Wordtrade.com

11312 US 15-501 North, Suite 107/ PMB #226/
Chapel Hill NC 27517/ USA

ph 9195425719/ fx 9198691643/ www.wordtrade.com

November 2023

SPOTLIGHT 112

Wordtrade Reviews: Angels in Athens

Contents: Angels in Athens

Editorial Appraisals:

Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise, most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

THE RIGOR OF ANGELS: BORGES, HEISENBERG, KANT, AND THE ULTIMATE NATURE OF REALITY by William Egginton [Pantheon, ISBN 9780593316306]

A poet, a physicist, and a philosopher explored the greatest enigmas in the universe—the nature of free will, the strange fabric of the cosmos, the true limits of the mind—and each in their own way uncovered a revelatory truth about our place in the world

"[A] mind-expanding book. . . . Elegantly written." —The New York Times

Argentine poet Jorge Luis Borges was madly in love when his life was shattered by painful heartbreak. But the breakdown that followed illuminated an incontrovertible truth—that love is necessarily imbued with loss, that the one doesn't exist without the other. German physicist Werner Heisenberg was fighting with the scientific establishment on the meaning of the quantum realm's absurdity when he had his own epiphany—that there is no such thing as a complete, perfect description of reality. Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant pushed the assumptions of human reason to their mind-bending conclusions, but emerged with an idea that crowned a towering philosophical system—that the human mind has fundamental limits, and those limits undergird both our greatest achievements as well as our missteps.

Through fiction, science, and philosophy, the work of these three thinkers coalesced around the powerful, haunting fact that there is an irreconcilable difference between reality "out there" and reality as we experience it. Out of this profound truth comes a multitude of galvanizing ideas: the notion of selfhood, free will, and purpose in human life; the roots of morality, aesthetics, and reason; and the origins and nature of the cosmos itself.

As each of these thinkers shows, every one of us has a fundamentally incomplete picture of the world. But this is to be expected. Only as mortal, finite beings are we able to experience the world in all its richness and breathtaking majesty. We are stranded in a gulf of vast extremes, between the astronomical and the quantum, an abyss of freedom and absolute determinism, and it is in that center where we must make our home. A soaring and lucid reflection on the lives and work of Borges, Heisenberg, and Kant, *The Rigor of Angels* movingly demonstrates that the mysteries of our place in the world may always loom over us—not as a threat, but as a reminder of our humble humanity.

Review

Praise for *The Rigor of Angels*

"[A] mind-expanding book. . . . Elegantly written. . . . This is a book about the tiniest of things—the position of an electron, an instant of change. It is also about the biggest of things—the cosmos, infinity, the possibility of free will. Egginton works through ideas by grounding them in his characters' lives. . . . The beauty of this book is that Egginton encourages us to recognize all of these complicated truths as part of our reality, even if the 'ultimate nature' of that reality will remain forever elusive. We are finite beings whose perspective will always be limited; but those limits are also what give rise to possibility. When we choose what to observe, we insert our freedom to choose into nature. As Egginton writes, 'We are, and ever will be, active participants in the universe we discover.'"
—The New York Times

"This is intellectual history of the highest order, an acrobatic feat that examines how the lives of Jorge Luis Borges, Werner Heisenberg, and Immanuel Kant all show the falsity of what we assume is fixed reality. What a poet, physicist, and philosopher can teach us about life and its uncertainties is told in exhilarating detail, and William Egginton makes his insights accessible even to readers who are none of the above. Love, quantum mechanics, and free will have never been dealt with so engagingly. Do not let that previous sentence scare you. *The Rigor of Angels* is immensely rewarding."
—Air Mail

"*The Rigor of Angels* is a book of tremendous intelligence and beauty. William Egginton makes

the paradoxes of physics, metaphysics, and literature intelligible by showing how these paradoxes shape the limits of the visible world and the possibilities of the invisible one. His writing reminds us that the best humanist inquiry unites the arts and the sciences in the patient pursuit of the truth."
—Merve Emre, Shapiro-Silverberg Professor of Creative Writing and Criticism at Wesleyan University and contributing writer at *The New Yorker*

"A fascinating reflection!"
—Carlo Rovelli, *New York Times* best-selling author of *Anaximander and the Birth of Science* and *Seven Brief Lessons on Physics*

"Humans are ambitious folk; we want to be able to know everything. But the world repeatedly confounds us with limitations on what can be known, and inescapable mediators between ourselves and the truth. William Egginton draws compelling connections between Borges, Kant, and Heisenberg, three of our most audacious theorists of limitation. We are left marveling at how much we are nevertheless able to capture of that elusive quarry called reality."
—Sean Carroll, *New York Times* best-selling author of *The Biggest Ideas in the Universe: Space, Time, and Motion*

"Physicists attempt to explain reality, poets provide our emotional response to it, and philosophers try to establish cerebral connections. All of these endeavors are plagued with uncertainty. Werner Heisenberg, Jorge Luis Borges, and Immanuel Kant struggled with this uncertainty throughout their entire lives. Egginton takes us on an illuminating journey through the fascinating labyrinth created by their intertwined intellectual paths."
—Mario Livio, author of *The Golden Ratio* and Galileo and the Science Deniers

"This book brilliantly weaves together the core ideas of three of the greatest minds of Western literature, philosophy, and physics into a soul-searching narrative. Egginton masterfully illuminates the paradox of being human, of being caught between the search for the order behind things and the magic of the transcendent, of knowing that we are playthings in the hands of time, as our lives continually fork as we make choices and we become one self while imagining countless others."

—**Marcelo Gleiser, author of** *The Dawn of a Mindful Universe: A Manifesto for Humanity's Future*

"Poetry, science, philosophy—for the ancients, these intellectual-artistic pursuits taught us what it is to be human: how to transcend our current station, how to grow and flourish, how to remain humble in the face of mystery and failure. Egginton's *The Rigor of Angels* is a stark reminder of what each of us can achieve if we only remember what remarkable beings we are."

—**John Kaag, author of *Hiking with Nietzsche***

CONTENTS

Like Borges's wizard, when we observe the world, we make a map or mental picture of it. And we make that map ubiquitous in space and durable in time. But there are fundamental flaws in the image we create of the world, those that Kant termed antinomies. Like an imperfection in an otherwise flawless gemstone, it would be a mistake to try to eradicate them. For the flaws are inseparable from knowledge itself.

On a walk together in 1926, a venerated older scientist pressed the younger Heisenberg on the weakness he saw disqualifying his approach—that he was jettisoning our long-held belief in the independence of reality from our observations of it. Heisenberg pushed back. Had not the renowned professor himself come up with his own epochal discovery by overturning our most basic assumptions about time and space?

"Possibly I did," Albert Einstein grudgingly conceded, "but it is nonsense all the same."

One of the great tools humans have developed since the rise of modernity is science. At its core science is a way of looking at the world that foregrounds intellectual humility. It refuses on principle to know more than it can know at any given time. But even the greatest scientists aren't immune to projecting their prejudices on the world. Einstein—a man so brilliant that even his self-proclaimed blunders have an irritating propensity to turn out true—also had a tendency, especially in his later years, to lecture his fellow physicists in religious terms about what they should expect to discover about the ultimate nature of reality. In fact, his now famous quips about God being subtle but not malicious, or "the Old One" not throwing dice, finally led an exasperated Niels Bohr to beg the great man to "stop telling God what to do."

For all their profound differences, Jorge Luis Borges, Immanuel Kant, and Werner Heisenberg shared an uncommon immunity to the temptation to think they knew God's secret plan. Each in his own way resisted the urge to project essential aspects of how human beings experience reality onto reality itself, independent of how we know it. Indeed, Heisenberg's disruption of classical physics had its roots in an iconoclastic countercurrent to a powerful human tendency to conjure the ultimate nature of reality in our imagination, and then go out and discover it. There is indeed rigor in the world, as Borges famously wrote, but "humanity has forgotten, and continues to forget, that it is the rigor of chess masters, not of angels:'25

Knowledge is man-made, our own way of making sense of a reality whose ultimate nature may not conform to our conceptions of it. Is the saturated red of a Vermeer part of that ultimate reality? The soft fuzz of a peach's skin? The exalted crescendo of a Beethoven symphony? If we can grasp that such powerful experiences require the

active engagement of observers and listeners, is it not possible, likely even, that the other phenomena we encounter have a similar origin? When we do the opposite, we forget the role we have in creating our own reality.

In their lives, struggles, and obsessions, Borges, Heisenberg, and Kant pushed far enough against the limits of imagination, observation, and thought to unearth the antinomies engendered by that forgetting. This book is divided into four sections, each of which revolves around one of those antinomies: Are space and time infinitely divisible, or are they composed of indivisible chunks? Is there something like a supreme and unconditional being, or is everything in existence conditioned and affected by something else? Is there a spatial or temporal edge to the universe, or does it extend infinitely with no beginning or border? Are we free to choose our path in life, or is our every choice determined by the physical world we live in?

The sections in turn contain three chapters, each of which focuses primarily on one of our protagonists, the influences that were decisive for him, how he grappled with that antinomy in the realm of science, literature, or philosophy, and how that struggle ultimately paved the path toward his understanding of how knowledge structures reality. Thus our story opens, however improbably, with a Russian journalist who discovers he has a gift that is also a curse: a near-perfect memory. We then join Borges as he, prodded by the desire to recover the receding moments of bliss of a shattered romance, probes the paradoxes of what memory and perception entail. Using fiction to file away at the imperfections of human knowledge, he imagines a character who can perceive and remember everything, perfectly, with no gap in space or loss in time. In so doing he reveals the very insight that ignited Kant's revolution in thought: an observation of the world can never be perfectly of the world; it always requires something else, the insertion of a minimal distance that permits it to become knowledge in the first place.

In the chapters that ensue, we delve into the realm of the impossibly small; we stretch our minds to encompass everything at once; we travel to the beginning of time and the edge of existence; and we search for an iota of freedom in the mechanistic chain of

nature. As we make this journey, we will be rocked by the astonishing implications that these thinkers' collective discoveries had for our conceptions of beauty, science, and what we owe to each other in the brief time given to us in this universe.

In telling the stories of Borges, Kant, and Heisenberg, this book also tells the story of those before them who caught a glimpse of the truth, who unearthed the tenuous and eternal crevices of unreason underlying our picture of the real. It tells a cautionary tale about the danger of assuming reality must conform to the image we construct of it, and the damage that our fidelity to such a seductive ideal can wreak. Most of all, it sings an ode to the boundless potential of our knowledge, once we have worked ourselves free from the blinders imposed by imagined perfection. <>

THE MASK OF MEMNON by Jean-Luc Beauchard [Cascade Books, 9781666719512]

What gives life its meaning? This question stands behind every philosophical inquiry, and philosophy itself arises from it. Confronting the problem of meaning is, as Camus says, the fundamental task of human life. Yet at bottom, meaning is an aesthetical category. Meaning hinges on interpretation. It makes sense then to turn to art--and in particular the art form which deals most explicitly with meaning, the novel--if we are to attempt to address it. Inspired by but critical of Roland Barthes's ""death of the author"" literary theory, THE MASK OF MEMNON seeks to reconcile opposing philosophical approaches to the question of meaning by examining the death of the author from the perspective of the character, not the reader. In this work, the traditional dichotomy between external/objective meaning and internal/subjective meaning is upended and a new paradigm is proposed.

Review

THE MASK OF MEMNON is a breath of fresh air, a unique work of mesmerizing philosophy--one readers will wish they had authored themselves! With this incredibly deep set of reflections on philosophy, art, and literature, Beauchard restores our belief

in the meaningfulness of writing by giving us what we have all been waiting for, something truly worth reading.--Steven DeLay, Old Member, Christ Church, University of Oxford

Combining a deep philosophical knowledge with detailed literary analysis and an engaging, lyrical style, THE MASK OF MEMNON productively advances existentialist debates about the nature of meaning--and, just as important, meaninglessness. With his emphasis on 'characterly living, ' Beauchard offers transformative readings of monumental literary works while also demonstrating the value of more novelistic forms of philosophical inquiry capable of reaching into the unsettling core of human existence. --Scott M. Reznick, Assistant Professor of English, State University of New York

CONTENTS

With Gratitude

Today, every criticism is an affront. To object, to disagree, to assert that another is wrong in his thinking is tantamount to doing violence. "He challenges me? He insults me!" Thus concludes the spirit of the age. But need that be the case? Or might it be that to challenge is to honor, to object is to set above, to refute is to bestow the mark of distinction? In the pages that follow, there are countless critiques—each born of a deep admiration, a profound love for the man and the work it is leveled against. Plato, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Camus—these are the men who made me. To object to them is to pay them homage. It is to insist that their ideas are worth grappling with, that their philosophies merit consideration, that their views cannot be set aside, they must be

confronted. The philosopher, by my reckoning, is the one who loves the ideas of others so much that he needs to correct them. Like a wife who apprises her husband of his every fault, a true philosopher is neither a lackey nor a critic. He is a lover who longs to set right the beautiful mistakes that taught him to love in the first place.

It is with these considerations in mind that I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all of the thinkers who have made me what I am—and most especially those I lovingly correct in the pages that follow.

Author's Note

I have for some time wanted to write a novel that I have been unable to write. It is not that I have not tried to write it. I have. And more than once. But each fresh attempt has yielded the same result. Each has fallen flat. And each for the same reason. My issue is not that the idea, the jumping-off point, is somehow flawed. Quite the opposite. My issue is that the idea is too good. It's too beautiful. It's better than the story. And there can be no greater sin for the would-be novelist than to offer sacrifice at the altar of that old tempter god, the god of the good idea. A novel is not, as Camus suggests, philosophy in images. A novel is a world. It is meant to be inhabited. It is meant to be lived. And in the world of the novel, the good idea is always an idol. It distracts and distorts. It simplifies. It is a surrogate god. A jealous god. Unhappy until it has stripped the work of all meaning beyond its own.

But we philosophers are pagans. We are not novelists. We are not philosophical enough for art. We find no joy in simply telling a story. We sacrifice to whichever god or gods will have us. And thus we find ourselves ever on our knees before the altar of the good, nay the great, idea. We sacrifice everything—everything!—to the idea. We sacrifice ourselves. And so it is that I now use (and use up) my novel before it is finished. I use it not to tell a story, not to build a world, but to make a point. I use it as pretext. As a mere lead-in to the philosophical discussion of meaning and meaninglessness . . .

The Mask of Memnon

What then would have come of the novel mentioned at the start of this book? What followed the death of its author? It is perhaps a truism that the Greeks foresuffered us all, saw with gouged-out eyes the lives we grope through in the dark. Memnon was known to the Greeks. He was a man, not a god, destined to be written off the page. He was, it could be argued, an absurd man—a conqueror, a king, a fool. If Homer is to be believed, he was quite handsome. (Was he another of Camus's Don Juans?) Well, looks mean something. In the world of flesh and blood, appearance is no small consolation. But Memnon was meant to receive a greater blessing than this. The gods cared little for his warrior ethic. They did not love his nobility, his righteousness, his clear moral vision. They cared only for the man, the little man, destined as he was to fall.

The night before he was to head into battle in defense of Troy, Memnon sat feasting with the Trojans and with his men. It was a dark night, polar dark, the kind that makes of each man a solitary thing, that causes each to sink into the seclusion of himself, keeping lonely vigil in the blackness of his mind, the abyss of his desire, the hole that is his heart. Priam, noting the somber mood, leaned over to Memnon and beseeched him to say something— anything!—that might raise the warriors' spirits. "Lift your glass," he said. "Assure us of our victory." Memnon grunted. He raised his eyes from his plate and met Priam with his gaze. "If you want to judge my story," he said, "look not to what I say but what I do. The true storyteller lives his novel. His ink is his blood." Then he stood before his men and bowed down at their feet. He kissed the earth, he kissed their feet, he rose and lifted his glass. "Drink with me," he said. "Wine is no mean thing and friendship hard to come by." The men did as he commanded, they drank and laughed, and the night was merry and foolish.

In the morning, before Dawn had gifted the city with her blessing of crimson and gold, Priam called his generals to himself and said, "Do whatever Memnon tells you. Did you notice how your hearts burned as he spoke? He is not like the others." They agreed and followed Memnon into battle. The day was hot, bright, and filled with stinking death. And Memnon squeezed from it every drop it had to offer. As he fought, the gods smiled

upon him. They smiled but did nothing. They rose up not in his defense. Nor did they take arms against him. They simply remained silent. "This one," said Zeus, "is more than a god. He is a man and we mustn't meddle." What did it take for the gods to restrain their wills? What did it take to give up the power that was theirs, to forsake their divinity? We need look no further than Memnon to find our answer. Memnon, pierced with a spear through the heart. Memnon, poured out upon the stones. Memnon, son of man, child of light, whose death cast a shadow over every immortal, whose blood bubbled up from the earth and became an unending river. The gods fell silent that day. They died so Memnon might live. They let that little man fight and they let him fail, and he was free to make of himself what he willed. And what was Memnon's response? What could it be but to offer himself in the same way? To give himself as a ransom for others?

There is a river that flows with blood—so says Quintus of Smyrna. It waters dry roots and stirs life where life has been snuffed out. In the Posthomerica, Quintus tells us that "each time that woeful day on which Memnon died comes round," the river of blood gives off "a loathsome stench," the unbearable smell of Memnon's "fatal wound."1 The odor of corruption is strong. Memnon was no god. He was a man, one who descended to the depths of meaninglessness, who become meaningless himself. Yet by his death, he set others free. His friends, we are told, became birds—free to fly where they willed.2 No one knew where they came from or where they were going, and that was the sign they were born of Memnon.

Nietzsche may have ushered in the death of God, but he retained a god all the same. In his 1886 preface to The Birth of Tragedy, he calls himself a "disciple of a still 'unknown God,' a supplicant at the altar of "an entirely reckless and amoral artist-god." That God—the "primordial artist of the world," the "sole author and spectator" of our novelistic lives—does not simply look on from a distance, but at times enters the drama and becomes "at once subject and object, at once poet, actor, and spectator." No place is this more evident, Nietzsche insists, than Greek tragedy, "all the celebrated figures of the Greek stage—Prometheus, Oedipus, etc.—are mere masks of this original hero, Dionysus . . . [B]ehind all these masks there is a deity . . . the one truly real

Dionysus [who] appears in a variety of forms." How meaningless, then, are these individual characters, mere masks for their blood-drunk god? How absurdly pointless, the tragic hero whose suffering is not his own?

Memnon teaches a different lesson. Pierced through the heart, wounded by this life, he is not the mask of a man concealing the face of a god. No, Memnon is no Greek hero. He is a foreigner, an outsider, coming to the Greeks out of Egypt. If he veils his face, that is because he looks too human, too mortal, fated only to fall. Memnon is a man. He is just a man. But when he removes his mask, he reveals that oft-neglected truth that the face of a man is more radiant than the Sun. <>

City of Man: A Novel Reading of Plato's Republic by Jean-Luc Beauchard, Foreword by John Panteleimon Manoussakis [Cascade Books, ISBN 9781666752779]

Why does life in society make us so unhappy? Why has civilization always been marked with social unrest? From the time of Plato, our greatest thinkers have understood that in order to confront the ills of the city, one must first look to the individual, to the maladies and discontents of the human soul. In this novel reading of Plato's Republic, the insights of Nietzsche and Freud are brought to bear on one of western civilization's most important texts. But what is at stake is far more than our interpretation of the Republic. City of Man will leave readers better equipped to face the crises that confront us today by reintroducing the import of that oft-quoted but rarely practiced Delphic maxim: know thyself.

Review

"On its face, this text presents an undertaking that many would find laughable. Yet, the end result is nothing short of an incisive and wholly new reading of what is arguably the backbone of the Western canon. It is a true rarity to find scholarship like this today, almost to the point that it makes one wonder how a thinker like Jean-Luc Beauchard exists at all."--Bryan Cocchiara, instructor of philosophy, Brookdale Community College

"If this book accomplishes nothing else than to stand as a reminder of the right and wrong way to approach Plato (and, perhaps, every other text as well), it would still deserve to be

called a masterpiece. For it stands, like Socrates in Athens, as a memorial of our ignorance." --John Manoussakis, associate professor of philosophy, College of the Holy Cross

"In CITY OF MAN, Jean-Luc Beauchard leads us through the labyrinth of the dialogues, using his pen as a sword to slay the monsters hidden within and weaving an incredibly subtle thread to guide us back to safety. The gods will no doubt smile on this modern-day son of Theseus and reward him justly for his exceedingly fine achievement." --Joaquim Maria Nivola, translator of Les problèmes d'un problème

CONTENTS

Letter from John Panteleimon Manoussakis

Boston, April 28, 2023

My dear Jean-Luc Beauchard,

I cannot thank you enough for bestowing upon me the privilege of being among the first to have read what will undoubtedly and in due time must be recognized as a masterpiece—although I am not sure of which field, philosophy or literature? I expect, that is, that many will be puzzled (and many will be annoyed and put off) by a book so unique in its style, so ambiguous in its genre. Not quite a philosophical novel, but is it more accurate to call it a fictious philosophy? I think, or I prefer to think of it as dramatic philosophy, as one finds at the beginning of good, scholarly editions of Plato's

dialogues a list of the dramatis personae, a detail that no one has taken more seriously than you.

If the City of Man succeeds there where every other reading of Plato thus far, no matter how brilliant, has failed, that is because the City of Man approaches Plato in a way that no one else before has dared to follow, in a way unlike any other in the past—from the Diadochi of the Academy to Derrida and beyond; it has approached Plato as another. And I am now fully convinced that Plato would not allow any reader to approach him (let alone welcome him inside and show him the mysteries within the dialogues) except as another, because that is how he himself writes: as another. Here, then, comes the rarest of all compliments and a well-deserved one at that: You read Plato as Plato, as Plato wrote. I don't think there is any greater honor that a human being could bestow upon another than this.

You see, my dear Jean-Luc, we have all made the same embarrassing mistake of approaching Plato as ourselves and fully proud of and content, with our proper names. And so we have found the gates of the Academy closed. But not you. If this book accomplishes nothing else than to stand as a reminder of the right and wrong way to approach Plato (and, perhaps, every other text as well), still it would deserve to be called a masterpiece. For it stands, like Socrates in Athens, as a memorial of our ignorance—

But as literature, I would place the City of Man next to Nabokov's Pale Fire in terms of its style and achievement, but closer to Hesse's Steppenwolf in terms of its message and its humor. (I quite agree, by the way, that having footnotes run continuously throughout the text, totaling just short of a thousand, adds a great deal of hilarity; a point I hope the publisher won't diminish by turning them into endnotes—especially given what happens in Book VIII.)

It is a book, also, that deserves to be read again—it necessitates a second reading and I would like to read it again, or at least to read certain passages again, now that I have a general shape, so as to enjoy them more. My comments here, impressions from a first reading, are confined only to the book in general and not to any particular ideas. I am

sure that we will have the time and the opportunity to discuss those in the future. But for now, it suffices to give glory and thanks to God for a remarkable achievement.

Yours most affectionately,
Fr. John Panteleimon Manoussakis
Philosophy Department, College of the Holy Cross,
Worcester, MA

With Gratitude

Does anyone read anymore? And I don't mean what passes for reading in the American academy where simply identifying in a given work that which one expected to find is rewarded with plaudits, major grants, and prestigious chairs. No, I mean the hard, taxing work of trying to honestly assess what an author is saying and trying to understand why. I mean the slow, laborious toil of rereading and crossreading, questioning a text and allowing oneself to be questioned by it. I mean the kind of reading that mirrors writing and is just as judicious, just as inspired, just as true. Every book cries out for true readers. The greatest books demand them. In the pages that follow, I have attempted to model that which I take the responsibility of readership to be. I have tried to offer a reading worthy of the text that provoked it. Whether I have succeeded, however, is not for me to decide. The ultimate judgment rests with you, dear reader—you, whom I suspect to be a true reader. And for that, I am eternally grateful.

***

We are wont to forget the cruelty at the heart of this world, the darkness it harbors within. Perhaps that is because this world is our creation and we prefer not to look too deeply into ourselves. Yet any impartial consideration of the absurdity and callousness that governs so much of our daily lives will cause us to question not only our ideals, our moral standards— our understanding of "justice" and the certainty with which we wield it— but our fondness (prejudice, bias may be more fitting terms) for culture, for civilization, for humanity itself. Camus, who understood that humor is the best means of waking men to forgotten truths, observed through the mouth of Meursault how

ridiculous it is that our laws and often our fates are "decided by men who change their underwear." A fine point. But the situation is more dire still. George Orwell, in his essay "Inside the Whale," reminds us that in Europe nearly "every grain of soil has passed through innumerable human bodies," has, at one time or another, been a human body. And Europe is far from alone in this regard. We too spend our days walking over a vast graveyard, whistling through a valley of dry bones (Ezekiel 37). Yet we forget—and, indeed, must forget—that our streets are paved over corpses, our cities erected atop burial grounds. We forget that the dead are always with us, always beneath us, at the foundation of everything we do.

Strange. Who are these lifeless ones? Why are we so quick to push them from our minds? Why do we offer them no monuments, no way of commemorating the dead save the buildings we construct above them in order to conceal them, to keep them hidden in the crypt below? Yes, if we are being honest, we will have to admit that this too has been one of the dark places of the earth, as is every place inhabited by the race of man. But has the glow of our electric lights—bright enough to blot out the stars—made it any brighter? Have the advances of science, technology, human understanding brought us any nearer to penetrating that immense and incomprehensible void, the darkness upon which everything stands?

Let us consider those early adventurers who made their way across the black waters of the Atlantic and dropped the first anchors on this country's unmolested shores. Well, they made it here. That counts for something. But what did they find? What was their reward? They called it the "New World" and yet it was constructed just like the old. It certainly had all of the old problems. Forests, famines, flies, disease. Brutal heat and biting cold. Death skulking in the air, in the water, hanging over the land like fog over the sea. Imagine what it was to climb down from one of those toy ships after being tossed about like a plaything by blind and raging swells. Imagine being greeted by dark and mysterious wilderness, wild animals and wild men in whom you see reflected the madness of your own heart. Imagine the loneliness, the frustration, the tedium, the fear. And all the while the growing suspicion that nothing will come of it, that—live or die—these things matter little: The hand has been dealt and lost and there is nothing

to be gained. They called it the New World but there is nothing new under the sun (Ecclesiastes 1:9) and each of them must have been gripped by that same human fear, the fear that fills us all, that pushes us, drives us, compels us to commit the inhuman atrocities that are the hallmarks of human existence. The fear of death.

It was up to these men, these small, insignificant men, to discover a New World, to build it, to cultivate it, to bend it to their wills. Well, how did they set about doing it? It's fashionable these days to look back at the crimes committed by frightened men in frightening times—those whom, when faced with the horror of existence, acted horribly—and to condemn them for being the monsters we are certain they were. (Indeed, if we remember the dead at all, we do so only to thank God that we are not as bad as them— and this, incidentally, is the one time we remember God.) Yet are we really so different from our ancestors? Have we not sprouted from the same root, were we not made from the same stock?

For Augustine, man is the corrupted animal. If we today find this observation untimely, if it conflicts with contemporary mores—that is, if we are unwilling to admit that the stain of Adam rots each of us to the core and hope instead that it is possible to be a good man, a just man, a moral man—we must surely admit that collectively we are not much better than those we condemn for having shaped this new world by brute force, the "triumphant monsters," as Nietzsche would call them, who constructed civilization by "unhesitatingly laying their terrible claws upon a populace" and shaping it to their wills. We must say that something of those monsters of old still lives in our new world, that society testifies to their continued influence while at the same time attempting to conceal it.

Do you suppose it was an accident that both Cain and Romulus founded cities, that the hand that murders is the hand that creates? Or is there perhaps a connection between the construction of the city—the cultivation of the polis, the building up of the state—and the violence that civilization is meant to suppress? Can one be civilized without being violent, cultured without loving cruelty? It may seem like I'm being hyperbolic. But, as I said above, the most disinterested consideration of human society will reveal

that culture is not only built upon but necessitates "a disgusting procession of murder, arson, rape, and torture." The two are bound together like two creatures with one head. Don't believe me? "Why, look around you: blood is flowing in rivers, and in such a jolly way besides, like champagne." This statement, penned a hundred and fifty years ago, is as true today as it was then, as it will be a thousand years hence.

Socrates tells us in the Republic that if we want to understand the human psyche we should first look to the city: an image of the soul of man. In this book, I propose to do just that. However, I will not look at the ideal city, will not construct a "just" city in order to understand what man ought to be, as Socrates attempted to do. Such a place has never existed. Nor such a soul. Rather, it is by looking honestly at the city of man, by entering into the profound darkness of its heart, that I hope to broach the subject not of what we should be but what we are. Such a project will undoubtedly fall well short of its purported aim and the image it offers will, I suspect, be partial and distorted. (There are truths too terrible to know and we philosophers are as good as any at concealing them from ourselves.) Nevertheless, this work represents one man's attempt to pay more than lip service to that oft-quoted but rarely practiced Delphic maxim: know thyself. It represents a feeble but honest effort to gaze unflinchingly into the dark. <>

A Comprehensive, Annotated, and Indexed Bibliography of the Modern Scholarship on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (544/1150—606/1210) by Damien Janos and M. Fariduddin Attar [Series: Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 1 The Near and Middle East, Brill, ISBN: 9789004516182]

The study of Islamicate intellectual history has witnessed a rapid growth of scholarship on post-classical thinkers and especially on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210 CE), one of the leading theologians and philosophers of his time. However, there is presently a lack of methodological

tools and reference works in Rāzī studies. This book is the first bibliographical work entirely devoted to this thinker. It surveys the modern historiography on Rāzī from the nineteenth century onward and includes more than 1000 specialized entries written in European languages, Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. The bibliography also provides a preface, an introductory essay, annotations to the entries, and various indices to help students and experts navigate the complex field of Rāzī studies.

CONTENTS

When in the first half of the 18th century, the German protestant theologian Johann Jakob Brucker (1696–1770) wrote his Historia critica philosophiae, a monumental five-volume work on the history of philosophy, he showed a keen interest in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210). Informed by an entry on him in Leo Africanus' miscellaneous report on "some famous people among the Arabs," he included a two-and-a-half-page long portrayal of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī in the 200 pages of his third volume that covers the history of Arabic philosophy. "Among the Arab philosophers who Leo Africanus also greatly praises," writes Brucker, "is Ibnu El-Chatib Rasi, a famous philosopher and theologian of great repute, and a distinguished preacher of his age." Brucker's source, Leo Africanus (d. ca. 1550), was a North-African Muslim captive whose real name was al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad al-Wazzān, and who, after being introduced to the court of Pope Leo X (r. 1513–21), mingled with Renaissance scholars highly interested to learn more about Arabic philosophy. It is unclear, however, to what extent Leo wrote his reports based on his memory or on Arabic written sources that might have been available to him. In the printed version of his article on Rāzī, Leo jumbles the Ashʿarite theologian and philosopher, who lived in Iran and Central Asia during the 6th/12th century, together with another scholar who was known as Ibn al-Khaṭīb, namely Lisān

al-Dīn b. al-Khaṭīb (d. 776/1374) from Granada in Spain. Leo, who was himself born in Granada and who grew up in Fez in Morocco, was familiar with the life and works of Lisān al-Dīn b. al-Khaṭīb, a writer and politician who was also a close friend of the historian Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406). Johann Jakob Brucker was understandably confused as to how the Ibnu El-Chatib in Leo's book, who was born in Rayy in Persia and who seemed to have had a full career as philosopher and theologian in the Islamic East, could also have been involved in the dynastic intrigues of the Naṣrid Emirate of Granada and written books on that city's history. Either Leo's memory faltered, Brucker assumed, or the preserved text of the entry on Fakhr al-Dīn in his Libellus de viris quibusdam illustribus apud Arabes is incomplete and corrupt. The inconsistencies in this entry led Brucker to conclude that Leo "jumbled together the ill-disposed fragments of information" on two scholars with a similar name. Indeed, Leo's text makes little sense and may have suffered from the intervention of a copyist or a compiler who combined two different entries on two different scholars that both went by the name "Ibn al-Khaṭīb."

Despite the confusion about Fakhr al-Dīn's real contributions to the history of Arabic and Islamic philosophy, the entry in Brucker's Historia critica philosophiae is a witness to the interest that scholars of the 18th century in Central Europe had in thinkers like Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.6 Had Brucker also consulted Barthélemy d'Herbelot's (1625–95) Bibliotheque Orientale, which was published 1697 in Paris, he would have learned that this Ibnu El-Chatib Rasi was one of the most influential Shāfiʿite scholars, "who added the knowledge of the foreign sciences to those of Mohammedanism, and who preached eloquently in Arabic and in Persian."

D'Herbelot's Bibliotheque Orientale was by far the most advanced Western resource on all things in the Orient at its time and it was a model for many later encyclopedias of the Enlightenment era. Like them, however, it was not written in Latin but in French, the new language of research in the early modern period, and therefore probably not available to Brucker. The Bibliotheque Orientale features a relatively extensive article on "Razi," where it lists his year of birth (543 AH) – slightly incorrectly, as he was born a year later – and his year of death (606 AH), according to the Muslim calendar. It also

provides a sketch of Rāzī's life and deals in great detail with a key event therein, namely the "solemn dispute" he had in Fīrūzkūh in 591/1195. D'Herbelot got his information about what we today call the "fitna of Fīrūzkūh" from a manuscript copy of Ibn al-Athīr's history, still our best source on the disputation and the following riots.8 D'Herbelot's article stretches over a full column of a dense folio page and includes a brief worklist. Several books of Fakhr al-Dīn, such as his Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīn wa-l-mutaʾakhkhirīn, as well as a work titled Uṣūl al-dīn, existed in the Royal Library in Paris and are listed here with reference to the manuscripts' numbers. D'Herbelot even notes one of the features of Fakhr al-Dīn's œuvre that has attracted much attention in the most recent literature on him. He reports from Ibn al-Athīr that Rāzī's adversaries in the fitna of Fīrūzkūh accused him of being "a philosopher, meaning according to the language of the Alcoranists [= Karrāmites], an unbeliever." Yet the first question discussed in his book titled Uṣūl al-dīn, d'Herbelot reports correctly from the manuscript at the Royal Library, is directed against the eternity of the world. Whereas his Karrāmite detractors in the fitna of Fīrūzkūh claimed that his teachings are of the same ilk as those of Aristotle, Avicenna, and Fārābī, writes d'Herbelot, it appears from his Uṣūl al-dīn, "that this author was not as Aristotelian as his enemies wanted us to believe, in order to discredit him." The relationship of Rāzī's Aristotelianism, or rather his Avicennism, and his work as an Ashʿarite Muslim theologian is still something that puzzles us today.

The one-column entry on "Razi" is not even the full extent of knowledge that d'Herbelot conveys on Fakhr al-Dīn. Earlier in his dictionary Rāzī's Muḥaṣṣal gets its own entry – which is cross referenced in the article on the author – as does al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī's (d. 675/1276 or 693/1294) well-known commentary on that book, al-Mufaṣṣal fī sharḥ al-Muḥaṣṣal. The title Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīn wa-l-mutaʾakhkhirīn is translated quite correctly as "Sentimens des Metaphysiciens, ou Docteurs Scholastiques tant anciens que modernes," and it is characterized as a work by "the most famous scholastic scholar of the Musulmans," Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.

If we were asked about the most famous scholastic thinker in Christianity, then many today as in the days of d'Herbelot would point to Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274). D'Herbelot

did not exaggerate when he put Rāzī on a level with the great Dominican "doctor angelicus." Fakhr al-Dīn was one of the most influential authors of what we identify as the madrasa era of Islamic intellectual history, an era we now also refer to as post-classical Islam. Johann Jacob Brucker and Barthélemy d'Herbelot were quite aware of Rāzī's great influence and his importance, because they wrote at a time when those madrasas were still functioning and when they educated many students. With the beginning of the colonial era in the Middle East, however, madrasa education would be pushed to the margins and other, Western forms of knowledge reproduction were privileged. For the Western knowledge of leading figures of the madrasa era – or of the post-classical period in Islamic intellectual history – the colonial era often meant a loss rather than an increase of information.

This is nowhere more evident than in the case of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Whereas Brucker and d'Herbelot made strong efforts to gather facts and insights about him, those efforts ceased almost entirely during the 19th century. In their bibliography of academic publications concerned with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, which we find here in print, Damien Janos and M. Fariduddin Attar have found less than a handful of contributions from the 19th century. As far as I know, the German scholar Richard Gosche (1824–89) has a short remark at the end of his monographic article on Ghazālī, where he briefly compares Rāzī's al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya with Ghazālī's Maqāṣid al-falāsifa. Gosche relied in his knowledge about Rāzī on Ḥājjī Khalīfa's (d. 1068/1657) bibliographical encyclopedia Kashf al-ẓunūn, which was already the main source for Barthélemy d'Herbelot, as well as on a manuscript of al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya in the Prussian Royal Library in Berlin. Manuscript catalogues, particularly Wilhelm Ahlwardt's monumental 10-volume catalogue of the manuscripts in the Berlin library, provide the most valuable information on Rāzī and his works throughout the 19th century.

For Western intellectual historians of Islam at the turn of the 20th century, Fakhr al-Dīn was of no interest. He belonged to the group of "epitomists" (Kompendienschreiber), dealt with briefly in Tjitze de Boer's (1866–1942) History of Philosophy in Islam. The book was published in German in 1901 and it treats the likes of Fakhr al-Dīn in a brief chapter, right after Ghazālī. Were his book about education,

writes De Boer, this group of scholars who worked at madrasas "would necessarily have a larger space assigned," but given that he writes a history of philosophy, "we shall dismiss it in a few words."14 On the one hand, De Boer acknowledges that Ghazālī did not destroy philosophy but rather integrated it into the Muslim mainstream, to the extent that "general culture too had adopted an element of philosophical learning." On the other hand, De Boer bemoans a lack of freedom in Muslim societies of this time that led to "a general decay of civilization." Literary production became stagnant and the same was true for philosophy. After Avicenna, "no one felt called upon to come forward with independent views [and] the day had come for abridgements, commentaries, glosses, and glosses upon glosses." So brief are De Boer's remarks in this chapter that he neglects to name any of those who followed Avicenna and Ghazālī. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's name does not appear.

Such lack of attention somewhat changed when in 1905 Rāzī's Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīn wa-l-mutaʾakhkhirīn appeared in a Cairo print.16 The German Privatdozent Max Horten (1874–1945) was one of the first scholars who took notice of this publishing event and who analyzed the book in at least three of his publications.17 Horten's work, however, did not yet create a breakthrough, for if we look at the first edition of the Enzyklopaedie des Islām, which was published in four volumes (plus supplement) during the years 1908 to 1938, we find that it lacks an article on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. The editors must have envisioned it because it is announced to appear under "Rāzī" in one of the earlier volumes.18 Other priorities must have prevailed, however, and when one looks through the third volume covering the letters L to M, which was published in 1936, there is no entry on him.

The encyclopedia's editors must have understood this desideratum, because when in the late 1930s and early 1940s the two Dutch scholars Arent Jan Wensinck (1882–1939) and Johannes Hendrik Kramers (1891–1951) compiled the one-volume Handwörterbuch des Islam from articles that appeared earlier in the much longer Enzyklopaedie des Islām, Kramer himself wrote the missing entry on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.19 This article is, however, relatively short and with just under one page comes nowhere near the five-page-long contribution on Ghazālī, for instance. Still, Kramer's article of 1941 is the first

encyclopedic treatment of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī after d'Herbelot's in 1697. It foreshadows the much longer entry on him in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, published in 1963, now also stretching over almost five encyclopedia pages. Its author Georges C. Anawati (1905–94) was one of the earliest intellectual historians of Islam after the likes of d'Herbelot who understood the importance of Rāzī and who devoted to him the attention that he deserves. Like his predecessor three centuries earlier, Anawati informs his readers about Rāzī's life and also focuses on the fitna of Fīrūzkūh. He provides an annotated worklist that, like that of d'Herbelot, is incomplete and where, just like there, Rāzī's Muḥaṣṣal draws the most attention. Elsewhere Anawati wrote more extensively about Rāzī's life and about the Muḥaṣṣal.

With the generation of Anawati, who was active during the third quarter of the 20th century and who trained many important intellectual historians of Islam, begins the slow academic discovery of Rāzī. The true flowering of studies on him, however, still had to wait for another quarter of a century, because it is only in the 1990s and then in the first decade of the 21st century that we see the first Western monographs on Rāzī together with a general increase in the number of studies.22 From one day to the next, however, this wellspring turns into a flood. The publication of Rāzī's al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya in 1987, a text of which there are hardly any manuscripts in European libraries, led to increased interest in its author. Anawati does not mention al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya in his EI2 article of 1963, yet since it came out in print it has replaced the Muḥaṣṣal as the work that draws the most attention. Finally, with the opening of many manuscript libraries in Istanbul to foreign researchers in 2002, more and more texts became accessible that are not yet available in print.

Today, the field of Rāzī studies is one of the strongest sub-fields in Islamic studies, with contributions on his philosophy, his theology, his ethics, as well as on his works in fiqh and its method, in the natural sciences, and in the occult sciences. We have become keenly aware that Rāzī was one of the most important intellectuals of Islam's post-classical period and, in fact, a thinker who set patterns for much of what we regard as characteristic for this period. As a philosopher he was instrumental in the establishment of the genre of ḥikma; as a theologian he was the creator of the order in

which subjects are dealt with in kalām textbooks of madrasa education; in fiqh he argued for maṣlaḥa as a productive source of law; in the genre of Qur'ān commentary, he went way beyond the text and included rational and scientific explanations of its meaning and examples for its daily usefulness; and in the occult sciences, he introduced teachings from Indian and so-called Ṣabian sages into what became a widespread Muslim understanding of the paranormal and the uncanny. These are just a few examples of the places in post-classical Muslim culture where Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī not only left an imprint, but where he was the originator of major new developments. For at least three centuries after his death, Rāzī remained the reference point in a great number of sciences in Islam. His importance is illustrated, for instance, by his frequent appearance in many chapters on different sciences in Ibn Khaldūn's Muqaddima.

This bibliography, with its 1100 entries, is a testament to the importance of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and to the research on him. Bibliographies like this one are common in other fields of research in the humanities, and even more so in the social sciences, as well as in STEM fields. They were also quite common in the earlier days of Oriental studies, when even the books displayed in the Oriental reading rooms of major research libraries were listed in publications.24 The late 20th century witnessed the elaboration of major bibliographies that focus on publications in particular languages.25 Since then, however, bibliographies have unfortunately become rare. Comprehensive topical bibliographies remain today a desideratum to which selective online tools such as the Oxford Bibliographies series are no substitute.26 With the exception of Jules Janssens' bibliographies on Avicenna27 – which are to some degree a model for this book – there are no recent bibliographic reference works devoted to the various subfields of Islamic intellectual history.

The goal of the present work is to list all modern academic publications that deal with any aspect of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's life and œuvre. Damien Janos and M.F. Attar have helpfully categorized the publications related to Rāzī into different subjects, so that readers may get a clear overview of the research that has been done in a specific subfield of Rāzian studies. This listing is in itself a monumental task, and one can only wish that such inventories be conducted for other major thinkers in Islam. Other

comparable endeavors to what Damien Janos and M.F. Attar have done here would enrich our field and increase the productivity and quality of future work on the history of Islamic thought. <>

HADITH AND ETHICS THROUGH THE LENS OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY by Mutaz Al-khatib [Studies in Islamic Ethics, Brill, 9789004525924]

This volume addresses the interplay of ḥadīth and ethics and contributes to examining the emerging field of ḥadīth-based ethics. The chapters cover four different sections: noble virtues (makārim al-akhlāq) and virtuous acts (faḍāʾil al-aʿmāl); concepts (adab, taḥbīb, ʿuzla); disciplines (ḥadīth transmission, gender ethics); and individual and key traditions (the ḥadīth of intention, consult your heart, key ḥadīths). The volume concludes with a chronologically ordered annotated bibliography of the key primary sources in the Islamic tradition with relevance to understanding the interplay of ḥadīth and ethics. This volume will be beneficial to researchers in the fields of Islamic ethics, ḥadīth studies, moral philosophy, scriptural ethics, religious ethics, and narrative ethics, in addition to Islamic and religious studies in general.

Contributors

Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir, Nuha Alshaar, Safwan Amir, Khairil Husaini Bin Jamil, Pieter Coppens, Chafik Graiguer, M. Imran Khan, Mutaz al-Khatib, Salahudheen Kozhithodi and Ali Altaf Mian.

يتناول هذا الكتاب الصلة بين الحديث والأخلاق، الأمر الذي لم يحظ بالاهتمام في الدراسات المعاصرة حول الأخلاق الإسلامية .فهو يؤسس لفرع أخلاقي جديد اسمه »الأخلاق الحديثية «التي تشكل مع أخلاق القرآن ما يسمى »الأخلاق النصية .«يغطي الكتاب جوانب نظرية وأخرى تطبيقية .فهو يبرز المضمون الأخلاقي الثري لمدونات الحديث، ويضم أربعة أقسام رئيسة هي مكارم الأخلاق وفضائل الأعمال، ومفاهيم الأدب والتحبيب والعزلة، كما يتناول الأبعاد الأخلاقية لرواية الحديث والجندر)النوع الاجتماعي(، بالإضافة إلى الأحاديث المفردة)كحديث إنما الأعمال بالنيات، وحديث استفتِ قلبك (والأحاديث الكلية التي تشكل أصول الحديث ومبادئه الكبرى .يحتوي الكتاب أيضًا على كشاف تحليليّ لأبرز مصنفات المحدثين في الأخلاق .من شأن هذا الكتاب أن يكون مرجعًا للطلاب والباحثين في المجالات الآتية :الأخلاق الإسلامية، والحديث النبوي، والفلسفة الأخلاقية، والأخلاق النصية، والأخلاق الدينية، وأخلاقيات السرد .بالإضافة إلى الدراسات الإسلامية والدينية بشكل عام

المساهمون

شفيق اكّريكّر، وصفوان أمير، وخَيرئيل حسيني بن جميل، ومحمد عمران خان، ومعتز الخطيب، ونهى الشعار، وفقيه الدين عبد القدير، وپيتر كوپنس، وصلاح الدين كوزيتودي، وعلي ألطاف ميان.

CONTENTS

This edited volume addresses the link between *ḥadīth* (Prophetic reports) and ethics, or what can be termed as "*ḥadīth*-based ethics." Despite *ḥadīth* (or Sunna) historically being the second normative source in Islam after the Qurʾān, this topic has not received sufficient attention in the contemporary scholarship on Islamic ethics. Indeed, *ḥadīth* played a key role in the development of Islamic thought and in forming *ʿulūm al-sharīʿa* (Islamic sciences), as has been noted by some contemporary scholars.[1] This volume introduces *ḥadīth*-based ethics as a sub-discipline of Islamic ethics and fills the gap within the scholarship on Islamic ethics and *ḥadīth* studies since one of its key characteristics is applying an interdisciplinary approach to both *ḥadīth* and ethics.

Approaching *ḥadīth* as a reference for ethics reflects the intensity of the ethical content contained in the Prophetic traditions and practices. To do so, one can distinguish between two levels of analysis. At the first level, the Prophetic Sunna is approached as a revealed reference or an exemplary application of the revelation. At the second level, the Sunna is approached as a historical reference for the ethics that prevailed in the formative period of Islamic history.

The mainstream position in Islamic history has held that declaring things and actions as good (*taḥsīn*) or bad (*taqbīḥ*) should be premised on revelation, not on human intellect as claimed by the Muʿtazila (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1996, 6/1:7–8, 6/2:323; al-Taftāzānī 1998, 4:282–283; Hourani 1985, 57–66; Shihadeh 2016, 384–407). If this is the case, then it should have been the standard that the Qurʾān and *ḥadīth* are the sources of both legislation and ethics. Historical reality, however, shows such theorising in Islamic legal theory (*uṣūl al-fiqh*) and jurisprudence (*fiqh*) but not so much in the field of Islamic ethics, where the role of *ḥadīth* or Sunna, like the Qurʾān, has been marginalised in classical Islamic moral philosophy. Furthermore, Majid Fakhry (d. 2021), in his book *Ethical Theories in Islam*, and Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī (d. 2010), in his book *al-ʿAql al-Akhlāqī l-ʿArabī* ("The Arabic Moral Reason"), introduced what were claimed to be comprehensive overviews of Islamic literature on ethics in the Islamic

tradition (Fakhry 1991; al-Jābirī 2001), but *ḥadīth* was, as clearly reflected in their works, absent in their overview of ethics in the Islamic tradition.

In contrast to the case of theoretical ethics, the practical and behavioural elements of the Prophetic *ḥadīth* have received extensive attention by *ḥadīth* scholars who have produced a vast genre, including the ethical aspects of Sunna. An extensive amount of *ḥadīth* literature has also been dedicated to *ādāb* (sing. *adab*, etiquettes and good manners) which have sometimes addressed professional ethics, such as the *ādāb* of the narrator of *ḥadīth* and the one who listens to him (*ādāb al-rāwī wa-l-sāmiʿ*), and the *ādāb* of the senior and junior jurists (*ādāb al-faqīh wa-l-mutafaqqih*). Additionally, some books have focused on outlining good and bad character (*maḥāsin al-akhlāq wa-masāwiʾuhā*), religious etiquettes (*al-ādāb al-sharʿiyya*), the etiquette of dealing with parents (*birr al-wālidayn*) and so forth. Other books are dedicated to the virtues and vices (*al-faḍāʾil wa-l-radhāʾil*); books enlisting incentives to do good (*targhīb*) and deterrents from doing evil (*tarhīb*); books concerned with the branches of faith (*shuʿab al-īmān*); books on virtues which vary according to persons, ages and times; and the Sufi literature on asceticism (*zuhd*), remembrance of God, supplication (*ādāb al-duʿāʾ*), spiritual diseases of the heart (*iʿtilāl al-qulūb*) and so on (al-Kattānī 1993, 50–60).

The six canonical collections of *ḥadīth* also had specific chapters dedicated to the *aḥādīth* on manners and ethics, whose total number reached more than 500 in the *Sunan* compiled by Abū Dāwūd (d. 275/888) and exceeded 600 in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Ibn Ḥibbān (d. 354/965) (al-Arnāʾūṭ and al-Qayyām 1999, 1:8). Moreover, the ethics of the Prophet (*akhlāq al-nabī*) were the subject of dedicated books, such as Abū l-Shaykh's work (1998), or occupied segments in books on the biography of the Prophet, meant to provide the exemplary model of ethics to be followed.

This Book

Against this background, the majority of this volume's chapters originated from a seminar I convened on "*Ḥadīth* and Ethics: Concepts, Approaches and Theoretical Foundations," at the Research Center for Islamic Legislation and Ethics (CILE) between

30 April and 2 May 2019. This seminar complemented a previous initiative on "Qurʾān and Ethics" within CILE's broader vision, which seeks to canonise the field of Islamic ethics through two different methods: teaching and producing reference works that help to fill the gaps and theorise the field.

This volume consists of 12 chapters that address the interplay of *ḥadīth* and ethics and contribute to examining *ḥadīth*-based ethics, which will hopefully inspire future studies to cover further aspects of this emerging field.

Broadly speaking, the chapters included in this volume cover five main aspects related to *ḥadīth* and ethics:

1. a theoretical foundation for *ḥadīth*-based ethics as a scholarly sub-discipline of Islamic ethics (chapter 1);
2. virtue ethics: noble virtues (*makārim al-akhlāq*) and virtuous acts (*faḍāʾil al-aʿmāl*), covered by chapters 4 and 5;
3. moral concepts (*adab, taḥbīb, ʿuzla*), covered by chapters 2, 6 and 7;
4. *ḥadīth*-related sub-disciplines (*ḥadīth* transmission, gender ethics), covered by chapters 8 and 9; and
5. foundational *ḥadīths* on ethics (the *ḥadīth* of intention, consult your heart, and other key *ḥadīths*), which are covered by chapters 3, 10 and 11.

These five sections offer various approaches to studying ethics in *ḥadīth* works. Chapters 1 through 5 focus on the overarching framework to scriptural ethics. As is argued in chapter 2, *ḥadīth*-based ethics "initiated an epistemological shift in the understanding of *adab*; namely, that it had been informed solely by customary law and human knowledge but came to be seen as dictated by divine command and associated with religious sensitivity." In chapter 3, examining specific key traditions is employed as one approach to study ethics in *ḥadīth*. Chapter 4 on Ibn Abī l-Dunyā (d. 281/894) represents an attempt to establish a new field by Islamising common morality through *ḥadīth*. In chapter 5, which takes the case of al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and his

commentators, the author examines what "*ḥadīth*-based ethics" means: is it only its attribution to the Prophet as long as it is about common knowledge of morality, or should it strictly follow the technicalities of authenticity as outlined in the *ḥadīth* sciences?

Chapters 6–7 and 10–11 focus on discipline-based approaches where ethics is studied through (a) personal accounts: al-Jīlānī's (d. 561/1166) conception and practice of *taḥbīb*, and al-Nābulusī's (d. 1143/1731) conception and practice of seclusion, and (b) interdisciplinary approaches where individual *ḥadīth*s are analysed through the lens of different disciplines, such as the *ḥadīth*s: "deeds are judged by intention" and "consult your heart." Chapters 8 and 9 especially focus on the role of interpretation in restoring the fundamental idea of *ḥadīh* as deeply intertwined with ethics. Chapter 8, in particular, utilises a Derridean trace to present the *quṣṣāṣ'* (storytellers/preachers) impact on the Sunna's transmission to the wider Muslim community. Meanwhile chapter 9 addresses "conflicting *ḥadīth*s" (*mukhtalif al-ḥadīth*) in searching for egalitarian gender ethics.

Chapter 12 can be considered as an appendix in which a classification of the key primary sources in the Islamic tradition that are relevant to the field of *ḥadīth* and ethics are presented in the form of an annotated bibliography.

After outlining the key ideas and approaches examined in this volume and the rationale of combining them together in one work, below, I provide a more elaborate overview of each chapter:

In chapter 1, "*Ḥadīth*-based Ethics: *Ḥadīth* as a Scholarly Sub-Discipline of Islamic Ethics," Mutaz al-Khatib lays out the foundations for *ḥadīth*-based ethics as a sub-discipline in Islamic ethics. This chapter provides the theoretical ground for the following chapters that tackle some of the issues in this emerging field. It reveals the value of *ḥadīth* as a corpus on ethics, conceptualises "*ḥadīth*-based ethics," classifies relevant works, and defines the key themes and issues in this emerging discipline.

In chapter 2, "*Ḥadīth* and the Concept of *Adab* as Moral Education," Nuha Alshaar treats the interaction between *ḥadīth* and the concept of "*adab*," historically a term with wide semantic meanings. *Adab* here is dealt with primarily as knowledge, an ethical call to action, and, especially, as a required form of training for those aspiring to maintain good manners, proper etiquette, and cleanse the soul.

In chapter 3, "al-Aḥādīth al-Kulliyya: Min al-Aḥkām al-Tafṣīliyya ilā al-Qawāʿid wa-l-Mabādiʾ al-Akhlāqiyya" ("Beyond *Aḥādīth al-Aḥkām*: From Detailed Rulings to Ethical Fundamentals and Principles"), Mutaz al-Khatib argues that the *ḥadīth* corpus comprises of key traditions that can serve as proper foundations for approaching *ḥadīth* literature as a repository of ethics, and where the focus will move: (a) from studying individual traditions to examining the overall governing system of *ḥadīth*; and (b) from the mono-disciplinary approach where *fiqh* is dominant, to an interdisciplinary approach where *fiqh* is one part of a much larger whole. The main part of this chapter analyses the key *ḥadīth*s categorised by *ḥadīth* scholars, including Abū Dāwūd (d. 275/888), Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1245), al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277) and others, such as *jawāmiʿ al-kalim* or those upon which the edifice of the Islamic tradition is constructed (*al-aḥādīth allatī ʿalayhā madār al-islām*).

In chapter 4, "al-Ḥāfiẓ Ibn Abī l-Dunyā wa-l-Taʾsīs li-Akhlāqiyyāt al-Makārim" ("Ibn Abī l-Dunyā and the Formation of the Ethics of Noble Deeds"), Chafik Graiguer argues that Ibn Abī l-Dunyā's work can be seen as an attempt to establish a *ḥadīth*-based ethics where *makārim al-akhlāq* refers to: human dignity, *murūʾa* (which contains a set of values in Arab pre-Islamic morality) and rationality. Ibn Abī l-Dunyā's work also addresses *faḍāʾil*, hence the ethics in Ibn Abī l-Dunyā's work are scriptural, in terms of form, and rational, in terms of content and sources.

In chapter 5, "Narrations on Virtuous Acts in Epitomes of al-Ghazālī's *Iḥyāʾ*: From Ibn al-Jawzī's *Minhāj al-Qāṣidīn* to its Reception in Modernity," Pieter Coppens focuses on the reception of the *Iḥyāʾ* in the Ḥanbalī circles of Baghdad and Damascus, with the epitomes of Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201) and Ibn Qudāma (d. 689/1290) at its centre. He argues that their criticism of al-Ghazālī's use of unreliable *ḥadīth* in matters related to

virtuous acts (*faḍā'il al-aʿmāl*) was among their main motivations for composing their texts.

In chapter 6, "*Ḥadīth* and Sufism in Ethical Discourse: Exploring ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī's Conception of *Taḥbīb*," Salahudheen Kozhithodi and Khairil Husaini Bin Jamil delve into the *ḥadīth al-taḥbīb* which reads: "I was made to love (*ḥubbiba ilay*) from your world; women and perfume, and I found the coolness of my eyes in the prayer." They argue for the intertwinement of *ḥadīth* and Sufism as a mechanism for ethical discourse where Sufi ethics claim a scriptural foundation, as evident in the scholarship of ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (d. 561/1166).

In chapter 7, "Seclusion: An Ethical Imperative Driven by the *Ḥadīth*," Mohammed Imran Khan explores ʿAbd al-Ghanī l-Nābulusī's (d. 1143/1730) seclusion (*ʿuzla*) in light of some of the moral and social dilemmas of associating with others. He argues that al-Nābulusī's concern for seclusion is justified by the *ḥadīth* traditions, and it is moral outrage which compels al-Nābulusī to write the tract as an ethical defence of his actions.

In chapter 8, "The Ethical in the Transmission of Sunna: Rethinking the *ʿUlamā'-Quṣṣāṣ* Conflict," Safwan Amir argues that the oft-neglected *quṣṣāṣ* (storyteller-preacher) played a vital role in directly conveying the Sunna to the larger public. He suggests that the *quṣṣāṣ* not only provide us with alternative histories to how knowledge was transmitted, taught, and realised in the Islamic tradition, but they also restore the fundamental idea of the *ḥadīth* as deeply intertwined with the ethical.

In chapter 9, "Abū Shuqqa's Approach to *Ḥadīth*: Towards an Egalitarian Islamic Gender Ethics," Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir tackles the question of how *ḥadīth*s have been reinterpreted to explain Islamic egalitarian gender ethics, through an analysis of ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Muḥammad Abū Shuqqa's (d. 1995) *Taḥrīr al-Marʾa fī ʿAṣr al-Risāla: Dirāsa ʿan al-Marʾa Jāmiʿa li-Nuṣūṣ al-Qurʾān wa-Ṣaḥīḥay al-Bukhārī wa-Muslim* ("The Liberation of Women at the Time of the Message: A Study on Women Composed of Qurʾānic Texts, and the *Ṣaḥīḥ*s of al-Bukhārī and Muslim").

In chapter 10, "Islamic Ethics and the *Ḥadīth* of Intention," Ali Altaf Mian contextualises "the *ḥadīth* of intention" in order to demonstrate, in part, the salience of *ḥadīth* texts as important sources for the study of Islamic ethics. He relates this *ḥadīth* to three broader themes in Islamic ethics. In doing so, he problematises the binary of the inner (*bāṭin*) and outer (*ẓāhir*) and highlights the social dimensions of intention through the illustration of migration, which signals the public – and not merely private – nature of intentions. The chapter also considers the multiple valences of intention in everyday Muslim religiosity.

In chapter 11, "Consult Your Heart: The Self as a Source of Moral Judgment," Mutaz al-Khatib explores the authority of the heart (*qalb*) as a potential locus of individual moral knowledge and normativity in Islamic ethics. To do so, he discusses two *ḥadīths* that ostensibly suggest that one's "self" is a potential source of the moral judgment. He argues that although the Islamic legal tradition, as a discipline, has focused on qualified external actions of individuals and the *ijtihād* (independent legal reasoning) of *mujtahid*s (jurists), it did not ignore the authority of the *bāṭin* over moral evaluation and the *ijtihād* of common individuals (*ijtihād al-mukallafīn*).

In chapter 12, "Muṣannafāt al-Muḥaddithīn fī l-Akhlāq: Kashshāf Awwalī" ("The Compendia of the Scholars of *Ḥadīth* on Ethics: A Preliminary Survey"), Mutaz al-Khatib presents a chronological bibliography of the key primary sources in the Islamic tradition with relevance to understanding the interplay of *ḥadīth* and ethics. The bibliography is preceded by an analytical introduction. This addition to the volume is meant to serve as a tool for future researchers to benefit from and build upon.

Although this volume is meant to provide theoretical foundations and insights about the study of *ḥadīth* as a crucial and rich source of Islamic ethics, there is a further thematic focus shared by various chapters, i.e., ethical subjectivity and relevant concepts such as intention, seclusion, noble virtues, *taḥbīb*, and consulting the heart.

The last editorial note I want to make here is that I have decided to pursue a systematic referencing to *ḥadīth* (*takhrīj*) and that is by referring to the book (*kitāb*) and the

chapter (*bāb*). The purpose of that is not just for technical benefit and following the traditionists' method but also to highlight the thematic relevance and the moral argument behind each title if any. <>

Troubling Topics, Sacred Texts: Readings in Hebrew Bible, New Testament, and Qur'an edited by: Roberta Sterman Sabbath [De Gruyter, 9783110650617]

Abrahamic scriptures serve as cultural pharmakon, prescribing what can act as both poison and remedy. This collection shows that their sometimes veiled but eternally powerful polemics can both destroy and build, exclude and include, and serve as the ultimate justification for cruelty or compassion.

Here, scholars not only excavate these works for their formative and continuing cultural impact on communities, identities, and belief systems, they select some of the most troubling topics that global communities continue to navigate. Their analysis of both texts and their reception help explain how these texts promote norms and build collective identities.

Rejecting the notion of the sacred realm as separate from the mundane realm and beyond critical challenge, this collection argues—both implicitly and sometimes transparently—for the presence of the sacred within everyday life and open to challenge. The very rituals, prayers, and traditions that are deemed sacred interweave into our cultural systems in infinite ways. Together, these authors explore the dynamic nature of everyday life and the often-brutal power of these texts over everyday meaning.

CONTENTS

Abrahamic scriptures serve as a cultural pharmakon prescribing what can act as both poison and remedy. This collection affirms that sacred texts can be more powerful than the sword, a bomb, or the internet of today's world in reaping havoc on the human experience. They serve as fire, lightning, and flood to cause destruction, suffering, and death. Their political nature enflames, justifies, and inspires military ventures. No use of sacred text for violence is innocent. No sacred text is apolitical. Both sides in a war can feel and claim God is on their side. The collection shows that their sometimes veiled but eternally powerful polemics can destroy and build, exclude and include, and serve as the ultimate justification for cruelty or compassion.

Authors here demonstrate compassion by finding cracks through which the light of inclusivity can shine. The production of sacred texts stems from multiple histories, contexts, and receptions. These sacred texts function to bequeath meaning, validation, and vindication in lived experiences and are inherently polemical. Here, scholars excavate these works for their formative and continuing cultural impact on communities, identities, and belief systems by probing some of the most troubling topics that communities across the globe navigate.

More specifically, contributors here recognize that sacred texts serve to define individual identity and promote collective norms. Providing the flexible scholarly tools to identify the mechanisms of that function, Cultural Studies developed as a robust strategy embracing a diversity of methodologies. In the 1970s, the Birmingham School

of Cultural Studies, notably Stuart Hall among others, articulated the tradition. Later Frederic Jameson and more recently Giorgio Agamben, contributed to an interdisciplinary approach in considering the performance of text and culture. An update to the Cultural Studies tradition has been suggested by law professor Kimberlé Crenshaw i. e., the concept of intersectionality, a term that serves to identify our combinations of identities and the role those combinations play in either empowering or disempowering us. I am reminded of the story of Ruth whose very identity exemplifies intersectionality. She is not only disempowered as a Moabite but also as a woman and finally as widow. The intersectionality of her multiple, marginalized identities radicalizes her status as a disempowered human being. By using a Cultural Studies lens, readers identify how a text, in this case the story of Ruth, is informed by and constructs individual identity and collective responses.

One of the most important methodologies in this collection is the interrogation of ways to think about the sacred. Traditional wisdom suggests a hierarch ical binary of the sacred and profane realms, defined most notably by Emile Durkheim. The sacred realm is thought of as separated from the human realm and deemed superior. Disagreeing with that familiar hierarchy, in his Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Giorgio Agamben examines the historicity of the sacred and profane categories. Agamben argues that the binary only serves to control human desire in the service of political and social power.

My interest in Cultural Studies as related to Abrahamic sacred texts began with the development of the project Sacred Tropes: Tanakh, New Testament, and Qur'an as Literature and Culture (Brill 2009). Introducing sacred Abrahamic texts as providing, among other functions, authority for social values, hegemonic power, and hierarchical status, the collection points to the infra- and inter-narrative discourse as signifiers and transmitters of communal norms. It is communal norms, as they developed and exist, that Troubling Topics, Sacred Texts continues to explore. In many ways, these chapters deny the neutral analytic style of academic writing revealing the authors personal proclivity, passion, and purpose. Contributors trespass the bounds and conventions of

traditional academic writing to merge the personal with the public voice to share the wisdom of those who have been studying their topics for years and in most cases decades.

In the above discussion, I have argued the importance of a polymorphous set of methodologies. Still, to make a large number of topics manageable, I enlisted a thematic approach suggested by comparative studies to tame and give shape to this project. Thus, the theme of troubling topics emerged. While the theme of troubling topics attracted discussants, organizing their chapters into clusters that identifed attributes of that theme contributed clarity to its power. The six sections into which the chapters are grouped enable the appearance in plain sight of realities that affect and trouble our daily lives: Gender & Sexuality, Body & Appearance, Women & Feminism, Death & Mourning, Life & Humor, and Crime & Disobedience.

What I discovered in reflecting upon the various contributors' introductory comments to the six sections was a shared message: the importance of focusing on the dynamic nature of everyday life and on the often brutal power of sacred texts to influence everyday opinions. For example, Gender & Sexuality introducer Monique Moultrie experienced that rhetorical brutality. As a child she heard of the oft-repeated preaching of both love and homophobia in a rural Baptist church. For Moultrie, Gender and Sexuality Studies show how gender, race, sexuality, and religion interact serving a social-formative function. She echoes J. Richard Middleton who, in his introduction to Death & Mourning, demonstrates how texts describe and guide the human existential experience through "orientation, disorientation, and new orientation." Middleton's point begs the question about the nature of that "new orientation" used for polemic purpose. What does that attempt at coherence look like? Who gets included, who excluded, who empowered and validated, who disempowered and marginalized?

Using the methodologies of Gender and Disability Studies to engage with the chapters in Body & Appearance, Marvin Sweeney confirms the intimacy of sacred texts to define what and how we think about our bodies related to gender, disability, nudity. He notes one foundational yet missing human bodily function not touched in the collection, the

sexual desire as expressed in the lyrical poetry of the Song of Songs. His point begs the question, Is there a methodology of desire? Or more radically, are all the methodologies different ways to talk about desire?

Ash Geissinger, in introducing Life & Humor, highlights the "political, social, and economic context" of the section chapters. Geissinger identifies that "individual spiritual gifts are carefully contained" by sacred texts whose polemics always attempt to act as agents of control. Geissinger notes that the chapters inform us not only of institutional power but also of a liberatory grass roots collective power thru individual agency. This suggests what the critical approach of New Historicism has helped us to see, the play of power on our individual lives.

Emran El-Badawi reminds us in introducing Crime & Disobedience that religious institutional power in its use of sacred texts harkens back to the concept of hegemony, defined by Antonio Gramsci to identify the powerplay amongst multiple influencers: ideas, texts, institutions, and grass roots expressions of desire. Linking the general concept of hegemony to its earthly particularity, Tammi Schneider, in her introductory comments for Women & Feminism, focuses on the brutality against women inscribed, normalized, and justified by institutions using sacred texts as playbooks. Referring to the Abrahamic texts writ large, Schneider opines that "all these textual traditions, and the communities who view them as sacred were produced about men, by men, for men."

Each chapter focuses on multiple layers of the human experience, a reality reflecting how we live, the multiple registers we occupy, and the formative powers that define us. This brief review of introducer comments hopefully has demonstrated how more than one methodology forms an analytic tool kit. The resulting analyses identify the play of power used to control and to define what is acceptable and what is not by a dominating set of controls revealed in these sacred texts: legalistic, ritualistic and cultural.

Gender & Sexuality

This section, introduced by Monique Moultrie, addresses perhaps the most fundamental and formational dimensions of the human experience. Gender & Sexuality recognizes that, since the earliest of civilizations and certainly in Mesopotamia, a well-established hierarchy of male domination marginalized fifty per cent of the world population through cultural and religious authority and tradition. In spite of the apparent attempt at maintaining a clear binary that supported male domination, three chapters reveal just how empty is that attempt at hierarchy and how hidden in front of our eyes are holes in that apparent seamless gender portrait. The chapters reveal the fuzzy gender identity of sacred foundational portraits.

Kecia Ali continues to enliven the voices of women as both scholars and literary figures. Ali demonstrates how the Qur'an oscillates between highlighting Mary's femaleness and simultaneously likening Mary to the prophetic and pious males in the Qur'an. The text offers rich notions of gender, kinship, and power. Ali argues that Mary's story is queer because the scriptural text consistently refuses gender-role binaries, even as it exalts Mary's motherhood and recognizes her embodied experience.

Benjamin H. Dunning uses his logical strategy to reveal the illogic in concluding that Paul's work censuring same sex desire is unequivocal. By reviewing other treatment in both academe and suggestive of the oft-used homiletics, Dunning helps us question the limitations, even from a textual basis, of those judgments. Dunning explores the problem of same-sex desire in Romans 1:18 - 32, the only extended reflection on the issue in the New Testament. Locating Romans within a tradition of anthropological speculation has the potential to render more visibly clear the degree to which the text's seemingly straightforward censorship relies upon an ostensible stability to sexed subject positions that the apostle's thought does not in fact provide.

Nicholaus Pumphrey conjectures that the fixity of Joseph in both the Hebrew Bible and Qur'an comes into question when examining the narrative closely. Idiosyncratic descriptions of Joseph include his beauty, suggesting attractiveness to both men and

women, the jealousy that he engendered whether with his siblings or the Egyptian court, and the purpose for his acquisition. Pumphrey argues that Joseph functions as a helpful example to demonstrate that biblical gender norms, especially masculinity, are not as fixed or binary as many biblical readers assume. Pumphrey's close reading of Joseph pericopes in both the Torah and Qur'an reveal a polymorphous performance of gender.

Body & Appearance

The second section, introduced by Marvin Sweeney, addresses how communities and individuals are nothing if not judgmental about the performance of the body and its appearance. No persona in these sacred texts is without nuance and thus especially rich for culturally co-opted polemical purpose. Body & Appearance highlights the reality that presentation of the self is a dynamic process between culture and self, with culture arguably exerting an irrevocable power over our own understanding and expectations of our selves. The chapters here suggest the importance of looking at the body as a body and the powerful signification that the culturally imbedded body exerts on our cultural education. Here contributors show us how the disabled, androgynous, and naked body inform that project.

Andrew Davis deauraticizes Job as patience personified. He argues that Job, while his behavior may be laudable, is not perfect and shows how Job donates for status, not divine reward. Job's speeches show he expected a quid pro quo. Job judges those to whom he donates as needy, even demanding, lower status, alien to his status. He is not the perfect altruistic donor, but his actions are righteous. The irony is that his friends try to judge him on the ancient standard of historical retribution for divine judgment. He insists there was no cause either for divine judgment or need even for his own redemption. The ultimate irony of Job is that God returns or provides a new set of children, wealth but does not refresh Job's face. He remains old and weathered. The text even denies a connection between righteousness and prosperity. His disfigurement is not made whole. It will remain with him the rest of his life, leaving many existential questions unanswered.

Hadas Hirsch shows the importance of fashion whose details the Qur'an emphasizes in order to establish gender hierarchy, social inclusion and exclusion, and organizational stability. Hirsch explains how the Muslim biblical and social tradition marks the divisions between non-Muslim/Muslim, men/women, married/concubine, young, attractive, and fertile/older, unattractive, and infertile, sinful/pure, war/peace, metonymy/metaphor with dress. Also, a possible third gender in heaven is suggested in the Qur'an. While clothing and other heavenly rewards are meant to be read metaphorically as the immaterial just rewards for leading a virtuous life, lived reality attests to the everyday consequences of these outward signs.

William Thomas McBride points to the naked body as a form of narrative seduction, a literary tool as old as humanity. McBride demonstrates that nakedness serves as a trope rich with many a cultural, religious, and literary import. Whether by Ham uncovering Noah's nakedness, Moses privileged visualization of YHWH unveiled, or the naked body of Jesus portrayed in medieval art, McBride sees representations of nakedness as sources of sexual desire, identification of sin, and ultimately institutional, patriarchal power. McBride turns to Moby Dick for Melville's use of the trope of nakedness linked to divine power in the exposure of the "dazzling hump" of the sperm whale.

Women & Feminism

The section Women & Feminism, introduced by Tammi Schneider, tackles the reality of embedded patriarchal power of Abrahamic sacred texts, Made clear is the essentially enriching and inclusive project in women as religious guides, exegetical readers, and communal leaders.

Women & Feminism, with nuance and stark clarity, shows that these texts are essentially written by men, about men, and for men. Yet, that having been said, these texts, according to contributors, reveal not only the power of women to subvert and challenge patriarchal traditions consistently and profoundly but that their leadership, as performed within the narratives, is also incontrovertible and often enacting critical

divine design. Also, with stark clarity, the texts memorialize the ill treatment that victimizes women by accepted religious and social practice.

Naomi Graetz has dedicated much of her academic life reminding us that domestic violence has plagued our humanity since the earliest written documents and that biblical stories often deliver radical portraits of the ugliest sides of humanity. Graetz guides us through one of the most troubling episodes in the Hebrew bible, the rape and dismemberment of the concubine of Gibeah. Using an intertextual strategy that links the concubine of Gibeah pericope to other episodes in the Hebrew Bible, Graetz shows how discreet elements may be coded either positive or negative, resulting in this pericope potentially providing a profoundly cautionary interpretation.

Gail Labovitz reveals the shocking denigration of portraits of women in specific talmudic selections. Labovitz examines rabbinic readings of gender in the creation story of Genesis, and particularly a recurring rabbinic motif found in midrash (Genesis and Leviticus Rabbah) and the Babylonian Talmud (Berakhot 61a and Eruvin 18a-b) of the original human as an androgyne or co-joined male/female pair. Bringing together contemporary cultural studies and feminist discussion as well as biblical and rabbinic scholarship, she dissects rabbinic ambivalence about whether women and femininity have a place in the original scheme of human creation and considers how modern Jewish feminist readers might, or might not, be able to extract any redemptive, recoverable theology from this tradition.

Tammy Heise reminds us that sacred texts serve political agendas as powerfully if not more so than weapons. Centuries of racism, oppression, and self-denigration are all reinforced by texts bequeathed with having unquestioned authority. Heise reports that white evangelicals have rejected gender egalitarianism by hardening their commitment to "biblical literalism" through a new emphasis on biblical inerrancy and enlisting the Curse of Ham and the Curse of Cain as justifications. Heise demonstrates how white evangelicals become important promoters of the new evangelical style of biblical literalism through their grassroots political organizing in support of conservative

causes and help make opposition to feminism, gay rights, and racial integration seem natural and biblically justified.

Mariah Richardson de-romanticizes the Book of Esther to remind us that women are regularly objectified, traded, and raped for the king's pleasure. She theorizes, "What if you were an older teenage girl deprived of sexual activity, isolated from your family, and massaged regularly with oils by maids for an entire year?" The colonization and subsequent slavery of the female body, the conquest of both the psychological and physical human being, reminds us that, in the Book of Esther, the woman so admired is also the woman erased. Nevertheless, as Richardson opines, Esther's agency surmounts her victimization to prevent the annihilation of her Jewish people in Persia.

Taira Amin points to the insidious way any sacred texts, through nuance and narrative, logic and polemics, interweave judgments upon categories of humanity, in this case, women. She notes that, thanks to Islamic commentary, how the anecdotal becomes the universal and ultimately the culturally internalized into accepted commonsense judgment. Amin informs us that one of the most widely discussed and yet under-researched Qur'anic concepts is the notion of kayd (to scheme). Although the concept has been used in the Qur'an multiple times, all too often, in the extra-Qur'anic sources like the tafsir, hadith and broader religious and popular literature, the notion of kayd is largely attributed to women with derogatory connotations which are often used to construct and represent problematic perceptions of women as inherently dangerous and corrupting.

Death & Mourning

The fourth section, introduced by J. Richard Middleton, explores the portraits of death and dying that fill our texts, questioning the very meaning of life framed by birth and death. Death & Mourning reminds us of the most profound existen tial questions. Are we born to die? Must we suffer to prove our faith? Can God be both merciful and vengeful? What is divine justice? Can we put God on trial? And why do good people

suffer if God is merciful? Topics such as after-death punishment and reward, Holocaust/Shoah, compassion, and everyday spirituality continue to beg for answers.

Zev Garber explains how the Akedah, reinforced through ritual, homiletics and liturgy, serves as a template for innumerable everyday and extraordinary personal decisions: to give charity, to die, to sanctify the name of God by death, to offer one's life to save another, to preserve life, to repent, to stand up against oppression and annihilation, to expiate. Horror exists in the Hebrew Bible just as in reality. Garber connects the diverse prongs of rabbinic interpretations of the Akedah with ways survivors and witnesses memorialize the Shoah/Holocaust. He connects three essential ways to understand the binding of Isaac with three mainstream ways to understand the Holocaust.

Sarah Corrigan broaches the topic, "Where is God when most needed?" She points to the heart wrenching absence of divinity when human pain is beyond what is bearable. Solace, suggests Corrigan, can come in the form of lamentations, the expression of the pain. Corrigan's musings lead us to the question of God's abandonment, the works that put God on trial, and those that hold God to task for catastrophes. While these plaintiffs may nevertheless admit their culpability, Lamentations cries out against the divine firestorm. Corrigan points to the lonely victim and the collective solace available to those who suffer through these expressions of loss, pain, and mourning.

Kathleen Lundeen touches on the essential divinity of the everyday as promoted in the tradition of the English Romantics, thus privileging the human experience of history over the promised life after death. Lundeen confronts the ultimate question of Job: whether ill fortune connects to divine punishment and why the good person suffers. Enlisting John Milton's reading of Job and William Blake's reading of Milton, Lundeen demonstrates how English Romantics attest to the transforrnative power of recognizing the divine in the ordinary, the culminating message of Job.

Roberta Sabbath traces treatment of suicide beginning with biblical texts, rabbinic responsa, homiletics, and philosophic discourse to contemporary Jewish denominational leadership. Unlike in everyday life where death by suicide is rarely

discussed, in the Hebrew Bible and subsequent Jewish texts, suicide receives robust attention, underlining the reality that suicide is as old as writing. Sabbath discovers that the dominant treatment in texts and in Jewish traditions across denominations is one of compassion. Of primary importance is providing comfort to survivors as preparation for a thriving life after the devastating loss of a loved one and to secure the eternal life of the deceased as part of that comfort to survivors.

Walid Saleh reminds us of the development of a text and the early stages of a religion. In this context, the intersection amongst the monotheistic, pagan, and tribal worlds inevitably all informed a developing worldview. Saleh writes that the problem of death was a salient feature of the late antique world, and many sacred texts of this period can be seen as grappling with the problem. Saleh demonstrates that the Qur'an transforms the pagan Arab finality of death into a gateway for a post-death existence in which the morally responsible human being experiences something akin to the heavenly lives of the classical gods while those who bypassed their moral responsibility experience endless torment.

Life & Humor

Fifth section contributors, introduced by Ash Geissinger, demonstrate that, for millennia, the faithful and the doubters alike look to sacred texts for guidance in making life's most mundane decisions. These texts guide us in our duty to ourselves as well as our communities. They allow us to laugh at ourselves even in times of trauma. And, all too often, they are used as cudgels to suppress, control, and justify excluding and marginalizing the Other as well as politicizing religious institutional power. Life & Humor reveals textual immanent divinity within ethical ideals related to wealth, ethnicity, humor, and institutional power. The section reflects the complexity of our earthly lives that must balance spirituality and communal responsibility with individual agency and explores how humor and laughter express individual agency in the face of both.

Mourad Takawi argues that the human experience of divine immanence appears in the Qur'an in addition to, rather than in place of, divine transcendence. Takawi examines Sura 48 to discover not the traditional exegetical emphasis of this sura on military victory but instead, and more clearly and powerfully, the individualized experience of divine immanence, called the Sakinah. While Islam is often attributed with possessing the purest expression of divine transcendence, Takawi has identified Qur'anic expression of divine presence and immanence as well as dramatic and affirming intertextuality with the Torah and Gospels.

Kerry Danner reminds us of the powerful ethical directive to care for those in need in our communities. In her focus on Luke, we see the continuation of the tradition begun in biblical verses that will itself be continued in Lukan ones. Danner critically guides us through the shared traditions of early biblical and rabbinic Jewish traditions that profoundly influenced the earliest Christian understanding of responsibility to care for the needy. She enlists contemporary thinkers who parse the Lukan tradition in order to better evaluate its relevance to today's ethical challenges of equity and charity.

Roni Cohen brings the satire, parody, and irony of medieval Jewish European context into our twenty-first century aesthetic. We can appreciate the delicious self-reflexivity, ability to laugh at ourselves, and the recognition of political hierarchies that marked equally medieval yesteryear and today's polities. Cohen reminds us that the ability to laugh at ourselves and our own troubles is perhaps one of life's best medicines. He examines the parody of the Megillah of Esther, the Midrash that describes and celebrates the Queen who was willing to sacrifice her own well-being to save Jews against a threat of annihilation by Haman. The medieval Midrash parody turns the tables and makes Haman the victim with all of the parodic elements of satire.

Daniel Nii Aboagye Aryeh points to the power of the polemics of biblical language to serve as a tool of control both in the service of cruelty and compassion. He argues that the message of inclusivity and compassion exist in the Lukan verses. Aryeh discusses the multifaceted issues of ethnicity and miracles and Lepers in Luke 17:11 — 19. In his socio-rhetorical exegesis of the text, he argues that the repeated terms, phrases, and

concepts in the pericope are designed to keep the attention of the audience and to eliminate ethnocentric elements. The reference to ancient biblical Israelites' religious worship center—the Temple, the priest, and the religious and political city—Jerusalem, indicate that the author uses a biblical Israelite's point of view in composing the narrative. It is an epideictic rhetoric based on pathos argumentation for the audience to see Jesus as a social reformer and miracle worker inspiring us to emulate the character of the Samaritan ex-Leper.

Leonardo D'Avila peels away the centuries of doctrine, tradition, and institutional power to demonstrate that Paul's works were used to bequeath ultimate power to a burgeoning Church in favor of political stability over individual and communal liberation. D'Avila explains the development of theology through the iteration of translation, figuration, and polemics. He emphasizes the political expediency for Church hegemony to emphasize the mind/body duality and transcendent religiosity to serve as cudgel for compliance with Church hegemonic control.

Crime & Disobedience

Final section contributors, introduced by Emran El-Badawi, point both to how individuals and communities challenge or embrace these texts in efforts to strengthen their own individual advocacy and agency, on the one hand, or enforce the homogeneity of their communities, on the other. Crime & Disobedience also examines both sides of the agreement that sustains a relationship between the individual and the community. A polity must govern with the consent of the governed and so must respond as a supplier of order, inspiration, and hope. But what happens when the individual enacts criminal behavior, recognizes cracks in institutional integrity, or develops a mistrust in an orthodox message? This section explores ways societies and individuals express that challenge.

Sophia Avants finds that crimes of deceit (such as fraud) are discussed in the Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts in a way that could enlighten our own contemporary view of the responsibility of the individual to the community. While modern philosophy tends

to focus on the individual, rabbinic legal tradition considers harm to the community in weighing individual acts. Whereas the focus on teshuva or forgiveness appears again and again, it is always in the context of keeping whole the interactions amongst one's fellow humans. Harm to an individual is understood as a breach of the social fabric by modern legal theorists. That idea, labeled the "king's peace" in common law, matches the cosmology in these sacred texts with the understanding that the "king" is a divine one.

Darren M. Slade unveils the hermeneutics of theoprepes, the routine act of minimizing, sanitizing, omitting, or rationalizing God's immoral and deadly behavior whether in the ancient or contemporary world. Slade also argues that ancient interpreters used an analogous strategy of hagioprepes to minimize, sanitize, or omit the embarrassing, immoral, and deadly behavior of biblical saints. Slade provides a historical review of many notable institutions of oppression and murders justified using this biblical tradition and authority.

David M. Barbee examines Romans 13 that ostensibly can be and has been read to call for unquestioning obedience to state and political control. Barbee guides us through biblical and theological studies discourse that assert widespread disagreement over precisely what Romans 13 means and express almost unanimous agreement that it does not mean absolute obedience.

Magda Hasabelnaby shares with us the frank and refreshing cultural examination by Arab-Muslim American poet Mohja Kahf of both her ideas about Islam and her American cultural context which inevitably confront one another during her daily life. Hasabelnaby navigates us through Kahf's poetry, social commentary, and novels and their multi-layered use of Qur'anic and Hadith references.

Hasabelnaby acknowledges that the innovative and often shocking iteration of inter- and hyper-textuality challenges readers to engage with sacred texts as cultural, social, and inspirational sources.

Conclusion

In the chapters that follow, contributors examine performative aspects of Abrahamic sacred texts. Not all aspects but enough to inspire the recognition of the malleability of sacred texts and the polemic purposes that these texts have served. Contributors offer readings that, while not challenging entire traditions, broaden their compassionate possibilities.

The polymorphous nature of textual analyses enlisted by our authors provides a unique testimony to the richness of these sacred signifiers. Contributors come from universities in Egypt, Israel, United Kingdom, Brazil, Canada, Ghana, and across the United States. They represent a spectrum of sectarian and public, large and small, seaboard and heartland academic environments. Contributors themselves are diverse in academic maturity, gender, confessional identity, ethnic background, and age. Their discussions suggest the wisdom of Walter Benjamin that texts deemed sacred are not to remain untouched by doubt, quizzical engagement, dialogical criticism, and comparatist investigation.

In conclusion, sacred texts themselves consistently return to privileging life, not requiring death; as preferring celebration, not suffering; as encouraging empathy, not alienation; and, most often, as focusing on inclusion, not marginalization. Sacred texts also acknowledge individual agency as it negotiates communal cohesiveness. The narratives and legalisms inspire emotional and cognitive engagement. In sum, sacred texts address earthly reality with all its nuances and contradictions and call upon us to respond. This collection offers robust responses to that call. <>

Handbook of Positive Psychology, Religion, and Spirituality edited by Edward B. Davis, Everett L. Worthington Jr., Sarah A. Schnitker [Springer, ISBN 9783031102738] Open Access.

- A comprehensive resource examining the intersections of positive psychology
- Draws connections between two fields that research has increasingly shown to be connected
- Useful for social and clinical scientists as well as practitioners
- This book is open access, which means that you have free and unlimited access

This handbook aims to bridge the gap between the fields of positive psychology and the psychology of religion and spirituality. It is the authoritative guide to the intersections among religion, spirituality, and positive psychology and includes the following sections: (1) historical and theoretical considerations, (2) methodological considerations, (3) cultural considerations, (4) developmental considerations, (5) empirical research on happiness and well-being in relation to religion and spirituality, (6) empirical research on character strengths and virtues in relation to religion and spirituality, (7) clinical and applied considerations, and (8) field unification and advancement. Leading positive psychologists and psychologists of religion/spirituality have coauthored the chapters, drawing on expertise from their respective fields. The handbook is useful for social and clinical scientists, practitioners in helping professions, practitioners in religious and spiritual fields, and students of psychology and religion/spirituality.

Review

Book Endorsement Statements for the Handbook of Positive Psychology, Religion, and Spirituality

“Most classical treatises of religion in psychology and related disciplines have taken a deficiency approach to the topic—religion as a defense against threat, danger, insecurity, and death. Since the launch of positive psychology, research has—again and again—demonstrated the one-sided nature of such treatises. Religion and spirituality also provide sources for growth—security, meaning, belonging, self-transcendence, and more.

The *Handbook of Positive Psychology, Religion, and Spirituality* provides a masterful, comprehensive review of theory, research, and clinical applications at the exciting intersection between the psychology of religion/spirituality and positive psychology. It also demonstrates that each of those fields is incomplete without the other. This book should be in the shelf of every serious student of religion, spirituality, and psychology." - Pehr Granqvist, Ph.D., Professor of Psychology, Department of Psychology, Stockholm University

"An epic moment for human flourishing resides within the synergy of positive psychology and spirituality. Within this volume is found the next frontier of positive psychology, exponentially expanded through spiritual awareness; and so too the translation of spiritual experience into lived positive cognition, behavioral habit, and practice. The editors of this volume help clear a rich new terrain for the next generation of humanitarian practitioners, researchers and scholars." - Lisa Miller, Ph.D., Professor of Psychology and Education, Founder of the Spirituality, Mild, Body Institute (SMBI), Teachers College, Columbia University

"At last! This broad-based, creative, integrative handbook really helps to fill a niche by focusing directly on the interface between positive psychology and the psychology of religion and spirituality. I especially appreciated the inclusion of a variety of faith traditions and the chance for 'deep dives' into so many aspects of positive psychology."- Julie J. Exline, Ph.D., Professor of Psychology, Department of Psychological Sciences, Case Western Reserve University

CONTENTS

Integrating Positive Psychology and the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality: Transcending Coexistence to Potentiate Coevolution by Edward B. Davis, Everett L. Worthington Jr., Sarah A. Schnitker, Kevin J. Glowiak, Austin W. Lemke, and Chase Hamilton

It was a fall day in 1930, and the famous American philosopher and historian William Durant was raking leaves in his yard. A despondent stranger walked up and shocked Durant by confessing he was planning to commit suicide unless Durant could give him "one good reason" to live. Flustered, Durant gave a feeble reply: "I bade him get a job—but he had one; to eat a good meal—but he was not hungry; he left visibly unmoved by my arguments" (Smith, 2017, p. 19). Durant was so haunted by the man's question that he wrote over 100 of the brightest minds of his time, asking each luminary to answer the question "What is the meaning or worth of human life?" (Durant, 1933, p. 3). He compiled their answers in On the Meaning of Life (Durant, 1933), published in the wake of World War I and heart of the Great Depression (Smith, 2017).

Questions about life's meaning have vexed humans across history. For millennia, philosophers and religious scholars led discourse on the topic, but since psychology's inception in the late nineteenth century, psychology has contributed to this discourse as well. Psychology's contribution budded with the work of William James, a founding figure both in mainstream psychology and the psychology of religion and spirituality (R/S; i.e., "the empirical or academic study of spiritual experience or organized religion from a psychological perspective," VandenBos, 2015, p. 860). James (1890/2011) presciently warned psychology from becoming "a psychology without a soul" (p. 7), experiencing a kind of etymological amnesia by forgetting its Greek root words psyche and logos literally mean "the study of the soul" (Pillsbury & Pennington, 1942, p. 2). Unfortunately, James's advice went unheeded. Psychology largely ignored the scientific study of R/S until the 1960s, when interest was reinvigorated (Hood, 2012).

Yet another of psychology's roots remained largely neglected until the end of the twentieth century. In his 1998 Presidential Address to the American Psychological Association (APA), Martin E. P. Seligman (1999) averred: "It's my belief that since the end of World War II, psychology has moved too far away from its original roots, which were to make the lives of all

people more fulfilling and productive, and too much toward the important, but not all-important, area of curing mental illness" (p. 559). In response, he issued a clarion call for a "positive psychology" (Seligman, 1999, p. 561) that would redress this imbalance and help psychology reclaim its mission by reorienting psychological science and practice toward understanding and promoting human strength and flourishing (Seligman, 1999). Several of Seligman's predecessors (such as William James, Abraham Maslow, and Carl Rogers) had already called for psychology to focus more on positive mental health, optimal functioning, personal growth, and human potential, but it usually is Seligman who is credited with catalyzing the positive psychology field in 1998 (Hart, 2021).

Positive Psychology and the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality

Positive psychology is the "field of psychological theory and research that focuses on the psychological states (e.g., contentment, joy), individual traits or character strengths (e.g., intimacy, integrity, altruism, wisdom), and social institutions that enhance subjective well-being and make life most worth living" (VandenBos, 2015, p. 810). In developing the Values in Action taxonomy that became the theoretical foundation of positive psychology, Peterson and Seligman (2004) consulted scholars and exhaustively searched the scholarly and historical literatures. They drew heavily from the writings of religious scholars and moral philosophers across time, cultures, and faith traditions. Indeed, R/S was one of the 24 character strengths that emerged in their taxonomy.

However, mainstream psychology has historically adopted a "noninteractive stance" (Jones, 1994, p. 184) toward R/S, perhaps because psychologists (a) generally are much less religious or spiritual than the overall population (Shafranske & Cummings, 2013), (b) often do not have much formal training or competence in R/S (Vieten & Lukoff, 2022), and (c) frequently hold skeptical (or even biased) attitudes toward R/S (Gergen, 2009; Jones, 1994). But how much has positive psychology adopted this noninteractive stance toward R/S, given that R/S is one of the core character strengths (Peterson & Seligman, 2004) and is robustly linked to health and well-being (Koenig et al., 2012)? In many ways, this question is what sparked the current handbook.

With this Handbook of Positive Psychology, Religion, and Spirituality, we particularly sought to accomplish three goals: (a) examine the existing degree of overlap between the positive psychology and psychology of R/S fields, (b) summarize and synthesize the relevant theoretical and empirical literature at these intersections, and (c) catalyze the integration of these fields and thereby potentiate their coevolution toward greater scientific and societal impact. The purpose of this introductory chapter is to set the stage for your evaluation of whether this book achieves these lofty goals. First, we describe the cumulative growth of the two fields, including how much overlap exists and where their research is published. Second, we outline reasons why the increased integration of positive psychology and the psychology R/S would be reciprocally beneficial. Third, we discuss potential barriers to this integration and suggest ways to transcend them. Lastly, we preview the handbook and recommend ways to glean the most as you read it.

Existing Trends and Overlap

To examine existing trends and overlap, we conducted two systematic literature searches in the APA's PsycINFO database. Both searches were conducted on December 31, 2020, and only used the standardized index terms available in the APA Thesaurus of Psychological Index Terms (APA, 2020). The following four index terms were the only ones available to use for positive psychology: "positive psychology," "virtue," "happiness," and "well-being"; the only three available for the psychology of R/S were "religion," "spirituality," and "faith." We constrained our search to index terms, because using a controlled (standardized) vocabulary is generally recommended, due to countless ways researchers can describe related concepts (Soto, 2017). Additionally, for these searches, we used the search field "DE" (Descriptors), because doing so ensured the retrieval of entries that were focused on a specific concept (rather than entries that merely contained a keyword anywhere in the entry, regardless of that entry's focus).

In Table 1.1, we present the results of the first search, which identified the cumulative number of academic articles and book entries that focused on positive psychology topics, psychology of R/S topics, and both types of topics. Entries are presented by year, starting with 1998, when Seligman gave his APA Presidential Address on positive psychology. From 1998 to 2020, 48,623 articles and book entries focused on at least one of the indexed positive psychology topics; 26,192 on R/S topics; and 1,783 (2.4% of the collective 73,032 entries) on both.

Table 1.2 displays results of the second search, which examined a selection of premier psychology journals to see how much they each published articles on positive psychology topics, R/S topics, or both, between 1998 and 2020. Among the selected 23 journals (most of which were among the top-ranked psychology journals in the 2019 Journal Citation Reports [Clarivate Analytics, 2020]), the proportion of articles focusing on positive psychology varied widely—from 0.5% to 7.2%. By comparison, the proportion of articles on R/S was consistently low (0.0–2.0%), and the proportion on both R/S and positive psychology was extremely low (0.0–0.4%). Of the 56,400 articles published collectively across these journals, only 387 (0.7%) were on R/S and 31 (0.1%) were on both R/S and positive psychology. Even in the top niche journals in these fields, the proportion of articles on both topics was low, ranging from 3.9% (35/889) in Journal of Positive Psychology to 13.2% (69/522) in Psychology of Religion and Spirituality.

Integrating the Fields of Positive Psychology and the Psychology of R/S

There is growing scientific evidence that, across a wide variety of complex systems, integration ("the linkage of differentiated elements," Siegel, 2020, p. 461) is a central marker and mechanism of flourishing (Siegel, 2020). Indeed, we approach the current handbook with the belief that increased integration of positive psychology and the psychology of R/S will lead each field not only toward greater flourishing but also to greater flourishing in mainstream psychology and society. Yet first we explore reasons why such integration is even possible.

Why Can We Integrate These Fields?

They Often Have Similar Aims The overall aims of mainstream psychology are to (a) enhance scientific understanding of the human mind and behavior and (b) use this understanding to benefit society and improve people's lives (APA, 2011; Bermant et al., 2011). Similarly, the central aims of positive psychology are to advance scientific understanding of human strengths and flourishing and then use that understanding to benefit people, institutions, and societies (Hart, 2021; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Likewise, the main aims of the psychology of R/S are (a) to enhance scientific understanding of spirituality ("search for or relationship with the sacred," Harris et al., 2018, p. 1) and religion ("search for significance that occurs within the context of established institutions designed to facilitate spirituality,"

Pargament et al., 2013, p. 15) and (b) use that understanding to benefit society and improve people's lives (Pargament, 2013). In sum, because positive psychology and the psychology of R/S have resonant aims (with each other and with the aims of mainstream psychology), they can be integrated readily. Both fields are working toward the same goals—advancing understanding and improving lives.

They Have Similar Foundations

Next, both positive psychology and the psychology of R/S are dedicated to the empirical study of the human mind and behavior; thus, they share a fundamental methodology (empirical science) and topical focus (human mind and behavior). They also have similar historical and philosophical origins, dating back to the classical and medieval periods (e.g., the writings of Aristotle, Plato, and early and medieval Christian authors; see Chap. 2, this volume). Moreover, each has historically explored the foundations of morality, ethics, and virtues (see Chaps. 3 and 4, this volume). Further, there historically has been considerable overlap in these fields' epistemological assumptions (Nelson & Slife, 2012; Snyder et al., 2021).

They Have Similar Emphases

In the modern era, both fields have resonant emphases as well. For instance, positive psychology focuses on the study and promotion of subjective experiences and individual traits that enhance well-being, as well as on the social institutions that facilitate these experiences and traits (Seligman, 2011; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Similarly, the psychology of R/S studies people's search for the sacred and the social contexts and institutions that facilitate this search (Pargament et al., 2013). Both fields also emphasize practical applications (in clinical, workplace, and other contexts; Donaldson et al., 2020; Pargament, 2013) and issues relevant to people across cultures and time (health, well-being, meaning, virtues, positive emotions, and relationships; Seligman, 2011; Vaillant, 2008).

Why Should We Integrate These Fields?

Taken together, clearly we can integrate these fields, but should we? In the inaugural article of The Journal of Positive Psychology, Linley and colleagues (2006) asserted that positive psychology "can prosper through integration [with other fields and with mainstream psychology], rather than wither through isolation" (p. 5), and they outlined strategies for accomplishing that goal. Likewise, many scholars (Emmons & Paloutzian, 2003; Jones, 1994;

Pargament et al., 2013) have argued that the psychology of R/S will prosper to the degree it becomes more integrated with other disciplines, with other psychology subfields, and with mainstream psychology.

Greater Integration Will Benefit Both Fields

By "integration" we do not mean the two subfields will become indistinguishable. Rather, we are suggesting that these differentiable fields can achieve more interconnection and become increasingly intersecting circles on a Venn diagram in which their overlap represents a truly shared space of dialogue, synergy, and collaboration. As shown this shared intersection is currently quite minimal.

If positive psychology and the psychology of R/S achieve greater integration, it will be mutually beneficial. Because positive psychology already has a substantial platform in the scientific literature (Rusk & Waters, 2013) and public sphere (Donaldson et al., 2020), its integration with the psychology of R/S could permit the latter to have greater visibility and impact. Similarly, because positive psychology is grounded firmly in the highest standards of scientific measurement and methodology (Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), its integration with the psychology of R/S could enhance the scientific rigor of the latter's studies, measures, and methodologies (see Chaps. 7 and 8, this volume).

Positive psychology will also benefit from increased integration with the psychology of R/S. For billions of people across the globe, R/S is a major source of meaning (Park, 2010), identity (Hays, 2016), growth (Tedeschi et al., 2018), and resilience (Pargament & Cummings, 2010). Nonetheless, R/S has received relatively little attention within positive psychology (Rusk & Waters, 2013; Snyder et al., 2021). Increased integration of these fields would enable positive psychology to enhance its scientific understanding of how people from diverse cultures and traditions draw on R/S to nurture positive emotional and relational experiences, create and sustain a sense of meaning, cultivate and enhance their well-being, and cope with and grow from adversity (Pargament, 2013; Vaillant, 2008). It also would enable positive psychology to draw on well-validated measures of R/S and the expertise of religious/spiritual scholars and practitioners (Pargament, 2013).

Greater Integration Will Benefit Mainstream Psychology

Additionally, the broader field of psychology would benefit. Indeed, the APA's vision statement (i.e., the change APA aspires to bring in the world) is "a strong, diverse, and unified psychology that enhances knowledge and improves the human condition" (APA, 2011, p. 4, emphasis added). Within mainstream psychology, R/S is recognized as an important facet of human diversity (Hays, 2016; Vieten & Lukoff, 2022), yet as shown in Table 1.2, premier psychology journals still do not publish many articles on R/S. This dearth represents an enormous opportunity for positive psychology and the psychology of R/S. Because the link between R/S and well-being is so wellestablished (Koenig et al., 2012; Lefevor et al., 2021), research and practice at the intersections of R/S and positive psychology can help psychology fulfill its mission of improving people's lives. For example, greater integration of these fields can help psychology grow in scientific understanding of how R/S can enhance the flourishing of people, institutions, and societies. It also can help develop and refine spiritually integrated interventions that are evidence-based and designed both to alleviate problems and actualize potentials (Pargament, 2013; see Chap. 26, this volume).

Greater Integration Will Benefit Society Ultimately, the increased integration of positive psychology and the psychology of R/S will benefit society. Research suggests that the largest influence on someone's well-being is the country in which they live (Geerling & Diener, 2020). Nations can draw on scientific R/S research to enhance the well-being of their citizens individually and the flourishing of their society collectively (Diener & Seligman, 2004, 2018). People who are higher in well-being tend to live healthier and longer lives, have more positive and rewarding relationships, be more economically prosperous and productive, feel greater meaning and purpose in life, and exhibit better citizenship and civic engagement. Additionally, countries with higher collective well-being tend to experience greater collective economic, environmental, social, and societal flourishing (Diener & Seligman, 2018; Diener & Tay, 2015). When it comes to R/S, empirical evidence suggests that R/S may exhibit its strongest effects on people's well-being via its influence on their social support (Geerling & Diener, 2020), meaning/purpose in life (Jebb et al., 2020), and positive emotions (Van Cappellen et al., 2016). These effects are especially pronounced for people in societies characterized by difficult life circumstances (e.g., low safety, income, life expectancy, and basic need fulfillment; Diener et al., 2011). Increased research at the intersections of positive

psychology and the psychology of R/S could have a particularly strong and positive impact on those societies and their communities and citizens.

Early in the positive psychology movement, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) envisioned that "a psychology of positive human functioning will arise that achieves a scientific understanding and effective interventions to build thriving in individuals, families, and communities" (p. 13). Advancing scientific understanding and practical interventions at the intersections of positive psychology and R/S will help make this dream a reality. In so doing, the coevolution of these fields can promote their respective and collective actualization.

Barriers to Integrating Positive Psychology and the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality

Personal and Professional Unfamiliarity with Religion and Spirituality

In general, psychologists are not very religious or spiritual (Shafranske & Cummings, 2013). For example, in the U.S., roughly 90% of people believe in God and 75% say R/S is a very or fairly important part of their lives (Gallup, n.d.; Pew Research Center, 2017). However, only 30% of U.S. psychologists believe in God, and just 50% indicate R/S is very or fairly important (Delaney et al., 2013; Shafranske & Cummings, 2013). Although over 80% of U.S. psychologists believe R/S is beneficial to mental health (Delaney et al., 2013), only 20–30% receive explicit professional training in R/S competencies (Hathaway, 2013; Vieten & Lukoff, 2022). This lack of personal and professional familiarity with R/S is presumably one barrier that has limited the integration of the psychology of R/S field with both positive and mainstream psychology (Jones, 1994).

Skepticism Toward and Potential Bias Against Religion and Spirituality

Furthermore, psychology has historically exhibited considerable skepticism toward R/S, perhaps due to the dominant influences of positivism, naturalism, and materialism (Jones, 1994; Shafranske & Cummings, 2013; Slife & Reber, 2009). This skepticism creates a barrier between R/S and both mainstream psychology and positive psychology. In fact, some scholars have even averred that mainstream psychology is fundamentally biased against R/S (Gergen,

2009; Slife & Reber, 2009). This skepticism and possible bias may be one explanation for why there currently is so little incorporation of R/S into positive psychology research (see Table 1.1; Rusk & Waters, 2013) and so little R/S research published in premier psychology journals (see Table 1.2).

Skepticism Toward and Potential Bias Against Positivity

Correspondingly, one possible barrier to the integration of positive psychology with mainstream psychology and psychology of R/S research might be humans' evolutionarily adapted negativity bias ("propensity to attend to, learn from, and use negative information far more than positive information," Vaish et al., 2008, p. 383). This bias helps explain why people across the world are often more psychophysiologically reactive to negative than positive news content (Soroka et al., 2019). This negativity bias likely contributes to mainstream psychology's tendency to focus on negatively valenced phenomena such as distress, disease, and dysfunction (Seligman, 1999; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Another consequence of this tendency may be a bias against positivity, especially when it comes to publishing manuscripts or funding projects that focus on positive topics (e.g., strengths, virtues, resilience, and well-being) or processes (e.g., growth, optimal functioning, flourishing, and actualization). Psychology's potential bias against positivity may be so strong that it fuels skepticism toward various forms of positivity that are encountered in scientific research, clinical practice, and everyday life (e.g., posttraumatic growth; Tedeschi et al., 2018). This skepticism and bias may impede the integration of positive psychology and the psychology of R/S.

Recommendations for Transcending These and Related Barriers

Despite these barriers, integration between positive psychology and psychology of R/S is possible. Several scholars have proposed theoretical accounts for how mainstream psychologists can better engage the study of R/S (Cresswell, 2014; Gergen, 2009; Jones, 1994; Paloutzian & Park, 2021; Slife & Reber, 2009) and positive psychology (Hill & Hall, 2018; Snyder et al., 2021). These accounts often begin with identifying value conflicts (Yarhouse & Johnson, 2013), self-assessing biases embedded in one's own worldview assumptions (e.g., about ontology, anthropology, universalism, and morality; Hill & Hall, 2018) and philosophical

assumptions (e.g., about epistemology and about whether theism and scientific naturalism are compatible; Nelson & Slife, 2012; Slife & Reber, 2009, 2021), and then working to transcend these biases.

Although people may adopt a variety of approaches to interacting across disciplines and subdisciplines (e.g., Jones [1994] describes critical-evaluative, constructive, and dialogical approaches to interactions between R/S and psychology), there is recent convergence on approaches that emphasize social constructionism, cultural diversity, and lived experiences. For example, Cresswell (2014) argues psychologists should adopt a pragmatic cultural-psychology approach that focuses on "inductive understandings of realities shaped in everyday practices within communities as opposed to naturalist laws" (p. 137), partly to avoid the "nothing but—" reductionism William James sought to redress. Hence, in this handbook, we devote considerable attention to theory, methodological assumptions, cultural diversity, and practical applications.

Outline of the Handbook

The handbook is divided into eight parts: historical and theoretical considerations (6 chapters), methodological considerations (2 chapters), cultural considerations (8 chapters), developmental considerations (2 chapters), happiness and well-being (4 chapters), character strengths and virtues (3 chapters), clinical and applied considerations (5 chapters), and field unification and advancement (1 chapter).

Part I: Historical and Theoretical Considerations

The six chapters comprising the first part of the book will lay the foundation for understanding the ways the psychology of R/S and positive psychology overlap. The present chapter offers an orientation to the topic and the book, and then Nelson and Canty (Chap. 2) offer an overview of each field's history, including how those histories interact. In Chap. 3, Porter and colleagues explore philosophical questions regarding whether these fields can and should be integrated, as well as philosophical reasons why methodological pluralism is a promising paradigm for integration. Next, Ratchford et al. (Chap. 4) examine the intersections of virtue theory and research in these fields, and MacDonald (Chap. 5) reviews each field's dominant theories of health and well-being. Park and Van Tongeren (Chap. 6) propose that meaning is a framework for integrating science and practice in these two fields, and they offer suggestions for guiding this process. Throughout Part I, authors explore motives, models, and

methods for bringing together these currently rather disconnected fields. They approach integration historically, philosophically, and theoretically, and they argue that virtues, health/well-being, and meaning are focal areas by which these subfields can become unified more fully and synergistically.

Part II: Methodological Considerations

Two chapters comprise this section, and each chapter reveals the shared commitment that the positive psychology and psychology of R/S fields have to empirical methods. In Chap. 7, Hill et al. review existing measurements in these fields and offer recommendations for using those tools and techniques in research and practice. Tsang and colleagues (Chap. 8) summarize existing methodologies utilized in each field, and like Porter et al. in Chap. 3, they suggest that methodological diversity is a promising strategy for achieving greater integration and impact. Overall, in Part II, the authors help lay the methodological groundwork for the rest of the handbook.

Part III: Cultural Considerations

Similarly, the next section helps lay the cultural groundwork for the book. Mattis (Chap. 9) discusses how various cultural groups have grappled with matters of virtue, justice, and well-being, including how religious/spiritual institutions and individuals have successfully (and unsuccessfully) promoted virtue, justice, and well-being worldwide. This leads to chapters exploring the intersections of positive psychology with each of the world's major religions: Christianity (Hodge et al., Chap. 10), Judaism (Schiffman et al., Chap. 11), Islam (Saritoprak & Abu-Raiya, Chap. 12), Hinduism (Singh et al., Chap. 13), and Buddhism (Segall & Kristeller, Chap. 14). The section's last two chapters examine the geographically different cultural contexts of science and practice at the intersections of positive psychology and the psychology of R/S. Rossy and colleagues (Chap. 15) focus on the regions of Europe, non-U.S. North America, and South and Central America. Cowden and colleagues (Chap. 16) look at the regions of Africa, Asia, and Australia–Oceania. Taken together, in Part III, authors unpack the cultural nuances and complexities embedded in science and practice at these intersections.

Part IV: Developmental Considerations

But these nuances and complexities are not limited to matters of culture, faith tradition, or geography, as Part IV illustrates through its focus on human development. Like in Chap. 6, King and colleagues (Chap. 17) adopt a meaning-making framework to discuss how R/S can

help promote the thriving of children and adolescents. In Chap. 18, Davis and colleagues propose Positive Religious/Spiritual Development theory, an integrative theory that explains how R/S develops and interacts with well-being across the lifespan. In these chapters, we see how science and practice at the intersections of R/S and positive psychology must adopt a developmentally sensitive framework, even as they must adopt the culturally responsive frameworks highlighted in Part III.

Part V: Happiness and Well-Being

Parts V and VI shift the discussion of positive psychology and R/S toward particular topics of study. Part V looks at the topics of happiness and well-being. Mancuso and Lorona (Chap. 19) review existing theory and research on the relationship between life satisfaction and R/S, including the nuances that affect the directionality and dynamics of this relationship. Likewise, Van Cappellen and colleagues (Chap. 20) synthesize existing theory and research on the link between positive emotions and R/S, with a focus on the self-transcendent emotions of awe, gratitude, compassion, and love. The other chapters in this section consider the intersections between R/S and both physical health (Masters et al., Chap. 21) and mental health (Shafranske, Chap. 22), including the directionality and influencers of these relationships.

Part VI: Character Strengths and Virtues

In Part VI, the topical discussion pivots to specific character strengths and virtues. This section begins with chapters exploring theory and research at the intersections of R/S with two sets of related virtues: (a) forgiveness and hope (Washington-Nortey et al., Chap. 23) and (b) humility and gratitude (Cauble et al., Chap. 24). Then, in Chap. 25, Long and VanderWeele examine another set of related virtues—the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love—but they do so from a public health perspective. In so doing, they help transition to the next section, which is practical and applied in focus.

Part VII: Clinical and Applied Considerations

Part VII looks at applications in particular domains. Captari and colleagues (Chap. 26) focus on clinical and applied interventions at the intersections of R/S and positive psychology. The next four chapters look at these intersections in other applied contexts: work (Dik & Alayan, Chap. 27), couple and family relationships (Mahoney et al., Chap. 28), faith communities (Wang et al., Chap. 29), and disasters and humanitarian aid (Captari et al., Chap. 30).

Part VIII: Field Unification and Advancement

In Chap. 31, we summarize key themes that emerged across the book. We propose unifying positive psychology and psychology of R/S into an integrated field—the positive psychology of R/S—and make recommendations for science, practice, and funding in this field.

Conclusion and Suggestions

We hope this review of the topic and the handbook has whetted your appetite for the chapters that follow. We encourage you to approach this book as an intellectual meal to savor slowly and mindfully. Yet we recognize you might not be satisfied fully with the buffet, because as always, there are many unanswered questions. As this chapter's analysis of publishing trends reveals, there currently is not much overlap between the positive psychology and psychology of R/S fields, but there is exciting potential for them to become more unified in science and practice. We encourage you to approach this handbook with that vista of possibility in mind. Search for reasons that might be beneficial for positive psychology to integrate R/S more into its theorizing, empirical research, and practical applications. Similarly, look for ways religious/spiritual individuals and institutions might benefit from positive psychology's theories, research, and applied tools. Ultimately, we hope this chapter's suggestions will inform what you "eat" and digest from this book, so that it can help guide you to new horizons of discovery in your research, practice, and life. <>

Recentering the Self: A Defense of the Ego by Michael Washburn [Transpersonal and Humanistic Psychology, State University of New York Press, SUNY, ISBN: 9781438494678]

In **Recentering the Self**, Michael Washburn presents a new account of the ego, ego development, and the role of the ego in spiritual life. He starts by tracing the premodern antecedents of the notion of the ego in Greek philosophy and Christian theology and then explains the seventeenth-century emergence of the notion in Descartes's radically new account of the soul's relation to the body. Reviewing subsequent criticisms of the notion, the author formulates a revised conception of the ego that highlights the ego's inherently two-sided nature, as a subject and agency that, although rooted within interior consciousness, lives originally and primarily in the material, social world. Washburn uses this revised conception

of the ego to explain how the two sides of the ego develop in concert over major stages of the human lifespan and why the ego, despite widespread belief to the contrary, plays primarily a positive role in spiritual life. **RECENTERING THE SELF** makes important contributions to the history of philosophy, consciousness studies, phenomenology, developmental psychology, and spiritual or transpersonal psychology.

Review

"Michael Washburn is considered one of the most authoritative theorists of transpersonal development, and **RECENTERING THE SELF** provides a much-needed supplement to his theory, offering a reexamination of the notion of the ego and its development, first within the general context of the human lifespan and then within the specific context of spiritual life." -- Massimo Marraffa, Roma Tre University

CONTENTS

The notion of the ego, long thought to express a signature insight of the modern period, has almost as long been a target of strong criticism. Criticism of the notion picked up pace in the second half of the twentieth century, and many now consider the notion of the ego to be a defining myth, not a signature insight, of the modern period. Responding to this reversal of opinion, RECENTERING THE SELF undertakes a defense of the ego, a defense that is multidisciplinary in perspective and wide in scope. This defense begins with a rethinking of the notion of the ego (part 1) and then proceeds to a corresponding rethinking of ego development, first within the general context of the human lifespan (part 2) and then within the specific context of spiritual life (part 3).

Part 1 rethinks the notion of the ego by examining its historical origins, by reassessing major criticisms of the notion, and then by formulating a revised conception of the ego designed to meet critical challenges. This revised conception of the ego is here referred to as "RCE."1 Part 2 rethinks ego development within the general context of the human lifespan by applying RCE to ten well-studied stages of ego development. The purpose of part 2 is to use RCE to highlight basic psychological (cognitive, motivational, behavioral) and philosophical (phenomenological, existential) aspects of the ego's development during the ten stages considered. Finally, part 3 rethinks ego development within the specific context of spiritual life by applying RCE to four broad stages of spiritual development: spiritual preawakening, spiritual awakening, spiritual growth, and spiritual maturity, The purpose of part 3 is to use RCE to clarify the essential role played by the ego in these four stages and thus to defend the ego against

the strongly negative accounts of its role in spiritual life that are prevalent in spiritual literatures.

The rethinking of the notion of the ego in part 1 consists of three main tasks. The first is to explain the principal ideas that have been associated with the "traditional" notion of the ego, by which I mean the notion that emerged at the beginning of the modern period. This task is taken up in chapter 1, which presents a brief exposition of Rene Descartes's account of the soul as a "thing that thinks" (res cogitans) or, more precisely, a thing the only function of which is to think. In saying that the only function of the soul is to think, Descartes was stressing the point that the soul performs only rational functions and not, as had long been believed, also biological (body-animating, body-regulating) functions.

Descartes divided the rational functions of the soul into two basic types, which he referred to as "perception of the intellect" and "operation of the will."' Perception of the intellect is a passive function by which the soul, as a thing that thinks, experiences (Descartes: perceives) whatever arises within consciousness or presents itself to consciousness through the senses. In contrast, operation of the will is an active function by which the soul operates either on ideas or mental images, thus performing active cognitive functions (functions that operate on things in order to know them), or on impulses, the body, or states of affairs in the world, thus performing active practical functions (functions that operate on things in order to regulate, utilize, or change them). In our terminology, that which performs the functions just outlined is the ego.

Descartes's account of the soul as a thing the only function of which is to think thus introduced the notion of the ego into Western intellectual history. Stripped to essentials, the notion he introduced is that of the subject and executive agency of consciousness. The ego is the subject of consciousness because it is that which experiences whatever arises within consciousness or presents itself to consciousness through the senses. The ego is thus an "experiences," a subject that intuits, perceives, observes, senses, and feels. However, the ego is not only a subject or experiences but also an agency because it performs active, will-initiated—henceforth: "executive"—

functions of cognitive and practical sorts. The ego performs cognitive executive functions such as controlling attention, holding things in mind, recalling things to mind, switching between cognitive tasks, and engaging in operational thinking of all types. Additionally, the ego performs practical executive functions such as regulating impulses, moving the body, and undertaking actions in the world. The ego bequeathed to us by Descartes is exclusively passive in its experiencing (Descartes: perceiving) function. The ego is the recipient rather than to any extent the creator of the thoughts, images, impulses, sensations,

and sense impressions it experiences.' In contrast, the ego bequeathed to us by Descartes is exclusively active in its executive (Descartes: will-initiated or volitional) functions. The ego alone initiates and carries out the cognitive and practical functions it performs.

The notion of the ego, once introduced in the seventeenth century, raised perplexing new philosophical questions, questions that became central to the discussion of the traditional notion of the ego. The following questions are among those that came to the fore: Is the ego something real, or is it only a useful fiction or, perhaps, a persistent illusion? If the ego is real, what kind of thing, if a thing at all, is it? How, if at all, can the ego be known to exist? Is the ego a necessary basis of consciousness? How, as the subject of consciousness, does the ego hold consciousness together as one consciousness? How, as the executive agency of consciousness, can the ego be causally efficacious in performing its executive functions? If the ego is causally efficacious in performing its executive functions, is its efficacy confined within consciousness or does it extend to the body and to bodily actions in the world? Chapter 1 presents Descartes's answers to these and other questions about the ego by identifying eleven ideas that are prominent in or assumed by his account of the soul as a thing the only function of which is to think.

The second task in rethinking the notion of the ego is to trace the antecedents and historical emergence of the traditional notion. This task is taken up in chapter 2, which places Descartes's account of the soul in its seventeenth-century context and explains

which of its principal ideas were carried over from the premodern past and which broke new ground for the modern future. As we shall see, Descartes's account of the soul emerged from an attempt to satisfy the requirements of both Christian orthodoxy, which held that the soul is incorporeal and immortal, and the new mechanistic paradigm of seventeenth-century science, which held that physical nature, including organic bodies, can be explained exclusively in terms of the motion and contact of physical things. The result of this attempt to satisfy the requirements of both an old religion and a new science was a conception of the soul that in important respects preserved ideas with long histories but that in other respects broke with the past in such a way as to replace the premodern rational-biological soul with an exclusively rational-interior soul, the subject-agency of which is the ego of the modern period.

The third task in rethinking the notion of the ego is to formulate a revised conception of the ego (RCE) designed to meet critical challenges. This task is taken up in chapters 3 through 5. Chapter 3 sets forth the core ideas of RCE by responding to criticisms of the notion of the ego that were debated between Descartes's time and the end of the nineteenth century. These core ideas are set forth briefly in this introduction, beginning here with the following general idea: the ego is a side of two fundamental dualities of human experience and would be incomplete or could not function without the other sides of these dualities. We call these dualities the "duality of the interior ego and the worldly self" and the "duality of agency and spontaneity."

First, the ego, as the subject of consciousness, exists as the interior side of an interior-exterior duality, the exterior side of which is the worldly self. As we explain in chapter 3, the ego, in the very process of its production as the interior subject of consciousness, is already in the process of appropriating and thus forging for itself an exterior or worldly side, a side consisting of its worldly experiences and what it perceives to be its worldly (bodily, mental, social) attributes. Second, the ego, as the executive agency of consciousness, functions as the executive, managing, side of an interior-interior duality, the other side of which is the underlying source or sources from which the internally generated contents of the ego's experience spontaneously arise. As we explain in chapter 3, the ego functions as an agency only by giving focus, engagement, and,

therefore, guidance to the spontaneity of consciousness, which produces for the ego the thoughts, images, and impulses with which it performs its executive functions. According to RCE, the dualities of the interior ego and the worldly self and of agency and spontaneity are inherent to the constitution of the ego. The ego, as the subject of consciousness, is incomplete apart from its worldly self; and the ego, as the executive agency of consciousness, cannot function apart from the spontaneity of consciousness.

Chapter 4 adds quite a few ideas to RCE by responding to criticisms of the traditional notion of the ego that were debated in the twentieth century. Specifically, chapter 4 responds to criticisms set forth by the following twentieth-century perspectives: psychoanalysis, which argued that the traditional view that the ego has complete control of its executive functions and the traditional view that the ego has primacy over the passions are false; existential phenomenology, which argued that the traditional view that the ego resides within the interior of the psyche is false; depth psychology, which argued that the traditional view that the ego has complete access to the interior of the psyche is false; symbolic interactionism and relational psychoanalysis, which argued that the traditional view that the ego always has privileged access to itself is false; postmodernism, which argued that the traditional view that the ego is the author of its identity in the world is false;4 psychoanalytic feminist theory, which argued that the traditional view that the ego (as conceived in the modern period) is gender-neutral is false; and physicalism in the philosophy of mind, which argued that the traditional view that the ego's interior side is something more than physical science can explain is false.

Among the ideas added to RCE in chapter 4, the most general is that the ego, on its interior side, is a bridge that integrates the two fundamental dualities introduced a moment ago. Chapter 4 explains how the ego bridges and integrates the fundamental duality of the interior ego and the worldly self, including, among its specific forms, the duality of interior psychic life and embodied, social life, the duality of self-authorship and social construction of identity, and, generally, the duality of subjectivity (including its phenomenal, intentional, and cultural dimensions) and objectivity (including its physical, functional, and social dimensions). Chapter 4 also explains how the ego

bridges and integrates the fundamental duality of agency and spontaneity, including, among its specific forms, the duality of executive and spontaneous (intuitive, creative) cognition and the duality of self-control and the passions.

A major point made in chapter 4 is that the ego's role as bridge and integrator of the dualities just mentioned indicates that neither of the sides of these dualities is inherently dominant over the other. It indicates that, depending on conditions, the sides can be in relatively balanced interaction or can be out of balance (in either direction), with one side exerting dominance across a wide range of possibilities, from slight to extreme, although never complete. Chapter 4, therefore, concludes that the "truth" about the dualities under discussion lies on neither of the sides of these dualities but rather on the middle ground between the sides.

More precisely, chapter 4 concludes that the truth lies on a wide and shifting middle ground because whether the sides of the dualities are in or out of balance depends on empirical factors, which can vary from one person to another and can change over time for a single person. With this conclusion, chapter 4 challenges both the traditional notion of the ego and its primary antitraditional critics. It challenges the former by rejecting the view that forms of human subjectivity and agency in principle have dominance over their corresponding forms of objectivity and spontaneity; and it challenges the latter by rejecting the view that in principle the dominance goes the other way around. Neither side of these dualities has an inherent primacy over the other. Chapter 4 argues that the truth is determined by empirical factors, not a priori arguments, and that empirical factors indicate that the truth cannot be fixed and is subject to change, lying on a wide and shifting middle ground between the sides of the dualities in question.

Chapter 5 adds two final ideas to RCE by adopting, revising, and integrating the ideas of the self-system and the lifeworld, the former borrowed from the interpersonal psychoanalysis of Harry Stack Sullivan, and the latter borrowed from existential phenomenology. These two ideas further develop the notion of the exterior, worldly side of the ego, the idea of the self-system explaining what the ego is as an exterior or

worldly self and the idea of the lifeworld explaining what kind of world the ego lives in as such a self. The ideas of the self-system and lifeworld play central roles in our account of ego development in parts 2 and 3. The two ideas are set forth more clearly later in this introduction.

The basic ideas of RCE are borrowed from historical sources. One of these sources is Buddhism; the others are major figures or schools in modern European philosophy and psychology, where the modern European period is here understood to extend from the early seventeenth century to the end of the first half of the twentieth century. Primary among the modern European sources are Descartes, Kant, (William) James, classical psychoanalysis, Jungian psychology, and existential phenomenology. Although the ideas borrowed from these sources are part of the historical record, belonging more to the past than to the present, they all still retain their original value. Furthermore, I hope to show that the value of these ideas can be more fully realized if, first, they are revised so that they can withstand criticisms that, like those considered in chapter 4, have emerged in more recent times and if, second, they are adapted to each other so that they work together as cohering ideas of a single theoretical framework, such as RCE.

Regrettably, newly emerging theoretical approaches often supplant rather than supplement older ones, which are then treated as if they have only historical significance. This book moves in the opposite direction. Committed to the view that the notion of the ego was a signature insight rather than a defining myth of the modern period, this book is a project of retrieval and rethinking. It reevaluates and, when appropriate, reemploys ideas that played important roles in shaping the traditional notion of the ego.

It reevaluates these ideas to determine which among them have withstood the test of criticism. It then reemploys those that have withstood this test, first by revising them so that they fit together in mutually strengthening and clarifying ways, second by grounding them in recent research, and third by demonstrating how, once thus revised and grounded, they can provide both historical perspective and new insights to current debate.

Buddhism, Kant, and James provide RCE with its most prominent ideas. These ideas are set forth in chapter 3 and further developed in chapter 4. From Buddhism RCE adopts two key ideas. The first is that there is a "space of spontaneity" within the psyche, what earlier was described as the underlying psychic source or sources from which arise the thoughts, images, and impulses with which the ego performs its executive functions. According to Buddhism, the more deeply a meditator examines consciousness, the more evident it becomes that consciousness is an open space in which thoughts, images, and impulses arise unpredictably and of their own accord. Meditative awareness of this space reveals that the thoughts, images, and impulses that arise within it are countless in number and that they appear and disappear in a seemingly uninterrupted process of creative production. Buddhists have referred to this space of spontaneity as a "fertile void" or "creative emptiness."

The second key idea adopted from Buddhism is that to experience the space of spontaneity within us is to experience the absence of an ego in that space. According to Buddhism, meditation shows that at the center of consciousness, where a unified, executive ego is supposed to be, there is instead only an open space of spontaneity. In our view, the thoughts, images, and impulses that arise within the space of spontaneity are produced spontaneously for the ego, which appropriates them and thus relates to them as its own thoughts, images, and impulses when, guided and motivated by them, it performs its executive functions. Buddhism argues otherwise, holding that there is no ego for which these thoughts, images, and impulses are produced or by which they are appropriated for executive purposes. According to Buddhism, the presumption that there is such an ego is unmasked as a false belief or persistent illusion once the space of spontaneity is brought meditatively into view. To be aware of the space of spontaneity is to be aware only of thoughts, images, and impulses that arise without having been premeditated by an ego and that come and go without being appropriated or put to functional use by an ego.

According to RCE, awareness of the space of spontaneity does not unmask the ego as a false belief or illusion. Rather, it hides the ego, just as awareness of the ego's executive activity hides the spontaneity of consciousness. Sitting silently in Buddhist meditation,

it certainly seems as if there is nothing more to consciousness than a space in which thoughts, images, and impulses spontaneously arise, just as, actively engaged in operational thinking or goal-directed action, it certainly seems as if there is nothing more to consciousness than an executive ego thinking its own thoughts and pursuing its own aims. RCE argues that these appearances, although indisputable, are misleading because they hide the fact that the ego and the spontaneity of consciousness work together as opposite, coessential interior sides of consciousness, together making up what earlier was referred to as the duality of agency and spontaneity.

The ego is the side of this duality that experiences what arises within or is presented to consciousness and that performs executive functions of cognitive and practical sorts. In contrast, the spontaneity of consciousness is the side that produces the internally generated content of experience, specifically the thoughts with which the ego thinks, the images with which the ego imagines, and the impulses on which the ego acts. Although, as opposites, the ego in its agency and the spontaneity of consciousness hide and frequently conflict with each other, they more fundamentally, according to RCE, require and complete each other. According to RCE, the ego and the spontaneity of consciousness have coevolved to work together as complementary opposites, each providing for the other what the other cannot provide for itself.

Chapters 3 and 4 explain in some detail how the ego and the spontaneity of consciousness interact, explaining that the spontaneity of consciousness provides the ego with the internally generated content of its experience and that the ego, when strongly organized, selectively focused, and functionally engaged, provides the spontaneity of consciousness with guidance in what content to produce. The spontaneity of consciousness does not cease being spontaneous and, therefore, unpredictable in the specific thoughts, images, and impulses it produces when under the ego's strong guiding influence. Nevertheless, when under such influence, it does tend to produce thoughts, images, and impulses of types that are relevantly responsive to the ego's engaged concerns. Whereas a weak, unfocused, and disengaged ego is witness to the free play of the spontaneity of consciousness, as occurs during reverie and dreams, a strong, focused, and engaged ego "harnesses" the spontaneity of

consciousness in such a way that for the most part it produces thoughts, images, and impulses that facilitate the ego's executive functions and thus allow the ego to act effectively in the world. In this account of the interaction between the ego and the spontaneity of consciousness, it becomes clear that the ego bridges and integrates the duality of agency and spontaneity—including the dualities of executive and spontaneous cognition and of self-control and the passions—rather than standing only on the side of agency.

RCE also adopts two ideas from Kant. The first is that the ego is a formal unity of apperception, which means that the ego is (1) an experiencing subject that cannot experience itself directly because, as an experiencing subject, it is empty of intuitable content (a formal unity of apperception); (2) an experiencing subject that, because it is itself temporally unified (self-identical over time), unifies its experiences by binding them together under its unified point of view (a formal unity of apperception); and (3) an experiencing subject that is aware of itself as that to which its experiences belong, as that which not only unifies its experiences but also appropriates them, thus assuming ownership of them and relating to them as "its" experiences (a formal unity of apperception). Kant's idea that the ego is a formal unity of apperception is complex and subtle. However, I hope to show that it is an idea that, if properly unpacked, can be shown to ascribe to the ego no more than we can experience for ourselves as egos.

The second idea adopted from Kant, this one a hypothesis rather than an idea conveying what we can experience for ourselves, is that the ego, as a formal unity of apperception, is the organized form of an activity, not a thing. In adopting this idea, RCE does not accept Kant's account of the activity of which the ego is the organized form. Whereas Kant held that this activity works beyond consciousness to produce both the ego and consciousness, RCE holds that it works within consciousness to produce only the ego. Specifically, whereas Kant held that the activity that produces the ego is a synthesizing process of a "transcendental" (supraempirical) sort, RCE holds that this activity is a synthesizing process of a neurophenomenological sort, a synthesizing process that works at once within the neurological bases and the subjective interior of consciousness.

Although RCE does not adopt Kant's account of the activity that produces the ego, it does accept his view that this activity produces the ego in a twofold way, as both the unifying subject and the appropriating owner of consciousness. It produces the ego as the unifying subject of consciousness by creating a temporally unified experiencing point of view under which succeeding experiences are held together and thus unified within one consciousness. Simultaneously, it produces the ego as the appropriating owner of consciousness by attaching the experiences that the ego unifies to the ego in such away that they belong to it as parts of what it is, thus transforming these experiences from unowned, impersonal experiences into the ego's experiences. Because the activity of which the ego is the organized form produces the ego as both the unifying subject and appropriating owner of consciousness, RCE calls it the "unifying-appropriating function."

Taking this Kantian line of thought one step further, RCE holds that the ego, as the organized form of the unifying-appropriating function, can be understood to be not only active in its inherent nature but also active as an agency, specifically as an agency that performs executive functions of cognitive and practical sorts. According to RCE, the unifying-appropriating function constitutes the ego as a subject that performs two root functions, an experiencing function, which the ego performs as the unifying subject of consciousness, and a proprietary function, which the ego performs as the appropriating owner of consciousness. RCE explains in general terms how these two root functions underlie and make possible the ego's executive functions, the experiencing function underlying and making possible the ego's cognitive functions and the proprietary function underlying and making possible the ego's practical functions.

The hypothesis that the ego is the organized form of the unifying-appropriating function is the leading hypothesis of RCE. In chapter 3, we argue that this hypothesis is warranted because it helps to explain important facts and assumptions about the ego that would otherwise go unexplained. We have just proposed that it helps to explain the ego's structure as a formal unity of apperception and the ego's cognitive and

practical agency. In chapters 3 and 4, we propose that the hypothesis also helps to explain several other basic, essential features of the ego.

RCE also adopts two ideas from James. These ideas are already implied by the hypothesis that the ego is the organized form of the unifying-appropriating function. Nevertheless, they are ideas that first came to prominence in James's work. The first of these ideas is that everything in the "stream of consciousness" is in ceaseless motion, including the ego as interior subject and executive agency of consciousness. The second idea is that the ego has two, interior and exterior, subjective and worldly, sides, which we have referred to as the fundamental duality of the interior ego and the worldly self. James expressed this second idea by saying that the ego is both an interior subject or "I" and an exterior object or "Me." As an interior subject or I, the ego is a temporally unified conscious point of view that has experiences and that performs executive functions; and as an exterior object or Me, the ego is an embodied self defined by the experiences it has and by the worldly attributes with which it identifies?

In adopting these ideas from James, RCE uses the Kantian ideas we have introduced to explain them. RCE explains that the ego on its interior side is in ceaseless motion because it is the organized form of an activity, the unifying-appropriating function. Additionally, RCE explains that the ego has not only an interior but also an exterior side because, as an interior ego with a proprietary function, it appropriates its experiences and what it

perceives to be its bodily, mental, and social attributes, thus forging for itself an exterior side by making itself an object or Me in the world. In this way, the ego, in the very process of being constituted on its interior side is already in the process of forging for itself a worldly self. In sum, according to RCE, the interior ego, as subject or I, is an ever-in-motion, ever-reconstituting unifying-appropriating function; and the exterior ego, as object or Me, is the set of worldly experiences and attributes that have been appropriated by the interior side of the ego in the exercise of its proprietary function.

To flesh out the idea of the ego's exterior side, RCE adopts and revises three key ideas from psychoanalysis. One of these ideas, mentioned earlier, is that of the self-system,

which is borrowed from Harry Stack Sullivan. The other two ideas are those of the ego ideal and the superego. RCE revises Sullivan's idea of the self-system so that it focuses on self-knowledge and self-motivation rather than, as it does for Sullivan, on self-esteem. Thus revised, the self-system consists of the following four components: (1) the ego on its interior side, as subject and executive agency of consciousness (the self of the self-system); (2) the self-representation (the ego's primary instrument of self-knowledge); (3) the ego ideal (one of the ego's two primary instruments of self-motivation); and (4) the superego (the other of the ego's two primary instruments of self-motivation).

RCE adopts the idea of the self-representation without needing to revise it. According to the general understanding, the self-representation is the mental record on which the ego keeps track of what it believes itself to be as a human being in a material, social world. In adopting this understanding of the self-representation, RCE interprets it in terms of the Kantian and Jamesian ideas just introduced. For RCE, therefore, the self-representation is the mental record on which, in Kantian terms, the ego keeps track of the experiences and attributes that, by exercising its proprietary function, it has appropriated and thus relates to as parts of what it is. In Jamesian terms, the self-representation is the mental record on which the ego, as interior subject or I, keeps track of the experiences and attributes that make up its worldly side, as exterior object or Me.

Whereas RCE adopts the idea of the self-representation without needing to revise it, it adopts the ideas of the ego ideal and the superego only with significant revisions. Specifically, it revises them to clarify their relations to the two chief motivating forces of life, desire (ego ideal) and fear (superego). As defined by RCE, the ego ideal is the ego's desire-elicited, "pulling," or, in Aristotelian terminology, telic instrument of self-motivation. Specifically, the function of the ego ideal is to manage the ego's pursuit of desire by encouraging the ego to pursue desires that facilitate or at least do not conflict with its ideal goals. In turn, as defined by RCE, the superego is the ego's fear-driven, "pushing," or, in Aristotelian terminology, efficient instrument of self-motivation. Specifically, the function of the superego is to manage the ego's avoidance of fear by

pressuring the ego to act in ways that minimize unwanted consequences. Redefined in these ways, it becomes clear that the ego ideal and superego work together in opposite but complementary ways, as telic and efficient motivators of the ego's actions. The ideas of the ego ideal and the superego are among the most important insights of psychoanalysis. The importance of these ideas becomes more evident, I believe, when they are revised, as they are by RCE, in ways that clarify their relations to desire and fear and their opposite but complementary roles as instruments of the ego's self-motivation.

The idea of the self-system just set forth fills out the idea of the ego's exterior side by explaining how the ego not only thinks of itself as a self with worldly experiences and attributes (self-representation) but also motivates itself to act as a self with worldly desires (ego ideal) and fears (superego). The self-representation is a record on which the ego logs everything it has appropriated and thus made part of itself, as worldly object or Me. In turn, the ego ideal and the superego are auxiliary agencies by which the ego motivates itself to act in pursuit of worldly interests, whether by satisfying worldly desires or avoiding worldly fears. Together, the self-representation on the one hand and the ego ideal and the superego on the other provide the ego with both self-knowledge and self-motivation as a self that belongs to and acts in the world.

The idea of the self-system as defined by RCE implies a closely associated key idea, that of the shadow. The idea of the shadow was introduced by Carl Jung. Because Jung wrote on such topics as archetypes, synchronicity, and mysticism, many hold his contributions to psychology in suspicion. However, there is nothing occult about the idea of the shadow, which is simply the idea that there are parts of the ego's life that the ego does not acknowledge because they are highly threatening to it. Whereas the self-representation is a mental record of those parts of the ego's life that the ego has appropriated and thus understands belong to it as parts of what it is, the shadow consists of those parts of the ego's life that the ego has disowned and hidden from view. Whereas the self-representation is the record of the experiences and attributes that the ego relates to as Me, the shadow is an unconscious subsystem underlying the self-

system to which the ego has banished the experiences and attributes that it relates to as not-Me.

This brief account of the shadow reveals that the shadow is the negative counterpart of the self-representation: the shadow consists of all those parts of the ego's life, if any, that are excluded from the self-representation. The "if any" qualification was inserted because the fact that a person has a self-representation does not by itself imply that that person has a shadow. As we shall see in chapters 9 and 10, the self-representation emerges before the shadow is formed, the former emerging in the second half of the second year, and the latter emerging, along with the ego ideal and the superego, in the transition from early to middle childhood. Additionally, as we shall see in chapter 17, the shadow is sometimes awakened in adults in a way that leads to its integration within consciousness. Thus integrated, the shadow ceases to exist and what was the shadow becomes part of a more inclusive self-representation.

This point made, the more important point here is that the shadow, once formed in the transition from early to middle childhood, consists of those parts of the ego's life that the ego has excluded from consciousness because they are highly threatening to it. Because the shadow is excluded from consciousness, it is not part of the self-system. Indeed, the shadow is in certain respects the antithesis of the self-system. Nevertheless, because the shadow is the negative counterpart of the self-representation, it is inherently tied to the self-system, as an underlying unconscious subsystem. Tied to the self-system in this way, the shadow, once formed, develops in concert with the self-system, stage by stage over the course of life.

Unfortunately, the idea of the shadow has been a frequent target of criticism. The primary issue is that it is difficult to explain how the ego can hide unwanted parts of itself, thus removing these parts from consciousness and forming the shadow. From the beginning, the explanation has been that the ego accomplishes this feat by so inhibiting the expression of unwanted parts of itself that these parts are expelled from consciousness. This explanation, that the shadow is the product of repression, has come under criticism because the idea of repression, especially in its original Freudian

formulation, has been called into question, for reasons discussed in chapter 10. To adopt the idea of the shadow, therefore, the idea of repression needs to be reconceived in such a way that it can explain the formation of the shadow without relying on assumptions that have called it into question.

In chapter 10, I propose what I call the "energy-reduction" conception of repression, which, I believe, meets these stipulations. After setting forth this conception of repression, I incorporate it within RCE to explain how the ego creates the shadow—as part of the same process by which it creates the ego ideal and the superego—in the transition from early to middle childhood. Then, in chapter 12, I use the energy-reduction conception of repression to explain how the ego reconstitutes the shadow, as an adult shadow, in early adulthood. Finally, in chapters 11, 13, 16, and 17, I use the energy-reduction conception to explain why shadow awakening is more likely to occur during some developmental stages (adolescence, midlife transition, spiritual preawakening, and spiritual awakening) than during others.

Further to flesh out the idea of the ego's exterior side, RCE adopts two ideas from existential phenomenology, the idea of the existential priority of the world over subjectivity and the idea of the lifeworld. According to the first of these ideas, we live originally and primarily in the world and withdraw into subjectivity only as a "secondary abode." RCE, in adopting this idea from phenomenology, reformulates it to say that the exterior, object or Me, side of the ego has existential priority over the interior, subject or I, side. The exterior side has this priority because the ego, from birth forward, spends most of its time as a bodily self engaged in the material, social world. The ego at the beginning of life is not yet aware of subjectivity as an interior space distinct from the physical, intersubjective, and communal spaces it shares with others. Moreover, after discovering this interior space, the ego withdraws into it only as a secondary abode, as a place for sleep, reverie, introspection, prayer, or meditation.

In following existential phenomenology by assigning the world an existential priority over subjectivity, RCE does not follow existential phenomenology by also assigning the world an ontological priority over subjectivity. According to existential

phenomenology, subjectivity, as an interior space set off from the world, is derivative in nature, emerging only in acts of withdrawing from engaged participation in the world. Thus conceived, subjectivity is an emerging and disappearing epiphenomenon, an interior space that is created only in the act of entering it, collapsing and thus vanishing upon return to worldly engagement.

RCE does not accept this view. RCE holds that subjectivity—rooted in and arising from the neurological bases of consciousness—is the place within which the ego is originally formed. This view follows from RCE's idea that the ego is the organized form of the unifying-appropriating function, which, again, works at once within the neurological bases and the subjective interior of consciousness. According to RCE, therefore, the ego is formed within a domain, subjectivity, in which originally and primarily it does not live. However, although subjectivity is not the place in which the ego originally and primarily lives, it is the place in which the ego is

formed and, therefore, in which it comes most intimately in touch with itself, as interior subject or I.

In this view, the ego, in the very process of being constituted as the subject and executive agency of consciousness, is already projecting itself outwardly. It is already employing its proprietary function to appropriate its experiences and what it perceives to be its worldly attributes, thus constituting for itself an exterior side. The ego, that is, is already living in the world and establishing itself as a self belonging to the world in the very process of being constituted as an interior subject and agency. RCE thus holds that the ego's interior and exterior sides are both basic, although in different ways. The ego's interior side is basic ontologically, so far as its original constitution as subject or I is concerned; and the ego's exterior side is basic existentially, so far as its lived experience as worldly object or Me is concerned.

As for the second idea that RCE adopts from existential phenomenology, that of the lifeworld, RCE agrees with existential phenomenology that the world in which we originally and primarily live is the world as it is experienced prereflectively by an engaged subject, not the world as it is described by science or as it might exist apart

from human experience. RCE incorporates this idea of the lifeworld by redefining it as the world as it is prereflectively experienced by the ego through the lens of its self-system. Thus defined, the lifeworld is the world as it is invested with personal meanings by the ego's self-representation and as it is charged with positive and negative values by the ego's ego ideal and superego, respectively. With this conception of the lifeworld, it becomes clear that the lifeworld, like the shadow, is inherently tied to the self-system and, therefore, develops in concert with it.

Using RCE as a guide, part 2 of **Recentering the Self** provides an account of ego development that highlights both the interior and exterior sides of the ego as we have thus far described them. It tracks how the ego develops both as an interior subject and executive agency and as an embodied self with a self-system living originally and primarily in a lifeworld. A primary contribution made by this approach to ego development is that it brings together psychological (psychoanalytic, Jungian, developmental, clinical, neuropsychological) studies and philosophical (Buddhist, Kantian, Jamesian, phenomenological, existential) perspectives, using the former to give scientific grounding to the latter and using the latter to give more human meaning to the former. The result is a whole-life account of how the ego and its executive functions, self-system, shadow, and lifeworld develop in concert stage by stage over the course of life.

Inescapably, the account of ego development in part 2 reflects the author's perspective as a white male who has lived comfortably in the United States in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Understanding this fact, I have tried hard to overcome biases and blind spots so that the account of ego development in part 2, although not suited for everyone, might have existential significance for most people. I am hopeful that the account of ego development focusing on the ego's interior side will have such significance because it explains how the ego bridges and integrates opposite sides of inherent dualities of human experience, dualities with which everyone is intimately familiar. It explains how the ego, as an interior subject, forges, monitors, and maintains its outer, worldly self and how the ego, as an interior agency, engages and guides the spontaneity of consciousness.

I am even more hopeful that the account of ego development focusing on the ego's exterior side will have existential significance for most people. It tracks the ego's self-systems and corresponding lifeworlds as they change from stage to stage and thus presents both a "biography" of the ego and a "travelogue" of its journey through the world. I understand that this account of the ego's life and journey, in stressing how we are alike rather than how we differ, goes against the grain of current discussion. I also understand that, despite having tried to make the account as inclusive as possible, unconscious biases and blind spots have inevitably worked against my aim. Nevertheless, I hope that readers will find something of value in the book to the extent that it succeeds in being inclusive, even if they are dismayed to the extent that it does not.

Part 3 of **Recentering the Self** applies RCE to stages of spiritual development with the aim of defending the ego against the widespread view that it plays primarily a negative role in spiritual life. This negative view of the ego is found in Asian traditions such as Advaita Vedanta and Buddhism, which hold that the conditioned individual self or ego is not ultimately real, either because individual selves, properly understood, are nothing other than the unconditioned universal self (atman is Brahman: Advaita Vedanta) or because meditation reveals the existence only of ever-changing constituents of consciousness, not of a self that is the subject and owner of consciousness (anatman or no-self: Buddhism). Either way, these views hold that attachment to the idea of an individual self or ego stands in the way of liberation or enlightenment. An even more negative view of the ego is found in Taoism and Zen, which, in addition to espousing the theoretical nonultimacy of the ego, most often speak negatively of the ego's executive functions, arguing that (operational) thinking interferes with the immediacy and fullness of experience and that (intentional) acting interferes with the spontaneous unfolding of life. That the ego plays primarily a negative role in spiritual life is also frequently advocated within relational traditions, such as the Abrahamic faiths, which hold that the ego is prone to unwholesome feelings, urges, or social influences or, as Christianity maintains, is hereditarily predisposed to sin. Finally, the view maintaining the ego's negative role is also widely

espoused among transpersonal theorists, many of whom write from one or more of the Asian perspectives just mentioned.

Part 3 begins by dividing spiritual development into the following four broad stages: spiritual preawakening, spiritual awakening, spiritual growth, and spiritual maturity. It then tracks changes in the ego's status, role, self-system, and lifeworld as spiritual development unfolds through these stages. This account of the ego's spiritual development leads to the following four general conclusions: (1) that the ego, as the organized form of the unifying-appropriating function (a self-conscious subject and agency), is real and, therefore, is not something to unmask as a false belief or persistent illusion; (2) that the ego is present in all known spiritual states, even those in which it seems to be absent; (3) that the ego has necessary, positive roles to play in all stages of spiritual development; and (4) that the ego is as essential to the "spirit" of spiritual life as this spirit is to the ego, since it is through the ego's conscious perspective that spirit perceives the world and with the aid of the ego's executive functions that spirit expresses itself in the world. Generally, the position defended in part 3 is that successful spiritual development requires a strong and resilient ego, not an ego that has been dispelled, dissolved, or suppressed, let alone mortified. Successful spiritual development requires that the ego be strong enough to withstand and resilient enough to adapt to awakened spiritual life so that, eventually, it can become a mature vehicle for spiritual life.

In putting the ego at center stage, the account of spiritual development set forth in part 3 opens itself to three main criticisms: that it might represent men's experience better than women's, that it might represent relational spiritual traditions better than nondual traditions, and that it might have little or no relevance for indigenous spiritual traditions. I address these criticisms in chapter 16, where I acknowledge their importance and attempt to respond to them. First, I explain that the account of spiritual development set forth in part 3 can be understood to apply to both women and men once it is understood how marked differences in women's and men's ego development in patriarchal societies help explain corresponding differences in their spiritual development. Second, I propose that the account of spiritual development set

forth in part 3 applies to nondual spiritual traditions by presenting a challenge to them, specifically, the challenge of acknowledging the ego's presence and essential role in spiritual life, even in expressions, states, and stages in which it seems to be absent from or resistant to spiritual life. Finally, I acknowledge that the account of ego development set forth in part 3 applies to indigenous traditions only abstractly and uncertainly, if at all. With these responses, I explain the qualifications that must be placed on and the merit that remains for an account of spiritual development that, like the one set forth in part 3, puts the ego at center stage.

I should add a note on scholarship. Part 1 is scholarly in aim. Chapters 1 and 2, which focus on the notion of the ego in historical perspective, are primarily scholarly endeavors. They cite a wide range of sources that help explain how the premodern notion of the soul was transformed into the modern notion of the ego. Chapters 3 through 5, which set forth RCE, are more theoretical than scholarly in aim but nonetheless require frequent references to historical sources and empirical findings, which are cited in the endnotes. Part 2, which sets forth an account of ego development based on RCE, presupposes and thus rests on many more psychological and other scientific studies than could possibly be cited. Part 2 is very wide in scope, seeking to show how RCE can be applied to major stages of the human lifespan. Given this scope, it was necessary in part 2 to be highly selective in referring to supporting literatures. Nevertheless, I have tried in part 2 to cite behavioral, clinical, neuroscientific, and other studies whenever points are made that might raise questions for the reader. Finally, part 3, which applies RCE to four stages of spiritual development, is intended as a proposal rather than as a scholarly exposition or theoretical demonstration. As explained in chapter 16, the account of spiritual development set forth in part 3 is hypothetical only. Moreover, based on RCE, it is an account that to a significant extent is the author's own invention. Scholarly citations are for these reasons provided in part 3 only as required in making explicit references to sources.

A note is also needed on terminology used in part 2 in discussing ego development in childhood and old age. "It" is used when referring to a (single) child instead of alternating between "he" and "she" or using "they." Additionally, "old" is used when

referring to people in the last stage of life instead of using words such as "older" or "elderly." These choices were made without intending any disrespect for children (including my younger self) or old people (including my current self). <>

The Evil Creator: Origins of an Early Christian Idea by M. David Litwa, [Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780197566428]

This book examines the origins of the evil creator idea chiefly in light of early Christian biblical interpretations. It is divided into two parts. In Part I, the focus is on the interpretations of Exodus and John. Firstly, ancient Egyptian assimilation of the Jewish god to the evil deity Seth-Typhon is studied to understand its reapplication by Phibionite and Sethian Christians to the Judeo-catholic creator. Secondly, the Christian reception of John 8:44 (understood to refer to the devil's father) is shown to implicate the Judeo-catholic creator in murdering Christ. Part II focuses on Marcionite Christian biblical interpretations. It begins with Marcionite interpretations of the creator's character in the Christian "Old Testament," analyzes 2 Corinthians 4:4 (in which "the god of this world" blinds people from Christ's glory), examines Christ's so-called destruction of the Law (Eph 2:15) and the Lawgiver, and shows how Christ finally succumbs to the "curse of the Law" inflicted by the creator (Gal 3:13). A concluding chapter shows how still today readers of the Christian Bible have concluded that the creator manifests an evil character.

Review

"Nevertheless, the book offers an extremely helpful and compelling exploration of the various voices in the early Christian centuries who held this view, making clear that it was sufficiently widespread that it cannot be explained as a late anomaly." -- James F. McGrath, Butler University, *The Society of Biblical Literature*

"It is a highly recomendable book which will introduce its readers in a world of practice and reflection on how people developed novel Jewish forms of life in the aftermath of the crisis of the first and second major Jewish revolts against the Romans, and the re-writings of these debates in later times." -- Markus Vinzent, San Miguel de Abona

"*The Evil Creator* is a thoughtful and historically-responsible reading of the Bible. Examining the Creator Deity of the Bible through the lens of various early Christian interpreters who themselves long ago identified many of the same concerns that modern interpreters struggle with today makes this book not only a valuable contribution to the field of Biblical Studies but also important for modern readers who ponder the God of the Bible." -- Kevin Sullivan, Illinois Wesleyan University

"David Litwa is to be congratulated for this book, which is both well-researched and thought-provoking. He compellingly delineates here how the idea of an inferior creator-God arose directly from what was said in some of the earliest and, for many, sacred Christian texts, including Paul's letters and the Gospel of John." -- Ismo Dunderberg, author of *Beyond Gnosticism: Myth, Lifestyle, and Society in the School of Valentinus*

"Readers interested in why so many ancient Christians concluded that the creator was evil have here in one book an extremely well-researched assemblage and exposition of evidence suggesting answers. Litwa reviews the role of indigenous Egyptian myth, Graeco-Roman philosophical argument, and above all, interpretations of Jewish and Christian scripture. His sobering concluding chapter reviews how ancient evil-creator doctrines live on today. An important contribution on a perennial theological challenge." -- Michael A. Williams, University of Washington, Seattle

CONTENTS

Why the Evil Creator?

> Free will was the excuse for everything. It was God's alibi. They had never read Freud. Evil was made by man or Satan. It was simple that way. But I could never believe in Satan. It was much easier to believe that God was evil. —Graham Greene

Of the many beliefs held by early Christians, the notion of an evil creator is perhaps the most scandalous. It was fundamental to Platonism— the ascendant philosophy during Christianity's infancy— that the creator, though distinct from the high god, was good. Of all possible worlds, the creator made this world following the finest of all possible models. The creator's unstinting care for the universe— called providence— was widely accepted in antiquity as the only pious option available. The bright sun, clear air, and fresh water were silent but eloquent witnesses of divine goodness, not to mention the very gift that made gratitude possible: human intelligence. Far from shutting out people from the richest of benefits, the creator equipped them, according to Plato, to become as much like the divine as possible.

By contrast, some early Christian groups thought that the creator of this world (known in Hebrew as "Yahweh," or "the lord") was an evil or hostile being opposed to the true and transcendent deity. To quote just a sample of some early Christian texts:

The chief creator was a fool. He despised condemnation and acted with audacity.

The ruler was a joke, for he said, “I am god and no one is greater than I . . . I am a jealous god . . .” He is conceited and does not agree with our Father.

What kind of god is this? First, he begrudged Adam’s eating from the tree of knowledge. Second, he said, “Adam, where are you?” [This] god does not have foreknowledge. He has certainly shown himself to be a malicious envier.

The concept of a wicked creator was the hallmark of Christians who today are still grouped under the global category of “gnostic.” We shall shortly take the opportunity to improve on this fuzzy and contested term. For now, it is sufficient to note that these early Christians were spread out in major urban centers across the Mediterranean world (Antioch, Alexandria, Rome, Carthage). Their founders and theologians were educated and gifted writers. They knew how shocking it was to proclaim an evil creator in their time, but they composed lengthy origin stories to depict him in living and lurid images— such as a lion- headed serpent. The question is why— why did they affirm a malevolent creator, and how did they know that he was malign?

Scholars have searched for broader philosophical motives to explain the origin of the evil creator idea. Some Platonists of the second century CE were prepared to contemplate evil emerging from nature, matter, or the erring fluctuations of a World Soul. A distinctly evil creator, however, was generally not even considered as a philosophical option among the major schools, since it would conflict with divine providence. Now educated early Christians often wished to appear philosophical. Yet philosophy was little help for those Christians who imagined an evil creator. There must therefore have been other motives for some Christians to envision such a being.

The apostle Paul, following a trend in ancient Jewish theology, demonized the pantheons of all other peoples (1 Cor 10:20, following Ps 96:5). Paul lived in a world teeming with demons whom he called “rulers”— provincial potentates reigning from the lower heavens (Rom 8:38– 39; 1 Cor 2:6– 8).13 Paul also believed in their chief ruler: a quasi- divine figure of evil who had various aliases: the devil, Beliar, Satan, and so on. Here was a “homemade” antidivine agent in Jewish lore whose oppositional role could readily be transferred to the creator.

Yet it is difficult to see why or how such a transfer would take place, since the creator in Jewish tradition was overwhelmingly conceived of as blessed and worthy of devotion. Jewish scriptures regularly called the creator compassionate, caring, and just. The Psalms sung at length of the abundance of divine mercy, forgiveness, and lovingkindness. Thus to imagine the creator as a malicious being arrayed against a higher, benevolent deity required another, much bolder step.

Yet what was it? Could it have been the experience of horrible social and political turmoil suffered by the Jews between 66 and 135 CE? During this period, Jewish groups drew up their battle lines against the Romans and thrice raised the ululations of war. In 66 CE, they proclaimed freedom in Jerusalem, slaughtered the Roman garrison, and defended their besieged city until mothers reportedly ate their own children.17 A party of radicals held out three additional years in the fortress of Masada, committing mass suicide the night before an enraged Roman army rammed through their charred gates. From 115 to 117 CE, Jewish militia in Libya, Egypt, and Cyprus took over entire cities, slaughtering at will and desecrating temples. Finally, in 132 CE, Jews in Palestine carved out a rebel kingdom in the Judean foothills, using the tactics of guerilla warfare until they were hunted, starved, or flushed out from every underground hideout and rocky fort.

Ancient Romans and Greeks could not understand why this tiny nation continually rebelled while larger and more powerful kingdoms lowed quietly under the Roman yoke. There were a bevy of socioeconomic and political reasons, but from the perspective of these Jews themselves, theological considerations played the most prominent role. These Jews acted as they thought their god had commanded— to rid the Holy Land of "heathen," to set up a kingdom governed by divine law, and to await the Messiah's iron rod reign.

But none of this ever happened. The Jewish deity did not intervene, and whole Jewish communities were drowned in their own blood. In Alexandria of 117 CE there was a virtual genocide, with Jews of all ranks murdered in the streets. Further down the Nile, festivals were arranged celebrating the defeat and slaughter of the Jews for over a

century. Throughout the Mediterranean world, Jews were forced to pay a burdensome tax (the fiscus Iudaicus) simply because they were Jews or converts to Judaism. By 135 CE, they were banned from living in Jerusalem— renamed Aelia Capitolina— then the location of a gleaming new temple to Zeus. Jews were prevented even from setting foot on the island of Cyprus. According to one report, Jews that were shipwrecked there could be hacked to pieces on the shores with impunity.

Thus in the first forty years of the second century, political events turned sour, to say the least, for many Jews in Palestine, Syria, and Egypt. Yet despite apocalyptic prophecies new and old, the world never ground to a halt, and the thick veil of heaven remained untorn. Targeted by the tax system, and stigmatized by failed rebellions, Jews, according to one theory, looked around and began to see themselves "as strangers and afraid in a world their God had never made."

Despite the enticements of this lachrymose tale, however, it does not actually explain how the notion of an evil creator arose. After all, Jews with apocalyptic and Messianic hopes— as is typical in Abrahamic religions— overwhelmingly blamed their sins for disasters, not the creator. If Jews became alienated from the world, this hardly meant alienation from god or the belief that their deity did not create the world. Failure on earth might, indeed, have tied their hearts more tightly to heaven. Even if it did not, why would Jews— whose sole hope and commitment was to exalt their putatively unique lord— rewrite scripture to portray Yahweh as foolish and evil? It would have been simpler for them to renounce the faith, assimilate to the larger society, and move on. (And indeed, some did.)

Perhaps, however, we have been looking for an answer in the wrong place. Perhaps it was not the Jews at all who turned in desperation against their deity. Christians, after all, had just entered history in significant numbers. Newly converted Gentile Christians had no original love or loyalty for the Jewish god, and they already had a vested interest in criticizing the rules and regulations of Yahweh's Law, the so- called yoke of compulsion. Early Christians also paraded their Messiah as the true object of worship, declaring the Jews to be blind for misinterpreting their own prophecies. If any group

could suddenly turn on the Jewish god, it was the Christians, who had already turned against Yahweh's people to carve out a space for their own identity as priests and kings in a new "kingdom of god."

Who were, we might ask, the Christians most hostile to the Jews? It was, we were once told, those Christians who were expelled from the synagogues. They were expelled because the Jews pointed out that they worshiped one god, not a divine Messiah and his reputed Father. One could not confess "the Lord is one" if one worshiped two distinct beings— or so the earliest rabbis thought. Against such reasoning, a group of Christians supposedly identified the Jews with "the world" and concluded that the world itself was evil because it had rejected and isolated early Christians.

Yet here again we run into the same problem we did before: the conception of a bad world does not necessarily or immediately lead to a bad god-who-made-the-world. Besides, a large contingent of Christians simply claimed the Jewish god for themselves, identifying him with their all- good and merciful father. They even appropriated Jewish scriptures, claiming that the Messianic prophecies were about Jesus and that the lord had in fact chosen them— not unbelieving Jews— before the foundation of the world (Eph 1:4).

To be sure, the Jewish scriptures themselves could sometimes speak of other divine beings in the heavens. The book of Exodus speaks of an "Angel of Yahweh" who bears Yahweh's name and— according to later tradition— participates in the work of creation. This angel sometimes punishes sin, but he is never described as evil, nor is it clear why or how such an angel would ever become evil and be equated with the Jewish deity. This logic, though argued vigorously, is missing several steps and is often based on late evidence.

Nevertheless, paying close attention to scriptural interpretation does, I believe, set us on the right track. There were, after all, numerous "hard sayings" and stories in scripture— texts that seemed like thorns in the eyes of educated and philosophically informed readers. Typical examples come from the first six chapters of Genesis. Why, for instance, did the Jewish god prohibit the first humans from eating the fruit of the

tree of knowledge (Gen 2)? Why did he not seem to know Adam's location in the garden of Eden? Why did he eventually cast Adam and Eve out of Eden (Gen 3)? Why did he later send a flood to wipe out most of humanity (Gen 6- 8)? And— beyond the book of Genesis— why did Yahweh repeatedly say that he was jealous? Assuming he was the most powerful being in the universe, whom could he possibly envy?

These were questions that early Jews and Christians were asking already in the late first and early second centuries CE. Most Jews and Christians, it seems, found a way to answer them while preserving the glory and goodness of the Jewish lord. For other Christians, however, these problematic sayings and stories produced a cumulative case against the benevolent character of the creator. As more and more negative stories were told about the creator based on his own scriptures, the reading of these scriptures helped to cultivate a deep- rooted suspicion that the creator was not benign after all.

Although this hypothesis is hardly new, it has not, to my knowledge, been the subject of a book length investigation. Naturally, able scholars have written dozens of essays on individual scriptures that could be taken to support an evil creator, but these have mostly focused on passages from Jewish texts. In this book, I ultimately grant more weight to distinctly Christian scriptures (the "New Testament"), in part because the Christian interpretation of these texts gives a sense for the hermeneutical frameworks that were then applied to Jewish scriptures.

Figures and Sources

Before we dive into the maelstrom of early biblical interpretation, however, we must inquire about the Christians who used scripture to derive the evil creator. In many cases, their names have been utterly forgotten. We can reasonably refer to certain Christian conventicles as "Sethians" (aka the Seed of Seth, the Immovable Generation, the Generation Without a King) in the sense of a distinct sociological group. It is inaccurate, however, to speak globally of "G/ gnostics" as if this label included every supporter of the evil creator idea. It did not, for instance, typically include Marcion, a key second century Christian theologian and our focus in Part II.

Here in Part I, I examine the origin of the evil creator idea among other early Christian groups. In Chapter 1, I refer to people whom Epiphanius of Salamis (about 315– 403 CE) called "Phibionites" in Egypt. I will compare the views of these Phibionite Christians with the description of the evil world rulers in the Secret Book of John and the so-called Ophite diagram. The Secret Book is widely held to be the classic work of the Sethian school of Christian thought. The "Ophite diagram" was named after a group that heresiologists called "Ophite" ("Serpentine"). We do not know how the latter group labeled itself, although "Christian" seems a fair guess since Celsus, a Platonist writing about 178 CE, assumed their Christian identity.



In Chapter 2, we encounter other types of Christians labeled "Peratic," "Archontic," "Severian," and "Manichean." Once again, it would be a mistake to clump together these systems under one global category, "gnostic," since none of them belonged to a single school of thought or shared a coherent spirituality. What united them in this case were certain hermeneutical strategies for interpreting John 8:44. They all agreed, as it turned out, that John 8:44 spoke of "the father of the devil," a being whom they identified with the putatively wicked god of the Jews.

Method

In large part, this is a work of reception history— more specifically the history of interpretation. I define the latter as the study of the activated meanings of a text in a given historical context. The historical focus of this book is the period between the mid– second and the late fourth century CE. Accordingly, I do not aim to uncover the earliest ("original") meanings of biblical texts. Rather, I attempt to recover what they meant at a particular time frame to the particular Christian interpreters studied here.

As a scholar, I acknowledge that I have my own interpretive horizon, best disclosed, perhaps, through a discussion of hermeneutical presuppositions. I assume, first of all, that there is no "plain" reading of biblical texts, but simply readings that make sense in certain cultural environments to certain persons or groups for certain reasons. No text is hermeneutically determined. There is a hermeneutical fullness— caused in part by semantic gaps— in biblical texts that allow searching minds to fill in the blanks and make inferences. In new contexts, interpreters ask different questions and bring out distinctive facets of a text not readily visible to those in different times and intellectual traditions.

I presuppose, furthermore, that interpretation is always selective and limited by the horizon of the interpreter (whether ancient or modern). As a result, reception history is always our reception of an earlier reception. We are the ones who imagine and reconstruct the earlier interpretive horizon that is to some degree fused with our own.

It used to be thought that so- called gnostic exegesis was an intentionally perverse kind of "protest exegesis." This view has been thoroughly criticized and is no longer tenable, at least as a generalization.49 When the earliest Christian interpreters read John 8:44, for instance, it was not to counter a standard or "normative" reading of the verse, since such a reading had not yet emerged.

The greatest benefit of reception history for this study is that it allows a clearing of the table— a suspension (though obviously not a complete liquidation) of our value judgments in the interest of reading and hearing biblical texts as they were interpreted in antiquity. This suspension is especially needed when dealing with a theologically charged topic like the evil creator. Traditional ("orthodox") readings of Christian scripture have in effect made the evil creator an impossible idea— or if possible, then blasphemous and dangerous. To the best of our ability, we must bracket these traditional readings to endeavor to understand interpretations from a fundamentally different— though still Christian— preunderstanding. It is pointless to defend readings that construct an evil creator. At the same time, it is historically important

charitably to understand them, in part because— as I point out in the Conclusion— analogous readings have resurfaced in the modern world.

In our quest for understanding, however, I must offer the following caveat. The early Christian interpreters discussed in this book were no friends of the Jewish deity and were likely no friends of the Jewish people either. Some of them were staunch critics of Jewish scriptures, at least insofar as these scriptures portrayed the creator as the true deity. A great deal of what these Christians wrote might seem (sometimes crassly) anti-Jewish in modern ears. As historians, we owe it to the ancients to understand them on their own terms and faithfully to report their words, their logic, and their inferences. It should go without saying, however, that I myself do not support or condone any interpretation that might lead to anti- Judaism in any form at any time for any reason. This point should be obvious, yet the terrible forces of racism that still lurk in our world compel the clearest of speech. In investigating the nature and sources of evil, we must never succumb to it.

Introduction to Marcion

> If the gods do something foul, they are not gods. —Euripides.

Marcion of Pontus is the major focus of Part II and thus merits a brief introduction here. This early Christian theologian was born in the late first century CE in Pontus (north- central Turkey), immediately south of the Black Sea. Although most of his early history recorded by his opponents is unreliable, it is relatively secure that he became a shipowner who managed an affluent shipping business. He was wealthy enough, at least, to make a large donation to a church in Rome when he settled there sometime in the late 130s CE.

In Rome, Marcion met Cerdo from the Roman province of Syria. The report of Cerdo's teachings and the extent of his influence on Marcion are unclear. Apparently both men distinguished the Judean creator from the good and true deity revealed in and through Jesus Christ.

Likely, however, Marcion already made this distinction before coming to Rome.

At the time, Roman Christian movements formed a loosely connected network of churches run by individual leaders called presbyters. Individual presbyters jostled for preeminence with no undisputed leader. Claims about a succession of single bishops suggesting a unified organization appeared only later (in the 160s CE).

After some years laboring within established ecclesial networks, there was an opportunity for Marcion to present his views to a group of presbyters. A meeting— we do not know how official or how large— was convened. It became clear on this occasion that Marcion's conception of an evil creator, although based on a biblical principle— that good character cannot come from evil actions (Luke 5:36– 37; 6:43)— was not supported by the majority.

Marcion was not excommunicated. He left the established networks of his own accord. Probably using the cash of his previous donation (dutifully returned to him), Marcion organized his own ecclesial movement in Rome. From Rome, he began an ambitious mission to establish his form of Christianity in other parts of the empire.

Marcionite Scriptures

By Marcion's time, there was already an edition of Paul's letters known where he grew up in Pontus. Marcion republished an edited version of these letters (the Apostolikon). To it he attached a single gospel, called the Evangelion, evidently an early form of the gospel now referred to as Luke. Marcion also published a prefatory tract called Antitheses (or Oppositions), which I will introduce in Chapter 3.

Marcion had several leading disciples (Lucanus, Potitus, Basilicus, Syneros, Apelles, and Prepon are named in the sources). In these sources, it is often hard to distinguish their teaching from the master's. To highlight this confluence (and ambiguity), I will often use the descriptor "Marcion(ites)."

When Marcion died and under what circumstances are unknown, but his church movement lasted several centuries, notably in the eastern Mediterranean. Epiphanius said that in his day (about 375 CE), Marcionites existed in Rome, Italy, Egypt, Palestine, Arabia, Syria, Cyprus, Persia— among other places. A Syrian bishop (about 450 CE)

spoke of converting over a thousand Marcionites in a Syrian town and mentions eight other entirely Marcionite villages in his area. Evidently Marcion's message proved compelling to many, and in some areas Marcionite Christianity was the most widely known form. An inscription found in Damascus refers to a Marcionite congregation (synagogë) and dates from 318 to 319 CE. In the mid– fourth century, Cyril of Jerusalem advised Christians that, if they arrive in a new town, always to ask for the catholic church, lest someone lead them to the Marcionite counterpart. To Marcionites themselves, their Christian identity was not in doubt, and their movement produced not a few martyrs who died confessing the name of Christ.

Marcion's Teachings

I follow the current consensus that Marcion's intellectual project was not so much the separation of Law ("Old Testament") and gospel ("New Testament") as it was the distinction between two superhuman entities competing for the hearts and minds of human beings. Marcion compared two scriptural anthologies (now called the Old and New Testaments) to show that they were inspired by two different superhuman figures with two opposing characters.

Under the influence of the famous church historian Adolf von Harnack, older scholarship maintained that Marcion opposed a good god and a just creator. More recent interpreters, however, understand that he contrasted a good god with an evil creator. Although later Marcionites came up with a range of theological positions (causing confusion in the sources), Marcion's own position, it seems, was that the creator was evil.

Marcion and Philosophy

Based on his literary activity, scholars infer that Marcion had a solid education in grammar, though he probably lacked formal philosophical training. At the same time, popular philosophical ideas had long dyed the wool of Marcion's mind, forming his sense of what was theologically appropriate.

Christian scripture teaches that god alone is good (Luke 18:19). Marcion, following Plato, went further by his assumption that god, to be god, must be good—in fact the Good and source of all good for all beings. This Platonized Christian divinity was immensely powerful but had one limitation: he could not do evil. Indeed, it was sacrilegious to say that god did anything morally base.

By Marcion's time, belief in god's exclusive goodness had become cultural common coin. The idea appears in Philo, Plutarch, Alcinous, Numenius, and Apuleius— all leading Middle Platonists of the period. The Chaldean Oracles scold the ignorant: "you do not know that every god is good, you drudges. Sober up!" Bellerophon, a character in one of Euripides's famous plays, declared "If the gods do something bad, they are not gods." The idea that god(s) must be good was widespread. In essence, then, all Marcion had to show was that the actions and character of the Judean creator were not— or not exclusively— good. Marcion could thereby show that the Judean god was no god at, but rather an imposter.

Two Gods?

It is often stated that Marcion believed in two gods, but this formulation is not correct. Marcion would not have described himself as a ditheist (a kind of polytheist). He maintained that there was another god superior to the creator, without affirming the creator's deity in an absolute sense. Marcion's distinctive term for the "god" of Jewish scripture was the "creator" or "cosmocrator" ("world governor").

Marcion's most thoroughgoing opponent, Tertullian, called both Marcion's supreme deity and the creator "gods" in a polemical attempt to portray Marcion as a polytheist. Indeed, Tertullian opened his description of Marcion's theology with the claim that Marcion "presents two gods." Tertullian made this charge even though he largely adopted Marcion's way of referring to the Jewish deity as "the creator."

Tertullian well knew that for Marcion the creator was wicked, or at least not good. The creator, as Tertullian's Marcion observed, was known to become enraged, grow jealous, exalt himself, become irritated, and so on. Marcion called him "severe, ignorant . . .

capricious . . . petty, a lover of war," and "most pitiless." Whoever Marcion's creator was, therefore, he was not good; and a being who lacked goodness, no matter how powerful, could not be god.

Superhuman beings overcome by nasty emotions and who stirred up trouble for humanity shared a common designation in Christian thought: they were demons. It is nowhere attested that Marcion called the creator a demon, though one early writer— a theologian named Ptolemy— indicated that for Marcion the creator was the devil. In our description of Marcion's theology, we cannot blindly follow Ptolemy, but neither should we follow heresy hunters in calling Marcion's creator "god," since Marcion himself demonstrably preferred other terms.

For Marcion one could reasonably say that the creator looks more like what most early Christians called a demon than a god. Christians since the days of Paul had been demonizing competing gods (on the basis of Ps 96:5). The idea that Marcion demonized the creator fits this trend, especially since some of the very criticisms that early Christian apologists hurled against Greco- Roman gods were launched, by Marcion, against the Judean creator. Although Marcion recognized the creator's power and his control over this world, he complained of his wicked character and refused to worship him as god. When compared with the supremely good Father, the creator was one of those falsely named "gods" who, to adapt a Pauline phrase, are "by nature not gods" (Gal 4:8).

Biblical Interpretation

If Marcion's assumptions were informed by philosophy, the springs of his thinking were biblical through and through. He had his own canon, the Evangelion and Apostolikon. Marcion also used the Jewish Bible as a source for his thinking, though not as scripture. It would be a mistake to think that Marcion's depiction of the evil creator is based "completely on Old Testament testimony." For Marcion, the Law and the Prophets told the true (if partial) story of a false god. Yet the wicked character of the creator was equally— if not more so— exposed in Marcion's "New" Testament.

Only by contrasting the god revealed in Christ did the evil of the creator shine through.

The task of exploring the logic of Marcionite biblical interpretation is complicated because hostile reporting has obscured Marcion's interpretive decisions. Heresy hunters generally presented Marcion's teaching as daring doctrine with little or no discussion of its biblical background or logic. Fortunately, there are careful scholarly reconstructions of Marcion's scriptures that provide the basis of his interpretations.

We also possess reliable editions of the chief anti- Marcionite tracts. The longest of these, a Latin work by the aforementioned Tertullian, was composed in North Africa (its third edition dated to 207 CE). Another useful work is the Adamantius, a late third or fourth century dialogue featuring two different Marcionite speakers (Markus and Megethius). Finally, there is the ample report on Marcion made by Epiphanius, a bishop and heresy hunter whom we have already had occasion to meet.

Roadmap

To summarize our itinerary for Part II, then: Chapter 3 studies Marcion(ite) interpretations of Jewish scripture whence derived the evil creator idea. Of chief importance was Isaiah 45:7, where the creator confessed to making "evils." The creator also admitted to being jealous and enraged (Exod 20:5; Isa 5:25). Marcion's special talent was contrasting the divine character deduced from Jewish scripture with the divine character of Christ. For example: (1) the creator's command to despoil the Egyptians with Christ's exhortation to voluntary poverty, (2) the creator's directive to punish "eye for eye" with Christ's principle of non- retaliation, (3) the creator's genocidal violence with Christ's call to be free from anger.

Chapter 4 treats the Marcionite interpretation of 2 Corinthians 4:4. Marcion(ites) understood "the god of this world" (2 Cor 4:4), to be the creator because (1) this is one of the creator's known scriptural titles, (2) it accords with his well- known function (ruling creation), and (3) it concurs with his past actions (cognitive incapacitation). According to Marcion, "the god of this world" joined forces with the blind "rulers of this world"

who crucified Christ (1 Cor 2:8). This wicked alliance encouraged the idea that the creator was evil.

Chapter 5 examines the Marcionite reception of Ephesians 2:15 (Christ "destroyed the Law of commandments by [his] teachings"). If Christ destroyed the Law by his teachings, the Law could not be good. Paul called the Law "good" in the sense of "just" (Rom 7:12). For Marcion, however, the creator's justice was only a cover for his savagery. From his perspective, the Law revealed sin and thus enslaved people to the creator. Christ came to abolish this Law to free humanity from slavery. Since Christ came as destroyer of the creator's Law, he proved that the Law was evil. If the Law was evil, so was the Lawgiver.

Chapter 6, in turn, shows how Christ "destroyed" the Law from stories in Marcion's Evangelion. After treating Evangelion 23:2 (Jewish leaders accuse Christ of "destroying the Law"), the discussion focuses on Jesus's concrete violations of the Law. For example, Christ touched lepers in violation of the Law and healed them apart from the Law's purification rites. Moreover, Christ controverted the Law to honor parents by requiring a would- be disciple not to bury his father, and in general by urging his disciples to abandon their families. Finally, Christ, according to Marcion(ites), violated Sabbath laws on numerous occasions, even claiming to be lord of— effectively over— the Sabbath.

Chapter 7, finally, examines the Marcionite interpretation of Galatians 3:13. In this verse, Christ "becomes" a curse on the cross. As the source text (Deut 21:23) shows, Jesus was cursed specifically by the creator. The creator's curse against Christ, despite its presumed salvific benefit, was an act of harm incompatible with the view that a divine being cannot inflict evil. Marcionite Christians understood the creator's curse against Christ as incriminating the creator's character. Whatever good resulted from the curse was not planned by the creator and could not exculpate him. A being who cursed the sinless savior was not only lacking goodness from a Marcionite perspective, he was also evil.

Finally, a word about method— here also reminding readers of what was said in the Introduction to Part I. In what follows, I will try to reconstruct how Marcion read or would have read certain scriptural texts as productive of the evil creator idea. This is my primary aim. To achieve that aim, I will appeal to the grammar and context of the text that we think Marcion was interpreting. In no case, however, am I trying to determine what the text "actually" or "originally" meant. I will also occasionally invoke interpreters roughly contemporary with Marcion to get a better idea of what might have been plausible to Marcion or indicative of his logic. In rare cases, I will invoke modern interpreters who read biblical texts in a way analogous to Marcion. All this data is gathered to support and reconstruct what I think was the Marcionite reading of a particular text. I make no claim whatsoever to exegete texts in a way that covers their entire biblical context or that engages with all the recent scholarly literature (most of which is miles apart from a Marcionite mentality). My endeavor is, through and through, to understand texts as Marcion(ites) would. <>

Meister Eckharts Rezeption im Nationalsozialismus: Studien zur ideologischen Ambivalenz der ‚deutschen' Mystik Editors: Maxime Mauriège and Martina Roesner [Series: Studies in Mysticism, Idealism, and Phenomenology, Brill, ISBN: 9789004517622]

Wohl kein mittelalterlicher Autor hat im Laufe der Jahrhunderte eine größere Faszination auf seine Leser ausgeübt als Meister Eckhart. Die besondere Universalität und Weite seines mystisch-theologischen Denkens hat ihn jedoch auch immer wieder zur Projektionsfläche für ideologisch motivierte Interpretationen aller Art gemacht. Der vorliegende Band beleuchtet die Rezeption, die Eckharts Mystik in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus erfahren hat. Im Mittelpunkt stehen dabei die verschiedenen und teilweise widersprüchlichen Versuche, Eckhart zum

Begründer eines „germanischen Christentums“ bzw. eines „deutschen Glaubens“ zu stilisieren und ihn in polemischer Weise gegen das Judentum, aber auch gegen die Katholische Kirche in Stellung zu bringen.

Meister Eckhart is undoubtedly one of the most fascinating medieval authors, who has appealed to a wide audience across the centuries. At the same time, the extraordinary universality and openness of his mystical-theological approach has repeatedly made him the object of all kinds of ideological projections and misinterpretations. The present volume examines the reception of Eckhart's mysticism in the era of National Socialism. The main focus is put on the different and sometimes contradictory attempts to present Eckhart as the founder of "Germanic Christianity" or "German faith" and as a visceral opponent of both Judaism and the Catholic Church.

CONTENTS

Wer war eigentlich Meister Eckhart, und welche (Be-)Deutung hat er – je nach Rezeptionsepoche – für uns? Anstatt diesem Namen ein Gesicht zuordnen zu können, da offenbar kein authentisches Bildnis von ihm überliefert wurde, bemüht man sich seit der Wiederentdeckung seiner Schriften im Zuge der späten deutschen Romantik sozusagen darum – um es mit Eckharts paradoxem Ausdruck zu formulieren –, ein ‚Bild ohne Bild' dieser Persönlichkeit des Spätmittelalters, d. h. ein Bild seiner geistigen Gestalt zu erfassen, ja sogar zu bestimmter Zeit von neuem zu erfinden. Denn später haben auf je unterschiedliche Weise nicht nur Germanisten, Philosophen und Theologen aus wissenschaftlichem Interesse versucht, mit unablässigem Eifer der Eigenart dieses Denkers bzw. dem Gehalt und Sinn seiner Lehre nachzuspüren, sondern leider auch – teilweise zu den angeführten Gruppen von Geisteswissenschaftlern gehörende – Verfechter einer abseitigen, weil unwissenschaftlichen Ideologie, welche die dunkelste Epoche der deutschen Geschichte und in deren Verlauf eine finstere Eckhart-Rezeption prägte, nämlich die dem Nationalsozialismus eigene.

Anfang der 1930er Jahre trat die Eckhart-Forschung jedoch mit der Inangriffnahme einer historisch-kritischen Edition sämtlicher Werke des Dominikanermeisters in „ein neues Stadium": „Sie führte in stärkerem Maße als bisher zu den Texten selbst hin und bot eine solidere Basis für die folgenden Untersuchungen, die sich bemühen, Eckharts Leben und Werk, seine Sprache, sein Denken und seine Bedeutung für die Geschichte des Geistes neu zu ergründen." Obwohl diese beim Verlag Kohlhammer erschienene Gesamtausgabe im Laufe der Jahrzehnte eine einstimmige internationale Anerkennung als zuverlässige Textgrundlage jeder wissenschaftlichen Eckhart-Interpretation fand, wurde sie dennoch zu ihrer Entstehungszeit hauptsächlich in ihrem Heimatland mit allerlei Wertschätzung bzw. großer Verehrung begrüßt, weil sie dort einem in

verschiedener Hinsicht brennenden Bedürfnis nach einem umfassenden ‚authentischen' Eckhartbild entgegenkam und folglich als nationale Ehrenpflicht deutscher Wissenschaft angesehen wurde. Im Nachhinein kann man zwar wohl feststellen, dass der Beginn dieses Editionsunternehmens eine Neubelebung der Eckhart-Forschung mit sich brachte, doch lässt sich aus dessen tatsächlichem Entstehungskontext nicht leugnen, dass es zugleich den Triumph einer ganz anderen, bei weitem über das Feld der wissenschaftlichen Forschung hinausgehenden ‚Eckhart-Renaissance' verkörperte: „ein Eccehardus redivivus besonders sinistrer Art". Dem Begriff ‚Renaissance' eignet hierbei eine doppelte Bedeutung, die aus zwei verschiedenen Betrachtungsweisen dieses Phänomens resultiert: einerseits als forschungsgeschichtliches Phänomen, das sich auf die Neuaufwertung des Werkes Eckharts im Zusammenhang mit der Herausgabe neuer Textgrundlagen bezieht, was der Auftakt zu einem Wandel des Eckhartbildes in den einschlägigen Forschungsgebieten war; und andererseits als nationaltypologisches Phänomen, weil die erneuerte wissenschaftliche Begeisterung für diesen ‚deutschen' Denker mit dessen hierzulande zunehmender publizistischer Popularisierung einherging, welche sich bis zu seiner völkischen Aneignung als Repräsentant des Deutschtums und Inbegriff eines neuerwachenden germanischen Selbstbewusstseins entwickelte.

Um dies zu verdeutlichen, ist es dienlich, auf folgende Aussagen hinzuweisen, die in einer 1935 veröffentlichten Abhandlung von Erich Seeberg, dem damaligen Vorsitzenden der von der Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft gegründeten und unter deren Schirmherrschaft stehenden ‚Meister-Eckhart-Kommission', formuliert wurden: „Die Eckhart-Renaissance, die wir heute erleben, geht stark auf Rosenbergs bekanntes Buch zurück; und das hat sie heraufgeführt, daß wir seit dem Sieg der

nationalsozialistischen Revolution uns alle bemühen, das Deutsche in unserer Kultur zu Ehren zu bringen und eben dies Deutsche von all den Zutaten zu reinigen, die über ihm zugewachsen sind.“ Hauptproponent einer ideologisch-propagandistischen Vereinnahmung dieses vielberufenen Mystikers zugunsten einer nationalsozialistischen Kultur- und Religionskritik war demnach der Chefideologe der NSDAP, Alfred Rosenberg, der in seinem 1930 und danach in weiteren hohen Auflagen erschienenen *Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts* den „heiligen und seligen Meister“ als „Apostel der deutschen Glaubenswerte“, d. h. als einen Verkünder des „Grundbekenntnisses alles arischen Wesens“ darstellte bzw. fiktionalisierte; und der im Anschluss daran entbrannte ‚Streit um Meister Eckhart‘ hatte u. a. zur Folge, dass sich deutsche, sowohl katholische als auch protestantische, von Seeberg angeführte Eckhart-Forscher aufgerufen fühlten, „als Frucht ihrer loyalen Zusammenarbeit bald dem deutschen Volk die lateinischen und deutschen Werke Meister Eckharts in einer großen und relativ billigen Gesamtausgabe zugänglich [zu] machen“.

Da Rosenberg und sein Buch seitdem in der Forschung jeweils als emblematischste Figur und wirksamstes Werk derartiger Eckhart-Renaissance gelten, neigen die auf die Zeit des Nationalsozialismus Bezug nehmenden Eckhart-Studien selten dazu, weniger bekannte, aber rezeptionsgeschichtlich ebenso beachtenswerte Akteure und folgenreiche Quellen oder Aspekte in Betracht zu ziehen. So wurde dieses Themenfeld bisher leider noch nicht in seiner Breite und Tiefe untersucht, sondern teils in vereinzelten, eher kleinen Beiträgen, teils in historisch umfassenderen Darlegungen der Eckhart-Rezeption und -forschung sowie in Studien zu zeitgenössischen Rezipienten mehr oder weniger gründlich behandelt. Daher die Erarbeitung des vorliegenden Bandes. Anlass und Antrieb dazu war die vom 19. bis 21. Mai 2016 in Erfurt von der Meister-Eckhart-

Forschungsstelle am Max-Weber-Kolleg veranstaltete internationale interdisziplinäre Tagung „Eine Lichtung des deutschen Waldes – Mystik, Idealismus und Romantik“, deren erste Sektion vier Vorträge zum Thema „Meister Eckhart in der nationalsozialistischen Rezeption“ bot. Davon sind hier drei – die der beiden Herausgeber und der von Christoph Henning – in ausgearbeiteter Form enthalten. Ergänzend dazu wurden zusätzliche Beiträge zur erweiterten Einsicht in den Komplex von Gebrauch und Missbrauch der Lehre und Schriften Meister Eckharts im Kontext des Nationalsozialismus aufgenommen. Doch angesichts der Vielfalt des Sachverhalts kann dieser Sammelband keinen Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit erheben, sondern versteht sich als Anstoß und Einladung, das Thema intensiver und somit eingehender zu erforschen. Anstatt dieses finstere Kapitel mehr als ein Dreivierteljahrhundert nach Befreiung von der NS-Herrschaft lediglich als Last der Vergangenheit zu empfinden und es zu einem vernachlässigbaren Aspekt der Wirkungsgeschichte Eckharts herabzustufen, sollte man es endlich als Forschungsdesiderat betrachten und sich folglich dessen umhergeisterndem Schatten stellen, der über dem damaligen Aufschwung der modernen Eckhart-Forschung in Deutschland lag, welcher eng mit dem großen ‚nationalen‘ Unternehmen einer wissenschaftlichen Edition sämtlicher Werke dieses Dominikanermeisters zusammenhing.

Die besonders geartete Geschichte der Eckhart-Rezeption in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus wirft die Frage auf, warum unter allen christlichen Mystikern gerade Meister Eckhart zum Gegenstand einer derartigen ideologischen Vereinnahmung werden konnte, aber keine der anderen großen Gestalten der deutschen Mystik des Mittelalters, wie etwa Hildegard von Bingen, Mechthild von Magdeburg, Johannes Tauler oder Heinrich Seuse. Der Grund für diese betont ‚germanisierende‘ Deutung von Eckharts

Denken liegt paradoxerweise in der unüberbietbar großen Universalität seines mystisch-theologischen Ansatzes begründet, der einerseits aufgrund der starken Betonung der Gottebenbildlichkeit und Gottessohnschaft aller Menschen in grundsätzlichem Widerspruch zu jeder nationalistisch gefärbten Grundhaltung steht, andererseits aber durch ebendiese universalistische Ausrichtung auch am wenigsten als spezifisch christlich-innerkirchliche Mystik in Erscheinung tritt. Zwar stellen auch bei Eckhart die Menschwerdung Gottes in Jesus Christus sowie die Heilige Schrift des Alten und Neuen Testaments selbstverständliche Grundgegebenheiten der christlichen Existenz wie auch der christlichen Theologie dar, doch eignet seiner Mystik eine besondere Dynamik, die auf die Übersteigung und Sprengung aller spezifischen Bestimmungen Gottes hindrängt und letztlich auch die historische Gestalt Jesu Christi sowie die trinitarischen Personen insgesamt als etwas ‚Vorletztes' gegenüber dem absoluten Einheitsgrund der Gottheit erscheinen lässt.

Dieser Grundzug seines Denkens beruht letztlich auf einer konsequenten Weiterführung und Vollendung der negativen Theologie, lässt sich aber auch leicht in einem dezidiert antikatholischen Sinne deuten, als habe Eckhart die Absicht verfolgt, „unser Sein und Werden zu entgiften, das Leib und Seele knechtende syrische Dogma zu überwinden und den Gott im eigenen Busen zu erwecken, das ‚Himmelreich inwendig in uns' ". Eckhart selbst hätte eine solche ideologisierende Interpretation seines Denkens ganz sicher auf das schärfste missbilligt, doch liegt ihr überraschenderweise dasselbe Argumentationsmuster zugrunde, das auch von den päpstlichen Zensoren in Avignon gegen Eckhart ins Feld geführt wurde: Diese Kommission hatte 28 sehr pointiert klingende Sätze aus Eckharts Schriften herausgegriffen und auf ihre Rechtgläubigkeit hin untersucht. Dabei wurden die betreffenden Aussagen jedoch nicht nur aus ihrem jeweiligen

Zusammenhang gerissen, sondern die Zensoren setzten Eckharts zugegebenermaßen oft sehr ungewohnt und radikal klingende Ausdrucksweise auch mit einer heterodoxen Position im ausgedrückten theologischen Inhalt gleich. Für die päpstliche Kommission war damit der häretische oder zumindest häresieverdächtige Charakter dieser Sätze erwiesen. Der Umstand, dass die inkriminierten Formulierungen ausschließlich aus Eckharts deutschen Predigten und Traktaten stammen, ist jedoch ein starkes Indiz dafür, dass sich die Anklage vor allem an Eckharts sprachlicher Ausdrucksweise entzündete, denn ganz ähnlich lautende Passagen aus seinen lateinischen Schriften wurden nicht beanstandet, obwohl sie auf begrifflicher Ebene dieselben theologischen Gedanken artikulieren wie die deutschen Werke. Betrachtet man nun Eckharts ambivalenten ‚Erfolg' in der NS-Zeit, so fällt auf, dass dieser in nicht unwesentlichem Ausmaß mit seinem Avignoneser Prozess zusammenhängt sowie mit der Lehrverurteilung, die ein Jahr nach seinem Tod durch Papst Johannes XXII. gegen 26 in seinen Schriften enthaltene Sätze ausgesprochen wurde. Für die nationalsozialistische Eckhart-Rezeption, in der das antikatholische Ressentiment der Kulturkampfzeit ungebrochen weiterlebt, ist dies Grund genug, ihn zu einem Märtyrer für die germanische Sache zu stilisieren, dessen „‚deutsche Religion' […] hernach von Rom offiziell durch eine Bulle ‚verurteilt' " worden sei. Diese ideologisch motivierte Interpretation folgt damit aber letztlich demselben Denkmuster wie die Avignoneser Kommission, da sie die ungewöhnliche Ausdrucksweise in Eckharts deutschen Werken als Indiz für eine theologische Heterodoxie auf der inhaltlichen Ebene nimmt, nur dass sie diesen ‚häretischen' Grundzug nicht mehr negativ, sondern ausnehmend positiv bewertet.

Nun ist es zwar durchaus richtig, dass Eckhart den Anspruch hegte, in seinen Schriften „Neues und Ungewöhnliches" (*nova et rara*) zu bieten, doch

verstand er selbst dies nicht als generelle Negation der scholastischen Theologie seiner Zeit, sondern als den Versuch, bislang wenig beachtete, in seinen Augen aber wichtige Punkte der christlichen Theologie und Philosophie in den Vordergrund zu stellen und ausführlich abzuhandeln. Dies hindert die NS-Ideologen jedoch nicht daran, ihm zu bescheinigen, „jedes seiner Worte [sei] ein Schlag in das Gesicht der römischen Kirche und [sei] auch als solcher empfunden worden".

Obwohl Eckhart selbst stets energisch den Vorwurf bestritten hat, er habe eine außerhalb der kirchlich-christlichen Lehre stehende oder ihr gegenüber gar feindselige Mystik vertreten, verleiht der extrem universalistische Ansatz seines Denkens den Zentralbegriffen seiner Mystik doch eine grundlegende Amphibolie, die sie für eine ideologische Vereinnahmung anfällig macht. Dies gilt umso mehr, als er in seinen deutschen Predigten und Traktaten erstmals den Versuch unternimmt, die lateinische Begrifflichkeit des scholastischen Denkens in die Volkssprache zu übertragen, und dabei auf Begriffe
wie *wesen*, *grunt*, *gelâzenheit*, *abegescheidenheit*, *vernünfticheit*, *adel* usw. rekurriert, die von ihm selbst zwar in einer präzisen philosophisch-theologischen Bedeutung verwendet werden, zugleich aber beständig Gefahr laufen, von seinen Hörern und Lesern in einem alltagssprachlichen Sinne missverstanden und banalisiert zu werden. Liest man Eckharts deutsche Werke vor dem Hintergrund seiner lateinischen Schriften, so wird überdeutlich, dass auch in seiner mittelhochdeutschen Terminologie eine ganze Obertonreihe scholastisch-metaphysischer Bedeutungsebenen mitschwingt, die für ein unverkürztes Verständnis seiner Mystik unabdingbar sind. Klammert man diesen scholastischen Hintergrund jedoch aus, erweckt der faszinierende Sprachduktus seiner deutschen Werke den Eindruck eines geheimnisvollen *Clair-obscur*, das dazu einlädt, den

unüberbietbar offenen Universalhorizont des eckhartschen Denkens als ideale, weil vollkommen leere Projektionsfläche für die eigenen ideologischen Vorstellungen und Vorannahmen zu benutzen.

Dieses systematische ‚Vorbeihören' an Eckharts eigentlicher Grundintention betrifft nicht so sehr einzelne Gedankenmotive als vielmehr die Ausrichtung seines Denkens insgesamt: Eckharts Mystik ist in all ihren thematischen Facetten von der Grundeinsicht getragen, dass das eigentliche Selbstsein des Menschen nicht auf der Ebene seiner natürlichen, empirisch-biologischen oder auch historisch-politischen Existenz zu finden ist, sondern auf der überzeitlichen Ebene jener transzendentalen Dynamik, die ihn beständig aus Gott als dem ersten Prinzip hervorgehen lässt. Dennoch interpretieren die nationalsozialistischen Rezipienten dort, wo sie sich auf Eckhart beziehen, dessen Lehre von der Gottesgeburt beharrlich in einem empirisch-ontischen Sinne und deuten seinen transzendental-anthropologischen Begriff der ‚Abgeschiedenheit' entweder als „das schönste Bekenntnis des germanischen Persönlichkeitsbewußtseins" oder auch als „völkisches Bekenntnis", das dazu aufruft, sich „frei von allem [zu machen], was [dem eigenen] Wesen eine fremde Zutat geben […] könnte". Diese politisch-ideologische μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος (*metábasis eis állo génos*) gipfelt in der grotesken Behauptung, „das ‚Seelenfünklein' Meister Eckharts [sei] nichts anderes als der ‚Führer in uns' ". Dass Eckharts Mystik von ihrem ganzen Ansatz her in Widerspruch zu solchen banalisierenden empirischen Konkretionen steht, wird dabei geflissentlich ausgeklammert. Dieser aus heutiger Sicht haarsträubend anmutende Versuch einer politisch-ideologischen Indienstnahme der eckhartschen Mystik ist jedoch deshalb so erfolgreich, weil er sich von vornherein auf einer hermeneutischen Metaebene bewegt, die durch keine noch so eindeutigen, den ideologischen Behauptungen widersprechenden

Textbefunde erschüttert werden kann. In dem Moment, wo Eckhart zum Apostel des „nordischen Abendlandes“ erklärt wird, ist es ein Leichtes, seine extensive Verwendung der lateinischen Sprache als ein bloßes Zugeständnis an die Zeitumstände zu deuten und die scholastische Form seiner Argumentation zu einem „arischen Mißbrauch jüdisch-talmudischer Methoden […], ein[em] Akt der Notwehr“ umzufälschen.

Unbeschadet dieses gemeinsamen ideologischen Apriori nimmt die politisch motivierte Vereinnahmung Eckharts in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus doch sehr unterschiedliche Formen an. Die Aufsätze, die in diesem Band versammelt sind, stellen sich die Aufgabe, diesen unterschiedlichen Rezeptionslinien nachzugehen und sie in ihrer Spezifizität hervortreten zu lassen. Der Beitrag von Martina Roesner befasst sich mit der Art und Weise, in der Meister Eckhart im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert zur Schlüsselfigur in der Rekonstruktion einer Genealogie des ‚deutschen Geistes‘ avanciert, wobei das Interpretationsschema zunächst konfessioneller bzw. völkerpsychologisch-deskriptiver Natur ist und erst im 20. Jahrhundert durch einen unverhohlen rassentheoretischen Ansatz abgelöst wird. Der Aufsatz von Martina Wehrli-Johns widmet sich in besonderer Weise der Eckhart-Rezeption bei Jakob Wilhelm Hauer, dem Gründer der ‚Deutschen Glaubensbewegung‘, der vor dem Hintergrund seiner religionswissenschaftlichen Kenntnisse Eckharts Mystik in die Nähe der indoarischen Religionen rückt.

Der Beitrag von Yossef Schwartz analysiert zum einen die ideologischen Hintergründe der zwei konkurrierenden Eckhart-Editionsprojekte, die während der 1930er Jahre in Deutschland bzw. in Italien begonnen wurden, und skizziert zum anderen die unterschiedlichen Ansätze einer jüdischen Rezeption Eckharts, die – fernab aller deutschtümelnden Vereinnahmung –

teils seine Kontinuität mit Cusanus betonen (Cassirer, Klibansky), teils sein Denken unter einem anarchisch-revolutionären Blickwinkel betrachten (Mauthner, Brunner, Landauer). Der Aufsatz von Christoph Henning widmet sich der Eckhart-Deutung bei Hermann Schwarz, der Eckharts Motiv der ‚Entselbstung' und des ‚Lassens' vom persönlichen Eigenwillen zwar übernimmt, es jedoch nur als Rücknahme der Individualseele in die Universalität der ‚Volksgemeinschaft' interpretiert und damit nationalsozialistisch nutzbar macht.

Maxime Mauriège legt anhand einer detaillierten Analyse von Zeitdokumenten dar, dass Eckhart von nationalsozialistisch geprägten Denkern mitnichten nur positiv gedeutet wurde, sondern bisweilen auch – wie etwa bei Karl Kindt – aufgrund seiner ‚weltflüchtigen', ‚schöpfungsfeindlichen' Grundhaltung sowie aufgrund seiner Beeinflussung durch jüdische Denker wie Moses Maimonides gerade als Feind des ‚jungen Deutschland' bezeichnet wurde. Kindts Verunglimpfung Eckharts als eines ‚falschen Propheten' steht in scharfem Gegensatz zu Rosenbergs schwärmerischer Verklärung Eckharts, was nur beweist, dass die ideologischen Deutungsansätze im Grunde aus Eckhart nur herauslesen, was sie selbst in ihn hineingelegt haben. Der letzte Beitrag in diesem Band stammt aus der Feder von Ricardo Baeza und geht der Frage nach, welche Verbindung zwischen Heideggers Eckhart-Rezeption und seiner Kritik des ‚Judentums' in den *Schwarzen Heften* besteht. Dabei wird deutlich, dass sich Heidegger bei seiner Kritik des ‚jüdisch-rechnenden Denkens' der bisherigen Metaphysik auf Eckharts ‚Gelassenheit' beruft, die in der Lage sein soll, den Geist der ‚Machenschaft' und der einseitigen Beherrschung der Wirklichkeit zu überwinden und ein neues Weltverhältnis zu begründen.

Auch wenn sich die Beiträge des vorliegenden Bandes einer nunmehr gut 80 Jahre zurückliegenden Epoche der deutschen Geistesgeschichte widmen, lässt sich aus ihren Ergebnissen doch eine eindeutige Schlussfolgerung mit Blick auf die Eckhart-Rezeption der Gegenwart ziehen: Das, was das Faszinosum von Eckharts Mystik ausmacht – ihre unerhörte Weite, Offenheit, begriffliche Kühnheit und Radikalität –, bedingt zugleich auch ihre Anfälligkeit für ideologische Vereinnahmungen aller Art. Als Antidot gegen solche Fehlentwicklungen ist die philosophie- und theologiegeschichtliche Kontextualisierung von Eckharts Denken ebenso wichtig wie die Betonung der inneren, systematischen Verbindung zwischen seinen lateinischen und deutschen Werken. Vielleicht noch wichtiger ist jedoch, sich Eckhart in der Haltung des ‚ohne Warum' zu nähern und ihn in keiner Weise für die eigenen Belange und Interessen instrumentalisieren zu wollen. Der wahrhaft arme Mensch ist derjenige, der auch mit Blick auf Eckhart nichts will, nichts weiß und nichts hat, sondern gegenüber allen eigensüchtigen Aspekten der Eckhart-Rezeption ledig und frei ist.

„Warum liest du Eckhart?" – „Traun, ich weiß es nicht, aber ich lese ihn gerne".

Maxime Mauriège und Martina Roesner

Translaion

Who was Meister Eckhart, and what significance does he have for us – depending on the epoch of reception? Instead of being able to assign a face to this name, since apparently no authentic portrait of him has been handed down, since the rediscovery of his writings in the course of late German Romanticism, efforts have been made, so to speak – to use Eckhart's paradoxical expression – to capture a 'picture without a picture' of this personality of the late Middle Ages, i.e. an image of his spiritual form, even

to reinvent it at a certain time. Later, not only Germanists, philosophers and theologians, out of scientific interest, tried in different ways to trace the peculiarity of this thinker .dem or the content and meaning of his doctrine with unremitting zeal, but unfortunately also – some of whom belonged to the groups of humanities scholars mentioned – advocates of a remote, because unscientific ideology, which marked the darkest epoch in German history and in the course of which a sinister one Eckhart's reception, namely that of National Socialism.

At the beginning of the 1930s, however, Eckhart research entered "a new stage" with the launch of a historical-critical edition of all the works of the Dominican master: "It led to the texts themselves to a greater extent than before and provided a more solid basis for subsequent investigations, which strive to re-examine Eckhart's life and work, his language, his thinking and his significance for the history of the mind." Although this complete edition, published by Verlag Kohlhammer, has received unanimous international recognition over the decades as a reliable textual basis for any scholarly interpretation of Eckhart, it was nevertheless greeted with all sorts of appreciation and great veneration at the time of its creation, mainly in its home country, because it met a burning need for a comprehensive 'authentic' Eckhart image in various respects and consequently served as a national duty of honor of German science. In retrospect, it may well be said that the beginning of this edition enterprise brought with it a revival of Eckhart research, but it cannot be denied from its actual context of origin that it also embodied the triumph of a completely different 'Eckhart Renaissance' that went far beyond the field of scientific research: "an eccehardus redivivus of a particularly sinister kind". The term 'Renaissance' has a double meaning, which results from two different ways of looking at this phenomenon: on the one hand, as a phenomenon in the history of

research, which refers to the revaluation of Eckhart's work in connection with the publication of new textual foundations, which was the prelude to a change in the Eckhart image in the relevant fields of research; and, on the other hand, as a national-typological phenomenon, because the renewed scientific enthusiasm for this 'German' thinker went hand in hand with his increasing journalistic popularization in this country, which developed up to his völkisch appropriation as a representative of Germanism and the epitome of a newly awakening Germanic self-confidence.

In order to illustrate this, it is useful to refer to the following statements, which were formulated in a treatise published in 1935 by Erich Seeberg, then chairman of the 'Meister Eckhart Commission' founded by the Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft and under its patronage: "The Eckhart renaissance that we are experiencing today goes back strongly to Rosenberg's well-known book; and this has led them to the fact that since the victory of the National Socialist revolution we have all endeavored to honor the German in our culture and to cleanse this very German from all the ingredients that have grown over it." The main proponent of an ideological-propagandistic appropriation of this much-appointed mystic in favor of a National Socialist critique of culture and religion was thus the chief ideologist of the NSDAP, Alfred Rosenberg, who in his myth of the 20th century, published in 1930 and then in further large editions, presented the "holy and blessed master" as an "apostle of German religious values", i.e. as a herald of the "basic confession of all Aryan being" or fictionalized; and the ensuing 'controversy over Meister Eckhart' had the consequence, among other things, that German, both Catholic and Protestant, Eckhart scholars led by Seeberg felt called upon "to make Meister Eckhart's Latin and German works available to the German people in a large and relatively cheap complete edition as a fruit of their loyal cooperation".

Since Rosenberg and his book have since been regarded in research as the most emblematic figure and most effective work of such Eckhart Renaissance, the Eckhart studies referring to the National Socialist era rarely tend to take into account lesser-known but equally noteworthy actors and momentous sources or aspects in terms of reception history. Unfortunately, this topic has not yet been examined in its breadth and depth, but has been dealt with more or less thoroughly, partly in isolated, rather small contributions, partly in historically more comprehensive explanations of Eckhart's reception and research, as well as in studies on contemporary recipients. Hence the preparation of this volume. The occasion and impetus for this was the international interdisciplinary conference "A Glade of the German Forest – Mysticism, Idealism and Romanticism", organized from 19 to 21 May 2016 in Erfurt by the Meister Eckhart Research Centre at the Max Weber Kolleg, the first section of which offered four lectures on the topic of "Meister Eckhart in the National Socialist Reception". Of these, three – those of the two editors and that of Christoph Henning – are included here in elaborate form. In addition, additional contributions have been made to provide an expanded insight into the complex of use and abuse of Meister Eckhart's teachings and writings in the context of National Socialism. However, in view of the diversity of the facts, this anthology cannot claim to be complete, but is intended as an impetus and invitation to research the topic more intensively and thus more thoroughly. Instead of perceiving this dark chapter more than three-quarters of a century after liberation from Nazi rule merely as a burden of the past and downgrading it to a negligible aspect of Eckhart's history of influence, one should finally regard it as a research desideratum and consequently face its haunting shadow that hung over the upswing of modern Eckhart research in Germany at that time,

which was closely linked to the great 'national' enterprise. a scholarly edition of all the works of this Dominican master.

The special history of Eckhart's reception during the National Socialist era raises the question of why, among all Christian mystics, Meister Eckhart in particular could become the object of such ideological appropriation, but none of the other great figures of German mysticism of the Middle Ages, such as Hildegard von Bingen, Mechthild von Magdeburg, Johannes Tauler or Heinrich Seuse. Paradoxically, the reason for this emphatically 'Germanizing' interpretation of Eckhart's thinking lies in the unsurpassable universality of his mystical-theological approach, which on the one hand is in fundamental contradiction to any nationalistically colored basic attitude due to the strong emphasis on the image of God and the divine sonship of all people, but on the other hand is also the least specific due to this very universalistic orientation Christian-inner-church mysticism appears. Although the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ as well as the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are self-evident basic facts of Christian existence as well as of Christian theology, Eckhart also possesses a special dynamic that pushes towards the transcendence and exploding of all specific determinations of God and ultimately also the historical figure of Jesus Christ as well as the Trinitarian persons as a whole as something 'penultimate' in relation to the absolute reason for unity of the Godhead.

This basic feature of his thinking is ultimately based on a consistent continuation and completion of negative theology, but can also easily be interpreted in a decidedly anti-Catholic sense, as if Eckhart had pursued the intention "to detoxify our being and becoming, to overcome the Syrian dogma that enslaves body and soul, and to awaken God in our own bosom, the 'kingdom of heaven within us'". Eckhart himself would certainly have

strongly disapproved of such an ideologizing interpretation of his thinking, but surprisingly it is based on the same pattern of argumentation that was also used against Eckhart by the papal censors in Avignon: This commission had picked out 28 very pointed-sounding sentences from Eckhart's writings and examined them for their orthodoxy. However, the statements in question were not only taken out of their respective contexts, but the censors also equated Eckhart's admittedly often very unusual and radical-sounding manner of expression with a heterodox position in the theological content expressed. For the papal commission, the heretical or at least heresy character of these sentences was thus proven. However, the fact that the incriminated formulations originate exclusively from Eckhart's German sermons and treatises is a strong indication that the accusation was ignited above all by Eckhart's linguistic expression, because very similar passages from his Latin writings were not objected to, although they articulate the same theological thoughts on a conceptual level as the German works. If one now looks at Eckhart's ambivalent 'success' in the Nazi era, it is striking that it is to a not inconsiderable extent related to his Avignonese trial and to the doctrinal condemnation that was pronounced one year after his death by Pope John XXII against 26 sentences contained in his writings. For the National Socialist reception of Eckhart, in which the anti-Catholic resentment of the Kulturkampf period lives on unbroken, this is reason enough to stylize him as a martyr for the Germanic cause, whose "'German religion' [...] afterwards he was officially 'condemned' by a bull by Rome. However, this ideologically motivated interpretation ultimately follows the same pattern of thought as the Avignonese Commission, since it takes the unusual language in Eckhart's German works as an indication of a theological heterodoxy on the level of content, except that it no longer

evaluates this 'heretical' basic feature negatively, but exceptionally positively.

Although it is quite true that Eckhart claimed to offer "new and unusual" (*nova et rara*) in his writings, he himself understood this not as a general negation of the scholastic theology of his time, but as an attempt to focus on points of Christian theology and philosophy that had received little attention but were important in his eyes. However, this does not prevent Nazi ideologues from attesting to him that "every word he said was a slap in the face of the Roman Church and was perceived as such."

Although Eckhart himself has always vigorously denied the accusation that he represented a mysticism that was outside the Church's Christian doctrine or even hostile to it, the extremely universalist approach of his thought nevertheless gives the central concepts of his mysticism a fundamental amphibolism that makes them susceptible to ideological appropriation. This is all the more true since in his German sermons and treatises he is the first to attempt to translate the Latin concept of scholastic thought into the vernacular, referring to terms such as *wesen,* grunt*, gelâzenheit*, abegescheidenheit*, vernünftikheit* , *nobility* etc., which are used by himself in a precise philosophical-theological sense, but at the same time constantly run the risk of being misunderstood and trivialized by his listeners and readers in an everyday sense. If one reads Eckhart's German works against the background of his Latin writings, it becomes abundantly clear that his Middle High German terminology also resonates with a whole series of scholastic-metaphysical levels of meaning, which are indispensable for an unabridged understanding of his mysticism. However, if one excludes this scholastic background, the fascinating linguistic style of his German works gives the impression of a mysterious *clair-obscur*, which invites us to use the

unsurpassably open universal horizon of Eckhart's thought as an ideal, because completely empty, projection surface for one's own ideological ideas and assumptions.

This systematic 'listening by' of Eckhart's actual basic intention concerns not so much individual thought motifs as the orientation of his thinking as a whole: Eckhart's mysticism, in all its thematic facets, is supported by the basic insight that the actual selfhood of man is not to be found on the level of his natural, empirical-biological or even historical-political existence, but on the transcendental level of those transcendental Dynamism that allows him to constantly emerge from God as the first principle. Nevertheless, where they refer to Eckhart, the National Socialist recipients persistently interpret Eckhart's doctrine of the birth of God in an empirical-ontic sense and interpret his transcendental-anthropological concept of 'seclusion' either as "the most beautiful confession of Germanic personality consciousness" or as a "völkisch confession" that calls for "making oneself free from everything that gives [one's own] being a foreign ingredient [...] could". This political-ideological μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος (*metábasis eis állo génos*) culminates in the grotesque assertion that "Meister Eckhart's 'soul fox' [is] nothing more than the 'leader in us'". The fact that Eckhart's mysticism contradicts such banalizing empirical concretions in its entire approach is deliberately ignored. However, this attempt at a political-ideological appropriation of Eckhart's mysticism, which seems hair-raising from today's point of view, is so successful because it moves from the outset on a hermeneutical meta-level that cannot be shaken by any textual findings, no matter how clear, that contradict the ideological assertions. At the moment when Eckhart is declared an apostle of the "Nordic West", it is easy to interpret his extensive use of the Latin language as a mere concession to the circumstances of the time and to falsify the scholastic

form of his argument into an "Aryan abuse of Jewish-Talmudic methods [...], an act of self-defense".

Notwithstanding this common ideological a priori, the politically motivated appropriation of Eckhart during the National Socialist era took very different forms. The essays collected in this volume set themselves the task of pursuing these different lines of reception and allowing them to emerge in their specificity. Martina Roesner's contribution deals with the way in which Meister Eckhart became a key figure in the reconstruction of a genealogy of the 'German spirit' in the 19th and early 20th centuries, whereby the interpretation scheme is initially confessional or descriptive in terms of people's psychology and is only replaced in the 20th century by a blatantly racial theoretical approach. The essay by Martina Wehrli-Johns is dedicated in a special way to the reception of Eckhart by Jakob Wilhelm Hauer, the founder of the 'German Faith Movement', who, against the background of his knowledge of religious studies, brings Eckhart's mysticism close to the Indo-Aryan religions.

On the one hand, Yossef Schwartz's contribution analyzes the ideological background of the two competing Eckhart edition projects that were begun in Germany and Italy during the 1930s, respectively, and, on the other hand, outlines the different approaches to a Jewish reception of Eckhart, which – far removed from all Germanic appropriation – partly emphasize his continuity with Cusanus (Cassirer, Klibansky), partly his thinking from an anarchic-revolutionary point of view (Mauthner, Brunner, Landauer). Christoph Henning's essay is dedicated to Hermann Schwarz's interpretation of Eckhart, who adopts Eckhart's motif of 'self-abandonment' and 'abandonment' of personal self-will, but interprets it only as a

withdrawal of the individual soul into the universality of the 'Volksgemeinschaft' and thus makes it usable by the National Socialists.

On the basis of a detailed analysis of contemporary documents, Maxime Mauriège argues that Eckhart was by no means only interpreted positively by National Socialist thinkers, but was also sometimes – as in the case of Karl Kindt – described as an enemy of 'young Germany' because of his 'worldly', 'anti-creation' attitude and because of his influence by Jewish thinkers such as Moses Maimonides. Kindt's denigration of Eckhart as a 'false prophet' stands in sharp contrast to Rosenberg's rapturous transfiguration of Eckhart, which only proves that the ideological interpretations basically only read out of Eckhart what they themselves have put into him. The last article in this volume was written by Ricardo Baeza and explores the connection between Heidegger's reception of Eckhart and his critique of 'Judaism' in the *Black Notebooks*. It becomes clear that Heidegger refers to Eckhart's 'serenity' in his critique of the 'Jewish-calculating thinking' of previous metaphysics, which is supposed to be able to overcome the spirit of 'machination' and one-sided domination of reality and to establish a new relationship to the world.

Even though the contributions in this volume are devoted to an epoch of German intellectual history that was now a good 80 years ago, a clear conclusion can be drawn from their results with regard to Eckhart's reception of the present: what makes Eckhart's mysticism so fascinating – its unheard-of breadth, openness, conceptual boldness and radicalism – also determines its susceptibility to ideological appropriation of all kinds. As an antidote to such undesirable developments, the contextualization of Eckhart's thought in the history of philosophy and theology is just as important as the emphasis on the inner, systematic connection between his

Latin and German works. Perhaps even more important, however, is to approach Eckhart in the attitude of 'no why' and not to want to instrumentalize him in any way for one's own concerns and interests. The truly poor person is the one who, even with regard to Eckhart, wants nothing, knows nothing and has nothing, but is single and free from all selfish aspects of Eckhart's reception.

"Why do you read Eckhart?" – "Traun, I don't know, but I like to read him".

Maxime Mauriège und Martina Roesner <>

The Christians of Phrygia from Rome to the Turkish Conquest by Stephen Mitchell [Series: Early Christianity in Asia Minor, Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity, Brill, ISBN: 9789004546370]

The towns and villages of Phrygia, a predominantly rural region of inner Asia Minor, provide richer documentation of their early Christian communities than any other part of the Roman empire. This includes the earliest lengthy Christian funerary text, coin types depicting Noah and the Flood introduced by Christians at the Phrygian emporium of Apamea, the famous 'Christians for Christians' inscriptions, and more than a hundred other pre-Constantinian grave monuments, The abundant evidence for the Christian presence up the Turkish invasions throws new light on continuity between Late Antiquity and the Middle Byzantine period, and on the warfare between the Byzantines and Turks in the 11th century. This is the first exhaustive regional study since 1897.

CONTENTS

This book is a contribution to the series Early Christianity in Asia Minor, initiated by Professors C. Breytenbach and C. Markschies in the Theology Faculty of the Humboldt University. This was part of the Topoi Research Network in Berlin, funded by the German Federal Government as one of its Excellence Initiatives from 2007–2019. I joined the group working on Early Christianity in Asia Minor in 2008 and the bonds have been tighter since my own move to Berlin in 2015. I have enjoyed the friendship and intellectual support of a valued group of close colleagues: Cilliers Breytenbach has been the organising genius, ably supported by Professor Klaus Hallof, director of *Inscriptiones Graecae* in the Berlin Academy of Sciences, and Professor Christiane Zimmermann, who has now provided a new base for the project at the University of Kiel. Cilliers Breytenbach and Christiane Zimmermann led the team by example, publishing their volume on Lycaonia, the region of Asia Minor that has produced the greatest number of early Christian inscriptions. Since then Professor Breytenbach has joined forces with Dr Elli Tzavella to complete the first volume of the parallel series on early Christianity in Greece, devoted to Athens, Attica and adjacent areas. The initial foundations of the entire programme were laid by Professor Ulrich

Huttner (Siegen), who created most of the Asia Minor entries for the *Inscriptiones Christianae Graecae* data base between 2008 and 2013, while writing the first volume in the Asia Minor series to appear, on early Christianity in the Lycos valley. Dr Julien Ogereau, his successor, currently at the University of Vienna, managed and developed ICG, while preparing a volume on Macedonia. Dr Philipp Pilhofer, Maya Prodanova and Patrick Hommel have worked respectively on Cilicia and Isauria, Thrace and Galatia, and been invaluable discussion partners, and the last two have played important parts in creating the data base. Dr Pilhofer and I coedited a volume of studies devoted to parts of Asia Minor which are not due to receive monograph treatment in the foreseeable future.

This study is largely founded on the Christian inscriptions of Phrygia, a rich archive of more than 500 texts, which have played an ever-growing part in our understanding of the first thousand years of Christian history in Asia Minor. All students of Roman and Byzantine Phrygia are indebted to the intrepid and tireless epigraphic explorers of the region, who have literally created this entire field of study by their discoveries, and then illuminated it by their analyses and debates. The sequence begins with the greatest figure of all, Sir William Mitchell Ramsay, who explored every facet of Phrygia's topography and history in the early part of his career, which culminated in the two volumes of *The Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia* (1895, 1897), a work that most judges today would consider to be his masterpiece. His example inspired a distinguished series of followers, many from his native Scotland, including J.G.C. Anderson, W.M. Calder, W.H. Buckler, and C.W.M. Cox. The last three were responsible for publishing newly discovered material during the 1920s in articles that appeared in the *Journal of Roman Studies*, and were then the architects of the classic series *Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua*, which presents the abundant fruits of their continuing exploration of

Phrygia. Calder resumed work in Asia Minor during the 1950s and directed another generation of explorers, notably M.H. Ballance, whose discoveries In Phrygia and Lycaonia have supplied the material for a further volume of MAMA, edited by P. Thonemann.

Since the late 1960s Phrygia has been the domain *par excellence* of Thomas Drew-Bear, who made finds on a scale that matches that of any of the early pioneers, which have been published with great expertise by himself or the scholars with whom he has collaborated. His regretted death in 2022 has deprived this book of what would have been its most expert and critical reader. Since 2000 there has been a steady growth in the number of publications by Turkish scholars, notably Eda Akyürek-Şahin, although this has been more concerned with pagan than with Christian religious monuments. The archaeology of Phrygia has now become much better known and understood. Marc Waelkens in the 1970s and 1980s and Tomas Lochman in the 1990s and early 2000s made fundamental contributions to the understanding of Phrygian monuments of the Roman period from an archaeological perspective. These have contributed directly to a better grasp of the documentary epigraphic record, and stimulated new research on Phrygia's art and culture. The excavations directed by F. D'Andria at Hierapolis, Celal Şimşek at Laodiceia, and Chris Lightfoot at Amorium have created a new knowledge base for the settlement history of Byzantine Phrygia until the Turkish conquest, and the detailed excavation results from these sites complement the masterly and detailed synthesis of regional history, archaeology and topography by Klaus Belke and Norbert Mersich which they presented in *Tabula Imperii Byzantini* 7. Philip Niewöhner's field work and study of ecclesiastical architectural decoration has brought order and new insights into the material history of Phrygia in late antiquity and the Middle Byzantine period.

Work on early Phrygian Christianity was given a new impetus by Elsa Gibson's 1978 monograph on the 'Christians for Christians' inscriptions, which contained both known material and new texts found by herself and Thomas Drew-Bear. Most but not all subsequent work has dealt with the Montanists, and led theological scholars, including August Strobel and Peter Lampe, to visit and conduct research in the region themselves. Pride of place among the new investigators of the 'Phrygian Heresy' must be assigned to the Australian scholar William Tabbernee, whose collection of *Montanist Inscriptions and Testimonia* established a bench mark in the collation of epigraphic evidence from the region. He and Peter Lampe can also claim credit for identifying the location of the Montanist centres Pepuza and Tymion. Other Australasian scholars, inspired by the example of Edwin Judge, have carried the torch for the history of early Christianity in Asia Minor. Greg Horsley in the New Documents series was an important pioneer in bringing epigraphic and papyrological evidence to bear on the study of the New Testament, Paul Trebilco has written fundamental studies of Jews and Christians in the first two centuries, and Paul McKechnie's more recent synthesis on Asia Minor's Christians places strong emphasis on the epigraphic evidence. Peter Thonemann's monograph on the Maeander river has led to an important breakthrough in our knowledge of south-west Phrygia. The abundance of Anglo-Saxon and German scholarship on these themes has tended to overshadow the outstanding work of a French scholar, François Blanchetierre, on second- and third-century Asiatic Christianity and on the Montanists. The inscriptions of the later centuries are now much better understood and appreciated thanks to the extraordinary work of the doyen of Byzantine epigraphic studies, Denis Feissel, a true successor to Louis Robert. Burgeoning research world-wide on all aspects of the history

of late antiquity and Byzantium has vastly enriched our understanding of the contexts in which the epigraphy of Phrygia belongs.

A word is necessary on the presentation of the inscriptions, which are quoted in whole or in part throughout this study, especially in chapters 4 and 5. Many inscriptions survive in fragments or are only legible with difficulty. Letters, words or whole phrases that have to be supplied by their editors are printed within square brackets: [ ]. Conventional brackets ( ) mark text that was never inscribed but could be understood, i.e. abbreviated words. Diamond brackets < > indicate letters omitted in error by the stone-cutter. Curled brackets {} are used for superfluous letters introduced in error by the stone-cutter. A large part of the craft of the epigraphist lies in supplying missing text. Convincing restoration is dependent on an accurate reading of what survives, a precise estimate of how much is missing, a correct understanding of the preserved sections, and a good knowledge of the vocabulary and phraseology that are to be found in comparable inscriptions. Simple, formulaic epitaphs are relatively easy to emend, elaborate literary compositions in a fragmentary condition are usually beyond definitive restoration, although their general sense may be clear. Another epigraphic convention is to place a dot under uncertain letters. When the surface of the stone is damaged or the engraving is careless, it is often very hard to be sure, for example, whether a letter is an A, Λ or Δ. The correct reading is usually resolved by the context. In most epigraphic publications and on the ICG Web-site and Repertorium, uncertain letters are indicated by this convention, but I have not adopted it for this book, as its use is subject to a variety of interpretations, and I have preferred simply to state verbally if I consider a reading to be doubtful. It will become quickly obvious that the grammatical features and orthography of many of the inscriptions diverge considerably from the norms of Classical

or *Koine* Greek. These features mostly reflect the dialectal variations and phonology of Phrygian Greek and the development of the language in the Byzantine period and should usually not be taken as an indication of sub-literate incompetence. It is also essential to recall that all inscriptions are both texts and monuments. Understanding of the wording of the texts needs in all cases to be combined with an evaluation of the object – tombstone, part of a building, mosaic, or an entire structure – to which it is attached. The illustrations have been selected not so much to guarantee the reading of the inscriptions as to illustrate their materiality as part of the built environment of Christian Phrygia.

Another introductory word should be said about chronology. Since this book deals with the emergence and development of Christianity over nearly a thousand years, establishing a chronology for the evidence – inscriptions, buildings, saints' lives and other literary testimonia – is self-evidently of paramount importance. The dating of individual monuments is always a matter for discussion, but it is worth stressing as a general principle that most of the inscriptions of all periods can be grouped with others that resemble them, and clusters of related texts can be dated with more confidence than individual items. Chapter 4, by far the longest in the book, collects all the inscriptions that I would place between c.180 and 330, that is the period of the high Roman empire. Chapter 5 assembles the inscriptions of the Byzantine period up to *c.*1100. The terms late Roman or early Byzantine are conventionally applied to the centuries from 300 to 600, and I use both in this book. Very few Christian texts and monuments from Phrygia can be dated between 600 and 900. It is no longer common to refer to a 'Byzantine dark age', but this was unquestionably the obscurest period in the history of Christian Phrygia, illuminated by only a few shafts of light

from the excavations at Amorium and Hierapolis and scanty allusions in historical sources. This obscurity was followed by resurgence and renewal in many of the Phrygian settlements, and I have adopted the term Middle Byzantine to describe texts and monuments which should be assigned to the period 900–1100. This study barely touches the Late Byzantine period, as Byzantine control over Phrygia passed to Seljuk Turks and the Ottoman *Beyliks*. Most of its Christian population converted to Islam in the centuries between 1100 and 1400. <>

Anthroposophieforschung: Forschungsstand – Perspektiven – Leerstellen edited by Viktoria Vitanova-Kerber and Helmut Zander (Anthroposophy Studies: Research – Prospects – Gaps) Funded by Schweizerischer Nationalfonds (SNF), Language: German [Series Okkulte Moderne, De Gruyter Oldenbourg, ISBN: 9783110771145] Open Access

Rudolf Steiner's (1861–1925) anthroposophy is present in society (Waldorf schools, Weleda, Demeter…) but not in scholarly research. This volume is the first to present academic research articles that close this gap by delving into examples, documenting the state of research for selected topics, and helping to establish anthroposophy studies in the academic field.

Die Anthroposophie Rudolf Steiners (1861-1925) ist eine der wichtigsten esoterischen Traditionen der Gegenwart, deren Wurzeln im Okkultismus des 19. Jahrhunderts und insbesondere in der Theosophie liegen. All dies hat Steiner philosophisch reflektiert. Ihre Bedeutung verdankt die Anthroposophie aber vor allem den Praxisfeldern: Waldorfschulen, anthroposophischen Krankenhäusern, der biodynamischen Landwirtschaft und den weniger bekannten Dimensionen (Banken, Hochschulen, Stiftungen). Aber die wissenschaftliche Forschung ist schwach. Zwar liegen einige grundlegende Publikationen vor, an

Detailforschung fehlt es jedoch überall. Der vorliegende Band enthält exemplarische Forschungen zu Waldorf-pädagogik, Landwirtschaft, Steiners Philosophie, Kunst (Hilma af Klint), Entwicklungen nach 1945 sowie Länderstudien (Bulgarien, Rumänien). Der Forschungsstand wird darüber hinaus durch bibliographische Informationen zu wichtigen Praxisfeldern sowie in einem einleitenden Überblick über aktuelle Debatten dokumentiert.

Rudolf Steiner's (1861-1925) anthroposophy is one of the most important esoteric traditions of the present day, whose roots lie in the occultism of the 19th century and in particular in Theosophy. Steiner reflected on all this philosophically. However, anthroposophy owes its importance above all to the fields of practice: Waldorf schools, anthroposophical hospitals, biodynamic agriculture and the lesser-known dimensions (banks, universities, foundations). But scientific research is weak. Although there are some basic publications, there is a lack of detailed research everywhere. This volume contains exemplary research on Waldorf education, agriculture, Steiner's philosophy, art (Hilma af Klint), developments after 1945 and country studies (Bulgaria, Romania). The state of research is also documented by bibliographic information on important fields of practice as well as in an introductory overview of current debates.

INHALTSVERZEICHNIS

Erforschung der Anthroposophie: Pfade, Gegenstände, Konzepte by Helmut Zander

Die wissenschaftliche Erforschung der Anthroposophie ist ein einsames Geschäft: Netzwerke, die den akademischen Standards genügen, existieren kaum. Folglich fehlen starke institutionalisierte Strukturen, in denen sich Forscherinnen und Forscher austauschen und miteinander streiten können. Zugleich ist die Anthroposophie eine faszinierende Welt — und die wohl wichtigste „esoterische" Tradition mit Wurzeln im Okkultismus der Jahrzehnte um 1900, die diese Zeit überlebt hat. Mit ihrem Anspruch, eine „wissenschaftliche" Weltanschauung und damit intellektuell satisfaktionsfähig zu sein, vor allen Dingen aber mit ihren Praxisfeldern hat sie eine immense kulturelle Bedeutung erhalten. Hier kann man, und ich erlaube mir diese persönliche Bemerkung,

auf ganz wunderbare Menschen treffen, die mit hohem Engagement versuchen, mit Steiners Ideen intellektuell zu leben und die in der Praxis nicht selten ihr Leben für ihre Ideale bis an die Grenzen dessen, was Menschen leisten können, und oft darüber hinaus, einsetzen. Zugleich gibt es hoch dogmatische Anthroposophen und Anthroposophinnen, die einen mit ihrer irritationsfreien Arroganz zur Verzweiflung treiben können und von denen eine Gruppe in der Corona-Krise mit radikaler Impfverweigerung, Verschwörungserzählungen und ihren Verbindungen zu rechtsextremen Kreisen den anderen Pol des anthroposophischen Spektrums dokumentiert haben. An der Relevanz der Anthroposophie im Guten wie im Schlechten kann jedenfalls aus unserer Sicht kein Zweifel bestehen.

Vor diesem Hintergrund haben wir am 18. und 19. Oktober 2019 an der Universität Fribourg ein Forschungsatelier veranstaltet, um auszutesten, ob es möglich ist, einen Überblick über den Stand der Forschung zu geben. Das Ergebnis ist der hier vorliegende Band, der durch das Coronagewitter und ein extrem langes peer-review Verfahren erst 2023 erscheint und von dem wir hoffen, dass er eine erste Abhilfe schafft. Wir versuchen im ersten Teil, den Forschungsstand in einigen Bereichen zu kartieren und Anregungen für die weitere Arbeit zu geben; der zweite Teil enthält bibliographische Stichworte mit wichtiger Literatur zur weiteren Forschung.

Bei dem Stichwort Einsamkeit wird jeder, der sich einmal mit der Anthroposophie und ihrer Geschichte beschäftigt hat, möglicherweise auf die umfangreiche Literatur verweisen, die es dazu und zu Rudolf Steiner sowie zur anthroposophischen Praxis gibt. Aber diese stammt weitgehend von Anthroposophen und Anthroposophinnen, die in der Regel die Standards wissenschaftlicher Arbeit nicht anlegen: insbesondere die methodisch reflektierte Aufarbeitung der Materialien, etwa mit der historisch-kritischen Quellenanalyse oder ethnologischen und sozialwissenschaftlichen Methoden. Andere Zugänge sind im Prinzip nicht zu kritisieren, denn es gibt kein Monopol auf die Definition eines Wissenschaftsbegriffs. Aber letztlich haben Anthroposophen und Anthroposophinnen meist schlicht andere Interessen: Im Vordergrund stehen Fragen der sinnvollen Lebensführung und der weltanschaulichen Deutung von Kosmos, Mensch und Gesellschaft. Diese Literatur hat ihr ganz eigenes

Recht, gehört aber nicht in eine universitäre Forschung, die sich nach anderen Kriterien definiert und die, wie insbesondere die Religionswissenschaft, für die Methodenreflexion zu den konstitutiven Standards gehört und die zumindest intentional normative Deutungen ausschließt. Unabhängig davon sind diese Veröffentlichungen in der Erhebung von Quellen häufig von unersetzlichem Wert, auch für die wissenschaftliche Arbeit. Natürlich gibt es Anthroposophinnen, die relevante Beiträge zur Forschung geliefert haben und auf dem „Klavier der Wissenschaft" spielen. Und so hatten wir etwa Robin Schmidt, der wichtige Beiträge zur Geschichte der Anthroposophischen Gesellschaft verfasst hat, eingeladen, oder David Marc Hoffmann, dessen Dissertation über Steiner und Nietzsche weiterhin ein Standardwerk ist und der inzwischen die Rudolf Steiner-Nachlassverwaltung in Dornach leitet; beide mussten aus terminlichen Gründen absagen.

Inzwischen wirft das Jahr 2025 mit Steiners hundertstem Todestag seine Schatten voraus. Für viele Bereiche, insbesondere für die Praxisfelder, erscheinen anthroposophische Publikationen oder sind dazu angekündigt, die Gesamtausgabe von Steiners Werken soll dann vorliegen, Martina Sams Steinerbiographie dürfte bis dahin weit gediehen sein. Augenscheinlich sucht man eine stärkere Mitsprache in der Auseinandersetzung über Steiners Werk, vielleicht auch die Deutungshoheit. Im Kontext dieser Debatten deutet sich eine fundamentale Auseinandersetzung an, die aber mit einer gewissen Regelmäßigkeit aufpoppt. Mehr oder weniger deutlich wird von Anthroposophinnen der Anspruch artikuliert, Steiner, seine Weltanschauung und die anthroposophische Praxis ließen sich angemessen nur mit einer alternativen Wissenschaft(stheorie) analysieren. Dabei geht es letztlich um den epistemologischen Status von Steiners „höherer Erkenntnis", die dann nicht mehr nur das Objekt wissenschaftlicher Forschung wäre. Diese Auseinandersetzung ist intrikat, auch deshalb, weil die weltanschaulichen, spirituellen Interessen nicht immer offengelegt werden.

Die in dieser Einleitung zusammengetragenen Informationen sollen einige Ergebnisse der bisherigen Forschung präsentieren, aber dieser Text funktioniert zugleich wie ein Vergrößerungsspiegel, der in den jeweiligen Themengebieten die weißen Felder

unerforschter Untiefen sichtbar macht. Auf besonders markante Lücken verweise ich explizit, aber diese sind nur die Spitzen vieler Eisberge. Vollständigkeit ist weder im Blick auf die schon bearbeiteten Gegenstände noch in der Anzeige von Forschungslücken angezielt. bei den Publikationen sind insbesondere Monographien berücksichtigt, Texte, die seit 2007 erschienen sind, sind bevorzugt aufgenommen,2 anthroposophische Literatur fehlt aufgrund ihrer häufigen Distanz zu den Standards universitärer Forschung weitgehend.

Forschungsgeschichte

Die Erforschung der Anthroposophie begann im Umfeld der evangelischen Theologie. Nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg, als die Texte Steiners vielfach nicht zugänglich waren, versuchten Theologen, die Anthroposophie zu verstehen. Dabei sind unter anderem zwei Publikationen entstanden, die zwar die Patina einer zehnjährigen Geschichte angesetzt haben, aber als erste Sichtungen Pionierarbeiten waren. Kurt Leese (1887-1965), von Hause aus evangelischer Theologe, der sich gleichwohl von seiner Kirche distanzierte, dem Nationalsozialismus näher trat und dem die Lehrbefugnis entzogen wurde, legte 1918 eine Analyse der Anthroposophie unter dem Titel Theosophie vor, zwei Jahre später folgte von Johannes Frohnmeyer (1850-1921), Missionar der Baseler Mission, Die theosophische Bewegung, mit einem besonderen Augenmerk auf die Verbindungen nach Asien, 1923 schließlich Anthroposophische Schau und religiöser Glaube von Heinrich Frick (1893-1952), systematischer Theologe, aktiver Nationalsozialist und 1947 Rektor der Universität Marburg mit einer Gesamtdeutung von Steiners Weltanschauung.3 Diese Literatur war der Auftakt einer bis heute andauernden Auseinandersetzung mit Rudolf Steiner und der Anthroposophie vor allem in der evangelischen Theologie.

Die erste wichtige, historisch-kritisch arbeitende Studie stammt ebenfalls aus den Jahren nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg. 1922 veröffentlichte Jakob Wilhelm Hauer, protestantischer Theologe, berühmter Indologe und später als Nationalsozialist Verfolger der Anthroposophie, eine schmale Aufsatzsammlung mit dem Titel Wesen und Werden der Anthroposophie, in der er nachwies, dass und wie Steiner

theosophische Literatur verarbeitet hatte, ohne diese Beziehung zur Gänze offenzulegen, und dass er seine Publikationen tiefgreifend überarbeitet hatte, ohne die teilweise weitreichenden Konsequenzen einzugestehen. Hauers wegweisende Publikation blieb allerdings ohne unmittelbare Nachfolge.

Forschungsgegenstände

Der „geborene" Gegenstand der Erforschung der Anthroposophie ist natürlich die Biographie Rudolf Steiners. Die große Zahl von Darstellungen aus anthroposophischen Federn sind letztlich fast allesamt Versuche, einen großen Eingeweihten oder zumindest bedeutenden Lehrer und Sinnstifter zu verstehen. Darin finden sich viele Einsichten und materiale Trouvaillen, aber wissenschaftlichen Standards genügen sie in der Regel nicht — und wollen dies auch nicht. Die erste umfassende Biographie publizierte 1982 Gerhard Wehr, ein lutherischer Theologe mit dem Interesse an Mystik und einem offenen Herzen für Traditionen am Rande oder im Konflikt mit dem hegemonialen Christentum. Er hat das biographische Material kritisch gesichtet, bei hoher Wertschätzung von Steiner als spiritueller Persönlichkeit. Christoph Lindenbergs zweibändige Steiner-Biographie aus dem Jahr 1997 ist eine bis heute unverzichtbare Publikation, allerdings markant von anthroposophischen Interessen geprägt. Sie zeigen sich etwa in der Deutung der Theosophie, deren Bedeutung abgewertet wird, manche Themen (Esoterische Schule, Freimaurerei) sind nur gestreift, und überhaupt werden viele kulturelle Verknüpfungen und Abhängigkeiten Steiners zugunsten seiner Autonomie marginalisiert. Dass viele Kapitel zu den letzten Lebensjahren Steiners Lücken aufweisen, lag wohl auch am schlechten Gesundheitszustand Lindenbergs. 2011 erschien meine eigene Stei-ner-Biographie,22 mit einer historisch-kritischen Analyse der Quellen und einen Schwerpunkt auf der Kontextualisierung von Steiners Denken (und die ich, wenn ich dies sagen darf, für meine weiterhin anregendste Publikation im Feld der Anthroposophie-Forschung halte). Augenblicklich erscheint eine weitere Biographie Steiners von Martina Sam, die im Umfang die vorliegenden übertreffen wird.

Die Defizite in der Erforschung von Steiners Leben sind aber weiterhin groß und — natürlich — wachsen sie mit der weiteren Forschung. Eine beträchtliche Lücke liegt in der kontextualisierenden Analyse von Steiners Texten, insbesondere seiner Vorträge, deren Zahl sich auf etwa 6000 belaufen dürfte und die geschätzt 90 Prozent der Texte in der Gesamtausgabe ausmachen. Wer waren Steiners Hörerinnen respektive Leserinnen? In welche konkrete Situation hinein hat Steiner gesprochen? Welche Themen und Probleme standen im Hintergrund, seien sie expliziert oder nur angedeutet oder gar nicht erwähnt? Welche Veränderungen nahm Steiner vor, wenn er das gleiche Thema in neuen Situationen (etwa öffentlich oder im Arkankreis) oder vor unterschiedlichem Publikum oder mit zeitlichem Abstand behandelte? Angesichts des bislang weitgehenden Fehlens derartiger Untersuchungen, kann man die Praxis, Zitate aus beliebigen Vorträgen Steiners mit möglicherweise unklarer Verlässlichkeit für ein Thema zusammenzuklauben, für die vergangene Forschung verstehen. Anthroposophinnen hatten ein solches Vorgehen durch Sammlungen einschlägiger Stellen befördert, und viele Forscherinnen — auch ich allzu oft — waren ihnen gefolgt. Eine derartige kontextfreie Steiner-Lektüre sollte aber langsam an ihr Ende kommen.

Perspektiven für systematische Analysen

Bei systematischen Deutungsoptionen könnte man einmal mehr mit den Naturwissenschaften beginnen. Der Druck der naturwissenschaftlichen Epistemologie in Verbindung mit den Erkenntnissen der Forschung der technischen Umsetzung war eines der großen Themen des 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhunderts, an dem auch die Anthroposophie partizipierte. Die biographischen Prägungen Steiners, die an High-End-Produkten der Technik des 19. Jahrhunderts wie der Semmering-Bahn beginnen, gehören ebenso dazu wie seine der Biologie entnommenen Deutungsmuster, etwa hinsichtlich der schon genannten Evolutionslehre (Stichwort: Ernst Haeckel). Steiners Ideen von Objektivität oder unbegrenzter Erkenntnis sowie überhaupt sein Wissenschaftsbegriff sind nicht nur Produkte seines philosophischen Nachdenkens, sondern ebenso von naturwissenschaftlichen Konzepten, beide zuletzt angebunden an die Vorstellungen des 19. Jahrhunderts. Allerdings gibt es in Steiners Biographie keine stabilen Fixierungen bei der Beanspruchung der Naturwissenschaften, vielmehr haben

sich seine Einschätzungen betreffend der Reichweite des naturwissenschaftlichen Wissens schon zu seinen Lebzeiten geändert. Die Vorstellung, es habe die Anthroposophie als Ausdruck einer „objektiven" Erkenntnis gegeben, ist ein Produkt weltanschaulicher Zuschreibung sowohl von Anthroposoph.inn.en als auch von Kritikern; die Realität war und ist auch heute anders.

Ein weiterer zentraler kultureller Kontext Steiners und der Anthroposophie ist der Historismus. Man kann darunter verkürzt die Einsicht in die historische Konstitution aller Dinge verstehen. Im 19. Jahrhundert hatte diese Perspektive hoch dramatisch an Schärfe gewonnen, weil durch die Zugänglichkeit von Texten nichtchristlicher oder außereuropäischer Kulturen (vor allem Hinduismus, Buddhismus, Islam), durch archäologische Grabungen oder ethnologische Forschungen die Einsicht in die historische Kontextualität Europas und des Westens in die normative Debatte um Relativismus überführt worden war. Wenn die Naturwissenschaften von Steiner als helle Verheißung interpretiert werden konnten, dann war der Historismus die finstere Bedrohung. Naturwissenschaften konnten als Garant verlässlicher, weil empirisch-„objektiver" Erkenntnis gelten, wohingegen historische Forschung als Labyrinth konkurrierender Deutungen und damit eines Subjektivismus und Relativismus angesehen werden konnten. Aber natürlich sind die Dinge nicht so einfach. Verkomplizierend kommt hinzu, dass, umgekehrt, Steiner seit seiner theosophischen Phase auch die empirischen Erkenntnisse der Naturwissenschaften als geisttötend, „ahrimanisch" verwerfen konnte und er die Historie faktisch als das Edelsteinbergwerk betrachtete, in das man Schächte abteufte, um die Informationen für die okkulte Geschichte auszugraben.

(Un-)vergessene Lektüren

Zum Schluss ein flaneurhafter Blick auf Literatur zur Anthroposophie, die vielleicht die wissenschaftliche Faszination wecken kann — die bibliographischen Stichworte werden noch systematisierte Informationen liefern — und manchmal wie im Dornröschenschlaf zu dämmern scheinen. Es gibt Bücher, tolle Bücher, die zu Unrecht nicht die ihnen gebührende Aufmerksamkeit erhalten haben oder gar vergessen

werden — ich denke, nicht zuletzt, weil es keine funktionierende scientific community für die Erforschung der Anthroposophie gibt. Die meisten guten Werke werden wahrgenommen und davon ist in diesem Buch viel die Rede, aber einige fallen durch das Raster der Rezeption. Ich möchte deshalb drei Bücher vorstellen, die ich — in einer subjektiven Perspektive, natürlich — aufgrund mangelnder Aufmerksamkeit für nicht ausgeschöpft halte.

Jan Stottmeister: Der George-Kreis und Theosophie.72 Stottmeister analysiert nicht nur die theosophischen Neigungen oder zumindest die Offenheit wichtiger Personen des George-Kreises, sondern schreibt zugleich eine Rezep-tionsgeschichte Steiners. Nicht eine der vielen Geschichten von Hass oder Ver ehrung, sondern eine, in der zwei Charismatiker mit dem gleichen Ziel, ein tieferes oder höheres Wissen zu erreichen, miteinander konkurrieren, Stefan George und Rudolf Steiner. Stottmeister behandelt zentrale Fragen der Theoso-phie mit präziser Sachkenntnis, insbesondere die Frage nach den Bedingungen und Möglichkeiten (höherer) Erkenntnis, die eben nicht nur von Theosophen gestellt wurde, oder die Konflikte, die auftauchen, wenn man sich zwischen zwei solcher Figuren entscheiden muss, wie er anhand von Alexander von Bernus oder Ernst Bloch dokumentiert.

Robin Schmidt: Glossar. Stichworte zur Geschichte des anthroposophischen Kulturimpulses. Wir haben, wie gesagt, keine Geschichte der anthroposophischen Bewegung und der Anthroposophischen Gesellschaft nach Steiners Tod, nur gigantische Archivbestände und umherliegende Texte wie Felsbrocken nach einem Vulkanausbruch. Aber es gibt Robin Schmidt, lange Zeit Mitarbeiter in der anthroposophischen „Stiftung Kulturimpuls" in Dornach, der ein Glossar verantwortet, das hier Abhilfe schafft, aber schon im Titel zu tief stapelt: Ja, es sind nur Stichworte, aber die haben es in sich: solide recherchiert, umfangreich, momentan alternativlos. Zu seiner eigenen Marginalisierung trägt der Text zudem bei, weil er versteckt in einer Publikation zu Kurzbiographien publiziert ist, wo man ihn nicht vermutet und mithin auch kaum jemand findet. Aber bevor wir eine größere Geschichte dieses anthroposophischen Feldes besitzen, muss man zu Schmidt greifen: wenn man etwas über die Strukturen der Anthroposophischen Gesellschaft, ihre Vorstände, die

Praxisfelder, Initiativen, anthroposophische Vereinigungen, Landesgesellschaften, Verlage, Zweige ... wissen will.

Ansgar Martins: Rassismus und Geschichtsmetaphysik. Wir haben viel, manche Anthroposophen sagen: zu viel Literatur zum Thema Rassismus — wohingegen die polemischen Kritiker der Anthroposophie meinen (und da geben ihnen auch viele Anthroposoph.inn.en Recht), wir hätten davon noch viel zu wenig. Was wir allerdings in der Tat immer noch nicht haben, ist eine minutiöse historisch-kritische Aufarbeitung, nicht nur der Stellen, wo Steiner von „degenerierten Indianern" und der „weißen Rasse", die an der Zukunft arbeite, spricht, sondern auch — etwa — der evolutionstheoretischen Annahmen im Hintergrund oder des Wechselspiels von Relativierung und Verschärfungen in Steiners Werk. Wie man so etwas machen kann, zeigt Martins mit seinem Versuch, kleinteilig makro- und mikrohistorische Kontexte, Interessenlagen und Zwänge aufzuarbeiten. So könnte es gehen, wenn man das Thema im großen Format aufschlüge. Bis dahin ist man bei Martins in besten Händen.

Karen Swartz: Management Matters. Organizational Storytelling within the Anthroposophical Society in Sweden, so der Titel einer organisationssoziologischen Studie über die schwedische Landesgesellschaft der Anthroposophischen Gesellschaft. Hinter dieser Themenbeschreibung im flotten Wissenschaftsenglisch verbirgt sich für mich die größte Überraschung in der Erforschung der Anthroposophie seit langem. Der kleinere Teil der Überraschung ist das Thema dieser Arbeit: eine Diskurs-analyse der inneranthroposophischen Narrative über das Selbstverständnis, die von einer goldenen Gründungsgeschichte, einer schwierigen Gegenwart und einer unsicheren Zukunft in Schweden erzählen, und das alles zentriert um den Fokus Rudolf Steiner. Auf der Grundlage qualitativer Interviews erfährt man, wie heterogen, manchmal desorientiert, manchmal frustriert, gleichwohl fest von der Zukunft der Anthroposophie überzeugt viele Befragte in der institutionalisierten schwedischen Anthroposophie sind (wobei vielleicht die basalen Gemeinsamkeiten manchmal leicht unterbelichtet bleiben). Die definitiv größere Überraschung ist die Autorin selbst, die von ihrer anthroposophischen Prägung kein Hehl macht. Aber sie räumt mit der im anthroposophischen Milieu fast immer präsenten Steinerapologie und

Wahrheitsbeanspruchung ohne großes Federlesen auf, sie bietet einfach Wissenschaft. Dass sie eine Position einnimmt, gehört in die Normalspannung von Erkenntnis und Interesse, aber sie funktionalisiert ihre Deutung nicht primär für normative Deutungen. Empirische Sozialforschung, Einbeziehung eines neoliberalen Rahmens für anthroposophische Aktivitäten, narrative Medienanalyse — derartiges war für Arbeiten mit anthroposophischem Hintergrund über lange Zeit einfach Ausland. Wenn diese Arbeit zur Benchmark für Anthroposophieforschung aus dem anthroposophischen Milieu würde, bräche eine neue Zeit an.

Die Beiträge dieses Bandes

Fast alle Beiträge dieses Bandes sind von einer stereoskopischen Perspektive geprägt: Der Bezug auf Quellen ist die Basis der Überlegungen, die aber in theoretische Reflexionen als dem zweiten Standbein wissenschaftlicher Analyse eingebettet sind. Dies ist der Versuch, sich im wissenschaftlichen Zugang nicht zu verlaufen: weder sich als Jäger und Sammler in der wilden weiten Welt der Anthroposophie einzugraben noch in der luftigen Höhe des reinen Denkens die Mühsal des historisch-kritischen Frondienstes zu scheuen. Zumindest im Hintergrund steht ein weiteres Interesse, die Erforschung der Anthroposophie (wie überhaupt der Esoterik) aus dem Getto einer separierten Disziplin zu lösen und so die Intersektionalität mit anderen kulturellen Feldern aufzuzeigen. Dass alle Autor.inn.en Neuland betreten, ist selbstverständlich.

Ansgar Martins eröffnet mit Überlegungen zu Apokalyptik, Sozialreform und Ich-Philosophie. Über einige Entwicklungen und Neuansätze in der deutschsprachigen Anthroposophie seit 1925, die es ermöglichen, die Forschungsgeschichte mit Entwicklungen in der Anthroposophie zu parallelisiert. In seinen Überlegungen skizziert er Phasen mit unterschiedlichen anthroposophischen Interpretationsparadigmen des Lebens und Werks Rudolf Steiners, in denen deutlich wird, dass nicht nur Steiner kontextuell gelesen werden muss, sondern auch seine Interpretation durch unterschiedliche Deutungen gebrochen wird. Diese doppelte Brechung bedeutet nicht nur, Steiner und seine anthroposophische Rezeption zu historisieren, sondern auch die Notwendigkeit zur wissenschaftshistorischen

Selbstreflexion der Anthroposophie-Forschung: Denn auch sie folgt häufiger, als ihr lieb oder bewusst ist, den Deutungsvorgaben Steiners und seiner Anhänger innen.

Ann-Kathrin Hoffmann analysiert in ihrem Beitrag Vom Kopf auf die Füße stellen: Waldorfpädagogik als Kulturforderung im Zeitalter des Intellektualismus? den Gebrauch des Begriffs Intellektualismus im Werk Steiners und seiner Applikation in der Waldorfpädagogik. Was wie die Beschäftigung mit einem allzu partikularen Begriff klingt, führt de facto ins Zentrum von Steiners intellektuellem Selbstverständnis: Insofern die Anthroposophie eine Wissenschaft sein sollte, mussten er und seine Anhängerinnen eine Position auf Augenhöhe mit den intellektuellen Debatten ihrer Zeit einfordern. Zugleich aber hielt Steiner Intellektualismus für eine Bedrohung, insbesondere für Kinder, weil er in diesem Intellektualismus ein fixiertes, sozusagen dogmatisches Wissensverständnis sah. Für die Vermittlung eines dagegen gerichteten „lebendigen" Wissens zahlte er allerdings einen Preis: eine Distanzierung von einer kritischen Wissenschaft.

Stephanie Majerus untersucht ein zweites anthroposophisches Praxisfeld, die Landwirtschaft, und geht dabei zugleich der Interpretation fundamentaler Konzepte Steiners nach: in ihren Überlegungen zum „Ich" als Teil eines kosmischen Lebensstroms — eine kulturanthropologische Einordnung von Demeter-Bauern. Sie bezieht dazu Methoden der qualitativen Sozialforschung ein und thematisiert eine fundamentale Grundspannung in Steiners Reflexionen, die sich durch alle Phasen seines Lebens ziehen: Wie verhalten sich Steiners Interpreten gegenüber den pan(en)theisierenden Tendenzen in Steiners Werk, die bis zur Auflösung des Individuums gehen können, auf der einen Seite, und, auf der anderen, der Konzeption einer Individualität, in der Steiner im Kern ein „Ich" mit einem hohen Anspruch auf Autonomie lokalisiert? Majerus verweigert die Vereindeutigung dieser Positionen zugunsten der einen oder anderen Seite und fordert, die Komplexität und Steiners Veränderungen in unterschiedlichen Lebenslagen nicht aufzulösen.

Ionur Daniel Bäncilä eröffnet mit seiner Studie ein anderes, noch kaum begangenes Feld, die regionalen Profile der Anthroposophie, und dies zu einem Teil Europas, der

ausgesprochen schlecht erforscht ist: Die Anthroposophie in Rumänien: rezeptionsgeschichtliche Momentaufnahmen. Wie in einem Mikrokosmos trifft man in Rumänien auf Anthroposophisches in den gesamten letzten hundert Jahren: auf den jungen Steiner mit Vorträgen in Siebenbürgen, auf die Versuche von intellektuell ambitionierten Anthroposophen, sich zwischen Steiners Tod und dem Ende der kommunistischen Herrschaft mit unterschiedlichen Ausprägungen des Zeitgeistes in Rumänien zu arrangieren oder auf Versuche, die anthroposophische Landwirtschaft in dörflichen Strukturen zu etablieren. Nach 1989 schließlich stößt er auf die Suche nach Verbindungen zur orthodoxen Spiritualität, die im anthroposophischen Weltanschauungskomplex mit der Würde besonderer spiritueller Tiefe ausgezeichnet ist.

Eine weitere Regionalstudie zur Anthroposophie hat Viktoria Vitanova-Kerber für Bulgarien beigesteuert. Hier ist die Situation in doppelter Weise komplex: Zum einen hat die Anthroposophie in der Zwischenkriegszeit, im Ersten Weltkrieg, in der kommunistischen Phase und nach der Wende des Jahres 1989 wie in Rumänien in unterschiedlichen Formen überlebt; zum anderen aber lassen sich Austauschprozesse sowohl mit verwandten Gruppen, insbesondere der von Petar Dunov gegründeten Weißen Bruderschaft, aber auch mit Vertretern der orthodoxen Kirche nachweisen. Dieses weltanschauliche Feld hat sie zudem hinsichtlich der Umsetzung der Anthroposophie in Praxisfeldern analysiert.

Dem komplexen Verhältnis von Spiritualität und Kunst widmet sich ein Doppelaufsatz von Marty Bax und Helmut Zander: Hilma af Klint und die pietistischen Wurzeln von Esoterik und Anthroposophie. Der Ausgangspunkt ist das künstlerische Werk von Hilma af Klint, die — noch vor Wassily Kandinsky — als eine „Erfinderin" der künstlerischen Abstraktion gilt. Marty Bax kann nun nachweisen, dass die bislang nicht zuletzt von Anthroposophen propagierte These, dass für diesen entscheidenden Schritt die Theosophie respektive Anthroposophie Rudolf Steiners verantwortlich sei, nicht zutrifft. Ihre These lautet vielmehr, dass die Wurzeln im radikalen Pietismus des schwedischen Protestantismus zu finden sind —ehe af Klint zu Steiners Anthroposophie fand.

Helmut Zander beansprucht in seinen Überlegungen zu Pietismus und „Esoterik" nachzuweisen, dass sich dieser Weg vom Spiritualismus und seines pietistischen Zweiges in „esoterische" Vorstellungen häufig findet. An den Beispielen von Augustin Bader, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe und Rudolf Steiner lassen sich solche Transfers seit der frühen Neuzeit exemplarisch belegen. Af Klint kann man vor diesem Hintergrund in eine lange Tradition christlich-hermetischer („esoterischer") Interferenzen einstellen.

Marty Bax führt den Nachweis ihrer These unter dem Titel Hilma af Klint. Vom radikalen Pietismus zur Anthroposophie. Mythos und Wahrheit (Alternative: Abschied vom Mythos und Annäherung an die Wahrheit) detailliert durch. Sie dokumentiert unter Rückgriff auf tells unpublizierte Dokumente af Klints frühe Spiritualität zwischen Pietismus und protestantischem Spiritismus und relativiert dabei ihre Bedeutung zugunsten anderer Mitglieder aus der religiös geprägten Künstlerinnen-Vereinigung De Fern, insbesondere im Blick auf Anna Cassel. In der exemplarischen Interpretation von Kunstwerken af Klints kann sie schließlich zeigen, dass bislang theosophisch/anthroposophisch gedeutete Motive in Wirklichkeit aus ihrer protestantischen Tradition stammen und die Genese ihrer abstrakten Bilder in diesem kulturellen Wurzelwerk zu verorten ist.

Den Band beschließen Überlegungen von Hartmut Traub zur wissenschaftstheoretischen und methodologischen Einordnung des Denkens Rudolf Steiners. Er vertritt die These, dass die fehlende wissenschaftliche Beschäftigung mit dem (philosophischen) Werk Steiners mit akademischen Ausschließungsprozessen zusammenhängt, die in unterschiedlichen Wissenschaftsverständnissen gründen. Er fordert deshalb, in Steiners Werk unterschiedliche Textgattungen (etwa metaphorische, therapeutische oder philosophische Texte), die in unterschiedliche soziale Kontexte gehören, hinsichtlich ihrer Interpretationszugänge zu unterscheiden.

Wir danken schließlich dem Schweizerischen Nationalfonds, der das Projekt Die Genese der universitären Religionswissenschaft in Auseinandersetzung mit nichthegemonialen, insbesondere theosophischen Traditionen, in dessen Kontext der

folgende Band entstanden ist, gefördert hat und der auch die Drucklegung durch eine großzügige Finanzierung mit uneingeschränktem open access ermöglicht hat. Die katholische Fakultät der Universität Freiburg hat die Tagung, auf der die vorliegenden Beiträge diskutiert wurden, mitfinanziert. Moritz Bauer danke ich für die vorbereitenden Arbeiten zur Publikation. Eine große Hilfe bei allen Fragen waren Ansgar Martins und Peter Staudenmaier. Ein ganz besonderer Dank aber gilt Viktoria Vitanova-Kerber, die die intellektuelle Ausrichtung begleitet und die editorische Knochenarbeit dieses Band federführend verantwortet hat und ohne deren Übersicht, Zuverlässigkeit und Rettungsaktionen dieser Band wohl immer noch eine okkulte Ankündigung wäre. <>

[Translation:

Research on Anthroposophy: Paths, Objects, Concepts by Helmut Zander

The scientific study of anthroposophy is a lonely business: networks that meet academic standards hardly exist. As a result, there is a lack of strong institutionalised structures in which researchers can exchange ideas and argue with each other. At the same time, anthroposophy is a fascinating world — and probably the most important "esoteric" tradition with roots in the occultism of the decades around 1900, which survived this period. With its claim to be a "scientific" worldview and thus intellectually satisfying, but above all with its fields of practice, it has gained immense cultural significance. Here, and I take the liberty of making this personal remark, one can meet wonderful people who are highly committed to trying to live intellectually with Steiner's ideas and who in practice often dedicate their lives to their ideals to the limits of what people can achieve, and often beyond. At the same time, there are highly dogmatic anthroposophists who can drive you to despair with their irritation-free arrogance, and one group of whom has documented the other pole of the anthroposophical spectrum in the Corona crisis with radical refusal to vaccinate,

conspiracy narratives and their connections to right-wing extremist circles. From our point of view, there can be no doubt about the relevance of anthroposophy, for better or for worse.

Against this background, we organized a research workshop at the University of Fribourg on 18 and 19 October 2019 to test whether it is possible to give an overview of the state of research. The result is the present volume, which will not be published until 2023 due to the corona thunderstorm and an extremely long peer-review process and which we hope will provide a first remedy. In the first part, we try to map the state of research in some areas and provide suggestions for further work; the second part contains bibliographic keywords with important literature for further research.

When it comes to loneliness, anyone who has ever studied anthroposophy and its history may refer to the extensive literature that exists on it and on Rudolf Steiner as well as on anthroposophical practice. But this comes largely from anthroposophists, who generally do not apply the standards of scientific work: in particular, the methodologically reflected processing of the materials, for example with historical-critical source analysis or ethnological and social science methods. In principle, other approaches are not to be criticized, because there is no monopoly on the definition of a concept of science. But in the end, anthroposophists usually simply have other interests: the focus is on questions of meaningful living and the ideological interpretation of the cosmos, man and society. This literature has its own right, but it does not belong in university research that defines itself according to other criteria and which, like religious studies in particular, is one of the constitutive standards for methodological reflection and which, at least intentionally, excludes normative interpretations. Regardless of this, these publications are often of irreplaceable value in the collection of sources, including for scientific work. Of course, there are anthroposophists who have made relevant contributions to research and play on the "piano of science". And so we had invited, for example, Robin Schmidt, who wrote important contributions to the history of the Anthroposophical Society, or David Marc Hoffmann, whose dissertation on Steiner and Nietzsche continues to be a standard

work and who now heads the Rudolf Steiner estate administration in Dornach; both had to cancel due to scheduling reasons.

Meanwhile, the year 2025 is casting its shadow ahead with the centenary of Steiner's death. For many areas, especially for the fields of practice, anthroposophical publications will appear or have been announced, the complete edition of Steiner's works should then be available, Martina Sam's Steiner biography should be well advanced by then. Obviously, they are looking for a stronger say in the debate about Steiner's work, perhaps also the sovereignty of interpretation. In the context of these debates, there are signs of a fundamental confrontation, but it pops up with a certain regularity. More or less clearly, anthroposophists articulate the claim that Steiner, his worldview and anthroposophical practice can only be adequately analyzed with an alternative science (theory). Ultimately, this is about the epistemological status of Steiner's "higher knowledge", which would then no longer be just the object of scientific research. This debate is intricate, also because ideological, spiritual interests are not always disclosed.

The information gathered in this introduction is intended to present some of the results of previous research, but this text also functions as a magnifying mirror that makes the white fields of unexplored shoals visible in the respective subject areas. I explicitly refer to particularly striking gaps, but these are only the tips of many icebergs. Completeness is not aimed at either with regard to the objects already worked on or with regard to the indication of research gaps. In particular, monographs are included in the publications, texts that have appeared since 2007 are preferred,2 Anthroposophical literature is largely absent due to its frequent distance from the standards of university research.

History of research

The study of anthroposophy began in the context of Protestant theology. After the First World War, when Steiner's texts were often inaccessible, theologians tried to understand anthroposophy. Among other things, this resulted in two publications that have taken on the patina of a ten-year history, but were pioneering work as their first

sightings. Kurt Leese (1887-1965), a Protestant theologian by training, who nevertheless distanced himself from his church, came closer to National Socialism and was deprived of his teaching license, presented an analysis of anthroposophy in 1918 under the title Theosophy, followed two years later by Johannes Frohnmeyer (1850-1921), missionary of the Basel Mission, The Theosophical Movement, with a special focus on the connections to Asia, Finally, in 1923, Anthroposophical Show and Religious Faith by Heinrich Frick (1893-1952), systematic theologian, active National Socialist and 1947 rector of the University of Marburg with an overall interpretation of Steiner's worldview.3 This literature was the prelude to an ongoing debate on Rudolf Steiner and anthroposophy, especially in Protestant theology, which continues to this day.

The first important historical-critical study also dates from the years after the First World War. In 1922, Jakob Wilhelm Hauer, Protestant theologian, famous Indologist and later, as a National Socialist, persecutor of anthroposophy, published a slim collection of essays entitled The Essence and Becoming of Anthroposophy, in which he proved that and how Steiner had processed Theosophical literature without fully revealing this relationship, and that he had profoundly revised his publications without admitting the sometimes far-reaching consequences. Hauer's groundbreaking publication, however, remained without an immediate successor.

Objects of research

The "born" object of the study of anthroposophy is, of course, the biography of Rudolf Steiner. The large number of depictions from anthroposophical pens are ultimately almost all attempts to understand a great initiate or at least an important teacher and creator of meaning. There are many insights and material trouvailles in them, but they usually do not meet scientific standards — and do not want to. The first comprehensive biography was published in 1982 by Gerhard Wehr, a Lutheran theologian with an interest in mysticism and an open heart for traditions on the fringes or in conflict with hegemonic Christianity. He critically examined the biographical material, with a high regard for Steiner as a spiritual personality. Christoph Lindenberg's two-volume biography of Steiner from 1997 is an indispensable

publication to this day, but it is distinctively influenced by anthroposophical interests. They can be seen, for example, in the interpretation of Theosophy, the meaning of which is devalued, some topics (esoteric school, Freemasonry) are only touched upon, and in general many of Steiner's cultural connections and dependencies are marginalized in favor of his autonomy. The fact that many chapters on the last years of Steiner's life have gaps was probably also due to Lindenberg's poor health. In 2011, my own biography of Styria was published,22 with a historical-critical analysis of the sources and a focus on the contextualization of Steiner's thought (and which, if I may say so, I consider to be my most stimulating publication in the field of anthroposophy research). Another biography of Steiner by Martina Sam is currently being published, which will surpass the present one in scope.

However, the deficits in the study of Steiner's life are still great and — of course — they grow with further research. A considerable gap lies in the contextualizing analysis of Steiner's texts, especially his lectures, which are likely to amount to about 6000 and which make up an estimated 90 percent of the texts in the complete edition. Who were Steiner's listeners or readers? What specific situation did Steiner speak into? What topics and problems were in the background, be they explicit or only hinted at or not mentioned at all? What changes did Steiner make when he dealt with the same topic in new situations (e.g. in public or in the Arcane Circle) or in front of different audiences or with a time lag? In view of the lack of such investigations so far, the practice of cobbling together quotations from any of Steiner's lectures with possibly unclear reliability for a topic can be understood for past research. Women anthroposophists had promoted such an approach through collections of relevant bodies, and many women researchers, including myself all too often, had followed them. However, such a context-free Steiner reading should slowly come to an end.

Perspectives for systematic analyses

In the case of systematic interpretation options, one could once again start with the natural sciences. The pressure of scientific epistemology in connection with the findings of research into technical implementation was one of the major themes of the

19th and early 20th centuries, in which anthroposophy also participated. Steiner's biographical imprints, which begin with high-end products of 19th-century technology such as the Semmering Railway, are just as much a part of this as his patterns of interpretation taken from biology, for example with regard to the aforementioned theory of evolution (keyword: Ernst Haeckel). Steiner's ideas of objectivity or unlimited knowledge, as well as his concept of science in general, are not only products of his philosophical reflection, but also of scientific concepts, both of which are ultimately linked to the ideas of the 19th century. In Steiner's biography, however, there are no stable fixations on the use of the natural sciences, rather his assessments regarding the scope of scientific knowledge changed during his lifetime. The idea that anthroposophy existed as an expression of "objective" knowledge is a product of ideological attribution by both anthroposophists and critics; the reality was and is different today.

Another central cultural context of Steiner and anthroposophy is historicism. In short, this can be understood as the insight into the historical constitution of all things. In the 19th century, this perspective had become dramatically sharper, because through the accessibility of texts from non-Christian or non-European cultures (especially Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam), archaeological excavations or ethnological research, the insight into the historical contextuality of Europe and the West had been transferred into the normative debate on relativism. If Steiner's natural sciences could be interpreted as a bright promise, then historicism was the sinister threat. Natural sciences could be regarded as a guarantor of reliable, empirical-"objective" knowledge, whereas historical research could be regarded as a labyrinth of competing interpretations and thus of subjectivism and relativism. But, of course, things are not so simple. Complicating matters is the fact that, conversely, since his theosophical phase, Steiner has also been able to dismiss the empirical findings of the natural sciences as mind-numbing, "ahrimanic" and he regarded history as the gemstone mine into which shafts were sunk in order to excavate the information for occult history.

(Un)forgotten readings

Finally, a flâneuric look at literature on anthroposophy, which may be able to arouse scientific fascination — the bibliographical keywords will still provide systematized information — and sometimes seem to dawn as if in a deep sleep. There are books, great books, that have unjustly not received the attention they deserve or are even forgotten — I think, not least because there is no functioning scientific community for the study of anthroposophy. Most of the good works are noticed and there is a lot of talk about that in this book, but some fall through the cracks of reception. I would therefore like to present three books that I consider — from a subjective perspective, of course — to be unfinished due to a lack of attention.

Jan Stottmeister: The George Circle and Theosophy.72 Stottmeister not only analyses the Theosophical inclinations or at least the openness of important people in the George Circle, but also writes a history of Steiner's reception. Not one of the many stories of hatred or veneration, but one in which two charismatics compete with each other with the same goal of achieving a deeper or higher knowledge, Stefan George and Rudolf Steiner. Stottmeister deals with central questions of theophysics with precise expertise, in particular the question of the conditions and possibilities of (higher) knowledge, which was not only asked by Theosophists, or the conflicts that arise when one has to choose between two such figures, as he documents with the help of Alexander von Bernus or Ernst Bloch.

Robin Schmidt: Glossary. Keywords on the history of the anthroposophical cultural impulse. As I said, we have no history of the Anthroposophical Movement and the Anthroposophical Society after Steiner's death, only gigantic archives and texts lying around like boulders after a volcanic eruption. But there is Robin Schmidt, a long-time employee at the anthroposophical "Stiftung Kulturimpuls" in Dornach, who is responsible for a glossary that provides a remedy here, but already stacks too low in the title: Yes, they are only keywords, but they have it all: solidly researched, extensive, currently without alternative. The text also contributes to its own marginalization because it is published hidden in a publication of short biographies, where one does

not suspect it and therefore hardly anyone can find it. But before we have a larger history of this anthroposophical field, one has to resort to Schmidt: if one wants to know something about the structures of the Anthroposophical Society, its boards, the fields of practice, initiatives, anthroposophical associations, national societies, publishing houses, branches ... wants to know.

Ansgar Martins: Racism and Metaphysics of History. We have a lot, some anthroposophists say: too much literature on the subject of racism — whereas the polemical critics of anthroposophy think (and many anthroposophists agree with them) that we still have far too little of it. What we still do not have, however, is a meticulous historical-critical reappraisal, not only of the passages where Steiner speaks of "degenerate Indians" and the "white race" working on the future, but also — for example — of the evolutionary assumptions in the background or the interplay of relativization and aggravation in Steiner's work. Martins shows how something like this can be done with his attempt to work through macro- and micro-historical contexts, interests and constraints in a small-scale manner. This is how it could go if the topic were opened on a large scale. Until then, you are in the best hands with Martins.

Karen Swartz: Management Matters. Organizational Storytelling within the Anthroposophical Society in Sweden, this is the title of an organizational sociological study on the Swedish national society of the Anthroposophical Society. Behind this description of the topic in brisk scientific English hides for me the biggest surprise in the study of anthroposophy for a long time. The smaller part of the surprise is the theme of this work: a discourse analysis of the inner-anthroposophical narratives about self-understanding, which tell of a golden founding story, a difficult present and an uncertain future in Sweden, and all this centered around the focus of Rudolf Steiner. On the basis of qualitative interviews, one learns how heterogeneous, sometimes disoriented, sometimes frustrated, but nevertheless firmly convinced of the future of anthroposophy, many respondents are in institutionalized Swedish anthroposophy (although perhaps the basic similarities sometimes remain slightly underexposed). The definitely bigger surprise is the author herself, who makes no secret of her anthroposophical influence. But it does away with the stone apology and claim to truth

that is almost always present in the anthroposophical milieu without much pen-reading, it simply offers science. The fact that it occupies a position belongs to the normal tension between knowledge and interest, but it does not functionalize its interpretation primarily for normative interpretations. Empirical social research, inclusion of a neoliberal framework for anthroposophical activities, narrative media analysis — for a long time, this was simply foreign for works with an anthroposophical background. If this work were to become the benchmark for anthroposophical research from the anthroposophical milieu, a new era would dawn.

The contributions of this volume

Almost all of the contributions in this volume are characterized by a stereoscopic perspective: the reference to sources is the basis of the considerations, which, however, are embedded in theoretical reflections as the second pillar of scientific analysis. This is an attempt not to get lost in the scientific approach: neither to dig in as hunters and gatherers in the wild, wide world of anthroposophy, nor to shy away from the hardships of historical-critical servitude in the lofty heights of pure thought. At least in the background, there is another interest in detaching the study of anthroposophy (as well as esotericism in general) from the ghetto of a separate discipline and thus demonstrating intersectionality with other cultural fields. It goes without saying that all authors are breaking new ground.

Ansgar Martins opens with reflections on apocalypticism, social reform and ego philosophy. On some developments and new approaches in German-speaking anthroposophy since 1925, which make it possible to parallelize the history of research with developments in anthroposophy. In his reflections, he outlines phases with different anthroposophical interpretation paradigms of Rudolf Steiner's life and work, in which it becomes clear that not only Steiner must be read contextually, but also that his interpretation is broken by different interpretations. This double refraction means not only historicizing Steiner and his anthroposophical reception, but also the necessity for self-reflection on anthroposophy research in the history of science: for it

too often follows the interpretive guidelines of Steiner and his followers more often than it would like or be aware of.

Ann-Kathrin Hoffmann analyses in her article Putting your head on your feet: Waldorf education as a cultural promotion in the age of intellectualism? the use of the term intellectualism in Steiner's work and its application in Waldorf education. What sounds like a preoccupation with an overly particular concept de facto leads to the center of Steiner's intellectual self-image: insofar as anthroposophy was to be a science, he and his followers had to demand a position on a par with the intellectual debates of their time. At the same time, however, Steiner considered intellectualism to be a threat, especially for children, because he saw in this intellectualism a fixed, dogmatic understanding of knowledge, so to speak. However, he paid a price for imparting a "living" knowledge directed against it: a distancing from critical science.

Stephanie Majerus examines a second anthroposophical field of practice, agriculture, and at the same time pursues the interpretation of Steiner's fundamental concepts: in her reflections on the "I" as part of a cosmic stream of life – a cultural-anthropological classification of Demeter farmers. To this end, it incorporates methods of qualitative social research and addresses a fundamental tension in Steiner's reflections, which run through all phases of his life: How do Steiner's interpreters relate to the pan(en)theizing tendencies in Steiner's work, which can go as far as the dissolution of the individual, on the one hand, and, on the other, the conception of individuality, in which Steiner essentially locates an "I" with a high claim to autonomy? Majerus refuses to clarify these positions in favor of one side or the other and demands that the complexity and Steiner's changes in different life situations should not be resolved.

With his study, Ionur Daniel Bäncilä opens up another field that has hardly been explored, the regional profiles of anthroposophy, and this to a part of Europe that has been extremely poorly researched: Anthroposophy in Romania: snapshots of reception history. As if in a microcosm, one encounters anthroposophies in Romania throughout the last hundred years: the young Steiner with lectures in Transylvania, the attempts of intellectually ambitious anthroposophists to come to terms with different

manifestations of the zeitgeist in Romania between Steiner's death and the end of communist rule, or attempts to establish anthroposophical agriculture in village structures. Finally, after 1989, he came across the search for connections to Orthodox spirituality, which is endowed with the dignity of special spiritual depth in the anthroposophical worldview complex.

Another regional study on anthroposophy was carried out by Viktoria Vitanova-Kerber for Bulgaria. Here the situation is doubly complex: on the one hand, anthroposophy survived in different forms in the interwar period, in the First World War, in the communist phase and after the turn of 1989, as in Romania; on the other hand, however, there is evidence of exchange processes both with related groups, in particular the White Brotherhood founded by Petar Dunov, but also with representatives of the Orthodox Church. She has also analysed this ideological field with regard to the implementation of anthroposophy in fields of practice.

The complex relationship between spirituality and art is the subject of a double essay by Marty Bax and Helmut Zander: Hilma af Klint and the Pietistic Roots of Esotericism and Anthroposophy. The starting point is the artistic work of Hilma af Klint, who — even before Wassily Kandinsky — is considered an "inventor" of artistic abstraction. Marty Bax can now prove that the thesis, which has been propagated so far, not least by anthroposophists, that Rudolf Steiner's theosophy or anthroposophy is responsible for this decisive step, is not true. Rather, their thesis is that the roots can be found in the radical pietism of Swedish Protestantism —before af Klint found his way to Steiner's anthroposophy.

In his reflections on Pietism and "esotericism", Helmut Zander claims to prove that this path from spiritualism and its pietistic branch to "esoteric" ideas is often found. The examples of Augustin Bader, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Rudolf Steiner provide exemplary evidence of such transfers since the early modern period. Against this background, Af Klint can be placed in a long tradition of Christian-hermetic ("esoteric") interference.

Marty Bax proves her thesis under the title Hilma af Klint. From Radical Pietism to Anthroposophy. Myth and truth (alternative: farewell to myth and approach to the truth) in detail. Drawing on tell's unpublished documents, it documents af Klint's early spirituality between Pietism and Protestant spiritualism, relativizing its significance in favor of other members of the religiously influenced artists' association De Fern, especially with regard to Anna Cassel. In the exemplary interpretation of works of art by af Klint, she is finally able to show that motifs that have so far been interpreted theosophically/anthroposophically actually originate from her Protestant tradition and that the genesis of her abstract paintings can be located in this cultural roots.

The volume concludes with reflections by Hartmut Traub on the epistemological and methodological classification of Rudolf Steiner's thought. He argues that the lack of scholarly engagement with Steiner's (philosophical) work is related to academic exclusion processes based on different understandings of science. He therefore calls for a distinction to be made in Steiner's work between different textual genres (such as metaphorical, therapeutic or philosophical texts) that belong to different social contexts in terms of their interpretive approaches.

Finally, we would like to thank the Swiss National Science Foundation, which supported the project The Genesis of University Religious Studies in Dealing with Non-Hegemonic, especially Theosophical Traditions, in the context of which the following volume was written, and which also made it possible to print it through generous funding with unrestricted open access. The Catholic Faculty of the University of Fribourg co-financed the conference at which these contributions were discussed. I would like to thank Moritz Bauer for the preparatory work for the publication. Ansgar Martins and Peter Staudenmaier were a great help with all questions. A very special thanks, however, go to Viktoria Vitanova-Kerber, who accompanied the intellectual orientation and was responsible for the editorial backbreaking work of this volume and without whose overview, reliability and rescue operations this volume would probably still be an occult announcement. <>]

The Oxford Handbook of the Reception of Aquinas edited by Matthew Levering and Marcus Plested [Oxford Handbooks, Oxford University Press, 9780198798026]

The Oxford Handbook of the Reception of Aquinas provides a comprehensive survey of Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant philosophical and theological reception of Thomas Aquinas over the past 750 years. This Handbook will serve as a necessary primer for everyone who wishes to study Aquinas's thought and/or the history of theology and philosophy since Aquinas's day. Part I considers the late-medieval receptions of Aquinas among Catholics and Orthodox. Part II examines sixteenth-century Western receptions of Aquinas (Protestant and Catholic), followed by a chapter on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Orthodox reception. Part III discusses seventeenth-century Protestant and Catholic receptions, and Part IV surveys eighteenth- and nineteenth-century receptions (Protestant, Orthodox, and Catholic). Part V focuses on the twentieth century and takes into account the diversity of theological movements in the past century as well as extensive philosophical treatment. The final section unpicks contemporary systematic approaches to Aquinas, covering the main philosophical and theological themes for which he is best known. With chapters written by a wide range of experts in their respective fields, this volume provides a valuable touchstone regarding the developments that have marked the past seven centuries of Christian theology.

Review

"The hardback presentation by Oxford University Press is attractive, the format and typesetting clear and consistent, and the general editorial details professionally executed, making the volume as a whole both readable and enjoyable. This handbook will appeal not only to the growing audience of those interested in the study of Aquinas and the extensive tradition of his reception, whether Catholic, Christian, or secular, but also to all those interested in the broad range of theological and philosophical problems upon which the thought of Aquinas has been brought to bear throughout the

course of the second millennium and beyond." -- Robert McNamara, Journal of Jesuit Studies

"THE HANDBOOK OF THE RECEPTION OF AQUINAS can just in itself be taken to speak a theological word. The practical lesson of the Handbook is easier to state. Depending on one's intellectual commitments, it can serve as an occasion for an examination of conscience." -- Guy Mansini, The Thomist

"This is truly a remarkable accomplishment in the history of Aquinas studies. Again, as noted in the beginning, the arguments and narratives in this book superbly elucidate the scope of Aquinas's influence upon the Christian church as a whole, and in this regard, it has built a solid foundation for future research into the so-called "ecumenical Thomism." Whatever fruits this book will bear, however, it has to be noted at this point in time that its publication is a landmark for historical theologians and philosophical theologians alike, and this is a significant milestone especially for those who appreciate the rich history of scholastic theology, because in this work they can find Aquinas's many friends and foes who altogether formed a distinct but vital tradition of faith." -- Seung-Joo Lee, Church History and Religious Culture

"This volume is an astonishing achievement...I have never before read a handbook from cover to cover. I did with this one, and it was a joy, as it will be for anyone whose thought has been nurtured by Friar Thomas of Aquino." -- The Revd Dr Andrew Davison, Church Times

- Provides an authoritative survey of Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant philosophical and theological reception of Thomas Aquinas over the past 750 years
- Features 44 contributions from an international and renowned team of contributors
- Includes chapters on central philosophical and theological themes

CONTENTS

Contextualizing Our Handbook by Matthew Levering and Marcus Plested

The Oxford Handbook of the Reception of Aquinas could not have been done 25 or even 15 years ago, not only because of lack of scholars with the expertise to do it, but also because of lack of a sufficient audience or interest. In this Preface, we examine how this change came about. We first very briefly discuss the rise in appreciation for reception history, and second we set forth some aspects of the growth of Thomistic studies over the past twenty-five years. A Handbook devoted to Aquinas' reception should explain, however briefly, how the contemporary reception of Aquinas has enabled our Handbook to come to be. That is the modest purpose of this Preface.

Today, of course, interest in the 'reception' of influential texts and authors has become commonplace. In part due to the influence of Alasdair MacIntyre's work on tradition-constituted inquiry (MacIntyre 1981; 1988; 1990) as well as the earlier work of Hans-Georg Gadamer on tradition and rationality, scholars have become increasingly aware that one cannot properly read texts abstracted from their prior reception. A masterful example of this new interest in reception is the three massive volumes of The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine (Pollmann 2013), which employs an encyclopedic format to expose the rich veins of the reception of Augustine, with significant attention to Augustine's own texts as well. Interest in reception likewise characterizes a number of recent biblical commentaries, such as the volumes of the Blackwell Bible Commentaries series (see Kovacs and Rowland 2004). The eagerly-anticipated Oxford Handbook to the Reception of Christian Theology (eds. Sarah Coakley and Richard Cross) also speaks of the growing recognition of the importance of this theme.

Our Handbook very deliberately incorporates Orthodox and Protestant reception of Aquinas alongside Catholic reception. But the audience for the present volume has been expanded significantly by the contemporary surge of interest in Aquinas' theology among Catholic theologians across the theological subspecialties. This is especially true in English-speaking countries, but it has also manifested itself in Europe, Asia, and

elsewhere. In Germany, we think of the work of the late Otto Hermann Pesch, Thomas Marschler, Helmut Hoping, Lydia Maidl, Jan-Heiner Tuck, and others; in the Netherlands, Harm Goris, Henk Schoot, and Anton ten Klooster, among others. In France and Switzerland, notable students of Aquinas include Jean-Pierre Torrell, Gilles Emery, the late Servais Pinckaers, Benoit-Dominique de la Soujeole, and Serge-Thomas Bonino —and the list could be much expanded. British and Irish Thomists, such as Simon Gaine, Paul Murray, Nicholas Austin, Kevin O'Reilly, and Fergus Kerr, are increasing in number. In the United States and Canada, the number of significant works published by Catholic Thomists in the past 25 years reveals a major resurgence of interest. Indeed, to enumerate all the many American theologians involved in this movement would hardly be possible within the confines of this brief preface.

The abovementioned scholars reflect for the most part a theological surge of interest in Aquinas. Philosophically, Aquinas never ceased to be of interest. Thus, it is less persuasive to speak of a philosophical 'resurgence' of interest in Aquinas, at least in the United States, where his work never ceased to interest Catholic philosophers. In the United States and Canada, philosophers such as Norris Clarke, Benedict Ashley, John Wippel, Lawrence Dewan, and Ralph McInerny—along with their many students—have kept Thomist philosophy current. The Scottish philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre's discovery of Aquinas' importance for moral theory had a large (and ecumenical) impact. The links between Aquinas and contemporary analytic philosophy were already notable on the British scene in the work of Elizabeth Anscombe, Peter Geach, and Anthony Kenny (among others). In recent years the number of Catholic and non-Catholic philosophers working out these connections has burgeoned, with notable figures including Norman Kretzmann, Eleonore Stump, and most recently Edward Feser, who is retrieving neo-scholastic philosophy in dialogue with analytic philosophy. Phenomenological interest in Aquinas has continued to grow in the United States and Europe thanks to such figures as Robert Sokolowski and, in his own fashion, Jean-Luc Marion, In Germany, Ferdinand Ulrich has continued the Continental tradition of creative metaphysical development of Aquinas while Robert Spaemann has constructively engaged with Aquinas' moral theory. The Dutch philosopher Leo Elders

and his Belgian student Jorgen Vijgen have underlined the Aristotelian dimension of Aquinas. The Dutch philosopher Rudi te Velde and the Irish philosopher Fran O'Rourke, among others, have focused attention upon the Platonic (participatory) and Dionysian influences in Aquinas' philosophical achievements.

Under the leadership of the American theologian Thomas Joseph White, an important and impactful centre for philosophical and theological research and outreach, the Thomistic Institute, has been established at the Dominican House of Studies in Washington, DC. White has moved to found a similar Thomistic Institute at the Angelicum in Rome. Other especially important centres for Thomistic philosophy and theology include the 'Barcelona school' of Thomism, the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht, the Aquinas Institute at Blackfriars (Oxford), the Aquinas Center for Theological Renewal at Ave Maria University, the philosophy department of the Catholic University of America, the philosophical Center for Thomistic Studies at the University of St. Thomas in Houston, and the doctoral programme in theology at the University of Fribourg. At the University of Notre Dame, Jean Porter and Joseph Wawrykow have directed the dissertations of a number of now influential Thomist moral and historical theologians. Significant research in Aquinas' philosophy and theology now takes place in Latin and South America (especially Chile and Argentina), Africa (especially Nigeria), Asia (especially the Philippines), and Australia and New Zealand.

In the 1990s, when we were doctoral students, there were many Thomist philosophers but relatively few Thomist theologians. Outside the field of moral theology, where Thomistic virtue ethics had been revitalized by MacIntyre and Stanley Hauerwas, their number could be counted on one hand—or two hands if one moved beyond the English-speaking world. Even 25 years ago, mining Aquinas' theology for contemporary dogmatic purposes was seen in most theological faculties as a questionable and retrograde thing to do, one in need of defence and explanation. Looking back, however, it is clear that things had already begun to shift, due to the work of David Burrell, Thomas Weinandy, and many others—perhaps above all the Lutheran George Lindbeck and the Episcopalian Victor Preller who persuaded a generation of very talented doctoral students at Yale that Aquinas should be a central interlocutor. At

several British universities including Oxford and Cambridge a renewed interest in Aquinas was also in the air.

At much the same time, the Revue thorniste was being reinvigorated by a young generation of French-speaking Dominicans. By the 1990s it was publishing some of the most significant theological work of the day. In the United States, The Thomist had been similarly reinvigorated by J. A. DiNoia (Lindbeck's student). As editor of New Blackfriars, Fergus Kerr ensured that this journal, too, contributed much to renewal of interest in Aquinas. A number of Ralph Mclnerny's doctoral students, stimulated by regular conferences at the Maritain Institute of the University of Notre Dame, had begun to make significant contributions on theological topics, perhaps most notably Thomas Hibbs.

Outside the Catholic world, the renewal of interest in Aquinas' theology began as a Lutheran and Episcopalian/Anglican project spearheaded in the 1990s and 2000S by Yale-school theologians and by their postliberal confreres, among them Stanley Hauerwas, Bruce Marshall, Reinhard Hutter, Eugene Rogers, A.N. Williams, Kathryn Tanner, and John Milbank (Marshall and Hatter, of course, are now significant Catholic Thomist theologians). In more recent years, Methodist and Reformed scholars have joined in. We think of studies such as Edgardo Colon-Emeric's Wesley, Aquinas, and Christian Perfection: An Ecumenical Dialogue (2009); Kenneth Loyer's God's Love Through the Spirit: The Holy Spirit in Thomas Aquinas and John Wesley (2014); Charles Raith II's Aquinas and Calvin on Romans (2014); Tyler Wittman's God and Creation in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth (2018); and the volume edited by Manfred Svensson and David VanDrunen, Aquinas among the Protestants (2017).

Following renewed interest in Aquinas' own theology came interest in his reception. Among Protestants, the foundations for this were laid by the historian Richard Muller and, in his later work, the theologian John Webster. Muller's multi-volume history of Reformed scholasticism cleared away a number of faulty perceptions (Muller 2003). Webster began as a Barthian but grew increasingly interested in the Reformed scholastics and in Aquinas; his circle of influence—also informed by Ivor Davidson—

includes Michael Allen, Scott Swain, Steven Duby, and Christopher Holmes. These scholars show serious knowledge of and appreciation for both Aquinas and the Reformed scholastics. Their work emphasizes that Thomistic scholasticism does not mean unbiblical rationalism, but rather enters deeply into the import of the Scriptures.

On the Catholic side, Romanus Cessario has had a significant impact in stimulating interest in the reception of Aquinas (see Cessario 2005; Cessario and Cuddy 2017). Additionally, graduate students began to realise that scholarship on Aquinas could benefit from deeper attention to his earlier commentators. We think, for instance, of John Meinert's The Love of God Poured Out (2018); R. J. Matava's Divine Causality and Human Free Choice (2016); and Reginald Lynch's The Cleansing of the Heart (2017). The work of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, which not too long ago was verboten due to his political errors, has been sympathetically retrieved by Richard Peddicord (2005) and Aidan Nichols (2008), and can now once again be mined for insights, with new translations of his work appearing regularly. Charles Morerod (1994), Joshua Hochschild (2010), and Michael O'Connor (2017) have, for their part, sympathetically retrieved the work of Cajetan.

Until recently, it seemed highly unlikely that similar developments would take place in the Orthodox world. But the work of John Demetracopoulos and others involved in the Thomas de Aquino Byzantinus project together with Marcus Plested's Orthodox Readings of Aquinas (2012)—along with a growing recognition that much later patristic theology has a distinctly 'scholastic' tenor, especially once one arrives at the Christological controversies of the fifth century and the work of St Maximus the Confessor and St John of Damascus—suggest that things are shifting. Byzantium (unlike much modern Orthodox theology) was not inveterately opposed to Latin scholasticism. Indeed, it was St Gregory Palamas' opponent, Barlaam the Calabrian, who was fiercely opposed to scholasticism in general and Aquinas in particular, whereas Palamas himself stood in a long tradition of Byzantine scholasticism and shows no animosity towards the theology and methodology of the Latin West.

Today, however, it is rare to find an Orthodox theologian drawing significantly upon Aquinas for constructive rather than historical purposes. The most notable exception is David Bentley Hart, but his employment of Aquinas has not been widely embraced within Orthodox circles. Moreover, while appreciating Aquinas as a philosopher, Hart has steered relatively clear of Aquinas as a theologian; and he has been sharply critical of the Thomistic commentatorial tradition, especially its Dominican exponents. Orthodox theologians generally prefer to remain anchored in Scripture and the Church Fathers up to Palamas, while few modern Orthodox theologians have much time at all for medieval Latin scholasticism. But there is no doubt that Aquinas has been a significant presence in the Orthodox past and, mutatis mutandis, may well be so again.

During the period in which the Catholic Church insisted upon adherence to Thomas Aquinas' thought as a marker of Catholic orthodoxy—beginning with Pope Leo XIII's Aeterni Patris (1878) and ending with the Second Vatican Council (1962-5)—Protestants and Orthodox theologians understandably reacted by distancing themselves from Aquinas as well as from his commentators (including his Protestant and Orthodox ones), who were deemed rationalists, unbiblical, and unspiritual. In this period, Catholics adopted a defensive policy against the inroads of theological liberalism, which had hugely impacted Protestant theology in nineteenth- and early-twentieth theology, and which also threatened Catholic theology. This defensive policy included a suspicion of ecumenism as a Trojan horse for liberalism. Given that leading Catholic Thomists of the time period showed little positive interest in Protestantism or Orthodoxy, it is unsurprising that a strong reaction was provoked in those traditions. Yet by the 1920S Catholic theologians themselves were seeking to expand Catholic theology in ecumenical directions, and they sought to benefit from historical retrievals of the Church Fathers and from historical-critical biblical scholarship (see Kirwan 2018). These theologians gradually became the majority, and by the time of the Second Vatican Council this movement—labelled the nouvelle theologie—had taken over. Thomism essentially disappeared as a vital force within Catholic theology for a generation.

Although this disappearance left the Catholic Church weaker in a number of ways, it opened the door to a Catholic Thomism that would be much more interested in and receptive to the contributions of Protestants and Orthodox. Given the depth of Aquinas' own use of Scripture and the Fathers, as well as Aquinas' profound writing on the spiritual life, Aquinas could be and was reread in a manner now fully open to Protestant and Orthodox emphases. The emergence of this ecumenical Thomism has now led to an ecumenical interest in the reception of Aquinas among Catholics, Orthodox, and Protestants. As noted above, especially significant here is the contribution of Reformed scholars who are retrieving the Thomistic achievements of the period of Reformed Orthodoxy.

This is the context in which the present Oxford Handbook has taken shape. After an introductory chapter on the sources of Aquinas, written by Jean-Pierre Torrell, we devote six chapters to the late medieval receptions of Aquinas among Catholics and Orthodox. We then treat sixteenth-century Western receptions of Aquinas (Protestant and Catholic) in five chapters, followed by a chapter on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Orthodox reception. After four chapters on seventeenth-century Protestant and Catholic receptions, we survey eighteenth- and nineteenth-century receptions (Protestant, Orthodox, and Catholic) in five chapters. The twentieth century receives ten chapters, given the diversity of theological movements in the past century and the need to cover philosophy extensively as well. Finally, we devote twelve chapters to contemporary systematic approaches to Aquinas, covering the main philosophical (six chapters) and theological (six chapters) themes for which he is best known. Our suggestion to the authors of these chapters was that they should highlight elements that should be present in any reception of Aquinas, in whatever era. But we gave these authors ample leeway to engage the topics of their chapters in a contemporary fashion appropriate to their own expertise.

Our hope is that this Handbook will serve as a helpful primer for everyone who wishes to study Aquinas' thought and/or the history of theology and philosophy since Aquinas' day. In the present context, of which this Handbook is a fruit, Aquinas' philosophy and theology are returning to some degree of prominence both within and beyond the

Catholic tradition. But even those who do not count Aquinas among their primary interlocutors will find that the present Handbook stands as a valuable touchstone regarding the Christian theology of the past seven centuries. Such is Thomas' stature that there are few theological developments in that period on which the reception of Thomas does not have some bearing or make some contribution to, whether by way of approbation or reprobation. <>

Bulwarks of Unbelief: Atheism and Divine Absence in a Secular Age by Joseph Minich Forword by Carl R. Trueman [Lexham Academic, ISBN: 9781683596752]

How modernity creates atheists—and what the church must do about it.

Millions of people in the West identify as atheists. Christians often respond to this reality with proofs of God's existence, as though rational arguments for atheism were the root cause of unbelief. In Bulwarks of Unbelief, Joseph Minich argues that a felt absence of God, as experienced by the modern individual, offers a better explanation for the rise in atheism. Recent technological and cultural shifts in the modern West have produced a perceived challenge to God's existence. As modern technoculture reshapes our awareness of reality and belief in the invisible, it in turn amplifies God's apparent silence. In this new context, atheism is a natural result. And absent of meaning from without, we have turned within.

Christians cannot escape this aspect of modern life. Minich argues that we must consciously and actively return to reality. If we reattune ourselves to God's story, reintegrate the whole person, and reinhabit the world, faith can thrive in this age of unbelief.

Review

This is an important book both in its argument and its proposals, a significant contribution to recent conversations about modernity, faith, and what it means to be human in a technological world. —**Carl R. Trueman,** from the foreword

If you found Charles Taylor's analysis persuasive, I think you'll find Minich's even more so. —**Michael Horton,** J. Gresham Machen Professor of Systematic Theology and Apologetics, Westminster Seminary California

Minich has written a wonderfully scintillating treatment of the spiritual condition of modernity, culturally perceptive and psychologically astute. Especially attentive to the material factors that have rendered atheism so thinkable and attractive, his account offers insights lacking in many ideological fall narratives and resists the temptation of nostalgic laments over disenchantment. His concluding section presents a theological framing for the modern condition that is suggestive and daring, which I will doubtless be reflecting upon for some time. —**Alastair Roberts,** adjunct senior fellow, Theopolis Institute

CONTENTS

Whence Atheism? Whither God?

The (Recent!) Past is a Foreign Country

From 1906 to 1911, the Dutch theologian and statesman Herman Bavinck (1854-1921) put the final revisions on his four-volume magnum opus, Reformed Dogmatics. Arguably the most learned Reformed theologian of his day, Bavinck filled his Dogmatics with asides demonstrating encyclopedic knowledge of and competence in both ancient and contemporary philosophy, law, science, and history. What is more, his ethos throughout is one of cosmopolitan generosity and poise, even while arguing positively

for historic Christian orthodoxy. It is fascinating to encounter, therefore, the dismissiveness and brevity (only a few pages in the second volume) with which he treats the subject of atheism. He writes:

> There is no atheistic world. There are no atheistic peoples. Nor are there atheistic persons. The world cannot be atheistically conceived ... There is nobody able, absolutely and with logical consistency, to deny God's knowability and hence his revelation ... A conscious theoretical atheism in an absolute sense, if it ever occurs, is rare ... But this [self-conscious materialism] almost never happens. Taken in an absolute sense, as the denial of an absolute power, atheism is almost unthinkable ... It therefore requires a certain effort not to believe in a personal God.'

Bavinck is, of course, aware of the existence of self-conscious materialists and atheists. He names several of them. He is likewise aware of all the ways in which his claims concerning the universality of a more-or-less personal notion of God could be contested by persons working in the field of religious anthropology, which had been growing since the late nineteenth century. He engages this body of scholarship. What strikes the reader about these particular statements, however, is the absolute (perceived) implausibility of atheism for Bavinck. While he interacts extensively with various philosophers throughout his Dogmatics, and while he writes frequently in his Dogmatics as well as in his larger corpus concerning the relationship between religion and science, the so-called problem of atheism is not treated by him as an item of significant concern.

And yet, at the same time (in 1910), across the Atlantic, John Updike's fictional Reformed Presbyterian minister, Clarence Arthur Wilmot felt the last particles of his faith leave him.

> The sensation was distinct—a visceral surrender, a set of dark sparkling bubbles escaping upward ... Clarence's mind was like a many-legged, wingless insect that had long and tediously been struggling to climb up the walls of a slick-walled porcelain basin; and now a sudden impatient wash of water swept it down into the drain. There is no God ... Life's sounds all rang with a curious lightness and flatness, as if a resonating base beneath them had been removed. They told Clarence Wilmot what he had long suspected, that the universe was utterly indifferent to his states of mind and as empty of divine content as a corroded kettle. All its metaphysical content had leaked away, but for cruelty and death, which without the hypothesis of a God became unmetaphysical; they became simply facts, which oblivion would

> in time obliviously erase. Oblivion became a singular comforter. The clifflike riddle of predestination—how can Man have free will without impinging upon God's perfect freedom? how can God condemn Man when all acts from alpha to omega are His very own?—simply evaporated; an immense strain of justification was at a blow lifted. The former believer's habitual mental contortions decisively relaxed. And yet the depths of vacancy revealed were appalling. In the purifying sweep of atheism human beings lost all special value. The numb misery of the horse was matched by that of the farmer; the once-green ferny lives crushed into coal's fossiliferous strata were no more anonymous and obliterated than Clarence's own life would soon be, in a wink of earth's tremendous time. Without Biblical blessing the physical universe became sheerly horrible and disgusting. All fleshly acts became vile, rather than merely some. The reality of men slaying lambs and cattle, fish and fowl to sustain their own bodies took on an aspect of grisly comedy—the blood-soaked selfishness of a cosmic mayhem. The thought of eating sickened Clarence; his body felt swollen in its entirety, like an ankle after a sprain, and he scarcely dared take a step, lest he topple from an ungainly height.

Here we are confronted with a curious juxtaposition. At the dawn of the twentieth century, Bavinck cannot imagine the success of atheism. Toward its close, Updike (perhaps reflecting on his own struggle) can not only haunt his reader with the felt plausibility of a purely materialist universe, but his protagonist's faith quite literally leaves him. Throughout the novel, Clarence wishes that he could retain his lost religion, but the former minister cannot force himself to believe what he (despite himself) no longer finds believable. What is more, Updike's protagonist has his crisis of faith in the precise decade that Bavinck declares atheism impotent in its charms. And indeed, despite Bavinck's inability to imagine an atheist universe, the recent historical consensus is that it was precisely during his lifetime that the atheist option (at least in the West) became a widespread-enough temptation to marshal adherents exceeding a handful of European elites. Bavinck's failure of imagination certainly does not imply his inability to intellectually struggle with the intersection between the claims of the Christian faith and the complexities of the modern world. In fact, this struggle largely defined his youth. And certainly, developments that are clear to the historian in hindsight are sometimes muddled for actual historical actors. In any case, it would seem that modern persons do not have to go very far back into history to find themselves in a foreign country.? What, then, constitutes this ancestral foreignness as it

pertains to the plausibility of atheism? Said differently, what changed between Herman Bavinck and John Updike?

MY HYPOTHESIS

In this volume, I make two parallel arguments. My first claim is that the most illuminating point of departure for interpreting the rise of unbelief over the last century and a half is the modern sense, shared by theists and non-theists alike, of divine absence. That is, whatever one believes propositionally about the question of God, God's existence is not felt to be obvious in the same way that, for instance, the fact that you are reading this right now seems obvious. It is common for modern religious persons to confess doubts that render the comparative confidence of previous centuries foreign. Certainly, I do not claim that God was crudely visible in the past, but divine invisibility was not ordinarily perceived to be relevant to the question of God's existence as such. When did it become the case, then, that the phenomenon of divine absence pressured human persons in the direction of non-belief? If nothing else, this is a curious property of modern religious consciousness. This con-textualizes my second argument. My own hypothesis is that the salient factors that explain the relationship between divine absence and modern atheism are located at the intersection of the vast proliferation of modern technoculture, the way the world seems or manifests to correspondingly alienated laborers, and the resultant loss of a sense that one belongs to, and is caught up in, a history that transcends one. I use the term "technoculture" because I am not interested in technology or its proliferation in the abstract but in its concrete historical and cultural usage and the manner in which this shapes the human's relationship with his or her self, with others, and with the world. As will be apparent, particularly important and implicit in my usage of the term is an emphasis on the nature and effects of modern labor. In any case, my argument is supported (on the one hand) by noting the rise of unbelief at the same point that these features of our modern world became most prominent. But this is more deeply explained by a phenomenological analysis (defined below) of our technological and practical condition—highlighting how these identified features orient us to the world in such away that it seems devoid of non-projected meaning and personhood (and, therefore,

of God). This is, again, irrespective of whether or not one happens to believe in God. I am also keen to note that this does not constitute a comprehensive moral evaluation of these phenomena. Even in using the term "alienation," I am more immediately interested in a description of our phenomenal relation to the world than I am in questions of goodness or justice.

I locate my attempted contribution here, then, at two points. First is the claim that focusing specifically on this shared sensibility of divine absence (as opposed to broader considerations concerning the sheer number of unbelievers) is the most useful way to illuminate the starting place from which modern persons engage the question of God. Second, I aim to highlight the specific manner in which our use of modern technology and our experience of modern labor cultivate a posture toward reality that reshapes our plausibility structures and our sense of reality such that God's non-obviousness is now felt to be an argument against His being at all.

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

My method in making this argument will typically involve engaging specific questions and texts that help get into or illuminate the theme of the particular chapter considered broadly—and then to fill out these broader insights with specific examples where relevant and useful. For instance, I will fill out a more general insight concerning the philosophy of technology with a more specific insight drawn from the impact of modern film. Broadly speaking, the interlocutors I engage are influenced by the phenomenological tradition and/or its methods (usually seen as birthed in the work of Edmund Husserl). Generally, this philosophical school is concerned with a fine-grained analysis of the world as it is manifested, even subconsciously or tacitly, in human experience. So, for instance, a phenomenological analysis of a building would be less interested in the process by which it was made than in how the building seems to a person consciously experiencing it. For humans, this seeming is never a bundle of separate perceptions of weight, height, color, and so forth, but a kind of whole that contains implicit interpretations, judgments, and associations. This tradition is useful for my purposes because in asking the question of God in its relationship to the modern

technoculture, I want to ask how the world (or reality) seems to those caught up in that technoculture—and evaluate how this might shape our approach to the question of God. To the extent that I depart from this phenomenological method (for instance, in bringing up information drawn from sociological or statistical analysis), it will be in the service of claims that are chiefly established through phenomenological observation of the world. My motive here is to demonstrate the consistency between the research that highlights a social or statistical correlation between, say, the parallel emergence of modern technology and unbelief and the philosophical analysis that attempts to get inside and interpret why this correlation takes precisely the historical shape and content that it does. In aggregate, this represents a cumulative case for my hypotheses, with phenomenological analysis taking a primary role and sociological/ statistical analysis taking a confirming/secondary role.

THE LIMITS AND SCOPE OF THIS PROJECT

It should be clear, then, that this is not (as such) a work of history. What I suggest draws upon the work of historians and the analysis of philosophers to give a theoretically plausible account of modern belief conditions. In my judgment, the argument has a prima facie plausibility that consequently generates questions that could potentially be answered by more fine-grained historical analyses. I will try to identify these as they arise in the text.

Furthermore, this volume is not meant to make a case for or against atheism. In one sense, the case I make herein is deflationary for atheists who assert that the recent prevalence of atheism is obviously due to its intellectual superiority over other options. Nevertheless, it is entirely possible to be persuaded of atheism and to reject this insufficient explanation of its recent success. In the fourth chapter and in the conclusion, it will be clear that I am nevertheless writing from the position of historic Christian creedal orthodoxy (specifically in the Magisterial Protestant tradition). In these chapters, I will reflect upon the implications of the first three chapters for practitioners of Christianity within my own branch of Christendom.

My title draws upon Charles Taylor's notion of what he terms the "bulwarks of belief." By this, he refers to those background features of medieval Christian culture that (both consciously and subconsciously) rendered belief in God all but inevitable. By contrast, I speak of "bulwarks of unbelief," or those features of the modern world that render unbelief as at least plausible (a "living option," in the taxonomy of William James).

I execute the above argument, then, in five steps. In chapter 1, I will place my argument concerning atheism in the context of the interdisciplinary scholarly debates over the meaning of modernity, secularization, and the so-called "disenchantment of the world." Herein, I seek to identify what, in my judgment, has been insufficiently weighted in scholarly interpretations of modern unbelief—particularly as it pertains to the above-mentioned relationship between unbelief, divine absence, and modern technoculture. In chapter 2, I will attempt to make a prima facie case that there is enough of a significant correlation between the emergence of these two phenomena to warrant a phenomenological and theoretical analysis of their causal relation. In chapter 3, therefore, I will make a philosophical case for a causal link between them. Specifically, I will argue that modern technoculture and labor render unbelief a living option by posturing us toward reality in such a way that it seems devoid of its demonstrable immaterial dimension(s). The case having been made, I will move on in chapter 4 to consider implications—albeit from the particular vantage point of a Protestant interested in maintaining traditional creedal Christian orthodoxy who nevertheless cannot escape the pressures that mitigate against it. I argue that such persons cannot orient themselves relative to modern atheism without orienting themselves relative to the forces that give rise to it. Rejecting (however) both Ludditist nostalgia and progressivist religious revolution, I will argue that the modern moment is an opportunity to render orthodox belief more substantive and mature. This is because navigating these challenges requires an integration of the mind and will in order to reattune oneself to reality in its fullness. Such mediation (between mind and will) tends to suffocate nominal and shallow mediate positions between mature faith and unbelief. I will further argue that an underappreciated dimension of modern alienation and cultural disorientation is modern humankind's felt inability to be involved with

and shape the history to which it nevertheless imagines itself to belong. Consequently, I will argue that recognizing the divine intentionality of the larger story of which this particular moment is a part (the civitate Dei) helps orient us to realities from which we cannot be alienated, even in principle. It is in the repentance and re-habituation of the whole person that we re-inhabit the world in such a manner as to render atheism less plausible. Via a new ordo amoris, we learn to maturely embrace precisely this particular moment and our limitations and opportunities within it (the attempted transcending of which is perhaps the chief idolatry of modernity—as well as its chief anxiety). Finally, in a brief conclusion, I will take stock of the overall argument in relation to the quandary of modern pluralism, and I will attempt to show that the public veracity of the Christian faith depends upon the persuasion of whole persons. <>

Imagination Now: A Richard Kearney Reader edited by M. E. Littlejohn [Rowman & Littlefield, ISBN: 9781786609205]

The world is increasingly polarized along religious, ethnic, race, gender, class, and ideological lines. But must such diversity necessarily breed suspicion, fear, or violence? Richard Kearney invites us to consider another path. He wagers that the cause of our divisions often lies not in difference but in a lack of creative imagination. Ever in a spirit of dialogue, he shows how poetics and narrative imagination can break the hold of hostility and open new possibilities of reconciliation, accomplishing what moral arguments alone cannot.

Now, more than ever, there is an urgent need for Kearney's work, which addresses our current moment of crisis and division, providing pathways of creative response and healing. This book follows Kearney's journey through the fields of philosophy of the imagination, hermeneutics, philosophy of religion, ethics, psychology, practical philosophy, and politics. The selection of writings in this volume offers to the specialist and the general reader a concise, well-rounded entry into one of the most prolific and wide-ranging thinkers in contemporary philosophy.

Reviews

Murray E. Littlejohn has prepared a gift for those new to Richard Kearney's work and a valuable compendium for those already familiar. It is an exceptional constellation of essays that map the contours of Kearney's ranging conversations and comprehensive writings on the

imagination. More than this, it is a catalyst for further reflections on the imagination with Kearney and the philosophical hermeneutical tradition from which he was formed. Such reflections are vital for our times disciplined by imaginations contained, embraced, and subjected by economic and technological rationalities, wherein nothing and no one remains exempt from the market or the machine. Kearney's writings, as this collection has gathered, offer help—help to imagine again, to imagine differently.
— Ashley John Moyse, McDonald Postdoctoral Fellow in Christian Ethics and Public Life, University of Oxford

An invaluable resource for anyone interested in Richard Kearney's continuous impact and influence on the fields of philosophy and religion, not least because of its helpful introduction to Kearney's work, his background, and the philosophical legacy that he was schooled in and continues to advance.
— Michael Oliver, Departmental Lecturer in Modern Theology, University of Oxford

Now for half a century, Richard Kearney has walked and thought through our age of nihilism with courage and lucidity. And he has told us not only how to understand it correctly, but how to survive it. By focusing on imagination, possibility, the event to come and anatheism, he shows, humbly but forcefully, that we may still live, breathe and inhabit the world with someone like God.
— Jean-Luc Marion, Académie Française, author of 'God Without Being and Being Given'

In the intellectual effervescence of this unfixed "now," we are treated to the fresh history and dauntless eschatology of Richard Kearney's polymorphic poetics. Art and ethics, flesh and wound, carnality and trauma, politics and epiphany: the essays resonate together in this after-God of a God in the making.
— Catherine Keller, Drew Theological School

CONTENTS

"You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows," and one need but glance at the headlines of print, television, and social media to know moment to moment that our world is increasingly marked by polarization and hostility along religious, ethnic, racial, class, gender, and ideological lines. Exchanges across these divisions seem under threat of breaking down, often under the ominous shadow of violence. Even in countries that embrace democratic processes, open civil dialogue and

reasoned communication can be conspicuously absent. Against the backdrop of this pervasive malaise Richard Kearney remains a voice of hope, advocating the imagination as the vehicle of change so needed to address the dark tendencies of our times. For the imagination can break us out of the false narratives and conceptual frameworks that hold us captive in our struggles, opening dialogical paths beyond religious, secular, socio-political, and economic dogmatism. Over the last forty-five years Kearney's body of writings has provided an antidote for philosophy's forgetfulness of the imagination and our increasingly anemic social imaginary, providing a fertile reimagining of traditions and possibilities of reconciliation and human flourishing in a divided world—wagering peace against war, hospitality against hostility, creative exchange against the echo chamber of ideological self-justifying rhetoric.

This philosophy is not born of an easy, naïve optimism, or the invention of a mind isolated within the high walls of the Academy. Kearney's thought emerges out of hard-won insights forged in the fires of suspicion, violence, and opposition that marked much of twentieth-century Ireland... His is a philosophy that is alive, engaged, and rooted in the conversational word, true to the hermeneutic spirit, and true to the lifeblood of philosophy since Socrates. Indeed, over all his years of teaching and writing, dialogue is at the heart of Kearney's hermeneutic approach to philosophy. He has published several volumes of conversations with thinkers such as Paul Ricceur, Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jean-Luc Marion, Julia Kristeva, Gianni Vattimo, and Noam Chomsky: Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers (1984), States of Mind (1995), Debates in Continental Philosophy (2004), and Reimagining the Sacred (2015). Far beyond mere recapitulations, these interview books are a significant philosophical achievement. Kearney's rare combination of conversational generosity and breadth of knowledge of the philosophical terrain permits him to clarify and challenge the thought of his conversation partners, and to move them into places both deep and engaging.

Faced with a publishing record so extensive and multifaceted, the current volume makes no claim to be comprehensive, not least of all because Kearney is still a thinker in motion. Yet its central organizing theme, the imagination, is a leitmotif throughout

Kearney's work. What is presented here plies a thematic and historical course through the main rivers and a few of the tributaries of Kearney's thought, tracing key themes as they develop, recur, and interweave organically. The essays in this volume span over three decades, and the changing cultural references serve to highlight the enduring character of Kearney's insights against the backdrop of a rapidly shifting culture. The hope is that new readers will find the texts presented here to be a well-rounded introduction to a wide-ranging thinker, and that longtime readers will appreciate anew how Kearney's insights are amplified in their transpositions and multifaceted interplay across different domains.

The selections have been grouped into four primary areas, chosen to highlight Kearney's major contributions to philosophy, his multi-disciplinary interests, and his relevance for public discourse. Section I, "Rethinking Imagination: Poetics, Literature, Culture," presents the scholarly foundations of Kearney's major work. From historical studies to engagement with contemporary thinkers, Kearney discusses the urgency of the imagination in the contemporary world and its innate bearing on ethics. Section II, "Reading Life: Hermeneutics, Carnality, Psychoanalysis," follows Kearney's development of hermeneutics. For Kearney, interpretation is not merely a matter of understanding words on a page, but of reading faces, in all the vulnerability of their flesh and blood. It requires instinct, tact, imagination, and reading between the lines. Section III, "Reimagining God: Religion, Aesthetics, Sacramentality," takes up Kearney's proposed antidote to religious or atheist triumphalism: to reimagine God as possibility and to look for his presence not in pillars of shining clouds but in the simple moments of day-to-day life. Section IV, "Thinking Action: Ethics, Politics, Peace," presents the philosophy behind Kearney's practical initiatives in reconciliation outside of the academy and the challenge of facing the stranger's ambiguous advent as friend or foe. It is only fitting that this book should conclude in a dialogue with Richard Kearney now, as he reflects on the path he has traversed from his awakening to philosophy and brings his thinking to bear on pressing concerns of our time.

Hostility, division, and war seem to come far more easily than amity, collaboration, and peace, but Kearney's philosophy resists despair. He bids us to take up the ethical task of

attending to the stranger and the marginalized of society, risking dialogue, offering sanctuary, and resisting the building of walls. His work speaks to the disaffected, those "beyond the pale." To those who can't even imagine re-engaging with religion after the tyranny of dogmatism, to those who cannot dream of breaking bread with the other amidst the memory of violation and bloodshed, and to those who find themselves prisoners of monotony in the slow march of the everyday, excarnate twenty-first-century existence, Kearney's work extends a hand. Can we dare to hope again, can we dare to reimagine that our world might be refigured, that there remain for us new possibilities yet untapped? Can you and I imagine now?

This is Kearney's wager.

Rethinking Imagination: Poetics, Literature, Culture

The five chapters in this section together lay a foundation to understand the anthropological, epistemological, and ethical role of the imagination as it develops throughout Richard Kearney's work. Chapter 1, "Imagination Now: The Civilization of the Image" (1988), situates Kearney's early work as a challenge to the excesses of postmodernity as a self-parodying hall of mirrors that reduces the human to a mere pawn of impersonal forces from which there is no clear escape. This essay is all the more relevant to read today, as the omnipresence of smartphones and rise of social media confirm Kearney's diagnosis with their new intensified possibilities for our seduction and manipulation through the constant flow of instantly available images. Kearney's solution to this predicament, the path of recovering our humanity in an age of alienation, is a critically re-appropriated imagination, always in dialogue with the other. Expanding on this theme in Chapter 2, "Poetics of Imagining" (1991), Kearney, recounts the history of imagination, particularly as developed by phenomenology and hermeneutics, combining critical insights that would anticipate a further development of narrative imagination. This project is taken further in Chapter 3, "Hermeneutics of Imagination" (1995), which addresses the postmodern world that has proclaimed the death of God, the death of ethics, and the death of art. Kearney's response to the first of these can be found in Section III, but here he defends the place of ethics and art by

emphasizing their shared reliance on "phronetic" imagination. With a sensitivity to the particular, the unique, and the situational, Kearney argues that phronesis is a form of narrative hermeneutics that opens a freedom of possibilities beyond the flattening universalization of theoria. Chapter 4, "Narrative Matters" (2002), clarifies the philosophical structure of "narrative" as (1) mythos, or plot; (2) mimesis, or re-creation; (3) catharsis, or release; (4) phronesis, or wisdom; and (5) ethos, or ethics. Kearney argues for the necessity of stories, whether history or fiction, for being human and for making sense of ourselves, of each other, and our world. Finally, Chapter 5, "Hebraic and Hellenic Myths of Imagination" (1988), showcases a selection of Kearney's detailed studies of the history of imagination, focusing on two founding myths at the center of Western culture. Both regard the possibilities of imagination as a mixed blessing, precariously hovering between transgression and godliness.

Reading Life: Hermeneutics, Carnality, Psychoanalysis

While Richard Kearney has mastered the art of reading texts and images, he never loses sight of the fact that the whole person is always immersed in life and action. From the language of the flesh and its physical and psychic vulnerabilities, Kearney's therapeutic, diagnostic, diacritical hermeneutics extends beneath and between the lines, through tact and gut instinct, as well as literary and psychoanalytic creativity. Chapter 6, "Diacritical Hermeneutics: Reading between the Lines" (2011), combines deconstruction's careful attention to detail with a hermeneutic surplus of truth to explain Kearney's unique strategy: critical, criteriological, grammatological, diagnostic, and carnal. This last idea is one that Kearney will continue to develop in Chapter 7, "Carnal Hermeneutics" (2015), where he retrieves a fuller understanding of an incarnate philosophy. Excavating its linguistic roots and philosophical origins in Aristotle, he also draws from contemporary phenomenological thinkers like Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jean-Louis Chrétien. Chapter 8, "Losing Our Touch" (2014), brings some of these ideas beyond the academy and to the larger public. Kearney explores ways that the virtual world can lead to "excarnation" and alienation from the fullness of our embodied humanity, thereby rupturing our relationship with the other. This section closes with two complementary pieces that seek to understand such ruptures,

in the flesh and in the psyche. Chapter 9, "The Hermeneutics of Wounds" (2016), reflects on wounded healers, from Oedipus and Chiron to Helen Bamber. They understand that the narrative and carnal dimensions of cathartic suffering, applied with proper tact, can help mediate the healing of unspeakable traumas. Chapter 10, "Writing Trauma: Narrative Catharsis in Homer, Shakespeare, and Joyce" (2013), discusses how the telling of stories can possess a healing power for the one who tells them. From Joyce and Odysseus to Freud and Shakespeare, Kearney reflects on how stories told, received, and intertwined in their retelling—can be a balm for the ruptures of intergenerational wounds between fathers and sons.

Reimagining God: Religion, Aesthetics, Sacramentality

One of Richard Kearney's objectives in writing on God and religion is to liberate us from the interminable discussions of proofs and refutations and return us to the ground of possible encounter with the God who cannot be mastered or defined, and who does not seek to master and define us. Kearney allows himself to be guided through a multiplicity of voices that echo and enhance each other: the Judeo-Christian tradition and interreligious wisdom, as well as art, literature, and poetry. Kearney's "God of the Possible" (2001), explored in Chapter 11, is not the God who is or is not, but rather the God who may be, can be, and shall be, if we let him—the God who awaits our response in order to be God for us. Possibility for Kearney is the dynamic flowering of newness and transfiguration that can be embodied in our lives if we agree to respond to the invitation. Chapter 12, "God after God: An Ana-theist Re-Imagining of God" (2014), further explores this invitation to encounter this God, which Kearney puts in the form of a wager which he calls "anatheism": the "return to God after God," after the idols. It is only from this place of humble recognition of one's ignorance that one can take the authentic stance of the wager on religion. Chapter 13, "Toward a Phenomenology of the Persona" (2001), works out a hermeneutics of the person in conversation with Derrida and Lévinas. Kearney reveals the dangers of philosophies unable to walk the fine line between absence and presence, transcendence and incarnation, infinite and finite. An eschatological approach, on the other hand, can help preserve the irreducible otherness of the person and take up in a new way the patristic insight of personal

relation as an icon of the divine. In Chapter 14, "Epiphanies of the Everyday: Toward a Micro-Eschatology" (2006), Kearney argues for the revelatory value of a "fourth reduction," which would redeem the humbleness of the everyday and the experience of the "least of these." In Chapter 15, "Making God: A Theo-poetic Task" (2018), Kearney shows the productive ambiguity of anatheism in poetry, literature, and the visual arts, where human creativity is invited to share in the creative action of the divine, granting us the dignity and freedom to enter divine play.

Thinking Action: Ethics, Politics, Peace

Time and time again, Richard Kearney returns to the question of a peacemaking imagination, discerning possibilities of hospitality under the real threat of violence. As his scholarly engagement on the future of Ireland propelled him to serve as a public intellectual, and his ethical hermeneutics of the imagination inspired practical peace initiatives like the Guestbook Project, Kearney puts his texts into action. Chapter 16, "On Terror" (2003), tries to understand what cannot be understood in the aftermath of 9/11. Noting the rise of the monster, in myths and films as well as in national rhetoric and media coverage, Kearney underscores the importance of art in coping with unspeakable terror. He advocates for still more: a path of empathy and forgiveness. Chapter 17, "Exchanging Memories: Between Poetics and Ethics" (2008), showcases Kearney's hermeneutic insight and interpretive imagination as he provides an extended reflection on Brian Tolle's Irish Hunger Memorial in New York. In so doing, he highlights the significance of place and considers how the displacement inherent in art can help configure an ethics of hospitality. The risk of this hospitality is played out in Chapter 18, "Aliens and Others" (2003), at a personal, national, and political level. The unknowability of the Other provokes our choice either to welcome the unknown, which challenges us, or to exile the unknown as alien, inhuman, and monstrous. Weaving his way through conversations with Derrida, Lévinas, Kristeva, and Freud, Kearney ultimately argues for a hermeneutic response in the spirit of Ricoeur, one which is able to cope with the ongoing risk of discerning between guest and enemy. Chapter 19, "A Postnationalist Ireland" (1999), diagnoses how simplistic notions of nationalism and sovereignty dangerously narrow the political future of Ireland as well

as Great Britain. Kearney aims here to reclaim the past of these intertwining identities in order to reimagine a peaceful and shared future, particularly in light of the new possibilities opened up by the European Union. This chapter is all the more significant to read today, as Brexit threatens to undermine the unity achieved while Kearney was writing this piece in the late 1990s. The most recent piece in the volume, Chapter 20, "Double Hospitality: Between Word and Touch" (2019), reflects on the significance of the handshake through the story of South African scholar and peace activist Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela. Incorporating a discussion of an ethics of translation, Kearney explores the possibility of welcoming the other through word and flesh.

Richard Kearney Now

True to his hermeneutic spirit, Richard Kearney's philosophy is always implicitly in conversation with the texts of the past and present. The dialogical character of his philosophy is made explicit in the volumes of conversations he has published where he is in critical and productive engagement with contemporary thinkers (see page xxi). It is thus most appropriate to conclude this volume of selected writings with Richard Kearney in conversation. The following piece has been drawn from a series of oral discussions that occurred in Boston and Paris between summer 2018 and early winter 2019. To better serve the reader and to highlight Kearney's ideas and the flow of his thinking, the editor's side of these lively discussions has been kept to a minimum so as not to interfere with the flow. <>

THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISES OF ST. IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA: A LIVED EXPERIENCE by Gerald O'Collins SJ [Paulist Press, ISBN: 9780809156405]

The book follows the structure of the Spiritual Exercises, commenting on major themes in what Ignatius calls the First Week, the Second Week, the Third Week, and the Fourth Week, ending with the Contemplation for Attaining Love. It engages the audience by introducing fresh reflections on the Principle and Foundation (to be read in the context of late medieval marriage vows), and by using, at length, several episodes in the Gospel stories (e.g. the nativity

of Christ, the call to service of Peter's mother-in-law, the particular approaches of the evangelists to Christ's passion and death, and the place of Ch. 21 in John's theology of love) to show how contemporary biblical interpretation enriches possibilities for prayer.

Resources for prayer are drawn from Christian painting, sculpture, music, literature (e.g., Pascal and Kierkegaard) and poetry. The author explores links between the Exercises and the traditional practice of *lectio divina*. In doing this, he illustrates the scope of teaching on *lectio divina* coming from the Second Vatican Council and shows how translators and commentators have missed the Council's use of the technical term *lectio divina*.

CONTENTS

The task of reinterpreting and reappropriating classical texts and, not least, the religious classics never ends. After the Second World War (1939-45) and especially after

the Second Vatican Council (1962-65), Jesuits and others promoted everywhere a richer and deeper reading of the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola (ca. 1491-1556) and more authentic ways of doing retreats. This practice recovered his advice to allow "the Creator to work directly with the creature and the creature with the Creator and Lord" (SpEx 15). It was also an effective response to the call to holiness, which Vatican II recognized as reaching all the baptized (Lumen Gentium, the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, 39-42).

In Asia, Australia, the British Isles, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Latin America, Spain, the United States and elsewhere, those were golden years in the retrieval of an effective and personal contact with God through doing the Spiritual Exercises. A glance at the bibliography included at the end of this book illustrates the work of Jesuits and others who led this retrieval. But the task of interpretation and appropriation continues. In our post-pandemic world, we need to reflect further and let the Lord improve our practice.

This book, offered above all to those who seek God through doing the Spiritual Exercises and those who direct such "exercitants," comes from years of experience and publishing. Above all in Australia, the British Isles, Italy, and the United States, I have directed "exercitants" and "retreatants"—through longer and shorter forms of the Exercises—and written numerous articles about the Exercises. In Melbourne (Australia), I was invited to lecture for two years on the Spiritual Exercises for the College of Jesuit Spirituality. With two friends I was graced by the chance of publishing a course on the Exercises given by Anthony de Mello in his Pune ashram (see bibliography).

The book does not comment on every paragraph and detail in the Exercises. It sets itself to reflect creatively on all the major themes. In doing that, it takes up Ignatius's division of a retreat of approximately thirty days into four "weeks," each lasting around seven or eight days, that culminate in the Fourth Week's contemplation of the risen Jesus.

After a prologue offered by the Principle and Foundation, the First Week seeks to experience deep repentance for sin and a total turning to God. The Second Week begins with a contemplation on the kingdom of Christ and focuses on his life. The Third Week attends to his passion and death. The Fourth Week draws food for prayer from Christ's resurrection and the Contemplation for Attaining Love.

From the start we should also clarify how Ignatius uses the terms contemplation and meditation. By meditation he tends to mean praying over themes such as sin and hell. Where thought characterizes meditation, contemplation calls on the imagination to enter into the mysteries of Christ and let prayer become more a function of the heart.

With grateful thanks, I use the English translation of the Exercises produced by Joseph Munitiz and Philip Endean and published by Penguin (see bibliography). The paragraphs within the texts will be indicated by "SpEx" followed by the relevant number. Thus Ignatius's explanation of the four "weeks" occurs in SpEx 4. I strongly encourage both those who direct and those who do the Exercises to use the Penguin translation together with this book.

In publishing this work, I am aware of attaching myself to a cohort of eminent Catholic and Anglican commentators. They have inspired my desire to share the faith journey of the Exercises, which embodies the Ignatian vision and values. After many years of involvement, I continue to experience the Exercises as a remarkably powerful means for reigniting our spiritual life and enhancing our service of others.

I offer this book in the hope that it will help many Catholics and other Christians to reset their lives by finding the light and strength conveyed regularly through the Exercises. With immense gratitude, the work is dedicated to the memory of James Walsh, SJ, the founder of The Way. He never failed to encourage me to reflect seriously on the best Christian spirituality and spread its message and practice.

We begin with the midlife journey and experiences that prompted Ignatius Loyola to fashion the Spiritual Exercises.

A Midlife Journey and Experiences

What we draw from outstanding books that have shaped the religious history of the world will be greatly enlarged by knowing something of the author's life and spiritual experiences. Hence our reflections open by placing Ignatius of Loyola with other outstanding teachers of the Christian Church who went through a spiritual journey in their middle years. Then we will focus on the particular experiences that shaped and fed into the creation of the book in question, his Spiritual Exercises, and the making of the Exercises it proposes.

The Midlife Journey

Born in Loyola, a Basque town forty miles from the French border, Ignatius entered the service of the treasurer of Castile. Ten years later, he joined the duke of Najera, Emperor Charles V's viceroy for Navarre, a northern section of the kingdom of Castile. In 1520 he helped to suppress a rebellion in the city of Najera. Then in 1521, the French king tried to win back Navarre. He sent twelve thousand infantry, eight hundred horsemen, and twenty-nine pieces of artillery across the frontier. Four days later the French forces were encamped about a mile from the walls of Pamplona. There were only about one thousand troops available to defend the city, and some of these deserted.

Ignatius himself arrived at top speed on a horse. The city itself surrendered to the French forces. Ignatius and some others made their stand in the fortress of Pamplona. They were desperately outnumbered, the fortifications were incomplete, and the French had artillery.

On May 20, 1521, a cannon ball fired by the French forces storming the fortress ricocheted off a nearby wall and shattered Ignatius's right leg. Resistance ended, and Pamplona surrendered. Ignatius was taken home in a litter to the castle of his family in Loyola. The injury put an end to his career as soldier and diplomat.

After surviving several operations and a long convalescence, Ignatius left home for seventeen years of travel that took him to Jerusalem, back to Spain, north to Paris,

across the channel to London, back to Spain, and then to his final home in Rome as superior general of a new religious order, the Society of Jesus (Jesuits). Often described as the time of his religious conversion and spiritual growth, these years make up the midlife journey of a saint who, throughout his autobiography, calls himself "the pilgrim."

In 1978 I produced *The Second Journey* (Paulist Press), an exploration of midlife journeys. Human history, as I realized then and later, throws up everywhere examples of such journeys: from Abraham and Sarah to Moses, from Paul of Tarsus to Mother Teresa of Calcutta, from Dante Alighieri to Eleanor Roosevelt, from John Wesley to Jimmy Carter, from John Henry Newman to Dietrich Bonhoeffer.

Western literature also enshrines numerous instances of such journeys in the "middle years." Such works as Homer's Odyssey, Virgil's Aeneid, and John Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress present heroes driven in midlife to leave their familiar environments, attempt new projects, and travel strange roads. This is being "in the middle way," as T. S. Eliot put it in East Coker. He takes us back to the picture of the midlife journey with which Dante opens the Divine Comedy: "In the middle of life's road, I found myself in a dark wood—the straight way ahead lost."

The image of the midlife journey derives from our literary imagination as well as from undoubted history. The real world of midlife journeys has created its make-believe counterpart, which reflects and illuminates these journeys.

Mapping the characteristic pattern of such journeys will allow readers to recognize Ignatius as a case in point. At least six factors create the basic pattern.

First, a midlife journey happens to people. They do not voluntarily enter it. They can be swept into it by various factors. We might classify their stories into two classes according to whether the cause is some observable phenomenon or is something inward and less obvious.

Very often the catalyst appears "negative." A traffic accident, a serious illness, the birth of a disabled child, the death or infidelity of a spouse, unexpected job loss, or

disillusionment over what public success has brought them can plunge people into an unexpected crisis. Left to themselves, they would never have chosen the pain of such a situation. It simply happened to them.

The battle of Pamplona and a long convalescence initiated a midlife journey for Ignatius. A brush with death caused his world of chivalry and diplomacy to disintegrate. Without his wanting or planning it, Ignatius suffered the profound upheaval that he records in his reminiscences, and a midlife journey began. Many choices feature in the later stages of his story. But the start of the pilgrimage was thrust upon him.

Second, a midlife journey characteristically includes an outer component—a specific journey or a physical restlessness that keeps a person traveling in the hope that "if I relocate, I will find the solution."

The outer journey may prove a real Odyssey or Aeneid. But it may be no more than a shift from the suburbs to the city, or something a little longer like Mother Teresa's 1946 train ride out of Calcutta. Of course, it is the inner component that brings about a genuine midlife journey. The external traveling has only a subordinate function. All the same time, some shift in place seems to be a steady feature of authentic midlife journeys.

Wesley's voyage to Georgia, Bonhoeffer's visit to New York on the eve of the Second World War, Newman's Mediterranean tour, and Ignatius's wanderings belong here. He traveled from Loyola to the Holy Land, back to Spain, north to Paris, back again to Spain, and eventually found journey's end at the Jesuit headquarters in Rome.

Third, midlife journeys entail a crisis of feelings, symbolized by Dante's terror at being lost in a forest. Such a crisis may arise from a recent personal failure (Wesley and Carter), unresolved conflicts from the past (St. Paul), or fears for the future (Bonhoeffer). However it happens, a powerful crisis of feelings always seems to blaze up as one is swept into a midlife journey.

Through the months of recovery from his wounds, Ignatius experienced emotions of comfort and distress—"sad and happy thoughts," as he called them. Learning to interpret and handle these fluctuating feelings constituted a vital stage in his journey. The Rules for the Discernment of Spirits (found in the Exercises) passed on to others what Ignatius had painfully found out for himself.

The afternoon of life, according to Carl Gustav Jung, brings "the r*eversal of all the ideals and values that were cherished* in the morning" (italics mine).' These are strong words. Whether we stress this fourth point or make it more gently, midlife journeys bring a search for new meanings, fresh values, and different goals.

The roles by which people have identified themselves no longer seem important. Old purposes fade. Values and goals that gave meaning to life lose their grip. The wounds Ignatius suffered during the battle at Pamplona healed but left an ugly protrusion of bone. He was so anxious to retain his role as an elegant officer Ile persuaded some surgeons to cut it away. Without a murmur he endured their primitive surgery, driven by the fear that he would lose the identity by which he had defined his existence. But then a midlife journey led Ignatius to treasure other values and find a different identity.

In the language of the Exercises, Ignatius asked himself: "What have I done for Christ? What am I doing for Christ? What ought Ito do for Christ?" (SpEx 53).

Fifth, people on midlife journeys repeatedly betray a deep sense of loneliness. This loneliness should eventually turn into

the aloneness of a quiet and integrated self-possession. But before that happens, they will find themselves in Dante's "dark wood." Society can make them suffer deeply. For Ignatius that began with imprisonment by the inquisition in Spain. He made his pilgrimage to the Holy Land alone.

Eventually, people who pass through a midlife journey may transform their community and even society. They may resemble Aeneas, fashioning a whole new group of people. The followers Ignatius gathered around him became the "school masters of Europe" and missionaries to the human race.

The sixth and last feature in the pattern of midlife journeys concerns their end. Ideally such journeys end quietly, with a new wisdom and a coming to oneself that releases great power. Midlife journeys typically begin dramatically: For Ignatius, a cannon ball sweeps over the ramparts of a Spanish fortress; Newman suffers a severe, near-fatal illness when traveling in Sicily without his friends; Bonhoeffer sees Hitler plunge the world into war. The endings of such journeys tends to be quiet and undramatic. Ignatius limps into Rome after seventeen years on the road. Newman heads home, sensing that he has "a work to do in England." Bonhoeffer, hanged by the Nazis at the end of World War II, reminds us that midlife journeys can also have a dramatic, even tragic, ending. His influence on the world came posthumously, especially in the 1960s when his Letters and Papers from Prison sold by the thousands and helped inspire the civil rights movements.

Midlife journeys terminate with the arrival of true adult wisdom. It is the wisdom of those who have regained equilibrium, stabilized, and found fresh purposes and new dreams. They come to themselves in self-discovery and final self-identification, which allows them to reach out to others and prove astonishingly productive for the world. Their midlife journeys end with new dreams in which fresh responsibilities begin. Through his Exercises and the founding of the Society of Jesus, Ignatius lived out for the benefit of others what he had experienced for himself.

Such, then, are six characteristics of midlife journeys, exemplified by the story of Ignatius. Eliot's Little Gidding interprets such journeys as Odysseys that eventually bring us home to the place where we started: "We shall not cease from exploration/And the end of all our exploring/Will be to arrive where we started/And know the place for the first time."

What of Ignatius? Rather than becoming an Odyssey, his midlife journey took the shape of an Aeneid. His explorations finally took him to a new place and the unexpected task of founding a worldwide family of followers. In our day, one of them leads the Catholic Church as Pope Francis.

There are, of course, other ways to read the story of St. Ignatius Loyola after he was severely wounded on May 20, 1521. But reflecting on his midlife journey sheds much light on what happened. < >

Jung on Ignatius of Loyola's Spiritual Exercises: Lectures Delivered at ETH Zurich, Volume 7: 1939–1940 by C. G. Jung, edited by Martin Liebscher, translated by Caitlin Stephens [Series: Lectures Delivered at ETH Zurich, Volume 7: 1939–1940; Philemon Foundation Series, Princeton University Press, 9780691244167]

Jung's lectures on the psychology of Jesuit spiritual practice—unabridged in English for the first time

Between 1933 and 1941, C. G. Jung delivered a series of public lectures at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. Intended for a general audience, these lectures addressed a broad range of topics, from yoga and meditation to dream analysis and the psychology of alchemy. Here for the first time are Jung's complete lectures on Ignatius of Loyola's Spiritual Exercises, delivered in the winter of 1939–1940.

These illuminating lectures are the culmination of Jung's investigation into traditional forms of meditation and their parallels to his psychotherapeutic method of active imagination. Jung presents Loyola's exercises as the prime example of a Christian practice comparable to yoga and Eastern meditation, and gives a psychological interpretation of the visions depicted in the saint's autobiographical writings. Offering a unique opportunity to encounter the brilliant psychologist as he shares his ideas with the general public, the lectures reflect Jung's increasingly positive engagement with Roman Catholicism, a development that would lead to his fruitful collaborations after the war with eminent Catholic theologians such as Victor White, Bruno de Jésus-Marie, and Hugo Rahner.

Featuring an authoritative introduction by Martin Liebscher along with explanations of Jungian concepts and psychological terminology, this splendid book provides an invaluable window on the evolution of Jung's thought and a vital key to understanding his later work.

Review

"A uniquely original and bold commentary on a classic work of Catholic spirituality. It not only sheds light on C. G. Jung's interest in the foundations of Christianity, but allows one to understand, among other things, the importance of religious experience in his approach. A must-read for those interested in his work, especially the relationship between analytical psychology and religion."—Henryk Machoń, Opole University of Technology

CONTENTS

When I was engrossed with psychology and alchemy—no, to be more precise, it was when I was giving the seminar on Ignatius of Loyola—once, in the night, I had a vision of Christ. One night I awoke and there, at the foot of the bed, I saw a crucifix. Not quite life-sized. It was very

> clear and couched in a bright light. In this light, Christ was hanging on the cross and then I saw that it was as if his entire body were made of gold, as if of green gold. It looked wonderful. I was scared to death by it. Just then I was particularly engrossed by the "Anima Christi" [prayer]. There is a very beautiful meditation by Ignatius on it. —C. G. Jung, 27 June 1957

From October 1938 to June 1939 Carl Gustav Jung's weekly lectures at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH) were dedicated to the practice of active imagination as part of the individuation process, and its parallels in Eastern meditative practice. Jung discussed the understanding of meditation in texts such as the Amitayur-dhyana-sutra, Shri-chakra-shambhara Tantra or Patanjali's Yoga Sutra. Notwithstanding the professed focus on Eastern spirituality, his lectures were strongly comparative as between East and West, for he also discussed Christian meditative practice as depicted in works by mystics such as Meister Eckhart (ca. 1260—ca. 1328) or Richard of Saint Victor (d. 1173). However, it must have come as a surprise to the audience when Jung concluded his "remarks on Yoga" in the midst of the summer term on 9 June 1939 with a quotation from **The Secret of the Golden Flower** in order to begin the next lecture of 16 June with a "turn Westward" and a "return to our own Europe." From that date until 8 March 1940, he developed an interpretation of Ignatius of Loyola's Exercitia spiritualia, a text that he regarded as the prime example of the description of a Christian practice comparable to Eastern meditative techniques.

The Exercitia spiritualia were probably written around 1524 when Ignatius, after his conversion experience in 1521 and a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, settled in Barcelona for a period of two years. They were published in a limited edition during his lifetime, but none of these copies survived. The earliest edition we have today is a Spanish text, known as "the Autograph," which was not in Ignatius's own handwriting, but contains his corrections and annotations. As today's editors of the English translation make clear, there was an understandable reluctance of Ignatius to disseminate the text to a wider audience "as it was always through the spoken word that he introduced people to the Exercises. Somebody is required to 'give' the exercises, and only persons who have experienced the process that set these exercises in motion can do this." For the uninitiated, the text looks rather uninspiring and reads like a practical manual for spiritual advisors. It opens with a set of twenty annotations, followed by detailed

instructions on how to guide and accompany the retreatant through the four weeks of exercises. Whereas the focus at the beginning is to remove any obstacles that might hinder a clear and honest prayer to God, the exercises increasingly center on the life and teachings of Jesus Christ. In the first week, the retreatant is asked mainly to reflect on their sins and to meditate on the whereabouts of sinners' souls after death. This needs to be done with the involvement of all the physical senses, to create the most vivid possible impression. It is with this same intensity that the retreatant is then instructed to follow the birth, death, and resurrection of Christ in the weeks that follow. This practice of imagining oneself into biblical settings prompted Jung to draw parallels with his own psychological method of active imagination, which formed the overarching topic of his ETH lectures at the time. It was in this that he saw the similarities with the aforementioned spiritual texts from the East, characterizing the Spiritual Exercises as a Western equivalent to yoga.

The Vision of the Serpent and the Cross

In the 1925 seminar, Jung emphasized the similarities of his vision to the initiation rites of the Mithraic cult:

> These images have so much reality that they recommend themselves, and such extraordinary meaning that one is caught. They form part of the ancient mysteries; in fact it is such fantasies that made the mysteries. Compare the mysteries of Isis as told in Apuleius, with the initiation and deification of the initiate. [. . .] One gets a peculiar feeling from being put through such an initiation. The important part that led up to the deification was the snake's encoiling of me. Salome's performance was deification. The animal face which I felt mine transformed into was the famous [Deus] Leontocephalus of the Mithraic mysteries, the figure which is represented with a snake coiled around the man, the snake's head resting on the man's head, and the face of the man that of a lion. [. . .] In this deification mystery you make yourself into the vessel, and are a vessel of creation in which the opposites reconcile.

It is not entirely clear whether Jung had read Funk's collection in 1913. If so, it would have been his earliest reading of the Exercitia spiritualia and of the Reminiscences. In the Reminiscences, Ignatius described a series of visions which have remarkable similarities to Jung's own vision of the serpent and the cross. If he had come across these by 1913, his visions might have been informed not only by his knowledge of the

Mithraic mysteries, but also by the images of Loyola's memories. In his lectures in 1939, Jung had a particular interest in the following visions of Ignatius:

> While he was in the almshouse something happened to him, many times: in full daylight he would see clearly something in the air alongside him, which would give him much consolation, because it was very beautiful, enormously so. He couldn't properly make out what it was an image of, but somehow it seemed to him that it had the shape of a serpent, and it had many things which shone like eyes, though they weren't eyes. He used to take much delight in and be consoled by seeing this thing, and the more times he saw it, the more his consolation would increase. And when that thing would disappear from his sight he would feel sad about it.

According to Jung, Ignatius was incapable of reconciling this positive image of the serpent with Christian dogmatics that only seem to recognize it in its evil expression. But, Jung suggested, he could have thought of the serpent which Moses lifted up in the desert to protect his people from the plague of snakes. In John 3:14, Jesus takes up this image to teach about the elevation of the Son of Man: "And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of Man be lifted up." In the vision of Ignatius, Jung finds similarities to his own vision of the serpent in 1913, and supposes immediately that Ignatius struggled also with the moral dilemma involved in the reconciliation of the ethical opposites of good and evil. But this problem was Jung's own, whereas Ignatius seemed not to worry about the ethical quality of this visionary image; or at least, his reminiscences do not suggest so. Against the background of Jung's own visionary deification, of his becoming Christ, where the unification of the opposing serpent and the cross lead to his new God, Jung's understanding of Ignatius's ignorance about the identity of the serpent and Christ can be seen as a depiction of Jung's own struggle.

The particularity of the Ignatian serpent lies in its number of eyes. According to Jung, such a serpent symbolically represents the lower part of the nervous system, the medulla and the medulla oblongata. It is a symbol of the instincts, from which psychic life develops. Jung links it to the Kundalini snake of Indian yoga. It is a healing serpent:

> When this serpent appears to us it means: I am reunited with my instincts. That is why the god of physicians, Asclepius, has a serpent. Because it all depends on reuniting the sick person

> with their own roots. Life will always cut us off from our roots. That is the danger of living solely in the conscious mind. One of the aims of the art of medicine, therefore, is to restore man to his own constitution in order for him to function according to his original foundations, to react, to live, in accordance with his own rules of life.

According to Jung, Ignatius had injured himself through his physical practice of penitence. During his suffering, the healing serpent appeared, but he could not identify the serpent in its twofold nature: that is, as a symbol of venom and cure. Again, we see Jung's "resolution" in the mystery of Christ.

Jung discussed Ignatius's second vision concerning the serpent in the lecture of 7 July 1939. Here is Ignatius's text from the Reminiscences:

> After this had lasted a good while, he went off to kneel at a cross which was nearby in order to give thanks to God. And there appeared to him there that vision which had often been appearing and which he had never recognized: i.e., that thing mentioned above which seemed very beautiful to him, with many eyes. But being in front of that cross he could well see that that thing of such beauty didn't have its normal colour, and he recognized very clearly, with strong backing from his will, that it was the devil. And in this form later the devil had a habit of appearing to him, often and for a long time, and he, by way of contempt would cast it aside with a staff he used to carry in his hand.

The serpent appeared to Ignatius before the cross, and he identified it as the devil. The positive, undetermined tone associated with the first appearances of the serpent changed into the rejection of the serpent as evil. In his lecture, Jung emphasized the phrase "unter kraftiger Zustimmung seines Willens" (with strong backing from his will). The unconscious phenomenon per se would always be morally indifferent, and could be good or evil, Jung explained. It was only when it was placed in a certain conscious atmosphere (Bewusstseinsatmosphäre) that it would get determined in a moral sense. In this way, Jung was able to claim that Ignatius had been too dogmatic to reconcile the two visions. Jung instead had embraced the venomous serpent, the tempting pleasure in the appearance of Salome, and had reconciled it with the healing power of the cross, hence reaching a higher state through the union of the opposites: "Because I also want my being other, I must become a Christ. I am made into Christ, I must suffer it. Thus

the redeeming blood flows. Through the self-sacrifice my pleasure is changed and goes above into its higher principles." A valuable indication of how strongly Jung associated his own vision of 1913 with those of Ignatius is the reoccurrence of the Christ image in the aforementioned vision of Jung at the time of the lectures on Ignatius.

Jung suggested that Ignatius had misunderstood his vision by giving it a moral value based on his belief in Christian dogma. This is the conscious atmosphere—Bewusstseinsatmosphäre —in which the healing serpent is replaced by the evil one of temptation. But is it possible that Jung was immune to such a conscious moral judgment in the case of his own visions? Here he is again, elaborating on his vision of the serpent and the cross in the 1925 seminar:

> Salome's approach and her worshipping of me is obviously that side of the inferior function which is surrounded by an aura of evil. I felt her insinuations as a most evil spell. One is assailed by the fear that perhaps this is madness. This is how madness begins, this is madness. [. . .] You cannot get conscious of these unconscious facts without giving yourself to them. If you can overcome your fear of the unconscious and can let yourself down, then these facts take on a life of their own. You can be gripped by these ideas so much that you really go mad, or nearly so.

Clearly Jung here applies a conscious moral judgment to his visionary unconscious experience: "surrounded by the aura of evil", the "fear of madness," and so on. What then, one is tempted to ask, is the Bewusstseinsatmosphäre in which these moral determinations are made? It is the realm of science, of psychology. For many years after his visionary experiences, Jung tried to find a scientifically adequate expression to make his individual experience generally explicable and applicable. He thereby applied conscious moral judgments to his previously morally undetermined unconscious experience. "Unter kraftiger Zustimmung seines Willens" (with strong backing from his will), he tried hard to appease his visionary experiences with modern science, in the same way as Ignatius tried to do with Christian dogma."

To summarize: Jung's choice to work through the Ignatian exercises in the lecture series of 1939/40, despite his lack of expert knowledge in the field, was-triggered not least by his intention to compare his visionary experiences in the years from 1913 onward to the visions of Saint Ignatius. After the lecture series, the topic played a role once more,

albeit a minor one, in a letter to the Dominican priest, and professor of dogmatic theology in Oxford, Victor White (1902-60), in which Jung asked about the nature of the "Anima Christi" prayer. During and after the war, Jung was also in contact with one of the leading Jesuit theologians and Church historians of his time, Hugo Rahner (1900-68), who, besides his research on patristics, was well known for his historically orientated theological studies of the life and work of Ignatius of Loyola. Rahner attended the Eranos conferences from 1943 to 1948. But notwithstanding his contact with such Jesuits as Rahner and Louis Beirnaert (1906-85), Jung would never again undertake an attempt to lecture or write about the Exercitia spiritualia. <>

15 Years - *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF JUNGIAN STUDIES*

Jung was deeply concerned by our capacity as a species to destroy ourselves because of the "genius" of a few whose uncritically held actions were irrevocably sweeping the human race away from the memory of our humanity. How (we may ask) have social relations based on violence, domination and centralized power become so normalized in today's social reality? Flipping this question to open another window of specific inquiry we ask, where in our broader Jungian world are conscious, deliberate, collective and creative choices being made about how we organize our social groups, fairly distribute resources and practice humane politics without the need of an overwhelming centralized control - and where are we failing to do so? How well are we engaging our shadowy group dynamics so that (against the odds) we (as a global Jungian community) can draw on the creative resources of a differentiated humanity towards and a world we can fall in love with? In order to reflect on how well our journal listens to the voices and minds of a differentiated international Jungian community today, we turn to a recollection of the forces behind the founding of our parent organization the International Association of Jungian Studies (IAJS) in 2002 from which the International Journal of Jungian Studies (IJJS) was born.

The roots of our creation story began in a movement to officially recognize the distinct efforts of Jungian scholars amidst a backdrop of marginalization. At the turn of the 21st century, the International Association of Analytical Psychology (IAAP) was (and remains) the dominant organization on the world stage yet only accepted affiliated institute-trained analysts as members. A number of Jungian analysts within the IAAP had scholarly leanings from a variety of disciplines, had published articles or books or were affiliated with a University. However, non-institute trained clinicians, scholars (not affiliated with the IAAP), clergy, artists and others with a professional or scholarly interest in Jungian and post Jung thought could not become members. They, Renos Papadopoulos recalls, did not have an institutional "home." Another marginalizing co-factor for Jungian scholars, Susan Rowland adds, was the prejudice against Jung in the academy at large.

The institutional split between scholarly studies and clinical practice and our inability to bear the libidinal intensities that spring forth from our differences within the IAAP (and everywhere) was also reflected in the shadowy underbelly of group dynamics. Some analysts, for example tended to discredit academic activities for privileging the "thinking function." Some academics tended to denigrate analysts because their feeling and intuitive leanings were considered non-academic. Whenever we gather in a room there are divisive under currents of othering - those split off shards of psyche that become activated in a collective field, no matter how

many dreams we have analyzed or books we have written. The trick, if we can call it that is to have a means of taking stock of ourselves, and each other so that we can tap into what is emerging in the room (society, group) that has something to tell the group about itself. The anarchists and visionaries in society, as Jung was and the energies of many people who founded IAJS, were tending to the wound in a piece of the Jungian world. They were limping and looking for the limp within a society the way a physical therapist zeros in on our wounded body when we walk into the examination.

There were exciting tremors of activity that validated the need for scholarly recognition. Andrew Samuels and Renos Papadopoulos identify several social-political events that underlie the eventual emergence of the IAJS. "We were a couple of cowboys," Andrew animatedly quips recalling the establishment of Analytical Psychology at the Centre for Psychoanalytic Studies for the University of Essex in 1995, where both he and Renos were appointed professorships. According to Renos, this was the first time that such a chair was established at a British University in a Centre for Psychoanalytic Studies or anywhere in the world.

On the heels of this development, in 1998, at the XIV Congress of the IAAP in Florence, several key events occurred that furthered the recognition of scholarship. Renos was elected on the Executive Committee and proposed the formation of an Academic Subcommittee within the IAAP that was accepted. Andrew became the honorary Secretary in the Executive Committee (he was not an analyst). The overall aim of this new committee was to encourage and promote interest and involvement of IAAP members in academic research within the organization and in the world. The second event was the commitment to create the First International *Academic* Conference of Analytical Psychology to be jointly organized by the Centre for Psychoanalytic Studies ,University of Essex (Colchester, UK) and the IAAP in 2002 at the University of Essex.

CARL GUSTAV JUNG

Prior to the 2002 conference in Essex, Renos remembers proposing the formation of a new organization, separate from the IAAP that would represent Jungian academic work comprised of IAAP members and non IAAP members. This would be a "natural development," he argued, following the surge of rising interest. There was initial and significant resistance expressed by a number of IAAP Executive Committee members about a new body having a right to exist outside of the IAAP. Dialogue eventually gave way to openness and new collaborative

possibilities between a new group and the IAAP. During the 2002 conference, Susan Rowland remembers Andrew standing on a stage during one of the all-member meetings. He invited anyone who was interested in starting a new organization that would represent Jungian scholars including IAAP members and anyone else who was interested, to meet him in the hallway outside of the room. Susan Rowland was one of about 20 plus people who gathered there. She asked for everybody's email addresses saying she would later contact them to proceed with the next steps. The formation of the IAJS, Renos remembers was the fulfillment of a dream of many IAAP members who valued their academic affiliation and scholars who valued Jungian perspectives.

The labor of creating the IAJS began with the formation of the Board. Susan became the first Chair and recalls the excitement of those early days. All meetings were conducted through email. At the beginning, the IAJS shared collaborative interests in the Jungian journal *Harvest*, affiliated with the C. G. Jung Analytical Psychology Club in London. Renos was the first Editor-in-Chief for years and recalls carrying boxes of *Harvest* "pamphlets" from the printers. He recruited the young graduate student Sonu Shamdasani to contribute to the History section, for example and enjoyed the creative freedom to build an inclusive international scholarly journal amidst the enthusiasm of an increasing membership. In 2007, the IAJS amicably parted with *Harvest* and Renos negotiated a contract with Routledge to publish what is known as *The International Journal of Jungian Studies* (IJJS). Today, the *IJJS* is published by Brill, thanks to Jon Mills who negotiated the contract.

At the most fundamental level, narratives like the one above are expressions of meaning. This is our story, how we got here and part of what the essence of this journal is about. As editors of the *IJJS*, almost two decades later, we are tasked to draw on the creative resources of a global and differentiated humanity including those voices (minds) that are marginalized. New research that challenges the status quo of uncritically held ideology and practice has something to teach us about ourselves. Like our founders, we do not feel that there needs to be a divide between the academy and clinical work. Jung himself felt that dividing lines were transparent in this area, though naturally this kind of interdisciplinary work requires a rigorous and careful approach that considers the challenges inherent in comparing and contrasting specialties and our propensity as human beings to *other* differences. Likewise, we also seek to bridge the divide between psychiatry and psychology—between soma and psyche—and what is universal and what is singular -- in a disciplined manner. From here we

seek to carry forward in the direction that the early analytical psychologists established, to recognize the influences of the human psyche on its expressions and vice-versa.

Like Jung himself, we seek to engage with a variety of disciplines in order to bring them clinical relevance, but also bring attention to the way that the study of the human psyche, based ultimately on daily clinical observations, can inform other disciplines. This is an art based on science, as are all healing traditions. Maintaining a multi-disciplinary openness means that we encourage the submission of papers from Jungian Studies and other disciplines, psychoanalysts of all traditions -including Analytical Psychology, psychotherapists, physicians and students/candidates of these approaches and others in an ongoing critique/engagement with Analytical Psychology. Academic areas include but are not limited to: psychoanalysis, philosophy, child psychology, world religious studies, Feminist critique, art-based research, film and media studies, queer-trans theory, fine art, art history, art therapy, neuroscience, linguistics, literature, social justice, eco justice, business, history, education, anthropology, trauma studies, group and community studies, cultural studies, critical theory, political theory, psychiatry, comparative studies, psychedelic medicine, bio-medicine, technological studies and other sciences. What brings these all together is a drive for ever-deepening the understanding of the human psyche, so that we might build a more humane human world.

Robin McCoy Brooks and **Erik D. Goodwyn**, Co-Editors-in-Chief, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF JUNGIAN STUDIES

CITY OF ECHOES: A NEW HISTORY OF ROME, ITS POPES, AND ITS PEOPLE by Jessica Wärnberg [Pegasus Books, 9781639365210]

From a bold new historian comes a vibrant history of Rome as seen through its most influential persona throughout the centuries: the pope.

Rome is a city of echoes, where the voice of the people has chimed and clashed with the words of princes, emperors, and insurgents across the centuries. In this authoritative new history, Jessica Wärnberg tells the story of Rome's longest standing figurehead and interlocutor—the pope—revealing how his presence over the centuries has transformed the fate of the city of

Rome.

Emerging as the anonymous leader of a marginal cult in the humblest quarters of the city, the pope began as the pastor of a maligned and largely foreign flock. Less than 300 years later, he sat enthroned in a lofty, heavily gilt basilica, a religious leader endorsed (and financed) by the emperor himself. Eventually, the Roman pontiff would supplant even the emperors as de facto ruler of Rome and pre-eminent leader of the Christian world. By the nineteenth century, it would take an army to wrest the city from the pontiff's grip.

As the first-ever account of how the popes' presence has shaped the history of Rome, City of Echoes not only illuminates the lives of the remarkable (and unremarkable) men who have sat on the throne of Saint Peter, but also reveals the bold and curious actions of the men, women, and children who have shaped the city with them, from antiquity to today. In doing so, the book tells the history of Rome as it has never been told before.

During the course of this fascinating story, City of Echoes also answers a compelling question: how did a man—and institution—whose authority rested on the blood and bones of martyrs defeat emperors, revolutionaries, and fascists to give Rome its most enduring identity?

Review

"The book's strength is its range, from St. Peter in the first century all the way to Pope Francis today. Wärnberg is especially good on the early years, when Christianity and the papacy emerged under the shadow of a hostile imperial Rome. The story of how popes became leading actors is well told." -- ***The Economist***

"Wärnberg provides a worthwhile account examining the many "layers of legend" about this ancient city. Wärnberg is at her best during the Renaissance period, when "the papacy and the Church had become a state-like institution: organized, largely self-sufficient, and recognized by political powers." Wärnberg's mildly upbeat conclusion affirms that both Rome and the papacy remain inextricably entwined despite their diminished roles and that recent popes have exerted a positive influence. A useful resource for students of Christian history and papal aficionados." -- ***Kirkus Reviews***

"Telling the history of Rome over nearly 2,000 years through the deeds (and misdeeds) of the Popes of the Roman Catholic Church is more than just a beautiful conceit. Jessica Wärnberg has written a deeply informative book that never fails to entertain, unearthing facts that make The Da Vinci Code read like children's lit." -- ***Air Mail***

"This marvellous and original study offers us Rome in all its beauty, depravity and resilience. The history of papal power is never better explained, as successive Popes struggled with temporal power, contested ecclesiastical authority and the looming shadow of the legacy of ancient Rome. An excellent read that will reshape our perceptions of how the modern Vatican state came to be." -- Andrew Pettegree, author of *The Library: A Fragile History*

"Wärnberg is brilliant." -- Dan Snow, historian and podcast host

"A tremendous, engrossing, and illuminating history of papal Rome. *City of Echoes* is a must-read for everyone with an interest in the Eternal City." -- Angus Robertson, author of *Crossroads of Civilization: A History of Vienna*

"Serious, exactingly-researched history, with all the gripping intensity of a rattling good yarn. Filled with intriguing and unexpected facts, *City of Echoes* conjures up some superb images. Jessica Wärnberg shows us how the truth can be be even more exciting than any Dan Brown yarn." -- Paul Strathern, author of *The Borgias*, *The Medici*, and *The Other Renaissance*

"*City of Echoes* is a sweeping journey through the intertwined history of the city of Rome and the popes from the earliest Christian times till today. It's wonderfully readable and thoroughly enjoyable." -- Philip Freeman, author of *Hannibal*, *Alexander the Great*, and *Julius Caesar*

"Terrific! Jessica Wärnberg is an assured guide through the panorama of Rome's Christian history, evoking a turbulent world of warfare, witchcraft and inquisitors. Not only that, she achieves the considerable feat of making church history fun. Highly recommended." -- Catherine Fletcher, author of *The Beauty and the Terror: An Alternative History of the Italian Renaissance*

CONTENTS

Prologue: City of Echoes

Rome is the city of echoes, the city of illusions, and the city of yearning. —Giotto di Bondone

Pacing through empty streets just after dawn, two young men slip into Santa Maria in Traspontina, a sixteenth-century church on the approach to Saint Peter's Basilica in Rome. The men are strangers in the city. Not Romans nor even Italians but Austrian Catholics, visiting Rome on a singular, grave mission. In their view, they have come to Rome to save Santa Maria in Traspontina from desecration: they have come to defend the holy Catholic faith. On a recent trip to the city, one of the men had been disturbed to discover wooden statues to a naked fertility goddess in the church, alongside altars to Saint John and the Virgin Mary, Mother of God. What's more, he could not appeal to

Catholic authorities to stop what he saw as an act of sacrilege for the statues had been venerated in the Vatican Gardens in the presence of the pope himself.

Entering the silent church, the men genuflect solemnly in front of the high altar before sweeping into the side chapels to scoop up the sculptures and carry them away. Their arms full, they flee, running a few minutes to the Ponte Sant'Angelo, a bridge built by the emperor Hadrian and later adorned with angels bearing the instruments of the crucifixion of Christ. Standing beneath the angel that holds the cross itself, the men hurl the statues into the dark depths of the River Tiber. Their mission accomplished, the sun risen, they flee the scene.

Discovering the theft, the Carmelites who run the church raise the alarm. News of the incident divides Rome and Catholics across the globe. Are these men heroic champions of the Catholic faith? Or are they vandals who have disrespected the donors of the statues and stolen from a Roman church? In the ensuing investigation the chief of the Italian police dredges the river to recover the sculptures. Meanwhile, the pope is resolute. During the next papal mass, a ritual bowl of soil honouring the goddess, Pachamama, is placed on the High Altar at Saint Peter's Basilica.

***

It was the winter of 2019 and I was leaving a restaurant in London when I heard about the theft of the Pachamama statues. A friend showed me the video on his phone as we walked through rain-washed streets. He was surprised that I had not seen it when it had emerged a few weeks before. At that time, I was living in the UK, nearly 1500 km from Rome. Despite the distance, it mattered to me what had happened in the Italian city that morning. It also mattered to me how the pope had reacted to the theft. I had encountered similar interest among friends, of various religions or no faith, who balked or rejoiced when the pope spoke on pressing questions for the modern world. For, despite appearances, Rome and the popes are not mere historic curiosities. They are ancient symbols of universal significance that survive, remarkably intact, provoking interest, affection and even bold action in the digital age.

From the time of the emperors to our own day, the deeds of the popes have reverberated beyond the walls of Rome. Within them, the fabric of the ancient capital has been transformed. In words, deeds and travertine stone, over almost twenty centuries, the city of Rome and the popes have become inextricably intertwined. Streets crowded with Baroque churches and punctuated with dimly lit shrines, the smiling face of a recent pontiff hanging behind the till of a bar — even today, the visual result of the union is so complete that it appears to be preordained. Layers of legend — whether black or golden — also cloud our view. This book illuminates its evolution over nearly 2,000 years. Tracing the history of Rome, its people and popes in conversation with one another, it tells stories with a symbolism that echoes into our own day. Ancient heiresses swap their fortunes for hair shirts. Ethiopian diplomats roar with laughter in the palaces of cardinals. The son of a hosteler rises up to rule Rome, aping emperors and popes, only to become a bloated, tyrannical disappointment. As modernity dawns, men and women from all over the globe travel to the city, shooting from behind barricades of mattresses to defend treasured ideals. Unpicking narratives familiar and strange, we can illuminate the lives of those who walked Rome's streets to reveal how the city developed its most enduring identity.

It will be a commonplace for some readers that the first Christian emperors forged the foundations of papal Rome. Lauding saints in brick, marble and paint, leaders from Constantine the Great (306-37) crystallised religious belief and papal authority in monumental form. However, the story of Rome and the popes begins much earlier, with a much humbler man and a narrative that weds the city, its people and the divine. It was the mid-first century when Peter, a fisherman from the shores of the Sea of Galilee, journeyed to pagan Rome to spread the nascent Christian faith. As a younger man, he had walked the baking streets of Jerusalem. There, a man calling himself the son of God told Peter that he was the rock upon which he would build his entire Church. By the time that Peter was in Rome, that leader, Jesus of Nazareth, had been crucified. For followers such as Peter, Jesus' agony on the cross was the salvation of all of mankind. Soon enough, Peter's own blood would be spilt near a racetrack in the north of Rome. It too would become a wellspring for Christians to come. When Peter

died in Rome, he imbued the city with the unique authority given to him by Jesus. On these foundations, Rome's bishops would elevate themselves as universal pastors and supreme leaders of Christ's Church on earth.

In the age of Nero (54-68), Peter's death went unnoticed by most men and women. He was killed as an anonymous criminal, compelled by a bizarre new cult. It was the feet of the earliest adherents to Christianity in Rome that marked out the first pilgrimage route in the city: a pathway to the dusty hill where they believed that the Prince of the Apostles had died. It was only some centuries later that Constantine raised a great basilica where they had long prayed. Rome became the centre of Western Christendom as the result of one unlikely visitor, whose death in the city inspired the devotion of ordinary hearts. Paradoxically, while Rome remained pagan that devotion only entrenched the city's Christian character. As men and women died for the faith in Roman circuses and streets, Christians declared that their blood steeped the city in holy prestige. Christian Rome, then, appears to emerge as an accident of history. The early popes ensured that it did not remain that way for long. Stories of the lives and deaths of the Christian martyrs, including Peter, were engraved, sculpted and painted across the city The story of the Christian Church was written into Rome's fabric as a powerful drama that linked heaven and earth. The result has compelled countless people, from those first furtive Christians to the Ethiopians who arrived proffering jewels in exchange for salvation in the fifteenth century. Today, statues of martyrs in Rome still stand amid piles of notes scribbled with prayers. It is this continued devotion that has bolstered the Christian identity of the city down the ages, whether at the hands of Baroque artists or the guns of nineteenth-century papal Zouaves.

At the centre of this remarkable story sit the popes, totemic and enduring. Their office has survived even as monarchies, dictatorships and empires have faded into the annals of the past. 'Rome is the city of echoes', in the words of the Renaissance artist Giotto di Bondone.

The last gasps of empire certainly resonated in the foundations of the Roman Church. Nevertheless, it is the echo of Christ's words to Peter that continue to underpin the

authority and significance of Christian Rome. Inside the dome of the Basilica of Saint Peter, 'Tu es Petrus' . . — those words spoken by Jesus in Jerusalem — speak out in an unbroken ring on rich gold ground. From the first centuries after Peter's death to the election of the present Pope Francis I in 2013, the Bishops of Rome, or popes, stand in a line that Peter began. The potency of this Petrine authority — a link to Jesus Christ himself — was recognised early by princes seeking legitimacy for their political power. By the early modern period, secular leaders had granted the popes so many lands in the name of Peter that the Papal States cut a swathe right across the Italian peninsula, making the pope a prince himself.

But even when the Papal State was wrested from the pontiffs in the political tumults of the nineteenth century, Rome's popes retained an inalienable authority that compelled even non-believers to seek their ear. As late as 1922, this was recognised by the fascist premier, Benito Mussolini, who knew that he could not rule Italy without Pope Pius XI (1922-39) on side. Despite the Church's waning influence in the modern West, political leaders still arrive in Rome. A century after the rise of Mussolini, Emmanuel Macron, the head of the secular French Republic, was at the Vatican imploring Pope Francis to intervene for peace in the war between Russia and Ukraine. Moreover, even as the Church becomes increasingly global, this influence is bound to the city of Rome. The idea of Rome is so powerful that it is often synonymous with Catholicism itself. When the missionary Matteo Ricci arrived in China in the sixteenth century, he adopted the dress and philosophy of Confucius to convert souls to Christianity. Now, many Chinese Catholics see proximity to Rome as the hallmark of authentic Catholic belief, in spite of (or, in some cases, because of) the political barriers that have divided them from the structure of the Church.'

The history of Rome and its popes is one of many narratives, which interweave not only with one another but with the history of the Christian Church and the world at large. To tell its story coherently, this book commits many sins of omission, but aspires, as far as possible, to illuminate fundamental truths. At its heart, it aims to reveal the often unlikely story of the emergence of the papacy in the city of Rome, tracing a remarkable

story of mutual influence and the endurance of an institution (as well as an idea) that was born in the age of Saint Peter and lives on in our own day. <>

Selected Papers on Ancient Literature and its Reception by Philip Russell Hardie [Series Trends in Classics, De Gruyter, ISBN: 9783110792423]

This volume gathers together about two thirds of the articles and essays published between 1983 and 2021 by Philip Hardie, whose work on ancient literature has been of seminal importance in the field. The centre of gravity lies in late Republican and Augustan poetry, in particular Lucretius, Virgil, and Ovid, with important contributions on wider Augustan culture; on Neronian and Flavian epic; on the Latin poetry of late antiquity; and on the reception of Latin poetry.

CONTENTS

CONTENTS VOLUME II

PART VII: ROMAN EPIC
44 Poet, Patrons, Rulers: The Ennian Traditions
45 Metamorphosis, Metaphor, and Allegory in Latin Epic
46 The Word Personified: Fame and Envy in Virgil, Ovid, Spenser
47 Allegorical Absences: Virgil, Ovid, Prudentius and Claudian
48 Closure in Latin Epic
49 The Vertical Axis in Classical and Post-classical Epic
50 The Hesiodic Catalogue of Women and Latin Poetry
51 Crowds and Leaders in Imperial Historiography and in Epic
PART VIII: NERONIAN AND FLAVIAN EPIC
52 Lucan's Song of the Earth
53 Flavian Epicists on Virgil's Epic Technique
54 Flavian Epic and the Sublime
55 Tales of Unity and Division in Imperial Latin Epic
PART IX: LUCRETIUS AND THE RECEPTION OF LUCRETIUS
56 Reflections of Lucretius in Late Antique and Early Modern Biblical and Scientific Poetry: Providence and the Sublime
57 Lucretius in Late Antique Poetry: Paulinus of Nola, Claudian, Prudentius
PART X: LATER LATIN POETRY
58 Polyphony or Babel? Hosidius Geta's Medea and the Poetics of the Cento
59 Martyrs' Memorials: Glory, Memory, and Envy in Prudentius Peristephanon
60 Augustan and Late Antique Intratextuality: Virgil's Aeneid and Prudentius' Psychomachia
61 Cowherds and Saints: Paulinus of Nola Carmen 18
62 Unity and Disunity in Paulinus of Nola Poem 24
PART XI: POST-CLASSICAL
63 Renaissance Latin Epic
64 Shepherds' Songs: Generic Variation in Renaissance Latin Epic
65 Vida's De Arte Poetica and the Transformation of Models
66 Multiple Allusivity in Girolamo Vida De Arte Poetica
67 Virgilian Imperialism, Original Sin, and Fracastoro's Syphilis
68 Adamastor and the Epic Poet's Dark Continent
69 The Augustanism of Ben Jonson's Poetaster
70 Milton's Epitaphium Damonis and the Virgilian Career
71 Miltonic Echoes: Fallen and Unfallen Resonances in Paradise Lost
72 Lucan in the English Renaissance
73 Abraham Cowley Davideis, Sacri Poematis Operis Imperfecti Liber Unus
74 Generic Dialogue and the Sublime in Cowley: Epic, Didactic, Pindaric
75 Ovid and Virgil at the North Pole: Marvell's 'A Letter to Dr Ingelo'

The papers gathered in these two volumes constitute about two thirds of my output of journal articles and book chapters published between 1983 and 2021. Close reading guided by larger literary-historical, conceptual and methodological questions has been my preferred modus operandi. Nullius addictus iurare in uerba magistri, my approaches have nevertheless felt the magnetic attraction of the various contexts of my academic formation and employments. Much of my production of articles and chapters has been related to my various book projects. And many papers have been the result of the need to devise something relevant for the agendas of the numerous conferences that are both a pleasure and a constraint in the life of the present-day academic in the humanities. 2006 is the date of the last paper that I published as an article in a peer-reviewed journal, as opposed to a chapter in a volume of conference proceedings, or other collaborative book, or handbook or companion (those juggernauts of the mod-ern academic publishing scene). My interest in Greek and Latin literature was stimulated first by the excel-lent teaching that I received at St Paul's School in London, notably from my Latin teacher in the eighth form (as St Paul's labels what in most English schools is known as the sixth form), Dr W.W. Cruickshank), a rigorous master in the old tradition, but with an inborn sensitivity for the texts as literature. As an undergraduate in Oxford (1970–1974), I was in one of the first cohorts which could choose to take papers in literature in 'Greats' (the second part of the BA degree in Classics), as opposed to a restrictive diet of ancient history and philosophy, and I benefitted from the teaching of two outstanding literary scholars, Ewen Bowie in Greek, and John Bramble in Latin. John, whose career as a classicist was to be cut short by early retirement, had brought with him from Cam-bridge exciting new ways of reading ancient texts.

Those were the days when New Criticism, hardly new in English literary studies, was news for classicists. John Bramble's inspirational teaching further fired my own interests. The next decisive impetus for future lines of inquiry came with an MPhil at the Warburg Institute in London (1974–1976), where I was exposed to the teaching of the art historians Ernst Gombrich and Michael Baxandall, the polymath Otto Kurz, and the historian of philosophy Charles Schmitt. My MPhil dissertation (unpublished) was on 'Humanist Exegesis of Poetry in Fifteenth-Century Italy and the Medieval Tradition of Commentary'; it centred on the humanist development of the late-antique and medieval tradition of allegorical commentary on Virgil, with particular reference to Cristoforo Landino, together with some consideration of the traditions of commentary on Dante and on the Bible.

My time at the Warburg first launched my interests in the classical tradition ('reception' had not yet become the preferred term of art) and in allegory, particularly of philosophical and rationalizing stripes. And Virgil was the central author of my dissertation. Pursuing an interest in Neoplatonism arising from my studies in Florentine humanism, I spent a year reading around late-antique and medieval Neoplatonism in Freiburg-im-Breisgau, the university of Heidegger and Husserl. I real-ised that I was not cut out to be a historian of philosophy, and returned to Ox-ford to spend three years as a lexicographer on the Oxford English Dictionary, re-connecting with my undergraduate fascination with language and comparative philology. I was then lucky enough to be elected to a junior research fellowship at my old college, Corpus Christi, despite the fact that I had very little to show by way of completed research (this was a break that could never happen in to-day's results- and outputs-obsessed climate). My research proposal was for a general study of the reception in Latin literature and scholarship of Greek philosophizing interpretation and allegory of myth and literature (concrete evidence of my reading are a couple of published pieces on Plutarch). After about a year of the fellowship it became clear that an, unplanned, book on the Aeneidwas struggling to be born. Cosmos and Imperium (1986) bases a reading of certain strands of the Aeneid on the interactions of poetry and philosophy which

fed into the allegorizing industry. In some ways, the book is a Renaissance reading of Virgil. I did not dare to say this too loudly before an audience of classicists, and confined myself to reproducing a Renaissance engraving of the storm in Aeneid 1 on the dust jacket. Virgil's reception of the philosophical poet Lucretius figures largely in Cosmos and Imperium, and the reception of Lucretius both in antiquity and later has been a continuing interest. My Lucretian Receptions(2009) includes revised versions of a number of articles and chapters which have not been given third outings in the present collection. Once a Virgilian, always a Virgilian. Earlier pieces are spin-offs from my first book, and over the years I have returned repeatedly, and with pleasure, to other aspects of Virgil, chiefly with reference to the Aeneid and to the reception of Virgil. After Cosmos and Imperium I had planned to move on to a later epic poet, and proposed a commentary on either a book of Lucan or of Statius for the Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics(the 'green and yellows'). But the series editor, Ted Kenney, was, at that time, of the view that the market would not bear a book of post-Virgilian epic, and I was forced back on Virgil, and a commentary on Aeneid 9 (1994). Simultaneously, however, I was developing some ideas on the reception of Virgil in imperial epic, which took shape as The Epic Successors of Virgil (1993), after an invitation by Denis Feeney and Stephen Hinds to contribute a short volume to their new 'Roman Literature and its Con-texts' series. This collection contains a few pieces on Lucan and Flavian epic, and rather more on Ovid and his reception. My earlier pieces on Ovid are studies of his response to Virgil, although Ovid in fact has a rather low profile in Epic Successors, for the reason that the Metamorphoses, soaked in the Aeneid though it is, did not respond so readily to the central themes of that book. My Ovidian interests subsequently developed different kinds of momentum. My own contributions to the, by now vast, body of work that has reclaimed Ovid as a towering author in the western tradition have, again, been in part filtered through a Re-naissance glass. Milton took Ovid quite as seriously as he took Virgil. Other pieces in these two volumes came out of my work towards more re-cent books. Rumour and Renown: Representations of Fama in Western Literature (2012)

extended my interests in reception up to the early eighteenth century, a period further explored in Celestial Aspirations: Classical Impulses in British Poetry and Art (2022). Of the two essays on Abraham Cowley (73, 74) one is related to the themes in that book, while the other is a sample of my longstanding interest in Neolatin poetry. The invitation to deliver the Sather Lectures at Berkeley in 2016 prompted me to take a closer look at late antiquity, which bore fruit in Classicism and Christianity in Late Antique Latin Poetry (2019) and in a series of shorter essays. <>

Plato of Athens: A Life in Philosophy by Robin Waterfield [Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780197564752]

> "Plato himself, shortly before his death, had a dream of himself as a swan, darting from tree to tree and causing great trouble to the fowlers, who were unable to catch him. When Simmias the Socratic heard this dream, he explained that all men would endeavor to grasp Plato's meaning. None, however, would succeed, but each would interpret him according to their own views." — Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy 1.29–37

The first ever biography of the founder of Western philosophy

Considered by many to be the most important philosopher ever, Plato was born into a well-to-do family in wartime Athens at the end of the fifth century BCE. In his teens, he honed his intellect by attending lectures from the many thinkers who passed through Athens and toyed with the idea of writing poetry. He finally decided to go into politics, but became disillusioned, especially after the Athenians condemned his teacher, Socrates, to death. Instead, Plato turned to writing and teaching. He began teaching in his twenties and later founded the Academy, the world's first higher-educational research and teaching establishment. Eventually, he returned to practical politics and spent a considerable amount of time and energy trying to create a constitution for Syracuse in Sicily that would reflect and perpetuate some of his political ideals. The attempts failed, and Plato's disappointment can be traced in some of his later political works.

In his lifetime and after, Plato was considered almost divine. Though a measure of his importance, this led to the invention of many tall tales about him-both by those who adored him and his detractors. In this first ever full-length portrait of Plato, Robin Waterfield steers a

judicious course among these stories, debunking some while accepting the kernels of truth in others. He explains why Plato chose to write dialogues rather than treatises and gives an overview of the subject matter of all of Plato's books. Clearly and engagingly written throughout, Plato of Athens is the perfect introduction to the man and his work.

***

The prospect of writing a biography of Plato is daunting, and many have judged it a lost cause. The sources are mostly thin and unreliable, the information sporadic and often uncertain, the chronology of his written works impossible to determine with precision. No official Athenian documents survive that mention him. Moreover, Plato hardly refers to himself in the dialogues (as his written works are called) and never speaks in his own name. Nevertheless, as I hope this book demonstrates, a book- length treatment is both possible and desirable. As well as unearthing biographical details, one has to delve into many areas that have the potential fundamentally to impact what one thinks of Plato, such as: What kind of writer was he? How should we read the dialogues he wrote? Is what we call “Platonism” true to its origins? Plato is a household name— a rare status for a philosopher— and he effectively invented the discipline we call philosophy. It would be good to gain some idea of the man himself.

Naturally, many books on Plato start with a chapter or a few paragraphs on his life, but, as far as I am aware, the last dedicated biography in English of any length was published in 1839, when B. B. Edwards translated the Life of Plato by Wilhelm Tennemann and included it in his and E. A. Park’s Selections from German Literature. The book you hold in your hands shares with this predecessor little except a critical approach. That is, I do not just write down “facts” and conclusions but also to a certain extent, suitable for a book designed for a general audience, explain what the evidence is and how I understand it, because nothing is uncontroversial in Plato studies. But otherwise my book is different in that it ranges wider and is longer than Edwards’s fifty- six pages. And since the main fact about Plato’s life is that he was a writer, my book will also serve as an introduction to his work. I do mean “introduction”: finer points of interpretation and philosophical complexities play no part, and I have toed a fairly conservative line on most issues that exercise interpreters of Plato. This is not a book about Plato’s philosophy but about Plato, though, as a biography of a philosopher, references to aspects of his thought are inevitable. But I focus more on general characteristics than the

particulars and the ever- contended details. I am more likely to tantalize readers with suggestive and intriguing ideas of Plato's than elaborate them or spell out their pros and cons.

After about 2,400 years, Plato's books have scarcely aged; they are as brilliant, witty, profound, and perplexing as they have always been. Most of them are not only inspired but inspiring; they are very enjoyable to read, and even the few drier ones contain ingenious and delightful passages. No philosopher is as accessible to non- specialists as Plato. I hope that this book will stimulate readers to turn next to reading the dialogues themselves and to find out more about Plato's work. To this end, I have appended a fairly long bibliography. In terms of my personal biography, the book is a kind of summation, the fruit of many years of thinking and writing about Plato (not that he has always been my exclusive focus). Almost the first article I had published, more than forty years ago, was on the chronology of Plato's dialogues— a topic that, naturally, has exercised me in this biography. So, although I now disagree with the thesis of that article, the book completes a circle for me.

Review

" *Plato of Athens* is erudite and fascinating, and realises its aim of showing that his works were magnificent, that "Plato invented philosophy" not as a body of doctrine but an open-ended and insatiable quest." -- Jane O'Grady, The Telegraph

"If all Western philosophy is as has been claimed a series of footnotes to Plato of Athens, it's fortunate indeed that all his dialogues have survived and attracted translators and interpreters of the caliber of Robin Waterfield. Brilliant, witty, profound--and perplexing: Plato's all those and more (a uniquely resonant stylist too), and it's no mean tribute both to him and to the author to say that Robin Waterfield has done him justice." -- Paul Cartledge, author of *Thebes: The Forgotten City of Ancient Greece*

"Whitehead once characterized the history of Western philosophy as a series of footnotes to Plato. Here, at last, we have an authoritative body text for the man himself. 'No philosopher,' Waterfield writes, 'is as accessible to non-specialists as Plato.' The same can be said for this remarkable, impeccably researched biography" -- M. D. Usher, author of *Plato's Pigs and Other Ruminations*

"Writing a biography of Plato is a tricky endeavor, to say the least. Robin Waterfield nonetheless succeeds in delivering a gripping, plausible, and enlightening portrait. Those new to Plato as well as seasoned scholars will come away from Plato of Athens not only with as rounded a picture of Plato the man as may be possible, but also with an excellent sense of his philosophy and the historical times in which he lived and with which he engaged." -- Iakovos Vasiliou, author of *Aiming at Virtue in Plato*

"Waterfield evokes [the Academy's] atmosphere superbly. Indeed, the passages on Plato's teachings, his dialogues and his contribution to the field of philosophy are a particular strength of the book...His account of Plato's failure to reform the tyrant [Dionysius II] and establish a new constitution for him is particularly well done." -- Daisy Dunn, *Literary Review*

"Waterfield's narrative is compelling." -- *The Atlantic*

"Waterfield evokes [the Academy's] atmosphere superbly. Indeed, the passages on Plato's teachings, his dialogues and his contribution to the field of philosophy are a particular strength of the book...His account of Plato's failure to reform the tyrant [Dionysius II] and establish a new constitution for him is particularly well done." -- Daisy Dunn, *Literary Review*

CONTENTS

Plato's importance as a philosopher is universally acknowledged. He was the first Western thinker systematically to address issues that still exercise philosophers today in fields such as metaphysics, epistemology, political theory, jurisprudence and penology, ethics, science, religion, language, art and aesthetics, friendship, and love. He was the heir to a long tradition of thinking about the world and its inhabitants, but the use he made of this inheritance was original. In effect, he invented philosophy, and he did so at a time when there was little vocabulary or framework for doing so— no words for "universal," "attribute," "abstract," and so on. Moreover, he founded a school, the Academy, which was dedicated not just to philosophy, but to scientific research and practical politics, and fostered thinkers of the stature of Aristotle and Eudoxus, whose multiple influences on subsequent thinkers were profound. The Academy taught philosophy and encouraged research for almost a thousand years, a span still unsurpassed by any other educational establishment in the West.

The range of topics Plato addressed, the depth with which he addressed them, and the boldness of his theories are astonishing. It is not just that he raised questions that still provoke us, but he also asked, as a philosopher must, whether it is possible to come up with secure answers to the questions, and even whether knowledge is possible at all. He was concerned not just with conclusions but with how we reach them. He had certain definite doctrines, or theories perhaps, but even they might find themselves tested in the dialogues. This sense of philosophy as an ongoing quest is one of the most attractive features of his work. What is more, these ideas are generally presented in a way that is accessible to every intelligent reader because Plato's brilliance as a philosopher was matched by his talent as a writer. In later centuries, many thinkers have written philosophical dialogues, but none of those dialogues has captured the fluency and conversational realism of Plato's work at its best.

I said just now that Plato raised questions that still provoke us, but the "us" in that sentence consists chiefly of practicing philosophers. It is more to the point to say that he raised questions that should still provoke us— all of us, not just philosophers. In a world in which even liberal democracies can be distorted by fanatical, incompetent, and emotionally immature leaders, should we perhaps not pay more attention to

Plato's prescriptions for turning out political leaders who are both competent and principled? In a world in which information and misinformation are more widespread than ever before, especially thanks to social media and the Internet, should we not reconsider Plato's insistence that our actions should be based on knowledge, not belief or opinion? When many perpetuators of popular culture drag us down to the level of the lowest common denominator, let's reflect on Plato's reasons for loathing both trivialization and the unthinking acceptance of ideas and practices even when they are widely sanctioned by society. Plato was an idealist in that he believed that perfection, or at least a far better state of affairs, is achievable in every area of human life, starting with personal reformation. Should we not similarly devote our energies to improving ourselves and the world around us, so that each generation bequeaths to the next conditions that are healthier and more sustainable than what went before?

Plato's work generated discussion and responses throughout antiquity and in every generation since. There is still such an enormous output of scholarly books and articles every year that it would take more than a single lifetime to master all the publications and all the languages required to read them. He is read and studied in, I dare say, every country in the world. The indexes of a good proportion of the nonfiction books on any reader's shelf will have an entry for Plato.

Plato was not just important but super-important. And so he has been judged by some of the greatest intellects of recent times. Perhaps the most famous such assessment is that of the English philosopher Alfred North Whitehead (1861– 1947), who wrote in Process and Reality, published in 1929: "The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato." I believe this to be correct, in the sense that Plato invented what we call the discipline of philosophy, though like all great thinkers and innovators, he also built on the work of his predecessors. He could have echoed Isaac Newton: "If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants."

But let's be clear on what Whitehead was saying: every great Western thinker, from Aristotle onward, has been indebted to Plato. Aristotle's debts are more close and

obvious than those of, say, Judith Butler, but the foundations of even Butler's work were laid down by Plato. If the mark of genius, rather than merely great intelligence, is that the field in which the person works is forever changed, or a new field created, then Plato was a genius. In saying that he invented philosophy, Whitehead and I are not saying that he got everything right. Of course not: that would make all subsequent philosophy even more of a waste of time than many people already think it is! And in any case, it is the job of philosophy to inquire, more than it is to come up with solutions. Plato launched philosophical investigation.

Whitehead's estimation of Plato is so famous that it has long had the status of a cliché. But it is not commonly noted that Whitehead was preceded on the other side of the Atlantic by Ralph Waldo Emerson, leader of the Transcendentalists. Whitehead was ensconced within the establishment, while Emerson was more of an outsider; perhaps this is why the latter's saying has been forgotten. "Out of Plato," Emerson said, in his chapter on Plato in Representative Men (1876), "come all things that are still written and debated among men of thought." We note his "all things," a measure of Plato's great importance.

I could add testimonials from many others, such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770– 1831), who said in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy that Plato and Aristotle "above all others deserve to be called the teachers of the human race." I could add testimonials from thinkers and commentators of our own time, but it is the way of things that current philosophers and scholars have not yet passed the test of time and attained the stature of Whitehead, Emerson, and others. So I rest my case on these quotations from earlier thinkers, and on the fact that Republic at least, and often more of Plato's works, are invariably included in the canon of Great Books of the World. Nor is this reverence for his books a new phenomenon. Most ancient Greek literature has been lost, sometimes by accident, but more often because it was felt to be not worth preserving, in the sense that, in the centuries before the invention of the printing press, no one was asking scribes to make copies. Yet we have the complete set of Plato's dialogues; not a single word that he published has been lost. Every generation of readers in antiquity and the Middle Ages felt that Plato's work was worth preserving.

In short, without Plato, European culture would be poorer, or at least it would have had to struggle to attain the same richness. Plato cannot be dismissed as just a dead white male. It is safe to say that, apart from the Bible, no body of written work has had such an impact on the Western world as Plato's dialogues. Over the centuries, Platonism has reappeared in some form or other in philosophical contexts— in much early Jewish, Christian, and Islamic thought; in the ideas of the Cambridge Platonists such as Henry More and Ralph Cudworth; in the slightly later seventeenth- century dispute between John Locke and Gottfried Leibniz; even in the late nineteenth- century "platonism" of Gottlob Frege's mathematical philosophy. But that is not my point, which is that Plato bears some responsibility for forming and tuning the way all of us think, whatever our gender, skin color, cultural background, or philosophical or political affiliation. In saying this, I am not promoting the chauvinistic notion that the only discipline worthy of the name "philosophy" is the Western version, founded by Plato; but I am saying that, whether or not we know it, our minds have been affected by him. Moreover, I have suggested that he still has important lessons for us— that he should continue to affect the way we think about many of the issues that currently trouble or perplex us. This book, then, attempts to contextualize the work of this important thinker and to uncover as much as possible what else he did other than write books.

A Life in Philosophy and a Philosophical Afterlife

What Plato accomplished in his lifetime is astounding, but his achievements extend beyond his lifetime. He started a tradition that has sent ripples down to our own time. The vibrancy of the tradition is not marred but proved by the courses that it took. It was capable of being skeptical in one era and dogmatic in another; it was capable of stimulating thinkers as diverse as Aristotle and Speusippus. Just as Socrates generated about half a dozen lines of work, all of which were authentically Socratic, so his greatest student created a philosophy that was capacious enough to include contradictions and yet remain intact. There surely can be no higher praise for an innovative philosopher. Plato did this by his aloof presence in the Academy, and above all by the multifaceted nature of the dialogues. They are and are not dogmatic; they invite readers in and then compel them to fall back on their own resources; they make everything seem

straightforward and then pull the rug out from under their feet. To aid him in this work he invented a character called Socrates, and the homage to his teacher lies precisely in the fact that he is a Platonic invention, a vehicle for perpetuating the work that, on Plato's understanding, Socrates initiated. Other Socratics also made the attempt according to their own understanding of Socrates, but the survival of Plato's work and the loss of theirs tells a tale.

Plato opened up infinite possibilities for the future of philosophy— not just for academic philosophers but for any of us who think and who care about what we are and what we may become, as individuals and as the human species. For anyone who strives to value knowledge over belief and to practice critical thinking rather than blind acceptance, who knows that there is more to the world than meets the eye, who thinks that virtue is not just a stuffy Victorian value and is prepared not just to sweep that insight under the rug but let it alter their world forever, however difficult and unpopular that may be— for all these people, Plato's life is a paradigm and his instruction deeply rewarding.

Philosophy addresses the big questions: What is the meaning of life? What is consciousness? What is the best form of government? What is goodness? What is truth? Should we trust our reasoning capacity? Do we have free will? And a host of other questions. Human beings are naturally endowed with curiosity, and philosophy is the ultimate way of attempting to satisfy curiosity. Philosophy begins in wonder, as Plato said. [Theaetetus 155d.] If we lose that sense of wonder— if we become immersed in the trivia of everyday life and what passes for popular "culture"— we risk living in a stale universe. Plato's thought has lasted well because there will always be those who refuse to quell their curiosity.

The particular spin that Plato put on doing philosophy also remains important. By writing philosophy as conversation, he expressed the notion that searching for truth is an ongoing quest. Knowledge is possible, but it is just as important to keep looking for it and to doubt that one has ever found it. Philosophy, as Plato practiced it, trains the mind and endows one with problem- solving skills; it teaches one to think clearly, and

without clear thinking, we are less likely to be successful in any of our endeavors. There can hardly be a better introduction to philosophical thinking than reading Plato's dialogues and reflecting on both the ideas and the methodology. It does not really matter whether or not he was "right." Reading the dialogues stimulates one to think for oneself about philosophical issues.

Plato started practicing philosophy with Socrates and others at an early age. He found that there was no field of human endeavor where philosophy could not help. He perpetuated the practice of philosophy and philosophical principles in everything he did. It is not just that he wrote stimulating and profound books, but he himself returned to the murky cave of the real world. After his first failure in Syracuse, one might think that he would not have returned, but he did, and by doing so, he left us with a model of dedication to a cause and of how a philosopher might try to make himself useful in a political context— a model taken up by recent thinkers such as Bernard Williams. And he founded the Academy, a school that perpetuated philosophy for almost a thousand years. Plato's life was truly a life in the service of philosophy, and that is why his life should still matter to us. The big questions do not go away. <>

<>