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The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek and Indian Philosophies by Thomas McEvilley (Allworth Press) This unparalleled study of early Eastern and Western philosophy challenges every existing belief about the foundations of Western civilization. Spanning thirty years of intensive research, this book proves what many scholars could not explain: that today’s Western world must be considered the product of both Greek and Indian thought—Western and Eastern philosophies.

Thomas McEvilley explores how trade, imperialism, and migration currents allowed cultural philosophies to intermingle freely throughout India, Egypt, Greece, and the ancient Near East. This groundbreaking reference will stir relentless debate among philosophers, art historians, and students.  More

Post-Hellenistic Philosophy: A Study in Its Development from the Stoics to Origen by G. R. Boys-Stones (Oxford University Press) This book traces, for the first time, a revolution in philosophy which took place during the early centuries of our era. It reconstructs the philosophical basis of the Stoics' theory that fragments of an ancient and divine wisdom could be reconstructed from mythological traditions, and shows that Platonism was founded on an argument that Plato had himself achieved a full reconstruction of this wisdom, and that subsequent philosophies had only regressed once again in their attempts to 'improve' on his achievement. The significance of this development is highlighted through parallel studies of the Hellenistic debate over the status of Jewish culture; and of the philosophical beginnings of Christianity, where the notions of 'orthodoxy' and 'heresy' in particular are shown to be tools in the construction of a unified history of Christian philosophy stretching back to primitive antiquity. More

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy XXVIII edited by David Sedley (Oxford University Press) (Hardcover) Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. OSAP is now published twice yearly, in both hardback and paperback. This volume includes articles on Heraclitus and Plotinus, with several on each of Aristotle and Plato. More

Visions of Development: A Study of Human Values by David Alexander Clark, Peter H. Nolan (Edward Elgar) Visions of Development is a path-breaking and original volume, examining concepts and perceptions of human development through a unique synthesis of empirical and philosophical work. It builds on the foundations of Sen and Nussbaum’s capability approach, now at the forefront of development studies.

The author identifies and clarifies academic concepts of development, to consider how poor people themselves perceive ‘development’ and confronts abstract concepts of development with the views of ordinary people. The book represents the first systematic attempt to construct a development ethic (list of valuable capabilities) that is based directly on the values and experiences of the poor.

David Clark considers the case for viewing development in terms of the expansion of human capabilities instead of some narrow conception of utility or opulence, and develops a non-paternalistic methodology for forging a development ethic that can respect the values of all people. He then proceeds to develop an account of human development based on the perceptions of people living in both rural and urban locations in South Africa - Murraysburg and Wallacedene respectively.

A multidisciplinary and accessible text, this challenging book will appeal not only to scholars and researchers in development economics but also economic geographers, social scientists and political economists. It will also be of great interest to policymakers and practitioners.

Excerpt: The concept of human development is as old as philosophy itself. Discussions of what makes a good life date back at least to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and the Ancient Greek tradition. In fact, much of ancient philosophy concerns itself with the question of eudaimonia, i.e.. `the state of having an objectively desirable human life.’ The objective character of eudaimonia distinguishes it from the ancient philosophies of the Epicureans and Stoics, who saw the good in terms of mental tranquillity; and from modern concepts of utility, which are concerned with the achievement of a subjectively satisfactory life.

But Ancient Greek philosophy (and subsequent moral theories) had little influence upon the development of modern political economy and social science - the disciplines that eventually gave rise to the birth of development studies as an independent field of inquiry in the 1950s. Social scientists expressed little interest in ancient concepts of eudaimonia and human flourishing. Outside the domain of Classics and Philosophy these concepts were largely forgotten. Economists in particular were uncomfortable with ethical questions and sought to avoid subjective value judgements by divorcing their `science' from the realms of politics and moral philosophy.

Most development economists turned to more practical issues, such as the determinants of economic growth and the merits of competition and trade. Modem conceptions of development concerned themselves with growth, capital accumulation, technological change, structural transformation of the economy, and the modernisation of the social, cultural and political institutions necessary to facilitate economic development (see Chapter 1). In the early days of the development studies discipline comparatively little attention was devoted to the development of human beings as ends in themselves.

In fact economists and other social scientists have said little of substance about the meaning of `development'. No books appear to be devoted to an exclusive or systematic treatment of the concept of `development' .4 Instead, discussions have been restricted to a small number of academic papers and introductory chapters in elementary textbooks. Some meaningful contributions have been made, but most of the available literature takes the form of criticizing existing concepts rather than developing new ideas or building upon old ones. In most cases little direct interest is expressed in the concept of development. Most treatments seem to be motivated by other objectives, such as the desire to reassess existing development strategies or construct basic social and economic indicators to guide public policy.

There are several practical reasons for studying the concept of development. In particular a more thorough and comprehensive exposition of the meaning of development could help to improve policy and form a foundation for building new and better theories. In the words of one of the pioneers of development studies:

... we have to dispel the fog around the word development and decide more precisely what we mean by it. Only then will we be able to devise meaningful targets and indicators, and thus help to improve policy, national or international.

By the 1990s however, the `fog' surrounding the concept of development had not cleared. The notion of development still seemed to require clarification before it could be used to inform public policy, as another prominent scholar of development observed:

... the main question - What does development mean? - is important. The failure to have an objective that is widely understood, and accepted and has relevance for policy, is an important reason for the many difficulties that nations encounter in designing consistent and effective policies.

Yet despite the widespread interest in designing development strategy and the calls to clarify and agree the goals of development, few economists or social scientists made a serious effort to work in the field of development ethics.

An early exception was Denis Goulet whose book, The Cruel Choice, aimed to introduce - in the words of the sub title - `a new concept in the theory of development'. Goulet however, devotes only seven pages (of a 362 page book) to the actual formulation of a development ethic (Goulet, 1971, pp.87-94).6 Moreover, Goulet's notion of development (life sustenance, self­esteem, and freedom from servitude) is remarkably thin in comparison to Aristotle's original account of human flourishing, and contains little that is genuinely new. Subsequent attempts to conceptualise development in the 1970s and early 1980s were typically confined to the enumeration of basic needs or the construction of a small selection of socio-economic indicators.

Few social scientists concerned themselves with the big picture. Instead, attention centered on a narrowly defined set of human needs. One distinguished economist-philosopher however, has adopted a different approach. In a series of journal papers and books dating from the late 1970s, Amartya Sen began to construct a more comprehensive framework for conceptualising human well-being and development. According to Sen development is about the expansion of human capabilities. One argument in favour of the capability approach is the need to (re)focus on people, who are the ultimate beneficiaries of real development. Following the eighteenth century philosopher Immanuel Kant, Sen argues for the necessity of viewing people as ends in themselves and never as only means to other ends:

Human beings are the agents, beneficiaries and adjudicators of progress, but they also happen to be - directly or indirectly - the primary means of all production. The dual role of human beings provides a rich ground for confusion of ends and means in planning and policy making. Indeed, it can - and frequently does - take the form of focusing on production and prosperity as the essence of progress, treating people as the means through which the productive process is brought about (rather than seeing the lives of people as the ultimate -concerns and treating production and prosperity merely as means to those lives). (Sen, 1990, p.41)

Meanwhile some modern philosophers had already given some thought to the ultimate ends of a good human life. Perhaps the most notable is James Griffin (1986) whose book Well-Being proposed a list of Prudential Values.' But in stark contrast to most other philosophers, Sen's approach is firmly rooted in social science. His philosophy has profoundly influenced the way in which economists and policy makers think about the real world. By focusing on ends rather than means, Sen has revolutionised the way in which social science understands the concept of 'development'.

Sen is also responsible for inspiring other social scientists to take an active interest in development ethics. By the 1990s the capability approach had emerged as the leading alternative to traditional concepts of welfare. Sen's conceptual framework (and friendship with the late Mahbub ul Haq) encouraged the UNDP to compile a Human Development Report, which has been published annually since 1990 (e.g.. UNDP, 1990; see also Haq, 1995). Meanwhile WIDER published the proceedings of two major conferences attended by leading economists and philosophers from around the world, both of which were concerned with the foundations and application of Sen's capability approach (see Nussbaum and Glover, 1995; Nussbaum and Sen, 1993)." New terminology began to enter the social science and development literature. Phrases like `development ethic', `human good', `good living' and `well-being' were finally used alongside more familiar terms such as `living standards', `quality of life' and `human development'.

But most of the debates that transpired were conducted by philosophers or economists with a keen interest in philosophy from elite universities in the UK and North America. (Consider the list of contributors to the WIDER conferences in the two volumes cited above.) These philosophers operated strictly at the level of theory. While most economists were uncomfortable with ethical questions, social philosophers expressed little interest in solid empirical work. The possibility of testing their grand designs in the public domain or constructing an account of human well-being that rests squarely on the values and attitudes of ordinary people were not seriously considered." Some philosophers regarded such endeavours as superfluous and perhaps even misguided. Most felt that such tasks fell outside the domain of philosophy and should be left to social scientists or anthropologists who are better equipped to handle these kinds of investigations.

While Sen's capability approach has revolutionised our understanding of human development, further research is required to make his framework operational. Before human development can be assessed a list of relevant ends is required. Although countless lists have appeared in the literature, no systematic attempt has been made to develop an account of capability or need through scientific investigation. There are no apparent examples of what might be called an 'empirical philosophy' in development ethics, where theoretical accounts of human well-being and development are informed by empirical studies of human values. 13 It is therefore prudent to reflect on the usefulness and relevance of some of the abstract concepts of human development and hypothetical accounts of well­being advocated by philosophers and social theorists. An authentic development ethic should not be divorced from the hopes, expectations and aspirations of ordinary people. 14 This point has been underlined in the South Report, which was compiled by an independent team of scholars from developing countries:

True development has to be people centered. It has to be directed at the fulfillment of human potential and the improvement of social and economic well-being of the people. And it has to be designed to secure what the people themselves perceive to be their social and economic interests.

Taking account of the views of ordinary people from poor countries may also provide philosophers and social theorists with some useful and potentially unique insights into human development.

In fact one solitary social scientist (who wrote long before Sen inspired a small group of economists and social theorists to take an active interest in development ethics) has called for a more direct approach for understanding poverty and human development. In a passage which has been overshadowed by more recent contributions to development ethics, Goulet observes:

Underdevelopment is shocking: the squalor, disease, unnecessary deaths, and hopelessness of it all! No man understands if underdevelopment remains for him a mere statistic reflecting low income, poor housing, premature mortality or underemployment. The most emphatic observer can speak objectively about underdevelopment only after undergoing, personally or vicariously, the 'shock of underdevelopment.' This unique culture shock comes to one as he is initiated to the emotions that prevail in the 'culture of poverty' . . . Chronic poverty is a cruel kind of hell, and one cannot understand how cruel that hell is merely by gazing upon poverty as an object. Unless the observer gains entry into the inner sanctum of these emotions and feels them himself, he will not understand the condition he seeks to abolish.

While Goulet may overstate the necessity of encountering the phenomena we seek to understand, there can be no substitute for experience itself 15 Yet since this passage was written, many of those who have made key contributions to development ethics have managed to avoid encountering 'development' or 'undergoing personally or vicariously, the shock of underdevelopment'.

The preceding remarks suggest that efforts to conceptualise human well­being and development would benefit from the closer integration of the philosophy and social science disciplines. This book represents an ambitious attempt to bridge the gap between social science and philosophy in the field of development ethics. The aim is to introduce a new kind of 'empirical philosophy' that is informed by scientific inquiry and firmly rooted in social reality. In order to achieve this goal our inquiry attempts to: (1) identify and clarify some of the academic concepts of development commonly found in the social science and philosophy literature; (2) consider how poor people themselves perceive development (a 'good' form of life); and (3) confront abstract concepts of development with the views of ordinary poor people living in two distinct locations.

The results of this study help to throw light on two fundamental questions. The first asks if there are any common human values upon which we can build a theory of the good. In contrast to traditional wisdom, the evidence presented below suggests that it is possible to achieve a broad consensus regarding the central features of a good human life. The second question relates to the nature and character of human values themselves. What are the objects of a good human life? One interesting aspect of this question concerns the distinction between a 'morally good life' and the kind of life in which 'comfort' and 'enjoyment' play a large part (see Walsh, 1995). The evidence presented in this study implies that most people value a life of comfort and satisfaction, but also believe that such a life should be combined with ethical behaviour that includes at least some altruistic acts.

Terms such as `the good life', `human good' and `development ethic' are used interchangeably throughout this study. While these terms (like other concepts in social science) are clearly `value loaded' and carry `emotive connotations', an effort has been made to employ them in a neutral and scientific way (insofar as this is possible). By using these terms one does not necessarily `beg the question'. Ultimately our respondents have the final say on what constitutes a good form of life. This inquiry is concerned with the dimensions of human development rather than the process of economic development. It is not my intention to underplay or deflect attention from the significance of economic growth for long-term improvements in living standards and social well-being. But the success of economic development does ultimately have to be judged in terms of its consequences for human beings.

A final point remains. The word `concept' is used to refer to the idea of development. The term `definition' is resisted in this context. A `definition' consists of a rigid statement or description of the precise nature and meaning of an object or word and therefore implies a high degree of precision and objectivity that the notion of development seems to lack. In contrast, a `concept' is composed of a set of ideas, beliefs and values about a particular object, and thus more adequately portrays the subjective character of development. 

Chapter 1 reviews some of the abstract concepts of development employed in economics and social science. A prima facie case is made for conceptualising development in terms of human capability. It is also suggested that a new approach, which draws on perceptions of development among the poor, is required to provide potentially sterile debates about the nature of human well-being and development with new impetus. Chapter 2 considers the case for viewing development as capability expansion. The capability approach is also compared and contrasted with more traditional ways of conceptualising development, which typically focus on income, commodity command and utility. Chapter 3 paves the way for making the capability approach operational. A methodology is developed for forging an international development ethic; and a list of potentially valuable ends is identified by drawing on the work of philosophers and social theorists. Chapter 4 provides a detailed analysis of our surveys, which investigated how ordinary poor people from a rural village and urban township view a good life. The results are used to evaluate the usefulness and relevance of some of the theoretical accounts of human well-being and development advanced in the academic literature, and provide the foundation for developing a more realistic and robust theory of the good.

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