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**Editorial Appraisals:**
Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise most of our content represents the authors’-editors’ own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

Critical Readings on Tang China 4-Volume Set
edited by Paul W. Kroll [Critical Readings, Brill, 9789004281134]

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The Tang dynasty, lasting from 618 to 907, was the high point of medieval Chinese history, featuring unprecedented achievements in governmental organization, economic and territorial expansion, literature, the arts, and religion. Many Tang practices continued, with various developments, to influence Chinese society for the next thousand years. For these and other reasons the Tang has been a key focus of Western sinologists. This volume presents English-language reprints of fifty-seven critical studies of the Tang, in the three general categories of political history, literature and cultural history, and religion. The articles and book chapters included here are important scholarly benchmarks that will serve as the starting-point for anyone interested in the study of medieval China.

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VOLUME 3
Lexical Landscapes and Textual Mountains in the High T'ang by Paul W. Kroll
The fifty-seven articles and book chapters reprinted in this four-volume set of Critical Readings on Tang China aim to give a broadly representative survey of English-language scholarship on the Tang from the past three generations. The Tang dynasty, formally founded on 18 June 618 and officially terminated on 5 June 907, was the second great imperium of Chinese history (the first being the Han dynasty of 202 BCE to 220 CE) and, in the opinion of many people, its three centuries were the cultural and political high point of traditional China. During this time Tang China was the most advanced civilization in the world, as well as being the most extensive territorial empire. At its fullest strength the Tang controlled all of what we think of today as “China proper” and also exercised administrative suzerainty westward over most of central Asia (excepting Tibet), including the Tarim Basin and Taklamakan Desert and across the Pamir range to the Hindu Kush in present-day Afghanistan—domains once known in the West by the romantic names of Dzungaria, Sogdiana, Ferghana, and Transoxiana. To the southeast the Tang empire reached far into what we now know as northern Vietnam, the former Annam. And eastward during these centuries, Tang China was the dominant cultural influence over the newly developing states of Korea and Japan.

Immediately preceding the Tang, the Sui dynasty, established in north China in 581 as successor to the Northern Zhou (557–581), conquered eight years later the Chen dynasty (557–589) that was the last of six southern dynasties centered on Jiankang (present-day Nanjing) after the demise of the
Han. The Sui thus became the first dynasty in nearly three centuries to reunite all of China under a single rule. But the Sui did not last, being replaced in 618 by the Tang. Thus the short-lived Sui stands in relationship to the Tang rather like the brief but preparatory Qin 秦 (221–206 BCE) in its relationship to the following and longer-lasting Han.

The vast empire of the Tang was administratively organized as a collection of roughly 350 prefectures (zhou 1′ì`f) or commanderies (jun ßj3) and, under those more than 1200 districts (xian ~,), of roughly county size. There were also higher-level officials, often called “commissioners” (shí ~) with various specific titles and duties of supervision coordinating designated matters of several prefectures or larger areas. On the margins of the empire were military protectorates holding more or less loose control over various “foreign” areas and populations. The chief officials of the far-flung local domains of the empire were centrally appointed by the court and sent out from the capital for set terms, ideally to be evaluated periodically and then promoted or demoted, as deserved, to posts in other locations, thus diminishing the possibility that any individual official might build up a private sphere of power. Of course the most desirable postings were always those in the capital city of Chang’an 長安 (near present-day Xi’an 西安) or, failing that, in the secondary capital at Luoyang 洛陽.

The Tang capital of Chang’an was a walled city comprising approximately thirty square miles that had been built from the ground up with the founding of the Sui in the early 580s. It was located southeast of the site of several previous capitals called Chang’an, going back to pre-imperial times. This new city, which the Sui named Daxingcheng 大興城, was laid out on a grid pattern, comprising one hundred and six separate walled neighborhoods as well as a large bureaucratic compound and an even larger palace enclaves for the imperial family. When the Tang took it over, they applied to it the historic name Chang’an and would continue to develop it throughout the dynasty. At its height it accommodated a million people within its walls, with another million in the near suburbs—an urban-centered population that would only begin to be approached elsewhere in the world by Baghdad in the mid-ninth century and Córdoba in the tenth—and which included large representations of traders and shopkeepers, monks and divines, musicians and entertainers from all corners and regions of Asia. The “foreign” element, particularly from the widespread oasis cities and settlements of central Asia, contributed to Chang’an’s truly cosmopolitan character.

The dynasty’s secondary capital of Luoyang, where the court was in residence at various times, was not as large or as exactly laid out but was only slightly less grand than Chang’an. The other great cities of the realm included especially Jinling 金陵 in the Yangzi delta, which (as Jiankang) had been the capital of a succession of “southern” dynasties during the four centuries between the Han and the Tang, and Yangzhou (also called, as of old, Guangling 廣陵), slightly downstream from Jinling and on the opposite shore of the Long River (Changjiang 長江, as the Yangzi was then called). There were also dozens of other cities and hundreds of small towns that constituted the functional map of Tang imperial governance.

The greatness and legacy of the Tang can be seen in many areas. In terms of political and institutional history, the forms and practices of administration during the Tang remained (with some alterations) largely the norm for the succeeding millennium of imperial history. A few examples are the civil-service examination for prospective officials, the nationally applicable legal code, establishment of a government bureau for the drafting of an official state history, the system of bureaucratic review and transferral of centrally appointed officials, an extensively organized and carefully maintained network of postal and staging stations for official communication and administrative travel. The literary achievements of Tang writers (most of whom were at least sometime members of or aspirants to the state bureaucracy), especially evident in verse but also in other genres, are well known and have become a significant part of the
history of world literature and the record of humanity’s highest individual responses to the beauties and sufferings of life. In religious and intellectual history, too, the Tang left its mark, most notably with the sinicized form of Buddhism known as Chan (Japanese: Zen) which even today is the most pervasive tradition of Buddhism in East Asia. In this sphere one must take account also of religious Daoism, which was equally prevalent throughout the Tang empire, having extra import because of the dynastic family’s claimed descent from the ancient sage Laozi.

We speak of the Tang as a successful dynasty that lasted for nearly three centuries, unlike the relatively brief Sui, but this picture needs some qualification. It took several years after the founding of Tang in 618 before other rival claimants for the fallen Sui mantle were completely defeated; and even at that point one could not be sure whether the Tang would last or for how long. In the event, it did endure. Yet even this is something of an intentional misreading. For the Tang was formally abolished on 16 October 690, replaced by the Zhou dynasty of Empress Wu, formerly the chief wife of Emperor Gaozong and now the first and only woman in Chinese history to wield power in her own name, after previously exercising unofficial control over the court during the last dozen or so years of Gaozong’s life. In 690, with the supplanting of the Tang, it would have looked to contemporaries as though the Tang had been just one more in the line of brief dynasties lasting only two or three generations that had been the norm in the Nanbeichao period. However, Empress Wu refrained from putting to death her two sons by Gaozong, each of whom had briefly occupied the throne, while she pulled the strings, after Gaozong’s demise and before Empress Wu’s own usurpation (Zhongzong 中宗, r. 649–683 and Ruizong 睿宗, r. 684–690). While these demoted scions lived there persisted some anamnesis, even a reservoir of loyalty, toward the dynastic Li family among a portion of the officialdom and aristocracy, so that when the aged empress was deposed on 23 February 705, it was not only possible but seemingly apposite that the Li line of succession should be restored and with it the Tang dynasty once more. Later historians, even up to the present, have regarded the fifteen-year Zhou interregnum as an illegitimate interruption and thus usually treat the Tang as having continued unbroken throughout that period, though in actuality it did not.

One curious result of the Zhou interregnum was that the feasibility—if not the formal acceptance—of female rule had been proven, to the point that Zhongzong’s court (r. 705–710) in the restored Tang was essentially dominated by women, namely his Empress Wei, their daughter Princess Anle, and Shangguan Wan’er 上官婉兒, a woman of exceptional literary talent who had been Empress Wu’s secretary and drafter of decrees and who had resourcefully transferred her services to Empress Wei. The poisoning of Zhongzong in 710 by his empress and daughter was meant to secure the throne, effectively if not in name, for the latter. But it was another woman, Princess Taiping 太平公主, favored daughter of Empress Wu and Gaozong, who, along with her nephew Li Longji 李隆基, a son of Ruizong, thwarted this plan and ended the lives of all three of those women. Princess Taiping had her own plans for ascendancy which became apparent during the second reign of Ruizong (710–712), but these were eventually scotched by Li Longji (known to history by his posthumous temple-name as Xuanzong 玄宗) who put the dynasty back on a strong footing and ruled for more than forty years during the great age that came to be known as the “High Tang.”

Those were the golden years, the famous Kaiyuan 开元 (713–742) and Tianbao 天寶 (742–756) eras that saw the fullest flowering of Tang power, prosperity, and cultural distinction. However, Xuanzong’s reign terminated in the catastrophe of the An Lushan 禄猴 rebellion, which lasted from late 755 to 763 and included the emperor’s ignominious abandonment of the capital and flight to Szechwan.

In fits and starts the Tang regained control of the whole country, but for the next century and a half certain parts of the state were supervised more by
local military commissioners than by bureaucrats from the central government, although the official administrative machinery of the empire continued to function and both the idea and the reality of the Tang state was preserved. There was a pervasive sense, though, that the world had changed, and this second half of the Tang dynasty was in some ways a different polity than the first half. Culturally, nevertheless, there was much continuity. Although some scholars see the great rebellion of the mid-eighth century as the beginning of a new period in Chinese history, the so-called “early modern” or the inaptly termed “Middle Period” extending on even to the late Ming, it is more accurate to regard the Tang as a single whole, representing the era of “late medieval” China. Within general continuities, there were of course, as would naturally be expected over time, certain developments and changes of emphasis in political, scholarly, literary, and to some degree social trends during the dynasty's last century and a half.

Two important features of Tang government, which lasted with some variation till the twentieth century, might be underlined here. The first is the famous civil-service examination system, with the jinshi (進士 “Presented Scholar”) exam as its most competitive and prestigious challenge. Some misconceptions exist about this annual exam. It did not attain the high status it is usually thought of as having till 681, when a separate section focusing on literary composition was added to it. Although it is often said that lyric poetry (詩) was the focus of this section, that was so only occasionally and even then only partially; more often when verse composition was required it was the fu (賦) that was asked for, a more expansive and demanding genre of poetry. The focus of the exam questions for the jinshi and the genres of writing required for it (almost always including one or another form of parallel prose) were often in dispute and often changed. By the ninth century an increasingly elaborate ritual program surrounded the presentation of candidates at court, the exam itself, the posting of results, and celebrations for those who passed. But passing the jinshi exam was not a ticket to high office or indeed to any office, for successful graduates had then to sit for a higher-level xuan ("selection") exam, the passing of which only then qualified one as a possible candidate for official appointment but guaranteed nothing. The most desirable initial appointment came to be a one- or two-year assignment as a collator or editor in one of the imperial libraries in Chang'an, allowing one to remain in the capital, have access to texts that might otherwise be difficult to consult, and also take advantage of opportunities to meet and become known to higher officials who could help a budding career. A sense of the competitive nature of the exam comes with the realization that there were typically no more than thirty individuals who were certified as passing the jinshi in any year, out of nearly a thousand candidates. Also worth noting is the importance of the so-called decree examinations, several of which might be held in any one year, these being called at the behest of the emperor for specified purposes, and under a variety of names; candidates were fewer and those who made the grade here but a handful. The meaningful point is that the exam system, despite the ideal of meritocracy and aura of brilliance attached to it, contributed a quite small number of individuals to the very large official bureaucracy, most of whose members came in through different routes of family privilege.

Another particularly noteworthy feature of Tang government, which had a long and important legacy, was the establishment of a dedicated historiography office. The responsibilities of this office included full-scale and wide-ranging archiving of records pertaining to places, people, and events of relevance to the dynasty, both current and past, and the periodic composition of summaries, narratives, and monographs drawn from these materials. The accounts of contemporary matters were recorded and collected, ideally for the ultimate use of historians of later dynasties who would write the definitive history of the Tang. But there was constant discussion and controversy regarding the proper interpretation of earlier documents, especially as their significance affected the formulation and execution of present-day policies.

Indeed, history and scholarship were hardly to be distinguished, and both were of political as well as
practical consequence. Shifting our perspective only slightly, one can also locate them both in the broader field of “literature” conceived generally. Like the dynasties that came before it, the Tang was part of a civilization that valued and emphasized literature—the written word—to a degree hardly matched elsewhere in the world. It is no wonder in this regard that sinological studies should by tradition be so obsessively text-centered, even while additional inquiry is today allotted to other matters such as material culture. But even the focus of archaeology, which is annually revealing to us new objects of study, is most often directed to excavated texts, notably epigraphy. It is what the Chinese of Tang times, as of other eras, said for and about themselves that draws our continuing attention. Moreover, it is literature in its narrower sense, the expression of individual thought and feeling, that has always been recognized as the most illustrious aspect of Tang civilization. This explains its comparatively prominent place in Tang studies generally and in the extracts collected here.

Scholars typically divide their focus in studying the past into large categories, usually dependent on the disciplinary boundaries of university departments. Hence there are specialists of history, or literature, or religion, etc. Since life is short and knowledge is infinite, these are necessary concessions. We realize nonetheless that lived existence in Tang China, as in our own individual experience today, did not proceed in terms of discrete divisible quanta. The men and women we study from past times were not themselves specialists but faced all sides of human experience. To begin to understand them properly, we must try to broaden our own perspectives accordingly. Hence the articles selected for reprinting here cover many different fields. Still, one cannot take in everything at once, and for convenience’ sake I have organized these items into three major categories: Political History; Literature and Cultural History; and Religion.

In the past hundred years, as Western scholarship on premodern China has developed in increasingly sophisticated and inevitably more specialized ways, study of the “late medieval” period centered on the Tang has yielded manifold new discoveries and understandings of that great age. The four volumes here at hand gather extracts of some of the most important English-language examples of these studies, with the intent of serving as a first (but hopefully not last) reference for interested students and scholars. If possible, I would have reprinted here the four most outstanding books on Tang China published in recent times, namely Edwin G. Pulleyblank’s *The Background of the Rebellion of An Lu-shan* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1955), Antonino Forte’s *Political Propaganda and Ideology in China at the End of the Seventh Century* (Naples: Istituto universitario orientale, 1976; much revised 2nd edn., Kyoto: Italian School of East Asian Studies, 2005), Stephen Owen’s *The Great Age of Chinese Poetry: The High T’ang* (Yale Univ. Press, 1981), and David McMullen’s *State and Scholars in T’ang China* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988). Pulleyblank’s and Forte’s books are so tightly structured that it was not feasible to extract a single chapter from either of them. From Owen’s and McMullen’s books I have drawn a chapter apiece but also included separately published articles on different topics by both authors. These four books should be at the top of the reading list for anyone interested in Tang China. Also in this category are the three great books of Edward H. Schafer, *The Golden Peaches of Samarkand: A Study of T’ang Exotics* (Univ. of California Press, 1963), *The Vermilion Bird: T’ang Images of the South* (California, 1967), and *Pacing the Void: T’ang Approaches to the Stars* (California, 1977), which are in the nature of literary encyclopedias on different aspects of Tang culture and imagination.

I had originally drawn up a list of eighty-five significant articles and book chapters for inclusion, but limitations of space demanded a severe reduction of that list, with the result that many equally deserving publications are, regrettably, not included here. Those that are included, as is Brill’s practice with all of the volumes in its Critical Readings series, have been completely reformatted in uniform style for ease of reading, and no longer carry their original pagination. Obvious typographical and factual errors have been corrected, but no substantive revisions of content have been made; the material stands as originally published, although most living authors would have welcomed the possibility to add later thoughts or
more recent reflections. It should be noted that the older articles and chapters use the Wade-Giles romanization system that was standard in English-language scholarship till about two or three decades ago, while the more recent items use the Hanyu Pinyin system that is now the norm. <>


In Philosophical Horizons Yang draws freely from Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist texts, alongside great Western philosophers to provide penetrating discussions of some of the most important issues in modern philosophy, especially those topics related to comparative and Chinese philosophy.

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Excerpt: Significant Chinese Philosophical Concepts

- **biran** 必然 ("what is necessarily the case")
- **chengji** 成 Z ("completed self," "refined self")
- **chengren** 成人 ("complete person," "perfected person," "refined person")
- **dangran** 当然 ("what should be the case")
- **dao** 道 ("way," "method," "principle")
- **de** 德 ("power," "virtue")
- **du** ("proper measure")
- **fa** 法 ("law," "method")
- **gong** 公 ("public," "general," "to make public")
- **gongzheng** 公正 ("justice")
- **he** 和 ("harmony")
- **jian'ai** 兼爱 ("universal love")
- **jing** 經 ("dogma," "guideline," "constant")
- **jingjie** 穀物 ("state of mind," "spiritual state," "realm")
- **junzi** 君子 ("superior person")
- **li** ("ritual" "ritual propriety")
- **li** 理 ("principle," "reason," "defining pattern," "coherence")
- **lixing** 理性 ("rational," "reason")
- **liyi** ("ritual propriety and morality")
- **lizhi** 理智 ("intellectual reason")
- **ming** ("names")
- **qi** 氣 ("material force," "air," "stuff")
quán 权 ("measure," "expedient,"
"transitory")
ren 人 ("humaneness," "benevolence")
shí 實 ("actualities")
shì 事 ("thing[s]," "event[s]," or "matters")
sìr 真然 ("what should be the case," "the way things are")
shù 循 ("reciprocity")
sī 私 ("private," "individual," "secret")
tiánmíng 天命 ("the mandate of heaven")
tóng 同 ("sameness")
wú 无 ("non-being," "non-presence," "to lack")
wúwéi 无为 ("non-action," "doing non-doing," "acting without interfering")
xīo 孝 ("filial piety")
xìng 性 ("nature," "disposition," "natural tendencies")
yáng 养 ("bright," "light," "higher")
yì ("appropriate," "human relations," "duty," "equitable")
yīn 影 ("shade," "dark," "lower")
yǒu 有 ("being," "presence," "to have")
zhèng 正 ("central, "straight/upright," "to align/correct")
zhèngmíng 正明 ("rectifying names")
zhèngyì 正義 ("justice")
zhòng 重 ("nascent equilibrium")
zhòng 忠 ("faithfulness")
zhǒngshū 忠恕 ("faithfulness and reciprocity")
zīrán 自然 ("self-so," "natural," "spontaneity")

Translators’ Introduction to Philosophical Horizons
Paul J. D’Ambrosio is associate professor of Chinese philosophy at East China Normal University in Shanghai, China, where he also serves as Dean of the Center for Intercultural Research, fellow of the Institute of Modern Chinese Thought and Culture, and the program coordinator ECNU’s English-language MA and PhD programs. He is the author of 真假之间 (Sincerity and Pretense in Ancient Chinese Philosophy, Genuine Pretending) (Kong Xuetang Press, 2019), co-author (with Hans-Georg Moeller) of Genuine Pretending (Columbia University Press, 2017), editor (with Michael Sandel) of Encountering China (Harvard University Press, 2018). Additionally, he has authored over 50 articles, chapters, and reviews, and has translated several books on Chinese philosophy.

Ady Van den Stock is a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Languages and Cultures at Ghent University in Belgium. His research is focused on the development of Sino-Islamic traditions of thought in modern China and on modern Chinese philosophy, specifically New Confucianism and Marxism. He has published a monograph devoted to the latter topic entitled The Horizon of Modernity: Subjectivity and Social Structure in New Confucian Philosophy (Brill, 2016) and translated the work of Chinese philosophers such as Li Zehou, Yang Guorong, and Feng Qi. He currently serves as Executive Director of the Académie du Midi Philosophical Association and as board member of the European Association for Chinese Philosophy.

Dan Sarafinas is from Pembroke MA. He holds a B.A. Phil. from Loyola Marymount University, an M.Phil. from Zhongnan University, and is currently a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Macau. He has served on translation teams working on texts by Li Zehou, Yang Guorong, and Guo Qiyong.

Sharon Y. Small is currently a post-doctoral fellow at East China Normal University. She received her PhD from the Department of Philosophy at Peking University where she specialized in Ancient Chinese Philosophy with focus on Daoism using recently excavated manuscripts. Her research interests include both Ancient and Modern Chinese thought along with the development of ideas and language in Pre-Qin times. Aside from research, Sharon currently works as a translator for contemporary Chinese scholars.

Stefano Gandolfo was originally trained in Economics and Philosophy (B.A. double major, cum-laude, Honors in Philosophy) at Yale University where he also had the opportunity to rigorously study Chinese as a Richard U. Light Fellow. Upon graduation, he pursued his graduate studies in Peking University in Chinese Philosophy (M.A. cum laude, Exceptional Thesis Award, Outstanding International Student Award) over a span of three
years as a CGS Scholar. Currently, Stefano is an Ertegun Scholar at the University of Oxford where he is reading for a DPhil in Chinese Philosophy (Oriental Studies) under the supervision of Professor Dirk Meyer.

The writings of Yang Guorong 杨荣 (born in 1957 in Zhuji 诸暨, Zhejiang province) span over three decades and have given shape to one of the most comprehensive and challenging bodies of philosophical work in the present-day Chinese intellectual landscape. He is author of over a dozen books and countless articles, an increasing number of which is being made available in English translation. As is reflected in the essays collected in the current volume, his interests as a thinker are wide-ranging, extending from the Book of Songs (Shijing 诗经) to classical pre-Qin thought, Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, and contemporary currents of Western philosophy such as phenomenology and existentialism. This already presents us with one of the most salient and important characteristics of Yang’s philosophical undertaking, namely an insistence on maintaining a close connection between history (shi 史) and thought (si 思), as the title of one of his books from 1999 indicates.

Yang’s philosophical analyses are often if not always accompanied by and embedded in extensive researches into intellectual history. According to his own understanding, he inherited this methodological focus on the “unity of thought and history” from his teacher and forebear at East China Normal University (Shanghai) Feng Qi 冯契 (d. 1995), whose philosophy of “wisdom” (zhiihu 智慧) can hardly be set apart from his sustained historical reconstruction of the “logical development” of traditional Chinese thought. Indeed, before he began developing and presenting his own constructive philosophy, Yang Guorong was probably best known for his astute and ambitious studies of the great Ming dynasty Neo-Confucian Wang Yangming 王阳明 (d. 1529) and the latter’s impact in the subsequent development of Chinese thought. This phase in Yang’s research crystalized in the two seminal books, Wangxue tonglun—cong Wang Yangming dao Xiong Shili 王学通论—从王阳明到熊十力 (An Introduction to the Wang School of Neo-Confucianism: from Wang Yangming to Xiong Shili) from 1990 and Xin xue shi si—Wang Yangming zhexue de chanshi 心学之思—王阳明哲学的阐释 (Thinking through the Heart-Mind: an Interpretation of the Philosophy of Wang Yangming) from 1997. Unlike thinkers classified under the general heading of “New Confucianism” however, Yang’s researches into the history of Chinese thought show little or no sectarian bias, nor do they attempt to directly reassert the normative value (let alone superiority) of the Confucian creed in modern society. Rather, his approach to Chinese traditions of thought seems motivated by a genuine desire to think through the historical dimension of the particular philosophical problems he is wrestling with, instead of pre-senting the former as a ready-made solution to the latter. Like all great modern Chinese thinkers, he thus draws freely and adroitly on Confucian, Daoist, as well as Buddhist texts, all while staging a dialogue with Western thinkers such as Kant, Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. The close nexus between the historical and constructive dimensions of Yang’s philosophy is also borne out by his study of late imperial “evidential studies” and the reception of science and technology in modern Chinese thought entitled The Metaphysical Dimension of Science: the Genesis and Evolution of Scientism in Modern China (Kexue de xingshang zhi wei: Zhongguo jindai kexuezhe de xingcheng yu yanhua 科学的形而上之维—中国近代科学主 X 的形成 及衍化) from 1999. In the last chapter of this book, entitled “Returning to Concrete Existence” (Huigui juti de cunzai 回归具体的存在), Yang effectively articulates the programmatic aim of his “mature” philosophy, namely that of developing a “concrete metaphysics” (juti de xing’ershangxue 具体的形而上学). For Yang, only a form of metaphysics which heed this call of returning to the concrete historical as well as social dimensions of human existence stands a chance of overcoming and sublating the critique and rejection of metaphysical thinking often seen as coinciding with the emergence of continental as well as analytical currents of modern Western philosophy. Such a
movement toward the “concrete” also entails transcending the disciplinary differentiation characteristic of modern academic philosophy and attempting to recover “wisdom” as the original goal of philosophy in China as well as the West. While Yang is hardly insensitive to the complex problems raised by the endeavor of cross-cultural thinking, he does not allow himself to be restrained by the exaggerated sense of methodological doubt that often haunts the discipline of comparative philosophy. Instead, in Yang’s work, research into the history of Chinese thought accomplishes something similar to the “leap” out of the sterile vicious circle of Kant’s reflexive critique of reason suggested by Hegel in the introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit: the question concerning the conditions of the possibility of knowledge is “resolved” by returning to its actual historical trajectory, which is part of an ongoing process instead of something that is yet to be initiated. In this sense, the essays in this volume can be seen both as stepping stones toward the concrete and as concrete incarnations of the unity of history and thought Yang Guorong has consistently pursued throughout the years.

This book is a collection of essays. They were published in various academic journals and newspapers throughout China over the past several years and were later collected into the present volume. Readers are thus encouraged to study chapters in this text in any order they see fit. Since each chapter is a distinct essay we have decided to reference major figures, concepts, and texts accordingly. That is, by introducing the first instance of a figure, concept, or text with Chinese characters, translations, and dates afresh in each chapter. All translations from other sources are the respective translator’s own, unless otherwise indicated. When referring to passages from Chinese classics, we cite the chapter and section number as they appear in the online version of the text at the Chinese Text Project website (www.ctext.org), unless otherwise noted. The style of the translation also varies in each chapter, reflecting not only the translator’s preferences, but also the changes in Professor Yang Guorong’s own voice throughout these works. Readers will also notice that some translations of key concepts vary to a limited extent. For example, tian dao 天道 is sometimes translated as “heavenly dao” and other times as “the dao of heaven,” these differences speak to the various connotations being highlighted in Professor Yang’s writing. For the reader’s convenience a list of key philosophical terms and their various translations is included in this book. It should be noted that these translations, and their employment in the book do not necessarily reflect the philosophical attitude of the translator. These terms are translated according to professor Yang Guorong’s understanding and many of the English renderings come directly from him. Additionally, depending on the context some characters are not translated but left in pinyin (Romanized Chinese) with definitions in parenthesis. For example, Chapter 16 is on gongzheng 公正, which is commonly translated as “justice,” but since gongzheng is the major topic the word is not translated. We have also opted to use simplified Chinese, as the original book was published in simplified Chinese.

Introduction

In the midst of our interactions with people and the world, we have always been confronted with the problem of knowledge of the world and knowledge of people themselves. From the early periods of myths and shamanism to today’s various forms of knowledge and academic disciplines, they all use different methods to open up unknown frontiers. Whether it is myth, shamanism, or even science, they can all be seen as particular approaches to understanding the world, representing different historical periods’ efforts to understand the world and revealing different methods used to investigate the world.

There can exist different horizons toward the understanding of the world and persons. “Horizons” penetrate into many diverse perspectives and also contain different points of view concerning the investigation of questions, the latter is concretely manifested as the distinctions between concepts such as experience and transcendence, skill (技) and dao 道 (“way” “method”). Taking the pursuit of wisdom as its guiding direction, philosophy’s horizon should first of all use the dao perspective, which is different than using a “skill” perspective or
"tool" (qi 器) perspective. The horizon of the "tool" or "skill" perspective mainly reflects the horizon of knowledge. Looking at this from a more internal level, the contemplation of philosophy on one hand takes the presence of the world and the existence of the person as its object, thus possessing a universal character. While on the other hand it exhibits the particular and partial investigation of human nature and heavenly law. With this in mind, the horizon of philosophy contains universality, individuality, and other dimensions.

Gilles Deleuze believed "philosophy is the discipline that involves creating concepts" and Hegel connected philosophy and ideas together, believing that ideas are what philosophers research, not mere concepts. In its practical form, philosophy both constructs and analyzes concepts, and is also related to ideas. We can understand concepts in a different respect: the general sense of concepts themselves touches upon ideas, but when speaking about concepts and ideas in relation to each other, they have a distinguishing emphasis and ideas point more in the direction of a unity. Based on this latter meaning, starting off with concepts and basing them on ideas seems to reflect the different horizons of philosophy. Broadly speaking, after philosophically grasping the world, many different horizons can be seen, and this particular type of horizon takes a philosophic stance toward the world and simultaneously allows for different meanings to emerge from the world. In regard to ontology, we should recognize that we only have one world, and for that matter, the real world is a public one. However, because of the different horizons, the meaning of the world emerges in many different forms.

From the perspective of the interrelatedness of the comprehending subject, in one respect every subject's life background, value perspective, and cognitive orientation are different, and thus each subject's horizon is different. This generates a field of meaning with its own particular features, leaving the subject within "a different world" in some sense. On the other hand, the comprehending subject must have a foundation for a fusion of horizons, ceaselessly reaching for a certain level of common understanding and a "common world," the latter of these being necessary for the intercommunication and social interaction between subjects. The creation of "different worlds" and movement towards a "common world" creates two interrelated aspects of comprehending and grasping the world, and associated with this process is the division and fusion of horizons.

In regard to the individual, one's horizon constitutes their background for grasping the world and also brings some restrictions to this process. As a consistent and stable perspective toward the world, one's horizon not only contains one's understanding of the world in an epistemological sense, but also frames one's attitude toward the world with respect to one's values. Approval of any type of philosophic position makes it easy to pursue an investigation from only this perspective and neglect other possible angles of understanding. At this point it is important to pay attention to the transformation and expansion of one's horizon. Purely having one particular horizon as a foundation will often restrict one's understanding of things, while the transformation or expansion of one's horizon is necessary for overcoming the restrictions brought on by a solidified and rigid horizon. In fact, the previously mentioned "dao perspective" implies continuously overcoming the simplification and rigidity of one's horizon and moving toward the concrete, real world through the expansion of one's horizon.

The thought and distinctions of the relevant questions in this book include the fields of human nature and heavenly law and also express a concrete philosophic horizon. In recent years, despite my research being primarily concentrated in the fields of the world of meaning and practical philosophy, as represented by the two books The Mutual Cultivation of Self and Things: A Contemporary Chinese Philosophy of the Meaning of Being (Chengji yu chengwu: Yiyi shijie de shengcheng 成自物世界的生成) and Human Action and Practical Wisdom (renlei xingdong yu shijian zhihui 人类行动 j 实践智慧) respectively, I have simultaneously been working on questions within other fields, and this book is a compilation of a number of philosophic manuscripts I have been working on since 2009. The manuscripts
took shape from various sources including academic lectures, records of speeches from academic conferences, as well as papers and meditations on the classics. The content of these manuscripts touches on different aspects within the domain of philosophy. Roughly speaking, they can be broken into four parts. The first part addresses philosophic questions in a general sense, such as the characteristics of philosophy itself, the approach to philosophic research, education within philosophic horizons, philosophic elucidations of ecological questions, etc. The second part concerns an understanding of Chinese philosophy, such as the meaning of “philosophy” within the field, the position of Chinese philosophy, etc. The third part is comprised of an investigation into a number of concrete issues within the history of Chinese philosophy that touch on general concepts and questions such as Chinese philosophy’s dao, the question of human nature, the concept of “justice” etc., as well as particular people and texts. The fourth part concerns major schools of thought within modern Western philosophy, and also, more specifically, contains a brief analysis of analytic philosophy and phenomenology.

What is philosophy? Throughout the evolution of the history of philosophy we have continuously faced this question. One of the distinguishing characteristics that makes philosophy different from other academic disciplines is that it not only confronts the world, but is also meant to reflect on its own role, and the question “what is philosophic questioning” is an embodiment of this type of self-reflection that philosophy engages in. The many manuscripts incorporated into this book also touch on different aspects of this topic. In recent years, the evolution of philosophy has appeared to move more in the direction of specialization, and philosophers have gradually become more professional and specialized. After the beginning of the 20th century, following metaphysics being called into question and the change in direction of linguistics, this trend developed a step further. As a result of this we have distanced ourselves from and forgotten wisdom. A transformation of philosophy’s horizon can also be seen here, and this transformation seems to have more of the tendency of shifting from wisdom towards knowledge. In order to take one more step toward engaging in a self-reflection of philosophy, we must refocus on the intrinsic nature of philosophy as wisdom.

The circumstances that Chinese philosophy has confronted have had their own distinct characteristics. Since the point in time that Chinese philosophy acquired its recent form, Chinese philosophy’s identity has been a controversial topic. Starting out from its universality, its particularity, or other horizons, the understanding of Chinese philosophy and the position given to it have been quite diverse. A true grasp of Chinese philosophy must be based on Chinese philosophy, while returning to a wider meaning of philosophy itself. This equally touches upon the transformation and expansion of horizons. Philosophy both possesses a common, universal form, while a diverse and personalized form also emerges. Very early on Chinese philosophy distinguished between “skill” and “dao,” or “the pursuit of learning” (weixue 为学) and “the pursuit of dao” (weidao 为道). Within this distinction, “skill” and “in the pursuit of learning” refer to the object of the horizon of experience, while “dao” and “in the pursuit of dao” refer to human nature and heavenly law, the latter belonging to the domain of wisdom in a broad sense. Taking wisdom of human nature and heavenly law as content, Chinese philosophy can no doubt be classified as falling under the scope of philosophy. In addition to this, approval and recognition of the dual horizon must be formed. Recognition implies affirmation of the individuality and particularity of the form of philosophy, and that the substance of philosophy values diversity. The compliment to this is the affirmation of Chinese philosophy as a specific form of philosophy, which contains universal meaning, and behind its recognition lies the confirmation of this type of universal theoretical meaning.

From an historical perspective, Chinese philosophy has formed a variety of theories and questions during the course of its evolution, and to concretely understand Chinese philosophy, one must enter into these relevant theories and conduct a multifaceted inspection of the questions contained within. From human nature to selfhood, from cognition to politics,
from schools of thought to individuals, this book is meant to embody the intent of research of the theories and questions within Chinese philosophy. All of these topics revolve around the questions of Chinese philosophy itself and the theme never leaves the two fundamental aspects of “heavenly dao” or “dao of heaven” (tiandao 天道) and the “humanistic dao” or “dao of man” (rendao 人道). Despite involving the diversity of these subjects, the research approach will be relatively consistent and, as such, will concretely demonstrate that the pursuit of learning has no Chinese-Western distinction and also show the unification of history and thought. The pursuit of learning without any Chinese-Western distinction implies that any limiting and confined academic tradition will be avoided, that the investigation of Chinese philosophy will start off from an open academic position. The unification of history and thought emphasizes the connection between the history of philosophy and philosophic theories. These two points can simultaneously be seen as recalling and reflecting upon the internal horizons embodied within the process of Chinese philosophy.

Following the confluence of Chinese and Western philosophy in recent years, Chinese philosophy has been unable to continue to advance within its own tradition, the interaction between Chinese and Western philosophy having become an unavoidable historical trend. Regarding Western philosophy since the 20th century, analytic philosophy and phenomenology have undoubtedly been its two most important styles of thought. With that in mind, this book will take the distinctions between these styles of thought in order to discuss the works of analytic philosophy and phenomenology. There exist many different types of technical investigations of concrete details within the history of philosophy, and these documents are meant to enable us to grasp the important philosophic character exhibited by analytic philosophy and phenomenology as important schools of thought within the contemporary Western world, opening up their inner philosophic meaning.

This book also includes relevant academic responses and interviews as an appendix in order to allow the reader to understand my academic research background on a wider level.

Whether it is the investigation of the world or the pursuit of wisdom, each embodies, on one hand, uniqueness and, on the other hand, its internal limitations, and the corresponding research in this book is no exception. As described previously, to overcome this type of limitation requires a further deepening of research and an unceasing expansion of one’s horizon. <>


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Excerpt: For more than two millennia, readers have turned to the Lunyu (Analects or the Selected Sayings) as an authoritative guide to the teachings of Kongzi (Confucius; trad. 551–479 BCE), the most important figure in the East Asian tradition. Insofar as Kongzi has stood for certain foundational values and practices, including learning (xue 學), reverence for the past (gu 敬), ritual propriety (li 礼), the nobility of official service (shi / shi 仕), and the interdependence of family virtues like filial piety (xiao) with official virtues like loyalty (zhong), the Lunyu has been a potent “initiation text” into that tradition, to borrow a phrase from Robert Eno—or, to quote one early witness, it is “the linchpin of the Five Classics and the mouthpiece of the Six Arts” To this day, the practice of introducing traditional China via the Lunyu continues in classrooms around the world.

The Lunyu certainly lends itself to the role of gatekeeper text. As a guide to the quotable Kongzi, it is short (ca. 16,000 characters) and divided into five hundred or so bite-sized, easily memorized bons mots. Even its challenges are conducive to reader engagement. The text does not present Kongzi's teachings in ways that a modern academic philosopher would recognize as rigorous. Logical connections between and across entries are implicit at best. Contradictions abound. Entries of various formats (sayings, comments, dialogues, anecdotes, testimonia) are strung together indiscriminately with little or no context. The Lunyu is not disorganized so much as unconstructed, the overall effect of which is to invite, even demand, the active participation of readers in ways that few other classical texts do. The text also facilitates this process by tempting readers with the promise of “a single thread tying Kongzi's Way together” (4/15 and 15/3) or the challenge of reconstructing the “three [unexpressed] corners” (san yu) for every “single corner” (yi yu; 7/8) in the text itself.

The Lunyu continues to anchor the contemporary imagination of the Warring States “Masters” (zhuzi 諸子). In the last century or so, many of the most important voices in the field of classical Chinese philosophy have done a great deal of “thinking through Confucius” and the Lunyu, to quote David Hall and Roger Ames. Within the history of philology, the Lunyu has provided fertile ground for the development of various critical methodologies. Whenever philologists set out to reorder a text’s juan 卷 (fascicles, chapters) or zhang 章 (paragraphs, entries) with the aim of sequencing its layers chronologically, wittingly or not they are following a path paved centuries earlier by Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁斎 (1627–1705), Cui Shu 崔述 (1740–1816), and others who sought to identify Kongzi’s original teachings amid the Lunyu’s miscellanies.

The Continuing Currency of the Lunyu Nearly two decades into the twenty-first century, the field of Lunyu studies is as vibrant as ever. Since 2000, publications in English have included new translations by Edward Slingerland (2003), Pan Fu’en and Wen Shaoxia (2005), and Ann-ping Chin (2014); reprints of older translations by Arthur Waley (2000), Burton Watson (2007), Simon Leys (2014), and David Hinton (2014); collections of essays edited by Bryan W. Van Norden (Confucius and the Analects: New Essays; 2002), David Jones (Confucius Now: Contemporary Encounters with the Analects; 2008), Amy Olberding (Dao Companion to the Analects; 2014), and Michael Nylan (The Analects [Norton Critical Edition]; 2014); monographs by Daniel K. Gardner (Zhu Xi’s Reading of the Analects: Canon, Commentary, and the Classical Tradition; 2003), John Makeham (Transmitters and Creators: Chinese Commentators and Commentaries on the Analects; 2003), Amy Olberding (Moral Exemplars in the Analects; 2012), Henry Rosemont (A Reader’s Companion to the Confucian Analects; 2013), and Michael Hunter...
and many more journal articles besides. Publications in Chinese from the same period number in the thousands. The Lunyu has been introduced and reintroduced and re-reintroduced so many times now that one could write a dissertation just on the genre of the Lunyu introduction.

Given this context, one might wonder whether the world needs yet another book on the Lunyu. The easy response is that there is clearly a market for such publications. In the People's Republic of China, China Central Television's broadcast of Yu Dan's 讲座 Lunyu in 2006 created a national sensation. The printed version of those lectures, Lunyu xinde 論心得 (Confucius from the Heart: Ancient Wisdom for Today's World), has sold millions of copies. Even more remarkably given the anti-Confucian campaigns of the Maoist era, the Communist Party has come to embrace Kongzi 孔子 and the Lunyu as a way of promoting its version of traditional Chinese values, now manifested in some five hundred "Confucius Institutes" all over the globe. In 2015 various speeches by Xi Jinping 習近平, the general secretary of the Communist Party of China and president of the People's Republic of China, were collected and published with the title Xi Jinping: How to Read Confucius and Other Chinese Classical Thinkers. Quotations of the Lunyu also featured prominently in the opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, a landmark event in China's emergence on the global stage. The vibrancy of the East Asian classical tradition, with the Lunyu as one of its crown jewels, is something even the most contrarian of Lunyu scholars can be grateful for.

Our Position on the Lunyu

Nevertheless, the Lunyu's canonicity is not the point of departure for our project. Instead, what motivates this volume is the editors' belief that direct evidence of the Lunyu's authority and even its existence is sorely lacking before the Western Han period (202 BCE–9 CE). As argued in Hunter's contribution in this volume, the earliest sources to corroborate the existence and circulation of a Lunyu text date to the mid- to late Western Han, when the imperial dynasty began teaching it to princes and invoking it as an instrument of imperial legitimacy. The earliest sources to describe the Lunyu as a record of Kongzi's teachings compiled by his students emerged decades after its adoption by the imperium. Moreover, representations and quotations of Kongzi prior to the Han period exhibit so few parallels with the Lunyu as to preclude the possibility of direct borrowing from a Lunyu text. To date, the only excavated or looted manuscripts to corroborate the existence of the Lunyu date no earlier than the mid-first century BCE. The wealth of non-Lunyu Kongzi material in earlier manuscript finds only makes the Lunyu's invisibility in the Warring States period and the first decades of the Han dynasty that much more remarkable.

Here we must acknowledge our debt to scholars whose skepticism regarding the traditional account of the Lunyu's origins inspired our own. These include the entire tradition of critical Rongo (Analects) scholarship in Japan, from Takeuchi Yoshio (1886–1966) and Tsuda Sōkichi (1873–1961) to Kaneto Mamoru; the works of Zhao Zhenxin Tǎ (1902–1989) and Zhu Weizheng 維鋭 (1936–2012) in China; and the writings of John Makeham, Mark Csikszentmihalyi, Christiane Haupt, and Oliver Weingarten.13 Of special note is Makeham's 1996 article "The Formation of Lunyu as a Book," an enduring work of scholarship that established the contours of the revisionist position within English-language scholarship.

When we step back to consider the available evidence in its totality, we conclude that the likeliest context for the creation of a Lunyu text is the Western Han dynasty. (This is the argument summarized in Hunter's contribution and in his recent monograph.) We believe that the Lunyu is both an imperial and a dynastic text. By that we do not just mean that the Lunyu is a product of the Han period. The Lunyu as a book came into existence under the intellectual, political, and social conditions of a unified imperial state governed by members of a dynastic lineage. Given the amazing breadth and dynamism of the "Kongzi" phenomenon in the Warring States period, the standardization of Kongzi quotation practice via the Lunyu would not have been possible prior to the Qin 秦 unification or the increasing centralization of
the early Western Han, nor is there any evidence of such standardization prior to empire. This is not to say that all of the Lunyu was written from scratch in the Han; our inquiry is about the compilation date of the Lunyu as a book, not about the dating of its individual passages. With regard to the latter, we remain largely agnostic: given the paucity of parallels between the Lunyu and pre-imperial Kongzi quotations, evidence that a given saying circulated as a Kongzi saying prior to the Lunyu is not forthcoming in the vast majority of cases. We simply insist that inclusion in the Lunyu is not a marker of a saying’s antiquity or authenticity. Moreover, it was under the Western Han dynasty that the need for a quotable Kongzi canon became pressing, as emperors and subjects alike looked to justify their policies with reference to the sage behind the Five Classics, the newly established state-sponsored curriculum for the training of imperial officials. As noted by Hunter, echoes of Western Han recruitment edicts in the Lunyu further reveal its interest in the “selection” (lun 论) of talented and virtuous candidates, a key ingredient in the emerging imperial system. As a companion text to the Xiaojing 孝經 (Classic of Filial Piety), which established the broader social, political, and cosmological implications of xiao 孝 (filiality) for an early imperial audience, the Lunyu indoctrinated imperial scions in values conducive to dynastic continuity. In short, even if it existed in the Warring States period in some form, a possibility that can never be dismissed, such a text could not have had the authority it enjoyed under empire. The Western Han dynasty did not merely put its seal of approval on a preexisting text; in a very real sense, it “created” (zuo 作) the Kongzi canon it needed.

This is a controversial position, one with which not all the contributors to this volume (or participants in the 2011 conference that precipitated it) would entirely agree. Despite our enthusiasm for revisionist Lunyu scholarship, we do not offer this volume as a definitive answer to the question of the Lunyu’s origins. To the contrary, we openly acknowledge the contested nature of our claims and the impossibility of proving once and for all a particular date for any part of the Lunyu, let alone for the collection as a whole. (As pointed out by Goldin and others in the present volume, the undeniable presence of pre-Han material in the Lunyu significantly muddies the distinction between a Han and pre-Han text.) No less for the Lunyu than for other early texts, early China scholars cannot presume to offer anything approaching definitive proof of its origins. Paradoxically, this is even truer today than it was a few decades ago thanks to the combination of newly available manuscripts, digital research tools (as in Hunter’s contribution), and broader comparative approaches to the study of ancient text cultures. To quote the introduction of another volume in the Studies in the History of Chinese Texts series:

The certainty that the eminent philologist Bernhard Karlgren still felt, in the mid-twentieth century, when deciding on the interpretation of individual Chinese characters and words, is long gone: a wealth of new data from unearthed ancient manuscripts, together with more sophisticated conceptual approaches that are informed by neighboring disciplines and cross-cultural comparisons, especially the study of ancient Mediterranean texts, has made us far less sure of ourselves in evaluating the “right” choice for this or that Chinese character. ... In this endeavor, we have been happy to trade false certainty for more interesting and productive questions and possibilities.

What is true of individual Chinese characters is even more true for processes of textual formation in the ancient context. In the face of such uncertainties, the best one can do is to consider all the evidence at one’s disposal in the hopes of devising a provisionally workable hypothesis, all while explicitly acknowledging the tentative nature of one’s conclusions and welcoming new evidence as it becomes available. As a field, the worst thing we can do is to promise more certainty than our sources allow us. However much we would like to recover The Original Analects or The Authentic Confucius, that should not be the goal of (self-)critical textual scholarship.

Given the multiplicity of voices on the topic, all of them making very strong cases one way or the other, there is a larger question here: how do we
engage in controversy? Or, how does one collaborate in such a way that all perspectives are cherished? Irrespective of their intellectual, methodological, or disciplinary commitments, all our contributors started from the premise that the question of the Lunyu’s origins remains open and vital. Our goal is not to rebut other views or to establish a new orthodoxy but to create a space in which different hypotheses can be advanced, tested, and modified.

Of Rugs and Dominoes

The essays in this volume are further united by a willingness to consider the implications of rethinking the Lunyu’s origins. By virtue of its canonicity, the Lunyu is embedded in the modern imagination of early China in ways that few other texts are. Consequently, every hypothesis about the Lunyu’s nature, origin, context, and circumstances of composition and compilation implies wider assumptions about ancient Chinese textuality and its intellectual, social, material, and political contexts.

To quote Mark Csikszentmihalyi, problematizing the Lunyu’s chronology and its relationship to the historical Kongzi “has the effect of pulling the rug out from under the usual narrative of what is often called the ‘history of thought’ (sixiang shi 思想史) of early China.” Or to use another metaphor: knock over the Lunyu and many other dominoes also fall. These include

♦ Destabilizing the traditional timeline of early Chinese thought anchored to the Kongzi of the Lunyu as the earliest master and/or the Lunyu as the earliest work of philosophy.
♦ Problematizing the Lunyu as a source of social, political, or linguistic realities in the early Warring States period.
♦ Complicating the study of Kongzi by removing the most convenient Kongzi canon. If not via the Lunyu, how does one go about reading and teaching the voluminous yet scattered corpus of early Kongzi literature?
♦ Dissolving the disciplinary divide between pre-Qin and early imperial thought. If the Lunyu did not exist or did not circulate widely prior to the Western Han period, then it can hardly be read as a foundational text of “pre-Qin philosophy” (xian Qin zhexue 先秦哲學). Whether any texts traditionally dated to the Warring States period can be read exclusively from a pre-Qin perspective is an open question.
♦ Problematizing the master-student model of intellectual and textual transmission that is so central to the modern imagination of the early Chinese intellectual scene. Insofar as Kongzi is thought to have formed the first “school” or “intellectual lineage” (jia ), and insofar as he and his dizi (followers) exemplify master-student relationships in general, where else should we look for evidence of master-student transmission if not to the Lunyu? If master-student schools and lineages did not play as large a role in the formation of “Masters” literature, then what is the underlying mechanism of intellectual and textual transmission in the Warring States period?
♦ Exposing the anachronisms inherent in using post-Lunyu sources to make sense of pre-Lunyu sources. Sima Qian’s (ca. 145–85 BCE) Shÿi (Grand Scribe’s Records), most of our earliest extant commentaries to the classics, and resources like the Shuowen jiezi (Explanations of Characters Simple and Compound) character dictionary of ca. 100 CE all feed the impression that the Lunyu was integral to the pre-Han textual record, and all come to us from the early empire.
♦ Questioning the appropriateness of the accretion model of textual formation. Insofar as the field of Lunyu studies has taught us to think of early texts as successive layers of accretion, rethinking the Lunyu also leads us to reconsider our default assumptions about how early texts were formed. Canonization is by definition a process of selection and exclusion, and early descriptions of editors, including Kongzi, Liu Xiang] (79–8 BCE), and many others, provide overwhelming evidence for the compilation of ancient Chinese texts through processes of reduction, not expansion.

From a traditional perspective, these points might read as rallying cries for a deconstructionist, if not outright nihilistic, program. To the contrary, for us
the payoff of rethinking the Lunyu is the thrill of exploring new perspectives in the study of early Chinese texts. The contributions to this volume are offered in that spirit.

The Contributions
Appearing more than two decades since the publication of his seminal essay “The Formation of Lunyu as a Book,” John Makeham’s chapter (“A Critical Overview of Some Contemporary Chinese Perspectives on the Composition and Date of the Lunyu”) surveys the current state of Chinese-language scholarship on the Lunyu, in particular in relation to recently unearthed manuscripts. Makeham spotlights “methodologically naïve” efforts to use these manuscripts to reaffirm traditional accounts of early ru 儒 intellectual history involving both the Mengzi 孟子 (Mencius) and a (re)constructed Zisi 子思子 (Master Zisi) and to claim an early date for the Lunyu within this history. In a detailed rebuttal of some of the most prominent studies to this effect, Makeham demonstrates how their use of manuscript evidence from Guodian 郭店 and from the Shanghai Museum corpus involves multiple leaps of faith and logical fallacies. Makeham urges us to distinguish between an irrecoverable past and a reconstructed past and to be more critically aware of our own roles as interpreters.

In chapter 2 (“The Lunyu as an Accretion Text”) Robert Eno defends the accretion model of the Lunyu, the most influential theory of the text’s origins in the modern era. After broadly surveying (and critiquing) previous iterations, including those of Kimura Eiichi and E. Bruce Brooks and A. Taeko Brooks, Eno presents the most cautious and persuasive version of the accretion theory to date. Without assuming a strong link between the Lunyu and the historical Kongzi, Eno tentatively dates the core layer of the Lunyu to the late fourth or early third century BCE, with additional stages of redaction taking place in the Qin and Han periods. Of particular note is Eno’s discussion (following Kanaya Osamu) of “the likely role of Qin encyclopedia” in the compilation of the Lunyu and other ru texts both in the years before the imperial unification and then further with the official erudites at the Qin imperial court. Their textual work, according to Eno, prepared the basis for the subsequent canonization by Western Han scholars.

Adopting a different approach to the question of the Lunyu’s origins, in chapter 3 (“The Lunyu as Western Han Text”) Michael Hunter summarizes the argument for reading the Lunyu as a Western Han text. From a statistical analysis of thousands of Kongzi quotations across all early Chinese texts, Hunter shows that before mid-Western Han times, anything resembling the received Lunyu would be unreconstructable from Kongzi quotations in other texts. Hunter places the compilation and canonization of the Lunyu in the reign of Han emperor Wu 武 (141–87 BCE), that is, the time between the Huainanzi (139 BCE) and the Shiji (ca. 100 BCE), “with post-Shiji texts drawing heavily from the Lunyu for their Kongzi quotations and pre-Huainanzi texts drawing their Kongzi material from elsewhere.” While Hunter allows for the Lunyu’s inclusion of pre-imperial material, he removes the Lunyu from its exalted position as the fountainhead of Chinese philosophy and, furthermore, opens perspectives on what a philosophical reading of the Lunyu as a Western Han text might reveal.

In chapter 4 (“Confucius and His Disciples in the Lunyu: The Basis for the Traditional View”) Paul R. Goldin mounts a vigorous defense of “the traditional understanding of the [Lunyu’s] philosophical importance” even as he accepts a Western Han date for the redaction of the received Lunyu. Surveying various philosophical issues from the fourth and third centuries BCE, Goldin argues that the Lunyu’s silence on these issues is in keeping with an early Warring States intellectual milieu. He further shows how references to other philosophers in early texts suggest a robust overall framework for the traditional chronology of Warring States texts. Without committing to the view of the Lunyu as an authentic record of Kongzi’s teachings, Goldin thus maintains the Lunyu’s status as a canonical, or at least early, source of Chinese philosophy and that “whoever was responsible for compiling” the text “included an overwhelming proportion” of genuinely early material within it.

In contrast, Joachim Gentz, in chapter 5 (“The Lunyu, a Homeless Dog in Intellectual History: On
the Dating of Discourses on Confucius's Success and Failure”), expresses skepticism regarding the prospects of dating the Lunyu. While acknowledging its wealth of “concepts, ideas, thoughts, terms, metaphors, discourses, and problems,” he argues that the Lunyu does not contextualize or systematize these elements in ways that lend themselves to intellectual historical analysis, because “[t]he purpose of the book is obviously not to take part in intellectual debates.” Drawing broadly on a wealth of transmitted texts and recently unearthed manuscripts, Gentz presents two case studies: the Lunyu’s contradictory presentation of ren (often translated as “humaneness” or “benevolence”) and its treatment of the problem of Kongzi’s success and failure in comparison to pre-Han debates on the subject. Yet neither individual concepts nor the success/failure problem, Gentz concludes, allow us to date the Lunyu—a text that with its fundamental focus on Kongzi’s action “is homeless in early Chinese intellectual history.”

In chapter 6 (“Confucius’s Sayings Entombed: On Two Han Dynasty Bamboo Lunyu Manuscripts”) Paul van Els judiciously surveys the evidence from two fragmentary Lunyu manuscripts, one from the tomb of Liu Xiu (d. 55 BCE), the king of Zhongshan, unearthed in the 1970s near the modern-day city of Dingzhou 定州 in Hubei 湖北 Province, and the other from the tomb of a high-ranking Han official in Lelang Commandery 樂浪郡 in modern-day North Korea. After summarizing the circumstances of the manuscripts’ discovery and scholarly history, as well as their archaeological contexts, physical characteristics, and paleographic features, including a number of textual variants, van Els addresses more difficult questions regarding the dating, provenance, and purpose of the manuscripts. Through a detailed comparative analysis of their script styles against various other Han dynasty manuscripts, he argues that both manuscripts date to the first century BCE and not to the early Western Han, as some have contended.

Although not focused primarily on the problem of the Lunyu’s chronology, Matthias L. Richter’s contribution in chapter 7 (“Manuscript Formats and Textual Structure in Early China”) bears directly on the question of how we should imagine the processes of textual formation and transmission that ultimately produced the received Lunyu. Richter targets the widely held assumption that the composite nature and fluidity of texts like the Lunyu are attributable to the format of bamboo manuscripts, which (so the assumption goes) invited the rearrangement, addition, and subtraction of individual bamboo slips—in Erik Maeder’s memorable phrase, the “loose-leaf ring binder” theory of textual formation. In contrast, Richter finds little evidence for such a theory, instead pointing to numerous instances in which scribes endeavored “to define textual identity and to prevent a potential confusion of textual order.” When looking for explanations for the Lunyu’s heterogeneity, Richter concludes, we must look to factors other than early manuscript formats.

In chapter 8 (“Interlocutor Collections, the Lunyu, and Proto-Lunyu Texts”) Mark Csikszentmihalyi examines the role of “interlocutor texts” in the formation of the received Lunyu. The point of departure for his essay is early theories of the Lunyu’s composition, which assign a prominent role to Kongzi’s students as recorders, compilers, and transmitters of his teachings. However, in his survey of early texts (including whole chapters and shorter dialogues) attributed to interlocutors like Zengzi 曾子, Csikszentmihalyi finds little evidence for the stable attribution of such texts to specific interlocutor figures. To the contrary, there is evidence to suggest that extant interlocutor texts reached their final form only in the Han period, perhaps under the influence of the Lunyu. Csikszentmihalyi also devotes a substantial section to the relationship between the Lunyu and the Shiji chapter of collected biographies of Kongzi’s students, which “likely was not done by someone with something very much like a modern Lunyu in front of them.”

Esther Sunkyung Klein, in chapter 9 (“Sima Qian’s Kongzi and the Western Han Lunyu”), takes a closer look at that crucially important witness to the Lunyu’s emergence in the Western Han period: Sima Qian’s Shiji. Klein surveys the use of Lunyu parallels in three layers of the Shiji: the numerous taishigong yue 太史公 (the honorable senior
archivist says) passages in which the historian speaks in his own voice, the Kongzi biography of the “Kongzi shijia” 孔子世家 (Hereditary House of Kongzi), and the disciple biographies of the “Zhongni dizi liezhuan” 仲尼弟子 之傳 (Arrayed Traditions of Zhongni’s Disciples). Finding that “Sima Qian had a Lunyu, or at least some proto-Lunyu source(s),” Klein catalogs various discrepancies and contrasting points of emphasis between the Lunyu and the Shiji. These include the Shiji’s amplification of certain Lunyu sayings, its condensation of others, its fascination with Zigong coupled with its relative disinterest in Zengzi, its interest in invoking a more “esoteric” Kongzi, and its emphasis on Kongzi’s authorship of the Chunqiu 春秋 (Spring and Autumn Annals).

Finally, in chapter 10 (“Kongzi as Author in the Han”) Martin Kern surveys early sources for the notion of Kongzi’s authorship of the Chunqiu as a test to falsify the hypothesis of a Han compilation date for the Lunyu. According to Kern, there is little if any evidence of this notion in pre-imperial texts; and notably, the Chunqiu is not even mentioned in the Lunyu. Kern further shows that contrary to common assumptions, the idea that Kongzi authored the Chunqiu also remains limited to very few texts during the Western Han period. The most important exception is Sima Qian’s Shiji, which, in Kern’s reading, differs strikingly from the Lunyu in one particular respect: unlike the Kongzi in the Lunyu, the Shiji Kongzi, suffering and frustrated, is obsessed with being recognized by others, and for this reason created the Chunqiu. While these observations could be interpreted to mean that the Lunyu comes from an earlier period, Kern suggests that it was the very nature of the text as an imperial primer for the education of the crown prince (and others at court) that shaped its ideological outlook, including the absence of any mention of the Chunqiu as a text critical of failed rulership. <>

Confucius Beyond the Analects by Michael Hunter [Studies in the History of Chinese Texts, Brill, 9789004336926]

In Confucius Beyond the Analects, Michael Hunter challenges the standard view of the Analects as the earliest and most authoritative source of the teachings of Confucius. Arguing from a comprehensive survey of the thousands of extant sayings and stories from the early period, Hunter situates the compilation and rise of the Analects in the Western Han period (206 BCE–9 CE), roughly three centuries after the death of Confucius. As a study of the growth and development of the Confucius figure over the course of the early period, the book is also meant to serve as a roadmap for those interested in exploring the wealth and diversity of Confucius material beyond the Analects.

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Excerpt: Some years ago when I was first developing an interest in early Chinese thought, the obvious first step was to learn something about Kongzi, (Confucius; traditionally 551–479 BCE). My first purchase was D.C. Lau’s 1979 Penguin Classics translation of the Lunyu (Analects), followed by Wing-tsit Chan’s 1963 A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Both books taught me a great deal: that Kongzi lived from the mid-sixth through the early fifth century BCE; that he was from the state of Lu, one of the smaller Warring States (Zhanguo) struggling to defend itself against powerful neighbors; that, try as he might, Kongzi failed to find employment as an adviser to a lord; and that he taught a number of students who
transmitted his teachings to later generations. I learned a number of things about Kongzi’s “philosophy,” including his “humanism” (Chan), his interest in the cultivation of character, his emphasis on the proper conduct of ritual (li 禮), and his influence on the development of the Chinese intellectual tradition. Perhaps most importantly, I also learned how to go about studying Kongzi: begin with the Lunyu, “the most reliable source of Confucius’ teachings.”

I took that advice to heart. While living in Beijing and beginning my studies of the classical language, the Lunyu was the first classical text I read in the original. That decision served me well when I entered graduate school at Princeton University and was asked to read the Lunyu as part of the first assignment of my first graduate seminar. My sense of the Lunyu’s special status was only reinforced as I familiarized myself with the secondary literature in early China studies, which often featured the Lunyu toward the beginning of a study as the earliest or most foundational example of a given topic. Now as a teacher of early Chinese thought and the classical language, I find myself instinctively perpetuating the grand tradition of Lunyu-centric pedagogy. As I have learned, the Lunyu readily lends itself to that purpose.

By any definition of the term, the Lunyu is a true classic: as the preeminent source of the teachings of the most influential figure in the East Asian tradition, as a cornerstone of traditional Chinese pedagogy for the last two thousand years, as a foundational text within the modern study of the classical period, and as a work that continues to mediate individuals’ experience of traditional China. Notwithstanding the Lunyu’s importance in the later tradition and in the modern era, the main argument of this book is that evidence of its special status, and even its existence, prior to a certain point in the Western Han period (202 BCE–9 CE) is flimsy at best. Consequently, students and scholars alike are ill-served by the Lunyu-centric approach to Kongzi and early China studies in general. This argument is in service of an even larger project toward which this study is but a preliminary step: retelling the story of early Chinese thought with the Kongzi of the Lunyu playing a supporting, as opposed to a starring, role.

The Kongzi of the Lunyu
At its core, this book is about the relationship between two different Kongzis: the Kongzi of the Lunyu and the wider “Kongzi” phenomenon.

The first Kongzi is the figure who emerges from the hodgepodge of sayings, dialogues, anecdotes, and other miscellanea called the Lunyu, a text in twenty chapters split into five hundred or so entries with a grand total of approximately sixteen thousand Chinese characters. The most common entry is a stand-alone saying prefaced with zi yue 子曰 (the Master said), as in the very first entry of chapter 1:

The Master said, “To learn and then to practice it in a timely fashion—is this not a pleasure? To have a friend come from afar—is this not a joy? To not be resentful when unrecognized by others—is this not [indicative of] a noble man?”

The first authority explicitly named in the Lunyu is a certain Master You, or Youzi, in the second entry of the first chapter, followed in the very next entry by Zengzi Not until 2/19 (i.e., the nineteenth entry of chapter 2) do we find the name of the figure traditionally identified as the Master of the Lunyu: Kongzi.

The Lunyu’s content is perhaps best described as “didactic.” As a compilation of discrete pieces of quotable wisdom, it is not unlike collections of proverbs and instructions known from the ancient Near East and Mediterranean contexts. In it we find statements on many of the core concepts and values of the Chinese intellectual tradition, including ren T (humaneness), yi 義 (propriety), and li 禮 (ritual). Some entries deal with these ideas in an abstract manner, whereas others apply them to particular individuals or situations. Often they are presented as advice to Kongzi’s dizi (students, followers) or other contemporaries. The text also includes a number of third-person descriptions of the Master, for example, in Lunyu 10. The penultimate chapter consists entirely of sayings...
attributed to Kongzi’s dizi. Whether or not all the discrete statements in the Lunyu add up to a coherent philosophy or worldview is debatable. Adjectives like “heterogeneous,” “unsystematic,” and “miscellaneous” are not uncommon in modern scholars’ descriptions of the text.

It is often said that the Lunyu “purports” to be a record of Kongzi’s teachings. In fact, the Lunyu never describes itself as anything at all—that is precisely the problem. Although it refers to a number of figures who, like Kongzi, lived in the sixth and early fifth centuries BCE, such references are too common in sources from the pre- and early imperial periods to serve as reliable markers of historical authenticity. The title Lunyu, which appears nowhere within the text itself, also raises as many questions as it answers. Yu d means “talk” or “sayings,” the quoted material that makes up the bulk of the text; lun labels these sayings as having been “ordered” or “selected.” But aside from highlighting the work of the Lunyu’s compilers, the title tells us nothing about their identity or goals. Lunyu studies is the subfield devoted to compensating for the Lunyu compilers’ dogged unwillingness to explain where their text came from and how it should be read.

Whence the Lunyu?
A comprehensive survey of the long and storied history of Lunyu studies from the first century BCE to the present day is beyond the scope of the present book. But within that tradition it is possible to discern three basic approaches to the question of the Lunyu’s origins, beginning with that of Liu Xiang (79–8 BCE), the official charged by Emperor Cheng (r. 33–7 BCE) in 26 BCE with organizing the imperial archives. According to a fragment from Liu Xiang’s lost Bie lu (Separate Listings):

All twenty sections of the Lunyu of Lu are fine sayings recorded by Kongzi’s students. The expanded account in the “Yiwen zhi”（藝文志）Record of Arts and Letters) bibliography, the thirtieth chapter of Ban Gu’s (32–92 CE) Hanshu i shu（History of the [Former] Han), drew from Liu Xiang’s earlier work while filling in a few more details:

The Lunyu consists of Kongzi’s responses to his students and contemporaries as well as conversations among his students and the talk they themselves heard from the Master. At that time, each student had his own records. After the Master died, his followers gathered [those records] together and arranged and edited [the collection], thus calling it the “Lunyu.”

Here the emphasis on spoken language is significant given the perception of Kongzi as the author of the Chunqiu（春秋）Annals), a chronicle of Spring and Autumn era (722–479 BCE) history that, unlike the Lunyu, was ranked among the Five Classics. Extracting Kongzi’s wisdom from the Chunqiu entailed a convoluted hermeneutics to decode Kongzi’s judgments from the weiyan（微言）subtle wording) of the text; nowhere does the Chunqiu quote Kongzi directly. At least when dealing with the quotable Kongzi, the Han bibliographers tell us, the Lunyu is a reliable source of Kongzi’s teachings because it was compiled by the people who knew him best.

Extant sources do not tell us how Liu Xiang came to think of the Lunyu as a record compiled by Kongzi’s dizi. Was that theory based on a reading of the Lunyu itself? If so, which passages? Did early bibliographers have access to a tradition of Lunyu bibliography? If so, how was that tradition transmitted, and who were its keepers? Did their account reflect the popular perception of the text in their own time? Could Liu Xiang have made it up? It is difficult to say. In any event, Lunyu scholars in the ensuing centuries largely followed the course laid down by the bibliographers of the Han. For those like Zheng Xuan (127–200), Liu Zongyuan (773–819), and Zhu Xi (1130–1200) who worked within the traditional parameters, the goal of Lunyu studies was to refine the traditional view (for example, by determining which of Kongzi’s dizi were responsible for the text) without undermining its basic premises.
By the seventeenth century, however, a growing number of scholars had begun suggesting revisions to the traditional view because of its failure to account for one of the Lunyu’s most salient features—its internal disarray. Insofar as it represented the Lunyu as a composite, multiauthored text, the traditional view implicitly allowed for a certain degree of heterogeneity. For a new wave of critical Lunyu scholars, however, the text was simply too jumbled and inconsistent to have been put together at one moment in time by a single group of people devoted to preserving Kongzi’s teachings for posterity. These scholars’ core intuition, one that would form the basis of the modern scholarly consensus, was that such inconsistencies must have been the product of diachronic processes of textual formation. I shall refer to this view as the “accretion theory.” Ito Jinsai (1627–1705) was the first to argue that the “lower Lunyu” (xia lun) of Lunyu 11–20 was added to the “upper Lunyu” (shang lun) of Lunyu, a theory he based on the former’s different argumentative style, the relative length of its entries, and the inclusion of several numbered lists. Ito’s followers Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728) and Dazai Shundai (1680–1747) expanded upon that approach by attributing layers to particular dizi and supplementing Ito’s observations about the Lunyu’s internal inconsistencies. Arguing along parallel lines, Cui Shu (1740–1816) observed that Lunyu 16–20 was not only more eclectic in its style and content but also broke from the quotation pattern of Lunyu 1–15, preferring “Kongzi said” (Kongzi yue) to “the Master said” (zi yue). On this basis, he argued that chapters 16–20 were added to the text by “later people” (houren) whose connection to the historical Kongzi was tenuous. Cui Shu also identified a handful of “suspect” (ke yi) passages within Lunyu 1–15, thereby demonstrating the need to analyze the text on the level of the individual entry (zhang), not just the chapter.

Together, these scholars charted a new direction for critical Lunyu studies: cataloging the Lunyu’s inconsistencies, mapping those inconsistencies onto different layers, sorting those layers chronologically, and (when possible) identifying their authors, be they Kongzi’s first- or second-generation students, later keepers of the Kongzi tradition, or Cui Shu’s indeterminate “later people.” It was in the twentieth century that the accretion model received its fullest elaboration, beginning with Takeuchi Yoshio (1886–1966) in his 1939 Rongo no kenkyū (Lunyu Studies). One of Takeuchi’s innovations was his use of new sources of evidence to develop a model of the Lunyu’s formation, including the testimony of Wang Chong (27–100 CE) and intertextual parallels in texts like the Mengzi and Xunzi. Positioning that the various Lunyu editions referenced in Han era sources originally consisted of distinct proto-Lunyu collections, Takeuchi proposed a multistage redaction model in which two, originally distinct, proto-Lunyu collections curated by followers of Zengzi and Zigong were combined in the mid–Warring States period and then further expanded in the Han. Takeuchi was also the first to suggest that the received Lunyu was compiled in the Western Han period, pointing to King Xian of Hejian (r. 155–130/129), a known patron of scholars and collector of texts, as a key figure in the text’s history.22 (For my version of this scenario, see pp. 302–313.) Kimura Eiichi (1906–1981) further reinvigorated the accretionist approach through his painstaking analysis of the Lunyu’s internal (dis-)organization. Where Takeuchi took the chapter or book as the primary unit of accretion, Kimura demonstrated the importance of analyzing the Lunyu’s structure on the level of individual entries. On the basis of numerous “passage clusters” (shōgun 章群), Kimura developed a significantly more nuanced and complex picture of the Lunyu’s redaction history while continuing the time-honored tradition of ascribing layers to particular dizi or dizi lineages stretching back to the historical Kongzi himself. (Kimura’s model is discussed at greater length in chapter 4, pp. 231–244.)

Accretion theorists as a group deserve a great deal of credit for the critical spirit they brought to Lunyu studies and for their exhaustive analyses of the Lunyu itself. All too often, however, accretion theorists have proceeded under the assumption that the Lunyu, whatever its flaws, is still our best source of Kongzi’s teachings.23 What ultimately motivates
the identification of later accretions is the promise of a purer, more consistent, more “Original Analects” (to quote E. Bruce Brooks and Taeko Brooks). In this way, accretion theorists have generally reaffirmed the Lunyu’s privileged status without subjecting the traditional view to more thoroughgoing scrutiny.

This book is rooted in a third approach to the question of the Lunyu’s origins, one that takes its cue from the study of the Lunyu’s intertextuality. Where accretion theorists are preoccupied with resolving the incongruities and inconsistencies of the received Lunyu, in the work of scholars like Tsuda Sōkichi (1873–1961), Zhao Zhenxin, Kaneto Mamoru, Zhu Weizheng, and John Makeham, one finds an emphasis on a very different problem: if the Lunyu really is the text posited by the traditional view, then why do we encounter so few signs of the Lunyu’s influence in the pre-imperial textual record? In particular, why is there so little overlap between the Kongzi of the Lunyu and the Kongzi of the Mengzi and Xunzi, texts traditionally thought to have been composed by later followers of Kongzi? Why do intertextual parallels in pre-Han manuscript finds so often differ from the Lunyu with respect to their form, content, and attribution? And why do the first references to a named “Lunyu” text and the earliest Lunyu manuscripts date no earlier than the Western Han period? For this group of scholars, the puzzle resolves itself once certain traditional premises are abandoned: “the formation of Lunyu as a book” (to quote the title of Makeham’s article on the subject) likely occurred centuries after Kongzī’s death, perhaps toward the end of the Warring States period (Tsuda), the early part of the Western Han (Zhao, Zhu, Makeham), or even as late as the first century BCE (Kaneto). Disagreements aside, what distinguishes the approach of “revisionist” scholars is a willingness to question the privileged status of the Lunyu and the correspondingly underprivileged status of less canonical sources of Kongzī.

In and of itself, accepting a late date for the compilation of the received Lunyu need not entail a wholesale rejection of either the traditional view or of the accretion model. For instance, Takeuchi proposed that the received Lunyu was compiled in the Western Han period from three independently circulating Lunyu traditions—the Lu, Qi, and “ancient” versions—even as he imagined a multistage redaction history stretching back to Zengzī (the Lu Lunyu) and Zigong (the Qi Lunyu) in the first generation of Kongzī’s dizi. As for the “curious” lack of Lunyu quotations and references in pre-Han sources and the likelihood that the authors of the Mengzi, Xunzi, and other works drew from “quite different collection[s] of [Kongzī] sayings,” Arthur Waley had a perfectly reasonable rejoinder:

> It would be rash, however, to conclude that the Analects were not known or did not exist in the days of Mencius and Hsün Tzu. We possess only a very small fragment of early Confucian literature. Could we read all the works that are listed in the Han Shu (“Yiwen zhi”) bibliography, we should very likely discover that some particular school of Confucianism based its teaching on the Analects, just as Mencius based his on another collection of sayings.

In other words, given our limited knowledge of the early textual heritage, our default position should be to follow the Han bibliographers—who, it must be acknowledged, knew far more than we do about their texts—in treating the Lunyu as a pre-imperial source. Waley’s position deserves to be taken seriously. Our picture of the early textual record is woefully incomplete, so much so that we have no way of knowing how woefully incomplete it really is. Indeed, skepticism about the prospects of recovering the historical Kongzī or the origins of the Lunyu is a recurring theme in the writings of revisionist scholars, as it is in the present study. Not only do I doubt whether the historical Kongzī can be recovered from the sources available to us, but I also countenance the possibility that the historical Kong Qiu of Lu孔丘 might not have existed at all—or, more precisely, that our explanations for the rise of “Kongzī” as a quotable authority need not depend on the existence of a flesh-and-blood person of the same name. And if there is cause to doubt the traditional view of Kongzī and the Lunyu, then the same skepticism should also apply to Kongzī’s dizi and their presumed role in the
recording and transmission of Kongzi’s teachings. I am also dubious about the prospects of reconstructing the textual history of the received Lunyu, including answering the critical question of whether the text was the product of diachronic accretion or (following Tsuda) synchronic compilation.

The question before us is how we respond to skepticism regarding the Lunyu’s origins or (following Waley) the evidentiary basis of the revisionist view itself. Crucially, that question is not simply a matter of picking one period or timeline over another, as if one could settle the controversy with a few quick edits to the Lunyu’s Wikipedia page. Whether acknowledged or not, a significant amount of scholarship in the field of early China studies has been conducted under the assumption that the Lunyu’s antiquity and canonicity are settled facts. Insofar as scholars of early Chinese thought have read the Lunyu as the locus classicus of various terms and concepts, insofar as linguists have cited the Lunyu as an archaic source of Old Chinese, and insofar as philologists have dated other texts with reference to the Lunyu’s traditional chronology, the resulting histories and models and timelines have assumed the Lunyu-centric view of Kongzi. Consequently, the more critical question is not whether the Lunyu might or might not be a pre-Han text but whether enough evidence can be found to justify continuing to read the Lunyu as the most authoritative Kongzi text from the Warring States era and, thus, as a foundational work of pre-imperial Chinese thought.

This book answers that question in the negative. Both as a contribution to the revisionist tradition of Lunyu scholarship and as a reaction against the continuing influence of the traditional view, it aims to make the best possible case for the revisionist position by presenting (1) the external evidence (or lack thereof) of the Lunyu’s circulation and influence, (2) the early imperial context for the rise of the Lunyu as an authoritative source of Kongzi, (3) (following Tsuda) a critique of accretion models that extend the Lunyu’s redaction history back into the pre-Han era, and (4) a reading of the Lunyu as an early imperial collection compiled in response to earlier Kongzi texts and traditions. Finally, as a corrective to the tendency even within many revisionist studies to focus on the Lunyu to the exclusion of other sources of Kongzi, it is (5) an argument for reorienting Kongzi studies around the “Kongzi” phenomenon in its totality.

From Kongzi to “Kongzi”
To that end, the second “Kongzi” in this study is the figure referenced in thousands of passages scattered across more than a hundred different early sources, including transmitted texts and an ever-increasing number of manuscript finds. (For a visualization of the largest of these sources through the end of the Western Han, see figure 1; for a more complete list, see pp. 39–45.) From the Warring States through the end of the Han period (and beyond), authors invoked Kongzi in a multitude of sayings, dialogues, and anecdotes, and they also spilled many bronze tripods’ worth of ink recounting his virtues and vices. Sorting through the Lunyu’s five hundred or so entries to ask “Who was Kongzi really?” is one kind of challenge. Posing the same question to the entire corpus of early Kongzi material is akin to viewing a Cubist portrait through a kaleidoscope.

The sheer size and scope of the “Kongzi” phenomenon present any number of challenges, not the least of which is a loose prima facie objection to claims that a particular version of Kongzi is better or truer than any other. When one begins with the Kongzi of the Lunyu and moves on to other versions of Kongzi in piecemeal fashion, maintaining one’s belief in the specialness of the Lunyu is not especially difficult. But begin with the “Kongzi” phenomenon in its totality, and the view from the Lunyu or any other single source seems parochial. Even a cursory glance at figure 1 undermines the notion that “Kongzi” was the purview of a single group of dizi, a multigenerational “school” (jia 家) devoted to preserving Kongzi’s memory, or even the Ru 儒, those ill-defined experts in ritual and canonical learning often referred to as “Confucians.” If anything, figure 1 visualizes the problem that might have motivated the traditional view of the Lunyu in the first place: how to separate the important or trustworthy material—the “good sayings” (shan yan 善言), to quote Liu Xiang—from the rest.
As it happens, a version of this objection was articulated perhaps as early as the third century BCE:

Those who show off their learning nowadays are the Ru and Mohists. The Ru venerate Kong Qiu [Kongzi], the Mohists venerate Mo Di [Mozi]. Since the death of Kongzi there have been the Ru of Zizhang, the Ru of Zisi, the Ru of the Yan clan, the Ru of the Meng clan, the Ru of the Qidiang clan, the Ru of the Zhongliang clan, the Ru of the Sun clan, and the Ru of the Yuezheng clan. Since the death of Mozi there have been the Mohists of the Xiangli clan, the Mohists of the Xiangfu clan, and the Mohists of the Dengling clan. Thus, after Kongzi and Mozi the Ru split into eight factions and the Mohists into three. What each faction includes or excludes contradicts the others. Nevertheless, they all refer to themselves as the true Kongzi or Mozi. Kongzi and Mozi cannot be resurrected, so who is to settle [the question] of learning nowadays?

世之顯學,儒、墨也。儒之所至,孔丘也。墨之所至,墨翟也。自孔子之死也,有子張之儒,有子思之儒,有顏氏之儒,有孟氏之儒,有漆雕氏之儒,有仲良氏之儒,有孫氏之儒,有樂正氏之儒。自墨子之死也,有相里氏之墨,有相夫氏之墨,有於陵氏之墨。故孔、墨之後,儒分為八,墨離為三,取舍相反、不同,而皆自謂真孔墨。孔墨不可復生,將誰使定世之學乎?

This quotation from the Han Feizi 韓非子 describes a milieu in which people, not texts, are the primary keepers of a teacher’s memory. The question posed here is not which record is most reliable but who among the many claimants to Kongzi’s mantle was entitled to “refer to himself as the true Kongzi.”

Although its polemical thrust cautions against taking it as an objective description of late Warring States factionalism, the Han Feizi’s challenge to those who would claim knowledge of Kongzi’s original teachings still stands: in light of the multiplicity of Kongzi-related sources, how do we determine which accounts of his life and thought, if any, are the good ones?

Herein lies what I shall refer to as “the Kongzi problem,” a label inspired by Western classicists’ struggle with a roughly contemporaneous figure of comparable stature—Socrates (ca. 469–399 BCE). From an early China scholar’s point of view, the sources of Socrates’s life and thought are an embarrassment of riches. Socrates’s existence is corroborated by one contemporary source, Aristophanes’s (ca. 446–386 BCE) Clouds, as well as a number of Socratic dialogues written in the decades immediately following his death in 399 BCE. Although Plato’s (420s–348/347 BCE) are the most well known of these texts, other associates of Socrates who participated in the genre include Aeschines of Sphekts (430/420—after 376/375 BCE; seven dialogues, all lost), Phaedo of Elis (b. 418/416 BCE; two dialogues, both lost), Euclides of Megara (450/435—ca. 365; six dialogues, all lost), Antisthenes (ca. 445—ca. 365; a number of dialogues, all lost), and Xenophon (430–354), whose Symposium, Memorabilia, Oeconomicus, and Apology are extant. Most extant sources also agree on a handful of basic biographical details, including when Socrates lived, the circumstances of his death, and his unattractive appearance. Excavators of the Athenian agora in the 1950s even claimed to have confirmed a detail from Xenophon’s account of Socrates in the Memorabilia and from Diogenes Laertios’s (third century CE?) Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers after discovering a cup engraved with the name “Simon” at the site of a leatherworking shop. They speculated that this person was the same Simon said to have owned a leather shop frequented by Socrates, and who reportedly made notes of their conversations. Even if (as seems likely) their speculation was unfounded, the mere possibility of establishing a material connection with the historical Socrates, however tenuous, illustrates the advantageous position of Socrates studies relative to Kongzi studies.

Nevertheless, the many contradictions among extant sources of Socrates, even within the Platonic corpus, coupled with the ongoing controversy over which of these sources can be trusted, eventually engendered a Han Feizi–like skepticism regarding the prospects of recovering the historical Socrates. An increasing number of scholars have gone one
step further to argue that the Socratic problem rests on a false premise. In the words of Louis-André Dorion:

Since [the works of Plato, Xenophon, et al.] are literary works in which the author can give his imagination free rein, while remaining within the plausible bounds of a credible representation of Socrates’ éthos, the degree of fiction and invention inherent in logoi sokratikoi [Socratic discourses] means they cannot be considered as accounts written for their historical accuracy. This does not mean, of course, that the logoi sokra­tikoi contain no single authentic trait or accurate detail; but as the historical concern of logoi sokratikoi is only incidental, and since we do not have at our disposal the criteria that would allow us to separate invention from authenticity, it would certainly be more prudent to renounce any hope of finding the “true” Socrates in these writings.

Dorion’s and others’ willingness to acknowledge the intractability of the “Socratic problem,” despite Socrates’s exalted status in the Western tradition and the (relative) wealth of nearly contemporaneous sources, is inspiring, as is their pursuit of other approaches to the study of the logoi sokratikoi, approaches that do not hinge on claims about the historical Socrates. My survey of the “Kongzi” phenomenon in part I (“Beyond the Analects”) is offered in the same spirit.

A second major challenge posed by the shift in focus from Kongzi to “Kongzi” is conceptual. Thus far I have cravenly resorted to referring to “Kongzi” in quotation marks not as a person but as a vague “phenomenon.” But what does this “Kongzi” refer to? On the most concrete (and trivial) level, “Kongzi” (or the alternate names “Zhongni”, “Kong Qiu”, etc.) is the common denominator in thousands of passages across dozens of early texts. Taken together, these passages are the product of—what exactly? His followers’ desire to record and preserve the memory of a beloved teacher? The literary representation of a sagely exemplar? The symbolic projection of early attitudes about “learning” (xue), “ritual” (li 礼), and other ideas typically associated with Kongzi? Countless acts of veneration of a cherished ancestor figure? The appropriation of an ancient authority to sanction new texts and arguments? Some or all (or none) of the above?

There is little reason to suppose that early authors and their audiences would have answered the “Who is Kongzi?” or “What is ‘Kongzi’?” question in the same way. On the evidence of texts like the Mengzi (see, e.g., pp. 222–223), defenders of Kongzi’s legacy claimed that their “Kongzi” was the one, true, historical Kongzi. Insofar as the true Kongzi was defined in opposition to the false, those same defenders also accused others of maliciously inventing sayings and stories, in the course of which they acknowledged other “Kongzi”-related motivations. The authors of the Huainanzi and the “Yu yan” (Imputed Words) chapter of the Zhuangzi famously observed that attributing a new text to an ancient authority like Kongzi was a winning rhetorical strategy. Writing from a much later perspective, the author of the following Kong congzi (Kong Family Masters Anthology) dialogue offered a rather nuanced take on “Kongzi”:

Duke Mu said to Zisi, “There are those who suspect that the Master’s sayings recorded in your writings are actually your own words.” Zisi replied, “Among the sayings of my grandfather recorded in my writings are some which I have personally heard and some which I have learned from others. So even though my writings consist of words which are not precisely the Master’s, they do not fall short of the Master’s ideas. What is it that you doubt?”

The duke said, “The content [of your writings] is faultless.” Zisi said, “It has no errors because it consists of my forefather’s ideas. But let us suppose that what you just said is correct and that they are my own words. As my words are faultless, they would still be worthy of honor. But since it is not the case [that Kongzi’s words are really my own], why doubt it?”

穆公謂子思曰:子之書所記夫子之言，或者以謂子之辭。子思曰:臣所記臣祖之言，或親聞之者，有聞之於人者。雖非其正辭，然徵不失其意焉。且君之所疑者何?公曰，於事無非。子思曰:無非所以得臣祖之意也。就如君言以為
臣之辭，臣之辭無非，則亦所宜貴矣。事既不然，又何疑焉？

Zisi’s coy hypothetical (“let us suppose that what you just said is correct . . .”) and his outright admission that some of his sayings “are not precisely the Master’s” hint that at least some audiences knew better than to expect simplistically true-or-false accounts of Kongzi.

In some respects, it may be useful to think of “Kongzi” as a kind of genre or discursive space, a set of formal and thematic parameters within which early authors articulated their own ideas and pursued their own agendas. The great appeal of a genre-based approach lies in emphasizing the creativity and dynamism of the “Kongzi” phenomenon, without which it is difficult to make sense of the vast textual output diagrammed in figure 1.

Figure 1 Major sources of Kongzi through the end of the Western Han period (plus the Kongzi jiaoyu and Kong congzi).

On the other hand, there are various ways in which “Kongzi” frustrates a genre study. Insofar as the corpus of Kongzi material is an amalgam of different formats, including gnomical sayings, extended monologues, dialogues, anecdotes, etc., following Bakhtin we might understand “Kongzi” as a “secondary” or “complex” speech genre. Even then, the fluidity or instability of these formats, and even of the Kongzi yue marker itself, would seem to undermine the internal coherence of a “Kongzi” genre. When a Kongzi saying in one text appears in another without a Kongzi yue 孔子曰 (Kongzi said) marker, or when a Kongzi-centric anecdote appears elsewhere with a different protagonist and setting, the implication is that these passages’
“Kongzi”-ness was extrinsic. Drop the quotation marker from most Shi 詩 (Odes) and Shu 書 (Documents) quotations and their genre is more or less self-evident. Do the same with Kongzi yue and those utterances often become indistinguishable from generic didactic discourse.

Speaking in the most general terms, “Kongzi” would seem to lend itself to two basic approaches. On the one hand, it is possible to conceptualize “Kongzi” as an object in the early Chinese imagination. This is a figure whose physical and psychological characteristics could be described, whose virtues could be enumerated, whose life could be narrated in a biography—in short, the sum of all possible answers to the question “Who is Kongzi?” However, early sources also preserve a wealth of passages in which an author used Kongzi without saying anything about him. The common denominator in this material is not “Kongzi the teacher” or “Kongzi the sage” or “Kongzi the man of Lu.” It is simply the Kongzi of Kongzi yue 孔子曰 (Kongzi said), a marker whose presence signified something about the text to which it was attached. This “Kongzi” is the answer not to a “who” but to a “what” or a “how” question: what did early authors mean to communicate when they attributed something to Kongzi, and how did these attributions affect the reception of the attributed texts? I take up such questions in chapter 2.

Which came first, Kongzi the man or Kongzi the voice? The sketchiness and uncertain chronology of our sources, especially those traditionally dated to the early to mid–Warring States period, preclude a definitive answer to that question. It stands to reason that the first person who quoted Kongzi, like his audience, had a sense of who Kongzi was. However, the fact that so many Kongzi passages neither offer nor assume a sense of Kongzi the man indicates that the “who” of Kongzi was not necessarily integral to the “Kongzi” phenomenon in general. As I argue in chapter 2, representations of Kongzi as a man can often be understood as biographical projections of the function of Kongzi yue within early Chinese textual culture. In other words, Kongzi in many texts is the figure he had to be in order to legitimate and rationalize Kongzi yue discourse.

The third and most formidable obstacle to studying “Kongzi” is practical. When understood as artifacts of a shared discursive practice governed by a loose and evolving set of conventions, all Kongzi texts are on an equal footing such that there is no a priori reason to read some sayings or stories before others. From the curated Kongzi of the Lunyu we might turn to Sun Xingyan’s (1753–1818) Kongzi jiyu (Collected Sayings of Kongzi), a more or less comprehensive compilation of all Kongzi sayings, dialogues, anecdotes, and testimonia preserved outside the Lunyu and several other canonical sources. Totaling 106,000 characters in eight hundred or so entries with a median length of 78 characters, Sun’s original version of the Kongzi jiyu is more than six times the size of the Lunyu. A modern edition of the text, the 614-page Kongzi jiyu jiaobu (Collected Sayings of Kongzi, Collated and Supplemented), adds another five hundred passages culled from several important sources omitted by Sun (including the biographies of Kongzi and his dizi in the Shÿi [Grand Scribe’s Records], totaling 12,700 characters) in addition to a handful of manuscript finds. But even this edition omits material from two of the largest Kongzi collections: the Kongzi jiayu (Sayings of the House of Kongzi; 57,000+ characters) and the Kong congzi (Kong Family Masters Anthology; 35,000+ characters).

A related issue is accessibility. The Lunyu has been translated dozens of times into numerous languages, including at least fifteen times into English within the last century and a half. It is also one of a handful of texts routinely assigned in introductory courses on traditional Chinese thought, history, religion, and culture in universities around the world. In contrast, the Kongzi jiyu has been translated into Mandarin but no other modern languages. It is also a terrifically unwieldy introduction to “Kongzi” insofar as it assumes the reader’s familiarity with the roughly 130 sources it draws from, including numerous textual fragments known only from later collectanea. How does one go about reading such a volume of material? How do we sort it? And if not with the Lunyu, where do we even begin reading?
New technologies offer one solution. The present study is the result of a fortuitous convergence between the critical reevaluation of the received textual record prompted by recent manuscript finds, on the one hand, and the availability of digitized texts and computer database technology, on the other. Insofar as these tools have facilitated the research outlined above, this introduction would be incomplete without an acknowledgment of the promise and pitfalls of engaging “Kongzi” primarily through digital media.

From Kongzi Canon to “Kongzi” Database

The first challenge a study of early Kongzi material must overcome is securing a corpus that is maximally reliable and comprehensive. The most convenient solution is to rely on a preexisting collection like the Kongzi jiyu or the Kongzi— Zhou Qin Han Jin wenxianji (Kongzi—Collected Literature from the Zhou, Qin, Han, and Jin; hereafter Kongzi wenxianji) edited by Jiang Yihua 姜義華, Zhang Ronghua, and Wu Genliang (1990). However, neither collection is an ideal reflection of early writings about Kongzi. Not only do they exclude the most recent manuscript finds, but they also omit material with close parallels in canonical sources like the Lunyu. Both compilations are also overly inclusive in certain respects. For example, the Kongzi wenxianji reproduces the entirety of the Chunqiu and certain parts of the Zhouyi (Zhou Changes) that are traditionally ascribed to Kongzi even though the texts themselves contain few, if any, references to him. The organization of these compilations is another issue. The Kongzi jiyu muddies the picture somewhat by presenting Kongzi material thematically instead of chronologically, thus jumbling pre-Han, Han, and post-Han versions of “Kongzi.” Perhaps their biggest drawback is that they extract Kongzi-related passages from their original sources, thereby abetting the temptation to read “Kongzi” in isolation.

Some of these problems can be avoided or at least minimized by building one’s own corpus of Kongzi material using a database of digitized texts. At the initial stages of this research project, I first conducted a search for “Kongzi” and related names, including “Zhongni”, “Kong Qiu”, fuzi (the Master), and “Ni fu” (Father Ni), across all the sources in my database. Next, I tagged these passages according to whether they included Kongzi attributions (typically marked by yue q) or simply referred to Kongzi without quoting him. I then checked my corpus against the Kongzi jiyu jiaobu and Kongzi wenxianji looking for passages that my automated searches might have overlooked. At a later stage, I also conducted searches for citations of the most common sources of Kongzi material, especially the Lunyu, Xiaojing (Classic of Filial Piety), and Chunqiu traditions. But rather than extract these passages and compile them together into a single master text like the Kongzi jiyu, I saved my corpus as metadata, as a layer of information grafted onto the primary sources themselves to facilitate the identification and analysis of Kongzi material in situ. The “Kongzi” who emerges from this corpus is not simply the sum of all discrete statements about or attributed to him, as he is in the Kongzi jiyu and Kongzi wenxianji. He (it?) is a voice and a symbol woven inextricably into the fabric of the early tradition.

However, in the course of compiling this corpus I found myself having to make a series of subjective decisions about what counted as an “early” “Kongzi” “passage.” The most daunting challenges have to do with chronology. For the sake of convenience, I define “early” as “prior to the abdication of the last Eastern Han (25–220 CE) emperor on December 11, 220 CE,” the event that marks the end of the “early” period within the standard periodization scheme. In practice, however, it is difficult if not impossible to ascertain the precise date of a given source. Consider the case of the Kongzi jiyu, the received version of which was edited in the third century CE by Wang Su (195–256). Whereas the editors of the Kongzi wenxianji treat the Kongzi jiyu as a post-Han text, I have included it within my corpus on the grounds that it includes a large amount of material from earlier sources.

Fragments of otherwise lost texts are similarly problematic. When the late tenth-century Taiping yulan Imperial Survey of the Taiping Era) encyclopedia attributes an otherwise unknown
dialogue between Kongzi and his dizi Zigong to the Shizi, how can we be sure that the fragment represents a genuinely early Kongzi tradition? In other instances, it is difficult to discount the possibility that a Kongzi attribution or Lunyu quotation was interpolated into an earlier source. When in doubt, I have tended to err on the side of inclusiveness. However, given the many uncertainties surrounding the dating of early texts irrespective of their relationship to Kongzi, there would seem to be no solution to the chronology problem beyond acknowledging its existence and taking care to avoid unnecessarily bold conclusions based on unverifiable timelines.

Determining what counts as a “Kongzi” attribution is only somewhat less problematic. Consider the case of “Zi yi” (Black Robes), whose received version in the Liji (Ritual Records) and two Warring States manuscript versions in the Guodian and Shanghai Museum corpora do not identify the “master” (zi) whose sayings structure the text. Similarly, not one of the thirty zi yue sayings in the Zhouyi includes information tying that master to Kongzi or to anyone else. Junzi yue (the noble man says) and shengren yue (the sage says / the sages say) attributions in a number of texts were sometimes understood by Han commentators as implicit Kongzi attributions—should a comprehensive corpus of Kongzi sayings include this material as well? The absence of standardized quotation marks. Although a computer database can automate the search for explicitly or predictably marked Kongzi material, ultimately there is no substitute for a careful reading of the sources themselves. Recent manuscript finds only compound these challenges because of the many uncertainties surrounding the reconstruction and dating of excavated and looted corpora. Not only have I had to add to my corpus as new Kongzi-related manuscripts have become available, but also the digital editions of the manuscripts in my database are, at best, extremely tentative representations that must be constantly updated as better transcriptions become available.

In short, my “corpus of early Kongzi material” is a rickety construction built atop numerous assumptions and educated guesses. More often than not, deciding whether a given passage belongs in the corpus is relatively unproblematic. However, the gray areas are extensive enough to raise doubts about the value of the exercise. Be that as it may, the undertaking is worthwhile insofar as it teaches a basic truth that is not so easily gleaned from the Lunyu or any other single source: “Kongzi” is a construct, not a given. And if this is true of the fraction of early Kongzi material that happens to have survived to the present day, then there is reason to think that the problems of determining what counted as “Kongzi” material, which sayings and stories were earlier or later, and which deserved to be remembered and requoted also bedeviled the earliest compilers of this material.

Building such a corpus is not simply a necessary first step in the study of the “Kongzi” phenomenon. It is also an initiation into the time-honored practice of selecting one’s very own Kongzi.

Reading “Kongzi” in Context
Transforming “Kongzi” into a digital object does nothing to reduce its sprawling miscellaneousness. However, it does facilitate the analysis of its intertextuality, a crucial component both of the revisionist critique and of my own discussion of the dynamics of the “Kongzi” phenomenon.

To take a concrete example, consider the first ten characters of Lunyu 7/1, arguably the most famous saying in the text:
The Master said, “[I] transmit without originating and trust in and love the ancient.”

4. Ban Gu’s 班固 (32–92) Hanshu, “Li yue zhi” (Record of Ritual and Music) (22.1071): Restoring the old culture, doing away with [the melodies of] Zheng and drawing close to the elegant, transmitting without originating, trusting in and loving the ancient. 修起舊文，放鄭近雅，述而不作，信而好古。

5. Hanshu, “Rulin liezhuan” (Biographies of the Forest of Ru) (88.3589) And so [Kongzi] said, “Transmitting without originating, trusting in and loving the ancient.”

6. Hou Hanshu, a memorial by Xu Fang submitted ca. 103 CE (44.1500–1501): Kongzi said, “Transmit without originating.”

7. Zhao Qi’s 趙岐 (d. 201 CE) Mengzi commentary (7/1a) Thus, one must rely on a square or compass to make something straight or round, like the Lunyu’s “transmitting without originating, trusting in and loving the ancient.” 然必須規矩，乃成方圓，猶論語述而不作，信而好古。

Judging from the Mozi, Xunzi, and Huainanzi examples with zuo 作 (originating), so ideally our search would identify any and all passages that juxtapose these two characters (or their semantic, graphic, or phonetic variants) in any order. Using a “regular expressions”–enabled search utility, we can do just that:

[述循術順].{0,6} 作 | 作.{0,6}[述循術順]

Translated into plain English, the search string reads:

Search for passages in which shu 述 (or the variants xun 循, shu 術, or shun 順) is followed within six spaces by zuo 作, or in which zuo 作 is followed within six spaces by shu 述 (or the variants xun 循, shu 術, or shun 順).

This particular search yields several additional hits, including:


10. Xunzi 22, “Zheng ming” 正名 (16/3b): If a true king were to arise, he would certainly follow the old names in some instances and originate new names in others.若有王者起, 必將有循於舊名, 有作於新名。

11. Huainanzi 13, “Fan lun” 汎論 (13/5b): A great man originates and a follower follows. 大人作而弟子循。

12. Shiji 130.32gg–3300 What I refer to as “transmitting” past events and arranging the related traditions is not “originating.” For you to compare it to the Annals is a mistake.余所謂述故事, 整齊其世傳, 非所謂作也, 而君比之於春秋, 謬矣。

13. “Yue ji” 樂記 (11/9a): Thus, those who know the nature of ritual and music can originate; those who recognize the patterns of ritual and music can transmit. Originators are called sagely; transmitters are called enlightened. Being enlightened or sagely refers to transmitting or originating. 故知禮樂之情者能作, 識禮樂之文者能述。作者之謂聖, 述者之謂明。明聖者, 述作之謂也。

14. “Zhong yong” 中庸 (16/5a): The Master said, “... A father originates, a son transmits.” 子曰:... 父作之, 子述之。

15. Yantie lun 10, “Ci fu” 刺復 (2/10b): The Man of Letters and Learning said: “Holding up the square and compass to know what is appropriate, blowing the pitch pipes to know when something is out of tune—this is best. Following without originating and awaiting others—this is the next best.”文學曰:... 乃將規矩而知宜, 吹律而知變, 上也; 因循而不作, 以俟其人, 次也。

16. Hanshu 97.3980, “Walqi liezhuan” 戶戚列傳: The Way of the noble man is to
delight in following and to treat reform and originating as weighty affairs.

君子之道，樂因循而重改作。

17. Lunheng 84, “Duì zuò” 對作
(29/8b): Some say, “Sages originate and superior men transmit. It is wrong for a [merely] superior man to originate something. The Balanced Discourses and Government Affairs can be called ‘original works.’” In reply I say, “They are neither ‘original works’ nor transmissions. They are ‘discussions.’”

或曰：聖人作，賢者述，以賢而作者，非也。論衡政務，可謂作者。曰：非作也，亦非述也，論也。

In our initial search, five out of seven hits explicitly or implicitly associated shu er bu zuo with Kongzi or the Lunyu, all five of which date to the Han period. In the second set of results, the only parallel attributed to Kongzi is a significant variant in the Liji (13). Judging from the Mozi, Xunzi, and Huainanzi examples (8–11) and also the Shi ji parallel (1) from the first search, authors through the late Western Han seem to have used the “transmit/originate” dichotomy without any reference to Kongzi or to the second half of Lunyu 7/1 (“trust in and love the ancient”), a sign that Kongzi’s ownership of the saying was not fixed until the latter part of the Western Han period at the earliest.

The insight that an iconic text like the Lunyu is really a “tissue of quotations” (to quote Roland Barthes) is by no means unobtainable using conventional print media. However, digital texts and database tools do make such insights more accessible, just as they minimize the need to privilege the Lunyu or another Kongzi canon. If the cost of this approach is that the Kongzi of the Lunyu loses his grip over our experience of the early Chinese textual heritage, then at least he is in good company:

“To be, or not to be. That is the question.”
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE (1604)
Ralph Lever (1573): “to be or not to bée”
Dudley Fenner (1584): “to bee or not to be”
Thomas Bilson (1585): “That is the question”
Abraham Fraunce (1588): “to bée, or not to bée”
William Perkins (1596): “to be or not to be”
John Deacon (1601): “to be, or not to be”
Robert Rollock (1603): “to be or not to be”
Henoch Clapham (1604): “to be or not to be”

In light of Lunyu 7/1, the observation that the Master, like the Bard, might have “transmitted” more than he “originated” should perhaps come as no surprise.

The Argument
This book is a study in two parts. Part 1 (“Beyond the Analects”) is an overview of the early “Kongzi” phenomenon in the aggregate and an exploration of the function of Kongzi yue in the micro. This analysis of “Kongzi” contextualizes the arguments of Part 2 (“The Analects in Context”) regarding the emergence of the Lunyu in the early imperial period, the evidence (or lack thereof) for the Lunyu’s circulation in the pre-imperial period, and how to read the text against the wider “Kongzi” phenomenon. At every step, my aim is to undermine the Lunyu-centric approach to Kongzi while also demonstrating the value of subordinating Lunyu studies to the study of “Kongzi” in general.

Chapter 1, “The Big Picture,” is a record of my attempt to map the “Kongzi” phenomenon in general. After surveying extant sources of Kongzi in the first section, I then discuss those features which defined “Kongzi” across time and space, including the genres of Kongzi material, the use of dizi and other interlocutors, and the “where” of Kongzi. In a final section on the provenance of early Kongzi material, I outline in broad strokes the emergence of the Lunyu in the Western Han period. Throughout the chapter, I emphasize two aspects of the “Kongzi” phenomenon, the first of which is its universality. In contrast to the traditional understanding of Kongzi as a man from a particular locale (Lu 魯) whose legacy was managed by a particular group of people (his dizi) or ideology (that of the Ru 儒), I argue that “Kongzi” was primarily universal or cosmopolitan in its orientation, even within sources like the Zuozhuan 左傳 (Zuo Traditions) traditionally associated with the state of Lu. That orientation derives from a
second distinctive feature of “Kongzi” relative to other quotable authorities in the period: its use as a source of comments and commentaries on other texts and traditions. “Kongzi” was the name given to the voice which mediated canonical traditions, stories, legends, famous personages, and other cultural artifacts for consumption by the cosmopolitan elites of the Warring States period.

Chapter 2, “A Dozen Perspectives on ‘Confucius’ beyond the Analects,” complements the macro-observations of chapter 1 through a series of micro–case studies, most of which explore Kongzi’s role as a universal commentator. In the course of the chapter, I argue that the diversity of early Kongzi material is, to a large extent, a function of the range of texts and traditions for which Kongzi’s voice was invoked, with different kinds of materials posing different interpretive challenges. Against this backdrop, representations of Kongzi as an individual with his own personality, talents, and history can be understood as projections of the virtues and values implicit in Kongzi yue comments and commentaries.

Chapter 3, “The Analects Ascendant, ca. 100 BCE–220 CE,” brings the focus back to the Lunyu to explore the circumstances of its emergence in the Western Han period. As a complement to the big-picture perspective of chapter 1, it presents a series of more focused surveys which point to the reign of Emperor Wu (r. 141–87 BCE) as the period within which a Lunyu text first emerged. In the second half of the chapter, I survey manifestations of the Lunyu’s authority in various Han era sources, including imperial edicts, memorials, histories, commentaries, and treatises.

Chapter 4, “Searching for a Pre-Han Analects,” opens with a straightforward question: what evidence, if any, can be adduced for the influence, circulation, or existence of a Lunyu text prior to Emperor Wu’s reign? After surveying the external evidence of Lunyu parallels in the relevant pre-Han sources, I turn to the internal evidence of Lunyu chronology as presented by proponents of the accretion model, according to which the Lunyu evolved into its present form over the course of centuries. As both approaches fail to yield reliable evidence of the Lunyu’s pre-Han origins, the chapter concludes with a qualified endorsement of the Lunyu as “a Western Han text.”

Chapter 5, “Reading the Analects in Context,” reads the Lunyu as the product of a Western Han political, intellectual, and textual milieu. Through a series of analyses of Lunyu passages with intertextual parallels in earlier or contemporaneous sources, I argue that the Lunyu is most profitably read as a post-“Kongzi” text that offered an independently quotable version of Kongzi for use by early imperial elites. Certain parallels between the Lunyu and Western Han recruitment edicts further suggest that the collection was conceived, at least in part, as a guide to the evaluation and selection of talented individuals for the Han imperial bureaucracy. After a brief speculative interlude in which I explore one possible scenario for the Lunyu’s emergence in the Western Han, in a final chapter I consider the implications of abandoning Lunyu-centrism both for Kongzi studies and for the study of early Chinese thought more broadly.

Chapter 5 concludes with an examination of the Lunyu’s role and significance in the broader context of early Chinese intellectual history, and a discussion of its relationship to other pre-Han and Han sources.

All Lunyu citations in this book are taken from the ICS Ancient Text Concordance Series edition (Lunyu zhuzi suoyin 論語逐字索引). Whenever possible, I have relied on a digital edition of the Sibu congkan (Collected Publications of the Four Divisions) for citations of the received corpus. A citation of, for example, page 3b of the eighth juan (fascicle) in the twelfth pian 篇 (chapter) of the Sibu congkan edition of the Xunzi is abbreviated “Xunzi 12 (8/3b).” Old Chinese reconstructions are those of Schuessler. All translations of the Shi (Odes) are from Arthur Waley’s 1937 translation (updated and edited by Joseph R. Allen in 1996). All other translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

Paradigm Shifts in Early and Modern Chinese Religion: A History by John Lagerwey [Handbook of Oriental Studies/Handbuch der Orientalistik: SECTION FOUR: China, Brill, 9789004383111] From the fifth century BC to the present and dealing with Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, and popular religion, this book explores the four periods of paradigm shift in the intertwined
histories of Chinese religion, politics, and culture. It serves as the introduction to the eight-volume Early and Modern Chinese Religion.

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Excerpt: Starting in the year 2001, while teaching at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (EPHE), I organized a group of twelve French scholars to work on a multi-disciplinary history of Chinese religion and culture in ancient and early medieval China. This group in turn became the core for a seven-day conference in Paris in December 2006 that covered the same periods. In 2009, a French volume was published (Religion et société en Chine ancienne et médiévale) and, shortly thereafter, in 2009 and 2010, the results of the Paris conference: Early Chinese Religion I• Shang through Han (12,0 BC–220 AD) and Early Chinese Religion II• The Period of Division (220–89 AD). In fall of the year 2010, having moved to the Centre for China Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), I began to teach a course called “A Critical Cultural History of China,” the first semester of which was entirely based on these two two-volume sets. At the same time, I began planning, with colleagues from CUHK and the EPHE, two further sets on modern Chinese religion. The relevant conferences were held at CUHK in June and December 2012 and led to the publication, in 2014, of Modern Chinese Religion I• Song-Liao-Jin-Yuan (960–1368) and, in 2015, of Modern Chinese Religion II• 18,0–201,. I began using the Song-Yuan set in the spring semester of 2015 and the contemporary set in the spring semester of 2016. The present book is a précis of my lectures.

The goal of this overview is to make these eight bulky volumes user-friendly for students (and professors) who have never read a word about Chinese religion, and who may well share still widespread prejudices about it, even that there is no such thing or, if there is, that it is called Buddhism and is not Chinese. These eight volumes show clearly that religion is just as integral a part of Chinese history as it is of any other civilization, not something to be stuck in a corner or put as an afterthought in the last chapter of a general history. Rather, it is the heart of the story, reflecting and propelling change in the political, social, economic, medical, philosophical, and aesthetic realms.

That is why the entire project has been resolutely multi-disciplinary, involving specialists of archaeology, architecture, iconography, literature, mythology, philosophy, medicine, economics, ritual, doctrine, and, in the final set, gender and ideology. Although my own lectures are less comprehensive, they still incorporate a wide range of subjects. But it is important to underline from the start that this book, first, would not have been possible without
the concerted efforts of the specialists I so abundantly cite and, second, reflects my own limits, especially with regard to archaeology and iconography. A different reader of the eight volumes would produce a significantly different synthesis.

One further caveat: there are virtually no chapters in the eight volumes that are neatly confined to the 20-page standard, and not a few chapters are more like small books. This is the result of a policy decided at the beginning, that authors should write as many pages as they needed in order to address their topic clearly. In many cases this required new research and, in virtually all cases, syntheses on a scale never before attempted. For many of the chapters in these volumes there is nothing comparable in any language. That is, these are not synthetic overviews of the pre-cooked variety; they are original essays in which the authors struggle to give form to new insights about their respective fields.

A final note: while the eight volumes taken together, being focused on periods of paradigm shift, do not constitute a history of Chinese religion(s), they are unique in the very precise sense that they incorporate all major forms of Chinese religion. Most scholars are specialists of one religion—Buddhism, Daoism, or Confucianism—in a single period, and there are virtually no specialists of the most important Chinese religion of all, namely, the people’s religion, centered on local temples, gods, and spirit mediums, and later involving spirit writing as well. Thanks mainly to scholars from Taiwan, we have been able to avoid producing a purely elite version of Chinese religious history.

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Ever since Max Weber, there has been a widespread consensus to the effect that "modernization" may be described as a process of rationalization, interiorization, and secularization. In reality, these three "-izations"—and a number of others that express different aspects of the same process, like masculinization, individualization, and universalization—are all parts of the ongoing process normally referred to, more simply, as history. History is about change, but like science as described by Thomas Kuhn, not all change is of the same quality: there is incremental change, and there is radical change, or paradigm shift. All -izations processes are uniquely visible in times of paradigm shift.

That is why this thumbnail sketch of Chinese religion and culture will focus on the -ization process in four key periods of Chinese history: the Warring States (481–256 BC), the Period of Division (220–589 AD), Song-Yuan (960–1368), and 1850–present. These are of course general approximations, not water-tight divisions in time.

But before embarking on this adventure, it may be useful to supply definitions of a few key terms, starting with the word “religion” itself. I define religion as “the practice of structuring values”. This definition aims to avoid a whole series of easily made assumptions, for example, that religion assumes belief in the existence of divine beings of an anthropomorphic sort. Because the cosmological imagination plays a central role in Chinese religious history, this history tells us very clearly that the anthropomorphic imagination—like the cosmological—is a cultural proclivity, or “bent”. But if we think for a moment about this rather fundamental fact, we realize immediately that the gods—and even the “monotheistic” God—have also always been understood as “ideas”, indeed, ideas of a core, structuring kind. Thus Platonic thought defines God in terms of the good, the true, and the beautiful, meaning “God” encompasses ethical, metaphysical, and aesthetic ideality. The Biblical God, by contrast, is said to be “love” (mercy, compassion)—another all-encompassing idea that refers to central features of human society and behavior: values that, if they are not practiced, are dead (as the book of James in the New Testament so eloquently explains).

Defining religion in this way has the signal value of reminding us that the ongoing war of “materialistic” science versus all forms of “spirituality” belongs to the past. While “science”, as “scientism”, has played a central role in convincing many people over the last couple centuries to abandon their “infantile” religious fantasies, it has also revealed its poverty when it comes to providing values that give meaning to individual and social life. These
values come from culture, from the interaction of ancient cultural traditions with new economic and social conditions. And so, just as religion—even (or perhaps especially) anthropomorphic religion—has refused to go quietly into the good night, so has science had to beat a retreat from its erstwhile arrogant assumptions about its straw man “rival”. To put it another way, as long as there are humans, there will be a duality of “matter” and “spirit”, of “nature” and “culture”, because this is the way humans sort out two universally evident facts of human life: first, that there is a remarkable difference between a living body which breathes and a corpse which decays; second, that words and language constitute a second order of reality that is in a complex relationship with a primary reality of “things”. Science of late has contributed magnificently to breaking down barriers on the “ladder of being” between animals and humans, and we now understand increasingly how much the use of tools—including the ultimate tool of language—is something we share with the animal world, but even the most reductionist interpreters of these facts will usually admit that there is a qualitative leap from the one to the other. As Bob Dylan sang, “Man gave names to all the animals, in the beginning, long time ago.”

A final word on the implications of the above definition of the word “religion”: it means that everyone, even the scientistic reductionist, is “religious”. To be human is to be “religious”, that is, to seek for an order of things and self that gives meaning and structure to what we do. Is this purely “subjective”, as Protestant and Kantian understandings of religion might lead us to think? No, it is as much a part of objective reality as anything we may choose to study. And because, in the end, value systems are so radically historical and cultural, they cannot be understood as anything other than “social”, and therefore “political”. We cannot separate off a realm of “individual belief” as the subject of a constitutional clause defending “freedom of religion”, because beliefs are not individual, and the practices they sustain and/or encourage have social and political consequences that no society or polity can ignore.

To understand what I mean by “rationalization” we may start with the process of induction described by Plato in “The Banquet”: we go from many individual interpretations of love (or justice, in The Republic) to the idea of Love (or Justice). “Abstraction”, of course, is but a part of the human creative process:

to it must be added, at the very least, the processes of deduction and intuition, including, as regards the latter, “eureka” moments when something hitherto utterly opaque suddenly becomes crystal clear, and barriers fall.

Rationalization, in other words, tends toward the universal, but it does so by means of the “prophetic” or “priestly” discoveries of individuals. By the priestly, I am referring to the person who belongs to the time of the “incremental”: he practices the rituals of his discipline (whether “scientific” or “religious”) until they become second nature, and thereby develops a kind of all-embracing wisdom. By the prophetic, I refer to those individuals who, in times of social crisis somatized as “sickness unto death”, are suddenly “transported” with a sense of cosmic unity that “brings the house down”, causing the displacement of all standard goalposts of the value system in such a way that something radically new—and universal—creates a rupture, leading to such “before” and “after” situations as that expressed by the BC/AD distinction, or that in China before and after the integration of Buddhism. Both forms of “subjective” experience—that is, of experience of the subject—involve interiorization, of both the broken and the whole, which are then seen as in a relationship of re-ordering or healing: religion is first and foremost about such healing, of individuals and societies. It is therefore eminently about the history, in a given culture, of the ongoing and perpetually renewed discovery of an ideal individual subject and community.

At bottom, “secularization” simply refers in an abstract, universalizing way to these moments of rupture in human history: points or periods in time when long-standing value systems built on long-gone political and social orders and values collapse. And because “necessity is the mother of invention”, from the crucible of somatized and
social disorder a new order emerges that denies the existence of an “other world” that no longer makes sense in the context of a new economy, polity, and society. The “gods” worshiped hitherto—and their priests and rituals—are either rejected outright, or at the very least radically reinterpreted so that they become compatible with new social, economic, and political circumstances. That is why Socrates had to drink the hemlock, and why early Christians were martyred as “atheists”. It is also no doubt what today makes Buddhist “mindfulness” so attractive over against Biblical anthropomorphism.

Because the unfolding story is about the gradual emergence and discovery of the subject, we will speak of the process as one of “individuation”. The fact that the individual subject, in her search for healing and a new order, discovers new and ever more universal principles that transcend gender, race, class, and even culture, we will refer to this as “universalization” (or “popularization”). But why, then, call the process “masculinization”? Because historical societies, however much progress they made in the direction of universality, were (and are) constructed around gender (and class) divisions. One example of this is Paul, who can say at once that “in Christ there is neither male nor female, neither Greek nor Jew” and affirm that Christ is the head of his body the Church just as the male is the head of the female. To this day, it is the latter, gendered hierarchy that, illogically, takes precedence over the prophetic announcement of universal equality. Another example is Laozi, who, at the same time he refers to the supreme principle Dao (Way) as “mother”, is in fact above all interested in the “newborn male child” who clings to the Mother. Why? I believe the answer is quite simple, and may be seen in Laozi’s statement—quite similar, actually, to Paul’s about head and body—that “the sage is for the belly, not for the eyes”. Here belly and eyes refer to two modes of conception: that of the head and that of the belly, or male intellectualism versus female production of life. Laozi takes the side of the female mode of conception, but what is conceived is not a female but a male child, as will become clearer in what follows. The “end of history” is the end of gender inequality, on all levels, starting with the “metaphysical”.

This book is a narrative built around the idea of paradigm shift and a synthetic vision of Chinese religion as quintessential expression of Chinese society and culture. Throughout, I have relied on extensive citation of individual authors and avoided excessive overlay of commentary. The Conclusion will focus on my own understanding of core features of Chinese cultural history.

Chinese and Western Dualism
We may begin by looking at permanent differences with the Western philosophical tradition. Romain Graziani rightly sees this as a question of the nature of the subject:

One of the broadly shared assumptions of Western philosophy is that the dominant function in human beings is thinking and knowing. It deals with self-conscious subjects as the sole cause of their actions, transparent to—and sovereign over—themselves. Philosophers find, in the thoughts they entertain about their own thoughts, the very substance of their beings. They focus their sight and attention on thought as if it were the summit of their activity. They deliberately forget everything that is prior to thought, prior to language, prior to clear and distinct ideas, namely their inner dispositions, moods, frames of mind, mental impulse or life force. The essence of classical metaphysics revolves around the question: how is true knowledge possible? Plato’s concept of psyche, Aristotle’s noos, Descartes’ res cogitans, or Kant’s transcendental subject were all posited in order to answer this fundamental question of true knowledge.

From this very general perspective we can discern a duality that runs from ancient Greece through the Hellenic world down to Christianized Europe—a duality first outlined by Pierre Hadot and then by Michel Foucault—between a theoretical subject primarily conceived as a thinking being aspiring to authentic knowledge, and an ethical subject engaged in the process of transforming himself through various practices. The latter tendency seems to prevail in early China and constitutes one
of its most salient orientations. These practices transform the self-conceived as an ethos, defined by one’s character, inner dispositions and behavior. Contrasting with the theoretical question of knowledge, the way of ethics explores the construction—but, as we will see below, also the dissolution—of the self. The subject or the self is conceived as the totality of its concrete aspects, not as an immortal ontological reality distinct from the body.

At the end of my Introduction to Early Chinese Religion II, I suggest briefly a systematic approach to these differences:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>body</th>
<th>soul</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>matter</td>
<td>spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>letter</td>
<td>spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>outer</td>
<td>inner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ritual</td>
<td>myth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>space</td>
<td>time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If, in the West, everything in the left hand column is inferior to what is in the right, in China, it is a matter of priority and what we may call elementary “set theory”: that which is on the left is prior to that which is on the right, and encompasses it. Ultimately, in China likewise, patriarchy rules, and the male is superior to the female, but the route followed by the Chinese to get to that point of view is very different from the West: everything in the right hand column is inside its counterpart on the left. Thus mythology—or, more generally, discourse—is implicit within ritual and need not, indeed should not be made explicit.

Concerning this table, we should first point out that the letter versus the spirit is relevant only to the West, not to China, where, as there are no letters, there is also no literalism. (Literalism might well qualify as the standard form of Western “heterodoxy”.) Second, the preference for ritual over discourse is most clearly visible in the “teaching of the Rites” (lijiao 禮教), as Confucianism came to be called. Thus Confucius himself was determined to keep practicing archaic rituals because of their value for self-cultivation, and the neo-Confucians took up as a virtual battle cry this phrase from the Analects: “Conquer the self and return to ritual” (keji fuli). For Léon Vandermeersch, the positive valuation of ritual in Confucianism is due to the fact that the rite, rather than being, as a contemporary Westerner might typically think, a formal, repetitive—even obsessive—“going through the motions”, reflects, rather, a deep rational structure, a logic, like the lines in a piece of jade: a logos 理. He therefore suggests that, where Western thought is “teleological”, Chinese thought is “morphological”.

Laozi attacks the Confucian li, but he does so against the background of self-cultivation of the kind described by Romain Grazioli:

10. As you carry your bodily soul embracing oneness, can you never depart from it? As you concentrate your qi and extend your suppleness, can you be as a new born babe? As you polish the dust from your mysterious mirror, can you render it free of all blemishes? As you cherish the people and order the state, can you do so without awareness? As heaven’s gate swings open and shut can you keep to the female?

We should, therefore, perhaps replace the ritual/myth pair with another, broader distinction, between practice and theory, and state the Chinese point of view as follows: as theory is implicit in practice, it is better to practice than to prattle. Or, as Laozi puts it:

56. Those who know do not speak; those who speak do not know.

But we must go farther than that: “morphological thought” in Vandermeersch refers not to a discourse on external forms imposed on content but to deep structures embedded in both language and ritual. Access to these structures requires involvement of the whole person, that is, of a living body engaged in repetitive practice—ritual—in a space. As much as teleology implies an “end game”, morphology requires going inside and delving deeper.

Why should this have become the standard Chinese approach to the “truth of the subject” they sometimes call “Real Person” (zhenren 真人)? While the centrality of sacrifice to the Shang and Zhou polity may serve to explain origins, I suggest it is the emergence of the cosmology of Dao and Qi in the Warring States that locked in this approach to the human subject and society. As we saw, Jean
Levi puts it this way: “The word Dao refers to absolute generality that is infinite extensiveness” (665). And I commented as follows: This feature of extensiveness is particularly noteworthy in a context where “the principle of territorial structuring becomes central” (664) and “administrative division of territory is the paradigm” of rationality (669). Levi goes on to examine the unique—not to say curious—place of the “center” in late Warring States thought:

In becoming the model of human time, the cycle of seasons is subverted and spatialized. This spatialization is visible in the transition from the four natural to the five ritual seasons, obeying the law of classification by five for the elements. But there is no fifth season. There is no middle of the year. It is but the mark of the centrality of the royal figure par excellence, symbolized by the Yellow Emperor, who reigns from the center of the earth over a fictive season. (671–72)

As intimated above in the reference to “keeping to the female”, it is to the Laozi we must turn for a systematic statement of the relationship between the dualities of early Chinese thought:

1. A dao that may be spoken is not the enduring Dao. A name that may be named is not an enduring name. No names—this is the beginning of heaven and earth. Having names—this is the mother of the things of the world. Make freedom from desire your constant norm; thereby you will see what is subtle. Make having desires your constant norm; thereby you will see what is manifest.

If we reconstruct our dualities table on the basis of this statement, it would look like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>enduring</th>
<th>not enduring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no-name</td>
<td>have-name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no-desire</td>
<td>have-desire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subtle</td>
<td>manifest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The (chrono-)logical priority given the subtle over the manifest is elsewhere expressed as a preference for non-action/no-words over action/words, the belly (the inner) over the eye (the outer), the female over the male, the black of unknowing over the white of knowing, humiliation over adulation, the uncarved block over utensils carved from it, and no-being over have-being:

2. Therefore the sage dwells in the midst of non-action (wuwei) and practices the wordless teaching.
12. The five colors blind men’s eyes, The five tones deafen men’s ears, The five flavors numb men’s mouths, Racing at a gallop in pursuit of the hunt maddens men’s minds. Rare objects obstruct men’s conduct. Therefore the sage is for the belly and not for the eye.
28. One who knows the male but preserves the female becomes a ravine to the world. Such a one never swerves from constant virtue and returns again to be a new born baby. One who knows white but preserves black becomes a standard for the world. Such a one never deviates from constant virtue and returns again to being limitless. One who knows glory but preserves shame becomes a valley to the world. Such a one is always supplied with constant virtue and returns again to be an uncarved block. When the uncarved block is dispersed, vessels are made from it.

32. The Dao is ever nameless. Though the uncarved block be small, it cannot be made the subordinate of any in the world ... As soon as it is cut, then there are names. Once there are names one must know it’s time to stop. Knowing to stop is the way to avoid danger.
40. The things of the world are born from being, and being is born of nothing.

These preferences, in turn, lead to a whole series of behavioral strategies, notably being like water, “weak and soft” (78) and taking “the lower position” (66), or “clingng to the mother” (the Dao) within rather than busying oneself with the outside world:

52. The world has a beginning—take it to be the mother of the world. Having grasped the mother, you can know the child. Having grasped the child, return to preserve the mother and you will live out your life without danger. Block the portals and shut the gate, you will live out your days and never be troubled. Open the portals and turn to the tasks, you will live out your days and never be rescued.
In the Laozi, as in much Chinese thought, the two contrasted elements are frequently seen as complementary parts of an alternating whole, on the model of the seasons, as in the “Treatise on Music”:

Creating in spring and maturing in summer, this is benevolence. Gathering in autumn and storing in winter, this is righteousness. Benevolence is close to music and righteousness to ritual. Music is a matter of honesty and harmony, and so one leads the spirits by following Heaven. Ritual is a matter of segregation and appropriateness, and so one lodges the demons by following Earth. Thus when the sages created music they did it by echoing Heaven Jam, and, when they designed the rites they did it to match the Earth.

This view perfectly expresses a Dao-based monism, or mitigated dualism, that fits well with the Mencian idea of the goodness of human nature: the “good heart” (liangxin). But Mencius also knew that the good heart could easily go astray, overwhelmed by an interest in “profit” (li), and Laozi suggests the same with his constant call to “return” to the state of unknowing and nondesiring. In general, as Mark Csikszentmihályi shows, the elite of ancient China agreed that desires need to be “dammed” by means of self-cultivation training. Xunzi and Han Feizi, thinking it unlikely that any but a few sages would engage in such training, considered human nature to be evil, and this became the dominant view through the Tang, as seen in Curie Virág’s citation of Zheng Xuan, the late Han commentator on the Classics:

That man is still at birth is his Heaven-endowed nature. That he is set into motion having been stirred by things are the desires of his nature. When things arrive there is knowing, and when there is knowing, liking and disliking becomes manifest. When liking and disliking are not moderated within, and one’s faculty of knowing is enticed by what is outside, one cannot return to oneself, and heavenly principle is destroyed. Now, the things that stir man are endless, and if man’s likes and dislikes are not moderated, then when things arrive, man is transformed by the things. When man is transformed by things, he destroys his heavenly principle, and fully indulges in his desires. (1197)

Daoxue people, in Virág’s account, overcame Tang dualism, as in Zhang Zai’s return to the Qi-based vision of alternating states:

When qi collects together, differentiation is manifest and there is form 有形; when qi does not collect together, then differentiation is not manifest and there is no form 無形 ... Therefore, when the sage looks around himself and investigates [the world], he says, “I know the cause of hiddenness and manifestation 幽明.” (1202)

Relying on the Zhongyong, Zhu Xi (1130–1200) likewise focuses on alternation:

The nature is the state before movement 性是未動, and the feelings are the state after movement 情是 Z 動. The mind 心 encompasses both the states before and after movement. (1211)

It will be noticed that Zhang Zai assumes a world in which “having form”—occupying space and being visible—is the norm, and that Zhu Xi’s concern is with recovering the unity of the subject in the inner world of the heart. But he remains very aware of the threat of duality, clearly defined in body/nature—physical/spiritual—terms:

For Zhu Xi, bad desires came from the “human mind” 人心, good from the “Dao mind” 道心 (1205): the former derived from “the selfishness of the physical body” 形氣之私, the latter from the “correctness of the innate nature and destiny” 性命之正 (1206).

Daoxue senior statesmen like Zhen Dexiu 真德秀 (1178–1235) are even more dramatic in their expression of that duality:

The surging of the physical nature is more powerful than galloping horses. Inner mental attentiveness is the reins [that control them]. Emotions unleashed are deeper than a flooding river. Inner mental attentiveness is the dike [that holds them back]. (1227)

From ethical to class and gender dualism is of course a step easily taken (and in fact taken
already by Mencius, who distinguished between “men of mind” and “men of muscle”).

But even more important to our understanding of what is at stake in Daoxue dualism is its distinction between two forms of tradition or authority, that of government and that of the Dao. As I wrote above (p. 129), “If, in the phase prior to its institutionalization, Daoxue considered its moral authority (daotong 道統) to be superior to dynastic legitimacy (zhengtong 政統) (8, note 5),

“This creation of a religious Daoxue over against a political empire—a City of Dao versus a City of Man—did not survive the Ming founder who ... claimed for himself the status of sage-king, combining both political and moral authority” (70).

As this is also how the Buddhist challenge to imperial legitimacy ended, it illustrates very clearly that the political meaning of morphological dualism is the enfolding of the moral—the religious—in the political: the heart is to the person what the sovereign is to the state. The Ming founder put it this way in his commentary to the Laozi:

This is because the body of the ruler is the empire, the dynasty, and the myriad creatures, and because the spirit and the breath of the ruler are the prince of the realm.

By contrast, what we can affirm with certainty is that the weft texts enable us to understand the Lingbao Daoist theory of the origin of its scriptures: What Wang Chengwen calls “the theology of the celestial writs of Lingbao” is derived from Han-era weft texts, which use terms like “original writs” (benwen 本文), “perfect writs” (zhenwen 真文), “red writs” (chiwen 赤文), and “celestial writs” (tianwen 天文).

In the Lingbao canon, the creative Dao embodied by the anthropomorphic Lord Lao is displaced by these celestial writs:

Born prior to primordial commencement within the vacuous cave, when heaven and earth had not yet taken root nor the sun and moon lit up, all was abysmal darkness: they are without ancestor and without progenitor. The numinous script was obscure, flickering between visibility and invisibility. The two principles relied on them for their separation, the great yang relied on them in order to illuminate ... The marvelous power of the numinous script is the mystic root of heaven and earth. Its
awesome numinosity is huge and broad, universally expanding without limit ... The red script of the chaotic cavern is ... ancestral to the era of primordial commencement ... Above it has no progenitor; the Dao is its body. The five scripts expanded widely, germinating the spirits and deities of the universe.

Clearly, the creative power of the patterned trace is here identical to that of the spoken word of God in the first chapter of the biblical book of Genesis, or to the Logos in the opening passage of the Gospel of John.

But what is most important for us here is the fact that these luminous writs are light, “flickering between visibility and invisibility”, belonging to the realm of the eyes, not the ears, occupying space before they initiate time: born “within the vacuous cave ... the Dao is its body.” That is, the “red writs” (chiwen) are like the newborn “red infant” (chizi) of the Laozi, the spark of life in the womb of the Dao, or the trigram kan ☵, the Yang within the Yin, referred to in inner alchemy texts as the True Yang (zhenyang). They are thus the perfect illustration of “that which is on the left is prior to that which is on the right, and encompasses it”, or “morphological thinking”:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dao</th>
<th>De</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yin</td>
<td>Yang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>Son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subtle</td>
<td>manifest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>space</td>
<td>time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pattern</td>
<td>discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eyes</td>
<td>ears</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rest</td>
<td>movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is “mitigated dualism”, or “dualism with Chinese characteristics”, in which the manifest world of time hides itself—is “enfolded”, “spatialized”—within the subtle, hidden world of space, and indeed cannot issue forth from the “vacuous cave” until a time of rest—stillness—gives way to a time of movement: emotion, inspiration, revelation. To quote again the Laozi,

10. As heaven’s gate swings open and shut can you keep to the female?

61. A large state lies downstream; it is the female of the world. In intercourse, the female overcomes the male by means of stillness, because stillness lies below.

But what I would like most to insist on here is the idea that the discovery of the power of Chinese characters now clearly points to a remarkable fact: as much as alphabetical writing mirrors the time of speaking, characters occupy space, as do bodies in ritual. Tendencies that were already present when language was still understood as speech—in which the Dao was “infinite extensiveness”, time was spatialized, and the father was excluded from a “uterine world” composed of mother and son—were now multiplied by the reflection on the written as pattern in the esoteric weft texts. This in turn confirmed a preference for “teaching without talking”: ritual.

Had Buddhism—where all scriptures were “uttered by the Buddha” and preaching aimed at lay conversion—not burst into this world, Daoism would have remained a virtually private religion, transmitted in secrecy from master to adept. The oralizing impact of Buddhism turned Daoism into a public religion which, like Buddhism, sought universal salvation.

Patriarchy with Chinese Characteristics

We have already suggested that, while seeming to vaunt the Yin as superior to the Yang, Laozi is in fact recommending strategies for men to capture the power of the feminine. Buddhism, for all its emphasis on the “Buddha heart” in all humans, also says that, to attain nirvana, a woman must first become a man, and nuns are seen as requiring double the number of rules given monks (500 vs 250). Buddhism’s extreme rationalism was perhaps the most powerful impetus it gave to the ongoing process of the masculinization of thought and social practice.

In the third period of paradigm shift, we saw in both Quanzhen and Daoxue a radicalization of spiritualization and anti-body views:

In Quanzhen preaching, inner alchemy is the urgent spiritual work needed to escape ‘the carcass of the body’ 軀殼, which is just a ‘hut of bones’ 髓屋 ... Zhu Xi neatly summarizes Daoxue spiritualization by con-trasting the “selfishness of the physical body 形氣之私 and correctness of the innate nature and destiny 性命之正.”
Interiorization reached maximal expression in the totally internalized rites of Zheng Sixiao. Heavily “mental” Chan Buddhism found a place for women, but as zhangfu 夫, a term meaning “manly man”. Miaodao responds when asked by a Chan master why she gets involved in this zhangfu business: “Have the Buddhist teachings ever made a distinction between man and woman, who are identical in their characters?” But the use of the term to begin with, and Miaodao’s assertion of identity between the genders almost foreshadows the “iron girls” of the Maoist period. That said, Hsieh also has a whole section on “humble old women in Ch’an encounter dialogues”, women depicted as ridiculing monks for holding discriminatory views. Humble yet spiritually advanced female figures, they incite the renunciation of all dualistic thought. The term laopo 老婆, old woman or grandmother, was also used to refer to monks like Huangbo Xiyun (d. 850), said to have “the earnest mind of an old woman”. Old women, says Hsieh, represented compassion and unselfish efforts, people who were marginal and powerless yet compassionate. All this suggests Chan also foreshadowed the old women of the contemporary religious scene.

By contrast, notes Hsieh in his conclusion, Zhu Xi saw no place for women outside the household and vehemently opposed women becoming nuns, prohibiting it when a magistrate in Tongan, Fujian (1154–57), and banning nunneries when prefect of Zhangzhou (1190–91). But there is a further contrast to be made between both elite Chan and Confucianism and the active leadership roles played by women in Song lay Buddhist societies and post-Song popular religious sects. What we see at work here is the ultimately democratic and egalitarian impulses of Buddhism, a kind of gender blindness rooted in transcendental non-dualism. As such, it cannot but remind us of something similar in Pauline Christianity: “There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Galatians 3:28).

What we see in Modern Chinese Religion suggests that the contemporary period shows considerable continuity with what is outlined in the preceding paragraphs. First, we find continuity in what I think fair to refer to as the arrogance of the elites who constructed “scientific” modernity against the “superstition” of “ignorant peasant women”. We find it also in what Xiaofei Kang calls the “public patriarchy”, in which nation-building, the party-state, and the personality cult all took precedence over female liberation. Like the KMT therefore, they opted for “wise mothers and good wives” or, worse, “Iron Girls”. “Mao became a godly figure who embodied the party, the nation, the state and—all in all—the ‘public patriarchy’.” In both the KMT and the CCP, Kang concludes, “Confucian patriarchy and the traditional religious order were attacked, but Confucian values of female virtues were sustained to support new forms of state patriarchy.”

In my view, the two parties that have ruled China over the last century, even when they were engaged in attacks on Confucianism, constantly showed themselves to be Confucian, not only in their practice of patriarchal gender discrimination, but also in their attitudes toward and treatment of religion which, in continuity with the Confucian administrative tradition, they have been resolutely determined to control. That is, the party-state, insofar as it carries on the tradition of the church-state, defining orthodoxy and assigning to government a role not of autonomous legislation but of execution of orthodoxy as orthopraxy, is still the Legalist-Confucian state of imperial times, obeying a theory/practice structure derived from authoritarian definitions of morphological thinking such as those outlined by Jean Levi in Early Chinese Religion I. Shall we say here that radical body/soul Greek dualism is what ultimately ensures the possibility not only of the autonomy of the religious sphere but the autonomy of all spheres that we have suggested constitutes an accomplished modernity? What we certainly can say is that, when democracy comes to China—as it will—it will owe a great deal to the two foreign religions bearing at least the seeds of gender—indeed of universal—equality.

And Tomorrow?
In our Introduction to Modern Chinese Religion II, we state that the “Manifesto on Behalf of Chinese
Culture” published in Hong Kong in 1958 insisted the core of neo-Confucianism was its “religious dimension”, as illustrated in the idea of the unity of humans and heaven, “understood as the affirmation of one’s moral subjectivity.” They also asserted that “the moral spirit of Chinese culture” was incompatible with an autocratic regime, and that the traditional focus on the virtuous rule of the sovereign should now be on that of the people in a democratic constitutional regime. Mou Zongsan in particular developed a renewed ideal of the “inner sage/outer king” that combined the moral vision of Confucianism with the universal values of science and democracy. <>

The Banished Immortal: a Life of Li Bai (Li Po) by Ha Jin [Pantheon, 9781524747411]

From the National Book Award-winning author of Waiting: a narratively driven, deeply human biography of the Tang dynasty poet Li Bai—also known as Li Po In his own time (701–762), Li Bai’s poems—shaped by Daoist thought and characterized by their passion, romance, and lust for life—were never given their proper due by the official literary gatekeepers. Nonetheless, his lines rang out on the lips of court entertainers, tavern singers, soldiers, and writers throughout the Tang dynasty, and his deep desire for a higher, more perfect world gave rise to his nickname, the Banished Immortal. Today, Bai’s verses are still taught to China’s schoolchildren and recited at parties and toasts; they remain an inextricable part of the Chinese language.

With the instincts of a master novelist, Ha Jin draws on a wide range of historical and literary sources to weave the great poet’s life story. He follows Bai from his origins on the western frontier to his ramblings travels as a young man, which were filled with filled with striving but also with merry abandon, as he raised cups of wine with friends and fellow poets. Ha Jin also takes us through the poet’s later years—in which he became swept up in a military rebellion that altered the course of China’s history—and the mysterious circumstances of his death, which are surrounded by legend.

The Banished Immortal is an extraordinary portrait of a poet who both transcended his time and was shaped by it, and whose ability to live, love, and mourn without reservation produced some of the most enduring verses.

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Excerpt: He has many names. In the West, people call him Li Po, as most of his poems translated into English bear that name. Sometimes it is also spelled Li Bo. But in China, he is known as Li Bai. During his lifetime (701-762 AD), he had other names—Li Taibai, Green Lotus Scholar, Li Twelve. The last one is a kind of familial term of endearment, as Bai was twelfth among his brothers and male cousins on the paternal side. It was often used by his friends and fellow poets when they addressed him—some even dedicated poems to him titled "For Li Twelve." By the time of his death, he had become known as a great poet and was called zhexian, or Banished Immortal, by his admirers. Such a moniker implies that he had been sent down to earth as punishment for his misbehavior in heaven. Over the twelve centuries since his death, he has been revered as shixian, Poet Immortal. Because he was an excessive drinker, he was also called jiuxian, Wine Immortal. Today it is still common for devotees of his poetry to trek hundreds of miles, following some of the routes of his wanderings as a kind of pilgrimage. Numerous liquors and wines bear his name. Indeed, his name is a ubiquitous brand, flaunted by hotels, restaurants, temples, and even factories.
In English, in addition to "Li Po," he once had another pair of names, Li T'ai Po and Rihaku. The first is a phonetic transcription of his original Chinese name, Li Taibai, the name his parents gave him. And Ezra Pound, in his Cathay—his collected translations of classical Chinese poetry—called Li Bai Rihaku because Pound had translated those poems from the notes left by the American scholar Ernest Fenollosa, who had originally studied Li Bai's poetry in Japanese when he was in Japan. Pound's loose translation of Li Bai's "The River-Merchant's Wife: A Letter" has been included in many textbooks and anthologies as a masterpiece of modern poetry. It is also one of Pound's signature poems—arguably his best known. For the sake of consistency and clarity, in the following pages let us stay with the name Li Bai.

He also has several deaths ascribed to him. For hundreds of years, some people even maintained that he had never died at all, claiming to encounter him now and then. In truth, we are uncertain about the exact date and cause of his death. In January 764, the newly enthroned Emperor Daizong issued a decree summoning Li Bai to serve as a counselor at court. It was a post without actual power in spite of its high-sounding title. Yet to any man of learning and ambition such an appointment was a great favor, a demonstration of the emperor's benevolence and magnanimity—and in Li Bai's case, a partial restoration of the high status he had once held in the court. When the royal decree reached Dangtu County, Anhui, where Li Bai was supposed to be located, the local officials were thrown into confusion and could not find him. Soon it was discovered that he had died more than a year before. Of what cause and on what day, no one could tell. So we can only say that Li Bai, despite his renown, passed away in 762 without notice.

However, such an obscure death was not acceptable to those who cherished his poetry. They began to give different versions of his death, stories spun either to suit the romantic image of his poetic personality or to provide a fitting conclusion to his turbulent life. In one version, he died of alcohol poisoning; this was in keeping with his lifelong indulgence in drink. Another claims that he died of an illness known as chronic thoracic suppuration—pus penetrating his chest and lungs. The first mention of this comes from Pi Rixiu (838-883) in his poem "Seven Loves": "He was brought down by rotted ribs, / Which sent his drunken soul to the other world." Although there is no way we can verify this claim, it sounds credible—such a chest problem could have been caused by his abuse of alcohol. In his final years, Li Bai's drinking and poverty would have aggravated his pulmonary condition. But the third version of his death is far more fantastic: in this version, he drowns while drunkenly chasing the moon's reflection on a river, jumping from a boat to catch the ever-shifting orb.

Even though this scene smacks of suicide and is perhaps too romantic to be believed, it is the version that has been embraced by the public—in part because Li Bai, as his poetry shows, loved the moon. Even in his early childhood he was fixated on it. In his poem "Night Trip in Gulang," he writes, "As a young child, I had no idea what the moon was / And I called it a white jade plate. / Then I wondered if it was a mirror at the Jasper Terrace / That flew away and landed on top of green clouds." In Chinese poetry, Li Bai was the first to use the image of the moon abundantly, celebrating its loftiness, purity, and constancy. He imagined the moon as a serene landscape with sublime dwellings for xian, or immortals, who are often surrounded by divine fauna and flora and their personal pets. The beliefs of the ancient Chinese did not separate divinity from humanity, and their imagined heavenly space resembled the human world, with similar (but more fantastic) landscapes and architecture and creatures. If cultivated enough, any human being could rise to the order of divinity, becoming a xian—many temples in China worshiped these kinds of local deities. Heaven was inhabited by these beings, who were somewhat like superhumans, powerful and carefree and immortal.

The moon in Li Bai's poetry is also associated with one's home or native place, and as a beacon shared by people everywhere,

The poets who came after him have continued to celebrate his moonlit death: even though they know it may not be true, across the centuries they have eulogized the shining moment in their verses. Even today, lovers of Li Bai's poetry indulge in the myth.
One contemporary scholar writes that Li Bai "rode a whale, floating away with the waves, toward the moon." This heaven-ward journey is presented from the distraught, drunken poet's point of view so that Li Bai appears to be returning to his original, divine position. Such romanticization shows the nature of scholarship around Li Bai, which is partly based on legends and myths. Because people want him to have a glorious end, they have been eager to perpetuate the moon-chasing legend.

However, for all the imaginative attempts to glorify him, a single clear voice spoke about his situation presciently when the poet was still alive and in exile. His staunch friend Du Fu laments in his poem "Dreaming of Li Bai":

The capital is full of gorgeous carriages and gowns,
But you are alone gaunt and sallow despite your gift.
Who is to say that the way of heaven is always fair?
At your old age you can't stay clear of harm.
Your fame that's to last ten thousand years
Will become a quiet affair after you are gone.

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Taoism and Self-Knowledge: The Chart for the Cultivation of Perfection (Xiuzhen Tu) by Catherine Despeux, Translated by Jonathan Pettit [Sinica Leidensia, Brill, 9789004322158]

In Taoism and Self Knowledge, Catherine Despeux develops a history of the "Chart for the Cultivation of Perfection" a text containing an array of meditative techniques for individual salvation and thunder rites. This chart was transmitted widely among Taoists in Quanzhen tradition.

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Excerpt: Mental and visual representations of the body are the result of personal and collective experiences, and notions of what constitutes the body vary from one culture to another. The ways in which we isolate the objects of knowledge or perception depend on the conceptions we have of them. In the West, for example, the body is delimited by the skin and forms an entity in itself, but this is not necessarily so for a Taoist adept. Sometimes, it is difficult to understand how other cultures have apprehended representations of the body and have translated them into illustrations. These representations are very different from their Western counterparts. It is thus imperative to examine our own conceptions and to keep a certain distance from them.

In China, visual representations of the body are rare. Whenever such images appear (e.g., in painting, in sculpture, in Taoist scriptures), the depictions evoke the lightness of the human being. The lines are under emphasized, and they often undulate as they are drawn to depict body movements. These representations are closer to medieval, or even earlier, Western drawings than the sculptures of Michelangelo or Rodin, exalting muscle and power. Even though the knowledge of the body has greatly evolved over the past few centuries in China, it has nevertheless remained relatively constant when compared to Western knowledge during this same time. Descriptions and representations are relatively rare, and surprising in their simplicity.

Despite the relatively small number of images, Taoist writers often emphasize the significance of the human body. The thirteenth chapter of the Book of the Way and its Virtue, for instance, reads, “If I suffered so many evils, is it not because I have a body?” In ancient China, xing 形, a term designating the body structure, does not appear in classical texts such as the Analects or Mencius. Xing, however, is commonplace in early Taoist texts. It appears nearly two hundred times in Zhuangzi’s self-titled Taoist treatise from the fourth century BCE. What is immediately striking, both in medical and Taoist representations, is the ovoid shape of the body, mostly drawn without the limbs. This kind of closed and delimited space evokes the Chinese Creation myths and the Chinese conception of the world as Chaos, a mixed, undivided whole, sometimes described as having the shape of an egg.

There are several different terms in Chinese to describe the body such as the body/person (shen 身), the physical body (ti 體) or its structural appearance (xing 形). Very early in ancient China, thinkers developed the analogy between the body and the universe, which became so common that we now speak of microcosm and macrocosm. There are many more analogies and approaches to the body, which is also the place where the individual and social identity take shape. But in China, there are few graphic representations of the body prior to the Song period (960–1279). Recently drawings representing gymnastic movements (daoyin 導) were recovered during the 1973 Mawangdui (Hunan) excavations, and there are some manuscripts and diagrams of the body in the Dunhuang manuscripts. There are sixteen texts related to moxibustion and representing simply the
outline of the body, and several diagrams of the whole body or of the face, in documents relating to divination.

No extant Taoist text composed before the Song dynasty contains a graphic representation of the body. The catalogues of the imperial library in the official histories of these periods mention some titles of “diagrams” (tu), which are all related to the five viscera or the acupuncture points. The other components of the body or the body as a whole do not seem to have been the object of specific representations. The human body was also not a common feature in painting more generally. With the exception of portraits, which first appeared in the Tang, the reproduction of the human is not a common subject.

In Taoism, the earliest known visual representations of the body were created in the middle of the tenth century. They inaugurated a series of drawings, all related to the Internal Alchemical techniques developed during the late ninth and the tenth centuries. Like grimoires, these charts combine inscriptions and drawings often very schematic. These representations proceed from an organicist and ritualized worldview, including an order, an invisible inner structure and processes. Therefore, the body, discretely represented, is integrated into an ensemble of transformations and organization: it becomes the field of life.

Inner Alchemy, literally “inner cinnabar” (neidan), is a synthesis of ancient gymnastic, dietetics, breathing and meditation practices. The practices featured cosmological concepts adapted from operative alchemy, the “outer cinnabar” (waidan). The manipulations of Inner Alchemy take place in the laboratory of the alchemist, i.e., within the human body. Before the appearance of the Inner Alchemical system, however, the vocabulary of operative alchemy was already used in Taoism as a metaphorical resource for describing the techniques and the experiences of meditation.

During the transition from operative alchemy to Internal Alchemy—the two are not mutually exclusive but may be performed concomitantly—several changes occurred. There was first a phenomenon of internalization and transposition of the laboratory within the body. Here, the adept envisioned the cauldron and the furnace, the basic utensils of the alchemist, as metaphors for the main places to which the adept transferred his attention. These places varied depending on the stage of progress. It was either the kidneys (a term used in traditional Chinese writings to designate both kidneys and genitals) and the heart, or the lower part of the abdomen and the head. Eventually, the concrete manipulations of operative alchemy were replaced by the mental manipulations in Internal Alchemy. In the latter, an adept uses the power of imagination and visualization to induce changes in his person and his relation to the world.

One of the most common features of Inner Alchemical texts is the adaptation of cosmological concepts and models to describe the human body and the individual. In Chinese alchemy, the inner transformation is modelled on the evolution of nature. As was the case in operative alchemy, the analogy between microcosm and macrocosm is prior to Internal Alchemy; this correspondence can be found as early as the Han dynasty. Microcosm and macrocosm work in the same way: the body becomes a microcosm in which we find heaven and earth, sun and moon, stars, mountains and valleys, rivers and oceans, wind, clouds, rain, dew, and snow.

Abolishing the distinction between inside and outside, the Taoist transposes in the body both the natural world, as well as the sacred world of heavens, hells, gods and demons. The visualization practices of the body deities and the efforts to keep them in oneself are common procedures in most of the Taoist currents, notably in the Upper Clarity tradition (Shangqing 上清). Keeping the deities in his body permits a long life and the attainment of immortality. But the deities are also placed inside the body by the officiant during the rituals he performs to remedy the disorders not for himself but for the community or for a particular person, whether the problems or diseases or epidemics, or natural disasters, to mention only the main situations envisaged.

This book analyses the many versions of a body map called the Chart for the Cultivation of Perfection. These maps have emerged in different parts of China, and include a wide variety of texts,
inscriptions, and figurative elements. For most maps, we do not know the author or under what circumstances they were made. This representation of the body is the culmination of a long tradition of schematic drawings that guided the meditator and the practitioner of rituals. The earliest manuscripts incorporating this kind of body maps were made in the tenth century. We also have partial maps from later centuries preserved in the Taoist Canon. But the popularity of these kinds of maps spread beyond canonical anthologies. Handwritten versions were circulated among members of temple groups large and small. This same broad appeal exists today, as is evidenced by Brigitte Baptandier’s recent study. Patrice Fava discovered a manuscript that demonstrates how people carry maps of the body and a map of the skeleton of the Lord Lao (Laojun gulu 老君骷髏). A better understanding of the various versions of body maps in this book will clarify different ways that groups transmit this information.

The research into the history of representations of the body and alchemical processes prior to this Chart for the Cultivation of Perfection enables us to retrace its origins. The inventory of the various copies we possess, less than a dozen, illuminated the Taoist context in which it was used. The recent discovery of a version from a private collection has enriched this knowledge. The few, albeit minimal, variations between these different examples nevertheless show a flexible use of this map. In addition to the pictographic elements, the inscriptions and texts of the chart also were compared with those found in the known literature of the Taoist Canon and its complements.

In order to make more comprehensible the inscriptions and texts of this chart that we will translate throughout this study, I have grouped them according to three topics. The first topic is the body and its main sites for alchemical transmutations. This refers to the cosmological body becoming a spatio-temporal area in which the various alchemical operations will take place during meditation. Second, I address the body as a sacred world of paradises and hells, with its different palaces and divinities. Third, I present the inscriptions, texts and pictograms evoking the main processes of Internal Alchemy and the processes related to the thunder rites. I will explain the preliminary indications of this chart in the light of fundamental writings of Internal Alchemy and the thunder rites, in addition to the translation of the texts on the map.

Analysis of the Chart for Cultivation of Perfection demonstrates this Taoist representation of the body dates from the Qing dynasty, probably not earlier than the eighteenth century. Yet, it resonates with the drawings of the body and alchemical processes which have developed since the drawings of Yanluozi (tenth century) under the Song, Yuan and Ming dynasties. Most of its visual elements are richer than those of Yanluozi; they are inspired by diagrams found in alchemical texts of Song and
Yuan. Moreover, in spite of this evolution, the drawings, even though they present variants, nevertheless display a remarkable continuity.

The place and the date of creation of the original Chart for Cultivation of Perfection remains uncertain. All the known copies come from temples belonging to the Dragon Gate lineage, which in many places have developed alchemical techniques linked to the cultivation of perfection and to thunder rites. The known versions show a broad diffusion of the chart.

The alchemical techniques mentioned in the form of symbols, captions, texts or drawings, correspond to texts from the Ming and Qing dynasties. The symbolic language of these charts is not as heavily influenced by laboratory terms as was the case in the Song dynasty. Rather, its language makes reference to the natural world, the animal world, and the heavens. The exchange and union process between opposites such as yin and yang, water and fire, are described in poetic terms. It is likewise for the process of transmutation of the three basic ingredients (the spermatic essence, the breath and the spirit), or the five agents (wood, fire, earth, metal, water). These changes occur in three steps suggested by the symbolism of three chariots represented along the spine, drawings already present on the Yanluozi diagrams (tenth century).

There is also emphasis on specific elements of the southern alchemical tradition linked to Zhang Boduan, such as the representation of orifices as places of transition from one reality to another, places of transmutation and access points to reality. Similarly, the kidneys are of paramount importance. It is the subject of several diagrams and inscriptions consisting of terminology found in the alchemical texts of the southern tradition. Here is situated the pivot of transformations, the root of life, the place from where springs thunder. But the unique feature of this body map is the close link established between Inner Alchemy and the thunder rites, combining inner meditation, visualizations and rituals in a simultaneous action on the inner world of the officiant and the outside world.

The body itself is not drawn according to visual reality, but as a cosmological place and a sacred area. It is the perfected state (zhen 真) of the body, just as the charts of the Five Peaks are the real and efficient representations of the five mountains. In the empty space of the sheet, the representations by lines are only there to evoke the places for the realization of the Way or of alchemical process. If Yanluozi had drawn two representations more anatomical in style next to the alchemical representations, these types of representations have completely disappeared in later Taoist works, especially when the charts underwent simplification. Indeed, if the depictions of the six viscera remained on the Chart for the Cultivation of Perfection, would it not be even more important to highlight the central representation of the “alchemical pot.” This pot was the trapeze with above the cruciform flower and its centre, the lines being there to contain the inscriptions about the transformations in five viscera and the five directions, and evoke the image of the athanor, place of transmutations.

The image of the body, an oval outline from which the limbs are absent, is a stylistic form that first appeared in the Song dynasty. Indeed, if the lower limbs are represented, crossed in lotus posture in accordance with the meditation technique commonly used, they appear more like a support for the central oval than an integral part of the body. The more the body is refined, the more its contours disappear until reinstatement to the Way, to emptiness.

Even more than in the other representations, the circle dominates, or at least the idea of circular motion. It is suggested by numerous circles: the circle crowning the head, the central circles forming a flower, the circles of the three passes, the circle inside the kidneys, without forgetting the encircled characters. This habit of drawing circles for representing the unity that comprise the phenomena or the movement probably goes back to the school of Chan Buddhism. A nested circle of black and white rings, a probable model of representation of the “Chart of the Great Ultimate” (Taiji tu), represents the Ālayavijñāna, the eighth cognitive faculty of Buddhism called “storehouse consciousness,” support of all knowable, receptacle of the seeds of all phenomena.1 This diagram is
integrated into a text on the history of Chan Buddhism written by Zongmi (780–841), a specialist in both Chan and Flower Ornament (Avatamsaka) Buddhist schools. It also exists in the Buddhist context representations by five black or white circles of the “Map of the Five Positions” (Wuwei tu) representing schematically five positions of the mind in its relation to the world, or five forms of relationship between the noumenal and the phenomenal, the universal and the personal, the one and the many, according to the Cao Dong school (ninth century) of Chan Buddhism. He also recalled the use of the circle by two masters of one of the five main schools of Chan Buddhism: the Guiyang school. Guishan Lingyou (775–853) and Yangshan Huiji (807–883) used the circle in their teaching, to express the totality, the relations between the one and the multiple, and the simultaneous understanding of the noumenal and the phenomenal. But in the Taoist context it also bears the connotation of a magical place, a place of passage called hole, cavity, pass, a locus of transmutation, of all possibilities. It is also the delimitation of a space, and the control of the object: when a Taoist adept draws a character in a circle, he fixes and controls the object or the god represented.

In the Chart for the Cultivation of Perfection, we find the semantic component of “rain” representing the breath of Supreme Yin (Taiyin), the Supreme Yang (Taiyang) and the Celestial Net. One essential difference between this Chart and other known body maps is the representation of the thirty lunar phases around the body, which strongly evokes the dynamism, the waxing and waning cycle of yin and yang, and the phases of the sun and of the moon, in both the microcosm and the macrocosm. While characters designating the phases of the new moon, full moon and the moon quarters are inscribed on the representation of the Book for Universal Salvation, they are replaced here by drawings and we cannot truly say that there has been an amalgam with the representation of the alchemical mirror of Xiao Peng. We note that in any case, under the Qing Dynasty, the lunar phases tend to be represented by drawings.
and hells, the terminology, suggests that they are rites which belong to a school linked to the Correct Method of the Heart of Heaven and to the rites of the Jade Hall developed by Lu Shizhong (after 1138) and Lei Shizhong. The rites of the Jade Hall are defined as the “internal secrets” of the Correct Method of the Heart of Heaven.

Lei Shizhong (1121–1295) gravitated to the Mount Wudang area and had many disciples. Even if the existing copies of the Chart for the Cultivation of Perfection do not give that of Mount Wudang as the oldest, it is not impossible that it is nevertheless the place of origin of this chart. As regards palaces and alchemical terminology, the Chart for the Cultivation of Perfection is a continuation of the Universal salvation scripture’s comments and is also based on the Combined Scriptures of the Founding Acts of the Jade Emperor on High (13th century), an important text for the current of the Pure Subtlety, but also in the Dragon Gate tradition and other currents employing the thunder rites.

This representation of the body is a “diagram” (tu 圖), or a “diagram and register” (tulu 圖籙). It is related to other famous diagrams of Taoism, especially the Numinous Treasure and alchemical traditions. One Song text, the Representations of the Original Chaotic Great Ultimate in the Culture of Perfection by Xiao Daocun, makes great use of the drawings, notably the circles. From the Song onwards, the habit to illustrate the methods for the cultivation of perfection became more and more numerous. The question arises, as with most of maps: how should we read them?

An overall reading of this diagram is comparable to “creative thinking” (yi 意), the internal image that allows the efficient implementation of any act and empowers creation. The role of a register, as is suggested by the name given on the version of the Dragon and Tiger Altar, the magical aspect, talismanic, one could say exorcist, is certainly present. We know only the circumstances of the etching of the stele of the Wudang Mountains, created at the anniversary of Lü Dongbin, and we have found that commemorative steles of an almost talismanic value were often engraved on the occasion of important cultural ceremonies. Laszlo Legeza mentions this talismanic value of the steles.

While Zhejiang Province was often affected by fires, an official had engraved a “Diagram for the Perfected Warrior to Push away the Fire” (“Zhenwu bihuo tu” 真武避火圖). He says: “I instructed Chen Jijin, Deputy Director of Studies, to copy and ... to oversee how it would be engraved on stone to be implemented across provincial towns, in order to expel evil influences originating from the site, while remaining available those wishing to make prints.” This Chart for the Cultivation of Perfection is reminiscent in many ways of talismans, especially those drawn with a head and representing a god’s body, a sacred geography.

One finds in the Great Method of the Jade Hall of the Three Heavens, of the Supreme Mysterious Origin a series of six talismans having a human form and representing a body, which are intended to purify the body of different elements: the three corpses and the seven po; they eliminate the fatigues of the heart due to the passions, to sex, to avidity, the wilting of the complexion, the fatigue of the body.

Talismans are the body of primordial breath allowing the access to the sacred world, they are the “perfected form” (zhenxing 真形) and the revelation of Reality. Likewise, the Chart for the Cultivation of Perfection is made of primordial breath, it guides the adept who, at different states creates this inner landscape and becomes efficient.

In Taoism, the relationship between the diagrams (tu), the talismans (fu 符), and the registers (lu 籟), has already been noted; Brigitte Baptandier has even translated the term tu as a “talismanic table,” an expression which is well suited to our representation, actually built as a talisman. We find similar components, such as circled characters, trigrams, spirals, pictographic parts, symbolic system, and inscriptions. The body of the follower himself is a talisman, in the sense that it includes only half of the elements, its counterpart being in the celestial world or the world of the Perfection (zhen 真). According to the Book of the Abyssal Perfection (Dongzhen jing), “the gods of the body command 18,000 deities. When man concentrates his mind on them, the 18,000 deities do not disperse, in this case, the heavens bring down...
The oldest oracle in the world was created over 4,500 years ago by Fu Xi, the mythical First Emperor of China. The I Ching, or Book of Changes, has been used ever since as a venerated source of philosophical wisdom. Consult it with respect and you will receive advice on how to act now—and in the future. Now Chao-Hsiu Chen’s 64 exquisite paintings make it easier to understand than ever before, and the I Ching’s wisdom is accessible to everyone, anywhere, and at any time. Includes three metallic coins.

Excerpt: THE TEMPLE AND THE I CHING

There was no wind; it was calm everywhere. The river ran gently without hurry, forming one curve after the other until it reached the ocean.

The reed beds along the shore were shaken by a group of egrets; a crowd of gulls invaded the territory, creating another breeze. One flew up suddenly from the surface of the water, with a freshly caught fish in its beak. The other birds gathered around him, creating a further disturbance.

I was following the spectacle played out by the birds before me, and my sight rose higher and higher, until it reached a golden twinkling ... It was the top of the temple tower, which seemed to glow more than I remembered. I had met the abbot there a while ago, and he had helped me to learn the way to great compassion.

I walked along the sandy riverbank, and climbed the hill to the temple. Nothing seemed to have changed. It was late afternoon, before evening prayers, and I found the master meditating in the octagonal pavilion in the garden. I put my palms together in front of my chest, and made a low bow.

"Which way has led you here this time?" the master asked me with a gentle smile.

"The way of the water," I answered respectfully, and stole a glimpse at him. His silver beard was even longer than before. He broke out laughing.

"If you have found the way of the water, which goes everywhere, even to the lowest places, then you are ready for the I Ching. I will show you the secret of it."

And so the time went by. Each time I visited the master in the temple, I learned more of the different versions of the I Ching, and I discovered an old version with the interpretations of Lai Zhi De, who was born in the fourth year of the Jia Jing reign of the Emperor Shi Zong in the Ming Dynasty (the year 1525 in the Western calendar). This version combines the different Chinese philosophies of Taoism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Legalism, and the idealist philosophy of the Confucian school in the Song and Ming dynasties, together with the deep understanding of the law of nature and changes of life.

I present this I Ching to you, based on the studies of Lai Zhi De. During my work, the voice of the master often appeared with the words:

Life comes, because it comes.
Life goes, because it goes.
Everything changed, because it happened.
Nothing remained, because it changed ...
an important source of understanding traditional Chinese thought and society. To help readers fully appreciate this archaic classical work, the author of this book comprehensively considers the explanations of the characters of zhou and yi from all traditional perspectives, and then introduces the relationship between Confucius (551-479 BCE) and the later Yi zhuan (Commentaries on the Changes), which elevated the Zhou yi from a divination manual to a classic of wisdom literature. The connections between the sixty-four hexagrams introduced in the book can help define the import of the different hexagrams. As the foundation of the Zhou yi, the traditional study of images and numbers plays a major role in the book. The Zhou yi originally was a divination manual, and this book also offers the author’s special perspectives on this topic. The first part of this book also sketches a scholarly outline of the history of Changes scholarship and further explores image-numerological approaches to the Zhou yi employed by Zhou yi experts of past dynasties.

The second part of this book is made up of some of the author’s prefaces and speeches, which exhibit his views on the relationship between the Yi jing and Chinese oracular culture, on the influence of the Zhou Changes upon Confucianism and contemporary life, and on the latest archaological discoveries.

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Note: The program of translation of the book is sponsored by the Chinese Fund for the Humanities and Social Sciences An achievement of the Center for Zhouyi & Ancient Chinese Philosophy of Shandong University—one of the key research institutes of humanities & social science in China. The translation of the book was primarily proof-checked by Lawrence Scott Davis.

Excerpt: The Zhou yi (a. k. a. Yi jing, the Book of Changes, Zhou Changes) is one of the oldest texts in world history, and it is often considered the "first in the Confucian classics." To this date, it continues to be an important source of understanding traditional Chinese thought and society. To help readers fully appreciate this archaic classical work, the author of this book comprehensively considers the explanations of the characters of zhou and yi from all traditional perspectives, and then introduces the relationship between Confucius (551-479 BCE) and the later Yi zhuan (Commentaries on the Changes), which elevated the Zhou yi from a divination manual to a classic of wisdom literature.

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The Chinese version of this book was published in 1985, which immediately aroused attention from both researchers and amateurs, and continues to be a best seller even now. To date, its Chinese version has become essential reading for both researchers and amateurs and has been reprinted over ten times; its circulation has amounted to over 100,000 copies sold in China.

"This is, to my knowledge, is the first scholarly monograph on the Yijing (Classic of Changes) to be rendered from Chinese into English. As such, it offers English-language readers a unique opportunity to see how one of the foremost scholars of the Changes in China, Professor Liu Dajun, has been thinking about this ancient Chinese classic. Translated by another highly regarded scholar of the Changes, Dr. Zhang Wenzhi, this book will yield many insights, and explain a number of concepts that have not been fully articulated in any Western-language survey of the Changes:"

Richard J. Smith, George and Nancy Rupp Professor of Humanities emeritus, Rice University and author of Fathoming the Cosmos and Ordering the World: The Yi Jing 0-Ching, or Classic of Changes) and Its Evolution in China "Published in the 1980s, Liu Dajun's Zhouyi Gailun (An Introduction to the Book of Changes) is ground-breaking in the study of the Yi jing. In the book, Liu shows that the image-numerology method—popular during the Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.-220 C.E.)—transformed the Yi jing into a cosmological manual to link all aspects of human life to the unfolding of the cosmos. As a result, the Yi jing was used in a wide variety of areas such as developing the calendar, designing musical tonality, and improving medical science. Thanks to Zhang Wenzhi's translation, Liu Dajun's insights are now made accessible to readers in the English-speaking world. With Zhang's translation, readers will have a deeper understanding of the Yi jing as a world classic that teaches us how to cope with uncertainty and serendipity in everyday life:‘ Tze-ki Hon (Professor, Department of Chinese and History, City University of Hong Kong)

"The great Zhou yi Master Liu Dajun orchestrates his deep traditional understandings of the text through penetrating explorations of the main traditional modes of thought concerning the workings and understanding of the Classic of Changes. This is the most effective critical examination we have of the foundations of study of the Yi jing, now brilliantly translated into English by Professor Zhang Wenzhi; it is an indispensable companion to reading the Zhou yi." Lawrence Scott Davis, Professor of Chinese Literature, Nanjing University.

The Zhou yi, usually rendered as the Book of Changes, the Classic of Changes, or the Zhou Changes, and so on, is a cryptic, archaic book. Several hundred types of exegetical books about it have been written from the Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.-220 C.E.) through contemporary times, and yet the Zhou yi still presents many enigmas. Liu Dajun has been studying the Zhou yi for many years and completed this Zhou yi gai lun (An Introduction to the Book of Changes) based upon his comprehensive insights, setting forth his unique perspectives on many puzzles related to the Zhou yi. Liu Dajun avers that, in studying the Zhou yi, we should not only highlight the verbal exegesis but also take imagenumerology into account."Today our interpretations of the text come mainly from verbal exegesis, but at the same time, we should also give consideration to the imagery which can still be seen from the basic text." Based on concrete evidence, he asserts: "The authors of the Zhou yi certainly had used the inverted images in the imagery of the Changes." These views are really incisive. The book also examines many divinatory stories and points out that "The fortune or misfortune of the hexagram or line statements in question is not of great significance to the consultant, since the interpreters of the hexagrams can always find their own reasons," which is particularly on the mark in demonstrating the superstitious quality of divination. So far as the
origin of the Yi zhuan ("Commentaries on the Changes," or the "Ten Wings") is concerned, Liu agrees by and large with my conclusions in "On the Dating and Philosophical Ideas of the Yi zhuan" (Lun Yidazhuan de zhuzuo niandai yu zhexue sixiang and adds important supplements, proving with sufficient evidence that the Wenyan ("Commentary on Words of the Text") came into being earlier than the Xici ("Commentary on the appended Phrases"), the Tuan ("Commentary on the Judgments") appeared earlier than the Wenyan, and the Da xiang ("Commentary on the Great Images") was completed earlier than the Tuan. This part of his argument is indeed tenable. It is only his conclusion that the Shuogua ("Explaining the Trigrams") came into being earlier than the Xici that apparently needs further discussion, given that the composite terms like daode (literally, way and virtue) and xingming (literally, nature and fate) in the Shuogua are not available in Mencius and Zhuang zi neipian ("Internal Chapters" of Zhuang zi), but frequently appear in Zhuang zi waipian ("External Chapters" of Zhuang zi) and Xun, and therefore ought to be the terms prevailing in the late Warring States period (475-221 B.C.E.). So, at least the first two paragraphs of the Shuogua ought to appear later than the "Internal Chapters" of Zhuang zi but are contemporary with its "External Chapters," which could not have existed earlier than most of the material of the Xici. These issues can be further investigated, but I am very pleased to see this new achievement in Zhou yi studies. <>

Chinese Culture of Intelligence by Keping Wang [Palgrave Macmillan 9789811331725]

With the rise of China in the 21st century, this book offers a trans-cultural and thematic study of key Chinese concepts which influence modern day Chinese thinking across the spheres of politics, economics and society. It reflects on the major schools of Chinese thought including Confucianism, Daoism and Zen Buddhism, providing a historical perspective on the ideological development of China in terms of the relationship between man and nature, social ethics, political governance, poetry education, aesthetic criticism and art theory. It also explores primary aspects of Chinese poetics and aesthetics with reference to the interaction between the endogenous theories and their western counterparts. Written by a leader in Chinese Aesthetics against the background of both globalization and glocalization at home and abroad, this is a key read for all those interested in the cultural, philosophical and aesthetic underpinnings of contemporary China.

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Praise for Chinese Culture of Intelligence

"Since the days of Lin Yutang and his wonderful books My Country and My People and The Importance of Living (1935 and 1937), there seems to be a lack of comprehensive interpretations of Chinese culture for the Westerner. Keping Wang’s Chinese Culture of Intelligence can be seen as an attempt to fill this lacuna. His inspiring book highlights some Chinese cultural ideals and their relevance to the human condition from a modern transcultural perspective. It reconsiders such fundamentals as the human-nature relationship, the ideal of harmony, character cultivation, the role of poetry and music, Zen Buddhist views and many more of the intriguing aspects of Chinese culture that have not lost their relevance today. Keping Wang’s book provides insights into what really matters behind the Chinese way of thinking and doing from the past to the present. And so we discover that Chinese culture, yet so little understood in the West, still can teach us a lot—as way of life.” —Karl-Heinz Pohl, Professor, Sinology Department, Trier University, Germany

"This marvelous book considers the dramatic, complex renaissance of China in the 21st century and offers a deeply humane and ecumenical perspective. Beginning from the most basic Heaven-human relations, Professor Wang describes the place of the human being in the world, and a response to our situation that emphasizes cultivation of wisdom. The vision of self-cultivation is then extended in such a way that the practical application of poetics, with all its far-reaching capabilities, holds out an elegant, if subtle, hope for the future. The outlook is both intimately Chinese and eminently transcultural at the same time, a testament to Professor Wang’s wide experience in history, philosophy and aesthetics." —Rick Benitez, Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, Australia

Excerpt: The new millennium witnesses the rejuvenation or renaissance of China with her increasing impact in more areas across the world. Accordingly, there arise a number of such assumptions as China model, China erection, China collapse, and China threat. Observed and articulated from different angles for different purposes, they are all set out to be somewhat eye-catching, thought-provoking, anxiety-hatching, or fear-raising. In order to render these disputable and paradoxical scenarios more substantial and justifiable rather than sensational and confusing, a variety of approaches are called for to find out what really matters behind the Chinese way of thinking and doing from the past to the present. One of them, in my view, seems to be more fruitful than any others in a cognitive sense. It is based on Chinese culture of intelligence as is reasonably verified by virtue of my working contact with many colleagues from the West, and my teaching experience in some universities overseas. The core substance of such culture consists in Chinese ideals and philosophical ponderings, all preoccupied with the Way (Dao) of heaven and human, the expectation of ecumenism via harmonism, the virtue of sageliness within and kingliness without, the telos of keeping the country in peace and its people at ease, the humane governance through wise leadership, the rationale of appropriate inheritance and innovation, the theorem of character building through education, the approach to aesthetic contemplation, and so forth. This book is intended to have a second reflection on them with due consideration of their historical relevance to the human condition and the global issues at large.

Incidentally, what is noteworthy is the notion of wen hua qua culture in Chinese tradition. It is the shortened form of ren wen jiao hua. Originally it means to enlighten, cultivate, and moralize persons by means of education in rites and music (li yue) apart from the classics by ancient thinkers. As noted in early history, rites (li) used to stand for legal rules, social institutions, ceremonial rituals, and codes of conduct, which were designed and regulated to impose on personal cultivation and citizenship from without. Music was then a trinity of arts as it was integrated with poetry and dance. It would be performed in accord with rites and their specific requirements, and deployed to facilitate character building and human fulfillment from within. Naturally it was supposed to realize these teleological aims through joy-conscious recreation and appreciation as well.

This being the case, what Chinese culture (wen hua) implies is more corresponding to its Hellenic
counterpart (paideia). It is by nature multi-dimensional and multi-functional. Say, it is related not only to the continuing evolution of philosophical, pedagogical, and artistic thoughts, but also to the historical sedimentation of social ethos, spiritual pursuit, and national mentality. All this is, explicitly and implicitly, embodied in the political, economic, ideological, ethical, and other practical domains. As discerned in these domains ever since the New Culture Movement (i.e., the Westernization) launched in the early twentieth century, the positive aspects would provide Chinese citizens with an inexhaustible fountainhead of initiative and spirituality and motivate them to work hard toward the long-term goals and dreams for a just society, a prosperous state, and a good life altogether. Instead, the negative aspects would lead them to pin down the endogenous shortcomings, shrug off the redundant components, and hanker after other alternatives with particular reference to the Western counterpart. It thus helps promote the pragmatic conception of transformational creation or transformational creation among the Chinese practitioners at confrontation with modernity in the past century or so.

In brief, this volume is schemed to reconsider some cultural ideals along with some leading thinkers ranging from antiquity to modernity in China. The reconsideration is to be carried out from a transcultural perspective against the background of both globalization and glocalization at home and abroad. As widely acknowledged in the recent period, transcultural approach is comparative and interactive in essence. It is hereby employed to explore the cardinal features, including differences and similarities, of more than two target cultures in striking contrast. Very often than not, it tends to take up the other culture(s) as a mirror to show up the merits and demerits of the endogenous heritage. Further on, it is claimed to attain an in-depth understanding of the chosen objects through comparative analysis and draw out complementary possibilities for the sake of transformational creation via selective innovation.

Conducted as a thematic inquiry, this book will look specifically into such conceptual entities and thinking strategies as heaven-human oneness, the meeting of East and West, harmonization without being patternized, all under heaven as a genre of ecumenism through harmonism, cultivating wisdom for a good life, ancient quarrel over music, gentle and kind character building by poetry education, poetic wisdom in Zen enlightenment, moralistic poetics in Neo-Confucianism, the poetic state par excellence, transcultural pursuit of the Overman, pragmatic reason in view of anthropo-historical ontology, emotional root of aesthetic metaphysics, sublime poetics of Maratic type, experience of appreciating landscape, art as sedimentation in a trifold linkage, and so forth. During the process, it will expose some theoretical hypotheses with reference to the interaction and synthesis between Chinese and Western doctrines. In a word, what is to be discussed herein attempts to rediscover the old in order to perceive the new in light of the historical union of the past, the present, and the future.

These discussions comprise 17 essays in all. Some are written recently for international symposiums. Others are partly reproduced out of the papers I have contributed to the journals and books over the past decade, which are published by such bodies as Ashgate, Blackwell, China Social Sciences, Fudan University, Rodopi, Springer, University of Sydney, University of Hawaii, and so on. Most of them were initially presented at international conferences organized by universities or societies across Europe, America, Australia, Asia, and Africa. Afterward they were further developed and formulated as a result of the comments and queries collected on those rewarding roundtable and panel sessions. When fitted into this volume, they are all subject to further clarifications, modifications, and additions regarding certain arguments in question. <>


Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) was one of the most important philosophers of all time; he was also one of the most radical and controversial. The story of Spinoza’s life takes the reader into the heart of Jewish Amsterdam in the seventeenth century and, with Spinoza’s exile from Judaism, into the midst of the tumultuous political, social, intellectual, and religious world of the young Dutch Republic. This new edition of Steven Nadler’s biography, winner
of the Koret Jewish Book Award for biography and translated into a dozen languages, is enhanced by exciting new archival discoveries about his family background, his youth, and the various philosophical, political, and religious contexts of his life and works. There is more detail about his family’s business and communal activities, about his relationships with friends and correspondents, and about the development of his writings, which were so scandalous to his contemporaries.

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Excerpt: Preface to the Second Edition
It has been almost three hundred and fifty years since the death of the philosopher Bento/Benedictus de Spinoza, in 1677, and over two decades since I completed the first edition of this biography. Remarkably, we are still uncovering new facts related to his life — in archival documents, in published and unpublished treatises and broadsheets, and in a wide variety of correspondences — as well as putting together already known facts in new and illuminating ways. Despite the still relatively impoverished information about his ancestry, his parents and other relatives, his youth, and even the years of his maturity, a better picture is emerging of his family background, his activity as a merchant, and his life after his extraordinary expulsion from the Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish congregation. We are also, I believe, gaining a deeper understanding of his grand philosophical project, especially as Spinoza scholars are now more open than ever to the various intellectual contexts of his thought.

In this second edition, I have also been able to take advantage of Edwin Curley’s completion of his magisterial, two-volume English edition of Spinoza’s writings. This means that, for the most part, I can refer the reader consistently to just one source for translations of Spinoza’s works and letters (although in some cases I have modified these translations)...

Preface to the First Edition
Baruch de Spinoza (1632-77) was the son of a prominent merchant in Amsterdam’s Portuguese Jewish community. He was also among the more gifted students in its school. But something happened around his twenty-third year — whether it was sudden or gradual, we do not know — that led to the harshest excommunication ever proclaimed by the leaders of the Amsterdam Sephardim. The result was Spinoza’s departure from the community — indeed, from Judaism entirely. He would go on to become one of the most important and famous philosophers of all time, and certainly the most radical and controversial of his own.

The young man’s transformation (if that’s what it was) from ordinary Jewish boy — living, to all appearances, a perfectly normal orthodox life and remarkable perhaps only for his intelligence — to iconoclastic philosopher is, unfortunately, hidden from us, possibly forever. We have only the herem document, full of oaths and maledictions, that was composed by the community’s governors. There is so little surviving material, so little that is known for certain about the details of Spinoza’s life, particularly before 1661 (when his extant correspondence begins), that we can only speculate on his emotional and intellectual development and on the more mundane matters that fill out a person’s existence. But what a rich field for speculation it is, particularly given the fascination of its subject.

Metaphysical and moral philosopher, political and religious thinker, biblical exegete, social critic, grinder of lenses, failed merchant, Dutch
intellectual, Jewish heretic. What makes Spinoza’s life so interesting are the various, and at times opposing, contexts to which it belongs: the community of Portuguese and Spanish immigrants, many of them former "marranos," who found refuge and economic opportunity in the newly independent Dutch Republic; the turbulent politics and magnificent culture of that young nation which, in the middle of the seventeenth century, was experiencing its so-called Golden Age; and, not the least, the history of philosophy itself.

As a Jew, even an apostate one, Spinoza was always, to a certain extent, an outsider in the Calvinist land in which he was born and from which, as far as we know, he never traveled. But after his excommunication from the Talmud Torah congregation and his voluntary exile from the city of his birth, Spinoza no longer identified himself as a Jew. He preferred to see himself as just another citizen of the Dutch Republic — and perhaps, as well, of the transnational Republic of Letters. He nourished himself not only on the Jewish traditions to which he had been introduced in the synagogue’s school, but also on the philosophical, theological, and political debates that so often disturbed the peace of his homeland’s first hundred years. His legacy, of course, was as great as his appropriation. In many respects, the Dutch Republic was still groping for its identity during Spinoza’s lifetime. And as much as Spinoza’s Dutch contemporaries reviled and attacked him, there can be no denying the significance of the contribution that he made to the development of Dutch intellectual culture. It is, perhaps, as great a contribution as that which he made to the development of the character of modern Judaism.

This is the first full-length and complete biography of Spinoza ever to appear in English. It is also the first to be written in any language in quite a long time. There have, of course, been short studies of one aspect or another of Spinoza’s life, and practically every book on Spinoza’s philosophy begins with a brief biographical sketch. But the last substantial attempt to put together a complete "life" of Spinoza was Jacob Freudenthal’s Spinoza: Sein Leben und Sein Lehre at the beginning of this century. A great deal of research into the history of Amsterdam’s Portuguese Jews and on Spinoza himself has been done since Freudenthal published his valuable study, however…

Let the scholarly reader beware: it was not my intention to track down and present the various sources of Spinoza’s thought, all the possible thinkers and traditions that may have influenced him. That would be an infinite task, one that no individual could accomplish in a lifetime. This is, in other words, most definitely not an "intellectual" biography. At certain points it was important — indeed, essential — for me to look closely at what seemed to be Spinoza’s intellectual development. But I make no claims for exhaustiveness in my research on his philosophical origins. Nor is this a study of Spinoza’s philosophy. Books and articles on his metaphysical and other doctrines are a dime a dozen, and I had no desire to add to the growing bibliography of literature for specialists. Rather, I have tried to provide the general reader with an accessible overview of Spinoza’s ideas. If I appear to some Spinoza scholars to be guilty at times of simplification or distortion, then I plead nolo contendere: I do not want to pick any academic fights on the finer details of Spinozism. Let that be for a different time and place. What I am interested in — and what I hope my reader is interested in — is the life and times and thoughts of an important and immensely relevant thinker.

The question that lies at the heart of this biography is how did the various aspects of Spinoza’s life — his ethnic and social background, his place in exile between two such different cultures as the Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish community and Dutch society, his intellectual development, and his social and political relationships — come together to produce one of history’s most radical thinkers? But there is another, more general question that interests me as well: what did it mean to be a philosopher and a Jew in the Dutch Golden Age? The quest for answers to these questions must begin almost two hundred years earlier, in another part of Europe. <>

Spinoza’s Political Treatise: A Critical Guide edited by Yitzhak Y. Melamed, Hasana Sharp [Cambridge University Press, 9781107636927] Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise was published anonymously in 1670 and immediately
provoked huge debate. Its main goal was to claim that the freedom of philosophizing can be allowed in a free republic and that it cannot be abolished without also destroying the peace and piety of that republic. Spinoza criticizes the traditional claims of revelation and offers a social contract theory in which he praises democracy as the most natural form of government. This new Critical Guide presents new essays by well-known scholars in the field and covers a broad range of topics, including the political theory and the metaphysics of the work, religious toleration, the reception of the text by other early modern philosophers, and the relation of the text to Jewish thought. It offers valuable new perspectives on this important and influential work.

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Excerpt: If it is no longer possible to call Benedict de Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise “a neglected masterpiece,” such a description of the Political Treatise remains quite justified. Editors of various critical editions praise the Tractatus Politicus as Spinoza’s most developed analysis of civil life, containing the most mature and systematic expression of his political thought. In the recent publication of the second volume of The Collected Works of Spinoza, Edwin Curley contends that the Political Treatise “offers us the materials for a much deeper understanding of Spinoza’s political philosophy than we could glean from his other works.” In the French edition, Pierre-François Moreau goes further. He declares that we find in Spinoza’s final work the most “autonomous” expression of his first principles as well as his politics. According to Moreau, we find in the Political Treatise Spinoza’s philosophy freed at last from both the conceptual constraints of Cartesianism and traditional perspectives on natural law and right. Yet, very few scholars, especially among those writing in English, examine the TP in any detail. How is it that a major work by such an influential and controversial philosopher has been virtually ignored?

Although we do not know precisely when Spinoza began composing his Tractatus Politicus, he was working on it intensively from the second half of 1676 up until his untimely death in February 1677. In contrast to a number of his other works, Spinoza likely did not circulate the manuscript among his friends and correspondents. The only reference to it is in a copy of a letter, the original of which is lost. We know neither the date nor the addressee of the letter, though it served as the preface to the Political Treatise, included in his Opera Posthuma (1677). The letter apologizes for a lapse in communication, but expects that his friend will be pleased since it was by virtue of this very friend’s urging that he had been occupied composing the Political Treatise. He describes the first six chapters, and notes that he is currently drafting the seventh
on monarchy. He announces his intention to proceed to an analysis of “Aristocratic and Popular Governments, and finally to Laws and other particular questions concerning politics.” Spinoza succumbed to illness after authoring only four paragraphs of what was projected to be one of two chapters on democracy, or popular government. Thus, what was planned but never written includes the remainder of chapter II, another on democracy, as well as chapters on “laws” and “other particular questions concerning politics.” The fact that his last work was incomplete and uncirculated among his friends serves as partial explanation for its relative obscurity.

Unlike the Theological-Political Treatise and the Ethics, the TP did not attract much attention for the first two centuries following Spinoza’s death. It would be fair to conjecture that the Political Treatise simply disappeared in the controversies surrounding the Ethics and Theological-Political Treatise. Small batch printings of the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, the Ethics, and especially the Theological-Political Treatise were frequent in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Between 1670 and 1694, the TTP was printed many times, often under disguised titles, and distributed in various translations: French, English, and Dutch. The eighteenth century saw many printings of the Ethics and the TTP as well as a translation of the entire Opera Posthuma into German. To appreciate the significance of Spinoza’s influence in the history of modernity, scholars point to Pierre Bayle’s widely read Historical and Critical Dictionary (1697), which dedicates its longest entry to Spinoza. Besides Bayle’s dictionary, the other primary introductions to Spinozism for the wider, educated European public was Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie (1751-1759). Neither mentions the Political Treatise at all. So while Spinoza is widely considered among the most influential philosophers of the modern period, his final words were not among those that preoccupied either his critics or his acolytes.

The history of Spinoza’s reception focuses heavily on the first part of the Ethics, in particular on the relationship between substance and modes, along with significant attention to (and, of course, alarm at) his critiques of teleology, providence, miracles, and free will. His contemporaries and successors were most concerned to determine the theological and metaphysical implications of Spinoza’s insistence that modes inhere in Substance, such that particular things ought to be understood as those infinitely many ways that God exists. Even if his political philosophy was original and radical, most shocking and exciting were Spinoza’s denials of any real distinction between the creator and its creations, the teleological order of the universe with man at its center, and the portrait of a God who might intervene prudently in worldly affairs. Spinoza’s apostasy — fantastic and real — overshadowed the portrait we have only recently begun to draw of Spinoza as a political scientist: a thinker striving to make sense of human affairs “with the same freedom of spirit” proper to mathematics or meteorology (TP, ch. III/273/34).

Today, although scholarship on Spinoza is flourishing, very little of it develops the concepts and arguments of his final work. While we can only speculate about why this is the case, the fact that the Theological-Political Treatise primarily discusses democracy while the Political Treatise only does so before examining the form of government that most preoccupies twentieth- and twenty-first-century political philosophy in the west is surely part of the explanation. The Theological-Political Treatise likewise concerns issues — such as the relationship between religious pluralism and political freedom — that remain at the center of geopolitical struggles today. Yet, if we can hope to find in the Political Treatise a “much deeper understanding of Spinoza’s political philosophy” and the most “autonomous” and original expression of his thinking, we risk missing a great deal by ignoring it. Without the Political Treatise, we not only lack a more complete picture of Spinoza as a political thinker, but we are also deprived of many of his insights into the dynamics of power and social life.

This volume brings scholarly attention to this least studied of Spinoza’s major works. Since so little has been written on the Political Treatise, independent of Spinoza’s other work, we aim to begin rather than conclude discussion of the text. It is intended as an invitation to deeper exploration of the many problems and analyses we might find in the Political Treatise. Since the essays included in this
volume and those to come will likely produce interpretations no less diverse than those of the Ethics and the Theological-Political Treatise, we do not want to foreclose debate about the message or meaning of the Political Treatise in this introduction. Nevertheless, we will say a few words about the work’s global ambition.

In his editorial preface, Curley announces that the "central thesis of Spinoza’s moral and political philosophy is that nothing is more useful to us than living in community with other people, and binding ourselves to fellow citizens by such ties as are apt to make us one people" (E4app12] II/269/9—10). The Political Treatise does not deviate from this central thesis, declaring repeatedly that the commonwealth operates to the extent that “the multitude is guided as if by one mind.” Moreover, the civil order is more coherent, harmonious, and unified to the extent that it agrees with the dictates of reason (TP, ch. 2] III/283/10-20). Like the virtuous person in the Ethics, the commonwealth is powerful and rational to the extent that it does those things that truly enhance and contribute to its perseverance (TP, ch. 4] III/292).

Just as the first part of the Ethics arouses no end of interpretive problems by claiming that modes have their being in substance and are freer to the extent that they are conceived through the necessity of their flow from the essence of God, the Political Treatise likewise invites us to puzzle over the precise relationship of the many to the one. If a state operates only by securing some kind of mental harmony, what is the minimum threshold for unity? If we are more or less “one” depending on how well our actions agree with reason, do we cease to be distinct individuals to the extent that we exercise our power effectively? Or does the "one mind" of civic rationality yield some kind of dialectical paradox such that each of us is increasingly individuated and united to the collective to the extent that the civil order encourages the free exercise of our powers? The Political Treatise reveals the practical dimensions of age-old metaphysical questions concerning the identity of particulars that together compose larger unities. Likewise, it takes the constitution of unity to be a social problem that might be solved politically. It elaborates an institutional program that promises to coordinate an inevitably diverse populace, subject necessarily to affects, into an effective unity (animorum unione).

The express aim of the Political Treatise is to outline the conditions under which a commonwealth’s affairs may be "so ordered that, whether the people who administer them are led by reason or by an affect, they can’t be induced to be disloyal or act badly" (TP, ch. II III/275/21-25. Italics added). This aim is much more ambitious than the TP, where Spinoza stresses: "I do not intend to show how a state could be formed so that it might, in spite of everything, always be preserved securely" (TTP, ch. 17] III/203/5). In the TP, Spinoza’s concern is less with the susceptibility of subjects to irrationality than with the temptation of rulers to abuse. He insists everywhere that it is folly to count on the virtue of the state’s ministers for an enduring commonwealth. “Whether the constitution is monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic, it is necessary to appoint judges who will “practice justice without giving special consideration to anyone, not even the King, if he commands something to be contrary to the established law. For Kings are not Gods, but men, who are often captivated by the Syrens’ song” (TP, ch. 7] III/308/1—2). The first word of the Political Treatise is affectus, in whose bondage each of us remains necessarily. The problem is not only that any one of us is susceptible to illness, greed, or vengeance. It is that a poorly ordered commonwealth provides nearly irresistible temptations for those in power to undermine the fabric of social life. When affairs are so ordered that it is all too easy for a powerful few to seek private gain or to use the police or military as a vector for revenge, even the strongest of souls may be compelled to do so. For reason "has no weight in the marketplace or the court, where we need it most” (TP, ch. 1] III/275/ 13-15).

One of the important features of the TP is the appearance of the notion of a “free multitude” (ch. 5 [111/296-7], and ch. 7 [III/319]). While in the TTP and the Ethics Spinoza’s attitude toward the multitude is typically negative, the TP promotes the establishment of a community of free men. The reader will also discern in the TP passages in which Spinoza criticizes his own, early negative attitude...
toward the multitude (compare TP, ch. 7 [III/319/27] with E4p54s). The result is that the Political Treatise appears more universalistic, evincing an ambition to maximize the proportion of a commonwealth’s subjects who might benefit from institutionalizing liberating forms of association. Rather than blaming some segment of society for civil unrest, the Political Treatise aims to understand how natural beings, subject necessarily to passions, can be enabled and constrained to animate and preserve the common interest. It treats the virtue and vice of rulers and ruled as the creatures of the commonwealth. If rulers are good, the credit lies with the State’s organization. If subjects violate the law and threaten social security, the State must be disordered (TP, ch. 5) III/295-96). Spinoza’s political program is predicated on the universality of our finitude. It appreciates the vulnerability of each and every one of us to vice. Nevertheless, the vice of statesmen is of particular concern because it is especially consequential. Thus, the focus of the Political Treatise is upon those forms of political order that breed vicious ministers of public affairs whose disdain for law and the common interest threaten to “turn the civil order into a state of hostility” (TP, ch. 41 III/293/22).

At the same time, our finitude justifies the relative optimism and ambition of the Political Treatise. Because we are so deeply shaped by how political and social life is ordered, by how others act and feel, and by civic participation, a State organized to engender a free multitude rather than slaves (instruments of pleasure and power for the rulers) will yield enduring power for itself and its constituents. He thus outlines the institutional arrangements that support the greatest possible exercise of reason, for as many — male — citizens as possible. Representatives of government ought to be involved in different trades, hail from diverse regions, and have different forms of expertise. Transparency and participation, he suggests, will enable as many as possible to govern and be governed in accordance with their own interests. In addition to an uncompromising critique of political abuse, Spinoza’s commitment to realism exudes hope for the possibility of a free republic.

Although the Political Treatise conveys a deep appreciation for human plasticity and the possibilities of shared virtue, Spinoza famously excludes women and servants (as well as foreigners and criminals) from the category of subjects who might share the duties of democratic government. This exclusion is at odds with several currents of his argument in the TP as well as the philosophical anthropology of his Ethics. If, as he contends repeatedly, we reason better, the more actively diverse members of the commonwealth contribute to the process of deliberation, why exclude the vast majority of constituents? If a preponderance of vice is owed to a poorly ordered commonwealth and not to any innate defect in human beings, why not order the society to maximize the political intelligence of the whole populace? These and other problems concern contributors to this volume, but critical debate will surely not be settled here. Spinoza’s Political Treatise is both incomplete and imperfect, but its study provides an undeniably richer and perhaps more controversial portrait of his political philosophy.

The first two chapters address the relationship of Spinoza’s Political Treatise to his other major works. Michael Rosenthal’s essay asks four questions about Spinoza’s political theory. First, what is the nature of Spinoza’s so-called realism about politics? Second, what is the ideal civil order or constitution? Third, what does it mean for a realist about politics to speak of ideal constitutions? Fourth, what is the relation of the TTP to the TP? Some have argued that Spinoza’s account in the TP is more “scientific” than in the TTP and eliminates artifices like the social contract and narrative. Rosenthal claims that the TP still depends upon them in crucial ways. He argues the same tripartite structure of explanation is found in both the TTP and the TP: the descriptive or sociological (third-person); the juridical or normative (second-person); and the narrative (first-person). The goal of this chapter is to provide answers to the first three questions concerning how realism is compatible with idealization in terms of this tripartite account.

A commitment to method, argues Julie Cooper, is one of Spinoza’s philosophical signatures. Yet surprisingly little has been written about Spinoza’s method for the study of politics. In this context, the Political Treatise emerges as a crucial text for understanding Spinoza’s method, because it is the
lone text in which Spinoza opines on proper approaches to the study of politics. In this chapter, Cooper examines the techniques that Spinoza employs in the Political Treatise. When compared to the Theologico-Political Treatise, the Political Treatise is notable for its abstraction, for the negligible work performed by history and experience, according to Cooper. She highlights Spinoza’s abstract turn in an effort to temper some of the revolutionary fervor that surrounds Spinoza’s unfinished work. In the Political Treatise, dispensing with an abstract theory of right does not usher in a permanent revolution. Rather, it licenses abstraction from historical contingency in a quest for modes of argument — whether deductive or empirical — powerful enough to forestall controversy and dissent.

The next four contributions, each in its own way, pay particular attention to affects, social passions, and virtue. They address the relationship of these human phenomena to the formation or durability of a commonwealth. Moira Gatens examines what Spinoza means when he commits to developing his political theory from the point of view of “human nature .. . as it really is.” She maintains that the Political Treatise treats human nature and its powers of action as they are revealed in recorded history and through everyday experience and observation rather than in an idealized or a priori way. Spinoza’s ambition is to refrain from mocking or bemoaning human folly and instead to try to understand the causal ground of human action. Following the method deployed in natural philosophy, he vows to consider human affects not as malfunctions of human nature but as necessary and integral parts of its mode of being. But does this stated aim of the TP indicate an inconsistency or conundrum in Spinoza’s philosophy? Given his explicit critique of universals and abstractions, and his doctrine of the singular essence that defines each individual thing, is it permissible for him to posit a conception of human nature at all? If it can be shown that Spinoza does not have a robust notion of an actually existing human nature, then in what sense can the TP claim to show human nature as it really is?

Running through Spinoza’s work — argues Susan James — is the venerable view that human beings have more in common with each other than with any other kind of thing, and that, as they become more rational, their commonality increases. James’s chapter begins by considering the kinds of commonality that are at stake in Spinoza’s argument. At first glance it seems that people become more like one another as reasoning leads them to shared knowledge claims, but this, she suggests, is not all that Spinoza has in mind. The differences that interest him are above all differences in our affects, and the commonalities with which he is concerned are commonalities of desire. This view is worked out in his doctrine of the imitation of the affects, a psychological mechanism that both makes us interdependent and inclines us to envy. One of the tasks of the state is therefore to contain the envy that underprivileged groups are liable to feel for those whose political rights or privileges exceed their own. But how can political communities ensure that envy does not directly or indirectly generate faction and conflict? In particular, how is it meant to be limited in the model constitutions set out in the Political Treatise, which all contain significant levels of political inequality? James identifies a solution to this problem and applies it to Spinoza’s notorious defense of political inequality between men and women.

Chantal Jaquet examines Spinoza’s claim in TP, ch. 6, that a multitude unites to form a political body prompted not by reason but by some common affect: fear, hope, or desire to avenge a common injury. This chapter examines the possibility, realizability, and legitimacy of such a paradoxical and problematic form of unity. It demonstrates the originality of Spinoza’s thesis, which has not been recognized by commentators. It proceeds to examine the problems a foundation of revenge involves, such as durability, susceptibility to violence, and legitimacy. It concludes with a definition of the “correct use” of revenge by distinguishing carefully, as Spinoza does, a passion for revenge that derives from desiderium rather than from cupiditas. It illuminates the precise kind of vindictive affect that can ground a multitude’s agreement, and thus sovereign law and common justice.
Hasana Sharp develops the implications of Spinoza’s invocation in chapter 6 of the traditional analogy between the oikos and the polis. Careful attention to this analogy reveals a number of interesting features of Spinoza’s political theory. Spinoza challenges the perception that absolute monarchy offers greater respite from the intolerable anxiety of the state of nature than does democracy. He acknowledges that people associate monarchical rule with peace and stability, but asserts that it can too easily deform its subjects. Unchallenged monarchy may be credited with a certain order, “but if slavery, barbarism, and desolation are to be called peace, there can be nothing more wretched for mankind than peace.” This is all familiar to friends of Spinoza, but what kind of democracy is the alternative to those monarchies that tend toward despotism? It is a form of association that, he suggests, resembles a bitterly quarrelsome but nevertheless virtuous family. Thus, he admits that democratic, or popular, rule is typically turbulent and disorderly, but urges his reader to view contentions and disputes as a kind of salutary discord that preserves rather than threatens virtue.

The proceeding three essays consider matters specific to the distinctive regimes of government. The first two examine the question of national religion in aristocracies. The third considers Spinoza’s remarks on the relative advantages of aristocracy versus democracy. The chapter by Mogens Lærke takes a closer look at Spinoza’s conception of a “national religion” in chapter 8 of the TP, in connection with another text that it is explicitly and closely related, namely chapter 19 of the TTP, dedicated to the “right concerning sacred matters” (jus circa sacra). Lærke argues that we should not see Spinoza’s call for a national religion to reflect straightforward Erastianism, or the subjection of all religious matters to state control. Instead, on Spinoza’s view, state administration of sacred matters is a delicate balancing act between both promoting and curbing religious diversity within the state, drawing the benefits from it while avoiding its inherent dangers. Lærke’s argument is that the conception of a national religion in TP, ch. 8, is Spinoza’s practical guide to how to perform this balancing act.

Daniel Garber’s contribution examines Spinoza’s recommendation that all the patricians in an aristocracy “should be of the same Religion, a very simple and most Universal Religion, such as we described in that Treatise.” What does Spinoza mean here by the “very simple and most Universal Religion,” he asks. Garber argues against the view that Spinoza intends the dogmas of the TTP outlining a religion of reason to replace traditional religions. Religion for Spinoza, Garber argues, is practice, not faith, and it involves imperatives to be followed and not dogmas or beliefs to be held. The “very simple and most Universal Religion,” he argues, consists only of the imperative to love one’s neighbor as oneself, and to love God above all.

The dogmas of Universal Faith are needed only for those not capable of attaining religion through reason: For the rational agent, the imperatives are not laws, given by a divine lawgiver, but eternal truths.

In “Spinoza on Aristocratic and Democratic Government,” Theo Verbeek makes a compelling case for special attention to the neglected chapters of the Political Treatise on aristocracy. He demonstrates the novelty of Spinoza’s claims about aristocracy, which contain an implicit critique of his own country. In addition, he maintains that Spinoza’s celebrated preference for democracy is less a spirited defense of egalitarian principles than a resignation to the impossibility of sustaining the best government in principle: aristocracy. Verbeek argues that the events of 1672 depleted Spinoza’s hope of modeling politics on the rational morality he advances in the Ethics. His advocacy of democracy, then, signals the loss of faith in the self-correcting mechanisms of reason, and the inevitability of the instability democracy promises.

The concluding three chapters examine the question of political power — its character and its sources of durability and vulnerability — in the TP. Yitzhak Y. Melamed’s chapter begins with the observation that Spinoza is commonly perceived as suggesting that any empowerment is essentially good. In his chapter, Melamed discusses Spinoza’s assertion in chapter 7 of his Political Treatise that “the most stable state is one which defends only its own possessions, and cannot seek those of others.” Melamed shows that Spinoza develops a view
Spinoza’s treatment of absolute sovereignty raises a number of interpretative questions. According to Justin Steinberg, Spinoza seems to embrace a form of absolutism that is incompatible with his defense of mixed government and constitutional limits on sovereign power. And he seems to use the concept of "absolute sovereignty" in inconsistent ways. Steinberg offers an interpretation of Spinoza’s conception of absolutism that aims to resolve these concerns. Steinberg argues that Spinoza is able to show that, when tied to a proper understanding of authority, absolute sovereignty is not only compatible with, but actually necessitates, powersharing and constitutionalism. His treatment of "absolute sovereignty" in the political works is akin to his treatment of "substance" and "God" in the Ethics: he transfigures the concept from within a common framework. This interpretation renders intelligible and consistent the various claims that Spinoza makes about sovereign absolutism in the Political Treatise. 

Filippo Del Lucchese focuses on the relationship between Machiavelli and Spinoza, using the concept of constituent power to analyze their contribution to the foundation of modern political thought. Both authors ground the stability of the State and its freedom on the popolo (Machiavelli) and the multitudo (Spinoza); this is not the generic people of modern constitutionalism, but rather the demos, the specific group inside the civitas whose power is exercised on, and sometimes against, other political subjects. Both authors aim at keeping alive the conflictual and constituent force that creates the juridical space of the State by recognizing the prominent role of social and political conflict. While Machiavelli explicitly argues for social conflict as the ground of political freedom, Spinoza develops his conflictualist approach through more implicit examples. Considering them together allows one to identify a radical democratic and revolutionary ground for the foundation of political modernity. <>

Spinoza and German Idealism edited by Eckart Förster And Yitzhak Y. Melamed [Cambridge University Press, 9781107021983]

There can be little doubt that without Spinoza, German Idealism would have been just as impossible as it would have been without Kant. Yet the precise nature of Spinoza’s influence on the German Idealists has hardly been studied in detail. This volume of essays by leading scholars sheds light on how the appropriation of Spinoza by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel grew out of the reception of his philosophy by, among others, Lessing, Mendelssohn, Jacobi, Herder, Goethe, Schleiermacher, Maimon and, of course, Kant. The volume thus not only illuminates the history of Spinoza’s thought, but also initiates a genuine philosophical dialogue between the ideas of Spinoza and those of the German Idealists. The issues at stake - the value of humanity; the possibility and importance of self-negation; the nature and value of reason and imagination; human freedom; teleology; intuitive knowledge; the nature of God - remain of the highest philosophical importance today.

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Excerpt: German Idealism is sometimes characterized as a synthesis of the fundamental ideas of Spinoza and Kant. Though such a statement is too simplistic, there can be little doubt that without Spinoza, German Idealism would have been just as impossible as it would have been without Kant. Indeed, each of the German Idealists emphasized the importance of Spinoza for his own endeavor – in terms of both agreement and disagreement – just as each of them did with Kant.

Yet the precise nature of Spinoza’s influence on the German Idealists has hardly been studied in detail. While a few older monographs address individual aspects of this relationship, there is in English no comprehensive examination of the profound impact that Spinoza’s philosophy had on the German Idealists. Most importantly, there is no work that represents the current state of scholarship in these fields and reflects the enormous advances achieved by the research of the last few decades.

The present volume ill:s this lacuna. Moreover, the volume also sheds light on how the appropriation of Spinoza through Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel was prepared by the reception of Spinoza’s philosophy by, among others, Lessing, Mendelssohn, Jacobi, Herder, Goethe, Schleiermacher, Maimon, and, of course, Kant. The main aim is not merely to trace a part of the reception history of Spinoza’s philosophy, however, but to initiate a genuine philosophical dialogue between the ideas of Spinoza and the German Idealists. We believe that the issues at stake – the value of humanity, the possibility and importance of self-negation, the nature and value of reason and imagination, the possibility of a philosophical system, human freedom, teleology, intuitive knowledge, the nature of God – are of the highest philosophical importance even today.

This collection is especially timely in light of the trends in recent scholarship. Over the last few decades, there has been within the anglophone philosophical community a remarkable revival of interest in German Idealism. In its first phase, this revival gave particular emphasis to the relationship between German Idealism and Kantianism, playing down the metaphysical or speculative side while stressing the social and pragmatic dimensions of the idealist systems. More recently, however, this interest has also taken a more metaphysical direction, coupled with a concern with how the German Idealists conceived of the proper task and nature of philosophy itself.

This new direction of inquiry has been paralleled, interestingly, by the re-emergence of metaphysics as a central area in analytic philosophy. As is well known, the analytic tradition began with a pronounced rejection of the Hegelian and Spinozist philosophies of the British Idealists, and it seems hardly a coincidence that the re-emergence of metaphysics as a central philosophical discipline toward the end of the twentieth century occurred simultaneously with an increase of interest in and engagement with Spinoza’s philosophy, including a re-evaluation of his central role in the development of modern philosophy. In point of fact, the fate of Spinozism has always been – and presumably will continue to be – strongly tied to the fate of metaphysics, for Spinoza is the metaphysician par excellence of western philosophy.

The present volume grew out of a conference on Spinoza and German Idealism, held at Johns Hopkins University in May, 2010. The conference’s goal was to bring together scholars working in these areas and to make available for general discussion some of the results of these promising recent developments.
In the opening chapter, “Rationalism, idealism, monism, and beyond,” Michael Della Rocca examines Spinoza’s philosophical position from a number of different angles. He articulates, first, the particular kind of rationalism Spinoza endorses. He then explains what kind of idealism Spinoza’s rationalism commits him to – namely a version of idealism compatible with Spinoza’s explanatory separation between thought and extension. He then turns to the nature of the monism embedded in Spinoza’s rationalism – namely a monism in which the multiplicity of finite things enjoys only some degree of existence. In the end, however, Della Rocca argues, this line of thought pushes us beyond both monism and Spinoza to a view according to which, perhaps, nothing exists fully.

The presence of Spinoza in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is examined by Omri Boehm in his chapter, “Kant’s idea of the unconditioned and Spinoza’s: the fourth Antinomy and the Ideal of Pure Reason.” Taking his cue from Kant’s claim, in the Critique of Practical Reason, that if transcendental idealism is denied, “nothing remains but Spinozism,” Boehm argues that this claim in fact reaffirms an argument Kant had already advanced in the fourth Antinomy. In light of this Antinomy’s analysis of the unconditioned being’s relation to the world, it becomes clear that already in the first Critique Kant had viewed Spinozism as a necessary outcome of transcendental realism.

The relation between Kant and Spinoza is examined further in a chapter by Karl Ameriks, entitled “The question is whether a purely apparent person is possible.” As Ameriks argues, given both Kant’s transcendental idealism and his critique of rational psychology, it is not easy to understand how – or even whether – Kant can vindicate any substantial claims about our personal identity. Spinoza’s philosophy presents a significant challenge to such claims, and Schleiermacher’s notes on Spinoza and Jacobi provide one of the very few early discussions as to how Kant’s philosophy might relate to that of Spinoza. By considering a wide range of Kantian texts, Ameriks discusses how Kant might have reacted to Schleiermacher on this topic.

In 1785, four years after the publication of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, F. H. Jacobi published his conversations with Lessing, On the Doctrine of Spinoza, in Letters to Mr. Moses Mendelssohn. With this Jacobi ignited the notorious Spinozastreit, or Pantheism Controversy, which shook the German intellectual world at the end of the eighteenth century. Jacobi himself was negatively disposed toward Spinozism (as was the addressee of his letters, Mendelssohn) and strove to offer an alternative to it. Thus, Michael Forster argues in “Herder and Spinoza,” he can hardly be credited with initiating the “massive wave of positive appropriations of Spinoza” that followed in the wake of his publication. Instead we must turn to those who, at the time, were enthusiasts for Spinoza’s philosophy: Lessing, Herder, Goethe, and among these Herder most of all. In 1787 Herder published a work, entitled God: Some Conversations, which defended a revised form of Spinoza’s metaphysical monism and determinism. As Forster shows, however, Spinoza’s positive influence on Herder began as early as 1768-1769, and Herder gradually came to incorporate increasingly fundamental aspects of Spinoza’s thought from both the Tractatus Theologico–Politicus and the Ethics.

At the bottom of Goethe’s disagreement with Jacobi’s interpretation of Spinoza lies his conviction that, in identifying the “spirit of Spinozism” with the principle a nihilo nihil it, Jacobi commits Spinoza to a causal explanatory principle, and thus to a second kind of knowledge. For Goethe, however, Spinoza’s “most subtle ideas” concern the third kind of knowledge. In “Goethe’s Spinozism,” Eckart Förster traces the steps that Goethe undertook to develop Spinoza’s programmatic reflections on the third kind of knowledge into a methodology of scientia intuitiva applicable to natural objects.

Fichte, in his early Wissenschaftslehre, criticizes Spinoza’s account of consciousness for both finite and infinite beings. In “Fichte on the consciousness of Spinoza’s God,” Johannes Haag reconstructs this criticism against the background of Fichte’s own conception of consciousness, in particular the specific understanding of the hathandlung, i.e., the original positing of the I as an I, and the allied concept of an intellectual intuition. As Haag
argues, while Spinoza’s subjects of empirical consciousness are incapable of an intellectual intuition, his God is similarly incapable of proceeding from the original handlung to the second, equally essential step of self-positing, namely that of counter-positing. As a consequence, God too is incapable of an intellectual intuition, since the latter presupposes the second step. As a result, neither empirical subjects nor God can fulfill the conditions Fichte places on an explanation of consciousness.

In “Fichte on freedom: the Spinozistic background,” Allen Wood explores Fichte’s conception of freedom and his arguments for it, emphasizing the powerful influence Spinoza always had on Fichte. When the latter was “converted” to Kantianism in 1790, he had yet to publish anything, but he was already twenty-eight years old, and a fully formed philosopher; he even thought of himself as having a philosophical “system.” All the evidence suggests that this system was a form of Spinozism. Throughout Fichte’s life, Spinoza continued to be at least as powerful an influence as Kant ever was. His true even with respect to that issue wherein Fichte saw himself aligned with Kant and in opposition to Spinoza: namely, freedom of the will. We have here a paradigm example of what we may call ‘negative influence’ in philosophy: the influencing philosopher determines the way the influenced philosopher poses and resolves the issue about which they disagree.

In “Spinoza in Schelling’s early conception of intellectual intuition,” Dalia Nassar examines Schelling’s earliest philosophical writings and argues that, until 1796, Schelling was much more influenced by Spinoza than by Fichte. In particular, she contends, Schelling’s conception of intellectual intuition, which he first developed in Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie (1795), mirrors Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge. In spite of his clear affinity with Spinoza, however, Schelling maintains a critical attitude toward him. Nassar considers the reasons for Schelling’s distance from Spinoza and concludes that, for Schelling, Spinoza’s immanentism was not immanent enough.

Michael Vater (“Schelling’s philosophy of identity and Spinoza’s Ethica more geometrico”) closely examines the extent of Spinoza’s presence in Schelling’s first document of his Philosophy of Identity, the 1801 essay Presentation of My System of Philosophy. Of those who sought to incorporate into their own systems as much as they dared from the Ethica more geometrico, no one, Vater argues, was more forthright than Schelling. His Presentation utilized three key concepts of Spinoza: the definition of substance as self-existing and attribute as what is conceivable only through itself; the infinite nature of the apparently finite; and conatus, or the endeavor of a finite entity to preserve its being.

In the German Idealists’ appropriation of Spinoza, few thoughts were considered as important and central as the principle omnis determinatio est negatio, which Hegel and his contemporaries attributed directly to Spinoza. In his chapter, “‘Omnis determinatio est negatio’: determination, negation, and self-negation in Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel,” Yitzhak Melamed argues that this famous dictum was in fact interpreted in three quite different senses, which might be called the acosmic, the dialectical, and the Kantian sense, respectively. He examines each interpretation in detail and compares it with Spinoza’s own position. Ultimately, he concludes that, in spite of Kant’s expressed hostility toward Spinoza’s philosophy, his latent use of the formula turns out to be much closer to Spinoza’s meaning than Hegel’s enthusiastic adoption of the principle.

Dean Moyar examines Hegel’s criticisms of Spinoza in order to address the ongoing dispute about Hegel and metaphysics. This debate is consistently framed in terms that refer to Spinoza as a philosopher with a robust metaphysical view. The assumption is that if Hegel is shown to be closer to Spinoza than to Kant, his view should be considered metaphysical. By examining Hegel’s criticism of Spinoza, focusing especially on the relation between thought and substance, Moyar clarifies some of the central issues in the debate over Hegel’s metaphysics and situates his position on metaphysics in relation to both Spinoza and Kant.

Gunnar Hindrichs interprets Spinoza’s and Hegel’s philosophies as two models of metaphysical
inferentialism. Both combine the inferential texture of thinking with revisionary metaphysics. They differ, Hindrichs argues, in the fact that Spinoza’s model rests on definitions of basic concepts and amounts to an intuitive knowledge of the whole, whereas Hegel’s model dismisses these moments as violating the inferential structure of thought. For Hegel, the only fixation that can be justified under inferentialist premises is the closed system at the end of reasoning. Thus, Hegel transforms Spinoza’s prima philosophia into a philosophia ultima.

Frederick Beiser, in “Trendelenburg and Spinoza,” maintains it is necessary to consider the nineteenth-century philosopher Trendelenburg if one wants to do full justice to the theme of Spinoza and German Idealism. For the same criteria by which we describe Schelling and Hegel as idealists apply perfectly well to Trendelenburg. Tracing the latter’s complex and developing appropriation of Spinoza, Beiser shows that Trendelenburg regarded Spinoza’s system as new and original in that he provided the only alternative to materialism and teleology as the principles for the explanation of reality—a position for which Spinoza himself, however, provided insufficient justification.

What would Spinoza have made of the idealists’ appropriations and criticisms of his thought, as presented by the authors in this volume? This collection opens with an examination of Spinoza’s philosophical position and concludes with Don Garrett’s “Reply on Spinoza’s behalf.”


Ex nihilo nihil fit. Philosophy, especially great philosophy, does not appear out of the blue. In the current volume, a team of top scholars—both up-and-coming and established—attempts to trace the philosophical development of one of the greatest philosophers of all time. Featuring twenty new essays and an introduction, it is the first attempt of its kind in English and its appearance coincides with the recent surge of interest in Spinoza in Anglo-American philosophy.

Spinoza’s fame—notoriety—is due primarily to his posthumously published magnum opus, the Ethics, and, to a lesser extent, to the 1670 Theological-Political Treatise. Few readers take the time to study his early works carefully. If they do, they are likely to encounter some surprising claims, which often diverge from, or even utterly contradict, the doctrines of the Ethics. Consider just a few of these assertions: that God acts from absolute freedom of will, that God is a whole, that there are no modes in God, that extension is divisible and hence cannot be an attribute of God, and that the intellectual and corporeal substances are modes in relation to God. Yet, though these claims reveal some tension between the early works and the Ethics, there is also a clear continuity between them.

Spinoza wrote the Ethics over a long period of time, which spanned most of his philosophical career. The dates of the early drafts of the Ethics seem to overlap with the assumed dates of the composition of the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and the Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well Being and precede the publication of Spinoza’s 1663 book on Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy. For this reason, a study of Spinoza’s early works (and correspondence) can illuminate the nature of the problems Spinoza addresses in the Ethics, insofar as the views expressed in the early works help us reconstruct the development and genealogy of the Ethics. Indeed, if we keep in mind the common dictum “nothing comes from nothing”—which Spinoza frequently cites and appeals to—it is clear that great works like the Ethics do not appear ex nihilo. In light of the preeminence and majesty of the Ethics, it is difficult to study the early works without having the Ethics in sight. Still, we would venture to say that the value of Spinoza’s early works is not at all limited to their being stations on the road leading to the Ethics. The teleological attitude of such a sort would celebrate the works of the “mature Spinoza” at the expense of the early works. However, we have no reason to assume that on all issues the views of the Ethics are better argued, developed, and motivated than those of the early works. In other words, we should keep our minds open to the possibility that on some issues the early works might contain better analysis and argumentation than the Ethics.
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Spinoza’s fame—or notoriety—is due primarily to his posthumously published magnum opus, the Ethics, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, to the 1670 Theological-Political Treatise. Few readers take the time to study his early works carefully. If they do, they are likely to encounter some surprising claims, which often diverge from, or even utterly contradict, the doctrines of the Ethics. Consider just a few of these assertions: that God acts from absolute freedom of will,1 that God is a whole, that there are no modes in God, that extension is divisible and hence cannot be an attribute of God, and that the intellectual and corporeal substances are modes in relation to God. Yet, though these claims reveal some tension between the early works and the Ethics, there is also a clear continuity between them.

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The mid-nineteenth-century discovery of the two Dutch manuscripts of Spinoza’s Short Treatise on...
God, Man, and His Well-Being proved to deliver a crucial impetus for the study of the formation of Spinoza’s thought and his early works. The publication of Meinsma’s seminal 1896 study and collection of sources, Spinoza en zijn kring, was followed in the twentieth century by the important books of Jacob Freudenthal (Spinoza: sein Leben und seine Lehre, 1904), Stanislaus von Dunin-Borkowski (De junge de Spinoza, 1910), I. S. Révah (Spinoza et Juan de Prado, 1959), and Henry Méchoulan (Amsterdam au temps de Spinoza, 1990). These crucial tomes, alongside scrupulous philological works by Filippo Mignini, Fokke Akkerman, and Piet Steenbakkers and more recent studies by Yosef Kaplan on the seventeenth-century Jewish community of Amsterdam, placed the field on solid ground. Nevertheless, there is still much regarding Spinoza’s early biography and thought that is shrouded by the veils of ignorance and ideology. Specifically, we seem to have little solid knowledge of the reasons for the ban placed on Spinoza in July 1656, and of Spinoza’s intellectual development in the following years. Regrettably, much of the discussion of Spinoza’s attitude toward Jewish philosophy and thought has been motivated and masked by ideologies and counter-ideologies. On the one hand, we encounter the still-common narrative, which could be dismissed as simple ignorance were it not the outcome of deeply entrenched prejudices, of Spinoza’s ascent from the fundamentalist philosophy of the rabbis to the enlightenment of Cartesianism. In fact, the major medieval Jewish philosophers—Maimonides, Gersonides, and Hasdai Crescas—openly advocated views which hardly any Cartesian would dare entertain due to their heretic perception in the Christian context. On the other hand, we find the ideological construct of “Philonic philosophy” by Harry A. Wolfson, who virtually effaced any difference between Spinoza and his medieval predecessors (as well as between the various medieval philosophers themselves) in an attempt to provide a counter-narrative to Hegel’s Christian historiography of the history of philosophy. Thus a careful, thorough, and ideology-free examination of Spinoza’s critical dialogue with Jewish sources is still a desideratum, awaiting the formation of a critical mass of scholars equipped with the required philological and philosophical skills.

Most of the essays in the current collection stems from two jointly organized conferences that were held in the fall of 2011 at Johns Hopkins University and the École normale supérieure de Lyon. The aim of the conferences, and of this collection, was not to provide a systematic commentary on the corpus of Spinoza’s early works, but rather to bring together scholars from several continents, with diverse philosophical orientations and scholarly interests, in order to stimulate the study of Spinoza’s early works. For this reason, I have not hesitated, as editor, to allow some degree of overlap among the topics of the papers, especially since they display well-distinguished attitudes. The scholarly literature on the early works of Spinoza is quite limited (especially in English), and it is my hope that the current volume will stimulate interest and further study of this argument-rich, bold, and imaginative corpus. Our aim here is not to summarize the achievements of a certain research agenda, but rather to re-launch one.

The twenty studies assembled in this volume differ significantly in their scope. Some concentrate on a single work by the young Spinoza, while others discuss a broad selection of texts. In the first of these studies, Edwin Curley, a leading scholar and translator of Spinoza for several decades, addresses an early work of Spinoza’s that is not available to us (and perhaps never existed at all!). In his Dictionary article on Spinoza, Bayle claimed that Spinoza had composed (but never printed) a defense of his departure from the synagogue, which included many of the things that subsequently appeared in his “pernicious and detestable” Theological-Political Treatise. Curley attempts to determine what this work might have contained, assuming that it existed.

In 1979 Filippo Mignini published a groundbreaking study that contested the then commonly assumed chronology of Spinoza’s development, and argued that the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (= TIE, first published in Spinoza’s 1677 Opera Posthuma) had been written by Spinoza before the Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being. Over the past thirty-five years, several editions and translations of Spinoza’s early works have appeared, along with a number of studies concerning the formation of his...
philosophy, and a great majority of these have followed this seminal essay, either in its entirety or in partial form. In his current contribution (Chapter 2 of this volume), Mignini provides additional evidence in support of the anteriority of the TIE, and further develops his general interpretation of it, by focusing on Spinoza’s notion of “fiction.”

Two studies address the crucial notion of truth in the TIE. According to Alan Nelson in Chapter 3, though the TIE emphasizes the project of attaining true ideas, it proposes that the final goal, the “highest good,” is to perfect one’s nature through the “knowledge of the union that the mind has with the whole of Nature” (TIE §13). In the first part of his chapter, Nelson draws out connections that Spinoza seems to be making between true ideas and the unification of the mind with the whole of Nature, or God, and points out the Cartesian background of these connections. The second part of the chapter traces the development of these themes in the Ethics. The goal of the Ethics is again to achieve union with God, but now this is to happen through an intellectual love of God, which is “the very love of God by which God loves himself” (E5p36) and one and the same as God’s love of men (E5p36c). The mind’s being a true idea of the body, however, appears to be inconsistent with unification with God, because the mind is affected by other finite things. In Chapter 4, John Morrison suggests a thorough and systematic new interpretation of Spinoza’s concept of truth in the TIE (and the Ethics), according to which an idea of x that is contained in S’s mind is true, if and only if, (1) it represents x’s essence (and perhaps properties) but nothing else, and (2) it is contained in S’s inborn idea of her own essence, or was deduced by S from ideas contained in her inborn idea of her own essence.

Michael LeBuffe’s contribution (Chapter 5) addresses the provisional moral-ity of the TIE. According to LeBuffe, the young Spinoza proposes that even as we work at emending the intellect we should live by certain rules, which we must assume to be good. We should accommodate ordinary ways of speaking and living to the extent that we can without compromising our project. We should enjoy pleasures in moderation. Finally, we should seek instrumental goods only insofar as they are necessary for health and social acceptability.

In order to explain shifts in Spinoza’s views about the way that we should live while we pursue the good, LeBuffe traces developments in his accounts of ideas and of the relationship between the philosopher and society. The final essay to concentrate on the TIE is by Mogens Lærke, who studies Leibniz’s engagement with this work. In May 1678, Leibniz wrote from Hanover to his friend Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus: “Surely you do not ignore that the posthumous works of Spinoza have been published. Among them there is a fragment On the Emendation of the Intellect, but he stops exactly at the place where I expected the most” (A II, i, 413). This short passage constitutes the only direct evaluation of Spinoza’s TIE by Leibniz that we know of. It was the result of his first (and last) reading of the text, which had taken place some four months earlier, shortly after the son of a certain Abraham Arendt brought Leibniz a copy of the freshly printed Opera Posthuma, which had been sent directly to Hanover from Amsterdam by one of the editors of the work, Hermann Schuller. At that time, Leibniz read the TIE attentively, underlining and writing short marginal comments in his copy of the work. Leibniz’s evaluation of the TIE in the letter to Tschirnhaus expresses disappointment, and one wonders what exactly it was that Leibniz so eagerly expected to learn at the point where Spinoza’s text breaks off with a reliqui desiderantur. In Chapter 6, Lærke attempts to answer this question by reconstructing Leibniz’s reading of the TIE on the basis of his marginal notes and the context of his engagement with Spinoza’s philosophy in the latter half of the 1670s.

Five of the chapters concentrate on the Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being (= KV). This early work of Spinoza’s was neither published in his lifetime nor included in his Opera Posthuma. Two manuscripts of the Dutch translation of the work were discovered in the nineteenth century, and ever since it has attracted the attention of scholars interested in Spinoza’s philosophical development. Daniel Garber studies the Cartesian nature of this work in Chapter 7. Spinoza is best known for the monism of his Ethics and his account of mind as identical to body. However, Garber argues, he took quite a different view in the KV.
Although in many ways Spinoza’s early view of mind and its relation to body shows many affinities with the view that he was later to take, Garber argues that in the KV Spinoza held that the mind is a thing (a mode, though not a substance) genuinely distinct from the body. More generally, Garber argues, in the KV Spinoza is much more directly engaged with debates coming out of Descartes and early Cartesianism than he would be in the Ethics, where the influence of Hobbes is stronger. Colin Marshall, in Chapter 8, studies Spinoza’s mostly neglected account of reason in the KV. That account, Marshall argues, has at least four features that distinguish it from that of the Ethics: in the KV, (1) reason is more sharply distinguished from intuitive knowledge, (2) reason deals with things as though they were “outside” us, (3) reason lacks clarity and distinctness, and (4) reason has no power over many types of passions. Marshall argues that these differences have a unified explanation, consisting of a principle that Spinoza accepts in both works and a central change. The principle is that “whatever we find in ourselves has more power over us than anything which comes from outside,” and the change is that the objects of reason are common things/common notions. Understanding this, Marshall claims, sheds light on the psychological and epistemological motivations behind Spinoza’s mature doctrines.

In Chapter 9, Russ Leo shows that Spinoza was a careful reader of Calvin and of Reformed Orthodoxy. Throughout the KV, Spinoza used and transformed Calvinist concepts and terms. This suggests that Calvinism acted as another crucible for Spinoza’s mature thought. Moreover, it shows that, in his attempt to address a larger, ecumenical audience, Spinoza was willing to enter into debate with Calvinists and Anti-Calvinists alike during the vibrant and volatile theological-political milieu of the 1640s and 1650s. Chapter 10 by John Carriero focuses on chapter 16 of part 2 of the KV. His contribution scrutinizes Spinoza’s odd notion that the will is not a “real thing” but rather a “being of reason.” Spinoza develops this claim by comparing the will to a universal. In the first part of the chapter, Carriero contrasts Spinoza’s conception of a (physical) individual as a determination of the universe’s basic geometrical, kinetic, and dynamic invariances with an Aristotelian conception of an individual constituted by various interrelated “perfections” that are capable of two modes of existence, one in the individual and another in the mind. As Carriero argues, Spinoza’s thesis that the will is not a real thing concerns what might be thought of as the ontology of power and cuts more deeply than the themes usually associated with Spinoza on the topic of free will, namely those concerned with freedom, determinism, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Spinoza’s fundamental claim concerns what a power (such as the will) is—that is, a certain determination of the universe’s invariances, which implies that the will is not some “compartmentalized” power that we bring to the universe’s causal table.

The last essay focusing on the Short Treatise is Chapter 11 by Valtteri Viljanen. In this chapter, Viljanen traces and explicates the rather consistent essentialist thread that runs through the KV. This allows us not only to better understand the work itself but also to obtain a firmer grasp of the nature of its author’s whole philosophical enterprise. In many ways, the essentialism we find in the Short Treatise is in line with Spinoza’s mature thought; but there are also significant differences, and discerning them throws light on the development of his philosophy. Viljanen argues that, while Spinoza’s notion of essence remained rather stable throughout his career, its ontological status underwent some notable changes, being in the Short Treatise less independent of actual existence than in the later works.

Chapter 12 by Frédéric Manzini poses the question: “When was Spinoza not young anymore?” As Manzini points out, there is much discussion about whether Spinoza’s system was the same in his early works as in his Ethics. Manzini suggests that Spinoza’s coming of age—philosophically speaking—can be assigned to a single, crucial moment, namely the incompleteness of his 1663 book, Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy, which presumably attested to Spinoza’s decision to abandon, rather than reform, Cartesianism. Chapter 13 by Tad Schmaltz studies the conception of eternity in Spinoza’s early period. There is some scholarly controversy over whether Spinoza endorsed a durational or non-durational account of...
eternity in the Ethics. There is also the unresolved question of whether the sort of eternity that Spinoza attributes to substance in this text is the same as the sort of eternity he attributes to certain modes of substance (such as “infinite modes” and the human mind). Schmaltz suggests that we can make some progress on these difficult interpretive issues by considering the connection of the Ethics to two 1663 texts by the young Spinoza: the Cogitata Metaphysica (appended to Spinoza’s book, Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy) and the so-called “Letter on the Infinite.” According to Schmaltz, these texts indicate that, on Spinoza’s considered view, substance is eternal in a non-durational sense, but that modes can be eternal only in a durational sense.

For German and British Idealist readers of Spinoza, the key to his metaphysics is its alleged “acosmism”—that is, its denial of the reality of the “world” of finite things. In Chapter 14, Karolina Hübner examines and challenges the oft-repeated Idealist argument that what leads to the unreality of finite things is the fact that the differentiation of finite individuals as finite requires negation, whereas what genuinely exists is purely positive. The chapter investigates how Spinoza understands the nature of negation, its role in constituting finite things, and its relation to both divine and human thought; it also examines several possible but ultimately unsatisfying arguments on both sides of the controversy, arguments that focus on divine omniscience and divine attributes. In conclusion, Hübner suggests that Spinoza’s early Metaphysical Thoughts offers unparalleled insight into his conception of negation, showing in particular that its account of “beings of reason” presents a powerful argument against the Idealist. Chapter 15 by Oded Schechter traces the development of Spinoza’s theory of the three (or four) kinds of cognition. While previous scholars have paid some attention to the minor changes in the description of each of the kinds of cognition, Schechter goes further, and shows that the nature and function of the threefold distinction changes from one work to another. The TIE relies on the distinction as part of its attempt to find the proper method for philosophizing. In the KV the kinds of cognition constitute distinct manners of existence. Relying on this crucial observation, Schechter explains Spinoza’s enigmatic claims in the conclusion of the Ethics about the eternity of our minds.

In his early writings, Spinoza advocates a thoroughgoing anti-abstractionism. As he warns readers in his earliest work, “so long as we are dealing with the investigation of things, we must never infer anything from abstractions, and we shall take very great care not to mix up the things that are only in the intellect with those that are real” (TIE §93). In Chapter 16, Samuel Newlands explores Spinoza’s early writings against abstracta and abstract thinking. He investigates whether Spinoza’s early repudiation of abstractions and abstract thinking is consistent with his ontology, and also looks at Spinoza’s only explicit argument in these texts for his anti-abstractionism. Finally, Newlands discusses the wide-ranging uses to which Spinoza puts his anti-abstractionism. Yitzhak Y. Melamed argues in Chapter 17 that a study of the early works of Spinoza and the early drafts of the Ethics shows that Spinoza experimented with various conceptions of substance and attribute that are significantly distinct from the definitions we find at the beginning of the final version of the Ethics. Indeed, Melamed suggests that at a certain point in his development Spinoza seems to have entertained a metaphysics free from the notion of attribute. According to Melamed, the tensions inherent in Spinoza’s account of substance and attribute were never fully resolved, even in the final version of the Ethics.

Ursula Renz in Chapter 18 examines the shift from Spinoza’s early characterization of the intellect as “wholly passive” to his later views, according to which mental states consist in the activity of forming ideas. Following a close reading of the relevant passages of the Short Treatise, she argues that, in contrast to Descartes, Spinoza is not bound by any kind of systematic constraint to conceive of the intellect as either passive or active. The reason is that, according to him, there is no real distinction between the understanding and the will, or to be precise, between the activity of understanding and the activity of willing. Renz investigates the development of Spinoza’s use of the notion of idea,
and she contends that this development is at least partially due to Spinoza's new approach to the mental. As an overarching argument, she shows that while large parts of the conceptual or metaphysical framework remain the same in the Ethics, there are major shifts in the level of Spinoza's philosophy of mind and epistemology. In Chapter 19, John Brandau concentrates on Spinoza's enigmatic claim in the KV that entities can have varying degrees of essence. This puzzling claim can create the impression that Spinoza quantified essence as a mass term rather than a count term, and that entities are distinguished not by possessing distinct essences so much as by possessing distinct quantities of a homogenous “stuff,” essence. In his chapter, Brandau provides an alternative explanation of what Spinoza might have meant by claiming that entities may have varying degrees of essence. He argues that Spinoza identified a thing’s essence with its perfection, and that, generally speaking, an entity may have more or less essence in proportion to the quantity of its essential properties.

Pina Totaro, the author of the concluding chapter of the volume, is the co-discoverer of the manuscript of Spinoza's Ethics, recently found in the Vatican Library. The manuscript contains some crucial elements for a better understanding of the intellectual biography and philosophy of the young Spinoza. The Vatican manuscript is not an autograph, but a copy made by Pieter van Gent. It was brought to Rome probably by the German mathematician and philosopher E. W. Tschirnhaus, who gave the manuscript to the Danish scientist and theologian Niels Stensen. Before leaving Rome for Northern Europe, Stensen delivered the manuscript of the Ethics to the Congregazione del S. Uffizio with a complaint against Spinoza. After having recovered the history of the Vatican manuscript, Totaro discusses the differences between the manuscript of the Ethics and the printed edition in the Opera Posthuma (1677).

Let me conclude by thanking the Philosophy Department, the Singleton Center for the Study of Pre-Modern Europe, and the Stulman Program in Jewish Studies—all at Johns Hopkins University—and the École normale supérieure de Lyon for their generous support of the two conferences and this collection. I would also like to thank Jason Yonover for his skillful copyediting of the final manuscript of the book and Alex Englert who prepared the index with great care. Finally, I would like to dedicate this volume to our colleague, Alan Gabbey, in honor of his retirement. <>

Exemplars of Truth by Keith Lehrer [Oxford University Press, 9780190884277]

This monograph is both an intellectual summation as well as a philosophical advancement of key themes of the work of Keith Lehrer on several key topics— including knowledge, self-trust, autonomy, and consciousness. He here attempts to integrate these themes and develop an intellectual system that can constructively solve philosophical problems. The system is indebted to the modern work of Sellars, Quine, and Chisholm, as well as historically to Hume and Reid. At the core of this system lies Lehrer’s theory of knowledge, which he previously called a coherence theory of knowledge but now calls a defensibility theory.

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Excerpt: As I looked at my work over more than half a century, it fit together in a systematic way that surprised me and motivated the present manuscript. I have written about knowledge, self-trust, consciousness, and autonomy. This resulted in books and volumes of journals collecting deeply insightful articles about what I had written. How could all that fit together into one system? The answer is this volume, but here is the short story. What unifies my thought is the theme of the critical evaluation of the initial states of desire, belief, and conception. Social scientists provide us with accounts of how these states arise and their defects. What we desire, believe, and conceive is often irrational. So what is a philosopher to contribute? A theory of
how evaluation of these states takes us to a higher plane of what it is reasonable for an autonomous and trustworthy agent to prefer, to accept, and to think. It is natural for the social scientist to look for regularities, universal or stochastic principles, that govern our thought and action. Finding such laws is the invaluable game of science. But they, like the rest of us, confront the question of the reasonableness, justification, and defensibility of what they study. The answer to the question is creative evaluation.

DEFENSIBLE KNOWLEDGE AND EXEMPLARS REPRESENTATION

After writing a number of books on knowledge, the question arises—Why another? The answer is brief. There was a history of epistemology aimed at finding certain and infallible statements as a foundation, a tradition advanced by Schlick (1979) and Ayer (1940) among others in the 20th century. The effort failed. The reason is that all description is fallible and because we are fallible in our use of language. That led to a view that knowledge must result from the relation to a background system of description, which, though fallible, is the basis for the defense and justification of knowledge claims. This was a view defended in various forms by Neurath (2008), who opposed the foundational theory, and in unique ways by Quine (1960), Sellars (1963a), and myself. I have called it (Lehrer, 1974) the coherence theory. However, all of the authors were left with the problem of explaining the special role of experience in the background system. This book offers a solution to the problem of the role of experience. The solution presented in this book is that reflection on experience converts the experience itself into an exemplar, something like a sample that becomes a vehicle of representation. The special role of the exemplar of experience is to be at the same time the term of representation and the object represented. The exemplar represents itself and exhibits something about evidence and truth concerning experience that, as Wittgenstein noted, cannot be fully described but can only be shown. Exemplar representation is the missing component that links a background system to truth about the world.

AN OVERVIEW

Good philosophy should contain something old, something new, something borrowed, and something true. In Knowledge (Lehrer, 1974), I defended a coherence theory of knowledge based on a theory of justification construed as the capacity to meet objections to the knowledge claim in terms of global features of a background system of belief. Here, I maintain the view that knowledge is the capacity to meet objections in terms of a background system. That is something old. Something new is that I now construe the capacity as a local defense of the target claim, and I construe the system as an evaluation system of claims that are positively evaluated and autonomously accepted combined with preferences over states of acceptance and reasonings involving such states. Most critically, I amend my view to include something borrowed from Hume (1888) about sensory experience. That is a theory of the relation of the background system to exemplar representations of experience. Using experience as a vehicle of representation has a reflexive truth security, though the operation of representation is fallible, as are all the operations of the mind.

Exemplar representation provides a truth security from the process of reflexive exemplarization of sensations. However, that security is consistent with my earlier claim that beliefs about the character of sensations and thoughts are corrigible as a result of the influence of the background system. I may know from exemplarization what a sensation is like, but, at the same time, form a false belief about the sensation. My earlier example (Lehrer, 1974) was a person informed by a respected physician that itches are mild pains. The person believes, accepts, that he has a pain when he itches, and as a result the belief is false. Taking an aspirin will not relieve the itch. Even if the person knows what the itch is like from exemplarization, he may misidentify it as a pain from the influence of background beliefs and the possibility of error. The process of exemplarizing may itself be cognitively distorted by background beliefs, and even where it is effective and not distorted, that is only a contingent fact. The truth security of exemplar representation does not supply the logical impossibility of error. The logical possibility of error is ubiquitous and
exhibits how we are fallible. Nevertheless, exemplar representation can provide evidence and defense for what we accept.

Finally, I argue that we have an exemplar representation of the evidence of truth and of truth itself. This may leave you wondering whether I have abandoned coherentism for foundationalism. The answer is explained in the last chapter. I seek to offer you something both new and true.

GLOBAL COHERENCE VERSUS LOCAL DEFENSE

I called my theory a coherence theory because justification and defense of a knowledge claim's target content depends on a relation to a background system, but it is better named as a defensibility theory of knowledge as Kim suggested in his doctoral dissertation at the University of Arizona (1992). The features of the background system that enable the subject to meet objections to the target content are usually local features of the system relevant for the specific defense of that content rather than global features of the system. Defense of the target content directs the background system toward what is relevant for the defense of that content and meeting those objections. The theory of defensible knowledge has itself been modified to meet objections, as I shall explain below. Central to the modification is a theory of representation to explain how the background system is connected with truth by the evidence of experience. A theory of exemplarized experience explains the connection. I turn now to a brief narrative of my efforts to articulate a satisfactory coherence theory of defensible knowledge.

Objections arose to what I argued, and the justification of my epistemology required that I answer the objections my views elicited. This resulted in the publication of later books, Theory of Knowledge (1990) and Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edition (2000b), as well as a sequence of published papers. There were changes of details, and details are important, but I want to make it clear what central idea motivates the theory I have been articulating over half a century. It is a simple idea motivated by a line in Sellars. He remarked that reliable belief formation was not sufficient for knowledge because it neglected the role of what I called the justification game in human knowledge. His point was that a true belief could arise in a reliable manner though the subject is unable to justify the acceptance of the belief. Belief, not even reliably formed belief, is enough for knowledge. One must have adequate evidence and be able to articulate it to succeed in the justification game of knowledge.

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A short summary of what has been offered may be useful to tie my argument together. I have discussed knowledge, self-trust, autonomy, and consciousness. I appreciate the logical detail of the style of analytic philosophy. However, I attempted to construct a system for consideration. The risk of error is greater in the project, but my goal is philosophical explanation. As I observed the constructive and destructive work of detailed analysis, which I value and hopefully exhibited, I became convinced it takes an explanatory system, a theory, to solve philosophical problems, whatever the risk of error. A new theory of knowledge motivated me. Here are the components in brief of what I have done. The theory, suggested by my earlier work, is that there is a kind of knowledge that I have called a coherence theory of knowledge but now prefer to call a defensibility theory of knowledge. The basic assumption of such a theory is that knowledge requires the capacity to justify or defend the target claim of knowledge in terms of a background system. The defensibility is an internal capacity supplied by that system to meet objections to the target claim. The account of defense or justification both in terms of what is considered an objection and how it is met is initially an internal matter, though the influence of external criticism is essential to making the internal worthy of self-trust. It is a central feature of the personal and internal that it reflects the trustworthiness of a person in the pursuit of reason, most notably, in the goal to discern truth from error. I assume that a person may believe things prior to understanding the distinction between truth and error. Moreover, as many have argued, belief may arise before the use of reason and remain contrary to it. So, I took a different propositional attitude to form the background system, which I call acceptance. One
has the freedom to decide whether to accept a claim or reject it. I formerly thought of the background system as simply a system of what a person accepts. Though acceptance remains the basic propositional attitude, the voice of reason within, meeting objections that arise from what a person accepts must include reasonings on acceptances and preferences concerning acceptances in the background system. I called the background system the evaluation system.

The role of preference is of special importance in the account of meeting objections. One way, though not the only way, of meeting an objection to a target claim is to reply to the objection that it is more reasonable to accept the target claim than the objection in terms of the evaluation system. What is the source of such reasonableness? The reply is twofold. First of all, the person prefers accepting the target claim to accepting the objection. Secondly, the person is reasonable in what they prefer. The reasonableness of acceptances, preferences, and reasoning depends on the reasonableness of the person, which in turns depends on the trustworthiness of the person in the pursuit of reason and truth. Trustworthiness does not guarantee success, for we are fallible, but the trustworthiness of a person is the source of the reasonableness in what the person accepts, prefers, and how they reason. Of course, the trustworthiness of a person, which amounts to being worthy of self-trust, is not a blank check but depends in turn on what a person accepts, prefers to accept, and how they reason. There is a loop of trustworthiness to the manifestations of it and back onto itself.

Given the fallibility of our trustworthiness in discerning truth from error, defensibility of justification in terms of an internal system is not sufficient for knowledge. An external truth constraint is required, namely, that the defense is not defeated or refuted by errors in the evaluation system that supplies the defense. Defense or justification that is not defeated or refuted by errors in the background system is defensible knowledge. I have called the subsystem of the evaluation system cleansed of error the ultrasystem of a person. That system tests personal defense and justification to yield the undefeated and irrefutable defense.

This account left us with two problems. One concerns truth. The question is whether the background system connects representation with experience and what we accept with empirical truth. The most fundamental change in my reflections on knowledge is that I argue that conscious experience can become a vehicle of representation as the experience is used to represent what it is like by exhibiting what it is like. Such experience is self-representational, and the acceptance of such a representation closes the gap between the vehicle of representation and the experience that makes it true. The truth-maker and the representation of it are one. Representation incorporates instantiation. The role of such self-representation or reflexive representation provides the empirical connection of representation with phenomenology and acceptance. The process, which I called exemplarization, must yield exemplar representation. When it does, however, there is an identity between the vehicle representation and the truth-maker. Moreover, as we know what the exemplarized experience is like, we know something about what truth is like as we experience the identity of representation and truth-maker.

What is the connection between reflexive exemplar representation and other representations? The exemplar representation may be attached to represent other experiences, as well as external qualities and external objects, exhibiting what it is like to experience them. Radiating and extending semantic connections, one might think of them as stochastic-meaning connections. The exemplarized experiences become exhibits of what the external entities are like, or at least, what it is like to experience them. In this way, the accepted premises of our experience, our exemplar representations, become part of the justification and defense of target knowledge claims within our evaluation system. Our reasonings from the evidence of premises of exemplarized experience to conclusions extending beyond them become part of that system. When objections are met and the defense of the target claim is undefeated and unrefuted by errors in our system, we obtain defensible knowledge. Notice the role of the evaluation system even in the defense of exemplar
representation. The process of exemplarization must itself be trustworthy and be defended against the objection that it is not. The defense appeals to and depends on the evaluation system as the exemplar representation is included within it.

Some will think of exemplar representations of experience as foundations of our knowledge as they provide evidence, though use as evidence requires the system support of their trustworthiness. I have suggested the metaphor of a keystone in the arch of reason and argued before that the principle of trustworthiness is the keystone in the arch of acceptance. I amend the metaphor to include a pair of stones at the base of the arch that are exemplar representations of the internal and external world. They would sit useless on the ground of knowledge without the arch of acceptance and the keystone holding it together. I acknowledge, however, the special role of experience and the exemplar representation of it in an arch of empirical knowledge.

Exemplar representation can be attached to other representations. The attachment is stochastic, even if it is semantic and constitutive of meaning. This entails that what is attached can be detached. We all know this as we discover the illusions of sense. When an illusion is understood, moreover, the experience is detached from one representation and attached to another. Here we confront the connection between freedom and autonomy on one side and representation and acceptance on the other. We have autonomy in how we represent the world and what we accept about it. The dogmatic fixation of belief may conceal this autonomy and the connection between how we represent the world and ourselves in our world. This is a mistake we transcend more easily by distinguishing acceptance from belief and knowledge. The dynamic change and choice in how we represent the world and the diachronic character of the connection of experience with meaning create the stones in the keystone arch of knowledge. Experience and autonomy are the parents of creative thought and representation.

The appeal to autonomy raises questions I have sought to answer. Autonomy, I have argued, is conveyed by a power preference. A power preference loops back onto itself as one of the preferences concerning a target choice. The power preference achieves autonomy when the explanatory loop is primary. One might object that reason, guidance by reasoning, settles the matter of what to prefer, even what power preference to have. However, the preference for how to reason loops back onto itself in what I have called an ultrapreference. The ultrapreference is itself a power preference. A power preference of choice is autonomous when the explanatory loop is primary, that is, when you have that preference because you prefer to have it. Power preferences for how we choose, how we reason, and, yes, how we represent the world and ourselves are an expression of our autonomy. Are those preferences in turn influenced by how we represent the world? Yes. Which comes first, autonomy or representation in the life of reason? Neither. Welcome to the largest loop of reason. Answers to fundamental questions of knowledge, autonomy, and truth are tied up, down, and together in the explanatory loop. I hope that the chapters in this book draw you within it.

The Time Has Come: Why Men Must Join the Gender Equality Revolution by Michael Kaufman [Counterpoint, 9781640091191]

“For too long the struggle for the rights of women and girls was seen as women’s business. Of course, it’s equally men’s business and stops being such a struggle when it’s seen that way. This reframing gives us a chance to understand violence against women as deeply toxic for us all.”

—Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, UN Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of UN Women

The Time Has Come explores how a patriarchal culture that has given power to men comes at a huge cost to women, children, and, surprisingly, to men as well. It details how very achievable changes in our workplaces, in the ways we raise boys to be men, and in the movement to end men’s violence will bring significant rewards to communities all around the world.
Michael Kaufman is the cofounder of the White Ribbon Campaign—the largest international network of men working to end violence against women—and for decades has been an advisor on gender equality to the United Nations, governments, NGOs, schools, and workplaces around the world. With honest storytelling, compassion, and hard-hitting analysis, The Time Has Come is a compelling look at why men must take a stand in the fight for general equality.

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Excerpt: The public world of gender relations is exploding around us. The private world of relationships, families, and sex is a minefield of power and love. There has never, ever, in the eight-thousand-year history of our male-dominated world, been a moment quite like this. You and I are living it. The gender equality revolution.

It’s in our offices and factories in the quest for equal pay, for women’s advancement, and against sexual harassment. It’s on college campuses, in downtown neighborhoods, and suburban homes in the fight to end violence against women. It’s the struggle by parents to redefine whose work it is to raise children and for society to provide the resources for parents to do the job well. It’s the back-and-forth skirmishes to ensure that women have the unalienable right to physical autonomy, including choosing whether or not to become a parent. It’s a powerful rethinking of how we raise girls and boys. It’s a celebration of the right to love who we want to love and define who we want to be. It’s a push for more, and more diverse, women in politics and in the boardroom.

The gender equality revolution is coming on fast and coming on strong.

It’s time for men to join the fight for gender equality.

Fifty years of feminist organizing came to a head in early 2017. Millions of women and hundreds of thousands of men greeted the election of Donald Trump with some of the largest demonstrations the United States has ever seen. People joined in around the world. They were not only reacting to Trump’s boast of assaulting women but also were there to celebrate the impact of feminism and to show they would resist any attempts to roll back progress on women’s rights.

The people in the streets and the tens of millions more who cheered in support inserted new life into decades of feminism and powered everything that was to come. Within months, revelations of sexual harassment and assault poured out of Silicon Valley; the film, theater, and TV industries; and the corporate world at home and abroad. The betrayal of trust, abuse of authority, and the denigration of women by men in positions of power pounded into our brains. As #MeToo and #TimesUp captured our attention, discussions quickly moved from newsrooms to dining rooms, staff rooms, and locker rooms. Men asked wives, daughters, and coworkers: Did anything like that ever happen to you? and a frightening number of women answered, Yes, of course, but why has it taken men so long to listen?

The spreading shock waves are giving new impetus to demands in our workplaces for equal pay and equal access to all jobs. The millennia-long affirmative action program for my half of the species simply can’t go on. The shock waves are bringing new energy to concerns about the panoply of violence—verbal, sexual, emotional, physical—that countless women still experience. They are bringing more attention to the critical
need for quality, affordable childcare and for parental leave.

And for men? More and more of us are realizing we cannot stay silent. We know we must speak out and we must examine our own attitudes and behaviors. But we’re also realizing that it’s time to rethink and reshape what it means to be a man because of the destructive and self-destructive ways we’ve defined manhood.

When I Chose to Join the Fight
For almost four decades, the focus of my work as an educator, advisor, speaker, activist, and writer has been on engaging men to promote gender equality and to explore how gender equality is bringing positive changes to men’s lives.

I grew up in the 1950s and 1960s in a pretty traditional North American home (first in Ohio, then North Carolina, then in Ontario, Canada). Dad was a doctor, Mom a housewife. But equality was assumed. There was never a question.

The phalanxes of Secret Service, plainclothes Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and who knows who jamming the corridors outside the meeting room. And yet, it was also utterly mundane, just another meeting at another table: people occasionally shared a quick aside with a neighbor, a few leaders fiddled with their translation devices to find the right channel, and one fidgeted and seemed rather out of place.

Whatever the problems with these types of meetings (including their staggering security budgets) and whatever criticism I might have about some of the policies of these leaders, it was an incredible moment. It shows the world-shaking impact of feminism. It led to at least one bit of concrete action: countries pledged $3.8 billion for girls’ education in the Global South—the United States was the only country that didn’t put up a penny. In a wide range of discussions during the course of the year, government ministers and policy makers were addressing women’s rights, the impact of policies on women and girls, and the role of men and the lives of men and boys.

From dining rooms to the halls of power, gender equality is definitely on the table. This book is all about how men can join women—in part by women reaching out to men and challenging us, and in part by men reaching out to our brothers—in continuing what is the greatest revolution in human history: the work to win women’s rights, gender justice, and gender equality.

And as we shall see, winning those rights and the massive changes of our era that started as a women’s revolution are already bringing enormous benefits to men and to the world.

What that means, and what I aim to show you, is that feminism is the greatest gift that men have ever received.

However, it does not come for free. It means challenging inequality and also challenging oneself. It often requires challenging the beliefs and actions of other men around us. It means listening to the voices of women and daring to look at forms of power and privilege we have enjoyed as men that might have been invisible to us. Yet I am absolutely certain that men’s commitment to a gender-equitable future will transform men’s lives in positive ways.

Men’s embrace of this change has certainly been sparked and encouraged by women. But ultimately we need to find effective ways to bring in men as active proponents of change. This starts with men being part of the struggle for women’s rights. In that, we can take some inspiration from two men living half a world apart.

Two Men
We often think of leadership as what takes place at the apex of a company, a government, or a team. But leadership is also about our actions in our neighborhoods, over a glass of beer, or in our homes. Sometimes it’s a small gesture, while other times it’s far more dramatic. And while we need new government policies, changes in laws and action at the highest levels, some of the most effective change happens in our communities or at a kitchen counter.
This includes men taking leadership alongside women to work for the right for women to live free of violence. After all, this right is not only critical for women’s safety, health, and emotional well-being, it is a precondition for women’s equal participation in the work force, education, and politics. It’s also the precondition for future generations of girls and boys to grow up in loving and secure homes, free of the emotionally and intellectually debilitating impact of violence on children.

I met a man from the Swat Valley, a remote, mountainous region of Pakistan. He was young, but already his face was gaunt and angular, as if blowing sand had chiseled rock fractured by cold winter nights. His hair was thick and dark, and by the end of the afternoon, dense stubble had formed on his face. When I first sat down with him in a small restaurant, his shoulders were slumped and he glanced around with caution, perhaps even suspicion. But when we talked, a fierce passion came into his eyes and his soft voice rose when he spoke of the day he graduated from law school and returned home to Swat. (At the time, many years ago, I hadn’t heard of this region; now I know it is where Malala and her family are from.)

While he was away at law school, the generals in power, in an attempt to appease the rising number of Islamic fundamentalists, were making use of something called the Hudood Ordinances. It was a reactionary interpretation of Islamic law that proclaimed, among other things, that if a girl or woman made an accusation of rape, she had to produce four male witnesses to substantiate the crime. As you might imagine, no woman was ever able to meet this requirement. Not only would their accusations then be branded as false, but these women could then be charged with adultery. If found guilty, they could be put in prison; they could be put to death.

This man saw all this and said to himself, “This is against the legal tradition of Pakistan. And he thought, This is not what I believe are the teachings of Islam. He decided to defend these women and he quickly found success, if not in leading to charges against the men who had committed sexual assault, at least in receiving acquittals of adultery for these girls and women.

The response of the powers that be was to throw him into prison. When he told me this, I instantly imagined the hardship and suffering he underwent in this prison in a remote region of Pakistan. And then I imagined even worse: how the other male prisoners had tormented him when they discovered why he was there.

Whatever I imagined, however, was wrong. When the other male prisoners found out he was in prison for defending women in their community, they went on a hunger strike. It was a place where food was never plentiful, but they refused to eat even what little they had until this man was released. It did not take long, for within days, the rusty door was unlocked and he walked away free.

Another story, from half a world away: It was a number of years ago. I was in a small town on the shore of Lake Huron helping folks on a local campaign to promote equality and end violence against women. The air was crisp that night in early winter, and already there was a layer of powdery snow on the ground. Christmas lights glowed on lampposts as I drove toward a church to talk about the problem of violence against women. I spoke that night about the epidemic of this violence, from the most commonplace sexual harassment at work to the most horrific moments of murder; of the pioneering, difficult, and often heroic work of women around the world; and of the White Ribbon Campaign.

After my talk, a man approached me. I noticed his hesitation to speak. I was pretty tired and steeled myself for what I imagined would be a long, impromptu counseling session. Patiently, he waited until other people had asked me a question or exchanged a few words. He didn’t speak until everyone had left.

Finally, with eyes unable to meet mine and in a quiet voice, he asked me: “Is it okay if, well, you know, if people make copies of White Ribbon things?” I assumed he meant making copies of our posters and flyers, or our materials for distribution in schools or workplaces.

“Of course,” I said. “We encourage you to take whatever we do and adapt it for your own use.” Still wary, he asked, “Even your TV ad?” At the time
we had a thirty-second television message about the importance of men speaking out. "That too," I said. He still didn't look at me. Finally he said, "Is it okay to make more than one copy?" I said he could make all the copies he wanted.

Only then did he relax and look at me.

He said, "Well, I've made dozens and dozens of copies."

He owned a small shop that repaired electronic equipment, especially VCRs. He had made many copies of our TV message and whenever he repaired a VCR, he slipped in the videocassette and returned it to the owner without saying a word. So when his customers switched on their TVs to see if the VCR worked, suddenly they would see a message about speaking out against men's violence toward women.

It's a long way from a small town in North America to a bustling city in the Swat region of Pakistan. One of these men risked much more than the other. But these two men represent the millions of men and boys around the world who, right now, are speaking out to their friends at school or work, or who are raising their sons with a strong belief in the equal rights of women. There are millions of men who are supporting campaigns big and small, who are taking initiatives to make their own lives, workplaces, and homes more gender equitable.

There are so many of us, so many men, who are now realizing these changes stand to make our own lives better too. There are so many men who realize the time has come. <>

In The Time Is Now, Sister Joan Chittister—a rabble-rousing force of nature for social justice and fervent proponent of personal faith and spiritual fulfillment—draws on the wisdom of prophets, both ancient and modern, to help us confront the societal forces that oppress and silence the sacred voices among us.

Pairing scriptural insights with narratives of the truth-tellers that came before us, Sister Joan offers a compelling vision for readers to combat complacency and to propel ourselves toward creating a world of justice, freedom, peace, and empowerment.

For the weary, the cranky, and the fearful, this energizing message invites us to participate in a vision for a world greater than the one we find ourselves in today. This is spirituality in action; this is practical and powerful activism for our times.
thought of a better future or give in to the allurements of a deteriorating present. They never lose hope that the values they learned in the best of times or the courage it takes to reclaim their world from the worst of times are worth the commitment of their lives. These people, the best of ourselves, are legion and they are everywhere.

It is the unwavering faith, the open hearts, and the piercing courage of people from every level of every society that carries us through every major social breakdown to the emergence again of the humanization of humanity. In every region, everywhere, they are the unsung but mighty voices of community, high-mindedness, and deep resolve. They are the prophets of each era who prod the rest of the world into seeing newly what it means to be fully alive, personally, nationally, and spiritually.

It is to these average but courageous people

WHY READ THIS BOOK
With the world around us cracking at the seams and America in a state of polarization and political disarray, this book sets out to answer the most serious questions of them all:

How do we really get out of the swamp we’re in?
Answer:
By confronting it.
Response:
How?
Answer:
Truthfully.
Response:
But what will that take?
Answer:
A model, a vision, a commitment, courage, and .. .
Aaaaaand ... ?
What else is needed to fix this muddled world?
Answer:
You.

A CHOICE
We have a choice.

You and I stand in a space between two worlds. The first world is the one we were told—and never doubted—would last. The statue of Lady Liberty stood in the bay of the Port of New York and welcomed foreigners to our shores. The Constitution rested on its three-part government, each one serving as a check and balance on the other two, all of them devoted to answering the needs of the entire country. That was then.

Now the statue still stands there but the welcome is an illusion that is too often measured by color and ethnicity. The Constitution still exists, yes, but its interpretation now rests more on the prejudices of partisanship than on universal national concerns.

The second world in which we are steeped, the one we are living in now, defies everything we were taught to expect. Immigrants in dire straits are locked out of the United States. Members of Congress barely speak to their counterparts across the aisle, let alone feel required to respond to their needs. Long-standing international alliances are fracturing. The proliferation of nuclear weapons has raised its ugly head again after years of negotiation—even in countries long considered too small and remote to be a threat to anyone. As Americans, we are the first country to unilaterally violate an international treaty. In our withdrawal from the treaty with Iran that constrained its nuclear ambitions, we undermine international negotiations. A secure and stable national future for a global community can no longer be taken for granted.

We have a choice.

More than that, national borders everywhere are breaking down as entire populations are driven from their homes to find a place in other countries. Yet at the same time, alt-right and far-left political positions are dividing peoples everywhere, threatening local and global peace.

Somewhere between pre-war isolation and a postwar world that put its hope in the power of global institutions, life turned upside down. We became citizens of the world, clinging as we might to small-town USA. The planet is now our neighborhood, a polyglot place where very
different kinds of people need and want the same things.

We now find ourselves surrounded by people formed in other ways and places who by virtue of their tribes, cultures, and religions see life in other ways than we do. They were raised to value other ideals than we were. They speak another language. They paint a different face on their icons of God. They, too, seek life in its fullness. At base, we are all nothing more than humans together. We all want an order in our societies that we can depend on. We want a good future for generations to come. We want a way to make a steady, decent living that provides the basics of life and a chance to enjoy them. We want the opportunity to become the best of ourselves. Most of all, perhaps, we want a government that exists for the good of its citizens, that protects rather than oppresses its people, that is an equal partner in the community of nations.

Until now, destiny meant the right to get more of the past. Not now. Instead, the diverse cultural and generational makeup in our country does not yearn for the America of the past because they never knew it.

We may all seem to be going in the same direction, but when we get to the crossroads of a world in flux the human parade splits: Some emphasize the need to preserve the values and structures that brought us to this point. Others warn that standing still while the world goes on will be our downfall. So we wander in a world of expectations we can neither see nor embrace.

Breaking news: the world is a land mine of differences.

No doubt about it. The direction we take at this new crossroad in time will not simply affect the future of the United States. It will determine the history of the world. The future depends on whether we make serious decisions about our own roles in shaping a future that fulfills God’s will for the world, or simply choose to suffer the decisions made by others intent on imposing their own vision of tomorrow.

This moment is a daunting one. At every crossroad, every one of us has three possible options: The first choice is to quit a road that is going somewhere we do not want to go. We can move on in another direction. We can distance ourselves from the difficulties of it all. We can leave the mission unfinished.

The second alternative is to surrender to the forces of resistance that obstruct our every step toward wholeness. We can succumb to the fatigue of the journey that comes from years of being ignored, ridiculed, or dismissed for our ideas. We can go quietly into oblivion, taking on the values of the day or going silent in the face of them. This choice, in other words, is to crawl into a comfortable cave with nice people and become a church, a culture, a society within a society. We can just hunker down together and wait for the storm to calm down, go by, and become again the nice warm womb of our beginnings.

The third choice is to refuse to accept a moral deterioration of the present and insist on celebrating the coming of an unknown, but surely holier, future. The third choice is to go steadfastly on, even if we are not sure what we will find at the end of it. The third choice is to follow the path of the prophets of old. It is to echo those who came before us who spoke the voice and vision of God for the world. It is to risk, as the prophets did, not really being heard at all—at least not until long after the fact.

The third choice is a choice that demands great courage. But courage, however apparently fruitless, is not without its own reward. Anaïs Nin wrote once: "Life shrinks or expands in proportion to one’s courage." And courage is a prophet’s road.

The prophets had a choice.

So do we. <>

Rationalization in Religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam edited by Yohanan Friedmann and Christoph Markschies [DE Gruyter, 9783110444506]

Current tendencies in religious studies and theology show a growing interest for the interchange between religions and the cultures of rationalization surrounding them. The studies published in this volume, based on the international
conferences of both the Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften and the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, aim to contribute to this field of interest by dealing with concepts and influences of rationalization in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and religion in general. In addition to taking a closer look at the immediate links in the history of tradition between those rationalizing movements and evolutions in religion, emphasis is put on intellectual-historical convergences: Therefore, the articles are led by central comparative questions, such as what factors foster/hinder rationalization?; where are criteria for rationalization drawn from?; in which institutions is rationalization taking place?; who propagates, supports, and utilizes rationalization?

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Excerpt: The present volume is based on the conference on “Rationalization in Religions” convened jointly by the Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften and the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities in Berlin on December 16-18, 2013. The conference was the first in a series of workshops on religion and modernity arranged on the basis of the collaboration agreement concluded in 2000 between the two academies.

Christoph Markschies: Rationalization in Religions
Philosopher Carl Friedrich Gethmann, a member of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy, has described rationalization as the “targeted, structured and reproducible operation of optimization.” Gethmann’s broad definition covers rationalization across a range of very different areas — in the economy, in society, even in the mind of the individual. In our own field of religious studies, the first scholar who comes to mind in this context is the philosopher and sociologist Max Weber, who introduced the term “rationalization” to the field. Maintaining that religious rationalization preceded social rationalization, Weber identified rationalization structures within the Judeo-Christian tradition that, as Gethmann puts it, “encouraged the establishment of rational conceptions of the world and the emergence of a modern consciousness.” In his studies of the “economic ethics of the world religions,” Weber developed the notion of a universal historical process of “disenchantment” (Entzauberung) of the religious-metaphysical conceptions of the world and argued for a “unidirectional rationalization of all world religions.” According to Weber, all paths of
religious rationalization lead towards an understanding of the world that is purified of magical notions. Only the occidental path of development, however, leads to a fully decentralized understanding of the world.'

It is not my intention, at this juncture, to provide a full recapitulation of Weber’s view of the rationalization that is inherent in all world religions. His basic assumptions concerning an occidental rationalism, and thus a particularly marked rationalism in the occidental religions, which he set against the Orient and its religions, appear highly problematic to us today. In view of the obvious problems in Weber’s conceptualization, I believe it makes more sense, in talking about "rationalization in religions," to stick with Gethmann’s definition of rationalization and to speak of an optimization of the "rationality" of religion. But what is rationality?

I turn again to Gethmann, who defines "rationality" as "developing processes for the discursive upholding of claims to validity, to follow these and to avail of them." A religion becomes rationalized when its exponents argue discursively - that is, in line with contemporary standards of rationality - in favor of its claims to validity, and when those claims to validity can be asserted in this way, instead of authoritatively and using instruments of power.

Notwithstanding our criticism of Weber, we are left with the question of whether such a tendency is actually inherent in all world religions, and whether this development intensifies over time. The conference on which the present volume is based set out to address this question, focusing mainly on Judaism, Christianity and Islam, aside from Shaul Shaked’s treatment of Zoroastrianism. Many of the papers focus specifically on the formative periods in which these three religions (sometimes referred to as "Abrahamic") came into contact with the "cultures of rationality" that surrounded them, leading them to develop independent philosophies, theologies or at least argue with the pagans about the rationality of their respective Holy Scriptures.

To an extent, Berlin can be described as a hot spot for this kind of research into the formative periods of the Abrahamic faiths. In the area of Judaism, for example, one could mention the studies of Peter Schäfer of Berlin (and Princeton), who convened several conferences, the results of which have since been published, to examine the relationships between the Greco-Roman culture of rationality and the large corpus of rabbinic literature.

Regarding Islam, we might point to the Berlin research of Islamic studies scholar Sabine Schmidtke, also of (Berlin and) Princeton, whose paper "Rediscovering Theological Rationalism in the Medieval World of Islam" was part of a larger project funded by the European Research Council - the groundwork for which, however, was laid down by several research groups at the Israel Institute for Advanced Studies, to which our Jerusalem colleagues, such as Sarah Stroumsa, made a considerable contribution. In the area of Early Christianity, we may note the studies of the reception of the Alexandrian culture of knowledge, and especially of (neo)Platonic philosophy, among Alexandrian Christians such as Clement of Alexandria and Origen; this work, too, has taken place in Berlin, within the circle surrounding the edition of the works of these Early Christian thinkers, in particular at the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy, but of course not only there.'

A number of efforts have recently been made to analyze and compare these attempts - facilitated by the continued existence in Late Antiquity of a culture of knowledge with shared standards of rationality - to integrate a culture of knowledge and rationality into the respective religions; worth mentioning here, for example, are the publications of Guy Stroumsa. These comparative approaches are, of course, still in their nascent stages, with studies of "rationalization in religions" generally limited to one of the three - Judaism, Christianity or Islam - not to mention certain limitations in their perspectives (for example, because of the way reception has developed in modern times, the significance of Platonism has been afforded more attention than that of the Stoic tradition).

An earlier collaborative effort to examine "Religion and Rationality" was undertaken at a conference with that title held in Berlin in 2009. That conference took a closer look at the relationship between scripture and rationalization - that is, between normative texts and efforts to adapt
reflective work on them to contemporary standards of rationality. The colloquium’s thesis was that interpretation, particularly in the form of scientific commentaries, is a literary medium and institutional method for approaching holy texts that makes it possible to arrive at rationalizations in accord with a methodically controlled procedure. The colloquium took a very broad comparative approach, classifying Marxist texts alongside ancient oriental ones as “Scriptures” in the terms of a phenomenological approach to religion. The question already arose there as to whether a phenomenological comparison of the possibly differing potentials of religions to rationalize their traditions, and of their possibly differing strategies, would have to look not only at interpreting Holy Scriptures but also at theological reflections that are not presented in the form of commentary.

While we might tremble today to sketch broad outlines and model clear structures like those proposed by Weber, perhaps we can nevertheless create a list of criteria to outline how rationalization might be practiced by those actively involved in religions (such as religious experts or theologians). I would like to mention a few questions that might be helpful in this regard:

- What factors promote/impede rationalization?
- From where are the criteria for rationalization drawn, and how are they applied?
- In what institutions does rationalization take place, and where is it critiqued?
- What circles of proponents propagate, support and utilize rationalization?
- Does the friction between clergy and other theologians that is so characteristic of Christianity exist in other religions as well?
- The papers presented herein offer a historical perspective on these and other questions, along with some answers.

As a methodological framework critical rationalism upholds the following theses, among others:

There is something (reality) not created by man’s ideas, language and/or conventions. This reality, which is full of mysteries, nevertheless is assumed to be, in principle, comprehensible.

All knowledge claims are conjectural and remain so until they are refuted. Nevertheless, it is not impossible to get closer to a true understanding of reality, whether natural or socially constructed, by means of learning through our own mistakes and by reflecting on the mistakes committed by others.

All observations are theory-laden. There is no such a thing as `brute or naked (i.e. un-interpreted) fact’.

It is the `growth of interesting and informative knowledge about reality’, and not ‘knowledge per se’, which is important.

Knowledge advances in two complementary ways: via negativa and via positiva. The former concerns what we learn from disproving the conjectures made about the reality of things. We learn that reality is not the way these conjectures claim that it is. In other words, we learn through the mistakes we have made in our conjectural exploration of reality or from the mistakes made by others. The latter pertains to conjectures which so far, and despite our best efforts to refute them, have proved resilient and remain corroborated. Such claims are regarded as our best provisional candidates for knowledge about reality.

The following two schemata present the way we develop our knowledge:

P1—>TS—>EE—>P2

In the above schemata, P1 is a problem which presents itself to the inquirer. TS is a tentative solution which the inquirer produces (in the shape of a conjecture) to solve the problem. There may be more than one solution for the problem with which the inquirer is grappling (TS, ... TS n+m). Each proposed solution should then be subjected to the process of error elimination (EE). Each genuine problem, almost invariably, introduces in its wake fresh new problems (P2 ... P n+m) due to the fact that reality, as critical rationalists assume, is not exhausted by our conjectures and constantly introduces new aspects/challenges.

Critical assessments of conjectures are made in two ways: for all those knowledge claims and
conjectures which have empirical content and deal with empirically accessible aspects of reality, assessment will be done by means of empirical testing as well as analytical (i.e. rational, logical and philosophical) evaluations. For those knowledge claims which do not have empirically testable contents and/or are about those aspects of reality which are not empirically accessible, and are neither empty nor truisms nor tautologies, assessment will be done by analytical means. Such claims can also be assessed in an indirect way by evaluating empirical/practical consequences which may result from them.

Morality/ethics and the growth of knowledge are closely connected. Morality manifests its role in the growth of knowledge in at least two ways. On the one hand, inquirers must regard ‘others’ as ends in themselves and not means. This is because it is only through dialogue with ‘others’ that one can hope to correct one’s mistakes (avoid one’s epistemological blind spots) and also get access to unique sources of knowledge. But proper dialogue can only take place if the interlocutors regard those with whom they are interacting as belonging to the category of ends in themselves. On the other hand, inquirers must avoid resorting to any tactic, e.g. obscurantism or ad-hoc manoeuvres, which would make the task of critical assessment of their knowledge claims less effective.

Pluralism (in the sense of diversity of ideas and views and the existence of pluralistic knowledge eco-systems) is of great importance for the growth of knowledge. In a pluralistic environment, in which a large variety of conjectures can be produced as possible solutions to the challenges presented by reality, the chances of stumbling upon a conjecture which is on the right track are much higher than in eco-systems in which one or a few dominant views stifle the flourishing of alternative ideas or suppress their emergence.

Justification, of all sorts and types, is impossible. Whatever people suggest as a justification for their claim is in need of further justification. The impossibility of justification, however, does not mean that we cannot rationally prefer some theories to others. This is done by means of producing sound arguments which explain why some theories are to be preferred to others.

Induction, as a method of logical inference, is invalid, and as a method for discovery is impossible. The impossibility of induction has no impact whatsoever on our ability to learn from experience by means of the method of producing conjectures and trying to find their shortcomings. The so-called ‘problem of induction’, generalisation from a limited set of data, is one of the aspects of 'the problem of demarcation', distinguishing between genuine knowledge and pseudo-knowledge. The latter problem is about what we learn the former about how we learn.

Critical rationalists introduce the following finer sub-divisions in reality (R): the natural (physical) part of reality (World1 (W1)), the subjective content of each individual’s cognitive and emotive apparatus (World, (W2)) and the sphere which contains ALL publicly available products of human interaction with reality (World3 (W3)). W3 contains all intellectual/linguistic (in the extended sense of the term) products. It is the abode of entities such as our theories, moral principles, legal codes, blueprints and plans of all technological products, music, poetry, religious, philosophical and other types of ideas. W3 is as real as the other types of reality. This is because entities in W3 have the power of influencing other aspects of reality. W, is the link between W, and W3. Challenges presented to people (W2s), either through what happens in W, or by what appears in W3, may prompt them to come up with solutions. The conceptual contents of these solutions belong to W3. Similarly, ideas deposited in W3 could prompt people to make changes in W, (Popper, [1994] 2012: ch. 1).

Knowledge claims ought to be objective. Objectivity is here understood as amounting to ‘public accessibility and public assessability’. Although pursuers of knowledge are immersed in their own local cultures and traditions and carry their cultural and metaphysical baggage as well as value systems, they can do their best, in their quests to understand different aspects of reality, to keep their conjectures free of such external influences in order to depict reality itself as faithfully as
possible. What makes this task possible is the public accessibility and assessability of scientific (knowledge) conjectures. The critical assessment of these conjectures helps pursuers of knowledge to (as much as humanly possible) detect and eliminate the biases that may have been imported into their conjectures and thus make their conjectures represent reality more faithfully.

From the above it also follows that knowledge claims ought to be, as much as it is possible, value-neutral. What pursuers of knowledge, in their efforts to understand reality, aim to achieve is a truthful understanding of reality itself and not values or habits of this or that individual, group or culture.

Human knowledge is not absolute, certain, infallible, indubitable or justified. In other words, our knowledge claims, which are always conjectural, cannot — no matter how accurate they are — fully capture reality. Reality, as critical rationalists surmise, is indeterminately infinite, whereas we are finite, fallible creatures with limited cognitive abilities.

Certainty/certitude belongs to the realm of personal psychology. It is not an epistemological category. Psychology deals with external causes whereas epistemology is concerned with internal reasons and arguments. It is possible to induce 'certainty/certitude' about certain ideas/claims in individuals' minds by non-cognitive means such as brain-washing and propaganda. Individuals may also acquire certainty as a result of their existential experiences. However, whatever about which individuals are 'certain', as a result of external stimuli or personal experiences, as long as it remains in their W2S, it cannot be regarded as objective knowledge since it is neither publicly accessible nor publicly assessable.

Whatever becomes part of the three worlds (1, 2 & 3), i.e. the realm to which human beings have access, would inevitably and necessarily assume the limitations of these three worlds. Within each world there are indeterminately large number of capacities and potentials which can, in principle, be actualised.

All theories (conjectures, hypotheses etc.), which are needed to be produced in response to the challenges presented by reality, must be constructed by us. Reality does not suggest any solution or conjecture (theories). The role of reality is to act as a referee and judge in assessing the tenability (or otherwise) of our proposed conjectures (solutions) (Popper, 1994: ch. 1).

In the course of acquiring knowledge by means of the method of conjectures and refutations, one ought to distinguish between two important contexts: the context of discovery and the context of assessment. The role of these two contexts in producing knowledge is different but complementary. Neither can, in the absence of the other, produce knowledge. The context of discovery belongs to the realm of personal psychology. It is intimately related to one's W2. It is the arena in which, as a result of one's constant and systematic grappling with the problem(s) with which one is dealing, the 'solution(s)' to one's problem(s) may be 'envisioned' or 'experienced' in the shape of flashes of insight, moments of epiphany, flares of intuition and their ilk. These visions/experiences, which are all 'existential' in kind and not 'epistemological', are, by their very nature, transitory and short lived. As soon as they are over, one needs to 'reconstruct' them by means of one's memory, concepts and language. The reconstructed 'solution(s)' must then be presented to 'the context of assessment', which is the public arena, and must be assessed critically to expose their faults and defects. 'Reconstructed' versions of 'existential moments' can never fully represent reality since our language and concepts always remain imperfect. Nevertheless, such 'reconstructions' can, in principle, present good approximate representations of some aspects of reality, and it is not impossible to get closer to a better understanding of reality via such 'reconstructions'.

Critical rationalism relies on a metmethod/methodological framework called situational analysis/situational logic, for exploring the situations in all those realms in which human interaction matters. Since this meta-method will be used in the subsequent chapters of the present volume, below I briefly introduce its main features.
Situational analysis

Situational analysis which was introduced by Popper, and further developed by other fellow critical rationalists, provides, in the general context of critical rationalism, a powerful tool for analysing the acts of human actors in various situations.

'Situation' is a general name for any circumstance in which human actors interact with each other (and with the environment); in other words it refers to particular 'human conditions'. To analyse a situation means to study the ways in which the main actors act (in relation to other actors and the environment) to achieve their aims and objectives. The analyst explores the impacts and outcomes (i.e. the wanted and unwanted consequences) of the actions of the actors in the situation.

The first task of the analyst is to define a boundary for the 'situation'. That is to say, the time and place which identifies the 'situation' in question. He/she should provide reasons as to why such a proposed boundary is suitable for understanding the 'situation' under consideration. For example, suppose a researcher (or an analyst) intends to do a research on the response of Muslim intellectuals to modernity. The researcher/analyst should specify the boundary of his/her 'problem situation' by specifying the place (e.g. the country) to which the intellectuals in question belong and the period in which their activities he/she intends to explore. For example, if the analyst has in mind to explore the responses of Egyptian Muslim intellectuals to modernity in the period between 1900 and 1930. After de-limiting the boundary of the situation, the analyst should specify the main actors and others whose action may influence 'the situation' in ways which are of interest or importance from the view of the analysis in question. To each actor, a set of aims as well as a certain amount of background knowledge related to the situation and the aims they pursue are attributed. These attributions are nothing but conjectures produced by the analyst. For each attribution, the analyst ought to produce reasons as to why it fares better in comparison to some rival attributed aims/background knowledge in the face of challenging evidence/arguments. The analyst should also identify the set of 'institutions' (including traditions, laws, rules and regulations) as well as the physical environment (obstacles) in the situation under study which could influence the actions of the actors.

Each model of 'Situational Analysis' is also enriched by an empirical conjecture which serves as the major premise in the explanatory scheme of the model. This conjecture is called 'the rationality principle' or 'the principle of charity'. It simply states that actors in the 'situations' act in ways they think to be fit for their purpose. The rationality principle implies that an agent/actor in a situation may act according to beliefs/theories which he/she may think to be true, though those beliefs/theories may be false in reality.

The importance of this 'principle' is that it forces the analysts to do their best to find a rational explanation for the actions of the actors in a particular situation, even in the face of most adverse evidence. To ascribe the unusual actions of particular actors to their madness or insanity would not help us to learn anything from the situation and the interaction of the actors in it. Mad or insane behaviour does not need rational explanation. It requires only causal explanation.

Situational analysis is not based on subjective features of actors, such as their hopes or fears, but objective problems which actors want to solve (or objective aims which they want to achieve). The analyst can ascribe various cognitive and emotional capacities to actors, on a conjectural basis. However, his/her conjectures must be empirically falsifiable. In other words, they must have informative content. They must not be truisms or tautologies.

This model for analysis could be applied equally effectively to both texts and events. The outcome of the analysis would be objective since it can be scrutinised by other researchers. They can critically examine any claims made about the situation or the actions of the actors. They can also examine the assumptions made in reconstructing the 'situation'. As a result of such critical assessments, the original account of the situation under consideration could either be improved upon or discarded.

The peculiarities of the scientists/scholars' upbringing, biases or prejudices concerning reality. Unless studying such biases is the goal. But even
then, the outcome ought to be objective in the sense explained in Section 3. For technologies, on the other hand, being impregnated with those values cherished by their inventors or end-users is not only a virtue, but also an indispensable characteristic. Technologies ought to be user-friendly, for the more they reflect the values and pragmatic preferences of their inventors or end-users, the more acceptable they will be.

Scientific conjectures (conjectural knowledge-claims) aim to transcend particular contexts and account for each context’s particularities by incorporating initial and boundary conditions in the theory’s general body. Einstein’s general theory of relativity is supposed to be valid throughout the universe, despite the fact that the particular form of the space-time curvature caused by the gravitational field of the black hole in our galaxy’s centre differs from the space-time curvature caused by a quasar’s gravitational field. Technologies, on the other hand, are context-sensitive, for without proper fine-tuning a technology devised to respond to the needs of people in a specific environment or context may not work properly in other environments or contexts. For example, a car designed for Europe’s cold and wet climate has to be modified appropriately before it can be used in Africa’s hot and dry deserts. An astronaut walking on the Moon’s surface must wear a space suit, as opposed to a tuxedo or woolly jumpers.

Another notable difference pertains to the fact that scientific knowledge is, by and large, cumulative, whereas technological know-how is to some extent (though not in all cases) tacit and non-cumulative. Those past scientific (knowledge) conjectures that have been successful over a long period of time and have successfully defeated our best and most effective attempts to falsify them are routinely incorporated as approximations in the subsequent and more explanatory theories. As for technologies, since part of their know-how is transferred through some sort of master-disciple relationship or acquired as personal skills, in many cases if the know-how is lost it is lost forever, or at least its retrieval would be extremely difficult.

The criteria for judging advances in science and in technological activities are also different. In science, the criterion of approaching the ideal of the truth about reality provides a rough (and admittedly not yet very well formalised) measure for progress. In technology and engineering, where the main concern is usually devising more effective practical solutions, or more efficient machines and instruments, pragmatic considerations are more prominent.

Contrary to the view held by a number of writers, including Martin Heidegger (1993), technologies do not have essences but only functions, which cause them to become individuated. Their users could add or omit functions in order to adapt them to the purposes they have in mind.

For both knowledge claims and technological constructs, reality is the final arbiter: it corrects the mistakes of our knowledge claims and exposes the defects of our technological constructs. For technologies, although the users’ tastes and preferences (which together form an important part of their networks of meaning) are important for judging the technology’s desirability, nevertheless, the constraints imposed by reality for judging the efficacy of its functions are decisive.

Each specific technology is identifiable as such only for those who share a network of meaning or a collective intentionality that recognises that particular technology and its characteristic functions. For example, an Amazonian tribal member will see a laptop as a thing, not a laptop. Philosophers define such a case as the difference between "seeing" and "seeing as". Seeing something as something particular is only possible for those who share in the network of meaning related to that thing.

Earlier it was suggested that the aim of science is to discover the truth about reality. At the most basic level, such truth corresponds to fundamental laws that govern reality at those levels. In the natural sciences, fundamental laws are our best guesses for capturing the fundamental laws of nature (Rosenberg, 2005). It is therefore important to distinguish between these laws and the fundamental laws of science. The latter, as suggested above, are our best representations of the former. Fundamental laws are universal and valid in all contexts.
In the realm of technologies, which is a realm entirely constructed by us and which should be distinguished from realm of science/nature, all laws are phenomenological (technological/empirical). Phenomenological laws are used in specific contexts and for particular phenomena (e.g. the classical laws of gases, Ohm's law of electric resistance in electric circuits, Hooke's law of elasticity, the laws of fluid dynamics and Coulomb's law of the force between two electric charges). According to critical rationalists, all such laws are derivable from fundamental laws either directly or by "approximate derivation". For example, Coulomb's law is a consequence of Maxwell's equations and the Lorentz force for static charges, and the Euler equation for a perfect fluid is a consequence of the fundamental law of dynamics and Kepler's law, which states that the planets' elliptical orbits can be approximately derived from Newtonian theory.

Knowledge/science does not tell technologists what to do, but, at best, only specifies the boundaries or limits of what cannot be achieved. For example, the principle of energy conservation informs technologists and engineers that it is impossible for them to construct a perpetual motion machine. Similarly, entropy suggests that they cannot make a machine that functions at a 100 per cent efficiency rate (Popper, 1944: Sec. 20).

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