Washing the Brain - Metaphor and Hidden Ideology by Andrew Goatly (Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture: John Benjamins Publishing) What is meant by the notoriously vague term 'ideology'? Defining this could take a whole book, so Goatly provisionally adopts van Dijk's definition and description in Ideology: "the basis of the social representations shared by members of a group. This means that ideologies allow people, as group members, to organise the multitude of social beliefs about what is the case, good or bad, right or wrong, for them and to act accordingly.” One major determinant of these social representations will be "the material and symbolic interests of the group ... power over other groups (or resistance against the domination by other groups) may have a central role and hence function as a major condition and purpose for the development of ideologies". This emphasis on power is central to my use of the term, and, for brevity's sake one might adopt Thompson's definition "meaning in the service of power".
This notion of ideology has something in common with the classical Marxist definition, which sees ideology as "false-consciousness", a misleading representation, the superstructure overlaying and distorting a material reality and the development of the Marxist concept of ideology into the theory of hegemony: instead of an overt imposition of an ideology by the ruling class, hegemony manages the mind in covert ways to construct a consensus about the social order which benefits those in power. Hegemony depends upon the naturalization of ideology as common-sense, and thereby makes ideology latent or hidden.
However, Goatly does not believe in the possibility of
non-ideological thought. To some extent, all consciousness is
false-consciousness. Ideology is not, like halitosis, just something
that the other person has. It is, in fact, often as unnoticeable and
ubiquitous as the air we breathe. After all, we are all members of a
community and share the thoughts and language that make action
within that community or society possible.
Though ideology is ubiquitous in thought, some ideologies or ways of understanding the world may be more useful than others. Even the same ideology may simultaneously have useful and harmful effects. It is helpful, therefore, to see ideology as simultaneously "empowering, useful and adaptive on the one hand, and disempowering, distorting and maladaptive on the other.” In principle, therefore, one ought to adopt an ambivalent attitude to ideology in general and even to particular ideologies.
Some approaches to ideological analysis, such as Foucault's, have downplayed the cognitive element. But ideology is in your head as well as in discourse. "It arises out of cognitive mechanisms as well as out of technology and social practices.” Van Dijk's definition places emphasis on both the social and cognitive aspects of ideology, and their manifestation in or construction by discourse.
By one of the intricacies of word-formation and subsequent
semantic drift, washing the brain does not mean quite the same as
brainwashing. Though the latter may have originally stressed the
removal of existing patterns of thought in order to introduce new
ones, it now tends to mean the inculcation of propaganda. Washing
the brain, by contrast, suggests the possibility of removing harmful
ways of thinking. The paradox is, of course, that the metaphorical
pattern that this title exploits has itself been recruited in the
cause of harmful ideologies, such as ethnic cleansing and other
drives towards racial or mental purity.
This book draws on two traditions which have, until recently, remained pure and unadulterated by each other, but which have been the focus of my research interests over the years. It is an attempt at cross-fertilization between cognitive linguistic (CL) accounts of metaphor, and critical discourse analysis (CDA), what has been called "Critical Metaphor Analysis". It demonstrates the importance of metaphorical patterns in the vocabulary and grammar of English for representing and shaping ideologies and social practices. To do so it relates metaphorical patterns or "themes" to a wide range of aspects of contemporary life, including medical practice, adversarial legal systems, time and motion studies, the politics behind 9/11 and the New Right, racism, urbanization, defense spending, commoditization and privatization, sexual exploitation, educational philosophy and practice, biological and mechanistic theories of "human nature", and our present ecological crises. It engages with the current debate over the relative importance of biology and culture, a debate partly dependent upon or reinforced by metaphorical themes, and traces the ideologies expressed by metaphorical themes back to a tradition which includes Hobbes, Newton, Hume, Adam Smith, Malthus and Darwin.
Cognitive linguistic accounts of metaphor, beginning with Metaphors We Live By (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), are associated with scholars such as George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Mark Muller, Eve Sweetser, Raymond Gibbs, Gerard Steen, Zoltan Kövecses, Gunther Radden and Antonio Barcelona. The Critical Metaphor Analysis tradition comprises work by, among others, Roger Fowler, Tony Trew, Gunther Kress, Jay Lemke, Norman Fairdough, Ron Carter, Michael Toolan, Teun Van Dijk, Ruth Wodak, and Paul Chilton. The aim of Critical Metaphor Analysis is "to investigate critically social inequality, as it is expressed, signaled, constituted, legitimized and so on by language use" (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 2). Critical Metaphor Analysis purpose, therefore, is to investigate and uncover ideology, in so far as it is expressed and influenced by language and discourse.
More recently these two traditions have begun to come together. Hiraga (1991), Chilton (1996), Lakoff (1996), Balkin (1998), Jones (2000), Stockwell (2000), Musolff (2004) and Charteris-Black (2005), among others, have begun to seriously explore the ideological effects of metaphor. Stockwell's chapter is particularly interesting in opening up possibilities for alignment, demonstrating the similarities in Fairclough's and Lakoff's analysis of Gulf War discourse, and pointing out various commonalities between the two traditions: both are anti-objectivist, believing that discourse/metaphor construct or confer a reality or folk model rather than simply describing it; Fairclough's notion of "Members Resources" is a cognitive notion, and relies on scripts, frames and schemata, which are more or less the same as CUs Idealised Cognitive Models (ICMs); and Stockwell quotes Fairclough's recognition of the importance of choice of one metaphor rather than another as a symptom of ideology. Nevertheless he stresses that, for the most part, the CL tradition sees metaphor as a function of (universal) embodiment rather than (historical) ideology. So, although within cognitive linguistic Kövecses (2005) has recently emphasized the importance of culture to metaphorical patterns of vocabulary, he does not stress the centrality of ideology to culture.
An extremely important book, Balkin's Cultural Software, provides a theoretical basis for the intersection of Critical Metaphor Analysis and cognitive linguistics. Balkin regards metaphor as a cognitive mechanism of ideology, which will produce ideological effects (1998: 112-3, 243-8). He stresses the need for the cognitive and psychological to be taken into account in discourse and ideological analysis (p. 186). In addition, taking up the Critical Metaphor Analysis mission, he argues that ideological analysis does not end with a demonstration that a particular belief or symbolic form is partly or wholly false or distorted. It must ask how this falsity or distortion might create or sustain unjust social conditions or unjust relations of social power.
The present book continues the attempt to combine the Critical Metaphor Analysis tradition with the cognitive linguistic tradition. It addresses the agenda set by Peter Jones (2000: 243) "such CL methods, insightfully applied to the internal semantic resources of ideological discourse, could usefully augment and concretize the Marxist analysis of ideologies in terms of historically specific external relations between conceptualizations (social consciousness) and social practice (social being)". It stresses the common ground between the two approaches — that language is not some transparent medium through which we think, but that it shapes our thoughts and practices. So the conventional metaphors in the discourses of race, sex, politics, defense, economics, environment, and so on, tend to determine our ways of thinking/consciousness and acting/practice in these social spheres.
The metaphor themes discussed in this book are, of course, selectively taken from Metalude, and perhaps paint an unduly pessimistic view of the effects of metaphor on social life. If metaphor is a form of bricolage, taking something which happens to be at hand to perform a task for which it was not originally designed, it may be inadequate to that present task, and though useful, also distorting (Balkin 1998). Metaphor as a mechanism of ideology is therefore ambivalent. For example, in chapter two we look at the DISEASE IS INVASION metaphor, and show how the tradition of regarding diseases as invaders who have to be killed has become dominant, but, is rather unhelpful in certain areas of medicine like auto-immune diseases. Nevertheless, it would be hard to deny that the eradication and control of disease through antibiotics, dependent upon this traditional metaphor, has had positive effects on health. Goatly analyses the favorite metaphors of capitalism, metaphors of competition and war, quality as quantity, and quality as wealth. However, it would be perverse to deny that the capitalist enterprise has, in the past, unlocked human potential for invention and motivated technological advances, many examples of which are conducive to an improvement in human well-being. In both these examples, it may be that once useful metaphors have, in a new cultural ecology, partially outlived their usefulness: growth is, for example, maladaptive for mature economies.
Goatly could have written another book about positive metaphor themes, though it would have been shorter. There are a number of alternative metaphors which represent humans, not only as competitive animals, but as involved in productive and co-operative relationships: social organisations as buildings or as the human body, and relationships as music. However, Goatly has selected the themes by way of warning. The world faces a number of pressing crises - environmental problems, economic unsustainability and exploitation, poverty, racism, disease and so on - to which neo- conservative thinking, dependent upon the metaphorical patterns themes Goatly analyses, seems to have no answer. If this book can make a tiny contribution to raising awareness of the dangers of acting out these metaphors it may be modestly successful.
What this book attempts to do is, in fact, rather modest.
It presents little empirical psychological evidence, though perhaps
more sociological evidence, for the suggestions it makes about the
influence of metaphorical patterns on thought and practice. All it
probably succeeds in doing is to be suggestive. Of course, obtaining
psychological and empirical sociological evidence for metaphoric
effects on behavior would be a very time-consuming task One could
for example follow up the claim that metaphors of sex as violence
encourage rape by collecting data from convicted rapists and from a
control group of the male population to ascertain whether the first
group was more likely to use these violent metaphors for sex. Then
one would have some hard evidence of whether ways of speaking
metaphorically correlate with social action or practice. In which
case they perhaps (re)-produce social practices.
Specifically, this book attempts two things. First, it suggests that the metaphorical patterns observable in the lexicon of English have widespread effects on the concepts which drive our social practices and which reinforce social patterns of inequality, injustice and environmental exploitation within our present capitalist economies. Second, Goatly addresses the more theoretical question of the extent to which the metaphorical patterns to be found in the lexicon have their origins in (universal) bodily experiences, and the extent to which they are cultural and ideological constructs.
Goatly introduces terminology for and background in cognitive approaches to metaphor and critical discourse analysis, and explains the nature of the database that provides the lexical evidence for this study.
Goatly explores some salient metaphorical patterns with consequences for power relations, such as height, centrality, speed, fighting, violence for sex, linear and divisible space for time, color for race, and gives evidence of their effects on architecture, medicine, race (and racing), transportation, military spending, and industrial working practices.
Goatly shifts the emphasis to mechanical and commodity metaphors for humans and society (and other natural objects), in their relation to sexual, industrial, and economic practices. It considers the treatment of women as food and workers as machines, the invisible (clock) hand of the market driving capitalist economies, and the development of bioengineering, as well as the patenting of genes, the sale of body-parts, and privatization, which reinforce structures of inequality and the equation of quality with quantifiable measures such as money.
Goatly explores natural metaphors for humans, either as landscape, weather or animals, discussing the question of whether humans are literally or only metaphorically animals, and whether aggression or co-operation constitute their defining characteristics or similarities. As a snapshot of the current ideological positions at the start of the 21st century, it critiques Gaia theory with its principles of symbiosis, co-operation and interdependence, theories in socio-biology, right-wing theories emphasizing property / trade as distinctively human, and reconstructionist theories idealistically emphasizing humans' use of symbols, language and cultural institutions which distinguish them from animals. It points out the relevance to these positions of metaphors such as disease for ideas, fighting for activity, calculation for thought, and money / wealth for relationship.
Goatly is concerned with the ways in which metaphorical patterns interrelate: the use of identical metaphors for different topics to merge concepts (e.g. good is high and more is high, so more is good, with its consequences for over-consumption and obesity); the use of different metaphors for the topics of emotion and education, leading to different educational practices; conflicts between the positively evaluated metaphor themes, relationship as proximity / cohesion versus freedom as space to move, and their consequences for family life, birth rates and cold-war discourse; and complex interactions involving similarity as proximity, category as divided space, impurity as mixing, disease as invasion and its reversal, as recruited in anti-immigrant discourse.
Goatly questions to what extent our thinking and ideology is determined by our bodies and the metaphors which they give rise to, and what variation we have in the metaphor themes across languages and cultures, two questions that are linked since bodily experience is assumed to be universal. Beginning with the best candidate for universality through bodily experience, that is metaphors for emotions, it explores Damasio's recent theory of their intimate relationship with bodily responses, and cites scientific and linguistic evidence to build on Kövecses' work on specific physiological responses underlying metaphor patterns. However it summarizes some of the important cultural variations based on the metonymies of physical responses, showing the effect of culture and ideology on emotion metaphor. Widening the scope of the argument to metaphorical patterns in general, by examining Grady's work on primary metaphors, and comparing his data with Metalude, it reveals that a considerable number of metaphor themes lack a bodily experiential correlation as their basis, suggesting non-universality, and concludes that the experiential hypothesis may be a form of reductionism, a hypothesis already challenged by the idea of the body as historical and cultural as well as biological.
Goatly moves from vocabulary to grammar to consider the influence that typical clauses and "grammatical metaphors" have on our thinking and ideology. It demonstrates how literal grammar imposes the rigid distinction between nouns and verbs and between things and processes, and how it structures the relationships between subjects, verbs and objects to build a Newtonian model of our experience. This model is out of step with modern scientific thinking about our physical and biological environment, and dangerous in its implications about human domination of nature - as exemplified in the environmental degradation caused by the civil engineering mega-projects described in Josephson's Industrialized Nature. By contrast "grammatical metaphors", which deviate from the typical clause structure, construct a worldview more sympathetic to the findings of modern physics and to ecology. But an alternative worldview is achieved even more radically by the North American language, Blackfoot. Grammatical differences in the representation of possession are also shown to have ideological consequences, as have languages spread throughout Europe in step with the advances in capitalism.
Goatly traces the ideological tradition of Hobbes, Hume,
Adam Smith, Malthus and Darwin, pointing out the ways they select,
exploit and reinforce many of the metaphorical patterns already
discussed and which are the basis for New Right thinking, and a
resurgent sociobiology and eugenics. It simultaneously demonstrates,
through selective critiques by Tawney and Weber, how the ideological
tradition of Protestant capitalism broke with an earlier ideology
and its metaphors. By way of summary of the contemporary dominance
of neo-con ideology it critiques Lakoff's analysis of left-wing and
conservative US political ideologies in his book Moral Politics. It
concludes that these metaphor patterns are no longer ideologically
neutral and universal but have undergone a process of cultural
selection and reinforcement to produce and construct the dominant
value system. Moreover, naïve universalist cognitive metaphor theory
could be a kind of reductionism to biology, and yet theological,
especially Hegelian, doctrines of incarnation proclaim that
absolute embodiment, far from entailing reduction, is the
realization, fulfillment and perfection of an otherwise vacuous
truth. Nevertheless we should be aware of the reductionist and
misleading tendencies of metaphor itself, as well as its theories,
as conveyors of partial knowledge.
The question of categorization raised earlier in our discussion of Bourdieu. To start with Goatly acknowledges that the major metaphor for categories is a divided area.
This is apparent from the lexis in Metalude where divide
means 'to distinguish as belonging to separate categories' (how can
we divide the middle class from the working class?), to place is to
'categorize in a particular class or group' (the law places road
rage in the same category as wife-beating), separate means 'to
consider independently as belonging to different categories' (you
can't separate technology from morality), pigeon-hole means
'categorize' (he can't be pigeonholed as a jazz musician), bifurcate
The results of dividing are the categories or sub-categories which are divided spaces of various kinds: segment 'subcategory' (a segment of the population of the US lives in dire poverty), sector 'subcategory of an economy or large group' (the poorest sectors of the population are immigrants), subdivision 'division of a category into smaller categories' (there is a subdivision of speech sounds into vowels and consonants), part 'sub-category' (spiders are not part of the insect family), compartment 'category' (he keeps his studies and his religious beliefs in separate compartments), demarcation 'separate categorization' (in some English departments there is little demarcation between Literature and Film).
The last of these examples introduces the idea of a boundary, a line which separates spaces and therefore categories: boundary, dividing line 'distinction between two types of thing' (the boundary between medicine and superstition is sometimes unclear), or between the category of what is known and what is not known as in frontier 'limit of knowledge, (he has extended the frontiers of particle physics).
When categorization is difficult then the dividing line is not clear: it may be blurred, smudged 'not clearly differentiated or categorized' (the line between advertising and press reporting is becoming badly smudged / blurred), a grey area 'situation difficult to categories where the rules are uncertain' (surrogate motherhood is a legal grey area), or so thin it is difficult to detect - a fine line 'distinction that's difficult to make' (there's a fine line between paedophilia and natural attraction to children). Alternatively, the thing to be categorized may fall on the borderline 'in or between subjects' (medicine is on the borderline of zoology and psychology).
Category distinctions can be ignored or disappear in various ways and to various extents. The categories may overlap 'be partly the same' (the areas of interest in the two organizations overlap but are not identical). Another topic or text may fit into two categories, straddle 'combine two different topics' (the study of metaphor straddles linguistics and psychology). If one category includes another it will colonize 'take over another subject area' (literary studies has been colonized by feminism). Alternatively various categories may be subsumed into a larger more general category which covers them as in cover-term 'general term of classification' ( `vehicle' is a cover term for cars, lorries, bikes etc), or umbrella, blanket 'applying generally' (cat' is also an umbrella / blanket term for tigers, lions etc). These general classifications or inclusions are overarching `including or affecting every type of area, person or thing' (the overarching principle in all government policy is to make education a priority). Otherwise a more general term can be seen as a large bag with several compartments - portmanteau 'covering a wide range of items, usually for a single purpose' (it was kind of portmanteau bill, covering everything from fighter planes to army supplies).
Following Benveniste, Bourdieu enjoys delving into the etymology of such categorical divisions. He identifies the power to categorise with the power of the king, by analogy with the delimitation of territory over which the king has control, using the etymology of the cognate vocabulary regio (`region'), rex (`king'), regere fines (`to rule straight lines or national boundaries'), diacrisis, (decree'). He also connects this with language and discourse through auctor (`author') and auctoritas (`authority').
The etymology of the word region (regio), as described by Emile Benveniste, leads to the source of the di-vision: a magical and thus essentially social act of diacrisis which introduces by decree a decisive discontinuity in natural continuity (between the regions of space but also between ages, sexes, etc.). Regere fines, the act which consists in "tracing out the limits by straight lines", in delimiting "the interior and the exterior, the realm of the sacred and the realm of the profane, the national territory and the foreign territory", is a religious act performed by the person invested with the highest authority, the rex, whose responsibility is to regere sacra, to fix the rules which bring into existence what they decree, to speak with authority, to predict, in the sense of calling into being, by an enforceable saying, what one says, of making the future that one utters come into being. The regio and its frontiers (fines) are merely the dead trace of the act of authority which consists in circumscribing the country, the territory (which is also called fines), in imposing the legitimate, known and recognised definition (another sense of finis) of frontiers and territory - in short the source of legitimate division of the social world. This rightful act, consisting in asserting with authority a truth which has the force of law, is an act of cognition which, being based, like all symbolic power, on recognition, brings into existence what it asserts (auctoritas, as Benveniste again reminds us, is the capacity to produce what is granted to the auctor). Even when he merely states with authority what is already the case, even when he contents himself with asserting what is, the auctor produces a change in what is: by virtue of the fact that he states things with authority, that is, in front of and in the name of everyone, publicly and officially, he saves them from their arbitrary nature, he sanctions them, sanctifies them, consecrates them, making them worthy of existing, in conformity with the nature of things, and thus "natural".
The point is that the authority, the arbiter, is the one with the power to make categorizations and assign to social roles. Kategorein originally meant 'to accuse publicly, to be told what you are and so "social essence is the set of those social attributes and attributions produced by the act of institution as a solemn act of categorization which tends to produce what it designates" . Though distinctions and categorizations often give the appearance of being based on objective differences, in fact, especially in the case of categorizing social classes, we are dealing with continua, and different critical features used for classification will give us different categories, since these features seldom cluster congruently. In education, of course the continuum of marks has to be divided by the arbiter to separate the lowest pass mark from the highest failing mark.
For Bourdieu social and political struggle is a "struggle over the power of preserving or transforming the social world by preserving or transforming the categories of perception of that world.” "Science is inevitably involved in this struggle and agents wield a power which is proportional to their symbolic capital, that is, to the recognition they receive from the group".
Both Lakoff and Bourdieu are looking for a middle way between Objectivism and Subjectivism. As the latter puts it this middle way is "that 'reality' which is the site of a permanent struggle to define 'reality'", a struggle between an objectivism which ignores how representations evoke a reality, and a subjectivism which states there is no reality apart from representation. One can, perhaps propose some such framework as follows. There exists a real world, but we have no direct "real" knowledge of it, since that knowledge is produced discoursally and linguistically through conventionalized metaphors, some of which are so conventionalized we call them literal. Knowledge of the world is mediated through perception, cognition and language / discourse. However, meaning and cognition certainly is grounded in our interaction with a real world and we do experience this real world, especially through the material consequences of our actions. Although we have no direct knowledge of this world, we develop those metaphorical models and categories which are positively adaptive to our environment, both physical, and, hopefully, social, too. They are tested against experience, through feedback, and if the models and categories are more or less true they promote our physical and social survival and well-being. If these models are wrong we become sick, endangered, or fail to survive. These models, perceptual, linguistic and discoursal, are crucially dependent on the dominant metaphors or semantic categories which we absorb with our first language. And part of the purpose of this book is to raise the possibility that some of these widespread and unchallenged metaphorical themes or models are not conducive to the future survival and well-being of the human race: a lot of negative feedback is coming our way.
In this chapter we have considered three different kinds of
metaphor theme interaction: multivalency, where sources are shared,
diversification where targets are shared, and evaluative opposition.
At the beginning of the chapter we showed how multivalency can lead
to association between different targets so that GOOD IS HIGH and
MORE IS HIGH taken together suggest MORE = GOOD, which reinforces
patterns of excessive wealth accumulation and consumption as part of
the Protestant capitalist ethic, despite the objections that Small
is Beautiful. We also explored how CHANGE IS MOVEMENT and
DEVELOPMENT / SUCCESS IS MOVEMENT FORWARD might suggest that CHANGE
=DEVELOPMENT / SUCCESS, again an increasingly doubtful and
contentious suggestion, though one which the technologically driven
retail economies of the West have espoused in the cause of selling
the latest and most fashionable consumer products. Goatly also
considers the evaluative oppositions FREEDOM IS SPACE TO MOVE
(PURPOSE IS DIRECTION) V. RELATIONSHIP IS PROXIMITY / COHESION and
CERTAINTY / RELIABILITY
Goatly then exemplifies two kinds of diversification.
Emotion, constructed in opposition to the certainty / solidity of
facts, is diversely structured as movement, liquid, and weather, all
sources sharing grounds of uncontrollability, passivity of the
experiences, and brevity. Diverse metaphor themes for education,
unlike emotion, were quite varied in their grounds, either
undermining attempts at educational reform, through lexis such as
giving, provision, balanced curriculum, according to an ideology
that sees knowledge as a commodity, or encouraging it through lexis
such as exploration, and construction, where the latter metaphors
seem to be reducing the power and control of the educational
authorities over the educational process and giving more freedom to
Goatly also considers a complex nexus of metaphorical interactions implicated in racism: RELATIONSHIP IS PROXIMITY, SIMILARITY IS PROXIMITY, CATEGORY IS DIVIDED AREA, SOCIAL ORGANISATION IS A BUILDING, SOCIAL ORGANISATION IS A BODY, RACE IS
COLOR, IDEA IS DISEASE, DISEASE IS INVASION - a nexus which suggests that the ideal state is one where the inhabitants are the same color, and constructs immigrants as invaders, or a disease, or as bearing dangerous ideologies.
The first part of this study concentrates on the exploration of how metaphor themes are associated with various aspects of contemporary social life. The second part becomes more theoretical and philosophical in nature. In this section Goatly addresses the question, first introduced indirectly earlier, of the relative importance of bodily experience and culture in the patterns and networks of metaphors in the lexicon of contemporary English. Next Goatly considers much of the persuasive evidence that metaphors for emotions are grounded in bodily experience, showing how these are culturally modified to some extent at more specific levels, though even this bodily experience may be to some extent culturally relative. Then Goatly takes up grammar as a perspective on that shows that the most frequently occurring grammatical structures in English, if not most European languages, and those first acquired in childhood, structure the world, and humans' interactions with their environment in ways which are both out of step with modern scientific theories, and potentially destructive. "Grammatical metaphors" of various types may go some way to reconceptualizing in the direction of a more helpful grammar. However, a radically different grammar and worldview, such as that of the Algonquin language Blackfoot, could be even more helpful. Next Goatly attempts to show that various metaphor themes of competition and conflict, quantification, money and commoditization have been created, exploited and nurtured from the early capitalist period onwards, as manifest in the philosophical writings of Hobbes, Hume, Smith, Malthus and Darwin. It concludes with a discussion of the theological concept of incarnation and locates this within a discussion not only of Lakoffian theories of experientialism but also of metaphorical reductionism.
As my arguments about the issue of the experiential hypothesis and metaphoric universals are quite subtle and extend over these three chapters it is desirable at this point to chart the course of the argument in advance. Goatly presents considerable evidence that identical metaphorical patterns are extremely widespread across different languages, if not universal, particularly those in which there is an intimate relationship between what is being conceptualized and bodily experience. The most obvious case is in conceptualizing emotion, since emotion is very often defined in terms of disturbance to bodily equilibrium, or is manifest in changes to the body. The strong correlation between emotion and the bodily experience and perception of the body gives a real-world or metonymic basis, which can be elaborated metaphorically. Even here, we find that different languages, though they may share metaphorical patterns at the general level, differ in the particular lexis used to instantiate the general pattern.
Moreover, we have to take account of the fact that the body and bodily experience are affected by culture, so the fact that bodily experience gives an experiential basis for metaphors does not entail that that all kinds of bodily experience are universal.
Furthermore, even at the less specific level there are "exotic" languages such as Blackfoot where even the most general cognitive patterns do not seem to apply, such as the distinction between objects and processes caused by or acting on those objects. The result is that the Event Structure schema, which might seem, from the point of view of Western languages, a candidate for universal general metaphorical patterns (CAUSE IS FORCE, CHANGE IS MOVEMENT, ACTIVITY / PROCESS IS MOVEMENT FORWARD, DIFFICULTY IS OBSTACLE etc. etc.) may not apply to all languages. In other words the paradigm metaphor of activity — that independently existing objects exert a force on other independently existing objects to move them — is not a universal metaphor for actions or events. In addition, ideology has effects on the metaphorical patterns to be observed in the dictionary. The ideology may invent the metaphorical equation, as in TIME IS MONEY / COMMODITY or DISEASE IS INVASION. Or it may recruit existing metaphors and encourage, develop and elaborate them, as when ACTIVITY IS MOVEMENT FORWARD 1S elaborated, through the ideology of competition into the idea that activity is a competitive race, either against others or against time. In doing this it may attempt to replace or marginalize alternative metaphors, such as disease as imbalance, or activity as the harmonious workings of the body or a machine.Goatly concludes this study with specific examples of how metaphor themes have either been created or exploited and elaborated to express, bolster and strengthen a capitalist ideology which began in the 16th century, under the historical influence of Protestantism, and has become the common-sense dominant ideology in the last twenty-five years. One strand of this ideology, which sees humans, like animals, as competing for scarce resources in order to ensure the survival of themselves and their families, is strengthened by the prolific metaphor themes of competition such as ACTIVITY IS GAME - BALL GAME, CARD GAME, BOARD GAME, GAMBLING GAME or themes of violence ACTIVITY IS FIGHTING, HUMAN IS ARMY, SEX IS VIOLENCE. A second strand equates quality with quantity QUALITY IS QUANTITY, and, more particularly, with wealth QUALITY IS MONEY / WEALTH, assuming that well-being, relationships (AFFECTION / RELATIONSHIP IS MONEY / WEALTH), time (TIME Is MONEY / COMMODITY), indeed virtue itself, can be expressed or recognized in terms of money or material possessions. Goatly shows that these metaphors have a continuity in the works of Hobbes, Smith, Hume, Malthus and Darwin and that they were either created or nurtured and espoused in turn by these philosophers.
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