Food, Fish, Crime, War: Redemption?

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Frank and Al: FDR, Al Smith, and the Unlikely Alliance That Created the Modern Democratic Party by Terry Golway [St. Martin’s Press, 9781250089649]

"The tangled, tragic story of Al Smith and Franklin Roosevelt is one of the great tales of American politics, and Terry Golway has told it beautifully. This is a joyous book... an especially important book now, given the unwelcome return to our national life of the same “all-American” bigots who opposed Smith."

—Joe Klein

"I highly recommend this fascinating and enlightening book." —Franklin D. Roosevelt, III

"Beautifully written...the book is must reading for anyone interested in the history of American politics and the rise of the country’s welfare state." —Robert Dallek, author of An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963

“A marvelous portrait... Highly recommend!” —Douglas Brinkley, author of Rightful Heritage: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Land of America

The inspiring story of an unlikely political partnership—between a to-the-manor-born Protestant and a Lower East Side Catholic—that transformed the Democratic Party and led to the New Deal

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Democratic Party was bitterly split between its urban machines—representing Catholics and Jews, ironworkers and seamstresses, from the tenements of the northeast and Midwest—and its populists and patricians, rooted in the soil and the Scriptures, enforcers of cultural, political, and religious norms. The chasm between the two factions seemed unbridgeable. But just before the Roaring Twenties, Al Smith, a proud son of the Tammany Hall political machine, and Franklin Roosevelt, a country squire, formed an unlikely alliance that transformed the Democratic Party. Smith and FDR dominated politics in the most-powerful state in the union for a quarter-century, and in 1932 they ran against each other for the Democratic presidential nomination, setting off one of the great feuds in American history.
The relationship between Smith and Roosevelt, portrayed in Terry Golway’s Frank and Al, is one of the most dramatic untold stories of early 20th Century American politics. It was Roosevelt who said once that everything he sought to do in the New Deal had been done in New York under Al Smith when he was governor in the 1920s. It was Smith who persuaded a reluctant Roosevelt to run for governor in 1928, setting the stage for FDR’s dramatic comeback after contracting polio in 1921. They took their party, and American politics, out of the 19th Century and created a place in civic life for the New America of the 20th Century.

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Excerpt: The dull light of a winter’s afternoon in Albany was beginning to fade, and the men in stiff collars and dark suits who wrote New York’s laws shuffled papers and tapped their desks while tiresome colleagues expounded on this or that, seemingly unaware that their impatient audience was making plans for the rest of the evening. Some, the more dutiful, would return to the cheap rooming houses they rented for the legislative session. Others would head for the city’s legendary saloons or perhaps to the Ten Eyck Hotel, where it was good to be seen, and afterward stroll toward the Hudson River, to places where women made a living providing the comforts of home, an hour at a time.

In January 1911 the air was unusually warm, as it had been for more than a month. Doctors said the absence of snow and bone-chilling temperatures were to blame for a terrible outbreak of pneumonia that had claimed the lives of more than three dozen Albanians since the beginning of December.

The new majority leader of the New York State Assembly found himself alone and surprisingly unscheduled as his colleagues made their way into the delightfully temperate, if somewhat dangerous, Albany air. Had it been a Thursday, he would have gathered up three or four of his colleagues—men from the mountains of the North Country, the mill towns of western New York, the potato fields of Long Island—and walked down the hill from the capitol past St. Peter’s Church to Keeler’s Restaurant on State Street. As the streetcars clambered by, they’d talk politics, gossip about absent colleagues, or critique the day’s debates. Once at Keeler’s, they would feast on corned beef and cabbage in one of the fabulous restaurant’s fourteen dining rooms, where dozens of waiters scurried about with heaping plates of crab, lobster, and shrimp for those with a bit more cash to spend. Later, when the cigars came out, they’d turn their attention to their host as he told stories in his carnival barker’s voice about an exotic place called the Lower East Side of Manhattan, where, it seemed, people from half the nations on earth lived side by side in relative peace and even had a laugh together on occasion. The host had a gift for imitating accents the likes of which his listeners had never heard but found hilarious.

This was the world of Alfred Emanuel Smith, the very picture of a rough-and-tumble pol from the immigrant wards of urban America. He sang Irish songs and told Irish stories, but in truth, he was only half Irish. His father thought of himself as Italian-American, but, in fact, he was half German. Al Smith was a gregarious symbol of the new twentieth-century American who lived in tenement houses, not log cabins or mansions, and who worked in factories, not barns or office buildings.
And like those other new Americans, he worshipped God in ways that many found offensive, dangerous, and utterly un-American. He was a Catholic, like many of his neighbors—except for those who were Jewish. He lived in a portion of America that other Americans would not recognize, where business was transacted in languages other than English, where the locals had long and strange-sounding names, where children played in streets rather than fields. He lived in a portion of America that frightened other Americans.

Al Smith had a honker of a nose, and his big smile revealed a mouthful of gold fillings. His wide-striped suits were brassy and loud. In his younger days, his five-foot, seven-inch frame was slender and lithe. Now, at age thirty-seven, there was a hint of a paunch underneath his vest. He was rarely without a cigar and smoked as many as eighteen a day. His voice, a laborer’s bellow, was urban and ethnic, and in his everyday speech he displayed only the slightest familiarity with English as it was spoken in the Fort Orange Club, just around the corner from the capitol, or in the uptown neighborhoods of Manhattan. But a more refined colleague who was fond of Smith said he and other legislators overlooked Smith’s “violations of the rules of grammar” because he was such an easygoing fellow, quick with a song and story and a slap on the back.

Except for Thursday night, nobody in Albany worked harder than Al Smith did. He was invariably described as a self-taught political genius, for he left school in eighth grade when he went to work to help his widowed mother and his younger sister. But he had some help in mastering the art of legislation: for a few years early in his political career, Al Smith roomed with a quiet young German immigrant with a law degree, Robert Wagner, who taught him the tricks lawyers played with the people’s business. The two men, both products of the streets of New York City, became good friends, and now, in the winter of 1911, they were the talk of Albany. Smith was not only the assembly’s majority leader but chairman of the all-powerful Ways and Means Committee. Wagner, at age thirty-three, was the youngest president of the state senate in New York history.

The press called Smith and Wagner the “Tammany Twins,” for they were members of Tammany Hall, the infamous Democratic Party machine run by Charles Francis Murphy, a saloonkeeper who was said to treat politicians under his control as though they were waiters at his favorite dining establishment, Delmonico’s.

Because it was not a Thursday and there would be no corned beef and cabbage at Keeler’s, Al Smith had nothing but his tedious homework to keep him busy until bedtime on this warm January night. But then he ran into his friend Wagner, whose business on this night was very much unfinished. Wagner was on his way to see a junior member of the state senate who was holding up business in Albany on an issue that had little to do with the making of laws and budgets, about which the young man knew very little. He had won election to the state senate in 1910 after promising the laborers, farmers, and mechanics in his rural district that he would protect them from the evils of city politicians, and everybody in the district knew who and what he meant. Now he was making good on his promise and, not coincidentally, adjusting the beam of publicity from Wagner and Smith to himself.

Wagner sought to put an end to the nonsense, so he donned a sackcloth of humility, placed his hat in his hand, and prepared to walk across State Street to meet with the new state senator from Dutchess County, Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Roosevelt! Smith had never met the man, but he had heard all about him. Who in Albany had not? Two weeks into his career as a public servant, the twenty-eight-year-old with the brilliant smile and impeccable pedigree had proclaimed himself the new archenemy of Tammany Hall and Murphy the saloonkeeper. He was serving as the spokesman for about two dozen dissident Democrats who refused to attend the party’s voting sessions to choose a new U.S. senator from New York. These were the dying years of the old way of electing senators, when state legislatures, not the people, made the choice. Democrats controlled both houses of the legislature, so they were ready to send a fellow Democrat to Washington as the term of the Republican incumbent, Chauncey Depew, expired.
Murphy the saloonkeeper supported the candidacy of a onetime state legislator and lieutenant governor named William Sheehan, known to friend and foe alike as "Blue-Eyed Billy," a charming if not necessarily remarkable politician who had grown rich as a lawyer in New York City. But Roosevelt, with his hours of experience in government to draw upon, decided that Sheehan was not fit for the U.S. Senate, a place where men with faces meant for marble pillars debated great issues of the day in language that would make Shakespeare weep with envy. Roosevelt preferred Edward Shepherd, an earnest reformer from Brooklyn with a summer house on Lake George's Millionaire's Row. The New York Times described him as a man who was "born into politics of the higher sort."

Newspapers reported on the emergence of a new Roosevelt, a distant cousin of the former president and the husband of his niece, who was fearlessly taking on Murphy the saloonkeeper and his minions like Smith and Wagner. "There is nothing I love as much as a good fight," he told reporters. "I never had as much fun in my life as I am having right now."

Word spread from Albany about this new prince of reform with his Teddy-like pince-nez and a similar sense of his own righteousness. Letters filled the new senator's mailbox from admirers near and far. "Although I live in New Jersey," wrote one correspondent, "I wish to encourage you in the magnificent fight you and your associates are making to save the Democratic party ... from destruction by its alleged 'leaders' in corrupt alliance with 'the interests'. You and your associates in this fight represent democratic Democracy, while Sheehan and his backers represent plutocratic Democracy."

Plutocratic Democracy? Represented by Al Smith, with his eighth-grade education and workingman's bellow? Democratic Democracy? Represented by Franklin Roosevelt, a wealthy Harvard graduate elected to office with no qualification other than his kinship with a popular former president? It was a strange business, politics.

Robert Wagner told Al Smith of the humiliating task he was about to perform—here he was, the president of the state senate, a man who could kill a bill or approve a contract without a word of explanation, going off to negotiate with a troublemaking freshman in his parlor, on his turf, on his terms!

Smith's reaction was instant and unexpected. I'll come along with you, he said.

It was just a short walk, a few minutes, from the capitol to Roosevelt's residence at the corner of State Street and South Swan Street, but it would have been more than enough time for Smith to vent about Roosevelt and his friends. The press may have seen them as steadfast defenders of good government, but Smith saw something quite different: bigotry disguised as principle. "There's nothing the matter with Sheehan," Smith had said. "He's all right, except he's an Irishman. That's all they've got against him." The father of young Senator Roosevelt once decreed that he would not hire any Irishmen to work the grounds of his estate. Smith would not have been surprised to hear it.

Franklin Roosevelt lived in what he called a "palatial" townhouse, which he rented for $400 a month at a time when he and Smith and Wagner and their colleagues earned $1,500 a year as legislators. But the young senator from Dutchess County did not lay awake at night in the upstairs bedroom wondering how to pay the rent. He was, after all, a Roosevelt.

Smith and Wagner climbed the seven stairs from street level to the building's impressive doorway and announced their presence with a knock. The door opened, revealing neither Senator Roosevelt nor his wife Eleanor, but a butler. A butler, in Albany, working for a state senator! The two visitors surely were either shocked or amused, or perhaps a little of both.

Wagner, with his law school polish, announced in an appropriately formal tone that he and Assemblyman Smith had an appointment to see Senator Roosevelt.

The butler found this puzzling. "I know the senator is expecting Senator Wagner," he said, his voice trailing off as he examined this uninvited guest with his cigar and gold fillings.
Smith gave the butler a smile as he brushed passed him. "That's all right," he said. "I'll come along, too."

Smith would tell the story of his first meeting with Roosevelt many times in the prosperous years of his later life, perhaps over drinks in his Fifth Avenue apartment as the sun descended below the tree line of Central Park, perhaps at one of the many dinners and receptions held in his honor as a martyr in the fight for a more pluralistic, tolerant American democracy. But he never said what he discussed with Roosevelt that night in Albany because, after all, it was a private conversation, and Al Smith learned from his mentors that when you made a promise—to deliver a contract, to hire a friend, or to keep a conversation private—you kept your word. And he always did.

The result of the meeting, however, was clear: it was a waste of time. Roosevelt continued to speak for the dissidents who held up the senate vote until Murphy the saloonkeeper abruptly changed tactics, dropping Sheehan in favor of a prominent judge who just happened to be a friend of his, and the rebellion disintegrated. Roosevelt, who had said he would never compromise with the Tammany boss, cast his vote for Murphy's choice. The caucus room erupted in hoots and laughter.

Franklin Roosevelt's time in Albany was short. He was soon off to Washington to serve the new president, Woodrow Wilson, as assistant secretary of the navy—the post his famous fifth cousin, Theodore, held just over a dozen years earlier.

Al Smith, like many of his colleagues, was not unhappy to see Roosevelt leave. He told friends that the young man from Dutchess County didn’t understand politics, and what’s more, he simply wasn’t likable. "Franklin," he told a friend, "just isn’t the sort of man you can take into the pissroom and talk intimately with."

With Roosevelt gone, Smith continued his extraordinary rise to power, winning election as governor four times and, in 1928, becoming the first Catholic to be nominated for president of the United States.

To deliver his nominating speech that year, Al Smith chose a man the press had been describing as his protégé and friend—Franklin Delano Roosevelt, or "Frank," as Smith now called him. Weeks after Smith won the nomination, he called Roosevelt in Warm Springs, Georgia, and persuaded him to run for governor of New York, never mind that Roosevelt had not been able to move his legs for seven years. Roosevelt agreed, reluctantly. Smith lost the 1928 presidential election, but Roosevelt won the governor's race and became a national figure.

Four years later, both men sought their party's presidential nomination, setting off one of the most epic feuds in American political history. Roosevelt captured the nomination when he cut a shrewd backroom deal with Smith's bitter enemy, William Randolph Hearst, a deal that two men who once worked for Smith, James A. Farley and Edward Flynn, helped to broker. Roosevelt went on to win the presidency and make history with his New Deal reforms, thanks in no small way to the persistence of one of the era's greatest U.S. senators, Robert Wagner. The Social Security Act, the National Labor Relations Act, laws that virtually outlawed child labor, established a federal minimum wage, imposed new regulations on business, and established a federal role in public housing all echoed in some way measures Smith had advocated during his years as a state legislator and as governor. Roosevelt would point out that most of what he did to lift the nation out of the Great Depression had already been done by Al Smith in New York.

And yet, by the mid-1930s Al Smith had become one of Franklin Roosevelt's most embittered critics. They would eventually reconcile, but the feud that began when they were in each other's way in 1932 became one of the New Deal's most fascinating, and tragic, storylines.

In 1944, when both men had only months to live, an acquaintance asked Smith at a summer barbecue what he thought of Roosevelt, who was running for a fourth term as president of the United States. It was an innocent question, but Smith's friends cringed when they heard it. Certain topics were best left alone.

Smith's unmistakable voice, so harsh and so New York that men and women in the heartland covered their ears when they first heard it through the
miracle of radio in the 1920s, quickly filled an awkward silence. "He was the kindest man who ever lived," he said. There was a pause, and then he said what he really meant. "But don't ever get in his way." <>

**Juvenile Delinquency: Pathways and Prevention**
by Christopher A. Mallett and Miyuki Fukushima Tedor [SAGE Publications, Inc, 9781506361024]

**Juvenile Delinquency: Pathways and Prevention** explores the pivotal roles that family, trauma, mental health, and schools have on juvenile delinquency, while exploring opportunities for prevention and intervention. Authors Christopher A. Mallett and Miyuki Fukushima Tedor draw from years of experience working with juvenile offenders to shed light on the nature of delinquency and the diverse pathways to juvenile delinquency, while offering evidence-based techniques for preventing and rehabilitating youthful offenders. Clear explanations of the concepts and thought-provoking case studies move students beyond memorization—encouraging them to think critically about juvenile delinquency and make recommendations for better practices and policies.

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**Juvenile Delinquency: Pathways and Prevention** explores the major themes and causes of delinquency, with a specific focus on young people most at risk for involvement with the criminal justice system. With a practitioner-oriented perspective, this textbook provides the full story of juvenile delinquency—one that emphasizes the pivotal role that family, trauma, mental health difficulties, and schools play, while exploring evidence-based prevention and intervention programs. Recognizing the many aspects that affect childhood and adolescent delinquency, this text offers students a framework and foundation for understanding juvenile delinquency that covers the traditional background needed (functioning and history of the courts, the measurement of delinquency, and theoretical explanations of crime) but goes much further in detailing the nature and diverse pathways of delinquency and what can be done to deter offending and criminal behavior.

The objective of this stand-alone textbook is to provide a comprehensive assessment of delinquency and the juvenile justice system that is focused on children and adolescents who are most at risk for involvement with the juvenile courts. In so doing, a broad paradigm is used, supported by and encompassing several theoretical views—social disorganization, life course (developmental), strain, and social learning—that integrate the individual, family, school, and community risks for delinquency. This textbook encapsulates the major explanations for why young people become formally involved with the juvenile courts, but it also shows how the recent punishment era has harmed adolescents and
young adults. In addition, an extensive review is included of what evidence-based practice and policy recommendations should be pursued by juvenile justice and related stakeholders.

This textbook is organized into 4 distinct sections and 14 chapters. Each chapter includes many interactive and critical thinking sections, as well as special interest boxed features on (a) practice—"What can I do?"; (b) policy—"What's being done?"; and (c) research—"What works?." The first section (Juvenile Justice System) is an overview of the juvenile justice system—functions, processes, history, juvenile court structure, and measurements of delinquency and youthful offending.

Chapter 1 reviews how the juvenile justice system operates. From the initial police contact, diversion, and arrest decision-making, to youthful offender risk assessment, juvenile court referral, delinquency adjudication, and use of detention/incarceration facilities. This chapter presents this overview and highlights the purpose of the juvenile justice system, interrelationship with the adult criminal courts, and rights of the arrested and accused. In addition, the functioning of the child welfare system is included, as well as examining how it interacts with the juvenile courts.

Chapter 2 reviews the history and formation of the juvenile justice system. This includes an analysis of juvenile justice’s ongoing historical shifts from a rehabilitative to a punitive focus (almshouses, houses of refuge, the Child-Saving Movement, and the institutionalization of youthful offenders), along with the establishment of the juvenile courts around the turn of the 20th century. Also included is an analysis of the establishment of youthful offender Constitutional rights, recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions on youthful offender sentencing, and today’s state trends moving away from a "tough-on-crime" paradigm and the utilization of evidence-based juvenile court practice.

Chapter 3 provides up-to-date information from key national data sources on arrests, status offenses, police contact, detention, and deeper penetration by young people into the juvenile justice system including incarceration and transfers to adult criminal court. This includes reporting on the following: Uniform Crime Reports; National Incident-Based Reporting System; National Crime Victimization Survey; National Longitudinal Survey of Youth; National Youth Survey-Family Study; Monitoring the Future; Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System; and national (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention) juvenile court reports.

The second section (Theories of Delinquency) is an in-depth overview of the many historical and current theories of delinquency and crime, highlighting how these have changed over time and what empirical evidence there is across these paradigms. These two comprehensive theory chapters provide frameworks to understand the substantial issues related to delinquency and the juvenile justice system discussed throughout the textbook.

Chapter 4 begins with a discussion of theoretical issues and concepts of delinquency and crime, including the definition of crime, the conflict versus consensus models of law, the stance on human nature, the unit of analysis, the nature versus nurture debate, free will versus determinism, internal or external factors, change or static factors, distal or proximate explanations, and specific versus general explanations. Next reviewed are important theories—the preclassical and classical, early biological, early social structural, modern biological, and modern psychological—while keeping the chronological order of the theory development and highlighting some of the historical backdrops wherein these theories of crime were developed.

Chapter 5 reviews the theories of crime that emerged post-1930, including sociological theories and the biosocial approach. The differences among the major sociological paradigms of crime and delinquency are compared and contrasted, including the following: strain/anomie theories; social disorganization theory; learning theories; subcultural theories; control/neoclassical theories; modern classical theories; social reaction, critical, and feminist theories; and life-course theories.

The third section (Problems That Lead to Delinquency) is a comprehensive assessment of the struggles experienced by many vulnerable children and adolescents in the United States. A
A developmental perspective is used to review childhood and family delinquency risks and difficulties—poverty, maltreatment, unsafe neighborhoods, trauma, and mental health—and later adolescent challenges—offending behaviors, special education disabilities, academic failure, drug use, and bullying, among others. In so doing, it is explained how and why certain numbers of these young people end up involved in harsh school and/or juvenile justice discipline systems and who are disproportionately impacted, what traumas they experience, who have poor school outcomes, and what delinquency pathways they follow.

Chapter 6 reviews the disproportionate impact punitive juvenile justice and school policies have on certain child and adolescent populations, including racial/ethnic minorities, victims of abuse or neglect and those who have witnessed violence; those with special education disabilities; and those who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (LGBT).

Chapter 7 examines how adolescents are developmentally different from young adults and the numerous pathways youthful offenders take to harsh discipline outcomes. The most difficult and harmful are juvenile and adult criminal justice incarcerations, placements that preclude successful reentry for many of the young people returning back to their community. These punishment pathways make it difficult for youthful offenders to divert from poor outcomes and are reinforced by zero-tolerance-focused school policies and punishment-focused juvenile courts. The risk for traumatic experiences and suicide greatly increases the farther a young person penetrates the juvenile justice system and, in particular, when incarcerated.

Chapter 8 traces the historical development of discipline in schools, with a focus on the most recent zero tolerance movement that significantly shifted and increased school discipline in the 1990s. These discipline measures brought increased student exclusion through school suspensions and expulsions, decreasing the chances for these students to succeed in school and increasing their risk for juvenile court involvement. These changes were brought about because of several factors—school shootings, fear of adolescent “super-predators,” and the juvenile justice system’s shift toward punishment and away from rehabilitation. Because of these changes, most schools greatly increased security measures within their buildings and the use of police officers on campus. These changes lead to what many have come to identify as a “school-to-prison” pipeline.

Chapters 9 and 10 use the social disorganization and life-course (developmental) theoretical frameworks to review the impact of trauma and related difficulties (including maltreatment), mental health disorders, and special education disabilities on delinquency outcomes. With most youthful offenders formally involved with juvenile courts suffering from at least one, if not more than one, of these difficulties or disabilities, evidence is clear that these problems are significant risks for delinquency. These two chapters cover specific discussions of the types, impact, and prevalence of these problems for children and adolescents, gender-identified differences, and how the juvenile courts have become the inappropriate referral of last choice for many of these young people.

The fourth section (Solutions to Delinquency) reviews the empirical evidence on what stakeholders in the juvenile justice, youth-caring, and schools systems can do to improve child and adolescent outcomes. These chapters focus on minimizing childhood and adolescent risks and traumas through early assessment and prevention, treatment of the risks and problems identified, school inclusion efforts, diverting and rehabilitating most of these young people away from punishment and the juvenile justice system, and identifying what works for those adolescents formally involved (low level and serious offending) with the juvenile courts.

Chapter 11 discusses how many of the factors linked with later juvenile court involvement are rooted in childhood, making it critical to investigate this developmental time period, and it is divided into two sections—primary- and secondary-school-aged young people. The earlier a difficulty or problem is identified in children, the better the chance that harm can be minimized and outcomes improved; hence, striving to understand onset and occurrence of these matters is important. If the etiology and scope of the problems are identified...
and understood, more effective steps can be taken by policy makers and stakeholders in delinquency prevention. Programs that focus on the primary risk factors for delinquency are included in prevention and intervention/programming for trauma, maltreatment, and mental health/substance abuse problems.

Chapter 12 provides evidence of how to move from punitive to rehabilitative policies and practices in schools and school districts. In some states and jurisdictions, there have been successful changes, modifications to policies, and much improved outcomes for most students. To do so, schools have moved away from zero tolerance policies and have incorporated reformations as well as inclusive (keeping students in school) programming—positive behavioral protocols, conflict resolution, truancy prevention, and increased family and student engagement, among others. In addition, improved screening and identification of risks and difficulties can lead to significantly improved outcomes and fewer referrals to police and juvenile courts.

Chapter 13 focuses on the rehabilitation and diversion of low-level offenders from the juvenile courts. Most young people who have an initial contact with law enforcement and the juvenile courts do not have a second contact. These initial contacts are most often misdemeanors or status offenses. Nonetheless, contact with the juvenile justice system provides an important opportunity for the juvenile courts and related youth-caring systems to identify and assist adolescents with difficulties, as well as to desist behaviors or decisions that lead to initial contact. Thus, there is a focus on these effective interventions and diversions, used in the juvenile justice system and through community-based efforts.

And finally, Chapter 14 focuses on the rehabilitation of serious and chronic offenders involved with the juvenile courts. Most of these young people have committed felonies or have become habitual low-level offenders. Hence, examples, discussions, and highlights are provided of how juvenile courts use their supervision and programming, probation departments, and detention and incarceration facilities to improve serious youthful offender outcomes. There are effective ways to reduce recidivism, have youthful offenders complete school, and improve transitions to young adulthood. <>

Schumann: The Faces and the Masks by Judith Chernaik [Knopf, 9780451494467]

A groundbreaking account of Robert Schumann, a major composer and key figure of Romanticism, whose life and works have been the subject of intense controversy since his early death in a mental asylum. Schumann: The Faces and the Masks draws us into the milieu of the Romantic movement, which enraptured poets, musicians, painters, and their audiences in the early nineteenth century and beyond, even to the present day. It reveals how Schumann (1810-1856) embodied all the contrasting themes of Romanticism—he was intensely original and imaginative but also worshipped the past; he believed in political, personal, and artistic freedom but insisted on the need for artistic form based on the masters: Bach, Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven. It details his deep involvement with other composers of his time, such as Chopin and Mendelssohn, Liszt and Brahms, as well as the literary lights of the age—Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Heinrich Heine, E.T.A. Hoffmann—whose works gave inspiration to his compositions and words to his songs.

Drawing on hitherto unpublished archive material, as well more established sources of journals, letters, and publications, Judith Chernaik provides enthralling new insight into Schumann’s life and his music: his sexual escapades, his fathering of an illegitimate child, the facts behind his courtship of Clara Wieck—already a noted young concert pianist—his passionate marriage to her despite the opposition of her manipulative father, his passionate marriage, and the ways his many crises fed into the dreams and fantasies of his greatest works, turning his tumultuous life into music that speaks directly to the heart.

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Excerpt:

Music is the most romantic of all the arts—one might almost say, the only genuinely romantic one for its sole subject is the infinite. -E. T. A. HOFFMANN

Schumann was a key figure in the new Romanticism of his age.

He was a true Romantic in his embrace of poetry and feeling, his love of emotional extremes, his intermingling of life and art. He held passionate convictions about the art of music that was "food and drink" to his fellow musicians in their youth. He believed that music, like all the arts, must respond to the times, that it must be original and forward-looking while building on the greatest works of the past. His music was closely interwoven with the chief events of his life and the people he loved, especially his wife, Clara, herself a great artist. His major works have endured through all changes of taste up to the present time.

He was the most literary of composers. In his early years he was torn between literature and music and tried his hand at both. Fortunately for us, his early sketches for novels in the style of his favorite Romantic writers came to nothing. Instead we have the enduring magic of Carnaval and Kinderszenen, the great song cycles, a wealth of chamber music, four symphonies, the Manfred Overture, and many other orchestral and choral works. His ambition to become a virtuoso pianist had to be abandoned when he injured his right hand, having used his own ingenious invention to strengthen the weak middle fingers. His extraordinary artistic achievements must be set against recurrent illness, self-inflicted obstacles, and misjudgments, detailed in the following pages.

More than 150 years after his death in Endenich asylum, aged forty-six, Schumann’s life and works still arouse partisan debate. Biographers disagree about whether to attribute his final illness to lifelong mental disorder or to the last stage of syphilis, contracted in his early youth. Performers argue about the merits of his late works: the Violin Concerto, which his close friend the violinist Joseph Joachim believed unworthy of publication; a song cycle setting the sentimental poems of a child poet for whom Schumann felt great enthusiasm; the haunting Songs of Dawn for piano, almost the last work he wrote before his breakdown. Some critics think these works reflect his mental decline; others see a master forging new artistic paths.

Questions still rage about Schumann’s skill as a symphonist. Brahms and Clara Schumann were bitterly estranged following a quarrel about the respective merits of the first and final versions of Schumann’s D Minor Symphony. Gustav Mahler, who championed Schumann’s works, reorchestrated the symphonies with a heavy hand. In his performances and recordings of all four symphonies, the conductor George Szell defended them as supreme masterpieces against the opposition of virtually all his colleagues, but he too indulged in some reorchestration. Leonard Bernstein, a great admirer of Schumann, was one of the first conductors to return to Schumann’s original scores.

Clara Schumann’s role in Schumann’s life remains a subject for debate, as her own works are rediscovered and newly assessed. Was she responsible for tempering the originality of Schumann’s early works, urging him toward more conventional forms? Was her own genius stifled by Schumann’s love of home and family? The complex relationship of these two great artists was central.
to the work of both, giving definitive shape to Clara Schumann’s career and immortalized in Schumann’s music.

Described by friends as an impractical dreamer, Schumann founded and edited a successful music journal with contributors in every major European city. No doubt his father’s experience as a publisher, translator, and editor contributed to his own expertise. Like his father, he had to prove his financial competence before marrying the woman he loved. Throughout his life, he carefully noted all professional and household income and expenses, down to the last groschen for beer at his favorite tavern.

His diaries describe bouts of depression, fears, and phobias, and—details omitted in the early biographies—his sexual experience, his overindulgence in alcohol, his determination to reform, and his frequent lapses. It is possible that he suffered from what is now called a bipolar personality. He records symptoms associated with depression: sleeplessness, racing thoughts, nightmares, inability to work. Yet he was remarkably productive, writing compulsively in periods of intense creative inspiration. He had a high sexual drive, often related to manic excitement. He suffered panic attacks; he feared living on a high floor lest he be tempted to throw himself from the window. He idealized his fellow musicians Chopin and Mendelssohn, and he invested his close friends with qualities larger than life. They became characters in a novel, with literary names and personalities. He fell in love with married women, moved on easily to romantic infatuations with more available women, until his attachment to the young Clara Wieck deepened to become the great love of his life.

Schumann’s fantasies entered into his music with the creation of the impetuous Florestan and the sensitive Eusebius, Romantic “doubles” of Schumann himself. Florestan and Eusebius are credited as the composers of his early works for piano and the authors of articles for his music journal; it is their names or initials, rather than Schumann’s, that appear on his published scores and in the journal. They join commedia dell’arte clowns in his delightful Carnaval masquerade; they write variations on themes composed by Clara in dances full of wedding thoughts. Many other elements of Schumann’s life play significant roles in his music: his vast reading, his liberal political enthusiasms, his love of games and puzzles.

As he assumed many “masks” in his music, he also had many faces, many selves. He compiled notes for an autobiography at intervals throughout his life, each time stressing selective features of his history. He instinctively presented different aspects of himself to Clara, to Mendelssohn, to close friends and distant acquaintances.

His inmost self is revealed in his music, but that self, too, is multifaceted. In his songs Schumann speaks through the words of his favorite poets. In all his music, the real self, the personal signature, is instantly recognizable but extremely resistant to analysis.

This study of Schumann’s life and art is addressed primarily to the general reader, the music lover who may have no specialized musical training. I have tried to avoid technical language, but I hope to convey a sense of the quality and range of Schumann’s compositions. In his music he expressed everything that he felt unable to express in words. When he was improvising at the piano or writing at his desk, composing his wonderfully original piano suites, inventing musical settings to love poems and ballads, tackling the larger forms of symphony and chamber music, it was his true self that was speaking. His early works are closely related to his own experiences, his moods, his fantasies, his relationship with Clara, both before and after their marriage. His later works also lend themselves to autobiographical readings. They should be read in terms not only of his life but his world, its politics, its ethos, its dominant themes. He gave musical voice to his imagined Davidsbund (Band of David)—his secret society of like-minded friends and artists—and to fellow composers and poets in ways that were as real to him as the spirits who later visited him in Endenich asylum. At the same time, his music is beautifully organized, clear in its structure, reflecting his profound understanding of harmony and counterpoint, his close study of the music of Bach and Mozart, Schubert and Beethoven.
How can one write about music for a reader who has no specialized musical knowledge? Many musicians regard music as a form of storytelling, while musicologists talk about “gestures,” or “foreground,” “middle ground,” “background”—suggestive metaphors useful for pointing out the elements of a work that might otherwise be missed. But music has its own language, and metaphors drawn from literature, mime, or the visual arts are at best approximate. There is no substitute for listening to the music itself, encountering it directly in performance. Schumann believed with his whole being that music could express every human emotion and aspiration, all the manifold “states of the soul.” His music speaks with extraordinary power to the imagination of the listener—but what it communicates remains untranslatable.

Fortunately, the Internet makes it possible to listen to almost all music composed before the twentieth century. Each work discussed in the following pages can be accessed on the Internet in recordings by the greatest performers. Musical scores are also available on the Internet, and musical analysis ranging from program notes to PhD theses. The curious reader with a beginner’s knowledge of musical language can find explanations of tonality, chromaticism, dissonance, modulation, sonata form, the “circle of fifths,” and related guides to musical understanding, simply by inserting the term on the search engine of a computer.

I hope in writing about Schumann’s life to encourage readers to listen to his music, the major works above all: Carnaval, the Fantasie in C, the song cycles, the Spring Symphony and the Rhenish Symphony, the joyous Piano Concerto, the popular Piano Quintet. I hope that I can also lead readers to the less familiar works: the “secular oratorio” Paradise and the Peri, the ambitious Scenes from Goethe’s “Faust,” and the late fairy tales, some composed for intimate chamber duos, others for grand choral and orchestral forces.

My research has benefited from generous help from the director and staff of the Robert-Schumann-Haus in Zwickau. Their superb ongoing publishing programs have enabled me to present new information about the lives of Schumann and Clara, shedding light on their family background and on Schumann’s early sexual experience, including his probable fathering of an illegitimate child. The recently published medical diary by the director of Endenich asylum has made it possible to chart the course and diagnosis of Schumann’s final illness and death.

The music is paramount, as all those who love Schumann’s music know. His works are constantly being rediscovered, and many have never gone out of fashion. They appeal directly and passionately to performers and listeners. Just as Schumann read his own plots into Schubert’s simple dances and Chopin’s “Mozart” Variations, artists who study Schumann’s works arrive at widely differing views of their meaning. At their best, his works speak directly to the heart. With closer acquaintance the structure of each work becomes clear: the relation of parts to the whole, the melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic continuities and contrasts, the several “voices” speaking separately and together. Schumann’s individual musical signature is always unmistakable, his special qualities of tenderness, fantasy, and humor, his emotional extremes and his heroic efforts to resolve them.

I hope the music will be served by my attempt in the following pages to unravel some mysteries of the life, and to convey the joy and the suffering that informed Schumann’s musical world. <>

The Dinosaur Artist: Obsession, Betrayal, and the Quest for Earth’s Ultimate Trophy by Paige Williams [Hachette Books, 9780316382533]

New Yorker writer Paige Williams “does for fossils what Susan Orlean did for orchids” (Book Riot) in this "tremendous" (David Grann) true tale of one Florida man’s attempt to sell a dinosaur skeleton from Mongolia—a story “steeped in natural history, human nature, commerce, crime, science, and politics” (Rebecca Skloot).

In 2012, a New York auction catalogue boasted an unusual offering: “a superb Tyrannosaurus skeleton.” In fact, Lot 49135 consisted of a nearly complete T. bataar, a close cousin to the most famous animal that ever lived. The fossils now on
display in a Manhattan event space had been unearthed in Mongolia, more than 6,000 miles away. At eight-feet high and 24 feet long, the specimen was spectacular, and when the gavel sounded the winning bid was over $1 million.

Eric Prokopi, a thirty-eight-year-old Floridian, was the man who had brought this extraordinary skeleton to market. A onetime swimmer who spent his teenage years diving for shark teeth, Prokopi's singular obsession with fossils fueled a thriving business hunting, preparing, and selling specimens, to clients ranging from natural history museums to avid private collectors like actor Leonardo DiCaprio.

But there was a problem. This time, facing financial strain, had Prokopi gone too far? As the T. bataar went to auction, a network of paleontologists alerted the government of Mongolia to the eye-catching lot. As an international custody battle ensued, Prokopi watched as his own world unraveled.

In the tradition of The Orchid Thief, The Dinosaur Artist is a stunning work of narrative journalism about humans' relationship with natural history and a seemingly intractable conflict between science and commerce. A story that stretches from Florida's Land O' Lakes to the Gobi Desert, The Dinosaur Artist illuminates the history of fossil collecting—a murky, sometimes risky business, populated by eccentrics and obsessives, where the lines between poacher and hunter, collector and smuggler, enthusiast and opportunist, can easily blur.

In her first book, Paige Williams has given readers an irresistible story that spans continents, cultures, and millennia as she examines the question of who, ultimately, owns the past.

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Excerpt: This is a work of nonfiction. No names have been changed, no information invented. My reporting began in 2009, but for the purposes of the book’s final form the immersive research occurred between 2012 and 2018. In the United States, I reported in Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, DC, and Wyoming. In Mongolia, I reported in the Gobi Desert, Töv Province, and Ulaanbaatar. In Canada, I reported in Edmonton, Alberta. In Europe, I reported in Munich, Germany, and in Charmouth, London, and Lyme Regis, England. The information that I gleaned from interviews with paleontologists, geologists, fossil dealers, preparators, collectors, museum curators, auctioneers, law enforcement, and various government agents may not appear in full here, yet these generous people’s insights informed the work. Written source material, some of it obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, included unclassified and declassified U.S. embassy cables and State Department reports, civil lawsuits, Department of Justice criminal case files and asset forfeiture records, library collections, news archives, peer-reviewed research papers, and county court
documents. I also relied upon sources’ personal photos, videos, correspondence, and papers. Mongolian documents were translated by Mongolians unrelated to the Mongolian government or the T bataar case.

Much of this book grew out of "Bones of Contention," a piece that I wrote for The New Yorker in January 2013. There, as here, I tried to convey the nuances of the debate over who owns, or should be allowed to collect and own, natural history, and how that conflict may in turn affect a range of interests, including public policy, science, museums, and geopolitics. Various scenes I observed directly. For convenience, I occasionally interchange "dinosaur," "fossil dinosaur," and "skeleton"—writing that someone "bought a dinosaur" I of course refer to the extinct animal's stony remains. Likewise, I occasionally use "bone" for "fossil," having explained that fossilization yields rock. The title The Dinosaur Artist is not intended to refer exclusively to a leading subject of this book, Eric Prokopi, but rather also to dinosaurs' unparalleled power to remain culturally, scientifically, and aesthetically relevant despite extinction, and to the long, crucial intersection between science and art. Some readers may also choose to infer the formal definition of the word: "a habitual practitioner, of a specified reprehensible activity." When speaking, some scientists refer to natural history museums by their acronyms ("AMNH" instead of "the AMNH"); although "the AMNH" clangs in my ear, I use that construction for clarity. I’ve borrowed slivers of my own language from the original New Yorker piece and from a Smithsonian article I later wrote about the endangered takhi horse, a creature that was a divine thrill to see in person on the Mongolian steppe.

Origins
In the summer of 2009, I came across a newspaper item about a Montana man convicted of stealing a dinosaur. The idea sounded preposterous. How was stealing a dinosaur even possible? And who would want to?

Nearly a decade earlier, this man, Nate Murphy, who led fossil-hunting tours in a geological signature in Montana called the Judith River Formation, had become well known for unveiling Leonardo, a late Cretaceous Brachylophosaurus and one of the best-preserved dinosaur skeletons ever found. A volunteer fossil hunter named Dan Stephenson had found the skeleton during one of Murphy's excursions on a private ranch near the small town of Malta. The remains constituted the first sub-adult of its kind on record and, remarkably, still bore traces of "skin, scales, muscle, foot pads—and even his last meal in his stomach," National Geographic reported. "To find one with so much external detail available, it's like going from a horse and buggy to a steam combustion engine," Murphy told the magazine. "It will advance our science a quantum leap."

"Our science" was an intriguing phrase. Murphy wasn't a trained scientist; he was an outdoorsman who had taught himself how to hunt fossils in the Cretaceous-bearing formations that run with photogenic accessibility through states like Wyoming, Utah, Montana, and South Dakota. He believed he had something to offer paleontology, and, presumably in pursuit of this idea, he had taken fossils that didn’t belong to him. (Not Leonardo; another dinosaur.) What at first appeared to be little more than a bizarre true-crime story became, to me, an absorbing question of our ongoing relationship with natural history, with the remnants of a world long gone.

We know which life-forms exist because we encounter them, but what came before? Answers can be found in rock. If you’ve ever picked up a shark tooth or a leaf-imprinted stone, you were holding a fossil—a time portal, a clue. By definition, fossils are prehistoric organic remains preserved in the earth’s crust by natural causes. If you, yourself, would like to become a fossil, a specific chain of events must occur. Your corpse must not be eaten or scattered by scavengers, or destroyed by other ruinous forces like weather and running water. You must be buried quickly in sediments or sand: metamorphic and igneous rock, which form under conditions too superheated and volatile to preserve much of anything, are no good at making fossils, but sedimentary rock—limestone, sandstone—proves an excellent tomb. Your soft tissues and organs will decompose, but unless they’re obliterated by the planet’s incessant
chemical and tectonic motions, the hard bits—teeth and bone—will remain. These will be infiltrated by groundwater and will mineralize according to whatever elements exist in the patch of earth that has become your grave—eventually, you may become part crystal or iron. Then, to even start to be scientifically useful, you must be discovered.

Good luck with all that. It’s been estimated that less than one percent of the animal species that ever lived became fossils.

While the process is rare, the product is ubiquitous, at least regarding some species. But which fossils are important to science and how should they be protected? Paleontologists have one answer, commercial fossil dealers another, and they’ve been fighting about it for generations.

As the only record of life on Earth, fossils hold the key to understanding the history of the planet and its potential future. Studying them, scientists can better monitor pressing issues such as mass extinction and climate change; hunting, collecting, or viewing them, anyone may feel connected to both the universe’s infinite mystery and Earth’s tangible past. To see the dinosaur bone beds of the Liaoning province of northeastern China is to see a landscape that 120 million years ago featured lush lakes and forests in the shadow of active volcanoes. To encounter Glossopteris imprints—an extinct seed fern found in South America, Africa, Australia, and Antarctica—is to witness evidence that those continents once existed as a single landmass. To hold a Kansas clam is to touch a relic of the Western Interior Seaway, which for roughly 20 million years bisected North America, overlaying what are now North Dakota, Wyoming, Colorado, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Florida, along with parts of fourteen other states and swaths of Canada and Mexico.

Fossils are found in every part of the world, and so are fossil collectors, who are legion. Collectors spend significant chunks of their lives hunting for fossils, researching fossils, buying fossils, displaying fossils, trading fossils, visiting fossils in museums, and talking—and talking and talking—about them. Fossil enthusiasts are as obsessed a segment of natural history lovers as ever existed. "I have been in people’s houses where every possible inch of their home is covered in fossils," the vertebrate paleontologist Mark Norell, of the American Museum of Natural History, once said. "Even the dishwasher has trilobites in it."

This, minus the dishwasher, has been going on for millennia. As humans collected the remains of one life form after another, naturalists built an inventory of the planet’s former inhabitants. That inventory today is known as the fossil record, a compendium that is postulated, debated, and revised by paleontologists through peer-reviewed research, providing a portrait of lost time. Without fossils, an understanding of the earth’s formation and history would not be possible. Without fossils, we would not know Earth’s age: 4.6 billion years. We would not know when certain creatures lived, when they died out, how they looked, what they ate. Without fossils, natural history museums might not exist. The geologic time scale would not exist because knowledge of the earth’s stratigraphy, or layers, would not exist. We would not know that the continents were not always where they are now, and that Earth’s shifting, sliding plates rearrange land and sea. We would not know the climate has warmed and cooled and is changing still. We would not know that five mass extinctions have occurred and that we’re in the sixth one now. We would have no idea of any ice age. Without fossils, we would not know that birds evolved from dinosaurs; or that Earth was already billions of years old before flowering plants appeared; or that sea creatures transitioned to life on land and primates to creatures that crafted tools, grew crops, and started wars. We would not know that rhinos once lived in Florida and sharks swam around the Midwest. We would not know that stegosaurs lived millions of years before T rex, an animal that, in geologic time, is closer to human beings than to the first of its kind.

The earth’s layers are finite: each has a beginning, middle, and end, like tiramisu, wherein ladyfingers meet mascarpone. The most recent layers hold mammals, fishes, and birds not terribly different from those that are alive today, but the further back one goes, the more fantastical some of the creatures. The fossil record shows that life began with microscopic organisms and flourished to the unthinkably gargantuan animals of the Mesozoic, a
160-million-year era that ended some 65.5 million years ago. In the Age of Reptiles, dinosaurs crashed through forests, terrorized prey, zipped around like overstimulated roadrunners, and lub-lubbed along, looking for something leafy to eat and trying to avoid being eaten. Their remains continually surface as weather, erosion, and civilization peel the planet layer by layer.

Fossils are the single most important clue to understanding how the planet evolved, yet attitudes toward their protection vary from continent to continent, and from state to state. The United States, a particularly fossil-rich country, is unusual: policymakers have had no desire to mess with private-property laws, so it remains true that if you find fossils on your own land, or on private property where you have permission to collect, they are yours to keep or sell or ignore or destroy, no matter what or how scientifically important the specimen may be.

Three primary groups of people seek and covet fossils: paleontologists, collectors, and commercial hunters. Paleontologists hone their expertise through undergraduate, graduate, and doctoral courses that immerse them in geology, evolutionary biology, zoology, computer science, statistical analysis, ecology, chemistry, climatology, and other maths and sciences. They pursue specialties in areas like paleobotany (fossil plants), invertebrate paleontology (animals without backbones, like mussels and corals), micropaleontology (requires a microscope), and vertebrates (backbones). Paleontologists tend to work in academia and museums, publishing their research in peer-reviewed scientific journals such as Geology and the Journal of Vertebrate Paleontology. Scientists believe it crucial to protect certain types of fossils by banning their trade. Commercial dealers, on the other hand, hunt, sell, and buy fossils, at trade shows, in privately owned natural history shops, and online. It is entirely legal to sell some fossils and illegal to sell others, and it's often been hard for consumers to know the difference. Many dealers grew up hunting fossils and might have studied natural sciences in college if they'd had the chance. Most are self-taught. Many are libertarians and believe they should be able to do whatever they want as long as they're not hurting anybody. Many loathe government regulations and feel entitled to fossils, taking the view that the earth belongs to everyone. Most fossil dealers feel that by collecting and selling fossils they're rescuing materials that otherwise would erode, and that their industry provides a valuable service by supplying classrooms and collectors and, in some cases, museums, and by encouraging widespread interest in the natural world. Commercial hunters take pride in selling to museums, but they also court wealthy, private collectors. Successful dealers can make a living in fossils, though it is rarely a get-rich game, since so much of the profit folds back into the hunt. Overseas museums, especially those proliferating in China, Japan, and the Middle East, have no problem buying commercially while public museums in the United States—those supported by tax dollars—tend not to shop the market, preferring to collect their own materials under scientific conditions. While both a commercial hunter and a paleontologist may also be a collector, no reputable paleontologist is a dealer: paleontologists do not sell fossils for much the same reason hematologists don’t peddle vials of blood. Fossils are the data, it’s been said.

A fossil’s contextual information is as important as the fossil itself. Extracting a fossil minus that correlating data has been compared to removing a corpse from the scene of a homicide without noting, say, the presence of shell casings or biological evidence like semen and blood. Approximate cause and time of death may be inferred, but a fossil alone cannot tell the whole story; in fact, the whole story can never be told, at least not without a time machine. But the story starts to come together through the analysis of details like the circumstances of fossilization (called taphonomy), the presence of other fossil animals and plants, and stratigraphy, which helps paleontologists understand when the animal lived and died. The enormous femurs found protruding from the Big Bone Lick bogs of Kentucky (as happened in the 1700s) tell one story; the large three-toed footprints found sans bones in the Connecticut River Valley of Massachusetts (as happened in the 1800s) tell another.

For decades the federal government debated whether and how to regulate fossil collecting, particularly regarding vertebrates, which are less
common than invertebrates. The most extreme-minded paleontologists have long wanted a ban on commercial collecting, but commercial hunters organized against the idea. They defended their trade, and paleontologists defended the objects fundamental to their science.

Despite experience and field expertise, dealers who call themselves "commercial paleontologists" are not in fact paleontologists. Paleontology would not exist without them, though. The science started at the hands of natural history lovers—started long before the words science and paleontology even existed—and became perhaps the only discipline with a commercial aspect that simultaneously infuriates scientists and claims a legitimate role in the pantheon of discovery. The work of commercial hunters has allowed paleontologists some of their biggest breakthroughs and museums their most stunning displays. Museum visitors may not realize they’re often looking at specimens discovered not by scientists but rather by lay people like themselves. A California boy named Harley Garbani became obsessed with fossils in the 1930s, after finding part of a camel femur while following in the tracks of his father’s plow. He became a plumber but went on to find extraordinary, tiny fossils by crawling on his hands and knees in "cheaters" (jewelers’ goggles), plus the first significant Triceratops skeleton in over half a century and a T rex skeleton so good it would take years for someone to come across a better one. By the time Garbani died, in 2011, he had collected for the Natural History Museum of Los Angeles County and the University of California—Berkeley’s Museum of Paleontology. Lowell Dingus, an American Museum of Natural History (AMNH) paleontologist who knew Garbani while in grad school at Berkeley, called him "among the greatest fossil collectors that ever lived and the greatest one that I have ever known and worked with."

A more recent collector was Stan Sacrison, an electrician and plumber from Harding County, South Dakota, the self-declared “T rex Capital of the World.” In the 1980s and '90s, Sacrison found such notable rex specimens that with each new discovery his twin brother, Steve, a parttime gravedigger and equally gifted fossil hunter, carved notches into the handle of his Bobcat earthmover. Discovering even one or part of one T rex was a feat, given that fewer than fifteen had been unearthed. The Sacrison twins, who lived in the tiny town of Buffalo, had grown up near fossil beds and were taken with the hunt. They had learned that it was smart to search after a big storm or a spring thaw because weather and erosion unwrap gifts of bone. They had familiarized themselves with geology, knowing it’s as pointless to search for mastodon in rock formations 100 million years old as it is to look for Vulcanodon in sediments laid down during the Pleistocene.

Another name to remember is Kathy Wankel. When the Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History (NMNH) unveils its new hall of dinosaurs in 2019, after a five-year, $48 million renovation, it will feature, for the first time, its own Tyrannosaurus rex, courtesy of Wankel, a Montana rancher who in 1988 found the skeleton now known as "The Nation’s T. rex." The specimen is considered important partly because it includes the first complete T rex forelimb known to science.

Despite amateurs’ contributions, science and commerce developed stark opposing arguments:

- **Commerce:** overregulation destroys the public’s interest in the natural world.
- **Science:** commodification compromises our evolving understanding of the planet.
- **Commerce:** science doesn’t need hundreds or even dozens of specimens of one species.
- **Science:** multiple specimens elucidate an organism and its environment over time.
- **Commerce:** private collectors wind up donating their stuff to museums anyway.
- **Science:** specimens collected under nonscientific conditions are worthless to research.
- **Commerce:** most museum fossils land in storage, never to be studied. Science: stored fossils have generated profound advances decades after their discovery.
- **Commerce:** scientists are stingy and elitist, with their snooty PhDs. Science: commercial hunters are destructive and greedy.
Such were the contours of a seemingly intractable conflict. "Whether or not it's okay to sell and buy fossils is a matter of debate on scientific and ethical grounds, with analytical rigor and professional honesty squaring off against free enterprise," the paleontologists Kenshu Shimada and Philip Currie and their colleagues wrote in Palaeontologia Electronica. They called "the battle against heightened commercialization" of fossils "the greatest challenge to paleontology of the 21st century."

On both sides, the disagreement struck people as a shame, because scientists and commercial hunters at least were united in their love of one thing: fossils. If only more people would take a sincere interest in "rocks that can talk to you," the paleobotanist Kirk Johnson, head of the Smithsonian's NMNH, once told me. "The fact that our planet buries its dead is an amazing thing. The fact that you can read the history of the planet in fossils is profoundly cool. A smart kid can find a fossil and tell you what happened to the planet 4 billion years ago. We finally figured out how the planet works, and we did it through fossils."

If the confessed dinosaur thief Nate Murphy became an emblem of the tension between science and commerce, he didn't reign for long. In the spring of 2012, a case emerged that surpassed all others in its international scope and labyrinthine particulars, touching on collectors, smuggling, marriage, democracy, poverty, artistry, museums, mining, Hollywood, Russia, China, criminal justice, presidential politics, explorers, Mongolian culture, the auction industry, and the history of science. This book is that untold story. <>

Daemon Voices: On Stories and Storytelling by Philip Pullman Philip Pullman, edited by Simon Mason [Knopf, 9780525521174]

From the internationally best-selling author of the His Dark Materials trilogy, a spellbinding journey into the secrets of his art--the narratives that have shaped his vision, his experience of writing, and the keys to mastering the art of storytelling.

One of the most highly acclaimed and best-selling authors of our time now gives us a book that charts the history of his own enchantment with story--from his own books to those of Blake, Milton, Dickens, and the Brothers Grimm, among others--and delves into the role of story in education, religion, and science. At once personal and wide-ranging, Daemon Voices is both a revelation of the writing mind and the methods of a great contemporary master, and a fascinating exploration of storytelling itself.

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Excerpt: As the author of some of the most popular
stories of our time, Philip Pullman requires very little
introduction; his books have been read by millions
of eager readers the world over, not only the
trilogy of His Dark Materials, but also the Sally
Lockhart novels, his fairy tales, his retelling of
Grimm’s folk tales, the fable The Good Man Jesus
and the Scoundrel Christ, and many others. He is
recognised as one of the world’s great storytellers.

During my work on his essays, we met several times,
usually at his home. In person he is a striking
presence, physically imposing but quiet in his
manner. He typically dresses in casual, practical
clothes with plenty of pockets that give him the air
of a craftsman, an electrician perhaps, or a
carpenter—which, in fact, he is. When we began
our meetings he still had his famous ponytail, which
he had vowed to keep until finishing the first
volume of The Book of Dust. He reported that The
Bookseller had said it made him look like a retired
roadie. The ponytail came off a few months later,
and he showed it to me in a transparent bag. "I'm
thinking of donating it to the Bodleian Library," he
said.

Humorous, formidably knowledgeable, sharply
intelligent and firm in his opinions, he has absolutely
no airs and graces, instinctively putting people at
their ease. Each time I met him I was struck by his
relaxed courtesy. (I was struck in a different way
by his pair of hyperactive cockapoo puppies—
Mixie and Coco—who flew at me from all angles,
even, somehow, from above, while Philip calmly
made coffee in the kitchen.) The low-ceilinged,
open-fired room where we talked was filled with
objects—musical instruments, pictures, books and
wooden constructions that he had made himself.

The pleasure he takes in the well-made is evident,
and I was often shown things he liked: a Doves
Press edition of Paradise Lost printed with the
famous Doves type; a woodcut by John Lawrence;
a life-size alethiometer made for him by an
admiring reader. He nearly always had a story to
tell about these objects. The Doves type, he told
me, was once destroyed by their co-owner T. J.
Cobden-Sanderson after a dispute with his business
partner Emery Walker, by casting it, bit by bit, into
the Thames from Hammersmith Bridge, a process
which he undertook only on dark nights, and which
took him five months to complete, beginning at the
end of August 1916 and finishing in January 1917.
Nearly a hundred years later, it was retrieved by
the Port of London Authority’s Salvage diving team
employed by a designer wishing to digitise the
type.)

This instinct to tell stories is deep in Philip. For sheer
storytelling excitement, his own are hard to beat.
But their popularity is due also, I think, to their
thoughtfulness, the way in which, with great
curiosity and energy, they engage ideas and issues
and ask interesting questions. Is the world
conscious? What is our place and purpose here?
What is evil? Where does religious belief come
from? Can innocence be regained? His stories
dramatise such questions in thrilling ways. And so
do his essays.
The 32 here, selected from more than 120, were written over many years. The oldest is "Let's Write It in Red," a fascinating—and fascinated—meditation on story writing considered as a game, dating from June 1997. The most recent is "Soft Beulah's Night," from November 2014, an impassioned personal testament to the wisdom and originality of the poet William Blake who, arguably, has influenced Philip the most.

The essays are also very varied. Partly, this is because they were written in different circumstances, for different purposes: many were talks, delivered at conferences or symposia; others were articles in newspapers; yet others were commissioned pieces in journals, chapters in books, programme notes and promotional pieces. Mainly, though, it is because Philip’s interests range so widely. Not for nothing is his personal dæmon the raven, that picker-up of bits and pieces here and there. Like most great writers, he is a great reader, and thinks about what he has picked up during a lifetime of passionate, engaged reading of the work of physicists, literary theorists, historians, film-makers, theologians, art historians, novelists and poets.

He is interested in the discoveries of science ("intellectual daring and imaginative brilliance without parallel"), the freedoms of democracy (in particular "the great democracy of reading and writing"), the evils of authoritarianism ("always reductive whether it’s in power or not") and the pitfalls of education ("any education that neglects the experience of delight will be a dry and tasteless diet with no nourishment in it"). He is profoundly interested in religion, while remaining puzzled by aspects of it. "The first thing to say about the Bishop’s arguments in his book," he writes in "God and Dust," "is that I agree with every word of them, except the words I don’t understand; and that the words I don’t understand are those such as spirit, spiritual and God."

He is interested, above all, in human nature, how we live and love and fight and betray and console one another. How we explain ourselves to ourselves.

So there is great variety here. But all the essays relate, deliberately, to a single theme. Storytelling. It is what he knows best. His own stories, and his experience of writing them. Other people’s stories, and his passionate appreciation of them. The techniques of writing stories. The pleasures of reading stories. The importance of stories in our culture.

To pick a few examples, at random. In "Magic Carpets" he writes about the responsibilities of the storyteller—to his audience, to language, to his story and—not the least important thing—to his family’s finances. In "The Writing of Stories" he shares his thoughts on technical issues: tenses, perspective and other aspects of narration. In "Oliver Twist" and "Paradise Lost" he celebrates a few of the authors and books he particularly loves. In "God and Dust" he writes about story and religion; and in "The Origin of the Universe" about story and science. In "Folk Tales of Britain" and "As Clear as Water" he explains why he so loves the swift, clean tone of the oldest forms of storytelling. And in numerous essays he generously writes about his own work, including (in "The Writing of Stories") his composition of the opening passages of The Golden Compass, and (in "The Path Through the Wood"), the thinking that led to the idea of the extraordinary wheeled creatures called mulefa who appear in The Amber Spyglass. "Around this time," he writes, "my son Tom and I spent a morning walking around Lake Bled, in Slovenia, talking about the problem ..." He has turned his account into a story, and it is all the more interesting for it.

Though they often deal with abstruse ideas, the essays are never in the least obscure; Philip’s storytelling ("I realised some time ago that I belong at the vulgar end of the literary spectrum," he remarks) is evident in the instantly engaging tone, the vivid imagery and striking phrases, the resonant anecdotes.

It is striking, though not surprising, how well the essays cohere, despite their diverse origins. As in a conversation, a favourite topic is explored in different ways, from different angles, raised in one essay, scrutinised at greater length in another, re-examined in a third, developed in a new context in a fourth, and transformed in a fifth. I think it is possible to read them, in fact, as a single, sustained engagement with story and storytelling by a great
storyteller and, to my mind, the book takes its place naturally among Philip’s others. I hope that it will give his readers the same excitement that it has given me in bringing them together.

I should say a word about the methodology of gathering and ordering them. As I mentioned, they were written over the years, for various purposes. Many were talks, delivered at a specific moment in time, at a particular place. Slight tweaks have been made here and there to eliminate instances of unnecessary outdatedness. A bigger issue was the occurrence of repetitions, as Philip returned over and over again to favourite topics. Tweaks have been made here too—though not too many. As I say, I felt that the return—the re-examination and development—of these ideas and themes is an important part of the overall story. Although Philip returns several times to, say, the Gnostic myth or Kleist’s essay “On the Marionette Theatre,” I have preserved these passages as much as possible, cutting out only word-for-word duplications.

The sense of an overall story also directed my ordering of the essays. I could have arranged them chronologically or thematically, but I found the former unenlightening and the latter too clunky. I toyed for a while with the idea of a random arrangement, but randomness can be dull and awkward as well as serendipitous, and in practice I doubted it would end up random at all. I opted for something else: a loose arrangement along a thread of connections and correspondences, which begins with the figure of the storyteller, proceeds through many different explorations of the writing of stories, broadens to take in the pleasures, purpose and nature of reading stories, and ends with a deeply felt statement of belief in the power and centrality of stories in our culture. If readers want to read the collection from the beginning, I hope they will find pleasure and interest in this order. But it is not intended to limit readers, who are of course free to dip in and out as they wish, find a congenial subject in the topic finder, or just choose an essay at random. After all, as Philip says, free and democratic reading is a vital part of the Republic of Heaven, and delight always an aspect of storytelling. —Simon Mason

Oxford, March 2017

Topic Finder

Certain themes recur in more than one essay. The lists below identify some of those themes and group together the essays in which they are discussed.

ON CHILDREN’S LITERATURE
- Imaginary Friends
- Intention
- Children’s Literature Without Borders

ON EDUCATION AND STORY
- Let’s Write It in Red
- Talents and Virtues
- Paradise Lost

ON FOLK TALES, FAIRY TALES AND EPICS
- Epics
- Folk Tales of Britain
- As Clear as Water
- Imaginary Friends
- Magic Carpets
- The Classical Tone

ON HIS DARK MATERIALS
- Dreaming of Spires
- God and Dust
- Heinrich von Kleist, "On the Marionette Theatre"
- Reading in the Borderland
- The Path Through the Wood
- The Writing of Stories

ON MY OTHER BOOKS
- As Clear as Water
- Intention (The Scarecrow and His Servant)
- Poco a Poco (Clockwork and I Was a Rat!)
- The Firework-Maker’s Daughter on Stage
- The Path Through the Wood
- (I Was a Rat!)
- The Story of The Good Man
- Jesus and the Scoundrel Christ

ON OTHER MEDIA: FILM, TV AND THE THEATRE
- Let’s Pretend
- Let’s Write It in Red
- Magic Carpets
- Oliver Twist
- The Writing of Stories
- The Firework-Maker’s Daughter on Stage

ON PICTURES
- A Bar at the Folies-Bergère
- Maus

"If anyone you know is struggling with addiction—or if you think you might have a problem—you want to read this book."—GARTH STEIN, bestselling author of The Art of Racing in the Rain

"a proven, comprehensive program that compassionately guides the reader to a place of resolution”—DAVID PERLMUTTER, M.D., #1 New York Times bestselling author of Grain Brain, and, Brain Maker

"a massive achievement and a giant step forward for addiction medicine”—ANNIE GRACE, author of This Naked Mind

Drug overdose is now the leading cause of death for Americans under fifty. Even as opiate addiction skyrockets, more people than ever before are hooked on alcohol, sedatives, cigarettes, and even screens. The face and prevalence of addiction has changed and evolved, but our solutions to addiction are stuck in the past.

We’ve been treating addiction as a black or white issue, a disease you either suffer from or will never suffer from. The problem with this model is that it doesn’t account for the incredible forces working against all of us, pushing all of us toward addiction: stress, undernourishment, sleep-deprivation, vitamin D deficiency, and isolation, not to mention a flawed medical system and corrupt pharmaceutical companies doling out prescriptions at every turn.
The truth: Addiction is a disease that, like many others, exists on a spectrum. We are more vulnerable to becoming addicted to substances at certain points in our lives and based on the evidence provided in *The Addiction Spectrum*, most effective at kicking addiction when we take a holistic approach. With the help of the 13-point plan and individual protocols detailed in this book, you have the power to change your destiny. No one understands this more than Dr. Paul Thomas, who recovered from alcohol addiction early in his career and founded one of the most effective rehabilitation centers for teens and young adults in his hometown of Portland, OR. Named one of the top family doctors and one of the top pediatricians in the country, Dr. Paul is also board-certified in both integrative medicine and addiction medicine. This unique combination of specialties is intentional: Dr. Paul has devoted his entire life and career to saving lives.

Using the best conventional medicine alongside the new science of alternative health, Dr. Paul has treated thousands of patients with the life-saving solutions provided in *The Addiction Spectrum*. Addiction is a compendium of often devastating circumstances that have gone unchecked by society for far too long. This book is a positive light and guide to overcoming not only addiction but the challenges and obstacles that affect us all.

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About the Authors
Excerpt: My name is Paul, and I’m a recovering alcoholic. My wife, Maiya, is a recovering opioid addict. Five of our nine kids (we have three biological and six adopted, all of whom are young adults now) have struggled with substance use. As much as addiction has affected my life on a personal level, it is also one of the most critical health problems of our time.

We are in the midst of a devastating addiction crisis in the United States and around the world—one that is affecting each and every one of us. You picked up this book because you or someone you love is struggling with addiction. That addiction probably involves opioids or even heroin, though it may be an addiction to another hard drug like cocaine or meth, to alcohol or marijuana, or to something more seemingly "benign," like gaming, the internet, or that brand-new smartphone you can’t stop yourself from checking over eighty times a day (the national average).

Not a day goes by without public-health officials, doctors, politicians, and even the president calling attention to this crushing crisis of addiction. There’s a reason the Office of the Surgeon General now names addiction a top public-health priority: more
people are dying from drug overdoses than from traffic accidents in the United States.

The numbers are grim and are getting worse. Over 20 million Americans (more than the entire population of New York) are addicted to drugs or alcohols. Some 12.5 million people over the age of twelve report misusing prescription opioids in the prior year, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention says that 115 people a day are dying from opioid overdose in the United States alone. Next time you're at a party or a family gathering, look at the people around you—I in 7 of your friends is expected to become addicted at some time in the future.

According to data compiled by the New York Times, drug overdose is now the leading cause of death for Americans under fifty and touches people from every socioeconomic background and every region of the United States from Texas to Virginia to California. More Americans were killed last year by drug overdose than died in the entire Vietnam War. At the same time, over 15 million adults in America are abusing alcohol and over 88,000 people are dying each year from alcohol-related deaths. Addiction is an unsustainable tragedy of epic proportions. We need to fix this problem, and we need to fix it now.

In 2016, more people died from drug overdoses than from motor vehicle accidents.

I'll put it bluntly: I wrote this book because I don't want you to die. I don't want addiction to ruin your life. I don't want addiction to steal your loved ones from you. I want you not only to survive, but also to thrive. Which is why the book you're holding in your hands is literally a matter of life and death.

While the mainstream media has been relentlessly reporting on the problem of addiction, no one is offering real solutions. Alcoholics Anonymous works for some—myself included—but we know that Narcotics Anonymous is less effective. Other programs like Self-Management and Recovery Training (SMART) are making great strides but haven't been able to move the needle. The life expectancy of a person with an opioid or heroin addiction is abysmally low, and relapse rates are sky high.

That's the bad news. It's overwhelming.

***

My name is Paul, and I'm a medical doctor. I am board-certified in addiction medicine and pediatrics. I have spent my entire professional career finding effective and lasting ways to help people addicted to narcotics as well as to alcohol, stimulants, pot, and even screens. I've been practicing medicine for over thirty years with an open mind, a keen interest in the most recent science, and a willingness to adapt my treatment techniques based both on the latest research and on what is working and what isn't for each patient. I have a thriving integrative addiction treatment clinic called Fair Start and a busy pediatric practice, which now has over thirteen thousand patients, six doctors, eight nurses, and four nurse practitioners.

With a team of the best, most forward-thinking, and most compassionate doctors, nurse practitioners, and nurses by my side, I work day in and day out to help young people at risk of becoming addicted improve their mental and physical health and to help adults who are addicted get out of the clutches of drug abuse and get into recovery. I have also spent much of my life struggling to overcome my own demons. Like you or your loved one, I have battled addiction. I spent twenty-seven years of my life abusing alcohol and eleven of those years addicted to nicotine. Though I've been sober for over fifteen years, I still struggle with overeating and other unhealthy behaviors, which I'll tell you more about later in this book. At the same time, I've been blessed with a tremendous amount of energy and a stubborn determination to change the world by improving people's health. Mine is an optimistic—and highly effective—approach to treating what has proven itself to be one of society's most challenging health problems. I have developed a recovery plan that actually works, not only to help you avoid addiction when you think you may be sliding into it, but to support every aspect of your health as you struggle to beat the habit, subdue your cravings, and redirect the destructive behavior that may be ruining your life.
In 2009 I opened my addiction clinic in Portland, Oregon. Its mission, from the beginning, has been to help young adults kick addiction and take back their lives. I treat mostly millennials who are hooked on heroin, opioids, cocaine, methamphetamines, marijuana, alcohol, or some combination of these. In the past nine years, we have treated over five hundred patients struggling with addiction, including teens and even some tweens. We have also helped opioid-dependent young women navigate pregnancy and deliver healthy babies.

Although conventional doctors may protest that a pediatrician is not qualified to treat addiction, the sad truth is that every pediatrician in America needs to be more aware of and more educated about how to prevent addiction in young people and how to help them once it starts. In the past twenty years, America has experienced an explosion of brain disorders, mental illness, and addiction among children and young adults. Anxiety, depression, and focus challenges—including ADD and ADHD—put young people at greater risk for addiction. Fifty-four percent of my Fair Start patients report having anxiety, depression, ADD, or ADHD prior to becoming addicted. To practice pediatrics in America today is to practice mental-health and addiction medicine.

Why are people struggling with mental-health issues and addiction more today than ever before? Policymakers and doctors dodge this question with long-winded jargon-filled answers, but I am going to tell it to you straight: You are stressed out, undernourished, vitamin D deficient, and sleep-deprived. You are not getting enough exercise, time outside, or community support. Courtesy of your handheld computers, you feel more disconnected than ever before. At the same time, your immune system is under constant assault from the chemicals in your food, your water, and even your medications. Add to all this a medical system that profits from patients’ poor health, and you have the perfect addiction storm.

Sometimes it is family history that puts you at higher risk for addiction; other times it is as simple as a bout of anxiety or a dental procedure. But we are all vulnerable to becoming addicted. I want to stop for a moment and reiterate that truth: every single one of us is a potential addict—you, your partner, your friend, your parent, your child. If you yourself have struggled with addiction, think of the sober people in your life who have judged or dismissed you and remember that within them is a potential addict. If you have never had a problem with addiction, recognize that, given the wrong circumstances, you too could become addicted. Our unhealthy lifestyles and exposure to toxins make us more vulnerable to addiction than we have ever been before. Understanding this is the only way to make sense of the explosion of opioid addiction in this country and explains why my solutions, which you’ll learn about throughout this book, are so effective.

Many of my patients who spiral out of control with drug addiction were first prescribed opioids after an injury, an accident, or a wisdom-tooth extraction. Their doctors often insisted on doling out prescriptions for these highly addictive painkillers, even when my patients (or their parents) said they preferred to stick with something milder, like aspirin or ibuprofen! Just last month a young person in my practice who was off to college in a new city was hospitalized for severe stomach pain. The hospital doctors tried to put her on a morphine drip even before they had a diagnosis (it turned out to be appendicitis). Knowing her family history, she said, “No, thank you,” opting for a nonaddictive pain medicine instead. If the doctors had asked before they offered, they would have found out that this eighteen-year-old has alcoholism and addiction on both sides of her family. Exposing her to a highly addictive opioid could have had disastrous results.

We know from science that the earlier young people are exposed to drugs, the more likely it is that they will get addicted. Early and repeated exposure to opioids can even cause addiction in young people who have no other obvious risk factors. I’ve seen this happen in my practice. Yet medical doctors irresponsibly continue to expose even the youngest patients.

We also know that untreated mental- and physical-health problems can catapult people into addiction. For those of you who suffer from attention deficit disorders, anxiety, and depression, self-soothing with alcohol or drugs feels like a solution. It is a
solution! You use substances to self-medicate without ever realizing that is what you are doing. At the same time, your doctors fail to recognize and treat the underlying causes of your poor physical and mental health, prescribing you medication to mask the symptoms instead. When you are already struggling with mental- and physical-health issues—as so many of us are—and you are then prescribed highly addictive medication, is it any wonder you succumb?

Opioid-induced euphoria is enticing for everyone, and irresistible for some. Usually with a doctor’s blessing, you get your prescription refilled many times, long after the initial need for the medication is gone. And when those same doctors finally notice there’s a problem and refuse to write another script, you turn to street drugs like heroin for relief. It sometimes takes only months, or it may take several years, but eventually the drugs stop working, the anxiety gets worse, and you find yourself in a downward spiral of self-loathing, pain, and despair.

Addiction has no regard for wealth or status. Though the heaviest users who come to Fair Start are often unemployed or underemployed, I also have many full-time college students and many professionals working in occupations like medicine, engineering, law, and education. My patients reflect the demographics of the greater Portland area. They are mostly white; some are Hispanic, Asian American, African American, and Native American. Although many are not married, nearly all have partners. Their significant other may also be struggling with substance abuse. About a quarter have children and arrive for visits with a baby or toddler in tow. Many, however, have lost primary custody of their kids because of their drug use. Some have had run-ins with the law.

In the past nine years of scheduling hundreds of patients at Fair Start, I found that 15 percent never showed up to the first appointment. This reflects one of the biggest challenges facing addicts who want treatment. Your life is disorganized, and you may not be thinking straight. You want help today—so you make an appointment with a doctor like me who takes insurance, is here to help you, and has a supportive, compassionate, and well-trained staff. But by the time the appointment comes, your motivation to stop using is already gone. Why go to the doctor for help when your solution of choice is within arm’s reach?

If you’re not an addict, you probably think this can’t and won’t happen to you. You’re mistaken. Our high-stress lives, unhealthy lifestyles, and lack of community leave us all vulnerable. To be human is to be prone to addiction. The rate of full-blown addiction has tripled in the United States in the last twenty years. The only way to understand this incredible rise in addiction statistics is to fundamentally change the way we think about, talk about, and treat addiction.

Addiction is a spectrum. Most people think the world is divided into two kinds of people: addicts and nonaddicts. You’re either an alcoholic or you’re not, with no in between. But that is not how addiction works. In reality, we are all somewhere on the addiction spectrum. When you are on the mild end of the spectrum, you have little problem with alcohol, drugs, or addictive behaviors. You are able to enjoy alcohol, experiment with addictive substances, take opioids for a limited amount of time and for their intended reason, or engage in highly pleasurable addictive behaviors without it becoming a problem. You may overuse once or twice, but you learn from your mistakes. You stop if you are worried, often for good. You don’t want to live life in an altered state, so for the most part you stay away from anything that you could become addicted to.

Others of you are at moderate risk. Like those on the mild end of the addiction spectrum, you often can and do restrain your use, at least at the beginning. You manage to keep yourself under control, though you may overindulge from time to time. You may wake up feeling miserable, guilty, or ashamed, but you are usually able to conquer the urge to use too much. You would not necessarily be diagnosed as an "addict," but if you told a knowledgeable mental-health professional the truth (which you don’t, because you’re too ashamed or too private to admit what you are actually doing), you would likely be diagnosed with a substance-use disorder. You are using more than is healthy and are always at risk of developing a more
severe use disorder, but because your use is not ruining your life, you remain somewhere in the middle of the spectrum.

And some of you, like me and my wife and my patients, are or have been on the severe end of the addiction spectrum. You experience unbearable and often uncontrollable cravings. Once you start, you don’t seem to have an off switch. Your addictions take over your life.

You have the power to change your destiny. Your place on the addiction spectrum is always changing. Although you may feel as if you’re climbing an insurmountable mountain as you struggle to recover, don’t despair. You can’t change certain factors that put you at risk, which I’ll talk about in the next chapter, but the more you improve your eating habits, make lifestyle changes, reduce your exposure to toxins (including stress), and seek out and find connectedness, the more you will move toward the mild, healthy end of the spectrum, creating for yourself a steadier, more manageable, and more joyful life.

The opposite is also true. You may be in perfect health and look down on all the addicts whom you secretly think of as poor saps who lack willpower and moral fiber. But being on the mild end of the spectrum today does not mean you may not be moving toward the severe end of the addiction spectrum tomorrow. You are most susceptible to addiction after a traumatic event like an unwanted divorce, unexpected loss, or physical injury. Understanding that addiction is a treatable condition that happens on a spectrum is crucial to preventing addiction and helping you heal.

If you’re holding this book in your hands, you have likely lost much to addiction. Maybe you’ve been told addiction is an intractable problem with no real solution, a sign of moral failing or weak character. You’re embarrassed, tired, and discouraged. Perhaps you’ve tried on your own to conquer your addiction and failed. You picked yourself up and tried again—only to fall flat on your face. You may be suffering from other chronic or acute health problems. Left to fend for yourself, you have fallen victim to isolation and pain. Unable to handle the withdrawal symptoms that occur when you try to stop, you’re in prison and you are your own jailer.

Or perhaps it is your loved one who is suffering, and you have no idea how to help. You feel out of answers.

That’s where I come in. You are the reason I wrote this book. I don’t have all the answers—no one does—but I do have an implementable, individualized plan of action that is going to help you begin to enjoy better health, today, as you work to beat back addiction.

The best part about my treatment approach? It has worked for hundreds of addicts, and it will work for you too.

I am here to tell you that you are not alone. And you don’t need to suffer any longer. Addiction is not intractable. Addiction is not a moral failing. You do not need to be exhausted. You do not need to be stressed out. You do not need to be miserable. You do not need to be ashamed.

In this book you are going to learn the key strategies you need to overcome addiction, prevent future relapse, and feel better in literally every aspect of your health and your life. They include how to:

- Eat real food as it comes from the earth.
- Reduce stress in all forms, including from television, news, social media, toxic people, and toxic environments.
- Increase your level of vitamin D through lifestyle intervention and supplementation.
- Improve your mental and physical health with daily exercise.
- Discover high-quality sleep that refreshes and rejuvenates.
- Fix your broken gut microbiome (if you don’t know what that is yet, you soon will!).
- Find and build connectedness, replacing the false connection of addiction with true relationships.

Some of these interventions may seem obvious; others may be ideas you’ve never heard of before, let alone considered trying. You don’t have to be perfect. You don’t have to do it right every time. In
my approach it’s okay to fail. I want you to embrace your imperfections instead of feeling ashamed of them. But don’t underestimate the revolutionary power of making what may seem like simple health and lifestyle changes. Throughout this book I’m going to walk you through all of these strategies and more, explain the science behind them, and give you detailed advice about how to implement them successfully in your life.

There seems to be a growing lack of true connection in our culture—genuine connection to ourselves and to each other. But to beat addiction you must build connections with other people. Lasting, sober, healthy connections are an essential component to good health for everyone. This is, after all, the elusive thing that so many of you are looking for when you drink or use. You feel socially inept, so you drink and the awkwardness goes away. You feel lonely and alone, so you use in order to bond with other people who are also using. You believe you’re having a rip-roaring good time, and you feel profoundly connected to your addict friends.

The paradox, of course, is that the high is a lie. As you spiral from the moderate to the severe end of the addiction spectrum, you start to realize that the false sense of connection you have been getting from your addiction is actually cutting you off from other people and crippling your ability to connect. Recovery is so painful because it involves waking up to the fact that you are disconnected. If that sounds hard, it’s because it is hard. But millions of others have gotten drug-free and sober. If you follow my program, you can and you will get sober too. But you can’t do it alone. Luckily, you don’t have to.

The Failed Conventional Medical Approach

The problems addicts face are physical, behavioral, and emotional. You often lack a sense of purpose. You often feel profoundly alone. But when you seek help from the medical system, rarely do you find answers that address all the facets of your addictive tendencies. Instead, you’re met with disapproval from doctors who may believe you are just not trying hard enough. You know what I’m talking about, because you’ve lived it. Conventional medicine treatment options often feel more like judgment than help and frequently come laced with insinuations, accusations, and hostility.

Doctors are taught to focus on physical symptoms. Medical doctors have very little, if any, training in anything else. Can’t sleep? There’s a pill for that. Depressed? Here’s some medication. Overcome with anxiety? I’ve got a pill for that too. Side effects from all those meds you’re on? There are pills for those as well! I have patients whose doctors have put them on thirteen different medications at the same time, despite the fact that no studies exist showing that the combination of those medications is safe or effective.

Don’t misunderstand me—I use pharmaceuticals in my practice every day. I am grateful for them. Sometimes a pharmaceutical intervention is the first and best step to helping a suffering addict. There is often benefit to using controlled prescription medication to support a brain that has been chronically flooded with harmful drugs in order to begin the process of allowing the body to heal.

But as an integrative physician, I strive to give my patients the tools to recognize the underlying health conditions that contribute to their struggles. These tools can be applied to many different kinds of addiction, not just to heroin and opioids, which is why this book deals with the origins of addiction and with so much more than just “hard” drugs. Most drug abusers also drink, smoke cigarettes, and find themselves with behavioral addictions as well. Most alcoholics or heavy drinkers also do a lot of drugs. And, as I said earlier, many of us who are not ostensibly addicts—as hard as it might be to admit—have addictive tendencies that negatively affect our lives and that we often unwittingly pass on to our children.

Although “integrative medicine” is a household term in most of my circles, unless you’re already a progressive-minded doctor or have been studying alternative health, you may have never heard this term before. Integrative medicine is healing-oriented, taking account of the whole person and including every aspect of her or his lifestyle. It emphasizes the relationship between practitioner and patient, is informed by the most current scientific research as well as a doctor’s own clinical
experience, and makes use of many different healing modalities and therapies that more conventional, mainstream doctors may dismiss as "crazy" or "woo-woo" (without bothering to research or try them).

Just as every human fingerprint is a unique pattern of whorls and lines, every person's brain offers a unique challenge. As an integrative physician, I look for root causes of addiction instead of just treating symptoms. I combine the best of modern medical practices with a more holistic approach. I gather information from the patient about genetic vulnerabilities, food and nutrition, and other lifestyle choices and then use this information to devise a plan that integrates alternative healing practices designed specifically for the patient.

Your particular addiction is unique to you and therefore requires a unique integrative medical approach. Addiction treatment is not one-size-fits-all. So the first thing we need to do is locate the root causes of your addiction, which is what I talk about in part I. It is important to begin at the beginning—together we will figure out where you are now on the addiction spectrum, explore the risk factors that got you there, and discuss the myths about addiction that you need to let go of in order to heal. In part I, I also help open your eyes to how the medical establishment, the food industry, and pharmaceutical companies have primed you for and profit from your addiction. I also help you figure out how your genetic vulnerabilities, sleep habits, food choices, and stress levels contribute to the problem.

Once you know better, you can do better. Armed with information about who is benefitting from your addiction and how you are being encouraged to take more drugs that you don't actually need, in part II, I walk you through the best ways to set your body up for success. Because every addiction has a different effect on both your mental and physical health, part II covers major addictions in separate chapters and offers ways to heal your body and your mind from the abuse it has received courtesy of your drug or behavior of choice, whether it is opioids, meth, alcohol, marijuana, or even screens. In each chapter in part II, I give you an individual treatment plan, which includes lifestyle changes, nutritional intervention, and the supplements you need to support your best health. In part III, I explain my integrative health program in more detail, giving you advice on how to navigate a sometimes hostile medical system and providing inspiration on how to embrace your recovery journey. I explain why I believe you need mind, body, and spirit to work together to heal.

There are stories, suggestions, and solutions in every chapter, so I recommend you read this book from cover to cover, though you may be tempted to start with the chapter in part II that tackles your or your loved one's most pressing addiction and then circle back to the other parts of the book. My goal is to get you far, far away from the severe end of the addiction spectrum, regardless of your drug of choice.

If you take only one thing away from this entire book, here's what I hope it will be: The journey to health is so much more than a pill or some counseling. To find your true exuberance, real potential, and lasting good health, you must rebuild the basic cornerstones of your brain and body. This requires a change to your entire approach to recovery. You must understand that you are on a spectrum of addiction, and that the power to heal is in your hands.

Will You Benefit from Reading This Book? Chances are a medical assistant has asked you some or all of the questions below while he or she was sitting in front of a computer typing away, checking off boxes on a list and not making eye contact. Chances are you didn't even know that person's name. And I'd be willing to bet you didn't answer truthfully. Why should you? None of us feels comfortable revealing intimate details about our personal struggles to someone we've just met, who isn't looking at us, and who we'll probably never see again. But you are safe here with this book in the privacy of your own space. I want you to be straight with me now—and, more important, with yourself. You have nothing to lose, and everything to gain. So here goes. If your answer to the question is yes, mark the box:

- Do you ever drink or use drugs more than you planned to?
Do you ever have remorse about drinking, using drugs, or any other potentially addictive behavior, including but not limited to playing video games, surfing the internet, gambling, or watching porn?

Do you ever hide your alcohol use, drug use, or other addictive behaviors from your family and friends?

Have you ever had a blackout?

Are you struggling to make commitments or tackle new things because you’re more interested in drinking or using?

Are you having problems at work or at school because of your drinking or using?

Have you lost interest in activities that were once important to you?

Are you feeling unwell or unhappy?

Do you feel tired all the time?

When you don’t drink or use drugs, do you feel sick, or suffer anxiety, cravings, or shakes?

Have you ever thought, “I should cut back,” but then pushed that thought out of your mind?

Do you have family members or friends who would answer yes to these questions for you, even if you’re sure the answer is no?

Together we will build health and wellness into your life starting now. Start today, regardless of your age. Start before you get addicted. Start after you’ve already succumbed. Start before you get pregnant. Start as you cradle your newborn in your arms. It is never too late and it’s never too early to implement a wellness plan that will help you take control of your addictions, your health, and every aspect of your life.

The Addiction Spectrum explains the factors that prime the brain for addiction, gives you the information you need to avoid addiction before it starts, and offers an approach to help you become physically and psychologically healthy, well grounded, and addiction-free. It’s a compendium of everything I’ve learned in the past nine years of treating addicts and the last thirty years of practicing medicine. Filled with stories of recovery and hope, the book you are holding in your hands may be the most important book you will ever read.

Pandemic 1918: Eyewitness Accounts from the Greatest Medical Holocaust in Modern History by Catharine Arnold [St. Martin’s Press, 9781250139436]

Before AIDS or Ebola, there was the Spanish Flu — Catharine Arnold’s gripping narrative, Pandemic 1918, marks the 100th anniversary of an epidemic that altered world history. In January 1918, as World War I raged on, a new and terrifying virus began to spread across the globe. In three successive waves, from 1918 to 1919, influenza killed more than 50 million people. German soldiers termed it Blitzkatarrh, British soldiers referred to it as Flanders Grippe, but worldwide, the pandemic gained the notorious title of “Spanish Flu”. Nowhere on earth escaped: the United States recorded 550,000 deaths (five times its total military fatalities in the war) while European deaths totaled over two million.

Amid the war, some governments suppressed news of the outbreak. Even as entire battalions were decimated, with both the Allies and the Germans suffering massive casualties, the details of many servicemen’s deaths were hidden to protect public
morale. Meanwhile, civilian families were being struck down in their homes. The City of Philadelphia ran out of gravediggers and coffins, and mass burial trenches had to be excavated with steam shovels. Spanish flu conjured up the specter of the Black Death of 1348 and the great plague of 1665, while the medical profession, shattered after five terrible years of conflict, lacked the resources to contain and defeat this new enemy.

Through primary and archival sources, historian Catharine Arnold gives readers the first truly global account of the terrible epidemic.

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**Excerpt: An Ill Wind**

As the Sun sank over a windswept Yorkshire churchyard in September 2008, a battered lead-lined coffin was reburied hours after being opened for the first time in eighty-nine years. The familiar words of the burial service resounded through the twilight as samples of human remains were frozen in liquid nitrogen and transported to a laboratory with the aim of saving millions of lives. Medical researchers had exhumed the body of Sir Mark Sykes (1879-1919) in order to identify the devastating 'Spanish flu' virus which killed 100 million people in the last year of the First World War. Sir Mark, a British diplomat, had succumbed to Spanish flu during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, dying in his hotel near the Tuileries Gardens. Like many victims of Spanish flu, Sir Mark had been fit and healthy, a man in his prime at just thirty-nine years old.

Sir Mark’s remains had been sealed in a lead-lined coffin, befitting his status as a member of the nobility, and transported to Sledmere House, the Sykes’ family seat in east Yorkshire. Sir Mark was buried in the graveyard of St Mary’s church, which adjoined the house. If his body had not been hermetically sealed by a thick layer of lead, his life might have passed quietly into history. But an accident of chemistry meant that the lead dramatically slowed the decay of Sir Mark’s soft tissue, giving scientists investigating the H5N1 ‘bird flu’ virus a unique opportunity to study the behaviour of its predecessor. One theory of the cause of the 1918-19 epidemic was that it originated with an avian virus, H1N1, which is similar to H5N1. Researchers believed Sir Mark’s remains might hold valuable information about how the influenza virus leapt the species barrier from animals to humans.

In 2011, there were only five useful samples of the H1N1 virus around the world and none from a well-preserved body in a lead-lined coffin. H1N1 had already been sequenced by scientists using frozen remains found in Alaska, but many questions remained about just how the virus killed its victims and the way it had mutated by 1919, when it killed Sir Mark Sykes.

Professor John Oxford, the eminent virologist who led the team investigating Sir Mark’s remains, told reporters that the baronet ‘died very late in the epidemic, when the virus had almost burnt itself out. We want to get a grip on how the virus worked both when it was at its most virulent and when it was coming to the end of its life. The samples we have taken from Sir Mark have the potential to help us answer some very important questions’.
After a two-year process of gaining permission from the Diocese of York to carry out the exhumation, involving a special hearing presided over by a High Court judge, Professor Oxford’s team, wearing full bio-hazard kit and accompanied by medical experts, clergy, environmental health officers and Sir Mark Sykes’ descendants, finally exhumed his grave. After a short prayer, the gravestone was removed and the coffin uncovered inside a sealed tent before researchers wearing protective suits and breathing apparatus opened the casket. After so many months of preparation, it was a tense and exciting moment. But the investigation seemed doomed to failure. A crack was discovered in the top of the lead lining, meaning that the chances of finding a pristine sample of the virus were remote. The coffin had split because of the weight of soil over it, and the cadaver was badly decomposed. Nonetheless, the team were able to extract samples of lung and brain tissue through the split, with the coffin remaining in situ in the grave during this process to avoid disturbing the body any further. Although the condition of the cadaver was disappointing, a study of the tissue samples taken from the remains eventually revealed valuable genetic imprints of H1N1 and its condition when Sir Mark died.

The exhumation of Sir Mark Sykes’ body represented just one attempt to find an explanation for the deadly disease that had devastated the globe during the last year of the Great War. In three successive waves, from spring 1918 to summer 1919, the phenomenon that became known as `Spanish flu' killed an estimated 100 million people worldwide. The disease was not classified as `Spanish flu', or the more fanciful sobriquet `Spanish Lady', immediately. The shape-shifting creature that was Spanish flu was a slippery beast, difficult to define beyond the common characteristics of acute breathing difficulties, haemorrhaging and fever. As it progressed, many doctors and civilians would wonder whether this apocalyptic disease was actually influenza at all.

In terms of national identity, there was nothing inherently Spanish about Spanish flu. At first, in the early months of 1918, the majority of doctors believed they were dealing with nothing more serious than a particularly aggressive outbreak of common or garden influenza. But as the epidemic continued, and King Alfonso XIII of Spain fell victim along with many of his subjects, this virulent strain of influenza was discussed freely in the Spanish press. Debate of this nature was possible as Spain was a neutral country during the First World War. Elsewhere, in Britain and the United States, censorship made such speculation impossible beyond the pages of medical journals such as The Lancet and the British Medical Journal. Under 'DORA', or the Defence of the Realm Act, newspapers were not permitted to carry stories that might spread fear or dismay. As the term `Spanish flu' entered the language in June 1918, The Times of London took the opportunity to ridicule the disease as little more than a passing fad. By the autumn of 1918, when the deadly second wave of Spanish flu was hitting populations worldwide, the implications of the disease proved impossible to ignore. The United States recorded 550,000 deaths, five times its total military fatalities in the war, while European deaths totalled over two million. In England and Wales an estimated 200,000, 4.9 per 1,000 of the total population, perished from influenza and its complications, particularly pneumonia.

Today, despite regular health scares about bird flu, SARS, HIV and Ebola, it is difficult to envisage a scenario in which something as common as influenza could cause widespread illness and death. Although most of us will contract influenza several times during our lifetimes, the influenza vaccination being only approximately 50 per cent effective, the majority will survive with a minimum amount of medical attention. What then was so different about Spanish flu and why did it have such a devastating impact?

To gain some understanding of these factors, we need to define the nature of influenza and consider a brief history of the disease. In general terms, influenza is a complex disease caused by an airborne virus which spreads between individuals in microscopic droplets, via coughing or sneezing. Bringing people together in close contact aids the spread of the infection, particularly in overcrowded communities such as schools, military camps and hospitals. In many cases, schoolchildren are the first
to catch the virus and then transmit it to their families.

Although Spanish flu constituted the most deadly mutation of the flu virus, flu itself is nothing new. References to influenza as an affliction date back to classical times, with Hippocrates witnessing an apparent epidemic of influenza in Greece in 412 BC and Livy recording a similar outbreak in his history of ancient Rome. <>

Creative Selection: Inside Apple's Design Process During the Golden Age of Steve Jobs by Ken Kocienda [St. Martin's Press, 9781250194466]

An insider’s account of Apple’s creative process during the golden years of Steve Jobs.

Hundreds of millions of people use Apple products every day; several thousand work on Apple’s campus in Cupertino, California; but only a handful sit at the drawing board. Creative Selection recounts the life of one of the few who worked behind the scenes, a highly-respected software engineer who worked in the final years of the Steve Jobs era—the Golden Age of Apple.

Ken Kocienda offers an inside look at Apple’s creative process. For fifteen years, he was on the ground floor of the company as a specialist, directly responsible for experimenting with novel user interface concepts and writing powerful, easy-to-use software for products including the iPhone, the iPad, and the Safari web browser. His stories explain the symbiotic relationship between software and product development for those who have never dreamed of programming a computer, and reveal what it was like to work on the cutting edge of technology at one of the world’s most admired companies.

Kocienda shares moments of struggle and success, crisis and collaboration, illuminating each with lessons learned over his Apple career. He introduces the essential elements of innovation—inspiration, collaboration, craft, diligence, decisiveness, taste, and empathy—and uses these as a lens through which to understand productive work culture.

An insider’s tale of creativity and innovation at Apple, Creative Selection shows readers how a small group of people developed an evolutionary design model, and how they used this methodology to make groundbreaking and intuitive software which countless millions use every day.

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Excerpt: This book is about my fifteen years at Apple, my efforts to make great software while I was there, and the stories and observations I want to relate about those times. If you want to know what it was like to give a demo to Steve Jobs, or why the iPhone touchscreen keyboard turned out the way it did, or what made Apple’s product culture special, read on.

I’ll tell you what it was like to be an Apple software engineer, the pressures and pleasures of working at such a demanding company, and the rush of excitement we coders feel when we make a computer do something new using nothing more than solitude, brain power, and typing.

I’ll tell you about the Apple programmer community I became a part of, and how a small group of geeky introverts created a web browser and a touchscreen smartphone operating system starting with only dreams, goals, and ideas.

I’ll tell you about how programmers fit into the larger Apple software development system, the joys of collaborating with designers who could bring refinement and elegance to the look and feel of our apps, and the stress of presenting work to colleagues, managers, and executives who always
pressed for improvements that seemed just out of reach.

There are many aspects to making products in the Apple way—industrial design, hardware engineering, marketing, legal, and managing a vast international supply chain, to name just a few—but to understand what makes Apple what it is, its essence, you need to understand software, and I’ll introduce you to the world programmers inhabit, how software gets made from scratch, and how we tried to imbue this software with spirit.

While other companies design beautiful hardware, excel at marketing, hire good lawyers, and manufacture gadgets at scale, no other company makes software as intuitive, carefully crafted, or just plain fun. If there’s a unique magic in Apple’s products, it’s in the software, and I’ll tell you how we created some of the most important software in the company’s history.

When I joined Apple in 2001, desktop and laptop computers were still the company’s main products, and while the colorful iMac had been a notable success in reestablishing Apple as a design leader in high technology—Steve Jobs had been back for four years following his eleven-year exile—the company still sat below 5 percent share in a market dominated by Microsoft Windows. Apple certainly had its core enthusiasts at that time, and they were passionate about its products, but to everyone else, the Mac was a computer they might have used in college but forgot about when they became adults and got jobs.

Four months after I started at Apple, things started to change. The release of the iPod was as much a surprise to me as it was to everyone else, and this portable music player kick-started Apple’s shift from computers to personal technology. The iPod also provided the money and the confidence that would lead to the development of the wildly successful devices that followed. This culminated with the iPhone, the product that transformed Apple from a technology bit player into one of the world’s most profitable enterprises.

I was a witness and a contributor to these times and these changes. I started programming for the iPhone when the number of software engineers and designers on the secretive project could fit in a small conference room. If you ask me about the first iPad, I might refer to it as K48, the internal code name we developers used before Steve Jobs and the marketing department picked a real product name. Today, on the day I’m writing this introduction, hundreds of millions of people will use these Apple products, and if you count the browsers on Windows and Google Android that use code based on the Safari browser I helped develop, the number of daily users runs to well over a billion, perhaps it’s closer to two.

Yet we never thought about such big numbers. We were too busy focusing on small details. Every day at Apple was like going to school, a design-focused, high-tech, product-creation university, an immersion program where the next exam was always around the corner. With that intensity came an insistence on doing things right, and, without explicitly trying to do so, we developed an approach to work that proved particularly effective for creating great software.

My goal is to share our approach with you—to explain the way we worked. To begin this discussion, I have identified seven elements essential to Apple’s software success:

1. Inspiration: Thinking big ideas and imagining what might be possible
2. Collaboration: Working together well with other people and seeking to combine your complementary strengths
3. Craft: Applying skill to achieve high-quality results and always striving to do better
4. Diligence: Doing the necessary grunt work and never resorting to shortcuts or half measures
5. Decisiveness: Making tough choices and refusing to delay or procrastinate
6. Taste: Developing a refined sense of judgment and finding the balance that produces a pleasing and integrated whole
7. Empathy: Trying to see the world from other people’s perspectives and creating work that fits into their lives and adapts to their needs
Nobody outlined this list in a new-employee orientation. There weren’t any signs affixed to the walls of our Cupertino campus exhorting us to "Collaborate!" On the contrary, we felt, on an instinctive level, that imposing a fixed methodology might stifle the innovation we were seeking.

Therefore, our approach flowed from the work. This happened from the top down, stemming from the unquestioned authority and uncompromising vision of Steve Jobs, and it happened from the ground up, through the daily efforts of designers and programmers you’ve never heard of, people like me and my colleagues, some of whom I’ll tell you about.

You may have come to this book for a number of reasons, among them to find a from-the-trenches perspective on how an iconic American company worked, to hear the back story on some of your favorite Apple products, or to learn something about the arcane craft of software development. But if you’re expecting to read a handbook about the “Seven Elements That Made Apple Great,” I hope you’ll see that working in the Apple style is not a matter of following a checklist.

While the seven essential elements are a distillation of what we did on an everyday basis, they represent long-term discovery too. An important aspect of this book is the way we built our creative methods as a by-product of the work as we were doing it. As all of us pitched in to make our products, we developed our approach to creating great software. This was an evolution, an outgrowth of our deliberate attention to the task at hand while keeping our end goal in mind. We never waited around for brilliant flashes of insight that might solve problems in one swoop, and we had few actual Eureka! moments. Even in the two instances in my Apple career when I did experience a breakthrough—more about these later—there certainly was no nude streaking across the Apple campus like Archimedes supposedly did. Instead, we moved forward, as a group, in stepwise fashion, from problem to design to demo to shipping product, taking each promising concept and trying to come up with ways to make it better. We mixed together our seven essential elements, and we formulated “molecules” out of them, like mixing inspiration and decisiveness to create initial prototypes, or by combining collaboration, craft, and taste to give detailed feedback to a teammate, or when we blended diligence and empathy in our constant effort to make software people could use without pulling their hair out. As we did all this mixing and combining of our seven essential elements, we always added in a personal touch, a little piece of ourselves, an Octessence, and by putting together our goals and ideas and efforts and elements and molecules and personal touches, we formed our approach, an approach I call creative selection.

A Conversation with Ken Kocienda, Author of Creative Selection
Q: Why did you create the term "creative selection" to describe Apple’s approach to creativity during its golden age?

I chose "creative selection" because of its obvious reference to Darwinism. Like evolution by natural selection, our work at Apple was the result of a long chain of incremental improvement, with the strongest aspects of each generation providing the basis for the next. For whatever reason, we didn’t have a name to describe our design process at Apple. Yet, once I started to think about the way we made demos, evaluated them with a critical eye, decided how the demo could be made better, and then followed up with a subsequent demo based on those decisions, it seemed like "creative selection" was a good fit—it spoke clearly to our evolutionary design process.

Q: One of your titles at Apple was "Experimental Designer," what did that look like day-to-day?

The two parts of the name refer directly to what I did every day. I experimented with new ideas for software, and I created designs that we could use in our products. "Experimental" refers to the freedom to think new ideas, while "designer" refers to a responsibility to think through how a new idea might balance out with existing ideas and products. Both these concepts were essential to how Apple thought about creative work. We wanted our products to incorporate both the freshness of the new and the comfort of the familiar.
Q: What was your impression of working with Steve Jobs?

Steve was the most focused person I ever met. While some people would say he could act like a "jerk" around the office, I disagree. Steve simply didn’t care about social graces when it came to doing creative work, and he figured that brutal honesty was the most efficient way of working. More than anything, Steve wanted Apple products to be great, and when work is in development, it rarely is. Hence, Steve saw the need for truly straightforward talk to keep the progress moving. Luckily, I never really was on the receiving end of a tirade. I remember one time how he hated an idea I had to lock the screen orientation on the original iPad, one that would prevent the display changing from portrait to landscape. With an elongated sneer, he said I was "reeeeally confuuuused". I didn’t think so, but at times like that, it was usually best to change tack. On the bright side, if Steve approved a demo I showed him or if he accepted an idea I proposed, then it meant he truly liked it. When I did something that passed muster with him, like when I finally developed a workable system of autocorrected typing for the first iPhone, I felt that I had really accomplished something.

Q: What was Apple’s secret sauce that led to their success at creativity?

The way we pursued creativity at Apple was a combination of factors that may seem simple—perhaps even simplistic. Many fields are like this. Take piano playing. Even with the great virtuosos, all they do is hit the right keys at the right time with the right touch. It sounds trivial when you break it down like this, but of course, the music emerges from the nuances of the performance. At Apple, we used seven essential elements—inspiration, collaboration, craft, diligence, decisiveness, taste, and empathy—and we had our own way to combine these concepts to produce our work. For example, inspiration is "dreaming what might be possible". When we were in the early stages of developing the first iPhone, one of our designers had a vision for how multitouch user interfaces should behave. He would place a single sheet of paper down on a table in front of him and extend his index finger to touch the middle of the sheet. Then he would begin sliding his finger and the paper around as an inseparable unit, swirling the sheet around and around, the lockstep movement of his gesture and the object he was manipulating modeling the fluidity and responsiveness he wanted for the iPhone user interface. Ideas for software and products have to come from somewhere, and once we had this inspiration like this for the iPhone user interface, it was up to programmers like me to combine coding craft and long months of diligence to make the software match the inspiration. If we had a "secret sauce," it was in how the end products we made became inseparable blend of all the elements we put into them.

Q: Why was software design at the heart of that success?

Software has always been a big part of Apple’s success, even from the earliest days of the company. Apple was Steve Jobs’s vision of a computer for software hobbyists. The graphical user interface software on the Mac made the computer a tool for artists and designers. In more recent times, it’s the software that allows the iPhone to act as a phone or a map or a timer or a game or a thousand other things. By modeling these concepts in software, we no longer need the physical objects like wall phones, paper maps, or kitchen timers. This idea is at the heart of Apple’s approach to making products. We embraced software, and the almost infinite flexibility and adaptability of bits and pixels. We realized that if we paid careful attention to the design of a software version of a map on a smartphone, we could make something better than any paper map ever could be.

Q: Most people don’t associate creativity with software programming at a tech company. How did your liberal arts background help you bring creativity to your software design work at Apple?

I think it’s a shame that people don’t associate creativity and programming. As a history major who ended up working in high-tech, I always thought of software design as a medium of expression, that being creative in software required the same mindset that it does in painting, sculpture, or music. At Apple, I wasn’t alone in thinking this way. We had this lovely grand piano
on the Apple campus in Cupertino, and on the top of it, there was a small card that read: "This Bösendorfer piano was a gift from Steve Jobs to the team that created the original Macintosh in 1984. They were musicians and artists who understood that technical mastery alone is not enough. They believed that the true measure of things we create is the joy they bring and that beauty matters." At Apple, we often said that we worked at "the intersection" of liberal arts and technology, that in order to make the best products we could, we needed to incorporate the best of all human culture into our work. My background in the liberal arts always made me look for the purpose in what we did, so that our software was more than just a computing for the sake of the itself, that our products would meaningful and useful for people.

Q: When you worked on the iPhone did you have any clue about how revolutionary it would become?

Not at the outset. When I started working on the iPhone, I thought we were just going to make a great cell phone. That was exciting enough in itself. Then, once we got into the project, everyone on the team became so focused on the day-to-day problems of figuring out how we wanted our software to behave, and then with the practical challenges to make it actually function that way, that it was hard to know what it all might mean once we were done. Even so, over the eighteen months I worked on the iPhone in secret before Steve announced it in January 2007, I gradually came to think that the software was coming together pretty well. Yet, it was only in the late fall of 2006, around six weeks before Steve's keynote presentation, that I first saw a late-stage hardware prototype with all our software running on it. This was the first time I ever held an iPhone in my hands without any supplementary hardware boards or cabling attached to it. From the moment I took this prototype into my hands, I got a sense of the freedom of walking around with this amazing little touchscreen computer. In an instant, I knew it was special and I knew I wanted one. Even so, I wasn’t sure everyone out in the world would agree.

Q: What was the biggest challenge you faced when inventing auto-correct?

My biggest challenge was the fear of failure. I worked with the constant worry that my typing fix-up code might turn the iPhone into another version of the Newton, the handheld personal digital assistant Apple created in the 1990s. Unreliable handwriting recognition sunk the Newton. The product never sold well because people couldn’t easily and conveniently enter text into it. In the early days of iPhone autocorrection, it didn’t work well at all, and it seemed like history might be repeating itself. There was a lot of pressure on me, and my way of coping was to not think about the what might happen if the software didn’t turn out. I just kept going, and kept making what seemed like the most sensible improvements to the algorithms and the dictionary that autocorrection relied on. Throughout this time, secrecy was also a big challenge. Since so few people were disclosed on the existence of the iPhone, only several dozen people got to try keyboard autocorrection before Steve announced the product to the world. I was nervous about how everyone would take to keyboard autocorrection once they tried it, but it turned out alright, and today, typing on a sheet of glass seems completely normal.

Q: What would most surprise users of Apple products about what went into inventing them?

Probably the amount of uncertainty and doubt we felt. For most of the time through the year to eighteen months that a product was in development, it was no good. The software was clunky and full of bugs. We often worked with placeholder art that wasn’t as beautifully crafted as the graphics customers see in the store. We always went through long periods where we weren’t sure whether we were on track. We always wondered if we changed this feature or that concept, whether the end result would work better. This is actually one of the key ideas behind "creative selection". We made changes all the time. Each demo was different from the previous one in a way that tested some new variation on an existing idea. We were always experimenting. Sometimes, these new ideas wouldn’t work, and we were forced to backtrack. Most of the time, we could forge ahead and continue building and improving. Throughout, we had very few Eureka! moments. In a way, the doubt we felt on the small scale of an
individual feature or demo was counterbalanced by a large-scale confidence in our incremental process—that this was the way to achieve the best possible results.

Q: Who is your book written for and in what ways might they apply your insights?

I wrote for creative and technical people in all fields and businesses, to show how we approached design challenges at Apple. My stories about creating the Safari web browser and the autocorrecting keyboard can serve as examples for how to solve problems, and how to combine design and technology. I tried to break down some of the complexity of a concept like "innovation," to show that if you start with an idea, stay focused, and keep gathering improvements gradually, it is possible to create results that are much better than you might have hoped for when you started out. I think these are general lessons that anyone can use.

I also want to inspire young people. Over twenty years ago, as I started contemplating a career in high-tech, I read Steven Levy's Insanely Great: The Life and Times of Macintosh, the Computer that Changed Everything. That book made me want to follow in the footsteps of the creators of the Mac and to make a great product of my own. So, I hope that young people who read my stories about the iPhone will feel the same way as I did when I read about the Mac, and that someday, we'll all be using the great products they make, ones that use technology we can only dream about today.

Finally, I wanted to reach out to Apple enthusiasts, people who love the company’s products, specifically to those people who admire the care and attention that is evident in the making of Mac, the iPhone, and the iPad. I wanted to tell stories that confirm what these Apple fans like to think: indeed, we did take great care and attention in creating these products.

Q: What are the most valuable lessons anyone can learn and apply from the "golden age" of Apple?

The most valuable lesson is to focus—to pick out a worthy goal and keep heading toward that goal despite difficulties and distractions. We had that kind of focus at Apple during my career, and our goal was to make great products. Steve Jobs kept us working on that goal and he demanded that we stayed focused on it. Once you have such a goal in mind, then the "golden age" of Apple shows how to pursue your aim. We used seven essential elements in our work—inspiration, collaboration, craft, diligence, decisiveness, taste, and empathy—but these might not be the ideal elements for a different field. In sports, taste and empathy might be switched out for elements like toughness and competitiveness. A top-level executive at a large company might refine the notion of collaboration and recast it as communication. In the design and technical environment at Apple, our elements were so well ingrained in our culture that we didn’t even talk about them overtly, even though every designer and programmer lived them every day. So, the larger lesson might be to call out and identify the most important elements of success for your work or team or organization, to support them openly and clearly, and to not take them too much for granted. My point is that understanding the core elements that are essential to your work is vital to achieving excellent results.

Q: What did Apple do that helped foster a collaborative environment?

Small teams formed the foundation of the collaborative environment at Apple. You might be surprised to hear that there were only two or three dozen people working on the user interface software for the original iPhone. Keeping teams small like this had important follow-on effects. Smallness empowers people. Working in a small organization always made me feel like I could make a difference. There just weren’t that many levels of management between me and Steve Jobs. I knew that if I did good work, Steve would want to see it, and that if he approved a feature I dreamed up, my idea would make it into the product. Simple as that. We also had the notion of Directly Responsible Individuals—each important project had a single person’s name written down next to it. This DRI was the one who was charged with making that feature happen. This smallness and the assignment of DRIB fostered efficient communication. If you had a question about a feature, you asked the DRI, and that individual was empowered to make decisions. Of course, there were reviews and all big decisions eventually needed to be approved by Steve, but there was
very little red tape clogging the works. Steve’s position of unquestioned authority helped to keep the infighting and turf wars to a minimum. Excellent collaboration fell out of this structure. Our collaborative environment was a byproduct of this combination of smallness, assignment of responsibility, streamlined communication, and a clear line of authority.

Q: What new developments in software design have the potential to create the next big disruptive innovation?

The most interesting disruptions in software are usually driven by changes in hardware. That was certainly true for a product like the iPhone—its multitouch software traded out the mouse and hardware keyboard for our fingers. Eye-tracking hardware might be such an advance we’ll see in the future. Input method changes like this always present new possibilities for how software can be designed to fit people and adapt to our needs. Those are the kinds of innovations that interest me. If we can someday look at the software objects we want to interact with, and if those objects are represented in an augmented reality environment where software is overlaid onto the real world, computing will take another step toward occurring at the speed and ease of thought. This is a matter of making the user interface disappear, to make the computer recede, to make the machine pay attention to us rather than the other way around, to make software into a better tool for us. I think this kind of advance is on the horizon too—and will likely become commonplace within the next decade. <>

Lonely Planet’s Ultimate Eats: The World’s Top 500 Food Experiences... Ranked by Lonely Planet Food [Lonely Planet Food, 9781787014220]

We asked the planet’s top chefs, food writers and our food-obsessed authors to name their favorite, most authentic gastronomic encounters. The result is a journey to Mozambique for piri-piri chicken, Japan for bullet train bento boxes, San Sebastian pintxos bars, and a further 497 of the most exciting eateries anywhere on Earth.

Ultimate Eats is the follow-up to the bestselling Ultimate Travel and is a must-own bucket list for foodies and those who love to travel. You’ll discover the planet’s most thrilling and famous culinary experiences, the culture behind each one, what makes them so special, and why the experience is so much more than what’s in the plate, bowl or glass in front of you.

- Where Can You Find The World’s Ultimate Eating Experiences?
- Oyster Slurping On The Tasmanian Coast?
- Devouring Texan Slow-Cooked Beef Brisket?
- Feasting On Fiery Piri Piri Chicken in Mozambique?
- Searching Naples For The Perfect Pizza Marcherita?

With Contributions From Gail Simmons, Dan Hunter, Florence Fabricant, José Andrés, Elena Arzak, Mak Hix, Eric Ripert, Ben Shewry, Andrew Zimmern, Curtis Stone, Monica Galetti, and others.

How many have you tried and what’s your number one?
- A Selection among the 500 Entries:
  - Laksa, Malaysia
  - Grilled octopus, Greece
  - Smorrebrod, Denmark
  - Ceviche, Peru
  - Po boy, USA
  - Steak tartare, France
  - Bibimbap, Korea
  - Dim Sum, Hong Kong
  - Reindeer Stew, Finland
  - Jerked chicken, Jamaica
  - Asado, Argentina
  - Shakshuka, Israel
  - Pho, Vietnam
  - Wildfoods Festival, New Zealand
  - The Fat Duck restaurant, UK
  - Tokyo sushi counters, Japan
  - Bistecca alla Fiorentina, Italy
  - Adelaide Central Market, Australia
  - Grilled fish, Seychelles
Excerpt: You’ll need to jostle your way to the bar to order, poised for an opening to appear. ‘Un pincho de anchoas con pimientos, por favor. Y una copa de chacolí. ¡Gracias!’ A small plate comes back with your first pintxo and a glass of Basque sparkling wine. ¡Saiud! Welcome to San Sebastián in Spain, one of the world’s greatest cities to eat your way around. Sandwiched between the Bahía de le Concha and the city’s river, the grid of narrow streets in San Sebastián’s old town are packed with pintxos bars, each serving their own speciality of these Basque bites. In Bar Txepetxa on C/Pescadería, anchovies are the go-to snack. A few doors down at Nestor, it’s a beefheart tomato salad dressed with just olive oil and salt, or a tortilla so sought after that you have to put your name down on a list for a slice. Further along C/Pescadería, Bar Zeruko’s theatrical creations include a morsel of cod on a miniature smoking grill. It’s as if the city has been designed to delight every sense - and your sense of adventure, as you meander from bar to bar, meeting different people, trying new and inventive Basque flavours.

Trips like this inspired Lonely Planet’s Ultimate Eats, our collection of the world’s most memorable eating experiences. Food and place are inextricably connected: local dishes evolved according to what grew nearby or what was in season. Occasionally a gastronomic genius will create a classic that is recreated in restaurants around the world: how many versions of salad Niçoise might ever have been made? But only on the French Riviera can you try it in its home and there, in the golden light and sea breeze, everything makes more sense - the tuna from the Mediterranean, the sunripened Provencal tomatoes. Thanks to migration and globalisation, it’s easy to find kimchi in Los Angeles or manoushe in Melbourne but only in Korea or Lebanon can you dig down to their cultural roots. In these places, you don’t just taste the dish but experience the whirl of people, languages, aromas and sounds that are unique to that destination. That’s what makes each dish memorable.

So, how did we draw up our selection? First, we canvassed the Lonely Planet community - our writers, bloggers and staffers, a globetrotting group of people known to obsess over food and travel - for their most delicious discoveries. We also asked 20 chefs and food writers with an interest in world cuisines - from José Andrés to Andrew Zimmern - for their five favourite food experiences (see the coloured panels). With this long list to hand, we sought to rank the entries: where should you go for the world’s must-have food experiences? Our team of expert food editors were aided by a panel - made up of chef and TV presenter Adam Liaw and food blogger Leyla Kazim - that evaluated the entries according to the taste of the dish, its cultural importance, and the special atmosphere of the location.

This book is the result of their deliberations. Looking at our top ten, it seems that shared, communal food experiences rated highly - pintxos in San Sebastián, dim sum in Hong Kong and sushi in Japan - and we wondered what caused this. Clearly, we enjoy eating food around other people with the extra local interaction and the sense of place these experiences offer. Perhaps the added variety also rewards the more intrepid gastronaut, who is not always completely sure what they’re ordering...

Eating local has wider benefits too. Arguably, sustainability is higher when food is seasonal and grown in the vicinity, supporting local communities. An advantage of going to these places in person is that you can ask the server before ordering about the restaurant’s sourcing policies - of seafood, which figures prominently in our top 20, for example - or where the ingredients come from. Vote with your dollar or yen or euro.

This book travels the world with an insatiable appetite. It takes in the culinary melting pots of London, New York and Melbourne, and also such don’t-miss destinations as Lima, Singapore and the Yucatán. A few of the experiences we recommend are really off the beaten track: bush tucker in outback Australia or Faroese cuisine for example. But what they all have in common is that they will put you in thrilling touch with a place, its people and their way of life all thanks to some delicious food. In the Eat It! section of each entry we tell you exactly where to go to try each dish. Turn to our
guidebooks and lonelyplanet.com for more detailed directions.

So, don’t delay! Pack your passport (and loose-fitting clothing) and start ticking off your favourite food experiences from our list of Ultimate Eats.

Fashion Climbing: A Memoir with Photographs by Bill Cunningham and Hilton Als [Penguin Press, 9780525558705]


The untold story of a New York City legend’s education in creativity and style

For Bill Cunningham, New York City was the land of freedom, glamour, and, above all, style. Growing up in a lace-curtain Irish suburb of Boston, secretly trying on his sister’s dresses and spending his evenings after school in the city’s chicest boutiques, Bill dreamed of a life dedicated to fashion. But his desires were a source of shame for his family, and after dropping out of Harvard, he had to fight them tooth-and-nail to pursue his love.

When he arrived in New York, he reveled in people-watching. He spent his nights at opera openings and gate-crashing extravagant balls, where he would take note of the styles, new and old, watching how the gowns moved, how the jewels hung, how the hair laid on each head. This was his education, and the birth of the democratic and exuberant taste that he came to be famous for as a photographer for The New York Times. After two style mavens took Bill under their wing, his creativity thrived and he made a name for himself as a designer. Taking on the alias William J.--because designing under his family’s name would have been a disgrace to his parents--Bill became one of the era’s most outlandish and celebrated hat designers, catering to movie stars, heiresses, and artists alike. Bill’s mission was to bring happiness to the world by making women an inspiration to themselves and everyone who saw them. These were halcyon days when fashion was all he ate and drank. When he was broke and hungry he’d stroll past the store windows on Fifth Avenue and feed himself on beautiful things.

**Fashion Climbing** is the story of a young man striving to be the person he was born to be: a true original. But although he was one of the city’s most recognized and treasured figures, Bill was also one of its most guarded. Written with his infectious joy and one-of-a-kind voice, this memoir was polished, neatly typewritten, and safely stored away in his lifetime. He held off on sharing it--and himself--until his passing. Between these covers, is an education in style, an effervescent tale of a bohemian world as it once was, and a final gift to the readers of one of New York’s great characters.

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PREFACE BY HILTON ALS
The Doors of Paradise
Becoming William
My First Shop
A Helmet Covered in Flowers
The Luxury of Freedom
Nona and Sophie
The Southampton Shop

Excerpt: For nearly forty years, Bill Cunningham was a fixture on the streets of New York City. Clad in his trademark blue jacket with a camera draped around his neck, he captured the style and society of his beloved city for his On the Street column in the New York Times. Yet despite being one of the city’s most recognized and treasured figures, Bill was also one of its most guarded. He was famously private, even with his closest friends.

When Bill passed away in 2016, his family made an unexpected discovery: he had left behind two copies of his memoir, neatly typewritten and carefully polished. Alongside the pages was a rough sketch of a group of fashionably clad women ascending a ladder and **Fashion Climbing**—an intimate portrait of Bill as we’ve never seen him before, and the story of his early education in creativity and style.

**Fashion Climbing** begins with Bill’s childhood in an Irish suburb of Boston, where he secretly tried on his sister’s dresses and spent his evenings in the city’s chic boutiques. Bill dreamed of living a life dedicated to fashion, despite the fact that this desire was a source of shame to his family. After dropping out of Harvard at nineteen, Bill fought his parents tooth and nail for permission to come to
New York City: the land of freedom, glamour, and, above all, style.

When he arrived in New York, he reveled in people-watching. He spent his nights at opera openings and gate-crashing extravagant balls, where he would take note of the styles, watching how the gowns moved, how the jewels hung, how the hair lay on each head. This was his education, and the birth of the democratic and exuberant taste for which he became famous. After two style mavens—the women who eventually gave Jackie Kennedy her famous pink Chanel suit—took Bill under their wing, his creativity thrived. Adopting the alias William J.—because designing under his family's name would have been a disgrace to his parents—Bill became one of the era's most outlandish and celebrated hat designers, catering to movie stars, heiresses, and artists alike. His mission was to bring happiness to the world by making women an inspiration to themselves and everyone who saw them. These were halcyon days, when fashion was all he ate and drank.

Charming and immensely fun to read, Fashion Climbing is the story of a young man discovering who he is meant to be and a final gift to the devotees of one of New York's great characters. With an introduction from Hilton Als and never-before-published photographs from Bill's collection, "this wins," as Booklist said in their starred review.

About the Author: Iconic New York Times photographer Bill Cunningham was the creative force behind the columns On the Street and Evening Hours. Cunningham dropped out of Harvard and moved to New York City at nineteen, eventually starting his own hat design business under the name William J. His designs were featured in Vogue, the New Yorker, Harper's Bazaar, and Jet. While covering fashion for publications including Women's Wear Daily and the Chicago Tribune, he took up photography, which lead to his becoming a regular contributor to the New York Times

in the 1970s. Cunningham was the subject of the documentary Bill Cunningham, New York. His contributions to New York City were recognized in 2009 when he was designated a "living landmark."

Excerpt: I loved him without knowing how to love him. If you think of love as an activity—a purposeful, shared exchange—what could anyone who was lucky enough to be acquainted with Bill Cunningham, the late, legendary New York Times On the Street and Evening Hours style photographer, writer, former milliner, and all-around genial fashion genius, really offer him but one's self? I don't mean the self we reserve for our deepest intimacies, the body and soul that goes into life with another person. No, the Cunningham exchange was based on something else, was profound in a different way, and I think it had to do with what he inspired in you, what you wanted to give him the minute you saw him on the street, or in a gilded hall: a certain faith and pride in one's public persona—"the face that I face the world with, baby" as the fugitive star, the princess Kosmonopolis, has it in Tennessee Williams's Sweet Bird of Youth. Like the princess, Bill knew a great deal about surfaces; unlike the princess, though, he was never fatigued or undone by his search for that most elusive of sartorial qualities: style. You wanted to aid Bill in his quest for exceptional surfaces, to be beautifully dressed and interesting for him, because of the deep pleasure it gave him to notice something he had never seen before. Even if you were not the happy recipient of his interest—the subject of his camera's click click click and Bill's glorious toothy smile—there were very few things as pleasurable as watching his heart beat fast (you could see it behind his blue French worker's jacket!) as he saw another fascinating woman approach, making his day. That's just one of the things Bill Cunningham gave the world: his delight in the possibility of you. And you wanted to pull yourself together—to gather together the existential mess and bright spots called your "I"—the minute you saw Bill's skinny frame bent low near Bergdorf's on Fifth Avenue and Fifty-Seventh Street, his spot, capturing a heel, or chasing after a hemline, because here was your chance to show love to someone who lived to discover what you had made of yourself. His enthusiasm defined him from the first. It permeates this, his posthumous memoir, Fashion Climbing, which covers the years Bill worked in fashion before he picked up a camera. (He published only one book during his lifetime, 1978's Facades, which starred his old
friend, portraitist Editta Sherman, dressed in a number of period costumes Bill had collected over the years. He was not happy with the book but he was a perfectionist and anti-archival in his way of thinking, so how could a book satisfy his need to move forward, always? Fashion Climbing is, in many ways, his most unusual project. Of course at the end of his memoir he uses his story to help point the way toward fashion's future.)

As a preternaturally cheerful person, Bill seemed not to ever feel alone—after all, he had himself. Born to a middleclass Irish Catholic family in Depression-era Massachusetts, Bill was raised just outside Boston; as a little boy he loved fashion more than he longed for anything as unimaginative as social acceptance. He begins Fashion Climbing this way:

My first remembrance of fashion was the day my mother caught me parading around our middle-class Catholic home.... There I was, four years old, decked out in my sister's prettiest dress. Women's clothes were always much more stimulating to my imagination. That summer day, in 1933, as my back was pinned to the dining room wall, my eyes spattering tears all over the pink organdy full-skirted dress, my mother beat the hell out of me, and threatened every bone in my uninhibited body if I wore girls' clothes again.

A familiar queer story: being attacked for one's interest in being one's self. Still, there is no rancor when Bill says: "My dear parents gathered all their Bostonian reserve and decided the best cure was to hide me from any artistic or fashionable life." But this was not possible. He would be himself, despite the pain. After he found work as a youth in a high-end department store in Boston, there was no stopping him, really, and no turning back. After Boston, the move to Manhattan where he lives for a time with more disappointed relatives, secures a job at Bonwit's, and designs his first hats. The startling optimism of his outlook! In 1950, when he was twenty-one, he was inducted into the army. "At first I was heartbroken at the thought of giving up all the years of hard work," he writes, "but I never had a mind that dwelled on the bad. I always believed that good came from every situation." He would love despite the cruelty he had been given.

It's like watching a movie—Bill post-Bonwit's, working as a janitor in a town house in exchange for a room to show his hats. The other residents are straight out of Truman Capote's Breakfast at Tiffany's and still, despite the mayhem—there's even a flood—Bill presses on, and presses against our hearts because of his acceptance of others while maintaining very strict standards for himself. Living on a scoop or two of Ovaltine a day when things just weren't happening financially, he fed on fashion and beauty; there was no shortage of it in all those glistening store windows advertising so much that's been forgotten. I don't think it's too much to compare Bill to the Catholic art collectors John and Dominique de Menil, who regarded their commitment to beauty and supporting artists as a spiritual practice, a form of attention that was a kind of loving discipline: you could love God through his creators and their creations. There's a nearly unbearable moment in the 2010 documentary Bill Cunningham New York when Bill is asked about his faith—his Catholicism. It's the only time he turns away from the camera; his body folds in on itself. I turned away from the screen in that moment, just as, when Bill was the smiling recipient of the Council of Fashion Designers of America's Media Award in Honor of Eugenia Sheppard in 1993—he collected the award on his bicycle perch, of course—I turned away, too: How could such goodness be possible? In the world of fashion? Such tenderness—it would kill you and Bill if he didn't have an essential toughness, too, a way of looking at fashion's transformative value, its ability to make and remake the spirit, without being sentimental about it, any of it.

Fashion Climbing more or less closes with his realization that hats are going out of style and the originality he ultimately achieved as a milliner is to no end because by 1964 who wears a hat? "Constant change is the breath of fashion." Bill proves, in Fashion Climbing, that having a fashion personality is distinct from being a person who's interested in style, and how style grows out of the kind of self that turns the glass of fashion to the wall. (As writer Kennedy Fraser observed, style is fashion's "anarchic" cousin who refuses to play by the rules.) Toward the close of Fashion Climbing, Bill writes: "The wearing of clothes at the proper place
and time is so important." That's because they tell a story—not only about the wearer, but also about her time. How dare one not pay attention to the world one lived in, a world filled with the gorgeous tragedy of what is happening now, never to be repeated. For the fashionable minded (Bill never liked ladies in "borrowed dresses," he said) and other followers of the herd, Bill offers a kind of prayer:

Let's hope the fashion world never stops creating for those few who stimulate the imaginations of creative designers, and on wearing their flights of fancy, bring fashion into a living art. There's only one rule in fashion that you should remember, whether you're a client or a designer: when you feel you know everything, and have captured the spirit of today's fashion, that's the very instant to stand everything you have learned upside down and discover new ways in using the old formulas for the spirit of today.

The light that lit Bill from within—his heart light—was that of a person who couldn't believe his good fortune: he was alive. And I'm sure Bill knew that part of the privilege of life is our ability to have hope, that which is the backbone of all days. 

A Politically Incorrect Feminist: Creating a Movement with Bitches, Lunatics, Dykes, Prodigies, Warriors, and Wonder Women by Phyllis Chesler [St. Martin's Press, 9781250094421]

A powerful and revealing memoir about the pioneers of modern-day feminism Phyllis Chesler was a pioneer of Second Wave Feminism. Chesler and the women who came out swinging between 1972-1975 integrated the want ads, brought class action lawsuits on behalf of economic discrimination, opened rape crisis lines and shelters for battered women, held marches and sit-ins for abortion and equal rights, famously took over offices and buildings, and pioneered high profile Speak-outs. They began the first-ever national and international public conversations about birth control and abortion, sexual harassment, violence against women, female orgasm, and a woman's right to kill in self-defense.

Now, Chesler has juicy stories to tell. The feminist movement has changed over the years, but Chesler knew some of its first pioneers, including Gloria Steinem, Kate Millett, Flo Kennedy, and Andrea Dworkin. These women were fierce forces of nature, smoldering figures of sin and soul, rock stars and action heroes in real life. Some had been viewed as whores, witches, and madwomen, but were changing the world and becoming major players in history. In A Politically Incorrect Feminist, Chesler gets chatty while introducing the reader to some of feminism's major players and world-changers.

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Excerpt: I've written many books but never before have I written a book in this way. The chapters tumbled out all at once; I could barely keep up with them. Stories that belonged at the end of the book demanded my attention even as I was writing about something that took place much earlier.

This book happened just like second-wave feminism did: all at once.

The world had never seen anything like us, and we'd never seen anything like each other. We—who only yesterday had been viewed as cunts, whores, dykes, bitches, witches, and madwomen; we who had been second- and third-class citizens—had suddenly become players in history. The world would never be the same, and neither would we.

I was born on October 1, 1940, in Borough Park, Brooklyn, exactly ten months after my parents were married.

Like all firstborn Orthodox Jewish girls, I was supposed to be a boy.

In many ways I behaved like a boy. I refused to help my mother with the dishes, I played punchball and stickball and, soon enough, engaged in other kinds of games with boys. Although I was known as a brain, I was also an early-blooming outlaw. I ran away from home when I was five years old and got a job sweeping the floor in the barbershop across the street. The police found me and brought me home. Only boys, especially boys who wrote, did things like that. They hit the road, walked across America, drank, took drugs, had sex—lots of sex—led expatriate lives, joined the Navy. Nice Jewish girls—nice American girls—were not supposed to do such things. But some of us did.

I'm a quintessential American—the daughter and granddaughter of immigrants.

I'm a Jewish American, heir to a treasured tradition of learning that has survived countless massacres, exiles, and genocides.

I'm a child of the working poor, a "daughter of earth."

America—and the moment in history at which I was born—meant that I received a first-rate education. Such luck—and hard work—may explain how I became a professor of psychology and women's studies, the author of seventeen books, and a feminist leader.

On my father's side, I'm a first-generation American.

I know that my father, Leon, was born in 1912 in Ukraine. He was a child survivor of World War I, the Russian Revolution, a civil war, and pogroms. He never once mentioned any of this. Nothing this important was ever openly discussed. How can I ever piece together his story?

My father named me after the mother he barely knew—my Yiddish name is Perel (Pearl)—a woman hacked to death by Cossacks in her tea shop when my father was only an infant.

My mother was the only member of her family who was born in America—her parents and sisters were born in Poland.

My grandparents never learned to speak English; my mother remained their translator and only caregiver until they died.

I wrote the first draft of this book as if it were a mural. Every day you could find me perched on my stool as I checked memory against diaries, correspondence, scrapbooks. I could spend weeks reworking a small detail in one corner of the canvas.

I was everywhere at the same time, all over my feminist life: writing about patriarchy in Kabul in 1961; attending a National Organization for Women meeting in 1967; cofounding the Association for Women in Psychology in 1969; demanding a million dollars in reparations for women from the American Psychological Association and pioneering one of the first women's studies courses in 1970; delivering a keynote speech at the first radical feminist conference on rape in 1971; publishing Women and Madness in 1972.

We pioneers emerged between 1963 and 1973 and took ideas seriously. Some of us were geniuses. Many of us were dangerously intelligent, and most of us were radical thinkers. We did not all think alike. We were champion hairsplitters and disagreed with each other with searing passion.
In our midst was the usual assortment of scoundrels, sadists, bullies, con artists, liars, loners, and incompetents, not to mention the high-functioning psychopaths, schizophrenics, manic depressives, and suicide artists.

I loved them all.

I even began to love myself.

Without a feminist movement I would have had a career but not necessarily a calling; I still would have written my books, but they would have had much smaller audiences and far less impact.

We knew nothing—absolutely nothing—about our American and European feminist foremothers, even less about non-Western women, including feminists. In Women of Ideas and What Men Have Done to Them (1982), the divine Australian scholar Dale Spender documented how the most remarkable feminist work had been systematically disappeared again and again.

Few of us knew that feminists before us had battled for women’s rights in the Western world in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. Feminists had opposed sex slavery, wage slavery, marriage, organized religion, and the absence of women’s legal, economic, educational, and political rights. Their writings were brilliant and fiery—but unknown to each successive generation.

Each generation of feminists had to reinvent the wheel.

Within ten to fifteen years, books by the best minds of my feminist generation were out of print. Within fifteen to twenty years, university professors and their students were largely unfamiliar with most of our work. They took for granted, or regarded as hopelessly old-fashioned, the grueling lawsuits we had brought and our brave activism—if, indeed, they remembered what we had done at all.

In our own lifetimes we became our suffragist grandmothers and shared their dusty, forgotten fate.

But I remember us as we were, and how we will always be: politically and sexually daring, vivid, vivacious, incredibly vibrant.

Some feminists whose ideas inspired me the most may be unknown to you; this is precisely Dale Spender’s point.

I hope that what I’ve written here will draw you closer to their work, that you’ll seek it out and come to know it.

I’ve been close to most of our feminist visionaries and icons. What I’ve written may make you laugh, but it may also shock you. Our feminist pioneers were only mortal; they were as flawed as anyone else—save in their work, which was both extraordinary and overinflated.

First, we formed a civil rights organization for women: the National Organization for Women, which brought class-action lawsuits and demonstrated against women’s legal, reproductive, political, and economic inequality. For the second time in the twentieth century, women (and some men) crusaded for women’s rights, this time by focusing on hundreds of issues, not only one issue, the vote.

Then we picketed, marched, protested, sat in, and famously took over offices and buildings; helped women obtain illegal abortions; joined consciousness-raising groups; learned about orgasms; condemned incest, rape, sexual harassment, and domestic violence; organized speakouts, crisis hotlines, and shelters for battered women; and came out as lesbians.

Finally, we implemented feminist ideas within our professions and so began a process of transformation that continues to this day.

These were the three mighty tributaries of the second wave. I swam in all three.

Soon, large numbers of women began to integrate previously all-male bastions of power. We became artists, astronauts, business executives, CEOs, clergy, college presidents, composers, construction workers, electricians, firefighters, journalists, judges, lawyers, midlevel managers, physicians, pilots, police officers, politicians, professors, scientists, small-business owners, and soldiers.

Radical feminist ideas and activism were a bit like LSD. So many women became high at the same time that suddenly the world became
psychedelically clear, and all the Lost Girls found ourselves and each other.

This was the first time in my life that I experienced female solidarity based on ideas—and it was wondrous.

And yet.

I had such an idealized view of feminism and feminists that when I began to encounter incomprehensibly vicious behavior among feminist leaders, I was stunned, blindsided.

I had expected so much of other feminists, far too much—perhaps we all did—that when we failed to meet our own high standards, many of us felt betrayed.

And then, when we were really betrayed—slandered, shunned by everyone we knew, our ideas stolen, our authorship denied, our history revised—we had no name for what was happening.

Eventually, we called some of this "trashing," and it drove away many a good feminist. It never stopped me—nothing ever did—but it took its toll.

This means that my greatest comfort and strength came from doing the work itself—and from knowing that the work touched, changed, and even saved women's lives.

This memoir isn't a history of second-wave feminism; it's not even a history of my most important feminist ideas and campaigns. This is the story of how a daughter of working-poor immigrants came into her own and helped illuminate the path for others.

Here I relate some memories from the war zone, stories that are important to me and that might be of interest to you.

This book isn't about the generations of feminists who succeeded us. Their stories belong to them.

Although I've been blessed in every way, my life has also been hard. Fighting for freedom—and for the right to be heard—is essential to me, but the price I've paid is all that I have. Isn't this always the case?

I was utterly naive and ill-prepared for the life I was destined to lead. Angels must have watched over me; I can offer no better explanation for why I survived and flourished.

For more than a half century I've been a soldier at war. I carry scars; all warriors do. Most of us were felled, daily, both by our opponents and friendly fire.

Despite everything, despite anything, I wouldn't have missed this revolution, not for love or money. I remain forever loyal to that moment in time, that collective awakening that set me free from my former life as a girl. Allow me to paraphrase the most memorable speech Shakespeare gave King Henry V:

[She] that outlives this day, and comes safe home ...
Then will [she] strip [her] sleeve and show [her] scars.
And say "These wounds I had...."
This story shall the good [woman] teach [her] children. ..
From this day to the ending of the world,
But we in it shall be remember'd;
We few, we happy few, we band of [sisters];
For [she] to-day that sheds [her] blood with me
Shall be my [sister]; be [she] ne'er so vile,
This day shall gentle [her] condition:
And [gentlewomen everywhere] now a-bed
Shall think themselves accursed they were not here,
And hold their [humanity] cheap whiles any speaks
That fought with us.... <>

The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age by David E. Sanger [Crown, 9780451497895]

In 2015, Russian hackers tunneled deep into the computer systems of the Democratic National Committee, and the subsequent leaks of the emails they stole may have changed the course of American democracy. But to see the DNC hacks as Trump-centric is to miss the bigger, more important story: Within that same year, the Russians not only had broken into networks at the White House, the State Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but had placed implants in American electrical and
nuclear plants that could give them the power to switch off vast swaths of the country. This was the culmination of a decade of escalating digital sabotage among the world’s powers, in which Americans became the collateral damage as China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia battled in cyberspace to undercut one another in daily just-short-of-war conflict.

The Perfect Weapon is the startling inside story of how the rise of cyberweapons transformed geopolitics like nothing since the invention of the atomic bomb. Cheap to acquire, easy to deny, and usable for a variety of malicious purposes—from crippling infrastructure to sowing discord and doubt—cyber is now the weapon of choice for democracies, dictators, and terrorists. Two presidents—Bush and Obama—drew first blood with Operation Olympic Games, which used malicious code to blow up Iran’s nuclear centrifuges, and yet America proved remarkably unprepared when its own weapons were stolen from its arsenal and, during President Trump’s first year, turned back on the US and its allies. The government was often paralyzed, unable to threaten the use of cyberweapons because America was so vulnerable to crippling attacks on its own networks of banks, utilities, and government agencies.

Moving from the White House Situation Room to the dens of Chinese government hackers to the boardrooms of Silicon Valley, New York Times national security correspondent David Sanger—who broke the story of Olympic Games in his previous book—reveals a world coming face-to-face with the perils of technological revolution. The Perfect Weapon is the dramatic story of how great and small powers alike slipped into a new era of constant sabotage, misinformation, and fear, in which everyone is a target.

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Excerpt: A year into Donald J. Trump’s presidency, his defense secretary, Jim Mattis, sent the new commander-in-chief a startling recommendation: with nations around the world threatening to use cyberweapons to bring down America’s power grids, cell-phone networks, and water supplies, Trump should declare he was ready to take extraordinary steps to protect the country. If any nation hit America’s critical infrastructure with a devastating strike, even a non-nuclear one, it should be forewarned that the United States might reach for a nuclear weapon in response.

Like most things in Washington, the recommendation leaked immediately. Many declared it a crazy idea, and wild overkill. While nations had turned their cyberweapons against each other dozens of times in recent years, no attack had yet been proven to cost a human life, at least directly. Not the American attacks on Iran’s and North Korea’s weapons programs; not the North Korean attacks on American banks, a famed Hollywood studio, and the British healthcare system; not the Russian attacks on Ukraine, Europe, and then the core of American democracy. That streak of luck was certain to end soon. But why would Donald Trump, or any of his successors, take the huge risk of escalating a cyberwar by going nuclear?

The Pentagon’s recommendation, it turned out, was the prelude to other proposals—delivered to a president who values toughness and “America First”—to use the nation’s powerful cyberweapons far more aggressively. But it was also a reminder of how quickly the fear of devastating cyberattacks has moved from the stuff of science fiction and Die Hard movies to the center of American defense strategy. Just over a decade before, in 2007, cyberattacks were missing entirely from the global “Threat Assessment” that
intelligence agencies prepare each year for Congress. Terrorism topped that list, along with other post-9/11 concerns. Now that hierarchy has been reversed: For several years a variety of cyber threats, ranging from a paralyzing strike on the nation’s cities to a sophisticated effort to undercut public confidence in its institutions, has appeared as the number one threat on the list. Not since the Soviets tested the Bomb in 1949 had the perception of threats facing the nation been revised so quickly. Yet Mattis, who had risen to four-star status in a career focused on the Middle East, feared that the two decades spent chasing al Qaeda and ISIS around the globe had distracted America from its most potent challenges.

"Great power competition—not terrorism—is now the primary focus of US national security," he said in early 2018. America's "competitive edge has eroded in every domain of warfare," including the newest one, "cyberspace." The nuclear strategy he handed Trump gave voice to an inchoate fear among many in the Pentagon that cyberattacks posed a threat unlike any other, and one we had completely failed to deter.

The irony is that the United States remains the world’s stealthiest, most skillful cyberpower, as the Iranians discovered when their centrifuges spun out of control and the North Koreans suspected as their missiles fell out of the sky. But the gap is closing. Cyberweapons are so cheap to develop and so easy to hide that they have proven irresistible. And American officials are discovering that in a world in which almost everything is connected—phones, cars, electrical grids, and satellites—everything can be disrupted, if not destroyed. For seventy years, the thinking inside the Pentagon was that only nations with nuclear weapons could threaten America’s existence. Now that assumption is in doubt.

In almost every classified Pentagon scenario for how a future confrontation with Russia and China, even Iran and North Korea, might play out, the adversary’s first strike against the United States would include a cyber barrage aimed at civilians. It would fry power grids, stop trains, silence cell phones, and overwhelm the Internet. In the worst-case scenarios, food and water would begin to run out; hospitals would turn people away. Separated from their electronics, and thus their connections, Americans would panic, or turn against one another.

The Pentagon is now planning for this scenario because it knows many of its own war plans open with similarly paralyzing cyberattacks against our adversaries, reflecting new strategies to try to win wars before a shot is fired. Glimpses of what this would look like have leaked out in recent years, partly thanks to Edward J. Snowden, partly because a mysterious group called the Shadow Brokers—suspected of close links to Russian intelligence—obtained terabytes of data containing many of the “tools” that the National Security Agency used to breach foreign computer networks. It didn’t take long for some of those stolen cyberweapons to be shot back at America and its allies, in attacks whose bizarre-sounding names, like WannaCry, suddenly appeared in the headlines every week.

Yet the secrecy surrounding these programs obscures most public debate about the wisdom of using them, or the risks inherent in losing control of them. The government’s silence about America’s new arsenal, and its implications, poses a sharp contrast to the first decades of the nuclear era. The horrific scenes of destruction at Hiroshima and Nagasaki not only seared the national psyche, but they made America’s destructive capabilities—and soon Russia’s and China’s—obvious and undeniable. Yet even while the government kept the details classified—how to build atomic weapons, where they are stored, and who has the authority to order their launch—America engaged in a decades-long political debate about when to threaten to use the Bomb and whether to ban it. Those arguments ended up in a very different place from where they began: in the 1950s the United States talked casually about dropping atomic weapons to end the Korean War; by the eighties there was a national consensus that the US would reach for nuclear weapons only if our national survival was at stake.

So far, there has been no equivalent debate about using cyber-weapons, even as their destructive power becomes more evident each year. The
weapons remain invisible, the attacks deniable, the results uncertain. Naturally secretive, intelligence officials and their military counterparts refuse to discuss the scope of America's cyber capabilities for fear of diminishing whatever narrow advantage the country retains over its adversaries.

The result is that the United States makes use of this incredibly powerful new weapon largely in secret, on a case-by-case basis, before we fully understand its consequences. Acts that the United States calls "cyber network exploitations" when conducted by American forces are often called "cyberattacks" when American citizens are the target. That word has come to encompass everything from disabling the grid, to manipulating an election, to worrying about that letter arriving in the mail warning that someone—maybe criminals, maybe the Chinese—just grabbed our credit cards, Social Security numbers, and medical histories, for the second or third time.

During the Cold War, national leaders understood that nuclear weapons had fundamentally changed the dynamics of national security, even if they disagreed on how to respond to the threat. Yet in the age of digital conflict, few have a handle on how this new revolution is reshaping global power. During his raucous 2016 presidential campaign, Trump told me in an interview that America was "so obsolete in cyber," ignoring, if he was aware of it, that the United States and Israel had deployed the most sophisticated cyberweapon in history against Iran. More concerning was the fact that he showed little understanding of the dynamics of the grinding, daily cyber conflict now under way—the short-of-war attacks that have become the new normal. His refusal to acknowledge Russia’s pernicious role in the 2016 election, for fear it would undercut his political legitimacy, only exacerbates the problem of formulating a national strategy. But the problem goes far beyond the Trump White House. After a decade of hearings in Congress, there is still little agreement on whether and when cyberstrikes constitute an act of war, an act of terrorism, mere espionage, or cyber-enabled vandalism. Technological change wildy outpaces the ability of politicians—and the citizens who have become the collateral damage in the daily combat of cyberspace—to understand what was happening, much less to devise a national response. Making matters worse, when Russia used social media to increase America's polarization in the 2016 election, the animus between tech companies and the US government—ignited by Snowden’s disclosures four years earlier—only deepened. Silicon Valley and Washington are now the equivalent of a divorced couple living on opposite coasts, exchanging snippy text messages.

Trump accepted Mattis’s nuclear recommendation without a moment of debate. Meanwhile the Pentagon, sensing Trump’s willingness to demonstrate overwhelming American force in cyberspace as in other military arenas, published a new strategy, envisioning an era of constant, low-level cyber conflict in which America’s newly minted cyber warriors would go deep behind enemy lines every day, attacking foreign computer servers before threats to the United States could materialize. The idea was classic preemption, updated for the cyber age, to "stop attacks before they penetrate our cyber defenses or impair our military forces." Other proposals suggested the president should no longer have to approve every cyber strike—any more than he would have to approve every drone strike.

In the chaos of the Trump White House, it was unclear how these weapons would be used, or under what rules. But suddenly we are in new territory.

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Cyber conflict remains in the gray area between war and peace, an uneasy equilibrium that often seems on the brink of spinning out of control. As the pace of attacks rises, our vulnerability becomes more apparent each day: in the opening months of 2018, the federal government warned utilities that Russian hackers had put “implants” of malware in the nation’s nuclear plants and power grid and then, a few weeks later, added that they were infesting the routers that control the networks of small enterprises and even individual homes. In previous years there has been similar evidence about Iranian hackers inside financial institutions and Chinese hackers siphoning off millions of files...
detailing the most intimate details of the lives of Americans seeking security clearances. But figuring out a proportionate yet effective response has now stymied three American presidents. The problem is made harder by the fact that America’s offensive cyber prowess has so outpaced our defense that officials hesitate to strike back.

"That was our problem with the Russians," James Clapper, President Obama’s director of national intelligence, told me one winter afternoon at a diner down the road from the CIA headquarters in McLean, Virginia. There were plenty of ideas about how to get back at Putin: unplug Russia from the world’s financial system; reveal Putin’s links to the oligarchs; make some of his own money—and there was plenty hidden around the world—disappear.

Yet, Clapper noted, "every time someone proposed a way to strike back at Putin for what he was doing in the election, someone else would come back and say, 'What happens next? What if he gets into the voting system?' "

Clapper’s question drives to the heart of one of the cyberpower conundrums. The United States can’t figure out how to counter Russian attacks without incurring a great risk of escalation. The problem can be paralyzing. Russia’s meddling in the election encapsulates the challenge of dealing with this new form of short-of-war aggression. Large and small powers have gradually discovered what a perfect digital weapon looks like. It is as stealthy as it is effective. It leaves opponents uncertain about where the attack came from, and thus where to fire back. And we struggle to figure out the best form of deterrence. Is it better to threaten an overwhelming counterstrike? A non-cyber response, from economic sanctions to using a nuclear weapon? Or to so harden our defenses—a project that would take decades—that enemies give up attacking?

Naturally, the first temptation of Washington policy makers is to compare the problem to something more familiar: defending the country against nuclear weapons. But the nuclear comparison is faulty, and as the cyber expert James Lewis has pointed out, the false analogy has kept us from accurately understanding how cyber plays into the daily geopolitical conflict.

Nuclear arms were designed solely for fighting and winning an overwhelming victory. "Mutually assured destruction" deterred nuclear exchanges because both sides understood they could be utterly destroyed. Cyberweapons, in contrast, come in many subtle shades, ranging from the highly destructive to the psychologically manipulative.

Until recently, Americans were fixated on the most destructive class of cyberweapons, the ones that could turn off a nation’s power or interfere with its nuclear command-and-control systems. That is a risk, but the extreme scenario, and perhaps the easier to defend against. Far more common is the daily use of cyberweapons against civilian targets to achieve a more specific mission—neutralizing a petrochemical plant in Saudi Arabia, melting down a steel mill in Germany, paralyzing a city government’s computer systems in Atlanta or Kiev, or threatening to manipulate the outcome of elections in the United States, France, or Germany. Such "dialed down" cyberweapons are now used by nations every day, not to destroy an adversary but rather to frustrate it, slow it, undermine its institutions, and leave its citizens angry or confused. And the weapons are almost always employed just below the threshold that would lead to retaliation.

Rob Joyce, Trump’s cyber czar for the first fifteen months of the administration and the first occupant of that office to have once run American offensive cyber operations, described in late 2017 why the United States is particularly vulnerable to these kinds of operations, and why our vulnerabilities won’t go away anytime soon.

"So much of the fabric of our society rests on the bedrock of our IT," said Joyce, who spent years running the Tailored Access Operations unit of the NSA, the elite operation charged with breaking into foreign computer networks. "We continue to digitize things; we store our wealth and treasure there; we run operations; we keep our secrets all in that cyber domain." In short, we are inventing new vulnerabilities faster than we are eliminating old ones.

Rarely in human history has a new weapon been adapted with such speed, customized to fit so many different tasks, and exploited by so many nations to reshape their influence on global events without
turning to outright war. Among the fastest adapters has been Putin’s Russia, which deserves credit as a master of the art form, though it is not the only practitioner. Moscow has shown the world how hybrid war works. The strategy is hardly a state secret: Valery Gerasimov, a Russian general, described the strategy in public, and then helped implement it in Ukraine, the country that has become a test-bed for techniques Russia later used against the United States and its allies. The Gerasimov doctrine combines old and new: Stalinist propaganda, magnified by the power of Twitter and Facebook, and backed up by brute force.

As the story told in this book makes clear, parts of the US government—and many other governments—saw all the signs that our chief adversaries were headed toward a new vector of attack. Yet the United States was remarkably slow to adapt to the new reality. We knew what the Russians had done in Estonia and Georgia a decade ago, the first time they used cyberattacks to help paralyze or confuse an opponent, and we saw what they later attempted from Ukraine to Europe, the testing grounds for cyberweapons of mass disruption and subtle influence. But an absence of imagination kept us from believing that the Russians would dare to leap the Atlantic and apply those same techniques to an election in the United States. And, like the Ukrainians, we took months, even years, to figure out what hit us.

Worse yet, once we began to grasp what happened, a military and intelligence community that prides itself on planning for every contingency had no playbook of ready responses. In early 2018, when asked by the Senate Armed Services Committee how the National Security Agency and US Cyber Command were dealing with the most naked use of cyberpower against American democratic institutions, Adm. Michael S. Rogers, then coming to the end of his term as commander of both organizations, admitted that neither President Obama nor President Trump had given him the authority to respond.

Putin, Rogers said, “has clearly come to the conclusion that there’s little price to pay here and that therefore ‘I can continue this activity.’” Russia was not alone in reaching this conclusion. Indeed, many adversaries used cyberweapons precisely because they believed them to be a way of undercutting the United States without triggering a direct military response. North Korea paid little price for attacking Sony or robbing central banks. China paid no price for stealing the most private personal details of about 21 million Americans.

The message to our adversaries around the world is clear: cyberweapons, in all their various forms, are uniquely designed to hit America’s softest targets. And because they rarely leave smoking ruins, Washington remains befuddled about how to answer all but the biggest and most blatant attacks.

Rogers told me as he began the job in 2014 that his number-one priority was to "establish some cost" for using cyberweapons against America. "If we don’t change the dynamic here," he added, "this is going to continue." He left office, in 2018, with the nation facing a far larger problem than when he began.

IN LATE JULY 1909, Wilbur and Orville Wright arrived in Washington to show off their Military Flyer. In the grainy pictures that have survived, Washington’s swamp creatures streamed across the bridges spanning the Potomac to see the show; even President William Howard Taft got into the act, though the Wright brothers were not about to take the risk of giving him a ride.

Not surprisingly, the army was fascinated by the potential of this wild invention. Generals imagined flying the craft over enemy lines, outflanking an oncoming force, and then sending the cavalry off to dispense with them. It wasn’t until three years later, in 1912, that someone thought of arming one of the new “observation aircraft” with a machine gun. Things both ramped up and spiraled down from there. A technology first imagined as a revolutionary means of transportation revolutionized war overnight. In 1913 there were fourteen military airplanes manufactured in the United States; five years later, with World War I raging, there were fourteen thousand.

And they were being used in ways the Wrights never imagined. The Red Baron shot down his first French aircraft in April 1916, over Verdun.
Dogfights became monthly, then weekly, then daily events. By World War II, Japanese Zeros were bombing Pearl Harbor and performing kamikaze raids on my father’s destroyer in the Pacific. (They missed, twice.) Thirty-six years after Orville’s first flights in front of President Taft, the Enola Gay banked over Hiroshima and changed the face of warfare forever, combining the reach of airpower and the destructive force of the world’s newest ultimate weapon.

In the cyber world today, we are somewhere around World War I. A decade ago there were three or four nations with effective cyber forces; now there are more than thirty. The production curve of weapons produced over the past ten years roughly follows the trajectory of military aircraft. The new weapon has been fired, many times, even if its effects are disputed. As of this writing, in early 2018, the best estimates suggest there have been upward of two hundred known state-on-state cyberattacks over the past decade or so—a figure that describes only those that have become public.

And, as in World War I, this glimpse into the future has led nations to arm up, fast. The United States was among the first, building “Cyber Mission Forces,” as they call them-133 teams, totaling more than 6,000 troops, were up and running by the end of 2017. While this book deals largely with the “Seven Sisters” of cyber conflict—the United States, Russia, China, Britain, Iran, Israel, and North Korea—nations from Vietnam to Mexico are emulating the effort. Many have started at home by testing their cyber capabilities against dissidents and political challengers. But no modern military can live without cyber capabilities, just as no nation could imagine, after 1918, living without airpower. And now, as then, it is impossible to imagine fully how dramatically this invention will alter the exercise of national power.

In 1957, with the world on the nuclear precipice, a young Harvard scholar named Henry Kissinger wrote Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. The book was an effort to explain to an anxious American public how the first use, a dozen years before, of a powerful new weapon whose implications we barely understood was fundamentally reordering power around the world.

One doesn’t have to endorse Kissinger’s conclusions in that book—especially his suggestion that the United States could fight and survive a limited nuclear war—to admire his understanding that after the invention of the Bomb, nothing could ever be the same. “A revolution cannot be mastered until it is understood,” he wrote. “The temptation is always to seek to integrate it into familiar doctrine: to deny a revolution is taking place.” It was time, he said, “to attempt an assessment of the technological revolution which we have witnessed in the past decade” and to understand how it affected everything we once thought we understood. The Cuban Missile Crisis erupted only five years later, the closest the world came in the Cold War to annihilation by miscalculation. That crisis was followed by the first efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons before they dictated our fate.

While most nuclear analogies do not translate well to the new world of cyber conflict, this one does: We all live in a state of fear of how our digital dependencies can be hijacked by nations that in the past decade have discovered a new way to pursue old struggles. We have learned that cyberweapons, like nuclear weapons, are a great leveler.

And we worry, with good reason, that within just a few years these weapons, merged with artificial intelligence, will act with such hyperspeed that escalatory attacks will take place before humans have the time—or good sense—to intervene. We keep digging for new technological solutions—bigger firewalls, better passwords, better detection systems—to build the equivalent of France’s Maginot Line. Adversaries do what Germany did: they keep finding ways around the wall.

Great powers and once-great powers, like China and Russia, are already thinking forward to a new era in which such walls pose no obstacle and cyber is used to win conflicts before they appear to start. They look at quantum computers and see a technology that could break any form of encryption and perhaps get into the command-and-control systems of America’s nuclear arsenal. They look at
bots that could not only replicate real people on Twitter but paralyze early-warning satellites. From the NSA headquarters at Fort Meade to the national laboratories that once created the atomic bomb, American scientists and engineers are struggling to maintain a lead. The challenge is to think about how to defend a civilian infrastructure that the United States government does not control, and private networks where companies and American citizens often don’t want their government lurking—even for the purpose of defending them.

What’s missing in these debates, at least so far, is any serious effort to design a geopolitical solution in addition to a technological one. In my national security reporting for the New York Times, I’ve often been struck by the absence of the kind of grand strategic debates surrounding cyber that dominated the first nuclear age. Partly that is because there are so many more players than there were during the Cold War. Partly it is because the United States is so politically divided. Partly it is because cyberweapons were created by the US intelligence apparatus, instinctively secretive institutions that always err on the side of over-classification and often argue that public discussion of how we might want to use or control these weapons imperils their utility.

Some of that secrecy is understandable. Vulnerabilities in computers and networks—the kind that allowed the United States to slow Iran’s nuclear progress, peer inside North Korea, and trace Russia’s role in the 2016 election—are fleeting. But there is a price for secrecy, and the United States has begun to pay that price. It is impossible to begin to negotiate norms of behavior in cyberspace until we too are willing to declare our capabilities and live within some limits. The United States, for example, would never support rules that banned cyber espionage. But it has also resisted rules prohibiting the placement of "implants" in foreign computer networks, which we also use in case the United States needs a way to bring those networks down. Yet we are horrified when we find Russian or Chinese implants in our power grid or our cell-phone systems.

"The key issue, in my opinion," says Jack Goldsmith, a Harvard law professor who served in George W. Bush’s Justice Department, "is the US government’s failure to look in the mirror."

On a summer day in 2017, I went to Connecticut to see Kissinger, who was then ninety-four, and asked him how this new age compared to what he grappled with in the Cold War. "It is far more complex," he said. "And over the long-term, it may be far more dangerous."

This book tells the story of how that complexity and danger are already reshaping our world, and explores whether we can remain masters of our own invention. <>

**Beautiful Country Burn Again: Democracy, Rebellion, and Revolution** by Ben Fountain [Ecco, 9780062688842]

In a sweeping work of reportage set over the course of 2016, New York Times bestselling author Ben Fountain recounts a surreal year of politics and an exploration of the third American existential crisis. Twice before in its history, the United States has been faced with a crisis so severe it was forced to reinvent itself in order to survive: first, the struggle over slavery, culminating in the Civil War, and the second, the Great Depression, which led to President Roosevelt’s New Deal and the establishment of America as a social-democratic state. In a sequence of essays that excavate the past while laying bare the political upheaval of 2016, Ben Fountain argues that the United States may be facing a third existential crisis, one that will require a “burning” of the old order as America attempts to remake itself.

**Beautiful Country Burn Again** narrates a shocking year in American politics, moving from the early days of the Iowa Caucus to the crystalizing moments of the Democratic and Republican national conventions, and culminating in the aftershocks of the weeks following election night. Along the way, Fountain probes deeply into history, illuminating the forces and watershed moments of the past that mirror and precipitated the present, from the hollowed-out notion of the American Dream, to Richard Nixon’s southern strategy, to our weaponized new conception of American
exceptionalism, to the cult of celebrity that gave rise to Donald Trump.

In an urgent and deeply incisive voice, Ben Fountain has fused history and the present day to paint a startling portrait of the state of our nation. Beautiful Country Burn Again is a searing indictment of how we came to this point, and where we may be headed.

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The Third Reinvention
2016 was the year all the crazy parts of America ran amok over the rest. Screens, memes, fake news, Twitter storms, Russian hackers, pussy grabbers, Hillary’s emails, war, the wall, the wolf call of the alt-right, “hand” size, lies upon lies upon lies and money-money-money—the more money, the more lies, is this politics’ iron rule—they all combined for a billion-dollar stink of an election. This wasn’t Demo-crats versus Republicans so much as the sad, psycotic, and vengeful in the national life producing a strange mutation, a creature comprised of degenerate political logic. The logic of this politics—the logic of the Frankenstein—requires ultimately that the monster turn on its maker. The logic doesn’t tell us who wins. That has to play out in the slog of daily gains and losses, but it would be hard to devise a more spectacular conflict than this high-functioning creature of American schizophrenia versus the very system that brought him to power.

To call Donald Trump a hypocrite insults the scale of the thing. Move far enough along the hypocritic spectrum and eventually you cross into schizophrenia, and nothing less than psychopathy serves to illustrate the magnitude of Trump’s achievement. In him we had a candidate who proffered family values at every turn, a man twice divorced, a tabloid-fodder serial adulterer and sexual trash-talker. “The least racist person you’ll ever meet,” he described himself, while animating his campaign with racist appeals so large and livid that neo-Nazis, the KKK, and the alt-right endorsed him in language evocative of second comings. After making his career as one of the most celebrated libertines of our time, he became a Bible quoter and toter on the campaign trail, this self-proclaimed business genius with a complicated history of bankruptcies, bailouts, welched debts, and dealings with mobsters. A draft dodger enamored of the military; macho tough-talker and finicky germophobe; champion of U.S. manufacturing, purveyor of signature-label clothing made overseas; and loud, proud patriot with a mysterious affinity for Vladimir Putin, one of America’s most dedicated foes. Trump the billionaire ran as a fire-breathing populist while offering nothing concrete or even coherent in terms of wages, unions, health care, or taxes that might benefit working people, though his tax plan promised huge benefits for the upper class.

None of this was hidden. The Trump disjunct flamed in plain sight for everyone to see, and he owned it with the coarse, loose-cannon style of the consummate New York asshole. All the stranger, then, that this star and symbol of big-city life should become the hero of the heartland, all those millions of wholesome acres of Bible Belts that truss the nation’s middle and nether regions. The guy from Sodom and Gomorrah was all right! His insults and
earthiness were received as authenticity: here at last was a man who would stick it to the elites after all these years of eating their shit, the snobby pieties about tolerance and diversity forced down your throat by the pinheads who'd figured it out for the rest of us. It was galling. It got you down on yourself. It made you touchy and weak where you used to be strong, then this badass comes along and puts it right out there every time he flaps his mouth, says all the things you wanted to say all these years as you lived in constant apology just for being who you are, diminished, depressed, bottled up, pissed off, a hundred fuck-yous a day muttered at Obama and his crowd, heavy weather from Washington all the days of the year. A miracle, the white man who says what he wants! Free, free at last!

This may be the most powerful medicine in politics, the leader who delivers a man to his natural self. To be acknowledged as you are, affirmed and blessed from above: one can imagine it as a spiritual experience. A profound burden is lifted. No more doubt, no dark loathings, only the certainty that you are good and on God’s side. Ecstasy isn’t out of the question. What greater thrill besides sex to be delivered to yourself, liberated from the bad opinion of your enemies? Something of that ecstasy could be heard at Trump’s rallies, "Build that wall!” and "Lock her up!” bellowed like Romans watching lions sink their teeth into Christian flesh.

"He tells it like it is." How often we heard him praised in those terms. "He says what a lot of people are thinking." Apparently so; many more than were willing to admit to the pollsters, though one wonders how strong white identity was to begin with, when the basic courtesy that’s the face of political correctness is viewed as a monstrous threat. If economic distress is offered as the socially acceptable reason for Trump’s election, the fact remains that many millions of his supporters voted against what seems to be their own economic interests. White women voted for him in spite of Hillary’s support of equal pay, along with a broad complementary agenda that promised help with the exhausting challenge—most of which falls on women—of juggling home life and job. Working- and middle-class whites voted for him despite his conventional enrich-the-rich policies (rant's against trade deals aside) that have, among the poor and working class especially, stunted wages, shortened life expectancy, driven up drug addiction and suicide rates, and made upward mobility the exception rather than the rule. Trump’s election seemed to be the triumph of identity politics—white identity politics—over economic interest.

Then again, maybe identity politics is economic. Maybe nothing less than hard-core economic realism explains Trump’s victory, a well-honed popular instinct for how money and race have always worked in America. It must be said that many millions of Americans implicitly, and not unreasonably, regard freedom as a finite thing: to the extent that any group, tribe, cohort has greater freedom, others must necessarily have less. Then there’s the corollary, which gets us closer to the crux: the less freedom you have, the more readily you’re subject to economic plunder. Put the two propositions together and you have what could be called the American anthropology, the two horns of a bloody dilemma on which the democratic experiment has balanced for 240 years. Profit proportionate to freedom; plunder correlative to subjugation. In practical terms, the organizing principle has most often turned on race and gender, the bondage of black men and women being the starkest example. It’s as plain as the numbers in the account books of a Cooper River rice plantation, race-based chattel slavery as the engine for tremendous wealth creation. Emancipation erased some $4 billion of capital from Southern slaveholders’ books. It also literally diminished these slaveholders’ freedom with respect to their former slaves; or, to shade it more finely, restricted their prerogative, their license, the field over which their free will could play. Forced labor, assault, theft, rape, torture, mutilation, murder, kidnapping, these were all within the accepted prerogative of slave owners, all mechanisms of control in a social structure organized for plunder on the industrial scale. The power—the prerogative—of literal life and death; a monopoly on freedom, if you will. American slaveholders enjoyed a scope of freedom that we associate these days with drug lords and Third World lunatic dictators.
The plunder continued in slightly less brutal form after Emancipation, but there was an even bigger game afoot, a more universal plunder with race still playing a pivotal role. Jay Gould, the nineteenth-century robber baron, offered a clue when he said, "I can hire one half of the working class to kill the other half." A startlingly frank approach to the politics of division, but Gould overstated the case. He didn’t have to hire anybody; thanks to America’s racist legacy, it’s easy to get the job done for free. Generations of political hacks have done quite well for themselves and their clients by salting the racial divide, the basic message going something like: Watch out, white people! Blacks are coming for your homes, your women, your jobs, your life! The move is so standard a part of the hack repertoire that it’s come down to us as a political term of art, "the Southern Strategy," - and for the past fifty years it’s worked to perfections in distracting the white working and middle classes from the huge plunder of wealth by society’s higher reaches.

But with the Great Recession of 2008, that snake oil started to lose some snap. The biggest wipeout of household wealth in eighty years got people’s attention; we’d been had, was the general feeling, a sentiment that the government was all too willing to confirm. The financial institutions that caused the crisis received billions in government loans and guarantees, dwarfing funds devoted to things that would help working people—unemployment benefits, mortgage relief, fiscal stimulus. The bankers continued to get huge bonuses; the big financial institutions got bigger; and for all the fraud and speculative flimflam that led to the crash, and despite numerous referrals to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution, only one midlevel investment banker went to jail. What the Tea Party and Occupy movements had in common was the rage of the little guy getting screwed right and left, though how we were getting it, and by whom, these essential questions were ripe for manipulation amid an angry, badly educated, highly propagandized public. Trump rode the rage by coupling easy-to-digest populist rhetoric—the system is rigged!—with bare-knuckle racism, the most reliable play in the American power-grab book. But after all the sound and fury of the most bizarre election in the country’s history, the equation hasn’t changed. Profit proportionate to freedom; plunder correlative to subjugation. Until the values in the equation change, it’s still a chump’s game.

Twice in its history the United States has had to reinvent itself in order to survive as a plausibly genuine constitutional democracy. In each case, the reinvention was compelled by the profoundest sort of crisis, and each case may be framed as a turning point in the long elaboration of certain words the country has looked to time and again to define itself. The words were there at the start, presented as "self-evident" truths in the Declaration of Independence. "All men are created equal." All men are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights." Among these rights—bestowed by no less an authority than the creator, thus sacred—are the rights to "life, liberty & the pursuit of happiness."

The Enlightenment philosopher, political genius, and slave owner Thomas Jefferson wrote these words; fair to say that he, too, had the American schizophrenia. But the moral potential was in the words, and a reasonable person could place the center of American history right there, in the contest for fulfillment of that potential. At no point has it ever been a sure thing, or even the common goal. Emancipation, the first reinvention, was brought about by the crisis of slavery. Were people of color to be included among the "men .. created equal." Were they to have dominion over their lives, their bodies, the profits of their labor. For four years the land literally burned with the question; either the country would be reinvented as a profoundly different social order—with a redistribution of freedom, in effect, a resetting of the values in the freedom-profits-plunder equation—or it would be broken in two. Some seventy years later the existential crisis of the Great Depression forced a second reinvention, and it would be broken in two. Some seventy years later the existential crisis of the Great Depression forced a second reinvention, and if "existential" reads as an overstatement, that’s because we’ve lost proper appreciation for the turmoil of the early 1930s. Had the country elected as president in 1932 some tragic mediocrity along the lines of a Franklin Pierce or a James Buchanan, it’s easy to imagine an antebellum or even Weimar-like drift toward civil war, a totalitarian
regime. Another literal burning. Instead we got Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal, his answer to the threat that unbridled industrial capitalism posed for democracy. Roosevelt articulated as no president had ever done before the link between freedom and profit, subjugation and plunder. Modern life, he asserted, threatened to trap working people in a new kind of bondage, a shell democracy that maintained the forms of political equality while abetting an economic system that denied the great mass of people meaningful agency over their lives. The early 1930s offered plenty of proof for Roosevelt’s proposition: the soup kitchens, migrant camps, hobo squats, and railroad yards, not to mention the National Mall in Washington, DC, during the months it was occupied by the Bonus Marchers, were teeming with slat-ribbed citizens who, it may be safely said, had lost meaningful agency over their lives. At the 1936 Democratic National Convention, Roosevelt made his case for a second term and the continuation of the New Deal:

The age of machinery, of railroads; of steam and electricity; the telegraph and the radio; mass production, mass distribution—all of these combined to bring forward a new civilization and with it a new problem for those who sought to remain free.

For out of this modern civilization economic royalists carved new dynasties. New kingdoms were built upon concentration of control over material things. Through new uses of corporations, banks, and securities, new machinery of industry and agriculture, of labor and capital—all undreamed of by the Fathers—the whole structure of modern life was impressed into this royal service...

The royalists of the economic order have conceded that political freedom was the business of the government, but they have maintained that economic slavery was nobody’s business. They granted that the government could protect the citizen in his right to vote, but they denied that the government could do anything to protect the citizen in his right to work and his right to live.

Today we stand committed to the proposition that freedom is no half-and-half affair. If the average citizen is guaranteed equal opportunity in the polling place, he must have equal opportunity in the market place.

The New Deal reinvented America for a second time—call it the second redistribution of freedom, a radical reset of the values in the freedom-profits-plunder equation. A reset as applied to whites, it must be noted. Powerful Southern legislators saw to it that blacks were largely excluded from the benefits of New Deal initiatives. All men created equal. Still not even close. The pursuit of happiness. So many forced to run that race on their knees. It would take the civil rights movement to jump-start that unfinished work, but the New Deal reinvention established a structure, a rough framework for equality that wouldn’t be seriously challenged until the Reagan era.

There’s a touch of the uncanny in all this. Roughly eighty years separate the Revolutionary period from Emancipation. A more or less equal span of time separates Emancipation from the New Deal—about the span of a reasonably long human life, and nearly the same run of years from the New Deal to the present. The long clock, coincidentally or not—historian mystics, dig it!—concurs with the palpable ripeness of our time, an era of insane economics where the top One Percent possesses wealth on the level of sultans and pre-Revolution French kings, while the middle and bottom struggle to manage such basic necessities as health care and educating their kids. This kind of imbalance screams that the freedom-profits-plunder equation is seriously skewed, and is just as seriously incompatible with a system of government that claims to be democratic. Overweening freedom for a few—or call it what you will, autonomy, license, prerogative, privilege—translates, as it always has, into plunder of the many, a state of affairs starkly opposed to Jefferson’s foundational principle of equality, and the guarantee of meaningful autonomy—those rights to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness—that by the same moral logic proceeds from equality.

"Economic tyranny," Franklin Roosevelt called it, the modern capitalist threat to equality of rights that he sought to counter with the New Deal, just as the abolitionist movement—and Abraham Lincoln, in
due course—sought to end that earlier form of legalized, race-based economic tyranny. There was reaction, of course. The bloodiest war in the country’s history was fought over racial tyranny, a bloodletting that continues to this day. The reaction to Roosevelt’s reinvention was confined to the political fringes for almost fifty years; it took Reagan to bring it into the mainstream, “the Reagan Revolution” some call it, the unbridling of market forces that carried distinct racial overtones, the conservative hostility toward government displaying special animus for government’s ongoing efforts to realize the promise of Emancipation.

The gross disparities not just of wealth but of opportunity—disparities that are even more pronounced for people of color—very arguably show that at this point in our history, the reaction is winning. Maybe it’s a sign that we’ve lost all sense of the trauma that led to the first two reinventions. We don’t remember, not in the visceral, experiential sense. The living memory of once-recent history has faded to abstraction; maybe this is the meaning of those eighty-year cycles of crisis and reinvention, that we have to live it all over again. And maybe nothing short of an existential crisis can trigger these profound acts of reinvention. Lincoln and Roosevelt had the vision and strength of will to lead the country out of two incarnations of hell. One wonders how close to hell we’ll have to come in our own time before a similarly drastic act of reinvention is attempted. Either it succeeds, as has happened twice in our history, or America becomes a democracy in name only, a sham sustained by the props and gestures of representative democracy, as fake as the soundstage of the cheesiest Hollywood movie.

Much of this book was written over the course of the 2016 presidential campaign. These essays attempt to bear witness to the events of an extraordinary election season, and to place those events in context, to decipher some meaning beyond the pileup of polls and speeches and news cycles. The scorched-earth tactics of the campaign, the wholesale retreat into fantasy, the daily outbreaks of absurd and disturbed behaviors, it seemed the only proper way to view these was as symptoms of tremendous stress. A fundamental break seemed to be building, a feeling that became more urgent with Trump’s run to the nomination and election. Whatever the trajectory of the forces and stresses in play, it seemed certain he would deepen and accelerate their trajectory.

So this book may be read as the record of a developing crisis, one drastic enough to raise the possibility of a third reinvention, which, if attempted, will inevitably meet with vigorous, perhaps violent, resistance from stakeholders in the current order. In facing the crises of their own times, Lincoln and Roosevelt urged the country to a larger sense of itself, a broadening of Jefferson’s principle of equality and what it means for humans to be truly free. The reinventions led by those two presidents can and should be viewed as moral actions, but they were supremely practical as well: the survival of the country as a genuine constitutional democracy was at stake. The beautiful country was burning: literally in the first instance, thankfully less so in the second. One wonders what manner of burning awaits us in the time of Trump.  

Award-winning journalist Sam Anderson’s long-awaited debut is a brilliant, kaleidoscopic narrative of Oklahoma City—a great American story of civics, basketball, and destiny. Oklahoma City was born from chaos. It was founded in a bizarre but momentous “Land Run” in 1889, when thousands of people lined up along the borders of Oklahoma Territory and rushed in at noon to stake their claims. Since then, it has been a city torn between the wild energy that drives its outsized ambitions, and the forces of order that seek sustainable progress. Nowhere was this dynamic better realized than in the drama of the Oklahoma City Thunder basketball team’s 2012-13 season, when the Thunder’s brilliant general manager, Sam Presti, ignited a firestorm by trading future superstar James Harden just days before the first game. Presti’s all-in gamble on “the
Process”—the patient, methodical management style that dictated the trade as the team’s best hope for long-term greatness—kicked off a pivotal year in the city’s history, one that would include pitched battles over urban planning, a series of cataclysmic tornadoes, and the frenzied hope that an NBA championship might finally deliver the glory of which the city had always dreamed.

Boom Town announces the arrival of an exciting literary voice. Sam Anderson, former book critic for New York magazine and now a staff writer at the New York Times magazine, unfolds an idiosyncratic mix of American history, sports reporting, urban studies, gonzo memoir, and much more to tell the strange but compelling story of an American city whose unique mix of geography and history make it a fascinating microcosm of the democratic experiment. Filled with characters ranging from NBA superstars Kevin Durant and Russell Westbrook; to Flaming Lips oddball frontman Wayne Coyne; to legendary Great Plains meteorologist Gary England; to Stanley Draper, Oklahoma City’s would-be Robert Moses; to civil rights activist Clara Luper; to the citizens and public servants who survived the notorious 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building, Boom Town offers a remarkable look at the urban tapestry woven from control and chaos, sports and civics.

Excerpt: Killer of the Killer
Red Kelley was the man who killed the man who killed Jesse James. That is: in 1892, ten years after Jesse James was shot in the back while dusting off a picture frame, Red Kelley hunted down his killer, Bob Ford, and shot him in the throat with a double-barreled shotgun. This did not happen in Oklahoma City—the famous events, the front-page news items, rarely ever do. It happened in Creede, a silver-mining boomtown in Colorado. Ford was running a saloon in a tent. Kelley walked in, said, "Hello, Bob," and shot Ford as soon as he turned around. He expected to be celebrated as a national hero for this—Jesse James, after all, was a legend whose righteousness had only grown and grown in the years since his death, and Bob Ford was (as the folk song says) a “dirty little coward.” Instead, Red Kelley was sentenced to ninety-nine years in prison. He did not get the star treatment he felt he deserved. Kelley was not a first-tier outlaw—one of those infamous, larger-than-life antiheroes who robbed the robber barons and blurred the boundaries between good and evil. He was not Billy the Kid or John Wesley Hardin or Ned Kelly or Smokin’ Royce Young. He was not Butch or Sundance or—obviously—Jesse James. Red Kelley was a D-list outlaw, very far down the folk-hero food chain. He was a vigilante vigilante, the backup to the backup.

Kelley ended up serving ten years of his sentence before he managed to get himself released. He left Colorado and headed down to Oklahoma City, where the outlaw action was rumored to be hot. It was 1904 by then, the start of a new century, and the Wild West was shrinking. Some vestige of it had survived, however, in Oklahoma. Oklahoma City was only fifteen years old and, after a brief lull, booming again. For a criminal, its red-light district was a safe haven of arson, murder, gambling, drunkenness, bribery, and prostitution. Shoot-outs could be enjoyed indoors or out. Around the time of Red Kelley’s arrival, a man called the Armless Wonder, whose arms were reportedly five and seven inches long, cocked his gun with his chin and shot a man who owed him money. There were riots so wild that whole buildings were left permanently infused with bullets. In a popular saloon, someone poured alcohol into a man’s boots and lit them on fire, burning his feet so badly they had to be amputated.

Red Kelley fit right in. He was angry, petty, and violent. He had big ears and about three mustaches’ worth of mustache. He skulked around Oklahoma City’s trouble spots wearing a long overcoat, even in hot weather, with a revolver in each of his front pockets. The tips of his mustache were so long and pointy they almost looked prehensile, like they might reach out and take things off store shelves. One day, in the course of his skulking, Kelley was stopped and questioned by the Oklahoma City police. They weren’t arresting him—they made no accusations, filed no charges, and allowed him to go freely on his way. But the questioning alone was enough to offend Red Kelley. He had been a lawman once, a deputy...
marshal in Colorado, not to mention the man who killed the man who killed motherfucking Jesse James, and he believed that he deserved more respect. This injustice would not stand. Kelley promised his underworld friends that he would take revenge, as soon as he possibly could, on the Oklahoma City police.

His opportunity came on the very next day, January 13, 1904. Officer Joe Burnett was patrolling a notorious strip of saloons and brothels when he happened to pass Kelley in the street. "Hi, Red," Burnett said. This—a friendly greeting from a passing policeman, in broad daylight—was more than Kelley was willing to endure. He drew his gun. The fight that ensued was both ridiculous and deadly, a rare combination. Officer Burnett grabbed Kelley's wrist and managed to hit him twice on the head with his club. Kelley fired wildly into the air. The two men wrestled to a stalemate. For fifteen minutes, they dragged each other down the street. It was a slow-motion death struggle. Kelley tried to yank his wrist free while Burnett hung on, literally, for his life. At some point, one of Kelley's friends came out of a saloon and shot at Burnett, but he missed and ran away. Kelley, in his desperation, started biting Burnett's ears. As he bit, he fired his gun so many times, so close to Burnett, that its explosions lit the policeman's clothes on fire. People gathered in the street to watch. Things were getting terrible. Kelley was biting actual chunks out of Burnett's ears. Burnett kept asking bystanders for help, shouting that he was a policeman. They just answered: How do we know for sure? You didn't really know such things, in 1904, in Oklahoma City.

The fight scraped on through the center of town. It ended up a full seventy-five feet from where it had started, in an empty lot. Burnett was smoldering and bleeding. Kelley was shooting and biting. They were a perfect balance of control and chaos. Uninterrupted, they might have fought each other until both died of natural causes. But then suddenly, by chance, the scales tipped. Across the street, the front door of a warehouse opened. A man stepped out. It happened to be one of Officer Burnett's friends. He sprinted over and grabbed Red Kelley by the wrist. "Is his gun empty?" he shouted. Kelley, defiant to the end, fired again and said, "Does it sound like it's empty?" Now that someone else had taken over the interminable duty of clinging to Red Kelley's murderous wrist, Burnett was finally able to draw his own gun. He fired. Boom. Kelley died in a gigantic pool of blood just off of First Street. This incident—along with many others more or less like it—titillated local newspaper readers for weeks. Oklahoma City police officer Joe Burnett was now the killer of the killer of the killer of Jesse James.

This book is a history of Oklahoma City. That may strike you as unnecessary, or unfortunate. If so, I would understand. In the larger economy of American attention, Oklahoma City's main job has always been to be ignored. When non-Oklahomans need to think about the place, we tend to fall back on clichés: tepees, wagon trains, the Dust Bowl, country music, college football, methamphetamine, radical anti-government politics. There is always, of course, the Broadway musical Oklahoma!, with its soaring anthems of Manifest Destiny. Every five or ten or twenty years, the world is forced to pay serious attention to Oklahoma because something terrible has happened there: a tornado or a bombing or an economic collapse. But then we go back to ignoring it. This is natural. We can't pay attention to everything. You have to know how to look past a place. And Oklahoma City, in the grand scheme of things, is a very easy place to look past.

This changed for me, very suddenly, in the summer of 2012, when I was sent to Oklahoma City on a magazine assignment: to write about the city's improbable new pro basketball team, the Thunder, which had evolved, with almost unbelievable speed, from a morally tainted laughingstock to one of the most powerful collections of talent in sports. That narrow assignment widened very fast. As soon as I got near Oklahoma City, I felt a mysterious inner needle beginning to vibrate—a needle that, in all of my journalistic wanderings, I had never noticed before. I wasn't sure what it measured, or if it measured anything at all. But there it was, moving.

For the next several years, I followed the vibrations of that needle wherever they happened to lead. That turned out to be all over Oklahoma City: to
rock concerts, house parties, a megachurch, an abandoned skyscraper, locker rooms full of seminaked men, the opening of a time capsule, the 2016 NBA Western Conference Finals, and a TV news station weather center in the middle of a deadly storm. I walked under some of the most beautiful skies I’ve ever seen—wide, blueberry cream—regions of stretching alien vastness—and under some of the most horrifying. I was lied to, cheerfully, dozens of times, often by people I came to consider friends. I got severe sunburns and blisters. For the first time in my life, I began to take seriously the occult power of the number 13. I sat shotgun, for days and days, while different Oklahomans drove me around the city saying wildly divergent things about exactly the same territory. I committed vandalism. I found myself formulating, over the course of many months, a question that seemed to be, on multiple levels, the key to the entire place: Is it possible to control an explosion?

The result is this book. From a distance, Oklahoma City looked like almost nothing. Up close, it turned out to be about almost everything. It became obvious immediately that the new basketball team was deeply entangled in every other aspect of the place—its politics, its history, its economics, its weather—and that this nexus of Oklahoma things was further inextricable from an even larger nexus: certain fundamental tensions in the DNA of democracy itself. Oklahoma City was like a laboratory for unavoidable American problems. What does an individual gain, and what do they lose, when they become assimilated into a group? How does something as messy as a mass of people ever organize itself into a functional system? Or is it always ultimately destined to fail?

I have come to believe, after my time there, that Oklahoma City is one of the great weirdo cities of the world—as strange, in its way, as Venice or Dubai or Versailles or Pyongyang. It is worth paying attention to, on its own terms, independent of any news cycle, strictly for the improbability of what exists there, all the time, every day. It is a place where a golden geodesic dome sits down the street from a tiny building with a giant milk bottle on its roof, where a thin-shell concrete retrofuturistic church is known affectionately, to certain locals, as the City Titty. It is a place where a blacksmith once died of the hiccups. I’m not going to argue that Oklahoma City is an ideal city—not many people, outside of certain boosterish sections of the city itself, would be willing to go that far. But it’s the kind of city that, in its excesses, its imbalances, its illusions, its overcorrections, its lunges of pride and insecurity, its tragedies, and its improbable achievements, says something deeper about the nature of cities, about human togetherness, than a more well-rounded or traditional city ever could. It is an unlikely, unreasonable, and arbitrary place, a city that came into being outside of the normal run of history—and so, in a sense, a pure city. For the purposes of this book, and with apologies to Charleston, Austin, the Portlands, Fort Worth, Indianapolis, Chattanooga, Charlotte, Memphis, San Antonio, and of course Seattle (always special apologies to Seattle), Oklahoma City is the great minor city of America.

The main story of this book spans roughly one year in the life of Oklahoma City, from perhaps the most controversial trade in NBA history to the widest tornado ever recorded. Nesting inside that story are innumerable other stories, both famous (Ralph Ellison, Kevin Durant) and less so (civil rights leader Clara Luper, civic booster Stanley Draper, NBA bench player Daniel Orton). Because every Oklahoma City moment tends to be connected to every other, the narrative drops into and out of history. The city has existed for only a little over a single human life span—not yet 130 years—but in that time it has lived the life of many cities. From its very first moment, OKC has always wanted to hurry up—to exist, somehow, in its own glorious future. It has never been able to do so, of course. The future it hurls itself into is never the future it was fantasizing about. And so it hurls itself again. This makes the present feel like history. OKC is a place where time does not work properly: it crawls, then lurches forward, then piles up on itself, then pauses, then slides backward, then repeats itself, then freezes, then stumbles forward again. On the city’s very first afternoon, in 1889, its population exploded from zero to ten thousand. (“To leave a familiar locality for a few hours,” one settler wrote, “was to never find it again, so rapidly did the face
of the young city change.

In the twentieth century, the skyline froze for thirty years, then was largely destroyed—intentionally—in less than a decade. ("You can't operate in 1964 with buildings designed for 1925," the mayor told his people.) The city decided it needed to be bigger, so—for absolutely no good reason—it annexed enough land to make itself the largest city, by land area, in the entire world. Several years ago, a skyscraper rose up out of an old parking lot to dominate Oklahoma City seemingly overnight. What I'm telling you, what I will continue to tell you, is that time does not make sense here. Just outside city hall, a nine-foot-tall statue of a dead civic leader bears this inscription: LOOK AROUND YOU! WHAT YOU SEE TODAY WAS HIS TOMORROW ... YESTERDAY. If Red Kelley and Officer Burnett were to have their fight in Oklahoma City today, 114 years later, it would happen right in the heart of a very different downtown. The zone of sin and degeneracy in which Kelley first attacked Burnett was later cleared to build grand municipal buildings. Kelley and Burnett would have dragged each other, biting and fighting, along the back side of the Devon Tower, an 850-foot glass skyscraper that is the most literal possible monument to the city's grandiose self-image. They would have seen—on passing cars and plate-glass windows and the T-shirts of passersby—infinite logos of the Oklahoma City Thunder, the basketball team that has become the international face of the city. Bystanders to the modern brawl would not be cowboys and ruffians but city workers in suits and ties heading back from lunch meetings at which they had enjoyed scarlet quinoa with roasted carrots and local honey; joining them would be self-employed hipsters who'd spent the morning in the nearby coffee shops plotting political action and designing websites for one another, plus homeless people heading toward the bus station, plus possibly even tourists coming to see the bombing memorial before getting slightly drunk at the chain restaurants in Bricktown. Today, Kelley and Burnett would have wrestled over nice pavement instead of dust. They would have scraped their way past a large rack of bicycles, part of a municipal bike-rental program called Spokies. Their fight would have ended not in an empty lot but right in the middle of the new public library—a clean white curving building with an elaborately choreographed fountain outside. Instead of a warehouse, Officer Burnett's rescuer would have come running out of the county courthouse, a stately New Deal monolith with civic quotes carved onto its limestone face. (HE WHO HAS MOST ZEAL AND ABILITY TO PROMOTE PUBLIC FELICITY, LET HIM BE THE SERVANT OF THE PUBLIC.) Red Kelley's gigantic pool of blood would have gushed out of him and—as his eyes glazed over, as he considered for the last time the cruel injustices of justice—soaked into the public library's carpet, creating a nightmare for the cleaning staff.

Red Kelley's name, it turns out, was not even actually Red Kelley. It was Edward O'Kelley. People called him Red because of his Irish hair. After the fight, his body was buried in an unmarked grave far uptown, in what would eventually become Fairlawn Cemetery, the final resting place of many of OKC's most revered city fathers. Officer Joe Burnett, it was said, never fully recovered from his injuries. He died thirteen years later and was buried in the same cemetery. Today, this cemetery is not far uptown at all; it's a short, easy drive from the scene of the crime and is now adjacent to the fashionable Paseo Arts District, where you can go on art walks the first Friday of every month and patronize funky shops with decorative knight's armor and patchouli incense and earrings made out of glass-encased cicada wings, where you can stand in an art gallery eating cheese cubes, in an atmosphere of provincial cosmopolitanism, while admiring expressive paintings with titles like Life in the Harmonious Balance of Things Without Fear of Death, all while young people with dreadlocks dance in drum circles on the street outside, oblivious to your very existence, a closed society that involves only the drummers and the sacred all-encompassing universe itself, not any of the actual boring people around them, boom boom, transcendence, boom boom, patchouli, boom. Return with me, if you will, to Oklahoma City at the end of the summer of 2012, right around the moment everything was—once again, again—about to change. <>
Inspector Oldfield and the Black Hand Society: America’s Original Gangsters and the U.S. Postal Detective who Brought Them to Justice by William Oldfield and Victoria Bruce [Touchstone, 9781501171208]

The incredible true story of the US Post Office Inspector who took down the deadly Black Hand, a turn-of-the-century Italian-American secret society that preyed on immigrants across America’s industrial heartland—featuring fascinating and never-before-seen documents and photos from the Oldfield family’s private collection.

Before the emergence of prohibition-era gangsters like Al Capone and Lucky Luciano, there was the Black Hand: an early twentieth-century Sicilian-American crime ring that preyed on immigrants from the old country. In those days, the FBI was in its infancy, and local law enforcement were clueless against the dangers—most refused to believe that organized crime existed. Terrorized victims rarely spoke out, and the criminals ruled with terror—until Inspector Frank Oldfield came along.

In 1899, Oldfield became America’s 156th Post Office Inspector—joining the ranks of the most powerful federal law enforcement agents in the country. Based in Columbus, Ohio, the unconventional Oldfield brilliantly took down train robbers, murderers, and embezzlers from Ohio to New York to Maryland. Oldfield was finally able to penetrate the dreaded Black Hand when a tip-off put him onto the most epic investigation of his career, culminating in the 1909 capture of sixteen mafiosos in a case that spanned four states, two continents—and ended in the first international organized crime conviction in the country.

Hidden away by the Oldfield family for one hundred years and covered-up by rival factions in the early 20th century Post Office Department, this incredible true story out of America’s turn-of-the-century heartland will captivate all lovers of history and true crime.

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Excerpt: On the night of April 18, 1908, in the railroad town of Bellefontaine, Ohio, eighteen-year-old Charles Demar walked into the fruit shop he owned with his uncle, Salvatore Cira, and put a bullet into his uncle’s head. Salvatore’s body was discovered later that night by his wife among crates of bananas and apples spattered with his blood. When the police arrived, Mrs. Cira appeared not to understand them, or at least she pretended she didn’t speak English. This wasn’t surprising, as the police commonly ran into this problem with Italian immigrants who wanted nothing to do with law enforcement on any level. The most preyed-upon victims were completely unwilling to give police any leads, even if they’d personally seen a suspect commit a crime against a loved one.

It’s not that the Bellefontaine police lacked investigative skills. No law enforcement institution in the nation had been able to penetrate the crime-ridden neighborhoods across America that absorbed six million Italian immigrants in the last two decades of the 1800s. Increasingly in the papers, the gruesome crimes were credited to "Black Hand" criminals because of several recovered threat letters eerily penned by "La Mano Nera." Only after massive criminal activity in New York City’s Lower East Side began to bleed into surrounding neighborhoods did the NYPD form a group of five Italian-American police detectives. The "Italian Squad," under renowned detective Joe Petrosino, was having some luck by 1908 and making arrests for individual crimes, especially bombing incidents.
The Bellefontaine cops searched the premises of Demar’s Fruit Importers and collected as much evidence as they could. There was no sign of forced entry, and they found cash in a drawer untouched. What they did find on Cira’s body tipped them off to the idea that the murder was more sinister than a random killing. In the dead man’s pants pocket, there were two letters written in Italian. Knowing they had no chance of getting anywhere by interviewing friends or relatives of Cira, the cops were hopeful that the letters would lead to a break in the case. They also knew that their work was done, because the letters put the murder squarely under the jurisdiction of the United States Post Office Department and its prominent inspectors.

The Bellefontaine Police brought the letters in a secure pouch to the U.S. Post Office in Columbus. The enormous four-story federal building on Third and State Streets was the closest post office to Bellefontaine where a Post Office inspector was domiciled. There they found Inspector no. 156, Frank Oldfield, a diminutive man in a well-fitting suit, chomping away on a cigar. Oldfield pushed some papers and files aside and opened the letters. He made a quick visual scan of the documents with his magnifying glass. A satisfied smile appeared on his face.

Since arriving in Columbus in 1901, the forty-one-year-old Oldfield had become one of the most aggressive and successful Post Office inspectors in the service. He’d run down safecrackers, exposed a corruption ring between a U.S. congressman and the New York City assistant district attorney, and busted crooks on the railroads for robbing the mail. But there was nothing Oldfield wanted more than to “run to earth” what he believed was an international organized crime ring spanning America all the way to Palermo, Sicily: truly bad guys whose members called themselves The Black Hand Society.

Few people knew that U.S. Post Office inspectors were the country’s most powerful federal law enforcers at the time. Long before the FBI came into being, U.S. Post Office inspectors had jurisdiction all over the world. The presidentially appointed position gave a Post Office inspector authority to take over an investigation from any law enforcement agency in the country if the United States mails were used in any fashion. He could bust a crime ring anywhere on earth if one of the suspects so much as licked a U.S. postage stamp and sent a letter or package through the mail. Inspectors moved about on the railways where every train had a postal car, hopping on anywhere at a moment’s notice and flashing a silver badge in lieu of fare. They went with a vengeance after train robbers who grabbed pouches of cash and valuables in transit across the country, even on ships across the ocean. Inspectors had the legal authority to commandeer any vehicle they needed: a horse and buggy, a train—even a steamer ship—if it meant catching a crook. They dressed in plain clothes, carried concealed weapons, and worked mostly under the radar, using secret coded telegrams to update headquarters along the way.

But with all their incredible crime busts, not one Post Office inspector had yet had a single break into the crimes of the Black Hand Society. <>

**Flights** by Olga Tokarczuk, Translated by Jennifer Croft [Riverhead Books, 9780525534198]

Winner of The Man Booker International Prize

A visionary work of fiction by "A writer on the level of W. G. Sebald" (Annie Proulx)

"A magnificent writer." --Svetlana Alexievich, Nobel Prize-winning author of Secondhand Time

"A beautifully fragmented look at man’s longing for permanence.... Ambitious and complex." -- Washington Post

From the incomparably original Polish writer Olga Tokarczuk, **Flights** interweaves reflections on travel with an in-depth exploration of the human body, broaching life, death, motion, and migration. Chopin’s heart is carried back to Warsaw in secret by his adoring sister. A woman must return to her native Poland in order to poison her terminally ill high school sweetheart, and a young man slowly descends into madness when his wife and child mysteriously vanish during a vacation and just as suddenly reappear. Through these brilliantly imagined characters and stories, interwoven with
haunting, playful, and revelatory meditations, Flights explores what it means to be a traveler, a wanderer, a body in motion not only through space but through time. Where are you from? Where are you coming in from? Where are you going? we call to the traveler. Enchanting, unsettling, and wholly original, Flights is a master storyteller’s answer.

Excerpt: HERE I AM
I'm a few years old. I'm sitting on the windowsill, surrounded by strewn toys and toppled-over block towers and dolls with bulging eyes. It's dark in the house, and the air in the rooms slowly cools, dims. There’s no one else here; they’ve left, they’re gone, though you can still hear their voices dying down, that shuffling, the echoes of their footsteps, some distant laughter. Out the window the courtyard is empty. Darkness spreads softly from the sky, settling on everything like black dew.

The worst part is the stillness, visible, dense—a chilly dusk and the sodium-vapor lamps’ frail light already mired in darkness just a few feet from its source.

Nothing happens—the march of darkness halts at the door to the house, and all the clamor of fading falls silent, makes a thick skin like on hot milk cooling. The contours of the buildings against the backdrop of the sky stretch out into infinity, slowly lose their sharp angles, corners, edges. The dimming light takes the air with it—there's nothing left to breathe. Now the dark soaks into my skin. Sounds have curled up inside themselves, withdrawn their snail's eyes; the orchestra of the world has departed, vanishing into the park.

That evening is the limit of the world, and I’ve just happened upon it, by accident, while playing, not in search of anything. I’ve discovered it because I was left unsupervised for a bit. I realize I’ve fallen into a trap here now, realize I’m stuck. I'm a few years old, I'm sitting on the windowsill, and I'm looking out onto the chilled courtyard. The lights in the school’s kitchen are extinguished; everyone has left. All the doors are closed, the hatches down, shades lowered. I'd like to leave, but there's nowhere to go. My own presence is the only thing with a distinct outline now, an outline that quivers and undulates, and in so doing, hurts. And all of a sudden I know: there’s nothing for it now, here I am.

The World in Your Head
The first trip I ever took was across the fields, on foot. It took them a long time to notice I was gone, which meant I was able to make it quite some distance. I covered the whole park and even—going down dirt roads, through the corn and the damp meadows teeming with cowslip flowers, sectioned into squares by ditches—reached the river. Though of course the river was ubiquitous in that valley, soaking up under the ground cover and lapping at the fields.

Clambering up onto the embankment, I could see an undulating ribbon, a road that kept flowing outside of the frame, outside of the world. If you were lucky, you might catch sight of a boat there, one of those great flat boats gliding over the river in either direction, oblivious to the shores, to the trees, to the people who stand on the embankment, unreliable landmarks, perhaps, not worth remarking, just an audience to the boats’ own motion, so full of grace. I dreamed of working on a boat like that when I grew up—or even better, of becoming one of those boats.

It wasn’t a big river, only the Oder, but I, too, was little then. It had its place in the hierarchy of rivers, which I later checked on the maps—a minor one, but present, nonetheless, a kind of country viscountess at the court of the Amazon queen. But it was more than enough for me. It seemed enormous. It flowed as it liked, essentially unimpeded, prone to flooding, unpredictable.

Occasionally along the banks it would catch on some underwater obstacle, and eddies would develop. But the river flowed on, parading, concerned only with its hidden aims beyond the horizon, somewhere far off to the north. Your eyes couldn't keep focused on the water, which pulled your gaze along up past the horizon, so that you'd lose your balance.

To me, of course, the river paid no attention, caring only for itself, those changing, roving waters into which—as I later learned—you can never step twice.

Every year it charged a steep price to bear the weight of those boats—because each year someone drowned in the river, whether a child
taking a dip on a hot summer's day or some drunk who somehow wound up on the bridge and, in spite of the railing, still fell into the water. The search for the drowned always took place with great pomp and circumstance, with everyone in the vicinity waiting with bated breath. They'd bring in divers and army boats. According to adults' accounts we overheard, the recovered bodies were swollen and pale—the water had rinsed all the life out of them, blurring their facial features to such an extent that their loved ones would have a hard time identifying their corpses.

Standing there on the embankment, staring into the current, I realized that—in spite of all the risks involved—a thing in motion will always be better than a thing at rest; that change will always be a nobler thing than permanence; that that which is static will degenerate and decay, turn to ash, while that which is in motion is able to last for all eternity. From then on, the river was like a needle inserted into my formerly safe and stable surroundings, the landscape composed of the park, the greenhouses with their vegetables that grew in sad little rows, and the sidewalk with its concrete slabs where we would go to play hopscotch. This needle went all the way through, marking a vertical third dimension; so pierced, the landscape of my childhood world turned out to be nothing more than a toy made of rubber from which all the air was escaping, with a hiss.

My parents were not fully the settling kind. They moved from place to place, time and time again, until finally they paused for longer near a country school, far from any proper road or a train station. Then traveling simply became crossing the unplowed ridge between the furrows, going into the little town nearby, doing the shopping, filing paperwork at the district office. The hairdresser on the main square by the Town Hall was always the same, washed and bleached in vain because the clients' hair dye left stains like calligraphy, like Chinese characters. My mom would have her hair dyed, and my father would wait for her at the New Café, at one of the two little tables set up outside. He'd read the local paper, where the most interesting section was always the one with the police reports, gherkins and jam jars stolen out of cellars... 


Epigenetics upends natural selection and genetic mutation as the sole engines of evolution, and offers startling insights into our future heritable traits.

In the 1700s, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck first described epigenetics to explain the inheritance of acquired characteristics; however, his theory was supplanted in the 1800s by Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection through heritable genetic mutations. But natural selection could not adequately explain how rapidly species re-diversified and repopulated after mass extinctions. Now advances in the study of DNA and RNA have resurrected epigenetics, which can create radical physical and physiological changes in subsequent generations by the simple addition of a single small molecule, thus passing along a propensity for molecules to attach in the same places in the next generation.

Epigenetics is a complex process, but paleontologist and astrobiologist Peter Ward breaks it down for general readers, using the epigenetic paradigm to reexamine how the history of our species—from deep time to the outbreak of the Black Plague and into the present—has left its mark on our physiology, behavior, and intelligence. Most alarming are chapters about epigenetic changes we are undergoing now triggered by toxins, environmental pollutants, famine, poor nutrition, and overexposure to violence.

Lamarck's Revenge is an eye-opening and provocative exploration of how traits are inherited, and how outside influences drive what we pass along to our progeny.
Excerpt:

The Jurassic Park of Nevada

There is a scabrous mountainside in western Nevada that probably looks no different now than it did a century ago, when dusty miners hacked at the chaotically bedded rocks making up this geologically tarnished landscape. These last-chance men were looking for signs of metals in the sedimentary rocks, ores that were certainly not present when these strata were deposited as a shallow, tropical seabed between 225 and 190 million years ago. But millions of years later (yet still millions of years before the present time), the massive folding and compression of all of the North American Cordillera heaved these deeply buried strata and their enclosed fossils upward from their miles-deep grave, and amid that tectonic violence, cracks and crevices were produced in these rocks that were sometimes invaded by metal-rich fluids, rising from far deeper in the earth. These metalliferous fluids eventually turned to rock as well, but this time rock filled with gold, lead, and, most abundantly, silver. The result was the great discovery of the Comstock Lode and the announcement in 1859 followed by Eldorado Canyon, Austin, Eureka, and Pioche Mines, all discovered in the 1860s. The riches found here drew men from all over the globe, and the long-suffering women who followed them.

The Nevada miners searched for the telltales of silver-laced ore, that most precious of the state’s mineral treasures. The dappled pits and darker mine shafts perforating the landscape remain like random polka dots of black and white and attest to uncounted tons of rock removed one pickax blow (or dynamite explosion) at a time. But in spite of their fervor and toil, few of those miners found anything but misery, and by the early twentieth century the land was given back to nature. Yet now, a century after the Nevada silver rush, a new breed of miner has come, but with goals far different from a bonanza strike. The riches they seek are information and data from the nature of the fossil record of these rocks. One of the best sites for their search is also one of the deepest ravines cutting into this mountainous landscape. Long ago it was rather facetiously named New York Canyon.

There is little that invokes New York, the state or city. The only Great White Way comes from the white limestone that reflects the merciless, year-round Nevada sunshine. There is certainly no silver in these rocks—not in this particular canyon, anyway. But there is scientific gold instead, information that can help answer a long-running scientific mystery.

If Charles Darwin had known about the fossil record of New York Canyon, he would have hated it, because this fossil succession would have contradicted his theory that fossils should exist as an "insensibly graded series" of shapes demonstrating the slow change from one species to another. In fact, Darwin went to his grave knowing that in most cases fossil successions actually showed that the switch from one fossil species to another was not gradual at all. One kind of fossil species
was overlain by an entirely different one, already cut in whole cloth.

The modern searchers of these rocks in New York Canyon are specialists in the fossil record and have come to test Darwin’s theory, as well as to better understand one of the most consequential of all geobiological events, for the sedimentary record of this canyon and the surrounding regions gives evidence of one of the five largest of Earth’s past mass extinctions, events that were short-term annihilations of most kinds of life on Earth. Some come to see if there is anything about this ancient mass extinction that might yield wisdom about the Sixth Extinction, the one going on now. There is no disputing the fact that a gigantic mass extinction occurred throughout the world about 200 million years ago. But what happened soon after is the core of the mystery. In the time known as the Early Jurassic, a world emerged from catastrophe, a biologically bereft place with few species and few individuals of any life-form, save microbes. Darwinian theory cannot explain the fossil data. New species jumped from the graves of the old. How could mass death be followed by such rapid renewal of life? Deep in the canyons here, hundreds of individual layers are bare of any fossils at all. But further up the wall are some of the most spectacular fossils of all time: the coiled, chambered shells of ammonites, themselves descendants of, and looking like, the still-living pearly nautilus. Stratum by stratum, specimen by specimen, the beautiful ammonite fossils are collected, numbered, and then later scrutinized with the powerful twenty-first-century means of quantifying morphology and its change. Even with means of studying morphological change far more powerful than was available to Darwin, the appearance of these species still seems to have been sudden. The term amply describes the appearance of species diverse in shape, abundant in number, and decidedly deficient in any kind of fossilized ancestors. And it is not just here in Nevada that this apparently rapid flowering of entirely new species decorates the oldest rocks dated to the beginning of the Jurassic period.

At any global site with earliest Jurassic marine strata, the message is the same: New species appear with what seems like too much rapidity to be explained by current theory. This is a scientific problem not only for Darwin but for modern evolutionists, because the succession of fossils in these limestone canyons is inexplicable by Darwin’s great theory of evolution alone and thereby challenges one of the most robust of all scientific understandings.

The revolutionists attacking the scientific bedrock that Darwin built are “evolutionists” as well, but they come armed with a new set of theories, from a field known as epigenetics. Some call themselves “epigeneticists”; others invoke another name and call themselves neo-Lamarckians.

Darwin’s theory has undergone many modifications over the past 150 years. The “modern synthesis,” a name given to the current version of Darwinian evolutionary theory, added the twentieth-century discoveries from genetics, molecular biology, developmental biology, and paleontology, among others, into the current theory of evolution. In fact, it is not one single theory but can be thought of as a “scientific paradigm,” which is a collection of well-accepted theories. Other major scientific paradigms include the theories regarding relativity, quantum mechanics, and continental drift, each being composed of multiple interlocking theories combined into a whole. Like the others, evolutionary theory is entrenched and accepted. But on occasion, even seemingly irrefutable scientific principles and paradigms do falter because of revolutionary new discoveries that cannot be explained by the old theories.

The fossils from New York Canyon might turn out to be one of many lines of research helping to convince a conservative scientific establishment that evolutionary theory built only on Darwin’s foundation is incomplete. What is missing are important new concepts from the field of epigenetics.

To date, most discoveries adding to the science of epigenetics have come from modern biology, with little input from paleontology: It is rare indeed to find fossilized DNA where the marks left by epigenetic change are preserved. Yet epigenetics has a great deal to add to the overall understanding of the history of life, beginning with
the origin of the first living species itself, and then continuing as a significant driver of the diversification into the many millions of species aggregated into the major categories of life defined today.

There is also a relatively new contention that, just as the major events in the history of life have been affected by heretofore ignored or undiscovered epigenetic processes, so too has the social as well as biological history of our own species been greatly affected by epigenetic processes. Thus not just our evolutionary history; human cultural history has been affected by epigenetics as well.

The crux of epigenetic theory is that major environmental changes occurring during the life of an individual can cause heritable changes to that organism during its lifetime that can then be passed on to the next generations. As a result of substantial environmental change experienced by the organism, a possible consequence can be physical changes to the organism’s DNA and chromosomes. The environmental changes might be caused by chemical or other physical changes (such as loss or gain of oxygen and changes in temperature or water acidity or alkalinity, among so many others); by biological events, such as the onset of disease; or by new predators, loss of food sources, or many other factors. Humans are animals. War, famine, disease, domestic violence, drugs, cigarettes, or new kinds of chemicals in our food, water, air, agricultural fields—all of these can be the kinds of major environmental factors that can trigger genomic change by the addition of tiny molecules adhering to our DNA or through changes to the scaffolding holding the shapes of our DNA in ways that cause genes to turn on or off. And these are genes that would not have done this otherwise. Sometimes these changes happen only in a way that affects the organism in question. But sometimes they get passed on to future generations.

An increasing number of laboratory tests and experiments support the evolutionary pathway of “heritable” epigenetics: an event causing an organism to undergo a chemical change to its genome, usually (as noted above) through the attachments to DNA of tiny methyl molecules, each but a few atoms long. Yet when these seemingly insignificant hitchhikers plaster themselves onto a DNA molecule, changes in gene action can occur. Life-affecting chemicals coded by the genes of the organism might stop being made. Or new kinds of molecules might start being synthesized within a cell, chemicals that were not present before.

Darwinian theory posits that genes are fixed, that nothing an organism can do during its life can affect its evolutionary and genetic legacy. But an increasing number of experiments show that environmental change taking place during the life of an organism can change not only the recipient but its descendants as well, making these heritable, epigenetic events prime movers of evolutionary change. Furthermore, they can cause rapid evolutionary change—more rapid by far than the slow, gradual change that Darwin posited as being caused by infrequent, randomly produced mutations. The process is not a rival to evolutionary theory: The process of heritable epigenetics is an addition to evolutionary theory. As such, it provides profound explanations for interpreting the fossil record, but perhaps, also, for evolutionary changes that have been produced by seminal moments in human history.

The history of life is composed of long periods of mostly slow and gradual environmental change, or no change at all for one or more millennia, and often the conformity of environments is mimicked by many of the communities inhabiting these static environments, themselves undergoing little compositional change in the kinds and relative numbers of species. But then comes the temporally short but radical change in those seemingly “permanent” conditions, causing oceans to become poisonous, or broad inland branches of the world’s oceans to recede from formerly vast but shallow seas. Or far more rapid events, such as paroxysms of volcanism rapidly heating the atmosphere or, faster yet, the environmental effects of asteroid or comet impact. In similar fashion, human history seems to show analogous patterns, much as human warfare has been described for soldiers: long periods of boredom punctuated by short intervals of chaos, death, and destruction. A newer view is that both life on Earth, as well as human civilizations, have responded to these environmental catastrophes with evolutionary change far faster...
than during the calm periods, positing that sudden environmental stress to populations also stimulates epigenetic change in humans. For human civilizations, it is not the sudden change in oxygen levels or temperature, for instance, or a new kind of parasite or predator or competitor; it is the analogous events of war, famine, disease, and perhaps even religion that shake us and evolutionarily stir the pot of our species’ gene pool.

Looking Back
A staple of cinema, even from its earliest incarnations, has been the portrayal of the future and humanity’s place in it, either overtly or allegorically, and quite often that vision has been dystopias. For example, consider the polluted cityscapes portrayed in the 1982 film Blade Runner, where it is small mom-and-pop stores that produce organs and whole creatures synthetically, while larger corporations produce artificial humans, or "replicants." The twenty-first-century movie sequel continued visions of the environmental and technological future where a technological elite equipped with godlike powers of invention produces products that eventually turn on their inventors (just as they did in Blade Runner, in the many Jurassic Park movies, and most recently in the television series Westworld).

We are still a long way (if ever) from building Turing-tested AIs so "human" that neither they nor we can tell that they are artificial, or from bringing dinosaurs back to life from the long dead. Yet the distant future often has a tricky way of arriving sooner than is comfortable. In one sense a “far future” that was technologically impossible prior to this new century has indeed arrived. We are building the laboratories and instruments now bringing to life new kinds of organisms that evolution never produced, and using these tools to concoct a welter of genetically altered or grown-in-test-tube animals and plants. We are now fully capable of artificially producing humans with attributes making them more efficient killing machines than any brought to life by natural selection. Superorganisms. The means to build them comes from a theory first espoused almost a quarter of a millennium ago by the French naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, using a new term for that science: heritable epigenetics.

Beyond imagining what the future might hold, television and cinema have two prime motives: to make money for large corporations and to entertain the masses. Yet beyond all of our wishes to be entertained is a third role of big-budget screen entertainment: as a refuge from stress. There is a palpable sense of fear that the near future evokes, because never before has technology been so frightening to so many people. It is no longer simply the possibility of nuclear Armageddon that can keep children fearful in the night. Biology is now more threatening and at the same time more promising for our next generations. Designer soldiers can be faster, stronger, deadlier. Designer children can be smarter, healthier, more beautiful, more long-lived. Biology is the curse and the blessing, and as a main purveyor of our species’ emotions, cinema knows this. Now cinema is economically dominated by humans that are "super." Some are good, some are evil. All are more powerful than we "ordinary" (i.e., produced by evolution) members of Homo sapiens. They are also subtly portrayed as what we need to become to survive this increasingly violent, crowded, toxic world. And watching them on-screen can keep the nightmares at bay, at least in two-hour shots.

We want to be entertained, which is often synonymous with escape, because outside of the multiplex or our various screens at home as well as at work, the world is getting scarier. Going outside is more dangerous. Staying home is safer. Our screened world is the safest place of all for many of us. The screened world, be it in the multiplex, the home TV, the iPad, or the cell phone, is also a place where our species evolves culturally—and, according to many scientific seers, probably biologically as well. The average American spends a minimum of ten hours on one kind of screen or another each day. ‘Now the same movies can be delivered to us at the touch of a button, and that touch can serve as a means of isolating ourselves from the human community. Where once there were suits of armor to defend ourselves, now we are armed with cell phones, and this transition maybe rapidly evolving the human race.
Are our genes changing as fast as culture and technology? More important, does anything we experience during our lifetimes have any effect on our own genomes, our inherited genes, the information locked in our DNA that has been uniquely ours since birth? Based on Darwinian evolution, now called the "new synthesis," the answer is a reassuring and resounding "No!" It is an answer megaphoned by leading scientists who keep the flame of the Darwinian paradigm alive, and backed by the major scientific funding agencies. Yet epigenetics argues otherwise.

Darwin and his great theory have always seemed to give a grace note of safety: that our genes are impervious to change during our lifetimes. Biologically, this meant that no matter how badly you screw up via bad choices, such as the use of drugs, cigarettes, or alcohol, or exposure to toxins, violence, religion, or love, none of it will affect the genes you pass along to your children. Thus according to current evolutionary theory, events in our lives, both the good (achieving happiness, religious contentment) and the bad (acquiring post-traumatic stress disorder from exposure to inhuman violence, or having been abused as a child, or growing up near a factory releasing polychlorinated biphenyl [PCB]-like poisonous chemicals into the nearby environment), are meaningless to the children we might produce.2 Darwin gave us this solace: Nothing that happens in our lives can affect what we pass down to our children through heredity. The revolution that is epigenetics demonstrates that this is not true.

Charles Darwin espoused evolution as driven by natural selection. However, an earlier theory, proposed more than a half century before the first publication of Darwin's greatest work, came from a naturalist whose life and work were limned by the flames of the French Revolution.

Jean-Baptiste-Pierre-Antoine de Monet, Chevalier de Lamarck, had a different view about heredity and why animals changed through time. His scientific beliefs were that things that happen to us during our lives can change what we pass on to our next generation, and perhaps into even further generations. Darwin knew well what Lamarck theorized. Darwin believed that his own theories about evolution could not coexist with any aspect of what Lamarck postulated. We now know this is no longer the case.

Lamarck's Revenge looks anew at what are, perhaps, humanity's most basic questions: the "where," "when," and "why" of getting to the present-day biota on this planet. But the vehicle to do this is by asking specifically about the "how." What were the evolutionary mechanisms, the balance between Darwinian and neo-Lamarckian (aka heritable epigenetics), that produced not only our physical biology but some aspects of our heritable behavior as well?

Here are some possibilities. First, that the process known as epigenetics combined with periods of extraordinary environmental change has played a far greater role in what is called the "history of life" than is accepted by all but a small cadre of revolutionary biologists. This is perhaps most decisively shown through the epigenetic process of "lateral gene transfer," where on a given day, in a given minute, some organism is invaded by another and a product of that invasion is the incorporation of vast numbers of new genes, making the invaded creature something else again, neither the invader nor the invaded. This is known.

Second, new evidence points to a probable role of epigenetics in producing rapid species transitions by mechanisms other than lateral gene transfer. Science has discovered that major evolutionary change of a species can happen a thousand times faster by epigenetics than by the process demanded by the Darwinian theory of single, random mutations along a creature's genome or DNA (or, in some cases, RNA). This is most likely to occur during and immediately after rare, major environmental perturbations (such as mass extinctions and their aftermath).

Many scientists believe we are in such a period again, and that humanity itself is surrounded by genomes undergoing "epi-mutations," the extremely rapid change of genomes by the major epigenetic processes, themselves triggered by environmental crises during random day-to-day existence. It makes sense that we are not only surrounded by such change but that our own genes are equally malleable and now equally affected. In humans,
such crises work through the effects of our mammalian stress systems, which are coupled to human gut biomes. It has been our response to cancer-causing environmental toxins and our responses to war, famine, disease, and strident religion; to the poisons we eat; the poisons we hear on partisan media; the poisons we bear through racism, sexism, and any form of abuse, from child to spousal to bullying in general. Stress hurts us. Stress also changes us epigenetically. We evolve from stress, and we pass on new characteristics acquired during our lifetimes.

The many physical environments or habitats colonized by life are obviously not the same, with some being more rigorous than others. But in exploring many of the veritable libraries written about evolutionary theory, what seems to often be missing concerns the intersection of time and environment.

Yes, there are genuine paradises for Earth life, places like the rain forests and corals reefs so filled with the ingredients that support life that they are packed with species, and have been since the time of the first animals on Earth. At the opposite ends, in the most inhospitable places on land and in the greatest depths of the oceans, there are far fewer species. In similar fashion, some time periods have been more challenging to life than others, even in the most supportive of environments. There are good times and bad on Earth, and it is proposed here that that dichotomy has fueled a coupling of times when evolution has been mainly through Darwinian evolution and others when Lamarckian evolution has been dominant. Darwinian in good times, Lamarckian in bad, when bad can be defined as those times when our environments turn topsy-turvy, and do so quickly. When an asteroid hits the planet. When giant volcanic episodes create stagnant oceans.

There is far more to evolution than simple morphological or physiological change. Behavior—violence, religion, sexism, love, tolerance, racism, intolerance—can be hereditary in at least having the capability to change genomes. All of these might be changing our species. The balance of hormones in each of us is affected by our exterior experiences; all that we experience during our lives can affect the generations we contribute to. Lamarck first suggested this. That it is not just whether we survive our environment, but what our environment does to us. Now we know that this is indeed the case. Our DNA is changed not by subtraction or addition of new code, but by adding on tiny molecules that act like on-off switches. Genes that once worked no longer do. Genes that were switched off by natural selection get switched back on.

When a parent becomes a sexual predator. When our industrial output warms the world. When there are six billion humans and counting.

The history of humanity also has witnessed fluctuations in "environmental" conditions through time. Such stress might be quantified in some respects—theoretically, in the average level of stress hormones of a human at a given moment in time. Environmental changes range from the coming and going of the repetitive ice age advances of the last 2.5 million years to the times of global disease and pestilence, or global hunger, or global war, or even heightened level of violence. Have these ebbs and flows caused variance in the rate of evolutionary change of our own species by triggering rapid epigenetic evolution, compared to the more tranquil periods, when change—if it took place at all—was the slower, more Darwinian kind? What if we could take a sample of global human stress in the same way that paleontologists take a sample of global organismal diversity (number of species) and disparity (number of body plans) at some interval of geologic time? In this experiment we would compare stress levels continent by continent, race by race, gender by gender, age by age. What is the level of stress molecules in descendants of enslaved people or survivors of the Holocaust or genocide? What is the level of stress in the rich compared to the poor? Which groups are evolving more quickly at least partially by heritable epigenetics? And most important: If stress in our modern world is causing human evolutionary change, what are we evolving into?

These are uncomfortable questions. But comfort is not something science cares about. Scientists have actually posed these questions,' and by sampling both human and animal bones from the last several
millennia we can measure the level of epigenetic change for given times. Scientists in the emerging field of paleophysiology are searching the entire archaeological record, sampling the bones of man and beast in search of answers. How much epigenetic change will be visible from the extracted DNA? <>

 Amateur: A True Story About What Makes a Man by Thomas Page McBee [Scribner, 9781501168741]

 From an award-winning writer whose work bristles with “hard-won strength, insight, agility, and love” (Maggie Nelson), an exquisite and troubling narrative of masculinity, violence, and society.

 In this groundbreaking new book, the author, a trans man, trains to fight in a charity match at Madison Square Garden while struggling to untangle the vexed relationship between masculinity and violence. Through his experience boxing—learning to get hit, and to hit back; wrestling with the camaraderie of the gym; confronting the betrayals and strength of his own body—McBee examines the weight of male violence, the pervasiveness of gender stereotypes, and the limitations of conventional masculinity. A wide-ranging exploration of gender in our society, Amateur is ultimately a story of hope, as McBee traces a new way forward, a new kind of masculinity, inside the ring and outside of it.

 In this graceful, stunning, and uncompromising exploration of living, fighting, and healing, we gain insight into the stereotypes and shifting realities of masculinity today through the eyes of a new man.

 Excerpt: November 2015

 According to the laws of physics and USA Boxing, this wasn’t a fair fight. But there we were, two guys past our primes, circling each other in front of seventeen hundred drunk onlookers in Madison Square Garden, that hallowed hall of American boxing.

 Since July, I’d bled at the gums and screamed into pillows and almost quit. I’d failed. I’d temporarily, and to varying degrees, lost my mind, my hearing, and my friends. All so that a guy with seventeen pounds on me could beat bruises across my face, both of us a messy mosaic of blurred senses, damp armpits, hot lights, tangy throat, rubber-mouthguard bite marks, squeaky pivots, spangles of stars.

 All so that my fists could connect with his stomach, and his mine. It would hurt, the stinging price of knowing my body’s upper limits, but for now my muscles harmonized out their combinations as a meditative quiet sucked the cheers out of the stadium. I understood that we were both just sinew, and blood, and bone, and follicles, and decay.

 The truth was, I loved him even as I danced around him with my hands in the air. I was a new man, the first transgender man to fight in the most storied boxing venue on earth, there to close the gap between us like the fiction that it is.

 Why Am I Doing This?

 Why do men fight? What makes some of us want to get hit in the face? What makes others show up to watch?

 What makes a man?

 When I first began injecting testosterone, I was thirty years old and needed to become beautiful to myself. I clocked my becoming primarily in aesthetic terms: the T-shirt that now fit me, the graceful curl of a biceps, the glorious sprinkle of a beard. I loved the way men looked, and smelled, and held themselves. I loved their lank and bulk and ease, their straight-razor barbershop shaves, their chest-first centers of balance. I loved the quiet efficiency of the men’s restroom, the ineffable physical joy of running alongside my brother, the shadows we cut against the buildings we passed.

 I loved being a man in that I loved having a body.

 I had surgery to reconstruct my chest; I stuck a long needle into the meat of my thigh each week; I changed my name and my place in the world—all so I could quit hiding behind pulled-low baseball hats and rash guards, free to pull off my shirt and jump right into the waves.

 The joys I found at first were daily, simple, and rooted in the warm physicality of a new freedom—toweling off after a shower and catching a glimpse of my flat chest in a foggy mirror; the way clothes
suddenly fit my squarer shoulders and slimmer hips. The extra muscle mass that squared my walk, broadened my hands, my calves, my throat. I touched the dip of my abs, half-naked in the bathroom, and the muscle and skin synced in the mirror. I turned, and he turned. I smiled, and he smiled. I expanded, and so did he.

Stories about trans people, when we hear them at all, often end with such shining symbolism, meant to indicate that the man or woman in question has succeeded, in the transition, in the grand task of finally being themselves. Though that’s lovely, and even a little true, in the same way a pregnancy or a near-death experience can act on the body like gravity, reshaping our days and memories and even time around its impact—it isn’t where my story ends. Not even close.

I am a beginner, a man born at thirty, with a body that reveals a reality about being human that is rarely examined. Most of us experience gender conditioning so young—research shows it begins in infancy—that we misunderstand the relationship between nature and nurture, culture and biology, fitting in and being oneself. This book is an attempt to pull apart those strands. It also became, as I wrote it, a kind of personal insurance, a way to track and shape my own becoming in a culture where so many men are poisonous.

I too come from a long line of poisonous men.

***

As the testosterone took hold and reshaped my body, its impact as an object in space grew increasingly bewildering: the expectation that I not be afraid juxtaposed against the fear I inspired in a woman, alone on a dark street; the silencing effect of my voice in a meeting; the unearned presumption of my competence; my power; my potential.

I could feel myself forming in response to conference calls and tollbooth workers and first dates. I was like a plant in the sun, moving toward whatever was rewarded in me: aggression, ambition, fearlessness.

So I shrugged into men’s T-shirts, which suddenly and beautifully fit, trying to pretend that I wasn’t stuck between stations, the static giving way to errant pieces of concerning advice I picked up along the way, a mounting dissonance I pushed aside until an otherwise ordinary spring day when the troubling gap between my past life and my new body could no longer be ignored.

To the strangers nearby on Orchard Street, the scene must have seemed innocuous. I looked like any other Lower East Side white guy in his thirties: tattooed, skinny, in sneakers and sunglasses. But I was just four years on testosterone. My beard, complete with errant gray hairs, telegraphed a life I hadn’t yet fully lived.

Plus, my guard was down. I’d just left Jess, my new girlfriend, upstairs in my apartment, the promise of an empty evening spread out before us, and I was on my way to the bodega for ice cream when I clocked that the new restaurant with the beautiful front window had finally opened up next door. With a learned confidence I texted, “I’m taking you here tonight,” alongside a photo I snapped of the “modern British” spot, capturing—in the glarey bounce of my accidental flash—its impossibly cool new denizens, framed by that window in a soft and romantic light.

"Hey!" I looked up, catching the gooey spring light through the trees like a breath before going under, knowing, in the way of animals, that I’d surrendered my night to the big-bicepsed guy in a white T-shirt coming my way. "Are you taking a picture of my fucking car, man?" he shouted, his voice strangely hoarse.

I studied his approach, the moment expanding already into something bigger, people dumbly moving out of the way, gawking but not interfering. This was the third near scuffle I’d found myself in, in as many months. It was otherworldly the way an otherwise idyllic moment could suddenly tip toward violence. As he came into focus, I locked up with dread.

A queasy fear wavered through me.

The Before me wanted to run, as I had run from my stepfather as a child, this stranger and the man...
who’d raised me sharing, momentarily, the same scary, bald menace.

"Hey!" the stranger said. He had dark, wavy hair and a blurry mass of tattoos on his forearm, and the unkempt look of the newly divorced. He seemed drunk.

I intuited that he wanted attention, that he hoped to not only cause a scene, but to leave the exchange with black-eyed proof of it.

Men don’t run. The unwanted thought appeared in my brain, through the static. And so I heaved a great sigh and turned toward him because that’s what men do. I asked him in the lowest tone I could rumble “What in the fuck” he wanted. He pointed at a bright red Mercedes parked in front of the restaurant—the kind of car that looked like a dick. Sweat clung to his face, too much for the chilly afternoon. I took in the wildness in his eyes and was surprised to feel both scared of and sorry for him.

What would Mom say? Keep it in perspective. The voice was so precisely hers, it was as if she were really next to me. Thomas, she warned me, when I balled my fists. He looked haunted, I thought, relaxing my hands.

"I was taking a photo of the restaurant in front of your car," I tried, softening my tone a bit, breaking the rules of the scene. "I want to take my girlfriend on a date there." I remembered, at the last moment, not to add an upward lilt to the end of my thought. "I saw the flash!" he growled, beyond logic, a man committed to his part.

That was the worst of it, I realized. He couldn’t even see me.

I could be anyone.

"Men don’t hug," my uncle told me, extending his hand on a warm day a few years before. It was offered kindly, my new life a stream of unsolicited advice, a guide to the construction of a passable masculinity.

He wasn’t wrong. Jess was often the only person who touched me. It struck me that this unfriendly, unshaven man before me now needed human contact… <>

Autonomy: The Quest to Build the Driverless Car—And How It Will Reshape Our World by Lawrence D Burns and Christopher Shulgan [Ecco, 9780062661128]

An automotive and tech world insider investigates the quest to develop and perfect the driverless car—an innovation that promises to be the most disruptive change to our way of life since the smartphone

We stand on the brink of a technological revolution. Soon, few of us will own our own automobiles and instead will get around in driverless electric vehicles that we summon with the touch of an app. We will be liberated from driving, prevent over 90% of car crashes, provide freedom of mobility to the elderly and disabled, and decrease our dependence on fossil fuels.

Autonomy is the story of the maverick engineers and computer nerds who are creating the revolution. Longtime advisor to the Google Self-Driving Car team and former GM research and development chief Lawrence D. Burns provides the perfectly-timed history of how we arrived at this point, in a character-driven and heavily reported account of the unlikely thinkers who accomplished what billion-dollar automakers never dared.

Beginning with the way 9/11 spurred the U.S. government to set a million-dollar prize for a series of off-road robot races in the Mojave Desert up to the early 2016 stampede to develop driverless technology, Autonomy is a page-turner that represents a chronicle of the past, diagnosis of the present, and prediction of the future—the ultimate guide to understanding the driverless car and navigating the revolution it sparks.

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Excerpt:

The Quest Goes On
It ain't over till it's over. —YOGI BERRA

In October 2017, to coincide with the ten-year anniversary of its win at the DARPA Urban Challenge, Carnegie Mellon University invited the members of its self-driving-car teams back to Pittsburgh for a reunion. The event coincided with a series of panel discussions on the history, present and future of autonomous technology. Red Whittaker was kind enough to invite me to participate. It was a wonderful event, with a special reception held at Pittsburgh's beautiful Phipps Conservatory, and it represented for me, as well as people like Urmson and Salesky and all the others who attended, an opportunity to consider how far we'd all come.

One of the high points was Whittaker’s role as master of ceremonies at the reception, where the legendary robotics professor revealed that Spencer Spiker had solved the twelve-year-old mystery behind the engine trouble that caused Highlander to come in third in the 2005 DARPA Grand Challenge.

Just days before, Spiker had been crawling over the Humvee’s engine to clean it up and make sure it was ready to be displayed on campus during the reunion. His knee accidentally pressed against the electromagnetic interference filter, which reduced the static in the signal to the Humvee’s fuel injection system, and the engine died. That was strange, Spiker thought. Subsequent investigation revealed that the filter, which must have been damaged in the rollover, caused the engine’s unreliable operation. After the speech, Whittaker handed the filter over to Chris Urmson, who examined the device, which was a little smaller than a Rubik’s Cube. “This would have been a useful thing to know twelve years ago,” Urmson said. Then he looked up at the man who was his former thesis supervisor and grinned, “I don’t think I’d change anything, though. Things worked out pretty well for us all.”

That was my takeaway, too. Back in those days, as the races were happening and for years after, the technologists working on self-driving cars, as well as many of the other research projects that had the potential to reduce the waste in the auto industry and transform personal mobility, often exhibited a frustration that society, and the auto industry overall, was either unwilling or unable to understand what was possible. I was as guilty of feeling that frustration as anyone else, when, say, my R&D budget was cut, or the media didn’t get the point of a concept car.

I no longer feel that frustration. Nor, I imagine, do any of the engineers and computer scientists who gathered together in Pittsburgh that weekend. Because our predictions have been borne out. We exist in a world now that has changed a lot in just a decade—and will continue to change, just as most of us predicted, and hoped. These days Red Whittaker, who once felt as though he spent a significant amount of time battling with university administration to develop and test his robots, is feted on banners strung up around campus that read, “This one is for the revolutionaries!” And Whittaker absolutely remains a revolutionary; about to enter his eighth decade on the planet, he’s still pushing the bounds of what’s possible, as one of his many start-ups develops a robot to explore the surface of the moon.

More than seven years ago, when I first started working with the Chauffeur project, in 2011, I was struck by the engineering team’s dismissal of Detroit’s record of innovation. The Silicon Valley roboticists thought the auto industry was tradition-bound, and tired. Similarly, I was frustrated by Detroit’s hostility toward Chauffeur’s work.
Since then, the attitudes on both sides have changed. Now known as Waymo, the former Chauffeur team has come to respect Detroit—just as the auto industry that once derided their work has embraced a future of autonomous mobility on demand. The enmity that once characterized the relationship between Silicon Valley and Detroit has given way to a spirit of collaboration. I criticized my old company’s CEO, Mary Barra, for her proclamation that 2016 would be the year that Detroit "took on Silicon Valley." Barra would soon back down from the combative language. Her team at GM would establish a template for collaboration that would come to dominate the way the major automakers approached the problem of developing driverless mobility by outsourcing the R&D to Silicon Valley technologists. Barra’s company created that template with her March 2016 purchase of Cruise Automation. She further strengthened GM’s hand by fully engineering the Chevy Bolt EV so that Cruise’s self-driving system could be factory-installed equipment and built in high volume when ready. Barra’s strategy received a strong endorsement in May 2018 when Japan’s SoftBank Group announced a $2.25 billion investment in Cruise, one of the sector’s largest-ever deals, with particular significance given SoftBank’s reputation as a savvy player in the mobility space. The investment valued Cruise, originally purchased by GM for $581 million, at $11.5 billion—quite an appreciation. Less than a year later, Ford executive John Casesa was instrumental in the creation of that automaker’s self-driving start-up, Argo AI, led by Bryan Salesky after he left Google and joined up with his old thesis adviser, Pete Rander, formerly of Uber. Casesa now serves on Argo’s board. The Ford board of directors also demonstrated their commitment to the automaker’s new direction when it installed as company CEO the head of the Smart Mobility program, Jim Hackett.

Chris Urmson would arrange a similar deal after he left Chauffeur in August 2016 to become CEO of an autonomous vehicle company cofounded with Sterling Anderson, formerly of Tesla, and Drew Bagnall, formerly of Uber. Known as Aurora, and located in Palo Alto, the company would arrange its own collaborative deal with Volkswagen and Hyundai and announce in 2018 that it had to false positives, Uber had disabled emergency braking maneuvers and instead relied on its software to alert its human safety driver to take over operation of the SUV. Unfortunately, according to the NTSB, the safety driver didn’t react in time, apparently because she was distracted by the vehicle’s self-driving interface. She didn’t apply the brakes until after the impact. It was yet another dangerous situation created by the handoff problem: that is, the inability of a human operator to take over from the autonomous software. Uber halted its autonomous testing in the crash’s immediate aftermath.

It was another historical moment for autonomous vehicles, one that threatened to halt progress toward a wider mobility disruption, just as the Joshua Brown crash had. But then Waymo demonstrated its leadership with a remarkable series of announcements and public appearances; indeed, in the weeks after the Herzberg crash, Waymo was said to have conducted more media relations than it had during the previous nine years it had been known as the Google self-driving-car team.

The week after the Herzberg crash, Krafcik traveled to Las Vegas, where he made headlines when he told the National Automobile Dealers Association that the Waymo technology would have been able to properly handle incidents like the one that killed Elaine Herzberg. Days later, at the New York International Auto Show, Krafcik announced the company’s single biggest deal with an automaker—the commitment to incorporate up to 20,000 Jaguar I-PACE electric SUVs as part of the Waymo fleet by the end of 2020. Later deals, such as an agreement with Fiat Chrysler to purchase up to 62,000 Pacifica minivans, would exceed even these numbers, as Waymo executed its expansion strategy.

The announcements amounted to the most comprehensive description yet of the future that Waymo hoped to bring about. Rather than a disruptor of existing businesses, Waymo portrays itself as an enabler of future businesses. One way that’s happening? Through partnerships with such companies as Avis and AutoNation, who have committed to maintaining Waymo’s growing fleet.
According to Krafcik, these partnerships are working well and will help Waymo to scale its business at lower cost, leading to more people enjoying new forms of mobility.

Along with previously disclosed news—the company’s millions of miles driven, the fact that Waymo Chrysler Pacificas already were providing autonomous rides in Phoenix without any safety drivers behind the wheel—Krafcik and his company were demonstrating their unwavering commitment to bringing about an autonomous future. “We want to create a driver that never gets drunk, never gets tired, never gets distracted,” Krafcik said at one public appearance. Having launched the first driverless commercial transportation service in 2018 in Phoenix, Waymo soon will be providing a million trips per day with a tailored mobility service, meaning lots of different sizes and types of vehicle options. You’re taking a carload of kids to soccer practice? Use a Chrysler Pacifica. Going out to dinner? Use a Jaguar I-PACE. Taken together, the press appearances served to consolidate the company’s position as the clear leader in the self-driving space.

I continue to marvel at the unwavering commitment Larry Page and Sergey Brin have made to developing driverless vehicles. The stakeholders in the 130-year-old roadway transportation system, like auto, oil and insurance companies, would never have catalyzed the mobility revolution because they had too much vested in the current system. It took visionaries like Page and Brin, with their belief in the potential of digital technology, their passion for designing compelling experiences, their deep pockets to act on their aspirations and their commitment to make the world a better place, to kick-start the new age of automobility.

This last decade has been a learning process for everyone who works in this space. We’ve all grown. All changed our minds about one thing or another. How far we’ve come from those days in Victorville, at the DARPA Urban Challenge, when many of us figured that we could get this thing done—if only a single company would pony up the cash.

Well, lots of companies have ponied up a whole lot of cash, billions of it, in fact, and we’re nowhere near done. This thing is harder than it looks. On nearly every front—technological, societal, political—we’ve all realized the scale of the challenge is much bigger than any of us envisioned. No single company can do it alone.

And yet, the quest goes on. I do think it’s inevitable. My favorite symbol that this is happening came the same month as Krafcik’s announcement, when the ultimate car guy, Bob Lutz, the helicopter-flying, muscle-car-developing, cigar-chomping and climate-change-denying former vice chairman of General Motors, published an essay in Automotive News. "The era of the human-driven automobile, its repair facilities, its dealerships, the media surrounding it—all will be gone in 20 years," Lutz wrote. "The end state will be the fully autonomous module with no capability for the driver to exercise command."

I couldn’t believe it—Lutz, age eighty-five, the man at GM who tried countless times to cut the R&D budget I was spending to get us to exactly the future he described, had finally come around.

If that doesn’t mean the mobility disruption is inevitable, I don’t know what does.

Who is going to win?

Simply to ask that question is to misunderstand the scale of what’s happening, and I’m as guilty of that thinking as anyone. A previous iteration of this book’s subtitle was "The Race to Build the Driverless Car." A race being something with winners and losers. Sure, some people, and companies, will do better than others, and some will fare worse. To me, it’s hard to imagine a future that sees the major automakers with their market capitalizations in the tens of billions of dollars ever outright beating the technology companies, like Alphabet, Apple and Amazon, with values that bob in the middle hundred billions. But on some level, this is something that will improve so many things for so many people that I think it behooves us all to help to work toward it.

The mobility disruption will not affect everyone in the same way. As we’ve mentioned, for the elderly or those who live with disabilities, the prospect of liberated mobility likely will be overwhelmingly positive. Others, though, may lose their jobs as a
result of autonomous technologies, or due to the downsized economics of the automotive or oil sector. Many of these people will find work in mobility management, content creation for autonomous vehicle riders or the manufacturing of fuel cells or electric batteries. Remember, more than a century ago, plenty of people worked as blacksmiths providing horses with shoes—and years later, it turned out most of them navigated the automobile disruption just fine.

There's a lot of speculation about whether children born today will ever get their drivers' licenses. That's a good question. Some might, the way some children today still learn how to ride horseback. But I think by the time a child born today gets old enough to drive, the imperative to drive, for the freedom of it, will have dissolved. Freedom of mobility will exist for everyone, regardless of whether you're able to operate a motor vehicle. A future without human-driven cars will not be a utopia. Not by itself. Bear in mind how great the science-fiction writers depicted the Internet before anyone considered the medium might also produce Internet trolls, fake news and doxxing. Nevertheless, life will improve after the mobility disruption. When road rage is a thing of the past, and the labor changes have been sorted out, our cities will have rationalized themselves into more pleasant habitats, more appropriate for people, and many of the inconveniences that defined our daily routines will have evaporated.

I'm going to conclude with a joke, which happens to be a trademark of mine.

It starts like this: An old farmer is riding in a wagon towed by his old and nearly blind horse, Buddy. The farmer comes across a stranger whose car is stuck in a rut. The stranger asks the farmer if he would help pull the car out of the rut. The farmer says he will and hitches Buddy to the rear of the car. Then he starts yelling. "Pull, Ginger, pull!" he shouts, and nothing happens.

"Pull, Coco, pull!" he hollers, and again nothing happens.

"Pull, Daisy, pull!" he yells, and still—nothing.

Finally, the farmer cries as loudly as he can, "Pull, Buddy, pull!" And Buddy pulls the car out of the rut!

The stranger is very grateful—and then he asks the farmer why he called Buddy all those different names?

"Oh," the farmer replies, "Old Buddy can't see nuttin' and if he thought he was pullin' all by himself, he wouldn't even try."

I often felt like Buddy while I tried to pull the auto industry out of its 130-year-old rut. With one crucial difference: Buddy couldn't see too well and I can't hear too well. Many of us felt like we were pulling all by ourselves in those early years of developing these transformative technologies. But now, I think, we all realize how many people out there were pulling for the same thing.

Byron McCormick has been pulling since he graduated from Arizona State University in 1974. Robin Chase has been pulling since she conceived of Zipcar. Martin Eberhard and Marc Tarpenning have been pulling since they teamed up to launch Tesla. Tony Tether pulled hard when he led the DARPA challenges. And Red Whittaker, Sebastian Thrun, Chris Urmson, Bryan Salesky and many more pulled impressively as DARPA Challenge competitors.

Then came people like Elon Musk, Travis Kalanick and, most importantly of all, Larry Page, Sergey Brin and John Krafcik. They all started pulling with much more strength.

Looking back, I can't stop marveling at that moment in Victorville, California, after the DARPA Urban Challenge in 2007—when everything changed. That race set up the battle between incumbents and disruptors that will define the future of the auto industry—and personal mobility in general. At Detroit's darkest hour, you had these bold plays from Google, Tesla, Uber and Lyft. The timing's remarkable.

If we pull it off, and we will, we're going to take 1.3 million fatalities a year and cut them by 90 percent. We're going to eliminate oil dependence in transportation. We're going to erase the challenges of parking in cities. All that land will allow us to reshape downtowns. People who...
haven't been able to afford a car will be able to afford the sort of mobility only afforded to those with cars. And we’re going to slow climate change.

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The Age of Questions: Or, A First Attempt at an Aggregate History of the Eastern, Social, Woman, American, Jewish, Polish, Bullion, Tuberculosis, and Many Other Questions Over the Nineteenth Century, and Beyond by Holly Case [Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity, Princeton University Press, 9780691131153]

A groundbreaking history of the Big Questions that dominated the nineteenth century

In the early nineteenth century, a new age began: the age of questions. In the Eastern and Belgian questions, as much as in the slavery, worker, social, woman, and Jewish questions, contemporaries saw not interrogatives to be answered but problems to be solved. Alexis de Tocqueville, Victor Hugo, Karl Marx, Frederick Douglass, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Rosa Luxemburg, and Adolf Hitler were among the many who put their pens to the task. The Age of Questions asks how the question form arose, what trajectory it followed, and why it provoked such feverish excitement for over a century. Was there a family resemblance between questions? Have they disappeared, or are they on the rise again in our time?

In this pioneering book, Holly Case undertakes a stunningly original analysis, presenting, chapter by chapter, seven distinct arguments and frameworks for understanding the age. She considers whether it was marked by a progressive quest for emancipation (of women, slaves, Jews, laborers, and others); a steady, inexorable march toward genocide and the "Final Solution"; or a movement toward federation and the dissolution of boundaries. Or was it simply a farce, a false frenzy dreamed up by publicists eager to sell subscriptions? As the arguments clash, patterns emerge and sharpen until the age reveals its full and peculiar nature.

Turning convention on its head with meticulous and astonishingly broad scholarship, The Age of

Questions illuminates how patterns of thinking move history.

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This book was born of a question I could not answer. At a conference in 2008, I presented material from my first book, Between States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World War II. Paul Hanebrink, a great intellect and old friend, asked how the Transylvanian question related to others of the time, like the woman or the worker question. I was at a loss. Although I—like so many others—had written about questions myself, I had never considered whether there was a family resemblance between the mass of geopolitical, social, economic/material, and scholarly questions that proliferated during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. What were they? And why were there so many of them? When were they first framed as "questions," and why did they beg a solution rather than an answer?

So I began to seek out scholars and thinkers who had taken this path before me. With the partial exception of Fyodor Dostoevsky, I found no one who had contemplated questions as an aggregate phenomenon with a history of its own. There are many good reasons why this is the case. One is that scholars who work on a particular historical problem or within a particular region or methodology might only concern themselves with one or two questions. International historians might encounter the Eastern or the Polish, but not the woman or the tuberculosis question. Jewish historians will have thought extensively about the Jewish question. Regional historians will know their regional questions: Kansas, Transylvanian, Macedonian, Irish, et cetera. Marxist historians will know about the social and the worker questions; historians of nationalism about the nationality question; historians of slavery about the (anti-)slavery question, and so on. Occasionally someone will show, as I did in a chapter of my first book and Wendy Brown did much better in an article, the relationship between two questions.

Rarely someone will wonder when it was that a particular question was formulated as such.

On the whole, however, questions have been treated singly. The result is that historians—myself included—have viewed them very much as our protagonists did: defining them in accordance with our own criteria, assigning origins and a trajectory to them based on those criteria, and occasionally even offering "solutions" to them.

And yet there are many reasons why we may wish to take a broader view, especially in thinking about the extremely long nineteenth century (1770-1970). For one, questions were everywhere. From a spattering of references to the American and the Catholic questions in the mid-to-late eighteenth century, there followed a deluge in the nineteenth century. Thomas Malthus was among the pamphleteers to weigh in on the bullion question of the 1810s, and the Polish question was discussed at the Vienna Congress in 1814-1815, where Napoleonic Europe was dismantled, as were the Turkish and Spanish questions at the subsequent congress in Verona in 1822. Before long, a full-blown press brawl was underway over the best solutions to the Eastern, Belgian, woman, labour [worker], agrarian, and Jewish questions. These were folded into "larger" ones, like the European, nationality, and social questions, even as they competed for attention with countless "smaller"
ones, like the Kansas, Macedonian, Schleswig-Holstein, and cotton questions.

The nineteenth-century drive to settle or solve questions reveals something essential about them: they were construed as problems. The "question" had become an instrument of thought with special potency, structuring ideas about society, politics, and states, and influencing the range of actions considered possible and desirable. This potency is evident in another familiar formulation, one which nineteenth-century commentators arrived at quite early: the "definitive" or "final solution."

One effect of the Final Solution was that it appeared to break the ubiquity of the question idiom. In the decades that followed World War II, growing awareness of the Holocaust seemed to put an end to the heyday of questions. The formulation itself was presumed tainted. A few questions survived, emerged, or were periodically invoked: the Algerian, German, black, nuclear, gay, Israel/Palestine, and environmental questions, for example; in Turkey one can still speak of a Kurdish question, and even call it "the Eastern question." But for the most part questions have become the stuff of historical monographs or other forms of retrospective analysis. Nowadays we speak of "resolving issues" or "crises" in the international and domestic political spheres, or engage in scholarly or public "debates" on matters of culture, as opposed to "solving questions."

Perhaps this is why Vladimir Putin’s reference to the Ukrainian question in 2014 did not arouse much interest: we no longer live in an age of questions. And yet the New York Times has recently reported on the "French question"; the Scottish referendum and Brexit have reintroduced the "English," "Irish," and "Catalonian" questions; and the "migrant (refugee) question" now regularly haunts European headlines. Could it be that we are now on the cusp of another age of questions? If so, we might do well to consider what the first one wrought.

A Quest
The deepest roots of the word for "question" in Latin and Greek both contain the interrogative sense of question, and the question as problem. Yet they also conceal within them another meaning.

In Greek for question also means "that which is sought," and in Latin, quaero means not only "to ask" but also "to seek"; we find the word quest built into question.

Writing a history of the age of questions is appropriately a quest. It is a quest to find their origins and burial spots. An honest history of the age must reckon with the unlikelihood of definitively locating either. But sometimes when we go looking for one thing, we come upon something else. In my search for the origins and burial spots of questions, I came to see the structure of nineteenth- and twentieth-century social and political thought very differently. The chapters that follow seek to replicate the myriad ways of seeing that are individually inadequate, but in aggregate indispensable to attaining this curious vantage.

Finally, since a quest to find origins and endings is partly a quest to better fathom the world we inhabit, each chapter poses anew the question of relevance to our time: how forcefully or subtly has the age of questions left its mark on our thinking and our condition? What of that age has disappeared, survived, or transmuted? Is it indeed part of the past, or are we still living in it? My intention is to make evident through historical inquiry something that generally requires a deft literary or artistic sensibility, namely, what Keats called "Negative Capability" ("that is when man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts"), what Thomas Mann called Ästhetizismus (aestheticism), and why the writer Christa Wolf envied painters for their ability to show everything at once. The arguments exist simultaneously, and the tension between them binds them together into a single whole, like the planks of a suspension bridge.

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frage, das worauf es ankommt, das wesentliche, der schwerpunkt: das ist die frage, darum handelt es sich, das must entschieden warden.

[question, that which matters, the gist, the focal point: that is the question, that’s what it’s about, that must be decided.] -SECOND ENTRY UNDER "FRAGE" IN THE DEUTSCHES WÖRTERBUCH
This book is structured as an argument, not in the sense of a claim or contention but in the sense of a dispute. Following an introductory chapter with background on the peculiarities and emergence of questions, I put forward seven distinct arguments regarding the essence of the age of questions. Every chapter advances an argument of its own, but also engages in an argument (dispute) with the others. Readers are invited not only to consider the relative merits of the arguments but above all to gain a more complete perspective on the age by viewing it from different vantages, like a town as viewed from a nearby hillside, from its sewers and prisons, through the eyes of a child or a dandy, from a nearby village, and from stories and songs about it. In the final chapter, the analysis seeks to integrate all the arguments regarding the essence of the age into a single, higher-order one.

The chapters and their arguments are as follows:

The national argument is that the age of questions had a British imperial origin, but developed distinctly national attributes. It concludes with a case study on Hungary, which possessed both imperial and national status and ambitions, to illustrate the trajectory of the age.

The progressive argument views emancipation as the watchword of a fundamentally reformist and sometimes revolutionary age.

The argument about force is that universal war and genocide, the Final Solution, represent the fullest realization of the age of questions.

The federative argument proposes that the erasure of boundaries was the shared ideal of the age, elaborated through some of the same queristic tendencies that gave rise to genocide and emancipation.

In the argument about farce, the age of questions appears as a mischievous and often malicious pretense.

The temporal argument proposes that time was the eminence grise of the age of questions, for which timing was everything. Questions came and went, rose and fell, raised hell, mutated, and disappeared, but above all they were self-consciously of their time while straining to become timeless.

The suspension-bridge argument unites all opposites into one, mimicking an age that sought to do just that. Querists wanted to span contradictions between reality and an ideal, between timeliness and timelessness, between the universal and the particular. Their questions were a way of being in two places at once.

By design, certain pieces of evidence appear in different chapters to support divergent claims. The chapters also contain arguments that recur and are strengthened across the book. These overarching patterns can be summarized as follows:

The formulation "the x question" emerged slowly over the end of the eighteenth century and gathered momentum in the first decades of the nineteenth. Instead of being understood as questions to be answered, these were treated as problems to be solved. Some of the earliest questions were born in clusters during and after the Napoleonic Wars and were defined in opposition to their scholastic predecessors. Whereas scholastic questions were timeless, the "x question" was to be very much of its time. The formulation appeared in treaty negotiations, parliamentary debates, and related pamphlets, and Great Britain was very likely its birthplace. Querists soon emerged in France, the German states, the Habsburg Empire, and North America. By the second half of the nineteenth century, questions were being discussed and debated in nearly every language of Europe and beyond: into Tsarist Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

What I call the "age of questions" began in the 1820s and 1830s as a result of the expansion and politicization of press distribution, the enlargement of the voting franchise (in Britain), and a tight series of international events. These three developments gave rise to an international public sphere, the habitat in which questions thrived and proliferated. The attendant international events included: the Greek uprising in the Ottoman Empire (1821-1832), ultimately resulting in the independence of
Greece; debates in the British parliament around the Bill for Removal of Jewish Disabilities (1830) and the reform act for the expansion of the voting franchise (1832); the Polish November uprising in tsarist Russia (1831), crushed by tsarist troops; the Belgian Revolution (1830-1839), resulting in Belgium's independence; the French invasion and conquest of Ottoman Algiers (1830); the Mehmet Ali crisis in the Ottoman Empire (1831-1833), which resulted in the Great Powers coming together to prevent Ottoman collapse; and the July Revolution (1830) and the June rebellion (1832), which codified popular sovereignty in France.

Since questions were irritants that begged a timely solution, the age of questions had an allergy to the present. The many individuals who weighed in on questions—I call them querists—wanted change. Being allergic to the present suggests movement forward, so the fundamental impulse of the age often appears progressive. But moving away from the present is not inherently progressive, nor were querists themselves.

Early on, querists had a fairly mathematical understanding of questions: they viewed them like math problems that could have only one solution, like $2 \times 2 = 4$. One-solution thinking implied that a question/problem could be solved once and for all, so querists sought a definitive or final solution. But not everyone agreed on whether something was a question/problem or not, and oftentimes querists created or wielded questions to serve a political purpose or personal gain, or accused each other of doing so. Certainly when querists made their interventions, they generally had a particular solution in mind, so they defined a question so as to make their preferred solution seem the more attractive or obvious. Part of definition was assigning a date of origin. Birthdates were often chosen strategically to point to a particular definition, and hence solution, of a question.

The realm of questions was highly contentious and competitive: querists sought to raise the profile of their questions in order to draw attention to preferred solutions. Because querists generally worked backward from favored solutions, there were often as many different formulations and definitions of a question as there were solutions (or querists). The question: "What was the Eastern question?" might seem a simple one, and many seemingly straightforward answers have been offered, such as that the Eastern question was the matter of how to manage the decline of the Ottoman Empire. But since the "Eastern question" was defined by individual querists in accordance with their desired future, some defined the question/problem as the presence of Muslim Turks in Europe, for others it was Russian expansion, or Poland's right to exist, and for still others it was about the looming Apocalypse and the Second Coming of Christ. Querists deployed questions to stake out the terrain of the future. While there was overlap between some of their plots, such overlap was not common but rather disputed terrain.

Assigning a singular definition to any given question belies one of querism's essential features; its competitive spirit.

Not everyone could create or weigh in on questions, but by the end of the nineteenth century, the number of querists swelled considerably, representing different professions, ages, genders, nationalities, and walks of life. Their interventions came mostly in the publicistic realm of newspapers and pamphlets but could also be found in government correspondence and parliamentary debate; there were even some periodic leaks of questions into poetry, fiction, philosophy, and scientific works. When this happened the publicistic boundary was often policed by other querists.

The publicistic habitat of questions was a function of their deliberate timeliness and urgency. As some lingered over decades and even a century, however, querists began to lose faith in final solutions and started to see questions as chronic or recurring. During the second half of the nineteenth century, the mathematical model was yielding to a medical one: the driving metaphor was no longer the mathematical problem or equation to be solved, but instead one of an illness to be cured or a biological condition, such as hunger, that could recur. This meant that a question periodically had to be addressed anew.

It was mostly around wars and periods of social and political upheaval that questions were most
hotly debated and discussed, and when querists hoped for expedient solutions. At other times, a question might seem to recede or even disappear. The fickleness of questions resulted in a series of common strategies among querists: To gain attention or promote a particular solution, they tied their questions to larger ones and to ones that had been solved the way querists wanted theirs to be solved. Size mattered for querists, who often declared their questions to be of Europe- or worldwide significance and therefore "everyone's" problem. They also regularly cast questions as vital, a matter of life and death. In the words of Fyodor Dostoevsky, "a question like 'to be or not to be: " Querists also inserted urgency into these discussions by outlining what would happen if a given question were not solved in accordance with their wishes: common threats were violence, civic unrest, and war.

These strategies had four significant implications. First, insofar as questions were cast as vital, they were presumed to penetrate into multiple realms of human existence (science, religion, politics, metaphysics, economics, etc.). This meant that a solution had to be fundamental enough to penetrate into all those realms. Some querists argued, for example, that a solution to the social question would necessarily entail the creation of a whole new man, or that a solution to the Polish question would require the total reinvention of international diplomacy.

Second, insofar as querists bundled questions together and implied that one could not be solved without addressing or at least affecting the other(s), both questions and querists' wished-for solutions grew larger and more wide ranging, such that solving them was also presumed to require international cooperation.

Thirdly, as querists bundled questions together so that it seemed impossible to solve one without addressing the other(s), they often threatened a universal war if their questions were not expediently solved. Finally, since bundled questions were presumed to require a Europe- or worldwide solution, querists frequently proposed federation, or the elimination of borders, as the omnibus solution. Some even viewed the necessity of powers to act together to solve questions as the practical basis for such a federation.

In short, many querists threatened that if there was no omnibus solution, universal war would result. But in order to eliminate existing boundaries and create the conditions for federation, a universal war was required. So querists presented universal war as both a threat and a promise, an outcome to be avoided at all costs and the only means of achieving a desired outcome. The age of questions made the Great War thinkable. Querists also increasingly posited a relationship between the geopolitical questions of the East and the social questions of the West, arguing that changing a border in the Balkans to address the Eastern question, for example, could inflame the social question and precipitate a revolution in France.

The Crimean War and later the Great War entranced many querists, who believed that universal war would bring about longed-for solutions. After the postwar peace treaties of 1918-1920, a number of questions were considered "solved," at least in part. But the losers of World War I—dissatisfied with the status quo—became especially active querists during the interwar period. Hitler was one of them. He bundled questions together, insisting they needed to be solved together, and saw universal war and the elimination of boundaries as the path to the great omnibus solution (including but not limited to the Final Solution).

The most general characterization of the age, one that encompasses all of the aforementioned features, is that querists used questions to span contradictions. They often argued that a question/problem arose out of a contradiction, or a gap between a universal ideal and a particular reality. Queristic interventions were like large shoes devised to span the gap. They made it possible, in a sense, to be in two places at once. But like large shoes, they left an outsized footprint on the terrain of nineteenth- and twentieth-century history, such that the efforts of querists appear variously as poignant ambition, destructive hubris, and comedic vanity.

From Chaos to Catastrophe? Texts and the Transitionality of the Mind by K. Ludwig Pfeiffer
This book focuses on the tensions between processes of the mind and its products from worldviews to models of thought. Processes are described in neurobiological and evolutionary terms. Given both a relative opacity of processes and of the outside world, their dramatic quality, their closeness to 'hysterical' and 'schizophrenic' tendencies and, within the weakening orientating power of worldviews, an alarming catastrophic potential emerge.

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Excerpt: Processes and Products: Claims, Goals, Risks
My title may be too dramatic, my subtitle rather uninspiring. Even so, the mixture might yield a suitable discursive working temperature. This should happen especially if one brings the terms chaos and catastrophe close to their technical 'philosophical' meaning in which, for catastrophe, sudden discontinuities, mostly called bifurcations (subtle, catastrophic, explosive) are seen as the result of a slow underlying evolution, or where, in the case of chaos, small changes of initial operating conditions and parameters in nonlinear systems bring about unexpectedly radical results. It goes without saying that this take-over of technical terms is a pretty loose one. In this book, chaos, feeding on the technical sense, refers to the workings of consciousness, catastrophe, also profiting from the technical sense, to real consequences for which symptomatic, typical or far-reaching significance can be claimed. I assume, as it were, elective affinities between chaos and catastrophes, between the processes and the products of the mind. Chaos and catastrophe, in whichever sense,
are couched in an atmosphere of highly charged drama. This is because they are produced by the hysterical (sometimes also called schizophrenic) consciousness. The term ‘hysterical consciousness’ is derived from Edgar Morin’s evolutionary anthropology (see part I, chapter 6); with the term ‘schizophrenic’ I align myself more or less with Julian Jaynes’ notion of the old bicameral mind which has survived, both as a term and as a phenomenon, in its far too narrow pathological meaning. I am very much relieved, however, to see that the term ‘hysteria’ appears meanwhile to have made its way also into historical studies. In his new book on failed predictions, Joachim Radkau characterizes various periods in German after-war history as periods of hysteria (because of the Sputnik shock, dying forests, nuclear dangers etc). I am sure it would be easy to find many more, especially since Radkau, in an earlier book, has described the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as an age of nervousness. In other words: The use of ‘hysteria’, ‘hysterical’ and ‘schizophrenic’ as general (some would say: metaphorical) concepts, not just as systematic concepts for special pathological cases of persons and societies might not be as absurd as it looks at first sight. In fact, similar or analogous notions show up in many theoretical contexts: Konrad Lorenz assumes that in a certain sense "we are all psychopaths" because we pay heavily for the many of our unfulfilled desires. Arthur Koestler traces human tendencies toward self destruction back to the evolutionary blunder of a "schizophreniological disposition", with evolution failing to integrate the old (limbic) and the new (neocortical) brain. The list could be continued.

The book, in what could easily look like overreaching itself, is rather like a bet on the possibilities of describing both processes and to assess the achievements or the functional deficits of products of consciousness. It does not ignore so-called realities, historical, social and otherwise. But they are considered in fairly general forms only, in which they may be said to modulate the relations between processes and products (more on history towards the end of this introduction). Processes of consciousness (called thoughts, ideas, images or something else) often appear chaotic in the conventional and the technical sense. Products of consciousness like total conceptions of the world and human beings, worldpictures, theories, models of thought and a lot of products in between (doctrines, dogmas, ideologies, opinions) spring from the activities with which consciousness tries to make sense of itself and the world. In order to ease and yet to structure these transitions (adding up to the concept of transitionality) I have looked at texts mostly, but certainly not always called literature. In spite of that, this book is not about literary techniques of representing consciousness variously called (authorial) thought report, narrated monologue, free indirect style, interior monologue or stream of consciousness. I rather follow older theorists like Eliseo Vivas for whom literature was searching for "the primary data of human experience", or contemporary ones like Terence Cave who see the best parts of the literary area as "the signature of cognition in action". In that capacity, it is among the richest of our cognitive artefacts. The kind of thinking it offers may come close to philosophical, scientific, political, everyday and other modes. But it also develops cognitive surplus values. Such surplus values, in their turn, do have practical importance, even if this is not immediately obvious. They tend to appear with particular force in the elaboration of the transitions built into conscious processes, transitions elusive and evanescent, hard to grasp, to describe or to define, yet crucial for the formation of realities we are likely to accept, desire or reject. Starting out from the incessant dynamics of the basic elements of consciousness (which we may or may not call ‘thoughts’), a conscious space is being built up all the time in which the more or less internal patterning of conscious processes is ultimately confronted, for better or worse, with what consciousness conceives of as realities out there. Given the multitude and partial vagueness or lack of communicative fitness of conscious processes, linked with more or less unknown unconscious ones, there must be a certain degree of ‘freedom’ of conscious activities (which may or may not be related to the notorious problem of freedom of the will). Given the pressures from ‘out there’, there will also be restrictions to that freedom. Consequently, the intention, on a second level, is to set up a cost-benefit analysis for the relations between the
processes of consciousness and its products, from an inner dynamics of what looks like a liquid mass of conscious events, where thoughts are barely identifiable, to the most elaborate finished products. Such an analysis is surely crucial for the future of especially Western societies. Since this book is not an exercise in cultural criticism (German "Kulturkritik"), however, this analysis will show up in repeated, fairly simple (hopefully not simplistic) assertions only, not in the form of a really elaborated argument. Even so, an evolutionary logic will hopefully emerge within the range of products of thought. This logic should show implications and consequences, risks, main and side effects in the transitions from total conceptions like cosmologies to worldviews, from dogmas to theories and finally down the supreme reign of inflationary and inflated opinions, today digitally created, sustained and multiplied.

Obviously, histories of types of thought, including their `origins' in psychological, intellectual, social and other dispositions and traditions, have often been written. Very often, the history of ideas is seen as the professional field in which such inquiries mainly take place. It would be silly to deny how much one must profit by them. Yet the history of ideas seems to be plagued by one central problem, namely an unresolved wavering between historical specificity and typological generality. Intellectual currents must be given names (idealism, materialism, gnosticism, apocalyptic, utopian or dystopian thought etc). The impression that such currents show up repeatedly or even permanently, that they are fixed parts of typological inventories of human thought is hard to ward off. The impression collides, however, with the conviction that these currents of thought are much more enmeshed in and determined by the web of history or histories, so that their typological generality turns out to be an illusion.

I am therefore trying out an approach which, first, confronts the dynamics of the (as we will see: `hysterical' or `schizophrenic' tendencies of the) mind with its products, that is to say types of thought, but, second, reduces the generality of these types by a limited and selective interpretation of their functional value with respect to satisfactory explanations of the world, individual situations and the orientation of action.

In the digital age, it would be possible to use the metaphor of interfaces of the mind for the transitional spaces envisaged here. Such terminological tricks would not, however, dispel the impression, easily gained and hard to get rid of, that the enterprise faces discouraging risks. At first glance, the transitional dynamics seems to veer towards a multitude of arbitrary or the limitations of conventional forms. The idea of transitionality, in the way it is developed here, might appear to be useless because I do not adopt the quasi-natural starting point for such investigations which are broadly called creativity studies. Such studies have been pursued for quite a while within disciplines and approaches like editorial science, brain research, as well as investigations into textual genesis as a complex process triggered by rough concepts, sketches, schemes as well as linguistic, musical and image stimuli, and handled in practice more easily with the blessings of the digital age. The force of such approaches is hard to deny, conclusive results, however, even harder to attain.

On all levels, the evidence is rather fragmentary. I have shifted therefore, much like a traditional literary scholar, my attention back to elaborate finished products appearing mostly in the shape of published books. Method and manner of this investigation, collecting and exploiting all kinds of evidence from philosophy, neurobiology and evolutionary anthropology may appear rather arbitrary. As always, they must be judged by their fruits which I intend to gather especially in the second and third parts.

Very roughly, as far as products of consciousness are concerned, I will make use of mainly, though not exclusively, four types: Total conceptions of the world and human beings, worldpictures (for which I will use, for reasons to be explained later, the German term Weltanschauungen), theories, and models of thought. Although these are types which, to all intents and purposes, overlap and can be found at all times, they are characterized also and, I hope to show, preeminently by degrees of suitability and functionality but also deficits with respect to the situations in which people find themselves. Certainly, the categories named
present rough distinctions only. In any period for which I assert the hegemony of one of these terms, a stronger or weaker presence of others can also be detected. Moreover, overlaps and forms in-between certainly occur frequently. Consequently, the point is not that products appear at a certain time; it is rather the relative role they play in configurations of products of thought in varying situations within longer periods of time.

Twentieth-century German Nazism, to take one of the worst examples of what one would call a Weltanschauung, certainly saw itself and was frequently seen as an irresistible rhetorical-cognitive machine. But the writing for this product was on the wall early on. In terms of ideas, it was a botched concoction.

Christopher Ricks for instance has understandably called Fascist `ideology', in this case the ideas of the British Fascist leader Sir Oswald Mosley, as being dedicated, devoted, pledged and doomed to "nullity" (Ricks 1983: 3). In terms of action, Nazism was primitively politicized. It did not really deserve the name of Weltanschauung in comparison with those gestures towards totality which one can find in the nineteenth century, the period which I would like to proclaim the most important historical area for this product of thought.

Why so many people went along with the Nazi ideology (here the term would make sense in spite of my reservations to be spelled out below) for such a long time must be due to very extraordinary factors which keep fueling an immense amount of historical explanation. The ambition of this book does not go so far.

However, in spite of a lack of historical specificity, the distinctions between products of thought should be instructive with respect to the risks and side effects in the interplay of the ways of consciousness and the ways of the world. In spite of overlaps, it should be possible to distinguish, for instance, between medieval religious dogma and the dogmatism of opinions in later times. Sometimes, the Reformation is seen as a crucial event in this development: "Before, one could manage with a minimum of dogmas. Now, distinctions in the doctrines of the Church(es) became of utmost importance. The progressive intellectualization of the articles of faith drove Protestant theologians into quarrels concerning the interpretation of Luther's teachings." This 'intellectualization' goes hand in hand with the narrowing range of the world picture behind the quarrels. In a general form, Bishop George Berkeley may have had something like that in mind when he wrote: "Few men think, but all insist on having opinions." Berkeley presents this as a general human tendency. I assume it is. Also, in order to suggest the fairly general way in which history enters the picture let me suggest that the way in which such a tendency shows up depends also on characteristic arrangements of knowledge. Thus, Schopenhauer, who quotes the Berkeley phrase, attributes an obsession with disputes, due to a lack of real knowledge, already to the Middle Ages. (This is not a contradiction, but a variation on the Reformation thesis above.) The obsession seems to have been brought under control, though, by elevating Aristotelian logic into the center of all knowledge.

Whether correct or not, this would be an example for a configuration of thought not to be found at all times, but not restricted to one short period either. It is clear that this medieval 'solution' of knowledge control could not assert itself anymore today. Whatever configuration for W B. Yeats' "The Second Coming" (1919) we may assume, we cannot ignore the modern implications of a phrase like "the centre cannot hold" especially in its conjunction with "Things fall apart" (1. 3). These phrases look as if they were comparable to John Donne's "Tis all in pieces, all coherence gone" ("The Anatomy of the World", 1611). But in contrast to the latter, there is no cushioning transcendent(al) faith in Yeats which softens and ultimately neutralizes the fall into incoherence.

The (very) general historical pattern, perhaps I should say: my evolutionary scheme concerning products of thought looks like this: We find total conceptions (of human beings and the world, including cosmologies and cosmographies like the great chain of being) mainly from antiquity to the eighteenth century; we meet Weltanschauungen as totalizing efforts at a comprehensive worldview mainly in the nineteenth century. The plurality of theories with greater or smaller range dominates the twentieth century. I interrupt to admit that the
history of theory goes back of course to ancient Greece. Yet it seems equally clear that ancient theoria represents a life form which, while using thought as its rational basis, preserves visionary elements and the inclusion of eudaemonia, that is to say the unfolding of the rational parts of the soul which the twentieth century concept has more or less completely lost. Theoria is intimately concerned with the orientation of life, theory is not or at best loosely so. Where twentieth century theory ventures into the field of recommendations for action (like Arnold Gehlen’s anthropology telling us to let ourselves be consumed by institutions), it is doubtful whether the recommendation really follows from the theory. That is why the twenty-first century can enjoy, but also has to wrestle with what we might call models of thought and their implications. Models of thought are risky in a double sense. They enjoy the freedom to sketch bold projections, but they also run the risk of being dislodged from ‘realistic’ contexts of action altogether. In its turn, Weltanschauung in German implies already a somewhat strained effort to order the world in spite of its resisting complexity.

With many other theories I share the conviction that the Western eighteenth century represents the great historical divide which radically changes the fate of the central problem of all these types (and the many in between), namely the question if and to what extent these products of thought are able to imply or present norms and orientations of action. My overall thesis is that the products of thought have progressively lost that power in the West. The orientation of action is included or taken for granted in total conceptions, it encounters difficulties in Weltanschauungen, it is lost more or less in theories and rather more than less in models of thought. Today, it appears therefore that the West, blocked by a huge amount of self-criticism anyway, looks fairly helpless in the many situations in which it is confronted, by groups large and small, with strict demands for social organization and action of one and only one kind. This helplessness becomes all the more conspicuous when such demands are made in the name of a higher, especially religious order. We will encounter this judgment, embodied particularly by Georges Devereux, more often later on. By contrast, Arnold Gehlen has described Schopenhauer as the last important philosopher with a “total view” or perception of life (including the life of animals and plants). Gehlen’s characterization must be qualified, however, since Schopenhauer’s total view does not direct action; it rather contains the strong recommendation to negate the will, that is to say to renounce action as much as possible altogether. Modern efforts to set up total conceptions (theories of everything, grand unified theories and the like) have met more with mockery than with serious discussion. Most of them are restricted to the range of objects normally tackled by physics anyway.

Competitive configurations of products will be analyzed in fairly minute detail. They are embedded in a loose historical framework taken over from E. J. Hobsbawm. He holds that “the revolution which broke out between 1789 and 1848 [...] forms the greatest transformation in human history since the remote times when men invented agriculture and metallurgy, writing, the city and the state. This revolution has transformed, and continues to transform, the entire world.” Strictly speaking, Hobsbawm has in mind two revolutions, the rather more political French and the industrial British. Their early phase was thus tied to “a specific social and international situation”. But its "long-range results [...] cannot be confined to any social framework, political organization, or distribution of international power and resources". For Hobsbawm, these results consist mainly in the development of capitalist industry and of middle class or ‘bourgeois’ liberal society propagated ultimately "across the entire world". My emphasis will be on cognitive implications relevant for the orientation of action.

In this respect, Hobsbawm’s picture translates into a Western world which has given in to a compensatory need, severing the justification of action from its older context as part of total conceptions and Weltanschauungen and turning them into separate systems of ethics. This is an unfortunate situation, because the ensuing plurality of ethical systems cannot really cope with its logical consequence, the plurality and arbitrariness of motivating and legitimizing action. This state of things differs radically from what Arnold Gehlen had in mind when he urged the need for pluralistic
ethical projects. Gehlen argued that this pluralism must take at least four levels of ethical or moral relevance into account: ethical norms emerging from relations of mutuality, a number of physiological regulations of behavior including well-being and happiness, ethical forms of behavior related to the family and ultimately extended into global humanitarianism, and the ethical demands of institutions including the state.

This ethical pluralism does not amount to general tolerance; it is rather its opposite. Societies proclaiming general tolerance must assume to have no internal or external enemies or believe that their formulae for appeasement and pacification work sufficiently well. We know meanwhile that this is not the case. In the West, the confusion of ethical pluralism and general tolerance was facilitated and encouraged by the progressive moral disqualification of the state. From there, the transition from tolerance to a "nihilistic acceptance of everything" is easy. Ethics was meant to reintroduce norms of action as a discourse of its own after world picture and action had been severed in the later eighteenth century. This severance is also responsible for the compulsion to invent or reorganize legal discourse (see part II, chap. 4). This necessity, in its turn, explains the frequency of legal discourse in eighteenth-century texts, including those called literature. In recent times, numerous studies have been devoted to this interpenetration. The severance also shows up on other levels, for instance those described in cheerful resignation by Nicholas Mosley who will be examined at greater length in the third part: "My reason tells me what theories are the most possible, the most likely, the most desirable; but it needs more than Reason to put any theory across, it needs a great Faith. And my Reason tells me that it is dangerous to trust in Faith, for how does one know that one's Faith is Right? And so I'm stuck, and likely to remain so." Similarly, even where chains of action, as in the military, are hierarchically ordered, the order of orders is not enough: "(...) what was required was more than a reliance upon orders; it was a two-way trust that had something of the nature of love".

Obviously, ethics, like theory, can and must be traced back to antiquity. For a long time, however, it was plausibly classified as applied anthropology and not as a discourse of its own. Right from the beginning I am thus flaunting my conviction, to be corroborated by evidence later on, that systems of ethics do not heal but rather cement the separation of world pictures and the legitimation of action. Legitimation is then progressively pushed aside by questions of motivation, with disastrous results. The contingency and arbitrariness, the hollowness and ensuing stretchiness of motivation cannot be controlled. For Gehlen, in an analogous development, family morality together with its extension into global humanitarianism have failed. Family morality may be necessary for individual psychic health. But anything possessing "greatness" (state, religion, the art and sciences and even economic life) gained that greatness only after leaving the dimension of the family behind.

Such situations do not need specific historical causes to be brought about; they can be triggered by a lack of logical connection between a world structure, postulated by a product of thought, and the drive towards or necessity of action. Empirically ("historically"), from day to day, cultural life is "short-winded", marked by what Luhmann has called opaque complexity. Logically and conceptually, total conceptions and Weltanschauungen are unstable at any time. Subjecting all or most of what can be called real to their dictates, they inevitably push their claims too far and turn into extravagant or overwrought metaphors of reality. This does not at all rule out shorter or longer periods of stability. The elements, for instance, of the relations between humans and nature, of hunger and food, of mother and child, moon and darkness, the sequence of birth and death impose themselves as a kind of "empirical Apriori". Yet they remain ambiguous because, although touching human life profoundly, they also seem to be independent of it. Their processes seemingly following cycles of their own, we cannot calculate, control and figure them out completely. In spite of the happiness they can offer, they also remain sources of anxiety.

The difficulty of the conceptual situation can be exemplified with the term ideology, which I have tried to keep out of this book as much as possible. Its conceptual history from a descriptive to a
polemical combat term appears to me to be too unfortunate for use. It has become both overly complex and terribly simplistic. For the latter, indeed the dominant trend we just have to think of the usual implication that the ideology is always the doctrine, thought and opinion of the other. Contradictory connotations of the term are remarkable right away in Marx who starts out with the meaning of Weltanschauung and then moves away into the murkier regions of false consciousness. (Incidentally, to quite a considerable extent Marxists themselves classify Marxism as a Weltanschauung and thereby support my typology.) It is helpful, however, to follow a tendency in conceptualization which sees the totalizing Weltanschauung as the effort, frequently doomed to obvious failure, to bring a broad range of phenomena, say from the economy to aesthetics, under conceptual control. It is also helpful to keep in mind the fruitful convergences between this typology and the one formulated by Hans Blumenberg in terms of reality concepts. My total conceptions will largely be found in what Blumenberg calls reality of momentary evidence and guaranteed reality. To a much reduced degree, they may still float around in his third concept which he calls reality as the realization of a homogeneous context. This type is on its way to Weltanschauungen, because, as we will see, Weltanschauungen are in most cases marked, in contrast to total conceptions, by efforts and (often obvious) difficulties of construction. Blumenberg’s fourth concept, again, reality as resistance, is tied up in various ways with Weltanschauungen (if realization requires an obvious effort or is noticeably difficult), but may also be related to the more relativistic atmosphere in which theories and models of thought are couched.

Products of thought are the end result of processes of thought. We therefore have to find ways of connecting these two domains. The first part of the book is supposed to take care of that task. It might appear as one long detour since the evidence which I try to collect from neurobiology, evolutionary anthropology, philosophies of consciousness and literature does not lead to the products in any straightforward way. Yet it has seemed imperative to me to find out how far one can get with what can be called the internal logic of for instance and mainly neurobiology in order to be able to go beyond. The main result (the ‘hysterical’ or ‘schizophrenic’ consciousness and its immediate extensions) should reward the trouble. For purposes of illustration, I have inserted confrontations with literary texts along the way.

The second part exploits the biographical structure of many texts, especially so-called novels, in order to show the hysterical mind at work and to suggest, in the way of the cost-benefit analysis already mentioned, its more than biographical consequences. In order to get an idea of the central problem I am driving at the reader is asked to see the first and second part as a confrontation: The more, in the developmental logic of the main products of thought, these lose their overall cognitive and orientating power, the more that power can be and is replaced by the ‘hysterical’ and ‘schizophrenic’ forces of consciousness which then can elevate any product, however fragmentary and dogmatic, into a solution (sometimes a final one) for private and public woes. The first part attempts to describe the ‘chaotic’ workings of consciousness, but also to demonstrate layers of their attractiveness in the fascinating shapes they may gain in the obsessive, mostly ‘literary’ search for forms in which they can both be contained and display that fascination. The second part, by contrast, emphasizes the ‘catastrophic’ drift which the products of consciousness take on in the logic of their development. In very different forms, this is a massive problem for most modern societies. In the third part, this confrontation, namely the relations and conflicts between Oswald Mosley and his son Nicholas, is acted out in a personalized political-religious paradigm.

Finally, I have thought it appropriate to start out with three preparatory chapters in order not to be plagued with their problems throughout the book: Chapter 1, tacitly abandoning concepts like intentionality, introduces the notion of transitionality and assesses the range of conscious phenomena, thereby drastically limiting the relevance of the unconscious. Chapter 2 plays down the unavoidable oscillation of analyses like the present ones between universal and particular claims. Chapter 3
argues for the necessity of a plurality of competing, but also mutually supportive discourses and therefore for a methodological flexibility which is certainly not generally welcome. <>

The Diversity Delusion: How Race and Gender Pandering Corrupt the University and Undermine Our Culture by Heather Mac Donald [St. Martin's Press, 9781250200914]

By the New York Times bestselling author: a provocative account of the attack on the humanities, the rise of intolerance, and the erosion of serious learning America is in crisis, from the university to the workplace. Toxic ideas first spread by higher education have undermined humanistic values, fueled intolerance, and widened divisions in our larger culture. Chaucer, Shakespeare and Milton? Oppressive. American history? Tyranny. Professors correcting grammar and spelling, or employers hiring by merit? Racist and sexist. Students emerge into the working world believing that human beings are defined by their skin color, gender, and sexual preference, and that oppression based on these characteristics is the American experience. Speech that challenges these campus orthodoxies is silenced with brute force.

The Diversity Delusion argues that the root of this problem is the belief in America's endemic racism and sexism, a belief that has engendered a metastasizing diversity bureaucracy in society and academia. Diversity commissars denounce meritocratic standards as discriminatory, enforce hiring quotas, and teach students and adults alike to think of themselves as perpetual victims. From #MeToo mania that blurs flirtations with criminal acts, to implicit bias and diversity compliance training that sees racism in every interaction, Heather Mac Donald argues that we are creating a nation of narrowed minds, primed for grievance, and that we are putting our competitive edge at risk.

But there is hope in the works of authors, composers, and artists who have long inspired the best in us. Compiling the author's decades of research and writing on the subject, The Diversity Delusion calls for a return to the classical liberal pursuits of open-minded inquiry and expression, by which everyone can discover a common humanity.
through my soul, and died away for want of utterance."

How much things have changed.

In 2016, a student petition at Yale University called for dismantling the college’s decades-long requirement that English majors take a course covering Chaucer, Spenser, Milton, and Wordsworth. Reading these authors "creates a culture that is especially hostile to students of color," complained the students. Sadly, there was by then nothing remarkable in this demand. Attacks on the canon as an instrument of exclusivity and oppression have flourished since the 1980s, when Jesse Jackson famously joined Stanford students in chanting, "Hey, hey, ho, ho, Western Civ has got to go." But in the past few years the worldview behind such antagonism has become even more militant, transforming not just universities but the world at large. The demand for "safe spaces," reflexive accusations of racism and sexism, and contempt for Enlightenment values of reason and due process are no longer an arcane species of academic self-involvement—they increasingly infuse business, government, and civil society. The Diversity Delusion is an attempt to investigate how this transformation happened and why.

The roots lie in a charged set of ideas that now dominate higher education: that human beings are defined by their skin color, sex, and sexual preference; that discrimination based on those characteristics has been the driving force in Western civilization; and that America remains a profoundly bigoted place, where heterosexual white males continue to deny opportunity to everyone else.

These ideas, which may be subsumed under the categories of "diversity" and identity politics, have remade the university. Entire fields have sprung up around race, ethnicity, sex, and gender identity. Coursework in traditional departments also views the past and present through that same self-engrossed lens. A vast administrative apparatus—the diversity bureaucracy—promotes the notion that to be a college student from an ever-growing number of victim groups is to experience daily bigotry from your professors and peers. In fall 2015, black Princeton students chanted: "We’re sick and tired of being sick and tired"—a phrase first used by Fannie Lou Hamer, a civil rights activist from the deep South who was beaten in the 1950s for trying to vote. Hamer had grounds aplenty to be sick and tired, but any Princeton student who thinks of himself as downtrodden is in the grip of a terrible delusion. That delusion, however, is actively encouraged by Princeton's administrators, including the vice provost for institutional equity and diversity, who in early 2018 erected posters throughout campus inviting students to report "problematic experiences based on identity." In 2016, Brown students occupied their provost’s office to demand exemption from traditional academic requirements such as class attendance because they were so focused, they said, on staying alive at Brown. Fact-check: No Brown student is at risk of his life from going to classes and trying to learn.

This victimology fuels the sometimes violent efforts to shut down speech that challenges campus orthodoxies. Taught to believe that they are at existential threat from circumambient bias, students equate nonconforming ideas with "hate speech," and "hate speech" with life-threatening conduct that should be punished, censored, and repelled with force if necessary. In March 2017, a mob of Middlebury College students assaulted a professor, giving her a concussion and whiplash, following their successful effort to prevent social scientist Charles Murray from speaking to a live audience by shouting, pounding on walls, and activating fire alarms. Murray just missed being knocked down and beaten himself. After this attack, 177 professors from across the country signed an open letter protesting that the assailants had been disciplined, however minimally. The professors blamed the Middlebury administration for the violence, since its decision to allow Murray to lecture constituted a "threat" to students. A few days later, another group of faculty members described the tribulations that students and faculty "of color" on that bucolic campus allegedly encounter: marginalization, neglect, objectification, and exclusion from full participation in campus life. The protest was a matter of "active resistance against racism, sexism, classism, homophobia, transphobia, ableism, ethnocentrism, xenophobia,
and all other forms of unjust discrimination," they wrote.

In May 2017 students from Evergreen State College in Washington state stormed into a class taught by biology professor Bret Weinstein and began cursing and hurling racial epithets. "F**k you, you piece of shit," screamed one student. "Get the f**k out of here," screamed another. Weinstein, a lifelong progressive, had refused to obey an edict from Evergreen’s Director of First Peoples Multicultural Advising Services that all white faculty cancel their courses for a day and stay off campus. White students were also ordered to absent themselves from the school, to show solidarity with the supposed struggles of Evergreen’s minority students. Weinstein told the mob that he did not believe that science professors at Evergreen were "targeting" students of color, contrary to the premises of a newly announced equity initiative. "F**k what you have to say," a student responded. "This is not a discussion." Evergreen’s president, after being subjected to a similar expletive-filled mob tirade, expressed his "gratitude for the [students] passion and courage." In September 2017, Weinstein and his wife, also an Evergreen biology professor, accepted a $500,000 settlement to resign from the college.

Universities should be the place where students encounter the greatest works of mankind and learn to understand what makes them touchstones of human experience. History should convey the hard work it took over centuries to carve stability and prosperity out of violence, tyranny, and corruption. Instead, victim ideology encourages ignorant young adults to hate the monuments of Western civilization without bothering even to study them. (Bruce Bawer and Roger Kimball previously called out these trends in The Victims’ Revolution and Tenured Radicals, respectively.) Faculty respond to students’ know-nothing tantrums with silence—when they are not actively colluding in the destruction of humanistic learning.

None of this campus self-pity is justified. American college students are among the most privileged human beings in history. But the claim of ubiquitous "racism, sexism, classism, homophobia, transphobia, ableism, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia" is now lodged in the non-academic world as well, where it is being used to silence speakers and ideas with which favored victim groups disagree. Civility is shrinking and civil peace may be in jeopardy. Masked anarchists use force to block conservatives from speaking in public forums. The free speech crisis on and off campus will not be solved until the premises of victimology are challenged directly and exposed as fraudulent, as this book aims to do.

The academic obsession with identity is ironic, since its roots lie in a philosophy that denied the very existence of the self. In the 1970s, the literary theory of deconstruction took over humanities departments with a curious set of propositions about language. Because linguistic signs were arbitrary, successful communication was said to be impossible. Most surprisingly, the human subject was declared to be a fiction, a mere play of rhetorical tropes. In the 1980s, however, the self came roaring back with a vengeance as feminists and race theorists took the mannered jargon of deconstruction and turned it into a political weapon. The key deconstructive concept of linguistic "dérance" became identity difference between the oppressed and their oppressors; the prime object of study became one’s own self and its victimization. The most significant change concerned attitudes toward the Western intellectual tradition. Deconstructive theorists such as Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida performed their interpretive sleights of hand on Proust, Rousseau, Plato, Shelley, and Wordsworth, among other leading philosophers and writers. They did not disparage these complex texts as the contemptible products of dead, white males. Multiculturalism, which took over literary studies in the 1980s, destroyed that respect for the canon while continuing the deconstructive stance of exposing alleged subtexts and suppressed meanings. What had been an epistemological project became a political one.

And now multiculturalism’s cover for unblemished ignorance of the past—the reflexive "dead, white male" taunt—is being used to further rationalize formal and informal censorship. A twenty-three-year-old theater student at the University of California, San Diego, circulated a petition in
February 2018 to cancel a course on Woody Allen's movies, due to Allen's alleged sexual improprieties. Asked if the demand to efface the course raised free speech problems, the student dismissed the First Amendment as an "outdated" law "written by a bunch of white men." (It is a certainty that she has read neither the amendment nor the history of the Bill of Rights.) The university rejected the petition, but the multicultural excuse for trashing Enlightenment principles continues to wreak havoc elsewhere.

Even the one remaining bright spot in the universities is vulnerable. Academic science is in the crosshairs of the victimologists. For now, university researchers are still accomplishing astounding feats of intellectual discovery. But the incessant demand from administrators and government officials that science departments hire by gender and race, rather than established accomplishments, may take a toll on their intellectual capital. That demand continues into the marketplace, where activist groups and the media exert identical pressure on for-profit science and technology firms in Silicon Valley and elsewhere.

"Diversity" in the academy purported to be about bridge-building and broadening people's experiences. It has had the opposite effect: dividing society, reducing learning, and creating an oppositional mind-set that prevents individuals from seizing the opportunities available to them. It is humanistic learning, by contrast, that involves an actual encounter with diversity and difference, as students enter worlds radically different from their own. Humanistic study involves imaginative empathy and curiosity, which are being squelched in today's university in favor of self-engrossed complaint. Teaching the classics is the duty we owe these great works for giving us an experience of the sublime. Once we stop lovingly transmitting them to the next generation, they die.

For decades, universities have drifted further and further away from their true purpose. Now they are taking the rest of the world with them. <>

Ethical Considerations at the Intersection of Psychiatry and Religion aims to give mental health professionals a conceptual framework for understanding the role of R/S in ethical decision-making and serve as practical guidance for approaching challenging cases. Part I addresses general considerations, including the basis of therapeutic values in a pluralistic context, the nature of theological and psychiatric ethics, spiritual issues arising in diagnosis and treatment, unhealthy and harmful uses of religion, and practical implications of personal spirituality. Part II examines how these considerations apply in specific contexts: inpatient and outpatient, consultation-liaison, child and adolescent, geriatric, disability, forensic, community, international, addiction and disaster and emergency psychiatry, as well as in the work of religious professionals, ethics committees, psychiatric education, and research.

Thick descriptions of case examples analyzed using the framework of Jonson and Winslow show the clinical relevance of understanding the contributions of religion and spirituality to patient preferences, quality of life, decision making, and effective treatment.

Fung, M.D., Sc.D., FRCP, [Oxford University Press, 9780190681968]

Psychiatry and religion/spirituality (R/S) share an interest in human flourishing, a concern with beliefs and values, and an appreciation for community. Yet historical tensions between science and religion continue to impede dialogue, leaving clinicians uncertain about how to approach ethical questions arising between them. When are religious practices such as scrupulosity disordered? What distinguishes healthy from unhealthy religion? How should a therapist approach a patient's existential, moral or spiritual distress? What should clinicians do with patients' R/S convictions about faith healing, same-sex relationships, or obligations to others?

Discussions of psychiatric ethics have traditionally emphasized widely accepted principles, generally admired virtues, and cultural competence. Relatively little attention has been devoted to the ways that R/S inform the values of patients and their clinicians, shape preferred virtues, and interact with culture.

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The flourishing, individual beliefs and values, and social context. Yet tensions between science and religion, and especially between psychiatry and the behavioral sciences and religion, have historically hindered constructive dialogue, creating uncertainty about how to approach ethical questions emerging at the interface between them. Many questions arise: What is the clinician’s role in treating patients with unhealthy forms of religion? How should a therapist approach a patient’s existential, moral, or spiritual distress? What are the ethical implications of taking into account a patient’s religious beliefs as they bear on decisions about treatment, parenting, or end-of-life care?

Psychiatric ethics have traditionally focused on the implications of generally accepted principles and professional virtues, including respect for the patient’s culture and values. Both the Resource Document on Psychiatrists’ Religious and Spiritual Commitments published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and the Position Statement on Spirituality and Religion in Psychiatry published by the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) emphasize the need to understand the place of religion/spirituality as a source of these values. Conversely, religious ethics often emphasize caring
for the ill and impaired. However, few resources are available for understanding the ways in which religion/spirituality informs the relevant values of patients and their clinicians, how clinicians should address conflicting values, or what principles should guide the interaction between clinicians' own professional and personal commitments. Discussions within the APR’s Caucus on Spirituality, Religion, and Psychiatry of this conceptual and practical lack led to this project.

Our aim in this volume is to help readers think more clearly about these issues as they are encountered by psychiatrists and other mental health professionals, religious professionals working in mental health settings, bioethicists, healthcare ethics committee members, and trainees in all of these disciplines. Rather than philosophical arguments or practice guidelines, the contributors offer a conceptual framework for understanding the role of religion/spirituality in ethical decision making and pragmatic guidance for approaching challenging cases. Authors in Part One explore several dimensions of the ethical challenges presented by religious/spiritual in psychiatric practice, and those in Part Two describe ways of approaching these in different treatment contexts. Wherever appropriate, we have asked psychiatric and religious professionals to collaborate.

In Chapter Two, John Peteet addresses psychiatry’s lack of a clearly articulated set of values with which to approach the complexities of clinical work within a pluralistic context. He suggests that four core values—prevention and treatment of disease, patient centeredness, relief of suffering, and enhancement of functioning—can be traced to psychiatry’s roots in humanistic medicine. When each is counterbalanced by the others from the perspective of the clinician’s and the patient’s worldviews, they offer a value-based approach to understanding the patient’s disorder, chief concern, and prerequisites for flourishing. This approach, reflected in the Jonsen Four Topics Model for ethical reasoning (Jonsen, Siegler, & Winslade, 2015), frames and illuminates the relevance of religious and spiritual commitments in clinical work.

In Chapter Three, Mary Lynn Dell and Daniel Grossoehme discuss the relationship between religion/spirituality and psychiatric ethics, beginning with a review of religious ethics and religious bioethics from the perspectives of several major world faith traditions. Elements of Jewish, Christian (Catholic and Protestant), Islamic, Hindu, and Buddhist religious ethics are considered, with particular attention to how ethical teachings of these traditions interact with common elements of psychiatric ethics. Our hope is that this chapter will be helpful as readers become more aware of when and where theological perspectives have particular relevance in psychiatric practice.

In Chapter Four, Allan Josephson explores religious/spiritual and ethical aspects of psychiatric diagnosis. He argues that because diagnosis involves knowing the patient “through and through; it of necessity includes knowledge of the patient’s religious/spiritual or secular worldview and related commitments. After considering how these present challenges in the care of patients struggling with issues of meaning, moral distress, and authority/autonomy, he discusses ethical challenges for diagnosis presented by a pluralistic psychiatric culture, including overdiagnosis and a loss of perspective on the whole patient.

In Chapter Five, James Griffith and Gina Magyar-Russell acknowledge that personal spirituality sets a standard for relational and ethical living but consider three major ways in which religion can be unhealthy and potentially harmful: when "sociobiological" religion obscures personal spirituality, when religion becomes a venue for mental illness, and when individuals experience spiritual struggle.

In Chapter Six, Len Sperry considers how clinicians should approach the various spiritual and religious concerns that adult patients present in everyday psychiatric practice. These include those noted in the V code, Religious or Spiritual Problem, in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) (APA, 2013). The author presents a taxonomy of these concerns that is useful in making treatment decisions and an ethical framework for responding to them. He emphasizes the patient’s informed consent and the competency of the psychiatrist in addressing
religion and spiritual issues, which has implications for professionals’ scope of practice.

In Chapter Seven, Nancy Kehoe examines the unique ethical dilemmas faced by religious professionals in dealing with mental health and illness. Some of these are rooted in a lack of understanding of mental illness and its impact on the community; others have to do with the multiple relationships with members of the congregation and lack of objectivity when conflicting concerns emerge. Still others relate to the inevitable boundary crossings and risk of boundary violations, decisions regarding confidentiality, and the situation of being the sole religious leader in the community with unclear guidelines for oversight or accountability.

In Chapter Eight, Don Postema considers the role of religion/spirituality in the work of ethics committees. He reviews the history of ethics committees and consultation, notes the re-emergence of the religious and spiritual in medicine and healthcare, and uses a challenging case to illustrate the need to integrate moral, religious/spiritual, and psychiatric perspectives.

In Chapter Nine, James Lomax and Nathan Carlin discuss the clinical implications of a mental health professional’s personal religion/spirituality by focusing on the example of fundamentalism and the importance of understanding and managing one’s countertransference reactions to the patients whom it has shaped.

Chapter authors in Part Two identify and address ethical challenges involving religion/spirituality in various areas of psychiatric practice: outpatient (Morgan Medlock and David Rosmarin), inpatient (Shad Ali and Abraham Nussbaum), geriatric psychiatry (John Peteet), community psychiatry (Tony Benning), consultation liaison (Marta Herschkopf and John Peteet), forensic psychiatry (Michael Norko), child and adolescent psychiatry (Carol Kessler and Mary Lynn Dell), addiction psychiatry (Chris Cook, Eilish Gilvarry, and Andrea Hearn), emergency and disaster psychiatry (Sam Thielman and Glen Goss), disability psychiatry (Bill Gaventa and Mary Lynn Dell), international psychiatry (Walid Sarhan and Alan Fung), psychiatric research (Alexander Moreira-Almeida, Quirino Cordeiro, and Harold Koenig), and psychiatric education (Gerrit Glas).

Given the lack of universally accepted definitions of religion and spirituality, we use the following working definitions in this book: Spirituality refers to one’s relationship to something larger that gives life meaning, and religion refers to a tradition of spiritual beliefs and practices. The two are not identical but often travel together; we recognize this by using the term religion/spirituality wherever appropriate. The term ethics is also subject to various definitions; we use it simply to mean inquiry into what is good and right.

Many of the chapters feature case examples that illustrate the relevance for decision making of medical indications, patient preferences, quality of life, contextual factors, and religion/spirituality in relation to culture. Several contributors use the Jonsen Four Topics (or Four Quadrant) Model in their discussion. The editors have employed this model as a helpful tool for almost three decades to provide a consistent framework for the systematic analysis of ethical dilemmas that have arisen in clinical work—primarily in consultation liaison psychiatry, as well as in work with ethics committees, in general clinical ethics consultations, and in educational sessions with trainees learning and working at many levels in numerous medical disciplines.

The originators of the Four Topics method, Albert R. Jonsen, Mark Siegler, and William J. Winslade, developed this four-part model to bring order and consistency to the way in which ethicists and clinicians consider ethical quandaries. This method is especially helpful when the emotions of patients, family members, and medical care providers risk coloring the understanding of the facts and the true nature of the ethical issues at hand. By working through and identifying the information requested in each section, all individuals involved in a particular dilemma are more likely than not to be assured that what matters most to them is included in ethical analysis and decision making. Although it was not originally intended and is not predominantly used by clinicians concerned with ethical issues at the intersection of psychiatry, ethics, and religion/spirituality, we have found the
Four Topics Model to be very applicable to mental health and ethics quandaries because of its broad conceptualization of personhood.

The first topic or quadrant is Medical Indications. This section focuses on the medical problems at hand and the accompanying diagnostic, therapeutic, and prognostic considerations. Although it is not always the most important contributor to understanding and addressing the ethical quandary, this body of medical/psychiatric information must be understood as well as possible to provide the best conceptual understanding for matters included in the other three sections.

The second topic or quadrant involves Patient Preferences. What does the patient decide or want to do in the current circumstances? If the patient is not able to speak for himself or herself at the time of the consultation or when the ethical quandary arises, has anyone else been authorized to speak for and make decisions on behalf of the patient?

The third topic or quadrant refers to Quality of Life. How does the particular disorder or illness and its treatments affect patients' quality of life and their ability to earn a living, to engage with family and friends as they find meaningful, and to participate in and enjoy what has mattered to them in their lives before, during, and after treatment?

The fourth topic or quadrant considers Contextual Features, the nonmedical but nevertheless significant elements that influence the kinds of decisions patients make for themselves in healthcare settings, as well as how the "system" interacts with patients and their loved ones. This is the quadrant that ensures that finances, legal concerns, social concerns, and other institutional matters relevant to ethical analysis and decision making are not forgotten. It is in this fourth quadrant, Contextual Features, that Jonsen, Siegler, and Winslade placed the reminder for ethicists and clinicians dealing with ethical dilemmas to inquire about religious and spiritual factors that may be influencing clinical decisions.

Religion, Spirituality, and Culture
It is noteworthy that religion/spirituality and culture share an intimate and complex relationship, with important implications for both mental health and ethics. Multiple cultures may practice the same religions, leading to challenges in distinguishing cultural from religious prohibitions (e.g., appropriate dress, accepting treatment from members of other faiths). Multiple religions can co-exist in one culture, and mental health practitioners may encounter problems stemming from their lack of familiarity with differences relative to values regarding health beliefs and practices, child rearing, sexuality, family, and death and dying.

To provide clinicians a framework for organizing cultural information relevant to diagnostic assessment and treatment planning, the Outline for Cultural Formulation (OCF) was introduced in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR) (APA, 2000). In 2013, the DSM-5 updated the OCF and presented an approach to the assessment using the Cultural Formulation Interview (CFI), which has operationalized the process of data collection for the OCR. The revised OCF includes systematic assessment of the following domains: (1) cultural identity of the individual; (2) cultural conceptualization of distress; (3) psychosocial stressors and cultural features of vulnerability and resilience; (4) cultural features of the relationship between the individual and the clinician; and (5) overall cultural assessment (APA, 2013). The CFI contains 16 core questions (with both patient and informant versions) as well as 12 supplementary modules designed to expand on each domain of the core CFI for specific populations.

The core CFI is a 16-item semi-structured interview that follows a person-centered approach to cultural assessment, focusing on the individual's experience and the social contexts of the clinical problem (APA, 2013). The questions cover four domains of assessment: (1) cultural definition of the problem (questions 1-3); (2) cultural perceptions of cause, context, and support (questions 4-10); (3) cultural factors affecting self-coping and past help seeking (questions 11-13); and (4) cultural factors affecting current help seeking (questions 14-16). Questions 6 through 12, 14, and 15 have been regarded as having specific relevance to spirituality/religion (APA, 2013).
In addition, supplementary module 5 of the CFI focuses on Spirituality, Religion, and Moral Traditions, and its 16 questions aim to clarify the influence of spirituality, religion, and other moral or philosophical traditions on the individual’s problems and related stresses. These questions address (1) spiritual, religious, and moral identity; (2) role of spirituality, religion, and moral traditions; (3) relationship to the presenting problem; and (4) potential stresses or conflicts related to spirituality, religion, and moral traditions (APA, 2013).

*Fish, Justice, and Society* by Carmen M. Cusack [Human-Animal Studies, Brill, 9789004373358]

Fish, Justice, and Society is a novel scholarly work that goes in depth into the fishing industry, fish, and aquatic environments. This book delves past the façade of what may be known by the average fisherman, bringing to the surface new information about numerous species and aquatic habitats.

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Excerpt: Fish, Justice, and Society explains intersections between law, culture, tradition, ancient practices, and science. This book also defines "crime" in terms of cruelty, feminism, and other philosophical bases. These analyses suggest that cruelty is a discrete topic defined by codes and cases, and demonstrate that the topic of cruelty can be more expansive. Treaties and laws could prohibit a greater number of actions based on philosophical premises in addition to those already undergirding law and customs.

This book examines fish as an ancient crux of human civilization and shows how humanity, including family life and sexuality, has absorbed the preeminence of fish. "Ancient" civilization is defined by mainstream society in Biblical terms. Though history and prehistory preceded these eras, such as Middle Bronze II, Iron I and II, Hellenistic periods, and the Achaemenid period, Biblical scriptures have informed and shaped modern society’s perception and treatment of fish unlike other influences and sources. It demonstrates how aquaculture and fishing have been central foci within human civilization and exposes the power that they continue to have over contemporary humans’ treatment of and interactions with marine life. Religious interest in fish is a powerful influence and motivator throughout the world. Secularized societies continue to embrace religious philosophies formulated, in part, to maintain ecologically balanced relationships with fish.

International, federal, and state fish and wildlife agencies rely on philosophical principles to formulate and enforce laws binding humans and animals. Although animals are not subject to the law, they may be controlled in their actions and regeneration. Fish and wildlife agencies are not only responsible for animals, their duties may include human trafficking and drug interdiction, traffic stops, and other dangerous activities. For example, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries Enforcement Division agent, Tyler Wheeler, was shot five times during a traffic stop on a road that runs between Arkansas and Louisiana. A patchwork of agentic oversight and enforcement is used in emergency, ad hoc, strategic, and long-term capacities. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), and other relevant means for controlling people, waterways, aquatic
environments, and animals are discussed throughout the book.

Habitat destruction is a global problem. Fish, Justice, and Society examines how widespread marine habitat destruction can affect seemingly unrelated species, such as white tigers managed by U.S. Fish and Wildlife. Domestic affairs include the Keystone pipeline, customs enforcement in gateway cities, natural disasters, and gangs. International problems affected by habitat destruction include Native villages in Latin America, endangered species in Asia, African politics, and compromise to endemic biodiversity in Australia.

The popularity and necessity of strong fish and wildlife regulation cannot be overstated. Agencies protect the environment, human health, natural resources, international peace, and the American way of life. The public’s invitation to expand their power, or at a minimum maintain their public presence, is evident in reality television shows (e.g., Whale Wars, Coast Guard Alaska, and Water Cops Miami). For example, Water Cops Miami explores the collaboration between City of Miami Marine Patrol, Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, U.S. Coast Guard, Special Ops Maritime Security, and other agencies. City of Miami Police may be asked by the U.S. Coast Guard or customs to dive to search a vessel for contraband (e.g., a Haitian fishing vessel). U.S. Army Special Forces may take their course, Special Ops Maritime Security, to give them special skills to work outside the Army. Working with the military allows them to share resources and solidifies their importance to national security at a time when national security is a hot-button issue.

International interest in collaborating with U.S. agencies has reached a zenith, yet the crescendo continues. In 2012, President Barrack Obama organized a Presidential Task Force on Wildlife Trafficking. Senior representatives from the following departments were ordered to participate in the task force: Department of the Treasury, Department of Defense, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Transportation, Department of Homeland Security, United States Agency for International Development, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Security Staff, Domestic Policy Council, Council on Environmental Quality, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Office of Management and Budget, Office of the United States Trade Representative, as well as other agencies and offices designated by co-chairs.

The Office of the President has been influential in maintaining Americans’ interest in fishing. On November 14, 2016, President Obama expressed his remorse that Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton allegedly had not been elected to the Office of the President. He regretted that despite campaigning by diverse groups and individuals, the voices of more people attending fish fries had not been heard. He described fish fries as being part of "grassroots" politics as well as political structures that "build state parties and local parties". Fish fries are a cornerstone of American communities, and therefore politics. Throughout his presidency, he often complained about divisiveness and people’s unwillingness to listen to his good ideas. One reason was that "good ideas don’t matter if people don’t hear them". His comments refocused Americans on the importance of staying loyal to Clinton by maintaining their family lives and local culture. Fish fries represent positive change and a place to exercise constitutional rights.

Fish symbolize destruction. They have been used by gangs as symbols for drugs and human trafficking relating to fishing vessels. Fish symbolize illegal and insulting depictions of sex, gender, sexuality, and sexual conduct. They symbolize harm caused by consuming them; and they cause harm to fishermen, communities, and nations unable properly to regulate them.

Nuanced uses of fish reveal undertones present in psychological attitudes toward fish and marine life. For example, the delicacy caviar is a form of gendercide used to nourish humans and as a beauty treatment (e.g., caviar shampoos and facials). Fish may be used in tubs to remove foot callouses, and their body parts may be sold for medicinal purposes (e.g., fertility treatments). These uses offer insight into humans’ envy of fish, one possible reason for their consumption.

Folklore, dreams, and other sources of revelatory vision influence policy. American folklore (e.g.,
Noah’s ark) has influenced domestic attitudes and strategies. Foreign folklore discussed throughout this book normalizes outside perspectives in this context to demonstrate how humans have developed civilization to include and rely on fishing. The ocean is inextricable from human civilization.

*Fish, Justice, and Society* is ordered based on the flow of topics. Flow is an essential attribute of the ocean. Seashell ribs, the moon, and salt all contribute to flow in special ways (Genesis 2:21-24). Relationships between these massive forces are invidient to an untrained eye, and yet, the flow between these forces is a critical component of life and survival on Earth. Each marine and aquatic organism contributes a specialty toward the survival of the ecosystem.

In conglomerate, each force develops a specialty, which is a system; and that system is a force, and so on.

These chapters represent that flow and piecemeal approach to survival. Chapter One: Black Markets deals with crime. It is distinct from, and therefore followed by Chapter Two: Crime. The crimes discussed in each chapter differentiate humans from animals. Many of the crimes described in Chapter One are against laws made to protect animals. However, Chapter Two’s crimes include rape and burglary, which are human crimes, not animals’ wrongdoings or crimes against animals, per se.

Chapter Three: International discusses international topics found in Chapter One, but with a legal gaze toward authority and procedure. Chapter Four: Human Victimization spots Chapter Two when discussing violation of the human body aboard sea vessels. It does not directly follow-up Chapter Two because the premise of international authority and law above and beyond a nation’s reach must be described in detail. Chapter Five: Vessels paints a picture of a ship as an inanimate object and as a body on a body of water. The ship is the vessel, but so are the sailors. Chapter Six: Regulations reinforces the law undergirding each topic and reminds readers of the importance of preserving life.

Chapter Seven: Treaties and Foreign Fishing toggles between Chapters One, Three, and Six while setting-up readers for information about Natives and other sensitive subjects. The topics cannot be collated directly without establishing proper sensitivities. Chapter Eight: Grassroots establishes that sensitivity in order to inform readers about the War Against Animals. This bellicose chapter is not insinuative of peace as much as it serves as a warning about how humans are willing to take law and lead future generations to respect all of nature. Chapter Nine: Structures reclaims waterways exploited by humans by reminding readers not to draw negative inferences about the progress that humankind has made on behalf of humanity, animals, and the environment. Structures evidence a willingness to participate in the ecosystem.

Chapter Ten: Interdiction sadly portrays a web of its own. Chapter Eleven: Conflicts turns the tables to portray another type of web—one in which humans are shown to be overrated and underprepared.

Chapter Twelve: Education convinces audiences that with just the right strides and backing, humanity can overcome ignorance with enlightenment. Chapter Thirteen: Speech rouses audiences by cutting into their psyches to show why perhaps all of these regulations and inferences are necessary. Perhaps humans are depraved, envious, and belittling. Perhaps humans need greater education in all regards. Chapter Fourteen: Sexual Depictions proves that by showing the role of depictions in human culture.

Like fertility, humans appropriate their own sex and other animals’ sex for commerce. This is why chapters on human sexuality are followed by Chapter Fifteen: Business. Chapter Sixteen: Aquaculture follows the flow of business-mindedness; and points to serious problems with commerce. Chapter Seventeen: Reproduction is the most important chapter because emotional stakes are highest here. Animals’ voices can be heard crying-out through the pages for humans to stop, and they must. Chapter Eighteen: Gendercide is a logical follow-up and reflects on male suffering. Chapter Nineteen: Beauty insults women, who use other animals’ eggs for beauty products; and makes mention of dear, sweet creatures utilized as
tools without proper treatment or guarantees for future comfort.

Chapter Twenty: Protectors grasps readers from sallow depths and lunges them forward with victorious hearts. Here, sharks, defenders of the ocean, are discussed. This flow from Chapter Nineteen is necessary to wake readers. Chapter Twenty One: Psychosocial Motives and Beliefs taps deeply into human fears to rouse them from beliefs about sharks that may be thwarting them from actively engaging their fellow humans to prevent them from entering the ocean.

Chapter Twenty Two: Recreation reprieves humans, who dignifiedly participate in boating culture and other activities that contribute to animals’ well-being, not detract from it (Figure 1). Chapter Twenty Three: Natives solidly convinces Natives that Americans ought to leave Native rituals and lands to Natives. This is an important follow-up to Recreation because it shows that educated persons can distinguish recreation from what Natives do (e.g., subsistence). Chapter Twenty Four: Japan splashes onto the pages to bring forth new life after a dour tome to past wrongs and historical errors. No doubt Japan plays the biggest role in the export of raw fish to American culture, and this is why this chapter is so important to follow-up behind Chapter Twenty Three: Natives. Chapter Twenty Five: Poison describes a pufferfish, who is a poisonous fish eaten in Japan. The reference here is inextricable because of their promotion of this risky food choice. Chapter Twenty Six: Technology hints that all technology may not be poisonous as has been claimed by older generations struggling to maintain control over fishing and commerce. Chapter Twenty Seven: Sharks is about guarding, a logical follow-up to Chapter Twenty Six. The book concludes with Chapter Twenty Eight: Seabirds, an homage to friends far-off, who watch from shore and far above the sea to make sure that everything is OK.

Fish, Justice, and Society is about the fabric of human existence. It relates to fish intrinsically and serves intermediately between fish and other Earthlings. The purpose of this book is to explore relationships. The purpose is served when students, professionals, scholars, and readers absorb the information and apply the lessons for the benefit of fish and other creatures. Fish, Justice, and Society cannot be acknowledged without experiencing compassion for aquatic species and relevant friends and aids, who are sometimes human. This book is a standalone work, but also complements other works, such as C. M. Cusack, Fish in the Bible: Psychosocial Analysis of Contemporary Meanings, Values, and Effects of Christian Symbolism [Vernon Press, 9781622732357], which acknowledges the complexity of human perspectives on fish. <>

In Crimes Against Humanity in the 21st Century, Dr Robert Dubler SC and Matthew Kalyk provide a comprehensive analysis of crimes against humanity in international criminal law, including an analysis of its history, its present definition and its raison d’être.

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Excerpt: A crime may be said to be “against humanity” when the very fact that a fellow human being could conceive and commit it demeans all members of the human race, wherever they live and whatever their culture or creed. It not only deserves but demands punishment, irrespective of time (it can never be forgiven) or place – hence a universal jurisdiction arises to hold perpetrators to account. It includes genocide, and mass murder or systematic torture when authorised by a political power, and it imputes liability not only to heads of state and to military or political commanders (irrespective of immunity or amnesty), but to bureaucrats, ideologues, propagandists and others complicit in its commission. It is a crime so outrageous that the international community is obliged by its own law to intervene, irrespective of state sovereignty, to ensure that it is stopped and that its perpetrators are eventually punished.

The crime against humanity now has a 21st Century legal definition, embedded in Article 7 of the Rome Treaty of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which covers any “widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population pursuant to a state or organisational policy.” This definition, and other elements and consequences of the crime, have received detailed explication in the judgements of a number of international courts and tribunals, and from regional human rights courts and local supreme courts. There have been commentaries from many distinguished jurists, mostly since the 1990’s when the crime shed any necessary connection with war and thus became available for use against states and statespeople who direct internal oppression. One of the great merits of this book, written by and for legal practitioners, is that it accurately analyses all these precedents and works them into a coherent exposition of the international criminal law that has emerged today, seventy years on from the judgement at Nuremberg.

I was, by happenstance, born on the very day of that judgement, so the length of my life is a measure of the time taken so far to fulfil its promise that perpetrators of great crimes will eventually be held to account. This began well enough, with that great post-war human rights triptych of 1948-49 – the Genocide Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions – followed in later years by the ‘good conventions’ against torture and apartheid and mistreatment of women and of children. But none had enforcement mechanisms – as someone noted when surveying the killing fields of Rwanda, “the road to hell is paved with good conventions.” As a student in the 70’s I joined Amnesty and wrote grovelling letters – which was all you could do – to Amin and Pinochet and other mass-murderers, begging them to desist. The letters were never answered, although a quarter of a century later I did have the satisfaction of filing a brief for Human Rights Watch against Pinochet when he was arrested in London in 1999. This had been made possible by a new interest in global justice, sparked when the UN established criminal courts in 1994 to punish crimes against humanity in the Balkans (the ICTY) and in Rwanda (the ICTR). At the fag-end of a century in which 150 million lives had been lost through war and repression, it was as if the millennium had ushered in a new trend in international affairs – justice, rather than diplomatic expediency. Tyrants who might previously have been induced to leave the bloody stage only with an amnesty in their back pocket and their Swiss bank accounts intact might now face trial in an international court for crimes against humanity.

The trend continued into the 21st century, creating precedents and forensic practices as Milošević, Karadžić and Mladić, Charles Taylor and Hissène Habré, and hundreds of their accomplices were indicted at courts in The Hague and elsewhere. The UN court in Sierra Leone, of which I was the first President, decided that recruiting children for war was such a crime, and that prosecution for other crimes against humanity could not be avoided by pleading an amnesty. The ICTR and ICTY became active in fine-tuning the law and extending its liability to accomplices – councillors and politicians and propagandists. Thus the development of international criminal law proceeded at a fast pace (although the trials themselves were slow and laborious). The process seemed, by 2011, to have become established as an element of international peace-keeping: that was when the Security Council unanimously authorised “all necessary means” to stop Colonel Gaddafi from taking further lives of his own people in Libya. This was pursuant to its...
‘responsibility to protect’ obligation to protect victims from crimes against humanity being committed by their own government. The ICC prosecutor, after the Security Council referred the situation in Libya, speedily indicted Gaddafi, his son Saif and his spymaster Senussi. But 2011 was the high-watermark of humanitarian intervention. The International Criminal Court’s actions against Gaddafi created over-optimistic expectations for international justice, exemplified by the first peaceful protestors in Damascus, with their banners reading “Assad to The Hague”. After his brutal forces had killed 800 of them in the first few months I wrote an article for The Independent urging that the situation in Syria should be referred to the ICC by the Security Council. Of course it was not – the Russians threatened to veto, anxious to protect their naval base in the Mediterranean, and by now 450,000 have been killed while half of Syria’s people are internally or externally displaced. Assad has gotten away with it, and the message is all too clear: no perpetrator with big-power support in a pole-axed Security Council will be sent for trial at an international court any time soon. As for the intervention in Libya, that country has gone from bad under Gaddafi to worse under his violent and warring successors: it has not passed without notice, in North Korea and elsewhere, that had the Colonel developed weapons of mass destruction, and in particular a nuclear bomb, NATO would have been reluctant to intervene.

The cause of international justice is not helped by the resurgence of support for state sovereignty, reflected in the rhetoric of Donald Trump, the UK vote for Brexit, and the election of inward-looking nationalist parties in Poland and Hungary. Nor has it been assisted by all the African states – Chad, Malawi, the Congo, South Africa, Uganda, Djibouti and Kenya – which have thumbed their nose at the ICC by welcoming Omar-Al-Bashir, head of state of the Sudan, despite his indictment for genocide and crimes against humanity. The authors of this book carefully explain the ICC reaction (p.224 et seq) but their work has gone to press before the latest Bashir travel embarrassment: on 23rd November 2017 he was welcomed in Sochi by President Putin, who actually sent a Russian VIP plane to bring him into the country to sign an agreement to purchase a Russian nuclear power station. This was the first real defiance by a ‘Big 5’ power, and it demonstrates all too clearly the current lack of respect for the Court.

Notwithstanding the current travails of international criminal courts, the crime against humanity is an important concept which judges and diplomats, journalists and politicians must understand. It is not only a basis for international prosecution, but an argument for extradition of perpetrators as it is an argument for asylum made on behalf of persons likely to be subjected to it. It is a matter for policymakers always to take into account in international relations. The popular reversion to notions of sovereignty will not affect demands for Magnitsky laws (adopted so far in the US, Canada and several European countries) under which individuals implicated in crimes against humanity are denied entry, have their bank accounts frozen and (in some models) are refused entry for their parents to go to hospitals or their children to have private schooling. Magnitsky laws must be passed by national parliaments and applied by a national tribunal so they do not involve international criminal jurisdiction, but make use of its principles and precedents in order for the state to sanction those believed to have abetted international crimes.

There will, then, be many occasions for determining whether a crime against humanity has taken place, and given the looseness of the political rhetoric in which the phrase is frequently to be found it will be important to adhere to the definitions and qualifications in what is now a developed customary law. There are still “grey areas” of course – does the requirement of an “organisational policy” include ISIS (at least when it has territory) but not the mafia? ... and so on. But the full scope of the law, and most of its questions, are settled coolly and comprehensibly in a book which will be of great assistance to practitioners. The authors are right to survey the pre-Nuremberg history and to analyse some of the lesser Nuremberg cases – involving Nazi judges and industrialists and propagandists, which remain important precedents. The fin-de-siècle story, of how liability for crimes against humanity was extracted from its war context in the Nuremberg
The charter and developed as a free-standing rule of international criminal law, is well told.

The authors’ warning that the rule is one of international law, and should respect its requirements of sufficient state practice and juristic approval, is important at a time when international justice must inch its way forward against populist suspicion of being an incursion on sovereignty. Those appointed as international judges, especially if they have a human rights background, can be all too willing to extend the law to cover behaviour which is appalling but was not criminal by international standards at the time it was committed. My appeal court in Sierra Leone had to decide in 2004 whether it was an international crime in 1996 to recruit children for front-line fighting. At that time there was no state practice to make it a crime, and indeed the defendant, Hinga Norman, had himself been recruited by the British army at the age of 14. My colleagues, over-concerned that it should be a crime held (mistakenly, as later cases have shown) that it was indeed a crime by 1996. I dissented, pointing out that state practice was only sufficient by 2002, when the ICC statute outlawing child recruitment came into force. I was described — correctly if not always favourably — as a “moderate positivist”. Moderate positivism is, I believe, the way forward for international criminal law, and this book will greatly assist that process, by its systemic analysis of all the precedents we can now be positive about.

On 5 December 2003, an Australian MP stated ‘[o]ur government is engaged in a continuing crime against humanity’. The statement was made in respect of the Australian government’s policy of mandatory detention of asylum seekers prior to the determination of their claims for asylum. Of course, one may think that this is just another example of the label ‘crime against humanity’ being used as a rhetorical figure of speech and outside its strict or technical meaning in international law. The term has been used to describe terrorist attacks, policies of assimilation, and the destruction of the social safety net. It appears the term can be used to describe anything which outrages us.

Yet, there is often more to it than rhetoric. Australian barrister, Julian Burnside Qc, as well as various other academics have made submissions to the International Criminal Court (ICC) that the Australian Government’s policy is in fact a ‘crime against humanity’ as defined in Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute). By parity of reasoning, then-President George Bush may also have committed crimes against humanity by the United States’ detention of persons at Guantánamo Bay. Likewise with the imprisonment of American nationals of Japanese descent during the Second World War by then-President Roosevelt makes him guilty of this international crime along with the Nazi leaders.

Crimes against humanity is a mechanism by which the perpetrators of some of the worst atrocities may be held to account by the international community. At the same time, however, adopting an overly broad and insufficiently rigorous interpretation of crimes against humanity has the potential to delegitimise the significance of the crime, undermine the confidence that it will be applied correctly by courts and dissuade states from supporting international institutions such as the ICC. Today, this constraint upon leaders of State Parties to the ICC Statute, such as the United Kingdom, France and Australia, would appear to depend upon the proper interpretation of Article 7 of the ICC Statute. Similarly, the constraint upon former state leaders who are not parties to the ICC Statute such as Henry Kissinger or George Bush Senior may depend upon the right of other states to prosecute for committing a ‘crime against humanity’.

One difficulty lies in the fact that, unlike the crime of genocide, for instance, the definition of crimes against humanity is not set out in any one treaty. The crime is one of customary international law that has been implemented differently in different settings. The ICC Statute is one and perhaps the most prominent statute – others include the statutes of the World War II tribunals (the London Charter, the Tokyo Charter, Allied Control Council Law No 10), the statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals created by the UN Security Council (the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) and the statutes of the various other hybrid tribunals including in Sierra Leone, East Timor and Cambodia. Appendix 1 sets out the definitions of the crime in each of these international or ‘hybrid’ instruments and the definition in the ILC 1996 Draft Code. In addition the right to invoke universal jurisdiction over those accused of committing crimes against humanity remains controversial in theory and difficult in practice.

Another difficulty lies in the loose concepts contained in definition of crimes against humanity, such as a ‘widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population’ and a ‘State or organizational policy to commit such attack’. Many questions remain: how many victims need to be killed for an attack to be ‘widespread or systematic’, what determines whether a group of people are a ‘population’ or a ‘civilian’ population, and what kinds of actors can have the requisite ‘State or organizational policy’.

It is often said that mankind needs a faith if the world is to be improved. In fact, unless the faith is vigilantly and regularly checked by a sense of man’s fallibility, it is likely to make the world worse. David Cecil, Library Looking-Glass: A Personal Anthology (1975)

The label, a ‘crime against humanity’, has been used by commentators, but less frequently by states, to describe a vast array of different human rights abuses, including terrorist attacks, policies of assimilation and the destruction of the social safety net. It appears sometimes that the term can be used to describe anything which outrages us.

Part of the difficulty is that ‘crimes against humanity’ as defined in Article 7 of the ICC Statute or the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) contains loose concepts that are susceptible to a range of interpretations and are readily applicable to a range of circumstances. For example, the meaning of concepts such as a ‘widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population’ and a ‘State or organizational policy to commit such attack’ are far from clear in international law. Whilst the ad hoc

Tribunals have made substantial progress in elucidating principles that guide the crime’s meaning, those pronouncements are in the context of their own statutory definitions and factual situations and form only one part of a larger body of sources from which the law is to be drawn. There is the Nuremberg Charter, the Tokyo Charter and Allied Control Council Law No. 10, the Jurisprudence and origin, the many hybrid tribunals such as Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo and Cambodia, as well as states’ own legislation and jurisprudence and sources such as the International Law Commission.

It remains a complex and difficult exercise to identify with precision the ‘correct meaning’ of crimes against humanity’ under international law.

One has a sense that the concept of ‘crimes against humanity’ cannot, and should not, be reduced to just a dry exercise of construing international law. There is a desire to uncover the essence of the concept, to state why it is that ‘crimes against humanity’ are important and to identify what the concept aims to protect. ‘Crimes against humanity’ must be something more than just the sum of the definitions in treaties, such as Article 7 of the ICC Statute. This text has sought to address this issue; to explore: whether there is some overarching theory of crimes against humanity? What is distinctive about crimes against humanity? and How are they different from other kinds of evil conduct such as ordinary domestic crimes or human rights abuses?

The answer is not to be found merely in a literal reading of the text of Article 7. Nor is the answer to be found in using so-called ‘purposive’ reasoning based on notions such as human rights and human dignity to expand the definition of crimes against humanity to address as many wrongs as possible. Without understanding the history and raison d’être of crimes against humanity, such an approach is unhelpful. It does not identify in what way crimes against humanity seeks to protect and preserve human rights.

The authors suggest that what is needed is an historical review of crimes against humanity – dating back from antiquity through to the present day – to understand the context in which crimes against humanity has arisen, the legal constraints
upon their operation and to isolate what it is that defines a crime against humanity and its role in the international legal order.

An Historical Approach to Crimes against Humanity

One trend in the discussion of crimes against humanity has been to focus solely on the fact that the crime seeks to protect the victims of atrocities and to punish the perpetrators. Another trend has been to seek to distance the modern definition from Nuremberg based on the view that such a definition was historical only, is outdated and 'shackles' the modern definition of crimes against humanity. What a historical view of crimes against humanity reveals, however, is that to adopt such an approach is to see only one side of a more complex equation.

Crimes against humanity is not simply a crime. The 'chapeau element' came to replace the war nexus as the jurisdictional threshold or the so-called 'international element' that distinguished crimes against humanity from domestic crimes and meant that international institutions could intervene. It is a permissive rule of international criminal jurisdiction which allows the international community – by way of the Security Council or potentially the ICC – to exercise criminal jurisdiction and stand in judgment over crimes committed by that state against its own nationals even where the state does not consent.

It is not only the protection of victims that has been central to discussions on crimes against humanity, but also concerns about state sovereignty and international intervention. From the moment Grotius in the seventeenth century, asserted a right of foreign states to prosecute for crimes against the law of nations, objection has been made against the concept of crimes against humanity on the ground that it may lead to pretextual and unjustified interference in the affairs of other states. At Nuremberg, crimes against humanity was thrust into the realm of international law to justify the Allies' assertion of jurisdiction over the crimes committed by defeated German authorities against their own people. And, a long history of rules from Charles i to Slobodan Milošević to Hissène Habré has refused to recognise the authority of a court to try them for their atrocity crimes. Trials for crimes against humanity are necessarily associated with both foreign intervention and the leaders of the losing state ending up in the dock.

Before Nuremberg, the notion of a crime against humanity was best conceptualised as being founded – philosophically and historically – in the concept of humanitarian intervention and the idea that there are certain values which are both universal to the human condition and ultimately superior to the state and any of its laws such that intervention was justified. After Nuremberg, that changed. While the crime was crystallised into a norm of customary international law, the Allies rejected the conceptual foundation of humanitarian intervention and instead limited the ambit of crimes against humanity to crimes committed pursuant to an aggressive war waged by Axis powers. As de Vabres, the French judge at Nuremberg wrote, ‘[t]he theory of “crimes against humanity” is dangerous: ...dangerous for the States because it offers a pretext to intervention by a State in the internal affairs of weaker States'. The Allies had firmly in mind the concern that Hitler himself had invoked the doctrine of humanitarian intervention to justify his invasion of Czechoslovakia and they were concerned that states may use the assertion of crimes against humanity to unduly and inappropriately interfere in the affairs of other states (including themselves).

The result was that crimes against humanity was severed from its origin in humanitarian intervention and its future application was stifled by the requirement that it was only able to be prosecuted when committed in connection with an act of aggression. Despite being an ad hoc (and perhaps even unprincipled) requirement, the war nexus was a very deliberate limit on what would otherwise have been an incredibly broad principle of international jurisdiction over the ordinary crimes committed by citizens of foreign states within the territory of that foreign state. As Justice Jackson stated at the London Conference:

[O]rdinarily we do not consider that the acts of a government towards its own citizens warrant our interference. We have some regrettable circumstances at times in our country in which minorities are unfairly
treated. We think it is justifiable that we interfere or attempt to bring retribution to individuals or to states only because the concentration camps and the deportations were in pursuance of a common plan or enterprise of making an unjust or illegal war in which we became involved. We see no other basis on which we are justified in reaching the atrocities which were committed inside Germany, under German law, or even in violation of German law, by authorities of the German state.

It should not be forgotten that the Nuremberg precedent emerged at around the same time as the UN Charter, which enacted strong provisions prohibiting the use of force and enshrining the principle of non-intervention in the purely domestic affairs of other states. Aside from self-defence, the critical exception to these prohibitions concerned action authorised by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in circumstances where there is considered to be a ‘threat to peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression’ such that measures would be justified to ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’.

Between Nuremberg and the 1990s, the international community grappled with how the law of crimes against humanity could be modernised and its application expanded outside the limited context of an international armed conflict. It is often forgotten that, throughout this period, the potential definitions varied significantly and no clear consensus was reached upon a suitable replacement for the war nexus. It was not until the 1990s, with the drafting of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes and the establishment of those ad hoc tribunals by the UN Security Council that the ‘widespread and/or systematic attack against a civilian population’ formulation started to crystallise as the candidate most worthy of states’ consideration as a replacement for the war nexus.

At the same time as this debate as to crimes against humanity was occurring, the UN Security was also coming to terms with the way in which it exercised its powers and the circumstances in which it considered its intervention appropriate, i.e., deemed there to be threats to international peace and security warranting intervention. Most significantly, between 1991 and 1998, there was a reinterpretation of the notion of ‘threats to international peace’ by the Security Council so that it could encompass an atrocity purely internal to one state. An international consensus emerged that an internal atrocity of sufficient scale and seriousness and of a particular quality will amount to a threat to international peace under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In deciding when intervention was required or appropriate, the Security Council was required to conduct a similar balancing exercise to crimes against humanity – namely, to protect both the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention as well as to prevent the occurrence of large-scale atrocities.

It was in this context that, in 1993 and 1994, the Security Council adopted the test of a ‘widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population’ as central to establish a crime against humanity in times of peace in the context of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes. Viewed in its historical context, this test was intended serve as a replacement to the war nexus, that would set out the circumstances in which intervention by way of the establishment of international jurisdiction over crimes against humanity was warranted in times of peace.

At the Rome Conference, the representatives of the international community considered this definition in the context of the world’s first permanent international criminal court. The same questions arose as had arisen at Nuremberg – how could the application of the crime be extended beyond Nuremberg while at the same time provide states with appropriate protection from undue intervention from foreign states? The result of the ICC Statute was that the ambit of prosecution for crimes against humanity was again limited in the interests of striking a balance between the protection of victims and the protecting state sovereignty.

While the ICC Statute was enacted and the ICC created, the ICC itself was constrained in important ways. Rather than endorsing a model of universal jurisdiction, bringing a matter before the Court requires either a state’s consent to be bound by the ICC Statute or a UN Security Council resolution.
Even then, a case will not proceed unless it is of a certain gravity and the relevant state is unwilling or unable to prosecute. Further, the definition of crimes against humanity was itself consciously limited by the states involved. The term ‘attack’ was defined to mean ‘a course of conduct involving one or more acts of a kind referred to in Article 7(1)’ to emphasise that a certain scale was required and the attack was required to be committed pursuant to a ‘State or organizational policy’.

To understand just how invasive states considered the potential exercise of international jurisdiction over their nationals to be, it is necessary only to look at the reluctance of states to sign up to the ICC Statute, or the way in which states have addressed the issues involved with prosecuting crimes against humanity, such as: universal jurisdiction, immunities, the obligation to extradite or prosecute and the legality of amnesties. The criticism which states such as Spain and Belgium have attracted for their broad exercise of universal jurisdiction is indicative of the way in which states view the exercise of jurisdiction over their nationals. Most notoriously, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld threatened to move NATO’s headquarters out of Brussels unless the Belgian law was rescinded.

Accordingly, the modern definition of crimes against humanity can be seen as the mechanism by which – like the war nexus at Nuremberg and like ‘threats to international peace’ in the UN Charter – a balance is effected between the interests of state sovereignty and human rights. It requires that the crime reaches such a level of international concern as to warrant international intervention by way of the establishment of international criminal jurisdiction over persons in respect of crimes in peacetime. With that historical background and function in mind, consideration may be given to how that balance is to be effected by the concept of ‘crimes against humanity’.

The ‘Humanity’ Principle
There are various theories about the concept of crimes against humanity which focus on there being an attack against ‘humanity’. There are number of competing ideas and these can be grouped into four schools of thought.

First, there is the view that the essence of the crime is that there has been an affront to the victim’s humanity, meaning that quality which we all share and which makes us human. The offence’s defining feature under this theory is the value they injure, namely human-ness. It is an international crime because this universal value is attacked. De Menthon, the French prosecutor at Nuremberg, supported this view, saying the offences are ‘crimes against the human status’. Egon Schwelb’s influential early account of Nuremberg also thought humanity was likely being used as a synonym for ‘humaneness’. This theory is grounded in natural law notions of universal right and wrong. Apart from the obvious problem of vagueness, the core problem with this theory is that it ‘seems at once too weak and too undiscriminating’. It would cover, for example, any and all cases of murder, rape or serious assault.

Secondly, to counter the unwieldy breadth of this theory of crimes against humanity, there is a further school of thought which suggests that the essence of the offence is that the victim is selected by virtue of belonging to a ‘persecuted group’. The defining feature of the offence is that the crimes take place pursuant to a policy of persecution. Hence, isolated or random acts are excluded. According to Hannah Arendt, the value which is being protected is that of human diversity, without which the very words ‘mankind’ or ‘humanity’ would be devoid of meaning. An attack upon the Jews in Europe is a crime against humanity because ‘mankind in its entirety’ is ‘grievously hurt and endangered’. If left unpunished then ‘no people on earth’ can feel sure of their continued existence.

The main problem with this theory of crimes against humanity is that it is too discriminating and too limiting. It does not address any attack on ‘humanity’, but only those motivated by racial or other prejudices. It has the further difficulty that, while having been included in various formulations of crimes against humanity up to the 1990s and specifically included in the definition of crimes against humanity in the statute of the ICTR, state practice supporting such a restriction is limited.

The wane of the need for a discriminatory motive has led to a revised version of this second school of
thought. This has involved an expansion of the notion of a ‘persecuted group’. According to David Luban, the crime’s defining aspect is that victims are targeted by a ‘political organization’ based on their membership of a group or ‘population’ rather than any individual characteristic. Here, ‘population’, as confirmed in the case law of the ad hoc Tribunals, simply means either a group whose features mark it out for persecution or simply any collection of people who may inhabit some geographic area under the control of a political organisation. Therefore, ‘crimes against humanity assault one particular aspect of human being, namely our character as political animals’. We have a universal need to live socially, but because we cannot live without politics, we exist under the permanent threat that ‘politics will turn cancerous’.

The essence of the offence, based on this theory, is that there is an organised or systematic attack by one ‘group’ on another ‘group’. Luban argues that if the attack is ‘directed’ against such a body, rather than the personal attributes of the individuals, there is no need for a large body of victims, or indeed, more than one victim. Luban’s reasoning, however, is too subtle and does not convincingly explain our instinctive reaction to the evil that accompanies a ‘crime against humanity’. When rebel forces in 1999 attacked Freetown in Sierra Leone, leading to the indiscriminate abduction of thousands of children so that they could become child soldiers or sex slaves, it just does not capture the essence of the atrocity to say that it was an attack against ‘our character as political animals’.

Further complications arise with the related notion that a crime against humanity cannot be committed where individuals are targeted on the basis of their individual attributes. An oft-cited passage from the ICTY Trial Chamber judgment in Limaj provides that ‘the targeting of a select group of civilians – for example, the targeted killing of a number of political opponents’ cannot constitute a crime against humanity. This decision requires important qualification and, fundamentally, hinges on the proper interpretation to be given to the word ‘population’. It seems incongruous to say that a deliberate decision by a head of state to kill, say, 200 dissidents selected by reason of their unique leadership qualities is not a crime against humanity because they do not form a ‘population’, but a totally indiscriminate attack on a small village for purposes unrelated to the inhabitants’ individual characteristics and which also leaves 200 dead is a crime against humanity.

Thirdly, there is the school of thought which focuses not just on the victim’s humanity, but on the need for an ‘added dimension of cruelty and barbarism’ to be displayed by the perpetrator. This locates the essence of the crime in the added degree of heinousness involved in participating in such an attack, as opposed to an ordinary criminal act. This leads to difficult issues of proof for the prosecution, as occurred in the Canadian case of Finta, which adopted this test and was heavily criticised at the time for that reason. Such a theory is still too indiscriminate because, as has been observed, such a notion could just as easily cover cruel treatment of animals or child abuse.

Under Article 7 of the ICC Statute, there is the special mens rea of knowing involvement in a ‘widespread or systematic attack’. Sources up to the Rome Conference of 1998 were far from clear on the issue. Whilst the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR were silent on the matter, Finta was followed by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Tadić without analysis, probably because an alibi defence was raised rather than any question of intent. The special mens rea requirement was then incorporated into Article 7 as few States pushed for an offence less onerous than that set out in the Tadić Trial Judgment. Justice Cory in Finta stated that there needed to be a special mens rea because:

[t]he degree of moral turpitude that attaches to crimes against humanity and war crimes must exceed that of the domestic offences of manslaughter and robbery. It follows that the accused must be aware of the conditions which render his or her actions more blameworthy than the domestic offence.

This rationale has been repeated by Robinson (who was part of the Canadian delegation at the Rome Conference), other scholars, the Appeals Chamber in Tadić and the Peruvian Supreme Court in Fujimori.
It is not entirely persuasive to argue that the moral culpability of the perpetrator of crimes against humanity is, or ought to be, greater than that for perpetrators of domestic crimes. If one considers the many diverse defendants that have been charged with crimes against humanity, they have not all been high ranking state officials. The 17-year-old Nazi recruit or the villager who joins a militia in East Timor does not necessarily act in a more ‘heinous’ manner than the ordinary rapist or murderer. It is not correct to say that a person convicted of, say, murder, as a crime against humanity deserves significantly greater punishment than one convicted of the domestic crime of murder (albeit there may be some level of greater culpability in knowing that their actions further a larger scale atrocity). As Richard Vernon puts it:

We cannot suppose that the most inhumane results (however measured) reflect the most subjectively measured inhumanity. There is no reason why a middle-level administrator of genocide must be more “inhumane” than, say, a serial rapist, or even a sadistic teacher. It is the special political circumstances which bring forth crimes against humanity, not the heinousness of the acts themselves. For example, until Milošević fermented a culture of hate, Tadić, the ordinary café owner, may never have taken to torturing his fellow Bosnians. It is more convincing to regard any threshold test as needing to look to these broader political circumstances of crimes against humanity rather than merely describing a special type of evil conduct as displayed by the perpetrator.

Fourthly, and most persuasively, there is the theory or school of thought that puts forward as the defining aspect of the crime that of scale and seriousness. A crime against humanity must ‘shock the conscience of humanity’ which, as understood in the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, primarily does so because of its magnitude and gravity. It is set apart from ordinary inhumanities by its grossness. An attack of sufficient ferocity, seriousness and scale means the domestic legal order is left behind and it is the international community as a whole which is being threatened. A single murder may be a domestic crime but when there is an attack involving a thousand murders an ‘international’ crime arises. This is the theory put forward in a number of cases such as Eichmann and the Justice Case.

If the focus is on the extent of the harm done to victims, not the level of wrongdoing displayed by the perpetrator, then the concept of scale in this fourth school of thought begins to have some traction. The Preamble to the ICC Statute speaks of the need to respond to ‘unimaginable’ atrocities.

It is impossible to think that the authors did not have in mind large-scale crimes as judged by their effect on victims.

This view, properly, raises the important question of whether a minimum level of scale and seriousness is required for a crime against humanity. Many commentators reject the notion that there must be a minimum number of victims before an international interest is warranted. Luban, for example has argued as follows:

To assert that only large-scale horrors warrant international interest reverts to the very fetishism of state sovereignty that the Nuremberg Charter rightly rejected. The assertion implies that small-scale, government inflicted atrocities remain the business of national sovereigns – that a government whose agents, attacking a small community as a matter of deliberate policy, forcibly impregnate only one woman, or compel only one father to witness the torture of his child, retains its right to be left alone. These are profoundly cynical conclusions, and it will do no credit to the Rome Statute if the ICC accedes to them by interpreting the requirement of multiple acts to mean many acts. Fortunately, “multiple” might be read to mean as few as two, in which case the damage the multiple act requirement inflicts need not be severe. Any body-count requirement threatens to debase the idea of international human rights and draw us into what I once called “charnel house casuistry” – legalistic arguments about how many victims it takes to make a “population”.

This view is popular among human rights organisations as well as those minded towards using so-called ‘purposive’ reasoning based on
notions such as human dignity as to interpret the ambit of crimes against humanity. But such a result would make the test for crimes against humanity too undemanding and too undiscriminating. It would extend the notion of a crime against humanity not only to the acts of Al-Qaeda, the Red Brigade, the Baader-Meinhof gang, the IRA, the Ulster Volunteer Force, but also to any two crimes of say the Ku Klux Klan, the Mafia ‘and for that matter – why not? – the Hell’s Angels’.

On this logic, the assassination of a single political figure may amount to a ‘crime against humanity’ on the basis that it is intended to threaten a ‘civilian population’. Ratner and Abrams speculate that the killing of Hungarian leader Imre Nagy in 1956 by the Soviet authorities, may suffice as a crime against humanity if it is intended to threaten the entire ‘civilian population’. Similarly, the assassination of Magistrates Falcone and Borsellino by the Sicilian mafia in 1992 or the imprisonment of Aung San Suu Kyi by the Burmese military could also suffice.

The problem with this is that, at the end of the day, scale and seriousness do matter when it comes to the concept of crimes against humanity. There are two clear and principled answers to Luban’s complaint that a requirement of scale debases the idea of international human rights.

First, as has been contended in this text, when a comprehensive analysis of state practice and opinio juris is conducted, the better conclusion is that customary international law requires a minimum level of scale and seriousness. Accordingly, to not apply such a minimum standard risks breaching the fundamental rights of persons accused of committing crimes. In doing so, it risks undermining the legitimacy and credibility of the institutions that enforce international criminal law, such as the ICC.

Secondly, and more philosophically, as argued in this text, the requirement of scale serves a purpose beyond merely describing an element of the offence. It is only if scale is seen as no more than an element of the crime itself that one reaches, as Simon Chesterman has written, ‘the gruesome calculus of establishing a minimum number of victims necessary to make an attack “widespread”’. Rather, as noted above, crimes against humanity is not simply a crime but a permissive rule of international criminal jurisdiction that permits intrusion on state sovereignty and intervention in the affairs of other states. As concerned the Allies at Nuremberg, it is this result that provides the great potential for crimes against humanity to serve as a potent and powerful mechanism to hold unscrupulous states and individuals to account for atrocities. But it also this feature that is invasive of state sovereignty and has served to dissuade states from endorsing crimes against humanity in an unconstrained form.

The Security Council and the ICC, like all international institutions, are creatures of diplomacy and statecraft, not of humanity. It is naïve to think they will be above politicking or will not have agendas and biases. Slobodan Milošević’s accusation against the ICTY that the ‘trial’s aim is to produce false justification for the war crimes of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) committed in Yugoslavia’ are not absurd. Nearly all international trials are political affairs, the trial and hanging of Saddam Hussein in the Iraqi High Tribunal is one end of the spectrum. As Schwarzenberger put it, Nuremberg’s legacy is that ‘still tighter ropes’ can be ‘drawn in advance round the necks of the losers of any other world war’. The decision by the ICTY Prosecutor not to prosecute NATO leaders for their role in certain bombing raids in Serbia strikes one as another political decision. The decision by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia to prosecute only a very small number of Khmer Rouge offenders is yet another.

One cannot assume merely because a body is international that it will be fair and impartial. Similarly, one cannot assume simply because the ICC Statute ‘guarantees’ defendants a right to a fair trial that either the prosecutor or the judges may not ‘stretch’ the bounds of existing international law to pursue what some states may regard as selective, politically motivated prosecutions or charges. It was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), with its history of show trials, that was favoured by the United States’ for a trial of Nazi leaders. It was Churchill who opposed such a course because he feared that such a trial would inevitably become a political affair. It is
ironic that America today fears that the ICC’s jurisdiction over its nationals may result in politicized prosecutions. But that fear is real and valid.

The high threshold test in the definition of a crime against humanity, including the requirement of scale and seriousness, exists to answer such scepticism. It exists not only to shock the conscience of the international community, but also to make it more difficult for there to be political, biased or simply misguided prosecutions against government officials or military interventions by the Security Council. The same function is served to prevent misguided interference by the ICC and states exercising or purporting to exercise universal jurisdiction. If an atrocity in question is both manifest and widespread, then the potential harm that may be caused to suspects, or peaceful relations between states, is outweighed by the far greater evil that may occur if no attempt is made to stop and prosecute those involved.

But when is this minimum level of scale and seriousness met? There is no ‘body count’ fixed for all time like an element of the crime itself. Rather, that assessment must be made, like all other elements of the crime, on the basis of the state practice and opinio juris of crimes against humanity. At least while the jurisprudence is relatively nascent, the practice of the UN Security Council in intervening under Chapter vii in purely internal atrocities may also provide a useful yardstick (albeit one to be used cautiously with due appreciation of the different contexts in which they arise). A detailed consideration is undertaken and a final conclusion offered in Chapter 8 of this text.

The Impunity Principle
While a minimum level of scale and seriousness is necessary to constitute a crime against humanity, it is not sufficient. When a serial murderer kills a number of people (even if targeted on discriminatory grounds), it is not condemned as a crime against humanity. Similarly, the practice of the international community has been to draw a distinction between ‘mere’ acts of terrorism by terrorist organisations unconnected with a state and crimes against humanity. Something more is needed. There must be some reason why the international community should step in, so as to ensure that the perpetrators of the relevant crimes are not likely to go unpunished (referred to in this text as the ‘impunity principle’). This reason is found where the de jure or de facto power ordinarily responsible for bringing such perpetrators to justice are implicated to some extent in the offending, such that the offending have impunity from their actions.

The impunity principle has a lengthy pedigree. The principle has been a constant in the concept of a crime against humanity since the antiquities. St Augustine, basing himself upon the practice of plebeian resistance to senatorial decrees, suggested there was a right of humanity to respond to ‘abominable’ state acts. It was also inherent in the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. After Nuremberg, all of the main scholars writing at the time wrote that the defining aspect of a crime against humanity is that the perpetrators enjoy de facto or de jure immunity because their acts are linked to the policy of a bandit state which promotes or tolerates such crimes. The statement of Justice Jackson has already been referred to. Similarly, the us Military Tribunal in Einsatzgruppen declared that:

Crimes against humanity ... can only come within the purview of this basic code of humanity because the state involved, owing to indifference, impotency or complicity, has been unable or has refused to halt the crimes and punish the criminals.

Whenever there is a manifest failure by a state to deal with large-scale crimes, the desire naturally arises to create an alternative mechanism for trying the perpetrators. This can only occur by creating a court outside the state concerned and investing it with extraterritorial or international jurisdiction. This is necessary, not because state-backed criminal conduct is more reprehensible than a large-scale ‘ordinary’ domestic crime, but because the latter takes place in a jurisdictional vacuum. State complicity or indifference towards an atrocity threatens world peace because the perpetrators enjoy or are likely to enjoy impunity. It is this ‘policy element’, rather than some technical notion of an attack on a ‘population’, which converts a large-scale criminal enterprise into both a crime
against humanity and a threat to international peace.

Consider Saddam Hussein's attack on the small village of Al-Dujail. It was carried out on the express orders of the head of state. The state's military, with helicopter gunships, attacked a defenceless village. Such gross misuse of state power strikes at the core of the crime's rationale. This is captured by the remark of the UNWCC that an attack is a crime against humanity ‘particularly if it was authoritative’. The same impunity issue arises where the territorial state acquiesces, tolerates or supports militia groups, such as the ‘Jokers’ or Arkan's Tigers in Bosnia, the Interhamwe in Rwanda, militias in East Timor in 1999 or the Janjaweed in the Sudan. No such impunity issue arises in the case of a serial killer, criminal gangs or even terrorist organisations in circumstances where the territorial state is willing to punish the perpetrators of any relevant atrocity.

It is this purpose that is served by the so-called ‘policy element’. At Nuremberg, Article 6(c) of the London Charter contained no explicit requirement that there be a state policy, but the authors contend that the better view is that such a requirement was in fact implicit. The policy element has now been explicitly adopted in Article 7 of the ICC Statute in requiring that the attack be pursuant to a ‘State or organizational policy’. And while the requirement of a policy element under customary international law has been largely rejected by the international and internationalised tribunals following the decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Kunarac, it has been contended in this text that the reasoning in the decision does not adequately sustain that view.

Ultimately, it is contended in this text that the better view is that the attack must be committed pursuant to a policy – being a policy in a loose sense that it includes tolerance or acquiescence – of a state or such other non-state entity that has such a level of de facto control of people, resources or territory as to amount to a ‘state-like’ entity. Such a conclusion is consistent with the impunity principle discussed above. Such a conclusion is also supported by a careful analysis of the decisions of the international and internationalised tribunals, an analysis of state practice since the Rome Conference in 1998 and an understanding of the situations in which the UN Security Council has intervened in purely internal atrocities. Non-state entities can also satisfy this definition depending on the extent to which they have sufficient control over territory, resources or people such that they sufficiently threaten the territorial sovereign and lead to the equivalent result that atrocities committed by them or their approval are likely to go unpunished but for the intervention of the international community.

Legitimacy of Crimes against Humanity and the Role of Customary International Law

Finally, it is important to make a note about two concerning trends in the jurisprudence on crimes against humanity. The first is the heavy reliance on decisions of the ad hoc Tribunals in interpreting the elements of crimes against humanity – often without discussion or analysis. The decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Kunarac, and its rejection of any requirement of a policy element for crimes against humanity under customary international law, is the example par excellence. On the one hand, there is much merit in drawing heavily on the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals, as indeed this text has done. The ad hoc Tribunals have produced a significant amount of case law that has effectively formed the backbone of the international jurisprudence on crimes against humanity. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the norms being applied are not some sui generis source of law existing in isolation. Decisions only have force to the extent that they can be properly said to form part of customary international law.

This means that the requirements of the various elements of crimes against humanity need to be established with precision and to be constituted by both widespread and representative state practice accompanied by opinio juris. Those elements cannot be established by way of poorly reasoned decisions of any single tribunal. Even the ad hoc Tribunals – which assume greater significance given that they are bodies created by the UN Security Council – are relevant only to the extent that they constitute one instance of state practice (to be
looked at in the context of the full picture of all other state practice) or because they exhibit persuasive reasoning. These decisions must always give way to the extent that state practice and opinio juris, on balance, points in a different direction.

In assessing what weight is to be given to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals in the assessment of its contribution as state practice, each decision must be looked at in the context of both the jurisdiction being exercised and the particular facts of the case. In the context of the policy element, for instance, it is significant that the overwhelming majority of cases that state that no policy element exists under customary international law occurred in circumstances where a state policy element was clearly present. Cases addressing crimes against humanity outside the context of either a state policy or an armed group with de facto control of territory, people or resources, are rare. In the most notable of these cases – the decisions of the ICTY in relation to the Kosovo Liberation Army – crimes against humanity was found not be made out. More recently, controversy has emerged at the ICC in respect of the proper classification of the entity involved in the Kenyan post-election violence.

Seen against these observations, caution must be exercised when relying on jurisprudence or commentators’ conclusions as to the status of certain aspects of crimes against humanity under customary international law, without proper identification and analysis of the basis on which such propositions are founded. Discussion on the war nexus is an example of this. It is often stated that crimes against humanity did not require a nexus with an international armed conflict even before the ICTY Tadić Jurisdictional Decision and the drafting of the ICC Statute. But such statements are often made without a full understanding of the historical analysis undertaken in this text, including what occurred at Nuremberg and what happened in between Nuremberg and the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC Statute in the 1990s. Also, for example, the work of the International Law Commission is often cited without fully considering such sources in their complete context, including the weight to be given to such practice and the profound disagreements then on foot between the various state representatives.

Ultimately, while the question of the applicability of the war nexus will become of less and less relevance as time goes on, other aspects of the definition of crimes against humanity continue to remain controversial. Importantly, this includes whether a crime against humanity must reach a minimum level of scale or seriousness and whether it must be committed pursuant to a state policy. If so, what is that minimum level of scale and seriousness and what are the requirements of the state policy? While it is often stated, following the recitation of principles in Kunarac and the other ad hoc Tribunals, that customary international law has no such requirements, the authors have suggested in this text that a full and careful analysis of state practice suggests otherwise.

The second trend of concern relates to the willingness of the ICC to apply the words of the ICC Statute at times as though it exists in a vacuum. Of course, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties dictates that the statute must be interpreted in light of the ordinary meaning of the words in their context and in light of its object and purpose. But, as noted above, the wording of the chapeau for crimes against humanity is inherently ambiguous. It is both necessary and appropriate to look to supplementary means of interpretation. Indeed, the ICC Statute itself recognises it may also be appropriate to look to ‘the principles and rules of international law’. Crimes against humanity were not created in 1998 with the Rome Statute, but rather have a rich and complex history that can and should be drawn upon by the ICC in ascertaining the proper meaning to be given to crimes against humanity.

Relying only – and indeed even primarily – on the ordinary words of the Statute permits of too many differing interpretations and runs the risk of creating disputes and undermining the legitimacy of the Court. Examples of clear areas of ambiguity abound, including the meanings to be given to the words: ‘attack’; ‘civilian’; ‘population’; ‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’. This is before even addressing the vexed ‘State or organizational policy’ requirement and the underlying crimes. The clear response to
such a concern is that the ICC should draw heavily on the meaning of crimes against humanity under customary international law when considering what meaning to be given to Article 7 of the ICC Statute. Given the rigorous standard required to establish a norm of customary international law, such an approach would encourage a more rigorous analysis to be undertaken and would in turn lead to greater credibility and legitimacy for the Court.

Of course, there may be differences between the position under customary international law and the position under the ICC Statute. For instance, this text has contended that the minimum level of scale or seriousness and the policy element may be different in the ICC as compared with custom, owing to the fact that the ICC has a number of safeguards built into its constitutional structure that protect state sovereignty that a state exercising universal jurisdiction, for example, would not. This includes the fact that a prosecution may only take place where a state is ‘unable or unwilling’ to prosecute themselves. Nonetheless, such differences do not detract from the authors’ suggested approach.

First, and most obviously, the rights of an accused must be safeguarded. International crimes charged must rest ‘on firm foundations of customary law’ and be defined with sufficient clarity for them to have been reasonably foreseeable and accessible at the date of the offence. The important principle of nullum crimen sine lege provides that whilst international offences need not always be prescribed in precise and exact terms, the elements of the offence must be accessible and reasonably foreseeable on the part of the defendant at the time of the offence. The Secretary-General, in the case of the ICTY, said the customary law status of the offences within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal ought to be ‘beyond doubt’. Similarly at the ICC, to the extent that there is ambiguity in the law on crimes against humanity, it is fundamental that a criminal defendant is entitled to receive the benefit of any such doubt.

Secondly, as noted above in the context of the humanity principle, states are justified in concerns to ensure that international prosecutions are carried out fairly. Prosecutions in the ICC are no exception.

While the ICC has been established and has now completed a number of prosecutions for crimes against humanity, the ICC itself remains controversial. Three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the US, China and Russia) and a large number of other powerful and populous states (e.g. India, Indonesia and most Middle-Eastern States) are not parties to the ICC Statute. Additionally, the disquiet among African states about the manner in which the ICC has conducted itself — including by overly targeting African states and by the indictment against sitting Sudanese President, Omar Al Bashir — has led to the creation of a separate regional criminal court and to a number of others states threatening to withdraw from the ICC Statute. There is a need to counter the deep suspicion felt by some states, such as the United States, towards international judges and prosecutors and their willingness to brand norms as customary.

It is sometimes said that demands for so-called positivist approaches to interpretation of international criminal law are outdated and simply hinder the international community from achieving a just outcome. To the contrary, the authors suggest that such an approach is the only approach to ensure the long term viability and support for international criminal law and the institutions that enforce it. The evolution of customary international law depends upon the consent of the international community and of the states that make it up. The practice of states forms the basis for the existence of crimes against humanity and the ICC and their support is critical to its success. The ICC depends upon the practical cooperation of states to arrest individuals involved, to provide evidence that may be used by the ICC in criminal prosecutions and, indeed, to continue to fund the ICC itself. The failure by a growing number of states to arrest Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir despite an active ICC arrest warrant illustrates how non-cooperation can undermine international criminal justice objectives.

Adopting an approach that carefully considers crimes against humanity under customary law — and in particular, analyses in line with that suggested in this text, bookmarked by the humanity principle (a minimum level of scale and seriousness) and the
impunity principle (a policy element) – will provide states with a greater degree of certainty about what the law is and how the particular court or tribunal is likely to apply it. This enables all states to more confidently join or remain bound by the ICC Statute or indeed to act in relation to crimes against humanity in other ways (e.g. asserting universal jurisdiction over certain crimes). It will also increase the confidence that states may have in the ICC to apply the law rather than attempt to mould the law to redress any perceived injustice that finds its way to the Court. States should be confident when signing up to the ICC that its leaders and its citizens will not find themselves charged unless they can be confident it is clearly appropriate.

The suggested approach explicitly recognises that crimes against humanity does not effect a one-sided recognition of the importance of protecting human rights, but rather a balance between human rights and the sovereignty of states. Providing explicit recognition to state sovereignty in the proper interpretation of crimes against humanity is not only correct as a matter of law. It is also important to the way in which the consensus of the international community can be built and the confidence in its institutions safeguarded. Crimes against humanity is, in that respect, a proposition far more palatable to states than one that focuses solely on the protection of human rights.

The suggested approach also encourages international tribunals and the courts of states exercising universal jurisdiction to not become silos of jurisprudence but to look to and consider the way in which courts around the world have considered these difficult issues. This can only benefit the quality of the analysis and add further content to how the difficult issues such as scale and seriousness and the policy element are met. They also provide courts with an opportunity to engage in judicial comity where appropriate. Substantive and useful discussion of the policy element has, for instance, occurred in Courts in the us, France and Peru. Consideration of the distinction between crimes against humanity and terrorism has been considered in Spain. Consideration of whether an attack was directed against a civilian population rather than military objectives has been considered in Germany. And a number of the peculiarities of the ICC Statute have already been considered by the Special Panels in East Timor, which adopted a similar statute to the ICC.

Conclusion

A ‘crime against humanity’ is a chameleon-like creature. We all have a sense of what it is but find it hard to be specific about its elements. Through the ages, it has taken its colour from the times which have called forth the tribunals created to convict persons of the crime. It requires: firstly, a serious universal crime based upon the notion that there exist universal principles of criminal law shared by all humanity; and secondly, an attack of a certain type. Since the abandonment of the war nexus there are those who wish to downplay the threshold requirement of a crime against humanity because they see in this category of crimes an international penal code protecting individuals from the state.

Unlike the definitions of other international crimes like slavery, genocide or torture, which can cover an isolated crime, crimes against humanity require a course of conduct. This is intended to describe attacks which both ‘shock the conscience of humanity’ and ‘threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world’. It thereby describes an atrocity which permits, and perhaps requires, an international response to each and every ‘crime against humanity’ by either the Security Council or the ICC’s Prosecutor. It is this unique feature which sets a ‘crime against humanity’ apart from domestic crimes or ordinary human rights violations. It also gives to the concept its unique potency in international discourse.

The threshold for crimes against humanity is high – attacks must reach a minimum level of scale and seriousness and be committed pursuant to the policy, tolerance or acquiescence of the state or de facto power. This high bar is deliberate. It maintains the stigma and seriousness attached to the label ‘crimes against humanity’ that warrant international action. It provides states with some protection against political and biased prosecutions. If adopted, it will also provide criminal defendants with greater certainty as to what the law is. Alternatively, to allow crimes against humanity to be diluted into yet another serious human rights violation malleable to the
circumstances risks encouraging indifference in the international community to claims of 'crimes against humanity' as well as opposition to strengthening the institutions that enforce the crime.

The twentieth century was an age of extremes, extreme violence included. The aim must be to make the twenty first century the age when, like polio or small pox, 'crimes against humanity' can also be a thing of the past. That aim is not necessarily achieved by seeking to extend the meaning of 'crimes against humanity' to redress every wrong and to apply to every criminal defendant. Effective enforcement is more likely achieved by maintaining the crime's potency and engendering the confidence of the international community to support its deployment. <>


Empower your students to become part of the solution.

The new Sixth Edition of Anna Leon-Guerrero's Social Problems: Community, Policy, and Social Action goes beyond the typical presentation of contemporary social problems and their consequences by emphasizing the importance and effectiveness of community involvement to achieve real solutions. With a clear and upbeat tone, this thought-provoking text challenges readers to see the social and structural forces that determine our social problems; to consider various policies and programs that attempt to address these problems; and to recognize and learn how they can be part of the solution to social problems in their own community.

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Many of the social policy discussions (including immigration, LGBTQ rights, the Affordable Care Act, and Internet neutrality) have been updated to reflect the most recent government actions and debates.

More recent data, and new data sources, have been incorporated throughout, both in the main narrative and in the "Exploring Social Problems" features.

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Other new or expanded coverage elsewhere includes economic anxiety, robotization in the workplace, white nationalists, feminist theories about race, "fake" news, net neutrality, community policing, gentrification and segregation in U.S. cities, and the immigration and environmental policies of the Trump administration.

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Excerpt: I wrote this text with two goals in mind: to offer a better understanding of the social problems we experience in our world and to begin working toward real solutions. In the pages that follow, I present three connections to achieve these goals. The first connection is between sociology and the study of social problems. Using your sociological imagination (which you’ll learn more about in Chapter 1), you will be able to identify the social and structural forces that determine our social problems. I think you’ll discover that this course is interesting, challenging, and sometimes frustrating (sort of like real-life discussions about social problems). After you review these different social problems, you may ask, "What can be done about all this?" The second connection is between social problems and their solutions. In each chapter, we review selected social policies along with innovative programs that attempt to address or correct these problems. The final connection is one that I ask you to make yourself: recognizing the social problems in your community and identifying how you can be part of the solution.

Learning Features of This Text
The three connections are made evident in each chapter and throughout the text through a variety of specific learning features:

- A focus on the basis of social inequalities. Using a sociological perspective, we examine how race and ethnicity, gender, social class, sexual orientation, and age determine our life chances. Chapters 2 through 6 focus specifically on these bases of social inequality and how each contributes to our experience of social problems.
- A focus on the global experience of social problems. Throughout the text, the consequences of social problems throughout the world are highlighted, drawing upon data and research from international scholars and sociologists. In a boxed chapter feature, Taking a World View, specific social problems or responses are examined from a global perspective.

We look at China’s aging population (Chapter 6), Japan’s educational tracking system (Chapter 8), Mexico’s maquiladoras (Chapter 9), the International Women’s Media Foundation (Chapter 11), and marijuana legalization in other countries (Chapter 12).

- A focus on social policy and social action. Each chapter includes a discussion on relevant social policies or programs. In addition, each chapter highlights how individuals or groups have made a difference in their community. The chapters include personal stories, some from professionals in their field, others from ordinary individuals who accomplish extraordinary things. Several feature those who began their activism as young adults or college students. For example, in Chapter 8, you’ll meet Wendy Kopp, the woman behind the Teach for America program; in Chapter 13, you’ll meet Max Kenner, founder of the Bard Prison Initiative, an educational program for prisoners; and in Chapter 17, you’ll read the story of Camila Vallejo, who began her activism while she was a student at the University of Chile. The text concludes with a chapter titled "Social Problems and Social Action" that identifies ways you can become more involved.

- "What Does It Mean to Me?" exercises. Each chapter includes questions or activities that can be completed by small student groups or on your own. Although some questions require you to collect data and information on what is going on in your own state, city, or campus,
- most of the exercises ask you to reflect on the material and consider how the social problem affects you. These exercises take you out of the classroom, away from the textbook, and into your community!

Highlights of the Sixth Edition
I have made a number of revisions in response to comments and feedback from the many instructors who adopted the earlier editions and from other interested instructors and their students.
Expanding the sociological perspectives.
Four theoretical perspectives (functionalist, conflict, feminist, and interactionist) are presented in each chapter, identifying how each perspective defines the causes and consequences of specific problems. Additional material has been incorporated in Chapter 3 (impact of immigrants on the economy), Chapter 4 (gender binary and transgender identity), Chapter 9 (the living wage movement), Chapter 11 (media portrayal of women athletes), and Chapter 13 (disparities in policing). In Chapter 1, I've included a general overview of basic sociological terms and concepts.

Keeping it current. The focus of this text is unlike most other social problems texts, featuring a strong emphasis on social policy and action. It is necessary with each edition to provide an update on significant social policy decisions and debates. In this edition, the following social policy discussions have been updated: immigration (Chapter 3), LGBTQ rights (Chapter 5), the Affordable Care Act (Chapter 10), Internet neutrality (Chapter 11), opioid use (Chapter 12), and assault weapons (Chapter 13).

Data matters. Data are important for understanding the extent of our social problems and recognizing populations vulnerable to them. In each revision I update data sources and incorporate new research findings. In this edition, each chapter includes a new feature, Exploring Social Problems, offering a closer empirical examination of social problems such as elderly income sources, minimum-wage employment, health care access, violence against women, and Internet access.

Life after college. What can you do with a sociology undergraduate degree? Almost anything. And to prove it to you, each chapter includes a Sociology at Work feature, reviewing the invaluable workplace skills that you'll develop as a Sociology major and presenting stories of sociology graduates who continue to rely on their sociological imaginations in their field of work.

I wanted to write a book that captured the experiences that I've shared with students in my own social problems course. I sensed the frustration and futility that many felt by the end of the semester—imagine all those weeks of discussing nothing else but "problems"! I decided that my message about the importance of understanding social problems should be complemented with a message on the importance of taking social action.

Social action doesn't happen just in Washington, DC, or in your state's capital, and political leaders aren't the only ones engaged in such efforts. Social action takes place on your campus, in your neighborhood, in your town, in whatever you define as your community.

There were stories to be told by ordinary people—community, church, business, or student leaders—who recognized that they had the power to make a difference in the community. No act is too small to make a difference. Despite the persistence and severity of many social problems, members of our community have not given up. <>

Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics by Austin Carson [Princeton Studies in International History and Politics, Princeton University Press, 9780691181769]

Secret Wars is the first book to systematically analyze the ways powerful states covertly participate in foreign wars, showing a recurring pattern of such behavior stretching from World War I to U.S.-occupied Iraq. Investigating what governments keep secret during wars and why, Austin Carson argues that leaders maintain the secrecy of state involvement as a response to the persistent concern of limiting war. Keeping interventions “backstage” helps control escalation dynamics, insulating leaders from domestic pressures while communicating their interest in keeping a war contained.

Carson shows that covert interventions can help control escalation, but they are almost always detected by other major powers. However, the shared value of limiting war can lead adversaries
to keep secret the interventions they detect, as when American leaders concealed clashes with Soviet pilots during the Korean War. Escalation concerns can also cause leaders to ignore covert interventions that have become an open secret.

From Nazi Germany’s role in the Spanish Civil War to American covert operations during the Vietnam War, Carson presents new insights about some of the most influential conflicts of the twentieth century.

Parting the curtain on the secret side of modern war, Secret Wars provides important lessons about how rival state powers collude and compete, and the ways in which they avoid outright military confrontations.

CONTENTS
1 Introduction
2 A Limited-War Theory of Secrecy
3 The Emergence of Covert Warfare
4 The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939)
5 The Korean War (1950-1953)
6 The Vietnam War (1964-1968)
7 The War in Afghanistan (1979-1986)
8 Conclusion
Index

Excerpt: An irony of the end of the Cold War was confirmation that it was, in fact, never cold in the first place. In the early 1990s, interviews with Soviet veterans and newly opened archives verified that Soviet pilots covertly participated in air-to-air combat with American pilots during the Korean War for two years. About a decade later, declassification of 1,300 American intelligence documents confirmed an even more striking fact: US intelligence agencies knew about the operation. One intelligence review from July 1952, a full year before the end of the war, estimated that 25,000-30,000 Soviet military personnel were "physically involved in the Korean War" and concluded that "a de facto air war exists over North Korea between the UN and the USSR." In short, the Cold War started hot. Yet neither Moscow nor Washington gave any public indication that direct combat was taking place.

This episode is a dramatic example of the two related phenomena this book seeks to understand.

The Soviet entry in the Korean War is a case of covert military intervention, in which an external power secretly provides military assistance during a war. The American decision to stay silent after detecting Russian pilots is a case of collusion, in which one government detects but does not publicize or confirm the secret intervention of another government. The episode raises two related but distinct questions. First, why use a covert form of intervention, especially if it will be detected by an adversary? Second, why would an adversary play along?

The conspiracy of silence that emerged in the Korean War is but one example of a broader phenomenon. In political campaigns, rival candidates may uncover evidence of secret legal or ethical violations by their opponents. While going public with such information is tempting, exposure could force the rival candidate to respond in kind and lead to a rash of attack ads and inflammatory accusations. Such mudslinging could depress turnout and open the door for other candidates, creating good reason for mutual restraint regarding secrets. Childhood family dynamics also feature reciprocal secret keeping. Two siblings often know about one another’s secrets, be it hidden Halloween candy, forged homework, or a clandestine romantic relationship. Exposing the other’s secret to teachers or parents, while tempting, might prompt a reaction that neither sibling wants. If this scenario looms, then a sustainable conspiracy of silence could emerge. Finally, firms may find evidence that their competitor uses offshore bank accounts to evade taxes. The detecting firm may be tempted to expose and undermine its competitor’s advantage. Yet doing so risks provoking regulators to more closely scrutinize the industry as a whole. One reasonable response would be mutual restraint in keeping secret such tax evasion.

In each example, a mutually unacceptable outcome influences both the initial act of secrecy and the response by one who finds the secret. The central insight is that mutual silence may result if individuals, firms, or governments can act secretly, observe one another doing so, and share fear of a mutually damaging outcome. Cooperative secrecy of this sort is not so surprising for siblings that live
together or firms that might price fix or collude in other ways. However, such behavior is quite surprising in world politics, especially during war. That collusive secrecy would emerge among rivals under anarchy is especially unexpected.

This book analyzes the politics of secrecy in war and puzzling features like tacit collusion among adversaries. Secrecy has long been a hallmark of international politics where “incentives to misrepresent” can be powerful for governments that must fend for themselves. Seeing states act covertly is not surprising per se. After all, secrecy can be essential for protecting military forces in the field and for operational surprise. Hence the adages that “loose lips sink ships” and “tittle tattle lost the battle.” Yet secrecy in the Korean War example appears to be serving different ends. Covert activity was observable to the rival. Rather than being in the dark, Moscow’s adversary had a unique window into its covert behavior. Moreover, secrecy in this case seems to have been mutually beneficial. Both the American and the Soviet leaders appeared to derive value from keeping the public and other governments in the dark.

This book links such decisions to limited war dynamics and the desire for escalation control. Large-scale conflict escalation is a mutually damaging outcome that is influenced by exposure decisions. I develop a theory in which initial covertness and reactive secrecy are driven by the need to control escalation and avoid large-scale conflict. When escalation risks are significant, adversaries will tend to share an interest in prioritizing control. External military involvement in a local war raises the prospect of expansion in scope and scale. Intervening covertly, however, allows both the intervener and its rivals to better control what scenario unfolds following the intervention. Keeping an intervention covert—that is, acting on the “backstage” rather than the “frontstage”—has two limited-war benefits: easing constraints from a domestic audience and improving communication about interest in limited war. Covertness minimizes domestic hawkish pressures and expresses a mix of resolve and restraint that supports limited war. In the Korean War, covertness regarding the Soviet role allowed each side to operate with fewer constraints, to save face as it limited war, and to have confidence that its adversary valued limiting the conflict. This happened because of, rather than in spite of, detection by the other side. A central finding of the book is that this is not one-of-a-kind. Rather, covertness and collusion are an important part of wars ranging from the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s to the American occupation of Iraq in the 2000s.

Beyond developing a novel logic for secrecy in war, this book also offers new insights into the very nature of modern war. In the wake of two devastating world wars in the first half of the twentieth century, how did great powers avoid a third? Nuclear weapons, democracy, and bipolarity are typical answers. This book provides a different take on this question. As O’Brien notes, wars still erupted after 1945 despite these larger changes but were “guided by the principle that the conflict should be geographically limited to the immediate overt belligerents.” I show that leaders learned over time to use covertness and collusion to avoid domestic constraints and miscommunication that might otherwise lead to large-scale escalation. This book underscores that overtness is an important qualification and identifies how it came to be. Conflicts like the Korean and Vietnam Wars featured direct casualties among the major powers on the backstage. Moreover, understanding these historical links between limited war and secrecy offers practical lessons for policymakers responding to tragic and potentially explosive civil wars in places like Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

Secret Wars also holds broader theoretical implications for scholars of International Relations (IR) beyond the study of secrecy itself. For example, the secret side of war I analyze yields new insights about domestic politics and statecraft. Subsequent chapters feature infamous personalist dictators like Adolf Hitler cautiously navigating the dangers of conflict escalation via covertness and collusion. These otherwise unobservable policy decisions showcase caution on the part of leaders and regime types better known for reckless aggression. Regarding democracies, the book shows that democratic leaders often detect but stay silent about covert activity by other governments. This is an under-recognized way in which presidents
and prime ministers can deceive and manipulate domestic elites and public opinion which raises questions about accountability and transparency in democracy. The book also provides new insight into how states under anarchy communicate. Covert intervention takes place in a distinct communicative venue during war. This backstage is visible to other major powers and can allow governments to send and receive messages, including regarding escalation and limited war. This metaphor of a theater provides a heuristic use for the study of war more generally. Rather than conceptualizing war as simply a bargaining process dividing up finite spoils, the book suggests the promise of conceptualizing war as a kind of performance. Later chapters show how major powers move between visible and hard-to-observe spaces to manage the image and meaning of their clashes. Doing so protects the performance of limited war and produces collaborative patterns like collusion that are otherwise hard to explain.

The Topic
This book addresses two questions. First, why do states intervene covertly rather than overtly? Second, when covert interventions take place, why do detecting states collude rather than expose? Secrecy, defined as intentional concealment of information from one or more audiences, is simply one way of making decisions and behaving in the world. Secrecy can be used regarding state deliberations, government decisions, communications among heads of state, or externally oriented policy activity. Secrecy, moreover, requires effort. Especially for complex organizations like states, effectively concealing decisions and actions requires information control in the form of physical infrastructure, rules, penalties, and organizational habits. A term closely related to secrecy, which I use when discussing military intervention specifically, is "covert." Covertness is defined as government-managed activity conducted with the intention of concealing the sponsor’s role and avoiding acknowledgment of it. It has a narrower scope than the term "secrecy" because it is specific to a state’s externally oriented behavior rather than discrete decisions, refers to the sponsor’s identity rather than operational details or outcomes, and explicitly incorporates the concept of non-acknowledgment.

I specifically assess secrecy regarding external military interventions. An intervention is combat-related aid given by an outside state to a combatant in a local civil or interstate conflict that includes some role for personnel. An overt intervention involves weaponry and personnel sent to a war zone without restrictions on visibility and with behavioral and verbal expressions of official acknowledgment. A covert intervention, in contrast, features an external power providing such aid in a way that conceals its role and does not feature official acknowledgment. Covert intervention is a specific form of covert operation, distinct from covert surveillance, regime change, or other operation that does not aim to alter battlefield dynamics. States can covertly intervene by providing weaponry that lacks military labeling or appears to originate from a different source; they may send military personnel in unmarked civilian uniforms, as "volunteers," or as "military advisors." Much existing research has focused on why states intervene and on intervention’s effect on war duration and other outcomes. I focus on the how of intervention, specifically, covert compared to overt forms. Such a focus is both theoretically important and timely. Just in the last ten years, the list of countries that have reportedly featured covert external involvement by major powers includes Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Somalia, Pakistan, and Yemen.

Covert interventions raise a second-order question regarding secrecy: If detected, will others keep the secret too? This question is especially germane for other major powers that are most likely to detect a given covert intervention. Providing military aid beyond one’s borders for months or years is a significant undertaking, no matter the scope. Doing so without partial exposure is difficult enough. In addition, major powers tend to invest significant resources in intelligence bureaucracies. To be clear, detectors often remain in the dark about many details. However, the sponsor of a covert intervention is often discernible. Any detector has two basic options: collude or expose. Exposure involves publicly revealing evidence that a covert intervention is underway and/or publicly validating
allegations by others. Collusion, in contrast, involves staying silent. There is an informational component of collusion; the detector must keep evidence of a covert intervention private rather than share it widely. There is also an acknowledgment component: a colluder must publicly deny or stay silent about allegations of a covert intervention made by others such as the media.

Two Puzzles

The study of secrecy, deception, and related aspects of informational misrepresentation are at last getting their due in IR. In the past ten years, new research has been published on secrecy in diplomacy and deal-making, prewar crisis bargaining, military operations, elite decision-making, alliances, and international institutions. This has been joined by related work democracies and non-democracies in both intervener and detector roles. These choices ensure the book can weave a coherent historical narrative that holds across a broad range of contexts. It is important to note that I explicitly reject the treatment of each conflict as an independent event. I follow others in conceptualizing limited war as a learned state practice akin to other learned practices like nuclear deterrence. Moreover, key mechanisms such as backstage communication benefit from experience. Thus, escalation control becomes easier with more interactions. My selection of conflicts allows me to specifically identify cross-conflict influence. For example, a leader in one war (say, the Korean War) may observe and understand its rival’s covert intervention in terms of similar events during a prior war (say, the Spanish Civil War). This, in turn, may improve the leader’s confidence that limited war is the rival’s goal. I present primary documentation of exactly these intertemporal comparisons in later chapters. Moreover, this evidence of cumulative learning is a distinct form of evidence that limited-war issues are important.

Contributions

The theory and findings presented here make contributions to scholarship on international relations, histories of war, and policy.

For scholars of International Relations, the theory and empirical findings most directly contribute to the growing research on secrecy-related themes. I develop a distinct escalation-focused understanding of why states value covertness during war and why collusion often follows. Moreover, while anchored in the dynamics of limited war and intervention, the basic structure of the argument is broadly applicable to situations with a mutually damaging outcome. More broadly, the book develops several conceptual tools—e.g., how secret behavior is detected, the phenomenon of collusive secrecy, and the distinct effects of acknowledgment—that can inform future research on secrecy in other domains.

My findings also have implications for broader themes in the study of war. The book makes clear that information plays a more complex role in war than often assumed. Scholars of IR have long viewed information primarily as a strategic resource wielded against rival states to secure tactical or strategic advantage. Deception along these lines has been seen as one key reason two sides can believe war will pay; such mutual optimism makes war more likely. While information revelation is often useful, this book shows how restricting some specific kinds of information can be important to preserving leaders’ ability to control escalation. The implication is that more transparency and more information, especially when it fuels hawkish domestic constraints, can worsen the prospect for containing war.

The book also makes a case for reviving the study of escalation and sheds new light on its dynamics. Studies of limited war and escalation largely fell out of fashion with the end of the Cold War. Yet developments in the last ten years—the rise of China; the emergence of cyberwarfare; Russia’s revisionism in Eastern Europe—have generated renewed interest in escalation dynamics. My theory draws attention to a largely overlooked aspect of limited war: transgressions that are covert and unacknowledged. Earlier work on limited war has simplified the choice regarding limits to “obey” or “violate.” This book shows that governments often have a third option: covertly violate them. I argue this third option has unique and important consequences for escalation. These mechanisms can provide insight into whether, say, a clash in the South China Sea escalates. The book suggests concealment, ambiguity, and non-acknowledgment can be important tools for managing the domestic
pressures and miscommunication risks in the aftermath of such a clash. Moreover, analyzing the backstage can reveal unique and meaningful forms of adversary collaboration that might otherwise be overlooked. This is dramatized by the mutually concealed Soviet-American casualties that helped keep the Korean War limited.

Taking the covert side of conflict seriously also yields new insights about domestic politics. A consistent finding across conflicts is that autocratic regimes exhibit caution and insight about democratic domestic constraints that is often not observable when only analyzing overt behavior. The covert sphere also appears to host instances of democratic leaders suppressing intelligence findings that might endanger limited war which is a novel purpose for deception. The book also has important implications for new forms of covert warfare, such as non-attributable cyberattacks. One important rationale for using a cyber offensive attack instead of a kinetic use of force is escalation control. Moreover, the theory provides important insight into the diplomatic and domestic implications of publicizing forensic analysis of a cyberattack, as in the American intelligence findings about Russian interference in the 2016 election. Similarly, collusive secrecy could emerge among adversaries in civil wars or between governments and terror groups if one conceptualizes escalation more broadly. I discuss many of these extensions in more depth in chapter 8.

The broadest implications of the book reach beyond issues of conflict and communication. The intuition of the theory has implications for states struggling to avoid any worst-case outcome, not just large-scale escalation. Leaders that hope to avoid an all-out trade war or a diplomatic crisis over blame for past war crimes, for example, might find tools like covertness and collusion to be useful in similar ways as limited-war scenarios. The book builds this logic, in part, by drawing on insights from comparisons to performance and the stage. Previous scholars drawing on dramaturgical concepts and the work of sociologist Erving Goffman have focused on widely visible impressions, roles, and performances. This book adds consideration of the backstage. Theorizing what states conceal as part of performing is useful in its own right; it also helps shed light on the production of cohesive frontstage performances. Moreover, conceptualizing limited war as a kind of performance recognizes that states often must work together, explicitly or tacitly, to define the nature of their encounters. Secrecy and non-acknowledgement are therefore part of a process of instantiating limited war. This basic insight—that states, even adversaries, can use secrecy to cultivate a definition of specific encounters as a way to maintain political control—has wide applicability.

The book also highlights events and episodes in the covert sphere that change how we understand specific wars and modern war more broadly. A dedicated analysis of the backstage and escalation dynamics sheds new light on conflicts ranging from Vietnam to the Spanish Civil War. Archival records I review show that, for example, Nazi Germany tracked Soviet covert involvement during the war in Spain and carefully calibrated covert German combat participation in light of hawkish domestic sentiment in London and Paris. I review unusually candid declassified American records that show that US leaders anticipated the covert involvement of Chinese and Soviet personnel in the Korean War and detected their presence after entry. Newly reviewed archival material from the US covert intervention in Laos during the Vietnam War shows that leaders foresaw media leaks and carefully calibrated their response in order to limit the war. Subsequent empirical chapters note the episodes that add new details to the histories of these wars.

The covert sphere is more than a venue for rivals to deceive and outmaneuver one another during war. The backstage is also a segregated space that can help major powers, even adversaries, manipulate perceptions and control the escalation risks of war. The book also shows that the domestic politics that shape secrecy decisions are complex. Rather than the evasion of antiwar mass mobilization to initiate and maintain intervention, I demonstrate that secrecy is alluring to democratic leaders seeking to insulate themselves from hawkish reactions that would make limiting war more difficult. This results in two very different stories about secrecy in a case like the Vietnam War. Nixon and Kissinger used
secrecy to minimize antiwar constraints late in the
war, but this book tells the story of the early and
middle years, in which the Johnson White House
saw secrecy and non-acknowledgment as critical to
keeping the war localized to Vietnam. This book
therefore joins with well-known observations of war
theorists like Clausewitz and Schelling that
controlling escalation during war is challenging. It
differs, however, in linking that process to secrecy-
related tactics and outcomes.

Finally, the book has implications for policy analysts
and decisionmakers who use and react to the
covert side of war. First, I find a recurring pattern
of communication and collusion in covert
interventions. While it is tempting to focus on
operational considerations when assessing or using
covert methods, this book highlights a specific set of
political considerations relevant to exposure and
acknowledgment. For example, my theory suggests
leaders may need to bridge traditional analytic
divides by combining analysis of domestic political
constraints abroad with expertise on covert
operations and military considerations. Failure to
do so may lead to an inaccurate understanding of
the value of covertness for rivals. Second, the book
suggests that policymakers need to be attentive to
differences among covert interventions. Policy
design should account for the timing and location of
different interventions as well as the severity of the
specific escalation problems I develop in chapter 2.
Users of covert military tools should specifically
assess different exposure scenarios and whether
effective secrecy or mere non-acknowledgment can
achieve key goals.

Third, the book’s findings provide policymakers with
a rare set of cross case historical comparisons that
can guide efforts to decipher the meaning of rivals’
activity in the covert sphere. This is especially
important and timely in an era when leaders in
countries like Russia and China increasingly seem to
favor tactics that draw on covertness and non-
acknowledgement in “hybrid warfare” or “gray
zone conflicts.” Fourth, the book provides important
lessons about when to expect collusion from other
governments. I find that adversaries often share an
interest in avoiding competitive embarrassment by
exposing one another. Yet I also find that collusion
is most reliable when other major powers also seek
to control escalation and have unique knowledge of
covert activity. These incentives and constraints can
be assessed if leaders seek to anticipate when a
rival will participate or abandon secrecy-related
restraint in a limited war.

Plan of the Book
In chapter 2, I develop my core concepts and
theoretical claims. I define and take stock of the
challenge of war escalation and the practice of
limited war. I argue that secrecy generally
addresses two common pathways for unwanted
escalation: political constraints and
miscommunication. The heart of the chapter argues
that covert forms of military intervention can
simultaneously insulate leaders from outside
audience reactions and communicate to adversaries
one’s interest in maintaining a limited-war
framework. I then connect these themes to the two
puzzles by showing that limited-war dynamics
make sense of collusion by an adversary and the
continued value of widely exposed interventions.
The chapter ends by explaining how the severity of
escalation dangers influences the choice between
frontstage and backstage and identifies process-
related observable implications.

Chapter 3 describes the confluence of political,
technological, and social changes that prompted
the emergence of covert military intervention as an
escalation-control technique. The chapter therefore
places my case studies in historical context and lays
the foundation for assessing how more recent
political and technological changes, such as
cyberwarfare and drones, influence the covert
sphere. It highlights the special role of World War
I. I conceptualize the Great War as a critical
juncture that dramatized the dangers of large-
scale war escalation and accelerated political,
social, and technological developments that
influenced escalation control. These changes
sharpened the problem of escalation control by
making leaders more vulnerable to hawkish
domestic constraints and making intentions about
limited war harder to discern. Yet it also made
possible new ways of using military force
anonymously through, for example, the
development of airpower.
Chapters 4 through 7 move chronologically and assess secrecy in four wars. In chapter 4, I analyze foreign combat participation in the Spanish Civil War. Fought from 1936 to 1939, the war hosted covert interventions by Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. The chapter leverages variation in intervention form among those three states, as well as variation over time in the Italian intervention, to assess the role of escalation concerns and limited war in the use of secrecy. Hitler’s German intervention provides especially interesting support for the theory. An unusually candid view of Berlin’s thinking suggests that Germany managed the visibility of its covert "Condor Legion" with an eye toward the relative power of domestic hawkish voices in France and Great Britain. The chapter also shows the unique role of direct communication and international organizations. The Non-Intervention Committee, an ad hoc organization that allowed private discussions of foreign involvement in Spain, helped the three interveners and Britain and France keep the war limited in ways that echo key claims of the theory.

Chapter 5 shifts the focus to the early Cold War. I review primary materials on a poorly understood aspect of the Korean War: Soviet-American air-to-air combat over North Korea. Records released since the end of the Cold War document how Washington and Moscow engaged in a deadly multiyear struggle for air supremacy and used secrecy to contain its effects. The chapter includes new archival material on American intelligence showing anticipation, detection, and concealment of the Soviet covert entry. The chapter also assesses the United States’ initial decision to intervene overtly, its turn to covert action against mainland China, and China’s complex role in the war. I argue that China’s initial ground intervention used secrecy to achieve surprise, following an operational security logic, but used an unacknowledged “volunteer” intervention to limit the war.

Chapter 6 focuses on the covert side of the Vietnam War. Secrecy famously helped Richard Nixon cope with dovish domestic opposition toward the end of the war. In contrast, I highlight the role of covert intervention in helping both sides compete in Vietnam while keeping the war limited during the earlier Johnson years (i.e., 1964-1968). Even as he greatly expanded US military activity in Vietnam, President Lyndon Johnson acted to avoid provoking a larger war with China or the Soviet Union. Covert US military operations in places like Laos, though an open secret, were a way to prosecute a counterinsurgency while keeping a lid on hostilities. China and the Soviet Union similarly sought to control escalation dangers through covertness. Both communist patrons provided military personnel covertly to improve air defense in North Vietnam. The chapter suggests that all three outside powers worked hard to avoid public and acknowledged clashes up through 1968.

In chapter 7, I analyze the end of the Cold War and external involvement in Afghanistan. On the Soviet side, the December 1979 invasion was preceded by six months of covert involvement in counterinsurgency military operations. I review evidence on the motives for covertness and the detection of it by American leaders. The chapter then assesses covertness in the American weapons supply program after the overt Soviet invasion. Escalation fears—in particular, fear of provoking Soviet retaliation against Pakistan and a larger regional war—led to consistent efforts to keep the expanding US aid program covert from 1979 to 1985. By the mid-1980s, however, American leaders embraced a more aggressive strategy and identified key changes that largely eliminated the risk of escalation, leading them to approve an overt form of weaponry (the Stinger missile system). The chapter also reviews covert Soviet cross-border operations into Pakistan and US inferences from its detection of these activities.

The book concludes in chapter 8. I summarize the key empirical findings and address extension of the basic argument to cyberconflict and violence within states (i.e., civil wars, terrorism). I then present a brief case study of a post-Cold War conflict: the Iranian covert weapons supply program during the US occupation of Iraq (2003-2011). The chapter also addresses questions about the initial choice to intervene, mistakes and exploitation, and the possible implications of social media and leaks in the contemporary era. I conclude by discussing the implications of secrecy’s role in escalation control for policy and scholarship. <>
Exile, Statelessness, and Migration: Playing Chess with History from Hannah Arendt to Isaiah Berlin by Seyla Benhabib [Princeton University Press, 9780691167251]

Exile, Statelessness, and Migration explores the intertwined lives, careers, and writings of a group of prominent Jewish intellectuals during the mid-twentieth century—in particular, Theodor Adorno, Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin, Isaiah Berlin, Albert Hirschman, and Judith Shklar, as well as Hans Kelsen, Emmanuel Levinas, Gershom Scholem, and Leo Strauss. Informed by their Jewish identity and experiences of being outsiders, these thinkers produced one of the most brilliant and effervescent intellectual movements of modernity.

Political philosopher Seyla Benhabib’s starting point is that these thinkers faced migration, statelessness, and exile because of their Jewish origins, even if they did not take positions on specifically Jewish issues personally. The sense of belonging and not belonging, of being “eternally half-other,” led them to confront essential questions: What does it mean for the individual to be an equal citizen and to wish to retain one’s ethnic, cultural, and religious differences, or perhaps even to rid oneself of these differences altogether in modernity? Benhabib isolates four themes in their works: dilemmas of belonging and difference; exile, political voice, and loyalty; legality and legitimacy; and pluralism and the problem of judgment.

Surveying the work of influential intellectuals, Exile, Statelessness, and Migration recovers the valuable plurality of their Jewish voices and develops their universal insights in the face of the crises of this new century.

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Excerpt: In the early decades of the twenty-first century, exile, statelessness, and migration have emerged as universal experiences of humanity. In 2000, there were 175 million migrants out of 6 billion of the world’s population. In 2015 the number of international migrants—persons living in a country other than where they were born—increased by 41% to reach 244 million worldwide. It is not the absolute number of migrants or their proportion of the world’s population that merits attention (about 3.1% out of a world population estimated at about 7.5 billion are international migrants) but the fact that their number has grown faster than the world’s population in this period. There has been an intensification of migratory movements in the past fifteen years, with the condition of refugees reaching crisis proportions not encountered since World War II. A report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees finds that 65.6 million, that is, one out of every 113 persons in the world, was displaced by conflict, violence, or economic and ecological disasters by the end of 2016.2 Compared with today’s suffering masses of humanity from the Global South and East desperately trying to reach the resource-rich countries of Europe, Canada, the USA, and Australia, the intellectuals considered in this volume belonged to an educated elite, even though they were predominantly Jewish refugees persecuted on account of their religion and ethnicity. They had or
would receive a superb education, which enabled them to adapt quickly to their host countries. In this book I explore the intertwining of the lives, careers, and thoughts of Theodor Adorno, Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin, Judith Shklar, Albert Hirschman, and Isaiah Berlin among others.

It has often been noted that the exodus of the Jewish intelligentsia from Europe produced one of the most brilliant and effervescent intellectual movements of the twentieth century. Indeed, these thinkers reflected upon their own experiences in a wrenching reckoning with the legacies of the European Enlightenment, Romanticism, and German Idealism. Many, among them Arendt, Adorno, and Berlin, saw in the tensions and conflicts developed by German Idealism—between reason and science, freedom and causality, the citizen and the individual—the sources of an intellectual collapse and malaise that would become particularly visible after the failure of Hegelian system-building.

Others, such as Shklar, Hirschman, and Berlin turned from German thought to the French and British Enlightenments and entertained a more skeptical habit of mind. Departing from the exaggerated ideals of human emancipation and reconciliation that dominated German thought, they searched for the rule of law in a decent society, and a social science that would illuminate the unrealized but intended consequences of human action. At least in one case, namely Albert Hirschman’s, the exodus from Europe would lead to Latin America, India, and Africa. Nonetheless, the depth of their reckoning with the European legacy makes these thinkers indisputable interlocutors even for those who want to “provincialize Europe,” in Dipesh Chakrabarty’s famous phrase.

It is with the conviction of the universality of the human experiences addressed in their political philosophies as well as with the hope of retrieving the salutary plurality of their Jewish lives’ that I approach these thinkers in this book. Four clusters of themes will guide my approach: Jewish identity and otherness; exile, voice, and loyalty; legality and legitimacy in liberal democracies; and pluralism and the problem of judgment. These themes will be refracted through each thinker’s individual and collective experiences, but their significance transcends biographical detail and reengages us with the continuing dilemmas of our societies and politics in a new century.

The Universal and the Particular: Then and Now

It has often been remarked that the rivalries of émigré politics are of the most intense kind. Certainly the preceding chapters have provided enough evidence for this truism: the struggle that broke out among Arendt on the one side and Scholem and Adorno on the other in curating the posthumous work of Walter Benjamin; Isaiah Berlin’s bitter comments about Arendt and his attempts to discredit her work; Strauss’s cutting dismissal of Berlin’s value pluralism; and, of course, the Eichmann controversy. We have seen skirmishes and outright intellectual wars among these intellectuals. Yet beyond personal animosities and rivalries four themes link the work of these thinkers: Jewish identity and otherness; exile, voice, and loyalty; legality and legitimacy in liberal democracies; and pluralism and the problem of judgment.

Jewish Identity and Otherness. The rise of modern liberal societies in Western Europe enabled emancipation via the extension of civil and political rights to Jewish populations. But this circumstance also posed special challenges to retaining Jewish identity while embracing equality in predominantly Christian societies. As has been told well by authors such as Amos Elon, George Steiner, Yuri Slezkine, and others, the German Jewish experience yielded an intellectual and spiritual response of unparalleled brilliance and depth to this tension between identity and equality. This outburst was accompanied from the start by the suspicion that all was not well within putative emancipation, and that, in Moritz Goldstein’s words, “the German Jewish Parnassus” was an illusion, because the larger German society had never believed and would not accept that the Jews were true heirs of German culture and philosophy. Even while recognizing this attitude, Goldstein denies it and asks what a Jewish idiom (Sprechart) and public sphere would look like for the Jews of Europe. He introduces the location of the Jews as “the eternal half-other.”
I have argued that this search for ways and reasons to preserve aspects of one’s individual and collective identity as a form of equality-indifference continued in the work of Hannah Arendt (who knew and admired Goldstein’s essay) in her invocation of the persona of the “self-conscious pariah,” who has no desire to assimilate wholly into the larger society and to become a parvenu. Nor does Arendt accept the standpoint of the pariah, who is pushed or pushes herself to the outer edges of respectable society. The self-conscious pariah cultivates an attitude of critical distance and searches for the universal in the particular.

Shklar, deeply aware of this dimension in Arendt’s work, named her most extensive commentary on her, “Hannah Arendt as Pariah.” She claimed that Arendt clung “to a bizarre notion” that being Jewish was “an act of personal defiance and not a matter of actively maintaining a cultural and religious tradition with its own rites and patterns of speech” Shklar was not reluctant to declare the German Jewish tradition dead after Arendt’s passing away.

Despite this final reckoning with Arendt’s life and work, which she had admired and valued at other points, Shklar, like Arendt herself, and like nearly everyone else discussed in this volume, was a secular Jew. The only exceptions are Emmanuel Levinas and Robert Cover, who were religiously observant. While Leo Strauss’s reflections on Athens and Jerusalem and his thesis that modernity had to grapple with politicaltheology are well known, less attention has been paid to the Jewish sources of Cover’s theory of law as jurisgenerativity. As discussed in chapter 2, Cover claims that all nomos requires narratives that cannot be supplied by the secular state with its jurispathic apparatus of the courts and enforcement. Paideic communities of meaning (often religious in character) always exist in the plural, and they challenge the monopoly of narrative by the secular state.

Cover’s reflections on paideic communities have gained a new relevance in our age in which the nation-state’s monopoly on the meaning of public lives has waned but not disappeared. The much-used and abused term “multiculturalism” cannot begin to address the dilemmas of maintaining equality and difference in the global era and of the legal as well as cultural challenges this poses. I have suggested that in today’s political discourse, Islam and Islamism have become the principal signifier of otherness in the affluent democracies of the West. How to maintain one’s otherness and idiom in a democratic public sphere that recognizes both plurality in the Arendtian sense and pluralism in Berlin’s sense continues as a principal challenge for us today.

Exile, Voice, and Loyalty. The Hebrew term “galut,” according to the Jewish Virtual Library, “expresses the Jewish conception of the conditions and feeling of a nation uprooted from its homeland and subject to alien rule.” The secular Zionist project since Theodor Herzl sought to put an end to this condition by creating a homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine. For religious Zionists and religious Jews in general the return to Zion is not just a project of creating a homeland but it is returning to the “promised lands of Eretz Israel,” to the land promised by God to the Jewish people.

Of the thinkers considered in this book, Berlin and Levinas were most sympathetic to and endorsed the idea of a return to Palestine as the historical homeland of the Jewish people. Having analyzed the significance and rise of nationalism out of the spirit of European romanticism in many of his writings, Berlin thought that the Zionist goal, whether in its secular or religious form, was a legitimate aspiration of the Jewish people, although he himself chose to make a home in a liberal, democratic, and increasingly multicultural Britain.

It was Levinas who transmuted the longing to put an end to the pain of galut into the ethical imperative that comes from being “faced” with the other. Yet we can never fulfil this imperative, and, as Judith Butler notes in her insightful reconstruction of the Levinasian imperative, to be confronted with the “face” of the other also means never to be at home, since the other can unsettle me, grab hold of me, and subject me to herself.

Yet galut can persist without becoming an ethical imperative. One can be in exile without feeling exiled and homeless. Although Shklar, Hirschman,
and Berlin lost the countries of their birth and were exiled from them, they ceased to be exiles in the sense that they found a new home in their adoptive countries. Arendt as well, despite her support of political as opposed to religious Zionism in the 1930s and 1940s, found a home in the United States. In her work, the exilic consciousness was never quite stilled, and it led her from one controversy to another.

The most famous analysis of exit, voice, and loyalty is that of Albert Hirschman. As discussed in chapter 8, for Hirschman, "exit" is a broader concept than "exile" in that it can signify not only the end of allegiance to country, kin, and tribe, but also, more prosaically, quitting a firm or even merely abandoning a brand. Hirschman's contribution not just to economic but democratic political theory lies in his analysis of the interplay between exit and voice. This is not a simple dynamic: the absence of exit need not always mean the presence of voice, just as the availability of exit need not mean the absence of voice. It is fascinating that Hirschman himself modified this aspect of his formula when he encountered the political condition of his divided birth-city of Berlin and the East German dissident movement. He added "loyalty" to his famous dichotomy of exit versus voice to explain those conditions when individuals chose to remain even in the absence of voice because they felt loyalty and attachment.

Shklar was more interested in the endemic conflict of loyalties between exile, voice, and obligation. For her such multiple loyalties were an aspect of the modern condition, and she distrusted nationalisms that sought to reduce conflicts of loyalty by monopolizing one form of obligation among others. A liberal society in a minimal sense was based on the avoidance of cruelty, but a broader version of liberalism, would encourage both voice through membership as well as respecting the multiplicity of our allegiances. For Shklar, the law was the medium through which this balance was to be attained.

Exile, then, has several dimensions: it can be a form of religious and spiritual homelessness that may or may not accompany actual political and legal exile; it can refer to the political and legal condition of individuals and groups who have fled from or have been forced out of their homelands. Exiles are often, though not always, stateless.' Arendt and Shklar were quite attentive to the membership status of exiles. In fact, Arendt's contribution is unique in that she focuses upon the condition of statelessness that had hitherto been of interest to international lawyers alone (see chapter 6). Partly under her influence in contemporary political thought, the condition of exile, refugee, and statelessness have become the prism through which to reflect upon the dysfunctionalities of the nation-state system.

Legality and Legitimacy in Liberal Democracies. Max Weber's sociology of modernity and his account of the philosophical dilemmas of value pluralism have deeply affected nearly all the thinkers considered in this volume. Although his 1931 essay on "The Actuality of Philosophy" is atypical of Adorno's later work in the tradition of Critical Theory—a tradition referred to even as "Weberian Marxism"—Adorno, in this essay, criticizes the subjectivism of neo-Kantian epistemology, which Weber saw as the only plausible response to the demise of the two world-metaphysics of Plato and Kant (see chapter 3 above). Adorno, however, believed that to assume that the object of knowledge was constituted by the subjective assumptions of the knower, be they epistemological or value-axioms, was equivalent to indulging the conceit of "constitutive subjectivity" that denied our imbrication in the otherness of external nature and our inner nature, that is, our embedded existence and emotional, affective dispositions. Adorno's attempt to recoup otherness from the imperialism of modern subjectivity—a theme that never left his work—takes the form of a defense of essay-writing as opposed to philosophical system-building. The philosopher becomes like a miniature artist who tries to capture the dignity of the particular through disclosing crystalline elements and configurations. This early essay, which is still key to understanding Adorno's mature work, left many of his colleagues baffled and certainly seemed to be a very elusive, not to say, rather obscure response to Weber's challenge.

Kelsen, Schmitt, Strauss, and Shklar as well as Berlin were haunted by Weber's questions, which I have
named the "Weimar syndrome": how to defend, intellectually and institutionally, modern constitutional republics and liberal societies in an age of value pluralism as well as class conflict? Liberalism seemed incapable of providing a strong justification in its own defense. Kelsen admitted that the bases of the legal system rested on a Grundnorm for which no further justification was possible. For Schmitt, this was a clear recognition of the fact that every legal system rested on presuppositions that it could neither fully clarify nor justify. The existential decision between "friend" and "foe" is constitutive of the political, and Schmitt in his Concept of the Political presents this view as being nothing more than an application of Weber’s theory of value-differentiation to the political realm. Strauss was the one who saw the potentially nihilist consequences of Weber’s challenge and who wrote one of the most penetrating critiques of Weber and Schmitt (see chapter 2 above). For Strauss, liberalism could be defended only if a strong conception of human value, ultimately leading to a form of natural law, could also be accepted. Far from having solved the politicotheological problem, liberalism only exacerbated it.

Shklar, who was a keen student of Weber, reformulated his challenge not through metaphysics or value theory but as the question of whether the authority of legal norms could be accepted independently of moral and political considerations. Shklar’s response to legal decisionism and legal formalism was a form of contextualism: a legal system was viewed as legitimate because it was embedded in the historical context of other practices and institutions. Shklar thought that the philosophy and sociology of law were inseparable. In that sense for her it was not the philosophical question of justification that was primary but the more empirical question of why people accepted a legal system to be legitimate at all. Legalism, in the manner of Kelsen and his student, H.L.A. Hart, was unsatisfactory because it attempted to create a universe of self-contained legal norms that was illusory. Nevertheless, legalism, understood as the core of the rule of law, was fundamental to liberal politics: liberal equality required, much as Weber had taught, the procedurally correct formulation and application of publicly promulgated general norms. Shklar was too shrewd a social analyst not to note that, thus formulated, legalism would be compatible with certain forms of authoritarian regimes, as well. Where did the democratic element come in?

The pursuit of a wider concept of legitimacy led Shklar as well as Arendt to the paradoxes of revolutionary foundings. On the one hand, the law framed the political and thus had to stand outside it; on the other hand, the law was made possible by the political acts of humans joining together in contract, association, and promise. Whereas Shklar is convinced that liberalism and liberal democracy need to be reconnected in a disenchanted universe that has demystified the sources of law, Arendt searches for some element in the Western tradition, for some aspect of political experience that would give law stability without ontologizing it. Arendt rereads the Founding Fathers of the American Revolution and discovers the Montesquieuian concept of the "principle." The "abyss of freedom" encountered in the project of the "new," i.e. in the founding of republics and the formation of democratic sovereignties, cannot be avoided, but the will of the sovereign can be bound through principles. Such beginnings "rupture the linear continuity of time" and initiate a new political practice requiring the founding of new rules and institutions; they bring forth a new world. The indeterminacy of new beginnings cannot be avoided any more than the "tragedy of the political" can through which hopeful and emancipatory beginnings turn into tyranny or terror. The "revolution can devour its own children." Precisely because she had faith in human natality and the capacity to create new beginnings, Arendt insisted on the republican vigilance of the citizenry in liberal democracies. Liberalism presupposed a more active and vigorous concept of politics than "negative liberty" permitted. Arendt, who wrote one of the first and most brilliant dissections of twentieth-century totalitarianism, was just as alert as Berlin to the perversions of politics through totalizing ideologies that denied plurality. In her much-misunderstood conclusion to On Revolution, she predicted the transformation of democratic republics into consumerist paradises in which citizens
were duped among the citizens and to their capacity and willingness to take the standpoint of the others. Such fragmentation is not wholly negative, in that it has also given rise to "counter-publics" by oppositional groups that had not enjoyed their own public voices and media. Yet the more the interlocking of these counter-publics fails, and the more individuals withdraw into the cocoons of their own epistemological universes, the more we will lose a sense of a shared political world. Today such loss is accompanied by another epistemological predicament: we are said to be living in "post-truth" or "post-fact" societies.

Such loss of truth has made it easy, particularly since the events of September 11, 2001, to transform legitimate security concerns into intense paranoia and public lies. A significant portion of the American public still believes that the attacks of September 11 were caused by Iraqi nationals. The inconclusive wars against Iraq and Afghanistan, started by the George W. Bush administration, have set into motion an unravelling process in the Middle East. For the first time since the Sykes-Picot accords of 1915, the map of this region is being redrawn. But the United States is busy closing its borders to refugees.

The global refugee crisis reveals not only Europe's clay feet but also the withdrawal of the United States into an isolationist posture seeking to absolve itself of its human rights obligations and commitments. The refugee becomes the enemy, the other, and the criminal. Continuing a trend that had already started under the Obama administration, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency is supplied with personnel and resources, while refugee camps in the United States' southern border are becoming internment camps for mothers and children. The Federal government is declaring that activities by its own citizens to solidarize with refugees in sanctuary cities are illegal and is penalizing them.

Against this worrisome panorama, recalling the work and lives of the émigré intellectuals discussed in this book summons both hope and fear: hope, because their reflections on politics shows that catastrophes can be overcome, that new beginnings are possible, and that wise and lasting institutions can be built on the ruins of old ones; fear, because the one country that opened its arms to many, even if not all, of these great thinkers (Berlin was British, and Levinas French) is now turning away from its own best and unique legacies.

Their lives, work, and example show us that hope must triumph over fear and that the courage for telling it as it is can cut through the deluge of propaganda, fake news, and the illusions of a post-truth society. <>

One Person, No Vote: How Voter Suppression Is Destroying Our Democracy by Carol Anderson, foreword by Senator Dick Durbin [Bloomsbury Publishing, 9781635571370]

Long-listed for the National Book Award in Nonfiction

From the award-winning, New York Times bestselling author of White Rage, the startling--and timely--history of voter suppression in America, with a foreword by Senator Dick Durbin.

In her New York Times bestseller White Rage, Carol Anderson laid bare an insidious history of policies that have systematically impeded black progress in America, from 1865 to our combustible present. With One Person, No Vote, she chronicles a related history: the rollbacks to African American participation in the vote since the 2013 Supreme Court decision that eviscerated the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Known as the Shelby ruling, this decision effectively allowed districts with a demonstrated history of racial discrimination to change voting requirements without approval from the Department of Justice.

Focusing on the aftermath of Shelby, Anderson follows the astonishing story of government-dictated racial discrimination unfolding before our very eyes as more and more states adopt voter suppression laws. In gripping, enlightening detail she explains how voter suppression works, from photo ID requirements to gerrymandering to poll closures. And with vivid characters, she explores the resistance: the organizing, activism, and court battles to restore the basic right to vote to all
Excerpt: In *White Rage*, Carol Anderson gave us a carefully researched history of American civil rights and race politics from the Civil War to current times. Her work marched us through the painful chapters of Reconstruction, Jim Crow, the Great Migration, and the Civil Rights Movement to the battles we face today.

When I read *White Rage*, I recommended it to my Democratic colleagues in the U.S. Senate. Senator Harry Reid was so impressed that he invited Professor Anderson to address our Senate Democratic Conference. Her passion and scholarship made a real impact.

In her new work, *One Person, No Vote*, Carol Anderson turns her focus to the central issue of racial justice in our time: the right to vote.

Under the specious banner of combating "voter fraud," the Republican Party has launched a nationwide voter suppression effort. Using voter ID laws, reduced voting opportunities, gerrymandering, and even the national census, Republicans clearly believe their future success depends more on constricting rather than convincing the electorate.

When you follow the money behind this national push, the usual suspects surface. The Koch brothers and their allies bankroll operatives like the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). They produce "model legislation" to combat alleged voter fraud by requiring photo identification at the polls. Republican legislators pass and Republican governors sign these laws, which restrict and discourage voting by minorities, the elderly, the young, the poor—anyone who might oppose their partisan agenda.

The rationale for these laws has been repeatedly debunked. For example, a 2014 analysis by Professor Justin Levitt of Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, found only thirty-one incidents of voter fraud out of hundreds of millions of votes cast since 2000.

In 2012, as chairman of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, I chaired national hearings on barriers to the ballot in Ohio and Florida, states that had recently passed restrictive voting laws. We called election officials of both parties, put them under oath, and asked a simple question: What was the incidence of voter fraud or voter irregularity in your state which gave rise to these state laws restricting voters' rights? Their answer was the same in both states: There were few incidents, and virtually none was worthy of prosecution.

This lack of evidence underscores an ugly truth: It's not "voter fraud" that has inspired this new wave of voter suppression laws. Instead, it's the same animus that led to poll taxes, literacy tests, and the infamous Mississippi Plan, which became the template for voter discrimination for decades. That ugly animus was denounced in 2016 by a three-judge federal appeals court that examined a 2013 North Carolina voting law that required strict voter photo identification and limited early voting. The law, the judges wrote, "target[ed] African Americans with almost surgical precision." This was no coincidence, the court found, noting that "before enacting [the] law, the legislature requested data on the use, by race, of a number of voting practices. Upon receipt of the race data, the General Assembly enacted legislation that restricted voting and registration in five different ways, all of which disproportionately affected African Americans."

Unfortunately, this movement is not confined to state legislatures. In his 2005 confirmation hearings to serve as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, John Roberts said that the right to vote "is preservative ... of all the other rights." His
new black robe was barely wrinkled eight years later when, in the Shelby County v. Holder case, he cast the deciding vote to overturn a key provision of the Voting Rights Act requiring preclearance of new election laws in states with a history of voter discrimination. The Republican-dominated Supreme Court gave a green light to the "No Vote" Republican strategy—and the Voting Rights Act, which had enjoyed virtually unanimous bipartisan support in Congress as recently as 2006, became a casualty of the GOP voter suppression campaign.

Since then, efforts to restore the Voting Rights Act through measures such as the Voting Rights Amendment Act and the Voting Rights Advancement Act have stalled in Congress. Meanwhile, Republican-led state legislatures continue to enact laws making it harder for a significant number of Americans to exercise their fundamental right to vote.

Evidence suggests that their plan is working. A recent study found that in the 2016 election, Wisconsin's voter ID law deterred nearly 17,000—and perhaps as many as 23,000—eligible voters in two counties from casting ballots. President Trump's margin of victory in Wisconsin was only 22,748 votes.

In her Shelby County dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that though progress had been made in protecting the vote, Congress reauthorized the Voting Rights Act in 2006 because "the scourge of discrimination was not yet extirpated." She was right.

As Carol Anderson makes clear in One Person, No Vote, the right to vote is under even greater assault today. For the sake of those who fought and died for it, it is up to all of us to insist that this most basic American right be protected. Reading this well-crafted book —will arm you with the facts. <>

Don't Unplug: How Technology Saved My Life and Can Save Yours Too by Chris Dancy

Chris Dancy, the world's most connected person, inspires readers with practical advice to live a happier and healthier life using technology

In 2002, Chris Dancy was overweight, unemployed, and addicted to technology. He chain-smoked cigarettes, popped pills, and was angry and depressed. But when he discovered that his mother kept a record of almost every detail of his childhood, an idea began to form. Could knowing the status of every aspect of his body and how his lifestyle affected his health help him learn to take care of himself? By harnessing the story of his life, could he learn to harness his own bad habits?

With a little tech know-how combined with a healthy dose of reality, every app, sensor, and data point in Dancy's life was turned upside down and examined. Now he's sharing what he knows. That knowledge includes the fact that changing the color of his credit card helps him to use it less often, and that nostalgia is a trigger for gratitude for him.

A modern-day story of rebirth and redemption, Chris' wisdom and insight will show readers how to improve their lives by paying attention to the relationship between how we move, what we eat, who we spend time with, and how it all makes us feel. But Chris has done all the hard work: Don't Unplug shows us how we too can transform our lives.

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Christmas fell on a Thursday in 2003, so I had been looking forward to the long four-day weekend for a while. I knew I’d be at my favorite dive bar around the corner, the Atrium, by early afternoon. I just had to make it through the morning festivities, trying to put on a good show for Doug.

Every year, my partner, Doug, decorated the whole house for Christmas and spent hours cooking a delicious meal. But I could never work up any enthusiasm for the holiday. Every year, I swore to myself that I’d do my best, but this year was starting out just like all the rest.

I was sacked out on the couch, a 64-ounce Double Big Gulp from 7-Eleven on the table in front of me. Across the living room, my dog, Buster, was lying on the floor, looking about as healthy as I did. His eyesight was failing; he’d been diagnosed with diabetes two years ago. The vet had assured us he would live a long life as long as we gave him his insulin and watched him closely, but from what I could see, he was getting slower and slower.

“What do you think Priscilla is up to this year?” Doug asked with a sidelong glance.

Priscilla, my mother, was a distant character in my life. A few months ago, I had written her an email when I was in a particularly bad state. I just as quickly regretted telling her so much—she wanted to help, but really, how could she? She lived far away with my father, to whom I rarely spoke, and she knew nothing of my complicated world. I shrugged my shoulders and lit up my tenth cigarette of the morning.

My uncle Joe, my father’s brother, would be arriving any minute. Uncle Joe was a divorcé with a few anger issues, and as he lived not far from us in Denver, he usually turned up for the holidays. I used to think it was nice of us to invite him to visit, but in reality, I probably invited him because he would inevitably start a fight, threaten me or break things. That destructive nature was familiar to me—it ran deeply in my family. His presence gave me a good excuse to go hide in the basement.

My mother, who lived in Florida, didn’t usually send gifts all the way to Colorado. But this year was different. Several days ago, some carefully packed boxes had turned up at our front door. Doug, who had apparently been given explicit instructions, had been guarding them since they’d arrived. I had to admit, I was curious.

It was 8:30 a.m. All I wanted to do was smoke another cigarette or two, finish my vat of soda and go surf the internet in the safe darkness of my basement, though I suppose it was time to put some clothes on.

I descended the stairs—down to what Doug called my warren. After five years with Doug, I had finally taken my drug and internet use down to the quiet basement. I was a 35-year-old drug addict, already half-dead, with very little to show for the life I’d lived. The warren suited me just fine.

My room in the basement, what I liked to think of as my office, did look a bit like a warren. Thousands of photos, clippings and souvenirs were pinned to cork boards covering every square inch of the walls; my entire life, a story told on hundreds of pieces of paper, was displayed around me. Here was all I had seen, accomplished, lived and loved. I had the paperwork to prove it.

Buster started to bark upstairs. Shit. It was time to do Christmas. I trudged slowly upstairs again.

At 35, it shouldn’t have been this hard to climb ten stairs.
"Hello Christopher!" Uncle Joe called out at top volume.

I shuffled through the living room, trying to ignore the lights, gifts and decorations Doug had hung so carefully. It was all so beautiful, it hurt to look at it. I grabbed the gifts I had wrapped for Joe and Doug and tried to hand them out—I liked giving gifts at Christmas, especially ones I could not afford. I craved the instant gratification of other people's gratitude.

"Hang on, Chris," Doug said gently. "We have a phone call to make." I sat down impatiently, but kept my mouth shut as Doug started dragging boxes out of his office where he had hidden them. My impatience turned to excitement; what was my mother up to?

Doug dialed my mom, then handed me the phone.

"Hello?"

"Hey Mom, it's Chris."

"Merry Christmas, Christopher!"

"Merry Christmas, Mom." My tone softened when I heard the excitement in her voice.

"Christopher, listen to me. Are you listening?"

"Yes, Mom." I rolled my eyes.

"I'm serious, listen to me," she said firmly.

"Ok Mom, I'm listening."

"The boxes that I sent you? You have to open them in order, ok?"

"What order? What are you talking about?"

"Open the first box and take out the book inside."

"Ok, I'll have Doug help me and then we'll call you back."

"Christopher, stay on the phone with me!"

Why was she so serious this morning? I smiled to myself and grabbed the first box.

"Ok Mom, I see a blue binder."
measurements, my weight, my height, notes about which foods I liked.

I began to short-circuit.

I told my mother I had to go and hung up the phone. I heard, "Christopher wait ..." as I put the receiver down. Doug stood there looking down at me with this goofy grin on his face, and Uncle Joe smirked at me.

I had been entirely upended by my mother. She had sent me the sum total of my life to that point, catalogued, described and ordered.

A life, one that had been filled with achievements, all slightly dimmed because my mother had mostly been missing.

But after all that, she had been there. She had been there for me.

I stood up and reached for my cigarettes.

"What are you doing?" asked Doug.

I looked at him with swollen eyes.

"I'm going downstairs to my computer."

I opened the door to the basement. I could feel the numbness returning. Soon I would be safely back online, ignoring the world around me. <>

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