Styling Thought and Story

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Editorial Appraisals:

Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise most of our content represents the authors’-editors’ own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

New Perspectives on Power and Political Representation from Ancient History to the Present Day: Repertoires of Representation edited by Daniëlle Slootjes and Harm Kaal [Radboud Studies in Humanities, Brill, 9789004291959] Open Source

New Perspectives on Power and Political Representation from Ancient History to the Present Day offers a unique perspective on political communication between rulers and ruled from antiquity to the present day by putting the concept of representation center stage. It explores the dynamic relationship between elites and the people as it was shaped by constructions of self-representation and representative claims. The
contributors to this volume – specialists in ancient, medieval, early-modern and modern history – move away from reductionist associations of political representation with formal aspects of modern, democratic, electoral, and parliamentarian politics. Instead, they contend that the construction of political representation involves a set of discourses, practices, and mechanisms that, although they have been applied and appropriated in various ways in a range of historical contexts, has stood the test of time.

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Excerpt: Repertoires of Representation by Harm Kaal and Daniëlle Slootjes
From classical societies to our modern age, ruling classes and their subjects have sought ways to communicate their rights and expectations to each other. Rulers have pursued avenues for legitimising and consolidating their position of power. Subjects in turn have looked for ways to express their loyalty or make known their discontent about their leaders. Over time and in different political systems, both leaders and those being led have developed and reshaped various modes of political communication to do so, be it oral, written, or material. This volume examines these various modes of political communication between rules and rulers from antiquity to the present day by the application of the concept of representation. This concept has proven its value in studies that explore the functioning of power relations.

According to recent studies and public debate, political representation is in a state of crisis. The authority of the key institute of political representation – parliament – and its members is subject to a fierce debate and the same goes for the status of political parties as the competent and trustworthy intermediaries between government and the people. Initiatives have been launched to develop alternative forms of political representation. Moreover, political scientists and philosophers have tried to come to terms with the recent historical trajectory of political representation. These studies have been added to an already vast body of scholarship on political representation that stretches out into the disciplines of political philosophy, political science, art history, cultural history and, of course, political history. Most of these studies are oriented towards the “formal” aspects of political representation, treating it as a status that results from particular political procedures and constitutional arrangements, and
research is dedicated to an investigation of how representatives take up their role.

In a thought-provoking article on political representation, Michael Saward takes issue with such interpretations. Saward invites us to move away from a focus on “forms” of representation (such as trustees or delegates) and to ask ourselves the question, “what is going on in representation?” His answers revolve around the notion of claim making: what is going on in representation is that political actors are claiming to be representative. Rather than mirroring reality (mimesis), representation thus is constructed through the making of representative claims. He sees political representation as a “dynamic relationship” and stresses its “performative” and “aesthetic” aspects: “representing is performing [...] and the performance [...] adds up to a claim that someone is or can be ‘representative.’”

Saward’s main contribution to the historiography of modern political representation is that he offers a theoretical reflection that underpins recent deconstructions of political representation in the wake of the cultural and linguistic turn. For political historians, Saward’s approach to political representation indeed sounds familiar. Since the 1980s, a broad body of scholarship has emerged on the impact and meaning of the language and culture of politics in explaining the formation of political identities and constituencies, starting with Gareth Stedman Jones’s work on the Chartist movement and Lynn Hunt’s and Keith Michael Baker’s studies on eighteenth century French political culture. Political constituencies, Jon Lawrence has argued, should not be treated as “pre-established social blocs awaiting representation,” but seen as “painstakingly constructed [...] alliances.” Political parties in turn were not the “passive beneficiaries of structural divisions within society,” but “dynamic organizations actively involved in the definition of political interests and the construction of political alliances” through political discourse. The performative power of the language and culture of politics has also been taken up by German political historians such as Willibald Steinmetz and Thomas Mergel in explorations of both extremist and democratic politics.

In this volume, building on Saward, we employ the concept of representation as an instrument that assists us in understanding the “dynamic relationship” between elites and the people which is shaped by the following two discursive practices. First of all, constructions of self-representation are being employed in the search for public display of one’s power, be it of the individual ruler or of the collective of subjects. We define a variety of material and immaterial instruments that have been used to achieve and promote self-representation, ranging from statues, coins, dress, manifestations to speeches, biographies, and interviews. Throughout the centuries these instruments have been at the heart of constructions of self-representation or Selbstdarstellung. Nevertheless, we also witness the emergence of new media or the abandonment of certain instruments that are no longer being regarded as effective (see for instance the chapters by Hekster, and Gijsenbergh and Leenders). In our effort to examine these constructions of self-representation and position them into a larger repertoire, it is important to consider their reception as well as contested or alternative constructions. Both rulers and subjects are agents and receptors within these constructions of self-representation. Furthermore, accessibility to rulers offers valuable insights into the representative relations between rulers and ruled. This requires us to take into account the various practices through which accessibility of rulers was shaped, expressed, and represented, which includes the visual and material culture that surrounded those in power (see the chapters by Van Berkel, Rietbergen, and Raeymaekers and Derks).

Second, representative claims are verbal acts through which political actors and institutions present themselves as representatives of others. Political actors such as politicians, leaders of social movements, or even “ordinary” citizens claim that they represent a particular group of people, that they speak on behalf of others (see the chapters by Van Meurs and Morozova, Kaal and Van der Griend). The same is applicable to institutions, ranging from parliament to less obvious institutions such as medieval religious orders (see the chapter by Roest) and present-day independent regulatory
agencies (see the chapter by Van Veen). Deconstruction helps us to appreciate that through these claims people are in fact invited to understand themselves as a group that is being represented. This thus calls for an analysis of political communication, because here we find how a broad range of political actors define the nature and identity of those they claim to represent.

Representative claims are “read back,” that is, they are not merely imposed on a passive audience, but they are received and possibly also contested in various ways. We should therefore also explore political representation in interaction between the makers and recipients of representative claims (see the chapters by Van Meurs and Morozova, and Kael and Van der Griend). Moreover, representative claims potentially have a “silencing effect”: turning those who are claimed to be represented into a passive audience that is expected to put its trust into their representative.

Building on these two discursive practices, we aim to move away from normative and essentialist notions of political representation, as well as from limited, reductionist associations of political representation with the formal aspects of modern, democratic, electoral, and parliamentarian politics. In this volume, we bring together work on political representation conducted by scholars of Radboud University working on ancient, medieval, early modern, and modern political history. The research conducted by the political historians of the modern era on representative claim-making and self-representation acted as a starting point for a discussion with colleagues working on earlier eras. To what extent were the concepts that are at the heart of modern theories of political representation—such as representative claims and repertoires of representation—also applicable to earlier political systems and contexts? And to what extent are acts of (self-)representation built around similar practices and discourses throughout the ages? This set-up enabled us to integrate recent work by ancient, medieval, and early modern political historians, and the research conducted within the field of political science and communication, political philosophy, and modern political history. The latter includes innovative studies on deliberative democracy, on the interaction between formal and informal politics, and on practices of democracy, such as the recent work on petitioning by political scientist Dan Carpenter. The former have introduced new methods to explore the history of political representation from a constructivist, cultural perspective. This has, among others, resulted in new perspectives on the concept of political power through research on how Roman emperors, medieval kings, and the pope publicly represented themselves as a way of performing power. Such studies have drawn attention to the semiotics of representation in the form of symbols, rituals, festivities, dress, speech acts (and so forth). This invites us to also explore these elements of political representation for the modern era. But it also works the other way around: what has been argued for modern representative claims is also significant for scholars working on earlier eras. The public performance of power through a range of media like statues, parades, dress, coins, and architecture, for instance, also involved a negotiation of the reception of these representations of the political and again show that political representation is in essence a dynamic process.

Our volume does not offer a full-fledged diachronic overview, but we do aim to inspire scholars to delve deeper into the continuities (and breaks) at play in political representation. Chapters collected in this volume at least provide enough evidence to suggest that this is a path worth pursuing. Moreover, although the majority of the chapters focus on the European context, the chapter by medievalist Maaike van Berkel on the accessibility of Abbasid rulers at their courts shows striking similarities with Western repertoires of representation. She makes clear that it is also worthwhile for future researchers to widen their geographical scope and study political representation cross-culturally, exploring similarities and differences in practices and discourses of political representation not only across time, but also across space.

We contend that the construction of political representation involves a set of discourses, practices, and mechanisms that, although they have been applied and appropriated in various ways in a range of historical contexts, has stood the test of
time. As a consequence, the contributions in our volume will demonstrate that, due to the continuity in certain customs and constructions of self-representation, the artificial boundaries between Antiquity, the Middle Ages or the Renaissance, and the modern era should be lifted. One can think, for instance, of the ceremonial surrounding the inauguration of Queen Elizabeth II of England in 1952 or that of King Willem Alexander of the Netherlands in 2013 to see the strong resemblance with the ceremonies of Roman or Karolingian emperors and kings. Modern kings and queens stand in a long tradition that we will fail to understand if we continue to apply artificial chronological boundaries. Moreover, our perspective allows us to connect the assemblies of the people and representative claims as they emerged in the early Roman Republic with those in the Middle Ages and later eras when parliaments arose. Indeed, the determination of the Roman tribune of the plebs Tiberius Gracchus to make the Roman people aware of their potential power shows similarities with later expressions throughout the states of Europe of popular leaders who offered to represent citizens within politics.

The contributions in this volume, which are presented in a chronological order, originate from a series of seminars in which the members of the Institute for Historical, Literary, and Cultural Studies at Radboud University reflected on the meaning of the concept of political representation in their field. In his chapter, Olivier Hekster shows that, in their representation of power, Roman emperors had to deal with institutionally and deeply entrenched senatorial elites. Hekster analyses imperial Roman representation in order to explore how the institutional basis of councillors surrounding a monarch influences and shapes competing representative claims of rulers and the circles revolving around them. Early emperors had to uphold the republican ideal that their extraordinary position was based on senatorial acclamation. Architecture, images, coins, and other visual sources are studied and show a mixed message of a superior senator annex monarch visible throughout Rome. The notion of Roman emperorship as tempered by senatorial advice remained strong, but the balance increasingly shifted towards councillors as supporting actors who belonged to the monarch. Although the distance between reality and representative claim had widened enormously over the centuries, the representative claim by senatorial councillors was maintained. Roman emperors continued to rule in a senatorial world, at least symbolically.

In her contribution, Maaike van Berkel focuses on the accessibility of rulers by analysing how access to the Abbasid Caliph was represented in (near)contemporary writings on the reign of Al-Muqtadir (r. 906-932). Van Berkel approaches access as a gradual and differentiated phenomenon shaped by cultural representations. Accessibility and simplicity were the ideal example of early Islam as epitomised by Mohammed himself, but were gradually replaced by the more hierarchical social models of the cultures the Muslims conquered. Although access to the Abbasid court became increasingly regulated, the seemingly contradictory discourses on the accessible yet distant ruler remained dominant. Al-Muqtadir’s rule is an exception, as he is virtually solely represented as an inaccessible, distant Iranian ruler. In this case, representations of power closely resembled Al-Muqtadir who came to power at a young age and was dependent on his relatives and courtiers to rule. This perceived relationship of dependence resulted in ideals of accessible rulers being projected on the vizier, rather than his caliph.

The political nature of medieval religious orders is at the heart of Bert Roest’s chapter. Roest argues that, in the historiography of medieval political thought and religious orders, the representative organisation in religious orders is often neglected. He demonstrates that religious orders were powerful, multinational organisations that played many roles within medieval society and influenced secular governance. Classical texts on political thought therefore need to be re-examined from this angle, as they were shaped by familiarity with religious modes of representation and delegation. Roest discusses Franciscan thought on and practices of representative government and urges historians to take it seriously. Franciscan ideals of evangelical equality gradually evolved in a balanced hierarchical administrative system. Later changes reinforced the executive power of provincial
ministers and the minister general, but did not undermine the central tenets of the representative elements and priority attached to the legislative power of the general chapter. Franciscans played important roles in secular and ecclesiastical government, and their expertise, especially in technical matters, was drawn upon and applied in local representative government.

In his contribution to this volume Peter Rietbergen analyses and compares the built environments of Rome and Versailles and their representations in print as rhetorical texts that proclaim a message of supreme power. Although Rome and Versailles are perceived as the prime embodiments of religious and secular monarchy, the distinctions were less clear-cut than often assumed. Both French and papal rulers’ power representations were intimately shaped by conceptualisations of cosmic order and hierarchy legitimating their rule. Popes very much represented themselves with all the trappings of temporal monarchs, while the kings of France never ceased to present themselves in a religious, transcendental context as well. Both Rome and Versailles were constructed to face political challenges, respectively the Reformation and Humanism and power claims by urban elites and aristocrats. Both popes and kings exploited all aspects of visual propaganda, from religious iconology to print publications, thereby elevating the political rhetoric of capitals to a new height.

The issue of access is again taken up by Dries Raeymaekers and Sebastiaan Derks. Much like Van Berkel, they approach access primarily from a cultural perspective. Whereas previous historical research on the politics of access focused on physical access and its regulation to monarchs, their chapter widens the scope for future research by including the interconnected and complex practices in which the idea of access itself was shaped, expressed, and represented: the culture of access. Access was firstly a process of negotiation — a constant interplay of spaces, strategies, personalities, rituals, artefacts, and events — which was presented and visualised in varied ways and enacted through diverse repertoires of performances. By focusing on its representation, the manifold nature of arrangements characterising courtly life can be approached better in context, and its structures laid bare. Raeymaekers and Derks discuss four repertoires to study this: the articulation of space; the regulation of space; monopolising access; and visualising access, as in day-to-day practices, rituals, the visual and material culture of courts, architecture, and the politics of access are expressed.

Marij Leenders and Joris Gijsenbergh invite us to consider the modern era with their chapter on the ways in which the Dutch Prime Minister Hendrikus Colijn (1869-1944) has been depicted in photographs and cartoons. They show how the relationship between leaders and “the people” was a recurring theme in interwar debates on the system of political representation. Leenders and Gijsenbergh argue that visual sources offer insights into the ideals of political representation as they were presented to voters. Photographers, caricaturists, and (newspaper) editors influenced the reputation and representation of politics and attempted to legitimise and delegitimise certain types of leadership. Two repertoires of representing idealised leadership stand out: deliberative leadership, with leaders holding courteous, constructive discussions with MPs, and authoritative leadership or disciplined democracy, in which leaders largely ignored Parliament. The 1930s witnessed an important shift in representing representative politics: deliberative parliamentarianism did not disappear, but a strong leader now represented the nation, and photographs and caricatures delivered an important contribution to this image. Although some perceived this shift in the representation of political leadership as a threat to democracy, the vast majority, so Leenders and Gijsenbergh argue, welcomed it as an improvement of the system of parliamentary democracy.

Harm Kaal and Vincent van de Griend offer a critical examination of the current discourse of a crisis of political representation in both research and public debate. This discourse suffers from a lack of reflection on the multifaceted ways in which politicians and the people they represent interact. Historians, so they argue, must ask what went on in representation and explore the repertoires of communicative practices to study the interaction between the formal and informal worlds of politics.
The authors identify four practices to explore popular perceptions of political representation and “the political”: letters; television; opinion polls; and popular culture. They introduce a case study of letters written to the Dutch social-democratic party in the second half of the 1960s. These letters offer insight into how people experienced and responded to party developments, how they conceived themselves as political subjects, but also how the party itself responded to the “voice of the people.” They claim that in order to incorporate the voice of the people in post-war political history, historians must study the communicative practices and media through which citizens have voiced their political opinions.

The chapter by Wim van Meurs and Olga Morozova concentrates on contemporary practices of representative claim-making in post-communist Ukraine. Van Meurs and Morozova compellingly show that representation in the sense of claiming to act on the behalf of others rests on legitimation. In 2014, opposition leader Julia Tymošenko, just released from prison, went to Majdan, Kyiv’s main square in an attempt to turn herself into the leader of the popular revolt that had broken out. The crowd, however, failed to accept her claim that she would defend their interests. The protesters, as the authors argue, “refused to be ‘led’ or ‘represented’” and instead embraced the romantic ideal of popular sovereignty. Van Meurs and Morozova do not approach democratic representation or street politics through a normative lens, but instead explore explicit references and acknowledged role models by actors themselves in the dynamics of political contestation. The authors zoom in on Majdan square as a site of political contestation to study its layers of meanings and how actors diachronically link their repertoires of action and representative claims to the past. They argue that “Majdan” signifies a fundamental rejection of existing representative institutions and show how street politics acts as part of a repertoire with which “the people” contest politicians’ representative claims.

In the final part of this volume Adriejan van Veen explores the representative claims of Independent Regulatory Authorities (IRA). Van Veen takes issues with the characterisation of IRAs as “unrepresentative” unelected bodies and goes on to show that they should be considered non-electoral representative claimants that wield considerable competences today. He offers an examination of four Dutch IRAs by applying Michael Saward’s framework of representative claims. These IRAs have been instituted as independent bodies that are to represent economic and non-economic “public” interests in marketised and liberalised domains. Van Veen shows that the IRAs themselves increasingly claim to represent public and consumer activities in their public self-representation. Moreover, through their interaction with representatives of sectoral interests, IRAs are also confronted with a host of representative claims. Far from being unrepresentative, IRAs, thus, are representative claimants – and facilitators of representative claims. Independent market regulation involves the construction and reception of representative claims just as much as the traditional electoral sphere.

Essay The Dark Side of ‘The Arabian Nights’ — Robert Irwin

In an essay on toy theatres, ‘A Penny Plain and Twopence Coloured’, the novelist Robert Louis Stevenson recalled the evening when as a child ‘I brought back with me “The Arabian Nights Entertainments” in a fat, old double-columned volume with prints. I was well into the story of the Hunchback, I remember, when my clergyman grandfather (a man we counted pretty stiff) came up behind me. I grew blind with terror. But instead of ordering the book away, he said he envied me. As well he might!’ The innocent childhood delight in reading The Arabian Nights (or more correctly The Thousand and One Nights) has been much celebrated in Victorian and subsequent literature. The stories are indeed delightful, but how innocent are they? A fisherman, desperate to make a living, casts his net out four times a day. On the particular day in question he has little luck until the fourth attempt when he finds a brass jar in his net. When he unstoppers the jar an enormous Writ (a kind of jinni) comes billowing out and the Writ, whom Solomon had imprisoned in the flask, now threatens to kill the fisherman. Yet the wily fisherman tricks the jinni into re-entering the flask and only releases...
the Writ on receiving the promise that he, the Ifrit, will not harm him, but reward him. So then the Writ takes him to a lake where there are white, red, blue and yellow fish. The fisherman takes some of these fish to the sultan's palace where he is richly rewarded. The sultan orders that the fish should be cooked, but just as the fish are put in the pan, ready to be fried, the wall of the kitchen bursts open and a woman appears who demands to know if the fish are true to their oath. They affirm that they are. Now the sultan and the fisherman are determined to solve the mystery of the curiously coloured fish and they set out towards the lake that no one has ever seen before. Then the sultan proceeds on alone and enters a palace in the middle of which he encounters a prince who has been turned to stone from the waist down. The prince tells the sultan his story... So far so mysterious. And so innocent. But just as the leisurely flow of the Thames in Joseph Conrad's The Heart of Darkness carries the novel's readers to the depths of the Congo and the horrors that were being practised there, so the bizarre and meandering narratives of the linked stories of 'The fisherman and the Ifrit' and 'The semi-petrified prince' conduct us to a tale that is dark and cruel.

The prince relates how he used to rule over the Black Islands and believed that he was happily married, but eavesdropping on his wife's slave-girls he learned that he was being cuckolded: every night his wife had been giving him a sleeping draught before going out to visit her lover. So the following night the prince pretended to take the sleeping draught and feigned sleep before following his wife out of the palace. When she entered a hut he climbed on the roof to spy on her. She went up to a black slave. 'One of his lips looked like a pot lid and the other like the sole of a shoe - a lip that could pick up sand from the top of a pebble. The slave was lying on cane stalks; he was leprous and covered in rags and tatters. As my wife kissed the ground before him, he raised his head and said: "Damn you, why have you been so slow? My black cousins were here drinking and each left with a girl, but because of you I didn't want to drink."
The prince watched his wife humble herself before the slave and cook for him, but when he saw her undress and get in the bed of rags and tatters with the black slave, he lost control of himself and, descending from the roof, he unsheathed his sword and struck at the neck of the slave with what he hoped was a fatal blow before slipping away. When his wife, a sorceress, eventually discovered it was he who had come close to killing her beloved, she cast the spell upon him that turned his lower half into stone.

There is no need here to follow this story any further. 'The semi-petrified prince' is a tale told by Shahrazad to King Shahriyar as she tells stories night after night with the aim of prolonging her life. King Shahriyar had previously resolved to sleep with a virgin every night and then have her killed the following dawn. He had resolved on this brutal measure after learning from his brother Shah Zaman that he had been the victim of sexual betrayal by his beautiful wife. "Mas'ud," the queen called, at which a black slave came up to her and, after they had embraced each other, he lay with her, while the other slaves lay with the slave girls and they spent their time kissing, embracing, fornicating and drinking wine until the end of the day'. Shahriyar has the wife and all her slaves executed.

So a story of sexual betrayal, a fantasy of a black man secretly pleasuring a queen, provides the pretext for the long sequence of framed tales that follow concerning magic, romance, revenge, travels to distant lands, holiness, and more sexual betrayals. Daniel Beaumont, one of the few critics of the Nights to focus on the originating frame story's implicit taboo against black men sleeping with white women has this to say: 'The racism involved is unmistakable. The scandal is clearly worsened by the fact of the slave's blackness. The view that slavery was a divine punishment imposed on blacks was known in medieval Islam'. Beaumont goes on to cite the tenth-century historian and belletrist al-Mas`udi's account of how Noah was alleged to have cursed his son Ham and called on God to make Ham ugly and black, and to make Ham's son a slave to the son of Shem.

The sexual threat posed by black men, as well as the disparagement of their looks and intelligence, features in a significant number of the stories of the Nights, including 'King `Umar ibn al-Nu'man and his
family’, ‘Juder and his brothers’, ‘Gharib and Ajib’ and ‘Sayf al-Muluk’. The innocence of pre-modern fantasy is precisely a fantasy. The stories reveal racist prejudices not only regarding blacks, but also with respect to Jews, Persians and Europeans. Moreover, racism is not the only issue, for the stories also provide many instances of sexist and misogynistic assumptions, as well as a taste for Schadenfreude and the heartless mockery of cripples.

These ugly passions can be found elsewhere in medieval Arabic popular literature. Tales of the Marvellous and News of the Strange is a rival story collection to the Nights, though much less well known. It includes 'The Story of Ashraf and Anjab and the Marvellous Things That Happened to Them', a sustained fictional exercise in racial abuse, in which the black slave Anjab usurps the young Arab noble Ashraf’s place and goes on to perpetrate monstrous crimes. As with 'The story of the semi-petrified prince' in the Nights, there is an aesthetic aspect to the racial abuse. The sadistic and villainous Anjab is described to Harun al-Rashid as follows: 'This man is black as a negro ... with red eyes, a nose like a clay pot and lips like kidneys' and his mother is no better looking for she 'was black as pitch with a snub nose, red eyes and an unpleasant smell'. There are many instances of racism and misogyny in Tales of the Marvellous and its anonymous author, or authors, took additional delight in mocking cripples and in piling misfortunes on them.

Of course parallels for the sort of racism found in the Nights and Tales of the Marvellous can easily be also discovered in British popular literature, in novels by Sax Rohmer, Sapper, Dennis Wheatley and Ian Fleming in which the villains customarily suffer from the dual misfortune of being ugly and not being British. In such books a swarthy complexion and a foreign accent can be used to signal criminal intentions to dim-witted readers. To stick with popular literature, the second half of Margaret Mitchell’s best-selling novel, Gone With The Wind (1936) harped on the sexual threat posed to white women in the wake of the American Civil War, as in the following passage: 'But these ignominies and dangers were as nothing compared with the peril of white women, many bereft by the war of male protection, who lived alone in outlying districts and on lonely roads. It was the large number of outrages on women and the ever-present fear for the safety of their wives and daughters that drove Southern men to cold and trembling fury and caused the Ku Klux Khan to spring up overnight.'

The Thousand and One Nights is the product of many anonymous authors over the centuries; a version of the Nights existed in the tenth century. A more extensive version survives from the fifteenth century (and it was this that was translated into French by Antoine Galland at the opening of the eighteenth century), but the Arabic story collection was still being added to as late as the opening of the nineteenth century. While some of the stories are folk tales, many stories have been taken from high literature and reflect courtly or scholarly preoccupations. Therefore the stories do not present a consistent attitude towards race or towards anything else and there are quite a few positive representations of black people. In particular Masrur, Harun al-Rashid’s sword bearer and executioner, features in several stories and is always presented positively. Bizarrely in one short story, 'The pious black slave', the slave in question is rewarded for his piety by being turned white at the hour of his death.

But the question of race is brought to the fore and in a most positive way in 'The story of al-Ma’mun, the Yemeni and the six slave girls'. In this story the Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mun is told of a wealthy Yemeni who possesses six beautiful slave girls. 'Of these one was white, the second dark, the third plump, the fourth thin, the fifth yellow and the sixth black.' These slave girls are like hetairas or geishas, for they are highly cultivated and consequently, when their owner asks them to first sing and then engage in a boasting contest concerning their respective merits, the result is a civilised symposium. Though the white girl disparages the black girl and, among other things, relates the story of the curse of Ham, the black girl is more than equal to this verbal contest and she cites the Qur’an as well as a string of poets in praise of darkness. She concludes by comparing the white girl’s complexion to leprosy before reciting a poem:

""
Do you not see how high a price is fetched by musk,  
While a load of white lime fetches one dirham?  
Whiteness in the eye is ugly in a young man,  
While black eyes shoot arrows.'

The Yemeni delivers no verdict at the end of the debate, whose implicit message must be that all races are equal. (By the way, the yellow girl will not have been Chinese, but Greek, for the Byzantines were conventionally referred to as Banu'l-As far, 'the Sons of the Yellow'.)

`The story of al-Ma'mun, the Yemeni and the six slave girls' is a specimen of munazara, a genre of Arabic high literature in which the respective merits of things or people were debated, for example, Kufa versus Basra, the pen versus the sword, the Abbasids versus the Umayyads. 'The dispute about the merits of men and women' is another example of munazara that has been included in the Nights. The genre of munazara overlapped with that of mufakhara, or boasting. The master of this kind of literature was the prolific and brilliant essayist al-Jahiz (c.776-868 or 9), by common consent the finest prose writer of the Arab Middle Ages. Al-Jahiz, whose grandfather is said to have been a black cameleer, composed the Kitab fakhr al-sudan `ala al-bidan, (The book of vaunting of blacks over whites), a sustained defence of black people, albeit one that worked with stereotypes: 'These people have a natural talent for dancing to the rhythm of a tambourine without needing to learn it.' Blacks were also described as great singers and al-Jahiz claimed that in general they were strong, good tempered, cheerful and generous. The Arab perception of the black man had been warped by only encountering them as slaves. Al-Jahiz also argued that skin colour was not determined by heredity, but was entirely due to climate and soil and, if blacks moved into the clime, or zone, occupied by the Arabs, over time they would lose their blackness. In this he was to be echoed by the fourteenth-century philosopher and historian ibn Khaldun.

Al-Jahiz wrote that Arabs used to accept black husbands for their daughters in pre-Islamic times, but not in his own time. His perception that racial prejudice had increased in the Islamic centuries may have been correct. In pre-Islamic times and during the first century of Islam, the aghribat al-Arab, or (Crows of the Arabs), poets of black ancestry, enjoyed considerable reputations in Arabia and the most famous of them, Antara ibn Shaddad, a warrior as well as a poet, had a popular epic devoted to him. Even in al-Jahiz's time religious, scholarly and high literature was almost entirely free of prejudice against black people.

To return to the Nights, the stories that form part of the early core of the story collection are fairly free of anti-Semitism and there are no disparaging comments about Jewish physiognomy. For example, the Jewish doctor in the 'Hunchback' cycle of stories is presented as the equal of the Muslim storytellers he is with. Moreover the Nights contains several stories about pious Israelites. But some of the stories that were later added to the corpus of Nights have a nasty feel. For example, in 'Three princes of China', two of the princes are murdered by a Jewish community in Iraq and rolled inside mats, but when the third prince arrives, he tricks the leader of the Jews into killing his own son. In `Masrur and Zayn al-Mawasif' Zayn al-Mawasif's Jewish husband is cuckolded by Masrur and ends up being buried alive by a slave-girl. In 'The fisherman and his son' the fisherman gets the jinni at his command to throw a Jewish merchant into the fire. Villainous and drunken Jewish pirates feature in 'The merchant's daughter and the prince of al-Iraq'. It is possible though unprovable that growing Arab anti-Semitism was influenced by Western anti-Semitism. In Reason and Society in the Middle Ages, Alexander Murray has argued that anti-Semitism and the pogroms that followed in Europe got under way in the late eleventh century. Those who read the Nights in English or French translations should be warned that, though there are certainly racist passages in the original Arabic, the racist abuse has been heightened or actually invented in the English translation of Richard Burton (1885-8) and the French translation of Joseph Charles Mardrus (1899-1904). Burton was a firm believer in the legend of Jewish ritual murder and wrote a treatise on it that was posthumously published. In 'The semi-petrified prince', Burton has the king imitate `blackamoort speech: 'he keeps on
calling `eaven for aid until sleep is strange to me from evenin' till mawnin', and he prays and damns, cussing us two'. The original Arabic gives no licence to Burton's rendering of `blackamoort speech. In a note to the opening account in the Nights of the sexual betrayal of Shahriyar by his wife, Burton notes that 'debauched women prefer negroes on account of the size of their parts'.

As for Mardrus's elegantly composed but essentially fraudulent 'translation', he imported extra 'negrest and 'negressest to serve as slaves in the stories. His work was a product of its times and, since he wrote at a time when the virulent right-wing and Catholic campaign against the Jewish Captain Alfred Dreyfus had reached a feverish pitch, his 'translation' is peppered with anti-Semitic digs. (Dreyfus was tried for treason and sent to Devil's Island in 1894. He was only exonerated in 1906.) It is possible that the ethnic prejudices that feature in many of the stories of the Nights gave additional impetus to the racism of Burton and Mardrus. Certainly some famous racists came to cherish the Nights, it was the favourite book of the racial theorist Joseph-Arthur de Gobineau (1816-82). In the Essai sur l'inegalite des races humaines (1853-5), for example, he wrote, 'in the Arabian Nights—a book which though apparently trivial is a mine of true sayings and well observed facts—we read that some natives regard Adam and his wife as black, and since these were created in the image of God, God must also be black....' The Nights was also the favourite book of the fantasy author H.P. Lovecraft and the pulp thriller writer, Sax Rohmer; instances of racist attitudes abound in Lovecraft's stories and he was also the author of a poem On the Creation of Niggers (1912). As for Sax Rohmer, the creator of the villainous mastermind Fu Manchu, his fictions do not betray any particular animus against the Chinese (as one might have expected), but they do show that he was virulently prejudiced against blacks and Jews.

There is no space and perhaps no need to provide a full discussion of the other forms of racist attitudes embedded in the Arabic stories of the Nights. Persians often feature as pagan Magians and as such they have a propensity for homosexuality, cannibalism, sorcery and piracy. Byzantines are customarily shown to be cowards.

The Franks are barbarous, lecherous and not fond of washing. Yet though examples of racial prejudice are easy to find, there is little sign of the converse—that is, an awareness of and pride in an Arab self-identity. The Arabs' status as Muslims seems to take precedence over their ethnic origin. When the term 'Arab' does feature in the stories, it is often used to refer specifically to Bedouin and the Bedouin are usually, though not always, depicted as cruel and thieving. They are also portrayed as stupid, and, for instance, in `Dalila the crafty', Dalila, who is being crucified, tricks a Bedouin into taking her place in exchange for the promise of fritters.

In recent decades there has been a marked tendency to write about racism as if it is something that was invented in the West in fairly modern times. Thus the philosopher and cultural historian Michel Foucault presented racism as a uniquely modern and Western phenomenon which originated in Europe in the seventeenth century. The electronic catalogue of the library of London University's School of Oriental African Studies lists 724 books as dealing with race and 137 specifically devoted to racism. As far as I can tell, only one book deals with pre-modern racism (in medieval Europe). In effect racism is a crime without a history.

There has also been a tendency to trace racism back to racial theorists such as Gobineau, Ernest Renan and Houston Chamberlain, but this is surely a case of putting the cart before the horse. Racism did not need theoretical articulation to serve as its midwife. In a recent book, Racisms from the Crusade to the Twentieth Century (2014), Francois Bettencourt has defined racism as 'prejudice concerning ethnic descent coupled with discriminatory action'. So in what sense can there be racist literature? Must literature call for discriminatory action before it can be termed 'racist'? Bettencourt argues that the ideological origins of systematic racism can be traced back to Europe in the twelfth century and that the expulsion of the Moriscos (the Christian Arab and Berber descendants of Muslims who had been forced to convert to Christianity) from Spain in the years 1609-14 was the first practical instance of systematic racism. But this is questionable, as it was not so much the racial origins of the Moriscos that...
was in question as the genuineness of their adherence to the Christian faith. Bettencourt maintains that 'discriminatory action' is a necessary part of the definition of racism. Of course no such 'discriminatory action' follows from the hostile portraits of blacks, Jews, Franks and others in the Nights, yet if we are not to describe those portraits as racist, what other adjective is available?

The opening story of the Nights, the story of Shahriyar’s sexual betrayal, closely followed by the account of his brother Shahzaman’s similar betrayal and then that of the sleeping jinn by the woman with a hundred signet rings, all of this leading on to the account of Shahrzad’s telling stories for her life, has an undeniably potent charge. The erotic force of the opening scene, was of course, given dramatic expression in Diaghilev’s production of the ballet Scheherazade in 1910. The plain truth is that the stories of the Nights, like the Bible and Shakespeare’s plays, derive much of their power from cruelty, prejudice, violence, deceit and hatred. My murshid (my spiritual guide) used to say ‘Il faut beaucoup de noir pour voir la lumière’ - it takes a lot of black to get some light. It is an unwelcome conclusion, but is it possible that the stories of The Thousand and One Nights fascinate, not in spite of their sinister blemishes, but because of them? <>

The Thousand and One Nights and Orientalism in the Dutch Republic, 1700-1800 : Antoine Galland, Ghisbert Cuper and Gilbert de Flines by Richard van Leeuwen and Arnoud Vrolijk [Amsterdam University Press, 9789462988798]

Antoine Galland’s French translation of the “Thousand and One Nights” appeared in 1704. One year later a pirate edition was printed in The Hague, followed by many others. Galland entertained a lively correspondence on the subject with the Dutch intellectual and statesman Gisbert Cuper (1644-1716). Dutch orientalists privately owned editions of the “Nights” and discreetly collected manuscripts of Arabic fairy tales. In 1719 the “Nights” were first retranslated into Dutch by the wealthy Amsterdam silk merchant and financier Gilbert de Flines (Amsterdam 1690-London 1739). The Thousand and One Nights and Orientalism in the Dutch Republic, 1700-1800: Antoine Galland, Ghisbert Cuper and Gilbert de Flines explores not only the trail of the French and Dutch editions from the eighteenth century Dutch Republic and the role of the printers and illustrators, but also the mixed sentiments of embarrassment and appreciation, and the overall literary impact of the “Nights” on a Protestant nation in a century when French cultural influence ruled supreme.

The volume includes many color illustrations and is quite elegantly designed.

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Excerpt: In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Orientalism was in vogue in various forms in Western Europe. This trend of cultural exoticism had been triggered by Europe’s increased
interaction with Oriental societies — from the unfamiliar empires of China, Japan and Mughal India to the more conversant Muslim realms of Persia and the Ottomans. Following in the tracks of explorers and traders, European scholars and diplomats sought to solidify relationships with these foreign regions and to enhance their knowledge of non-European languages and cultures. The Portuguese, Dutch and English trading companies were not only instruments for exploiting new economic opportunities in the East; they were also carriers of commodities and ideas that changed fashions, tastes and intellectual debates in Europe. In the course of two centuries, Europe's encounter with the Orient decisively transformed the direction of European intellectual and cultural history, providing new visions of the world and of Europe's place in human civilisation.

This new taste for the Orient can also be perceived in the field of literature. Although Orientalism had been an important element in European literature from the Middle Ages onwards, it was in the eighteenth century in particular that references to the Orient became more prominent and structurally incorporated. This was the century of the so-called Oriental tale, the type of short story set in the Arab world or the more distant East and usually marked by a distinct, exotic ambience. The taste for Orientalism was, of course, partly aroused by the growing communication between Europe and the Orient and by Europe's keen interest in travel accounts and information concerning Eastern societies. It was also stimulated, however, by what is commonly considered to be one of the greatest literary events of the period: the appearance of the first European translation of the Thousand and one nights. The French Orientalist Antoine Galland's version of the Arabic collection of tales was published in twelve volumes between 1704 and 1717. The work, entitled Mille et une nuit, became an instant success; it gained a wide readership in France and was soon re-translated into all the main European languages. It is no exaggeration to say that Galland's version of the Thousand and one nights not only established a European 'tradition' of the Nights but also significantly contributed to the shaping of the literary landscape in Europe in the eighteenth century.

The first European version of the Thousand and one nights was particularly popular in France, England and Germany, where it inspired a vogue of literary Orientalism that continued throughout the eighteenth century and that could still be perceived in the literary trends of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In other countries such as the Dutch Republic, similar tastes emerged, although perhaps less prominently. The Orientalist traditions and their literary components in France and Britain have received ample attention from scholars, but Orientalism in the Netherlands has hardly been touched upon. There has also been limited interest in the reception of the Thousand and one nights in the Netherlands and the impact of the work on Dutch literature and culture. This book aims to fill, at least partly, this apparent lacuna and to present some new findings concerning the reception of the Nights in the Dutch Republic in the eighteenth century and, more specifically, the first translation of Galland's Mille et une nuit into Dutch.

In the seventeenth century, the Dutch Republic was economically and intellectually at the centre of Europe. As we will see, developments in literature and culture in the Low Countries during this period cannot be dissociated from the wider European context. The country's prominence within Europe was particularly reflected in the field of printing and publishing. Amsterdam, The Hague and Leiden were the centres of European publishing, not only because their printing techniques were advanced and refined but also because the relative degree of freedom of expression in the Netherlands allowed foreign authors to publish works that would have been banned in their own countries. Moreover, communities of religious refugees from France and England had settled in the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, forming links between the Netherlands and European intellectual networks. Although the economic role of the Netherlands declined in the eighteenth century, its prominent position in the field of publishing and the international dimension of its cultural and intellectual life persisted at least until 1750, when French censorship was relaxed. The international orientation of Dutch literary and intellectual networks can also be perceived in the way in which the Thousand and one nights was
received in the Netherlands In this book we will show that also in the domain of Orientalism, the Dutch Republic was integrated into European networks and dynamics.

Although the starting point of this study is the publication history of the Thousand and one nights in the Dutch Republic in the eighteenth century, we will also sketch a broader picture of Dutch Orientalism and Oriental studies and their international connections in the field of literature. But before we turn our attention to the Dutch Republic, we feel it is incumbent on us to give a brief introduction to the Thousand and one nights, and a summary of the circumstances of the appearance of the Galland translation and its significance for European Orientalism.

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The Thousand and one nights and literary Orientalism in Europe

Antoine Galland (1646-1715) was a French Orientalist and classicist who travelled to the Ottoman Empire on two occasions as a member of French diplomatic missions. During his stay in Istanbul and Smyrna he collected manuscripts and books, and his travel journals are still an important source of historical information, especially about scholarly circles and the book market. Back in France, Galland became the custodian of an important private collection of historical coins, and in 1701 he was accepted as a member of the prestigious Académie Royale des Inscriptions et Médailles. In 1709 he was offered the chair in Arabic studies at the Collège Royal (now Collège de France). His scholarly efforts were directed at the field of numismatics, which at that time belonged to the core interests of historical research, but he also published a collection of Arabic maxims and proverbs' and a treatise about coffee. Apart from this, he edited the voluminous and important encyclopaedia Bibliothèque orientale which was compiled by Barthélemy d’Herbelot (1625-1695) and appeared posthumously in 1697. He completed a translation of the Qur’an, but the manuscript was lost after his death.

Galland always considered his work on the Mille et une nuit as a sidetrack to his more scholarly occupations. He received a medieval Syrian manuscript of the collection of stories from a friend in Aleppo and started to translate it in his spare time. The first volume of the translation, which appeared in Paris in 1704, was such a success that the publisher, the widow of Claude Barbin, pressured him to provide more material, upon which Galland bemoaned the irony that the audience appreciated these literary trivialities more than his more serious academic publications. After completing the translation of the manuscript, which comprised only 282 nights, Galland looked for supplementary manuscripts kept in the Bibliothèque Royale in Paris and added these stories to his translation. Moreover, he added stories he had heard from a certain Hanna Diyab, a Syrian cleric who was introduced to him by a mutual friend. Finally, a fellow Orientalist, François Péris de la Croix (1653-1713), handed some translations of Turkish tales to the publisher which were inserted without Galland’s prior knowledge in the Mille et une nuit.

This recapitulation of how Galland’s Mille et une nuit was compiled, which is essentially considered as the foundation of the European Thousand and one nights tradition, indicates what a shaky agglomeration of materials from various sources it was. Neither the publisher nor Galland himself cared to inform the reader of this rather haphazard procedure, and the Mille et une nuit became the standard version of the Nights for a long time to come. Galland has often been criticised for his lack of scholarly diligence in his translation, but it should be kept in mind that his procedure was not uncommon in the eighteenth century and that his translation is generally quite accurate. Anyhow, the public was enchanted and the Mille et une nuit was a commercial success that was soon translated into English, German and Dutch.

Interest in Galland’s translation inspired scholars and writers to explore the field of Oriental and pseudo-Oriental literature. The aforementioned Oriental scholar Péris de la Croix published a collection of Persian tales and later compiled his famous Mille et un jour. This was allegedly a collection of Persian stories taken from a manuscript provided by a Persian shaykh, but it was later
discovered to be a misrepresentation. It was in fact a translation of a random selection of Turkish tales preserved in the Bibliothèque Royale, edited to conform with the format of the Thousand and one nights, with a narrative frame and embedded stories.

It became no less popular than its original model and was translated into all the major European languages.

Other, less famous collections of a similar kind were the Contes orientaux (1745) by Comte Anne Claude Philippe de Caylus (1692-1765) and Melanges de littérature orientale, traduits de divers manuscrits turcs, arabes et persans de la Bibliothèque du Roi (2 vols, 1770) by Denis Dominique Cardonne (1721-1783). Cardonne, who worked as a translator in Istanbul and became professor of Turkish and Persian at the Collège Royal, also published an enlarged edition of Antoine Galland’s Contes et fables indiennes de Bidpai et de Lokman. Traduites d’Ali Tchelebi-ben-Saleh, auteur turc. Ouvrage commencé par feu M Galland, continué et fini par M. Cardonne (3 vols, 1778); and Extraits des manuscrits arabes dans lesquels il est parlé des événemens historiques relatifs au règne de Saint Louis (1819). The collections of Caylus and Cardonne contained a variety of tales translated from various Arabic and Turkish manuscripts, which give a picture of the literary taste in the Ottoman Empire but do not in themselves represent coherent literary works.

It is remarkable that although several prominent scholars were working with material of the Thousand and one nights or similar texts in Arabic, Turkish or Persian, no serious research was conducted into the provenance of these stories and the philological aspects of the available manuscripts. Apparently, tales of this kind were not deemed to be of sufficient significance for scholarly interest and were only seen as entertainment. After Galland’s success, European travellers and scholars continued to search for ‘complete’ Arabic manuscripts of the Nights in Damascus and Cairo. This popularity among Westerners may have contributed to the appearance of several manuscript copies in Egypt and Syria in the second half of the eighteenth century, some of which are still preserved in Western libraries.

One of the scholars interested in manuscripts of the Thousand and one nights was the Austrian Orientalist Joseph Freiherr von Hammer-Purgstall (1774-1856). On his journey to Egypt he purchased a ‘complete’ manuscript of the work, which was, however, lost in shipwreck. Later he acquired an identical manuscript which he translated into German. Both this text and the translation were subsequently lost, but a French translation of the German text had been made by François-Guillaume Stanislas Trébutien (1800-1870) which was published in 1828 under the title Contes inédits des Mille et une nuits. In the course of the nineteenth century, more manuscripts and materials were collected, and gradually a European ‘branch’ of text editions and translations of the Thousand and one nights developed which interrelated with the Arabic tradition in interesting ways. Scholarly research into the textual history of the Nights and the relationships between the various manuscripts was not undertaken until the end of the nineteenth century, when Orientalists such as Hermann Zotenberg (1836-1894), the Dutch scholar Michael Jan de Goeje (1836-1909) and Duncan Black Macdonald (1863-1943) speculated about the philological aspects of the work.

In this period of two hundred years, the corpus of Thousand and one nights texts edited by Oriental scholars had increased considerably, and as a consequence the philological study of this material had become only more and more complex. As explained above, the work of Galland, who compiled his version from various sources, served as an example for later scholars and literati. Copyists, writers, travellers, scholars, forgers and deceivers not only added all kinds of material to the corpus during the course of time, they also often claimed to have found the ‘original’ and ‘complete’ text, although the actual provenance of their material usually remained obscure. These mystifications added to European interest in the work and resulted not only in numerous ‘authentic’ versions but also in all kinds of adaptations and rewritings. This habit of treating the Thousand and one nights as a general framework for material associated
with Oriental storytelling has continued to the present day.

The arbitrariness to which the Thousand and one nights was subjected in the realm of European literature and scholarship was partly inspired by the nature of the work itself. After all, the text consists of a framing story in which it is explained how Shahriyar, the mighty king, is cuckolded by his spouse. Thereupon, in order to prevent similar humiliations in the future, he decides to marry a virgin every evening and have her executed in the morning. Just before the reservoir of young virgins is depleted, Shahrazad, the daughter of the vizier, voluntarily offers to marry the king. After making love, Shahrazad begins to tell a marvellous story, which induces the king to keep her alive to hear the remainder of the story the following night. In this way Shahrazad succeeds in postponing and ultimately preventing her execution, and she lives happily with the king forever after. This frame serves as a container for a true avalanche of stories told by Shahrazad, which are, obviously, intended to amaze the king — and the reader — and hold his attention for as long as possible.

The stories contained in the frame are of very diverse genres and types, and it seems, at least in the later versions, that the Arabic compilers, like Galland, inserted material from various sources. Although there are some references to a work called the `Thousand and one nights' or `Thousand nights' in the Arabic literary tradition, these are too scarce and too brief to obtain an idea about the nature and contents of an original version of this work. The manuscript that was used by Galland, which dates back to approximately the middle of the fifteenth century, is the oldest substantial text that we possess. However, as observed above, this text contains only 282 nights and is therefore considered `incomplete'. The later manuscripts compiled in the eighteenth century were supplemented with all kinds of material to complete the 1001 nights, but it is still unclear how these versions relate to an `original' version of the Nights, if at all. Since later manuscripts, editions and translations tended to follow these examples and include material from a great variety of sources, the textual history of the Nights became increasingly and inextricably complex.

The fluidity of the corpus of the Thousand and one nights is enhanced by the great diversity of the inserted stories. Shahrazad unleashes a seemingly endless stream of stories of all possible kinds or types. The texts mostly contain a core part which is fairly consistent in the various versions, but even this part includes love stories, adventure stories, fables, magical stories, etc. The later supplements incorporated moral tales, romances of chivalry, magical journeys, erotic stories, apocalyptic stories, etc., apparently without a care for the coherence of the work. The corpus thus became an amalgam of all kinds of material, some of which probably derived from an `original' Thousand and one nights, while others belonged to other collections that may have been older than the `original' Nights. European editors and translators in their turn augmented the corpus with stories from Persian, Indian or Italian sources or with fables written by themselves.

Partly because of this confusion, it is still not possible to present a faithful reconstruction of the textual history of the Thousand and one nights. It is assumed that the work was modelled after Sanskrit examples, through a Persian intermediary, and that the first Arabic versions appeared in Egypt and Baghdad in the eighth to tenth centuries. Of these versions, no manuscripts have been preserved. The earliest substantial fragment is the abovementioned Syrian manuscript used by Galland. In the eighteenth century, an Egyptian `branch' of the collection was established that eventually became the modern standard version and which was printed by the Bulaq press in Cairo in 1835. Other early editions include the second Calcutta edition edited by William Macnaghten (1793-1841) and printed in four volumes by the Baptist Mission Press in Calcutta in 1839-1842 and the so-called Breslau edition edited by Maximilian Habicht (1775-1839), which appeared in 1825-1838 in what is now Wroclaw, Poland. In the meantime, Galland's translation was retranslated into the main European languages. The first translation of the Egyptian `complete' manuscript, in a shortened and bowdlerised version, was made by the English ethnologist Edward William Lane (1801-1876; English translation 1838-1840).
The ambiguity of the corpus of the Thousand and one nights, and of Galland’s translation in particular, probably contributed to its popularity as an inexhaustible source of stories. It certainly inspired many authors to conceive stories of the same type, often presented as authentic Oriental works. It should be noted here that Oriental motifs had been an integral part of European literature since medieval times. Various cycles of chivalric romances, such as those of Chrétien de Troyes and the Amadis series, began to include as standard components episodes in which the heroes travelled to the Eastern Mediterranean coasts with their magical atmospheres and hostile knights. It is no coincidence that works such as the Catalan romance Tirant lo Blanc (1490) by Jose Martorell and Martí Joan de Galba, and Cervantes’ masterpiece Don Quixote (1605/15) — both works regarded as standing at the threshold of ‘modern’ European literature — have strong Oriental elements. At the turn of the eighteenth century it was commonly believed that storytelling, or literary fiction in general, had originated in the Orient and were a special characteristic of the Arabs and Persians. This conviction paved the way for the reception of the Thousand and one nights, which was immediately recognised as a work of unbounded fantasy and as a sublime exponent of the art of storytelling and of the Oriental imagination.

Among the authors who took inspiration from the Mille et une nuit for their own literary efforts was the French popular writer Thomas-Simon Gueullette (1683-1766). He produced several collections of fabulous exotic tales set in time frames, for instance Les Mille et un quart-d’heure, contes Tartares (1715) and Les sultanes de Guzarate, contes Mogols (1732). Although their literary value is limited, these collections — presented as authentic Oriental material — became hugely popular in France and abroad. A more sophisticated author who used Oriental themes and motifs and who referred to the Mille et une nuit was Claude Prosper Jolyot de Crébillon (1707-1777), a pioneer in the development of the French and European novel. His libertine work Le sopha (1742) recounts the adventures of Amanzéï, a courtier whose soul has been transformed by the God Brahma into a sofa which is used in various sordid love affairs. His soul is finally set free when two innocent virgins are united on the sofa in pure and unadulterated love. The novel criticises the licentious habits of the French nobility and is modelled after the Mille et une nuit. His satirical work Tazzaï et Néadarné (1734) was also influenced by the vogue inspired by the Mille et une nuit.

Apart from these rather frivolous pastiches, which became a trend particularly in France, the model of the Mille et une nuit was combined with the popular genre of the travelogue, which provided the stories with a realistic setting and gave the author the opportunity to comment on the differences between European and Oriental societies, using embedded tales to add either allegorical illustrations or an element of fantasy. The first example of this kind is Les avantures d’Abdalla, fits d’Hanif, written by abbé Jean-Paul Bignon (1662-1743) and published in 1712-1714 in two parts under the pseudonym 'Mr. De Sandisson'. The book was allegedly based on 'an Arabic manuscript found in Batavia' (now Jakarta, Indonesia). The story is about Abdalla, who receives the assignment to go in search of a rejuvenating source on the island of Borico. On his way there, Abdalla meets his fellow traveller Almoraddin. They rescue some Indian ladies and visit a Persian lady who tells them stories. A peculiar story is about a visit to Topsy-turvy Island' where everything is the opposite of earthly phenomena. It is ruled by fairies who perform strange occult rituals. Another example is the well-known novel in letter form by Montesquieu (1689-1755), Lettres persanes (1721; 2nd enl. ed. 1754), containing the fictional letters of two Persian gentlemen travelling to Europe and philosophising about the conditions in various countries. Other famous examples are Candide ou l’optimisme (1759) by Voltaire (1694-1778) and Gulliver’s Travels (1726) by Jonathan Swift (1667-1745). Both are rather acrimonious satires of French and British societies respectively, and both contain various references to the Mille et une nuit.

According to Raymond Schwab, one of the biographers of Antoine Galland, the French translation of the Thousand and one nights was crucial for the development of the spirit of the Enlightenment in French literature, both because of
Enlightenment philosophers such as Diderot and Voltaire made ample use of the models provided by the Mille et une nuit for their philosophical stories and novels. Voltaire mentions Shahrazad’s tales in his novel Zadig (1747), and Diderot shaped his satirical/erotic/philosophical novel Les bijoux indiscrets (1742), about a bet waged between a sultan and his main concubine, in the format of the Thousand and one nights. The trend of combining adventurous tales, the motif of the journey, and philosophical and scientific speculations culminated in the ambitious novel Manuscrit trouvé à Saragosse (1805 and later) by the Polish/French author Jan Potocki (1761-1815). This book, about a Flemish prince from the Southern Netherlands travelling through the Sierra Nevada and becoming the victim of a mysterious spell, consists of a temporal frame of sixty days containing inserted stories and intellectual meditations. It has been described as a ‘European’ Thousand and one nights.

In England as well, the Oriental tale came into vogue, although the often excessive fantasy of the French tales was criticised by some. Authors such as Samuel Johnson (1709-1784; Rasselas,1759), Frances Sheridan (1724-1766; The History ofNourjahad,1767, 2nd ed. 1798),4 and John Hawkesworth (1715-1773; Almoran and Hamet,1776) used the format of the Oriental fable for their intellectual and philosophical explorations, either to reflect on the ideal society or to speculate about moral dilemmas and the human condition. In Germany, the Thousand and one nights was introduced into the literary canon by the Late Enlightenment philosopher and writer Christoph Martin Wieland (1733-1813). Wieland began his literary career writing pastiches of the Thousand and one nights and in 1786-1789 published the collection of fairy tales Dschinnistan, which consisted of edited material from the French collection Le Cabinet des fées and some original stories inspired by Galland’s Mille et une nuit. He also wrote romances that were partly modelled after ancient Greek works and partly after the Thousand and one nights, such as Don Sylvio von Rosalva (1764) about a prince who becomes infatuated with Oriental stories, and Idris und Zenide (1767).5 Wieland’s Der goldne Spiegel oder die Könige von Scheschian (1772), in the mirror-for-princes genre, is constructed as a sequel to the Thousand and one nights, presenting an ideal society in a complex frame story. As an exponent of the Enlightenment, Wieland condemned the genre of the fairy tale as prone to Schwärmerei, or excessive fantasy, but he acknowledged its value as instructive and educational material. He introduced the Thousand and one nights to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, who, according to his diaries, read the work in several phases of his life and used its narrative strategies and motifs in his novels and fairy tales.

The influence of the Thousand and one nights can also be perceived in the initial phases of the trend of what is usually called Gothic literature or fantastic literature.

This genre — based on suspense, mystery, conspiracy and a touch of horror — became popular in the second half of the eighteenth century and paved the way for various forms of Romanticism. Horace Walpole (1717-1797), famous for his novel The Castle of Otranto (1764), also wrote a collection of Oriental tales. German authors such as Maximilian Klinger (1752-1831) and Ludwig Tieck (1773-1853) used figures and motifs from the Nights for their dark, dramatic stories and novels, such as Die Geschichte Giafars des Barmeciden (1792) and Abdallah (1797), respectively. Of particular importance are the works of two authors who personified the trend of black romanticism: Jacques Cazotte from France (1719-1792) and the Englishman William Beckford (1760-1844). Both authors used Arabic manuscripts of the Thousand and one nights as their starting point. Cazotte rewrote a translation of a Parisian manuscript of the Nights made by a Syrian scholar named Dom Denis Chavis, supplemented the collection with his own stories, and published it as Suite des Mille et une nuits. Beckford learned some Arabic and translated some Arabic stories from a manuscript in his possession but became famous for his pastiches of the Nights, which were suffused with a strong sense of eroticism (mainly homo-eroticism) and sensuality. His most famous work is Vathek (1786), an extravagant fantasy about a caliph indulging in earthly pleasures and selling his soul to the devil. This book, first published in French,
became a cult novel for devotees of Gothic fiction. Both Beckford and Cazotte evoked a world of spells and demons, horror and inescapable fate. This trend continued into the nineteenth century as exemplified by such authors as E.T.A. Hoffmann (1776-1822) and Théophile Gautier (1811-1872) — both of whom acknowledged the influence of the Thousand and one nights — and in English literature by Washington Irving (1783-1859), Edgar Allan Poe (1809-1849) and George Meredith (1828-1919).

The eighteenth century marked the emergence and popularity of didactic literature for children, adolescents and adults alike. The most famous adaptation of Thousand and one nights tales for children was the collection The Oriental moralist, or the beauties of the Arabian nights entertainments, accompanied with suitable reflections adapted to each story from 1790, compiled by the Reverend J. Cooper (pseudonym of Richard Johnson, 1733/4-1793), which was reprinted until modern times. Another collection of educational tales for children, all of the Oriental type and referring partly to the Nights, was Palmblätter (1786) by August Jacob Liebeskind (1758-1793), which was translated into all major European languages.

To conclude this brief survey, mention should be made of the tradition of the popular theatre in France and England. This tradition was initially inspired by the Italian Commedia dell'Arte and found its setting in the fairs of Paris. In the eighteenth century it was usually given the name Arlequinade, which became a term for farcical plays satirising the authorities and bourgeois attitudes in general. Such plays were often banned by the government. The stories on which these plays were based were for the most part simple, but in the course of the eighteenth century the taste for Orientalism began to permeate them. Aladdin with his magic lamp, for example, became a familiar figure on the stage. In England a similar tradition is the Christmas pantomime, which, after the popularity of the Thousand and one nights, began to include from the eighteenth century onwards such figures as Aladdin and Sindbad. The rather exuberant farces and comedies indulged in baroque, exotic settings and costumes and in vulgarity and mirth at the expense of bourgeois taste. An important author who wrote several Arlequinades and who co-operated with Péris de la Croix in the editing of his Oriental translations was Alain-René Lesage (1668-1747), who became famous for his picaresque novel Histoire de Gil Blas de Santillane, which appeared in three volumes between 1715 and 1735. His work shows that the Thousand and one nights was a rich source of inspiration not only for high-brow literature but also for more popular tastes.

The overview above shows how deeply the Thousand and one nights had penetrated into European culture during the course of the eighteenth century. Its influence can be found in various genres and literary types and often contributed to the development of these genres, some of which were still in a nascent phase at the time, such as the novel and various kinds of novellas. The vogue of Orientalism in France, England and, to a lesser extent, Germany set the scene for the emergence of Dutch Orientalism, which nonetheless had its own particular roots and contexts. <<

The Phenomenology of a Performative Knowledge System: Dancing with Native American Epistemology by Shay Welch [Performance Philosophy, Palgrave Macmillan, 9783030049355]

This book investigates the phenomenological ways that dance choreographing and dance performance exemplify both Truth and meaning-making within Native American epistemology, from an analytic philosophical perspective. Given that within Native American communities dance is regarded both as an integral cultural conduit and “a doorway to a powerful wisdom,” Shay Welch argues that dance and dancing can both create and communicate knowledge. She explains that dance—as a form of oral, narrative storytelling—has the power to communicate knowledge of beliefs and histories, and that dance is a form of embodied narrative storytelling. Welch provides analytic clarity on how this happens, what conditions are required for it to succeed, and how
dance can satisfy the relational and ethical facets of Native epistemology.

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Excerpt: Over the past few decades, there has been an upsurge in Native and Indigenous performance arts to revisit and remember—to tell through retelling—stories of the past and how they have shaped Native and Indigenous identities and knowledges as those stories, identities, and knowledges have struggled to survive continued expropriation, abuse, and erasure. Native dance, specifically, has experienced revitalization through a number of Native artists’ endeavors to interweave the traditional with the contemporary. Native and Indigenous performance arts companies such as Native American Theatre Ensemble, DAYSTAR, Institute of American Indian Arts, Dancing Earth Contemporary Indigenous Dance Creations, Native Earth Performing Arts, Turtle Gals Performance Ensemble, Spiderwoman Theater, and Red Arts Performing Arts Company have utilized embodiment and motion as a way of accessing and extracting blood memory to communicate such knowledges to Native and non-Native audiences. In the Foreword of Native American Dance: Ceremonies and Social Traditions, W. Richard West Jr. (1992) explains that:

Dance is the very embodiment of Indigenous values and represents the response of Native Americans to complex and sometimes difficult historical experiences. Music and dance combine with material culture, language, spirituality, and artistic expression in compelling and complex ways, and are definitive elements of Native identity.

Beyond the articulation of identity, dancing within the Native American worldview is deeply entrenched in and as a way of knowing. Charlotte Heth (1992) explains: “Indeed, in Indian life, the dance is not possible without the belief systems and the music, and the belief systems and the music can hardly exist without the dance”.

In 1921, the Canadian Department of Indian Affairs issued the following Circular decree:

I have, therefore, to direct you to use your utmost endeavours to dissuade the Indians from excessive indulgence in the practice of dancing. You should suppress any dances which cause waste of time, interfere with the occupations of the Indians, unsettle them for serious work, injure their health or encourage them in sloth and idleness. You should also dissuade, and, if possible, prevent them from leaving their reserves for the purpose of attending fairs, exhibitions, etc., when their absence would result in their own farming and other interests being neglected. It is realized that reasonable amusement and recreation should be enjoyed by Indians, but they should not be allowed to dissipate their energies and abandon themselves to demoralizing amusements. By the use of tact and firmness you can obtain control and keep it, and this obstacle to continued progress will then disappear.
This circular demonstrates why it is that the deployment of dance as a mechanism for articulating Native American epistemology is not merely a fanciful interdisciplinary trick. Dance, whether as social or ritual performance, has always been a cornerstone of cultural practice and education and communal relationship strengthening. Further, dance is often explicitly regarded as a highway for Truth, as exemplified by David Delgado Shorter’s book title, *We Will Dance Our Truth: Yaqui History in Yoeme Performances*. It is for this reason that the activity of dancing specifically was targeted by settler-colonial states as one that needed to be promptly eradicated throughout the Americas. Scholars and practitioners of Native and Indigenous dance have had to fight for their right to dance within the broader fight for sovereignty and cultural rejuvenation. Historically, the fight was merely to dance at all. Today, the fight is to dance on one’s own terms: as a tribal nation, as a performer, as an urban Native American, as a mixed-blood, and as a storyteller. Therefore, I offer this analysis of dance as a mode of Native American epistemology in solidarity with others as a decolonial act of resistance, both in the academy and on the stage.

To begin, I would like to situate myself to create more familiarity with my reader so that she or he may travel this path with me in relation. I think that the reader can glean much insight from knowing why I approach these ideas from the specific angles I do and why it is that I highlight some respects more than others. My trajectory through this analysis is not a result of ranking and prioritizing any one idea over another but rather consequent my own personal knowledges and how I understand and try to make sense of these ideas for myself. I did not come to this intuition that dance is a primary mode for Native American ways of knowing as a result of my Oklahoma Cherokee heritage. My dad’s side of the family is, and has been for a very long time, non-traditional folk; my great-grandfather chose not to pursue citizen status after being placed on the Roll. And I am not a dancer. What I am, however, is an aerialist, which many people call sky dancers. While I dreamt my whole life of becoming a dancer, I was prohibited by doing so by a disability in my legs that I was born with. So when I found aerial “dancing”, I finally found a way of creating and expressing with my body as I had long fantasized about doing. Coincidentally (or not) enough, it was about this time within my academic trajectory that I could finally slow down and take the time to immerse myself in Native American Philosophy and Native American Studies so that I could better understand my heritage and my kin. Thus, I believe it was the unique, simultaneous intersection of delving into aerial dance and Native epistemology that spurred this project, which might never have come about had the two spheres of my life not sprouted in tandem in my imagination.

This information is all particularly relevant for two reasons beyond creating relations. First, it is relevant because my perspective on dance, embodiment, and choreographing all stem from a unique perspective from that of a traditional dancer or dance theorist. I came to aerial innovation and choreography as a fully formed (or corrupted, one might say) philosopher, which means I have always approached it with inadvertent conceptual objectives rather than as love and experience of pure art.

Second, my relationship to and knowledge of Native American ways of knowing, while incredibly familiar upon learning, are not my original epistemic praxes. I want to make it very clear from the outset that while I aim to write as consistently as possible with Native American ways of knowing, I am not capable of fully writing from a Native American way of knowing even though I have recognized such epistemologies practiced within my family that were taught to me. As a result, I write this with an always glaring concern of my risk of subconsciously “justifying” Native American ways of knowing through Western theory in a colonizing way rather than merely elaborating on Native American ways of knowing with the help of some Western theory. Historically and to the present
day, Western philosophy has been egregiously guilty of distorting Native theories and practices. Aside from seemingly innocuous failed endeavors to represent Native constructs that have no corollary in the Western perspective, Western theorists have intentionally manipulated and damaged Native and Indigenous ideologies for the purpose of misrepresenting them as childish and primitive for the purpose of justifying genocide and domination. So, I ask you, as the reader, to yourself also be mindful of conflating or subconsciously interpreting compatibility between Native American epistemology and Western theory with Western theory’s legitimization of Native Philosophy.

Laurelyn Whitt offers a clear explication of what it means to reject the conception of epistemology as a universal frame of knowing when she states:

To speak of a knowledge system is to abandon the idea that a single epistemology is universally shared by, or applicable to, all humans insofar as they are human. It facilitates instead a cultural parsing of the concept of epistemology, suitable to the heterogeneity of knowledge. There are specific epistemologies that belong to culturally distinctive ways of knowing. Thus, in this book I aim to flesh out, from an analytic philosophical perspective, a Native American epistemology, specifically in terms of its being a performative knowledge system. Very specifically, my purpose in this book is to fully develop an analysis of the Native American philosophical definition of Truth, which is purely procedural and action-centered; that is, my goal in this book is to articulate what it means and how it is for Truth to be constituted by the performance of an action rather than by content or nature of statements. This definition is discussed in chapter 2. Generally speaking, a knowledge system must contain four characteristics: a theory of knowledge that accounts for what counts as knowledge, tells us how we know, constrains how knowledge is or may be accrued, directs how it is learned or taught, and explains how new things can come to be considered forms of knowledge. To give substance to the notion of Native epistemology as a performative knowledge system in a way that satisfies these criteria and, more specifically, to provide contextual depth and richness to this analysis, I argue that and demonstrate how the phenomenology of dance choreographing and dance performance exemplifies both the definition of Truth and meaning-making within Native American epistemology. Given that within Native American communities dance is regarded not only as an integral cultural conduit but also as “a doorway to a powerful wisdom”, I argue that and substantiate how it is that dance and dancing can both create and communicate knowledge. That dance—as a form of oral, narrative storytelling—has the power to communicate knowledge of individual and collective beliefs and histories is not of much controversy from the perspective of dance theory and Native Studies. Narrative is the heart and soul of both knowledge and ethical relations in the Native tradition, particularly because narrative is born through an oral tradition, which relies on the sharing of individual experiences for knowledge construction; it helps individuals apprehend and deal with the complexity of the world by providing a storied picture through which to see particular instantiations of more general occurrences. And dance is a form of embodied narrative storytelling. My work with respect to this claim is to provide further analytic clarity on how this happens, which conditions are required for it to succeed, and how dance can satisfy the relational and ethical facets of Native epistemology. The more convoluted task for me, however, is to give traction to the idea that dance creates and effects knowledge by eliciting unique embodied metaphor cognates in the body to reify through the body ideas and stories that may be ineffable. This line of argument may bear additional fruit for Native Philosophy and Native/Indigenous Studies; such explications can be explored to apprehend how contemporary dance performance can interpellate and fuse collective embodied knowledges that survive against a context of a besieged oral traditions and endangered languages.

In the second chapter, I draw on the philosophical works of Thomas Norton-Smith (2010), Brian Burkhart (2004), John DuFour (2004), and Willie Ermine (2000), among others in Native and Indigenous Studies articulating the nature of Indigenous knowledge, to impart the interconnected
terrains of the overarching Native American epistemological landscape established by Native philosophers up to this point. The purpose of this chapter is simply to orient the reader toward the three components of Native American epistemology that play pivotal roles in my arguments: ethical harmony, relationality, and praxes/procedures/processes. Relatedly, my ultimate goal here is to synthesize the various accounts of Native epistemology to further flesh them out into one coherent, complete analytical frame. I show that Native American epistemology highlights two distinctive goals regarding the relationship between knower and knowing. Primarily, the purpose of pursuing knowledge is to help guide individuals along the right path. Relatedly, knowledge has at its end the nurturing of relationships between individuals and community members, including non-human persons and the environment, to ensure harmony betwixt them and to pass down the stories of the histories of such relationships. It is in this sense, then, that knowledge within the Native American worldview is regarded not only as relational, but also as ethical. I then show that Native epistemology is a procedural analysis of knowledge. This understanding of knowledge as an ethical, active, and interactive means through which to discover the right path requires a shift in how we understand the conception of Truth in itself. Thus, Native American epistemology culminates in an analytic procedural—as opposed to propositional—analysis of knowing and Truth. Truth is an assignation of action and only those actions that satisfy the constraining normative criteria, which function as the basic truth conditions for the Truth of performance. Furthermore, I show that knowledge exists at both the individual and the collective level. Some knowledge that affects the community, either in terms of its goals and commitments or its histories, psychologies, and politics, cannot be known by individuals alone, and members of the community can know those truths as a collective (e.g., blood memory).

In Chapter 3, I delve into the intersection of phenomenological embodiment and embodied cognition as developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson to help set up the frame that I construct to demonstrate the philosophical relationship between dance and Native American ways of knowing. I highlight their claims that our understandings and knowledge of the world are derived by constructing metaphorical cognates from our bodily experiences of and interactions with others and the world. This partnership elucidates how meaning is embodied, as both frameworks are grounded in experiential, phenomenological approaches to knowledge. This blending of Native American epistemology and an embodied cognitive theory of meaning helps to flesh out my claim that metaphorical knowledge lends itself to an analysis of procedural knowledge. Using pivotal Native American knowing practices, I will show that metaphorical knowledge is not merely expressive; it is a function of Truth insofar as it is lived truth. I first develop the connection between embodied knowledge at the unconscious level with Native American embodied forms and processes of knowing, such as blood memory. I then link embodied implicit knowledge to embodied intuition, which is highly valorized in Native epistemology. Following from these phenomenological unconscious and implicit ways of knowing at the embodied level, I then demonstrate how embodied metaphor extends itself procedurally into meaning-making and communication through praxes of narrative storytelling. Storytelling is the primary mechanism through which to convey and pass down knowledge and has as much, if not more, cognitive content and meaning than propositional knowledge. The revelation that meaning and knowledge are embodied portends how it is that knowledge and meaning emerge from action, which shores up the Native American conception of Truth as both phenomenological and procedural in relation to the performance of actions in and as lived Truth.

In Chapter 4, I tie together the discoveries of contemporary cognitive embodied metaphor with the significance of both the body and dance in knowing processes of Native American epistemology. I maintain that because the mind is inherently embodied, dance is the epicenter of knowing praxes because the dancing body contains and displays embodied metaphors that operate as a narrative, whether abstractly, symbolically, or
I interrogate whether and how dance, both through ritual and social practice, can effectively function as a mode of meaning and Truth-making from and within a Native American epistemological perspective. In the first section, I give an overview of contemporary Native American and Indigenous dance, as articulated by scholars and dancers working in this area. This section outlines the significance of Native and Indigenous dance to Native and Indigenous life and culture and explains the personal, cultural, and political values that are or can be communicated through dance, and where Native and Indigenous dance is today. The second section pivots away from Native dance to draw together connections between embodied metaphor, dance, and narrative generally. It is imperative to cement these ties ahead of time to lay the groundwork for establishing the centrality of dance to Native ways of knowing in the third section. Thus, section three unites the information of sections one and two so as to push out such arguments with as much vividness as possible. In the third section, I apply the previous arguments regarding Native dance as a process of meaning-making and Truth creation to the analytic conditions for Truth in Native American epistemology. I argue that the stories communicated through dance are able to be taken up by the viewer. It is not that viewers impute subjective meaning qua subjective interpretation to the rendering of the dance; rather, the story is told and taken up in as much of an objective fashion as are traditional oral narratives—story through the body does not bequeath to us less knowledge of the story and storyteller, it often tells us more. To do so, I employ the schema of embodied cognitive metaphor to dance as a performative, communicative action and process as capable of initiating and sustaining relations of ethical interdependence between dancer and viewer vis-à-vis the power of the dance so that stories that need not or cannot be spoken may yet be given voice so that they may be created and shared.

My main objective in the final chapter is to construe an analytical analysis of how dancing and choreographing can satisfy the core requirements of the Native procedural knowledge framework discussed in chapter 2: respectful, successful, and performance. Obviously, that dance is an activity and process will already have been established and will be reintroduced to set up the analysis. The pivotal argument in this chapter substantiates how dance satisfies the successful criterion. This is going to rely on a comingling of knowing-how arguments in relation to successfully deploying embodied metaphors and technique with processes of uptake and attentiveness on the part of the viewer. Success, on this analysis, can be either an individual analysis or a dyadic analysis. I account for the fact that under an ideal analysis, success will be dyadic insofar as all knowledge is shared and relational. However, I highlight how it is that a performer may partially succeed at performing the Truth even if the audience fails to grasp it. I then address the respectful component by revisiting both the ethical conditions and limits of knowing. When taken together with the upshots of Chapter 4—that if knowing is embodied, metaphorical, relational, and praxis based—then my argument becomes evident—that dance is the most unmediated and clearest mode through which to generate and communicate knowledge and Truth from the perspective of Native American epistemology. My secondary objective in this chapter is to differentiate the Native analysis of performative Truth from the theory of Truth construed by Johnson and Lakoff and Johnson. This is an important concluding task insofar as much of my argument follows from or is coupled with their arguments regarding embodied metaphor and Truth consequent of their embodied realism metaphysics. It is central that I demonstrate that this analysis of Native epistemology is not tantamount to the Western theory from which I pull even though, as I will show, they are consistent.

I should note that I am restricting my analysis to modes of knowing, understanding, and meaning-making by human persons. The Native American worldview holds that other-than-human persons are capable of meaning-making and knowing insofar as they are persons and also in relations to human persons and each other. Moreover, other-than-human persons, ranging from animals to rivers, dance. I restrict my analysis to human persons not because humans have a distinctive or more sophisticated capacity to know and dance but rather because my understanding of knowing and
dancing is itself limited to human persons. But there is much one could say, particularly by folks working within environmental ethics and animal-centered ethics or areas of studies, about how other-than-human persons perform truths through dance, especially when they dance with each other. When I explain to my students how it is that other-than-human persons know and share meaning, I offer examples of how animals know and tell us when the land or volcanoes are upset and that there will be an earthquake, eruption, or storm, or how the land or trees will tell us when they are sick or healthy depending on what they are capable of or willing to provide to the human and other-than-human community. Often times, my examples reference how other-than-human persons know and share knowledge with humans in times of crisis. However, these persons know and understand and make and share meaning with us and each other under all conditions, both stable and unstable, in dreams and while awake. While most Western scholars would not have noticed that I address only one small group of persons, this demarcation would have been flagrantly obvious to those connected to Indigenous ways of knowing. That Western thinkers would not have thought twice about my centering of human persons reveals the extent to which Western worldviews are exceedingly anthropocentric.

Another respect in which my analysis is purposely circumscribed around human persons in relation to knowing is that there is more than one kind of knowing and more than one kind of knowledge within the Native American worldview that are not acknowledged within the Western worldview. Pace Western epistemology, Native American epistemology—and epistemologies—recognize forms of knowing and knowledge that exist independently of us and that do not require or depend on human persons' participation. In Anishinaabe Mino-Bimaaziziwin (The Way of the Good Life): An Examination of Anishinaabe Philosophy, Ethics and Traditional Knowledge, D’Arcy Rheault simplifies the dual layer of realities; he explains that there is one realm of physical reality and one realm of spiritual reality. Human persons and other-than-human persons have access to the physical realm and with concerted effort at harmonizing their mind and self and finding the right path, which I will discuss later, and they can potentially access the spiritual realm through prayer, dreams, and visions. But, again, there is knowledge of the universe within the spiritual realm that obtains over and beyond any pertinence of or to persons. This kind of knowledge precedes culture, language, time, and persons (ibid.). There is knowledge held by the land; there is knowledge held by the universe; there is knowledge held by our ancestors and more-than-human persons. Many ritual performances that humans perform operate to pay homage to or thank the land and universe, the creator(s) or more-than-human persons, or the ancestors through practices of prayer and gifting/offerings. These are done in the hopes that the land, universe, creator(s), or ancestors will gift to the people some of their guidance or protection—some might say in the hopes to share in their knowledge. Such examples include the sun dance performed by the Sioux or the deer dance of the Yaqui. Just as there are some ways of knowing or some knowledge that ought not to be shared by Native folks with non-Native peoples, there are some ways of knowing and knowledge that are potentially inaccessible, either ethically or metaphysically, to Native peoples.

These delineations that I implement lead to further methodological matters that I should articulate and explain. First, the project is exceptionally interdisciplinary and pluralistic. To make my arguments, I draw from arguments that bridge the sciences, humanities, and fine arts; I engage with Cognitive Science, Dance Studies and Dance Theory, Philosophy, Native Studies and Native Theory, and Sociology/Anthropology. Within philosophy, I intermingle with Native Philosophy, Philosophy of Dance, Embodied Cognitive Theory, Epistemology, Pragmatism, Phenomenology, and Performance Philosophy. I highlight this aspect of my methodology because such pluralistic and interdisciplinary work is outside of the norm within traditional, mainstream analytic philosophy, especially within epistemology. But my aim is not to cohere with the traditional standards of analytic philosophy, even if this risks placing my workout outside of what is considered Philosophy proper. My intellectual and methodological commitments
are to remain true to Indigenous methodologies, which prioritize pluralist and interdisciplinary approaches. Among many, one reason for this methodological commitment coincides with Native American and broader Indigenous valuations of myriad, distinct, and different perspectives and voices. Inclusive research approaches contribute to decolonial projects within the academy and are one substantive method by which to bridge the gaps between Indigenous knowing and epistemology. Furthermore, Native American ways of knowing are polycentric and thus respectful Native American methodologies require voices from many directions to bring understanding to questions, whether small or large. This analysis would be neither possible nor permissible without the plethora of voices and experiences that I invite and welcome beyond my own experiences, beyond my armchair, and beyond my discipline.

The second methodological point regards my claim that this is an analytic analysis. What I mean by analytic here is a much thinner implementation of the term than usually denoted within the field of Philosophy. By analytic, I refer almost exclusively to writing style and systematic approach. I forego many of the deeper presuppositions regarding purpose and content; that is, I do not aim for universality, certainty, or absoluteness with respect to my analysis. I do not imply or suggest that my account is fixed, rigid, complete, or impermeable. I do not offer necessary and sufficient condition. As I will show, these very notions of Western philosophy, specifically in the area of analytic philosophy, contradict and are at direct odds with the understanding of knowing in Native epistemology. Knowing is perceived as always coming to be, becoming, and progressing; the notion of a complete account of knowing and knowledge does not have linguistic or cognitive possibility. My aim to be systematic is not and should not be perceived as an attempt to erase the plurality of particular means to and modes of knowing within diverse Native and other Indigenous communities. And it should not be perceived as an attempt to pin Native knowing down into a static definition-based account. Rather, my hope is that my analytical style presents the analysis and explanations as simply and clearly as possible so that others may come in and fidget with the claims and ideas as either they see fit or as need be. In this case, analytical clarity must not be conflated with analytical conceptual completeness. My analysis is not the analysis of Native American epistemology, as many analytic projects position themselves to be. My analysis is one way of understanding the relationship between performances as Truth in the Native American worldview, especially insofar as I delimit my account to the realm of human persons and dancing. Some of the traits that Maori education activist Graham Smith posits as central to Indigenous methodologies and theories are that they be flexible, inclusive, critical, and broadly applicable, which I interpret as user-friendly. My use of an analytic style helps me approximate these objectives as much as possible.

Another concern that may arise from my initial claim that I am offering an analytic analysis, which is related to concerns over universality and absoluteness, is the concern that I am offering a pan-Indian and pan-Indigenous analysis, which would erase the substantive and meaningful distinctive identities between tribes and tribal nations. One question that often is asked by philosophers and other scholars is how one can speak of a Native Philosophy when there are numerous tribes and tribal nations with different practices, languages, and cultures. Citing Leroy Little Bear, Margaret Covach contends:

As Indigenous people, we understand each other because we share a worldview that holds common, enduring beliefs about the world. As Indigenous scholar Leroy Little Bear states, “there is enough similarity among North American Indian philosophies to apply concepts generally”.

Similarly, Whitt avows:

...given the global presences of some 5000 distinctive indigenous cultures, references to an “indigenous” knowledge system—even if one confined its scope to Native North America as I tend to do here—is empirically tenuous at best...[But] it would...be historically and politically myopic to only see differences. Concrete diversity does not preclude commonality or community; there is much that binds
indigenous peoples together. There are shared conditions, shared responsibilities, and a shared struggle. Artist Gail Tremblay portends:

[Each of us] comes from a people who has also had the experience of facing forces of colonization by outsiders and has been subjected to attempts at physical and cultural genocide. Each knows the pressure to assimilate to other cultural patterns, and the pain of loss that has been handed down across the generations of people since contact...So it is that coming from such diverse cultures, we can join together to say, we are one.

And choreographer Gower-Kappi avows: “We might be different, from different climates, landscapes, but we all believe we come from the land”. Regarding epistemology more specifically, Dian Million espouses that Indigenous scholars recognize the oral and communal knowledge as epistemic practices even though they are invalidated, ignored, or erased by the academy. He explains that these epistemic systems are theoretical frameworks insofar as they proffer a worldview paradigm on knowing. As such, and without ignoring or erasing significant cultural differences, some Native scholars—especially Native philosophers and Native theorists—merge and blend disparate tribal and tribal nation epistemologies where they are consistent to establish a broader Native American or Indigenous worldview and underlying epistemology. It is very common for Native and other Indigenous folks to speak to a Native or Indigenous worldview while also acknowledging that distinct groups have distinct philosophies and epistemologies consequent of cultural practices and histories. So it may be of use to note that when I speak of Native Philosophy, I use this phrase, as many others do, as interchangeable with the notion of worldview.

Identity-based terminology, which can depend on settler-colonial legal designations and/or legal tribal nation designations are quite complicated and diverse. This issue is crucial to political and cultural sovereignty. Though there are still many variations, both internally and externally, regarding how identity markers are used, I attempt to offer a brief description here. However, this is not ideal, complete, or definitive and is only my attempt to best capture the diversity and variation in how identity descriptors are taken up. For both Native and non-Native folks, this terminology may be a bit confusing. Indigenous refers to Native peoples in some general respect, insofar as an Indigenous person is Native to some place. Many do use them interchangeably, though not all theorists do. Some scholars strictly use the term Native without further designation; others strictly use the term Indigenous. Many Native folks in the current USA use the term American Indian—I do not, but I use American Indian when I am referencing others who do. Many Native North Americans/American Indians use the shorthand Native to refer to themselves and some Indigenous Native South American peoples also use the term Native as a generic phrase, though—again—not all do; many Native South Americans use the term Indigenous. Native North Americans often only refers to folks native to the current US territory while those native to lands in present day Canada may refer to themselves as Native, Indigenous, or Aboriginal, which includes First Nations, Inuit, and Métis, certainly never as American Indians. Similarly, Native South Americans would never use the term American Indian. They frequently also specify as to whether they are Mayan or Azteca or, even more specifically, identify which Indigenous group of the Maya or Aztec they belong to. There are wide-ranging debates regarding uses of specific terms. What one resource says may be rejected in another resource; how one person identifies may be in conflict with how another person identifies, even if they are of similar heritage. The APA committee on Native American and Indigenous Philosophy has gone through numerous debates and name changes specifically for this reason. Some folks consider Native a term that is waning. Some folks reject the term Indigenous because they deem it a scientific designation referring to groups such as plants and, instead, utilize Aboriginal. I use the term Native and Native American interchangeably and use the phrase “Native and Indigenous” when I am referring to things that apply to Native North Americans, Aboriginal/Native Hawai’ians, Aboriginal Pacific Islanders, Indigenous Africans or
folks from the African diaspora, Māori, Aboriginals, and Native/Indigenous South Americans. General/broad terms are sometimes used with political intention but not always. It’s also pretty common for Native folks in “Indian Country” to refer to themselves as plain ol’ Indians.

I primarily utilize the term Native to be in accord with much of my research and switch to Native and Indigenous when I am addressing perspectives or issues that are diverse but have points of commonality. I use Native American, specifically in relation to epistemology—as in the title of this book—for two reasons. First, my analysis of a performative knowledge system is developed to flesh out a specific definition of Truth within Native American philosophy. And relatedly, many of the scholars that I draw on are or work in Native American philosophy. I also incorporate scholars into the philosophical analysis of epistemology who primarily use Native as a broad term, which is why I alternate between Native American epistemology and Native epistemology. Yet as one can see, many of the scholars I cite use Native and Indigenous interchangeably, but some others do not. Given the commonality of this tendency to use Native and Indigenous interchangeably in the scholarship, I sometimes alternate between them. But many other theorists either strictly use the term Indigenous or Aboriginal and I do my best to be attentive to how scholars refer to themselves or their work and try to make clear when scholars are differentiating themselves or their work as strictly Indigenous or Aboriginal rather than Native.

I should also note that not all theorists who identify as Native American are citizens of tribal nations, such as myself. Moreover, it is not always clear whether or not a theorist is of Native or Indigenous descent, even if they are working in and on Native American or other Indigenous theory and issues. I try to make sure that I do not refer to scholars as such, or imply such an identity, unless it is particularly clear in the text. If it is clear, I make a specific identity reference to the author or speaker. If the author does not explicitly identify his or her self then I do not attribute—nor imply—identity ascriptions to the author. Not all theorists who work in or on Native and Indigenous issues are Native/Indigenous, just as not all theorists working in feminist or black theory are women or racialized. When a theorist’s identity is not stated, even when I am discussing Native and Indigenous issues, I do not impute an identity ascription to them and I hope that you will not either.

Relatedly, some may wonder why I am positing this analysis as a philosophy given the extensive plurality and differences between Native American groups and folks. Many other authors use the term Thought rather than Philosophy, e.g., Indigenous Thought or American Indian Thought. A short quip on this concern is that I am a philosopher—not just in training, but in my very soul—therefore I would just like to presume that whatever I’m cranking out just so happens to be Philosophy, whether Western scholars and the Western academy deem it thus or not. But this speaks to the other reason why I am too intent on identifying this work as Philosophy or a philosophy. In all of my time in the discipline of Philosophy, until only very recently, the academy and particular identifiable philosophers have told me in no uncertain terms that there is not, and has never been, Native American Philosophy: It doesn’t exist, it isn’t done, there aren’t any other Native folks in the field unless they’re in Ethnic Studies, and even if there were such a thing, it wouldn’t be valuable or count as real scholarship within Philosophy. Fast forward to the past few years when Native philosophers are demanding more visibility and are becoming more active. In my attempts to procure funding from external organizations, I have been told similar things. In fact, when I applied for funding from the NEH for a Native Philosophy individual research project, each commenter refuted the existence of Native Philosophy. One commenter stated: “There is no such thing as Native American Philosophy. Native peoples did not produce anything sophisticated or systematic enough to constitute proper Philosophy. At best, one might say there is a Native American Thought”. And with just those few words, the commenters deemed my research project “Without Merit” and undeserving of consideration for funding. From my perspective and from my experience, the rejection of the existence of Native Philosophy with only the permission of something much “softer”—Thought—is not only a colonial
practice, it evidences a lack of sophistication within Western Philosophy by revealing an inherent absence of actually being able to even consider, for just one second, otherwise. In essence, it is utter garbage. There was once a time when the same sentiments were attributed to Africana Philosophy—itself an Indigenous Philosophy. So I defend this project as a work of Native American Philosophy as an act of self-actualization and as an act of colonial academic resistance. Additionally, some readers may be discontent with my use of the term “Western” in that Western philosophy is heterogeneous. However, within Native Studies and Native Theory and Philosophy, the foundations of Western society and the corresponding mainstream ideology suffice to legitimize this grouping; most if not all Native scholars use the term “Western”, though some use “Eurocentric”, interchangeably with “dominant”, “dominating”, or “colonizing” worldview or framework; it points to an intellectual heritage. In relation to Native Philosophy and Indigenous knowledges, the primary intellectual heritage stems from actual genocidal practices of people, languages, and culture of Native peoples that have projected Native practices of ways of knowing as savage, inherently irrational, mystical, nonsensical, and incoherent. For example, most mainstream Western epistemologies reject practices or conditions of knowing that are inherently normative, but all, outside of religious liberation theory, reject claims to knowing that have spiritual components. That Native epistemology is inherently value laden and ethical stemming from the land and spirit of the land is used as an example of the unsophisticated nature of Native peoples' ways of thinking. And as far as I can tell, most, if not all, Western epistemologies reject the idea that other-than-human beings are full epistemic agents on equal standing with humans and who have equally profound forms and ways of knowing—except perhaps in a more limited and inequivalent sense of having equal consideration, though even this more limited moral conception is not recognized in or extended to the agency of the land itself.

Distinctions can be drawn between Native American, First Peoples, and Indigenous perspectives—or, Diné, Cherokee, Choctaw, Métis, Inuit, Maori, etc.—just as Western philosophy can often be divided into Anglo, French, American, German, etc. philosophy. And there are even further cultural and linguistic disparities within each of these identities as they break down into clan identities. But many of the foundational principles of Native Philosophy are broadly shared, as is the linguistic syntax and structure, which permits of a broad ideology through which to analyze the world—or more appropriately, to participate in the world and our relationships. From the Native and/or Indigenous frame, Western philosophy—or the Western worldview, which includes Western epistemology—is conceived of as a unity in terms of its dominant and colonial positioning in relation to other worldviews that are purposefully marginalized by it. It is identified as the dominant and dominating worldview in order to capture the power relations exerted both epistemically and politically, through its neoliberal and neopositivist spirit and underlying foundations, over Indigenous peoples. Western philosophy is grounded in a linear and binary logic that upholds the law of non-contradiction, whereas Native logic is a circular, non-binary version of logic that moves between relationships and consequently rejects the law of non-contradiction. For example, gender exists in the Native framework, but there is typically more than two and the masculine and feminine are not conceived as opposing but rather as complements; yet how many genders there are and how gender is presented will, in fact, vary across tribes. Moreover, this logic is shared more broadly by Indigenous folks throughout the Americas; Aztec logic posits a similar logic of agonistic ionic pairs, and Mayan philosophy holds a similar complementary logic. North and South Native Americans are land centered, and Pacific Islanders are water centered—all of them are constellation centered. What this tells us is that Native Americans, along with many other Indigenous groups, are place centered. Western frameworks, because grounded in universality, atomistic individualism, and hierarchy, do not recognize the importance of place since the recognition of relations to space and place would have precluded
or, at least, most certainly caused great cognitive difficulty and dissonance for their colonial ventures. Most Native American accounts of ways of knowing highlight frameworks of holism and polycentrism.

And there are many more examples of similar and shared ontological and epistemological commitments, such as a universal energy that imbues all things and ethical relations among all persons—both human and nonhuman, commitments to reciprocity, respect, relationality, responsibility to Mother Earth and community, pluralism, inclusivity, and an intermingling ethical metaphysics grounded on dynamicism, agonism, complementarity, animism, and locality. Native Philosophy maintains no such distinction between metaphysics and ethics and conceptualizes ontology and knowledge in terms of ethical relationships.

The point of propping up the “Western vs. Indigenous” or “Western vs. Native” distinction is always to account for the power differential between them at the ideological level, which gives rise to the continued abuse, colonization, erasure, and exploitation at the political and academic level. The aim of producing systematic Indigenous and/or Native American analyses is to resist the incessant efforts by the academy to force Indigenous knowledges to conform to Eurocentric, Western conceptual and cognitive categories that do obtain in these systems of knowledges. And even when Native scholars attempt to articulate or translate Indigenous theories into oversimplified and malnourished Western paradigms, the academy rejects their attempts to do so and labels them inadequate because the ideas that do not reinforce the superiority of the Western framework are deemed incapable as constituting valid frames and concepts cannot be “suitably” molded into an assimilationist intellectual machine, which Marie Battiste and James (Sa’ke’ji) Youngblood Henderson refer to as “ontological imperialism” and “cognitive imperialism”.

That my aim is to account for (an) epistemology within a Native American worldview substantiates why it is that I cite as extensively as I do. The act of quoting serves four interrelated purposes. First, it is imperative to draw attention to the places where Native and other Indigenous scholars of various affiliations and descents intersect on issues related to Native epistemology. And while I do focus on Native American epistemology given my focus on a specific definition, I do include voices of Indigenous peoples more broadly given that there are many points of commonality between various Indigenous groups regarding ontology, ethics, and ways of knowing. Second, I am not a point or voice of authority on Native American ways of knowing. Knowing is a communal process and I only know what I know given my diffuse familial understandings that I have identified, through my conversations with others, and my extensive attention to far-reaching, wide-ranging, diverse scholarly work by those who are embedded in traditional cultural practices and/or have connections with their (or others’) elders. It is consequential to me that I orient myself in conversation with others from whom I have learned what I know rather than centering myself as if this were all my own doing. To leave out the words and names, or to relegate the words and names of others to footnotes, regularly would be to engage in what I would perceive to be a form of testimonial and discursive violence—or just more simply, it would be downright disrespectful given the sheer amount of work I know many of these scholars and dancers have done to be able to share what they have come to know. There are others who have more authority or experience from which to speak, especially in relation to contemporary Native and Indigenous dance, and I defer to them when their words and ideas prove indispensable; similarly, there are some ideas that just cannot be paraphrased without causing an injustice to the precision or significance of the direct words of the speaker. This further explains why I directly cite Native and Indigenous dancers as they are directly cited in the work of scholars in dance studies. I also want to draw attention to the fact that some Native scholars have more of a hold on their language than others. But I should note that when I refer to more authority, one should not presume that authority is tantamount to authenticity, which is a Eurocentric and violently imposed identity ascription. Western scholars search desperately for authentic Native people and voices in scholarship and discount any as legitimate sources who do not reinforce the stereotype and caricature of the
pipe-smoking Indian who speaks little and solely in metaphor and substantiates Western conceptions of Native epistemologies as being nothing short of mere mysticism. Within the area of Native/Indigenous Studies, scholars such as Audra Simpson, Andrea Smith, Vine Deloria Jr., Brain Burkhart, as well as myself staunchly reject the idea of authenticity, as it aims to align with Western academic fetishizations. Thus, when possible, I include and identify specific Native and/or Indigenous terms that others share to help clarify and enrich the analysis of Native American epistemology in Norton-Smith, DuFour, and Burkart that I work to flesh out. Third, my use of bringing in as many voices as possible in their own words holds true to an Indigenous methodology of epistemic pluralism and polycentrism. Finally, as I will show, narrative storytelling is the central mode of sharing knowledge within Native American epistemology. Thus, it is methodologically salient for me to impart the stories told by others, especially as it relates to the experiences of embodied knowing and dancing. Unlike Western philosophy, the stories of others must be passed down and not reformulated into paraphrases that not only make their experiences invisible but also abandon the character of story itself.

I must stress that I did not participate in the academic research in and on Native and Indigenous dance and dancing that I cite. All first-person ethnographic citations of and from Native and Indigenous dancers were done either in publications by the dancers themselves or by other scholars in either or both Native/Indigenous Studies and Dance Studies. It is through my intersections with this academic and museum research that I see my philosophical analysis of the analytic definition of Truth in Native American epistemology as being most robustly interdisciplinary. First, and generally, the field of Philosophy has long sequestered itself from the other disciplines as somehow being above and beyond. But, as if becoming more of a given rather than an exception, good philosophy—useful philosophy—must exist in conversation with others in the academy and the world who generate and yield meanings and give life to otherwise infertile arguments. Second, as I have said (and will continue to say), my argument that dancing is truthing is not original in itself from Native and Indigenous perspectives. My goal is to give the analysis of the philosophical definition that posits Truth as a function of action, rather than proposition. Thus, my interaction with and engagement of ethnographic and empirical matters related to Native and Indigenous dancing serves to properly contextualize my extensive overall argument. So, one might conceive of my interdisciplinary approach, specifically as it relates to Chapter 4, as a symbiotic methodology: the narrative ethnography that I cite yields contexts and examples to substantiate the philosophical arguments while the philosophical arguments can, if needed, contribute to the understanding of similar and related notions and concepts that anchor empirical work from a distinctively philosophical perspective. Just as narrative ethnography breathes life into philosophy, philosophy can generate analytic tools and colored lenses of the world for others to build layers from multiple angles into their narrative, ethnographic, empirical inquiries.

This is a secondary reason I quote as frequently as I do, and this relates to my citations of Western theory. As I stated above, this book is exceptionally pluralistic, not only within Philosophy but also between disciplines. When one is working just within one’s own field, and writing just for one’s own field, it is rather easy to insert a position or claim then include a series of author citations alongside it to demonstrate that one knows the history and range of the claim under examination. But this is not possible when juggling disciplines that do not even all belong under the same umbrella. I intermingle the humanities, social sciences, hard sciences, and fine arts for one project. This means that each distinct audience who reads this book will very likely have little to no familiarity with the other disciplines incorporated into my analysis. It’s not absurd to imagine that some folks will have familiarity with only about 20% of the authors in conversation here. So, I work diligently to provide thorough exegesis and detailed descriptions of each of the positions that pertain to my analysis. And in so doing, I include lots of quotes from the distinctive theorists so that readers can get a sense of these author’s voices as they are
used in their own scholarship area. As a further note, because readers will be coming to this project with distinctive intellectual goals in mind, not all of every word will be absolutely crucial to each and every reader. I do submit extensive coverage of the range of questions needed to be answered to draw all of the connections for an analytical analysis of a phenomenological knowledge system, but folks from, say, Native Studies might not need all of the background on cognitive science included. Therefore, my aim is to both provide clear and instructive discussion of all relevant scholarship so that any newcomer can learn more about each of the related fields and order the arguments most accommodatingly so that readers can weave in and out for their own purposes without losing a sense of the overall line of reasoning; the quotes I’ve selected, then, can be viewed as a sort of curated, illuminated fast-track through the various discourses.

The final point regarding my methodology is my use of the terms “phenomenology” and “phenomenological”. As I stated, I offer an analytic analysis of the phenomenology of Native American epistemology. In this statement, I imply and employ multiple senses of this notion. To reiterate, I proffer that my style is analytic while the content of the analysis is not always or necessarily so. But here I shift the emphasis from my style to the myriad ways in which the content of my analysis is largely phenomenological. Certainly, most of the material I draw on from my analysis—whether it be dance theory or cognitive theory—has firm roots in key canonical phenomenologists, such as Merleau-Ponty and Sheets-Johnstone. But I also use the term phenomenology in other ways. I use this term very loosely in that I conceive of one’s phenomenological experience to be rather interchangeable with one’s lived experience, except that in choosing this term, I aim to highlight the embodied aspects of lived experience. While all lived experience is embodied, I use the term phenomenological experience to pick out specifically those experiences that are centered on—whether directly or indirectly, intentionally or subconsciously—the body and what the body is providing to the person in that experience. Another way that I use the term is much narrower. This use of the term refers so very specifically to the experience of the body as the body, so deeply that one’s sense of existence is as her body. This use may not make sense to all readers. It is an understanding of phenomenology that is peculiar to athletes, dancers, some disabled folks, and even those who have been raped or brutally assaulted. While phenomenologists, especially in their methodology, reject dualism and the mystified notion of a “mind” that exists independently of us, we are always aware of a conscious self, which is partially why many of us who reject dualism still secretly ponder about the “I can’s” of phenomenology—where am “I”? even though I know I just am my body. But those of us who live much of our lives so deeply and so meaningfully through our bodies really have a distinct conception of “I” and “I can” when we are living through our bodies; it is as if the question of where “I” am doesn’t make sense anymore because “I” am one with my body, my body is “me”, body and self are fused and all thoughts seem to echo throughout one’s chest and limbs and they answer back as a sort of inner interlocutor but they are still you. This is what I mean, at times, when I refer to a phenomenological experience—it is a particular kind of existence through the body when in motion.

Before I sashay on to Chapter 2, I would like to explain my own history and role in the area of Native Philosophy. My work in Native Philosophy began when I was a graduate student. Initially, I was working on the metaphysics of race in relation to mixed-race Native people and the politics of blood-quantum. At that point, the only book I had found on Native Philosophy was the American Indian Thought anthology (2004), which led me to seek out those whose work was in this book. Upon discovering the APA Committee on American Indian Philosophers (as it was named at the time), I began to become acquainted with both the Native and non-Native philosophers working in this area, most of whom were in the anthology. I also joined the committee as a member while a graduate student. I began studying their work and developing a course in Native American Philosophy, which I have been teaching for many years. During this time, I developed work that allowed me to link my original area of specialization in Feminist
philosophy with Native Philosophy. As time went on, I was elected to the committee and have worked with these other Native philosophers consistently on advancing both Native Philosophy and the visibility of Native philosophers within the discipline. As my studies, research, and teaching advanced, my interests in Native Philosophy shifted from my primary interest being on the ethico-political to the metaphysical and epistemological—though there is no actual distinction between them in Native and Indigenous philosophy. Currently, I am the co-editor of the APA Newsletter on Native American and Indigenous Philosophers (as it is now named).

I must also pay homage to the thinkers who came before me and made this project possible—to acknowledge my philosophical relations, as it were. Mark Johnson provides me the necessary theoretical link of embodied metaphor that allows me to complete the bridge between dance and Native American knowledge at the analytic phenomenological level. As it turns out, my project here follows very closely to his own projects, specifically that of demonstrating the centrality of art to meaning-making. And it is important to note, given how intertwined my project is with his own, that I became aware of his work through other scholars contributing to Native American theory, who also draw on the notion of embodied metaphor for explicating a Native worldview. One might say that I picked up on their trail and followed it. What I should emphasize from the outset, though, is that embodied cognitive theorists have been drawing on Native American frames and worldviews to be able to thicken their own analyses. This is because Native American epistemologies, and philosophies more generally, have posited embodied knowledge, including embodied metaphor, all along. And most importantly, I aim to further develop the Native American epistemological analysis of Thomas Norton-Smith, who also drew from these theorists, and the very recent work of Brian Burkart on Native American epistemology and locality. I acknowledge my great debt to and appreciation of the works of Norton-Smith and Johnson who laid the analytic groundwork for this project.

Brown, Juan Carlos Flores [Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies, and Movements Series, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 9781538114308]

This second edition concentrates on various philosophers and theologians from the medieval Arabian, Jewish, and Christian worlds. It principally centers on authors such as Abumashar, Saadiah Gaon and Alcuin from the eighth century and follows the intellectual developments of the three traditions up to the fifteenth-century Ibn Khaldun, Hasdai Crescas and Marsilio Ficino. The spiritual journeys presuppose earlier human sources, such as the philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and Porphyry and various Stoic authors, the revealed teachings of the Jewish Law, the Koran and the Christian Bible. The Fathers of the Church, such as St. Augustine and Gregory the Great, provided examples of theology in their attempts to reconcile revealed truth and man’s philosophical knowledge and deserve attention as pre-medieval contributors to medieval intellectual life. Avicenna and Averroes, Maimonides and Gersonides, St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Bonaventure, stand out in the three traditions as special medieval contributors who deserve more attention.

This second edition of Historical Dictionary of Medieval Philosophy and Theology contains a chronology, an introduction, appendixes, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has over 300 cross-referenced entries on important persons, events, and concepts that shaped medieval philosophy and theology. This book is an excellent resource for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about medieval philosophy and theology.

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This latest volume to the Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies, and Movements series focuses on the philosophy of the Middle Ages, but this is a philosophy so intertwined with religion that it also includes theology. Although covering mainly Christianity and the West, it also touches on Judaism and Islam and their centers in Europe and includes information on the great Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle. Although relegated to the past, medieval philosophy and theology can be used to address present-day problems.

This second revised and expanded edition of Historical Dictionary of Medieval Philosophy and Theology contains a dictionary section with brief entries on important philosophers and thinkers of the period, such as Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Peter Abelard, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham, but also their predecessors, such as Augustine, Plato, Aristotle, Avicenna, and Averroes. Other entries describe major concepts and issues, institutions and organizations, and conflicts and other events. A chronology and introduction provide a time line and an overview, appendices contain reference material, and an extensive bibliography lists a variety of works for further research.

Given the unusually large span of time and amount of information in this book, it is fortunate that its two authors combine a broad range of backgrounds and interests. Stephen F. Brown is American, and Juan Carlos Flores was born in San Salvador, although both pursued their doctoral studies at the University of Louvain in Belgium. They obtained their doctorates in philosophy and also have extensive theological backgrounds. Dr. Brown completed his undergraduate studies at St. Bonaventure University and has taught in the Theology Department of Boston College for almost four decades. Dr. Flores did his doctoral dissertation on the doctrine of the Trinity and Henry of Ghent and is professor at the University of Detroit Mercy. Both have written extensively and are editors of medieval Latin philosophical and theological texts.

The Middle Ages and Medieval were not originally purely temporal terms signifying the period between the ancient and modern worlds. They were pejorative expressions, much like the phrase the Dark Ages. What we call the Middle Ages was first viewed as a period of low intellectual achievement compared to the high philosophical and literary accomplishments of the Greco-Roman world that preceded it and the technological advances and philosophical and theological alternatives of the modern world that followed.

The negative judgment regarding medieval intellectual life is perhaps best captured in the closing paragraph of W. T. Stace's A Critical History of Greek Philosophy: "Philosophy is founded upon reason. It is the effort to comprehend, to understand, to grasp the reality of things intellectually. Therefore it cannot admit anything higher than reason. To exalt intuition, ecstasy, or rapture, above thought—this is death to philosophy. Philosophy, in making such an admission, lets out its own life-blood, which is thought. In Neo-Platonism, therefore, ancient philosophy commits suicide. This is the end. The place of philosophy is taken henceforth by religion. Christianity triumphs, and sweeps away all independent thought from its path. There is no more philosophy now till a new spirit of enquiry and wonder is breathed into man at the Renaissance and the Reformation. Then the new era begins, and gives birth to a new philosophic impulse, under the influence of which we are still living. But to reach that new era of philosophy, the human spirit had first to pass through the arid wastes of Scholasticism."

We hope that this volume will challenge to some degree this evaluation. While this book is not a history of medieval philosophy or theology but rather a historical dictionary, we have attempted to include within it a description of the important persons, events, and concepts that shaped medieval philosophy and theology. Perhaps surprisingly for some, this is not exclusively a dictionary of Christian philosophers and theologians. Arabian and Jewish thinkers played an important role in the history of medieval philosophy and theology—both within their own cultural and religious worlds as well as, and perhaps even more so, in the Christian world. The medieval world of philosophy and theology is a multicultural world.
The medieval philosophical and theological endeavor was one of great interplay among authors from the three great religious traditions, who adopted, adapted, and shared the philosophical riches of the classical world and the religious resources of the biblical heritage.

In relation to the temporal context of this volume, we might clarify another point: among the authors, events, and concepts we include in this volume are some that certainly are not counted as medieval. Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca lived centuries before the medieval period. The biblical revelation, on which the medieval conceptions of the created world were mainly based, was complete and already richly examined and interpreted when medievals studied it. Contemplation and friendship were discussed long before they were treated by medieval thinkers. Yet these ancient and biblical authors, events, and concepts were of the utmost importance to medieval philosophers and theologians. They are presented here in terms of their influence in the medieval era.

In compiling this book, we have depended on a large variety of primary and secondary sources. In a special way, we want to acknowledge our indebtedness to The New Catholic Encyclopedia (2002), The Dictionary of the Middle Ages, The Columbia History of Western Philosophy, Dictionnaire de la Théologie Catholique, Dictionnaire de la Spiritualité, and Lexicon für Theologie und Kirche. We have also depended on a number of other dictionaries and histories of philosophy and theology, most notably, E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages; A. Maurer, Medieval Philosophy; J. Marenbon, ed., Medieval Philosophy; J. J. E. Gracia and T. B. Noone, eds., A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages; Y. Congar, A History of Theology; B. Hägglund, History of Theology; P. W. Carey and J. T. Lienhard, eds., Biographical Dictionary of Christian Theologians; J. Pelikan, The Growth of Medieval Theology; and M. L. Colish, Medieval Foundations of the Western Intellectual Tradition. The sources of the first edition of this work were printed works. Here in this second edition, our search for bibliography has been assisted by electronic sources, in particular the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Medieval philosophy is an outgrowth and continuation of ancient philosophy. Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Neoplatonists formulated philosophical insights that, in the medieval period together with revelation, yielded a number of outstanding well-ordered visions of reality. "Scientifically well ordered" is a predominant characteristic of medieval philosophy and theology, especially in its more mature phases. This is certainly not true of Plato’s dialogues taken either severally or as a whole. Though truer of Aristotle, his extant writings still left certain fundamental issues open for intense debate, development, and resolution. Moreover, his First Philosophy, which we now call the Metaphysics (the treatise that comes closest to presenting his fundamental science of reality), is a posthumous compilation of his different insights into first and dependent causes and the unified character of general reality, rather than, as medieval thinkers would later aspire to achieve, an integrated science of this subject. Nevertheless, Plato and Aristotle, the primary philosophical sources for medieval thinkers, in their various inquiries do adhere consistently to discernible methodologies that greatly informed the fundamental frameworks of medieval outlooks. Choosing between the Platonic and Aristotelian approaches as starting points for a philosophy became for medievals, as for many even today, a basic decision, one with far-reaching consequences. Though sharing enough to be synthesized by some into one vision, most subsequent philosophers understood the irreducible fundamental differences of these two perennial approaches. It forced them to choose as a starting point either one or the other.

Plato’s basic insight is that the mind’s assessment of sense experience appeals to sources only seen, however obliquely, with the mind’s eye. When we judge, for example, one thing to be better than another, we appeal to a standard of goodness. This standard cannot appear to us through the senses. If it did, it would not really be the true standard, for then we would still be able to judge it itself in relation to other things, necessitating a higher norm in accord with an invisible standard of
goodness. Though we appeal to goodness as a standard of judgment, we do not understand goodness itself perfectly, and we experience much difficulty when trying to give a scientific account of it. However, forms such as goodness are each understood as one unchanging essence. If goodness were somehow many or were of different types, it would need to be judged to be a good thing, and that by which it would be so judged would then be goodness itself. The soul that judges by means of these perfect forms possesses, therefore, some knowledge of an unchanging measure, however imperfect that knowledge may be.

True knowledge, properly speaking, can only be of unchanging things, since they alone can yield unwavering truth and provide a norm for judging changing realities. Of changing things, namely sensible things, we can only have opinion, not true knowledge. Man’s access to unchanging realities that transcend the sensible world is evidence, for Plato, of the preexistence of the soul. The soul must have lived in a world of unchanging realities before its birth into its present earthly existence. The access to unchanging realities is not explainable in terms of our present sense experiences, which are of changing things. Yet, some knowledge of unchanging realities is now present to us. So, it can only be present to us as something we remember from our pre-earthly life. These basic insights pervade Plato’s dialogues, and they provide keys to the further developments of his thought. We cannot here spell out all these developments that are found in his many dialogues, but we can indicate two general consequences of his developed thought (refer to the section “Plato in the Medieval World”). First, the sensible world, as a copy of a truer intelligible reality, owes its character and order to an ultimate source or cause that produced the orderly world we inhabit out of the desire to give of itself, that is, to share its goodness and wisdom. Secondly, the soul, above all a lover of true reality, thirsts for a return to this ultimate source, which is the ground of life, knowledge, and reality.

The central tenets of Aristotle’s philosophy likewise depend on his starting point, which is his account of change. Even in the Metaphysics, dealing with topics to be studied after all others, he begins by addressing change as that which first presents itself as a subject for philosophical questioning. The fact of something new coming into being, the most evident of phenomena, must be explained, not explained away, as Aristotle feels his predecessors had done. Plato’s unchanging forms, understood by Aristotle as causes separate from changing things, fail by their very definition as unchanging realities to account for change. The same applies to those philosophers who, like Parmenides and Melissus, posit only one principle of being. These thinkers are caught in the following dilemma: either something comes from being or from nonbeing. If from the former, then it already was, and therefore does not come to be. If from the latter, then nothing ever would come to be. Either way, there is no real change, in the sense of something truly new coming into being. On the other hand, claiming that all reality is in flux or is always changing, as Heraclitus and his followers seem to convey, destroys all intelligibility in nature, as there remains no fixed ground for our judgments. When we would speak of anything, it already has passed away or ceased to be. Learning from the failures of earlier natural philosophers to explain change or how something new can come into reality, Aristotle finally arrived at an account of change that was based on three principles: two contraries, and an underlying subject. Every type of change is the actualization of a potency.

This portrait of change is dealt with more fully in our entry on Aristotelianism. Suffice it to say here that in this account Aristotle discovers the immanent forms governing and dictating the goals of all processes, including the human soul as the form of the body. He also discovers the eternal nature of change, the eternal character of the universe that includes it, and the eternal existence of the ultimate cause of all change and motion, the first Unmoved Mover. This First Cause, which is pure actuality, governs all things as the ultimate end that each thing approaches through the limited actualization of its form. As natural forms are immanent, the sensible world is not a copy of higher unchanging forms and does not owe its orderly patterns to a Creator. The Unmoved Mover is not an efficient cause. It is complete in itself and has no relation on its part to other things. However, other things are
all related to it. They want either consciously or unconsciously to be complete just as the Prime Mover is complete. They do not want to be the Prime Mover, since they do not have the nature or essence of the Prime Mover. However, they do want to be complete according to their natures. Men, for instance, by having a human form or nature, want to be as fully human as they can be. In this way, but at their own level, they try to imitate the Prime Mover, aiming at becoming complete, but complete as human beings. Their immanent form, the human soul, aims them in that direction.

The immanence of forms not only is the key to Aristotle's philosophy of human activity; indeed it is the key to the activities of all things, whose forms make them the kind of things they are and lead them to do the things they do. The immanence of forms also means that human knowledge of them is abstractive: the intellect knows these forms when it draws them out of the sensible particulars in which the forms are found. We do not arrive at the knowledge of universal principles through recollection of universal transcendent realities we encountered in some previous life. Finally, as the human soul itself is an immanent form, its goal is actualization according to its nature, a nature that is fulfilled chiefly through growth in knowledge and moral virtue. When Aristotle says, "All men by nature desire to know," he is not simply giving a description. He is declaring that it is the very nature of man that he wants to know the things that lead to the highest human happiness. Only in pursuing such objects will he be fulfilled as a human being.

More than Plato and Aristotle, the Neoplatonists, particularly Plotinus and Proclus, do provide explicit philosophical systems, basically syntheses of Platonic and Aristotelian thought. These syntheses, which served as examples for medieval philosophical and theological systems, essentially subordinated Aristotelianism to Platonism: the sensible reality adequately described by Aristotle depends on the more fundamental reality discerned from Plato's writings. Plato's ultimate source is to be understood as the One, from which all things emanate (through necessary stages bridging spiritual and material reality) and to which all things seek to return. In general, medieval thinkers try to move beyond the necessity embedded in this conception, with its concomitant theses, in their pursuit of an intelligible account of the God of revelation who freely created the world.

While "scientifically well ordered" is the characteristic style of medieval speculation, God oriented is its central tendency. Understanding the most worthy objects of knowledge, namely, God and his works, is the chief task. The resources for this task are reason and revelation. The scientific character of medieval philosophy and theology largely stems from the conviction of the fundamental compatibility of these two sources. The truth is one. How can two contradictories both be true? Revealed truth is therefore compatible with rational truth. The truth of reason found in the texts of the philosophical tradition must be gathered and synthesized. Such philosophical syntheses in their turn must themselves be examined and judged in relation to the truth of revelation. This attitude is what generated competing philosophical and theological visions. The philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and their followers are viewed by medieval thinkers as great intellectual inheritances, since these philosophers concluded, on the basis of reason, truths about God and the world that were often consonant with and illustrative of truths affirmed by revelation. However, the great Greek thinkers did not say all that could be said about God. Nor were they free from erroneous judgments. Some of their conclusions stood in need of revision. Inspired by the teachings of revelation and their conviction of the one divine source of the truths found in creation and in revelation, medieval thinkers drew further intelligibility from studying the philosophical tradition and the world they experienced, and they formulated well-ordered versions of this intelligibility. These syntheses are neither classical nor modern, but properly medieval, though dependent on classical sources.

To the extent that the wisdom of the classical philosophical tradition is still relevant today, medieval philosophy and theology continue to have something to offer us. To realize this more fully, medieval thought needs to be studied, understood, and appreciated in terms of its own richness, not according to how it agrees with our present-day ways of thinking. To the extent that solidly based,
well-ordered thought can still be one of the aspirations of our life of reason, medieval philosophy and theology provide some of history’s best models. How this desire for a well-thought-out, unified view of reality cannot be an aspiration today is difficult to see. It challenges many contemporary trends that use reason more for the destruction of argument and reasoned discourse, substituting the celebration of personality, or limiting all worth in terms of immediate practical ends. Such trends toward disorder have always existed. The desire to find the fundamental order of reality, as it presents itself in experience and well-informed tradition, remains the purest aspiration of reason, the core of our being. Furthermore, medieval thinkers, in their quest for God, whose presence they found in the proper ordering of the soul and in the beauty of the world, provided some of the most thorough reflections on the spiritual dimensions of reality—reflections that are still relevant in our own present-day search for the meaning of our human existence. In addition, the fruits of their concern for rigor and clarity provide us with some of the best examples of intellectual analysis.

Modern Criticisms of Medieval Philosophy and Theology

The Scientific Revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries influenced specifically modern conceptions of man and the universe that shared a rejection of the medieval and classical outlook. The new paradigm of scientific explanation—the mathematical law applied to empirical phenomena—had proved increasingly successful. The final victory of this new science was Isaac Newton’s universal law of gravitation, accounting for the motion of all bodies, earthly and heavenly. Even though the success of the new science related to bodies, such as the confirmation of Nicolaus Copernicus’s heliocentric theory, it also influenced the explanation of other dimensions of existence. And even though the new science focused mainly on how things occur (in mathematical terms), while medieval science focused mainly on the purpose or why of things, the new emphasis replaced, more than supplemented, the old. Insofar as the question why fell outside the new explanatory boundaries, it came to be seen by many as unscientific. Rather, mechanistic explanations began to dominate.

For the medieval mind, on the other hand, why something happens cannot be divorced from how it happens, since the end always governs the means. To Thomas Aquinas, the notion of law, for instance the natural law (which grounds his ethics), is through and through teleological: man is, inclined to virtue because this is the best fulfillment of his rational nature. Immanuel Kant’s morals offer a telling contrast to Aquinas’s medieval approach. Kant, in his very search for human freedom and autonomy, presupposes a mechanistic view of the world: “Thus a kingdom of ends is possible only on the analogy of a kingdom of nature; yet the former is possible only through maxims, i.e., self-imposed rules, while the latter is possible only through laws of efficient causes necessitated from without.... nature as a whole is viewed as a machine.” (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 2:438, trans. J. W. Ellington, Hackett edition). In other words, Kant’s categorical imperative is meant as a (self-determined and thus free) law analogous to the (necessary) law of nature. Yet Kant still wants his imperative to be as necessary, universal, and compelling as the mechanistic laws of nature. Moreover, he wants the moral agent to focus on the purely formal aspect of the action the capacity of the action to become a universal law—rather than on the proper ends of man’s nature considered as a whole.

The growing influence of the new science presupposed at least some acceptance of its fundamental premise: reality is primarily what is reducible to mathematical laws, namely bodies. This premise is manifested most saliently in the modern assumption, found, for example, in Galileo, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke: external bodies possess “objective” or primary reality, while the mind of the perceiver is a more “subjective” or secondary reality. This distinction has metaphysical and moral ramifications. Concerning metaphysics, with spiritual dimensions relegated to the “subjective,” material reality becomes the primary criterion and reference point. René Descartes’s search for certitude in the human subject itself presupposes the characteristic modern break between the objective and subjective realms.
Concerning morals, with teleology relegated to the past, emphasis is placed either on the practical benefits of human endeavor, as in Francis Bacon, or on abstract principles, as in Kant.

These remarks on the Scientific Revolution and its ensuing influence on philosophy are not meant as a resolution of choice between the modern and the medieval outlooks. They are meant simply to point out that modern philosophy, like medieval philosophy, also rests on basic assumptions about man and the universe. They are also meant to point out that the success of the new science pertained to an area of reality, namely material reality, specifically to an aspect of material reality, namely how it works. The question of the extent to which modern science applies to the rest of reality is open for debate. So too is the question of the relative strengths of medieval and modern philosophy.

However, other factors aside from the Scientific Revolution, such as new political and economic realities, contributed to the modern rejection of the medieval outlook. This historical period cannot be discussed fully here, but some of the philosophical views that voice this rejection can be pointed out. It is possible to trace various elements of medieval philosophy and theology and indicate their survival in the writings of modern authors. This effort has already been made in the case of Descartes with the attempts at establishing his dependence on various Jesuit sources, especially Francisco Suárez’s Disputationes and the Suárezian manuals used at La Flèche, the Jesuit school where Descartes began his philosophical studies. Nonetheless, despite certain limited inheritances from medieval philosophy and theology, the predominant attitude among modern authors in regard to their medieval predecessors is one of rejection.

This stance of rejection holds for many areas of thought. It is most evident in The Prince written by Niccolò Machiavelli in 1513. In chapter 15, Machiavelli criticizes the whole orientation of classical and medieval political and moral philosophy:

For many authors have constructed imaginary republics and principalities that have never existed in practice and never could; for the gap between how people actually behave and how they ought to behave is so great that anyone who ignores everyday reality in order to live up to an ideal will soon discover he has been taught how to destroy himself, not how to preserve himself. For anyone who wants to act the part of a good man in all circumstances will bring about his own ruin, for those he has to deal with will not all be good. So it is necessary for a ruler, if he wants to hold on to power, to learn how not to be good, and know when it is and when it is not necessary to use this knowledge.

The Greek word for virtue or human excellence, arete, was translated into Latin as virtus. Virtutes (virtues) for ancient and medieval philosophers were the characteristics or habits human beings had to develop to become excel-lent human beings. For Machiavelli, virtue took on a new meaning: the Italian virtù for him meant “learning how not to be good, and knowing when it is and when it is not necessary to use this knowledge.” Machiavelli’s virtù is more aptly translated as cunning.

Thomas Hobbes followed Machiavelli’s negative view of the nature of human beings in The Citizen:

For Hobbes, this is a false conception of man’s nature, which is basically selfish. The positive view of man, according to Hobbes, also provides the wrong key to his character: man’s strongest control is fear. His behavior, in reality, is controlled by actual force or by the fear of force, not by reason or a desire to fulfill an ideal image he has of himself. Classical and medieval education is useless and ineffective from Hobbes’s perspective.

In his Leviathan, Hobbes brings forward another criticism, challenging the whole classical and
medieval view of life’s meaning. There is no ultimate eudaimonia (happiness); that is, there is no final goal that gives human life its real meaning. There is, in brief, no ultimate human good to be pursued; there are only the actual, finite goals we aim at each day: eating a good meal, having a comfortable home, enjoying good health, visiting a particular vacation spot, and saving money for more such enjoyments in old age. There is no ultimate meaning to human life, only proximate satisfactions of our appetites. Francis Bacon, in The Great Instauration, endorsed a view of science that well fit this philosophical vision of Hobbes. Bacon ridiculed the various medieval followers of Aristotle: "Philosophy and the intellectual sciences stand like statues, worshipped and celebrated, but not moved or advanced. Nay, they sometimes flourish most in the hands of the first author, and afterwards degenerate."

He argued that "the wisdom derived from the Greeks is but like the boyhood of knowledge, and has the characteristic properties of boys: it can talk but it cannot generate, for it is fruitful of controversies but barren of works." He argued the case against the Aristotelian and medieval ideals of knowledge in favor of pursuing "inventions that may in some degree subdue and overcome the necessities and miseries of humanity." For Bacon, the true ends of knowledge are the benefits it brings to the material dimensions of man’s earthly life.

In the realm of religion, modern critics were also forceful opponents of medieval Scholasticism. Martin Luther, in his Disputation against Scholastic Theology, argued against what he presented as the common opinion: that no man can become a theologian without Aristotle. He claimed that, on the contrary, "no one can become a theologian unless he becomes one without Aristotle," and that "the whole Aristotle is to theology as darkness is to light." He considered "the entire Ethics of Aristotle to be the worst enemy of grace."

In their views of ethics and politics, in their portraits of man’s nature, in their considerations of life’s purpose, in their presuppositions concerning true religion, the early modern authors were very critical of the direction and accomplishments of medieval developments in philosophy and theology. Later modern philosophers and theologians who disagreed with these early authors of modernity did not, however, choose to return to the perspectives of classical or medieval sources. They rather argued for new forms of modern ways of thinking. Kant, for example, disagreed with the pessimistic view of man presented by Hobbes but also criticized the optimistic view offered by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Instead of recovering an earlier view of man’s nature, however, he chose instead to avoid the battle over man’s nature. He decided to anchor his ethics and politics not in nature, but in pure reason, that is, the pursuit of rational self-consistency that would never make any act morally obligatory unless it could become a universal rational law. In his judgment, this approach to morality avoids foisting our opinions about something being right and wrong on others. It limits us from turning our desires into moral demands. It leaves outside the discussion of morals particular conceptions of what a man is or ought to be. Man can only obligate himself and others to what rational beings can be obligated to perform in terms of their rational self-consistency.

In considering the goals of science, the early modern view of Bacon was to find inventions that might alleviate man’s sufferings and satisfy his temporal needs. Rousseau criticized this view of the purpose of science in concrete ways by asking what are man’s real needs? He argued against artificial needs created by a society that has pulled many human lives into a vortex of artificial desires. Yet he never thought of asking the classical and medieval question: What is man’s ultimate desire or what is the most fulfilling form of human life?

One strong component of recent modern thought, accented particularly by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, is that nature is no longer a dominant characteristic of reality. The ruling category is history. We are ever progressing. Progress is not only the law of ever-improving technology; it is the law of human history. We as human beings are becoming ever freer by overcoming the obstacles to human progress. We are not as prejudiced as our forefathers. We no longer live in local ghettos. We are becoming cosmopolitan,
multicultural, a global village. The rallying cry is "Keep marching forward."

The modern critics of early modernity are true critics of the early moderns. Yet they have not escaped their basic presuppositions. In effect, Kant, Rousseau, and Hegel represent a second wave of modernity, and both waves are fundamentally at odds with classical and medieval thought. They portray the medieval world as passé, outdated, archaic.

Study of Medieval Philosophy and Theology Today

It might be objected that some modern researchers have returned to the study of the classical philosophies of Greece and Rome and that there are many who are interested in the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and Proclus. This objection might be confirmed by the observation that there have also been restorations of the study of medieval philosophies and theologies, especially through the endorsements of Pope Leo XIII's encyclical letter Aeterni Patris (On the Restoration of Christian Philosophy) in 1879 and the more recent 1978 encyclical of Pope John Paul II, Fides et Ratio (Faith and Reason). Certainly, these and other efforts have turned attention once again to classical and medieval thought. Often, however, this interest has been almost purely historical: the philosophies and theologies of the ancients and medievals are appreciated in the same way that any archeological remains are honored. In some instances, nonetheless, medieval philosophies and theologies have been studied as manifestations of timeless truth. Is what they teach true or false, wise or unwise, reasonable or unreasonable? Before such questions can be answered, there is a prior requirement: we have to understand the medieval authors on their own terms. We have to enter their well-forgotten world and see if we can understand things the way they saw them. We have to bracket our own modern categories and frames of reference. Do the ancients and medievals have anything to teach us? Are truth, wisdom, and reason time-bound categories? Or can we learn from people who thought differently, and even perhaps more richly, than we do ourselves at the present time? We hope the rest of this volume will put our readers at the beginning of the path to answering such questions. <>


Timeless wisdom on controlling anger in personal life and politics from the Roman Stoic philosopher and statesman Seneca In his essay “On Anger” (De Ira), the Roman Stoic thinker Seneca (c. 4 BC–65 AD) argues that anger is the most destructive passion: “No plague has cost the human race more dear.” This was proved by his own life, which he barely preserved under one wrathful emperor, Caligula, and lost under a second, Nero. This splendid new translation of essential selections from “On Anger,” presented with an enlightening introduction and the original Latin on facing pages, offers readers a timeless guide to avoiding and managing anger. It vividly illustrates why the emotion is so dangerous and why controlling it would bring vast benefits to individuals and society.

Drawing on his great arsenal of rhetoric, including historical examples (especially from Caligula’s horrific reign), anecdotes, quips, and soaring flights of eloquence, Seneca builds his case against anger with mounting intensity. Like a fire-and-brimstone preacher, he paints a grim picture of the moral perils to which anger exposes us, tracing nearly all the world’s evils to this one toxic source. But he then uplifts us with a beatific vision of the alternate path, a path of forgiveness and compassion that resonates with Christian and Buddhist ethics. Seneca’s thoughts on anger have never been more relevant than today, when uncivil discourse has increasingly infected public debate. Whether seeking personal growth or political renewal, readers will find, in Seneca’s wisdom, a valuable antidote to the ills of an angry age.

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Excerpt: "Your anger is a kind of madness, because you set a high price on worthless things." Seneca the Younger wrote those words in the mid-first century AD, as the Roman principate, the system of one-man rule inaugurated by Augustus Caesar, reached its fourth generation. Seneca ostensibly addressed that thought to his elder brother Novatus but really intended it for all his Roman readers, and it continues to speak powerfully today, in an age that still struggles, more than many previous ones, to deal with insanities wrought by anger.

To better grasp what Seneca means when he defines anger as a misvaluation, try the following exercise. Recall the last minor incident that sent you into a rage. Perhaps a reckless driver cut you off and made you slam on your brakes, or someone cut in line in front of you or stole a parking spot or a cab from under your nose. You were injured—or were you? Were you notably worse off, a day or two later, than before the incident occurred? Did it really matter that someone disrespected you, in the way that global climate change matters? Or the threat of nuclear war? Or the fact that stars are collapsing into black holes in other parts of our galaxy, swallowing up everything around them?

The juxtaposition of the quotidian with the immeasurably vast is a favorite stratagem of Seneca's, especially in On Anger (De Ira in Latin), the essay from which this volume is drawn. By shifting our perspective or expanding our mental scale, Seneca challenges our sense of what, if anything, is worth our getting angry. Pride, dignity, self-importance—the sources of our outrage when we feel injured—end up seeming hollow when we zoom out and see our lives from a distance: "Draw further back, and laugh" (3.37). Seneca's great exemplars of wisdom—Socrates, the most revered sage in the Greek world, and Cato the Younger, a senator of the century preceding Seneca's, in the Roman world—are, in this essay, seen getting spat on, knocked about, and struck on the head without expressing anger or even, it seems, feeling any.

An infringement on your car's right of way might not matter, but your reaction to it does, Seneca believed. In your momentary road rage, in your desire to honk at, hurt, or kill the other driver, lie grave threats to the sovereignty of reason in your soul, and therefore to your capacity for right choice and virtuous action. The onset of anger endangers your moral condition more than that of any other emotion, for anger is, in Seneca's eyes, the most intense, destructive, and irresistible of the passions. It's like jumping off a cliff: once rage is allowed to get control, there's no hope of stopping the descent. Our spiritual health demands that we let go of anger, or else it will never let go of us.

Seneca knew at first hand the perils of anger. By the time he came to write On Anger, or at least the greater part of it, he had witnessed, from the close vantage point of the Roman Senate, the bloody four-year reign of Caligula. (We might give other names than anger to Caligula's maladies—paranoia, say, or sadism—but Seneca, to advance his case, lumps all of that emperor's cruelties under the heading ira). Caligula casts a long shadow over On Anger; Seneca often mentions him by name, but also invokes him implicitly when he associates anger with instruments of torture, with flames and swords, and with civil strife. The nightmare of the Caligula years, it seems, had taught Seneca the high cost of unrestrained wrath, not just to the individual soul, but to the whole Roman state.

It was unusual in Rome for a philosopher and moral essayist to occupy a seat in the Senate, but Seneca was an unusual man. In youth he studied with teachers who embraced Stoicism, a system imported from Greece that counseled mental self-control and adherence to the dictates of divine Reason. He chose to follow the Stoic path, but not in any orthodox way; as a mature writer, he drew on many philosophic traditions, or else eschewed theory altogether in favor of practical ethics enhanced by rhetorical flourish. On Anger is a case in point: only a portion of the treatise, largely confined to the first half, is demonstrably rooted in Stoic principles. The second half, from which much of this volume is drawn, deals with the problem of anger more pragmatically, reminding us, in its most banal passages, not to overload our schedules, or take on tasks at which we're likely to fail.

Seneca, to judge by his self-presentation in his writings, was a self-reflective and inward-looking man. He describes, in one of the passages translated below (3.36), his zen-like nightly reviews
of his own ethical choices — tranquil meditations conducted in the quiet of his bedroom. Yet we know that Seneca also enjoyed proximity to power and eagerly played the game of Roman politics, sometimes with disastrous results. In his thirties, he entered the Roman Senate, where he gained a reputation as an original and compelling speaker, but his eloquence only aroused the envy of emperor Caligula, who reportedly wanted him killed (but was himself assassinated before taking action). Under Claudius, Caligula’s successor, Seneca came under suspicion again and was exiled to Corsica; the charge brought against him, adultery with one of Caligula’s sisters, was likely a pretext. Quite possibly On Anger was begun during that period of exile.

After eight years on Corsica, and the near-extinction of his political career, Seneca was recalled to Rome in AD 49 with a most important brief: instructing and guiding the thirteen-year-old Nero, Claudius’s adopted son and presumptive heir. With the support of Agrippina, another of Caligula’s sisters and Claudius’s new wife, Seneca became more influential than ever, and also extremely rich. It was at about this time, presumably, that he completed On Anger (our only firm clue as to its date is that Novatus, to whom it is addressed, changed his name to Gallio in late 52 or early 53, so the treatise must have been published before that). Perhaps the work was circulated at Rome to herald its author’s return there, and to advertise the humanity of the man reentering the inner circle of imperial power—much as a modern politician might publish a memoir prior to a run for higher office.

Humanity, in the sense of humaneness, is indeed the keynote of On Anger. To counter the impulses of anger, here defined as the desire to punish, Seneca reminds us of how much we humans have in common—above all, our forgivability. In between monsters like Caligula and saints like Socrates stand the other 99.9 percent of the human race, sinners all, yet all deserving of clemency. “Let’s be kinder to one another,” Seneca exhorts, in the impassioned final segment of his treatise. “We’re just wicked people living among wicked people. Only one thing can give us peace, and that’s a pact of mutual leniency.” This theme of a shared fallibility underlying the social contract recurs often in Seneca’s writings but is nowhere so clearly or so loftily expressed as here.

Seneca brought all his formidable rhetorical powers to bear in On Anger, sometimes chilling his readers with tales of grotesque cruelty, other times uplifting them with exhortations toward mercy, and finally leaving them haunted by the specter of death, the grim absolute that was never far from his thoughts (see How to Die: An Ancient Guide to the End of Life in this series). He deploys his famously seductive prose style, rendered here only with very partial fidelity, to keep us hanging on every word. (The passages in this volume do not represent “every word” but constitute less than onethird of On Anger; the whole may be read in Robert Kaster’s translation in the University of Chicago volume Anger, Mercy, Revenge.)

Seneca ended his life as the victim of a wrath he could not assuage. The emperor Nero, after more than fifteen years under Seneca’s tutelage, became increasingly unstable and paranoid in the mid-60s AD, and imperial Era began to raise its head once again, as in the bad old days of Caligula. Seneca was linked to an assassination plot by means of contrived evidence and forced to commit suicide in AD 65.

The complexities of Seneca’s life, and the sheer volume of his writings, have made him harder to embrace today than the two great Stoics who followed him, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius (see How to be Free, another volume in this series, for excerpts from the writings of the former.) Nevertheless his thought remains, for some, a source of inspiration and a guide toward moral awareness. In the mid-twentieth century, the psychologist Albert Ellis drew on Seneca and other Stoics in formulating his rational emotive behavior school of therapy, and in later decades Michel Foucault used Seneca’s practice of daily introspection as a model for what he termed "care of the self." Under that model, ancient Stoicism has a salutary role to play in the modern world, as we seek remedies, at night in our quiet bedrooms, for our many ills of the soul.

The present volume honors the idea that Seneca was not writing only for elite Romans of the age of
Nero, but for all people at all times. In an age when anger thrives, he has much to teach us.

Essay: Badiou on "Being and the Void"
The term "multiple-being" carries the most importance for understanding some of the key notions in Alain Badiou's major text, Being and Event. We can therefore begin by examining his use of multiple-being in that text. "Multiple-being" means that which is "composed solely of multiplicities," each of which is itself a multiple. Badiou places this idea at the center of his philosophy on the basis of a pure, unverifiable decision, a philosophical or "meta-ontological" one, that "mathematics is ontology—the science of being qua being." This science consists in "the axiomatic decision which authorizes set theory." According to Badiou's adaptation of set theory, the multiple presents "nothing." But this nothing is not empty, because multiple is "presentation itself." It therefore does not refer to the ideal objects of Platonism, innate ideas of Descartes, conventions of formalism, or any other candidate for being an object of mathematics. Multiples are strictly indifferent to things, sensory qualities, or any other content we might assign to the pure elements (further multiplicities) they contain. This indifference restricts access to the multiple and the idea of presentation except through thought; at the same time, this indifference to content ensures the universal applicability of set theory: the notion of multiple covers "everything that is, in so far as it is.

Situations. The concept of "multiple" and the meta-ontological decision concerning it may seem barren and arbitrary. But these two anomalies become more tolerable and concrete when Badiou introduces the idea of a "situation." The multiple is a situation as soon as it is takes on content and is designated as a specific set of elements, that is, as soon as it is "counted-as-one" and thus no longer the uncounted "nothing" it was before the count occurred. This self-counting or "structuring" renders the situation at once a "consistent multiplicity" and an "inconsistent multiplicity": a "one/multiple couple for any situation." The consistent multiplicity is the result of the operation of the count-as-one, for example, a structured set of galaxies, persons, or even things selected at random. In contrast, the inconsistent multiplicity is a nothing or "not-one." It is impossible for this type of multiplicity to be presented without becoming counted-as-one in the situation to which it is linked. It is "retroactively discernable" only as being "anterior" to the count. Indeed, this inconsistent multiplicity is "solely the presupposition that prior to the count the one is not." It is the "not-one" upon which "the count operates."

Ontology. How can Badiou or we speak of an inconsistent multiplicity without thereby counting it as one? Badiou's answer: Access to the inconsistent multiplicity can take place only through "the ontological situation." This situation is the only one by means of which Badiou or any other ontologist can think this multiplicity. It, and only it, has the task of "the presentation of the presentation," that is, the presentation of the multiple prior to its being made a one-effect by the structure of a nonontological situation. More specifically, the task of the ontological situation is to "discern [the unpresented or inconsistent] multiplicity without having to make a one out of it," that is, "without possessing a definition of [it]."

In line with Badiou's proclivity for unconditional decisions, the axiom system (not intuition or sensory perception) authorizes the conversion of the inconsistent multiplicity into an ontological consistency that, unlike all other consistencies, is not composed "according to the [count as] one" of situations. The prescriptions of the axiom system—ontology—thereby "deconstruct any one-effect" and "unfold, without explicit nomination, the regulated game of the multiple such that [ontology] is none other than the absolute form of presentation, thus the mode in which being proposes itself to any access" This discernment, of course, is that of thought and not through sensory perception or intuition. But its upshot is clear even if stipulated only by fiat: the pure multiple is, the one is not (only from within the nonontological situation is it the case that the reverse is deceptively true, that the multiple "is not" and the one "is").

The void as the name of being. Badiou complicates this ontology by referring to the inconsistent multiplicity as the "void." The term highlights that the inconsistent multiplicity and the operation of the
count (as opposed to the result of this counting) are both "nothing," that is, the "unpresentable" or "undecidable of presentation."16 The one in the case of the operation of the count is just the operation of creating ones and does not refer to a being behind the scenes. Badiou therefore says that this "one," like the inconsistent multiplicity, "is not" even though it creates situational ones (organized multiples) from the inconsistent multiplicity. Because the unpresentable (the inconsistent multiplicity and operation of the count) must exist in order for there to be a count and hence a situation, the term "nothing" is a "name" for more than non-being. It is "subtracted" from the count, "sutures" the situation to its being (the inconsistent multiplicity), and, as "the non-one of any count as one," is "scattered all over, nowhere and everywhere.

Badiou prefers the term "void" to "nothing" in the context of naming the being of inconsistency. Either way, void or nothing, this presents a problem: the void is not one, but, as nothing, neither can we say that it is multiple. Badiou responds to this issue by saying that we can still consider the void as the "multiple of nothing," which also means that it is "subtracted from the one/multiple dialectic" and designates "being qua being." We can do this because under the "law" of the ontological situation we can "know nothing apart from the multiple-without-one" and thus must define the void as the multiple of nothing in light of the original decision to endorse ontology as mathematics, that is, as set theory. More exactly:

In ontology ... the unpresentable occurs within a presentative forcing which disposes it as the nothing from which everything proceeds. The consequence is that the name of the void is a pure proper name, which indicates itself, which does not dispose any index of difference within what it refers to, and which auto-declares itself in the form of the multiple, despite there being nothing which is numbered in it. The proper name "void," then, makes "nothing," the unpresentable, be or exist as the only existent and as that from which "everything proceeds" Indeed, Peter Hallward points out that this implies that the name in this case "invents, literally ex nihilo," the multiplicity that it names. It will help to remember that the unpresentable, the void itself, is the inconsistent multiplicity, pure presentation, in relation to the situation that it sutures to the latter's real being (the inconsistent multiplicity), from which it, the situation, was produced by the count as one. As the title of "Meditation Four" in Badiou's Being and Event proclaims, "void" is "the proper name of being."

The void as founding. There are two more parts to this "ontological discernment" of the void. The first concerns a precise sense in which the void "founds" each situation and is thus, as we said, the nothing from which everything proceeds. Because the void is the only multiple that is the multiple of nothing, it is also an "empty set": it cannot, in the technical terminology of set theory, belong to, cannot be presented in, any situation. But as Hallward clarifies, "it is included [though not belonging to, that is, not presented] in every situation." This is because a set is included in another if it has "no elements that are not themselves included in [the other set]"; the "void," as the only "empty set," has no elements and therefore doesn't have any that are not themselves included in the situation. It therefore is automatically included as a subset of every possible situation and set. It, like all other sets, is also a subset of itself. Because a subset is not itself an element, the void cannot, despite its inclusion, be presented in—belong to—a situation; it therefore cannot be known within the situation that includes it. As we might guess, these technical distinctions are preparing the way for delegated beings, under special circumstances, to be capable of seeing or thinking what others cannot discern in a situation.

Because the void is nothing, it also limits the situation of which it is a subset: as nothing, it, unlike any other set, cannot be decomposed into further elements; it is therefore the rock bottom of any situation or any of its sets. This constitutes it as the "founding" term of any situation. Moreover, this foundation has what we might call a hidden depth: the empty set, like all sets, always has an "excess" of subsets over the elements in the set or situation in which it is included; this is because a subset can be composed of the many possible combinations of the elements of the original set to which it belongs, even if these combinations are infinite in number.
This excess implies that "it is impossible that every [subset] of a multiple belongs to [the situation]" and therefore some subsets will not be counted in a situation. They will be presented only by the proper name of the void. <>

**Being and Event** by Alain Badiou, trans. Oliver Feltham (Continuum International Publishing Group, 9780826458315)

Two things are new in this much-anticipated translation of Badiou: the language and the preface. Both are instructive. Translator Oliver Feltham stayed "as close as possible to Badiou's syntax" but "at the price of losing fluidity." The logic behind this sacrifice being that Badiou's syntax does its own philosophical work; the unfortunate result being that many sentences, though elegant in French, are wounded in English. For example, this hop-along on Marxism: "That the dialectic of its existence is not that of the one of authority to the multiple of the subject." Thankfully, Badiou addresses such dissonance and his larger philosophical goals in an indispensable new preface-without which the 37 weighty meditations might be lost to the layperson. Even with the new preface, those reading Badiou or Continental philosophy for the first time might experience something intellectually akin to running into the ocean. (Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil is a slimmer, more accessible introduction to this novelist, and playwright and professor at Ecole Normale Superieure.) Otherwise it takes a miracle to understand the four theses of this work, organized as they are into a chevron consisting of Being, Event, Truth, Subject. Badiou is concerned with the potential for profound, transformative innovation in any situation. His approach is part mathematical (Condor's set theory), part rationalist (Anglo-American), part poetic (Continental) and part textual legends of philosophy are confronted "on singular points"), but his ideas are intensely rarified.

**Being and Event** is the greatest work of Alain Badiou, France's most important living philosopher. Long-awaited in translation, **Being and Event** makes available to an English-speaking readership Badiou's groundbreaking work on set theory - the cornerstone of his whole philosophy. The book makes the scope and aim of Badiou's whole philosophical project clear, enabling full comprehension of Badiou's significance for contemporary philosophy. Badiou draws upon and is fully engaged with the European philosophical tradition from Plato onwards; Being and Event deals with such key figures as Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, Rousseau, Heidegger and Lacan. This wide-ranging book is organised in a careful, precise and novel manner, reflecting the philosophical rigour of Badiou's thought. Unlike many contemporary Continental philosophers, Badiou - who is also a novelist and dramatist - writes lucidly and cogently, making his work far more accessible and engaging than much philosophy, and actually a pleasure to read. This English language edition includes a new preface, written by Badiou himself, especially for this translation. **Being and Event** is a must-have for Badiou's significant following and anyone interested in contemporary Continental philosophy. <>

**Assemblage Theory** by Manuel DeLanda (Speculative Realism, Edinburgh University Press, 9781474413626)

Manuel DeLanda provides the first detailed overview of the assemblage theory found in germ in Deleuze and Guattari's writings. Through a series of case studies DeLanda shows how the concept can be applied to economic, linguistic, and military history as well as to metaphysics, science, and mathematics.

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Excerpt: Series Editor's Preface
It is a pleasure for this series to host the publication of Manuel DeLanda’s Assemblage Theory, the most recent and perhaps most lucid statement of his philosophy that we have. DeLanda is well known to Anglophone readers of continental philosophy – especially among Deleuzeans – as a respected innovator in this sub-field since the 1990s. He reached his current level of importance along a highly unorthodox career path that began with film-making, passed through an astonishing period of self-education in philosophy, and came to fruition in 1991 with the first of numerous influential books. He has worked as an adjunct professor in prestigious schools of architecture, and for some years as a faculty member at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland. All the while he has been largely ignored by professors of philosophy but adored by graduate students – a demographic profile that usually indicates a thinker of high calibre, a full generation ahead of peers. DeLanda’s popularity shows an additional element of paradox since his ontology is an uncompromising realism, still a minority position among continental thinkers despite the onset of a broader speculative realism movement.

DeLanda was born in Mexico City in 1952 and moved in the 1970s to New York, where he lives to this day in a spirit of understated bohemianism. As a student and practitioner of experimental film, he circulated in the New York art scene and acquired some international renown. The Manuel DeLanda we know today first emerged in roughly 1980, when he began to shift his focus to computer art and computer programming. In an effort to understand his equipment properly, DeLanda resolved to teach himself symbolic logic, a decision that soon led him to the classic writers of analytic philosophy, which may help explain the clarity of his writing style. After a time he worked his way into the rather different intellectual atmosphere of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, in whose works DeLanda found both a materialism and a realism, though ‘realist’ is a word rarely applied to Deleuze by his other admirers.

In 1991, not yet forty years old, DeLanda joined the authorial ranks with his debut book, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines. It is worth noting that this book was written just before the Persian Gulf War and General Schwarzkopf’s daily highlight footage of smart bombs going down chimneys: the first contact for most of the global public with the coming intelligent weaponry. Military thinkers also took note of the book, and adopted this work of a basically Leftist thinker for serious study in their academies. This promising debut was followed in 1997 by A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History, which explores the way in which various cyclical processes repeat themselves in natural and cultural settings, and is filled with riveting concrete examples such as an account of how rocks are reduced to smooth pebbles in a stream. In 2002, DeLanda published one of the great classics of Deleuze scholarship, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, which relates Deleuze’s philosophy in some detail to such disciplines as nonlinear dynamics and the mathematics of group theory. This was followed in 2000 by a less famous but even more frequently cited book, A New Philosophy of Society, in which DeLanda developed the outlines of a realist social theory as consisting of different scales of assemblages. In 2010 there came the short book Deleuze: History and Science, and in 2011 Philosophy and Simulation, with its unforgettable discussion of thunderstorms, among other topics. DeLanda’s most recent book before this one was the 2015 Philosophical Chemistry, which examines chemistry textbooks taken at fifty-year intervals, and rejects the Kuhnian model of sudden ‘paradigm shifts’ tacitly favoured by most continental thinkers.

DeLanda’s widespread appeal as an author can be traced to several factors. There is his great clarity as a prose stylist, the thorough research he invests in each book, and his impeccable taste in pinning down cutting-edge problems across multiple disciplines. There is also the utter lack of frivolity in his works, though his serious attitude is always coupled with a freshness that makes his authorial voice anything but oppressive. And whereas most continental thinkers who turn to science quickly indulge in nihilistic aggressions and an almost religious zealotry, DeLanda’s version of science makes the world more interesting rather than less real.

While DeLanda’s admiration for Deleuze and Guattari is always in evidence, the present book
offers more pointed criticism of these figures than we have previously seen him deliver. One point of contention is Marxism. Though Deleuze and Guattari work politically within a basically Marxist outlook, DeLanda turns one of the most prominent non-Marxist Leftists in continental circles today. He prefers to Marx the analysis of capitalism found in Fernand Braudel’s masterful three-volume Civilization and Capitalism, with its attention to different scales of markets and its crucial distinction between markets and monopoly capitalism. Given Braudel’s conception of society as a ‘set of sets’, of intertwined assemblages of all different sizes, it is no longer possible to reify ‘Capitalism’ in the manner of ‘Society’, ‘the State’, or ‘the Market’. (A striking similarity, by the way, between DeLanda and Bruno Latour, whose anti-realistic tendencies repel DeLanda immeasurably more than they do me.) And whereas Braudel traces the birth of capitalism to maritime cities such as Venice, Genoa, Lisbon, and Amsterdam, Deleuze and Guattari retain the Marxist prejudice that since banking and commerce are ‘unproductive’, such cities cannot possibly have been the birthplace of capitalism, which Deleuze and Guattari therefore link to the state rather than the commercial city. DeLanda objects not only to this assumption, but also to the old Marxist chestnut about ‘the tendency of the rate of profit to fall’, a ‘tendency’ that DeLanda bluntly proclaims ‘fictitious’.

He adds that Deleuze and Guattari remain too committed to an ontology of ‘individuals, groups, and social fields’, which cannot account for Braudel’s attention to economic organisations and cities. This leads DeLanda to more general conclusions that are sure to spark controversy: ‘Much of the academic left today has become prey to the double danger of politically targeting reified generalities (Power, Resistance, Capital, Labour) while at the same time abandoning realism.’ Any new left worthy of the name would need to ‘[recovery] its footing on a mind-independent reality and . . . [focus] its efforts at the right social scale, that is . . . [leave] behind the dream of a Revolution that changes the entire system’. Along with Marx, DeLanda finds an additional target on the left in the person of Noam Chomsky, whose linguistics he sees as too dependent on an ontology of internal relations.

On other fronts, however, DeLanda takes a more positive Deleuzean line in a way that runs counter to present-day Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO). For instance, DeLanda has no use for the concept of essence. He critiques Aristotle’s conception of formal cause, which OOO adores. DeLanda further advocates a genethistorical rather than synchronic approach to individuation, drawing on Gilbert Simondon no less than Deleuze. And whereas OOO advocates realism without materialism, DeLanda insists on a close alliance between the two terms, which he seems to use more or less as synonyms.

Although Assemblage Theory is a refined presentation of an already long intellectual trajectory, its clarity of style and wealth of examples also make it a suitable introduction to DeLanda’s work more generally. Here we have one of the most formidable thinkers in present-day continental philosophy, moulded by his own hard work and insight, with no support from the traditional institutions of philosophy through which most of us have passed, willingly or not. DeLanda’s resulting independence of mind makes him one of the crucial dialogue partners for anyone wishing to see contemporary philosophy with their own eyes.

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Writing a book about the concept of assemblage presents various challenges. The easiest one to meet is terminological. The word in English fails to capture the meaning of the original agencement, a term that refers to the action of matching or fitting together a set of components (agencer), as well as to the result of such an action: an ensemble of parts that mesh together well. The English word used as translation captures only the second of these meanings, creating the impression that the concept refers to a product not a process. If this were the only challenge it could be easily bypassed. We could simply take the term agencement to be the name of the concept, the concept itself being given by its definition. But this way out is blocked by the fact that the concept is given half a dozen different definitions by its creators, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Each definition connects the concept to a separate aspect of their philosophy, using the terms
that are relevant for that aspect, so when taken in isolation the different definitions do not seem to yield a coherent notion. This book is an attempt to bring these different definitions together, introducing and illustrating the terms required to make sense of them. We can begin with the simplest definition, one involving a minimum of additional conceptual machinery:

- **What is an assemblage?** It is a multiplicity which is made up of many heterogeneous terms and which establishes liaisons, relations between them, across ages, sexes and reigns – different natures. Thus, the assemblage’s only unity is that of a co-functioning: it is a symbiosis, a ‘sympathy’. It is never filiations which are important, but alliances, alloys; these are not successions, lines of descent, but contagions, epidemics, the wind.

In this definition, two aspects of the concept are emphasised: that the parts that are fitted together are not uniform either in nature or in origin, and that the assemblage actively links these parts together by establishing relations between them. The contrast between filiations and alliances gives us a clue regarding the type of relationships needed to hold the parts together. Some relations, such as that between parents and their offspring, or those between brothers or sisters, define the very identity of the terms that they relate. One can only be a father if one is related genealogically to a son or a daughter, and vice versa, so that the identity of the role of father, or of that of son or daughter, cannot exist outside their mutual relation. Traditionally, these relations are designated as relations of interiority. On the other hand, when two groups of people related by descent enter into a political alliance, this relation does not define their identity but connects them in exteriority. It is a relation established between the two groups, like the air that exists between them transmitting influences that connect them but do not constitute them. The terms ‘interiority’ and ‘exteriority’ are somewhat misleading because they suggest a spatial relation, a relation internal or external to something. A better choice would be intrinsic and extrinsic, but the intent is clear: if a relation constitutes the very identity of what it relates it cannot respect the heterogeneity of the components, but rather it tends to fuse them together into a homogeneous whole.

The majority of relations in the world are extrinsic. Intrinsic relations tend to be confined to niches, such as social roles defined by conventions. For there to be a convention, there must be alternative ways in which the identity of a social role is defined, and the choice among the alternatives must be arbitrary. Family relations, for example, vary across cultures, as do the rights and obligations attached to the role of parents, offspring, and relatives. So the fixing of one of these alternatives by an arbitrary social code constitutes its very identity. A similar situation arises in biology with respect to the roles that organisms of the same species play relative to one another. When the behaviour of an organism is not learned but is rigidly coded by its genes, and when there exist alternative behavioural patterns that could have performed the same function, its identity can be considered to be determined by relations of interiority. Hence Deleuze’s attraction to the ecological relation of symbiosis, as in the relation between insects and the plants they pollinate, because it involves heterogeneous species interacting in exteriority, and their relation is not necessary but only contingently obligatory, a relation that does not define the very identity of the symbionts. In both the social and biological cases, intrinsic relations are such because they are coded, and because the code arbitrarily selects one alternative over the rest. This suggests that the opposition between the two types of social ensembles mentioned in the previous quotation, those linked by filiation and alliance, respectively, may be captured by a single concept equipped with a variable parameter, the setting of which determines whether the ensemble is coded or decoded.

Chapter 1 explores this possibility. In their exposition of assemblage theory Deleuze and Guattari tend to use a series of oppositions: tree/rhizome, striated/smooth, molar/molecular, and stratum/assemblage. But they constantly remind us that the opposites can be transformed into one another. In particular, the kinds of ensembles designated as ‘assemblages’ can be
obtained from strata by a decoding operation. But if one member of these dichotomies can be transformed into the other then the oppositions can be replaced with a single parametrised term capable of existing in two different states. This yields a different version of the concept of assemblage, a concept with knobs that can be set to different values to yield either strata or assemblages (in the original sense). The coding parameter is one of the knobs we must build into the concept, the other being territorialisation, a parameter measuring the degree to which the components of the assemblage have been subjected to a process of homogenisation, and the extent to which its defining boundaries have been delineated and made impermeable. A further modification to the original concept is that the parts matched together to form an ensemble are themselves treated as assemblages, equipped with their own parameters, so that at all times we are dealing with assemblages of assemblages. Using this modified version of the concept, Chapter 1 goes on to detail a materialist social ontology in which communities and organisations, cities and countries, are shown to be amenable to a treatment in terms of assemblages.

Chapter 2 uses this social ontology as a context to discuss the assemblage approach to language. As is well known, Deleuze and Guattari were highly critical of orthodox linguistics, and adopted ideas from sociolinguistics to study language in its communal and institutional context. A tightly knit community, for example, is an ensemble of bodies (not only the biological bodies of the neighbours, but also the architectural bodies of their houses, churches, pubs, and so on) in which the fitting together is performed by linguistic acts that create social obligations among the neighbours. A promise between community members must be kept, else the reputation of the member breaking it will suffer, and he or she may be punished with ostracism. Similarly, a military or corporate organisation is an ensemble of bodies (including the bodies of their weapons and machines) in which commands create the bonds that fit them together: after being commanded to do something a subordinate is held responsible for the fulfilment of the command, and punished for disobeying it. Social ensembles held together by enforceable obligations are referred to by the authors as ‘collective assemblages of enunciation’. However, their discussion of this important concept is hampered by a social ontology that includes only three levels: individuals, groups, and the social field. A more finely grained ontology, with many levels of social ensembles between the person and society as a whole, will help us to clarify and extend their ideas about language.

Chapter 3 concentrates on a specific social organisation, the army. One of the earliest illustrations of an assemblage was the warrior–horse–bow ensemble of the nomads. This assemblage can become a component part of a larger one, a nomad army, while its own components can also be treated as assemblages: the bow as an ensemble of a flexible arc, a string, and a projectile. And similarly for a Second World War army as an assemblage of Platoons, themselves composed of soldiers, their rifles, and their radios. Armies are therefore a perfect example of a nested set of assemblages. In the history of armies we can detect transformations that add to their flexibility or that, on the contrary, make them more rigid and obedient. These transformations can be modelled by setting the parameters of the assemblage to the right settings, a task that is greatly simplified if an assemblage’s components have parameters of their own. This way, we can locate the right level in the nested set at which the coding or territorialisation occurred, and do justice to the complexity of the historical record.

Chapter 4 discusses scientific fields, viewed as assemblages of a domain of laboratory phenomena, a community of practitioners, and the techniques and instrumentation that fit one to the other. Unlike other approaches, in which the cognitive items governing scientific practices (concepts, statements, problems, explanations, classifications) are viewed as related to one another in interiority, forming a monolithic paradigm from which there is no escape short of a religious conversion, in this chapter we explore the idea that cognitive tools are not fused into a totality but rather coexist and interact in exteriority. The distinction between strata and
assemblages in this case corresponds to what
Deleuze and Guattari refer to as major and minor sciences. An example of a major science is an
axiomatised version of classical physics, in which
immutable truths about nature’s laws are used as
self-evident axioms, while deductive logic is used to
derive in a uniform way an unlimited number of
further truths (theorems). An illustration of a minor
science would be chemistry, a field that resists
axiomatisation and in which the phenomena in the
domain continuously confront partitioners with
variation, even as they strive to find constants,
posing new problems for them to solve.7 In this
case too, we can replace the dichotomy
major/minor by a single concept, while deriving the
very real distinctions discussed by the authors from
the settings of the parameters. And as in the case
of armies, scientific fields can also be treated as
assemblages of assemblages, allowing us to locate
at the right level of the nested set the changes
brought about by the conditions created by the
settings of the parameters.

Chapter 5 tackles the most difficult notion in this
approach: the diagram of an assemblage. An
ensemble in which components have been correctly
matched together possesses properties that its
components do not have. It also has its own
tendencies and capacities. The latter are real but
not necessarily actual if they are not currently
manifested or exercised. The term for something
that is real but not actual is virtual. An
assemblage’s diagram captures this virtuality, the
structure of the possibility space associated with an
assemblage’s dispositions. But in addition to
defining a virtual space already caught up into
actual ensembles, trapped into their materiality
and expressivity to a degree specified by the
parameters, the diagram connects an assemblage
with other diagrams, and with a cosmic space in
which diagrams exist free from the constraints of
actuality. While the ontological status of
dispositions that are not currently being manifested
is controversial, the existence of the cosmic plane is
clearly much more so. Nevertheless, this chapter
strives to show that both are compatible with a
materialist metaphysics.

Chapter 6 deals with another metaphysical
question: all assemblages should be considered
unique historical entities, singular in their
individuality, not as particular members of a
general category. But if this is so, then we should
be able to specify the individuation process that
gave birth to them. In the previous chapter we had
already begun to use examples of assemblages
belonging to the natural world, proof that the
approach is not confined to social assemblages, an
emphasis that continues into this chapter. The
individuation processes behind physical atoms and
biological species are used as illustrations. Chapter
7, finally, returns to the question of the virtual
diagram of an assemblage, but this time to connect
this notion to epistemological rather than
ontological questions. It is the most technical
chapter, because a rigorous discussion of diagrams
must proceed using concepts from mathematics, but
it introduces all the necessary notions in clear
technical and historical detail.

What gets lost in this new version of the concept of
assemblage? Not much. The rich descriptions made
by Deleuze and Guattari of rhizomes versus trees,
or of molecular flows versus molar aggregates, or
of smooth spaces versus striated ones, are all
recoverable as descriptions of qualitatively
different phases of one and the same entity,
making these renditions every bit as useful as a
detailed portrayal of the differences between a
substance in the liquid and crystalline states. Hence,
the change in this respect boils down to a matter of
emphasis: using strata and assemblages as distinct
categories allows one to stress their very important
differences, even if it complicates the discussion of
their mutual transformations. The other change,
conceiving of the components of an assemblage as
themselves assemblages, is also harmless, as is the
idea that the environment of an assemblage is itself
an assemblage. The authors introduce further
categories of being to define the different kind of
components, like the category ‘bodies’ for the
working parts of ‘machinic assemblages’, and use
words like ‘conditions’ to define the larger context
in which an assemblage operates. But their
tendency to view the world (natural and social) in
terms of two (or three) levels makes the expression
‘the larger context’ particularly dangerous, since it
ends up engulfing what in reality is a multi-level
ontology. Hence, replacing bodies (and other
component types) and contextual conditions by smaller and larger assemblages, respectively, allows us to sidestep this difficulty. It also yields a view of reality in which assemblages are everywhere, multiplying in every direction, some more viscous and changing at slower speeds, some more fluid and impermanent, coming into being almost as fast as they disappear. And at the limit, at the critical threshold when the diagrams of assemblages reach escape velocity, we find the grand cosmic assemblage, the plane of immanence, consistency, or exteriority. <>


The philosopher David Hume was born in Edinburgh, Scotland on April 26, 1711. Known for his re-thinking of causation, morality, and religion, Hume has left a lasting mark on history. James Madison, the "father" of the U.S. Constitution, drew heavily on Hume's writing, especially his "Idea of Perfect Commonwealth," which combated the belief at the time that a large country could not sustain a republican form of government. Hume's writing also influenced Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations and the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This edition attempts a broader picture of Hume's philosophy including more detail on the elements of his psychology, aesthetics, social and political philosophy as well as his legacy in contemporary topics of race, feminism, animal ethics, and environmental issues.

This second edition of Historical Dictionary of Hume's Philosophy contains a chronology, an introduction, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has over 100 cross-referenced entries covering key terms, as well as brief discussions of Hume's major works and of some of his most important predecessors, contemporaries, and successors. This book is an excellent resource for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about David Hume.

This second edition is not a complete revamping of the first, but it is enough of an updating and expansion to warrant purchase by those who own the earlier edition. Merrill (Univ. of Oklahoma) was the sole author of the first edition, and here he is joined by Coventry, who has put her stamp on the work by increasing the number of entries from 112 to 148; the page count from 350 to 373; and the pages in the bibliography from 71 to 99. New entries include important and relevant topics missing from the first edition—for example, aesthetics, beauty, convention (central to Hume's philosophy), race, and sexual passion. The entry on women from the first edition is now split into two entries, one on feminism and one on women. . . The second edition is a few centimeters larger in size and is printed on more attractive, cream-colored paper, which makes it easier to hold and more pleasant to read. This will be a helpful and welcome study aid for anyone seeking to learn and understand the thought and life of one of the most significant modern philosophers in the Western tradition.

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Excerpt: David Hume is among the top contenders for the greatest philosopher—certainly one of the very best in the 18th century to write in English, although few of his contemporaries recognized his true stature. For the last century or so, his reputation has been on the rise. Indeed, it is little short of amazing that Hume's ideas should continue to exert such lively influence not only on philosophy but also religion, politics, economics, and perspectives on human nature. Of course, there are detractors, but his genius shines brightly after nearly three centuries, and his views are still relevant and important today.

Studying Hume is clearly rewarding, but as with the study of any great philosopher, it can sometimes be difficult—thus a handy guide such as this Historical Dictionary of Hume's Philosophy is useful. It describes Hume the person, his thought, and his times and presents his major writings, concepts, and arguments, as well as the views of other
philosophers who influenced him or were influenced by him. While it focuses mainly on Hume the philosopher, this dictionary does not neglect Hume the historian, essayist, economist, and diplomat. On the contrary, it shows that Hume’s thought cannot be neatly divided into the philosophical and non-philosophical.

The first edition of the book was written by Kenneth R. Merrill, emeritus professor of philosophy and former department chair at the University of Oklahoma, where he taught for well over four decades. He was keenly interested in Hume ever since his doctoral work at Northwestern University, and he lectured and wrote extensively on Hume and other 17th- and 18th-century philosophers. The dictionary has now been expanded by Angela M. Coventry, associate professor at Portland State University. Hume first captured her interest when she was an undergraduate student at the University of Tasmania, and she has been teaching and writing about Hume ever since. Here, they provide a broad framework for integrating and understanding the profound and wide-ranging work of a truly great thinker.

It has been more than 10 years since Kenneth Merrill’s Historical Dictionary of Hume’s Philosophy appeared. Some background to the book was provided in the preface to the first edition, and this is reprinted with some (minor) revisions below.

The second edition of the dictionary adds entries in the first edition, revises some entries, and substantially enlarges the bibliography. This edition attempts a broader picture of Hume’s philosophy including more detail on the elements of his psychology, aesthetics, and social and political philosophy, as well as his legacy in contemporary topics of race, feminism, animal ethics, and environmental issues.

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It is hardly necessary today to make a case for Hume’s stature as a philosopher. He is, indeed, widely regarded as one of the greatest philosophers ever to write in the English language. His contributions are influential in many areas to do with religion, morals, politics, metaphysics, epistemology, economics, and history, and his influence on subsequent thinkers is wide-ranging. In 1766, Jeremy Bentham, the English philosopher who is often credited with founding utilitarianism, said that after reading Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, he felt as if scales had fallen from his eyes. The great German philosopher Immanuel Kant lamented misunderstandings of Hume’s philosophy and credited Hume with waking him from his “dogmatic slumber” in the introduction to the 1783 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Arthur Schopenhauer wrote that “there is more to be learned from each page of David Hume than from the collected philosophical works of Hegel, Herbart and Schleiermacher taken together.” In the 20th century, Hume’s legacy was affirmed in an official statement in 1929 when Hume was declared the “positivist par excellence” by the Vienna Circle and again in the 21st century when Jerry Fodor called Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature “the founding document of Cognitive Science.

It was not always so. In his own day, and for most of the 19th century, many saw Hume as merely a negative, destructive skeptic. Early in the 20th century, the Scottish philosopher Norman Kemp Smith argued that Hume’s “skepticism” was in fact a variety of naturalism, which is directed mainly against rationalist philosophical theories and not against commonsense notions of causation, the external world, morality, and the like. Hume scholars have criticized many of Kemp Smith’s specific claims, but no one doubts the key role he played in changing the way Hume is interpreted. It is a pleasure to note that Hume scholarship is flourishing today, as it has been for the past several decades. Even critics who find Hume’s arguments unconvincing are generally willing to concede that his philosophy is eminently worthy of careful attention.

Hume was not just a great philosopher; he was also a great stylist. So it is surprising—even dismayingoften to find that he seems to provide no clear, definitive answers to any number of important questions that he raises. Even when we allow for readers who ignore context or read carelessly (or both), and for what Hume calls “merely verbal disputes,” there remain differences of opinion among able and thorough scholars.
about Hume’s real position on several key issues. I have tried throughout this book to be faithful to Hume’s own texts in describing his views. Since I provide copious references to those texts, readers may judge for themselves how well I have succeeded. For what I take to be obvious reasons, I avoid scholarly disputes about Hume. I do note from time to time that disputes exist about this or that issue, but I have sought to be evenhanded when I characterize differences of opinion among Hume scholars.

Evenhandedness is one thing; completeness is a different matter. Essentially, completeness is impossible. I have had to make countless decisions about what to include and what to omit—often with a pang of regret about the exclusions. Many decisions were obvious, especially about entries in the dictionary proper, but not all of them. I had no precise set of criteria for deciding, but I was guided in large measure by the character of the book. It is a dictionary, which means that even the longer entries are too short to include blow-by-blow accounts of scholarly disagreements. Such differences of opinion are sometimes noted, and readers may consult the bibliography for details. Moreover, it is a historical dictionary, which means that thinkers such as Ralph Cudworth, George Campbell, and Richard Price—not household names even in philosophical households—get an entry because they were important to Hume, because they help readers to understand Hume, or because they were part of the background against which Hume wrote. Several better-known philosophers—Descartes, Francis Hutcheson, and Kant, for example—also get entries for the same reasons. There are historical notes scattered throughout, calling attention to affinities, debts, antagonisms, etc.

This book is intended mainly for the nonspecialist, but it should be a useful compendium for readers of all sorts. It is not intended to be (and in any case could not be) a substitute for reading Hume’s own writings, but it should help readers—especially those new to Hume—see the general shape of Hume’s philosophy and thus understand his writings better. And it deals with a great many details of that philosophy.

Although the entries in the dictionary are as self-contained as feasible, it is, obviously impossible to make them absolutely so. The aim—a difficult one to realize—has been to strike a balance between making entries self-contained and keeping repetition within practical bounds. Some entries come closer to the ideal than others. Many entries refer readers to related topics (some of them indicated by boldface type), which help make the entry in question fuller and easier to understand. However, readers will find it useful to go through the introduction, basically a sketch of Hume’s philosophy that appears before the dictionary proper, as a way of setting particular topics in a larger context. Further, it would be advisable for readers to look at a few basic topics in the dictionary as a background for more specific topics. I will mention a half dozen or so.

Hume is an empiricist, which is to say that he seeks to base all aspects of his philosophy on experience. For Hume, experience gets cashed out primarily in terms of perceptions, especially in the more narrowly philosophical parts of his system (which constitute the major focus of this book). Accordingly, it would be helpful for readers to study the entries titled "Experience" and "Perceptions" before going to other entries. The same advice applies to the entry "Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact," which describes the two fundamental kinds of knowledge in Hume’s epistemology, and to the entry titled "Cause/Causation/Cause-Effect," which concerns the most important relation (by far, as Hume holds) in our knowledge of matters of fact. A few entries are of a general philosophical sort and not focused on Hume—for example, "Common Sense," "Empiricism and Rationalism," "Ethics," "Knowledge," and "Mind."

David Hume is a great philosopher. He is also an excellent writer. Happy the philosopher who is both, for the two kinds of excellence do not always go together. He also wrote in English, which means that English-speaking readers do not need a translator to tell them what he said. This is a significant advantage. Very few students of the history of philosophy are sufficiently fluent in Greek, Latin, French, Dutch, German, or whatever to read Plato, Thomas Aquinas, René Descartes, Benedict Spinoza, Kant, or whomever in the original
languages. With these authors, if a passage seems unclear, we must first try to tell whether the translation is accurate—which is to say that we encounter an additional barrier to understanding. If, on the other hand, Hume's meaning is unclear, readers fluent in English can deal with his own words rather than the English equivalent (more or less) of words in some other language. And such readers can savor Hume's writing—its cadences, diction, use of figures of speech, and such—firsthand.

Hume's contributions are various, and some of these are better known than others. Every student of the history of philosophy knows that Hume forced us to rethink what we thought we knew about causation and morality and religion, among other things. On the other hand, very few of those students know that James Madison, the "father" of the U.S. Constitution and the fourth U.S. president, drew heavily from Hume's Essays—especially his "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth"—to combat the widespread belief that a large country could not sustain a republican form of government. Hume's writings also exerted a strong influence on the Scottish philosopher-economist Adam Smith, whose Wealth of Nations is probably the most famous work in economics ever published. Hume wrote a multivolume history of England and upward of 50 essays about political, moral, and literary subjects. And, as suggested previously, he wrote extensively about philosophy in the more restrictive sense (metaphysics, epistemology, ethics), though Hume himself saw no sharp separation between the various disciplines devoted to the study of human nature.

Indeed, Hume wrote about most of the things that people have found to be important or interesting (or, of course, both), and he did so (for the most part anyway) in an engaging style. The qualifier for the most part anyway is required to make a place for Hume's youthful masterpiece, A Treatise of Human Nature, which is a work of unmistakable philosophical genius but is not always exactly written in an engaging style.

Hume notes that humans are active and social beings no less than reasonable beings, and that the most perfect character is one that strikes a balance between them. In like fashion, he contrasts two species of philosophy: "the easy and obvious" versus "the accurate and abstruse." And, as with character, Hume does not want to discard either sort of inquiry. The ideal is to "unite the boundaries of the different species of philosophy, by reconciling profound inquiry with clearness, and truth with novelty." Reasoning in "this easy manner" should have the salutary effect of subverting a kind of abstruse philosophy that shelters superstition, absurdity, and error.

Hume's professed aim in philosophy is straightforward and (perhaps misleadingly) simple: to construct a map of human nature ("mental geography," as Hume himself calls it) by a careful study of how people actually live, think, feel, and judge. This project comprises a positive side (drawing the map, as it were) and a negative side (criticizing inaccurate maps). As an empiricist, Hume must subject his claims to the test of experience. This means that he rejects any preconceived program that would substitute abstract a priori reasoning for actual observations. In Hume's view, we cannot deduce facts about the external world or about human beings from putative self-evident principles and definitions. Hume says, in effect, "Don't tell me how things must be. Tell me, on the basis of empirically accessible evidence, how things actually are."

Hume's stance sets him in direct opposition to rationalist philosophers such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, who try to do exactly what Hume says no one can do. And it helps us understand the skeptical side of Hume's philosophy, which is directed primarily against rationalist theories about human nature, knowledge, morality, and the world. These theories purport to demonstrate that our beliefs about the external world, other people, causation, moral obligation, and such rest on rationally unshakable foundations. Hume argues that our basic beliefs have no such rational basis, but he never says that these beliefs are false or that we ought not hold them. Instead, he offers explanations of how we acquire them and why we cannot give them up.

By way of a survey of his life and times and a discussion of the outlines of his thought, this
introduction invites readers to meet, or renew acquaintance with, the man and the philosopher David Hume. It provides a useful background for the dictionary proper, which covers myriad details about Hume’s writings. Unlike the dictionary itself, the introduction does not have to observe alphabetical order but can offer a narrative account of relevant facts about Hume and his world.

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Hume’s writings cover a wide range of subjects: philosophy in the narrow sense, history, religion, economics, politics, literature, criticism, among others. Most commentators now hold that we cannot properly understand Hume’s treatment of the "standard" philosophical topics—knowledge, perception, causation, skepticism, and the like—without taking account of his views about topics falling outside the "standard" ambit. Although Hume himself contrasts "the easy and obvious philosophy" with "the accurate and abstruse", he intends no invidious comparison. On the contrary, both ways of doing philosophy are commended. Human beings are born not only for action but also for reflection; the ideal life would incorporate both sides of human nature. The same goes for writing style, and Hume’s own writings exemplify both the easy and obvious and the accurate and abstruse ways of doing philosophy. Even his more narrowly philosophical works are informed by his broad knowledge of history and literature. In that way, he carries out his announced intention to found the science of human nature on a comprehensive examination of what people actually do “in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures”. Such an examination must include what people actually did in times past and in other places; in other words, it must be rooted in history.

Hume is unique among great philosophers in being also a first-rate historian. If Hume uses his knowledge of history in developing his epistemology or his ethical theory, it is also true that he applies his philosophical principles to the study of history (or economics or literary criticism or aesthetics). As a historian, he seeks to show how events and movements are better understood as the consequences of human nature than as random (or divinely appointed) happenings. In his essay "The Populousness of Ancient Nations," Hume appeals to common sense sharpened by logic to refute the claim (widely believed in the 18th century) that the population of the ancient world was greater than that of Hume’s own world.

Hume also wrote about the role of money in economics (he is strongly anti-mercantilist), the balance of trade (do not worry about what may appear to be an unfavorable balance), and interest (he argues that interest rates are not a function of the amount of money in circulation), among other topics such credit and taxes.

Although Hume never confuses moral judgments with artistic (or what we would call aesthetic) judgments, he holds that both sorts of judgment are founded on taste or sentiment, not on reason. This sounds like subjectivism and relativism, and the wide (or even wild) disparities in aesthetic tastes seem to confirm the maxim de gustibus non disputandum est (there is no disputing taste). But, of course, we do dispute tastes more or less constantly. Further, some opinions about, say, painting or literature would be (almost) universally rejected as silly; for example, that Andy Warhol is a greater artist than Rembrandt or that Zane Grey is a better writer than Shakespeare. In a wellknown and influential essay—"Of the Standard of Taste"—Hume develops a theory, based on actual human practice, that allows for nonarbitrary, objective standards in what he calls criticism, while preserving the affective origins of all aesthetic judgments. To be a discriminating critic, one must cultivate a certain delicacy of imagination, must have wide experience, and must avoid prejudice. To the question "Is Hume an objectivist or subjectivist in aesthetics?" the correct answer is "Yes" (or, less coyly, "Both")—which is also the correct answer to the question "Is Hume an objectivist or subjectivist in ethics?"

Hume’s writings on all these topics have also inspired reflections on contemporary perspectives of feminism, race, suicide, animal ethics, and environmental issues. <>

Philosophy in Classical India: The proper work of reason by Jonardon Ganeri [Routledge, 9780415240345]
This now near classic original work focuses on the rational principles of Indian philosophical theory, rather than the mysticism more usually associated with it. Ganeri explores the philosophical projects of a number of major Indian philosophers and looks into the methods of rational inquiry deployed within these projects. In so doing, he illuminates a network of mutual reference, criticism, influence and response, in which reason is used to call itself into question. This fresh perspective on classical Indian thought unravels new philosophical paradigms, and points towards new applications for the concept of reason.

Editorial Assessment
This volume foreshadows Ganeri now deeper and wide-ranging reconsideration of the role of Indian philosophy on the world stage. It stands up to more recent work by the same author.

Philosophy in Classical India
Recent years have seen the beginning of a radical reassessment of the philosophical literature of ancient and classical India. The analytical techniques of contemporary philosophy are being deployed towards fresh and original interpretations of the texts. This rational, rather than mystical, approach towards Indian philosophical theory has resulted in a need for a work which explains afresh its central methods, concepts and devices. This book meets that need. Assuring no prior familiarity with the texts, Jonardon Ganeri offers new interpretations which bring out the richness of Indian theory and the sophistication of its methods. Original in both approach and content, Philosophy in Classical India contains many new results, analyses and explanations.

Discussing a diverse range of key Indian thinkers, Ganeri asks: What is the goal of their philosophical project and what are the methods of rational inquiry used in their pursuit? Recognising reason as the instrument of all philosophers, this book studies the active rational principles that drive classical Indian philosophy. The philosophers discussed here form a network of mutual reference and criticism, influence and response, and in their work one finds a broad vein of critical rationality in which reason is at once used constructively and to call itself into question. The inquiries of the classical Indian philosophers into the possibilities of human reason are considered afresh: new philosophical paradigms are unravelled, new applications for the concept of reason are discovered, and a common philosophical vocabulary is thereby enriched. Philosophy in Classical India rescues a story suppressed in Orientalist discourses of the East – the story of reason in a land too often defined as reason’s Other.

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Excerpt: This is a book about philosophical theory in classical India. It is an attempt to understand the nature of the classical Indian philosophical endeavour, and in so doing to reveal a richness of projects and a diversity of methods. Reason is the instrument of all philosophers, but conceptions of the nature and function of reason vary along with varying ideas about the work for which reason is properly employed. Manu, the lawmaker, said that those whose only guide is reason should be banished from the company of the virtuous. That is the view too of the great narrators of the Indian epics. Reason unchecked was seen as a threat to the stability of Brahminical social order, as the tool of heretics and troublemakers. But the epic horror of pure reason was a disdain not for reason itself, but only for its capricious use, to undermine belief rather than to support it, to criticise and not to defend. Philosophy in India, or so I argue in Chapter 1, flourished in the space this distinction affords.

The mortal finger in Michelangelo's Creation stretches out, but cannot touch the divine hand. Is this an appropriate metaphor for reason itself? Does the subjectivity that goes along with being situated in the world preclude our attaining through reason an objective conception of it? Is the idea that human reason can find nature intelligible in some fundamental way misguided? This ancient problem is but one of the leitmotifs of philosophical inquiry in classical India, where radical critiques of reason are as plentiful as more moderate applications. Brahman, the still divinity, the Upanisadic symbol for objectivity itself, is that from which 'before they reach it, words turn back, together with the mind'. But if there are limits to language and reason, can we by reason come to know what they are and where they lie? Or are the limits of reason themselves beyond reason's limit? Can it be rational to strive to transcend the boundaries of reason, to attempt what one knows to be impossible? If reason is by its very nature limited, then perhaps the subversion of reason itself becomes a rational end. That appears to be the conclusion of Nagarjuna, the founder of Madhyamaka Buddhism, whose philosophical method I examine in Chapter 2. He reasons that the constructs of reason are as empty as the magician's hat, and he welcomes the predictable retort that his own reasoning is empty too.

Other paradigms abound in India of the nature of philosophical inquiry and the proper work of reason. Some are familiar, for instance the instrumentalist conception of reason as promoted by Kautilya, a royal minister, strategist and educator. Others, less so. In Chapter 3, I show how the Vaisesika metaphysicians find in reason a tool for the construction of a formal ontology. A hierarchical theory of categories and natural taxonomies, alleged to be the metaphysics encoded in the Sanskrit language itself, is interpreted graphically, giving metaphysics a formal basis. The Yogacara Buddhist, Dinnaga is, by contrast, an ontological reductionist and a
nominalist. He is uncompromising in his search for unity and simplicity in philosophical explanation, and he uses the method of rational reconstruction to rebuild our old conceptual superstructures on new, leaner, foundations. His system is my concern in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 concerns the Jaina philosophers, who look to reason as an instrument of harmonisation. The ancient philosophical controversies – so resistant to solution, so intractable to the up-front reasoning of debate, argument and evidence – call, it seems, for a new rationality, one whose function is to subvert the way ordinary language works, making explicit the hidden parameters in assertion, and so enabling the reasoner to harmonise apparently conflicting beliefs. The task of reason is again different in the new epistemology of the later classical writers. The problem now is whether the norms of reason can themselves be rationally justified, and the idea to be defended is that reason sustains a wide reflective equilibrium of beliefs, actions, principles and theories. It is in this way, I argue in Chapter 6, that an attempt is made to diffuse a critique of reason advanced by the formidable Advaita sceptic, Srinivasa – that reason seeks to justify itself only at the peril of a viciously infinite regress.

These are just some of the shifts and turns of the classical Indian concept of reason, some paradigms for a problematic notion. Many others do not get a mention here. In particular one may refer to the Mimamsakas, who see in reason a hermeneutical instrument for the analysis of the Vedas, and to the Veda-ntins, who wrestle with the relations between reason, authority and faith. My justification for omitting these approaches is only that a great deal has already been written about the place of reason in Indian philosophy of religion, and I want to focus on philosophical agendas overlapping, but not coextensive with the soteriological. Nor do I feel any need to follow the ‘six systems’ approach to the study of Indian philosophy, popularised by Max Müller and later by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, but too simplistic to do justice to a complex web of interconnections, themes, personalities and transformations. The authors I do discuss form a moderately compact network of mutual reference and criticism, influence and response. In their work one finds a broad vein of critical rationality, in which reason is used both constructively and also to put itself in question.

What do we mean when we speak of a culture’s notion of the rational? Not, of course, that the concept itself is culturally specific, but only that it is embedded, articulated and manifested in culturally specific ways. J. N. Mohanty, a formidable interpreter of India’s past, has observed that the role a concept of rationality has within a culture is a highly stratified one, its criteria and principles operating ‘first of all in the life-world of the community concerned, then in the higher-order decisions of the scientists, law-givers and artists, finally in the theoretical discourse of the philosophers’. There is much truth in this remark. New paradigms of what it is to act and believe rationally come into being as old concepts are criticised, revised and rejected. A particularly fine example of this approach to the analysis of Indian theory is Bimal Matilal’s study of the concept of reason embedded in changing treatments of moral dilemmas in the epic literature and dharmasastras. His idea is that a diachronic study of conceptions about what constitutes an adequate resolution to a moral dilemma illuminates both shifts in the notion of reason itself, and also the mechanics of internal criticism, theory revision and paradigm rejection.

Forms of rationality are, I maintain, interculturally available even if they are not always interculturally instantiated. In an influential and thought-provoking essay, A. K. Ramanujan has advanced a thesis contrary to mine. His claim is that there is a type-difference between Indian and western modes of reason. Drawing his conclusion from a range of linguistic and anthropological evidence, Ramanujan suggests that norms of reason are conceived as ‘context-sensitive’ in India, whereas in the West they are ‘context-free.’ The distinction is one he derives from linguistics, in which context-free rules, such as that every sentence has a verb, are contrasted with rules that are sensitive to grammatical context, such as the rule governing pluralisation of nouns in English. I have no objection as such to distinctions of this sort, but only to their application. It can at best be only a contingent truth, a historical fact about the exemplification of paradigms, that such a separation should exist, and if so it is of limited philosophical significance. In
fact, my investigations here have convinced me that East–West type-difference hypotheses of such generality are definitely false. Some paradigms for the rational can be found in both cultures, for example, instrumentalism and the epistemic conception of reason. Others, for instance the Jaina notion of a rationality of reconciliation, or the modelling of reason by game-theory, are found in one, but not the other. The point is to discover new forms of rationality and applications of the concept of reason, and so to enrich a common philosophical vocabulary. We become in this way aware of possibilities for reason we had forgotten or had not yet seen.

Might I not be accused of a reconfigured Orientalism in looking for expressions of rationality in Indian philosophy, on the grounds that the West is again setting the standard? As one critic has said, ‘[w]hy is a need felt to describe the “rationality” of the Indian philosophies, to assert that Indian philosophers were “as rational” as their western counterparts? Such a general project would not be conceived of with regard to western philosophy, because the West sets the paradigm. We look in our traditions for what is to be found in the West, like the sense-reference distinction. But why should we even look for such a distinction?’ I suggest that the criticism here depends on a failure to distinguish sufficiently carefully between philosophical problems and philosophical explanations. The point is not to comb the Indian literature for the sense-reference distinction, but for their solutions to the problem that distinction was invented to solve, a problem that is as real for Fregeans as for those who reject his distinction, as real for Indian philosophers of language as for their western colleagues. If the objection is simply that ‘rationality’ is a western concept imperiously misapplied, my response would be that it is no more western than perception, thought, language or morality. The mistake here is in thinking of such philosophical concepts as internal to a theory, when in fact they are concepts about which there can be many theories (a distinction particularly well articulated in Canguilhem’s philosophy of science). Indeed, so far from being Orientalist, the project envisaged here is that of rescuing a story suppressed by Orientalism – the story of reason in a land too often defined as reason’s Other.

In analysing the philosophical literature of classical India, then, I adopt an approach neither comparative nor historical. Philosophy is not history, even if both disciplines are relevant to the study of classical India. History studies ideas in their context – it situates an author in an intellectual milieu. Philosophy, on the other hand, tries to free an idea from its context – it separates the idea from what is parochial and contingent in its formulation. The historian of Indian philosophy must be sensitive to the character of a philosophical thesis, but ought not indulge in wanton borrowing from other philosophical literatures. David Seyfort Ruegg offered some timely methodological advice when he said that the historian of Indian thought should ‘beware of anachronistically transposing and unsystematically imposing the concepts of modern semantics and philosophy, which have originated in the course of particular historical developments, on modes of thought that evolved in quite different historical circumstances, and which have therefore to be interpreted in the first place in the context of their own concerns and the ideas they themselves developed’. The historian’s worst crime is anachronism, displacing a concept and resituiting it in some new and inappropriate context.

A philosopher has also to be guarded, but for different reasons. The philosopher must take care not to mistake contingent properties in the contextual formulation of an argument or idea for essential properties of the argument or idea itself. If the historian’s worst crime is anachronism, that of the philosopher is parochialism, failing to separate the idea from its context. The philosopher’s goal is to decontextualise. It is not to recontextualise, to situate old ideas within the context of current philosophical concerns, except in so far as those concerns are themselves context-neutral. The philosopher examining the Indian theories is for this reason justified in using the modern philosophical idiom as a generally shared and convenient vehicle in which to frame his discussion. The concerns of the classical Indians are clearly recognisable as philosophical, and in using a contemporary idiom, one’s aim is to bring out the philosophical structure of those concerns, whether or not they coincide with
anything in contemporary philosophical theory. My goal then is not the mere comparison of one idea with another, but the unravelling of new philosophical paradigms. It would be rather to miss the point to criticise that venture on the grounds of a difference in the preoccupations, religious beliefs and motivations of the classical philosophers. For discoveries made by the classical Indian investigators into the possibilities of human reason can be of interest and relevance even in different times and other cultures. There are indeed, as David Hume once said, more species of metaphor in this world than any one person can have dreamed. My approach, distinct both from comparative philosophy and from the history of ideas, is instead a critical and analytical evaluation of conceptual paradigms in Indian theory.

To help those who are coming to the subject anew, I have added to each chapter a list of texts as a guide to further reading. I also give, in the list of philosophical texts discussed in this book, as comprehensive an indication as I can of what translations are available at the present time. Many of the important texts have been translated at one time or another, and even if some of the older translations are not to a modern standard, they do at least help open up the subject to non-Sanskritists. Unless otherwise specified, however, the translations in this book are my own.

I would like to express my gratitude to the British Academy, whose award under the Research Leave Scheme in 1999 freed me from departmental duties, and so gave me the time to prepare a typescript. Heartfelt thanks too to Gillian Evison, Simon Lawson, Helen Topsfield, Elizabeth Krishna and Kalpana Pant, librarians of the Indian Institute in Oxford, an invaluable research archive wherein I found all the materials I needed for this book. It is a pleasure to thank Roger Thorp and Hywel Evans at Routledge, who have been meticulous in overseeing the production of the book at every stage, and also to thank the referees for many helpful comments. Thanks too to Piotr Balcerowicz, Arindam Chakrabarti, Brendan Gillon, Stephen Phillips and Richard Sorabji for their sustained encouragement. The experience of trying for a number of years to teach courses on Indian Philosophy at King’s College London and the University of Nottingham has been an important stimulus for the ideas developed in this book, and I have benefited from the keen critical faculties of my students in both institutions. Above all, however, it has been the teachings and writings of my late supervisor, Bimal Krishna Matilal, which have inspired and sustained me, as indeed they have many others, and it is with pleasure and gratitude that I dedicate this book to him.

The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy edited by David Boonin [Palgrave Macmillan, 9783319939063]

This book brings together a large and diverse collection of philosophical papers addressing a wide variety of public policy issues. Topics covered range from long-standing subjects of debate such as abortion, punishment, and freedom of expression, to more recent controversies such as those over gene editing, military drones, and statues honoring Confederate soldiers. Part I focuses on the criminal justice system, including issues that arise before, during, and after criminal trials. Part II covers matters of national defense and sovereignty, including chapters on military ethics, terrorism, and immigration. Part III, which explores political participation, manipulation, and standing, includes discussions of issues involving voting rights, the use of nudges, and claims of equal status. Part IV covers a variety of issues involving freedom of speech and expression. Part V deals with questions of justice and inequality. Part VI considers topics involving bioethics and biotechnology. Part VII is devoted to beginning of life issues, such as cloning and surrogacy, and end of life issues, such as assisted suicide and organ procurement. Part VIII navigates emerging environmental issues, including treatments of the urban environment and extraterrestrial environments.

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Excerpt: Philosophers and Public Policy

Public policies come in many forms and address an enormous variety of subjects. Depending on the nature of the issue in question, policy makers may therefore find it useful, perhaps even essential, to consult experts across a wide range of fields: economists, psychologists, historians, physicians, statisticians, environmental scientists, chemists, engineers, legal scholars, education specialists, nutritionists, diplomats, just to name a few. Where in all of this do philosophers fit? What distinctive contributions can they make to deliberations about public policy? This Handbook is an attempt to answer that question by illustrating the many ways that philosophical reasoning can fruitfully be brought to bear on matters of public policy.

One distinctive contribution philosophers can make to thinking about public policy takes place at a relatively theoretical level: they can help us think more carefully and critically about abstract and general moral principles that most people find themselves appealing to across a broad range of public policy contexts. Most people, for example, have at least a general sense that considerations of distributive justice are important in many areas of public policy, but they may not have thought more specifically about what exactly distributive justice means. Most people also have a general sense that equality matters in many public policy contexts, but they may not have thought clearly about just what equality amounts to or about what exactly it is that should be equalized. Chapter 31 provides a careful analysis of a variety of principles of distributive justice that might be thought most appropriate for informing economic policy and takes the reader through some of the apparent strengths and limitations of each. Similarly, Chap. 32 helps the reader work their way through a variety of forms of egalitarianism with the goal of determining the conception of equality that should
be viewed as most important in a liberal society, and Chap. 33 in part pursues a similar project with respect to gender equality in particular. In other cases, many people may not even be aware that conclusions about some particular policy matter depend in part on taking a stance on some more abstract question, and it may take a philosopher to come along and reveal the connection between the concrete and the abstract. Chapter 49, for example, discusses the ways in which different policy positions regarding the controversial practice of surrogacy may turn out to depend on different theoretical views about the metaphysical relationship between pregnant woman and fetus.

While these kinds of philosophical contributions often take place within a general framework largely abstracted from specific policy issues, there are also a number of important ways that philosophers can more directly help us make progress when thinking about more concrete questions. One way they can do this is by using the tools of philosophical argument and analysis to try to defend a particular position on a given policy issue. Many of the contributions to this volume do this. Some focus on relatively specific issues such as imposing mandatory minimum sentencing laws for drug offenses (Chap. 5), banning computer-generated child pornography (Chap. 29), and granting pharmaceutical companies temporary exclusive user rights to the clinical data they use to show that their products warrant market approval (Chap. 44). Others aim to stake out a specific position on relatively broader questions such as whether religion should receive special protection in our legal system relative to nonreligious forms of conscientious belief (Chap. 22) and whether non-human animals should have political standing (Chap. 23).

While arguing for a specific policy position clearly makes an important contribution to discussion of the particular policy issue in question, arguing against a particular position on a specific matter of public policy can also prove extremely valuable. In the current debate over physician-assisted suicide, for example, most people hold either that it should be illegal across the board or that it should be legal, but only in cases where the person who wishes to die is terminally ill. Chapter 53 argues that this second position should be rejected.

The argument of this chapter maintains that if there are good reasons to permit physician-assisted suicide for terminally ill people, these reasons are also good reasons to permit it for all competent adults who wish to die. The debate, on this account, should not be between allowing physician-assisted suicide for none and allowing it for the terminally ill but between allowing it for none and allowing it for all. The conclusion of the argument of this chapter does not tell us whether physician-assisted suicide should be allowed for none or allowed for all but by trying to show that the increasingly popular intermediate position is inconsistent and untenable, it nonetheless makes an important contribution to resolving the debate over physician-assisted suicide.

And, indeed, even arguing not against a particular position but just against a particular argument for a particular position can produce important results. The other chapter on physician-assisted dying in this volume (Chap. 52), for example, focuses exclusively on one kind of slippery slope argument that has often been defended by those who are opposed to medically assisted dying. The chapter argues against this kind of argument and, in doing so, extracts several important lessons that can usefully be extended to many other policy debates in which slippery slope arguments have played a role. A number of other entries in this collection also help us make progress in particular policy debates by trying to rule out certain arguments or certain positions even if they do not purport to thereby rule in only one.

And sometimes philosophical analysis and argumentation can help move a public policy discussion forward without taking a particular stand on any of the options currently on the table. One way it can do this is by helping to identify theoretical criteria by which any particular option in a particular policy debate should be judged. Chapter 15, for example, draws a distinction between ideal theory and non-ideal theory, identifies some objections to ideal theory, argues that prominent arguments on both sides of the open borders debate are subject to some of these
objections, and concludes that any satisfactory position on issues of migration justice must therefore satisfy the methodological desiderata of non-ideal theory. This conclusion by itself does not tell us whether we should support or oppose a policy of open borders, but it does tell us where to look for an answer and, just as importantly, where not to look.

Another way philosophers can help move a policy debate forward without endorsing one side over another is simply to help us better understand the nature of the considerations that can be offered in support of each side. The debate over permitting health care professionals to refuse to provide certain services that would ordinarily be a part of their professional responsibilities on the grounds that they are conscientiously opposed to them, for example, at times involves appeals to a wide variety of considerations and values that can be difficult to keep track of. Chapter 46 is valuable largely for providing a critical survey of some of the most influential arguments that have been offered on both sides of that debate, and a number of other chapters in this collection are useful, at least in part, for the same reason.

In addition to the variety of ways in which philosophers can contribute to discussions of public policy, there are also a variety of methods they can turn to when doing so. One method starts by appealing to a general theory of some sort and then tries to extract from that theory a conclusion about some particular policy issue. Chapter 37, for example, largely draws on Marx's theory of credit in an attempt to illuminate contemporary problems surrounding student loan debt. Chapter 47 turns to the pragmatism of John Dewey for insights into a number of public policy issues regarding the management of mental health problems in educational settings. Several chapters appeal in part to general principles developed by John Rawls as a way of reaching conclusions about particular policy questions. Other arguments are developed within a broadly consequentialist framework while still others proceed from a more rights-based set of assumptions.

A second approach to thinking about concrete policy matters tries to remain neutral between rival moral theories. One way to do this is to examine a particular policy issue from the perspective of a broad range of traditional theories and see to what extent, if any, there is overlap among their conclusions. Chapter 10, for example, looks at the contemporary controversy over interrogation torture in part through the lens of such traditional general approaches as Kantianism, utilitarianism, virtue ethics, and the natural law tradition, and attempts to arrive at an assessment of that practice by doing so. A number of other chapters in this volume also take a pluralistic approach of this sort to one degree or another.

A different version of this second approach relies on a different way of remaining neutral between rival moral theories. On this version of the approach, the argument for a conclusion about a particular policy matter starts not with a set of general views but with a particular judgment about a particular case that seems compatible with a set of such views. The argument in Chap. 4, for example, is grounded in the claim that Abe's behavior is morally wrong in the following scenario:

Abe and Julian are walking down the street when they encounter what they quickly realize is a gang of gay-bashing hoodlums. The gang leader asks Abe whether his friend is gay. As it happens, Abe knows that Julian is in fact gay. Without expressing any approval for gay-bashing, honest Abe replies: "I cannot tell a lie. Yes, he is most definitely gay." The gang then proceeds, as Abe knew they would, to beat up Julian.

The chapter does not offer an argument for the claim that Abe's behavior is wrong in this case. It simply assumes that people from across a broad range of theoretical orientations will agree that it is wrong. And from the assumption that Abe's behavior is wrong, the chapter goes on to derive a defense of the practice of jury nullification, arguing that Abe's situation is relevantly like that of a jury in a case where the defendant will be punished for violating an unjust law if convicted. Chapter 14 does something similar when it takes a relevantly uncontroversial claim about a case involving a patient who sneaks into a clinical trial they were not selected for and uses it to justify a substantive
conclusion about the enforcement of border control policy.

As should also be clear by this point, there is considerable diversity not only in terms of the kinds of contributions philosophers can make to public policy discussions and the kinds of methods they can use to make them but in the kinds of subjects their contributions can help illuminate. Some chapters in this collection focus their attention on issues that people have been debating for quite some time, such as abortion (Chaps. 50 and 51), criminal punishment (Chap. 6), and freedom of expression (Chap. 24). Others highlight some of the ways philosophers can help us grapple with policy questions that have arisen only recently. Sometimes this is because of relatively new technological developments, as in the case of Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR) gene editing (Chaps. 38 and 39), modern military drones (Chap. 11), and various recent advances in neurotechnology (Chaps. 3 and 7). In other cases, it is due to relatively recent social developments, like the current controversies over removing statues honoring Confederate soldiers (Chap. 27) and over whether bakers should be legally required to sell cakes for same-sex weddings (Chap. 25). And in some cases, philosophers provide a valuable service by helping us start to think about policy decisions that may have to be made in the face of future technological developments. Striking examples in this volume include discussions of human cloning (Chap. 48), future forms of space exploration including terraforming Mars (Chap. 61), and sexual orientation conversion efforts if future technology renders them effective (Chap. 41).

The chapters that enable this volume to do all of this are divided into eight parts. Part I focuses on the criminal justice system. It begins with an examination of four specific questions that each arise at a different stage of the system: whether current pretrial detention policies in the United States are morally justified (Chap. 2), whether brain scans of a defendant should be admitted as evidence in criminal trials (Chap. 3), whether juries should vote to acquit a defendant despite sufficient evidence of guilt if they believe the legal prohibition or prospective punishment involved in the case is unjust (Chap. 4), and whether the use of mandatory minimum sentences in the context of drug laws should be abolished (Chap. 5). These chapters are followed by three more that each take on a more general criminal justice issue: the implications of different views about free will for the practice of criminal punishment in general (Chap. 6), the implications of recent developments in neuroscience for the criminal law as a whole (Chap. 7), and the relationship between anti-violence movements and state violence, with a special focus on anti-rape activism (Chap. 8).

Part II considers policy issues surrounding war, terrorism, and national sovereignty. It starts with a discussion of some basic ethical questions about the use of military psychological operations (Chap. 9), turns to two recent controversies that have arisen in the context of the war on terror in particular—the use of interrogational torture (Chap. 10) and the use of lethal drones (Chap. 11)—then offers an analysis of the kind of violent atrocities associated with some terrorist groups and the kinds of misunderstandings of such violence that can lead to unjustified policy choices (Chap. 12). This part of the book then concludes with three pieces that address different aspects of thinking about immigration policy. Chapter 13 offers a defense of a policy of open borders, Chap. 14 defends a government duty to take reasonable steps to minimize unauthorized immigration, and Chap. 15 makes the case for the value of non-ideal theory when trying to work out the best view of immigration justice.

Part III is devoted to issues concerning political participation, manipulation, and standing. It begins with two chapters about the way citizens in democratic states determine who governs: one providing an ethical assessment of actual voter behavior (Chap. 16), the other providing a defense of the claim that children should have the right to vote (Chap. 17). It then offers two contributions to the recent debate over one way that states, in turn, can determine how their citizens behave: the much-discussed "libertarian paternalism" of nudges (Chaps. 18 and 19). And it concludes with four pieces on topics that each, in one way or another, engage with questions of equal standing: education policies that deny equal standing to students with
Part IV discusses a variety of issues regarding freedom of speech and expression. It starts with a treatment of the value of liberty of thought and discussion in general (Chap. 24) and then turns to consideration of two important US Supreme Court cases that each raise questions about what counts as expression for purposes of such protection: Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission (2018), which raises the question of whether the artistry involved in creating a wedding cake should be viewed as a form of expression (Chap. 25), and Citizens United v FEC (2010), which raises the question of whether donating money to a political campaign should be viewed as a form of expression (Chap. 26). It then moves on to consider three additional issues where the controversy is not so much over whether something is a form of expression but about the appropriate ways of responding to it: the question of what to do about racist monuments such as those devoted to Confederate soldiers (Chap. 27), the question about whether creationism should be taught in public schools (Chap. 28), and the question of whether computer-generated child pornography should be illegal (Chap. 29). This part then concludes with discussion of a question of importance to those whose freedom to express themselves depends in part on the services of signed language interpreters (Chap. 30): does the Americans with Disabilities Act discriminate against deaf people?

Part V covers issues concerning justice and inequality, with a special emphasis on economic issues. It begins with three pieces that each have a relatively general focus: evaluating competing principles of distributive justice (Chap. 31), determining what kinds of equality matter and when they matter (Chap. 32), and raising the same kinds of questions with respect to gender equality in particular (Chap. 33). It then turns to four pieces that each bring theoretical considerations to bear, at least in part, on some more concrete issue: determining the most effective ways to make charitable donations (Chap. 34), evaluating the use of privatized prisons (Chap. 35), and thinking about student debt and the federal student loan system (Chaps. 36 and 37).

Part VI turns to a variety of issues involving bioethics and biotechnology. It begins with two chapters, each taking as their point of departure the recent development of CRISPR gene-editing technology. Chapter 38 provides some general background about CRISPR science and the current thinking about the policy questions it raises, and goes on to challenge a distinction that seems to play a significant role in that thinking: that between genetic therapy and genetic enhancement. Chapter 39 focuses more specifically on the potential use of CRISPR to fight the spread of malaria by introducing an infertility gene or malaria-resistant gene into the mosquito population and then considers and responds to a number of objections that can be raised against such a practice. These chapters are followed by two more that deal with other controversies surrounding enhancement and therapy more generally: the debate over enhancement and cheating in the world of sports (Chap. 40) and a discussion of what public policy regarding sexual orientation conversion efforts should be if technology that would render such efforts successful eventually emerges (Chap. 41). Evolutionary biology clearly plays a role in the background to these debates, and it is then brought to the forefront in Chap. 42, which argues that public policy decisions should not be based on evolutionary accounts of human behavior.

This part of the collection then moves on to a pair of chapters that each examine policy problems surrounding clinical research: how to address the potential for exploitation when such research is conducted in relatively low-income nations by entities from relatively high-income nations (Chap. 43), and whether to grant pharmaceutical companies temporary exclusive user rights to the clinical data they use to show that a new drug of theirs is sufficiently safe and effective (Chap. 44). A treatment of another kind of issue relating to the use of data follows in Chap. 45: the controversy...
surrounding what constitutes responsible management of what has come to be known as "Big Data". This part of the book then concludes with a discussion of two issues involving health care professionals and providers: the debate over the ethics of conscientious objection accommodation for medical workers (Chap. 46) and a challenge to the current popularity among mental health professionals of "resilience" as a strategy for managing mental health issues (Chap. 47).

Part VII moves on to treat a variety of additional issues, several of which are also often subsumed under the heading of bioethics but which here are gathered together as a distinct grouping of issues relating to the beginning and end of life. This part of the volume begins with four pieces that focus on controversial practices at or near the start of life: the debates over reproductive human cloning (Chap. 48), surrogate pregnancy (Chap. 49), and abortion (Chaps. 50 and 51). It then concludes with three pieces that focus on controversial practices at or just after the end of life: physician-assisted dying (Chaps. 52 and 53) and the procurement of organs for transplant from cadavers shortly after death (Chap. 54).

Finally, Part VIII takes up environmental ethics and problems. It begins with two pieces that are focused at a relatively general level: an effort to "revive a dynamic `biophilic' ethics of interconnectedness and eco-justice" that has wide-reaching implications for our treatment of the natural environment (Chap. 55) and an effort to develop a rights-based account of the kind of precautionary principle that many people think appropriate to apply to a wide range of environmental issues (Chap. 56). It then turns to three questions about how we might appropriately respond in cases where our views about the environment have not yet been put into practice, ranging from the socially conscientious use of philosophy of science in the service of environmental policy (Chap. 57) to divesting from fossil fuel companies as a response to accelerating global warming (Chap. 58) to more extreme forms of environmental civil disobedience in still other contexts (Chap. 59). This part of the book, and the book as a whole, then concludes with two pieces that focus on places less commonly associated with thinking about the environment but no less important despite this fact: the urban environment (Chap. 60) and the extraterrestrial environment (Chap. 61).

Having said a few words about what this book tries to do, it may help to conclude by saying a few words about what it does not try to do. First, this book does not try to provide a fully comprehensive treatment of the area it covers. Philosophy and public policy is simply too broad an area, including far too many specific subjects, for it to try to do that. It also does not attempt to offer a completely representative sampling of work in the area. While many of the topics it covers are subjects of considerable discussion and in one way or another typical for the field, others are somewhat more idiosyncratic and not especially illustrative of main currents in the area. Similarly, this book does not purport to represent a prioritized view of the field. It does offer coverage of many of the most significant and urgent issues confronting us, some of which are literally a matter of life or death, but it also considers a variety of issues that cannot be said to be of such far-ranging importance while omitting treatment of other issues that are clearly more pressing. Finally, this book does not pretend to be balanced in the sense of giving both sides of any given debate an equal hearing. A few subjects are tackled in more than one chapter in a manner that when combined approaches something like a pro and con treatment, and several others are discussed within a single chapter in a way that gives roughly equal coverage to opposing sides of the issue, but many of the chapters in this volume focus largely or entirely on defending a single point of view about a particular issue, a perspective that is not countered by any corresponding treatment of that issue elsewhere in the book.

In all these respects, this handbook might therefore best be thought of as something more like a snapshot of the field. A photograph of an enormous subject cannot be expected to comprehensively capture every element of that subject in clear detail. If a hundred thousand people are jammed into a stadium, for example, not everyone's face will fit in the frame if any of the faces are to be adequately portrayed. And since different angles
and vantage points will reveal different portions of the crowd, and from different perspectives, with differences between who is in the foreground and who is in the background, no single shot can claim to be perfectly representative or balanced, either. These are limitations on what a single photograph of a crowd can accomplish, but none of these limitations prevent a photo of a crowd from being a good photo. Similarly, there are limitations on what a single collection of works on philosophy and public policy can accomplish, even a relatively large collection, but the hope is that this volume will nonetheless prove able to do what a good photograph can still do: capture your interest in its subject, draw you in to examine it more closely, provide mental stimulation and enjoyment, and, ideally, inspire you to think about its subject more carefully and to explore it from more angles than any one representation of it can provide. <>


Psychoanalysis is often equated with Sigmund Freud, but this comparison ignores the wide range of clinical practices, observational methods, general theories, and cross-pollinations with other disciplines that characterise contemporary psychoanalytic work. Central psychoanalytic concepts to do with unconscious motivation, primitive forms of thought, defence mechanisms, and transference form a mainstay of today’s richly textured contemporary clinical psychological practice.

In this landmark collection on philosophy and psychoanalysis, leading researchers provide an evaluative overview of current thinking. Written at the interface between these two disciplines, the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychoanalysis contains original contributions that will shape the future of debate. With 34 chapters divided into eight sections covering history, clinical theory, phenomenology, science, aesthetics, religion, ethics, and political and social theory, this Oxford Handbook displays the enduring depth, breadth, and promise of integrating philosophical and psychoanalytic thought.

Anyone interested in the philosophical implications of psychoanalysis, as well as philosophical challenges to and re-statements of psychoanalysis, will want to consult this book. It will be a vital resource for academic researchers, psychoanalysts and other mental health professionals, graduates, and trainees.

With contributions from 35 leading experts in the field, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychoanalysis provides the definitive guide to this interdisciplinary field. The book comprises eight sections, each providing an overview of current thinking at the interface between philosophy and psychoanalysis through original contributions that will shape the future of the debate in its area. The first section covers the philosophical pre-history of the psychoanalytic unconscious, including discussions of Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. The next three present evaluations of psychoanalysis. Thus, the second examines how psychoanalysis was received and developed in the twentieth century by Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, the Frankfurt School, and Ricoeur. In the third, central clinical concepts, such as transference, symbolism, wish-fulfilment, making the unconscious conscious, and therapeutic action are presented and interrogated. The fourth discusses the scientific credentials of psychoanalysis, and whether it is better understood as a form of phenomenology. The final four sections turn to the contribution and significance of a psychoanalytic perspective for different aspects of human self-understanding. In that on aesthetics, philosophical theories of art, literature and film are illuminated. In the section on religion, Freud’s challenge to theism, philosophical and psychoanalytic responses to that, and Lacan’s reinterpretation of religion take centre-stage. Next, questions of love, mental health and evolutionary neuroscience are discussed in relation to ethics. The final section examines the radical challenge of psychoanalysis to political and social institutions, including issues of education, gender and war.

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Abstract

This Handbook examines the contributions of philosophy to psychoanalysis and vice versa. It explores the most central concept of psychoanalysis—the unconscious—in relation to its defences, transference, conflict, free association, wish fulfillment, and symbolism. It also considers psychoanalysis in relation to its philosophical prehistory, the recognition and misrecognition afforded it within twentieth-century philosophy, its scientific strengths and weaknesses, its applications in aesthetics and politics, and its value and limitations with respect to ethics, religion, and social life. The book explains how psychoanalysis draws our attention to the reality of central aspects of the inner life and how philosophy assists psychoanalysis in knowing itself. This introduction elaborates on the phrase ‘know thyself’, the words inscribed at the Temple of Delphi, and illustrates the connection between matters philosophical and psychoanalytic in relation to the Delphic command by highlighting their mutual concern with truth and truthfulness.

A Delphic Command

The words inscribed at the Temple of Delphi—‘know thyself’—have been a guiding light for both philosophy and psychoanalysis. Thus it is often said that an important aim of psychoanalysis is self-knowledge. An explicit connection to Delphi, however, was made by Freud himself just once, in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, where he says ‘The road whose goal it is to observe the precept γνῶθι σεαυτόν [gnothi seauton: know thyself] runs via the study of one’s own apparently accidental actions and omissions’. The claim that this was not only an aim of psychoanalysis, but the guiding principle of Freud’s life and work, was left to Ernest Jones to make in his obituary of Freud (in the kind of hagiographic language which could only be justified, if at all, in such a context): ‘Future generations of psychologists will assuredly wish to know what manner of man it was who, after two thousand years of vain endeavour had gone by, succeeded in fulfilling the Delphic injunction: know thyself’. Jones rehearsed the claim again in his influential biography of Freud, and the connection between psychoanalysis and the inscription at Delphi became widespread, endorsed by such luminaries as Sterba, Eissler, Menninger, Kohut, and Bettelheim, who elaborates the aim by connecting it with practical effects: ‘The guiding principle of psychoanalysis is that knowing oneself requires knowing also one’s unconscious and dealing with it, so that its unrecognized pressures will not lead one to act in a way detrimental to oneself and others’.

While the Delphic command is mentioned in several of Plato’s dialogues, Socrates, like Freud, takes it up in discussion just once, in the Phaedrus, where he claims that it is ‘ridiculous’ to pursue knowledge of other things before one knows oneself, a claim which places self-knowledge at the heart of the human epistemological endeavour. What Socrates himself meant by inviting us to pursue self-knowledge is something about which scholars disagree, yet there are at least four senses in which the endeavour has been considered central to philosophy.

First we have the practical endeavour of the individual philosopher, through her philosophical reflection on her predicaments in their particularity, better to come to know herself. This goal, clearly apparent in the approach of Socrates, the Stoics, and Epicureans, has been suggested as the
intelligibility-conferring setting against which various ancient philosophical texts must be read. An explicit personal, therapeutic, existential engagement in doing philosophy is only occasionally to be found in more recent philosophers yet may play an implicit motivating role for philosophers more widely.

Next we have that project which could be called ‘knowing ourselves’—namely the philosophical project of clearly articulating the human condition in its generality. This is the Socratic task taken up in theoretical mode. This project of philosophical anthropology may appear merely descriptive yet, to the extent that humanity is to be understood by reference to ideals, aspirations, and excellences (such as truth and truthfulness, love and goodness, reason and rationality), it is not intelligibly separable from fundamental evaluative questions of how to live (i.e. from what we here call ‘ethics’, which we understand more broadly than questions of ‘morality’ traditionally conceived).

Thirdly we meet with the philosophical valuation of knowing ourselves as an intrinsically valuable way of life. This was most famously encapsulated in Socrates’ famous retort when invited at his trial to abandon reflection on the Delphic oracle’s pronouncements (i.e. to abandon his search for wisdom): ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’. Here philosophical reflection becomes not merely a reflective means to a non-reflective end but an end in itself, one which constitutes a significant form of the good life.

Finally we may bring these together, as when my philosophical reflection on how I am to live is informed by my best understanding of how one may live best given what it is to be human, or when my understanding of how one may live best is informed by deep reflection on my own (or others’) personal experience. While different philosophers have understood the connection between self-knowledge and the ethical life in various ways, it is notable that living an examined life, one enabled by philosophical enquiry, has been seen as the crowning purpose and achievement of philosophy by many, from Plato and Aristotle, through Descartes, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, and Dewey to Martha Nussbaum and Bernard Williams. And here we meet with values that find expression not only in philosophy but also in the goals and methods of psychoanalysis. In what follows we explore the character and congruence of such endeavours at self-knowledge.

As Bernard Williams expresses our second, theoretical, version of the Delphic command, philosophy can be understood as ‘part of a more general attempt to make the best sense of our life, and so of our intellectual activities, in the situation in which we find ourselves’. As such, he argues, philosophy is a ‘humanistic discipline’. It is humanistic not only in the sense that the central object of study is ourselves, but also that its understanding develops within and expresses a ‘human perspective’. Definutive of such a perspective is that it is irreducible to that of the natural sciences in its style, method, and aims. The scientific ambition that particularly concerns Williams is that of working towards a description of the world ‘as it is in itself, independent of perspective’. The contrastive aim of philosophy, as he understands it, is to do proper justice to matters of meaning, intelligibility, and significance—matters which, he argues, involve reason reflecting on itself from within, drawing inescapably on such perspectival modes of understanding as are inevitably historically and culturally situated and conditioned.

Williams’s thought may here helpfully be brought into relation with that of Charles Taylor who takes us closer to matters psychoanalytic with his focus on that project of self-understanding which involves our articulating—both in the sense of ‘giving voice to’ and in the sense of ‘developing and refining’—our emotional experience. Thus according to Taylor we are essentially ‘self-interpreting animals’ whose ‘interpretation of ourselves and our experience is constitutive of what we are, and therefore cannot be considered as merely a view on reality, separable from reality, nor as an epiphenomenon, which can be by-passed’. What Taylor means here by ‘self-interpretation’ is not an essentially intellectual or reflective act, but nevertheless pertains to a kind of self-understanding not met with in animal life. We highlight two aspects of Taylor’s discussion.
First, Taylor argues that ‘experiencing a given emotion involves experiencing our situation as bearing a certain import’. An import is a way in which a situation or object can be relevant and important to us, given our desires and purposes. Taylor’s claim is now very widely accepted in the philosophy and psychology of emotion as the claim that emotions constitutively involve our making appraisals of situations, which appraisals form ‘the grounds or basis for the feeling’. Thus, we can define emotions ‘by the imports they relate to: fear is the affective response to the menacing, anger to the provoking, indignation to the flagrantly wrongful, and so on’. As a consequence, our emotions are not intelligible for what they are merely in objective—i.e. experience-independent, physiological, or physical-causal—terms since they essentially ‘characterize things in their relevance to our desires and purposes’.

Second, Taylor highlights the relationship between our self-understanding, our social and moral emotions, and what it is to lead a human life. Shame, for example, is only intelligibly experienced by those who understand, experience, and value their lives as having a certain kind of import—i.e. only intelligibly experienced by subjects with an aspiration to dignity. The subject who feels shame cares about how she handles herself and how she is seen by others. She is someone who understands herself, in her shame, to be failing to meet standards that matter to her. In such ways are self-conscious social subjects partly constituted, in their emotional lives, by their self-interpretations.

None of this is to say that there is no space for our self-interpretations to go awry, nor to suggest that we may not fail to interpret ourselves in apt ways. What it suggests, however, is that from the point of view of philosophical anthropology, aspirations to grasp what it is to lead a human life in merely objective terms (i.e. in terms not referring to a subject’s self-understanding) will be doomed to failure; from the point of view of psychopathology, that the relationship between self-interpretation and selfhood must be taken into account in understanding the distinctive sufferings of human selves; and from the point of view of therapy, that we can begin to understand how a merely talking cure could be thought curative of such disturbances as reach down into our selfhood—since reinterpreting the meaning of one’s behaviour will be at the same time a refashioning of oneself.

Recovering the Inner Life
Williams and Taylor pursue philosophy as, in part, a project of retrieving, sustaining, and exploring a conception of what it is to live a human life. The living of a distinctly human life involves, at its paradigmatic best, the experience of a rich inner subjectivity which informs our relationships, work, and creative projects. Aspects of this inner life may, and frequently do, remain stunted or atrophy through lack of nurture, become covered over by emotional defences against the pains of living, be inhibited by ideological narrowness, or be degraded through corrupt forms of relationship. Against such natural tendencies, many of the arts and humanities, including literature, poetry, history, and philosophy, engage in a continuing project of developing and retrieving our subjectivity. The project may be valuable for individuals yet also, more broadly, for cultures.

What makes this ongoing endeavour intelligible to its participants is the possible disjunction of our implicit, lived understanding of what it is to live a distinctly human life and those more explicit self-understandings which may do better or worse justice to what is implicitly grasped and lived. What makes it necessary is the way in which our implicit, lived understandings may have been muted or thwarted by various factors including our explicit self-conception that may tacitly or explicitly trash much of what makes for our humanity. (Imagine how impoverishing it would be to actually live as if that philosophy or psychology of mind you consider most implausibly reductive, or which simply leaves out of account or sees as merely epiphenomenal that which in your inner and existential life most matters to you, were true.) And what makes it valuable is the recovery of that within us which has become muted, our emancipation from such falsifying self-understandings as impoverish our self-becoming, and the intrinsic dignity of the examined life.

Nothing in such a humanistic approach is opposed to the natural scientific study of human life, but it
challenges the scientistic thought that such a life may itself be adequately articulated in the terms offered by the natural sciences. The humanity that Williams and Taylor retrieve for us is one run through with a constitutive normativity, subjectivity, affectivity, rationality, and agency, and the methods they retrieve for us are ineliminably hermeneutic and aspire to no interpretation-transcending objectivity. What matters for them is not that the humanities and social sciences demonstrate the validity and reliability of their methods by adopting natural scientific methods ill-fitted to self-interpreting animals, but rather that they self-critically deploy such meaning-apprehending methods as are apt to the study of human life.

Such a focus is also central to the vision of psychoanalysis which pursues its own exploration and development of our humanity on two fronts. First, at the level of theory, and by contrast with behaviourist, cognitivist, and physiological psychology, it emphasizes the inner subjective life. This is the life of our preoccupations—with erotic desire and social recognition, with our shame, guilt and contrition, power and humiliation, with our hopes and our histories, loveliness and loneliness, lovesickness and consuming hatreds, shyness and courage, envy, resentment and gratitude, intense secret passions, idealizing delights, the peculiarly vaunted or denigrated status for us of our significant attachment figures, our sexual adequacy and inadequacy, fateful repetitions, with our expressions and deeds which threaten to betray us, and all of our inner conflicts, moodiness, anxieties, excitements, self-punishments, self-defeating behaviours, irrational impulses, and bodge-job forms of self-management. This caboodle is what we may call our ‘subjective life’ or ‘internal world’, and many a student of psychology has been disappointed to find that what they naturally hoped would be centre stage on their syllabus—namely why our emotional life is so often baffling and tumultuous—barely gets a look-in beside the studies of cognition, behaviour, perception, and neuropsychology. It is, of course, the life of the neurotic subject—but also of all of us, since ‘psychoanalytic research finds no fundamental, but only quantitative, distinctions between normal and neurotic life’ and ‘the psychical mechanism employed by neuroses is not created by the impact of a pathological disturbance upon the mind but is already present in the normal structure of the mental apparatus’.

Second, at the level of practice, psychoanalysis aims to attain or recover for us the very subjective sense of what otherwise appears not as meaningful, humanly intelligible moments of emotionally charged behaviour, but instead merely as behavioural signs and symptoms of an unknown condition. It aims, that is, to restore or develop in us our subjectivity, to help us recover or grow our agency or self-possession, to retrieve or awaken our inner lives, to ‘make the unconscious conscious’ and thereby to ‘know ourselves’.

It is safe to say that, compared to any other psychological school, psychoanalysis has in both its theory and practice most keenly kept its pulse on the distinctive qualities of the inner life. That philosophy may borrow from it to considerably enrich its own sense of what it really means to live a distinctly human life should not be surprising. One of the most valuable contributions made by psychoanalysis to the project of making sense of ourselves is its drawing our attention to both the clinical data and the everyday observations upon which it constructs its theories. It offers up, if not an entirely new, then a considerably under-examined, set of human experiences. Such experiences are relevant not only for psychoanalysis’ own explanatory and therapeutic projects, they also deserve a place in the understanding of what it is cp. s) to be human at play in many other disciplines—including, of course, philosophy. Many chapters in this Handbook consider the significance of psychoanalysis as a contribution to the meaning and meaningfulness of human activity, to the nature of human experience, to a philosophical anthropology and the phenomenology of human consciousness and relating, and thus to questions in ethics, religion, aesthetics, and, of course, self-knowledge.

Thus, psychoanalysis draws our attention to the reality of central aspects of the inner life which we know implicitly to be essential to human life as lived yet which for various reasons often escape
our reflective grasp. As Nietzsche remarked, philosophy is littered with claims and ideas, e.g. about human psychology and ethics, that are insufficiently tied to human reality. For example, the important Aristotelian conception of man as a ‘rational animal’ might, if we’re not careful, illegitimately displace from our self-understanding the essential contribution made by our emotional sensibilities, sensibilities which make possible not only irrationality and human impoverishment but which put us in contact with reality and enable our flourishing. Or an equation of mentality with consciousness may squeeze out of view the essential contribution to our psychological lives of dynamically and descriptively unconscious mental processes. At the time of writing, many areas of philosophy are undergoing transformation in response to developments in the social, cognitive, and neuropsychological understanding of unconscious processes and the possible challenges these provide to the autonomy and integrity of conscious rational deliberation. The issue is at the heart of philosophy’s project, as the place and nature of reason and conscious deliberation have been of central concern to philosophy since its inception.

A second reason why philosophy should attend to the understandings of human life offered by psychoanalysis, and may be enhanced by psychoanalytic reflection, is that the unconscious may be understood to consist of optional and idiosyncratic aspects of our lives which go unexamined and constrain our sense of what is possible. This point can be better understood in light of a more familiar argument concerning why philosophy should attend to history, deriving from the self-interpreting nature of human life. If what it is to live a human life or have a human mind were immutable facts, they could be interrogated by means of a familiarity with any human culture at any point in history (one’s own culture and times, for example). Since, however, what it is to be a human being itself changes (within limits) over time and place, philosophers attempting to grasp what it is to live a human life or to be minded in human ways will do well to attend to more than their present time. This will be important not only for the understanding of other modes of human life but, perhaps even more importantly, for the understanding of our own. For it is only when set against the backdrop of other ways of being human that we can understand the distinctive shape, and acknowledge the contingency, of our own life. This lesson from history, we say, has a psychoanalytic analogue given above. Thus, a historical, sociological, and psychoanalytic method may help philosophy come to know itself, to make its unconscious conscious, by unearthing the contingent character of the forms of life which it takes for granted, including the form of its own enquiries.

Psychoanalysis: Know Thyself
But in what ways may philosophy return the favour? Various chapters of this Handbook provide their own diverse answers. But, following here the theme of ‘know thyself’, we propose that one of philosophy’s distinctive contributions is to assist psychoanalysis in knowing itself. Psychoanalysis as a discipline involves an ongoing dialectic of psychological theory and therapeutic practice informing each other, over time generating diverse self-understandings that are in tension with one another. Perhaps the debate over natural science and hermeneutics provides the most striking example of this. Philosophy can make more explicit conceptual implications, uncover misunderstandings, unearth problematic structuring assumptions, and enable new and productive self-understandings.

As an illustration: it is today fairly well understood that the kind of self-knowledge sought both by psychoanalysis and by anyone hoping to do genuine emotional work on herself, is not simply reflective. It may be interesting for us to develop beliefs about our minds’ functioning, and such beliefs may even be true, but, from a therapeutic point of view, the risk is significant that such an intellectual self-acquaintance may defensively stand in the way of, and disguise the ongoing need for, an emotionally deeper and mutative form of self-knowledge. Relatedly, Jonathan Lear notes that even ‘raising “the question of how to live” can be a way of avoiding the question of how to live’. Getting clear on what is and isn’t involved in that deeper and intrinsically transformative project of knowing thyself is something with which philosophy
has been concerned for centuries before psychoanalysis, and without philosophical aid it is inevitable that psychoanalysis will sometimes embed those self-misunderstandings about what it is to know thyself with which philosophy has had to grapple.

Consider for example Hadot’s explication of that first sense of ‘know thyself’ offered in our first section:

[In] the Socratic dialogue ... the interlocutors are invited to participate in such inner spiritual exercises as examination of conscience and attention to oneself; in other words, they are urged to comply with the famous dictum, ‘Know thyself’. Although it is difficult to be sure of the original meaning of this formula, this much is clear: it invites us to establish a relationship of the self to the self, which constitutes the foundation of every spiritual exercise.

But is ‘this much’ clear? Sometimes this is the relationship taken in knowing oneself, but others have taken the Delphic command otherwise.

Augustine, for example, urged that when the mind ‘is ordered to know itself, let it not seek itself as though withdrawn from itself, but let it withdraw what it has added to itself’. That is to say that some central forms of knowing oneself involve not the gleaning of new information about oneself—not an addition but a subtraction, not so much the establishment of a helpful self-relation but the undoing of an unhelpful self-relation. In addition we also meet with those other forms which take us closer to self-becoming, i.e. to growing into one’s own character, to articulating and making more determinate what is as yet undeveloped, than to any increased store of knowledge about oneself.

Philosophical reflection on the way that the term ‘self’ works in a variety of locutions—including ‘know thyself’—bears this out and helps us guard against assuming that it inevitably signifies the object of a reflexive relationship, and instead helps us see how it functions to signal the absence of relationship. Consider, for example, ‘self-respect’, ‘self-possession’, ‘self-motivation’, ‘self-consciousness’, ‘to thine own self be true’, ‘selfishness’. Someone who ‘selfishly’ ‘keeps something for himself’ is not well understood as keeping something for someone who happens to be himself, but rather as simply keeping something without thought of later giving it to anyone. The same may be said of someone who ‘keeps something to himself’: he just doesn’t share it with others. Someone who is ‘self-possessed’ doesn’t stand in a positive relation of possession to himself (whatever that would mean), but is rather free from the psychological influence of others past and present. He now acts in a straightforward and decisive manner that is free from responsibility-avoiding dither. Someone who becomes ‘self-conscious’ is, to be sure, thrown into an anxious state of wondering how she is coming across to others, and in this sense it is she and they, these flesh and blood people (but not some additional ‘self’ that she has), who are the objects of her attention. Yet what is also essential to our self-conscious subject is that she has been thrown out of relationship with these others, at least in any trusting connected form. Someone who is ‘true to herself’ is not so much simply representing herself accurately or simply happening to act on the basis of whatever she desires. Rather, she is not in the business of dissimulation but now chooses and acts according to her own values. The ‘self-motivated’ person is simply a person whose motivation to achieve her goals is not dependent on external influences. And, we suggest, one important understanding of the person who follows the Delphic command focuses not on the subject enjoying a reflexive relationship with his own mind but on his enjoying the absence of unhelpful defence mechanisms. For just as ‘being true to oneself’ is not perspicuously taken to cover, say, unremarkable cases of wanting to go for a walk and then, by gosh, going for a walk, so too ‘knowing thyself’ is not perspicuously taken to cover, say, ordinary cases of being able to verbally express one’s thoughts and feelings about, say, going for that walk. Instead ‘knowing thyself’ is, in such cases, not a matter of having, but rather of emancipating oneself from, a certain relation with oneself—a relation of self-deception or the inability to tolerate and own one’s thoughts and feelings. In such contexts, at least, the injunction to ‘know thyself’ refers not to the cultivation of a truthful reflexive presentation of the mind to itself.
but to a non-dissimulative, non-reflexive engagement with one’s life.

Or—by way of understanding the value of philosophical reflection on ‘knowing thyself’ to psychoanalysis—consider the idea that such self-knowledge is by itself but a morally neutral affair. Here we are offered the notion of a psychopathic patient who, despite her depravity, and perhaps even because of a successful psychoanalysis, knows herself perfectly well—not just in the sense of having a factually correct understanding of her own psychology, but also in the sense of having dismantled her defences. Without philosophical reflection such an idea can seem rather too clearly intelligible, as if there were no meaningful alternative. Yet, while the claim remains controversial, it certainly has been doubted whether what we understand by the Delphic command, or for that matter by the work of psychoanalysis, can quite so readily meet with an amoral interpretation. For, the suggestion goes, just as it is only in and through our joy, anger, and sadness that we really understand what it is to know reward, be wronged, and lose what matters to us, so too it is only really in and through relationships conditioned by love that we can comprehend others’ true reality, and only in and through our honest commitment, integrity, and humility that we can know what it is to lead a truly human life. On this view we do not grasp what it is to be a human living a distinctly human life by becoming knowledgeable about the behavioural habits of Homo sapiens. Rather we grasp it by engaging in forms of relationship with others which are essentially characterized in moral terms—in terms of what is humane, in terms of what is revealing of our and their humanity. Truly understanding what it is to wrong someone, for example, may be thought to consist not simply in being able to track a range of abstract propositional entailments, but instead in feeling guilt and wanting to put it right. There are certainly senses in which a clever and uninhibited psychopath may ‘know herself’, but if she can’t feel the guilt she has nevertheless accrued by her evil acts then, the suggestion goes, there is yet an important form of self-knowledge which she lacks.

This excursus into two important, psychoanalytically pertinent meanings of ‘knowing thyself’ is of course but one of the ways in which philosophy may repay psychoanalysis for its enriched reflective conception of our inner life. Stepping back to survey the interdisciplinary field we may distinguish advocative, critical, and synoptic applications of philosophy to psychoanalytic theory.

On the advocative side we find philosophy helping to defend and clarify psychoanalytic theory from misunderstandings. Here we might think, for example, of how best to understand the physicalistic and energetic metaphors within psychoanalysis, how best to understand the notions of psychological ‘structures’ and defence ‘mechanisms’, and which methods of investigation, epistemic standards, and forms of understanding and explanation are best suited to knowledge of inner life.

On the critical side we find philosophy helping to sort out the wheat from the chaff within psychoanalytic theory. What has mattered here is not so much the scientific evidence for the truth or falsity of psychoanalytic theories, which is not a direct matter for philosophy. Instead what matters here is the cogency of the forms of reasoning used within psychoanalysis to support its claims, and the critical unearthing of optional, perhaps even worrisome, moral and political values tacitly embedded in the theory and practice. Here, connecting the critical with the advocative application, the question of whether psychoanalysis can qualify as a science, and if so, what kind of science, has been of considerable importance. In such ways psychoanalysis comes to better know itself—to know and work through its habitual irrationalities in the service of achieving a more honest, perhaps a more modest, less hubristic, and more integrated enterprise.

The synoptic contribution of philosophical reason to psychoanalysis takes us into a broader discussion of interdisciplinarity in psychoanalytic thought.

Psychoanalysis Situated

The earlier discussion of the Delphic command stressed the importance of not misunderstanding ‘knowing thyself’ as always and inevitably involving the cultivation of a positively informative relation of
the self to itself. Instead it urged the significance of a form of ‘knowing’ marked principally, not by the presence of a particular epistemic attitude but rather, by the absence of self-deception. Another way to misunderstand ‘knowing thyself’ merely as a self-relation would be to assume that it did not essentially implicate others— i.e. to overlook the essentially interpersonal nature of self-knowledge. This idea that we come to know ourselves in and through one another forms the heart of Hegel’s conception of identity as ‘negation’: we become who we are in so far as we distinguish ourselves from others and in so far as we achieve mutual recognition with them. Such negation determines not only our sensorimotor selfhood—as we differentiate from, while at the same moment we perceptually and motorically relate to, our proximate environments—but also our personalities—as we come to relinquish our childhood egocentricity. In that process we come to appreciate both that we and others have genuinely different tastes, desires, and values and that, all being well, for all that we may still offer one another humane recognition. Or, at least, that we may—if we so wish—work to achieve that mutual recognition and mutual accountability, work to manage our relationships, and overcome our and others’ misrecognitions, such unending work being—in the ‘tragic vision’ of psychoanalysis—an aspect of any worthwhile relating at all.

That self-knowledge may be won through essentially relational means marks a significant theme of recent psychoanalysis which has come to place our object relations and our in-ter-subjectivity at the heart of both its clinical theory and its clinical practice. Yet negation and relation also provide another means for philosophy to repay its debt for the richer picture of the inner world offered to it by psychoanalysis: by helping psychoanalysis ‘know itself’ through grasping its relations to, identities with, distinctions from, debts to, and dependencies on other disciplines. Here philosophy plays its long-established role of coordinating and synthesizing synoptician.

Psychoanalysis itself originated in interdisciplinary reflection. It is both well known and frequently forgotten within psychoanalysis that Freud drew upon extensive non-clinical sources in constructing psychoanalytic theory. Patricia Kitcher lays out the full extent of Freud’s borrowings from theories and discoveries of his time in neurophysiology (neurons, psychic energy, the reflex model of the mind), psychology (associationism, functional analysis), psychiatry (unconscious ideas, the sexual origin of neurosis, the separation of ideas and language), sexology (infantile sexuality, stages of sexual development, component instincts), anthropology and evolutionary biology (recapitulationism), with further ideas taken from philology and sociology. To the extent to which psychoanalysis draws on non-clinical findings and models directly it will need to revisit such ideas as have been superseded within their source disciplines. The same may be said of the use by more recent incarnations of psychoanalysis of theories and concepts from structural linguistics, attachment theory, existential phenomenology, Marxism and critical theory, anthropology, postmodernism, developmental psychology, and neurobiology. Philosophy in synoptic, grand-theoretic, mode may take up the task of urging and facilitating such updatings, and of drawing critical attention to failures to do so.

Philosophy’s job here, however, is not only the uncomfortable one of interdisciplinary police officer, but also that of diplomat. For sometimes, when psychoanalysis borrows from other disciplines, it does not so much directly import their concepts, as tacitly reappropriate or metaphorically extrapolate them for its own ends. While this may, in many cases, relieve psychoanalysis of the obligation to keep track of changes in scientific knowledge and understanding within the source domains, it may result in unclarity about the imported concepts, e.g. whether they are best understood as carrying literal or metaphorical senses (an example here may be Freud’s use of energetic and biological concepts). Here the task of philosophy is to clarify this indeterminacy and to assess whether inferences are being made within the psychoanalytic theory which illegitimately switch the senses of terms mid-argument.

Perhaps the most significant diplomatic role for philosophy concerns the questions of whether and how the findings and the methods of non-psychoanalytic disciplines are to be brought to bear on psychoanalytic theory and vice versa.
Looking back a few decades one thinks especially of attempts to use the quantitative methods of experimental psychology to test hypotheses derived from psychoanalytic theory, or to test the adequacy of psychoanalytic therapy. The distinctly philosophical questions here were whether and when and how such hypotheses are pertinent to the theory, whether the theory is genuinely testable, whether it’s too bad for the theory or too bad for the experimental methods if it isn’t, and whether and when such methods truly are apt to investigation of the internal world. In the background of such debates lies the central question of whether psychoanalysis is a science. If so, of what sort, and are our existing conceptions of science adequate when it comes to the idea of a ‘science of subjectivity’? If not, is this because psychoanalysis is unscientific (i.e. a failed science) or non-scientific (e.g. a Weltanschauung)? More recently one thinks of the theory and findings of experimental psychology concerning the non-dynamic unconscious and their significance for psychoanalytic theory. In defending the claim that apparently meaningless human phenomena may have a sense, Freud argued that merely physical (e.g. genetic or neurological) explanations frequently fail to tell us all we want to know, and that psychological explanation remains called for—but he failed to adequately consider the different psychological ways in which we may make sense of such phenomena (e.g. via such heuristics and biases in information processing as form part of an ‘adaptive’ unconscious). Recent work on both sides explores the complementarity of such explanations, and offers us the understanding that cognitive processing is motivated in psychodynamic ways and that the psychodynamic unconscious may be comprised of structures first delineated outside psychoanalytic theory. Here the philosopher’s role is both synoptic (surveying the points of overlap and contact in the objects and the theories) and diplomatic (working to ensure that different schools, with their different approaches to the life of the mind, do not talk past one another).

A certain kind of good psychoanalysis might go something like this (but without the linear form): build enough trust between a vulnerable patient and a respectful analyst; examine and carefully deconstruct the patient’s defensive character formations; try to tolerate, truthfully acknowledge, and integrate such latent unintegrated and undeveloped feelings and expectations that induce shame and distrust in the patient; facilitate thereby the development of these feelings and the patient’s increased realistic self-confidence. Along the way such grandiose ambitions and self-deceiving illusions as serve defensive ends may be dismantled in the pursuit of a more workable inner life, an increased ability to remain inwardly and outwardly truthful, and the forming of deeper relationships. A good philosophical analysis of psychoanalysis may proceed along parallel lines. Having one’s precious psychoanalytic understandings subjected to philosophical critique may be galling, parts of what was cherished may have to be foregone, ambitions may sometimes need to be scaled back, collaborations more willingly entered into—with the rewards being greater clarity and the opportunity for what is truly valuable within the theory to shine and grow. The result is a discipline with its finger even more keenly on the pulse of our baffling inner lives and yet more serviceable to those seeking to follow the Delphic command.

Truth and Truthfulness

We close with an illustration of the closeness of matters philosophical and psychoanalytic in relation to the Delphic command by an examination of their mutual concern with truth and truthfulness.

Freud commented that ‘Psychoanalytic treatment is founded on truthfulness’ and—perhaps less truthfully!—that, regarding his own development of psychoanalysis, ‘My single motive was the love of truth’. It is a motivation he urges on the patient too, in the ‘fundamental rule’ of psychoanalysis. ‘The only exception’ to the rule that the patient be encouraged to speak of whatever he or she wants is ‘in regard to the fundamental rule of psychoanalytic technique which the patient has to observe’. What is the rule? Freud tells his patient that:

You will notice that as you relate things various thoughts will occur to you which you would like to put aside on the ground of certain criticisms and objections. You will be tempted to say to yourself that this or that is irrelevant here or that it’s quite
unimportant or nonsensical so that there’s no need to say it. You must never give in to these criticisms, but must say it in spite of them—indeed, you must say it precisely because you feel an aversion to doing so. Later on you will find out and learn to understand the reason for this injunction, which is really the only one you have to follow. So say whatever goes through your mind ... [N]ever forget that you have promised to be absolutely honest and never leave anything out because for some reason or other it is unpleasant to tell it.

This valuation of truth-telling is also central to that most psychoanalytical of pre-Freudian philosophers, Friederich Nietzsche, who, in his last work The Antichrist, wrote: ‘Truth has had to be fought for every step of the way, almost everything else dear to our hearts ... has had to be sacrificed for it. Greatness of soul is needed for it, the service of truth is the hardest service’. In The Gay Science, he explains that the ‘“will to truth” does not mean “I do not want to let myself be deceived” but—there is no alternative—“I will not deceive, not even myself”; and with that we stand on moral ground’.

Earlier we considered the notion of knowing thyself, and tried to do more justice to the idea of such a gain in knowledge than could be done by reading it in terms of increasing one’s stock of information about oneself. In particular we stressed self-knowledge as overcoming self-deception and self-alienation and as relating realistically with others. Later we will also go on to discuss ‘knowing one’s own mind’ in the sense of arriving at non-vacillating resolve and determinacy of thought and will. So too, in considering truth, we do well to attend to uses of the concept which take us beyond notions of mere correctness. Thus not only a judgement expressed in a proposition, but also plumb lines, hearts, desires, and lovers, may all be true. And if we are true to someone (including ourselves—recall ‘to thine own self be true’), then correct judgement also does not seem to come into it. We may here recall Martin Heidegger’s recovery of truth as athenia from otherwise hegemonic conceptions of truth as adequatio—the former to do with something’s self-revelation or unimpeded unconcealment, the latter to do with one thing’s correct representation of something else (see Gipps, this volume). We may think, too, of Gilbert Ryle’s discussion of what he called ‘avowals’—utterances such as:

‘I want’, ‘I hope’, ‘I intend’, ‘I dislike’, ‘I am depressed’, ‘I wonder’ etc—and of how we may be tempted by their form to misconstrue all the sentences in which they occur as self-descriptions. But in its primary employment ‘I want ... ’ is not used to convey information, but to make a request or demand. It is no more meant as a contribution to general knowledge than ‘please’... Nor, in their primary employment, are ‘I hate ... ’ and ‘I intend ... ’ used for the purpose of telling the hearer facts about the speaker ... They are things said in detestation and resolution and not things said to advance biographical knowledge about detestations and resolutions.

The truth of such avowals is not a function of their expressing correct judgements that one hates or intends, but rather of their being expressions of the hate and intention in question. When we express ourselves truly, or again truthfully, we typically speak ‘from’, not ‘about’, our thoughts and feelings, and do so without perverting their articulation.

What none of these philosophers considers, in their talk of truth as the auto-revelation of Being to us (Heidegger) or as the auto-revelation of the human heart and mind to itself and others (Nietzsche, Ryle), is the significance, including the ethical significance, of an interpersonal commitment to truthfulness for the very constitution of what is there to be revealed. To put it otherwise: we do well to avoid considering the value of truthfulness only in relation to the expression of what already has determinate psychological shape, and instead to acknowledge its even more fundamental role in our minds becoming made up, in various senses of that idiom. Such a focus is provided by Williams’s discussion of the virtues of truth and truthfulness, the psychoanalytic resonances of which should shortly become clear.

Williams begins with the observation that many of our thoughts do not already clearly take the form of a belief as opposed to a desire or, say, a wish. For sure, sometimes we do have:

very determinate dispositions to assert certain things. But in many other cases, it is
not merely the case that we do not know what we believe (though this is of course often true), but that a given content has not come to be a belief at all. What makes it into a belief may be that we are asked about the matter or about the belief and then have to decide whether we are prepared to assert it or not. How can that be, if assertions are expressions of belief? The answer is that assertions ... often give others a reason to rely on what we say, either as a statement of how things are, or as an expression of how they seem to us. So ... I have to consider what I am prepared, sincerely and responsibly, to assert. I ask myself what I believe, and that is, in such a context, the same question. The question should not be understood, however, as simply one of what I already believe; in trying to answer it I do not simply review my dispositions but consider my reasons for taking a given content to be true, and this is a question of what I am to believe.

A subject may be sincere in that he may come out with what is on his mind at any moment, but unless there is some consistency between what he says from occasion to occasion it will be hard to treat what he says as expressive of anything that dignifies the description of ‘belief’ (Williams suggests the phrase ‘propositional mood’ as a more fitting alternative). He may at first be ‘awash with many images, many excitements, merging fears and fantasies that dissolve into one another’.

What will help a subject firm up his thoughts into distinct beliefs, desires, and wishes that no longer bleed into one another, will be in part the conversations he has with others. In conversation you may ask me what I think or feel about something, and if I am to respect the relationship we have, to be of use to you, and to be someone whose word counts for something, it will be important that I give thought to the matter at hand and actually form determinate thoughts or feelings. At a level more basic than the enjoyment of any transparent self-understanding of determinate beliefs and desires ‘we are all together in our social activity of mutually stabilizing our declarations and moods and impulses into becoming such things as beliefs and relatively steady attitudes’.

Williams identifies a second way in which conversations clarify what we believe. Some of our thoughts are wishes, and through wishful thinking, turn into beliefs. Or again, some of our indeterminate thoughts may become either wishes or beliefs, and which they become may depend on other wishes and desires we have. Wishful thinking, says Williams, ‘is very basic and not a great mystery: the steps from its being pleasant to think of P, to its being pleasant to think that P, to thinking that P, cover no great psychological distance’. As a result, ‘there is no mystery about the fact that ... an agent may easily find himself committed to [the] content of his wishes and beliefs in the wrong mode’. However, this does not happen transparently. When beliefs arise in these ways, when they ‘become hostage to desires and wishes, they do so only as the result of hidden and indirect processes, against which the disciplines of the virtues of truth are directed’. And this is something that conversations with others can help prevent.

This applies not only to questions of what to believe, but also when thinking about what to do. Since:

individual deliberation ... is inherently open to wishful thinking ... it needs the virtues of truth as much as purely factual inquiries need them. [So] thinking about what one individual should do can usefully involve more than one person: we can think about what I should do. This is not just because you may have experience and knowledge which I lack, but because your wishes are not mine—possibly not in their content, certainly not in their effects. [We] help to sustain each other’s sense of reality, both in stopping wishes’ becoming beliefs when they should not, and also in helping some wishes rather than others to become desires.

The same may also be said of a third question, self-interpretation: we may equally helpfully think together about who I am.

The implications of Williams’s philosophical argument for both psychoanalytic theory and practice are clear. Yet, arguably, they are equally
relevant to philosophical practice itself. Nietzsche and Wittgenstein both identify a similar role for the will and its influence on philosophical thought as Williams identifies for the wish here, and with it the significance of an ethic of truthfulness in philosophy. Wittgenstein’s remarks return us to the very first sense of ‘know thyself’ we identified in relation to philosophy, the practical endeavour of the philosopher to come to know herself:

What makes a subject difficult to understand—if it is significant, important—is not that some special instruction about abstruse things is necessary to understand it. Rather it is the contrast between the understanding of the subject and what most people want to see.... What has to be overcome is not a difficulty of the intellect, but of the will.... Work on philosophy is ... actually more of a kind of work on oneself.

The edifice of your pride has to be dismantled. And that means frightful work.... One cannot speak the truth, if one has not yet conquered oneself. One cannot speak it—but not because one is still not clever enough.

A Handbook of Philosophy and Psychoanalysis
Wittgenstein’s reflections on philosophical practice carry both explicit and implicit psychoanalytic overtones, but he famously had an ambivalent relationship to psychoanalysis itself, while Freud in turn famously had an ambivalent relationship with philosophy. In 1886 Freud avowed to Fliess that he secretly nourished ‘the hope of arriving ... at my initial goal of philosophy’ after ‘the detour of medical practice’. Furthermore he supplemented his medical lectures by enrolling in six of the philosopher Brentano’s lecture courses, and also met with him outside the class. He conceived of psychoanalysis as standing in a ‘middle position between medicine and philosophy’; he also added that he had ‘never really been a doctor in the proper sense’. Later though he confessed to a ‘constitutional incapacity’ for philosophy and became famously dismissive of ‘the philosophers’—whom he equated with those who dogmatically insisted that ‘“consciousness” and “mental” were identical’ and so would not accept what he variously described as the ‘postulate’ or ‘hypothesis’ of unconscious mental life.

By happy contrast with Freud’s ‘philosophers’, those contributing to this Handbook show a sympathetic interest in psychoanalysis’ most central concept, the unconscious, in relation to its closest conceptual allies: defences, transference, conflict, free association, wish-fulfilment, and symbolism. Several of their chapters work to help psychoanalysis know itself by elucidating, retheorizing, and rescuing ‘the unconscious’ from objections and misrepresentations—including its self-misrepresentations. Other contributions explore psychoanalysis in relation to its philosophical prehistory, the recognition and misrecognition afforded it within twentieth-century philosophers, its scientific strengths and weaknesses, its applications in aesthetics and politics, and its value and limitations when brought to bear on ethics, religion, and social life.

Further introduction we save for the openings of each of the sections which follow. Within each section, we have endeavoured to provide an evaluative overview of current thinking at the interface between philosophy and psychoanalysis through original contributions that will shape the future of the debate. Some chapters lean more towards the overview, others towards developing a line of argument that defends a particular position, but taken as a whole, each section forms the ground for future research.

We close by acknowledging three points. First, we have not sought to provide an introduction to psychoanalytic theory, for which we refer the reader to Bateman and Holmes, Rusbridger and Budd, Eagle, Lear, or Milton, Polmear, and Fabricius. Second, there are some limitations in coverage. The reader will notice, for example, that Jungian, Lacanian, and feminist traditions feature far less prominently than Freudian and object-relations approaches. Sometimes this wasn’t for lack of trying to solicit contributions but, especially in relation to the paucity of coverage of post-Lacanian developments, we must also own a lack of editorial expertise in assessing their cogency. The third relates to this being a Handbook of philosophy and, not philosophy of, psychoanalysis.
It may be remarked that we have included some, but not extensive, coverage of the ‘Freud Wars’ which constituted a once-prominent strand within the philosophy of psychoanalysis of the last forty years. Some of the important issues that arose in those debates, in particular the scientific evidence for and conceptual validity of psychoanalytic theory, have naturally found their place in this Handbook, but on the whole, we have encouraged different modes of engagement of the kind discussed and illustrated in this introductory chapter.


Abstract
This section of the Handbook consists of five chapters that focus on how psychoanalysis intersects with the history of philosophy. Three themes are examined: philosophical anticipations of psychoanalytic ideas; the clarification of psychoanalytic ideas by situating them in their intellectual context; and alternative approaches to psychoanalytic material provided by philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche and Baruch Spinoza. Also considered in this section is how Nietzsche and Arthur Schopenhauer anticipated aspects of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory. The first chapter explores Schopenhauer’s conception of mankind’s motivations and his writings on madness, the second deals with Freud’s thinking on sexuality and the sexual drive, and the third describes an implicit concept of an unconscious first made explicit by Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling and later deployed to explicate human motivation by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. The last two chapters discuss sublimation and the solipsistic aspect of Freud’s systematization.

As a distinctive therapeutic practice deploying free association as its key method, psychoanalysis may rightly be said to have originated with Freud. The same is not true of a variety of its core concepts such as the unconscious, repression, sublimation, projection, the significance of the sexual drives, and wish-fulfilling fantasy. The psychological and medical prehistory of psychoanalytic notions clustered around the idea of a dynamic unconscious has been masterfully traced by Ellenberger. The chapters of this section consider instead the philosophical prehistory of psychoanalysis. They trace a history of ideas from Spinoza through to Nietzsche, and investigate three forms of connection between the two disciplines: 1) philosophical anticipations of psychoanalytic ideas; 2) the clarification of psychoanalytic ideas through situating them in their intellectual context; and 3) alternative—perhaps even superior—approaches to psychoanalytic material provided by the philosophers in question. While we have arranged this section’s chapters in the chronological order of the philosophers they consider, in this introduction we instead discuss them in terms of the above three themes.

Philosophical Anticipations of Psychoanalytic Ideas

The two central philosophers who clearly anticipated aspects of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory are his precursor Arthur Schopenhauer (and his contemporary Friedrich Nietzsche. As described by Ellenberger and Chapman and Chapman-Santana amongst others, Nietzsche developed various concepts similar to those of Freud, for example the transposition into psychology of the principles of the conservation and transformation of energy; sublimation; repression (Hemmung); ‘ressentiment’; conscience theorized along the lines of the superego; unconscious guilt; and the id. In their chapter, Brook and Young provide a comprehensive elaboration of the ways in which Schopenhauer anticipated Freud. Central to Schopenhauer’s conception of mankind’s motivations in The World as Will and Representation is that of an inscrutable transcendental will, manifesting itself in sexual and self-preservative drives, with its own intentions that are yet disguised by the rationalizations of the ego. Brook and Young also draw our attention to Schopenhauer’s striking writings on madness, comparing his consideration that, faced with unbearable sorrow, the mind ‘seizes upon madness as the last means of saving life’, with Freud’s contention that delusions are ‘applied like a patch over the place where originally a rent had appeared in the ego’s relation to the external world’.
Comparison of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory with that of Schopenhauer not only throws up interesting parallels but also, according to Sandford, helps reveal some of what is distinctively original about Freud’s formulations. Sandford pursues this thought with especial reference to Freud’s thinking on sexuality as found in the 1905 edition of his Three Essays on Sexuality. As Sandford describes it, Freud’s predecessors, including Kant and Schopenhauer but also the sexologists Krafft-Ebing and Moll, held to a conception of the sexual instinct (Geschlechtstrieb) as geared towards copulation and reproduction. By contrast with this, Freud’s conception of the sexual drive (Sexualtrieb) had it essentially aimed at the experience of pleasurable sensations, and only contingently connected to reproductive ends. As such, it provides us with a new philosophical anthropology and radicalizes our understanding of what can be meant by the concepts of the natural and the perverse in relation to human sexual life.

Psychoanalysis Situated in its Intellectual Context

While Freud was critical of ‘the philosophers’, he appears to have had in mind the likes of his one-time teacher Brentano for the latter’s exclusive focus on the conscious mind. Yet by contrast with Brentano, the German Romantics and idealists offered a conception of the driving forces of the human subject as part of a will extending much further back into nature than is reached by consciousness. In his chapter, Gardner traces an implicit concept of an unconscious transcendental self-underpinning consciousness, informing mental structure and creating mental content, back to Kant (1724–1804) and Fichte (1762–1814). He tells how the concept was first made explicit by Schelling (1775–1854), and posited as generative of individual character by the physicians Schubert (1780–1860) and Carus (1789–1869), before being deployed to explicate human motivation by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Yet he also discusses how Freud’s psychoanalysis makes use of another version of the self, one which Gardner exemplifies—without meaning thereby to attest to an informing influence—with the pre-Romantic Spinoza (1632–77). The aspect of Spinoza’s philosophy to which Gardner attends is his naturalistic conception of affects as causally determining actions independently of the agent’s rational endorsement. As explored throughout this Handbook, psychoanalysis is replete with fruitful yet challenging tensions between meaning, artistry, and understanding on the one hand, and causation, science, and explanation on the other. Gardner clarifies these tensions by describing how psychoanalysis contains within itself, in an imperfectly fitting manner, two different conceptions of mind: the experience-synthesizing transcendental mind of the post-Kantians, and the naturalistically conceived mind with causal powers and animal instincts of Spinoza.

Retheorizing the Unconscious

The third reason for considering psychoanalysis in relation to the history of philosophy is the resource the latter provides for providing alternative theorizations of psychoanalytic phenomena. This is most evidently undertaken by the twentieth-century philosophers considered in the next section, but also here by Gemes in his chapter on Nietzsche and sublimation, and by Macdonald in her chapter on Hegel and recognition.

As Gemes describes, the concept of sublimation plays an essential role in psychoanalysis, yet was never given a fully satisfactory treatment by Freud. In particular, Freud failed to provide a convincing criterion to help us distinguish between symptoms caused by repression and culturally valuable activities resulting from sublimation. Nietzsche, however, now comes to the rescue on precisely this point by suggesting that, whereas neurotic symptoms involve disintegration of the psyche, sublimation involves the integration of sublimated drives within the master plan of a dominant drive. This dominant drive provides the lynchpin for our self-becoming, a notion which is essentially evaluative insofar as, by contrast with the ugly disintegrative and self-hating nature of repression, it involves power, greatness, beauty, and life affirmation.

As Gemes also makes clear, sublimation (by contrast with repression) involves a desire to unite, and in this way connects Nietzsche’s thought with a conception of sublimation more prominent in post-Freudians such as Klein and Loewald than in Freud.
Such a connection with post-Freudian themes is also made by Macdonald, who draws on the dialectical conception of selfhood found in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) to help transcend what Ricoeur described as the solipsistic aspect of Freud’s systematization (i.e. the structural, topological, and energy-balancing models of the individual mind) which clashes with the relational character of his therapy. Scholars influenced by Kojève’s reading of Hegel have stressed the resources of the earlier Master–Slave moment of his dialectic (the struggle for recognition between, and the mutual dependency of, Slave and Master) for overcoming the merely intrapsychic character of Freud’s structural and topological models of the psyche. This, however, inscribes a rather paranoid moment into the heart of human intersubjectivity, whereas Macdonald follows Hyppolite in suggesting a happier resolution. This interpretation focuses on later moments of the dialectic, in particular that of the Unhappy Consciousness and his relationship with the figure of the Counsellor. The resolution it brings helps the Unhappy Consciousness overcome his sense of meaningfulness and lack of self-sufficiency by grasping the intrinsically relational nature of any mature independence. This correlativity of mature independence and relational dependency has been placed centre stage by relational schools of psychoanalysis, yet receives a more rigorous dialectical formulation in Hegel’s phenomenology.

Clinical psychoanalysis is sometimes taken to task for its alleged aim of explaining to the patient his present pain in terms of what is uncovered by way of his history. Given the focus on the here-and-now transference relationship by many of today’s psychoanalysts, the accusation can already be seen as baseless, but the accusation also risks misunderstanding the value of such understanding of personal history as develops within an effective psychoanalytic treatment. One of the values of such historical work is the way it helps the patient grasp the non-inexorable contingency of her current moods and modes of relating (Lear, this volume). It may be clinically pointless to explain the present by relation to the putative past, but what is not pointless is a patient and analyst using reference to the past to help the patient get such a vantage on the present as reveals it to be optional, as one possibility amongst others, as something that can be conceived and rendered otherwise. Being able to step back and relate the present to the past is a restoration or new development of personal agency. We believe that the chapters offered in this section allow something of a similar shift to be made in relation to psychoanalytic theory. As psychoanalysis comes to know itself through narrating its own conceptual history, it is afforded the possibility of stepping back from and grasping its latent assumptions as contingent theories as options that may both reveal and constrain, as developments that may be disputed and which could have been otherwise, as possibilities that now may indeed become otherwise in the hands of a reinvigorated theory-generating agency.

Twentieth-Century Engagements by Richard G.T. Gipps and Michael Lacewing

Abstract

This section of the Handbook consists of four chapters that focus on the different ways in which twentieth-century philosophers engaged with psychoanalysis. The first chapter examines Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s existential-phenomenological reformulation of the psychoanalytic unconscious, with emphasis on his argument that the unconscious is an all-pervasive invisible ‘atmosphere’ (atmosphère) inexorably surrounding the lived-body and shaping all our emotional experience. The second chapter considers Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophical critique of psychoanalysis and how he drew on Sigmund Freud’s writings to test his new linguistic methods in philosophy. The third chapter describes how the Frankfurt School used Freudian psychoanalysis to bolster its Marxist critique of modern society, citing as an example Theodor W. Adorno, who offered an explanation of how fascist mass movements occurred by drawing on Freud’s theory of narcissism. The last chapter discusses the key hermeneutic themes found in Paul Ricoeur’s engagement with Freud in his book Freud and Philosophy.

While philosophical interest in the unconscious long predated him, the extent of Freud’s influence on the twentieth century was such that further philosophical
thinking about the nature and significance of unconscious mental life was by way of engagement with or reaction against his thought. This philosophical engagement with psychoanalysis proved a love–hate relationship, and some of the strongest opposing reactions to psychoanalysis, and especially to its father figure, were held within the same individuals or schools. Philosophers related in various ways to psychoanalysis: i) by reformulating or critiquing the theory of the unconscious; ii) by applauding the resource it offers for social critique, or deploring it for reactionary obstructions to emancipation; iii) by vaunting it as a secular spirituality, or decrying its psychological straitjacketing; iv) by emulating its methods and aims transposed into the philosophical context; v) by criticizing its failings to measure up to extant paradigms of knowledge, or by drawing on its distinctive insights into human nature to further philosophical projects; vi) by finding within it either a unifying understanding, or a misleading conflation, of matters biological and matters meaningful. The following compressed overview provides a sense of some major lines of development.

Classic examples of twentieth-century philosophical reformulations of the unconscious include Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (1970) phenomenological understanding of it as an all-pervasive invisible ‘atmosphere’ (atmosphère) inexorably surrounding the lived body and shaping all our emotional experience; Martin Heidegger’s (2001) ontological refashioning of it in terms of the distinctive form of human existence (Dasein) and the ‘clearing’ (die Lichtung) within which anything shows up for us in experience; Jean-Paul Sartre’s (1943/2003) replacing it with bad faith (mauvaise fois); and Jacques Lacan’s (1966/2002) articulation of it in terms provided by structuralist linguistics.

Philosophers vaunted and decried psychoanalysis as a model for both social and individual emancipation. At the social level the major impetus came from the Marxist philosophy of the Frankfurt School. For example Marcuse found Freud’s focus on the liberation of libidoinal life a valuable resource to challenge what is stultifying in the social order, while Fromm saw Freud’s focus on libidoinal drives as distracting from the social determinants of psychological illness.

A psychoanalytic ethic of knowing thyself is a famously secular one (see Gipps and Lacewing, ‘Introduction: Know Thyself’, this volume). Yet twentieth-century philosophers have differed in their assessments of the viability of psychoanalysis as a philosophy for life. Herbart Fingarette, for example, saw in it a profound means of spiritual self-transformation. By contrast Philip Rieff doubted the moral depths of the ‘psychological man’ who lives in an ‘era of the therapeutic’, an era which replaces an ethics of passionate commitment to ideals and social purposes with one of inner, individual, rational, compromise-making self-consciousness. Michel Foucault similarly considered psychoanalysis as contributing to the creation of its own object of study—a pathologically self-preoccupied subject whose natural outer-directed intentionality is subverted by the inward focus of the psychoanalytic gaze.

Psychoanalysis as a therapy aims not to teach general truths about human life, but to make conscious what an individual has repressed and thereby transcend the obstacles to growth. As a model for philosophical practice this has been most strongly developed in France. Thus Gaston Bachelard (1936/1964) drew on a psychoanalytic model to interrogate and unearth such ‘epistemic obstacles’, and ‘blindly accepted, unquestioned convictions’ with an affective rather than rational nature, as inform and constrain scientific theorizing. Jacques Derrida, who often engaged directly with Freud and Lacan in his writing, also developed a ‘deconstructive’ approach to reading texts which aims to unearth what is repressed yet quietly crucial within an author’s system of thought. Luce Irigaray deploys a similar method; she pays particular attention to the elision of woman within the dominant forms of thought offered by psychoanalysis and philosophy. Michel Foucault analysed reason’s duplicitous disavowal of the resources of madness, and sometimes saw psychoanalysis as perpetrator, and sometimes as sensitive recoverer of unreason. In a different spirit, both Ludwig Wittgenstein and Friederich Waismann analogized between philosophical practice and psychoanalysis. According to Gordon
Baker’s reading, the salient points of comparison involve the non-generalizable, patient-specific nature of a philosophical therapy which is designed not to undo false beliefs but rather to relieve mental cramps which have their roots not in the intellect but in the will.

The philosophical critique of psychoanalytic science takes various forms. On the one hand we find those—Alasdair MacIntyre and Adolf Grunbaum, for example—who find psychoanalysis wanting according to standards (e.g. nomological conceptions of causal explanation) invoked, at least for a while, by twentieth-century philosophy of science. On the other we meet with critics—Deleuze and Guattari (1987), for example—who take Freud’s psychoanalysis to task for so persistently reading the data through the theory they are supposed to evidence that other ways of reading them become unavailable. And then there are those—Karl Popper, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Frank Cioffi, for example—who find psychoanalysis variously insightful yet also severally tendentious, especially as it tacitly but effectively renders its own pronouncements immune from meaningful challenge. Contrasting with these critical projects are the uses of psychoanalytic ideas by philosophers to further their philosophical anthropologies. Leaving aside those who themselves appear in the Handbook, the most prominent of these friends of psychoanalysis is perhaps Richard Wollheim whose writings on personal identity draw deeply on the Freudian and Kleinian theory of identification, the superego, internal objects, and projective identification. Also worthy of mention here is Ilham Dilman’s trilogy on Freud and the mind, human nature, insight, and therapeutic change.

Twentieth-century philosophy was preoccupied by the question of naturalism—i.e. with the place of meaning in a natural world. Some philosophers—Susanne Langer and Paul Ricoeur, for example—found in psychoanalysis a happy or unhappy union of man’s symbolic and animal natures. Others—such as Ludwig Wittgenstein (and Jurgen Habermas)—complained that psychoanalysis ‘conflated reasons and causes’ or suffered a ‘scientistic self-misunderstanding’ when it saw its methods as scientific rather than interpretive, and its insights as belonging to natural science rather than to the humanities.

In this section of the Handbook we offer four exemplary critical and exegetical chapters considering particular twentieth-century philosophical engagements. James Phillips considers Merleau-Ponty’s existential-phenomenological retheorization of the psychoanalytic unconscious. Merleau-Ponty’s thought is particularly important as it is located at the intersection of two of the most important strands of twentieth-century thinking about human nature—namely Heidegger’s existential phenomenology and Freud’s psychoanalysis—and its significance for understanding unconscious life is only now being appreciated (see also Fuchs, this volume). Donald Levy critically examines Wittgenstein’s philosophical critique of psychoanalysis. Wittgenstein offered us no sustained treatment of psychoanalysis, but was, like Freud, a product of early twentieth-century Vienna, with a sister treated by Freud; he styled himself a ‘disciple of Freud’, and kept on returning to Freudian themes throughout his life’s work. Freud’s writings—especially the Interpretation of Dreams—provided him with opportunities to test his new linguistic methods in philosophy. Such methods were designed to reveal latent confusions about (for example) the mind, confusions caused by making simplifying assumptions about how the language of the mind works, assumptions which may be overcome by attending to the rich diversity of its essential forms. Martin Jay surveys the Frankfurt School’s sundry uses of Freudian psychoanalysis to bolster its Marxist critique of modern society. An important question for philosophy in integrative mode is how to understand the relations between the trans-individual nature of society and social change and the intrapsychic forces at work in individuals. To give here just one example from Jay’s discussion, Adorno drew on Freud’s theory of narcissism to explain how fascist mass movements occurred—the authoritarian-type personality both impotently submitting to authority while also magically identifying with it and finding an out-group to serve as the locus for all that is denigrated and abjected. Finally, Richard Bernstein provides an explication of the key hermeneutic
themes to be found in Ricœur’s engagement with Freud in his Freud and Philosophy. Ricœur’s book remains one of the most substantial single-volume treatments of Freud’s thought available in English, and Bernstein provides an introduction to the significant contours of Ricœur’s early study of Freud.

This is a small selection from among the many strands of twentieth-century philosophers’ engagement with Freud and psychoanalysis. For readers interested in Heidegger’s and Sartre’s approaches to psychoanalysis, and in the Daseinanalytic approaches of Medard Boss and Ludwig Binswanger, see Askay and Farquhar and Holzhey-Kunz. For a clinical introduction to Lacan, see Baillly and for a philosophical exploration, Grigg. Many of the themes canvased here are still live concerns in the engagement between philosophy and psychoanalysis and as such naturally take up their place in the majority of the chapters comprising the rest of this Handbook. Yet whereas twentieth-century engagements between philosophy and psychoanalysis could sometimes be marked by ‘either/or’s (either reasons or causes, either a science or a humanity, etc.), a salient feature of many of the twenty-first-century engagements represented here is the work they put in to transcend—or at least contend with, without inappropriately resolving —such dichotomies.

Clinical Theory by Richard G.T. Gipps and Michael Lacewing

Abstract

This introduction provides an overview of some of the central issues in clinical psychoanalytic theory explored in this section, such as those relating to drives and symbolism, the distinction between the conscious and the unconscious, and the intentionality of defences. The chapters in this section deal with topics ranging from transference and ‘transference neurosis’ to Sigmund Freud’s contributions to psychoanalysis, with particular emphasis on the shifts in the psychoanalytic theory of symbolism since Freud, his drive theory, his core concept of wish fulfilment, and his understanding of mourning, repetition, and the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis. Also discussed are therapeutic transformation and making the unconscious conscious, along with the meaning of inner integration.

Amongst the psychologies psychoanalysis is unique in deriving many of its significant insights from within a particular kind of interpersonal relationship. Its laboratory is the iconic couch on which the adult patient lies, or is the play setting of the child patient, an essential ingredient of both being the presence of a quietly attentive analyst. Such settings do of course allow the analyst to come to know of the idiosyncratic unconscious wishes, fears, and phantasies of the particular patient. But the kind of insights we here have in mind concern instead those which drove the development of psychoanalysis’ key concepts. Over the course of the twentieth century deeper understandings of what was happening between patient and analyst, and within the patient, and within the analyst, and the treatment of new groups of patients (e.g. those with borderline and psychotic conditions), made for the enrichment of psychoanalytic theory and for the sporadic demoting or weeding out of such aetiological and metapsychological constructs as showed little utility.

What in psychoanalytic theory has developed most significantly over the twentieth century has been the characterization of the patient’s states of mind, the nature of the defences she deploys, the form taken by her relationships, and the nature of her therapeutic healing. These matters are often not separable. Consider—as does Hughes in her chapter —the transference. When one first learns about transference one hears of the ways in which a patient starts to treat his analyst as if she were, say, a beloved mother or a feared father; the idea of transferring or substitution is here to the fore. One also learns of Freud’s contention that the patient transfers his neurotic preoccupations from the external world onto the person of his analyst, thereby producing that ‘transference neurosis’ which it is the analyst’s task to treat by fostering mutative self-understanding (i.e. by ‘analysis’). Later, however, the idea of past figure/present figure, or significant other/analyst, substitution rather takes the backstage in our understanding of transference. What instead takes the fore is our sense of the powerful unconscious dimension of important relationships (such as the psychoanalytic
relationship) and the inexorable and unwitting idealization, denigration, or fear met with there. As Lear puts it in his chapter’s section

‘Transference’: ‘The best way to understand this, I think, is not in terms of repetition or reproduction, but as the self-maintaining imaginative activity of an unconscious teleological structure’. That such ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ transferences have a history, extend beyond the consulting room, and sometimes bear unpicking in terms of that history, is indubitable. Yet what matters to the treatment, and what has come to characterize it as distinctly psychoanalytic, is rather the analyst helping his patient, in the here and now, to separate an utterly compelling emotional experience of him as, say, ideal or useless from the reality of his less-than-ideal yet better-than-useless therapeutic presence. This procedure, incidentally, gives the lie to those critics who insist that, unlike certain other therapies, psychoanalysis involves a patient merely developing new narratives about their pasts. For what, other than behavioural exposure treatments, could be more present-moment-focused than a therapy in which such affective dispositions as are causing havoc in the patient’s life are not merely reflectively but experientially brought to mind and worked through within the therapeutic relationship itself?

In addition to that by Hughes, chapters by Petocz, Pataki, and Lear concern themselves with Freud’s contributions to psychoanalysis, yet do so in no merely historical way, for it is their contention that the value and character of what Freud had to offer has not always been sufficiently understood, perhaps not even by Freud himself. Thus Petocz considers the nature of symbolism, and begins her chapter by characterizing the shifts in the psychoanalytic theory of symbolism since Freud. In short, contemporary psychoanalysis often presents the mind’s basic sense-making activity in terms of a function called symbolization, thinking, or dreaming which has the task of providing as-yet unassimilable emotional experiences with thinkable form. (The task of clinical psychoanalysis is then to facilitate this through the ‘containing’ presence of the analyst who can also help by not reacting, but instead thinking, when the patient projects intolerable experience into her.) In her comprehensive ‘Freudian Broad’ theory of symbolism, Petocz resurrects for us a conception which treats of both regressive (pathological) and progressive (assimilative) aspects to such non-linguistic, conflict-avoidance-motivated, mistaken identifications (of symbol and symbolized) as make for symbolism. Importantly, however, she also reconnects our symbolic meaning-making to our biological natures through a reworking of Freud’s often ignored drive theory.

The chapter by Pataki clarifies, and relocates as central on the psychoanalytic map, Freud’s core concept of wish-fulfilment. This concept of the pacification of a wish through its ersatz fulfilment was, he notes, one of Freud’s most important and singular innovations, one he used to explain dreams and daydreams, neurotic symptoms such as compulsive activity, delusion and hallucination, humour and art, slips of the tongue, religious belief and activity, and morality itself. In one sense the concept plays a less explicit role in today’s psychoanalytic theory, but perhaps this is because it has, as it were, been absorbed into the very form of psychoanalytic thinking, tacitly defining there what is to count as an internal world, omnipotent phantasy, symbolic meaning, and dynamic motivation. By rendering it once again explicit Pataki also reminds us of what is most distinctive about psychoanalysis amongst the psychologies.

Lear’s contribution also takes us back to Freud—in particular to his understanding of mourning, repetition, and the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis—while in the process taking forward our understanding of the task and means of a successful psychoanalytic therapy. He asks if there are ‘forms of imagining that distort one’s view of the world and thus get in the way of one’s attempt to live a meaningful life’. He answers that there are, that they function as ‘imaginative a priori’s, constraining our understanding of our experience which, therefore, appears inexorably fated. More than that they are defensively motivated, functioning omnipotently to immunize the subject from what she fears—in effect by getting in there first and herself bringing this imagined fate crashing down on her own head. Lear documents the sometimes fearful work of giving up such habits of imagination through developing the analytic
ability to attend to and play with (rather than be swept along by) one's own imaginings—or as he puts it elsewhere, developing one's capacity for irony—and to then apply practical reasoning to the mind and in so doing transform its structure.

The theme of therapeutic transformation and making the unconscious conscious is taken up in the chapters of both Finkelstein and Leite, the former focusing the discussion through considering the difference between conscious and unconscious intentional attitudes, the latter with a focus on inner integration. Finkelstein asks what it is that distinguishes dynamically unconscious from conscious intentional attitudes. Traditional answers tend to invoke an introspective faculty: an attitude is unconscious until it falls under the spotlight of inner awareness. Developing some ideas from Wittgenstein, Finkelstein eschews inner awareness in favour of expressive ability. Unconscious feelings find their own expression in our behaviour, and while we may learn to correctly ascribe them to ourselves in a manner similar to how we ascribe feelings to others, such self-ascription does not itself yet amount to expression. By contrast, what makes our feelings conscious is, he suggests, that we may express them by self-ascribing them.

Leite pursues the question of the meaning of inner integration by asking what it could mean to bring to consciousness, or integrate, an unconscious belief that one knows consciously perfectly well to be false. For such a predicament is, he suggests, precisely often the one we are in: that while consciously I know perfectly well, aside from in those moments when I’m most in the grip of the negative transference, my analyst not to be a tyrannical monster, my unconscious has rather a different notion about her. Leite makes a plea for a realistic result of analysis which has the patient able to not always utterly relinquish the unconscious belief when it becomes conscious, but to be able to take an ironic and good-humoured attitude towards it.

The chapters of this section exemplify the rich ongoing debate over central issues in clinical psychoanalytic theory—for example in the disagreements between Pataki and Petocz on the drives and symbolism, and between Finkelstein and Leite on how best to frame the distinction between the conscious and the unconscious. However, despite its greater length, the section is notably incomplete, lacking as it does dedicated discussions of other central clinical concepts, e.g. psychological structures (id, superego, ego, internal objects, etc.) or the defences (are they best conceived of as intentional or non-intentional, sub-personal or personal, etc.). Nevertheless, readers will find some of these addressed en passant in this section (e.g. Pataki on the intentionality of defences) or in other sections (e.g. Lacewing on the ontology of unconscious states).

Phenomenology and Science by Richard G.T. Gipps and Michael Lacewing

Abstract

This introduction provides an overview of the five chapters in this section, which explores some of the central issues in psychoanalysis as it relates to phenomenology and science. One such issue concerns the scientific status of psychoanalysis (natural or social? bona fide or tendentious?), and more specifically which between the methods of psychoanalysis and its real-life practice may be considered scientific. One of the chapters examines psychoanalysis as a scientific theory of mind, arguing that psychoanalysis fails to test its theories. Another chapter suggests that many of the central tenets of psychoanalytic theory are evidentially supported by recent developments in empirical neuropsychology. Also discussed are the debate between those who view psychoanalysis as science and those who insist that it rather offers a hermeneutic, how psychoanalysis provides a phenomenology in its articulations of unconscious life, and alternative phenomenological schemes for framing the dynamic unconscious.

Philosophical disputation concerning psychoanalysis often begins—and unfortunately sometimes ends—with the question of whether psychoanalysis counts as scientific psychology. The claim that it does not is often taken to imply ‘too bad for psychoanalysis’, rather than, say, ‘too bad for scientific psychology’, or ‘so what else is it then?’ But the debate, if it is to be philosophically respectable, cannot simply take for granted some or other unexamined conception of what being a science amounts to. And it will only
generate confusion, rather than pertinent critique, if it imports standards inappropriate to its object. What it needs are explicit, workable, and apt conceptions of scientificity. What we need to know when engaging with the debate is, for example, whether we are here talking narrowly about natural science or much more permissively about Wissenschaft—i.e. a systematic body of knowledge—or something in between? If by 'science' we mean Wissenschaft, then in that case anthropology, natural history, art history, and psychoanalysis shall—as and when they accrue knowledge rather than indulge speculation—all be counted as sciences. Freud certainly used the term Wissenschaft to describe his endeavours, but he also tended to think that 'the intellect and the mind are objects for scientific research in exactly the same way as any non-human things'.

But what does the 'same way' mean in the quotation from Freud? Natural history differs considerably from, say, chemistry in its use of merely observational rather than experimental methods to accrue knowledge. Freud's suggestion assimilates viable understanding of matters psychological to the model of natural sciences; it leaves out of consideration, for example, the possibility that psychoanalysis may better be considered a social science—a science whose objects and methods are importantly unlike those populating, and used to interrogate, non-human nature. We should also consider that even parents with the best intentions and the most delightful offspring can sometimes impose on their children in such a way as risks thwarting rather than nurturing their flourishing. This, at least, is the force of Habermas's contention that, in relation to his own intellectual progeny, Freud laboured under 'a scientific self-misunderstanding'.

The question of the scientific status of psychoanalysis (natural or social? bona fide or tendentious?) also requires specification as to the relevant aspect of its object. Are we talking about the metapsychology (e.g. about putative underlying psychological structures such as the id and superego), the aetiological theories (e.g. as concern the developmental origins of various psychopathologies), the clinical theory (e.g. relating particular difficulties to particular current defensive organizations), or the successfulness of the clinical practice (e.g. as evaluated in outcome studies)? And are we talking about whether the methods of psychoanalysis could, in theory, count as scientific or about whether the real-life practice of psychoanalysts does so? And if we are interested in testing the theory, then what kind of procedure is here to count as 'testing'? And if we are talking about the clinical theory, then which aspect of which one? Psychoanalysis has after all developed a large number of theories of various phenomena from which a variety of hypotheses may be drawn for testing, albeit all organized around centrally recurring themes of dynamically unconscious motivation, defence mechanisms, symbolization, and transference.

This last point raises a deeper question about how to understand psychoanalysis. When we are talking about just such fundamentally organizing conceptions as unconscious motivation, etc. are we describing the a posteriori hypotheses of a fallible science, or rather the a priori organizing conceptualizations which belong to something we could call the 'philosophy' of psychoanalysis? (Compare: do concepts such as 'force' and 'space' function to define physicists' very field of enquiry, or do they function by referring, hopefully successfully, to phenomena that show up within that field?) Perhaps that distinction is itself rather too blunt to be helpful, and we should do better to consider the a priori and the a posteriori as separated by degrees rather than by an immutable chasm. When we meet with an effective piece of clinical psychoanalytical theory, is its effectiveness to be understood in terms of its ability to bring to life or make visible something which beforehand too often went unnoticed—thus enriching the conceptual frameworks with which we articulate human nature, or is it proposing a new causal explanation for something which was perfectly visible all along? With regards to this issue of visibility, a question not often enough asked, which parallels that of the scientific prowess of psychoanalysis, concerns its phenomenological credentials: what wattage of illumination of human nature has really been achieved by psychoanalysis compared with other sciences and humanities?
In this part, the chapter by Eagle focuses on psychoanalysis as a scientific theory of mind. Taking testability as a measure of scientific standing, he takes psychoanalysis to task for its failure to test its theories. While Freudian theories can be used to generate testable hypotheses, Kleinian and post-Kleinian theories are, he suggests, not so readily testable. While they may play a variety of valuable functions inside and outside the clinic, contributing to a scientific theory of the mind is not amongst them. Furthermore, setting aside the theories, the practice of psychoanalysts does not encourage a scientific approach—an objection pressed most frequently by Frank Cioffi. Particular difficulties noted by Eagle include a failure to address confirmation bias, a dearth of decent published case studies, aetiological theories developed merely on the basis of clinical data, concepts being tacitly redefined to preserve the otherwise implausible theories they articulate, and a culture of hostility to research, guild mentality, and gurus.

While Eagle looks at the extant scientific habits of psychoanalysts, Hopkins—a philosopher—aims to demonstrate the scientific significance of psychoanalysis by newly integrating it with attachment theory and neuroscience, arguing that many of the central tenets of psychoanalytic theory are evidentially supported by recent developments in empirical neuropsychology. Hopkins stresses the consiliences between psychoanalytic understandings of the task of assimilating emotionally overwhelming experience (e.g. in dreaming) to maintain reality contact, the development of symptoms when that breaks down and primary process modes of cognition take over, the significance of our attachment histories for developing the neurological structures required for such emotion processing, Freud’s early neurological thought on minimizing ‘free energy’, and the theoretical neuroscientist Karl Friston’s more recent conception of the brain as tasked with free energy minimization by producing such ‘predictive models’ of the perceptually encountered world as minimizing complexity while maximizing accuracy. We note that other such integrations are possible; those who prefer their theoretical neuroscience in non-computational flavours may consult Allan Schore’s synthesis. The value of Hopkins’s chapter for this book, though, is to indicate another way in which psychoanalysis may seek to take its place amongst the sciences. As such it shows philosophy in its synoptic mode (see Gipps and Lacewing, ‘Introduction: Know Thyself’, this volume)—i.e. in its attempt to bring together disparate fields of knowledge with a philosophical eye to the maximal coherence of the proposed integration. We may note too the other scientific integrations now available and featuring in other sections of this handbook—with anthropology (Narvaez, this volume), with sociology.

Lacewing’s chapter steps back from the scientific details to review the debate between those who would articulate psychoanalysis as science and those for whom it rather offers a hermeneutic. In fact that very distinction is one which—in the course of a careful unpicking of the assumptions at play in the debate of the last forty years between realist and constructionist strands in American psychoanalysis—is deconstructed in the course of his argument. That debate has, he contends, tended to confound its participants because it too often runs together matters which are more fruitfully kept separate. While it is possible to espouse all of realism (rather than constructionism), to respect (rather than deprecate) metapsychology, to believe in mental determinacy (rather than hold to the indeterminacy of the mental), and to portray psychoanalysis as aiming to provide scientific (as opposed to a different kind) of knowledge, these need not stand or fall together and should not in any case be assimilated. Although he is here not primarily making a case for a particular combination of these themes, one possibility that becomes particularly clear over the course of Lacewing’s chapter is that of a realist hermeneutic science which respects mental indeterminacy while deprecating metapsychological speculation.

Matters take a somewhat different tack in the chapters by Fuchs and Gipps. If we understand what it is to be scientific in terms of testability, these chapters can be understood as highlighting the importance of primarily non-scientific aspects of psychoanalytic knowledge. That is, they are interested instead in our most basic disclosure or characterization of unconscious life—
psychoanalysis as phenomenology. We do not test
the aptness of a fundamental conceptual metaphor,
picture, or vocabulary of unconscious life against its
object, since that procedure presupposes that we
have what here we do not have, namely some
other conceptual scheme disclosing that object
within which the comparison could be framed.
Instead we consider its fruitfulness both in
stimulating the development of further illuminations,
and in warding off irremediably speculative,
esoteric, or otherwise fruitless conceptions of our
unconscious life.

Gipps aims to draw out how psychoanalysis
provides a phenomenology in its articulations of
unconscious life. The first half of his chapter makes
a series of distinctions between our
acknowledgement of and accounting for
phenomena, grammar versus fact, revelation versus
representation, and poiesis versus posits, and
describes the central aspects of psychoanalytic
theory in terms of the former element within each
pair. The second half considers how a
phenomenological understanding of psychoanalytic
theory sheds light on the divergence between the
(typical) psychoanalyst's and the (typical)
psychologist's understanding of psychoanalytic
theory and therapy.

Fuchs canvases several alternative
phenomenological schemes for framing the dynamic
unconscious, and to replace or at least complement
the 'depth' metaphors of traditional psychoanalysis,
he develops in detail a conception which puts to use
Merleau-Ponty's notion of the lived body and
Lewin's notion of a life space. For Fuchs and
Merleau-Ponty, the unconscious is sedimented in
such bodily habits as we are blind to precisely
because they shape our very experience itself.

Between them, these five chapters offer the basis
for future work on the philosophical understanding
of psychoanalysis. They analyse and deconstruct
both psychoanalytic 'theory' and practice, and
provide a range of approaches from which the
question 'what is psychoanalysis?' may be
answered. They seek to identify and preserve what
is most valuable about psychoanalytic thought even
while urging its development and integration with
other philosophical and empirical approaches to
understanding human beings.

Aesthetics by Michael Lacewing and
Richard G.T. Gipps

Abstract
This introduction provides an overview of the
chapters in this section, which explores the role of
psychoanalysis in aesthetics. More specifically, the
chapters examine some psychoanalytic concepts
with which to think more deeply about human
creativity and aesthetic sensibility, such as wish and
wish fulfilment, the depressive position, projection,
containment, and mentalization. The focus is on
what Sigmund Freud thinks about art, how we
should understand it (the question of criticism), what
makes an experience distinctively aesthetic, and
how we should understand artistic creativity. One
of the chapters deals with film theory, arguing
against the cognitive turn in favour of the view that
'the creation and experience of film is driven by
desire and wish fulfilment and functions so as to
satisfy certain psychological, protective, expressive
needs of both artists and audiences'. Another
chapter considers the developmental,
transformative nature of art, and the particular
importance of its form in this respect.

IN our 'Introduction: Know Thyself', we commented
that one important use that philosophers have
made of psychoanalysis is to deepen our
understanding of the meaning and meaningfulness
of human activity and experience. Among the
defining characteristics of human beings are our
creativity and aesthetic sensibility. Experiences of
creativity and aesthetic appreciation, which can be
unusually intense, are essential to human life, and
yet very difficult to articulate and understand
reflectively. As Freeman notes in his chapter on the
work of Richard Wollheim, arguably the most
significant philosopher of psychoanalysis of the
twentieth century, philosophical aesthetics seeks to
think and write about these experiences in a
rigorous and analytic way, and psychoanalysis can
assist in that.

We may take the following as core questions that
the philosophy of art seeks to answer: What is art?
How should we understand it (the question of
criticism)? What makes an experience distinctively aesthetic? And how should we understand artistic creativity? On each of these, Freud has little to say directly, and although he attempts to address the second and fourth, Wollheim argues that he does not display a deep understanding of art. But his initial thoughts point us in particular directions that may be fruitfully developed.

Freud famously claims that art, like dreaming, involves the creation of a fantasy in which unconscious wishes are fulfilled. As in dreaming, we enjoy these wish-fulfilling fantasies in many cases because the wish is at least partly disguised. Unlike dreaming, however, to engage the spectator, not merely the artist, the fantasy must touch on something universal in the human condition. The formalist Roger Fry rightly objected that art cannot be understood simply as wish-fulfilment, but many of his objections rest on misunderstanding Freud’s claims or can be met by a more sophisticated account of the place of wish-fulfilment in artistic creativity. For example, Fry overlooks Freud’s equal emphasis on the importance in art of both taking account of reality (e.g. the manipulation of real materials) and connecting the wish to something universally true in human experience. Or again, many emotions and wishes may be at play, and the wish that is fulfilled is to find an expression that represents a resolution of the conflict between them.

Building on this idea of conflict resolution, Hanna Segal famously develops a detailed account of artistic creativity through the lens of Kleinian theory. Leaving aside for now Klein’s backstory of distinct developmental stages, the centrepiece of the theory as it has been taken up in post-Kleinian work is that of discrete psychological positions. The depressive position is that mode in which we are able to experience both love and hate towards the same object, giving rise to anxiety, feelings of loss and guilt, and the desire to ‘repair’ symbolically what we destroy in feeling. The impulse to create arises from such feelings, and functions to resolve the (usually unconscious) conflict of the depressive position. Segal famously provides an analysis of classical tragedy in these terms, in which she drew on Bion’s notion of the container—contained—made bearable and thus able to be thought about—by the beautiful, unifying form it takes. A related Kleinian account is provided by the art critic Adrian Stokes who understood the total form of a painting or sculpture as the container for that turmoil projected into it by the artist who can there work it through into more manageable and harmonious forms.

Thus, psychoanalytic theory, as Freeman notes, provides the grounds for defending the ‘psychologization’—or given the anti-psychologization of the last seventy years following Wimsatt and Beardsley’s famous attack on ‘the intentional fallacy’, a ‘rep psychologization’—of the meaning of an artwork, one which connects it closely to why we produce art at all and why we seek it out. Wollheim’s response to Wimsatt and Beardsley’s charge is carefully laid out in ‘Criticism as Retrieval’, but each chapter included here provides additional reasons to revisit psychoanalytic approaches in aesthetics.

It is worth noting that the rejection of psychoanalytic contributions to understanding art has been fuelled by two misunderstandings that mark discussions from Fry onwards. The first, already noted, is a misunderstanding of psychoanalytic theory itself, typically substituting its rich resources with an implausible oversimplification. The second is the thought that psychoanalytic accounts of criticism or creativity aim to be complete in themselves; because they are not, psychoanalytic approaches are to be rejected. But while it is true that psychoanalytic resources must be supplemented by others, this does not make them irrelevant. As Cox and Levine note in their chapter, the light that psychoanalysis casts on our experience of art can be necessary without being sufficient. And Wollheim would agree, arguing that there is much else that we need to know as well, from artistic conventions to available materials to the social purposes of artworks.

The importance of desire in aesthetics forms the main theme of Cox and Levine’s chapter on film theory. Arguing against the cognitive turn, perhaps most forcefully championed by Noël Carroll, they defend the view that ‘the creation and experience of film is driven by desire and wish-fulfilment and
functions so as to satisfy certain psychological, protective, expressive needs of both artists and audiences’. Without this perspective, we cannot adequately explain the power of film and its effects on viewers, nor some characteristics of specific genres, such as horror.

It is notable that Wollheim himself goes well beyond wish-fulfilment in tapping the resources psychoanalysis provides. In criticism, says Wollheim, we should seek to reconstruct the creative process, but this includes not just conscious and unconscious intentions, but many things—psychological, historical, social, cultural, and chance—that can impact on these. While Freud himself does not make the connection, Wollheim takes projection to be central to the processes of creation and appreciation. Our imagination redeployes what has its psychological origins as a defence. Freeman provides an admirably clear guide to Wollheim’s complex and challenging theory of how projection underpins our ability to perceive artworks and nature as expressive of psychological—especially emotional—properties. The role and nature of expressive perception forms the basis of Wollheim’s account of what is both distinctive and valuable about art.

Galgut’s discussion of literary form returns us to Segal’s ideas of another value in art, namely its developmental, transformative nature, and the particular importance of its form in this respect. Many have noted that art resembles psychoanalysis in enabling emotions to be worked through, mostly notably in the case of literary art which uses language to give form to what we feel unconsciously. As we engage with reading, our minds relate to other minds, and this provides an opportunity for development, especially in emotional insight. The development of such insight—the ability to understand the emotional experience of others and oneself—is of course central to psychoanalysis but, Galgut argues, it can also be facilitated by literature. In philosophical and psychological discussions of understanding other people, subsumed in debates over ‘theory of mind’, this attention to emotion—including the impact of emotional self-regulation on interpretation—is typically missing. By contrast, it plays a central role in the theory of ‘mentalization’, a modern development of a psychoanalytic account of how we understand ourselves and others. Galgut argues that certain kinds of literature, especially in respect of their form, can develop mentalization, not least through the complex provision of a multiplicity of perspectives.

As noted at the outset, then, psychoanalysis offers us a number of concepts—we have considered here wish and wish-fulfilment, the depressive position, projection, containment, and mentalization—with which to think more deeply about an aspect of human experience that is important, intensely felt, but otherwise enormously difficult to articulate and understand.

Religion by Michael Lacewing and Richard G.T. Gipps

Abstract

This introduction provides an overview of the chapters in this section, which explores some of the important contributions of psychoanalysis to our understanding of religion, with particular emphasis on Sigmund Freud’s views. In The Future of an Illusion, Freud argues that religion—or more specifically, beliefs in the Judeo-Christian tradition and its prehistory—is an ‘illusion’, an idea that is not necessarily false, but one that is produced by the wish for it to be true. Each of the chapters agrees with the notion that there is a close connection between religious belief and desire, and addresses Freud’s account of the origin of religion in structures of subjectivity. Topics include Jacques Lacan’s theory of religion, the implications of psychoanalytic theories of subjectivity for philosophy of religion, the epistemology of religious belief in relation to the epistemology of psychoanalysis itself, and Freud’s supposed view that religion expresses a ‘historical truth’.

The standard interpretation of Freud’s account of religion goes something like this. In The Future of an Illusion, Freud compares religion—or more specifically, beliefs in the Judeo-Christian tradition and its prehistory—to an ‘illusion’, an idea that is not necessarily false, but one that is produced by the wish for it to be true. Let us think about the human situation independent of the claims of religion. What would human beings wish the
universe to be like, given our situation? The answer, Freud argues, is just how religion describes the world as being. In other words, religion presents an understanding of the universe that we can understand as a wish fulfilled.

The origins of the wish fulfilled by religious belief are two-fold. First, in the history of humanity, we find ourselves part of an overpowering, uncaring nature. Thus, we need ways to propitiate the uncontrollable forces we face. And so we seek to be able to control the forces, e.g. through influencing a god that can do this—the god of the sea or wind or a God who is God of all things. Or, we can seek to align ourselves with God, to live a good life that will protect us from the worst effects of these forces. Our security rests in God’s love for us—if it does not save us physically, it does so in a deeper sense. Second, in our individual history, as children, we each experience our dependency, our inability to take care of ourselves. Our wishes are met by our parents, but we soon realize their fallibility and limitations. Hence, we arrive at the idea of a much more powerful and perfect parent in God. Thus, argues Freud, we have a naturalistic, psychological explanation of religion—we can explain the origin of its claims in our wishes and the origin of our wishes in our experience of reality.

However, we can turn Freud’s approach on its head. Suppose God does exist and created us. What would human beings wish for—or better—what would human beings desire deeply? God—the fulfilment of our nature would be to stand in good relationship with God. Here, however, the desire is realistic, just as the child’s desire to be looked after by its parents is realistic, necessary for its life and flourishing. Even if Freud (P. 534) shows that religious belief originates, at least in part, in our wishes, he does not show that those wishes, and so religious belief, originate simply in response to our helplessness in a difficult and dangerous world.

If we accept this much—that religious belief is closely connected to desire—as each of the chapters included here does, there are at least these three paths of thought leading on from here. First, we may seek to develop or challenge Freud’s account of the origin of religion in structures of subjectivity. Each of the three chapters included here takes us down different branches of this path that reclaims religion from Freud’s negative evaluation of it. Both Cottingham and Blass, in different ways, review and deepen the standard interpretation of Freud before going on to discuss, respectively, Jung and the resources of modern cognitive psychology and neuroscience, and recent psychoanalytic theories in the British and American traditions that regard religious belief positively, while Boothby provides us with an overview of Lacan’s theory of religion.

Second, we can develop the question of whether these accounts of religious belief undermine, support, or simply bracket as unimportant the truth of religious belief, or again whether they have some effect on our understanding of what it could be for religious belief to be ‘true’. This is the main focus of Blass’s discussion.

Third, we may ask what further implications—beyond adding possible reasons for or against belief in the existence of God—psychoanalytic theories of subjectivity have for philosophy of religion. There are, of course, different philosophies of religion, drawing on different traditions in philosophy. Boothby notes the development of ideas from Kant and Hegel on religion and subjectivity in the thought of Lacan and the modern Lacanian Žižek. An important project in Cottingham’s previous work, of which he provides a clear synopsis here, has been to consider the implications for philosophy of religion in the analytic tradition. In particular, he criticizes the dominant ‘epistemology of control’ that reflects only the conscious, detached, analytic way that we may respond to questions about God. Our best psychological theories indicate that this needs integrating with an ‘epistemology of receptivity’ that reflects the direct, intuitive, imaginative, and typically unconscious ways in which we constantly engage with the world through all our cognition, and may be of yet greater importance in acquiring the relevant evidence for thinking meaningfully about religion. Here, notes Cottingham, the epistemology of religious belief (and its necessary reflection in philosophy of religion) mirrors the epistemology of psychoanalysis itself.
This is a conclusion that Blass shares. After carefully demonstrating that Freud's later views on religion changed from those expressed in The Future of an Illusion, she criticizes recent theories for failing to take the truth of religious claims seriously, yet it was exactly this point that vexed Freud, and his search for truth is not something we should lightly set aside (see Gipps and Lacewing, 'Introduction: Know Thyself' in this volume). Blass shows that by Moses and Monotheism, Freud arrives at the view that religion expresses an 'historical truth', an impression made on the mind by past reality, but which does not accurately reflect that reality, because the mind cannot do so at that time as the events are too primal. The origin of religion in the history of humanity rests in such events, Freud thinks, but this new account of mental functioning has implications for primal events in each individual's life as well. A sense of conviction in the 'rightness'—or truth—of an idea cannot be dismissed as wishful, but may reflect some fundamental aspect of human nature and experience—and this is something that the psychoanalysis must be attentive to more generally. It is a surprise to find this thought in Freud's late work, as it is more often presented by Freud's critics as an objection to the 'standard story'.

Lacan's thought on religion is no less full of surprises, as richly brought out by Boothby. Lacan understands the mind and its operations along three axes or registers. To oversimplify hugely, 'the imaginary' structures the ego, its initial division as 'me' (moi) from the true 'subject' (je) of desire, and its operations of defence and transference. 'The symbolic' concerns the sphere of language and rules/laws more generally, generated through and regulating our encounter with 'Others'. 'The real' involves our encounter with what is incomprehensible, both outside and inside us. Where does God (as thought by us) fit in? Is God part of the incomprehensible real, as Kant argued? Or is God the ultimate 'Other', providing regulation for our lives? Boothby argues that both answers are correct, unified and coordinated by Lacan's concept of 'the Thing', that which is both beyond representation and yet can only be thought—symbolized—at all as precisely being beyond representation. In other words, it is symbolized as a question mark or an 'X'. The real and the symbolic thus arise together in human subjectivity, with the first incomprehensible real being the desire of the Other. Our relation to the real and the Other is ultimately one of desire, not—as Kant held—of thought. Along the way, Lacan argues that this account not only explains religion but specific practices, such as sacrifice, and Christian doctrines, such as the Incarnation.

The important contributions of psychoanalysis to our understanding of religion are not only, then, Freud's negative critique, but bringing to our attention the deeper roots of religious belief in human subjectivity. Philosophy of religion can no longer rest content with examining religion in relation to rationality but must come to grips with unconscious imagination, emotional response, and desire. It is interesting to note the steps already being taken in this direction.

Ethics by Michael Lacewing and Richard G.T. Gipps

Abstract
This introduction provides an overview of the three chapters in this section, which explores central issues in ethics in the context of psychoanalysis, including the nature of virtue, the ground of normativity, moral development, the relation between reason and passion, naturalism and moral motivation. One such issue concerns Sigmund Freud's theory of the superego, which is said to undermine the 'authority' of morality. The first chapter argues that the superego represses conscience, and that our 'moral-psychological difficulties' can be understood only in light of repressed love. The second chapter examines the place of psychoanalysis in the relationship between virtue and mental health, and between vice and mental dysfunction. The third chapter discusses the idea of an 'evolved development niche' to address object relations and their role in moral development.

Undoubtedly the best-known contribution of psychoanalysis to ethics is Freud's theory of the superego. Many—including Freud at times—have understood his theory to undermine the 'authority' of morality. On this understanding, far from being the voice of pure reason, as Kant would have it, or
a God-given sense of what is right and wrong, our conscience as superego is the distillation of the views and values of those around us when we were very young children, distortingly filtered through our own infantile concerns, instincts, and emotions. Furthermore, morality, in the form of the superego, can give rise to various forms of mental distress—narcissism, moral masochism, obsessiveness, ascetism, and a split between 'reason' and 'passion'. Consequently, a reduction in the strength of the superego is a frequent aim of psychoanalysis.

There are a variety of responses to this picture. The first is to follow the line of thought rather uncritically, and adopt some form of moral scepticism or nihilism. But this tends to be motivated by an oversimple understanding both of morality and of Freud's theory, and so while it has been taken up in popular culture, it is rarely developed by psychoanalysts and philosophers. A second response is to reject Freud's theory of the superego wholesale. But while many of the details have come under attack, e.g. the claim that the superego is the result of resolving the Oedipus complex, those attracted by Freud's naturalism still need some account of our acquisition of moral values. A third response, then, is to develop Freud's theory to find in the resources of psychodynamic psychology a rational alternative. A fourth approach is to distinguish 'bad superego morality', based on fear and aggression, from 'good ego ideal morality', based on love. As a variant of this, one might set aside superego theory and use other resources in psychodynamic psychology to remodel our account of the development of our moral sense.

In his chapter, Backström rejects all of these in favour of a new approach again. He argues that it is a serious mistake to equate conscience and the superego, arguing instead that the superego represses conscience. The foundation of morality is love, understood as an openness to the other, and conscience is the call of love. Backström's approach is to offer a phenomenological analysis of the meanings inherent in our emotional lives to show that our 'moral-psychological difficulties' can be understood only in light of repressed love. We struggle to remain open in love towards others, and the many ways we deny, refuse, and distort this openness not only provide the material for the drama of human relationships, including 'essentially misrecognized' emotions such as envy and jealousy, but also cause many theoretical misunderstandings, from Freud's structural model of id–ego–superego to various accounts of the nature of love to the attempt to ground morality in reason rather than openness. While Backström's account is Freudian in understanding moral psychology in terms of love and repression, it is highly critical of Freud's inability to understand these terms and their relationship adequately.

As argued in our 'Introduction' to this Handbook, questions at the intersection of psychoanalysis and ethics go to the very heart of both disciplines, raising issues about the purpose of each, their self-understanding, and the status of their theoretical models. As Harcourt has commented, there is a 'long tradition' in moral psychology stretching back to Socrates that enquires into 'the relationship between human nature, the good life for man, and human goodness'. Not only has psychoanalysis much to contribute to this enquiry; the enquiry in turn raises challenging issues for how psychoanalysis should understand itself (as a science, as a humanism, as an ethical relationship?) and its aim (psychic health, self-knowledge, goodness?). In his chapter, Harcourt surveys the place of psychoanalysis in this three-way discussion 'between the kinds of creatures we are, what it is to be good or excellent of our human kind, and what constitutes a good life for us'. There are those who argue that psychoanalysis does not aim at nor concern itself with human excellences or the good life, but, by contrast, with psychic health. However, there are others who reject the contrast, because psychic health should be understood—as Plato and Aristotle thought—in terms of human excellences. Harcourt argues that psychoanalysts who take the former route unknowingly tend to smuggle in human excellences in their characterization of psychic health. If, then, psychoanalysis addresses the question of human excellences, or again, the question of how to live a good human life, the further question arises whether, on the psychoanalytic account, this is something that is necessarily or recognizably 'morally good'. We are here in the territory of the
relationship between virtue and mental health, and its converse, the relationship between vice and mental dysfunction. If there are strong connections here, then psychoanalysis may lend support to the tradition of ‘virtue ethics’ in philosophy. Harcourt concedes that some virtues—those of courage, truthfulness, and the capacity to relate to others as separate beings—may be supported by psychoanalytic accounts of mental health, but argues that otherwise this claim is over-optimistic. What follows? One possibility, which Harcourt is sceptical about but leaves open, is that psychic health, though not a sufficient condition for virtues, is a necessary condition for them.

In the background of Harcourt’s discussion is the question of what a naturalistic moral psychology might look like. A great deal of empirical psychological work has been done recently on the first of Harcourt’s three relata, viz. what kind of beings are we, and its implications for moral psychology. In her chapter, Narvaez begins by arguing that, in studying ourselves as we are now, we have frequently failed to fix an appropriate ‘baseline’ of comparison by which to understand the results. Seeking to provide a wider empirical context for understanding object relations and their role in moral development, she develops and defends the idea of an ‘evolved development niche’, the characteristic environment for human babies over the vast expanse of time between our evolution as a species and the changes of the last 10,000 years. Drawing on studies in neuroscience, developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, and anthropology, Narvaez argues that our ‘species-typical’ upbringing is significantly different from today’s culturally typical—but species atypical—parenting practices. Our current practices frequently result in a disordered emotional foundation to the self-giving rise to moral psychological problems, a focus on protecting the self against threats rather than an open engagement with others. Her arguments offer the possibility of an empirical framework that supports Backström’s phenomenological analysis and takes up Harcourt’s question of the connection between virtue and mental health.

Our three chapters thus survey central issues in ethics, including the nature of virtue, the ground of normativity, moral development, the relationship between reason and passion, naturalism, moral motivation, and much more. Many other topics in ethics, not covered in any depth in this section, have received rich contributions from psychoanalytic theory. Examples include analysis of moral emotions, such as guilt and shame; responsibility; the aim of human action; moral epistemology; the nature of empathy; the difference between real virtues and their simulacra; and a great many topics in practical ethics, including, of course, the ethics of confidential relationships.

Politics and Society by Michael Lacewing and Richard G.T. Gipps

Abstract
This introduction provides an overview of the four chapters in this section, which explores the link between psychoanalysis and social and political theory. Each chapter examines or advocates radical change; the first appeals to psychoanalytic ideas to support radicalism concerning the basis of war and pacifism; the second deals with the organization of education; the third argues for change in psychoanalytic theory and practice by emphasizing socially radical ideas on gender; and the fourth traces the origins of radical thinking in psychoanalysis to ‘Jewish modernity’. Also discussed are Sigmund Freud’s Civilization, which addresses the nature of social oppression and its internalization in the superego; how society imposes normative social categories in the formation of human individuals; the role of anxiety and of defences against anxiety; contemporary populism in relation to the role of a leader and changing social expressions of inegalitarianism; and how best to contain human destructiveness.

Radicalism, in the context of social and political theory and practice, is the view that something at the very ‘root’ of our social and political order and institutions is wrong and needs to change. Either the understanding of human beings, their needs and possibilities, that is implicitly or explicitly assumed by social structures is mistaken or the structures fail to contribute to human flourishing or, in most cases of radical thought, both. While psychoanalysis has primarily been concerned with the individual and their mental health, a radicalism of this kind finds a
clear expression in the late works of Freud, mostly famously in Civilization and Its Discontents. It is from this radicalism that discussions of the relation between psychoanalysis and social and political theory tend to begin. The four chapters included here are no exception, each exploring or advocating radical change, either by appealing to psychoanalytic ideas to support radicalism concerning the basis of war and pacifism (Butler) and the organization of education (Rustin), or appealing to socially radical ideas on gender (themselves fed by psychoanalysis) to argue for change in psychoanalytic theory and practice (Gyler).

In his review of radical thinking in psychoanalysis, Frosh identifies its origins in ‘Jewish modernity’, ‘a mixture of universal striving, alertness to social injustice, self-reliance, and a capacity for resilient truth-seeking that was relatively free from any impulse towards justification of existing social norms’. After Freud, the radical potential of psychoanalysis was most developed within the Berlin Psychoanalytic Society and the Frankfurt School (see Jay, this volume), the leading thinkers of which were—almost without exception—Jewish. The mid-nineteenth-century breakdown of traditional Jewish society together with the rise of anti-Semitism enabled Jewish thinkers to develop a more critical mode of thought, and Freud counted himself amongst them.

Psychoanalysis offers an understanding of human subjectivity that places emotions and unconscious drives centre stage, an understanding that is typically missing, or at least under-theorized, in social and political thought. For example, Butler notes that political philosophy presumes that we are disposed to live together in society, submitting to common government whether through social ties or prudential self-interest. But Freud’s reflections on the death drive call this universal assumption into question. If we are also unconsciously motivated to destroy the bonds that make society possible, motivations that are acted upon most fully in war, then our understanding of how societies sustain themselves and why they break down will need reconsideration. A central recognition of psychoanalytically informed social thought is that there are contradictions in the idea of ‘civilization’.

What is necessary for society to be possible, e.g. sexual repression or the redirection of our destructiveness, also sets up psychological and social conditions that endanger society itself, or at least its aim of enabling positive human development. But these conditions can be neither understood nor averted by conscious rational reflection alone—hence the space for a psychoanalytic contribution to social and political theory.

Psychoanalytic ideas thus provide a lens for reading contemporary social and political trends and events in terms of the presence and force of such unconscious emotions and drives, enabling us to better know ourselves. A brief selection of these ideas from the four chapters is collected here:

The primary focus of Freud’s Civilization was the nature of social oppression and its internalization in the superego. With the resulting sexual repression no longer quite what it used to be, the vicissitudes of the relation of society to pleasure, and in particular the idea of the ‘management’ of pleasure, were explored by the Frankfurt School and are revisited here by Frosh. The question remains, how should we understand and respond to society’s encouragement of (demand for?) the search for pleasure?

In the formation of human individuals, society may be said to impose normative social categories. Perhaps none is more deep-rooted than that of gender. Gyler argues that, despite the social transformations of the last fifty years, we continue to understand and elaborate our subjective experience in terms of normative gender categories. What response does this require from us at this stage? While her focus is on the response of psychoanalysts themselves, the question generalizes.

Central to the psychodynamic understanding of the mind is the role of anxiety and of defences against anxiety. These defences can be social as well as individual in form. Rustin argues that in addition to anxieties and defences concerning love and hate, deriving from the life and death drives, psychoanalytic theory needs to find a central place for anxieties and defences deriving from a distinct epistemophilic drive. The concept of epistemic
anxiety has important implications for the organization of education, as evidenced by recent social events, including the 2016 debates over Brexit in the UK and the election campaign of Donald Trump, in which social antagonisms around educational advantage played an important role.

We may relate aspects of contemporary populism to a question raised by Butler concerning the role of a leader and changing social expressions of inegalitarianism: ‘If we say that an elected official has licensed a new wave of misogyny, or that he has made widespread racism permissible, what sort of agency do we attribute to him? Was it there all along, or has he brought it into being? Or was it there in certain forms and now his speech and action give it new forms?’

Among the defences against anxiety and our natural tendency to envy (Klein) are various phantasies and projections concerning our relation to authority and to the social ‘other’ (race, class, immigrant . . .). What kinds of social arrangements and institutions could ameliorate anxiety and envy, to provide some form of containment (Bion) for them? Might such institutions be opposed because they remind us of the vulnerability that gives rise to anxiety in the first place?

Finally, how should we understand human destructiveness and how best to contain it?

While psychoanalysis raises these questions, a further theme of these chapters is whether psychoanalysis has sufficient resources to answer them. Does its radicalism run out at this point? While the critical resources of psychoanalysis are apparent, its potential to contribute positively to radical social and political theory is less obvious. First, in its own clinical practice and theory, it has often been conservative. Gyler makes the case forcefully concerning gender identity and inequality. While contemporary psychoanalytic thought has turned away from a focus on gender, it nevertheless retains a traditional association of masculinity with reason and culture and femininity with emotion and nature, or again, the feminine continues to be conceived as ‘lack’ or ‘absence’. There is little positive contribution to a transformation of this patriarchal symbolic order, demonstrated for example by how little psychoanalysis has had to say about transgender.

Frosh, drawing on previous work by Rustin, observes that psychoanalysis can enable us to think how ‘specific modes of social organization can moderate or produce states of increased vulnerability or greater security, exaggerated violence or more resilient possibilities of nonviolent, reparative practice’. Butler similarly comments that ‘for societies that wish to organize themselves on the basis of a principled opposition to cruelty, that is, to war or to the death penalty, there first has to be a mindfulness of the destructive potential that inheres in all group formations’. But, and this is a second reservation concerning the radical contribution of psychoanalysis, these responses contribute towards social improvement, rather than pointing us towards anything more revolutionary.

Third, one clear line of thought in Freud about how to respond to the antisocial tendencies of human beings—our anxiety, envy, and destructiveness—is to harness and strengthen the bonds of life and love, the forces of Eros, that hold us together. But even Freud was doubtful whether this can suffice. For example, in his exchange with Einstein, ‘Why War?’, discussed by Frosh and Butler, he agrees with Einstein’s emphasis on the need for an international agency that can limit state sovereignty to prevent the outbreak of war. But for such an agency to work and contain aggression, it would need to rest on widespread sentiments favouring internationalism over nationalism. For this, a ‘cultural evolution’ is needed—but is it possible?

Butler concludes her chapter by identifying the importance of critical thought, which among other things is ‘a form of judgement, that knows how and when to check that destructiveness and that has the power to do so’. Critical thought comes under attack in certain forms of ‘mass psychology’, but she argues, ‘[s]uch judgement is crucial to the operation of politics, and one task of political theory is to establish the conditions of its possible exercise’. If our aggression is inescapable, then perhaps it can be rallied to the cause of life through its expression in critical thought—we rally our hatred against war and destruction to adopt an aggressive form of pacifism. With these last
thoughts, a radical political response finds some place in psychoanalytic thought. <>

**Inventing Afterlives: the Stories We Tell Ourselves About Life** by Regina M. Janes [Columbia University Press, 9780231185707]

Why is belief in an afterlife so persistent across times and cultures? And how can it coexist with disbelief in an afterlife? Most modern thinkers hold that afterlife belief serves such important psychological and social purposes as consoling survivors, enforcing morality, dispensing justice, or giving life meaning. Yet the earliest, and some more recent, afterlives strikingly fail to satisfy those needs.

In *Inventing Afterlives*, Regina M. Janes proposes a new theory of the origins of the hereafter rooted in the question that a dead body raises: where has the life gone? Humans then and now, in communities and as individuals, ponder what they would want or experience were they in that body. From this endlessly recurring situation, afterlife narratives develop in all their complexity, variety, and ingenuity. Exploring afterlives from Egypt to Sumer, among Jews, Greeks, and Romans, to Christianity’s advent and Islam’s rise, Janes reveals how little concern ancient afterlives had with morality. In south and east Asia, karmic rebirth makes morality self-enforcing and raises a new problem: how to stop re-dying. The British enlightenment, Janes argues, invented the now widespread wish-fulfilling afterlife and illustrates how afterlives change. She also considers the surprising afterlife of afterlives among modern artists and writers who no longer believe in worlds beyond this one. Drawing on a variety of religious traditions; contemporary literature and film; primatology; cognitive science; and evolutionary psychology, Janes shows that in asking what happens after we die, we define the worlds we inhabit and the values by which we live.

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Excerpt: David Hume had an answer for the FBI. The single most famous event in that British philosopher’s life was a visit James Boswell, Samuel Johnson’s biographer-to-be, paid him in 1776. “Nothing endears so much a friend as sorrow for his death,” Hume had observed, yet it was not sorrow moving Boswell to Hume’s side, but curiosity. As Hume lay dying, Boswell came to see how an atheist died. Serenely and cheerfully, was the answer, with no itchy desire after eternal life, no fear of roasting in flames, no apprehensions about annihilation, and no dread of the gaping gap of vanished consciousness. Boswell had bad dreams for a week.

To begin a book about afterlives with someone who did not believe in one may seem perverse, but it has a purpose. Everyone has some belief, or beliefs, about what happens after death, even if the belief is that nothing at all happens or that nothing can be known about what happens or that there is no point even thinking about it. Once death becomes a phenomenon that human beings can think and talk about, we inevitably ask, “So what comes next; what’s after that?” The question applies both to the dead and to the survivors, and answers range from “nothing” to “eternities.” Whatever the answer, it establishes our relationship to the cosmos we live in: what it means, what it is for, and how we are to live within it while we live.

Death, of course, has at once everything and nothing to do with the afterlife. Afterlives are narratives made by the living in order to define the relationship between the living and the dead, between the self and the prospect of its own death, between survivors and those who have disappeared from the social unit. Death is the limit that provokes those fictions. Out of death’s blank wall, we want to make a gate, and then we demand to know what is on the other side of the
gate. Hume vanished without fear. Boswell lived
less happily, complaining of his melancholy the
year before Hume died, "[A]ll the doubts which
have ever disturbed thinking men, come upon me. I
awake in the night, dreading annihilation or being
thrown into some horrible state of being."

Some of

us know exactly what and whom to expect—and
may be praying that we've got it wrong and there
will be a loophole through which we can wriggle
out of our just deserts into paradise.' Many
presume on paradise.

The word afterlife presupposes some posthumous
existence, pleasant or unpleasant, but beliefs about
what happens "after life" include the denial of any
such existence. Whether an afterlife is affirmed or
denied, the afterlife narrative overcomes death,
dominates it, and reintegrates death and the dead
into the continuing self-conceptions of the living.

When blurb writers exclaim, "This book is not about
dead death, it's really about how to live!" they are
describing not a happy accident but a necessary

fact.

As a word denoting what happens after death,
rather than in later life, "after life" comes tardily to
English. It is not used until 1598, in an introduction
to Christopher Marlowe's posthumous works, where
it refers to the memory of the author and the man.

Literary studies still use the word most frequently
to refer to authors' reputations. Not until 1611 does
the term refer to the state of a soul after death,
when it turns up in the wondering words of a
pagan, surprised by Christian missionaries who tell
"vs strange things, and give us faire promises of
after life, when this life shall be ended."

Christians,
firmly possessed of "eternal life; a phrase first
attested in 1479, had no need to meddle with any
life that was merely "after." For seventeenth-
century writers, "after life" designated the
speculations of heathens and the denials of
Epicureans and Sadducees. The preferred generic
term for their own afterlife expectations was
"future state," a phrase that the OED gives to
Alexander Pope's Essay on Man (1733), but that
already appears in 1588 in Gervase Babington's
exposition of the Lord's Prayer, sandwiched
between one's future state in this life (1567) and
the future state of England (1589), also very much
in this life. Christians start using the term afterlife to
refer to their future and eternal state only in the
mid-eighteenth century. As the word changes, so
does the concept, less "state" and more "life:

In religious studies, afterlives accompany the
complex and nuanced understanding of a religious
tradition over time and in time. Scholars maintain a
careful professional agnosticism as to the reality of
intrinsically unverifiable afterlives and the claims of
contending traditions. What a tradition maintains
as to immortality is accepted as given, while its
chops and changes, responses to political and
intellectual ferment, differences from itself from
moment to moment, form the object of study.

Creating new knowledge through meticulous detail,
religious-studies scholars are rightly suspicious of
grand historical narratives and ahistorical cognitive
arguments. This study proceeds otherwise.

It proposes a fable of origins in cognitive studies
because the irreligious, too, need to be accounted
for. As unbelievers like Hume demonstrate, there is
no "hard wiring" of afterlife belief (or God), but
afterlife beliefs (like God) do originate in human
sociality and cognition, that is, language. Other
primates recognize death and dislike it, but they
have nothing to say about it. Human afterlife talk
weaves death into life's narrative, if only to write
FINIS, as Walter Benjamin implies. Religious
traditions occasionally recount the origins of their
afterlife beliefs, while those outside those traditions
(and outside of religious studies) commonly explain
away those beliefs in functional terms ranging from
codescending to paranoid: as compensatory or
consoling or ethical or controlling or imitative or
stolen.

Yet the earliest attested afterlife beliefs (and some
still current) are not compensatory, consoling,
ethical, or controlling. Nor can we know what they
may imitate or from whom they may have been
stolen. They neither satisfy human desires nor have
anything to do with justice or morality. Some other
explanation is necessary, for people wanting
explanations. The human mind seems the place to
look. But not just the mind: human minds are always
(already) social. Proposed is an ahistorical account
that accommodates both the cognitive quandary
death poses and the social injury it creates.
This ahistorical deep structure (a modern mythos) supports, but does not determine, the variety afterlives display in changing socio-political and economic circumstances. That morality and the afterlife originate independently is not immediately obvious. The misery of some early afterlives we have never known, and we have forgotten the horrors of earlier iterations of our own. Only very lately—and still not universally—do justice and morality attach themselves to afterlife beliefs, and only in the enlightenment does human happiness come to dominate afterlife expectations. These claims require demonstration that only a narrative traversing many places and times can supply, if they are to persuade.

Applying the cognitive and collective insights of the first chapter to pre-Christian western afterlives, we see how western afterlife beliefs develop moralistic immortality and contend with empirical skepticism up to the advent of Christianity. The parallel but far more complex processes on the other half of the globe are briefly charted, with Hume’s tribute to "the Metempsychosis?" Once western moralistic immortality is in place, afterlife imaginings proliferate without fulfilling all human wishes. More famous for resisting priestcraft than for piety, the enlightened eighteenth century pursued happiness all the way into the next world. Putting into place the consolatory clichés about the afterlife that moderns take for granted and assume are eternal, Enlightenment invented the wish-fulfilling afterlife attacked in the next century by Marx, Engels, Freud, et al. Now we live with and without afterlives, and the final chapter celebrates the flourishing of afterlives no one believes in found in recent film and fiction.

Dispelled are a number of common misconceptions about the afterlife, including the assumptions that afterlife beliefs are universal and all cultures subscribe to some promise of life after death, that afterlives originate to console the dying and their mourners, that afterlives originate as a form of wish fulfillment, that afterlives are necessary for morality, that afterlives are a construct of power to control the minds and behavior of the living. Many of these misconceptions are a product of the afterlife that the Enlightenment put in place three hundred years ago, and there is something to be said for each of them, as a purpose such beliefs have served. Their grudging attitude obscures, however, the very interesting work an afterlife can do, the creation ex nihilo of great imaginative fabrics. They also underestimate the persistent note of skepticism that accompanies afterlife affirmations. More damagingly, they have sometimes inhibited modern atheists from developing their own afterlife narratives independent of, though derivative from, their culture’s traditional religions. The calligraphy for FINIS can be as elaborate as one likes, as extensive as the mind can reach.

Chapter 1, "Concerning the Present State of Life After Death," takes up the current proliferation of afterlives, proposes an origin for afterlife theorization in primate behavior and theory of mind relative to dead bodies, sketches the prehistoric evidence for afterlife beliefs, assesses the role of afterlife beliefs relative to morality, and indicates the insufficiency—and necessity—of anti-afterlife arguments from John Toland to Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. The questions here are why we construct afterlives at all and what they do for us. The argument is that afterlives originate in empathy with the socialized dead body and respond to a cognitive and social demand: what has happened to the life that animated this body? What now is the community’s relationship to that body? Justice and morality have originally no connection with death. Death comes like the sun and the rain equally to the just and the unjust, the moral and the immoral. Death level; it does not differentiate. The connection to justice and morality is self-consciously patched in at different times and places; thereafter it sticks like a burr. For this argument to be persuasive, it needs to be held against actual afterlife conceptions as they developed through time.

Chapter 2, "Impermanent Eternities," sketches the transformations in western afterlives from the Egyptians and Sumerians through Jews, Greeks, and Romans, ending when Christianity arrives. When such well-informed writers as S. Jay Olshanky and Bruce A. Carnes assure readers that concepts of life after death emerged to "soften [death’s] harsh reality,” only acquaintance with harsh early concepts can provide the necessary
corrective. Early afterlives are dismal everywhere but Egypt. Even Egypt lacks initially any correlation between justice and death, although it will model exploiting the afterlife for social control. Elsewhere afterlife fates were more likely to correlate with how one died and how fecund one had been. Post-Homeric philosophers and poets belatedly meted out justice after life to Greeks and Romans, but ancient Israel zealously erased its traditional justice-free afterlife beliefs as it compiled the Torah and Prophets, leaving only traces of disapproval. Analogous to varna-shrama-dharma’s role in Hinduism, lineage and the law gave Israel all the meaning and morality it needed. Post-exilic Deuteronomic ideology linked God, life, and law with temporal reward, apostasy with temporal punishment and death. When those linkages broke down in the Hellenistic period and diaspora (reported in Esther, Daniel, and Maccabees), a new concept was borrowed: resurrection. Life became for the first time eternal and linear. Having infiltrated Judaism, eternal life and resurrection defined Christianity and Gabriel’s message to Muhammad. After a brief tour of Asia, fast forward seventeen hundred years.

Chapter 3, "Touring Asian Afterlives: Eternal Impermanence," visits that part of the world where "afterlife" is a misnomer. "Afterlife" assumes an ending. Asia adopts rebirth, the endless, visible burgeoning of life from life, and then sets about putting an end to it as the highest philosophical attainment. A better life may be in prospect the next time around—or much worse. Morality is sometimes supposed to depend on rebirth: what other guard is there on behavior? Life continues, or the consequences of actions, though bodies do not. Consequences unfold into the future, well beyond the individual performing an action. Tracing the ancestors, rebirth, and such key concepts as dharma, karma, non-self, emptiness, and Pure Land, from the Vedas through Buddhism, Jainism, and Hinduism in their travels from India, the chapter jogs to China to pick up Confucianism, Daoism, and new varieties of Buddhism, hovers over Tibet, and on to Japan, ending with two encounters between Buddhism and the Christian west that validate Buddhist insight.

Chapter 4, "Pursuing Happiness: How the Enlightenment Invented an Afterlife to Wish For;" exposes a neglected but crucial period in the development of modern afterlives. In the eighteenth century, British thinkers created the wish-fulfilling afterlife that we now take to be eternal and that Marx and Freud attacked with such energy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The traditional Christian afterlife damned to eternal sulphurous flames all non-Christians and many Christians (almost all, among Calvinists); for the devout, the faithful, the repentant, or the elect, it was theocentric. The beatific visions that close the biblical book of Revelation (c. 100 CE) and Dante’s Paradiso (set in 1300) are paradigmatic. Dying, one encountered God, at best met Jesus and the souls of good men made perfect, and enjoyed eternal, unimaginable ecstasies. (Whether these meetings took place immediately upon death or only at the Last Judgment puzzled Protestants.) Those rigorous God-centered raptures yielded to an afterlife that accommodated friends, relations, children, and current intellectual movements, all the secular delights of love, life, and mind. As Keith Thomas observed, "only in the early modern period [was] stress ... laid on the reunion of the nuclear family. As earthly values changed, so did conceptions of heavenly felicity." Particularly significant for conceptualizing historical change is that improvements came from below, moving from popular discourse into mainstream theological acceptance. Theology bent to desire, led by women, sealed by men. A pivotal moment in the human demand for happiness after death as well as in life, the eighteenth century located the truth of the afterlife in the human mind, where the argument of this book begins, but in a different drawer. Their drawer was labeled "wishing makes it so, because of the organization of the human mind and the benevolence of God" Unnoticed, Adam Smith refiled it where it is found today.

Chapter 5, "Wandafuru Raifu or Afterlife Inventions and Variations," asks what use afterlives are if we do not believe in them. Freed from that odd couple theology and reality, afterlives in which no one believes function as usefully as, but less threateningly than, afterlives in which almost everyone believes. Representing the dazzling
variety of modern reinterpretations of afterlives are Hirokazu Kore-eda and Spike Jonze, J. M. Coetzee and Milan Kundera, Steve Stern and George Saunders; meanwhile Samuel Beckett sneers. Unlike traditional afterlives, the modern ones pretend to no explanatory power, but they continue to dissipate death's terrors by articulating and reinforcing values that shape living in the present. Certain behaviors are rewarded, others punished, and the project elicits reflection and self-examination from reader or viewer, as to the quality and character of life as it is lived. Authors approaching death as their topic disclose their deepest concerns as artists and, perhaps, as human beings in their fantasies of last things, beyond the end. Some modern writers, Nadine Gordimer and Julian Barnes come to mind, carp at the afterlife, sour grapes in the sky, but do not leave it alone.

Some fascinating topics are no more than glimpsed. Only in America are the dead tormented by "unfinished business," like Carousel's Billy Bigelow. When Europeans come back from the dead, as in Pedro Almodóvar's Volver, Guillaume Canet's Ne dis personne, or Stieg Larsson's Girl with the Dragon Tattoo, the person has not really died, though someone else is likely to have been murdered. An afterlife is a narrative of destination, the reciprocal of a myth of origins. Cultures want stories about where they came from; so they want stories about where their members go when they are no longer here. Giving up Genesis, we cling to a Big Bang. Why develop whole other worlds for the dead? is much the same question as why tell stories about characters as imaginary as the dead have become.

A study that traverses this much terrain temporally and geographically is evidently much indebted to the work of other scholars in many fields; their ghosts appear in the notes and bibliography. The literature on death and the afterlife is vast: it would require several lives perfectly to control it. Primary material begins in prehistory and continues to the present. Modern secondary material has a briefer history but has multiplied exponentially in the last fifty years. Philippe Ariès's complaint in the 1970s that death cannot be spoken or addressed transformed the world it entered and generated numerous studies of dying practices and beliefs. Studies now document death and afterlife beliefs from the Egyptians and Sumerians to the present. This study does not pretend to analyze in detail the death rites or beliefs of a single culture or religious tradition but rather ranges widely across cultures and times and traditions, ending in mere literature and movies. Why? In our end is our beginning.

Once upon a time, renting all the Japanese films at the local video store to keep company with a son away in Japan, I came across one that made me ask: what course can I teach that will let me show this film? After Life is the mistranslated English title of Hirokazu Kore-eda's Wandâfuru raifu. Ten years earlier, a children's version of Gilgamesh had astonished me, much as the first translations had astonished the nineteenth century. Familiar with biblical and classical traditions, passionate for John Dryden's translations of Lucretius, and curious about the power of this Japanese film, I began looking into primatology and the origins of morality, Terror Management Theory, with its important discovery of mortality salience and odd insistence on death's terrors, and such current standard works as Alan Segal's Life After Death (2004), Colleen McDannell and Bernhard Lang's Heaven: A History (1988, 2001), and John Bowker's Meanings of Death (1991), among many others. I found myself troubled by certain absences.

The insights and scrupulous accuracy of these authors move with a teleological thrust toward the afterlife most Christians now enjoy. There seemed no place for the tradition of afterlife denial or the afterlife fantasies of afterlife deniers or the inventions that emerge outside religious traditions. John Bowker seemed almost discontented when he observed that "Virtually everything that can be imagined about death has been imagined."

What a literary scholar finds, of course, is narrative. Once language possesses us, it expresses individuals' thoughts and concerns, but more importantly it makes a society cohere through shared stories and their meanings. Afterlives are stories we tell each other and ourselves about death, a word so powerful that it elicits as strong a physio-psychological response as a life-threatening situation or the thing itself. These stories may be Aristotelian in form, their meaning produced by the
end, or they may be cyclic, unfolding endlessly, their meanings in process, provisional, momentary. Traditionally, afterlives have been presented as something to be believed, nor is this study exempt, though it leans the wrong way. Those who believe in their disbelief are also represented here. All that we know of any afterlife is the stories we tell now, and they are perhaps afterlife more than enough.

As to Kore-eda’s film, it is worth traversing millennia of afterlives to reach it. Whether or not you read this book, do see the movie. But be warned—it is a Japanese movie, and so it is slow, very slow. Some viewers will regard it as taking an eternity to come to an end. <>

Near-Death Experience in Indigenous Religions by Gregory Shushan [Oxford University Press, 9780190872472]

Near-death experiences are known around the world and throughout human history. They are sometimes reported by individuals who have revived from a period of clinical death or near-death and they typically feature sensations of leaving the body, entering and emerging from darkness, meeting deceased friends and relatives, encountering beings of light, judgment of one’s earthly life, feelings of oneness, and reaching barriers, only to return to the body. Those who have NDEs almost invariably understand them as having profound spiritual or religious significance.

In this book, Gregory Shushan explores the relationship between NDEs, shamanism, and beliefs about the afterlife in traditional indigenous societies in Africa, North America, and Oceania. Drawing on historical accounts of the earliest encounters with explorers, missionaries, and ethnologists, this study addresses questions such as: Do ideas about the afterlife commonly originate in NDEs? What role does culture play in how people experience and interpret NDEs? How can we account for cross-cultural similarities and differences between afterlife beliefs? Though NDEs are universal, Shushan shows that how they are actually experienced and interpreted varies by region and culture. In North America, they were commonly valorized, and attempts were made to replicate them through shamanic rituals. In Africa, however, they were largely considered aberrational events with links to possession or sorcery. In Oceania, Micronesia corresponded more to the African model, while Australia had a greater focus on afterlife journey shamanism, and Polynesia and Melanesia showed an almost casual acceptance of the phenomenon as reflected in numerous myths, legends, and historical accounts.

This study examines the continuum of similarities and differences between NDEs, shamanism, and afterlife beliefs in dozens of cultures throughout these regions. In the process, it makes a valuable contribution to our knowledge about the origins of afterlife beliefs around the world and the significance of related experiences in human history.

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GREGORY SHUSHAN has produced the most important scholarly work on near-death experiences (NDEs) in the last thirty years. Not since Carol Zaleski’s landmark study (1987) comparing medieval NDEs and modern NDEs have we witnessed an academic study that is critical, interdisciplinary, and nonpartisan. So much of what
we read about the NDE, even in the academic world, is limited by single-discipline thinking and an "unhealthy" obsession with material versus religious convictions. The work produced here in this book avoids this populist trap and by so doing provides us a resulting work that is nuanced, revealing, and original.

There is little doubt that a person's cultural background plays a role in what they might experience in a dream, an out-of-body experience, or an NDE. There is little doubt that such experiences will also be prompted or shaped by their physiology. Just as a smile must have physiological correlates so too must a thought, and logically, an NDE. But explaining a smile physiologically does not naturally extend itself to an explanation of happiness, not the least because happiness is only one of potentially dozens of reasons for a smile to cross one's face. Without doubt, culture, character, previous experience, and physiology, all play a role in how one encounters new experiences, especially experiences for which one has little preparation.

And the near-death experience is and has been an extraordinary novel experience in every human culture in which it has appeared. This evocative, consistent, but always reorienting "invasion" into everyday assumptions about how reality works is the basis for Shushan's argument that NDEs have played a crucial role in the development of most, if not all, human religions. This evocative, consistent, but always reorienting "invasion" into everyday assumptions about how reality works is the basis for Shushan's argument that NDEs have played a crucial role in the development of most, if not all, human religions. It is the show-stopping and disruptive role of the NDE that has generated the foundational force for religion, either creating its major direction and shape or redirecting or tempering its vision of possibilities. And it appears to have performed this role in widely dispersed cultures that have had little or no connection with one another. Shushan guides us through the early indigenous cultures of North America, Oceania, and Africa to establish this argument.

As part of his review, Shushan must navigate the counterarguments that come from those who believe that religions create the conditions for NDEs and not the reverse, that NDEs are merely physiological phenomena, or that NDEs are cultural and linguistic artifacts alone. Shushan resists the reductionist tendency to explain a complex and layered experience with a single explanation. He very quickly exposes the limitations of these single-discipline explanations. Whatever the mixture of possible explanations for the NDE one fact remains unshakeable. Near-death experiences are experienced as absolutely real, true to life, as empirical as your current experience of reading these words. Why then is there so much apparent diversity of images and symbols? Why, beneath all this diversity, is there yet a seemingly persistent core set of images and characteristics? Why are these experiences so extraordinary and yet so familiar? Why are they so life-changing both for the individuals who report them and also for those who hear of them?

Many of these academic questions occur largely because we are often struck by the novelty—the sheer jolting unusualness of the NDE as compared to our everyday experience. It is the unusual that attracts the unusual questions. This tendency has been exposed in the history of anthropology, where, in that discipline, there has been a long tradition of treating other human conduct unfamiliar to us as "exotic." We have asked questions about "others" that we rarely ask ourselves and are surprised that when we do so that the answers are just as weird and exotic. This was the message of the seminal 1956 American Anthropologist paper describing "Body Ritual among the Nacerima" by Horace Miner.

The "Nacerima" (Americans) were a "strange" tribe of people who indulged in seemingly odd body rituals including placing sticks in their mouths followed by gulping mouthfuls of water that was subsequently spat out. This ritual was followed every morning and sometimes even again in the evenings. One could only speculate and debate the reasoning behind these behaviors. Was it related to food—to clarify and cleanse? Often the ritual appeared before eating, which made the "stick in mouth" ritual unlikely to be merely an oral bathing rite. Perhaps there were spirit beliefs associated with the rite after all. When asked about not performing these daily rites most of the members of this culture would declare that many catastrophes would befall them—"their teeth would fall out, their gums bleed, their jaws shrink, their
friends desert them, and their lovers reject them” (SO4).

The purpose of Miner’s paper was twofold. First, Miner showed the reader how the analytical style and language we use to describe the unfamiliar can actually help artificially construct, and therefore exaggerate, the unfamiliar. Second, he showed us that to the extent that we dismiss the experience of those we describe and fail to understand their knowledge of their own world in their terms, we risk creating theories that are more fantastic and misleading than the world we are trying to describe. To a very large extent that has been the fate of the NDE both by the major religions and also the scientific community.

The facts are that if any of us travel to a new country for the first time—one that is very different from our own—our experience of it will be very colored by our previous travel experiences; our personal values and preferences with respect to food, customs, sights, smells and sounds; what we have been led to expect from friends and colleagues or literature, television, or Internet coverage of that place; even by where and how much we see of that country. Our experience will also be colored by our physiology—our health during that time, whether we are colorblind or hearing impaired, whether we visit a place from the perspective of a wheelchair or with a guide dog by our side. These are such common, everyday assumptions that we scarcely mention them in our conversations and discussions when remembering that travel with friends and family. And the fact that these are crucial factors in understanding what we saw and how we experienced it makes none of these factors a basis for believing that our travels were hallucinatory or imaginary. The fantastic is a question we reserve for others, not ourselves.

The reason for much of this taken-for-granted comfort around travel tales is that so many have shared them. Incredulity and skepticism frequently come from little or no experience, and this is often the case with formal religious and scientific institutions. The regular but marginal occurrence of NDEs has made these experiences both a powerful driver of change and development within religion and a source of fear and suspicion. The widespread nature of even broader mystical experiences—such as out-of-body or shamanic experiences or deathbed and bereavement visions—has meant that they are not, strictly speaking, "anomalous." They have been part of the normal experience of cultures, but a disruptive—and therefore sometimes marginalized—part of that norm. This disruptive influence has always demanded change or accommodation from our different social institutions.

We have been slow to recognize this driving cultural and religious force in our lives, largely because of the popular tendency to exoticize or marginalize experiences to which we do not have ready or repeated access. Gregory Shushan carefully guides us toward the data and reasons why this has been so. He also describes the process by which, despite regular attempts to marginalize its power, the NDE has been perhaps the most important shaper of religious creativity in human history. This is a journey and an argument as fascinating and as engrossing as the social history of mankind itself.

Conclusions, and Epistemological Implications

The Native America chapter presents a virtual model of the experiential source hypothesis: that NDEs as filtered through cultural/individual layers are commonly the basis for afterlife beliefs. There are nearly seventy narratives describing or attesting to ostensibly documentary Native American NDEs across the continent, dating from the late sixteenth to early twentieth centuries. More than twenty overt indigenous statements testify that local Native American afterlife beliefs, and even whole religious movements, commonly originated in NDEs. Shamanic practices were often intended to replicate NDEs, which provided a road map for the shaman to negotiate his or her culturally situated journey to the other world.

Africa presents a nearly opposite scenario to Native America. From a perhaps even more extensive range of sources from across the continent, scarcely ten NDEs were found, and only two statements that afterlife beliefs originated in them. Such a stark difference can be explained by the crucial role of local socioreligious contexts.
surrounding beliefs in life after death. While there is, of course, a great diversity of cultures and beliefs across every continent, there are nevertheless some distinctively African regional tendencies very different from those in North America. Generally speaking, African speculations and statements about personal survival and the nature of the afterlife were comparatively rare, as were mythological narratives of underworld journeys and heavenly ascents. Instead, attitudes toward death were more often characterized by high degrees of fear and avoidance, including beliefs in the potentially malevolent influences of ancestor spirits, and that death is fundamentally unnatural and due either to violence or witchcraft. Shamanic-type activities were focused on spirit possession rather than soul travel, and fears of disembodiment were not uncommon. Indeed, most of the few existing African NDEs were related in contexts of suspicion or aberration, with typical reports involving those who returned from death being "killed again," and/or suspected of being possessed by spirits, or of being zombies reanimated by witches. Corpses were frequently seen as sources of pollution and contamination, while burial was often conducted immediately after death while the body was still warm. Clearly, these were not receptive environments for NDEs to contribute to afterlife beliefs, let alone to be reported or to even occur.

This contrasts sharply with North America, where long-standing traditions of otherworldly shamanic practices and visionary experiences undoubtedly meant greater cultural receptivity to the phenomenon. Furthermore, as the exceptions that prove the rule, nearly all the African NDEs were from Bantu cultures, which had a correspondingly greater tendency toward more detailed afterlife beliefs and myths. In short, the differences in orientation of afterlife beliefs between the African and Native American cases reflect different local attitudes toward death and spirits per se. These attitudes, in turn, affected receptivity of NDE phenomena, with Africa placing cultural restrictions on them, and Native America valorizing them.

Similar conclusions have been reached by the psychologists Natasha Tassell-Matamua and Mary Murray in their study of 220 NDEs from New Zealand. They found that Maori respondents reported "deeper NDEs" than those of European background, and suggested that they had "greater cultural tolerance and acceptance of transcendental experiences, and supernatural beliefs and explanations for unusual experiences." Cultural orientation thus influenced the content as well as the depth of the experience: "a cultural response affirming experiences such as NDEs may result in less psychological resistance, thus enabling the phenomenology of the NDE to unfold more readily, leading to deeper NDEs." Tassell-Matamua and Murray also concluded that individuals from a culture with more positive attitudes toward NDEs would more readily relate the experience to others, "whereas those from less affirming cultures may downplay their responses."

From Oceania there were thirty-six accounts describing or attesting to historical NDEs, and an almost casual acceptance of them—though they are confined to Polynesia (20) and Melanesia (16). Also from these regions were nineteen overt statements that NDEs were the origin of afterlife beliefs, or that they supplemented or confirmed them (eleven from Polynesia, eight from Melanesia). This is in addition to claims of obtaining specific rituals, instructions, knowledge, or sacred songs and dances in the otherworld. In striking contrast to the preponderance of myths in Africa explaining why people did not return from the dead, in Polynesia and Melanesia there was a widely occurring integration of NDE phenomena into beliefs about why some people did return from the dead (i.e., that they were sent back by spirits in the other world for various reasons). Indeed, belief in NDEs was more widely attested in Polynesia and Melanesia than documentary accounts of actual incidents. There were also numerous NDE-like myths, demonstrating a strong link between belief and experience. In contrast, while there were examples of knowledge or rituals originating in the otherworld in Micronesia and Australia, they were in shamanic rather than near-death contexts. While shamans regularly practiced the restoration of souls to bodies, however, accounts of shamanic journeys to afterlife realms were rare, particularly in Micronesia. There are no overt statements of
afterlife beliefs originating in NDEs from either region, and indeed no clear NDEs.

Oceania also had highly varied attitudes toward the dying. While there are certainly examples of corpse-fear, avoidance, and taboo, bodies were also often the focal point of grief, with mourners weeping over them, embracing them, and even "retaining portions of the corpse as cherished mementoes." While it was often the case that "vigorous efforts" were made to keep an individual alive up to the possible last moment, it is also true that in some societies the dying were ignored, or even abandoned, starved, or buried alive. Unlike Africa, however, a specific fear of the dead returning to life appears to have been absent. Generally speaking, these differences were regionally based, and correlate both with local beliefs and incidence of NDEs. Thus, the comparatively numerous NDEs found in Melanesia and Polynesia correspond to funerary practices that facilitated the deceased returning to life, to more positive attitudes toward the dead, and a greater interest in the afterlife per se (bearing more similarities to the Native American model). In contrast, the lack of Australian and Micronesian NDEs reflects funerary practices that carried a greater risk of premature burial, alongside more negative attitudes toward the dead, a greater focus on mediumship and possession (Micronesia) or otherworld journey shamanism (Australia), and a general disinterest in afterlife speculations.

There is a direct relationship between the occurrence of NDEs, afterlife conceptions that are similar to NDEs, shamanic otherworld journey practices, and indigenous statements that beliefs originated in the experience. Where NDEs are lacking, there were cultural restrictions on their integration into local religions. In such cases, however, there is also a correspondence between afterlife beliefs and other types of extraordinary experience. For example, OBEs, mediumistic communications, deathbed visions, ghosts, poltergeists, and possession are related to African, Micronesian, and Australian ancestor beliefs. The ethnographic sources themselves indicate that afterlife conceptions were often grounded in conceptually and culturally relevant extraordinary experiences. Considering that the beliefs were never systematized in these cultures and that there was no "orthodoxy," the correspondences between belief and experience are all the more remarkable.

This study has also found that certain NDE elements such as walking along a path or road, earthly locales, and food taboos are cross-culturally common mainly in indigenous societies. Occasional highly specific similarities without NDE parallels are also evident between distant, historically unrelated cultures. The attainment of shamanic status and abilities through quartz crystals being pressed into the chest was common to the Kwakwaka’wakw in North America, and to the Jajaurung of Australia. This is certainly too precise for mere coincidence to be a compelling explanation. Likewise, dipping the hand into one of two pots in the other world as a mode of determining one’s return to Earth was shared by the Hopi (red and black pots filled with suds), and the Chaga (hot and cold pots, one containing bangles). Though we may speculate that some other sociocultural features shared by these two societies must have resulted in these particular forms of conceptual logic, for now these similarities remain essentially inexplicable. Parallels with beliefs in ancient civilizations also defy a simple explanation, including the association in afterlife contexts between a sun-god named Rā and his journey through the netherworld in both pharaonic Egypt and the Cook Islands; the motif of the Clashing Rocks in ancient Greece, the Marquesas Islands, and Apache North America; a boy who was killed by his father so he can learn about the afterlife in Vedic India and Hopi Arizona; and the surprisingly common taboo on eating in the otherworld.

All this leads to the following interrelated hypotheses:

- While NDEs are universal, and people commonly base certain religious beliefs on them, they do so only when their cultural environment allows—unless they are innovating away from established tradition. Local attitudes toward death affect receptivity to NDE phenomena.
- In addition to providing a well of symbols with which to express and interpret NDEs,
a culture and its environment also impose limitations on such expressions.

- With the exception of certain funerary practices (e.g., the hurried disposal of bodies), existing beliefs and cultural orientation do not make NDEs more or less likely to occur, but more or less likely to be expressed and accepted.

Shamanic otherworld journey practices are often secondary phenomena, contributing more to the maintenance of afterlife beliefs through experiential validation than to their origination. Shamanic experiences vary widely in context (including associated ritual practices and religious beliefs), and therefore vary more widely phenomenologically. NDEs are more thematically stable, and share a universal return-from-death context. Nevertheless, some shamanic experiences may have been actual NDEs, or fundamentally akin to them.

"Belief" and "experience" can be artificially discrete and even inextricable categories. Indigenous statements about beliefs often referred to an experience not only as the source and authority of the belief, but also as the actual descriptor of it. In some cases, the only statement of belief on record is an account of an NDE, implicitly supporting the experiential source hypothesis.

Evaluating what are normally seen as competing theories from various disciplines, and combining the most cogent and relevant elements of each enables the formulation of a more comprehensive overall theory with the greatest explanatory force. The full range of cross-cultural similarities and local particularities can be most fully understood through a consideration of various factors, which need not be seen as mutually exclusive. Evolutionary psychology helps us to understand why people are willing to accept the claims of NDErs, shamans, and visionaries: contact with ancestors serves a community-binding function, encouraging common beliefs and promoting tradition, social cohesion, and continuity, while also sanctioning the NDE testimony. The NDE narratives serve to flesh out and validate our natural cognitive predisposition to believe in life after death, and thereby encourage receptivity to new teachings arising from the experience, and facilitating their integration into local worldviews. The healing and transformational benefits of NDEs and shamanic experiences also help to account for the development and maintenance of religious beliefs and practices.

Some aspects of afterlife beliefs are best explained by psychological factors. Realms of abundance reflect anxieties about having adequate necessities in this life, while providing reassurance of better conditions to come. Political factors include the concepts of postmortem reward and punishment being used as a tool of social control, leading to more elaborate descriptions of rewards and punishments. Though impossible to determine in indigenous societies due to a lack of religious texts that developed over long periods of time, the idea is supported by the fact that a stress on negativity and threat in the afterlife beliefs of early civilizations appeared alongside an increase in more popular religious texts and their accessibility, and were often very clearly manipulations by the elite. Beckwith argued that in Hawai’i, themes of reward and punishment were introduced by the ruling elite for political purposes. The relatively rare cases of distressing NDEs (may also contribute to beliefs in punishments and hellish realms, though such descriptions are also comparatively rare in both the beliefs and experiences reviewed here. Another important political factor is the indigenous use of NDE narratives in the formation of religious revitalization movements that reasserted sociocultural power and identity.

Conceptual logic and environmental factors account for afterlife realms mirroring earthly social structures, hierarchies, and local topographical features; as well as notions of rebirth and renewal being expressed in terms of the cycles of the natural and celestial worlds. While there appears to be little correspondence between corpse disposal methods of burial or cremation and beliefs in underworlds or heavens, there is a correlation between complexity of funerary ritual and level of concern with afterlife speculations. This is paralleled in conceptions of spirits of the dead existing either on Earth or in another world, and in
degrees of detail in afterlife descriptions. Personal perspective and interpretation also play a significant part, for those who have experiences and codify beliefs are not simply culturally constructed automata, but unique individuals with varying ideas, beliefs, and imaginations.

Nevertheless, the remarkably consistent similarities between afterlife beliefs cross-culturally and their widespread correspondences with NDE phenomenology indicates an integral experiential element. This is supported by the fact that nearly everyone who has an NDE believes in the veridicality of the experience (even where it is interpreted in negative terms by the community, as in some African examples). The fact that such experiences normally occur in death related contexts makes it unsurprising that individuals would interpret them in relation to that context, and subsequently believe that it was an experience of surviving death in an afterlife state. The numerous examples of NDEs that run contrary to local or personal beliefs demonstrate not only that these experiences are not predicated on cultural expectation, but also that they often lead to a spiritual or religious reorientation. Furthermore, skepticism and reasoning seem to be natural, intuitive human universals (regardless of the cultural parameters in which they exist). As rational beings, we need convincing reasons for our beliefs, and NDEs offer just such a reason for afterlife beliefs, authenticating and giving form to what we are already naturally inclined to believe. Experiential validation is important to the establishment of new beliefs and the maintenance of existing ones, and is thus itself a factor in the formation of religions.

On a wider theoretical level, the evidence here presents a major challenge to constructivist paradigms that claim that all experience is entirely linguistically and/or culturally created, and that because all religions and cultures are unique there can thus be no cross-culturally common types of experiences on which religious beliefs could be based. The notion that religious experiences are wholly cultural-linguistic constructions conflicts with the widely held perspective that religious beliefs are wholly cultural-linguistic constructions. If afterlife beliefs, for example, cannot be objectively and meaningfully cross-culturally similar, how can dissimilar beliefs result in cross-culturally similar NDEs? If one were to claim that there simply are no cross-cultural similarities of either NDEs or afterlife beliefs, the mass of evidence to the contrary needs to be somehow proven false. Otherwise, if we acknowledge that there is a type of human experience that is regularly interpreted in "religious" terms cross-culturally, similarities can no longer be dismissed as theoretically unintelligible 'Western scholarly subjectivities. We then have a category of phenomena that can logically and generically be called "religions." This could provide validation for the highly controversial concept of "religion" being a category distinct from other aspects of human cultural phenomena. Kripal similarly argues that the experiential source hypothesis leads to the recognition of a category of "the sacred"—separate from both faith and reason, suggesting the need for a field that sees "the sacred as the paranormal."

Whatever the ultimate nature of the prompting event (neurophysiological, metaphysical, or something else), NDEs are powerful generators of religious beliefs in an afterlife, both for individuals and in established religious traditions. While not every religious system shares similar afterlife conceptions, and though some have none at all, cross-cultural structural similarities are so widespread that it is tempting to speculate an NDE element for afterlife journey conceptions even in the absence of a documentary example.

The conclusions here have been reached through "inference to the best explanation"—abductive reasoning and rational judgment about the problems in question, the evidence related to them, and the various interdisciplinary models relevant to explaining them. In addition, we have in many cases actual proof of our hypotheses in the form of indigenous statements. Our conclusions thus have the advantage of ensuring that the ethnohistorical narratives remain contextually rooted, and interpreted in ways that respect the meaningfulness they had to the people who expressed them to begin with. This ensures our interpretations are consistent with local "religious reasoning".
This combination of approaches has led to a more comprehensive and satisfying explanation than could be achieved by relying on a single Western social or biological scientific model, all of which have been shown to be inadequate in isolation. Regardless of widespread scholarly assumptions across the sciences and humanities, there is nothing to support any single restrictive and ultimately sterile cultural or biological source theory; and much to support the experiential source hypothesis in combination with various sociocultural, biological, psychological, and environmental factors. The theoretically eclectic model presented here addresses the entire spectrum of similarities and differences in both beliefs and experiences across cultures. In contrast, a cultural source theory cannot be substantiated by reference to diffusion (i.e., to explain cross-cultural similarities), or through a postmodernist-sanctioned denial of similarities on the grounds of prior philosophical commitments. Likewise, a biological source theory cannot account for wide cross-cultural variations of beliefs or experiences. In short, the present study effectively refutes cultural and biological source theories in isolation, and falsifies much of postmodernist doctrine concerning comparison and experience per se, on empirical, theoretical, and philosophical grounds.

Until the late twentieth century, historically and historiographically, NDEs were neglected experiences. Considering the sheer volume of documentary narratives alongside related myths, practices, and beliefs as found in the anthropological record, this is surprising. That NDEs were widely considered on an indigenous level to be key components of philosophical-religious systems is demonstrated both by narratives being repeated over the course of decades in strikingly similar terms (e.g., Maori, Ojibwe), and by the numerous indigenous testimonies that they were the source for various beliefs, rituals, religious innovations, and revitalization movements. What has prevented them from being identified as a discreet and important class of phenomenon by the vast majority of anthropologists and other interpreters of religions? Indeed, what has prevented such a relevant experience type from being seen as a factor contributing to religious beliefs, to the extent that serious arguments to this effect have been isolated, rare, or effectively marginalized? The answer would seem to lie in a refusal to take indigenous testimony seriously, from early missionary astonishment that afterlife beliefs could derive from NDEs, to philosophical and religious denigrations of the authority of experience, to Eliade’s determined obsession with universalizing shamanism, to medical and psychological pathologization, to postmodernist fixations on the particularities of culture and language to the exclusion of all else. All these perspectives deny a voice to the very people whose religions and experiences are being “explained” (or, rather, explained away).

The recognition of the significance of NDEs in human thought and experience is long overdue. They can be an empowering force, both on the individual level when we consider the positive life changes experiencers commonly undergo after their NDEs; and on a social-cultural-political level as evidenced by religious revitalization movements with NDE foundations. They can thus be a catalyst for personal or cultural renewal. This helps to explain why at certain times and in certain places, people are more willing to accept the testimonies of those who have such experiences. This applies to the intense popular modern interest in the phenomenon, as exemplified by NDE interest groups in which members seek to renegotiate their spirituality in light of such experiences. These groups share many characteristics of new religious movements, and elevate those who have had NDEs to a higher, often guru-like status. Near-death experiences provide one way for unaffiliated "spiritual but not religious" people to find a community with certain common beliefs normally the preserve of organized religions. Testimonies of NDErs give comfort to those who grieve the loss of loved ones, and to those who are fearful of death. These benefits come without the attendant commitments and potential philosophical compromises involved in mainstream religious affiliation.

It is tempting to conclude that societies that accept NDEs and lend credence to experiencer testimony enjoy the positive fruits of the phenomenon, as widely described in NDE accounts around the
world. Those who pathologize them, silence them, or view them in terms of aberration and danger do not. While individuals are microcosms of their societies, just as in Price’s mind-dependent afterlife model, they also contribute to the formation of those societies. The positive fruits of their experiences can thus have a positive impact on their communities. <>

Where Are the Women?: Why Expanding the Archive Makes Philosophy Better by Sarah Tyson

[Philosophy has not just excluded women. It has also been shaped by the exclusion of women. As the field grapples with the reality that sexism is a central problem not just for the demographics of the field but also for how philosophy is practiced, many philosophers have begun to rethink the canon. Yet attempts to broaden European and Anglophone philosophy to include more women in the discipline’s history or to acknowledge alternative traditions will not suffice as long as exclusionary norms remain in place.

In Where Are the Women?, Sarah Tyson makes a powerful case for how redressing women’s exclusion can make philosophy better. She argues that engagements with historical thinkers typically afforded little authority can transform the field, outlining strategies based on the work of three influential theorists: Genevieve Lloyd, Luce Irigaray, and Michèle Le Doeuff. Following from the possibilities they open up, at once literary, linguistic, psychological, and political, Tyson reclaims two passionate nineteenth-century texts—the Declaration of Sentiments from the 1848 Seneca Falls Convention and Sojourner Truth’s speech at the 1851 Akron, Ohio, Women’s Convention—showing how the demands for equality, rights, and recognition sought in the early women’s movement still pose quandaries for contemporary philosophy, feminism, and politics.

Where Are the Women? challenges us to confront the reality that women’s exclusion from philosophy has been an ongoing project and to become more critical both of how we see existing injustices and of how we address them.

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Excerpt: I want to find it interesting, rather than depressing, when people with little formal exposure to philosophy, upon hearing about my research interests, ask: Were there women in the history of European and Anglophone philosophy? I want to politely laugh when people working in academic philosophy ask the same question, because usually they have the good manners to sound rueful as they ask it. They are making a joke, and I know what it is like to feel compelled to make a joke you know is not funny. How is it that people who do not really know much about European and Anglophone philosophy “know” there were not women in its history? How is it that people who probably were not required to read any historical women as part of their education in European and Anglophone philosophy feel uncomfortable enough (and, on good days I think, sympathetic enough) to joke about women in its history?

Somehow, it has become common knowledge, both within the formal discipline of European and Anglophone philosophy and outside of it, that historical women did not contribute to philosophy and they have little to contribute to it now. Consider this description from Alain de Botton’s popular book on philosophy:

In spite of the vast differences between the many thinkers described as philosophers across time (people in actuality so diverse that had they been gathered together at a giant cocktail party, they would not only have had nothing to say to one another, but would most probably have come to blows after a
few drinks), it seemed possible to discern a small group of men, separated by centuries, sharing a loose allegiance to a vision of philosophy suggested by the Greek etymology of the word—philo, love; Sophia, wisdom—a group bound together by a common interest in saying a few consoling and practical things about the causes of our greatest griefs.

The description, compelling as it may be, has a fateful phrase: "a small group of men." Research, primarily by feminist philosophers, shows that de Botton's perception of the history of European and Anglophone philosophy reflects a widely shared belief even within the discipline of philosophy that women have not done and do not do philosophy, that women were not and are not philosophers. The problem in the passage is not that de Botton has expressed a misogynist sentiment; rather he has not had to go to the trouble of saying anything about women at all. Women simply do not figure into the practice of philosophy. And that lack of figuring is a powerful mode of prohibition—philosophy is not a practice for women.

But not everyone questions whether there were women in the history of European and Anglophone philosophy. Some people "know" there have not been very many or very many of any quality. Sometimes this view is sympathetically rendered: women have been barred from European and Anglophone philosophy or the fundamental skills that make philosophy possible, such as literacy, so it is not surprising that there are so few (worthwhile) women in the history of philosophy. And it is easy to think that when someone names, or even discusses, a woman or two in the history of European and Anglophone philosophy progress has been made. Ah, Margaret Cavendish! Yes, she was a very important thinker in the seventeenth century.

Michèle Le Doeuff, attending to how conceptions of the relationship between women and philosophy have changed significantly through time, notes that the mid-eighteenth century marks the beginning of explicit theorization about a conflict between femininity and philosophy. In her reflection on this change, Le Doeuff warns that acknowledging the philosophical work of a few women might not be progress (or even a salutary regression to the time of Diogenes Laertius or Descartes, neither of whom seemed to think there was a necessary conflict between women and philosophy). Rather, Le Doeuff writes: "The semi-clever argue that there really is a prohibition. As for the clever, they have a more subtle relationship with the prohibition: a relationship which can be described as permissive, as long as it is understood that permissiveness is a sly form of prohibition, and just the opposite of anything that might count as transgression or subversion."

While de Botton simply excludes women from European and Anglophone philosophical history, Le Doeuff points to exclusion rendered through certain forms of inclusion. This latter mode of prohibition—permissive prohibition—acknowledges women's presence in the history of European and Anglophone philosophy while dismissing their authority, through attention to a woman's biography (particularly her romantic interests), for instance, rather than her work.

Feminist scholars have been aware of this problem of permissive prohibition for some time. As Linda Alcoff argued in the mid-1990s:

The first response to a survey of the "blind spots" on women in the canon should not be simply new work on women using previous methods but must be a self-reflective, self-critical one, on the part of philosophy itself, in order to answer how it could be the case that, as Le Doeuff puts it, "where women are concerned the learned utter, and institutions let them utter, words which fall clearly below their own usual standards of validation." How does this licensing of misogyny operate within canonical texts? What standards of validation permit the opportunist devolution of the usual standards when the subject is women?

Alcoff warned that we should not expect old methods, which have licensed misogyny, to yield new results. Her critique was directed toward a canonical version of European and Anglophone philosophy's history, one that might admit a few women (Héloïse, Elizabeth of Bohemia, or Mary Wollstonecraft) only to deem their work beneath real philosophical inquiry. The lesson remains vital: simply trying to bring historical women's writing to
philosophical attention without changing the practices by which we deem something worthy of philosophical attention can aid in the exclusion of women from philosophy, even in the guise of certain forms of permissiveness. So long as we "know" that "women" and "philosophy" are antithetical categories, reclaiming historical women's philosophical work risks reinforcing what it is meant to displace—women's exclusion from philosophy.

Before offering reassurances that there is much that can be done about women's exclusion, there is another set of problems I need to acknowledge. Reading the history of European and Anglophone philosophy in relation to women's exclusion is tricky. The history of feminism is also a history of exclusion. Hortense Spillers, critiquing feminism's imbrication with white heterosupremacy, points to the "duplicitous involvement of much of feminist thinking in the mythological fortunes (words and images) of patriarchal power." Thus, in addition to pointing to the misogyny that structures the discipline of European and Anglophone philosophy, this project also troubles feminist approaches to misogyny. There is not a straightforward approach to claiming philosophical authority for women because philosophical authority has been established through women's exclusion, the focus of chapters 2, 3, and 4. But there is also not a straightforward approach because the category of "women" is itself a field of contestation. The important work of what has come to be called reclamation has laid bare women's prohibition (and sometimes elimination) from European and Anglophone philosophy while often making the term "women" appear unified and homogenous. We err if we accept that unified rendering in trying to reclaim women's philosophical authority, and we err in an all-too-common way. As Spillers has written in reference to the term "sexuality": "Feminist thinking often appropriates the term in its own will to discursive power in a sweeping, patriarchist, symbolic gesture that reduces the human universe of women to its own image. The process might be understood as a kind of deadly metonymic playfulness—a part of the universe of women speaks for the whole of it."

Reclamation engages in such appropriation when it fails to interrogate the category of "women." The fact that the majority of women who have thus far been reclaimed in the history of European and Anglophone philosophy are white must be understood as an effect of geopolitical developments that have shaped European and Anglophone philosophy, and thus its interdictions, more broadly. These developments include, but are certainly not limited to, European genocidal colonialism and the Atlantic slave trade. To resist reproducing the epistemological effects of these violent exclusions in, as Spillers puts it, its own will to discursive power, feminist reclamation must recognize these apparently extraphilosophical forces for the way they have been enacted through and shaped by philosophical practices.

To be clear, the focus of this book is incredibly narrow, inasmuch as the exclusion of women is only one facet of European and Anglophone philosophy's exclusionary practices. But through offering critical reflection on strategies for conceiving of and redressing this exclusionary practice, I hope to aid in the redress of other, imbricated practices. This redress can only be accomplished, however, if the ways we theorize women's exclusion do not engage in what Spillers called a "deadly metonymic playfulness." We cannot take the exclusion of some white, European and Anglophone women as the paradigm work of exclusion.

As a way of working against the deadly metonymic playfulness within the field of reclamation, I focus on how chattel slavery has formed not only the canons of European and Anglophone philosophy, but also the archives of European and Anglophone feminist reclamation. I seek reclamation practices that thematize and, where possible, transform the effects of those exclusions, rather than accepting dominant practices of constituting the traditions of European and Anglophone philosophy. Part of the work of chattel slavery was the violent erasure of the thoughts of the enslaved—indeed, of even acknowledging that those enslaved were capable of thought at all. Reclamation that works against this powerful history needs practices of critically excessive engagements with texts to which no philosophical authority has been granted, as they
seem so far beyond philosophy’s ambit. We must attend to how the thoughts of those enslaved have been made to seem outside the work of philosophy. And we must employ modes of engagement that do not reinforce such boundary setting. Such engagements cannot bring back the thoughts of the vast majority of those destroyed by rapacious European expansion. But we can do much more, philosophically, with the texts we have.

Meeting at a Dinner Party
One of the origins of feminist reclamation of women in the history of European and Anglophone philosophy was Judy Chicago’s The Dinner Party (presumably not the kind of gathering de Botton had in mind). This installation, first exhibited in 1979, is a banquet of thirty-nine place settings on a triangular table atop a raised dais. Each place setting honors a different woman, with an additional 999 names inscribed on the dais. Mary Ellen Waithe was provoked by seeing the installation with the label “philosopher” for several of the women who had a place setting, and that provocation is part of the reason she started the work that led to the four-volume A History of Women Philosophers, one of the earliest texts of reclamation and a focus of analysis in the first chapter. Thus, Waithe, like many who have seen The Dinner Party, was challenged by Chicago’s version of history. But unlike many, Waithe took the challenge as an invitation to change history through attention to women thinkers in the history of European and Anglophone philosophy. She remains silent, however, about one of the women with a place setting who was not labeled a philosopher: Sojourner Truth. This silence is understandable at one level, because it was the label “philosopher” that Waithe sought to reclaim with her work. If Chicago had labeled Truth a philosopher, we have every reason to believe that Waithe would have investigated.

But the obstacles to Truth’s inclusion in the history of European and Anglophone philosophy, to establishing her authority within that philosophical tradition, are complex and trouble not just the discipline of European and Anglophone philosophy, but that of U.S. feminism. At another level, then, Waithe’s silence must be interrogated, rather than explained away. Truth, the only black woman at The Dinner Party, was also one of two guests not to be represented by a vulva. Spillers’s analysis of Chicago’s decision reads into it “a range of symbolic behavior”:

“The excision of the female genitalia here is a symbolic castration. By effacing the genitals, Chicago not only abrogates the disturbing sexuality of her subject, but might as well suggest that her sexual being did not exist to be denied in the first place. Truth’s ‘femaleness,’ then, sustains an element of drag.”

Spillers speaks not of “the black female in her historical apprenticeship as an inferior social subject, but, rather, the paradox of non-being.” An aim of this book is to make Truth’s absence from European and Anglophone philosophy notable and troubling as it signals a range of symbolic behaviors that ascribe black women not just inferior status, but nonstatus. I seek to understand how dominant European and Anglophone philosophical practices of telling its history and feminism’s critical work on that history have contributed to the paradox of nonbeing. The category of “women,” as Spillers makes clear, is not the remedy to the exclusions of European and Anglophone philosophy, but rather a site of strategic maneuvering. “We need reclamation practices that recognize and account for this strategic maneuvering rather than ones that rely on, and thereby reproduce, these exclusions, as feminist reclamation has often done. My point is not to castigate Chicago or Waithe or the reclamationists I critique, but rather to understand where reclamation comes from “in order to be creative,” as Audre Lorde writes, and to find “the courage and sustenance to act where there are no charters.”

Diotima
To argue for new practices of critical reclamation, throughout the book, I track the fate of a character spoken about in Plato’s Symposium, Diotima. Plato has Socrates claim that Diotima was a Manitean priestess who taught him about love; she reportedly laughs at the limitations of his thinking. Waithe’s A History of Woman Philosophers framed Diotima’s importance for feminist reclamation, but the latter’s
repute for having taught Socrates was always an
idea that traditional European and Anglophone
philosophy has tried to manage. Waithe's
intervention thus came in the midst of long-
established conversations about this woman in the
history of European and Anglophone philosophy.

It is worth a quick review of this history to
understand the situation into which Waithe
launched her project.

After Plato let Diotima onto the scene of
philosophy, many have tried to dismiss her through
permissive prohibition. Indeed, Plato brings her to
the scene of philosophy in a permissively
prohibitory way. In the dialogue, Diotima does not
appear, let alone speak; Socrates rather claims to
relate her teachings at least a quarter century
after receiving them. To complicate things further,
this dialogue is the report of Aristodemus's
reconstruction of the speeches, not from
Artiodemus, but from Apollodorus, who heard it
from Aristodemus and is now repeating it for the
second time in three days. Not just Diotima is
absent from the event at which the speeches were
given—Socrates and Aristodemus, along with all
the other speechmakers, are also absent.

Even with all this careful packaging, European and
Anglophone philosophers have developed another
mode of protection against thinking of Diotima as
important to the history of philosophy—treating her
as a fiction. Luis Navia, in his work on the problem
of establishing an accurate account of who Diotima
was, offers this symptomatic view: "The friends and
acquaintances of Socrates appear distinctly drawn
throughout the dialogues, and there are no
compelling reasons to believe that any of them are
fictitious or imaginary characters, expect perhaps
for Diotima, the Mantinean seer who plays an
important role in the Symposium, and about whom
there are no other references outside of this
dialogue."

Perhaps, in the crowds that fill Plato's dialogues,
there is one fiction, Diotima. Navia further notes
two of the most important pieces of evidence that
feed opposing sides of the controversy of Diotima's
(non)being. First, he notes that Plato is not known to
have constructed from whole cloth any other
character in the dialogues, and second, he claims

that no other record of Diotima exists except that
given to us here by Plato.

On the first point, A. E. Taylor provides one
defense of Diotima's historical existence,
emphasizing Plato's otherwise perfect record in
fictionalizing real persons:

I cannot agree with many modern scholars
in regarding Diotima of Mantinea as a
fictitious personage; still less in looking for
fanciful reasons for giving the particular
names Plato does to the prophetess and
her place of origin. The introduction of
purely fictitious named personages into a
discourse seems to be a literary device
unknown to Plato ... and I do not believe
that if he had invented Diotima he would
have gone on to put into the mouth of
Socrates the definite statement that she
had delayed the pestilence of the early
years of the Archidamian war for ten
years by "offering sacrifice" at Athens....
The purpose of the reference to the
presence of Diotima at Athens about 44o
is manifestly not merely to account for
Socrates' acquaintance with her, but to
make the point that the mystical doctrine
of the contemplative "ascent" of the soul,
now to be set forth, was one on which the
philosopher's mind had been brooding
ever since his thirtieth year. 'This, if true, is
very important for our understanding of
the man's personality, and I, for one,
cannot believe that Plato was guilty of
wanton mystifications about such things.

Taylor's strong defense of Diotima's historicity,
however, is undercut when he writes: "To all intents
and purposes, we shall not go wrong by treating
the 'speech of Diotima' as a speech of Socrates." In
other words, even if we believe that Diotima was a
real person we need not concede to her any
philosophical authority.

Other scholars—even those with feminist
commitments—dismiss Diotima's historicity
altogether. Martha Nussbaum, for instance, writes
in The Fragility of Goodness: 'Socrates' teacher is a
priestess named Diotima. Since she is a fiction, we
are moved to ask about her name, and why Plato
should have chosen it.' Nussbaum then engages in
exactly what Taylor dismissed as fanciful, that is, a
reading of Diotima’s name and its importance to the meaning of the dialogue.

Richard Hunter gives a slightly different, perhaps more cunning, view when he writes:

There has been much discussion of the historicity of Diotima, though her role in the Symposium is obviously a fictitious one (she has even had an advance inkling of Aristophanes’ speech, and we should no more wonder when she and Socrates used to meet than we should inquire when Er of Pamphylia told Socrates the story which concludes the Republic. It was common enough at symposia for the male guests to impersonate characters, including women, through the recitation of poetry, whether one’s own or another’s … and Socrates’ gambit must be seen, in part, as appropriate to the setting in which he finds himself.

Hunter does not claim so much that Diotima is a fiction as that Socrates has taken liberties that make her role fictitious. Even if she did exist, she certainly was not at the symposium described by Plato; rather, she may have been impersonated by Socrates, a common enough practice, according to Hunter. Here Diotima is allowed existence but only as a vehicle for male ventriloquism. Nussbaum and Hunter’s treatments of Diotima both appear in works published well after feminist interest in Diotima had been established. Thus, both treatments indicate a resilient tradition of thinking about Diotima as either fictional or a vehicle for Socrates’s view that has continued with little or no trouble despite feminist debates and sometimes within feminist work.

Motivated by Mary Ellen Waithe’s reclamation of Diotima and appreciating the significance of Diotima’s relegation to fiction, Margaret Urban Walker uses the case of Diotima to present her concerns about the future of European and Anglophone feminist philosophy. She writes: "Waithe’s restoration of just a small sampling of women philosophers throughout history, and her concern with Diotima’s reality serve as a cautionary tale."

Inasmuch as, Walker reasons, women have already produced philosophy and been forgotten, there is reason to worry that this could happen again, regardless of how open the field seems at the moment. Walker’s essay title reflects both the main point of the essay and the importance of Diotima as a figure in it: "Diotima’s Ghost: The Uncertain Place of Feminist Philosophy in Professional Philosophy." The cautionary tale that Walker finds in Waithe’s work revolves around not so much the importance of women philosopher’s historical existence, but their philosophical authority, and the ways the disciplinary practices of European and Anglophone philosophy threaten them with rhetorical "nonbeing." Diotima’s ghost is not a remnant of her historical existence, in Walker’s rendering, but a specter of her lost authority.

But are feminists right to spend so much time on such a troubled case? After all, there are plenty of other candidates for reclamation. I take up this question in different forms in the first four chapters. I argue that Diotima is worth a fight, but there are better and worse strategies to employ. Of particular importance, I show, is resisting the attempt to prove Diotima’s historical existence as the foundation for her philosophical authority.

We are unlikely to find sufficient empirical evidence to substantiate Diotima’s historicity. But that problem of the archive is not simply unfortunate or frustrating, that problem is a result of women’s exclusion. The gaps, silences, and muted voices of the archive have been produced through myriad practices of prohibition and elimination. We must have theories of exclusion that grapple with these productive effects and pursue reclamation anyway. Not just Diotima’s philosophical authority is at stake, but also our contemporary practices of conferring philosophical authority.

To make the point slightly differently, the history of European and Anglophone philosophy is more than incomplete; it has been constructed through practices of exclusion that we can critique. We need practices of reclamation that comprehend the myriad modes of prohibition and erasure employed to deny philosophical authority. Without such grounding in theories of exclusion, reclamation risks permitting some women into the history of European and Anglophone philosophy in ways that
strengthen philosophy’s exclusionary practices, because the practices of producing philosophical authority have not been changed. As difficult as Diotima’s reclamation is, hers is not the most troubling. Indeed, Diotima’s name appears in philosophical history, even if she is invoked only to be disregarded. But there are other exclusions at work, all the more powerful for the faintness of their traces, which have given the philosophical canon its form. In some disagreement with Le Doeuff, then, this book appreciates the cunning of permissive prohibition and prohibition to create a tradition that insults some while failing even to mention others. Given that systematic practices of exclusion have so shaped our understanding, I argue that feminist reclamation’s goal should not be the supplementation of philosophy, but rather its transformation...

Historical women’s texts can reshape contemporary practices of European and Anglophone philosophy. My overview in the first chapter, and foregrounding of transformative reclamation, makes clear how consequential our theories of women’s exclusion are for how we engage historical women’s work and how those engagements can impact our practices now.

Because how we theorize exclusion is so consequential for how reclamation proceeds, the subsequent three chapters of this book outline three very different approaches to theorizing women’s exclusion. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 consider the influential theories of Genevieve Lloyd, Luce Irigaray, and Michele Le Doeuff, as well as investigate the reclamation practices they could or do support. While Lloyd and Irigaray offer important insights about exclusion for the field of reclamation, I conclude that Le Doeuff’s method leads to the most promising reclamation practice.

In chapter 2—"Conceptual Exclusion"—I reconsider Lloyd’s The Man of Reason: ‘Male” and “Female” in Western Philosophy, a critique of how reason has been conceptualized as masculine throughout European and Anglophone philosophical history. Lloyd’s approach to the masculinization of reason has great potential as a basis of transformative reclamation, the particular strength of her method consists in its demand to treat thinkers as part of the history of conceptualization and to show the role metaphor plays within that history. Her project comes into productive crisis when she engages the work of Simone de Beauvoir. Lloyd does not give an explicit account of how Beauvoir managed to make a philosophical contribution, but Lloyd’s account hints at the possibility that Beauvoir was able to do so by sacrificing her femininity.

This thesis is productive because it makes clear that the concepts of “femininity” and “women” need not always align. While these two categories are closely allied—in their denigration and exclusion from European and Anglophone philosophy and within feminist work to challenge that denigration and exclusion—Lloyd’s inclusion of Beauvoir as a woman philosopher who participated in the marginalization of femininity allows us to glimpse a crucial distinction. Tina Chanter more fully articulates this distinction in tracing how Beauvoir participated in the exclusion of women from European philosophy in order to do her own philosophical work. Chanter’s account brings with it an important methodological insight. We must read for the way women who philosophize navigate the exclusion of femininity and women from philosophy. In other words, the epistemic norms that have worked to exclude women’s philosophical authority can, and often will, operate in the philosophical work of women.

In chapter 3—"Reclamation from Absence"—I argue that Irigaray provides the example of a method for reclaiming women’s work in her essay “Sorcerer Love: A Reading of Plato, Symposium, ‘Diotima’s Speech.’” In that work, Irigaray offers a model of reclamation as love. She develops that method in conversation with the absent Diotima. By using Diotima’s absence from the Symposium as the basis for engaging the words Plato attributes to the priestess, Irigaray shows that reclamation must transform philosophical practice through introducing the question of sexual difference that this tradition has all but excluded. I examine how irigaray, through conceiving of philosophy as a practice of loving engagement with traces of feminine subjectivity, imagines and performs new forms of philosophical authority. While conceding the power of this approach, this chapter also surveys problems...
with Irigaray’s account that limit its transformational potential.

In the fourth chapter—"Insults and Their Possibilities"—I highlight the importance of Le Doeuff’s attention to insult and innuendo in European and Anglophone philosophical history and the practice of uchronic history she develops in response to that history. To understand "uchronic," think first of "utopia." If a utopia is a placeless place in which we can imagine a world ordered by our ideals and their consequences, then uchronic history is a timeless time in which we can similarly imagine a world ordered by our ideals and their consequences. Uchronic history is a species of counterfactual narrative: one imagines a history in which women’s writings were not excluded and projects the possible contemporary consequences of this. While I find Le Doeuff’s theory of exclusion deeply promising, I argue (following Penelope Deutscher) that her method is also problematic insofar as it often fails to critique the duplicitous involvements with patriarchal power, to use Spillers’s words, of those historical ideals. In other words, these historical texts need to be examined not just for their promise in helping us to understand and critique our contemporary situation, but also for how they reproduce hierarchies and marginalizations. I suggest that a critical uchronic practice can make both moves possible, and I employ such a method in the final chapter.

Chapter 5—"From Exclusion to Reclamation"—compares the contributions of Lloyd, Irigaray, and Le Doeuff, so as to clarify the advantages and pitfalls of how they theorize women’s exclusion. First, I consider how Lloyd, Irigaray, and Le Doeuff can respond to charges that how they reconstruct history is fatally inaccurate. Although reclamation depends upon careful historical work, it cannot stop there. The historical archives to which reclamation can turn for texts have been shaped by massive exclusions. Reclamation must highlight the limitations of our archives—limitations that are not the result of unfortunate historical accidents (missing files, disintegrating documents, and the like), but rather the consequence of enduring practices of interdiction.

Further, as Irigaray and Le Doeuff demonstrate, we can read the texts we do have in imaginative ways in order to open new avenues of thought. (Lloyd, by contrast, does not read archival limitations as a form of exclusion, nor does she offer imaginative ways to deal with the limitations of the archive.) In comparing forms of reclamation developed by Irigaray and Le Doeuff, I suggest that the latter’s method encourages more freedom in speculating from historical texts to new contemporary possibilities. Decisive for my assessment, however, is that Le Doeuff is the only one of the three who recognizes and regularly engages with women in the history of European and Anglophone philosophy. Lloyd and Irigaray tend to tell the history of European and American philosophy as the history of men or masculine subjectivity, respectively. While their stories serve feminist critiques, they also reinforce the fallacy that the history of European and Anglophone philosophy has proceeded without women. The chapter concludes with a response to charges that Le Doeuff’s feminism is suspect because of her loyalty to philosophy.

In the final chapter—"Injuries and Usurpations"—I reclaim two texts. The first text is a document important in Le Doeuff’s reclamation of Harriet Taylor Mill, the Declaration of Sentiments. The Declaration of Sentiments was signed at the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848, which launched the women’s rights movement in the United States. Using Le Doeuff’s uchronic method to think through some of the demands of the Declaration, I also attend to the problematic hierarchies the document employs. To deepen concerns about the problems of the Declaration, I pivot to Sojourner Truth’s speech at the Akron, Ohio, meeting on women’s rights in 1851. Truth’s speech not only critiques the understanding of women’s rights reflected in the Declaration, but also offers a significantly different vision of freedom. I again use the uchronic method, but the uncertainties around what Truth said at the meeting (we have many reports, but no text from Truth’s hand) require reading multiple versions of the speech to speculate on what Truth may have been saying. I argue for the importance of reading uchronically with the uncertainties of the text to engage Truth as a philosophical thinker. And I draw
out the consequences of this engagement for contemporary practices of European and Anglophone philosophy.

The aim of this project is to reflect on what is at stake in the work of reclaiming women philosophers in and for the history of European and Anglophone philosophy. Feminist reclamation has its origin in an impulse to redress the silencing of women, but the mechanisms of that silencing have remained un- or undertheorized. In the absence of sufficient theorization, views about the nature of women’s exclusion and the nature of what they have been excluded from have operated nonetheless. Through explicit theorization of exclusion, we can appreciate how some modes of reclamation have reinforced powerful forms of exclusion. Conversely, through assessing theories of exclusion through the methods of reclamation they suggest, we can also appreciate how some theories of women’s exclusion have reinforced powerful forms of marginalization and erasure already operating in philosophy. Ultimately, this book does not identify one sure strategy for reclamation arising from the right theory of exclusion. Philosophy is a living practice, and my aim is to make us aware of how our practices of history telling are central to what it is possible for us to think. <>

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