Culture Works

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The bestselling author of The Future of the Mind, Physics of the Future and Physics of the Impossible, traverses the frontiers of astrophysics, artificial intelligence, and technology to offer a stunning vision of humanity’s future in space, from settling Mars to traveling to distant galaxies.

Formerly the domain of fiction, moving human civilization to the stars is increasingly becoming a scientific possibility—and a necessity. Whether in the near future due to climate change and the depletion of finite resources, or in the distant future due to catastrophic cosmological events, we must face the reality that humans will one day need to leave planet Earth to survive as a species. World-renowned physicist and futurist Michio Kaku explores in rich, intimate detail the process by which humanity may gradually move away from the planet and develop a sustainable civilization in outer space. He reveals how cutting-edge developments in robotics, nanotechnology, and biotechnology may allow us to terraform and build habitable cities on Mars. He then takes us beyond the solar system to nearby stars, which may soon be reached by nanoships traveling on laser beams at near the speed of light. Finally, he brings us beyond our galaxy, and even beyond our universe, to the possibility of immortality, showing us how humans may someday be able to leave our bodies entirely and laser port to new havens in space.

With irrepressible enthusiasm and wonder, Dr. Kaku takes readers on a fascinating journey to a
future in which humanity may finally fulfill its long-awaited destiny among the stars.

Excerpt: Toward a Multiplanet Species

When I was a child, I read Isaac Asimov's Foundation Trilogy, which is celebrated as one of the greatest sagas in the history of science fiction. I was stunned that Asimov, instead of writing about ray gun battles and space wars with aliens, asked a simple but profound question: Where will human civilization be fifty thousand years into the future? What is our ultimate destiny?

In his groundbreaking trilogy, Asimov painted a picture of humanity spread out across the Milky Way, with millions of inhabited planets held together by a vast Galactic Empire. We had traveled so far that the location of the original homeland that gave birth to this great civilization was lost in the mists of prehistory. And there were so many advanced societies distributed throughout the galaxy, with so many people bound together through a complex web of economic ties, that, with this huge sample size, it was possible to use mathematics to predict the future course of events, as if predicting the motion of molecules.

Years ago, I invited Dr. Asimov to speak at our university. Listening to his thoughtful words, I was surprised at his breadth of knowledge. I then asked him a question that had intrigued me since childhood: What had inspired him to write the Foundation series? How had he come up with a theme so large that it embraced the entire galaxy?

Without hesitation, he responded that he was inspired by the rise and fall of the Roman Empire. In the story of the empire, one could see how the destiny of the Roman people played out over its turbulent history.

I began to wonder whether the history of humanity has a destiny as well. Perhaps our fate is to eventually create a civilization that spans the entire Milky Way galaxy. Perhaps our destiny is truly in the stars.

Many of the themes underlying Asimov's work were explored even earlier, in Olaf Stapledon's seminal novel Star Maker. In the novel, our hero daydreams that he somehow soars into outer space until he reaches faraway planets. Racing across the galaxy as pure consciousness, wandering from star system to star system, he witnesses fantastic alien empires.

Some of them rise to greatness, ushering in an era of peace and plenty, and some even create interstellar empires with their starships. Others fall into ruin, wracked by bitterness, strife, and war.

Many of the revolutionary concepts in Stapledon's novel were incorporated into subsequent science fiction. For example, our hero in Star Maker discovers that many superadvanced civilizations deliberately keep their existence a secret from lower civilizations, to prevent accidentally contaminating them with advanced technology. This concept is similar to the Prime Directive, one of the guiding principles of the Federation in the Star Trek series.

Our hero also comes across a civilization so sophisticated that its members enclose their mother sun in a gigantic sphere to utilize all its energy. This concept, which would later be called the Dyson sphere, is now a staple of science fiction.

He meets a race of individuals who are in constant telepathic contact with one another. Every individual knows the intimate thoughts of the others. This idea predates the Borg of Star Trek, where individuals are connected mentally and are subordinate to the will of the Hive.

And at the end of the novel, he encounters the Star Maker himself, a celestial being who creates and tinkers with entire universes, each with its own laws of physics. Our universe is just one in a multiverse. In total awe, our hero witnesses the Star Maker at work as he conjures up new and exciting realms, discarding those not pleasing to him. Stapledon's trailblazing novel came as quite a shock in a world where the radio was still considered a miracle of technology. In the 1930s, the idea of achieving a space-faring civilization seemed preposterous. Back then, propeller-driven airplanes were state-of-the-art and had hardly managed to venture above the clouds, so the possibility of traveling to the stars seemed hopelessly remote.

Star Maker was an instant success. Arthur C. Clarke called it one of the finest works of science fiction ever published. It fired up the imagination of a whole generation of postwar science fiction writers. But among the general public, the novel was soon forgotten amidst the chaos and savagery of World War II.
Finding New Planets in Space

Now that the Kepler spacecraft and teams of Earth-bound astronomers have discovered about four thousand planets orbiting other stars in the Milky Way galaxy, one begins to wonder if the civilizations described by Stapledon actually exist.

In 2017, NASA scientists identified not one but seven Earth-sized planets orbiting a nearby star, a mere thirty-nine light-years from Earth. Of these seven planets, three of them are close enough to their mother star to support liquid water. Very soon, astronomers will be able to confirm whether or not these and other planets have atmospheres containing water vapor. Since water is the "universal solvent" capable of being the mixing bowl for the organic chemicals that make up the DNA molecule, scientists may be able to show that the conditions for life are common in the universe. We may be on the verge of finding the Holy Grail of planetary astronomy, a twin of the Earth in outer space.

Around the same time, astronomers made another game-changing discovery, an Earth-sized planet named Proxima Centauri b, which orbits the star closest to our sun, Proxima Centauri, which is just 4.2 light-years away from us. Scientists have long conjectured that this star would be one of the first to be explored.

These planets are just a few of the recent entries in the huge Extra-solar Planets Encyclopaedia, which has to be updated practically every week. It contains strange, unusual star systems that Stapledon could only have dreamt of—including systems where four or more stars rotate among one another. Many astronomers believe that if you can imagine any bizarre formation of planets, then it probably exists somewhere in the galaxy, as long as it doesn’t violate some law of physics.

This means that we can roughly calculate how many Earth-sized planets there are in the galaxy. Since it has about one hundred billion stars, there might be twenty billion Earth-sized planets orbiting a sunlike star in our galaxy alone. And since there are one hundred billion galaxies that can be seen with our instruments, we can estimate how many Earth-sized planets there are in the visible universe: a staggering two billion trillion.

Realizing that the galaxy could be teeming with habitable planets, you will never see the night sky in the same way again.

Once astronomers have identified these Earth-sized planets, the next goal will be to analyze their atmospheres for oxygen and water vapor, a sign of life, and listen for radio waves, which would signal the existence of an intelligent civilization. Such a discovery would be one of the great turning points in human history, comparable to the taming of fire. Not only would it redefine our relationship to the rest of the universe, it would also change our destiny.

The New Golden Age of Space Exploration

All these exciting discoveries of exoplanets, along with the novel ideas brought about by a fresh new generation of visionaries, are rekindling the public’s interest in space travel. Originally, what drove the space program was the Cold War and superpower rivalry. The public did not mind spending a staggering 5.5 percent of the nation’s federal budget on the Apollo space program because our national prestige was at stake. However, this feverish competition could not be sustained forever, and the funding eventually collapsed.

U.S. astronauts last walked on the surface of the moon about forty-five years ago. Now, the Saturn V rocket and the space shuttle are dismantled and rusting in pieces in museums and junkyards, their stories languishing in dusty history books. In the years that followed, NASA was criticized as the "agency to nowhere." It has been spinning its wheels for decades, boldly going where everyone has gone before.

But the economic situation has begun to change. The price of space travel, once so high it could cripple a nation’s budget, has been dropping steadily, in large part because of the influx of energy, money, and enthusiasm from a rising cohort of entrepreneurs. Impatient with NASA’s sometimes glacial pace, billionaires like Elon Musk, Richard Branson, and Jeff Bezos have been opening up their checkbooks to build new rockets. Not only do they want to turn a profit, they also want to fulfill their childhood dreams of going to the stars.

Now there is a rejuvenated national will. The question is no longer whether the U.S. will send
astronauts to the Red Planet, but when. Former president Barack Obama stated that astronauts would walk on the surface of Mars sometime after 2030, and President Donald Trump has asked NASA to accelerate that timetable.

A fleet of rockets and space modules capable of an interplanetary journey—like NASAs Space Launch System (SLS) booster rocket with the Orion capsule and Elon Musk’s Falcon Heavy booster rocket with the Dragon capsule—are in the early testing phase. They will do the heavy lifting, taking our astronauts to the moon, asteroids, Mars, and even beyond. In fact, so much publicity and enthusiasm have been generated by this mission that there is rivalry building up around it. Perhaps there will be a traffic jam over Mars as different groups compete to plant the first flag on Martian soil.

Some have written that we are entering a new golden age of space travel, when exploring the universe will once again become an exciting part of the national agenda after decades of neglect. As we look to the future, we can see the outlines of how science will transform space exploration. Because of revolutionary advances in a wide range of modern technologies, we can now speculate how our civilization may one day move into outer space, terraforming planets and traveling among the stars. Although this is a long-term goal, it is now possible to give a reasonable time frame and estimate when certain cosmic milestones will be met.

In this book, I will investigate the steps necessary to accomplish this ambitious goal. But the key to discovering how our future may unfold is to understand the science behind all of these miraculous developments.

Revolutionary Waves of Technology

Given the vast frontiers of science that lie before us, it may help to put the broad panorama of human history into perspective. If our ancestors could see us today, what would they think? For most of human history, we lived wretched lives, struggling in a hostile, uncaring world where life expectancy was between twenty and thirty years of age. We were mostly nomads, carrying all our possessions on our backs. Every day was a struggle to secure food and shelter. We lived in constant fear of vicious predators, disease, and hunger. But if our ancestors could see us today, with our ability to send images instantly across the planet, with rockets that can take us to the moon and beyond, and with cars that can drive themselves, they would consider us to be sorcerers and magicians.

History reveals that scientific revolutions come in waves, often stimulated by advances in physics. In the nineteenth century, the first wave of science and technology was made possible by physicists who created the theory of mechanics and thermodynamics. This enabled engineers to produce the steam engine, leading to the locomotive and the industrial revolution. This profound shift in technology lifted civilization from the curse of ignorance, backbreaking labor, and poverty and took us into the machine age.

In the twentieth century, the second wave was spearheaded by physicists who mastered the laws of electricity and magnetism, which in turn ushered in the electric age. This made possible the electrification of our cities with the advent of dynamos, generators, TV, radio, and radar. The second wave gave birth to the modern space program, which took us to the moon.

In the twenty-first century, the third wave of science has been expressed in high tech, spearheaded by the quantum physicists who invented the transistor and the laser. This made possible the supercomputer, the internet, modern telecommunications, GPS, and the explosion of the tiny chips that have permeated every aspect of our lives.

In this book, I will describe the technologies that will take us even farther as we explore the planets and the stars. In part 1, we will discuss the effort to create a permanent moon base and to colonize and terraform Mars. To do this, we will have to exploit the fourth wave of science, which consists of artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, and biotechnology. The goal of terraforming Mars exceeds our capability today, but the technologies of the twenty-second century will allow us to turn this bleak, frozen desert into a habitable world. We will consider the use of self-replicating robots, superstrong, lightweight nanomaterials, and bioengineered crops to drastically cut costs and make Mars into a veritable paradise. Eventually, we will progress beyond Mars and develop settlements on the asteroids and the moons of the gas giants, Jupiter and Saturn.
In part 2, we will look ahead to a time when we will be able to move beyond the solar system and explore the nearby stars. Again, this mission surpasses our current technology, but fifth wave technologies will make it possible: nanoships, laser sails, ramjet fusion machines, antimatter engines. Already, NASA has funded studies on the physics necessary to make interstellar travel a reality.

In part 3, we analyze what it would require modifying our bodies to enable us to find a new home among the stars. An interstellar journey may take decades or even centuries, so we may have to genetically engineer ourselves to survive for prolonged periods in deep space, perhaps by extending the human lifespan. Although a fountain of youth is not possible today, scientists are exploring promising avenues that may allow us to slow and perhaps stop the aging process. Our descendants may enjoy some form of immortality. Furthermore, we may have to genetically engineer our bodies to flourish on distant planets with different gravity, atmospheric composition, and ecology.

Thanks to the Human Connectome Project, which will map every neuron in the human brain, one day we may be able to send our connectomes into outer space on giant laser beams, eliminating a number of problems in interstellar travel. I call this laser porting, and it may free our consciousness to explore the galaxy or even the universe at the speed of light, so we don’t have to worry about the obvious dangers of interstellar travel.

If our ancestors in the last century would think of us today as magicians and sorcerers, then how might we view our descendants a century from now? More than likely, we would consider our descendants to be like Greek gods. Like Mercury, they would be able to soar into space to visit nearby planets. Like Venus, they would have perfect immortal bodies. Like Apollo, they would have unlimited access to the sun’s energy. Like Zeus, they would be able to issue mental commands and have their wishes come true. And they would be able to conjure up mythical animals like Pegasus using genetic engineering.

In other words, our destiny is to become the gods that we once feared and worshipped. Science will give us the means by which we can shape the universe in our image. The question is whether we will have the wisdom of Solomon to accompany this vast celestial power.

There is also the possibility that we will make contact with extraterrestrial life. We will discuss what might happen were we to encounter a civilization that’s a million years more advanced than ours, that has the capability to roam across the galaxy and alter the fabric of space and time. They might be able to play with black holes and use wormholes for faster-than-light travel.

In 2016, speculation about advanced civilizations in space reached a fever pitch among astronomers and the media, with the announcement that astronomers had found evidence of some sort of colossal “megastructure,” perhaps as big as a Dyson sphere, orbiting around a distant star many light-years away. While the evidence is far from conclusive, for the first time, scientists were confronted with evidence that an advanced civilization may actually exist in outer space.

Lastly, we explore the possibility that we will face not just the death of the Earth but the death of the universe itself. Although our universe is still young, we can foresee the day in the distant future when we might approach the Big Freeze as temperatures plunge to near absolute zero and all life as we know it likely cease to exist. At that point, our technology might be advanced enough to leave the universe and venture through hyperspace to a new, younger universe.

Theoretical physics (my own specialization) opens up the notion that our universe could be just a single bubble floating in a multiverse of other bubble universes. Perhaps among the other universes in the multiverse, there is a new home for us. Gazing upon the multitude of universes, perhaps we will be able to reveal the grand designs of a Star Maker.

So the fantastic feats of science fiction, once considered the byproduct of the overheated imagination of dreamers, may one day become reality.

Humanity is about to embark on perhaps its greatest adventure. And the gap that separates the speculations of Asimov and Stapledon from reality may be bridged by the astonishing and rapid advancements being made in science. And the first step we take in our long journey to the stars begins when we leave the Earth. As the old
Chinese proverb says, the journey of a thousand miles begins with the first step. The journey to the stars begins with the very first rocket. <>

How to Think Like an Anthropologist by Matthew Engelke [Princeton University Press, 9780691178783]

From an award-winning anthropologist, a lively accessible, and at times irreverent introduction to the subject.

What is anthropology? What can it tell us about the world? Why, in short, does it matter? For well over a century, cultural anthropologists have circled the globe, from Papua New Guinea to suburban England and from China to California, uncovering surprising facts and insights about how humans organize their lives and articulate their values. In the process, anthropology has done more than any other discipline to reveal what culture means—and why it matters. By weaving together examples and theories from around the world, Matthew Engelke provides a lively, accessible, and at times irreverent introduction to anthropology, covering a wide range of classic and contemporary approaches, subjects, and practitioners. Presenting a set of memorable cases, he encourages readers to think deeply about some of the key concepts with which anthropology tries to make sense of the world—from culture and nature to authority and blood. Along the way, he shows why anthropology matters: not only because it helps us understand other cultures and points of view but also because, in the process, it reveals something about ourselves and our own cultures, too.

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Excerpt: In the summer of 1879, Frank Hamilton Cushing set off from his desk at the Smithsonian Institution to undertake three months of research in New Mexico. Under the auspices of the federal Bureau of Ethnology, his task was to find out everything he could "about some typical tribe of Pueblo Indians."

Cushing ended up in Zuni, one of the pueblos. He was captivated by the Zuni’s methods of farming and irrigation, animal husbandry, skill at pottery, and elaborate ceremonial dances. He stayed longer than three months—a lot longer, as it happens, nearly five years. By the time he returned to Washington, D.C., in 1884, he spoke the language fluently, was a decent enough potter, and bore a new title, alongside that of U.S. assistant ethnologist: "First War Chief of Zuni."

Cushing published several essays on his time in Zuni, among them a series with the rather prosaic title "Zuni Breadstuffs." Yet the Zuni attitudes toward their food, and toward raising crops, were anything but dull and mundane. What we learn via Cushing is not only how the Zuni till the land or bake cornmeal bread. This is also the series of essays in which he sets out the importance of hospitality, explains how grandparents instill the values of patience, respect, and hard work in young children, and interprets how the rich symbolism of the Kâ’-Kâ’ festivals underscores the importance of the practice of uxorilocal marriage (the technical term for when a man goes to live in the homestead of his wife). What emerges from this treatment of Zuni foodways is something of the culture writ large, of how a society in this often harsh and unrelenting environment flourishes through communal ties and mutuality. "Patient reader, forgive me for having lingered so long in the Zuni cornfields," he writes at one point. "However closely we may have scrutinized these crops growing green, golden grown as they may have been, we have but barely glanced at them according to the rules and practices of their dusky owners."

In 2000, Caitlin Zaloom set off from Berkeley, California, to London to undertake research on futures trading. Zaloom had already spent six months in 1998 working as a runner at the Chicago Board of Trade. The value of runners had been tested by time; these were the people who literally ran across trading floors, scraps of paper in their
hands with orders placed by customers on the other end of a phone. The Chicago pit was a "financial melee," Zaloom writes, "runners often elbowed each other out of the way," and "the noise was deafening." It wasn't the chaos of the floor that bothered these ambitious capitalists, however. It was the dawning of the electronic age. Electronic trading was on its way, and it would radically transform the nature of their work within a few years. As in Chicago, in London Zaloom was up at the crack of dawn every day and off to the City. There, though, she didn't throw on a trader's coat and exchange elbows with her peers in the pit: "I spent nine hours a day with eyes fixed on my screen and fingers lying lightly on the mouse, poised to click the second an opportunity for profit appeared."

German treasury bond futures might well be recognized as closer to the workings of power than a Zuni cornfield, but they are hardly a riveting topic. For Zaloom, however, futures trading was a window onto the larger world of markets, morality, and conceptions of rationality. It was also a window onto the processes of globalization, itself furthered by new technologies, market regimes, and culturally specific systems of exchange. What made electronic trading particularly interesting to her was the extent to which it promised to deliver a truly "free" market—one based on the rationality of electronic, disembodied transactions rather than humans literally fumbling over each other. Get out of the trading pits, the promise of e-trading held, and it's almost as if you step out of culture; you free yourself from the biases and background factors that might hamper your profits. As Zaloom makes clear, the promise wasn't delivered, in large part because you can't step out of culture—you can't trade futures in a culture-free zone.

Cushing in Zuni; Zaloom in London: this is anthropology. Over the past 150 years, the discipline of anthropology has been driven by a curiosity with humankind's cultural expressions, institutions, and commitments. What is it that makes us human? What is it that we all share, and what is it that we inherit from the circumstances of society and history? What can seemingly small details, like the cultural significance of maize or our use of computers, tell us about who we are?

Anthropology has always worked at the intersection of nature and culture, the universal and the particular, patterns and diversity, similarities and differences. Exactly how that work takes place has changed over time. Back in Cushing's day, theories of social evolution, modeled on the findings of Charles Darwin in biology, drove the ways in which the newly emerging field of anthropology approached cultural diversity; back then, the Zuni were thought to occupy a different, earlier stage of humankind's development. Today, an anthropologist such as Zaloom would be much more likely to argue that the truck and barter of small-scale societies should be treated in the same frame as e-trading in cyberspace. Still other approaches have been dominant, and even today there are distinct ones: there are cognitive anthropologists and postmodern ones too; Marxists and structuralists; most—including me—would subscribe to no such labels, preferring to draw from their own handmade portmanteau. But what binds them all is the stitch of the cultural.

This book focuses in the main on the kind of work that Cushing and Zaloom have done, which is often called social or cultural anthropology. It's the kind of anthropology that I do as well—hence my slant. But not all anthropologists work with living, breathing people, situated in a particular place or community. In several national traditions, the biological and evolutionary aspects of humans are looked at alongside the cultural ones. Archaeology and linguistics are often important areas of anthropology too. Some anthropologists, in other words, focus on teeth and hip bones; others on what prehistorical settlement patterns can tell us about the emergence of agriculture, iron smelting, and state formation; still others on technical aspects of Bantu noun classes and phonology (the study of the organization of sound use in language). When it comes to archaeology and linguistics, the links with culture are pretty obvious: archaeology, after all, is concerned with what we often call "material culture"; language and culture are two sides of the same coin. (And besides, most linguistic anthropologists study language use rather than its abstracted formalities. That means studying it in particular places and particular times, much like cultural anthropologists.) Yet even for anthropological specialists in anatomy and evolution, the building blocks of culture are a central interest. The size of our brains, our dental makeup, and the strength of our thighbones are studied by biological anthropologists for what they make of us human.
can tell us about the origins of language, tool use, and the rise of bipedalism. In a word, culture.

First Contact: a Personal Tale
I remember very well the first piece of anthropology I read. I was a first-year student at university, holed up in the library on a cold Chicago night. I remember it so well because it threw me. It challenged the way I thought about the world. You might say it induced a small culture shock. It was an essay titled "The Original Affluent Society" by Marshall Sahlins, one of the discipline’s most significant figures. In this essay, Sahlins details the assumptions behind modern, Western understandings of economic rationality and behavior, as depicted, for example, in economics textbooks. In doing so, he exposes a prejudice toward and misunderstanding of hunter-gatherers: the small bands of people in the Kalahari Desert, the forests of the Congo, Australia, and elsewhere who lead a nomadic lifestyle, all with very few possessions and no elaborate material culture. These people hunt for wildlife, gather berries, and move on as necessary.

As Sahlins shows, the textbook assumption is that these people must be miserable, hungry, and fighting each day just to survive. Just look at them: they wear loincloths at most; they have no settlements; they have almost no possessions. This assumption of lack follows on from a more basic one: that human beings always want more than they have. Limited means to meet unlimited desires. According to this way of thinking, it must be the case that hunters and gatherers can do no better; surely they live that way not out of choice but of necessity. In this Western view, the hunter-gatherer is "equipped with bourgeois impulses and paleolithic tools," so "we judge his situation hopeless in advance." Drawing on a number of anthropological studies, however, Sahlins demonstrates that "want" has very little to do with how hunter-gatherers approach life. In many of these groups in Australia and Africa, for example, adults had to work no more than three to five hours per day in order to meet their needs. What the anthropologists studying these societies realized is that the people could have worked more but did not want to. They did not have bourgeois impulses. They had different values than ours. "The world's most primitive people have few possessions," Sahlins concludes, "but they are not poor.... Poverty is a social status. As such it is the invention of civilization."

After reading Sahlins, I could never hear talk about "affluence" in quite the same way. I could never rest easy with my own assumptions about what it means and how my assumptions often took on the rather dangerous garb of common sense. This lesson from Sahlins was only the first of many when it came to words I thought I knew how to use, how to think with. As a student, I quickly learned that anthropology is very good at questioning concepts, at questioning "common sense." One of the discipline's trademark clichés is that we make the familiar strange and the strange familiar. It is a cliché, but it's no less true for being so. And that process of questioning, that process of turning things upside down, is one of lasting value.

In the chapters to follow, I take a page from Sahlins's book—from every good anthropologist’s book—and set about exploring and questioning concepts. They are not technical concepts, and they are all ones with which you will be familiar. They are, in fact, everyday words, and purposefully so. As a rule, anthropologists are interested in everyday things. I begin with anthropology’s foundational concern itself—culture—and then go on to consider a small number of others: civilization, values, value, blood, identity, authority, reason, and nature. It is a barebones list; I am all too aware of what's being left out. What about "society"? What about "power"? But there is no point in trying to be exhaustive; there would always be another term to add. This book is a map with some points of orientation. It is meant to be a useful guide to a larger territory—the territory of our lives—which is and always will be defined by the importance of taking account of the lives of others.

Anthropology doesn't just level critiques. It doesn't just point to the ways in which our understandings of "affluence," "civilization," and "blood" are culturally specific, or even handicapped by the blind spots of our common sense. Anthropology also explains. Above all, it explains both how and why culture is central to our makeup as human beings. We are not automatons. We are not governed by a strong "human nature," and we are not simple products of our genes. We make choices. The hunter-gatherers have had choices, and they have often chosen, historically speaking, to cultivate the
value of egalitarianism, while downplaying that of property, in order to maintain their ways of life. The nomadic existence of hunting and gathering is dependent upon both of these things: the sharing of resources and the discouragement of status and accumulation (stuff, after all, only weighs you down). Up until the 1960s, for example, the Hadza, a group of hunter-gatherers who live in Tanzania, chose not to adopt the ways of nearby pastoralists.

Our "choices" of course are often constrained. The environment plays a role, cultural traditions play a role (we can’t make them up out of whole cloth), and the broader currents of politics and society play a role too. Sahlins published "The Original Affluent Society" in 1972. By that point in time, the ability to live a nomadic lifestyle had been seriously curtailed. Colonial expansion often led to seizure or redeployment of the land that nomadic groups had relied upon. So we do find impoverished hunters and gatherers, Sahlins notes, but this has to be seen as a result of "colonial duress"—of being dragged into the orbit of "civilization." That’s what he means by saying that poverty is an invention of civilization. This duress has continued into the present day, although more often now under the auspices of globalization.

Over the past fifty years, the Hadza have lost access to 90 percent of the land they traditionally relied upon to hunt game. Similar stories can be found around the globe, from the Kalahari Desert in Namibia to the forests of Malaysia. Hunters and gatherers don’t have nearly as many choices these days. Another thing I learned from "The Original Affluent Society" then is just this: no culture exists in isolation. No culture is ever really original; every culture is, we might say, always on a nomadic path.

Anthropology Proper

Before embarking on our more focused discussions, it will be helpful to provide a bit more background on anthropology as a discipline. This book is not a history of anthropology. But throughout, I will highlight some of the key figures, trajectories, and trends because the story of anthropology’s emergence and development tells us important things about the modern academic disciplines more generally. Some background is also helpful given the emphasis here on the subfields of social and cultural anthropology. These are not as well-known as archaeology and biological anthropology. I am a cultural anthropologist, yet I still have some blood relatives who think I dig potshards out of the ground or measure skulls. Also, if people are aware of the sociocultural traditions, they often think anthropology’s remit is Zuni, not London—that London, being in the West, and perhaps even "modern," is the preserve of sociologists. While it’s true that anthropologists traditionally tended to focus on the non-Western world, there have long been exceptions—there is a great anthropological study of Hollywood published in 1950, for instance. It’s never just been jungles and drums.

Anthropology as we know it is just over 150 years old. The Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland was formed in 1848. In 1851, Lewis Henry Morgan, a lawyer from upstate New York, published League of the Iroquois and went on to produce a series of seminal studies on kinship based on work with Native American peoples. In France, the first chair in anthropology was established in 1855 at the Musée d’histoire naturelle, Paris. This is about as far back in the modern genealogy as we can reasonably get. It is not unusual for anthropologists to claim earlier figures as ancestors: Michel de Montaigne (1533-92), for instance; Herodotus (484-426 BC) is also a favorite. Both had what has come to be known as an anthropological sensibility. Herodotus traveled to far-flung lands and provides us with rich descriptions of "Others" to the Greeks. Montaigne did not travel in this way, but for his important essay "Of Cannibals" he took pains to speak with three Tupinambã Indians (from what is today Brazil), brought to France, whom he met in Rouen. In the essay, he implores his readers not to be too swift to judge their supposed savagery (the Tupinambã were said to have eaten their Portuguese captives), urging us to understand the more holistic picture of their practices and ways of life.

In each of these prototype cases, as in the fully-fledged anthropological ones we’ve considered briefly, two key features stand out: (1) the importance of fieldwork; and (2) the principle of cultural relativism. You can’t understand anthropology without understanding these things.

Fieldwork has long been the central rite of passage for the anthropologist. While some founding figures are better described as "armchair anthropologists" (because they relied primarily on the work and reports of others), and while some traditions have
clearer and longer-standing divisions of labor between empirical research and theory building (the French, for instance), you generally can’t be taken seriously without spending a year or more among the people you’re studying. Some anthropologists begin their careers this way, off in the field, and don’t end up returning a lot, or ever; they carry on doing anthropology by turning to more theoretical or conceptual concerns. Indeed, some of the most important anthropological thinkers are not die-hard fieldworkers. But in nearly all cases, they did it to start with and it confirms their bona fides.

The main aspect of fieldwork is participant observation. Exactly what this means can differ. If you are in Zuni, or some hamlet in Chhattisgarh, India, it should mean almost total immersion. You should live with the locals, eat with them, learn their language, and take part in as full a range of their activities as possible. In short, and to put it in decidedly unscientific terms, you should be hanging out and doing stuff. If you are in London, total immersion can be slightly more challenging. Not all futures traders, of course, live in something akin to a pueblo, and they may well not invite you into their homes on a regular basis to break bread. Not that hospitality counts for nothing in England, but still, it’s not the Zuni of 1879. As Zaloom did, though, you should get into the thick of things at work (or church, or gambling shops, or whatever you happen to be focusing on): you should be seeking those profits yourself because what you need to appreciate is how the people you’re studying think, act, and live. One thing I always tell my PhD students is that being a fieldworker is kind of like being that kid in school who always wanted to play with everyone. "Hey, what’s going on? Can I join in?" That’s the life of an anthropologist in the field.

There can be a fine line between participant observation and going native. Anthropologists should not "go native." Going native can rob you of the critical distance you need to make an analysis; it can also prompt ethical challenges. During his fieldwork, Cushing came close on several occasions (actually, he went over the line): shooting at Navajo ponies (which, he claimed, had been wrongly brought onto Zuni lands), leading a raid on horse thieves (resulting in the death of two men), and even claiming an Apache scalp. Cushing had been inducted by his hosts as a war chief; claiming scalps is what was required of a man of his standing. Cushing also sent one U.S. senator into near apoplexy by exposing the fraudulent land claim of the senator’s son-in-law, an action that led to Cushing’s recall by the Bureau of Ethnology. "If a civilized white man can now get only 160 acres of land as a homestead by paying for it, and an Indian can get over 1,000 acres without paying for it," the angry senator wrote, "had not the white man better adopt the Cushing plan and become one of the Zuni Indians?"

Cushing may have championed the Zuni’s case against the shady dealings of the political elite, but it should not be forgotten that he was in the employ of the U.S. government and that he arrived not long after some of the most brutal and bloody chapters of America’s westward expansion. In 1994, the Zuni artist Phil Hughte published a series of cartoons about Cushing, and it really captures the conflicted place of the anthropologist. Some of the cartoons express admiration for Cushing’s dedication to the Zuni; others convey much more ambivalence, and even anger, at what Hughte and many other Zunis have seen as betrayals and bullying—including reenacting parts of a secret rite for colleagues back in Washington. The final cartoon in Hughte’s book is of Cushing’s demise, in 1900, when he choked on a fish bone over dinner one night in Florida, where he was conducting an archaeological dig. The cartoon is called The Last Supper and Hughte tells us: "This was a fun drawing to do."

Hughte’s schadenfreude is not hard to understand. Anthropology has often been tagged as a handmaiden of colonialism. And in some respects, it was—and can be—in neocolonial and neo-imperial forms. In the United States, this has extended from "Indian affairs" in the nineteenth century to a series of controversial special operations and counterinsurgency programs in Latin America and Southeast Asia in the 1960s; from 2006 to 2014, the United States ran another controversial counterinsurgency program in Iraq and Afghanistan, engineered in large part by an anthropologist and staffed by many too. In the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal, anthropologists often worked for the state or otherwise closely with colonial officials during the heydays of their
empires, with many colonial officials in Britain being trained in anthropology themselves.

Yet even in the early generations, the commitment to anthropology and the ties anthropologists created with the people they studied often trumped colonial agendas—or even worked against their grain. In many ways, Cushing embodies the best and worst of what anthropologists can do. And we should not forget the worst. Today, though, to be sure, many anthropologists are active champions of the communities they study (and not by claiming enemy scalps). They promote group rights, are openly critical of detrimental or counterproductive government and NGO projects, and protest against the interests of mining companies and lumber mills in Papua New Guinea and the Amazon rainforests. Doctor and medical anthropologist Paul Farmer cofounded Partners in Health, a medical NGO, as well as the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti. In the United Kingdom, dozens of anthropologists serve as witnesses in asylum tribunals, sharing their country expertise for cases pertaining to Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere.

If fieldwork is the hallmark method, cultural relativism is the hallmark mode. In one way or another, all anthropology is underpinned by it. Put simply, cultural relativism is a critical self-awareness that your own terms of analysis, understanding, and judgment are not universal and cannot be taken for granted. Yet putting this "simply" doesn't always do the trick; cultural relativism is one of the most misunderstood aspects of the anthropological sensibility—even, I would argue, by some anthropologists. Indeed, not all anthropologists are cultural relativists. But they all use cultural relativism to get their work done.

It's often helpful to explain what cultural relativism is by explaining what it's not. One of the most important essays on the topic, in fact, by Clifford Geertz, is called "Anti Anti-Relativism." Not even someone like him—he was a very gifted writer—could take a direct approach to such a delicate topic.

Cultural relativism does not require you to accept everything that other people do that you might otherwise find unjust or wrong. Cultural relativism does not mean you have no firm values or even that, as an academic (or poet or priest or judge), you can never say anything true or even general about the human condition or in a crosscultural frame. Cultural relativism doesn't require you to condemn statistical data, scoff at the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, accept the practice of female circumcision, or declare yourself an unbelieving atheist. These are often the kinds of charges leveled against "relativists"—that they deny the existence of hard data or have no moral red lines, or maybe even moral standards. But none of this has anything to do with how anthropologists use relativism in their research and approach to understanding the human condition.

Another way to put this is that cultural relativism is the sensibility that colors the method. It is an approach, a styling. It is what helps anthropologists guard against the dangers of assuming that their common sense or even informed understanding—about justice or affluence or fatherhood or the elementary forms of religious life—is self-evident or universally applicable. For an anthropologist, it is vital to understand how justice, or affluence, or fatherhood, or religion gets understood locally—if at all. Indeed, it is not uncommon for the people an anthropologist studies to confound the terms of analysis offered up. Art? What's that? Religion? Huh? Oedipus? Who cares? Freedom? That doesn't look like freedom to us. We already had a hint of this in Sahlins's treatment of the original affluent society. At its most basic, relativism should provide an appreciation of what Bronislaw Malinowski, to whom we'll presently turn, called "the native's point of view, his relation to life"; the goal is "to realize his vision of his world."

The Birth of a Discipline

It took a couple of generations for anthropology to professionalize what had originally been an amateur or "gentlemanly" pursuit of knowledge. When Cushing went to Zuni, there were no departments of anthropology in American universities; the modern university system itself, in which the social sciences came to occupy a distinct wing, was still in development. Cushing attended Cornell University but did not receive a degree. In Britain, Edward Burnett Tylor, who eventually occupied a personal chair in anthropology at Oxford University, never went to university himself and became an "anthropologist" partly because he was a sickly young man whose middle-class Quaker
parents could afford to send him to the Caribbean, in the hope that the climate might do him some good. There, he met a true gentleman-explorer, Henry Christy; they went off to Mexico together and Tylor tried his hand at a popular literary genre of the Victorian era: the exotic adventure. His book on their travels in Latin America met with some success and led to a more systematic and ambitious study, Primitive Culture (1871). At Cambridge University, the first major "anthropological" expedition, in 1898, was undertaken by a small group of men trained in psychiatry, biology, and medicine.

Early champions fought hard for anthropology's incorporation into the university system. Bronislaw Malinowski, regularly acknowledged as the founding figure of British social anthropology (though neither he nor many of his students were British), wrote a passionate critique of amateurism and a manifesto for "the law and order of method." Malinowski had no time for the kind of gentleman-explorers one found in Victorian Britain, or even any well-intentioned colonial officers or missionaries, whose observations were "strongly repulsive to a mind striving after the objective, scientific view of things." He made an institution of what Cushing had been doing thirty years earlier: fieldwork by participant observation. In his classic study, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922), based on his two years of fieldwork in the Trobriand Islands, Malinowski made much of his tent, pitched in medias res on the Nu'agasi beach. Not for him the colonial district officer's veranda. In the 1920s and 1930s, at the London School of Economics (LSE), he trained or otherwise influenced almost all of the leading lights of the next generation: figures such as E. E. Evans-Pritchard and Edmund Leach (they were very English, actually), Raymond Firth (a New Zealander), and Isaac Schapera and Meyer Fortes (both South African). Firth and Schapera carried on at the LSE; Evans-Pritchard went to Oxford and Leach and Fortes to Cambridge, where in each university important departments grew up.

In the United States, the German émigré Franz Boas did at Columbia University what Malinowski had done at the LSE—and this was over a much longer period of time, 1896 to 1942. His students included Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, Melville Herskovits, Zora Neale Hurston, Edward Sapir, Robert Lowie, and Alfred Kroeber, some of whom—especially Mead—became household names and were very widely read. Others went on to establish new centers of anthropology, including, for instance, the department at the University of California, Berkeley. Kroeber taught at Berkeley for over forty years; Lowie for over thirty years. Herskovits had a similarly long career at Northwestern University.

For these early generations, especially in the United States, the task of "salvage ethnography" was often a major motivation: recording the ways of life of disappearing peoples, through either destruction or assimilation into the workings of modernity. One of Kroeber's main research interests captures this particularly well: for a time in the 1910s, he worked closely with a man named Ishi, the last surviving member of the Yahi people of California. Kroeber and some of his colleagues at Berkeley took pains to record as much as they could from this last "wild man," as he was referred to at the time. Boas himself is often noted for the prodigious amount of documentation he produced. Aficionados of anthropology's history will refer to Boas's "five-foot shelf"—the five feet worth of books and papers he wrote, that is. Some of these were classic studies of exchange systems among Native Americans of the Northwest Coast; some were their recipes for blueberry muffins. Although Boas lacked the flair of Cushing on similar topics, he is the canonical figure. For not only did he train so many of the first few generations of anthropologists, he also shaped the paradigm of anthropology with which we still work—or grapple—today.

Caveat Emptor!
Introducing anthropology is not easy—you simply can't cover it all. So you need to beware, reader, of what you have before you. I have already stressed that in what follows I'll be focusing in the main on social and cultural anthropology rather than other subfields. And as the scope of the last section implies, I am also going to be concentrating by and large on traditions that grew up in the United Kingdom and the United States. Yet a few points need to be kept in mind.

The first is that, while the British and American branches did start out as fairly well-defined traditions, they both changed and opened up over time. Malinowski and Boas were strong
personalities; they had strong programs and that carried their work pretty far and pretty diffusely. Both are still read today, especially Malinowski (although it is probably Boas’s legacy that has gained wider purchase). But they were never the only dominant figures, and it would now be impossible to find any such coherence, given the range of ways in which the discipline has unfolded. There are still ways in which “American cultural anthropology” and “British social anthropology” differ, but a lot of Americans teach in the UK and a lot of Britons teach in the United States; training of PhD students in the best departments is also thoroughly multinational and cosmopolitan (and well beyond the Anglo-American world). And, of course, remember that the founder of British social anthropology was Polish and the founder of American cultural anthropology was German.

That leads us to the second point: there has always been a lot of international exchange. Another key figure in this was A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, an Englishman, who was something of an heir to Malinowski in Britain (not that Malinowski would have had it that way) but also extremely influential in the United States, where he taught at the University of Chicago in the 1930s. Chicago has been a leading department since then and has always aimed to include prominent figures on the faculty roster from outside the American tradition. Radcliffe-Brown also taught in Australia and South Africa. The other country with a dominant tradition of anthropology—France—also had links with both Britain and America, especially America via the wartime exile of Claude Lévi-Strauss, who spent some of the 1940s in New York City and whose seminal work on structuralism was partly made possible by the richly ethnographic case studies of Boas and his students. The affinity between Boas and Lévi-Strauss, despite the very different kinds of anthropology they produced, is captured in symbolism you could not top. Lévi-Strauss was at the luncheon in 1942 when Boas died; according to the Frenchman, Boas died in his arms. Many years later, though, it was British social anthropologist Edmund Leach who became Lévi-Strauss’s main exponent and advocate in the English-speaking world. Mary Douglas, another British major figure, also drew heavily on structuralism.

Finally, it is worth noting the importance of other traditions altogether, with those in Brazil, the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, South Africa, Australia, India, and each of the Scandinavian countries playing notable roles. (The Scandinavians punch well above their weight, actually, and have done for several decades.) Indeed, a contemporary Brazilian anthropologist, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, is one of the most influential figures at the moment; we’ll consider some of his ideas later on. And then there are even more layered identifications and connections, with, say, renowned Germans in Dutch universities, or the fact that a Briton, an American, a Belgian, and a Dutchman direct the various prestigious Max Planck Institutes in Germany that are dedicated to anthropology. Another eminent contemporary anthropologist, Talal Asad, was born in Saudi Arabia, raised in India and Pakistan, educated in the United Kingdom, and rose to prominence in the United States. In short, you should not come away from this introduction thinking the story of anthropology’s positioning in the world of nation-states is a straight-forward one.

Anthropology is also more than an academic discipline; we have seen this in the various brief examples provided thus far—from taking scalps (again, not recommended) to starting NGOs in Haiti. More broadly, however, what is often called “applied anthropology” can be found in most sectors and levels of operation. There are, as I noted earlier, anthropologists who put their skills to use for the U.S. military; there are others who become professional consultants and start their own businesses to provide “ethnographic solutions” to various problems, which might include anything from helping a housing association recognize the signs of domestic violence among tenants to providing advice on how a French cosmetics company might best market its products in Jordan. At the University of Copenhagen, you can even now study for a master’s degree in “business and organizational anthropology” and then maybe go on to work for ReD Associates, a Danish anthropology consulting firm. ReD knows that culture matters, and that it can be sold. They publish thoughtful articles like “Why Culture Matters for Pharma Strategy.” In an online interview for the Harvard Business Review, Christian Madsbjerg, ReD’s director of client relations, says that the problem with so much marketing (a $15 billion-a-year industry, he informs us) is that it too often doesn’t understand the product “in its cultural
context, in its average, everyday situation." This is Anthropology 101.

And then there are the leavers; to wrap up the introduction to this introduction, I might as well point out that some famous people, and some who have made their names in other professions, have anthropology in their backgrounds. It is a small discipline and we need all the publicity we can get. Prince Charles has a degree in anthropology. Gillian Tett, the prominent journalist and an editor at the Financial Times, did a PhD in anthropology at Cambridge. Film director Jane Campion studied anthropology in New Zealand, and Barack Obama’s mother, Ann Dunham, was an anthropologist of Indonesia. Nick Clegg, former deputy prime minister of the United Kingdom, has a degree in anthropology. Kurt Vonnegut was kicked out of the PhD program at the University of Chicago, but that might have been for the best: while a lot of anthropology has made a difference in the world, it’s nice to have Slaughterhouse Five and Cat’s Cradle in the annals of literature. Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of an independent Kenya, got his PhD in anthropology at the LSE; alongside his involvement in politics, he managed to produce a classic anthropological study, Facing Mount Kenya, on the Kikuyu people. (So he was a "native anthropologist"—and pretty early on.) Ashraf Ghani, president of Afghanistan, got his PhD in anthropology at Columbia University and was a professor for some time at Johns Hopkins University.

Anthropology is a discipline that on the face of it might seem to have little practical or vocational value. In today’s intellectual climate that’s increasingly something that has to be explained or excused. And it brings on the occasional existential shudder. But the discipline of anthropology offers a profoundly useful way of thinking about the modern world. In an interview from 2008, Gillian Tett spoke of how her move into the world of financial journalism was informed by her anthropological training. It was just after the 2008 crash. "I happen to think that anthropology is a brilliant background for looking at finance," she said. "Firstly, you’re trained to look at how societies or cultures operate holistically, so you look at how all the bits move together. And most people in the City don’t do that.... But the other thing is, if you come from an anthropology background, you also try and put finance in a cultural context. Bankers like to imagine that money and the profit motive is as universal as gravity. They think it’s basically a given and they think it’s completely apersonal. And it’s not. What they do in finance is all about culture and interaction."

In the manner of the classic by Marshall Sahlins, and echoing in a more popular register what we can find in the work of Caitlin Zaloom, Tett is pushing for that anthropological sensibility. And whether you’re concerned with the financial world of the City of London or whether it’s something else that piques your interest—traditional life in the Trobriand Islands, perhaps, or Hindu rituals; or why some NGO development projects fail, and some succeed; or how to sell hamburgers in Hong Kong, or understand the use of social media in Turkey; or, for that matter, how best to reach and serve victims of domestic violence in a social housing project—going for that holistic view, and appreciating the cultural dynamics in play, will most likely do you good.

With so much culture on display, there is a danger of being left dazzled. We have covered a huge range of worldviews and ways of life: pious Muslims in Cairo seeking self-betterment through the advice of sheikhs; indigenous Bolivians obsessed with football but not with winning; futures traders in London for whom computer transactions promise a more perfect market; Melanesian men willing to set out across rough seas in small canoes in search of necklaces and bracelets they cannot wear; Ukrainians whose lives, and world, have been irrevocably shattered by the nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl; feisty brides and angry daughters in China, the former negotiating their nuptial haul, the latter seeking redress and honoring a mother in the medium of song.

So there is a lot of difference in the world—still. Colonialism didn’t get rid of it—it didn’t produce clear-cut renderings of Christianity, commerce, or civilization. It didn’t make the Mashpee Americans and it didn’t make Zimbabwe British; what "cricket" means in Zimbabwe is not self-evident. Globalization hasn’t gotten rid of the difference either. Satellite television in Belize didn’t wipe out local culture; if anything, this conduit of global flows only reinvigorated it—or, arguably, even helped make it up.
Difference for difference's sake, though, is not the point of anthropology. If it were, we would indeed be dazzled, even blinded. While anthropology wants to document difference—and often be a witness to it—it also wants to make sense of those differences. Anthropology seeks to explain. "Native points of view" are not just issues of perspective; they are matters of logic and modes of reasoning too. They reveal something of "how natives think."

Learning something about the practices of fatwa-seekers in Cairo, then, we also learn about how, in Islam, freedom is defined in relation to authority, not against it. The Ese Ejja in Bolivia play down the competitive stakes of football because of their commitment to egalitarianism, a value we often find highly developed in small-scale, stateless societies that have traditionally minimized the importance of private property. Futures traders in the City of London turn to technology because they operate in a system that seeks to dehumanize the realm of market exchange. If business isn't personal, do whatever you can to get rid of the people. Men from the Trobriand Islands participate in Kula exchange because it brings them renown but also because it undergirds the very logic of sociality, in which the individual self is measured in terms of relations to others. For the victims of the Chernobyl meltdown, caught between the political and scientific regimes of a defunct Soviet empire and a sputtering postsozialist state, suffering came to define the terms of existence. Theirs is a particularly stark case of how, in many contemporary contexts, we are seeing the emergence of a biological citizenship, claims for which are based not on the human condition but on a medical one. Village brides in northeast China and mourning daughters in the Júzò valley have taken up the idiom of individualism, but it does not produce a mere echo of something Western. They are using something new to shore up, reinvigorate, and reinvent older things. These examples from China are just two of many in the book that help us understand the ways in which tradition and modernity are not fixed states but fluid and relational terms.

It is not, of course, that anthropology just "seeks to explain." After all, political science, philosophy, and sociology also offer explanations. What gives anthropology its distinctive character is the extent to which those explanations are dependent upon local knowledge. Hau is not just a Maori term; it has been, for nearly a century now, an anthropological term of art. It reminds us that distinctions between people and things are not nearly as clear-cut as we often assume. Perspectivism, likewise, is not just a characterization of certain Amerindian worldviews; it is a brainteaser that prompts anthropologists to wonder whether we can (and should) rethink what falls within the boundaries of humanity and humankind.

A lot of anthropological explanation, in other words, involves figure-ground reversals—switching up the foreground and the background of what you're looking at. In order to get a holistic explanation, anthropology often has to upend common sense and question what gets taken for granted. Anthropology prompts us to reconsider not only what we think we know—but what it means to be affluent, why blood matters, what constitutes reason—but also the terms by which we know it. It contains elements of strangeness and surprise.

Among the people of Mount Hagen, we have learned, it makes more sense to think in terms of wild/domestic than nature/culture. Nature and culture are not hardwired, binary distinctions. They are concepts with particular histories. For the Araweté, nature and culture are more fitting and useful terms, but their ratios have to be reversed. Whereas in the West we think in terms of one nature and many cultures, in this Amerindian cosmology it is the opposite. The Iñupiaq put little store by the "blood" that Americans, Britons, and many others hold so dear in reckoning kin. Among them, it's perfectly possible to say: "he used to be my cousin." Nor is death what it used to be. In Canada and the United States, advances in medical technology, the dynamics of secularization, and a persuasive rhetoric of "the gift of life" have helped legitimize the idea of the brain-dead patient. In these contexts, organ donation is a way of giving that patient agency. If this is not a spirit acting in the world, it may be the modern equivalent—which is not to say that technological capabilities determine the boundaries of life and death. In Japan, an equally developed medical system has not given rise to the same separation of body and mind: the Japanese recognize the idea of a "living cadaver" for the oxymoron it is.

I hope that some of the specifics stay with you. Facts, social and otherwise (although perhaps not
"alternative"), still count for something. It's helpful to know a little about the Hindu caste system, what a fatwa is (and isn't), and that there is a place in the world called the Trobriand Islands—where cultural tourism and Pentecostal preachers are now just as much going concerns as the older traditions of the Kula Ring and the exchange of banana-leaf cloth at funerals. The anthropological approach to knowledge has always had an ethical dimension.

We are better people for knowing more about others. And whether those others come from Zuni or London is of equal worth, equal value to the project of anthropology. What Ruth Benedict argued in 1934 is just as relevant today: "There has never been a time when civilization stood more in need of individuals who are genuinely culture-conscious, who can see objectively the socially conditioned behaviour of other peoples without fear and recrimination."

More than anthropological tidbits, though, what I hope you take away is some measure of an anthropological sensibility—how to bring an anthropological approach to bear in the world around you. How to think like an anthropologist.

Some anthropological projects might seem more relevant to that world, and your concerns, than others—research on the financial markets in Chicago and London, for instance, or the ethics of organ donation and end-of-life care. These have easy applicability, perhaps even practical implications. Margaret Lock's research on organ transplants, for example, led to a key role for her in the International Forum for Transplant Ethics. Along with a philosopher and a lawyer, she worked for several years with transplant surgeons and other medical professionals in the forum to promote a more global approach to the ethical dimensions of organ procurement. This is anthropology that matters, that makes a difference.

Knowing something about the traditions of burial in West Africa, then, and, even more important, the ways in which local people adapted what they did to accommodate public health and cultural concerns alike, was a necessary precondition to halting the epidemic. Yes, the protective body suits mattered, and rehydration fluids, and ambulances and field hospitals, and the courageous work of national and international medical experts and volunteers. But so, too, did an understanding of local techniques and traditions of care, commemoration, and common sense. So, too, in other words, did culture and places remote to us are nevertheless intimately connected. The Bovine Mystique tells us about the Basotho, but it also tells us something about the global mining industry, about how people use money and other assets to negotiate gender relations, and about how traditions can be great sources of creativity and innovation. In the coming decades, a repeat study of the Bovine Mystique might well also tell us something about climate change; it was a drought, after all, that underscored its importance to begin with.

In a recent study of the 2013-15 Ebola epidemic in West Africa, anthropologist Paul Richards highlights the remark of a British politician, Norman Tebbit, who once suggested "the taxpayer could no longer afford to fund irrelevant anthropological studies of prenuptial practices in the Upper Volta." Yet it is precisely in the study of many such seemingly irrelevant, esoteric, or trivial things—cultural curiosities, we might say—that we so often find things of value, things overlooked or taken for granted that actually matter quite a lot. Richards has been conducting research for over forty years in Sierra Leone, the country that saw the second-highest official death toll from the Ebola outbreak. His analysis of the epidemic is duly attentive to the epidemiological data, the facts and figures of pathology, and the strengths and weaknesses of the international response effort. But much of the middle of his book is dedicated to detailed ethnographic descriptions of burial practices in Mende and Temne villages. Why? Because preparing the corpse for burial was one of the "super-spreader events." People wanted loved ones to be properly washed and cared for, but this was also one of the most likely ways to come into contact with the bodily fluids that transmit the Ebola virus.

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and a certain social science called anthropology.


A study of how doing field research submerged in a different culture impacts one’s sense of identity.

"Wengle documents convincingly, and with a great deal of sensitivity to and empathy for his informants, what fieldworking ethnographers undergo while anthropologizing.... If one wants to understand what kind of data ethnographers generate, what kind of facts they notice, what kinds of events they record (rather than others that they could have generated, noticed or recorded, but did not) reading Wengle’s book is indispensable. It goes a long way toward doing away with the mystique of fieldwork. Since, in addition, it discusses everything that is important in life—food, sex, death, am I forgetting anything? Ethnographers in the Field is an elegant and foretelling must for anyone seriously contemplating fieldwork." —American Anthropologist

"This critical examination of both the professional and personal aspects of fieldwork contributes to a better understanding of how such complex interactions shape analysis and interpretation." —Mid-America Folklore

Notes and Fragments

Like the past, the psychoanalytic present is no more than one of a number of possible constructions.... When it comes to the analysis of experience, there are only pragmatic stopping points.... There are more ways than one to understand reality. —Roy Schafer, Language and Insight

At the level of concrete detail, no two fieldwork experiences are exactly similar or typical. At a more abstract or analytic level, however, there are many similarities indeed. In the preceding four chapters, I have tried to showcase nearly the entire continuum of fieldwork experiences as related to the issue of degree of self/identity fragmentation. From this perspective, fieldwork can be fairly self-neutral (Rita), more or less middle-range self-dystonic (Karen, Cathy, and Sam—although in some ways Sam’s is a difficult placement), and finally, remarkably and brutally self-dystonic (Sue, Cesara, and Malinowski).

The process of fieldwork always subjects an anthropologist to an attack against his sense of self/identity because he has lost, at least temporarily, those innumerable identifications with his home world and significant others that normally sustained his sense of self/identity. The anthropologist wakes up to find himself a stranger, and perhaps a little afraid, in a world he never made, a world that is totally perplexing, mysterious, and often difficult to penetrate. Having lost the positive mirroring traditionally provided by his trusted significant others and having given up the psychologically sustaining matrix of world familiarity, the anthropologist begins to experience the disintegration of his sense of identity. This disintegration of, or attack against, his sense of identity can be experienced in a multitude of ways; it can be represented in a thousand different masks. Among the many possible representations of this attack, we have seen a few of the more common: doubts about the integrity of one’s body self, about one’s basic competency as a fully functioning human being, about one’s intellectual prowess and ability to complete the project, and others. These identity attacks are most prevalent and severe at the beginning of fieldwork, but they never entirely recede and are present, to some extent, even during the happiest and most productive periods of the fieldwork. These latter periods, generally the time of maximum secondary identification with the native culture, will be discussed more fully in the second volume of this work.

To halt or at least stem—better yet to reverse and repair—the disintegrative inroads made against his sense of identity, the anthropologist will, while in the field, engage in a series of behaviors that function to solidify his threatened self-representation. These defensive/replicative behaviors, like the identity attack itself, can take a multitude of forms. The anthropologist may, for example, resist learning the native language in favor of his own native language; he may dream of past experiences from his culture; he may covet letters from home; he may abstain from having sexual relations with a member of the indigenous culture in favor of fantasized attachments to partners from his home world; he may seek out or create an alter ego from among the members of the indigenous culture to provide him with positive mirroring; and so on. However different these
behaviors may appear to the casual observer, they do share one important similarity: they enable the anthropologist to restore some component of the positive mirroring that he has lost in going to the field, and they enable him to restore, to an extent, those recently broken links, those innumerable identifications with his home world that helped to sustain his sense of identity. Defensive/reparative behaviors function to provide the anthropologist with a life-sustaining matrix of familiarity; they are life preservers in a literal sense.

The relative effectiveness of these defensive/reparative behaviors will depend on the severity of the self-disintegrative inroads experienced by the anthropologist during fieldwork. The severity, or if you will, the depth and intensity of these inroads will, in turn, be conditioned by the interaction between two largely psychological factors, the relative stability and solidity of the anthropologist's sense of self (considered generally, the anthropologist's psychobiographic past), coupled with the relative degree of overlap or discrepancy between the cognitive maps of the anthropologist and his people. In situations in which the anthropologist has a reasonably stable self-representation and experiences minimal cognitive clashing during fieldwork, his "identity crisis" will be fairly minor and controllable (containable) through the activation of defensive/reparative behaviors. In situations, however, in which the anthropologist has marked vulnerabilities in his self-representation and experiences some cognitive clashing, his "identity crisis" will be very severe and the effectiveness of his defensive/reparative behaviors greatly curtailed. It is in the latter cases that one sees the self-immortalizing, religious identification with anthropology occurring as a response to the existential vacuum created by the fieldwork experience. Finally, between these two extremes lies the middle range of anthropological field experience, with its "some but not too great" amount of self-dystonic experience. It is here, in this middle range, that the majority of anthropologists probably locate their field experiences.

With this short summary of my work at hand, I want to turn and explore, albeit briefly, several implications of my ideas.

Fieldwork as Objectively Traumatizing
In Part II of this book, I implicitly, and in Part III, explicitly, argued for the primacy of the influence of the anthropologist's psychobiographic past in determining the extent of the identity attack during fieldwork. Thus Cesara found her fieldwork a brutal and searing attack on her sense of self because she experienced herself as burdensome and dependent, Malinowski because of his particular self-vulnerability, and the same with Sue and her feelings of self-inauthenticity. If we bracket for a moment the ultimate truth of this idea of the primacy of the anthropologist's psychobiographic past, we are left with an interesting question: Is there such a thing as an objectively traumatizing field experience? Is there a field experience so bad that nearly every anthropologist, irrespective of personality, who undertook it would come out of it shattered or traumatized?

The answer to this question is probably no.

Every anthropologist has his favorite horror story about fieldwork. These are generally told in a variety of different situations and for a variety of different reasons: at cocktail parties, for example, to regale the uninitiated and to instill within them the romantic ethos of anthropology, to graduate and advanced undergraduate students to test their mettle and to determine if they have the right stuff. Of all of these stories, there are perhaps two that are told most frequently, Colin Turnbull's fieldwork among the Ik and Napoleon Chagnon's among the Yanomamo. And of these two stories, it is Turnbull's that most people have in mind when thinking about an objectively traumatizing field experience. Why this story, and not Chagnon's, we shall see momentarily.

The details of Turnbull's experiences among the Ik, as eloquently if distressingly put forward in The Mountain People, are familiar enough by this time to render much recounting unnecessary. Suffice it to say that Turnbull paints a picture of the Ik as being a very nasty people indeed, creatures hardly deserving of the label human. To mock and to ridicule the sick and crippled, to prey upon those too weak to resist, to delight in others' pain, to hoard vital necessities and to deprive other Ik were all behaviors observed by Turnbull during his fieldwork. Needless to say, Turnbull had a remarkably difficult time studying the Ik; fieldwork was, for Turnbull, a traumatic experience.
To rephrase the question that started this discussion, is it possible to imagine another anthropologist experiencing all that Turnbull did and yet not finding his fieldwork traumatic?

The answer to this question is probably yes.

It is not likely that many people would find fieldwork among the Ik, at least under conditions comparable to those faced by Turnbull, a peachy, delightful experience. Some, I hope very few, would, and that is my point. An event that is intolerable and traumatic to one person might be difficult but manageable to another and hardly worth mentioning to a third. The degree of trauma produced by any given event is always and only determinable in relation to the degree to which it is self-dystonic, and the latter is determinable only in relation to the individual's psychobiographic past. However harsh it might seem, nothing is universally traumatic.

Chagnon’s fieldwork experience, poignantly recorded in the opening pages of Yanomamo: The Fierce People, is at least as well-known as Turnbull’s if not so controversial. Without engaging in a "my people were worse than yours because" game—an inverted oneupsmanship—it is safe to say that, like Turnbull’s experience, Chagnon’s was not set up to be much fun—it was fraught with routine and periodic ax fights, the tropical weather and insect life, the unsanitary conditions, the occasional ambush, and the whole host of other horrors described by Chagnon. And yet, the remarkable thing about it, from my perspective here, is the relatively untraumatizing effect that it had on Chagnon. Nowhere in Chagnon’s writings do we detect any real, substantial evidence of psychological trauma. Admittedly, there are many reasons why one might attempt to cover over evidence of trauma, but still there is, generally speaking, some evidence, some hint of the cover-over attempt, of the trauma lurking beneath the façade. This is not meant to imply that Chagnon’s stay was trouble-free or without psychological strain—it had enough of both, to be sure—but it does mean that Chagnon was not nearly psychologically traumatized to the extent that Turnbull was, and more to the point, that others who have studied the Yanomamo were (reporting on a young man who returned, psychologically distraught, after three months among the Yanomamo studying male-female relations).

Why one and not the other? Why is one fieldwork experience traumatizing and another not? Why does one man not experience an objectively difficult fieldwork situation as traumatic? How can another man go from paradise with the Pygmies to, a decade later, Conradian horror among the Ik? Why do two women, one in Africa, one in South America, experience relatively straightforward and objectively nonbrutalizing fieldwork situations as traumatic? All for the same reason—because trauma is in the eye of the beholder and not in some objective yardstick. Psychological trauma is produced through the interaction of some triggering event or catalyst with elements of an individual’s psychobiographic past; trauma is always a consequence of interaction.

Omphalos
Every field of human study that wishes to continue to exist needs a sort of data lifeline. And certainly, to continue to exist independently, without fear of annexation, a field needs unique data, or if this is impossible, a unique way of collecting data. In the case of anthropology, this unique way of collecting data is fieldwork, and a momentous discovery it was. With the advent of systematic fieldwork, anthropology and more particularly anthropologists, came of age and secured their data lifeline.

Coming of age is a great, if problematic, event but by itself is not enough to guarantee success in the storm and stress of life. Maturity, and ultimately progress, come to a field of human study only if its practitioners periodically turn backward and fold inward upon themselves to examine their fundamental philosophical and methodological presuppositions. In the case of anthropology, this omphalitic urge arose relatively late, at least as compared to its sister disciplines in the human sciences, and took an unfortunate turn.

Bob Scholte, one of the leading figures in omphalitic anthropology over the past fifteen years or so, has always emphasized the need for the development of a fully "reflexive, critical, and emancipatory anthropology"; an anthropologist must realize, says Scholte, that his field experience is "still a primary and intersubjective reality in which his tradition and humanity condition what he can hope to experience and to understand". In calling attention to the influence of the anthropologist’s tradition on his way of perceiving
the world, Scholte is arguing that anthropologists do unto themselves what they have always been so quick to do unto others, namely to consider their own beliefs, pet theories, and attitudes as culturally constituted and historically mediated. In calling attention to the anthropologist's humanity as a factor influencing his perception of the world, Scholte is, in essence, arguing for the necessity of a psychology of fieldwork and of the fieldworker.

Although Scholte was very right in arguing for the necessity of both tradition and humanity studies, anthropologists have not, as a group, been equally receptive and attentive to the need for both types of study. With few exceptions, it almost appears as though anthropologists have drawn a sharp dividing line between these studies, declaring the nonpsychological or tradition type welcome and the explicitly psychological unwelcome. At least, that is how the results would have it appear. Thus, as for the purely epistemological, tradition studies, we have many: emic/etic, inside/outside, phenomenological-hermeneutic/objectivist, cognitive/behavioral, experience-near/experience-distant, a "writing ethnography" school, a "dialogical" school, and so forth. As for the more explicitly psychological, there are only relatively few studies.

This lack would not be particularly regrettable except that the anti-psychological bias—or at least the tendency to ignore psychological matters—of certain anthropologists has led them, in their epistemological studies, to some very curious conclusions. Although any one of a number of studies could be mentioned, I am thinking particularly of Clifford Geertz's highly influential "From the Native's Point of View" study. Geertz's basic position, in brief, is that to see things from the native's point of view, the anthropologist need not be a perfect "walking miracle of empathy," but instead needs to be able to piece together and interpret the native's symbol system. The latter idea, about the importance of symbol systems, seems to me very defensible and very necessary. The former idea, however, about empathy and its relative unimportance, seems to be the mistaken result of a faulty confusion.

In building up his argument against the importance of empathy, Geertz relies heavily on his reading of Malinowski's diary. As Geertz points out, and as we have already seen, Malinowski was not an especially nice guy, he was not tactful, friendly, and patient with the natives, and he certainly was not a "walking miracle of empathy." But then, in what can only be called an unjustified psychological leap, Geertz apparently assumes that Malinowski's characteristic attitudes and feelings, particularly his inability to empathize with the natives, are typical and apply to the experiences of the majority of anthropologists. It is on this basis, on this assumption really, that Geertz can pose his central question: "Where are we when einfuhlen disappears?"

It is one thing to study an extreme instance of any given phenomenon with an eye toward illuminating its more normal or middle-range instances. This is, in fact, routine procedure in much of the human sciences, and as long as one is aware of the relevant parameters, pretty much trouble-free. It is altogether different, however, to study an extreme instance of a phenomenon without realizing—or without mentioning—that it is extreme, that it is not normal or typical. Malinowski's characteristic self-vulnerability, which produced the startling qualities of his fieldwork experience, is not typical of the majority of anthropologists. One cannot uncritically draw conclusions about the typical anthropologist's characteristic psychological abilities from Malinowski's case.

We can, however, go still further and answer Geertz's question in the affirmative: a special psychological closeness, a transcultural identification, can occur between anthropologist and native. I am referring here to that process that I earlier described as a typical defense against the identity attack experienced by many anthropologists during fieldwork, namely, secondary identification with the native culture. However fleeting or however long-lasting it may be, secondary identification enables the anthropologist to feel and to experience, as well as to see and to know, the native's point of view. Secondary identification, if not true empathy, nevertheless mimics it closely enough to aid in the process of reconstructing the native's world sense. Secondary identification enables the anthropologist to narrow, for a time, the vast gap of cultural experience separating him from his subjects.
This is not meant to produce too one-sided a picture. Fieldworkers are not perfect empathizers or social chameleons; nobody is. The analysis of symbol systems is an important device to help the anthropologist know the native’s point of view. By the same token, however, empathy or secondary identification is an important device to help the anthropologist experience, and therefore to know in a wider sense, the native’s point of view. One without the other yields an analysis either intellectually top-heavy or emotionally touchy-feely. Both are needed, and just as the epistemologist of anthropology needs the psychologist, so vice versa.

Psychobiography and Validity
There are a number of ways to describe the central principle underlying all successful psychobiography: there is always an element of subjectivity in an individual’s theorizing; the dominant questions that animate an individual’s work, as well as his answers to those questions, will always be conditioned by what, psychologically speaking, he is; an individual’s dominant ideas, theoretical beliefs, and the like reflect and express his most vivid, problematic, and salient subjective concerns as conditioned by early formative experiences (Atwood and Tomkins 1976). When applied to anthropology, the above statements could be rephrased, without violence, to the following: an anthropologist’s field observations and interpretations are, on one level, not truth and reality but rather species of autobiography. An anthropologist in the field is, again on one level, practicing a sort of selfmancy, a divination based on self. It is as if the anthropologist projects his self, lays it onto the world as if it were a Procrustean grid, and then, hey presto, he suddenly discovers in his field notes what he really knew all along, what he was psychologically all along. Whatever else patterns of culture really are, they can be interpreted as patterns of personality—the anthropologist’s to some extent—writ large, thrown gigantic upon the screen, and given a long time span. It is almost as if there was truth in Plato’s thought that all knowledge is remembering, recollecting from a forgotten shadow side of existence.

One of the more interesting things about these statements is that people often react very negatively to them, almost as if they were on the receiving end of either implicit or explicit criticism. Why this response?

Part of this response is probably explained by fear of solipsism—the dead hand of Johann Fichte, among others. Admittedly, my cursory listing of psychobiographic tenets that began this section might tend to encourage this concern and justifiably so. But my listing was cursory, and a more complete discussion would not fail to mention that subjective concerns alone do not and cannot entirely determine the form and content of an individual’s work. It is no accident, for example, that Cesara’s need to escape from her burdensome self should take, in one form, a cry for a radical feminism, or that Malinowski’s concern over his self-vulnerability should take hold in a theory of organic functionalism, the strands of which were in the air in the early part of this century. Theoretical concerns of any individual in any field will always depend on a complex interplay of subjective factors and the social/intellectual milieu in which the theorist is situated. If a radical feminist movement did not exist, it would not have been possible for Cesara to seize it as a means of expressing her own self-dilemma; the same can be said about Malinowski’s use of an organic functionalism. It is the interaction between subjective and external factors that produces the final form of an individual’s ideas. Cesara did not just seize and parrot the radical feminist perspective, but she gave to it a particular coloring all her own, just as Malinowski surely did not simply adopt any old functionalism, but rather adapted one to suit his subjective concerns.

A second problematic aspect about the element of subjectivity in theorizing is a hangover from the days when scientific observers were thought to be neutral, cameralike machines whose only concern was objectively to record pure data. But this misses the point, more fundamentally, because it confuses two entirely different concerns, subjectivity and validity. Here one must be careful. In pointing to the subjective influences that conditioned the work of Cesara and Malinowski—for that matter that condition everyone’s work—I am not attempting to explain away the value of that work. A theory is never simply a subjective product. It always assumes an independent life of its own and so must be judged as to its explanatory usefulness apart from its creator’s psyche. Any given prediction
derived from a theory must be tested, as must the logic that holds the theory together, without regard for its creator's personality foibles. Thus when I say that Cesarea embraced Sartrian existentialism as a defensive maneuver to shore up her threatened self-representation, this should not be heard as implying that she had no especially strong intellectual reasons for her choice or that her brand of Sartrian existentialism is necessarily "wrong." I am implying, however, that nobody adopts, augments, and defends a perspective on human nature for purely intellectual reasons. The perspective that is adopted must answer or meet the individual's intellectual and emotional or psychological needs.

On the level of specifics, then, there is little, if any, intrinsic connection between the subjective concerns of a theorist and the ultimate validity of his ideas. On a more general level, however, there is an area in which the dependence of a theory on its creator's subjective concerns is relevant. I am referring here to a major derivation based on psychobiographical studies, namely, that no single theory in the human sciences can ever do justice to the entire range of phenomena implicated in the understanding of any aspect of human behavior. The various constituents of reality for any given theory must always be more or less exaggerated or underrated in their importance depending upon the subjective concerns of the theorist. No theorist can devote the same loving care to those aspects of reality that do not concern him deeply as to those that he has a real psychological need to develop; I have told my truth, and not the whole truth, about fieldwork. From this point of view, Bateson makes a great deal of sense in his argument about the importance of having two eyes; two descriptions of the "same" reality are always more useful than one. Double descriptions, though not truth, do underline the differential aspects of reality that must inevitably be ignored in any one description or theory.

It would be useful if one could approach the recent Mead/Freeman debate, as well as the earlier Redfield/Lewis controversy, from this point of view. Rather than splitting into armed and hostile camps each defending its own doctrine (that is, its own self-objects, its own focal symbols of immortality power), the disputants in these issues might be or have been better off recognizing that the accounts offered by both theorists are necessarily incomplete because they are products of different subjective concerns coupled with different intellectual and social milieus. This would still leave room for arguments about the general applicability and the accuracy of each theorist's account; that would not change. But the spirit of the debate might at least be a little less acrimonious. And certainly, much anthropological self-flagellation, now displayed with too much vulgarity and bad taste in our leading journals, might then be and have been avoided. To paraphrase Norman O. Brown's comment about the intellectual life, what the anthropological world needs is a little less strife and a little more Eros.

Women as Anthropologists
There are two relatively disparate points that need to be made on this subject. The first relates to an aspect of my methodology (women in my sample), whereas the second relates more broadly to a matter of anthropological methodology (women in the field).

Having worked his way through the interview vignettes and case studies in Chapters 3 through 6, the reader will by this time have realized that I ultimately analyzed more female than male anthropologists' field experiences. Although this skewing of sex ratios was not intentional—at least not consciously—it also was not catastrophic in the sense of placing a "gender constraint" on the general applicability of my conclusions. Unlike the different developmental lines traversed by males and females in the classic Freudian paradigm, from the point of view of self-psychology, and more particularly from that of identity maintenance, the processes that produce and stabilize an individual's sense of identity are identical for males and females. The characteristics of the fieldwork situation that render it an identity-dystonic experience (the loss of positive mirroring from and familiar identifications with significant objects in the home world) affect males and females equally. Had I analyzed an even number of males and females, my results would have been substantially the same as they are now—a prediction for future research.

Admittedly, although the processes of identity maintenance are similar for males and females, the specific symptoms of identity disintegration and the defensive/reparative behaviors undertaken in response to it may differ between the sexes. One
might reasonably expect to find that gender-specific cultural expectations and stereotypes play a determining role in shaping the form taken by specific symptoms and defensive/reparative behaviors. Whether the anthropologist has a good cry or puts a clenched fist through a wall in response to the depression that accompanies identity disintegration depends, to some extent, on the natal and adopted culture’s definition of appropriate behavior for males and females. To cite a second and more potentially interesting example, growing up as a woman in America requires that one accept, at least partially, a greater emotional sensitivity and perceptiveness as appropriate to the feminine role. Therefore, one might expect the female anthropologist to express aspects of this increased emotionality in her choice of defensive/reparative behaviors, for example, writing heartfelt letters home or keeping an emotionally honest and revealing diary. In fact, it may very well be this image of the woman as a more emotionally resonant and perceptive being that helps to explain why female anthropologists were so early to seize on the emotional stresses and strains of fieldwork as a problem in need of further study and why the most psychologically open and revealing account of fieldwork yet written was authored by a woman (Malinowski never intended his diaries to be published). It is also reasonable to suppose that this image of the woman as an emotional sponge unconsciously guided my choice of informants; I expected women to be more forthcoming and sensitive about the emotional/psychological trials and tribulations of fieldwork and so included more of them in my sample. With this thought, I will end the discussion of women in my sample and consider, briefly, one specific issue related to women in the field.

Over the past several decades, anthropologists have grown progressively more interested in the nature of their discipline and in their data-gathering techniques. Much like their counterparts in physics, anthropologists have come to recognize that their data are largely the result of a process of interaction between a disturbing influence (the anthropologist) and the field in and on which it acts (the indigenous culture). Fieldwork is a process of negotiation between the observer and the observed. From this dialogical perspective, it is especially important to analyze and determine the influence of the anthropologist on the data that are being studied. And one characteristic of anthropologists that is certainly noticeable and likely to influence the data they collect is their gender.

No one, I think, would deny that the fieldworker’s sex makes a difference, that it must be seen as influencing the fieldwork situation and therefore the data that are collected. A number of studies in this area have focused on the problem of differential access to data—that female anthropologists get access to certain cultural practices and social spheres from which male anthropologists are barred and vice versa—particularly as it is related to the role the anthropologist assumes in the eyes of the native people. The role adopted by the fieldworker is crucial for any role is, by definition, restrictive: "Only in rare instances does the status ascribed to the ethnologist lend itself to comprehensive fieldwork.... [The ethnologist must] insist on being shown also that which is normally turned away from a person occupying that status".

For female anthropologists, and particularly for those who work in nonliterate cultures, the available roles that can be adopted, whether freely chosen or "forcibly" imposed by the community, are few in number. The anthropologist needs to guarantee her ability to act independently, but she also must enable the culture’s members to feel as if they can adequately control and protect her; she must be classifiable but not straightjacketed into an impossibly narrow and confining role. The fieldworker’s difficulties are further compounded because in most cultures, women are not permitted much leeway in the performance of their role responsibilities. Any deviation from the norm tends to stand out clearly and to draw much unfavorable reaction. In such a situation, the anthropologist will often adopt or accept an existing variant or "deviant" role that enables her to flout or disregard traditional expectations for women’s behavior while still remaining classifiable and therefore relatively unthreatening. Landes, for example, assumed the successive roles of "artist," "prostitute," and "Communist" during her fieldwork in Brazil. Briggs, during her stay with the Eskimo, moved between the roles of "mentally retarded" and "child." Weidman and Nader, for reasons of appearance and attitude, were classified as "men". Often a woman fieldworker will be treated as a postmenopausal tribal woman, a "sexless" being
that is permitted a great deal more independence than a "normal" woman. This sexless status has often been considered ideal because of the relative freedom of movement and wide range of access that it allows.

Although the direct methodological implications of adopting any one status have already been mentioned here and by many others (that is, a "woman-man" would get access to some areas that a "Communist" might not, and vice versa), there is an indirect implication that has received much less attention but is clearly related to the main thrust of this book. I am referring to certain defensive/reparative behaviors that may be activated by the anthropologist who has adopted a role during fieldwork that is discordant with her own self-image/identity. Although, for example, it may seem methodologically ideal for the initiate-anthropologist to be classified and treated as a postmenopausal woman, such a status may promote severe psychological difficulties in the area of identity maintenance. On one hand, these difficulties may be largely dealt with through the activation of defensive/reparative behaviors that serve to link the anthropologist to her home world—witness the cases of Karen, Cathy, and Sue that were discussed in earlier chapters. On the other hand, however, the initiate-anthropologist may also activate a defensive/reparative behavior that serves not so much to establish a link with her home world as to distance her from the indigenous culture and more particularly from her newly acquired "unreal" and "unlivable" status. These potentially methodologically significant responses may include feelings of (un)conscious resentment directed against the native people or a tendency to focus on identity-syntonic aspects of the surrounding environment while ignoring identity-dystonic aspects. This very human tendency to concentrate on identity-syntonic aspects of the surrounding environment can produce in the anthropologist a decidedly one-sided and incomplete description of a culture. Or more accurately phrased, when whole chunks of experience are (un)consciously ignored, the resulting account must be less rich and humanly complex than is otherwise possible. Devereux has discussed this process of "distortion" at great length and reached a substantially similar conclusion, although it is couched in a somewhat different psychological idiom.

The psychological difficulties that are generated when a host culture imposes an "unlivable" identity on an anthropologist are certainly not confined to women. Devereux, for one, reports that he was unable completely to fulfill the role responsibilities of a shaman among the Sedang for at least one of the required attributes, assuming an exploitive role, was too identity-dystonic for him to accept. I have concentrated on female anthropologists in this section largely because of their majority presence in my sample. Whether the discrepancy between "real" and "imposed" identity is a greater problem for female as opposed to male anthropologists (because of fewer available identities for females to assume coupled with more stringent role-performance ideals) or whether specific defensive/reparative behaviors mobilized during fieldwork are characteristically different between female and male anthropologists are questions for future research.

Informants in the Field
Devereux has put together an extremely persuasive argument for his belief that "every thought system ... originates in the unconscious as a defense against anxiety and disorientation." Although the social and natural sciences are, for the most part, concerned with different objects of study—human beings versus inanimate matter—both are rooted in anxiety reduction. Given the ubiquity of anxiety reduction as a motive in theory construction, it is imperative for the scientist to determine whether he is using his particular methodology in a "sublimating manner, or unconsciously, in a defensive manner only". Whenever one studies human beings, one will inevitably encounter situations that generate anxiety. A method that helps to increase one's detachment and therefore to reduce anxiety can hold great benefits for scientific inquiry. Devereux believes that the crucial factor is the degree of self-awareness the investigator possesses about his reasons for adopting a particular methodology. An investigator who is aware of his own deep motives for adopting any given methodology is more likely to be able to reduce his anxiety without distorting his results than is the blithely unaware investigator.
The medical doctor who is aware of his reasons for remaining rational and aloof in the face of great suffering is likely to be a much different and better doctor than the one for whom rationality becomes an unexamined end in itself—a defense, and not as in the first instance a sublimation, against anxiety that can turn into an "impersonal 'morgue approach' to patients".

I have discussed Devereux’s ideas in some detail here because they seem to me to sum up and to parallel my own ideas about the nature of anthropologist-informant relations during fieldwork. It would be too much of an exaggeration to claim that every friendly or every hostile relationship entered into during fieldwork originated in the anthropologist's unconscious as a defense against the anxiety associated with identity fragmentation, but certainly some do. We have already seen how the anthropologist may turn to his principal informant, or avoid and dislike other people, in an effort to stabilize his sense of identity. The anthropologist may need to locate or create the too-well-informed informant, the native "philosophy don," if he is to assure the stability of his sense of identity; the anthropologist may also need to avoid the presence of, or actively hate, certain people whose very existence and way of life threaten his psychological security (for example, Sam's feelings about the missionaries he lived with and Cathy's avoidance of her adopted parents' daughter). But surely from a methodological point of view, it makes a great deal of difference how aware one is of the reasons one has for selecting a particular friend or enemy.

Coming to like a person, or to dislike another, is a commonplace in human existence. For the fieldworker, however, these feelings must become something more, a source of information and a chance for self-reflection. If they do not, if the fieldworker's personal relationships go unexamined, then they can become sources of bias and distortion, or at the very least, missed chances. This is not to say that the psychologically aware investigator will necessarily produce a complete and thoroughly representative account of any given culture. As we have already seen, every investigator is subject to a set of unique psychobiographic constraints that channel his interests and ideas into certain areas. Within any one of these areas, however, it is the investigator's responsibility to be methodologically honest, to explore the domain openly and by using whatever means are available. And sources of pleasure and sources of pain are two such available means that the anthropologist can exploit to open up further areas of inquiry, that he can use to deepen and enrich his understanding of the native culture.

Forming friendships is essential to good fieldwork. The anthropologist needs to have one, or several, special informants with whom he can discuss his ideas and whose opinions and ideas he can trust. By the same token, however, the anthropologist needs to be aware that an especially congenial relationship with an informant might actually say more about the unconscious needs of the anthropologist than about any particular facet of the culture he is studying. The anthropologist needs actively to question whether he is making friends with only a select group of natives and differentially weighting the view of the culture that he receives from them. For the anthropologist who is actively interested in pursuing self-reflection, who seeks out his own underlying motives, his fears and fantasies, personal relationships entered into during fieldwork can become a pathway that leads him to discover hitherto unsuspected patterns of connection between elements of native cultural practice.

Similarly, the anthropologist needs to examine the underlying nature of the anxiety that he experiences when meeting certain people or engaging in particular events. Obeyesekere, for example, explains how he was able to use his own anxiety at the sight of a woman whose hair was matted into prominent locks as a springboard to enter into a deeper understanding of native culture. In like fashion, Devereux was able to use his feelings of anxiety about and dislike for the cultural practices of the Sedang to discover that the people themselves disliked many of their own cultural practices but felt constrained by evil gods. Rather than simply avoiding the sources of their anxiety, both Obeyesekere and Devereux were able to take a creative and methodologically significant stance toward their own human reactions. Perhaps their experiences suggest what might be called a fundamental tenet of fieldwork methodology: the anthropologist's feelings and desires, whether positive or negative, are tools that can be used to allow him to penetrate more deeply into the world of the native.
Like all human beings, fieldworkers make friends and enemies; they laugh and cry, hate and love; they have great days and absolutely rotten days. Being aware of the underlying motives animating these feelings, of the process of identity loss and defensive/reparative behavior, of the need for links to the home world and for “mirror” informants, will not make any of these phenomena or feelings disappear; the most psychologically sophisticated and sensitive anthropologist will still experience culture shock and all its consequences. But being aware of these phenomena—a mode of understanding that might be developed with the aid of psychoanalysis, for one example—can help to reduce the likelihood of being unconsciously controlled by them. Even a little awareness and a little understanding can keep the anthropologist from producing “a self-indulgent branch of lyric poetry ... [an account of] how he feels projectively about the unknown”. If there is any one most important lesson to be derived from the psychology of fieldwork, then surely it must concern the value of being critically and creatively self-aware.

Fieldwork is certainly the most remarkable and unusual requirement imposed by a discipline on its practitioners. Giving up one’s familiar world, friends, and style of life to go and live and work in a Newfoundland fishing village, an Austrian peasant community, or a Brazilian Indian tribe entails a degree of self-sacrifice that is relatively unknown in the other human sciences. There is something grand and romantic, almost heroic, in this idea of self-sacrifice for the sake of knowledge. As Friedrich Nietzsche pointed out, the human animal has a bad memory for things in general but an excellent one for events cloaked in pain, guilt, and self-sacrifice. Ah, but what is the lesson, what is to be learned, and what remembered? And so it is necessary to be relentless in ferreting out the dark side of fieldwork, for only then can the other side, the rebirth of the anthropologist, be fully comprehended and understood in a rigorous manner. This story, that of the transition from the dark to the light, awaits another day. <>

The New Chimpanzee: A Twenty-First-Century Portrait of Our Closest Kin by Craig Stanford [Harvard University Press, 9780674977112]

Recent discoveries about wild chimpanzees have dramatically reshaped our understanding of these great apes and their kinship with humans. We now know that chimpanzees not only have genomes similar to our own but also plot political coups, wage wars over territory, pass on cultural traditions to younger generations, and ruthlessly strategize for resources, including sexual partners. In The New Chimpanzee, Craig Stanford challenges us to let apes guide our inquiry into what it means to be human.

With wit and lucidity, Stanford explains what the past two decades of chimpanzee field research has taught us about the origins of human social behavior, the nature of aggression and communication, and the divergence of humans and apes from a common ancestor. Drawing on his extensive observations of chimpanzee behavior and social dynamics, Stanford adds to our knowledge of chimpanzees’ political intelligence, sexual power plays, violent ambition, cultural diversity, and adaptability.

The New Chimpanzee portrays a complex and even more humanlike ape than the one Jane Goodall popularized more than a half century ago. It also sounds an urgent call for the protection of our nearest relatives at a moment when their survival is at risk.

Excerpt: Over the past two decades, scientists have made dramatic discoveries about chimpanzees that will change the way we understand both human nature and the apes themselves. Although there is a rich history of chimpanzee field research going back nearly sixty years, almost all the findings discussed in this book have been made just since the turn of the millennium. From genomics to cultural traditions, we’ll consider our close kin in a new light and ask what this information may mean for a new and improved understanding of human nature.

Studying wild chimpanzees is the profession of a very small number of people in the world. At any one time there are probably fewer than a hundred scientists and their students actively engaged in chimpanzee field observation and study. The number of full-time professors in American universities whose careers are focused mainly on wild chimpanzee research is perhaps a dozen. Add in the scholars and conservationists doing work in related areas, and the global army of chimpanzee watchers is a few hundred strong. The available funding for the work they do is a fraction of that given to scientists in other endeavors. Yet the results
of new studies are front-page news and are rightly touted in the international media for the clues they provide about human nature.

My own involvement with chimpanzees came about fortuitously. In the late 1980s I was conducting my doctoral research in Bangladesh on a previously little-known monkey called the capped langur. I was living in a ramshackle cabin on stilts at the edge of a rice paddy, spending my days following a group of the monkeys on their daily rounds in the nearby forest. Capped langurs are handsome animals, their gray backs set off by a flame-orange coat underneath and a black mask of skin for a face. Unfortunately, their behavior is not as interesting; they traveled only a hundred meters per day and spent nearly all their waking hours calmly munching on foliage. The most interesting observation I made in thousands of hours with the langurs was the fatal attack on an old female by a pack of jackals. Jackals were not thought to prey on animals as large as eight-kilogram monkeys, but with the extirpation of leopards and tigers in the area, they may have taken on that role. As I strolled along behind the group one afternoon, observing the matriarch feeding on the ground right in front of me, a pair of jackals burst from a thicket, grabbed her, and dragged her off. It was a vivid demonstration for me of the potential for predators to make a powerful impact on the survival of an individual, and on the population of monkeys in this forest.

As I looked ahead to the completion of my PhD and considered post-doctoral options, I sent letters to a number of primate researchers in Africa and Asia proposing projects that involved the study of predation’s effects on wild primate populations. A colleague suggested I write to Jane Goodall. Goodall’s field site in Tanzania had been attacked by a rebel militia in 1975. Four Western students were kidnapped and held for ransom in neighboring Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Although all were eventually released unharmed, the park had been generally off-limits to visiting researchers for more than a decade. I mailed a thin blue aerogram—this was pre-Internet—expecting no reply. When I returned to Berkeley months later, a letter from Goodall was waiting, inviting me to come to Gombe to study the predator-prey interactions between chimpanzees and the red colobus monkeys, whose flesh they so relish. A year later, with a permit from the Tanzanian government and a shoestring budget in hand, I arrived to begin several years of back-and-forth travel to Gombe to study the hunting behavior of chimpanzees and its impact on the behavior and population biology of the monkeys they hunt.

The world’s most famous study of animal behavior is located in a former British colonial hunting reserve, now a tiny but important jewel in Tanzania’s national park system. It’s an oblong strip of forest and hills, about ten miles long and two miles wide, hugging the shore of Lake Tanganyika, two hours by boat from the harbor town of Kigoma. Before Goodall’s arrival, Kigoma was best known for its harbor and its proximity to Ujiji, where the newspaper reporter Henry Morton Stanley found the missionary doctor and explorer David Livingston in 1871. It was a sleepy port town with one main dirt road, a few cafés, and a lot of ramshackle market stalls. These days Kigoma is bustling; it’s the jumping-off point for ecotourists headed to either Gombe or Mahale National Parks to see wild chimpanzees. Beginning in the 1960s it was the home of Goodall and a team of Tanzanian assistants, soon joined by students from North America and Europe who documented the intimate details of the lives of wild apes. It is sacred ground for any student of animal behavior.

I had come to Gombe mainly to study red colobus monkeys—the favored prey animal when chimpanzees go hunting—and their relationship with their predators. Unlike most researchers who arrive at Gombe to study chimpanzees, I was fairly ignorant about their celebrity status. I knew that each member of the same matriline bore a name starting with the same letter, but the names Fifi, Frodo, Gremlin, and Goblin bore no special meaning to me at the start of my study. This would soon change; spending long hours in close quarters with chimpanzees, you cannot help becoming immersed in their lives and personalities. The daily life of a researcher is organized around the daily lives of the animals; you go where they go, when they go, resting when they rest and sweating up steep hills right behind them.

This book is about the lives of chimpanzees living where they belong, in the tropical forests of Africa. Most of us who have spent time with wild chimpanzees have an uneasy relationship with
captive research and the ethics of keeping and studying apes in zoos, laboratories, and the like. Psychologists working in laboratories and primate centers have made amazing discoveries about the workings of the chimpanzee mind. These discoveries hold great promise for a deeper understanding of our own intellect and the meaning of intelligence. On the other hand, these researchers work with chimpanzees that are locked up in enclosures that, however artfully designed, cannot mask the fact that the apes are prisoners. In the best-case scenario, large and well-funded primate centers maintain their chimpanzees in large social groups that occupy spacious outdoor enclosures. In such places, detailed observations of social behavior are possible that could never be accomplished in the rugged, dense forests in which chimpanzees naturally live. But spaciousness is relative. A very lucky captive chimpanzee might spend his life on a well-landscaped two-acre island. The same ape, if raised in Africa, would spend a lifetime traversing up to fifty square kilometers of forest. Captivity provides freedom from hunger, predators, and disease, but with the loss of environmental enrichment beyond measure. A cage is a cage, no matter how large or well designed. Moreover, research on behaviors that evolved in an African forest should obviously be done in an African forest. For this reason I have chosen to focus on what we have recently learned about chimpanzees in the wild, and only occasionally introduce captive findings, exciting though they may be in their own right.

The book is organized as a series of narratives about each of the major areas of recent research. Chapter 1, "Watching Chimpanzees," sets the stage by describing the close evolutionary relationship between humans and their ape relatives and discussing many of the issues current in chimpanzee field research. Chapter 2, "Fission, Fusion, and Food," is about the complicated nature of chimpanzee society and the role that both ovulating females and food availability play in it. In Chapter 3, "Politics Is War without Bloodshed," I consider the Machiavellian and fascinating world of chimpanzee politics. Chapter 4, "War for Peace," focuses on the nature and causes of violence within and between chimpanzee communities. Chapter 5, "Sex and Reproduction," is about the rather complicated sexual politics of chimpanzee life. Chapter 6, "Growing Up Chimpanzee," describes the early lives of male and female chimpanzees and the factors that turn them into successful or not-so-successful adults. Chapter 7, "Why Chimpanzees Hunt," describes chimpanzee meat-eating behavior, which shocked the world when first reported by Goodall in the early 1960s. I reflect on my own work on chimpanzee hunting and recount the ensuing debate over the meaning of meat in chimpanzee society.

Chimpanzees are the most technologically gifted creatures on the planet besides ourselves. In Chapter 8, "Got Culture?," I examine chimpanzee intelligence as evidenced by the many recent discoveries of tool use among wild chimpanzees. Chapter 9, "Blood Is Thicker," is about the emerging field of ape genomics. I share what we have learned in the past few years about the genetics of chimpanzees and what that may tell us about our own evolutionary history. Chapter 10, "Ape into Human," concludes the book with some lessons that we can learn from chimpanzees in order to better understand ourselves. It is also about the use and misuse of extrapolations from ape behavior to that of early humans.

My hope is that readers will appreciate chimpanzees for what they are—not underevolved humans or caricatures of ourselves, but perhaps the most interesting of all the species of nonhuman animals with which we share our planet. The gift of the chimpanzee is the vista we are offered of ourselves. It is a gift that is in danger of disappearing as we destroy the chimpanzees' natural world and drive them toward extinction. A tiny fraction of chimpanzees live in protected sanctuaries, where their health is monitored and we are aware of every problem that faces them. The other 150,000 chimps living in the forests of Africa are still unknown, unmonitored, and in dire need of protection. To gain a fuller sense of what we will lose if chimpanzees cease to exist in the wild, read on. <>

**Culture Writing: Literature and Anthropology in the Midcentury Atlantic World** by Tim Watson
[Modernist Literature and Culture, Oxford, 9780190852672]

Focusing on the 1950s and early 1960s, **Culture Writing** argues that this period in Britain, the United States, France, and the Caribbean was
characterized by dynamic exchanges between literary writers and anthropologists on both sides of the Atlantic. As the British and French empires collapsed and the United States rose to global power in the early Cold War, and as intellectuals from the decolonizing world challenged the cultural hegemony of the West, some anthropologists began to assess their discipline’s complicity with empire and experimented with literary forms and technique. *Culture Writing* shows that the "literary turn" in anthropology took place earlier than has conventionally been assumed, in the 1950s rather than the 1970s and 80s. Simultaneously, some literary writers reacted to the end of the period of modernist experimentation by turning to ethnographic methods for representing the people and cultural practices of Britain, France, and the United States, bringing anthropology back home. There is analysis of literary writers who had a significant professional engagement with anthropology and brought some of its techniques and research questions into literary composition: Barbara Pym (Britain), Ursula Le Guin and Saul Bellow (United States), Édouard Glissant (Martinique), and Michel Leiris (France). On the side of ethnography, the book analyzes works by anthropologists who either explicitly or surreptitiously adopted literary forms for their writing about culture: Laura Bohannan (United States), Michel Leiris and Claude Lévi-Strauss (France), and Mary Douglas (Britain). *Culture Writing* concludes with an epilogue that shows how the literature-anthropology conversation continues into the postcolonial period in the work of Indian author-anthropologist Amitav Ghosh and Jamaican author-sociologist Erna Brodber.

One sign of a powerful critical argument is that its insights overflow its own ostensible archive and start to change the way we read cherished items in our private archives. Tim Watson’s rich new study, *Culture Writing: Literature and Anthropology in the Midcentury Atlantic World* is just such a book.

In 1933 Evelyn Waugh turned his experiences as a jilted husband and failed explorer into the story "The Man Who Liked Dickens," material that was adapted the following year for the conclusion of his fourth novel, *A Handful of Dust*. Mr. Henty (Tony Last in the novel), his heart broken by an unfaithful wife, signs on (French Foreign Legion-style) to a rag-tag anthropological expedition to "the upper waters of the River Uraricoera" in northern Brazil, for much the same reason that Leopold Bloom sets off on his more local odyssey on June 16, 1904—to sidestep his wife’s dalliance with her lover.

The story is a small comic masterpiece, and at the same time something like a parable about the unstable power dynamics of the ethnographic gaze. The titular Dickens fan Mr. McMaster ("son of the master") is a Kurtz-like European-gone-native surrounded by worshipful indigenous people; but in the end it is McMaster, and not Henty, who proves to be the more serious student of anthropology. As the story draws to a close McMaster is comfortably ensconced in the heart of darkness, having Dickens’s "thick descriptions" of London life read to him by the British subject he’s holding hostage—Henty, a would-be social scientist forced to give voice to the anthropological aspirations of fiction, doing the police in different voices. With the tables thus turned, it becomes possible for us to recognize Martin Chuzzlewit as the amateur ethnography it always was. In the very heart of darkness we find ... London.

Waugh’s satiric tale stands midway between modernism’s earliest sustained engagement with the burgeoning science of ethnography, Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* (1899/1902), and the body of anthropological writing—both fictional and social scientific—that forms the archive for *Culture Writing*. Returning us to the "literary turn" in anthropology—and suggesting that it started a good quartercentury earlier than we’d previously thought—Watson narrates a surprising story of the crosscurrents mutually interanimating anthropology and literary fiction. A Handful of Dust, just coincidentally, was published in the same year as one of the pillars of English-language anthropology, Ruth Benedict’s *Patterns of Culture*. Dickens, of course—like his contemporaries in chronicling London life, Friedrich Engels (The Condition of the Working Class in England, 1845) and Henry Mayhew (London Labour and the London Poor, 1849-50)—wrote at the very moment that anthropology was being established as a discipline. The Ethnological Society of New York was founded in 1842, its London counterpart in 1843; meanwhile Martin Chuzzlewit ran serially from December 1842 through July 1844. This is perhaps just one example of what Watson means when he writes that "literature, literary studies,
anthropology have been mutually entwined since the middle of the nineteenth century, when they began to take their modern forms almost simultaneously and under the direct influence of each other."

Part of the story Watson tells here has to do with the complicated relationship between these two different ways of knowing and telling about human culture—with fiction’s anthropological aspirations, and anthropology’s fictive ones. And his focus, rather than the mid-nineteenth-century moment of anthropology’s professional consolidation, or literary high modernism’s early twentieth-century efflorescence, is the post-World War II confluence of anthropology and fiction in the face of the decolonization of the Anglophone and Francophone Atlantic. Barbara Pym, whose writing is at best a footnote in the conventional account of literary modernism, is shown here to be not simply importing the methods of ethnography into her quiet depictions of English life—an autoethnographic strategy that Watson, adapting the term from Jed Esty, calls "home anthropology." Pym worked for decades as an editor at the International African Institute in London, and had a granular, working-professional’s understanding of trends and tensions in the field; as a result, her writing also engages the then-current critique of functionalism in favor of an anthropology of social change that was rolling English anthropology. Watson has now given us a way to read and value Pym’s fiction, itself no small contribution to modernist studies.

Though Watson constrains himself to a limited historical window (1945-1965), that hole-in-the-wall proves to be both strategic and capacious: it allows him to tell a story that weaves together British, American, and French writers, fiction and anthropology, through the work of Pym, Mary Douglas, Saul Bellow, Michel Leiris, Édouard Glissant, Ursula Le Guin, Laura Bohannan, and Claude Lévi-Strauss, among many others. Like the engagement with anthropology in those novelists he analyzes, and the embrace of fictional techniques in his anthropologists, Watson’s treatment of anthropology is thorough and serious: serious enough to make us embarrassed to continue to pursue our work in relative ignorance of the field that was so important a provocation for the fiction of the first two post-war decades.

As the Modernist Literature and Culture series approaches its close, we’re pleased to bring you this important study of decolonizing and Cold War modernism and its alliance with the human sciences.

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Excerpt: Kinship between Literature and Anthropology

Historical fiction, literary history, the historical novel: phrases that signal the interdisciplinary relationship between literature and history are commonplace and seem self-evident, even though the relationship between the two disciplines is often fraught and never straightforward. By contrast, analogous terms to mark the exchanges between literature and anthropology are far less well established. Literary anthropology? The anthropological novel? These formulations, while hardly unknown, are not part of the everyday discourse of either discipline—let alone the broader public sphere—and they certainly do not carry the scholarly imprimatur of a category like the historical novel. This stark contrast is surprising,
however, even if it is rarely noticed. Literature, literary studies, and anthropology have been mutually entwined since the nineteenth century, when they began to take their modern forms almost simultaneously and under the direct influence of each other. James Buzard has argued that proto-anthropological descriptions of Irish and Scottish cultures in early-nineteenth-century national tales fed directly into the mainstream of English Victorian fiction, which was dominated by "autoethnographic" narrative points of view. Matthew Arnold claimed that his mid-nineteenth-century studies in Celtic literature would have been "impossible" to write without "touching on certain points of ethnology." Early-twentieth-century exchanges between artists and ethnographers were central to the development of modernist cultures on both sides of the Atlantic. The 1980s "literary turn" in anthropology along with literary scholars' embrace of Clifford Geertz's anthropological concept of "thick description" cemented the scholarly reciprocity between the disciplines in their current professional incarnations. And in the contemporary moment, both literature and anthropology are valued for the training they offer to students in empathy and in seeing the world from the point of view of another person or group, as part of a humanistic education under threat. Simply put, anthropology and literature have been engaged in a mutual dialogue for more than two hundred years.

Many scholars have highlighted and documented the relationship between these two fields of knowledge, even if these critics' efforts have not yet led to a widespread recognition of the long and rich entanglement between literature and anthropology. Culture Writing contributes to and supplements a rich body of comparative research and writing. Scholars of the relationship between literature and anthropology whose work has been invaluable in my research include Eric Aronoff, Nancy Bentley, Celia Britton, James Buzard, Gregory Castle, James Clifford, Vincent Debaene, Jed Esty, Brad Evans, Susan Hegeman, Christina Kullberg, David Luís-Brown, Marc Manganaro, and Carey Snyder, among others. My contribution to this interdisciplinary dialogue is to focus on a relatively neglected period in the anthropology-literture exchange: the mid-twentieth-century period between the end of World War II and the mid-1960s, after the moment of high modernism and before the postmodern turn. In this epoch in the Anglophone and Francophone Atlantic worlds, the convergence of anthropology and literature is a particularly rich place to analyze the effects of decolonization, the new hegemony of the United States in the Cold War, the transformations of modernist aesthetic projects, and the role of intellectuals in a world becoming dominated by technical and professional specialization. In the Anglophone context, these issues often played out in struggles over the term "culture," while in the Francophone world the equivalent terms were civilisation and fait social total (total social fact). I supplement and revise the existing body of comparative literature-anthropology scholarship by arguing that the "literary turn" in anthropology in fact began significantly earlier than has been assumed since the influential publication of James Clifford and George Marcus's Writing Culture. Clifford, Marcus, and many others who have followed them have identified a disciplinary break that followed the posthumous publication of the founding father Bronislaw Malinowski's fieldwork diary in 1967 and a period of guilty disciplinary introspection that encouraged experimentation with forms and methods within anthropology. I propose that the literary turn began instead with women writers and ethnographers like Laura Bohannan, Ursula Le Guin, and Barbara Pym in the 1950s. Moreover, instead of emphasizing the disciplinary rupture that was caused by the revelations in Malinowski's personal diary, I highlight continuities between the literary-ethnographic dialogues of the 1930s and 1940s and the literature-anthropology conversations of the 1950s and 1960s, tracing lines of connection from Zora Neale Hurston, Michel Leiris, and the English Mass-Observation project in the earlier period to the major figures of my book: Pym, Bohannan, Le Guin, Saul Bellow, Édouard Glissant, and Leiris himself, the figure who most clearly straddled the two periods and bridged the two fields in a unique way.

One result of this altered disciplinary chronology is that it has strengthened the connection James Clifford himself makes in his introduction to Writing Culture between anthropological self-consciousness about forms of representation and anthropological reflection on the discipline's complicity with colonial and state power: "The critique of colonialism in the postwar period—an undermining of 'the West's' ability to represent other societies—has been
reinforced by an important process of theorizing about the limits of representation itself. While Clifford sees this postcolonial conjunction as one among several important challenges to the discipline of anthropology in the 1970s and 1980s, I argue that the entanglement of literature and ethnography in the 1950s and 1960s was one of the principal manifestations of the "undermining of the West's ability to represent other societies" during the period of decolonization. It was through experiments with form—fictionalizing fieldwork in a late colonial environment, for example, as Laura Bohannan did in her 1954 novel, Return to Laughter—that some anthropologists were able to register the profound transformations of the postwar, decolonizing world. Likewise, it was by adapting ethnographic methods and transferring them to metropolitan settings that novelists like Barbara Pym and Saul Bellow were able to register some of the effects of postwar decolonization and Cold War social change in their fiction. And in the Francophone world, it was the writer-turned-anthropologist Michel Leiris who produced one of the first strong public critiques of anthropology's complicity with empire, "The Ethnographer Faced with Colonialism"—although, as Clifford says in referring to Leiris's essay, we may nevertheless wonder "why so late?" for anthropology to "reckon with ... political conflict in its midst." In the moment of postwar challenges to French rule in Southeast Asia, North and West Africa, and the Caribbean, it was avowedly in the guise of the imaginative writer that Leiris the anthropologist floated the "hopelessly idealistic dream" of sending a group of ethnographers from "colonized countries" to "come to us [i.e., France] on a mission to study our ways of life." While Leiris's essay was written with a "very simple goal in mind—to orient French ethnography in a direction I will not hesitate to describe as more realistic," it was in his speculative and creative mode of writing that he was able to imagine the kind of reverse anthropology that might actually remedy some of the legacies of ethnographic complicity with empire.

Leiris's "dream," however, shatters on the rock of one of the most significant features of this postwar, decolonizing moment in anthropology: the increasing professionalization and institutional embeddedness of the discipline. Colonized ethnographers, Leiris noted, would not "resolve the problem" of imperial complicity, because "these researchers would do their work using methods we had taught them and what would be thus created would be an ethnography still strongly marked by our stamp." The question of professional training, and its heightened importance in anthropology now that it was expanding its place within cultural and educational institutions throughout the Atlantic world, make this 1945-65 conjuncture a crucial transitional period in the relationship between literature and anthropology. Few people would have known this better than Michel Leiris, selected without any formal anthropological training to be the secretary-archivist of the famed Dakar-Djibouti ethnographic expedition led by Marcel Griaule in the early 1930s, an appointment that would have been hard to imagine only a decade later for someone without professional credentials in the discipline.
seen as a domain of knowledge that required a specific, institutionally ratified training.

This did not mean, of course, that the boundaries between the two fields became impossible to cross. While in the modernist period literature and anthropology were in conversation in mostly informal, albeit mutually fruitful ways, in the midcentury moment the writers I analyze all had a significant professional engagement with anthropology in its institutional setting. Barbara Pym (England; chapter 1) worked for decades as an editor at the International African Institute in London, the premier site in the Atlantic world for Africanist anthropology; Saul Bellow (United States; chapter 3) was an anthropology major at Northwestern University, studying with Melville Herskovits, one of the leading figures of the field, and then began a PhD in anthropology at the University of Michigan before abandoning it to become a writer; Michel Leiris (France; chapter 5) trained formally in anthropology after the 1930s African expedition and in the postwar period held an influential position at the new Musée de l’Homme in Paris; Édouard Glissant (Martinique; chapter 4) studied under Leiris’s supervision in Paris for a certificate in ethnology in the 1950s; and although Ursula Le Guin (United States; chapter 2) was a student of literature rather than anthropology, she was the daughter of one of the leading lights of American anthropology, Alfred Kroeber, and grew up in Berkeley in an academic household where anthropological topics and anthropologists were everyday concerns and a crucial part of her educational formation.

However, the same processes that led to anthropology’s growing institutionalization after World War II also raised troubling questions for some within the discipline. As anthropology departments consolidated themselves in major universities across the Atlantic world, as some leading figures such as Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict became public intellectuals and media commentators while others, like Bronislaw Malinowski, became more conservative as they accrued more cultural capital, a few anthropologists began to question the discipline’s historical alignment with those in positions of power, with European imperialisms, and, in the postwar moment, with the technocratic infrastructure of Cold War neocolonialism. While many anthropologists worked on the Allied side during World War II and continued to cooperate with state apparatuses of empire and soft power after the war, some had doubts about the impact such partnerships were having on the intellectual project of the discipline itself. John Embree, for example, who provided intelligence to the US military in Southeast Asia during the war, afterward came to be strongly skeptical about the compromises and complicities inherent in state-supported projects. By 1949, he was warning his colleagues that “an anthropologist who serves as cultural officer is ... soon faced with a problem in professional ethics.”

Moreover, a larger number of dissenters within anthropology, especially in the British tradition, grew dissatisfied with the discipline’s dominant functionalist, synchronic models and methods, which began to seem outdated at the moment when global upheavals rendered it necessary to understand the ways in which social and cultural organizations changed over time. These internal disciplinary changes, combined with the questions raised about the funding and working conditions of anthropology in the decolonizing, early Cold War world, had the effect of spurring some anthropologists to turn toward literature at the same time, and for some of the same reasons, that some literary figures were turning to anthropology. Narrative form promised a way to address questions of time and social change, and the non-empiricist, aesthetic basis of literature offered to counteract the technical aspects of anthropology that made it potentially complicit with state and economic power. I analyze in Culture Writing some exemplary figures of this literary turn, arguing that we should change the periodization of that movement within anthropology, dating these literary-inflected reckonings with complicity back to the 1950s and early 1960s. The writers I focus on include Laura Bohannan (United States; chapter 2), who did conventional fieldwork in northern Nigeria but then wrote a novel, Return to Laughter, based on her time there; Michel Leiris, who always remained a writer as much as an anthropologist and whose “The Ethnographer Faced with Colonialism” (1950) is a landmark in the discipline’s self-reckoning with empire; Claude Lévi-Strauss (France; introduction), whose Tristes tropiques made literary form, travel narrative, and memoir the bedrock of a new kind of anthropological practice; and, to a lesser extent, Mary Douglas (Britain;
introduction and chapter 1), whose early writings on Congo shifted from the discipline’s customary usage of the timeless ethnographic present tense to the past tense of fiction and history, as anticolonial forces drove out the Belgian rulers.

I focus on a relatively brief but intellectually and aesthetically rich twenty-year period. This midcentury moment, roughly 1945-65, has tended until recently to be seen by literary scholars as an afterthought to the period of modernist experimentation between the world wars. Historians have sometimes also seen this period, especially the 1950s, as a kind of interlude, a moment of temporary social consensus, after the global upheavals of World War II and before the new instabilities of the later 1960s and the war in Vietnam. Historians of anthropology have focused less on this moment than on the period of dynamic expansion before World War II and on the disciplinary transformations of the 1970s and 1980s. The period when anticolonial movements, in various ways and with various degrees of success, managed to force the European empires to dismantle their administrative apparatuses and withdraw their troops—the moment, in other words, of decolonization—has often been subordinated to the historical dramas that came both before and after it, the rise of Nazism and World War II, followed by the rise of US power and the Cold War. These are broad generalizations, of course, and certainly there now exists a substantial body of excellent scholarship in many disciplines and fields on the midcentury period, much of which I am indebted to in ways that will be clear in the pages that follow. Nevertheless, it is significant that there is still not a shorthand term for this period in literary, cultural, or historical studies. To call it "late modernism" is to privilege the modernist moment that precedes it. To call it "postwar," as in the title of Tony Judt’s monumental history, is to privilege World War II and, implicitly or explicitly, the history of Europe. To call it "postcolonial" is proleptic, since many territories remained colonies until well into the 1960s (and some long after, of course).

I propose here that we follow Simon Gikandi’s suggestion and return to that moment, to rethink it, and to name it as decolonization: "If you see decolonization as that search for a new humanism, driven by powerful ethical concerns about the status of the human, and the status of culture, and the status of moral well-being, then perhaps we need to go back to that moment and see how that ethical project could somehow politically and ethically be sustained and indeed, be debated." Anthropologists and literary writers were especially engaged by these ethical and political questions of a new humanism and the status of culture during this period. Of course, they had also been engaged with them in the first half of the twentieth century. But decolonization brought their desires and their claims to be specialists in humanism and in the study of culture into sharp relief, sometimes by revealing the historical complicity between culture and imperialism, sometimes by showing new ways forward for literature and the social sciences, as I hope to show.

Although decolonization was, of course, a global phenomenon, I focus in Culture Writing on its central network, the Anglophone and Francophone Atlantic worlds. This necessarily involves exclusions of significant material, writers, thinkers, and cultural phenomena, from the small (the intriguing South Asia sections of Lévi-Strauss’s Tristes tropiques, for example) to the large: I have little to say here, for instance, about the fantastically rich tradition of anthropology and literature in Latin America or about North American writers whose horizon was the Pacific Rim, such as anthropologist-turned-poet Gary Snyder. However, Culture Writing is still broad in scope, even if its time period is narrowly drawn. Most scholars have focused on either the Anglophone or the Francophone context, while I analyze both in detail here, not least because there was significant intellectual, cultural, and personal traffic between them. In so doing, I argue that the concept of an Atlantic world, often presumed to have lost its explanatory power after the mid-nineteenth century and the rise of global empires, in fact retains its usefulness in describing anthropological and literary relations in the time of decolonization. A circumAtlantic perspective allows us to see that interdisciplinary exchanges between literature and anthropology continued in the period after World War II, when the British and French Empires were dismantled and the United States rose to global hegemony as the leader of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Of course, decolonization was not a uniform process and it was not experienced or represented consistently across this Atlantic world, so it may be
helpful here to give a historical sketch of its impacts in the Francophone and Anglophone (British and US) spheres.

The French Empire came apart in a process marked by two extremes: on the one hand, the long, bloody anticolonial wars in Indochina (1946–54) and in Algeria (1954–62); on the other hand, the outwardly peaceful incorporation of the colonies of the Francophone Caribbean (Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Guiana), along with the Indian Ocean island of Réunion, into the juridico-political structures of France itself as départements d’outre-mer (overseas departments). The establishment of the overseas departments was a compromise forged under the leadership of the Communist Martinican deputy and négritude poet Aimé Césaire, who wagered that incorporation into France would grant the territories more autonomy and political leverage than a potentially fruitless, lengthy struggle for independence. As I show in my fourth and fifth chapters, which focus on Césaire’s Martinican protégé Édouard Glissant and Césaire’s metropolitan friend Michel Leiris, this bet on départementalisation only partially paid off.

Moreover, it would be wrong to presume that in the overall framework of French decolonization there were not threads connecting the extremes of its process. Frantz Fanon, to pick the most striking example, traveled from colonial Martinique (where Césaire was his secondary school teacher) to Paris during World War II, and his experience of French racism led him to write Peau noire, masques blancs (Black Skin, White Masks) in 1952 and ultimately to travel to Algeria, where he joined the anticolonial military campaign of the Front de libération nationale (FLN) and wrote the classic critique of French colonial rule and defense of national liberation struggles, Les Damnés de la terre (The Wretched of the Earth). Nevertheless, despite the wars, despite the French Left’s anticolonial position, and despite the arrival in metropolitan France of many refugees and former colonial settlers from Algeria, much of French culture and society continued in relative silence about decolonization. Francophone anthropology and literature in the period after World War II were formed at this intersection, between a full-fledged engagement with decolonization, which was altering the most basic parameters of anthropological fieldwork, for example, and a continued investment in the centrality of metropolitan France that barely registered the changes of decolonization, or saw them as a rearrangement of the lines of force on a map that remained functionally unchanged by départementalisation and the emergence of independent states in West Africa.

To complete this sketch of Francophone geopolitical realignment after World War II, we need to account for the significantly increased influence of the United States in the Atlantic world. American aid to France under the Marshall Plan helped rebuild the country after the war, but French alignment with the United States in NATO eventually came to be seen within France as a loss of independence, and Charles de Gaulle pulled the country out of the Atlantic military alliance at the end of the period covered in Culture Writing. As in other societies that came into the US sphere of influence during the Cold War, French cultural responses to the Americanization of the postwar world ranged from a melancholic anxiety over the loss of sovereignty to a buoyant celebration that recognized new artistic, political, and psychological possibilities in Les États-Unis. Jean-Luc Godard’s first film, À bout de souffle (Breathless, 1960), with its central jagged, doomed Franco-American love affair, combines both of these attitudes in postwar France.

Across La Manche (the "English" Channel), the lack of debate over the consequences of the British Empire’s unraveling was even more striking than it was in France. The imperial (and nationalist) incompetence that led to Partition and the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 had genocidal consequences: the mass slaughter of millions of people as they moved across the newly created borders in South Asia. In Britain, however, there was a failure to face up to the end of empire, as postwar austerity and the drive to create a new kind of British welfare state kept most people’s attention closer to home. John Darwin argues, in his survey of postwar Anglophone decolonization, that policymakers in the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices, under pressure from anticolonial forces throughout the empire, quietly granted independence to the colonies while banking on a British “popular indifference [that] was both familiar and convenient ... No British colonial commitment in the 1950s became a major political issue at home—
with the exception of Suez.” Probably Darwin overstates the case: the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, for example, was widely discussed in the 1950s, although almost always in Britain in a frame that portrayed the rebels as primitive and barbarically violent—a piece of conventional wisdom that is a sobering reminder of the limited influence of an anthropological ethics of cultural relativism in the dominant spheres of the postwar Atlantic world. (As in the case of the French and their supporters in Algeria, it took decades, and the persistence of survivors, historians, and journalists, before stories began to emerge of the barbaric atrocities committed by the British in Kenya, including the widespread use of torture and concentration camps. These crimes were deliberately hidden at the time, however, so it is not surprising that they did not become part of the popular understanding of the empire in Britain.)

Overall, however, Darwin’s claim is persuasive. A case could be made that the arrival in Britain in the 1950s of thousands of black migrants from the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa, and the polarizing debate that ensued, became a kind of surrogate referendum on the end of empire. Under a 1948 citizenship act that was meant to shore up the unity of the empire after Indian and Pakistani independence, citizens of British colonies had the right to move to Britain and seek housing and employment. So given the labor shortage in Britain as it rebuilt after the war, many Caribbean and African citizens moved to Britain in the late 1940s and into the 1950s. As I show in chapter 1, some anthropologists who had carried out fieldwork in Africa turned their investigative lens on the streets of Notting Hill, Nottingham, and Bristol as part of a widespread conversation about this social transformation of postwar Britain. A kind of imperial condescension, along with a recognition of the aid that colonial soldiers and workers had provided on the Allied side during the war, led the British to claim the newcomers as evidence for the virtues of the newly established Commonwealth of Nations, with its stated commitment to pluralism, multiculturalism, and national partnerships. The corollary of this imperialist fantasy was stated sharply and prophetically by Winston Churchill’s private secretary, David Hunt, in 1954: “The minute we said we’ve got to keep these black chaps out, the whole Commonwealth lark would have blown up.” The Commonwealth survived, but never became the instrument of British global reach its planners envisaged. The debate over race and immigration in Britain turned ugly as the 1950s went on, and restrictions on Commonwealth immigration in the early 1960s explicitly drew lines based on race and kinship that did have the effect of keeping “black chaps” out of the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the myth of the peaceful transfer of power in Britain’s former colonies persisted as sub-Saharan African and the larger Caribbean colonies gained independence in the later 1950s and early 1960s.

As with France, though, decolonization in the British context cannot properly be understood without factoring in the influence of the United States. The Commonwealth of Nations may have been an administrative apparatus, but underlying it was the sterling area, an attempt to force former British colonies to trade using British currency. The experiment persisted for a while during decolonization, but the global power of the dollar eventually prevailed and the sterling area was already of much diminished importance by the end of the period covered in this book. Shortly thereafter Britain would formalize this shift in the balance of economic forces in the Atlantic world by voting to become a member of the European Economic Community in 1973, joining France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg in a bloc designed to counter the economic power of the United States.

Along with the movement of capital, the movement of labor was tied directly to US postwar influence in a decolonizing world. Many Caribbean migrants in fact arrived in Britain in the 1950s as a direct result of the passage of the McCarran-Walter Act by the US Congress in 1952. This law greatly restricted immigration to the United States for certain categories of people, and Anglophone Caribbean citizens were sharply affected. Prior to 1952, the United States had been the destination of choice for migrant laborers from the Anglophone Caribbean, who were included in the immigration allocation for Britain, which had been large enough to allow a substantial number of West Indians to move to the United States in search of work. After 1952—in an administrative change that represented de facto US recognition of the breakup of the British Empire—separate quotas were initiated for each of the Caribbean islands,
with a total quota of only eight hundred migrants per year from the British West Indies. Postwar US hegemony thus asserted itself in the arena of the movement of labor: far from reaping the benefits of the imperial connection, Caribbean migrants arrived in Britain, in the words of the Times British Colonies Review in 1955, "because there is nowhere else for them to go ... [Britain] is seldom more than a second-best choice, at least as far as the working-classes are concerned." In this sense too, decolonization and its far-reaching effects took place within an Atlantic world system being redefined and restructured after World War II.

These strands—and all three of the countries I focus on in this book—come together in the one event during this period that John Darwin acknowledges did create a substantial debate in Britain over its imperial legacy: the Suez crisis of 1956. Here Britain and France were actively and militarily aligned with each other (working secretly with the new government of Israel) against the nationalist government of Egypt, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. When British and French troops attacked Suez and attempted to regain control over its canal, the major shipping route to Asia that Egypt had nationalized, a combination of Egyptian resistance and US diplomatic pressure forced the European powers into a quick and humiliating retreat.

Britain's inability to project its imperial, military power did generate a kind of provisional reckoning with decolonization back home, and the prime minister at the time, Anthony Eden, took refuge in the immediate aftermath of the debacle at the Jamaican estate of Ian Fleming, Goldeneye. After Eden's return from his Caribbean sojourn, he was forced to resign.

The willingness of the United States—acting through the United Nations—to side against its ostensible allies, France and Britain, in the Suez conflict illustrates the "serious dilemma facing the United States, with which its new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concluded its 1948 report "The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires and Its Implications for US Security." On the one hand, the United States could not "be swayed by the colonial powers" without "alienat[ing] the dependent peoples and other non-European countries" and leading them toward the Soviet sphere of influence. On the other hand, "US encouragement of colonial self-determination and economic development may itself incur the charge of US imperialism and run the risk of alienating the colonial powers." The US intelligence services saw what the British and French publics, and perhaps their governments, were not able to acknowledge: "The colonial powers appear unwilling ... to recognize fully the force of nationalism in their remaining dependences ... As a result of the rapid breaking-up of the colonial systems, a new power situation is developing in the former colonial world" 34 Through the period covered in Culture Writing, the United States attempted to position itself as a new Great Power that was nevertheless anticolonial in orientation.

American attempts to maintain that paradoxical position were of course often not successful. In 1950, the US government opted to provide military assistance to France in Indochina, a decision that would lead directly to the Vietnam War after France's defeat and withdrawal from the region, creating the most visible and enduring example of US imperialism replacing that of the European powers. In other venues, however, especially in the Atlantic world, the United States preferred to operate through clandestine channels and through the deployment of what came to be called "soft power." On the one hand, as is now well known, CIA front organizations supported cultural programming and publications in Europe, Africa, and the United States itself. On the other hand, more open US state funding for programs in American literary studies and other academic subjects at universities overseas was a crucial factor in creating support for US geopolitical goals. The United States was acutely aware that racial discrimination and injustice at home were hampering its efforts to project itself as a liberatory force in the world: the 1948 CIA report acknowledged that "US treatment of its Negroes, powerfully played up by Soviet propaganda, embarrasses the US on this issue." To compensate, the United States recruited African American artists, performers, and writers to serve as cultural ambassadors. In academic circles, the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations provided sizable grants to support research in the social sciences and humanities, legitimating the United States as a philanthropic force in what was coming to be called the "developing world," in anthropology, for example, the International African Institute (IAI), based in London, was the recipient of grants from all three US foundations beginning in the 1930s.
An intriguing example of how such funding arrangements worked out on the ground can be seen in the late 1950s correspondence between the IAI's director, Daryll Forde, and the Ford Foundation's New York-based program associate, Melvin Fox, preserved in the IAI's archives, such as the aerogram Fox sent to Forde on February 17, 1958, from Accra, reporting on meetings Fox had been having in Ghana with US academics visiting there, and trying to connect them with the IAI. "Among the many others who have been rushing about, like us, probing into Ghana's secret parts, and getting her civil servants to lay bare their souls and to confide their problems has been Professor [Frederick] Harbison (Princeton), [John T.] Dunlop (Harvard) + Charles [sic] Kerr, newly appointed President of the U. of C[alifornia], who were working on a study of "labor productivity and other problems of industrialization in a number of developing countries." The study would be published two years later as Industrialism and Industrial Man. Prominent US economists, anthropological institutions, and funding organizations converged in the newly independent West African nation of Ghana, formerly the British colony of Gold Coast, now led by Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah, who had himself briefly undertaken graduate work in anthropology at the London School of Economics in the early 1950s. Such a convergence can be seen as emblematic of the process of decolonization in the period of Culture Writing, linking the unraveling European territorial empires to the newly hegemonic United States and linking the geopolitical and economic structures of power to the intellectual and cultural developments in the Atlantic world that are the focus of this book.

The borders where literature and anthropology bumped up against each other are significant and intriguing sites for an analysis of the cultural consequences of decolonization and Cold War neocolonialism. A scene that occurs toward the end of Barbara Pym's 1955 novel, Less than Angels, which centers on a group of anthropologists and their friends and kin, can serve as a starting point for the arguments I make in this book: that literature and anthropology were tightly connected in the time of decolonization, as they had been since the late nineteenth century; that this connection was undergoing significant changes as a result of institutional pressures in both fields brought on by global upheavals after World War II; and that reformed versions of literature and anthropology, in their fraught intimacy and because of their intellectual histories, were uniquely placed to register and reflect on the transformations brought on by decolonization.

In Less than Angels, the missionary and linguist Alaric Lydgate, a kind of amateur anthropologist, returns from an unspecified African posting to his suburban home in Surrey, with trunks full of ethnographic notes and a severe case of writer's block. At the end of the novel, encouraged by Catherine Oliphant, a romance fiction writer and journalist, Alaric decides to burn his papers in a November garden bonfire, to the consternation of his professional anthropologist sister, Gertrude, and her friend Esther Clovis, office manager of the central institution of the novel, the African Library, which is modeled on the International African Institute. "Kinship tables!" [Esther] shrieked. 'You cannot let these go!' She snatched at another sheet, covered with little circles and triangles, but Alaric restrained her and poked it further into the fire with his stick." No longer burdened by the documentary evidence of his fieldwork, Alaric declares himself now "free to do whatever I want to." As the November fire crackles, part of the English (anti-Catholic) tradition of Guy Fawkes Night but here also perhaps signaling the modern disintegration of the British Empire in Africa and elsewhere, Alaric imagines what his newfound freedom from colonial and professional restraint might bring: "I could even write a novel, I suppose," he muses.

In the end, the novel closes with Alaric and Catherine's future as writers and/ or lovers unresolved, but the connections between literature and anthropology are clear to see. Writing fiction in the aftermath of empire is a viable possibility, if not necessarily a practical one; it is most definitely a rebuke to a version of anthropology ridiculed here as a technical, professional jargon from which we need to be liberated. Alaric and Catherine reject the professionalized discipline of anthropology—alluring to the amateur linguist but ultimately an intellectual dead end—but not the cross-cultural principles and potentials of
The novel ends with the invention of a hybridized, cosmopolitan tradition, in which the bonfires and fireworks of Guy Fawkes Day are celebrated by Catherine, Alaric, and his housekeeper, Mrs. Skinner, with African blankets and masks, as observed by their next-door neighbors Mabel and Rhoda, mother and aunt of an anthropology student, Deirdre. As Catherine says to Esther at the moment of the note burning, "he [Alaric] has the most wonderful material"; burning the evidence of misplaced faith in professional anthropology frees the ethnographer-novelist to produce a different, more imaginative version of culture writing.

Colonial Anthropologists
Notably absent from these closing scenes in Pym’s novel, however, are African people themselves, the ones who made and traded the blankets and masks, or had these parts of their cultures stolen from them; many of them were, of course, actively resisting the British and the French at this precise moment. Barbara Pym’s novels, as I argue in chapter 1, consistently draw attention to this absence, even as they just as consistently decline to redress it. On the one hand, this could be seen as a more ethical aesthetic stance to take, after the blatant misappropriations of African and other colonized cultural patrimony in the heyday of European modernisms between the world wars: by self-consciously not representing Africans, Pym by and large avoids the problems of primitivism, romantic overinvestment, and derogatory caricature. However, in a novel about anthropologists, this also means she follows what might seem a surprising trend in the discipline: the postwar decline in the number of prominent anthropologists from colonial contexts or North American minority groups. The least charitable generalization about anthropology imagines it as always following the model of the white or European expert outsider among the colonized, producing works with titles like How Natives Think, the title given to the 1926 English translation of the French anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s 1910 Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures (Mental processes in primitive societies). Obviously there is truth in this stereotype, and the critique of anthropology’s romantic primitivism or, more simply, its racism is well founded and so well known that I hardly need to recapitulate it here. However, the early period of anthropology also produced a number of significant anthropological thinkers and writers from those allegedly "inferior" societies, and the persistence of the stereotype of the anthropologist-as-imperialist also represents a failure to acknowledge this more complicated cultural and intellectual history. The life and works of Francis La Flesche (Omaha), Jean Price-Mars (Haitian), Jacques Roumain (Haitian), Jomo Kenyatta (Kenyan), Zora Neale Hurston and Katherine Dunham (African American), Manuel Gamio (Mexican), and Fernando Ortiz (Cuban), among many others, constitute a major part of the history of anthropology as a discipline—and, in the cases of Roumain, Hurston, Dunham, and La Flesche, part of the history of the relationship between anthropology and the creative arts. The period of decolonization is different. While we can point to figures like M. G. Smith (Jamaican) and Elena Padilla (Puerto Rican), they are relatively rare exceptions, a scarcity that is all the more surprising since this is the first moment of anthropology’s reckoning with its links to empire. As already noted, in 1950 Michel Leiris called for the training of “native ethnographers,” but he did so as if none had previously existed or were currently active in the discipline. The subsequent reckoning with imperial complicity that characterized the discipline of anthropology from the 1980s onward often overlooked these earlier figures. Even James Clifford and George Marcus’s transformational anthropology, Writing Culture, in wondering why Leiris’s essay came “so late” in the history of the discipline, suggests that in the 1980s “a new figure has entered the scene, the ‘indigenous
ethnographer, " without significantly acknowledging these precursor figures.

In retrospect, this moment of decolonization is an interlude between an earlier period, when anthropology offered a productive, if always ambivalent, framework for some indigenous and subaltern intellectuals, and a later period, after, say, the publication of Talal Asad's anthology Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter (1973) and Dell Hymen's collection Reinventing Anthropology (1972), when postcolonial and minority thinkers once again took to anthropology and attempted to reform it. The increasing institutionalization of anthropology after World War II, in museums (especially in the Francophone context) and in universities, meant that doors were partially closed to the outsiders, nonconformists, and minority groups who might previously have found a place there. In fact, even the most influential, mainstream figures in anthropology in the first half of the twentieth century had often come from groups marginal to the dominant social and professional classes: immigrants and/or Jewish (Bronislaw Malinowski in Britain, Franz Boas and Melville Herskovits in the United States, Marcel Mauss in France) and women (Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict in the United States, Audrey Richards and Lucy Mair in Britain). Figures like Hurston, La Flesche, and Kenyatta should be seen in this context, and the mainstreaming of anthropology in universities and museums foreclosed this possibility for many.

It is also tempting to speculate that in the era of decolonization, those colonized people educated in colonial institutions were the first to grasp the complicity of anthropology with empire and chose other forms of expression: for example, literature, or, like Nkrumah in Ghana, political action. At the University College of Ibadan in the 1950, for example, Chinua Achebe's studies in comparative religion might well have led him to a more professional involvement with the discipline of anthropology; instead, of course, he became a writer of fiction and poetry. Achebe's landmark novel, Things Fall Apart (1958), combines a fervent critique of anthropology (embodied in the character of the brutal District Commissioner) with abundant use of anthropological language and points of view in its narration. The one writer of colonial origin in Culture Writing, Martinique's Édouard Glissant, is a partial exception to this trend, with his ethnological studies in Paris in the early 1950s, but his relationship to the discipline of anthropology remained ambivalent and (to choose a term from his own oeuvre) somewhat opaque.

Modernism and Anthropology
As critics of modernism and historians of anthropology have shown us in exemplary detail for the first half of the twentieth century, literature and anthropology developed in tandem, with multiple borrowings, rapprochements, and dialogues. Some of the examples of these interdisciplinary conversations and exchanges are now well known. Declaring his intention to break the mold in anthropology and leave the amateurs of the discipline behind, for example, Malinowski aligned himself with the formal complexity and experimentation of modernism: "[W. H. R.] Rivers is the Rider Haggard of Anthropology. I shall be the Conrad!" In Malinowski's groundbreaking and enduring work, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922), various narrative devices are employed to draw in and engage the reader, finding ways to turn the writer's "own experience of the native's experience" into "the reader's experience as well—a task that scientific analysis yielded up to literary art," as the historian of anthropology George Stocking puts it. James Clifford, the most perceptive thinker about the formal similarities between anthropological writing and literary discourse, shows that Malinowski's famous prime directive of fieldwork-centered anthropology, "to grasp the native's point of view, his relation to life, to realise his vision of his world," required the deployment of a wide range of literary techniques. Most notably, these have included free indirect style (conveying another's point of view but with a degree of narrative control on the part of the author) and the use of multiple narrative voices within a single explanatory frame of reference, as modernist authors like T. S. Eliot notoriously did.

Modernist authors such as Eliot likewise borrowed from anthropology in return. The year 1922, as Marc Manganaro has so persuasively demonstrated, constituted a kind of annum mirabilis for the intersection of anthropological and literary texts: not only Malinowski's Argonauts but also the modernist landmarks The Waste Land and Ulysses were published in that year.38 Both Eliot's and Joyce's literary worlds owed much to
anthropological techniques: the impetus to collect and compare myths and customs, in the case of Eliot and his now notorious reliance on James Frazer’s The Golden Bough; and the urge to document in painstaking detail the everyday customs and manners of a group of people in one location, in the case of the Dublin of Ulysses and, earlier, Joyce’s story collection Dubliners. In addition, James Clifford highlights the exchanges between French poets, novelists, and anthropologists in Paris in the interwar period in his formulation of the term “ethnographic surrealism.”

In recent years, a number of scholars have built on the research of Clifford, Stocking, and Manganaro to produce a rich body of work that significantly amplifies and sharpens our understanding of these convergences of literature and anthropology. Nancy Bentley has persuasively shown that early-twentieth-century novels of manners by Edith Wharton and Henry James are in constant dialogue with parallel anthropological texts. Carey Snyder surveys the full range of British modernists and enumerates their debts not only to the formal discipline of anthropology, but especially to nonliterary texts that were influenced by anthropology and ethnographic fieldwork while remaining outside the academic discipline, such as "narratives of exploration, travel writing, comparative anthropologies, and touristic advertisements: "David Luis-Brown places Zora Neale Hurston’s literary work in the context of both her own ethnographic writings and that of the Mexican-born, Chicago-trained anthropologist Manuel Gamio.

Most significantly for my project, Eric Aronoff and Brad Evans have both recently emphasized the ways in which modernism and anthropology came together to produce and rely on a spatialized, synchronic model of culture in the 1920s Atlantic world. Aronoff shows that the culture concept did not begin in one field and migrate into the other, but "emerged in a thoroughly interdisciplinary conversation, involving figures who crossed the boundaries between what later became literature, literary criticism, anthropology, linguistics, and social science"; he argues that "key figures [he highlights Edward Sapir, Ruth Benedict, Willa Cather, and others] began to imagine culture as a synchronic, spatial structure." Evans makes a similar claim: "In the classical, modernist sense in which it rose to prominence, culture was conceptualized not as a process but as a thing—complex and whole" Manganaro, picking up this same definition (originally Edward Tylor’s) of culture as a "complex whole," shows how in the period between 1910 and 1940 "complexity and wholeness become integral to the prevailing conceptions of modernism that unite early-century anthropology, literature, and literary theorizing ... In a consequent and common (though significantly variable) institutional turn, tribes and poems get read as complex wholes whose meaning, as decoded by institutionally based specialists, resides in the interrelation of their intricate parts." This spatial framework enabled an important model of cultural pluralism and comparativism—cultures were not inferior or superior to each other, only different from one another—but it failed to account for social and historical change and tended to fix groups of people to particular regions and territories.

Therefore, as this spatial concept of culture solidified its reach, and as modernist writers and fieldwork-inspired anthropologists became embedded in institutions that were close to, if not directly overlapping with, the mechanisms of state power (universities, museums, publishing houses, and so forth), it was perhaps inevitable that other strands in the relationship between literature and anthropology began to come to the surface in the 1930s, precursors of the kinds of interchanges of the time of decolonization that I analyze in this book. Like Luis-Brown, for example, Manganaro turns at the end of his book to Zora Neale Hurston (whom I discuss in more detail later), whose literary ethnographies reimagine culture as "shreds and patches ... as something other than rooted, as something as mobile and as mixed as Hurston’s own heterodox traveling life," In the British context, Malinowski became a more and more conservative figure, both in terms of disciplinary gatekeeping and in terms of pro-establishment politics, so it is not surprising that some figures within both anthropology and literature would come along to challenge the patriarch and his models. A similar pattern can be seen in France, where the rigorous and rigid disciplinary protocols of Mauss and Griaule became more and more standardized, while generating some resistance and alternative ways of understanding and representing forms of social organization.
Interestingly, moreover, these shifts that began in the 1930s represented a return to earlier literary-anthropological exchanges of the nineteenth century, in the period that Brad Evans’s book labels Before Cultures and that Gregory Castle and James Buzard describe as the period of "autoethnography." Buzard, in particular, makes the intriguing and persuasive case that what we have come to see as the "self-universalizing," authoritative models of British culture offered by major Victorian novelists in fact developed out of a far less confident "self-delimiting (or, in narrative terms, a self-interrupting) autoethnographic project" of fiction writers of the early nineteenth century. For Buzard, the loosely structured turn-of-the-nineteenth-century national tales and romances of the British peripheries (Scotland and Ireland, especially) fed directly into a narrative tradition in Britain that "constructed" its narrator’s (and many characters’) desired position vis-à-vis Zora Neale Hurston’s Mules and Men begins as home anthropology in the most literal sense. "First place I aimed to stop to collect material was Eatonville, Florida," she writes on the first page, identifying her childhood home town as the first fieldwork site for her research on African American folk tales. In a sly writer’s touch, Hurston then uses free indirect discourse to establish her professional authority as an anthropologist while at the same time keeping her narratorial distance from it: "And now, I’m going to tell you why I decided to go to my native village first," where the phrase "native village" signifies in a different register from the rest of the sentence, lightly mocked perhaps but at the same time intimately familiar to the narrator, authorizing Hurston’s fieldwork site. Native villages are where anthropologists are supposed to go, and this is how "arrival scenes" in anthropological monographs are supposed to be told, as in the most famous example of all, from the opening of Malinowski’s Argonauts of the Western Pacific: "Imagine yourself suddenly set down surrounded by all your gear, alone on a tropical beach close to a native village." Hurston is not a conventional anthropologist, since native villages are usually the places of fieldwork subjects, not the places that produce ethnographers, but as I argued earlier in this introduction, the relative openness of anthropology to "insider" intellectuals like Hurston, La Flesche, and Kenyatta in the period when it was still establishing itself institutionally means that Hurston’s narrator can take more or less for granted that her readers will be open to her black female narrator as an authoritative ethnographic voice. The difficulties in her text are, on the one hand, the skepticism (and sometimes hostility) she faces from her Florida and Louisiana research subjects—her former neighbors in Eatonville, the migrant black logging workers and camp followers in Loughton, the hoodoo practitioners and customers in New Orleans—and, more important for my argument here, her struggles with a changing academic institution whose imprimatur she seeks but whose rules and practices are becoming increasingly exclusionary.

Scholars have extensively documented the acute tensions among literary technique, anthropological genre rules, professional ambition, academic gatekeeping, and race and gender constructions that underlie and animate Mules and Men, not to mention Hurston’s entire literary and anthropological career. Marc Manganaro highlights what he sees as the "fragmentariness" of the text, contrasting it to the symmetrically crafted cultural comparisons of the almost contemporaneous Patterns of Culture (1934) by one of Franz Boas’s other students, Ruth Benedict, which went on to be a bestseller after World War II and a perennial undergraduate textbook, in contrast to the almost complete eclipse of Hurston’s reputation until the 1970s. Manganaro makes the important point, however, that despite the "seemingly meandering" narrative of Mules and Men, "in fact Hurston was working solidly within Boasian anthropological parameters." And in an important recent article, Daniel Harney has argued that instead of asking whether or not Hurston had agency as an African American woman in the fields of literature and anthropology, we should instead focus on the ways in which she made the very topics of professionalization and specialization her key concerns as a writer and intellectual: "Hurston's work participated in larger modernist debates about the proper relationship between specialists and the general public in an increasingly ubiquitous professional society." Hurston’s (successful) application for a Guggenheim fellowship to study diasporic black folklore in Jamaica and Haiti made explicit her intention to use both literary and ethnographic techniques as ways of addressing this problem of specialization: she proposed traveling to the Caribbean "to collect for scientific scrutiny all
phases of Negro folk-life and to personally produce or create fiction ... that shall give a true picture of Negro life ... at the same time that it entertains."

Mules and Men, then, is a multilayered set of fictions—those of her informants, enclosed in a picaresque narrative of Hurston’s own travels—that seeks to explore a question of professional practice that is in fact the main reason she gives for choosing her “native village” as her point of scholarly entry: “I knew that the town was full of material and that I could get it without hurt, harm or danger.” The book that follows is a vibrant, voluminous confirmation of the first half of that sentence as well as an anxious exploration and rethinking of the second half, of which Hurston’s narrator’s escape from a knife attack at a dance at the central Florida logging camp is but the most dramatic example. Fittingly, Hurston’s narrator leaves open the question of who might be hurt, harmed, or endangered by her research: the ethnographer herself or her subjects? As the narrator of Mules and Men moves past this initial stance of scholarly innocence and learns to see the world, and fieldwork, more wisely, we learn that both ethnographer and subjects are at risk and that the conversation between literary writing and institutional anthropology is a way of documenting that ambiguous situation while seeking to avoid worsening it.

In the Francophone context, that conversation was at least as well established as in the United States and Britain, and probably more so. As I discuss in chapters 4 and 5, many French anthropologists wrote literary nonfiction in addition to their scholarly monographs, to the extent that Vincent Debaene has documented and analyzed the wide-ranging phenomenon that began in the 1920s and 1930s of the deuxième livre (second book), when many of the leading French anthropologists followed up their monographs with travelogues, fieldwork memoirs, and so forth, such as Marcel Griaule’s Jeux et divertissements abyssins (1929) followed by his Les Flambeurs d’hommes (1934) and Alfred Métraux’s Ethnology of Easter Island (1940) followed by his L’île de Pâques (1941). Later in this introduction I discuss probably the most highly acclaimed of all these deuxième livres, Claude Lévi-Strauss’s Tristès tropiques (1955), but here I want briefly to argue that Michel Leiris’s 1934 book L’Afrique fantôme (Phantom Africa) is a significant text to think about in terms of the interdisciplinary dialogue between literature and a professionalizing anthropology. Leiris breaks the mold of Debaene’s “second book” model: he wrote his unclassifiable L’Afrique fantôme before his scholarly work on possession rituals in Sudan and Ethiopia (and later, his ethnographic work in Martinique and Guadeloupe that I discuss in detail in chapter 5); indeed, he wrote the book before he had become an anthropologist at all, in terms of formal training and an academic appointment. Showing the fluidity of French exchanges between the two disciplines before World War II, it is telling that Marcel Griaule would ask Leiris, a nonanthropologist but a relatively well-known surrealist poet and writer, to serve as the secretary-archivist for his landmark two-year African expedition from Senegal to Djibouti (1931-33). Nevertheless, L’Afrique fantôme documents—often in excruciating detail—some of the same new challenges to and reforms of that interdisciplinary dialogue that Hurston’s Mules and Men reveals in the US context.

The interwar exchanges between the French avant-garde and anthropology have been well documented, most notably by James Clifford in his work on ethnographic surrealism. In the friendship between Métraux and Bataille, in the literary interests of Marcel Griaule and Marcel Mauss, and in the pages of the literary-ethnographic journal Documents, edited by Bataille with contributions by Leiris, Griaule, and others, Clifford finds strong evidence for a fertile convergence of surrealism and ethnography: “Unlike the exoticism of the nineteenth century ... modern surrealism and ethnography began with a reality deeply in question. Others appeared now as serious human alternatives; modern cultural relativism became possible.” Clifford spends most of his time documenting ethnographic surrealism rather than “its converse, surrealist ethnography,” but Clifford suggests that many ethnographies (he mentions those of Malinowski and Griaule) utilize collage, incongruity, and startling juxtapositions as part of their repertoire, inspired by the surrealist project of Breton and his followers. And one ethnographic text stands above them all, for Clifford, as a
What is it about this book that gives it the special status accorded to it by Debaene and Clifford, especially when both critics also allude to the experience of boredom that can attend reading Leiris’s 650-page tome? Mostly thwarting the reader’s expectation of the gothic, brought on by the title, the book instead chronicles the logistics and pragmatics of a journey in which, as Leiris recalled subsequently, “I initiated myself into the profession of ethnographer.” The hundreds of dated diary entries, apparently accurate transcriptions of the notes Leiris wrote in the field, certainly contain surrealistic flashes of a literary sensibility: recollections of dreams, reflections on eroticism, accounts of Zar and Dogon ritual practices, and so forth. Overwhelmingly, however, they document the practical matters of the expedition: the minutiae of travel arrangements, weather patterns, the arrivals and departures of expedition members and African guides and laborers, negotiations with customs officials and with French, British, and Italian colonial authorities. The result is a cross between an idiosyncratic private diary and a professional guide to fieldwork travel: a hoard of stories about places to stay, places to eat, the climate, bureaucratic practices, and so forth.

In the final section of the book, for instance, as Leiris, Griaule, and the other fluctuating members of the group travel out of Ethiopia (where they have spent several months in Gondar), into Eritrea, and finally to Djibouti, there is no conventional fieldwork at all. Leiris painstakingly notes, for example, the number of mules and horses that go missing one day, how long it takes to recover them, and how late, therefore, their dinner is at the camp that night. When the group switches from mules to cars in the western Eritrean town of Omhajer, Leiris comments (twice) on the motion sickness of the dog Potamo. After the party finally arrives in Djibouti, after a two-year journey, a friend of Griaule’s discovers he is in town and sends a car and driver, summoning them “right now” to dinner with the Belgian consul, where Leiris, Griaule, and their companions function at the gathering like “people from the bush,” enlivening the dinner party until even the Belgian consul, taciturn at first, joins in the fun: “We laugh like pirates.” Collectively, the episodes reveal the tedium, the exhaustion, and the episodes of colonial complicity that are fundamental to fieldwork and to the ethnographic enterprise more generally.

The book serves as a massively extended prologue to Leiris’s 1950 essay “The Ethnographer Faced with Colonialism,” which I mentioned earlier and discuss in more detail in chapter 5. At the same time, the relentless chronological drive of L’Afrique fantôme—this happened, and then this happened, and then this further thing happened—puts the narrativizing impulse and the passage of time at the center of anthropological work, challenging the discipline’s tendency to compose its analyses in synchronic, spatial terms, seen most obviously and routinely in the identification of a particular group of people, and their customs, with a particular place—something that is part and parcel of Leiris’s own formal ethnographic writing, as in La Langue secrète des Dogons de Sanga (Soudan français) (The secret language of the Dogons of Sanga, French Sudan, 1948). In its plainspoken, professional descriptiveness, and in its recognition of the passing of time as a fundamental part of anthropological work and its writing, one of the original titles proposed by Leiris for his book was clearly more appropriate than the one we have now: De Dakar a Djibouti (1931-1933). The adventurous literary artist is initiated into the professional practice of anthropology. Which are the professional observations of the ethnographer and which of the writer? On December 20, 1932, the party find themselves in Tessenei, a “pleasant colonial town,” where they dine with kind Italians in a Greek restaurant at the beginning of a happy evening that ends with their listening to recordings of Verdi and Rossini at the house of an Asmara-based lawyer, “thirty years in Eritrea.” While indigenous residents are observed as a group—“the women and the girls who work in the factory are dressed in brightly colored trade cloth; many of them pair a semi-European summer dress with an Abyssinian hairstyle or a Muslim veil”—the white settler-colonists and European colonial officials are given the individual traits we might expect of characters in novels, even when they are not given names—the Asmara lawyer, for example, in addition to being a music lover, is an avid hunter, and Leiris relishes two meals centered on “a warthog that the lawyer has killed.” Is this a kind of “home anthropology,” an ethnography of the
settler class and the anthropological travelers themselves? Or is it a literary attempt to lay bare the preconditions of ethnographic fieldwork, to show that the search for cultural patterns among ostensibly "primitive" peoples requires a prodigious expenditure of time and social energy on colonial officials, white settler elites, and comprador intermediaries?

If Leiris hoped to undermine the allure of the anthropologist-as-adventurer, however, others continued to benefit from it. The Argentina-born English explorer Tom Harrisson made a name for himself in the mid-1930s as an amateur anthropologist in the New Hebrides, publishing an account in 1937, entitled Savage Civilization, of his time among people he described as cannibals. He returned to Britain, teamed up with the poet Charles Madge and the documentary filmmaker Humphrey Jennings, and helped to direct the best-known project of British "home anthropology,” Mass-Observation, an ambitious attempt to capture social attitudes and document everyday customs via questionnaires, diaries, and surveys of ordinary Britons in the years just before and during World War II (a project that continued into the postwar period, before Mass-Observation eventually became a commercial marketing survey organization). On the face of it, Harrison’s almost vaudevillian pride in his lack of academic training—"There ain’t no academia about here in this universal smokey cobbledlog," he promised a potential fieldworker for his Bolton-based "Worktown" project in 1937—makes Mass-Observation a radically different project from Leiris’s initiation into the professional world of Francophone anthropology. However, the "relentless empiricism" of Harrison’s method in Mass-Observation is in fact not dissimilar to the painstaking note taking of L’Afrique fantôme. While Harrison and Madge mostly professed disdain for academic anthropology and (especially) sociology, the latter only just becoming established in British universities at the time, in practice they worked hard to make connections to individual anthropologists, and to Bronislaw Malinowski in particular. Madge attended Malinowski’s legendary seminar at the London School of Economics, and he and Harrison persuaded the dean of British anthropology to contribute a lengthy, generally positive afterword to one of Mass-Observation’s early publications, First Year’s Work.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that Mass-Observation was an important precursor to the rich but fraught interchanges between an establishment anthropology and British literary culture that I discuss in chapter 1. The enterprise benefited from the tight-knit personal and institutional connections in the British cultural and political elite. Madge and Jennings’s mentor at Cambridge was I. A. Richards; Madge’s wife was the poet Kathleen Raine; and he was able to establish a strong enough connection to the ultimate cultural gatekeeper, T. S. Eliot, to guarantee that Faber & Faber would publish Mass-Observation’s first book-length work, May the Twelfth, an account of the surveys kept by volunteers on the twelfth day of each month in 1937 leading up to the coronation of the new monarch, George VI, in May of that year.

On the one hand, Mass-Observation, at least in its early incarnation, represented continuity with some of the most significant strains in avant-garde modernism and anthropology’s investment in insular, self-contained models of culture. For example, Madge was close to several members of the English group of surrealists and wrote a favorable review of the French surrealist movement. The modernist investment in the power of the single image (shared by Richards and another of Madge and Jennings’s strong influences, William Empson) is evident in the instructions given to the volunteers who kept the 1937 day-surveys: "The observer is to ask himself at the end of each day what image had been dominant in it. This image should, if possible, be one which has forced itself on him and which has confirmed its importance by recurrence of some kind. The image may occur in a series of varying forms or may take the form of a coincidence.” On the other hand, the use of volunteer observers, as well as the emphasis on everyday Britain and on the personal diary, aligned Mass-Observation more closely with the return to realist fiction that marked the writing of a figure like Barbara Pym and the documentary-style "kitchen sink" novels and films of postwar British working-class life, rather than with experimental modernism.

Anthropology and Literature after Modernism: The 1950s
Hurston, Leiris, and Mass-Observation serve here as examples of prewar movements and figures foretelling the larger-scale changes in the discipline of anthropology, and in the anthropology-literature connection, that I analyze in the five chapters that follow. The atrocities, upheavals, and mass movements of people brought about by World War II and by the overthrow of European imperialisms constituted a fundamental challenge to the spatial, synchronic models dominant in anthropology, and some anthropologists and writers responded by questioning or abandoning functionalist models. At the very moment that the grandees and gatekeepers of anthropology were declaring the essential truth of functionalist models of culture—"synchronic study is the sine qua non of functional research," as Meyer Fortes sweepingly put it in American Anthropologist in 1953—a new generation of anthropologists and writers moved to put social change, cultural transformation, and narrative at the center of their work. For example, the young British anthropologist Peter Lloyd recalled later in his career that he had arrived in Nigeria for fieldwork in the late 1940s armed with "an opposition ... to the functionalism current at that time. Less confrontationally, but perhaps more far-reachingly, Mary Douglas at the beginning of her illustrious career published her first monograph in 1963 with an introduction explaining her decision to write in the past tense rather than the customary present tense of ethnographic analysis. "In the last three years the Congo has changed so radically that it is very unlikely that things are still as I knew them," Douglas commented, her plain-spoken, understated methodological note belying the significance of this shift toward the language of narration and of the novel.

Both Lloyd and Douglas were affiliated with one of the premier anthropological institutions of the Atlantic world during this period, the International African Institute in London. Founded in the 1920s with the support of the Colonial Office, the IAI had by the 1950s come to occupy a powerful position within anthropology on both sides of the Atlantic, and its publication of the essay collection African Systems of Kinship and Marriage in 1950, coedited by the IAI's director, Daryll Forde, and one of the doyens of British anthropology, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, represents the high-water mark for functionalism and its chief anthropological analytic tool, kinship relations. Because of its influence, the IAI is a central institution in this book, but not only for its place in the discipline of anthropology. For almost the whole of the period I study here, the IAI employed the novelist Barbara Pym in administrative and editorial roles from 1947 until her retirement due to ill health in the mid-1970s, including a lengthy period as managing editor of IAI's journal, Africa, the premier venue for anthropological scholarship on Africa in English during this period. Pym may well have helped to compile the elaborate foldout kinship diagrams in African Systems of Kinship and Marriage; she was certainly the friend and frequent correspondent of Douglas, Lloyd, and many other anthropologists in the Anglophone and Francophone worlds on both sides of the Atlantic. Her employment at the IAI is a sign of the institutional success of anthropology, well connected and well funded enough to employ several paid staff members. (As I mentioned earlier and as I discuss in more detail in chapter 1, much of the IAI's funding, especially for its African fieldwork, came from grants from US foundations, Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie, making it a truly Atlantic institution.) At the same time, Pym's connection to the IAI signals the strength of the connection between literature and anthropology and the continued possibilities for transformational conversations between the two fields. While Forde and Radcliffe-Brown were attempting to enforce disciplinary orthodoxy, Pym, Douglas, Lloyd, Laura Bohannan, and many other writers and anthropologists were passing through the same seminar rooms and offices and beginning to produce very different accounts and explanations of social organization.

Moreover, the work of figures like Lloyd and Douglas shows that at least some anthropologists were beginning to come to terms, however tentatively, with the fraught, intimate relationship between their discipline and the mechanisms and practices of colonialism, especially in the decades after fieldwork became standard practice. Mary Douglas's turn to narration in the past tense was spurred partly by the changes in a Congo now "free of colonial restraint," a phrase that implicitly recognized that her earlier fieldwork took place under conditions of colonial oppression. A turn to literature was one way to acknowledge and come to terms with this complicity, to express some of its implications outside the constraints imposed by the professional protocols of the discipline. In what has
become the best-known—but still rarely analyzed—example of this trend, Laura Bohannan, an American anthropologist who studied for her PhD at Oxford and was affiliated with the IAI, turned her fieldwork experiences in northern Nigeria in the early 1950s into a novel, Return to Laughter, rather than a conventional anthropological monograph, as I discuss in more detail in chapter 2. From the side of literary writing, I argue in chapter 1 that Barbara Pym, in her novels Excellent Women and Less than Angels, picks up the critique of functionalist anthropology that was in the air among her correspondents and visitors at the IAI and turns a reformist ethnographic eye on English middle-class culture, and on one particular tribe within it: academic anthropologists. I argue in Culture Writing that these experiments linking anthropology and literature in the 1950s and 1960s mean that we should change our dating of the "literary turn" in anthropology, moving it back in time from its now conventional beginnings in the 1970s and 1980s.

James Clifford in the introduction to Writing Culture—whose significance I recognize and draw on in the title of my book—does cite Bohannan, Michel Leiris, and Lévi-Strauss’s Tristes tropiques as "disturbances" in the "set of expository conventions" of 1950 anthropology. However, Clifford sees them as "earlier disturbances," implying that the real upheaval in the discipline came later. For Clifford, as for many if not most subsequent commentators on the history of anthropology, the real upheaval can be marked rather precisely to the posthumous 1967 publication of Bronislaw Malinowski’s fieldwork diary from his Pacific islands researches (1967) publicly upset the applecart. Henceforth an implicit mark of interrogation was placed beside any overly confident and consistent ethnographic voice. What desires and confusions was it smoothing over? How was its ‘objectivity’ textually constructed? Without diminishing the impact of the publication of Malinowski’s diaries—which revealed that he harbored derogatory, hostile, and misogynistic attitudes toward the people he lived among during his fieldwork—to use that publication as a bright line dividing a before and after for the discipline overall, this event is also given prominence by Marc Manganaro, Brad Evans, and Clifford Geertz, among many others; moreover, Gregory Castle explicitly connects Malinowski’s diary with the literary turn and literary techniques in the discipline I show in Culture Writing that it was principally women writers and anthropologists who in fact led the way both in continuing the dialogue between literature and anthropology, despite the professional boundaries erected between the two, and in undercutting the colonialist and intellectually narrow-minded aspects of anthropology that the professional gatekeepers such as Malinowski—himself a key player in the establishment of the IAI in the 1930s—worked to maintain, even if they did so with benevolent and high-minded intentions.

Clifford shows that the institutional constraints against this experimentation were relatively strong: "Laura Bohannan ... had to disguise herself as [Elenore Smith] Bowen," the pseudonym Bohannan chose when Return to Laughter was first published in 1954. (He also notes that these pressures, although perhaps more pronounced in the 1950s, were not new: "Sapir and Benedict had, after all, to hide their poetry from the scientific gaze of Franz Boas [in the 1920s].") However, Clifford, perhaps unconsciously, undoes the connection between imaginative and ethnographic texts that Writing Culture ostensibly makes when he claims that Bohannan "had to disguise ... her fieldwork narrative as a 'novel,'" where the superfluous quotation marks around "novel" and the notion of "disguise" indicate Clifford’s continued commitment to the truth claims of anthropology and to the authority of "being there" that Clifford argues is central to the fieldwork model. Bohannan, I would emphasize, wrote a novel, not a "novel," and in chapter 2 I undertake one of the very first analyses of Return to Laughter that takes it seriously as fiction, rather than viewing it as a disguised report from the field. To highlight the interdisciplinary dialogue, I pair my analysis of Bohannan’s book with an examination of Ursula Le Guin’s first novel, Rocannon’s World (1966), in which the protagonist is an adventuring hero (in a sci-fi version of imperial romance), a skilled, professional scientist, and an anthropologist torn between his allegiance to imperial power and his sympathetic identification with the alien others with whom he lives and works. These two texts by women writers, I would argue, rather than the belated publication...
of Malinowski’s fieldwork diaries, mark the real beginning of the literary turn in anthropology born out of postcolonial self-reflection.

And what of the anthropological, postcolonial turn in literary writing in this same period? Le Guin’s novel is part of this shift too. And while Barbara Pym (when she is remembered at all) is customarily viewed as a latter-day Jane Austen, a chronicler of the provincial world of middle England with its jumble sales, church hall meetings, and endless cups of tea, I read her professional engagement with the anthropology of Africa as a significant element in her fiction and as a way of coming to terms with postwar, welfare-state, decolonizing Britain. Influentially, Jed Esty, in his book A Shrinking Island, identified a strain of late modernist British writing, characterized most clearly by the later works of Forster, Eliot, and Woolf, that engaged in what Esty called “home anthropology,” a celebratory and nostalgic retreat to an insular description of English customs as a way of warding off the end of empire. While indebted to Esty’s analysis, Culture Writing analyzes a different version of “home anthropology,” of which Pym’s fiction is my prime example. Eschewing the functionalist, synchronic models of culture that produced a version of little England that appealed to Forster, Eliot, and Woolf, Barbara Pym embraced the turn to an anthropology of social change and, albeit ambivalently, combined Africanist ethnography with descriptions of English middle-class life, especially women’s lives. The result, in Pym, in Le Guin, in Leiris, and in the American writer Saul Bellow, was a different kind of home anthropology, one in which writers turned to ethnographic techniques and practices to make sense of British, French, and US societies in the time of decolonization.

In Britain in particular, following the para-academic example of Mass-Observation, anthropology quite explicitly came “home,” and several landmark anthropological studies of migrant communities in Britain from the imperial peripheries appeared during this period, beginning with Kenneth Little’s Negroes in Britain (1948) and including his Edinburgh colleague Michael Banton’s The Coloured Quarter (1955) and the social anthropologist Sheila Patterson’s Dark Strangers (1963). Each of these researchers also did fieldwork in, and wrote about, African societies. An opening narrative gambit from Patterson’s interesting study, based on several months of fieldwork in Brixton, can stand in for this notion of anthropology coming home:

One afternoon, in May 1955, I went down to the South London district of Brixton to make a reconnaissance for the study of a recent West Indian migrant group which is the subject of this book. As I turned off the main shopping street, I was overcome by a sense of strangeness, almost of shock ... Almost everybody in sight was black. Such a sight should have been familiar enough to me after years in Africa and the West Indies ... None the less, confronted by such a street scene in the heart of South London, I still experienced this profound reaction as if to something unexpected and alien.

This interest in an anthropology of Britain extended even to studies that seemed far removed from the mother country. For instance, the anthropologist Mary Douglas, who established her reputation with a series of articles and then her 1963 monograph on the Lele people of Congo, revealed fifteen years after that book’s initial publication that she had been implicitly comparing the Lele to the British in her work: "The productive side of their [Lele] economy seemed to me at the time of writing a model of our own plight in Britain. Outpost then of a great European tradition, but a poor relative, less energetic, less investment-minded, we in this island seemed to parallel the case of the Lele outpost of the Kuba tradition and poorer neighbours of the then thriving, pushful Bushong."

Moreover, while migration and the politics of race in Britain were perhaps understandable—if still groundbreaking—targets for anthropologists in Britain, other areas of British life were also subjected to anthropological scrutiny, following the pioneering, if eccentric, efforts of Mass-Observation. As the welfare state expanded and new towns were built on the outskirts of London to "resettle" working-class communities from what was now considered to be inferior housing stock in the city, the sociologists Michael Young (principal architect of the historic 1945 manifesto of the Labour Party that brought them into power after World War II ended) and Peter Willmott spent a year living among and interviewing working-class Londoners for their landmark study, Family and Kinship in East London (1957). As the term "kinship" in the title suggests, in the resulting book, which was...
widely read and celebrated, they turned to models borrowed from Africanist anthropology to explain what, to them, initially seemed a surprising persistence of extended family and community network structures at a time when the smaller, "nuclear" family was everywhere being heralded as the most desirable unit on which to base the new society.

In the other major pole of the Anglophone Atlantic world, the concept of culture was likewise expanding its reach, although in the United States the idea of "home anthropology" functioned differently, since studies of indigenous communities had been some of the earliest writings in American anthropology and continued to form a significant component of the discipline, from Franz Boas’s early investigations among the Kwakiutl people of Vancouver Island (fieldwork that had in fact been funded by the British Association for the Advancement of Science) to Ruth Benedict’s analysis of Pueblo culture in the US Southwest. A significant research project in rural areas of the US territory of Puerto Rico in the late 1940s and early 1950s launched the careers of several leading figures in American anthropology, including Sidney Mintz and Eric Wolf, and led the Puerto Rican ethnographer Elena Padilla, who was a researcher on the project, to write a popular sociology of islanders in New York City, Up from Puerto Rico (1958), that can be usefully compared to Patterson’s Dark Strangers.

A striking feature of the US scene during the period of decolonization was the emergence of a few anthropologists as media personalities and public intellectuals. Margaret Mead, author of Coming of Age in Samoa (1928) and the wartime study of US life And Keep Your Powder Dry (1942), and Ruth Benedict, author of the bestselling Patterns of Culture (1934), sought repeatedly, in popular magazines and on the new medium of television, to use their status as leading academic figures to promote cultural pluralism in general and the usefulness of anthropology in particular as a weapon against racial discrimination. This plea for the special status of the anthropologist as the new incarnation of Matthew Arnold’s "man of culture" reached its peak during this period with Susan Sontag’s homage to Claude Lévi-Strauss an enlightened combination of literary sensibility and scientific detachment, especially in his narrative Tristes tropiques (1955), which I discuss in more detail later: "The profoundly intelligent sympathy which informs Tristes Tropiques makes other memoirs about life among pre-literate peoples seem ill-at-ease, defensive, provincial. Yet sympathy is modulated throughout by a hard-won impassivity." While few went as far as Sontag, her claims for the privileged perspective of a figure who combined literary and anthropological insights can stand as an extreme case of the more general tendency I am investigating in Culture Writing.

In fact, as I discuss shortly, the situation in the Francophone world was rather different, since "culture" never had the central status in anthropological studies there that it did in the Anglophone world. But Sontag’s attempt to bridge the gap between Anglophone and Francophone intellectual culture via Lévi-Strauss (himself the French anthropologist most influenced by Anglophone traditions) is also part of the sidelining of anthropology coming from indigenous and colonized intellectuals themselves that I discussed earlier, at the moment when decolonizing literary writers were receiving regular and sustained attention in the imperial and North American metropoles for the first time. While London, Oxford, Paris, New York, and Chicago were clearly the institutional centers of anthropological study, research and teaching were also taking place in regions that even historians of the discipline often assume were only sites of fieldwork whose research was "written up" and published back in the metropole. For example, Tristes tropiques discusses the establishment of Brazilian universities before World War II, and the Brazilian anthropologist Darcy Ribeiro’s first works were published in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In Haiti, the novelist Jacques Roumain had been one of the founders of the national Bureau d’ethnologie in 1941, and the Bureau published significant anthropological research and produced folkloric performances in the 1940s and 1950s. In sub-Saharan Africa, research centers were established at colonial universities and colleges, most notably the East African Institute of Social Research at Makerere College (later University) in Uganda in 1948, whose first director was the distinguished...
anthropologist Audrey Richards; the West African Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of Ibadan in Nigeria; and the earliest of all, the Rhodes-Livingston Institute (RLI) in Lusaka (then Northern Rhodesia, now the capital of Zambia), established in 1938. The RLI’s second director (1941-47) was Max Gluckman, a white South African who moved to the University of Manchester and established a major department of anthropology there in the 1950s. While many of these institutions were the creation of colonial regimes, viewed as a whole they complicate the sense that anthropology took place “over there” before being disseminated “back home.” These research centers also continued and transformed themselves in the period leading up to and after independence.96 In the context of départementialisation (integration of Caribbean territories into the French state), in 1965 the Martinican writer and theorist Édouard Glissant founded the Institut martiniquais d’études (Martinican Studies Institute), as I discuss in chapter 4.

The title of Glissant’s institute’s journal, inaugurated in 1971, was Acoma: Revue de littérature, de sciences humaines et politiques. This juxtaposition and exchange between literature and the “human and political sciences,” including anthropology and sociology, suggest a significant distinction between the Francophone and Anglophone worlds during this period, as previously mentioned. On the one hand, the term la culture did not carry anything like the significance in the French intellectual tradition that “culture” did in the English-speaking world; there were not two separate histories of “culture” (the arts and, more broadly, a set of customs) to converge during this period in the Francophone world. On the other hand, as the subtitle of Glissant’s journal suggests, there was a much longer tradition in France of linking literature and the social or human sciences together, evident in the interwar moment of “ethnographic surrealism” documented by James Clifford and by the constellation of thinkers and writers around the journal Documents, linking Georges Bataille, Michel Leiris, and others in a multidisciplinary group that called itself the Collège de sociologie.97 In his major study of the relationship between literature and anthropology in France in the twentieth century, Vincent Debaene suggests that in contrast to the Anglophone world, where the Arnoldian tradition tended to elevate literature as the leading form in the group of the arts that make up the idea of culture as refinement, in the Francophone world literature has tended to see itself as separate from other art forms and to claim a much broader explanatory power that would align it with the human sciences: “If anthropology crosses paths with literature in France, it is less because of the former’s predilection for aesthetic objects … and more because the latter refuses to be just another of the fine arts and begins from the premise that everything contributing to the knowledge of mankind falls under its auspices.” Coupled with “the striking absence of the term culture” in French anthropology, the relationship between literature and anthropology during this period in the Francophone world begins to look rather different from the Anglophone context.

In his book (published initially in French as L’Adieu au voyage) Debaene claims that French anthropology always allowed for a passage from the ethnographic to the literary: “Contrary to Franz Boas’s students, ethnographers trained by [Marcel] Mauss were not trying to grasp an ethos, they wanted to breathe an atmosphere; they were not trying to decipher patterns, they were seeking a radical mental transformation.” In chapter 5, I argue that this persistent possibility that scientific, anthropological research might turn into atmospheric, imaginative writing was one reason for the separation of the one from the other in French anthropology. The phenomenon of the deuxième livre existed in order to maintain the scientificity of the first, as evidenced by the strict division of labor Michel Leiris personally enacted, conducting all his ethnographic research and writing in his office at the Musée de l’Homme and all his literary and autobiographical writing at his home (leading ultimately to the creation of two entirely separate archival collections of Leiris’s papers, despite his status as one of the foremost literary anthropologists of the twentieth century in any language). And although, as Debaene shows, this Francophone tradition of two separate books dates back to the early-twentieth-century beginnings of anthropology in France, in the decolonization period, I argue in Culture Writing, it begins to break down, as writers like Glissant, Lévi-Strauss, and, despite his separate office spaces, Leiris himself mingled literary and anthropological tropes within single works.
Claude Lévi-Strauss’s Tristes tropiques is probably the best-known blended text of literature and anthropology published during the period of Culture Writing, and it is also the text that most obviously bridges the Francophone/Anglophone anthropological and literary divide during this time. It was first published in French in 1955 and translated into English in 1961 but with its original French title, a choice that has served to highlight the book’s distinctiveness in the intervening decades. Although Sontag’s 1963 homage to Lévi-Strauss was predicated on the relative neglect of the French writer in English-speaking circles at that time, in retrospect Tristes tropiques has to be seen as a key text of this exchange between literature and anthropology in decolonization in both language traditions. Lévi-Strauss himself, having escaped Nazi-occupied France and reached the United States (via Martinique and Puerto Rico, a journey that is narrated in the opening section of Tristes tropiques) and being significantly influenced by Anglophone, especially American, anthropological writing, is a central figure linking the Francophone and Anglophone literary and anthropological traditions together. Alluding in his book to Robinson Crusoe as well as to Proust, to Boas as well as to Mauss, Lévi-Strauss brings the Francophone analysis of the social fact into dialogue with the Anglophone Atlantic world’s struggles over culture. As Debaene shows in his insightful analysis of the text, Tristes tropiques is the narrative that emerges fifteen years after Lévi-Strauss’s journeys to Brazil and the literary texts he began to write, but set aside, while he was traveling in the Americas. It is an intricately braided, multilayered narrative that has literary materials as its source and bedrock—in spite of the famous, exasperated opening sentences of the book, “I hate travelling and explorers. Yet here I am preparing to tell the story of my expeditions”. At the same time, however, as Debaene also argues, Tristes tropiques forms the basis for the structuralist anthropology of Lévi-Strauss that was to follow, however different in form the equations, diagrams, and analysis of those subsequent texts appear to be at first glance.

It can come as a surprise to a reader who associates Lévi-Strauss with the influential kinship diagrams and equations of structuralism to encounter an earlier iteration of that thinking in a self-consciously literary and narrative form. In Tristes tropiques, Lévi-Strauss ponders the fact that his earliest associations with Brazil, when he was offered the chance to teach at the newly established University of São Paolo in 1934, were of “clumps of twisted palm trees” and “the smell of burning perfumes,” the latter because of “an unconscious awareness of the similarity of sound between ‘Brésil’ and ‘grésiller’ (to splutter in burning)”. However, far from rejecting such associations as the youthful excesses of imagination, Lévi-Strauss proceeds to affirm the importance of literariness, in this case “a spontaneous pun,” for subsequent “interpretation”: “Considered in retrospect, these images no longer seem so arbitrary. I have learnt that the truth of a situation is to be found not in day-to-day observation but in that patient and piecemeal process of distillation which the linguistic ambiguity suggesting the idea of a perfume perhaps encouraged me to practise in the form of a spontaneous pun, the vehicle of a symbolic interpretation that I was not yet in a position to formulate clearly”. The paring of a situation down to its essential figure, rather than the empiricist accretion of details through observation: Lévi-Strauss offers a reflection on interpretation that privileges the modernist shock of the surprising word or spontaneous image and privileges the individual response rather than the social fact. “Even now,” he acknowledges—after having spent considerable time and conducted much day-to-day observation in Brazil, in both cities and rural areas—“I think of Brazil first and foremost as a burning perfume”. Lévi-Strauss may be thinking of the fact that the Portuguese term Brasil, from the brazilwood trees harvested there, derives from a Latin term meaning “burning ember.” The French word for embers is braises. In any event, Lévi-Strauss’s traveling and exploring in Brazil are fused with literariness from start to finish; the practice of fieldwork does not overwrite the experience of “linguistic ambiguity.”

We are prepared, therefore, for the blending of literature and anthropology that is evident in what is perhaps the most influential section of Tristes tropiques, Lévi-Strauss’s encounter with the indigenous Caduveo people (now called Kadiwéu) in the “wretched hamlet” of Engenho in Mato Grosso do Sul state. The name of the village, from the Portuguese term for sugar mill, is a reflection of
the region’s history as part of the Atlantic world system of slavery and monoculture. Lévi-Strauss insists repeatedly, although sometimes with a romantic frustration, on the modernity of the indigenous groups that he meets, their status as members of a modern capitalist system. Here, Lévi-Strauss is struck both by the economic impoverishment of the community and, conversely, by an “extraordinary feature” of its culture, the "undeniably expert" body painting carried out by the women of the community. Their "asymmetrical arabesques", some of which are reproduced in Lévi-Strauss's line drawings accompanying the text, stand out to him not only because of their technical skill and aesthetic form, but also—as the corollary of the spontaneous pun that links Brazil to burning perfume—because "these knightly Indians looked like the court figures in a pack of cards".

Even more striking, this comparison—a self-consciously literary and Eurocentric one, filtered for Lévi-Strauss through the fact that card games have been "imaginatively defined with such success by Lewis Carroll"—becomes the basis for an extraordinarily sweeping, ambitious statement of social and cultural analysis and a preview of his anthropological method to come in later volumes such as Structural Anthropology:

The customs of a community, taken as a whole, always have a particular style and are reducible to systems. I am of the opinion that the number of such systems is not unlimited and that—in their games, dreams, or wild imaginings—human societies, like individuals, never create absolutely, but merely choose certain combinations from an ideal repertoire that it should be possible to define. By making an inventory of all recorded customs, of all those imagined in myths or suggested in children’s games or adult games ... one could arrive at a sort of table, like that of the chemical elements, in which all actual or hypothetical customs would be grouped in families, so that one could see at a glance which customs a particular society had in fact adopted.

The utopian methodological dream of a perfectly systematic scientific "table" of human societies and their customs, one that could be read "at a glance," emerges from a comparison that relies on literary reading, governed by the same kind of contingency that puts Brésil on the same plane as grésil and containing, via Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, more than a hint of the absurd.

It is in this context that we should understand the social and political analysis that concludes Lévi-Strass’s reflections on the Caduveo, one made famous and greatly influential in literary and cultural studies by the prominence given to it by Fredric Jameson in The Political Unconscious (1981). Unlike their neighbors, the Bororo people, Lévi-Strauss argues, the Caduveo deal with problems of social inequality not by creating institutions—in the case of the Bororo, marriage and kinship rules—but by creating art to resolve these contradictions in imaginative form. The Bororo, “faced with a contradiction in their social structure, had succeeded in resolving (or concealing) it by essentially sociological methods”, but the Caduveo could not resolve these contradictions "by means of artful institutions". Nevertheless, these contradictions “continued to haunt them in an insidious way” and so “they began to dream about it,” since they could not "become conscious of it and live it out in reality". Instead, the Caduveo resolved their social and political contradictions "in a transposed, and seemingly innocuous, form: in their art ... In the last resort the graphic art of the Caduveo women is to be interpreted ... as the phantasm of a society ardently and insatiably seeking a means of expressing symbolically the institutions it might have, if its interests and superstitions did not stand in the way". In other words, as Jameson glosses this passage, "The visual text of Caduveo facial art constitutes a symbolic act, whereby real social contradictions, insurmountable in their own terms, find a formal resolution in the aesthetic realm."

It would be hard to overstate the influence of this formulation of Jameson’s, which in various guises has entered into the common sense of literary and cultural analysis, at least until the recent turn against this kind of symptomatic close reading or interpretation of literary and cultural objects and toward ideas of distant reading, surface reading, description, and network and information analysis. Just as I am arguing in this book for an earlier date for anthropology’s "literary turn," I also show that the cultural turn of literary new historicism, which so often invokes this Jamesonian analysis, can be traced back to this earlier moment of literary and anthropological entanglement in the moment of decolonization. It would seem that now is a
propitious moment to carry out this look back to the midcentury moment of decolonization. At this moment when the term "culture" has achieved ubiquity in everyday language, at least in English, from the most grave ("rape culture") to the most banal ("celebrity culture"), the term has lost a lot of its intellectual currency and explanatory value in literary studies, but even more so, argues Susan Hegeman in her smart exploration of this moment, in anthropology itself: "The repudiation of the concept of culture—the turn away from the cultural turn of the 1980s and 1990s," she argues, has taken place "especially [in] anthropology, one of culture's central disciplinary homes and yet the site of perhaps its most intense rejection." Ironically, this turn away from culture as an animating concept and ground for anthropology, and also for some strands of literary studies in the wake of the cultural studies upheaval of the 1980s and 1990s, comes at the same moment that rich and compelling intellectual histories of the culture concept are appearing with regularity, especially those that understand "culture" in the context of empire, such as Andrew Sartori's Bengal in Global Concept History and Qadri Ismail's Culture and Eurocentrism. I hope that Culture Writing will give us a richer understanding of what is being repudiated now, as I argue for the significance of an earlier literary turn in anthropology and of an earlier cultural turn in literary studies in the mid-twentieth-century decolonizing Atlantic world.

I conclude this introduction with a summary of the five chapters that follow. If my time frame is narrow, my geographical and interdisciplinary scope is broad. I analyze literary writers and anthropologists from across the Anglophone and Francophone Atlantic world. Barbara Pym (England), Ursula Le Guin (United States), Laura Bohannan (United States), Saul Bellow (United States), Édouard Glissant (Martinique), and Michel Leiris (France) are the major figures, but other writers who feature in these pages include Jean Rouch (France), Chinua Achebe (Nigeria), Mary Douglas (England), Bessie Head (South Africa/Botswana), Erna Brodber (Jamaica), and Amitav Ghosh (India/United States). Of course, most anthropologists of this period did not become poets or novelists, and most literary writers eschewed ethnographic methods and models. But the writers I study here produced an intriguing set of responses to challenges in both fields, as anthropology slowly began to come to terms with its complicity with empire and as literature grappled with the end of modernist experimentation and a return to forms of social realism. Collectively, they make up a small but significant slice of the cultural and intellectual history of the midcentury period, a moment when "culture" and "writing" went together in ways that they had not before and would not after.

In chapter 1, I analyze the novels of Barbara Pym, a neglected British writer whose seemingly cozy, provincial fictions of middle-class England are in fact ethnographic documents informed by the on-the-job education Pym was receiving in her position as an editor at the International African Institute in London, the premier institutional site for the anthropology of Africa in the postwar period. In Excellent Women (1952) and Less than Angels (1955), Pym casts a sardonic, observant eye on English customs. Where most readers of Pym imagine her to be a nostalgic celebrant of a more sedate England of tea and jumble sales, I read her as part of the postwar movement to document everyday life that is part of the turn to "home anthropology" Jed Esty describes. Pym's fictional England is inflected by her detailed, albeit secondhand knowledge of everyday life in African societies and by a desire to represent non-normative social networks (female-headed households, gay and lesbian relationships, the ties of female friendship and civic engagement) at a time when the British welfare state was establishing itself with assertive material and ideological support for the nuclear, heteronormative family. Rather than seeing her as pining for a lost England, I analyze the way in which Barbara Pym's fiction observes manners and customs in order to document the great changes rolling postwar Britain, and in particular to show how important African and colonial elements were in the transformation of British culture—even as Pym for the most part keeps actual Africans and other colonized subjects offstage in her novels. Pym's fiction consistently draws attention to what it appears to ignore: the significance of the transatlantic, decolonizing frames in which postwar English quotidian life was being redefined.

In Less than Angels and in Excellent Women, Pym also observes the observers, since a community of anthropologists is at the center of each novel.
Included among her anthropologist characters are numerous figures based on real ethnographic researchers of the period, some of whom—like Laura Bohannan, Darryl Forde, Jean Rouch, and Peter Lloyd—I discuss in this and subsequent chapters of Culture Writing. I also make use of Pym’s notebooks and letters, including the professional correspondence with anthropologists such as Mary Douglas and others that she carried out as part of her editorial work at the International African Institute. Pym was uniquely situated to bring anthropology and literature together, and her professional relationships and personal friendships with anthropologists left her sometimes “regret[ing] that more of them did not turn their undoubted talents to the writing of fiction. Their work often showed many of the qualities that make a novelist—accurate observation, detachment, even sympathy.” I argue in this chapter not only that Pym employed anthropological techniques in her writing—her analysis of the social roles of women at a church jumble sale in Excellent Women, for example—but that she clearly aligned herself with rising trends within the discipline in the 1950s that rejected the functionalism and emphasis on kinship networks that had dominated British social anthropology up to that time. At the moment of decolonization, Pym’s ethnographic version of England relied on those anthropologists who were able to reflect on the state of the discipline and see that it needed to be able to document social change.

In chapter 2, following on from this observation about the challenge that decolonization offered to the discipline of anthropology, I look at fictional narratives of and by anthropologists in the twilight of imperial rule. As a novelist like Pym brought decolonizing anthropology to bear on English lives and customs, other writers were responding to the challenge of representing the anthropologist in the field. Rocannon’s World (1966), the first novel by Ursula Le Guin (the daughter of the leading American anthropologist Alfred Kroeber and the writer Theodora Kroeber), features an eponymous ethnographer hero, who respects, learns from, and finally settles among the “hominoid” peoples he encounters on the planet Fomalhaut II, while ultimately ensuring that their planet will remain within the imperial League of All Worlds that sent him to carry out his Ethnographic Survey in the first place. The science fiction genre allows Le Guin a sanctioned distance from the messy realities of colonial and Cold War anthropology, while at the same time enabling the kind of direct reflection on the complicity of the discipline with power politics that few, if any, anthropologists themselves were comfortable with or, indeed, able to carry out. Is Rocannon a late imperial hero in the mode of Rider Haggard’s Allan Quatermain? Or is he a companion figure to Chinua Achebe’s creepily malign District Commissioner in Things Fall Apart, combining anthropological research with the blunt calculus of colonial power?

The American anthropologist Laura Bohannan, who studied at Oxford and traveled to northern Nigeria for her doctoral fieldwork, depicts a finer-grained, earthbound version of the ambiguity of Rocannon’s role in her novel Return to Laughter (1954), written under the pseudonym Elenore Smith Bowen and reissued in 1964 with the subtitle An Anthropological Novel. Turning her fieldwork experiences in a Tiv settlement into a Bildungsroman, Bohannan documents her first-person narrator’s psychological and cultural transformation while never quite losing sight of the advice her teachers give her before she sets out: “Never, never be an embarrassment to the administration.” Switching formally between the past tense of the realist regional novel and the timeless ethnographic present tense of the academic monograph, Bohannan’s narrator also shuttles uncomfortably between subject positions as an American, as a “European,” and as a woman. These instabilities combine in a powerful representation of a system of knowledge production trying and failing to obscure its debt to imperial administration. Widely reviewed and well received at the time of publication, Return to Laughter has never gone out of print and remains one of the most important twentieth-century fictions of anthropology, but it has been virtually ignored by literary historians. I analyze the novel in the context of Bohannan’s academic publications of this same period, highlighting a contradiction between her articles in the journal of the International African Institute, Africa, which are sometimes critical of the British colonial administration, and her anonymous narrator of Return to Laughter, who is careful to give credit to the District Officer, Sackerton, and who calls herself an “heir to civilization” as she reads Robinson Crusoe and Shakespeare in “the bush.”
In chapter 3, I analyze an almost contemporaneous anthropological tale depicting an American in Africa, Saul Bellow’s 1959 novel, Henderson the Rain King. Bellow’s protagonist, Eugene Henderson, is an amateur anthropologist, the scion of a literary New England family, who leaves his library to travel among Africans he hopes to encounter as cultural equals. Henderson the Rain King, for all its satirical excesses, is an ethnographic novel asking central anthropological questions: What are the patterns of culture? How far do they determine human thought and behavior? How and when do they change? However, given the novel’s comic tone and Henderson’s ludicrous failures in intercultural communication, it is also an anti-anthropological novel, a parody of fieldwork and of a field its author abandoned, having majored in anthropology, studying with Melville Herskovits at Northwestern University, and begun a PhD in anthropology before leaving academic research to become a full-time writer. Henderson’s buffoonery highlights—by contrast—the ordinariness of Africans he meets, precisely the effect that anthropologists sought to achieve in their writing. On the other hand, the novel consistently subordinates African culture to the psychological drama of Henderson’s (and perhaps “America’s”) midlife crisis.

I use some of Bellow’s early drafts of the novel (held in his papers at the University of Chicago library) to show how the author borrowed and transformed specific citations to anthropological texts into the more generalized depiction of a nonspecific Africa in the completed novel. I argue that in doing so, Bellow aligns his novel with the shift among some anthropologists—most publicly, Margaret Mead—to put their discipline in the service of the new institutions of “development,” such as UNESCO and aid organizations. Bellow’s protagonist is the opposite of the heroic anthropologist, and he provides an interesting and sometimes critical vantage point from which to examine the transition from European colonial rule to US-led neocolonialism and humanitarian interventions in Africa during this period. At the end of the chapter, I turn to a reading of Bessie Head’s 1965 story, “The Woman from America,” in which the friendship between Head’s Botswanan female narrator and the African American title character, built on customary practice and everyday communication, serves as a postcolonial riposte not only to the story’s agents of US soft power and development aid but also to Bellow’s imaginary Africa.

In chapter 4, I discuss the relationship between literature and anthropology in the Francophone world in the period immediately after World War II and the violent collapse of French rule in Algeria and elsewhere in Africa, focusing in particular on the work of the Martinican novelist, poet, and critic Édouard Glissant. I argue that his early novels La Lézarde (translated as The Ripening, 1958) and Le Quatrième Siècle (The Fourth Century, 1964) evince a much stronger engagement with the discipline of anthropology than has been realized up to now. Likewise, his unclassifiable prose volumes, Soleil de la conscience (Sun of consciousness, 1956) and L’Intention poétique (Poetic Intention, 1969), show an ambivalent but surprisingly sustained interest in anthropology. Why, I ask in this chapter, would an anticolonial writer and activist like Glissant turn toward the human science that was most marked by its birth under colonialism? Martinique’s status at a tangent to decolonization elsewhere—along with Guadeloupe, Réunion, and Guiana, it became an “overseas department” of France in the 1940s—makes anthropology a fruitful, but also risky interlocutor for an anticolonial intellectual like Glissant.

Although critics of Glissant often mention that he read widely in anthropology and, in fact, studied for a Certificate in Ethnology at the Musée de l’Homme in the late 1940s and early 1950s, with rare exceptions his relation to the discipline of anthropology has not merited much discussion among his followers and critics. (In this respect, despite a writing style that is formally quite different, Glissant’s work has been received in strikingly similar ways to that of Pym and Bellow, both of whose critical reputations have developed with little attention to their anthropological influences, as I discuss in chapters 1 and 3.) Nonetheless, Glissant’s complex, ambivalent, but sustained engagement with anthropological texts and ideas is integral to what we can call, following Glissant’s own terminology, his “poetic intention”—the creation of a unified oeuvre. This is especially apparent in Glissant’s early fiction and nonfiction, as he was establishing his voice in relation to the cultural and political ferment of the postwar Francophone Caribbean and to the French
intellectual and poetic tradition. In chapter 4, I analyze the ways in which Glissant adopts and adapts anthropological approaches in his fiction and his early essays, culminating in my argument that his literary meditation Soleil de la conscience can usefully be read as a kind of ethnographic chronicle of Paris in the 1950s. Was anthropology a cursed legacy of colonial rule, or did it rather offer a rare premise for intercultural communication that Glissant did not see in the other social sciences, or even in much French literature?

In chapter 5, I analyze the ethnographic and autobiographical writings of Michel Leiris, who supervised (albeit haphazardly) Glissant's ethnological studies in Paris and who is perhaps the highest-profile figure during the period in either the English-speaking or French-speaking worlds to develop a strong reputation as both a literary artist and a practicing anthropologist. Leiris was a surrealist writer who became an ethnologist almost by accident and whose first ethnographic work, L'Afrique fantôme, was presented in a form that owed as much to travelogue, to memoir, and to literary techniques as it did to anthropological training. So why, in the period of decolonization, did he attempt to enforce such a firm distinction between his ethnographic and his literary writing? Although he maintained a prolific and successful dual career as a literary author and as a professional anthropologist at the Musée de l'Homme in Paris, and although his ethnographic travels in sub-Saharan Africa and in the Francophone Caribbean provided frequent memories and stories for his four-volume epic autobiographical work, La Règle du jeu (The Rules of the Game), for Leiris the two modes of writing remained surprisingly distinct.

While Glissant suggested in Soleil de la conscience that he was "l'ethnologue de moi-même" (the ethnologist of myself), Leiris was maintaining separate writing and work spaces: his anthropology books and work took place at the Musée de l'Homme, while his literary writing was almost all done at home. Although Leiris came of age professionally and aesthetically during the fertile interwar period in France of "ethnographic surrealism," a look at his anthropological writings in the period after World War II shows a surprising fidelity to the protocols demanded by the discipline's founders and leaders, Marcel Mauss, Marcel Griaule, Georges-Henri Rivière, and Paul Rivet. As a way of beginning to solve this puzzle, I analyze in some detail Leiris's Contacts de civilisations en Martinique et en Guadeloupe (Cultures in contact in Martinique and Guadeloupe, 1955), a text, as yet untranslated, that Glissant called not only a great ethnographic text but "quite simply, a great modern book." What was it about this survey of social and economic life in these two French départements d'autre mer that generated such enthusiasm on the part of the Martinican writer in his admiration for Leiris the humanist ethnographer? Drawing on the notebooks that Leiris wrote during his time in the Caribbean, I argue that Contacts de civilisations in its own way carries out a sly subversion of the protocols of anthropological writing in ways that parallel and complement the work of Glissant, turning from a statistical survey in its opening pages into something more akin to a novel of manners by the end. Ultimately, however, the literary turn in Contacts de civilisations falls prey to the tropes of imperial romance that it ostensibly seeks to undercut, just as Leiris's stated desire to reform anthropology from the inside is thwarted by his continuing investment in the collection of objects demanded by Francophone anthropology's institutional location in museums.

Finally, I conclude Culture Writing with an afterword on two later literary responses to the cultural turn of the period of decolonization. Amitav Ghosh, like Laura Bohannan an Oxford-trained non-British anthropologist, follows Bohannan in writing an ambivalent narrative disavowal of the discipline in his nonfiction book In an Antique Land (1992). Ghosh's memoir of his doctoral fieldwork in northern Egypt chronicles his failure to persuade his hosts of the similarities between postcolonial India and Egypt, because his status as a representative of the forces of "Development" and his professional training as an anthropologist overwrite any symbolic kinship with his Egyptian friends. Ghosh's narrator turns away from anthropology toward the written archives of a precolonial history that promises to establish the Indian Ocean connections he had sought in the postcolonial present. Less disenchanted with the discipline of anthropology than Ghosh is the Jamaican novelist and sociologist Erna Brodber, for whom the colonial-era discourse of anthropology is a legacy that provokes a powerful response and creative fertility. Like in an
Antique Land, Brodber’s novel Louisiana (1994) mixes history, ethnography, and narrative and puts the figure of the postcolonial intellectual trained in anthropology at the center of the story. Ella Townsend, a Jamaican American, Columbia-trained anthropologist—a literary variation on the prewar African American anthropologists Zora Neale Hurston and Katherine Dunham—travels to Louisiana and discovers that the technological tool of her academic training, her tape recorder, becomes the conduit through which the voices of the ancestors, hers and her informants’, speak across the divides that separate black people in the US South from blacks in the Caribbean and separate the living from the dead. Anthropology is not redeemed—eventually Ella abandons both her academic life and the tape recorder—but it is reconfigured for a postcolonial literary tradition that, since Achebe and Glissant, has never been able to leave the ethnographic mode fully behind.

To close this lengthy introduction, let me return briefly to the question of interdisciplinarity with which I began. While literary studies and history may seem like obvious cognate disciplines, there has also been continuous friction between them and sometimes strong resistance to the exchange of concepts and methods. Hayden White’s Metahistory (1973), for example, an examination of the narrative tropes underlying the writing of the leading figures of the European historiographical tradition, has had nothing like the impact on the professional practice of history that Clifford and Marcus’s analogous Writing Culture (1986) had on anthropology. The latter volume made it disciplinary common sense to put questions of rhetoric, representation, and writing at the heart of the practice of modern anthropology. Eric Slauter, in an influential article about the relationship between literary studies and history in the interdisciplinary field of Atlantic studies, pointed out a “trade deficit” operating between the two disciplines, summarizing in a commercial metaphor some of the inequalities and resentments operating between the two disciplines: “Literary scholars,” he argued, “import more from historians than they export to them.” By contrast, it can sometimes seem as if anthropology and literary studies have been engaged in a long-term series of reciprocal exchanges based on a kind of intellectual gift giving. If history and literary studies are cross-border commercial rivals, literary studies and anthropology are kissing cousins who exchange presents on birthdays.

The story, of course, is more complicated and entangled than this idea of mutual reciprocity might at first suggest. As anyone knows who has ever forgotten a relative’s birthday, or read a Jane Austen novel, or taken an introductory class in anthropology, gifts are embedded in—and construct the pathways for—complex webs of social obligation and networks of authority. As Marcel Mauss put it at the outset of The Gift (1925), one of the most influential texts in the history of anthropology, first translated into English during the period covered in my book (1954), “In theory [gifts] are voluntary, in reality they are given and reciprocated obligatorily.” When and how must a gift, or a visit, or a letter be acknowledged? When and in what form should it be returned? In the chapters that follow, I track and analyze some of those exchanges, borrowings, and reciprocations—and, sometimes, resistances that took place between literature and anthropology in the midcentury Atlantic world. I hope the result will be a somewhat more ready acceptance and recognition of the terms I queried at the outset of this introduction: literary anthropology and the anthropological novel.

Postcolonial Anthropological Literature: Amitav Ghosh and Erna Brodber

The literary and anthropological works I have discussed in this book take us up to the mid-1960s, by which time the British and French territorial empires had largely been ended by anticolonial opposition, the pressures of US strategic power, and the new Cold War geopolitical alignments of the world. In the period since then, far-reaching, interlocking changes have restructured the disciplines of anthropology and literary studies. The "literary turn" whose beginnings I chart in this book accelerated and deepened in the 1980s and early 1990s. Anthropologists reflected on the power dynamics between themselves and their informants and joined with literary scholars in highlighting the instability of texts. The result was to undermine the empiricist and scientific claims of cultural anthropology—and, especially in North America, to exacerbate tensions among the "four fields" of anthropology, often setting biological anthropologists and archaeologists against cultural
anthropologists. Literary experimentation in anthropological writing was one result of this disciplinary transformation: a whole new wing of the discipline had to be opened up to accommodate the shift from a handbook like Leiris’s Brief Guidelines for Collectors of Ethnographic Objects (1931) to Michael Taussig’s uncatgorizable book My Cocaine Museum (2004).

Not as well labeled, but significant all the same, was the turn in literary studies toward anthropology—or at least, in recursive fashion, to some of those anthropologists who had begun to show interest in literary analysis. The literary new historicists in the 1980s explicitly stated that their inspiration came from anthropology—and from Clifford Geertz’s concept of “thick description” in particular—as they claimed a much broader repertoire of cultural objects for the practice of literary close reading. Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt describe the “liberating effect he [Geertz] had on those who came to him, as we did, from the outside ... He argued that our [literary critics] interpretive strategies provided key means for understanding the complex symbolic systems and life patterns that anthropologists studied. The effect was like touching one wire to another: literary criticism made contact with reality.” (Geertz, in turn, repaid some of these compliments in his lectures at Stanford University in the late 1980s on "the anthropologist as author.") In my introduction I discussed the way in which Lévi-Strauss’s analysis of Caduveo body painting in Tristes tropiques slowly but significantly made its way into literary criticism via Jameson’s use of it in The Political Unconscious, where it became central to the practice of "symptomatic reading." In Gallagher and Greenblatt, the debt to anthropology is more immediate and more electrifying. Under the joint influences of post-linguistic turn anthropology and British cultural studies, literary studies made "culture," rather than literature per se, its primary object of analysis. It became routine to call the discipline "literary and cultural studies" in the 1990s. Ironically, given Geertz’s use of the term "description," literary studies is now undergoing a turn away from cultural analysis and toward "surface reading," description rather than analysis, and network and information studies. Perhaps, then, now is the moment to look back and reflect on the place of "culture" in both disciplines as its centrality weakens.

But to do so is to be confronted immediately by the fact, as I have mentioned on more than one occasion in these pages, that "culture" has had nowhere near the same centrality in Francophone intellectual production during this period. Moreover, the "literary turn" in Anglophone anthropology did not really have an equivalent in Francophone circles of the discipline, despite the connections and exchanges between the two sets of practitioners, and despite the centrality of French theoretical and philosophical works in Anglophone literary and cultural studies. While Foucault’s work on the relationship between knowledge and power and Derridean notions of the instability of texts were invoked as major components of the literary turn in anthropology, for example, James Clifford and George Marcus’s pathbreaking anthology, Writing Culture, has still not been translated into French, as the historian of Francophone anthropology Vincent Debaene has pointed out. Ironically, as Debaene suggests, the well-established French tradition of anthropologists writing a "second book" (deuxième livre) of a more literary bent has forestalled the development of hybrid, experimental work in the discipline, while even fostering a "strong anti-literary stance, the consequence of a deep and general mistrust of rhetoric, which can be found both in the Durkheimian legacy ... and in the institutional construction of anthropology as a museum-based discipline." Such a comparative perspective can help us to avoid generalizations about revolutionary change within disciplines or modes of writing and to focus on elements that remain more continuous over time and on differences between French-speaking and English-speaking traditions of both literature and anthropology.

For example, as Jeremy MacClancy points out in his survey of anthropologists in literature, there are far fewer French novels featuring anthropologists than Anglophone fictions of the same category. It may seem surprising that the discipline that helped to forge the literary identities of Michel Leiris and Claude Lévi-Strauss is not more frequently represented in Francophone fiction, but we can speculate that French literary culture displays an anti-anthropological stance in direct proportion to the anthropologists’ anti-literary suspicion of rhetoric claimed by Vincent Debaene. Moreover, if we turn to Anglophone representations of anthropology in literature, we can note a striking
continuity of tropes over time, a consistency that parallels the longevity of the Francophone custom of the "second book" and calls into question the extent to which literary studies and anthropology have really transformed themselves since the heyday of empire. MacClancy notes that anthropologists are significantly more numerous than other social scientists in their appearances in fiction, but he argues that this wealth of characters has not translated into a plenitude of forms. His survey shows that most figures of the anthropologist, from the 1930s to the present, whether they are women or men, British or American (or even, occasionally, non-Western), have tended to fall into two categories. "In the great majority of the 170 items that I have read, the anthropologist-characters fall easily into one of two polar types, which I shall call The anthropologist as hero" and 'the pathetic anthropologist,'" observes MacClancy, adding that "the latter ... is by far the more common." My analysis of fictional anthropologists in this book to some extent confirms this bifurcation, with Le Guin's Rocannon at one pole and Bellow's Henderson at the other.

Of course, some fictional figures from the novels I have discussed do complicate MacClancy's neat binary. Laura Bohannan's unnamed narrator in Return to Laughter is neither heroic nor pathetic, as befits a novel that seeks to redeploy the tone and concerns of the middle-class novel of manners to a rural West African setting. And in less than Angels, Tom Mallow is pathetic for the bulk of the novel (when he is not being irritating), until the very end, when Pym turns him into an ambiguous hero in death. He takes part in a "political riot" and is "accidentally shot" by the British colonial authorities. His lover, Catherine, comes to see it as "a noble way to die ... fighting for an oppressed people's freedom against the tyranny of British rule," imagining Tom blending into the crowd in the "native robe" that "he often used to" wear. Others back in England are more skeptical, with Mark worrying that he'll continue to be overshadowed by Tom even in death—"it's going to be so tiresome if Tom is going to be built up into a kind of Lawrence of Arabia figure"—and suggesting that Tom was observing rather than participating: "He just happened to be there, as any other anthropologist might have been". In one of the extremely rare moments when the narrative focal point shifts to Africa, Pym's narrator seems to know that Tom had joined the protest "more out of curiosity than passionate conviction", but the next sentence presents the viewpoint of "the harassed young administrative officer" who collects Tom's belongings and letters and sends them back home, suggesting the narrator's proximity to a colonial power that needs to downplay the significance of "anthropologists who meddled in politics". Does Tom turn heroically toward the forces of decolonization, in a culmination, Catherine imagines, of "the breaking-away from his upbringing, the great house, the public school"? The novel allows for this possibility but subordinates it to the perspective of the unnamed young colonial official, who "had liked Tom Mallow—they had often had an evening's drinking together". In the end, fieldwork and imperial complicity remain fused in Pym's novel, however precariously.

This idea of the anthropologist choosing, albeit ambivalently, to side with anticolonial forces is given greater dramatic emphasis in Ursula Le Guin's 1972 novel, The Word for World Is Forest, part of the Hainish cycle of novels initiated by Rocannon's World. In the later novel, Raj Lyubov is an anthropologist who accompanies the Terran settlers on the planet of Athshe, antagonist of his violent fellow Terran, Captain Davidson, and friend of the Athshean resistance leader, Selver, whose language and customs Lyubov studies and values. Where Le Guin had previously combined the martial adventurer and the humane scientific observer in the figure of Rocannon, here she splits them apart, making the military character, Davidson, a figure of rapacious ethnocentrism and the scientist, Lyubov, a figure of sympathetic attentiveness who suffers from migraines. Lyubov's attractiveness is established early on through his literary proclivities, fragments of Wordsworth and Marvell popping up in an internal migraine monologue that follows the first Athshean uprising: "The world is too much with us, ow, ow, ow above the right ear"

I always hear Time's winged chariot hurrying near, for the Athsheans had burned Smith Camp day before yesterday and killed two hundred men. Later in the novel, warned by Selver that a final attack on the Terran headquarters is coming, Lyubov chooses not to tell the imperial authorities, instead submitting "a soothing report, and the most
inaccurate one Lyubov ever wrote”. When the attack comes, with Lyubov’s dwelling the only one spared, “in that moment he knew what he was: a traitor”.

Like Tom Mallow, though, Lyubov chooses sides but does not survive the struggle that follows, as if the act of renouncing observation and choosing full participation means not only the end of anthropological practice but the demise of the anthropologists themselves. Lyubov tries bravely, though futilely, to save a Terran woman from the fighting but is struck and killed by a burning wooden beam falling from one of the dwellings the colonizers had built with material from the Athshean forest they had desecrated. The novel’s sympathies lie clearly with the Athshean people and their right to resist those who would plunder their world for resources (having previously turned their own Earth into a desert); the anthropologist is just as clearly right to renounce his “character and training disposing him not to interfere in other men’s business”. At the very end of the novel, however, Le Guin redeems anthropology all the same, when the visiting representative from the League of All Worlds, Lepennon, informs Selver that the planet will be left to its own devices, with a promise that “no one will come here to cut the trees or take your lands” (186), because Lyubov’s earlier reports on Athshean culture have been read and acted on back at the imperial center: “I’ve had time to read some of his [Lyubov’s] studies of your people ... it’s largely because of that work of his that Athshe is now free of the Terran Colony”. Ultimately, the novel cannot allow the anticolonial forces to be the determining ones, but must fold them back into a grander narrative—that of the League of All Worlds—in which the wise words of the anthropologist are imagined to have the power to bring peace and understanding. In the remainder of this afterward, I briefly analyze two more literary texts that, like The Word for World Is Forest, postdate the main timeline of Culture Writing and further complicate the tropes of the heroic and pathetic anthropologists, showing how anthropology’s collaboration with imperialism continues both to haunt the discipline and to breathe new life into literary production: Amitav Ghosh’s In an Antique Land (1993) and Erna Brodber’s Louisiana (1994).

Amitav Ghosh received his PhD in anthropology at Oxford in the 1980s, doing his fieldwork in rural Egypt at a site that he found via connections of “Doctor Aly Issa, Professor in the University of Alexandria, and one of the most eminent anthropologists in the Middle East.” (As I noted in chapter 2, Issa had been part of the circle of students at Oxford in the late 1940s and early 1950s that included Laura Bohannan and Mary Douglas.) Ghosh, therefore, like Saul Bellow and Gary Snyder, was a writer who had postgraduate-level academic training in anthropology but abandoned the discipline in favor of literary writing. However, unlike Bellow, Snyder, or—even more so—Barbara Pym, Ghosh has also more or less abandoned anthropological characters and tropes in his fiction as well, in favor of forms of the historical novel that narrate cross-cultural exchanges and communications without an ethnographer to mediate them. In an Antique Land narrates, in complex, heterogeneous fashion, the first and last attempt of this postcolonial intellectual to use the colonial-era discipline of anthropology to establish a cross-cultural connection to residents of another postcolonial nation. The fact that this connection fails is not attributed solely to anthropology itself, but the discipline cannot help but tie Ghosh the fieldworker in acutely uncomfortable ways to both the history of empire
and the contemporary logic of development. In an Antique Land, therefore, is a farewell to anthropology as well as an intricate fieldwork narrative.

Two narratives structure the book in a kind of interlocking double-helix pattern. Ghosh weaves back and forth between an account of his arrival and acculturation in the Egyptian villages of his fieldwork (Lataîfa and Nashawy) and an account of his archival and historical detective work trying to uncover enough information to tell the story of an enslaved Indian man in the household of a twelfth-century Jewish trader from the Middle East. In large part, the adventure story genre that provides some of the narrative urgency for Le Guin's, Bohannan's, and even Bellow's novels is relocated in Ghosh's text to this archival quest. One indication of this is that Ghosh delays, for intriguing reasons, providing the personal name, Bomma, of his medieval Indian quarry and instead names him for the catalog number of the archival manuscript letter in the National and University Library of Jerusalem in which he first appears: "The slave of MS. H."

While Bomma, the twelfth-century slave, necessarily remains a shadowy figure, he comes to bear the weight of Ghosh's desire to erase various kinds of borders—religious, national, ethnic, and so forth—and to enact a half-idealized version of a postcolonial, nonaligned solidarity movement, linking Mangalore, India, to Cairo; linking Hinduism, Judaism, and Islam; and linking South Asia to the Middle East via trade and migration networks that predate the radical transformation of the world map brought about by European conquest and empire. By contrast, Ghosh's presentday cross-cultural encounters in northern Egypt, rich, intriguing, and affective as they are, cannot escape the politics of globalization and development that overdetermine them.

Meeting a new group of men at a wedding party in Nashawy, for example, Ghosh tries to establish common ground by "affirm[ing], over and over again, that yes, in India too people used cattle-drawn ploughs and not tractors; waterwheels and not pumps; donkey-carts, not trucks, and yes, in India too there were many, many people who were very poor". But he is met with disbelief: "They [villagers] had constructed a certain ladder of 'Development' in their minds ... I realized that the fellahaen saw the material circumstances of their lives in exactly the same way that a university economist would: as a situation that was shamefully anachronistic". Unspoken but implied is the assumption that Ghosh's status as an educated outsider—kin to the "university economist" and to the "doctor who had recently been posted to the government clinic" for whom the men initially mistake him—makes him an integral part of, and certainly higher up on, this ladder of Development. Previously, albeit perhaps unwittingly, Ghosh had confirmed and consolidated this connection. When a water pump arrives in Lataîfa, Ghosh is asked to evaluate it, since water pumps are "known generically as 'al-makana al-Hindi', the Indian machine, for they were all manufactured in India", and he is known by the villagers as the "doktór al-Hindi". In a bit of self-deprecating comedy of which Laura Bohannan's earlier narrator would have been proud, Ghosh, who knows nothing about engineering, solemnly inspects the pump and pronounces it "an excellent machine". (This is also a revised, less hysterical version of Henderson's attempt to intervene in the water problems of the Arnewi people, in Saul Bellow's novel I analyze in chapter 3, an intervention that ends with Henderson creating an improvised explosive device and making everything worse.) Driven by the expectations of his hosts—"a quick look at the anxious, watchful faces around me told me that escape was impossible"—Ghosh submits to the logic of Development and becomes an expert in international aid. And while this incident plays out as farce, it is repeated later as a tragic argument between Ghosh and Imam Ibrahim. The Muslim cleric's accusation of Indian "savagery" (because of the Hindu practice of cremation) goads Ghosh to claim India's place above Egypt on the ladder of Development: "Ours [guns and bombs] are much better. Why, in my country we've even had a nuclear explosion. You won't be able to match that even in a hundred years". A chastened narrator subsequently reflects on "the dissolution of the centuries of dialogue that had linked us ... the irreversible triumph of the language that has usurped all the others in which people once discussed their differences," the language of "science and tanks and guns and bombs". We are back at the same dilemma that confronted Le Guin's eponymous hero in Rocannon's World: anthropology is a part of science, and science...
serves the interests of conquest and imperial power.

Ghosh’s multilayered, self-reflexive narrative is a remarkable contribution to the rich tradition of anthropological literature; it is also a kind of farewell to anthropology for its author. Other postcolonial intellectuals, however, have made firmer commitments to the discipline. If Michel Leiris’s postwar dream of cadres of trained "native" anthropologists invigorating and transforming the discipline has never fully come to pass, thinkers and writers such as Deborah Thomas, Kamala Visweswaran, David Scott, Lila Abu-Lughod, and Gina Ulysse have become significant voices in the discipline. Moreover, Leiris’s hope that these postcolonial ethnographers would turn their observational skills onto the metropole itself has been answered by many anthropologists who have resisted the customary practice of carrying out fieldwork in non-Western locations.

One effect of this shift in the discipline is to remind us of an earlier iteration of anthropology in the Americas, discussed in my introduction, when some intellectuals from the African diaspora chose anthropology as the lens through which to investigate links among black people around the Atlantic world in the wake of slavery and the slave trade. The novelist Jacques Roumain and the anthropologist Jean Price-Mars from Haiti, the African American choreographer, dancer, and anthropologist Katherine Dunham, and the writer, folklorist, and anthropologist Zora Neale Hurston are perhaps the best-known representatives of this prewar intellectual movement. I discussed Hurston’s Mules and Men in some detail in my introduction. In Erna Brodber’s novel Louisiana, published a year after In an Antique Land, a Jamaican American researcher named Ella Townsend channels the historical figures of Dunham and Hurston in particular when her teachers at Columbia University (the institution where Franz Boas taught) send her to rural Louisiana in 1936 to investigate "the struggle of the lower class negro."

Brodber’s novel is predicated on structurally similar historical traumas—the histories of slavery, forced migration, and cultural suppression that separated Africans from their homelands but also from each other regionally within the Americas. But where Ghosh’s narrative is a tale of failure, Brodber uses the literary benefits of narrative discontinuity, radical shifts in point of view, and the reader’s suspension of disbelief to create a story and a history of renewed cultural and spiritual connection, a provisional healing of traumatic breaks. As Ella replays the tape in order to transcribe and analyze her conversations with Mammy King (also known as Suzie Anna), she notices that voices appear that she had not heard at the time of her interviews: the tape recorder has accrued "additional data", as parts of a conversation between Mammy and her deceased Jamaican friend, Lowly, appear from another realm entirely. The tape deck becomes "the people’s recording machine", and Ella wonders if she is carrying out "the anthropology of the dead? Celestial ethnography?". The long history of Western protagonist likewise has a tangential, but thereby fruitful relationship to the discipline. It is made clear that Ella is chosen for the research project at Columbia University because of her race and her academic promise rather than her training; she is "made a fellow in Anthropology for the duration of the project" and given "pre-field training" that "wasn’t much. The most challenging part was handling a recording machine". Thus the novel begins as a fieldwork narrative, but it very quickly transforms into something quite different, a combination of oral history, spiritual connection, diasporic cultural communication, and romance. Ironically, it is the very technological, scientific tool of the academic discipline—the recording machine—that becomes the vehicle whereby Ella Townsend merges her anthropological, genealogical, cultural, and racial identities. The tape recorder, with its aura of northeastern academic prestige, becomes a kind of "magic pot" through which the intertwined folk stories, songs, and oral histories of black people in Louisiana and the Caribbean reveal themselves.

Ghosh’s nonfiction narrative proposes his academic research as a symbolic way of healing the divisions of Partition that left his Dhaka-based family history on one side of a postcolonial and religious border while he grew up on the other side, in Calcutta. Brodber’s novel is predicated on structurally similar historical traumas—the histories of slavery, forced migration, and cultural suppression that separated Africans from their homelands but also from each other regionally within the Americas. But where Ghosh’s narrative is a tale of failure, Brodber uses the literary benefits of narrative discontinuity, radical shifts in point of view, and the reader’s suspension of disbelief to create a story and a history of renewed cultural and spiritual connection, a provisional healing of traumatic breaks. As Ella replays the tape in order to transcribe and analyze her conversations with Mammy King (also known as Suzie Anna), she notices that voices appear that she had not heard at the time of her interviews: the tape recorder has accrued "additional data", as parts of a conversation between Mammy and her deceased Jamaican friend, Lowly, appear from another realm entirely. The tape deck becomes "the people’s recording machine", and Ella wonders if she is carrying out "the anthropology of the dead? Celestial ethnography?". The long history of Western
anthropologists acquiring sacred or domestic objects and placing them in museums for research and display is turned on its head in Louisiana, as the academic tool of research is given a new spiritual aura and becomes the conduit for a diasporic African connection that links song, story, memory, and the written word, that links the scientific claims of anthropology to the "high science" of Caribbean and southern US black ritual and spiritual practice.

Eventually, as with all technology, the tape recorder becomes obsolete, and Ella begins to receive the voices through a pendant that she has designed herself—an intriguing, if accidental, reminder of the sapphire necklace reclaimed from the museum by Semley at the start of Le Guin's Rocannon's World. Ella and her partner, Reuben (a Congolese researcher who grew up in Belgium), attempt to return the machine to Columbia University, but nobody is interested in it any longer. (I have not been able to determine whether this is an explicit allusion to the film camera and tape recorder that Melville Herskovits insisted Katherine Dunham take to the Caribbean to document ritual dances, which eventually Dunham stopped using as she participated more and more in the dances as a ritual practitioner.) Conversely, the novel does not set up the spiritual world as a higher, mystical retreat from the world of academic research or the world of politics: the history of Mammy King and Lowly turns out to include migration to Chicago and work as Garveyite organizers and labor activists. In the broader, Atlantic world context of the novel, there are hints that Reuben's role after Ella's death includes going "(back?) to the Congo" and fighting "in the Kasavubu/Lumumba struggles of the 1960s" (4), a speculative linking of anthropology to anticolonial resistance, putting one of Brodber's characters into the political and cultural upheavals in central Africa that impelled Mary Douglas at the start of her career to give up the anthropological present tense, an apparently minor grammatical decision that I argue in my introduction and chapter 1 signaled a major shift in the discipline of anthropology in its relationship to empire and power.

Clearly the lengthy, rich, mutually productive dialogue between literature and anthropology continues into the present. It seems telling, however, that the historical imagination of Brodber's novel involves a turn away from anthropology after the 1930s: toward spiritual power on the part of Ella and toward anticolonial politics on the part of Reuben during the period I analyze in Culture Writing.

Brodber implicitly acknowledges that the borders between the two fields, literature and anthropology, were at their strongest during this period after World War II, especially for the minority and colonized intellectuals who made such significant contributions to the discipline before and after. In this book, I have investigated the ways in which literature and anthropology remained connected during the period from 1945 to 1965 in spite of those obstacles, and I have tried to show that the necessary reforms within the discipline and its reckoning with imperial complicity began precisely as a result of these connections, suggesting the 1950s as a new starting point for the vaunted "literary turn" in anthropology. Likewise, I have argued that literary writers who were drawn to newer anthropological techniques and tropes in the fiction of this period were reckoning with, and to some extent rejecting, modernist models that had themselves been anthropologically inflected: synchronic, static models of culture; romantic investments in the idea of the primitive, and so forth. The anthropological turn of literary writers of the 1950s and 1960s was, I would suggest, a return to the traditions of the nineteenth-century novel—traditions that, as James Buzard and others have shown, were themselves ethnographic. This cycle of gift giving and return between the two disciplines has been going on for more than two hundred years; it shows no signs of ending any time soon. <>

The Oxford Handbook of Prehistoric Figurines by Timothy Insoll [Oxford Handbooks, Oxford University Press, 9780199675616]

Figurines dating from prehistory have been found across the world but have never before been considered globally. The Oxford Handbook of Prehistoric Figurines is the first book to offer a comparative survey of this kind, bringing together approaches from across the landscape of contemporary research into a definitive resource in the field.

The volume is comprehensive, authoritative, and accessible, with dedicated and fully illustrated
chapters covering figurines from the Americas, Europe, Africa, Asia, and Australasia and the Pacific laid out by geographical location and written by the foremost scholars in figurine studies; wherever prehistoric figurines are found they have been expertly described and examined in relation to their subject matter, form, function, context, chronology, meaning, and interpretation. Specific themes that are discussed by contributors include, for example, theories of figurine interpretation, meaning in processes and contexts of figurine production, use, destruction and disposal, and the cognitive and social implications of representation.

Chronologically, the coverage ranges from the Middle Palaeolithic through to areas and periods where an absence of historical sources renders figurines "prehistoric" even though they might have been produced in the mid-2nd millennium AD, as in parts of sub-Saharan Africa. The result is a synthesis of invaluable insights into past thinking on the human body, gender, identity, and how the figurines might have been used, either practically, ritually, or even playfully.

Excerpt:

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Miniature Possibilities? An Introduction to the Varied Dimensions of Figurine Research by Timothy Insoll

Introducing this Handbook is a daunting task because of, first, the wealth of material it contains and, second, the difficulty in saying anything new due to the comprehensive nature of the chapters herein. Equally, focusing on more general themes in prehistoric archaeological figurine research by way of review, which would be the obvious remit of an introductory chapter, would only be to duplicate the content of the subsequent two chapters (Chapters 2 and 3). Hence the focus will be upon introducing the chapters themselves through drawing out some of the salient research possibilities and ideas they contain.

The Handbook’s coverage is comprehensive but not exhaustive. There are some regional omissions: Central Asia, the Arabian Peninsula outside the Near East, and South Asia beyond the context of the Indus civilization. This is because it was not possible to find authors to write chapters on the relevant material, rather than an absence of archaeological figurines. However, the past significance of figurines does also vary regionally. In East Africa and in the Pacific for example, there are very few, and, in prehistoric China, figurines, certainly of anthropomorphic form, were not of great importance (Chapter 21). In Chapter 4, Stevenson also refers to figurines being ‘few and far between’ in predynastic Egypt. Significant differences can also be evident in figurine frequency across the same time period in adjacent regions. Neolithic contexts in Italy have yielded approximately 235 complete figurines and figurine fragments, whereas from the neighboring Balkans some 50,000 are currently known (Chapter 34).

**FIGURINE DEFINITION AND ‘MEANING’**

The definition of a figurine can be seen to be broad. The initial Handbook guidelines acknowledged that the definition of the category of ‘figurine’ is variable and differs based on regional and chronological context. Hence, certain forms of figurative representation sitting outside the narrower modern definition of ‘figurine’ as ‘a small carved or sculptured figure’ (Friedrichsen 1986: 749) were encouraged to be included where relevant. It was also noted that primacy should be given to ‘statuette’ forms, implying portability (excluding, for example, carved monoliths), and three-dimensionality (excluding, for example, engraved plaques).

Contributors move beyond this with varied definitions used. Sometimes this is on the basis of size, with smaller representations defined as ‘figurines’ and larger, as with half life-sized or bigger representations in prehistoric China, being ‘figures’ (Chapter 21). Sized-based definitional criteria are also discussed by Morris for the Aegean in Chapter 29 where ‘figurines’ are up to 25 cm in height and ‘figures’ up to 70 cm. This also relates to portability, for ‘sculptures’ are described as life size and usually in fixed locations. In Palaeolithic Central and Eastern European contexts ‘figurine’ definition includes both two- and three-dimensional material (Chapter 30).

Figurines can also be of varied forms. Anthropomorphic forms are not privileged herein. Where they may have been the focus of study in the past to the detriment of other figurine forms, as in prehistoric Cyprus (Chapter 33), this is now being redressed. In Chapter 18, Lau makes the cogent point that, even where a human form is depicted, we should not think that the figurine could not have had different and changing ontological status. Zoomorphic forms dominate some assemblages and were particularly pronounced in the Easter Island corpus for example (Chapter 27). Mixed assemblages occur as during the Harappa phase at Indus civilization sites such as Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa where Bos zoomorphic figurines dominate.
along with female anthropomorphic ones (Chapter 22). Other figurines, as with some Neolithic Central European examples, are of indeterminate form, either human or zoomorphic, perhaps a desired characteristic and stressing their dual nature as Bânffy notes in Chapter 31.

The figurine form can also lend itself to the depiction of different elements on the same item, perhaps as viewed from different angles. This is apparent in figurines from contexts as diverse as Anatolia (Chapter 2a) and the Amazon (Chapter 19). In Chapter 26, Daems describes a Late Neolithic figurine from Tepe Yahya, Iran, which could be viewed as female from the front but from the top and sides possibly depicts a phallic. In Chapter 6, Barich refers to an anthropomorphic figurine from Farafra in the Sahara that, seen from behind, ‘resembles a bird with plumage’. Figurines can also be parts of other objects, blurring simplistic definitions, as when they are attached to pots for instance (Chapters 4, 8, 14, 19, 25, and 33), bronze vessels (Chapter 21), or other objects (Chapters 16 and 20). Anthropomorphic pots can also blur figurine definition, as with the pots modelled in the shape of the human body from the Neolithic Hungarian Körös culture (Chapter 31).

Recurrent in this Handbook, following the exhortations of Bailey (2005, 2013) is the recognition that figurines are not images alone, but objects that matter and which can have agency (Chapter 2). To quote Bailey (2013: 245; emphasis in original), ‘by seeing that figurines are representations for, one recognizes that they have agency. Equally, figurines are the outcome of conscious processes of material, technical, and aesthetic selection, that is, ‘figurines as process’ (Chapter 2). Figurines are, as Kuijt aptly puts it in Chapter 24, the materialization of ‘clay ideas.

A consensus is apparent that prehistoric figurines should be approached as objects with complex meanings that require interpretation and not just description. Seminal in this realization, as cited in various chapters (e.g. Chapters 6, 20, 26, 33, 2, 29, 37, and 4) was Ucko’s (1968) study, described by Morris in Chapter 29 as ‘a cornera stone of modern figurine studies. Ucko’s contribution to figurine studies is positively acknowledged, as are recurrantly. Less positively accepted are the generalizing approaches of, for example, Gimbutas (1982, 1989) (see Chapters 36, 3, and 2). Overall, healthy debate is evident in figurine studies as is evident in this Handbook (e.g. Chapters 36, 24, 3, and 2).

Precisely defining figurine meaning is difficult, for multiple meanings were probably ascribed to many prehistoric figurines and these meanings could change over time (Chapters 5, 24, 33, and 36). They were subject to what Stevenson describes, in Chapter 4, as the ‘condensation’ of diverse actions, relationships, and concepts. Contributors also challenge the notion that all figurines were somehow linked with ‘ritual. In many contexts they had a ritual role (Chapters 13 and 21); in others, figurine function varied (Chapter 6) and could change over time. Some figurines were also toys. In Chapter 9, de Maret illustrates this for Central Africa, and, in Chapter 14, Overholtzer interprets the overrepresentation of crude figurines in certain Aztec domestic floor contexts as suggesting they were toys. Many of the cattle figurines in Neolithic contexts in the Sudan may also have been toys, an interpretation suggested by their being found in settlements (Chapter 5). Some Indus figurines seem also to have become toys after their primary use, and existed alongside other figurines that were produced only as toys (Chapter 22).

Defining figurines as ‘art’ is rare in the Handbook outside Palaeolithic contexts (Chapters 30 and 37), reflecting shifts in ways of viewing this material. However, avoiding the concept of ‘art’ is not to deny that some figurines might have been valued as aesthetic creations, produced as objects of beauty and wonder. The visual qualities of color and luminosity of the Minoan Snake Goddess figurines would have been readily apparent to those viewing them (Chapter 29). Figurines chart changing tastes and aesthetic patterns, and can provide an insight into past aesthetic thinking (Chapter 3) as manifest by the disappearance of ceramic figurines amongst Amazonian Indian groups, reflecting, as Barreto notes in Chapter 19, changes in representational language to a less figurative one in the post-Columbian period. Figurine aesthetics could also be defined through representational emphasis, as with ‘cropping’ in prehistoric China, utilized to emphasize phalluses or heads for example (Chapter 21).

The scale of analysis to apply to the study of prehistoric figurines is an issue that is also considered. The question of how far comparative...
analysis should be extended is one of relevance (Chapter 3), with a shift evident from the meta-narrative to specific figurine forms, assemblages, and questions (Chapter 7).

**FIGURINE CONTEXT AND USE**

All the chapters indicate the importance of figurine context. Without adequate attention to context, the danger exists that the beguiling artefact that can be the figurine itself becomes the focus and the investigator slips into the default position of being `figurine centric' (Chapter 2). In some regions, for example in predynastic Egypt (Chapter 4) or West Africa (Chapter 8), the previous absence of adequate consideration of context is being redressed. Figurine context is extremely varied, as the chapters indicate, and patterns of figurine disposal and deposition versus that of other categories of material can allow significant inferences on past figurine use, as Priewe discusses in Chapter 21 with reference to figurines and red pottery cup deposition in the Middle Yangtze region of China. Similarly, a special curation rationale appears to have been applied to Neolithic Eastern and Central European figurines when other categories of material culture would be routinely discarded (Chapter 31).

Figurines are particularly well contextualized in certain regions. In the Temple period on Malta, for example, figurines are largely retrieved from megalithic temple structures and tombs (Chapter 32); in Sardinia bronze figurines (bronzetti) were frequently placed in locations such as temples and central meeting places (Chapter 35). Yet even where contextual information is present, reconstructing from this how figurines were used can be difficult (Chapter 36). Figurines often come from disposal contexts that might not relate to original use. Some West African figurines were disposed of in shrine deposits apparently unconnected with primary usage (Chapter 8). Similarly, in Chapter 28, Renfrew describes how the primary use context for many of the large marble Cycladic figurines is not known. In the Indus region, figurines have been recovered from waste middens, house floors, and domestic rubbish pits, but again there is a lack of primary figurine use contexts such as burials or shrines (Chapter 22).

Figurines could also be indiscriminately deposited, as seemingly was Olmec practice (Chapter 12). Interpretation is generally enhanced, though not always unproblematically, where ethnography is available (Chapter 24), as is evident in discussion of figurine use on Easter Island (Chapter 27) or in the Arctic or northwest coast of North America (Chapters 16 and 17), but for the majority of prehistoric contexts in this Handbook relevant ethnography is lacking. However, more generally, ethnographic sources can be seen to be effective in encouraging thinking in new or more complex ways, as in relation to how figurines in the past might have been perceived as having agency or being imbued with personhood.

**FIGURINE MATERIALITY**

The extent of archaeological figurine materiality discussed in the following chapters is wide. In Chapter 36, Bailey refers to `figurines as the body made material. Materials used for figurine manufacture range from goat and antelope metapodia in Central Africa (Chapter 9), wood on Easter Island (Chapter 27), cave stalactite in Italian Palaeolithic contexts (Chapter 34), steatite and mammoth tusk in the Upper Palaeolithic of Western and North Central Europe (Chapter 37), chalk in the Western European Neolithic (Chapter 38), driftwood and walrus ivory in the North American Arctic (Chapter 17), marble in the Cyclades (Chapter 28), sandstone in Neolithic Sudan (Chapter 5), mud in southwestern North America (Chapter 15), bronze in China (Chapter 21), bone in the Upper Palaeolithic (Chapter 30), copal for the figurines representative of Aztec imperial ritual (Chapter 14), and faience and ivory in Minoan and Mycenaean contexts (Chapter 29), to, above all, fired and, to a lesser extent, unfired clay. Understanding of figurine materiality is skewed in favour, generally, of archaeologically durable materials. Figurines could be made from less permanent materials such as wood, as already mentioned, textiles, or dough (Chapter 26). Multiple materials were used in the Manchay figurine from Mina Perdida in the Central Andes that had a bottle gourd frame, clay/plaster surface, and human hair and cotton thread cording (Chapter 18).

Figurines could also be adorned, decorated, filled, connected to, or treated with other substances and materials, becoming accretive objects, as Meskell describes in Chapter 2. In Chapter 15, Schaafsma, for example, relates how clay heads were
attached to fibre bodies to make figurines in the Sacaton phase, and how feathers were attached to figurines in a Salado cave cache in southwestern North America. Perishable materials such as feathers, wood, and plants were also seemingly used with some prehistoric Anatolian figurines (Chapter 26). Paint was applied as red wash and dots to some ceramic Neolithic Mesopotamian figurines (Chapter 25). Repeated painting was also a feature of some Cycladic figurines (Chapter 28). The nostrils of some Easter Island wooden statuettes were filled with red or orange pigment to represent the breath of life (Chapter 27). Red ochre was coated on to some predynastic Egyptian fired clay figurines (Chapter 4).

The realization that figurines were part of much wider material worlds is recurrent in the Handbook. In Neolithic Western Europe, figurines were part of a 'broader world of representation' (Chapter 38): at Çatalhöyük, anthropomorphic and zoomorphic figurines were connected with wall paintings, human skull removal and plastering, and other material culture (Chapter 2). Overall, the production and use of figurines could form part of what Antczak and Antczak eloquently define in Chapter 10 as 'sociomaterial ritual habitus', and as such were entangled within a web of materiality, which could make them efficacious (Chapter 18).

FIGURINES, GENDER, SEX, AGE, THE BODY, AND PERSONHOOD

A shift beyond defining figurines in simplistic male and female terms is apparent. As Meskell indicates in Chapter 2, figurines can be embodied but not necessarily linked to specific gender or sex. Representing the 'corporeality of the human body' (Chapter 10) rather than maleness or femaleness could have been key (Bailey 2013: 248), and sexless figurines are widely found (e.g. Chapters 25, 26, and 36). Equally, supposed sexual characteristics can be misleading (Chapter 36): breasts and pregnant bellies could be indicators of obesity rather than indicators of sexuality (Chapters 12 and 21).

Figurines might also have offered the medium for creating an ideal of gender and/or sex through the elision of male and female via androgynous representation, or via the duality of male and female figures composing the same figurine. Some Marajoaro figurines from the Amazon combined both male and female elements (Chapter 19), as did a figurine found in an A-group site in the Sudan (Chapter 5). In Chapter 36, Bailey refers to Neolithic Southeastern European figurines that have a phallic neck but with breasts and pudendum. Gender might also be blurred, as Knox suggests in Chapter 33, for some prehistoric Cypriot figurines.

Although in many instances the representation of pregnancy and birth (Chapters 8, 13, 17, 23, and 26), singular biological sex, and/or the cultural construction of gender are apparent (Chapters 12, 22, and 25), the factors underlying the use of prehistoric figurines for representing sexed bodies and their function within gender construction and gender relations were complex. Figurines could be used in the formation of gender and the citation of sex perhaps via initiation as in southern Africa (Chapter 7). This might be broadly akin to how some Neolithic Iranian figurines were possibly used for didactic purposes perhaps linked with the female life cycle (Chapter 26). Some figurines in the North American Arctic were similarly used for didactic purposes. These were dolls that could be used for play but also to teach children about adult activities (Chapter 17). In the Caribbean, figurines could be used as substitutes for women in ritual practices (Chapter 10). In the Levant, male and female sexed bodies or portions thereof began to only be represented by figurines during a time of stress (Chapter 24). On Easter Island, women used wooden figurines to make obscene gestures whilst men were painted with images of female genitalia (Chapter 27), the latter impossible to reconstruct archaeologically.

Figurines were certainly 'somatic' media (Chapter 4). In human terms they provided a medium for miniature human representation, and the idea of miniaturization is seen as particularly significant in some contexts (e.g. Chapters 4, 6, 18, and 29). Figurines could be 'mimetic representations of miniature humans' (Chapter 13). As Bailey (2005: 32-9) has discussed, miniatures serve to distil and compress what is represented, and can promote, through the agency of miniature threedimensionality, object intimacy, and tactility. Miniaturization could also stretch the limits of imagination and challenge intelligibility. The 'tropes' of material reality could be subverted and played with.
Figurines could also represent age from infancy to antiquity (Chapter 12) and be used for the inscription of personhood (Chapters 7 and 15). Prehistoric figurines potentially attest a significant range of understandings of personhood and ontology. For example, in Chapter 19, Barreto indicates how Amazonian perspectivist ontologies were based on beliefs that both humans and non-humans formerly shared humanity, then separation occurred, but non-humans still viewed themselves as human; these ontologies can be reflected in complex ways by stone or clay figurines from the region. Whilst Mizoguchi, in Chapter 23, argues that the varied forms of both fantastic and realistic Jomon figurines and the existence of pots with figurine-shaped motifs suggests, ‘human beings, animals, plants and supernatural beings were perceived to be mutually transformative.

Figurines could also be used to create ideal persons or qualities or essences of persons. Janus heads might reference wisdom, foretelling, fantasy, or even physical abnormality (Chapter 13). The fusing of animal and human forms is a repeat theme (Chapters 8 and 20), perhaps as a reflection on ontology, perhaps to create mythical creatures of imagined forms. Some of this imagery could also reflect masquerade. In Chapter 25, Campbell and Daems refer to ‘reptilian-like’ facial characteristics evident on examples of Late Ubaid figurines from Mesopotamia that might depict masks. More unequivocally, figurines depicted wearing human, animal, or indeterminate masks were found in Linear Pottery culture (‘Linearbandkeramik’ or LBK) contexts in Central Europe (Chapter 31).

Figurines can provide information on dress and accoutrements and bodily adornment and modification otherwise lacking in the archaeological record. In prehistoric Malta, several hairstyles as well as dress were modelled on figurines (Chapter 32). Incised lines and zigzags on figurines and a face pot from Neolithic Italy might have related to decorations also applied to the bodies of the living (Chapter 34). Yup’ik dolls from the North American Arctic were often decorated with facial tattoos and labrets (Chapter 17). The incisions made on a figurine from a child’s grave at el-Kadada in the Sudan perhaps represented tattoos or clothes (Chapter 5). Either scarification, tattooing, or wearing armlets is indicated on the arm of the early Upper Palaeolithic lion-man’ from Hohlenstein-Stadel, other figurines depict bracelets, belts, and hats of woven fibres or shells (Chapter 37). Possible tattoos are depicted on the faces of some Neolithic figurines from the Aland Islands in the Baltic (Chapter 38). Possible tattooing or scarification is depicted on a figurine from the predynastic Egyptian site of Mahasna, while other predynastic figurines depict hairstyles and attire (Chapter 4).

FIGURINES AND POWER

Figurines are powerful objects, as contemporary responses to figurines indicate (e.g. Bailey, Cochrane, and Zambelli 2010), and they were also seemingly considered as powerful in varied prehistoric contexts. Figurines could be literally power objects (Chapter 9) invested with substances that were perceived as giving them power (see Hersak 2010). Figurines could also be used in the construction and legitimation of power, as in the Mayan context, where elite figurine production in ceremonial centres occurred and figurines were utilized in elite burial contexts and as part of ceremonies associated with political elites (Chapter n). Figurines in prehistoric Sardinia appear to have played a central role in politics (Chapter 35). Power seems also to have been a major factor structuring the production, curation, and use of figurines on the northwest coast of North America (Chapter 16). The presence or absence of figurines might also attest to changing power structures. In Chapter 5, Haaland and Haaland suggest that the general disappearance of figurines and their replacement by larger figures in the Sudan after the Neolithic was perhaps due to changes in social and political organization, with increasing centralization and specialization evident. In Chapter 4, Stevenson also charts how figurine usage reflects power changes in predynastic Egypt: from ‘embodied projections of inward-looking group ritual action’ to a possible decline in the relevance of anthropomorphic imagery as state formation processes ‘gathered pace’.

The power of figurines is also suggested by the fact that deliberate fragmentation could have been a recurring practice, perhaps at the end of the ‘life’ of the figurine (but see Chapter 36). Intentional breakage seems to have been a factor in Hohokam figurine usage in the southwest of
North America (Chapter 15). It was also possibly significant in some Mesopotamian contexts (Chapter 25) and in many Central and East European Neolithic ones (Chapter 31). In Bandkeramik Western European Neolithic contexts, intentional fragmentation of figurines appears to have occurred, perhaps paralleling the controlled fragmentation of bodies evident in Bandkeramik cemeteries (Chapter 38). At the Early Bronze Age site of Kayos on Keros in the Aegean, deliberate fragmentation was also evident, and here it seems that figurines were brought to Keros from other Cycladic islands already fragmented (Chapter 28). Items such as a house model and anthropomorphic vessels were also metaphorically ‘killed’ in Cypriot Chalcolithic contexts by being defaced and broken, and in the Bronze Age many plank figurines were deliberately broken (Chapter 33). Purposeful decapitation was also evident on many of the figurines of Bering Sea cultures in the North American Arctic (Chapter 17). This was not a unique instance, for the decapitation of two figurines at the Highland Formative Mesoamerican site of Gualupita was interpreted as potentially allowing their force or energy to escape (Chapter 13).

Besides removing them from active use, in some instances fragmentation might also hint at perceptions of past figurine agency. Figurine agency or related concepts is a theme explored by various contributors (Chapter 35), and Gell’s (1998) ideas of object agency have proven influential here. Andeans believed figurines to be imbued with force or energy and thus a primary role they assumed was as a surrogate (Chapter 18). Figurines might also have functioned as objects used to enchain people with the past and with powerful places, spirits, and people (Chapter 14).

FIGURINES, SENSES, AND PERFORMANCE

It is also apparent that figurines need not have been static objects but could be subject to manipulation and utilized in performance-related activities (Chapters 4, 13, and 14), including, but not exclusively linked, to ritual. Figurines can appeal to the senses. They can be tactile objects, and were perhaps deliberately exploited as such, as with some Early Jomon figurines from Japan (Chapter 23) and carefully fired figurines from the Sahara (Chapter 6). Figurines can also be visually appealing, and this seems to have been the quality drawn upon in later Jomon contexts, with a change in emphasis placed on seeing figurines rather than handling them (Chapter 23).

Figurines could also be made to enhance performance. The inclusion of whistle vents in some Mayan figurines attests an aural dimension perhaps linked to performance (Chapter n). Sardinian bronzetti of musicians provide glimpses into performances involving sound—music—and possibly dance (Chapter 35). Some Amazonian (Chapter 19) and Aztec figurines functioned as rattles, by containing small clay pellets, and other Aztec figurines were puppet-like, with limbs attached with string (Chapter 14). Stone figurines with string holes that allowed their heads to be moved like puppets were also found in several Maltese Neolithic temple sites (Chapter 32). The presence of detachable heads on Anatolian figurines suggested that they too might have been used for performative purposes (Chapter 20).

Initiation potentially provided a context for figurine performance (Chapters 7 and 8). Gesture is a further important component of performance and figurines can ‘fossilize’ gesture and posture (Chapter 29). This might be particularly applicable to ritual gesture and posture: gestural differences between Minoan bronze and clay figurines were interpreted as suggestive of ritual variation (Chapter 29).

FIGURINE MANUFACTURE

Figurines are testimony to human technical ingenuity. This is an issue not lost on the contributors to this Handbook, who indicate the range of mechanisms used to construct figurines: from the wooden sticks or reeds used as a core around which some figurines were formed in predynastic Egypt (Chapter 4), or the wooden dowels used on some figurines at Çatalhöyük (Chapter 2) or in the prehistoric Sahara (Chapter 6), to the ceramic joints and moulds used by Mayan figurine makers (Chapter n) and the peg holes recorded on Neolithic Italian figurines indicating that they were made in separate pieces and then joined together (Chapter 34). Factors such as the use of moulds relate also to how unique figurines might have been perceived. This raises questions such as to what extent the manufacturing processes reference the emphasis given to creativity and experimentation as opposed to a more homogeneous production (Chapter 30).
Clark and Kenoyer suggest the making of Indus figurines was meaningful in perhaps re-enacting birth or creation of deities or human beings from clay or earth as suggested by figurines being hand-modelled rather than moulded.

Technological choice is significant. Additive (ceramic) versus reductive (ivory, stone, bone) figurine manufacturing processes are explored in relation to the Upper Palaeolithic (Chapter 30). These are technological themes that merit exploration in figurine assemblages elsewhere. Figurines could also be pierced or incised with holes to assist firing or for the insertion of dowels, sticks, reeds, pegs, or string, or, as with some Harappan figurines, to allow their being attached to other objects or placed on sticks (Chapter 22). Figurines could also be pierced to facilitate their being worn, as with some Minoan pierced anatomical parts (Chapter 29). In other instances, cavities, holes, or incisions might be unconnected with manufacture and instead used to offer libations (Chapter 8) or for the addition of secondary materials, as with a Dorset period wooden figurine from the North American Arctic that had its neck pierced and filled with red ochre (Chapter 17). Holes pierced through figurines could also perhaps relate to the depiction of internal organs, as Mizoguchi suggests in Chapter 23 for holes pierced vertically through some Jomon Incipient period figurines. Other figurine cavities remain unexplained, as with the perforations found on examples of Santarém figurines from the Amazon (Chapter 19).

CONCLUSIONS: THE `STATE' OF PREHISTORIC FIGURINE RESEARCH

The `state' of prehistoric figurine research varies regionally. In areas where there is a significant history of figurine research, Mesopotamia (Chapter 25) or the Levant (Chapter 24), for example, the agenda has moved beyond inventory and description to a greater extent than areas where research has been much more limited and where even basic summaries are lacking, as in West Africa (Chapter 8). Perhaps because of the wealth of data in both Mesopotamia and the Levant, comparisons are made across different regions and time periods (see Chapters 24 and 25) that would be difficult to achieve elsewhere.

It is also surprising that in some regions where it might be assumed that figurines have been the focus of significant archaeological attention this is not correct, and they have instead been somewhat neglected, as with Olmec (Chapter 12) or Aztec (Chapter 14), or prehispanic Andean (Chapter 18) figurines. In other instances, varying regional trends in research are discernible, as manifest by recurrent interpretive themes—shamanism in the Americas (Chapters 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, and 19), or a focus upon age in parts of Africa (Chapters 7 and 9). What is certain is that both strong empirical research and focused interpretation are vital in successful figurine research (Chapters 2 and 3), as all the contributors in this Handbook achieve.

Increasingly, interdisciplinary approaches in figurine research are also key (Chapter 2). Through exploring the application of techniques such as computed tomography (CT) scanning to look inside figurines, DNA analysis to examine what substances might have been added to or used in conjunction with figurines, and X-ray fluorescence (XRF), instrumental neutron activation analysis (INAA), and other elemental analysis methods, new insights into prehistoric figurines can be gained. INAA has been used effectively on Olmec (Chapter 12) and Aztec figurines (Chapter 14), and Sears describes, in Chapter ii, how XRF, INAA, and microscopy were employed to investigate the pastes used in Mayan figurines. Macro and microscopic study of Upper Palaeolithic figurines from Western and North Central Europe has indicated how mammoth ivory figurines were made (Chapter 37).

This Handbook brings together prehistoric figurine research from around the world. It is essentially a summary of work in progress that also indicates the many directions this research could focus upon. These are many, one that can be briefly isolated here as tying together various themes already isolated—materiality, gender, sex, personhood, fertility, power, agency, sensory perception, performance—is the role of figurines within medicine and healing.

This is identified by several contributors, as can be inferred through the large numbers of figurine fragments found near Aztec sweatbaths where curative rituals were performed (Chapter 14); or through the `votive' body parts found in the Minoan peak sanctuaries that seem to have functioned to facilitate healing (Chapter 29); or by the potential pathological conditions (oversized breasts, buttocks and stomachs, distorted phallic forms) found at the
Mnajdra Temple on Malta (Chapter 32); or by a possible diseased individual represented by a female figurine from the necropolis of Cannas di Sotto on Sardinia (Chapter 35); or by a wooden figurine from a burial on Southampton Island in the North American Arctic, which was drilled with holes corresponding with lesions on the accompanying woman’s skeleton (Chapter 17). However, medicine and healing could be explored in more detail in relation to figurine assemblages elsewhere. The concept of visual ‘synecdoche’ as described by Farbstein in Chapter 30 might be pertinent here, where the part is used as a referent for the whole—eyes, arms, vulva, and so on. Figurines, complete or fragmentary, can potentially reference human concern with the maintenance of health and the avoidance and curing of disease and disability in varied ways.

Another future research direction is the magical role of figurines. This is a subject touched upon by some contributors, but in general not considered at length. For example, in Chapter 15, Schaafsma indicates how some Basketmaker III figurines from the southwest of North America could have been used for black magic; in Chapter 26, Daems describes how some Iranian prehistoric figurines, perhaps perceived as miniature beings, were possibly able to be manipulated for magical purposes; and, in Chapter 27, Orliac and Orliac refer to Easter Island figurines being used for both black and white magical purposes. The overall absence of magical interpretations for figurines perhaps reflects the decline of magic as an interpretive theme. Magic as a concept can be misunderstood, ill defined, simplistic, sometimes perjorative, but notwithstanding this, it is conceivable that some figurines must have had magical roles, particularly where ‘magic captures the intractable power of things’, and ‘traces a mode of thinking that is layered, reticular, and corporeal’, that is, well suited to figurines.

Finally, and unfortunately, prehistoric figurines can also attract attention as objects with financial value and as such become commodities traded in the international art and antiquities market (Chapters 4 and 28). Archaeologists have a role, a voice, and a degree of power here in speaking out against this trade, the destruction of archaeological sites, and the decontextualization of figurines.
their use beyond the Neolithic into the Bronze and Iron Ages. He discovers that there was not a single point in time when tells stopped being occupied; instead, they seem to have gradually fallen out of use.

Steve Mills, Mark Macklin and Pavel Mirea explore the dynamic character of human-river interactions in the Teleorman valley. For the Teleorman valley, they suggest that a more stable riverine environment may have contributed to the attraction of a Neolithic lifestyle, while a period of greater instability could be associated with the end of tell settlements.

In the first of two papers in The Neolithic of Europe centered on burial evidence from the Carpathian basin, Eszter Banffy, Janos Jakucs, Kitti Kohler, Tibor Marton, Krisztian Oross and Anett Osztas discuss unusual burials from three Neolithic sites in the Sarkoz region of southern Hungary. Large-scale inter-regional communication networks, local situations and the intimate, personal scale of each individual burial event hence combine to create a rich and complex picture that must be appreciated at several analytical scales — something Alasdair has always advocated in his work.

Pal Raczky and Alexandra Anders take these issues further by adding multiple temporal layers into the mix. Their analysis focuses on the site of Polgar-Csoszhalom, where a tell settlement, an associated flat site and enclosure ditches have been uncovered. Raczky and Anders present four unusual interments and conclude that burial is a mutable arena for expressing social relations, one that responds to historical transformations.

Rick Schulting and Dusan Borie have set themselves the challenging task of comparing processes of Neolithisation in southeast Europe and in Britain and Ireland using isotopic evidence.

Laszlo Bartosiewicz, Alice Choyke and Ffion Reynolds continue on an animal theme, but focus on the symbolic role of one particular species, red deer. Their starting point is a worked frontlet from the Iron Age site of Sajópetri, Hungary. Having first contextualized the find in its regional and chronological setting, they provide a wide range of comparanda illustrating the importance of deer symbolism in societies around the world.

Amy Bogaard, Stefanie Jacomet and Jorg Schibler then take readers of The Neolithic of Europe back to the Neolithic and into central Europe, comparing the economic regimes of the Alpine foreland to those in the loess zone. Any cultural differences between the Alpine and loess regions are not determined by a divergent economic basis, but, as the authors point out, reflect different reactions to the social dynamics inherent in a Neolithic way of life.

In a similar vein, Daniela Hofmann and Eva Lenneis discuss a particularly intractable problem of LBK architecture, namely the significance of tripartite houses. These structures, which show a more subdivided interior and are often longer than their bipartite counterparts, are not equally frequent in all regions and phases of the LBK.

Switching from domestic to monumental architecture, Philippe Lefranc, Anthony Denaire and Rose-Marie Arbogast consider five enclosures from different middle Neolithic culture groups in Alsace. The long-term existence and wide geographic distribution of these sites is testament to the success of this form of monument, while some sites allow readers to glimpse the details of the ceremonial activities played out there.

In his ambitious paper, Christian Jeunesse covers the longue duree of prehistoric and later social development in Europe by outlining an interesting dialectic between periods in which elite graves form a relatively flat hierarchy, and those — generally short — phases in which truly exceptional prestige goods are deposited in what could be termed chiefly or princely graves.

Richard Bradley and Leonardo Garcia Sanjuan consider two sets of monuments, those of the Morbihan, Brittany, and those at Menga near Malaga in Spain. They may have been built in response to natural disasters or were, in some cases, destroyed by catastrophic events.

Another paper in The Neolithic of Europe which focuses on two geographic areas is that by Andrew Meirion Jones, Andrew Cochrane and Marta Diaz-Guardamino, whose contribution covers the rock art and carved objects of Britain, Ireland and Atlantic Iberia. By exploring various examples they demonstrate that there is extensive evidence for reworking and re-use in Neolithic art.
Alistair Barclay and Oliver Harris return to the topic of domestic architecture, using the increasing evidence for Neolithic houses in Britain and Ireland to trace how different kinds of communities could be brought into being. Different ways of doing things and different reactions to innovation were always possible, even within what we now define as an ‘early Neolithic’ horizon.

Vicki Cummings and Colin Richards consider the passage grave tradition of Britain and Ireland in relation to the concept of ‘wrapping’. The authors ponder whether, in fact, it was the act of wrapping which was the most important element of these monuments, not that which was wrapped (the chamber).

The paper by Alex Bayliss, Caroline Cartwright, Gordon Cook, Seren Griffiths, Richard Madgwick, Peter Marshall and Paula Reimer returns to a site much cherished by Alasdair: the West Kennet palisade enclosures. Thanks to the meticulous recording kept at the time and the available archives in various institutions, it was possible to obtain new 14C-dates and to reassess the chronology of the site within a Bayesian statistical framework.

Josh Pollard and colleagues tackle the use of Stonehenge in the Chalcolithic and Bronze Age. It appears that Stonehenge continued to play an important role in the lives of people in this area, in terms of a place marking important times of the year but also in the structuring of broader networks and lineages. Increasingly, however, other forms of monument and actions took precedence.

Finally, in The Neolithic of Europe Alison Sheridan re-evaluates the evidence for relations between Ireland and Scotland across a large chunk of the Neolithic. She clearly favors migration from Continental Europe as the ultimate source of Neolithic things and practices in both areas, as supported by the growing corpus of early radiocarbon dates and lately by first aDNA studies, and outlines two strands of migration. Interaction between Ireland and Scotland remains of crucial importance in subsequent centuries, as for instance seen in stylistic similarities in pottery and megalithic architecture, as well as the distribution of lithic material.

Each [paper] is a testimony to Alasdair’s standing amongst the European archaeological community. During his distinguished career he has influenced and befriended many scholars from Europe and beyond and the introduction and introductory paragraphs of each of the papers clearly demonstrate warmth, gratitude and respect … I am also sure that he will (rightly) be delighted with this festschrift and he should be proud of the influence he has had on studies into the European Neolithic.

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– Alex Gibson, Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society

As with Alasdair Whittle’s own research, the coverage in The Neolithic of Europe is broad, ranging geographically from southeast Europe to Britain and Ireland and chronologically from the Neolithic to the Iron Age, but with a decided focus on the former.

Taken together, the papers reflect the breadth of Whittle’s interest as much as the respect and friendship he commands among colleagues across Europe. They form a suitable gift in celebrating his enormous contribution to the field. <>

From Cooking Vessels to Cultural Practices in the Late Bronze Age Aegean, 1st edition edited by Julie Hruby & Debra Trusty (Oxbow Books)

Late Bronze Age Aegean cooking vessels illuminate prehistoric cultures, foodways, social interactions, and communication systems. While many scholars have focused on the utility of painted fine ware vessels for chronological purposes, the contributors to From Cooking Vessels to Cultural Practices in the Late Bronze Age Aegean maintain that cooking wares have the potential to answer not only chronological but also economic, political, and social questions when analyzed and contrasted with assemblages from different sites or chronological periods. The text is dedicated entirely to prehistoric cooking vessels, compiles evidence from a wide range of Greek sites and incorporates new methodologies and evidence.

The editors are Julie Hruby and Debra Trusty. Hruby is Assistant Professor of Classics at Dartmouth College, where she teaches Greek archaeology. Trusty is a PhD candidate at Florida State University. Her dissertation focuses on the ability of cooking vessels to identify specific characteristics of the Mycenaean political economy. The book has 17 contributors.

The contributors to From Cooking Vessels to Cultural Practices in the Late Bronze Age Aegean utilize a
wide variety of analytical approaches and
demonstrate the impact that cooking vessels can
have on the archaeological interpretation of sites
and their inhabitants. These sites include major Late
Bronze Age citadels and smaller settlements
throughout the Aegean and surrounding
Mediterranean area, including Greece, the islands,
Crete, Italy, and Cyprus. In particular, contributors
highlight socioeconomic connections by examining
the production methods, fabrics and forms of
cooking vessels.

This volume begins to fill the need for a text that is
entirely dedicated to Aegean Bronze Age cooking
vessels. Each chapter focuses on cooking vessels
from sites in Greece or in places impacted by
prehistoric Greek ceramic culture. These sites
include major citadels and smaller settlements
throughout the Aegean and surrounding
Mediterranean area, including the Greek
Mainland, the Cycladic islands, Crete, Italy, and
Cyprus. The primary goal is to investigate the
potential for Minoan and Mycenaean cooking
vessels to illuminate important economic, political
and social issues in Mediterranean prehistory.
These include craft production techniques, trade,
and consumption on a range of different scales.
Increasing attention to socioeconomic questions over
the last few decades makes this an opportune time
to reconsider prehistoric cooking vessels. Chapters
within From Cooking Vessels to Cultural Practices in
the Late Bronze Age Aegean utilize a variety of
analytical techniques and methodologies to
demonstrate the impact that cooking vessels can
have on the archaeological interpretation of sites
and of their inhabitants.

First, Debra Trusty (Chapter 2) surveys the history
of scholarship on prehistoric cooking wares. Trusty
contrasts the state of scholarship on prehistoric
Aegean cooking wares with that of other contexts,
including Classical Greek and Native American,
noting that the scholarship of Aegean prehistorians
has sometimes tended to lag.

Julie Hruby (Chapter 3) examines the development
of class-differentiated cuisine over time, using
specialized cooking pots as a proxy for the
development of haute cuisine. She uses
experimental approaches to investigate how
culinary technologies functioned and therefore to
understand how cuisine changed over time.

These articles precede a geographical look at
individual sites around Greece and Crete. Starting
in the west, Joann Gulizio and Cynthia Shelmerdine
(Chapter 4) contrast two phases of cooking pot
assemblages at Iklaina, those before and after the
probable incorporation of the site into the Pylian
state in LH IIIA2 early. They restrict their study to
three specific vessel types (spit supports, griddles,
and tripods) in order to demonstrate how the
inhabitants of Iklaina experienced changes in
cooking and eating habits at a time of political
change. They find some evidence that might
suggest a decrease in the frequency of spit support
and tripod use after that transition.

Bartlomiej Lis (Chapter 5) compares cooking pots
from three different sites in Central Greece and the
Peloponnese: Mitrou, Tsoungiza, and the Menelaion.
He observes shifts from the Early Mycenaean
period to the Palatial period and from the Palatial
period to the Post-Palatial period, with a trend
toward increasing uniformity not only at the first
transition but also, more surprisingly, at the second.

Walter Gauss, Evangelia Kiriatzi, Michael
Lindblom, Bartlomiej Lis, and Jerolyn Morrison
(Chapter 6) shift focus from the Mainland to the
adjacent island of Aegina. Their discussion fills a
chronological gap in the analysis of Aeginetan
cooking pots, that from Late Helladic II through the
Early Iron Age.

Evi Gorogianni, Natalie Abell, and Jill Hilditch
(Chapter 7) turn readers’ attention to the island of
Kea, where they use cooking vessels as a proxy for
culinary technologies and provide much-needed
information on cooking vessel fabric characteristics
on a macroscopic scale. They argue for a more
nuanced understanding of the process of
Minoanization, arguing that it has been overstated
due to a combination of biased discard practices
and the incomplete description of Mainland vessels.

Salvatore Vitale and Jerolyn Morrison (Chapter 8)
examine the culinary technologies of Kos,
presenting an overview of the Bronze Age storage
and cooking pot assemblages and evaluating the
Late Bronze Age processes of Minoanization and
Mykenaeanization.

Jerolyn Morrison (Chapter 9) surveys the evidence
for cooking at Neopalatial and Final Palatial
Mochlos. She sees shifts in ceramic types, such as
the introduction of larger tripods and of new rim
shapes on cooking dishes at the transition to the Final Palatial period, but she finds that even where the cooking and serving pot types (and so presumably the style of food production and consumption) shifted, the foodstuffs themselves apparently did not.

Elisabetta Borgna and Sara Levi (Chapter 10) examine the cooking vessels of Post-Palatial Crete and contemporaneous ones from Italy, finding that while Mycenaean ceramic forms are generally quite popular in Italy, the same is not true of cooking pots. The reverse is also partially true; only a limited number of Italian shapes appear in Cretan contexts.

Reinhard Jung (Chapter 11) shifts readers’ attention to the Fast, where he demonstrates that there is a substantial shift in Cypriot cooking ways at many sites between the Late Cypriot I-II period and the Late Cypriot III period. Cooking pots change in morphology with the introduction of several Mycenaean shapes and in manufacturing methods from handmade to wheelmade; hearths shift from relatively simple features that might be only flat spaces or shallow pits to elaborate built structures.

Mike Galaty (Chapter 12) provides From Cooking Vessels to Cultural Practices in the Late Bronze Age Aegean with its conclusion, in which he advocates for the definition of research questions as we shift from descriptive to interpretative perspectives. He uses Eastern North American strategies for analysis of cooking vessels as a comparandum, contrasting the cultural-historical and processual approaches that have taken root among archaeologists working in that region with the frequently descriptive approaches used in the Aegean. He recommends that all coarse pottery be kept that researchers develop and use a shared terminology and classification system, that summary data should be presented and statistical analysis undertaken, that they adopt hypothesis testing, and that they adopt a ceramic-ecological research framework.

The editors have done a wonderful job and inspired high-quality contributions that are beautifully illustrated with an abundance of illustrations and colour photos... this timely book has demonstrated that the future of cooking vessels studies is bright and full of possibilities. – Dr Ina Berg, Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society

From Cooking Vessels to Cultural Practices in the Late Bronze Age Aegean is timely. Recent improvements in excavation techniques, advances in archaeological sciences, and increasing attention to socioeconomic questions make this an opportune time to renew conversations about and explore new approaches to cooking vessels and what they can teach us. By using a wide variety of methods in the book and recognizing the issues and obstacles that need to be overcome, scholars can begin to collaborate to develop a better understanding of this under-researched class of Bronze Age Aegean functional ceramics. <>

The Crown of Aragon: A Singular Mediterranean Empire edited by Flocel Sabaté [Brill’s Companions to European History, Brill, 9789004349605]

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Excerpt: Preface by Flocel Sabaté

This book contributes a new perspective about what was known as the Crown of Aragon, a set of territories that became a leading actor in the Late Middle Ages before disappearing and becoming absorbed within various modern nations. It is a collective endeavour written by several specialists, working under a common well-defined line in order to clearly present the perspectives of analysis with which historiography has been renewed recently.

In medieval Europe, societies were structured into political entities according to the systems and values then valid, giving rise to models that appeared complex. This makes sense because political management combined power organised on different levels, fragmented jurisdictions, legislations adapted to diverse realities, permeable frontiers, polycentric areas and a play on identities and combinable otherness. The homogenisation that was gradually imposed in the modern centuries led to attention being focused on explaining the models adapted to the more centralised and vertical systems. Then, the elaboration of history in line with the national parameters in the nineteenth century contributed powerfully not only to ignoring the diverse entities of the dominant model but also, especially, to eliminating the tools with which to approach knowledge about this.

Amidst this difficulty of understanding systems outwith the pattern of political model imposed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the majority of the historians of these centuries were contaminated, more or less consciously, by a certain teleological view of history. That enabled the different systems to be dealt with as imperfect and immature and be left in a marginal sector. In contrast, recent historiography has attempted to analyse the Middle Ages through the values of the men and women involved, with the aim of grasping their real meaning. That has also meant a revision of the structures of power they lived under and the values that society was organised around. This task is more necessary than it might seem because, in the end, the roots of most current European identities, languages and societies lie in the Middle Ages.

Within this framework, this book focuses on the trajectory of an entity that enjoyed a special leadership in the late-medieval Mediterranean, the Crown of Aragon, so called in reference to the name of the royal lineage that presided over it. In fact, in the Middle Ages, these political entities did not require any official denomination, which is why the first dispute nowadays arises from what to call them and how to define them. Thus, the first chapter (written by Flocel Sabate) looks into how valid it is to use denominations such as empire for these entities. The roots of the Crown of Aragon entity are to be found in the northeast of the Iberian Peninsula, in a context of the frontier between the area of Carolingian origin and Islam (analysed separately by Adam Kosto and Jesús Brufal) and include expansion towards Occitania, in the south of modern France, finally cut short in the midst of the Cathar conflict (studied by Pere Benito). In this late-medieval period, society moved towards a cohesion clearly shown in the literature, that began in an ecclesiastic framework and culminated with the troubadours (as Isabel Grifoll shows) and the artistic and architectural expression of the Romanesque (presented by Xavier Barral-i-Altet).

Consolidation in the twelfth century furnished the bases of a feudal and bourgeois society, with a heavy jurisdictional and fiscal fragmentation, over which, nevertheless, a structure of political government and social projection was built. This dynamic took place in the thirteenth century when the Muslim territories in the east of the Iberian Peninsula and the neighbouring islands were conquered, immediately followed by expansion across the Mediterranean and that culminated in the fifteenth century (as explained by Flocel...
The strong economic growth (with both its take-off and its slowdown detailed by Antoni Riera) was principally based on commercial expansion across Mediterranean (as Damien Coulon explains) and infused the people who formed part of it with specific characteristics (as presented by Maria Bonet).

This Mediterranean expansion stimulated new systems for the control of the sea, (as stated by Alessandra Cioppi and Sebastiana Nocco). In any case, the territorial growth and spread of maritime influence led to interactions between identities, and here, the cohesive function of culture based on the Catalan language stands out (as Flocel Sabaté analyses). It was precisely this interweaving of language, royal court and social strength that propelled Catalan into an outstanding position (as Lola Badia and Isabel Grifoll present), giving rise to a prestigious literature (as detailed by Lola Badia). This was also when a Mediterranean Gothic style appeared (as explained by Xavier Barral-i-Altet).

The changes to values, attitudes and political forms that characterised Europe in the modern centuries altered and fragmented this singular political entity spread across the Mediterranean. However, a specific legacy remains, even cultural and landscape, scattered across the territories that adopted new identities (as Luciano Gallinari and Esther Martí present) together with a clear ideological legacy (studied by Antoni Simon). This is the inheritance of the old Crown of Aragon, one that has left specific traits on the Mediterranean (as David Abulafia concluded).

This path, detailed by outstanding researchers, shows that the network of territories and peoples spread around the Mediterranean perhaps extended more or less randomly, depending on luck or misfortune in battles and trade disputes, but nevertheless adopted a sense, a structure and solid political, economic, social and cultural axes, the comprehension of which is essential for really understanding our present.

The Crown of Aragon in Itself and Overseas: A Singular Mediterranean Empire by Flocel Sabaté

One may think that the human essence has always been the same: in the Middle Ages the soul was seen from the perspective of the seven deadly sins, as it still was literally in times much closer to us. However, the social and human structures with which people adapt to the territory can change, as can the concepts used to denominate these. Thus, both the place and the terms with which we approach the past must be defined.

From the mer i mixt imperi to the imperi e senyoria “Aquesta és aquella ja benaventurada, gloriosa e fidelíssima nació de Catalunya, qui per lo passat era temuda per les terres e les mars; aquella qui ab sa feel e valent espasa ha dilatat l’imperi e senyoria de la casa d’Aragó”.

These were the words with which Bishop Joan Margarit addressed the Parliament or Courts in Barcelona in 1454. One and a half centuries earlier, around the start of the fourteenth century, the word imperi was used by civil servants in the royal chancellery of the Crown of Aragon in an attempt to seat the bases for the power of the sovereign on the Romanist formula of the mer e mixt imperi to serve royal pre-eminence while accepting access to part of the jurisdiction in certain places by all those (nobles, barons, churchmen and bourgeoisie) who were able to claim they had already enjoyed said jurisdiction for a long time. Throughout the thirteenth century, jurists had stated that the monarch should hold the merum imperium over the whole country as a kind of higher jurisdiction “del Príncep per rahon de general jurisdicció que ha en son regne, cor en tots homes del regne seu a mer imperi, cor totes coses que són e'l regne són del rey quant a jurisdicció”.

These are practically the same words Guido de Bayisio used to defend the imperium generalis jurisdictionis et potestatis of the king of France. Placing the empire over the kingdom was one of the demands spread by Romanist jurists around Europe to consolidate a royal plenitudo potestatis. The simultaneous spread of Aristotelian philosophy also contributed to this aim, and reinforced “il ‘regime di uno solo’ anche come la forma di governo più consona all’ordito ontologico dell’universo”. With these arguments, the sovereign sought a higher position from which to negotiate with the estates. Negotiation was inevitable, which is why all sides aimed to start from as strong a position as possible. Power in the Middle Ages was
based by definition on agreement, because the sovereign had to reach agreement with the different holders of power, while the latter claimed to be representative. That is why there was a move towards a political system based on groups with social power, like the estates, and this generated institutional mechanisms where the “right of consent” could be applied. This explains the establishment of parliaments in the thirteenth century.

This Europe-wide reality adapted to the balance of forces in each territory. In the case of the Crown of Aragon, the king required the backing of the Romanist discourse because his position was very weak. Thus, the 1137 dynastic union through the marriage of the count of Barcelona and the infant Aragonese heiress, aged only one, led to a union of the territories in the northeast of the Iberian Peninsula. The fact that this union was only dynastic was precisely due to the weakness of the crown. Indeed, in the second half of the twelfth century, both Aragon and Catalonia were united internally, but, despite sharing the same sovereign, did not form a single country. In other words, the unifying force did not flow from the dynasty but rather from the separate dynamics within the Aragonese and Catalan societies. Thus, in the former case, at the end of the twelfth century and after a century of expanding southwards into areas outside its original Pyrenean nucleus, and coinciding with a growing social harmonisation, the name of the initial small kingdom of Aragon came to identify the sum of all these lands. At the same time, in the latter, the Carolingian-origin counties in the northeast of the Peninsula had grown so close socially by the start of the twelfth century that they were perceived under a common name: Catalonia. From the outset, given a lack of a stronger force, the joint sovereign had to respect the institutional and social duality of the two regions.

Catalonia is made up of territories that had been counties that split from the Carolingian matrix as a result of the ninth-century crisis of the Empire. They became independent from each other but gradually came closer between the ninth and twelfth centuries given the common context of being on the frontier between Islam to the south and the continuity with Europe to the north. The institutional and social cohesion of each of the counties between the ninth and tenth centuries, their expansion over the frontier in the tenth and eleventh centuries under the impulse of the barons and the feudal fragmentation of the eleventh and twelfth centuries led to a mosaic of jurisdictions and incomes that the count of Barcelona was unable to correct despite dominating all Catalonia in the twelfth century. Meanwhile, the Aragonese nobility went from dependence on the monarch through the local domains (tenencias) received in the original territory or from expansion over the frontier, to a feudal structure. This was imposed at the beginning of the thirteenth century, the same period when municipal governments were consolidated. The latter combined their power inside the town or city and their projection over their respective areas of influence. Consequently, the thirteenth-century monarch was forced to adapt to the nobles and municipalities in both Aragon and Catalonia. Expansion into the ever-weaker Muslim-held lands could compensate for the monarch’s difficulties. Thus, James I claimed these conquests for himself, titling himself king of Majorca and Valencia from 1238 on, and treating these as new domains where he could establish a favourable jurisdictional structure and tax regime. However, the monarch soon also had to cede power in these territories, not only to the emerging urban capitals but also, more importantly, into the hands of the nobles, who cut back his powers to tax and his jurisdictional reach.

There were strategic and commercial reasons for the interventions by James I in Ifriqiya, nowadays Tunisia, especially after 1240. However, in 1279 when his son, Peter the Great, wanted to reinforce his domain through a tribute, a conflict of interests arose with Sicily. Then, in 1282, the same sovereign accepted the crown of Sicily. This was offered to him by the burghers of Palermo and part of the Norman nobility who rose against the French Angevins who then ruled the island. This is what Pope Martin IV condemned when he excommunicating Peter and called the crusade against Catalonia that Philip III of France headed. The defence against this invasion illustrates the state of power in the Crown: the Aragonese king received support from his subjects after agreeing to wide concessions to the estates in the Parliaments (Cortes or Corts). This led to the consolidation of a jurisdictional mosaic. The consequence was that until the end of the Ancien Régime, the royal officials could not even enter territories outwith the royal
domain, and these thus remained beyond the sovereign’s jurisdiction and fiscal reach.

The diplomatic solution to the Sicilian crisis was to leave the island under the dynasty of the Catalan-Aragonese king but with a change of monarch. This came about in 1297, when after the Treaty of Anagni signed in 1295, Pope Boniface VIII created the kingdom of Sardinia and Corsica for James II of Aragon, who quickly withdrew from Sicily and left it in the hands of his brother Frederick. However, two decades passed before James could attempt to take possession of Sardinia by force. In fact, this invasion led to a whole century of costly confrontation that drained the monarchs’ resources. We can see this in Lleida, one of the most important cities of Catalonia, in the debate in 1366 in the municipal council about the monarch’s request for financial backing because “ell no pot provehir com no haje moneda de què proveesque a la guerra”.

The king, needful of credit, had to repeat these requests to a population that was immersed in grain shortages and a demographic crisis. The country also suffered thirteen incursions from the north, mainly by idle troops from the Hundred Year’s War, as well as the havoc wreaked by piracy, now not only on the high seas but also right on the coast. The parliaments were called whenever the monarch required finance. This led to agreements on compensation and public indebtedness to supply him with enough credit to cover his demands. This was how the king hoped to tackle the serious invasions by Castilian troops between 1356 and 1375 (which ended up decanting pre-eminence in the Peninsula towards Castile) and the challenges in the Mediterranean. In fact, the growing Catalan participation in the Sicilian trade accentuated tensions with the Genoese republic before the end of the thirteenth century. This led to outbreaks of privateering that intensified in the following decades and drew the Crown of Aragon into the war between Genoa and Venice after 1350. This acute danger from privateering continued throughout the century despite a series of arbitral sentences and peaces. In fact, these tensions and problems became mixed up from the 1390s, when the Aragonese royal house attempted to take direct political control of Sicily. In 1392, the Sicilian, Andrea Chiaromonte, received a letter of encouragement from the Sard, Brancaleone Doria, to join forces so that “els iniqui et malvagi cathalani meteriamo a morte”.

There were two immediate consequences of that situation. Firstly, there was an increase in the monarch’s institutional weakness given that he had had to cede huge amounts of royal patrimony in exchange for funds. In fact, only 13.43% of the territory of Catalonia and 22.17% of its population remained under royal domain in 1392. Then, a political model was applied that placed sovereignty in the hands of the people, not the monarchs, because the estates granted the requested assistance according to their own interests but under a discourse in which they presented themselves as representatives of the country. This gave rise to an explicit duality between the monarch and “the land” (la terra), the latter coming increasingly under municipal guidance.

Claiming economic and social pre-eminence under political formulae, the city of Barcelona sought to consolidate a leading role in the running of the Crown. This was reflected in the protocol and epistolary communication with the other cities of the Crown in a pyramidal network. These other places also took part in these municipal political manoeuvres but distrusted the weight claimed by Barcelona. In fact, the royal dynasty was unable to unify the Crown and had to respect the unity reached by each of the territories they ruled over and which became institutionally ever more autonomous. In 1363, even state taxation appeared, applied to everyone. However, this was not in the sovereign’s hands, but was instead held by the estates, represented by a permanent diputació in each of the territories, Aragon, Valencia and Catalonia. These diputacies quickly worked to ensure their own permanence, taking over political functions and justifying themselves by presenting themselves as the representatives of their territories. This was explicitly proclaimed in Valencia in 1409: “lo offici de la Diputació representàs tot lo regne”. In fact, the power of the estates even reached the institutional aspect closest to sovereignty: the succession to the throne. In 1396, it was the city of Barcelona that guided the succession to John I and in 1410, there was an interregnum resolved formally two years later through election by a small group legitimated by parliamentary
representativeness, in other words, “fo lo XI Rey de Aragó e comte de Barcelona elegit per la terra”.

Meanwhile, the chronicler Bernat Desclot put the following in the mouth of admiral Roger of Lauria in 1285: “no solament galera ni lleny, mas no crec que ningun peix se gos alçar sobre mar si no porta un escut amb senyal del rei d’Aragó en la coa”. In fact, the different groups with power in the Crown of Aragon strengthened their positions thanks to the Mediterranean. The presence in Greece, and control over the duchies of Athens (1311–1388) and Neopatras (1319–1391), could be summed up as the by-product of the help the Almogavars lent to the Byzantine emperor in his fight against the Turks. However, it was really the imposition of a feudal domain and the attraction of Catalan population that converted Thebes into a major trading centre linked to investors, mainly those from Barcelona. This Greek domain not only contributed to the glory of the Sicilian and Catalan-Aragonese monarchs but also enabled them to seek out relics considered favourable to the dynasty, like those of Saint George.

Similarly, the sovereigns sought further glory in all the Mediterranean campaigns, either Peter the Great, who seized Sicily, or Peter the Ceremonious, concerned with leaving a victorious image for posterity. The Catalan nobility also found a way to consolidate itself by establishing minor branches over-seas, both in the early action in Sardinia in the twelfth century headed by the Viscounts of Bas, and in ties with the Sicilian nobility in the late-medieval centuries and the settlements on Sardinia after the conquest in the fourteenth century. Notably, the Mediterranean soon became part of the budding twelfth-century Catalan bourgeoisie. The diplomatic contacts between the house of Barcelona and the Italian coastal republics in the first half of the twelfth century produced notable joint actions like the campaign against Majorca in 1113, the taking of Almeria in 1147 and the conquest of Tortosa in 1148, as well as the concern to reinforce the Provençal coast and contacts with Ligurian and Tuscan republics, and were related to involvement in maritime trade. In the early years of the twelfth century, Barcelona became increasingly important as a distribution centre that attracted many Italian merchants, while the Barcelonan merchants were frequent visitors to all the ports of the Mediterranean. By the end of the century, the trade route from Barcelona to the Eastern Mediterranean and its branches had become increasingly important without affecting the existing routes to North Africa and the trade with Ceuta. Ships carried European textiles, increasingly the middling quality material produced in Catalonia, to the East and returned with spices to be distributed around Europe for the elites to use in their food to show off their wealth, as did the Catalan and Occitan elites from the twelfth century.

Thus, in the thirteenth century, relations with the north of Africa were reinforced. Trade with Tunisia and Sallee increased, but more notably, given the large profit margins involved, trade with the East grew, and this also benefited even more from the seizure of Sicily. Links with the Eastern Mediterranean thus became the mainstay of the late-medieval Catalan economy, as they generated profits and incentives that were felt throughout the economy.

There was a notable proliferation of Catalan consulates in Mediterranean ports. The antecedents for these lay in the twelfth century and they were consolidated over the following century under royal control until James I ceded them to the local authorities of Barcelona in 1268. Thus, the latter were allowed to designate consuls “in partibus ultramarinis et in terra de Romania et in quibuslibet aliis partibus in quibus naves vel ligna Barchinone navigaverint”. These were the Catalan consulates - consulem Cathalanorum. However, as in the specific case of Ragusa, these also served all the Aragonese king’s subjects: “omnes et singulos Cathalanos et alios subditos et naturales dicti domini nostri regis”. This was the king of Aragon ("Nós, el rey d’Aragón” as he presented himself) even when he was acting in his royal domains overseas, like the regni Sicilie or the regne de Cerdenya, places where those who fought under his name did so in the name of the dynasty: “Aragón!, Aragón!” At the same time, the proper name used to describe his subjects was Catalan, a term used by those who welcomed them and those who fought them. The fact that everyone from the Iberian Crown of Aragon was called Catalan evidently reflected the political and economic weight of Catalonia in these Mediterranean activities, but was also indicative of a cultural unity. This was very clear with Catalan being the common
language for all those from Catalonia, Roussillon, Majorca and Valencia.

James II seized the kingdom of Sardinia in 1323, an act that led to recurrent armed conflict throughout the fourteenth century. This was not seen as a war between sovereigns but as a conflict between nations, explained and expressed in very strong terms, often with great aggressiveness and always as a reaction of the Sards against the perverse acts of the Catalans, and this emphasised the collective perception of identity.

Thus, the Mediterranean catalysed the Crown of Aragon. It had a leading place in all the main events that affected the kingdom. When, under pressure from the estates led by the city of Barcelona in 1396, John I was to be succeeded by his brother, Martin, the latter was in Sicily finishing carving out a royal domain for his son, Martin the Younger. And when the latter's condition as heir to the Crown of Aragon ended in 1409, it was because he met a premature death on Sardinia, through the mala aria. This deadly disease had taken over the Sardinian atmosphere despite King Peter the Ceremonious writing poems about “lo bon ayre e la noblea d’esta isla de Cerdenya” and invoking the protection of Our Lady of Bonaria in the mid-fourteenth century.

The Mediterranean merged the discourses that reinforced the monarchs of the Crown of Aragon, the commercial interests of its elite, the spread of a political and social model and growing cultural influence. In 1412, the new dynasty from Castile immediately seized it. Ferdinand I retained Sicily for the Crown of Aragon, against the conditions of the will of Martin 2, who had bequeathed the island to his grandson Frederick,100 and also managed to obtain papal confirmation for his rights over the kingdoms of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. In 1420, Alfonso the Magnanimous finally subdued Sardinia and went on to concern himself with Corsica where conflict continued until his death in 1458. These tensions were really with Genoa and led to both war and privateering and involved joining the infighting that fractured the Ligurian city. In any case, the Catalan imprint transformed Sardinia. It lost its own traits, replaced by the institutional and social forms of Catalonia, not only with the imposition of figures of government and representativeness but also changes to its social identity, with feudalisation and the spread of urban influence into rural area.

The Mediterraneanisation of the Crown of Aragon became even more marked under Alfonso the Magnanimous. After being in Sicily from 1432, he made a triumphal entry into Naples in 1442 and set up a notable court there where cultural patronage became part of a strategy to exalt the figure of the sovereign. He was idealised first for capitalising humanistic values, beginning with virtue and continuing with the rules that governed society. While burnishing his humanistic image, he immersed himself fully in the power struggles in the Italian Peninsula. He was unable to inherit the promised lordship of Milan, in 1447, and despite his splendid reception in Naples in 1452, he failed to convince the Emperor Frederick to designate him imperial vicar in Tuscany and Pisa. However, he did take his full part in the political chess game played out in Italy, where he used his eminence to contain the French and handle the fear of the Turks, while in 1455, he managed to have one of his subjects, the Valencian Calixtus III, chosen as pope.

Nevertheless, the latter would not avoid a clash with Alfonso by reinforcing papal pre-eminence over the Church of the Crown of Aragon. The culture of his origins continued to make itself felt: the Great Hall of the Castel Nuovo in Naples with its Gothic archaism, built by the Majorcan Guillem Sagrera, was defined by Pietro Summmonte as “é cosa catalana”; “a la catalana” dishes were added to the refined cuisine and recipes from the south of Italy,108 while the book that the chef Robert de Nola dedicated to Alfonso’s son, Ferdinand I, was written in Catalan. In Rome, Catalan was the language of the papal courts of Calixtus III and his nephew Alexander VI, alongside Italian and Latin, and Catalan culture and language were studied by the humanists in both Rome and Naples.

The king, from his throne consolidated in Naples, could feel closer to the eastern side of the Adriatic and look towards the Balkans. The lower Adriatic was a region well known to Catalan merchants through the port of Ragusa, whose consulate was extended in 1443. The Neapolitan royal title included the Angevin rights over the kingdoms of Jerusalem and Hungary. In this context, in 1444 the Voivode of Bosnia swore an oath of allegiance to Alfonso. Nevertheless, when the regent Janco Hunyadi offered the crown of Hungary to the
Magnanimous in 1447, he rejected it because it would mean an open battle with the Turks. Shortly after, in 1448, the Ottomans vanquished the Hungarians in the Second Battle of Kosovo.

In any case, in 1437 the lord of the Despotate of Arta, Carlo II Tocco, reinforced his position with royal confirmation from the Magnanimous.11a This was repeated in 1452 with Leonardo III Tocco as Duke of Leukas, Count Palatine of Cephalonia and Despot of Arta, including the rights and family titles over different parts of Greece. Alfonso intervened directly in Albania in 1451, even sending a viceroy, who minted reyals d’argent in Kruje in 1454 to pay the castellans in Albania, while also taking on a theoretical viceroy of Greece and Sclavonia. In 1455, the king appointed a viceroy for Morea, with power over the Strait of Corinth, although in reality he remained in Epirus, given the impossibility of slowing Turkish expansion.

The fall of Constantinople in 1453 was the culmination of Turkish power but, for the Magnanimous, this also pointed to the prophecies that proclaimed him as a future liberator of Christendom. However, he would never have enough power to undertake an open campaign, nor any of the hoped-for crusades against the Turks. Neither would the ephemeral domain over Kastellorizo, the islet off the coast of Anatolia seized by the Magnanimous in 1450 and held under Neapolitan sovereignty until 1522, be of use as a military or commercial outpost.

The main trading base in the Eastern Mediterranean was the island of Rhodes, seat of the Order of the Knights of Saint John of the Hospital, which had come under the orbit of the Crown of Aragon due to a large number of its members being from this kingdom, some of whom held leading posts in the government, including two Grand Masters, Antoni Fluvia (1421–1437) and Pere Ramon Sacosta (1461–1467). In reality, this made the island vulnerable to the Turks. The Hospitallers on Rhodes fought off a Turkish siege in 1480, but could not survive the next siege in 1522, after which Charles I of Spain and V of Germany offered them the island of Malta, until then linked to Sicily and consequently deeply involved in the trade and strategies of the Aragonese crown since the thirteenth century.

Alfonso’s policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and his military actions and privateering made him “dueño del mar” and gave him enough prestige to be able to arbitrate between the Turks and Cypriots, for example. However, the consequences of these actions, the requisitioning of vessels and even trading on his own account, often clashed with the interests of the Catalan commercial bourgeoisie, who continued to need the conditions that encouraged trade with the East. In Naples, Alfonso heard the complaints and demands from a Catalonia divided by political and social tensions. Before the Parliament held in Barcelona in 1454, Bishop Margarit praised the “nació catalana, qui per lo passat era temuda per les terres e les mars, aquella qui ab sa feel e valent espasa ha dilatat l’imperi e senyoria de la casa d’Aragó”, while he addressed the king in the name of “aquesta quasi vídua nació de Catalunya que per la sua innada jídelitat meresca de vostra majestat e de tot altre senyor ésser ben tractada”, thus reproaching the monarch for his protracted absence in Italy. It was Alfonso’s brother and successor, John II, who had to face the civil war that broke out in 1462 and that showed up social tensions and, notably, the confrontation of political discourses, because the representatives of the “land” (terra), sure of their representativeness, did not hesitate to remove the disobedient monarch, while the latter countered with his authority directly linked to and depending on God, with the backing of Pope Pius II.

The monarch won the long civil war that ended in 1472. However, there was then an outburst of legal and social conflicts in the countryside, the estates maintaining their discourse of representativeness and a serious economic upset. Within the Crown, Valencia, which had become the largest city in the Iberian Peninsula, had greater weight than Barcelona, while Catalan traders’ control over the distribution of oriental spices fell into French and Italian hands. At the same time, the activity of merchants-bankers, the adaptation to new markets and the power of the cities facilitated an economic globalisation—“la repubblica internazionale del denaro”—that enabled trade to continue in the Mediterranean in the early sixteenth century despite the adversities and which was coherent with the simultaneous maintenance of agricultural and industrial production and demographic attraction. However, as the century went by, the new oceanic routes grew in
importance, while instability from various causes increased in the Mediterranean, just when the eastern Catalan consulates were being closed.

From the end of the fifteenth century, the monarchy increasingly interfered in the consulates. The king’s aim was for them to play not only a commercial but also a diplomatic role and to seek equalisation between, and even a merger of, the Catalan and Castilian consulates, “a fin que todos los vasallos nuestros tengan y gozen de unos mismos privilegios”, leading for example, to the “consol de nuestras naciones de Spanya en Venecia”, as King Ferdinand V of Castile and II of Aragon stated in 1486. From 1479, he was the first monarch to wear both crowns, which is why he addressed the “consulibus mercatoribus tam cathalanorum et castellanorum quam etiam quarumvis aliarum nacionum horum nostrorum Hispanie regnorum ac aliarum subditorum nostrorum”.

The unification of the Peninsula was completed with the addition of Navarre in 1512 and delayed by the premature death of the Portuguese prince Miguel in 1500, which put back the incorporation of Portugal into Spain until 1580. These were dynastic unions that respected the institutions and characteristics of each territory, which is why the sovereign referred to “nuestros reynos de Espanya”. At the same time, starting in the same fifteenth century, the monarchs always referred to Spain (“sepa su sanctidat en lo que en Espanya gastamos el tiempo y el dinero”), spoke about the royal house of Spain and both they and those who addressed them summarised their long list of titles as king of Spain.

The continuity with the ancient Visigoth kingdom of Spain would be perpetuated through the Castilian title, as authors like Sánchez de Arévalo argued: “in regno quod hodie appellatur Castellae et Legionis resedit titulus et nominatius regnum Hispaniæ”. In any case, the political and fiscal structure of Castile granted the monarch great power over the noble fragmentation and tensions with the cities in the fifteenth century. Thus, just when the humanist intellectuals in both the Crown of Aragon and elsewhere adopted the Peninsula as a reference point, Castile claimed its teleological pre-eminence over the same. This pre-eminence was expressed in literary terms, and these displaced Catalan language and cultures, even in Naples after the accentuated changes in the court and its politics in the sixteenth century.

At the Council of Constance in 1417, the Spanish nation included the subjects of the kings of Portugal, Castile, Navarre and Aragon, to whom the Sards and Sicilians were added, and the protests of the representative of the first two were linked to the desire to leave the Aragonese king in a minority. The medieval monarchy, as such, aimed to add domains and lordships with their institutions and cultural traits, not to homogenise these. The Hispanic Crown accentuated this image in the sixteenth century, not only through its expansion in America but especially through its interference in Europe, where it controlled a veritable territorial axis from Sicily to the Low Countries. However, this did not impede a “definitiva hispanización y hasta castellanización de la Monarquia” given the line that was being imposed in the government of the whole entity.

In this context, the Spanish monarchy encouraged the practical dissolution of the Crown of Aragon by accentuating the individualised treatment of each of the territories (Aragon, Valencia, Catalonia, Sardinia, Naples, Sicily, as well as the Balearic Islands). In reality, this tendency was already occurring at the end of the Middle Ages through the social and institutional cohesion of the respective regional societies and the few common traits that could be provided by a monarchy limited in its access to the jurisdictions and fiscal power.

The generalised tension in Europe between the “gouvernement mixte” —or “mixed constitution”— inherited from the Middle Ages and the movement towards absolutist formulae encountered a specific scenario in the disparity between the peninsular territories that made up the Hispanic monarchy. In the Crown of Aragon, the oligarchies, now with little power to influence the monarch, called for the participative medieval model. This led to serious tensions with the central royal power, like the clashes in Aragon at the end of the sixteenth century or the rise in dialectic tensions that led to armed confrontation in Catalonia in 1641, where the representatives of the estates rejected the King of Spain as the sovereign over there territory, as Portugal also did. This led to a long war, the secession of Portugal and the submission and partition of Catalonia, the northern area of which
became part of France, as agreed in the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659.

The War of the Spanish Succession that broke out in 1700, culminating with the enthronement of the Bourbons in Spain, led an institutional homogenisation and a redesign of Europe that marked the end of the model created in the Middle Ages around the Crown of Aragon. Between 1707 and 1716, the so-called Nova Planta decrees abolished the representative institutions of the territories of the Crown of Aragon (Valencia, Aragon, Catalonia, Majorca) and imposed a new uniform model for Spain. At the same time, the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713–1715 split Naples, Sicily, Sardinia and the Balearic island of Minorca among others, from the Spanish crown.

The end of this stage showed that the Crown of Aragon created in the Middle Ages had left its imprint by bequeathing a political model and Mediterranean expansion to later centuries.

Empires: From the Contemporary Experience to the Conceptual Rediscovery of the Medieval Empire

In 1623, Francisco de Moncada published a book in Barcelona to re vindicate the fourteenth-century campaign by the Aragonese and Catalans in the Eastern Mediterranean, which was the “perdición y total ruina a muchas naciones y provincias, y admiración a todo el mundo”. The record of this memorable medieval past grew even stronger in the eighteenth century, precisely as a remembrance of the Catalan medieval past, where the spread over the Mediterranean had spurred economic revival, was expressed by Jaume Caremas when he wrote, “cuán floreciente fue la aplicación e industria, el comercio y la popularidad de Barcelona desde el siglo XIII hasta el XIV; como pudieron los reyes tomar las gloriosas empresas que hicieron en la España, Francia, Italia y Grecia”. The search for new models for the unity of Spain in the early decades of the nineteenth century also led to some sights being placed on the Crown of Aragon, idealised as a participative and plural model, and so considered ideal for the diversity of the Spanish state. As a proposal, it did not prevent a model of cohesion of Spain being adopted, one based on the continued pre-eminence of Castile, especially after 1875.

The European model based on independent states with a balance between them, symbolically established at Westphalia in 1648, and Rousseau’s recommendation in the eighteenth century for state structures to be based on nations rather than dynasties, led to the liberal movement gaining ground in the early nineteenth century. The nation-states that took over in that century had two concerns: to infuse the values of national unity among the population and compete for pre-eminence on the international stage. The medieval paradigm between a pope and an emperor was finally broken with the formal dissolution of the Holy Roman-Germanic Empire in 1806. In the new context, the leading rulers did not hesitate to proclaim themselves the heads of empires: Russia in 1721, France in 1804 and 1852 and Germany in 1871. The British colonial empire must also be added, with a formal imperial title to India from 1876, and the multinational Austrian empire from 1804, redefined as Austro-Hungarian in 1867. Spain also had its own empire built in the modern epoch mainly in America, as Salvador de Madariaga claimed much later, in the mid-twentieth century. From his conservative outlook, he defended the Spanish imperial work in America as full of human values and a brilliance that was the envy of the other nations, who would mount a veritable anti-Spanish conspiracy until it was destroyed.

Empire thus seemed to be the destiny of all upcoming nations. Even Catalonia, that, as a region of Spain, worked to recover its cultural identity, adopted a similar aspiration, as the politician and theorist Enric Prat de la Riba wrote in 1906: “Ja el nacionalisme català ha començat la segona funció de tots els nacionalismes, la funció d’influència exterior, la funció imperialista”. This pretended Catalan empire sought moral leadership of a longed-for economic and social modernisation of Spain. At the same time, the state empires in Europe grew in strength, a tendency that could only imply danger, as it led to confrontations with existing discourses of pre-eminence.

Imperialism was thus the bearer of an aggressiveness that responded, from Lenin’s reading of Marxism, to an economic and social strategy of concentrating production and monopolies. That was the culmination of the highest phase of capitalism, which explains imperialism’s
great responsibility for the outbreak of the Great War. This identification between capitalism and imperialism, with the serious consequences of destabilisation and social oppression, was part of the Marxist outlook throughout the twentieth century. Che Guevara warned about this in the 1960s, “el imperialismo ha sido derrotado en muchas batallas parciales, pero es una fuerza considerable en el mundo y no se puede aspirar a su derrota definitiva sino con el esfuerzo y el sacrificio de todos”.

This same conceptualisation has enabled the generalisation of the term empire, with uses that are more informal than institutional. This is shown by the bibliography from the second half of the twentieth century with titles like ¿Fin del imperio USA? In fact, after experiencing the Cold War as a conflict between two ideologically opposed empires, in the twenty-first century, Noam Chomsky could still reflect on “the post-9/11 world” seeing in it, “imperial ambitions” on the American side. A similar use could be projected historiographically over the past, referring to “feudal imperialism”, as a descriptor for the practices of accumulative territorial expansion during the Late Middle Ages.

In reality, since the last decade of the twentieth century, the nation-state model had not only been discredited by the demonstrable difficulty of building tolerant and prosperous governments but also especially because it had been overtaken by the accelerated evolution of societies. Globalisation meant intensifying exchanges, mobility, information and communication with the corresponding search for new social structures around citizenship, with a revision of traditional national, ethnic and religious identities. In this context, through the implementation of the Schengen Agreement in the 1990s, Europe broke with the model rooted in Westphalia and fed by the nineteenth-century nation-state discourses, and moved towards a world of shared sovereignty, with permeable frontiers and social mobility. The consolidation of globalisation has normalised interferences on all levels—economic, financial, political, humanitarian, solidarity—, a reflection of a world in which identities, cultural references, economic pressures and also decision-making in any field has little to do with national maps or even geographic locations. In attempting to propose adequate models to run this world of forcibly shared realities, many authors have turned their gaze back to the Middle Ages, where authority could not be exercised in any other way than by trying to fit together various levels of power defended by bearers of different degrees of representativeness, within an ideological, human, economic and cultural permeability that mixed general references with local concretions. So there has been talk of a new Middle Ages, not in any pejorative sense nor as a synonym of a society without control (as had been predicted in the 1970s), but rather by perceiving the relation between the current cyber-spatial society and medieval social homogeneity. The Middle Ages can supply references for running a polycentric society, characterised by the porosity of the frontiers, the fragility of geography, the communicability of space, the ambiguity of authority, the influence of supranational pressures, the trans-nationality of the elites, the versatility of legislations, the transfers between public and private property and the interference of beliefs with global pretensions. Thus, on entering the twenty-first century, the term ‘neo-medievalism’ has taken on a new meaning as a proposal for a political model. This is what authors like Guehenno or Waever had attempted to define before the end of the twentieth century as the concept of empire, combining unity and decentralisation, like the Roman, Persian, Carolingian, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires had done. As Kobrin wrote in 1998, “pre-modern refers to prior non-territorial modes of political organization: empire and medieval”. In other words, in this search for a model for the present, empire and neo-medievalism become synonyms, as Zielonka mentioned. Specifically, the challenges of defining a new model of government for Europe that adequately combines the different degrees of permeability and sovereignty means conceiving, in Irina Angelescu’s words, “the EU as a neo-medieval empire” to ensure its future, given that “one of the most pre-eminent features of a neo-medieval empire is flexibility and, in the long term, adaptation and survival”.

Thus, although leaning towards the generic formulations of political theorisation, empire and especially the medieval are again in a central and model position. This can only spur on knowledge of what the medieval empires really were.
Medieval Empires and the Crown of Aragon

Historiographically, since 1940 when Parry mentioned the Spanish empire in the sixteenth century, various authors, especially since the 1960s, have qualified the expansion of Spain and, to a greater extent, Portugal, in the modern centuries as imperial. As Hausser and Pietschmann recently remarked, the imperial vision in these modern political-territorial entities is rooted directly in the medieval theories of power, either to transfer ideas from the Holy Roman Empire to the other side of the Atlantic or, perhaps even more so, by the sovereign aggregating different degrees of domain over various spaces.

The Middle Ages are properly identified with a single empire, which, precisely to legitimate itself, sought the continuity from the Roman Empire with the blessing of the Church. It was the latter, after all, that had restored the empire in Western Europe, as well as the remaining Eastern Roman Empire around Constantinople. Despite this, the concept of “empire” that developed in Roman law in the Late Middle Ages was centred around the claims for the potestas regalis, the iurisdiction paired with the merum imperium. This use of the term imperium by the sovereign generated praise, like that from the above-mentioned Bishop Margarit who exalted “l'imperi e senyoria de la casa d'Aragó” before the Catalan Parliament or Courts in 1454.

This term refers to empires made up of a sum of very different territories under a single crown. In the Middle Ages, these sums of territories under a single ruler responded to processes of armed expansion or dynastic accumulation, and in both cases, the historiography has sometimes opted to qualify them as empires. The first case can be applied even to a common lordship, as in the case of Pisa between the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when it experienced “the Dream and the Reality of an Empire” while desiring “the creation of the ‘Mediterranean Empire’”, and it also is the more famous case of Venice after the thirteenth century, usually referred to as an empire by historians. The best-known example of the second case, based on dynastic accumulation, would be L'Empire des Plantagenêt (1154–1224). Martin Aurell, who awarded the imperial qualification to that case, in contrast, rejected it in more amorphous and less united sums, like the one that arose around the same time behind the projection of the royal house of Aragon and the county of Barcelona into the actual French Midi, which responded to a “conception patrimoniale plutôt que de programme impérial ou de construction d’un État”. Thus, he corrected Santiago Sobrequès who identified this sum as “l'imperi ultrapirinenc dels sobirans de Barcelona”.

In fact, in these medieval processes of accumulation, there was very rarely a programme that went beyond considering it honourable for the sovereign to accumulate titles and rights of different order. Thus, one can calibrate levels of domain before granting the historiographic qualifier of imperial. The various senses that this term can be defined by are contained in the many papers presented to the International Medieval Congress held in Leeds in 2014 that took the medieval empire as a special strand. Empire as a synonym of programmatic expansion could arrive from the consolidation of different monarchies at the end of Middle Ages, the reason why Horts Pietschmann could use the terms imperialismos or expansiones for the actions of France in Italy throughout the Anjou dynasty, Aragon in the Mediterranean under Alfonso the Magnanimous, Portugal in Africa and across the Atlantic under the Avis dynasty and Castile in its expansion under the Catholic Monarchs.

Among the recreational activities in the above-mentioned congress, one, on 8th July 2014, was devoted to “Recipes from a forgotten empire: a medieval feast from the Crown of Aragon”. In fact, there is a long tradition of referring to the Crown of Aragon as an empire, as Esteban Sarasa did when referring to the expansion by James 2 to Majorca and Valencia in the thirteenth century: “el llamado ‘imperio’ de Jaime I el Conquistador”. However, Ferran Soldevila specified that it was after these two conquests when the veritable “expansió imperialista” took place. The empire was thus identified with expansion in the Mediterranean, as Rovira i Virgili accepted. Mediterranean imperialism added to the political expansion and economic interests of the merchants, as Jaume Vicens Vives defined when identifying “la ruta de las especias como estructura fundamental del gran comercio barcelonès y base del imperialismo mediterráneo de sus reyes”. In this
sense, Vicens Vives valued the thirteenth-century expansion and understood that in the following century, Peter the Ceremonious led "el proceso de reconstitución imperial catalanoaragonés".

It was "l'imperi marítim català", according to Durliait and Pons. Similarly, Mario Del Treppo, even more explicitly depicting the vital importance of Mediterranean trade for the economy of the Crown of Aragon, could refer to it as "l'imperi dels mercaders catalans". David Abulafia's view was of an empire both economic and political under the orbit of the Crown of Aragon when he concluded that, given the failure of the Kingdom of Majorca, "no longer a buffer between France and Catalonia, the Balearics and Roussillon became advanced posts of assertive Mediterranean emperors seeking to extend their influence beyond Sardinia and Corsica to Sicily, Africa and the Levant".

Given the interests at stake, Pierre Vilar did not hesitate to interpret a very conscious imperial movement in thirteenth-century Catalonia: "Catalunya, Estat-nació excepcionalment precoç, dotada des del segle XIII d'una solidaritat interna i d'una consciència d'imperi, única sens dubte en aquella data". ["Catalonia, an exceptionally precocious nation-state, endowed with an internal solidarity and empire of empire since the thirteenth century, which is undoubtedly one of those dates."] In fact, Charles Emmanuel Dufourcq not only accepted that the Crown of Aragon created a commercial empire through different ways, which included political and economic pressure, but that it also initiated the imperialist methods of the later epochs. In contrast, it was the supposed programmatic aspect and posterior systematic actuation that raised greater distrust in Francesco Giunta regarding the imperial definition, because he saw an inability of the economic and military powers in the Crown of Aragon to really accept and force the creation of an empire. However, Henri Bresc did not discount that there was a political will in the House of Barcelona towards the universal empire, related to the sense of the medieval monarchy.

Thus, he and Geneviève BrescBautier had no doubts about placing Sicily “au coeur de l’empire d’Aragon”. Alfonso the Magnanimous’ acts in the fifteenth century could be considered as going further in this direction. When Amadeo Serra analysed the great hall Alfonso the Magnanimous had built in Castel Nuovo in Naples from the artistic point of view, he saw “una sala para el imperio mediterráneo de Alfonso el Magnánimo”. Momčilo Spremic’ had no doubt that in Alfonso the Magnanimous “tutta la sua politica orientale fu un misto di idee dei crociati e di mire alla creazione di un impero mediterraneo”.

Jerome Lee Shneidman consecrated the application of the imperial qualifier to the Crown of Aragon in 1970 with the publication of his vast study titled The rise of the Aragonese-Catalan Empire, 1200–1350. He was followed by Hillgarth, who emphasised the Catalan part in the title—The Problem of a Catalan Mediterranean Empire 1229–1327—but concluding that the expression was not valid. He wrote that "it seems unwise to use the nineteenth-century term ‘imperialism’ to describe a very different age; to suppose an attempt to make the Mediterranean a ‘Catalan lake’ reminds one more of Benito Mussolini than of the cautious James II”. In fact, what Hillgarth defined was the nineteenth century use of the term empire, but not in the sense that Bishop Margarit used it, as mentioned above, in the fifteenth century. Hillgarth himself concluded his reflection by emphasising the commercial, political and cultural links inherent in the expansion: “the success of Catalan as a Language mirrors the political and economic achievements (...) of the Crown of Aragon”. From these elements, Anthony Luttrell rebutted Hillgarth’s approaches to claim the Catalan empire as an example of a “late medieval Mediterranean empire”.

In 1995, Clay Stalls added another objection, not so much to the name as to the conceptualisation implicit in the historiographic treatment, given that he perceived a veritable Manifest Destiny in the way some Castilians and Aragonese approached the peninsular expansion over Islam: “For many Aragonese scholars—and for Castilians as well—the expansion of the Christian realms in Islamic Spain is a form of Manifest Destiny”. Against this, Catalan historians sought the same explanation in the expansion across the Mediterranean: “For Catalans the Reconquista, as the bedrock of Castilian hegemony over the Peninsula, is a non-question. Their form of manifest identity concerns Catalan expansion in the Mediterranean”. In truth, despite not using imperial denominations, from the
nineteenth century, the traditional Catalan historiography interpreted that its splendour was in its actions in the Mediterranean, but excluding the exploits of Alfonso the Magnanimous. This what Norbert Font argued in 1899 in a popular work republished various times in the first third of the twentieth century:

després del regnat de Jaume I semblava que la Confederació catalanoaragonesa havia arribat ja al pinacle de la glòria, però no fou així; la seva missió en la reconquesta ja havia acabat, però començà un nou desenvolupament que estengué la seva glòria per fora de la Península i féu que els nostres reis figuressin en la política d’Europa conquistant el tron de Sicília, humillant l’orgull de França, imposant el poder marítim de la confederació per tota la Mediterrània.

[After the reign of James I it seemed that the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation had already reached the pinnacle of glory, but it was not true; His mission in the recapture was over, but a new development began that extended his glory on the outside of the Peninsula and made our kings appear in the politics of Europe conquering the throne of Sicily, humbling the pride of France , imposing the maritime power of the confederation throughout the Mediterrànìa.]

School texts under the Spanish Republic in the 1930s taught that this prowess raised the country above the other European powers: “Catalunya estava cridada a ésser i, efectivament, ho fou, la primera potència marítima de la Mediterrània d’aquell temps”. Significantly, one of the schoolbooks from that epoch divided the history of Catalonia into five parts, titling the third L’Imperialisme català, dedicating it to “de Pere el Gran fins a l’extinció de la dinastia catalana”. These explanations even led Josep Trueta to claim Catalan expansion as a precedent for the British Commonwealth in The Spirit of Catalonia published in 1946:

During the fourteenth century, the power of the Catalans grew until they were the leading country in the Mediterranean. The flag with the four red stripes was the national emblem of a confederation of peoples which, allowing for the difference of time and experience, may be considered the only precedent of the modern British Commonwealth.

Curiously, this view has persisted, partly at a popular level. Until fairly recently, one could find popular works that defined the Crown of Aragon as a Catalan Mediterranean empire, imagining it as big as possible, as in a popular book published by Helena Drysdale in 2001: “Catalonia was the Mediterranean’s greatest medieval maritime power, with Barcelona ruling an empire that included not only Valencia but Southern France, Sicily, Malta, and much of modern Greece”.

Nevertheless, the collection of the territories under the same kings took the name of the royal dynasty, which is why the expression “Crown of Aragon” has been used since the Late Middle Ages. This facilitated confusion with the region that was the origin of the royal lineage, by summarising everything as Aragon. In his line-up of vanished kingdoms, Norman Davies devoted a chapter to Aragon, defined as “a Mediterranean Empire (1137–1714)”, but accepting that the basis for the expansion was “Catalonia’s commercial potential”.

However, the same expression for all the territories grouped together—Crown of Aragon—, could even be used to distort its historical sense in order to praise Aragon over the Catalan identity. That is what José Luis Corral did when he stated that only a crude manipulation by nineteenth-century Catalan indoctrinators had led to the belief that “la conquista del Mediterráneo por la Corona de Aragón” was an “empresa catalana”. This interpretation was far from scientific rigor but nevertheless, in the same visceral way it is expressed, it belongs to an ideological context that still, in the twenty-first century, continues to purport to base the cohesion of Spain on the arguments that gained strength in the last quarter of the nineteenth century around the Castilian identity, interpreting everything and anything that does not fit into the official discourse, even including the veracity of the historical narrative, as a danger to be fought. On this base, over the last decades of the twentieth century, some politicians and thinkers tried to strengthen the identity of such regions of the old Crown as Valencia and Aragon by encouraging popular distrust of Catalonia, which has muddied understanding of what the Crown of Aragon was and the name itself. Norman Davies has grasped the perception that the memory of the Crown of
Aragon and its expansion has become enmeshed in this debate about Spanish identity on the popular level: “Memories of the former Crown of Aragon have in effect been carefully compartmentalized. People remember only what they want to remember. They suffer from a lack of benevolent but impartial concerns; and quarrels can be easily provoked”.

However, the intense research into different fields and scenarios during the twentieth century has generated objective conclusions, as befits the scientific approach, that are not only fully agreed but widely disseminated. Thus, we can now see the Mediterranean and all the actors involved in it with their correct importance. So, one can nowadays refer to the expansion from the northeast of the Iberian Peninsula across the Mediterranean as an empire, with a historiographic significance as an unequal sum (in the legal and jurisdictional sense) of territories under the same sovereign. In fact, this is seen in the Late Middle Ages with the use of the Romanist terminology that interpreted the expression of the “l'imperi e senyoria de la casa d’Aragó”, not by chance repeated various times in this text. However, the beneficiaries of the expansion were not only the sovereigns, but also all the estates in the Crown, so portraying the real state of power in the Crown.

In any case, this was an unequal and disjointed sum. The starting point was a weak sovereign in the twelfth century presiding over the Kingdom of Aragon and the County of Barcelona, but unable to unify them. The expansion in the thirteenth century added Valencia and Majorca, but both territories maintained and reinforced their internal unity. After identifying the County of Barcelona with the whole Catalonia, this set of Iberian lands was defined in 1319 as the indivisible Crown of Aragon, but each of the regions became a unit in itself, constantly reducing the shared cohesion. The addition of Athens and Neopatras brought a distant domain, both feudal and commercial, that did not survive the fourteenth century. Sardinia meant a century of exhausting war that transformed the appearance of the island, and Corsica was a papal donation in the thirteenth century that led to a regional confrontation in the fifteenth and, finally, a failed possession. Sicily was added in 1282, but with its own king until 1409. A domain in the Aegean like Kastellorizo between 1450 and 1522 was little more than anecdotic. The unity of the territories was as minimal as Valla saw it in the mid-fifteenth century: “el reino de Cerdeña ha sido mal apaciguado y casi enemiga del nombre de Cataluña (...) ¿y qué decir de Sicilia, que apenas ha aprendido a estar sometid a un reino extraño?” Within the Sicilian orbit, Malta played an important commercial role, although it was ceded to the jurisdiction of the Hospitallers in 1522. Rhodes, precisely one of the main economic bases, did not even become part of the Crown of Aragon. A large part of the growth in Mediterranean trade was based on vessels in ports like Alexandria, Beirut and Ragusa, with no greater institutional presence than the Catalan consulates. Naples was not included until 1442, and from there, the outlook was especially towards Italy and the East. The rights over the kingdoms of Jerusalem and Hungary were seen to be sterile. The mid-fifteenth century appointment of a viceroy of Albania and the Balkan pretensions had little practical effect, not even during the brief period when the domain of the Tocco family over the Epirus region included an explicit recognition of the sovereignty of the Neapolitan King of Aragon. Catalan cultural and linguistic presence was the basis for part of the expansive prestige, although between the end of the fifteenth and especially in the sixteenth century, Castilian was gradually replacing Catalan as a language of prestige. The domain over the islands and the south of Italy lasted until the eighteenth century but as part of the Hispanic Monarchy, in which the Crown of Aragon as such was diluted from the sixteenth century onwards. Thus, the whole was not only scattered and diverse, but also barely synchronised and coordinated. However, in the Middle Ages, a large part of the discourse of the pre-eminence of the king was built on this basis, including references to both his military success and the prophecies about him as the saviour of Christendom; different strata of the nobility benefited from it; and, notably, the ruling elites were based on the Mediterranean trade. Thus, it was a complex and vital amalgam and, in a historiographic and almost literary sense, we can call it an empire, although it was, in any case, a singular Mediterranean empire. <>

The Existentialist’s Survival Guide: How to Live Authentically in an Inauthentic Age by Gordon Marino [HarperOne, 9780062435989]
Human beings are moody creatures, susceptible to an array of psychological setbacks, crises of faith, flights of fancy, and other emotional ups-and-downs. Soren Kierkegaard, Frederick Nietzsche, and other existentialists understood this well. Rather than diagnosing troubling moods as afflictions to be treated with pharmaceuticals, the existentialists believed that such feelings not only offer enduring lessons about living a life of integrity, but also help us discern an inner spark that can inspire spiritual development and personal transformation. To listen to Kierkegaard and company, how we grapple with these feelings shapes who we are, how we act, and, ultimately, the kind of lives we lead.

In *The Existentialist’s Survival Guide*, Gordon Marino, director of the Hong Kierkegaard Library at St. Olaf College—and boxing correspondent for *The Wall Street Journal*—recasts the practical take-aways existentialism offers for the 21st century, when every crisis feels like an existential crisis. From negotiating angst, depression, despair, and death to practicing faith, morality, and love, Marino dispenses wisdom rooted in the works of the existentialists on how to face life head on and still keep your heart intact, especially when the universe feels like it’s working against you and nothing seems to matter. Just as likely to quote Bob Dylan as Camus and Heidegger, Marino likes to call his book a first cousin of Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations. Not a step by step manual, per se, but a set of life-altering and in some cases, life-saving epiphanies, this powerful and personal book is a repository of existential prescriptions for living an authentic and upright life in an increasingly chaotic, inauthentic age.

INTRODUCTION

I want this to be an honest book. No disrespect to other scribblers and beekeepers of ideas, but honest in the sense that instead of serving up re-rehearsed intellectual history, I want to believe that I have absorbed and can pass along some wisdom from Soren Kierkegaard and other existentialists whom I spent much of my adult life studying. “He who studies with a philosopher,” the Stoic Seneca (4BC—AD65) tells us, “should take home with him some good thing every day; he should daily return home a sounder man, or on the way to becoming sounder.” The same holds for someone like me who has spent decades walking with Kierkegaard and those who followed him. Either I was made sounder or I was wasting my time. If the former, then I ought to be able to pass on a few nuggets of wisdom, and if the latter, then I should remain mum or restrict myself to simply charting the history of existential ideas.

Existentialism is a state in the union of philosophy, and philosophy is the love of wisdom—as opposed to knowledge—where wisdom might be understood as a pretheoretical understanding of how to live. At the end that was the beginning of this book, I started to feel that, neurotic as I am, I didn’t have anything worthwhile to impart, even secondhand. Yes, I know: there is nothing more irksome than an author writing about how hard it was for him or her to write their book. As though the word processor were Alepp! But when I first sat at the keyboard, the blank page put me on the canvas, or rather in bed. Personally speaking, the attempt to write has always seemed like a confrontation with the void inside me, with my own emptiness.

For all my blessings, I’m a relatively haunted human being. In fact, I would have to place myself on the rather miserable end of the spectrum. Clinically speaking, I am a card-carrying depressive. To be fair to myself, I have tried to be a kind person. At least since my borderline-criminal days, I have made substantial efforts to nurture the lives of my students and others, but I am no more a moral hero or sage than I am a contended individual who sleeps soundly and rises in the morning eager to embrace the promises of the day.

My aim in this book is to articulate the life-enhancing insights of the existentialists. And yet their shimmering genius aside, the cast of characters introduced in these pages do not have much better grades on the happiness or moral curve than I do. In truth, to a man and woman, the existentialists are a veritable cadre of neurotics. So, who are they—or me, their apostle—to pass along life prescriptions?

At this juncture, you would be right to prepare for an “on the other hand” or ”but still,” as in although I have undermined the very idea of this book, please read on! Well, you’re right: there is a ”but still,” for all my foibles and problems the existentialists, and Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) in particular, helped me to endure. At the risk of seeming histrionic, there was a time when Kierkegaard
grabbed me by the shoulder and pulled me back from the crossbeam and rope.

Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Dostoyevsky, and other existentialist thinkers faced life unblinkered and were nevertheless able to lead authentic lives and keep their heads and hearts intact. More than any other group of philosophers, they understood what we are up against in ourselves, that is, moods such as anxiety, depression, and the fear of death. Today, these inner perturbations are usually classified in medicalizing terms. But in their own inimitable, indirect manner, the existentialists remind us of another perspective on these and other troublesome emotions. In the pages that follow, I will try to recover those reminders.

—Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Dostoyevsky, and other existentialist thinkers faced life unblinkered and were nevertheless able to lead authentic lives and keep their hearts intact. —

I am sure there are readers familiar with that exclamation point of an expression “existential threat,” but unfamiliar with existentialism. For those who might be tilting their heads, asking, “What is existentialism?” a survey of the movement is in order.

—Existentialists have been perennially concerned with questions about the very meaning of life, questions that tend to come to the fore when we have become unmoored from our everyday anchorage. —

The existentialism that helped sustain me is personal in nature. Representatives of this approach think about existence from the inside out, from a first-person perspective. There is much dispute about the roster of this motley crew of thinkers. With the exception of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), who was the only one to accept the label and only for a short period at that, scholars cannot agree on an official muster list. For instance, I edited Existentialism: The Essential Writings, an anthology that included Albert Camus (1913-1960), who, for reasons to be discussed, seemed a no-brainer, and appears in virtually every such collection. Then I thumbed through David Cooper’s excellent Existentialism, only to learn that the venerable professor denies that Camus is an existentialist because “unlike the rest of our writers, it is not at all his aim to reduce or overcome a sense of alienation or separateness from the world.”

Strange, because I would have thought that the sheer attempt to articulate this sense of alienation would have been enough to warrant membership in the club.

Further complicating the issue, many of the writers classified under that heading did not in any way think of themselves as philosophers, even though for the most part you’ll only find courses on existentialism in philosophy departments. For instance, it would be fair to tab Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862), a contemporary of Kierkegaard, an existentialist even though he is rarely included as one in anthologies or course syllabi.

Though we are without a body of unifying creedal convictions, a set of themes links this diverse group of intellectual pirates. Existentialists have been perennially concerned with questions about the very meaning of life, questions that tend to come to the fore when we have become unmoored from our everyday anchorage. It has been argued that the roots of existentialism were planted as science began to displace faith in what Max Weber termed “the disenchantment of nature.” Blame it on Copernicus, who awoke humankind from the dream that the Garden of Eden sits at the center of the earth, earth at the center of the universe with God out there watching the play of human history as though in a theater. Another cause for existential head scratching was the emergence of nation-states in Western Europe, which brought with it the breakdown of the tidy feudal ordering of society, where everyone understood his or her place both in the cosmos and society.

In the modern era, periods of cataclysms have always been a boon to existentialism. Following the abattoir of the First World War, many turned to writers who grasped that life was not dictated by reason, to help them understand, or at least come to grips with, the madness. Interest in existentialism rocketed after World War II and the Holocaust, when humankind once again proved what it is capable of.

And yet, in the mid-twentieth century, at the same time that existentialism was gaining popularity, analytic philosophy ruled the roost in Anglo-American universities. This mode of inquiry developed on the back of logical positivism, a movement that began in Austria with Rudolf
Carnap and the conviction that any proposition that was not testable was not worth thinking about. Advances in formal logic also gave a fillip to this hard-nosed mentality, one that placed maniacal stress on logical form and clarity.

If we cleave to the biblical distinction between word and spirit, the spirit of the analytic philosophy was to cleanse philosophy of anything that smacked of metaphysics, unanswerable questions about the nature and foundations of being itself. So far as the fundamentalists of this school of thought were concerned, anything that could not be defined clearly was mumbo jumbo better left alone or to the poets.

I recall a graduate seminar at the University of Pennsylvania, a bastion of analytic philosophy in the early 1980s. Before the beginning of one class, our renowned professor read aloud a sentence from Kierkegaard, a sentence that will reappear more than once in the pages to follow. It is a sentence that encapsulates the leitmotif of this book: "The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation's relating itself to itself in the relation." Putting down the text, he chuckled and wondered aloud with a tinge of genuine pity, "How could any reasonable person take this spaghetti plate full of words seriously?" Even though I was a fledgling and largely closeted student of the Dane at the time, I couldn't deny that the spaghetti image was so compelling that even Kierkegaard might have cracked a smile over it.

If there was one judgment that united existentialists it was an antipathy toward academic philosophy, with the notable exception of Professor Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Though he took the equivalent of his doctorate in theology, Kierkegaard was never a professor. In fact, he expressed nothing but disdain for the academicians whom he perceived to be constructing castles of abstractions while living in doghouses next door. Kierkegaard dismissed professors as tapeworms who have nothing of their own to say, but feed off the thoughts of more creative spirits. The existential triumvirate of Sartre, de Beauvoir, and Camus were prolific authors who did not draw checks from universities. Nietzsche, the man who very early on resigned his position as a professor at the University of Basel and rightly said of himself, "I am not a man, I am dynamite," chided those with chalk in hand for their lack of courage and creativity, hurling insults like "conceptual mummifiers" at them.

There are at least two strands of existentialism. Existential phenomenology, one strand, has its taproot in epistemological worries about what we can and cannot know. It stems from the groundbreaking work of Jewish-German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). The epiphany that ignited phenomenology emanated from Husserl's teacher Franz Brentano (1838-1917). Brentano observed that, unlike objects in the material world, mental events—ideas, thoughts, and feelings—are intentional; they always refer to something beyond themselves. For instance, the image I have of the pine tree beside my window refers to something outside of consciousness. In contrast, the pine tree itself just is and does not refer to anything. Bluntly stated, ideas point to something where as things themselves, objects, just are.

But how can you be sure that external objects exist when all you can know is the impression and idea of those objects? After all, contact with the world is mediated by ideas and you can't get outside your ideas to check and see if they correspond to things in the so-called real world. This dilemma is what the philosophers call the "ego-centric predicament." In an end run around questions of this sort, Husserl developed phenomenology, a term that derives from the Greek word for "appearance." He implored us to remove our conceptual glasses and see the world afresh. His clarion call was "back to the things themselves." Husserl's intuition was to "bracket" the question of the existence of things and instead concentrate on delivering pure descriptions of the things themselves. After a fashion, Husserl bid us to glimpse the world as children again, without processing it through concepts. A devotee of Husserl, Sartre was both a philosopher in the traditional sense and a writer of fiction. In his novel Nausea, Sartre generates many examples of beholding the world à la Husserl, in its raw form. Midway in the book, Roquentin, the protagonist, is staring at the root of a nearby chestnut tree. Roquentin thinks to himself, "This root .. . existed in such a way that I could not explain it. Knotty, inert, nameless, it fascinated me, filled my eyes, brought me back unceasingly to its own existence ... I saw clearly that you could not pass from its function as a root, as a suction pump,
to that, to that hard and thick skin of a sea lion, to this oily, callous, stubborn look. The notion of a suction pump might help you grasp what all roots have in common but it does not explain the concrete particular in front of Roquentin, a particular that could be processed many different ways.

Because of his emphasis on concrete existence, Husserl earned a reputation as a for bearer of existentialism. Phenomenologists such as Sartre who followed him were riveted to the task of revealing the very structures of consciousness. In the thicket of his sometimes impenetrable tome Being and Nothingness, Sartre describes a man looking through a keyhole to spy on a woman. Suddenly the voyeur has the feeling that someone has come up behind him. In an instant, he is suffused by shame and immediately goes from feeling like a subject to feeling like an object, which, with some elaboration, Sartre assimilates as evidence that our being-with and being-for-others is an integral aspect of the structure of consciousness.

Heidegger and Sartre were prime practitioners of the phenomenological method, a method not always appreciated by their Anglo-American brethren. Here is an almost random and, believe it or not, relatively straightforward excerpt from Sartre's Being and Nothingness:

[C]onsciousness is an abstraction since it conceals within itself an ontological source in the region of the in-itself, conversely the phenomenon is likewise an abstraction since it must "appear" to consciousness. Sartre, who goes on in this manner for some six hundred pages, is claiming that consciousness is an abstraction because consciousness appears to itself as an object of consciousness. For my graduate school professors of the analytic persuasion, this sort of talk was, as Ludwig Wittgenstein put it, "language gone on a holiday." Now, existential phenomenologists might have replied to this insult by saying that the desiccated lingo of philosophical academe should get out of its straitjacket and take a holiday!

There is, however, another cadre of existential thinkers, to whom "existential" still implies attending to concrete existence who avoid floating off into abstract theories detached from reality. For the most part, the reflections in this book keep company with Kierkegaard, Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910), Fyodor Dostoyevsky (1821-1881), Miguel de Unamuno (1864-1936), Camus, and other literary exponents of the existential tradition. All else aside, the sheer ability of these writers to move the waters of language and their fierce engagement with the hurly-burly of real life provide a magnet for rapt attention and engagement.

Going back to the pre-Socratics (and still much alive in the dialogues of Plato), there has been an ongoing debate among the lovers of wisdom as to whether wisdom is best transmitted in the form of mythos, stories and poems, or in the form of logos, explanations and reason. As the reader will witness, the existentialists who inhabit the following pages delightfully combine elements of both poetry and reason. Most of the writers who have helped me to continue putting one foot in front of the other are logical enough, but tend to rely on stories to transmit their insights about how to live.

Soren Kierkegaard, the poet-philosopher or philosopher-poet of this book, possessed scintillating philosophical abilities; however, he primarily considered himself a poet in the Romantic tradition of a Goethe. For all the arguments Kierkegaard stitched into his sprawling authorship, he was more mythos than logos. Almost unique in detecting the question of how to deliver life-altering and -sustaining truths, Kierkegaard invented and practiced what he termed "the method of indirect communication."

Kierkegaard believed that when it came to the essentials in life—say, how to be a righteous and faithful individual—we have all the knowledge we need. Integrity demands many things, but it does not depend on acquiring new knowledge. If—as Bob Dylan teaches—you don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows, you surely don't need an ethics professor to teach you the difference between right and wrong. More than anything, what is required is a passionate relationship to our ideas—and even that sounds too flat, too abstract. This is where mythos comes in.

—Kierkegaard believed that when it came to the essentials in life—say, how to be a righteous and faithful individual—we have all the knowledge we need. Integrity demands many things, but it does not depend on acquiring new knowledge.—

Kierkegaard believed that ethico-religious communication, that is, communication that has to do
with our moral and spiritual lives, was not a matter of
conveying thought contents but of pricking
conscience, of augmenting care for the right things.
In one of his most poignant journal entries, penned
when he was a twenty-one-year-old on vacation,
the young Kierkegaard reminds himself, "Only the
truth that edifies is the truth for Thee." The hunger
for truth ought to be something more than
intellectual curiosity; it ought to be a hunger for
truths that build you up, that make you a better
human being, if not necessarily a happier
individual. At the peril of preaching, these are the
truths that we need to be true to for them to have
purchase on our lives.

—Your hunger for truth ought to be a hunger for
truths that build you up, that make you a better
human being, if not necessarily a happier
individual.—

Talk with people who identify themselves as
philosophers and within moments they will demand,
"What's your argument?" Plato and his teacher
Socrates believed geometrical proofs to be the
model for an argument. With existentialism,
argument often takes the form of a story or
description, in which you either see yourself or you
don't.

The great Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-
1776) conjured up mind-boggling puzzles that
philosophers have been trying to solve since his
death. And yet, at the end of the day, he was
content to leave these problems in his study to go
and play billiards as though the conundrums he
served up were nothing to lose sleep over. In
contrast, the existentialists, like the Stoics, regarded
philosophy as a way of life. They were deadly
serious about their ruminations.

Camus, for example, began his singular
philosophical treatise, The Myth of Sisyphus, with
these welcoming sentences:

There is but one truly serious philosophical
problem, and that is suicide. Judging
whether life is or is not worth living
amounts to answering the fundamental
question of philosophy. All the rest —
whether or not the world has three
dimensions, whether the mind has nine or
twelve categories — comes afterwards.
These are games; one must first answer.
Answer what? The question of whether or not life is
worth living. It is Shakespeare's, "To be, or not to
be?" A line down, the twenty-nine-year-old Camus
pokes a finger in the reader's chest, insisting that if
the answer is "life is not worth living," then we
should — well — kill ourselves. Camus describes life
as a collision between human beings who have an
innate craving for meaning and a universe that is
as indifferent as rock, utterly devoid of meaning.
No matter, Camus counsels that we should put the
revolver back in the drawer. Consciousness of
absurdity is worth the candle, for as Camus
pronounces, "There is no fate that cannot be
surmounted by scorn" or laughter.

The analytic philosopher Thomas Nagel offered a
rebuttal to Camus's philosophy of the absurd.
Judging Camus to be a mite hysterical, the
unflappable Nagel explains that the experience of
the absurd derives from the simple fact that we
humans are unique in our capacity to take two
different perspectives on our lives — the everyday
view in which we go about our business, and
another objective vantage point from which we can
look at our lives sub specie aeternitatis. From this
perspective, the workings of the world seem trivial,
much ado about nothing. Perhaps clad in corduroys
and with chalk dust on his pants, Professor Nagel
prescribes a dash of irony to dispel the disquieting
feeling of the absurd.

Again, unlike Hume and Nagel, the existentialists
don't quit their questions for a beer or a game of
backgammon. In his Two Ages, Kierkegaard
decrees that the objective thinker is actually a
suicide,' because we are actually spirits, and the
person who continuously strives to think about life
from a disinterested perspective systematically
chooses the self-interest that is the animating force
of his or her spirit.

As intimated earlier, the question of meaning is
paramount, both in general (as in what is the
meaning of life) and in particular. For instance,
later in this book, we will find Kierkegaard, writing
under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, reciting a
litany of objective facts about death, but then
grabbing the reader by the lapels and reminding
us that all the facts in the world won't offer a
glimpse into the meaning of what it means that I
will die. With this emphasis on the "I," the scribblers
once known for their berets and black attire, were
uniquely inside-out first-person thinkers. Thinking
from within the coordinates of my own existence
earmarks the existential point of view.
As the subtitle of this book indicates, authenticity is a common theme. Thanks, to some degree, to the ever presence of and pandemic addiction to social media, we live in an era in which appearances seem more important than reality. Today, there is little premium placed on being authentic. For example, I received an email from a friend who was ill and had to cancel lunch. At the bottom of the page were three boxes with alternative automatic responses: "Oh no. Get well soon." "Thanks. I understand." "I hope you feel better soon." In a dither, I scrolled down and tapped the first alternative but I was embarrassed to respond in such an inhuman, inauthentic manner.

Kierkegaard rarely used the term authenticity and it was not a virtue Nietzsche lionized. However, it is not surprising that in the late fifties and sixties authenticity and existentialism would become terms married to each other. After all, existentialists of almost every ilk stressed honesty with oneself, walking your talk, becoming your true self. Novels like The Catcher in the Rye, The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit, and Death of a Salesman attest to the fact that Americans felt as though Big Brother was watching over them in a disguised but powerful demand for conformity. For all our professed individualism, there was a persistent worry about being a phony, about selling your soul so you could land a job with a company that would put your body in the right kind of car.

In 1946, in the most widely circulated essay ever published on the subject, "Existentialism Is a Humanism," Sartre proclaims that for humans "existence precedes essence." Sartre explains that artifacts created by human design are constructed with an aim or purpose. The purpose is the essence of that thing. Sartre says, for example, take a pair of scissors. Scissors are made to cut. That is their essence. But with humans it is entirely different. Sartre has unshakeable faith that we were not created by God with a plan. So for Sartre, we are who we choose to be. We define ourselves by our choices, which, along with freedom, is another theme unifying the existentialists. Some philosophers have chided existentialists for being mere psychologists. There is a measure of truth to this accusation. They take moods and emotions much more seriously than most of the members of the American Philosophical Association. The pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus famously said "you can't step into the same river twice"—everything is in flux. Much of the wisdom found in Western philosophy is faceted to the task of forming an inner compass, of finding something that will keep us constant and steady as the outer and inner world continuously shifts.

For philosophers such as Socrates (469/470-399 BC), Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), and Immanuel Kant (1724—1804), reason is the compass, and moods threaten to distort our inner needle. Joy, depression, anxiety, and other affects imperil our inner stability. There are, however, philosophers who tip their caps to feelings. Aristotle (384-322 BC), who during the late—Middle Ages was referred to simply as "The Philosopher," maintained that the recipe for being a virtuous individual entails having the right feelings in the right measure at the right time. Hume, of the razor-sharp mind, believed it was the feeling of sympathy, not reason, that gave wings to our better angels.

And yet the existentialists do more than acknowledge the felt aspect of life. They concentrate on the emotions. Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre argue that moods like anxiety are conveyors of self-understanding. And for Kierkegaard, depression can instruct us in our powerlessness and total dependency on God. Rather than working to override troublesome feelings, the existentialists directly address the likes of anxiety, depression, envy, and guilt. As Sartre's essay notes, the intense focus on discomfiting feelings capable of bending the shape of our lives has invited critics to grouse that existentialism is too negative, too bleak.

Of course, most of us can be good Samaritans when it is nothing but green lights, but that is not how life usually goes. I once spoke with a young athlete who, crestfallen, confided that she had just been diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis. Much of her identity and her ways of coping with anxiety had been built around having six-pack abs and sweating it out. Not being able to push herself as much physically is not the end of the world, but she will surely have to struggle to sustain a kind heart in the midst of her anger, her disappointment, and the anxiety that she can no longer leave behind in the weight room.

Saint Paul spoke of the "groaning of existence." Our cast of thinkers recognize that our lives have
everything to do with how we absorb the inevitable blows of life.

Once again, the existentialism that was my lifeline is a first-person way of thinking. For that reason, it seems only appropriate to briefly describe the personal circumstances in which Kierkegaard and company became my walking partners.

—Saint Paul spoke of the "groaning of existence." Our cast of thinkers recognize that our lives have everything to do with how we absorb the inevitable blows of life.—

The Performance Cortex: How Neuroscience is Redefining Athletic Genius by Zach Schonbrun
[Dutton, 9781101986332]

Why couldn’t Michael Jordan, master athlete that he was, crush a baseball? Why can’t modern robotics come close to replicating the dexterity of a five-year-old? Why do good quarterbacks always seem to know where their receivers are?

On a quest to discover what actually drives human movement and its spectacular potential, journalist, sports writer, and fan Zach Schonbrun interviewed experts on motor control around the world. The trail begins with the groundbreaking work of two neuroscientists in Major League Baseball who are upending the traditional ways scouts evaluate the speed with which great players read a pitch. Across all sports, new theories and revolutionary technology are revealing how the brain’s motor control system works in extraordinary talented athletes like Stephen Curry, Tom Brady, Serena Williams, and Lionel Messi; as well as musical virtuosos, dancers, rock climbers, race-car drivers, and more.

Whether it is timing a 95 mph fastball or reaching for a coffee mug, movement requires a complex suite of computations that many take for granted—until they read The Performance Cortex. Zach Schonbrun ushers in a new way of thinking about the athletic gifts we marvel over and seek to develop in our own lives. It’s not about the million-dollar arm anymore. It’s about the million-dollar brain.

Excerpt: Last spring, I traveled to Dublin to attend the Society for the Neural Control of Movement’s annual conference, where I heard, on day one, a presenter elegize the recent passing of a dear colleague. "He was never happier than when he was descending electrodes into the spinal cord looking for a neuron," he said. "When he found one, he treated it like the first neuron he found." A lesson therein for us all. I myself was not sure what exactly I had descended into. One attendee, Elzbieta Jankowska, began her career stimulating the lumbosacral region of decerebrate cats more than half a century ago. Another claimed to be the "academic great-great-grandson" of Claude Bernard. One of the most decorated active researchers in the world, Tom Jessell, was there to discuss his work with mouse genetic tools. And me? I was there because of my wife.

She discovered the small blurb in my Columbia University alumni magazine about the two neuroscientists trying to work in Major League Baseball. I knew of sports psychology, mindfulness training, even brain gaming as a growing fad among professional franchises. But neuroscience seemed to represent a different level of sobriety. What were they looking for? What had they found?

I met Jason Sherwin at a dingy Jamaican buffet with a bright crimson awning in East Flatbush, across from the SUNY Downstate hospital where he was working. We still joke about the “mystery meat” served alongside collard greens and gummy plantains. We spoke for two hours as he related his life, his résumé, how he met Jordan Muraskin, how he envisioned their company as helping to usher in "Moneyball 2.0": biometric analytics, a priori probabilities, brain data. I wrote the story for the website SB Nation Longform, a now-defunct outlet for sportswriting’s deep cuts. But as I wrote it, I knew it was a sports article by its place of residence only. On the surface, the efforts by Jason and Jordan were intended to help professional baseball teams scout and improve hitters. But, to zoom out a bit, their endeavor seemed to be more like tracing the essential correlates of a skill. This skill could be anything that requires a rapid decision: passing to an open wide receiver, whistling a foul call, responding to gunfire after a report of breaking and entering. Those are outcomes, like the speed of a car as it zips down the highway. Jason and Jordan encouraged me to reconsider what is going on beneath the hood. Hitting a baseball, to take one of the more
straightforward outcomes, has been deemed "the most difficult thing to do in sport." Some might quibble about this, but those who do normally have not tried it. The most proficient hitters are hardly at all cut from the same cloth. The two front-runners for the Most Valuable Player of the American League in 2017, in fact, were a Venezuelan infielder standing five feet, six inches tall and weighing 165 pounds (Jose Altuve) and a Californian outfielder standing six feet, seven inches and weighing 282 pounds (Aaron Judge). We already know what distinguishes them; we can see it. So what relates them? What actually is responsible for their skill? Jason and Jordan wondered, and so did I, once I really started to think about it. It would seem to have nothing to do with their biceps muscles or fast-twitch fibers or even their vision, which for most baseball players is largely the same. It would seem to have much more to do with the neural signals that impel our every movement.

How do we move? A few people have looked into this. The Egyptians actually wrote of head injuries and movement disorders. Erasistratus and Herophilus explored the cerebella of fast-moving animals like deer and rabbits. Galen of Pergamon learned about the brain from tending to the wounds of the gladiators. The origin of movement had bewitched some of history's shrewdest minds: Alcmaeon, Plato, Aristotle, Posidonius, Al-Razi, Descartes, Newton, Franklin. When the brain's primary seat of voluntary action, the motor cortex, was finally discovered, by a pair of wayward Germans in 1870, the operation had been conducted on a dog sprawled across a dresser at the home of one of the men. The eureka moment howled from a living room in Berlin.

Since then, most of the motor research has been conducted more quietly. For some reason, the field does not seem to attract the attention given to clinical tales or the various meditations on our cognition, such as the neuroscience of self; the neuroscience of language; the neuroscience of dogs; the neuroscience of consciousness; the neuroscience of being a good parent. An Amazon book search on the phrase "neuroscience of movement" turned up a fuchsia textbook published in 1997 and scant other options. Part of the problem might be that the question of movement sounds old and elemental, the stuff of anatomy classes and collapsible polyvinyl skeletons. The other problem is that progress has been a bit slow. When I visited one neuroscientist, he was in the middle of crafting a rebuttal to a controversial interpretation of motor learning. The offending interpretation was made in 1951. A popular experimental paradigm in most motor research labs is called a "force-field adaptation task," which was first introduced in 1994. It replaced the reciprocal protocol task, born in 1954. Other techniques came and went. Theories appeared and disappeared like pimples. As I walked outside the conference hall at the Clayton Hotel during the NCM meeting, I scanned the bewildering titles on hundreds of posters, each being presented with hand waves and speeches in fast-forward by nervous postdocs. "All of this is going to change," said Jordan Taylor, a professor at Princeton, waving his own hand toward the rows. Maybe he was right. I hoped to capture it while it lasted.

I ordered a textbook called Principles of Neural Science. It arrived weighing almost 10 pounds, checking in at 1,760 pages. Skimming through it, I learned that it takes a tenth of a second to process everything we see; that a newborn infant is able to reflexively churn its legs, despite the fact that its spinal cord cannot yet transmit messages down from the brain; that visual inputs get siphoned into two streams, a "where" and a "what"; that the "where" stream is also sometimes called the "how" stream, and the "what" stream imbues our inputs with meaning; that the sense of touch on our fingertips is twice as bad at age 70 as it was at age 20; that the Behaviorists came before the Cognitivists. This was just Chapter 38. By now I had a book on my hands. The first person I called was neuroscientist John Krakauer, a silver-tongued polymath I had come across, haranguing a hapless science reporter about Michael Jordan and behind-the-back passes. "I think you just need to decide, what kind of piece do you want to write?" he told me. "Do you want to write about the motor system hunters and what they're beginning to learn, or do you want people to speculate about what makes these top athletes so good?"

I hung up the phone in a daze. All my life I had admired athletes, fantasized about being one myself, and in my professional life I had been
fortunate to get up close to many of the greatest. But one forty-minute phone call had irrevocably pierced my shroud of ignorance. All my life I had focused on the body. I realized now that my attention had been amiss. "It's like saying people who can speak French very well have a very dexterous tongue," Krakauer said. "It would be the wrong place to assign the credit."

As I proceeded to spend more time with Krakauer, and then with Adrian Haith and Daniel Wolpert and Emily Cross, Jörn Diedrichsen, Andrew Pruszynski, Doug Crawford, Dagmar Sternad, Bob Kirsch, Daniel Laby, and many others, a clearer picture of the story I wanted to tell began to form. Readers of this book might be surprised not to find much discussion of two popular and seemingly relevant topics: genetics and concussions. There are more than enough books devoted to each of those subjects, and more undoubtedly on their way. Instead I endeavored to stay faithful to an area that had been, in my opinion, woefully underserved: the motor system. I would focus on the men and women, contemporary and across history, who have devoted their lives to understanding how the motor system produces the performances we watch and adore.

The narrative would remain anchored by the baseball diamond, to that purest of athletic exchanges, when a batter stands at the plate awaiting a pitch. All along, I, and millions of others, had cared solely about the infinite possible outcomes that could result from that confrontation, rather than the infinitesimal interactions in the four-tenths of a second in between. It was time to give those milliseconds their due.

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Updated fully, this accessible and comprehensive text highlights the most important theoretical, conceptual and methodological issues in cognitive neuroscience. Written by two experienced teachers, the consistent narrative ensures that students link concepts across chapters, and the careful selection of topics enables them to grasp the big picture without getting distracted by details. Clinical applications such as developmental disorders, brain injuries and dementias are highlighted. In addition, analogies and examples within the text, opening case studies, and 'In Focus' boxes engage students and demonstrate the relevance of the material to real-world concerns. Students are encouraged to develop the critical thinking skills that will enable them to evaluate future developments in this fast-moving field. A new chapter on Neuroscience and Society considers how cognitive neuroscience issues relate to the law, education, and ethics, highlighting the clinical and real-world relevance. An expanded online package includes a test bank.

Excerpt: The fourth edition of this book, although extensively revised, retains the spirit, organization, and many of the features of the first three editions. Like the earlier editions, it provides a systematic introduction to the neural basis of mental function. It includes state-of-the-art research from experimental work performed with humans and animals, as well as findings from clinical populations. The goal, as before, is to provide a balanced, synthesized, and integrated view of what we know both about the brain and about cognition. Simultaneously, the text aims to provide these views in accessible prose that will excite
students to think critically about the potential of cognitive neuroscience to yield new insights.

While the entire text has been revised and updated, two sets of major changes are especially notable. First, the content of the book has been modified in line with the changing nature of the field. The introductory chapters have been reorganized to provide an integrated overview of the nervous system at both cellular and neuroanatomical levels in Chapter 1, followed by a new chapter on the historical development of cognitive neuroscience (Chapter 2). Two new chapters have been included, one on Social Cognition (Chapter 13) and another on Cognitive Neuroscience and Society (Chapter 17). The inclusion of these chapters reflects rapid expansions in new research in these subfields combined with awareness of the need for cognitive neuroscientists to address questions of societal interest. In addition, material on hemispheric specialization from prior editions has been integrated with coverage throughout the text, rather than parcelled into a separate chapter as in prior editions. Second, the book has been revised to make the content more accessible to students. It has been rewritten to focus on major concepts and to present them, and the experiments that support them, in a way that makes the critical ideas clear to students without bogging them down in detail. Finally, recognizing the importance of visual elements in learning, the four-color art program has been completely revised with an expanded set of figures in every chapter.

In addition to these major changes, every chapter has been thoroughly updated to reflect current findings in the fast-growing field of cognitive neuroscience. While the current edition still includes findings from traditional methods, such as the study of brain-damaged patients, which have provided foundational knowledge to the field, we pay special attention to the integration of findings from a variety of newer approaches, including transcranial magnetic stimulation, diffusion tensor imaging, multi-voxel pattern analysis, and studies examining functional connectivity. Throughout, our intention is to provide students with a thorough and solid grounding in the basic principles and findings of cognitive neuroscience, tools that they can then use to further understand applied and clinical problems.

Text Organization and Features
The book’s soul remains very much the same as in the first three editions, as the following main features have been retained.

The book provides a systematic survey of the neural bases of a wide variety of mental functions
The overall organization of the book is divided into three main sections: fundamentals (Chapters 1-3), neural bases of specific mental functions (Chapters 4-13), and broader applications (Chapters 14-17). The first part of the book, comprising the first three chapters, provides students with a basic foundation for the exploration of cognitive neuroscience. The first chapter provides information about the basic parts and divisions of the central nervous system and the fundamentals of neural transmission. This chapter may be unnecessary for students who have already completed a course in physiological psychology, but will be of use to students who have not. The second chapter outlines the historical milestones in the development of the field, with special attention to methodological and conceptual developments that advanced the field in different eras. The third chapter acquaints students with the myriad of burgeoning techniques, both standard and novel, that are available to scientists and clinicians in their quest to understand the neural bases of mental function.

The second part of the book, Chapters 4 through 13, provides a survey of the neural bases of mental function, with each chapter devoted to a distinct mental function. The chapter topics discussed are, in order, motor processes, early perceptual processing, object recognition, spatial cognition, language, memory, attention, executive function, emotion, and social cognition.

The last part of the book, comprising the last four chapters, examines broad-based applications in cognitive neuroscience, including development, aging, clinical syndromes, and the interface between neuroscience and society. Instructors may view these chapters as more discretionary than earlier ones, in the sense that they cover more advanced issues. In our teaching, we’ve found that these advanced, applied, and clinical issues are of special interest to many students, as they find it very rewarding to use the knowledge that they have gained earlier in the text to approach these
broader applications. Chapter 14 examines mental conditions such as schizophrenia, depression, anxiety disorders, and substance abuse from a cognitive neuroscience perspective. Chapter 15 examines neural plasticity from a lifespan perspective, including developmental changes during childhood, adolescence, and aging. In addition, it discusses recovery of function in children and in adults, and the neural bases of developmental disabilities. Chapter 16 examines syndromes that are characterized by generalized cognitive disorders (rather than the more localized and specific disorders discussed in Chapters 4 through 13), including closed head injury, dementia, demyelinating diseases, and epilepsy. Finally, the text ends with Chapter 17, Cognitive Neuroscience and Society, which critically examines the ways in which cognitive neuroscience knowledge can be applied to domains of broad societal concern such as education, social inequality, the law, and morality.

The sequence of the chapters is designed for progressive learning. The chapters have been carefully sequenced so that information in later chapters builds upon information in earlier ones. Notably, the processes most linked to motoric and sensory functions are presented earlier, and those that depend on more integrative aspects of brain function, such as executive function and emotion, are presented later. For example, the chapter on object recognition directly precedes that on spatial processing, so that the student is introduced to the ventral and dorsal visual processing streams in consecutive chapters. The chapter on memory is preceded by the language and object-recognition chapters so that the distinction between generalized memory disorders and the "memory" problems that are specific to certain domains (e.g., anomia in language or agnosia with regard to objects) is clear. Yet, despite the intentional progression of ideas across chapters, chapters are written to be self-contained so that instructors may alter the order of material depending on specific syllabus needs.

The book is designed to actively engage students in the process of learning. Most chapters begin with an opening case history to pique the students’ interest and preview issues that are discussed later in the chapter. For example, the opening case history in Chapter 4 discusses how Muhammad Ali’s boxing career led him to have a Parkinsonian disorder, and the opening case history in Chapter 16 discusses the mental decline of Marie’s maternal grandmother due to dementia. The text is written in a conversational tone rather than in a technical style, to grab the students’ interest and retain it. We use analogies extensively so that difficult conceptual issues can be presented in a tractable manner. Each chapter includes an "In Focus" box that explores in depth a specific applied issue in cognitive neuroscience, helping students to see the implications of research for everyday life.

To keep students oriented to terminology, key terms are introduced in boldface and defined in a glossary at the back of the book. Chapter summaries allow students to review the material learned or preview what is to be discussed, and outlines at the beginning of each chapter provide a clear conceptual structure of the contents. All these features are designed to make this book as user-friendly as possible.

State-of-the-art knowledge in the field is presented without sacrificing accuracy or oversimplifying the material. As researchers who maintain highly active and visible research programs, we are in a position to ensure that the book contains not only a discussion of the "classic" findings in the field, but also the cutting-edge portion of our knowledge. Never, however, are students overwhelmed with a laundry list of findings or with overly technical arcane issues. Rather, representative studies are used to highlight the nature of current debates, so that students can understand, and think critically about, the conceptual issues under consideration and how researchers attempt to reason based on experimental evidence. Our extensive work in both research and teaching in cognitive neuroscience allows us to present issues in a manner that is precise and sophisticated, yet also accessible and integrative.

WHAT’S NEW IN THIS EDITION
While the approach of the prior editions has been retained, this fourth edition has nevertheless been extensively revamped. The main new additions are as follows.
The use of an integrated four-color art program
With this edition, we have thoroughly revised the art program, emphasizing systematic depiction of information across the figures, so as to enhance students’ ability to understand the material. All figures from earlier editions have been redrawn, and many new figures have been added. Some figures highlight regions of the brain so the reader can quickly see "where" and "what" in the brain are important. Other figures present data from representative studies in the field, so that students can gain experience in viewing and interpreting data; still others depict important experimental paradigms so that students can quickly grasp how a key study was conducted.

Addition of two new chapters
Two chapters have been added to the text to reflect growing areas of research over the last decade. A new stand-alone chapter covering social cognitive neuroscience (Chapter 13) is now included due to the burgeoning growth of research in this area. In the previous edition of the text, this material was relegated to a relatively short section of the chapter on Emotion. The new Social Cognition chapter addresses how new knowledge from neuroscience expands our understanding of how we perceive the mental states of other people, categorize people into social groups, and control our behavior to align with social norms.

In addition, completely new to this edition is Chapter 17, Cognitive Neuroscience and Society. This chapter, which concludes the book, covers issues of broader societal significance to which the field can speak. For example, the chapter addresses research on how laypeople view neuroscience research, what neuroscience may add to our understanding of the effects of social inequality on development, and how neuroscience knowledge is being used in criminal justice settings. As students of cognitive neuroscience enter a wide range of professions, such as law, education, and business, it is crucial for them to be able to critically evaluate what neuroscience can and cannot add to discussions of issues in these arenas.

Extensive updating of the material to incorporate the acceleration of knowledge in the field
The field of cognitive neuroscience continues to explode with new discoveries. As a result, all of the chapters of the book were extensively rewritten to incorporate this vast amount of additional knowledge, which is reflected in hundreds of new references from studies using diverse methodologies.

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The Heart Is a Shifting Sea: Love and Marriage In Mumbai by Elizabeth Flock [Harper, 9780062456489]

"Elizabeth Flock takes us on an intimate cruise on the shifting sea of the heart, in the best book set in Bombay that I’ve read in years. Flock’s total access to her characters, and her highly sympathetic and nonjudgmental gaze, prove that love and literature know no borders. Easily the most intimate account of India that I’ve read, and of value to anybody
that believes in love and marriage."—Suketu Mehta, author of Maximum City

"This remarkable debut is so deeply reported, elegantly written, and profoundly transport ing that it reads like a novel you can't put down. It's both a nuanced and intimate evocation of Indian culture, and a provocative and exciting meditation on marriage itself."—Katie Roiphe, author of The Violet Hour

In the vein of Behind the Beautiful Forevers, an intimate, deeply reported and revelatory examination of love, marriage, and the state of modern India—as witnessed through the lives of three very different couples in today's Mumbai.

In twenty-first-century India, tradition is colliding with Western culture, a clash that touches the lives of everyday Indians from the wealthiest to the poorest. While ethnicity, class, and religion are influencing the nation's development, so too are pop culture and technology—an uneasy fusion whose impact is most evident in the institution of marriage.

The Heart Is a Shifting Sea introduces three couples whose relationships illuminate these sweeping cultural shifts in dramatic ways: Veer and Maya, a forward-thinking professional couple whose union is tested by Maya's desire for independence; Shahzad and Sabeena, whose desperation for a child becomes entwined with the changing face of Islam; and Ashok and Parvati, whose arranged marriage, made possible by an online matchmaker, blossoms into true love. Though these three middle-class couples are at different stages in their lives and come from diverse religious backgrounds, their stories build on one another to present a layered, nuanced, and fascinating mosaic of the universal challenges, possibilities, and promise of matrimony in its present state.

Elizabeth Flock has observed the evolving state of India from inside Mumbai, its largest metropolis. She spent close to a decade getting to know these couples—listening to their stories and living in their homes, where she was privy to countless moments of marital joy, inevitable frustration, dramatic upheaval, and whispered confessions and secrets. The result is a phenomenal feat of reportage that is both an enthralling portrait of a nation in the midst of transition and an unforgettable look at the universal mysteries of love and marriage that connect us all.

Excerpt: Nine years ago, at the age of twenty-two, I moved from Chicago to Mumbai in search of adventure and a job, knowing no one in the city. I lived there for nearly two years. During that time—because I was restless and homesick—I stayed with half a dozen couples and families across the city and met many more. This is where my interest in the Indian love story began.

In Mumbai, people seemed to practice a showy, imaginative kind of love, with an eye toward spectacle. Relationships were often characterized by devotion, even obsession, especially if two people could not be together. This kind of love played out on the movie screens, but it was also deep in the bones of India's stories, in the Hindu scriptures and the Bhakti and Sufi devotional poems. I was young, and drawn to the drama.

It was also a kind of love I admired, because it seemed more honest and vulnerable than what I knew. My parents divorced when I was very young, and after watching my father's two subsequent marriages fall apart, I thought that perhaps this devotional quality was what they'd been missing. When I arrived in Mumbai after my dad's third divorce, the city seemed to hold some answers.

Out of all the people I met in Mumbai, three couples stood out from the rest. I liked them because they were romantics and rule breakers. They dreamed of being married for seven lifetimes, but they didn't follow convention. They seemed impatient with the old middle-class morals. And where the established rules for love did not fit their lives, they made up new ones.

I began asking them questions about their marriages. I had no defined goal at first. Eventually, though, I quit my job at an Indian business magazine to write about them, drawn in by their love stories. I wanted to write about them to understand how their marriages worked.

The American journalist Harold Isaacs, who chronicled Asian life in the mid-twentieth century, once complained that Americans had only a few impressions of Indian people: as exotic (snake charmers and maharajahs), mystical (holy men and palmists), heathen (cow and idol worshippers), and pitiful (leprous beggars and slum dwellers). Isaacs
was writing fifty years ago, but it seems that not much has changed since. The same tired stereotypes are still trotted out by Westerners. With a country as large as India, it is tempting to oversimplify. And in Mumbai, City of Dreams, it is easy to overromanticize.

In reality, India is too big and diverse for generalities. It is home to a sixth of everyone on Earth and a bewildering array of languages, religions, castes, and ethnicities. And Mumbai is an unpredictable city. I was reminded of this when I returned five years after my accident and found things were not as I remembered.

At home in Washington, DC, I had regularly questioned whether I was fit to write a book about Indian marriages. I wasn't Indian or married. But as the years passed, I saw that the book I wanted to read about India—that I wanted Americans to read about India—did not exist. Ultimately, I decided to approach the subject the only way, as a reporter, I knew how: to go back to Mumbai armed with a dozen notebooks, a laptop, and a recorder.

When I landed in Mumbai in 2014, the city, save for its skyline—which had more malls and high-rises—looked much the same. The people I knew did not. Their marriages did not. They were calling old lovers. They were contemplating affairs and divorce. And the desperate attempts they were making to save their marriages, by having children, in at least one instance, were efforts I recognized from my own family.

Within each couple, one partner had begun dreaming of a different life while the other was still moved by old ideas. Where before their love stories had dazzled me, now they struck me as uncertain. I tried to make sense of what had changed. "Cities don't change," an editor in Mumbai told me with a sigh. "People do."

It was not just them. Indian historian Ramachandra Guha said that India is undergoing not one, but multiple revolutions: political, economic, urban, social, and cultural. In Europe and America, these revolutions were staggered. In India, these changes in cities and in people are happening all at once. And they seem to be upending the Indian marriage.

Nowhere are these shifts happening faster than in Mumbai, India's most frenetic city. And in no part of society is it causing more pain than among India's middle class, which does not have the moral freedom of the very rich or very poor. Certainly, for all three couples I followed, the opinions of family, friends, and neighbors mattered very much. People will talk was a phrase I often heard when I asked why they didn't do what they wanted.

That, and: What you dream doesn't happen. And yet I found our conversations would often end in dreaming, as they spoke of hopes for a bigger house, a better job, a trip to Kashmir, getting pregnant, falling in love again, or moving somewhere far away. Or they spoke of how their dreams had been deferred but would surely someday belong to their children.

This is a work of nonfiction. I began writing it when I first met these people in 2008, but the bulk of the reporting was done when I returned to them in 2014 and 2015. For months, I lived, ate, slept, worked, and traveled alongside them. We mostly spoke in English, though sometimes in simple Hindi. They spoke in both languages and others among themselves.

I was present for many of the scenes detailed in these pages, but the majority that took place in the distant past were reconstructed based on interviews, photographs, e-mails, text messages, diary entries, and medical and legal documents. I interviewed each couple separately and together, formally and informally, over hundreds of hours.

Even when I was not in India, we spoke constantly. So much that their intimate world in Mumbai often felt more real to me than my life in DC or New York. Despite the vast physical and cultural distance between us, it felt as if we were still in the same room. It was rare that I did not hear from one or several of them every day, often in a flood of messages: recent medical reports; news of a fight at home; photographs of children clowning around before bed.

All the names of the people I wrote about in this book have been changed to protect their privacy. The names I've used were either chosen by them or are analogous in some way to their real names. In India—as in many places—names carry meaning.

In all instances, I have favored the Hindi, Urdu, Arabic, and other foreign-language spellings that the people use themselves. I have also used the
English translations of the Quran, Mahabharata, and other religious and sacred texts that they keep at home.

This book could not have been written without the generosity of these three couples. In Mumbai, people will discourage you from saying thank you, but I am enormously grateful for how they opened their homes and their lives to me, even when it did not make them look good or wasn't easy. I hope that this book honors their trust in me.

In the end, these are three love stories among millions. I cannot pretend that they represent the whole of India, of Mumbai, or even of the city's contemporary middle class. But, as a well-known Dushyant Kumar poem says, it is when pain grows "as big as a mountain" that walls quake, foundations weaken, and hearts change. I am certain these couples are not alone in their pain, or in their dreaming. <>

Oklahoma Winter Bird Atlas by Dan L. Reinking (University of Oklahoma Press)

Beautifully illustrated with color photographs, maps, graphs, and tables, the Oklahoma Winter Bird Atlas offers ornithologists and amateur birders alike a wealth of easy-to-read information about the status of bird species in Oklahoma. A companion to the Oklahoma Breeding Bird Atlas, this landmark volume by biologist Dan L. Reinking provides a detailed portrait of more than 250 species, from the oft-spotted Red-tailed Hawk, Dark-eyed Junco, and Northern Flicker to the rarely seen Blue-headed Vireo, Cassin's Finch, and Verdin.

The atlas—one of the first of its kind for winter birds—uses a combination of species accounts, grouped by scientific order, and illustrations to provide a systematic inventory of winter bird distribution across Oklahoma's counties. Each species account includes a photograph of the featured bird in winter plumage, along with a brief description outlining the times of year it appears in the state, its habitat, its distribution across the state's counties, and its behavior. Maps indicate surveyed locations in which the species was spotted, while charts and tables further describe the bird's abundance.

The data compiled in Oklahoma Winter Bird Atlas represent the work of more than 75 volunteers who conducted bird counts in both early and late winter for the George M. Sutton Avian Research Center. The data span five winters, 2003 to 2008, and 577 blocks of land. Comprehensively researched and thoughtfully presented, the Oklahoma Winter Bird Atlas will prove an invaluable resource for evaluating trends in bird populations that change over time due to such factors as urban expansion, rural development, and climate change.

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Reinking is a biologist at the George M. Sutton Avian Research Center in Bartlesville, Oklahoma. A birder since age twelve, he is president of the Oklahoma Ornithological Society.

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For a variety of reasons likely including interesting territorial, courtship, nest-building, incubation, and chick-rearing behaviors, the obvious importance of nesting habitat to reproduction and population size, and perhaps even the more pleasant seasonal weather, studies of bird distribution using atlas
methodology have thus far taken place largely during the nesting season.

Reinking in Oklahoma Winter Bird Atlas says that as the first Oklahoma breeding bird atlas project wound down, he and the other staff members of the George Miksch Sutton Avian Research Center were considering future projects, they proposed to conduct a similar survey instead focused on winter bird distribution in Oklahoma. Bird distributions that change over time can change in the winter season as well as in the nesting season, and such changes may be important to understanding population trends.

In brief summary of some of the survey results, the most widely distributed species was Red-tailed Hawk, which was recorded in 551 blocks (over 95 percent of surveyed blocks). Dark-eyed Junco, Northern Flicker, American Crow, Northern Cardinal, and American Kestrel were also among the most widely distributed species. The type and intensity of stratified random samples used in this project are most effective for detecting species of high to moderate distribution and abundance, but this survey effort was clearly intensive enough to pick up a number of species of very limited winter occurrence in the state such as Blue-headed Vireo, Cassin’s Finch, Lewis’s Woodpecker, Woodhouse’s Scrub-Jay, and Verdin. Not surprisingly, there were also a few species known to have very limited distribution in the state that surveys did not record, including Bushtit, Pinyon Jay, and Red-cockaded Woodpecker. As is typical of any large-scale effort to get skilled observers in the field and reporting their observations, several unusual (outside of normal winter range) records were unearthed, including a Green-tailed Towhee and Gray Catbird in central Oklahoma, a Sage Thrasher and Rufous Hummingbird in the northeast, a Say’s Phoebe in the southeast, and a Pyrrhuloxia and Blue-gray Gnatcatcher in the southwest.

While the distribution maps included in the species accounts were the main objective of this project and were gathered through carefully designed, standardized surveys to ensure that the data were robust and the methods repeatable, Reinking also recognized that having skilled observers in the field provided an opportunity to collect additional data that, while less structured, could still be of value. Two types of additional data were collected: (1) Because atlas survey blocks selected for sampling represented only about one-twelfth of Oklahoma’s total geographic area, all or parts of many of Oklahoma’s major reservoirs did not fall within the boundaries of survey blocks. This could have led to an incomplete picture of the distributions of many water-bird species (such as ducks, gulls, grebes, etc.) from the survey block data. To help overcome this limitation, observers were asked to visit Oklahoma lakes and record the aquatic-associated species present. These lake surveys were a voluntary side project and therefore varied in number and location each winter, but about 100 water bodies were surveyed at least once during the five years of fieldwork, and nearly 80 species were recorded. (2) Many species with very local distributions or that occur in only small numbers are not well recorded with atlas-style surveys. A list of such species was provided to project volunteers and staff, with a request that sightings of these species anywhere in the state be reported, along with any more-common species that were found outside their normal range.

Additional objectives for the project included evaluating year-to-year variations in distribution and abundance of irruptive species, and looking for any changes in distribution from early winter to late winter in cold-sensitive species. Mountain Bluebird, Pine Siskin, Purple Finch, Red-breasted Nuthatch, and Townsend’s Solitaire all showed strong patterns of year-to-year variation in their frequency of occurrence.

Beautifully illustrated, this landmark volume offers a wealth of easy-to-read information. Comprehensively researched and thoughtfully presented, the Oklahoma Winter Bird Atlas will prove an invaluable resource for evaluating trends in bird populations that change over time due to such factors as urban expansion, rural development, and climate change. <>

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