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The cities of current global image capitalism and their urban formation, of historical globalized nationalism, as well as significant examples of the four major kinds of nation-states, just over two centuries ago. The national transformation of cities has focused on the urban center of the nation-state, its capital, which is the object of this study. Mostly pre-national cities of different kinds were changed into national cities, but sometimes nation-states built new cities for themselves. Nation-states arrived at their chosen capitals along different historical pathways and after long or short, rough or smooth journeys. These historical experiences left enduring marks on each capital city.

Nationalism and nation-states were part of a much larger epochal change, the rise of modernity as a new historical era, rejecting authorities and institutions of the past (inner-worldly ones above all) and trying to create new societies, new cultures, a new world. The national and the global first met in this context, as global nationalism. Major meeting-places of this encounter were the national capitals, which now had to adapt to global models of a capital `worthy of the nation', taking in the avenues of Second Empire Paris, the infrastructure of London, in some places the Mall and the Capitol Building of Washington.

Nations developed and changed, and the constitutive elites of nation-states were faced with popular challenges from the ascendancy of originally subaltern classes, ethnicities/races and gender groups. Occasionally these challenges were strong and successful enough to create distinctive popular moments of power, manifested in urban history. National struggles for power could take extreme and violent forms, not only destructive and ephemeral, like wars and riots, but also, for a time, forms cemented in the capital city, which we shall also look at.

In recent times the global has taken center stage, first in the form of global, transnational capitalism. To a recent contemporary authors, the national is on the verge of becoming an extinct species, particularly in big cities. We shall consider those claims, skeptically but seriously, trying to disentangle the intertwined dynamics of the global, the national and the local in the new style of globalist urbanism, of verticality, novelty and exclusivity. At the very end we shall venture a glance into the future of our four forces.

Underlying my interest in the choreography of the urban, the national, the popular and the global are old analytical interests in forms and relations of power and in meanings, ideology and symbolic forms. Cities affect us by their spatial structuring of social relations and by their provision of meanings of social life. This might be urban power, but cities in the nation-state era are not actors of power of the same weight as the national, popular and global forces. Cities of our time had better be approached as manifestations and representations of power. Our main research question here is: What kind of power does the urbanity of the capital cities under investigation manifest and represent?

The study is global and historical, from the first national capitals, revolutionary Paris and Washington, D.C., up to today and the flamboyant new capital of Kazakhstan, Astana. But it is, of course, neither an encyclopedia of the capitals of the world nor a world history of power. It deals with a set of significant examples of the four major kinds of nation-state and national capital formation in the world, with some historical moments of power change and with how capitals of the different national types have had to confront the challenges of popular and global moments.


Why are cities centers of power? A sociological analysis of urban politics. In this brilliant, very original survey of the politics and meanings of urban landscapes, leading sociologist Göran Therborn offers a tour of the world’s major capital cities, showing how they have been shaped by national, popular, and global forces. Their stories begin with the emergence of various kinds of nation-state, each with its own special capital city problematic. In turn, radical shifts of power have impacted on these cities’ development, in popular urban reforms or movements of protest and resistance; in the rise and fall of fascism and military dictatorships; and the coming and going of Communism. Therborn also analyzes global moments of urban formation, of historical globalized nationalism, as well as the cities of current global image capitalism and their variations of skyscraping, gating, and displays of novelty.

Through a global, historical lens, and with a thematic range extending from the mutations of modernist architecture to the contemporary return of urban revolutions, Therborn questions received assumptions about the source, manifestations, and reach of urban power, combining perspectives on politics, sociology, urban planning, architecture, and urban iconography. He argues that, at a time when they seem to be moving apart, there is a strong link between the city and the nation-state, and that the current globalization of cities is largely driven by the global aspirations of politicians as well as those of national and local capital.

With its unique systematic overview, from Washington, D.C. and revolutionary Paris to the flamboyant twenty-first century capital Astana in Kazakhstan, its wealth of urban observations from all the populated continents, and its sharp and multi-faceted analyses, Cities of Power forces us to rethink our urban future, as well as our historically shaped present.

Excerpt: This is a book about meetings and relationships between four social forces: the urban, the national, the popular and the global. We shall be watching how they meet and how they change the urban habitat during the lifetime of the national, up until now. The urban is old: cities have existed for thousands of years, but they have been transformed by the arrival of the national in the form of nation-states, just over two
This has been a project long in coming, arising out of free time in Budapest in 1996, as the incumbent of a temporary European Chair of Social Policy at the ELTE University and many times interrupted by seemingly more urgent obligations. It was initially inspired by a history of the city’s Heroes’ Square. A first study analyzed the processes and symbolic transformations which turned major dynastic residence cities of Europe into national capitals. Due to a couple of editorial mishaps it was published only in 2002. Then I managed to get some funding (from two now-defunct Swedish public research funds, FRN and HSFR, and from the INTAS of the EU, also passed away) and to link up with urbanist colleagues of various disciplines from all over the world, resulting in a series of joint regional publications. As always, my research is the product of an individual craftsman, not an industrial output by a factory of research assistants.

Without original intention, this book has become part of a tetralogy of global studies, which started with Between Sex and Power: Family in the World, 1900-2000 (2004). It was followed in 2011 by The World: A Beginner’s Guide and in 2013 by The Killing Fields of Inequality.

For me this book has been an immensely stimulating and enriching learning experience, one which included, of course, the opportunity to visit the cities treated here. Critical analyses of power more often make one angry than happy. But I do hope that I will be able to convey also something of the excitement at learning about cities and their diversity in time and space.

During this long process, I have piled up an enormous debt of gratitude. My wife, Sonia Therborn, has accompanied me on most of my often-strenuous urban explorations since she retired from clinical psychology (and often before) and has transferred her sharp psychological eye onto urban anthropology, enlightening a myopic macro-sociologist.

Cities and Power

Cities emerged as concentrations of power, and of wealth, some five thousand years ago. Lewis Mumford once defined a city as a ‘point of maximum concentration for the power and culture of a community,’ and later began his list of ‘chief functions of the city’ with ‘to convert power into form’. Cities now contain more than half of humankind; power and wealth are reaching unprecedented degrees of planetary concentration. At the dawn of planetary urbanization, understanding the inscriptions of power in our built urban environment is not only a scholarly, but, even more, a civic imperative.

Despite Mumford’s declarations, power has slipped out of the grasp of mainstream urban history and social science more often than not, or it has been relegated to the past. After the Baroque, Mumford’s own interests veered to technological and economic change. A recent (and good) collective work with the seductive title Embodiments of Power both starts and stops with the Baroque. Leonardo Benevolo’s monumental History of the City makes the European revolutions of 1848 a divide between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘post-liberal’ city, but Benevolo loses most of his interest in power after 1848. The late Sir Peter Hall presents a cultural axis in Cities in Civilization, but his Book Four on the ‘urban order’ is not very concerned with the political order.

The great historian-cum-sociologist Charles Tilly was a sharp critical analyst of power, but a resolutely materialist network structuralist with little interest in meaningful forms, whether of cities – which he mainly saw as sites of capital concentration - or of states. He never grasped, or thought important, the difference between Baroque, absolutist, dynastic states and states of nations, with their national capitals. In his view, after Charles V’s imperial abdication in 1557, ‘nation-states began to get priority’, particularly after 1700.

Synergetic encounters of political theory/history and urbanism have been few and fragile enough to allow the great urbanist, Peter Hall, to get away - twice or thrice, first in 1993, then in 2006, with a paperback repetition in 2010 - with the following typology of capital cities:

1. Multi-function capitals
2. Global capitals
3. Political capitals
4. Former capitals
5. Ex-imperial capitals
6. Provincial capitals
7. Super capitals

With all due respect, this list reminds me of a list of animals which Michel Foucault, without citation, claimed Jorge Luis Borges had excavated from an ancient Chinese encyclopedia, according to which the animal kingdom comprised the following types:

- a. belonging to the Emperor
- b. embalmed
- c. tamed ...
- d. sirens
- e. fabulos ...
- f. innumerable ...
- g. which from afar resemble flies

In the currently prevailing urban discourse, power is submerged in conceptions of economic nodality, certainly a legitimate and important research topic in itself - but with city power measured by the zip codes of major corporations and/or business services firms. For all its other merits, which are many and have been deservedly applauded, this approach has two limitations in a context of cities and power. Its economism leaves out the power manifestations of the urban built environment itself. Even the most imaginable capitalist city is not only business offices and their connections to business offices elsewhere. Second, the political economy conception of world/global cities seriously underestimates the power of states in the current world.’ After all, this is a world where the latest US president (Barack Obama) has been at war for the whole of his two terms of office, longer than any president in US history, making war in seven different countries of the world.’

The analytical framework deployed here - forms of state formation and their consequences, combining structural and symbolic perspectives on the city, identifying and exploring moments of major historical urban change worldwide - does not seem to have been used before. But no claim to originality is made with regard to studying power dimensions of contemporary cities. Apart from the vast monographic literature, which will be referred to repeatedly below, there are a number of distinguished comparative contributions. As
Furthermore, we shall analyse urbanistic Communism as an threat, i.e., at fascism and apotheosis of national elite power under perceived popular the same or similar social roots. Here we shall look into the Political power can, of course, take many different forms, from a supremacy of economic power. clearly a different kind of political power; the latter m excluded from the nation coming out of the rise of social and political forces once the historical national elites. One is a p relationship to prevailing capitalism.

Modern processes of urban power form a quadrangle of competing actors and types of influence. In one corner is political authority - national and/or urban - identifying the character of which is a major aim of this study, with variable powers and resources of design and regulation; in a second corner is capital, global as well as national, with economic power and resources of design and ‘development’; third, there are the classes of privilege, with their desires, fears and resources; and finally, there are the popular classes, with their grievances and their capacities of resistance and of change.

We begin with the national elites’ political power, emerging from the welter of nation-state formation. In this macroscopic global analysis, the national elites will be approached through the specific contexts of nation-state construction and the latter’s relationship to prevailing capitalism.

Then we shall look into two types and two eras of challenges to the historical national elites. One is a popular challenge, coming out of the rise of social and political forces once excluded from the nation-making process. The other is a global challenge of non-national forces and issues. The former is clearly a different kind of political power; the latter may posit a supremacy of economic power.

Political power can, of course, take many different forms, from the same or similar social roots. Here we shall look into the apotheosis of national elite power under perceived popular threat, i.e., at fascism and kindred military dictatorships.

Furthermore, we shall analyse urbanistic Communism as an enduring radical popular challenge to historical elite rule, and into post-Communism as a new kind of political power.

After World War II there was concern with democratic versus non-democratic architecture and urban design, especially in West Germany.” This is here taken into account, but it would not work as a master distinction, given the fact that most of the nation-states of the world for most of the 225 years covered in this book were non-democracies.

Popular political power has asserted itself in different ways: in access to institutional power, as in ‘municipal socialism’, welfare-state cities or, recently outside Europe, in city governments by middle-class coalitions with the urban poor, but also in successful protest moments: stopping the ravages of the ‘Car City’ in the North Atlantic of the late 1950s to 1970s and, even more recently, in a spate of urban revolutions - or better called, given their basically ambiguous (but always non-working-class) social character, extra-constitutional regime changes. It may also make up bargaining power in cities where public participation in urban planning and development is recognized.

Capital cities are by definition sites of political power. But popular challenges mean that they are often also sites of resistance, of political counter-power, of protest rallies and headquarters of opposition movements, parties and trade unions.

Most of the constitutive national elites were capitalist or pro-capitalist, and their imprint on their nation and its capital is duly taken into account. But there is also the raw economic power of capital and wealth outside political channels. This - economic - is the second source of power we have to pay attention to. It operates in two major ways in our story. One is its imprint on the spatial layout and on the patterning of buildings, and most specifically through skyscrapers. The other refers to the urban exclusivity of wealth and economic prosperity, as manifested in gating and private cities of the privileged.

At some level, all systems of political power need representation, in the sense of public display. Power needs public representation to be recognized, respected, awed or admired, in order to be obeyed and followed. A new reign of power is publicly and ceremoniously inaugurated. Secondly, modern nation-state power (in particular) needs representation in order to give direction to the self-identity, thoughts, beliefs, memories, hopes and aspirations of its citizens. This is the second function of monumentality, as well as of flags, coca-colas, symbolic pins, public banner slogans and rhetorical addresses to the nation.

Economic power as such needs no representation; money is force enough in itself. Many times it is wiser to let it operate in the dark rather than in broad daylight.’ Corporations and capitalists often want to display their wealth, though, and to bask in admiration of their buildings.

‘Representation’ has a connotation of intent, which would be much too narrow a perspective for what we are trying to do here. Basically, our interest is in manifestations of power. Representations make up an important part of the latter, but there are also power manifestations through ignorance, neglect or rejection of certain areas or parts of the population, and there are power manifestations of order and disorder, of competence and incompetence. <>
Radioactivity: ‘Eminently Noxious’

In 1979, and thus several years after the Situationist International’s dissolution in 1972, Guy Debord remarked in a letter to a correspondent that ‘the Situationist International is like radioactivity: it’s scarcely ever mentioned yet traces of it can be found almost everywhere, and it lasts a long time.’ Today, one could reply that the group and its practices are now spoken of a great deal, and perhaps to the detriment of their corruptive aspirations. The Situationist International’s anti-art stance has been canonised into the pantheon of art history, the group’s techniques of ‘psycho-geography’ and déroutement have become established cultural tropes, and Situationist material is now a staple of both the bookshop and the lecture-hall. This contemporary endorsement does, however, stand in marked contrast to the reception that first greeted Debord and the Situationist International’s work. For example, in 1966, Strasbourg University found itself at the centre of a national scandal, as the entirety of its Student Union’s funds had been used to print 10,000 copies of the Situationist tract ‘On the Poverty of Student Life’. The text denounced the university as an institution, railed against the quiescence of students and their faux radicalism, and called for the total, revolutionary transformation of society as a whole. Its virulence led the judge presiding over the Union’s subsequent closure to direct the following, memorably damming remarks at the students who had organised its publication:

... these five students, scarcely more than adolescents, lacking all experience of real life, their minds confused by ill-digested philosophical, social, political and economic theories, and perplexed by the drab monotony of their everyday life, make the empty, arrogant, and pathetic claim to pass definitive judgements, sinking to outright abuse, on their fellow-students, their teachers, God, religion, the clergy, the governments and political systems of the whole world. Rejecting all morality and restraint, these cynics do not hesitate to commend theft, the destruction of scholarship, the abolition of work, total subversion, and a world-wide proletarian revolution with ‘unlicensed pleasure’ as its only goal. In view of their basically anarchist character, these theories and propaganda are eminently noxious. Their wide diffusion in both student circles and among the general public, by the local, national and foreign press, is a threat to the morality, the studies, the reputation and thus the very future of the students of the University of Strasbourg.

Rather different judgements seem to be passed upon this material today. Not only have Debord and the Situationist International been firmly embraced by the academia that they once denounced: in addition, the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs has actively supported the dissemination of Situationist texts as a means of promoting French culture overseas, and in 2009, the French State bought an archive of Debord’s work for the nation. This acquisition, which was conducted in order to prevent its sale to Yale University, resulted in the archive’s installation in the Bibliothèque nationale de France. To predictable consternation, this required the President of the Bibliothèque to dub Debord’s work a ‘national treasure’, and it prompted Nicolas Sarkozy’s minister of culture to describe Debord as a ‘great French intellectual’. What was once a ‘threat’ had thus become a ‘treasure’. This transition might lead one to ask whether any ‘radioactive’ or ‘noxious’ elements still remain within this material. Such a question bears direct relation to the familiar problematic of ‘recuperation’: a term that the Situationist International used to denote the neutralisation of radical material through its incorporation into the culture that it once challenged. Unsurprisingly, those who would defend the group’s political and theoretical legacy have often made reference to the concept of recuperation; after all, one can now buy ‘Situationist’ t-shirts and mobile phone applications, and references to Debord and the Situationist International pepper the contemporary discourses of art, popular culture and the press. Yet however apposite it may be, recuperation is also a potentially problematic concept. Stressing the contrast between the original, radical purity of Situationist material and its contemporary appropriations can foster a degree of protective reverence that jars with the Situationist International’s rejection of their own revolutionary fetishisation (‘mythological recognition’ on the part of their ‘feeble admirers’ was typically denounced by the Situationist International in the harshest of terms). There is, however, a further dimension of the concept of recuperation that seems pertinent here: one that can help to explain the important connections that should be drawn between Debord and the Situationist International’s dismissal of such reverence on the one hand, and their notions of ‘spectacle’ and ‘spectatorship’ on the other. This, however, requires a few initial, explanatory remarks.

Time and Spectacle

According to the interpretation that will be advanced within this book, Debord’s concept of spectacle cannot be fully understood if it is treated independently from his views on time and history. To put this very briefly, as a more detailed account will be provided later: time, for Debord, exists independently of humanity; history, however, is specific to human beings, as it corresponds to humanity’s existence in time, and to its awareness of that existence. For Debord, human beings are capable of shaping and determining their own lives and circumstances. Consequently, history, in his view, is something that can be made: we can consciously shape our own existence in time. History, therefore, is not just a retrospective catalogue of events for Debord, and nor is it just the discipline of studying such events. Instead, it is a process through which human agents shape themselves and their world, and through which they come to know themselves through such activity. In this regard, Debord’s most famous work – 1967’s The Society of the Spectacle – is best understood as a book about history. Or, to put that more precisely: it is a book that describes a society that has become detached from its capacity to consciously shape and determine its own future.
Debord’s basic claim in The Society of the Spectacle is that modern society has become characterised by a passive, contemplative attitude towards the conduct and results of its own activity. This is because activity within this society is conducted in tacit accordance with the requirements of an effectively autonomous economy. However distinct and opposed they may seem, practically all areas of life, and all social and political institutions, now operate as elements of a single biopolitical order, which serves, in Debord’s view, to regulate and manage lived activity in a manner that allows the capitalist economy to continue operating. In his theoretical work, Debord describes this as a condition in which human subjects have become dominated by their own creations: they live within a social order that they have created, but which ultimately rules them. Society has thus become characterised by a state of separation from its own history. Life has become alienated from those who live it, and historical time now unfolds as an object of detached contemplation. Consequently, for Debord, we have become ‘spectators’ of our own lives: mere observers of a historical existence that we could, potentially, consciously shape and direct. Or, as he put it in 1961:

History (the transformation of reality) cannot presently be used in everyday life because the people who live that everyday life are the product of a history over which they have no control. It is of course they themselves who make this history, but they do not make it freely or consciously.

This condition of separation is conceived in terms of the subordination of human agents to their own powers and capacities, which have become alienated and localised within the various institutions and formations that compose the governing social order of spectacular society. Because these are the very same powers that alienated individuals might use to shape their own lives, the task of the modern revolution, for Debord, was to reclaim and employ them: to take charge not just of the means of production, as in classical Marxism, but of the means of collectively producing and directing life as a whole. Such a revolution could not be content with a more equitable rearrangement of the existing social system. Instead, the Situationists’ unabashedly utopian goal was to infuse lived experience with the passion, creativity and imagination that had previously only been articulated within the cultural realms of art and poetry. For the Situationists, whose political goals had developed from their early concerns with avant-garde art, the modern revolution would afford a ludic, creative relation to lived time: art would cease to function as a means of representing and commenting upon life, and would instead become one with life itself. This would be achieved through using society’s previously alienated technological and creative powers to consciously create the ‘situations’ that compose lived time. Within modern society, they claimed, all such situations are dull, rationalised components of the spectacular social order; the all-encompassing revolution that the Situationist International envisaged would, however, afford a social existence within which these moments of experience would take on more festive qualities. This would result, according to Debord, in a ‘new historical life’, wherein those currently ‘estranged from history’ would be able to directly ‘live the historical time’ that their own social activity creates: to thus shape their own collective experience, and to thereby make their own history.

The emphasis that has been placed here on the importance of time and history within Debord and the Situationist International’s work may sound a little strange to those who have been introduced to their ideas by Anglophone academia. Within the latter context, the Situationist International is often treated as a group of artists, and Debord is frequently discussed as if he were a media theorist. Yet whilst the Situationist International certainly emerged from the milieu of avant-garde art and culture in the 1950s, they went on to reject their status as an art movement in the strongest terms (‘there is no such thing as Situationism’, they stressed, ‘or a Situationist work of art’); and whilst Debord’s spectacle does indeed pertain to the adverts, images and entertainment to which it is commonly reduced, his theoretical work has a far broader and more ambitious scope than those reductively media-centric readings would allow. Such readings are, in fact, directly undermined by statements made within the very first chapter of The Society of the Spectacle, where we are explicitly told that the ‘mass media’ is only the spectacle’s ‘most stultifyingly superficial manifestation’.15 The typical reduction of Debord’s thought to a diatribe about modern society’s visual culture is thus quite wrong. Greater purchase on his ideas can be gained if we focus instead on the manner in which he describes the spectacle as a ‘paralysed history’: as an ‘abandonment of any history founded in historical time’, and as ‘a false consciousness of time.’

Rather than presenting a simple complaint as to the functional importance of the media and mass entertainment within modern capitalism, Debord’s theory describes a society that has become separated from its own historical agency. Debord’s concept of spectacle is also often reductively identified with modern capitalism. This is hardly surprising, given that he clearly presents the society of the spectacle as a moment in the development of capitalist society. However, and as we will see later, Debord also indicates that the dynamic of separation described above is much older than modern capitalism. Society’s complete colonisation by capital and the commodity had simply generalised that dynamic, bringing it to an extreme, and thereby rendering it the defining feature of the age. Therefore, the problematic of spectacle (the alienation of collective power and agency) can be distinguished, to some degree, from modern capitalism’s complete actualisation of that problematic, and can also be ascribed to other forms of separated power. Hence Debord and the Situationist International’s attribution of the term ‘spectacular’ to religion, dogma, political leadership, etc.; hence also Debord’s indications that ‘all separate power has been spectacular’, and that ‘at the root of the spectacle lies the oldest of all social specialisations, the specialisation of power’. What is at stake here, therefore, is not just a rejection of capitalism and commodification per se, but rather a much broader concern with the alienation of historical agency. In Debord’s view, such alienation could not be fully superseded, within the modern period, through the destruction of capitalism alone, but only through the abolition of all forms of hierarchy, separation and representative leadership.

Contentions such as these can help to explain the Situationists’ concerns that the Situationist International itself might become a spectacular figurehead (hence their rejection of, and contempt for, their own ‘pro-Situ’ admirers). They can also help us to
address their attendant pursuit of non-hierarchical forms of political organisation (one cannot 'combat alienation', they claimed, 'by means of alienated forms of struggle'). Furthermore – and to return now to the points with which we began – they also serve to cast the notion of recuperation in a slightly different light.

This is because the issues described above lend themselves to a profound concern with the separation of theory from practice. Given that the ultimate aim of revolution was a condition of self-determinate engagement with lived time – and given also that spectacle was ultimately identified with the deprivation of such a temporality – bodies of putatively radical theory that stood removed from concrete praxis were themselves considered to be instances of spectacle. This is because such theories could only function as representations of the praxis that they purported to facilitate; as constructs that might appear to articulate and express radical agency, but which in fact serve to arrest it, by virtue of their separation from that agency's actualisation. This is why Debord warned, in typically prescient fashion, that if his 'critical concept of spectacle' were to be removed from the 'practical movement of negation within society', then it too would become 'just another empty formula of sociologico-political rhetoric', serving only to 'buttress the spectacular system itself'. Perhaps needless to say, this bears obvious relation to the Situationist International's transition from a 'threat' to a 'national treasure'. It also implies the following points.

If recuperation means a collapse into spectacle – and if spectacle essentially means a state of separation from praxis – then recuperation occurs whenever radical potential is diverted away from its actualisation, due to its having been identified with a static construct that serves to merely transfix such potential agency. This certainly pertains to the piles of Situationist t-shirts, academic conferences and books that have accrued around Debord and the Situationist International's work, and indeed to its contemporary cultural endorsement. Yet more importantly, it also relates to any perspective that would view this material as being possessed of some kind of timeless truth. For Debord, radical theory should be akin to strategic theory, insofar as both are required to intervene within changing contexts. If it is not superseded once the moment in which it sought to intervene has passed, but instead remains in place – perhaps due to its prominence and celebrity – then theory becomes dogma, and praxis gives way to spectacle. Hence the following lines, taken from Debord's 1978 film, In Girum Imus Nocte et Consumimur Igni:

> Theories are only made to die in the war of time. Like units of varying strength, they must be sent into battle at the right moment; and whatever their merits or insufficiencies, they can only be used if they are on hand when they are needed. But they have to be replaced because they are constantly being rendered obsolete – by their decisive victories even more than by their partial defeats.

Theories are thus attempts to clarify a given moment. Their task is to afford an understanding of a political and economic landscape, to provide insight into the forces ranged upon it, and to thereby further the work of those that would hasten its passage into the past. Clearly, any such theory can only be properly valid within the context that it seeks to articulate, and cannot be arbitrarily imposed upon other contexts. Therefore, just as no general would use the same plans in each and every engagement, so too would it seem problematic, if one treats this material on its own terms, to transpose Debord and the Situationist International's fifty-year-old analyses onto our own present circumstances.

Consequently, rather than contending, with some enthusiastic commentators, that 'never before' has Debord's theoretical work 'seemed quite as relevant as it does now', a sympathetic reading of this material might instead focus on the sense in which it explicitly invited its own supersession. If one did indeed set out to identify the more critical and antagonistic dimensions of this material, and to thus ascertain whether any 'noxious' and 'radioactive' elements still remain within it, then there would seem to be some virtue in attempting to address the notions of time, history and praxis that support it. This is because they drive this body of work's impetus towards opposition and intervention, and indeed towards the generation of new, more contemporary theoretical positions.

This book is intended to serve as a contribution towards the study of those foundational conceptions of temporality and praxis. It will try to draw out the conceptual mechanics and philosophical framework that support Debord's work, and which motivate its demands for intervention within the 'war of time'. To that end, it will pursue the following goals.

**Temporality, Hegelian Marxism, and a Philosophy of Praxis**

Firstly, and primarily, this focus on time, history and spectacle will be used as a means towards developing a holistic reading of Debord's oeuvre. The contention that motivates this goal is that temporality is absolutely crucial to Debord's thought, and that many of the more seemingly disparate aspects of his work can be illuminated by attending to their shared bases in this concern. Doing so can also serve to highlight elements thereof that tend to be overlooked. As we will try to show, such an approach can provide a means of addressing the aesthetic, strategic, ethical, ontological and epistemological dimensions of his work, which exist alongside and inform its more obvious and celebrated components. Of course, it would be a mistake to develop a philosophical system from the work of a writer who rejected all such systems, but treating Debord's work in this manner can nonetheless reveal it to be a far more substantial, considered and coherent body of thought than might otherwise be supposed.

Addressing Debord's work in this manner involves reconstructing, and thereby evaluating, his Hegelian Marxism. This is an aspect of his work which is also often referred to within the extant literature, but which has seldom been addressed in great detail. That neglect is a serious problem: for as Debord put it in a letter to a correspondent, 'one cannot fully comprehend [The Society of the Spectacle] without Marx, and especially Hegel'. In accordance with that statement, this book will attempt to read Debord's work through these key influences.

If one does indeed read Debord's work in this manner, it soon becomes apparent that his theoretical writings imply a particular approach to Hegelian thought. To put it rather glibly: reading Debord through Hegel and Marx also affords a means of reconstructing Debord's Marxian reading of Hegel. As this book will attempt to demonstrate, that reading of Hegel is fundamental to the interpretation of spectacle outlined earlier. Inevitably, our attempts to reconstruct Debord's
approach to Hegel will need to be somewhat speculative, because his extant statements on the topic can only take us so far. We will need, therefore, to build upon those statements by reading them in the light of the philosophical and theoretical material that Debord drew upon when developing his ideas. There will, in consequence, be a large intellectual-historical component to this book’s discussions. Yet whilst such an approach may seem somewhat scholastic, it should also afford something new: for if one addresses Debord’s concerns with time and history in this manner, it becomes evident that his work implies a philosophy of history that effectively equates to a philosophy of praxis.

This can be illustrated with an anecdote. Giorgio Agamben, who had the rare honour of being one of the few modern intellectuals whom Debord did not despise, recalls in an essay that he once told Debord that he considered him to be a philosopher. Debord responded by saying ‘I’m not a philosopher, I’m a strategist.’ Agamben does not make this point, but Debord’s response to that question was no doubt due to his view that strategy is the form taken by philosophy when it becomes actualised, following Marx’s critique of Hegel, in historical praxis. To put it very crudely and reductively: Hegel, in Debord’s view, had developed a mode of thought capable of thinking change, conflict and historical movement, but bound it within the confines of a philosophical system that purported to herald history’s closure. The young Marx rectified that error with his call for philosophy’s realisation in praxis: dialectical thought would thereby cease to be a means of contemplating a purportedly finished world, and would instead serve as a means of consciously conducting the world’s transformation. Debord was a ‘strategist’, therefore, because his interpretation of Hegelian Marxism rendered the conduct of dialectical thought very much akin to that of strategic thought. Once actualised in praxis, dialectics would become a means of thinking and conducting change, process and conflict within lived time. Hence the references to ‘dialectical, strategic thought’ that can be found in Debord’s correspondence, and indeed hence also his contention, made in the personal notes that are now stored in the Bibliothèque nationale de France’s archive, that ‘to think dialectically and to think strategically’ is ‘the same thing’. Through looking at Debord’s debts to Hegel and Marx, and by doing so with reference to his key concerns with time and history, we can try to reconstruct the ideas that inform these views. Doing so also affords the possibility that these ideas might be drawn from Debord’s work and thereby developed and considered in their own right.

Having stated these aims, we should now indicate the way in which they will be pursued.

Archaeology

The difficulty faced by a study of Debord’s Hegelian Marxism is that he leaves us with very few explicit statements regarding its details. Nowhere in his public writings does Debord clearly set this out in toto: not even in the notes that he wrote on the hundreds of reading cards that are now stored in the Bibliothèque Nationale’s archive. Nonetheless, and as was indicated earlier, the conceptual framework that supports his claims can be inferred and reconstructed from textual evidence, and through reading that evidence in relation to the material that informed it. This is rendered somewhat easier by the fact that Debord provides us with important clues. He frequently employed détourné passages and phrases from other writers in his texts and used numerous quotations. These references are almost always unattributed, but they can be traced, identified, and used as means of piecing together his ideas.

A necessary corollary of this approach is that Debord and the Situationist International’s work cannot be treated as a known, familiar corpus that can be placed alongside more recent and popular bodies of ideas, and then measured according to their criteria. Instead, this book will try to treat this material on its own terms. This requires placing Debord and the Situationist International in relation to a rather different set of writers than those implied by more art-historical approaches to the Situationist International, and indeed by those that would cast Debord’s account of spectacle as a work of media theory.

Whilst the latter interpretations might invite appeal to figures such as McLuhan (‘the most convinced imbicile of the century’, according to Debord), Barthes (a writer who had ‘nothing to say’) or Baudrillard (an ‘idiot’, a ‘media clown’, and an example of the intellectual ‘lice’ that cling to the media in the hope of ‘drawing a reflection from it’), we will instead read Debord’s œuvre through its debts to writers such as Hegel, Marx, Korsch, Lefebvre and Lukács, and through the work of Young Hegelian writers such as Cieszkowski, Feuerbach and Stirner. His reading of Hegel will be reconstructed through reference to the French Hegel interpreters whose books Debord owned and studied (chiefly, Jean Hyppolite and Kostas Papaioannou). Likewise, when we come to address the aesthetic dimensions of his views on time, we’ll do so by making reference to Debord’s favoured poets and writers, such as Khayyám, Li Po and Manrique. Similarly, his interests in strategy will be considered by pursuing his references to Castiglione, Clausewitz, Gracián, Machiavelli and Sun Tzu. We will also need to address Debord’s debts to the ambience and legacy of Sartrean existentialism. This may seem questionable, particularly if one notes Debord and the Situationist International’s formidable hostility towards Sartre (a ‘buffoon’; a ‘nullity’; one of the ‘celebrities of unintelligence’; a consumer and purveyor of ‘Stalinist illusions’; less of a leftist than Khrushchev; one of the ‘worst enemies of all revolutionary research’, etc.). A theory of situations, self-constitutive action and temporal becoming that emerged in 1950s France cannot, however, be fully understood in abstract isolation from Sartre’s philosophy.

The approach taken to Debord’s work will therefore be archaeological in a sense (albeit not in that of Foucault, who was considered a ‘dupe’, and one of the ‘great men of recuperation’). This is because by addressing it in this manner, we will try to unearth some of its primary components, and attempt their assembly. This should afford a model of some of the key ideas that underlie and inform Debord’s work. As admitted above, this model will be necessarily speculative; yet provided we keep as close as possible to the letter of his texts, we can hope to arrive at a position that Debord would have been able to recognise as being at least similar to his own.

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Routledge Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies edited by Gerard Delanty [Routledge: 9781138094659]

Over the past two decades there has been great interest in cosmopolitanism across the human and social sciences. Where, earlier, it had largely been a term associated with moral and political philosophy, cosmopolitanism has now become a widely-used term in the social sciences. It is now integral to much of cultural, political and social analysis. This is the first comprehensive survey in one volume of the interdisciplinary field of cosmopolitan studies. With over forty chapters written by leading scholars of cosmopolitanism, this book reflects the broad reception of cosmopolitan thought in a wide variety of disciplines and across international borders. Both comprehensive and innovative in the topics covered, the Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies is divided into four sections:

- major theoretical debates, where the emphasis is on recent developments
- cultural topics in the social sciences
- the politics of cosmopolitanism
- major world varieties of cosmopolitanism.

The Handbook answers the need to take modern cosmopolitanism out of its exclusive western context and relate it to the historical experiences of other world cultures. This is a major work in defining the emerging field of cosmopolitanism studies. Throughout, there is a strong emphasis on interdisciplinarity, with essays covering philosophy, literary theory, history, international relations, anthropology, communications studies and sociology. The Handbook’s clear and comprehensive style will appeal to a wide undergraduate audience across the social sciences and humanities.

The emerging field of cosmopolitanism studies by Gerard Delanty

A volume such as this, bearing the title Cosmopolitanism Studies, is in need of some justification. Over the past two decades there has been very wide interest in cosmopolitanism across the human and social sciences. Where earlier it had been largely a term associated with moral and political philosophy, cosmopolitanism has now become a widely used term in the social sciences. In many ways cosmopolitanism constitutes an interdisciplinary area for the human and social sciences. As invoked in this volume, the idea of cosmopolitanism studies — or cosmopolitan studies — does not proclaim anything more than the recognition of potential interdisciplinarity. Currently it would appear to be the case that cosmopolitanism has been taken up variously by most disciplinary traditions, but not all mean quite the same thing. Cosmopolitanism in anthropology, for instance, is quite different from cosmopolitanism in sociology and in political philosophy. While the diverse literature often appeals to some classic texts, there is nonetheless considerable variety of interpretations and applications. In general, these vary from highly normative approaches to more empirical applications. There is much to be gained by greater dialogue between the various disciplines that have taken up the idea of cosmopolitanism. It is in this somewhat limited sense of interdisciplinarity that the notion of cosmopolitanism studies can be uncontroversially used. The present volume is largely in this mold. As several chapters demonstrate, philosophical debate about the normative characteristics of cosmopolitanism does not engage seriously with the anthropological and sociological literature on actual cosmopolitanism.

There is also a second and stronger sense in which the idea of cosmopolitanism studies can be used. This would be to refer to an emerging post-disciplinary studies area that exists beyond disciplinary traditions. Whether or not cosmopolitanism studies today constitute such a domain of inquiry that goes beyond the assumptions of interdisciplinarity cannot be so easily concluded. For adherents to disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, there will be some resistance to such moves, which will be judged to lead to a loss of theoretical and methodological rigor.

Yet, in whatever sense the term cosmopolitanism studies is used there is some justification for it in that cosmopolitanism, despite the absence of theoretical and methodological agreement, is certainly an object of research and reflection across a very wide range of disciplines. For the time being it will probably remain an interdisciplinary field and thus a contrast to, for instance, the related domain of global studies where the post-disciplinary moment is more pronounced.

Cosmopolitanism, it could be argued, is but an aspect of global studies and thus does not justify being designated a distinct domain of inquiry. However, such a charge is not quite warranted for cosmopolitanism has a different focus and background. Global studies, as the study of globalization, is a relatively recent development while cosmopolitanism has a long history as a concept and a literature that goes back to Ancient Greek thought. While it lacks the scope of global studies, its historical and philosophical background, diverse as it is, arguably provides greater focus. One of the defining aspects of cosmopolitanism is its normative orientation and it is this that distinguishes it from globalization, which in itself is not a normative concept. It is difficult to use the term cosmopolitanism without intending in some sense a normative
stance. It is precisely this normative orientation that will meet with opposition from those who would rather separate social and historical analysis from philosophically grounded concepts. But the attraction that cosmopolitanism has today is not unconnected with the implicit tension between cosmopolitanism and globalization, with cosmopolitanism suggesting a critique of globalization. The world may be becoming more and more globally linked by powerful global forces, but this does not make the world more cosmopolitan. If the normative underpinnings of cosmopolitanism are taken seriously, it must be apparent that it is not reducible to the condition of globalization.

In the broadest sense possible, cosmopolitanism is about the extension of the moral and political horizons of people, societies, organizations and institutions. It implies an attitude of openness as opposed to closure. For Eduardo Mendieta, in his chapter in this volume, it is now a challenge to the anthropocentric and zoomorphic assumptions that ground human exceptionalism. The political philosophy of cosmopolitanism has always upheld the spirit of openness and a perspective on the world that emphasized the extension of the bonds of inclusivity. Cosmopolitanism is therefore a condition that is more likely than not to be exemplified in opposition to prevailing conditions and thus signalling in some sense the exploration of alternatives to the status quo. This tension between the status quo and the imaginary of an alternative has often been taken to mean that cosmopolitanism is a purely ideal aspiration not rooted. The opposite is the case, for such projections are themselves real and products of concrete experiences. The growth of cosmopolitanism today is undoubtedly due to considerable disquiet about the impact of globalization, on the one side, and on the other the recognition that a globally connected world must find solutions that take into account the perspectives of others beyond one's own immediate context. Aspirations to improve social justice and find solutions for global environmental challenges are not simply unrealistic ideals unlinked to political practice, but in many ways have become a part of the social imaginaries of almost all societies in the present day. For this reason, then, as Chris Rumford has argued in his chapter, cosmopolitan opportunities do not appear ready formed as the antidote to the 'iron cage' of nationalism, but should be seen as potentials within the present. In similar terms, Ian Woodward and Zlatko Skrbiš argue that cosmopolitanism is never an absolute or fixed category that resides simply within some individuals more than others, but a dimension of social life that must be actively constructed through practices of meaning-making in social situations. But normative visions of alternative ways of organizing societies persist and these are discussed in the chapters by Gillian Brock and Daniel Weinstock who look at some of the debates within political philosophy on global justice.

Another, and older objection, is that cosmopolitanism reflects a disdain for the local and is an elite preoccupation. In this view, cosmopolitanism is simply a global ideology or an embracing of the world of the mobile global elite. The nature of cosmopolitan thought in recent years contradicts this criticism. We find a strong emphasis on cosmopolitanism as rooted as opposed to being a rejection of real communities. The notion of a rooted cosmopolitanism has been variously defended by theorists as different as the moral philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah and the sociologist Ulrich Beck and was also advocated by Hannah Arendt. The reception of cosmopolitanism in the social sciences as well as in post-colonial thought, whereby cosmopolitanism becomes linked with empirical social phenomena, makes it difficult to claim that cosmopolitanism is only an elite phenomenon. It is increasingly associated with the claims to rights of groups previously excluded from political community. Thus, for instance, in the chapter by Hensby and O’Byrne, it is associated with marginal groups and in the chapter by Walter Mignolo with decolonialism, while Patrick Hanafin sees in terms of the right to have rights. It is also worth recalling that in its classical origins in Ancient Greece the cosmopolitan current represented by the Cynics gave expression to anti-elite and anti-institutional notions of belonging and citizenship, a contrast to the Stoic tradition that fits more easily into the new Hellenistic empire of Alexander and the nascent Roman empire. The tension between popular and elite conceptions of cosmopolitanism has persisted in the subsequent history of the idea and can also be found in the discord between moral individualist positions and aspirations for new cosmopolitan world institutions. The chapter by Nigel Rapport in this volume can be seen as a plea for the former and a defense of the relevance and autonomy of the individual. Thus education, as Noah Sobe argues, provides one of the best arenas for examining the articulation of actually-existing cosmopolitanisms with cosmopolitanism as a normative moral and/or political ideal. Schools are, after all, places where educators struggle daily to impart, inscribe and actualize in their charges various visions of the proper individual and the good society.

The popularity of cosmopolitan today, it might be suggested, lies in its relevance to an understanding of major social change throughout the world (see the contributions in Part I by Gerard Delanty, Andrew Linklater and Piet Strydom and, in Part IV, by Maurice Roche on Europe). It is particularly relevant to an understanding of shifts in the social imaginaries of societies and the emergence of ethical and political responses to global challenges. Related concepts, such as internationalism, globalization and transnationalism do not quite offer a framework of interpretation and not all aspects of major social change can be understood with reference to these concepts. Cosmopolitanism concerns ways of imagining the world and thus it is more than a condition of mobility or transnational movement. It is particularly bound up with the expansion of democracy and the extension of the space of the political. But it is also an imaginary present in modern world literature, as Pheng Cheah discusses in his chapter on world literature as a form of world-making. He explores this in Goethe's idealist formulation and the challenge that Marx's materialist understanding of the world poses to the concept of world literature. These two models of world-making, he argues, suggest that the world ought to be rigorously distinguished from the globe.

The revival of cosmopolitan thought today has much to do with the tremendous changes that occurred in the 1990s in the aftermath of the end of communism in USSR and central and eastern Europe. In this period, which also saw the end of apartheid, the Tiananmen Square movement, and, extending into the present day, the movements towards democratization of the Arab world, cosmopolitanism in all these arenas has wide appeal as framework of interpretation. The two hundredth anniversary of Kant's 1795 work Perpetual Peace in 1995 was an important movement in the revival of cosmopolitanism since this work was the defining text in modern cosmopolitan thought with its central notion of a principle of
political modernity or its various liberal alternatives.

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Cosmopolitanism is thus best seen in light of a larger
choice between atavistic nationalism and religious
fundamentalism, one the one side, and on the other
cosmopolitan ideals. Both are part of the contemporary world.
Cosmopolitanism is expressed in degrees as opposed to being
condition that is either present or absent; elements of
something can be found in all societies. It may be
suggested that every political community contains both
cosmopolitan and anti-cosmopolitan orientations; or, in other
words orientations towards openness and closure are part of the
make-up of all collective entities. Viewed in such light, the
cultural politics of societies, both in the past and in the
present, are never entirely cosmopolitan in much the same way
that they are never entirely democratic. For the same reasons it
is a mistake to see cosmopolitanism in terms of a model of
decision. It is arguably the case that despite widespread and-
cosmopolitan trends, there has been a worldwide increase in
in cosmopolitanism and the carriers of it may be oppositional
movements or movements in the direction of global
democratizations, as discussed in the chapters by Richard
Vernon and Raf Marchetti, as well as the chapter by
Alexander Hensby and Darren O’Byrne.

Cosmopolitanism is thus best seen in light of a larger
framework of analysis than something that can be accounted
for in terms of attitudes. While the term cosmopolitanism goes
back to the Stoics, and earlier, it is best understood as part of
the social imaginary of the modern world. In this volume,
Strydom situates cosmopolitanism in the context of an account
of modernity. This approach is reflected in the general
association of cosmopolitanism with post-Kantian conceptions of
political community. Balibar, in his chapter in this volume,
argues that the Kantian tradition needs to be seen along side
the Marxist project of internationalism and that these two
models may have reached their limits today. But these are only
two models within western cosmopolitanism and need to be
situated along the influential liberal heritage of
cosmopolitanism. This all immediately raises a different
question, namely the relation between cosmopolitanism and
different models of modernity, since modernity does not consist
of one dominant form, as in the Kantian tradition of European
political modernity or its various liberal alternatives.

A problem for cosmopolitan studies is the term itself and its
western genealogy. Most conceptions of cosmopolitanism
emanating from the Kantian idea, which in turn derives from
the original Stoic philosophy, presuppose a largely western
approach to history and modernity. Is cosmopolitanism
therefore uncosmopolitan in being a product of the West?
Unfortunately, insufficient attention has been given to this in the
existing literature, which on the whole tends to ignore the
historical experience of non-western parts of the world. In this
volume, the problem of translating cosmopolitanism is
specifically addressed in the contributions by Walter Mignolo
and Bo Strath, as well as in the chapters that constitute Part IV,
on world varieties of cosmopolitanism, such as Yoshio
Sugimoto’s chapter on Japan where he makes the argument
that the concept of δ translates the western notion of
cosmopolitanism or Lisa Rofel’s discussion of the Chinese notion
of Tianzha. In view of the diverse interpretations of

This approach is not without its risks. It would not be helpful if
the universalistic impulsive within cosmopolitanism were
pluralized to a point that we end up with a diversity of
cosmopolitan cultures or a counter-western cosmopolitanism. As
Daniel Chernilo argues in his contribution to this volume,
cosmopolitanism necessarily requires a certain degree of
universalism, though such a universalism must be differentiated
and qualified. There is also the separate question whether
normative or descriptive claims are being made. A possible
way forward that will avoid the pitfalls of relativism and
universalism is to locate the cosmopolitan imaginary as an
orientation or self-understanding that exists within all world
cultures and while taking a diversity of historical forms is
always a response to the widening of human experience and
the broadening of political community. In his chapter on
cosmopolitanism in Africa, Richard Werbner avoids any
discussion of a civilizational particularism and concentrates on
a new kind of civic cosmopolitanism among activists. This is an
interesting contrast to Andrew Hartman’s characterization of
American cosmopolitanism in terms of a model of decline
arising out of a pluralism which has not in fact led to greater
cosmopolitanism. Whether or not such a sense of a decline in
the fortunes of American cosmopolitanism is warranted, his
chapter is a reminder that cultural pluralization is not always a
basis for cosmopolitanism. In much the same terms, Keith Jacobs
and Jeff Malpas claim that in the case of Australia and New
Zealand both societies have been led, not towards more
inclusive social and political formations, but instead to policies
that have encouraged increased insularity, individualization,
and exclusion. From a different theoretical framework, Maurice
Roche writing on Europe suggests that it is necessary to
maintain a clear distinction between the concept’s normative
and analytic meanings, and to focus on the latter. His argument
is that the concept of ‘cosmopolitan order’ can be useful in
addressing the social context of cosmopolitanism in terms of cultural mixtures, social openness and common power regimes, rather than focusing on attitudes and values. He claims that deep and long-term trends in Europe and the EU have operated to promote cosmopolitanism in the form of cosmopolitan social orders.

As is apparent from above mentioned chapters in Part IV, it is possible to find a way to conceive of varieties of cosmopolitanism in ways that do not entail the negation of universality and it is possible to do this in both historical and contemporary perspective. The key to this is the identification of alternative conceptions of what constitutes community as co-existence and as a broadening of horizons whether on national or transnational levels. This at least is a starting point for a basic definition of cosmopolitanism, which must be seen as extending into more complex levels of critical awareness and different orientations. And as several chapters argue, cosmopolitanism is not an historically invariable condition, but has shifted several times in history, as is vividly clear in the case of South America, China and India. The interrelation of European and non-European cosmopolitan cultures should also be considered, a theme that is more present in Aurea Mota’s account of Latin American expressions of cosmopolitanism and, too, in Huan Wardle’s discussion of ethnographies of cosmopolitanism in the Caribbean. Wardle, for instance, points out how widespread horror at Caribbean slavery played an important role in the emergence of European Enlightenment cosmopolitanism. Aurea Mota argues for the global relevance of the adoption of the liberal project in early nineteenth-century South America after independence and the idea of a Latin American cosmopolitanism that can only be seen as part of a wider world phenomenon of which it was a part. This corrects a major Eurocentric view of world history that liberal democracy was primarily a European development when, in fact, one of the most extensive experiments with democracy occurred in Latin America in the nineteenth century. According to Humera Iqtidar, if cosmopolitanism is understood as a distancing of the self, the ability to re-evaluate one’s own norms and practices, then it can be found in many instances of Islamic culture where the groups in question have developed those capabilities. In this view, Bryan Turner argues that cosmopolitanism is neither new nor necessarily secular. Stoicism, for instance, contributed significantly to the origins of cosmopolitanism, but its real driving force was religious. This is, too, a reminder that cosmopolitanism should not be equated with diverse and transnationally mobile urban populations, including in global cities, as Yeoh and Lin argue, for cosmopolitanism is about engaging with others and is to be found in locations that are not necessarily global spaces.

Considering the above reflections, a cosmopolitan approach does offer an alternative way to view major social change today to some of the dominant approaches, of which there are essentially three. One view is that because of global transformations there is increased homogenization in the world today. This thesis of homogenization has been reflected in diverse views ranging from implausible notions of the ‘end of history’ as a condition in which liberal democracy has become the dominant political system to more convincing arguments about societal convergences or the increasing importance of a ‘world culture’ or a dominant global culture eroding national or local cultures. Contrary to this is an approach that would see less convergence than greater divergence and, eventually but not inevitably, polarization. In the extreme it amounts to a notion of a clash of civilizations. Clearly both processes of convergence and divergence are in evidence in almost every part of the world and any account of social change will need to account for both. However, it is out of dissatisfaction with these accounts that alternative accounts have been put forward which see as the distinctive feature a process of hybridization in which cultures merge in a continuous creation of new forms. Cultures do not collide, but borrow from each other and adapt in different ways without an overall convergence being the result. This is often taken to be a case for cosmopolitanism. However, cosmopolitanism properly defined is not a condition of hybridization, but one of the creative interaction of cultures and the exploration of shared worlds. As such it, suggests heightened reflexivity.

While it can be argued that all cultures are in some way the product of cultural mixing, a point is generally reached whereby the cultural form ceases to be conscious of its hybridity and with the passage of time it takes on a more solidified character. At this point, the cultural entity in question will take on another character and the result may be surrender to a global culture, or itself become a global culture, or a process of polarization sets in. Distinct from the aforementioned processes, a fourth scenario is thus possible and can be termed a unity in diversity. In this case the distinctive development is less a mixing of cultures and the production of new hybrid forms, than a reflexive interrelation of cultures whereby the cultures undergo some change as a result of exchange. Diversity is not eradicated by mixing but also does not result in polarization. While diversity is preserved, there is also a degree of unity between the elements but without a dominant culture taking over. So, instead of a single culture emerging, the cultures co-exist through the creation of frameworks of solidarity and integration. This is essentially what cosmopolitanism seeks to identify and, as I argued in my contribution to this volume, the approach that describes it is a critical cosmopolitanism.

Does this mean that cosmopolitanism no longer has any relation with the political tradition that it is most commonly associated with it, namely the liberal legacy? In modern political philosophy cosmopolitanism has been in part allied with liberalism in that the moral and political values associated with cosmopolitanism are an extension of the liberal values of freedom, tolerance, respect for the individual, egalitarianism, etc. It has been mostly the case that cosmopolitan virtues have been espoused within the context of a broader embracing of liberal values. Despite the turn to cultural context today and the recognition of a multiplicity of cosmopolitan projects, one should not conclude that liberalism and cosmopolitanism have entirely decoupled, as Aurea Mota has argued in her chapter on Latin American cosmopolitanism. The liberal legacy itself has been diverse and like cosmopolitanism it is open to different interpretations.

The chapters written for this volume reflect the broad reception of cosmopolitan thought in a wide variety of disciplines, ranging from philosophy, literary theory and history to international relations, anthropology, communications studies and sociology. Part I presents generally theoretical approaches in which some of the major developments in recent theorizing are discussed. Given the wide literature that currently exists on the history of cosmopolitanism and the aspiration to present in this volume new thinking on cosmopolitanism, the chapters concentrate on recent developments, including the relationship between cosmopolitan
theory and empirical social research, as in the two chapters by Victor Roudemotof and Ian Woodward and Zlatko Skrbis. David Ingli’s chapter offers a succinct account of how much of the classical legacy can be reclaimed. The next two sections contain chapters respectively on the cultural and political conceptions of cosmopolitanism. Despite the arbitrariness of the distinction, it is in line with what is still a significant division within the literature on cosmopolitanism, which overall tends to be divided between largely cultural approaches and those that derive from normative political theory. The chapters by Sassatelli and Paperstergiadis are good examples of attempts to link normative and empirical approaches with respect to cultural analysis. Of all the social sciences, anthropology has been at the forefront in advocating cosmopolitan interpretations and in the chapter on this topic by Pnina Werbner there is a strong emphasis on the ethical significance of cosmopolitanism. Other topics include, communications, religion, cities, aesthetics, education and memory. The chapters in Part III on cosmopolitics typically address aspects of political community such as citizenship, human rights, democracy, equality and justice, solidarity, humanitarianism, and global civil society. Finally, Part IV, as discussed above, offers wide-ranging accounts of world varieties of cosmopolitanism. The rationale here is that cosmopolitanism today must be taken out of its exclusive western context and related to the historical experiences of other world cultures. In this vein, there are chapters on cosmopolitanism in the Caribbean, Latin America, China, Japan, and Africa as well as in major parts of the western world, such as Europe, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. Another chapter by He and Brown deals specifically with more general Asian perspectives on cosmopolitanism that go beyond specific civilizational and national forms. Indeed, in their account normative transnationalism is one of the most important expressions of Asian cosmopolitanism. Although not a regionally based cosmopolitanism, the final chapter by Laurence Miller and Scott Ury looks at Jewish cosmopolitanism as a major world variety. Given the diversity of approaches and applications an overall synthesis or summary is difficult. As I suggest in my own contribution, cosmopolitanism can be characterized as comprising three dimensions. First, cosmopolitanism concerns empirical phenomena, which can be best described as forms of experience. In this sense, cosmopolitanism can be said to be real in that it concerns real experiences. Second, cosmopolitanism concerns particular kinds of experience that entail their own interpretation. In this second sense, the normative component of cosmopolitanism is an empirically grounded one. It is on this level that the social imaginary of cosmopolitanism can be located. Third, it is possible to speak of a higher level of interpretations that goes beyond those that are rooted in people’s experiences of the world, namely evaluations, by which is meant philosophical and social scientific reflections on cosmopolitanism. In other words, cosmopolitanism is both a reality as well as a moral and political interpretation, but it is also an approach to the analysis of the social world.

The Routledge Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies aims to showcase some of the most innovative and promising developments in recent writing in the human and social sciences on cosmopolitanism.

Xi Jinping: The Governance of China English Version by Xi Jinping [Foreign Languages Press, 9787119090238]

Compiled by the State Council Information Office of China, the CCCP Party Literature Research Office and China International Publishing Group, Xi Jinping: The Governance of China is published by Foreign Languages Press in Chinese, English, French, Russian, Arabic, Spanish, Portuguese, German and Japanese, distributed worldwide. This book is a compilation of Xi Jinping’s major works from November 15, 2012 to June 13, 2014; it comprises 79 speeches, talks, interviews, instructions and correspondence in 18 chapters. Each item is accompanied by relevant notes about China’s social system, history and culture for readers reference. It also includes 45 photos taken at different stages of Xi’s life, providing readers with more information about his work and life. The publication of this book in various languages is of great significance. It will contribute to interpreting the concepts and principles of governance of the CPC leadership, and help the international community to learn more about and better understand China’s ideas, path of development, domestic and foreign policies, and response to international concerns about China.

Xi Jinping: The Governance of China Volume Two English Version by Xi Jinping [Foreign Languages Press, 9787119111612]

Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) held in 2012, the Central Committee with Xi Jinping as general secretary has led the whole Party and the people of China in the drive to realize the Two Centenary Goals and the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. In pursuit of these goals the country has upheld and developed socialism with Chinese characteristics, advanced the Five-point Strategy and the Four-pronged Strategy in a coordinated and integrated manner, and achieved historic progress in reform and opening up and socialist modernization. We have bravely faced new challenges, blazed new trails, resolved long-standing and complex problems, realized long-sought objectives, championed the causes of the CPC and the country, and brought Chinese socialism to the threshold of a new era. In the governance of the country, China’s Communists headed by Xi Jinping have kept pace with the times, and provided systematic answers, both theoretical and practical, to two critical questions of this new era: What is the socialism with Chinese characteristics that we should uphold and develop? How are we to achieve it? Together they have created Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as a guide to action in the decisive stage of completing a moderately prosperous society in all respects, in striving for great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, in achieving the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation, and in realizing the people’s aspirations for a better life. They have also contributed Chinese wisdom and Chinese solutions to building a community of shared future for mankind and promoting world peace and development. Xi Jinping is the principal proponent of Xi Jinping Thought
on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. The 19th CPC National Congress has recognized its worth as the latest milestone on the road that the Party will follow for the foreseeable future. Xi Jinping: The Governance of China was published in September 2014, as a collection of important speeches and written works by Xi Jinping covering the period from the end of the 18th CPC National Congress until June 2014. The book attracted widespread attention, and has been highly acclaimed by many Chinese and foreign readers. In the intervening period Xi Jinping has continued to explore the governance of China in the new era, providing a series of new concepts, ideas, and strategies which add further depth and innovation to the Party’s theoretical base. To reflect the evolution of Xi Jinping’s Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era and to help Chinese and foreign readers gain a full appreciation of the depth and innovation that it offers, the State Council Information Office, with the support of the Party Literature Research Office of the CPC Central Committee and China International Publishing Group, has compiled a second volume of The Governance of China. This new volume contains a compilation of 99 of Xi Jinping’s spoken and written works from August 2014 to September 2017, along with 29 related photographs. It is divided into 17 sections by topic, with the articles in each section arranged in chronological order. For ease of reading, notes have been added at the end of each article. <>


The research on President Xi’s governance philosophies is in its initial stage, with very few studies on the supporting capabilities behind the system. As a pioneer in this area, the author explains his original ideas in this work, some of which are yet to be tested through practice. I genuinely hope that the book will become the centerpiece in the education campaign on governance for CPC members and officials, and that it will enhance the implementation of President Xi’s thinking on governance in China. – Fu Chengyu, from the preface

Over the past few years, growing changes have quietly begun to reshape China under the governance of Xi Jinping. President Xi has developed his philosophical thinking on governing into a system to address the pressing issues of China, to develop and improve Chinese socialism, and to achieve modernization in all areas.

Zhou Xinmin’s new book *Xi Jinping’s Governance and the Future of China* explains the characteristics and patterns of President Xi’s governing philosophy from the perspective of the core capabilities required of the Chinese leadership, and reveals the four strategies of Xi Jinping’s governance:

- Mastering the direction of an overall situation with conscious and firm political willpower. Guiding the development direction of the country with modern and scientific governance thoughts. Activating endogenous power with continuous reforms and innovations. Gathering power for rejuvenation with the grand feelings about a world belonging to all peoples. Zhou Xinmin, who created the theory of leaders’ core capabilities in China, is a well-known expert in the research of Chinese leadership. Xinmin is the author of several books.

*Xi Jinping’s Governance and the Future of China* unpacks the core tenets of President Xi’s governance philosophy to provide a road map to convert his philosophical systems into actionable policies. Xinmin explains the achievements, the strategies, and the development of the president’s governing theories, and showcases the vision and capacities of the new generation of the Communist Party of China’s leadership.

*Xi Jinping’s Governance and the Future of China* also serves as a useful guide to global leaders who benefit from understanding the perspective that President Xi brings to international conversation. Xinmin’s essential work gives a simple analysis of the theoretical aspects of President Xi’s administrative approach and demonstrates how those theories are applied to the practical policies of the current Chinese leadership.

Through *Xi Jinping’s Governance and the Future of China*, it will become clear why: Xi Jinping’s strategies in government are so popular and successful. Over the past five years there were such tremendous changes in China that attracted much attention from the world. What the direction of China will be in the future. *Xi Jinping’s Governance and the Future of China* explains the characteristics and patterns of President Xi’s governance philosophy from the perspective of core capabilities required of the Chinese leadership.

Compared to previous works, this book has something new to offer. It has moved away from literal interpretation in a general sense, and employs a new perspective to focus on core capabilities – the supporting element behind governance philosophies – to conduct an in-depth analysis that is accessible and comprehensive.

There is no doubt that with more practice, the philosophical system will continue to develop and improve while enriching its contents. The essential capabilities of leadership, the decisive and fundamental pillars of the system, will not change with the times.

Divided into seven chapters *Xi Jinping’s Governance and the Future of China* builds upon the main theme of capabilities and employs a step-by-step approach in detailing its meaning with clear logic and rigorous deduction. Chapter 1, Achievements of Xi Jinping’s Practice of Governance, offers a comprehensive account of the CPC leadership’s governance philosophies, measures, and accomplishments.

Chapter 2, Interpreting Xi Jinping’s Governance Philosophies, makes an in-depth analysis of the guiding thoughts. Chapter 3, Practice of Xi Jinping’s Governance Philosophies, discusses the policies and methods employed. Chapter 4, The Governance of Great Leaders, summarizes the common traits of outstanding leaders. Chapter 5, Core Capabilities of Xi Jinping’s Governance, analyzes President Xi’s competence as China’s leader. Chapter 6, Development of Xi Jinping’s Governance Capabilities, traces back to the origin of Xi’s capabilities and follows his developmental path. Chapter 7, Setting Standards for Leading
Capabilities, explores the values extended from the capabilities of national governance. By discussing these theories, Xi Jinping’s Governance and the Future of China may play a central role in influencing and molding generations of CPC members and officials who are committed to CPC’s mission, Chinese socialism, and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. It may also help the modernization of China’s governance system and capabilities, and shed some light on achieving the Chinese Dream.

Xinmin’s work combines the theoretical with practical aspects of leadership and is a must-read for anyone doing business in and with China. — Latha Ramchand, dean of C. T. Bauer College of Business, University of Houston

We Are the Change We Seek: The Speeches of Barack Obama edited by E. J. Dionne Jr., Joy-Ann Reid, [Bloomsbury USA, 9781635570915]

A collection of Barack Obama’s greatest speeches, now including his farewell address, selected and introduced by columnist E.J. Dionne and MSNBC host Joy-Ann Reid.

We Are the Change We Seek is a collection of Barack Obama’s 27 greatest addresses: beginning with his 2002 speech opposing the Iraq War and closing with his emotional farewell address in Chicago in January 2017. As president, Obama’s words had the power to move the country, and often the world, as few presidents before him. Whether acting as Commander in Chief or Consoler in Chief, Obama adopted a unique rhetorical style that could simultaneously speak to the national mood and change the course of public events. Obama’s eloquence, both written and spoken, propelled him to national prominence and ultimately made it possible for the son of a Kenyan man and a white woman from Kansas to become the first black president of the United States.

These speeches span Obama’s career—from his time in state government through to the end of his tenure as president—and the issues most important to our time: war, inequality, race relations, gun violence and human rights. The book opens with an essay placing Obama’s oratorical contributions within the flow of American history by E.J. Dionne Jr., columnist and author of Why the Right Went Wrong: Conservatism—From Goldwater to Trump and Beyond, and Joy Reid, the host of AM Joy on MSNBC and author of Fracture.

Excerpt: “LET US MARCH” Barack Obama and the Audacity of Persuasion by E. J. Dionne Jr. and Joy-Ann Reid

BARACK OBAMA ENTERED the White House in January 2009 confronting as dismal a constellation of circumstances as any president since Franklin Roosevelt: a global financial meltdown that would come very close to being an economic collapse, skyrocketing rates of unemployment, and unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that showed no signs of being resolved. Despite his fervent campaign promise to ease the country’s political divisions, he discovered that he faced a Republican opposition intent on taking back power by stymieing his program, challenging his mandate to govern, and leaving his dreams of harmony stillborn.

Over time, this meant that Obama had to use his rhetorical gifts to confront and defeat his political adversaries. When circumstances required, Obama could be a highly effective partisan, which further embittered his opponents. Even at his most eloquent, Obama would never win over those who saw him as a dangerous philosophical antagonist.

Yet Obama never dropped the idea that beneath the surface of seething conflict, a country that had elected him as its first African American president was not as torn as it seemed to be. For his supporters—and, increasingly, as his term concluded, for Americans who had grown weary of the endless partisan wars—Obama remained a figure intent on evoking Abraham Lincoln’s appeal to the “better angels of our nature.” By the time his presidency neared an end, even some among his opponents conceded, sometimes grudgingly, that Obama had a calm fluency they would miss.

Obama always understood that when it came to moving people through the spoken word, he had “it.” He acknowledged as much in 2009 to Harry Reid, then the Senate Majority Leader, after Reid described an Obama floor speech as “phenomenal.” In his memoir, Reid said he would “never forget his response.”

“I have a gift, Harry,” Obama said in a way that seemed quite matter of fact.

Reid insisted that Obama spoke these words “without the barest hint of braggadocio or conceit, and with what I would describe as deep humility.”

The account was published after Obama had become president and Reid, the loyal Democrat, may have been going out of his way to make sure the new president was not seen as arrogant in his certainty about his eloquence. Yet there was a plausibility to Reid’s claim because Obama’s cool detachment often allowed him to tote up his own list of virtues and shortcomings dispassionately. He had simply concluded that being able to persuade, move, and inspire counted as one of his most important assets. He was right about this.

It is surprising that rhetorical genius is not and has never been essential to a successful presidency. Over the last century, the list of presidents we mark out as especially gifted speakers is not long—Franklin Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and Obama.

Roosevelt and Kennedy belong on the list not only because they spoke powerfully, but also because each mastered a new medium that had come to dominate politics—radio in FDR’s case, television in JFK’s. The demands of the two were different. Radio was warmly intimate, television friendly toward the coolly ironic. Reagan, liberals would always say, profited from his acting skills and from years on the speaking circuit, but he also excelled because he knew his own mind and had a clear sense of where he wanted to move the country.

Clinton shared with Reagan a gift for making coherent arguments and the sure knowledge that making those
arguments again and again was a central task of a successful presidency. At the 2012 Democratic National Convention, Clinton used his abilities to press the case on behalf of Obama, once his wife’s bitter rival, winning from the man he now supported a new title, “Explainer in Chief.” Proving that even Obama could sometimes be outshine rhetorically, Clinton’s case for Obama’s reelection was widely seen as more persuasive than the one the president made for himself.

In his choice of oratorical ancestors, Obama’s first love was Lincoln, a sensible choice for a politician from Illinois who had declared his presidential candidacy in Lincoln’s adopted hometown of Springfield, and whose election as the first African American president fulfilled the work of the Great Emancipator. (It did so in a way that might have shocked Lincoln, who, especially early in his career, shared many of the racial prejudices of his time.) Obama had something else in common with Lincoln:

a view that the trajectory of American history pointed toward justice and inclusion. Here, Obama also followed Martin Luther King Jr. Lincoln, King, and Obama all believed that the best way to redeem the American promise was to insist that from the country’s origins, this promise was inherent in its founding documents, the Declaration of Independence especially. Obama bound himself to the American past in order to change the future.

There was also a great deal of Roosevelt in Obama, both Franklin and Theodore. Obama, like Clinton, saw himself as the president of a new progressive era that shared in common with the original Progressive Era an imperative to deal with radical economic and social changes. If the early progressives sought to write new rules for a country that had moved from farm to factory and from rural areas to big cities, latter-day progressives would bring order and a greater degree of fairness to a nation even more metropolitan, both suburban and urban, and that was replacing manufacturing work with toll in the technological, scientific, and service economies. In one of the most important speeches of Obama’s presidency, in Osawatomie, Kansas, Obama hitched himself firmly to Teddy Roosevelt’s intellectual and political legacies.

A president who took over in the midst of the greatest economic catastrophe since the Great Depression could not avoid embracing FDR, and he also had FDR thrust upon him. A cover of Time magazine depicted Obama as an FDR lookalike, with a confident smile and a jaunty cigarette holder at his lips. It seemed appropriate for a man who struggled with his smoking habit.

There were certainly some echoes of JFK, particularly in Obama’s generational rhetoric. If JFK was the young voice of the World War II generation, Obama was the first president not touched by the turmoil of the 1960s and he saw himself as liberating the country from many of that era’s assumptions, struggles, and discords. Despite what his conservative enemies often said about him, Obama, like Kennedy, was mistrustful of ideology and could sometimes be very tough on allies to his left. (His Osawatomie speech was, in part, an effort to rekindle their faith in him.)

Perhaps the most unexpected reference point for Obama, given the philosophical divide between them, was Reagan. But Obama’s respect for the Gipper shouldn’t surprise. They shared something unusual in our history: Both had used a single speech to push themselves into the highest reaches of American politics. It is hard to find other politicians who have done the same. William Jennings Bryan with his “Cross of Gold” speech in 1896 came closest.

In Reagan’s case, the speech that launched a political career was “A Time for Choosing,” a broadcast Reagan made on behalf of Barry Goldwater’s failing presidential campaign on October 27, 1964. It is doubtful that the speech changed many minds—Goldwater went down to an historically resounding defeat—but it marked Reagan out as a conservative hero into our day. Using the telling quip, the engaging story, and the apt (if sometimes misleading) statistic, Reagan made modern conservatism sing. By the time Reagan closed (with Lincoln’s “the last best hope on earth” formulation), the millions of conservatives who watched him that night knew that they had found the man who would lead them to the White House. Sixteen years later, he did.

Obama opened his door to the American political imagination with a very different speech, his keynote address to the Democratic National Convention on July 27, 2004. What we remember is its call for national unity, its insistence that “there’s not a liberal America and a conservative America; there’s a United States of America.” Also: “There’s not a black America and white America and Latino America and Asian America; there’s the United States of America.” A country that, it seemed at the time, yearned for unity had found its champion.

What’s forgotten is that the speech was also a partisan address with a political purpose. In a sense, it embodied tensions that were present throughout Obama’s rise to office and his time in the White House. Obama always had to go back and forth between his conciliatory hopes and his need to win pitched battles with a Republican party that resisted his overtures.

If Reagan sought to sharpen ideological divisions, Obama saw ideological divisions themselves—especially around social and moral issues—as both the product of Republican strategizing and a drag on liberal and Democratic hopes. The lead-in to Obama’s peroration on behalf of unity, after all, was an attack on Republican divisive designs. “Now even as we speak,” Obama said, “there are those who are preparing to divide us, the spin masters and negative ad peddlers who embrace the politics of anything goes.” Obama was dividing the country in his own way: between those who would divide the country for political purposes and those who would not.

This spoke to what was an ongoing Obama project: to defang cultural issues along with racial and religious divisions by way of encouraging white working-class and middle-class Americans to support progressives and Democrats who had their economic interests at heart. The Red/Blue America speech included a paean to a progressive view of the economy and pledges on behalf of those “losing their union jobs” and decent wages. Ironically, Donald Trump, Obama’s archenemy, would appeal to precisely such voters in 2016. Two of Obama’s most important addresses, on religion before the Call to Renewal conference in 2006, and on race after the controversies surrounding his pastor, the Reverend Jeremiah Wright, were designed to close two of the widest divides in American politics—to the advantage, Obama hoped, of progressives.

“Secularists are wrong when they ask believers to leave religion at the door before entering the public square,” he said in the first speech. As for Wright, he criticized his pastor for
"having a profoundly distorted view of this country—a view that sees white racism as endemic and that elevates what is wrong with America with all that we know is right with America." Given the profound divisions that grew during the Obama years, it is paradoxical and even tragic that Obama dedicated so much of his rhetorical firepower to the task of conciliating religious white conservatives to his vision, only to look on as those divisions deepened. Even gifted preachers can fail in their task of conversion.

Obama had something else in common with Reagan, or hoped to. He, like Reagan, wished to realign American politics. Reagan had moved politics to the right. Obama wanted to be just as effective in reversing the tide. During his primary campaign against Hillary Clinton, Obama gave an interview to the Reno Gazette Journal in which he said pointedly: "I think Ronald Reagan changed the trajectory of America in a way that Richard Nixon did not and Bill Clinton did not." Aligning his opponent's husband with Nixon was probably no accident. But most telling were his words about Reagan. "He put us on a fundamentally different path because the country was ready for it," Obama said. "I think he tapped into what people were already feeling. Which is: we want clarity, we want optimism, we want a return to that sense of dynamism and entrepreneurship that has been missing."

The interview would prove to be an excellent guide to Obama's rhetorical strategy for the next eight years. Obama's approval ratings at the end of his term suggested that a majority of the country was, indeed, ready for the change he promised, even if a large minority would continue to resist.

And there was one aspect of Obama's rhetorical approach that was distinctly his own, or perhaps more accurately, that he shared not with past presidents but with the civil rights heroes: an acknowledgment that the task of bending history was long, arduous, and full of disappointments. That is where hope came in, and always would. Obama would insist that even in moments of disappointment, despair was not an option—not only because despair was useless, but also because it denied possibilities that would always exist.

"Hope is not blind optimism," Obama said early in the 2008 campaign. "It's not ignoring the enormity of the task ahead or the roadblocks that stand in our path. It's not sitting on the sidelines or shirking from a fight. Hope is that thing inside us that insists, despite all evidence to the contrary, that something better awaits us if we have the courage to reach for it, and to work for it, and to fight for it."

So Obama was constantly reminding his own side to count up the victories won, successes earned, possibilities realized. He told students at Howard University in 2016 that "to deny how far we've come would do a disservice to the cause of justice, to the legions of foot-soldiers, to ... your mothers and your dads, and grandparents and great-grandparents, who marched and toiled and suffered and overcame to make this day possible."

Obama's conservative detractors regularly accused him of "apologizing" for America. In truth, he was constantly making the case for America, the America that always had the capacity to change and "perfect" itself. Like his theological hero, Reinhold Niebuhr, Obama understood human frailty—"original sin" in Christian theological terms—but also the human capacity for transcendence. He calculated that frailty into all his endeavors, political and rhetorical. He was, like Niebuhr, resolutely a realist. But he kept placing his bets on transcendence and hope. "Yes, we can" was a clever political slogan, but it also went to the heart of the case he would make again and again.

KLOPPENBERG POINTS TO one important aspect of the Obama worldview that on occasion clashed with his hopeful view of the country and its future. Kloppenberg, who was writing at a low point in Obama's presidency, saw in Obama the philosophical pragmatism of William James and John Dewey. Even if nearly all politicians like to call themselves "pragmatic," pragmatism itself is a cool philosophy, not a hot ticket to rhetorical heights:

Pragmatism is a philosophy for skeptics, a philosophy for those committed to democratic debate and the critical assessment of the results of political decisions, not for true believers convinced that they know the right course of action in advance of inquiry and experimentation ... The flexibility of pragmatist philosophy, which helps explain Obama's intellectual acuity and suppleness, may paradoxically undercut his ability to inspire and persuade the American electorate and the United States Congress at a time when strident rhetoric and unyielding partisanship have displaced reasoned deliberation and commitment to problem solving.

Kloppenberg sympathized with Obama's struggle, but Obama was required to deal with the political circumstances he was given, not the circumstances he wished for. While we have collected in this volume some of his most persuasive, effective, and moving speeches, there were important times during his presidency when his rhetorical gifts failed him—including, when he didn't seem to deploy them at all. He was remarkably (and, to his supporters, surprisingly) ineffective in making the case for two of his major achievements, the economic stimulus and the health care program that bears his name. These failures haunted him throughout the presidency. He often seemed to treat the stimulus, wrote Jonathan Alter in his account of Obama's first year, "as if it was a dog's breakfast concocted by someone else." His arguments for Obamacare shifted as circumstances forced him to. He, like Reagan, wished to realign American politics.

At times, Obama seemed to lose his gifts of persuasion entirely. In his memoir Believer, David Axelrod, his senior adviser and a loyal friend, writes of a planning meeting for which he prepared a video that included parts of the 2004 convention speech and some of the inspiring moments of the 2008 campaign. "I finished with more recent footage, documenting a restrained president sharing the details of his deficit reduction policies and what they would mean for some distant fiscal year. It was a clinical and bloodless performance, with the political circumstances he was

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Johnston shines a light on the political termites who have infested our government under the Trump Administration, destroying it from within and compromising our jobs, safety, finances, and more.

No journalist knows Donald Trump better than David Cay Johnston, who has been following him since 1988. It's Even Worse Than You Think: What the Trump Administration Is Doing to America goes inside the administration to show how the federal agencies that touch the lives of all Americans are being undermined. Here is just some of what you will learn:

The Wall. Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto told President Trump that Mexico will never pay for the border wall. So, Trump is proposing putting a tariff on Mexican imports. But a tariff will simply raise the price of Mexican goods in the US, meaning American consumers will end up paying for the wall—if it ever gets built.

Climate Change. Welcome to the new EPA, run by Scott Pruitt, a lawyer who has spent much of his career trying to destroy the agency he now heads. Secrecy reigns at the new EPA because Pruitt meets with industry executives to find out which clean air and clean water provisions they most want to roll back, and keeps staffers in the dark to make sure these pro-pollution plans don’t leak prematurely.

Stocking the Swamp. Contrary to his promise to “drain the swamp” in Washington, DC, Trump has filled his cabinet with millionaires and billionaires, from Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, a Goldman Sachs and hedge fund veteran who made much of his fortune foreclosing on homeowners to billionaire heiress Education Secretary Betsy DeVos, who has already put the interests of bankers ahead of debt-burdened students and their families.

The Kleptocracy. Under Donald Trump conflict of interest is passé. When Trump isn’t in Washington, he stays at one of his properties, where the taxpayers pick up the tab for staffers, Secret Service, and so on, all at full price. And back in Washington, everyone now knows that the Trump International Hotel is the only place to stay if you want to do business with the administration. Meanwhile sons Donald Jr. and Eric run an eyes-wide-open blind trust of Trump holdings to avoid the appearance of conflict of interest—but not the reality.

Excerpt: As these pages show, based on his own words and deeds, Donald Trump is manifestly unfit to hold any public office. That Donald Trump legitimately holds office under our Constitution is beyond question. That he is a clear and present danger to the whole world should be obvious by now.

Trump lacks the emotional stability, knowledge, critical-thinking skills, and judgment to be commander in chief. Emotionally he remains the thirteen-year-old troublemaker his father sent off to a military academy, where by his own account brutality was common. Being stuck in the awkward year between childhood and maturity for nearly six decades is a terrible fate, one that has twisted Trump’s personality and explains much of his narcissism, immature attitudes about women, disregard for others, and his imagined intellectual gifts shown by his frequent declaration that “I’m like a smart person.”

Even by the standards of the incurious George W Bush, Trump is alarmingly ignorant. Not knowing a Shia Muslim from a Sunni Muslim or why this division within Islam matters deeply to American foreign policy decisions, Trump spews bigotry...
against all Muslims. George W. Bush constantly reminded the world that our response to 9/11 was not a war on Islam, that the faith was not the issue, but rather the abuse of it by zealots. Bush participated in Muslim religious events to emphasize that point.

Trump not only inflames hatred of all Muslims, he also allows himself to be used by the Saudis. They support the most violent faction of the Islamic religion and finance terrorists while Trump praises Riyadh for fighting against terrorism, unaware of how out of touch his words are.

More surprising than Trump’s lack of knowledge of geopolitics is his ignorance of economics, the field in which he was given a bachelor’s degree by the University of Pennsylvania. Anyone who did the work to earn such a degree would know that imposing a tariff on imports from Mexico to pay for his wall means that American consumers would bear the cost, not Mexicans.

Worse is Trump’s faux patriotism.

That Trump’s loyalties are divided, that he owes something to Moscow Putin, his years of lucrative financial transactions, and his hiring of Paul Manafort to run his campaign. Whether Trump is merely a fool or a knowing Kremlin agent is unresolved at this writing. What we know for sure is that the Trump campaign eagerly solicited the Kremlin’s help to defeat Hillary Clinton, wanted to use Russian diplomatic links to secretly communicate with Moscow, and that Trump directly participated in lying and covering up that secret collaboration with a hostile foreign power.

That Trump has no regard for decency in politics is shown by his leading chants of “Lock her up” and asking people at rallies to pledge loyalty to him just as James Comey, the FBI director he fired, said he was asked to do in private. These are words and actions befitting a dictator, not an American president. But they also fit with Trump’s philosophy. Those who turn the other cheek as Jesus Christ taught in the Sermon on the Mount are fools, idiots, and losers, Trump has said many times. His philosophy is revenge and violence against others, decidedly anti-Christian attitudes that have not dissuaded many prominent television preachers from their enthusiastic endorsements of him as a “fine Christian family man.”

Trump maintains strong support among roughly a third of Americans. Many of them are old enough to have lived through all or part of the Cold War and yet some of them tell journalists, focus group leaders, and pollsters that, like Trump, they trust Putin’s regime more than American intelligence agencies. During the Cold War, for sure, Republican politicians loudly denounced anyone who espoused such views as useful idiots, fellow travelers, and traitors.

This core of support, almost entirely among Republicans, means that sitting members of the House and Senate cannot go up against Trump unless they are confident they can win the next primary election. John Danforth, the former Republican senator from Missouri, said he was speaking out against Trump specifically because congressional Republicans cannot. Their inaction may be profiles in cowardice, but it also shows how the system of checks and balances built into our Constitution is not working as intended.

Trump may be part of a larger global social force, a political tsunami of fear and rejection of the modern world and a nostalgic desire to go back to an imagined past of peace and simplicity. We see this force in the rise of fundamentalist Christians, Hindus, Jews, and Muslims as well as a new age of dictators from Putin to Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to nationalists like India’s Narendra Modi.

Great social waves, like tsunamis, cannot be stopped by holding up signs in protest. They must instead continue until their destructive energy dissipates. Our hope must be that the future will produce better leaders, not worse.

And then there are Trump’s many delusions.

Trump claims to know more about the jihadis who created the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL, than America’s generals. He claims to know how to deal with North Korea, an impoverished cult state, and yet until the president of China gave him a long history lesson by telephone, Trump admits he had no knowledge of the history of conflict between the Chinese and Korean peoples. He claims to be the world’s foremost expert on taxes. All that is nonsense, a con job that should have had people laughing at him, not voting for him.

For almost three decades I have been pointing out that Trump creates his own reality, a point on which his other leading biographers agree. What astonishes me is how many people blind themselves to his nonsense. Then again, denial is a powerful human emotion and this mass reaction is understandable among those beaten down by nearly four decades of government policies that stealthily take from the many to enrich the few.

Trump brilliantly tapped into the economic malaise that has afflicted much of the country after more than three decades of economic stagnation. It began to lift only in 2013. When the cries of people for help go unheeded, they will turn to anyone, even a demagogue, for relief.

Many of the economic changes in America and the world are beyond the control of a president or Congress. As we move from the industrial era into the still emerging digital era and, soon, the biological age, the world will be vastly richer, but many people may be worse off. For millions of Americans the harsh truth is that inefficiency created industrial jobs. As techniques to manufacture more and better products with less and less labor advance, those boring but good-paying factory jobs are only memories. Trump can claim he will change that, but he cannot. No president can.

The path to a better future is through investing in education, and especially science, as well as improving infrastructure. Trump’s budget shows he is hostile to all of these, particularly science. Other politicians also have cut investments in the future. College, once free or cheap in many parts of the country, has become costly even for community college students. Not funding basic research today means America will be less prosperous than it could be in the future.

For more than two decades I have warned that the frustrations caused by Washington and state capitals adopting stealth government policies favoring the rich would one day explode in ways that would be harmful, not beneficial, to our democracy. In bestselling books, hundreds of articles, columns, and speeches I have documented how policies hardly anyone knew about take from the many in subtle ways and concentrate money in the pockets of the 32,000 or so Americans at the apex of the economic pyramid.
Trump is among those beneficiaries of modern America's silent plutocratic system of redistribution upward, a process that in Orwellian terms makes sure the pigs get the apples and milk because they claim they need them to help those animals who only get slop. That I explained these devices at great length in my books Perfectly Legal, Free Lunch, and The Fine Print shows that irony is not dead. Trump masterfully grasped the anxiety and fear among the economically oppressed who had been largely abandoned by the Democrats. His slogans showed his mastery of the art of persuasion.

To understand Trump's unfitness for office, step back for a moment and wipe from your mind the image Trump spent decades polishing through his faux reality television show, the books others wrote for him, and his manipulation of the conventions of journalism. Imagine a man you never heard of sits down next to you at the start of a cross-country plane flight or a long bus ride. This older man, his yellowish hair long and combed over, wearing a nice suit with a long necktie, incessantly talks about himself. You would get an earful of bluster about his wealth. Next he would be his imagined smarts—"I have a very good brain"—a tale told in sixth-grade sentences, half-finished thoughts, and other verbal ingredients of what is politely called "word salad".

Imagine he started talking, as he did to black leaders in February, about Frederick Douglass in the present tense, more than a century after his death. This man tells you that Douglass is "an example of somebody who's done an amazing job and is getting recognized more and more, I notice."

Listen as he describes climate change as a "Chinese hoax" and says America should mine and burn more coal instead of developing renewable energy sources like the rest of the world. Imagine him urging steam power rather than "digital" catapults to launch jet fighters from aircraft carriers because "no one understands digital."

Imagine him telling you that he gets pleasure from destroying the lives of anyone who slights him. And imagine he tells you that the Mexican government is sending hordes of murderers and rapists across the border and that all blacks live in ghettos, uneducated and often unable to find work.

Now imagine you are a black businessman, the owner of profitable factories like my former next-door neighbor in Rochester. Or a federal judge born in America whose parents came from Mexico. Or one of the millions of Americans who owe their jobs to "the digital."

You would, I imagine, fear you were, to use a Trumpian term, stuck next to a nut job until your trip ended.

How can it be that millions of people do not see Trump for what he is—a narcissistic, ill-informed, thieving old blowhard? As the adage goes, poor people are crazy; rich people are eccentric.

Before the election, I predicted that, as president, Trump's behavior would become increasingly erratic, and it has. That is because of his own shortcomings, especially his desperate need for adoration, his self-centered thinking, and his ignorance of basic issues of diplomacy, economics, and geopolitics.

A month after the inauguration, thirty-five psychiatrists wrote a letter to the editor of The New York Times that made exactly this point.

Mr. Trump’s speech and actions demonstrate an inability to tolerate views different from his own, leading to rage reactions. His words and behavior suggest a profound inability to empathize. Individuals with these traits distort reality to suit their psychological state, attacking facts and those who convey them (journalists, scientists).

In a powerful leader, these attacks are likely to increase, as his personal myth of greatness appears to be confirmed. We believe that the grave emotional instability indicated by Mr. Trump’s speech and actions makes him incapable of serving safely as president.

A few months later, psychiatrist Prudence L. Gourguechon, a former president of the American Psychoanalytic Association, proposed judging Trump's fitness for office using the United States Army Field Manual on developing leaders. She distilled from its 188 pages five crucial qualities needed to lead:

- Trust
- Discipline and self-control
- Judgment and critical thinking
- Self-awareness
- Empathy

Not one of these is part of Trump’s nature.

Trust. For years, he has said in talks and the books that bear his name that no one is to be trusted, especially those closest to you.

Discipline and Self-control. The Army manual says leaders maintain their composure under pressure and do not react "viscerally or angrily when receiving bad news or conflicting information," and do not allow "personal emotions to drive decisions or guide responses to emotionally charged situations." That's the opposite of Trump.

Judgment. That Trump asserts that the best advisers reside in his head and thus he does not need experts does not suggest sound judgment.

Critical Thinking. The Army manual notes that a leader adapts to new facts and "seeks to obtain the most thorough and accurate understanding possible" while also anticipating "first, second and third consequences of multiple courses of action;" A trademark Trump characteristic runs counter to this. "We have no choice," he says about everything from banning Muslims from entering America to building his wall on the Mexican border to repealing Obamacare.

Self-awareness. Trump lies compulsively, telling so many made-up stories, imagined events, and absurd fabrications that he often stumbles over his own statements. That Trump contradicts himself without embarrassment, remorse, or even acknowledgment goes to the heart of his lack of self-awareness. Showing video clips of Trump denying he said something followed by earlier clips of him saying that which he denied have become staple of political comedy shows like Saturday Night Live and late night television.

On his first full day in office, the public got a full dose of how Trump just makes stuff up and insists it is reality. The first official statement read by Sean Spicer, the White House press secretary, insisted that Trump's was "the largest audience to witness an inauguration, period. Both in person and around the globe."
Never mind that photographs and transit ridership data show that Obama’s second inaugural drew a larger crowd than Trump’s. Never mind that transit ridership at the 2009 inauguration was more than double that in 2017. Never mind that George W. Bush in 2001 and Bill Clinton in 1993 drew crowds that by such indicators as transit ridership and photographs were larger or at least equal. Never mind that as Spicer spoke, the largest mass demonstrations in American history, by far, were under way as about six million women and some men marched in Washington and more than 100 other cities to protest Trump’s presidency.

Spicer’s statement, obviously ordered by Trump as a test of his press secretary’s loyalty—and which Spicer said after resigning that he regretted—used a litany of what could be called alternative facts to justify the crowd size claim. Labeling anything that does not comport with Trump’s version of reality “fake news” is part of a strategy to muddy clear waters, sow confusion, and pose as the only honest person in a craven world of dissemblers.

Similarly, after denigrating American intelligence agencies, Trump insisted his dismissive remarks were made up by journalists, whom he calls “dishonest” and “among the most dishonest human beings on earth” and “totally dishonest.” With those words he is really speaking of himself.

Empathy. As for empathy, Trump flew twice to Texas after Hurricane Harvey. The first time he boasted about the size of the crowd he drew in Corpus Christi, his wife’s white athletic shoes not smudged by a speck of mud. On his second visit, he advised people at a feeding station to “have a good time.” During the presidential campaign he denounced John McCain’s five years as a prisoner of war and later mocked Khizr and Ghazala Khan, whose Army officer son was killed in Afghanistan.

Later Trump denounced the people of Puerto Rico after hurricane Maria flattened the island, mocking how the island name is pronounced by locals, saying “pwear-toe-rico.” And on his brief visit he tossed rolls of paper towels to those in the small audience, a Trumpian twist on Marie Antoinette. He criticized the mayor of San Juan for pointing out that, contrary to Trump’s claims of a great job of relief, people were dying for lack of water, food, medicine, and electricity and federal officials were slow to respond. Trump blamed the Puerto Ricans for refusing to help themselves. Lin-Manuel Miranda, creator of the musical Hamilton, noted the contrast between Trump’s remarks on the American island hurricane and those that ravaged Florida and Texas. “I’ve never seen a sitting president attack the victims of a natural disaster before.” Miranda said.

By every measure in the manual, had Trump become an Army officer instead of dodging the draft with his doctor’s note about a bone spur in his foot, he would not have risen through the ranks.

Throughout his campaign, Trump predicted his presidency would be one win after another. “We’re going to win so much you may even get tired of winning. And you’ll say please, please, it’s too much winning, we can’t take it anymore.”

That’s not what happened. Still, many of his supporters refuse to accept that they got conned. It must be the fault of Democrats or news reporters, or anyone except Trump. Such is the power of adoration of the celebrity, not that much different from when the ancient Greeks invented tales of intimacy with the gods, producing demigods. Right after they invented demigods, hubris appeared. And we know how that turned out...

Trump arrived with no idea of how Washington works. The self-proclaimed great negotiator then started off on the wrong foot and kept on going.

The smart first move would have been to introduce an infrastructure bill to undo decades of malign neglect. Rebuilding failing highways and bridges, replacing unsafe dams, building modern airport terminals, and improving water and sewer systems would have created jobs for construction crews, engineers, and factory workers nationwide. It would have made life more pleasant and signaled a better future. And Democrats would have had to go along with such a bill.

Instead Trump put that on the back burner and demanded an immediate replacement of Obama’s signature achievement, the Affordable Care Act.

A month after taking office, Trump met with governors to discuss the problems of repealing Obamacare. He came out of the closed-door session confessing his ignorance of what was common knowledge. “I have to tell you, it’s an unbelievably complex subject. Nobody knew that health care could be so complicated.”

That should have opened more eyes to Trump’s con artistry since everyone else in America knew health care was extremely complicated.

His most extreme supporters, the neo-Nazis, call him “savior” in their online publications. Trump claims that mantle, tweeting as a candidate “I alone can solve” the problem of “radical Islamic terrorism.” In accepting the Republican nomination for president, Trump declared “I alone can fix it.” Instead of disgust at such an authoritarian claim, or mocking laughter, his words were greeted with enthusiastic applause by leaders of the party that says it stands for personal responsibility and maximum individual liberty (including openly carrying loaded military-grade weapons).

Trump’s success in reaching the White House and his continued diehard support among a third of the adult population reveals a much more serious problem than a crazy man being president.

Donald Trump is not the political disease afflicting America, he is a symptom.

That millions of people voted for a narcissistic, know-nothing con artist who has spent his entire life swindling others while repeatedly urging followers to commit criminal acts of violence against his critics reveals more about America than about Trump.

During the Constitutional Convention, Benjamin Franklin was supposedly asked, “What have we got, a republic or a monarchy?” to which he replied, “A republic—if you can keep it.”

Franklin’s point was that self-governance requires people to accept the burdens as well as the benefits of freedom. It means they are responsible for their fate and cannot just blame a crazy king or an uncaring despot or anyone else. They must, to be free, take personal responsibility and be actively engaged in shaping the policies that will affect not only their lives, but those of generations to come.

If the United States of America is to endure, it must be with a recognition that compromise, cooperation, and caring about
the interests of those you dislike are the basic ingredients of success.

What we have seen since Watergate, unfortunately, is a widening chasm between the incentives of office seekers and the interests of the American people, a political divide that Trump recognized and brilliantly exploited. And now he uses his office to profiteer and to denigrate those who disagree with him, just as dictators and would-be dictators have always done. Under our Constitution we determine our political fate. If we wish to turn in our citizenship responsibilities and outsource the work to power mongers, we can do so.

Democracies do not die dramatically. They slowly fade away.

In a democracy, we deal with many contending interests through cooperation and compromise. But ever since the anti-tax zealot Grover Norquist popularized the quip by Dick Armey, the former Texas congressmen, that “bipartisanship is political date rape,” we have seen a growing sense of my way or the highway.

We live in a time when many people denigrate those who have worked to make the most of the opportunities of living in this country, not in terms of monetary rewards but of developing their character, intellect, and judgment. We should oppose these crass tendencies. Our Constitution was born of the Enlightenment, of the idea that reason and intellect and vigorous public debate could produce better societies than those ruled by dogma and monarchs who claimed authority as their divine right.

“Our Constitution is not written to handle someone like Trump,” the political scientist Jason Johnson told me. “That is the greatest danger and greatest harm he is to our country.”

Johnson notes that the Federalist Papers, the structured debate over whether America should adopt the Constitution, shows that the Framers "envisioned presidents who might be dishonest, who might not have consistent ethical values, but they never envisioned a self-involved dictatorial capitalist, so we don't have a government designed to restrain someone who doesn't care about any of the norms. The British would just get rid of such a person" by calling elections.

In America, though, "everything is dependent on the moral will of existing political parties and Congress, and we are all suffering for that whether we recognize it or not," Johnson believes the failure of Congress to rein in Trump’s profiteering, his dealings with the Kremlin, and his bellicosity will afflict America long after he leaves office. "For the next thirty-five years or so, the standard for what you can get away with as long as you are in power and stay in power has been lowered to a level I don't think any of us can fully appreciate today," he said.

America has yet to become the society that Martin Luther King dreamed of in 1963, in which we judge one another not by the color of our skin but the content of our character. Trump represents a diversion on the road to that much better society. He is emblematic of the tendency, magnified since the 1980s, to judge people by the content of their wallet, as if money had anything to do with character.

Our Constitution is meant to free the human spirit so we and our posterity may become something better than we were, better than we are today. Freedom is about choosing, but it is also about having to live with the consequences of the choices we make. If we choose to empower the dishonest, the ill prepared, the mean-spirited, and the emotionally immature, we will pay dearly.

Trump often speaks of a unified nation, revealing yet another aspect of his appalling ignorance about our nation. We were not founded to be united. We are not the Taliban, nor the Saudis, nor any other society built on the premise that every member will behave as those in power demand. No president should ever express his admiration for dictators and those who rule not because of popular support but with the iron fist and the gulag. Yet Trump has done exactly that with regard to power seekers in Russia, the Philippines, and Turkey, and even the fratricidal dictator in North Korea, whose power depends on maintaining his entire country as a prison.

Trump’s presidency poses a challenge for America. What future will we choose? Do we want to slide toward autocracy in this and future administrations? Or do we want a future that frees the human spirit even more?
lies, leaks, obstruction, and violence – they are working to delegitimize President Trump and drive him from office before he can drain the swamp and take away their power.”

Readers have heard of many of them – Elizabeth Warren, Al Franken, George Soros. You’ve seen their names on Facebook and Twitter and heard them on TV – Jake Tapper, Don Lemon, Rachel Maddow. Others may be unfamiliar to you – Neera Tanden, Tom Steyer, Anna Galland. Still others are nameless – members of the permanent government, the so-called Deep State.

According to Klein in All Out War, what all the villains have in common is their refusal to accept Donald Trump as their president. They live in an alternate universe of if-onlies: Hillary Clinton would have won the election if only the Russians hadn’t meddling in the election, if only FBI Director James Comey hadn’t reopened the investigation of Hillary’s emails shortly before Election Day, if only Bernie Sanders hadn’t damaged Hillary in the primaries, if only male voters hadn’t been women-haters, if only the Democratic National Committee had gotten its act together, if only there weren’t so many ‘deplorables’ in America, if only...

"Right up until election night," writes the Washington Examiner’s Michael Barone, "[the Democrats] believed that the future was forever theirs. Between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. on Election Night, it became clear that this was ... the god that failed."

For 221 years – ever since John Adams defeated Thomas Jefferson in the election of 1796 – the losing party has conceded defeat and moved on. That happened even after elections that were won by the squeakiest of margins – Kennedys, Nixon, Carter vs. Ford, Bush vs. Gore. This sacred tradition is being called into question for the first time in our history.

The villains are winning battle after battle against President Trump. He and his aides are the target of several congressional investigations, illegal leaks by the Deep State, daily lashings by the media, and Special Counsel Robert Mueller, who is examining charges of obstruction of justice.

"Much of Washington clearly views Mr. Mueller as their agent to rid the country of a President they despise," writes the Wall Street Journal. "Every political and social incentive in that city will press Mr. Mueller to oblige. But you cannot topple a duly elected President based merely on innuendo or partisan distaste without doing great harm to democracy."

There are villains on both sides of the political divide. Those on the Left want to impeach Trump. Those on the Right – people in his own party who are disloyal to Trump – want to invoke the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, under which the cabinet would remove the president and replace him with Vice President Mike Pence.

Either course of action would amount to a coup d’etat.

Klein says that he wrote All Out War because the time is getting short to stop the villains from overthrowing the president. If readers want to join the effort to prevent the villains from destroying our democracy, then this book – more than a year in the making and based on never-before-published information – is an essential guide.

Stunning in its revelations, there is no timelier book than All Out War. <>

How Democracies Die by Steven Levitsky, Daniel Ziblatt [Crown, 9781524762933]

“Cool and persuasive... How Democracies Die comes at exactly the right moment. We’re already awash in public indignation—what we desperately need is a sober, dispassionate look at the current state of affairs. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, two of the most respected scholars in the field of democracy studies, offer just that.” —The Washington Post

Donald Trump’s presidency has raised a question that many of us never thought we’d be asking: Is our democracy in danger? Harvard professors Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have spent more than twenty years studying the breakdown of democracies in Europe and Latin America, and they believe the answer is yes. Democracy no longer ends with a bang—in a revolution or military coup—but with a whimper: the slow, steady weakening of critical institutions, such as the judiciary and the press, and the gradual erosion of long-standing political norms. The good news is that there are several exit ramps on the road to authoritarianism. The bad news is that, by electing Trump, we have already passed the first one.

Drawing on decades of research and a wide range of historical and global examples, from 1930s Europe to contemporary Hungary, Turkey, and Venezuela, to the American South during Jim Crow, Levitsky and Ziblatt show how democracies die—and how ours can be saved.

Excerpt: Is our democracy in danger? It is a question we never thought we’d be asking. We have been colleagues for fifteen years, thinking, writing, and teaching students about failures of democracy in other places and times—Europe’s dark 1930s, Latin America’s repressive 1970s. We have spent years researching new forms of authoritarianism emerging around the globe. For us, how and why democracies die has been an occupational obsession.

But now we find ourselves turning to our own country. Over the past two years, we have watched politicians say and do things that are unprecedented in the United States—but that we recognize as having been the precursors of democratic crisis in other places. We feel dread, as do so many other Americans, even as we try to reassure ourselves that things can’t really be that bad here. After all, even though we know democracies are always fragile, the one in which we live has somehow managed to defy gravity. Our Constitution, our national creed of freedom and equality, our historically robust middle class, our high levels of wealth and education, and our large, diversified private sector—all these should inoculate us from the kind of democratic breakdown that has occurred elsewhere.

Yet, we worry. American politicians now treat their rivals as enemies, intimidate the free press, and threaten to reject the results of elections. They try to weaken the institutional buffers of our democracy, including the courts, intelligence services, and ethics offices. American states, which were once praised by the great jurist Louis Brandeis as "laboratories of democracy," are in danger of becoming laboratories of authoritarianism as those in power rewrite electoral rules, redraw constituencies, and even rescind voting rights to ensure...
that they do not lose. And in 2016, for the first time in U.S.
history, a man with no experience in public office, little
observable commitment to constitutional rights, and clear
authoritarian tendencies was elected president.

What does all this mean? Are we living through the decline and
fall of one of the world’s oldest and most successful
democracies?

At midday on September 11, 1973, after months of mounting
tensions in the streets of Santiago, Chile, British-made Hawker
Hunter jets swooped overhead, dropping bombs on La
Moneda, the neoclassical presidential palace in the center of
the city. As the bombs continued to fall, La Moneda burned.

President Salvador Allende, elected three years earlier at the
head of a leftist coalition, was barricaded inside. During his
term, Chile had been wracked by social unrest, economic crisis,
and political paralysis. Allende had said he would not leave
his post until he had finished his job—but now the moment of
truth had arrived. Under the command of General Augusto
Pinochet, Chile’s armed forces were seizing control of the
country.

Early in the morning on that fateful day, Allende offered
defiant words on a national radio broadcast, hoping that his
many supporters would take to the streets in defense of
democracy. But the resistance never materialized. The military
police who guarded the palace had abandoned him; his
broadcast was met with silence. Within hours, President Allende
was dead. So, too, was Chilean democracy.

This is how we tend to think of democracies dying: at the hands
of men with guns. During the Cold War, coups d’état accounted
for nearly three out of every four democratic breakdowns.

Democracies in Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic,
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand,
Turkey, and Uruguay all died this way. More recently, military
coups toppled Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi in 2013
and Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra in 2014. In all
these cases, democracy dissolved in spectacular fashion,
through military power and coercion.

But there is another way to break a democracy. It is less
dramatic but equally destructive. Democracies may die at the
hands not of generals but of elected leaders—presidents or
prime ministers who subvert the very process that brought them
to power. Some of these leaders dismantle democracy quickly,
as Hitler did in the wake of the 1933 Reichstag fire in
Germany. More often, though, democracies erode slowly, in
barely visible steps.

In Venezuela, for example, Hugo Chavez was a political
outsider who railed against what he cast as a corrupt
governing elite, promising to build a more “authentic”
democracy that used the country’s vast oil wealth to improve
the lives of the poor. Skillfully tapping into the anger of
ordinary Venezuelans, many of whom felt ignored or
mistreated by the established political parties, Chavez was
elected president in 1998. As a woman in Chávez’s home state
of Barinas put it on election night, “Democracy is infected. And
Chavez is the only antibiotic we have.”

When Chavez launched his promised revolution, he did so
democratically. In 1999, he held free elections for a new
constituent assembly, in which his allies won an overwhelming
majority. This allowed the chavistas to single-handedly write a
new constitution. It was a democratic constitution, though, and
to reinforce its legitimacy, new presidential and legislative
elections were held in 2000. Chavez and his allies won those,
too. Chávez’s populism triggered intense opposition, and in
April 2002, he was briefly toppled by the military. But the
coup failed, allowing a triumphant Chavez to claim for himself
even more democratic legitimacy.

It wasn’t until 2003 that Chavez took his first clear steps
toward authoritarianism. With public support fading, he stalled
an opposition-led referendum that would have recalled him
from office—until a year later, when soaring oil prices had
boosted his standing enough for him to win. In 2004, the
government blacklisted those who had signed the recall
petition and packed the supreme court, but Chávez’s landslide
reelection in 2006 allowed him to maintain a democratic
veener. The chavista regime grew more repressive after 2006,
closing a major television station, arresting or exiling
opposition politicians, judges, and media figures on dubious
charges, and eliminating presidential term limits so that Chavez
could remain in power indefinitely. When Chavez, now dying
of cancer, was reelection in 2012, the contest was free but not
fair: Chavismo controlled much of the media and deployed the
vast machinery of the government in its favor. After Chávez’s
death a year later, his successor, Nicolas Maduro, won another
questionable reelection, and in 2014, his government
imprisoned a major opposition leader. Still, the opposition’s
landslide victory in the 2015 legislative elections seemed to
believe critics’ claims that Venezuela was no longer democratic.
It was only when a new single-party constituent assembly
usurped the power of Congress in 2017, nearly two decades
after Chavez first won the presidency, that Venezuela was
widely recognized as an autocracy.

This is how democracies now die. Blatant dictatorship—in the
form of fascism, communism, or military rule—has disappeared
across much of the world. Military coups and other violent
seizures of power are rare. Most countries hold regular
elections. Democracies still die, but by different means. Since
the end of the Cold War, most democratic breakdowns have
been caused not by generals and soldiers but by elected
governments themselves. Like Chavez in Venezuela, elected
leaders have subverted democratic institutions in Georgia,
Hungary, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Sri
Lanka, Turkey, and Ukraine. Democratic backsliding today
begins at the ballot box.

The electoral road to breakdown is dangerously deceptive.

With a classic coup d’état, as in Pinochet’s Chile, the death of a
democracy is immediate and evident to all. The presidential
palace burns. The president is killed, imprisoned, or shipped
off into exile. The constitution is suspended or scrapped. On the
electoral road, none of these things happen. There are no
tanks in the streets. Constitutions and other nominally
democratic institutions remain in place. People still vote. Elected
autocrats maintain a veneer of democracy while eviscerating
its substance.

Many government efforts to subvert democracy are “legal,” in
the sense that they are approved by the legislature or
accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as
efforts to improve democracy—making the judiciary more
efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral
process.

Newspapers still publish but are bought off or bullied into self-
censorship. Citizens continue to criticize the government but
often find themselves facing tax or other legal troubles. This
sows public confusion. People do not immediately realize what
is happening. Many continue to believe they are living under a democracy. In 2011, when a Latinobarómetro survey asked Venezuelans to rate their own country from 1 ("not at all democratic") to 10 ("completely democratic"), 51 percent of respondents gave their country a score of 8 or higher.

Because there is no single moment—no coup, declaration of martial law, or suspension of the constitution—in which the regime obviously "crosses the line" into dictatorship, nothing may set off society’s alarm bells. Those who denounce government abuse may be dismissed as exaggerating or crying wolf. Democracy’s erosion is, for many, almost imperceptible.

How vulnerable is American democracy to this form of backsliding? The foundations of our democracy are certainly stronger than those in Venezuela, Turkey, or Hungary. But are they strong enough?

Answering such a question requires stepping back from daily headlines and breaking news alerts to widen our view, drawing lessons from the experiences of other democracies around the world and throughout history. Studying other democracies in crisis allows us to better understand the challenges facing our own democracy. For example, based on the historical experiences of other nations, we have developed a litmus test to help identify would-be autocrats before they come to power. We can learn from the mistakes that past democratic leaders have made in opening the door to would-be authoritarians—and, conversely, from the ways that other democracies have kept extremists out of power. A comparative approach also reveals how elected autocrats in different parts of the world employ remarkably similar strategies to subvert democratic institutions. As these patterns become visible, the steps toward breakdown grow less ambiguous—and easier to combat. Knowing how citizens in other democracies have successfully resisted elected autocrats, or why they tragically failed to do so, is essential to those seeking to defend American democracy today.

We know that extremist demagogues emerge from time to time in all societies, even in healthy democracies. The United States has had its share of them, including Henry Ford, Huey Long, Joseph McCarthy, and George Wallace. An essential test for democracies is not whether such figures emerge but whether political leaders, and especially political parties, work to prevent them from gaining power in the first place—by keeping them off mainstream party tickets, refusing to endorse or align with them, and when necessary, making common cause with rivals in support of democratic candidates. Isolating popular extremists requires political courage. But when fear, opportunism, or miscalculation leads established parties to bring extremists into the mainstream, democracy is imperiled.

Once a would-be authoritarian makes it to power, democracies face a second critical test: Will the autocratic leader subvert democratic institutions or be constrained by them? Institutions alone are not enough to rein in elected autocrats. Constitutions must be defended—by political parties and organized citizens, but also by democratic norms. Without robust norms, constitutions checks and balances do not serve as the bulwarks of democracy we imagine them to be. Institutions become political weapons, wielded forcefully by those who control them against those who do not. This is how elected autocrats subvert democracy—packing and "weaponizing" the courts and other neutral agencies, buying off the media and the private sector (or bullying them into silence), and rewriting the rules of politics to tilt the playing field against opponents. The tragic paradox of the electoral route to authoritarianism is that democracy’s assassins use the very institutions of democracy—gradually, subtly, and even legally—to kill it.

America failed the first test in November 2016, when we elected a president with a dubious allegiance to democratic norms. Donald Trump’s surprise victory was made possible not only by public disaffection but also by the Republican Party’s failure to keep an extremist demagogue within its own ranks from gaining the nomination.

How serious is the threat now? Many observers take comfort in our Constitution, which was designed precisely to thwart and contain demagogues like Donald Trump. Our Madisonian system of checks and balances has endured for more than two centuries. It survived the Civil War, the Great Depression, the Cold War, and Watergate. Surely, then, it will be able to survive Trump.

We are less certain. Historically, our system of checks and balances has worked pretty well—but not, or not entirely, because of the constitutional system designed by the founders. Democracies work best—and survive longer—where constitutions are reinforced by unwritten democratic norms. Two basic norms have preserved America’s checks and balances in ways we have come to take for granted: mutual toleration, or the understanding that competing parties accept one another as legitimate rivals, and forbearance, or the idea that politicians should exercise restraint in deploying their institutional prerogatives. These two norms undergirded American democracy for most of the twentieth century. Leaders of the two major parties accepted one another as legitimate and resisted the temptation to use their temporary control of institutions to maximum partisan advantage. Norms of toleration and restraint served as the soft guardrails of American democracy, helping it avoid the kind of partisan fight to the death that has destroyed democracies elsewhere in the world, including Europe in the 1930s and South America in the 1960s and 1970s.

Today, however, the guardrails of American democracy are weakening. The erosion of our democratic norms began in the 1980s and 1990s and accelerated in the 2000s. By the time Barack Obama became president, many Republicans, in particular, questioned the legitimacy of their Democratic rivals and had abandoned forbearance for a strategy of winning by any means necessary. Donald Trump may have accelerated this process, but he didn’t cause it. The challenges facing American democracy run deeper. The weakening of our democratic norms is rooted in extreme partisan polarization—one that extends beyond policy differences into an existential conflict over race and culture. America’s efforts to achieve racial equality as our society grows increasingly diverse have fueled an insidious reaction and intensifying polarization. And if one thing is clear from studying breakdowns throughout history, it’s that extreme polarization can kill democracies.

There are, therefore, reasons for alarm. Not only did Americans elect a demagogue in 2016, but we did so at a time when the norms that once protected our democracy were already coming unmoored. But if other countries’ experiences teach us that that polarization can kill democracies, they also teach us that breakdown is neither inevitable nor irreversible. Drawing lessons from other democracies in crisis, this book suggests strategies that citizens should, and should not, follow to defend our democracy.
Many Americans are justifiably frightened by what is happening to our country. But protecting our democracy requires more than just fright or outrage. We must be humble and bold. We must learn from other countries to see the warning signs—and recognize the false alarms. We must be aware of the fateful missteps that have wrecked other democracies. And we must see how citizens have risen to meet the great democratic crises of the past, overcoming their own deep-seated divisions to avert breakdown. History doesn’t repeat itself. But it rhymes. The promise of history, and the hope of this book, is that we can find the rhymes before it is too late.

The Making of a Dream: How a group of young undocumented immigrants helped change what it means to be American by Laura Wides-Muñoz [Harper, 9780062560124]

A journalist chronicles the next chapter in civil rights—the story of a movement and a nation, witnessed through the poignant and inspiring experiences of five young undocumented activists who are transforming society’s attitudes toward one of the most contentious political matters roiling America today: immigration.

They are called the DREAMers: young people who were brought, or sent, to the United States as children and who have lived for years in America without legal status. Growing up, they often worked hard in school, planned for college, only to learn they were, in the eyes of the United States government and many citizens, "illegal aliens."

Determined to take fate into their own hands, a group of these young undocumented immigrants risked their safety to “come out” about their status—sparking a transformative movement, engineering a seismic shift in public opinion on immigration, and inspiring other social movements across the country. Their quest for permanent legal protection under the so-called "Dream Act," stalled. But in 2012, the Obama administration issued a landmark, new immigration policy: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA, which has since protected more than half a million young immigrants from deportation even as efforts to install more expansive protections remain elusive.

The Making of a Dream begins at the turn of the millennium, with the first of a series of "Dream Act" proposals; follows the efforts of policy makers, activists, and undocumented immigrants themselves, and concludes with the 2016 presidential election and the first months of the Trump presidency. The immigrants’ coming of age stories intersect with the watershed political and economic events of the last two decades: 9/11, the recession, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama presidency, and the rebirth of the anti-immigrant right.

In telling their story, Laura Wides-Muñoz forces us to rethink our definition of what it means to be American.

Excerpt: Newton’s Third Law, “For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction,” holds true in politics as well as physics. On November 2, 2016, Donald J. Trump was elected president of the United States, overwhelmingly winning the nation’s electoral college while losing the popular vote by nearly 3 million votes.

Trump’s election was about more than immigration. Yet just as the young activists opened up space for all undocumented immigrants, their power also helped provoke a backlash that culminated in the election of a president who campaigned to drastically reduce immigration. For the first time, they found themselves living under an administration that seemed to struggle over how much to distance itself from its white supremacist supporters—and sometimes whether to distance itself at all.

Trump took the election as a mandate for his immigration plans. "From this day forward, a new vision will govern our land. From this day forward, it’s going to be only America first, America first. Every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs will be made to benefit American workers and American families. We must protect our borders,” he said in his inaugural address.

He tapped Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama, the man who had most consistently blocked both the DREAM Act and more comprehensive immigration reform, as attorney general. He made Stephen Miller, a campaign strategist and former Sessions staffer, who strongly supported stringent immigration controls, a top adviser. And he named Steve Bannon, who avowedly viewed Islam as a threat to the United States’ Christian core, as one of his most senior advisers, though Bannon would leave just six months later.

Although deportations had increased drastically under Obama, the Trump administration ratcheted up the number of arrests and detentions. It ended the more selective prioritization outlined in the Morton memos, under which the Obama administration had specified which immigrants officials should focus their limited resources on. Now, once again, nearly everyone was a target. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials conducted seemingly random, well-publicized raids, and Trump ordered DHS to hire 15,000 new agents to round up and process those in the country without authorization. Meanwhile, the backlog in immigration courts continued to rise, and the actual number of deportations fell.

Within months Trump tried to ban immigrants from half a dozen Muslim countries, only to be rebuffed by federal judges in several states. Still, a watered-down version of the ban slowly made its way to the Supreme Court. And the new administration successfully issued new rules to make it more difficult to prove asylum cases. DHS also quickly began seeking bids for the border wall, adding the estimated more than $2 billion into the proposed federal budget, despite having promised voters that Mexico would pay for it. He signaled he would not renew the temporary protected status (TPS), which for years had allowed millions of Haitians, Central Americans, and others who had fled natural and political disasters in their home countries to remain and work legally in the United States. Trump also pardoned Arizona sheriff Joe Arpaio, who had been convicted over the summer in federal court of criminal contempt for continuing to target Latino drivers, despite a preliminary order to stop the practice.

The undocumented activists and their advocates responded quickly to the administration’s actions. United We Dream leaders such as Cristina Jimenez and Julieta Garibay worked with their affiliates to set up massive chains of Twitter and
texting networks whenever they learned of raids. They began to hold community meetings to teach immigrants their rights and worked with thousands of new allies whom UWD said had begun calling to help: lawyers who didn’t specialize in immigration but wondered how they could be of use; community groups that wanted to know how to lobby against deportations, fill out basic immigrant paperwork, or even accompany immigrants to DHS appointments.

Mijente stepped up its organizing. For Tania Unzueta, watching young immigrants with DACA suddenly realize they might lose their cocoon of protection felt like déjà vu.

They are like us back in 2006, barely waking up, she thought.

Jose Antonio Vargas showed up at the president’s inaugural speech before Congress and pushed forward with his film festival highlighting the lives of immigrants in America. Even if they couldn’t succeed politically, he believed, they could continue to influence American hearts and minds by working with the producers of popular TV shows such as Superstore to better reflect the immigrant experience in pop culture.

In a handful of high-profile cases, DACA recipients were detained, but the activists remained outspoken, helping lead the fight to protect so-called sanctuary cities and enlisting the help of celebrities such as Lin-Manuel Miranda, who released a dark single entitled "Immigrants (We Get the Job Done),” which highlighted the struggles of the country’s newly arrived workers.

Meanwhile, Colorado Republican representative Mike Coffman floated a bill in the House called the BRIDGE Act to enshrine DACA into law until a permanent immigration bill passed. Florida Republican representative Carlos Curbelo of Miami introduced a new version of the DREAM Act under the title Recognizing America’s Children Act. Once more, the young leaders were conflicted over whether to support something that would exclude their parents, especially a bill they believed had so little chance of passing. They had developed new allies among Black Lives Matter activists, reproductive health advocates, Muslim Americans, and the LGBTQ community, all of whom also felt under threat. They supported the Native American protests against the Dakota Access Pipeline.5 They and the country had changed. They didn’t want to be saved. They wanted to organize so they could save themselves and their communities.

In February, Isabel and Felipe moved back to Central Florida. New York had been expensive, and they missed the sunshine. But for Felipe, the 2016 mass shooting at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, a place he’d frequented and that had welcomed not only the LGBTQ and Latino immigrant communities, was a sign: he was needed in his old stomping grounds, and he was needed to bridge the world between the activists and the rest of America.

Felipe became the point person in the Orlando mayor’s office leading up outreach to the victims and families of the Pulse massacre, his first government job. Isabel, too, was glad to be back. For so long, Isabel had yearned to be part of the intellectual rigor of academia. Only at the Graduate Center at City University of New York had they realized how much the action on the ground gave them purpose. Isabel went to work at the Florida Immigrant Coalition’s Central Florida office, returning to the organization where they had gotten their political start. Now more than ever, Florida would serve as a bellwether state for immigrant rights, and Isabel would help lead that fight.

Before leaving New York for Orlando, Felipe visited his mother in Brazil once again, and for the first time she agreed to meet his husband. Isabel had caught a cold on the long flight, and when Felipe’s mother saw them, it was as if a switch flipped. She began to fuss over Isabel, making them chicken soup and frequently checking in on them. Felipe and Isabel stayed with her for a few days, and Felipe later posted Facebook pictures of the three of them standing next to one another, awkwardly at times but finally together.

What has changed after so many years, he wondered, for her to move from "You’re a disgrace" to "I need to make soup for the person you married"? He tried to ask her, but she never seemed to answer his question. Maybe his younger cousins and uncles had influenced her. Maybe she’d finally seen how happy they were together. Maybe it was just time.

Back in Los Angeles, Dario began helping his father on the administrative side of the business, picking up Andrea from school and overseeing her homework. He began driving for Uber. And in his spare time, he finished his thesis film about his mother’s journey, sending it off to festivals in the hope that it might launch his career as a filmmaker. He tried not to think about what would happen if, under the new administration, his DACA application were not reauthorized.

On the other side of Los Angeles, as Alex awaited his final asylum hearing, he worked to implement an HIV-related research study through Children’s Hospital Los Angeles, screening at-risk queer men of color. He had begun dating a fellow undocumented immigrant and DACA recipient from Mexico, and in December 2016, the two married. They spent the holidays with Alex’s father. On Facebook, where he jokingly listed his profile as an "Exiled Political Whore," Alex shared posts asking for help to cover the nearly $465 fee for those seeking what could be their last DACA renewal. He sympathized with his husband and others who feared the loss of DACA. But he also continued to tweak activists over their focus on such a small segment of the nation’s undocumented immigrant community.

Welcome back to our reality, he thought.

Hareth began helping with her father’s business, too, ensuring the bookkeeping was up to date. At least for now, with her DACA protected status, she could secure credit cards with roughly half the interest rate her parents were given. Should anything happen to either of them under the new administration, she would be able to step in, and she would be able to care for Claudia and support Haziel. Betty and Mario increasingly feared leaving the house, but they had no choice. They needed to work. They weighed each trip to the grocery store, to a construction site, to one of Claudia’s games. Was it necessary? After the election, they argued more. Fear over their future brought long-simmering tensions to the surface.
Tennessee would later pull out of the group citing the “human element.” Ken Paxton and attorneys general in nine other states, including Erika Andiola, to further his progressive agenda.

Like Hareth, activists nationwide began mobilizing even as they began mourning. Within hours, celebrities came out on social media to offer support. Captain Marvel actor Brie Larson, Cher, Mark Ruffalo, Gigi Hadid, Kristen Bell, and Sean “Diddy” Combs spoke up, as did tech leaders such as Mark Zuckerberg. Time revisited the immigrants it had featured on its cover in 2012 for a follow-up story. Companies such as Apple, Uber, Amazon, and Microsoft pledged to help provide legal and other support for their employees with DACA. Univision announced a lobbying and media campaign in support of those with DACA, as well as promising to help affected employees. Telemundo also went public with support for them. The University of California, led by its president, Janet Napolitano, the former head of DHS, filed a lawsuit to block the dismantling of the program. So, too, did at least fifteen state attorneys general. Microsoft and Apple filed statements in support of the lawsuit. The National Congress of American Indians also announced support for those with DACA.

Over and over the young activists echoed similar words: We will NOT go back into the dark closet. We will NOT go back
into hiding. In late September, DHS finally reinstated Dario’s DACA protection, along with his two-year work permit.

In Congress, it began to look as though a stand-alone DREAM Act might once again have a chance. In July, Senator Lindsey Graham had offered a renewed version of the bill, cosponsored by fellow Republicans Jeff Flake and Dick Durbin, which quickly gained support.

The House was trickier. To pass, the bill needed 218 votes. Most of the 194 Democrats supported the proposal, and by the fall more than three dozen Republicans had signed on to some version of the bills, while dozens more had made favorable statements about them. Representative Gutiérrez knew they could easily lose both Democrats and Republicans if too much was tacked on to the bill, but if they could stave off any poison pills, and if Speaker Paul Ryan agreed to bring the bill to the floor, they might just have the votes.

Those were big ifs. Gutiérrez also understood how wary the young activists were of something that once again appeared to set them against their families. During a September 8 conference call, he addressed their ambivalence. “We need to focus on the DREAMers in a laser … way,” he insisted. “You are the most beloved, the most cared for, the most recognized. If you aren’t protected, then what chance do I have to protect your parents?”

United We Dream and other groups threw their support for the bill but urged it be a “clean” version, not one linked to the border wall or weighted down with numerous other security measures.

Everything comes with a price, Hareth thought as she followed the political debates, fearing her parents could find themselves in an even more precarious position under the latest version of the DREAM Act. But despite the uncertainty, despite her fear, she was buoyed by the support from Americans around the country, “people who are safe in their homes and have nothing to worry about, people in the top of their careers, and that matters.... These people have opted to speak up.”

In a further sign of just how much support they now enjoyed, in October 2016, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation awarded one of its $625,000 "genius grants" to thirty-three-year-old Cristina Jiménez Moreta, the leader of United We Dream.

ALTHOUGH MANY Americans might still distinguish the DACA-protected immigrants from their parents and even their peers, the very recognition of their claim to the American dream, the recognition of their humanity, has changed the broader conversation. It has forced an unwilling nation toward a reckoning of the roles played by millions of other undocumented immigrants living in the shadows.

Regardless of whether they finally achieve a legislative victory, these young leaders have already claimed a cultural one, redefining not only the terms of the immigration debate in the United States but also the definition of what it means to be an American.
remind readers of the centrality of these issues. In chapter 4, Terry MacDonald provides a conceptual and historical overview of the idea of global political justice. In chapter 5, David Lefkowitz takes a closer look at the idea of the legitimacy of international law. In chapter 6, David Held and Pietro Maffettone address the legitimacy of global governance institutions.

Chapters 7 and 8 address just war theory. Just war theory is one of the most important loci of what is defined as cross-fertilization between more traditional topics in international ethics and recent work in global political theory. In chapter 7, Laura Valentini discusses the relationship between jus ad bellum and global distributive justice. In chapter 8, Seth Lazar offers an account of killing in war based on associative obligations. His contribution is important in explaining the relevance of what are often called special relationships and the duties and obligations they generate.

Chapters 9 to 14 in Global Political Theory can be divided into three conceptually distinct clusters. The first cluster, chapters 9 and 10, discusses the issue of territoriality and the related concern for the ownership and sale of the natural resources found in a given territory. In chapter 9, David Miller and Margaret Moore provide an overview and assessment of different accounts of the nature and justification of territorial rights. They conclude by asking whether theories of territorial rights may help in answering difficult questions about contested territories. In chapter 10, Leif Wenar tackles the issue of natural resources. Who should control natural resources matters from a fairness perspective, yet, at the same time, who natural resources are controlled by has clear implications for how power is exercised by one group of human beings over another.

The second cluster, chapters 11 and 12, explicitly deals with two of the most important domains in the global economy, namely, international trade and international capital mobility. In chapter 11, Aaron James starts by discussing the very meaning of ‘fair trade’. The morality of practices approach presented by James is closely related to our present historical circumstances and to the state system as we see it, yet it also provides elements to assess critically the current system of trade from a normative perspective. In chapter 12, Peter Dietsch gives readers both an overview and an original assessment of one of the most important aspects of the global economy by addressing the controversial topic of international financial integration. His overall argument is that international financial integration, given prevailing institutional conditions, can pose threats to economic stability and self-determination and thus that substantial reforms are required in order for international financial integration to be morally desirable.

The third and final cluster in Global Political Theory, chapters 13 and 14, offers readers a way of understanding the moral aspects of global politics from a different angle by stressing the importance of human interactions with our shared environment and the relevance of our obligations to those who will come after us (but also before us). In chapter 13, Dale Jamieson and Marcello Di Paola set out what it means to do political theory in a different kind of world – one where human beings have dramatically altered the planet’s life. Finally, in chapter 14, Axel Gosseries and Danielle Zwarthoed develop the links between global justice and intergenerational fairness. They conclude by looking at the potential use of migrations as a way of replacing generations. Their contribution links our current moral and evaluative benchmarks to what we owe to those who will come after us and thus effectively gives us a way to think about the future (and past) subjects of global political theory.

If you want to join the debates about global justice, inequality, just war, territorial rights, and world trade, this is a book you have to read. Held and Maffettone have brought together a stellar group of academics, whose arguments are provocative, engaging, accessible, and important. — Michael Waizer, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

Political theory needs to catch up with the fact that many of the problems we face today can only be solved at a global level. Global Political Theory brings together leading thinkers working on the most important issues that the world must face over the coming decades. I hope it will help to set a new agenda for political theory. — Peter Singer, Princeton University and author of One World Now

The global dimension of political theory is so important these days that, without it, one often cannot understand the application of theoretical ideas, not even within the context of a national state. The essays in this volume make clear why this is the case and highlight the continuity between global and state-level theory. — Jeremy Waldron, New York University School of Law

This collection includes essays by some of the most prominent contributors to the current debate on global justice. The diversity of viewpoints represented and the real world problems and challenges to which they relate will provide the reader with a critical overview of the state of global justice as a philosophical inquiry, and why it actually matters. — Kok-Chor Tan, University of Pennsylvania

Many edited volumes have appeared in recent years on specific aspects of global political theory. However, none of these fully capture the fact that global political theory is increasingly becoming part of the core curriculum for advanced undergraduate and graduate students interested in moral and political philosophy. This original and comprehensive volume can be used for both research and teaching purposes. The number of original essays (15, including the editors’ introduction) and the conceptual progression of the chapters make this collection an ideal basic text for a course on global political theory. At the same time, the fact that the contributions are all originally developed for Global Political Theory means that scholars and research students alike will find the book relevant to their work. With contributions from leading scholars in the field, Global Political Theory is an accessible and lively book likely to become essential reading for students and teachers of political theory, philosophy and international relations. <>


This capstone of the significance of civil society for the effective functioning and development of democratic institutions and polity shows the value of academic institutional support. Anyone who wishes to effectively reform our society should closely read this report.
The civil society sector—made up of millions of nonprofit organizations, associations, charitable institutions, and the volunteers and resources they mobilize—has long been the invisible subcontinent on the landscape of contemporary society. For the past twenty years, however, scholars under the umbrella of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project have worked with statisticians to assemble the first comprehensive, empirical picture of the size, structure, financing, and role of this increasingly important part of modern life.

What accounts for the enormous cross-national variations in the size and contours of the civil society sector around the world? Drawing on the project's data, Lester M. Salamon, S. Wojciech Sokolowski, Megan A. Haddock, and their colleagues raise serious questions about the ability of the field's currently dominant preference and sentiment theories to account for these variations in civil society development. Instead, using statistical and comparative historical materials, the authors posit a novel social origins theory that roots the variations in civil society strength and composition in the relative power of different social groupings and institutions during the transition to modernity.

Drawing on the work of Barrington Moore, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and others, Explaining Civil Society Development provides insight into the nonprofit sector's ability to thrive and perform its distinctive roles. Combining solid data and analytical clarity, this pioneering volume offers a critically needed lens for viewing the evolution of civil society and the nonprofit sector throughout the world.

This book represents the capstone of a 25-year saga undertaken to rescue a crucial component of the world's social and organizational infrastructure from the virtual obscurity to which it had been consigned in the world's academic institutions, policy discussions, media coverage, and statistical systems. The social and organizational infrastructure in question is the vast collection of private, but not-for-profit, schools, clinics, hospitals, social service agencies, symphonies, human rights groups, environmental organizations, think tanks, professional associations, disaster relief and development organizations, and dozens more groups that make up what is variously termed the nonprofit, voluntary, noncommercial, civil society, or nongovernmental sector and the charitable giving and volunteering that help to support it. Few sets of institutions have been more important to improvements in the quality of life around the world, yet few have been more invisible in basic data systems, neglected in scholarly and media attention, and consequently either largely ignored or enveloped in a variety of misleading myths.

This saga started when two intrepid academics, one a young, German-born sociologist and the other an American professor who had recently completed the first economic analysis of this sector in the United States, found themselves invited to an intimate gathering of major charitable foundation leaders from around the world in Bonn, Germany, in 1991. In attendance were 10 or 12 senior foundation executives from Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands.

Discussion at this session focused on the inability of those in the nonprofit sector to attract the attention of policymakers, the media, or the academic community, let alone to represent themselves effectively to their citizens and the world. Each of the foundation leaders had been asked to come prepared to describe the scope, scale, and situation of this nonprofit or civil society sector in his or her own country, but as the meeting proceeded it became clear that there was a serious problem. Everyone had a different idea of what this sector contained, most of them quite partial or confusing. Only the Americans had even the sketchiest idea about its contours, scale, or sources of support, and even that was relatively recent and far from fully understood.

Midway through this awkward discussion, the American professor sheepishly raised his hand and, after being given the floor, called attention to this embarrassing point. I suggested that there was a way to remedy the problem but cautioned that this would require a serious, systematic, comparative effort and a willingness to set aside a variety of myths and misperceptions. A deafening silence followed. Unmoved, the senior leaders continued their groping effort to portray the sector they were part of but had little solid basis to understand.

But my remarks apparently sank in with one of the participants. At a celebratory dinner in honor of his birthday that evening, the leader of a major US charity bellowed out: "Salamon, how much would it cost to finance the kind of project you were describing this afternoon?" I did some quick mental calculations and responded with a rough estimate. "Good, let's raise that right here," he announced, and he went around the table pressing each of the participants to pledge their support for such a project. After some hemming, hawing, and temporizing that included the signing of a written agreement with the chairman of the meeting's host organization stipulating the exchange rate between Deutschmarks and dollars at which the German contribution would be paid, all the parties agreed. Thus was launched the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, for which this book is the capstone product, though not everyone present realized they had made a binding commitment, so that it took more than a year to convert that night's pledges into actual support.

Once launched, the Johns Hopkins CNP set about assembling an exceptional team of dedicated research partners, the CNP Local Associates. This trailblazing group of scholars took on what seemed at the outset to be an impossible and unrewarding task of assembling empirical knowledge about a set of institutions and behaviors for which little solid information was available and that was off the beaten academic track. The project also began assembling local advisory committees in each of the countries in which it worked.

A central premise of the project was that in order to gain visibility in policy and media circles, it was necessary to add to the moving individual stories of this sector's accomplishments solid and reliable empirical figures describing the size and economic weight of the nonprofit sector. This meant that sector stakeholders could illustrate the importance of this sector in terms that policymakers and the media find most compelling and easy to comprehend. From the outset the project also had a number of other, even more ambitious, objectives: to test,
and potentially challenge, some of the myths surrounding this sector and some of the early theories and beliefs purporting to explain why nonprofits arise and how they are financed; to legitimize the nonprofit sector as a field of study and foster a robust global community of scholars knowledgeable about this field and committed to work in it; and, most ambitious of all, to bring this sector into visibility in official statistics produced by national statistical agencies for the first time by changing the way the institutions and activities of this sector are treated in global statistical guidance systems.

Early on, the project had to confront the challenge of identifying a consensus definition of the sector it was proposing to measure. Such a definition needed to identify the same types of entities and activities in the enormously varied countries to which it would be applied, despite the enormous diversity of this sector and the vast differences in legal structures, economic circumstances, and cultural traditions that these different countries embodied. What is more, it had to do so in a way that could ultimately be incorporated into official international statistical systems. No wonder the whole enterprise met with considerable skepticism, and even some considerable derision, including within the sector itself.

But the project team persisted, thanks in important part to our Local Associates. Our commitment to a bottom-up process empowered them to start with the realities on the ground in our local sites and find the commonalities that would allow us to see the outlines of a true sector among the welter of individual organizations, behaviors, and national peculiarities. To our joy and amazement, as the first set of data began to hit the streets, other countries clamored to get into the project. As a consequence, the initial 8 countries with which we started this journey quickly grew to 13, and 13 to 2.3, and from there to 36, finally reaching well over 40 as of this writing, with good prospects of expanding further. As each group of countries joined the project, we repeated the same rigorous process of assembling reliable research partners, forming knowledgeable local advisory committees, testing our definition, assessing potential data sources, and making needed adjustments in the light of new information. Along the way, the project produced an entire book series published by Manchester University Press; 66 working papers; over 200 other articles, comparative reports, and book chapters; a series of project overview books; and two landmark additions to the official global statistical system—the Handbook on Nonprofit Institutions in the System of National Accounts (the UN NPI Handbook for short), published by the United Nations Statistics Division in 2003; and the Manual on the Measurement of Volunteer Work, published by the International Labour Office in 2011.

Inevitably, an undertaking of this scope and duration collects many debts to others without whose ingenuity, hard work, persistence, and support this project would never have achieved its promise. Altogether, 16 talented people worked at various times on the project’s core staff during its 25-year life, somewhere between 150 and 200 international researchers worked on various aspects of the project in the CNP partner countries under the guidance of our remarkable group of Local Associates, another roughly 800 individuals served on the project’s national and international advisory committees, and 94 separate organizations provided financial support. Partly out of this work as well has come a vibrant new international association dedicated to research on the global “third sector.”

The Puzzle of Civil Society Development by Lester M. Salamon

This book seeks to unravel a puzzle that has emerged from work that the present authors have undertaken over the past two decades to document the scope and structure of the nonprofit, or civil society, sector in countries throughout the world. That puzzle simply stated is this: How can we explain the enormous variations in civil society/nonprofit sector size, structure, financing, and role revealed by the powerful body of comparative data that this work has generated in more than 40 countries scattered widely across the world? Why is it, for example, that the nonprofit workforce varies from a low of barely 1 percent of the working-age population in Pakistan to over 15 percent in the Netherlands? The level of development likely plays a role here, but why, then, does the paid workforce of the civil society sector stand at nearly 10 percent of the country’s working-age population in Belgium but only 2.5 percent in Sweden—even though these two countries are at comparable levels of development? Why does government account for 65 percent of nonprofit revenue in Germany and only 36 percent in nearby Italy? And how is it that the overall size and structure of the Mexican nonprofit sector is virtually identical with that in Russia, a country seemingly worlds away?

Answers to these questions are crucial to a proper understanding of the nonprofit sector and its evolution and role. But their importance goes well beyond this. With government resources barely growing or in decline while the problems of poverty, distress, and environmental degradation are deepening daily, private, nonprofit, or civil society organizations have come to be viewed as crucial allies in the struggle to improve the quality of life on a global scale.

Because of their unique combination of private structure and public purpose, their generally smaller size, their connections to citizens, their flexibility, and their capacity to tap private initiative in support of public purposes, these organizations are increasingly being called upon to perform a number of critical functions: to help deliver vital human services; to empower the disadvantaged; to bring unaddressed problems to public attention; to give expression to artistic, religious, cultural, ethnic, social, and recreational values and impulses; to build community and foster those bonds of trust and reciprocity that are necessary for political stability and economic prosperity; and generally to mobilize individual initiative in pursuit of the common good.

Reflecting this, the accomplishment of the vast majority of the seventeen “Sustainable Development Goals” recently identified by the United Nations as the priority objectives of the international community’s “post-2015 development agenda” seem likely to depend critically on the contributions of private, civil society organizations.2 Understanding the factors that give rise to such organizations and shape their contours and roles may therefore hold the key to the success of this post-2015 agenda.

More fundamentally, unraveling this puzzle promises to provide the missing link in recent efforts to explain why nations fail. In a recent book with this title, Daron Acemoglu and James
A. Robinson argue that "[w]hile economic institutions are critical in determining whether a country is poor or prosperous, it is politics and political institutions that determine what economic institutions a country has." But what is it that determines the kind of politics and political institutions a country has? According to one promising line of research, a major part of the answer to this question lies in the presence of civic traditions emphasizing norms of trust and reciprocity—traditions that turn out to be associated with the presence of robust networks of associations, what we have termed nonprofit or civil society organizations. But what is it that gives rise to robust networks of civil society organizations? It is this question that this book seeks to answer.

Our answer departs, however, from the prevailing theories that have long dominated the academic literature on the nonprofit sector, and it challenges as well a number of popular beliefs that these theories, at least implicitly, have helped to sustain. These theories would have us believe that what gives rise to nonprofit organizations are the market-based preferences of individual consumer/ voters and producers of goods and services and/or the sentiments bequeathed by cultural traditions of altruism and caring.

More specifically, the preference theories argue that nonprofit organizations emerge to fulfill unsatisfied demands for collective goods on the part of consumers/ voters caused by inherent limitations of the market system and democratic political institutions, particularly in heterogeneous societies. Also at work, they argue, are the preferences of various social entrepreneurs or religious zealots who come forward to provide the supply of organizations to meet this demand because they see in the creation of nonprofit organizations a way to attract adherents to their religion or cause. The sentiment theories emphasize instead certain cultural values, frequently arising from religious beliefs, that incline individuals toward altruistic behaviors that require nonprofit institutions for their fulfillment.

Both of these sets of theories have a certain surface logic to them. Beyond that, they have conveniently supported a variety of firmly held popular beliefs about the nature and character of nonprofit institutions—such as the belief that nonprofit institutions are fundamentally supported by private charity and that they are a peculiarly American phenomenon and are far less prominent in countries that have established highly developed "welfare states" instead.

In the absence of solid comparative data on the scope and structure of the civil society sector around the world, it has been impossible to subject these theories to serious, cross-national, empirical testing. It has therefore been possible to believe them on faith or on the basis of their logical consistency with classical economic reasoning. But thanks to the work of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project in which I and an international team of collaborators have been involved for the past two decades, a robust body of solid, comparative data has been assembled on the civil society sectors in over 40 countries scattered broadly around the world using a common definition and common data-gathering protocols (table 1 lists these project countries). As a consequence, we now have systematic data on the size of the workforce, both paid and volunteer, of the civil society sector; the fields in which these organizations work and the scale of activity in each; the revenues of these organizations, both overall and by major source; and the economic impact these organizations generate.

As these data have come online, they have rescued the global nonprofit sector from its long-standing position as the invisible subcontinent on the landscape of modern society. In the process, we have come to recognize how far the realities of nonprofit operations globally diverge from some of the most fervently held popular beliefs that existed about this sector when we began this work. Included here were beliefs such as the following:

That no such thing as a distinctive nonprofit "sector" truly exists, but rather a confusing congeries of institutions and behaviors that blur too completely with other social institutions—market producers, governments, and households—to be capable of conceptual differentiation, let alone empirical study. To the contrary, the work we carried out through the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project has validated the existence of a set of institutions exhibiting a common set of objective definitional features in well over 40 countries that are scattered broadly throughout the world and that represent widely divergent levels of economic and social development as well as patterns of religious belief.

That the civil society sector, whatever its social importance, is not a significant economic presence. In fact, this sector is a major economic force, with a workforce that ranks among the top two or three industries in a wide range of countries.

That to the extent a nonprofit sector exists, it is largely an American phenomenon, reflecting the extraordinary generosity of the American public and the unusual American emphasis on individualism. In fact, the United States turns out to be not only not the sole country with a sizable nonprofit sector but not even the country with the largest such sector measured in terms of the relative size of its nonprofit workforce. That unlike the United States, which developed a robust nonprofit sector to handle social-welfare provision, the countries of Europe have created "welfare states" dominated by governmental provision of such services. In fact, what many of the countries of Europe have developed are "welfare partnerships" featuring extensive reliance on private nonprofit groups to deliver state-financed welfare services. In the process, the resulting nonprofit sectors have grown much larger in relative terms than their US counterpart.

That private charitable contributions—from individuals, foundations, and corporations—are the key to sustaining a vibrant set of nonprofit institutions. In fact, however, charitable contributions now account for a relatively small fraction of nonprofit revenues. Even in the United States, where many organizations do still rely heavily on charitable support, at least during their start-up periods, the sector as a whole, as defined in this project, receives less than 13 or 14 percent of its revenue from all sources of charitable giving combined. Far more important is the nearly 40 percent of all support coming from government and the 50 percent coming in the form of fees and charges. And the situation elsewhere is even more dramatic, with government accounting for 60 or 70 percent of...
the income of nonprofits in the countries with the largest and
most fully developed nonprofit sectors.

More importantly for our purposes here, we discovered
enormous variations in almost every dimension of the civil
society sector on which we were able to generate reliable
data—variations that do not seem consistent with either the
preference or sentiment theories dominant in the literature. For
example, as will be detailed more fully in chapter 3, the
presence or absence of robust nonprofit institutions does not
seem to correspond with the level of diversity of national
populations, as predicted by the preference theories. What is
more, we could find no religious tradition that failed to
emphasize personal altruism, making it unlikely that variations
in popular sentiments of caring or altruism could explain the
wide variations in the size or shape of the civil society sector
among countries that our data revealed. Indeed, some of the
countries with the strongest religiously inspired traditions of
charity and giving have some of the least fully developed civil
society sectors.

As this evidence mounted, it forced us to rethink prevailing
theories of the growth and development of civil society
institutions. More generally, we came to the conclusion that the
narrow focus on the rational choices of individual actors
maximizing their preferences for goods or services or
responding to abstract cultural values emphasized in the
preference and sentiment theories, whatever its value in
selected circumstances, was inadequate to explain the varied
dimensions of civil society development revealed by our data.
In particular, these existing explanations suffered from a more
general shortcoming common to classical and neoclassical
economics—a shortcoming that theorist Mark Granovetter has
termed “an atomized, under-socialized conception of human
action.” As Granovetter puts it: “Actors do not behave or
decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere
slavishly to a script written for them by the particular
intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy.
Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in
concrete, ongoing systems of social relations.”

Fundamentally, we will argue that this concept of
“embeddedness” applies forcefully to the development of
nonprofit institutions. Choices about whether to rely on the
market, the civil society sector, the state, or kinship networks
in the provision of key human services are not simply made freely
by individual consumers or service providers in an open
market, as the preference theories seem to imply. Nor are they
determined solely by freestanding cultural or religious
traditions. Rather, these choices, and these cultural traditions,
are heavily constrained by existing social and political
relationships that are inherited from the past and shaped by
complex interrelationships among the varying social strata and
social institutions that make up any society. These outcomes are
therefore heavily affected not simply by sentiments and
preferences but also by the exercise of political, social, and
economic power among key social groupings and institutions at
critical turning points in societal development.

This is not, of course, an entirely new observation. As Seibel has
reminded us, nonprofit organizations “are not only providers of
goods and services but important factors of social and political
coordination.” As a consequence, they do not float freely in
social space responding merely to sentiments and preferences,
as the prior theories seem to suggest. Rather, they are firmly
embedded in prevailing social, political, and economic
structures, often serving, in Seibel’s words, as “the knots within
networks of elites with reputation, finance, and power.” Civil
society theorists such as John Hall have acknowledged this
point as well, despite not working out its full implications. Hall
thus ascribes the emergence of civil society in Europe to “the
peculiar balance of forces among kings, nobility, and urban
middle-class elements.” Similarly, Gramsci points to civil society
organizations as crucial components of “the ‘trenches’ and the
permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position ...
between the forces of revolution and the forces of restoration.”
More recently, Howell and Pearce similarly emphasize civil
society’s character as an arena where “power relationships” are
“reproduced” as well as “challenged.”

Yet embeddedness in power relations has been conspicuously
absent from the dominant academic theories purporting to
explain the scope and character of the nonprofit sector. To be
sure, some observers have commented on the role of civil
society as a potential source of power. But whether because of
the heavy emphasis that sentiment theories put on civil society
as an expression of cherished values of altruism or solidarity,
or some other factor, the possibility that the civil society sector
could also be a product of power relations has largely been
downplayed or ignored.

It is the argument here that this inattention needs to be
corrected if we are to comprehend the puzzling variations in
the size, form, structure, and financing of civil society
organizations globally. But which power relationships are most
relevant?

Fortunately, we are not completely at sea in searching for
possible answers to this question. One important clue is offered
by political scientist Robert Putnam, who found himself drawn
“deep into the contrasting pasts of Italy’s regions” in order to
explain the striking variations in civic traditions and civil society
development that he argues lay behind the considerable
variations in the performance of Italian regional governments
in the 1970s and 1980s. This comparative historical approach
and its emphasis on “path dependence”—the durability of
historically rooted social relationships—is even more fully
reflected in the pioneering work of Barrington Moore, Jr., and
Dietrich Rueschemeyer and his colleagues on the “social origins”
of fascism and democracy as well as in the work of Gosta
Esping-Andersen and Theda Skocpol on the origins of the
modern welfare state.

Using this mode of analysis, Moore discerned in the historical
records of England, France, Germany, and China three distinct
“routes to the modern world”—democratic, fascist, and
communist—each of which could be attributed to a particular
constellation of relationships among landed elites, the rural
peasantry, urban working and middle classes, and the state.
Focusing on Latin America, Rueschemeyer and his colleagues
extended the range of relevant power relationships beyond
indigenous social classes to embrace international actors such
as colonial powers and a variety of essentially political
structures—such as governmental institutions and political
parties—that can magnify or lessen the power and influence
that different social groupings can wield. This latter
While neither Moore nor Esping-Andersen applies his analysis to the variations in the development of the civil society sector, and Rueschemeyer et al. and Skocpol do so only in part, there are strong reasons to believe that the mode of analysis they utilize should have considerable relevance to this question. This suggests the need for a more complex, historically rooted "social origins" analysis to account for the varied size, composition, and structure of the civil society sector in different societies.

Drawing on these insights, we formulate and test such a "social origins" explanation of global civil society development here. As is spelled out more fully in chapter 4, this explanation posits two fundamental propositions: first, that underlying the apparently random cross-national variations in key dimensions of the civil society sector lie some identifiable patterns that invite an attempt at explanation; and second, that these patterns are strongly associated with distinctive constellations of power relationships among a variety of socioeconomic groups and institutions, including landed elites, middle-class commercial and industrial interests, peasants, workers, and the institutions through which these groupings come together and express their interests and perspectives at critical moments in the histories of their societies. These critical moments often set a path, or establish propensities, that affect the evolution of important societal institutions and behaviors—including particularly civil society organizations and behaviors—for decades afterward.

Structure of Presentation

To explore these hypotheses, the discussion in the balance of this volume falls into two parts. Part I, which follows this introduction, consists of five chapters that carry the main thrust of the book’s message. Taken together, these chapters first outline in more detail the set of facts about the development of the civil society sector that this book seeks to explain and then test the ability of both the prevailing theories and the hypothesized social origins theory to explain these facts.

Thus, chapter 2 details the basic contours of the global civil society sector in the more than 40 countries on which systematic data have been assembled through the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (CNP Project). Two central conclusions emerge from this chapter: first, that the global civil society sector is far larger and more significant in more places than previous portrayals and popular assumptions suggest; and second, that some striking variations exist in many different facets of this sector, raising the intriguing possibility that these variations may hold important clues about the causes of civil society growth and development. Readers who have followed previous publications on these findings will be interested to find that the account here provides data on 10 additional countries either newly added to the project’s database or on which updated data have become available.

Against this background, chapter 3 outlines the various strands of the prevailing sentiment and preference theories and offers a first empirical test of the ability of these two sets of theories to account for the striking variations in civil society sector size and contours that chapter 2 documented. The central conclusion that emerges from these tests is that, at best, these dominant theories of civil society development account for a highly limited range of the observed variations, and at worst they support expectations that are the reverse of what the observed facts show.

Chapter 4 then lays out the proposed alternative social origins theory and the hypothesized patterns of civil society structure and functions that grow out of it. As suggested above, the heart of this theory is a model that sees the scope and structure of the civil society sector as the outcome of particular constellations of relationships among key social actors whose power is magnified or moderated by a number of important intervening factors during critical periods of development in different countries. Viewed through the lens of this theory it is possible to hypothesize the existence of at least five different patterns of civil society development and to identify the social origins likely to be associated with each.

Chapter 5 then tests this theory against the empirical data we have assembled on the size, composition, funding, and workforce structure of the civil society sector in our 41 CNP countries. It does so first by testing the extent to which the five patterns of civil society development hypothesized by the theory actually appear in the empirical record of these countries, then by determining the extent to which the factors that the theory hypothesizes to be responsible for the emergence of these patterns are actually evident in the historical record of these countries, and finally by assessing the ability of the theory to explain why some countries do not seem to fit any one of the five patterns and what development trajectory they may be on. In doing so, the chapter tests the ability of this theory not only to account for past developments but also to account for ongoing changes.

A concluding chapter to this central part of the volume—chapter 6—then summarizes the book’s major conclusion, fundamentally validating the social origins theory's explanation of the causes of the different observed patterns of civil society sector development observed in the data, acknowledges the limitations that this major conclusion nevertheless also confronts, and suggests how this theory can be deployed not only to explain the past but also to predict likely future developments.

Part II of the volume then turns from the analytical task of explaining the widespread variations in patterns of civil society development to a detailed look at the scale and shape of the civil society sector in the 10 individual countries newly added to the CNP Project’s research base or for which we now have updated data. This follows a practice of profiling newly added countries set in previous volumes in the series of books generated by this project. Given the analytical thrust of the present volume, however, we have extended the discussion in these 10 chapters to comment at least briefly on how well the social origins theory developed in the body of the book seems to account for the patterns that are evident in these additional countries. Since some of these are countries on which we now have data illustrating changes over time, we also assess the...
ability of our social origins theory not only to explain civil society sector realities at a point in time but also to understand what might be causing observed changes.

Caveats

As with any empirical study, important decisions have had to be made about the scope of this inquiry, the variables about which it has been possible to generate solid data, and the tests that could consequently be run. In particular, our focus is on what we consider to be the organizational heart of the civil society sector—the set of institutions and associated individual behaviors that lie in some sense outside the boundaries of the market, the state, and the household and that meet a set of defining features worked out through a collaborative process involving an international team of scholars at the outset of this project and then subsequently tested in each of the over 40 countries on which we conducted empirical research. As outlined more fully in appendix A, this definition focused our attention on entities that are (i) organizations, whether formally or informally constituted and whether legally registered or not; (ii) institutionally separate from government; (iii) prohibited from distributing any profits they may generate to their investors, managers, or directors; (iv) self-governing and able to put themselves out of existence on their own authority; and (v) noncompulsory, that is, engaging participants without compulsion.

We are well aware of the fact that alternative types of organizations and individual behaviors are sometimes considered parts of the civil society sector and that many other terms are often used to depict these entities and activities. When the work described here was initiated, however, the idea that any distinguishable sector of society could be identified outside the boundaries of the state and the market—let alone that it might be possible to gather systematically comparable data on it across a broad range of countries—was widely doubted and, at least in some quarters, vehemently resisted. Under the circumstances, it seemed prudent, and also highly useful, to focus on what we ultimately found through a bottom-up research process to constitute the institutional heart of this sector in the widest set of countries, recognizing that others could build on this foundation if they felt appropriate to encompass other types of institutions (e.g., cooperatives and mutuals that do not adhere to the non-distribution constraint incorporated in our definition) or other types of behaviors (e.g., unstructured forms of citizen engagement). Also weighing on our decisions was the hope that our work could influence existing official statistical systems, which had fundamentally buried the civil society sector in national economic statistics until the work of this project was able to demonstrate its true scope and size. It was therefore important to utilize a definition that could potentially be incorporated into the System of National Accounts, which guides official economic statistics around the world—a decision that paid off handsomely in the adoption by the United Nations Statistics Division in 2003 of a Handbook on Nonprofit Institutions in the System of National Accounts that incorporated our project’s definition and approach, in the issuance in 2011 by the International Labour Organization of a Manual on the Measurement of Volunteer Work, and in a new edition of the UN NPI Handbook in 2017 that extends the reach of the initial UN NPI Handbook to a broader range of so-called social economy institutions and direct volunteer activity.

Given the breadth and exploratory nature of this inquiry, moreover, it was necessary to impose some limits on the range of variables on which to focus. We selected variables that most clearly reflected the forms and levels of activity of our defined civil society organizations. We thus did not spend much time gathering data on the number of such organizations, since such data are notoriously misleading and inaccurate. Rather, we focused on employment, both paid and volunteer, expressed in full-time equivalent terms as a share of the economically active population in order to make them cross-nationally comparable;22 on the shares of revenue from various sources (philanthropy, government, and service fees); and on the fields in which organizations operate, classified using a special International Classification of Nonprofit Organizations (ICNPO) that built upon, but elaborated on, the International Standard Industrial Classification system used in most international economic statistics. Most of the data reported here were generated over an 18-year period stretching from 1995 through 2012. In a number of countries, time series data are available covering significant portions of the period, while in others work was undertaken more recently and earlier data are not available.

Despite these limitations, we are convinced that the data assembled and analyzed here represent the most detailed and reliable cross-national empirical picture of the global civil society sector available in the world. The data were generated using exacting standards of comparability by teams of researchers guided by a common set of research protocols and an agreed-upon common definition and were carefully monitored by a skilled staff. What is more, the data gain further credence from the fact that the project’s procedures and definition were subsequently incorporated into the official Handbook on Nonprofit Institutions in the System of National Accounts, issued as a publication of the United Nations Statistics Division in 2003, and adopted to date by 20 countries ranging from Canada to Kyrgyzstan and from New Zealand to Norway. We therefore believe that this body of data, while far from perfect, is sufficiently robust, reliable, and comparable to sustain the analysis presented here and that it offers important insights into the patterns of development of civil society institutions in an exceedingly wide range of countries embodying widely disparate levels of economic development, extensive regional diversity, and virtually every major religious tradition.

Finally, although we believe this book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of civil society sector development by calling attention to a set of factors that has been overlooked or downplayed in previous accounts, we are well aware of the enormous complexity of the social processes our book attempts to unravel and are not suggesting any single causal explanation. Indeed, the social origins theory elaborated here itself embraces a diverse mixture of factors that interact in complex and dynamic ways. Nor do we expect that the tests we have been able to generate on this theory constitute a definitive proof for all countries for all time. As we note again in the conclusion, data on countries not covered by this study may yield new evidence that will require modifications or even substantial revisions of
this approach. Our contention, rather, is that the factors associated with this theory seem to help significantly in accounting for the known facts and should therefore no longer be ignored.

With these caveats in mind, we turn now to what these data tell us about the scope, structure, financing, and role of the global civil-society sector and about the country-by-country variations in these dimensions that are also powerfully apparent.

Conclusion and Implications by Lester M. Salamon and S. Wojciech Sokolowski

As the previous chapters show, the social origins theory of the civil society sector carries us considerably far down the road toward explaining the diverse size, shape, functions, and support structure of the civil society sector around the world, and does so considerably better than the existing theories that have been deployed up to now. What the analysis here reveals is that while the civil society sector may be a conduit for altruistic sentiments and personal preferences, the size of the sector and the shape that it takes depend heavily on the broader structures of power relationships in society. Restoring considerations of power to the center of analysis of civil society thus emerges as a central imperative if we are to understand the path that civil society development takes.

Of course, this corroborate in a number of representative cases does not represent a definitive proof. Further inquiry is needed to provide additional evidence and to test alternative explanations and causal relations. Data on countries not covered by this study may yield new evidence that will require modifications or even substantial revisions of the social origins of civil society theory.

As it stands, however, the social origins theory goes beyond the prevailing explanations of civil society development stressing the presence or absence of various sentiments or preferences by emphasizing the embeddedness of civil society institutions in prevailing power relationships in society as these relationships evolve over time. In the process, this theory proves able to explain developments that these other theories cannot. One of them is the robust growth of the civil society sector in countries with generous public welfare programs. Another is the relatively small size of the sector in countries where government public welfare programs are minimal or virtually nonexistent. And yet others are the peculiar variations in the functions carried out by the sector, the revenue sources on which it relies, and the levels of volunteer participation it engages from place to place.

Also of particular interest within this refrained explanation of civil society development is the significant connection that emerges between the growth of the civil society sector and the strength of labor movements and their political extensions. This connection is often missed in public perception, as civil society and organized labor are often seen as two separate social institutions pursuing wholly disparate, if not mutually antagonistic, goals. But the contribution of the labor movement to the development of the civil society sector is significant and takes two different forms. In the first place, organized labor has created a wide array of self-help groups and clubs serving the needs of the working class. And in the second, organized labor’s demands have often leveraged government policies that create favorable conditions for general civil society sector growth. This observation brings us back to the observation of Kwame Nkrumah, cited in chapter 2, that helped explain our emphasis on the organizational core of civil society. As Nkrumah put it: “We must organize as never before, for organization decides everything.”

A final implication of the analysis here is the realization that civil society institutions, broadly conceived, can function not only as sources of protection and support for those at the bottom of the social and economic pyramid but also as convenient excuses for evading more robust forms of assistance to those in greatest need or, worse yet, as instruments for suppressing more radical forms of social and political activism. In its heyday, the liberal pattern of civil society development functioned very much in the former way, while the early development of the welfare partnership pattern had elements of the latter—and there is a danger that recent appearances of this pattern in Russia and China could evolve in the same way.

The social origins of civil society theory seems able to explain not only why some culturally different and geographically distant countries fall into the same patterns of civil society development but also why certain others deviate from the initially hypothesized patterns. The key to this explanation for both sets of countries is the analysis of the dynamics of power relations among key social actors, socioeconomic classes, and institutions representing or mediating their class interests.

The real promise of the social origins of civil society theory may ultimately lie elsewhere, however. For if this set of factors can explain what has happened in the past, it may also be capable of yielding reasonable hunches about what might be lurking on the horizon if present trends continue.

Stated differently, the social origins of civil society theory can not only explain the past but also help forecast the future. This can offer valuable insights into possible outcomes in rapidly changing parts of the world. For example, what might the social origins of civil society theory suggest about likely developments of the civil society sector in such turbulent regions as Central and East Asia or the Middle East? In Central Asia, a number of former Soviet republics seceded from the Russian Federation, forming new sovereign countries and potentially opening new space for civil society development. At the same time, China instituted a series of reforms that radically liberalized its economy. A rather different development occurred in the Middle East. Following the example of Turkey, many Middle Eastern countries instituted statist regimes in the 1950s and 1960s to promote rapid modernization of their traditional societies and economies, but, unlike Turkey, most of them failed to achieve that objective due to a combination of international and domestic factors. This failure to produce the promised results undermined the legitimacy of the statist regimes and fueled growing popular dissent, manifested by the Arab Spring and, in other places, by fundamentalist religious movements.
Despite their fundamentally different natures, developments in both of these sets of regions spurred renewed interest in the potential of civil society, creating a wave of optimism about its future in Asia and the Middle East. Yet the social origins of civil society theory suggests a much more sober, and perhaps more realistic, view of the situation. Despite far-reaching political transformations, the power relations in many of the countries in these parts of the world have not been transformed that much. In the newly independent states of Central Asia and in China, the state still holds the hegemonic power it did throughout the second half of the 20th century. In the Middle East, the military exercises hegemonic power in countries ruled by both secular regimes, like Egypt, and by fundamentalist theocracies, like Iran or Saudi Arabia. The social origins of civil society theory would therefore predict that the civil society sector in these countries will continue to face constraints and is likely to remain caught in the statist pattern—with its characteristic features of small size, limited volunteer participation, and low government support—for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the collapse of the central state in countries like Libya, Syria, or Iraq is likely to perpetuate the traditional pattern of civil society development, or perhaps a fundamentalist variant of it characterized by tight control by clerical authorities, private philanthropy as a major, but confining, revenue source, and a growing reliance on religiously based charitable organizations that utilize access to human services as a vehicle of social control and religious mobilization.

But prescient as it might be about future outcomes in the absence of changes in prevailing structures of power, the social origins of civil society theory is also available as a guide to the steps needed to alter the current trajectories. If by bringing a fresh set of insights into our understanding of the important social phenomenon represented by the global civil society sector, this book succeeds in bridging the gap that has long existed between the study of civil society and the study of the broader dynamics of social reality with which it is so intimately intertwined, it will have served its purpose well. This, at any rate, would be our hope.

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Hitler in Los Angeles: How Jews Foiled Nazi Plots Against Hollywood and America by Steven J. Ross [Bloomsbury USA, 9781620405628]

The chilling, little-known story of the rise of Nazism in Los Angeles, and the Jewish leaders and spies who recruited who stopped it.

No American city was more important to the Nazis than Los Angeles, home to Hollywood, the greatest propaganda machine in the world. The Nazis plotted to kill the city’s Jews and to sabotage the nation’s military installations: plans existed for hanging twenty prominent Hollywood figures such as Al Jolson, Charlie Chaplin, and Samuel Goldwyn; for driving through Boyle Heights and machine-gunning as many Jews as possible; and for blowing up defense installations and seizing munitions from National Guard armories along the Pacific Coast.

U.S. law enforcement agencies were not paying close attention—preferring to monitor Reds rather than Nazis—and only Leon Lewis and his daring ring of spies stood in the way. From 1933 until the end of World War II, attorney Leon Lewis, the man Nazis would come to call “the most dangerous Jew in Los Angeles,” ran a spy operation comprised of military veterans and their wives who infiltrated every Nazi and fascist group in Los Angeles. Often rising to leadership positions, this daring ring of spies uncovered and foiled the Nazi’s disturbing plans for death and destruction.

Featuring a large cast of Nazis, undercover agents, and colorful supporting players, Hitler in Los Angeles, by acclaimed
historian Steven J. Ross, tells the story of Lewis's daring spy network in a time when hate groups had moved from the margins to the mainstream.

Hitler in Los Angeles: How Jews Foiled Nazi Plots Against Hollywood and America, by Steven J. Ross, shows how seriously the Nazis in power in Germany took the influence of Hollywood movies—not only on Americans, but on their own population.

Georg Gyssling was a German diplomat whose function was to see that no anti-Nazi films were released by the Hollywood studios. He succeeded in finding out what films were scheduled to go into production and if they contained any criticism of the Nazi regime.

Gyssling made it explicitly clear that Nazism wasn’t exportable (Europeans living under Mussolini or Franco might not agree) and he was “The Most Charming Nazi in Los Angeles.”

Hitler in Los Angeles describes the actions of different power centers—the (mostly Jewish) movie moguls who, except for Warner Bros., accommodated the Nazi regime for as long as they could in order to keep their European business functioning; Nazi diplomats in Los Angeles who threatened actors, writers, and producers, and who tried to blacklist Jewish stars like Edward G. Robinson; Martin Dies and other members of the House un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), who were investigating subversive Nazi activity in the United States; and fifth columnists who worked for the Germans or their American agents.

It’s also the story of anti-Semites like Senators Gerald Nye and Bennett Clark, who investigated what they considered anti-Nazi propaganda in films. Members of America First, they turned their hearings into anti-Semitic rallies.

A campaign to impeach President Roosevelt was reaching its climax when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and Germany declared war on the United States.

The Nazis became the enemy, a state which many of the people described in Hitler in Los Angeles had long recognized. (American citizens of Japanese descent also became the enemy, proving that racism was not a uniquely Nazi phenomenon.)

Many Americans had worked before the war to provide the US government with information about Nazi threats and turned after the war to fighting for civil rights for other groups. Unfortunately, many, like Leon Lewis, saw society become less tolerant, not more.

The main lesson author Steven J. Ross takes from this story is that every American is responsible for protecting every other American.

Rome Measured and Imagined: Early Modern Maps of the Eternal City by Jessica Maier [University of Chicago Press, 9780226127637]
Following these two aspects—of form and content, if you will—in the period under discussion, this book shows how they were constantly debated, combined, and adapted rather flexibly. If each chapter represents a different stage in these negotiations, the story ends when the boundaries between the various options have become rigid rather than fluid.

The first chapter, "Toward a New City Image," brings together the earliest city images from the Quattrocento and introduces the two trends of orthogonality and pictorialism in their nascent stages.

While Leon Battista Alberti’s Descriprio Urbis Romae (c. 1450) explains how the city and its monuments should be measured, Francesco Rosselli published a picture (c. 1485) that, even though it is now lost, had immense influence on how people imagined the unique city of Rome.

The second chapter, "Putting Rome in Drawing," gives us the humanist antiquarian scholars, fervently measuring and drawing the ancient city in order to preserve its memory and to serve as basis for new architectural projects. Although both goals were clearly aligned in their wish to let new Rome be reborn from the old, they did in fact elicit different approaches. Architects, like Sebastiano Serlio, favored and further developed orthogonality, whereas the pictorial mode served the memory formation of ancient Rome, as the work of Andrea Fulvio shows. Interestingly, the primary protagonist of this chapter, Raphael, seems to have gradually changed his mind with regard to this debate.

The third chapter, "Syntheses," is devoted to Leonardo Bufalini’s Plan of Rome (1551). It is no coincidence that this map occupies the middle of Maier’s narrative, since it functions as the point toward which earlier city images develop, and the point from which later prints can be seen to both derive and diverge. Bufalini’s map is indeed remarkable, and counterintuitive if considered from a traditional teleological viewpoint. With Maier’s framework in mind it makes more sense. In the debate between orthogonality and pictorialism, Bufalini takes a radical standpoint, choosing the first without hesitation. However, with regard to Rome’s chronology, his map fuses all time layers into one map, making it an image of "sixteenth-century Roman culture, where the past is sometimes encroached on the present, and mathematics could be pressed into the service of the imagination" (p. 78).

The fourth chapter, "Antitheses," discussing prints by Pirro Ligorio and Stefano Du Pâarac among others, shows how maps printed in the century after Bufalini distance themselves from him, but still build on him. The “anachronistic” mingling of old and new Rome is put to the wayside in favor of separate images of “Roma antica” and “Roma nuova,” gradually shifting the focus to the second. Furthermore, although the purely orthogonal representation of Rome is not followed, the contours of the city measured by Bufalini are taken as the standard for pictorial plans and views. They thereby do benefit from the advances in technology, and become more lifelike as result.

The fifth chapter, "Before the Eyes of the Whole World," continues on this note, showing what a combination of pictorialism with further exactitude in measuring and representation can amount to. Prints by Antonio Tempesta, Giovanni Maggi, Lieven Cruyl, and others represent the variation that is still possible in a genre in which topicality is ever more valued. Baroque Rome appears the sole protagonist of these maps, often by mediation of the church, and by now finds a still larger audience also outside of Rome.

Presenting Battista Falda’s Planta grande (1676) as the ultimate peak of this development, the epilogue considers how in the eighteenth century the two trends finally and definitively grow apart, with on the one hand the orthogonal map by Giambattista Nolli (1748) and on the other the famous Prospetto by Giuseppe Vasi (1761). However, Piranesi reminds us that there always remains room for creativity and flexibility.

Each of the maps discussed in Rome Measured and Imagined has already received rigorous treatment in other publications, which may be more suited for a detailed appreciation of their artistry. However, this book is also adorned with fine images: the most important ones collected in a quire of color plates, and others throughout the book to support Maier’s observations. Most importantly, this book lets us set our modern preoccupation with exactitude aside when we think of cartography. Instead, we can now consider these city portraits as an early modern genre, that is best appreciated in its interaction with other scholarly, artistic, and literary genres. To see that maps of Rome, just like antiquarian treatises, drawings, or poems, also represent a certain perspective, this book is most valuable.

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The Social and Political Philosophy of Mary Wollstonecraft, edited by Sandrine Bergès and Alan Coffee [Oxford University Press, 9780198766841]

Interest in the contribution made by women to the history of philosophy is burgeoning. Intense research is underway to recover their works which have been lost or overlooked. At the forefront of this revival is Mary Wollstonecraft. While she has long been studied by feminists, and later discovered by political scientists, philosophers themselves have only recently begun to recognise the value of her work for their discipline. This volume brings together new essays from leading scholars, which explore Wollstonecraft’s range as a moral and political philosopher of note, both taking a historical perspective and applying her thinking to current academic debates. Subjects include Wollstonecraft’s ideas on love and respect, friendship and marriage, motherhood, property in the person, and virtue and the emotions, as well as the application her thought has for current thinking on relational autonomy, and animal and children’s rights. A major theme within the book places her within the republican tradition of political theory and analyses the contribution she makes to its conceptual resources.
Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797), a famous and prolific writer whose work was translated into several languages during her lifetime, reflected on the philosophical and political issues connected with the topics current at that time. Her ideas focus on important themes such as how a community organizes itself and what is wrong with the general positions of women in society. Today, her writing serves as an example of a proto-feminist approach which articulates this special problem of the sexes as an elementary moment in political philosophy. Nonetheless, although these issues have continued to be relevant, Wollstonecraft’s position is debated within feminist theory. Her writings satisfy the claims of the feminist approach insofar as they contain a decisive critique of patriarchal dominion which points to political misogyny, presented in just as decisive a critique of Rousseau’s double morals in his political representational claims and the educational and political model he had drafted for women. Rousseau’s model excluded women from egalitarian participation, which was defended by Wollstonecraft in a general and radical claim for the participation of everyone, male or female.

What makes Wollstonecraft so controversial among feminist thinkers is, above all, her critique of women’s weaknesses and their acceptance of their own slavery, seemingly begging for food instead of fighting for freedom. Women, she wrote, subject themselves to domination, “creeping in the dust” and relinquishing their dignity. Consequently, Wollstonecraft’s sisters in gender, emphasizing the need for unity among the suppressed sex, called Wollstonecraft herself a misogynist. This feminist critique pointed out the masculinism of (her) reasoning. One of their main arguments was that with reference to the ideal of reasonability, Wollstonecraft had denied or neglected the female perspective, the importance of otherness, in feminist political and social reasoning. Under this polemic arc, the authors of this collection have gathered material to sketch the current discussion on topics of feminist political and social philosophy.

With this background in mind, the contributions endeavor to engage with this outstanding writer. Wollstonecraft’s thoughts are redefined in today’s language, reflecting today’s questions. The authors present a wide variety of perspectives on a group of texts which emerged at a time when questions that still occupy us today were articulated for the first time. Today these questions are subjected to a multi-faceted interpretation which arises from the problems we face today. The essays do not praise Wollstonecraft as the forerunner of proto-feminist ideas, nor do they interpret her as a self-denominating politician. In general, a prudent approach to explaining and understanding Wollstonecraft’s daring ideas is offered.

In reading Wollstonecraft today, and taking her thoughts into account from today’s perspective, one is struck by the power of this philosopher. Leaving aside biased interpretations of female or male dichotomies, stigmatized political demands, or the extensively discussed reason-emotion dualism, we find a differentiated and deliberate presentation of Wollstonecraft’s thoughts, which for that reason seem much more familiar to the philosopher of the 21st century. Beyond the one-dimensional justification of a feminist, or rationalist and therefore misogynist, philosopher of the 18th century, we discover a discussion beyond the pro or contra of sexist-driven politics.

Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792) is a standard text for feminist political philosophy and has become important and influential in this field. Wollstonecraft is a political philosopher who carried on discussions with contemporaries such as Edmund Burke, Thomas Paine and Catharine Macaulay at their levels. Wollstonecraft’s writings were widely available then and still are today, a tradition nearly uninterrupted. Today her writings are also accessible as printed material and online. There is no doubt that this satisfies one of the main conditions for integrating her ideas into the canon of philosophy. Due to this easy and varied availability, the contributors do not quote from the same sources, which seems acceptable.

The collection is basically divided into three conceptual approaches. The editors start by presenting a somewhat chronological attempt at historic positioning -- papers occupied with Wollstonecraft’s own references to historic political philosophy. Wollstonecraft’s thoughts on classical authors are included. Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics frame this kind of deliberate reinterpretation and repositioning of Wollstonecraft’s thoughts. Sylvana Tomaselli investigates the analysis of inequalities with regard to love, esteem and respect, referring thereby to the 18th century debates on platonic topics dealt with in the works of Burke and Price, and reviewed by Wollstonecraft in her journalistic analyses. This contextual re-positioning results in what has been called a more deliberate and differentiated approach, which does not allow the propagation of general claims such as the radical abolishment of inequality, as “she did not in fact seem to believe the eradication of the consequences of innate differences possible,” as Tomasselli states. Astonishing statements, among them that Wollstonecraft had never claimed “women were equal or unequal to men” are found and explained. As inequality could only be identified with regard to the task of being a woman, Tomaselli tries to explain and to break through the dichotomist clusters of political and gender classification. Nancy Kendrick follows with an article rereading Wollstonecraft’s interpretation of how a marriage should be conceptualized in a sphere of equality or complementarity, reflecting Aristotle’s ideas on marriage and friendship.

Finally, in the third article taking this historical approach, Martina Reuter definitely denies that the dichotomous clustering between reason and passion, mind and emotion, could contribute to an original understanding of Wollstonecraft’s intentions. According to Reuther, Wollstonecraft’s interpretation of passion and its strong dependency on reason demonstrates how she conceptualizes the dependency of reason on nature. This interpretation may be seen as a fundamental key to a new way of reading Wollstonecraft today -- as a kind of relational thinker, here traced back in her origins to one of her most admired idols, Catharine Macaulay, and to Macaulay’s reference to the Stoics.

The second part offers re-interpretations of social and political demands and expands on Wollstonecraft’s ideas, which were constrained between individual liberty and egalitarian values. Catriona Mackenzie rebuts the earlier feminist critique of Wollstonecraft’s “masculine” claim on autonomy and considers it a necessary precondition to a self-determined and meaningful life. Wollstonecraft’s interpretation of women as both despots and slaves “allowed her to look beyond slavery as a relation of total powerlessness on one side and total
power on the other, and to open up the space for complicated questions of complicity, resistance, and agency. The author shows that a one-dimensional understanding of Wollstonecraft cannot do justice to her dynamic and particularized point of view. Beyond all defensible critique of a patriarchal suppression, Wollstonecraft focuses on the ideal of the individualist as a central democratic endowment for citizenship. Rights and duties, sketched out by Wollstonecraft and compared to Burke, Rousseau, Bentham, Kant and others, allow the reader to experience her thoughts through the canonical classics in the discussion of rights for women, children and animals.

The collection concludes with essays on republicanism, a topic widely discussed by women philosophers of the early modern period. From the early 18th century with Mary Astell until the end of the century, whether in England with Catharine Macaulay, or in France, where Olympe de Gouges and Sophie de Grouchy publicly took part in the discussion, the prolific outcome of women’s contributions to this topic has become widely acknowledged. In fact, Karen Green in A History of Women’s Political Thought in Europe, 1700-1800, [Cambridge University Press, 9781107085831] has pointed out that the political democratic movement cannot be satisfactorily understood unless the writings of women are considered. Women’s protest about having been systematically excluded from the benefits of citizenship and deprived of their voices is a core theme of that period, shared by women as well as male intellectuals.

Philip Pettit continues with ideas on the question of domination in marriage using Ibsen’s play, A Doll’s House. Susan James delivers a fruitful comparison of Wollstonecraft’s concept of rights in her Vindication of the Rights of Men and the Vindication of the Rights of Women, two main volumes published within two years of each other. Answering the general claim that the second book does not treat the concept of rights at all, James offers a conceptual interpretation of what Wollstonecraft determines rights to mean in the specific context of women’s divestment in the political area. The reader’s perspective on Wollstonecraft is broadened by the introduction of the role of natural rights and natural law as functional elements of Wollstonecraft’s republican idea of liberty. Lena Hallidenius concludes this part by insisting that political representation is not symbolic but the claim for a “direct share in government.”

Particularly in the closing contributions of the editors, but also in the general framework of the book, the philosophy of Wollstonecraft is presented in the context of current discussions, from a feminist as well as from a general political perspective. The collection abandons the schemata of fruitless one-dimensional interpretations that position Wollstonecraft as either a proto-feminist or a rationalist misogynist. Her feminist ideas are embedded in a broader reflection that begins by retracing her sources back to the classics, and follows by positioning her thoughts with the republican ideas of natural laws, pointing to the relevance of her ideas in identifying questions about rights and duties in a socially and politically diverse society. Moreover, the collection shows the necessity of an exegesis of the philosophy of women. It confirms Wollstonecraft as an inspirational writer of the Enlightenment period whose ideas sketch out future concepts, the relevance of which scholars are only beginning to discover. The importance of her writing on the perspectives of women’s issues in the broader republican and democratic context, the question of representation and egalitarian participation, are becoming increasingly necessary for feminism, and therefore for the political discussion. Reviewed by Ruth Hagengruber, Paderborn University. <>

Perpetrators: The World of the Holocaust Killers by Guenter Lewy [Oxford University Press, 9780190661137]

"Monsters exist, but they are too few to be truly dangerous. More dangerous are the common men, the functionaries ready to believe and to act without asking questions." Primo Levi’s words disclose a chilling truth: assigning blame to hideous political leaders, such as Hitler, Himmler, and Heydrich, is necessary but not sufficient to explain how the Holocaust could have happened. These leaders, in fact, relied on many thousands of ordinary men and women who made the Nazi machine work on a daily basis--members of the killing squads, guards accompanying the trains to the extermination camps, civilian employees of the SS, the drivers of gas trucks, and the personnel of death factories such as Auschwitz. Why did these ordinary people collaborate and willingly become mass murderers? In Perpetrators: The World of the Holocaust Killers, Guenter Lewy tries to answer one of history’s most disturbing questions.

Lewy draws on a wealth of previously untapped sources, including letters and diaries of soldiers who served in Russia, the recollections of Jewish survivors, archival documents, and most importantly, the trial records of hundreds of Nazi functionaries. The result is a ghastly, extraordinarily detailed portrait of the Holocaust perpetrators, their mindset, and the motivations for their actions.

Combining a rigorous historical analysis with psychological insight, the book explores the dynamics of participation in large-scale atrocities, offering a thought-provoking and timely reflection on individual responsibility for collective crimes. Lewy concludes that the perpetrators acted out of a variety of motives--a sense of duty, obedience to authority, thirst for career, and a blind faith in anti-Semitic ideology, among others. A witness to the 1938 Kristallnacht himself and the son of a concentration camp survivor, Lewy has searched for the reasons of the Holocaust out of far more than theoretical interest: it is a passionate attempt to illuminate a dismal chapter of his life--and of human history--that cannot be forgotten.

Flawed Justice

Over seventy years have passed since the liberation of the notorious Nazi concentration and extermination camp at Auschwitz by the Russian army in January 1945. Yet, even today, the German state continues to convict and sentence former SS guards who served at Auschwitz--a symbol of the Holocaust--despite the advanced age and declining health of both perpetrators and witnesses. Has Germany always demonstrated the political will to try such perpetrators, decades after the commission of the acts? What about the uniformity of sentences imposed? In an insightful new work, Guenter Lewy examines these key questions as well as others,
focusing specifically on the perpetrators—their crimes, their motivations, and justice received. His book, while a difficult read, makes an important contribution to our understanding of the Holocaust.

As one can perhaps surmise by its title, *Perpetrators: The World of the Holocaust Killers* is a grim and unrelenting work, which, like most of its predecessors, spares no detail in order to illuminate the horrific acts associated with facilitators of the Holocaust at the ground level. The author writes, "Much of the book, unfortunately, reads like a catalogue of horrors." Thus, the focus of Lewy’s book is on the killers themselves, as opposed to bureaucrats or staff members who enabled the Holocaust from a distance, avoiding close contact with the victims. It is in the tradition of earlier works, among them Christopher Browning's *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police: Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (1992), Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s *Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (1996), and Saul Friedlander’s *Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939-1945: The Years of Extermination* (2007), the second of a two-part history. Each of these describes in graphic detail the nature of the perpetrators’ roles, and each draws its own conclusion as to what motivated the killers. Lewy follows suit in *Perpetrators*.

The author brings several unique perspectives to his survey of Holocaust perpetrators. He witnessed Kristallnacht as a child and his father survived a short internment at the notorious Buchenwald concentration camp. For Lewy, "taking up the subject of why so many ordinary Germans participated in Nazi crimes was ... of more than theoretical interest. It illuminates a chapter in my personal life that I cannot and should not forget." Lewy is passionate yet objective throughout the book, despite the one-sided nature of his subject matter. Also unique is his source material; the author relies heavily on evidence not previously available in the English language.

Most important here are the German court trial records of many of the Nazi functionaries and perpetrators, particularly those that focus on crimes committed during the years 1939-45. Of course, the German legal system continues to try perpetrators, as mentioned above, so the author also references those trial transcripts. In addition, Lewy includes other non-English-language sources, such as letters from German soldiers assigned in the East to their families back home; diaries; and eyewitness accounts, previously untapped, from Jewish survivors of the Holocaust. Collectively, Lewy’s sources and personal insight add depth and value to the growing literature focusing specifically on the Holocaust perpetrator perspective.

*Perpetrators* is organized clearly and logically. Following an introduction that contains a useful survey of the literature to set the context, Lewy divides the book into seven chapters. The first four analyze categories of killers: concentration camp guards, members of the mobile task force death squads (Einsatzgruppen), and those who served in death camps—those designed specifically to kill rather than "concentrate" Jews and other persons deemed unworthy of life by the Third Reich. Chapter 5 provides valuable insight on what options were available for those who chose not to participate in the killings, and how the chain of command dealt with them. In the penultimate chapter, the longest and perhaps most useful, Lewy effectively describes the inadequacies of postwar judicial systems that resulted in "flawed justice" for the perpetrators as a whole. (It is one of Lewy’s central arguments and provides the title for this review.) The final chapter provides the author’s conclusions as to what motivated "ordinary people" to kill, essentially adding to the conversation established over time by Browning and Goldhagen, among many others.

The strengths of *Perpetrators* are the added depth and breadth the book brings to Holocaust discussions. While descriptions of the atrocities are familiar to specialists, Lewy’s use of court records includes eyewitness accounts that convey a very personal, ground-level view of what transpired. Accounts of participants, victims, and eyewitnesses regarding the mass killings, crimes against women and children (as well as infants), and medical experimentation are particularly devastating, harrowing to read, and difficult to imagine. The author includes accounts of well-known as well as obscure perpetrators, whether members of the SS, the Wehrmacht, or other national contingents who willingly participated in the mass murder of Jews. Collectively, the accounts encapsulate the horrors of the perpetrator world and are perhaps necessary to gain an understanding of the magnitude of the crimes committed on behalf of the Nazi state. They also help to put into context the extent of justice doled out to the perpetrators once put on trial.

This leads to perhaps the book’s greatest contribution: Lewy’s insights on "flawed justice." The author shows us that in many cases justice was either not served or served unevenly at best. As an example, Lewy shows that through the year 2005, (West) German authorities had brought charges against 16,704 alleged perpetrators, from an estimated population of well over 100,000 potential killers in the organizations most involved. Of these, only 981 were accused of offenses involving killing, and of that small number only 182 received the maximum sentence—life imprisonment—under German law (pp. 88-89). (Note that Germany abolished the death sentence in 1949; relatively few German courts administered that penalty prior to that time. By comparison, the Allied military tribunals in the western zones of occupation executed a far greater number of convicted perpetrators—approximately 6,500—before 1949.)

Lewy posits several reasons for this seemingly dismal record. Among them were the difficulty in finding and trying defendants in the chaos of the immediate postwar period, the ebb and flow of German public opinion that favored perpetrators during much of the Cold War, and the political-military climate of the Cold War itself. Another reason is the differing legal standards between the Allied military tribunal system and the German civil system; the Allies employed a "common design" framework in which defendants could be charged based on membership in a killing organization or assignment at a death camp, regardless of their specific role in the machinery of killing. Most useful are Lewy’s insights into the inner workings of the German court system, with the ebb and flow of judicial rulings, legislative changes, and reaction to public opinion. Lewy characterizes the postwar German judiciary as "tainted." For example, many postwar judges were members of the Nazi Party, and the state retained many of them despite the Allies' systematic denazification program. Hence, those who escaped justice themselves were sitting in judgment of others. As a result, many judges were sympathetic with defendants, resulting in inconsistent or reduced sentences. Of course, complicating all of this was the political-military
atmosphere within Germany, especially with the onset of the Cold War. The Allies, in need of West Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, ceased the aggressive pursuit of war criminals, also resulting in commutations or reduced sentences. In the decades since, with generational changes and shifts in German attitudes, the German state today continues to convict Holocaust killers with marked determination. However, as Lewy notes, the opportunity for future trials is rapidly diminishing with the passage of time.

Finally, the author adds his personal take on what motivated the perpetrators to kill so many innocents, particularly women, children, and infants. Indeed, by simply mentioning the term "ordinary men," Lewy enters the intellectual fray with the other authors previously mentioned. Lewy, like others before him, argues that "there was no typical perpetrator." He disagrees with Goldhagen's thesis regarding eliminationist anti-Semitism: "With regard to the motivational cause of the Holocaust, for the majority of perpetrators, a monocausal explanation does not suffice." Lewy contends that there is no single explanation for why perpetrators killed, nor was there any single murderous prototype. He recites a litany of potential reasons, then discounts them one by one as singular causes. The author does agree, however, with many Browning's social constructs that existed within such organizations as the Reserve Police Battalion 101, which made it easier for killers to kill, although he would argue that anti-Semitism played a larger role in perpetrator motivation than Browning argues in *Ordinary Men*. (Browning focuses primarily on structural reasons, such as the Nazi indoctrination policy regarding the Jews, rather than any latent anti-Semitism on the part of ordinary Germans, as more critical in motivating perpetrators.) Lewy's argument is thus nuanced and based on multiple influences, none of which is pre-deterministic: "None of these factors creates causality or dictates a person's behavior... There remains an element of personal agency".

Some may question the book's length; it is only 136 pages, excluding notes and index. Perhaps it could have been published as a chapter or journal article, or made longer with additional depth, evidence, and insight provided by Lewy's excellent source material. Regardless, the author makes a valuable contribution by providing detail on the perpetrators and by offering his views on what motivated the killers. His embellishment of each chapter with specific court case evidence and/or testimony is particularly noteworthy.

Due to its specialized nature, *Perpetrators* will be of most interest to students of the Holocaust and perhaps not as much to the general reader, who may turn to different sources for a broader portrayal--one focusing beyond the world of the killers themselves.

Nevertheless, the book represents the most recent scholarship on these critical topics, and readers will benefit from Lewy's valuable insights on how the German justice system dealt with perpetrators, a subject still relevant seventy-two years after the liberation of Auschwitz and the end of World War II.

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This groundbreaking international bestseller lays to rest many myths about the Holocaust: that Germans were ignorant of the mass destruction of Jews, that the killers were all SS men, and that those who slaughtered Jews did so reluctantly. Hitler’s Willing Executioners provides conclusive evidence that the extermination of European Jewry engaged the energies and enthusiasm of tens of thousands of ordinary Germans. Goldhagen reconstructs the climate of “eliminationist anti-Semitism” that made Hitler’s pursuit of his genocidal goals possible and the radical persecution of the Jews during the 1930s popular. Drawing on a wealth of unused archival materials, principally the testimony of the killers themselves, Goldhagen takes us into the killing fields where Germans voluntarily hunted Jews like animals, tortured them wantonly, and then posed cheerfully for snapshots with their victims. From mobile killing units, to the camps, to the death marches, Goldhagen shows how ordinary Germans, nurtured in a society where Jews were seen as unalterable evil and dangerous, willingly followed their beliefs to their logical conclusion.

**The German Historians: Hitler’s Willing Executioners and Daniel Goldhagen** by Fred Kautz [Black Rose Books, 9781551642123]

In 1997, Daniel Goldhagen published his groundbreaking international bestseller entitled Hitler’s Willing Executioners, which he believed would lay to rest many myths about the Holocaust: that Germans were ignorant of the mass destruction of Jews, that the killers were all SS men, and that those who slaughtered Jews did so reluctantly. Drawing on a wealth of unused archival materials, principally the testimony of the killers themselves, Goldhagen took his readers into the killing fields where Germans voluntarily hunted Jews like animals, tortured them, and then posed cheerfully for snapshots with their victims. From mobile killing units, to the camps, to the death marches, Goldhagen showed how ordinary Germans, nurtured in a society where Jews were seen as evil and dangerous, willingly followed their beliefs to their logical conclusion.

An explosive work, exhaustively documented and richly researched, it offered irrefutable proof that should have forced a fundamental revision in our thinking and recording of events, but instead of seeing this work as a chance to seriously re-evaluate what happened in Germany, the influential German historians angrily rejected it with accusations of a lack of scholarship, to a reaction against its popularity. This investigative work deals with that historical bias and the resulting complicity.
Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland by Christopher Browning [HarperCollins, 9780060190132]

Shocking as it is, this book—a crucial source of original research used for the bestseller Hitler’s Willing Executioners—gives evidence to suggest the opposite conclusion: that the sad-sack German draftees who perpetrated much of the Holocaust were not expressing some uniquely Germanic evil, but that they were average men comparable to the run of humanity, twisted by historical forces into inhuman shapes. Browning, a thorough historian who lets no one off the moral hook nor fails to weigh any contributing factor—cowardice, ideological indoctrination, loyalty to the battalion, and reluctance to force the others to bear more than their share of what each viewed as an excruciating duty—interviewed hundreds of the killers, who simply could not explain how they had sunk into savagery under Hitler. A good book to read along with Ron Rosenbaum’s comparably excellent study Explaining Hitler

On June 13, 1942, the commanding officer of Reserve Police Battalion 101 received orders to round up the Jews in the Polish town of Josefow and shoot all but the able-bodied males. Major Wilhelm Trapp, who wept over the order, gave his troops the extraordinary option of “excusing themselves” from the task. Of the 500 in the unit only a dozen did so, and the rest slaughtered 1500 women, children and old people. Thus, began the career of one of Nazi Germany’s most efficient extermination units. Drawing on postwar interrogations of former Battalion members, Browning reconstructs the 16-month period from the Jozefow massacre to the Battalion’s participation in the brutal “Fall Harvest Jew Hunt” in November 1943, during which these ordinary men, mostly middle-aged working-class people from Hamburg, shot to death some 38,000 Polish Jews and sent 45,000 others to the Treblinka gas chambers. In the vast Holocaust literature, this short work stands out with breathtaking impact, for it reveals how average Germans became mass murderers. “If the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 could become killers under such circumstances,” asks the author, “what group of men cannot?”


OASE 96 examines the revival of architectural practices that focus on reuse and appropriation of buildings, environments and materials. What is the possible positive or negative social impact of these interventions?

In Building in Time, Marvin Trachtenberg describes the many ways in which the design, the construction and the afterlife of historical monuments were completely intertwined. Important buildings such as cathedrals could only be completed through the work of many generations. The building masters were passers-by in a creative process: their efforts were inevitably part of the continuity of the course of history. Building did not take place based on a definitive plan, but by continuously amending an edifice under construction, making sense of the changes in the lifeworld to which a building belonged. Trachtenberg describes the emancipation of architecture from the Renaissance onwards as a conceptual, artistic endeavor that gradually created an ever-growing distance between the actual work of construction and the changing environment of the building. He illustrates this new design ethos with a reference to the work of Leon Battista Alberti, who states in a well-known section of De Re Aedificatoria that a design is finished when anything that is added or removed produces a lesser result. This statement reduces design to a conceptual work on paper that precedes the building process. Everything that follows constitutes a possible threat to the highpoint that had been reached in the design process. The incompetence of the builders, as well as the lack of understanding of the users.

The intellectual rift between thinking and acting, between the drawing and the life of the building, created a distance between what makes sense to the architect and what makes sense to the proverbial other. This divide gave the architect a dubious reputation. Admired as a genius, but also dismissed as otherworldly, impractical and ill-adjusted. The architect is faced with an impossible task: to make buildings ready for an unpredictable life, always out of reach. Jeremy Till describes in Architecture Depends how difficult it is for the majority of architects to cope with what escapes their control, while architecture is typically defined by contingency and the uncertainty created by external factors — people, circumstances, events. Fighting this state of dependency and aiming for autonomy and false perfection only leads to the further marginalization of architects in society. Instead, Till suggests embracing it and seeing it as a chance for architecture to actively relate to this ever-contingent reality.

The tension between the intentions of the designer and their effects in practice, between the ways in which a building is conceived and subsequently used, is a recurring theme within the discourse on architecture that developed in the second half of the twentieth century as a critique of the modern tradition. We are thinking of three strands of this critique in particular, each with a different take on the notion of use: the critique of the hegemony of design (and the designer), with as the alternative design practices that places the user in the center (Jacobs, Gehl); the critique of vulgar interpretations of
functionality, supporting an open interpretation of the relationship between form and use (Rossi); and the critique of the commodification of architecture (and the city), placing the focus on the accumulated use value rather than the exchange value (Lefebvre). In these three positions use is rendered in very different terms, but all three ideas point to the relative autonomy of an aspect of use: the autonomy of the user, the autonomy of the city as an inalienable collective good, the autonomy of (architectural) form with respect to use, that is, the possibility to put a form to different use and the openness of form to perpetual re-appropriation. By emphasizing use these three positions, each in their own way, distance themselves from a one-sided functionalistic approach.

These historical positions offer the intellectual comfort of clarity. As radical points of departure they structure the debate on use and appropriation. They do have the tendency, however, to turn into caricatures of a potentially critical practice. There is the risk of the populistic glorification of the user as the sole source of legitimacy, detached from any historical, cultural, social or political frame of reference. There is the absolute fascination for an architectural form that presents radical design choices as political choices and speaks about possibilities of use on paper as if they are real. There is the glorification of the informal city, as a self-organized reality, looking at form mainly as a source of alienation, restraint and repression.

This issue of OASE brings a variety of practices that look at the contradictions inherent to this subject, not as a nuisance, but as the core of a socio-poetic process from which architectural meaning may be derived. Together they do not add up to a singular position, but define a common quest for an architecture of use and appropriation, capable of articulating these inherent contradictions, giving them form, making them manageable. The architecture of use and appropriation brings together the ‘architecture for architecture’s sake’ with the wayward user and the historical incongruence of the city. The fascination for form and aesthetics, the care for everyday use patterns, the appreciation for the poetic beauty of all the unintended, accidental corners of the city are not necessarily in contradiction.

The meaning architecture may derive from use and appropriation is the central focus of the call for contributions at the basis of this issue of OASE. We asked authors to retrace this quest for meaning in concrete practices. We received more than 60 reactions and selected 15 contributions. Despite the high degree of heterogeneity, all texts in one way or another give content to the rather fluid notion of the architecture of use and appropriation. Reading across the various contributions we see about five different ways in which use and appropriation are mobilized as a source of architectural meaning.

Many of the practices addressed in this volume find meaning in some form of collective making. The designer as the evident hero of the design and building process recedes to the background and makes room for an intensive exchange between a broader constellation of actors, civic as well as market, public and other institutional players. The distance between designers and other ‘space producers’ is reduced. The traditional boundaries of the architectural profession are opened. Various authors discuss in detail the varieties of meaning and relations that emerge through the process of (sometimes literally) building together. This partly happens by finding points of connection in a project within the capabilities of (future) users. Furnishing, decoration, the permanent adaptation of the building are no longer a threat but are part and parcel of the building process. It also involves, however, the mounting of processes in which collective ambitions are formulated, well before an actual design is produced. This alternative position does not imply that the spatial expertise of the architect is no longer valued. It requires architects to leave their comfort zone and to act in an open way during the various stages of the building process, in the same way that users are asked to take an active role and enter into a dialogue with the designer.

A second source of meaning is found in the search for a sensible relationship with the big and urgent social questions of our time. In contrast to universalist or generalist approaches, we are looking at specific, focused and humble efforts to relate to the turbulent societal context. The evident spatial implications of big challenges, such as climate change, the limitations of our health care system, or the need to bring back the manufacturing jobs in our cities, helps to foster the belief in the capacity of design to formulate alternative answers. The meaning of architecture is enhanced by its ability to address these issues. Sue Anne Ware goes as far as identifying herself as a ‘design-activist’. Through landscape interventions that are generally co-created by a variety of partners, Ware hopes to contribute to the political awareness regarding themes such as the refugee crisis, poverty, substance abuse and homelessness. In other contributions, the question of ‘What world are we designing for?’ is also leading. Kathy Velikov and Geoffry Thün, for example, seek to address questions of social inclusion in their project ‘Protean Prototypes’. The project ‘ParckFarm’ also demonstrates through spatial interventions on the ground and intensive interaction with the neighborhood, the possibilities of an alternative form of public space that frames the needs of the multi-ethnic neighborhood, not in abstract terms but by articulating them in concrete form.

A third reservoir of meaning is the careful interpretation and reinterpretation of the context in which design takes place. These practices aspire to have meaning for that context, which starts by creating context. This manifests itself in the development of a broad and varied range of analytic and representational techniques and methods, with the aim of rendering our everyday lifeworld more visible and more intelligible. Several designers invest in empirical research and fieldwork, participative observation and interviews. Cynthia Susilo and Bruno De Meulder show how a seemingly generic shopping mall shapes the multi-coloured lifeworld of varying groups who find an evident place of encounter there. Ariane d’Hoop shows how the importance attributed to the kitchen and to cooking together in a psychiatric ward can be traced in the seam between two different tile patterns. This heightened amount of attention paid to use and appropriation implies a strong sensitivity to the potential of space to contribute to the construction of alternative social spaces that ‘make sense’ in different and changing ways. Hence visual material and text are given equal weight in this issue of OASE. In many contributions patterns and rituals of use have been extensively documented. Viewing buildings and larger environments through the lens of use and appropriation opens up a world of design possibilities.

Fourth, use and appropriation derive meaning from the symbolic order of the architecture itself. This may happen directly through the appropriation of form within a semiotic landscape, but may also concern the monumentalizing of
sublime uselessness. Luc Deleu makes the argument for a flexible and beautiful structure that makes room for change, because all and everyone finds purpose in it. Deleu and T.O.P. office investigate possibilities of use, but they stay away from the study of the actual use. Other authors wish to directly interfere in the lifeworld of the user, and research and test in detail which possible use and meaning may be particularly pertinent. They enter conversations with people because meaning in the end comes in the form of a personal meaning. Several contributions show the importance of individual as well as collective narratives, which may reinforce or activate patterns of use, or alternatively change or alter them.

Finally, we see how use and appropriation are never static, but form over time like sediment, layer by layer. Caroline Dionne, about the work of Patrick Bouchain, speaks of the expansion in space and time of what architecture is like. The projects ’Holding Pattern’ and ’Parkfarm’ also investigate how temporary cultural events may nevertheless produce a lasting impact on a neighborhood. This happens not only through social exchange and interaction, but also by investing in direct actions and experiments that challenge existing conventions, settled ideas and policy arrangements. Working with time produces a nice mix of aspects of design, building, maintenance and use. The conceptual world of the designer and the lifeworld of the user may start to blend.

The selection of practices in this issue is deliberately diverse. We do not formulate a spectacularly new paradigm, but enter an irreducible question, surround it with commentary, and produce a little theory of practice. We are witness to a rather relaxed and emancipated treatment of the subject by a new generation of designers that was raised on long-lasting, often charged discussions regarding participation, use and appropriation, but is no longer haunted by it. We are looking at a generation that has been educated by the pioneers from the participation movement, had architectural theory as part of their curriculum, neither approaches the matter in a naïve nor cynical way, but that does take the question of use and appropriation seriously and mobilizes a broad design register to incorporate aspects thereof in their personal practice. The result is a kind of architecture that does not preach participation through formal rhetoric, but lets the world in, without giving up the commitment to a personal and purified design language.

This editorial is preceded by a visual essay, composed of 13 images, that were taken from the more than 60 contributions, and that illustrate dedication to the architecture Of use and appropriation in all its relaxed, formal plurality.

- Social Poetics: The Architecture of Use and Appropriation
- Tobias Armbrorst, Daniel D’Oca, Georgeen: Holding Pattern
- Thierry Kandjee, Petra Pferdmenges, Bert Gellynck: Curating the City-Making Process
- SueAnne Ware: Asylum for a Design Activist
- Ariane d’Hoop: Design Through Use for Alternative Psychiatry
- BAVO (Gideon Boie & Fie Vandamme): The Only Good Architect Is a Dead Architect
- Ruth Baumeister: Design Your Kitchen versus Kitchen Design
- James Longfield: Making Byker
- Casey Mack: From Bi-nuclear to Inre-rental
- Caroline Dionne: A Leap of Faith in the Realm of the Possible
- Fabio Vanin: Use as Form, An Open Question
- Marleen Goethals & Paul Vermeulen: Social Space Under Construction Urban Renewal in Broek, Vilvoorde
- Gabriel Cuéllar: The Freedmen Churches, Renewing Collectivity from the Margins of the City
- Kathy Velikov & Geoffrey Thün: Protean Prototypes, Urban Platforms for Appropriation
- Cynthia Susilo & Bruno De Meulder: Trickle-Down Globalisation versus Supralocal Collective Space
- Notes on the Shopping Malls of Manado, Indonesia
- Luc Deleu: Why Nautical Mile Is Still Just a Skeleton
- Abstracts/ Samenvattingen
- Biographies/ Biografieën

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Television shows, websites, and scientific journals frequently assert that the result of some research study or other is ‘statistically significant.’ Statistical significance seems to be the scientific community’s way of saying that the result is significant in the everyday sense of being important or meaningful, but, according to Rick Gurnsey, this is not so. Results may be statistically significant without being meaningful. Furthermore, it is increasingly evident that statistical significance is widely misunderstood not only by students and laypeople but also by researchers themselves.

Gurnsey is a professor in the Department of Psychology at Concordia University, Montreal. Gurnsey’s research has been funded by federal and provincial agencies continuously since 1989. He has taught introductory and advanced statistics for 15 years.

Statistics for Research in Psychology offers an intuitive approach to statistics based on estimation for interpreting research in psychology. This text covers topic areas in a traditional sequence but gently shifts the focus to an alternative approach using estimation, emphasizing confidence intervals, effect sizes, and practical significance, with the advantages naturally emerging in the process. This approach encourages readers to attach meaning (practical significance) to the size of some measured effect in the context of a specific research question, and discourages reliance on the context-independent notion of statistical significance. When researchers have to explain the meaning of research results without using the term ‘statistically significant,’ they recognize how heavily they have leaned on it.

Gurnsey says that instructors interested in making a shift to this syllabus must be able to do so without rebuilding their courses from scratch. A glance at the table of contents shows a reassuringly traditional sequence of topic areas. This is because estimation and significance tests rest on the same foundations, even though they differ in emphasis. The goal of
Statistics for Research in Psychology is to explain both approaches but shift the emphasis to estimation. Rather than devoting the main body of each chapter to testing hypotheses about population parameters, with estimation mentioned as a niche alternative, the focus is squarely on estimation, followed by a discussion of how confidence intervals (and test statistics) can be used to test null hypotheses. The people who developed the statistical methods routinely used in psychological research are introduced in Part 2 of Statistics for Research in Psychology. As most statistics instructors know, the so-called Fisher-Neyman hybrid model of statistical decision making would have pleased neither Fisher nor Neyman. Therefore, a historical perspective on statistics shows how some current confusion arose from blending two quite different philosophies. Unlike others, this text devotes a chapter to the problems associated with significance tests, including the file-drawer problem, p-hacking, and basic misunderstandings about p-values. The message to students is that statistical reform in behavioral research will be the responsibility, and accomplishment, of their generation. Each chapter has a clear through line and typically uses a single research question to aid its development. To avoid diversions from the main story, additional material is presented in end-of-chapter appendices. These include discussions of precision planning for estimation, power, and other technical material such as collinearity, bootstrapping, and probability density.

Many useful tools for performing statistical analyses are also discussed in appendices. The two most important tools are Excel and IBM SPSS Statistics. Instructors will have different opinions about which of these is most appropriate for their classes. Students using Statistics for Research in Psychology as part of an advanced course may need to have experience with SPSS in the likely event that they go on to conduct an independent research project. Students in an introductory course will benefit from a good grounding in Excel, because it provides a simple way to check hand calculations and provides useful tools for working with normal and t-distributions. Furthermore, Excel is in wide use in settings beyond universities. Additional appendices show students how to use R to put confidence intervals around statistics that have complex distributions, such as Cohen’s d and R². Finally, there are appendices showing how to use G*Power for prospective power analysis and sensitivity analysis.

The password-protected Instructor Resources site features author-created tools designed to help instructors plan and teach their course. These include an extensive test bank, chapter-specific PowerPoint presentations, and lecture notes. The open-access Student Resources site provides eFlashcards, web quizzes, access to full-text SAGE journal articles with accompanying assessments, and multimedia resources. Frequent opportunities for practice and step-by-step instructions for using Excel, SPSS, and R in appendices help readers come away with a better understanding of statistics that will allow them to more effectively evaluate published research and undertake meaningful research of their own. The material in Statistics for Research in Psychology is structured in a way that allows the advantages of estimation to emerge naturally. All of the standard material on significance testing is presented, but estimation is shown to be the more general method.

Innovative in its emphasis on estimation, Statistics for Research in Psychology is written in an engaging conversational style that addresses students directly. Sections include learning checks with questions for students to answer in order to assess their understanding before moving on to new material. There are also many end-of-chapter exercises, including definitions and concepts, true or false questions, calculations, and scenarios. Each chapter includes brief model reports of statistical analyses that follow American Psychological Association (APA) guidelines.


How human language evolved from the need for social communication

The origins of human language remain hotly debated. Despite growing appreciation of cognitive and neural continuity between humans and other animals, an evolutionary account of human language—in its modern form—remains as elusive as ever. The Social Origins of Language provides a novel perspective on this question and charts a new path toward its resolution.

In the lead essay, Robert Seyfarth and Dorothy Cheney draw on their decades-long pioneering research on monkeys and baboons in the wild to show how primates use vocalizations to modulate social dynamics. They argue that key elements of human language emerged from the need to decipher and encode complex social interactions. In other words, social communication is the biological foundation upon which evolution built more complex language.

Seyfarth and Cheney’s argument serves as a jumping-off point for responses by John McWhorter, Ljiljana Progovac, Jennifer E. Arnold, Benjamin Wilson, Christopher I. Petkov and Peter Godfrey-Smith, each of whom draw on their respective expertise in linguistics, neuroscience, philosophy, and psychology. Michael Platt provides an introduction, Seyfarth and Cheney a concluding essay. Ultimately, The Social Origins of Language offers thought-provoking viewpoints on how human language evolved.

Excerpt: The origins of human language, arguments from religion notwithstanding, remain hotly debated. From a scientific standpoint, human language must have evolved. As the great biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky said: “nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.” Yet, so far, evolutionary accounts have largely failed to provide a comprehensive explanation for why and how human language could have emerged from the communication systems found in our closest primate cousins. This dilemma reflects the fact that communication in human language arises from the union of semantic—words have referents—and syntax—words can be combined according to a set of rules into phrases and sentences capable of generating countless possible messages. Put simply, there is no single nonhuman animal—primate or otherwise—whose natural communication system possesses both semantics and syntax.

This apparent discontinuity has led some to propose that human language appeared fully formed within the brain of a single human ancestor, like Venus springing from the head of Zeus.
solely to support self-directed thought. Only later, according to this view, after language was passed down to the offspring of this Promethean protohuman, did language become a tool for communication. This solipsistic account, however, ignores emerging evidence for continuity in cognitive functions, like episodic memory, decision-making, empathy, theory of mind, creativity and exploration, counterfactual thinking, intuitive mathematics, self-awareness, and conceptual thinking, and the neural circuits that mediate these functions—though, to be sure, other discontinuities remain, in particular the ability to refer to the contents of representations (so-called extensive communication or metarepresentations: Sperber and Wilson. Despite growing appreciation for cognitive and neural continuity between humans and other animals, an evolutionary account of human language—in its full-blown, modern form—remains as elusive as ever.

The Social Origins of Language attempts to provide a new perspective on this quandary and chart a novel pathway toward its resolution. We contend that any biologically and humanistically plausible answer to the question of the origins of language must reflect the combined wisdom of multiple disciplines, each providing a unique but related perspective. In this brief volume, we provide an open dialogue among experts in animal communication, neurobiology, philosophy, psychology, and linguistics that began with a two-day symposium convened by the Duke Institute for Brain Sciences in 2014, at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina. The symposium and accompanying book orbit a keynote lecture by Robert Seyfarth and a provocative target article coauthored by Seyfarth and his long-time collaborator Dorothy Cheney. Seyfarth and Cheney are well known for their long-term studies of the behavior of monkeys and baboons in the wild, in which they use audio playback of communication calls to probe how primates think about their worlds. In their much-heralded and popular book, How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species (1990, University Of Chicago Press, 9780226102467), Seyfarth and Cheney provided strong evidence that vervet monkeys in Amboseli National Park, Kenya, use communication calls that seem to function much like human words, effectively labeling important objects and events in the environment such as predatory eagles and snakes. Taking a fresh look at their own work on social communication among baboons in the Okavango Delta of Botswana, which was originally described in their book Baboon Metaphysics: The Evolution of a Social Mind (2007, University Of Chicago Press, 9780226102443), Seyfarth and Cheney argue that the grunts given by baboons in advance of friendly interactions, and the shrieks given in response to aggression, demonstrate not only a richness and complexity in how these animals think about others in their groups but, more surprisingly, that baboons seem capable of combining a small number of communication calls with the large number of individual relationships within the group to produce a vast number of possible messages about social interactions. Seyfarth and Cheney provocatively suggest that these findings provide evidence that the interaction of primate communication systems with cognitive systems representing social knowledge effectively translate into a rudimentary "language" capable of both semantics and generative grammar. For Seyfarth and Cheney, the key elements of human language emerge from the need to decipher and encode complex social interactions in a large, multilayered group. This bold hypothesis serves as the jumping-off point for a targeted series of responses by symposium participants from several distinct disciplines. These rejoinders situate Seyfarth and Cheney's hypothesis, and the evidence upon which it is based, within the relevant contexts of linguistics, sociology, philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. The authors find sometimes surprising consilience in the comparison, and sometimes equally surprising contrasts as well.

For example, John McWhorter, a linguist with broad interests in creole languages, finds great resonance with Seyfarth and Cheney's arguments. In the chapter, Linguistics and Pragmatics by John McWhorter finds commonality in the pragmatics of language—the ways in which context and emphasis markers add new layers of meaning to an utterance—and the complex layering of structured communication in baboon social communication. He argues against a naively Chomskyan "syntactocentrism" and favors theories of language evolution in which pragmatics and semantics precede formal grammar, a view aligned with Seyfarth and Cheney's. In his view, focusing on the complexity of modern languages with a long history of development may be a red herring. After all, pidgin languages possess minimal grammatical machinery yet efficiently convey precise information via pragmatic markers, consistent with a socially based origin for full-blown language. By contrast, Where Is Continuity Likely to Be Found? by Ljiljana Progovac, a linguist who specializes in Slavic syntax, flips Seyfarth and Cheney's approach on its head by arguing that rather than look for the antecedents of human language in animal communication, we ought instead to look for elements of animal communication systems in human language. Such "living fossils" as it were, for example, two-word combinations that function as a protosyntax, invite the possibility of continuity in the evolution of human language from primate communication. Fluency Effects in Human Language by Jennifer E. Arnold, a psychologist who focuses on prosody—the timing, pitch, rhythm, and acoustic properties of speech—sympathizes with this perspective as well. Her research emphasizes the impact of subconscious processing routines that somewhat automatically shade spoken language by altering speech timing, pitch, and rhythm. Such markers can betray informational redundancies or statistical regularities that may be exploited by listeners in conversation. It's easy to imagine that the baboons studied by Cheney and Seyfarth use contextual information attending grunts and shrieks to develop a savvy understanding of their social worlds.

Notably, the two more biologically oriented commentaries—Primates, Cephalopods, and the Evolution of Communication by Peter Godfrey-Smith, a philosopher of biology, and the other, Relational Knowledge and the Origins of Language by Benjamin Wilson and Christopher I. Petkov, both neuroscientists—find some agreement with Seyfarth and Cheney but identify significant challenges to their proposal as well. Both chapters make the clear distinction between sender and receiver, and that what is unique about human language is that syntax allows for generative creation of an infinite number of messages by the sender and their interpretation by the receiver. The generative nature of baboon social communication appears to reside entirely within the receiver. Wilson and Petkov compare the impressive sensitivity of baboons to social order as expressed through sequences of calls with Artificial Grammar studies showing monkeys and other animals are sensitive to ordered sequences of arbitrary stimuli, and suggest that in fact social communication may be the prerequisite for the evolution of human language. They also sketch an outline of the neural circuits involved in sequence learning and production, and speculate that these circuits may interact with brain regions...
involved in social information processing when baboons or other animals make inferences about the interactions of others based on sequences of calls they hear.

Godfrey-Smith provides the most provocative challenge to Seyfarth and Cheney’s hypothesis by way of comparing the social communication system of baboons with the social communication systems of cephalopods—squid, octopuses, and cuttlefish. In his view, all the sophistication in baboon communication lies within the receiver. When a baboon emits a call, she surely intends to signal something about the environment—response to a threat, approach to a dominant baboon—yet the possible sets of messages are limited. Nevertheless, baboons listening to sequences of calls made by others can draw far more sophisticated conclusions about their social worlds, which Godfrey-Smith describes as a fortuitous consequence of baboon social ecology and the statistical regularities of vocalizations within the group. By contrast, certain species of cephalopods have evolved elaborate, combinatorial patterns of sequential coloration changes on their skin that, apparently, have very little effect on receivers and, instead, appear to be fortuitous byproducts of internal processes. The comparison of baboons and cephalopods highlights the importance of both sender and receiver in communication, and the fact that all elements of human language—semantics, syntax, pragmatics—must be considered in any account of its evolution.

In the final chapter, Seyfarth and Cheney provide a synthesis of the chapters written by the other authors in response to their own target article. Seyfarth and Cheney find common ground with the other authors in the importance of pragmatics, in addition to semantics and syntax, for shaping the meaning of communication signals. Indeed, all authors seem to agree that primate communication systems provide a rich pragmatic system for representing information about the social world. Ultimately, Seyfarth and Cheney contend, the need for our primate ancestors to represent and convey information about social context was the biological foundation upon which much more complex aspects of human language were scaffolded by evolution.

The foregoing overview makes plain that we have much to learn about how we came to be the only animal on earth with true language. The chapters included here provide a thought-provoking set of interrelated lenses through which we might catch a glimpse of how human language evolved. The ideas summoned in this brief, yet powerful, book endorse the hypothesis that we will answer this, and other challenging questions, only through interdisciplinary dialogue and investigation.

Interweaving myths in Shakespeare and his contemporaries
edited by Janice Valls-Russell, Charlotte Coffin, Agnès Lafont [Manchester University Press, 9781526117687]

This volume proposes new insights into the uses of classical mythology by Shakespeare and his contemporaries, focusing on interweaving processes in early modern appropriations of myth. Its 11 essays show how early modern writing intertwines diverse myths and plays with variant versions of individual myths that derive from multiple classical sources, as well as medieval, Tudor and early modern retellings and translations. Works discussed include poems and plays by William Shakespeare, Christopher Marlowe and others. Essays concentrate on specific plays including The Merchant of Venice and Dido Queen of Carthage, tracing interactions between myths, chronicles, the Bible and contemporary genres. Mythological figures are considered to demonstrate how the weaving together of sources deconstructs gendered representations. New meanings emerge from these readings, which open up methodological perspectives on multi-textuality, artistic appropriation and cultural hybridity.

Contents this volume:
Introduction: ‘Ariachne’s broken woof’ by Janice Valls-Russell, Agnès Lafont and Charlotte Coffin

1. Shakespeare’s mythological feuilletage: A methodological induction by Yves Peyré
2. The non-Ovidian Elizabethan epyllion: Thomas Watson, Christopher Marlowe,
Richard Barnfield by Tania Demetriou
3. ‘This realm is an empire’: Tales of origins in medieval and early modern France and England by Dominique Goy-Blanquet
4. Trojan shadows in Shakespeare’s King John by Janice Valls-Russell
5. Venetian Jasons, particoloured lambs and a tainted wether: Ovîne tropes and the Golden Fleece in The Merchant of Venice by Atsuhiko Hirota
6. Fifty ways to kill your brother: Medea and the poetics of fratricide in early modern English literature by Katherine Heavey
7 ‘She, whom Jove transported into Crete’: Europa, between consent and rape by Gaëlle Ginestet
8 Subtle weavers, mythological interweavings and feminine political agency: Penelope and Arachne in early modern drama by Nathalie Rivère de Carles
9 Multi-layered conversations in Marlowe’s Dido, Queen of Carthage by Agnès Lafont
10 Burlesque or neoplatonic? Popular or elite? The shifting value of classical mythology in Love’s Mistress by Charlotte Coffin
11 Pygmalion, once and future myth: Instead of a conclusion by Ruth Morse

Contributeurs:

Charlotte Coffin is senior lecturer at Université Paris- Est Créteil Val de Marne (France) and a member of the Institut des mondes anglophone, germanique et roman (IMAGER). She has published articles on classical mythology, the mythographers, Shakespeare and Heywood, and is preparing an edition of Heywood’s Golden Age for the online Early Modern Mythological Texts Series. She has contributed to the Dictionary of Shakespeare’s Classical Mythology and is a member of the editorial board (www.shakmyth.org).


Dominique Goy-Blanquet is professor emeritus at the Université de Picardie (France). Her works include Shakespeare’s Early History Plays (Oxford University Press, 2003); Shakespeare et l’invention de l’histoire (Garnier, 3rd edn 2014); and Côté cour, côté justice: Shakespeare et l’invention du droit (Garnier, 2016); and the editions of Richard Marienstras’s Shakespeare et le désordre du monde (Gallimard, 2012); of Lettres à Shakespeare (Marchaisse, 2014); and, with François Laroque, of Shakespeare, combien de prétendants? (Marchaisse, 2016).

Katherine Heavey is a lecturer in early modern English literature at the University of Glasgow (UK). Prior to this, she held a Leverhulme Early Career Fellowship at Newcastle University. Her first book, The Early Modern Medea: Medea in English Literature 1558–1688, was published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2015. She has published journal articles in Literature Compass, Renaissance Studies, Translation and Literature and the Journal of the Northern Renaissance.

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Mnemosyne by Ruth Morse

One final reflection, reader, before we invite you to turn our pages. Scholars, too, have debts, and it is a rare privilege to be able to thank those to whom we owe them, as well as the usual duty to acknowledge their writing. Much in this volume pays homage to Yves Peyré, who has done so much to expand our knowledge of intertextual engagements between early modern writers and their classical reading. In the plenary lecture he gave at the 2013 European Shakespeare Research Association (ESRA) Conference in Montpellier (France), he selected a phrase—one just long enough to be identifiable—and then demonstrated its longevity through centuries of reuse. He has taught us to listen better, to attend to detail, and to read marginal notes and commentaries such as the moralised Ovids, some of which were not available in modern editions when he began his work. There was no line to be on, no search engines, no Wikipedia, none of those searchable texts that have so transformed our work. Early English Books Online was a dream for the future. Yves’s example was simple: read the books, carefully, listening for echoes; remember. We would not have wanted to create this book without his presence. It is said that those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it, but it is just as true that without memory we cannot repeat it.

Mnemosyne was the mother of the Muses; her name is inscribed above the door to the Warburg Institute of the University of London, a gift from a Hitler refugee and a library of delight. We confess, all of us, to keeping this whole project a secret, and for several years. Perhaps, Professor Peyré, you have thought yourself forgotten. Not while Memory lives and reads.

Introduction: ‘Ariachne’s broken woof’ by Janice Valls-Russell, Agnès Lafont and Charlotte Coffin

In TROILUS AND CRESSIDA, when Troilus sees Cressida yield to Diomed’s advances, he reacts that his certainties ‘are slipp’t, dissolv’d and loos’d’. His references vacillate and fragment as he attempts to reconcile the Cressida he thought he knew in Troy and the one he has just observed in the Grecian camp. The effort required to rethink past knowledge in the light of present observation leads him to compress the mythological stories of Ariadne and Arachne:

... This is, and is not, Cressid!
Within my soul there doth conduct a fight
Of this strange nature, that a thing inseparable
Divides more widely than the sky and earth,
And yet the spacious breadth of this division
Admits no orifex for a point as subtle
As Ariachne’s broken woof to enter.
Instance, O instance, strong as Pluto’s gates,
Cressid is mine, tied with the bonds of heaven.
Instance, O instance, strong as heaven itself:
The bonds of heaven are slipp’d, dissolv’d, and loos’d,
And with another knot, [five]- finger- tied,
The fractions of her faith, orts of her love,
The fragments, scraps, the bits and greasy relics
Of her 0’er- eaten faith, are given to Diomed.
(V.ii.146–60)

Ariadne’s clew, intended to guide the lover safely through labyrinths of danger provided it does not break, has become Arachne’s woof, drawn through the warp to weave stories of love that a mere snapping of the yarn can disrupt. Yet, perhaps Troilus attempts to cling to the reassuring story of Ariadne as a saviour, even while the evidence clashes with the story he had believed in: the tracery of erstwhile bonds has been erased in a moment of cognitive dissonance. Starting from this instance of mythological texturing, this introduction sets the scene for the following chapters and their reinterpretations and explorations of the ways William Shakespeare and his contemporaries worked mythological material on their looms.

Yves Peyré’s analysis of the resulting mythological cluster (‘Ariachne’s broken woof’) shows how it brings together two Ovidian stories that Shakespeare suffuses elsewhere in his work with Petrarchan imagery of the beloved woman’s hair as an imprisoning net and labyrinth. In Troilus and Cressida, the resulting image of male dependence on and fearful fascination with female erotic agency carries intimations of self-destruction in the larger context of Troy’s impending fall. It also encapsulates the dramatist’s own art of creative interweaving. Shakespeare enunciates this enmeshed reference to Metamorphoses in epic material that he refashions by injecting the medieval tradition of Troy and its historical reverberations into the classical tradition. Cressida herself—her persona and her name—is an invention created by a misreading, conflating two figures from the Iliad, Briseis and Chryseis, given life by Boccaccio, by Geoffrey Chaucer, by Robert Henryson and, eventually, Shakespeare. The ‘overlapping’ of texts and sources from different authors and different strata of cultural history combines the activities of a weaver’s (Arachne’s) production, with threads that suggest patterns and constitute guiding or teasing clews (Ariadne’s) for the reader/ spectator—a method that results in those tensions that Troilus finds so unsettling: ‘this is, and is not’.

That classical mythology should be at the heart of this joint creative process between authors and their publics is not accidental. No myth exists in isolation, nor stands alone. ‘Ariadne’s broken woof’ and the complex heritage of reception associated with Cressida’s name exemplify the ways early modern authors make the most of classical mythology’s lability, its potential for versatility and its inherent capacity to invite shifting interpretations: it simultaneously suggests analogy and tension between Arachne’s enmeshing process within a web and Ariadne’s liberating guidance out of the labyrinth, itself a stone web. Individually and collectively, readers and writers grasp allusion, identify or reinvent genealogies, retrace ramifications and recycle what they have inherited—as they understand or misunderstand, reinterpret or misinterpret. So doing, they engage in a process that a Franco-Flemish tapestry of the late fifteenth century captures in its depiction of Penelope, reproduced on the cover of this volume: as she weaves by day and unweaves by night, gaining a form of agency through her shuttle, which Nathalie Rivère discusses in Chapter 8, so her story—like other myths—travels through time, acquiring, shedding and refashioning content, and shifting in focus. Thus, in this design, a tapestry embraces medieval design and Renaissance perspective in its staging of a figure in the process of creating a tapestry, with yet another tapestry hanging as a backcloth in the background.
The contributors to this volume share Peyré’s concentration on historically informed close reading in order to identify and understand the multiple layers that modify mythological texts from generation to generation. In their discussions of canonical texts alongside less frequently explored works, the following chapters offer fresh perspectives on classical mythology as it informed the writings of Shakespeare and his contemporaries over a period that ranges from the 1580s to the 1630s, from Christopher Marlowe to Thomas Heywood. Focusing on interweaving processes in early modern appropriations of myth, the chapters draw on a variety of approaches to ask how the uses of mythological stories enabled writers to play with representations of history, gender and desire. Building on recent research in different areas of early modern studies (classical reception, history of the book, medieval heritage, theatre history), this volume seeks to heighten awareness of multi-directional interactions in the perception and reappropriation of classical mythology in Elizabethan and Jacobean culture.

Reading and studying mythology: performative rhetoric and ‘a tract of confusion’

Fascination with mythology enabled ‘the survival of the pagan gods’ (to borrow Jean Seznec’s title) and offered a series of proxies to writers and artists otherwise constrained by censorship and self-censorship in what topics they could explore and what interests they could express. As is well known, mythographers, from Boccaccio and Pictorius to Natale Conti and George Sandys, collated, referenced and glossed underlying meanings of myths, juxtaposing multiple interpretations. Across Europe, humanists used myths to explain the world and human activity. Classical mythology served both as a form of shorthand and as a springboard for invention, with poets, pedagogues and preachers drawing upon figures and tropes, reworking and reassembling them according to their aesthetic, rhetorical or ideological agendas. Thus, in his Heptameron of Civill Discourses, George Whetstone illustrates the ways love ‘transgresseth every law’ with ‘Pigmalion [who] doted upon an image: Narcissus [who] was drowned in imbrasing his owne shadow: & mightie Jove, many times, [who] cast aside his divinitie, to dallie with simple country trulles’. In a sermon preached in 1612, Thomas Adams explains God’s legitimate desire to make man in his own likeness, ‘as Apelles was delighted with his Tables, Pigmalion with his Yvorie Statue, Narcissus with his forme in the Fountaine’. The Apelles and Narcissus images resurface in Stephanus Luzzvic’s recusant Devout Heart, in a hymn in which Jesus is compared to Apelles and invited to paint a figure that the faithful ‘may imitate, and love, / As did Narcissus’.

John W. Velz and John Lewis Walker’s annotated bibliographies show how much work has focused on the reception of the classics – more particularly of classical mythology – in early modern England, in and around the works of Shakespeare. While it is well known that he and his contemporaries had direct access to Ovid as well as Seneca, Virgil, Horace and other classical authors, critics have more frequently considered the classics alongside each other, rather than through their interactions. Research on the reception of leading authors has left in the background the influence of others, such as Appian, Lucan, Lucian, Ausonius: the fact that they were not all readily available in English translation was no impediment to access. Students and scholars had access to Greek texts through primers and editions printed on the Continent: bilingual Latin–Greek editions and Latin translations of Euripides, Homer, Pausanias or Musaeus, whose Hero and Leander was one of the first texts printed in Greek, by the Aldine press in 1494. Gordon Braden has shown how Marlowe used one of these editions to write his own Hero and Leander. In Chapter 2 Tania Demetriou shows how, like Musaeus’ Hero and Leander, Colluthus’s Abduction of Helen attracted interest as a pedagogical text, as well as inspiring poets. Ongoing research informing this volume confirms that the presence of Homer and other Greek sources in the early modern period was more important and influential than was once thought, nuancing the picture of classical reception and opening up new perspectives.

The swift, cumulative diversification of texts broadened readers’ and writers’ horizons well beyond what they were exposed to in the classroom or at university. Classical poetry and drama reached a widening audience through print: in Greek, in Latin and in vernacular translations. Ideas and texts circulated, and writers were very much aware of what was being produced in other countries, with Abraham Fraunce, for instance, as Demetriou recalls, presenting the Spanish poet Juan Boscán as a literary model alongside the Italian Torquato Tasso, and England’s own Philip Sidney.

Links among learning, reading and orality remained strong, in keeping with a tradition of teaching in which texts were recited and exercises in rhetoric had a performative dimension: ‘the study of books did not constitute a separate pedagogic sphere but one interwoven with their performance ... Those who could not perform what they knew, but knew it only from books, had no kind of learning at all.’ Marginia and annotations framed source texts, offering interpretative guidance, drawing on (other) classical sources, mythographical commentaries or elucidations by Erasmus and others. Reciprocally, examples drawn from mythology illustrated adages and sententiae; and dictionaries provided encapsulated accounts of myths. All this catered for different levels of readership, and nourished readers’ own handwritten annotations, and commonplace books, as they sought to make sense of interpretations that could at times appear confusing: in his dedicatory letter to the countess of Bedford, which precedes his masque The Vision of Twelve Goddesses, Samuel Daniel complains about ‘the best Mythoeologers, who wil make somewhat to seem anything, are so unfaithful to themselves, as they have left us no certain way at all, but a tract of confusion to take our course at adventure’. Yet this ‘tract of confusion’ also contributed to the emergence of distinctive forms and voices; and it nourished readers’ and audiences’ receptivity to allusions and rewritings that could seem at once familiar and novel.

Texturing classical mythology, Roman politics and English history

The presence of classical mythology tends to be underplayed in religious texts such as those quoted above or in plays that dramatise the history of England. Yet, as essays in this collection analyse in detail, Shakespeare and his contemporaries converse – and are conversant – with sources and influences indiscriminately across the board: they invite classical texts into their writings along with medieval commentaries, Tudor refashions and humanist glossings, reworking all this with and into material drawn from medieval
chronicles, biblical writings, romances, Italian novelle, and the works of fellow poets and dramatists.

Let us briefly consider Suffolk’s downfall in 2 Henry VI, which provides a case study of overlapping uses of material, as Shakespeare draws from a variety of classical authors and genres, injecting them into a plot lifted from English chronicles. Two moments are striking in the course of a scene where fighting and unnatural portents blurt in the ‘loud- howling wolves’, ‘misty jaws’ of graves and bloodstained shore (IV.i.3, 6, 11). The Lieutenant insults Suffolk, punning on his name, William de la Pole:

Lieutenant. Poole! Sir Poole! lord!
Ay, kennel, puddle, sink, whose filth and dirt
Troubles the silver spring where England drinks.
Now will I dam up this thy yawning mouth
For swallowing the treasure of the realm.
...And wedded be thou to the hags of hell,
...By devilish policy art thou grown great,
And like ambitious Sulla, overgorg’d
With gobdets of thy [mother’s] bleeding heart.
(IV.i.69–85)

The second moment occurs some thirty lines later, shortly before Suffolk is beheaded:

Suffolk. I charge thee waft me safely cross the Channel.
Whitmore. Come, Suffolk, I must waft thee to thy death.
Suffolk. [Pene] gelidus timor occupat artus: it is thee I fear.
(IV.i.114–16)

This Latin phrase – which may be translated as ‘icy fear seizes my limbs almost entirely’ – has been identified as a misquotation from Virgil and Lucan. It also functions as a conflation. In the Aeneid, Virgil uses the phrase ‘subitus tremor occupat artus’ (VI, 446) to describe Turnus’s horror at the sight of Alecto, with her foaming mouth and hydro- like head of snakes, come from the underworld to wage war and death. 15 In Lucan’s Pharsalia, an unfinished account of the civil wars of Rome, the inhabitants of Ariminum quake with fear on discovering that Caesar has crossed the Rubicon: ‘derigueret metu, gelidos pavor occupat artus’ (Pharsalia, I, 246), which Marlowe translated as ‘They shooke for feare, and cold benumm’d their limbs’. And thus we see English dramatists plundering Latin historical sources in order to lift their plays into something more than chronicle. Some spectators would have recognised the mythological references; others would not, but all would be aware of the hags of hell, Suffolk’s arrogance and fear. These may suggest Virgil, in connection with the earlier evocation of portents of disaster, while intersecting with the Pharsalia, available in a Latin edition published in 1589 and read in schools. In Marlowe’s translation of the Pharsalia, Pompey is compared to ‘arch- traitor Sulla’ (I, 326), and depicted as ‘haaving lick / Warm gore gone from Sulla’s sword /[and] yet athirst; / Jaws flesh’d with blood continue murderous’ (330–2). Memories of the earlier civil wars fuse graphically with portents that are shot through with Senecan evocations of tyrants and ghosts: the sight of monstrous, ‘prodigious births ... appals the mother’ (560–1); ‘foul Erinny’s stalk’d about the wals, / Shaking her snaky hair and crooked pine / With flaming top’ (570–2); and in the ‘black night’ of Rome, ‘Sulla’s ghost / Was seen to walk, singing sad oracles’ (579–80).

In 2 Henry VI Shakespeare transforms Sulla’s dictatorship into monstrous jaws dripping with flesh and blood: Suffolk is a ‘yawning mouth’ (IV.i.72), ‘ambitious Scylla’ is ‘overgorg’d / With gobdets of thy mother’s bleeding heart’ (84–5), feeding and ambition are a form of pregnancy – ‘By devilish policy art thou grown great’ (83) – which in turn harks back to ‘sink’. Parallels between English and ancient history informed Elizabethan representations of civil strife. Written just before 2 Henry VI, Thomas Lodge’s The Wounds of Civil War, which dramatises Appian of Alexandria’s account of the struggle between Marius and Sulla (variously spelled Sylla, Scilla and Scylla in early modern texts), carries its own share of bloodshed and portents. In the 1578 translation of Appian, a marginal note alerts the reader to the ‘[m]onstrous tokens’ that announce Sulla’s massacres. Around the same time, Marlowe’s Tamburlaine compares his tyranny to ‘Jove’s dreadful thunderbolts’ (1 Tamburlaine, II.iii.6–24, 19) and himself to Jupiter (II.vii.12–29), a posture that Suffolk seeks to imitate when he is captured, without achieving his rhetorical oneupmanship: ‘Jove sometime went disguised, and why not I?’ (2 Henry VI, IV.i.48), ‘O! that I were a god, to shoot forth thunder / Upon these paltry, servile, abject drudges’ (103–4).

Reading this scene in the light of enmeshed source materials and the context of the London stage, one observes dramatists drawing on a common cultural background and reworking it in a shared environment, emulating and inspiring another one’s dramatic and rhetorical effects even while sharing tricks of the trade, such as multiple beheadings. In a culture better at listening than today’s audiences, a word or phrase that passed in a matter of seconds on stage might be remembered or recognised as echoes in subsequent plays or inserted into epic poems.

Fears of civil strife feed back into mythological narratives: in Lodge’s Scyllae Metamorphosis (1589/90), which revisits Metamorphoses, XIII (898–968), Ate punishes Scylla by unleashing ‘Furie and Rage, Wan- hope, Dispaire and Woe’ (715), who chain her to the rocks while the waves echo her howls. Fury is war, ‘[h]is hands and armes ibathed in blood of those / Whome fortune, sinne, or fate made Countries foes’ (719–20). Considering the marine setting in 2 Henry VI, the references to ‘loud- howling wolves’, the prophecy that Suffolk would die by water and ‘[a]gainst the senseless winds ... grin in vain’, one may speculate that audiences received the homophony of Sulla the dictator and Scylla the transformed maid as a composite monster. This conflation might seem less far-fetched when one reads in Marlowe’s translation of Pharsalia how, among the recorded portents, ‘Coal- black Charybdis whirld a sea of blood; / Fierce Mastives howled’ (I, 546–7). The texturing of material lifted from classical mythology, Roman history and medieval English chronicle releases a transformative process that has a generic impact: as Barbara Everett writes, ‘[i]n his history plays, Shakespeare turns chronicle into history, then history into drama, and then ... historical drama into something almost like myth: free-standing, undocumented and legendary works of art’.

‘Honest thefts’, borrowings, blendings and recursions

As this case study illustrates, the underlying approach of this volume is to apply to the area of classical mythology practices of reading and writing that Robert S. Miola describes as thinking ‘analogically, i.e. across texts, as well as logically’ – the ‘complex intertextual juncture’ Raphael Lyne traces in the Ovidian subtexts in The Faerie Queene. It also builds on Oliver Lyne’s notion of ‘further voices’ – of classical authors as
receptors and crafters as well as models of multi-faceted figures and tropes – and explores the implications of this in early modern writing. Translators, authors and scholars grew increasingly aware of this process as their knowledge of the classics expanded. Through Silver Age poets such as Lucan and Statius could be heard the voices of Virgil, Seneca and Ovid. In the fourth century CE, Ausonius admits his debt to Virgil in Cupid Crucifi ed and Colluthus displays his own debt to Homer in the Abduction of Helen. The perceived direction of these interactions was not always predictable: Tania Demetriou recalls in Chapter 2 how early modern commentators thought that the fifth-century CE poet Musaeus taught Homer his craft. As Peyré notes in Chapter 1, when inviting Ovid into his writing, Shakespeare is also playing host to Virgil and, through him, Homer, thereby incorporating a subtle layering of meanings – an intertextual feuilletage, to use Roland Barthes’s term – that reverberates through the text and beyond. And even when figures such as Europa or Pygmalion seem to derive from a single or predominant source (such as Ovid), or, in the case of Medea, a combination of classical sources (mainly Ovid and Seneca) and their early modern translations, similar processes are at work.

From the late fifteenth century onwards, Elizabethans and Jacobean accessors antiquity in the original text and in contemporary translation, alongside medieval texts, which provided printers with some of their earliest material, as A. E. B. Coldiron has shown. Circuits of penetration also included indirect channels via Italy, France and Spain. Several chapters in this volume demonstrate how the persistent medieval continued to shape readers’ apprehensions of, say, the Troy story through the Renaissance reprint culture.26 In Reading the Medieval in Early Modern England, Gordon McMullan and David Matthews underline a new ‘sense of continuity and dependence’ from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, and invite ‘reassessments of periodicity’, which question traditional literary history and allow fresh insights into literary texts. Curtis Perry and John Watkins warn of the dangers that lie in ‘the lure of a neo-Burckhardtian idea of early modernity’; to the ‘narratives of rupture’ that developed in the wake of Burckhardt’s study of the Italian Renaissance, Coldiron prefers ‘narratives of continuity’, ‘the continuing presence of copious and vividly present pasts’ in a ‘reprint culture’. Combining literary analysis and book history, she argues that literature of the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries changed in fluid, unpredictable ways, drawing on textual continuity even when asserting novelty. Even authors claiming to exhume an ancient past relied directly on a more recent past’s texts.

The contributors to this volume show how understanding modes of creativity and reception in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries requires flexibility about timelines. While the availability of source texts in new editions and the humanist work they generated inspired diversified approaches to classical material and released new forms of aesthetics in the arts that cannot be minimised, the slate was not wiped clean of intermediary influences: ‘medieval mediations’ (to borrow Coldiron’s phrase) were reactivated in the Tudor period, which looped back to earlier texts to usher them into the next decades through print and translation. Coldiron agrees with William Kuskin that ‘[t] exts do not emerge simply by linear means’. She suggests combinations of patterns of production and circulation that interact in ‘a vast, a very complex web’, with implications for the mythological material under discussion here. The linear organisation of transmission as translation is complicated by patterns that move forwards, backwards and sideways, across cultures and periods. Kuskin’s Recursive Origins: Writing at the Transition to Modernity is another contribution to this redefinition of periodisation. Importantly, from computer science, recursion designates the principle of reiterating one small operation again and again, gaining further complexity every time. An essentially dynamic process, it enables Kuskin to deconstruct illusory origins and identify the small ‘loops’ that have often been neglected in favour of huge leaps (as scholars addressed the relationship between Shakespeare and Chaucer, for instance, or Shakespeare and Ovid): ‘the so-called moment of origins is less a comprehensive return to the classical past than a cycling through of local recursions on immediate precedents’. Thus, the medieval and Tudor heritages remained very much present, through chronicles, romances and mythological texts; through printed editions of Chaucer, William Caxton or Geoffrey of Monmouth; as well as translations of authors such as Christine de Pizan, whose portraits of exemplary ladies Brian Anslay translated and published under the title Boke of the Cyte of Ladyes in 1521.

Recursive, relocated Troys

Classical mythology helped authors (and their publics) bend and challenge the genealogies of transmission and the boundaries of genre. This was particularly true of the matter of Troy, a supreme illustration of ‘new narratives loosely based upon classical originals’.

36 Caxton’s Recuyell of the Historyes of Troye, now famous for being the first book printed in English, in 1473–74, is itself a highly ‘recursive’ text, decisively contributing to the early modern fascination with Troy, which ranged across literary, historical and political agendas. The Recuyell loops back through an impressive number of texts. Caxton translated Raoul Lefèvre’s Recueil des hystoires de Troyes, completed a decade earlier, which adapts Boccaccio’s fourteenth-century Genealogia deorum gentilium in the first two books; the third book follows Guido delle Colonne’s late-thirteenth-century Historia destructionis Troiae, itself based on Benoît de Sainte-Maure’s twelfth-century Roman de Troie, which adapts two sixth-century Latin texts that passed for eye-witness accounts of the Trojan conflict, Dares the Phrygian’s De excidio Trojiae historiae and Dictys of Crete’s Ephemeris Belli Troiani.

Caxton’s Recuyell coexisted in print alongside universal chronicles, which interwove Trojan, Roman and ‘English’ matter, as well as more directly inspired narratives of Troy, and derivative romances and cautionary tales. Seventeen editions ensured its survival right into the eighteenth century. It influenced William Warner’s Albions England and George Peele’s Tale of Troy, and contributed to the dramatic texture and language of Troilus and Cressida. Around the same period, in the 1610s, Thomas Heywood drew on it as a major inspiration for Troia Britannica and his Age plays, alongside classical sources, which he diversely accessed firsthand and through commentaries. In parallel, the Troy material acquired dramatic resonance with the translation of Seneca’s tragedies in the 1560s and the availability of Euripides’s Greek playtexts, as Tanya Pollard has shown through her study of Hecuba. The story of Troy provided examples of fluidity, linking mythological material with the matter of history and politics, which in turn justified and reinforced its centrality: the story runs
through Roman and European history, or rather through chronicles’ (and kings’) ongoing concern to fashion and legitimate their myths of origins. Just as Rome founded its legitimacy and ancestry in Troy, England rooted its royal genealogy in the continuity of the Roman/Trojan lineage – Troy rising phoenix-like from its ashes in Rome before being relocated to England and, more specifically, London as Troia Nova, Troyvovant, or Troyvovantum. This historico-political appropriation of the myth, initiated by, among others, Geoffrey of Monmouth’s Historia regum Britanniae, was still current nearly 500 years later, in Thomas Dekker’s 1612 pageant, Troy Nova triumphans. It was further enriched by topical diplomatic and economic concerns: Andrew Duxfield argues that in the continuity of ‘mytho-historical antecedents’ that arch back to Rome and Virgil, Troy informed the legitimisation of Elizabethan England’s colonial ventures, pointing to the example, in Dido, Queen of Carthage, of ‘Aeneas’s account of the fall of Troy’.

There were, then, different ways of inviting the myth of Troy into the early modern world and onto the stage: in terms of setting and story, as in Troilus and Cressida; through the power of rhetoric, as Agnès Lafont demonstrates in her discussion of Marlowe’s Dido in Chapter 9; as a clew running through the dramatised history of England, as Dominique Goy-Blanquet shows in Chapter 3; and, within that context, as a cultural capital shared by dramatists and spectators, as Janice Valls-Russell suggests in her discussion of King John in Chapter 4. The example of Troy encapsulates the fluidity noted by Coldiron in the ways literature evolved between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries; the encounters between medieval-Tudor texts and the classics, through the Latin authors and increasingly, Homer; the malleability per se of the mythological material; and the flexibility of the Elizabethan stage, where ‘time and place of action are in constant flux’.

Whether directly accessed, or revisited by medieval and Tudor authors, this proteiform material was read and recycled alongside the early modern variations it inspired: epyllia, sonnets, sonnet sequences, epics, drama. Percolating through all levels of printing, Trojan material reached a widening range of readers, and the way it was packaged illustrates wider processes of reading and reception. Already in the Middle Ages, manuscripts by different authors were bound together, frequently revealing thematic correspondences. Paratexts also served to inflect reader response, such as the ‘surprisingly vicious, misogynist Latin poem’ that Caxton appended to his Recuyell and that was reprinted in most of the editions throughout the sixteenth century. Similarly, Wynkyn de Worde added to his illustrated edition of Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde (1517) stanzas that associate the mythological heroine with falsehood, undermining Chaucer’s nuanced point of view with an openly negative condemnation of Criseyde. And in 1532 Thynne printed Henryson’s poem, Testament of Cresseid, as a sixth book added without attribution to Chaucer’s poem, so that it reads as a sequel. Despite the differences between Henryson’s (Scots) English and Chaucer’s, his depiction of Cressida as a leprous whore influenced poets throughout the seventeenth century, who failed to remember that lepers were thought to have had their purgatory on earth, so that with death they went straight to heaven. Such juxtapositions foreshadow, Lindsay Ann Reid argues, Shakespeare’s open treatment of Cressida, which turns her into ‘an interpretative amalgam’, ‘compounding all prior readings of her text’. Thus, he summons into the epic framework of the Troy story the non-classical tradition of the Cressida story, with its variations on her inconstancy and Troilus’s constancy, to explore the interstices between ideals and ‘reality’ and question all forms of reception. Troilus anatomises this process in the speech that opened this introduction, and he later sums it up: ‘Go, wind, to wind: there turn and change together’ (V.iii.110). Love and heroism seem equally impossible, gesticulation and professions equally ineffectual.

Print and stage: growing up together and moving forward

Plays performed within a few years of each other reflect shared concerns, allusions and tropes. Authors parodied each other’s works: John Marston openly pastiched Kyd’s, Marlowe’s, and Shakespeare’s plays; their action; rhetoric; and the way they were performed and staged. Heywood had read and/or seen Shakespeare and Chapman, who had read and/or seen Marlowe and Lyly. They simultaneously engaged in ‘acute intertextual manoeuvres’ and indulged in intratextual self-referentiality, choosing to ‘recollect’ themselves. Translations of other European contemporary authors enriched the process. One instance of such lateral influences is the translation of Robert Garnier’s Senecan drama, Marc Antoine, by Mary Sidney Herbert, countess of Pembroke, which was published under the title Antonius in 1592 and later reprinted as The Tragedie of Antonie. Garnier’s play, written between 1575 and printed in 1578, is based on Jodelle’s tragedy, Cléopâtre, and Plutarch’s Lives (translated by Jacques Amyot), and is in itself an instance of interwoven influences: while the overall rhetoric is Senecan, the amplification of Cleopatra’s lamentation recalls Virgil’s Dido mourning Aeneas’s departure. Antony (II.502–13) and the chorus (II.862–5) establish parallels between Egypt and Troy while recalling other tragic tales, mostly from Ovid’s Metamorphoses. Sidney translates faithfully, introducing subtle inflections by referring directly back to source material, essentially Plutarch, which she seems to have read in Amyot and Thomas North’s translations. Her blank verse amplifies Garnier’s sympathetic characterisation of Cleopatra, which marks a break with the frequently derogatory medieval exemplum in emphasising her single-minded loyalty to Antony. Sidney thus introduced to the English cultural scene the dramatic potential of the Antony and Cleopatra story, which had inspired writers in Italy and France. More widely, her contribution heightened interest in Senecan tragedy, with new emphasis on character through rhetoric, especially the use of soliloquy and the delineation of passions through mythological references. Responding to Sidney’s influence as both translator and patron, Samuel Daniel produced a sequel, The Tragedie of Cleopatra (1594); Samuel Brandon opted for a different perspective in The Tragicomedie of the Virtuous Octavia (1598); and Fulke Greville wrote a play that he destroyed. Sidney’s play also influenced Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra.

Garnier’s play ‘generates unorthodox questions with respect to sexuality and political power’. In France as in England, it was proof that politically inflected classical tragedies could become a medium through which it was possible to comment on the contemporary scene from a safer historical and generic distance – even though Fulke Greville’s ‘act of cautious self-censorship’ suggests the ‘potentially loaded topicality of the tradition of the Antony and Cleopatra plays and, particularly, their potential to interrogate issues relating to politics and sovereignty’.
Such ‘encounters’ challenge the very notions of diachronic patterns, linearity or compartmentalised knowledge and culture, pointing rather to ‘a creatively confused sense of literary chronology’. Cross-fertilisation is synchronic, and accelerated by two complementary economic and cultural vectors, the book trade and the theatre: to quote J. S. Peters, ‘The printing press had an essential role to play in the birth of the modern theatre at the turn of the fifteenth century. As institutions they grew up together.’ Colin Burrow shows how ‘Shakespeare’s references to classical authorities are theatrically motivated performances rather than scholarly citations’: the classics are a ‘changing and theatrically inflected resource’. Illustrations of classical scenes in translations of Ovid also played their part in fashioning the representation of affect on stage, as did ‘illustrated Terences and Plautuses ... their woodcuts copied again and again in dramatic editions’. Research into the economics, architecture and sociology of the theatre industry and the politics underpinning companies’ agendas has cast fresh light on the conditions in which plays were written, staged, performed and received. All this helps us understand how creative habits were fashioned. If classical mythology left such marks on Shakespeare and his contemporaries, it is in part because the expanding availability of textual material occurred at a time of intense theatrical activity, with the development of outdoor and indoor playhouses, with their specific staging practices and targeted audiences. Not only was there fierce competition among the professional theatres, private patronage encouraged a wide range of cultural activities, within which women from aristocratic circles, such as Mary Herbert and Queens Anne of Denmark and Henrietta Maria, played a significant part. Whether performed in public playhouses or at court, plays and attendant genres such as masques provided an unrivalled arena for borrowings, blendings and parodies; for intergeneric experimentation and cross-generic transgressions; for a relocation of mythological narrative, topography and figures, to dramatic or serio-comic effect, as Charlotte Coffin shows in her discussion of Thomas Heywood’s Love’s Mistress in Chapter 10.

Interweaving processes

The nature of the early modern playhouse made it particularly well adapted to forms of writing that blend history; romance and classical mythology; epic scenes; and individual trajectories of quest, loss or transformation. Successive chapters in this volume propose close readings that reveal various forms of mythological interweaving, jacquarded motifs, plots and political agendas. While taking in ongoing processes of circulation, elaboration and reception, contributors to this volume invite us to return to the heart of the texts themselves. The interweaving that emerges is fluid, reflexive, self-regenerative, engendering new patterns that simultaneously retain familiar features. Writing of Bernardo Tasso’s Favola di Leandro e d’Hero (1537) in his study of the Renaissance fortunes of Musaeus’s Hero and Leander, Braden notes: ‘Neither a translation nor a substantially new work, it weaves continually in and out of the Greek poem during its 679 lines, with numerous substitutions, rearrangements, and interpolations; but it always returns to some unmistakable feature from Musaioi.’ What we term interweaving processes bring together complementary methods of investigation. Interactions, as we have seen, can travel back and forth in time, across cultures — radiate or come together. As previously discussed, they can be multi-layered — feuilletage — and entail proximity and displacement, overlayers and palimpsests that are not quite so. Conflations of source materials, mythological stories, narrative conventions and symbolical motifs all have a liberating, expansive effect. When Ruth Morse analyses what she terms Shakespeare’s ‘deep imaginative collocations’, which draw attention to textual and literary present absences, she shows how content can retain continuity while being remarkably malleable, expanding on the theory of memes. In the words of Helen Cooper, who has applied this theory to medieval romance, the meme is ‘an idea that behaves like a gene in its ability to replicate faithfully and abundantly, but also on occasion to adapt, mutate, and therefore survive in different forms and cultures’. Authors engage with their audiences through a play on familiarity and variation: ‘The very familiarity of the pattern of the motif, the meme, alerts the reader to certain kinds of shaping and significance, and sets up expectations that the author can fulfil or frustrate. The same motif will not always mean the same thing, or in the same ways; on the contrary, what matters most is the variations on the ways it is used.’ Variations can be simultaneous within a text, interacting with other material, mythological or non-mythological — processes that Nathalie Rivière de Carles describes and analyses in Chapter 8 as internal and external forms of interweaving. In her discussion of the influence of the Greek epyllion, and the ways poems such as Marlowe’s Hero and Leander deny all knowledge of the disaster to happen, Tania Demetriou draws attention to the ‘recalibration of poets’ classical interests’, through which they play on generic affiliation, suggesting an intimate link with epic while also distancing themselves from it. All these approaches are dynamic; they stimulate experimentation with rhetoric and genre; encourage the emergence of new aesthetics; legitimise the revisiting of political, religious or historical contexts; involve reader and audience — then as now — in an ongoing process of collaborative recognition and reinvention that goes some way to accounting for the enduring success of so many of Shakespeare’s and his contemporaries’ productions.

Close readings

Starting from a timeless trope — blushing, more specifically the blushing of Hermaphroditus and Narcissus — Chapter 1 (Yves Peyré) draws on examples from Ovid, Homer, Shakespeare, Marlowe and Spenser. Travelling from Ovid back to Homer; forwards to Shakespeare, Marlowe, Spenser; and back again to Virgil, he sets the tone of the volume’s investigation, organically evolving a methodology both from Roland Barthes’s theory of feuilletage (multi-layering) and Shakespeare’s own writing process. The dramatist’s combined dynamics of trans-textuality and multi-textuality invites ‘new types of dialogue ... beyond temporal and cultural differences’. The purpose is not to track source ramifications for their own sake: it is to investigate their impact on various forms of writing. Chapter 2 (Tania Demetriou) deconstructs assumptions about the so-called ‘Ovidian epyllion’, an anatory mythological narrative genre that emerged as a vibrant focus of creativity in late Elizabethan England. Demetriou demonstrates that alongside the pervasive influence of Ovid, this tradition owed much to the interaction between pastoral poetics and the
modern translators and authors were sensitive both to her
influence of Queen Henrietta Maria and her courtiers. She also
argues that Heywood at the end of his career was not so much
a garde versifier and exceptional Hellenist. The influence of Watson’s citation, translation and adaptation of ancient Greek epyllia and especially Colluthus’s Abduction of Helen reconfigures, she argues, the literary landscape that inspired Marlowe’s Hero and Leander, and affords not only new ways of reading this poem, but also external evidence that it is finished.

Chapter 3 (Dominique Goy-Blanquet) considers the political use of foundational myths and explores the ambiguity of origins. As medieval France and England sought to assert a degree of autonomy from papal Rome, they used legends to sustain national pride and support their theories of empire. The chapter retraces the complex lineages that purportedly originated in Troy, in a context of competition among the respective courts and chronicles of France, Burgundy and England. After recalling the increasing scepticism of early modern historians, Goy-Blanquet discusses Shakespeare’s critical treatment of these tales of origins in his history plays, both classical and medieval. Their mythical background is one of mingled yarns — French and English, Celtic, Roman and Trojan — that Shakespeare further interweaves, sometimes with deliberate anachronisms, as he invites his public to find ways out of Britain’s long and conflict-ridden involvement with continental culture.

Chapter 4 (Janice Valls-Russell) contends that in King John, the fall of Troy and the tragic fates of Andromache and Astyanax inform the staging of the siege of Angers, the rhetoric of conquest and destruction, the mother- and child figures of Constance and Arthur, and the latter’s death. Close readings suggest a rhetorical affinity with the translation of Seneca by Jasper Heywood, whose pathos is shown to derive from Homer via Euripides and Seneca. Stagings of the play provide instances of the way the audience is drawn into this cross-referentiality between an Elizabethan dramatist’s depiction of medieval cities and the ruins of Troy.

Chapter 5 (Atsuhiko Hirota) shows how the myth of Jason and the Golden Fleece provides a subtext to The Merchant of Venice, where the staging of adventurous Venetians as Jasons, and rich daughters as either Medeas or coveted wealth, is fraught with ambivalence. The chapter shows how the myth gains additional layers of meaning in the economic context of sixteenth-century England, where the Golden Fleece is readily associated both with the exploitation of New World resources and with the all-important English wool trade. Hirota also shows how ovine metaphors are at the heart of a network of interactions between classical myth and biblical episodes, a syncretic combination that Shakespeare exploits to dramatic and symbolic effect.

Chapter 6 (Katherine Heavey) extends the discussion of the myth of the Golden Fleece, from the perspective of Medea’s killing of her brother Apsyrtus. Shakespeare and his contemporaries knew the story through Ovid’s Tristia and Seneca’s Medea and their translations by Thomas Churchyard and John Studley, as well as Caxton’s History of Jason. Heavey’s discussion of various aspects of the myth (the brother-sister relationship, Apsyrtus’s youth, Medea’s repentance or lack thereof, Aeëtes’s grief) shows how early modern translators and authors were sensitive both to her transgression of conventional gender roles and to the grief of Aeëtes. This led playwrights and poets to reshape the myth so as to express culturally specific anxieties about proper male behaviour and the expression of emotions. Looking at passages from Thomas Heywood, Richard Robinson, Robert Baron and Robert Herrick, Heavey also analyses the political implications of the myth. Her investigation shows how a myth is continually reshaped through combinations of sources and adaptation to new concerns.

Chapter 7 (Gaëlle Ginestet) focuses on another feminine figure – Europa – and the story of her abduction, which finds one of its earliest sources in a Greek epyllion by Moschus and was popularised by Ovid. Europa’s ravishment by Jupiter in the guise of a bull provides an example of multiple rhetorical and aesthetic influences and readings in love sonnets and Shakespeare. Converging and conflicting depictions of Europa’s rape in classical sources were available in the sixteenth century (Moschus, Ovid, Horace), alongside medieval (Ovide moralisé, Chaucer) and early modern revisitations (translators, mythographers and emblematisists). Dipping into Horace, recovering elements that Ovid had left out from Moschus (to whom they had access in Latin translation), poets remetamorphosed the story into an erotic play of tensions between desire and rape.

Chapter 8 (Nathalie Rivière de Carles) turns to the ambivalent Penelopean and Arachnean palimpsests – discussed in this introduction to the volume – by exploring their impact on early modern English dramatic characterisation in plays retracing love and political conquests. The two myths connect the three ‘lives’ Aristotle defines as the components of the human quest for happiness: sensual enjoyment, political achievement and intellectual contemplation. Analysing classical and Renaissance sources alongside a corpus of Shakespearean and non-Shakespearean plays, and looking beneath the mythographical cloth of a silent exemplarity so as to retrieve the political ‘voice of the shuttle’, the chapter shows how the figures of Penelope and Arachne enable a debate on disobedience and the creation of representations of female agency on the stage.

Chapter 9 (Agnès Lafont) reinscribes Marlowe’s Ovidian handling of the episode he draws from Virgil of Dido’s fated encounter with Aeneas in a cultural context that includes medieval and Tudor revisitations of the mythological Dido. Her study of Dido, Queen of Carthage traces the transmission of references to her problematic exemplarity, from Chaucer’s Legend of Good Women to Caxton’s Eneydos and sixteenth-century pamphleteers such as Thomas Feylde, broadening the scope of possible intertextual echoes. In transferring the story to the stage Marlowe plays games with his sources, and this generic shift creates another reversal: as performed by boy actors, Dido’s classical plight becomes a parody of aristocratic love concerns.

Chapter 10 (Charlotte Coffin) explores the reception of Thomas Heywood’s Love’s Mistress, which dramatises the story of Cupid and Psyche, from Apuleius’s Golden Ass. Through comparison with emerging trends and contemporary genres Coffin contends that the play demonstrates the complex ways in which classical mythology could be received within a cultured audience in the 1630s. She connects Heywood’s treatment of myth with the vogue for burlesque that was beginning to develop in France, and may have reached England through the influence of Queen Henrietta Maria and her courtiers. She also argues that Heywood at the end of his career was not so much
going back to his mythological plays of the 1610s, as emulating the innovations of his young rival, James Shirley. Rounding off the volume, Chapter 11 (Ruth Morse) takes as its starting-point a reference to Pygmalion in Measure for Measure to engage in a methodological discussion of influences. Enlarging on medieval and early modern reception, and on the ensuing accretion of significances attached to the figure (and to his statue), this chapter surveys critics’ involvement with Pygmalion from a variety of perspectives, and the metamorphoses the myth undergoes in critical thought. Morse draws attention to the simultaneous continuity and malleability of references. The significance of the Pygmalion story is questioned afresh through relocations in new forms of popular culture, which evidence how Shakespeare’s reworking in turn inspires later authors. Thus Shakespeare becomes part of the interweaving, allusive process, enriching the tapestry with his own ‘displacements’ and ‘ruptures’ and thereby adding his own layer to the ongoing work of feuilletage, on which the volume opened.

This feuilletage of sources and influences was made strikingly apparent in Melly Still’s 2016 production of Cymbeline for the Royal Shakespeare Company: design, action and script gave physical and textual immediacy to the ways Shakespeare reshuffles myth, history and gender in the play to explore issues of origins and affiliation, tossing all the pieces in the air, as it were, to have them finally fall into place in a dizzying cascade of revelations. Illustrating the process that Morse describes in this volume and elsewhere, this production absorbed works produced in a ‘world consequent upon, as well as subsequent to Shakespeare’. This was a post- apocalyptic Iron Age Britain gone to ruin, ineffectually ruled by a queen wrapped in maternal grief. Memories of a former Golden Age were represented by a home video showing the royal family playing around a tree before the children’s abduction, a tree stump centre stage, and graffiti on walls that read ‘These were once trees’ and ‘Remember as it was’. The Roman legions were an orderly formation and Iachimo’s Renaissance Italy was a bling, sexist world. Cymbeline’s subjects wore cross- gendered clothes recycled from blankets, army surplus and lace tutus in a style loosely evocative of ‘shabby chic’ punk that suggested an inventive potential for renewal through the integration of diverse source materials. The script reflected a layering of influences: Latin, Italian and French were spoken, with the English text projected upstage. Attention was drawn to mythological imagery in the bedchamber scene, through a screen projection of the lines in which Iachimo compares himself to Tarquin entering Lucrece’s chamber, and the passage on Philemon that Innogen (or Imogen) was reading before going to sleep. Jupiter was flown down on the tree stump that had been uprooted earlier to reveal Belarius’s grotto in the gaping hole left by the roots, which dangled overhead like a protective canopy; the god then morphed into a reinvigorated Posthumus. This production thus drew attention to cultural and textual hybridity, and the tensions underlying individual and collective trajectories of loss and recovery. The design also drew on the aesthetics of screen epics such as Hunger Games, which are influenced by Roman history and myth, as mediated to some extent by Shakespeare. Groping through scenes of darkness towards uncertain stability, this production showed that the interweaving of mythology and history within and with texts such as Shakespeare’s is an ongoing creative process, one that remains deeply relevant to the expression of contemporary narratives.

He who dreams of drinking wine may weep when morning comes; he who dreams of weeping may in the morning go off to hunt. While he is dreaming he does not know it is a dream, and in his dream he may even try to interpret a dream. Only after he wakes does he know it was a dream. And someday there will be a great awakening when we know that this is all a great dream. Yet the stupid believe they are awake, busily and brightly assuming they understand things, calling this man ruler, that one herdsman—how dense! —ZHUANGZI, trans.

BURTON WATSON

Reality as a Problem: Thinking about Reality

This book explores a series of ideas concerning the nature of reality. The intention here is not a book of philosophy, nor a work of physics. Rather, the chapters here are concise presentations and studies of particular questions for those curious about what we are all apparently in—that is, reality itself. The book is designed for those with an interest in philosophy and in science, but is also intended for those who might, by chance, stay up at night wondering about the nature of what this book calls our “apparent reality”—the fact that there seems to be something out there, and the idea that it may, in fact, not be out there.

This book does not escort the reader through philosophical explorations in ontology, realism, and the nature of truth. Nor does this work does delve into quantum theory, multiverses, and black holes—such subjects have been treated in other works that are available to those who are curious. Instead, this work aims to provoke and inform the reader by assembling different—and sometimes unlikely—sources to look at the question of reality. This book includes primary sources quoted at length, since it is a work that is also designed to promote further investigation through those sources, which are also cited in an extensive bibliography.

The reader will find here the thoughts of the physicist David Bohm, the musings of the Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa, the thoughts on the nature of reality found in the final writings of Mark Twain, and insights from an early Daoist text. These are no mystical, “New Age” explorations, however: rather, the ideas here take the form of exercises in shifting perspectives, and in reframing questions. But there is philosophy here, and there is science: these fields provide a background for ways to address the title of the project: deciphering reality. There is indeed the assumption in this book that our apparent reality has the qualities of a cipher in every sense of that word: that it is cryptic, and that it is disguised—less due to some malicious creator than to our own inability to comprehend it from the inside or wherever we actually might be located. Another, earlier meaning of “cipher” was “zero”, from the Arabic: that is highly relevant, too, as near the conclusion this book suggests that “zero” just may be the clue we are looking for.

Access and Analysis
The title of this chapter, “Reality as Problem”, is a reference to two thinkers: the philosopher Martin Heidegger and the educator Paulo Freire. Heidegger, in his famous book Being and Time (Sein und Zeit), includes two sections that center on this idea of the “problem” of reality: one is entitled “Reality as a Problem of Being and the Demonstrability of the “External World”” and the other is entitled “Reality as an Ontological Problem”.1 In language that is not always easy for a non-specialist reader to comprehend, Heidegger wrestled with the interlocking issues of consciousness and awareness of reality, a reality independent of that consciousness, and, finally, the “possibility of an adequate ontological analysis of reality”. In addition, Heidegger addressed “the primary kind of access to what is real”. That question of “access”, as is suggested in subsequent chapters here, pervades everything from digital models of reality to Daoist thought. In discussing the “ontological problem” of reality—the nature of being in a given reality, in one respect—Heidegger notes the idea of “resistance”. This strikes the reader almost as an experiential, feeling-with-one’s-hands-in-the-dark exploration of our apparent reality: that reality, Heidegger notes, is “something [which] already must have been disclosed”, even as it is characterized by “ontic indefiniteness”.5 One can see even in such a brief citation how Heidegger struggled with writing about something so comprehensive—that is, reality itself—and our strange relationship to it. We are aware of reality, and in it, yet cannot objectively talk about our precise relationship to it. While the ideas of Heidegger may be familiar to many readers, especially those with a background in philosophy, an interesting concept concerning reality expressed by Paulo Freire may be less well known. Freire’s focus was on education, and that topic may seem remote from the question of the nature of reality. But there are echoes of Plato here: the idea that we have been educated to see a certain—highly constructed—reality. Freire’s pedagogical philosophy puts it similarly; as one study notes, Freire’s approach is to present aspects of people’s lived reality as a problem. Issues that have become invisible due to their ubiquity and as such seem to be unchangeable are seen with new eyes. They become the focus of critical dialogue. Although Freire was thinking about sociological concerns, his perspective works just as well for the approach to the question of reality taken by this book. Reality is a problem, if the way we engage in it, live in it—and even study it scientifically—makes it essentially invisible. Freire’s own words apply even more accurately: Cooperation leads dialogical Subjects to focus their attention on the reality which mediates them and which—posed as a problem—challenges them. The response to that challenge is the action of the dialogical Subjects upon reality in order to transform it. Let me reemphasize that posing reality as a problem does not mean sloganizing: it means critical analysis of a problematic reality. Again, while Freire is talking about sociological concerns in education, the precise framework outlined here can be applied to philosophical and scientific inquiries into the nature of reality. Freire’s “Subjects” are like both Plato’s cave dwellers and our contemporary scientists and philosophers. Reality mediates them, but at the same time, in dialogue, that same reality can become the focus of critical analysis. But as Freire implies, that is not a simple task in sociological terms—and it is equally difficult in philosophical and scientific terms. There is a tendency even in these latter fields, despite their objectivity and care with language, to “sloganize” the problem—that is, to build models, attach labels to those models, and then engage the models and labels as actual descriptions of reality, or even take them as reality itself. In contrast, what is needed—and more difficult to obtain—is a way to provide Freire’s “critical analysis” here: taking apart and analyzing something in which we are so completely and utterly immersed. It is the classic philosophical problem of asking a fish what it thinks about water: its response would simply be, “What’s water?” The German philosopher Paul Deussen framed the problem this way: The whole of religion and philosophy has its root in the thought that (to adopt the language of Kant) the universe is only appearance and not reality (Ding an sich); that is to say, the entire external universe, with its infinite ramifications in space and time, as also the involved and intricate sum of our inner perceptions, is all merely the form under which the essential reality presents itself to a consciousness such as ours. We perceive an appearance and not reality. As for reality itself, we do not know “the form in which it may subsist outside of our consciousness and independent of it”. Deussen very precisely parses the problem, too, then, of the project of philosophy versus the project of science: For all philosophy, as contrasted with empirical science, is not content to learn to know objects in their circumstance and surroundings, and to investigate their causal connections; but it rather seeks beyond all these to determine their nature... This fact, then, that philosophy has from the earliest times sought to determine a first principle of the universe, proves that it started from a more or less clear consciousness that the entire empirical reality is not the true essence of things, that, in Kant’s words, it is only appearance and not the thing itself. It is difficult to say at what point in their long history human beings actually felt that their everyday reality was not the “true essence of things”, but this is certainly an ancient idea. Early thinkers such as Pythagoras and Plato wrestled with this idea; it is interesting to consider that mathematics, myths, and symbols were believed to have some relationship to that essence. Proclus, in his analysis of Plato, had a view that is worth keeping in mind here: he believed that the fundamental truth of reality was not hidden by the “veils” of mathematics. Rather, Proclus believed that the veils, like theological myths and Pythagorean symbols, serve as a means of transition to the study of ontologically higher objects that are not immediately accessible—provided of course that we have the proper preparation and guidance. What this means is a more subtle, even relational approach to the question of the “real” and our connection to it. In dealing with symbols as a transitional way of accessing reality, one is reminded of mathematical physics—where the equations are reflections of our approaches to the actual functioning of the physical world. The equations do not “veil” that world, but rather allow our minds to take an intermediate step towards (a potentially) complete understanding. However, that “understanding” still seems remote. Physics has long held the mantle of the project of investigating “empirical reality”, but even thousands of years after Plato, we are still struggling to find the essence—the “thing itself”, in other words. Moreover, as subsequent chapters here describe, trying to consider the objects in our apparent reality and “determine their nature” is difficult given that, among other things, it is not clear where “we” are in the grand scheme of things. What is subject? What is object?
If the goal of philosophy, as Deussen states, is “to determine a first principle of the universe”, how can that be achieved? Moreover, if human beings at some point in their history had “a more or less clear consciousness that the entire empirical reality is not the true essence of things”, that means that somehow we have the capacity to return to such an understanding. Potentially, we could go from a consciousness of this difference between empirical reality and essence, to a consciousness of the actual “essence of things”. This is an idea explored in the discussion of Daoism in this book; in the meantime, there are other considerations—from scepticism to simulation.

Reality Won’t Go Away

So, the problem of deciphering reality is a complex one, particularly in the sense of where even to start. The science fiction writer Philip K. Dick investigated the nature of reality in many of his works, but perhaps he addressed the problem most directly in a 1978 speech entitled, “How to Build a Universe That Doesn’t Fall Apart Two Days Later”.12 In the first part of the speech, he notes:

It was always my hope, in writing novels and stories which asked the question “What is reality?” to someday get an answer. This was the hope of most of my readers, too. Years passed. I wrote over thirty novels and over a hundred stories, and still I could not figure out what was real. One day a girl college student in Canada asked me to define reality for her, for a paper she was writing for her philosophy class. She wanted a one sentence answer. I thought about it and finally said, “Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn’t go away”. That’s all I could come up with.

Dick’s answer implies that there is a reality “out there” somewhere, that is independent of whether one believes in it or not, or is even aware of it or not. He was also interested in social and political control of our perception of reality, so it is not surprising that in his comments above, he is putting forward a Platonist view.

But in the same speech, Dick also questions the idea of an ultimate reality behind all appearances. In discussing the conflicting concepts of Parmenides and Heraclitus, and noting the paradoxes of Zeno, he comments that, “as you begin to ask what is ultimately real, you right away begin to talk nonsense”. Dick, in his cautious—even paranoid—way, made it clear that the very obscurity of reality allowed humans to wield the dangerous power of creating what he called “pseudo-realities”.

Wrestling with the puzzle of what might be found behind our apparent reality, or the world that we perceive every day, Dick played with all kinds of ideas, even supposing that time itself had stopped circa A.D. 50 and that the present is entirely an illusion! Indeed, the author was famous for the variety and dreamlike quality of his ideas: perhaps such a wide-ranging and organic approach is necessary in the face of a problem as profound as that of the decipherment of reality.

The concept of scepticism is often invoked when the topics of reality and illusion are addressed. To generalize, scepticism in this context would dictate that we have no firm way of telling what is real and what is not. There has been a backlash against scepticism in some respects—the idea that we are in a dream or simulation of some kind seems almost too childish to be taken seriously in philosophical or scientific terms. Even otherwise speculative writers on the subject of reality seem to reject anything hinting of solipsism, with one author stating flatly that the existing evidence “is sufficient to ensure that other observers do exist, and not just appear to exist”.

Although Dick himself did not say so, one could conjecture that he would have responded to such human self-assurance by saying, “I’m sceptical of those who aren’t sceptics”. Anti-scepticism, in its very attempt to apply a kind of “Occam’s razor” to arguments about reality as illusion or dream, makes a series of presumptions. It implies that we have sufficient information—and that we know that we have sufficient information—to dismiss the idea that our apparent reality might be an illusion, a dream, or a computer program. But leverage inside the box to move the box is impossible.

In a discussion of the movie The Matrix—a film that portrays the idea of reality as a simulation quite clearly—one author cites the arguments of the philosopher Bernard Williams:

Williams soothes our fears of being locked in a perpetual Matrix-like dream-prison by pointing out that the fact that we can make a distinction between dreams and waking experiences itself presupposes that we are aware of both types of experience and of the difference between them. We can talk sensibly about the difference between the two only because there is a difference between them, a difference that we are aware of.

But how do we make that distinction? From the most basic perspective, the only difference is consistency: in our apparent “waking” world, physical laws and other phenomena are consistent and predictable, while in the “dream” world, this is not the case. But who is to say that consistency is the defining characteristic of reality? As presented later in this book, a famous Daoist text known as the Zhuangzi (莊子) recounts the completely reversible story of the man who dreamed that he was a butterfly. For the Daoists, consistency is not a deciding factor for anything.

The Approach

While there have been innumerable books concerning the nature of reality, the present study takes a very particular approach. This book is not a traditional philosophical study of reality in metaphysical terms. While some standard philosophical concepts make appearances here, this book more particularly uses certain philosophical frameworks to examine a series of problems. In addition, the book connects aspects of the scientific approach to the nature of reality with the philosophical approach in a different way. This is not a traditional “philosophy of science” path; instead, philosophy—particularly Chinese philosophy—is used to talk about the testing and modeling of reality.

Moreover, this book does not examine at length the often-discussed relationship between reality and consciousness. Such themes have been explored in other works, both scientific and speculative. Instead, the more critical issue of the definition of such terms is explored. This is connected with other more fundamental questions raised here—questions that until now perhaps have received insufficient attention, and that are the focus of this book. Those questions include how we use visual models in talking about reality, and how deeply our conceptions are fixed to what one could call arbitrary preconceptions as to how reality is structured. In short, while not calling for a radical change, this book suggests—if indirectly—that there are other ways to frame questions about reality,
rather than always returning to the usual discussions of physicalism, the role of consciousness, and so on. This book also examines specific problems in an attempt to provide tools for further exploration in both philosophy and science. Each chapter focuses on a particular challenge to modeling what the term “real” means in any useful sense, and how we might better approach modeling this reality for the purposes of philosophical and scientific investigation. The problems presented here include those concerning digital simulations and interactions with virtual realities. These have been explored in other works, but in this book two very particular scenarios are presented, since they are formative to discussions of how we frame terms and use language, another theme relevant to a discussion of the nature of reality. The language issues in question here involve the definition of objects, the concept of “mediated” reality, and the definition of a “simulated” world. Looking at everything from data storage to Daoist texts, the questions of how to talk about something as remote and as intimate as reality are investigated.

A Series of Problems

What are some of the specific problems in discussing the nature of reality? The first problem, which is examined in Chapter 1 (“Reality as Simulation”), concerns spacetime in the context of a simulation. A number of authors have raised the idea that our experience of reality might be taking place in some kind of simulation, such as that run on a computer. This idea is not new, and even has been explored in popular culture. But there are a number of questions that remain only partially addressed—for example, what exact form would such a simulation take?

Some writers assume that it would look like the simulations that we ourselves run, although with far more computing power. But why would those creating this massive simulation necessarily behave as we do, and develop and employ technology in the same way? Moreover, how precisely would a simulation manifest the physical phenomena that we see around us? Aspects of such questions have been explored by figures such as Konrad Zuse, Stephen Wolfram, and others, and the chapter here on simulations builds upon their analysis to explain what terms such as “real”, “simulation”, and even “computer” might actually mean. More particularly, this first chapter asks, “What exactly is the difference between that kind of simulation and what we currently believe to be our physical reality?” To begin to frame an answer to this question, it is necessary to investigate spacetime and temporality (our sense of time) in the context of a simulation. Such an investigation reveals some surprising possibilities about a simulated universe, including the fact that inside the simulation, there is actually no difference between making a physical machine and just conceiving it.

The second problem—discussed in Chapter 2 (“Reality to the Test”)—takes us into some basic physics, and brings up specific questions concerning virtual reality or simulated environments of the type discussed in Hilary Putnam’s “Brain in a Vat” scenario and depicted in the popular film The Matrix. The discussion here addresses in simple terms this idea: Is there a test that one could devise to see if we are living in a simulation of the sort depicted in Putnam’s “Brain in Vat” or The Matrix? The third chapter, “Reality by Design”, investigates what is termed here the “prepositional model” or “locative model” of reality. These models of reality are very pervasive, not only in philosophy, but also in physics. Human descriptions of reality tend to be visual, and work on the basis of very concrete depictions—even when we claim to talk about transcendental “configurations” beyond our common physical senses and reason. These visual-biased models include “levels”, concentric rings, configurations of “inner” and “outer”, wholes made of component parts (such as atoms), substrates (such as “quantum foam”), and so on. This chapter provides a critique of such models, discussing how they contain an inherent bias that may prevent the development of better epistemological tools for studying the nature of reality.

Chapter 4, “Reality for the Daoists”, uses Daoist texts—particularly the Zhuangzi—to suggest other models for talking about the nature of reality. The discussion draws together philosophical approaches and scientific methods, but seeks to avoid a facile equating of early Chinese philosophical concepts with contemporary models in physics. Instead, the genuine similarities are presented: contemporary physics and certain aspects of Daoist philosophy both are seeking to provide a model of how reality functions and how we engage with that reality. Early Daoist thinkers did not possess an understanding of modern scientific principles; however, they were keen observers of our apparent reality, and were aware of the role of human consciousness in engaging whatever that reality might be.

The fifth and final chapter, “Reality in Conclusion”, recapitulates the idea of new models for thinking about the nature of reality. The discussion in that chapter concerns “ reframing inquiries about reality”—the idea that the problem is not only epistemological, but also investigative. In other words, the problem is not only one that involves the origin and nature of knowledge, but also the question of how we construct and carry out investigations of reality. Noting that the way that we currently frame our philosophy and science both empower and limits the potential scope of investigations of reality, this final chapter puts forward the idea of taking the decipherment of reality even further. Is there something even beyond digital simulations, the prepositional models of reality, and Daoist philosophy? Are there other ways—subter or more radical—to look at the decipherment of reality?

Concepts and Definitions

In investigating a subject as philosophically challenging as the nature of reality, it is vital to outline some basic concepts and definitions. This book’s investigation is very specific, in the sense that it approaches the question of the nature of reality in the form of what are essentially a series of chapter-length essays, as described above. Different aspects of reality are examined—the idea of simulation, the problem of modeling, and so on. In taking this approach, inevitably there are things left out—but the idea here is to present some ways of thinking about the process of investigation itself. This is the conceptual scope of this book.

But what is being investigated? “Reality” is a very broad term—indeed, it is one of the broadest terms that a language could articulate. Definitions of “reality” are almost as varied as the fields used to inquire about the word itself: philosophy and religion, physics, psychology, linguistics, and so on. In considering the studies presented in this book, the reader should note that the operative term here is “apparent reality”. This is the reality that we experience every day, the
experiential world of sights, sounds, and so on. This may seem limited, but it allows a reasonably close pairing of both philosophical and scientific approaches to the question of reality. Philosophy, even in some of its more abstract forms such as Daoism, deals with how we experience the world around us. Science approaches reality through the modes of the senses, and works with observable or, more precisely, detectable phenomena. In the simplest terms, this means that the study here is an investigation of what might be the more subtle nature of—or “behind”—that which we experience.

For Plato, the answer to this question of what we are observing was “shadows”, and finding the reality behind those shadows has been one of the goals of philosophical inquiry. In parts of this book, there is indeed the implicit assumption that there is something “behind” or “beyond” what we experience on a daily basis, and even something “behind” or “beyond” what scientists observe, measure, and assess. The analysis here frames the study of this apparent reality in this way. However, even that assumption eventually must be questioned, since the terms “behind” and “beyond” dictate a particular investigative framework—one implying that reality is structured in hierarchical layers—that may be completely misguided. Reality may not even be structured at all, or at least not in the way human beings think about structure.

Philosophy and Physics

As pointed out above, this book does not take a strict, traditional philosophical or science-based approach to the question of reality. However, it is important to make clear what philosophy and science actually do in terms of engaging reality. Philosophy engages reality by taking head-on the question of the source of what we observe every day—that is, our apparent reality—as well as any possible underlying foundations for what we experience. Philosophy employs epistemology not only to ask, “What do we know and how do we know it?” but also, “Can we know?” Moreover, philosophy may even offer postulates as to the existence of an ultimate reality—a final, incontestable and transcendental truth, an (eidos) or “Form” of the kind described by Plato. For philosophers, there is some mystery as to the nature of reality, because at least the initial epistemological answer to an understanding of reality as a whole is negative. That is, it seems impossible, as this book discusses later, to understand the system from within the system.

The seminal philosopher Heidegger, cited earlier, framed a similar problem in his discussion of Descartes and the concept of res extensa or “corporeal substance”. For Descartes, there was the subject, which engaged in thinking, distinct from the object of such thinking. Heidegger rejected this distinction between subject and object, arguing that there exists no such subject distinct from the external world, because of Dasein—a more comprehensive idea than that found in Descartes: existence as “being-in-the-world”.

From the viewpoint of physics, and of science in general, there is no mystery as to the nature of reality. Physics deals in observables and things that are measurable. Reality, as far as physics is concerned, is the apparent reality defined above—what we seem to experience around us every day. Again, that reality can be observed, measured, tested, and modeled. There is still a mystery in the sense that physicists would like to know why our apparent reality is the way that it is—why do we have these particular physical laws, why do things have the form that they do, and why does mathematics seem to describe our apparent reality so well. There is also some mystery in terms of structure: how the forces of nature are related, how time and space fit together, and how quantum-level structures might be related to larger-scale structures. But these are less “mysteries” than they are simply projects for physics to undertake, using its traditional methods of modeling, experimentation, and theory formation. The project of physics is to build models and make predictions, preferably predictions that can be tested.

However, even physics has a role in this book, where the chapters tackle reality as something to be deciphered or understood. That is because physics—just like philosophy—is an intellectual tool. Thus, as with any tool, there arises the question of whether or not we have the “right tool for the right job”. In physics, part of this means asking if the models being used are correct, or if there might be some other way of making models that would allow us to explore reality further. In a certain respect, this was the approach of the physicist David Bohm, some of whose ideas also are discussed in this book. Moreover, this issue of models means asking if traditional answers to observations in physics—such as the appearance of interference patterns in the double-slit experiment—could be re-examined with a different model to yield quite different insights into the nature of our apparent reality.

Many physicists might say that the role of physics is almost Voltairean in nature: it is about experimentation and formulation of theories in the examination of specific phenomenon, a modest but careful and diligent tending of notre jardin. Physics is not in the business of deciphering reality as a whole, nor opining as to its ultimate nature. But if physics indeed goes down that road, one can critique more specifically some aspects of a traditional physics approach to the nature of reality. Since certain kinds of physics have moved beyond our capacity to test theories experimentally, a new conceptual approach has appeared: the creation of increasingly complex and untestable models—what physicist Carlo Rovelli has called pejoratively the “physics of the ‘why not?’”. This is a kind of holistic approach, one that advances new ideas only in the sense of postulating other dimensions, or hidden forces or fields. It is not a physics of traditional data-gathering, nor building theories that are subject to empirical methods. One writer has even written of “transcendence as a tool in scientific theory formation”—an interesting epistemological concept. But, in short, that kind of speculative approach is problematic as a potential foundational philosophy for physics.

The philosopher Paavo Pylkkänen goes so far as to say, “Physics, from a philosophical point of view, is ... characterized by a great deal of conceptual confusion”. His essential point is valid—the problem is one of concepts, that is, how physics conceptually frames and terms the phenomena it encounters or wishes to model. Discussing quantum physics in particular, Pylkkänen notes:

The concept of “elementary particles”, and the images it may evoke, is thus actually very limited in its ability to help us capture what is essential about what we might call the more fundamental architecture of the physical world, as revealed in quantum and relativistic phenomena. We need new concepts and images that can better illuminate features such as wave-particle duality, non-locality, and the discontinuity of movement. But there is not yet agreement as to what such concepts should be, and
consequently, a great deal of confusion prevails in attempts to discuss the more fundamental structure of the physical world. Indeed, the discussion of “the more fundamental architecture of the physical world” has been going on for millennia, with contributions at least as far back as the philosophy of the ancient Greeks. Different concepts, from the Hellenistic four-element model to string theory, have been put forward.

Modern physics certainly is a far cry from Greek models of the universe: physics allows the in-depth investigation of phenomena, as well as precise mathematical predictions. Nonetheless, we still cannot claim to have the proper tools to discuss any “fundamental architecture” of reality, or even determine that there is such a basic structure. Prior to Pylkkänen, the British philosopher Owen Barfield commented that the results of physics have not been fully reconciled with perception and human cognition in “building up the general ... picture of the nature of the universe”. Barfield felt that reality should be understood as a “system of collective representations”. With great precision, he perceived the problem that reality can be approached with more than one method, leading in sense to more than one reality: We can think that what physics tells us is true, is true when we are studying physics, and untrue when we are studying something else. The objections to this course are obvious to me, and will be equally obvious to some of my readers. In his book Saving the Appearances: A Study in Idolatry, Barfield sought to explain how human consciousness might experience the “unrepresented” world—the noumenal reality behind the world of appearances. Barfield felt that while physics clearly articulated the existence of an “unrepresented” world, such a world might be approachable by a process he called “figuration”, so as to make, in the end, the noumenal become phenomenal. Such “figuration” does not play a role in contemporary physics, but it is related to Bohm’s ideas about physics, discussed later in this book.

Returning to Pylkkänen’s analysis, it is important to see that he critiques not only approaches in physics, but also in philosophy, stating that in philosophy there has been a strong tendency to look to the natural sciences when trying to resolve traditional philosophical issues, a tendency known as “physicalism” ... In a nutshell, physicalism says that our general concept of reality ought to be some sort of a generalization of what the natural sciences, especially physics, tell us ... But as a matter of fact, most physicist views currently on offer seem to have a very weak relationship to modern quantum and relativity theory. Physicalism thus does not yet manage to do what it says it ought to do. The “weak relationship” more generally comes from the fact that the project of philosophy and the project of physics are not actually the same, as pointed out above. In dealing with the natural sciences, Pylkkänen is also critiquing the belief that we should be able to use the methods of physics, for example, to talk about our “general concept of reality”. This book draws from the issue that Pylkkänen describes, in that it argues that there might be very different models that have yet to be formulated. Those models could yield more insights into the nature of reality, even while still functioning within the realm of the sciences. This book provides some suggestions of what other models—such as those involving simulations, and non-hierarchical or relational structures—might imply in a terms of new foundations for scientific inquiry.

A recent popular science book by a physicist, A Universe from Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather than Nothing, tackles the question of apparent reality in examining the question of the origins of the universe. But in some sense, this is a speculative exercise: it is impossible to use experimental methods to investigate a remote time before there was anything—before there was even space itself. This is philosophical speculation through physics, but the physics is not really helpful here since its methodological toolkit does not apply. Again, the reconciliation of the philosophy and physics is difficult, because the goals, if that is even the right word, are different.

Pylkkänen continues his critique of philosophical approaches: This “hollowness of contemporary physicalism” creates a great deal of frustration in philosophy. There are difficulties in the very attempt to formulate problems, let alone in the various attempts to solve them. For when physicalists formulate a philosophical problem, they typically make a reference to the physical world. Questions that are formulated and debated today include: What is the relationship between mental phenomena and the physical processes in the brain and matter more generally? What is the relationship between meaning and the physical items that carry meaning? However, as long as there is no coherent notion of what the physical means, the very problems making a reference to the physical will be out of focus. Again, this book addresses some of these issues of “formulation”—that is, what questions should be asked, or what questions make sense to ask. The discussion of simulations in this book addresses the particular problem that Pylkkänen implies in the passage cited above: that as we have “no coherent notion of what the physical means”, the matter that we observe in our apparent reality may be no more than thought. Moreover, as the discussion of simulations will show, such a conclusion is not reached through some kind of mystical approach, but rather a simple, computational one.

The famous physicist Sir Arthur Eddington articulated the problem of scientific approaches to the nature of reality quite elegantly in a lecture entitled, “Science and Mysticism”: We have acknowledged that entities of physics can from their nature form only a partial aspect of reality. How are we to deal with the other part? It cannot be said that the other part concerns us less than the physical entities. In another lecture, “The Nature of the Physical World”, Eddington brought up a similar point, worth quoting in full: The physicist brings his tools and commences systematic exploration. All that he discovers is a collection of atoms and electrons and fields of force arranged in space and time, apparently similar to those found in inorganic objects. He may trace other physical characteristics, energy, temperature, entropy. None of these is identical with thought. He might set down thought as an illusion—some perverse interpretation of the interplay of the physical entities that he has found. Or, if he sees the folly of calling the most undoubted element of our experience an illusion, he will have to face the tremendous question: How can this collection of ordinary atoms be a thinking machine? But what knowledge have we of the nature of atoms which renders it at all incongruous that they should constitute a thinking object? The Victorian physicist felt that he knew just what he was talking about when used such terms as matter and atoms. Atoms were tiny billiard-balls, a crisp statement that was supposed to tell you all about their nature in a way which could never be achieved for transcendent things like consciousness ... But now we realise that science has nothing to say as to the intrinsic nature of the atom. The
physical atom is, like everything else in physics, a schedule of pointer readings.
They key term here is “intrinsic nature”: physics is not designed to say anything about the intrinsic nature of things. Physics is set up to both observe and model our apparent reality, with the hope, perhaps, of revealing something about a deeper structure if there is one. But most scientific statements about such structure will be provisional or conjectural.
This does not mean that we should stop asking questions. Perhaps an investigation of our apparent reality and its source is best served not by a synthesis of philosophy and physics, nor even a new philosophy of physics, but by a more diffuse approach. Past attempts to combine philosophy and physics have been undertaken as a way of attacking the question of reality holistically, and often have yielded only weak science and simplistic philosophy. As Eddington put it, philosophy and physics are dealing with different “entities”, or at least very different aspects of those “entities”. So, in a more diffuse approach, one might look at different “entities”, and in a modest way see what they tell us about our apparent reality, without trying to build a “theory of everything” that somehow unites philosophy and physics in one grand scheme. This book takes precisely this diffuse approach: a few, selected examinations of certain ideas concerning reality. It is a process wherein one pulls at but a single thread—and yes, perhaps at some point, that thread might untangle the entire mystery.


Winner of the 2010 National Book Critics Circle Award for Biography

How to get along with people, how to deal with violence, how to adjust to losing someone you love—such questions arise in most people’s lives. They are all versions of a bigger question: how do you live? How do you do the good or honorable thing, while flourishing and feeling happy?

This question obsessed Renaissance writers, none more than Michel Eyquem de Montaigne, perhaps the first truly modern individual. A nobleman, public official and wine-grower, he wrote free-roaming explorations of his thought and experience, unlike anything written before. He called them “essays,” meaning “attempts” or “tries.” Into them, he put whatever was in his head: his tastes in wine and food, his childhood memories, the way his dog’s ears twitched when it was dreaming, as well as the appalling events of the religious civil wars raging around him. The Essays was an instant bestseller and, over four hundred years later, Montaigne’s honesty and charm still draw people to him. Readers come in search of companionship, wisdom and entertainment—and in search of themselves.

This book, a spirited and singular biography, relates the story of his life by way of the questions he posed and the answers he explored. It traces his bizarre upbringing, youthful career and sexual adventures, his travels, and his friendships with the scholar and poet Étienne de La Boétie and with his adopted “daughter,” Marie de Gournay. And we also meet his readers—who for centuries have found in Montaigne an inexhaustible source of answers to the haunting question, “how to live?”

Montaigne in Barn Boots: An Amateur Ambles Through Philosophy by Michael Perry [Harper, 9780062230560]

The beloved memoirist and bestselling author of Population: 485 reflects on the lessons he’s learned from his unlikely alter ego, French Renaissance philosopher Michel de Montaigne.

“The journey began on a gurney,” writes Michael Perry, describing the debilitating kidney stone that led him to discover the essays of Michel de Montaigne. Reading the philosopher in a manner he equates to chickens pecking at scraps—including those eye-blinking moments when the bird gobbles something too big to swallow—Perry attempts to learn what he can (good and bad) about himself as compared to a long-dead French nobleman who began speaking Latin at the age of two, went to college instead of kindergarten, worked for kings, and once had an audience with the Pope. Perry “matriculated as a barn-booted bumpkin who still marks a second-place finish in the sixth-grade spelling bee as an intellectual pinnacle . . . and once said hello to Merle Haggard on a golf cart.”

Written in a spirit of exploration rather than declaration, Montaigne in Barn Boots is a down-to-earth (how do you pronounce that last name?) look into the ideas of a philosopher “ensconced in a castle tower overlooking his vineyard,” channeled by a midwestern American writing “in a room above the garage over looking a disused pig pen.” Whether grabbing an electrified fence, fighting fires, failing to fix a truck, or feeding chickens, Perry draws on each experience to explore subjects as diverse as faith, race, sex, aromatherapy, and Prince. But he also champions academics and aesthetics, in a book that ultimately emerges as a sincere, unflinching look at the vital need to be a better person and citizen.

Montaigne and the Tolerance of Politics by Douglas I. Thompson [Oxford University Press, 9780190679934]

Toleration is one of the most studied concepts in contemporary political theory and philosophy, yet the range of contemporary normative prescriptions concerning how to do toleration or how to be tolerant is remarkably narrow and limited. The literature is largely dominated by a neo-Kantian moral-juridical frame, in which toleration is a matter to be decided in terms of constitutional rights. According to this framework, cooperation equates to public reasonableness and willingness to engage in certain types of civil moral dialogue. Crucially, this vision of politics makes no claims about how to cultivate and secure the conditions required to make cooperation possible in the first place. It also has little to say about how to motivate one to become a tolerant person. Instead it offers highly abstract ideas that do not by themselves suggest what political activity is required to negotiate overlapping values and interests in which cooperation is not already assured. Contemporary thinking about toleration indicates, paradoxically, an intolerance of politics.

Montaigne and the Tolerance of Politics argues for toleration as a practice of negotiation, looking to a philosopher not usually considered political: Michel de Montaigne. For Montaigne, toleration is an expansive, active practice of political endurance in negotiating public goods across lines of
value difference. In other words, to be tolerant means to possess a particular set of political capacities for negotiation. What matters most is not how we talk to our political opponents, but that we talk to each other across lines of disagreement. Douglas L. Thompson draws on Montaigne’s Essais to recover the idea that political negotiation grows out of genuine care for public goods and the establishment of political trust. He argues that we need a Montaignian conception of tolerance today if we are to negotiate effectively the circumstances of increasing political polarization and ongoing value conflict, and he applies this notion to current debates in political theory as well as contemporary issues, including the problem of migration and refugee asylum. Additionally, for Montaigne scholars, he reads the Essais principally as a work of public political education, and resituates the work as an extension of Montaigne’s political activity as a high-level negotiator between Catholic and Huguenot parties during the French Wars of Religion. Ultimately, this book argues that Montaigne’s view of tolerance is worth recovering and reconsidering in contemporary democratic societies where political leaders and ordinary citizens are becoming less able to talk to each other to resolve political conflicts and work for shared public goods.

**The Renaissance Rediscovery of Intimacy** by Kathy Eden [University of Chicago Press, 978-0226526645]

In 1345, when Petrarch recovered a lost collection of letters from Cicero to his best friend Atticus, he discovered an intimate Cicero, a man very different from either the well-known orator of the Roman forum or the measured spokesman for the ancient schools of philosophy. It was Petrarch’s encounter with this previously unknown Cicero and his letters that Kathy Eden argues fundamentally changed the way Europeans from the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries were expected to read and write.

The Renaissance Rediscovery of Intimacy explores the way ancient epistolary theory and practice were understood and imitated in the European Renaissance. Eden draws chiefly upon Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca—but also upon Plato, Demetrius, Quintilian, and many others—to show how the classical genre of the “familiar” letter emerged centuries later in the intimate styles of Petrarch, Erasmus, and Montaigne. Along the way, she reveals how the complex concept of intimacy in the Renaissance—leveraging the legal, affective, and stylistic dimensions of its prehistory in antiquity—perdues the literary production and reception of the period and sets the course for much that is modern in the literature of subsequent centuries. Eden’s important study will interest students and scholars in several areas, including classical, Renaissance, and early modern studies; comparative literature; and the history of reading, rhetoric, and writing.

**Nietzsche and Montaigne** by Robert Miner [Palgrave Macmillan, 9783319667447]

This book is a historically informed and textually grounded study of the affinities and tensions between the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel de Montaigne. It explores these connections in the context of Nietzsche’s reverence for Montaigne, a reverence he maintained for no other author.

Robert C. Miner considers the ideas of the Essais, and the (sometimes quite different) ideas they produce in the work of Nietzsche. Beyond questions of “influence,” substantive and interesting points of contact between these two writers exist and demand reflection. To identify these points and demonstrate their importance is the task of this book.

**Montaigne and Shakespeare: The emergence of modern self-consciousness** by Robert Ellrodt [Manchester University Press, 9781526116857]

This book is not merely a study of Shakespeare’s debt to Montaigne. It traces the evolution of self-consciousness in literary, philosophical and religious writings from antiquity to the Renaissance and demonstrates that its early modern forms first appeared in the Essays and in Shakespearean drama. The book points out an anticipation of the dissolution of the self in some modern authors. However, contrary to postmodern assumptions, this early calling into question of the self, did not lead to a negation of identity. Montaigne acknowledged the stable nature of his personality and Shakespeare, as Dryden noted, maintained the constant conformity of each character to itself from its very first setting out in the Play quite to the End, which proves true even when an evolution is perceptible as in Hamlet, Macbeth and Lear.

The historical development of subjectivity is also traced in the apprehension of time, culminating in the Essays and in the Sonnets. The presence of the new currents of skeptical thought in Montaigne’s Essays and in the ‘problem plays’ of Shakespeare, emphasized in recent studies, is acknowledged, but tempered by their constant adherence to permanent humanistic values: truth, friendship, tolerance for ‘the other’, sympathy for men of low birth and the destitute, an aversion for all ‘inhumanity’ and an interest in ‘essence’ and ‘transcendence’.

This illuminating volume will appeal to all students of literature, and any reader with an interest in the evolution of modes of thought. <&>

**The Oxford Handbook of Montaigne** edited by Philippe Desan [Oxford University Press, 9780190215330]

In 1580, Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) published a book unique by its title and its content: Essays.”R. A literary genre was born. At first sight, the Essays resemble a patchwork of personal reflections, but they engage with questions that animate the human mind, and tend toward a single goal: to live better in the present and to prepare for death. For this reason, Montaigne’s thought and writings have been a subject of enduring interest across disciplines. This Handbook brings together essays by prominent scholars that examine Montaigne’s literary, philosophical, and political contributions, and assess his legacy and relevance today in a global perspective.

The chapters of this Handbook offer a sweeping study of Montaigne across different disciplines and in a global perspective. One section covers the historical Montaigne, situating his thought in his own time and space, notably the Wars of Religion in France. The political, historical and religious context of Montaigne’s Essays requires a rigorous
presentation to inform the modern reader of the issues and problems that confronted Montaigne and his contemporaries in his own time.

In addition to this contextual approach to Montaigne, the Handbook also establishes a connection between Montaigne’s writings and issues and problems directly relevant to our modern times, that is to say, our age of global ideology. Montaigne’s considerations, or essays, offer a point of departure for the modern reader’s own assessments. The Essays analyze what can be broadly defined as human nature, the endless process by which the individual tries to impose opinions upon others through the production of laws, policies or philosophies. Montaigne’s motto -- “What do I know?” -- is a simple question yet one of perennial significance. One could argue that reading Montaigne today teaches us that the angle defines the world we see, or, as Montaigne wrote: “What matters is not merely that we see the thing, but how we see it.”

Montaigne: A Life by Philippe Desan, translated by Steven Rendall, Lisa Neal [Princeton University Press, 9780691167879]

One of the most important writers and thinkers of the Renaissance, Michel de Montaigne (1533–92) helped invent a literary genre that seemed more modern than anything that had come before. But did he do it, as he suggests in his Essays, by retreating to his chateau, turning his back on the world, and stoically detaching himself from his violent times? In this definitive biography, Philippe Desan, one of the world’s leading authorities on Montaigne, overturns this longstanding myth by showing that Montaigne was constantly concerned with realizing his political ambitions—and that the literary and philosophical character of the Essays largely depends on them. The most comprehensive and authoritative biography of Montaigne yet written, this sweeping narrative offers a fascinating new picture of his life and work.

As Desan shows, Montaigne always considered himself a political figure and he conceived of each edition of the Essays as an indispensable prerequisite to the next stage of his public career. He lived through eight civil wars, successfully lobbied to be raised to the nobility, and served as mayor of Bordeaux, special ambassador, and negotiator between Henry III and Henry of Navarre. It was only toward the very end of Montaigne’s life, after his political failure, that he took refuge in literature. But, even then, it was his political experience that enabled him to find the right tone for his genre.

In this essential biography, we discover a new Montaigne—caught up in the events of his time, making no separation between private and public life, and guided by strategy first in his words and silences. Neither candid nor transparent, but also not yielding to the cynicism of his age, this Montaigne lends a new depth to the Montaigne of literary legend.

The School of Montaigne in Early Modern Europe [set of 2 volumes]: Volume One: The Patron-Author and Volume Two: The Reader-Writer by Warren Boutcher [Oxford University Press, 9780198739678, set; vol1, 9780198123743; vol 2, 9780198739661]

This major two-volume study offers an interdisciplinary analysis of Montaigne’s Essais and their fortunes in early modern Europe and the modern western university. Volume One focuses on contexts from within Montaigne’s own milieu and on the ways in which his book made him a patron-author or instant classic in the eyes of his editor Marie de Gournay and his promoter Justus Lipsius. Volume Two focuses on the reader/writers across Europe who used the Essais to make their own works, from corrected editions and translations in print, to life-writing and personal records in manuscript.

The two volumes work together to offer a new picture of the book’s significance in literary and intellectual history. Montaigne’s is now usually understood to be the school of late humanism or of Pyrrhonian scepticism. This study argues that the school of Montaigne potentially included everyone in early modern Europe with occasion and means to read and write for themselves and for their friends and family, unconstrained by an official function or scholastic institution. For the Essais were shaped by a battle that had intensified since the Reformation and that would continue through to the pre-Enlightenment period. It was a battle to regulate the educated individual’s judgement in reading and acting upon the two books bequeathed by God to man. The book of scriptures and the book of nature were becoming more accessible through print and manuscript cultures. But while access was being mediated more intensively by teachers such as clerics and humanists, by censors and institutions, by learned authors of past and present, and by commentaries and glosses upon those authors. Montaigne enfranchised the unofficial reader-writer with liberties of judgement offered and taken in the specific historical conditions of his era.

The study draws on new ways of approaching literary history through the history of the book and of reading. The Essais are treated as a mobile, transnational work that travelled from Bordeaux to Paris and beyond to markets in other countries from England and Switzerland, to Italy and the Low Countries. Close analysis of editions, paratexts, translations, and annotated copies is informed by a distinct concept of the social context of a text. The concept is derived from anthropologist Alfred Gell’s notion of the “art nexus”: the specific types of actions and agency relations mediated by works of art understood as “indexes” that give rise to inferences of unique varieties. Throughout the two volumes the focus is on the nexus in which a copy, an edition, an extract, is embedded, and on the way that nexus might be described by early modern people.

Excerpt:

For the writer and ex-teacher Philip Pullman, the fundamental difference between democracy and theocracy is the fact that the former knows how to relate to books, and the latter does not:

Consider the nature of what happens when we read a book—and I mean, of course, a work of literature, not an instruction manual or a textbook—in private, unsupervised, un-spied-on,
alone. It isn’t like a lecture: it’s like a conversation. There’s a back-and-forthness about it. The book proposes, the reader questions, the book responds, the reader considers. We bring our own preconceptions and expectations, our own intellectual qualities, and our limitations, too, our previous experiences of reading, our own temperament, our own hopes and fears, our own personality to the encounter.

And we are active about the process. We oversee the time, for example. We can choose when to read; we don’t have to wait for a timetabled opportunity to open the covers; we can read in the middle of the night, or over breakfast, or during a long summer’s evening. And we’re in charge of the place where the reading happens; we’re not anchored to a piece of unwieldy technology, or required to be present in a particular building along with several hundred-other people. We can read in a bed, or at the bus stop, or (as I used to do when I was younger and more agile) up a tree.

Nor do we have to read it in a way determined by someone else. We can skim, or we can read it slowly; we can read every word, or we can skip long passages; we can read it in the order in which it presents itself, or we can read it in any order we please; we can look at the last page first, or decide to wait for it; we can put the book down and reflect, or we can go to the library and check what it claims to be fact against another authority; we can assent, or we can disagree.

So our relationship with books is a profoundly, intensely, essentially democratic one…. Furthermore, it isn’t static: there is no final, unquestionable, unchanging authority. It’s dynamic. It changes and develops as our understanding grows, as our experience of reading—and of life itself—increases…. Of course, democracies don’t guarantee that real reading will happen. They just make it possible. Whether it happens or not depends on schools, among other things. And schools are vulnerable to all kinds of pressure, not least that exerted by governments eager to impose ‘targets’, and cut costs, and teach only those things that can be tested. ’

In Pullman’s scene, to read a work of literature in private is to act in a specific fashion with one’s mind and body. It is not purely a matter of reading for pleasure. The literary book is both a form of cognitive activity modelled on oral discourse and an object that is handled in distinctive ways at moments of leisure. The properties of this kind of text, in this form, give rise to interactions that happen in particular spaces.

Thanks to the portability and efficacy of the technology (the codex), the reader can converse freely and healthily, in his or her natural person, with like-minded authors from distant times and places. The conversation is a ceaselessly questioning one; there is no final authority, no lecturer at a podium. The reader does not have to be in a monastic cell, a study, or a library to participate. The book is not a folio chained to a lectern, or confined in some other way to an institutional study-space visited under certain conditions—though other books are available in a public library for fact-checking.

It is a vade mecum (‘go with me’), a companion with whom idly to stroll and talk away from the business of the world, a recreational tool for use wherever one finds oneself in everyday life (up a tree, at a bus stop). It is part of the reader’s lived experience, a relationship that changes and grows. Could any other object perform this function with quite the same magic? E-readers ape the properties of the portable printed book. But do readers feel they support, as fully, the relationship with a literary work that Pullman prescribes?

The scene is, of course, symbolic. It represents the cognitive and social value of non-institutional study of literature. To use the book in this way is to be immune from state and church regulation; as an object, it indexes an unhindered capacity to think, move, and associate. The reader is enfranchised with the freedom to participate in frank and open conversation, and to judge for themselves. The agency exercised in cognitively processing literature with this innate liberty becomes, by transfer, the liberty of a citizen of a democracy.

It is a democracy made up of individuals whose capacity to reason critically is developed through their access to the leisure, spaces, and time necessary for ‘free’ reading and writing. ’For just as Pullman’s citizen is not subject to any order intrinsic to the book and the written words, so he or she is not subject to other unchanging forms of authority. The outcome is a social good: a healthy, because free, society. Advanced literacy is a means to the end of universal cultural enfranchisement. Books are the essential tools of a democratic civilization.

But there is an ominous background. Whether ‘real reading’ happens still depends in part on institutions, such as schools and the governments that pressurize them. Conversation of this kind, Pullman believes, is constantly under threat from agents of oppressive state and church schooling, from lecturers, grammarians, and theologians who would remove the learner’s freedom of judgement, restrict them to a timetabled classroom lesson, and instruct them to read pragmatically, dogmatically. They would tie them to unwieldy and oppressive technologies such as computer monitors and LCD screens. And they are winning. In a world of increasingly technocratic and theocratic societies, ‘real’ reading—Pullman believes—is increasingly rare. If real reading of literary books is the practice that artificially conserves and extends democratic conversation in the absence of the reality, then the stakes are high indeed.

Pullman goes on to visualize his argument by reminding us of the moment when President George W. Bush received the news of the second strike on the World Trade Centre. As the perpetrators hurled the plane at the tower, ‘their minds intoxicated by a fundamentalist reading of a religious text’, the leader of the free world sits in a classroom reading with children. Did the scene illustrate the difference between democratic reading and totalitarian reading? After all—something Pullman does not mention—the President was sitting beneath a chalked mantra that stated [r]eading makes a country great. Unfortunately, however, thanks to his own government’s educational policy, the book in the President’s hands is My Pet Goat, ‘a drearily functional piece of rubbish designed only to teach phonics’.

Advocates of phonics for state schools insist on its utility as a method that can teach all children to read and write, a method that can enfranchise all the citizens of a democracy by giving them the basic skills they need to learn and participate autonomously. But the problem for Pullman is that My Pet Goat is a technical reader, not a literary reader. Children brought up to think that that sort of thing is a real book, and that that sort of activity is what reading is like, Pullman believes, will be vulnerable to indoctrination. They will not be formed from the earliest stage for the kind of frank philosophical conversation that keeps democracy alive. Militancy against heretics can flourish, whether in Bush’s America or in Islamist theocracies.
Even contemporary teachers of the arts and humanities who still believe that the future of democracy rests on the relationship between literary subjectivity and political enfranchisement might find Pullman’s thesis questionable. If he can be taken to be saying that real reading is essentially democratic—liberal-democratic—are we led to conclude that there were no such readers in the ancient world or in the republics and monarchies of ancien régime Europe? Or, conversely, that they were all liberal democrats avant la lettre? This would be awkward. Free reading and normative reading, reading in private spaces and reading in public institutions, reading for pleasure and reading for doctrine—these practices have co-existed throughout literary history, sometimes in tension, sometimes in tandem, according to the social and cultural conditions of the time, the particular understandings of private and public, of official and unofficial learning, of clerical and lay personae.

Despite the warnings of Pullman and others, it might be argued that members of modern liberal elites still take the privilege to read and write in their personal ways, in private spaces they control, for granted. But the gaining of this freedom has a long, agonistic history, a history that became particularly vexed between the Reformation and the early Enlightenment. For Pullman’s idea that secular reading can be a leisurely but educational conversation nourished by unregulated, un-spyied-on, private book use has a firmly pre-modern provenance, in part bourgeois, in part aristocratic, mostly male.

There are precedents amongst the elite, cultivated classes of the ancient Roman world, who read at leisure, beyond the exercise of any public function, in their villas and gardens.

In more recent history, it goes back at least 900 years, to the moment when we first find records of practices of private reading and writing and vernacular manuscript circulation not confined to the institutions and disciplinary systems of the official (scholastic, professional, ecclesiastical) Latin culture. This provenance points to a gendered process of enfranchisement that is not so much one of democratization through universal literacy, as one of acculturation and ennoblement through unofficial self-schooling.

Also implicit in Pullman’s scene is a pre-modern history of increasing dependence of all kinds of formal and informal schooling on the technology and distribution of manuscript and printed books. The use of ‘conversation’ to figure practices of reading originated in monastic contexts, in relation to biblical and devotional texts. During the late medieval period, the ‘freedom’ of religious conversation came for the educated elite to depend on continuous private interaction with personally compiled and owned liturgical books or breviaries, outside the walls and rule of a monastery or convent.

By the early modern period, an equivalent dependence had developed in relation to secular literature. The way in which an individual’s private reading and writing, their cognitive interaction with books, informed their conversation outside formal institutions of learning was a marker not only of their Christian vocation, but also of their nobility of soul and mind. Where early sixteenth-century Germany saw widespread public recognition of the lay Christian whose religious life was shaped in and through private reading and writing, later seventeenth-century France saw the invention of the honnéte homme, whose library shaped his conversation in society, whose reading in literature was itself a form of conversation.

Indeed, throughout the second millennium CE, ‘rigid, professional, ordered practices of reading’, with ‘specific rituals for the readers’ behaviour and for the use of books that require environments with special furnishings and particular equipment and instruments’, were ‘opposed by free, relaxed, unregulated practices’, ‘freer reading habits’ associated with court society, and less constrained modes of reading used by bourgeois people who read in the vernacular. The former ‘order of reading’, as Armando Petrucci calls it (adapting Foucault’s ‘order of discourse’), acknowledges and tolerates, attempts to assimilate, the latter modes of reading (‘alone, anywhere in the house, in total liberty’), but can also take them to be potentially subversive.

The relationship between these complementary opposites is the relationship, then, between the way philosophical books were studied in institutional libraries and read by formal lecture and disputation in public schools, or the way religious books were consumed according to the rule of a monastery, and the way they were read and discussed not only at leisure but in other, non-professional settings—settings that could also, however, be described in particular circumstances as schools or academies, and include members of the clergy or clergy.
journals, annotations) that place artefacts in interactive settings—nexuses, in Gell’s terms—at particular moments: Lancelot Delrio interacting with Essais I 20; the copy of the 1580 Essais carried to Italy, confiscated and debated in ways registered in a manuscript journal; Maillefer’s manuscript memoir changing its course when it begins to register passages from the final chapters of the Essais (2.5.6). These represent specific instances in the complex and various processes that Darnton systematizes—from the point of view of a generalized history of the book—as a ‘circuit of communications’.

Some work in the history of the book uses a rather depersonalized or inert methodology focused either on manufacture and material formats (ignoring the phase of authorial composition and the text itself) or on circuits and networks and the types of ‘players’ that sustain them. One problem with the Darnton model and its progeny is that they posit (with some exceptions) a unidirectional flow of agency around the circuit from publisher to printers to shippers to booksellers to readers to author to publisher. Individuals should fit tidily into one of these roles. Receptions of all kinds—readings, translations—are absorbed within the lifecycle of the original work.

The Gellian model used in this study is meant both to counter and to complement these tendencies. It helps to bring out the diversity of the possible descriptions of agency relations in various nexuses mediated by literary and verbal artefacts, and allows each participant (including the artefact) to be an agent or patient in a particular role just for the instance in question. This may mean, for example, that a reading or a translation, far from being absorbed within the lifecycle of the original work, becomes a work, subordinating or even ignoring the actors and actions involved in the source’s production.

For there is one very important distinction between the two models: Darnton’s model and its derivatives aim to be objective historical models of the communications circuit; Gell’s is a way of theorizing participant-observers’ descriptions of particular nexuses and the contingent relations of agency and patiency that they comprise at a given moment, from a given perspective—hence my insistence throughout that Petrucci’s ‘free literate’ is not a recognizable social type in the early modern period, at least until Montaigne becomes canonical. It must be taken, rather, as shorthand for a personal act of reading and writing undertaken in specific, unofficial, private, or otherwise irregular circumstances. It is hoped the result is a new way of posing and answering questions about the genesis and influence of the Essais—and, by extension, of other books—in early modern literary and philosophical culture.

The resulting study does not treat its subject matter in chronological order. It is divided into two volumes, one of which focuses more on authorial contexts (Volume 1, ‘The patron-author’), and one on case studies of reader-writers of the book in different European locations (Volume 2, ‘The reader-writer’). But the two volumes work together as a single study: they constantly cross-refer; they overlap in many respects. Viewed as a whole, the study is organized thematically in three concentric circles around a core. The core comprises the last chapter of Volume 1 and the first chapter of Volume 2.

These two chapters deal with the two moments at which the Essais travelled with their author to encounter readers and censors in Rome and Paris. They are placed in the middle rather than at the beginning or end because the study of the particular literary nexus is the central task throughout. In the outermost circle, 1.1 and 2.7 work together as broader essays on this study’s approach to early modern literary history. They also delineate instances of people reading and writing, keeping and reviewing records, in non-institutional contexts of study and recreation. Both chapters draw on contrasts between Montaigne and Francis Bacon, who together define a whole range of ways of describing the persona and social setting of an independent investigator or reader-writer.

Moving inwards to the next circle, 1.2 and 2.6 both deal with the modern university tradition of the Essais, which inevitably mediates our relationship to the historical sources discussed in the more central chapters. The next and widest circle includes—and places in dialogue—chapters which focus on the agency of Montaigne and his collaborators in the making and the reception of the Essais (1.3 to 1.6), and chapters which focus on the agency of early modern reader-writers of the Essais (2.2 to 2.5). However, all of the chapters in this circle were conceived and written in relation to one another.

For, again, one cannot ultimately dissociate study of authors and other producers from that of their readers and rewriters; the two groups are always in relations of one sort or another. If Montaigne becomes a patron-author through the Essais it is by means of the agency of Gournay and others. So, the chapters in Volume 1 constantly invoke the agency of rewriters and disseminators beyond the authorial milieu, the chapters in Volume 2 the agency of the author and his friends and family. In the core chapters (1.7 and 2.1), the two categories of agents examined in the following and preceding chapters come together in dramatic live encounters, as Montaigne meets his censors and readers at Rome and Paris/Blois.

The premise throughout the two volumes is that the Essais make sense in relation to the conditions that shaped private reader-writers’ extramural participation in humane letters and practical philosophy, and in the closely associated culture of personal record-keeping (self-study or self-accounting). In the authorial contexts, the pairing of the Essais and the Journal makes this latter association clear. Montaigne was in the habit of keeping personal written records (in this case of a voyage), sometimes with the help of a secretary, and this habit shapes the Essais and its claim to distinctiveness in important ways.

The prominence given, in Volume 1 to Montaigne’s insistent description of his work as a registre or personal book of record emerged in tandem with research, described in Volume 2, on L’Estoile’s juxtaposition of the Essais and his own compilation of registres journaux (2.5.3-5), and on Slingsby’s use of Florio as a source and model for his own manuscript ‘book of remembrance’ (2.4.2-3). There are many other such connections. The prominence given to Lipsius in Volume 1 follows not only from his place in Gournay’s 1595 Preface, but from his role in the story of Van Veen’s Montaigne in Volume 2 (2.4) and of L’Estoile’s Montaigne (in which Lipsius’s works serve as a vade mecum, alongside the Essais) in 2.1 and 2.7.

Together, the two volumes trace a transnational itinerary between various locations and cities. In Volume 1, we spend more time on the estate at Montaigne, at Bordeaux, and at other locations in the southwest region of France. But we also follow the author on his Italian journey to various thermal spas, and through cities such as Florence, Urbino, and Rome. And there are non-authorial diversions to London, Louvain, and Stavelot. In Volume 2, we move from Paris and Blois, to
Geneva, then via northeastern Italy to southeast England. From the north of England we go to the northern Netherlands, then back to Paris and Rheims.

Use of the term 'transnational' should not, however, be taken to mean that we are travelling across clearly defined borders between national territories and corresponding national literatures and cultures—these borders were not firmly in place until the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

We also travel across a social spectrum. In Volume 1 we explore the ways in which Montaigne’s status as a noble d’épée and one-time magistrate shaped his approach to travel and to books. Marie de Gournay was the daughter of a trésorier who acquired a noble estate and who briefly entered into epistolary relations with one of the princes of the European republic of letters, Justus Lipsius. We also encounter high-ranking nobelwomen from Lady Anne Clifford to Madame de Duras, and aristocratic patrons in various cities in Italy. We explore the mentalities of witch-hunting magistrates in southwest France (Pierre de Lance) and the southern Low Countries (Pierre Dheure). Many of Montaigne’s associates and friends, such as Pierre de Brach and La Boétie were parlementaires, counsellors, or lawyers in his region or in Paris. Having met a number of high-ranking diplomats and clerics in Rome at the end of Volume 1, we explore the world of these robe intellectuals across France at the beginning of Volume 2.

Thereafter, in the rest of Volume 2, we encounter: senior Genevan pastors (Goulart and Perrot); a minor diplomatic servant in Ferrara (Naselli); a university philosopher and academician in thrall to his own uncle and to powerful court patrons (Querenghi); an educated household servant and iamentary lawyer in Holland who was a client to the famous humanist Lipsius (Van Veen); a humanist and retired parliamentary official in dire straits in the Paris of Henri IV (L’Estoile); a wealthy merchant of Rheims with little formal education and muted aspirations to noble status (Mailleré); a bishop (Camus) and a theological canon in the French provinces (Charron) who causes a stir with a book published in Paris.

This is not, then, a matter of switching from study of an autonomous literary ‘creation’ in Volume 1 to study of the fortunes and interpretation of that creation in Volume 2. The focus throughout is on the dynamic process of reading and rewriting in a sequence of social nexuses and geographical locations. The Essais are addressed at all times in The School of Montaigne as an interactive index of practical self-study and self-accounting; all the chapters explore (as William Sherman puts it), ‘the interface between “the text itself” (the words on the page) and the broader social and material matrix of “the extended work” (the contexts and collaborative efforts involved in creating meaning)’.

Across the two volumes we find aristocratic patrons, doctors of theology, pastors and friars, humanists and philosophers, noble professionals, honnêtes hommes/ dames, gentlemen (including Montaigne himself) and gentlewomen participating in relations near the Essais, and making use of the tools of reading and writing for self-study and self-accounting. We also find that many of them relate to the Essais as an ethical touchstone of the effects of self-consciously natural franchise and liberté, whether they do so in positive, guarded, or negative terms. This means I conclude—perhaps surprisingly—that Villey was right to identify the perennial significance of Montaigne’s work with what he conceptualized from his own vantage point as the enfranchisment of a critical thinker. But the aim of The School of Montaigne in Early Modern Europe is not to restore Villey’s mantra. The overall study aims, rather, to specify the historical circumstances in which the early modern reader-writer’s relationship to the technologies of letters—and via letters to the Book of the world—came to perform a special function for those with noble pretensions. These were often individuals whose subjection (willling or otherwise) to the expanded jurisdictions of early modern states and churches in times of crisis rendered older models of liberty, noble and bourgeois, inapplicable—especially if they were women. Even in contexts of violent civil conflict and poisonous religio-political controversy, they could materialize their innate nobility, their franchise and liberté, by means of the judgement with which they read, collected, copied, wrote, and circulated texts.

The origins of Pullman’s questioning reader of literature lay not in the circumstances that gave rise to free societies in the modern sense of liberal democracies with universal suffrage and literacy. They lay in the history that begins with the free literates of Petrucci’s late medieval period. It continues through the early modern period with the process to which reader-writers such as Gournay in France and Slingsby in England point us in different, gendered ways: the troubled enfranchisement of the unofficial, private ‘judge’ within the literary culture of practical philosophy and self-accounting.

Volume 1 analyses Montaigne’s persona as the patron of his own book and of the ‘free literate’ in both the early modern and modern periods. Though it draws on the reception studies that feature more heavily in Volume 2, its primary focus is the authorial milieu, the earliest editions of the Essais, and the Journal de voyage. However, as I explained in the ‘General Introduction’ to both volumes, authorial and reception contexts are not dissociated at any point. The whole two-volume study is structured as three concentric circles of chapters around an inner circle comprising two chapters (1.7 and 2.1). In the outermost circles, 1.2 combines with 2.6 to analyse the Essais as an object of modern scholarship and pedagogy, and 1.1 and 2.7 combine to analyse early modern literary culture and the Essais’ place within it.

The first chapter of this volume is a prologue to the whole two-volume study. It applies the Gellian model of social context (introduced in the ‘General Preface’) to the documentary record of Montaigne’s role as an unofficial, private judge or mediator in the elite culture of the time. It does this by analysing two anecdotes about artefacts given by scholars to the head of household at Montaigne. The two gifts are very different in kind: one is a medical amulet inscribed with characters, the other a philosophical book inscribed with letters. But both come with instructions for their use as prophylactics. Both end up being put to modified uses in new circumstances. Montaigne re-uses one and rewrites the other (in French). The gifts themselves, what is done with the gifts, and the anecdotes as printed in the Essais, together exemplify the indexing of agency relations within early modern types of art nexus.

The second chapter contrasts the results of this analysis with those of more traditional approaches. Brunetière and Villey inaugurated twentieth-century study of the Essais within the context of controversies about teaching the literary and philosophical classics in the state institutions of the Third
Republic of modern France. I show how Villey abducted Montaigne's critical agency in a manner shaped very much by the pedagogical culture of his own moment. He looked to the Essais for a shifting picture of what pedagogues of the time called la culture générale de l'intelligence. Villey said that studying the Essais was a way of being present at the formation of the man of letters and of the critical thinker. This could be put more strongly: it was a way of re-enacting that formation in the cultural conditions of 'the Third Republic of Letters' in France in the early decades of the twentieth century.

With Chapter 3 we begin a series of case studies centred on the Essais and the Journal de voyage. As we heard in the ‘General Introduction’, my research on Florio’s (2.3.1) and Querenghi’s (2.2.11) relationships to their patrons suggested a different, more historically informed approach to the question of how to take Montaigne’s self-portrait. The postmodern literary theorists who challenged Villey departed from the traditional modern notion of the author understood as the integral and self-sufficient subject who writes a text. They then deconstructed it. Chapter 3 departs, by contrast, from the traditional early modern notion of the author: the patron or privileged consumer whose moral and intellectual virtues, whose nobility of mind and soul, are apparent in the text— including books and records—they cause to be made or which they are seen to collect and dispose. This notion is seen to inform both the Essais and the Journal de voyage. The former text offers a new description of the possible relations between the patron-author, the book, and the reader-writer.

Chapter 4 argues that the Montaignean essai’s transformation of literary precedents was understood by contemporaries to be the performance of an unofficial role or unnamed office on the part of a nobleman who had fashioned a distinct philosophical persona. The office was that of private judgmental mediator between expert knowledge and lived experience—both his own experience and that of his ‘friends and family’. The persona was named by some of Montaigne’s contemporaries to be that of a ‘wise man’ or sage, on the model of those ancient men occupied with other business who happened to get reputations for dispensing moral and political sententiae when at leisure.

The chapter begins with the English Montaigne published by John Florio in 1603. From the perspective offered by that edition, we can better see the Essais as an enactment of the nameless philosophical role (office sans nom) that Montaigne played in the local knowledge economies of sixteenth-century France and Italy, especially in relation to elite women. Montaigne uses his pursuit of self-knowledge to filter the arts of sixteenth-century experts. He does this for himself, certainly, but also on behalf of contemporary patrons of knowledge from named noble patronesses such as Madame de Duras to new ‘friends and family’ who get to know him via his book. Once again, in this chapter, we concentrate on the conjuncture in the early 1580s of Montaigne’s composition of the privately kept Journal and of his defense and revision of the Essais.

Chapter 5 is complementary to Chapter 4. It shows in detail how the material and social process of noting, extracting, collecting, and redeploying literary and verbal artefacts indexed—for early modern participant-observers—both internal discourse (the cognitive operations of human consciousness in inventing and judging sensibilia in the rational mind) and external discourse and conversation. It starts with Pierre de Lancre’s and others’ judgements of the Essais, then follows the trail from Lancre to intellectuals and magistrates in the Low Countries (Delrio and Dheure). The result is a view of Montaigne’s entrance into late sixteenth-century learned conversation as a nobly virtuoso, freestyle registrar and comptroller of literary and verbal artefacts from classical citations to anecdotal experiences. The chapter complements the discussion, to follow in the second volume (2.2.7), of the uses made of the Essais by Simon Goulart in his printed miscellany.

Chapter 6 aims to show that two issues traditionally considered to be separate are in fact facets of one another. One appears to be about the meaning of the work: the increasing boldness and independence of tone in the Essais after 1580. The other appears to be about the fortuna of the text: how the earlier version of the book was received. The analysis integrates them. It uses Gournay’s 1595 edition to describe how participants in sixteenth-century literary culture routinely cared for their own and others’ critical fortunes. It goes on to show how Montaigne sought and obtained a reputation, via dissemination of his book, as a more authentically ‘naive’, unpremeditated philosopher, and to ask to what end he did this. It is Lipsius and Gournay who give this new kind of philosopher the ancient name of a sage, a wise man. The chapter also makes a further contribution to one of the overall arguments of The School of Montaigne: that an important cultural condition of the authenticity claimed by the Essais is the medieval and early modern practice of self-accounting, of writing and transcribing private mémoires of miscellaneous matters in tables and manuscript registers.

The seventh chapter is an apt end to Volume 1’s study of the patron-author, because it deals with the best-documented occasion on which Montaigne’s behavior in life and in his book, converge, at Rome in 1580-1. But it is also complementary to the first chapter of Volume 2, as I mentioned at the beginning of this Introduction. Chapters 1.7 and 2.1 are at one and the same time the last chapters that take Montaigne’s and his friends’ intentions as the primary object of study and the first chapters that focus on the stories of copies or editions received or produced by others beyond his immediate milieu. They deal with the work’s fortunes in Rome and Paris, the two most important cities in Montaigne’s world. Chapter 1.7 relates the transmission and evolution of the work after first publication (1580) to the story—told in the Journal—of Montaigne’s enfranchisement as a noble citizen of Rome at Easter 1581.

The chapter is also the conclusion to Volume 1’s overall concern with the combination of the Essais and the Journal, of printed literary register and private manuscript register, of writing and travel in the early 1580s.

The material focus is provided by the copy of Bordeaux 1580 that was confiscated at the gates of the city, recommended for expurgation by experts, but then returned to the author on condition that the next, revised edition mark his loyalty— rewarded with the title of civis romanus—to the Roman Catholic Church and its values. So, from the papal court and curia’s point of view, Montaigne is granted freedoms in exchange for his loyalty to established authorities. This is arguably the primary social transaction indexed by the Essais from 1588. The Essais and the Journal are restituted as registers of the ‘natural’ franchise and liberty of judgement of a noble gentleman’s conversation. They are registers which take the very different forms of an authentically private manuscript journal and of a printed book—a printed book that
of course masquerades in its later editions as a new kind of private register intended for friends and family only.

Volume 2
In Paris in early 1609, as he began a new volume of his registres, Pierre de L'Estoile adapted Varro's Latin to describe his existence evading the effects of melancholy in private: 'So I fashion a life reading and writing' (Sic legendo et scribendo Vitam Procuda'). He was no monk or scribe, but a layman keeping a personal archive of what he heard and read—including extracts from Montaigne's Essais.

In Volume 2 we switch focus from the patron-author to the reader-writers of the Essais across Europe. These are seventeenth-century descendants of the free literate of the late medieval period. The Essais become a context for their works, instead of vice versa. The primary objects of study are less, now, nexuses involving Montaigne and his collaborators than those involving various commentators, imitators, promoters, translators, and their networks of friends and family. We are concerned less with Montaigne's book than with their books—whether printed, manuscript, or a hybrid of both, whether literary works or personal records.

The early modern printed book was less protected, less fixed, more open to changes in form and use, from edition to edition, from copy to copy, than its modern counterpart. Early modern individuals who took advantage of this openness displayed a whole range of behaviours when they interacted with books in circulation. On the one hand, anyone from individual readers and translators to publishers and official censors could take what would now be considered extraordinary liberties with the published and unpublished writings of others. They could correct and expurgate or prohibit them, fragment and re-use them without acknowledgement, republish them without permission.

These dangers grew more severe once a greater variety of regulatory authorities were put in place after 1560. Any text, the persona of any author, could be subverted for confessional or commercial reasons when they circulated through international centres of differing religio-political hues, from Paris and Lyons, to Geneva, Frankfurt, and Rome. The instruments that could be used to protect against this, from royal privileges to friendly epistolary networks, were not guaranteed to work, as Jacques Auguste de Thou discovered after the first publication of his universal history in 1604.

In the case of new works by relatively unknown authors, users and publishers could, without acknowledgement, appropriate and reproduce parts or all of the work, with account taken neither of the meanings of the text in its original context nor of authorial intentions. The fate of La Boélie's most famous text in the hands of Huguenot propagandists (see 1.6.13) is a case in point: they disguised its true intentions (from Montaigne's point of view) by setting it amongst texts of a rebellious nature.

On the other hand, everyone from correctors in the printshop to readers in the marketplace could be described as intervening to help make a book what it had to be to survive uncathed. From this perspective, they could be said to be participating in the composition and revision of rounded moral, intellectual, and social stories about the making and transmission of a work (see 1.1.12). A simple example of such a story would be the enfancement of its writer with the persona of a noble author of good faith, by means of rhetorical praise. This could mean placing the work in meaningful relation to other works and personae in ways that shifted its understood significance as it moved from location to location.

The third chapter of Volume 1 (1.3) began with an analysis, in these terms, of the first printed response to the publication of Montaigne's book and of an anecdote concerning Henri III's reception of the work. The final chapter (1.7) featured another occasion upon which a specific copy of Montaigne's book was received as a recommendation of the memory of its author: the author's stay in Rome in 1580-1, and the return of the copy seized for examination at the gates.

Together, the two occasions suggest an outline of the kind of judgemental and anecdotal framework within which an elite consumer or patron might have been expected to place Montaigne's book, of the kind of inferences that might conventionally have been made. In both cases, a certain kind of story is told—by a royal bibliographer (La Croix du Maine), by papal authorities—about the author and what the book is doing for his public reputation. The book is received as an index of Montaigne's performance in the conversation of the time, as it centred on great contemporary patrons such as the King of France and the Pope, and on great classical patrons such as Plutarch and Seneca.

Volume 2 will ask what other stories were told with the Essais by early modern reader-writers in different locations across Europe. It mines some of the richest veins of evidence concerning the participation of the Essais in others' projects, for the fully evolved Essais were intended to facilitate sustained private commerce with the author on the part of a diverse public ('divers visages') of friends and family, of honnêtes hommes and dames who would frequent his book—as they might have frequented him in person—in their cabinets.

Putting to one side (except for Charron) the frequently studied philosophical texts of well-known public philosophers from seventeenth-century France (Descartes, Malebranche, Pascal), I assemble a sample public of reader-writers from across Europe. It is only a sample. With still more space, more might have been included about, for example, Spanish and neo-Latin contexts of reception and transmission. Nevertheless, as will become clear in the concluding chapter (2.7), the selected case-studies do provide a set of historical coordinates by which to plot a reading—against the grain of more abstract modern interpretations—of the Essais' place in wider cultural history.

So, the chapters in Volume 2 address: the most important early elogia of Montaigne, and readings of his text, by parlementaires in France; the three most important early vernacular translations in Italy and England (Naselli, Florio, Canini); the early Genevan editions, including Gouart's corrected text of 1595; the three manuscript journals with the best evidence of private readers' use of Florio's Essays in England and the Essais in France (Slingsby, Yorkshire; Maillefer, Rheims; L'Estoile, Paris); the two copies (Van Veen, The Hague; Maillefer, Rheims) which offer the richest evidence of the text's use as a personal instrument of self-study or practical philosophy over a lifetime; the set of printed Discorsi (by Flavio Querenghi) that best reveal use of Naselli's translation as a vade mecum in Italy; the printed work which systematized the text as an instrument of practical philosophy for the seventeenth century (Charron's De la sagesse); the seventeenth-century account of the Essais (in Bishop Camus's Diversitez) which, along with Gournay's preface, offers the most telling insights into its relationship to the contemporary culture of reading and writing.
In each case there is enough documentary evidence to reveal the social networks and conditions that shaped individuals’ use of the Essais, as well as the purposes and outcomes involved.

The first chapter is complementary to the final chapter of Volume 1; together they comprise the core of the two-volume study. Chapter 1.7 was about how Montaigne’s self-portrait in print worked in conjunction with his person in Rome. Chapter 2.1 is about how it worked in Paris and across the parliamentary network of intellectuals centred on the capital, with people who knew him—or of him—personally. We follow Montaigne on his trip to Paris in 1588, this time with the copy text for the new quarto edition of the Essais.

In Rome in 1580–1 there proved to be a close relationship between Montaigne’s reception in his physical person by the curial elite and the reception of his book. But in this case the physical encounter is less immediately significant. It emerges that Montaigne, in his persona as the author of the Essais, did not properly ‘arrive’ in Paris, as far as the parliamentary elite were concerned, until the posthumous publication of Paris 1595. And even then he was not accorded the position of a patron-author, which was held only by great lawyer-scholars such as L’Hôpital. His persona and his text were re-written for the early seventeenth-century purposes of a whole community of parlementaires.

Indeed, until the 1600s, he was very much in the shadow of the friend whose works he had edited and addressed to parlementaires in the early 1570s: La Boétrie.

When he did arrive (by means of Paris 1595, and the subsequent octavos), he was welcomed in terms that were complementary to but different from those used by Gournay, and which retrospectively inserted the author and his book into a politico context. The similarities and differences in ethos and fortunes between the Essais and that truly politique book, de Thou’s Historiae, are explored, especially with respect to the latter book’s own fortunes in the same two cities of Rome and Paris.

Montaigne and de Thou represent opposite ends of a range of choices available to free literates wanting to keep records of personal or historical matters. The important point is that de Thou and the other politiques understood Montaigne’s book to witness to a certain kind of free discursive behaviour, which they rooted in the author’s noble persona as an ex-conseller and private court mediator who was amenable to peace, and who saw the true causes of the wars of religion (not religion, but aristocratic factionalism).

The comparison between the circulation of Montaigne’s and de Thou’s books across France and Europe leads naturally to a broader consideration of the Essais-in-transmission across various countries and cities. The second chapter uses the English poet Samuel Daniel’s famous description of the cross-border ‘intertraffique’ of the mind to ask whether the ‘franchise’ of Montaigne’s worth was indeed recognized in cities from Geneva in Switzerland to Ferrara, Padua, and Venice in northeastern Italy.

The official and unofficial culture of correction had an important role to play in all these locations, as ‘negotiated censorship’ (Ingrid Jostock’s phrase) resulted in different outcomes in different cities. In Geneva, we need to attend to the relationships between ecclesiastical censors and libraires, and between the book trades in Paris and Lyon, to account for the fact that the Essais were first published in a heavily censored edition, before appearing unexpurgated—both times with false title pages.

Despite his activity as a censor, it is Simon Goulart who prepares us for the later chapters by revealing the market of free literates for whom Montaigne was judged to be writing. His 1595 edition combines with other evidence to show how one of the most significant early reader-writers of the Essais (Goulart himself) corrected and used the work.6 Scaliger received the edition as part of the oeuvre of Goulart, and of the city of Geneva he served. There are some parallels with the first Italian translation, which was also published in the period following the poorly distributed edition of Paris 1588, and which we can also see as part of the oeuvre both of its translator, Naselli, and of the Ferrarese court.

As we move to Padua-Venice we again find secular and regular clerics active in the mediation of the informal, ‘academic’ culture of practical philosophy. They become involved via courts, academies, and bookseller-publishers with the articulation of philosophical personae for themselves and their elite patrons. In the late 1620s and early 1630s, clerics called upon the Essais to assist in the fashioning of virtù civile and models of the philosophico-religious life for the noble elite of the Veneto. Flavio Querenghi used Naselli’s translation not in his public lectures on moral philosophy, which he delivered ex-officio, but in his discorsi, which draw on his private reading and writing in the settings of the accademia and other forms of amicizia.

The third chapter analyses the English school of Montaigne. For most of the seventeenth century, this derived in large part from the way John Florio and his associates, especially Samuel Daniel, enfranchised the essayist as a participant in the aristocratic culture of private learning in late Elizabethan—early Jacobean noble and royal households—especially the female sphere of these households (including Queen Anna’s court).

The Essais’ arrival in England is associated in modern historiography with an abstractly conceived rise of scepticism, individualism, or self-consciousness. At the time, however, it was associated more with the ambivalence surrounding the role and outcome in elite social and cultural reproduction of this free, family-based style of noble schooling and learned leisure—which extended to theatrical entertainments.

This type of schola was based on practical experience and on reading and writing fed by recent European vernacular literature (including romances in prose and verse), as much as by standard humanist tuition in the Graeco-Roman classics. Though designed to enfranchise those not training to be schoolmen from enslavement to both scholastic and humanistic couplings of grammar and logic, its outcomes and applications were uncertain, even undesirable (especially in the case of women), in many critics’ eyes.

Florio’s translation originated in a manuscript version of Montaigne’s chapter on the ‘institution’ or education of a young nobleman, addressed to the Countess of Bedford. The first edition (1603) was dedicated to six noblewomen, and the second (1613) to Queen Anna of Denmark. It consequently became a kind of sophisticated brevity for the institution and learned entertainment of the Jacobean gentry and nobility, especially for witty critique of the tyrannies of custom and fashion. This fact was brilliantly lampooned in Ben Jonson’s stage caricature of a ‘would-be’ politic Lady who uncritically
follows all court fashions, including the reading of Montaigne and other non-curricular continental texts. By relating this to the use of Florio’s text in Samuel Daniel’s The Queens Arcadia (performed 1605), we gain a better understanding of the context of Shakespeare’s use of the same text in The Tempest (1610-11).

The fourth and fifth chapters explore the relationship between the European transmission of the Essais and non-institutional cultures of record-keeping. What kind of book was in practice dedicated to what Montaigne describes (in ‘Au lecteur’) as a domestic and private end? Villey established the relationship between the Essais and printed miscellanies of ‘readings’ or leçons. Chapters 2.4 and 2.5 complement this by exploring—in the vicinity of the Essais—the relationship between reading and various kinds of miscellaneous private writing and self-accounting.

In 2.4.2, a Yorkshire gentleman caught up in the late 1630s in the beginnings of the British wars of religion starts to keep a book of personal commentaries modelled on Florio’s English Montaigne. In the second half of the chapter we switch to the religious wars in the Low Countries in the 1580s, where Pieter van Veen’s copy of the Essais first becomes a ‘Memoire’ of its owner—as it still is in the 1620s. It is a memoir not only in the specific sense that he writes a narrative of his life in the back, but also in the more general sense that it is designed to be an index of a son’s active remembrance and perpetuation of his father’s character and virtues. Van Veen’s extraordinary copy reifies an early modern understanding of the Essais as a work of art made for friends and family.

Chapter 2.5 begins with Pierre Huet’s early-eighteenth-century description of the school of Montaigne, which he says has been flourishing for more than a century. He denounces the Essais as ‘the breviary of urbane loafers and ignorant pseudointellectuals’, of undisciplined, over-free literates who do not want to pursue proper scholarship and knowledge. The chapter goes on to offer two further case-studies of such free literates in early modern France. Both read Montaigne’s work while writing paper journals to domestic and private ends; both combined reading and writing in books with the keeping and reviewing of personal records.

Ultimately, I aim to persuade the reader of this study that the manuscript records of L’Estoille and Maillefer, when combined with those of Slingsby and Van Veen, have as much to tell us about the historical meanings and uses of the Essais in early modern Europe as the printed philosophical responses of Descartes, Pascal, and Malebranche.

The final two chapters are complementary to the first two chapters of Volume 1. In 2.6, we return to the subject of 1.2: modern scenes of reading, teaching, and translation analogous to the early modern scenes described in the intervening chapters. It features two modern reader-writers of Donald Frame’s American English translation of the Essais (Gore Vidal and David Denby).

We consider a range of related intellectual contexts for Frame’s Essays: modern, pedagogical versions of ‘human philosophy’; the educational goals of elite institutions such as the École Normale Supérieure and Columbia University; the legacy of Pierre Villey’s work in twentieth-century Montaigne studies; and ‘Frame’s Montaigne’ as a composite product consisting of biography, translation, and critical study. We see how, in the twentieth century, generations of humanists in America and Europe called up the real person ‘Montaigne’ from behind his text and made him explain that text’s value to idealist programmes of general literary education. In Frame’s day, these programmes aimed to protect humane values against the reductive forces of ‘progressive’ modern society, to enfranchise the inner man.

The ‘Epilogue’ (2.7) picks up the discussion from the ‘General Introduction’ (in Volume 1) and the ‘Prologue’ (1.1) and extends it across a broader historical canvas. I ask how the case-studies in previous chapters, and new ones in this chapter of Bishop Caussin and Pierre Charron, might revise the sketch of the Essais offered in Erich Auerbach’s Mimesis. The history of Montaigne’s text and persona is related to the wider, post-Reformation battle over the enfranchisement of the unofficial reader-writer, the person who in particular circumstances is freed to use literary materials for their own purposes, in their own way.

I argue that the fundamental issue at stake in the early modern making and transmission of the Essais is the issue that is explicitly raised by Marie de Gournay in her preface of 1595, and, in a different style and context, by Charron’s use of Montaigne in De la sagesse (1601, 1604): how best to preserve and regulate the well-born individual’s natural liberté of judgement, their franchise or frankness, through reading and writing, in an age of moral corruption and confessional conflict.

Essay

Michel de Montaigne, the author of the Essais, was the first generation of his family to qualify as belonging to the sixteenth-century French military aristocracy (noblesse d’épée) by his grandfather’s purchase of the Montaigne estate (near Bordeaux) three generations prior. (Ownership of the estate entailed military obligation to the king of France; membership in the noblesse d’épée required that a family had not engaged in commercial trade, except for the sale of estate wine, for at least three generations.) During his lifetime, which included three decades of French religious civil war between Catholics and Protestants (Huguenots), Montaigne served two consecutive terms as mayor of Bordeaux (an office normally reserved for military aristocracy), and also served as a reliable negotiator for kings of France, notably Henry of Navarre, later Henry IV. He also may have seen military combat at close quarters for the Catholic side at his own request; his funeral statue shows him in full armor, and the people of Bordeaux never criticized this as the act of an imposter.

He was raised by a caring father, who saw that he learned Latin before French and had him nursed in a peasant village in order that he gain appreciation for the insights of the “common people.” At the age of thirty-eight, following the death of his dear friend, Etienne de la Boétie, he first attempted to retire to his study at Montaigne to write and reflect. Although called to public service, he persisted in this effort, producing the first edition of his Essais in 1580, continually revising and expanding them until his death in 1592. The Frame translation of the Essais, which I have used for this book, follows the convention of indicating successive textual revisions of the Essais through the notation, “A” (earliest), “B,” and “C” (latest). The Essais are organized into three volumes and range in length from less than a page to almost 150 pages. Book I contains fifty-seven generally short essays; Book II, thirty-seven essays, including the very long “Apology for Raymond Sebond”; and Book III, thirteen rather long essays.
Early on, the subject of Montaigne’s reflections became himself and his relation to the world. Although the style and length of essays changed over time (the later ones long and more outspoken), how much Montaigne’s substantive views (versus his momentary emphases) changed or evolved is a matter of scholarly dispute, characterized in the concluding bibliographic essay of this book. Montaigne’s reasons for writing the Essais are complex and may have evolved as well. He tells the reader that they were written for private purposes (to explore and console himself; to provide friends and relatives memories of him after he is gone), yet he caused them to be published, continually revised them (including new material to entertain previous readers), and made presents of them to royalty. In my view, it is beyond doubt that Montaigne hoped and expected to have some general effect on his readership then and posthumously, though this was not his overriding purpose in writing the Essais. As we shall see, Montaigne eschewed strictly instrumental purposes in most things.

Lively commentary on and criticism of the Essais began in Montaigne’s own time and continues to this day. The breadth of views in this commentary is engendered in part because Montaigne’s meaning in the disparate and ostensibly “rambling” Essais is not always clear, and often appears contradictory. The reasons for these apparent contradictions are themselves open to interpretation—a faithful reflection of Montaigne’s own internal inconsistency, a controlled employment of skeptical rhetorical technique to induce suspension of judgment in the reader, the mere surface of a coherent but hidden argument, and so on.

The view of the Essais presented in this book is meant to encourage a “naive” reading by liberally educated general readers in the interest of gaining an appreciation of Montaigne’s approach to the “art of living.” Some of the issues raised in the secondary literature are important and become interesting when held up against the reader’s own analysis of the full meaning of the texts in question. Since one of Montaigne’s points is often followed by an apparently contradictory one, secondary literature which addsuce scattered quotations to support a particular theme can be misleading. The soundest approach is to read each essay from beginning to end, including the long “Apology for Raymond Sebond,” the major subject of this book’s chapter on Montaigne’s religious views.

Montaigne’s subject in the Essais is himself, of, and vis-à-vis the world. Although he is impressed with the natural diversity and changeability of the world—human and nonhuman—and distrustful of the limited capacity of human reason and human generalization to grasp and explain this diversity and flux without explaining it away, still, “by accident,” in exploring himself he comes upon the more abiding aspects and characteristics of his own personality. For example, he finds that it is the essence of his being to prefer open and extensive communication; that he dislikes cruelty of any sort, even toward dumb animals; that he prefers pursuits of the private realm, such as friendship and conversation, in which people and actions can be taken on their own terms rather than as more instrumental means to future ends; that when he must perform public duties he tries always to do so in “as private a manner as possible,” and so on.

At least part of the adventure in reading and studying Montaigne’s Essais is the attempt to make sustainable generalizations—that is, meaningful and accurate generalizations—about his orientation to living, his “art of living” (a Cartesian phrase for a very anti-Cartesian viewpoint). He tells us that he changes so much from moment to moment that he does not paint his being, but his movement. Yet, if Montaigne were really just a series of instantaneous states of consciousness given continuity merely by being housed in the same mortal coil, readers would quickly lose interest in what he has to say owing to its lack of meaning. And, at any rate, as we’ve just observed, Montaigne himself begins to see the “ruling pattern” in his own personality, which strives to assert and preserve itself in the face of the internal and external changeability that constantly challenges it.

The approach of this interpretation of Montaigne’s Essais, then, is a rather formal one (especially in contrast to various postmodernist readings), which looks for patterned meaning in the Essais; which presumes that there are criteria for these meanings outside the Essais themselves, in at least the phenomenological structure of the world as Montaigne perceived it; and which resists the view that Montaigne’s meaning is deeply hidden or disguised as part of some practical or instrumental project, or that his literary persona is widely divergent from his actual one. In my view, this approach makes the most coherent sense of the evidence about himself and his views and is the most likely to give us a faithful portrait of Montaigne’s own intentions in writing the various essays (a criterion outside the essays themselves).

In this context, the view to which a reading of some of the best secondary literature and a complete re-reading the Essais has led, is the follow-ing.5 In spite of differences in emphasis over the decades during which the Essais were written and revised, there is evident a fairly consistent approach to the “art of living,” that is, living well, appropriately, and happily as a human being immersed in a world of contingencies, internal and external. The first thing to be observed about Montaigne’s approach is its goal or general orientation, which is clearly as much repose or tranquility in the soul (his language) available to us when we accurately match our individual capacities and our general capacities as human beings with what we can realistically achieve in life. (One can imagine, by contrast, other orientations—lives directed above all else to duty, or moral rectitude, or patriotism or military glory, or literary fame, or sensual appetite, or scientific mastery of nature, and so on.)

In combination with other considerations—Montaigne’s lack of decisive executive ability, his poor memory, his instinctive candor, the civil war around him, among others—he is led to an appreciation of private life, for it is in private life that it is most appropriate to do things for their own sake—to live in the present moment—and this is the key to psychic repose for Montaigne. Practical and political schemes that require complicated, instrumental planning and scheming and manipulation of men and events force one to live for the future (a very uncertain, alienated future) and do not lend themselves to internal repose. Montaigne appears to believe that only very great individuals (like Alexander and Caesar) can take on grand instrumental projects and not be so consumed by them that they are unable to do other things for their own sake.

Another reason why Montaigne eschews complicated instrumental projects is his assessment of the paucity of human intellect and reason (hence his penchant for arguments and tropes of the ancient skeptics). Like St. Augustine (but unlike
either the Pyrrhonian and Academic Skeptics), Montaigne appears to believe that the proper focus for the reasoning powers of a creature of body and soul immersed in an earthly flux of time and contingency is human conduct and human meaning. He clearly does not foresee the modern scientific project to master nature through steady and controlled accumulation of “data,” nor anticipate its degree of success in this endeavor, though this does not mean that his assessment of the ultimate futility of this kind of project (from the standpoint of human repose and psychic harmony) is off the mark. (The answer to that question is not in yet).

Montaigne’s assessment of the limited capacities of human reasoning in combination with his insight (borrowed in part from Horace 6 and Seneca) about the importance of living in the present moment, as well as the realization of the flux and changeability of his own personality, lead Montaigne to an appreciation of the ritualistic aspects of life and to a rather conservative approach to the basis for political legitimacy and religious orthodoxy (though, as we shall see, some of his personal views would be considered "progressive" by modern liberalism). Montaigne’s religious and political views are a subject of scholarly dispute, with interpretations ranging from the view that he was an atheist and Machiavellian of sorts to the view that he was a religious and political conservative. In between are views that Montaigne’s religious and political conservatism was purely instrumental, intended to mollify the effects of the civil war. These controversies are the reason for devoting separate chapters in this study to Montaigne’s religious and political views. For the present, suffice it to say that in coming to decisions about religious and political controversy, Montaigne counsels an approach that weights or privileges one’s religious and political inheritance, precisely because it is inherited. Also, for the present, it is sufficient to indicate that the interpretation favored here is that Montaigne was sincere in his defense of his inherited Roman Catholic faith and practice, and of the French monarchy; and also sincere in his advocacy (at least for himself) of a private over a public life, and of a truly private life rather than one utilizing time and energy in private for future public or political and social purposes and projects. Montaigne implies that if his Essais could have a ‘salutary effect on his civilization, so much the better, but that he was not prepared to craft them with that end constantly in mind.

Another of Montaigne’s important and influential themes concerns the cultivation of his own individuality for its own sake, though not in the willful and excessive way characteristic of the subsequent Romantic movement or of Nietzsche’s writing. He implies dramatically (by the time and energy he devotes to the project of exploring and essaying himself) that his individuality is important simply for itself and not for the universal characteristics it illustrates or deviates from, though it is reflective of these as well. In the terms of medieval scholastic philosophy, he implies that his particular “existence” is not simply “accident,” but an integral part of his “essence,” and that this is true of all individuals as particular concretions of body and soul. Thus the importance for Montaigne of an individual learning to belong to himself or herself, of making a life all one’s own in conformity with one’s “ruling pattern” (forme maistresse) against the constraints and impulses of the universal human condition—material, physical, and spiritual—and the contradictions inherent in the structural tensions of the public realm of appearances. In exploring this last thought, this study shows some comparison with the thought of Rousseau, who gives a fuller and more developed account of these contradictions than does Montaigne. In drawing out Montaigne’s appreciation of the ritualistic aspects of life and of actions done for their own sake in the present moment, this study draws comparisons with the more developed and consistently presented views on the same subject of the twentieth-century English philosopher, Michael Oakeshott.

Montaigne’s choice and cultivation of the essay form of writing (of which he is one of the creators) is reflective of the skeptical tenor of his thought and writing. His thought is often tentative and exploratory, though it is certainly more than simply the depiction of successive or serial states of consciousness. Following the convention of his time and exploiting the advantages of his agility in Latin and the resources of his personal library, themes are often spun around passages from ancient authors, such as Pyrrho, Plutarch, Seneca, and Horace, among others. The theme of an essay is often not apparent, especially judging from the title, and there are many apparent digressions. It is not always clear what his purposes are, though as this study tries to show, there are discernible and recurring themes and patterns throughout all three books of the Essais. And although Montaigne is important, historically speaking, in the sixteenth-century revival of ancient Pyrrhonian and skeptical arguments, it is clear that he uses their tropes and techniques for his own purposes (including, arguably, a defense of the truths of religious revelation), and not simply to induce a suspension of the reader’s judgment on all questions he considers.

For this reason, this exposition of Montaigne’s views in the Essais relies heavily on quotation from individual essays and provides textual context for the quotations as well, in order to get at Montaigne’s meaning. In most cases, secondary commentary and critique are relegated to the bibliographic essay and notes. For readers primarily concerned with issues of scholarly controversy or interested in making judgments on issues of scholarly controversy as they read the Essais, the bibliographic essay might be the best starting point. For readers who already feel akin to the idea of seeking delight in the present moment (where appropriate) and who are interested in reading Montaigne to make him their own, this latter advice is not intended.

Readers with some French who wish to read the Essais in French alongside the English will find them surprisingly straightforward, both syntactically and conceptually, especially in comparison with the more elaborate eighteenth-century style of a writer such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau (though getting used to the archaic Renaissance spelling, e.g. "moy" for "moi," takes a moment). The French editions usually cross-referenced in Montaignian English-language secondary literature are the one-volume Pleiade edition (which also includes Montaigne’s travel journals and other materials) and the three-volume Villey edition (which has an interesting appendix with collected reactions to the Essais over the centuries). I have used the Villey edition for the French text of the Essais in this book.

With regard to the question of Montaigne’s Essais as a choice for inclusion in a series on great works of Western civilization, several observations may be made. If “Western civilization” is taken in an historical way to be simply the evolved synthesis of the Greek, Roman, Hebraic, and Christian inheritances of the countries of Western Europe and the civilizations elsewhere that they spawned, then Montaigne’s Essais are clearly an important work. They are part of a Renaissance humanist-
intellectual tradition that generated a revived interest in Greco-Roman writers and tried to smooth out the differences between those writers (with more and less success) and their inherited religious traditions or to use them to modify their religious inheritances. And, as we’ve noted, for the long essay “Apology for Raymond Sebond” alone, Montaigne has been seen as an important figure in the sixteenth-century revival of classical Skeptic arguments that animated (in one direction or another) subsequent Western thinkers such as Descartes, Hume, and Kant.

Yet if Western civilization is taken in a more philosophic sense to indicate a distinctive general orientation toward human life and its relation to the divine and to the world, then Montaigne is arguably an even more important figure, for he takes an important logical potential in the Western synthesis and concretizes it in detail in the Essais. Let us unpack this idea.

Arguably, the Western synthesis of Greek rationalism, Roman pragmatism, and Judeo-Christian revelation has produced an orientation toward the individual and toward the individual event in history, which is distinctive. Arguably, this orientation is impelled to take the unique individual and the unique event in history as valuable in themselves and to cherish and cultivate that uniqueness, while at the same time hold that unique person or event in time in view against the backdrop of eternity, or something that transcends time and local mischief.

Metaphorically speaking, the complex Western impulse is to stand both within and without the stream of time and flux. This outlook is first clearly discernible in the trinitarian reflections of St. Augustine on human beings as units of body and soul, traveling on a pilgrimage through a secular time-stream devoid of meaning without the insight ignited by the conferral of God’s grace.

At first glance, Montaigne might seem like an unlikely candidate for inclusion within this civilization’s paradigm. He is wary of human appeals to transcendentals grounds in their practical activities, implying that this orientation may lead to arrogance, cruelty, and what we would call ideological fanaticism. He often tries to remind human beings of how much they share with the lower animals (rather than with the divine) as a way of recalling them to their littleness, in the interest of moral and social balance. And he cultivates his own individuality just because it is his, not because it is a reflection of some quality transcending his human nature. Yet this same Montaigne also (in a mixture of Greek and Christian theological conceptions) describes a neo-Platonic, timeless, unchanging, distant God, who without changing bestows his grace on human beings, beings who without that grace can never rise above the contradictions and obstacles of earthly life. The cultivation of his individuality for its own sake (a logical possibility entailed in the very idea of created beings whose existence is a part of their essence”), against the backdrop of an unchanging, timeless God, puts Montaigne squarely within this orientation as one who began to develop—in mundane, phenomenological terms—the unique, contingent pole of the Western existential tension, a tendency Tocqueville subsequently associated with democratic cultures. And on the general subject of Montaigne and Western civilization, we may also espie in the Essais an orientation within that civilization that rejects in advance (as futile from the standpoint of human repose) anything like the Cartesian and Baconian project for mastery and domination of physical and human nature.

Me, Myself, And I: What made Michel de Montaigne the first modern man?
By Jane Kramer September 7, 2009 Issue New Yorker
Montaigne’s essays chart the course of twenty years of self-investigation.

Every French schoolchild learns the date: February 28, 1571, the day a well-regarded and uncommonly educated nobleman named Michel de Montaigne retired from “the slavery of the court and of public duties,” moved a chair, a table, and a thousand books into the tower of his family castle, near Bordeaux, shut the door, and began to write. It was his thirty-eighth birthday, and, by way of commemoration, he had the first two sentences he wrote that morning painted on the wall of a study opening onto his new library—announcing, if mainly to himself, that having been “long weary” of those public duties (and, presumably, of his wife, at home in the castle, a few steps across the courtyard) Michel de Montaigne had taken up residence in “the bosom of the learned Virgins, where in calm and freedom from all cares he will spend what little remains of his life, already more than half expired.” His plan, he said, was to use the second half looking at himself, or, as he put it, drawing his portrait with a pen. He had his books for company, his Muses for inspiration, his past for seasoning, and, to support it all, the income from a large estate, not to mention a fortune built on the salt-herring and wine trades, which, in the last century, had turned his family into landed gentry. (His full name, as most oenophiles can tell you, was Michel Eyquem de Montaigne.)

Montaigne’s pursuit of the character he called Myself—“bashful, insolent; chaste, lustful; prating, silent; laborious, delicate; ingenious, heavy; melancholic, pleasant; lying, true; knowing, ignorant; liberal, covetous, and prodigal”—lasted for twenty years and produced more than a thousand pages of observation and revision that he called “essais,” taking that ordinary word and turning it into a literary occupation. When he died, at fifty-nine, he was still revising and, apparently, not at all surprised, since Myself was a protean creature, impossible to anticipate but also, being always at hand, impossible to ignore. I like to think of the essays as a kind of thrill, with Myself, the elusive prey, and Montaigne, the sleuth, locked in a battle of equals who were too close for dissimulation and too smart for satisfaction. And it may be that Montaigne did, too, because he often warned his readers that nothing he wrote about himself was likely to apply for much longer than it took the ink he used, writing it, to dry. “I am myself the matter of my book,” he said, when the first two books of essays appeared, in 1580. “You would be unreasonable to spend your leisure on so frivolous and vain a subject.”

He was wrong. By the time he finished a third book, eight years later, everyone in France with a philosophic bent and a decent classical education had read the first two—lured, perhaps, by the writer’s promise that “my defects will here be read to the life, and also my natural form, as far as respect for the public has allowed”—and, given that some ninety per cent of the French were illiterate, that probably means that everyone who could read the essays did. By sixteenth-century standards, Montaigne had produced a best-seller, although he
maintained the pretense that he wrote only for himself or, at most, “for a few men and a few years.” (“The public favor has given me a little more confidence than I expected” is how he described the effect on him.) News of the essays travelled fast. The first known English translation, by an exuberantly prolific language tutor named John Florio, went on sale in London at the turn of the seventeenth century, in time for Shakespeare to buy a copy. It was followed, in 1685, by the poet Charles Cotton’s lovely version—the one that most Englishmen and Americans read until 1957, when Donald Frame, a Columbia professor who went on to become Montaigne’s preëminent American biographer, produced his own translation. Thirty years later, the Oxford professor M. A. Screech did the same for Britain. I have used all three, along with, in French, my old, dog-eared Flammarion copy of the essays and the seriously intimidating new Pléiade edition, which came out in Paris in 2007, doubled in size by nearly a thousand pages of endnotes and annotations incorporating four hundred years of Montaigne research. (I admit to tweaking a few of the English quotes, in the spirit of competition and interpretation.)

However you read them, Montaigne’s books were utterly, if inexplicably, original. They were not confessional, like Augustine’s, nor were they autobiographical. You could call them the autobiography of a mind, but they made no claim to composing the narrative of a life, only of the shifting preoccupations of their protagonist in an ongoing conversation with the Greek and Roman writers on his library shelves—and, of course, with himself. His belief that the self, far from settling the question “Who am I,” kept leaping ahead of its last convictions was in fact so radical that for centuries people looking for precedents had to resort to a few fragments of Heraclitus on the nature of time and change—or, eventually, to give up and simply describe Montaigne as “the first modern man.” It didn’t matter if he was quoting Seneca in an essay called “To Philosophize Is to Learn How to Die” or, a few pages later, in an essay about imagination, musing on the vagaries of penises: “We are right to note the licence and disobedience of this member which thrusts itself forward so inopportune when we do not want it to, and which so inopportune lets us down when we most need it; it imperiously contests for authority with our will: it stubbornly and proudly refuses all our incitements, both of the mind and hand.” He followed himself wherever his attention settled, and his regard was always the same—intent, amused, compassionate, contrarian, and irresolutely eclectic. (He could jump from Plato’s discourse on the divinatory power of dreams to dinner at the castle—“a confusion of meats and a clutter of dishes displease me as much as any other confusion”—and do justice to them both.) One of his favorite philosophers, starting out, was the skeptic Sextus Empiricus, who had famously cautioned his followers to “suspend judgment” on everything but the experience of their own senses. Voltaire called Montaigne one of history’s wise men, but when it came to the big philosophical questions that absorbed him—the nature of justice, say, or morality—he seemed to be saying, like Sextus, that there may be no truths, only moments of clarity, passing for answers.

The best way to read Montaigne is to keep watching him, the way he watched himself, because the retired, reclusive, and pointedly cranky Michel de Montaigne is in many ways a fiction—a mind so absorbingly stated that by now it can easily pass for the totality of Montaigne’s “second” life. In fact, he went to the best parties in the neighborhood. He attended all the important weddings—and never mind that, by his admission, he’d practically been dragged to his own; the bride was a suitable Bordeaux girl named Françoise de la Chassaigne and the alliance more or less arranged. (His view of marriage, he wrote in the essay “On Some Verses of Virgil,” was that he was “not so fit for it” but had acquiesced for “posterity,” and he held to the common wisdom that the secret of a peaceful, companionable marriage was to keep one’s wife permanently unaroused, the better to fix her thoughts on the details of hospitality and “sound housekeeping.”) He had everybody’s ear. He corresponded with beautiful, educated women who read his drafts. He dined at the castle with wellborn men who had learned to value his advice and, more to the point, his tact during his years of “public duties,” both as a local emissary to the court of Charles IX, in Paris, and as a magistrate at the law court known at the time as the Parlement de Bordeaux.

He claimed to have forsworn his youth, which was apparently so unruly that eight years of it are missing from the public record; “I burned myself at lust in my youth, and suffered all the furies that the poets say come upon all those who let themselves go after women without restraint and without judgment” was how he described those years, when he was in his fifties. But he never forswore women or, for that matter, the thrill of watching a good battle, or any of the other indulgences of his class. (“For the intimate companionship of my table I choose the agreeable not the wise; in my bed, beauty comes before virtue,” he once said.) He left his tower in 1580 for a year of travelling. He left it again in 1581 to become the mayor of Bordeaux—at the time the country’s third-largest city and its richest port. Two years later, he agreed to a second term. And, while an avowed Catholic royalist (whether by conviction or, as a few of the essays suggest, because of a suspicion that taking a leap of faith on the big loyalties of his time was the best way to clear his mind for more enticing subjects), he was also a close friend and confidant of the Protestant Henri de Navarre, and was Navarre’s emissary to the Catholic court of Charles’s brother and successor, Henri III. His lifetime encompassed the spread of Calvinism through France, and the eight Catholic-Protestant wars provoked by conversions like Navarre’s within the royal family. And if Montaigne did not take sides in those wars, it may be that he thought of them as a family matter, which in a way they were. The Henris were both directly descended from Louis IX—the paterfamilias of three hundred years of French kings—and by 1584, with the death of Henri III’s brother, Navarre was himself first in line to the French throne. “My house, being always open, easily approached and ever ready to welcome all men (since I have never let myself be persuaded to turn it into a tool for a war in which I play my part most willingly when it is farthest from my neighborhood), has earned quite a lot of popular affection,” Montaigne wrote, about a year later, in the essay he called “On Vanity.”

Authors are, of course, sneaky. (Montaigne put it nicely: “All is a-swarm with commentaries: of authors there is a dearth.”) They lead you exactly where they want to go, and no farther. By the end of the essays, you know a great deal about Montaigne’s mind and temperament, but, as for his promise that “my defects will here be read to the life,” you are still waiting for the details of that life and most of the people in it. His evasions are legendary. He writes a great deal about the tyranny of laws but nothing about his fourteen years as a magistrate or his four years as a mayor, or even about his response, as mayor, to the plague that struck Bordeaux toward
the end of his second term, leaving a third of the population dead. (He fled.) He writes a great deal about wives but rarely refers to his own and never by name, though he claims to have made himself “fall in love” to marry, a task perhaps made briefly pleasant by the fact that Françoise is said to have been an exceptionally beautiful and lively girl. Montaigne, at the time, was thirty-two and, he says, ready to be a dutiful and respectful husband. But he was not much interested in Françoise—nor, it may be, she in him, since some scholars have thrown her into the arms of his younger brother Arnaud, a good-natured and sportif Army captain who died young, from a tennis ball to the ear. Montaigne himself rarely slept in his wife’s bed, except for purposes of procreation; she gave him six daughters in thirteen years, and only one of them, Léonor, lived past infancy—a fact he dismissed with the unnerving remark (Montaigne experts are still arguing about why he made it and what it meant) that he had “lost two or three.”

As for his mother, he alludes to her twice, but only in passing. Her name was Antoinette Louppes de Villeneuve. She came from a far-flung merchant clan, similar to the Montaignes in wealth and influence, but with the notable exception that, while the Montaignes were then solidly and safely Catholic, some of the Louppes were Protestant, and the family themselves were Sephardic conversos from Saragossa, where their name was Lopez de Villanueva. (Several had left Spain before the expulsions of 1492, and were thriving in Europe as properly minted Christians, or, as the new Pléiade edition chooses to put it, a Christian family “ancienement convertie.”) Antoinette grew up in Toulouse. She arrived at the castle a reluctant bride of sixteen, to marry Pierre Eyquem, an eccentric but apparently exemplary chatelain (and a future mayor of Bordeaux himself), and, once having settled her duty to her children by bearing them, she was attached mainly to herself. She claimed that Michel had exhausted her getting born—eleven months of pregnancy, by her calculations—and was furious to learn that, by her husband’s last will, he was not only heir to but steward of the estate she had expected to manage in her lifetime. Their relations were, by anyone’s standards, sour. The year after Pierre died, she threatened to sue Michel over the ownership of a family necklace; he discovered it in his wife’s jewel box and gave it back, hoping to avoid the scandal of a court case—after which she spent a long, bitter, and contentious widowhood in the company of a granddaughter who seems to have been the only relative she liked.

But Montaigne was not much interested in family histories of any sort, and his own was apparently untouched by not only the anti-Semitism that attached to the children of “new Christian” immigrants like the Louppes but also the Catholic-Protestant wars at home. Some of Montaigne’s siblings became Protestant, with no evident disruption to the family—even during the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacres of 1572, when thirty thousand French Calvinists died. He doesn’t mention those massacres in the essays, either. For him, the subject of Protestants and Jews (who had been barred from practicing their religion in France since the end of the fourteenth century) seems to have been, at most, food for his meditations on the absurdities of persecution and the fatal distractions of disharmony. He efficiently wrote off Martin Luther for leaving behind in Germany “as many—indeed more—discords and disagreements because of doubts about his opinions than he himself ever raised about Holy Scripture.” He quoted Josephus and admired the Maccabees. But, when it came to see an old Jew herded naked through the streets of Rome, he remained a reporter—curious, compassionate, but not particularly disturbed. He did not expect much better from the world. Relatives, to his mind, were accidents of birth, consideration, and proximity. The genealogy that interested him was the genealogy of thought. He was far more interested in thinking about religion with the Sophists and Skeptics in his library than he was in the part that religion, even his own Catholicism, played in him.

For all that, he was a passionate traveler. His search for the spa that would cure his kidney stones—the disease had killed his father and would eventually help kill him—took him to Switzerland, Austria, and Germany. His love of the classics took him to Italy. In Rome, where his own copy of the essays had been seized by the Inquisition, he walked the streets of his dead mentors: “I like thinking about their faces, their bearing and their clothing,” he said. “I mutter their great names between my teeth and make them resound in my ears.” (Latin, by his father’s decree, was not only his first language but the only one he could speak for his first six years.) He prowled the ghetto, visiting a synagogue, watching a circumcision, and happily cross-examining the rabbi. (By the end of his visit he had met the Pope and was made an honorary Roman citizen.) Today, we would call him a gentleman ethnographer, more enchanted than alarmed by the bewildering variety of human practices. “Yes. I admit it,” he wrote in “On Vanity.” “Even in my wishes and dreams I can find nothing to which I can hold fast. The only things I find rewarding (if anything is) are variety and the enjoyment of diversity.” He was interested in all things unfamiliar and exotic, from immolations in India to cannibalism in the New World. In the essay, he called “On the Cannibals,” he described “a very long talk” he had once had with a Tupi chief, brought to France from Brazil and, at the time, on display in Rouen for a royal visit. He admired the Indian’s gentleness and his evident perplexity at the pomp and the poverty and the cruelty displayed so indifferently and indiscriminately to him. “I think there is more barbarity in eating a man alive than in eating him dead,” he wrote, “more barbarity in tearing apart by rack and torture a body still sentient, in roasting him little by little and having him bruised and bitten by pigs and dogs (as we have not only read about but seen in recent memory, not among enemies in antiquity but among our fellow-citizens and neighbors—and what is worse, in the name of duty and religion) than in roasting him and eating him after his death.” No one has said it better.

“Anyone can see that I have set out on a road along which I shall travel without toil and without ceasing as long as the world has ink and paper,” Montaigne wrote at the beginning of “On Vanity,” his late and perhaps greatest essay. “I cannot give an account of my life by my actions: fortune has placed them too low for that; so I do so by my thoughts.” He compares himself to a nobleman he once knew who would keep his chamber pots for a week to display, seriatim, to his friends—“He thought about them, talked about them: for him any other topic stank”—saying, “Here (a little more decorously) you have the droppings of an old mind, sometimes hard, sometimes squittery, but always ill-digested.” He starts to extrapolate—“Scribbling seems to be one of the symptoms of an age of excess. When did we ever write so much as since the beginning of our Civil Wars? And whenever did the Romans do so as just before their collapse?”—and catches himself in time to add that “each individual one of us contributes to the corrupting of our time: some contribute treachery, others (since they are powerful) injustice, irreligion, tyranny, cupidity, cruelty: the
weaker ones bring stupidity, vanity, and idleness, and I am one of them." He accuses himself, a little pridefully, of pride—in writing at all, with his country at war, and in the small, stubborn habits with which he flaunts his disregard, saying that "if one of my shoes is askew then I let my shirt and my cloak lie askew as well: I am too proud to amend my ways by halves. . . . The words I utter when wretched are words of defiance."

Montaigne called "On Vanity" one of those essays which, being quite long and not at all confined by the titles he gave them, "require a decision to read them and time set aside." It is a meditation on dying and, at the same time, on writing—or, you could say, on writing oneself to life in the face of death, on getting "lost" in words and in "the gait of poetry, all jumps and tumblings" and in the kind of space where "my pen and my mind both go a-roaming." ("My mind does not always move straight ahead but backwards too," he says. "I distrust my present thoughts hardly less than my past ones and my second or third thoughts hardly less than my first.") And it draws pretty much the whole cast of characters from his library into the conversation—the kings and philosophers and poets and historians and statesmen and assorted saints and scoundrels whom he introduced on the first pages of Book I, with the words "Man is indeed an object miraculously vain, various and wavering. It is difficult to found a judgment on him which is steady and uniform." Since then, they have appeared and reappeared through the essays like characters in a novel, demolishing one another’s arguments. Now, in a way, he both honors and discards them, along with their clattering truths, their most congenial wisdom, and the deceptive comfort they sometimes bring.

Thus his ruminations on vanity move quickly from disreputable shoes (and the way that the “forlorn state of France” mirrors his “forlorn age”) to Petronius, Horace, and Lucretius, each discoursing, in Latin, on the metaphysics of droughts, storms, crop failures—the deaths of nature. But he isn’t interested. He interrupts them to complain about the burden of managing his own land, and the difficulty of economizing, in lean years, for someone “used as I am to travel not merely with an adequate retinue but an honorable one.” He says that, unlike Crates, who “jumped into the freedom of poverty. . . . I loathe poverty on a par with pain.” He prefers the freedom that money gives him to go away. “I feel death all the time, jabbing at my throat and loins. But I am made otherwise: death is the same for me anywhere. If I were allowed to choose I would, I think, prefer to die in the saddle rather than in my bed, away from home and far from my own folk. There is more heartbreak than comfort in taking leave of those we love. . . . I would willingly therefore neglect to bid that great and everlasting farewell.” He considers the case of Socrates, who, preferring death to banishment, took the hemlock—and then nails him with praise as one of those “heaven-blessed” men whose qualities are “so soaring and inordinate that . . . I am quite unable to conceive them.”

At the same time, he worries, or pretends to, about his inattention at home. He agrees with Diogenes, who said that the wine he liked best was always the wine somebody else had made, but then, typically, berates himself. He describes the good husbandry of his father: "I wish that, in lieu of some other part of his inheritance, my father had bequeathed me that passionate love for the running of his estates. If only I can acquire the taste for it as he did, then political philosophy can, if it will, condemn me for the lowliness and barrenness of my occupation." (Pierre, he said, was "the best father that ever was"; he had studied law to please him, and once spent more than a year translating Raymond Sebond’s enormous treatise "Theologia Naturalis" from Latin to French so that his father, who rued the lack of Latin in his own education, could read it.) A few lines later, he remembers that he is a father himself—and he turns to the problem of finding “a son-in-law who would fill my beak, comfort my final years and lull them to sleep, into whose hands I could resign the control and use of my goods . . . provided that he brought to it a truly grateful and loving affection.” But he doesn’t mention Léonor, or, for that matter, his dead children. When he thinks about loss now, at fifty-three, it is his father he mourns and, more than anyone, his "soul's" friend Étienne de la Boétie, a Bordeaux poet who was arguably the love of his life and whose early death, he once said, drove him to marriage in the hope of solace and then into his tower for escape. They are the absent interlocutors of "On Vanity": the people he talks to about death, talking to himself; the only ones he describes with what could be called a deep sense of relationship.

How to describe the dazzling ramble of “On Vanity”? For nearly all of its sixty pages, it has no arguments, personal or philosophical, to expound, no revelations on the nature of man to offer, no path to salvation to propose. What we get, instead, is the gift he has given himself: “scope and freedom” of interpretation; language that is “blunt” and “raw”; and, most of all, the experience of Montaigne thinking. (Ralph Waldo Emerson, in a classic essay on Montaigne, wrote that "the marrow of the man reaches to his sentences. . . . Cut these words, and they would bleed.") He can move in a few paragraphs from the admonitions in 1 Corinthians 3:20—"Those exquisite subtleties are only good for sermons: they are themes which seek to drive us into the next world like donkeys. But life is material motion in the body, an activity, by its very essence, imperfect and unruly: I work to serve it on its own terms"—to a riff on the corruption of judgments, the hypocrisy of moralists and diet doctors, and the secret sex lives of Greek philosophers, as described by an exceptionally expensive fourth-century-B.C. courtesan named Lais, who said, "I know nothing of their books . . . but those fellows come knocking at my door as often as anyone."

You could call this intellectual free association, but it is far too sterile a term for the mind of Michel de Montaigne running after itself, arguing against argument, reading his thoughts and his aging body at least as carefully as he reads his books. (His copy of Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura, at the Cambridge University Library, is filled with enough Latin and French margin notes to make a book themselves.) But he thinks of himself as a browser, and in a way he is, because, by his account, a couple of interesting thoughts or stories in one book will always remind him of something smarter, or more interesting—or, better still, contradictory—in another book, and he opens that. By the time he begins “On Vanity,” most of his favorite quotes have been carved into the beams and woodwork of the tower—for inspiration, fast access, and, perhaps, distraction. (He would have loved Google.) Those words are the preferred company of his old age, however spurious their counsel. He wants to “die, grinding [his] teeth, among strangers,” and what more accommodating strangers than dead ones, speaking across millennia from his rafters—the kind of strangers who, like paid companions to the old and frail, “will leave you alone as much as you like, showing you an unconcerned face and letting you think and moan in your own way.” Death, he says, "is not one of our social engagements: it is a scene with one character."
But the truth is that writing about death—surrounded by the books that he says “console me and counsel me to regulate my life and my death”—has put him off dying. The world intrudes on his gloom, battles for his attention, and almost always wins. He longs to revisit Rome. His wife must have been against this, because he says, “Truly, if any wife can lay down for her husband how many paces make ‘far’ and how many paces make ‘near’, my counsel is to make him stop half-way...and let those who wish do not to call Philosophy to their aid.” Like the clueless Professor Higgins, he wishes that women were more like men. “In a truly loving relationship—which I have experienced—rather than drawing the one I love to me I give myself to him,” he says, remembering La Boétie. “Not merely do I prefer to do him good than to have him do good to me, I would even prefer that he did good to himself rather than to me: it is when he does good to himself that he does most good to me. If his absence is either pleasant or useful to him, then it delights me far more than his presence.” The question, of course, is what the absence called death means.

The penultimate pages of “On Vanity” are an homage to Rome (and perhaps to himself, since he quotes in full the papal bull that made him a Roman citizen). But he ends the essay in the oracular heart of Greece, with the Delphic admonition to “know thyself,” and in a few pages turns the idea of vanity on its head, defending his pursuit of himself, however fractured, transitory, or imperfect, as the only knowledge he, or anyone, can hope to gain. It is the one argument for a “truth” he makes in a hundred and seven essays: “Nature has very conveniently cast the action of our sight outwards. We are swept on downstream, but to struggle back towards our self against the current is a painful movement; thus does the sea, when driven against itself, swirl back in confusion. Everyone says: ‘Look at the motions of the heavens, look at society, at this man’s quarrel, that man’s pulse, this other man’s will and testament’—in other words always look upwards or downwards or sideways, or before or behind you. Thus, the commandment given us in ancient times by the god at Delphi was contrary to all expectations: ‘Look back into your self; get to know your self; hold on to your self.’...Can you not see that this world of ours keeps its gaze bent ever inwards and its eyes ever open to contemplate itself? It is always vanity in your case, within and without, but a vanity which is less, the less it extends. Except you alone, O Man, said that god, each creature first studies its own self, and, according to its needs, has limits to its labors and desires. Not one is as empty and needy as you, who embrace the universe: you are the seeker with no knowledge, the judge with no jurisdiction and, when all is done, the jester of the farce.”

When Montaigne moved his books to the third floor of his tower, he moved a bed to the floor below. He would cross to his desk then, pen in hand, books scattered around him, and candle flickering, but in fact he never wrote or read after the sun set—a habit he recommended to his readers, saying that with books “the soul disports itself, but the body, whose care I have not forgotten, remains inactive, and grows weary and sad.” He was seven years into the essays when he suffered his first serious attack of kidney stones, writing that illness and sleep, like madness, “make things appear to us otherwise than they appear to healthy people, wise men, and waking people.” He lived in fear of the next attack, and, even more, of what he called “emptiness.” He was the man who (pace Roosevelt and Thoreau) first said, “The thing I fear most is fear...it exceeds all other disorders in intensity.”

Toward the end of his life, he claimed to have accepted emptiness. He had once called his essays “monstrous bodies, pieced together of diverse members, without definite shape, having no order, sequence, or proportion other than accidental,” and blamed the fact that “my ability does not go far enough for me to dare to undertake a rich, polished picture, formed according to art.” But there is every indication that, growing older, he missed the statesman’s life. When Navarre succeeded to the throne, in 1589, becoming Henri IV of France—and, after four more years of religious war, making a shrewd conversion to Catholicism with the words “Paris is well worth a Mass”—Montaigne wrote to volunteer his services again. Henri replied, delighted, and in January of 1590, when his letter arrived, Montaigne wrote back, saying that he had always wished for the succession, “even when I had to confess it to my curate,” and then offering the advice that “where conquests, because of their greatness and difficulty, could not be thoroughly completed by arms and by force, they have been completed by clemency and magnanimity, excellent lures to attract men, especially toward the just and legitimate side.” The passage is vintage Montaigne: a prescription for wise rule lurking in a few fine, flattering phrases about the fruits of victory; a strategic detour into the real world to say that “if rigor and punishment occur, they must be put off until after the possession of mastery”; and, finally, an appropriate classical example—in this case, Scipio the Elder. In July, Henri summoned Montaigne to Paris, but by September, when he had hoped to go, Montaigne was too sick to travel.

Our Contemporary, Montaigne: He Pioneered the Personal Essay and Made Candor Literary

By Danny Heitman | HUMANITIES, March/April 2015 | Volume 36, Number 2

Creating classic works from passing thoughts

In 1837, Ralph Waldo Emerson gave one of the most important speeches in American history, an address at Harvard University in which he urged students to fulfill the country’s political independence by being intellectually and culturally independent, too.

Through his “American Scholar” speech, Emerson suggested that his fellow citizens should test the ideas of the Old World against experience, and not simply embrace them through habit. “It is a mischievous notion that we are come late into nature; that the world was finished a long time ago,” said Emerson. “As the world was plastic and fluid in the hands of God, so it is ever to so much of his attributes as we bring to it.”

Emerson found the courage to question accepted wisdom in many places, but an important model for his critical thinking came, oddly enough, from Michel de Montaigne, an icon of the European literary tradition Emerson regarded so skeptically. In the early days of his career, as Emerson was seeking the best way to think and write, he looked to Montaigne, the sixteenth-century French essayist, as an inspiration. Later, Emerson wrote an essay about his hero, “Montaigne; or the Skeptic.”

Montaigne and Emerson are an unlikely literary pair. Emerson, an often-earnest New Englander with a Brahmin’s sense of propriety, once took Walt Whitman on a walk and advised the poet to tone down the “sex element” in Leaves of Grass.
Montaigne, by contrast, could be unabashedly frank, mentioning his track record with various enemas ("farted endlessly") and treating sex with matter-of-fact candor.

That sensibility sometimes left Emerson breathless. "Montaigne is the frankest and honestest of all writers. His French freedom runs into grossness," Emerson observes, with quite possibly a sigh, "but he has anticipated all censure by the bounty of his own confessions." Montaigne's occasional explicitness, although not to Emerson's taste, seemed to express his willingness to see things clearly.

Emerson first encountered the French writer as a young man. He had inherited a volume of Montaigne's essays from his late father's library, but he had neglected it for years, only opening the book one day not long after he graduated from college. Reading Montaigne was a revelation.

"It seemed to me as if I had myself written the book, in some former life, so sincerely it spoke to my thought and experience," Emerson declared. "I know not anywhere a book that seems less written. It is the language of conversation transferred to a book. Cut these words, and they would bleed; they are vascular and alive. One has the same pleasure in it that he feels in listening to the necessary speech of men about their work, when any unusual circumstance gives momentary importance to the dialogue. For blacksmiths and teamsters do not trip in their speech; it is a shower of bullets."

Emerson's feeling of finding himself in Montaigne's essays has been a common one for Montaigne fans. Shakespeare appears to have read Montaigne's essays and worked their insights into his plays, so that to watch the Bard is to see Montaigne just beyond the stage lamps, winking with approval. Virginia Woolf compared reading Montaigne to looking at a portrait and seeing your own image. "For thirty years," Gore Vidal told readers a few years before his death, "I have kept Donald M. Frame's translation of The Complete Works of Montaigne at, if not bedside, hand. There are numerous interlocking Olympic circles on the maroon binding where glasses were set after I had written some no longer decipherable commentary in the margin or, simply, 'How true!'"

The late Lewis Thomas, one of America's celebrated modern essayists, was another admirer. "For the weekend times when there is nothing new in the house to read," said Lewis, "and nothing much to think about or write about, and the afternoon stretches ahead all bleak and empty, there is nothing like Montaigne to make things better."

This is all tall praise, indeed, for a writer who seemed to do exactly the opposite of what was required to achieve literary fame. Born in 1533, Montaigne came from a wealthy family and held important government positions, including work as an adviser to three French kings. He studied law and served as a magistrate and mayor of Bordeaux. Even after ostensibly retiring, he continued to keep a hand in public life, mediating France's religious strife and serving once again as Bordeaux's mayor.

When Montaigne retreated to his country estate at age thirty-eight, instead of writing about his life at the center of power, he wrote mostly about what he saw from his tower library. The fruits of that period of relative seclusion secured his place in posterity. As the New Yorker's Jane Kramer has pointed out, every French schoolchild learns the date of Montaigne's "retirement"—February 28, 1571—because of its significance to the literature of France and, indeed, the world. "He had his books for company," writes Kramer, "his Muses for inspiration, his past for seasoning, and, to support it all, the income from a large estate, not to mention a fortune built on the salt-herring and wine trades, which, in the last century, had turned his family into a landed gentry."

At first glance, the musings from a man of leisure didn't seem the most promising material for a best-seller. Instead of penning an epic poem, a historical narrative, or an imposing treatise on government, a project for which he was eminently qualified, Montaigne decided to simply follow his thoughts wherever they led. The complete edition of his Essays is about thirteen hundred pages, but there's no obvious plot or design. Topics include everything from sadness to sleep, lying to Cicero, and drunkenness to the pleasure of books. Montaigne even includes a lengthy essay on thumbs, of all things. Like many educated men of the Renaissance, Montaigne looked to Greek and Latin classics for inspiration. "His first tutor spoke only Latin to him, and Montaigne himself spoke no French until he was five years old," notes scholar Kia Penso. In his writings, Montaigne quotes the Greek commentator Plutarch so often that the ancient historian and moralist presides over the essays like a favored uncle at the dinner table. But while Montaigne, ever the lawyer, leans on precedent when useful in making his case, he also embraces the Renaissance enthusiasm for close personal observation as an avenue to truth. He's one of the world's great noticers, his essays suffused with the texture of everyday sensation.

A quick look through the essays turns up one gem after another. "I have never had any trouble except in the management of my own affairs. Epicurus says that to be rich is not the end, but only a change, of worries," he laments at one point. "Nature seems to have inclined mankind to social intercourse above all else. And its supreme point of perfection, I find, is friendship," he observes in another passage. Another turn of the page reveals this thought: "I can dine without a tablecloth, but hardly without clean napkins, as the Germans do; for I soil them more than they or the Italians, since I make little use of a spoon or fork. I regret that the royal custom of changing napkins, together with the plates, after every course, is not more widespread." And then one dips in and finds Montaigne bridging the ageless subjects of sex and death with cutting concision: "Everyone, certainly, flees from seeing a man born, and everyone rushes to see him die. To destroy a man we use a large field in open daylight. But to make a man we sneak into as dark and secluded a corner as we can."

The quotidian quality of Montaigne's essays, in fact, is their biggest appeal. They seem so drawn from life that they look effortless. Penso recalls that philosopher Eric Hoffman once tried to share Montaigne's essays with some acquaintances, to no avail. "One man flipped through the book for a while and handed it back, observing that it was nothing special—anybody could have written it. Montaigne would have liked that."

When Montaigne changed his mind about a subject, instead of revising his views seamlessly, he'd often just tack an addendum on his previous statement, leaving the original one intact. One can easily imagine a contemporary literary agent surveying this messy mess, then pitching it into the trash can.

If Montaigne doesn't seem obviously concerned with pleasing an audience, it's probably because he wrote his essays at least as much for himself as anyone else. Montaigne's temporary withdrawal from public affairs came about because of what
we might today call a midlife crisis. He’d faced some losses that made him wonder about his own mortality and the point of existence. “His firstborn daughter had died at the age of only two months (the first of five to die in infancy),” Montaigne scholar Saul Frampton notes. “His younger brother had been killed, absurdly, tragically, by a blow from a tennis ball. His best friend, Étienne de La Boétie, had died of the plague in his early thirties. And his father, whom he adored, had recently suffered a prolonged and agonizing death from a kidney stone. Moreover, violent religious warfare was spreading across the country, setting light to Montaigne’s region, pitting Catholic against Protestant, father against son, massacre against murder.”

Feeling overwhelmed, Montaigne, a Catholic respected by both sides in the conflict, retreated to his estate near Bordeaux, financially secure enough, as he put it, to “pass what may be left of (my) life already more than half spent.”

Soon Montaigne grew restless. Today, he might have talked to a social worker or sought a prescription for his anxiety, but lacking that option, he improvised his own form of therapy, recording his thoughts on paper. Others had written in the first person before Montaigne, but they typically offered their opinions from positions of authority. Montaigne simply wrote as himself: a guy at the apparent midpoint of his life trying to sort himself out. He called his compositions “essays,” which translates as a trial or attempt, and seemed like a shrewd way to lower expectations. Montaigne offered his prose as a first stab at wisdom, a work in progress rather than an intact philosophical system.

Someone writing randomly about what he’s thinking for hundreds of pages sounds pretty dull, but Montaigne pulls it off. “How does it happen that Montaigne is not ever, not on any of all those pages, even a bit of a bore?” Thomas asks, and then answers his own question: “He likes himself, to be sure, but is never swept off his feet after the fashion of bores.”

While boredom grows from the same thing again and again, Montaigne expresses his own personality—and, by extension, the rest of humanity—as a richly varied organism: “I contain in some fashion every contradiction, as the occasion provides. Bashful, insolent, chaste, lustful, talkative, silent, clumsy, fastidious, witty, stupid, morose, gay, false, true, wise, foolish, liberal, greedy, prodigal: I see myself somewhat all of this as I turn myself around—and so will everyone if he does the like.”

The titles of Montaigne’s essays are often mere launching pads for compositions that, like human thought or table talk, allow frequent and seemingly accidental changes of scene or subject. One of Montaigne’s longestest essays, “An Apology for Raymond Sebond,” is typical of his technique. Although ostensibly a solemn defense of a religious philosopher of the period, the essay encompasses much more. “Raymond Sebond is the least of concerns; having given a dutiful nod to his father and Sebond in the first paragraphs, and an obligatory homily on the usefulness of reason for arriving at truth, Montaigne simply turns his mind loose and writes whatever he feels like writing,” said Thomas. “Mostly, he wants to say that reason is not a special, unique gift of human beings, marking us off from the rest of Nature. Bees are better at organizing societies. Elephants are more concerned for the welfare of other elephants, and cleverer at figuring things out; they will fill up the man-dug elephant trap with timber and earth in order to bring the trapped elephant to the surface. . . . It is the greatest fun.”

Not everyone has found Montaigne’s penchant for digression so charming. In the 1930s, scholar Marvin Lowenthal undertook one of the more eccentric projects in literary history, deconstructing Montaigne’s far-flung observations, then reassembling them through an elaborate cut-and-paste job into a standard memoir, The Autobiography of Michel de Montaigne. It’s a charming read, but Lowenthal treats Montaigne’s meandering style as a lapse to be repaired rather than a method to be explored.

Woolf, though, suggested that Montaigne’s improvising sensibility was a deft expression of how the human mind actually works. She reminded readers that this kind of thing is much easier said than done.

There is, in the first place, the difficulty of expression. We all indulge in the strange, pleasant process called thinking, but when it comes to saying, even to someone opposite, what we think, then how little are we able to convey! The phantom is through the mind and out of the window before we can lay salt on its tail, or is slowly sinking and returning to the profound darkness which it has lit up momentarily with a wandering light…. It is for this reason that Montaigne stands out from the legions of the dead with such irrepressible vivacity. We can never doubt for an instant that his book was himself.

“Montaigne’s writing could … be said to be the first sustained representation of human consciousness in Western literature,” said Frampton. “This is not to say that people had been unconscious in the periods before, or that accounts of individual lives had not been written, such as by Augustine or Abelard. But no one had paid such attention to the actual experience of living, or seen life as providing a moral lesson—in justifying political and religious tolerance and providing a reason to continue to live.”

If Montaigne’s essays seem revolutionary, it’s perhaps because they were born of revolutionary times. With the emergence of the printing press, Montaigne had more books at his fingertips than many earlier readers might have seen in a lifetime, a reality that greatly empowered him to indulge his curiosity. Montaigne’s intimate, first-person narrative of a mind sorting itself out seemed to reflect a growing acknowledgment among Renaissance thinkers that personal intuition, and not just institutional orthodoxy, could be a path to knowledge. That idea, shimmering throughout Montaigne’s essays, obviously resonated with Emerson, a Transcendentalist who suggested that individuals could have a direct relationship with the cosmos. In this way, Montaigne, the friend of French kings, expressed the early stirrings of a democratic spirit that would, two centuries later, drive the American and French revolutions.

While Montaigne was scribbling away at his desk, exploration of the New World was dramatically enlarging the globe’s known boundaries. “It is no wonder that Montaigne and his contemporaries—like Shakespeare and Cervantes, or Copernicus and Galileo in science were so brilliantly glib—they had brand new material to write about!” author Hilary Masters notes. “To fly to the dead orb of the moon and return is an amazing feat but only that. On the other hand, to return with stories of an alter world populated with people just like us, who are going about their odd religions, raising zinnias and putting the Julian calendar into stone steps—now, that’s the stuff of supermarket tabloids! Some inspiration! It is like the past catching up with the present to make an entirely different here and now.”
Montaigne was fascinated by what lands across the Atlantic could teach him. In “On the Cannibals,” he considers the cannibals of Brazil and suggests that these man-eaters might be more ethically pure than residents of the Old World, a radical notion within European society. “I am sometimes seized with irritation,” he wrote, “at their not having been discovered earlier, in times when there were men who could have appreciated them better than we do.”

That’s pure Montaigne—the bracingly subversive thought that seems delivered on the fly, as topical as a sound bite. The continuing appeal of Montaigne, in fact, is that he can seem urgently contemporary. One can read him randomly, too, as if web-surfing, confident that any page will yield something pungent, pithy, or profound. “You may wander about almost at will in Montaigne,” literary critic Clifton Fadiman remarked. “He should be read as he wrote, unsystematically.”

As Thomas observed in the 1970s, “It is one of the most encouraging aspects of our civilization that Montaigne has never gone out of print.” Some four decades later, the appeal of the man who essentially invented the personal essay remains as strong as ever. Shakespeare’s Montaigne, a selection of essays from the Elizabethan translation of Montaigne by John Florio, appeared in 2014. More modern and accessible English translations of Montaigne’s essays by Donald Frame and M. A. Screech still sell well. In recent years, two popular studies of Montaigne by Frampton and Sarah Bakewell have promised to inspire a new generation of readers. “Although the Essays present a different facet to every eye, everything in them is united in that one figure: Montaigne,” Bakewell writes. “This is why readers return to him in a way they do to few others of his century, or indeed to most writers of any epoch. The Essays are his essays. They test and sample a mind that is an ‘I’ to itself, as all minds are.”

‘Well said/well thought’: How Montaigne Read his Lucretius by Wes Williams

‘Bien dire/bien penser’: these terms can be found expressed as infinitives, rather than past participles, in a passage concerning Lucretius in book III, chapter 5, of Montaigne’s Essais, a chapter titled ‘Sur des vers de Virgile’. It is here that we find Montaigne’s most intense engagement with Lucretius, exemplified by the close reading of the poem’s opening evocation of Venus and Mars (De rerum natura 1.33-40). Of all the classical poets, only Horace is quoted more often in the Essais than Lucretius; there is no single chapter devoted to either writer, but the chapter ‘On some lines in Virgil’ also quotes and comments on these lines from Lucretius, in which Montaigne recognizes Virgil’s source. Earlier in the same chapter, an exploration both of what it means to read the ancient Latin poets on love, sex, and all things between, and of how to write about the experience in French, in prose, and in the present, Montaigne had quoted Virgil in support of the contention that poetry ‘représente je ne sçay quel air plus amoureux que l’amour mesme’ (reproduces an indefinable mood that is more amorous than love itself). ‘Expanding on this theme some twenty or so pages later, Montaigne offers both a comparison and a critique: ‘Ce que Virgile dict de Venus et de Vulcan, Lucrece l’avoit dict plus sortablement d’une jouissance descrôbée d’elle et de Mars’ (What Virgil says of Venus and Vulcan, Lucretius had said more appropriately of a stolen enjoyment between her and Mars).

The pages reproduced are taken from the ‘Exemplaire de Bordeaux’, Montaigne’s own marked-up copy of the second, 1588, edition of the Essais, the last version published in Montaigne’s lifetime, on which he made the handwritten notes, additions, and alterations which his literary executor, Marie de Gournay, would collate to produce the monumental work of scholarship that is her posthumous edition of the Essais in 1595. Lucretian reception history is also a history of annotation and marginalia, and the appearance of Montaigne’s copy of the Lambinus 1563 edition at a book auction in 1989, masked by a subsequent owner’s signature, but positively ‘bescribbled’ with its original reader’s notes, constitutes one of the several ‘moments of discovery’ which punctuate the narrative of Greenblatt’s The Swerve. It was long known that Montaigne had read Lucretius; the internal evidence of the Essais suggested as much and the four quotations from the De rerum natura in ‘Sur des vers de Virgile’ are just a few of close to a hundred and fifty such quotations or references to Lucretius in the Essais. Bibliographers, collectors, and booksellers had for many years speculated that the copy proper—were it ever to be found—would prove to be something of a treasure; and so it is. In exploring aspects of this marvellous possession, now held in the Gilbert de Botton collection in Cambridge University Library, I shall focus on questions that arise when we try to establish both how Montaigne read ‘his’ Lucretius, and how he made sense of the poem: made Lucretius, in some sense, his own.

Montaigne was a voracious reader. From the quotations painted on the beams in the ceiling of his study to the thousand or so books on the shelves on its walls, he surrounded himself with the words of others as he wrote. Among the essays themselves, it is perhaps the theoretical discussion found in the short essay ‘On books’ (II. 10) which offers the most programatically clear insights into Montaigne’s reading habits. It, like other chapters which set writers alongside each other in a process which Montaigne calls Tart de conférer, suggests that he read Lucretius in an ancient tradition, which is to say comparatively; more specifically, this sets the context for his reading of the De rerum natura in relation to Virgil’s poetry. But my aim in what follows is not to extend the logic of comparison by setting the ‘theory’ of the one essay (‘On books’) against the ‘practice’ of the other (‘On some lines in Virgil’). To do so would in any event be foolish, since ‘Sur des vers de Virgile’ is hardly typical. Montaigne’s direct quotation of Lucretius in the Essais is, as others have shown, fairly concentrated: ninety-eight of a total of some one hundred and fifty instances occur in just three chapters. By far the majority (seventy-six quotations all told) are in the ‘Apologie de Raimond Sebond’ (II.1.2), where they inform the argument by way of both contestation and support. After ‘Que philosophe, c’est apprendre à mourir’ (I.20), to which we return in a moment, and which includes sixteen quotations from Lucretius, the next most numerically significant chapter is ‘De l’inequalité qui est entre nous’
(l.42); here just six Lucretian references serve to convey the force of argument, with the last of them lending Montaigne his clinching, concluding example.

Sur des vers de Virgile has, then, just four quotations, the longest, and most distinctive of which is De rerum natura I.33-40: most distinctive because it is here that we see not only that Montaigne reads Lucretius, but also how he does so. At once untypical and exemplary, this is the passage in which Montaigne accounts, directly (which is to say by way of a comparison with Virgil), for his long and intense readerly relationship with the poet. It is here, above all, that Montaigne bears eloquent witness to the ways in which a persistent commitment to the reading of Lucretius’s poem transforms his own sense of the contested relation between the terms of my title: ‘bien penser’ and ‘bien dire’.

How Did Montaigne Read?

Montaigne’s Essais quote, allude to, and otherwise draw on his reading at every turn. Even when he claims to be setting books to one side, he seems unable to stop himself from quoting the example of others before him who did likewise. In Sur des vers de Virgile, for instance, following the discussion of Lucretius and the comparison with Virgil already alluded to, he suggests a readerly change of tack: I’m going now, he says, to abandon the theme of literary imitation and to speak and write ‘plus materiellement et simplement’. But as Terence Cave has pointed out, the very next sentence refers to Zeno and Cratippus and quotes Claudian; and the one that follows weaves together a quotation from Horace, a reference to Plato, and paraphrases of sayings of Alexander and Aristotle (III.5, 877-8).6 That Montaigne’s own writing voice was so insistently amplified by his prior reading is in large part a function of the humanist practice of imitation: reading the texts of the past in readiness to speak, or write oneself in turn. But he does at times make serious efforts to move beyond this habit of mind and to set it, too, to one side, so as to give free rein to what he calls his own, specific forms: ‘Quand j’escris, je me passe bien de la compagnie et souvenance des livres, de peur qu’ils n’interrompent ma forme. Aussi qu’à la verité, les bons auteurs m’abattent par trop et rompent le courage.’ (When I am writing I can do without the company and support of books because I am afraid that they will interfere with my form. Also, to tell the truth, because great authors overwhelm me and destroy my confidence). And yet, of course, even this claim is attenuated by the evidence of the library, the texture of the work as a whole, and (perhaps) its specific context as part of an essay concerned with ‘some lines in Virgil’.

In setting poets alongside each other, Montaigne was, as noted, both following and diverging from an ancient tradition. Such comparisons are the effect of a long established practice which has students of literature compare and contrast different writers, as if in perpetual competition, the better both to (re)establish the contours of the canon, and to refine and redescribe the technology of taste. It is a habit Montaigne draws on at several significant points in the Essais. ‘Du jeune Caton’ (l.37), for instance, concludes with what is in effect a competition, as he sets five Latin poets to battle against each other in praise of Cato: ‘et pour l’intérêt de Caton, et, par incident, pour le leur aussi’ (both in Cato’s interest and, incidentally, in their own also. This extended comparison itself then generates Montaigne’s own, powerfully articulated reflections on the effects of poetry. For in terms which anticipate those which he uses when thinking about Lucretius in the essay on Virgil, Montaigne here wonders at the power which poetry can have both on individual readers and on groups, gathered together (for instance in theatres) to subject themselves, willingly, to its force: ‘Elle ne pratique point notre jugement; elle le ravit et ravage [... ] Des ma premiere enfance, la poesie a eu cela, de me transpercer et me transporter’ (She/it does not make us apply our judgement; it/she ravishes and overwhelms it ... From my earliest childhood poetry has had that power to trans-pierce and transport me), minimally altered). Lucretius (since he has nothing to say about Cato) is not one of the five poets in this particular contest; all are unnamed, but it is the one Montaigne calls ‘the choir master’ (‘le maistre du choeur’) (and whom he seems to expect his readers to recognize as Virgil) who wins, hands down. Lucretius’s voice is, then, not called on to challenge ‘the choir master’; at least not here, not yet.

Books are not Montaigne’s only source material and not all of his discussions of the practice of reading are reflexive; not all bear on his own practice as a writer, or on the ways in which he anticipates readerly responses to his own text. But in the context of this discussion it is worth noting that the Essais proved to be an editorial success, and their author became more conscious of having transformed himself into a book in other readers’ minds, and hands, so his conception of what it means to read attentively, or well, became more acutely defined. Of the three ‘couches’, or compositional layers, of the text—corresponding to the versions published in 1580, 1588, and, posthumously, 1595—it is the last of these that contain the most complex reflections on his own practice both as a writer, and as a reader; both of others’ texts, and of his own. In a rich passage added to the final version of the ‘Consideration sur Ciceron’, we read the following:

Je sçay bien, quand j’oy quelqu’un qui s’arreste au langage des Essais, que j’aimeroye mieux qu’il s’en teust. Ce n’est pas tant eslever les mots, comme c’est de deprimer le sens, d’autant plus picquamment que plus obliquement.

I know well that when I hear someone dwell on the language of these Essays, I would rather he said nothing. This is not so much to extol the style as to depreciate the sense: the more galling for being more oblique.

Here, even as he recalls the experience of hearing readers talking about his work, Montaigne also fantasizes silencing the stylistically savvy among them. The anxiety he articulates is in large part social, since the chattering class of reader indulges, he suggests, an elevated attention to ‘style’, the better to disregard or even disparage the author’s ‘sense’. The point is reiterated in the subsequent paragraph as Montaigne offers a critique of the humanist practice of useful reading, in that it can motivate an unproductive misdirection of readerly attention. Even as he
acknowledges that he often quotes the authors he has read, he argues that the references and stories which he ‘spreads around’ in his text should not be only seen as part of a rhetoric of socially sanctioned display, mere evidence of the author’s cultural capital. They serve (at least sometimes) as part of an argument about what it means to read non-instrumentally:

Ny elles, ny mes allegations ne servent pas toujours simplement d’exemple, d’autorité ou d’ornement. Je ne les regarde pas seulement par l’usage que j’en tire. Elles portent souvent, hors de mon propos, la semence d’une matière plus riche et plus hardie, et sonnent à gauche un ton plus delicat, et pour moy qui n’en veux exprimer d’avantage, et pour ceux qui rencontreront mon air.

Neither these stories nor my quotations always serve simply for example, authority, or ornament. I do not esteem them solely for the use I derive from them. They often bear, beyond my purpose, the seeds of a richer subject and bolder material, and sound obliquely a subtler note, both for myself, who do not wish to express anything more, and for those who hit upon my tune. (minimally altered) Pas toujours; pas seulement; souvent: the modifiers trace the movement of the argument as it progresses, gently, from claim to invitation. It is a movement given further impetus by the pair of oddly conjoined images: first the ‘seed-bed’ of exempla, quotations, and citations which Montaigne has planted in his text, and then the ‘air’ or ‘tune’ of the writing which future readers may or may not one day ‘hit upon’. It is the interdependence of these elements that matters most to Montaigne as he imagines the thoughts and words working together, both in his own mind, and, ideally, in the mouths of readers, as they attune themselves in turn to the harmonious choir of voices speaking in and through ‘his’ Essais.

In some respects, this tunefully dialogic theme simply reworks an established early modern commonplace about the use of commonplaces: the theory of imitation in which the ancients are never quite absent, and yet only fully present when we ourselves call them back to life, through the conversation that is reading. But the passage also goes further than this. For it characterizes Montaigne’s ideal reader as one who both ‘hits upon’ [the original] ‘tune’ and extends the particular notes of which it is composed beyond the author’s intended ‘purpose’; in so doing, such a reader recognizes that the substance of the Essais does far more than serve as ‘matter’ to be deployed according to the tripartite humanist technology of ‘example, authority, and ornament’. And in describing the kinds and degrees of intimate reading he would wish to have others experience with the Essais, Montaigne is also, I think, describing his own sense of what it means to read Lucretius: as neither a member of a chattering class, nor a professional scholar, nor yet an altogether ordinary soul, but someone uniquely attuned to the contrapuntal workings of ‘style’ and ‘sense’.

For a book is neither a conclusion, nor an end in itself; it is part of a conversation which began before it took on its present shape, and will continue long after. This is as true of Montaigne’s own book as it is of those of the poets, philosophers, and historians he partially incorporates into his text; partially, since when Montaigne quotes directly from others he takes care through italicization (and, in the case of poetry, indentation) to signal the separation of their words from his own. Not to do so would be to reduce conversation to a dull monotonous: ‘Est quoadam vox ad audium accommodate, non magnitudine, sed proprietate. La parole est moitié à celuy qui parle, moitié à celuy qui l’escoute. Cettuyce se doit préparer à la recevoir selon le branle qu’elle prend.’ (There is a kind of voice adapted to the hearing, not by its volume but by its quality. Speech belongs half to the speaker, half to the listener. The latter must prepare to receive it according to the motion it takes) (Ill.13, 1088; 834). ‘Hearability’ is, it seems, a quality, or more precisely an affordance, of the well-tuned author’s voice. The fact that the Latin phrase which makes this point for Montaigne was itself added to the final edition of this, the final chapter of the Essais, makes of it neither an after-thought, nor a ‘source’ which the essayist only belatedly recognized, through retrospection and rereading. It is, rather, proof of the argument presented throughout the Essais about what it means for Montaigne to read: to hold oneself ready to accommodate new thoughts and words ‘according to the motion’ the conversation takes. For such a conversation to work, those engaged in the process must be ready both to listen and to speak, both between languages and across time.

‘His’ Lucretius: Annotation, Transcription, and Translation

This collection is, amongst other things, testament to the ‘hearability’ of Lucretius’s voice across the early modern period. The De rerum natura certainly holds a distinctive place in the Essais, with some 150 extracts, totalling 454 lines quoted, and more than a sixth of the poem either directly cited or paraphrased. If Montaigne’s first reading of the poem—initiated in 1564, when he acquired a copy of Lambin’s newly minted edition—seems to have been instrumental in his coming to terms with the premature death of his friend, La Boétie, then the addition of close to a hundred new Lucretian passages in the later editions of the Essais bears witness to new and distinct lines of thinking. For in these later readings Montaigne reconsiders not only his understanding of what it means to be an author, but also his own relation to the De rerum natura. He does so both in the light of his own earlier notes on the poem, written in the margins and endpapers of his copy, and in respect of his developing understanding of his own mortality. Lucretius’s voice is, in other words, woven into the texture and history of the Essais, through both quotation and commentary, in both Latin and French.

The point can be clarified with reference to the powerfully argued essay ‘Que philosopher, c’est apprendre à mourir’ (That to philosophize is to learn how to die) (I.20). Moving through a number of distinctive attitudes to death (some self-consciously ‘philosophical’, others markedly less so), the chapter concludes in Lucretian mode, as Nature argues the case for the necessity of death, even as she proves to be mother to all materially recurrent, living things. Mother Nature is, then, already present through not only personification but also prosopopoeia in the first edition of
the Essais. But her already distinctly Lucretian voice is then (as the pages reproduced here suggest) further amplified by annotation over the next twenty years of the life of Montaigne’s text. This amplification includes the addition of some sixteen new Latin quotations in this speech alone; almost all are taken from Lucretius.

These pages further underscore something fundamental about Montaigne’s reading habits. Even as he proves to be singularly alive to the new-fangled technology of print, Montaigne, like many readers then and now, allows himself to mark with his own inky hand the pages of his books. If this is famously true of his now celebrated copy of Lucretius, it is no less true of Montaigne’s own copy of the Essais: if he reads pen in hand, then he annotate his text (at least) as much when reading himself as he does when reading the works and words of others. This, like common-placing, is now increasingly recognized as something close to common practice amongst early modern readers, and much interesting work is being down on how, why, and by whom books were annotated across the period. But what Montaigne’s case in particular reveals is the extent to which a reader might maintain an at once auditory, tactile, and labile relation to whatever words s/he finds on the printed page: he not only scores the margin at points of particular significance, but also crosses words out, adds others, and changes the punctuation, both on the copy of his own Essais, and on other books which he makes in this way ‘his’. And rather than apologize for this habit, he celebrates it, conceiving of it both as an extension of his humanist training, and a mark of his own, distinctive, essayistic forme.

In the short chapter ‘Des livres’ (‘On books’) (II.10), an essay in which he makes much of his poor memory, he recalls the experience of picking up a book he thought he had never read, only to find it (as Montaigne’s early modern translator Florio puts it) ‘all bescribbled with [his] notes’. The recollection of this—doubtless not altogether uncommon—experience initiates a richly circumstantial discussion of how and why he marks and annotates the books he owns. One movement in this passage is worth quoting at length:

Pour subvenir un peu à la trahison de ma memoire et à son defaut, si extreme qu’il m’est advenu plus d’une fois de reprendre en main des livres comme recens et à moy inconnus, que j’avoy leu soigneusement quelques anniées au paravant et barbouille de mes notes, j’ay pris en coustume, depuis quelque temps, d’adjouter au bout de chasque livre (je dis de ceux desquels je ne me veux servir qu’une fois) le temps auquel j’ay achevé de le lire et le jugement que j’en ay retiré en gros, afin que cela me represante au moins l’aire et idee generale que j’avois conceu de l’auteur en le lisant. Je veux icy transcrire aucunes de ces annotations. Voicy ce que je mis, il y a environ dix ans, en mon Guicciardini (car, quelque langue que parlent mes livres, je leur parle en la mienne).

To compensate a little for the treachery and weakness of my memory, so extreme that it has happened to me more than once to pick up again, as recent and unknown to me, books which I had read carefully a few years before and scribbled over with my notes, I have adopted the habit for some time now of adding at the end of each book (I mean of those that I intend to use only once) the time I finished reading it, and the judgement I have derived of it as a whole, so that this may represent to me at least the sense ‘[air] and general idea I had conceived of the author in reading it. I want to transcribe here some of these annotations. Here is what I put some ten years ago in my Guicciardini (for whatever language my books speak, I speak to them in my own).

There is much to say about this passage, and what might look like its preternatural anticipation of recent materialist theories of distributed cognition and extended mind as evidenced by the practice of annotation. And in the context of our own earlier discussion, it is striking that Montaigne’s notes to himself seek to capture something of what Florio (through whom many of Lucretius’s ideas first found their way into English print) rightly calls ‘the aire’ he had conceived of the author on a first reading; but I want here to focus on the two parenthetical, bracketed, remarks in the passage quoted. The first is restrictive in scope; the second is at once explanatory and quasiproverbial; in intention and form. The parenthesis, in each case, serves to signal the importance of the remark. For in what amounts to a mode of annotation integral to the text, these phrases matter, since they have been effectively already underlined by the author. As if already excerpted for specific attention, they stand out from the rest of the sentence, and (as we shall see) Lucretius proves, over time, to be an exception to the rules which they encode.

Initially, Montaigne seems to have read Lucretius according to his customary habits. As Screech has shown in the monumental labour of love that is his transcription and analysis of the pen marks on Montaigne’s copy, and as Legros has more recently shown in turning his forensic critical attention from the beams above Montaigne’s head, to the notes in his books, the young Montaigne may, in 1564, have begun reading and annotating his Lucretius with the thought that he would do so just the once. He certainly records the date of his first complete reading of the copy, within months of its printing, hot, in other words, off the press; and he also notes down in the endpapers ‘the judgement [he] derived of it’, in terms that would have enabled him, were he ever to forget having read the book, to recall ‘the aire’ he had conceived of it on that first reading. But the kinds of notes Montaigne then goes on to make on his copy suggest not only that he never quite forgot having read this book, but that it was one with which he was to become engaged, immersed, insistently, repeatedly, over many years of reading, with a range of notational marks, from lists of numbers to an index; from dotted lines and one-word comments, to pages of numbered notes on the endpapers and flyleaves: in a word, entangled. The first parenthetical rule articulated in ‘Des livres’—annotate books you are likely to read just the once—does not, then, apply when Montaigne read his Lucretius. Nor, over time, does the second—speak to books in your own language, whatever theirs might be’. As Screech and, following him, Legros have shown, Montaigne’s notes on his copy of the De rerum natura can be classified into distinct kinds of remark—philological, literary critical, thematic, and so on; his extensive cross-referencing and page number notation
serves, furthermore, to supplement for the absence of an index in Lambin's edition. And, once again rules were modified, or even transgressed, as Montaigne's engagement with Lucretius developed: what look to be the early annotations are indeed all in Latin; only later, it seems, does Montaigne begin to speak to the poet in French; most notably, and repeatedly, in the margins of the text, and most often of all, with the recurrent tag line that seems to mean so much more than it already says: 'contre la religion'.

Leaving 'religion' to one side and returning to Montaigne's conversation with Lucretius in respect of sex, love, and the passage from De rerum natura 1.33-40 with which we began this discussion, it becomes clear that he both relishes the taste of the poet's Latin, and is inspired by his reading to experiment with the expressive possibilities of French. This is evident both from the notes on the copy of Lucretius held in his library, and from his critical commentary on the poem in the Essais: 'Amours de mars et Venus' reads the first of Montaigne's marginal notes; 'Imité [sic] par Vergile' reads the second, itself accompanied on the left-hand side of the page by the particular interrupted downward strokes which (here as elsewhere on the copy) seem to signify not only 'good stuff', but also 'come back to this later'. Which is what Montaigne does, when writing 'On some lines in Virgil':

belli fera moenera Mayors Armipotens regit, in gremium qui scephe tuum se Rejicit, aeterno devinctus vulnere amoris: Pascit amore avidos inhians in te Dea visus, Equo tuo pendet resupini spiritus ore:

Hunc tu diva tuo recubantem corpore sancto Circunfusa super, suaveis ex ore loquelas Funde:

Commenting on the passage which he here transcribes into the Essais, Montaigne makes the following observation:

Quand je rumine ce rejicit, pascit, inhians, molli, fovet, medullas, labe-facta, pendet, percurnit, et cette noble circunfusa, mere du gentil infusus [ ... ] quand je vois ces braves formes de s'expliquer, si vives, si profondes, je ne dict pas que c'est bien dire, je dict que c'est bien penser.

The verbs of action articulating the process of reading which Montaigne singles out for consideration tell their own story: when I taste and chew the poet's Latin words; when I see for myself the force and beauty of his eloquence; then I do not say what others say—that Lucretius speaks well; what I do say is that Lucretius thinks well. The pairing 'bien dire/bien penser' turns out to serve, then, as the conclusion to a dialogue in which Montaigne stages himself talking at once to himself and to his prospective reader. 'To speak well' clearly matters to Montaigne, but the formal organization of his phrasing suggests that something else matters more: something which risks going unheard in midstal talk of 'eloquence' and 'bien dire', namely the second of the verbs in this opposition (or pairing): 'bien penser'.

But why this insistence, and why here? Who is Montaigne speaking against; who needs persuading that Lucretius is best thought of not (just) as a stylist, but (rather) as a philosopher: one who 'thinks well' (too)? The negative turn of Montaigne's phrase underlines a further crucial point about reading in the early modern period: to read is to anticipate and to contest other readers' accounts of the text or the matter at hand. This is what publication taught the essayist, as we saw in respect of the passage from 'Consideration sur Ciceron', and the annotated reception history of the De rerum natura suggests that any early modern conversation about reading Lucretius was also likely to prove contestatory. The argument does not begin with Montaigne, any more than it concludes with his own rereading of himself. Indeed the specific distinction between speaking and thinking well that we have been focusing on here has both a charged history and a continuing present in respect of Lucretius's poem. As Ada Palmer has shown, early Renaissance readers marked up their copies of the De rerum natura in a range of different ways.” From the very frequent (philosophical corrections), through the common (poetic, literary, and otherwise cultural notabilia), to the rarer, more contentious notes concerning natural philosophy, atomism, and theology, copyists and rubricators working in the manuscript tradition permitted themselves only very occasionally to note that the poem contained this or that ‘opinio non christiana’, all the while ensuring what Greenblatt has called 'the survival of dangerous ideas'. But did humanist editors, such as Lambin, capitalize on this tradition so as to consciously cultivate the impression of Lucretius as, above all, a poet: a man of fine words and phrases, rather than of pernicious thoughts and ideas? The question is a vexed one; it has been evoked a number of times in this collection, and it is central to the paratexual material which stands guard over Lucretius's poem in his many humanist editions. Some scholars argue that early modern editors most frequently insist on a distinction between the work's beliefs and what might be termed its 'artistic merit', and this division of spoils is central to the account of the reception of Lucretius as narrated in The Swerve. Glossing Lambin, Greenblatt suggests that 'once the distinction has been drawn ... the full force of that merit can be acknowledged'; expanding on their common theme, Greenblatt further suggests that over the course of Lambin's prefaces and editions 'disavowal shades into a reassurance subtly conjoined with a warning: sing the praises of the poem, but remain silent about the ideas'.

Exactly what Lambin himself was up to in his prefaces, glosses, and suggestions for further, comparative reading is in truth much contested. I will certainly not have resolved the conflict here.” But I want to suggest that in drawing his reader's attention to specific words when explicating the passage he quotes at some length from the De rerum natura, Montaigne is at once imitating Lambin and marking out his own reading of the poem as somehow, crucially, distinctive. Lambin had himself already isolated four of the terms Montaigne notes and, true to form, he had glossed this passage by adducing Homer's fabula in book 8 of the Odyssey, which he read as ‘signifying the tempering of the primary qualities of hot and cold, moist and dry: for Mars is dry and hot, whilst Venus is moist and cold’. Wandering off into the adjacent worlds of allegory and humoral theory, Lambin avoids close engagement both with the words in front of him on the page, and with their more materially determined sexual sense. Montaigne, by contrast, sets Lucretius's terms down in a list intermingled with those of Virgil, the better to evoke, as it were enactively, and by
way of ‘rumination’ that rolls each delicious word round in the mouth, an experience: that of reading ‘his’ Lucretius. And it is on the basis of this experience that Montaigne can then move on to argue his case. Lucretius is a poet of real taste: one who not only speaks well, but thinks well, too.

Michael Screech (to whom we owe the first sustained study of Montaigne’s reading of Lucretius) draws close attention, in commenting on this passage, to the quality and scope of the essayist’s debt to Lambin. Keen to stress Montaigne’s ‘literary sensibility’, Screech first notes that Montaigne is ‘not the slightest bit interested’ in the allegorical Homeric readings which Lambin proposes by way of gloss to the passage discussed above. He then suggests that what concerns the essayist is, rather, ‘the sensitive evocation in high poetry of the sexual embrace which can bring back thoughts and memories of youthful joys to a lonely and rancid old man’. Whilst it is true that Montaigne avoids allegorizing where possible, it is not altogether clear that his reading of Lucretius evokes in him thoughts of old age and loneliness, let alone a sense of being rancid. The point bears on the material quality of the experience which reading Lucretius (as opposed to Virgil, for instance) represents for Montaigne: does reading only ever ‘bring back thoughts and memories’ of earlier times? Does a reader’s repeated engagement with a text only ever serve to recall the excitement of the first encounter? Or might the experience of reading be understood, rather, as (at least occasionally) a species of peculiarly attentive conversation, which takes place in something like an eternally recurrent present? The question is best resolved through the distinctive form of reading that is translation.

Screech translates the final stage of the sentence in contention here as follows: ‘When I look upon such powerful means of expression, so dense and full of life, I do not conclude that it is said well, but thought well.’ This is a translation composed in harmony with his understanding of what reading Lucretius meant, or rather did, to Montaigne. But what I think it misconstrues is the embodied, enactive dimension of Montaigne’s account of reading. Screech’s mentalizing ‘look upon’ is already allegorical, and his ‘conclude’ cuts short the conversational conceit in which Montaigne is engaged; his transposition of the concluding infinitives of the phrase into past participles makes a memory of an ongoing experience. This matters because the tense of each of the active, physically charged verbs in this sentence is determinedly present; Montaigne’s ‘looking’, like the ‘speaking’ (and the ‘ruminating’) which is said to accompany it, takes place in the habitual present: all of this is happening now, and might yet happen again. The point can, once again, be clarified by comparison. Frame, for his part, keeps the ‘see’ and the ‘say’ as active, present verbs, and, furthermore, accentuates, sharply, with added quotation marks, the dialogic aspect of Montaigne’s words; but he nonetheless settles on past participles for the conclusion of the thought: ‘When I see these brave forms of expression, so alive, so profound, I do not say “This is well said,” I say “This is well thought”’. Florio’s early modern account, by contrast, captures the several senses of reading as articulated in this passage more fully, and, by adding a ‘nimble’ to stress the point, he keeps the infinitives in the phrase alive: ‘When I behold these gallant forms of expressing, so lively, so nimble, so deep, I say not this is to speak well, but to think well’.

CONCLUSIONS: ‘MEANING MORE THAN THEY SAY’

Philip Hardie memorably writes the following about Virgil: ‘It is almost as if at the beginning of his career, Virgil intuits that Lucretius’s capacious textual universe will provide space within which to develop the projects of all three of his major works.’ The same could be said of Montaigne’s own relation to Lucretius, and of the three books of essays that make up his major work: the Essais. Montaigne would have enjoyed reading Philip Hardie; perhaps, one day, when the swerving atoms reorganize themselves into another Montaigne, he will have the chance to do so. The enabling fantasy for just such an eventualty — that the atoms might come together in this way again, so as to give birth to another Montaigne — is itself elaborated in one of the notes made on the flyleaves of Montaigne’s copy of Lucretius.

‘Wildly heterodox’ is how Greenblatt describes this note in The Swerve; ‘non incredibile est’ is how Montaigne himself frames the thought, characteristically careful (or perhaps playful), even when annotating for his own future reading self: Ut sunt diversi atomorum motus non incredibile est sic conuenisse olim atomos out conventuras ut alius nascatur montanus (Since the movements of the atoms are so varied it is not unbelievable that the atoms came together in this way once, or that in future they will come together like this again, so as to give birth to another Montaigne). That Montaigne was able to entertain the not incredible possibility of finding himself having already existed in the past, and reconstituted in some future moment is, perhaps, a function of his strong grasp of the imaginative reach afforded by the practice of reading.

When reading and annotating his Lucretius, then, Montaigne turned a keen and trained eye to material, commonplaces, and themes that could be reworked in his own writing; he also made a note of matter, words, and thoughts which he believes others to have derived from the poet. Among these, clearly, is Virgil’s reworking of the Lucretian lines relating the ‘Amours de Venus’, and when he reflects on the history of their relationship in the essay ‘On books’, Montaigne calls to mind an ancient complaint, the better to argue a contemporary case:

Ceux des temps voisins à Virgile se plaignoient deqoy aucuns luy compariroient Lucrece. Je suis d’opinion que c’est à la verité une comparaison inegale: mais j’ai bien à faire à me rassurer en cette creance, quand je me trouve attachez à quelque beau lieu de ceux de Lucrece.

Those who lived near Virgil’s time used to complain that some compared Lucretius to him. I am of the opinion that it is in truth an unequal comparison; but I have much to do to confirm myself in this belief when I find myself fixed on one of the beautiful passages in Lucretius.

These few words reveal much about what happens to Montaigne when he finds himself reading Lucretius. In particular, they say much about what is and is not
Through a series of sexually charged comparisons and says, and does. For Montaigne moves, as noted above, bears, rather, on conflicting accounts of what good poetry ‘conference’, or coupling, of these two passages; though of not just to give Montaigne credit for effecting the gods themselves engaged in love’s work. The point here is and between the work of the two poets as they evoke the clearly does, the peculiar twists and turns Lucretius; nor, it seems, does Lambin relish, as Montaigne passage from the Aeneid with these particular lines in annotations Montaigne makes to his own text.

The point Montaigne is making here is, initially, specific: it concerns the relative worth of the two poets, in respect of their ‘eloquence’. It is the art of ‘bien dire’ which causes ‘opinion’ to modulate to ‘creance’; it is the specific ‘beau lieu’ which ignites the heterodox thought that Lucretius might in fact be the better poet. And yet. Montaigne’s account of his ‘entanglement’ in Lucretius, articulated as it is first in terms of received opinion being modified by the experience of reading, and then of settled belief being made less secure by the power of the writing itself: all this also seems to mean more than it directly says. Might it show that on reading Lucretius Montaigne finds himself compelled to query certain other, otherwise settled, opinions, and beliefs? Not least among them the received opinion that the poem is best read for the ‘beau lieu’, the mark of style, and that all talk of ‘creance’—belief—is, in respect of this particular poet, left well alone?

The question is, as noted above, a vexed one. I have, here, explored it largely by way of the pairing (or opposition) ‘bien dire/bien penser’, derived from Montaigne’s powerful analysis of Lucretius’s opening evocation of the coupling of Venus and Mars. We have found both that the comparative habit of reading Lucretius in relation to Virgil is strongly ingrained in Montaigne, and that the experience of actually engaging in detail with the De rerum natura raises, for Montaigne, questions about common, or received, opinions, and settled, or unsettled beliefs. Returning one last time to the passage (and pages) from ‘Sur des vers de Virgile’ with which we began, we find these questions already anticipated by the essayist’s considered, reflexive account of what it means to read Lucretius, both by way of the contested comparison with Virgil, and as evidenced in the annotations Montaigne makes to his own text.

There is nothing specific in Lambin’s notes in Montaigne’s copy of the De rerum natura to suggest the linking of the passage from the Aeneid with these particular lines in Lucretius; nor, it seems, does Lambin relish, as Montaigne clearly does, the peculiar twists and turns of phrase, across and between the work of the two poets as they evoke the gods themselves engaged in love’s work. The point here is not just to give Montaigne credit for effecting the ‘conference’, or coupling, of these two passages; though of course credit should be given where it is due. The point bears, rather, on conflicting accounts of what good poetry says, is, and does. For Montaigne moves, as noted above, through a series of sexually charged comparisons and distinctions to explore exactly this question in this essay. Chiding the ‘moderns’ (anyone writing since Virgil) with effeminacy, Montaigne praises the ‘virile eloquence’ of the ancients, adding in the final edition, the man’s man, Seneca, in support: Contextus totus virilis est, non sunt circa flosculos occupati he beams, and Florio, translating for his English readers, follows suit: ‘The whole composition or text is manly, and they are not bebusied about Rhetorick flowers’.

Distinguishing itself, then from all that is ‘molle’ (soft, flabby, or flaccid), true eloquence is ‘nerveuse et solide’—sinnowie, material, and solid’ suggests Florio, interpolating another crucial adjective of his own; true eloquence is unafraid to risk causing ‘offence’, and as a result is given licence by readers not simply to ‘delight’, but to ‘fill and ravish’. ‘Elle ne plaict pas tant, comme elle remplit et ravit; Et ravit, le plus, les plus forts esprits’. Excitedly mimicetic, Montaigne’s own prose tumbles over itself as it presses on beyond ‘remplit’ and ‘ravit’, itself first repeated, and then serving to introduce first one, and then another ‘plus’, as he presses on towards the ‘plus forts esprits’, the finer minds he has in view at the end of the sentence...

Which is where we find Montaigne imagining that it might be good to add a further, closing point to his phrase. Is this the point, he wonders on rereading his own prose-poem, to add still more, to insert a further, reflexive, ‘plus’, by way of performative explanation of the inexhaustible power of words, hinting at still more significance, as yet unsaid? ‘Qui signifie plus qu’elle ne dict’: the subject of the phrase in its initial conception and context is poetic eloquence, a feminine noun in French, for all that Montaigne stresses the ‘virility’ of the poetry of the men whose words he has just relished. The import of the additional, marginal claim is that this order of eloquence ‘signifies more than it says’; or, perhaps, ‘means more than it lets on’. There is, clearly, more to be said about such poetry than that it is ‘well said’.

And yet. Montaigne crosses the phrase out; only to move it down half a page, to the point where it is clear that he is talking now exclusively about Lucretius, and explaining exactly why reading Lucretius matters: ‘Icy de mesme, le sens esclaire et produit les parolles: Non plus de vent, ains de chair et d’os’. ‘Here the sense (says Florio) enlightenn and produceth the words: no longer windy or spongy, but of flesh and bone. They signifie more than they utter’.

With the move from singular to plural, the subject of the meaningful verb has changed: no longer the poetic eloquence of Latinity, but Lucretius’s very particular ‘parolles’. To conceive of the relation between Lucretian ‘sens’ and ‘parolles’ in this way is to make a clear case against those who argue for the erection of a cordon sanitaire, ensuring the hygienic separation of fine words from dangerous ideas, and the security of a ‘literary’ firewall, behind which the thought-police need never peek. Vigorously countering any such understanding of Lucretius’s poem, Montaigne stresses that this is not just ravishing eloquence; it is, of course, that; but it both is, and means, so much more. In the resonant phrase with which I began this exploration, a phrase governed by the first person pronoun, bearing verbal witness to this singular reader’s response, Montaigne testifies to his belief that to write like Lucretius is not simply to speak well: ‘Je dicts que c’est bien penser’.

On reading Lucretius, Montaigne recognizes the offence to be no less the point and the pleasure than is the eloquence;
each is bone to the other’s flesh. Lucretius does more than confirm Montaigne’s belief in the redundancy of the opposition between sense and style; reading, annotating, and rereading this poem alongside the writing of his own Essais alerts him to the embodied force of both conjoined. He reads ‘his’ Lucretius comparatively, which is to say in relation both to Virgil and to himself; and he did so in a state of absorption or immersion that was to last an intellectual lifetime. There is, Montaigne tells us, nothing quite like reading Virgil on Venus; not even sex comes close. But even Virgil gets something wrong: his is too licentious an evocation of married love. For passionate, engaged, lifelong commitment (and, so the comparative argument of the essay goes) a more suitable instance of the coming together of style and ideas, saying and thinking—for that, you want Lucretius; nobody does it better. Venus ravishes Mars, and the reader’s mind is rapt in contemplation of its own assent to the embodied force of the words, marked, here, ‘icy mesme’ on the page. <>

Lucretius and the Early Modern edited by David Norbrook, Stephen Harrison, Philip Hardie [Classical Presences, Oxford University Press, 9780198713845]

The rediscovery in the fifteen century of Lucretius’ De rerum natura was a challenge to received ideas. The poem offered a vision of the creation of the universe, the origins and goals of human life, and the formation of the state, all without reference to divine intervention. It has been hailed in Stephen Greenblatt’s best-selling book, The Swerve, as the poem that invented modernity. But how modern did early modern readers want to become?

This collection of essays offers a series of case studies which demonstrate the sophisticated ways in which some readers might relate the poem to received ideas, assimilating Lucretius to theories of natural law and even natural theology, while others were at once attracted to Lucretius’ subversiveness and driven to dissociate themselves from him. The volume presents a wide geographical range, from Florence and Venice to France, England, and Germany, and extends chronologically from Lucretius’ contemporary audience to the European Enlightenment. It covers both major authors such as Montaigne and neglected figures such as Italian neo-Latin poets, and is the first book in the field to pay close attention to Lucretius’ impact on political thought, both in philosophy - from Machiavelli, through Hobbes, to Rousseau - and in the topical spin put on the De rerum natura by translators in revolutionary England. It combines careful attention to material contexts of book production and distribution with close readings of particular interpretations and translations, to present a rich and nuanced profile of the mark made by a remarkable poem.

Excerpt: In 1417, Poggio Bracciolini discovered a complete manuscript of the De rerum natura on the shelves of a monastery. The incident corresponds to the hoariest stereotypes of Renaissance history: a text recovered to the light after years of monkish darkness. ‘Still more, that text itself celebrates the triumph of the light of reason, ratio, over the darkness and fear of superstition, terremot animi tenebrasque. Lucretius has been viewed as the herald of modernity, a zealous opponent of the enslavement to tradition in science and religion. Thomas Jefferson and Karl Marx in different ways viewed him as a harbinger of the Enlightenment. In some more recent interpretations, Lucretius gains a Nietzschean inflection and becomes a prophet not so much of modernity as of postmodernity, or of a revisionist ‘aleatory’ materialism, with attention focused on the play of contingencies introduced by Lucretius’s swerve or clinamen. That swerve, as Harold Bloom long ago noted, offers a suggestive model for literary influence. Lucretius also poses contemporary questions that go beyond those interpretative frames, adumbrating contemporary ecological concerns.’ Poggio had certainly had a busy day.

That narrative of a sudden break in the Renaissance, presented most vividly in Stephen Greenblatt’s immensely influential The Swerve, has generated some sharp reactions. Lucretius, it is argued, was not really ‘discovered’ in 1417; nor did his natural philosophy adumbrate modern science; nor did it precipitate a wave of atheism; nor is there good evidence that his poem did sweep Europe. Even today, outside specialists in the classics, Lucretius remains little known—hence the element of astonishment with which Greenblatt’s book was greeted by general readers. And specialists in early modern literature and history have paid far less attention to Lucretius than to figures like Virgil and Ovid. In recent years there has been a major revival of scholarly interest, but much remains to be explored. The present collection aims to refine our understanding and to open up new directions. The chapters do not draw uniform conclusions about the cultural impact of the De rerum natura: the poem may have been received as subversive and disturbing in some circles while causing no ripples whatever elsewhere. Recognizing such diversity is more fruitful than seeking a bland middle way: the poem’s reception was and remains volatile. A common factor in many of these chapters is a close attention to the poem’s language and material circulation, as a means of refining generalizations about Epicurean philosophy. While insisting on the need to understand early modern readers without anachronism, they also recognize the ways in which Lucretius was from the start a figure at odds with his time, and calling forth special imaginative leaps in his most original readers.

That the reception of the De rerum natura was not simply a matter of darkness followed by instant illumination can perhaps be predicted from the poem itself. Despite his general assertiveness of tone, Lucretius several times voices his fear that his shadowy interlocutor Memmius may relapse into old superstitions. If he coats his Epicurean medicine with honey, it is because he is aware that his doctrine will be felt repellent by many or most of his readers; he can prevail only by a kind of well-meaning deceit (deceptaque non capiatur). The potential resistance could be ideological: Stephen Harrison (Chapter 1), makes clear why the poem’s subversiveness will indeed have made it bitter medicine for defenders of traditional values. But the difficulties were also aesthetic: few readers have complained that he ladled out too much honey, for large tracts of the poem are harsh in texture—‘crabbed’ was the standard early modern English description—and uncompromisingly technical. Lucretius reveals an ambivalence about the status of poetry, even strongly didactic poetry, within the Epicurean system: his
passion for his craft is evident, he even tells us that he dreams about writing his own poem, but he also again and again draws attention to ways in which poetic images can be misleading. The record of his reception amongst his contemporaries bears out the problems: though allusions indicate that his greatness as a poet was early recognized, esteem for his poetry rather than his didactic mission was not what he himself had aimed for. By the fourth century, when polarizations between Christians and the neo-paganism of Julian the Apostate intensified, Lucretius’s philosophy became more sensitive and liable to cause offence on both sides; many manuscripts may have been destroyed as part of Julian’s campaign to defend traditional pagan worship. To some extent, Lucretius became a tactical ally of Christian assaults on paganism, and we owe the survival of the poem at all to monastic copyists.

The interpretation of the next phase of the poem’s fortunes has been swayed by the development of different disciplines. Textual criticism in the field of classical literature has long taken Karl Lachmann’s edition of Lucretius as a foundational work, with Lachmann himself presented as a Lucretian figure bringing light out of darkness. More recent scholarship, by Sebastian Timpanaro and others, has highlighted the continuities between Lachmann’s method and the best scholarship of Renaissance humanists; the current Loeb edition frequently notes readings which we owe to early modern scholars. All these scholars showed a sensitivity to the material characteristics of manuscripts—Lachmann was able to infer the pagination of a lost original. At the same time, they tended to see themselves as bringing light out of an often confused and ignorant process of textual transmission. This has meant that the material witnesses of texts have been treated as raw materials without being a primary focus of interest in their own right. It is symptomatic that at the time of writing we lack an edition of the earliest manuscripts, for which scholars must still rely on expensive and rare photocopies produced more than a century ago. Recent scholarship on medieval and early modern manuscripts has urged a renewed attention to their material properties, a movement often linked with a postmodern celebration of plurality rather than a search for a fixed authorial original. These editors would be inclined to ask whether Lucretius arrived at or intended a fixed and final version of his text. Work on the material circulation of texts also highlights the precariousness of the survival of so many classical writings, so that the De rerum natura was far from unique in the paucity of copies. After all, we owe the survival of the poem at all to the cultural renaissance of the ninth and tenth centuries, which saw the transcription of the two earliest complete surviving manuscripts, another one now surviving in fragments and a further manuscript, now lost, which was the one Poggio recovered in 1417. Some commentators have found echoes of Lucretius in later medieval verse and prose and posited connections with monastic libraries. The myth of the dark ages is displaced by claims that the period was ‘a world full of light and learning’. The further that line of argument is pushed, the less of a case there is for a ‘discovery’ in 1417.

And yet the steady proliferation of manuscripts in Italy once Poggio’s copy had been circulated does indicate a demand that had not previously been satisfied. Gerard Passannante has shown that a reader with Petrarch’s expertise could infer something of what the DRN must have been like from surviving extracts and allusions in Virgil. Poggio knew the importance of his discovery because he was already primed as to what to look for. The fact remains that he had to look. No new evidence has been produced to counter the view of late-medieval decline which Greenblatt summarized from earlier authorities. R. W. Hunt, hardly a foe of medieval manuscript culture, wrote that by the twelfth century Lucretius ‘has vanished’; L. D. Reynolds agreed, ‘despite this promising start, Lucretius went underground for the rest of the Middle Ages, an eclipse which may be partly explained by the passionately anti-religious nature of his message’. Susanna Gambino Longo, while arguing that a small monastic elite may have continued to read and study Lucretius, acknowledges that the manuscripts would have been confined to an enfer or restricted category. We now at long last have a study based on a very detailed scrutiny of the early manuscripts, and David Butterfield’s conclusion is that the annotations in later hands either date from the first two centuries after their transcription or from a much later period: his conclusion, made in his essay (Chapter 2) and argued at greater length in his monograph, is that there is no evidence that anyone read Lucretius in the later Middle Ages. He offers detailed counter-arguments to various claims for direct echoes of the De rerum natura in medieval texts. The evidence does not point to any deliberate programme of suppression; one may also suspect, though, that the more obscure the poem had become, the more attention would be drawn to anyone who sought to revive it, and given its content this could have been an inhibiting factor. Butterfield points out that the title of the oldest surviving manuscript was erased and replaced, which only makes sense if the writer believed an association with Lucretius would be undesirable—the marks of an enfer.

Even if no more was at issue than that the poem came to seem obscure and irrelevant, that in itself points to a gap in comprehension of a kind that humanists became anxious to fill. From within the carefully codified paradigms of scholastic philosophy, Lucretius’s arguments might well have seemed eccentric and amateurish; and before that, Cicero, Plutarch, and Lactantius had developed strategies for dismissing Epicureanism through ridicule and rhetorical question. The longstanding quarrel between scholasticism and humanism seems still to come into play in contemporary debates: one may gain the impression from Greenblatt’s critics that the De rerum natura was merely one of several alternative expositions of atomist natural philosophy, and a poorly argued one at that, lacking the rigour of serious scholastic philosophers. But the poem also offers a passionate frontal assault on the idea that our world shows signs of divine design; outlines a history of this world from creation to a powerfully imagined destruction, as part of an infinite universe; narrates a radically materialist vision of the development of human society and a horrific vision of social disintegration; presents a part-satirical, part-sympathetic portrait of human erotic passion; urges a
radical reform in attitudes to death; outlines a coherent and entirely secular system of ethics; and throughout it offers a powerful appeal to the imagination and the emotions, in poetry that is utterly distinctive and matches the greatest in world literature. Perhaps monastic readers found little to interest them in this text, and exaggerated as Green-blatt’s negative portrayal of medieval culture may be, contemporary medievalists do not seem very interested either. Early modern humanists, however, were excited to recover a poem which Virgil had valued so highly, and indeed against which he had been prompted to react in such complex ways: to that extent, Lucretius had helped to set the Virgilian agenda, and given the massive prestige of the Aeneid across medieval and early modern periods, this was immensely important. The arguments of authorities like Lactantius, ridiculing Lucretius as a puerile malcontent, could now be seen to have been highly prejudiced.

Something new came into the world in 1417. But its reception was fascinatingly and unusually problematic—as Lucretius himself might have expected. The present collection shows how difficult it is to generalize about the mixture of enthusiasm and revulsion with which the De rerum natura was greeted, but that volatility is in itself worthy of note. Scholars may write of ‘Epicureanism’ as if it formed a unified body of thought to be accepted or rejected en bloc, but we need first of all to recall that relevant texts bore complex interrelations. Epicurus had fared less well than Lucretius in the preservation of his manuscripts: his major work On Nature and many other writings have not survived, and while fragments of papyri have been recovered from Herculaneum, all that was known in the early modern period was a handful of letters and some maxims. Most of these survive because they were collected in the sympathetic life of Epicurus in the tenth book of Diogenes Laertius’s Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, compiled from sources still available in the third century CE. This work was widely printed in Western Europe in Latin and subsequently Italian and French translations, though a Greek editio princeps was not available until 1533. While Stoicism was more immediately attractive than Epicureanism as a parallel to Christian philosophy, it was widely known to scholars that the ethically rigorous Seneca had himself greatly esteemed Epicurus and cited Lucretius with approval.” In a kind of dialectical relation with this growing body of scholarly knowledge, however, there emerged the polemical stereotype of the ‘epicure’ and ‘atheist’, figures who, lacking the restraint imposed by religious belief, reduced life to nothing but an endless pursuit of debauched pleasure. The two terms are paired in the first appearance of ‘atheist’ in the sense of ‘one who denies or disbelieves the existence of a God’ in the Oxford English Dictionary: ‘eate we and drink we lustely, to morow we shal dy, which al [th]e Epicures protest ope[n]ly, & the Italia[n] atheoi in lyfe practyse’. It is notable that the word is not actually ‘atheist’ but its Greek equivalent, associated with Italians: the Bible translator Miles Coverdale, writing c.1555, represents the very idea of not believing in God as alien to his native language. There was a gulf between this hedonistic notion of Epicureanism and the writings of Epicurus; but it was bridged to some extent by the wide availability of the highly negative views of Epicureanism found in Cicero’s De natura deorum and Plutarch’s In Colotem—texts which were polemically reductive, and engaged less with Epicurus’s own writings than with later followers. Seneca’s more favourable view of Epicurus was widely known, but it was not until Pierre Gassendi’s massive edition of Diogenes Laertius’s Life, with much commentary on Lucretius, in 1649 that Epicurus was really purged of his earlier notoriety. Even after that, and indeed down to the present day, confusion between the real philosopher and the caricatures remained commonplace.

It can also be difficult to distinguish between Epicurus and Lucretius, who presents himself as following in his master’s footsteps. We still cannot be sure how far Lucretius was drawing on Epicurus’s now-lost On Nature; certainly his poem, while having much in common with the letters that may have derived from that work, has a significant amount of material not to be found in any surviving writings. We are dependent on Lucretius alone for the famous swerve and the lengthy discussion of the origins of civilization in the fifth book. Just as significantly, though the point sometimes seems so obvious as to be ignored, Lucretius was a poet, and his discourse was very different in tone. Epicurus advocated a state of detachment from the unnecessary desires that are aroused by deceitful images and he seems to have found this state fairly easy to achieve: a figure of low affect, he wrote in a suitably economical prose. Insofar as religions distorted the true images of the gods, as themselves affectless and remote figures, he criticized conventional religion, but he also disliked public opposition, advocating instead a calm acceptance with inner reservation. How far he was an ‘atheist’ in the sense of denying that there was a reality behind human perceptions of the gods remains debated. With Lucretius that point is likewise open to debate, but his sensibility was very different. He was a poet of extraordinary skill and capable of great intensity, and a scorching wit of a kind that was popular in the seventeenth century; whatever his final beliefs about the gods, he passionately inveighed against superstition. Insofar as his poem could be classified as a literary text and hence liable to different standards of truth, his early modern defenders could use this fictional quality to outflank criticism: if any blame attached to the poem’s doctrines, it should be directed at Epicurus, not Lucretius. Insofar as he heightened the affective qualities of Epicureanism, however, disguising with poetic honey some doctrines which Christians considered poisonous rather than medicinal, his poetic skill could be seen as all the more subversive.

One further difference between the two writers was that Lucretius had to strain at the limits of the Latin language to accommodate Epicurus’s technical Greek vocabulary within the acceptable diction and metrical patterns of a Latin hexameter. He aimed to naturalize Epicurean terms by finding Latin equivalents with deep roots in the language, in the process often adopting an archaic idiom; but he also liked to show his virtuosity in the most sophisticated contemporary poetic techniques. His language can quickly jump from the prosaic to the elevated; he can ram points home with heavy repetition, but also slip them by the
reader with compressed aphorisms. These characteristics were to present problems for translators. The Swerve, aiming to introduce Lucretius to new readers, has remarkably little to say about the poem itself, with a summary in bullet points and a few excerpts from the translation by John Dryden, which is indeed fluent and energetic but gains this effect by expanding considerably on the original. These difficulties of language posed problems for editors and commentators. The fact that a word in the poem is to be found nowhere else in Latin may mean that it requires emendation or that it was a unique Lucretian usage; repeated lines may reflect scribal inattention or a deliberate authorial strategy; obscurities may need editorial tidying or may be intended as a stimulus to the reader. All these linguistic devices were deployed to convey philosophical doctrines which are in their barest prose expression extremely complex and often counter-intuitive. The editorial problems are acute, and early modern readers lacked the generations of textual scholarship on which today's editions rely. Even today, editors offer solutions to one passage as radically different as et ecum vi, 'and the force of horses', que elephantis, 'and by elephants', and hastatis, 'armed with spears'. Many passages had baffled the scribes of the oldest surviving manuscripts, and as derivatives of Poggio's manuscript began to circulate in fifteenth-century Italy, humanist readers turned to their favoured practice of philological analysis and comparison.

So acute was humanist interest in language that it often overshadowed questions of content, another reason why the reception of Lucretius might not immediately raise religious concerns. Fifteenth-century manuscripts circulated partly as prestige items with elaborate ornamentation, reflecting the social capital given by classical interests, and partly amongst the scholar community, whose interests might be more literary than philosophical. One fifteenth-century scholar who was to become a bishop transcribed the whole poem as an exercise in the praise of God and added a note apologizing not for any subversive content but for errors of sense or metre. Marginalia in early modern manuscripts pay far less attention to thorny issues like atomism and the fate of the soul than to textual emendations, vocabulary, including the Greek origins of Lucretius's Latin terms, and passages echoed by later Roman poets. Lucretius's challenges to an Aristotelian cosmology, including the idea of an infinite universe, might be simply ignored: one manuscript blandly provides illustrations that go against his own words. These emphases continued as manuscript transmission gave way to print. Just what Lucretius had actually written remained a problem. While Dionysius Lambinus's (Denys Lambin's) conjectural emendations in his great editions of the mid-sixteenth century are today considered to have been the greatest advance in improving the text before Lachmann, there was sufficient uncertainty for many editions to continue reproducing older manuscript readings. Much annotation in printed editions focused on basic elucidation rather than more controversial issues. With printing the opportunities for widespread diffusion of Epicurean ideas did greatly increase, but this did not necessarily mean an immediate wave of subversion. Printing, in the form of popular pamphlets and sermons, could bring the onslaught against the 'epicure' to socially diverse audiences. Editions of the De rerum natura tended defensively to displace ideological concerns on to Epicurus and to absolve Lucretius of personal responsibility for the ideas that he adorned poetically. And neo-Latin poets began to write imitations of the DRN which took pride in an ability to imitate the nuances of Lucretian language while specifically refuting his arguments. The honey and the doctrine could apparently be kept completely separate.

One may then imagine Lucretius as concluding that he had written in vain, that his early modern readers were as vulnerable as Memmius to lapsing back into superstition. Drawing on a meticulous survey of early manuscripts and printed books, Ada Palmer shows that the majority of readers for whom evidence survives skirted round atomism and mortalism while finding ways of assimilating Lucretius's ethics to Christianity. But she also highlights striking exceptions such as Machiavelli, who copied out and annotated the entire poem, with acute attention and a deep interest in the atomist core of his philosophy. And yet Machiavelli never mentioned Lucretius in any of his writings: had the manuscript not happened to survive, scholars would have been able to pour scorn on any Machiavellian debt to Epicureanism. This silence, from a writer not reluctant to take risks, forms part of a more general pattern of ambivalent allegiance and semi-disavowal that runs across early modern writers from Montaigne to Hobbes and Hutchinson. Bland sensibilities could remain effectively untroubled by Lucretius; more probing minds could be both stimulated and disturbed by the encounter. One of the period's greatest readers, Erasmus, risked presenting Epicureanism as very close to Christianity in his dialogue Epicureus (1533), and certainly knew Lucretius, but he never mentions him, perhaps because he considered the De rerum natura more dangerous than Epicurus's less easily accessible writings.

Such ambivalence underlay even the much-quoted praise of Lucretius by a later scholar, Isaac Casaubon, who hailed him as Latinitatis auctor optimus, thus placing him above even Virgil. He passed on this admiration to his son Meric, who wrote that he loved to recite the opening of Lucretius's second book to himself when he was out riding, and that it would be better not to translate such a great poem at all than to ruin it by a bad translation. John Evelyn, then engaged on a translation, declared himself disheartened by this; but when Casaubon wrote to him about that translation some years later, it was to censure him for misdirecting his talents on unworthy subject-matter. This ambivalence was a matter of family tradition. In 1668 Meric Casaubon denounced contemporary Epicureans and branded Lucretius as their inspiration, recalling that in a copy of the DRN that had come down to him, his father had attacked him as a minister of the devil. Isaac Casaubon's marginalia testify to his deep interest in Lucretius's philosophy and language—he had published a commentary on Diogenes Laertius and was well versed in Epicureanism—but also reveal several flashes of deep hostility; he was moved to address Lucretius as very stupid, stultissime, when denouncing his claim that the spontaneous generation of worms disproved the immortality
of the soul. For him Lucretius's greatness and his stupidity were hard to separate. Neither father nor son could sustain a stable and unproblematic distinction between the poem's form and its content, and Casaubon's rebuke to Evelyn implies that he had become tainted by the very act of translation. Lucy Hutchinson certainly considered herself so tainted; as David Butterfield's essay shows, Thomas Creech acquired notoriety from his translation.

Those translations were very belated. Translating great writers, both to broaden their audience and to provide a prop for those who read partly in the original, was a central humanist project. But nearly a century and a half elapsed between Poggio's discovery and the first translation into any vernacular. One reason for this delay could have been the formidable linguistic difficulties already discussed; both the poem's philosophical obscurity and its poetic quality were daunting. Nor is there any evidence of direct attempts to discourage translation. Nevertheless, when vernacular translations did emerge they had to apologize for themselves in very particular ways, magnifying the ambivalence already evident in the publication of Latin texts.

The chapters in this volume try to register these complexities. They do not propose an immediate reception of subversive Lucretian ideas, checked by or hidden from official censorship. They do not claim Lucretius's unique responsibility for modern atomism, secularism, or atheism, let alone modernity in general: all of these have a range of sources. But in focusing on the specific material and cultural contexts in which the De rerum natura was interpreted, they do bring out ways in which Lucretian themes and imagery percolated early modern culture, in the face of often subtle resistances. They highlight the agency of authors and readers, as opposed to contingencies and swerves, but pay attention to the constraints as well as the possibilities offered by early modern conditions of textual production and circulation. They explore aspects of the reception which have not received so much attention as atomism and natural philosophy, notably Lucretian ethics and politics; and they move from Renaissance Italy to Enlightenment Northern Europe.

Stephen Harrison begins the collection by pointing out that the question of Lucretius's subversiveness was not confined to medieval and early modern readers: the De rerum natura was read in Latin and in a way that invited new interpretation. Haggard, in his scepticism about the links between moral virtue, religious piety, eloquent speech, and political activism, all points on which he shares ground with Epicureanism, and which were to be taken up by Thomas Hobbes. As will emerge in later chapters in this volume, however, early modern humanism and republicanism was often surprisingly open to some aspects of Epicureanism. This applied even to the sensitive question of religion. As recent scholarship on early modern 'political theology' emphasizes, many humanists shared Livy's interest in the way Rome's 'civic religion' fostered her political institutions and military discipline, and Machiavelli's enthusiasm for Livy was part of a broader movement. The current interest in political theology stems in part from a critique of simplistic accounts of secularization, sometimes pushed to the point of arguing
that modern political theory is simply a secularization of Christianity. Epicureanism would clearly present a limiting case for such an argument, however; Lucretius shows no sign of approving the state religion of Rome. As Victoria Kahn has argued, Machiavelli often adopts a critical view of religious ideology that is closer to Lucretius than to Livy.

If Epicurean influence was so powerful, why then did Machiavelli not acknowledge it? Up to a point, he did. In the preface to one of his most ambitious works, the Discourses on Livy, he declared that he deliberately entreated para una vita, la quale, non essendo sata ancora da alunno trita, 'I have resolved to enter upon a path still untridden'. As Paul Rahe has pointed out, when early modern writers declared that they were doing something completely new, they generally acknowledged that they were simultaneously following someone else's tracks; Lucretius was well enough known in Machiavelli's Florence for his trita to be seen as a specific echo of Lucretius's avia Pieridum peragro loca nullius ante / trita solo, 'I traverse pathless tracts of the Pierides never trodden by any foot'. But this subtle acknowledgement was very different from Machiavelli's open following of Livy. One reason for his silence, which Brown has argued elsewhere, would be that the Lateran Council's ban on teaching the mortality of the soul in 1513, and the controversy caused by Pietro Pomponazzi's Trattato sull'immortalità dell'anima (1516), made him cautious about the association. This ban was not directly concerned with Epicurean texts: it emerged from a long debate about the central figure in the medieval academic canon, Aristotle, whose De anima was held by Averroes to show that the soul was mortal. But Lucretius's barrage of arguments against the soul's immortality in his third book, a tour de force of savage irreverence, had given a much stronger affective dimension to the debates, and had certainly been a provocation to Ficino in his defences of the soul's immortality. Concern about the De rerum natura was further indicated by a decree in Florence in 1517 against its being taught in schools. A tradition of scholarship on early modern Epicureanism and free-thinking, from Leo Strauss to Paul A. Rahe, has argued that figures from Machiavelli to Hobbes and Spinoza deliberately concealed their debts, adopting what Valentina Prosperi has termed a 'dissimulatory code'. Machiavelli's writings were after all found dangerous enough to be put on the Index of Prohibited Books as they stood.

But was dissimulation really needed? Yasmin Haskell's Chapter 4 on sixteenth-century neo-Latin poetry in Italy shows the intensity with which readers and writers engaged with Lucretius. Neo-Latin writing remains a neglected area in cultural history, but scholars like Haskell have been showing how vital and various these writings were. From the building-blocks of which we find evidence in annotations and commentaries, poets could construct new works which were deeply informed by classical texts but engaged with the discourses and debates of the contemporary Latinate republic of letters. Two of the poets she discusses, Aonio Paleario and the virtually unknown Lodovico Parisetti Junior, in different ways tried to separate the honey of Lucretian verse from the poison of its content: they addressed the Lateran Council's call for writers to refute mortalism, drawing ammunition from Ficino. Even within this shared agenda, Haskell is able to demonstrate significant variations in tone: Paleario urbanely showing off his responsiveness to Lucretius's poetic qualities; Parisetti downplaying specific allusions to the De rerum natura in his concern for a clear articulation of Christian orthodoxy. Another Lucretian imitator, Scipione Capece, had belonged to a group of Neapolitan writers who were exploring modern forms of scientific poetry and was able to deploy Lucretian language without raising any suspicions of religious unorthodoxy—his poem indeed gained warm support from successive Catholic editors. Capece and still more Paleario showed sympathies for religious reform, but these views did not surface in their Lucretian poetry. And yet the other poets she discusses, Palingenio and Bruno, were inspired by Lucretius into boldly unconventional views. Neither was by any means a programmatic Epicurean: Palingenio was warmly received in Protestant England, and Davidson and Haskell both make the point that Bruno's condemnation by the Inquisition was not for his atomism. Haskell's close readings, however, show how the influence of Lucretius's poetry might work at a more subliminal level: 'the free spirit of Lucretius breathes through Palingenius's poem at a sub-literary, almost autonomic, level'; both poets take inspiration from the transgressive images of flight above traditional limits. If one simply provides a checklist of Bruno's ideas against Epicureanism in general, the Lucretian influence may seem negligible; but, as Haskell has argued at greater length elsewhere, Bruno, as 'perhaps the first and last didactic poet since Empedocles to really do philosophy in verse', is inspired by Lucretius at the most profound levels of texture and tone. Sometimes callowly imitative, neo-Latin poetry could also be surprisingly innovative, though recognizing the difference poses real challenges for most readers today.

Haskell presents us once again with the difficulty of generalizing about the ideological constraints posed on the reading and imitation of Lucretius. Of her six writers, two were put to death on the Church's orders and a third had his body posthumously burned: a rather high attrition rate. It can be pointed out, however, that Palingenio and Paleario were suspect for Protestant rather than Epicurean heresy and that Bruno's philosophy, however deeply he was attracted to Lucretius, was not Epicurean. There was no point in writing allusive neo-Latin poetry unless one took for granted a readership that would respond favourably to works demonstrating a deep knowledge of Lucretius. Not only was Lucretius not placed on the Index, but the Jesuits developed strategies for teaching parts of the De rerum natura, recognizing its importance for any understanding of classical poetry and thought. N. S. Davidson's Chapter 5 offers another perspective on the Italian reception. Davidson has studied religious heterodoxy in early modern Italy, and the Venetian Republic, as a celebrated centre for independence of thought and a relatively free press, might have been expected to be a focus of radical speculation with a Lucretian tendency. Four early editions of the DRN were printed in Venice, and enthusiastic readers of the poem in manuscript and print form can be found in Venice. But many of these held ecclesiastical offices, and none of
them seems to have felt a religious problem in admiring Lucretius. Davidson is able to demonstrate much evidence for official concerns about challenges to the immortality of the soul or the existence or creating role of God, but he has not found any case where these were blamed on Lucretius: these views could have originated in the Aristotelian/Averroesian tradition, or, in less educated circles, from other sources of popular free-thinking. Padua, which was under Venetian control, became a major centre for scientific interest in Lucretius. The humanist Gian Vincenzo Pinelli drafted an extensive commentary which may have been intended as the basis for a new edition; Tito Giovanni Scandianese seems to have composed an Italian translation; and Girolamo Frachetta published in Venice a detailed paraphrase of the De rerum natura.

Such a readership, however, was necessarily limited to those who had a good Latin education, and who were to some degree invested in structures of secular and clerical power and patronage. The first vernacular translation of Lucretius did not appear until nearly a century and a half after Poggio’s discovery—a very pronounced time-lag. This can perhaps be explained in part by the sheer difficulty of translating Lucretius; yet an Italian translation was made as early as 1530 but never published (Chapter 2), nor was the later one by Scandianese. Frachetta thought it necessary to protect his paraphrase from potential censorship by a lengthy commentary explaining how Epicureanism deviated from the truth and from Aristotle. Writers do seem to have felt hesitant about coming forward as pioneers in this field, even if there is no evidence of direct censorship. Davidson points out that one official of the Inquisition argued that it would be absurd to ban pagan fables by Lucian, Lucretius, and the like—another example of the form/content split—but some writings by Lucian were in fact banned. Such instability, even if not openly repressive, could be disquieting. By the later seventeenth century there is clear evidence that the Inquisition could not tolerate an Italian translation that would be accessible to the plebs infima, the common people, and was trying to suppress circulation of Marolles’s French version. The lack of vernacular versions in turn helps to explain why we do not find free-thinkers from lower down the social scale appealing to the De rerum natura—they simply were not able to read it. In Italy there even seems to have been some hesitancy about publishing the De rerum natura in Latin. The 1515 edition, which appeared between the Lateran Council decree of 1513 and Pomponazzi’s work on the mortality of the soul in 1516, was the last to be printed there until 1647.

The banner of publication and scholarship passed to France, where a new generation of scholars was developing bolder methods of textual emendation, and Denys Lambin produced an edition of Lucretius that marked a high point of scholarship before Lachmann. In his preface, which was to be much reprinted in later editions and translations, Denys Lambin made a familiar split between Lucretius’s offensive, Epicurean content and his mastery as a poet. It has been argued that this was a defensive strategy, protecting the editor against his direct and sympathetic exposition of challenging views, but it raises once again the question of the relations between ideology and poetic form. In Chapter 6, Wes Williams suggests that Montaigne goes beyond Lambin in searching for a deeper engagement with the language of the poem, insisting that what is well thought will in itself produce the most powerful expression. For Montaigne, boldness of thought involves upsetting conventional literary hierarchies. The recovery of the full text of the De rerum natura had made it clear just how deeply Virgil had engaged with Lucretius, elevating the latter to the point of potentially displacing Virgil from his traditional supremacy in the poetic canon—a move which Casaubon in fact made.

Montaigne picks up a debt which Lambin had missed, identifying Lucretius’s circumfusa in a striking passage, as the ‘mother’ of Virgil’s infusus, and edges himself towards saying that the parent surpasses the child. This is indeed a passage where bold thought inspires bold language. Literally it means something like ‘you, goddess, with your sacred body poured-round from above on him as he reclines, pour out sweet words from your mouth’; but the Latin syntax intermingles the words referring to Venus and to Mars until it remains unclear whether the body referred to is that of Venus or of Mars. Circumfusa, literally ‘poured round’, can mean ‘surrounding’, and hence is often rendered as ‘embracing’; but the funde in the next line brings back the association with liquids, and the phrase has an erotic energy that precludes any precise visualization. This is the woman on top, using her sexually charged eloquence to challenge Roman military values. Of early modern translators, only Dryden fully catches the mobility of this passage, precisely by not giving a single equivalent for circumfusa:

There while thy curling limbs about him move,  
Involv’d and fetter’d in the links of Love,  
When wishing all, he nothing can deny,  
Thy Charms in that auspicious moment try[.]  
The second line, with an appropriate ambiguity, might refer to Venus as well as Mars; but the third loses Lucretius’s conclusion, bringing home just how hard the translator’s task is. It is notable that Virgil’s infusus refers to the post-coital male, not the female, in a conjugal relationship that is more conventional, if in Montaigne’s somewhat Epicurean view too passionate for a successful marriage. Without spelling out such implications, Montaigne exemplifies a mode of intensely engaged reading that will bring readers beyond scholastic and humanist commonplace.

Williams writes that this quotation from Lucretius, out of many in the Essays, is both ‘untypical and exemplary’, and these terms are useful for some more general questions. Montaigne, like Machiavelli, is an untypical reader of Lucretius in the intensity and intelligence of his engagement: as Williams puts it, he refuses to erect a cordon sanitaire between fine thoughts and dangerous ideas. It is significant that he quotes from the De rerum natura most frequently in discussing the sensitive topics of sexuality, religion, the soul, and social inequality. The history of his reading of Lucretius, like Machiavelli’s, is shadowed by the particularly problematic nature of the De rerum natura. His heavily annotated copy came to light only recently, because his name had been overwritten by a later owner who was
fearful of being compromised by his liberal views on witch-hunting.

Montaigne’s generous quotations made a substantial portion of Lucretius’s poem available; but these were still in Latin, without translation. When John Florio published his English version, directed specifically at a female audience, he did translate the quotations, and a further step towards vernacular diffusion was taken. It was not until 1650, however, that the poem broke through the cordon sanitaire of Latin, with the translation by Michel de Marolles, which heralded a series of versions in English. As we shall see in several chapters, this move towards the vernacular involved a complex dance of forward and backward steps, with greater openness towards Lucretius countered by protestations of distance and disengagement. Marolles’s task had been made easier by the appearance in 1649 of Pierre Gassendi’s influential Animadversiones on Diogenes Laertius’s life of Epicurus. Thanks to the inclusion of later Epicurean texts, including very large portions of the De rerum natura, and his own lengthy and discursive commentaries, Gassendi managed to swell the few surviving texts by Epicurus into a three-volume compendium which claimed for itself the dignity of an august philosophical system. Yet though Gassendi claimed to have removed the thorns from the rose of the Epicurean system, Marolles’s translation, as Cottegnies shows in Chapter 7, reveals continuing uncertainties. On one level, this was a clear and direct version, not shunning erotic matter that troubled many contemporary translators. As was so often the fate of translations, however, the paratextual materials underwent revisions as the translator engaged with the contradictory impulses to gain the maximum publicity for a controversial work and to distance himself from allegations of subversion. The process is illustrated by the continuation of the form/content split in Marolles’s pointed title Le Poète Lucrèce; by his quotations from Lambinus’s preface; by the dedication to Queen Christina, apparently included in some but not all copies and either failing to reach her or meeting her disapproval; and by Marolles’s appeal to Gassendi in his second edition, further to remove the thorn from the rose. Cottegnies finds a comparable ambivalence, indeed something close to schizophrenia, in the public presentation of the first English translation, by John Evelyn. The intellectual links between Paris and London were especially close with so many royalists in French exile, but these links could be problematic. The piety of Gassendi and Evelyn was not in question, and if Montaigne had proclaimed no less than ten times in his annotations that Lucretius was writing ‘contre la religion’, the purified Epicureanism now on offer made it easier to translate his religio as merely ‘superstition’. There remained, however, a lurking embarrassment in the figure of Thomas Hobbes, who, like Machiavelli and Montaigne, engaged intensely if obliquely with Lucretius, and whose notoriety as an ‘atheist’, however defined, led to anxious distancing.

One might also mention Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle, whose heterodoxy on religious matters combined with her gender made an explosive combination. Translation from the Latin, Cottegnies reminds us, made previously restricted texts available to women, and if Christina seems to have held back from proclaiming public interest in Marolles’s version, Evelyn’s wife Mary carefully studied his title-page when preparing a design for the English translation. Disavowal very often accompanied influence, however: John Evelyn never mentions Marolles, he left the remaining books of his translation unpublished, and when many years later he published a commendatory poem to Creech’s translation, he gave the misleading impression that he had got no further than the first book. Another woman writer, Lucy Hutchinson, expressed scorn for John and Mary Evelyn for having published at all, and kept her version in manuscript; there was a kind of schizophrenia in her own fierce rejection of Lucretius himself as well as her own translation in her dedicatory letter of 1675. When Aphra Behn, another figure vulnerable to charges of atheism, celebrated Thomas Creech as a bold emancipator who had helped women become equal to men through his translation, she seems to have been quite unaware of earlier women’s interest in Lucretius.

William Poole’s Chapter 8 explores a further controversial aspect of the De rerum natura. As Brown’s Chapter 3 showed, Machiavelli had been struck by Lucretius’s challenge to early modern hierarchies in one particularly fundamental way, in undercutting the biblical maxim that God had given humans dominion over animals. On the title-page of his edition, Creech shockingly portrayed the birth of animals and human beings from the Earth. As Poole shows, generation of animals from the earth might in some cases seem compatible with Christian belief, but the authoritative Genesis narrative seemed to leave no doubt of God’s direct creation of Adam and Eve. By the mid-seventeenth century, however, Hobbes and others were popularizing radically heterodox interpretations of scripture, and Isaac de la Peyrère had produced a reading of Genesis that squared with Lucretius; Marolles, Poole points out, was interested in this convergence. We need not, however, place such readings on any direct high road to modern atheism: Lucretius’s semina might be read as vital spirits rather than lifeless atoms, and attempts were being made to synthesize seemingly incompatible scientific models. Milton felt confident enough to play with Lucretian analogies in Paradise Lost.

Creech’s title-page also displays the inscription CASUS, ‘chance’. He thus heightens what for some contemporaries seemed the most absurd element of the whole Epicurean system: that the universe could have come together through a random play of atoms. A long chain of classical and Christian polemists had ridiculed the idea of a universe without intelligent design. As Nicholas Hardy shows in Chapter 9, however, Creech’s translation in fact acknowledges that there is an order in Lucretius’s system, and this recognition was widespread amongst seventeenth-century readers. Indeed, translators like Evelyn, Hutchinson, and Creech sometimes exaggerated the non-aleatory elements in Lucretius. Hardy shows, however, that even more recent translators have often simplified ambivalences in Lucretius’s provisional, metaphorical language in their concern to make his poem fit a general philosophical paradigm. As Gassendi had proposed, early modern natural theologians, keen to reconcile Christianity with the
most advanced forms of contemporary science, but no longer accepting the traditional teleological language of Aristotelian natural philosophy, could find an ally in Lucretius.

Political theorists also turned to Epicureanism as older discourses seemed inadequate to modernity. The mid-seventeenth-century English revolution was an important part of Pocock’s ‘Machiavellian Moment’, but as we can now see, Machiavellianism could come with a strong Lucretian inflection. As in the sphere of natural theology, Lucretius could, however, be open to strongly divergent interpretations. Norbrook’s Chapter 10 on readers of the fifth book of the De rerum natura shows that it could appeal across the political spectrum. Polemics often made a direct link between Lucretius and Hobbes, and indeed some modern commentators would agree that Epicureanism provided Hobbes with a crucial stepping-stone towards his self-consciously ‘modern’ political philosophy. There were, nonetheless, crucial differences, notably in Hobbes’s denial of the realm of freedom permitted by Lucretius’s swerve. One parallel that struck contemporaries was a common atheism and irreligion—though both writers have found interpreters who point to evidence for their belief in gods or the Christian God. Norbrook argues that a close reading of the De rerum natura leaves the status of Lucretius’s gods highly problematic, and this makes it all the more remarkable that he should have been translated by the fiercely puritan Lucy Hutchinson. However, his boldly secular narrative of the emergence of a state without any divine intervention or priestly aid could appeal to the broad alliance of anticlerical Erastians, keen to claw back state authority from the presumptions of the clergy, that fuelled the English Revolution.

Norbrook argues, however, that the heightened attention to the De rerum natura produced by Gassendi’s commentaries and new vernacular translations also allowed contemporaries to understand significant differences between Hobbes and Lucretius. Hutchinson had a clear understanding of Epicurus’s ethical and political severity, as opposed to the caricature of the licentious ‘Epicure’. The later translator Thomas Creech, borrowing from contemporary poets, was ready to play up the caricature. He also slanted the political emphasis in a Hobbesian direction, downplaying ethical freedom, in a way Machiavelli had not done, and heightening the fear of anarchy that drives the people into submission to their sovereign. Ambivalence is again apparent. Hutchinson by 1675 was sharply condemning her own translation, in the face of a new wave of libertine Restoration ‘Epicureans’, and of a renewed Anglican political theology; yet she took enough pride in her version to have a new copy made. Conversely, Creech may have been closer to his Hobbesian Lucretius than he was willing to acknowledge, and certainly knew that he would draw in readers—his edition sold very well; but he offered them safety by presenting himself as the shocked critic of these outrageous doctrines. Unlike Marolles’s Le Poëte Lucrèce, however, his title of The Epicurean Philosopher did not encourage readers to distance themselves from Lucretius’s doctrines.

Catherine Wilson’s Chapter 11 traces the continuing influence of the De rerum natura on political theory from the mid-seventeenth century through to the Enlightenment—an influence, she argues, which has still not been fully recognized. (There is very little about Epicureanism, for example, in Jonathan Israel’s Spinoza-centred studies of the Enlightenment and its origins.) While acknowledging crucial differences between Hobbes and Lucretius on the state of nature, she finds in Hobbes and his slightly later contemporary Samuel Pufendorf a radical nominalism or ‘fictionalism’ that deviates from the traditions of political theory and has a clear Epicurean basis. Wilson shows that these philosophers’ foundation of ethics in some form of self-interest rather than in religion or in civic virtue generated an intense debate about benevolence and the social order, and the precise extent to which Epicureanism itself legitimized mere self-interest. Turning to the fifth book, she traces the resonance of Lucretius’s unusual vision of the development of civilization down to Rousseau and Enlightenment debates about inequality. In certain inflections, the Epicurean legacy can legitimize a dark and competitive vision of human nature; in others, it reveals a utopian, pacifist, and egalitarian strand.

This is a story that can indeed be traced down to the materialism of Karl Marx. The young Marx wrote a doctoral thesis on atomism and took many notes on the De rerum natura. He responded to the opening lines as intensely as Montaigne, identifying Lucretius, the ‘fresh, keen, poetic master of the world’, with the Venus of his opening passage, melting pious conventions away—as opposed to the frigid commentators like Plutarch and Gassendi who rebuked or reformed him. He read the fifth book carefully in his career and it returned to his attention in his last years when studying the ethnography of Lewis Henry Morgan. When he wrote that the ‘new forces of production and relations of production do not develop out of nothing, nor drop from the sky’, he was alluding to, and presumably expecting his readers to recognize, two different passages in Lucretius: the claim that nothing can originate from nothing and the satirical jab at those who believe animals could have fallen from the sky. Though this form of words long became a cliché, in the claim that ideas do not fall from the sky, it is probable that few of its later users knew the Lucretian origin. That fact perhaps indicates that Marx stands at the end of a particular tradition of Lucretian reception: this materialism may seem too crude, too deterministic, for those more interested in swerves and indeterminacy. But swerves were never the whole story.

As Strauss and his followers always insisted, nineteenth-century historical materialism is a long way from ancient Epicureanism, with its modest goals for human change and prudential acceptance of a state religion. And yet Lucretius’s visionary imagination and irreverent wit could form a bridge between them; and one of the fascinating aspects of the early modern reception of Lucretius is its pivotal position. We should not expect early modern readers to have responded exactly as we do, but nor should we restrict the range of possible responses; some found the poem troubling, some exhilarating, some merely an enrichment of poetic diction. The best readers looked
back, and imagined alternative futures, with a passion and eloquence that resonate today. <>

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