pessimist.

Erich Heller has written that Hölderlin and Nietzsche "are possessed by a more intense and genuine feeling for man's spiritual need than is shown by much orthodox belief." Since both thinkers were well schooled in the Bible and in the classics, one is tempted to regard their faith as a vestige of the old faith somehow transferred into a pagan

worldview. But the classics and the Bible are threads of a common source, so that whether we speak of gods or God, the real concern is for man. In pagan times the poet and the priest were not separate individuals, as Novalis tirelessly explained in his philosophical writings, and the philosopher, as Nietzsche repeatedly noted, did not have a monopoly on truth and morality before the time of Socrates. Schlegel's call for a new mythology, Novalis's call for the union of poet and priest, Nietzsche's insistence that the proper study of the philosopher is the life of man—all of these expressions of post-Kantian philosophy have the determination of man at their basis. Hölderlin distinguished himself within this

context as well, and in his case, for the most part, poetry was the medium of expression as opposed to theoretical prose. In other words, though various individuals since the Enlightenment have written persuasively in prose on the unique capacity of poetry to say something meaningful about being, Hölderlin's use of the medium of poetry placed him within the source moderns generally objectify. And it is not simply a matter of Hölderlin's "use" of poetry for the communication of his special theory of poetry that is at stake here, for Hölderlin's poetry does not represent theory but practice.

Theorists and critics are justifiably in awe of the genuine poet and, as a result, often attempt to draw the poet into their domain, appropriate him, as it were. The genuine poet is one whose poetry is not merely interesting, autobiographical, idiosyncratic, clever, or glib. There are of course countless examples of poetry that are essentially individual, in the sense that the reader or listener is introduced to some individual who speaks in his particular way concerning whatever concerns him. If this were to suffice to describe Hölderlin as poet, surely very few essays and books would have been written about him. The "individual" is a commonplace in modern society, as long as we do not apply strict ontological categories to the term individualism, because the individual is a product of fragmentation, lack of planning, and absence of will. Too much poetry is a product of individuals trying to make their debut known to others; they are fascinated with themselves, perhaps others will be fascinated, too. It is an old problem.

In one of his greatest philosophical works Friedrich Schiller voiced his concern for the fragmentary nature of the modern individual. As a species we have of course

advanced, but Schiller was concerned about what has happened in the meantime to individuals. Why, he asked, did the individual Greek of ancient times qualify as a representative of his age, while the modern individual dare not? Schiller answers the question by claiming that "all-unifying nature" gave its forms to the ancients, while moderns are instead informed by "all-separating reason." This criticism of the modern individual was prevalent among classicists and romanticists; indeed, Rousseau had given the eighteenth century its ideal of nature. Nietzsche took up the problem of individual



versus natural, or collective art, in *The Birth of Tragedy*; the Greeks could not tolerate the individual on the tragic stage, for individuals are comic rather than tragic, and Nietzsche argued that the Greeks regarded the individual in much the same way that Plato regarded the idol as opposed to the idea. Particularly, German theory is full of expressions detailing the authenticity of the natural, the collective, the universal, as opposed to the rational, individual, idiosyncratic. It is therefore not surprising to find Nietzsche, in his later career, speaking of the poet as a mere fool, a mere comic and a magician. But once again it must be observed that Hölderlin was a poet who triumphed over the

difficulties of the modern individual, and though he was no less aware of the loss of nature than were Schiller and Nietzsche, in his case the reconciliation with nature occurs in practice.

In lines that are frequently quoted by today's poets Hölderlin asked: wherefore poets in paltry times? The wide-ranging implications of the poet's words could easily seduce us into thinking that the major concern here is a criticism of the age, but Hölderlin's poetry reveals that poets simply do not have it easy, not at any time. It is not too much to say that, for Hölderlin, the poets make time by determining man's place in time. There are, of course, poets who prefer to be passengers of their age, commentators and bards of the mundane, individuals hurled about by the same forces that propel all others like so many passive objects, but whose laurels as poets, rest upon the ability to snatch colorful moments from the general confusion and send them whirling on the wind like falling leaves. Hölderlin's faith in poetry and in all others, for whom poetry is, could not allow him to play the role of harlequin, nor was there any salon great enough to imprison him. It is ironic, though by no means unusual, that a poet whose great concern is for the proper place of man could find very little room within his own age. Hölderlin, who attempted to reveal man's situation in the present by recollecting the past and indicating the future, was himself, socially speaking, on the fringe. But speaking now in the language of poetry, it was not he who was on the fringe, but the contemporaries who circumscribed the boundaries of their age too narrowly, too superficially.

The title of this study readily identifies it as a methodology influenced by the writings of Martin Heidegger. Some are prone to take issue with this approach, as Heidegger's philosophizing on being has exerted a wide and, some would say, all-too-wide influence since the 1930s. New methods of criticism, often indebted to Heidegger, have since come into vogue, and some would like to see these contemporary approaches applied to Hölderlin. It is my view that Hölderlin's poetry, which so strongly reflects his faith in poetry, is very difficult to read even for the scholar of German; for this reason, my introduction to a broad selection of the major poems intends to make the poet accessible, readable, with the hope that readers will pursue Hölderlin on their own. Since much of the post-structuralist criticism questions the scholar's and reader's abilities to extract meaning from a text, indeed questions whether an author even succeeds in expressing what he intends, I prefer to use an approach similar in spirit to the subject at hand. Hölderlin was clearly convinced that, as a mode of discourse, poetry is able to speak more vitally, more concisely, than other forms of expression. Hölderlin did not question the meaning of the text so much as he worked to establish the meaning of the text as an activity that has occupied man since the dawn of speech. Text is a term that can be used ironically, or cynically, especially if one is inclined to overlook the challenge of meaning given by a text; in this sense, since no perfect interpretation or reading is possible, one decides instead to dispense with reading. Proving the ambiguity of a text becomes a challenge, a satisfying pursuit that places the author and critic on an equal footing and, of course, has the effect of absolving the critic of any responsibility concerning the issue of meaning.

When the question of meaning is nullified, neutralized, ironized, the most basic question of study is also blunted, namely: what do I learn here?

This Hölderlin is a practicum in reading, just as the poet was a practitioner of his art. What is at issue is the general and specific effect of Hölderlin's poems, that is, how they "work" on us, as indicated in the German verb *wirken*. Some of my colleagues will marvel at my audacity in writing in this spirit on Hölderlin's poetry; they might prefer no reading to any reading that attempts, actually and as lucidly as possible, to establish a meaningful reading. If Hölderlin's poetry, rife as it is with gods and demigods, were not made for mortal consumption, the detractors of meaning would be profoundly right, and the rest of us would desist. But Hölderlin's poetry, gods, demigods, and all, is properly suited for our reading and edification. Hölderlin's concerns for poetry were so basic, in the best sense of the word, that it would be cynical to deny access to his poems through interpretation. Those who are still in awe of language, who fear it, suspect it, berate it—but ultimately use it to their hearts' content—should read no further here. For Hölderlin language is as authentic as being, and being is not some trendy notion that could ever become passé.

A Heideggerian approach, I said—but with more than a grain of salt. It is not by accident that a good deal of Nietzsche appears in this study. Since Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Heidegger together represent some of our best efforts at defining being, it is proper to view their contributions as a continuum. But no one should infer that I am striking a great comparison here; Nietzsche was as different from Hölderlin as Heidegger was different from Nietzsche. And just as Nietzsche turned away from Hölderlin, misunderstanding him as a failed man, a weakling, so, too, Heidegger has read much into Nietzsche that is not there. Let us agree at the outset that each of these great thinkers had his own agenda. When they speak with authority on the issues held in common, we generally benefit.

As the problem of fragmentation described by Schiller, and Hölderlin, only continues to grow, and modern observers learn that "classical" issues are indeed living issues, Hölderlin is more relevant today than he was in 1800. As he himself observed long ago, there are too many sanctimonious poets who call upon "gods" and "nature" whenever they need a good effect. And what of today? For us nature is something of a quantity that we desire, not very strongly, to preserve and protect from the encroachment of industrial pollution and developers. Nature is the green power, it is what reigned on this planet before we took over. And whatever nature is, we seem to be saying to ourselves, it is surely an entity foreign to us. Often it is downright hostile, manifesting storms, floods, and earthquakes, and we reflect on how little has been done to control nature. Perhaps control is the key word here. Nature is something we control; it cannot possibly have a hand in controlling us. What emerges with great clarity in Hölderlin's poetry is the extent to which mankind is natural, and the manner in which man is what he is. These concerns may strike some as trivial, while some might argue that they are not the proper challenge of poetry. For the others Hölderlin has something timely to say.

Excerpt: Ascent: Philosophy and Paradise Lost metaphorically follows a philosopher and a believer as they take a tough hike all the way up to a mountain's summit. The "mountain" is Paradise Lost, which both of them read. The book is divided into "climbs" and "crossroads?" The "climbs" are uphill segments jointly forming a reading of Paradise Lost, a reading in which the poem's attempt to yoke together aesthetic achievement and a spiritual ascent is respected. The "crossroads" are bifurcations between religious poetry and secular philosophy. They are spots where a nonreligious philosopher will likely part company from Milton's projected reader. The attempt of this book is to underscore the differences between philosophy and literature, rather than their synergy. Accordingly, its readers will be rewarded by keeping in mind not the image of a well-run chariot drawn by

Ascent: Philosophy and Paradise Lost, then, is an attempt to bring secular philosophy, religion, and literature into one movement of thought. Paradise Lost will expose the spillover among the three domains. But it will also reveal junctions in which they must part company and reassert their autonomy. It is the tracing of this latter movement of recoiling that is the primary undertaking of this work. That lines of rupture will be underscored rather than blurred runs counter to the superficial interdisciplinary sentiment that celebrates the

Understanding a tripartite relationship—religion, philosophy, literature—is not achieved merely by probing the bipartite structures that form it. Relations are lived in and between their more visible thoroughfares. Still, it is impossible to appreciate how the whole is larger than the sum of its parts without traversing the



parts at the outset: the relations between philosophy and religion, between philosophy and literature, and between religion and literature. What, then, will we hear when the less audible dialogues between these become amplified through *Paradise Lost*?

First, philosophy and religion. Perhaps more than any other work in literature, Milton's poetic theodicy exemplifies the tension between the desire to believe and the wish to know. Milton was one of the most erudite poets, one who could hardly be expected to belittle knowledge. Yet given the subject of *Paradise Lost*—the catastrophe in which the pursuit of knowledge meant abandoning God, the context in which knowledge came to imply death—Milton's poem was compelled to choose sides. Of course, the poem could (and did) somewhat relax the tension between faith and knowledge by presenting the forbidden fruit as offering only sham wisdom. The problem is not, however, wholly finessed in this manner. It is not only the quality of the fruits of knowledge that matters, be they wholesome or rotten. The search for knowledge is a drive. Those who wish to gratify it make room for a type of hunger. They want to understand, to justify what they think they know, to find complexity, articulate questions, note distinctions, and refine observations. Knowledge-seeking is also an overarching existential motive for action. Judged by its light, the unexamined life becomes unworthy. That is how love of knowledge may compete with rival, existentially inclusive orientations such as faith, in which the guiding aspiration to be cultivated is nurturing bonds with God via obedience, gratitude, and love.

Milton, the learned polyglot, perceived that Eden yields a commentary on philosophy, the orientation standing for an unbridled pursuit of knowledge. Inquiry and faith do not have to be at odds. Yet once they become rival motives for action, philosophy may undermine faith, or marginalize it, or stifle the attunements that faith hopes to sharpen. The point is not merely that Milton had to commit to a prioritizing of faith over inquiry, a preference bound to be unpalatable for twenty-first-century philosophers; on that score he was no different from many other believers. It is that creating the imaginative space of *Paradise Lost*, for a poet disinclined to take doctrinal shortcuts, entailed transcribing such abstract prioritizing into a full-blooded existential clash played out between the craving to know more and the hope to strengthen the connection with God. The clash is not easily contained. Its repercussions affect the ways in which its readers will relate to meaningful action, to world-perception, and to the limits of understanding.

Milton was not the first to grapple with the puzzling tension between the striving to make the uttermost of our unique intellectual capacities and the divine injunction against doing so. The metamorphosis of a gift (knowledge) into a trap—such is how many before Milton have interpreted Eden. But by offering, arguably, the most committed recreation of Eden ever made, Milton paused over dimensions of the sin that were overlooked by other believers. He kept what he found enlightening in the most influential glosses on the implications of consuming the forbidden fruit—a sin of disobedience, yielding corrupt rather than genuine understanding. He also intuited, however, that equating

Edenic curiosity with disobedience could not be a fully satisfying answer. Obeying God must somehow differ from submitting to some other entity merely because of its might, like those fallen angels who bow to Satan. The difference between such subjections could not simply be a matter of devotion to the right object. Something about obeying God must categorically differ from a docile subservience to Satan's instructions. If obeying is not merely following orders, its meaning invites a more careful probing. Milton had to follow through and inquire why genuine, not merely distorted, knowledge was being withheld from righteous human beings by a benevolent God, and why acquiescing to this bewildering demand ought to count as praiseworthy obedience. Unlike some of his contemporaries, his imagination encompassed too much of the philosopher to be satisfied merely by vilifying curiosity.

This brings us to the relationship between philosophy and literature. Philosophy is an attempt to understand, an effort to reach, refine, and justify beliefs pertaining to highly general concepts, concepts that underpin practices, modes of thought, manners of sense-making and of evaluation. While it is difficult to find a challenger to the idea that literary works can be insightful with regard to such concepts, philosophers who view literary works as potential allies in their philosophical pursuits are obliged to both substantiate and vindicate this intuition. It is not enough for a literary work to include some pithy claims regarding truth, or love, or meaning, or death. Such claims can be taken out of the literary context or paraphrased. On their own, such claims also lack the normative dimension built into philosophizing the demand not just to propose, but to justify whatever is being claimed.

To overcome these objections, philosophers of literature (such as me) who think with or through literary works problematize the notion of justification. The contours of our argument are typically as follows: literary works (sometimes) catalyze intellectual growth in ways that differ from arguments, or from a systematic analysis of facts. The dissimilarity pertains either to the knowledge attained (whether or not the said cognitive contribution is, strictly speaking, knowledge) or to the manner of gaining it. Literary works thereby become partners in the philosopher's attempt to understand, to lead an examined life, and to break free from the hold of false beliefs and unsupported intuitions. The implication that philosophers of literature will draw from this is that given a modest recalibrating of overarching objectives, the two engines of philosophy and literature are able to sometimes drive a single locomotive. These philosophers may go on to say that if deprived of the synchronism between the two engines, some of our more important trains of thought would never leave the station. [Generally (and without going into particular positions at this point), aestheticians who argue that literary works provide knowledge ("cognitivists") do not necessarily subscribe to the stronger claim, according to which such knowledge is importantly distinct from the kind of knowledge that can be gained by other means. Those cognitivists who accept the stronger claim do not necessarily allow such a claim to modify their philosophical method. Those who do, begin exploring philosophical questions, at least sometimes, through readings of literary works. Even

the third group should not be seen as committed to the needlessly strong claim that the knowledge they are after can be acquired only through literature.] Such are the broad outlines of the "compensatory" mode of philosophical criticism. It is a mode that has become the default paradigm driving current philosophical criticism. Compensatory readings regard the interpretation of literature as yielding knowledge or moral attunement that cannot be acquired through philosophical argument alone. Important and laudable as such compensatory work is in highlighting the limitations of established philosophical methods vis-à-vis the objectives of philosophy, there is no reason to allow it to monopolize philosophical readings. For some literary works, this paradigm is merely inadequate. For others, like *Paradise Lost*, employing it seems to involve a far more violent form of interpretative imposition, in which the literary work's own assumptions about knowledge and aesthetic achievement are ignored.

Paradise Lost offers a powerful counterexample to proposed alliances between philosophy and literature.

Milton's poem puts before philosophers of literature a poetic achievement of repeatedly recognized aesthetic merit. It is, at the same time, a poem that regards the pursuit of understanding as conducive not to growth but to personal corruption. When such hostility to philosophy is expressed by a thoughtfully crafted literary creation, it becomes strained to regard the work as complementing philosophical pursuits. If the

antiphilosophical values that *Paradise Lost* is designed to instill are sympathetically entertained, any knowledge-related fruits picked through the poem's philosophical reading are trivialized. How can philosophers set out to read such poetry with an eye for insight and uniquely accessed experiential understanding while remaining untroubled by the perception of understanding as itself potentially dangerous, a perception that becomes part of the antiphilosophical experience created by the poem? Can one experientially respond to a work—feeling and thinking with it—while succeeding in remaining untouched by its skepticism with regard to what one is attempting to achieve?

Given this inability to force *Paradise Lost* into complementary relations with philosophy, what is needed is an alternative paradigm for the philosophical reading of

some literary works. What follows is a philosophical reading of *Paradise Lost* that hopes to do justice to its implicit critique of philosophy. Accommodating such a critique experientially does not amount simply to articulating it, confronting it as a thesis or an argument in poetic trappings. It means, rather, allowing for a reading that hosts sensitivities that compete with the philosopher's own, rival options that the philosopher hopes to understand via the multiple vocabularies of poetry—emotional, tactile, argumentative, and sensual. The poet's labor provides gateways into this imaginative understanding. We will be reading for tension, not for mutual reinforcement. The attempt will prove less predictable than it first promises to be. Because the poetry is disciplined and patient, we shall find the poem gravitating into possibilities that diverge from the poet's ostensible position.

Moreover (and this percolates to the third dyad: religion and literature), by reading *Paradise Lost* through the lenses provided by contemporary philosophy of literature, the distinct complexity of accounting for religious poetry, largely overlooked by contemporary secular analytic aesthetics, will surface. The weakness of theorizing about

"literature" or its experience via some one-size-fits-all "philosophical criticism" is difficult to conceal when addressing the literature of faith. The point is not merely that the poetry of Dante, Tasso, or Spenser calls for a philosophical analysis different from one suitable to modern novels. It is that faith is often not an element one can choose to ignore. For the poet, religious beliefs may influence aesthetic choices. For faithful readers, such



beliefs may modify what they will be willing to recognize as being aesthetic experiences. It may accordingly prove naive to attempt to separate the realm of aesthetics from the world of faith. Can a poem lamenting the Fall still aspire to be beautiful, or would such an achievement belie the poet's conviction that accessing beauty is no longer possible for the fallen, thereby exposing the poem's insincerity? Or how strained is it to appreciate a literary work for values such as, say, realism, insightfulness, vivid imagery, world-disclosing reach, and the like, when its author regards it merely as a verbal vestment for revelation? Denying the relevance of authorial intentions will be the aesthete's standard retort to such questions. Yet even the most assured critic taking this tack must doubt the soundness of reading Dante while smilingly brushing aside his religious intention.

The aura of condescension is hard to dispel. The stronger the work, the more such intention-free readings feel like acts that patronize giants who are not permitted to talk back.

Authorial intentions are, at times, lenses, perceptual facilitators designed to re-gauge aesthetic appreciation. To accept this does not mean that subscribing to the intended faith is a prerequisite for the sensitive reading of religious literary works. Such acceptance does prescribe, however, a genuine attempt to relate to religious works through the possibly distinct aesthetic values that they may be governed by. The aspiration to make theoretical room for these potentially distinct values is not only hamstrung by imagining that one can always ignore authorial intentions. It is also blocked by the implicit acceptance of a dubious version of literature's history: a false and simplified dichotomy between "secular" and "religious" has been imposed upon the genealogy of literature. ["In England, an Erasmian literary method has been conflated with a Petrarchan literary practice as a way of establishing a line from Wyatt and Surrey through the Elizabethans, beginning with Sir Philip Sidney and Edmund Spenser, towards the courtly and classical poetry of the early Stuarts surrounding Ben Jonson, and on to Andrew Marvell and John Dryden before and after the Restoration. The literature of the public theatre, including most of all the master of them all, Shakespeare, is tacked onto this narrative as belonging to a similar humanist tradition. The concerns of this literature are assumed to be overwhelmingly secular, and only accidentally religious. A separate tradition has been understood to exist of devotional literature, written (it seems) for separate people, and requiring (in modern literary histories) separate chapters to expound them. This is the case even when an author, such as John Donne, writes in both spheres: an extraordinary typological division has been imposed, splitting his life in two. Only an acknowledged genius, in the case of John Milton, has escaped; yet even then, the interpretative history of *Paradise Lost* has become isolated as a result." Brian Cummings, "The Protestant and Catholic Reformations," in *The Oxford Handbook of English Literature and Theology*, ed. Andrew Hass, David Jasper, and Elisabeth Jay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).] By compartmentalizing literatures in this way, one can entertain the assumption that the aesthetic appreciation of such works remains the same while what differs are the beliefs that underpin them. However, if religious poetry aims to realize distinct aesthetic values, the principles governing its appreciation may differ too; and to admit this can carry implications for the appreciation of irreligious literature as well. Secular literature written in nonsecular times too often engages in an implicit dialogue with religious concerns (authors like Donne engaged in both kinds of writings), so if the divide between secular and nonsecular literature is fuzzy, some of the values that are more explicitly mobilized within religious literature may also be implicitly undergirding secular literature.

The suspicion that religious poetry addresses distinct aesthetic merits surfaces when pondering a question such as the following: "What differentiates a religious poem that succeeds in serving as a conduit for revelation from one that does not?" Religious poets and their readers are likely to consider such didactic success part and parcel of what

makes some poems good ones. Secular aesthetes may initially hope to account for the difference in success by appealing to the same set of aesthetic virtues that lends distinction to nonreligious works (e.g., complexity, originality, precision): "The successful religious poem is simply better as a poem," they will say, "and it is better not because of some special standards it meets because it happens to be religious." But it is not obvious from the start that aesthetic virtues remain unaltered when crossing over from secular to religious territory. How, for instance, can one respond to the bare musicality of the *Divine Comedy* while concomitantly believing that its rhyme pattern is theologically charged? The teacher's perspective brings out the problem: introduced to Dante's poem, students learn that in each of its three-line stanzas the first and third lines rhyme, and that the second line rhymes with the first line of the following stanza. Suppose that the instructor proceeds to suggest to the students, not implausibly, that by having each rhyme repeated three times, the stanzas are chained together by sound links echoing the Trinity. What would it now mean to urge one's students to "listen for"/"appreciate"/"open up to" the poem's music? Is such listening the same activity as the one practiced when appreciating the acoustic effects of a Petrarchan sonnet? The music of a poem is one of the artistic values treasured by aesthetes who have emphasized art's nonparaphrasable, non-content-related qualities as its defining traits. But how may students be encouraged to hear Dante's verse without allowing for some substantive considerations to modify the ways in which they relate to the soundscape of the poem?

Theoretically messy options open up. Faith chimes with pleasure. Pleasure emerges as faith. The practical meaning of such embracing of religion's entwining with aesthetic effect is blurry even if one's students are devoted Catholics (what, precisely, are these students urged to do if they are not to ignore the religious underpinnings of Dante's rhymes?). It is even more mysterious if they are not. Should nonbelieving students be encouraged to cultivate some hypothetical "as if" attitude, pretending to be Dante's intended readers while knowing that they are not? What would this mean in practice? Rendering faith "relevant" or "irrelevant," accommodating or neutralizing it, become theoretical gestures with unclear referents.

"Fiction," to take another example, is typically understood by aestheticians as an invitation to imagine. But regardless of how one unpacks "imagination," is the invitation to imagine a breakfast at Trollope's Archdeacon Grantly's house comparable to imagining God's conversation with his literal or metaphoric son? Whereas the former is best fostered by articulating elements that create a world, the latter risks diminution if it becomes overly vivid. Moreover, religious literary works, while instantiating a call to imagine, are often not strictly fictional (in the sense of fiction being different from truth) because the author attempts a representencing of what he or she believes actually exists. Readers of Dante's underworld do not "makebelieve." They are guided to apprehend a difficult truth.

Unlike historians or biographers, religious authors, even iconophilic ones, will often refrain from producing overly vivid descriptions. The danger they mean to avoid is

cheapening God (a charge directed at *Paradise Lost* by Andrew Marvell and Dr. Johnson). True, it has been argued that when compared to all other monotheistic religions, the uniqueness of Christianity lies in the idea of God shedding his transcendence, entering the world of the senses by becoming flesh! Yet describing a translated version of God differs from his reduction into one. For this reason, the author of a religious work may search for a description that at once awakens the mind and pushes it away from clear visualization. Descriptions of God, not only in religious aesthetic works, may accordingly include elements that are calculated to undermine pictorial imaginings.

The third topic of this book, the third dyadic relationship in the triangle from which we began, is, then, the relationship between religion and literature. Yes, the literary work's "religious value," its capacity to advance its faith-related objectives, can call for adjusting aesthetic notions. But how to address the broader tension between religious value and aesthetic aspiration? Artistic overachievement as such has been flagged as a danger to faith by Karl Barth and Hans Urs von Balthasar. They claim that highly inspired beautiful works of religious art and literature that are meant to be gateways into a deepened faith may turn out to be spiritually treacherous whirlpools. The paradox is that the better such offerings are as creations enabling their appreciation in dissociation from religious intent, the more they risk lulling believers into spiritual failure. The failure can be a self-absorbed pleasure-seeking masquerading as faith, or a self-serving usage of God, or God-talk used as an outlet for vanity. The merits for which the aesthete praises the religious artist's creation can become the latter's nightmare.

Denouncing beauty, the road taken by some Protestants as a response to this paradox, has been rejected by von Balthasar as self-defeating. His claim is that waging war on beauty introduces into faith pernicious discontinuities between the perception of God's glory and the apprehension of his message. A cerebral, crippled faith results from skimming off what is imagined or sensed from that which is thought and felt. The antidote that von Balthasar recommends is the cultivation of an aesthetic attunement in which features of works of art become emissaries of higher intimations. God thereby ceases to be a mere source of instruction or salvation, and displays himself in his glory. Such encounters may become the visceral fountainhead for one's faith. The art occasioning these encounters need not be overtly religious: "Genuine, noble expression of the beautiful is simultaneously expression of the holy," maintains Gerardus van der Leeuw, expressing skepticism with regard to the idea of safely circumscribed "religious" as opposed to "profane" art. If the theological-aesthete is correct, a religiously driven instrumentalization of art, even when explicit, means not a degrading of art into the status of a didactic tool, as defenders of art's autonomy fear. Instead, such

instrumentalizing amounts to reaching the rock bottom of all aesthetic appreciation as such, even when one is responding to secular art. By implication, to refuse such instrumentalization by defending some seemingly pure art means endorsing a superficial aesthetics, blind to God's interlacing with beauty


Milton is well aware that his challenge is how to accommodate the mutually enforcing potential of poetry and faith while also blocking their misalliance. The shape this assumes is not some general apology for poetry as ancillary to religion. Rather, Milton's topic, modalities of human failure, allows for building into his characters the rewards and risks of particular aesthetic responses. He understands that the idea of seeing God in his creation, holiness in beauty, invites two possible interpretations. The first involves looking through particulars and grasping a nonsensual content. The second is sensual through and through: looking at particulars and beholding God. Adam exemplifies the first, Eve the second. Each is compelled to overcome specific challenges that Milton associates with their outlooks. *Paradise Lost* is, thus, not merely "for" or "against" linking poetry and religion. It is a poem that aspires to set forth the conditions under which such association is successful. Yet, because all this takes place not on the level of examined practices—poetry, religion—but

on the level of world-encounter, the result also becomes an anatomy of perceptual failure that reverberates as an account of a distorted aesthetic response. The justification of poetry is thereby implied by the shortcomings instigating the Fall: whatever prevents Eve from seeing God in matter and Adam from

seeing God through it threatens the reader of this religious poem as well. But these failures are possibilities, not necessities. Readers need not repeat the mistakes they are looking at. Experiencing beauty can lead one to God, rather than away from him.

[Ascent: Philosophy and Paradise Lost](#) opens with the imagination and with its unique mobilization in religious thinking. Knowledge and its fraught relationship with faith come next, followed by the distinction between meaningful and meaningless agency, a distinction Milton would have cast in terms of being fully alive as opposed to being dead-in-life. Gratitude in its varied forms is explored in the final chapters. Gratitude offers a conceptual gateway through which sin (as a failing of gratitude) and the fallen condition (as the consequence of such failure) are understood anew. The capacity to sustain the appropriate response to a gift is revealed to be the attitude that distinguishes religion.

Some foreseeable concerns that my method may raise should be addressed at this early stage. First, in permitting myself to use the general category "religious poetry" in a discussion of a single poem, I am obviously asking readers to grant exemplary status to *Paradise Lost*. This request is often implied in the analysis of some outstanding aesthetic



achievements, whose repeated and time-tested attraction plausibly indicates that they are expressing some reapplicable insight. To regard such reapplication as referring to overlap among radically different religious articulations is dubious. Even the literature closest to Milton's religious convictions will reject much of what is included in *Paradise Lost*. If this chasm is acknowledged in the case of Hopkins or Blake, how greater must it be when considering the Psalms or the Bhagavad Gita? And yet, the exemplarity of a work, the potential of reapplying its insights, need not signify partial overlap with what is already glimpsed elsewhere. It means, rather, a proposal for meaning-making that can be seriously entertained in distant contexts. The reach of a great work transcends its vocabulary.

It resonates for others not because it attempts to describe them as they are, but by exploring its own commitments. Auditors of a truly searching self-scrutiny find in some of its fruits offerings that speak for them too. Aristotle was accordingly right to ascribe universality to poetry but wrong to frame this observation in his chosen terms. When reading potent works, one often notes something that is not confined to the particularities being described. Yet the manner whereby thematic claims spring up and speak has less the character of a demand than the feel of an invitation: an offering to see or articulate something as this or that. By regarding *Paradise Lost* as speaking for religion, I have in mind such invitations.

Second (and relatedly), an obvious danger when discussing abstractions such as "philosophy" or "faith" is homogenizing different entities into interchangeable exemplifications of a type. Yet the required caution with regard to overlooking tensions between the particular and the general does not entail a categorical ban on the attempt to understand the general. This book's readers are accordingly asked to check the inclination to pose counterexamples whenever general notions—"the philosopher," "the religious reader," "philosophy," "religion"—are used. They are invited to test this book's attempt to illuminate the relationship between religion, literature, and philosophy not by considering whether or not what is being asserted applies to everything that these notions have denoted or can plausibly stand for, but by having in mind varied and significant exemplifications for what "philosophy," "literature," and "religion" are. They will be testing formulations that I hope are open to meaningful and informative reapplication at some points at which religion, literature, and philosophy intersect, not formulations that aspire to be corroborated by all such encounters.

Third, because this book argues for an irreconcilable divide between philosophy and some outstanding poetry, readers may conclude that such is my overall view, or that I have renounced the position developed in my previous book on the philosophy of literature. Such is not the case. I am committed to a "bottom up" philosophy of literature, in which close readings guide theorizing rather than the other way round. Much literature exhibits synergy with philosophy, able to outperform philosophy relative to philosophy's own ends. To accept this conclusion and to acknowledge its significance vis-à-vis philosophy's need for literature does not preclude grasping philosophy-literature

encounters in which it is misguided to look for such mutual empowering. A bottom-up philosophy of literature can generate several different accounts of the relationship between philosophy and literature, accounts that become mutually exclusive only if they aspire to cover literature in its entirety. By emphasizing how fruitful it can be to trace a potent philosophy/literature misalliance, this book's argument does not deny that the two often importantly reinforce each other.

Fourth, because my reading is sympathetic to the poem's stance, a colleague has convinced me that I must include a disclosure of my own atheism. It was interesting to discover that working with the poem has not prompted me to argue with it, or to reassess my beliefs or (like Empson) to find in it fortifications for my atheism. What has evolved instead is appreciation for the complexity and richness of a perspective I do not share. The poem communicated an alternative vision's comprehensiveness, a vision that recognizes the same basic questions from which my own meaning-making begins, yet provides different searching responses to them. The outcome is not conversion (nor does the poem aim for this); not even a reevaluation of my own disbelief. I can confess that reflecting consistently on the poem for several years is humbling. The effect does not have the detached feel of pluralism, of reconciling oneself to the possible validity of an alternative view. It involves, rather, appreciation for the beauty and depth of another outlook—something akin to the admiration for a friend who, for all his difference, one comes to like.

The act of befriending an outlook one does not endorse is continuous with the ethics of hosting that, we shall see, *Paradise Lost* proposes as a condition for genuine knowledge. Hosting by reading for difference and similarity offers a model for engaging with a competing view that differs from the confrontational examination expected from philosophy. Yet when justification and its standards are themselves contested, when that which counts as knowledge for one of the rival perspectives is merely pseudo-knowledge for another, and when the assumptions undergirding the competing epistemologies are basic, a confrontational model attempting to determine right and wrong becomes simplistic. Deciding who is right involves first committing to an epistemic paradigm. In the clash we will be visiting, however, it is the very choice of a paradigm that is under dispute.

Fundamental disagreements invite withdrawal into insulated monads. Hosting and allowing oneself to be hosted is a more rewarding alternative. If, while hosting and being hosted, one is not seeking confirmation of the superiority of one's own commitments, one discovers that the radical incommensurability of the roots does not work all the way through to the leaves. The point is not merely to demonstrate how dissimilarity and agreement coexist. Unreserved hosting includes a willingness to discern in the otherness of the guest the hints of a commentary upon who one is. The commentary is inquisitively critical but noncombative, interested less in ultimate defensibility than in roads not taken, in crisscrossing conceptualizations, and in the gains found in existential alternatives—gains perceived and appreciated, but not necessarily adopted.

**Ghalib: Innovative Meanings and the Ingenious Mind by
Gopi Chand Narang, translated by Surinder Deol [Oxford
University Press, 9780199475919]**

Interpretations of Mirza Ghalib's works have been changing with the times. Romantics, classicists, progressives, and modernists, all have found evidence in his writings that appeared close to their viewpoints.

Innovative Meanings and the Ingenious Mind studies the ingenious poetics of Ghalib by tracing the roots of his creative consciousness and enigmatic thought in Buddhist dialectical philosophy, in particular in Nagarjuna's concept of *shunyata* (emptiness or voidness). The author also underscores the importance of the Sabke Hindi tradition, that is, the Indian style of Mughal Persian poetry with indigenized poetics, especially through Abdul-Qadir Bedil, whom Ghalib considered his mentor. He contends that Ghalib reinvented and polished this tradition deploying the dialectical mode and the language of silence he mastered through his understanding of the ancient philosophy of India under the influence of his mentor Bedil of the Sabke Hindi tradition. Creativity is a complex matter where nothing is cut numerically to the preconceived notions. The charm of love poetry of Ghalib comes from his complexity and ingenuity. This has been established through the study in this book that makes it exciting and revealing. Gopi Chand Narang engages with Ghalib criticism that has flourished since his death and analyses the important works of the poet, including pieces from early *Nuskhas* and *Divan-e Ghalib*, using this central argument.

Excerpt: "Speech Is Honored a Hundred Times When It Appears on Your *Miraculous Lips*"


[Nutq ko sau naaz hain tere labe i'jaaz par. This misra' (line) was written by Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), also known as Allama Iqbal, paying tribute to the poetical genius of Ghalib in one of his poems.]

Ghalib's poetry can be compared to a proverbial bowl of the legendary king Jamshed that reflected a whole universe when gazed at intently. His couplets hide an astonishing world of layer upon layer of complex meaning. The biggest question about Ghalib's poetry is to discover the mysterious element that flares up like a flame and continues to lighten up vistas of meaning so that an ordinary reader is left breathless. The reader wants to assimilate the meaning while experiencing a creative occurrence that is hard to decipher in words. 'What is the secret of this poetic artistry and beautification that seems to be so flawless? What is the truth and inquisitive power in this poetry that strengthens our confidence in human ingenuity and inventiveness? It gives us the power to disengage ourselves from day-to-day mundane routines and heightens our awareness of life's beauty and its myriad pleasures. The more we think about these textured mosaics like magical thoughts, the newer doors of discovery open for us. It is true that there is something here for a reader of every taste, temperament, and orientation. There is a magnetic quality that draws the edges of our heart to itself, a phenomenon described in the following couplet by Mir Taqi Mir (1723-1810):

ek do hon to sehr-e chashm kahuun
kaarkhaana hai vaan to jadu ka

If it were one or two I would call it magic of the eyes;
there is a whole world of wizardry here.

Ghalib's critics have closely analysed every nook and cranny of this universe of magic, but in the world of beauty there are charms, there are enchantments, there are attractions, and then there are coquettish moves that can be felt but cannot be named. It is not commonly understood that Ghalib's literary critique is a 'journey to the unknown'. What Ghalib said about his beloved, the one who pirated his mental poise with her bewitching charm and beauty, applies to his poetic artistry as well:



balaa-e jaan hai Ghalib us ki har baat
ibaarat kya ishaarat kya ada kya

Ghalib, everything about her
is heart pulling.
The way she speaks.
The way she looks.
And the way she casts spell.

The speech, the looks, and the magical spell with the use of imagistic innovative language are all part of the 'unknown journey', meaning there are expositions of beauty that cannot be put into simple words. These can be felt at a deeper level, but they cannot be named.

Ghalib, in a letter addressed to Chowdhary Abdul Ghafoor, wrote something interesting about his enigmatic style. His thought was embodied in a Persian composition:

agar ch shaa'iraan-e naghz guftaar
z yak jaam and dar bazm-e sukhan mast

vale ba baada-e ba'ze hariifaa khumaar-e
chashm-e saaqi niiz paivast
mashau munkir k dar asha'r-e iin qaom
varaa-e shaari cheeze digar hast

There is no dearth of poets
but not all poets are the same.
There are some who are drunk
with the commonplace wine.
There are those who mix in their drink
saqi's beautiful glances.
But let us admit that there are those
who have something unique.
Their work can't be described with a label
like poetry because it is limiting.

What is beyond poetry is indescribable—deep beauty for which no words exist.

What is that thing which Ghalib calls 'something unique' (cheeze digar)? In the case of Ghalib's literary critique this 'something unique or beyond poetry' is all that matters. This is the same thing which we called earlier 'a journey of the unknown'.

There is a hikaayat about an old woman who was searching for something at a road crossing where there was light.

A passerby asked, 'What are you searching, old Ma?'

She said that she lost her keys and that's what she was looking for. The

interlocutor followed up, 'Where did you lose your keys, Ma?'

'Of course, I lost them at home,' the woman answered.

'But then why are you looking for them here?'

'Because there is light here and I might find them.'

This is the central issue of Ghalib's critique. Ordinarily, we look for Ghalib where there is light. And everything is clearly seen in the open, where everything is easily understood. In Ghalib's poetry everything happened or everything can be seen in the light—that is not the case.

If we have to tread on Ghalib's path, Hali is the basic source, though he is apologetic that his book *Yadgar-e Ghalib* is not well-suited for intellectual pursuits. It was the result of his desire to idolize someone, a tendency that can make anyone blind and deaf. He was disappointed that Mirza failed to gain recognition for his poetry in his lifetime, which he richly deserved. The mood of the times had changed and therefore, *Divan-e Ghalib*, was not one of those creations that the people needed. Although critical studies of Ghalib's poetry have advanced considerably during the last century, it is a fact that *Yadgar-e-Ghalib* is still the work that opens up pathways for future studies on Ghalib.

While laying the foundation of literary criticism in Urdu and the Ghalibiana critical discourse, Hali used *Yadgar-e-Ghalib* to highlight two main aspects of Ghalib's poetry, that is,

turfagi-e khayaal or ingenuity of thought, and jiddat-o nudrat-e mazaamiin or innovative freshness of subjects—these aspects have been universally accepted, which studies on Ghalib have repeatedly reaffirmed. 'While discussing Ghalib's verse, Hali has also discussed some general features such as inspirational flourish, how he composed and expressed his thoughts, his delicate handling of subjects, and the captivating use of similes and metaphors. While we commend and agree with Hali's description of specific aspects of Ghalib's poetics, our effort here is to find out whether behind these imaginative devices there is a mysterious poetic logic that tells us something more about his hidden or subconscious motivations that helped him to achieve his unique creative process. Hali says that a particular idea is new and unusual, but he does not tell us how it became new and unusual. How did Ghalib create that magical effect of openness, or the spin which made the meaning of ordinary day-to-day words to appear as a sparkle, as a flash of lightening?

'While making a reference to Ghalib's unusual creative abilities, Hali drops a few hints about some unconscious linkages or relationships, but he does not make any attempt to unravel the mystery of why Ghalib's mind is productive only in a certain enigmatic, dialectical way. Is there something hidden, something peculiar in the way his mind is structured, or an unconscious yearning that could be outside the conscious control of the poet?

The creative act itself is like a bag full of secrets. Literary criticism cannot claim to reach all its depths. We can only form an opinion on the basis of the reading of the text. Undoubtedly, there is something in Ghalib's inventive and imaginative poetry that is part of his mysterious creative process which he uses with a clear intent, and it has a deep connection with his dialectical discourse, the roots of which are hidden in the depths of his unconscious mind.

Here is the problem. *Turfagi-e khayaal* and *jiddat-o nudrat* can be found in other poets of Sabke Hindi masters as well. How do we differentiate Ghalib from these poets? These are actually common features of the Mughal Age. Hali and his contemporaries did not find any reason to probe this question. But modern criticism is justified in asking the following questions: How did the magically dense aspects of Ghalib's poetry, which are multilayered and multidimensional, and appeal to us, come into being? 'Where did innovative metaphors, similes, expression of inexpressible delicate feelings, adornments and beautifications, and uncommon inquisitive mode, which are all parts of his nonlinear multidimensional distinctive thought processes, come from? Is there a hidden scheme, a mysterious structure, and a different poetics? If the answer is in the affirmative, then what is its nature or secret? Our effort is not to bypass Hali. While we accept and appreciate his basic exposition of Ghalib's work, we want to raise some fundamental questions and find answers about Ghalib's mysteriously different poetics hoping that we might be able to lay our hands on something that lies at the depths of his creative process, that is, *cheeze digar*.


Hali talks about the poetic revolution, which appeared in India in the form of Persian ghazal, but surprisingly he does not mention Bedil's name, though Bedil had influenced

Ghalib the most. The paradox is that though Bedil's poetics served as a guide to Ghalib and remained the source of his main inspiration, Bedil was not accepted as part of the literary canon until then. He was in the background. Even Shibli in his monumental five-volume history of Persian literature ignored Bedil. 'Whether it is Hali, Shibli, or Azad, whenever they refer to Bedil, it is definitely not to praise him, though these three writers in their distinctive spheres were providing historical perspective and appreciation of the origin and evolution of the Sabke Hindi poetic tradition. On the canvas of narrative history, we can paint Ghalib's deep engagement and lifelong obsession with Bedil's creative poetic work, which was very deeply imprinted on his subconscious mind. When we talk about conscious or unconscious complexities of Ghalib's personality and his enigmatic creative artistry, we find some paradoxical 'unkind elements' that criss-cross his writing and then gradually they become somewhat resolved if we keep in view the not-so-obvious archetypal roots of Bedil and Sabke Hindi's dense and inventive poetic practises. If we do this, then some of these questions are not so difficult to answer and some of the mysteries tend to unravel step by step.

In this study, we shall attempt to look carefully at Bedil and Sabke Hindi's influence on how Ghalib produces or creates layer upon layer of dialectical and enigmatic meaning and weaves mystery of innovative beauty. We also include in this inquiry the broader influence of currents of thought in Indian civilization and Indian philosophical traditions, notwithstanding some aspects of Indo-Islamic heritage. What is there in Ghalib's mental structure that even ordinary thoughts come out multidimensionally with a spin as if dialectically textured? This much is clear in the deconstructive readings by Hali of selected couplets (Chapter 1) that show how Ghalib is different in illuminating meaning hidden in his verse and how the innovativeness of his approach is without a parallel.

We often come across Ghalib at places where any conversation in the commonplace or ordinary language is difficult, or where the decanter of wine tends to melt with the heat of enigmatic creativity (aabgiina tundi-e sehba se pighla jaae hai). Ordinary language is a victim of fixity and it suffers the limitations of linear differential binary thinking. Ghalib, in the expression of his feelings and sensibilities, attempts to be free from this and breaks all these differential barriers. For him life or existence is contradictory. In the manuscript Nuskha-e Hamidia (1821), which comprises verses written before the age of twenty-five, we find poetic work that is the product of a state, which in the mystic idiom can be called 'a state of no mind'. Sometimes, ordinary language is hardly able to deal with unfathomable realities of day-to-day life; it cannot deal with the thoughts that have to do with intuitive flights and deep reflection on the contradictory nature of life or existence. The paradoxical strangeness of this language lies

in the fact that it is a language of meaning beyond meaning, or it is the language of soundless silence, or 'one hand clapping' as Zen masters allude to. Very often, we meet Ghalib in the valley of his creative endeavour, where the sky is clear of all clouds and the self becomes simply a pollution-free pure reflection in the inner body's lake. This is the place where ordinary interpretations do not work. The wings of ordinary discourse begin to burn here. We are struck with some questions. Is Ghalib's poetry an attempt to restore the language of silence to its rightful place? Has today's human being forgotten the atrocities committed by fascist regimes or the deafening demands of widespread sectarianism and terrorism that have made us mute and insensitive to the language of inner silence? It seems that humanity has lost the language of its purity, primal innocence, and compassion. Ghalib's poetry can thus be seen as an attempt to restate the language of inner silence, the language of humanness, or the language of our primal innocence.



Regarding the dialectical spin which is the key to Ghalib's unique creativeness, we can find its hints in Sabke Hindi and we can even see its tracings in the works of Bedil. But from where has this seed come? Where are its unconscious archetypal roots? We have devoted two chapters in this book in our attempt to find some valid answers. The thinking

and philosophy behind negative dialectics finds its origin in the ancient Upanishads. But this is transcendental thinking that later flourished in mystical teachings of medieval Sufis and saints. It's pure, unpolluted form, transcendental or non-transcendental, however, free from all binary thinking is found only in the Buddhist philosophy. These influences have reached far away and have found a place in the Japanese and Chinese traditions as well. Its biggest fountainhead in Buddhist thinking is the philosophy of 'shunyata', which is neither religious, nor transcendental, nor dogmatic, nor any known path to enlightenment. This is simply a way of dialectical thinking of examining and cleansing every received truth, teaching, dogma, doctrine, viewpoint, tenet, principle, precept, maxim, creed, or ideology. Or it looks at them by turning them around, or putting them on their head. Reality is not linear or limited only to what we see. The obvious or commonplace makes us blind. The existence in fact is paradoxical, in which everything arises as a reflection of its non-being, everything we see or know is of dependent origination, lacking any true essence, that is, it is shunya (devoid of any substance).

Shunyata is therefore a tool for cleaning up the mind of illusionary, one-dimensional thinking so that the mind gets rid of the pollution of preconceived notions and we open ourselves to inner freshness, where we experience immanence, freedom, and self-awareness, which is our highest quality as human beings. In other words, as a pattern of thinking, it is like burnishing or polishing a mirror

that is synonymous with burnishing or polishing of the inner mirror that gets tarnished with the mundane or gets rusted with the given notions. When it is fully clean, the mirror of being starts to shine and then it truly reflects primal multidimensional reality. But traditionally, this method is transcendental; Ghalib's thinking, however, is non-transcendental because its foundation is existential. Ghalib's objective is not to discover spiritual deliverance or mystical *ma'refat* or *jnana*; his main concern is the human condition and he is focused on the existential awareness of humans together with the joy and celebration of life. *Shunyata* is non-transcendental; it is simply a method or tool like a whetstone. The whetstone can sharpen a knife, but cannot cut anything. After rejecting all given or pre-perceived truth, belief after belief, and showing that everything is paradoxical, and both existence and non-existence is a single organic whole, *shunyata* as a method of detached thinking dissolves and falls away.

As we mentioned, Ghalib's concerns are not transcendental; they are down-to-earth poetic. Ghalib's focus is human beings, their wishes and yearnings, life's paradoxes, and different ways employed by them to make sense of reality. This means that when we come to Ghalib's verse, we find that non-transcendental manifests itself through the mould of negative dialectical play. It gets absorbed into different poetic forms and opens up the possibilities of myriad meaning. Please note that we have not called it *shunyata* per se, but a peculiar poetics that is non-transcendental, dialectical, and dynamic. The source of different ways and patterns of Ghalib's dialectical thinking is certainly the dynamic of *shunyata*. It is a tool for removing the rust of mundane conventional thinking and opening a pathway of freedom and life's awareness. Negative dialectics is fully embedded in Ghalib's enigmatic inventiveness, so much so that it casts away all that is routine and commonplace in a way that it not only beautifies but also shines light on different shades of meanings. This is a magical act. We can find traces of this in the realm of *Sabke Hindi*, meaning Mughal Persian poetry, spanning back several centuries.

Ghalib's creative process is such that even when he touches simple words or ordinary expressions, they end up becoming a 'magical treasure trove of meaning' (*ganjiina-e ma'ni ka tilism*). His verse appears at so many levels, in so many forms and shapes, branching out in so many directions that it is not possible to draw any definite boundaries around it. The meanings are so subtle that we are often looking at a fast rotating linkage of thought for which no one description can be precise and clear-cut. The verse is no more verse; it becomes a part of life's paradoxical and mysterious melody. It takes us into a realm of freedom and openness. Ghalib's life and poetics are a true reflection of our yearning for freedom. This is an ideal for which he is ready to pay any price. The mundane ways of thinking, viewpoints, customs, and rituals are like chains that impede freedom. Only when we rise above our repressive routine thoughts and beliefs that we have a true taste of existential freedom; a poetic creative state in which joy and suffering, happiness and sadness, fame and ill fame, hot and cold winds of time—everything is levelled.

In this book, we are focused on Ghalib's Urdu writings, though wherever needed we have also referred to his Persian work. But the Urdu poetry is the very centre of our attention. We have devoted four chapters to this. We start with *Nuskha-e Bhopal Awwal* (we call it *Rendition One*) that was the writing which Ghalib calligraphed in his own hand in 1816 (when he was only nineteen years of age). This was also the time when Ghalib faced, for the first time, life's harsher realities and bitter criticism by contemporary poets who were used to writing in conventional styles which were popular at that time. The pain of rejection that he suffered in his early age stayed with him for the rest of his life. We have attempted to find how the creative yearnings of these years influenced the dialectical creativity of his more mature work in later years, how we find its footprints in the poetic work that is considered unique for its aesthetic quality and freshness of thought. We have tried to demonstrate, based on evidence, how this transformation and perfection occurred around the age of nineteen and not twenty-five, as was commonly believed. This was, in fact, the transformation, the seeds of which were present right at the beginning. Chapters 7 and 8 are devoted to this. Chapter 9 deals with *Nuskha-e Hamidia*, comprising of poetic work completed by the age of twenty-five. Chapter 10 takes us to the compiled *Divan* of selected verse, which also includes important manuscripts known as *Nuskha-e Shirani* and *Nuskha-e Gul-e Ra'na* which were compiled between 1826 and 1829, but the *Divan* was fully completed in 1831 and was published only in 1841. This is the same *Divan*, with few additions, that was reprinted five times during Ghalib's life; and it is on this *Divan* that Ghalib's fame rests. We have paid special attention to the chronology of all writings because that is the key to understanding the evolution of Ghalib's creative capabilities and dialectical mode of thought. In this way, we complete the exploration that we start in Chapter 1 with Hali's assessment and then Bijouri's characterization of Ghalib's links with India's thought, archetypal Buddhist *shunyata*, the poetics of *Sabke Hindi*, the influence of Bedil, and the unconscious Indian philosophical roots which are mysteriously embedded in the ingenious poetics and semantics of Ghalib.

We start this journey with Hali, and after deconstructing his text we formulate our questions about Ghalib's creative uniqueness. We also discuss Bijouri and Sheikh Muhammad Ikram. About Bedil and *Sabke Hindi*, we get some useful tips from Waris Kirmani, Russian scholar Natalia Prigarina, and Abdul Ghani, and a-not-very-well-known scholar, Vagesh Shukla. For *Nuskha-e Hamidia*, the two early manuscripts, and Ghalib's scholarly published larger *Divan*, we cannot thank enough Maulana Imtiaz Ali Khan Arshi and Kalidas Gupta Raza. Their works are respectively titled *Nuskha-e Arshi* and *Nuskha-e Raza*. The truth is that if Ghalib scholars had not worked on the chronological order of text and raised the level of discourse to pristine heights, we would have found it difficult to find our first step. We have benefitted from the findings of the experts, but in every respect, we have presented our own distinctive viewpoint, because the case we present here is different and our study points to a somewhat new direction. Wherever we have found light, we have embraced it and

used it to reinforce our formulations and conclusions. We are indeed indebted to all the scholars and experts.

Ghalib had written in a Persian couplet:
ta z divaanam k sarmast-e sukhan khwahad shudan
iin mai az qaht-e kharidaari kuhan khwahad
shudan

The vintage wine of my verse
will gain in its maturity
because of the famine of customers.
But the ones who taste it in the future
will surely get the benefit of aging
and will thus receive rare flavour and pleasure.

The interpretation of Ghalib's text has been changing with time. Bijnouri's Ghalib is not the same that was read by Hali; and Hali's Ghalib is not the one that was read by Nazm Tabatabai, Bekhud Dehlvi, Suha Mujaddidi, Hasrat Mohani, Niaz Fatehpuri, or Sheikh Muhammad Ikram. The Ghalib of Khurshidul Islam, Prigarina, or Waris Kirmani is also not the same Ghalib that belongs to Kaleemuddeen Ahmad, Ehtishaam Husain, Al-e Ahmed Saroor, Zoe Ansari, or Baqar Mehdi. In other words, each person reads his own Ghalib. It is true that the commentary of one does not agree with the commentary of the other. Votaries of classicism and romanticism had found their Ghalib. Progressives and modernists also found tracings in his writings that appeared close to their viewpoints. There is no limit to how someone could interpret Ghalib. His poetry does not fit into any one category of thought. That is why Ghalib called himself the 'nightingale of a garden which is yet to come into existence'. He is the last of the classicists and the first of the modernists. His thought is like a kaleidoscopic rainbow of colours. As times change, new meanings emerge. We can see that the way in which Ghalib's view of modern man appealed to the temperament of later generations, the same way Ghalib's dialectical open thinking and pluralism appeals to the contemporary mind. Ghalib opposes close-mindedness, sectarianism, oppression, and dogmatism. This is in tune with the postmodern thinking. Ghalib is not only embedded in Mughal aesthetics; the way he represents our philosophy and traditions of self-awareness is without any parallel. Notwithstanding his pride in his Turkish Central Asian descent, the roots of his creative consciousness and dialectical thinking are stuck deep in his own soil, the Indian soil.

In one of the most memorable Persian ruba'is, he emphasizes the point of his native origin. He compares the totality of his thought to Somnath temple in Gujarat that

was destroyed by the invading armies of Mahmud of Ghazni. But the temple was rebuilt. It was again destroyed by the army of Alauddin Khilji. Several further demolitions and reconstructions happened, but the temple came back to stand on its ground. There is something indestructible in the Somnath (the temple) of his poetry, and it goes on breathing despite repeated efforts to denigrate it. He wrote:

masanj shaukat-e Urfi k buud shiiraazi
mashau asiir-e Zulaali k buud Khwaansaari
b somnaat-e khayaalam dar aai ta biini
ravaan faroz baruu duush-haae zunnaari
Don't sing praises of Urfi
because he was Shiraazi
or that of Zulaali
because he was Khwansaari.

Come to my Somnath,
the treasure temple of my thoughts.
What new kind of world is flourishing?
And on my thread-borne shoulders
one may see a shine
of angelic light emitting thoughts.
[The sacred thread that is worn by Hindus as a
symbol of purity.]

After the Holocaust and its reaction in the form of Zionism, we have seen several ugly forms in today's world of racial and religious discrimination, communal discord, fascism, and colonialism that, in the name of its own dignified doctrines, justify killings and bloodshed of millions of innocent human beings. The fact that this is happening in the twenty-first century is a matter of shame.

God has been split into many parts. One god does not understand the language of the other gods. There are idols of different shapes and sizes. What is freedom for some is not freedom for others. The biggest challenge of the twenty-first century is the protection of human freedom, freedom for all. Against this background, Ghalib's dialectical discourse, its compassion, its openness, its plurality, its multidirectional yearning for upholding the dignity of human beings assumes even greater importance.

Ghalib rejects all forms of ritualism and all kinds of dogma in which 'keys to what is true' are held by a choicest few. When Ghalib talked of the downfall of the pillars of the faith and

the dissolution of its constituent elements, his voice was far ahead of its time. Using the grammar of his new style of poetry and through an altogether new creative signifier, Ghalib not only hit age-old stilted thought structures but also demolished in particular the routinely accepted views about man, god, nature, joy and grief, good and evil, hell



and heaven, sin and virtue. This was a revolutionary paradigm shift. His contemporaries could not properly assess what he had really accomplished. In a world that was still burdened with royalty and theocracy, Ghalib chose a radical path of freedom, plurality, and openness. Compare this against prevailing narrowness, sectarianism, intolerance, and blind faith. He asserted that truth is not the monopoly of a particular way of thinking or a dogma. The path of truth is open to us all.

Ghalib's poetical construct supports unqualified freedom of the human spirit. His dialectical discourse is an indication of the fact that human existence is paradoxical and multidimensional. And no one has a monopoly over truth. Quantum physics has dealt a blow to many beliefs of the past. There is a new language of paradoxical grammar and language of silence ('thoughts beyond words'). In Urdu language, there is no finer example of this than Ghalib's dialectical thinking and his self-illuminating poetry. With the dawn of each new age, the blooming garden of Ghalib's poetry will continue to lend itself to new meaning. In the poet's own words:

adaa-e khaas se Ghalib hua hai nukta cara
salaa-e aam hai yaraan-e nukta daan ke liye

Ghalib, I've sung many songs
in my distinctive style.
The rest is for the thoughtful readers
to turn over and think in their heads.

Gopi Chand Narang, Charlotte, North Carolina, June 2017

**The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy edited by
Jonardon Ganeri [Oxford Handbooks, Oxford University
Press, 9780199314621]**

[The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy](#) tells the story of philosophy in India through a series of exceptional individual acts of philosophical virtuosity. It brings together forty leading international scholars to record the diverse figures, movements, and approaches that constitute philosophy in the geographical region of the Indian subcontinent, a region sometimes nowadays designated South Asia. The volume aims to be ecumenical, drawing from different locales, languages, and literary cultures, inclusive of dissenters, heretics and sceptics, of philosophical ideas in thinkers not themselves primarily philosophers, and reflecting India's north-western borders with the Persianate and Arabic worlds, its north-eastern boundaries with Tibet, Nepal, Ladakh and China, as well as the southern and eastern shores that afford maritime links with the lands of Theravada Buddhism. Indian Philosophy has been written in many languages, including Pali, Prakrit, Sanskrit, Malayalam, Urdu, Gujarati, Tamil, Telugu, Bengali, Marathi, Persian, Kannada, Punjabi, Hindi, Tibetan, Arabic and Assamese. From the time of the British colonial occupation, it has also been written in English. It spans philosophy of law, logic, politics, environment and society, but is most strongly associated with wide-ranging discussions in the philosophy of mind and language, epistemology and metaphysics (how

we know and what is there to be known), ethics, metaethics and aesthetics, and metaphilosophy. The reach of Indian ideas has been vast, both historically and geographically, and it has been and continues to be a major influence in world philosophy. In the breadth as well as the depth of its philosophical investigation, in the sheer bulk of surviving texts and in the diffusion of its ideas, the philosophical heritage of India easily stands comparison with that of China, Greece, the Latin west, or the Islamic world.

Excerpt: Why Indian Philosophy? Why Now?

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A FOCUS ON FIGURES

In compiling this book, my hope is to present a balanced and impartial picture of the detail, diversity, and depth of philosophy in this region. What is the nature of a thinker's philosophical project? What are the methods of philosophical inquiry used in pursuit of their goal? What defines the philosophical movement and intellectual lineage to which an author belongs, and how does that affiliation bear on a thinker's philosophical project? To fulfill such an ambition requires that the contributions engage with the very qualities that make the field fascinating to a contemporary audience: the interplay between charismatic individuals, the negotiated interaction of widely different intellectual outlooks, the intervention of critical voices of dissent and disavowal. It is essential to emphasize regionality, vernaculars, subaltern communities, eccentrics, and to explore scholarly networks, nodes of philosophical activity, transnational encounters, and contexts of

philosophical invention. New research contained in this volume highlights previously unexplored thinkers and themes, drawing upon a vast array of scarcely studied and sometimes not even edited work. While past scholarship has tended toward obsessive interest in a select few individuals, the timeline that precedes this introduction is a record of a hundred outstandingly important thinkers, and this is but half of one percent of the total number known with certainty to have lived and whose writings have been preserved. There is important philosophical thinking among mathematicians and medics, in the poets and the pilgrims, while studies of philosophy in safe. India, secular India and stately India, of India's impact on global philosophical movements, and their effects on India all fall within the remit, not to mention the way Indian philosophical ideas migrate and transform in diaspora, in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Burma, Tibet, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, China, Japan, Central Asia and into the Persian and Arabic worlds and on to the West.

The chapters in this Handbook provide a synopsis of the liveliest areas of contemporary research and set new agendas for nascent directions of exploration. The volume comprises contributions each centered on philosophical ideas in a major figure, identified either by name or only descriptively as the author/compiler/redactor of a given text. The exact list has been determined by criteria that include the importance of the figure to the philosophical tradition, the philosophical interest of their ideas, and the availability of a contemporary scholar able to write about them with the requisite level of philosophical engagement. Although organized around figures and texts, the chapters deal with a specific philosophical question or issue that the given figure or text most centrally raises, the arguments presented in favor or against, rather than consisting in intellectual biography or a survey of a thinker's oeuvre. Often in conversations between two thinkers, perhaps separated in time but also often contemporaneous, scholarly affiliation (*śāstra*) is not the most salient indicator in understanding what is at stake, and what two interlocutors share as common points of conceptual reference may be as important as line and lineage (*sampradāya*); indeed, these exchanges, reciprocations, and reactions, actual or implied, constitute an important part of a thinker's intellectual identity.

Too great an emphasis on "systems," apart from repressing chronology and innovation, marginalizes the role of dissidents, doubters, and free-thinkers in providing interstitial critique. Talk of "schools" meanwhile implies a form of institutional organization and social arrangement alien to Indian contexts of scholarship. A danger in organizing material solely by discipline (for example, aggregating all and only Buddhist philosophy in one volume, journal, institute, or workshop, Hindu philosophy in a second, Islamic philosophy in a third) is that it makes it seem that the only exchanges that matter are internal, and this is a mistake because criss-crossing and boundary-hopping encounters are often highly significant, philosophically and prosopographically. There are plenty of examples of individuals—Vacaspati Miśra is one, Vijñānabhikṣu another, Appayya Dikṣita a third—who found being bound by just one disciplinary code an unbearable limitation on philosophical freedom; we cannot hope to understand what

they were about as philosophers (creative engagement, concordance, criticism, etc.) unless this is acknowledged.' Still others—most notably Jayarāṣi and Śrīhara—dismiss systemconstruction as a good way to do philosophy. In this volume, therefore, I have kept the focus firmly on individual philosophers, and have allowed them to tell us which interlocutors and questions they have found most engaging, whether this be from within the same discipline or lineage, or not. Surveys of general doctrine in Indian "schools" and "systems" are in any case already readily available and need not be replicated here.' What this volume does is to let the story of philosophy in India play out in the form of a sequence of individual acts of uncanny philosophical genius.

"Indian philosophy" is thus a designation for a vast and still vastly under-researched body of inquiry into the most fundamental topics ever to engage the reflective human mind. As the discipline of academic philosophy begins to address its history of elitism and exclusion, and to evolve into a genuinely diverse and pluralistic field, India's past represents an unquantifiably precious part of the human intellectual biosphere. For those who are interested in the ways in which culture influences structures of thought, for those who want to study alternative histories of ideas, and for those who are merely curious to know what some of the world's greatest thinkers have thought about some of the most intractable and central philosophical puzzles about human existence and experience, Indian philosophy is a domain of unparalleled richness and importance. Meanwhile, for those who draw upon India's intellectual past to give sustenance to contemporary programs of social and political reform, it is essential that the whole of this past, the fullness of its vast diversity and richness, is available and acknowledged.



Jonardon Ganeri

A BRIEF HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN INDIA

It has become something of a commonplace to speak of "classical Indian philosophy" or "philosophy in classical India." The term "classical," though, is problematic with respect to Indian philosophical historiography, as indeed is the term "medieval." This is because of the exceptional longevity and continuity of the tradition when contrasted with other

civilizations. We need to use a different stratification of India's intellectual past, not one borrowed from a history of European ideas. Historical narratives of Indian philosophy need also to be responsive to the different rhythms and trajectories of different locales in that vast region. Let us start afresh, with a new periodization. I'll distinguish first a period when philosophy was seen as essentially tied to the way one lives one's life, and it was also thought of as a vehicle through which one could achieve liberation or release from the sufferings implicated in any human life. I'll call the philosophies of this first period, which is from around the eighth century BCE until around the second century CE, "philosophies of path and purpose." Included in this broad designation will be the ancient wisdom of the Vedas, a body of ritual prescriptions seemingly brought to India by Aryan settlers and written in a sort of proto-Sanskrit called Vedic. Included too will be the Upaniads, beautiful and majestic texts articulating a vision of the unity of humanity, ritual, and cosmos. And it will include the original teachings of the Buddha, who seems to have lived after the composition of the earliest of the Upanisads but before the remainder, as well as other "striver" (sramana) intellectuals including Mahavira the Jina. The Buddha certainly taught a philosophy of path, since the fourth of his four Noble Truths is called the Truth of the Path, a path leading from suffering to nirvāṇa, the state of health in which one is free from spiritual as well as physical pain. Another text I would include in this period is the complex Hindu epic, the Mahabhārata, an order of magnitude grander than the Greek Iliad and Odyssey, which contains as a sort of inserted interlude that famous moral discourse between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna known as the "Song of the Lord," the Bhagavad-Gītā. Yet while the Gītā has justly been the subject of intense scholarship there is much interesting philosophy in the body of the epic itself, an ethics of ambiguity and disorientation that also reveals the important relationship between a work's literary form and its philosophical ambitions.

Dating authors and texts in the history of Indian philosophy with any precision is, I should caution, an extremely fraught exercise. At best, usually, one can work out the relative chronology, if for example one text directly cites another. More often even that is problematic. Issues of authorship are as complex as those of chronology. Attaching an author's name to a text is often vexed, for the texts of Indian philosophy are sometimes compilations, the composite work of a variety of hands and mouths that have been edited and reedited over a long period of time and in different recensions. The names that are traditionally put forward as the authors of these texts are sometimes no more than literary fictions; sometimes too a text is attributed to a famous philosopher as a way to give it extra clout. Even the date of the Buddha is controversial. Tradition

teaches that he died in 486 BCE at the age of 80. Modern scholarship is tending to push his date forward, perhaps to somewhere around 400 BCE or even sooner. On the other hand a recent excavation of the Mahā Devī temple at his historical birthplace, Lumbinī, has unearthed evidence that perhaps the tradition is correct after all. Only time will tell; or maybe it won't. Whenever it was that the Buddha lived, it was an interesting time from a philosophical point of view, and the records of his life contain colorful reports of a whole host of unusual and unconventional thinkers. The founder of Jainism, Mahāvīra, lived perhaps a little earlier, but Jainism and Buddhism share a spirit of defiance against the social and intellectual status quo. The Jainas' commitment to principles of tolerance, harmony, and rapprochement led them to a philosophy of pluralism in metaphysics and ethics, and to perspectivalism in epistemology and semantics.

The second period I will distinguish is what I will call "The Age of the Sūtra," a period when considerable effort was indeed spent in the philosophical construction of conceptual arrays (śāstra; tantra). The term sūtra means "thread," and a sūtra is both a single numbered philosophical aphorism and a text comprising an entire collection of such aphorisms. More important than even the sūtras themselves were the initial commentaries written on them. These first commentaries—the technical designation of which is *bhāṣya*—had as their explicit aim the construction of an organized body of concepts, a weaving of the threads into a single unified cloth of philosophy; and it is not unheard of for commentary and core to be co-produced in a single act of textual production. The authors of those first commentaries (Śābara, Patañjali, and Vātsyāyana, to name but three) were the true structure-creators in India. It is something of a common-place to talk about the "six systems of Indian philosophy," but I will reject this rather superficial doxography, orientated as it came to be around orthodox Hinduism's commitment to the veracity of the Vedas, ignoring less orthodox Hindu movements as well as all the dissenters, most especially the Buddhists and the Jainas, not to mention more naturalistic or materialist thinkers and other interstitial and dissident groups, and, as with all doxographies, enforcing an artificial order. It is worth remembering that to an eighth-century doxographer like Haribhadra the only philosophical systems were those of Buddhism, Jainism, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Mīmāṃsā, and, grudgingly, Lokyata. What is more important is that in the period from let us say 100 BCE until 450 CE a large part of the philosophical activity in India was focused on a crystallization of philosophical wisdom into more organized philosophical treatises. They retain the idea that learning philosophy is a way to the highest good, and thus a path with a purpose, but now see their primary work as consisting in detailed descriptions of the structure of the human being, of the world which human beings inhabit, and of the capacities human beings have to learn about this world. So the topic of the existence, make-up, and aspirations of the self retains center-stage, but supplemented now with an interest in, to use the Indian parlance, the *pramāṇas*, or principles for knowing reality, and the *prameyas*, reality as it is so known. Analogous ambitions in Buddhism and Jainism from the period are reflected in works such as Vasubandhu's

Abhidharmakośā-bhā sya and Umā svā ti's Tattvā rthā dhigama-bhā sya. Early Jainas and Buddhists use the term *sutta* to refer to the reported words of Mahā vira and the Buddha: in the Age of the *Sutta*, philosophical effort takes the form of seeking to identify and order the categorical philosophy those words contain.

Indeed until the second century CE, Buddhist and Jaina philosophy in India was written mostly in the languages of Pali and Prakrit, languages that, while not dissimilar to Sanskrit, were not destined to become the main vehicle for intellectual discussion on the subcontinent. Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga*, "The Path of Purification," is an organizational masterpiece, a structured representation of philosophy in the *sutta* as mediated by the then-extant Sinhala commentaries on canonical Abhidharmic classifications.

At a time when Sanskrit began to emerge as a shared discursive medium, the switch to Sanskrit by these thinkers was to prove monumental, and their impact on philosophy in India from then until the end of the first millennium immeasurable. Their rivals found themselves having to defend the foundations of their philosophical matrices as they had never had to before, and they skillfully adapted and reimagined the resources those structures made available in attempts to give answers to the challenges presented by Buddhist and Jaina thinkers, all the while co-opting and reusing Buddhist and Jaina ideas as they went. Among the most notable Buddhist philosophers in this period are Nagarjuna, whose anti-foundationalist quietism led to the formation of the branch of Buddhist philosophy known as *Madhyamaka*, the Middle Way, and Vasubandhu, who standardized *Sarvastivā da* and Abhidharmic schematization in Sanskrit.

Dignaga, sixth-century developer of the branch of Buddhist philosophy known as *Yogacara*, inaugurates a new epoch. Dignaga lived and taught at the Buddhist university of Nā landā , founded in the same century and destined to become one of the world's greatest centers of learning. Dignā ga owed much to internal dialogue with a contemporary of his, the grammarian-cum-philosopher Bhartrhari. His disciple Dharmakirti would go on to reinvent Dignā ga's innovation and adapt it to the needs of new Buddhist communities in ways Dignā ga himself may not have imagined, most notably by giving it an idealist inflection. Dignaga's breakthrough work was decisive in shaping the next period of Indian philosophy, a cosmopolitan Age of Dialogue in Sanskrit that runs at least until the relocation of Buddhists like Kamalaśila to Tibet. An emerging scholarly consensus agrees in identifying Dignā ga as marking the beginning of a new era in Indian philosophical thought, some scholars emphasizing his theoretical innovations⁴ and others his transformation of discursive practice. Dignā ga's new citational and critical practices were swiftly adopted by his opponents, a change already evident in the technical styles of respondents including Uddyotakara and Kumā rila. As important as these shifts in doctrinal formulation and discursive practice was the transformation Dignā ga achieved in ways of reasoning, with a movement away from an epistemic localism to a rule-based universalism. The Age of the *Sūtra*,



Choklang Dignaga

distinguished by its use of a style of inquiry grounded in adaptation and projection from locally normative paradigms, was over. Now too the precise formulation of definitions of key philosophical concepts takes center-stage as constitutive of philosophical practice, rival definitions of what purports to be a single concept locking horns in contexts of philosophical debate. Rapidly this became the hallmark of philosophical activity in a broad Sanskrit cosmopolis that was to endure for centuries and whose geographical borders spread well beyond the subcontinent. During this period of dialogue between Buddhist, Jaina, and Hindu astonishing theoretical advances were made in understanding the working of the human mind's properties, processes, and powers—in analyses of selfhood, consciousness, moral psychology, and agency by philosophers from *Praśastapada* to *Prabhakara*, from *Kumā rila* to *Śāṅkara*, from *Śāntideva* to *Śāntaraksita*.

With the decline of Buddhist societal influence in subcontinental India—and of course this did not affect its continuing importance in the neighboring territories of Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, Nepal, Tibet, China, the Maldives, Cambodia, and Indonesia—a new era of philosophy commences in India, now hallmarked by a spirit of uncertainty and questioning. This was a time of intellectual turbulence, as philosophers increasingly doubted the foundations of the structures they had done so much to construct and defend. With the Buddhists less available to provide a foil, philosophers of various persuasions, persuasions that would only later be aggregated under a unifying label "Hindu," began to question themselves and to

interrogate each other, while Jaina philosophers assumed if anything even greater significance. I'm inclined, therefore, to describe the period from the ninth or tenth to the thirteenth or fourteenth century, as an Age of Disquiet. Some of its great figures come from Kashmir, including Śaiva thinkers like Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, the Nyaya genius Jayanta Bhatta, and possibly also the transformative Carvaka Udbhata. If Jayaraṣi had announced himself to be a lion come to upturn every philosophical cart, and Vasistha had declared the world to be nothing but imaginary emergence, matters came to a head with a revolutionary critique of the fundamentals of epistemology provided by Śrīharsa. His twelfth-century philosophical classic, *Amassed Morsels of Refutation* (Khandanakhandakhadya), is a brilliant take-down of the definition-mongering philosophical activities of past generations of thinkers. Śrīharsa attempts to demonstrate that a philosophical method based on the search for definitions is misguided, indeed incoherent. He develops a rival method, a method of refutation, to expose the vacuity of a way of doing philosophy that had become *de rigueur* with Dignaga. His new method required him to reconstruct the best possible version of any definition, not merely the best one actually formulated, and his ability to articulate philosophical positions with greater insight, accuracy, and acuity than their own proponents is astonishing. This though was perhaps also his Achilles heel insofar as his reconstructions afforded great assistance to those he sought to refute.

When Gaṅgeśa intervenes in the fourteenth century, he is therefore responding to a variety of pressures internal to the Sanskrit world, critiques that had already been gathering force for some time. One came from the direction of the rival Mimamsaka philosophical theory about the nature of inquiry, developed within a context of defense of the legitimacy and authority of Vedic knowledge. If the Vedas are authoritative then there is no question about the truth of the beliefs we form from them and no further project of verification. Such an attitude toward inquiry is profoundly at odds with one which sees the truth as a matter of discovery and confirmation. The other came from a challenge to the pluralist metaphysics of common sense, and found its most severe articulation in Advaitic thinkers who sought to undermine the principle that appearance is trustworthy, and in particular that there is a world populated by middle-sized objects and known to a plurality of distinct cognizers. Gaṅgeśa's brilliant response, in a book that claims itself to be the "jewel which fulfills the wish for truth" (*Tattvacintā mani*), was to re-equip the philosopher's analytical arsenal, and his new conceptual methodologies rapidly gained currency throughout Sanskrit intellectual space, spreading to disciplines other than philosophy and to other regions, including the South where they secured much admiration but also admonishment from the Madhva thinkers Jayatīrtha and Vyasaīrtha. Disquiet continued too in the form of new Hindu arguments against a Hindu God.

A distinctive form of Early Modernity began to emerge in the sixteenth century. Occasioned in part by new overlappings with the Persian cosmopolis, with exposure to new paradigms of thinking, Sanskrit philosophers self-consciously set out to innovate, to think with the old structures but not defer to them. An astonishingly vast number of works

in Sanskrit exists from this enormously rich period, today lying unedited and sometimes in a single copy in manuscript libraries around the world. In the writings of those philosophers who followed Raghunātha Śrīmani, from about the middle of the sixteenth century until the middle of the eighteenth, there is a metamorphosis in epistemology, metaphysics, semantics, and philosophical logic. The works of these philosophers, many of whom lived in Raghunātha's hometown of Navadvīpa in Bengal, are full of phrases that are indicative of a newly open and exploratory attitude, phrases like "this should be considered further," "this needs to be reflected on: 'Openness to inquiry into the problems themselves is what drives the new work, not merely a new exegesis of the ancient texts, along with a sense that they are engaged in an ongoing project. A second group of philosophers, this time based in Varanasi (Benares), and again profoundly influenced by Raghunātha, sought to use his work in reinterpretations of ancient metaphysics, sometimes with the encouragement of Mughal patronage and support. At the same time, and in opposition to Raghunātha's band of new reasoners, while also coopting his methods, the works of thinkers like Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Appayya Dīkṣita and Nilakantha Caturdhara brought a distinctive renewal to Vedānta, in their own complex negotiations with Mughal patronage and power and with their own pasts. In tandem with these developments in the realms of Sanskrit, Islamic philosophers were producing important and innovative philosophy in parallel centers of Islamic learning. Three important Islamic trends in India emerge during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: first, the Perso-Indica project of Dara Shikuh and others involving a wide-ranging translation of philosophy from Sanskrit into Persian; second, the sufi philosophy of Muhibballah Ilahabadi, a prolific author in Persian and Arabic and defender of the Andalusian Ibn 'Arabi; and third, the debate between Avicennans—notably including the influential philosopher Mahmud Jawnpūrī—and Illuminationists. Meanwhile, Muhibballāh al-Bihārī's *Sullam al-'ulūm* is a milestone seventeenth-century Indian textbook in Arabo-Islamic logic. We still have only the most rudimentary understanding of the nature of intersections between nodes of Sanskrit, Persian, and Arabic philosophical scholarship during this profoundly innovative era of early modernity in India. Nor at present do we have much insight into the dynamics of philosophical activity in Indian vernacular languages in the period.

Then came British colonial occupation, and with it new philosophical priorities, perhaps most especially the need to respond to the incompatibility between the pretensions of European claims on the values of liberty, tolerance, equality, and secularism and the multiple and manifest illiberalities, intolerances, and inequalities of colonial rule, which began first during a period of exploitative governance by the East India Company from the Battle of Plassey in 1757 until the failed Independence War in 1857 and then under direct colonial rule by the British Crown until independence was finally won in 1947. In the end-game, a period we might describe as the Eve of Independence, Indian thinkers including Gandhi, Nehru, Ambedkar, and Tagore, often writing in English, bring political and social philosophy to the center-stage where in earlier times it had been

epistemology and metaphysics, while philosophers like Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya and Anukulchandra Mukerji reflect deeply on the nature of the subject, its freedom, agency, and identity, in a concerted effort to formulate the philosophical grounds of an intellectual decolonization. In the struggle for freedom from political and intellectual servitude the whole of India's philosophical past became an immense resource that could be drawn on, and in particular its perceived spirit of negotiated pluralism and non-coercive cosmopolitanism were made central in the design of a post-independence nation.

THE CONCEPT PHILOSOPHY AND ITS CONGENETICS

Let me conclude this introduction by saying something about the application of the concept philosophy in reference to India. Fortunately long gone are the days when Hegelian historians could seriously claim that there was no such thing as philosophy in India because the word "philosophia" is a Greek word. The proprietary argument is in any case spurious given that Alexander arrived to India with the Greek language in his retinue, and the word later thrived in India in its Arabic and Persian form *falsafa*; yet names in Indian languages are available for coincident species of that genus of intellectual skill to which philosophy also belongs. A Sanskrit term *anviksiki*, for example, meaning something like "critical investigation," is used in a work on statecraft dating perhaps from the fourth century BCE, Kautilya's *Arthaśāstra*; its author, a royal minister in the Magadha empire, is said to have written it in order to educate princes in the necessary skills required for a successful and prosperous rule. There are, he ventures, four branches of learning in which young princes should be trained: *anviksiki*, the methods of critical investigation; the religious canon made up of the three Vedas; *varttā*, the sciences of material acquisition such as trade and agriculture; and *dandaniti*, political administration and government. Kautilya explains the meaning of *anviksiki*: "Distinguishing with proper reasons, between good and evil in the Vedic religion, between profit and loss in the domain of wealth-generation, and between right policy and wrong policy in political administration, and determining the comparative validity and invalidity of all these disciplines in special circumstances, *anviksiki* renders help to people, keeps their minds steady in woe and weal, and produces adroitness of understanding, speech and action." To emphasize the point that *anviksiki* is not a body of knowledge but a method of studying the proper aims and methods of knowledge as such, he adds that it "has always been considered as lamp for all branches of study, the means for all activities, the support for all religious and social duties." Kautilya gives a list of the different types known to him—*samkhya*, *yoga*, and *lokyata*—which refer to different methods for approaching a critical investigation: a method of listing and enumeration, a method of dividing and reconnecting, and a method of empirical experimentation. Two other methods don't get a mention here, yet their names—*nyaya* and *mimamsā*—also in the first instance refer to techniques of reasoning: a method of observation-with-deduction and a method of textual hermeneutics. The subsequently-to-emerge intellectual structures were thus originally not so much given bodies of doctrine as the codification of particular ways of thinking

and methods of inquiring, distinctive approaches to what it is to experience the curiosity that makes us human.

Apart from the various methods of critical investigation there is a kind of thinking that consists in perspicuous ordering, staying on the surface, rendering evident. The distinction is between, on the one hand, the sequential reasoning of a critical investigation, and, on the other, using insightful ordering and sparseness to put a phenomenon on display. There is a parallel in the Indian mathematicians' discussion of a kind of mathematical proof that they say aims at rendering a mathematical result transparent rather than reaching it as the conclusion in a series of deductive steps. So Bhaskara II's diagrammatic proof of a theorem he knew from the *Sulba-sūtra* is meant not to deduce the theorem but to display it. A diagram as such is simply a diagram: it does not itself do anything. What does the proving is the viewer's moving triangles around in imagination to form two squares: the proof is enacted by the viewer. Thinking likewise occurs at the interface between text and reader, in the reader's acquisition of a clear perspective in the topology of concepts through their imaginative engagement with a text. One finds this method at work in those who compose compact texts that aim more at conceptual cartography than at structural construction. In this style of enquiry the idea of omission plays an important role, for thinkers who use principles of reason in this way are careful to omit anything that can cloud the reader's capacity to form a picture—a large part of philosophical skill is knowing what to ignore. Seeing interrelatedness is thus as creative a philosophical act as drawing consequences: one is a matter of evidence, the other of what is evident. Derived from a verb meaning "to see," the Sanskrit term *darsana* can mean "seeing the point" in something like that sense; it can also mean a "manner of seeing" or doctrinal outlook, and so was it used in the Buddhist doxography of Cattana in Tamil, in the Jaina doxography of Haribhadra, and still later in the Hindu doxography of Cennibhatta. A clear map of the conceptual terrain is a powerful tool, enabling both creative thought and aesthetic empathy, and philosophy based on this mode of reasoning has not lost sight of its ties to deepened ways



Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya

of living. As Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya most eloquently put it, "a true philosophical system is not to be looked upon as a soulless jointing of hypotheses; it is a living fabric ... It is not to be regarded as the special property of academic philosophy-mongers, to be hacked up by them into technical

views, but is to be regarded as a form of life and is to be treated as theme of literature of infinite interest to humanity." This is a more immersive, experiential, aesthetic conception of the rational life, and one with which several of

[illegible]

capital, though my influence is slight, I knew my role was to listen and report that artists working in Birmingham needed recognition and opportunities. But I had put some thought into the matter under discussion and said my piece.

'... a key problem is that nothing can be sustained in Birmingham at present, shows are either held in buildings that are difficult to use or that have short term leases, or leak or smell like a rat's nest ... an artist-run space assured of its permanency, or at least assured of a reasonable lease, could develop and focus a scene. And then ... Well, if recognition is what you want, magazines, galleries and curators will come ... as well as the people of the city. Isn't that what happened here in the sixties?'

A few of the younger artists were nodding as I spoke. One chipped in:

'Artists set up their own gallery in Birmingham, in 1965, in the Bull Ring ... they called it Ikon Gallery, the same gallery that has just moved to a newly refurbished building in Brindleyplace.'

Laughter interrupted the flow of discussion. 'So, you want another Ikon ...' jibed a woman in a beret, 'an artist-run space has been tried before, and hooray, it became a big success ... but here we are, locked out and unsupported! Despite being a little taken aback I continued, '... you are right, in the sixties work by living artists was a rare sight in Birmingham. This is no longer a problem in the nineties. Artists in Birmingham

need a platform ... a testing ground, a space for dialogue and the exchange of ideas, a place where artists from other cities can exhibit alongside artists from the city'.

A longstanding member of BAG grimaced and said, 'Aye, you want us to build a little utopia, a perfect idyll for struggling, local artists to hang out and continue their local struggle?'

I was not fazed by the chortling that filled the room. In a sense it was true, I did envisage a utopia of a kind but not an idyll. I will explain, just as I tried to explain to the artists gathered at the meeting. I think artist-run spaces can be utopic; that is, such ventures can point to another logic or set of relations, different to those that most, without question, take to be the natural order of things. And this does not necessarily lead to proposing a blueprint for a perfect society. The first utopias were fictions about strange places, not necessarily in the future but somewhere else. Often, they were vehicles for posing and exploring questions and contradictions through puzzles, absurdities and satire. The name Utopia, the title of the book about an island written by Thomas More in the sixteenth-century, articulates a contradiction. The title is derived from Greek, meaning no place or non-place: Utopia is another place that is no place. And while More's book discusses the island's novel organisation of commonwealth and communal living as harmonious, Utopia could equally be pictured as an absurd and totalitarian society or sixteenth-century Tudor England turned on its head.

I would like to think that spaces run by artists have the same potential to turn the world upside down or point to a world-yet-to-come. In artist-run spaces, the possibility exists that everything is art, from the writing of the press release to the

gallery's furniture to sweeping up. Artists running a space can experiment with every aspect of the organisation of a gallery and question specialisation and the division of labour that prevails in most art institutions, in which artist, curator and audience all have assigned roles.

My enthusiasm was met, for the most part, by the glazed expressions of individuals who were too long in the tooth for such speculation and more interested in the pragmatics of becoming successful artists. 'What use is a world yet to come,' intoned an elderly, paint-spattered man, 'when the present one ignores you? You may build the Hacienda — well bully for you — but more likely you will construct another ghetto. Why risk wandering down a cul-de-sac then, why not seek the fast lane?' He paused and gestured to all present, 'Who here would not jump at a solo show at the Ikon?' He had a point.

It was clear that some did not see any value in questioning hierarchies and conventions. Rather, they want to know how to climb higher up the order of things. Many at the meeting were in no mood to discuss dialectics, so I tried to be helpful. 'You want a launch pad? What about Transmission Gallery in Glasgow as a model, a space you no doubt have all heard of? Transmission is run through a committee that changes every few years as new artists take over the running of the space ... They hold the slides of hundreds of artists who are all members of the gallery and pay a membership fee ... when curators come to Glasgow they visit Transmission Gallery for a picture of what is going on, they seek out the gallery's archive of slides. The story of the rise of a Glasgow scene centred on Transmission is a unique tale but this is how most artists develop a profile, they collaborate to make a scene ... Isn't this true even of Damien Hirst?'

At this, the artist chairing the meeting sparked into life. 'Yes, Hirst is successful. What we need to do is find out who does his P.R. and hire him. Who does his promotion?' Speechless, I glanced over at Ruth Claxton for guidance but she had already lowered her gaze and was staring at the carpet again. I explained that Hirst is represented by White Cube gallery, and that Jay Jopling, the Old Etonian who owns the gallery, although reputed to be able to sell horse shit to a stable, would probably not be interested in promoting BAG. 'Make your own scene and then people will come ...' I said.

This last plea was drowned out as a flurry of voices speculated on how much day Jopling's services would cost. This is how things are at present I thought. Most artists want their five minutes in a white cube. I glanced up at the Venetian red and sage green interior. And who can blame them I thought. For the rest of the meeting, I too stared at the carpet until it was time to go.

I left the building despondent and tired. The weather had turned foul and made the journey to my hotel an ordeal. Digbeth, the location of the meeting, is not an area I am familiar with. Once a productive area of the city, Digbeth, like much of the Black Country, has suffered years of decline. I wandered along Heath Mill Lane, a very long and lonely stretch of road, hoping I was heading toward the city centre but the rain and the wind battered me into submission.

Then, a freak gale all but lifted me off my feet and I fell face first into a dustbin, cutting my forehead on the rim. I took refuge in a doorway and, frozen as I was, I must have dozed.

It is here that I hesitate, for I know that the events that follow are implausible. On waking I found the rain had not abated. A gentle tug of the hood of my coat had stirred me from sleep. I looked up to find a friendly smile belonging to a smartly dressed man who invited me inside, to shelter from the storm. I questioned whether it was safe to enter the building and he replied that he was the director of the space and he would vouch for my safety; besides he said, by the look of me, the streets were none too safe anyway. He told me I was his guest. In fact, he called me 'Guest' as if that was my name, which was said with a familiarity that was alarming but refuge from the rain was welcome. The director indicated that he was searching for the light switch when his pocket started to glow blue. He apologised saying, 'I have to get this', and proceeded to pull out a miniature television activated by stroking the screen, or so it seemed. Later I learned that he called this device his eye-phone, though it operated like all phones, as an object placed close to ear and mouth.

The phone call piqued my curiosity. From what I could gather, he was arranging a meeting between an art school, the Arts Council of England and a group of artists. My curiosity doubled when the director turned on the lights and I was surrounded by art. If I was in a gallery it was not one I recognised, or like any I knew. The floor was completely covered with a doodle, a billboard hung on scaffolding dominating the middle of the space, and the message, AS LONG AS IT LASTS', was inscribed on one the building's many pillars in a typeface very similar to that used by the artist Lawrence Weiner.

'Where am I?' My question was plain enough but the reply was not. The director answered, 'This is the gallery and the gallery is many things'. My puzzled expression drew no further explanation from the director who said that he would make us both a drink and then hurried to the rear of the building. Left to my own devices I looked around and saw a desk on wheels with papers and leaflets. My eyes glanced at a release for an exhibition. It was then that I pinched myself, very hard, on the forearm, for I read, 'This is the Gallery and the Gallery is Many Things ... an evolving space/ exhibition ... inaugural show ... Eastside Projects, 86 Heath Mill Lane, Birmingham ... 27 September to 22 November 2008'. Inaugural show ... Heath Mill Lane? TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHT!

A joke, I thought — an exhibition from the future. I looked at other exhibition releases lying on the desk by the door. All bore the same date: 2008. Yes a joke, must be, and not that original. The director beckoned to me from the far end of the building and I walked towards him asking again, 'Where am I?' The director told me to relax, saying the bump to my head must have disorientated my senses. I asked whether I was still in Digbeth, in Birmingham, and the director replied, gently, 'Yes. Of course ...' When I asked, 'And where exactly am I in Digbeth?', his face became concerned. Seeing that I was still confused, he explained that we were standing in the artist-run space Eastside

Projects. I felt queasy but composed myself as best I could and asked the date. On being told it was 23 November I could not contain myself '... and I suppose it is two thousand and eight?' 'Why yes', he replied, and then in an attempt to put an end to my questions about locations and dates he said, 'You are lucky, we are installing the next show tomorrow. I can show you around. But first, would you like to drink your tea?'

He pointed to a large, multi-faceted wooden sculpture. Very funny I thought, the prank had had gone too far and I replied, 'You are hilarious.' To my embarrassment, the director walked to the back of the construction where two cups of tea sat on a shelf, one of which he offered to me. I apologised, saying I thought it was a sculpture. 'But it is', he said, 'it is called Pleasure Island by Heather and Ivan Morison. This is the tea making area and inside is the office.' I asked to look at the sculpture's interior, and on seeing that the structure was built with every angle but a right angle I commented that the office made me dizzy, and that I would prefer squarer proportions. He said it worked well enough and that working in a box did not seem to hold any special advantages.

We drank our tea inside the 'island', where the director enthusiastically explained the ethos of the gallery. 'What we are trying to do here is explore ways of presenting art, as a contingent and social practice. The show is over but Pleasure Island will remain, as the gallery's office.' A little utopia I asked? The director did not respond to my provocation but gestured to the artworks visible through the doorway. 'What you see before you is an accumulation of works, built up over time. Past exhibitions and activities become part of the ongoing development of the space and material for future exhibitions.'

'You mean you don't strip back and de-install an exhibition in preparation for the next show?' He looked shocked and replied, 'No, why would we do that? Why would we erase all the ideas and encounters presented in one show in order to install another exhibition.' I replied that such an approach was surprising, for since modernist attitudes transformed museums and galleries, exhibitions are for the most part installed in such a manner. I would not say many view galleries as neutral spaces but they are not counted as works in themselves. I sensed I must have sounded negative, but despite myself, I found it hard to follow the director's reasoning.

'History does not bear this out, not in my world it doesn't!' I was stunned by the director's passionate reply. 'What you describe, El Lissitzky killed it, stone dead. Do you know his Abstract Cabinet, from 1926 ... exhibited at the International Kunstausstellung Dresden and Hannover Museum?' I nodded, although in truth I had only a vague recollection of the cabinet. 'Well', he continued, 'then you know he developed a new role for himself as artist-curator-designer by constructing an environment for works by other artists, an intertwining of art and exhibition space that was a work in itself.' I nodded again, this time I understood the director's rationale. The Russian artist El Lissitzky produced installations that utilised

To be honest, up until that point, I had doubts about the existence of 'the public', despite my question. In fact I would

