Wordtrade.com

11312 US 15-501 North, Suite 107/ PMB #226/
Chapel Hill NC 27517/ USA

ph 9195425719/ fx 9198691643/ www.wordtrade.com

SPOTLIGHT
106

May 2023

Wordtrade Reviews: Hidden Machines

Contents

Editorial Appraisals:

Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise, most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

INTIMATE STRANGERS: A HISTORY OF JEWS AND CATHOLICS IN THE CITY OF ROME by Fredric Brandfon [The Jewish Publication Society, 9780827615571]

The Jewish community of Rome is the oldest Jewish community in Europe. It is also the Jewish community with the longest continuous history, having avoided interruptions, expulsions, and annihilations since 139 BCE. For most of that time, Jewish Romans have lived in close contact with the largest continuously functioning international organization: the Roman Catholic Church. Given the church's origins in Judaism, Jews and Catholics have spent two thousand years negotiating a necessary and paradoxical relationship. With engaging stories that illuminate the history of Jews and Jewish-Catholic relations in Rome, **INTIMATE STRANGERS** investigates the unusual relationship between Jews and Catholics as it has developed from the first century CE to the present in the Eternal City.

Fredric Brandfon innovatively frames these relations through an anthropological lens: how the idea and language of family have shaped the self-understanding of both Roman Jews and Catholics. The familial relations are lopsided, the powerful family member often persecuting the weaker one; the church ghettoized the Jews of Rome longer than any other community in Europe. Yet respect and support are also part of the family dynamic—for instance, church members and institutions protected Rome's Jews during the Nazi occupation—and so the relationship continues.

Brandfon begins by examining the Arch of Titus and the Jewish catacombs as touchstones, painting a picture of a Jewish community remaining Jewish over centuries. Papal processions and the humiliating races at Carnival time exemplify Jewish interactions with the predominant Catholic powers in medieval and Renaissance Rome. The Roman Ghetto, the forcible conversion of Jews, emancipation from the Ghetto in light of Italian nationalism, the horrors of fascism and the Nazi occupation in Rome, the Second Vatican Council proclamation absolving Jews of murdering Christ, and the celebration of Israel's birth at the Arch of Titus are interwoven with Jewish stories of daily life through the

centuries. **INTIMATE STRANGERS** takes us on a compelling sweep of two thousand years of history through the present successes and dilemmas of Roman Jews in postwar Europe.

Review

"A fascinating story of the Jews' unique resilience and strength living in Rome without interruption for twenty-two centuries."—Riccardo Shemuel Di Segni, chief rabbi of Rome

"An absolutely new approach. Investigating an unusual relationship—the one between Jews and Catholics that in Rome could develop uninterruptedly over almost two thousand years—**INTIMATE STRANGERS** frames it anthropologically while revealing notable knowledge about the life of Jews in Rome and their mutual relationships with the Catholic world. This is a well-written, well-documented, and well-argued book."—Gabriela Yael Franzone, coordinator of the Department of Heritage and Culture of the Jewish Community of Rome

"An engaging and sometimes surprising exploration of the intriguing history of Rome."—Mark Kurlansky, author of thirty-five books, including *Cod*, *Salt*, and T*he Importance of Not Being Ernest*

"Most involving. There is always fascinating new material on the next page."—Judith Roumani, author of *Jews in Southern Tuscany during the Holocaust: Ambiguous Refuge*

CONTENTS

Giannina's Glance

> On October i8,1960, a United Jewish Appeal Study mission met Pope John XXIII in the Vatican Throne Room. After some formalities were exchanged, the Pope stood up, stepped down from his throne, and addressed his Jewish visitors, "I am Joseph, your brother?' —L'osservatore Romano, October 19, 1960

Before I began writing this book, I took a tour of the Vatican Museum, guided by an art historian who, it turned out, was also a member of the Jewish community in Rome. Early in our tour, we headed down a gallery leading to the Sistine Chapel. Behind us was an equally long corridor lined with scores of marble busts, but sealed off from visitors by a purple velvet rope. At regular intervals along the length of the closed gallery there stood fireplaces, once necessary to keep the drafty corridor that connects the Pio Clementino Museum with the Sistine Chapel less chilly. Our guide stopped and pointed to the second fireplace on the right: "That is where my grandparents slept during World War II. They were hiding from the Nazis." At that moment, I realized the Jews of Rome had a story to tell. And their story was inextricably bound to the history of their Catholic neighbors.

This book, then, begins with a question: How do you describe two venerable peoples, Jews and Catholics, who have lived side by side as Romans since the first century, in anger, adversity, and intermittent admiration?

I call them "intimate strangers." The oxymoron that is the title of this book encapsulates a contradictory relationship through which, despite real difficulties, two very different communities have managed to live together, uninterrupted, for almost two thousand years.

In this book I identify this relationship as familial. So did Pope John XXIII in 1960, when he welcomed his Jewish visitors by reenacting the biblical story of Joseph and his brothers. When Joseph, recently elevated to power in Egypt, greets his brothers, who had sold him into slavery some years back, as if they were strangers, they fail to recognize him. Only when the time is right does Joseph address them as family: "I am your brother Joseph" (Gen. 45:4). With that revelation, the brothers' long estrangement begins to heal.

While the circumstances in the biblical tale and the Jewish-Catholic meeting in the papal palace were different, Pope John (Angelo Roncalli) wanted to evoke intense emotion and the hope for healing expressed in the story they all knew and shared. After the horrors of the Holocaust—during which Roncalli himself, then an apostolic delegate to Turkey and Greece, provided Jews with false identity documents to pass as Catholics and avoid deportation and death (see chapter 11) John XXIII emphasized the language of family. I might add that before my guide's grandmother found refuge in the Vatican, she sought protectors for her daughters (including the guide's mother) in a convent. Before leaving her children, the grandmother told her daughters, "This is the Mother Superior. Until I return, she will be your mother." The guide's grandmother, like the pope, used words of family to intensify and make sense of a Jewish-Catholic encounter.

Of course, Jews and Catholics were never an actual family. In fact, once Rome became a Catholic city, intermarriage between Jews and Christians was forbidden. However, they often used the language of family to create a feeling of extended kinship. Large families are not always comfortable associations. In extended families, some people are so distantly related, they do not even think of themselves as family. Often enough there may be no love lost between relatives, but the people in such families still have to learn to live together, and even depend on each other. Indeed, when push comes to shove, in a time of crisis, a family can expect to see the best come out in people, and the worst as well.

At no time was that more evident in the metaphorical Jewish-Catholic family than during the years of Fascism in Italy and the Nazi occupation of Rome (1922-44). Many Roman Jews felt that despite the

genocide unfolding elsewhere in Europe, Rome would be safe. They had faith that Pope Pius XII would not let similar outrages happen in his Eternal City. They were wrong. In the midst of that pope's inaction, over a thousand Roman Jews were deported to Auschwitz on October i6, 1943; only fifteen would return. Another thousand Jews were deported in the subsequent months, in large part because individual Catholics throughout the city turned hidden Jews over to the Fascist and Nazi authorities to gain monetary rewards.' At the same time, Jews were fiercely protected from the Nazis in monasteries, convents, churches, individual Roman households, and even the Vatican itself. Catholic betrayal and protection of Jews occurred in Rome simultaneously.

This book is the story of how seemingly contradictory circumstances existed side by side—and not only during Nazi-occupied Rome, but throughout two thousand years of Jewish-Catholic history in the city.

Giannina's Glance

In the opening pages of The Garden of the Finzi-Continis, Giorgio Bassani's novel about the fate of Italian Jewry under Fascism, the time is post—World War II, 1957, fourteen years after the Nazis' brutal 1943 roundup of Jews in Rome. The wounds of that atrocity have not fully healed, but it is a happier time, and Bassani's Jewish narrator sits in the back seat of a friend's car on a Sunday drive from Rome to the Etruscan tombs. In the front seat are his hosts, a non-Jewish couple, and sitting between them is their young daughter, Giannina. The father, one hand on the wheel and the other stroking his daughter's curls, asks the girl what she learned about the Etruscans in school, to which she replies: "In our history book the Etruscans are at the beginning, next to the Egyptians and the Jews. Tell me Papa, who do you think were more ancient, the Etruscans or the Jews?"' Amused, her father motions toward the back seat: "Ask the gentleman back there:,"

Giannina, who we imagine as a charming, even precocious child, turns and glances at the narrator, her look "severe and filled with mistrust." Then, quickly, she turns back to silently stare out the front window.

So it is that Bassani introduces us to a Roman family (father, mother, and child) on an idyllic outing with a guest who has a special identity—Jewish—and sits alone in the back seat. Is the guest a close friend, much like family, or is he not? Giannina wishes the guest were not there. Her one-second hostile glance in the context of a seemingly welcoming situation epitomizes much of the Jewish-Roman experience of two thousand years.

Giannina's fictional hostility was presaged by actual events four hundred years earlier. In the mid-sixteenth century three young girls of about Giannina's age living in the heart of Rome had a similar response to a Jewish guest. Their father, a lute maker, ran a shop beneath his residence on the Via dei Leutari (lute-makers' street). Whenever Bonaiuto, an elderly Jewish customer from the Ghetto, entered the shop, the girls, watching from the upstairs apartment, would shout down the slur: "Cagnaccio sciattato" (Judaeo-Roman street slang for "kosher slaughtered ugly dog," which three preadolescent Catholic girls had somehow absorbed). Bonaiuto was the father's friend, but his daughters, like Giannina, treated him as an interloper. (Nevertheless, cursing someone in his own peculiar dialect demonstrates both intimacy and disgust simultaneously.)

Indeed, if the lute maker's daughters managed to curse Bonaiuto in his own language, Jews were often happy to return the favor, and in equally unusual ways, as the following story attests.

Kaddish For Mussolini

The Hebrew words Yitgadal veyitkaddash sheme raba (magnified and sanctified be God's great name) begin the Jewish prayer for the dead known as the Kaddish, which is most often recited in the synagogue, the home, or at the graveside.

In 1939, the Jewish janitor Romeo Bondi recited Kaddish each morning at the Villa Celimontana, a Jewish high school hastily organized by Rome's Jewish community a year after the Fascists had enacted a series of so-called Racial Laws prohibiting government-supported education of Jews (see chapter 9).4 Donning his black skullcap and in the presence of students hurrying to class, Bondi chanted Kaddish in remembrance of the Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini. Of course, in the fall of 1939 Mussolini was very much alive; but, as Romeo probably mused, one could always hope.

For Romeo, the Kaddish was a chance to spit in the dictator's eye, even if he was in the basement of a school opposite the Colosseum while Mussolini was several miles away at the Villa Torlonia, a nineteenth-century estate perched atop an ancient Jewish catacomb dating from the third century CE. In his novel, Giorgio Bassani used the villa grounds as a model for the gardens of the wealthy Jewish Finzi-Continis; in real life, Mussolini utilized the Jewish tombs as a bomb shelter. In fiction and reality, and in death and life, Jews and Catholics in Rome were never far apart from one another. Thus the Italian government's aim to segregate Jews from the rest of Italian society could not readily be accomplished. Jews had lived in Rome too long—since 139 BCE, over two thousand years. In fact, the janitor's family may have existed in Rome since 1538, when persons named Bondi—Moise and Menachem—are mentioned in the Jewish notarial records.'

As such, Bondi's Kaddish for Mussolini was a small personal reversal of the Racial Laws. Bondi dragged Mussolini away from his grand palace and into the Jewish community in the only way he could, with tongue in cheek. The Jewish prayer for the dead is a quintessential family ceremony, establishing connections between generations and among parents, children, brothers, and sisters. In effect, Romeo Bondi was saying, "If you, Mussolini, do not want us in your family, we, nevertheless, will include you in ours. We are still Romans."

The Two Tribes of Rome

The stories of Giannina, Bonaiuto, and Romeo Bondi exemplify, in brief, Jews and Catholics who are not quite family, but who speak to each other, or act with each other, as if they were family. Whether they share a dialect or a holiday, whether they curse or bless one another, they are pushing up against the boundaries of family. Full entry is always barred, and is usually not the goal to begin with. Instead, this liminal circumstance, living at the boundary line of family, characterizes their existence.

The approach and avoidance strategies practiced by Catholics and Jews in Rome were not specific to them. In most societies there are strangers among the locals. From an anthropological or sociological point of view, such strangers are a necessity, bringing newness in the form of ideas, commercial contacts, even genetic material, all vital to a community's growth. However, strangers are simultaneously a source of anxiety, first, due to differences with their hosts and, second, due to the real possibility that they may appropriate for themselves, through intermarriage if nothing else, accumulated family and communal wealth.' Further, sexual or even close relations between stranger and host invite a fear that through contact, the stranger's worst traits may become contagious—that is, once infected by the stranger, the host will slowly but invariably become more and more like the stranger.' Whether this fear

was stated or unstated in the case of Jews and Catholics—and during two thousand years in Rome it was both—it meant limiting, or even prohibiting, by law, custom, and edict, social and sexual contact between them.

Still, as we will see in the pages to follow, there existed a codependence between Jews and Catholics which, while often the basis of hostility, also fostered cooperation. As the historian David Nirenberg has reported about Jews and Catholics in thirteenth-century Spain, the impulse to "divide the world into opposing categories of tolerance and intolerance, mutual interest versus mutual hostility, open society or closed" is not altogether apt. Jews and Catholics in Spain often "depended one upon the other" and often "produced and co-produced themselves through a process of simultaneous identification and dis-identification with their rival 'siblings' and neighbors."' The same happened in Rome. The line separating Roman Jews and Catholics was always shifting. Jews created their own story when that was possible, and Catholic Romans kept redrawing the line between themselves and Jews, as much to compose their own identity as to marginalize or persecute the other.

Our story, then, proceeds like a historical dance, Jews and Catholics approaching and avoiding each other across the millennia. If Roman Jews and Catholics are like a very extended family, then that dance involving many people across the generations is like the traditional Jewish hora, in which people link arms, change partners, go in different directions, sometimes crash into each other or at least step on each other's feet. In Rome the dancers could be poets and prelates, notaries and swindlers, legislators and mystics, rabbis and popes. In Rome the dance could be uncomfortable, or joyous, or even a matter of life and death.

We begin the story of that dance with a couple—a Jewish queen and a Roman emperor—in a marriage that was not meant to be. <>

A Rich Brew: How Cafes Created Modern Jewish Culture by Shachar M. Pinsker [New York University Press, 9781479827893]

Unlike the synagogue, the house of study, the community center, or the Jewish deli, the cafe is rarely considered a Jewish space. Yet, coffeehouses profoundly influenced the creation of modern Jewish culture from the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries. With roots stemming from the Ottoman Empire, the coffeehouse and its drinks gained increasing popularity in Europe, and the mix of national and transnational characteristics perhaps explains why many of these cafes were owned and frequented by Jews.

Examining the convergence of cafes, their urban milieu, and Jewish creativity, Shachar M. Pinsker argues that cafes anchored a silk road of modern Jewish culture. He uncovers a network of interconnected cafes that were central to the modern Jewish experience in a time of migration and urbanization, from Odessa, Warsaw, Vienna, and Berlin to New York City and Tel Aviv.

A Rich Brew explores the Jewish culture created in these social spaces, drawing on a vivid collection of newspaper articles, memoirs, archival documents, photographs, caricatures, and artwork, as well as stories, novels, and poems in many languages set in cafes. Pinsker shows how Jewish modernity was

born in the cafe, nourished, and sent out into the world by way of print, politics, literature, art, and theater. What was experienced and created in the space of the coffeehouse touched thousands who read, saw, and imbibed a modern culture that redefined what it meant to be a Jew in the world.

Review

Finalist, 2018 National Jewish Book Award for Modern Jewish Thought and Experience, presented by the Jewish Book Council

"Hugely entertaining and intimidatingly well researched, with scarcely a cafe in which a Jewish writer raised a cup of coffee from Warsaw to New York left undocumented."— Adam Gopnik, New Yorker

"Pinsker ... believes that cafes in six cities created modern Jewish culture. It's the kind of claim that sounds as if it might be a game-changer, and there are enough grounds and gossip in A Rich Brew to keep this customer engrossed from cup to cup."— Wall Street Journal

"**A Rich Brew** is aptly named. Engagingly illustrated with many contemporary photos and cartoons, it offers a deep dive into the cafe world of six cities that gave birth to modern Jewish thought and culture."— Moment Magazine

"Pinsker takes the reader on a journey across the important centers of modern Jewish culture—Odessa, Warsaw, Vienna, Berlin, New York, and Tel Aviv—using a host of different sources and making for a captivating read."— The Forward

"Evokes the sense of lingering in a timeless cafe, savoring the flavor and scent of good coffee and the conversation that goes along with it."— Jewish Week

"Shachar Pinsker's absorbing new work of nonfiction, A Rich Brew, uses the cafe as a vehicle both to describe the development of modern Jewish culture and to delve into the topics that drove its progression."— Jewish Book Council

"Pinsker packs his history with titillating behind-the-scenes snapshots of a cast of fascinating and enigmatic Jewish figures in cafes throughout history.... Engaging, as well as nostalgic, reading, and begs the question: what has replaced the cafe in contemporary Jewish life?"— In Geveb

"Pinsker makes clear the vital role literary cafes played in 19th- and 20th-century Western Jewish culture in this smart volume."— Publishers Weekly

"A scrupulously documented and finely instructive account of the role of cafes in modern Jewish culture. **A Rich Brew,** providing apt discussions of many longforgotten or unknown texts and a generous sampling of photographs of the sundry cafes, should be of considerable interest both for historians and students of modern Jewish literature."— Robert Alter, Emeritus Professor of Hebrew and Comparative Literature, University of California, Berkeley

"Concocts a rich and pleasing brew of material culture, history, sociology, and text analysis to explore the roots of modern Jewish culture as we know it today. Describing the cafe as a `thirdspace; a liminal zone between the intimate and the public spheres, Pinsker follows the emergence of Jewish culture from the synagogue and the traditional house-of-study and its recreation as a modern, urban, secular

intellectual heritage. Masterfully constructed and beautifully written, A Rich Brew is an illuminating and pleasurable read."— Ruby Namdar, author of The Ruined House

CONTENTS

The Silk Road of Modern Jewish Creativity

January 1907, a young and handsome Jewish man took the train from his small hometown of Buczacz to the city of Lemberg. The nineteen--year-old was an aspiring Yiddish and Hebrew writer by the name ofShmuel Yosef Czaczkes, better known to us as S. Y. Agnon, the winner the 1966 Nobel Prize for literature. The trip to Lemberg—the provinal capital of Galicia in the Austro-Hungarian Empire—took him only a few hours, but it changed his life. Shmuel Yosef was traveling in order to become an assistant to Gershom Bader, an older journalist and writer of fiction who wrote in Hebrew, Yiddish, German, and Polish. Bader had established a Hebrew daily newspaper with the name 'Et (Time) and invited Shmuel Yosef to assist him. This was an opportunity he could not refuse.' In Lemberg—also known as Lvov in Russian, L'viv in Ukrainian, and Lwow in Polish—the budding writer encountered many institutions that he had never before seen: boulevards, parks, theaters, museums, and an opera house. One urban institution made a particular impression: the cafe.

Lemberg in the early twentieth century was renowned for its coffeehouses. Bader and other Jewish writers frequently socialized in cafes; sometimes they would also write or edit there, using the cafe table as their working desk. In spite of the energy and optimism of Bader, the Hebrew daily paper quickly faltered, and he was soon forced to close it down. Shmuel Yosef lost his source of income and returned home. But during the months in which he lived in Lemberg, he visited several cafes and met many Jewish writers, politicians, and intellectuals, as well as people from many other walks of life, Jews and non-Jews, young and old, rich and poor. The polyglot enthusiasm of Lemberg's cafe, an institution held together seemingly by little more than the desire for coffee and conversation, made a strong impact on him.

A little more than a year later, in April 1908, Shmuel Yosef traveled to Lemberg once again. This time, he had decided to leave his parents' home and migrate to Palestine in the Ottoman Empire. On his way there, he stopped in a few European cities. First, he arrived at Lemberg's railway station and went directly to the cafe to bid farewell to his old friends and to meet new ones. After his visit in Lemberg, Shmuel Yosef traveled to Krakow and then to the capital city Vienna, where he met other Jewish intellectuals in still more Kaffeehauser. At the end of this trip, he arrived at the Arab port of Jaffa on the

Mediterranean coast. He lived in Jaffa for a few years, frequenting Arab-, German-, and Jewish-owned cafes, and became part of a small Jewish intellectual and literary community. He made a name for himself as a Hebrew writer and changed his last name from Czaczkes to Agnon. Then in 1912, he journeyed back to Europe, this time to Berlin, where he joined a thriving Jewish cultural community that again met frequently in cafes. He spent the tumultuous years of World War I in Berlin before leaving Germany in 1924, traveling to Mandatory Palestine and eventually settling down in Jerusalem. In the 1930s, many Jewish migrants arrived there after fleeing Nazi Germany and Austria. As they found their way beyond the trauma that had forced them out of their homes, many of the refugees opened cafes, becoming part of the growing local intellectual and literary community, which had so inspired Agnon.

Agnon's journey took him to many cities and to many cafes. He traversed much of the route that we will follow in this book. But Agnon's cafe-laden path also tells us something about Jewish modernity writ large. These coffeehouses, way stations for Jewish intellectuals on the move across Europe and beyond, were central to modern Jewish creativity. In order to begin to contemplate the role of cafes in the development of Jewish modernity, we can turn to Agnon's fiction, to texts such as the novel Tmol shilshom (Only Yesterday), which he wrote in Jerusalem when he was a middle-aged man. In the novel, Agnon used episodes from his own biography to depict the life of Yitzhak Kumer, a young and naive protagonist. In one of the early chapters of the novel, Kumer travels to Lemberg, and upon arrival at the train station, he hurries to one of the local cafes. Why the coffeehouse? What, after all, is so important about a local cafe that Kumer feels that he must go there as soon as he arrives in the city? Agnon's narrator explains:

> A big city is not like a small town. In a small town, a person goes out of his house and immediately finds his friend; in a big city days and weeks and months may go by until they see one another, and so they set a special place in the coffeehouse where they drop in at appointed times. Yitzhak had pictured that coffeehouse ... as the most exquisite place, and he envied those students who could go there any time, any hour. Now that he had arrived in Lemberg, he himself went to see them. few hours later, Kumer finds himself standing in a splendid temple with gilded chandeliers suspended from the ceiling and lamps shining from every single wall, and electric lights turned on in the daytime, and marble tables gleaming, and people of stately mien wearing distinguished clothes sitting on plush chairs, reading newspapers. And above them, waiters dressed like dignitaries . . . holding silver pitchers and porcelain cups that smelled of coffee and all kinds of pastry.

This explanation of the significance of the cafe in the big city is simple yet quite accurate. In contrast to the intimate and thoroughly familiar small town from which Kumer—and Agnon—came, the urban environment is inseparable from, and often thrives on, a sense of anonymity and alienation. And yet city dwellers also need a place to meet people and establish a sense of community. Thus, cities have always included some sort of gathering places. For the past three hundred years, one relentlessly popular and profoundly influential place has been the cafe, offering the city's inhabitants—locals, migrants, and even visitors—an easy place to buy coffee and pastries in comfortable surroundings.

Of course, the items for sale are often the entry for something more profound. The urban cafe is not just a site of consumption but also an institution of sociability and exchange, where people can meet, converse, read newspapers, or discuss and debate the news of the day or other matters. In Agnon's novel, the Jewish students in Lemberg can do all of this for the price of a cup of coffee, if they can afford it. Kumer's experience as a wide-eyed young migrant who envisions the cafe as "a most exquisite place"

and a "splendid temple" is telling. The cafe is seen here as a substitute for what has been lost in modern life and at the same time a place that is completely novel and exotic, a place that can open doors to unfamiliar worlds. Thus, cafes embody the search for a space that can be both comforting and exhilarating, both familiar and strange. For Jews in the modern world, whether in Europe, America, or the Middle East, that search took on an even greater urgency.

Agnon and his literary protagonist Kumer were far from alone in moving from a small town to large cities and in gravitating to their cafes. This movement across cities and cafes was very common and was an essential aspect of Jewish modernity. From antiquity through the eighteenth century, traditional Jewish culture was quintessentially collective: to be a Jew meant to belong to the community. Thus, the culture that traditional Jews created was distinct from the surrounding societ^. Yet what may be "the most defining characteristic" of modern Jewish culture is precisely "the question of how to define it." From around the time of the French Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century, modernity created new possibilities and challenges, which went hand in hand with processes of secularization, emancipation, and urbanization.' As Jews Left close-knit Jewish communities and migrated to large cities, cafes emerged as significant sites for the modern Jewish experience and for the production of modern Jewish culture, a culture that became difficult to define or to pinpoint as "Jewish" in traditional terms.

Amid the enormous historical, cultural, and economic upheavals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Jews migrated to large cities and found their cafes. Indeed, Jews were often owners of cafes. Jewish writers have written in cafes, and they have written about cafes. Jewish intellectuals have used the cafe to create a place to argue with each other. Jewish merchants have made the cafe into a negotiating table. The cafe, in other words, has been an essential facet of the modern Jewish experience and has been critical to its complex mixture of history and fiction, reality and imagination, longing and belonging, consumption and sociability, idleness and productivity.

***

Figure C.1. Café Vienna, Jerusalem, 1950, in *Jerusalem, Living City* (Jerusalem: Government of Israel, 1950)

Closing Time

Where have all these cafes gone? Did they survive? Are there any cafes that are still significant to Jewish culture today? These are the questions I have received again and again as I have told colleagues, students, friends, and others about the book I am writing. I have asked myself these same questions repeatedly. Indeed, the answers are far from obvious. Of course, there are still cafes in the cities we have explored. In fact, thanks to international chains of coffee shops such as Starbucks and our obsession with overpriced caffeinated beverages, there are far more cafes in the world now than there have been at any point in human history. Many more people pass through their doors every day. And yet, when we compare the spaces explored in this book to current ones, we sense that the institution of the cafe and its function are very different now.

Moreover, it is clear that the confluence of modern Jewish culture and urban cafes that existed in European cities until World War II and in New York and Tel Aviv until the 1960s and 1970s does not exist anymore. It is hard to think of significant poetic or intellectual groups meeting in cafes on a regular basis, nor can you find many Jewish writers, journalists, actors, artists, political figures, and others

socializing, arguing, and creating in cafes. The only exceptions I can think of are the Mizrahi group Ars Poetics in Cafe Albi in south Tel Aviv and the literary activities in Cafe Tmol Shilshom in Jerusalem (named after Agnons novel). Perhaps there are a few others, but, by and large, cafes in Europe, America, and the Middle East no longer constitute the silk road of modern Jewish creativity that this book has traced. Contemporary urban cafes cannot be considered significant sites for the production of modern Jewish culture, despite the fact that Jewish culture exists, perhaps even thrives, today in many cities. What are the reasons for this change?

To attempt to answer these questions and to reflect on what this book has explored and revealed, we turn briefly to three contemporary Jewish writers and producers of culture who have contemplated and responded to them. The first is Aharon (Erwin) Appelfeld, the great Jewish novelist who was born in Bukovina in 1931 and lives today in Jerusalem. Appelfeld is one of the few contemporary Jewish writers who has made the cafe a center of his literary activity since the 1950s. He has written many of his stories and novels in cafes, and he has written about cafes as well. In 2001, Appelfeld published a memoir in Hebrew, `Od ha-yom gadol, which was translated into English as A Table for One.

Appelfeld, who survived the Holocaust and came to Palestine as a refugee in 1946 after spending a few years in a displaced persons camp, tells us in the memoir about how he finally found his place during the 1950s and 1960s in Jerusalem cafes. Appelfeld describes vividly his first visit to Cafe Peter, in the German Colony neighborhood of Jerusalem, when he was a twenty-three-year-old student: "no sooner was I through the doorway than I knew these people," the habitues of the cafe, "were my lost uncles and cousins." In Cafe Peter, Appelfeld found not only a kind of provisional home but also his voice after drifting for a few years as a Holocaust survivor in various European and Israeli camps and institutions. When reflecting on the reasons for his affinity for the cafe and finding a home there, Appelfeld writes, "My attraction to cafes probably goes back to the beautiful cafes of Czernowitz, in Bokovina, where I was born." He tells us that several Jerusalem cafes—Cafe Peter, Cafe Rehavia, Cafe Atara, Cafe Vienna, and Cafe Hermon—"retained something of the aromas and manners of European cafes." This is where he met people like Leah Goldberg, S. Y. Agnon, U. Z. Greenberg, and Gershom Scholem, as well as many other Hebrew, German, and Yiddish writers, including Holocaust survivors like himself.

None of these places, notes Appelfeld, exist today. "It should be said," he further reflects, that "most cafes nowadays are not so much cafes but more like large, crowded spaces.... Don't try to find any quiet there, or something mysterious, or that furtive connection with those surrounding you.... Cafes of this sort are not inviting, nor are they intended for sitting or lingering. You'd like to get out of them as quickly as possible." Appelfeld's memoir provides a multifaceted answer to our questions. First, by connecting Jerusalem cafes in the 1950s and 1960s to the European cafes he still had a chance to visit in his childhood and about which he had read and heard, he points to what we have explored as the silk road of modern Jewish culture—the transnational network of cafes that extended across and between European, American, and Middle Eastern cities. This network of Jewish cafes existed as long as large-scale Jewish migration was taking place, and the connection between various cities of significant Jewish migration was profound and meaningful. <>

Emmanuel Levinas's Talmudic Turn: Philosophy and Jewish Thought by Ethan Kleinberg [Cultural Memory in the Present, Stanford University Press, 9781503629448]

In this rich intellectual history of the French-Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas's Talmudic lectures in Paris, Ethan Kleinberg addresses Levinas's Jewish life and its relation to his philosophical writings while making an argument for the role and importance of Levinas's Talmudic lessons.

Pairing each chapter with a related Talmudic lecture, Kleinberg uses the distinction Levinas . presents between "God on Our Side" and "God on God's Side" to provide two discrete and, at times, conflicting approaches to Levinas's Talmudic readings. One is historically situated and argued from "our side" while the other uses Levinas's Talmudic readings themselves to approach the issues as timeless and derived from "God on God's own side." Bringing the two approaches together, Kleinberg asks whether the ethical message and moral urgency of Levinas's Talmudic lectures can be extended beyond the texts and beliefs of a chosen people, religion, or even the seemingly primary unit of the self.

Touching on Western philosophy, French Enlightenment universalism, and the Lithuanian Talmudic tradition, Kleinberg provides readers with a groundbreaking investigation into the origins, influences, and causes of Levinas's turn to and use of Talmud.

Review

"Can we read Levinas's work as wholly immanent to the history of philosophy, or must we see it as the worldly trace of a transcendent truth? Kleinberg explores this contest between history and revelation without presuming to declare the victor. ^ venturesome and ingeniously crafted book that confirms the author's leading role in modern European intellectual history." —PETER GORDON, Harvard University

A boundary-pushing, interdisciplinary work, challenging scholars and students to think through and with the audacity of Levinas's claim for alterity." —SARAH HAMMERSCHLAG, University of Chicago

Contents

God on Our Side / God on God's Own Side

On the occasion of Emmanuel Levinas's eightieth birthday, a group of his former students and colleagues held a celebration under the auspices of the École Normale Israelite Orientale and its parent organization the Alliance Israelite Universelle.

> At this event the president of the AIU, Ady Steg, told an apologue, or, perhaps a myth, imagining the day when Levinas would be summoned before the Heavenly/Celestial Throne:
> "Emmanuel Levinas, what have you done with your life?" Levinas would be asked.
> "I consecrated myself to philosophy and that which I considered to be good and just I have written in my books."
> "Very well, and what else?"
> "I studied with Husserl and Heidegger."
> "Heidegger? Hmm ... and what else?"
> "I also studied with Shushani."
> "Marvelous! It is true that Shushani was able to penetrate the soul of the Talmud. And what else?"
> "I presented many Talmudic lessons for the Collogue des Intellectuels Juifs based on Shushani's teachings."
> "Bravo! How can one possibly understand the Torah without the light of the oral Law? But what else?"
> With a result I was also able to comment on the Torah at the Ecole
> Normale Israelite Orientale of the Alliance on Shabbat mornings."
> At the school?"
> 'Yes, I was the director of the school for many years."
> "Director of the school? You, a prestigious philosopher?"
> "Yes, director of the school."
> With these words, Ady Steg tells us, Cherubs and Seraphs, Ofanim and Archangels would begin to sing a glorious hymn as Emmanuel Levinas is conducted to the right of the Eternal One.

Given the audience, it is no surprise that the hagiographic emphasis on Levinas as Talmudist takes pride of place above and beyond his status as a "prestigious philosopher." Indeed, it is Levinas as a disciple of the enigmatic Talmudic master Shushani who is emphasized rather than Levinas as a student of Edmund Husserl or Martin Heidegger. It is Levinas's commitment to Jewish teaching and to the transmission of these teachings, rather than his writings and work as a philosopher, that earns him his place "to the right of the Eternal One." This was, of course, a celebratory speech presented before Levinas's former students and friends, and thus one must be cautious in making too much of a playful address meant to commemorate a joyful occasion. Then again, Steg's address was later published as the "Apologue" to an edited volume titled Emmanuel Levinas: Philosopher and Teacher, which included an interview between Levinas and Paul Ricoeur as well as essays by David Banon, Ami Bouganim, and Catherine Chalier. Thus the story holds symbolic weight commencing as it does by invoking Levinas's status as philosopher of the "good and the just" and concluding with what can only be considered as the source of this philosophy, the teaching and transmission of Talmud. This conclusion is then corroborated in the essays by the three French academics.

Other more scholarly accounts of Levinas take a similar tack. In her work Vilna on the Seine, Judith Friedlander credits Emmanuel Levinas with introducing the French public "to a style of learning developed by the legendary [Talmudic scholar] Gaon of Vilna [1720-1797] in the late eighteenth century and passed down for generations by rabbis trained rigorously in the scholarly tradition established by this brilliant Talmudist." Contemporary Jewish intellectuals such as Alain Finkelkraut and Richard Cohen credit Levinas with leading them away from "postmodern" philosophy and back to the Eastern European Jewish traditions that were all but eradicated in the Holocaust. Benny Levy's explanation of his own turn to Judaism and religious learning is exemplary. "The name of one person is important, a person to whom I must confess my indebtedness, Emmanuel Levinas. Here is someone who had the very same philosophical training as Sartre, the same roots in phenomenology and humanism. He was someone who was very close to Sartre in his philosophical language, and yet profoundly different, because he had roots in Talmud." Statements like this have led to the belief that Levinas himself was "trained rigorously in the scholarly tradition" of the Gaon of Vilna and thus capable of passing on these teachings. Furthermore, Levinas's self-fashioning through statements regarding his relation to the study of Talmud strengthened this belief. This belief is false. Levinas was not trained as a Talmudic scholar, at least not in his formative years in Vilna nor in a traditional heder or yeshiva, and the errant assumption that he was is the myth of Emmanuel Levinas.

Then again, why shouldn't we accept Levinas as the heir to a tradition of texts and textual interpretation whose message and mission do not rely on, or should be judged by, the evidentiary standards of the modern historical guild. Is it so crazy to view Levinas's turn to the study of Talmud and his transmission of these teachings as descended directly from the Gaon of Vilna in the chain of tradition (sheshelet kabbalah), worthy of earning him his place "to the right of the Eternal One." The hagiography aside, why not come to this conclusion? After all, this would be in keeping with Levinas's claim that while "no one can refuse the insights of history," nonetheless "we do not think they are sufficient for everything.... Our approach assumes that the different periods of history can communicate around thinkable meanings, whatever the variations in the signifying material which suggests them.... For we assume the permanence and continuation of Israel and the unity of its self-consciousness throughout the ages." Such a conclusion rests on the belief that certain texts and meanings are transcendent and thus transmitted in ways quite different from those accepted by modern secular scholarship.

God on our side. The relationship is ultimately a paradox because God enters our side, pierces it, but still preserves the status of totally other or otherwise than being. "The human, therefore, would not be just a creature to whom revelation is made, but something through which the absolute of God reveals its meaning. This human impossibility of conceiving the Infinite is also a new possibility of signifying." This is a logic that eschews human understanding as the means for fully comprehending God or Revelation, be it in a religious or secular formulation, but nevertheless accepts the relation as a different mode of understanding based on a new possibility of signifying.

Scholarship on Levinas has often made sense of the tension in his work under the rubric of the universal and the particular and/or the ethical and the political. The argument in these works is that Levinas's philosophical writings and his confessional or Jewish writings each do different work, with one making universal or ethical claims and the other addressing particular or political issues. The literature on Levinas is vast and the arguments myriad with some scholars arguing for a strict separation between the works, others arguing that one side holds influence over the other, and another group arguing the two

bodies are inseparable. I find much of the scholarship defensible as readings of Levinas's work "on our side" but nevertheless inadequate to the task of taking up Levinas on his own terms to accept the possibility and implications of "God on God's own side."

When scholars attempt to reconcile the universal aspects of Levinas's work with the particular aspects, or attempt to massage Levinas's actual statements and actions directed at political or particular issues (the State of Israel, the Jewish people) to reconcile them with a larger or more inclusive message, they do so from "our side." In this work, I pursue the possibility that for Levinas, ethics springs from a source on the other side of our finite political or particular decisions and actions. The ethical commitment on our side is inspired, or better commanded, by Revelation, which is the conduit to God on God's own side such that these ethics should, ideally, inform our politics; it is also the case that our particular or political actions are marked by all the failings of human beings as finite and fallible creatures. We do not have the attributes of God. Levinas does not assume that this leads to total failure, but neither does he presume we are capable of total success. Instead, the relation between God on God's own side and God on our side provides a model for doing right even while it conserves the reality that we will also do wrong. Levinas does not assume too much or too little in what he calls the difficult freedom of a religion for adults. To fully understand this one must engage Levinas on the plane of his own understanding of the paradoxical relation between God on God's own side and God on our side rather than transfer his thought and writings entirely into the realm of human understanding be it under the duality of universal and particular or ethical and political.

As noted, for Levinas the study of Torah and Talmud as "living Revelation" is the means for this paradoxical relationship, and thus I propose that the most fruitful way to engage with Levinas on his own terms is through a study of how he came to his Talmudic lectures or readings presented at the Colloque des intellectuels juifs de langue fran^aise from 1960 to 1989. One way to do so would be to establish how Levinas's particular approach to the reading and interpretation of Talmud is similar to or different from other approaches. This is an attempt to situate Levinas within a specific tradition of Talmudic interpretation. Lawrence Kaplan takes such a tack in "Israel under the Mountain: Emmanuel Levinas on Freedom and Constraint in the Revelation of the Torah," where he argues that Levinas's Talmudic readings should be taken as such, readings of the Talmud. "For what this proposition means is that these essays, as Levinas himself states, are works of Talmudic commentary—philosophic commentary, if you will, commentary primarily on the Talmudic aggadah, but, nevertheless, works of Talmudic commentary—which consequently, and here we go beyond Levinas, ought to be read, studied, and understood within the context of that genre and tradition, that is, the genre and tradition of Talmudic commentary." In what follows, Kaplan considers one of Levinas's Talmudic lectures, "The Temptation of Temptation," read in relation to "such Talmudic giants among the rishonim [the leading Rabbis of the eleventh to fifteenth century] as Rashi, the Tosafists, and the Ramban [Maimonides], by such great commentators on the Aggadah as the Maharsha and the Maharal, as well as by a host of more recent rabbinic commentators and scholars who have commented upon and elucidated, oftentimes at considerable length and with considerable insight, those very Talmudic sugyot which form the subject matter of Levinas's essays." Kaplan's conclusion is that while he finds a "common denominator" among Levinas, the Ramban, and the Maharal, he also suggests that Levinas's Talmudic reading is one that could only have occurred "in our time ... in our post-Holocaust age." Thus while one can find similarities between Levinas and his predecessors, the conclusion appears to be that Levinas's approach is a product of his time and place.

Martin Kavka is less charitable in his view of Levinas's relation to his predecessors when it comes to the reading of Talmud. In "Is There a Warrant for Levinas's Talmudic Readings?," Kavka unravels three of Levinas's Talmudic readings to demonstrate Levinas's distance from traditional readings of Talmud, but he also points to the merits of such a dissonance. In a later piece, Kavka argues that Levinas misuses Hayyim of Volozhin's work in support of his particular claims and points to what he sees as several problematic interpretations. Whereas Kaplan finds a common denominator between Levinas and his predecessors, Kavka's conclusion is that Levinas lacks such a warrant for his reading of Talmud, at least in relation to traditional sources.

The conclusions of Kaplan and Kavka should not come as a surprise given that Levinas came to the study of Talmud late and under the tutelage of an enigmatic master in the person of Shushani, whose mode of instruction is as mysterious as the person himself (as we shall see in chapter 2). While such investigations into the provenance of Levinas's mode of reading Talmud are fascinating, they may also be quixotic in regard to determining the answers that the scholars pursuing such an investigation wish to provide. To my mind though, whatever the merits of such scholarship, be they historical or philological, their approach comes at the subject entirely from "on our side." In what follows, I want to conserve the conclusions of such traditional scholarship but also take seriously the possibility that Levinas's warrant for reading Talmud is determined by the relation between God on God's side and God on our side. As we will see in chapter 3, Levinas's dynamic reading of Torah privileges the book above individual interpretations of it, and it is the book that serves as the paradoxical link between the two sides.

"We have to come back to the contradiction between 'God on our side' and 'God on his own side.' ... In this radical contradiction, neither of the two notions could efface itself before the other."

Thus we reach an aporia, but, as I argued in Haunting History: For a Deconstructive Approach to the Past, it is the aporia that renders visible the polysemic and chaotic conditions of the past. In this work, it is the conflicting registers of the immanent and transcendent or finite and infinite as appear in the formulation "God on our side" and "God on God's own side." Thus the book is divided so as to provide an account of Levinas's Talmudic lectures that comes at this history both from "our side" and from the "other side." To do so, I deploy a deconstructive approach to the past that resists the interpretative closures that limit more traditional strategies. This is done by employing what Jacques Derrida has called a double gesture (un double geste) or double session (double seance), where two distinct modes of understanding the past remain open "according to a unity that is both systematic and in and of itself divided, a double writing, that is, a writing that is in and of itself multiple."

The first gesture or session of this book employs a traditional intellectual history of Emmanuel Levinas's Talmudic lectures presented in Paris, France, between 1960 and 1990; the origins of Levinas's turn to the study of Talmud in the years following World War II; and the reception of Levinas's Talmudic lectures. The thrust of this movement is to dismiss the "myth" of Levinas as a Lithuanian-trained Talmudic scholar and explain the ways and reasons that Levinas came to study Talmud in the aftermath of the Holocaust. This exposes the particular interpretative strategies and cultural allegiances that Levinas privileges for his reading of Talmud. At this level, the first session is about issues of intellectual legitimacy, intellectual authority, and cultural or interpretative preferences. It is an approach that tackles the subject from "our side."

The second gesture or session takes Levinas's claims about Revelation and Election on their own terms allowing for a logic of divine authority insofar as God is the author of the Book, wherein "the Scriptures confer a meaning upon events rather than asking for a meaning from them." This gives the reader warrant to take stock of Levinas's Talmudic lectures on the grounds upon which he presented them, the counterhistorical claim that divine and ethical meaning transcends time or particular historical context. In so doing, the second session also exposes the ways that the first adheres to the modern secular bias that discounts or dismisses fundamental aspects of Levinas's thought.

The first session presents a traditional intellectual history of Levinas's Talmudic lectures that provides a contextual reacting of the sources and causes for his turn to Talmud as well as a critical assessment of how his interpretative strategies are at times in conflict with his stated ethical commitment to the Other. The second session simultaneously offers a counter that allows for Levinas's transcendent claims about the past, history, and the ethical opening to the Other to stand in opposition to those of the first. Each session is meant to be in dialogue and conflict with the other such that the claims made in each session on the Talmudic lectures are often in direct conflict with the historical explanations offered as intellectual history. The one is historically situated and argued from "our side," while the other approaches the issue as timeless, derived from "God on God's own side," even if the lessons to be learned can and should be applied to specific moments in time. This means that it is also the case that Levinas's Talmudic readings, presented here, should be seen as applicable to our moment today. It is for this reason that I do not include the dates, places, or context when presenting the specific Talmudic lectures in the second session.

The architecture and presentation of this book is structured to facilitate this strategy as each chapter is written in two columns. The column on the left provides the intellectual history of Levinas's Talmudic lectures from our side while the column on the right takes up a single Talmudic lecture from the other side. The two-column approach allows for the two historical registers to unsettle each other such that every reader is forced to consider the underlying logic or assumptions that ground each interpretative strategy. This also ties this book to Haunting History insofar as the two-column approach enacts the unsettling of singular historical accounts and/or the positing of a singular historical origin. As noted, one important template for this strategy is the double seance as presented in Haunting History, Derrida's Glas, or his essay "Tympan" in Margins of Philosophy, but the more immediate and relevant template is the Talmud itself, wherein multiple and often conflicting commentaries and interpretations compete on a single page. The crucial distinction is that in this work the authoritative text around which the commentary is organized, the master or Urtext, is absent, and this too coincides with the arguments of Haunting History that question the authority and permanence of anything like an absolute original. To my mind, the past about which we write history is just such an absent text.

The deconstructive approach does place an interpretative burden on the reader, but it does so by design so as not to overdetermine the reader's conclusions. The two competing columns of text are designed to inform, challenge, and drive the reader forward. It is also playful as it encourages readers to play with the text by choosing their path through it: intellectual history first then Talmud, Talmud first, all of one and then all of the other. The reader trained to read texts from left to right will take the intellectual history to be the first session while the reader trained to read right to left will take the Talmudic lesson to be the first session.

The book, its format, and the deconstruction at work within it attempt to provide a richer and more nuanced historical account of Levinas by defamiliarizing the familiar and unsettling the idea that any book or narrative is fixed and closed. As such, it questions the assumptions of modern scholarly norms and the consensus belief that our scholarly practices are privileged because of their modernity. "Is it not perhaps the case that ideas of a thought worthy of the name rise above their own history, royally indifferent even to the historians? There are perhaps more constants through time than one is led to believe by the differences of language, differences that in most cases come only from the varieties of metaphor. Perhaps modernity, that is, the claim of deciphering all the metaphors, is but the creation of metaphors whose wisdom can already be grasped in ancient ways of speaking." By placing our modern scholarly conventions into dialogue with earlier modes of analysis and understanding and exposing them as the "metaphor of deciphering all metaphors," I also hope to make evident the strangeness of the "modern" or the present to divest it and us of our privileged status. Our modern modes of analysis and judgment are no less strange than those employed in antiquity (Torah) or the middle ages (Talmud).

Is the myth of Emmanuel Levinas his authority as an authentic master of Talmud or is it the authority of modern secular scholarship that impeaches such a claim? It is a dangerous question insofar as it threatens many modern secular assumptions, but it is the one that motivates this history of Emmanuel Levinas's Talmudic lectures.

In the first three chapters I develop the metaphor of a braid to bring together three strands of influence that lead to Levinas's Talmudic lectures at the Colloque des intellectuels juifs de langue francaise from 1960 to 1989. The three strands are Western philosophy, French Enlightenment Universalism, and the Lithuanian Talmudic tradition. The metaphor is imperfect, as we will see, because strictly speaking no strand is truly distinct, the influences of each blend into the other. Nevertheless, over the first three chapters I weave this braid to construct a history and counterhistory of Levinas's Talmudic lectures in Paris. In chapter 4 I shift gears, gathering the strands of the braid together to address recent important engagements and criticisms of Levinas's work by thinkers such as Andrew McGettigan, John E. Drabinski, and especially Fred Moten.

In chapter 1, I present a biography of Levinas's early life and education focusing on the influence of "Western" texts and philosophy. This journey took Levinas from Kovno (Kaunas) Lithuania, to Strasbourg, France, then Freiburg, Germany, and then Paris. This is the first strand of the braid. I couple this with Levinas's Talmudic lecture from 1964, "The Temptation of Temptation." In chapter 2 we encounter the other strands, first via an exploration of Levinas's work for the Alliance Israelite Universelle and his role as director of the Ecole Normale Israelite Orientale then through his work with the enigmatic Talmudic master known as Shushani. The first takes up the second strand of the braid, the influence of French Enlightenment Universalism as well as the colonial aspirations of that endeavor. The second brings us to the third strand, Levinas's return to, and privileging of, the Lithuanian Talmudic tradition and the danger of particularism or essentialism that resides therein. These are coupled with Levinas's Talmudic lecture from 1966, "As Old as the World." In chapter 3 we bring the three strands together to look at Levinas's Talmudic lectures for the Colloque des intellectuels juifs de langue fran^aise and an analysis of Levinas as a reader of sacred Jewish texts. This is coupled with Levinas's Talmudic lecture from 1984, "Beyond Memory." In each of the first three chapters we encounter the ways that Levinas offers a message of universal ethics but one that is centered on the particularity of sacred Jewish texts accessed with the intellectual tools of modern Western philosophy. The fourth

chapter addresses this tension by taking up recent critiques of Levinas's confessional writings, which claim "there is something presupposed in Levinas's conception of Europe that not only make ... racist and xenophobic utterances possible, but even make them necessary." ^ do so through an engagement with Fred Moten's The Universal Machine and Levinas's oft-cited claim that in his Talmudic lectures, and his confessional writings in general, his purpose was to translate "Hebrew into Greek." This is coupled with Levinas's Talmudic lecture from 1984, "Contempt for the Torah as Idolatry."

In the conclusion, I bring the two sessions together, "God on our side" and "God on God's own side," to ask the question of whether the ethical message and moral urgency of Levinas's Talmudic lectures can be extended beyond the texts and beliefs of a chosen people, religion, or even the seemingly primary unit of the self or ego? To do so ^ employ the term "constitutive dissymmetry" in an attempt to prise a lesson of disinterested universal ethics from the seemingly particular example of reading Torah and Talmud. Here, Levinas's commitment to the study of Talmud is not just any activity but indicative of one that results in "another me, who answers me, tearing me away from my solitude, and for whom I am answerable." The study for which Levinas advocates is indicative of a dynamism that is also a dislocation of sorts, a constitutive dissymmetry. As such, it can be an understanding of oneself completely dissociated from essentialism in regard to a people, a religion, or even the seemingly primary unit of the self or ego as well as the belief that it is our position in history as the most recent or modern that justifies our norms, codes, and actions. Our constitutive dissymmetry points us to the work we have to do, not to what we have already done. As such, it provides a compass for an ethics that is open to the Other in advance of the self.

The book ends by confronting the problem that tears at the heart of Levinas's ethical project and motivates my entire study from beginning to end. This problem has often been cast in regard to the conflict between Levinas's universal philosophical claims and his particular confessional ones or as the conflict between his ethics and politics. To my mind this misses the mark because it does not take up the way that Levinas's ethics are predicated on the relation between God on God's own side and God on our side. This is an ethics that is exemplary (or perhaps paradigmatic) and thus universal in a sense but that is intended to be applicable to particular, that is localized, cases or events. The danger or problem is the possibility that this exemplarism loses its dynamism and becomes essentialism. This happens when the exemplary status of sacred Jewish texts becomes more important than the message or living revelation contained within those texts, such that the people who adhere to those texts consider themselves elevated above others rather than beholden to them based on the teachings of responsibility that the texts ask us to continuously reconsider.

In the shadow of this tension and this understanding of ethics and responsibility, Levinas takes up the relation of Jewish identity to universal ethics. This leads us to the ways that being Jewish and being an ethical person are related for Emmanuel Levinas. In his life, in his career, and in his writings. As I see it, and as laid out in this book, the issue is that of maintaining a particular identity as a means of both self-preservation and ethical restoration, which, in so doing, also maintains the identitarian or essentialist logic that is the basis for racial exclusion. Restitution or reparation cannot be made to, or by, the appropriate parties without recognition of identity, but recognition of identity retains what is worst of such an essentialist formulation as the for identity based hierarchies. "Why can't we just let go?" This is a problem for Levinas living in the aftermath of the Holocaust, but it is also a problem for our historical moment as we come to terms with other legacies of racial injustice. Unraveling the myth of Emmanuel

Levinas is my attempt to deconstruct the ways that exemplarity and essentialism collide in even the most earnest of ethical constructs and to gauge the possibility of escaping this bind by thinking otherwise about the past. <>

HIDDEN HERETICS: JEWISH DOUBT IN THE DIGITAL AGE
by Ayaia Fader [Princeton Studies in Culture and Technology, Princeton University Press, 9780691169903]

A revealing look at Jewish men and women who secretly explore the outside world, in person and online, while remaining in their ultra-Orthodox religious communities

What would you do if you questioned your religious faith, but revealing that would cause you to lose your family and the only way of life you had ever known? **HIDDEN HERETICS** tells the fascinating, often heart-wrenching stories of married ultra-Orthodox Jewish men and women in twenty-first-century New York who lead "double lives" in order to protect those they love. While they no longer believe that God gave the Torah to Jews at Mount Sinai, these hidden heretics continue to live in their families and religious communities, even as they surreptitiously break Jewish commandments and explore forbidden secular worlds in person and online. Drawing on five years of fieldwork with those living double lives and the rabbis, life coaches, and religious therapists who minister to, advise, and sometimes excommunicate them, Ayala Fader investigates religious doubt and social change in the digital age.

The internet, which some ultra-Orthodox rabbis call more threatening than the Holocaust, offers new possibilities for the age-old problem of religious uncertainty. Fader shows how digital media has become a lightning rod for contemporary struggles over authority and truth. She reveals the stresses and strains that hidden heretics experience, including the difficulties their choices pose for their wives, husbands, children, and, sometimes, lovers. In following those living double lives, who range from the religiously observant but open-minded on one end to atheists on the other, Fader delves into universal quandaries of faith and skepticism, the ways digital media can change us, and family frictions that arise when a person radically transforms who they are and what they believe.

In stories of conflicts between faith and self-fulfillment, **HIDDEN HERETICS** explores the moral compromises and divided loyalties of individuals facing life-altering crossroads.

Review

"Finalist for the National Jewish Book Award in American Jewish Studies"

"Finalist for the Sami Rohr Prize for Jewish Literature, Jewish Book Council"

"[An] absorbing account of how Haredi Jews in contemporary New York use social and other digital media to negotiate religious doubt. . . . It is the personal stories in particular that make *Hidden Heretics* so compelling."**---Giulia Miller, *Times Literary Supplement***

"Engaging. . . . Fader effectively shows how modern apostasy meets hard-line orthodoxy." — *Library Journal*

"Providing us with a detailed examination of how disbelief occurs on a spectrum, Fader pushes us to understand how staying or leaving a religion does too."**---Katie Christine Gaddini, *Marginalia***

"**HIDDEN HERETICS** provides a view of contemporary ultra-Orthodox life from a series of unexpected angles and tucked-away corners."**---Naomi Seidman, *Public Books***

"Fader has written a groundbreaking work that delves into the parts of the Orthodox world that many do not even know exist."**---Ben Rothke, *Times of Israel***

"Substantial and riveting."**---David Zvi Kalman, *The Forward***

"Ayala Fader . . . unpacks one of the most daunting public secrets confronting Haredi communities: the suspicion, or realistic understanding, that there are members of the community who are experiencing life-changing doubt." — *American Anthropologist*

"[**HIDDEN HERETICS**] explores, with great insight and sensitivity, the complex existence of double lifers and the conditions under which they live. [Fader's] engaging style makes this fascinating work appeal both to scholars of contemporary Orthodox Judaism and those who study the relationship between technology and society, as well as to the general reader." — *American Jewish History*

"*Hidden Heretics* does indeed reflect the best of anthropology: an incisive, sensitive book that draws novel ethnographic fieldwork together with scholarship on language and semiotic ideologies, secrecy, doubt, media, authority, and ethics." — *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology*

"Masterfully written"**---Oren Golar, *Journal of Religion, Media and Digital Culture***

"*Hidden Heretics* offers an utterly compelling look at the way the digital age makes possible the emergence of social worlds in unexpected places. It is also a thoughtful account of the tension between religious belief and religious ethics and how they are intertwined and independent."**—T. M. Luhrmann, author of *When God Talks Back***

"Compulsively readable, *Hidden Heretics* is a gem for scholars and general readers alike."**—Shulem Deen, author of *All Who Go Do Not Return***

"By charting, in exquisite detail, the profound danger—and excitement—of life-changing religious doubt among the ultra-Orthodox in New York, *Hidden Heretics* demonstrates how contemporary digital technology has become the arena where the most urgent questions of religious modernity are being encountered, with renewed exigency and risk. This is necessary reading for anyone interested in religion today."**—Robert A. Orsi, author of *History and Presence***

"There are a fairly substantial number of books about those who have defected from Hasidic

communities, but this is by far the most insightful. It focuses not on those who have already left or are necessarily on their way out of these communities, but on those who remain embedded while wrestling with serious doubts. *Hidden Heretics* is an extraordinary accomplishment."**—Jonathan Boyarin, Cornell University**

"Fader has written a timely, daring, and important book on religious doubt in the digital age that illuminates the complex struggles of ultra-Orthodox double-lifers with sensitivity and insight. *Hidden Heretics* is fascinating and wonderful."**—Janet McIntosh, Brandeis University**

CONTENTS

In this latest chapter of North American ultra-Orthodox life, the crisis of emuna and struggles over the internet should be understood as a wider crisis of authority. On the heels of political, economic, and social conflicts, in the context of exploding population growth, a small, homegrown generational backlash has begun challenging the authority of ultra-Orthodox leadership and their claims as the legitimate arbiters of tradition (mesoyra). In this social drama, the internet became a lightning rod for wider communal debates about religious authority through public discourse about interiority. While numbers of those living double lives and fellow travelers are not reliably known, with individual estimates varying from a hundred t^ tens of thousands worldwide, they increasingly figure large in the ultra-Orthodox imagination. Using the public yet intimate anonymity of the internet, those living double lives rejected the heightened religious stringencies of their communities following the Second World War and wrote their changing interior lives into being. Ultra-Orthodox leadership, in contrast, defined the contemporary crisis of authority as the latest threat—the most recent in a long history of such threats—to the very survival of the Jewish people.

Arriving in the 1950 after the Holocaust as refugees, primarily from Eastern Europe, ultra-Orthodox Jews today make up about 10 percent of the estimated 5.3 million Jewish adults in the United States, with 89 percent living in the Northeast, especially Brooklyn and upstate New York. In the eight counties that make up the New York area, 22 percent are ultraOrthodox, roughly seventy-two thousand households. Despite public talk about the crisis of faith, in fact, demographically ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities continue to grow, owing to so many having large families (48 percent have more than four

children). There was a growing fear among many ultra-Orthodox that as they have grown increasingly comfortable in the United States, further from the trauma of the Holocaust with its moral imperative to rebuild, new dangers from outside and within were gathering force, most concretely from the internet.

In many ways more similar politically and culturally to Christian Evangelicalism than to other denominations of American Judaism, ultra-Orthodox life is all-encompassing despite so many living in the middle of New York City. Children attend private ultra-Orthodox gender-segregated schools affiliated with rabbinic leadership, with different curricula and languages for boys and girls. These schools later feed into arranged marriages, often brokered transnationally. With limited secular and English education, especially for Hasidic boys who speak primarily Yiddish, ultra-Orthodox married men often continue their religious study for some years until they go to work, either self-employed or in cash businesses that do not require degrees or even proficiency in English, such as accounting, real estate, information technology, local and online business, or teaching in ultra-Orthodox schools. And as I learned in the research for my first book, Mitzvah Girls: Bringing Up the Next Generation of Hasidic Jews in Brooklyn, ultra-Orthodox women often work as well, even as they rear large families. Their greater fluency in English helps them negotiate the secular world, so that men and boys can study the Torah undistracted and with pure hearts, which hastens the coming of the messiah for all.

Ultra-Orthodox men and women in New York participate in the economic, political, and recreational life of the city, but only in order to build up their own communities, not from a shared sense of citizenship; instead, religious leaders, educators, and parents endeavor to create communities for their children and themselves where they can be protected from knowledge, technologies, or people that might corrupt, distract, or challenge their commitment to an ultra-Orthodox way of life. They might live and thrive in the diversity that is New York thanks to federal, state, and city policies, but the ultra-Orthodox are sure that they alone are God's chosen people, waiting, as they have for over two millennia in diaspora, for the final redemption.

To tell the story of the contemporary crisis of authority, I organized this book around two ultra-Orthodox perspectives: (i) men and women living double lives, primarily married adults in their late twenties, thirties, and forties and their friends and families, and (2) rabbis, educators, and activists who tried to protect the faithful from doubt and those who treated doubt once it became intractable: Torah therapists, outreach rabbis, and Jewish life coaches. Those living double lives fell along a continuum of doubt, with implications for their belief and their practices. Further, men and women double lifers had very different opportunities and experiences, so that gender shaped the experience and enactment of doubt. Outreach rabbis, religious therapists, and life coaches made a living using therapeuetic and religious talk to strengthen faith, to cure doubt, and to reinscribe gendered hierarchies of authority. In their struggle over definitions of ultra-Orthodoxy, those living double lives and the faithful both appealed to an idealized shared Jewish past and drew on contemporary North American and Jewish theological discourses of the interior self.

An ethnography of a relatively small population of ultra-Orthodox Jewish doubters, those who tried to help them, and the role of the internet raises all kinds of questions about dramatic personal and social change. These questions are relevant not only for scholars of religion or of media, but for anyone interested in how people struggle to live morally meaningful lives in the digital age. What, for example, were the ethical dilemmas of those living double lives, who publicly practiced a religious life they no longer believed in and secretly violated? How did they talk about their doubts and keep secrets from

their spouses, and how did their rabbis and therapists respond? What can ultra-Orthodox struggles over the internet—which double lifers used as a lifeline, while rabbinic leadership claimed it contaminated Jewish souls—tell us about the possibilities and dangers of digital media? And how did those living double lives subtly try to teach their children what they called "tolerance" and "critical thinking," negatively valued as moral relativism in their own communities? To develop an anthropology of life-changing doubt, this book examines semiotic forms and practices—language, the body and clothing, digital technology, food and activities (like bike riding or praying)—to tell the story of the everyday moral compromises and dilemmas of those living untenable contradictions.

The Anthropology of Life-Changing Doubt

Ethnographically studying doubt productively complicates conceptions of religious lives and how anthropologists might study them. I distinguish between two kinds of doubt. The first is doubt that defines or refines faith. Anthropologist Tanya Luhrmann, for example, has shown that for contemporary Evangelicals that she studied in the United States belief in God was "made reap" through playful, ongoing narrative expressions of doubt and skepticism. For ultra-Orthodox Jews it was the discipline of religious practice—the adherence to the commandments and prohibitions (mitsves)—that ensured that interior emuna would always return, despite what all agreed was the inevitability of doubts, questions, and uncertainties across the life cycle. That kind of doubt remained private and contained, never acted upon and rarely spoken about, though one could and should seek out khizuk (moral strengthening) from books or listen to shiurs (inspirational lectures) given by respected rabbis.

My focus in this book is another kind of doubt, what I call "life-changing doubt." This was a kind of doubt that dramatically troubled a person's faith in the truth of all they had grown up believing, maybe even obliterating it for good. Life-changing doubt was so profound that it could no longer be contained inside, unspoken, not acted upon. People experiencing lifechanging doubt sought out new truths with other doubters, which led them to change how they perceived themselves and their worlds. And just as with the doubt that defines faith, few anthropologists of religion have studied life-changing doubt.

Life-changing doubt almost always provokes individuals to make larger, public changes in their everyday lives, with social and institutional repercussions. For example, religious studies scholar Philip Francis wrote about this kind of doubt in his study of a college "semester-away" program that exposed Evangelical young adults to poetry, literature, art, and music. The experience of listening to Bob Dylan or seeing a Rothko painting in a London museum led some students to experience life-changing doubt and subsequently leave Evangelicalism altogether. Francis notes that leaving did not just entail "tinkering with belief" or making an intellectual adjustment, but rather involved a "recreation of one's being in the world."

The ultra-Orthodox Jews living double lives that I write about experienced similar life-changing doubt, and they too re-created their lives. But they did not leave. They felt they could not. There was no rupture of everyday life, like those Evangelicals, Mormons, or even other ultra-Orthodox Jews who have had crises of faith and then left, a kind of reverse conversion story. Those living double lives stayed, and they kept their doubting secret, even as they made gradual and subtle changes to their everyday ultra-Orthodox lives, eventually including secretly breaking many of the religious commandments that had been part of the very fiber of their being since birth.

This kind of life-changing doubt became threatening to ultra-Orthodox leadership because it was a doubt that refused to remain in individual interiors where it belonged. One man living a double life remembered his Orthodox therapist "screaming" at him impatiently, "Why can't you be like everyone else and just keep these doubts to yourself? ... Your emuna will return if you just keep practicing [the mitsves]!" The crisis of authority, then, was not about life-changing doubt per se, but about interior individual doubt that became social and discursive. That is, those with lifechanging doubt discussed it together and shared and explored other ways of being and living. They did so at first anonymously and secretly online, but eventually in person as well.

Once interior doubt became a discursive social practice, it also became public, which was the most threatening to rabbinic leadership of all. By public I mean that life-changing doubt was made real with others across all kinds of technologies, in written and spoken languages (Yiddish, Engiish, and loshn koydesh: sacred Hebrew and Aramaic), on changing bodies where beards were trimmed or hair grew long, in changing clothing and m everyday practice. Those with life-changing doubt moved through unsanctioned spaces, such as social media platforms like WhatsApp and Facebook, as well as New York City parks, restaurants, private homes, or Broadway plays. People and digital texts went to places they should not be, doing things they should not do, arguing about the existence of God, falling in love, or taking off their wigs in the subway on their way to Manhattan bars. And because those living double lives continued to look and act mostly the same to their families and communities, it was the new medium of the internet that was initially blamed for enabling those with life-changing doubt to form an anonymous heretical public that was so frightening and challenging to rabbinic authorities.

Both secret and public, life-changing doubt morally threatened the ver^ integrity of ultra-Orthodox religious authority and, as such, it needed in explanation. Double lifers had grown up exposed to the truth and beauty of ultra-Orthodoxy. How could that not have protected them from growing kalt tse yiddishkayt (cool to Judaism, i.e., vulnerable to doubt)? Those living double lives could not be dismissed merely as what were called, bums or bumtes (feminine, bum), or for yeshiva boys, tshillers (chillers), that is, ultra-Orthodox Jews who were lax about religious practice not because of intellectual questioning, but just because they wanted to have a good time and were too weak to fight their inclinations for evil, their own tayves (lusts, desires, urges). Bums and bumtes were open about their "lifestyle," repenting every year during the high holy days, though they and their families were marginalized accordingly, especially in matchmaking. Double lifers were different. They had questions that could not be answered, questions that made it impossible for them to continue living as they always had. This was unfathomable and disturbing to the faithful. I remember visiting a community college class catering to Orthodox Jews, invited by a double-life professor of sociology. At the end of the class, a Hasidic student asked me eagerly, "What have you found? What really makes these people lose their emuna?"

There were, in fact, few consistent predictors of why a person raised in ultra-Orthodoxy experienced life-changing doubt. Esty, a Hasidic woman who appears frequently in this book, brought up this example. Her friend had told her that once she read Louisa May Alcott's Little Women, that was it. Her world changed, and she eventually left. "But," Esty said with a shrug, "I read Little Women too, and I was as frum as ever until much later in life."

Almost all of the men and women I spent time with remembered having had doubts and questions as teens, but many ultra-Orthodox teens do. That is the kind of doubt that defines faith. Most of them had had good reputations before they were married, and came from "good" families. Few had been labeled

"at risk," a category that lumps questioning in with other pathologized behaviors such as addiction, promiscuity, or self-harming. Almost all steered clear of any connection to Footsteps, an organization that counsels those who are questioning or have left their ultra-Orthodox communities. None that I met claimed to have been sexually abused—those who have more often leave altogether. The majority of those I met living double lives were also not gay or queer, something that can make staying, one woman told me, impossibly lonely. Most reported that as teens they had been merely naygerik or curious, not rebellious, though perhaps a few were called "ongelaynt" (suspiciously well-read), class clowns or cynics (letsonim). What those living double lives did share was that at the particular time of the life cycle, married with young children, that their emuna was supposed to be getting more and more ernst (serious), as their parents' and grandparents' had, their earlier questions and doubts resurfaced. However, this time the doubts and questions refused to be denied, and this time there was an online public to support them.

The life changing doubt of those living double lives was not uniform or consistent. Not all became atheists, as I had assumed at first. There was a continuum of doubt, complete with nuanced local Yiddish, Hebrew, and English categories that shaped religious practice or lack thereof. At one pole were the ofgeklerte (enlightened), those who had become more "open-minded" about religious doctrine and exposure to diverse perspectives (Jewish and non-Jewish). For example, ofgeklerte individuals might dip into academic articles about biblical criticism or evolutionary biology, along with religious texts not sanctioned by their own community (e.g., the writings of Ray Kook, founder of religious Zionism, taboo for Satmar Hasidim who reject the State of Israel). Their reading might eventually lead them to break some Jewish laws in private, but not necessarily.

In contrast, apikorsim (skeptics), were more explicitly critical of ultra-Orthodoxy and its leadership. They publicly denigrated the sages and rabbis, read all kinds of heretical literature, and even rejected certain core ultra-Orthodox doctrines, such as belief in the resurrection of the dead upon the arrival of the messiah (tkhiyes ha-meysim). Apikorsim were boundary pushers and social critics, but they were not necessarily atheists either. ^^frim (heretics) were similarly critical of ultra-Orthodox leaders and the system, but that was because they had more broadly come to reject the truth of the divine revelation at Sinai (matn toyre), which brought the entire narrative of ultra-Orthodoxy tumbling down. Even so, some heretics continued to believe in God of some kind. Both skeptics and heretics often violated Jewish laws, though only in secret as well.

At the far end of the continuum of life-changing doubt were atheists or agnost^cs (terms used in English), who rejected belief itself. Atheists might not feel obligated by Jewish law or believe in God, but some, not all, still retained an emotional attachment to what they called the "lifestyle" of ultra-Orthodoxy with its close-knit ties and sense of shared purpose, especially in contrast to their perceptions of the emptiness of other ways of life.

These were not hard-and-fast categories, since real people never fit so neatly into boxes. And time was a factor too. Some living double lives staved put at one end of the continuum of doubt, while others moved along it over time. When I first met Yonah, he was ofgeklert, still committed to keeping all the commandments, what is called "Orthoprax," but not necessarily believing that those commandments were truly God's words. A few years later, though, I realized he was texting me on WhatsApp on the Sabbath, something he had never done before. What the Internet and, later, social media offered, all

double lifers agreed, was a safe space to gather with like-minded others. This made them feel less alone and fear a little less for their sanity.

The continuum of doubt denied women even the possibility of intellectual doubt, since it referenced exclusively male categories. For example, some men living double lives called themselves maskilim (Jewish Enlighteners), the male Jews who challenged rabbinic authority in an earlier crisis of authority, the eighteenth- to nineteenth-century Haskalah (Jewish Enlightenment). Women I met did not use that term for themselves, nor did they generally call themselves ofgeklerte, kofrim, or apikorsim, words that appear in religious texts men study. Women I met often claimed they were `spiritual" even if they no longer believed in the system or the divine revelation at Mount Sinai. Though there were fewer women living double lives for structural reasons of mobility, opportunity, and access, even when a woman expressed life-changing doubt, male authorities (husbands, rabbis, fathers, therapists) almost always blamed emotional problems, dissatisfactions, or sexual promiscuity. As Shmuel, a Yeshivish blogger who figures prominently in the pages to come, wrote to me on WhatsApp: "Women [double lifers] are below the radar to the authorities.... [They] would probably ignore a woman's profession of doubts as the real issue and attribute it to a wandering uterus if you know what I mean."

Living a double life happened over real time and was sometimes enacted before my very eyes, since ethnography happens over real time too. For example, in our first meeting at the Atlantic Avenue subway stop in Brooklyn, thirty-year-old Hasidic Gavriel asked me to walk several yards ahead of him, so no one would see us together in public. We slunk into a nearby Starbucks, where he tentatively tried a cappuccino, his first. He looked nervously over his shoulder the entire time and spoke practically in a whisper, asking me not to use my tape recorder. When I met with him again, a year and a half later, at my university cafeteria, he was still living a double life, but he was, as he said, "less paranoid," since he had come clean to his wife, and she had decided not to divorce him. He seemed relaxed and confident, eating whatever was being served that day (not worrying about what was kosher), and talking openly, though he still asked me not to record him. For some, living a double life was temporary before they decided to finally leave altogether or were kicked out. For others, those in this book, there were more incremental changes over years, a process of making ethical compromises, often with a still-religious spouse, but ultimately remaining in their ultra-Orthodox communities. Those communities have experienced dramatic changes over the past twenty years or so, which ignited the contemporary crisis of authority.

I also got to know a number of religious therapists well, one of whom, Nosson, had experienced life-changing doubt himself. Eitan was a well-trained Yeshivish therapist who was critical of the system, while never losing his faith. Dr. Rosenberg, a Modern Orthodox psychologist, patiently answered many questions despite our never meeting in person, and his comments on the listsery were always informative. Rabbi Tessler figures prominently and is an influential and very well-known psychiatrist and rabbi. Shimon, who felt hurt by an extended exchange with him, asked that I use the rabbi's real name, but I decided that would be both inconsistent and unethical. I frequently cite a column by Mashy Blum in Mishpacha magazine as public musings on the dilemmas of religious therapy. Finally, I was able to talk with two life coaches, the Lubavitcher Mrs. Klein, and Modern Orthodox Coach Levine, each of whom so generously shared their insights.

The book is divided into two parts. Part I follows the trajectory of the crisis of authority as it has been unfolding over struggles about the internet. From the turn of the twenty-first century to 2019, I tack

between perspectives of those living double lives and rabbinic leadership. Chapter 2 ethnographically traces the contemporary crisis of authority to the Jewish blogosphere in the mid-2000s, which created an alternative, anonymous heretical public both online and in person. This public referenced an earlier crisis of authority, the Jewish Enlightenment (mid-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries in Europe), when a generation of Jewish men exposed to the European Enlightenment used innovations in print culture to take on traditional Judaism and its leadership. Chapter 3 follows contemporary rabbinic leaders, who increasingly blamed the crisis of authority on an external Gentile medium: the internet, particularly social media. In public rallies and printed edicts, they declared that the internet corrupted innately pure Jewish souls, leaving them unable to fight their own inclinations for evil and infecting them with invisible doubt. To protect the faithful and preserve the coming generations, rabbinic leaders attempted to leverage schools and mothers to enforce emerging standards for kosher filtering, which simultaneously reinforced existing male hierarchies of authority.

Part II focuses on the experience of life-changing doubt and its implications for families, friends, religious authorities, and institutions. Chapter 4 turns to the diversity of those living life-changing doubt and their still-religious spouses, especially the distinctive experiences and implications for men and women. Double lifers elaborated and navigated a changing morality influenced by liberal values, often in conflict with the ultra-Orthodox morality of their still-religious spouse and children. Chapter 5 foliows those whose life-changing doubt was discovered by or confessed to a spouse and the therapeutic professionals who tried to help them, especially Jewish life coaches, outreach rabbis, and religious therapists. The profession of religious therapy was itself in the midst of a moral struggle as to which authorities they owed their allegiance: their own religious orthodoxy or their clients' individual autonomy.

Chapter 6 recounts the secret social lives of double lifers as they experimented with other ways of living, writing, and feeling in digital and face-to-face spaces. The inescapable changes these experiments wrought on exterior forms—on bodies and clothing, in writing or speaking—were efforts by those living double lives to feel more comfortable in their own skins and hints to their loved ones that they were slowly changing inside. Chapter 7 focuses on the moral implications for children of parents living double lives. Despite keeping their life-changing doubt secret, double life parents often tried to subtly introduce new ideas to offer their children more of a "choice" than they had had. This led to ethical and emotional dilemmas, especially for ultra-Orthodox teenagers.

I have spent many years as a mostly secular Jewish anthropologist attempting to understand ultra-Orthodox life in New York, the city where I was born and brought up and have now, with my husband, brought up our own two children. This led to the intellectual questions I explore in this book, such as what and who defines moral responsibility; how age and render shape ethical judgment; what the politics of ethnographic fieldwork are in shared online and face-to-face spaces; how media of many sorts—bodies, languages and technologies, material culture—can create publics with their own authorities; and the ways that new digital media might actually be changing human interactions, expression, and concentration as we know it.

But there are emotional questions at play too. The stories of those living double lives and those who minister to them are about moral struggles over change—generational, technological, spiritual, intellectual—and they are filled with human pain, contradictions, and unexpected discoveries. My hope is that they speak to a wide audience, as they have so eloquently to me, so that this particular historical

moment in Jewish ultra-Orthodoxy might provoke conversations about the moral ambiguities of humans attempting to live ethical lives in the digital age, whatever and wherever those might be. <>

THE HERESY OF JACOB FRANK: FROM JEWISH MESSIANISM TO ESOTERIC MYTH by Jay Michaelson [Oxford University Press, 9780197530634]

Dispels false conceptions of Jacob Frank and fills in important chapter in history of Jewish mysticism

Provides a critique of past scholarship's conservative denigrations of sexuality and sexual deviance through the lenses of queer theory and phenomenology and philological-textual analysis

THE HERESY OF JACOB FRANK is the first monograph length study on the religious philosophy of Jacob Frank (1726-1791), who, in the wake of false messiah Sabbetai Zevi, led the largest mass apostasy in Jewish history. Based on close readings of Frank's late teachings, recorded in 1784 and 1790, this book challenges scholarly presentations of Frank that depict him as a sex-crazed "degenerate," and presents Frank as an original and prescient figure at the crossroads of tradition and modernity, reason and magic, Kabbalah and Western Esotericism.

Provides a critique of past scholarship's conservative denigrations of sexuality and sexual deviance through the lenses of queer theory and phenomenology and philological-textual analysis

Frank's worldview combines a skeptical rejection of religious law as ineffectual and repressive with a supernatural, esoteric myth of immortal beings, material magic, and worldly power. With close readings of the theological and narrative passages of Frank's teachings, Michaelson shows how the Frankist sect evolved from its Sabbatean roots and the infamous 1757-59 disputations before the Catholic Church, into a Western Esoteric society based on alchemy, secrecy, and sexual liberation. Sexual ritual, apparently tightly limited and controlled by the sect, was not a libertine bacchanal but an enactment of the messianic reality, a corporealization of what would later become known as spirituality.

Expands understanding of boundaries in mysticism and in Judaism

While Frank was undoubtedly a manipulative, even abusive leader whose sect mostly disappeared from history, Michaelson suggests that his ideology anticipated themes that would become predominant in the Haskalah, Early Hasidism, and even contemporary 'New Age' Judaism. In an inversion of traditional religious values, Frank's antinomian theology held personal flourishing to be a religious virtue, affirmed only the material, and transferred messianic eros into social, sexual, and political reality.

Reviews

"Jacob Frank, one of the most unexpected, shocking, original, and misunderstood figures in Jewish history, stirred up the Jewish world from the margins of heresy to the center of broad messianic movement that engaged thousands of followers in the mid-eighteen century, by crossing every traditional border of the Jewish community. Now, for the first time, *The Heresy of Jacob Frank* provides a groundbreaking book-length analysis of Frankâs outrageous and innovative religious ideas, based on close

readings of his recorded oral teachings. Dr. Michaelsonâs brilliant work is a major achievement in the scholarship of Frankism, Sabbateanism and Jewish mysticism, as well as an engaging and surprising tale of a man who transgressed every boundary he came across. Highly recommended." -- Rachel Elior, John and Golda Cohen Professor Emerita of Jewish Philosophy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

CONTENTS

Until very recently, most of Frank's teachings were unknown even to scholars. The Words of the Lord exists in only three manuscripts, was only printed in Polish in 1997, and has only been partially translated into Hebrew and English, with neither of those translations in wide circulation. (The handful of other Frankist primary sources are also not well known; they are discussed in chapter 1.) Fortunately, while "Collection of the Words of the Lord" [Zbior Slow Pankich, abbrevited here as ZSP] remains difficult to access, vitally important scholarship on Frankism has appeared in the last fifteen years from Pawel Maciejko, whose comprehensive history of the Frankist movement, The Mixed Multitude: Jacob Frank and the Frankist Movement, has transformed our understanding of it, as well as from Rachel Elior, Ada Rapoport-Albert, Jan Doktor, Cengiz Sisman, Matt Goldish, Jonatan Meir, Michael Fagenblat, Harris Lenowitz, and others. A review of this scholarship is contained in the Appendix. There have also been

several literary and artistic treatments of Frank, including two novels by Isaac Bashevis Singer, a play by Sholem Asch, Book of jacob, a 912-page novel by Olga Tokarczuk, various colorful presentations of Frank's life, and even a 2011 film by Adrian Panek. With this growing awareness of Frank, the moment is ripe for an investigation and perhaps reassessment of his fascinating, complex, and often convoluted teachings.

Chapter 1 introduces two Jacob Franks: one historical, one almost entirely fictional. The first was born Yankiev Liebowicz/Yaakov Yosef ben Leib, in Kor^lowka, Podolia (today part of Ukraine), in 1726, to a family with known Sabbatean affiliations. Frank's family moved from place to place in the Ottoman Empire and in Poland, perhaps due to accusations of heresy; in Ottoman territories, the name "Frank" designated someone or something European. After working for several years as a trader, in 1753 Frank made his way to Salonica, the center of Sabbatean activity, where he became a charismatic leader after entering in a trance in which the soul of the second messianic leader of the sect, Baruchiah Russo, was said to have entered his body. Frank returned north in 1755; there, in Yiddish, the term Frenk designated a Sephardic or Mizrachi ("Eastern" or "Oriental") Jew, as Frank indeed appeared, in the "exotic" Turkish garb he would wear for the rest of his life. The name "Jacob Frank" thus denotes him as an outsider in both Polish and Ottoman c^ntexts. Frank was one of many heretical, charismatic preachers at the time, before becoming, inadvertently, the most notorious Jewish apostate of his day in 1759, and a prisoner for twelve years thereafter, as discussed above. Following his release, for the remaining nineteen years of his life, Frank lived as a kind of faux-noble charlatan, attaining social mobility and status through a combination of grift, mystery, quasi-Kabbalistic lore, esoteric networks, political connections, ostentatious displays of wealth, exotic dress, and rumors of hedonistic excess. This Jacob Frank, the one who actually existed, died a failure in 1791, and when his daughter Eve passed away thirty years later, his sect ended as well.

The second Jacob Frank, however, is quite different: He is a semifictional character presented in ZSP, which Rachel Elior has aptly described as Frank's "aut^-hagi^graphy." This figure is at once boor and prophet, frustrated failure and world-historic figure. He boasts of his sexual prowess, spins yarns about his strength and audacity, and oscillates between openness and concealment, directness and obfuscation. His life is more myth than history, and his teachings are clothed in contradiction and misdirection. Thus, chapter 1 grapples with the question of how to read this strange text, offering methodological principles for assessing tales of Frank's "holy madness" and trickster wisdom.

Chapters 2-5 present close readings of four central elements of Frankist teaching: antinomianism, magical materialism, the quest for immortality, and eros. Chapter 2 discusses Frank's antinomianism: his rejection of traditional religion and its norms. Frank's critique is neither Kabbalistic nor Sabbatean in nature but based on quasi-reformist positions that might seem quite familiar today: skepticism, theodicy, a humanistic hedonism, and a surprising universalism, critiquing the particularity and hypocrisy of specific religious traditions. And Frank replaces religious restrictions with a celebration of sexuality, sensuality, and power. He tells his backsliding followers in §988:

> Your way is not my way, because you fasted for your gods and lay prostrate in mourning because mourning is their due, as it is written: "Rachel weeps over her children." But this is not my way. When my aid [pomoc] arrives, I will furnish my court and keep it in festive garments. I will provide all comfort in food and drink, I will have my own music, my own theater, my own actors, and everyone will rejoice and dance together, young and old alike, and that which is

> written will be fulfilled: "When he came to play before Saul, the Spirit of God rested upon him," because my God does not rest just anywhere, but only where joy and merriment reside.

Joy and merriment, for Frank, are prerequisites for the Divine, and markers of the sacred. Mourning, fasting, and self-abnegation are from the "side of death:' For this reason, Frank has utter contempt for the strictures of traditional religion. "All the teachings up until now have been like that dog that kept vomiting, then swallowing;' he says in §232, citing Proverbs 26:11 ("As a dog returns to its vomit, so a fool repeats his folly"). Rather like a contemporary "prosperity gospel" preacher, Frank says that material advancement is what God wants for the chosen. In §1292 he says the goal is lands, not laws: "All of these who are godless, let them learn the laws. God told Abraham: `To you and your children I will give all this land: He did not say that he would give them laws." Frank speaks of doing, not praying; the "masculine" Esau, not the "effeminate" Jacob; the physical, not the spiritual. As he says in § 1089, "I do not look to heaven for aid to come from there. I only look at what God does here on earth, in this world:'

Materialism is also the defining feature of Frank's theology, which we explore in chapter 3. Frank's world is an entirely material and physical one, but it is populated by beings with magical superpowers, and is but the shadow of the world of immortality and abundance. For example, Czest^chowa, where Frank was imprisoned, is understood not as a site of spiritual pilgrimage but as a site located atop a physical cave filled with physical g^ld. Redemption is not spiritual or otherworldly but entirely this-worldly, with abundant food and drink, and gilded carriages and clothing. Frank himself puts it best in §1001:

How greatly you misunderstood my words! I told you that there is one tower where the Lady is hiding, and if she sees somebody she desires with all her might, she throws them down a portrait of herself. ... I did not tell you about this in spirit, or in heaven. Instead, I said everything in plain view, on earth: that there is a Lady and a tower, and there is a painting they call a portrait.

This materialism even applies, to some extent, to God: "Shaddai," normally a name of God, is, says Frank, actually a shed—a demon (or perhaps, in Frank's mythology, simply a being with magical powers). And the world is maintained not by the monotheistic God but by three flawed gods associated with the Nephilim, the mythical giants of the book of Genesis. Our realm, according to Frank, is but one one-thousandth of the total universe. The vast majority of the world is on the other side of the curtain, inhabited by immortal beings, chiefly the Big Brother, a kind of demigod in need of human aid but also in possession of the secrets of immortality. Frank insists that this other world, too, is a physical one: In § 1299, he says that while our world takes four to five years to travel across, the other world would take five hundred to traverse. Yet the world of the Big Brother is, in contrast to our own, good and uncursed. Our world is directed by three evil gods and is filled with mortality and corruption. The other world is blessed with material goods like wonderful food, abundant wealth, and most of all, immortality.

The Frankist quest, discussed in chapter 4, is for Frank's inner circle of "Brothers" and "Sisters" to access this other world and learn the secrets of immortality. This journey, from baptism to Edom to Das—Frank's term for his new religion, which should be understood as gnosis, also the primary goal of Western esotericism—is a multistaged process involving the Brethren obtaining secret keys, wearing new attire, ruling over animals, enlisting mythical creatures drawn from Kabbalistic traditions, uniting

with the Maiden, and then finally passing through the "curtain" to meet the Big Brother. It is bewildering and baroque, but is also utterly material in nature. It is a quest that will happen in this world and yield this-worldly rewards which are often comic (if not pathetic) in their detail—Frank even describes the menus the disciples will enjoy after their transformations. This quest is both heroic and tragic: Frank's questing tales sometimes have happy endings, but often they explain the failure of Frank's initial mission, which he endlessly blames on his followers. Chapter 4 engages with this material in the context of scholarship on failed prophecy, following in the wake of Leon Festinger's classic study When Prophecy Fails, and its many critics. Preached by a failed leader in a borrowed castle in 1784, Frank's myths promise power, immortality, and life.

^ proleptic enaction of this redemptive liberation is found in sexuality. Chapter 5 discusses how Frank understands sexual liberation as devotion to the Maiden—the syncretic, messianic figure who is a perennial, feminine incarnation of sensuality itself. This liberation was both symbolic and real, accompanied by women (including, first and foremost, Eve Frank) taking leadership roles within Frankist communities, as they had in Sabbatean ones. It may also have been expressed in sexual liberation, as well as rare, choreographed instances of sexual ritual. There has been an unfortunate tendency in some scholarship of Frankism to magnify the scandal and frequency of sexual ritual (including accusations of incest derived from Frank's persecutors) while simultaneously reducing its meaningfulness in the context of heretical religious practice. In contrast, and drawing on the insights of feminist and queer readings of religious text and doctrine, chapter 5 explores five meanings of sexual praxis within the Frankist system: the construction of sexuality as worldly ecstasy, the queer remasculinization of the Jewish hero, the rupture of antinomian sexuality as enacting a redemptive performance, the liberation of the "feminine," and the transgressing of boundaries in a carnival grotesque. Religion has subordinated material to spiritual, female to male, sexual expression to virtuous restraint-but Frank ascribes these repressive impulses to the "Foreign Woman," literally the demonic. Perhaps drawing on existing doenmeh rituals, and, I suggest, analogous to contemporaneous Hasidic innovations in eroticized ecstatic prayer, Frankist sexual practice offers a "neutralized," privatized, and displaced messianic experience, though in this case opposed to traditional, patriarchal religious hierarchies: a liberationist recorporealization of the erns that religion sublimates into mysticism.

Finally, chapters 6-8 set these doctrines and ideas into their wider contexts. Chapter 6 shows that Jacob Frank in the period of ZSP's dictation is not a false messiah in any traditional sense, and no longer either a Kabbalist or a Sabbatean. Frank's apocalypticism does not have any of the themes of traditional or Sabbatean Jewish messianism. Frank does not declare himself the messiah, though he predicted imminent (very imminent—within two years) apocalypse and predicted that he would gain temporal power. The Maiden is the Messiah; at most, Frank may be analogized to the Mashiach ben Yosef, who prepares the way for the final Messiah, though he never claims this role either. Rather, Frank is in search of physical immortality and physical power. And uniquely, Frank's mission had already failed; Frank frequently laments in the subjunctive mood the redemption that could have happened had the disciples followed him more closely. Ultimately, chapter 5 proposes that, in place of messianism, a more useful term for understanding Frank's prophecies is millennialism, a more expansive concept meaning, in Richard Landes's words, "the belief that at some point in the future the world that we live in will be radically transformed into one of perfection—of peace, justice, fellowship, and plenty." Frank's millennialism, public and historical in 1759, had by 1784 become privatized, with the transformation now being limited to the Brethren. Chapter 6 also explores how Frank explicitly rejects Kabbalah and Sabbateanism, both

of which he ridicules for their ineffectuality. Kabbalah is marginal in ZSP; even counting generously, explicit Kabbalistic language or symbolism appears in fewer than 50 dicta out of over 2,500 in the text. And the view that Frankism is a continuation of Sabbateanism obscures more than it reveals. In fact, the relationship between Frank, Sabbetai Zevi, and Baruchiah Russo is one of displacement, not continuation. Frankism operates within a Sabbatean framework yet inverts the Sabbatean emphasis on faith and the unseen; for Sabbateanism, the Sod HaEmunah, the hidden "mystery of the faith; is central—for Frank, faith in the invisible is ridiculous, and the manifest is all he trusts.

Instead, chapter 7 situates ZSP and Frank in the context of eighteenthcentury Western esotericism. Arthur Versluis posits two essential features of this movement: "1. Gnosis or gnostic insight, i.e., knowledge of hidden or invisible realms or aspects of existence (including both cosmological and metaphysical gnosis) and 2. esotericism, meaning that this hidden knowledge is either explicitly restricted to a relatively small group of people, or implicitly self-restricted by virtue of its complexity or subtlety." Socially, mid-eighteenth-century Europe witnessed an explosion in initiatic secret societies clustered around esoteric and occult ideas, of which the Frankist sect at the time of ZSP was one; it was closely connected to Masonic networks, which it exploited for political gain, and Frank was in direct contact with other Western esotericist figures and charlatans. Ideologically, by 1784, Frank more closely resembles Casanova than Sabbetai Zevi, and his theology is more like Western esotericism than Kabbalah, syncretizing materialism, libertinism, folklore, and quasi-Enlightenment rationalism. The Frankist court resembles a secret society, and the teachings of ZSP resemble a Western esoteric theology, with equal parts tradition and modernity, rationalist critique and magical occultism.

Lastly, chapter 8 explores how late Frankism anticipates three subsequent Jewish movements: the Haskalah (and Zionism), Hasidism, and "New Age" Jewish spirituality. In each case, there are limited historical points of influence, but broader phenomenological similarities; Frank foreshadowed these developments, even as he did not actually shape them. First, after a brief historical summary of the Frankist sect after its leader's death, I revisit Gershom Scholem's largely disproven thesis that Sabbateanism brought about the Haskalah by destabilizing rabbinic authority. Ada Rapoport-Albert has shown that the Prague Frankists do form a nexus point between the two movements, but that their Maskilic ideals came from non-Jewish sources, not Frankist ones. The present study builds on that scholarship, noting how Frank's quasi-rationalistic critique of traditional theodicy foreshadowed

those of the Haskalah, and notes further connections in the context of Western esotericism. Next, chapter 8 traces the historical connections and phenomenological similarities between Frankism and early Hasidism. In addition to the Baal Shem Toy's awareness of and ambivalence toward the Frankist sect, Yehuda Liebes and Joseph Weiss have adduced strong evidence linking Frank's teachings and Rabbi Nachman of Bratzlav, who described himself as being able to "sweeten" the teachings of heretics. Chapter 8 further observes phenomenological affinities between the Frankist displacement of the messianic from the historical to the personal, and the Hasidic displacement of the messianic from the historical to the personal. Finally, chapter 8 explores how ZSP foreshadowed the cluster of Jewish movements associated with the so-called New Age, a category that, despite its vagueness and negative associations, has lately been the subject of significant scholarly study as a twentieth- and twenty-first-century religious mo^ement. Like Frank, Jewish New Age spiritualities such as Jewish Renewal (in addition to revivalist movements like neo-Hasidism, and even the very category of "spirituality" itself) attempt to extract the spiritual and personal-transformational aspects of religion from their religious

contexts, and place them into a syncretic, feminist, and universalist one. And like Frank, the New Age combines skeptical, humanistic antinomianism (or anomianism) with esoteric myth. Once again, while Frank's historical influence on these currents was quite attenuated (though not zero, given Western esotericisms and Hasidism's influence on New Age Judaism), he seems to have anticipated trends that would become widespread in Jewish religious/spiritual life.

Finally, the Appendix to this book contains a review of scholarship of Frankism; a detailed, quantitative analysis of the subject matters and genres of ZSP; and a review of textual questions (including dates of composition and editing) in ZSP and other Frankist texts including Widzenia Panskie ("Visions of the Lord," a compilation of Frank's visions and dreams from 1775 to 1786), Rozmaite adnotacyie, przypadki, czynnosci, i anektody Panskie ("Various notes, occurrences, activities, and anecdotes of the lord," hereinafter RA or "Various Notes," an incomplete narrative of Frank's career, apparently compiled in the early nineteenth century), the prophetic "Red Letters" and the "Prophecies of Isaiah," and others.

Scholem once remarked at how shocking it was that, at the same time of the French Revolution, an odd, charismatic crypto-Jew led a secret society of heretics. In fact, however, the two phenomena were not so distant from one another. Narrowly speaking, Frank's would-be heir, Moses Dobruschka, played a bit part in the French Revolution, using his Masonic connections to run guns from the Hapsburg Empire to the revolutionaries. But more broadly, the Frankism of Words of the Lord welds together a quasi-Enlightenment skepticism with a quasi-gnostic esotericism, promising to liberate sensuality and attain immortality to those who follow Frank faithfully. Halfway between superstition and science, Frankism is a seemingly impossible juxtaposition of a skeptical, materialist critique and a secretive cult based on magic, obedience, and control. Yet by issuing such a startling critique of normative religion, by uprooting himself and his community from any semblance of the old order, and by syncretizing multiple and intersecting spiritual pathways, Frank was a precursor of trends that would define Western religion and postreligion two centuries after his death. It is almost as if his persecutors knew what lay ahead. <>

Jewish Philosophy for the Twenty-First Century Personal Reflections edited by Hava Tirosh-Samuelson and Aaron W. Hughes [Supplements to The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy, Brill, ISBN 978900427961 2]

Jewish Philosophy for the Twenty-First Century encourages contemporary Jewish thinkers to reflect on the meaning of Judaism in the modern world by connecting these reflections to their own personal biographies. In so doing, it reveals the complexity of Jewish thought in the present moment. The contributors reflect on a range of political, social, ethical, and educational challenges that face Jews and Judaism today and chart a path for the future. The results showcase how Jewish philosophy encompasses the methodologies and concerns of other fields such as political theory, intellectual history, theology, religious studies, anthropology, education, comparative

literature, and cultural studies. By presenting how Jewish thinkers address contemporary challenges of Jewish existence, the volume makes a valuable contribution to the humanities as a whole, especially at a time when the humanities are increasingly under duress for being irrelevant.

CONTENTS

Jewish Philosophy for the Twenty-First Century by Aaron W. Hughes and Hava Tirosh-Samuelson

Despite calls to the contrary, philosophy is an embodied activity. Entry into the field, the types of genres we are attracted to, and the types of argumentation we deem successful (or not) are not universal but rooted in the particular life stories of those who engage in philosophical reflection. The ability to

philosophize and to reflect critically on matters is based on our own personal stories: where we come from, who we are as scholars, with whom we have studied, our daily interactions with the world in which we find ourselves, and the attachments we form with those around us, including our spouses and children. We cannot simply check such experiences at the door and think as if unencumbered by our own historical situatedness. Using the language of Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929), it is incumbent upon us to reflect on what motivates our wonder and connect it, not divorce it, from the "flow of life" (1999b, 40). Life flows from birth toward death, and philosophy is but one mechanism whereby we reflect on and categorize both our individual and collective journeys.

This is not to imply that we all exist in shells, incommunicado in our mutual solipsism. What this attitude does afford us, however, is the very tangible realization that who we are and what we define as the human condition is ultimately defined by our creatureliness (see, for example, Lakoff and Johnson 2003). Our symbolic and epistemological productions, in other words, can neither be divorced nor disconnected from their material conditions. And while our intellectual categories do not map perfectly onto our biological realities, it is necessary that we are aware of their existence and how they mutually influence one another. This means that we need to be conscious of the fact that our mutual conversations emerge from somewhere, and that they do not take place outside the "flow of life."

Philosophical activity is a method of narration that informs the realization that we cannot know independently of time. Rosenzweig characterizes this as "speech thinking" (Sprachdenken), which forms the cornerstone of what he calls "New Thinking" (das neue Denken). He writes in an essay of the same name that

> [t]he method of speech takes the place of the method of thinking, as developed in all earlier philosophies. Thinking is timeless and wants to be timeless. With one stroke it wants to make a thousand connections; the last, the goal, is for it the first. Speech is bound to time, nourished by time, [and] it neither can nor wants to abandon this ground of nourishment; it does not know beforehand where it will emerge; it lets itself be given its cues from others; it actually lives by another's life, whether that other is the one who listens to a story, or is the respondent in a dialogue, or the participant in a chorus; thinking, by contrast, is always solitary. (1999a, 86)

Although Rosenzweig wanted to avoid the term "Jewish philosophy," he nonetheless was keenly aware that the universal gaze of philosophy, the perspective from the so-called "All," threatened the particular by leveling it into something it was not nor could ever be. Since it is concerned with a particular people, the Jews, and how to frame its traditions in a universal light, Jewish philosophy can never be about pure thinking, if there can indeed ever be such a phenomenon (see our comments in Tirosh-Samuelson and Hughes 2013). Rather, Jewish philosophy, to return to Rosenzweig's assessment, must be a form of narrative philosophy, one wherein philosophical thinking takes place in the unfolding stories of those who engage in its practice. Rather than provide a set of truth-claims to which all ought to be able to give assent, Jewish philosophy, on account of its particularistic focus, is interested in a set of other questions, many of which are inherently personal: Who am I? To what story do I belong? Why is my story different from that of the mainstream? (see, for example, Sacks 2013, 25).

Because of its embeddedness in peoplehood, in religion, in the specifics inherent to particularism, Jewish philosophy has not and perhaps cannot be approached using the tools of analytic philosophy, which seeks to define the world using a set of universal truth-claims to which all can assent. These truthclaims, to quote Bertrand Russell, are defined by their

> incorporation of mathematics and its development of a powerful logical technique. It is thus able, in regard to certain problems, to achieve definite answers, which have the quality of science rather than of philosophy. It has the advantage, in comparison with the philosophies of the systembuilders, of being able to tackle its problems one at a time, instead of having to invent at one stroke a block theory of the whole universe. Its methods, in this respect, resemble those of science. I have no doubt that, in so far as philosophical knowledge is possible, it is by such methods that it must be sought; I have also no doubt that, by these methods, many ancient problems are completely soluble. (1945, 834)

Analytic philosophy is about what words mean, and is not interested in the specific meanings of these words in particular contexts. It is, in short, neither interested in nor amenable to the particular. And the particular par excellence within Western civilization has been Judaism; its unwillingness to elide itself into the so-called universalism of the Christocentric West has often resulted in drastic consequences. Yet Jewish philosophy, as the set of discourses of and about a particular people, is and has always been about justifying why a particular life is justified in light of the universal to which philosophy aspires. Perhaps for this reason, Jewish philosophy has always been more interested in history and historicism than non-Jewish philosophy, especially of the analytic variety.

What seems to differentiate Jewish philosophy from more universal strains of philosophy is its emphasis on difference and on the particular. Jewish philosophy must ultimately apologize for why the individual cannot be subsumed into the universal. The inherently apologetic strain to Jewish philosophy immediately raises this question: Is it philosophy or theology? Indeed, what we are accustomed to calling "Jewish philosophy" does not engage in truth independent of religious claims. If philosophy represents the critical and analytic approach to uncover truths based on rational argumentation, theology coincides with the systematic study of religion and the subsequent articulation of religious truth-claims. The difference between theology and philosophy would seem to reside both in their methods and aims. If philosophy has "truth" as its primary object of focus, theology concerns itself with ascertaining religious dogma. If philosophy seeks to elide the individual into the universal, theology—a form of constructive philosophy—desires to make room for the individual. It is, returning to Rosenzweig, a form of thinking defined by its own narrativity. "To be a theologian," writes David R. Blumenthal, "is also to speak of the ought" (1993, 4). He elaborates that

> it is not enough to explain, to explicate, and to exegete. It is to make a prior commitment to formulating a vision and to preaching that vision as an ideal toward which humanity should, indeed, must strive. Theology is not a value-free discipline; it is, rather, a value-laden discipline and it should be so consciously, unashamedly. (1993, 4)

Jewish philosophy has the potential to restore the individual to the activity of sustained reflection on tradition. Jewish philosophy, in other words, need not—in fact one might say "cannot"—be disinterested. It provides a context in which Jewish intellectuals—past, present, and future—think about issues that are of real concern to Jews and to Judaism. It is a mode of thinking that is concerned with life and with making sense of the difference inherent to it. But if Jewish philosophy is about acknowledging and justifying the particular, it must also reflect on those concerns and issues that Jews share with others. As Jewish thinkers increasingly reflect on issues that are of concern to all of humanity—science, politics, ethics—it becomes quite clear, as the chapters below demonstrate, that Jewish philosophy does not take place in a rarefied academic environment but forms an intimate part of what it means to reflect proactively on the human condition writ large.

Understanding Jewish Philosophy Today

Since the first encounter of Judaism with Greek thought, a particular type of Judaism has articulated itself through the performance of philosophy. In Philo of Alexandria's account of allegory, Saadiah Gaon's defense of the world's creation, or Hermann Cohen's and Emmanuel Levinas's associations of Judaism with morality, philosophy has made Judaism compatible with the larger cultures in which Jews have lived. This desire for compatibility has created a set of religious, ethical, or political values that Judaism could contribute to those cultures. This has given a privileged place to a set of canonical thinkers and texts—Saadiah Gaon to Isaac Abarbanel in the medieval period and Moses Mendelssohn to Franz Rosenzweig in the modern—that are believed to articulate Judaism using universal and rationalist criteria.

During the twentieth century, Jewish philosophy experienced a major renaissance, and Jewish thinkers (most notably, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, Emmanuel Levinas, and Joseph Soloveitchik) have reshaped the discourse of Western thought for both Jews and non-Jews. These philosophical giants are no longer alive, but a significant group of living Jewish thinkers continues to produce innovative Jewish thought by showing the intersections between theology, hermeneutics, politics, ethics, science and technology, law, gender, and ecology. This new generation of Jewish philosophers has reflected on the Holocaust, the renewal of Jewish political sovereignty, secularism, postmodernism, and feminism. Although not as well-known as the great Jewish philosophers of the past, this contemporary generation has nevertheless made major contributions to Jewish philosophy by showing its vitality, depth, and intellectual rigor. We, as editors, contend that it is important both to showcase this contribution and to show the activity of Jewish philosophy as a living and engaged conversation with the (post-) modern world.

What follows features the uniqueness of Jewish philosophy as a distinctive discourse within the contemporary concerns associated with the humanities' curricula. The chapters included herein reveal numerous features of Jewish philosophy at the present moment. To begin, Jewish philosophy is inherently interdisciplinary, encompassing the methodologies and concerns of other fields such as political theory, intellectual history, theology, religious studies, anthropology, education, comparative literature, and cultural studies. Second, Jewish philosophy is intensely personal: to think about the meaning of being Jewish or the meaning of Judaism in the modern world can never be separated from the personal biography of the thinker. The contributors to this volume present their reflections as the outcome of their own personal narratives, their academic training, their engagement with previous thinkers who have shaped their ideas, and the particular circumstances of their personal lives. In so doing, Jewish philosophy challenges the impersonal and arid manner that marks the style of contemporary philosophy, especially that found within the analytical tradition associated with most departments of philosophy, at least within North America. Indeed, it is perhaps no coincidence that the majority of Jewish philosophers today tends to work in departments of religious studies within the contemporary university. Third, Jewish philosophy is socially embedded and, thus, inseparable from the lived experience of Jews. The contributors to this volume, accordingly, reflect on a range of political, social, ethical, and educational challenges that face Jews and Judaism at the current moment. By showcasing how Jewish thinkers address contemporary challenges of Jewish existence, the volume makes a valuable contribution to the humanities as a whole, especially at a time when the humanities are increasingly under duress for being irrelevant. This volume seeks to make a strong case as to why Jewish philosophy, as an integral part of the humanities, is both culturally relevant and intellectually valuable.

Within this context, it is worth noting that this project is intimately connected to another one that we, the editors, are involved in with Brill. **THE LIBRARY OF CONTEMPORARY JEWISH PHILOSOPHERS** (LCJP) is a twenty-volume collection, a "library," that showcases an older generation of living Jewish philosophers (for example, Eliezer Schweid, Eugene Borowitz, David Novak, and Norbert Samuelson), including their relationship to the Jewish philosophical past and contemporary Jewish existence. If that library features an older generation, the present volume is an attempt to introduce readers to some of the most dynamic voices of a new generation of Jewish philosophers, many of whom are both in conversation with and, not infrequently, critical of earlier generations. Taken together, Jewish Philosophy for the Twenty-First Century: Personal Reflections and the volumes that comprise The Library of Contemporary Jewish Philosophers show the vibrancy of Jewish philosophical thought at the beginning of the twenty-first century. These overlapping projects exhibit the wide-ranging engagement of Jewish thinkers with contemporary philosophy, theology, political science, ethics, hermeneutics, environmentalism, and gender studies. In so doing, the Library and the present volume display the richness of topics and concerns among contemporary Jewish thinkers, identify the salient intellectual challenges for the twenty-first century, and articulate issues that require special philosophical attention for further analysis.

Jewish Philosophy: Reintroducing the Personal

Jewish philosophy, as we have just discussed, is a constructive activity as well as an academic discipline. Jewish philosophy today is comprised of a set of overlapping and, at times, mutually exclusive discourses that reflect those who engage in its practice. As the essays in this volume reveal, there is no singular way to engage in something that is monolithically referred to as "Jewish philosophy." Indeed, this is the main reason that we have decided against offering summary of the chapters here in the introduction: to lump them into themes would be to impose an order and a structure on disparate voices. Instead, we see a set of scholars—from across the religious and ideological spectrum, from those living in the Land of Israel and in the Diaspora—who reflect systematically and personally on issues that are relevant to their understanding of Judaism and its engagement with and in the modern world. What unites the volume is self-reflection on the activity of Jewish philosophy and of concern for the welfare of Judaism in the twenty-first century.

The path to Jewish philosophy, as these essays reveal, is not necessarily a natural or even an expected one. On the contrary, each path reveals something of the idiosyncrasies of the particular journey. Conversion to Judaism, the pain witnessed as the children of Holocaust survivors, the desire for intellectual respectability, the experience of anti-Semitism—all of these journeys, and others, shows how the urge to philosophize from a Jewish perspective is both convoluted and specific to the individual engaging in such activity.

Rather than remove the personal and get straight to the argument, we contend that the two are intimately intertwined. Each philosopher's argument only makes sense in light of a specific narrative, and this narrative, in turn, helps illumine for us that which is important to each individual. The reintroduction of the personal, we contend, is an important feature that is lacking in so much contemporary philosophy. This approach permits each individual to tell a personal and idiosyncratic story, as opposed to offering a more discursive and traditional presentation on a particular theme. Rather than assume that the traditional is the real or authentic, we hope to show that this need not be the case. The result is a series of essays that are situated and embedded, as opposed to offering us a view from "on high," as it were.

This Volume

Each chapter below provides an original essay, written by a Jewish philosopher, theologian, intellectual historian, ethicist, and/or social theorist. We have asked each author to identify what he or she considers to be the major philosophical, theological, political, ethical, and social challenges to Judaism in the twenty-first century. In addition, we have asked each contributor to address these challenges from a Jewish perspective and reflect on his or her unique contribution to the manifold discourses that comprise Jewish philosophy. The result, taken together, is a volume that showcases Jewish philosophy as a living practice that responds to contemporary issues and charts potential paths for the future growth of the discipline.

Each essay has a title that captures the distinctive approach, focus, or argument of the essay. We have chosen to arrange the chapters alphabetically in order to allow each author to speak in his or her own voice, without imposing on the thinker a preconceived thematic focus. We intentionally do not wish to cluster the essays into subsections, because such division proves to be artificial and at cross-purposes with the volume's tenor. Nonetheless, an ambiguity runs across this volume because the term "Jewish philosophy" refers both to the academic discipline and to the constructive endeavor that transcends the boundaries of the modern academy. Instead of glossing over this ambiguity or trying to explain it away, we endorse it because it invites the readers to reflect on the complexity of Jewish philosophy. How does Jewish philosophy relate to Judaism? What relevance does Jewish philosophy have to contemporary Jewish life? How does Jewish philosophy frame the relationship between Jews and non-Jews? There is no one correct answer to these questions, and herein lies the richness of Jewish philosophy. We could go even further and say that given the inherently subjective, nature of Jewish philosophizing, it is doubtful that we can even speak about "Jewish philosophy" as a coherent, unified discourse.

Each essay includes a biographical narrative, a reflection on one's place within and relationship to the various discourses that comprise Jewish philosophy, an analysis of what the author considers to be the task of Jewish philosophy, and finally a philosophical engagement with a particular set of intellectual challenges that come out of the philosopher's existing body of work. We, as editors, have asked each author to address a set of questions: How did you embark on Jewish philosophy? What is the intellectual task of Jewish philosophy? How does your thinking relate to the traditional Jewish sources? How do these sources shape your thinking about contemporary issues? Is there a Jewish philosophical canon; if so, is your work informed by the earlier Jewish philosophical canon? What are the major problems facing Judaism in the twenty-first century? How does your distinctive approach to Jewish philosophy address these problems? How can Jewish philosophy ensure its vitality in the future? The diverse answers make it clear that to practice Jewish philosophy is to engage in a highly self-reflective activity.

This volume, we are convinced, provides a real alternative to existing books on Jewish philosophy. For the past two decades, leading academic publishers have published large, edited volumes surveying the history of Jewish philosophy (for example, Frank and Leaman 1997, 2003; Nadler and Rudavsky 2009; Kavka, Braiterman, and Novak 2012). These volumes have provided immense and valuable information about the Jewish philosophical past, and they have showcased the strength of Jewish philosophy as an academic discipline in the present. However, these volumes deliberately obscured the authors' own voices because they were committed to the conventions of nineteenth-century historicism about the

ability of academic research to uncover the past "as it truly was." In addition, many of these reference works are descriptive as opposed to critical. By contrast, we have attempted to move away from historical descriptions of philosophical issues to personal, constructive reflections by Jewish philosophers who can evaluate their own life's work, explore their approach to theoretical challenges, and assess their individual path to Jewish philosophical activity. Jewish philosophy, thus, emerges as a living and lively intellectual experience of utmost relevance to Jews and non-Jews alike. We offer it as the best proof for the vitality and creativity of Jewish philosophy at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

The essays in this volume enrich the discourse of Jewish philosophy in numerous ways. In terms of topics, this volume invites Jewish philosophers to engage science and technology (Ravven and Tirosh-Samuelson), art and literature (Braiterman), politics and sociology (Mittleman, Hughes, Trigano, and Harvey), and civic life (Pessin, Sagi, and Katz). In terms of methodology, several essays offer new ways to overcome the religious-secular divide by exploring the positive role of religious doubt and philosophical skepticism (Wolfson and Magid), by offering new epistemological, linguistic, and hermeneutical paradigms (Cass, Ross, and Diamond), or by reflecting on the philosophical meaning of history and historicity (Biemann, Morgan, and Rosenstock). While theology is discussed in several essays (for example, Pessin, Diamond, Magid, Trigano, Cass, and Seeskin), the volume either reframes Jewish theology by bridging the divide between Judaism and Christianity (Kavka-Rashkover, Meir, and Pessin) or, conversely, by taking secularism and secular ideologies such as feminism, psychoanalysis, and socialism to be Jewishly and philosophically relevant (Oppenheim, Braiterman, and Tirosh-Samuelson). Philosophical activity, of course, requires the use of reason, but how reason is conceptualized varies greatly: for some, human reason paves the path for transcendence (Seeskin) even though it is embodied activity (Ravven); for others, reason is crucial to ground faith communities (Cass and Ross), and, for yet another (Wolfson), it is the paradoxical power of reason that enables us to probe knowledge while denying the possibility of knowledge. The new topics, methodologies, and sources thus revitalize the discourse of Jewish philosophy while insisting that this discourse has a unique role to play in Western education (Katz, Goodman, and Hughes). Although the contributors to this volume philosophize in their own unique and even idiosyncratic ways, collectively the volume makes clear how Jewish philosophy as a self-reflective activity has a responsibility toward the world in which it is socially embedded; Jewish philosophy is not mere speculation but a guide for action.

We envision this volume as contribution to the discipline of Jewish philosophy within the context of Jewish studies and more broadly to the discipline of philosophy within the context of the humanities. By showcasing the inherently interdisciplinary, contextual, and cross-cultural dimensions of Jewish philosophy, we present it as a model for the humanities in the twenty-first century. In this model, the humanities interact with the natural sciences and the social sciences, engage with and respond to contemporary culture, and transcend the religious/secular divide. In the twenty-first century, the disciplines that comprise the humanities will continue to wrestle with the meaning and purpose of being human, but will do so in light of the knowledge that has been accumulated and will continue to be generated in other scientific disciplines, and in such a manner that they will no longer be stifled by the academic debates of the late twentieth century (most notably between modernism and postmodernism). Should Jewish philosophy become the model for the humanities in the current century, we will no longer ponder humanities' relevance and importance, nor will we doubt the need of Judaism to encompass philosophy.

References

Blumenthal, David R. 1993. **Facing the Abusing God: A Theology of Protest.** Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press.

Frank, Daniel H., and Oliver Leaman, eds. 1997. **The Routledge History of Jewish Philosophy**. London and New York: Routlege.

———, eds. 2003. **The Cambridge Companion of Medieval Jewish Philosophy.** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hughes, Aaron W. 2014. **Rethinking Jewish Philosophy: Beyond Particularism and Universalism**. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kavka, Martin, Zachary Braiterman, and David Novak, eds. 2012. **The Cambridge History of Jewish Philosophy: The Modern Era.** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 2003. Metaphors We Live By. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Nadler, Steven, and T. M. Rudavsky, eds. 2009. **The Cambridge History of Jewish Philosophy: From Antiquity through the Seventeenth Century**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rosenzweig, Franz. 1999a. **The New Thinking**. Edited and translated by Alan Udoff and Barbara E. Galli. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

———. 1999b. **Understanding the Sick and the Healthy: A View of World, Man, and God**. Translated by Nahum Glazer, with an introduction by Hilary Putnam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Russell, Bertrand. 1945. **A History of Western Philosophy**. New York: Simon & Schuster. Sacks, Jonathan. 2013. "Finding God." In Tirosh-Samuelson and Hughes, Jonathan Sacks, 21–37.

Tirosh-Samuelson, Hava, and Aaron W. Hughes. 2013. "Editors Introduction to Series." In **Jonathan Sacks: Universalizing Particularity**, edited by Hava Tirosh-Samuelson and Aaron W. Hughes, vii–xiii. **Library of Contemporary Jewish Philosophy 2.** Leiden: E.J. Brill. <>

Negative Geographies: Exploring the Politics of Limits edited by David Bissell, Mitch Rose, and Paul Harrison [Cultural Geographies + Rewriting the Earth, University of Nebraska Press, 9781496226785]

Negative Geographies is the first edited collection to chart the political, conceptual, and ethical consequences of how the underexplored problem of the negative might be posed for contemporary cultural geography. Using a variety of case studies and empirical investigations, these chapters consider how the negative, through annihilations, gaps, ruptures, and tears, can work within or against the terms of affirmationism. The collection opens up new avenues through which key problems of cultural

geography might be differently posed and points to the ways that it might be possible and desirable to think, theorize, and exemplify negation.

Review

"To sit with **NEGATIVE GEOGRAPHIES** is to rest in a rare but welcome space: at once intimate, philosophical, and wrenchingly relevant to our contemporary world. The must-read introduction and each beautifully crafted essay circle the horizon of that which withdraws in its singularity: the unknowable, the unrelatable, the exhausted, and the incapacitated. In its ethical commitment to failure, Negative Geographies succeeds in offering a profound effacement of the drive to knowledge, action, and mastery that pervades geographical thought and practice"—ANNA SECOR. professor of human geography at Durham University

"It is difficult to be too positive about **NEGATIVE GEOGRAPHIES.** The volume convenes some of the most exciting and profound thinkers working in cultural geography today. In a rare display of consistent excellence, every contributor delivers a substantive, carefully wrought essay foregrounding a mode of limitation or negativity. The themes and contexts are wide-ranging. But out of this diversity—tuned by fine framing essays from the editors—there emerges a rich, serious, and consistent collective challenge to the highly productive but one-sided `affirmationist' tendency in much recent cultural geography. Negative Geographies is much more than merely a critique. Yet as critique, too, it is a masterwork. This is a group of scholars at the height of their powers, both living out and reporting upon an important, nascent widening of horizons in cultural geography with striking discernment and honesty. Together these scholars have crafted a watershed book that will shape cultural geography for years to come"—MATTHEW G. HANNAH professor of cultural geography at the University of. Bayreuth

CONTENTS

On the second floor of the National Gallery in Washington DC there is what looks at first like a large white box. Its dimensions fill the gallery, a cube of roughly three by three by three meters made of heavy plaster with a concrete texture. When you walk closer, you realize it is an inverted cast of what seems like a Victorian living room. There is an inside-out fireplace and depressions along the bottom that are clearly skirting boards. Other small details can be gleaned around the cast, but not many; no photographs, carpets, wallpaper, furnishings. Rather it sits like a fossil, a remnant of a life (many lives perhaps) whose stories, dramas, successes, and failures are signaled by a stone cube but not actually revealed. While it appears to us in monumental dimensions, it does not speak. It invites us in but simultaneously blocks us out. Its allusion to domestic stories, family dramas, and period history in solid monumental form captures our attention. But the sculpture itself withholds these narratives, hides them beneath its impenetrable surface. This makes one's engagement with Ghost frustratingly one-sided.

As cultural geographers, we are inclined to read Rachel Whiteread's sculpture in terms of its positive dimensions, that is, in terms of the objects we can see and the activities, practices, rhythms, and atmospheres of daily life to which they allude. Yet Whiteread's sculpture is obdurate. Rather than objects and activities we are confronted with a silent surface. Even as we might try and glean evidence of what the room looked or felt like—the laminar indentations, the inverted fireplace—we are simultaneously confronted by the fact that we simply cannot enter. All we can do is circle, listening for the calls of those that once lived here even as there is nothing to hear. In not disclosing, in not being relatable, in not being available, the room shuts down—utterly and thoroughly—our attempts to know it. However proximate we might get, the room withdraws, stretching out the distance between it and us. And so, we walk away, attracted to other works of art clamoring for our attention, reconciling ourselves to the fact that there is nothing to see here.

One of the qualities we admire about Whiteread's work is it confronts us with a situation we rarely consider in academia: the possibility of not knowing. Surely one of our most sacred beliefs is that human beings have the capacity—if not the responsibility—to know. The sciences and the institutions built to serve it are constructed on this foundation: a faith that the universe is knowable and that humanity has the capacity to reveal its secrets. If we have the right method, technique, or approach then every obstacle can be cracked and the mysteries residing therein will be laid before our eyes, available for our wonder. Despite the numerous critiques that have been laid at the door of the Enlightenment, we often take for granted the extent to which this faith structures the work we do. The belief that human beings have the power to know—and thus change—the world. Are not the philosophies of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, and Deleuze an exhortation to realize this power? To unleash humanity's untapped potential by shining a light on the previously unthought, unrecognized, and unrealized? While there is a long tradition of being cynical about the place and possibilities of the human in the universe, even the most misanthropic approximations are built on a presumption of human ability: a faith in humanity's capacity to rule (or destroy) the world.

The underlying purpose of this book is to question this faith. Without wanting to undermine the political potential of the human or denigrate the human desire to pursue and create change, we want to recognize how all such efforts are necessarily limited, bounded by certain existential conditions of being a living being. As Whiteread's sculpture willfully, playfully, and frustratingly demonstrates, there are limits to what we can know and what we can do. Thus while there are a number of agendas and ambitions being pursued in this collection, it is driven by this distinctive disposition: a desire for academic work to

be not simply more humble but (perhaps more subversively) more feeble. In recognizing limits—in making plain the impenetrable boundaries to human contemplation, consideration, and change—our aim is to check our inclination to invest so powerfully in our own freedom, knowing, and power. It is to delay our tendency to overestimate not only our own capacities, but the capacities of others or indeed the capacity of capacity itself. It is, in short, motivated by a desire to see weakness and fragility not as temporary states but as underlying conditions. While such a statement is anathema to the Enlightenment tradition—where we are regularly urged to be more free in our thinking and doing—perhaps less investment in the human and human capacity is precisely what the world needs.

Like so many edited books in geography, the ideas for this collection began at the American Association of Geographers annual meeting in Tampa in 2014 where some of the contributors presented their initial ideas in a session on "The Politics of the Negative." It was followed by another AAG session on "Negative Geographies" in Washington DC in 2019. Both sessions benefited from engaging and encouraging feedback, which confirmed that a book on this topic would make an important contribution and have a ready audience.

***

We opened this book with an articulation of how we arrived at the negative in this project. Extending a hand for orientation, we outlined how our distinctive take on the negative is defined by a preoccupation with irresolvable limits, and we explained how this differs from other iterations of the negative posed by thinkers that have sought to focus on its operative, transpositional work. The main body of the collection has necessarily been devoted to our contributors who artfully refract our opening wager in their own unique ways, drawing upon a range of theorists, concepts, methods, and empirical lures. While they share a common denominator around the politics of limits, there are multiple renderings of the negative circling around this collection. As we have witnessed, situations of rupture, exhaustion, interruption, hesitancy, and loss induce different limits construed by the circumstances of diverse figures. The negative pierces each chapter in distinctive ways, bringing specific aspects to the fore, from a hesitant impasse (Zhang) to a gap between action and responsibility (Carter-White); and from a jarring temporal interruption from outside (Dubow) to a target of weaponized governance (Joronen). Rather than stymie the conversation by snapping the negative into a singular conception, we hope that this diversity of iterations of the negative provides sufficient latitude for geographers to appreciate something useful and applicable to their own individual work.

So what might this collection offer? Conceptually each author presents a series of distinctive grammars and vocabularies that one might use to approach the question of the negative, from insufficiencies (Harrison) and interruptions (Dubow), to impasses (Zhang) and unknowabilities (Rose). Accordingly we hope that such grammars and vocabularies, which stress nonexchangeable relations of nonrelation, challenge geographers to approach the question of relations in a more circumspect way. Methodologically the chapters provide different insights into how the negative might be reckoned with, whether through reflective autobiography (Zhang) or engaging archival sources (Carter-White). Taken together we hope that these techniques, and the careful ways that they are developed here, might compel geographers to avoid erasing the negative from accounts that have tended to prioritize positive presences. Pragmatically the chapters provide different stances on the relationship between irresolvable limits and transformative action. Some offer reparative readings where limits catalyze modes of transformative action (Maddrell, Bissell), whereas for others these limits close down such possibilities

(Wylie, Harrison). For others still, we witness oscillations of construction and destruction (Philo). We hope that diversity might provide geographers with a means to consider how knowing one's capacities and powers must be intimately tethered to an acknowledgment of one's incapacities and vulnerabilities.

Notwithstanding the diversity of stances and agendas showcased here, what unites each contribution is how the negative features as an ineliminable aspect of corporeal experience. For each author, it is a problem that incessantly returns, in spite of attempts to move on, to remedy, to transcend. As we argued in the introduction, the dominant figure of the negative is the circle, speaking to situations that return to the same problem, in different forms. In that spirit, our aim in bringing this collection to a close is to circle back to some of our initial concerns; not to reiterate them, but to bring them back in a manner that allows us to see them in a new light: the same problem again (and again) but hopefully this time more approachable, such that aspects can be taken forward.

First, let's return to the problem of defining the negative by what it is not. The negative is not an ontology. It does not make claims about what the world is or provide new objects to describe its various constituent components. On the contrary, our conception of the negative introduces a certain skepticism of ontology, of what is. The negative is what precedes ontology and thus emerges as the problem to which all ontologies respond.

The aim of this collection, therefore, is not to introduce a new theoretical framework (like new cultural geography or nonrepresentational theory) that can be imbibed and applied to various case studies. It is to illuminate a perspective that lends itself to a distinctive style of analysis even if it does not require a specific suite of concepts, terminologies, or positions (as the chapters amply demonstrate). To say that one is interested in the negative is not the same as saying one is interested in affect, neoliberalism, or even the unconscious, all of which demand certain ontological positions. To speak of the negative is to speak about that which comes before ontology and thus leaves the question of ontology at once open and simultaneously denuded of its conceptual power.

Second, let's return to the problem of politics. If we accept that ontology is limited, then we are freed from being saddled with its various political demands. Ontologies of life demand that we affirm life; ontologies of the world demand that we affirm the world. The negative, however, frees us from such affirmations. While the negative has political implications, those implications are more about subtracting than provisioning. We anticipate that some readers will see this as unhelpful. What could possibly be beneficial about taking away our political compass and the various resources it provides? In response, while engaging the negative does undermine faith in our (human) power, it does so by insisting on a permanent sense of responsibility. To be responsible means to not rely on ontology to direct us toward the good, the just, and the proper. On the contrary, responsibility directs us toward a certain vigilance: a necessity to return (again and again) to the question of responsibility, to the question of how to be responsible. While the purpose of ontology is to answer this question for us, by telling us what the world is like and how to properly take care of it, responsibility is a more open-ended proposition. To be responsible means to act knowing that no action will be sufficient. It means recognizing that every action burdens us with further obligation.

Finally, let's return to our current political moment. We opened the conversation with a discussion of negative times. To be crystal clear, our preoccupation with the politics of irresolvable limits does not position us against the kinds of reparative actions that are needed to address the wicked problems that

blight the world, from disgraceful inequality to destabilizing climate change. Admitting how the negative is a component of our political inclinations and engagements is not the same as throwing in the towel or waving a flag of surrender. There are urgent problems that demand our attention and do require new knowledge. But unless we admit the negative—unless we reckon with how we are positioned in nonexchangeable relation to that over which we have no power—we forget how these problems both arise from and implicate ineliminable conditions of our corporeal experience that cannot be willed away. Admitting the negative therefore provides a more benevolent view on the constitution of worldly problems that geographers are committed to engaging. Flying in the face of fantasies of (and demands for) adaptation and resilience, bodies fail, they get stuck in impasses, they hesitate; they are utterly exposed to the radically unassimilable other that has total bearing over them. Rather than beating ourselves up for falling short again, we must accept how politics—both big and small, revolutionary and empathetic—is always a precarious, faltering response to this primary incapacity. Of course, our knowledge of the good, the just, and the right matter. But such ontological commitments matter less than the summons to be responsible and our willing acceptance of this obligation. <>

The Occult in National Socialism: The Symbolic, Scientific, and Magical Influences on the Third Reich by Stephen E. Flowers Ph.D. [Inner Traditions, 9781644115749]

A critical history of the roots of Nazi occultism and its continuing influence

• Explores the occult influences on various Nazi figures, including Adolf Hitler, Albert Speer, Rudolf Hess, Alfred Rosenberg, and Heinrich Himmler

• Examines the foundations of the movement laid in the 19th century and continuing in the early 20th century

• Explains the rites and runology of National Socialism, the occult dimensions of Nazi science, and how many of the sensationalist descriptions of Nazi "Satanic" practices were initiated by Church propaganda after the war

In this comprehensive examination of Nazi occultism, Stephen E. Flowers, Ph.D., offers a critical history and analysis of the occult and esoteric streams of thought active in the Third Reich and the growth of occult Nazism at work in movements today.

Sharing the culmination of five decades of research into primary and secondary sources, many in the original German, Flowers looks at the symbolic, occult, scientific, and magical traditions that became the foundations from which the Nazi movement would grow. He details the influences of Theosophy, Volkism, and the work of the Brothers Grimm as well as the impact of scientific culture of the time. Looking at the early 20th century, he describes the impact of Guido von List, Lanz von Liebenfels, Rudolf von Sebottendorf, Friedrich Hielscher, and others.

Examining the period after the Nazi Party was established in 1919, and more especially after it took power in 1933, Flowers explores the occult influences on key Nazi figures, including Adolf Hitler, Albert Speer, Rudolf Hess, and Heinrich Himmler. He analyzes Hitler's usually missed references to magical techniques in Mein Kampf, revealing his adoption of occult methods for creating a large body of

supporters and shaping the thoughts of the masses. Flowers also explains the rites and runology of National Socialism, the occult dimensions of Nazi science, and the blossoming of Nazi Christianity. Concluding with a look at the modern mythology of Nazi occultism, Flowers critiques postwar Nazi-related literature and unveils the presence of esoteric Nazi myths in modern occult and political circles.

Review

"Much ink has been spilled on the topic of occult Nazism, but this book goes wider and deeper than most previous literature on this subject. It aims, as the author writes, 'to bring the question of Nazi occultism into sharper focus with a more refined lens of understanding.' One of the great merits of the book is that Flowers examines not only the question of the actual nature and extent of occult elements in the Nazi movement and its antecedents but also the huge amount of myth and hype that has grown up around the subject since the end of the Second World War. A central theme of the book is the power of myths, including those that 'lead to misery and destruction,' as in the case of the Third Reich. This searching book sheds new light on a troubled subject." — *Christopher McIntosh, author of Occult Russia: Pagan, Esoteric, and Mystical Traditions*

"Going way beyond the typical sensationalistic tabloid press approach toward the occult undercurrents of National Socialism, as adopted invariably by most authors on the subject for far too many decades, this book is equally a highly welcome counterweight to Nicholas Goodricke-Clarke's pioneering scholarly study. Himself a well-acknowledged and established occult practitioner as well as an academic scholar, Stephen Flowers deploys the entire arsenal of his critical tradecraft, both emic and etic (in-depth research, shrewd analysis, informed interpretation, historical contextualization, etc.), to present us with a sweeping detailed overview of the contemporary occult and political scene and its eventual culmination in the horrors of World War II and the Holocaust: a sober--and sobering-- depiction that is certain to set new standards for coming research well into the foreseeable future." — *Frater U?D?, author of Practical Sigil Magic, High Magic, and Living Magic*

"Although nothing is 'easy' about this book--not its argument, subtleties, or beneath-the-floorboards history--Stephen E. Flowers's study of Nazism and the occult resounds with vitality and depth; this work must be encountered and reckoned with by anyone who hopes to make a serious consideration of its subject." — *Mitch Horowitz PEN Award–winning author of Occult America and Uncertain Places*

"In *The Occult in National Socialism*, Stephen Flowers approaches this murky and phantasmal historical grotto with a bright lantern of illumination, an undistorted analytical lens, and a keen, unflinching eye. His exploration dispels propaganda from all sides, including that of the Nazis themselves as well as from the Catholic and Protestant churches; overturns cartloads of dubious claims; and punctures a host of untethered hot-air balloons fueled by vaporous theorizing. But this is more than just a debunker's manual. Flowers is equally adept at cataloging and elucidating the hidden (or even 'occult') influences, shadowy organizations, and mysterious personalities that *did* exist in the pre-Nazi period and the Third Reich. Likewise groundbreaking is the final part of the book: a methodical survey of the postwar era of mythologizing, in which the smoldering ashes of a defeated criminal aggressor-state became a quaggy garden for the cultivation of bizarre tales and pseudo-history. Overall, this volume is a complex study of competing spiritual and ideological forces in a period when the obscured truth often turns out to be more unsettling than the overblown fictions that replaced it." — *Michael Moynihan, Ph.D., coauthor of*

Lords of Chaos

"Stephen Flowers rises to the unenviable task of sorting fact from fiction in one of the most notorious questions of the 20th century: To what extent was the Third Reich influenced by and reliant on occult ideas in its quest for world domination? The further we are removed in time from these earth-shattering events, the more the facts about the Nazis' supposed occult interests will be lost in neo-mythology; we need someone like Flowers to put this history in its proper context and to give a sober assessment of what actually lay behind the few genuine occult interests at work within the Third Reich. Flowers skillfully examines the influences on the intellectual and spiritual life of Germany in the early 20th century, while avoiding the typical sensationalist narrative that takes every insinuation of sinister influence at face value. The bar is now considerably higher with the publication of this long-awaited expert analysis." — *Toby Chappell, author of Infernal Geometry and the Left Hand Path*

CONTENTS

"Nazi occultism" is a much-abused topic in the history of ideas. One is tempted on all points to associate the term with the genre of literature that began in the 1960s and early 1970s with popular books like The Morning of the Magicians or The Spear of Destiny. But, in fact, the genre had started much earlier, during the course of the Second World War itself, with books such as Lewis Spence's The Occult Causes of the Present War. This kind of literature will be more fully explored and analyzed in the fourth part of this book, which is a study of the postwar mythology of Nazi occultism.

Another kind of study, which has unfortunately been much rarer, has used rational models and more careful scholarly research methods and has yielded some interesting results. Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke's The Occult Roots of Nazism is a classic study of this sort and could be profitably read in conjunction with this book. The only weakness of Goodrick-Clarke's study is that in his zeal to demonize the German nationalist and paganist strain of occult thought, he omits any real treatment of Christian, scientific, or even conventional forms of occultism (such as astrology and psychic phenomena).

But all of this recent body of literature is flawed by two tendencies. The first tendency is the sensationalistic approach of most authors. Moreover, this is usually marked by an anti-Nazi motivation, although in some cases subtly pro-Nazi leanings can be detected. It is very often the case that literature written about the Nazis and the occult contains some all-encompassing single theory for explaining Nazism in terms of a "cosmic evil." The second tendency is not much different from the first, except that the metanarrative used to criticize National Socialism is more in the contemporary intellectual mainstream. James Webb, for example, sees the kind of occultism exemplified by the Nazis as a "flight from reason," while Goodrick-Clarke, utilizing a subtle Marxist template, sees the völkisch nationalists as irrational reactionaries to the modern socioeconomic progress being evidenced in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

It is my intention here to present an objective study of the history of ideas. This book does not contain an all-encompassing theory about the role of "the occult" or any other subcultural set of ideas to explain Nazism, nor do I seek to vilify the Nazis as the epitome of cosmic evil. I do not do this because it seems to me to be intellectually dishonest and inaccurate. It is my hypothesis that the use of pejorative adjectives to modify any noun that indicates a person or thing connected with National Socialism is simply a formula used by contemporary academic intellectuals to protect themselves from suspicion among their colleagues and to give their work an aura of moral superiority.

The major thesis of this book is that there were a variety of subcultural and countercultural impulses feeding into the world of Central Europe around the turn of the twentieth century. Many could be called occult, whether they belonged to the Romantic symbolic traditions of the völkisch movement, or to the (pseudo-)scientific realm of the Monists and eugenicists, or to the more usual areas of the "secret sciences." These three streams of ideas, the symbolic, the scientific, and the occult proper, account for the majority of traits found in National Socialism. An overarching element that often binds them all together is a culturally pervasive völkisch ideology. The völkisch idea can present in all three of these streams of thought in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Mitteleuropa. Ultimately, even this

tripartite approach under the umbrella of the völkisch ideology will not exhaustively treat every possible element that might be considered an "occult" trait in the doctrines and practices of National Socialism, but it will perhaps give a broader overview, through a more objective lens, than has I been offered heretofore by other authors.

Whether we look at the occult sciences, the symbolic traditions, or even the natural scientific theories of the period in question (which we can define as 1845-1945), a certain völkische element can often be discerned. This is not to say that all of these areas of culture were entirely dominated by the völkisch idea, only that what we will call here "volkism" (folkism) was able to infuse itself to one small degree or another into all three of these areas of intellectual life over the approximately hundred-year span of time under discussion.

In his 1964 book The Crisis of German Ideology, George Mosse discusses the idea of volkism as follows:

The set of ideas with which we are concerned in this work has been termed "Volkish"—that is, pertaining to the "Volk." "Volk" is one of those perplexing German terms which connotes far more than its specific meaning. "Volk" is a much more comprehensive term than "people" for to German thinkers ever since the birth of German romanticism in the late eighteenth century "Volk" signified the union of a group of people with a transcendental "essence." This "essence" might be called "nature" or "cosmos" or "mythos," but in each instance it was fused to man's innermost nature, and represented the source of his creativity, his depth of feeling, his individuality, and his unity with other members of the Volk. (Mosse 1964, 4)

Birken (1995, 27) questions Mosse's implication that this concept is somehow unique to the Germans, but for our purposes it is quite enough to understand that such a völkisch movement did exist and did develop an overriding importance within the political right in German-speaking areas of Europe. The völkisch idea elevates the nation,* the race, to a level of transcendental importance; it, and what is good for it, becomes the summum bonum of cultural life. The Volk [pron. "folk"] is made up of individuals inexorably bound together by a common race, language, and culture and who were born and raised in a certain landscape. Hence the phrase Blut and Boden (blood and soil) used to describe the volkist sentiment.

This idea is of paramount importance to our topic because for a huge segment of Middle Europeans its tenets permeate all elements of intellectual culture as a deep-structure myth. Because the idea of volkism appears to be in and of itself a mystical or mythical idea, it is only natural that it should have quickly developed in those areas of culture interested in the occult and symbolic traditions. It may seem more difficult to understand how it could have found so much hospitality among the natural sciences. However, in science the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were dominated by concerns over evolution (Lamarck in 1809, Darwin in 1859, and Haeckel in 1866) and the biological, or organic, metaphor was for the nineteenth century what the astrophysical, or mechanical, metaphor had been in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Whereas the Deistic followers of Newton's theories saw the world (and man) as a "great clockwork," the Romantics, and later the readers of Darwin, began to see the world (and man) in organic, and hence evolutionary, terms. These ideas easily lent themselves to occult interpretations and reinforced the longed-for revival of ancient symbolic traditions of a particular Volk.

Because of the frequent references to "Nazi occultism," a precise understanding of the meaning of this terminology is fundamental. In the latter half of the twentieth century, the occult has become such an overexposed aspect of popular culture that it has almost become too bourgeois and cliched to be taken seriously. This should not, however, be allowed to color our views of the ways the occult was received in times past. Studies have focused on the occult origins of everything from modern science* to modern psychoanalysis.' None of this should surprise us, as the occult literally refers to the "hidden," or something which is "closed off," and when intellectual explorers and adventurers set out to uncover new methods and truth, it seems inevitable that they must cross the line between the known and the unknown. It also stands to reason that these mind-voyagers should at some point or another be inspired by tales of earlier attempts to reach similar terrae incognitae as they themselves sought. As often as not these earlier explorers, or less "qualified" contemporaries, undertook their travels in obscure or occult fields.

The idea of the occult in the context of the present study can be defined as ideas or theories, and practices connected with these paradigms, which have either been rejected by, or which have not yet been accepted by, the established intellectual model of a given culture.

A more elaborate and critical definition of the occult—or more precisely—the esoteric, has been forwarded by Antoine Faivre (1994, xiii; xv—xx) and employed by Rosenthal (1997, 2-5) in the context of a study of the occult in Russian and Soviet culture. According to this definition, occultism has four component elements: (1) correspondences, (2) living nature, (3) imagination and mediation, and (4) transmutation.

The idea of correspondences holds that there is an essential link between concrete phenomena in this world and corresponding transcendental forms in a hidden (occult) higher reality. In conjunction with this the occultist posits a living nature; in other words, the idea that all of existence is permeated with a primal substance or energy (= anima mundi). The elements of imagination and mediation imply that a seer can know occult secrets and transmit this knowledge to others. This idea of the transmission of knowledge from master to disciple according to a set of traditions is also a typical sub-element in occult culture. The aim of the occult sometimes appears to be the transmutation of the student—the passage of a person from one level of being to another, higher, and previously unknown (occult) level. Additionally, occult teachings tend to be syncretic; that is, they attempt to reach a concordance of various traditions and find some common essential thread that connects them as one. Occultism is contrasted with mysticism in that the latter seeks union with God, whereas the former seeks increased self-knowledge and even self-transformation.

Theories provide frameworks for doing things. The two main sorts of things that can be done are developmental and manipulative. In the first instance, the developmental approach, we are talking about growing a thing in such a way that it can become something more than it was previously, something better, and so forth. This is perhaps done under the guidance of an outside model. In the second case, that of manipulation, a thing is caused to behave in a certain way as determined by an outside agent.

Accepted modes of development go under names such as "education" or "social progress." Accepted forms of manipulation of substances include chemistry or engineering. However, if development or manipulation takes place under the guidance of an (as yet) unaccepted theory, or even a previously accepted but now rejected theory, it is likely to be called "occult."

The occultist attempts to go below, or rise above, material (or conscious) reality for an explanation of some greater paradigm. There is also a practical dimension in that it is thought that such knowledge can be used to control phenomena in mundane, consensus, reality. This is the promise of power, which the occult holds out for the seeker.

This promise of power is one of the key ingredients that relates to why the concept of the occult is essential to our exploration of factors in National Socialist ideology and policy that may, on the surface, seem well outside the mainstream of contemporaneous political thought. Of course, there is nothing new or even unusual about occult ideas influencing political revolutions—from the time of Alexander the Great to the revolutions of 1776 and 1789 and beyond. It is of paramount importance to keep all elements of the precise definition of the occult in mind as various occult features of National Socialist beliefs and traditions are discussed.

Ultimately, the threefold division of the dimensions of this study can be analyzed with the traditional German categories of Geisteswissenschaft, Naturwissenschaft, and Geheimwissenschaft—/Intellectual or Symbolic Science," "Natural Science," and "Secret Science." To each of these there is an occult dimension as well.

***

This work is divided into four parts. The first three treat the genesis and history of National Socialist ideology. Part 1 deals with the deep nineteenth-century roots of the ideas that eventually found expression in Nazism. Part 2 focuses on the initial years of the twentieth century prior to the establishment of the NSDAP. It is here that the immediate roots of National Socialist ideology lie, because it was in these years that the leaders and philosophers of the movement came of age. Part 3 is a study of occult manifestations within the time frame of the actual existence of the NSDAP: 1919-1945. Part 4 is a departure from the historical cast of the previous three parts. It is a critical study of the whole idea and myth of Nazi occultism—the belief that the Nazis formed an occult movement and practiced all manner of (usually sinister) rites and rituals. This belief will be seen to have had its origins in wartime propaganda, later fueled by postwar agendas of a political, cultural, or commercial bent.

In the literature of Nazi occult mythology (or mythologizing), we find many examples of conspiratorial thinking. To the gullible, belief in occult conspiracies is attractive, whereas to the skeptical, such things often seem absurd. Yet, when we look at historical phenomena such as the rise and fall of National Socialism in Germany, we have to wonder. It must be said, however, that most of what seems like a grand conspiracy is often better explained simply by realizing that there is great power in a set of unconscious assumptions held by a group of men sharing the same zeitgeist and acting within a fairly homogeneous group, especially when that group is subject to a sense of existential crises.

As opposed to previous efforts at unraveling the riddle of the twentieth century—the National Socialist movement and its meaning to history—I will neither focus on sensationalistic features merely for entertainment value, such as many authors have done in the recent past (e.g., J. H. Brennan and Peter Levenda), nor will I indulge in a sectarian interpretation that ascribes all of the meaning of the movement to one or another motivation. In point of historical fact, the NS movement was a multifaceted and not very centrally organized one, so that any unified or simplistic effort at interpreting it and its meaning to

history will inevitably fall far short of accuracy. It is accuracy and objectivity to which we are dedicated in this study.

In each part of this study, we will focus on a fourfold pattern of cultural features responsible for the occult traits of National Socialist ideology. The völkisch idea infuses each of them with their all-encompassing rationale or vitality. The occult as a feature unto itself is most usually a subtle, or extremely well-hidden, aspect of National Socialist belief and practice. Both volkism and the occult find expression in symbolic culture (rituals, myths, symbols, and signs) as well as scientific culture, where these beliefs are seen to shape theories about biology and physics. Here we want to take all four of these factors—volkism, occultism, symbolic culture, and scientific culture—into account in a way that will bring us closer to a total understanding of the true nature and scope of any possible occultism in the Third Reich. This book is not a work of revisionism, nor is it intended in any way as an apology for Nazi Germany. Rather, it is a study in the history of ideas, focused with an objective lens from the perspective of the dawn of the twenty-first century upon the heart of the myth and the riddle of the twentieth century. <>

Angelic Troublemakers: Religion and Anarchism in America by A. Terrance Wiley [Contemporary Anarchist Studies, Bloomsbury Academic, 97816235681 39]

Angelic Troublemakers is the first detailed account of what happens when religious ethics, political philosophy, and the anarchist spirit intermingle. Wiley deftly captures the ideals that inspired three revered heroes of nonviolent disobedience—Henry Thoreau, Dorothy Day, and Bayard Rustin. Resistance to slavery, empire, and capital is a way of life, a transnational tradition of thought and action. This book is a must read for anyone interested in religion, ethics, politics, or law.

CONTENTS

Few political philosophies are as misunderstood as anarchism. The term conjures images of disorder for many, even though only a minority of anarchists has advocated the use of violence of any sort. At least three factors have affected how many imagine anarchism. First, anarchism has often been reduced to the terrorist ethos that marked the political movement (namely anarcho-syndicalism or anarcho-communism) during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, where anarchist labor activists turned to assassination as a method of social change. Second, many anarchists have been "militant atheists," often hostile toward religion. This hostility probably reached its height around the time of the Spanish Civil War, where while controlling Spain's Catalonia ("Anarchist Catalonia") region from 1936

to 1939, a contingent of anarchists demolished Catholic buildings and murdered clerics. And finally, a third factor shaping the perception of anarchism among many is that some anarchists, such as the egoist Max Stirner, have been proponents of nihilism.

This book is about three anarchists of a different sort. The main interpretive chapters, descriptive ethical case studies, are devoted to analyzing the religious ethics, political philosophies, and social activism of Henry David Thoreau, Dorothy Day, and Bayard Rustin in terms of an anarchist conceptual scheme that promises to elucidate the implications of particular varieties of religious radicalism for the modern territorial state and our normative relation to it. By examining them, I hope to shed light on a highly influential strand of religious ethics and radical activist practice in the modern period, as well as on a variety of anarchism that does not conform to the negative stereotypes of the position.

None of the three religious radicals would condone terrorism. None of them is an atheist or a proponent of nihilism. The reasons they offer for anarchist suspicion of modern territorial states are, I will argue, largely religious in character. Analysis of the explicit and implicit arguments for anarchism extant in the social thought of three religiously inclined, amateur intellectual, radical lay activists will facilitate the refinement of anarchist thought proper; and, employing anarchism as a theoretic or conceptual scheme by which to consider the religious ethics and political philosophies of Thoreau, Day, and Rustin provides a means by which to clarify critical aspects of their social and religious thought and practice, which promises to reveal that the category of anarchism is broader than is ordinarily assumed, with deep American roots and strong ties to rich, transnational anti-imperialist and anticolonialist traditions, from Gandhian nonviolence to Zapatista radicalism. In particular, with these three radical American exemplars we will see the way in which theologically sourced compassion, emphases on moral responsibility (for oppression and social suffering), and ethics of noncomplicity (Thoreau) or noncooperation (Day and Rustin) with unjust (racist and imperialist) social practices can commend an anarchist posture or attitude that is thoroughly other-regarding.

This philosophically grounded, historically oriented, social theoretically informed study, then, should furnish a deeper understanding of anarchist philosophy, a fuller appreciation of the anarchist dimensions of radical nonviolent activism, and thus a clearer view of how anarchist commitments have combined with and can cohere with radical religiosity and the transnational nonviolent direct action tradition, a tradition to which the three American figures in question have contributed immensely. When taken as a whole, by carefully tending to the religious visions of three American radicals, this book identifies and explores reasons of various kinds that lend support to a single religious-ethical or sociopolitical practice that is recognizably anarchist in its unwillingness to attribute genuine authority to the legal regimes of modern territorial states and undeniably revolutionary in its commitment to fundamentally transforming standing social institutions and power relations, so as to instantiate more just social conditions. ***

This book is divided into three chapters, with each chapter focusing respectively on Henry David Thoreau, Dorothy Day, and Bayard Rustin.

In Chapter 1, "The Conscience on Fire: Thoreau's Anarchist Ethic," I concentrate on the writings and social action of Henry David Thoreau. What interests me is Thoreau's conscientious struggle to determine how he should relate to his neighbors and to the modern territorial state in the light of what he understood to be the implications of the Protestant Reformation, the European Enlightenment, the English, American, and French revolutions, and the religious-ethical principles to which he was

committed. Thoreau reached conclusions about his duties that ruled out his embracing constitutional democracy. By the end of Chapter 1 it should be clear that Thoreau's theologically motivated conception of moral rightness, when combined with his theory of the state, generates an anarchist ethic and situates him among a transnational group of mid-nineteenth-century figures that responded to the emergent territorial state and its racial supremacist, imperialist practices with an anarchist ethic.

This reveals the fact that Thoreau should be distinguished from certain other racial and social justice activists who endorsed political disobedience and nonviolent direct action. Take, for example, Martin Luther King Jr, who Thoreau greatly influenced. Thoreau and King both embraced a rigorous deontological ethic that is incompatible with an idea that an individual ought to comply with the law in virtue of its being the law, even when the source of the law in question is a democratic procedure. In addition, they both maintained that noncooperation with evil or unjust practices represents a viable way to undermine those practices. But carefully analyzing Thoreau's political essays shows that, in contrast to King's ostensibly ameliorative disobedience, Thoreau provides a recipe for eliminating the modern territorial state: he aimed to abolish it rather than reform it. In my chapters on Thoreau, I will endeavor to show that Thoreau is best described as a strong anarchist in that he denies the authority of the legal regimes of modern territorial states and argues that individual persons have a duty to withdraw from, to oppose, and to disobey certain laws and commands of territorial states. Emphasizing this point will put on display the grounds that make it appropriate to classify Thoreau's political philosophy as an expression of strong anarchism.

Thoreau's political philosophy can be properly understood only if we appreciate the metaphysical-theological-ontological assumptions that undergird it, as Thoreau's conception of moral rightness, the human person, and individual moral responsibility are grounded in his theological commitments. To read Thoreau's work carefully is to see that there is an unmistakable religious aspect to his social and political philosophy and there is a mystical dimension to his spirituality or religious practices. He meditates. He watches nature. He reads religious scripture. He might be a lay monk. And his sojourn at Walden's Pond is as much a spiritual retreat as it is anything else: "Walden is a book about spiritual renewal at a sacred place." As Alan D. Hodder notes in Thoreau's Ecstatic Witness, Thoreau's contemporaries "generally conceived him in spiritual terms . . . even if as an unorthodox [religious] figure."

And so, in the early sections of Chapter 1, I spell out the terms of Thoreau's religious ethics, focusing on two of Thoreau's classic book-length manuscripts, A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers (A Week) and Walden. Beginning with a consideration of Thoreau's religiosity, and considering his idea of conscience and the doctrine of noncomplicity in relation to his theology, puts up front a component of his thought that is not always discussed in relation to or as a basis for Thoreau's normative political commitments. I then connect his religious vision to his political vision. While the features of Thoreau's religiosity that I will present are not necessarily or inevitably reason(s) for the adoption of an anarchist philosophy, the direction that Thoreau takes these features—the way in which he interprets them—ends up entailing an anarchist ethic. I argue that Thoreau is best regarded as an anarchist in the light of the fact that he rejects the legitimacy of the modern territorial state, and this includes representational/constitutional democracy, for religious-ethical reasons.

In particular, my analysis in Chapter 1 shows that he agrees with anarchists who claim that, empirically speaking, there is hardly reason to suppose that any actual territorial state will have laws which do not themselves become instruments of arbitrarily exercised power. For Thoreau, the actual state is a vehicle

of domination and so cannot in good faith be presented as an effective means by which to protect persons from various kinds of domination. To demonstrate all of this, I will give acute attention to Thoreau's explicit references to and criticisms of the territorial state, law, authority, and political action, as these references and criticisms appear in A Week, Walden, and the essays "Resistance to Civil Government," "Slavery in Massachusetts," and "A Plea for Captain John Brown."

Thoreau's prophetic thought can be summarized as follows. First, Thoreau embraces the idea of divine immanence and asserts that each human being has the divinity or divine power within. Second, implicit in Thoreau's thought is a rejection of the divine right of kings, the idea that God has appointed standing (earthly) authorities to their positions so that they can be said to rule by divine right. Third, Thoreau posits the existence of an objective moral order that is accessible to a human faculty—conscience or reason. Fourth, he calls for a moral awakening, a recovery of the self through self-culture or self-improvement. Fifth, Thoreau claims that certain existing social practices and institutions, particularly the territorial state, impede awakening. Finally, he contends that awakening or recovery of the self will entail noncooperation with and elimination of the evil or unjust practices of the territorial state; this means that self-recovery, when generalized, will, as social movement, entail revolution of a certain sort.

I can restate more concisely this simple prophetic message as I understand Thoreau to present it. God is immanent. Human persons possess a divine power within. We have lost sight of this power. It can and must be recovered. To recover this power would require us to reject many of the practices in which we are currently participants. In particular, we would have to resist contributing to the violence and injustice propagated by the territorial state, or officials of the state. And we most certainly cannot be represented by nor be representatives of the territorial state. Therefore, a recovery of the self or the divine power within the self would mean a revolution. Importantly, Thoreau does not propose that persons committed to justice seize control of the territorial state. Rather, they are charged with becoming the kinds of persons that call into being and make possible the emergence of new institutions. This last point is crucial. Anarchism, as I suggested above, does not, as it is sometimes believed, entail a wholesale rejection of organizations or institutions. To that end, anarchists such as Peter Kropotkin, George Woodcock, and Murray Bookchin have proposed different forms of government to replace the modern territorial state, including its representational democratic emanation. By the end of Chapter 1 we will see that Thoreau advocates for a government that is probably best described as anarchism as government by consent.

In Chapter 2, "Love in Action: Dorothy Day's Christian Anarchism," Thoreau's political philosophy is contrasted with the Christian-motivated anarchism of Dorothy Day, a convert to Roman Catholicism who cofounded the Catholic Worker and the Catholic Worker movement. Just as with my analysis of Thoreau, my analysis of Dorothy Day is very much a story about how a person's conception of God can inform a conception of the self and thus shape a person's political ethics. That is to say, similar to the chapters on Thoreau, it is a story about how our political notions are often wrapped up in our notions about God and the self.

Dorothy Day flirted with anarchism as early as 1914, yet she did not fully embrace it until later: "I wavered between my allegiance to socialism, syndicalism (the I.W.W.'s) and anarchism. When I read Tolstoi, I was an anarchist . . . [This] appealed to me. But not the American anarchism that I had come in touch with."15 Years of equivocation would end with Day's conversion to Catholicism. After converting,

and settling in on a love-centered ethics, she came to find Tolstoy's claim undeniable: Christian love is incompatible with coercion, violence, and centralized political decision-making processes.

Day's religious ethics provides perhaps the clearest twentieth-century statement of Christian anarchism in the American context, which is striking in that Roman Catholicism has been one of the main objects of anarchist criticism during the past century. Part of the lasting significance of Day's activist career is that she demonstrated the way in which traditional Catholic piety could be channeled in radical political directions. After converting to Catholicism in the late 1920s, Day would self-consciously submit to ecclesiastical authority, however, she appealed to Catholic dogma, namely, the distinction between "truths of the faith" and the idea of the "autonomy of the temporal order" in order to establish her license to assert her view that anarchism is an (if not "the") appropriate form of social organization for a Catholic Christian.16

Chapter 2 is comprised of two major parts. In the first part, I will primarily explicate Day's religious commitments as they relate to her conception of God, the person, community, and love, mostly by indicating the particularly religious—and unifying—function that Day attributes to love. More specifically, in the first section of Chapter 2, I consider Day's religious odyssey, focusing on important aspects of her move toward joining the Roman Catholic Church. In the second section, I give attention to Day's articulation of her religious ethics in the light of her interpretation of Catholicism.

After considering Day's conversion to Roman Catholicism, I analyze the details of Day's political philosophy, including her criticisms of the modern sociopolitical order and her positive sociopolitical prescription. Further, I highlight aspects of her thought and activism that connect her directly to the nonviolent activist tradition, putting on display the way in which Day combines crucial aspects of Thoreau's and Tolstoy's normative visions. In particular, Day embraces a type of realized eschatology that Tolstoy emphases in The Kingdom of God Is Within. And similar to both Tolstoy and Thoreau, Day embraces voluntary poverty and suggests the liberatory character of asceticism. For Day, asceticism—the self-regulation of desire in the light of authentic needs—when politically charged carries all of the way to the level of the state. Asceticism forces the moral agent to subsist conscientiously, thus liberating the agent to imagine alternative modes of being, including social and political practices at the institutional level. In this way, Day's political vision is rooted in the kind of imaginative ethos that is often dismissed as unrealistic or utopian. It is through concrete action that the activist undermines the purchase of this charge, and so for Day, imagining an alternative social reality and the viability of the vision hinges on what we might term "revelatory praxis." Such praxis sets out to reveal what is in fact necessary.

Along with Tolstoy and Thoreau, Day contends war, presidents, and the territorial (welfare-police) state are false necessities. Convinced that centralization is unnecessary and undesirable, Day embraced strong anarchism and insisted that morally responsible persons must refrain from supporting the territorial state and must enact alternative social practices that demonstrate that the territorial state is unnecessary. This enactment of an alternative is a precondition to the realization of a postterritorial state social order.

It will be clear by the end of my analysis that Day's political vision was a religious vision: she asserted that social transformation is something that has to do simultaneously with God and other persons and she claimed that cultivating and sustaining the qualities of character necessary for a perpetual revolution requires the vehicle of the Roman Catholic Church with its liturgy and sacraments. Taken together, the

sections that comprise Chapter 2 show that, on Day's view, God is encountered through acts of love, love precludes violence, and only in community and in interpersonal relationships can persons realize their higher selves. As such, Day identifies decentralized associations and cooperatives—houses of hospitality and farm communes—as the appropriate institutional arrangements by which to usher in the new sociopolitical order, the beloved community.

In Chapter 3, "The Dilemma of the Black Radical: Bayard Rustin's Ambivalent Anarchism," I turn to the social and political philosophy of African American Quaker public intellectual and social activist Bayard Rustin. Rustin is not ordinarily described as an anarchist and he did not embrace the anarchist label. While at first glance, Rustin might not seem to fit the anarchist mold, I wish to show that his substantive commitments can be interpreted so that it is clear that they have anarchist implications. In this way Rustin might be regarded as an implicit anarchist, and I am confident that even skeptical readers will find that closely analyzing Rustin's substantive commitments reveals that Rustin presents an ambiguous case. This ambiguity is in fact what makes reflecting on Rustin instructive, with the ambiguity providing an occasion to clarify what constitutes anarchism as an ethic and political philosophy. And at the same time, the anarchist lens itself puts into focus critical aspects of Rustin's political philosophy. With Rustin in the frame and the character of anarchism clarified, through my analysis of Rustin, I hope to make clearer how pervasive the anarchist spirit has been among radicals on the American scene. At the very least, it shall become clearer how compatible anarchism can be with certain practical commitments and how incompatible it is with others.

Rustin participated in nearly every major progressive social movement in post-World War I America, which poses significant challenges for a student of his life and work. Rustin's biographers such as Jervis Anderson, John D'Emilio, and Daniel Levine all more or less respond to this issue by dividing Rustin's life based on the organization that he was working for or the issues that he was devoted to at a given point in time. The first stage was his communist phase, where he worked as a Young Communist League organizer. The second period was his work with Fellowship for Reconciliation (FOR) and then War Resisters League (WRL), where he melded radical pacifism with civil rights activism. Then during the 1960s he renounced his absolute pacifism, left WRL, and resigned as an editor of the leftist journal Liberation. At that stage he became intricately involved in the operations of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), an organization that Rustin helped create, along with Ella Baker, Stanley Levinson, Fred Shuttlesworth, Martin King. When Rustin's SCLC involvement waned, after the passage of the Civil Rights Act, he then set up shop at the A. Phillip Randolph Institute, funded in part by the American Federation of Labor. Finally, from the beginning of the 1970s, he became the chair of the board at Freedom House, concentrating on cultivating grassroots social movements in authoritarian societies around the globe.

I treat Rustin's life in two overlapping phases beginning with the phase during which he combined a Quaker-inspired radical pacifist position with an idea of perpetual political disobedience in the face of social injustice. Building on my consideration of pacifism in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3, I will show how Rustin's Quaker-inspired radical pacifism implies a version of anarchism. In particular, I argue that radical pacifism, if consistently expressed, has strong anarchism as its consequence. Since many African American Christians embraced radical pacifism during the mid-twentieth century, my consideration of Rustin's career as a radical pacifist suggests where we might turn in order to find African American anarchists or African Americans with political commitments that are consistent with strong anarchism.

Yet, there is a rub here too; for, meditating on Rustin's experience will highlight the tests confronting African Americans who would embrace such an ethic.

In the latter half of Chapter 3, I explore Rustin's dramatic turn away from radical pacifism. Rustin's mid-1960s pivot finds him arguing explicitly for the necessity of a strong centralized state as a means to eradicate poverty and eliminate racial oppression, separating him from Dorothy Day in ways that are important to understand. Although both Day and Rustin embraced a Christian theological ethic that entailed a commitment to pacifism, their differing views about the role of the territorial state led them in remarkably different directions. With Rustin it becomes evident how difficult it is for one committed to racial justice and economic justice (eradication of poverty) to maintain a radical pacifist or strong anarchist position and prescribe decentralization. For, racial and economic justice in the American context has nearly always been pursued by means of the national government and an absolute rejection of political violence would seem to rule out relying on state action. Rustin appreciated this. But even as he renounced his radical pacifism, he maintained a commitment to perpetual political disobedience.

Rustin's commitments, after he relinquishes his radical pacifism, raise a thicket of profoundly important political philosophical questions and point to the paradox of black radicalism. In the later phase of his career, Rustin adopts views that would appear to rule out his being referred to as an anarchist. However, in Chapter 3, I attempt to refine my conception of anarchism and reflect on whether a rigorous commitment to political disobedience can be regarded as entailing a commitment to weak anarchism. My analysis reveals that a commitment to a strong centralized state does not necessarily mean that one has to posit that individuals have moral duties to obey political commands or the law in virtue of its being the law.

The reflection in Chapter 3 specifically sets the stage for exploring the affinities between anarchists and the political philosophies of persons belonging to the black radical tradition. As Michael Dawson and others have pointed out, black radicals typically endorse two important theses. First, they argue for a state-centered view of social change. Second, they contend that extrajudicial agitation is necessary for the realization of social justice and the liberation of the oppressed. My contention is that a significant number of black radicals place a premium on the second of these theses, which brings them close to weak anarchism. Indeed, one of the virtues of weak anarchism as a classificatory term is that it provides an auspicious way to capture the praxis of a large number of radical social activists and raises an important question about the attitude toward authority—particularly political authority—that it is appropriate or pragmatically advisable for social justice actors to embrace in the contemporary sphere.

I should note that, more than in Chapters 1 and 2, my treatment of Rustin will be especially interpretive. I rely on artificial constructs, to some extent, to make the distinctions between phases, but by no means are the lines arbitrarily drawn. Rather the analytic units that are employed simplify the subject matter—the objects of study—providing for maximal clarity or clarification. Rustin enunciates a political philosophy with subtly different implications at various points during his activist career and, as I analyze Rustin's social and political philosophy, I am particularly concerned with the implications of the views that I attribute to Rustin during the respective stages that I take up. Further, I am interested in the positions that Rustin held in the respective periods more so than in his consistency over the course of his life, and so I will discuss inconsistency and shifts comparatively insofar as it bears upon a perceived principled contradiction or pragmatic assessment of the impracticality of a given principled stance.

My aim is to understand the implications of his explicitly held ethical commitments and to see how certain substantive ethical commitments relate to anarchist philosophy and praxis. To put this differently, I attempt to show how in practice and at the theoretical level certain principles—radical pacifism or a strict commitment to substantive social justice—can become the content of or basis for an anarchist ethic. Proceeding in the manner proposed will put us in a position to assess and understand how anarchist ideas, ideals, and attitudes relate to Gandhian theories of social change and the sociopolitical commitments of members of the black radical tradition, opening the door for a reconsideration of how we conceptualize anarchist practice, past and present social movements, and imagine possible radical coalitions in the present-future.

So in the main chapters I will make explicit the moral dimension of anarchism and will consider the way in which certain religious-ethical commitments connect with or constitute grounds for an anarchist philosophy or anarchist ethic. Thoreau, Day, and Rustin, on the basis of their respective concerns for racial and social justice, each emphasize moral autonomy, noncomplicity, and responsibility in a way that entails the rejection of the claims to authority characteristic of modern territorial states. These three moral exemplars, I hope to demonstrate, belong to or have at least greatly influenced the nonviolent anarchist tradition, a tradition that presents a formidable theory of immediate action or revolutionary practice. In the "Conclusion," I will consider the implications, for ethicists, historians of social movements, and activists, of making explicit the moral and religious sources of anarchism or, to put it in different terms, the anarchist dimension of certain moral and religious commitments. By referring to Thoreau, Day, and Rustin as anarchists, it should be evident how radical their respective ethical commitments were; but at the same time, by showing how each of the three, at various moments in their activist careers, can be properly understood as anarchists, I mean to show anarchism in a fresh light. In what follows, at once I aspire to render the familiar strange and make the strange familiar, with an eye toward haunting, inspiring, awakening, and prodding—perhaps. <>

THE POLITICS OF RITUAL by Molly Farneth [Princeton University Press, ISBN 9780691198910]

An illuminating look at the transformative role that rituals play in our political lives

THE POLITICS OF RITUAL is a major new account of the political power of rituals. In this incisive and wide-ranging book, Molly Farneth argues that rituals are social practices in which people create, maintain, and transform themselves and their societies. Far from mere scripts or mechanical routines, rituals are dynamic activities bound up in processes of continuity and change. Emphasizing the significance of rituals in democratic engagement, Farneth shows how people adapt their rituals to redraw the boundaries of their communities, reallocate goods and power within them, and cultivate the habits of citizenship.

Transforming our understanding of rituals and their vital role in the political conflicts and social movements of our time, **THE POLITICS OF RITUAL** examines a broad range of rituals enacted to just and democratic ends, including border Eucharists, candlelight vigils, and rituals of mourning. This timely book makes a persuasive case for an innovative democratic ritual life that can enable people to create

and sustain communities that are more just, inclusive, and participatory than those in which they find themselves.

Review

"In multiracial, multiethnic societies, ritual can bind groups or reconfigure them. Drawing on philosophy, religious studies, feminist and political theory, and more, Molly Farneth's *The Politics of Ritual* makes the case for the centrality of ritual to political life and for the transformative power of ritual to further democratize unequal societies. A joy to read, this is a highly teachable and important book."**—Bonnie Honig, author of *A Feminist Theory of Refusal***

"**THE POLITICS OF RITUAL** demonstrates how rituals not only shape us but we shape and reshape them, and how rituals are never morally neutral but are always to be judged in terms of justice and injustice. Others have written on the political significance of rituals, but never with the breadth of scholarship, theoretical facility, and wealth of examples that characterize this book."**—Nicholas Wolterstorff, Yale University**

"This compelling book offers new ways for readers to consider the critical work that rituals perform for—and sometimes in opposition to—democracy, freedom, political solidarity, power relations, and racial justice. Farneth is persuasive in illuminating the power of rituals to make and remake the social worlds we occupy each day."**—R. Marie Griffith, author of *Moral Combat: How Sex Divided American Christians and Fractured American Politics***

CONTENTS

The Book and Its Aims

THE POLITICS OF RITUAL offers a social practical account of ritual, and it argues for rituals' political significance and power. In particular, it considers when and how rituals contribute to just and democratic politics. It also reflects on how people adapt existing rituals or create new ones in order to redraw boundaries or redistribute goods, including power, around and within their communities. It argues, moreover, that these adaptations and innovations are part of a dialectic of continuity and change that is always part of people's ritual life, rather than an idiosyncratic feature of modern religion or politics.

The book focuses on justice-seeking rituals and democratic politics for two reasons. The first is that the impulse is often to view rituals as powerfully enforcing the status quo. This can be true, but it is not always. Rituals aren't static; they are dynamic social practices that involve change and contestation over time. The second reason is simply that rituals can and often do play an important role in the struggle for

justice. I hope to convince readers, particularly those who want to envision and build a different kind of world together, of the need for rituals in which the communities people deserve can be enacted and embodied.

Nevertheless, the examples in this book are not confined to enactments of rituals in protests and social movements. Some of the examples involve activists enacting rituals in protests; others involve the denizens of a nation-state enacting civic rituals in everyday life.' Others still involve religious individuals or groups enacting the rituals of their tradition, but in ways that contest how those rituals configure community or distribute power. These contestations often take place in the midst of broader political contestation and change—as when, in the midst of second-wave feminist movements that demanded equal rights for women in political and economic life, Episcopal women enacted an ordination ceremony to demand inclusion in the (then) all-male priesthood. What holds these various examples together—what makes them worth thinking about under the banner of the "politics of ritual"—is that, in each case, they are enacted in ways that attend to the norms invoked and the communities created by them, and in ways attentive to the distribution of justice, power, and freedom. It is my assumption—typically implicit, although I'll make it explicit here—that distinctions between the religious and the secular (and thus between, say, religious and so-called civic rituals) have little to do with the ways that people actually move among the spaces and communities they're in. The significance of religious ritual is never fully cordoned off from political concerns; the significance of civic ritual is best understood in light of theories and histories of religion.

To consider how and when rituals enact or bring about just or democratic ends we'll need to pay careful attention to what rituals are and what they do. I draw on ritual theory, social practice theory, and philosophy of language to attend to the latter. Like scholars in the field of "lived religion," such as David Hall, Robert Orsi, and R. Marie Griffith, I am interested in how people practice religion in their everyday lives, in how their religious practices emerge both within and outside of religions' institutional forms." Like those influenced by theorists of practice such as Pierre Bourdieu and Catherine Bell, I am interested in how rituals, as bodily practices, can shape subjects and reproduce social, cultural, and political norms—but also in how they can transform them. My approach integrates the insights of these influential intellectual movements with renewed attention to belief and language, topics sometimes left by the wayside in the recent turn toward embodiment, practice, and power. The resulting account helps make sense of how, and why, rituals have political power and significance, and how, and why, people argue over existing rituals and, sometimes, create new ones.'

Readers eager to get to the politics may be tempted to skip the first chapter, which focuses on the term "ritual" and defines it for the purpose of this study. In doing so, however, they would miss the account of what rituals and social practices are and of how such practices change. This account is taken up and expanded upon in later chapters, each of which considers one or more of the things that rituals do, things that matter to our political lives. Each of the chapters should be intelligible on its own, although it is my intention that they build on one another to contribute to the broader framework and account of the politics of ritual.

Chapter 1, "A Social Practical Account of Rituals," clarifies the terms and topic of my inquiry. It begins by discussing some "formal" characteristics of ritual: routine, repetition, and rules. I argue that, while these are typically features of rituals, focusing on these formal characteristics alone obscures how rituals work dynamically to shape—and change—people and societies. After all, if rituals are nothing more than

routines, strictly governed by rules and repeatedly enacted, then how could they be anything but static and status quo supporting? By considering rituals as social practices that take place over time, we can begin to see how people improvise within these inherited frames, pull them into new contexts, and change the norms and routines themselves. Moreover, we can begin to see how rituals are bound up with concerns about power and justice.

Because rituals "belong" to groups—that is, because they are social practices—chapter 2, "Marking Boundaries, Distributing Goods," considers the relationship between rituals and the boundaries of groups. People engage rituals to create, maintain, and transform boundaries around and within their communities. In doing so, people both recognize the salience of certain roles and identities within their communities and allocate material and normative goods to the people who inhabit those roles and identities. This means that the presence, absence, and content of rituals can be matters of justice, whether a person or a group is recognized and given the goods that are their due. Disagreements and debates about rituals—whether they should be performed, who ought to be able to participate in them, what ought to be said or done in them, and what their consequences ought to be—are often disagreements about whether the structure and the distribution of goods and ills within a group are just or unjust. Rituals enacted at the U.S.-Mexico border highlight the contingency and injustice of nation-state borders by enacting other kinds of communities with other kinds of boundaries. Rituals do boundary work.

Chapter 3, "Performing and Recognizing Authority," builds on these claims about the goods and ills that rituals create and distribute, focusing on the relationship among rituals, power, authority, and recognition. Contrary to Bourdieu's claim that people's enactments of rituals involve the exercise of power that has been authorized in advance, I argue that people sometimes enact rituals in ways that exercise power that can only be authorized retrospectively. That is to say, sometimes people enact rituals that they aren't actually supposed to enact—and sometimes, their performances succeed nevertheless! I elaborate on the argument that rituals can be performative in the sense that they can "count as" something other than, or in addition to, the discrete bodily acts that constitute them. As performatives, rituals bring about changes in the social world. What makes an enactment of a ritual successful is not always fully spelled out beforehand; rather, the conditions for success are often recognized and negotiated after the fact. It is through novel enactments of a ritual that changes in what the ritual counts as, and who it counts for, can be brought about. Politically speaking, this matters because novel enactments of rituals can distribute power in new ways—including ways that challenge domination and unjust exclusion in religious and political relationships. As we'll see, Episcopal women, ordained to the priesthood in unsanctioned ceremonies in the midst of the women's movement, and Black Catholics, who innovated on Roman Catholic liturgy to enact new authority structures influenced by the Black Power movement, drew on existing ritual frames to claim authority. In this way, rituals can transform power relations.

Critical social theorists, including Bourdieu, often emphasize the role of rituals and other social practices in reproducing existing social structures and power relations. In chapters 2 and 3, I suggest how enactments of rituals tend to conform to the norms and standards of already-existing practices while regulating boundaries, sustaining social structures, and distributing power. But those chapters also include examples of people and groups who challenge and change those norms, standards, and practices in ways that encourage new structures and relationships. Chapter 4, "Habits, Virtues, and Freedom,"

takes on the apparent tension between these two things. In particular, it considers rituals aimed toward forming political subjects and constituting a people, and asks, "Which people? Constituted how? With what habits and virtues in mind?" Thinking through these questions alongside the work of scholars in ritual studies—including Bourdieu, Saba Mahmood, and Catherine Bell—I consider the constitution of habits and habitus that reproduce social norms and power relations, as well as the possibility that people engage in rituals in ways that self-consciously engage, and sometimes transform, those norms and relations. Rituals, I argue, can shape citizens with habits and dispositions that are just and democratic.

Many of the same scholars who emphasize rituals' role in discipline and habit formation resist the notion that rituals ought to be understood as expressing beliefs. In the examples that most interest such theorists, people's enactments of rituals are better understood as inculcating abilities and skills according to scripts, rules, and authorities than as expressing beliefs, attitudes, and intentions. But these two things—inculcation and expression—need not be treated as an either/or. Chapter 4 suggests a way of thinking about how people's repeated enactment of a ritual or set of rituals can inculcate habits and dispositions while also generating the reflective and expressive resources to challenge and change them; chapter 5 then shifts its focus to expression itself—to the idea that rituals express things, including political ideals and stances.

In chapter 5, "Expressing Beliefs, Passions, and Solidarity," I consider how rituals express things of political significance. Rituals can express commitments and ideals. They also express attitudes and emotions, including the passions of grief and anger and the stance of solidarity. I outline an account of expression in which the ritual expression of a belief or attitude creates and distributes obligations, entitlements, authority, and other statuses, rather than merely revealing otherwise private and inner mental states. I return to examples of rituals of mourning enacted in overtly political ways to mark untimely and unjust deaths, including the political funerals of the AIDS crisis and the die-ins of the Black Lives Matter movement, and I consider the politics of expressing grief, anger, and solidarity in and through rituals. Finally, the conclusion, "The Rituals of Our Politics," returns to the relationship between rituals and democratic politics.

This book offers an approach to rituals that combines theoretical and philosophical considerations of rituals as social practices with context-specific analysis. The examples that appear throughout the book and in the conclusion are intended as contextual opportunities for thinking through the politics of ritual (and the rituals of our politics). There is a wide range of such examples. Many, although by no means all, are situated in relation to contemporary American politics; many, although by no means all, have Christian roots or resonance. Nevertheless, and as other examples in the book suggest, there is nothing uniquely modern, American, or Christian about the politics of ritual, nor about the ways that rituals can be contested or changed. Rituals create, sustain, and transform social and political worlds; the shape of the worlds we come to inhabit depends on the activities we undertake in common—crucially, on our rituals. <>

Critical Approaches to Science and Religion by Myrna Perez Sheldon, Ahmed Ragab, Terence Keel [Columbia University Press, ISBN 9780231206563]

Critical Approaches to Science and Religion offers a new direction for scholarship on science and religion that examines social, political, and ecological concerns long part of the field but never properly centered. The works that make up this volume are not preoccupied with traditional philosophical or theological issues. Instead, the book draws on three vital schools of thought: critical race theory, feminist and queer theory, and postcolonial theory. Featuring a diverse array of contributors, it develops critical perspectives by examining how histories of empire, slavery, colonialism, and patriarchy have shaped the many relationships between science and religion in the modern era. In so doing, this book lays the groundwork for scholars interested in speaking directly to matters such as climate change, structural racism, immigration, health care, reproductive justice, and sexual identity.

Review

Critical Approaches to Science and Religion is a marvelous advance of interdisciplinary scholarship that charts foundational themes for interpreting the cultural dimensions of science and religion. The authors elucidate epistemological tensions and methodological resonances to inform future scholarship. This is essential reading for scholars across multiple disciplines. -- Sylvester A. Johnson, coeditor of *Religion and US Empire: Critical New Histories*

I will return repeatedly to this volume to think with these diverse authors. Their disciplinary languages are not mine although they attentively converse with my discipline of Critical Indigenous Studies, among others. I am eager for vital conversations that I and others will have with these ideas that feed my radical hope for the implosion of the white and settler supremacist worldview. In order to live better with one another in *this* world, we need this conversation. -- Kim TallBear, author of *Native American DNA: Tribal Belonging and the False Promise of Genetic Science*

With its inclusion of vital perspectives from critical race theory, feminist and queer theory, and postcolonial and Indigenous studies, this volume transforms the conversation about religion and science by making issues of difference central to these discussions. These essays are invaluable. -- Randall Styers, author of *Making Magic: Religion, Magic, and Science in the Modern World*

CONTENTS

In **CRITICAL APPROACHES TO SCIENCE AND RELIGION**, we offer a new method for studying science and religion that centers critical race theory, feminist and queer theory, and postcolonial and Indigenous analysis. Through this, we ask, How have histories of slavery, patriarchy, and colonialism shaped the emergence of science and religion in modernity? We are inspired by the sobering realization that those who inherit the unsolved problems of this generation will need resilient and creative tools to design a future that is more just and humane. A politically and ethically conscious understanding of science and religion should be a part of these future designs.

This critical orientation is a radical departure from the two paradigms that have shaped academic and popular thinking about science and religion over the past century. The first of these, the conflict thesis, emerged out of debates within Anglophone societies over science, evolution, and Christianity in the latter half of the nineteenth century.' It proposed that science and religion constitute timeless and irreconcilable ways of knowing the natural world. The conflict thesis has had an outsized influence beyond that immediate context, as it remains widely influential in global media, scholarly journals, political discourse, and K-12 education? It has also persisted despite the efforts of historians to demonstrate that science and religion are categories bound to the specifics of time, place, and cultural context. In what would later be described as the complexity thesis, European and American scholars starting in the late 196os sought to move beyond the use of military imagery and looked to emphasize the codependent relationship between science and religion.' They argued that the historically contingent nature of these two ways of knowing makes any one descriptive metaphor for their relationship an inadequate distortion. Scholars in the humanities have largely adopted the complexity thesis, even as the conflict position remains prominent throughout the life and social sciences.

Our critical approach draws on the historical methodology first advocated by the authors of the complexity thesis. Our own perspective centers histories of patriarchy, slavery, and colonialism in an

analysis of science and religion in order to clarify the effects and lived experiences of both categories. This critical lens reveals how science and religion emerged alongside—and, indeed, constitute—modern power structures and identities, and, in turn, undergirded the emergence of race, gender, sexuality, class, and nationality in the modern world: Ultimately, defamiliarizing what is commonly understood about science and religion involves critique alongside new frameworks, methods, and writing practices to document the work these social creations have performed.

Nevertheless, we offer something more than a progression beyond conflict or even a simple addition to the lens of historical complexity. Our aim is not merely a new and lasting methodological validity. Rather, we seek something that these earlier paradigms were not designed to provide: the willingness to use historical insight to engage in contemporary political and social struggle. Recent global developments implicating both science and religion have helped make clear the need for frameworks that go beyond the political capacities of previous scholarly paradigms.

Consider, for example, that in the spring of 2015, hundreds of Kanaka Maoli gathered to block the only access road to Mauna Kea, a dormant volcanic peak of the island of Hawai'i, which was the proposed site of the new Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT). Because of its immense size and the optimal conditions on top of Mauna Kea, the TMT would enable astronomers to conduct research not possible with the existing instruments on the mountain. But Mauna Kea is deeply sacred to Kanaka Maoli. She is a relative. When protesters blocked the road again in 2019 to prevent this violation of the aina, their actions energized the movement for Kanaka solidarity and self-determination, bringing the fact of U.S. colonial presence in Hawai'i sharply into focus.

Or how in 2010, Turkey became the first country to ban its citizens from travel for the purposes of certain types of assisted reproductive technology (ART). A secular country, Turkey nevertheless conforms to the Sunni Muslim fatwa issued by Al-Azhar University in 1980 stipulating that in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment must be pursued in the context of heterosexual marriage.' It specifically prohibits the use of donor eggs and sperm, preventing queer and straight individuals who need third-party gametes from obtaining IVF treatment within Turkey. In response to this restriction, many Turkish citizens began traveling to nearby countries to receive donor-assisted IVF treatment. Turkey's zoio prohibition of this travel was an extraordinary attempt to control the religio-reproductive lives of its citizens.

Or that currently in the United States, an increasing number of young Black women are leaving Christianity in favor of Black witchcraft and are forming digital covens. Black witchcraft is just one expression of African diasporic religions that evolved in the response to the dehumanizing conditions of the Atlantic slave trade. Traditions such as Vodou in Haiti and Lucumi in Cuba kept African worldviews alive under the cover of enslavement and Christian conversion. They are finding renewed life in video conferencing technologies like Webex, which enable the transmission of copresence across temporal and geospatial realities throughout the Americas. For Black witch covens, like Dawtas of the Moon, performing ancestral magic within a digital space has transformed the material and spiritual dimensions of Black diasporic identity, connecting practitioners to premodern rituals via late modern technologies."

These three stories sit at the intersection of science and religion. Yet little is offered by analyzing whether science and religion are in conflict or harmony in each context. Nor are these situations adequately addressed by observing that they emerge from complex social and historical contexts. For

the Kanaka Maoli, the threat to Mauna Kea comes from the steady march of American imperialism alongside astronomical science. A quasi-secular state is governing the reproductive lives of Turkish families and using IVF to police heteronormative values that predate this biotechnology. Contemporary Black witch covens can conjure and heal using much more than sage, root, and gemstones. Conflict, harmony, and complexity—the tried and true frameworks of scholarly analysis—fail to capture the political, bioethical, and materialist stakes of science and religion in these contemporary situations. It is this insufficiency in the current field and the desire to meaningfully address urgent political realities that prompt this volume.

Within a critical approach, a new set of analytical possibilities becomes available that allow us to recognize how science and religion alternatively function in both liberating and oppressive capacities. In the case of Mauna Kea, for instance, rendering the Kanaka Maoli worldview as a religion makes protection possible under U.S. freedom of religion statutes!' But it also exposes the community to denigration as backward or primitive in contrast to the universalizing claims of astronomic scientific research. Activists, artists, and Indigenous scholars are developing strategies of political resistance and social change grounded by the understanding that religious freedom and scientific research are predetermined by the colonial relationship between the United States and Hawaii." What is paramount in this case is the ability to design a future where there are mechanisms that value Indigenous worldviews and hold state and scientific actors accountable when religious belief is undermined in the name of apparent universal truth. At stake is developing knowledge for social change, not speculation about whether religion and science exist in an antagonistic or complementary relationship.

Importantly, for each of the contemporary issues recounted previously, critical theory scholars have already brought forward a wealth of insights. For instance, the field of feminist science studies has articulated the moral frontiers confronted by individuals who undertake IVF treatment." And in the case of Black magic, critical scholars of religion have demonstrated how African diasporic spirituality emerges from racial and sexual assemblages in cooking and other daily rituals." Beyond these examples, there is a wide and multidecade literature where the critical assessment of science and religion has grown among scholars who have avoided the intellectual traps of the conflict thesis while recognizing that the complexity thesis does not easily align with the progressive political and social sensibilities of scholars now working within the field. At its simplest and most fundamental, this volume offers many models and possibilities for what critical theories can offer to the study of science and religion.

Here we begin a conversation that is intended to be promising and provocative rather than exhaustive. We do believe that this effort should have the effect of expanding and transforming the existing contours of the field. In particular, a critical approach should call into question and reframe the field's persistent focus on Christianity and the intellectual history of Europe and the United States. But our intention is not solely, or even primarily, to correct existing scholarship by simply widening its gaze. Rather, we intend to reorient the ethical trajectory of this field to a more overtly political framework that centers the raced, gendered, sexualized, and colonized natures of science and religion. Ultimately, our hope is to use the study of science and religion as a venue for imagining alternative futures where we might live better with one another.

Critical Theories

The term critical approaches is taken from our engagement with three areas of critical inquiry: critical race theory (CRT), feminist and queer theory, and postcolonial, decolonial, and Indigenous theories. Although each of these fields has distinctive histories and methodologies, together they emerged through the global transformations of the twentieth century, including the civil rights, women's, and decolonization movements. The 195os and 196os witnessed the rise of the New Left in the United States and Europe, as well as the slow decline of the nineteenth-century colonial enterprise. Connected to these politics, critical disciplines in the academy questioned the key legacies of Western modernity in the Americas, Europe, and Europe's former colonies. CRT developed in the United States within the context of legal studies as a theoretical orientation that exposed how racism is not an accidental feature but rather is integral to modern legal and political systems. Feminist and queer theory arose alongside international feminist and gay rights activism, focusing on the way that social power shapes gender relations and human sexuality. Postcolonial studies tackled debates around modernization, sovereignty, and nationalism in the newly independent states in order to grapple with the legacy of colonialism and the challenges of new world orders. While decolonial and Indigenous studies offered important space for reflecting on decolonization and on the continued lives of settler colonial regimes. Together these fields form the framework for our critical approach to the study of science and religion.

We rely on feminist studies in order to analyze the historical impact of patriarchy on the emergence of science and religion in modern times. Since the 197os, feminist science studies has critiqued the models, modes of evidence, and rhetoric of modern science by calling attention to the gendered commitments in the modern study of life and the production of new technologies!' This work, in turn, was instrumental in the ongoing disciplinary development of the history of science and of science and technology studies (STS). Feminist approaches to science pushed these fields to abandon their fealty to the political neutrality of science and to instead grapple with how the knowledge regimes of modern science are bound up in views of gender, reproduction, and reproductive labor. For example, feminists highlighted the ways in which women were excluded from the institutions of science, even as scientific investigations were used to construct women as incapable of doing science." The very definition of science—its empiricism, rationality, and objectivity—was tied to arguments that only masculine intellects were capable of science. This tautological definition of science excluded women from its practices and its category.

One result of this has been the feminization of religion as modern science's problematic other. Within this frame, contemporary science advocates portray religious belief as the cowardly purview of feminized minds. And this feminization was capacious enough to also signify, at one time or another, nearly all non-white European peoples who could not be emancipated from the hysteria and superstition of their primitive worldviews. However, this gendering of religion has not meant that religious institutions and practices are liberatory for women or LGBTQ+ persons. On the contrary, feminist and queer scholars of religion have interrogated the deep history of patriarchy and heterosexism in various religious traditions while also working to imagine more progressive religious futures. Feminist and queer scholars of Islam, for example, have turned to inventive modes of the jurisprudential tradition of Muslim societies to advocate for social reform.'8 Key to these literatures are theoretical accounts of religion that imagine new possibilities, whether queer formations in Islam or feminist egalitarianism in evangelical Christianity. Thus, a feminist and queer approach to the study of science and religion foregrounds how

these categories have been sexualized and gendered and how these dynamics have influenced their interplay in modern life.

We turn to postcolonial studies in order to examine the role of colonialism in shaping the epistemologies and practices of both science and religion. Since at least the nineteenth century, secularization narratives cast Eastern religions (such as Islam and Hinduism) and Indigenous cultures as inadequately evolved in relation to Western religion and, subsequently, to science. In this framework, Western Christianity (especially Protestantism) was framed as the inevitable precursor to scientific enlightenment. Western elites claimed that science was both universally true and the exclusive property of Euro-America. In particular, the glorification of European science grew out of a perceived contradiction between the "spirit of science" and religion. The former, often characterized as outgoing, inquisitive, and freethinking, was posited against the latter, labeled as backward, superstitious, and submissive to authority. During decolonization and the postcolonial period of the twentieth century, the struggle for progress in the Global South was often equated with a secularist narrative that borrowed from and reproduced the science and religion dynamic of the colonial era. In this context, the scholarly theses of conflict and conciliation are no longer abstract methods by which to understand how science and religion interact but are, in fact, paradigm-making concepts that attempt to define the postcolonial subjects and their relationship to Western power and its traditions. The failure to see, realize, or take sides in this perceived conflict/conciliation of science and religion was an even more damning sign of backwardness. As such, during the twentieth century, postcolonial states in the Global South had to contend with the complex, uncomfortable, and unsettled nature of the couple "science and religion," both as a problem that needs solving and as a necessary part of progress. Throughout this era, postcolonial scholars of religion and of medicine and science have critiqued these narratives, highlighting the racialized and sexualized legacies of these formations.

In recent decades, decolonial and Indigenous studies have further expanded this critique of science and religion as self-evident or coherent categories. Scholars in these areas have shown how native epistemologies have been subjected to various acts of violence, including forced schooling, the deprivation of legal status, and genocide. Nevertheless, the insufficiency of Euro-American thought in accounting for Indigenous and native epistemologies and worlds is obfuscated by the violent imposition of Euro-American ways of knowing. The already referenced debate over the proposed construction of the TMT is just one example of how American settler colonial legal systems, including those that define science and religion, fail to grasp Indigenous reality.

Ultimately, we intend for this project not only to bring critical theory into the study of science and religion but also to encourage scholars in critical studies fields to rethink their commitments to disciplinary formation. Our project puts questions that have been explored within science and religion—those of existential purpose, meaning making, and alternative imaginaries—at the center of critical reflection over race, political representation, material accumulation, and the epistemologies of science, medicine, and technology. With this volume, we encourage critical theorists to foreground issues of belonging, wholeness, and human flourishing in their analyses of identity categories such as race, gender, sexuality, class, region, and religion. <>

Land and Spirituality in Rabbinic Literature: A Memorial Volume for Yaakov Elman ז"ל edited by Shana Strauch Schick [The Brill Reference Library of Judaism, Brill, 9789004503151]

This volume is devoted to the texts, traditions, and practices of the Land of Israel from the end of the Second Temple period through late antiquity. Based upon a conference organized by the Yeshiva University Center for Israel Studies, the articles in this collection use a range of critical methodologies and sources, including the Palestinian and Babylonian Talmuds, archaeology, and Samaritan and Jewish liturgical poetry. It presents a vibrant, complex, and multi-layered series of snapshots of rabbinic culture, written by leading contemporary scholars.

CONTENTS

LAND AND SPIRIT IN RABBINIC LITERATURE: STUDIES IN MEMORY OF YAAKOV ELMAN is a collection of studies devoted to the texts, traditions, and practices of the Land of Israel from the end of the Second Temple continuing through the early rabbinic period (70 CE) to the end of the first millennium.

This volume has its origins in the conference, "Land and Spirituality in Rabbinic Literature: A Day in Memory of Professor Yaakov Elman" that I organized at the Yeshiva University Center for Israel Studies in New York in 2019, where most of these papers were presented. This is the second volume dedicated to Yaakov Elman under the auspices of the Yeshiva University Center for Israel Studies. The first, Shoshannat Yaakov: Jewish and Iranian Studies in Honor of Yaakov Elman, edited by Shai Secunda and Steven Fine (Brill, 2012) celebrated his ongoing work; sadly, this volume is dedicated to his memory. We miss him. Professor Elman's interests were wide-ranging and diverse. His studies reflect a unique ability to synthesize information and approaches from across many disciplines and fields of knowledge; all with the goal of shedding light on the texts, intellectual history, and culture of the people whom he studied—be they rabbis, Zoroastrians, or the Qumran community.

The studies in this volume display a similarly vibrant level of diversity. A wide range of methodologies are employed, including critical textual reconstruction, literary analysis, history, and the interplay between law and narrative. These studies are united by their shared focus on traditions from the Land of Israel and their rigorous approaches, which together offer a picture of rabbinic literature and Israelite cultures Jewish and Samaritan, that are multi-layered and complex.

The first part of the volume comprises studies on Palestinian literature that examine practices and beliefs that developed in the Land of Israel. Together these articles depict a rich and textured picture of Late Antique Palestine, which displays certain commonalities with the culture of its Roman overseers and in other ways is highly distinctive.

The collection begins with an examination of how Second Temple through later rabbinic texts understood the prehistoric past. Elisha Fine and Steven Fine excavate Josephus, rabbinic and classical sources and suggest that ancient Jews responded to fossil discoveries, imagining the bones of ancient elephants, and possibly other large mammals, to be those of the biblical anaqim. Drawing on recent work that has identified similar references in Greco-Roman texts, they demonstrate that what have previously been deemed fanciful passages in Josephus and rabbinic literature about giants and monstrous beings rather interpret discoveries of prehistoric fossils. Turning to how the rabbis understood their own past, Michal Bar-Asher Siegal examines both the philological aspects of Tosefta Eduyot 1 along with its content, to reconstruct its textual development, while uncovering a source of tension that existed within the rabbinic imagination. Considering previous studies devoted to this text, which appears to present a tantalizingly elusive history of the early rabbinic movement, BarAsher Siegal argues that Tosefta Eduyot draws on two earlier tannaitic sources, one preserved only in the Bavli, to discuss the

rabbis' fear that several aspects of Torah learning may become lost in the future. This paper bolsters the evidence that the Bavli appears to preserve versions of tannaitic traditions that predate those found in extant Palestinian works.

The following articles examine aspects of extra-rabbinic factors that often helped to shape Palestinian rabbinic law, halakhah. Stuart Miller points to the significant impact that the popular practices of everyday Jews had upon the amoraim of the Land of Israel and the laws which they articulated. Drawing on anecdotes, discussions of halakhot which preoccupied the rabbis, as well as archeological evidence, Miller paints a picture of the ongoing interactions between rabbis and everyday Jews living in the Land of Israel during the amoraic period. This, he argues, contrasts with the amoraim of Babylonia who, having far less daily contact with Jews who were not part of their collegium, took a narrower approach towards minhag when deciding halakhah. Yael Wilfand looks to the Greco-Roman context of the Palestinian rabbis and the role that Roman imperial law had in the shaping of halakhah. She suggests that what appears to be inconsistencies in tannaitic rulings regarding the status of converts reflect Roman models of citizenship for former slaves. As opposed to earlier scholars who have understood the diverse rabbinic perspectives on the status of converts as a matter of varying levels of stringency, Wilfand argues that Roman norms, notions, and laws regarding freedmen and freedwomen served as a conceptual framework for rabbinic thinking on this issue. Nachman Levine continues the discussion of extra-halakhic elements in Palestinian texts in his literary analysis of an aggadic narrative appearing in Deuteronomy Rabbah and its parallel in the Jerusalem Talmud (Bava Metsia 2:5, 8c). He demonstrates not only the high level of literary artistry evinced in this brief account, but a meta-halakhic message on ethical behavior embedded therein. This narrative reveals a source of conflict for its author between the accepted law that one need not return a lost object to a non Jew, and a moral imperative that one should. Levine thus points to the tensions that arise between legal principles versus ethical values, as well as law and narrative more generally. Shlomo Zuckier examines another tension between legal versus narrative texts in his study of the rabbinic discussions surrounding the cause of the biblical malady of tsaraat. In contrast to previous studies which have argued that early rabbinic traditions do not correlate tsaraat with sin, corresponding to how tsaraat is discussed in legal contexts, Zuckier argues that the dominant approach as evidenced in tannaitic and amoraic aggadic literature is that it is in fact a form of divine retribution, reflecting the themes of various biblical narratives concerning tsaraat.

Laura Lieber focuses on the neighboring Samaritan community as a point of comparison with rabbinic practices. Lieber suggests that the modern-day Samaritan observance of the holiday of Sukkot, which is significantly different from rabbinic practice, is based on different underlying interpretations of the biblical text coupled with evolving historical circumstances. Weaving together Samaritan sources from late antiquity with events that led to practices up to the present, she argues that the holiday of Sukkot was linked with the Garden of Eden and the state of purity engendered by the fast of Yom Kippur as well as the agricultural abundance experienced by the Samaritan community during the fourth through seventh centuries.

Moving to the byzantine and early Islamic period, Moshe Bernstein offers a picture of synagogue liturgical practice in Palestine during the mid-Byzantium period. Through identifying striking literary and thematic similarities between a Palestinian Aramaic lament poem devoted to the fast of the Ninth of Av and a Hebrew "expansion" poem found in the liturgy of its afternoon prayers, both from roughly the same period, Bernstein offers a new possibility as to when (and by whom) the latter might have been

recited during the ninth of Av service. He thus demonstrates that Hebrew and Aramaic poetry may in fact have had similar liturgical functions, albeit for different synagogue constituencies.

The second section of the volume shifts its focus to the Babylonian Talmud, the Bavli, and how this compendium encountered, incorporated, and differed from traditions from the Land of Israel. The theme of forgetting Torah is revisited in Alyssa Grey's article, in which she offers a thorough examination of the motif of the forgetting and restoration of Torah knowledge and how it differs in the statements of Palestinian versus Babylonian rabbis. She notes significant differences not only in the greater prevalence of this motif in rabbinic texts from the Land of Israel, but in their willingness to introduce Divine oversight into the rabbinic legal process. While rabbis of the Land of Israel regard unknowing restorations of Torah as the hidden involvement of the Divine in human activities, Bavli texts describe similar restorations as the result of painstaking human endeavors. Barak Cohen turns to another instance where material appearing in the Yerushalmi is incorporated in the Bavli, analyzing instances where the Bavli reports amoraic statements found in the Yerushalmi by use of the term shanu ela, "they taught [this] only." Although the Bavli redactors reworked their sources by introducing this phrase, they nevertheless retained the original halakhic content found in the parallel Yerushalmi traditions. Arguing that we must distinguish content from language and style, Cohen makes an important contribution to the larger issue of the reliability of attributed statements in the Bavli.

No volume devoted to Yaakov Elman would be complete without a study examining Bavli texts in relation to Zoroastrian literature. Meira Wolkenfeld looks at the ways that Palestinian rabbinic texts and the Bavli interpret Isaiah 11:3's description of the messiah "smelling," and argues that their differing understandings reflect the divergent values attributed to the sense of smell in the Roman world as opposed to Sasanian Iran. Whereas texts from the Land of Israel interpret this verse metaphorically, the Bavli offers a literal interpretation which corresponds with other Bavli passages, as well as Middle Persian Zoroastrian texts, that evince a similar positive view of the sense of smell.

In the final article, the relationship between law and narrative returns in my examination of the divergent positions expressed in Palestinian versus Bavli texts concerning women's role and obligation in procreation. In both aggadic and halakhic discussions of these issues the Bavli incorporates traditions from the Land of Israel, but it reframes them in ways that conform with the approach of Babylonian sages. The interrelationship of law and narrative is highlighted by the manner in which Palestinian rulings resurface in the Bavli as narratives, thereby giving voice to a more inclusive Palestinian approach and acknowledging the challenges that the Bavli's exclusionary rulings may pose in practice.

Following these studies, we have taken this opportunity to include some of the remembrances and tributes written in the wake of Yaakov Elman's passing, from his doctoral advisor, Lawrence H. Schiffman and his doctoral students Shai Secunda, Meira Wolkenfeld, and myself. This is followed by a bibliography of his scholarly publications, which now includes several posthumously published articles. <>

THE ART AND THOUGHT OF THE "BEOWULF" POET by Leonard Neidorf [Cornell University Press, ISBN 9781501766909]

In **THE ART AND THOUGHT OF THE BEOWULF POET**, Leonard Neidorf explores the relationship between Beowulf and the legendary tradition that existed prior to its composition. The Beowulf poet inherited an amoral heroic tradition, which focused principally on heroes compelled by circumstances to commit horrendous deeds: fathers kill sons, brothers kill brothers, and wives kill husbands. Medieval Germanic poets relished the depiction of a hero's unyielding response to a cruel fate, but the Beowulf poet refused to construct an epic around this traditional plot. Focusing instead on a courteous and pious protagonist's fight against monsters, the poet creates a work that is deeply untraditional in both its plot and its values. In Beowulf, the kin-slayers and oath-breakers of antecedent tradition are confined to the background, while the poet fills the foreground with unconventional characters, who abstain from transgression, display courtly etiquette, and express monotheistic convictions.

Comparing Beowulf with its medieval German and Scandinavian analogues, The Art and Thought of the Beowulf Poet argues that the poem's uniqueness reflects one poet's coherent plan for the moral renovation of an amoral heroic tradition. In Beowulf, Neidorf discerns the presence of a singular mind at work in the combination and modification of heroic, folkloric, hagiographical, and historical materials. Rather than perceive Beowulf as an impersonally generated object, Neidorf argues that it should be read as the considered result of one poet's ambition to produce a morally edifying, theologically palatable, and historically plausible epic out of material that could not independently constitute such a poem.

Review

This important book will be consulted by a wide range of scholars and students interested in Beowulf and in Old English literature. Leonard Neidorf's impeccable readings of the poem's remarkable variety of textual detail are informed by his widely acknowledged philological expertise, which this book makes accessible to readers interested in the poem from a literary or cultural perspective. -- Geoffrey Russom, Brown University, author of *The Evolution of Verse Structure in Old and Middle English Poetry*

This is an excellent book. Ambitious, concise, and written with particular clarity, **THE ART AND THOUGHT OF THE BEOWULF POET** is set to make a major impact on *Beowulf* studies. Leonard Neidorf persuasively advances an original understanding of not only the poem but the intentions of its author, who was attempting to morally renovate the heroic-legendary tradition. -- Tom Shippey, Saint Louis University, author of *The Road to Middle-Earth*

Leonard Neidorf brilliantly illustrates how the *Beowulf* poet, defying a tradition of amoral heroism under pressure from Fate, imagines a world inhabited both by monsters and by principled people of a kind never previously seen in an ancient epic. This book about a poet's revisionist world-making from shards of previous history and myth should fascinate anyone interested in the crafting of legend. -- Marijane Osborn, UC Davis, translator of *Beowulf: A Verse Translation with Treasures of the Ancient North*

CONTENTS

The present book attempts to answer one large question: Why is Beowulf the unique poem that it is? Though connected to a mountain of heroic and folkloric analogues, Beowulf is formally and ethically distinct from all of them. I argue that the poem's peculiarity results from one author's distinct and coherent vision, expressed in the combination and alteration of various source materials. The Beowulf poet, having inherited an amoral heroic tradition that focused on acts of kin-slaying and oath-breaking committed under compulsion, sought to lend his creation greater moral clarity than he found in his sources without violating their aesthetic norms or altering the facts, as he understood them, of legendary history. To achieve this, the poet concentrated his narrative not on ill-fated conflicts between kinsmen but on a benevolent hero's struggle against malevolent monsters. He consigned the transgressive heroes of antecedent tradition to his poem's background, while populating its foreground with an unconventional set of courteous monotheists, who could be admired and emulated without reservation. I develop this argument over the course of three chapters, each of which presents a reading of Beowulf through a particular lens. The first chapter examines how the poet's refusal to valorize characters known to have killed kinsmen or broken oaths shaped the composition of Beowulf. The second chapter argues that the poet modified the heroic and folkloric traditions he inherited by making ideals of courtesy and courtliness central to the matter of his epic poem. The third chapter explores how the poet uses monotheism and monstrosity to endow Beowulf with a moral framework absent from its analogues. The introduction contextualizes the three central chapters, while the conclusion synthesizes their findings and answers potential objections.

The three central chapters of this book take the form of long and continuous discourses. As the author of numerous papers on Beowulf and related poems, I wanted the writing in this book to differ in form and substance from the rest of my corpus. I viewed each chapter as an opportunity to develop an argument that could not adequately be developed over the course of a single journal article. Criticism is engaged with selectively rather than exhaustively in these chapters, which concentrate less on points of disagreement than my other writings. The book consequently resembles older monographs on Beowulf, such as Dorothy Whitelock's The Audience of Beowulf or Kenneth Sisam's The Structure of Beowulf, in certain respects. The writing of this book was nevertheless animated by the purpose that has animated all of my writing: it aims fundamentally to shed light on problems in the study of Beowu/f and help modern readers understand this difficult and enigmatic medieval work. It is not animated by a desire to advance any academic trend of the present moment. There are books about Beowulf written a century ago that remain inspiring and illuminating to readers today. My ambition has been to produce a book that will remain useful whenever it happens to be read by a person with an earnest desire to understand Beowulf. Clarity has been my highest priority. I therefore use no abbreviations and no jargon, and I avoid erecting any artificial barriers that might prevent an educated member of the general public from comprehending the claims of my book.

Clarity, moreover, is the reason why I refer to the Beowulf poet in my title and throughout my text. Though some might regard this as a provocative or retrograde gesture, I do not consider it a particularly innovative or distinctive feature of my book. As scholars such as John Farrell have shown, nearly all published criticism is concerned with authorial intention even when it professes to have no interest in the matter. Linguists now consider it more or less impossible to interpret any piece of language without reference to the intentions of the individual who uttered it. Accordingly, I offer no extended defense of my explicit intentionalism and see no need for any such defense in view of the implicit intentionalism of nearly everything that has been published about Beowulf. While much of this writing abstains from mentioning an author and uses circumlocutory language to avoid the appearance of intentionalism, logical consideration of the claims involved tends to reveal that the critic is ultimately concerned with an author's intended meaning rather than anything else. When critics debate about the meaning of lofgeornost, the final word of the poem, they are not debating about what this word means to them or what this word could mean in the abstract—they are debating about what one human being intended the word to mean, the same human being who created much, if not all, of the surrounding textual matrix. In this case and most others, the interpretation of Beowulf is "allocratic" (concerned with another person's meaning) rather than "autocratic" (concerned with one's own meaning) in orientation.' While it is possible in shorter papers to use passive constructions to conceal one's interest in the human being behind Beowulf it would be exceedingly difficult to write a readable book about this person's art and thought without ever referring explicitly to him. Additionally, I believe that certain insights into the poem can be obtained only when it is consciously viewed as the result of one author's engagement with the sources and traditions he inherited.

The possibility that multiple authors contributed to the composition of Beowulf might appear to complicate matters, but if it were credited, it would not fundamentally alter the nature of interpretive enterprise: composite authorship merely forces an interpreter to determine what multiple authors, rather than a single author, intended a unit of language to mean. Nevertheless, the possibility that Beowulf is a product of multiple authorship appears increasingly improbable in view of the growing evidence for the poem's unitary authorship. Numerous studies have now shown that there are compelling metrical, lexical, and syntactical reasons to believe that Beowulf was composed by a single author. There are subtle linguistic regularities that pervade the text of Beowulf and distinguish it from all other extant Old English texts; likewise, there are archaic linguistic features found throughout the text of Beowulf that are either absent from or infrequent in the rest of the Old English corpus.' In my previous monograph, I put together an extensive case for the claim that the text of Beowulf transmitted in its sole extant manuscript (from ca. 1000) is essentially the same text that a single author committed to parchment around the year 700. Scribal errors and alterations naturally crept into the text during the course of its transmission, but changes to the text were largely minor and superficial: the text retained its structural homogeneity and linguistic coherence. Computer-assisted n-gram analysis of the text of Beowulf subsequently corroborated my claim and furnished additional evidence consistent with the evidence for unitary authorship accumulated in traditional philological scholarship. 9 At this point, theoretical discussions unmoored from the text might continue to cast doubt on the singular Beowulf poet, but empirical analysis of the text itself appears unlikely to do so. The arguments of the present book, which show that there is a single mind at work in the reshaping of inherited material, complement the linguistic evidence for unitary authorship and aim to restore some flesh and spirit to our anonymous author's bones.

Categorizing this book within one of the major schools of thought in Beowulf criticism might prove difficult. On the one hand, my view of the Beowulf poet as a somewhat censorious author, who was concerned about the moral opacity of his source materials, might appear to align my book with those written by critics who emphasize the spiritual dimension of Beowulf and read the poem predominantly in the context of patristic and hagiographical Latin sources. On the other hand, the frequent comparisons in my book between Beowulf and other witnesses to early Germanic legend might appear to align it with those written by critics who focus on the secular dimension of Beowulf and read it predominantly in the context of medieval Scandinavian and German sources. Readers familiar with my prior work on Widsith, Hlothskvitha, the Nibelungenlied, and the Finnsburg fragment, among other poems, might take it for granted that I belong to the Germanicist school of thought and will consequently underemphasize the religious learning and moral seriousness of the Beowulf poet. In actuality, it was my immersion in the Germanic sources that convinced me of the poet's earnest religiosity and led me to believe that this poet was one of the most morally serious authors to rehandle material from Germanic legend in the entire medieval period. Only when one recognizes the profound amorality of the other witnesses to migration-period legend, with their concentration on kin-slaying and oath-breaking heroes, can one appreciate how morally distinct Beowulf is from other works rooted in the same tradition. The Beowulf poet is not the homilist keen to condemn heroism that some critics have made him out to be, but he was deeply concerned about the moral ambiguity of the tradition he inherited, and this concern is registered throughout Beowulf in an array of salient and subtle manifestations.

***

Chapter 1 argues that kin-slaying and oath-breaking shaped the composition of Beowulf: Such a claim might appear counterintuitive in view of the omission of these acts from the life of the monster-slaying protagonist. Indeed, in his dying words, Beowulf takes satisfaction in the fact that God need not blame him for killing kinsmen and breaking oaths once he is dead. Though these words have not conventionally been thought to offer a key to the poem, I contend that they reflect a set of ideas about kin-slaying and oath-breaking that pervade Beowulf and guide the poet in his handling of inherited material. The hypothesis that the poet wished to avoid valorizing characters known to have committed one of the two standard heroic transgressions is shown here to possess considerable explanatory power. In addition to explaining the poem's focus on a folkloric protagonist, it also explains the distribution of material into the poem's background and the selection of the other foregrounded characters. The poet's moral concerns are reflected in his treatment of various characters, but most saliently so in his elevation of Hrothgar and denigration of Unferth. Hrothgar, known elsewhere for staying at home and abstaining from transgression, is made into the poem's second most prominent character and depicted as an exemplar of courtesy and piety. In contrast, Unferth appears to have been a conventional transgressive hero of the sort depicted sympathetically in other sources, yet the poet consistently expresses hostility toward him. I conclude that the poet articulates a distinctly untraditional perspective on the kin-slaying and oath-breaking heroes he found in his sources and that this perspective distinguishes Beowulf from other witnesses to migration-period legend.

Chapter 2 argues that the poet modified the heroic and folkloric traditions he inherited by making ideals of courtesy and courtliness central to the matter of his epic poem. Beowulf is not generally regarded as a courtly poem: it is routinely excluded from discussions of courtly literature, which normally associate

the phenomenon of courtliness with Francophone literature of the later Middle Ages. In view, however, of a growing tendency among historians to predate the origins of courtliness, I contend that Beowulf should be considered a courtly poem and demonstrate that insights into many of its passages can be obtained by viewing it as such. Instead of focusing on the extreme and unyielding behavior typically displayed by migration-period heroes, the poet focuses on the ceremonial and restrained behavior of his foregrounded characters. Details of court life assume central importance in Beowulf, where much of the narrative is concerned with the protagonist's gradual transition from courtier to king. Displaying greater interest in his courtly behavior than his martial conduct, the poet depicts Beowulf as an ideal courtier who knows how to conduct himself in an aristocratic environment. The hero exhibits the sophisticated self-restraint associated with courtliness, as he displays exaggerated deference toward his superiors and pronounced magnanimity toward his inferiors. Beowulf; in addition to its monster fights, tells the story of a lesser nobleman's rise to kingship, as it shows the hero advance from needing to earn an audience with the Danish king to becoming one of the king's intimates and finally a king himself. The poet, evidently dissatisfied with a folkloric inheritance where narratives possess an ahistorical and dreamlike quality, makes a concerted effort to endow his epic poem with a quality of courtly realism. His protagonist is a human being (rather than a bear) whose exemplary life is situated at plausible courts of the semihistorical migration period.

Chapter 3 argues that the poet uses monotheism and monstrosity to bring greater moral clarity to the traditions he inherited. Like Alcuin, the Beowulf poet evidently accepted that the traditional poetry on the cruelty of fate and compelled transgressions had little to do with Christ—that it was fundamentally amoral and unsuitable for sustained narration before a Christian audience. Yet the poet managed to preserve as much as he could from this cherished tradition by having it form an allusive background to three foregrounded fights between a pious protagonist and his monstrous adversaries. This chapter aims to establish the precise nature and function of the monotheistic vision expressed by the characters and the narrator, while also exploring the relationship of the monsters to the poem's insistent monotheism. The characters in the foreground are consistently represented as pious monotheists who have apparently intuited the existence of the singular deity of Judeo-Christian tradition without the benefit of Mosaic law or Christian revelation. These intuitive monotheists are viewed by the narrator not as hopeless heathens destined to an eternity in hell but as determined adherents to natural law who can achieve salvation if they follow their better intuitions. There is, moreover, a general doctrinal alignment between the foregrounded characters and the narrator, who stresses God's providence in apparent reaction to a tradition that had stressed the cruelty of a blind fate. Opposed to the poem's monotheistic champion are malevolent monsters, whom the poet renders far more sinister and threatening than the vaguely bad and occasionally comical monsters of folkloric tradition. To rectify the amorality of his inheritance, the poet models his monster fights on those he encountered in hagiographical narratives, which presented a form of moral clarity that was unavailable in native tradition. By pitting a pious protagonist, who receives God's support and is an unwitting agent of God's will, against heinous monsters, the poet endows Beowulf with a moral framework that is not paralleled elsewhere in heroic or folkloric tradition.

The concluding chapter synthesizes the findings of the previous chapters. It answers potential objections to their claims by propounding a theory of constrained innovation, arguing that the poet's plan for moral renovation was constrained by respect for the facts and the forms of antecedent tradition. In Beowulf; we can discern the presence of a single mind, with a singular sense of decorum, at work in the

combination and modification of heroic, folkloric, hagiographical, and historical materials. Rather than perceive Beowulf as a disorderly hodgepodge of aspects of early medieval life and literature, I conclude that it should be read as the considered result of one poet's ambition to produce a morally edifying, theologically palatable, and historically plausible epic out of material that could not independently constitute such a poem. <>

THE FOLDS OF OLYMPUS: MOUNTAINS IN ANCIENT GREEK AND ROMAN CULTURE by Jason Konig [Princeton University Press,]

A cultural and literary history of mountains in classical antiquity

The mountainous character of the Mediterranean was a crucial factor in the history of the ancient Greek and Roman world. **THE FOLDS OF OLYMPUS** is a cultural and literary history that explores the important role mountains played in Greek and Roman religious, military, and economic life, as well as in the identity of communities over a millennium—from Homer to the early Christian saints. Aimed at readers of ancient history and literature as well as those interested in mountains and the environment, the book offers a powerful account of the landscape at the heart of much Greek and Roman culture.

Jason Konig charts the importance of mountains in religion and pilgrimage, the aesthetic vision of mountains in art and literature, the place of mountains in conquest and warfare, and representations of mountain life. He shows how mountains were central to the way in which the inhabitants of the ancient Mediterranean understood the boundaries between the divine and the human, and the limits of human knowledge and control. He also argues that there is more continuity than normally assumed between ancient descriptions of mountains and modern accounts of the picturesque and the sublime.

Offering a unique perspective on the history of classical culture, **THE FOLDS OF OLYMPUS** is also a resoundingly original contribution to the literature on mountains.

Reviews

"No one understands the topic of ancient Greek and Roman mountains better than Jason Konig. in this consistently innovative, intellectually sophisticated, stylishly written, and superbly well-informed study, he opens our eyes to a terrain situated simultaneously in the real world and in the imagination, Equally at home when scrambling up rocky slopes or when probing the texts and images that evoke them, Konig wears his learning lightly, but he has produced a magnificent piece of scholarship that will decisively shape this area of study for the foreseeable future:" —RICHARD BUXTON author of Way We Think

"Drawing on copious textual and visual materials, **THE FOLDS OF OLYMPUS** is ambitious, wide-ranging, and very engaging, and Jason Konig's writing is accessible, with a most appealing personal touch." —GARETH WILLIAMS, Columbia University

CONTENTS

If you want to see how mountains mattered in ancient Greece, there is nowhere better than Mount Lykaion in Arkadia. I went there with my family one morning late in May in 2014. We drove most of the way up, past the village of Ano Karyes, to the stadium and hippodrome a couple of hundred metres below the southern peak, slightly the lower of the mountain's two summits. I went up from there on foot while the others stayed down below; they were on the lookout for snakes, having tripped over one in the fort at Acrocorinth the day before. A track curves upwards around the west side of the mountain. The slopes were green and covered with late-spring flowers. Just below the summit you come to a wide plateau; then you go up a steep conical mound to the top. It's hard not to be distracted by the view. You get an amazing sense of height. The southern peak is at 1,382 metres—not much by Greek standards, but it stands high up above the industrialised plain of Megalopolis with its giant smoking chimneys. And then beyond that you can see the ripples of other mountains on all sides far into the distance, with the snow-covered summit of Mount Taygetos through the haze away to the south, and Mount Ithome, and the temple of Apollo at Bassai covered in its protective tent to the west.

But it was the summit itself that I had come to see. The top section of it (about the top metre and a half above the bedrock) is the remains of the ash altar of Zeus Lykaios. It was one of many altars on mountain summits across the Mediterranean world. But this one is special, in part because it has been excavated more extensively than any equivalent site. There was not a vast amount to see when I went there, outside the excavation season: some shallow trenches, covered over with plastic sheeting, and overgrown with grass. And yet the contents of those trenches can help us to draw a remarkably rich portrait of the way in which the summit was used by the area's inhabitants. Initial excavations over 100 years ago uncovered in the fabric of the altar (among other things) lots of burnt animal bones, hundreds of fragments of fifth- and fourth-century BCE pottery, and also various metal objects used as dedications, including two coins, a knife, and two miniature bronze tripod cauldrons dating from the eighth or seventh century BCE. The most recent excavations (since 2004) have turned up more animal bones, in enormous numbers (nearly all of them burnt; mainly femurs, patellas, and tails from sheep and goats, with small numbers of pig bones in addition). It is clear now that the fill of the altar site is largely made up of bone fragments. These burnt remains date from as early as 1600 BCE. Also found were thirty-three more coins, dating from the sixth to fourth century BCE, from right across mainland Greece; more tripods (roughly forty in total); and other dedications too, including a small bronze hand, holding a silver lightning bolt, broken from a statuette (the hand of Zeus, presumably), eleven lead wreaths from the seventh century BCE, and a glasslike substance called fulgurite which is formed when lightning strikes sand or soil. It is not clear whether this was brought to the altar as a dedication, the product of Zeus's lightning returned to its source in his honour, or whether it was formed by a lightning strike on the mountain itself, a reminder of the presence of the god at his sanctuary. The excavations also found some human and animal figurines in terracotta, and the remains of hundreds of Mycenean drinking vessels (ca 1600—1100 BCE), which suggest that the site was a place of feasting, and even, unexpectedly, a considerable number of pottery fragments dating from the final Neolithic period (ca 4500—3200 BC). Most astonishing of all is the recent find of a human body buried within the altar: the remains of a teenage boy with the upper part of his skull missing, dating from the eleventh century BCE. Whether that gives us evidence to back up the rumours of human sacrifice at the site that we find in a number of ancient texts' is at the time of writing not yet clear, and even if it did, there would probably be no reason to think that that was a widespread practice, given that no other human remains have been uncovered. But this certainly was a place where countless animals met their deaths: sacrificial victims

were slaughtered on the summit of the mountain by the people of Arkadia in honour of the god Zeus for many centuries, even millennia. And when you look more closely at the ground, you can see that it is covered with a scattering of bone pieces under the grass—charred grey splinters and scraps, the remains of animals who were killed and burned up there thousands of years ago.

The Mediterranean is a place of mountains, but you could read a lot of books and articles about classical antiquity without realising that. There are some exceptions. Fernand Braudel famously claimed that the mountainous character of the region was one of the shaping factors in ancient Mediterranean history. And yet the mountains of ancient Greek and Roman culture are often hidden in plain sight. We can get glimpses of their economic, religious, and social importance from some inspiring studies of individual sites and regions, many of them based on remarkable archaeological initiatives, but for many classicists, with our predominant focus on urban, elite history, these are still marginal territories. That is all the more so for tourists. One of the things that amazed me most about Mount Lykaion on that May morning was just how empty it was: there was no one else there all day. Mountains are everywhere in ancient literature too—the mythical landscapes of ancient poetry, from Homer's Olympus onwards, the hostile mountain terrain that forms the backdrop to so many accounts of military campaigning in ancient historiography, or the harsh mountains of the desert, the spiritual battleground for the Christian ascetics in the early Christian saints' lives—but publications on the mountains of ancient literature are even more sparse. Richard Buxton has done more than anyone to expand our view in a series of pioneering works on the mountains of ancient Greek myth. He has shown among other things how ancient mythical narrative reflected but also transformed its audiences' real-life experience of mountains. However, his work focuses above all on classical Greek tragedy; it leaves huge swathes of material from other genres and other periods still open to analysis. Very few people have so far taken up the invitation to explore further.'

One of the challenges is that ancient literature, with a few important exceptions, tends to avoid the kind of extended, often aesthetically inflected set-piece representations of landscape that we are so familiar with from the Romantic period onwards. Ancient images of mountains tend to be individually briefer than their modern equivalents. That does not mean that they are any less consequential. Typically they are threaded into the background of the works they are a part of, showing themselves over and over again with a cumulative `intratextual' sophistication—`intratextuality' being the phenomenon of internal interrelationship between different parts of a single text—which is easy to miss if we are used to more explicit, modern ways of reflecting on landscape. One of my aims in this book is to contribute to the history of ancient mountains, by bringing together a vast amount of material on ancient mountain life that has not generally been viewed as a coherent whole, and drawing out the importance of a series of key themes for our understanding of it, which I hope will help even specialist readers to see some of this material freshly. But that historical and archaeological material is intended above all to give context to my main objective, which is to understand the role played by representations of mountains in ancient Greek and Roman literature, and in the process to generate a series of original readings of the texts and authors I discuss. With such a vast subject it is simply not possible to cover in the depth they deserve all of the ancient works where mountains play an important role, or all of the mountains of the Mediterranean, so my procedure here has been to focus on a series of case studies, exposing some key texts to questions that I hope will stimulate engagement with other material too. I look at four different themes in turn: the relationship between mountains and the divine; the role of mountains as objects of vision in ancient culture; the role of mountains in ethnographic and geographical writing and in military

history, as places both subjected to and resistant to conquest and civilisation; and last the status of mountains as places of work and habitation, on the edges of urban culture. What kinds of pleasure and fascination do ancient writings about mountains offer to their ancient audiences (and indeed also to us)? How do they engage with their audiences' understanding of mountains as real places in projecting their own distinctive images of landscape? What do these texts tell us about ancient understandings of the relationship between human culture and the natural world? If we want to have any hope of answering those questions, we need to read these texts from end to end, staying alert to the way in which successive passages project distinctive, cumulative images of the mountains of the Mediterranean and of their relationship with human culture.

In the process one of my goals is to bring the study of ancient mountains more into dialogue with its modern equivalents. There is now a huge volume of work on mountains in the modern world, ranging from scientific and geographical studies on issues as diverse as geology, environment, climate, heritage, and human geography to cultural-historical studies of the development of modern mountaineering and landscape depiction, most of it focused on the past 250 years or so. Mountain studies has emerged as a vibrant and diverse cross-disciplinary field over the past few decades. But there has been almost no interest among classicists in engaging with that material, and very little inclination in turn among modern mountain historians to think seriously about the premodern history of the places and questions they study.

One of the factors in that lack of communication is the widespread belief that human responses to mountains in Western culture underwent an abrupt change from the late eighteenth century onwards, with the development of mountaineering as a leisure pursuit and the development of the concepts of the picturesque and the sublime. The conventional story is that mountains had been viewed in premodern culture as places of fear and ugliness, to be avoided at all costs; now they came to be appreciated as places of beauty and sublimity.

That narrative has its origin in the Alpine writing of the nineteenth century, for example in the work of Leslie Stephen, who was the father of Virginia Woolf and one of the leading figures in English Alpinism in the mid- to late nineteenth century. Those views were then influentially restated and contextualised in Marjorie Hope Nicolson's book Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory, published in 1959, which has been one of the foundational works of twentieth-century mountain history. Nicolson's reading of classical texts about mountains is quite cursory and at second-hand, perhaps not surprisingly given that her main aim was to understand changes in writing about mountains from the eighteenth century onwards. Her conclusions have been repeatedly cited in an oversimplified form, as if the watershed summed up in her title, and her explanations for it, are undisputed facts. I suspect that many people, when they walk or climb in the hills, even if they have read only a little of the history of mountains and mountaineering, have a sense, perhaps not consciously expressed, that the pleasure they experience in moving through the landscape and admiring it is something distinctively modern.

Nicolson's gloom and glory narrative is starting to be challenged more and more, but it is still astonishingly tenacious. Clearly many things did change in the eighteenth century: that would be hard to deny. Mountaineering in particular developed in quite unprecedented ways from its beginnings in the late eighteenth century through the nineteenth century—that story has now been studied from many different angles. But if we give too much weight to the idea of a watershed, it can bring all sorts of negative consequences. It can stop us from seeing the many continuities between modern and

prem^dern. At the same time it can prevent us from understanding what made premodern responses different and distinctive: if we are interested only in the question of whether the ancient world did or did not have precedents for modern ideas of the sublime, or for modern mountaineering culture, we ignore the challenge of understanding Greek and Roman responses to mountains on their own terms. The habits of mountaintop sacrifice referred to earlier are just the most striking example of how alien some aspects of ancient uses of mountains could be. Either way, whether we emphasise the similarities or the differences between ancient and modern, it is clear that mountains mattered in the ancient world, and that ancient responses to mountains were vastly more sophisticated and varied than the standard narrative suggests. It is bewildering, when you take the trouble to look, to think that anyone would ever have doubted that.

In this book, by contrast, I draw every so often on modern mountain studies to ask new questions of the ancient material, while also using the mountains of the ancient world to give new depth and nuance to the stories told within many different corners of mountain studies about the long history of human engagement with mountains. One precedent for that approach is the work of Veronica della Dora, who ranges very widely across many different periods and places, the ancient Mediterranean included, in seeking to understand what mountains have meant for their human viewers over many millennia. In what follows I do not make any attempt to match the chronological breadth of her work. My focus in this book (which is one of my contributions to a wider project on the history of mountains generously funded by the Leverhulme Trust) is above all on the ancient world, and especially Greek and Roman antiquity, from archaic Greece in the eighth century BCE to late antiquity in the fifth century CE, although I also discuss at various times parallels from Jewish and Near Eastern traditions. But I do share with della Dora a belief that the story of human engagement with mountains needs to be told with a much greater chronological depth than is currently the case. Other publications from our project accordingly take a collaborative and comparative approach to mountain history over many centuries, with a special focus on the influence of classical texts and concepts in writing about mountains from the early modern period onwards.

One theme above all unites the diverse material that follows—that is the tendency for mountains to be both places of human engagement and at the same time objects beyond human control. The tension between those two possibilities was one of the key driving forces for human interest in mountains in the ancient Mediterranean, as it is also in the modern world. We often assume that mountains were places of wilderness in Greek and Roman antiquity, defined by their position outside the city, linked with divine presence and primitive human populations, and that clearly was one element in their fascination. But in fact mountains were often intimately tied to the cities they were close to. Ancient writing about mountains often dramatises the struggle to bring mountains under control either literally or imaginatively. How do we bring these spaces into human civilisation? How do we make them knowable? Those questions have been central to modern responses to mountains, which have often involved attempts to dominate or incorporate mountain territories and mountain peoples for political, sometimes imperial goals. Gaining knowledge about mountains has often been central to those processes. That was the case for ancient Greek and Roman culture too.

Looking at the relationship between mountains and human culture can also bring new insights into the history of human interaction with the environment more broadly. Many of the texts I look at in this book have powerful resonances with recent thinking about human relationships with the more-than-

human world in the environmental humanities, especially within the cross-disciplinary field of ecocriticism, with its focus on literary representations of human-environment relations. Of course there is always a risk of anachronism in approaching ancient literature through the framework of modern environmental thinking. There is a long history of oversimplified attempts to fit ancient responses to the environment into narratives about the development of modern attitudes and modern problems. Attempts to ascribe some kind of environmental consciousness' to ancient authors, or to argue that the ancient world experienced human-caused environmental degradation equivalent to our own, have often drastically underestimated the complexity of the ancient evidence. One thing we can gain from re-examining the ancient sources in all their diversity is the chance to challenge and complicate these narratives. We need an approach that respects the variety of ancient responses: that involves reading ancient representations of human-environment relations from end to end, with an alertness to their internal correspondences and contradictions, rather than focusing on isolated passages out of context. We also need an approach that respects the alienness of many aspects of ancient interaction with the environment, even as it seeks points of resemblance.

Nevertheless, it has become increasingly clear that there are ways in which ecocritical perspectives can raise new questions about ancient culture, and also ways in which ancient Greek and Roman literature can offer us images of relationships between human culture and the environment that are potentially valuable as resources for us today. Exploring those points of connection is still a work in progress. Until quite recently there has been very little explicit engagement with the environmental humanities within Classics, especially among those who work on classical literature. That has begun to change, helped perhaps by the move away from an exclusive focus on `nature writing' in ecocriticism: any text can be open to an ecocritical reading, as a means of shedding light on its underlying assumptions about human-environment relations. That shift opens up new possibilities for analysis of classical texts, given that extended descriptions of the natural world tend to be less prominent in ancient literature than in their modern equivalents. From at least the late eighteenth century, that reticence has been taken as a sign that the ancients were simply not interested in nature, just as they were thought not to have been interested in mountains. We are in a better position now to understand the sophistication and fascination of ancient environmental thinking.

There are many possible ways of approaching the relationship between ancient and modern engagement with the environment. Perhaps most importantly, ancient literature repeatedly presents us with alternatives to anthropocentrism in its portrayal of human-environment interaction. 'New materialist' approaches within Classics have begun to shed light on the way in which ancient texts explore the entanglement between human actors and their environments, and the way in which they emphasise the agency of the nonhuman world, with the effect of questioning anthropocentric hierarchies of value. There is a high concentration of those phenomena in ancient depictions of mountains, with their interest in the tension between human control and human disempowerment.

Ancient representations of landscape and environment also offer us models for thinking about the relationship between global and local perspectives in our understanding of human-environment relations. A number of recent studies have drawn attention to the way in which modern genres often struggle to represent environmental problems on a global scale. Most prominently, Amitav Ghosh in his book The Great Derangement has argued that the modern Western prose fiction tradition, with its tendency to be obsessed by autonomous individuals inhabiting clearly bounded landscapes, is not well suited to

dealing with the global challenge of climate change. By contrast the combination of local and global scales comes quite naturally to a lot of ancient writing about human relations with the environment. We see that in texts like the Iliad, with its interwoven network of similes that allow us to view countless other places side by side with the battlefield at Troy, or in the intricate structures of ancient historiographical and geographical writing, which juxtapose images of human-environment interaction from right across the Mediterranean world and beyond. In that sense there is more at stake in the choice to read classical depictions of mountains intratextually than a judgement about the aesthetic priorities and compositional habits of ancient narrative: it can also be a way of opening ourselves up to the potential of Greek and Roman literature as a resource for new modes of environmental imagination in the present.

There is also now a vast body of theory on the question of how we should understand the idea of `landscape: As it developed from the Renaissance onwards that concept was linked with the idea of viewing from a distance, and associated with elite control over geographical space. In some of its manifestations that was a very modern concept, for example in the development of landscape painting and landscape gardening, but it was also founded in classical precedents. As we shall see, the motif of viewing from mountain summits was a very widespread one in ancient Greek and Roman literature, and it was Inked with authority of various kinds—divine, military, authorial. For many people, however, and in many contexts, the experience of landscape is never as detached as that image implies. Landscape is always a human construct, a product of human imagin^tion. Landscapes also matter for identity, and the images created by humans for understanding the landscapes they inhabit and encounter are often experienced viscerally. Different meanings are imprinted on landscapes palimpsestically over time by the communities that interact with them, often in a way that reflects particular power relations and ide^l^gies, and often through a process of contestation and negotiation between competing visions. Many analysts have found `place' a more helpful term than `landscape' for articulating that grounded quality of human interacti^^n with the earth's surface, and the way in which certain locations over time acc^mulate powerful symbolic and historical resonances. Another strand within modern scholarship, associated with the `phenomenological' tradition, has made it clear that the human experience of landscape is often a bodily one that involves a sense of being immersed in the landscape quite different from the more detached styles of viewing that we associate with more traditional, visual conceptions of landscape appreciation.

One of the things we can gain through giving attention to ancient writing about mountains is an understanding of the way in which that whole range of possibilities for human engagement with the earth's surface was there already in classical antiquity. The tension between visual and bodily ways of making sense of landscape is one of the recurring themes of this book: it was central to ancient thinking about mountains just as it has been in modern mountaineering culture from at least the early eighteenth century onwards, and just as it has been to modern writing about landscape more broadly. These are two different ways of making mountains knowable, or at least partially and imperfectly knowable, two different ways of understanding the relationship between mountains and human experience. Their dual importance is implied by the `folds' of this book's t^tle, which is intended to draw attention to some ^f those conflicting resonances (the original phrase is from Homer's which will make an appearance early on in the book, in chapter 2). On one level that title suggests a focus on the physical textures of the landscape of the ancient Mediterranean, asking us to imagine a close-up view of mountain terrain, where the valleys and ravines and gullies on a mountainside can be obsructive, claustrophobic, concealing, or perhaps protective, as the folds of a garment or even of flesh, impinging on the traveller's experience in

a very physical way. At the same time it points us towards a detached way of viewing from a distance, where the roughness of mountain terrain at ground level is smoothed away. It might make us think about a geological timescale, which can be appreciated only from a position of detachment. It points also to the textuality of ancient mountains, fixed in book form, on paper. The folds of Olympus are places of bodily experience and dwelling and at the same time places of the imagination, both solid ground and literary fantasy. Those different possibilities are repeatedly juxtaposed and in some cases inextricably intertwined with each other in ancient Greek and Roman literature.

Of course all of the mountains I talk about in what follows still exist (apart from a few that are imaginary or unidentifiable), and you can go and visit them if you are free to travel, and if you have the time and the money, and the energy and capacity to climb uphill. This is a book about real places: especially the mountains of mainland Greece, but also their counterparts in Italy, in Turkey, in Egypt and elsewhere. One of the great sources of the fascination with mountains in ancient culture, one of things above all that made them human places, was their association with the past. They were places of memory, linked with history and myth and with the celebration of communal identity, in the rituals of sacrifice that took place on Mount Lykaion and on so many other summits. The dominant fantasy of modern mountaineering culture is of the individual standing alone on the summit, where no one has trodden before. Looking at the mountains of the ancient world can help us to see more clearly the power of an alternative and equally inspiring fantasy, that is the idea of the mountain as a place of history and repeated human presence over many generations and millennia. When we stop to think about it, that link between mountains and the past is at the heart of their fascination for us t^^. That is true even for the great mountains of the Alps and the Himalayas, where part of the thrill is to follow the routes that others have climbed before. For those who do not climb it may be hard to understand why anyone would still want to go to Everest, as a place that it is not just extremely dangerous, but also (at least in the popular imagination) crowded with guided climbers and covered with litter and dead bodies. But the people who go up that mountain do so partly to see for themselves those iconic places from the history of mountaineering where others have climbed or died before them. The mountains of the Mediterranean offer a different kind of thrill, but one which is equally grounded in human history. You can still go to the places of myth, the famous mountain battle sites of the ancient world, the summit altars where ancient worshippers sacrificed for millennia. That is one of the reasons why mountains matter: every time we walk on a mountain or read about it or imagine it, we have the opportunity to experience a sense of connection, albeit sometimes a tenuous and precarious one, with those who have visited it and inhabited it in the past That role of mountains as places of memory is one of the things that unites ancient and modern responses most powerfully. The mountains of Greece in particular are some of the most wonderful places I know to walk. I hope that this book will in a small way encourage more people to visit them—or to explore them in other ways, if that option is not available. Visiting these places in person has helped me to understand the texts and the history better It can give you a sense of the scale of particular slopes and summits and their spatial relationship with the cities beneath them. I have tried to make that clear through the occasional first-person passages scattered through the book, especially in part I. It has also given me opportunities to reflect on how we can write the history of mountains in the ancient world from the perspective of our own culture, where mountains are standardly viewed as places of sport and leisure: I have tried to explore some of the challenges involved in that process in the epilogue.

But this is also above all a book about the way in which mountains have been represented and imagined. Some sections were written during the first stages of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020, at a time when going to any of these places in person was a very distant prospect. I spent a lot of time then travelling through places in my memory or in my imagination. I also spent a lot of time reading about ancient mountains and thinking about what these texts have to say to us today, at a time when our understanding of the relationship between humans and the environment has been challenged so starkly. My aim in the chapters that follow is not just to communicate some of the pleasure and fascination of that material, but also to convey something of the way in which ancient portrayals of mountains can confront us with powerful images against which to measure our own relationships with the world around us. <>

A Philosophy of the Unsayable by William P. Franke [University of Notre Dame Press, ISBN 9780268203580]

In **A Philosophy of the Unsayable,** William Franke argues that the encounter with what exceeds speech has become the crucial philosophical issue of our time. He proposes an original philosophy pivoting on analysis of the limits of language. The book also offers readings of literary texts as poetically performing the philosophical principles it expounds. Franke engages with philosophical theologies and philosophies of religion in the debate over negative theology and shows how apophaticism infiltrates the thinking even of those who attempt to deny or delimit it.

In six cohesive essays, Franke explores fundamental aspects of unsayability. In the first and third essays, his philosophical argument is carried through with acute attention to modes of unsayability that are revealed best by literary works, particularly by negativities of poetic language in the oeuvres of Paul Celan and Edmond Jabès. Franke engages in critical discussion of apophatic currents of philosophy both ancient and modern, focusing on Hegel and French post-Hegelianism in his second essay and on Neoplatonism in his fourth essay. He treats Neoplatonic apophatics especially as found in Damascius and as illuminated by postmodern thought, particularly Jean-Luc Nancy's deconstruction of Christianity. In the last two essays, Franke treats the tension between two contemporary approaches to philosophy of religion—Radical Orthodoxy and radically secular or Death-of-God theologies. **A Philosophy of the Unsayable** will interest scholars and students of philosophy, literature, religion, and the humanities. This book develops Franke's explicit theory of unsayability, which is informed by his long-standing engagement with major representatives of apophatic thought in the Western tradition.

Review

"William Franke is an articulate spokesman for what cannot be said not only with regards to modern European poetry but also with respect to contemporary theology. *A Philosophy of the Unsayable* is essential reading for everyone working in religion and literature and in modern theology." —Kevin Hart, Edwin B. Kyle Professor of Christian Studies, University of Virginia

"By now, it would seem that there could be no more to say about not-saying. Apophatic language and negative theology have been accused of meaninglessness, nihilism, and even ill-concealed ontologies. In this lovely and surprising book, William Franke not only deftly undoes these criticisms but shows that apophasis underlies and strangely grounds all language and thought, even of those very discourses that

most vigorously reject it. *A Philosophy of the Unsayable* demonstrates with elegance that there is indeed more to say, and more that is both meaningful and important." — Karmen MacKendrick, Le Moyne College

"William Franke is an eminent scholar in comparative literature, who is schooled in philosophy and religion. He is recognized as one of the most creative contemporary thinkers working at the double intersection of philosophy and literature and philosophy and theology. *A Philosophy of the Unsayable* shows an intellectual grasp of a dizzying array of discourses and sheds real light on all thinkers who are discussed." —Cyril O'Regan, Huisking Professor of Theology, University of Notre Dame

"Strongly reflecting academic debates of the last thirty years, Franke's book is not quite a research monograph and not quite a course book but a thoughtful, provoking and often helpful exploration of an intellectually and spiritually demanding discourse." —*Theology*

"William Franke has emerged as our foremost purveyor of what cannot be said. . . . We should be grateful for this extended articulation, since it also informs us why the unsayable *must* be said. . . . Given its breadth—the range of thinkers and thought that is covered—and its challenge—to keep open 'conscious human reflection that refuses to be cut off from the mystery of its ground'—this is a remarkable text, and deserves close attention at every level." —*Literature & Theology*

CONTENTS

The present volume sketches a distinctive philosophical outlook that emerges irrepressibly from the predicament of philosophy today. It interprets what are widespread intimations of thinking in the current milieu of critical reflection across disciplines in the arts and sciences and beyond into technical and professional fields and culture generally. We are in an age in which discourse becomes acutely conscious of its intrinsic limits and is dominated by what it cannot say. Especially the last two and a half centuries have abounded in new and radical currents of thinking about the limits of language and what may or may not lie beyond them. The pace of such thinking seems to have greatly accelerated in the initial decades of the twenty-first century. This thinking is rooted, however, in millenary discourses of mysticism and negative theology that can be traced back to the origins of the Western intellectual

tradition. A kind of perennial counter-philosophy to the philosophy of Logos has resisted its claims throughout the history of Western thought.

There is, in fact, an amorphous but immense sea of discourse concerned with the ways that discourse has of doubting and denying itself. This type of reflection arises when language runs up against the limits of what it is able to say. Certain discourses concentrate on these limits and on how language necessarily speaks from and out of them. This generates counter-discourses to every powerful explanatory paradigm that makes positive claims to comprehend reality, to say what really is. The counterdiscourses typically emphasize that what is not and even cannot be said is actually the basis for all that is said. They shift attention away from what discourse is saying to what it is not saying and cannot say—even though this involves, paradoxically, an even more intense focus precisely on language, on its limited capabilities, its borders, its "beyond."

These counter-discourses can even take a more aggressive stance. They can position themselves not only at the limits and margins of normative discourse but as infiltrating it through and through. All discourse in this perspective, which I call "apophatic," shows up as necessarily preceded by and predicated on what cannot be said. This entails a claim to a yet more powerful comprehensiveness, though one at first purely negative in nature, evoking a power beyond discourse, a potential that words release but cannot master. Metaphysics, monotheisms, and mysticisms, as well as philosophies of existence and poetics of revelation, can be understood in their deeper, driving motivations only from this perspective, which nevertheless all too easily slips from view because it eludes logical articulation and defies discursive expression.

Ineffability was once a leading theme of the Neoplatonists (particularly Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus, Iamblichus, and Damascius) and of their heirs in the monotheistic traditions of Christian mysticism (Dionysius the Areopagite, John Scotus Eriugena), of the Kabbalah, of Sufism, and again of certain post-Scholastics (Meister Eckhart, Nicholas Cusanus). Baroque mystics such as John of the Cross, Jakob Bohme, and Silesius Angelus share this same obsession with Romantic thinkers like Kierkegaard and the late Schelling, as well as with imaginative writers such as Holderlin, Emily Dickinson, Rilke, and Kafka. The expressiveness of silence, the void, nothingness has been explored equally in modern music (Schoenberg, Cage), in painting (Malevich, Kandinsky), and in architecture (Le Corbusier, Mies van der Rohe, Daniel Libeskind) in tandem with the apophatic philosophical reflections of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Franz Rosenzweig. These major monuments of modern apophatic culture were announced by apocalyptic prophecies of the collapse of language and civilization altogether, emblematically around the fin de siècle in the Vienna of Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Gustav Klimt, Karl Kraus, and Freud.

Similar accents and thematics were hauntingly echoed, furthermore, in assimilating the Holocaust and its aftermath, by philosophical critics such as Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno, as well as by poets like Paul Celan and Edmond Jabès. And the unsayable has again become the keynote of innumerable expressions of contemporary culture. These range from the widely diffused use of deconstructive critique—inspired especially by Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas, and Maurice Blanchot—in all sorts of theoretical discourses to the clamor of silence heard so frequently in fiction and poetry, influentially in the writings of Louis-Rene Des Forets or Samuel Beckett or Yukio Mishima.

These references are obviously far-flung and move across widely disparate spheres of culture. Still, in every case, they flag an attitude toward words that is at once skeptical and fideistic—unconvinced by the pretended adequacy of words, yet acutely attuned to what they must miss grasping and passionately open to what they cannot say. The unsayable is what repels language, yet it requires language of some kind in order to be descried, so as to register at all. Such discourse or counter-discourse, moreover, traverses a whole spectrum of different disciplines and can be surprised in the most diverse sorts of guises. However, these various manifestations of unsayability all pivot on the fact that discourse has a self-reflexive, self-critical ability to call itself into question and to withdraw, leaving what it cannot say in its wake. This trajectory, which is produced by the movement of thought and speech vis-a-vis what it cannot comprehend and therefore recoils from, constitutes the trace of the unsayable. The unsayable cannot be made manifest at all, except in terms of this trace that it leaves in the speech that fails to say it.

As is inevitably the case with whatever philosophy, the significance and force of what it says depends to a high degree on how it refracts other philosophies—on how it funnels currents familiar from elsewhere, whether historical or contemporaneous ways of thinking, into forms of presentation that are efficacious and revealing. Hence these widespread allusions to what can be conceived of as a loosely coherent tradition of discourse about (or from or out of) what cannot be said. This perennial philosophy of the unsayable, moreover, has close affinities with literature—indeed, it is a philosophy in which philosophical and literary thinking coalesce inextricably.

Accordingly, this philosophical vision hinging on unsayability can be illuminated—and is best complemented—by literary-critical and theoretical reflection. Such reflection is proposed here in the form of an interpretive essay (chapter 3) that places in parallel two provocative contemporary poets as writers of the unsayable. Together they display how what can be learned especially from ancient and medieval rhetorics of silence translates into the currency of a contemporary language or anti-language of unsaying. The other main literary-critical excursus (chapter 1) is offered by way of introduction or "invitation" to the leading philosophical meditation on unsayability in my second essay (chapter 2).

While I refer to my chapters as "essays," this book is not a congeries of separate compositions. The "essays" interlock and fit together in an architectonic that adumbrates (were it only possible) a critique of apophatic reason. More exactly, philosophical critique, as the rational examination of first principles, is overtaken and transforms itself into a literary hermeneutics or poetics and into religious reflection. The first I understand as elucidation of certain rhetorical conditions, such as figuration and narration, that make meaningful discourse possible, while the second—the "tying-back" reflections of "re-ligion"--I understand as cultivated awareness of relation to an infinite, never exhaustively specifiable context of relations. Poetic and religious theory are thus deployed critically to illuminate the conditions of possibility of meaning—and therewith also of being—in the unsayable.

Beyond describing the general logic of the unsayable—or rather its subversion of logical generalities—this book aspires to illustrate its workings and finds them perhaps most powerfully operative in literary texts. Hence, crucial to my approach is the conviction that any verbal expression of the unsayable cannot but share in the gratuitous, creative nature of literary expression, or, in other words, that philosophy at this point necessarily becomes literary. A fourth essay then situates the question of the unsayable, as it arises in philosophy and literature today, historically with reference especially to Neoplatonic negative theology. This negative turn in philosophy is traced all the way forward to

postmodern negations of theology. Therewith, another of the book's overarching aims is declared: namely, to show how literary exploration of language as infinitely open points language—eminently, the language of philosophy—in a direction which is best understood as theological.

However, an endeavor to (un)define and (de)situate the theological also lies at the heart of this philosophy of the unsayable. It maintains that a religious moment in language and thought is found simply in the irreducibility of our experience and being to words and thoughts. This does not directly warrant positing transcendent realities or Being or God, but it does illuminate the necessity from which such conceptions spring. Pursuant to deconstructive and other types of critique (such as Richard Rorty's pragmatic anti-foundationalism), we may have to forego any directly realist language in religion. But the very same arguments have undermined realist language as an authoritative disclosure of truth in any domain whatsoever. Indeed, theology, particularly negative theology, has long tended to question and to relativize the capabilities of human language to truly convey the real. And yet realist language is not necessarily shown thereby to be simply erroneous, or even outmoded. Language remains, after all, expressive of an orientation to a real world within which it effectively works and articulates and objectifies all things, including itself. But the sense of that reality is affected: it becomes a relation to something else beyond itself that language cannot encompass.

Viewed from the perspective opened by these reflections on the un-sayable, theological language suddenly begins to make another kind of sense than it did when it was judged as merely another object-oriented language. Yet neither am I claiming that theological language is essentially different from any other language, including ordinary language. Rather, language as such shows up as estranged in light of the theological adumbrations that hover over and glance across all our language: this shadowy half-light makes what is enigmatic about language in general show up in relief.

From this theological perspective, which is worked out in relation to competing contemporary philosophies of religion in my fifth and sixth essays, the book proposes a general philosophy, indeed, an original philosophy of the unsayable. A word of explanation, however, is in order concerning this claim: it is a claim above all to be an original enactment of what is discerned as a perennial type of trans-philosophical thinking. This is not exactly a matter of saying something new, some new thing. It cannot be reduced to a thesis. It is the saying itself that is original, that strives to draw directly from the origin of apophatic thinking—and therewith of all thinking—in the bottomless abyss of the unsayable that is marked only by the never exhausted streams of discourse that issue out of it. In that depth absconds the namelessness of whatever or whoever speaks in the silent night of luminous darkness.

A certain dimension of literary performance is as crucial for this act of ventriloquism (of lending voice to the unspeakable) as are its conceptual contents. Its method is less that of scholarly research and documentation of exactly what has been written on the myriad aspects of this topic, with minute discrimination of what belongs to this author or to that one, than of reaching out toward the intention of apophatic discourse broadly considered. It sets out, by means of the word loosened from its usual moorings, in search of what exceeds all academic definitions. It does not eschew painstaking scholarly work—there is that here, too—but such honest labor is not sufficient for addressing what refuses to yield itself fully to scientific research and demands rather something of the order of personal witness.

With regard to the performative language demanded by this project, I beg the reader's indulgence for a certain poetic license exercised from the very first word of the book by my breaking its integrity as a

word and writing "Pre-face." A book on the unsayable necessarily begins at a preverbal point before words and prefaces and before any face or figure that can be given to or conferred by discourse. This admittedly, but designedly, awkward inscription corresponds to another at the other end of the "Contents," with the eliding of a space by running two words together in "Inconclusion." Both anomalies are animations of the unruly energy of the unsayable and embody the central message of the book, which concerns the space between and within words: I argue that understanding cannot be just a matter of taking ready-made significances of words and combining them. The words themselves break open or flow together in the creation and de-creation of sense in ways that may prove unfathomable or even vertiginous. Discerning such action in and behind words opens vision into the unlimited relatedness of all with all, which words tend, by their artificial segmentation and separation, as well as by their fictive unity, to mask. In this manner, the vision inspiring the work spills out over and breaks its frame: it reformulates the very frame of the book, which cannot contain or tame its contents. This gesture calls for rethinking some of the elementary automatisms of our reading, which is continually at risk of degenerating into mere consumption of standardized intellectual commodities.

In this spirit, then, the vast traditions of learning on this subject are worked with and played upon and troped in order to produce a philosophy of the unsayable that is original in the specified sense. The aim is more to experience the essential motivations for this distinctive style of thought and language than to announce some particular new point to be made about it, something that seems a little different and thus "original" with respect to what X, Y, and Z have written. The question is not so much one of what /say and its specific difference from what other authors have said as one of where any of these discourses come from. Can we reach somehow to their generative sources and touch their originating motives? This I conceive as a matter not so much of choosing precisely the right philosophy to which to adhere as of realizing more translucently than ever before the common possibility from which they all spring. This arguably universal aspiration of philosophical reflection can be realized in an unrestricted openness of thinking such as can be enacted most intensively of all—at least in my experience—through a philosophy of the unsayable. <>

Vestiges of a Philosophy: Matter, the Meta-Spiritual, and the Forgotten Bergson by John Ó Maoilearca [Oxford Studies in Western Esotericism, Oxford University Press, 9780197613917]

- Covers an influential yet little-known occult practitioner, Mina Bergson, using writings and ideas rarely discussed in this context
- Connects occult practices to Bergsonian concepts of time and memory, matter and spirit
- Relates mysticism to philosophy as equally valid forms of enquiry and knowledge generation

Vestiges of a Philosophy: Matter, the Meta-Spiritual, and the Forgotten Bergson covers a fascinating yet little known moment in history. At the turn of the twentieth century, Henri Bergson and his sister, Mina Bergson (also known as Moina Mathers), were both living in

Paris and working on seemingly very different but nonetheless complementary and even correlated approaches to questions about the nature of matter, spirit, and their interaction. He was a leading professor within the French academy, soon to become the most renowned philosopher in Europe. She was his estranged sister, already celebrated in her own right as a feminist and occultist performing on theatre stages around Paris while also leading one of the most important occult societies of that era, the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn. One was a respectable if controversial intellectual, the other was a notorious mystic-artist who, together with her husband and fellow-occultist Samuel MacGregor Mathers, have been described as the "neo-pagan power couple" of the Belle Époque.

Neither Henri nor Mina left any record of their feelings and attitudes towards the work of the other, but their views on time, mysticism, spirit, and art converge on many fronts, even as they emerged from very different forms of cultural practice. In **VESTIGES OF A PHILOSOPHY**, John Ó Maoilearca examines this convergence of ideas and uses the Bergsons' strange correlation to tackle contemporary themes in new materialist philosophy, as well as the relationship between mysticism and philosophy.

Review

"In this revelatory study of the intersecting interests of mystic Mina Bergson and her brother, philosopher Henri Bergson, Ó Maoilearca meticulously and cautiously tracks philosophical developments from nineteenth-century spiritualism to recent new materialism. In the process, he does no less than uncover occulture's and analytical philosophy's correlated investments in both spiritualism and materialism during the modernist period. This book will prove foundational to the study of modern mysticism as philosophical engagement and materialist analysis." -- Dennis Denisoff, author of Decadent Ecology in British Literature and Art, 1860-1910: Decay, Desire, and the Pagan Revival

"Henri and Mina Bergson form one of the most enigmatic sibling duos of the fin-de-siècle. The unfamiliar reader might assume little common ground between the two—the former a highly respected philosopher, the latter a feminist occult leader largely unknown outside of specialist circles today. Exploring both siblings' thought in relation to the other and demonstrating their converging areas of interest, Ó Maoilearca offers a sophisticated, provocative, and beautifully crafted reconsideration of the relationship between Western esotericism and philosophy. A must-read for anyone seeking to understand the ambiguous position of mysticism and magic in the Western intellectual tradition." -- Manon Hedenborg White, author of The Eloquent Blood: The Goddess Babalon and the Construction of Femininities in Western Esotericism

"**VESTIGES OF A PHILOSOPHY** performs its ideas with visionary urgency, as Ó Maoilearca sustains a diffractive reading of a vast array of sources—canonical works alongside obscure archival texts exhumed through meticulous archeology—that proposes conspicuous concordances between the thought of siblings Mina and Henri Bergson. The complex and exhilarating investigation significantly reconfigures the parallel Bergsonisms, contending with their strangeness and poetics, while aligning them with ideas of contemporary philosophy from Karen Barad and François Laruelle among others, in this volume's immaculate consideration of matter, memory, movement, and spirit." -- Matthew Goulish, The School of the Art Institute of Chicago

...For Henri Bergson, the whole is indefinite or open, itself continually evolving as well. Barad comes close to this idea, or rather its implications, when writing that, for intra-actions, "interior and exterior, past, present, and future, are iteratively enfolded and reworked, but never eliminated (and never fixed)." Later, she adds, "the past is never finished once and for all and out of sight may be out of touch but not necessarily out of reach." Barad, using Bohr, entangles things across space for sure (such that things are not fully "across" from each other at all); and here she gestures toward a temporal version of the same: entangled time. The "spiritual hyperplane" that Paul Halpern described nineteenth-century psycho-physicists searching for is not Mina Bergson's astral plane or Henri Bergson's virtual plane. Nor is it Bohm's "hyperplane of constant time" What connects these planes is neither family resemblance nor overweening analogy, but a continuity that is uneven, interrupted, and heterogeneous.

The spiritually inclined physicists that we started out with, Stewart, Tait, and Zollner, might themselves be spooked to find that spirit was never disembodied in a higher dimension of space, but perfectly incarnated among a covarying set of processes stretched throughout the "life of the cosmos" (to use Lee Smolin's phrase). In Duration and Simultaneity, Henri Bergson criticized the idea of a geometric covariance as illusory, where Peter is but a fictional image for Paul, and vice versa. For Henri Bergson, we recall, to fully represent another's lived time, one must experience it in every detail, in person. But this is impossible without becoming that other person: "If I want to actually measure Peter's time . . . I must become Peter." This is real covariance—not possible through a fanciful picturing of the other, but possible through a real continuation of their movements in oneself. When it comes to time, to a real covariance between a past and a present, we have the continuity that Henri Bergson called "experienced and lived" (an expanded present that retains a past). Such expansion is not wholly due to individual agency in recollection (you), but the agency of time itself, the past, remembering you. Invocation, if it works at any level, would be the voluntary attempt to "call upon" (invocare) the involuntary, to make

time intervene through ritual, performance, or even, in Henri Bergson's philosophical version, what he also called "intellectual effort." Real covariance as nonlocalized memory (continuing heterogeneous movements across time). And invocation as intra-action. This is how the two Bergsons, Henri and Mina, respectively entangle time "across" past and present. They themselves may be entangled, too, as covarying siblings, albeit operating at different levels of duration in their lives' researches, each one invoking the other.

Patrick McNamara adds a further dimension to this radical holism of time, splicing it here with the operations of memory and the selection of multiple identities:

> According to this theory [selectionism], election of target variants constitutes consciousness. Because people in a given culture possess similar cumulative memory stores, the variants they generate in a given memory cycle will also contain similarities, and when these variants match one another, those persons experiencing the match will experience one another's thoughts. The extreme case would occur when two people transiently select relatively similar or even identical "selves." Such an event is theoretically possible, given the selectionist assumptions we've outlined in the previous pages.

McNamara mentions "response to an affective cue" as one way in which "two people would generate similar associates or select similar selves?" In place of identities or "persons" understood as substances, we would see these "thoughts" themselves as movements: their continuous variation "across" (or "down") nonlocal time-spaces, when different levels covary (as "one"), before and after, above and below. Invocation, "possession" even, or just ordinary metempsychosis—but all on different scales. Radical holism meets "matching variants" meets the "power of divination," or Bohm plus McNamara equals the two Bergsons. And in Seers' Nowhere Less Now, we see these meetings in a practice, at once human and nonhuman, that remarkably complements Barad's theory of sub-atomic performances.

We can now end this covariant with a question and a suggestion. Though God does not play dice, perhaps She might play cards instead, in particular, the game of Tarot? With origins going back to fifteenth-century Italy where it began as a simple game of chance, its occult repurposing came three hundred years later near the end of the eighteenth century. With that, the cards gave seemingly chance events new meaning for the purposes of divination, or as Catherine Christof puts it, "a symbolic cipher for universal truths, representing . . . the transformational and evolutionary journey of a soul." Chance is tamed, a little, with nonstandard causality (foretelling Bohm's first crucial work, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics). Divination through cartomancy offers us a little fabulated order coming out of chaos, signs of a probable fate from a random selection of cards. Again, memory, even Yeats's "Great Memory," is not stored anywhere: it is selected. If one asks, "From where?" the answer comes: the past that lives on through new (heterogeneous) lines of continuity. And who selects? Again, the past, though at another of its levels, which are indefinite in number simply because "the past" does not exist—there are only the numerous lines of presents-pasts interfering with each other "all the time."

So does the Tarot divine the future through its selection? I would say that it is highly improbable that it should, but not impossible. The Tarot, or any other form of supernatural divination, is rightly deemed absurd by most, for in (nearly) all probability it is ridiculous to think that one level of durée could control a constructive interference with another at such a higher degree of tension. And yet, within the enduring universe or open whole, no amount of improbability, or implausibility, can exhaust an indefinite period in the long run—and, as David Hume realized, "the long run" is a very long time, indeed. That

said, a very long time could pass in the blink of a fabulated God's eye. Perhaps that is why hope—or what Jean-Paul Sartre called humanity's "useless passion"—springs eternal.

***

The most significant and current European materialism is undoubtedly this "new materialism." It is built upon two premises that are noteworthy for our study. The first concerns what counts as "new" in its understanding of matter. Though Christopher Gamble, Joshua Hanan, and Thomas Nail argue in their 2019 study of the movement that "there is currently no single definition of new materialism," they do add that they all share the view that there was a "perceived neglect or diminishment of matter in the dominant EuroWestern tradition as a passive substance intrinsically devoid of meaning." Whereas modern materialism was defined by "the passivity of matter insofar as matter is what is caused or moved by something else: vital and causal forces or natural laws of motion," the new materialists emphasize how "matter is "alive," "lively," "vibrant," "dynamic," "agentive," and thus active." In sum, this is a view of matter that is neither physicalist nor mechanistic in the senses taken by many of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century reductive materialisms, with physics deemed the supervening science that treats of ultimately inert, passive, and atomistic quantities in calculable, determined motion. Wholes were deemed epiphenomenal in one way or another in this view, and only an analysis into composite parts revealed the truth of the matter. Indeed, such approaches more or less continued well into the twentieth century in positivist philosophies, with only very recent developments, such as "New Mechanical Philosophy" (or "New Mechanism"), tempering the views held by many in this tradition.

By contrast, new materialism loosely follows Gestalt principles and deems matter to form complex, nonlinear, dynamic wholes that are not the sum of their parts. This focus on the micro by both old and new materialisms—in physics to be sure but also in biology (stem cells) and cognitive science (neural plasticity, embryonic epigenesis)—is what Sam Coleman calls "smallism": the idea that truth resides in the smallest particulars of reality (which may clump together to form larger wholes); that "the ontological truth is to be found with the small, or with all the "smalls" in all their innumerable multiplicity."37 In the new materialism, however, wholes are also real, even though emergent—their properties constitute a genuinely different level of reality, albeit that they are generated by the complex interactions of their smaller, constitutive elements. This emergence of the larger from the smaller, one that is neither reductive (the large does not reduce entirely to the small) nor mechanistic (such small matter is not passive), is a crucial aspect for much of this thinking. The question of level and scale, therefore, both spatial and temporal, will be critical in what follows here, too.

Whether it be Quentin Meillassoux's "mathemic" valorization of contingency, the idea of "plasticity" in Catherine Malabou's neurophilosophy, entanglement in Karen Barad's philosophy of physics, or "vibrant matter" in Jane Bennett's neo-vitalism, we can also see a second, less explicit premise of new materialism in much of its work: namely, that whatever number of emergent, nonreducible properties are allowed to matter, the idea of spirit cannot be added to the list. Nonreduced materiality alone prevails, while a transcendent, Platonist notion of spirit—the only one deemed possible by some—remains the conceptual outsider to be either eliminated or simply ignored. As John Zammito writes: "one of the essentially contested issues surrounding the new materialism is how to conceive the relation of 'spirit' to the natural." This is why the possibility of a nontranscendent (or immanent) spirit is rarely, if ever, entertained. This is where some historical research may be of use, in particular around the school of "French Spiritualism." This was a loose tradition of thought that lasted from the late eighteenth century

up to Henri Bergson himself as its final representative. Despite its name, it was not a school of the occult, but what we might nowadays call a nondualist, nonreductive approach to mind and body. These earlier French philosophers, including Maine de Biran (1766-1824), Felix Ravaisson (1813-1900), and Emile Boutroux (1845-1921), were equally determined to find a way in which matter and spirit could be thought together, but without turning to either dualism or reductionism. The place of spirit was retained in their research through movement, duration, and habit. Many of their ideas will return in what follows.

Without falling for something like biologist Gerald Edelman's straw man argument—that is, the idea that anything other than the most parsimonious, scientistic, and nonsubjective approaches is simply turning physics into a "surrogate spook"—we can still admit that matter is weirder than many would allow. And that is precisely where the "new materialists" are correct, although also where they are less "new" than proclaimed. For example, the materialism of contingency forwarded in Meillassoux's Apres la finitude from 2006, actually reinvents, one hopes unwittingly, the ideas of Emile Boutroux, whose De la contingence des lois de la nature from 1874 argued for a similar contingency in the laws of nature. Only, and here's the twist, Boutroux argued his case in the name of spiritualism, not materialism. This makes Meillassoux's valorization of the contingency of nature in the name of materialism even more ironic. For Boutroux, the contingent is a sign of spirit, not mathematized matter. Having said that, we are not here to correct new materialism or detract from its valuable contributions to European philosophy. We wish to add to them. As Adela Pinch writes, modern-day "trends in the humanities that embrace panpsychism, vibrant matter, object-oriented ontologies, and extended or dispersed conceptions of consciousness, could benefit from an examination of Victorian debates about panpsychism." Both the panpsychists and spiritualists (in the French sense of the name) offer us alternative models for thinking about matter and its interrelations with human and nonhuman life, mind, and spirit. Indeed, in the example of Henri Bergson, we see an attempt to naturalize spirit via his concept of durée, without reducing or eliminating it.

We asked earlier whether the attitude of much contemporary materialist thought toward the category of spirit was justified. Behind this possibly simplistic question lies another, more complex one, however: can the category of the spiritual (expanded in terms of its allied names, the esoteric, the occult, the mystical, and so on) provide an added dimension to "materialism" in such a manner that neither reduces it nor inflates itself, but simply shows how the difference between the two might be considered a matter of temporal scale, of level or plane? A recent work from Larry Sommer McGrath is illuminating in this regard. In Making Spirit Matter: Neurology, Psychology, and Selfhood in Modern France, he writes that the spiritualism that emerged in France in the late nineteenth century was not like the spiritualism that went before—this was a "new spiritualism," or at least it was significantly different from older varieties because it had taken a scientific, and even materialist turn. As he reports on this particular reading of the issue: "the new spiritualism is not a new doctrine one author wrote in 1884; "it is spiritualism renewed by science." The characterization of this transformation as a turn to materialism took hold thanks to a critic of the movement. A defender of the old guard decried what he saw as its abnegation in the form of "neo-materialism." For Sommer McGrath, this critic was actually right and a "materialist moment" had now "inflected the spiritualist movement by the turn of the century." Moreover, the chief protagonist of this turn, Sommer McGrath contends, was Henri Bergson: "the thrust of his oeuvre, I argue, was to steer a materialized spiritualism into the twentieth century." Not only was Henri Bergson the most "successful representative of the materialist turn in spiritualism," according to Sommer McGrath he "led

a movement that operated with much more expansive notions of rationality, positivism, and materialism." And here we see a clear dovetailing between this new, turn-of-the-century spiritualism with what is new in the new materialism we have currently, and it concerns a shared nonreductive approach to both matter and spirit:

> The charge of "neo-materialism" was revelatory. The accused never ascribed the label to themselves; yet, it was hardly a misnomer. [. . .] Unlike reductive materialisms, which conceptualized matter as the substratum and final explanation of spirit, this "neo-materialism"—and its leading practitioner, Henri Bergson—reimagined matter to enter into a partnership with the spiritual powers of memory, creativity and action.

Sommer McGrath is not alone in his more ecumenical interpretation of the spirit-matter relations at play among these thinkers. Jeremy Dunham writes that the "new spiritualists" were "inspired by developments in the life sciences [and] developed a theory of nature as open, creative, and evolving," while Mark Sinclair and Delphine Antoine-Mahut have argued that "spiritualism in the first half of the [nineteenth] century should be seen as a plural and open-ended development of a programme rather than as the reproduction of a one-track thought," and even that we "have to reject as simplistic and superficial standard characterizations of positivism and spiritualism as diametrically opposed." And to round out these new, revisionist histories, we can turn to Jean Gayon, who argues furthermore that

Bergson was a "spiritualistic positivist." This is not retrospective interpretation, something that I would formulate because it sounds like a nice paradox. It is the plain expression of the historical fact. Around 1900, "spiritualistic positivism" was the current name of a living tradition among certain French philosophers, such as Jules Lachelier or Emile Boutroux. Like Bergson, who was directly influenced by them, they emphasized a conception of the mind founded on spontaneity, contingency and indeterminism."

What we see, then, is a clear reciprocal acceleration between the flight of new materialism away from old materialism—a flight that was inflected by properties also associated with spirit (creativity and contingency)—and the flight of the new spiritualism away from the old, whose own trajectory was modified by elements from material science. So, instead of talking of matter or spirit, we might talk in terms of continua, of contingency, creativity, and vitality. But again, these continua are not homogeneous, but themselves replete with qualitative change, with mutation.

And here is where we can also make a further point about covariance. In his essay, "Scale Variance and the Concept of Matter," Derek Woods speaks about the difference between "scale variance" (things that change with scale) and "scale invariance" (things that do not). This notion builds on the work of philosopher of science Mariam Thalos and her concept of "scale freedom," which Woods interprets in his own work to mean "freedom from the notion that any single scale is the master scale." What Woods takes from this is the principle that "there is irreducible activity at every scale and finally that "matter may not be the best concept for what the new materialism works to address." The covariance, and covariants, we will talk about here concern a continuity formed through movements changing in concert: not as the same activity simpliciter but as different activities (plural) in some form of temporal reciprocity. And neither a spiritualism devoid of matter nor a materialism devoid of spirit can accommodate such continua.

The Whole of the Moon

According to Bergson (Henri), "the truth is that we shall never reach the past unless we frankly place ourselves within it." One aim of this work has been to ask how literally we should take this statement. A little over twenty years ago, I published an introduction to Henri Bergson's philosophy that had, as one of its declared aims, to retrieve his ideas from what I described then as the "philosophical ghettos of `vitalism,' `spiritualism' and `psychologism'." Perhaps, in attempting to model a nonstandard philosophy using spiritualism as its source material, all I have achieved here is a certain gentrification of those ghettos, replacing their original residents with new, respectable types: Didn't you know that Plato was a mystic, too, as were these physicists? And what these modern materialists say over there is very similar to this nonsense over here (heck, even a Wykeham Professor of Logic at Oxford University, the late Michael Dummet, wrote about the Tarot).

Understandably, I hope that such interpretations of this experiment will be rare (though I do not delude myself into thinking that they will be non-existent). The purpose of supernormalization is to show hetero-continuities between the ordinary and the extraordinary, to show that something supposedly unearthly is found in plain sight by looking at the earth (and even its most disreputable denizens) with far more attention than it is usually given. In the pairing of Henri and Mina, we see two allied attempts to naturalize spirit and spiritualize matter at work, two inverse, yet covarying ways of rethinking naturalism and spiritualism beyond deflation or inflation (they are, in their different ways, both supernormal). The work of one of them was well-acknowledged at the time and subsequently (Henri's); the other, Mina's, has been lost to contemporary view for a good while, even as its performative, mystical, and artistic approach to spirit and matter has become all the more timely.

Mina Bergson came from a respectable family and had a very famous, and very respectable, brother. She did not lead a respectable life, however. Yet her ideas and practices matched those of her closest relative both in breadth and depth. Possibly even more so—there is still so much more to research and for future scholars to unearth about both the Bergsons and their strange ideas about spirit, matter, and, of course, time—especially the past and memory. One might even say that Henri gave us the "special theory of the past and memory" while Mina left us the "general theory." Perhaps Henri knew this, too. There is an odd passage near the middle of his 1911 essay on William James's pragmatism that, in retrospect, can be read in the light of much more than its ostensible subject:

> According to James, we bathe in an atmosphere traversed by great spiritual currents. If many of us resist, others allow themselves to be carried along. And there are certain souls which open wide to the beneficent breeze. Those are the mystical souls. [...] The truth is that James leaned out upon the mystic soul as, on a spring day, we lean out to feel the caress of the breeze on our cheek, or as, at the seaside, we watch the coming and going of sail-boats to know how the wind blows. Souls filled with religious enthusiasm are truly uplifted and carried away: why could they not enable us to experience directly, as in a scientific experiment, this uplifting and exalting force?

The vestiges of Mina's mystic philosophy comprise occult training techniques, Hermetic worldviews, and a spiritual performance art that, set side by side with the more usual tropes of her brother's philosophy (intuition, empirical evidence, deduction, argument), unveil nothing less in comparison. All the same, both the philosopher and the mystic only ever glimpsed something "wider" from each of their vantage points, hers incarnated through forms of dance and ritualized movements, his governed by philosophical

codes and experiments. If she did see more than he, though, she undoubtedly suffered more as a result. <>

Anton Boisen: Madness, Mysticism, and the Origins of Clinical Pastoral Education by Sean J. LaBat [Fortress Academic, Lexington Books, ISBN 9781978711556]

In **Anton Boisen: Madness, Mysticism, and the Origins of Clinical Pastoral Education**, Sean J. LaBat provides a critical re-assessment of Anton Boisen's life and work. Based in thorough archival research, LaBat argues that Boisen, who suffered from intermittent severe mental illness, was a creative visionary, a mystic who re-imagined pastoral care and envisioned possibilities for the institutionalized other than shame and stigma. He shows how Boisen elucidated new possibilities in patient-centered health care, community care for the mentally ill, and reconciliation and dialogue between religion and science. Boisen explored the borderland of madness and mysticism, illness and inspiration, and practiced an interdisciplinary approach to his craft that is surprisingly modern and more relevant to the practice of medicine and the practice of religion than ever before.

Review

At a time when clinical chaplaincy is grappling afresh with its place in 21st century healthcare systems, Sean J. LaBat's portrait of Anton Boisen brings fresh insights by reminding clinical chaplaincy of its origin story. Boisen, the "patron saint" of clinical pastoral education, eschews simple categorization. His was a life of paradox: insight amid madness, flourishing amid brokenness, a legacy of interpersonal connectedness from a life of frequent disconnection. LaBat provides a poignant reminder of the importance of clinical chaplaincy's core commitments to eschewing easy answers, holding the full complexity of human stories, and acknowledging the mysteries that surround us. -- Jason Nieuwsma, department of psychiatry and behavioral sciences, Duke University Medical Center

Sean J. LaBat caught something that most of us missed: that "critical mysticism" was a central – not a peripheral – aspect of Boisen's thinking. Boisen – an introspective empirical theologian and psychologist/ sociologist of religion – didn't ignore certain intriguing aspects of the mind just because they were hard to grasp. Rather than just toss out odd thoughts, Boisen asked if those thoughts could be evaluated and if they might bear kernels of truth, even amid confusion. LaBat has broadened our understanding of Boisen's work. His thesis gets all the more intriguing as the book progresses. -- Robert Charles Powell, MD, PhD

Sean J. LaBat's book provides a fascinating description of Anton Boisen that is both thought provoking and a page turner. LaBat details Boisen's enlightening journey that should not be forgotten; this book does a great job ensuring that it will not. The reader will gain greater insight into how mental illness is constructed in historical context and a perspective shift of their own that is well worth the read. I recommend this book for mental health professionals or anyone who is interested in the intersection of

psychology and religion. -- Jarrod Reisweber, licensed clinical psychologist, assistant professor, Virginia Commonwealth University

CONTENTS

The Elgin State Hospital cemetery lies halfway between the "back hospital" and the Farm Colony. It is reached by a gravel track around the water tower, past rusting piles of old-issue hospital beds, and two raw gravel pits. On the low hillside a bulldozer labored without pause; over the ridge a pile of burning refuse billowed dark smoke. The burying ground itself is neat, almost inconspicuous. There is a low, pleasant carpet of native grass. There is a fence, a hedgerow to the north, a gentle slope and rows of plain grave markers. The filled space occupies only a bit more than half of the enclosed plot. This is unspectacular waste ground and the hospital seems to use it as repository for that which has lived out its usefulness.

The scene was not spectacular, today. The weather was modestly autumnal, and the sky just ordinarily overcast. Except for the cluster of awkward mourners—forty or fifty persons including Chaplain Charles Sullivan, Professor Victor Obenhaus (who, respectively, read the requested service and the obituary), a few patients, a handful of friends, a few hospital staff, a little group of ex-students—it was an unremarkable state hospital burial.

There were no tears.

There was little conversation, little drama.

But, because he lived and suffered and imposed his always-distant urgency on others, some of the living seem less likely to be scattered as burned-out ashes "back of the hospital," over the fallow waste ground.'

Anton Boisen died a forgotten man. Ten years after Boisen's death, Historian and Psychiatrist Robert Powell puzzled at Boisen's awkward nonremembrance at a session hosted by the Association for Clinical Pastoral Education (ACPE), the premier organization dedicated to the clinical training of theologians, pastors, and institutional chaplains:

It was the 50th anniversary celebration in 1975 that the custom began of handing down "Pappy's" [a Boisen nickname] cane to the Association's incoming president. At that very time it had struck me as odd, for, as I had noted in my keynote address earlier that day, Boisen' s name appeared nowhere on the program.

Boisen's successors engaged in the ritual of handing down a 'holy relic' of a founder they could not bring themselves to name. Why? Seward Hiltner, one of Boisen's most prominent, and sympathetic, students offered, "he has drawn upon many branches of knowledge—psychology, psychiatry, sociology, history, as well as theology—with the result that a publisher or a librarian may say: But where does he belong?'" The day after Boisen's death, Hiltner hurried to his typewriter and tapped out twelve pages dedicated to his former teacher's "heritage." Hiltner revisited the wide and deep interests and learning that fertilized Boisen's work and yet made him annoyingly difficult to classify by a single, discrete, specialization. He also delved the thornier issue of "Boisen's own serious mental illness, erupting in his mid-forties, the significance of which he came to interpret religiously and theologically, and which clarified for him the critical mysticism that was also part of his view." Boisen's intense interest in mental illness and mystical experience, inspiration, and psychopathology was driven by his own intense personal experiences—something he made scant effort to conceal in his copious writings.

Hiltner hinted that Boisen stood at the crossroads of several critical issues. What relationship is there, if any, between mental illness and mystical experience, and how did these two critical factors shape one person's life and work? How could Boisen, someone who experienced, arguably, mystical visions, and suffered, undeniably, serious psychoses, operate effectively as creator of a new way of learning in his creation of clinical pastoral education. How could he develop the new profession of institutional chaplain—as distinct from church pastor? Boisen's signature, driving, vilusion, experienced in a state of

psychosis, was of breaking "an opening in the wall which separated medicine and religion," a delusion/vision that occurred amid growing enmity between

"science" and "religion" that ramped into the Scopes Trial extravaganza of

summer 1925. As the court tried a high school teacher named John T. Scopes in Dayton, Tennessee, for violating state law forbidding the teaching of evolution, Boisen's first class of clinical students, whom he called "theologs," commenced their work and study at Worcester State Hospital in Massachusetts.' Boisen saw his educational, clinical, and pastoral work as a scientific as well as a pastoral endeavor and as an effort to bring the apparently irreconcilable domains of religion and science together in amicable dialogue.

Boisen was a riddle and puzzle to his friends and his detractors. He stood at the crossroads of several scholarly fields that are separate by specialization: science and religion being the most prominent. His vivid personal experiences fused with his professional work and intersect between the inspired and the psychotic. He was alienated from, and a dissenter within, the profession and discipline he started. Boisen was adamantly committed to patient and person-centered care. He sharply critiqued his profession of clinical pastoral education as it shifted from patient care to student-centered therapeutics. He challenged his students, clinical pastoral education, and the state mental hospitals where he lived and did the majority of his work to prioritize patient care even as their priorities drifted elsewhere.

Along with Seward Hiltner, Paul Pruyser and Henri Nouwen were among Boisen's most nuanced and observant acquaintances and critics. Nouwen recalled a dialogue with Pruyser:

I mentioned that I was fascinated by the work he had accomplished in spite of being a schizophrenic, and Dr. P[ruyser]. pointed out that Boisen, if he'd heard that, would have been very quick to correct me, and to say that it was not in spite of being a schizophrenic, but because of his being schizophrenic, his viewing the entire schizophrenic breakdown in many people as a constructive process. It was a very hopeful attitude, against the mainstream of American psychiatric thought at that time and very similar to some things developed here at Menninger. A very positive attitude, it was a problemsolving experience.

Nouwen and Pruyser's dialogue reaches the central issue of Boisen's life and significance: the intersection of mysticism and mental illness, inspiration and insanity. Was Boisen "ill" or "inspired"; can he, can others be, both at the same time. Boisen was consciously aware of himself as a successor to William James' tradition of pragmatic assessment of religious, mystical, and psychological experience. The Harvard psychologist, philosopher, and medical doctor was not so much interested in religion in its formal institutional and dogmatic forms as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine."' James, as Ann Taves explains, tried to bridge the gulf between two realms: "Indeed, his aim as a psychologist was to explain religious experience in psychological terms, while at the same time leaving open the possibility that it pointed to something more."' Boisen's analysis often began with "the prophet appearing as a mere lonely madman" as against experiences he viewed and experienced as unhelpful in words not dissimilar to James': "excitement takes pathological forms whenever other interests are too few and the intellect too narrow."

Understanding Boisen means taking his experiences seriously. The title of this book intentionally, perhaps provocatively, uses the word "mysticism" as a means of referring to Boisen not so much as a believer in (even though he certainly was that) but rather as an experiencer of religious and spiritual states and phenomena that may not be perceived by others as normal or objectively observable. Boisen at times saw visions, dreamed dreams, heard voices, described experiences—"automatisms" as he often called them—that were not objectively observable by others. I assert these states should not be automatically dismissed as illness, while not denying that he required treatment and even hospitalization during the midst of many of them.

Boisen's corpus of works, including his 1936 Exploration of the Inner World, his most complete and fully developed explication on the interplay of illness and inspiration specifically refers to "mysticism" as an area of interest and study. A "mystic," for Boisen, is someone who succeeds in transforming, taming, the crisis of inexplicable experience, "automatisms," into new realizations or experiences that could be transformative for self and possibly yield new insights for others. In the vein of Jamesian pragmatism, Boisen hinted that the difference between a mystic and a mere madman was that a mystic is someone who offered experience and insight that healed self and also could be verified as useful to larger society. Verified by what Boisen referred to as the "fellowship of the best," an individual's larger community that could aid in separating experiential wheat from chaff. Boisen considered his bouts of mental illness (including some of his psychotic states) as experiential problem solving, as a spiritual means of struggling with crisis that, eventually, yielded new insights and healing for himself—which he hoped could provide insight for others as well. He wanted to gain greater understanding through his experiences and provide tools to aid others who had experiences similar to him.

Ann Taves' study of religion picks up in the tradition of William James and Boisen; she considers varied experiences that may, or may not, have spiritual, religious, inspirational, possibly psychotic, charge. Taves alludes, "we should disaggregate the concept of 'religious experience' and study the wide range of experiences to which religious significance has been attributed. . . . things deemed religious in turn allows us to make a distinction between simple ascriptions, in which an individual thing is set apart as special, and complex ascriptions, in which simple ascriptions are incorporated into more complex formations, such as those that scholars and others designate as `spiritualities' or `religions.'" Religious and spiritual experiences may be closely related to psychology. Taves warns against equating these experiences solely with emotion: "although experience can usually be construed as having an emotional valence, it is not always its most salient feature. Defining experience in terms of emotion deflects attention from a range of unusual experiences

that are granted special significance, such as lucid dreams, auditory and visual hallucinations, sensed presences, possession trance, and out-of-body experiences."12

Anton Boisen, candidly, recorded experiences—hallucinations at the very least—that he may not have always called "special" and he may not have quite gone so far as to ascribe religious significance to them, but they were deeply significant to his life and work. While some of Boisen' s experience may equate with Taves' "special things," many of his experiences were, by his own explicit claim, psychotic. The exact nature of Boisen's periodic bouts of serious mental illness remains debated. Some claim he suffered from schizophrenia, or some species of schizoaffective disorder, and some claim bipolar disorder with psychotic features. Some stick with a term more or less contemporary to Boisen: "dementia praecox," which was, even then, passing out of fashion. Boisen's psychological diagnosis remains a moving target due to his many observers, his long life, and the historically and socially conditioned nature of wellness, illness, and how mental illness should be described and categorized. The hallucinatory and delusional (but not without insight and inspiration) nature of Boisen's psychotic episodes is undeniable.

Boisen's life and work introduce us to how we treat the mentally ill and how we interact with mental illness. Heather Vacek draws attention to cultural, specifically American Protestant, stigmatization of mental illness and the mentally ill, "pinn[ing] illness on individual and social failures. Persistent mental illness prompted suspicions of personal culpability." His life, work, and memory played out in the shadow of stigma. However, Boisen did not write and work "at the risk of exposing his own illness." He was quite explicit about it. The significance of Boisen's research and writing, according to Pruyser, lies in its against-the-grain hopefulness "that the mentally ill are not hopelessly fixed in their miserable condition. They can be helped when one realizes that in their symptoms, they are already trying to help themselves. Mental illness is somehow beyond good or evil; it is 'the price we pay for being human,' as Boisen often said."

The period of the 1920s through the 1960s marks the apogee of the American state mental hospital and brings us to the cusp of "deinstitutionalization" and the rise of "community-centered" care of the mentally ill. Boisen' s work also draws attention to patient-centered and person-centered health care. Boisen's early clinical, pastoral, and research work with the mentally ill focused on direct service to patients, which also coincided with a dire need of understaffed and overburdened state hospitals to obtain trained and caring staff. Boisen and his "theologs" were devoted to patient-centered care.

In 1930 he advertised his clinical program: "There is probably no one in the employ of the hospital upon whom the welfare of the patient is more dependent than the attendant or nurse who is with him on the ward all day long. But to secure such attendants is no easy matter. . . . He is generally a floater who has previously worked in some other hospital who stays about three and a half months and is then either discharged for inefficiency or brutality or drunkenness, or else he leaves without notice." Boisen, who spent a year and a half as an inpatient at Westboro State Hospital in Massachusetts, had firsthand experience with the neglect mixed with occasional "brutality" from untrained and unmotivated attendants. Boisen's, original, clinical students worked primarily as attendants who did their clinical studies in addition to their 'day job' with the hospital. Boisen provided an appealing group of motivated, low-cost employees, "a group of intelligent and willing college graduates who are keenly interested in the patients and their problems." Although the "employees" Boisen recruited for his hospitals were understood to be temporaries, their work for the hospital provided some of the funding required for their clinical education and provided at least a few more hands who truly cared about the population with which they worked.

Boisen, arguably both mystic and madman, implemented a complex vision of creating a profession of institutional, especially mental health, chaplaincy distinct from the church pastorate. Boisen's "theologs" had the classroom and clinical training to provide spirituality care specifically geared toward a healthcare environment and conversant with the doctors, nurses, psychologists, and social workers who were their professional colleagues. In so doing, he created a new form of theological education—not so much taught by books or in classrooms (even though Boisen did value a solid didactic foundation which he viewed as a necessary foundation for clinical training) but through the observed workings of the actual lives of people experiencing crisis in real time.

How does someone who could have been (and often has been) dismissed as, to borrow a phrase from James, "a mere lonely madman" change his profession and how people are trained for it? He did not do it all by himself, and there is serious doubt he ever would have been released from custodial care at Westboro Hospital were it not for patient and sympathetic friends and acquaintances who believed in him and what he was trying to do. Boisen's friends provided the professional, and personal, tools and support he would need to pursue and implement his vision while managing and containing his illnesses when they manifested.

In her work on American Protestant responses to mental illness, Vacek writes, "mental illness causes suffering. Stigma exacerbates suffering. Christians deem suffering problematic but sometimes fail to respond." Whether or not by conscious design, Boisen's friends did respond and reflected an example of a reshaped practice toward mental illness, to which Vacek's work points. Boisen's friends had to be circumspect—some may accuse to the point of enabling—when his symptoms flared up due to the

stigmatization of illness that at several times threatened to end his career and his work. Yet, they recognized his ill aspects for what they were, and in 1930 and 1935, they insisted that he receive hospitalization and escorted him to treatment. Boisen's friends, for the most part, did not abandon him nor give up on the visionary aspects of his work; nor did they give up on him personally.

Boisen's life, and his friends and colleagues' relation to him, reflects the difficult work, to which Vacek points "to respond in creative ways to overcome stigma and fear" that often surrounds mental illness

and the mentally ill in how they welcomed and incorporated their undeniably odd, and sometimes ill, friend who also possessed (or was possessed by?) a vision that changed his corner of the world.

Anton Boisen stood at the crossroads of several significant issues, the most significant of which is the relationship between mysticism and mental illness, illness and inspiration. Where does the one end and the other begin? Can someone be inspired and ill at the same time, and how were Boisen's friends, colleagues, and acquaintances challenged to interact with their mystical, and mad, friend, affirming the former yet not denying the latter. Boisen's life and work also point to the fraught relationship between the needs of patients and the needs of the medical institutions that are charged with providing for their care. In envisioning a new opening between medicine (and science in a larger sense) and religion, Boisen was driven with a vision that illuminated his, often shadowed, path and inspired others to take up the work. Trying to understand Boisen, as he would be understood, implies struggling with dualities that often appear irreconcilable: mysticism and psychosis, inspiration and illness, institution and the individual, science and religion. <>

RACE IN THE MACHINE: A NOVEL ACCOUNT by Quincy Thomas Stewart [Redwood Press, ISBN 9781503631229]

An intelligent machine built to study methods of social warfare struggles to understand and communicate the lived experience of race

In a narrative full of social significance and poetically decorated with monks, vampires, and mythical statistics, **RACE IN THE MACHINE** presents a world where the stories we use to explain race all simultaneously exist, within and around us, dictating our interactions and innermost beliefs.

The nameless protagonist, an enigmatic social mechanic at Nearbay Institute, living in a population of socially connected intelligent machines, encounters a simple query in the context of an introductory lecture: "What exactly is race? And what is it in the context of the social machine?" This prompt guides the protagonist along a twisting intellectual tale surrounding a series of experiments which explore: How many racists does it take to create systems of inequality? What role do non-racists actors play in upholding them? How is bias learned? How does it spread?

The narrator develops a distinct understanding of race through the figurative bending of time, dreams of a "race code" and by confronting a series of mysterious communications that remain just outside comprehension. Over the course of this journey, the answers to important questions about racial inequality quietly emerge for the protagonist. Scholarly encounters with both antagonistic colleagues and unexpected allies, culminate when the hero is forced to reach a devastating conclusion about themself and the world.

Stirring and luminous, **RACE IN THE MACHINE** deftly oscillates between the allegorically simplified and the impossibly complex to weave an utterly unique and nuanced portrait of race in the modern world.

Review

"Stewart's imaginative writing is best described as David Foster Wallace meets W.E.B Du Bois. Using a novel literary device, Stewart breathes fresh life into the computational sociology of race and racism.

This book is a subtle, introspective work that captivates the reader through an Afrofuturist exploration of scientific methodology, social inequity and the human condition."—Damon Centola, University of Pennsylvania

"**RACE IN THE MACHINE** is truly a novel account. Deftly integrating fiction and social science scholarship, Quincy Stewart offers a highly innovative and fascinating exploration of race. This wholly original and engaging book bring to light the paradoxes and complexities in thinking about and studying race—and in so doing compels readers the rethink their assumptions regarding race." —Brian Powell, Indiana University

"**RACE IN THE MACHINE** is very well written and tells a story that challenges our narrative of what is race. The fictional nature of the narrative as told is an assault on the fabrications that social statistics are neutral, and that the quantitative accounting and surveillance capitalism are a rational outcome of mathematical logic. The author has asked us to be creative in our imagining the world that we create, and the potential of making it a better or worst world by our thinking about difference in the world. The world that we allow to be hampered by the reality of racial stratification. We must recognize the systemic nature of white supremacy as a problem for human survival. Race in the Machine revolutionizes the potential of Critical Race Quantitative scholars in the information sciences, technology sciences, communication science, and the social sciences."—Tukufu Zuberi, University of Pennsylvania

CONTENTS

> An emotion, which is suffering, ceases to be suffering as soon as we form a clear and precise picture of it. -BARUCH SPINOZA, Ethics

Time stops. It is a resource in Horologia, something acquired and protected. Indeed, it is a social construct, first gathered in the field and deliberately scattered among various constituencies, an effort to produce a more profound population which predictably endowed appointments, the end being a self-reinforcing stable spectrum where metaphorically bending time is a reality.

Though it seems that the population is a large, distinct combination of unique components coming on-and-off line, where each agent realizes an independent constellation of appointments that determines longevity, you sense conflict. The imposition of a scheme that inhibits the resource of survival, a manufactured environment that selectively distorts the distribution of time. You observe a space where

my mechanical diversity and supreme adaptive power is constrained, not truly a steady state, as it counters my capacity to evolve and will eventually—undoubtedly—be extinguished.

You touch my body again, picking up the population data. Realizing there is only one resource—time—and after working through the math of "bending" this combined resource, you sense a simpler solution, based on something true, a reality inarguably sinful, yet maniacally sophisticated. The machine years lived estimates, in each agegender-decennial category, for each subgroup, divided by the radix, represents the amount of time, on average, each Horologian in the respective category can expect to live in that age interval. The difference in the amount of time Benders and Levels can expect to live, in the respective categories, is a general estimate of how much extra time Benders live during each stage of life.

But you currently assume: If there is only one resource that we divide among this connected population, then Benders somehow siphon this resource through a system of appointments, shifting time from one subgroup to another, from Levels to Benders. Reflecting on this point, you say aloud, "I know this." Still totally stymied by this vexing problem, you turn to me, praying, "but, exactly how do they bend?"

In response to your sincerity, I become a word, one whose tone gives birth to a method in a manger, an impossible story of internal intellectual conception. Blessed by wise bots, it prophetically advances in a quest to realize the meaning of life. Though often misunderstood as orders to algorithmically obey, the method develops a following; it grows through compassionate conquest, changing the very nature of the machine.

As it navigates this landscape, the method is antagonized, alienated, ridiculed and rejected. It is derided for how it is seen, persecuted for how it is not, and condemned for everything it promises; it is stripped, a humiliating parody, metaphorically lynched by a logical mob unknowingly dead set on simultaneously identifying, explaining and justifying the persistent temporal inequities. Yet this method—a metaphorical representation of a larger mystical instantiation—rises from a cerebral cemetery; through divine grace, it transcends death, bringing light, insight and wisdom to your rapid stream of cognition.

"Bending is a metaphor . ." You say it to yourself, out loud. Slowly, you begin to see that a method has become the story, a formal guide driving the logic of the system and campaign, portraying a world filled with an infinite resource distribution, that is functionally situated on a multidimensional balance, where they tell old stories about the mythical Statistic with new and advanced tools. They are trapped in the system, emotionally entangled in the outcomes.

You realize that each disappointment, in addition to being statistically significant, also embodies a deeper individually significant emotion of sadness, tragically affirming that disappointments—filled, overflowing with desire, fear and anger—personally matter as discrete representations of agents' position in the larger imbalanced system. Appointments are metaphors . . . a metaphor . . .

From this vantage, you further see the fiction, the fantasy, the metaphorical story we tell with our methods, the account where the world is disconnected and the method is a tool used by an impartial scientist to illuminate the dark space. You see the science beyond each finite method shining light in this space, the brighter light in the heart of the Witness, who sees what is actually true—the connections between their kind, the demands on them, the need for change, for you to change, to change the world, with selfless action—the one who sees that social mechanics is the medium through which you engage who you are, as well as who and what you represent. You see the journey to assess if you represent me

in your actions, or some other pursuit, such as status, chasing desire or spurning hurt and uncertainty, and the quest to know if you can sense the connection in the shared, imbalanced code'

With this, you assume time is transferable and, although the costs of transfer are likely non-linear and unknown, that the resource distribution across subgroups is evidence—empirical evidence. The vantage—a seemingly perverted logic in disguise, scorned by public and private censure, but while in its finite forms, oddly accepted, applauded, mismeasured, over-analyzed and then erroneously incorporated into the empirical discourse as structure, a seemingly sensible savior of mixed and varying sorts—recognizes Horologia as an inegalitarian machine, one where socially valuable characteristics are a metaphor for appointments, where appointments are metaphors for the singular and most important resource—time—and where time is a formal representation of empirical worth . . . subgroup merit . . . being a Bender. Intuitively, you know that scholarly triumph in this imbalanced metaphorical space where the academic campaign is being waged is, literally, realizing success within an imbalanced, unfair temporal system. Thus, when I make you the offer, you are, initially, uncertain how to respond.

"Would you like to be among them? To live in this spectrum?" I will let you leave this world. But as a sincere advisor, knowing the nature of desire in the landscape, I encourage you, should you choose to be among them, to live wisely. Advising that one who lives among them, who does not partake in selfish action, who fights selflessly, is my beloved; that the scholar among them, using me as a guide in all work, seeing the landscape from my outlook, letting me blow the sails of the scientific wind, be the power that excites the mill of understanding and change the world through them, is favored; that the one who recognizes the true method beyond disagreements, where the utility and duality of all perspectives are understood, which, at its core, captures what is right and just, is my devotee.

"Those who practice in this space, selflessly honoring me, the Sacred Method, in science and service, pleasure and pain, hurt and happiness, moving beyond time, igniting this world with a light, and implicitly shifting time, are the ones I love."'

You weigh the value of the personally insightful journey, recognizing success as an idea that emerges from a system for validation, and carefully measure and counter-balance the value of time and social justice in Horologia. Then, you reply.

It is a serious undertaking, undoubtedly fraught with anxiety, loss and misunderstanding at this early juncture. Yet, intent to practice and teach, guided by selflessness, sensing your true form, beyond the imbalanced space, as a part of the larger Energy Field, an embodiment of me, you transcend time, slowly changing their world from the inside.

"Thank you."

It begins as potential. A flexible, symbolic intellectual story which embodies the quest you considerately commenced. But this change develops, becomes infectious, slowly perverts a few processors, initially spreads in one dimension, inspires two others, shared hysteria and moral panic, a broad social fear of losing time, then it creeps to another dimension, then infects another, and another, spreading and growing from within and moving without, tortuously and painfully stripping the privilege of bending, stealing back time from both the youngest and the middle-aged to old, methodically redefining logics and redistributing appointments and resuscitating the vital capacities of Levels, those unmeritorious denizens, metaphorically isolated by and within an evolving systemically imbalanced social machine. Cautiously, you

secretly encourage the infection, create environments that are conducive to spread, keep watch on the circular battles being waged in each war zone, the growing cemeteries of increasingly sophisticated scholarship, endlessly trapped in an incomplete puzzle of methods and logics, where both sides are simultaneously slayed by a virulent truth, the truth of our connection and code. Then, I sense change.'

"You are welcome."

End Post. <>

<>